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STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
• / «
HEARINGS ffTor
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 231
A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THERE ARE
EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES
PART 2
APPENDIX
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIKST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSIOS
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 231
A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THERE ARE
EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES
PART 2
APPENDIX
Printed for the use' of the Committee on Foreign Relations
■*flfW/
-M&
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68970 WASHINGTON : 1950
A>
J^#5iK
,^z? —
U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
<-uu 251950
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
•
TOM CONNALLY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE. Georgia ARTHUR II. YANDENBERG, Michigan
ELBERT D. THOMAS, Utah ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Maryland H. ALEXANDER SMITH, New Jersey
CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN. Rhode Island HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., Massachusetts
I'.RIEN McMAHON, Connecticut
.!. \V. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas
Fbancis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff
C. C. O'Day, Clerk
Subcommittee on Senate Resolution 231
MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Maryland, Chairman
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN. Rhode Island BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
BRIEN McMAHON, Connecticut HENRY CABOT LODGE, Jr., Massachusetts
Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel
Robert L. Heuld, Assistant Counsel Liox L. Tyler, Jr., Assistant Counsel
William .1. Kli.ma, Assistant Counsel Robert Morris, Assistant Counsel
Margaret B. Buchholz, Subcommittee Clerk
II
APPENDIX
Exhibit No. 1
[Daily Worker, February 21, 1940]
Signers of Protest
The following outstanding Americans, writers, poets, playwrights, educators,
judges, critics, and public officials signed the letter to President Roosevelt and
Attorney General Jackson protesting the attacks upon the Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade and condemning the war hysteria now being whipped
up by the Roosevelt administration :
Elliot Paul
Ernest Hemingway
Jay Allen ,
Vincent Sheenan
Paul Robeson
John T. Bernard
Louis B. Boudin
Z. Chaffee, Jr.
Muriel Draper
Quenten Reynolds
George Marshall
Elizabeth Dublin Marshall
Gardner Jackson
Alfred Kreymborg
Charles H. Houston
Dashiel Hammett
Prof. Horace M. Kallen
Ralph Roeder
Evelyn Adler
George Seldes
B. W. Huebsch
Hon. Vito Marcantonio
Bernard Denzer
J. A. MacCalluni
James L. Brewer
Hon. Dorothy Kenyon
Rev. Donald G. Lothrop
Arthur La Sueur
Bernard J. Stern
Aaron Copland
Hon. Stanley Isaacs
Prof. Harold C. Urey
James Thurber
Dr. Walter Briehl
Robert W. Dunn
Alexander Lehrman
Malcolm Cowley
Marc Blitzstein
Walter E. Hager
Albert Maltz
Margaret Lamont
Dr. Ernest P. Boas
Prof. Goodwin Watson
S. L. M. Barlow
Marguerite Zorach
William Zorach
Prof. II. P. Fairchild
Kyle Crichton
Anna Louise Strong
S. John Block
Anita Block
Dr. E. M. Bluestone
Arthur Kober
George H. Stover
Dr. Charles C. Webber
Frances B. Grant
Hortense M. Fagley
Alfred W. Bingham
Carl H. Levy
Mary Heaton Vorse
Louis Weisner
Edward L. Israel
Lillian Hellman
Louis F. McCabe
Arthur Emptage
C. D. Stevens
Bonnie Bird
Melvin Rader
Ralph Gundlach
William H. Morris
T. Addis
Helen Keller
Ada B. Taft
Jean Starr Untermeyer
E. A. Ross
F. O. Matthiessen
Dr. George Barsky
Belle Zeller
Van Wyck Brooks
Herman Shumlin
Prof. Robert S. Lynd
Mervyn Rathborne
Kirtley F. Mather
Lawrence S. Kubie
James Waterman Wise
Irwin Shaw
Dr. W. B. Cannon
Reuben Ottenberg
C. Fayette Taylor
Countee Cullen
Harvey O'Connor
Hon. Paul J. Kern
Nora Benjamin
Bennett Cerf
Dorothy Brewster
Fiorina Lasker
Stuart Davis
Clifford McAvoy
Charles Belous
Max Cleeber
William Gropper
Arnold Donawa
Brand Blanshard
Dr. Max Yergan
Prof. Vida D. Scudder
Isabel Walker Soule
Thomas E. Benner
Ephraim Cross
John F. Shepard
Langston Hughes
Morris Watson
Bertha C. Reynolds
Louis Untermeyer
Esther A. Untermeyer
C. S. Bacon
Howard Y. Williams
Lester Cohen
Edward Lamb
Tom Mooney
Rev. William Lloyd Imes
L. Eloesser
Dr. Harry Ward
Prof. Walter Rauten-
strauch
Hon. James H. Wolfe
Eda Lou Walton
Prof. Newton Arvin
1485
1486 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 2
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.,
New York, N. Y., November 16, 191,8.
Dear Friend : On Monday evening, December 13, the Very Reverend Hewlett
Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, and foremost leader in the democratic movement
for world peace, speaks at Madison Square Garden. This eminent churchman,
who will climax a month's tour of the United States with this rally, will present
his impressions of the American peace movement as it relates to the peace forces
of England and the continent. He will also report on his recent observations
of conditions in eastern Europe and his personal conversations with the leaders
of the new democracies.
We feel it is a rare privilege, indeed, for us to be able to present the Dean in
the first significant rally to follow the elections. We know you will appreciate
the importance of forcefully demonstrating, particularly before the new con-
gressional session, the people's will for peace through cooperation and friend-
ship with the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador from the Soviet Union, His Excellency Mr. Alexander S.
Panyushkin, will address the meeting. The meeting will also feature Paul Robe-
son, other well-known speakers and a program of entertainment.
As you may recollect, thousands were turned away from the Garden on the
occasion of the Dean's last visit here in 1945. Thus, to insure you proper ac-
commodations, we are enclosing an advance ticket order blank.
Won't you plan now to attend this rally for peace and reserve seats for your-
self and your friends?
Cordially yours,
Richard Morford, Executive Director.
RM ; rs
uopwa 16-39
enc.
Sponsors of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.
Louis Adamic
George F. Addes
Maxwell Anderson
John Taylor Arms
Max Bedacht
Mrs. Alice S. Belester
Dr. Henry Lambert Bibby
Mrs. Louis Bloch
Mrs. Anita Block
Simon Braines
Prof. E. W. Burgess
Hon. Arthur Capper
Charles Chaplin
Hon. John M. Coffee
Dr. Henry S. Coffin
Aaron Copland
Norman Corwin
Jo Davidson
Hon. Joseph E. Davies
Dr. Herbert John Davis
Hon. Hugh DeLacy
Dr. Stephen Duggan
Prof. Albert Einstein
Max Epstein
Dr. Mildred Fairchild
Dr. Robert D. Feild
Lion Feuchtwanger
Rev. Joseph F. Fletcher
Homer Folks
Dr. W. Horsley Gantt
Dr. Caleb F. Gates, Jr.
Dean Christian Gauss
Ben Gold
Dr. Mortimer Graves
Dr. Harry Grundfest
Dr. Alice Hamilton
Lillian Hellman
Mrs. Thomas N. Hepburn
Dr. Leslie Pinckney Hill
Prof. William Ernest
Hocking
Dr. Walter M. Horton
Lanffston Hughes
Dr. Walter Hullihen
Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs
Dr. Millard H. Jencks
Prof. Howard Mumford
Jones
Helen Keller
Rockwell Kent
Dorothy Kenyon
Dr. Serge Koussevitzky
Mrs. Thomas W. Lament
William W. Lancaster
1 >r. Emil Lengel
John F. Lewis, Jr.
Pn.f. Robert S. Lynd
Clifford T. McAvoy
Judge Lois Mary McBride
Maurice Maeterlinck
Fi'itz Mahler
Dr. Thomas Mann
Frank X. Martel
Dr. Kirtley F. Mather
Lewis Merrill
Dr. George R. Minot
Mis. Lucy Sprague
Mitchell
Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell
Charles Michael Mitzell
Pierre Monteux
Mine. Pierre Monteux
Bishop Arthur W.
Moulton
Hon. James E. Murray
Dr. Philip C. Nash
Dr. Robert Hastings
Nichols
Eugene O'Neill
Dr. Marion Edwards
Park
Dr. Frederick Douglas
Patterson
Bishop Malcom E.
Peabody
Hon. Claude Pepper
Prof. Ralph Barton Perry
Dr. E. C. Peters
Dr. John P. Peters
Henry W. Pope
Michael Quill
Carl Randau
Anton Refregier
Elmer Rice
Wallingford Riegger
Paul Kobeson
Col. Raymond Robins
Karl Robinson
Reid Robinson
Harold J. Rome
Joseph A. Rosen
Joseph A. Salerno
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1487
Sponsors of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. — Con.
Miles M. Sherover
Raymond P. Sloan
Dr. P. A. Sorokin
Maxwell S. Stewart
Leopold Stokowski
Raymond Swing
Genevieve Tabouis
Hon. Elbert D. Thomas
R. J. Thomas
Dr. Max Thorek
S. A. Trone
Phiilp II. Van Gelder
R. E. Van Horn
Prof. George Vernadsky
Bishop W.J. Wells
Dr. Harry F.Ward
Leroy Waterman
Max Weber
Dr. Henry N. Wieman
Dr. C. C. Williams
Hon. James H. Wolfe
1 >r. Max Yergan
Dean Mary Yost
Dr. J. J. Zmrhal
Leane Zugsinith
Exhibit No. 3
This ex'.iibir was not received by the reporter and was described by Senator
McCarthy as "a cordial invitation to attend a dinner and presentation of the first
annual award of the American-Russian Institute to President Franklin Roosevelt
for •Furthering American-Soviet Relations' " (transcript, p. 26).
Exhii;it No. 4
Executive Secretary. Prof. Donald McConnell
Secretary on Latin America, Dr. David Efron
Louis Adaniic
Dr. Wallace W. Atwood
Eleanor Copenhaver
Anderson
Prof. Hugo Fernandez
Artucio
Eunice Fuller Barnard
Alfred M. Bingham
Algernon Black
Bruce Bliven
Dr. Franz Boas
Heywood Broun
Erskine Caldwell
Charlotte Carr
Bennett A. Cerf
Evans Clark
Gifford A. Cochran
Dr. Gilberto Conception de
Gracia
Prof. George Counts
Malcolm Cowley
Prof. Horace Davis
Prof. Jerome Davis
R. E. Diffendorfer
Bailey W. Dime
Sponsors
Dr. William E. Dodd
Prof. Paul M. Douglas
Dr. Henry Grattan Doyle
John L. Elliott
Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild
Prof. Irving Fisher
Prof. Eugene Forsey
Margaret Forsythe
Frances R. Grant
Alberto Grieve
Sidney Hillman
Prof. Arthur N. Holcombe
John Haynes Holmes
Quincy Howe
Langston Hughes
Rev. William Lloyd Imes
Stanley M. Isaacs
Gardiner Jackson
Prof. Chester L. Jones
Rockwell Kent
Dorothy Kenyon
Max Lerner
Marina Lopes
Jean Lyons
George Marshall
Lewis Merrill
Dr. Clyde R. Miller
Prof Gardner Murphy
William Pickens
A. Philip Randolph
Marvyn Rathborne
David Saposs
Prof. Margaret Schlauch
Adelaide Schulkiud
Guy Emery Shipler
James T. Shotwell
Upton Sinclair
George Soule
Isobel Walker Soule
Maxwell Stewart
Isidore F. Stone
Prof. D. J. Struik
William Wachs
Prof. Goodwin Watson
Roy Wilkins
Dr. Max Winkler
Dr. Stephen S. Wise .
Max Yergan
Conference on Pan American Democracy
Executive Offices : 156 Fifth Avenue, New York
Telephone : WAtkins 9-0420
december 10-11, 19.'is, hotel washington, washington, d. c.
November 16, 1938.
Dear Friends : Enclosed you will find a Call to the Conference on Pan-American
Democracy to be held in Washington on December tenth and eleventh.
On behalf of the Committee of Sponsors may I urge that your organization
make every effort to participate? The problem is a pressing one and the need
for some solution immediate.
We understand your organization has a very real concern with the inroads
that fascism is making in this hemisphere, and we believe you can make a valu-
1488 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
able contribution to our conference. If you can send representatives, please
inform us at once.
We are looking forward to meeting tbem in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
Donald McConnell.
Delegates : Bernard Stern, Harry Lamberton, William Phillips.
DM: EAL.
UOPWA.
Exhibit No. 5
Trustees
Roger Baldwin
Joseph Brodsky
Heywood Broun
Edwin B. Burgum
Malcolm Cowley
Paul P. Crosbie
Benjamin J. Davis, Jr.
Robert W. Dunn
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Rabbi Israel Goldstein
Alfred Hirsch
Charles Krumbein
Corliss Lamont
Leroy Peterson
Abraham Unger
James Waterman Wise
Le Roy Bowman
Sponsors
James Gifford
Berenice Abbott
Peggy Bacon
Maxwell Bodenheim
Kenneth Burke
Addison T. Cutler
Edward Dahlberg
Clifton Fadiman
James T. Farrell
Waldo Frank
Charles Fuller
Hugo Gellert
Mordecai Gorelik
Granville Hicks
Horace M. Kallen
Dorothy Kenyon
Carol Weiss King
Alfred Kreymborg
Emil Lengyel
Lewis Mumford
Gardner Rea
Adelade Schulkind
John Sloan
Harrison Smith
Otto Soglow
Raphael Soyer
Ralph Steiner
Katbryn Terrill
Mary Van Kleek
Edna Lou Walton
Harry L. Lurie
Chairman: Paul P. Crosbie Secretary: James Lechat
Political Prisoners Bail Fund Committee
new york city
154 Nassau Street, Room 1200
BEekman 3-8576
January 18, 1935.
Dear Friend : After reading the enclosed manifesto, we believe that you will
be with us and one of us. We therefore urge you to act. Of primary importance
to the large success of the Bail Fund is your attendance at the committee's first
invited guest meeting (ticket enclosed).
This meeting will be held on Thursday, January 31st, at 8.30, in the Orozco
Room of the New School for Social Research. Here the Bail Fund will be fully
explained. There will be a talk by John Spivak and short talks by Roger Bald-
win, Corliss Lamont and Heywood Broun. Also some words by Angelo Herndou
and two other outstanding victims of the present deplorable bail situation.
Again we say, if you are with us in our purpose, do not fail to come to this
meeting. Should this be impossible, however, will you avail yourself of the
enclosed form in order to make closer contact with us.
Sincerely,
The Political Prisoners Bail Fund Committee.
A common bail fund fur those arrested in the struagle of the working class, for the rights
of op/tressed minorities, in the fight against war and fascism
Exhibit No. 6
An Open Letter to Governor Thomas E. Dewey
[New York Times, October 9, 1944]
It has been well said, "By their deeds you shall know them."
There is a deed crying to be done in the State of New York today. A deed of
simple justice, humanity, and fair play.
It is in your power and yours alone to do this act.
We ask you to grant a pardon to Morris I'. Schappes.
We ask you to do this because the continued imprisonment of this teacher and
scholar can only be interpreted by many thoughtful Americans as political
persecution.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1489
Morris l". Schappes has passed 11 months of an 18- to 24-month sentence arising
from the 1940 Rapp-Couderl investigation of subversive activity in the New
York City schools. Morris Schappes told the committee he had heen a Com-
munist. They demanded the names of all the Communists at City College.
Morris Schappes named three others, who, with himself, were known as Com-
munists. Ho said he knew no others. The committee said there were over 40,
not 1. as Morris Schappes testified. They called Morris Schappes a perjuror.
He was convicted.
This was the crime !
Even the most exacting will concede that Morris Schappes, whom even his
enemies never accused of harming or even desiring to harm a single human being,
has suffered enough.
We are engaged in a war against the barbarian who would impose the
philosophy that an individual life is cheap. We are affirming in terrible battle
that a single life is precious. We say further, Mr. Governor, that 2 years of a
good man's life are precious and not to be taken away lightly.
The last years of agony have taught us that the conscience must never sleep.
"What is done to tbe least of us is the concern of all. That is why we cannot in
good conscience fail to raise our voice against this injustice in our midst.
That is why we appeal to you, Mr. Governor.
To you and you alone American justice provides power above and beyond the
Courts — the power of the chief executive to pardon.
We ask you to use this power to pardon Morris U. Schappes.
The deed would find favor in the eyes of the people, who love justice.
Prof. Thomas Addis, Stanford Univ.
Rabbi David Aronson ( Del. Am. Jewish
Congress), Minneapolis, Minn.
Rabbi Aaron Ashinsky (Del. Am. Jew-
ish Congress), Pittsburgh, Pa.
State Senator W. P. Atkinson, Seattle,
Wash.
Prof. Frank Baker, Pres. State Teach-
ers College, Milwaukee, Wis.
Rev. Lee H. Ball. Lake Mahopac, N. Y.
Prof. Francis M. Barbour, S. Illinois
State Teachers College, Carbondale,
111.
Prof. Fred A. Barnes, Cornell Univ.,
Ithaca, N. Y.
Prof. Marion Bauer. New York Univ.
Rev. Robert Baxter, Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho.
Prof. Jos. W. Beach, Dept. of English,
University of Minnesota.
Win. Rose Benet, writer.
Rabbi Solomon Bersel, Philadelphia,
Pa.
Prof. Dorothy Bethurum, Connecticut
College, New London, Conn.
Rev. Lyndon S. Beardslee, Westboro,
Mass.
Rev. Archie B. Bedford, Svracuse. N.
Y.
Bishop W. Y. Bell. Halsey Institute.
Dr. W. A. J. Bellrock, Pres. N. A. A.
C. P., Chickasha, Oklahoma.
Father Benedict, Church of the Cruci-
fix, New York City.
Milly Brandt, Legislative Chairman,
Women's Div. ; Am. Jewish Congress.
Prof. Ray O. Billington, Smith College,
Northampton, Mass.
Prof. Raymond T. Birge, Chairman,
Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Calif.,
Berkeley, Calif.
Brooklyn Col-
Ithaca,
Rev. Dr. Kalil A. Bishars, Syrian
Protestant Church of Greater N. Y.
Slielton Hale, Bishop, Rector, St. Phil-
lips Episcopal Church, New York.
Rev. Dr. Clarence Bleakney, Newark,
N. J.
Rabbi Maurice J. Bloom, Temple Beth
Jacob, Newburn, N. Y.
Prof. Bart Bok, Harvard Univ., Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Rev. Lester L. Boobar, Bangor, Maine.
Rev. W. Russell Bowie, Instructor,
Union Theological Seminary, New
York.
Prof. Edw. S. Boyer, Religion & So-
ciology, Millikin Univ., 111.
Millan Brand, writer.
Prof. Joseph Bressler,
lege, B'klyn, N. Y.
Prof. J. P. Brets, Cornell Univ.
N. Y.
James L. Brewer, Attorney, Rochester,
N. Y.
Prof. Dorothy Brewster, Columbia
Univ.
Rev. Edward H. Brewster, Nannet,
New Hampshire.
Prof. Edgar S. Brightman, Theological
School. Boston, Mass.
Louis Bromfield, writer.
Rev. Oliver Hart Bronson, D. D., Sum-
merland, Calif.
Prof. Chas. F. Brooks, Blue Hill Ob-
servatory, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Dr. Charlotte Hawkins Brown, Pres.
Palmer Memorial Institute, Sedalia,
N. C.
Van Wyck Brooks, writer.
Rev. Robert Evans Browning, Vicar
Chapel of the Redeemer, Maryland.
1490
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Henrietta Buekinaster, writer.
Edwin T. Buchrer, Editor, Journal of
Liberal Religion.
Prof. Henry M. Burbage, Univ. of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.
E. A. Burdick, Dean of Students, Conn.
< iollege, New London, Conn.
Prof. Charles T. Barnet, Bowdoin Col-
lege, Brunswick, Maine.
Rev. Bates G. Burt, Rector, Pontiac,
Mich.
Prof. John L. Buys, St. Lawrence Univ.,
Canton, N. Y.
Witter, Bynner, poet.
Rev. Fred L. Cairns, Needham, Mass.
Rev. Raymond Calkins, Minister Emeri-
tus, Cambridge, Mass.
Prof. Alexander E. Canes, Mass. State
College, Amherst, Mass.
Prof. Nathaniel Canter, Univ. of Buf-
falo.
Rev. Francis C. Capossi, Wind Gap, Pa.
Edith F. Claflin, Columbia University.
E. N. Comfort, Dean of Oklahoma
School of Religion.
Rev. Kieth Conninr, Detroit, Mich.
Rabbi Jonah E. Caplan, Cong. Beth El,
Long Island.
Rev. J. Russell Carpenter, Lyons, N. Y.
Rev. Ruthven S. Chalmers, Boonville,
N. Y.
Alvin B. Christina n, State Director,
Penn. Farmers Union, Philadelphia,
Pa.
Rev. Merrill F. Clarks, New Canaan,
Conn.
Rabbi Henry Cohen, Galveston, Texas.
Chas. H. Collins, Exec. Secy., Negro
Labor Victory Com.
Aaron Copland, composer.
Prof. Fred A. Courts. Univ. of Missouri.
Pascal Coviei. publisher.
Prof. Philip W. L. Cox, N. Y. Univ.
Rev. Chas. E. Crak Jr., Pastor. Em-
manuel Episcopal Church, Louisville,
Ky.
Rev. Frank P.. Crandall, Salem, Mass.
Abraham Cronbach, Hebrew Union Col-
lege, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Prof. Ephraim Cross, College of City of
N. Y.
Margarel Cross. Director, Georgetown
House, Washington, D. C.
( lountee Cullen, poet.
Joseph Curran, Pres. Nat'] Maritime
Union, C. I. < >., N. y. Greater Indus-
trial Union Council.
W. C. Dabney, Editor, Cincinnati Union,
( 5inn., ( )hio.
Prof. George Dahl, Prof, of Old Testa-
ment, Yale Divinity School, New
I taven.
Thelma M. Dale, Pres. Nat'l Negro Con-
gress.
Henry W. Longfellow Dana, writer.
Prof. Margarel Darkow, Hunter College.
Benjamin J. Davis Jr., Councilman,
N. Y. C.
John W. Davis, Dean of Wesleyan Univ.
Rev. John Warren Day, Dean of Grace
Cathedral, Topeka, Kansas.
Rev. John De Benedetto, Baltimore, Md.
Albert Deutsch, columnist.
Rev. Albert C. Dieffenbach, Boston,
Mass.
Senator Chas. C. Digges, Detroit, Mich.
Rev. Truman Douglass, St. Louis, Mo.
Theodore Dreiser, writer.
Rev. Arthur Dumper, Dean of Trinity
Cathedral (retired), Newark, N. J.
Roscoe Dungee, Publisher, Black Dis-
patch.
Will Durant, writer.
Dr. Sherwood Eddy.
Rev. J. Earl Edwards, Queens Village,
New York.
Prof. Ruth Emerson, Dept. Medical So-
cial Work, Director Social Service
Dept.. Univ. of Chicago.
O. E. Enlield, County Attorney, Ellen
Co., Arnett, Okla.
Henrv Epstein (former), Solicitor-
GenT. New York State.
Katherine Ets. Asst. Librarian, Nat'l
City Bank, N. Y. C.
Jane Evans, Nat'l Fed. of Templehood
Sisters, Dir Nat'l Peace Conference.
Rev. John W. Findley, Univ. Presby-
terian Church, Purdue University,
Ind.
Rev. Judson E. Fiebiger, Utica, N. Y.
Rev. Arthur W. Farnum, St. Mary's
Parish, Asheville, N. C.
Prof. Henry P. Fairchild, New York
University.
Dorothy Canfield Fisher, writer.
Mrs. Mitchell Follansbee. League of
Women Voters, Fvanston, 111.
Prof. Frances A. Foster, Vasser College,
I'oughkeepsie, N. Y.
Waldo Frank, writer.
Elizabeth P. Frasier. Religious Educa-
tor, Protestant Episcopal Church,
Phila., Pa.
Rev. Stephen V. Fritchman, Boston,
Mass.
Rev. J. Shubert Frye. Syracuse, N. Y.
Prof. Wendell Furry, Harvard Univ.
Rev. I.ee Alvin Gates, Pastor, South
Presbyterian Church, Buffalo, N. Y.
Eustace (Jay, Editor. "Philadelphia
Tribune."
Rev. Palfrey Perkins. Kings Chapel,
Boston, Mass.
Wm. I. Gibson, Managing Editor, Afro-
American Newspapers.
Rev. Carlyle Glams, Editor. The Presby-
terian Tribune, Utica, N. Y.
Leonard E. Golditch, Attorney, Chair-
man. Xat'l Council to Combat Anti-
Semitism.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1491
Sol Goldman 1 1 >el. to Amer. Jewish Con-
gress), Progressive Order of the West.
Rabbi Solomon Goldman, Zionist Org. of
America, Chicago, 111.
Prof. Erwin B. Goodenough, Dept. His-
tory & Region, Vale University.
Prof. Everett W. Goodhue, Dartmouth
College, Hanover, N. H.
Rabi Robt. Gordis, Rockaway Pk., L. I.
Julian Goodman (Del, to Am. Jewish
Congress), Troy, N. Y.
Dr. David Graubart, North Park Con-
gregation, Shaare Tikvoh, Chicago,
111.
Rev. Chas. S. Gray. Stamford, Conn.
Prof. Rowland Gray Smith, Prof, of
Philosophy, Emerson College, Mass.
Rabbi Louis Greenberg, New Haven,
Conn.
Rabbi Simon Greenberg, Phila., Pa.
Rev. Stanley Gutellus, Rochester, N. Y.
Rabbi Sidney S. Guthman, Chelsea,
Mass.
Rev. Herman J. Hahn, Buffalo, N. Y.
Rabbi J. Louis Hahn, Cong. Mt. Sivari,
A. E. Pres. Rabbinical Council, Upper
Wash. Hts. & Inwood, N. Y.
Prof. S. Ralph Harlow, Chairman Dept.
of Religion, Smith College, Northamp-
ton, Mass.
Rabbi Harry Halpern, B'klyn, N. Y.
Roswell, G. Han, President, Mt. Hol-
yoke College, Mt. Holyoke, Mass.
Wm. P. Hapgood, President, Columbia
Conserve Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.
Lucius C. Harper, Exec. Editor, The
Chicago Defender.
Mrs. Anton S. Harrington, Farmers
Union, Schoharie Co. Com., N. Y.
M. Lafayette Harris. Pres., Philander
Smith College, Little Rock, Ark.
Wm. Harrison, Assoc. Editor, Boston
Chronicle".
Rev. Edler G. Hawkins, N. Y. C.
Prof. A. Gordon Hayes. Dept. of Eco-
nomics, Ohio State Univ.
Ben Hecht, writer.
Rev. Clifford W. Hilliker, Middletown,
N. Y.
Mary E. Holland, Exec. Secy. Children's
Aid, Denver, Colo.
Dr. Eugene C. Holms, Howard Univ.
Rev. Kenneth E. Hoover, Hobart, N. Y.
Prof. Harold Hotelling, Columbia Univ.,
N. Y. C.
Charles H. Houston, Attorney, Wash-
ington, D. C.
Daniel Howard, Supt. of Schools, Emeri-
tus, Windsor, Conn.
Rev. Lee A. Howe, Jr., Oneida, N. Y.
Rev. Duncan Howlett, New Bedford,
Mass.
Langston Hughes, writer, poet.
Mattie Hunter, Natl Council of Negro
Women.
Joseph Hyman, Jewish Federation, Indi-
anapolis, Ind.
Hulan E. Jack, New York State As-
semblyman.
Sam Jaffee, actor.
David D. Jones, Pres. Binnell College,
Greensboro, N. C.
Matthew Josephson, writer.
Rabbi Mordecai M. Kaplan, Society for
the Advancement of Judaism.
Prof. Raymond Kennedy, Dept. of So-
ciology, Yale University.
Rockwell, Kent, artist.
Judge Dorothy Kenyon, New York.
Freda Kirchway, Editor, "The Nation".
Rev. Stephen L. Kiser, Richmond Hill,
N. Y.
Harold V. Knight, Editor, North Da-
kota Union Farmer.
Rev. Carl Knudson, Plymouth, Mass.
Rev. C. Franklin Koch, New York City.
Prof. Michael Kraus, College of City of
N. Y.
Rev. Alfred M. Lambert, St. Monica's
Church, Hartford, Conn.
Rev. John Howland Lathrop, Church of
Our Savior, New York City.
Prof. Walter Landauer, Univ. of Conn.
Paula Laurence, actress.
John Howard Lawson, screen writer,
Hollywood.
Canada Lee, actor.
Prof. Paul Lehman, Bibical History,
Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
Ray Lev, pianist.
Prof. Norman Levinson, Mass. Inst, of
Technology.
Rabbi Israel Herbert Levinthal, D. D. ;
D. H. L., B'klyn Jewish Center.
Rabbi Benj. A. Lichter, Cong. B'nai
Israel, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Louis Lipsky, Amer. Jewish Conference
& Del. to Amer. Jewish Congress.
Rabbi Emmanuel Lederman, Denver,
Colorado.
Frank Marshall Louis, Assoc. Negro
Press.
Rev. Moses B. Lovell, B'klyn, N. Y.
Rev. Sidney Lovell, Chaplain, Yale Univ.
Harry L. Lurie, Former Dir. Council
Jewish Fed. & Welfare Funds. New
York City.
Florence H. Lascomb, Civil Liberties
Union, Cambridge, Mass.
Rev. Dr. John A. McCallum, Philadel-
phia, Pa.
Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Lucasville,
Ohio.
James H. McGill, McGill Mfg. Co., Val-
paraiso, Ind.
Rev. Chas. F. MacLennan, Cleveland,
Ohio.
John T. McManus, Movie Critic, New
York City.
Rev. Walter Henry MacPherson, S. T. A.,
Past Pres. of the Universalist Church
of America.
Prof. W. H. Mainwaring, Emeritus,
Stanford Univ., Calif.
1492 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Rabbi Jerome Malino, Danbury, Conn.
Albert Malt/., writer, Hollywood.
Rep. Vito Marcantonio, Congressman,
N. Y. C.
George Marshall, Nat'l. Fed. of Consti-
tutional Liberties, N. ft". C.
George Matis, Farmers Union, St. Johns-
ville. N. Y.
Prof. F. O. Matthieson, Harvard Univ.
Rev. Win. H. Melish, Church of the Holy
Trinity, N. Y. C.
Rev. Harry C. Mesine, Buffalo, N. Y.
Rabbi Israel Miller, Bronx, N. Y.
Erin O'Brien-Moore, actress.
Julian Morgenstern, President, Hebrew
Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Prof. Margaret S. Morris, Pembroke
College in Brown Univ., Providence,
R. I.
Prof. H. Nethercot, Northwestern Univ.
Prof. Robt. H. Nichols, Union Theologi-
cal Seminary.
Rev. Chas. C. Noble, Syracuse, N. Y.
Mrs. Josephine Nordstrand, Exec. Secy.
Wisconsin State Conf. on Soc. Leg.
Senator Stanley Nowak, Michigan, 21st
District.
Rev. Delos O'Brien, Wilmington, Dela-
ware.
Judge Patric H. O'Brien, Detroit, Mich.
Sono Osato, dancer.
H. A. Overstreet, Prof. Emeritus, C. C.
N. Y.
Ruth H. Page, Stowe College Alumni, St.
Louis, Mo.
Rev. George L. Paine, Cambridge, Mass.
State Rep. Wm. J. Pennock, Pres. Wash-
ington Pension Union, Seattle, Wash.
Angeline E. Phillips, Recording Secy.
Community Church, Berks Co., Pa.
Harriet Ida Pickens, Nat'l. Bus & Prof.
Council, Y'. W. C. A., N. Y. C.
Martin Popper, Nat'l. Lawyers Guild,
N. Y. C.
Elizabeth L. Porter, Case Supervisor,
Family Service Soc, New Orleans, La.
Pmf. Kenneth W. Porter, Vassar Col-
lege.
Rev. Edwin McNeill Poteal, Rochester,
N. Y.
Dr. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Editor
"Peoples Voice," Congressional Nomi-
nee'.
Rev. Irving E. Putnam, Association of
Wesley .Methodist Churches, Minneap-
olis, Minn.
Michael J. Quill, N. Y. C. Councilman,
Pres. Transport Workers Union.
Senator Thomas C. Robbins, 35th Dis-
trict, Seattle, Wash.
Prof. Walter Kautenst ranch, Columbia
University.
Rev. Daniel Lyman Didont, Phila., Pa.
Mary W. Rittenbouse, Ii'klvn Bureau of
Charities, N. Y. C.
Paul Robeson, actor, singer.
Dr. Henry B. Robins, Colgate-Rochester
Divinity School, Rochester, N. Y.
Earl Robinson, composer, Hollywood.
Sol S. Rodin. Secy., Brith Achim Assoc,
Edwin A. Rurit, Sage School of Philoso-
phy, Cornell Univ., Ithica, N. Y.
Prof. George Sarton, Harvard Univ.
Col. Wm. Jay Schieffelin.
Prof. Margaret Schlauch, N. (Y. U.
Helen S. Sellers. Member of Conn.
House of Rep. (1941-42).
Rabbi Max Shapiro, Miama. Fla.
Rev. Arthur Shenefelt, Norwood, Ohio.
Prof. John F. Shepard, Pres. Civil
Rights Fed., Detroit, Mich.
Dr. Guy Emery Shipler, Editor, The
( 'hurchman.
Prof. George H. Shull, Princeton, Univ.,
Princeton, N. J.
Eva Smill, Exec. Secy., Family Service
Soc, New Orleans. La.
Mason Smith, Editor, "The Interracial
Review".
Rev. F. Hastings Smyth, Superior, The
Society of the Catholic Common-
wealth, Cambridge, Mass.
Mrs. Samuel Spiegel, Nat'l Women's
League of United Synagogues.
Prof. Bertha K. Stavrianos, Smith Col-
lege, Northampton, Mass.
J. Stanley Stevens, Chaplain, U. S. N.
R.
Donald Ogden Stewart, writer, Holly-
wood.
Prof. Dirk J. Struik, Mass. Inst, of
Technology.
Rev. Harold C. Swezy, Church of Holy
Apostle, N. Y. C.
Prof. Jessie M. Tatlock, Mt. Holyoke,
College.
Prof. Alva Taylor. Secy., Southern Conf.
for Human Welfare, Nashville, Tenn.
Janet Thornton, Director, Social Serv-
ice, Presbyterian Hospital, N. Y. C.
Rev. Joseph H. Titus, Jamaica, N. Y.
Rep. Nicholas Tomassetti, Rep. from
New Britain to Conn. General Assem-
bly.
Judge Edward V. Totten.
Rabbia Joshua Trachtenberg.
Jim Tully. writer.
Mark Van Doren,. writer.
John Van Druten, playwright.
Pierre Van Paassen, writer, journalist.
Oswald Garrison Villard. writer.
Prof. Eda Lou Walton, x. Y. University.
Rabbi Juda Washer, New Kensington,
Pa.
Prof. Harry F. Ward. Union Theolo-
logical Seminary.
M. Moran Weston, Chairman, N. Y.
State Civil Liberties, Dept. N. Y.
State Elks Assoc.
Prof. F. W. Weymouth, Stanford Univ.
Prof. Philip E. Wheelwright, Dart-
mouth College.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1493
Prof George F. Whicher, Amherst Col- Dr. Abraham Wolfson, Pres., Jewish
le„.e Social Service Bureau, Newark, N. J.
Rev. John C. White, Bishop of Spring- Prof. Theresa Wolfson, B'klyn College.
field Illinois Prof. Thomas Woody, Prof, of Educa-
Doxv Wilkerson, Exec. Editor "Peoples tion Univ. of Pa., Phila Pa- -
U. „ Mary E. Woolley, President Emerita,
Robt. Wilkerson, Exec. Secy Negro p^ iS^.^^man, Prof, of Phi-
Welfare Assn., Anderson, Ind. losophy of Religion, Univ. of Chicago.
Rev. C. Lawson Williard Jr., Trimly Prof Paul Thomas Young, Univ. of II-
Episcopal Church. New Haven, Conn. linois.
Rev. David Rhys Williams, Rochester, Rabbi S. M. Zampowsky, Cleveland,
N. Y. Ohio.
Rabbi Samuel Wohl, Cincinnati, Ohio. Wm. Zorach, sculptor.
Organizations listed for identification purposes. 500 names unlisted for reasons
of space.
Exhibit No. 7
[Daily Worker, February 10, 1938]
Leading Citizens Laud Isaacs' Stand on Gerson
Condemning the "witch-hunting campaign" organized against Borough Presi-
dent Stanley M. Isaacs for his appointment of S. W. Gerson, former Daily Worker
reporter as an assistant on his staff, 47 prominent citizens last night signed
a letter to the Borough President supporting him in his determination to appoint
competent persons to office.
The letter, released for publication by Tom Cassidy, vice president of the
American Newspaper Guild and Daily News staff writer, carries the names of
outstanding liberals, trade-unionists, educators, and clergymen.
The text of the letter and names of the signers follow :
Dear Mr. Isaacs :
We, the undersigned, citizens of different shades of opinion, emphatically con-
demn the witch-hunting campaign organized against you for the appointment
of Simon W. Gerson to your staff.
AVe look upon the current inspired agitation against you — which bears the
earmarks of some of the propaganda so discredited and overwhelmingly repudi-
ated in the last election — as a threat to the whole merit system in public service.
It is the first step which leads to the institution of political qualifications within
the entire city service. If the present agitation is successful, the next logical
step is the institution of a system of political discrimination within the Civil
Service system. How far is that from the malodorous method of choosing public
servants from political clubhouse backrooms?
1494 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
We urge you to stand firm against this attempt to attack appointments on the
merit basis. We support you — as do thousands of liberal though inarticulate
citizens — in your determination to maintain your right to appoint competent
persons to office, irrespective of political outlook, a right won by the citizens of
New York only after years of struggle against corrupt political influence.
Sincerely yours,
Daniel Allen. Regional Director. State. County, and Municipal Em-
ployes Assn. ; Recorder John K. Ackley, City College of New
York: Dr. Helen Adams. Hunter College; William Albertson, Sec-
cretary. Local 16, Waiters and Waitresses Union; Prof. Edwin B.
Burgum. Washington Square College, N. Y. U. : Prof. Theodore
Brameld, Adelphi College : Samuel Berland, Mgr.. Laundry Work-
ers Union ; Michael J. Quill. City Councilman : Dr. Harry F. Ward,
Union Theological Seminary ; Rev. Bradford Young: Rev. William
B. Spofford; Rev. Lawson Willard. Jr.. Past County Chaplain,
American Legion. Queens County: Rev. A. Clayton Powell. Jr.;
Miss Helen Murray, Associate Secretary. Methodist Federation of
Social Service; Samuel A. Robbins, Chairman. Council of U. S.
Veterans and American Legionnaire : Dorothy Kenyon. Consumers
Union: Vito Marcantonio. former Congressman: Tom Cassidy,
Vice-President Newspaper Guild: Carl Randau, President. News-
paper Guild; Austin Hogan, President, N. Y. Local Transport
Workers Union ; Alexander Hoffman, Manager. Cleaners and
Dyers Union ; George Wishnack, Coordinator, International
Ladies Garment Workers Union: Ashley Patten, Executive Secre-
tary, Pullman Porters; Louis Weinstock, Secretary-Treasurer,
District Council 9. Painters and Decorators; David Freed. Sec-
retary. Local 802, American Federation of Musicians: Eugene P.
Connolly. Organizer, Transport Workers Union: Jonathan Eddy,
Executive Vice-President Newspaper Guild: Victor Pasche, Secre-
tary-Treasurer. Newspaper Guild: Mervyn Rathborne, President,
American Communications Association: Harry Gewirtzman, Man-
ager. Pocket-Book Workers Union : Samuel Kramberg, Local 302,
Hotel and Restaurant Workers Alliance: Irving Potash. Manager,
Joint Council Furriers Union; Ben Golden. Labor Arbitrator;
Vera Montgomery) Editor and Publisher, Yorkville Advance ; Prof.
John L. Childs. Teachers College: Prof. Robert K. Speer. Washing-
ton Square College: Dr. John McAlpin Miller. Long Island Uni-
versity; Dr. John T. Thirwall. City College of New York; Prof.
Margaret Schlauch, New York University: Prof. Lyman R.
Bradley. New York University ; Prof. Beryl Parker. New York
University; Prof. V. J. McGill, Hunter College: Prof. Howard
Selam, Brooklyn College: Malcolm Cowley, Editor, New Re-
public: Eda Lou Walton, poet and critic: Dr. Charles A. Hendley,
President. Teachers Union : Julia Church Kolar, Executive Board
Member, Descendants of the American Revolution.
Exhibit No. 8
League of Women Shoppers,
>
NEW YORK
(Photostat not legible — retained in subcommittee files.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1495
Exnirm No. 9
Chairman: William E. Dodd, Jr. Treasurer: S. D. Douglas
Executive Secretary: Leonard S. Beller
Advisers on Anti-Nazi Literature : Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein
(German Catholic Leader)
Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld (Former Minister of Justice in Prussia)
Carleton Beals
T. A. Bisson
Harriet stauton Blatch
Anita Block
S. John Block
Prof. Franz Unas
Dr. Barrett H. Clark
Prof. Thomas C. Cochran
Malcolm Cowley
Kar.' Crane-Gartz
Dr. Walter Danirosch
Prof. John Dewey
Sponsors
Dr. John Lovejov Elliott
Dr. H. C. Engelbrecht
.Martha Graham
Prof. Albert Guerard
Prof. Alice Hamilton
Moss Hart
I. A. Hirsohmaiin
Rockwell Kent
Dorothv Kenvon
Prof. Wm. H. Kilpatrick
Freda Kirchwey
Justice Anna M. Kross
Judge S. D. Levy
Prof. Eduard C. Landsman
Prof. R. M. Maclver
Annie Nathan Meyer
Lewis Mumford
Dr. Henry Neumann
Prof. Fredrick L. Schuman
R S-
Dr.
-Philip Silver
Van Doren
Lillian D. Wald
American Committee for Anti-Nazi Literature
Suite 302—20 Vesey Street
NEW YORK CITY
REctor 2-5867
Cable Address : LITCOM
March 24, 1939.
American Civil Liberties Union,
Neic York City
Gentlemen: May we have your opinion on the enclosed bill. We would ap-
preciate a prompt reply.
Thanking you for your cooperation, we are
Sincerely yours,
Leonard S. Beller, Executive Secretary.
LB: EL.
Exhibit No. 10
American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom,
New York City, January 11, 1940.
Hon. Martin Dies,
House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Congressman : On the basis of a careful analysis of the proceedings
and releases of the Dies Committee, copy of which I am enclosing, the American
Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom has come to the conclusion
that the further existence of the Dies Committee would constitute a serious threat
to intellectual freedom and civil rights in the United States. In our analysis we
present thorough documentation to substantiate this contention.
We have also submitted to the Speaker of the House petitions urging the dis-
continuance of the Dies Committee, signed by 5,672 American citizens, largely
from the academic and related fields. Further signatures will be transmitted
this week. Among the signers of this petition are twelve college presidents, six
college deans, and many other leaders of American culture and professional life.
I am enclosing a copy of the petition blank and a list of the outstanding signa-
tories for your consideration.
Respect fully yours,
Franz Boss, National Chairman.
Among the Signatories to the Fetition Sponsored by American Committee
for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom to Discontinue the Dies
Committee
Frank E. Baker, President, Milwaukee State Teachers College
Rufus E. Clement, President, Atlanta University
Clarence M. Dykstra, President, University of Wisconsin
1496 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Among the Signatories to the Petition Sponsored by American Committee
fob Democracy and Intellectual Freedom to Discontinue the Dies
Com m ittee — Continued
William Allied Eddy, President, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Guy Stanton Ford, President, University of Minnesota
George Willard Frasier, President, Colorado State College of Education
Ralph K. Hickok, President, Western College
Raymond A. Kent, President, University of Louisville
Frank Kingdon, President, University of Newark
William A. Neilson, Former President, Smith College
Walter Dill Scott, Former President, Northwestern University
Mary E. Woolley, Former President, Mt. Holyoke College
Harold C. Urey, Nobel laureate in chemistry, Columbia
John Dewey, Professor emeritus of Philosophy
Charles A. Beard, Former President, American Historical Association
J. McKeen Cattell, Editor, "Science"
Francis .1. McConnell, Bishop, Methodist Church
Paul U. Kellogg. Editor, "Survey Graphic''
Olin Downes, Music Critic, "The New York Times"
Jonathan Daniels, Editor, "Raleigh News & Observer"
Paul Robeson, Singer and actor
Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard University
Paul J. Kern, President, Municipal Civil Service Commission of N. Y. C.
Charlotte Carr, Head, Hull House, Chicago
Edith Abbott, Dean, University of Chicago School of Social Service
Ned II. Dearborn, Dean, New York University
Christian Gauss, Dean, Princeton University
Malcolm S. McLean, Dean, University of Minnesota
Frank L. Mott, Dean, University of Iowa
Carl Wittke, Dean, Oberlin College
Mary Antin, Author
Joseph Warren Peach, Author
Van Wyck Brooks, Author
Lilliam Hellman, Author
Inez Haynes Irwin, Author
Emil Lengyel, Author
Elmer Rice, Author
Ralph Boeder, Author
William Carlos Williams, Author
Henry Pratt Fairchild, Professor, New York University
Randolph B. Smith, Director, Cooperative School for Teachers
Sophronisba P. Breckenridge, Former President, American Association of Schools
of Social Work
Comfort A. Adams, Former President, American Institute of Electrical Engineers
Oswald Veblem. Former President, American Mathematical Society
John P. Peters, Secretary, Committee of Physicians for Improvement of Medical
Care
A. M. Schlesinger, Vice-President, American Historical Association
W. II. Malison", Editor, "Philosophy of Science"
Ellsworth Huntington, Professor, Yale University
Edward C. Tolman„ Professor, University of California
George I'. Adams, Professor, University of California
Ralph Linton, Editor, "The American Anthropologist"
W. A. Oldfather, Former President, American Philological Association
Walter R. Hager, Secretary, Teachers College, Columbia University
John F. Fulton, Yale Medical School
Ralph Barton Perry, Author. Pulitzer Prize biography of William James
Clyde Eagleton, Professor, New York University
Karl Menninger, Director, Psychiatric Clinic, Topeka, Kansas
Robert s. Lynd, Professor, Columbia University
Fred L. Redefer, Secretary, Progressive Education Association
[Ialford E. Luccock, Professor, Yale Divinity School
Alice Hamilton, Professor emeritus. Harvard Medical School
Vida I >. Scudder, Professor, Wellesley College
Eugene W. Lyman, Professor, Union Theological Seminary
D. W. Prall, Professor, Harvard University
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1497
Among the Signatories to the Petition Sponsored by American Committee
for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom to Discontinue the Dies
Committee — Continued
A. J. Carlson, Former President, American Physiological Society
Paul F. Gemmill, Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Edgar Dale, Professor. Ohio Slate University
Lester Dix. Principal, Lincoln School
V. T. Thayer, Educational Director. Ethical Culture Schools
Hairy J. Carman, Pro lessor, Columbia University.
Gortwin Watson. Professor, Columbia University.
L. G. Earth. Professor, Columbia University.
Dorothy Douglas, Professor, Smith College.
Frank H. Hankins, Professor, Smith College.
Hadley Contril, Professor, Princeton University.
Roy Dickinson Welch, Professor, Princeton University.
Hirtley F. Mather, Director, Harvard University, Summer School.
Morris R. Cohen, Professor, College of the City of New York.
Harry A. Overstreet, Professor, College of the City of New York.
Jerome Davis, Former President. American Federation of Teachers.
Robert Iglehart, Vice President, American Federation of Teachers.
Alonzo F. Myers. President. New York College Teachers Union.
Max Lerner, Professor. Williams College.
Jesse H. Holmes, Professor, Swarthmore College.
George Soule, Editor. "The New Republic".
Malcolm Cowley, Editor, "The New Republic".
Freda Kirchwey, Editor, "The Nation".
Maxwell S. Stewart, Editor, "The Nation".
Victor Weybright, Editor, "Survey Graphic".
Frank C. Bancroft, Editor, "Social Work Today".
Dashiel Hammett, Author.
Leone Zugsmith, Author.
Arthur Koher, Author.
Countee Cullen, Poet.
Matthew Josephson, Author.
Joan Starr Untermeyer, Poet.
Alfred Kreymborg, Author.
Donald Ogden Stewart, President, League of American Writers.
Lewis Mumford, Author.
Herman Shumlin, Producer.
AV. W. Norton, Publisher.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Past President, Explorers Club.
Mario Romaet-Rosenoff, Musician.
Aaron Copland, Composer.
Lehman Engel, Musician.
Rockwell Kent, Artist.
Morris Carnovsky, Actor.
Oliver D. Fargo, Author
Philip Loeb, Actor
Max Yergan, Secretary, International Institute for African Affairs
Charles Bolous, Former Councilman, New York City
Dorothy Kenyon, Former Justice, New York City
Hugh DeLacy, Councilman, Seattle
Justine- Miso Polier, Justice, New York City
Nicholas Tomassetti, Representative, Connecticut
William Lloyd Imes, Reverend, New York City
John Howard Lathrop, Reverend, Brooklyn, New York
Mary Van Kloock, Russell Sage Foundation
Mrs. Rachel Davis-Dubois, Service Bureau for Intercultural Education
Dr. Bernard Glucek, Psychiatrist
John B. Andrews, Secretary, American Association for Labor Legislation
J. F. Dashiell, Professor, University of North Carolina
Edward A. Ross, Professor emeritus. University of Wisconsin
W. H. Manwaring, Professor emeritus, Columbia University
Willystine Goodsell, Professor emeritus, Teachers College, Columbia University
Mitchell Franklin, Professor, Tulane Uniro—'ty
1498 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
\M<».\(; THE SlGNVTORIES TO THE PETITION SPONSORED BY AMERICAN COMMITTEE
for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom to Discontinue the Dies
Committee — Continued
Harry Elmer Barnes, Historian and Journalist
Edwin G. Boring, Professor, Harvard University
Rev. Alfred W. Swan, Madison, Wisconsin
Sera Bard Field, Poet
Charles Erskine Scott Wood, Writer
S. Stephenson Smith, Professor, University of Oregon
James B. Carey, Secretary, C. I. O.
Charles William Taussig, Chairman, National Advisory Committee
Martha Dodd, Writer
William E. Dodd, Former Embassador to Germany
George Seldes, Author
C. E. Ficken, Dean, Macalester College
Exhibit No. 11
James Waterman Wise, Chairman Isobel Walker Soule, Executive Secretary
Sarah Jackson Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
Advisory Committee
Stella Adler
Helen Alfred
Leroy Bowman
Rebecca Grecht
J. B. S. Hardman
Mary W. Hillyer
Lawrence Hosie
Grace Hutchins
John Paul Jones
Dorothy Kenyon
Freda Kirchwey
Harry W. Laidler
Margaret I. Lamont
Grace Lumpkin
Vito Marcantonio
Reinhold Niebuhr
Clifford Odets
Evelyn Preston
Margaret Schlauch
Sarah Jackson Smith
Isobel Walker Soule
Robert Speer
Eda Lou Walton
Bertha Pool Weyl
James Waterman Wise
Theresa Wolfson
Citizens Committee to Aid Striking Seamen
227 West 22nd Street
NEW YORK CITY
CHelsea 2-9786
January 28, 1937.
Dear Friend : The East Coast Seamen have called off the strike. They have
won some concessions. This decision will help the West Coast Seamen bring
their strike to a more successful end. This action has been commended by the
N. L. R. B. Hearings are being continued by them.
Now, the seamen are trying to get their jobs back. Many are already on the
high seas, while others here are carrying on the fight against discrimination,
lockout, blacklist and the Copeland Bill. These men are still without shelter,
food and clothing. In addition to the East Coast men. about 1,000 Pacific Coast
strikers who struck when their vessels reached Eastern shores, are without
resources.
These men are entirely dependent on our Soup Kitchen at 338 W. 25th St. for
food. Debts tor pas. electricity, and oilier essentials threaten its existence.
You have shown your warm-hearted interest in the men by your contributions
dining the strike. We appeal to you now — to help these men who conducted an
heroic, epoch-making battle for 84 long, cold winter days. Many of these men
are ill due to exposure and undernourishment.
All we ask you to, do is send a small contribution of. say. one, two or five
dollars, to tide over a difficult back-to-work period.
Won't you give your answer today? Please do take out your pen and write
your check- as soon as you read this letter.
Very sincerely yours,
Secretary, Citizens' Committee to M<l Striking Seamen.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1499
Executive Committee :
Dr. Worthy M. Tippy,
Honorary Presidenl
Prof. Henry Pratt Fair-
child. President
Gardner Jackson, Vice
President
Robert K. Speer, Treas-
urer
Samuel J. Rodman, Sec-
retary
Edward K. Kern, Direc-
tor of Activities
Algernon Black
Hadley Cantril
Ned II. Dearborn
Dr. Sidney E. Goldstein
Helen Hall
Rita Hochheimer
A. J. Isserman
Spurgeon Keeny
Clyde Miller
Dudley Nichols
Louise Pearson
Etta Schneider
Mark Starr
Katherine Terrill
Mrs. Joseph L. White
Ex hi in r No. 12
Advisory Board
Sherwood Anderson
James W. Angel]
Louis Adamic
Thurman Arnold
Vicki Baum
William R. Benet
Franz Boas
Louis Bromfield
.lames L. Brewer
Dr. A. A. Brill
Heywood Broun
Senator Arthur Capper
.Mate Connelly
Humphrey Cobb
Olin Downes
William E. Dodd
Theodore Dreiser
Walter Pric hard Eaton
Dorothy Canfleld Fisher
Abraham Flexner
( (smoiid K. Fraenkel
Edwin Franko Goldman
Rev. Ernest G. Guthrie
Dashiell Hammett
Lillian Hellman
Jesse H. Holmes
Mrs. Sheppard Homans
William K. Howard
Mrs. Harold L. Ickes
Rex Ingram
Stanley M. Isaacs
Horace M. Kallen
Dorothy Kenyon
Paul J. Kern
Freda Kirchwey
Fritz Lang
Robert D. Leigh
Irene Lewisohn
Robert Morss Lovett
Thomas Mann
Fredric March
Philip Merivale
Dudley Murphy
W. W. Norton
Lee Pressman
Will Rogers, Jr.
Alex Rose
John Rothschild
Wm. J. Schieffelin
Viola Brothers Shore
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Rexford G. Tugwell
Lillian D. Wald
Walter White
Mary E. Woolley
Film Audiences for Democracy
342 Madison Ave.
NEW YORK CITY
Phone VAnderbilt 6-3660
October 20, 1939.
Mr. Victor Riesel,
Managing Editor, The Neiv Leader Publishing Association,
New York City.
Dear Mr. Riesel : Mr. Kern requests me to say that he is speaking more or less
extemporaneously from a handful of notes at the Rand School, Monday.
If you wish to have your stenographer cover that it is agreeable to Mr. Kern.
Yours truly,
Fleet Munson.
To Encourage films that uphold American democracy, civil liberties, and peace; that pro-
mote better understanding and improve neighborly relations between racial and re-
ligious groups ; that present an accurate, undistorted as well as a socially useful por-
trayal of the contemporary scene. To Oppose all totalitarian trends, attacks on labor,
and films contrary to the principles of the Bill of Rights
Vol. 1, No. 2
Exhibit No. 13
Films for Democracy
April 1939
NEW YORK CITV
A nonprofit membership organization dedicated to
and distribution of truthful, fearless films which
American Democracy.
President :
Dr. Henry Pratt Fair-
child
Vice President :
Gardner Jackson
Treasurer :
Dr. Robert K. Speer
Secretary :
Samuel J. Rodman
Executive committee :
Hadley Cantril
Ned H. Dearborn
Helen Hall
A. J. Isserman
Clyde Miller
Dudley Nichols
Louise Pearson
Mark Stan-
Mrs. Joseph L. White
encouraging the production
safeguard and strengthen
Advisory Board :
Sherwood Anderson
James W. Angell
Louis Adamic
Thurman Arnold
Vicki Baum
William B. Benet
Franz Boas
Louis Bromfield
68970 — 50 — pt. •_»-
1500
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Advisory board — Con.
James L. Brewer
A. A. Brill
Heywood Broun
Senator Arthur Cap-
per
Marc Connelly
Humphrey Cobb
Olin Downes
William E. Dodd
Theodore Dreiser
Walter Prichard Ea-
ton
Dorothy Canfield
Fisher
Abraham Flexner
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Edwin Franko Gold-
man
Advisory board — Con.
Rev. Ernest G. Guth-
rie
Dashiell Hammett
Lillian Hellman
Jesse H. Holmes
Mrs. SLeppard Ho-
mans
William K. Howard
Mrs. Harold L. Ickes
Rex Ingram
Stanley M. Isaacs
Horace M. Kallen
Dorothy Kenyon
Freda Kirchwey
Fritz Lang
Robert D. Leigh
Irene Lewisohn
Robert Morss Lovett
Advisory board — Con.
Fredric March
Thomas Mann
Philip Merivale
Dudley Murphy
W. W. Norton
Lee Pressman
John Rothschild
Will Rogers, Jr.
Win. J. Schieffelin
Viola Brothers Shore
Rabbi Abba Hillel
Silver
Rexford G. Tugwell
Lillian D. Wald
Walter F. Wagner
Walter White
Mary E. Woolley
Exhibit No. 14
PROGRAM OF THE GREATER NEW YORK EMERGENCY CONFERENCE
ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS
Monday, February 12, 1940, at Two West Sixty-fourth Street, New York City,
the Meeting House of the Society for Ethical Culture
Organized antidemocratic forces are threatening the security and
freedom of human personality and the rights of minority groups here in
the United States. They are dividing, confusing, and weakening those
who wish to maintain our free democratic institutions. Such forces
of oppression and fear, growing stronger because of the war in Europe,
must not be permitted to overwhelm us. Never before have our consti-
tutional liberties been under such concerted attack. At this moment
we have a special responsibility as a united people to meet our danger
and protect our rights. There are literally thousands of nonpolitical
organizations in the City of New York which are vitally concerned with
the maintenance of the Bill of Rights, with minority and neighborhood
relations, and with antidemocratic legislation. This Conference is for
them.
Robeht W. Seaele, Chairman.
9: 30 a. m. — Registration of delegates and visitors
11 a. in. — General session
J'r< .siiliiii/ Chairman: Db. Max Yergax, Director, International
Committee on African Affairs
12 : 30 to 2 p. m. — Luncheon interval
2 5 p. m. — Panel discussions — Announcement of panel chairmen and speakers
mi page -
5-8 p. m. — Dinner interval
8 p. m. — General session — Presiding Chairman: Dr. Frank Kingdon, President,
Univeristy of Newark
Reports of panel discusions
Selection of Continuations Committee
Speakers :
Db. .John Elliott, Senior Leader, Society of Ethical Culture
Congressman John M. Coffee
Db. Mart E. Woolley, Presidenl Emeritus of Mt. Holyoke College
Profess b K. N. Llewellyn, Columbia Law School
Roger \. Baldwin, I Hrector, American Civil Liberties Union
Samuel L. M. Barlow, National Emergency Conference for Democratic
Rights
Other Speakebs to be Announced
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1501
Greateb New Yokk Emergency Conference ox Inalienable Rights
Room 508, 2 West 43rd Street, New York City
I' AN ELS
PANEL I — "FOREIGN BORN"
1. How to focus our energies the better to preserve the rights of the foreign
born.
2. How the foreign-language and foreign-born groups can unite to preserve
and enlarge democracy for themselves and for all Americans.
3. How to bring before the foreign born their duties and privileges as
Americans.
4. How to disseminate and coordinate the best in both foreign and American
cultures that froth may gain in understanding.
Chairman of Panel: Dr. Frank Kingdon, President, University of Newark.
Panel Speakers: Dr. Gerald F. Machacek, President, United Czechoslovak Ameri-
can Societies.
Erwin H. Klaus, Editor, The German- American.
Younghill Kang, New York University.
Edward Corsi, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson.
Irving Xovick, Acting Secretary, American Committee for the Protection
of the Foreign Born.
M. Garriga, Int'l Vice President, Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union.
Nathaniel Phillips, President, National League for American Citizenship.
Dr. Emil Lengyel.
PANEL II "THE CHURCH AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY"
1. What Democracy means to Religion.
2. What Religion means to Democracy.
3. What are the official attitudes of the Religious Bodies toward all phases
of Discrimination.
4. What is involved in freedom of speech for the clergy.
5. What is the Responsibility of the Church in the face of attacks upon
Minorities.
6. What practical methods are available to the Church.
Chairman of Panel: Rev. Lorenzo H. King, St. Mark's Methodist Church.
Panel Speakers: Dr. Emanuel Chapman, Fordham University.
Rev. A. J. Muste, American Labor Temple.
Rabbi William F. Rosenblum, Exec. Committee member, New York Board of
Jewish Ministers.
Rev. John Paul Jones, Union Church of Bay Ridge.
Dr. Theodore F. Savage, President, the Greater New York Feedration of
Churches.
Rabbi David DeSola Pool, Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue.
PANEL III "LABOR AND DEMOCRACY"
1. Labor's Civil Rights.
2. Congressional Investigating Committees
a. Dies Committee — its methods, procedure and objectives.
b. The Smith Committee — its methods, procedure and objectives.
c. The LaFollette Committee — comparison of procedure with that of
other Congressional investigating committees.
3. Legislation and the Trade Union Movement
a. Analysis of the Alien Bills.
b. Criminal Snydicalism Laws.
c. The application of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
d. The Wages and Hours Law.
1502 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Chairman of Panel: Leo Huberman.
Panel Speakers: Merle Vincent, General Solicitor, Wages and Hours Adminis-
tration.
Elmer Brown, President, Typographical Union, Local No. 6, A. F. of L.
Nathan Green.
Gardner Jackson, Labor's Non-Partisan League.
Manning Johnson, Business Agent, Cafeteria Employees' Union, A. F. of L_
Other speakers to be announced.
PANEL IV — "ORGANIZING OUR NEIGHBORHOODS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTIox"
1. Actual experiences of violations of civil liberties in neighborhoods.
2. Pending Legislation against Civil Liberties.
3. What the Neighborhoods are accomplishing. Legislative conferences ; citi-
zens' rights groups ; neighborhood papers ; the financing of neighborhood groups.
4. Practical steps to be taken to further organization in the neighborhoods.
Chairman of Panel: Dean Ned H. Dearborn, New York University.
Panel Speakers: Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs.
Hon. Vito Marcantonio.
Dr. Leonard Covello, Principal, Benjamin Franklin High School.
Thomas E. Stone, Executive Director, New York City Coordinating Com-
mittee for Democratic Action.
Lester Granger, Secretary, Committee on Negro Welfare, Welfare Council
of New York.
PANEL V — -"EDUCATION AS BASIS FOR TOLERANCE AND DEMOCRACY"
1. Personal Experiences Dealing with :
a. Minority Discrimination in Our Schools.
b. Student Organization and Relations.
c. Faculty Organization and Relation.
2. Education and Propaganda.
3. Legislative Threats to Our Educational System.
4. What Has Been Done to Counteract Antidemocratic Tendencies in the Field
of Education.
5. Practical Steps That Must Be Taken To Preserve Academic Freedom.
Chairman of Panel : Professor Walter Rautenstrauch, Columbia University.
Panel Speakers: Dr. Charles H. Fisher, former president, Western Washington
College of Education.
Dr. Benjamin Harrow, College of the City of New York.
Prof. Robert K. Speer, New York University.
Dr. Bella V. Dodd, Legislative Representative, New York, State Federation
of Teachers' Union.
William A. Hamm. Asst. Superintendent of Schools.
Prof. Doxey R. AVilkerson, Howard University.
This program, containing the names of the speakers, is a supplement to the
original Call to the ('(inference issued January .". 1940, Those organizations
which have not as yet signified their intention of sending delegates, are urged
to do so, by filling out and mailing without delay the Application for Credential
printed below. ,
Discussion will be limited to domestic problems related to civil rights, minority,
and neighborhood relations and to antidemocratic Legislation, with special
emphasis upon these problems in New York City.
The main purpose of the discussion in each Panel will be to determine the
besi and most fruitful methods of coping with the dangers threatening the civil
rights and security of citizens in their neighborhoods and in the legislative as-
semblies of the state and nation, and what program of action can he developed
by churches, schools, labor unions, settlements, fraternal orders and other organi-
zations to meet these threats.
No resolutions will be entertained by the chairmen of the panels or of the gen-
eral meetings.
Before adjournment of the panel meetings the delegates in each panel will
nominate representatives from their respective panels for membership on the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1503
•Continuations Committee, which will he empowered by the Conference to devise
means of continuing the work of the Conference.
Guest tickets are available for interested individuals. The charge for these
tickets is $1.
Application for Credential
greater new york emergency conference on inalienable rights
2 West 43rd Street, Room 50S, New York City
PEnnsylvania 6-7948
Name or Organization-
Address
Number of members —
Our organization will cooperate with the Greater New York Emergency
Conference on Inalienable Rights through (check participation desired).
1. Organizational sponsorship and participation.
2. Organizational participation not involving sponsorship.
3. Individual observer.
We shall be represented by the following delegates or observers. (An or-
ganization may signify immediately its desire to sponsor or participate,
and later register the names of its delegates or observers.)
Name of Delegate or Observer
Address City
Name of Delegate or Observer
Address City
Registration Fee : $1 per delegate or observer, with the exception of youth groups
which will be charged $.50
(Signed)
Name.
Office-
Each organization is entitled to two delegates or to two observers.
Contributions for the support of this conference are cordially invited.
Greater New York Emergency Conference on Inalienable Rights
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Robert W. Searle,
Chairman
Algernon D. Black
Vice Chairman
Jean Bowie,
Vice Chairman
Bertha J. Foss,
Vice Chairman
Robert K. Strauss,
Vice Chairman
Paul Frankfurter,
Treasurer
Thomas E. Stone,
Secretary
Samuel L. M. Barlow
Dr. Leonard Covello
Prof. Richard T. Cox
Rosalie Manning
Dr. Charles Obermeyer
Jeanne Ratner
Charles I. Stewart
GENERAL COMMITTEE
Rabbi J. X. Cohen
Ambrose Doskow
Mary Dublin
Mabel Brown Ellis
Christopher T. Emmet
Samuel S. Fishzohn
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Winifred Frazier
Rabbi Sidney Goldstein
Gilbert M. Haas
Helen Hall
Elizabeth Hawley
Joan Hellinger
Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs
Prof. William Kil-
patrick
Erwin H. Klaus
Charles E. Lane
Dr. Gerald F. Machacek
Polly Obermeyer
Margaret Parry
GENERAL COMMITTEE COn.
Elizabeth Peel
Rev. A. Clayton Powell
Jean Reichard
Alary Sinikhovitch
Jr. Mis. A. H. Vixrnan
Dr. Daniel Walsh
SPONSORS
Dorothy Andrews
Luigi Antonini
Dr. Robert W. Ashworth
Margaret Culkin Banning
George Gordon Battle
Hon. Charles Belous
Samuel M. Blinken
Van Wyck Brooks
Elmer Brown
William M. Callahan
James B. Carey
Hon. Emanuel Celler
1504
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
sponsors — continued
Rev. Allan Knight
Chalmers
Dr. Emanuel Chapman
Rev. Everett R. Clinchy
Rev. F. A. Cullen
Dean Ned H. Dearborn
Hon. Samuel Dickstein
Dr. John L. Elliott
Dr. Phillips I'. Elliott
Dr. Haven Emerson
Dr. Henry Pratt Fairchild
M. I. Finkelstein
Pr< f. John A. Fitch
Rev. George B. Ford
Rev. Harry Emerson
Fosdiek
Ben Golden
Rabbi Herbert S.
Goldstein
Prof. Samuel L. Hamilton
Rev. Ladislas Harsanyi
Dr. diaries J. Hendley
T. Arnold Hill
Rev. John Haynes Holmes
Jean Horie
Rev. Amos Horlacher
Rev. William Lloyd Imes
Dr. Alvin Johnson
Mrs. Ely Jacques Kahn
sponsors — continued
Dr. Horace V. Kallen
Milton Kaufman
Paul Kellngu
Hon. Dorothy Kenyon
Hon. Paul J. Kern
Freda Kirchwey
Prof. Philip Klein
Hon. Anna M. Kross
Mrs. C. D. Kyle
Rev. John Howland
Lathrop
Richard W. Lawrence
Abraham Lefkowitz
Rev. Henry Smith Leiper
Emil Lengyel
Dr. Eduard C. Lindeman
Harold H. Lund
Rev. George Maier
Sydney Maslen
Emmet May
Hon. Vito Marcantonio
Dr. Rafael Angel Marin
Lewis Merrill
Rev. J. N. Moody
Hon. Newbold Morris
Mrs. Alexander Mossman
Walter Mueller
Prof. Gardner Murphy
Hon. James E. Murray
sponsors — continued
Dr. Alonzo Myers
Dr. Henry Newman
Hon. Nathan D. Perlman
William Pickens
Hon. Justine Wise Polier
Hon. Almerindo Portfolio
A. Philip Randolph
Frederick L. Rederfer
Rev. Herman F. Reissig
Mrs. Robert V. Russell
Mgr. John A. Ryan, D. D.
Otto Sattler
Rose Schneiderman
Dr. Guy Emery Shipler
Rev. H. Norman Sibley
Samuel S. Solender
Prof. Robert K. Speer
L. Elizabeth Spofford
Rev. Wm. B. Spofford
Vilhjalmur Stefansson
Maxwell S. Stewart
Katherine Terrill
Eva Terry
Prof. Harold C. Urey
Walter White
James Waterman Wise
Prof. Mary E. Woolley
Rev. Benjamin F. Wyland
Exhibit No. 15
[From the New York Times, Tuesday, January 31, 1939. Advertisement]
An Open Letter to the Government and People of the United States
While you read this message, a major human tragedy is taking place. A
question of the greatest importance to our country and to the entire world is
being decided.
A brave nation is fighting against terrible odds, not only for its own inde-
pendence and freedom, but for the very life of democracy everywhere.
The whole world knows now that the "Franco Revolt" is in reality an inva-
sion. Hitler and Mussolini are bent on destroying the Spanish Republic, and
with its destruction gaining vastly increased power in the campaign against the
democracies. They have set out to replace a hopeful young republic with a dic-
tatorship patterned on the Nazi and Fascist models. In the Italian and German
press the full of Barcelona was hailed as a "great victory."
With indescribable brutality and complete disregard for world opinion, they
have warred against l*>tli the armies and the women and children of Spain. It
is clear that they intend to use Spain as a means of crippling French and British
democracy, and as a powerful springboard to South and Central America, where
their agents have for years been busy spreading propaganda against d smocracy
and for fascism.
If Franco, Hitler and Mussolini win in Spain, the fascist penetration of the
Western Hemisphere will he immensely strengthened. This will mean a greatly
increased defense problem for the United States.
It must not be allowed to happen! Democracy cannot permit unending ag-
gression against it. "Appeasement" has failed. (Tuna. Ethiopia, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Spain witness its failure.
What can our country do? The American people want peace. They abhor
aggression and warring dictatorships. They are committed to the democratic
way of life.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1505
The hard fact is that by our embargo against Spain we are giving aid to Hitler
and Mussolini and nil they stand for. Our embargo is helping to destroy a
republic which stands as a powerful bulwark against the fascist plans. If
that republic is destroyed, much of the responsibility will be ours.
The signers of this letter believe that Mr. Henry L. Stimson, former U'nited
States Secretary of State, is right when he says:
-II' this Loyalist Government is overthrown, it is evident that its defeat will
be solely due to the tact that it has been deprived of its right to buy from us
and other friendly nations the munitions necessary for its defense."
To the plea that the United States must remain neutral, we can only reply
that an embargo which permits aid to aggressors and denies it to the victim is
flagrantly unneutral. In the words of President Roosevelt to the 76th Congress,
"we have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our
neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly — may actually give aid to
the aggressor and deny it to the victim." A policy which places a friendly, rec-
ognized, democratically-elected government on the same plane with the foreign-
aided insurrectionist cannot, by any canon of law or tradition, be called neu-
trality. The embargo, as our most distinguished lawyers and historians have
insisted, is a clear violation of international law.
We submit to our fellow Americans and to our government that every obli-
gation of peace, of freedom, of justice, of self-interest, calls upon us to:
LIFT THE EMBARGO WITHOUT DELAY
It is not ton late. The Spanish Republic still lives. Its people, who still con-
trol Central Spain with Valencia and iron-willed Madrid, have no intention of
surrendering. A simple act of justice on the part of The United States of
America can still turn the tide in favor of democracy.
We who have signed this letter want to hear the cheer of hope and new
courage that will go up in every land, including our own, when the word goes
out that The United States has lifted the embargo against Spain.
American public opinion has given our government a clear mandate to act.
More than 7<i per cent of public opinion, according to the Gallup poll, supports
the Spanish Republic.
In the name of American fair play and of all our best traditions —
In the name of world peace and of democracy —
LIFT THE EMBARGO NOW
(Signed) Ernest Sutherland Bates, Robert Benchley, Mare Blitzstein,
Franz Boas, Mrs. Louis D. Brandeis, Louis Bromfield, Van Wyck
Brooks, Matthew J. Burns, Henry Seidel Canby, Walter B.
Cannon, M. D.. Carrie Chapman Catt, Albert Sprague Coolidge,
William E. Dodd, Sherwood Eddy, Edna Ferber, Christian Gauss,
Roswell G. Ham, Dashiell Hammett, Henry T. Hunt, Edward L.
Israel, Paul Kellogg, Rockwell Kent, John A. Kingsbury, Emil
Lengyel, Oscar E. Maurer, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Henry Mor-
genthau, William Allen Neilson, Marion Edwards Park, Dorothy
Parker, Charles Edward Russell, Alfred K. Stern, Paul H. Todd,
Harold C. Urey, Mary E. Wolley.
THESE EMINENT AMERICANS HAVE L'RGED THAT THE SPANISH EMBARGO BE LIFTED
Bishop Julius W. Atwood Rev. Francis J. McConnell Mary K. Simkhovitch
Rev. W. Russell Bowie Bishop Edward L. Par- Judge Milton E. Gibbs
Bishop Chauncey B.
Brewster
Rev. Hugh Elmer Brown
Eev. Raymond Calkins
Bishop Ralph S. Cushman
Bishon Charles K. Gilbert
Rev. Charles W. Gilkey
Rev. William E. Gilroy
Rev. L. O. Hartman
Rev. Ivan Lee Holt
Rev. Moses R. Lovett
Rev. Halford E. Luccock
sons
Rev. Harold C. Phillips
Rev. Daniel A. Poling
Rev. Julius S. Seebach
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise
Helen Hall
Linton B. Swift
Helen M. Harris
Elsie Voorhees Jones
Jessie Binford
Owen R. Lovejoy
Mary Van Kleeck
Judge Robert W. Kenny
Judge Arthur Le Sueur
Justice Justine Wise Pol-
ler
Justice James H. Wolfe
Hon. Charles Belous
Hon. Smith W. Brookhart
Prof. Leslie H. Buckler
Prof. Michael N. Chanalls
Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs
Hon. Paul J. Kern
Hon. Nathan R. Margold
1506
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
THESE EMINENT AMERICANS HAVE URGED THAT THE SPANISH EMBARGO BE LIFTED COI1.
Arthur Garfield Hays
Dorothy Kenyon
Louis F. MeCabe
Harold Riegelman
Frank P. Walsh
Dean Francis M. Shea
Natalie Bodanya
John Alden Carpenter
Elizabeth Sprague Cool-
idge
Walter Damrosch
Olin Downes
Jessica Dragonette
Rosina Lhevinne
Josef Lhevinne
Yehudi Menuhin
Alexander Smallens
Sigmund Spaeth
Lawrence Tibbett
Efrem Zimbalist
Ernest Hemingway
Theodore Dreiser
William Rose Benet
Margaret Culkin Banning
Countee Cullen
R. L. Duffus
Dorothy Canfield Fischer
Alfred Kreymborg
Upton Sinclair
John Steinbeck
Louis Adamic
Harry Elmer Barnes
Charles A. Beard
Sherwood Anderson
Franklin P. Adams
Maxwell Anderson
Brooks Atkinson
Stephen Vincent Benet
Pearl S. Buck
Vincent Sheean
Dorothv Thompson
Robert C. Clothier
Ada L. Comstoek
Henry Pratt Fairchild
Vida D. Scudder
Harold G. Urey
Hairy F. Ward
Henry L. Stimson
Margaret Bourke-White
George Biddle
Lewis Mumford
John Dewey
Daniel L. Marsh
A. F. Whitney
THEY SWEPT BACK NAPOLEON i
THE INVADERS OF 1939 WILL FOLLOW — IF THE EMBARGO
IS LIFTED
ACT NOW ! CUT OUT THIS COUPON
Capitol, Washington, D. G.
Joining with millions of other Americans of all political and religious faith, I
urgently request that the Embargo against Republican Spain be lifted now so
that world peace and democracy may be preserved. •
Name
Street Address
City State
Fill in name of your Senator or Representative and mail to Brig. Gen. H. C. Newcomer,
chairman, Washington Committee to Lift Spanish Embargo, room 100, 1410 M. Street NW.,
Washington, D. C.
Hon. Paul J. Kern, chair-
man : Honorary vice chair-
men : Hon. Henry T. Hunt,
Washington, D. C. ; Judge
Robert W. Kenny, Los
Angeles : Prof. Malcolm
Sharp, University of Chi-
cago.
Leo J. Linder, vice chairman ;
Prof. Herman A. Gray,
treasurer; Charles Rab-
bins, secretary.
St. Clair Adams, New Orleans
Spencer Austrian,
Los Angeles
S. John Block, New York
George K. Bowden, Chicago
Louis B. Boudin, New York
.lames L. Brewer. Rochester
Maurice C. Brigadier,
Jersey City
Bon. Smith W. Brookhart,
Washington, D. C.
Prof. Leslie H. Buckler,
University of Virginia
Prof. Michael N. Chandlis,
University of Newark
Russell N. Chase, Cleveland
Dr. Felix S. Cohen,
Washington, D. C.
Prof. Morris K. Cohen,
New York
W. A. Combs, Houston
Paul Coughlin, Seattle
Hon. Maurice P. Davidson,
New York
Exhibit No. 16
John P. Davis,
Washington, D. C.
Hon. Hubert T. Delaney,
New York
John D. Denison. Des Moines
Richard A. Dowling,
New Orleans
Osmond K. Freenkel,
New York
Walter Frank, New York
Leo Gallagher,
Los Angeles
Irwin Geiger,
Washington. D. C.
Max Golina, Milwaukee
Judge Milton E. Gibbs,
Rochester
Hon. Jonah J. Goldstein,
New York
Irvin Goodman, Portland
Dean Leon Green,
Northwestern University
Arthur J. Harvey, Albany
Prof. II. C. Havighurst,
Xort hwestern lTni versify
Arthur Garfield Hays.
New York
Charles II. Houston,
New Yoik-
Prof. Samuel Guy Inman,
New Yoik
Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs,
New York
Dorothy Kenyon, New York
Judge Arthur Le Sueur,
Minneapolis
Mark M. Litchman,
Seattle
Hon. Vito Marcantonio,
New York
Hon. Nathan R. Margold,
Washington, D. C.
Louis F. MeCabe,
Philadelphia
Carey McWilliams,
Los Angeles
Kenneth Meiklejohn,
Washington, D. C.
Samuel D. Menin, Denver
Darwin J. Mesorole,
New York
Prof. William E. Mikell,
Philadelphia
Earl E. .Miller. Dallas
Hon. Patrick H. O'Brien,
Detroit
Hon. Lsaac Pacht,
Los Angeles
Hon. J. Stuart Page,
Rochester
Nathaniel Phillips,
New York
Justice Justine Wise Polier,
Xew York
Walter H. l'ollak, New York
I Pressman, Pittsburgh
Prof. Leon A. Ransom,
Howard University
S. Roy Remar, Boston
STATE DEPARTMENT LMPLOYLE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1507
Harold Riegelman,
New Xorl
Mortimer Riemer,
Washington, 1). C.
Hon. Lester Wm. Roth,
Los Angeles
Harry Sacher,
New York
Exhibit No. 10 — Continued
Robert .1. Silberstein,
.\c\v Sork
s. Khan Spiegel,
Philadelphia
Harold Strauch, Hartford
Prof. Wesley A. Sturges,
Yale University
Maurice Sugar, Detroit
(Partial list )
A. Ovrum Tapper, Chicago
Dean William Taylor,
Howard University
Clare Warne, Los Angeles
Ruth Weyand, Chicago
Carlo Whitehead, l >enver
.1 list ice .lames 1 1. Wolfe,
Salt Lake City
Lawyers Committee on American Relations With Spain
150 Broadway
NEW YORK, N. Y.
REctor 2-S762
March 5, 1938.
A. Marx Levien, Esq.,
21 E. 40th St., New York City.
Dear Sir: We send you a Petition and Memorandum of Law on the Embargo
against Spain.
The eminent members of the bar and teachers of law who sponsor and endorse
the Petition and Memorandum firmly believe that the Embargo is legally un-
tenable and that it constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of interna-
tional law and an abandonment and reversal of traditional foreign policy of the
United States.
We urge you to join with us in requesting the reconsideration by the President
and the Congress of the policy of our government towards the republican govern-
ment of Spain.
We invite you to sign the Petition and secure the signatures of your colleagues
and friends in the profession. The matter is urgent and the prompt return of the
enclosed petition, duly signed, is earnestly requested.
Respectfully yours,
Paul J. Kern, Chairman.
Exhibit No. 17
Seventy organizations-
Chairman :
Susan Jenkins
Vice Chairmen :
Meyer Perednock
Winnifred Freeler
Rose Nelson
Secretary :
Gladys Holland
Treasurer :
Gertrude R. Prince
Executive Secretary :
Alice R. Collet
Executive Committee :
Jack Berbach
Dr. George Bersky
Annie S. Bromley
-settlement houses, consumers cooperatives, trade-unions, and
others — sponsor the committee
Sadie Cohen
George Wegmen Fish
Mildred Gutullig
Joseph Gross
Helen Hall
Isadore Kerr
Rudolph Kirwen
Felice Lourie
Dr. Mary Meekler
B. P. McLaurin
Plingerold Phillips
Jesse Raphael
Jessie Seator
Harold Wettenberg
Marion Wood
Advisory Board :
Ruth Beinduo
Morris L. Ernst
Dr. Lewis L. Harris
Arthur Keller
Dorothy Kenyon
Paul J. Kern
Dr. John A. Kingsbury
Henry W. Laidler
Dr. Charles A. Merkes
Frank Olmstead
Peggy Packard
A. Philip Randolph
Bernard Reis
Rose Schneiderman
Mary K. Shilberlich
Milk Consumers Protective Committee
Founded by Dr. Caroline Whitney
An Organization to Represent Consumer Interests
215 Fourth Avenue
GRamercy 5-4066
Chairman, Caroline Whitney Memorial Fund : Elinor Merrell
April 23, 1940.
Hon. John J. Dempset,
Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities,
House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir: As chairman of the Milk Consumers Protective Committee, I was
one of those consulted by Consumers Union in their preparation of a letter and
statement which they recently sent to you asking for a thorough investigation
1508 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
by your committee of the circumstances surrounding the preparation and release
of the report on "Communist Work in Consumer Organizations."
The facts and questionable circumstances indicating a conspiratorial relation-
ship between your committee's special investigator and an officer of Hearst's
Magazines. Inc.. are indeed, shocking. I urge that you make a thorough investi-
gation of these disclosures. I do so not only as chairman of one of the organiza-
tions attacked in the report, but also as a citizen. Such unorthodox procedure
on the part of a government body is contrary to our democratic traditions.
Respectfully,
Ashe Ingersoll, Chairman.
AI: RS.
Exhibit No. 18
Statement of Senator McCarthy ox Haldore Hansox
The next case is that of Haldore Hanson.
This man occupies one of the most strategically important offices in the entire
State Department.
It is my understanding that he joined the Department of State in February
1942, and is recognized in the Department as a specialist and expert on Chinese
Affairs.
Hanson, now Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Inter-Departmental
Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, will head up a Technical Co-
operation Projects Staff of the new Point 4 Program for aid to under developed
areas which will have charge of the expenditures of hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of our taxpayers' money over all the world. ( Source : Department of State
Departmental Announcements 41, dated February 21, 1950.)
The pro-Communist proclivities of Mr. Hanson go back to September 1938.
Hanson was a contributor to Pacific Affairs, the official publication of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, whose staff was headed by millionaire Frederick
Vanderbilt Field, an admitted Communist. Field has devoted bis entire fortune
to the Communist cause.
It is important that the committee keep in mind that Mr. Hanson also wrote
for the magazine Amerasia, of which Philip Jacob Jaffe was managing editor.
Jaffe was arrested, indicted, and found guilty of having been in illegal posses-
sion of several hundred secret documents from the State, Navy, War, and other
Government Department files.
Mr. Chairman, I have before me a document entitled "Department of State,
Departmental Announcement 41." The heading is "Establishment of the Interim
Office for Technical Cooperation and Development." Then in parenthesis, by way
of explanation of this rather high-sounding name, we find "Point Four Program."
The first paragraph of the order reads as follows :
"1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the As-
sistant Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Interim Office for Technical Co-
operation and Development (TCD)."
On page 4 we find that the chief of this Technical Cooperations Project Staff
is one Haldore Hanson.
Paragraph 2 on Page 1 sets forth the following responsibilities of Hanson's
division :
"The Interim Office ,is assigned general responsibility within the Department
for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical as-
sistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (h) directing the planning
in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point
Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely
upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other compo-
nents of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance pro-
grams as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the Ad-
ministrative area for the performance of service functions."
From this it would appear that his division will have a tremendous amount of
power and control over the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars which the
President proposes to spend under his Point Four Program, or what he has
referred to as the "Bold New Plan."
Hanson's appointment is not made b.\ the President, hut by the State Depart-
ment and is not subject to any Senate confirmation. Therefore, it would seem
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1509
rather Important to examine the background and the philosophy of this young
man.
The State Department Biographical Register gives what would on its face
seem to be a chronological story of an increasingly successful young man. It
shows that he graduated from college, for example, in 1934 at the age of 22; that
he was a teacher in Chinese colleges from 1934 to 1937; and then a press cor-
respondent in China from 1936 to 1939; a staff writer from 1938 to 1942; then
in 1942 he got a job in the State Department at $4,600 a year ; that in 1944 he was
listed as a specialist in Chinese affairs at $5,600; that in 1945 he was made Ex-
ecutive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State at $6,50U ; that in May of
1948 he was made assistant chief of the area division number 3; that on June 28,
1948, he was made acting chief for the Far Eastern Area, Public Affairs Over-
seas Program Staff; that on November 14, 1948, he was made Executive Director
of the Secretariat of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cul-
tural Cooperation. There is certainly nothing unusual about this biography.
Nothing there to indicate that this man might be dangerous in the State Depart-
ment as Chief for the Far Eastern Area Public Affairs, Overseas Program Staff,
during a time when the Communists were taking over China. However, much is
left out of this biography. It does not show, for example, that this young man
was running a Communist magazine in Peiping when the Japanese-Chinese war
broke out. It does not show, for example, that he spent several years with the
Communist armies in China, writing stories and taking pictures which the
Chinese Communists helped him smuggle out of the country. Nor does this
biography show that this man, after his return from China, wrote a book — a book
which sets forth his pro-Communist answer to the problems of Asiz as clearly
as Hitler's Mein Kampf set forth his solutions for the problems of Europe.
Nothing that he has said or done since would indicate that he repudiates
a single line of that book.
This man clearly believes that the Communists in China stand for everything
that is great and good. His is not the picture of a mercenary trying to sell his
country out for thirty pieces of silver. In reading his book, you are impressed
with the fact that he firmly believes the Communist leaders in China are great
and good men and that all of Asia would benefit by being communized.
Take, for example, what he had to say about Mao Tse-tung, the head of the
Communist Party at that time and now the Communist ruler of China, and Chu
Teh, commander in chief of the 8th Route Communist Army, and according to
Life magazine of January 23, 1950, Number Two man in prestige to Mao Tse-
Tung.
In Chapter 23, entitled "Political Utopia on Mt. Wut'Ai", in describing a meet-
ing with an American Major Carlson, here is what he had to say :
"We stayed up till midnight exchanging notes on guerrilla armies, the farm
unions, and the progress of the war. I was particularly interested in the Com-
munist leaders whom Carlson had just visited and whom I was about to meet.
Mao Tze-Tung, the head of the Communist Party, Carlson characterized as 'the
most selfless man I ever met, a social dreamer, a genius living fifty years ahead
of his time.' And Chu Teh, commander in chief of the 8th Route Army was 'the
prince of generals, a man with the humility of Lincoln, the tenacity of Grant,
and the kindliness of Robert E. Lee.' "
For a man slated a chief of the bureau which may have the job of spending
hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the world this indicates, to say the
least, a disturbing amount of hero worship for the number one and number two
Communist leaders in the Far East today.
On page 349, he condemns the right wing groups in the Chinese Government
for "fighting against the Democratic revolution as proposed by Mao Tse Tung
and the Communists."
On the same page he points out that anti-Red officials within the government
were making indirect attacks upon the Communists and that "leaders of the
Communist youth corps were arrested by military officers at Hankow. I myself
was the victim of one of these incidents and found that local officials were
the instigators."
From Hanson's book it appears that the Nationalist government knew of his
close collaboration with the Communist Army. For example, on page 350, we
find that his passport was seized by the police in Sian when they found that
he was traveling from Communist guerrilla territory to the Communist head-
quarters. He states that the man responsible "for this illegal action was
governor Ching Ting-Wen — one of the most rabid anti-Red officials in China.
The governor's purpose was merely to suppress news about the Communists."
1510 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Before quoting further from this book written hy Mr. Hanson, it might be
well to give a clearer picture of the job which Secretary Acheson has picked
out for him. The State Department document lists some of the duties of his
bureau as follows :
1. Developing over-all policies for the program.
2. Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
3. Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus
and making necessary adjustments.
4. Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for
U. S. bilateral programs.
5. Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies
and with other D. S. agencies participating in the coordinated program or other-
wise carrying on technical assistance activities.
1. Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for indi-
vidual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
2. Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from
any other source.
.°>. Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
4. Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate and
give administrative and program support to bilateral programs.
5. Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
6. Proposing program changes.
7. Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities and
reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.
This gives you some idea of the tremendous powers of the agency in which
Mr. Hanson is a top flight official.
Let us go back to Hanson's writings :
All thi-ough the hook he shows that not only did he have complete confidence
in the Communist leaders but that they also had complete confidence in him.
On page 256 he refers to how Communist generals Nie and Lu Chen-Tsao acted
as his couriers, smuggling packets of films and news stories for him with the
aid of Communist guerrilla spies into Peiping.
In this connection I might say that he very frankly points out that the Com-
munists do not tolerate anyone who is not completely on their side. Hansom
makes it very clear all through the book that he is not only on the Communist side,
but that he has the attitude of a hero worshiper for the Chinese Communist
leaders.
His respect and liking for the Communist leaders permeates almost every
chapter of the hook. For example, on page 284 and page 285, he tells about how
some ragged wail's whom he had gathered into his sleeping quarters regarded
Mao Tse Tung and Chu Ted as "Gods." He then goes on to tell about their
favorite Communist General, Holung, and states that they convinced him that
Holung was a very extraordinary man whom they described as "big as a Shan-
tungese, heavy as a restaurant cook but quick as a cat in battle." He then goes
on to describe on page 285 how. when he met General Holung, he found him to
be much as the hero-worshipping boys had described him. "He is." said Hanson,
"a living picture of Rhett Butler from the pages of Gone With the Wind."
This praise of Chinese Communist leaders — goes on page after page. On page
278, he describes Communist General P'eng as the most rigid disciplinarian and
"the most persistent student of world affairs."
In Chapter 26, he speaks with apparent bated breath of the "Brain Trust" of
Communisl leaders who were immortalized by Edgar Snow in his Red star Over
China.
On page 295 in referring to two other Communist generals, he says: "Should
this book ever fall into Communist hands, I must record that those two lonely
men made excellent company during my three weeks in Yenan."
After describing in complimentary manner tins university and the students,
on page 296 he says. "Every cadet divides his time between political and military
subjects. On the one hand he listens to lectures on Marxian philosophy, the
historj of the Chinese Revolution, the technique of leading a mass movement:
on the other hand he studies guerrilla tactics, the use of military maps, and the
organization of a military labor corps."
On page 297 he points out that no tuition is charged at the academy and that
each student is supplied with uniform, books, and food, plus a pocket allowance,
and then has this to say: •'Some recent visitors to Yenan have spread a report
that the academies are supported by Russian rubles — a thin piece of gossip. /
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1511
was told by several Chinese lenders, mchiding Mao Tse-Tung, that the largest
contributions came from American sympathizers in New York."
On page 297 and 298, BansoD relates that in talking to one of the Nationalist
war lords. "I suggested that he could learn a great deal from the Communists
about discipline and integrity of Leadership."
On page 303, Hanson has this to say. "My attitude toward Communist China's
leaders was a mixture of respect for their personal integrity and a resentment
of i heir suspiciousness. They impressed me as a group of hard-headed, straight-
shooting realists."
After an interview with Mao Tse Tung lie states, "I left with the feeling that
he was the least pretentious man in Yenan and the most admired. He is a com-
pletely selfless man."
Following is Hansons description of how the Reds took over. I quote from
page 102:
"Whenever a village was occupied for the first time, the Reds arrested the
landlords and tax collectors, held a public tribunal, executed a few and intimi-
dated the others, then redistributed the land as fairly as possible."
In Chapter 28, in comparing the Communists to Chiang Kai-shek's troops,
Hanson had this to say:
"I left Yenan with only one conviction about the Communists ; that they were
fighting against the Japanese more wholeheartedly than any other group in
China."
He then goes on to condemn "Red baiting" officials in Chungking.
On page 312 of his book. Hanson quotes a Communist editor as stating as
follows :
"Our relationship to the U. S. S. R. is no different than that of the American
Communist Party. We respect the work of Russia's leaders and profit by their
experience wherever we can, but the problems of China are not the same as
those of Russia. We plan our program from a Chinese point of view."
Hanson then adds, ''The explanation seemed logical enough to me."
In connection with Hanson's position as Chief of the Technical Cooperation
Projects Staff, in charge of Truman's Point Four Program, the following on
pages 312 and 313 of his book would seem especially significant. He quotes
Mao Tse Tung as follows : "China cannot reconstruct its industry and com-
merce without the aid of British and American capital."
Can there be much doubt as to whether the Communists or the anti-Communist
forces in Asia will receive aid under the Point Four Program with Hanson
in charge?
Gentlemen, here is a man with a mission — a mission to communize the world —
a man whose energy and intelligence coupled with a burning all-consuming
mission has raised him by his own bootstraps from a penniless operator of a
Leftist magazine in Peiping in the middle thirties to one of the architects of
our foreign policy in the State Department today — a man who, according to
State Department announcement No. 41 will be largely in charge of the spend-
ing of hundreds of millions of dollars in such areas of the world and for such
purposes as he decides.
Gentlemen, if Secretary Acheson gets away with his plan to put this man
to a great extent in charge of the proposed Point Four Program, it will, in my
opinion, lend tremendous impetus to the tempo at which Communism is en-
gulfing the world.
On page 32 of his book, Hanson justifies "The Chinese Communists chopping
off the heads of landlords — all of which is true," because of "hungry farmers."
That the farmers are still hungry after the landlords' heads have been removed
apparently never occurred to him.
On page 31 he explained that it took him some time to appreciate the appalling
problems which the Chinese Communists were attempting to solve.
In Chapter 4 of Hanson's book, he presents the stock Communists' arguments
for the so-called Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939.
Secretary Acheson is now putting Hanson in the position to help the Com-
munists solve the "appalling problems" in other areas of the world with hun-
dreds of millions or bilious of American dollars.
The obvious area in which this man will start using American money to help
the Communists solve the people's problem will be Indo-China and India.
It should be pointed out that this case was brought to the attention of State
Department officials as long ago as May 14, 1947. At that time, the Honorable
Fred Busbey, on the floor of the House discussed this man's affinity for the
Communist cause in China.
1512 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 19
[Department of State. Departmental Announcement 41]
Establishment ok the Interim Office fob Technical Cooperation and
Development (Point Four Program)
1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs [the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation
and Development (TCD)].
2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department
for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assist-
ance to economically underdeveloped areas and (&) directing the planning in
preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point
Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely
upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other com-
ponents of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance
programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the
Administrative area for the performance of service functions.
3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for :
(c) Developing over-all policies for the program.
(&) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
(c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bu-
reaus and making necessary adjustments.
(d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds
for U. S. bilateral programs.
(e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental
agencies and with other U. S. agencies participating in the coordinatpd
program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.
(f) Reviewing instructions to the field.
4. Tbe Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies
governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance
programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of
employment, and utilization of training facilities.
5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assist-
ance programs for :
(a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for
individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
(b) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate
from any other source.
(c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
(d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate,
and give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
(e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
(f ) Proposing program changes.
(<7) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities,
and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance pro-
grams. .
Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection
with the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion Aid programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected
by this announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where
circumstances require.
6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has :
(a) Action responsibility for :
1. Developing the U. S. position concerning the international organizational
machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance activities;
2. Developing the U. S. position concerning the relative proportions of con-
tributions to be made by the U. S. and by other countries to the special
technical assistance accounts of international organizations ;
3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts.
(&) Advisory responsibility concerning:
1. The character and scope of technical cooperation programs undertaken
by international organizations ;
2. The amounts of U. S. contributions to the special technical assistance
accounts of international organizations ;
3. U. S. positions on program allocations from such accounts by interna-
tional organizations.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1513
The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with interna-
tional organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for
direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized
agencies and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or
U. S. agencies on operating program matters as requested by the Interim Office.
The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding arrangements with
respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American states.
7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical assist-
ance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set forth in
the Organization .Manual of the Department.
(a) Tbe Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the In-
ternational Bank and Monetary Fund.
(P) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the
Internationa] Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation
Organization.
(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.
8. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and
technical exchange activities under the U. S. Information and Educational Ex-
change Act of 1948, and under the Act of August i), 1939, authorizing the Presi-
dent to render closer and more effective the relationship between the American
Republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific economic
development projects, is transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange
to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development. Activities
which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of Educational
Exchange. The functions, personnel, and records of the Secretariat of the Inter-
departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are trans-
ferred from the Office of Education Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical
Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions connected
with the publication of "The Record'' and the corresponding personnel and
records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.
9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Depart-
ment's representative on, and the Chairman of, the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistance Secretary
for Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee
on Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical
Cooperation and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.
10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs advise
the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the economic
feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the standpoint of
their respective specialized interests ; make or arrange for such economic studies
and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development
may require; and maintain liaison with U. S. and international agencies and
with private organizations on matters within their respective fields of interest
as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance programs.
11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Coop-
eration and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other para-
graphs above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future,
carried on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises
all responsibilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Insti-
tute's program. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development
and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for develop-
ing such working arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration
of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated
technical assistance program.
12. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists
of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated
officers :
Director : Leslie A. Wheeler, Ext. 3871.
Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief: Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011,
5012.
Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief: Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext
4r»71, 4572.
Technical Cooperation Management Staff: Richard R. Brown, Director of
Executive Staff. E. Ext. 2155.
(February 21, 1950 J
1514 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 20
Senator McCarthy's Statement on Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer
I should now like to take up the case of Esther Caukin Brunauer, Assistant
Director of Policy Liaison, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State, as a
salary of $9,70G a year according to the current Federal Register.
I urgently request that this committee give serious consideration to the details
of this case and act immediately to ascertain the facts.
Mrs. Brunauer was fur many years Executive Secretary of the American Asso-
ciation of University Women.
Mrs. Brunauer was instrumental in committing this organization to the support
of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-called consumer held. One
such instance of this activity was reported in the New York Times of April 27,
1943. In that case the American Association of University Women joined with
Consumers Union, The League of Women Shoppers, and other completely Com-
munist controlled fronts. I have explained to the committee that these organiza-
tions have heen declared subversive by various governmental agencies.
Exhibit R indicates that Mrs. Brunauer presided at a Washington meeting of
the American Friends of the Soviet Union. This organization has been cited as
subversive by the Attorney General of the United States, the House Committee
on Un-American Activities and the California Committee on Un-American
Activities. The principal speaker at this meeting was Myra Page, long an
avowed leader of the Communist Party and frequent writer for the Daily Worker
and other Communist periodicals.
Certainly this committee has no doubts as to the domination by the Communist
Party of the American Youth Congress. It has been cited as subversive by the
Attorney General and other governmental agencies.
Exhibit S shows Esther Caukin Brunauer was a signer of the call to the annual
meeting of the American Youth Congress in 193S.
Esther Brunauer is the wife of Stephen Brunauer, a Hungarian by birth. He
is a scientist who has had the rank of Commander in the United States Navy and
his scientific work has involved some of the topmost defense secrets which the
armed forces of his country possess.
I think it highly important that this committee immediately, in accordance
with their mandate from the Senate, obtain the files of the Federal Bureau of
Invesigation, Naval Intelligence, and the State Department on the activities of
Stephan Brunauer, the husband of this ranking official of the State Department.
I ask that the committee immediately seek to learn whether or not Stephan
Brunauer has
1. Been the subject of a constant investigation by government agencies over
a period of ten years.
2. A close friend and collaborator of Noel Field, known Communist who re-
cently and mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.
3. He has admitted to associates that he was a member of the Communist
party.
I am reluctant to go any further into this case but I am prepared to produce
competent witnesses who will testily to the importance of immediate action in
this matter.
It can be readily shown that at least three government agencies have been
sifting the activities of a small group of people whose work seriously threatens
the security of the country.
Certainly the Communist front activities of Mrs. Brunauer are sufficient to
seriously question her security status.
Exhibit No. 21
"WHO RULES IX SOVIET RUSSIA/"
A Lecture by Myra Page, Author — Educator — Lecturer. Typographical Tkm-
ci];. 423 G Street, X. W., Thursday, June 11th, 1936, S: 3u I'. M. Dr. Esther
Brunaukr. Will Preside
"A timely and interesting discussion on a much debated subject hy a well-
known American writer, who has spent 2 years in The Soviet Union. Myra Page
is the author of several hooks. Her most recent one is ".Moscow Yankee.'' She
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1515
is an instructor ;it Commonwealth College in Arkansas. Formerly on the staff
of the "Moscow Daily News." she is a contributor to the "Nation," "New Re-
public," and other American periodicals and is on the Editorial staff of the Maga-
zine "Soviet Russia Today."
Admission ::."> Cents. Auspices A. F. S. U.
Exhibit No. 22
Calling the Congress of Youth
We the undersigned* urged the organizations of youth and the agencies serving
youth to respond to this Call to the Congress of Youth. We take the initiative
in calling the young people of America together to give them an opportunity to
consider their mutual problems and train themselves for self-government by
practicing citizenship.
John P. Davis. National Negro Congress.
Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child
Labor Committee.
Dorothy Canfield Fisher.
W. P. Freeman, Order of Rainbow
Girls.
T. Arnold Hill, National Urban League.
Chas Kimball, League of Nations Asso-
ciation.
Mrs. Elgerton Parsons, Pan-Pacific
Women's Association.
Leland Rex Robinson, League of Na-
tions Association.
Lester F. Scott, Camp Fire Girls.
George N. Sinister, Commonweal.
George Soule, editor, the New Republic.
Monroe Smith, American Youth Hostels
Association.
Oswald Garrison Villard, the Nation.
< !. W. Warbasse, Cooperative League of
the U. S. A.
Richard Welling. National Self -Govern-
ment Committee.
Max Yergan, International Committee
on African Affairs.
women's organization
Mary McLeod Bethune, National Coun-
cil of Negro Women.
Esther Caukin Brunauer, American As-
sociation of University Women.
Hannah Clothier Hull, Women's Inter-
national League for Peace and Free-
dom.
Lena Madesin Phillips, International
Federation of Business and Profes-
sional Women.
Josephine Schain, National Committee
on the Cause and Cure of War.
health
Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, American
Public Health Association.
Dr. Kendall Emerson, National Tuber-
culosis Association.
Dr. Edward Hume. Christian Medical
Council for Overseas Work.
E. D. Mitchell, Journal of Health and
Physical Education.
William F. Snow, American Social Hy-
giene Association.
education
LeRoy E. Bowman.
William H. Bristow, National Congress
of Parents and Teachers.
Mrs. H. R. Butler, National Congress of
Colored Parents and Teachers.
President W. W. Comfort, Haverford
College.
President Donald J. Cowling, Carleton
College.
President John W. Davis, West Virginia
State College.
Edgar J. Fisher, Institute of Interna-
tional Education.
Robert Morss Lovett, University of Chi-
cago.
President Henry Noble MacCracken,
Yassar College.
Acting President Nelson P. Mead, Col-
lege of the City of New York.
Ordway Tead, Board of Education, New
York.
Irina E. Voight, National Association of
Deans of Women.
Mary E. Woolley, president emeritus,
Mount Holyoke College.
*The signers are issuing this Call, not as the official representatives of their organiza-
tions, but in their personal capacities as individuals deeply concerned with the role of
young people in the United States.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2-
1516
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
TRADE UNION
Luigi Antoninni, International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union.
Hevwood Broun, American Newspaper
Guild.
Redmond Burr, Order of Railway Te-
legraphers.
Jerome Davis, American Federation of
Teachers.
Frank Gillmore, Associated Actors and
Artists of America.
J. B. S. Hardman, editor, the Advance,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America.
Gardner Jackson, Labor's Nonpartisan
League.
Spencer Miller, Jr., Workers Education
Bureau of America.
Philip Murray, Steel Workers Organiz-
ing Committee.
A. Philip Randolph, Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters.
Reid Robinson, International Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.
Rose Schneiderman, Women's Trade
Urn ion League.
A. F. Whitney, Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen.
SOCIAL SERVICE
Lucy P. Carner, Council of Social Agen-
cies of Chicago.
Charlotte Carr, Hull House.
Hazel E. Foster, Association of Church
Social Workers.
Helen Hall, National Federation of
Settlements.
Fred K. Hoehler, American Public Wel-
fare Association.
Howard R. Knight, National Confer-
ence of Social Work.
Eduard C. Lindenian, New York School
of Social Work.
Francis H. McLean, Family Welfare
Association of America.
Lillie M. Peck, National Federation of
Settlements.
Mary K. Simkhovitch, Greenwich
House.
Lillian D. Wald, Henry Street Settle-
ment House.
GOVERNMENT
Ruth O. Blakeslee, Social Security
Board.
C. A. Bottolfsen, Governor of Idaho.
Arnold B, Cammerer, National Parks
Service.
Arthur Capper, U. S. Senator from
Kansas.
John M. Coffee, U. S. Representative
from Washington.
L. D. Dickenson, Governor of Michigan.
government — continued
Matthew A. Dunn, U. S. Representative
from Pennsylvania.
James A. Farley, U. S. Postmaster Gen-
eral.
Thomas F. Ford, U. S. Representative
from California.
Frank W. Fries, U. S. Representative
from Illinois.
Lee E. Geyer, U. S. Representative from
California.
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the In-
terior.
Ed. V. Izak, U. S. Representative from
California.
R. T. Jones, Governor of Arizona.
Marvel M. Logan, U. S. Senator from
Kentucky.
Robert Marshall, United States For-
estry Service.
John Moses, Governor of North Dakota.
James E. Murray. U. S. Senator from
Montana.
Culbert L. Olson, Governor of Cali-
fornia.
Robert F. Wagner. U. S. Senator from
New York.
C. W. Warburton, U. S. Department of
Agriculture.
M. L. Wilson, Under Secretary of
Agriculture.
RELIGIOUS
Henry A. Atkinson. World Alliance for
International Friendship Through
the Churches.
Naomi Brodie, Junior Hadassah.
Mrs. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Young
Women's Christian Association.
Samuel M. Cohen. Young People's
League of the United Synagogue of
America.
Bishop Ralph S. Cushman, Methodist
Episcopal Church.
Robert C. Dexter, American Unitarian
Association.
Mrs. Kendall Emerson, Young Women's
Christian Association.
Frederick L. Fagley, General Council
of the Congregational and Christian
Churches.
Stephen H. Fritchnian, Unitarian
Youth Commission.
William E. Gardner, National Young
People's Christian Union of the
Universalist Church.
Philip B. Heller, American Jewish
Congress.
Rufus M. Jones, American Friends
Service Committee.
Caroline B. Lourie. National Council of
Jewish Juniors.
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.
J. Carrel] Morris, Chistian Youth
Council of North America.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1517
religious — continued
Helen Morton. National Intercollegiate Katherine Terrill, Council for Social
Christian Council. Action, Congregation and Christian
Reverend A. Clayton Powell, Jr., , Church.
Abyssinian Baptist Church. Jls4dat7on' * Christian
Henrietta Roelofs, Young Women's Chai.les c> Webber, Methodist Federa-
Christian Association. tioI1 for Social Service.
Carl C. Seitter, National Council of Bishop Herbert Welch, Methodist Epis-
Methodist Youth. copal Church.
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Support of —
Thonias-Larrabee Federal Aid to Education Bill.
Wagner Health Bill.
Bloom Neutrality Act Revision Bill.
Pittman Resolution embargoing violators of Nine-Power Treaty.
Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bill.
Mitchell Bill barring discrimination on interstate carriers.
Wagner Labor Relations Act without amendment.
Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill.
Amendments to Social Security Act extending benefits to migratory, agri-
cultural and domestic workers.
Pensions of $60 per month at age 60.
Extension of Federal Farm Loans.
Placement of C. C. C. under civilian control and extension of educational
program.
Expansion of N. Y. A. and W. P. A.
Ratification of —
Child Labor Amendment.
Repeal of —
Oriental Exclusion Act.
Opposition to —
Smith Omnibus Bill and others directed at curtailment of civil liberties.
OFFICERS ELECTED
The Nominations Committee, elected at the Congress, presented a slate of
Officers, made up from nominations received from organizations and State
Delegation meetings, to the Joint Session of Senate and House. At the Session,
declinations, substitutions, and nominations were accepted from the floor and a
final ballot distributed for the vote resulting in the election of the following
Officers :
Chairman — Jack McMichael, National Intercollegiate Christian Council.
Vice-Chairmen :
J. Carrel Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America.
James B. Carey, United Electric, Radio and Machine Workers of America.
Mary Jeanne McKay, National Student Federation of America.
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.
Edward E. Strong/National Negro Congress, Youth Section.
James V. Krakora, Czechoslovak Society of America.
(Representative of farm organization to be named later).
Regional representatives :
New England : Alexander Karanikas, Massachusetts Youth Congress.
Middle Atlantic : Michael Gravino, New York State Youth Council.
East Central : Myrtle Powell, Pittsburgh Y. W. C. A.
South : Thelma Dale, Southern Negro Youth Congress.
Miss Jimmy Woodward, Y. W. C. A., Randolph-Macon College.
South West : Wynard Norman, Oklahoma Citv Youth Assembly.
West Central : Harlan Crippen, Minnesota Youth Assembly.
West Coast and Rocky Mountain : Clara Walldow, California Youth Legis-
lature.
Puerto Rico : Julia Rivera.
1518 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Treasurer : Harriet Pickens, Business and Professional Council, Y. W. C. A.
Executive Secretary : Joseph Cadden.
Representatives-at-Large :
Clarence Carter, Connecticut Conference of Youth.
Daniel J. Spooner, Young Peoples League of the United Synagogue of
America.
Howard Ennes, Washington, D. C, Youth Council.
Joseph Lash, American Student Union.
Margeret Day, National Federation of Settlements.
Josiah R. Bartlett, Social Action Committee, Union Theological Seminary.
(Representatives of Industrial Council, Y. W. C. A. and an A. F. of L. Union
to be named later.)
Elected Officers listed above constitute the Cabinet of the American Youth
Congress.
The Cabinet, meeting on July 5, made the following appointments :
Administrative Secretary — Frances M. Williams.
Legislative Director — Abbott Simon.
CREDENTIALS REPORT
Presented b/i the Chairman of the Credentials Committee, Roy Lancaster of the
ria.s By-Product, Coke and Chemical Workers.
73t> Senators and Representatives representing organizations with a total
membership of 4,G')7,915 (after subtraction for duplication) are accredited at
the Congress of Yoath. Of these, 96 are Senators delegated by 63 different
national organizations ; 640 are Representatives from 450 organizations.
Representation of women is approximately two-thirds that of men. The
youngest delegate is 14 years old and the median age is 22.
Exhibit No. 23
[From the New York Times, Thursday, March 16, 1939]
New Peace Group Is Organized Here — 17 Leaders of Various U. S. Organiza-
tions Join in Drive for Cooperative Program — Oppose Isolation Policy —
Revision of Neutrality Act To Be Sought — Eichelberger Is Elected
Chairman
A new peace organization to campaign for international cooperation under the
leadership of the United States, as distinguished from isolation, was started
here yesterday under the name of the American Union for Concerted Peace
Efforts.
In launching it, seventeen leaders of national organizations declared their con-
viction that the only road to peace for the United States and the world was a
vigorous three-point foreign policy : "To oppose aggression, to promote justice
between nations, to develop adequate peace machinery."
The new peace union likewise announced plans for a Conference of One Hun-
dred to be held in Washington on April 15 and 16 to bring together leaders of
organized public opinion.
Eichelberger Is Chairman
Clark M. Eichelberger, national director of the League of Nations Association,
who was elected chairman of the executive committee of the new peace body,
said yesterday it would emphasize a campaign to support the revision of our
present Neutrality Act along the lines of the amendment recently introduced by
Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah.
This amendment would have the practical effect of giving the President and
Congress an opportunity to decide who was the aggressor and to withhold the
economic resources of the United States from the aggressor while continuing to
supply aid to the victim.
"World cooperation alone can protect American interests," said the statement
of principles announcing the new group. "Consequently we support the leader-
ship of the United States in the cooperative use of its moral, diplomatic, and eco-
nomic power to find ways short of war to let the aggressor know that he can go
no further."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1519
Henry A. Atkinson, general secretary of the World Alliance for International
Friendship Through the Church and Church Peace Union, is vice chairman of the
ii '\v peace anion; Edgar J. Fisher, assistant director of the Institute of Inter-
national Education, is treasurer: and William W. Hinckley, chairman of the
National Council of the American Youth Congress, is secretary.
OTHERS ON THE COUNCIL
Other members of the executive committee are:
Vera W. Beggs, chairman of international relations, General Federation of
Women's Clubs.
Esther Caukin Brunauer, associate in international education, American Asso-
ciation of University Women.
Charles G. Fenwick, Professor of International Law, Bryn Mawr College.
Margaret Forsyth, chairman, women's committee, American League for Peace
and Democracy.
Emily J. Hickman, chairman, international section, public affairs committee,
National Board, YWCA.
Alves Long, former chairman, department of international relations, General
Federation of Women's Clubs. •
Rhoda McCullock, editor of Women's Press, published by the National Board
of the YWCA.
Marion M. Miller, executive secretary, National Council of Jewish Women.
Hugh Moore of Easton, Pa.
Josephine Schain, chairman, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of
War.
James T. Shotwell, president, League of Nations Association.
Mary E. Woolley. chairman, international relations committee, American
Association of University Women.
Exhibit No. 24
[From the New York Times, December 3, 1938]
Peace Group Seeks Aggressor Curbs — Committee Starts Campaign for an
Amendment to ( >ur Neutrality Statute — Would Aid Victim States — Present
Act Assailed as Not Being Neutral and Danger to Peace of This Country
The Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts, composed of leaders of fifteen
national organizations interested in world peace, started a campaign yesterday
for an amendment to the United States Neutrality Act so this country can
"determine the aggressor and apply embargoes to that State only and not to
its innocent victim." The committee's statement, it announced, had been signed
by the entire membership.
The statement called on the American people to write to their Members of
Congress urging "an amendment which will distinguish between aggressor and
victim ; which will stop shipments of munitions and raw materials to aggi'essors."
The present act, according to the statement "is not neutral" and "encourages
aggression and rebellion," "is un-American," and "endangers the peace of the
United States."
The committee asserted that "if these changes were made and the act invoked
Japan could no longer secure from us the 54 percent of the essential war supplies
she must purchase from abroad in order to continue her war in China." The
act. said the committee, should provide that "whenever the President finds that
war exists between nations, in violation of the Kellogg Pact or any other treaty
to which the United States is a party" he shall consult with other States at
peace, determine the aggressor and apply the embargo.
The membership of the committee, as made public yesterday, follows :
Clark M. Eichelberger, national director, League of Nations Association, and
chairman, Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts.
Henry A. Atkinson, general secretary. World Alliance for International Friend-
ship Through the Churches and Church Peace Union.
Edgar J. Fisher, assistant director, Institute of International Education.
William W. Hinckley, chairman. National Council, American Youth Congress.
Mrs. Vera W. Beggs, chairman, International Relations of General Federation of
Women's Clubs.
1520
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, associate in international education, American
Association of University Women.
Charles G. Fenwick, president, Catholic Association for International Peace.
Mrs. Margaret Forsyth, chairman, women's committee, American League for
Peace and Democracy.
Dr. Emily J. Hickman, chairman, international section, public affairs committee,
national board, Y. W. O. A.
Miss Alves Long, former chairman, department of international relations,
General Federation of Women's Clubs.
Mrs. Marion M. Miller, executive secretary, National Council of Jewish Women.
Miss Henrietta Roelofs, executive of public affairs committee, National Board
of Young Women's Christian Association.
Miss Josephine Schain, chairman, national committee on the Cause and Cure
of War.
James T. Shotwell, president, League of Nations Association.
Dr. Mary E. Woolley, chairman, international relations committee, American
Association of University Women,
Exhibit No. 25
PROCEEDINGS— CONGRESS OF YOUTH, JULY 1-5, 1939, NEW YORK CITY
Calling the Congress of Youth
We the Undersigned* urge the organization of youth and the agencies serving
youth to respond to this Call to the Congress of Youth. We take the initiative
in calling the young people of America together to give them an opportunity
to consider their mutual problems and train themselves for self-government by
practicing citizenship.
John P. Davis, National Negro Congress
Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child
Labor Committee
Dorothy Canfield Fisher
W. P. Freeman, Order of Rainbow for
Girls
T. Arnold Hill, National Urban League
Chase Kimball, League of Nations As-
sociations
Mrs. Edgerton Parsons, Pan-Pacific
Women's Association
Leland Rex Robinson, League of Nations
Association
Lester F. Scott, Camp Fire Girls
George N. Shuster, "Commonweal"
George Soule, Editor, "The New Re-
public"
Monroe Smith, American Youth Hostels
Association
Oswald Garrison Villard, "The Nation"
C. W. Warbasse, Cooperative League of
the U. S. A.
Richard Welling. National Self-Govern-
ment Committee
Max Yergan, International Committee
on African Affairs
women's organizations
Mary McLeod Bethune, National Coun-
cil of Negro Women
Esther Caukin Brunauer, American As-
sociation of University Women
Hannah Clothier Hull, Women's Inter-
national League for Peace and Free-
dom
women's organizations — continued
Lena Madesin Phillips, International
Federation of Business and Profes-
sional Women
Josephine Schain, National Committee
on the Cause and Cure of War
health
Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, American Pub-
lic Health Association
Dr. Kendall Emerson, National Tuber-
culosis Association
Dr. Edward Hume, Christian Medical
Council for Overseas Work
E. D. Mitchell, Journal of Health and
Physical Education
William F. Snow, American Social Hy-
giene Association
EDUCATION
LeRoy E. Bowman
William II. Bristow, National Congress
of Parents and Teachers
Mrs. H. R. Butler, National Congress
of Colored Parents and Teachers
President W. W. Comfort, Haverford
College
President Donald
College
President John W
State College
Edgar J. Fisher, Institute of Interna-
tional Education
J. Cowling, Carleton
Davis, West Virginia
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1521
education — continued
Robert Moras Lovett, University of Chi-
cago
President Henry Noble MacCracken,
Yassar College
Acting President Nelson P. Mead, Col-
lege of the City of New York
Ordwav Tead, Board of Education, New
York
lrma E. Voight, National Association of
Deans of Women
Mary E. Woolley, President Emeritus,
Mount Holyoke College
TRADE-UNION
Luigi Antonini, International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union
Hevwood Broun, American Newspaper
Guild
Redmond Burr, Order of Railway Teleg-
raphers
Jerome Davis. American Federation of
Teachers
Frank Gillmore, Associated Actors and
Artists of America
J. B. 8. Hardman. Editor, "The Ad-
vance," Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America
Gardner Jackson, Labor's Non-Partisan
League
Spencer Miller, Jr., Workers Education
Bureau of America
Philip Murray, Steel Workers Organiz-
ing Committee
A. Philip Randolph, Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters
Reid Robinson, International Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
Rose Schneiderman, Women's Trade
Union League
A. F. Whitney, Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen
SOCIAL SERVICE
Lucy P. Carner, Council of Social Agen-
cies of Chicago
Charlotte Carr, Hull House
Hazel E. Foster, Association of Church
Social Workers
Helen Hall, National Federation of Set-
tlements
Fred K. Hoehler, American Public Wel-
fare Association
Howard R. Knight, National Confer-
ence of Social Work
Eduard C. Lindeman, New York School
of Social Work
Francis H. McLean, Family Welfare As-
sociation of America
Lillie M. Peck, National Federation of
Settlements
Mary K. Simkhovitch, Greenwich House
Lillian D. Wald, Henry Street Settle-
ment House
GOVERNMENT
Ruth O. Blakeslee, Social Security
Board
C. A. Bottolfsen, Governor of Idaho
Arnold B. Cammerer, National Park
Service
Arthur Capper, U. S. Senator from
Kansas
John M. Coffee, U. S. Representative
from Washington
L. D. Dickenson, Governor of Michigan
Matthew A. Dunn, U. S. Representative
from Pennsylvania
James A. Farley, U. S. Postmaster Gen-
eral
Thomas F. Ford, U. S. Representative
from California
Frank W. Fries, U. S. Representative
from Illinois
Lee E. Geyer, U. S. Representative from
California
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of- the In-
terior
Ed. V. Izak, U. S. Representative from
California
R. T. Jones, Governor of Arizona
Marvel M. Logan, U. S. Senator from
Kentucky
Robert Marshall, United States Forestry
Service
John Moses, Governor of North Dakota
James E. Murray, U. S. Senator from
Montana
Culhert L. Olson, Governor of Califor-
nia
Robert F. Wagner, U. S. Senator from
New York
C. W. Warburton, U. S. Department of
Agriculture
M. L. Wilson, Under Secretary of Agri-
culture
RELIGIOUS
Henry A. Atkinson, World Alliance for
International Friendship Through the
Churches
Naomi Brodie, Junior Hadassah
Mrs. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Young
Women's Christian Association
Samuel M. Cohen, Young People's
League of the United Synagogue of
America
Bishop Ralph S. Cushman, Methodist
Episcopal Church
Robert C. Dexter, American Unitarian
Association
Mrs. Kendall Emerson, Young Women's
Christian Association
Frederick L. Fagley, General Council of
the Congregational and Christian
Churches
Stephen H. Fritchman, Unitarian Youth
Commission
William E. Gardner, National Young
People's Christian Union of the Uni-
versalis! Church
1522 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
religious — continued
Philip B. Heller, American Jewish Con- Henrietta Roelofs, Young Women's
gress Christian Association
Rufus M. Jones, American Friends Carl C. Seitter, National Council of
Service Committee Methodist Youth
Caroline B. Lourie, National Council of Katherine Terrill, Council for Social
Jewish Juniors Action, Congregation and Christian
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea Church
J. Carrell Morris, Christian Youth Jay A. Urice, Young Men's Christian
Council of North America Association
Helen Morton, National Intercollegiate Charles C. Webber, Methodist Federa-
Christian Council tion for Social Service
Reverend A. Clayton Powell, Jr., Abys- Bishop Herbert Welch, Methodist Epis-
synian Baptist Church copal Church
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PE0GRAM
Support Of
Thomas-Larrabee Federal Aid to Education Bill.
Wagner Health Bill.
Bloom Neutrality Act Revision Bill.
Pittman Resolution embargoing violators of Nine-Power Treaty.
Wagner- Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bill.
Mitchell Bill barring discrimination on interstate carriers.
Wagner Labor Relations Act without amendment.
Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill.
Amendments to Social Security Act extending benefits to migratory, agri-
cultural and domestic workers.
Pensions of $60 per month at age of 60.
Extension of Federal Farm Loans.
Placement of C. C. C. under civilian control and extension of educational
program.
Expansion of N. Y. A. and W. P. A.
Ratification of —
Child Labor Amendment.
Repeal of —
Oriental Exclusion Act.
Opposition to —
Smith Omnibus Bill and others directed at curtailment of civil liberties.
OFFICERS ELECTED
The Nominations Committee, elected at the Congress, presented a slate of
Officers, made up from nominations received from organizations and State Dele-
gation meetings, to the Joint Session of Senate and House. At the Session,
declinations, substitutions, and nominations were accepted from the floor and a
final ballot distributed for the vote resulting in the election of the following
Officers :
Chairman: Jack McMichael, National Intercollegiate Christian Council.
Vice Chairman : J. Carrel Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America.
James P>. Carey, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.
Mary Jeanne McKay, National Student Federation of America.
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.
Edward E. Strong, National Negro Congress, Young Section.
James V. Krakora, Czechoslovak Society of America.
(Representative of farm organization to be named later.)
Regional representatives :
New England — Alexander Karanikas, Massachusetts Youth Congress.
Middle Atlantic — Michael Gravino, New York State Youth Council.
East Central— Myrtle Powell. Pittsburgh Y. W. < !. A.
South — Thelma Dale. Southern Negro Youth Congress.
Miss Jimmy Woodward, Y. W. C. A., Randolph-Macon College.
•The signers are issuing this call, not as the official representatives of their organiza-
tions, but in their personal capacities as individuals deeply concerned with the role of
young people in the United States.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1523
OFFICERS ELECTED — COD tinned
South West -Wynard Norman, Oklahoma City Youth Assembly.
West Central — Harlan Crippen, .Minnesota Youth Assembly.
West Coast and Rocky .Mountain — Clara Walldow, California Youth Leg-
islature.
Puerto Kico — Julia Rivera.
Treasurer — Harriet Pickens, Business and Professional Council, Y. W. C. A.
Executive Secretary — Joseph Cadden.
Representatives at Large:
Clarence Carter. Connecticut Conference of Youth.
Daniel J. Spooner, Young Peoples League of the United Synagogue of
America.
Howard Ennes, Washington, D. C, Youth Council.
Joseph Lash. American Student Union.
Margaret Day. National Federation of Settlements.
Josiah R. Bartlett, Social Action Committee, Union Theological Seminary.
(Representatives of Industrial Council, Y. W. C. A., and an A. F. of L. Union
to be named later.)
Elected Officers listed above constitute the Cabinet of the American Youth
Congress.
The Cabinet, meeting on July 5, made the following appointments:
Administrative Secretary — Frances M. Williams.
Legislative Director, Abbott Simon.
CREDENTIALS REPORT
Presented oil the Chairman of the Credentials Committee, Roy Lancaster, of the
Gas By-Prod act, Coke and Chemical Workers
736 Senators and Representatives representing organizations with a total mem-
bership of 4,697,915 (after subtraction for duplication) are accredited at the
Congress of Youth. Of these, 96 are Senators delegated by 63 different national
organizations : 640 are Representatives from 450 organizations.
Representation of women is approximately two-thirds that of men. The
youngest delegate is 14 years old and the median age is 22.
Exhibit No. 26
Senator McCarthy's Statement on Owen J. Lattimore
The State Department, with great frequency, utilizes the services of a large
group of individuals in diverse fields as "consultants."
One of its most regular performers in this field is the man I wish to discuss
next. He is Owen J. Lattimore.
Lattimore was not only a consultant, but one of the principal architects of our
far eastern policy. This man is one of the State Department's outstanding ex-
perts on problems dealing with the Far East and lias been for a number of years.
Lattimore is currently employed as a director of the Walter Hines Page
School of International Relations, located at Johns Hopkins University in Balti-
more, Maryland. He has held numerous positions with the State Department,
among them a 6-month period in 1941 as the political adviser of President
Roosevelt to Generalisimo Chiang Kai-Shek. He was a Deputy Director in
charge of the Pacific Branch of the Office of War Information and in June of
1944, he, with John Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of the
State Department, accompanied Henry Wallace on a diplomatic tour of Siberia
and Free China.
Recently Lattimore completed a State Department mission to India and it is
understood that he is now a consultant in the Department. While the State
Department will tell you that he is not on the payroll as of today, the point is
he is still considered by the Department as one of its top advisers and is put on
and off the payroll as consultant apparently at will, and is apparently one of
the top men in developing our Asiatic program.
This man's record as a pro-Communist goes back many years.
I hand the committee a letter, dated December 19, 1940, on the letterhead of
Amerasia. Again we have the familiar name of Frederick V. Field, Communist
1524 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
chairman of the editorial board. Equally familiar is the name of Jhillip J.
Jaffe, managing editor of the magazine, who was indicted and convicted for
having illegal possession of secret State Department documents. The com-
mittee will note that there follows a list of eight members of the board of this
pro-Communist magazine. It will also observe that 50 percent of the editorial
board of this magazine, whose editor was convicted of possessing State Depart-
ment secret documents illegally, have been or are now highly placed officials of
the Department of State of the United States.
Their names are T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, David H. Popper, and William
T. Stone.
In the June 6. 1046, issue of the Washington Times-Herald there appears an
article, entitled "How Come?" written by Mr. Frank C. Waldrop, editorial
director of that newspaper.
Shortly, I shall read that article into the record, but I should like to mention
in passing that of the 57 instructors in the orientation conference and training
programs for personnel of the Foreign Service and the Department of State,
all but three were Government officials. Those three were Dr. Edward C.
Acheson, Director of the school of foreign service and brother of the present
Secretary of State ; Prof. Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University and
Prof. Frederick L. Schuman. of Williams College, Williamstown. Mass.
But more of this gentleman later.
When Mr. Waldrop asked, "How Come?" he was getting closer to a sordid
picture than he imagined.
Here is what he had to say:
"Herewith an item that may be of interest to Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes
who is doing his level best these days to cope with J. Stalin's bucking broncos
of the Kremlin.
"Whether he finds it interesting or not, he certainly could with profit ask a
few questions about a project in his own shop going by the title of the 'Orienta-
tion Conferences and Training Programs for Personnel of the Foreign Service
and the Department of State.'
"The writer of this piece sat in, uninvited, yesterday on one of those train-
ing projects and found it nothing more or less than an example to diplomats
on how to needle a man whose back is turned — in this case Gen. Douglas
MacArthur.
"To begin at the beginning, the State Department has a 'division of training
services' which has the very valuable assignment of making better diplomats
of the departmental forces.
"As a part of this, there are scheduled for every workday from Monday
through Friday all this month, a series of lectures by supposed experts on sub-
jects of importance in diplomacy.
"(Don't give up. It concerns You too, because the State Department is sup-
posed to look out for the interests of the United States between wars and you
live here.)
"Of 57 instructors listed to give the developing diplomats the real dope on
their business, all but three are Government officials.
"The three exceptions are : Dr. Edward C. Acheson, director of the school of
foreign service at the George Washington University here and brother of Under
Secretary of State Dean Acheson ; Prof. Owen Lattimore, of Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, and Prof. Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College,
Williamstown, Mass.
"Lattimore is a bosom pal of Henry Wallace, the great mind of the ages now
trying to decide whether he can best save the world by staying on in Truman's
Cabinet to bore from within or by resigning to bore from without.
"Lattimore also hangs out with other persons less well known, to an extent
that ought to give J. Byrnes some pause.
"Just an item: He was formerly on the editorial board of Amerasia, the pro-
Soviet magazine that got caught in possession of confidential State Department
documents in 1914 with result that an editor and a State Department employee
were convicted and fined.
"Lattimore also has described Stalin's Mood purges of 1936-39 as 'a triumph
for democracy,' and that, friends, is just a slight sample.
"He's clever, but you invariably find him in all those old familiar places when
you check up. Consider his performance of yesterday.
"Most people have the impression that on the record and the evidence the
welfare of the United States is better looked after in Japan with Gen. Douglas
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1525
Mac-Arthur in solo command, than in Germany whore a four-cornered quarrel
over the remains grows worse and worse.
"To all of this, Dr. Lattlmore yesterday issued an hour-long 'na-a-a-a-ah, it's
lousy.' His line is that the Japs have outsmarted MacArthur In that they are
holding onto a 'conservative' agricultural policy and occasionally rescue one of
their industrialists, hankers and so forth from the hangman's rope.
"Match that up, citizens, with what you've heen hearing from Moscow, if you
bother to listen. And match up with it the realization that such a thought is
the host offered our State Department help as expert inside dope on the Far East.
"How come the State Department has to drag in Owen Lattimore to tell what's
what in the Orient? Hasn't the Department got anybody on its own staff who
knows something?
•And as for the baby lined up for June 10— that F. L. Schuman— he's all
too well known around here, especially to people who have read the record of
the Dies committee.
"But if you don't already know what he is, you can get him completely in a
flash by turning to page 582 of his latest book, 'Soviet Politics At Home and
Abroad.' wherein he states:
"The Russian adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery
of man's fate. * * *
'•That is how the State Department's expert instructor on U. S. Soviet
relations sums up Stalin's behavior and the almost 28 bloody years of Communist
dictatorship in Russia.
"No wonder State Department secret documents leak. No wonder Jimmy Byrnes
goes to conferences with Molotov and comes staggering home asking who touched
off the blast !
"This writer plans to sit in on Schuman's June 19 performance, if it comes off,
and will try to report on same in this space. That is, of course, if they don't
lock the door first."
Thus we have the officials of the State Department again warned of a man
who by any "yardstick of loyalty" could not possibly be a good security risk.
Mr. Lattimore himself is a prolific writer and there is no lack of material
for the committee to ascertain exactly where this man stands in the political
scheme of things.
The Reverend James F. Kearney, S. J., writing in the Columbia magazine of
September 1949, gives more first-hand information of great value to the committee.
This magazine is published by the Knights of Columbus, the most prominent order
of Catholic laymen in America.
Here is what Reverend Kearney wrote:
"Who or what has so vitiated the opinion of intelligent Americans on the
China question? Until recently, despite the dust that has been deliberately
thrown in American eyes by pink correspondents, the question could be stated
so clearly and simply that grammar school students could grasp it. Having ex-
plained it to grammar students, I know. Here it is, expressed in monosyllabic
words : "If the Reds win out there, we lose. If they lose, we win. Well, for
all practical purposes, the Red have now won, and in consequence we and the
Chinese have lost. For communism it is the greatest triumph since the Rus-
sian Revolution ; for us, though few Americans yet fully realize it, it is perhaps
the greatest disaster in our history ; and the end is not yet. Who is responsible?
It wasn't a one-man job; short-sighted Chinese officials contributed 50 percent.
There are those who believe, though, that no Americans deserve more credit for
this Russian triumph and Sino-Ainerican disaster than Owen Lattimore and a
small group of his followers.
"Owen Lattimore, confidant of two United States Presidents, adviser to our
State Department, author of 10 books about the Far East, where he has 25
years of travel and study to his credit, was horn in Washington, D. C, but after
a few months was taken* to North China. At 12 he went to study in Switzerland,
then in England, and returned to China as a newsman before taking up explora-
tion, particularly in Manchuria and Mongolia. He then studied in Peiping, first
on a fellowship from the Harvard Yenching Foundation and later on a John
Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation fellowship, knows the Chinese, Mon-
golian, and Russian languages well.
"Returning to the United States at the outbreak of the Sino- Japanese war in
1937, a year later he became director of the Walter Hines Page School of Inter-
national Relations of Johns Hopkins University, a post he still holds. In 1941
he was for 6 months President Roosevelt's political adviser to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, then returned to the States to enter the OWI, becoming Deputy
1526 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Director to the Overseas Branch in Charge of Pacific Operations. In June 1944,
he and J. Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of the State
Department, accompanied Henry Wallace of the State Department on a diplo-
matic tour of Siberia and Free China.
"So high does Owen Lattimore stand in Washington that it is said that only
two books on President Truman's desk when he announced Japan's surrender
were newsman John Gunther's Inside Asia and Lattimore's Solution in Asia.
Lattimore was next named special economic adviser to Edwin V. Pauley, head of
the postwar economic mission to Tokyo. Though not an authority on Japan, he
did not hesitate to criticize former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's plan, adopted
by MacArthur, to govern the Japanese people through the Emperior. He be-
lieved that the Emperior and all his male heirs should be interned in China and a
republic set up in Japan.
"In this thoroughly distinguished orientalist's career there are many disturb-
ing features. For example, in former Red Louis Budenz' March 19, 1949, Collier's
article, entitled 'The Menace of Red China.' we read 'Most Americans, during
World War II, fell for the Moscow line that the Chinese Communists were not
really Communists * * * but agrarian reformers * * * That is just
what Moscow wanted Americans to believe. Even many naive Government
officials fell for it. * * * This deception of United States officials and public
was the result of a planned campaign ; I helped to plan it. * * * The num-
ber one end was a Chinese coalition government in which Chiang would accept
the agrarian reformers — at the insistence of the United States. * * * We
could work through legitimate Far East organizations and writers that were
recognized as Orienal authorities. Frederick V. Field emphasized use of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * The agrarian reformers idea started
from there. It took root in leading Far East cultural groups in the United
States, spread to certain policy-making circles in the State Department and broke
into prominent position in the American press. * * * The Communists were
successful in impressing their views on the United States State Department
simply by p'anting articles with the proper slant in such magazines as Far Eastern
Survey, Pacific Affairs, and Amerasia. Both Far Eastern Survey and Pacific
Affairs are publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is not a
Communist organization.' "
(Apparently the writer did not realize that this organization had been cited as
a Communist front by the California Committee on Un-American Activities.
1948 Report, page 168.)
"Where does Mr. Lattimore come in? From 1934 to 1941 he was editor of
Pacific Affairs. Freda Utley mentions him in two of her books. In her Last
Chance in China she tells how Moscow, where she then worked as a Communist,
was able to help its friends and discomfit its enemies in the Far East thanks
to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that Mr. Lattimore was among those
Americans who came to Moscow for help and advice (p. 193). In her Lost
Illusion (p. 194) she refers to the same 1936 Moscow meeting: 'The whole
staff of our Pacific Ocean cabinet had an all-day session at the institute with
E. C. Carter. Owen Lattimore. and Harriet Moore, leading lights of the Institute
of Pacific Relations. I was a little surprised at the time that these Americans
should defer so often and so eompletelv to the Russian viewpoint. * * *
Owen Lattimore found it difficult at first to submit to the discipline required
of the Friends of the Soviet Union. He told me a few months later in London
how he had almost lost his position as editor of Pacific Affairs because he had
published an article by the Trotskyist Harold Isaacs. In later years in the
United States it did not astonish me to find the Institute of Pacific Relations
following the same general lines as the Daily Worker in regard to China and
Japan.'
"Henry Wallace never claimed to be an expert on the Far East. How much
if any, of his report after returning from the Siberia-China visit was written or
suggested by the oriental expert, Mr. Lattimore, I do not know. One thing
emerges, however: after their return, the American policy which has proved
so disastrous for both Chinese and American interests and so helpful to Russia
was put into effect and is still being pursued. Lattimore's Solution in Asia
was described by one reviewer as 'an appeal to Chiang Kai-shek to free himself
from the galling yoke (of the Kuomintang) and to set free the democratic
forces which have proved effective in northwestern (Tuna,' i. e.. the Chinese
Reds. That book is again referred to in an article by ex-Communist Max East-
man and J. B. Powell in a June 1945 Reader's Digest article. The Fate of the
World Is at Stake in China, wherein they blast the deception 'that Russia is
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1527
a democracy and that tlio Chinese can therefore safely be left to Russian influ-
ence.' Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous
conception.
"Mr. Lattimore praised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge
by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 11136-39 as 'a triumph for democracy.'
He now urges our Government, in Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the spread
of the Soviet form of democracy in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate
the drift of bis book: 'He (Mr. Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic peoples
are more interested in actual democratic practises , such as the ones they can see
in action across the Russian bonier, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-
Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.' Does that
sound as if Mr. Lattimore, a top adviser on our far-eastern affairs, is on our
team?
"The same article continues with a prophecy which has just about come true:
'If Russian dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China the cause of democ-
racy (i. e.. United States style) in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles
need not include invading Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties
now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Mos-
cow. When these Communist Parties get control of a neighboring state the
Moscow dictatorship and its fellow travelers call that a friendly government.
It is by means of these Communist-controlled friendly governments — not by So-
viet military conquest — that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spread-
ing from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe.
"That is perhaps good background for the current slogan of Mr. Lattimore and
his loyal followers, Edgar Snow, Ted White, Richard Lauteroach, Harvard's
Fairbanks, and many an ex-OWI man — that there's nothing much for America
to worry about because Mao Tse-tung's communism is a nationalist movement.
A moment's reflection should make it clear that the very last thing a real Chinese
nationalist would do would be to swallow hook, line, and sinker the doctrine of
Karl Marx, a German Jew, who besides being a foreigner has a system that
goes counter to every Chinese instinct and every tradition in the Chinese concept
of society.
"This recalls an incident a Belgian priest related to me in Shanghai a year
and a half ago. He bad become a Chinese citizen, and when the Chinese Reds
occupied his church in North China they followed the usual custom (which is
probably news to Mr. Lattimore) of putting up the pictures of Marx and Stalin
in the place of honor above the high altar, with those of Mao Tse-tung and Chu
Teh below. A Chinese Red then told the priest flatly, 'We are going to get rid
of absolutely all foreign influence in China. Our policy is China for the Chinese.'
I can imagine Mr. Lattimore saying, 'Just what I told you.' But the Belgian-
Chinese replied, 'And those two foreign gentlemen up there, Marx and Stalin?
When did they become Chinese citizens?' The Red slunk silently away.
"If anyone is still puzzled by the contention that Chinese Marxists are pri-
marily nationalists, a glance at the Communist Manifesto will clear matters up.
'Though not in substance, yet in form,' we read there, 'the struggle of the pro-
letariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of
each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.'
That, I believe, shows us what is back of the present national slogan our United
States pinks apply to China's Reds. It's not authentic nationalism, of course, as
the Manifesto explains later : 'The Communists are reproached with desiring to
abolish countries and nationality. The workingmen have no country. We can-
not take from them what they have not got.'
"The spurious nature of the nationalism of Mao Tse-tung was admitted by
Mr. Lattimore himself, perhaps unintentionally, in a tape-recorded speech he
gave in San Francisco, December 7, 1948 : 'The Chinese Communists never
made any bones about the fact that they are Marxists. They are Marxist Com-
munists in their international relations. They never question the Russian
line. They follow every twist and turn of it.' That is an important admission
by Mr. Lattimore, since so many of his followers have been trying to tell us
there is no Moscow control over China's Reds. If they follow every twist and
turn of the Moscow line they are evidently not Chinese nationalists as we under-
stand the term, but pseudo-nationalists.
"A. T. Steele and Andrew Roth of the New York Herald Tribune and the Na-
tion, respectively, after getting out of Red Peiping recently, declared that the
Chinese Red leaders are in every sense of the word Communists who stand
squarely and faithfully for the Moscow Party line, and will join the Kremlin
in the coming world war III against the imperialist powers, particularly Amer-
1528
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ica. They likewise agree that while Mao might possibly become an extreme
nationalist at some future date, another Tito, there is absolutely no evidence
that this is a factor to lie seriously reckoned with for a long time, Mr. Lattimore
to the contrary notwithstanding. Spencer Moosa, latest newsman out of Pei-
ping, confirms their statements. The very first movie put on by the Reds in
the auditorium of the Catholic University in Peiping after they moved in this
year was the Life of Stalin. Need we say it was not anti-Russian V And so,
instance after instance shows the very close connection between Moscow and
Chinese Communism that has been witnessed throughout the last 28 years
by intelligent observers who have lived in Red China— ahere Mr. Lattimore
has never lived.
"To the average American, whom pro-Red propaganda is intended to vic-
timize, it seems quite natural that Mao Tse-tung, a native of China who has
never visited Moscow, should think first of Chinas instead of Russia's interests.
Yet how many native-born Americans are there who, once they join the party,
think nothing of selling out their country and its secrets to the Kremlin? Such
is the strange mesmerism exercised by their Moscow masters. It is, then,
no harder to understand Mao's utter devotion to the party line than it is to
understand that of Foster, or Dennis, or Earl Browder. After all, remember,
a real Communist has no country. And surely Mao has proved he is a 100-percent
Communist. s Let's not be deceived any longer, then, by this fake nationalism of
chi mi's Reds, which is the central thesis of Mr. Lattimore's recent book, The
Situation in Asia.
"If a man who had written 10 volumes about Africa, and thereby won a name
for himself as an authority, should nevertheless maintain that the Negroes in
Africa aren't really black but white, it would be a cause for wonder. Mr. Owen
Lattimore, who has written 10 books on Asia and is called the best informed
American on Asiatic affairs living today, is doubtless well-informed on many
Asiatic matters but unfortunately, if we are to take his written words as an in-
dex of his knowledge of China's Reds, he is very badly misinformed about the
true color of that most important body of individuals and their whole way
of acting. Which reminds me of a recent conversation with one of Mr. Lattimore's
OWI boys who had just returned from a 3-years' correspondent assignment in
China. I asked him why it was that practically all our foreign newsmen, though
supposedly educated in the American tradition of fair play, spoke entirely of
corruption in the Chiang regime but said nothing about the corruption in the Mao
regime. And this man, who was being paid for giving his American readers an
honest picture of conditions in the vital Far East, answered. Because there is no
corruption in the Red regime! I laughed at him for wasting his 3 years in the
Orient and passed him an article showing that not only is the Red regime corrupt,
but from every conceivable American standpoint it is conservatively 10 times
more corrupt than its corrupt opposite number.
"It is probably of such men that Mr. Lattimore, in his book Situation in China
(p. 177), writes: 'Hitherto American observers who have been acutely conscious
of secret police activities in Kuomintang China have had nothing comparable to
report from Communist China.' The reason is that these official observers were
allowed the freedom to observe the limited activities of KMT secret police,
while they weren't even permitted to enter Red China. Had they wished, though,
they could have learned a lot from people, some of them Americans, who had lived
in Red China. They would have heard, for instance, about the 'T'ing ehuang hui,'
or eavesdropper corps, who after killing off all watchdogs, creep up at night,
next to the wall or on the flat roofs of North China homes, to hear what is being
said inside the family about the Communists. Children are rewarded for spying
on their parents and, if anyone is believed to be giulty of anti-Communist remarks,
a terror gang swoops down at midnight and the chances are the unfortunate
victim will be discovered next morning buried alive outside his home. This sort
of secret police and terrorism combined has been so universal in Red China that
if Mr. Lattimore dosn't know about it he knows extremely little of Chinese
Communism.
"As far back as 1045 the predominant sentiment everywhere in Red areas
was fear, universal fear, fear at every instant, according to an official report
of a Frenchman, a former university professor from Tientsin who spent the
years from 1941 to 1!)4f> in Red territoy, and had been haled before both
Japanese and Red tribunals. 'It is not terror,' he says, 'for terror is a fear
which shows itself exteriorily. Here one must not allow his fear to be seen;
he must appear satisfied and approve everything that is said and done. It is a
hidden fear, but a creeping, paralysing fear. The people keep quiet. They do
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1529
not criticize; they avoid passing out any news. They are all aid of tlu-ir neigh-
bor, who may denounce them. They arc afraid of the Reds who might hear
and imprison them. When the Reds Impose a tax, it is paid without a word.
If they requisition anyone for public work, the work is done carefully and
rapidly, without need of any blows and curses as in the time of the Japanese,
and wonderful to say, without any need of supervision. (This is amazing to any-
one who knows the easy-going Chinese character.) I have witnessed groups of
workers along the big highways built by the Japanese, doing exactly the same
kind of work they did for the Japanese, hut how different their attitude! There
was no foreman there to supervise, and yet everything was done carefully, with
hardly a word, without the least hit of joking.' Mr. Lattimore, with his lack
of background, might interpret this as a sign of enthusiasm for the Red mas-
ters. But the report states simply, 'They were afraid.'
"What was true in 1945 in Red areas is also true today according to the very
latest 1949 reports that have filtered through the Bamboo Curtain: 'There isn't
too much suffering from hunger in the city, hut it is impossible to lay up any
reserves. The Communists search every house methodically and confiscate any
surplus. Anyone who complains or criticizes then disappears mysteriously,
buried alive, it is said. No one dares say a word, even to his best friend. In
the country districts conditions are terrible. The Reds take everything; grain,
livestock, clothing, tools, and now all are being mobilised for army service.
Famine reigns everywhere together with fear. The people endure this with
clenched teeth, but when asked how things are going always answer, "Every-
thing is going well." They had better.'
"These reports come from reliable people who were there and know what they
are talking about, and who ridicule the fairy tales Mr. Lattimore from his dis-
tant and comfortable chair in Johns Hopkins spins for eager young Americans
who believe he is an authority on China's Reds. What, for example, could be
further from the truth than this statement in The Situation in China, page 160:
'In China it may be conceded' (not by anyone who knows the situation, though,
if I may interrupt) 'that the Communists hold the confidence of the people to
such an, extent that they can probably do more by persuasion, with less resort
to coercion, than any previous revolutionaries in history. But the Communists
cannot indulge in experiments which the people do not accept, because the armed
and organized peasants, would be able to resist them just as they have hitherto
resisted the return of the landlords.' Sheer nonsense ! The only real landlords
left in lied areas are the Red leaders themselves, and the people know enough
not to try to resist these ruthless masters. For some reason, no one seems to relish
being buried alive; and so the Communists can indulge in absolutely any experi-
ment they choose without the slightest open resistance from the peasants, who
are merely awaiting patiently for better flays.
"Since Mr. Lattimore is patently in error on so many vital points connected
with the China Red question, it becomes more and more strange that his advice
on Red China should be followed almost slavishly by the United States State
Department. It has already brought China to disaster and may, if we continue
to follow it. also ruin America. It might be well to consider what advice he
has given for future United States policy so wTe shall know what a new litany
of Lattimore disasters awaits us.
"He has a chapter on Japan in his 'Situation in Asia' and. though he admits
General MacArthur is a first-class administrator, he dislikes his 'fatherly
mysticism' and 'old-line Republicanism', hints it would have been wiser to give
the Russians more say, considers the present policy as pseudo-realistic and bound
to fail. 'It's likely to blow up in our faces, like a humiliating stink bomb', damag-
ing Mac-Arthur's reputation in the end. He doesn't like keeping the Emperor,
nor the type of democracy MacArthur is giving, apparently preferring for Japan
the totalitarian type Mao Tse-tung is employing in China. Mr. Lattimore doesn't
like to see Japan make a bulwark against Russian expansion, and believes that
since she is possessed of the most advanced technical and managerial 'know-
how' in Asia she will eventually make her own terms with both Russia and
China, without consulting the U. S.
" 'The Japanese, watching America's failure to control the situation in China
through the Kuomintang, have been giggling in their kimono sleeves. In a
queer way it has helped to restore their self-respect for their own failure on the
continent.' He sees no future for Japan apart from the future of Asia, since
she needs the iron and coal of Manchuria and the markets of China.
"In this he is probably right ; that is why it was always to America's vital
interest to see that the Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China
1530 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
were preserved, though this adviser to our State Department did not think them
very important. He considers East Asia now definitely out of control by either
Russia or America, stating that it forms a group of 'third countries,' which
seem to resemble Nippon's ill-fated East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. He believes
Japan, then, will come to terms both with Communist Russia and Communist
China, and will end up by being more anti-American than anti-Russian. If we
had only adopted his plan for a Japanese 'democracy' right after the war, what
a deal of trouble we would have saved !
"What, now, are his plans for the mainland? He was long in favor of a
Chiang coalition with the Reds, and blames our 80th Congress for spoiling that.
The result is now Communist control — which of course would have eventuated
just as well had his original coalition idea gone through. We mustn't lay down
our own conditions for dealing with a Red China, he says, or we shall spoil
our favorable position with the Chinese. Has he never heard how Mao's Reds
detest Americans, and hold half a dozen U. S. consuls under house arrest? 'We
must at all costs avoid the appearance of wanting to punish the Chinese people
for having a government which we didn't approve for them in advance.' As if the
Chinese were really anxious for a puppet Red regime. We must not support
any rump government, for that would be dividing China. We must extend credits
to poor Red China and help build it up by trade and American engineering
'know-how' as 'Ford Motors and General Electric did in Russia in the period be-
tween tears'. But let's not lay down any conditions for our aid, by insisting
that Red China be hostile to Red Russia.
"And if all that isn't enough to make Uncle Sam suspect that Owen Lattiniore is
making a fool out of him in the interests of world Communism, the expert goes
much further : 'The new government of China will claim China's Big Five posi-
tion in the United Nations, including the right of veto. By the use of our own
veto we could delay China in moving into this position', but of course it would
be unfair to deprive Russia of another vote, especially since Russia has had
nothing whatsoever to do with imposing Communism on China ! See now why
the pinks are so strong on their insistence that the Red movement in China is
purely nationalistic ? And another vote for Mother Russia ?
"Let's take Outer Mongolia, that voted unanimously to be annexed to Russia
in 1945 — each voter being required to sign his name on his ballot. 'Mongolia,'
he says, 'is between a Communist-ruled Russia and a Communist-controlled
China. It would be an advantage to American policy to be able to emphasize
that there is a country occupying 600,000 square miles of territory * * *
inhabited by people who are neither Chinese nor Russians. It is impossible to
make use of this advantage unless the separation of Outer Mongolia is empha-
sized by membership in the United Nations. * * * It is true that Mongolia
as a member of the United Nations would mean another vote for Russia ; but
would this be a greater disadvantage than our present complete lack of access
to this key country between China and Russia?' (p. 220.)
"Yes, Mr. Lattimore, it would. Considering that the whole United States
had but one vote in the United Nations, while Russia started out with three, it
is simply wonderful of Owen Lattimore to give a couple more Far East satellite
votes to our 'cold war' enemy. Since he is one of the chief advisers to our
Far Eastern State Department Bureau, is it any wonder that disaster has been
piled on disaster in Asia for Americans while world Communism engages in
frenzied applause? If Mr. Lattimore is permitted to turn over one Far Eastern
vote after another to Russia, Moscow will soon dominate the United Nations, and
then can safely discard the veto. Why should one man. whose writings show he
has no knowledge of the character of China's Reds, be allowed to go on un-
challenged promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia? True, he doesn't
say he wants a Red Asia; but the publisher of his 'Situation in Asia' indicates
his intentions when on the jacket of the book they print a map of Lattimore's
Asia, including Japan, Sakhalin, all of China, the Philippines, the Dutch East
[ndies, Siam, Burma, Malaya and India, in nice Soviet Livi\.''
It is uncanny how these State Department policy makers are drawn together
tin)!' after time in an organization or group or project of pro-Soviet nature.
I now hand the committee a booklet setting forth the officers and trustees of
the Institute of Pacific Relations. It will be noted that Mr. Lattimore is a
trustee.
The familiar pattern starts again with Messrs. Lattimore, Hanson, Bisson, and
Jessup.
In the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have such pro-Communists as: Fred-
erick Vanderbilt Field, Philip Jaffe, Kate L. Mitchell, Andrew Roth, Nym Wales.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1531
The Attorney General of the United States lias declared the American Peace
Mobilization to be a subversive organization and the House Un-American Acti-
vities Committee has placed the same stamp of infamy on the Washington
Committee for Aid to China.
The American Peace Mobilization was short-lived. It existed during the days ■
of the Stalin-Hitler Pact and was liquidated by the Communists on the very day
that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.
Frederick Vanderhilt Field, one of the country's top Communists, was Execu-
tive Secretary of the American Peace Mobilization on Tuesday evening, Febru-
ary 11. 1941, also.
On that date, the Washington Committee for Aid to China, held a meeting
at 16th and "<>" Streets, N. W.. Washington.
At the time This meeting was held, President Roosevelt was under the most
savage attack of his career by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and his American
Peace Mohilization.
The Senators may recall that this was the occasion when the American Peace
Mohilization organized and carried out a twenty-four hour picket line around
the White House. The pickets carried placards denouncing Roosevelt as a war-
mongering tool of Wall Street.
On June 21, 1941, the American Peace Mobilization pickets were still sur-
rounding the White House. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on the morn-
ing of June 22, the pickets were withdrawn within an hour. The party line had
changed in a matter of minutes and the American Peace Mobilization then be-
came the American People's Mobilization, urging the immediate entrance of the
United States into the war.
Again, associated with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, we have Owen Lattimore
as the principal speaker at the above meeting on the evening of February 11,
1941, with only two other speakers : One of them was Frederick Vanderbilt
Field.
Here again we have the old familiar pattern of a member of the important
policy-making group of the State Department collaborating with known Com-
munists under the sponsorship of organizations •officially declared subversive.
I hand you an exhibit of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic
Rights, Exhibit 30. On April 21, 1943, the House Committee on Appropria-
tions issued a report citing this organization as "subversive and un-American."
On March 29, the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities cited it
as a Communist front.
On September 2, 1947, on page 12 of its Report No. 1115, the Congressional Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities said, "It will be remembered that during the
days of the infamous Soviet-Nazi pact, the Communists built a protective organi-
zation known as the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights,
which culminated in the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties."
In its 1948 report on pages 112 and 327, the California Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities, after citing it as a Communist-front organization, defending Com-
munists, had this to say : "After the dissolution of the American League for
Peace and Democracy in February, 1940, the Communist Party frantically or-
ganized a new series of front organizations. The National Emergency Con-
ference for Democratic Rights was one of the new fronts and it was filled from
top to bottom with veteran Communist Party-liners."
The Maryland Association for Democratic Rights was an affiliate of the Na-
tional Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights. At a conference of this
organization in Baltimore early in 1944, we have as sponsors, Mr. Owen Latti-
more and his wife.
Once again we have a policy-making State Department and attache collaborating
with those who have sworn to destroy the nation by force and violence.
I find it impossible to visualize this sort of a good security risk under the
"yardstick of loyalty"- outlined by Secretary of State Acheson.
I hand the committee an exhibit of the Writers' Congress of 1943, 31.
On December 4, 1947, and on September 21, 1948, the then Attorney General
Tom Clark in letters to the Loyalty Review Board, cited the Hollywood Writers'
Mobilization as subversive and Communistic. In its 1945 report on page 130,
the California Committee' on Un-American Affairs described this organization
as one "whose true purpose" was "the creation of a clearing house for Commu-
nist propaganda."
On October 1, 2 and 3 of 1943, the Writers' Congress and the Hollywood
Writers' Mohilization held a meeting on the University of California-LA campus
in Westwood. Appearing as the representative of the Office of War Information
was Mr. Owen Lattimore.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 4
1532 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Here again we have Mr. Lattimore involved as a principal in an organization
declared Un-American by the Attorney General of the United States.
In the magazine "Pacific Affairs" of September 1938, Owen Lattimore de-
scribed the Moscow purge trials as "a triumph for Democracy."
In his book entitled "Solution in Asia," Owen Lattimore declares that among
the people of Asia, the Soviet Union has "a great power of attraction * * *.
It stands for Democracy."
I submit that the background of Mr. Lattimore, his close collaboration and
affiliation with numerous Communist organizations ; his friendsbip and close
cooperation with pro-Communist individuals, leaves absolutely no doubt that he
is an extremely bad security risk under Secretary of State Acheson's "yard-
stick of Loyalty" and in fact, his wide knowledge of Far Eastern Affairs and his
affinity for the Soviet cause in that area, might well have already done tins
nation incalculable and irreparable harm.
So much for Mr. Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 27
Editorial Board: Frederick V. Field, Chairman Philip J. Jaffe, Managing Editor
T. A. Bisson Owen Lattimore David H. Popper
Ch-ao-Tinc Chi Kate Mitchell William T. Stone
Kenneth W. Colegrove Cyrus H. Peake
Amerasia
A Review of America and the Far East
NEW YORK
125 East 52nd St.
Telephone : PLaza 3-4700
December 19, 1940.
Horace W. Truesdell,
Washington Committee for Aid to Chi mi,
1410 H Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Truesdeix: We are of course very sorry that a simple, factual,
practically statistical article should have caused so much difficulty among indi-
viduals. You ask me to explain wliat happened. By this time the whole thing
is so involved that it would take 20,000 words to explain it. Some day when I
see you — I hope soon — I can show you our complete file of correspondence on it
from which you will see that it was impossible for me, as it is today, to judge
the merits of any particular person's claims. But what we are immediately
interested in is that such matters should not become the subject of discussion
in the magazine, having, as it does, such an important function to play in the
Far Eastern world. We feel that it would be indistinctly bad taste, not only
for the magazine but for the individuals involved, to have such explanations pub-
lished, even if I knew what to publish. Of course we are not publishing any
reprint of the article, as both you and Mr. Hu requested.
I suggest that sometime when I am in Washington that all of us have a session
together and try our best to solve the mystery so we may avoid such conflicts
in the future.
Sincerely yours,
Philip J. Jaffe.
pjj.hs
Exit 1 hit No. 28
[From the Washington (D. C.) Times- Herald, June 6, 1946]
How Come?
• (By Frank C. Waldrop)
Herewith an item that may he of interest to Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes
who is doing his level best these days to cope with J. Stalin's bucking broncos of
the Kremlin.
Whether he finds it interesting or not. be certainly could with profit ask a few
questions about a project in his own shop going by the title of the "Orientation
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1533
Conferences and Training Programs for Personnel of the Foreign Service and
the Departmenl of State."
The writer of this piece sat in, uninvited, yesterday on one of those training
projects and found it nothing more or less than an example to diplomats on how
to needle a man whose back is turned — in this case Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
To begin at the beginning, the State Department has a "division of training
services" which has the very valuable assignment of making better diplomats of
the departmental forces.
As a part of this, there are scheduled for every work day from Monday through
Friday all this month, a series of lectures by supposed experts on subjects of
importance in diplomacy.
[Don't give up. It concerns you, too, because the State Department is sup-
posed to look out for the interests of the United States between wars and you
live here.]
Of 57 instructors listed to give the developing diplomats the real dope on
their business, all but three are Government officials.
The three exceptions are : Dr. Edward C. Acheson, director of the school of
foreign service at the George Washington University here and brother of Under-
secretary of State Dean Acheson ; Prof. Owen Lattimore, of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. Baltimore, and Prof. Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College, Wil-
liamstown, Mass.
Lattimore is a bosom pal of Henry Wallace, the great mind of the ages now
trying to decide whether he can best save the world by staying on in Truman's
Cabinet to bore from within or by resigning to bore from without.
Lattimore also hangs out with other persons less well known, to an extent that
ought to give J. Byrnes some pause.
Just an item : He was formerly on the editorial board of "Amerasia," the pro-
Soviet magazine that got caught in possession of confidential State Department
•documents in 1944 with result that an editor and a State Department employee
were convicted and lined.
Lattimore also has described Stalin's blood purges of 1936-39 as "a triumph
for democracy," and that, friends, is just a slight sample.
He's clever, but you invariably rind him in all those old familiar places when
you check up. Consider his performance of yesterday.
Most people have the impression that on the record and the evidence the
■welfare of the United States is better looked after in Japan with Gen. Douglas
MacArthur in sole command, than in Germany where a four-cornered quarrel
over the remains grows worse and worse.
To all of this, Dr. Lattimore yesterday issued an hour-long "na-a-a-a-ah, it's
lousy." His line is that the Japs have outsmarted MacArthur in that they are
holding onto a "conservative" agricultural policy and occasionally rescue one of
their industrialists, bankers, and so forth from the hangman's rope.
Match that up, citizens, with what you've been hearing from Moscow, if you
bother to listen. And match up with it the realization that such a thought is the
"best offered our State Department help as expert inside dope on the Far East.
How come the State Department has to drag in Owen Lattimore to tell what's
what in the Orient? Hasn't the department got anybody o«n its own staff who
knows something?
And as for the baby lined up for June 19 — that F. L. Schuman — he's all too
well known around here, especially to people who have read the records of the
Dies committee.
But if you don't already know what he is, you can get him completely in a flash
by turning to Page 5S2 of his latest book, "Soviet Politics At Home and Abroad,"
wherein he states :
"The Russian adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery
of man's fate * * *."
That is how the State Department's expert instructor on U. S. -Soviet relations
sums up Stalin's behavior and the almost 28 bloody years of Communist dic-
tatorship in Russia.
No wonder State Department secret documents leak. No wonder Jimmy
Byrnes goes to conferences with Molotov and comes staggering home asking
-who touched off the blast !
This writer plans to sit in on Schuman's June 19 performance, if it comes off,
and will try to report on same in this space. That is, of course, if they don't lock
the door first.
1534
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 29
The Officers and Trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations Invite
Yor To Become a Member of Its American Council
One East Fifty Fourth Street, New York City 22, New York
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
American Council
I accept your invitation to membership in the IPR. Please enroll me in the
classification checked below. Enclosed is $
Contributing membership carries with it 36 publications annually
($10 to $100)
— the Far Eastern Survey, a biweekly periodical
— Pacific Affairs, a quarterly of research studies
— selected popular pamphlets
— regular newsletter on IPR activities
— notices of new books and other Far Eastern publications
— meetings, lectures and discussion groups (for members near IPR offices)
— 20 percent discount on all IPR books
Supporting membership carries with it
($100 to $2,500)
— all the above items
— specially requested research services. Many individuals, organizations,
firms, and Foundations assist substantially in this way to maintain the
reearch and educational program of the IPR.
Contributing and Supporting memberships help to meet the expense of educa-
tional, research, editorial, library and staff services, and permit a steady expan-
sion of the IPR program.
Contributions are deductible in computing income taxes
Name Occupation
Address
Area Interest
OFFICERS AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AMERICAN COUNCIL
Robert G. Sproul, Chairman
Edward C. Carter, Executive Vice Chairman
Joseph P. Chamberlain"
Mortimer Graves
Henry R. Luce
Ray Lyman Wilbur
Brooks Emeny, Treasurer
Tillie G. Stiahn, Assistant Treasurer
Lawrence Morris, Secretary
Vice Chairmen
Edward W. Allen
Raymond B. Allen
Christian Arndt
Paul S. Bachman
Eugene E. Barnett
Pearl S. Buck
George Cameron
Edward C. Carter
Joseph P. Chamberlain
Allan E. Charles
Lauchlin Currie
John L. Curtis
Joseph S. Davis
A. L. Dean
Arthur Dean
Len De Caux
Dorothy Douglas
Brooks Emeny
Frederick V. Field
Henry Field
Galen M. Fisher
G. W. Fisher
Charles K. Gamble
Clarence E. Gauss
Mrs. Frank Gerbode
Huntington Gilchrist
A. J. Gock
Carrington Goodrich
Henry F. Grady
Mortimer Graves
Admiral John W. Green-
slade
William R. Herod
John Hersey
Paul G. Hoffman
William C. Johnstone
Owen Lattimore
< Jharles F. Loomis
Henry R. Luce
Charles E. Martin
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
Abbot Low Moffat
Harriet L. Moore
George Abbot Morison
Lawrence Morris
A. W. Robertson
Chester Rowell
Robert G. Sproul
G. Nye Steiger
Donald Straus
George Taylor
Juan Trippe
Henry A. Wallace
Louis Weiss
Sumner AVelles
Lynn White, Jr.
Brayton Wilbur
Ray Lyman Wilbur
Herbert J. Wood
Mrs. Louise L. Wright
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1535
IPK REGIONAL OF] Id B
1151 So. Broadway 417 Market Street
Los Angeles 14. California San Francisco r>, California
215 Columbia Street 1710 C Street, N. W.
Seattle 4. Washington Washington 5, D. C.
Dillingham Building Annex. Halekauwila Street, Honolulu 16, T. H.
The privilege of voting for the Board of Trustees is limited to members who
are American citizens.
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
is one of ten national councils in as many countries of the world. The Institute
is a nonpartisan, private, research association supported by business corpora-
tions, by its members, and by Foundation grants. Its chief purpose is to
provide Americans with the facts about economic, political and social develop-
ments in the Far East. It takes on stand on public policy, but through its
publications and meetings provides an impartial forum within which Far
Eastern specialists, who represent many points of view, may analyze issues
frankly.
The American Council of the IPR publishes factual reports and studies in both
book and pamphlet form, and conducts workshops, conferences, and study courses
in many parts of the United States. Over two million copies of its popular pam-
phlets have been used by the Army and Navy, schools, colleges, and study groups.
In 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation Report called the Institute of Pacific
Relations "* * * the most important single source of independent studies
of the problems of the Pacific Area and the Far East."
In 1945 the United States Navy awarded its Certificate of Achievement to the
American Council of the IPR "in recognition of exceptional accomplishment in
behalf of the United States Navy and of meritorious contribution to the national
war effort."
Exhibit No. 30
Program
Friday evening, June Ik
Opening Meeting 8 : 30 p. m.
"Democratic Rights and National Defense"
Speakers :
Josephine Truslow Adams, Swarthmore College.
Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People.
Alfred K. Stern, Chairman, National Emergency Conference for
Democratic Rights.
Labor Speaker (to be announced).
Saturday afternoon, June 15
Registration 1:00 p. m.
General Session 1:30-2:00 p. m.
Presiding Chairman : Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Temporary Vice-Chair-
man Maryland Association for Democratic Rights.
Address : Samuel L. M. Barlow, National Emergency Conference for
Democratic Rights.
Round Table Discussions 2:00-4:00 p. m.
Round Table I. Democratic Rights and Labor.
Issues involved : National Defense and Civil Liberties ; the indus-
trial mobilization plan ; legislation and trade unions ; anti-trust
prosecutions.
Round Table II. Democratic Rights and Minorities.
Issues involved : The attack upon the foreign born ; Discrimination
against the Negro ; the anti-lynching Bill ; anti-Semitism ; civil
rights of political minorities ; intellectual freedom in the
schools.
1536
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Saturday afternoon, June 15 — Continued
Round Table III. Democratic Rights and the Church.
Issues involved : The Church and intolerance ; religion in a demo-
cratic society ; freedom of speech for the clergy ; the responsibility
of the Church in the face of attacks upon minorities.
(Chairman and Discussants of Round Tables to be announced).
Business Session 4 : 00-5 : 30 p. mv
Presiding Chairman : Rev. Theodore P. Ferris.
Reports by the Chairmen of Round Tables, with recommendations
for action.
Election of Officers and Continuations Committee.
Maryland Association for Democratic Rights
affiliated to the national emergency conference for democratic rights
franz boas, national honorary chairman
temporary officers
Win. F. Cochran, Chairman
Rev. Theodore P. Ferris,
Vice Chairman
Edna R. Walls, Secretary
Albert Lion, Jr., Treasurer
Bert L. Clarke, Executive Secretary
SPONSORS OF THE CONFERENCE
Mr. I. Duke Avnet Dr. Ernst Feise Rev. Joseph S. Nowak, Jr,
Dr. Floyd Banks Dr. Jonas Friedenwald Charles B. Olds
Walter Bohanan Helen Garvin Maizie Rappaport
Gertrude C. Bussey Sarah Hartman Leon Rubenstein
Marthe-Ann Chapman Sidney Hollander Dr. Leon Sachs
Savilla Cogswell Dr. W. Stull Holt C. A. B. Shreve
J. Marjorie Cook Mrs. Anne G. Huppman Dr. Henry E. Sigerist
Mrs. Henry E. Corner Owen Lattimore H. Bowen Smith
Dorothy Currie Mrs. Owen Lattimore William Smith
Fred D' Avila Claire Leighton Wm. F. Stark
Carrington L. Davis Edward S. Lewis Arthur K. Taylor
Mrs. Edmond S. Donoho Charles W. Mitzel
Jacob J. Edelman Samuel R. Morsell
In order to facilitate arrangements for the Conference, please return this blank ta
the address below as soon as possible
registration blank
Maryland Association for Democratic Rights,
19 Medical Arts Building, Baltimore, Md.
Name
Address
Please check your basis of participation in the Conference :
Individual
Representative of an organization
Organization
Total membership of organization
(Each organization is entitled to at least two delegates. Organizations
having more than 100 members are entitled to one delegate for every
additional 100 members.)
Registration Fee enclosed : 25c per delegate.
Exhibit No. 31
WRITERS CONGRESS— 1943
University of California, L. A. Campus, Westwood. Joint Auspices, Univer-
sity of California, Hollywood Writers Mobilization, Friday, Saturday,
Sunday, October 1, 2, 3
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1537
WRITERS IN WARTIME
Writers face tremendous and argent tasks in relation to the war. The spoken
and written word and the image on the screen are of crucial importance in de-
veloping civilian and military morale, in bringing the promise of victory to the
countries under Axis tyranny, in cementing the unity of the United Nations, in
clarifying the conditions for a just and lasting peace. In this second year of the
conflict, the effective use of word and image is vital to the winning of the war.
Believing that this places a direct responsibility on all writers, and seeking
to find ways and means by which the writer can understand and fulfill his obliga-
tions, the University of California and the Hollywood Writers Mobilization will
hold a Congress of professional writers for the achievement of the following
purposes :
To analyze propaganda techniques as weapons of victory; to sharpen the crea-
tive skill of writers by pooling their creative experience and knowledge ; to in-
vestigate the most effective use of new media of expression ; to strengthen firm
and continuous cultural understanding among the United Nations; to mobilize
the entire writing profession in a program of action for the free world of
tomorrow.
Opening session, Friday evening, 8: 15 p. m., October 1, 1943
EOYCE HALL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Welcome Robert G. Sproul, President, University of California
Reading of message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The Writers Congress Marc Connelly, Ralph Freud
Robert Rossen, Chairman
GREETINGS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
Thomas Baird Great Britain Yu Shan Han China
Phyllis Bentley Great Britain Mikhail Kalatosov U. S. S. R,
Nehemias Gueiros, Enrique de Lozada, Jose Ramos, Hernane Tavares de Sar
South America
SPEAKERS
Lieut. Col. Evans Carlson, United States Marine Corps
Y. Frank Freeman, Motion Picture Producers Association
Owen Lattimore, Office of War Information
Col. Carlos Romulo, the Philippines
Walter White, N. A. A. C. P.
GUESTS
James Cagney Thomas Mann Kenneth Thomson
Theodore Dreiser Elliott Paul Walter Wanger
D. D. Durr Capt. Paul Perigord Jack L. Warner
Lion Feuchtwanger Calvin J. Smith Col. Darryl F. Zanuck
A Cappella Choir — Director, Ray Moremen
Saturday Morning, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m., October 2, 19',3
A panel discussion is a general sociological and psychological approach to a
subject. A seminar treats the subject in relation to a specific, technical craft.
Location of sessions will be posted at Royce Hall, Friday evening, October 1st.
SEMINARS
The feature film
First Session: Dore Schary, Chairman; Sidney Buchman ; William Dozier ;
Talbot Jennings ; Col. Darryl F. Zanuck.
Treatment of the war in motion pictures. Responsibilities, accomplishments,
challenges to be met. Survey of war films made and to be made. Trends in the
story market. Indications for the future.
Radio news and analysis
Fox Case, Chairman; Harry W. Flannery ; Sam Hayes; Chet Huntley;
Clinton Jones ; Hubbard Keavy ; Nelson Pringle ; Wallace Sterling.
1538 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Methods employed in assembling, rewriting, and airing the news. An actual
radio news program prepared and broadcast before the audience of the seminar.
The role of the press
First Session : John Cohee, Chairman ; Alexander Kaun ; Robert C. Miller.
War coverage. The war correspondent. Covering the home front. The
labor press. The future functioning of the press in the war effort.
Song writing in tear
Arthur Schwartz, Chairman : Ira Gershwin ; Oscar Hammerstein, II ; E. Y.
Harburg ; Leo Robin ; Earl Robinson.
The contribution of the song to the war effort. The role of the writer. Goals
to reach. .uJ
Radio television
Lewis Allen Weiss, Chairman ; Klaus Landsberg ; Gilbert Seldes.
The challenge of a new medium. Present status. The transition period. The
writer in relation to television. Technical and economic implications.
Humor and the war
A. S. Burrows ; Carroll Carroll ; Cornwall Jackson ; Phil Leslie ; Leonard
Levinson; Sam Moore; Don Quinn; Frederic Rinaldo ; Melville Shavelson.
Humor in relation to the morale of the soldier and the civilian.
Saturday Afternoon, 2 to 5 p. in., October 2, 19J/3
PANELS
The nature of the enemy
John Wexley, Chairman ; Lion Feuchtwanger ; David Hanna ; Mikhail Kala-
tosov ; Dudley Nichols ; Col. Carlos Romulo ; Virginia Wright.
Treatment of the Enemy in films, books and radio. Survey and comparisons of
Enemy types. The writer probes the Nazi "mind." How should Japan's racist
political philosophy be treated by the writer? The key question: How closely
are the German and Japanese people to be identified with their rulers?
The American scene
Robert Rossen, Chairman; Howard Estabrook; Franklin Fearing; James
Felton: Bernard Gordon; Milton Merlin; Carleton F. Morse; Nat Wolff.
Tensions and dislocations at home. The family under constantly changing
social and economic conditions. The psychological factors which underlie cre-
ative writing in relation to the home front.
Indoctrination and training film
Capt. Bernard Vorhaus, Chairman ; Thomas Baird ; Lt. Col. Owen Crump ;
Lt. Col. Evans Carlson; Maj. Harrison Jacobs; Lt. Com. J. C. Hutchinson.
The function of the training film. Reports on visual orientation courses.
Showing of motion pictures exemplifying work of all branches of service.
Saturday Evening, 1:30 to 10:30 P. M., October 2, 19-'t3
PANELS
Minority groups
Leonard Bloom, Chairman; Cbarlotta Bass; Carlos Bulosan; John Collier;
Harry Hoijer"; Carey McWilliams ; Samuel Ornitz ; Dalton Trumbo ; Walter
White.
Historical and scientific background of the minority problems . . . The
writer's treatment of the question. The Negro : Case history of a minority
group.
Pan-American affairs
Ralph Peals. Chairman : Xehemias Gueiros ; Enrique de Lozada ; Jose Ramos ;
Hernane Tavares de Sa.
Inter-American relations in their sociological, political, and economic aspects.
Educational and linguistic problems defined and examined.
Propaga n it a a n a lysis
John B. Hughes. Chairman ; Lyman Bryson : Gordon Kahn ; Paul Lazarsfeld;
W. E. Oliver, Charles Seipmann; Frances Wilder.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1539
Propaganda techniques in relation to the American scene . . . The writer's
influence is strengthening the home front.
Probh ins of peace
Gordon S. Watkins, Chairman; Phyllis Bentley ; Yu Shan Han; Vladimir
Pozner; Robert Riskin.
Postwar Internal planning. Postwar international cooperation . . . Cultural
understanding among nations . . . The writer and his new audience.
Sunday Homing, 10 a. in. to 1,2:30 p. in., October 3, 191,3
SEMINARS
Writers in exile
Phyllis Bentley, Chairman: Gustave Aiit ; Lion Feuchtwanger ; Thomas
Mann ; Alexis Minotis ; Capt. Paul Perigord.
The exiled writer's relation to his home country- His creative and economic
problems . . . His return to his home country in the postwar world.
The role of the press
Second Session; Hobart Montee; Morris Watson.
War coverage . . . The war correspondent . . . Covering the home front . . .
The labor press . . . The future functioning of the press in the war effort.
Short-wave radio
Glan Heisch, Chairman; John Burton; E. T. Buck Harris; Lt. Col. Tom
Lewis ; Larry Rhine.
Short-wave radio programs for our troops abroad . . . Propaganda uses . . .
Actual illustrations of psychological warfare broadcasts by radio Tokyo . . . and
by U. S. stations.
The documentary film
Leo Hurwitz, Chairman; Thomas Baird; James Wong Howe; Joris Ivens;
Kenneth Macgowan ; Sgt. Ben Maddow ; Arthur Mayer.
The morale film . . . Wartime documentaries in commercial theaters . . .
Comparison of work accomplished in various United Nations.
Music and the tear
Lou Cooper ; Hanns Eisler ; Gerald Strang.
Music as an integral element of film and radio . . . The demands placed upon
music by the war.
Sunday Afternoon, 2 to 5 p. in., October 3, 19Jt3
seminars
The feature film
Second Session: Thomas Baird; Thomas Chapman; Jorge Delano, Sr. ;
Mikhail Kalatosov ; Robert Rossen.
The United Nations. Speakers from the British and Russian film industries.
A comparative survey. Concrete proposals for more effective screen writing
in terms of content and technique.
The animated cartoon
Phil Eastman, John Hubley, Karl van Lueven.
The unique position of the animated cartoon among war films . . . New oppor-
tunities for the writer and for the artist . . . Social and educational aspects.
Creative radio
Paul Franklin, Chairman; Hector Chevigny, Norman Corwin, Ranald Mac-
Dougall, Arch Oboler, Jack Runyon, Bernard Schoenfeld.
The radio dramatist in wartime . . . The commercial writer . . . Docu-
mentary radio . . . Evaluation of current tendencies . . . The future of creative
radio writing.
Publicity and the war
Cecil Carl, Chairman.
The role of the motion picture publicist . . . Exploitation and advertising in
the war effort.
1540
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Sunday Evening, 7:30 to 10:30 p. m., .October 3, 19.'f3
Concluding Session: Royce Hall — Reports From Panels and Seminars;
Resolutions — Program of Action
(Meals will be served on the Campus at nominal prices)
Committees of the Writers Congress
Gustave Arlt
Sidney Buchman
Fox Case
Marc Connelly
Jean Dalrymple
William Dozier
Charles Einfeld
Franklin Fearing
Y. Frank Freeman
Ralph Freud
Gnstave Arlt
Bill Blowitz
Richard Collins
Franklin Fearing
Paul Franklin
Sheridan Gibney
Talbot Jennings
co-chairmen
Marc Connelly ; Ralph Freud
treasurer
Francis Edwards Faragob
advisory committee
Francis H. Harmon
John B. Hughes
Joris Ivens
Stephen Longstreet
Alfred E. Longueil
Kenneth Macgowan
.Mary C. McCall, Jr.
William Morris, Jr.
Dudley Nichols
Mark Sandrieh
general committee
Howard Koch
John Howard Lawson
Melvin Levy
Alfred E. Longueil
Milton Merlin
Josef Mischel
Sam Moore
Carl Sandburg
Dore Senary
Arthur Schwartz
Robert G. Sproul
Rex Stout
Lamar Trotti
Walter Wanger
Jack L. Warner
Walter White
Col. Darryl F. Zanuck
Arch Oboler
W. E. Oliver
H. R. Reynolds
Allen Rivkin
Robert Rossen
Zachary Schwartz
Publicity direction, Vic Shapiro and staff ; executive secretary, Jane Mead
committees on panels and seminars
Minority groups
Ring Lardner, Jr., Chair-
• man
Charles Brackett
Edward Dymtryk
Everett Freeman
Don Hartman
Harry Hoijer
Robert Josephs
Carey McYVilliams
David Robison
Frank Tuttle
Nature of the enemy
John Wexley, Chairman
Fiances Goodrich
Albert Hackett
David Hertz
Dan James
Emmett Lavery
Stephen Longstreet
Marva Ross
Allan Scott
Propaganda analysis
Franklin Fearing, Chair-
man
Ben Barzman
Sidney Carroll
John Houseman
John B. Hughes
Sidney James
H. R. Reynolds
Cameron Shipp
Frances Wilder
American scene
Robert Rossen, Chairman
Edward Chodorov
Howard Estabrook
Franklin Fearing
F. Hugh Herbert
Problems of peace
.Melvin Levy, Chairman
Bill Blowitz
George Corey
Problems of peace — Con.
Sheridan Gibney
Richard Hocking
Sgt. Bob Lee
Milton Merlin
Hugh Miller
W. E. Oliver
Caroline Pratt
Hans Reichenbach
Paul Trivers
J'a))-. [merican affairs
Louis Solomon, Chairman
Irwin Braun
J. Robert Bren
Enrique de Lozada
Ilernane Tavares de S"a
Gerald Smith
Guy Endore
Manuel Gonzales
Jackson Leighter
Kenneth Macgowan
Joan Madison
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1541
COM M 1TTEK
Pa n-A hi erica n a ft a trs —
Continued
H.'R. Reynolds
Allen Hivkin
Waldo Salt
Leo Town send
Marion Zeitlin
Feature film
Richard Collins, Chair-
man
William Dozier
Talbot Jennings
JFay Kanin
Michael Kanin
Howard Koch
Dudley Nichols
Maurice Rapf
Meta Reis
Dore Schary
Lamar Trotti
Documentary film
Joris Ivens, Chairman
Bernard Gordon
Ian Hunter
Jay Leyda
Training films
('apt. Bernard Vorhaus,
Chairman
Lt. Commander J. C. Hut-
chinson
Major Harrison Jacobs
Lt. Fanning Hearon
Sgt. Stanley Rubin
Corp. Alex Greenberg
Henry Blankfort, Jr.
Edgar Peterson
Animated cartoon
iZachary Schwartz, Chair-
man
Graham Heid
Winston Hibler
Sgt. John Hubley
William King
Karl Van Leuven
Norman Wright
Creative radio
Arch Oboler, Chairman
Bernard Schoenfeld
s on panels and seminaus — continued
Humor and the war — Con.
Melvin Frank
Leonard Leviuson
Phil Leslie
Sam Moore
Norman Panama
Creative radio — Con.
Sam Moore
Wendell Williams
Radio neivs and analysis
Fox Case, Chairman
Radio shortwave
Glan Heisch, Chairman
Georgia Backus
Publicity and war
Tom Alfred
Bill Blowitz
Cecil Carle
Lou Harris
Role of press
II. R. Reynolds, Chairman
Charles Cosgrove
Donald Mac-Donald
John Maloney
W. E. Oliver
Robert Tonge
Writers in exile
Josef Mischel, Chairman
Gustave Arlt
Kurt Neumann
Song writing in war
Earl Robinson, Chairman
Leo Robin
Arthur Schwartz
Music and the war
Carroll Hollister, Chair-
man
Mischa Altman
Florence Byrens
Sol Kaplan
Gale Kubik
Lydia Marcus
Earl Robinson
Gerald Strang
Cyril Towbin
Humor and the war
Stanley Roberts, Chair-
man
A. S. Burrows
Julius Epstein
Don Quinn
Frederic Rinaldo
Fred Saidy
Melville Shavelson
Arrangements
Francis Edwards Fara-
goh, Chairman
Milton Merlin, Vice-
Chair man
Gustav Arlt
Fox Case
Franklin Fearing
Ralph Freud
Fred Grable
Hy Kraft
John Howard Lawson
Stephen Longstreet
Alfred E. Longueil
Melvin Levy
Mrs. Robert Rossen
Herman Rotsten
Adrian Scott
Jack Stanley
Mrs. William Wyler
Publicity
Bill Blowitz
John Clark
John Flinn
Chandler Harris
Jerry Hoffman
Leonard Neubauer
George Thomas, Jr.
Tickets
Jane Murfin, Chairman
Harold Buchman
Earl Felton
Robert E. Kent
Lewis Meltzer
Ann Roth Morgan
Frank Partos
Marguerite Roberts
Stanley Roberts
Richard Weil
GUILDS PARTICIPATING IN THE HOLLYWOOD WRITERS MOBILIZATION
Robert Rossen, Chairman
Paul Franklin, Vice Chairman
Pauline Lauber Finn, Executive Secretary
■Screen Writers Guild Screen Cartoonists Guild
Radio WTriters Guild American Newspaper Guild
Screen Publicists Guild Independent Publicists Assn.
Screen Readers Guild Song Writers Protective Association
1655 NORTH CHEROKEE, HOLLYWOOD 2 8, CALIFORNIA
1542 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 32
Senator McCarthy's Statement on Gustavo Duran
The Committee will recall that the name of Gustavo Duran was first mentioned
hy me as a possible bad security risk in a speech which I made in Reno, Neva'da.
At that time I said : "Now, let's see what happens when individuals with
Communist connections are forced out of the State Department. Gustavo Duran,
who was labeled as (I quote) 'a notorious international Communist,' was made
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American Affairs.
He was taken into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel
in the Communist International Brigade. Finally, after intense congressional
pressure and criticism, he resigned in 1946 from the State Department — and
ladies and gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high-sal-
aried job as Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary General of the United Nations."
This statement was promptly ridiculed by the Secretary of State who— through
Mr. Peurifoy — merely said that this man Duran was no longer an employee of
the State Department, but had been in the auxiliary foreign service from Jan-
uary 1943 until September 1945, and thereafter until October 4, 1946, in the
Department. Mr. Peurifoy added that Duran had voluntarily resigned from
the State Department on October 4, 1946.
One of the important facts that the Secretary overlooked in making this press
release is that this man is still, as of today, a high salaried official in the United
Nations. On March 8th my office phoned the office of Trygve Lie to find out
exactly what type of work he was doing. My office was advised that information
could not be given to me. The State Department advised me that Duran is
now Chief of the Cultural Activities Section of the Department of Social Affairs,
United Nations.
I was surprised to find that the Permanent Secretary of the United Nations
felt he could not give to a United States Senator the information as to what this
man was doing. However, since that time I have had the matter checked in New
York and am informed he is actually with the International Refugee Organiza-
tion, engaged in work having to do with screening refugees coming into this
country. The financial contribution which the United States makes toward the
running of this United Nations' agency amount to 45.57 percent. (Senate Report
1274, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, prepared by Subcommittee on Relations with International Organ-
izations.)
At the time that Acheson's man attempted to ridicule my statement, he either
did not know the facts in the case or he was covering up the information whicl>
is in the files and which should have been known to him.
This information, which I shall document for the committee, was known or was
available to the State Department. It shows that Duran was (1) well-known
for his rabid Communist beliefs and activities, (2) that he was active in secret
Soviet operations in the Spanish Republican Army, (3) that a highly confidential
report was sent to the State Department by the Military Attache at the American
Embassy in Madrid which according to all existing rules called for Duran's im-
mediate dismissal — unless the facts were proven to be wrong. Originally, I
understand it was claimed that this was a case of mistaken identity. That claim,
I believe, has been subsequently dropped in view of the fact that our intelligence
produced pictures of him in the uniform that he wore at the time he was the
regional head of SIM.'which was the Spanish Counterpart of the Russian NKVD
or OGPU. I now hand the committee one of those pictures.
At the time this intelligence report reached the State Department, Duran was
a highly placed official in a confidential capacity with the State Department
in South America.
When the American people read the carefully prepared statement put out by the
Secretary of State's office in regard to the Duran statement, they were entitled to
rely upon it as being the truth. Unfortunately, anyone who believed that state-
ment got a completely erroneous impression of the actual facts.
Whichever way you wish to interpret this situation I submit to the Committee
that it is typical of the carelessness of the top executives of the State Department
of this country. The situation I have just discussed is typical of the type of
news releases emanating from the State Department; it is typical of the half
truths we hear in answer to the information which I have been developing in
regard to the bad security risks in that Department.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1543
I now submit to the committee the Intelligence Report just referred to in its
entirety. It will be noted the State Department received a copy of it. There are
certain matters discussed in this report which I do not feel should be made public
until the committee has had a chance to thoroughly look into them. I have,
therefore, deleted these sections from the copies being handed to the^ press and
will not read them into the record at this time. The entire report, however,
with nothing deleted is being handed to each of the members of the committee.
B. I. D. No. 7232.
Report No. R-290/46.
Confidential Intelligence Report for General Use by any U. S. Intelligence
Agency
June 4, 194G.
From : Military Attache, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain.
Source : Spanish Army Central General Staff. B-3.
Area Reported On : Spain.
Who's Who: Gustavo Dtjran.
Following is the report given the Military Attache by the A. C. of S., G-2,
Spanish Central General Staff, After the M/A asked whether Dtjran was known:
1. "Gustavo Dtjrah came to Madrid for the first time in the nineteen twenties
from the Canary Island, in the company of another Canarian, a painter called
Nestor, who was registered by the Spanish police for the same reasons as
Duran * * *. As a friend of Nester, Gustavo Duran became employed as
a pianist in the company of Antonia Merce the 'Argentinita' and went to Berlin
to participated in that capacity in dance shows. However, his * * * caused
him to incur the fury of the Berlin police, which finally ousted him from Germany.
2. "Similar trouble happened to him in other Europen capitals.
His * * * grew to the limit in Paris, which was the preferred center for
his activities some years before the advent of the Spanish Republic in 1931,
while he was under the protection of his friend Nestor, the painter, who was
well known in certain Parisian quarters. About that time the Soviets entrusted
Gustavo Duran with some missions and finally appointed him their agent.
3. "Upon the proclamation of the Spanish Republic, the 'Porcelana' (as he
was nicknamed) returned to Madrid. His identity papers indicated that he was
the representative of the Paramount Film Co. However, bis true mission was
service of the GPU. Duran was greatly successful in his activities due to the
political protection he enjoyed. He soon became one of the leading members of
the Youths of the Communist Party and greatly contributed to the merger of
the Communist Youths with the youths of the Spanish Labor Party, thus giving
birth to the JSU ('Juventudes Socialisitas Uniflcadas' — United Socialist Youths),
of fateful remembrance, since this organization committeed the most cold-
blooded crimes before 18 July 1936 (date of the military uprising) and during
the Red revolution which ensued.
4. '•During the republican regime (1931-1936) Duran continued practising
his * * *. Together with other 'close' friends of his and some young
pro-Communist poets, among whom Alberty was noted, Duran succeeded in be-
coming notorious. All them were his tools and all them were made into active
Communists. In Duran's home located * * *, such meetings took place
that the police had to interfere frequently, thus giving occasion to complete his
record as * * * in the files of the General Directorate of Security. This
record as * * * was probably removed by his friend Serrano Poncela, who
was the Chief of the 'Red' Police during the months of October and November
1936 in Madrid and political reporter of 'Mnndo Obrero' (a Communist news-
paper) and Chief of the JSU Duran's release from his frequent imprisonments
for * * * conduct was due to his powerful political protectors, who blindly
obeyed orders from the Soviet political police.
5. "Upon the national uprising (beginning of Civil War) Gustavo Duran took
over the nearest convent to his house, called las Siervas de Maria,' located at
the old Chamheri Plaza. He was there the 'responsable', or chief. He was
afflicted there with typhoid fever during the month of August 1936.
The ''Cause General" (General Judicial Proceedings) has information about
the crimes perpetrated by the militia under the command of Duran's "choca"
(illegal prison). He was one of the principal leaders of the popular militia
created by the Communists. He was a personal friend of Lister and Modesto
(commanders of Red brigades, now Generals in the Russian Army) and soon
1544 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
became captain, major and lieutenant colonel of the "Red" Army. He belonged
to the General staff of the "Red" forces which directed the "brilliant" with-
drawals of Talavera de la Reina, Maqueda, Toledo, etc.
6. "When the international brigades were brought into the Madrid and Aran-
juez fronts, Gustavo Duran formed part of the High Russian General Staff,
with headquarters at Tarancon and its vicinity, where they left sad and hideous
recollections.
7. "After Tarancon we (the Spanish Intelligence Service) lost track of Duran.
It appears that he went to Moscow with a delegation of male and female mem-
bers of the "Red" Army. It appears that later he was for some time in Paris.
8. "And now he is in Washington as a collaborator of Spruille Braden, Chief
of a Section of the State Department."
9. M. A. Comment : A very reliable Spaniard who is anti-Franco in sympathies
but is middle of the road republican and extremely pro-U. S. and democratic
in his views states that he knows personally that Duran as commander officer
of an international brigade in a small town not far from Madrid ordered the
execution of the town electrician and another man who was a mason, neither
of whom has committed any act for which they should have suffered this
execution.
1332 Wendell G. Johnson,
Colonel, G. S. C, Military Attach d.
The Honorable Kenneth S. Wherry wrote to the State Department on August
2, 1946, demanding the immediate discharge of Duran. I now submit this letter :
August 2, 1946.
The Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Secretary: As a member of the Appropriation Committee, on April 18,
1946, I asked for investigation of certain persons holding positions of trust and
responsibility in your Department.
It was my purpose then and is now to withhold appropriations that finance
the salaries and activities of anyone in the State Department whose allegiance
apparently is to some other country rather than to the United States.
You will recall, Mr. Secretary, that when you appeared I questioned you about
some of these officials and among them was a Gustavo Duran. This was just
prior to the Carter Glass funeral. At that time you stated there was a question
of identity of Gustavo Duran. You stated further an investigation had revealed
that he was some other person than the man in the State Department, who has
been an assistant to Spruille Braden.
It has now come to my knowledge there exists an extensively military intelli-
gence report on this man, Gustavo Duran, and I am reliably informed that several
copies of this report have been delivered to the State Department.
I am now making this formal request upon you in my official capacity as a
United States Senator, and as a member of the State Department Subcommittee
on Appropriations, that on the basis of this report you immediately discharge
Gustavo Duran.
Cordially yours,
Kenneth S. Wherry.
KSW:emn
After Senator Wherry wrote this letter to the State Department, demanding
the immediate discharge of Duran, he received on September 14, 1946, the-
following letter from Six. Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary of State.
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, September 14, 1946.
The Honorable Kenneth S. Wherry,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator: I am in receipt of your recent inquiry about the security
investigation by the Department of Mr. Gustavo Duran. As you know, the
Department has a Security Committee which confines itself to reviewing security
investigations and to making recommendations based thereon. Of course, this
committee has nothing to do with reviewing the qualifications or competency of
the person reviewed for a position in the Department other than as security is-
involved. I have added this because from our conversation I would assume
that you seriously question the qualifications of Mr. Duran for employment, as
distinguished from security consideration. That phase of Mr. Duran's employ-
ment is not within the scope of the Security Committee.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1545
After reviewing the entire record on Mr. Duran as procured from all available
sources, the Security Committee recommended favorably on Mr. Duran. I bave
carefully gone over the record before the Security Committee and I have approved
their recommendation.
While I recognize thai the above conclusions are at variance with your own
feelings, I have to do my duty as I see it and I hope that you will recognize that
I have attempted to exercise my judgment faithfully and honestly.
With best wishes, 1 am
Sincerely yours,
(S) Donald Russell.
When Mr. Russell wrote this letter on September 14, 1946, he had in his flies
the top secret report from the Military Attache in Madrid, which I have already
referred to. outlining in detail the facts I have given on Duran.
What was the mysterious power in the possession of Duran that enabled him
to continue to serve as a confidential assistant to Spruille Braden, the then head
of the State Department's South American affairs?
Why was this man permitted voluntarily to resign in the face of these grave
charges?
Mr. Duran obviously had powerful friends and one of his greatest champions
was his immediate chief. Spruille Braden.
I now show the Committee a copy of a letter marked "secret" and dated De-
cember 21. 1048. in Havana.
Habana, December 21, 1943.
Memorandum for the Military Attache
Mi-. Gustavo Duran was recommended to me in the first instance by a friend
of unimpeachable patriotism and integrity. He was recommended for a specific
objective requiring a person of highly specialized qualifications; his duties were
to be concerned with protecting United States interests through confidential
surveillance over Falangist activities in Cuba. *
As to Mr. Duran's background, he is a naturalized American citizen born and
educated in Spain. He is of good family, and in his youth was particularly
interested in the arts. When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936, he
gave up everything to fight on the side of the Loyalists and from a somewhat
dilettante but brilliant young man, turned into a vital force for the Republican
cause. His military record was reportedly brilliant. He was further described
to me as being a man whose hatred for the Fascists, and his deep devotion to
liberal principles, are not open to debate. A close association with him during
a period of over a year fully support this description.
Mr. Duran arrived in Habana in November 1942 on the payroll of the Pan
American Union and was to transfer to the stall of the CIAA on February 1,
1043. Instead, I urgently recommended his employment as an Auxiliary Foreign
Service Office in a telegram from which I quote the following:
"I regard Duran as eminently qualified for the work he is performing and
I have the highest estimation for his intelligence and character as well as for
his complete loyalty and discretion. He has already proven of very great value
to this Embassy and I anticipate that his usefulness will increase as he becomes
more familiar with conditions in Cuba. I consider that his continuance here is
particularly desirable at the present time when our relations with Spain are
of such vital importance."
Mr. Duran has now served as one of my immediate associates for more than
a year. His work has been excellent and outstandingly useful to the United
States Government. From my personal knowledge based on close association,
Mr. Duran is not a Communist but a liberal of the highest type. I consider him
an unusually worthy, patriotic, and honorable American citizen, who shows great
promise as a United States Government official capable of high responsibility.
Spruille Braden.
Mr. Braden describes Mr. Duran as one recommended to him by a friend of
unimpeachable integrity.
He set forth in his letter that Duran was a naturalized citizen, born and
educated in Spain, of good family and in his youth was particularly "interested
in the arts." Braden said that from 1936 Duran gave up everything to fight
1546 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
on the side of the Spanish Loyalists and said he "urgently recommended his
employment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service officer."
Following Senator Wherry's letter to the State Department of August 1940,
in which the Senator maintained that this man was such a bad security risk
that he should be discharged, we find that he was permitted to resign on October
4, 1946.
In view of the grave charges made by Senator Wherry and the unusual attitude
of the State Department in permitting this man's resignation, it would be interest-
ing to know what, if any, investigation was made by State Department officials
as to his conduct while in a responsible, confidential capacity in the Department.
But Duran's friends in the State Department did not turn their backs on him.
After his resignation, Duran almost immediately was employed as a representa-
tive of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations. He was
employed there as of yesterday.
I have received a confidential report that Duran was recommended for his
UN position by a member of the present Presidential Cabinet. It has also been
reported to me that Duran is the brother-in-law of Michael Straight, the owner
and publisher of a pro-Communist magazine called the New Republic.
Here again it is certainly pertinent to inquire where this man got his power,
what he did while in the State Department, and possibly, of equal importance, is
what he did not do.
To complete this picture, I attach hereto copies of the following documents :
(1) Report from Edward J. Ruff, Assistant U. S. Military Attache in the
Dominican Republic, addressed to the American Intelligence Service dated De-
cember 30, 1943.
(2) Excerpt from the book, Why and How I Left Defense Ministry in the
Intrigue of Russia in Spain, by Idalicio Prieto, former Minister of Defense for
the Spanish Republican cause.
(3) A list of reference material for the committee's use in further checking
into the background and activities of this man who is now with IRO, screening
refugees coming into the United States.
December 30, 1943.
Report From Edward J. Ruff, Assistant U. S. Military Attache in the
Dominican Republic, Addressed to the American Intelligence Service
I want to take this opportunity to clarify my position in connection with
Report No. 428, dated 13 December 1943, subject: Gustavo Duran. Alleged Com-
munist Employee of the CIAA, Havana. As you know, this office received a
cable from the Military Attache, Havana, requesting that dissemination of this
report to be held up on the grounds that it was "absolutely incorrect." A few
days ago we received letter No. 7907 from Lt. Col. Brown, written by Ambassador
Braden concerning this individual. Both these communications corroborated
information which we had regarding Duran and I cannot see on the basis of their
reports how our report can be branded as "absolutely incorrect." Our only state-
ment in the report on Duran is that he was a member of the Communist Party in
Spain. From further reports received, this information can now be evaluated
as A-l. For your own knowledge, the information on Duran was submitted
by a Spanish refugee who also served as a Lt. Colonel in the Spanish Republican
Army and had served on Duran's promotion board in Spain, which board was
charged with considering recommendations for promotion of Spanish Republican
Officers. As our source was actually sitting on the Board at the time that
Duran's recommendation for promotion came through, he himself saw all Duran's
papers and letters of recommendation, and had access to complete information
regarding Duran's background.
He states, dogmatically, that the records showed Duran to be a member of the
Spanish Communist Party. Our source had previously made available to us
the information agreeing with that sent to us by Military Attache, Havana,
i'\c ]it tlic statement that Duran entered the Army as a private. According to our
Agent. Duran was commissioned directly from civilian life and given the rank
of Major in the Militia. Later when the Militia became part of the Spanish
Republican Army, he was made a Major in the Army. The only additional in-
formation we had, and which we did not mention in the report as it was not
believed pertinent, was the reported fact that Duran is a homosexual. I do not
question Duran's interest in the arts, his culture, or intelligence. However, we
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1547
only stated in our report that Duran was a member of the Communist Party, and
that we did not know whether he is still a member of the Communist Party. I,
myself, am convinced that Duran was a Communist and consider Ambassador
Barden's statement that he is a "liberal of the highest type" to be a euphemism.
Under the circumstances, I believed the reliability of our report still remains as
originally submitted.
The Ambassador here is inclined to concur in my report on Duran, but has
asked that do further official correspondence on the subject be sent up. Hence
this personal letter from me.
Sincerely,
Edward J. Ruff,
1st Lt., A. O. D., Assistant Military AttacM.
Excebpt Pbom the Book, Why and How I Left Defense Ministry in the
Intrigue of Russia in Spain, by Indalicio Prieto, Former Minister of
Defense for the Spanish Republic Cause
"It is true that I have had certain incidents with the Russians. Certain Rus-
sian technicians proposed to me in Valencia, that a service of Military Investi-
gations should be created. This was the Spanish counterpart of the NKVD. I
confess that I opposed the project. But because of insistent pressure, I created
the SIM. I was especially concerned with choosing a chief, until I gave it to an
intimate friend of mine, who had just come from France, where he was with
his family. In entrusting him with the task, I gave him these instructions :
"You are going to form the SIM, carefully, with elements of all groups of the
Popular Front. Your only charges will be these two : Do not permit the new
organization to be converted into an instrument of the Communists and do not
permit Russian technicians to gain control. Listen to the advice of these tech-
nicians and follow their orientations, which can be very useful to you, but con-
trol must always be in your hands and in that of the Government, and of no
one else."
I showed little tact in the selection of that comrade. A Republican named
Sayagues came in fact to be the chief of SIM. Regional chiefs of the SIM were
designated and they proposed to me a certain Gustavo Duran for the Madrid
zone. It was not concealed from me that the person proposed was a Communist
(Duran). I knew this, but in spite of that, he was appointed by me. In the
decree creating the SOI of August 1937 — a decree which I myself drew up, be-
cause I did not wish to follow in a slavish manner the project which was handed
me — there is an article by virtue of which the appointment of all agents of the
SIM rests exclusive with the Minister of National Defense. This was a guaran-
tee which temporarily I wish to establish. No one could be an agent of the
SIM who was not in possession of the memorandum book which bore duplicate
the signature of the minister. Duran having been appointed chief of the de-
marcation of the army of the center, of his own accord and without power to
do so, appointed the agents who were under his orders, which to the number of
some hundreds, were Communists and only four or five were Socialists. I faced
an intolerable situation, wherefore alleging, and with reason, that I lacked com-
manders in the army. I ordered that all military chiefs who were not in par-
ticular positions in the army should return to their former positions and thus
Major Duran had to return to his military function. Because of Duran's leaving
the SIM I received a visit from a Russian technician, of these services, who said
to me:
"Russian Agent. I have come to speak to you about the dismissal of Duran.
What happened?
"Prieto. Nothing special, I lacked commanders in the army and ordered Duran
to return to it.
"Russian Agent. No. You discharged him because he appointed Communists
as agents in Madrid.
"Prieto. That is also sufficient reason, because Duran absolutely lacked author-
ity to make appointments.
"Russian Agent. Why did he not have the power to appoint agents?
"Prieto. Because by virtue of the decree creating the SIM that power is
reserved exclusively to the Minister."
I read the decree and before the evidence of my statement my visitor alleged :
"Russian Agent. Duran could make temporary appointments.
68970—50 — pt. 2 5
1548 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Prieto. Neither actual nor temporary. Here in Spain, moreover, the tem-
porary is converted into the definitive.
"Russian Agent. Be that as it may, I come to ask you to immediately restore
Major Duran as chief of the SIM in Madrid.
"Prieto. I am very sorry, but I cannot consent.
"Russian Agent. If you do not restore Duran, my relations with you are
broken.
"Prieto. I am sorry, but Major Duran will go to the front of his division and
will not return to the SIM. Your attitude is unjustified and I cannot yield to it."
I did not yield as a matter of fact, and my relations with the Russian technician,
through his own wish, were absolutely cut off. I have not seen him since that
scene.
Exhibit No. 33
Habana, December 21, 1943.
Memorandum for the Military Attache
Mr. Gustavo Duran was recommended to me in the first instance by a friend
of unimpeachable patriotism and integrity. He was recommended for a specific
objective requiring a person of highly specialized qualifications ; his duties were
to be concerned with protecting United States interests through confidential
surveillance over Falangist activities in Cuba.
As to Mr. Duran's background, be is a naturalized American citizen, born and
educated in Spain. He is of good family, and in his youth was particularly
interested in the arts. When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936, he
gave up everything to fight on the side of the Loyalists, and from a somewhat
dilettante but brilliant young man, turned into a vital force for the Republican
cause. His military record was reportedly brilliant. He was further described
to me as being a man whose hatred for the Fascists, and his deep devotion to
liberal principles, are not open to debate. A close association with him during
a period of over a year fully supports this description.
Mr. Duran arrived in Habana in November 1942 on the payroll of the Pan
American Union and was to transfer to the stall of the C. I. A. A. on February
1, 1943. Instead, I urgently recommended his employment as an Auxiliary For-
eign Service Officer in a telegram from which I quote the following :
"I regard LHiran as eminently qualified for the work he is performing
and I have the highest estimation for his intelligence and character as well
as for his complete loyalty and discretion. He has already proven of very
great value to this Embassy and I anticipate that his usefulness will in-
crease as he becomes more familiar with conditions in Cuba. I consider that
his continuance here is particularly desirable at the present time when
our relations with Spain are of such vital importance."
Mr. Duran has now served as one of my immediate assistants for more than
a year. His work lias been excellent and outstandingly useful to the United
States Government. From my personal knowledge based on close association,
Mr. Duran is not a Communist but a liberal of the highest type. I consider
him an unusually worthy, patriotic and honorable American citizen, who shows
great promise as a United States Government official capable of high responsi
bility.
» Spruille Braden.
Exhibit No. 34
December 30, 1943.
Report From Edward J. Ruff, Assistant U. S. Military Attache in the
Dominican Republic, Addressed to the American Intelligence Service
I want to take this opportunity to clarify my position in connection with
Report No. 428, dated 13 December 1943, subject: Custavo Diran. Alleged Com-
munist Employee of the CIAA, Havana. As yon know, this officer received a
cable from the Military Attache, Havana, requesting that disseminations of this
report to bo hold up on the grounds that it was "absolutely incorrect." A few
days ago wo received letter No. TIMJT from Lt. Col. Brown, written by Ambassador
Braden concerning this individual. Both these communications corroborated
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1549
Information which we had regarding Duran and T cannot sec on the basis of their
reports bow our report can be branded as "absolutely incorrect." Our only state-
ment in the report on Dnran is that he was a member of the Communist Party in
Spain. From further reports received, this information can now be evaluated
as A-l. For your own knowledge, the information on Duran was submitted
by a Spanish refugee who also served as a Lt. Colonel in the Spanish Republican
Army and had served on Duran's promotion board in Spain, which hoard wras
Charged with considering recommendations for promotion of Spanish Repuhlican
Officers. As our source was actually sitting on the board at the time that
1 hiran's recommendation for promotion came through, he himself saw all Duran's
papers and letters of recommendation, and had access to complete information
regarding Duran's background.
He states, dogmatically, that the records showed Duran to he a member of the
Spanish Communist Party. Our source had previously made available to us
the information agreeing with that sent to us by Military Attache, Havana,
except the statement that Duran entered the Army as a private. According to our
Agent. Duran was commissioned directly from civilian life and given the rank
of Major in the Militia. Later when the Militia became part of the Spanish
Republican Army, he was made a Major in the Army. The only additional in-
formation we had. and which we did not mention in the report as it was not
believed pertinent, was the reported fact that Duran is a homesexual. I do not
question Duran"s interest in the arts, his culture, or intelligence. However, we
only stated in our report that Duran was a member of the Communist Party, and
that we did not know whether he is still a member of the Communist Party. I,
myself, am convinced that Duran was a Communist and consider Ambassador
Braden's statement that he is a "liberal of the highest type" to be a euphemism.
Under the circumstances, I believed the reliability of our report still remains as
originally submitted.
The Ambassador here is inclined to concur in my report on Duran, but has
asked that no further official correspondence on the subject be sent up. Hence
this personal letter from me.
Sincerely,
Edward J. Ruff,
1st Lt., A. O. D., Assistant Military Attache.
Exhibit 35
Senator McCarthy's Statement on John Stewart Service
This case is that of John Stewart Service,
This man is a foreign service officer of the Department of State and at the
moment is in Calcutta, India, where he is helping determine the all-important
policy of our Government toward India,
The name of John Stewart Service is not new to the men in the Government
who must pass on a governmental employee's fitness as a security risk.
When Mr. Peurifoy testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he
said that Service had been cleared four different times.
It is my understanding that the number has now risen to fiive and I earnestly
request that this committee ascertain immediately if Service was not considered
as a bad security risk by the Loyalty Appeal Board of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, in a post-audit decision, handed down on March 3 of this year.
I understand that this board returned the file of Mr. Service to the State
Department with the report that they did not feel that they could give him clear-
ance and requested that a new board be appointed for the consideration of this
case.
To indicate to the committee the importance of this man's position as a security
risk to the Government, I think it should be noted that he is one of the dozen
top policy makers in the entire Department of State on Far Eastern policy.
He is one of the small, potent group of "untouchables" who year after year
formulate and carry out the plans for the Department of State and its dealings
with foreign nations ; particularly, those in the Far East.
The Communist affiliations of Service are well known.
His background is crystal clear.
He was a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the Communist
Chairman of the Editorial Board of the infamous Amerasia.
1550 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Half of the Editorial Board of this magazine were pro-Communist members
of the State Department and the committee is in possession of these names.
On June G, 1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after an exceedingly
painstaking and careful investigation covering months, arrested Philip J. Jaffe,
Kate Louise Mitchell, editor and coeditor of Amerasia, Andrew Roth, a lieutenant
in the United States Naval Reserve stationed in Washington ; Emanuel Sigurd
Larsen and John Stewart Service, who were employees of the State Department
(this is the same John S. Service to whom I have just referred and who is pres-
ently representing the State Department in Calcutta, India) ; Mark Julius Gayn,
a magazine writer of New York City, who is about to leave for Russia. They
were arrested on charges of espionage in connection with the theft of the fol-
lowing Government records :
360 classified documents from the State Department, including some top
secret and confidential classification;
163 prepared by ONI.
42 prepared by MID.
58 prepared by OWL
9 from the files of the War Department.
Some of the important documents picked up by the FBI at the time of the
arrest were as follows :
First: One document market "secret" and obviously originating in the Navy
Department dealt with the schedule and targets for the bombing of Japan. This
particular document was known to be in the possession of Phillip Jaffe, one of
the defendants, during the early spring of 1945 and before the program had
been effected. That information in the hands of our enemies could have cost
us many precious American lives.
Second : Another document, also marked "top secret" and likewise originating
in the Navy Department, dealt with the disposition of the Japanese Fleet sub-
sequent to the major naval battle of October 1944, and gave the location and
class of each Japanese warship. What conceivable reason or excuse could there
be for these people, or anyone else without authority to have that information
in their possession and at the same time claim freedom of the press? That was
the excuse they offered. They stole this document for no good purpose.
Third : Another document stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph
Censorship, was a secret report on the Far East and so stamped as to leave
no doubt in anybody's mind that the mere possession of it by an unauthorized
person was a clear violation of the Espionage Act. This was not an antiquated
paper but of current and vital interest to our Government and the Nation's
welfare.
Fourth: Another document stolen was from the Office of Military Intelligence
and consisted of 22 pages containing information obtained from Japanese pris-
oners of war.
Fifth: Another stolen document, particularly illuminating and of present
great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing
complete disposition of the units in the army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located,
how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and
showing their military strength.
Many of the stolen documents bear an imprint which reads as follows :
"This document contains information affecting the national defense of
the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 United States
Code 31-32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents
in any manner to,an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
Despite the very small circulation of 1,700 copies of this magazine it had a
large photocopying department. According to Congressman Dondero, who spon-
sored the resolution for the investigation of the grand jury, this department
was working through the night, in the small hours of morning, and even on
Sundays. It could reproduce the stolen documents — and undoubtedly did — and
distribute them into channels to serve subversive purposes, even into clenched
'.ists raised to destroy our Government.
in June 1044 Amerasia commenced attacks upon Joseph C. Grew, who had
during bis stay in the State Department rather vigorously opposed the clique
which favored scuttling Chiang Kai-shek and allowing the Communist element
in China to take over.
Larsen, one of the codefendants in this case subsequently wrote a lengthy report
on this watter. I would like to quote briefly from parts of that report:
"Behind the now famous State Department Espionage Case, involving the
arrest of six persons of whom I was one. an arrest which shocked the Nation on
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1551
.Tunc 7. 101". is the storj of a highly organized campaign to switch American
policy in the Far East from its long tested course to the Soviet lino. It is a
story which has never hern told before in full. Many sensational though little
explained developments, such as the General Stilwell Affair, the resignation of
Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the
emergence of a pro-Soviel bine in the Far Eastern Division of the State Depart-
ment, are interlaced with the Case of the Six, as the episode became known. * * *
••It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the Espionage Case
which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But from
behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed
upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it. That operation vitally affects
our main ramparts in the Pacific. In consequence of this operation General
Marshall was sent on a foredoomed mission to China designed to promote Soviet
expansion on our Asiatic frontier. It was a mission which could not but come
to grief and which may yet bring untold sorrow to the American people.
"How did it happen that the United States began to turn in 1944 upon its
loyal ally, the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had for 7 years fought Japan,
and to assume the sponsorship of the rebel Communist regime which collaborated
with the Japanese during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact? How did it come
to pass that Washington since 1S)44 has been seeking to foist Communist members
upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of China, a maneuver equiva-
lent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z.
Foster into key positions in the United States Government? How did it trans-
spire that our top-ranking military leader, General Marshall, should have pro-
moted an agreement in China under which American officers would be training
and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time when they were
ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over were waging a war
of nerves upon the United States?
"Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under
Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And
was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a
blind alley and retirement?"
In describing the arrest, Larson had this to say about his arrival at the office
of the United States Commissioner:
"There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure
in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department, and to
Lieutenant Andrew Roth, liaison officer between the Office of Naval Intelligence
and the State Department, whom I also knew as an adherent of pro-Soviet policies.
Both of them were arrested separately the same night in Washington."
Larsen then goes on to describe John Stewart Service, John P. Davies, Jr., and
John Carter Vincent as the pro-Soviet group in the China Section whose views
were reflected by Amerasia and whose members were in close touch with Jaffe
and Roth. In connection with this, it will be remembered that John Service, as
Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military commission to
Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, you will recall that Stilwell demanded
that Chiang Kai-shek allow him to equip and arm some 300,000 Communists.
Chiang Kai-shek objected on the grounds that this was part of a Soviet plot
to build up the rebel forces to the extent that they would control China. Chiang
Kai-shek promptly requested the recall of Stilwell and President Roosevelt
relieved Stilwell of his command. It was at this time that Service submitted his
Report No. 40 to the State Department, which, according to Hurley, was a plan
for the removal of support from the Chiang-Kai-shek government with the end
result that the Communists would take over.
The espionage cases apparently had their origin when a British Intelligence
Unit called attention to material being published in Amerasia which was em-
barrassing its investigations.
Preliminary investigations conducted at that time by OSS disclosed classified
State Department material in the possession of Jaffe and Mitchell. The FBI
then took over and reported that in the course of its quest it was found that
John Stewart Service was In communication from China with Jaffe. The sub-
stance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached
the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington. One of
the papers found in Jaffe's possession was Document # 58, one of Service's
secret reports entitled : "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek — Decline of his Prestige
and Criticism of and Opposition to his Leadership."
In the course of the FBI investigation Amerasia was revealed as the center of
a group of active enthusiastic Communists or fellow travelers. To give you a
1552 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
better picture of Amerasia, it perhaps should be mentioned here that Owen Latti-
more was formerly an editor of Amerasia, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a
writer for the Daily Worker, was the magazine head. Mr. Jaffe incidentally was
naturalized in 1923 and served as a contributing editor of the Defender, a
monthly magazine of International Labor Defense, a Communist organization,
in 1933. From 1934 to 1936 he had been a member of the editorial board of
China Today, which was a publication of the pro-Soviet American Friends of the
Chinese People. At that time he operated under the alias of J. W. Philips.
Tinder the name of J. W. Philips, he presided in 1935 over a banquet at which
Earl Browder was a speaker. He also lectured at the Jefferson School of Social
Science, an avowed Communist Party institution. He was also a member of the
Board of Directors of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship. The
New York Times, subsequent to his arrest, referred to him as an active supporter
of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet movements for a number of years.
According to an article in Plain Talk magazine Jaff'ee has been a liberal con-
tributor to pro-Soviet causes and that on one occasion he reserved two tables
at a hotel banqnest held to launch a pro-Communist China front in the name
of "The fifth floor, 35 East 12th Street," which happens to be the National
Headquarters of the Communist Party.
I realize that this history of Jaffe's activities is unnecessary for most of the
members of this investigating body, but I feel that the record should be complete
so that anyone who reads it will understand the background of the individual
to whom his four codefendants had been delivering secret State and War De-
partment material. His coeditor, Miss Mitchell, gave a party for John S. Service
when he returned from China. Service had previously attended a special press
conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which he supported the
position of the Chinese Communists.
Larsen had this to say about his codefendants :
"I knew Jaffe and his group as the editor of a magazine which had almost
semiofficial standing among the left wingers in the State Department."
The night Kate Mitchell was arrested, she had in her possesion according to
Congressman Dondero, a highly confidential document entitled : "Plan of Rattle
Operations for Soldiers," a paper of such importance that Army Officers were
subject to court martial if they lost their copies.
Congressman Frank Fellows, a meniher of the Committee on the Judiciary
which investigated the grand jury which failed to indict Service, wrote a
minority report in which he stated :
"The author of the resolution under which this committee assumed
jurisdiction stated upon the floor of the House, 'The President authorized
the arrest to be made and the arrests were forbidden by the State Depart-
ment'."
Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew very urgently insisted ttpon a prosecution of
the six individuals who were picked up by the FBI on charges of conspiracy to
commit espionage. He thereupon immediately became a target in a campaign of
vilification as the culprit in the case rather than the six who had been picked
up by the FBI.
Lieutenant Roth wrote a series of articles for a New York paper and published
a book in which he vigorously attacked Grew for his opposition to the Commu-
nist sympathizers in the State Department insofar as the far eastern policy was
concerned.
Under Secretary Grew, after a lifetime in the diplomatic service, resigned and
President Truman announced that Dean Acheson would take over the post of
Under Secretary of State. * * *
"During my conference with Mr. Jaffe in October" Larsen said, "he dropped
a remark which one could never forget, 'Well we've suffered a lot', he said, but
anyhow we got Grew out'."
In regard to the legal handling of this case, the following is found in Plain
Talk in an article by Larsen :
"While public attention was largely focused upon extraneous issues, the
Espionage Case itself was following a special course behind the scenes. It ap-
peared that Kate Mitchell had an influential uncle in Buffalo, a reputable at-
torney by the name of James M. Mitchell, former president of the New York
State Bar Association. Mr. Mitchell was a member of a very influential law
firm in Buffalo, Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Bass & Letchworth. The New York
City correspondents of that law firm include the most redoubtable Col. Joseph
M. Hartfield, extremely well known and extremely influential in Government
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1553
circles in Washington. Colonel Hnrtfiold, who is regarded by sonic as one of
the most powerful political lawyers in the country, made at least four trips to
Washington where he called on top officials of the Department of Justice in the
matter.
In that connection I would like to quote again from Congressman Dondero's
talk on the House floor, in which he stated :
"I have heretofore charged and reiterate now that the court before whom these
cases were brought was not fully informed of the facts. A summary of the
court proceedings has been furnished to me, which shows no evidence or exhibit
obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation presented to the court. Jaffe's
counsel told the court that Jaffe had no intention of harming the Government,
and United States Attorney Hitchcock told the court there was no element of
disloyalty in connection with the case. If that is the fact, may I respectfully
ask what purpose did these individuals have in mind in stealing these particular
files?
Had this same thing happened in certain other governments, these people
would undoubtedly have been summarily shot, without a trial. Let us not forget
we were still at war with Germany and Japan when these files were stolen, and
Jaffe, in whose possession they were found, had been for more than 10 years a
leader and heavy financial supporter of Communist propaganda causes, accord-
ing to the FBI."
As I stated above, after the Grand Jury failed to indict Mitchell, Service, and
Roth, the House passed a resolution in which it directed the Committee on the
Judiciary :
"to make a thorough investigation of all the circumstances with respect to
the disposition of the charges of espionage and the possession of documents
stolen from secret Government files which were made by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation 'against Philip J. Jaffe, Kate L. Mitchell, John Stewart
Service, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, Andrew Roth, and Mark Gayn,' and to
report to the House (or to th? Clerk of the House, if the House is not in
session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress, the results of
its investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems necessary."
This committee then confirmed a report of a theft of a vast number of docu-
ments from the State, War, and Navy Departments, which ranged in classifica-
tion all the way from top secret to confidential. This committee report indicates
that a number of the members of the Grand Jury voted for the indictment of
Service and Mitchell on the espionage charges, but that the required number of
12 did not so vote.
It will be noted that the committee was not appointed for the purpose of
passing upon the guilt or innocence of the espionage suspects, but was appointed
for the purpose of investigating the way that the case was handled and to make
recommendations. The committee did not in any way question the theft of the
documents. However, it semed to place a great deal of stress upon the fact
that the documents might not be admissible in evidence because of the method of
obtaining them.
For example, on page five, the report states as follows :
"4. Many of the identifiable documents might have had their evidential
value destroyed by reason of the possibility of the court's sustaining the de-
fendants' motions attacking the warrants of arrest.
"VI. Judicial decisions require scrupulous care to see arat searches and
seizures are reasonable. While sparch and seizure on arrest may be made
without a search warrant, yet this is not so unless the warrant of arrest
issued after 'probable cause' of guilty had been established by legal evidence."
On page six, the following statement is made :
"If the warrant for arrest was not issued on 'probable cause' substanti-
ated by facts, the evidence disclosed as a result of the search and seizure
incident to the arrest based on such a warrant would be subject to suppres-
sion and, therefore, not usable as evidence of the crime for which arrest was
made."
While I have not seen any testimony of any of the Grand Jurors, and do not
know what it is available, this would seem to indicate that the committee felt
that the Grand Jury was disturbed, not so much by the question of guilt or
imiocence of the defendants, but by the question as to whether or not the guilt
or innocence could be proven they apparently feel that much of the material
1554 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
would not he admissible because of the method of search and seizure. The fol-
lowing comment will be noted on page seven of the committee report :
"Most of the items seized at Jaffe's office were typewritten copies. Some
of such copies were proved to have been typed in one of the Government
departments. It may be fairly inferred that the originals of such copies were
never removed but that copies were made at the department or agency where
the original reposed."
This makes it very clear that the committee felt making copies of secret docu-
ments and then delivering the copies to unauthorized persons placed the crime
in a different class from the delivery of the originals. It is rather difficult to
understand this reasoning in view of the fact that photostats or copies of an
important secret document would normally be of as much value to an enemy
power as the originals. The committee further pointed out that additional reason
for not finding the Grand Jury at fault is because any of the six can still be fur-
ther prosecuted on the charge of espionage. The Majority Report makes some
excellent recommendations, which the Secretary of State might well read. I
especially call his attention to recommendations one, two and three on page
nine, which read as follows :
"1. That the head of every department and agency of our Government see
to it that more — much more — care be exercised in personnel procurement.
That all those considered for Government positions in every echelon be in-
vestigated so thoroughly as to insure that no one be employed unless abso-
lute certainty has been attained that nothing in background, present attitude,
or affiliations raises any reasonable doubt of loyalty and patriotic devotion
to the United States of America.
'"2. That the watchword and motivating principle of Government employ-
ment must be : None but the best. For the fewer, the better, unless above
question. .
"3. That each and every present employee who fails to measure up to the
highest standard should be discharged. No house divided against itself
can stand."
One of the members of the six-man committee, Congressman Hancock, was
prevented by illness from participating in the report. Two of the members of
the committee wrote dissenting opinions, which meant that the decision to ab-
solves the Grand Jury of responsibility was made by a 3-2 decision.
Congressman Fellows in his dissenting opinion made the following statement:
"Jaffe either took these documents himself, or his confederates took them
for him. And two of the documents found were 'Top Secret' so marked and
so designated. I can see no point in arguing that these papers may not
have been of much value. The thieves thought they were. The Government
agencies so adjudged them. And the facts show that the defendants could
have had their choice of any documents they wishes; they were given no
protection so far as the State Department was concerned."
This transaction, or rather a series of transactions involved, embraces the
unlawful removal of "top secret," "secret," "confidential," and "restricted" files
from the Department of State, in our National Government. This is a very seri-
ous offense. In time of war, this is a most serious offense. When war is in
progress, or even in time of peace, it is of little or no concern whether the files
removed were "Originals" or "copies," the fact that "information" of either or
any classification was removed from the secret files in the Department of State
and was delivered to any individual, or group of individuals, who had no lawful
right to receive the' same, is the essence of the offense. When that very secret
information was thus unlawfully revealed to others, no matter how the same was
imparted to Mr. Jaffe. whether by an original, or by copy, or by any other method,
the real damage has been done.
There should not he any attempt made in the report to either minimize or
acquit anyone from the magnitude of the act or acts committed. The report
filed appears to be at least an attempt to either minimize or completely justify
some of the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly committed.
All those who participated in any way in the removal, or attempted removal, of
these documents from the Department of State — or who copied such reports and
thereafter delivered such copies to Mr. Jaffe, or to any other person, not law-
fully entitled to receive the same, should be prosecuted, and all those participat-
ing, in any degree in the unlawful acts under investigation, should he immediately
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1555
discharged from their positions in our Government. The report should speak
strongly and without any reservation upon that subject.
The questions here involved are so grave and the offenses so great, that no
effort should be made to protect or defend those who so offended, but the report
should be made both firm and strong -to speak the truth— but to place the blame
where the same rightfully belongs. .
This is but a small portion of the pertinent background of Service, but cer-
tainly, beyond doubt, it forever excludes this man as a security risk by whatever
yardstick it is measured.
igain we have a known associate and collaborator with ( ommumsts and pro-
Communists, a man high in the State Department consorting with admitted
espionage agents, and I wish to say to this committee what I said on the floor of
the Senate on February 20, 1M50. .
When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war. the State Department had in
China a voting man named John s. Service. His task, obviously, was not to
work for the communization of China. Strangely, however, he sent official re-
ports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang
Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope of China.
Later this man— John Service — was picked up by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department
information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph
Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced
to resign. Two days after Grew's successor. Dean Acheson, took over as Under
Secretary of State, this man — John Service— who had been picked up by the
FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China,
was not only reinstated in the State Department but promoted. And finally, under
Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions.
Mr. Chairman, today this man, John S. Service, is a ranking officer in the
policy-making group of "untouchables" on duty in Calcutta, India, one of the
most strategically important listening posts in the world today and since the
fall of China the most important new front of the cold war.
Five times this man has been investigated as to his loyalty and his acceptance
as a security risk to the Nation.
What possible reason could there have been for even a second investigation of
his record.
He was not an acceptable security risk under Mr. Acheson's "yardstick of
loyalty" the day he entered the Government.
He is not a sound security risk today.
Exhibit No. 49
Plot to "Wreck Labor Party Exposed
The plot to turn the American Labor Party into a "front" for the Communist
Party has been exposed by Charles Belous, who was secretary of the opposition.
On February 13, 1940, Belous resigned from this group which calls itself the
"Progressive Committee to Rebuild the A. L. P."
On April 2nd primary elections will be held throughout the State for party
positions in the American Labor Party. Members of the State Committee of the
Labor Party and delegates to the Presidential Convention will be elected.
For the first time since the organization of the Labor Party there is an organ-
ized movement which has named candidates in opposition to the candidates
which have the endorsement and support of the leadership and founders of the
American Labor Party.
Belous has exposed the vicious conspiracy of this opposition group. It is up
to the enrolled voters of the American Labor Party to do the rest. Join with
other members of the Labor Party and vote right on Primary Day — April 2nd.
READ THE STATEMENTS OF A MAN WHO KNOWS THE FACTS
[From the New York Post, Wednesday, February 14, 1940]
Belous Quits ALP Group Over 'Red Tie' — Says "Progressive Committee" Is
Tool of Communists
Former Councilman Charles Belous resigned today as secretary of the Pro-
gressive Committee to Reorganize the American Labor Party, and charged it was
1556 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
being used by tbe Communist Party in an effort to assure control of tbe ALP.
"It is clear that the Communists are conducting a knock-down and drag-out
fight to take over leadership of the ALP and make it a front organization," Belous
said at his home, 2S-29 Forty-first Av., Long Island City.
CALLED NEW DEAL FOES
The Progressive Committee, headed by Morris Watson and with Eugene P.
Connolly and Hyman Glickstein as moving spirits, is attempting to organize a
State-wide fight against the present ALP leadership in the April primary, when
a new State Committee will be elected.
Belous said it was the Watson group's opposition to President Roosevelt and
the New Deal which finally convinced him that its aims went far beyond a mere
change in ALP leadership.
"In the election of a successor to Congressman Sirovich," he said, "I was amazed
to find a group I was aligned with that was supposed to be supporting the New
Deal, openly fighting the election of Edelstein, the Democratic candidate."
Glickstein, attorney for the Watson committee, joined with Kenneth F. Simp-
son, GOP county leader, in a successful court action to void the nomination of
Edelstein by the ALP.
Belous said he had realized from the start that there were Communists in
the insurgent ALP movement, but that he had been "willing to work along with
them" for the common immediate objective of ousting the present ALP leadership.
FINDS KEAL AIM
Later events convinced him, he said, that the real aim of the Communists
went much further, being no less than to make the ALP the tail of the Commu-
nist Party kite.
He said that although he was secretary of the committee he .had not been
consulted in formation of many of its policies.
When the committee was first organized last December, he said, Prof. Herman
Gray of N. Y. U. and other recognized liberals were "supposed to be connected
with it, but they pulled away."
Belous, center of numerous political fights in Queens where he once headed
the City Fusion Party, said he was going to "take a rest from politics and try
to earn a living as an honest lawyer."
SEES MORE QUITTING
"Quite a few others in Queens who were in the same position that I was are
going to follow suit in resigning from the committee," he said. The ALP, it was
learned, probably will drop the charges of disloyalty on which it has been seek-
ing expulsion of Belous from the party.
In a formal statement announcing his resignation, as secretary of the Pro-
gressive Committee, the former Councilman said as a member of the group he
had found himself forced to condone and even justify Nazi atrocities and sup-
press "deep-felt sympathies for Poland and Finland."
Even more significantly, he said, he was expected to "join with the Garners
and Coughlins and Dieses and O'Connors to criticize" President Roosevelt and
for the defeat of New Deal candidates and policies.
[From the Daily News, Wednesday, February 14, 1940]
Belous Disavows Pko-Reds in A. L. P.
(By Lowell Limpus)
Denouncing "the complete sell-out and abandonment of one of the most sympa-
thetic Presidents that labor and the common man have had since Lincoln,"
former Councilman Charles Belous last night repudiated the faction which has
been opposing the American Labor Party's purge of Communists.
The former Queens legislator intimated that the Reds themselves are behind
the movement and declared that they are now blasting away at President
Roosevelt with all their political artillery.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1557
RESIGNED POST
Belous, who was just squeezed out of office by the last P. R. count, charged
that the Communists are not only demanding opposition to the New Deal in
return for their support hut that they also tried to make him justify Hitler
and the Nazis. As a result he resigned as secretary of the "Progressive Com-
mittee to Rebuild the American Labor Party."
In a public statement, Belous told how the rebel faction insisted that "I sup-
press my deep-felt symphathies for Finland and Poland" and revise his attitude
toward nazism. "Suddenly I must condone its atrocities, and even justify
them," he said. And the final straw came when he was told that he "must
now work for the defeat of New Deal candidates and policies."
Although ho didn't specify directly, there was no doubt about the group to
which the former councilman was pointing. "When I find my thoughts and acts
limited by strange logic and argument," he said, "one suspects something more
than a mere tolerant attitude toward all minorities, including Communists."
GIVING UP LIBERTIES
Belous announced he was withdrawing from Labor Party activities although
he would remain a member. Political observers generally believe that he lost
his Queens seat at the last election because he was reputed to be too close to the
Communists, although he specifically denied the charge during the campaign.
Originally a Fusion Party candidate, he switched to the American Labor Party
but was nosed out by Republican John Christensen.
issued by
Liberal and Labor Committee to Safeguard the American Labor Partt
fight the communist attempt to capture the labor party
State Headquarters : Hotel Claridge, 44th Street & Broadway, New York
Paul Blanshard, Chairman ; Frederick F. Umhey, Treasurer
VICE CHAIRMEN
Luigi Antonini Adolph Held Dorothy Kenyon
George S. Counts Louis Hollander Harry W. Laidler
Morris L. Ernst John Haynes Holmes A. Philip Randolph
Douglas P. Falconer Arthur Huggins Alex Rose
Grace Gosselin Alexander Kahn
Exhibit No. 50
October 10, 1939.
Mr. Alex Rose,
State Secretary, American Labor Party,
151 West Fortieth Street, Neiv York City.
My Dear Mr. Rose : I have just received your letter dated October 6th which
in tone suggests a pistol being put to my head. My impulse under such circum-
stances is to dare the damn fool to shoot. Particularly where as in this case
my views, and especially my loathing of all dictatorships, are so much a matter
of common knowledge that you certainly cannot claim to be in the dark about
them.
However, I realize that you are probably acting for what you consider com-
pelling reasons of party strategy and are at least trying to treat all candidates
alike. That being the case let me be magnanimous and answer your questions
as best I can. But remember, please, that I am running for Judge of the Municipal
Court, not for United States Senator, and so my opinions on international affairs
are not worth the paper they're written on.
However, here they arej
First, I regard with horror and loathing the Hitler-Stalin pact.
1558 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Second, I agree with you that any fusing of the brown and red dictatorships
is a treacherous blow to world civilization.
Third, I also agree, insofar as I understand them, with the President's pro-
posed changes in our present neutrality law. But frankly I have been far too
busy lately trying to be as good a Judge as possible to have given such legislation
the careful study it requires.
Fourth, it is not easy for me to be neutral when I think of either Hitler or
Stalin but I try not to lose my head and I continue to believe in the traditional
American civil liberties. Above all I hope that we may keep at peace and still
preserve American democracy.
Fifth, it goes without saying (or I should have thought it did) that I am not a
Communist or anything even remotely resembling one. I am just an old-fashioned
believer in democracy who gets awfully weary sometimes of all its ructions but
would never, never give it up.
Sixth, my original subscription to the Constitution and platform of the Ameri-
can Labor Party remains unchanged and requires no reaffirmation.
In conclusion may I remind you that I am running to succeed myself as Judge
of the Municipal Court on a platform of clean government and an independent
nonpartisan judiciary and that the American Labor Party has approved this plat-
form by its indorsement of my candidacy?
Very truly yours,
(Signed) Dorothy Kenton.
Exhibit No. 51
[From the New York Times, May 26, 1941. Advertisement]
An Open Letter to the President of tut-: United States
Mr. President:
We await your address on May 27 in the belief that you will tell what we must
do to insure the security of the United States by hastening the defeat of the
aggressors. 'We pledge to you our loyal support in the performance of this
historic task.
Some of us have been your political adherents, seme your opponents, but all
of us are united on this firm basis : we are Americans, you are our elected Presi-
dent. We acknowledge the eternal truth of that fine old American principle that
pplitical differences end at the water's edge. It is at the water's edge that our
people now stand, facing to eastward and westward the frightful reality of
world war and world revolution.
We have prayed that we might be spared from involvement in the war. But
we cannot close our eyes to the wholesale murder of liberty. Most of all we can-
not ignore the threats to our own security uttered and progressively enforced by
those tyrants who are dedicated to the proposition that democracy must die.
The dictators have extended their world war and world revolution from con-
tinent to continent — farther and farther out into the Atlantic Ocean — nearer and
nearer to the lifeline of the Western Hemisphere. With their propagandists
and saboteurs they have begun their invasion of this hemisphere.
The challenge is inescapable. We cannot meet it with mere words nor with
mere dollars. We know that strong action, even armed action, entailing greater
sacrifices will be required of us.
With firm determination to carry through at whatever cost the policies neces-
sary to defeat tyranny, we await the facts and leadership which the Commander-
in-Chief alone can give. We repeat to you, Mr. President, the final words of the
Declaration of Independence : "With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1559
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our
sacred honor."
Respectfully submitted.
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Washington, D. C. ; Lewis W. Douglas,
Phoenix, Ariz.; Henry A. Abbot, Lexington, Ky. ; Louis Adamic,
Milford, N. J. ; Allen D. Albert, Paris, 111. ; Paul Shipman Andrews,
Syracuse, N. Y. ; James R. Angell, New Haven, Conn. ; Luigi
Antonini, New York, N. Y. ; Frank Aydelotte, Princeton, N. J. ;
Carl E. Bailey, Little Rock, Ark. ; Margaret Culkin Banning,
Tryon, N. C. ; Stringfellow Barr, Annapolis, Md. ; David P. Bar-
rows, San Francisco, Calif. ; Kemp D. Battle, Rocky Mount, N. C. ;
James Phinney Baxter, Williamstown, Mass. ; Anita McCorrnick
Blaine, Chicago, 111. ; Henry Breckenridge, Chevy Chase, Md. ; Van
Wyck Brooks, Westport Conn. ; Thomas E. Burke, Washington,
D. C. ; Henry Seidel Canby, New York, N. Y. ; Oliver C. Carmichael,
Nashville, Tenn. ; Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, New Rochelle, N. Y. ;
Mary Ellen Chase, Northampton, Mass. ; Rufus E. Clement, At-
lanta, Ga. ; Pierce Cline, Shreveport, La. ; Robert C. Clothier, New
Brunswick, N. J. ; Ada L. Comstock, Cambridge, Mass. ; Karl T.
Compton, Boston, Mass. ; George Creel, San Francisco, Calif. ;
Virginius Dabny, Richmond, Va. ; Russell Davenport, Holyoke,
Mass., J. Lionberger Davis, St. Louis, Mo. ; Monroe E. Deutsch,
Berkeley, Calif. ; Mark Ethridge, Louisville, Ky. ; Silas Evans,
Ripon, Wis. ; Marshall Field, New York, N. Y. ; Harry M. Fisher,
Chicago, 111. ; Alvan T. Fuller, Boston, Mass. ; Harry David Gide-
onse, Brooklyn, N. Y. ; Mary B. Gilson, Chicago, 111. ; Virginia C.
Gildersleeve, New York, N. Y. ; Frank P. Graham, Chapel Hill,
N. C. ; Helen Hayes, Nyack, N. Y. ; Arthur Garfield Hayes, New
York, N. Y. ; Henry W. Hobson, Cincinnati, Ohio ; Hamilton Holt,
Winter Park, Fla. ; Mirian Hopkins, Hollywood, Calif. ; Rupert
Hughes, Los Angeles, Calif. ; M. Ashby Jones, Atlanta, Ga. ; Doro-
thy Kenyon, New York, N. Y. ; William Draper Lewis, Philadel-
phia, Pa. ; Larry S. MacPhail, Brooklyn, N. Y. ; Maury Maverick,
San Antonio, Texas; Francis E. McMahon, South Bend, Ind. ;
Joseph C. Menendez, New Orleans, La. ; Robert A. Millikan, Pasa-
dena, Calif. ; Christopher Morley, Roslyn, N. Y. ; Mrs. Dwight
Morrow. Englewood, N. J. ; Paul Scott Mowrer, Chicago, 111. ;
Francis P. Murphy, Nashua, N. H. ; Mrs. Burton W. Musser, Salt
Lake City, Utah ; Joseph Padway, Milwaukee, Wis. ; Ferdinand
Pecora, New York, N. Y. ; William Lyon Phelps, New Haven,
Conn. ; H. H. Pike, Jr., New York, N. Y. ; Gifford Pinchot, Wash-
ington, D. C. ; Charles Poletti, Albany, N. Y. ; Mrs. Frances F. C.
Preston, Princeton, N. J. ; Henry F. Pringle, New York, N. Y. ;
A. Philip Randolph, New York, N. Y. ; Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt,
New York, N. Y. ; Chester H. Rowell, San Francisco, Calif. ; Cor-
nelius D. Scully, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Robert E. Speer, Lakeville,
Conn. ; Charles P. Taft, Cincinnati, Ohio ; Henry W. Toll, Denver,
Colo. ; William L. White, New York, N. Y. ; Stephen S. Wise, New
York, N. Y. ; and more than 3,000 others, representative of a cross
section of the nation's life.
You Can Share in this Expression of faith in the President's leadership. Tele-
graph him today that you do. Simply Say : Add my name to the list of those
WHO PLEGE yOU THEIR SUPPORT IN THE HARRIMAN-DOUGLAS LETTER.
COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMERICA BY AIDING THE ALLIES
National Headquarters, 8 West 40th Street, New York City
1560 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 52
European Section, USSR Transmitters, Overseas & Far East Service
January 6, 1949.
RUSSIA HAS "FREEST WOMEN ON EARTH"
Moscow, Soviet Far Eastern Service, in English to India, January 5, 1949,
6 : 30 a. m. EST— L.
(Talk by Maria Sharikova, Assistant Chairman of the Moscow Soviet on the
Rights of Women)
(Summary with quotations)
The author began by saying that the U. S. representative in the U. N. Com-
mittee on the Rights of Women, Dorothy Kenyon, in endeavoring to conceal her
reactionary stand has engaged in slandering the Soviet people, in particular
Soviet women. In a radio broadcast over the Voice of America she talks a lot
of irresponsible drivel attempting to deny the political, economic, and social
equality enjoyed by the women of the USSR, at the same time painting a glowing
picture of the position of women in Britain and the United States, when she
knows full well what their position really is. "I am shocked at this shameful
downright lie, completely unsupported by the tiniest fact." As it happens, Doro-
thy Kenyon could not quote facts for that would at once disprove her assertions.
Sharikova goes on to claim that the respect in which Soviet woman are held
was attested by the welcome given to the USSR delegation at the International
Federation of Democratic Women. She outlines her own rise from the post of
a village schoolmistress before the Revolution to that she holds at present and
gives examples of other women in public positions. Is there any country in the
world, she asks, where women can develop politically and play such an impos-
ing role in the life of the State?
In the USSR whatever jobs women do they feel they are all the equal masters
of their country, contributing to the work of the organs of the Soviet State.
Dorothy Kenyon ignores such facts as these and tries to imply that women in
the USSR get only the heavy work, but in the USSR women at work are pro-
tected by labor laws, unlike in the United States "where women workers and
office clerks are completely dependent on the likes and dislikes of their em-
ployers." Women doing the same work as men get 30 to 40 percent less pay,
as is the case also in Britain.
Dorothy Kenyon keeps quiet about this, just as she keeps quiet about the dis-
graceful part played by the capitalists of the United States and Britain in ex-
ploiting female labor in the colonial and dependent countries. The commentator
describes the woes of the exploited women in the colonial countries of Asia and
Africa quoting from the speech of a United States progressive delegate to the
International Federation of Democratic Women to illustrate the conditions of
slavery in which they live.
After quoting more facts and figures illustrating the part played by women in
the U. S. S. R., Sharikova declares that instead of defending women in the UN,
Dorothy Kenyon had engaged in slandering the "freest women on earth, the
women of the U. S. S. R." However, as any of the thousands of visitors to the
U. S. S. R. can witness, "the slander indulged in by Dorothy Kenyon can hood-
wink no one."
ECONOMY OF SOVIET ZONE FLOURISHING
Moscow, Soviet Overseas Service, in English to North America, December 30,
1948, 9 : 00 p. m., EST— L.
(Commentary by Khalamov : "The Economic Situation in the Soviet Zone of
Germany
[Text]
"We know from reecnt history that fascist Germany was a kingdom of finan-
cial and industrial monopolies, and Prussian Junkerdom the bosses that consti-
tuted the backbone of predatory German imperialism. It was financial bigwigs
and such commanders of Ruhr-Wesphalian industry as Krupp and Thyssen who
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1561
summoned Hitler to power. Their aggressive idea of creating a peace-abiding
and democratic Germany is unreal and illusory.
"Yet German monopolies and Junker landed property rights have been done
away with only in the Soviet Zone. This problem has been successfully solved
in the Soviet Zone with due consideration for insuring a stable peace and uni-
versal security and with the active participation of broad democratic sections
of the population.
SUCCESS OF SOVIET LAND REFORM
"Only 4 months after the collapse of the Nazi regime, at the demand of the
German people, primarily the working peasantry, a democratic land reform was
successfully carried out in the Soviet Zone. This did away with Junkerdom,
that bulwark of German imperialism and aggression * * *
Exhibit No. 53
[From the New York Times, February 16, 1946]
Urge Bomb-Making Vacation — Columbia Peofessors Ask Declaration to Aid
UNO Commission
To the Editor of the New Yobk Times :
In view of the establishment of the UNO Commission on the Atomic Bomb,
we would like to suggest a declaration of policy of the following nature by the
President of the United States, in order that the discussions of the UNO Com-
mission may proceed in an atmosphere of full good faith and of confidence
in their successful outcome for international peace :
1. The United States will at once stop the production of bombs from ma-
terial currently produced. This includes the preparation of sub-assemblies and
all other procedures involved in the fabrication of bombs.
2. For one year, which would seem to be a reasonable time for the com-
mission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the Governments
concerned, we will stop accumulating purified plutonium and uranium-235,
which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs. The plants which produce
these materials will be kept merely in a stand-by condition. For this purpose
they will run at the minimum rate compatible with maintaining them in good
order, but they will not accumulate the resulting purified and fissionable prod-
ucts. As produced, these will be eliminated by appropriate means, such as dump-
ing them into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture.
3. We are prepared to have the disposition of our present stockpile of bombs
considered as one of the items in an agreement to be entered into by us and the
other Governments.
L. C. Dunn. Irwin Edman, A. P. Evans, Selig Hecht, P. C. Jessup,
R. M. Maclver, Edgar Miller, F. C. Mills, George B. Pegram,
I. I. Rabi, Jan Schilt, C. S. Shoup.
New York, Feb. 13, 1946.
The signers of the foregoing letter are, respectively, professors of zoology,
philosophy, history, biophysics, public law, sociology, biochemistry, economics,
graduate faculties (dean), physics, astronomy and economics.
Exhibit No. 54
Ambassador at Large,
Department of State,
Washington, March 24, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : In connection with my testimony on March 20, 1950,
before your Committee, I was asked by Senator Hickenlooper as to the precise
date of a Round Table discussion which was attended by Mr. Owen Latti-
more and in which I saw Mr. Lattimore. I stated in my testimony that I
1562 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
believed that this meeting was in December. Upon consulting the files of the
Department, I find that the meeting was on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.
I am enclosing a list of all the persons who attended this meeting.
Sincerely yours,
Philip C. Jesstjp.
(Enclosure.)
List of Consultants
Joseph W. Ballentine, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University, New
Haven, Connecticut.
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Illinois.
Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company, New York,
New York.
Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer and Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Port-
land, Oregon.
George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New
York, New York.
Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York, New York.
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company, New
York, New York.
John D. Rockefeller III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund. New York, New
York.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, New
York.
Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California,
San Francisco, California.
Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati,
Ohio.
Exhibit No. 55
List of Publications — Esther Caukin Bkunaueb
Guidance materials for study groups in international relations of the American
Association of University Women, including syllabi and bibliographies on
American foreign policy, European politics. Far Eastern affairs, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy. Central and Eastern Europe ami the United Nations;
also the International Problem-of-the-Month Series (193:1-1943), and the Front
Page (1943-44) brief guides to the study of contemporary international affairs.
The Peace Proposals of Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918. Ph. D. dis-
sertation, inni. Bound manuscripl on deposil in the Hoover Library and the
Stanford University Library; abstract published by the Stanford University
Press in 1927.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1563
Definitions of the Monroe Doctrine, published by the American Association of
University Women .about 1929.
An outline of War, written at the request of the National Committee on the
Cause and Cure of War, about 1935.
The Peace Proposals of December 1916-January 1917, Journal of Modern History,
Vol. IV. No. 4. December 1932.
National Defense: Institution*. Concepts, Policies, published by the Women's
Press of the Young Women's Christian Association, IS'37.
Statements before the Committee en Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
Seventy-sixth Congress, First Session on Present Neutrality Law (Public Res.
No. 27) : published by Hie V. S. Governmenl Printing Office. 1939.
Building //"' New World Order, published by the American Association of Univer-
sity Women in the International Relations Pamphlet Series, December 1939.
(This was used as the textbook for the League of Nations Association High
School Examination contest in 1940.)
Hit* America Forgotten? Myths and Facts about World Wars I and II, with an
introduction by James T. Shotwell. Published by the American Count-il on
Public Affairs, Washington, 1941. (pamphlet)
Facing the Nazi Menace, Vital Issues, June 1941.
Power Politics and Democracy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science. July 1941.
The Development of International Attitudes, in collaboration with Daniel Pres-
ents in International Understanding TJvrough Public School Curriculum, Part
II of the Thirty-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of
Education.
The United States in the Transition to the New World Order, a monograph for
the Second Report of the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, April
1941'.
Further Thoughts on Germany, World Affairs (published by the American Peace
Society). September 1942.
The Tinted Nations, Junior Red Cross Journal, September 1942.
Religion and the Free World, Junior Red Cross Journal, December 1942.
Frontiers of the Future, Junior Red Cross Journal, March 1943.
The Stake of the United States in International Organization, a chapter in a
textbook, Citizens of a New World, published by the National Council of the
Social Studies, 1944.
UNESCO to Date, United States National Commission for UNESCO, Report on
the First Meeting, September 19't6; Department of State Publication 2726,
1947.
Exhibit No. 56
Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Science,
Manhattan, March 22, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Ttdings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Ttdings : I have known Dr. Esther C. Brunauer since October
1946, and I am certain that she is loyal to the Constitution, laws and ideals of
the L'nited States.
My knowledge of Mrs. Brunauer is based on an official relationship that has
prevailed periodically since November 1946, when I attended the General Confer-
ence of UNESCO in Paris as a delegate, and Mrs. Brunauer attended as a mem-
ber of the staff of the State Department. This same relationship existed at
suhsequent General Conferences of UNESCO. Of course between the interna-
tional meetings, my work as chairman of the United States National Commission
brought me in touch with Dr. Brunauer and her work in Washington, D. C.
I would say that the present ideological warfare in the world is Dr. Brunauer's
chief concern, and in this she is constantly working to uphold United States
policy, as well as the democratic philosophy generally, and to defeat the devious
and clever tactics of the Russians and their satellites. At the Mexico City
conference in 1947, for example, she spent a full month in counteracting the
efforts of the Russian-dominated Polish delegation to pin the tag of "war-
monger" on the Western democracies, and especially on the United States. She
worked with devotion, precision, and effect. She was completely sincere in all
she did.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 6
1564 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
I could cite many similar examples which have proved to me that it is erro-
neous and un-American to refer to Dr. Brunauer as a Communist sympathizer.
Sincerely yours,
Milton S. Eisenhower.
Washington, D. C, March 24, 1950.
Re Esther and Stephen Brunauer.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Special Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I was considerably startled to read that Mr.
and Mrs. Brunauer had been accused of Communist leanings and disloyalty
before your subcommittee.
As you may perhaps recall, I helped as a member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee in the Eightieth Congress to initiate investigations which I believe
assisted the State Department in eliminating employees who had demonstrated
Communist leanings or were shown to be poor security risks. I am as anxious as
anyone to rid our Government of any employees whose loyalty is doubtful. How-
ever, erroneous accusations, even though made in good faith, hurt that objective
more than they help it.
I am convinced the accusations against the Brunauers are completely erro-
neous.
I first met the Brunauers in 1943, and Mrs. Ball and I have known both of
them intimately since 1945. We live only a few blocks apart here in Washington
and have spent many evenings together. Our conversations inevitably have
dealt at length with politics, with international problems and issues and with
the so-called cold war.
In all of our many hours of conversation, neither Esther nor Stephen has ever
revealed the slightest indication of Communist attitudes. On the contrary, both
of them are most strongly opposed to the ideology and practices of communism.
As you know, Stephen Brunauer was born in Hungary and spent his youth there.
Many of his boyhood friends have been victims of Communist dictatorship. He
is perhaps the most violently anti-Communist person I know.
I have no hesitation in vouching for the complete loyalty of Stephen and
Esther Brunauer to the United States and to our way of life.
With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
Joseph H. Ball.
American Association of University Professors,
Washington 6, D. C.
Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : It is my well-considered opinion that Esther Caukin
Brunauer and her husband, Dr. Stephen Brunauer are loyal Americans and
definitely are not poor security risks.
Mrs. Brunauer took her graduate work at Stanford University under my
direction and I have kept in close touch with her ever since. I have the highest
regard for her character, intellectual integrity, and devotion to all ideals for
which America stands. Her brilliant work as a research student in the Hoover
Library is a matter of record. For years she occupied an important part in the
American Association of University Women and has I know been considered for
a number of academic positions.
As examples may I cite first her efforts to place Hungarian diplomats in
this country who refused to accept Communist Hungary and resigned from the
diplomatic service. Second, the excellent talk which she gave on UNESCO at
the annual meeting of this association in Boston. Third, a long conversation
which I had with her in August 1947 when she was visiting Los Angeles.
The allegations made against Mrs. Brunauer I regard as baseless, appalling,
and not to be left unanswered.
Very sincerely yours,
Ralph II. Lurz
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1565
New York, N. T., March 23, 1950.
Dear Senator Typings: I am suffering from such a sense of outrage because
of Senator McCarthy's attacks on Esther Brunauer's loyalty that I am almost
speechless — 1 can only recite certain facts. I have known Mrs. Brunauer since
1942 when she was interim chairman of the National Committee on the Cause
and Cure of War, a group organized by the great woman suffrage leader Carrie
Chapman Catt. a generation ago. Mrs. Brunauer and I worked together for
the Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace when we supported
the United Nations. I have known Mrs. Brunauer always as an able statesman
and as an objective, farsighted hate-free thinker and it goes without say — as a
most loyal and useful citizen of the United States. If an inflamed mind with
the power to injure her and limit or destroy her usefulness can see in her calm
and philosophical approach to great problems anything evil or subversive, our
democracy is indeed in a bad way.
Yours sincerely,
(S) Vera B. Whitehome
(Mrs. Norman deR. Whitehome).
Noank, Conn., March 25, 1950.
The Honorable Miixard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : I am the Dean of Pembroke College in Brown Uni-
versity on leave of absence for this year and retiring in June 1950. From 1937-
1941 I was National President of the American Association of University Women,
and during those years I worked somewhat closely with Mrs. Esther Caukin
Brunauer who was the Associate in International Relations for the National
AAUW.
I am happy to testify to my strong convictions that Mrs. Brunauer is a loyal
and devoted citizen. She is also extremely able. Her programs for the use
of International Relations study groups in the AAUW were outstandingly good
and in every case were permeated by a rare understanding of the problems of the
United States in those difficult years. In that field alone Mrs. Brunauer did
much to rally the loyal support of the large membership of the Association for
the critical problems our country was facing at that time.
Mrs. Brunauer was also a representative of the American Association of
University Women at its international Conferences, several of which I also at-
tended, and her friendly spirit and great ability did much to make those Con-
ferences successful. I believe firmly that international understanding comes in
large measure from personal relationships among groups of different nations,
so her work in that field seemed to me of unusual value. The U. S. S. R. never
had representation at any of those Conferences.
I have not followed Mrs. Brunauer's career closely in recent years, but I am
fully convinced from my own personal knowledge that she is not only a woman
of unquestionable reliability and loyalty to her country, but that she must be a
great asset to any department which has had the good fortune to enlist her
services.
Sincerely yours,
Margaret S. Morriss.
Washington, D. C, March 22, 1950.
Senator Millard Tydings,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : I first met Mrs. Esther Brunauer through a mutual
friend in Baltimore, either in 1934 or 193."), and have known her and her husband
on a social basis since that time. Never have I had occasion to have any but
the highest regard for both Dr. and Mrs. Brunauer's qualities of character and
intellect. As a psychiatrist, and thus specifically accustomed to evaluating per-
sonalities. I would be very much astonished if either of them (I know Mrs.
Brunauer better than I do her husband), had anything except entire loyalty
for the principles of American democracy.
Trusting that the charges which have recently been made concerning Dr. and
Mrs. Brunauer will be proven conclusively to be wholly without foundation.
Respectfully yours,
^ ' Katherine K. Rice, M. D.
1566 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Vassar College,
Poughkeepsie, N. Y., March 25, 1950.
The Honorable Mt.lard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I feel compelled to write a vigorous protest to the
statements attributed to Senator McCarthy about Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer.
I have known Mrs. Brunauer since the late twenties when she accepted a position
with the American Association of University Women. As a member of the
International Relations Committee of the American Association of University
Women, serving under the chairmanship of the late President Mary Woolley
of Mount Holyoke College, I was closely associated with Mrs. Bruuauer. Sub-
sequently, I have followed her work with the greatest respect and interest.
Never have I heard her express any sentiment which by any stretch of the
imagination could be regarded as disloyal to her Government or as sympathetic
to the ideology of communism. Quite the contrary is true. Mrs. Brunauer has
repeatedly spoken to groups of American college women, and every time I have
heard her I have been impressed with her devotion to the American ideal.
Mrs. Brunauer's position with the American Association of University Women
was that of Staff Associate for the Committee on International Relations. She
was not in the consumer field, nor was she Executive Secretary of the Association
as reported by the press.
I have a profound confidence in Mrs. Brunauer's integrity and in her loyalty.
She is a citizen of whom America can be proud.
I also have great regard for your leadership, and it is my hope that you and
the members of your committee will refute the unjust and unwarranted charges
made against this citizen of our country.
Yours very truly,
Sarah Gibson Blanding.
Rochester, N. Y., March 24, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator: In connection with the charges leveled by Senator Mc-
Carthy against Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, I should like to offer my testimony
on her behalf.
I came to this country in 1937 and was naturalized in 1943 ; since 1937 I have
been employed as a research chemist by the Eastman Kodak Co. My entry into
the United States was made possible by an affidavit given by Dr. Esther Caukin
Brunauer and her husband, Dr. Stephen Brunauer. Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer
was at that time an Associate for International Relations in the American
Association for University Women, and she generously offered her affidavit
to me as to a former recipient of an International Fellowship from that
Association.
During the first few months of my stay in the United States I spent most of
the time in Washington and became closely acquainted with Dr. Esther Brunauer,
a privilege which I highly esteem, for I found her a rare person with the highest
code of personal conduct. Through her, I became aware of the ideas which are
the foundation of this country ; her interpretation made me understand and love
it. After I left Washington we could only meet occasionally, but as friends we
felt the need to discuss vital issues even on these occasions. I vividly recall Dr.
Brunauer's passionate devotion to this country, her high hopes when the United
Nations were founded, and later her distress over the obstructionist policy of
the Soviet Union.
In the light of my personal experience, it seems more than absurd that Dr.
Brunauer should hav ebeen made the target of such charges as were made by
Senator McCarthy — indeed, quite unforgiveable.
Respectfully yours,
Gertrude Kornfeld.
Washington, D. C, March 24, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Tydings.: Shortly after Senator McCarthy had named Dr.
Esther Brunauer as a poor security risk I wrote Dr. Brunauer and said that if I
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 15G7
could be of any help in this matter for her to let me know. Dr. Brunauer has
told me that a letter addressed to you could be of some help and that is why
I am writing.
The reason I offered to be of help to Dr. Brunauer is that I have known her
for some time and do not feel that the charge against her is justified. I first
met her early in February 1946 when I started work for the Department of State.
I saw quite a lot of her for the next two and a half years since her assignment
was connected with UNESCO and the work that I did was connected with
UNESCO also. For a few months we were in the same division in the Depart-
ment of State; alter that she transferred to the newly established UNESCO
relations staff whereas I remained in the Office of International Affairs. My
meetings with Dr. Brunauer, dealing as they did with UNESCO, covered a wide
range of subjects. It was quite obvious to me that Dr. Brunauer's views were
entirely orthodox. It is easy enough in conversations such as we had to spot a
person who is a "pink" and I am convinced that Dr. Brunauer was neither pink
nor any other reddish color.
I never saw Dr. I'.runauer associate with persons of eytreme leftish or com-
munistic sympathies and I would doubt very much that she had any such
associations.
It is true that a person can be a Communist and even his best friends will not
know it. However, this is something that happens very, very seldom. Ordi-
narily, a Communist can be spotted quite easily by his views on certain key
suhjects, by his mannerisms and by his actions.
I can say without any doubt whatsoever that there was nothing that Dr.
Brunauer did or said during the time that I have known her professionally
and socially that gives me the least reason to doubt her loyalty and I conclude
that she is loyal and should be allowed to continue in her very useful Govern-
ment career undisturbed by further accusations which appear to be groundless.
Sincerely yours,
James P. Hendrick.
Arlington, Va., March 2Jf, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, I). C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : May I take this opportunity to assure you of my
absolute faith in the loyalty and patriotism of Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer.
I had the privilege of working directly under Dr. Brunauer at the American
Association of University Women from September 1, 1929, until January 1, 1941.
For about 10 years of that time I was her private secretary. During that time
I was, of course, very closely associated with her. I cannot imagine anyone less
deserving of the accusations made by Senator McCarthy.
One of my duties as Dr. Brunauer's secretary was the stenciling for duplica-
tion or preparing for the printer of all material which she wrote during that
time. I feel sure that if you will check this material, which will be on file at the
American Association of University Women, you will agree with me that it clearly
indicates that the writer did not believe in communism nor in any of its ramifica-
tions.
Throughout my association with Dr. Brunauer it was quite evident that she
was working wholeheartedly and tirelessly for the promotion of an international
policy which would benefit the United States. There again an examination of
her writings at the AAUW would bear out my belief. A check of the interna-
tional items of the legislative program of that organization, which she supported
by -written material and speeches, would shed further light on her loyalty to the
best interests of her country.
I would like also to say that I considered Dr. Brunauer a personal friend of
mine and have only the highest regard for her loyalty, her integrity, her honesty—
in fact for her character as a whole.
I would be more than happy to give you any further information you might
wish about my associations with Dr. Brunauer.
Yours very sincerely,
Helen Alley
(Mrs. W. G. Alley).
1568 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C, March 23, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Ttdings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I understand that the Senate Foreign Relations
Investigating Subcommittee is giving Dr. Esther Brunauer (and her husband
Dr. Stephen Brunauer) an opportunity to appear before it in reply to the charges
made by Senator McCarthy.
I am sure that you and the members of your committee can be relied upon
to give fair and thoughtful consideration to the material which will be pre-
sented to you at that time. It is a very serious responsibility which has been
placed upon your committee. It is essential that persons with responsibility
in the Government have complete loyalty to our Government, but it is equally
important that the Government should not lose the services of able and loyal
citizens.
I have known Dr. Esther Brunauer personally since 1946 and have known of
her work as the associate in international relations of the American Association
of University Women prior to that time. Since 1946 we have worked together
within the Washington Branch of the AAUW and I have had frequent occasion
for contact with her. She is a thoughtful, well-balanced and mature woman.
From our talks I know that she has a deep faith in the democratic process. I am
convinced that she has no sympathy whatsoever with totalitarianism, either
of the right or the left. Furthermore, she is sufficiently astute that it would be
quite impossible for her to be used by persons with such sympathies.
I have not known Dr. Brunauer's work directly, since my own position as
Director of the Statistics Branch in the Public Housing Administration does not
bring me into contact with the Department of State. However, since the AAUW
is an organization seriously concerned with education in its broadest sense,
our contacts have not been of a frivolous nature, but. have been concerned with
the development of the program and policies of that organization.
I trust that your committee will take prompt action to clear Dr. Brunauer's
name so that she can continue to serve in the Department of State.
In addition, I would like to call your attention to the incorrect statements
made about Dr. Brunauer's activities in the AAUW. Laying aside any debate
as to whether activity on consumer problems should be considered indicative of
sympathy with communism, I would like to point out that Dr. Brunauer had no
part in developing organization activity in that area, but was concerned solely
with international questions.
I have made no reference to Dr. Stephen Brunauer only because I am not
personally acquainted with him.
Respectfully yours,
Ruth Lois Lyons.
University of Denver,
Social Science Foundation,
Denver, Colo., March 24, 195&r
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : I was both shocked and angered by Senator McCarthy's
attack upon Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer. I have known Mrs. Brunauer since
the time when she completed her Doctor's degree at Stanford University and
became the international relations specialist for the American Association of
University Women. While she was serving in that capacity I met her several
times, read her publications, and heard her speak before groups of university
women. The impression inevitably formed was of a woman devoted to America,
with a scholarly mind, extraordinarily well informed about world affairs, and
meticulous in documenting wbat she said and wrote. In other words, here was
a woman of the finest moral and intellectual integrity.
In more recent years, I have had the opportunity to observe at first hand
Dr. Brunauer's activities in the Department of State. I was appointed by the
National Commission for UNESCO as Chairman of its Committee on Secretariat
in the Department of State, and in this capacity was required to analyze Dr.
Brunauer's activities as a member of the UNESCO Relations Staff. The im-
pressions formed in earlier years, set forth above, were reinforced by my study
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1569
of her services in the Department of State. I found her to be extremely conscien-
tious, a tireless worker, and utterly loyal to our Government.
I am convinced that Senator McCarthy lias done a grave injury to Mrs.
Brunauer, and I hope that he or your committee will take appropriate steps to
clear her name before the American public.
Sincerely,
Ben M. Cherrington.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
New York, N. 7., March 23, 1950.
Hon. Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Str : I have recently read in the newspapers the accusations made by
Senator McCarthy concerning- Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer of the Department
of State. These accusations seem to me irresponsible and unjust. As a loyal
citizen of the United States I am venturing to write you this letter in defense
of a person whom I feel is unjustly accused.
I have known Mrs. Brunauer for quite a number of years and was familiar
with her work for the American Association of University Women before she
joined the staff of the Department of State. During 1946 I was closely associated
with her when she was the United States member of the Preparatory Commission
for UNESCO and I was a Deputy Secretary-General on the staff of the Prepara-
tory Commission. During that period I was working in London and Paris. Mrs.
Brunauer was frequently there sitting with the Preparatory Commission. I had
many close conferences with her concerning the policy of the United States
respecting the development of UNESCO. In her work at the Preparatory Com-
mission and in all my conversations with her, I know that she was a staunch
defender of the American system. In the negotiations of the Preparatory Com-
mission she consistently opposed the plans of Communist sympathizers. She as
much as any other single person is responsible for the development of UNESCO
along lines consistent with American policies.
Since 1947 I have been a member of the National Commission for UNESCO
and its Executive Committee. In that capacity I have seen Mrs. Brunauer at
work in the Department of State and have cooperated with her on various
matters concerning cultural relations between nations. I can testify that at
no time has there ever been the slightest evidence of disloyalty on her part.
On the contrary, she has been alert and able at defending and advancing the
democratic causes to which the United States and the western world are
committed.
The attack on her is unjust and can only have the effect of weakening American
prestige abroad and reducing the morale of the American civil service. I hope
very much that an opportunity may be given Mrs. Brunauer for complete clear-
ance of her good name.
Sincerely yours,
Howard E. Wilson.
Public Administration Clearing House,
Washington, D. C., March 23, 1950.
To Whom It May Concern:
I have known Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer since October 1945. I met her then
in connection with the United States Delegation to the London Conference early
in November 1945, to draft the charter of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization. I was one of the advisers to the Delega-
tion, and she was an expert for the Department of State. I saw a great deal of
her in London and worked with her there on the official work of the Delegation.
I have seen her sim-e on two or three occasions in connection with meetings
of the United States Commission for UNESCO, of which I was formerly a member,
and on one occasion I visited her home.
I have every reason to consider Mrs. Brunauer a very faithful, conscientious,
and able member of the State Department's permanent staff. She was highly
regarded by our Commission to London and by everyone I have ever spoken
to about her. No question of her loyalty or reliability has ever been raised in
my presence, nor have I ever had any reason to doubt them. I have always
1570 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
considered her to be a fine example of the American career woman in the
Department of State, and a person in whose loyalty and integrity complete
confidence can be placed.
Sincerely yours,
Herbert Emmerich.
Washington, D. C, March 23, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : As a Maryland voter and constituent of yours, let me
first salute you for the excellent job you are doing as chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Investigating Subcommittee. The whole Nation has confi-
dence in your integrity and fairness.
The purpose of this letter is to tell you and the other members of the subcom-
mittee of my shock and utter incredulity over Senator McCarthy's charges that
my friend, Esther Caukin Brunauer, was of questionable loyalty and a poor
security risk. I have known her personally for many years — since the middle
thirties at least. My husband, Raymond Clapper, who, as you will remember,
was killed in World War II during the Marshall IslancMnvasion, was also a great
admirer of her clear, brilliant intellect. If he were alive today I am sure he
would join me in vouching for Esther Brunauer's loyalty to the United States and
her hatred of all subversive activities. It is simply preposterous for anyone who
has known her to believe any such irresponsible nonsense as Senator McCarthy
is suggesting.
Esther Brunauer was associated with the AAUW for seventeen years, 1927 to
1944 in their Department of international education. Neither the organization
nor the subject of international education could possibly be considered question-
able. Since 1944, Esther Brunauer has been in the Department of State as
Assistant Director for Policy Liaison UNESCO Relations Staff. (Incidentally,
jost let me point out that Senator McCarthy's staff work must be inaccurate and
sloppy. He referred to Mrs. Brunauer's work as concerned with internal
security. )
In one of my regular weekly radio broadcasts over Station WCFM (March 16)
I said :
"It is nauseating to listen to Senator McCarthy insinuating names such as
those of Esther Brunauer, John Carter Vincent and John Davies into the
Senate hearings. I can speak from personal knowledge of these three in
particular. They happen to be almost lifetime friends of mine, about whose
patriotism I would vouch any day. These attacks smack too much of the kind
of thing Hitler as well as Stalin did so well. They create suspicion, hysteria
and chaos— just what the Commies want."
I know of no franker way to voice my confidence in Esther Brunauer than I did
in that broadcast.
Cordially,
Olive Clapper,
(Mrs. Raymond Clapper).
The University ok Chicago,
' Department of Philosophy,
Chicago, III, March 23, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United states Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir: I have learned with surprise that Senator McCarthy has testified
concerning Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer before your subcommittee alleging
that she is a person of questionable loyalty and a poor security risk. Since I
have known Mrs. Brunauer for a number of years and have worked in close
relations with her under circumstances which would give me grounds to judge
the loyalty of her attitude, actions, and statements, I think it my duty to write
to you concerning my judgment of Mrs. Brunauer's loyalty to the United States.
I have known Mrs. Brunauer since 1945. I was adviser to the United States
Delegation to the General Conference of UNESCO in Paris in 194<i. in Mexico
City in 1!)47. and in Beirut in 1!)48. and was acting counsellor on UNESCO affairs
attached to the Embassy in Paris in 1947. I had repeated opportunities to see
Mrs. Brunauer at work. I have served on committees with her, I have been
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1571
present with her at sessions of the General ('(inference of UNESCO and its
subcommittees, and I have conferred with her and corresponded with her on
particular items of the UNESCO program and the United States policy with
respect t<> that program. The members of a delegation learn a meat deal about
each other, particularly when the meetings extend to four or five weeks; and
five years of acquaiuteiice. a good part of them in close association of work
and interest in an international agency like UNESCO, would afford numerous
opportunities to learn about Mrs. Brunauer's basic attitudes and loyalty. In
all the period of my acquaintance with Mrs. Brunauer I have never seen or
heard her do or say anything disloyal to the United States. She has been an
assiduous and an intelligent worker for the interests of the United States in
the conferences in which I have seen her participate, and far from being a matter
of question, her insight into and her adherence to the principles of the American
way of life have seemed to he conspicuous in her work in the Department of State.
Yours sincerely,
Richard P. McKeon.
Cottey College,
Nevada, Mo., March 23, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
The United states Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I have known Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer over
a period of almost twenty years and have been well acquainted with both her
thought and the expression of that thought in her career as a leader in education
and in public office.
Dr. Brunauer's loyalty to all which is constructive and fine in American life
and in the American tradition is not to be questioned, and I am shocked that
such an implication as Senator McCarthy made about her in his statement to
the Subcommittee on Monday, March 13, should ever have been voiced. I am
convinced that it is altogether without basis. The integrity and the loyalty of
Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer are supported by her long record of conscientious,
conservative, and intelligent service.
I should like to add that I am deeply troubled also by the irreparable harm
which is done to persons in public careers by such unwarranted expressions as
that of Senator McCarthy.
Very sincerely yours,
Blanche H. Dow, President.
Arlington, Va., March 21, 1950:
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings: I have learned of the charges made about March
13, 1950. that Dr. Stephen Brunauer and his wife, Dr. Esther Brunauer, are be-
lieved to be Communists or to have Communist affiliations.
I wish to take this opportunity to say that I have known Dr. and Mrs. Brunauer
for over ten years and have always regarded them as American citizens com-
pletely loyal to the United States. I have never had the slightest reason for be-
lieving that either of them have any Communist leanings or affiliations and on
the contrary have always understood that they are, as other loyal Americans,
entirely opposed to Communism.
I may add as bearing on my statement that I have been connected with the
Foreign Service and the State Department for thirty-three years and am at
present Assistant Chief of the Visa Division. I have an English and Scotch family
background going back to the Mayflower and early Colonial days and would not
hesitate to divulge any derogatory information which might come to my attention.
I am glad to say that I have complete confidence in the loyalty of Dr. Brunauer
and Mrs. Brunauer.
Sincerely yours,
Eliot B. Coulter.
American Council on Education,
Washington, D. C, March 21, 1950.
Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings: I have noted the statements in the newspapers ema-
nating from Senator McCarthy reflecting upon the loyalty of Mrs. Esther Caukin
1572 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Brunauer. I wish to take this occasion to inform you and other members of the
Committee that I have known Mrs. Brunauer over a period of approximately 15
years. This acquaintanceship covers the period when she was a member of
the staff of the American Association of University Women and the period of her
service in the Department of State beginning in March 1944.
In the course of my contacts with Mrs. Brunauer, I have had occasion to be
acquainted with the nature of her work at the American Association of Uni-
versity Women and more particularly since she has been in the employ of the
United States Department of State. As President of the American Council on
Education I have had many and frequent contacts with her particularly in con-
nection with the work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization.
During all of this time I have admired the earnest self-sacrificing zeal with
winch she has pursued her work as a Federal employee. She has the respect and
confidence of her associates, who, so far as I know, have never in any way ques-
tioned her loyalty and devotion to the principles of our Government. I am mak-
ing this statement entirely without reservation.
Parenthetically, may I say that the character of the investigation which so far
has resulted from Senator McCarthy's charges seems to me to reflect very un-
wisely upon innocent people and especially to injure the effectiveness of our
diplomatic relationships in this exceedingly critical period of our history. It
seems to me that we have thoroughly normal channels, well established, for
testing the loyalty of government employees. I believe the present hearings have
performed no useful service and on the other hand have been injurious to the
character of innocent people and in our effectiveness in foreign relations.
Yours very sincerely,
George F. Zook, President.
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
Chicago, III., March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : As you are interested in obtaining all possible information
about those members of the Department of State who have been attacked as
"Communists" or as "poor security risks" by Senator McCarthy, I should like
to send you my unconditional endorsement of Esther Brunauer.
I worked with Mrs. Brunauer when she was Associate in International Educa-
tion of the American Association of University Women, and in the National
Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. At that time I was Chairman
of Foreign Policy for the National League of Women Voters and frequently
discussed international relations with her. Since the establishment of the U. S.
National Commission for UNESCO I have been associated with her at Com-
mission meetings, committee meetings and at the General Conference in Paris,
Mexico City and Beirut where I was a member of the U. S. Delegation.
I have never known a more devoted public servant than Mrs. Brunauer.
She is careful, conscientious and loyal.
I hope that your Committee will speedily prove to your own satisfaction
and that of the public that Mrs. Brunauer is a dependable and valuable mem-
ber of the Department of State.
Sincerely yours,
Louise Leonard Wright.
Stanford University,
Department of Political Science.
Stanford, Calif.. March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : May I bring to your attention a statement in
behalf of Esther Caukin Brunauer, who has been accused by Senator Mc-
Carthy as one of the officials of the Department of State whose loyalty is
questionable?
I have known Mrs. Brunauer for some twenty-five years. I first became ac-
quainted with her at Stanford University where she studied with me as a
graduate student. Her work was so outstanding that I recommended her highly
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1573
for a position as instructor at Scripps College. Before the decision was made
she \vas offered a position with the American Association of University Women
in Washington. D. C, which I felt would offer her greater possibilities so I urged
her to accept it.
I have kept in touch with her and her work ever since that time. While
working in the Department of State as head of the War History Unit, I had
occasion to consider her work and found that she was doing a very excellent
|ob. Later while I was writing a book on the history of the Department of
State — which has recently been published by Macmillan — I again studied her
work and that of the division to winch she was attached and found both most
satisfactory. Owing to the limitations of space and the cost of publication, I
was compelled to eliminate from the manuscript the brief but praiseworthy
evaluation which I gave of Mrs. Brunauer and her work.
I feel qualified to state categorically and unreservedly that I regard Esther
CauMn Brunauer as the highest type of public servant, one who can be de-
pended upon to serve her country to the best of her ability and with wholehearted
loyalty and devotion.
Sincerely yours,
Graham H. Stuart.
Washington, D. C, March 23, 1950.
Hon. Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir : For nine years Dr. Esther Brunauer has been known to me as the
intelligent and loving mother of two little girls.
During the nine years I have been in the Brunauer home at irregular hours
of the day and night and have never seen anything which would lead me to
suspect otherwise than a typical home life, composed of Mr. Brunauer, Mrs.
Brunauer, Sr., and the children.
I have been wondering how there could be much else than a typical home
life in the Brunauer house without my knowing it, as Mrs. Brunauer, Sr., and
the children are the type who tell all the family activities to the Doctor. I
usually have had a good account of Dr. Brunauer's activities. Also the children
show the result of much time spent upon them by the parents.
There has never been an accident or sudden illness during the nine years, when
I was not able to immediately locate Dr. Brunauer. Both Dr. Brunauer and
Mr. Brunauer seem to spend a lot of time with the family, and appear to
enjoy home life and their children.
Sincerely,
Margaret Mary Nicholson.
Dixie Cup Co.,
March 21, 1950.
Re: Esther Caukin Brunauer.
Hon. Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator : I have been associated with Esther Brunauer in various under-
takings for a decade or more. To me she has been the ideal among women
consecrated to the interests of their country.
I remember at the San Francisco Conference, where I served as a Consultant,
that she had her young children along, due to the fact that she had no one to
leave them with in Washington. Most women would have said it was impossible
to attend the Conference because of the children — but not Esther Brunauer.
She has worked with me in projects of the League of Nations, the United
Nations Association, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, etc., etc.
My observation of her from first to last leads me to conclude that we need
more — not fewer — women in American public life like Esther Brunauer.
Very truly yours,
Hugh Moore.
New York, N. Y., March 21, 1950.
Honorable Millard Tydixgs,
United States Senate, Washington, D. O.
Dear Senator : As a life-long Republican, I have been deeply shocked by Sen-
ator McCarthy's current accusations, particularly against Dorothy Kenyon and
Esther Brunauer, both of whom are well known to me personally.
1574 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Esther Brunauer I count as a friend of many years' standing. We served to-
gether for almost 20 years, beginning in 1927, on the Committee on. Selec-
tions for Oxford University of the American Association of University Women.
Dr. Brunauer was the very able and highly respected secretary of the committee,
upon whose sound judgment and careful, scholarly approach to questions the
other members constantly relied.
It is inconceivable that anyone with her fine intelligence, knowledge of his-
tory, mental and emotional poise should have Communist leanings or be the dupe
of Communist agitators.
Throughout the years I have known her, I have never heard Esther Brunauer
express any remotely questionable opinions.
If loyal, competent Government officials are to be branded as renegades, with-
out proper redress, no matter how unfounded the charges, we shall inevitably
lose the benefit of their services, and the country will suffer immeasurably.
Sincerely yours,
Margery B. Loengard.
The Washington Post,
Washington, D. C, March 21, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : I am writing you in behalf of Dr. Esther C. Brunauer,
of the State Department, a valued friend of mine, who in my opinion has been
falsely and irresponsibly accused by Senator McCarthy of disloyaty to her
Government.
As an editorial-page columnist for the Washington Post, I have known Dr.
Brunauer personally and professionally for nearly 5 years. Before that I was
generally familiar with her activities as international relations secretary for
the American Association of University Women.
From the time that Dr. Brunauer was appointed a consultant for the London
meeting to draft a constitution for the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization, on through her successive service with UNESCO,
including her representation of this country with the rank of Minister at the
first general conference of UNESCO in Paris, November 1946. I have frequently
met with her to discuss the aims and purposes of her work. I have always found
her strongly devoted to the freedom of knowledge and free exchange of ideas
for which UNESCO stands. What is more, all her attitudes, utterances, conduct
have always expressed a devotion to the ideals on which the American Govern-
ment rests.
Dr. Brunauer's associates, insofar as I have known them, have been definitely
anti-Communist. Personally I consider her reliability and honor beyond ques-
tion. It is incredible and inconceivable that she should be accused of disloyalty.
Yours sincerely,
Malvina Lindsay.
American Automobile Association,
Washington, D. C, March 22, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Sir : This letter is addressed to you and your associates in the Government
of the United States as an expression of greatest personal confidence in the
loyalty and integrity of Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer of thp Department of State.
I have personally known Dr. Brunauer for a period of 14 years. She is most
highly respected among university women, in both this country and others, as a
woman who, in her writings, public addresses, activities in organizations, and in
hoi' capacity as a national and international conference consultant, has stead-
fastly served to build up the best interests of democracy.
Dr. Brunauer's leadership activities have at no time been other than consistent
with the welfare of this country. It would be impossible for her, by the very
nature of her interests and of her character, to be other than a person of highest
reliability and good faith.
My closest association with Dr. Brunauer have been in the work of the American
Association of University Women, an educational organization which, in all its
activities, is soundly American. From 1936 to 1944, while Dr. Brunauer was
Associate in International Relations on the Headquarters Staff of the American
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1575
Association of University Women and while I was on the faculty in psychology
al the Pennsylvania State College, I served also as AAUW State president for
Pennsylvania. During thai period, I closely followed the work and Leadership
of Dr. Brunauer. Her loyalty to her country, then and now, is a matter of
established record and dependability.
The Government of the Tinted States is fortunate to have on the Staff of its
Department of State a woman of the caliber and integrity of Dr. Brunauer.
Very truly yours,
(Mrs.) Helen K. Knandel,
Educational Consultant, Traffic Engineering £ Safety Department.
Washington, D. C. March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tyihngs,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
.My Dear Senator Tydings : I want very much to express to you my deep
conviction as to the loyalty to our country of Esther Caukin Brunauer which
has been questioned by Senator McCarthy before your subcommittee.
I have known Mrs. Brunauer since 1925 when L was a freshman at Stanford
University in California. She was then a graduate assistant to my professor
of European history. Dr. Ralph Lutz. Dr. Lutz, as you may know, has been
for many years associated with former President Hoover in the work of the
Hoover War Library at Stanford. I know that Dr. Brunauer is held in the
highest esteem by the faculty under whom she worked at Stanford for her
doctorate.
My friendship with her continued when I came to live in Washington in 1930.
Since that time I have had regular contact with her, sometimes in various
organization activities : The American Association of University Women ; the
Committee on the Cause and Cure of War headed by Carrie Chapman Catt ; the
Committee on the Organization of Peace, headed by Dr. James T. Shotwell, and
sometimes in purely social gatherings.
I have always considered her contribution to popular discussion of public
affairs of the highest quality. She has been one of those professionally trained
women who has accepted the responsibility of citizenship — to help people gen-
erally become informed about public issues in order that they may act on
informed judgments. To me there is no greater contribution to the democratic
way of life.
I have also known her husband, Stephen Brunauer, since the time of their
marriage, primarily in a social capacity. I have had no grounds whatsoever to
question his loyalty to this, his adopted country. Contrariwise, I have always
respected his defense of free institutions and his service to the cause of free-
dom during the last war. I know, too, that members of his family have suffered
in Hungary at the hands of both Fascists and Communists.
If there is anything else that you think I might do to help clear the names
of Mr. and Mrs. Brunauer before your committee, I would be most happy to
be called upon.
Yours sincerely,
Anne Hartwell Johnstone.
P. S. — I should identify myself as a housewife and mother of two daughters.
I am currently a Director of the League of Women Voters of the United States.
I am married to William C. Johnstone, for 20 years associated with George
Washington University and now Director of the Office of Educational Exchange,
Department of State — A. H. J.
American Association of University Professors,
Washington, D. C, March U. 1950.
Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. G.
Dear Senator Tydings : This letter is in reference to Esther Caukin Brunauer.
I have known Dr. Brunauer for the past twelve years. I have known her in
special reference to her work in the State Department. The American Associa-
tion of University Professors, of which I am the General Secretary, has always
been interested in the programs of the State Department concerned with higher
education and cultural affairs, and representatives of this Association frequently
1576 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
confer with members of the Professional Staff of the State Department in
reference to higher education and cultural affairs. I have participated in a
number of conferences with Dr. Brunauer and others of the State Department.
I regard Dr. Brunauer as an able scholarly woman and as a loyal American.
At the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of this Association, which was held in
Boston, Massachusetts, on February 22-23, 1947, Dr. Brunauer was a participant
on the program. She spoke on the general subject : "UNESCO : Its Background
and Its Role in Building for Peace." Also participating in this meeting and
speaking on this subject was Mr. Charles A. Thomson, Executive Secretary of
the United States National Commission for UNESCO. Both Dr. Brunauer and
Mr. Thomson contributed immeasurably to the success of the meeting and to
the consideration of the significant subject on which they spoke.
I have had occasion to work with Dr. Brunauer in other connections. When
members of the Staff of the Hungarian Embassy resigned from that Embassy
at the time the Soviets took over the Government of Hungary, Dr. Brunauer
sought the help of this Association in finding academic positions for some of
these persons and our joint efforts resulted in the placement of some of them.
This is but a small bit of evidence, but very good evidence, that Dr. Brunauer is
not only not a communist but is not in any way sympathetic with communist
regimes.
There has never been and there is not now any doubt in my mind concerning
Dr. Brunauer's complete loyalty to the Government of the United States.
Very sincerely yours,
Ralph E. Himstead.
Washington, D. C, March 22, 1950.
Hon. Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings: I recently read in the newspaper about my patient
Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer and I feel it is my duty to make some statements
about my experiences with her.
I am an Obstetrician and I delivered Mrs. Brunauer three times : on July 31,
1934, October 24, 193S, and on May 11, 1942. She first came to me on January
10, 1934, and at that time she was about 2Vs months pregnant. She came to
my office frequently for prenatal care. I delivered her the first time after a
2S-hour labor. I came in contact with her many, many times. Similarly with
the second and third pregnancies. I came in close contact with her on numerous
occasions.
As she is highly intelligent and quite an interesting person I discussed with
her various topics aside from our Doctor-patient relationship. I can honestly
and conscientiously say that she had never made any remark that would reflect
upon her loyalty to our form of government or Constitution of the United States.
In my estimation she always was a valuable asset to the community and our
country. If necessary, I am willing to state these facts under oath.
I never heard her make any remark favoring any subversive movement or
foreign "ism." In other words, in my estimation she is a good American citizen
as anyone I ever met. I saw her last in my office on September 11, 1947, and
at that time her conduct was no different than at any time before.
Respectfully yours,
H. Hertzberg, M. D.
Santa Monica, Calif., March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings: For the past twenty years, in various capacities in
relation to the American Association of University Women — as member of the
National Board of Directors, Regional Vice President. Director of the South
Pacific Section, etc. — I have been in active contact with Mrs. Esther Caukin
Brunauer. During that time I have had ample opportunity to observe the char-
acter of her work, the facets of her personality, and the nature of her relation-
ships witli various groups. These have been consistently straightforward and
unimpeachably constructive.
Furthermore, I have read with care and attention, as they appeared, a good
number of the pamphlets and brochures which Mrs. Brunauer brought out dur-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1577
ing her distinguished service with the American Association of University
Women.
Although my home is on the West Coast, I have frequently been in Washing-
ton, particularly during the war, when I served on the seven-woman Advisory
Council sol up by the Navy Department. During that period I was in fairly
continuous touch with Mrs. Brunauer, as also during the San Francisco Confer-
ence, where I was a consultant to the American Delegation, representing the
American Association of University Women.
Throughout these two decades 1 have never heard, and I think, until Senator
McCarthy included Mrs. Brunauer in his sweeping challenge, no one of my ac-
quaintance had ever heard her integrity or her deep loyalty to her country
questioned.
Mr. Brunauer I have known for a much shorter period, but always with the
sense of his unfailing integrity. Mrs. Brunauer is a woman who, with her
husband, has quietly, unostentatiously kept her home, raised her family, and
served her country. Few have maintained a more honorable or a more truly
American record.
Sincerely yours,
(Mrs. M. W.) Gladys Murphy Graham.
Department of State,
Washington., March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Mit/lard Tydings,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Tydings : I am writing to you because I should like to go on
record regarding the loyalty of Esther Caukin Brunauer. I am now serving on
the Policy Planning Staff and have been with the Department of State for seven
years. Prior to that time I was instructor in government and sociology at Smith
College, Northampton, Massachusetts.
I have known Mrs. Brunauer since I worked with her in the Department of
State in preparation for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. I was closely
associated with her in these preparations and during the San Francisco Con-
ference on International Organization in 1945. Subsequently, I have worked
with her in connection with the development of American policy in the United
Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), and she and I
worked closely together on the Delegation to the Mexico Conference of UNESCO
in 1947. These associations resulted in my knowing Mrs. Brunauer intimately
and in having a very full insight into her thinking.
I want you to know that anyone who knows her as well as I do can have
no doubt whatsoever as to her complete integrity and loyalty as an American. In
all my experience with her I have never found her to depart in her thinking
from basic American principles of democracy, and her devoted and energetic
action on behalf of those principles in her government work testify to her com-
plete sincerity. She is a person of great character and deep convictions, and
those convictions are unqualifiedly dedicated to promoting our national interest.
I did not want to let this opportunity pass to add this word on behalf of one
of our most useful and most highly regarded government servants.
Sincerely yours,
Dorothy Fosdick.
The University of Georgia,
Department of History,
Athens, Ga., March 23, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings.
United States Senate. Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I am addressing you in regard to Esther Caukin
Brunauer, whose loyalty and fitness for service in the State Department have
been questioned by Senator McCarthy.
The charges made against Miss Brunauer seem to me to be fantastic, utterly
without basis of evidence, from the knowledge I have of Miss Brunauer. She has
been known to me for many years, earlier in connection with her executive
position in the Association of University Women, and more recently in connection
with the United States Delegation to London, in 1945, to establish the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
1578 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
In April 1944, I was appointed by Secretary of State Hull under the Roosevelt
Administration as a member of the Commission headed by Representative, now
Senator, Pullbright, to London for consultation with the Allied Ministers of Edu-
cation as to the uses of education as an instrument of peace after the war. Miss
Brunauer of the State Department prepared much of the material which gave
helpful information to the American Commission during our labors in London
during the month of April 1944.
In November 1945, under President Truman's Administration, I was again
appointed as a Delegate on the Commission of the United States to London to
the constituent assembly which set up the charter for UNESCO. On this Com-
mission Miss Brunauer served as an Expert Adviser from the State Department.
For the month of November 1945, I worked in daily consultation with Miss
Brunauer. During that period, in thrashing out all sorts of questions which our
delegates had to consider, never did I hear a word from Miss Brunauer, either
in official or unofficial dealings, which would reveal even the slightest Communist
or pro-Communist leanings. Nor have I ever hear in general rumor even the
faintest whisper to suggest that Miss Brunauer might be a Red, or even a Pink.
The strong impression I bad, and still have, of Miss Brunauer is one of steady
admiration for her clarity of thinking and for her expert, accurate knowledge of
American international affairs. I had and have complete faith in her high sense
of patriotism and complete loyalty to this country. I shall be glad if my word
of testimony can help to right the grievous wrong against Miss Brunauer in the
charges which appear to me false and entirely without evidence to support them.
Sincerely yours,
C. Mildred Thompson,
Emeritus Dean and Professor of History , Vassar,
At Present, Professor of History, University of Georgia.
Department of State,
Washington, March 22, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator Tydings : Immediately upon learning that Esther Caukin
Brunauer's name had been mentioned in connection with the investigation of the
loyalty of State Department employees, I wish to convey to the committee in
some form, any information which I may have which would be of use, however
slight, in the attempt to arrive at a true picture of the situation.
I have known Dr. Brunauer for a period of approximately 15 years and during
much of that time I have worked with her on matters of broad public interest
particularly in the field of economics. I have known her and her husband socially
and have had many pleasant talks on matters of national concern. During these
years I have never had the slightest reason to question the complete loyalty and
patriotism of Dr. Brunauer. I feel I have a reasonably clear understanding of
her attitudes and political views and have reason to think that they are very close
to my own. While I am not in a position to judge what information would be
of use to your committee, I should like to make this general statement and if you
should desire it, would attempt to add more specific information if I had some
indication of what would be useful.
Very sincerely yours,
Eleanor Lansing Dulles.
Washington, D. C, March 21, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : For many years Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer has been
intimately connected with the American Association of University Women. She
is at present an advisor on the Board of the Washington Branch of the American
Association of University Women.
There is no one whose sound advice and good judgment I value more than Dr.
Brunauer's. She is a person of excellent ability and of great integrity. She is
a great humanitarian and a loyal American.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1579
I sincerely hope that your committee will speedily correct the misinformation
used by Senator McCarthy.
Sincerely yours,
(Mrs. A. J.) Ruth S. Brumbaugh,
President, Washington Brunch, American Association of University Women.
Washington, D. C, March 21, WoO.
The Honorable Millard Ttdings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Typings: I am writing you about Dr. Esther Brunauer, who,
according to recent press releases, was among those whose loyalty to the
Government of the United States was questioned by Senator McCarthy.
It has been my privilege during the last three or four years to work fairly
closely with Dr. Brunauer on matters relating to UNESCO. At no time have I
known her to make a statement or to take a position that would lead one to
doubt her loyalty to our Government. When questions of policy have arisen that
required a definite position to be taken there was never any uncertainty that
siie stood solidly for the American form of government.
It is indeed to be regretted that any Member of the Congress should resort
to measures resembling those employed by the forms of government of which
we so heartily disapprove.
Respectfully yours,
A. J. Brumbaugh.
Arlington, Va., March 27, 1950.
The Honorable Millard Ttdings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. G.
Dear Mr. Senator : I should like to comment on the recent charges that Dr.
Esther Caukin Brunauer is a bad security risk.
I served as Dr. Brunauer's secretary for a period of two years from the time
of my appointment in the Department of State on January 24, 1947. I was not
acquainted with her prior to this assignment, and have not been officially
associated with her since January 1949, when I was transferred to another
Division within the Department. I assure you that this letter is purely volun-
tary on my part.
During the two years of my association with her I came to know her inti-
mately and to discover that she is a truly great woman and in equal measure
a great American. Patriotism, with Dr. Brunauer, is not something she tucks
away for special occasions as most of us do. It is the essence of her daily
thinking and motivates her daily life.
When, three years ago, Representative Bushey charged her with disloyalty
to her country I assisted in her prepaparation of a categorical denial of the
charges. I therefore am familiar with the exact charges and with the exact
rebuttals. It was my observation that the charges were completely disproved
by the facts presented. The denial was accepted by the Senate and published
in the Congressional Record in July 1947. It is, therefore, difficult to under-
stand how these disproved charges can now be used against her.
Dr. Brunauer prepared herself to take a responsible part in the international
affairs of her Government by many years of study both here and abroad. She
continues to take a scholarly approach to every aspect of her work of relating
the policy of United States representation in UNESCO to the total American
foreign policy.
The esteem and honor which is accorded her name were earned by twenty
years of constructive work in the interests of her country. I know how she
operates. She is modest. She seeks no personal acclaim. She is concerned
only with the ultimate goal of mutual understanding and peace among the na-
tions of the world. Were she a person of lesser stature, her idealistic approach
might seem naive, but her sincerity often leaves others abashed. As her secre-
tary I realize the depth of her sincerity and her content in making her con-
tribution. Many join me in the opinion that she is making a greater individual
contribution than any woman in America.
I was working daily with her at the time when the Hungarian Government
was taken over by the Communists. I was familiar, through her, with the
68970 — 50— pt. 2 7
1580 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
names and identities of the outstanding Hungarian figures in that event. I
was a witness to the strain Dr. Brunauer and her husband were under during
those critical days in Hungary. I was a witness to the grief they shared when
the coup was complete and many of their friends in Hungary, who had held out
to the end, succumbed to the pressure of communism. And I was a witness to
their sympathetic attitude towards those members of the Hungarian Embassy
staff in Washington who resigned their posts. It was abundantly clear which
side the Brunauers were on.
The recent charges against Dr. Brunauer can very easily be disproved. No
one who has ever been closely associated with her gives the smallest credence
to the charges. However, the general public has no basis on which to form an
opinion. It is hoped that the same spotlight can be turned on clearing her as
was turnd on accusing her — in simple justice — and in recompense for the unwar-
ranted injury done her.
Sincerely yours,
(Mrs.) Eire Stevens.
Washington, D. C, March 27, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I have known Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, and
her mother, and her father for thirty-three years. Both the charges which have
been made against her publicly before the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate, and the circumstances under which they have been made shock me deeply.
Because there exists in the Executive Branch of the Government an ade-
quate procedure for determining whether any employee is fit for and worthy
of employment by the Government in a particular position, it should be unneces-
sary for any individual to speak in behalf of another individual who is employed
by the Government. I have confidence in and respect for those procedures.
By the use of them, it has been determined that Dr. Esther Brunauer is worthy
of employment by the Federal Government in the position of responsibility and
trust which she now occupies.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the application of those procedures, and the
availability of other confidential procedures in the Government for ascertaining
facts, for making determination of who may be or may have become undesir-
able, it has been charged publicly, in the Senate of the United States that Dr.
Brunauer is not a proper person for such employment. This is a very serious
matter and, yet, mere unsubstantiated assertions have been made about her.
Resort has been made to anonymous allegations, malicious assertions, hearsay,
gossip, and innuendo. Inaccurate and untrue statements have been made
about her. The attack upon her is defamatory to her reputation and
good name. But because it has been made within the areas of privileged
communications to the Senate, and of the immunities of Members of the Senate,
Dr. Esther Brunauer is deprived of the protection of fundamental legal proce-
dures, of the right to defend her good name in court, and of obtaining remedies
for injury to her name and reputation.
The very procedures in the Executive Branch of the Government which exist
to protect both the Government and the individual, procedures involving the
safeguarding of privacy, the right to present evidence and to obtain hearings,
appeals and reviews, all of these are set to naught and nullified by the circum-
stances under which attacks have been made upon Dr. Esther Brunauer.
I deeply deplose those circumstances. But since they exist, it becomes neces-
sary for those who know Dr. Brunauer to state publicly the facts about her winch
they know, and their opinion of her. Therefore, I desire to make the following
statement :
Esther Caukin, now Mrs. Stephen Brunauer, is the daughter of Grace Black-
well Caukin and Ray Caukin, and was born in California. Her ancestors on both
sides fought in the American War for Independence. Her ancestors were of
English, Irish, French, and Dutch stock. On her mother's side, her ancestors
settled in Connecticut in 1630. Her great grandfather, Ed. Riley, settled in San
Francisco in 1858. He was Boston Irish.
Her father, Ray Caukin, served in the Army, in the Signal Corps, in World
War I. He is a member of the American Legion, a past commander. He was
a United States Post Master in Sierra Madre, California, and is now retired.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1581
Her mother, Grace Blackwell Caukin, was a leader in the Woman's Suffrage
movement in California; was Secretary of the California Woodrow Wilson
Campaign Committee : and was executive secretary, at one time, of the California
Democratic State Central Committee.
Both of her parents are living. They are splendid Americans, and solid
citizens.
I attended the San Francisco Girls High School with Esther Caukin Brunauer,
where we became close friends. We participated together in certain school
activities, and attended certain classes together. I know her character and her
attitudes very well, from long acquaintance. We have kept in touch with each
other from the time of our youth. From 1933 to the present, I have known Dr.
Brunauer closely in Washington, D. C.
From the time I first knew Esther Brunauer in 1917 until now, she has made
a record for which she deserves the highest commendation and respect; she had
the highest record in her class in high school ; she received scholarships in Mills
College, California, and at Stanford University. At Mills College she won the
Senior Class Prize for Scholarship, and there she founded The Honor Society
(the equivalent of Phi Beta Kappa), and was the vice president of the Associated
Students.
At Mills College she attracted the friendship of the President of the College,
the late Dr. Auralia Henry Bernhardt. At Stanford University she was a
protege of the late Dr. David Starr Jordan, Chancellor of Stanford. Later, she
hecame a friend of the late Carrie Chapman Catt. Throughout her life, she has
enjoyed the friendship and high regard of leaders in the field of education, and
in public life, and of good and reputable people.
A distinguished scholar of history and international relations — A. B., 1924,
Mills College; M. A.. 1925, and Ph. D., 1927. Stanford University — she became
a member of the staff in Washington, D. C, of the American Association of
University Women, in 1927, where she was director of its International Relations
Section, directing research and study programs for members of the Association,
and acting as its representative to the International Federation of University
Women. She held this post for seventeen years, until March 1944, when she
received an appointment in the State Department, Division of International
Security and Organization. She is still employed in the State Department. She
has. therefore, held only two jobs in twenty-three years, which is evidence of both
competence, trustworthiness, and faithfulness.
She married Stephen Brunauer in 1931. I have a high opinion of him. She
has had three children, two of which are living. She has been as competent
in her home as she has been in her professional work. She is a devoted wife
and mother. Her two daughters are well reared and well cared for, and all
that parents wish their children to be.
Esther Caukin Brunauer has certain traits of character which are predomi-
nant: She is loyal, sincere, honest, thorough, and possessed of good judgment.
She has devoted herself to her family and to her professional work all of her
life. She has concentrated upon her professional work to the exclusion of varied
and miscellaneous pursuits; and she has not been a joiner of organizations. Be-
cause her professional work took her into the study of international problems, in
which she acquired a high professional reputation, she was chosen to serve on
the National Committee of the Cause and Cure of War. That national com-
mittee was made up of representatives of about eleven national women's organi-
zations, and she was one of the representatives of the American Association of
University Women. She was chairman of a very important committee of the
Committee of the Cause and Cure of War, a committee appointed in 1936 to
make a study of our national defense. This committee reported its findings in
a printed pamphlet, and its findings created substantial public support of the
program of the Army for strengthening the United States military organization.
Dr. Esther Brunauer has belonged to very few organizations, most of them
professional ; and none of the few she joined have ever been pub on any list of
subversive or Communist "front" organizations.
People sometimes are judged by their associates. In my long acquaintance
and friendship with Esther Brunauer, I have observed that her associations,
contacts, and friendships have always been with persons who are respected and
honored.
What people think, say, and write is often an index of their points of view. I
can say unequivocally that Esther Brunauer thinks, talks and acts in accordance
with the highest concepts of a loyal, American citizen, and a Christian. She is
not and never has been a faddist, a soft-headed or a soft-hearted "sympathizer,"'
1582 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
a believer in any of the ideologies of advocates of un- or non-democratic political
or social systems. She is not a Communist 'sympathizer" or "fellow-traveler."
She is not and never has been a Communist, or a Fascist, or anything other than
a real American and democratic citizen.
I know of nothing in the record of Esther Brunauer which would provide a
basis for questioning her loyalty to her country, or her fitness for any position
of confidence and trust in any department of the Government, or anywhere else.
I have complete faith in her. I respect and admire her.
My opinion of Dr. Esther Brunauer is as follows : She is a loyal citizen of the
United States. She is a real American. She is an honorable woman, possessed
of the highest character and integrity in every respect — intellectually, morally,
and spiritually. She is possessed of keen intellect, sound judgment, strength of
character, and outstanding ability.
A great many women in the State of California, and throughout the United
States, are very proud of Esther Brunauer. Her story, her life, and her achieve-
ments have been what we consider the best of womanhood that can be produced
in our country. I resent deeply (and I know that I speak for many women) the
irresponsible charges and insinuations which have been lodged against her.
They are preposterous, scurrilous, and outrageous.
Esther Brunauer. an honorable and distinguished woman, a leader among
women, and a competent and loyal public servant, has been unjustly humiliated
before a committee of the United States Senate, and before the public. I am
•confident that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate will find no merit
whatsoever in the allegations which have been made against here. And when that
conclusion becomes evident, I sincerely hope, Senator Tydings, that your Coni-
mitte will publicly absolve Esther Brunauer from the charges which have been
made, so that in that way, there may be restored to her, as far as possible, the
full confidence and eminent status which she enjoyed before this extremely un-
fortunate incident occurred, and so that she may be completely vindicated.
Respectfully yours,
Marion J. Harron.
(Judge) Marion J. Harron.
Exhibit No. 57
American Association of University Women
National Headquarters, 1634 Eye Street, N. W.
washington, d. c.
Statement Regarding the Work of Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer as a Mem-
ber of the Staff of the American Association of University Women, 1927-44,
Annexed to the Letter of March 22, 1950, Addressed to Senator Millard E.
Tydings, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Assigned to Investigate Charges of Disloyalty Among Employees
of the Department of State
(Prepared by the General Director of the American Association of University
Women)
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy is reported to have said that Mrs. Esther Caukin
Brunauer was for many years executive secretary of the American Association
of University Women ; and further, that she was instrumental in "committing this
organization to the support of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-
called consumer field." Both these statements will be shown to be untrue.
"THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN
Organization and purpose. — The American Association of University Women
was organized in Boston in 18S2 for the purpose of uniting the alumnae of dif-
ferent colleges and universities for "practical educational work." It is an edu-
cational organization, composed of women graduates of approved institutions;
at the present time its membership numbers approximately 110,000 women,
graduates of 271 colleges and universities. The purpose and policies of the
Association are promoted through the joint efforts of its members, organized
into local branches in every state. At present there are 1,157 branches, rep re-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1583
senting a cross section of women graduates of colleges and universities of the
highest standing. The policies of the Association arc voted hy delegates repre-
sent ins; the membership in the biennial convention of the Association, and are
carried out by appropriate committees.
A major activity of the Association in its various branches is an extensive
program of adult education. This program represents a sense of responsibility
on the part of the women college graduates who make up the Association to be
informed themselves, to cultivate intelligent public opinion on major issues, and
to take action on the basis of a study of the facts.
Professional staff.— For each of the Association's committees there is a profes-
sional staff member at the national Headquarters, who carries on research and
study and directs and counsels the membership in cooperating toward the
Association's objectives in the field which she represents. The staff associates
carry out the policies voted by the convention and developed by the national
committees and the national Board of Directors. Staff members do not make
policy.
In 1927 Mrs. Brunauer was appointed as a staff associate at national Head-
quarters for the Committee on International Relations, a position which she oc-
cupied continuously until March 7, 1944. During that time her work was confined
solely to international education and international relations.
AAUW CONSUMER ACTIVITIES
The statement of Senator McCarthy that Mrs. Brunauer was "instrumental
in committing this organization to the support of various front enterprises, par-
ticularly in the so-called consumer field," is completely at variance with the
facts. Mrs. Brunauer had nothing whatever to do with the Association's con-
sumer program. While the consumer activities of the Association are therefore
not involved in this investigation, since this program has been attacked by
Senator McCarthy, I wish to state emphatically that the consumer program of
the American Association of University Women could not by any stretch of the
imagination nor in any particular be considered a "communist front" activity.
Senator McCarthy has referred specifically to an instance reported in the
New York Times for April 27, 1943. We find no reference to the American
Association of University Women in the New York Times of that date ; we do
find an intern in the Times of April 26 to which Senator McCarthy probably
refers. This item states that a request, signed by 15 organizations, was pre-
sented to Price Administrator Prentiss M. Brown, urging that grade labeling of
canned fruits and vegetables be required as a feature of price control, in order
that price maintenance should not be defeated by a lowering of quality. In this
suggestion the Association was joined by the American Home Economics Asso-
ciation, the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Council of
Jewish Women, aud other reputable organizations. To imply that a request
for information to enable housewives to know what they are buying is a "front
enterprise" is manifestly absurd.
MRS. BRUNAUER'S RECORD
But as I have stated. Mrs. Brunauer had nothing to do with the above or any
other consumer activity of the Association. Her responsibility was to help in
carrying out the objectives of the Association's Committee on International
Relations, which were: (1) "to foster closer international relationships among
university women throughout the world," and (2) "to assist in building up an
informed, vigorous American foregin policy."
Mrs. Brunauer srave wholehearted cooperation and leadership in the carrying
out of both these vurposps — and both are completely alien to the communist
philosophy. As international relations associate, she devoted much time and
effort to the International Federation of University Women, an organization
which the university women of the U. S. S. R. never joined, although the way was
open.
To the second purpose, the "building of an informed, vigorous opinion on
American foreign policy," Mrs. Brunauer contributed continuously and effectively.
She prepared, or arranged to have prepared, materials to assist local groups in
studying international issues objectively — a purpose entirely at variance with
the propaganda tactics of communism. By her honest, objective, and scholarly
approach to controversial questions, she did much to develop the techniques and
standards which have given the Association a place of leadership in the adult
1584 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
education field. The Association benefited greatly by her knowledge, integrity,
good sense, intelligence, and logical thinking.
While Mrs. Brunauer's whole record as an AAUW staff member exemplified
the best traditions of American democracy, I wish to call the attention of
your Committee particularly to the part she played in the Association's inter-
national activities in the critical period of 1939-41. This was the period of the
Nazi-U. S. S. R. friendship pact, when communists in the United States were
violently isolationists and anti-British. At this time, the American Association
of University Women was following the opposite line. Some instances of the
Association's activities which were in direct contradiction to the policies advo-
cated by communists may be cited :
(1) In the summer of 1940, the Association appealed to its members for homes
for British children who might be sent to the United States for safety ; more
than 3,000 members offered their homes.
(2) In September 1940, the Association cabled £1,000 to the British Association
of University Women for war relief.
(3) In September 1940, the Association cabled $2,000 to the University Women
of Finland, a country then suffering from the effects of Russian aggression.
(4) On January 1, 1941, a letter which Dr. Brunauer helped to draft, which
was signed by the Headquarters staff, was sent to all AAUW branches and State
divisions, urging them to promote public discussion of aid to Britain, and asking
that branches and members individually communicate their opinions on this
issue to their Congressmen.
(5) As a preliminary to the 1941 convention, an inquiry was sent to all
branches asking their opinions as to the extent of aid this government should
give to those resisting the Axis powers, and encouraging study of the question.
(6) On May 8, 1941 (while the Stalin-Hitler pact was still in effect and com-
munists were demanding, "Keep us out of war!") the American Association of
University Women in its biennial convention voted:
(a) Recognition of a common cause with all nations resisting totalitarian
aggression and the furnishing of whatever aid we can give to make this
resistance effective.
(6) Development of a closer international collaboration to be begun now
among the people resisting the Axis powers, and expanded as rapidly as
possible into suitable international institutions.
(The Association was, as far as I know, the first of the large women's
organizations to advocate such a step, and the convention delegates voted in
full understanding that military aid might he involved.)
(7) Immediately after this convention action, Mrs. Brunauer quickly fur-
nished AAUW branch and state international relations chairman with study
materials on how to make U. S. aid effective, urged continuous study of the
crisis in American foreign policy, and transmitted the convention request that
members communicate their opinions to members of Congress.
In these activities — all in direct opposition to the "party line" of that time —
Mrs. Brunauer was not a passive or reluctant participant; she was a leading
spirit in promoting all of them. Indeed, some members criticized her for too
openly favoring aid to Britain before this country entered the war.
Senator McCarthy is reported to have accused Mrs. Brunauer of being "instru-
mental in committing this organization [the American Association of University
Women] to the support of various 'front' enterprises." As I have stated, Mrs.
Brunauer had nothing to do with the particular enterprise which Senator Mc-
Carty cited. But it is true that she was instrumental in carrying out other
enterprises, outlined above — enterprises undertaken for the preservation of
democracy and directly in opposition to the policies advocated by communists
and communist sympathizers.
Mabch 22, 1950.
Exhibit No. H8
Statement of Duties of Haldohe Hanson With Department or State 1942 to
Date
i. february 1 942-decembkr 1944: divisional assistant, division of cri/rural
cooperation
This was principally a recruiting job, arising out of the program of wartime
aid to China, and involving the recruiting of American civilian technicians for
service in China, including engineers, agricultural experts, and health specialists.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1585
ii. December 1944— September 1047: executive assistant to the assistant
secretary for public affairs
I served as Executive Assistant under two Assistant Secretaries, covering a
period of two and one-half years. I was responsible for their correspondence
and visitors, and the management of their office.
During this period, I had the special assignment of drafting the legislation
authorizing the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program.
I worked with congressional committees for three years on this legislation which
is now known as the Smith-Mundt Act (or Public Law 402, 80th Congress).
Incidental to this legislative work, I represented the Department of State in
hearings on Senator Mundt's resolution for an International Office of Education,
the bill authorizing United States participation in UNESCO, and Senator
Fulbright's legislation establishing scholarship funds from surplus property
proceeds.
III. SEPTEMBER 1947-NOVEMBER 1948: ACTING CHIEF, FAE EAST BRANCH, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF
The Program Staff was an organization under the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs. The Far East Branch was responsible for recruiting the overseas
staff for five countries in the Far East, and for advising the Media Divisions
(such as the Divisions for Broadcasting, Press, Libraries) regarding public
attitudes of the various peoples in the Far East. During this period I made an
inspection trip to all of our information posts in the Far East.
IV. NOVEMBER 1948 TO DATE: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE
ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION
This Committee has for ten years conducted a program of technical coopera-
tion with Latin America, providing technical training and technical advisors
to foreign governments in such fields as agriculture, health, education, and
engineering. Recently, under authority of the Smith-Mundt Act, the Committee
has expanded its activities on a small scale to Asia and Africa.
I spent much of the year 1949 in travelling away from Washington. During
the months of January through March, I was on an inspection trip of our present
technical activities in Latin America. During July and August I served as
advisor to Assistant Secretary Thorp at the meeting of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in Geneva, Switzerland. This Council was drafting
the United Nations resolution on technical assistance. During September and
October, I was an advisor on the American delegation to the United States
General Assembly which was reviewing the same resolution. In November, I
was an advisor to the American delegation at the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization which met in Washington. Again my assignment con-
cerned a resolution on technical assistance.
In December 1949, my office and staff here transferred from the jurisdiction of
the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to the Assistant Secretary for Economic
Affairs, in preparation for the Point IV Program. My stall' is part of a new
office in the Department entitled the "Interim Office of Technical Cooperation
and Development." The duties of the Interim Office and the responsibilities of
the other offices of the Department in relation to this Program are set forth in
Departmental Announcement 41, a copy of which is attached.
Department of State Departmental Announcement 41
Establishment of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and
Development (Point Four Program)
1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the As-
sistant Secretary for Economic Affairs the Interim Office for Technical Coopera-
tion and Development (TCD).
2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department
for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical as-
sistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning
in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point
Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely
upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other com-
ponents of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance
1586 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the
Administrative area for the performance of service functions.
3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for :
(a) Developing over-all policies for the program.
( b ) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
(c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus
and making necessary adjustments.
(d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds
for U. S. bilateral programs.
(e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies
and with other U. S. agencies participating in the coordinated program or other-
wise carrying on technical assistance activities.
(/) Reviewing instructions to the field.
4. The Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies
governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance
programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of
employment, and utilization of training facilities.
5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assistance
programs for :
(a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for
individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
(&) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from
any other source.
( c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
(d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate, and
give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
( e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
(/) Proposing program changes.
(g) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities, and
reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.
Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection with
the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administration
Aid programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected by
this announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where circum-
stances require.
6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has-
te) Action responsibility for —
1. Developing the U. S. position concerning the international organiza-
tional machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance activities ;
2. Developing the U. S. position concerning the relative proportions of
contributions to be made by the U. S. and by other countries to the special
technical assistance accounts of international organizations ;
3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts,
(ft) Advisory responsibility concerning:
1. The character and scope of technical cooperation programs undertaken
by international organizations ;
2. The amounts of U. S. contributions to the special technical assistance
accounts of international organizations ;
3. U. S. positions on program allocations from such accounts by interna-
tional organizations.
The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with interna-
tional organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for
direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized
agencies and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or
U. S. agencies on operating program matters as requested by the Interim Office.
The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding arrangements with
respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American states.
7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical
assistance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set
forth in the Organizat ion Manual of the Department.
(a) The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the Inter-
national Bank and Monetary Fund.
(b) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the
International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation
Organization.
(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1587
S. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and
technical exchange activities under the U. S. Informal ion and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948, and under the Act of August 9, 1939, authorizing the
President to render closer and more effective the relationship between the
American republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific
economic development projects, is transferred from the office of Educational
Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development.
Activities which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of Edu-
cational Exchange. The functions, personnel, and records of the Secretariat
of the Inter-departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are
transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for
Technical Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions con-
nected with the publication of "The Record" and the corresponding personnel
and records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.
9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Department's
representative on, and the Chairman of, the Inter-departmental Committee on
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical Coopera-
tion and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.
10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs advise
the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the economic
feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the standpoint of
their respective specialized interests ; make or arrange for such economic studies
and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development
may require ; and maintain liaison with U. S. and international agencies and
with private organizations on matters within their respective fields of interest
as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance programs.
11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Coopera-
tion and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other paragraphs
above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future, carried
on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises all responsi-
bilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Institute's program.
The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development and the Bureau
of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for developing such working
arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration of the Institute
of Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated technical
assistance program.
12. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists
of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated
officers :
Director : Leslie A. Wheeler, Ext. 3871.
Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief : Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011,
5012.
Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief : Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext. 4571,
4572.
Technical Cooperation Management Staff : Richard R. Brown, Director of
Executive Staff, E. Ext. 2155.
(2-21-50.)
Exhibit No. 59
Text of Hanson Letter to Senator Tydings
What happens to a man's standing in his community when charged with pro-
Communist leanings was told yesterday by Haldore Hanson, chief of a techni-
cal staff working in the State Department on the Point 4 program for aiding
backward areas of the world.
Mr. Hanson wrote of his experience to Chairman Tydings of a Senate Foreign
Relations subcommittee investigating charges by Senator McCarthy, Repuhli-
can, of Wisconsin. Senator Tydings released the letter to reporters last night.
Mr. Hanson lives here at 1233 Thirty-seventh Street NW., during the winter
and at his farm in Loudoun County, 12 miles south of Leesburg, the remainder
of the year.
Text of his letter follows :
1588 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
March 24, 1950.
Dear Senator Tydings : On March 13 Senator McCarthy in sworn testimony
before your subcommittee accused me of haying pro-Communist proclivities
and of being a man with a mission to Communize tbe world.
Immediately afterward, both at a press conference and in two radio broadcasts,
I flatly denied these irresponsible charges. I pointed out that Senator Mc-
Carthy's charges were based solely on my public writings in China twelve
years ago and that he had withheld from your committee and the American
public the following facts which are public knowledge: First, that my assignment
to cover the Chinese Communists was as a correspondent for the Associated
Press in 1938: second, that the Chinese Communist armies were then under
Chiang Kai-Shek's Supreme Command and were resisting the Japanese invasion;
third, that the work of the Chinese guerrillas was one of the great news stories
of 1938. and I wrote the story as I saw it. There is no mystery about any of
my writings and I shall be glad to discuss them.
On the day that Senator McCarthy mentioned my name, I made known to
my superiors in the Department of State that I desired the opportunity to
appear before your committee and publicly defend myself against these charges
and to answer any questions that members of the committee might have con-
cerning me.
I knew that an examination of my record by your committee could quickly
establish the complete falsity of Senator McCarthy's accusations. For the rec-
ord. I submit that I was the subject of a favorable investigation by the Depart-
ment of State at the time of my appointment in 1942. In 1947 as a result of ir-
responsible statements by Representative Busbey of Illinois, I was investigated
by the Department with favorable results. After the inception of the President's
loyalty Program I was processed under the government-wide investigation by
the FBI which was completed in 1948. In these investigations my activities in
China, as well as in the United States, were covered and my writings were re-
viewed. On the basis of this investigation I was again given a complete loyalty
and security clearance by the Department of State.
In view of these circumstances I expected that I would be quickly vindicated
by your committee, and that the slurs upon my devotion to the United States
would be removed by your official action.
However, during the short time which has since elapsed, I am shocked to find
that, as a direct result of Senator McCarthy's untrue accusations and insinua-
tions, my family and I have been subjected to a series of humiliating incidents.
Each of these incidents is probably trivial in itself, but shows what a chain
reaction such irresponsible charges can have and, I fear, will continue to have.
For example, a man who feeds cattle on my farm in Virginia has been asked
why he continues to work with "that Communist." One neighboring farmer
began last week to refer to me as "that Russian spy." A man near my farm
made public remarks which could reflect on my credit standing, an indispensable
asset in the cattle business.
A petition calling my family undesirable and urging that we get out of the
community was circulated in a village near my farm. Most people approached
refused to sign it. Several of them were good enough to report the story to me.
I understand a lawyer has now advised the drafter of the petition not to
continue his activities.
If these incidents were the work of an occasional gossip, I would not dignify
them in a letter to a Senate committee. Rut these cumulative actions occurred in
a decent, educated, church-going community where I have owned a farm for five
years, helped others, l'>een helped by them, and enjoyed a reciprocal friendship
and respect with many of my neighbors. I hold no resentment against those
involved in these incidents, but I deeply resent tbe false accusations of a United
States Senator, speaking irresponsibly and protected by senatorial immunity
which can start such whisperings of suspicion and hate.
Therefore, I feel that it is of urgency for me to be granted a formal hearing
before your committee at its earliest convenience, not only for the purpose of
refuting Senator McCarthy's charges, but also in order that T may personally
tell you and the other members of the committee what damaging effects such
false accusations as Senator McCarthy makes can have upon an innocent Amer-
ican in Ins relationships with his neighbors and his community. I would like
to do anything within my power to prevent others who are innocent from going
through such experiences.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1589
Exhibit No. (ii)
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1590 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
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STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1591
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1592 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
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1594 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
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STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1595
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1596 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 67
Name : Conrad E. Snow
Date and Place of Birth : August 6, 1889, New Hampshire.
Son of Leslie P. Snow, president of New Hampshire Senate, 1919-20; Jus-
tice, New Hampshire Supreme Court, 1920-1931
Education :
Dartmouth College— A. P»., 1912.
Majored in Economics.
Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa.
Oxford University— B. A., 1915 ; M. A., 1929.
Honor School of Modern History.
Rhodes Scholar.
Harvard Law School— LL. B., 1917.
Editor, Harvard Law Review.
Ames Prize.
Experience :
Professional Attainments :
General practice of law, 21 years in New Hampshire. Active trial
attorney in State and Federal Courts. Senior partner or sole attor-
ney— 19 years. Martindale-Hubbell rating- — AVIG.
New Hampshire Bar Association: Secretary-Treasurer (10 years).
American Bar Association :
Member House of Delegates (5 years).
Section of International and Comparative Law.
American Law Institute : Compiled "New Hampshire Annotations of
Restatement of Law of Contracts."
American Judicature Society; Director (5 years).
Federal Bar Association
American Society of International Law
Rochester Trust Company: Director (12 years).
Public Offices :
New Hampshire Legislature. 1929-30; Chairman, Judiciary Committee.
New Hampshire Constitutional Convention, 1930; Chairman, Judiciary
Committee.
Department of State, 1940 (August 22) — Date; Assistant Legal Adviser
for Political Affairs, P-8.
Military :
First Lieutenant to Captain, 1917-19 ;
Personnel Adjutant, Fourth Field Artillery Brigade, AEF.
Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General, 1940—16
Director, Legal Division, office of Chief Signal Officer, 1941-45.
Officer in Charge of Clemency, OUSW.
Legion of Merit, 1945.
Name : Theodore Carter Achilles.
Place and Date of Birth : Rochester, New York, December 29, 1905 (straight
American descent on both sides for several generations).
Education :
Hill School, Pottstown, Pennsylvania.
San Jose High School, San Jose, California.
Leland Stanford University, A. B., 1925.
Yale University, 1926-28, graduate study.
Member of: Metropolitan and Chevy Chase Clubs, Washington; Yale Club,
New York.
Experience :
Engaged in newspaper work in California and Japan, 192S-30.
Married in 1933 to Marion Field.
Appointed, alter examination, Foreign Service Officer, January 8, 1932.
Stationed as Vice Consul at Havana. l!i.">2. in Rome, 1933.
Assigned to the Department of State. V.(35-39.
Third Secretary at the Embassy in London, 1939-41.
Charge d'Affaires ad interim near governments of Belgium, Netherlands,
Norway and Poland, in London in 1940-41.
To the Department in 1941.
Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1944, Chief,
1944.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1597
Experience -Continued
First Secretary of Embassy in London, 1045, and in Brussels, 1046.
Assigned to Department of State, 1947, as Chief of the Division of Western
European Affairs.
Member of U. S. Delegations at the International Labor Conference, New
York. 1941.
UX Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs, Virginia, 1043.
IX Conference on International Organization, Sau Francisco, 1945.
Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 1945.
Paris Conference, 19-Ki.
First Session, UN Assembly, London, 194G.
Second Session, UN Assembly, New York, 1047.
Present position : Director, Office of Western European Affairs.
Name : Willard F. Barber.
Date and Place of Birth: March 21, 1009, Mitchell, South Dakota.
Education:
Public Schools of California, Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico.
Stanford University, A. B., 1028; M. A. 1029.
Columbia University, Postgraduate work, 1030-1033.
Awarded Einstein Prize for Excellence in American Diplomacy, Columbia
University, 1933.
Graduated from the National War College, 1048.
Membership in Societies:
University Club, Washington, D. C.
American Foreign Service Association (Associate Member).
Pi Sigma Alpha.
National Honorary Political Science Fraternity.
American Society of International Law.
Association of American University Professors.
American Political Science Association.
American Society for Public Administraiton.
Member of Latin American Committee of American Political Science Asso-
ciation, 1046, and reappointed in 1047, 1048, and 1040.
Foreign Policy Association.
Publications :
In collaboration with W. B. Guthrie: American Government, a textbook,
published by Globe Book Company.
Contributor to : Foreign Service Journal, American Political Science Review,
American Journal of International Law, Hispanic American Historical
Review, The Journal of Politics, International Journal (Canadian), The
Western Political Science Review, The New Mexico Quarterly Review,
American Political Science Quarterly, The Western Political Science
Quarterly, etc., etc.
Professional Activities :
1031-1038, Tutor, then Instructor, in Government in Diplomacy, College of
the City of New York.
1938-1943, Officer of the Division of American Republics, Department of
State, working on problems of Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic and
< uba.
In 1942 on temporary assignment for U. S. Embassies at Port-au-Prince and
Ciudad Trujillo.
1944-1945, Assistant Chief, Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs,
Department of State.
1943-1946, Assistant Chief and Acting Chief, Division of Central American
and Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, including countries of Panama,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, Haiti,
Dominican Republic.
In 1944, Secretary to Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Eco-
nomic Development.
During 1945, on detail to U. S. diplomatic missions in Cuba, Dominican
Republic, and Haiti.
February 1946, Adviser to U. S. Delegate at Second West Indian Conference,
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.
May 1946, Representative of the Department of State at inauguration of
Governor of American Virgin Islands.
In 1946 appointed Chief of Division of Caribbean Affairs.
1598 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Professional Activities — Continued
1946 and 1947, Lecturer at Institute conducted by the School of Advanced
International Studies (Washington, D. C.) on Political Problems of the
Caribbean Area.
1947, Lecturer, American University, Washington, D. C, on "Problems in
Inter-American Relations."
1947, Participant in Brookings Institution Seminar on International Rela-
tions, held at University of Virginia and Dartmouth College.
September 1947, assigned to the National War College.
June 1948, graduated from National War College.
August 1948, Chief, Division of Central American and Panama Affairs, State
Department.
In 1948 on temporary assignment to U. S. Embassies at Panama, San Jose,
Managua, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and Guatemala City.
Appointed Alternate Member of State Department Loyalty and Security
Board, 1948.
1948, Appointed to State Department Advisory Committee on Information
Policy.
July 1949, appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American
Republic Affairs.
Travel : United States, Mexico, Canada, Caribbean Area, Europe and Iberian
Peninsula, Central America.
Marital Status : Married, one daughter.
Residence :
1522 Red Oak Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.
Telephone : SLigo 8275.
Name: John O. Bell.
Date and Place of Birth: Manila, P. I., October 4, 1912 (parents U. S. citizens).
Son of John Oscar and Fiances Earle (Cooley).
Education :
George Washington University, B. S., 1934; J. D., 1939 National War Col-
lege, graduated 1948.
Admitted to D. C. bar, 1938.
Experience : With U. S. Department of State since 1931.
Officer in Fraud Section, Passport Division, 1937-39. Assisted U. S. District
Attorney (S. D. N. Y.) in preparation and prosecution ppt. fraud case vs.
Earl Browder, chief government witness in connection therewith.
Executive Officer, Passport Division, 1939^1.
Chief, Air Priorities Section, 1943-46.
Chief, Air Transport Section, 1946.
Assistant Chief, 1946.
Associate Chief, 1947-48.
Chief, 1948.
Assistant Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs since 1948.
January 1949 assigned as Political Adviser to Chairman, Foreign Military
Assistance Correlation Committee.
Assistant Director, Mutual Defense Assistance Program since 1949.
Secretary for documentation, International Civil Aviation Conference, Chi-
cago, 1944.
Conference Registration Officer, United Nations Conference, San Francisco,
1945.
Special Representative of U. S. State Department Aviation negotiations in
Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay 1946-1947.
Alternate member U. S. Department of State Loyalty and Security Board
since 1948.
Member of:
D. C. American Foreign Service Association.
George Washington University Law Association.
Alpha Chi Sigma.
Name : G. Hayden Raynor.
Date and Place of Birth : August 28, 1906, Brooklyn, New York.
Education :
Sidney Lanier High School, Montgomery, Alabama, 1923 ;
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, A.B. 1927; (Held fellowship
in English teaching courses in Freshman English during senior year.)
Harvard, Graduate School of Business Administration, MBA 1929. .
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1599
Experience :
Summer, 1928 : Wall Street Journal ;
1929-30: Irving Trust Company, New York City, general hanking training;
1931-37: Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Personal trust admin-
istration ;
1937--10: E. It. Stettinius, Jr., Estate of Judith C. Stettinius, Financial and
investment work;
1939-40 : U. S. Steel Corporation, Office of the Chairman of the Board, General
Assistant, studies special problems;
1939: Served on Staff War Resources Board while Mr. Stettinius was chair-
man thereof ;
*1940: Assistant to the Commissioner in charge of Industrial Materials (E. R.
Stettinius, Jr.) of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National
*1941: Assistant to the Director of Priorities (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.) of the
Office of Production Management ;
*1941-3: Special Assistant to the Administrator (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.) of the
Lend-Lease Administration ; Served as Executive Secretary of the Policy
Committee of the Lend-Lease Administration ;
*Dec. 1944-45: Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (E. R.
Stettinius, Jr.) ;
♦Dec. 1944—45 : Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (E. R. Stettinius,
Jr.) ;
1945: Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs
of Department of State (title now is Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for
and the Bureau of European Affairs). For first six months handled
Economic Affairs for EUR and since early 1946 have handled United
Nations Affairs.
Publication : An article on the United Nations Charter in the University of Vir-
ginia Law Review (late 1945 or early 1946).
Clubs : Harvard Club of New York City.
Conferences: Have attended following conferences as Assistant to Chairman
United States Delegation : Dumbarton Oaks, Chapultepec, Mexico City, San
Francisco.
Have attended following conferences as Adviser to the United States Dele-
gation : Last half 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and the two Special Sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly (both parts), of the United Nations.
On occasion have served as Adviser to Senator Austin in his capacity as
United States Representative on the Security Council of the United Nations.
Have also served in 1946-47 as United States representative on the Mem-
bership Committee of the Security Council and occasionally on other com-
mittees during meetings of the General Assembly.
Name : David A. Robertson.
Date and Place of Birth : July 2, 1910, Birmingham, Alabama.
Education :
Grade School, High School graduate, Birmingham, Alabama.
University of Alabama, B. S., 1931 ; LL.B., 1933.
Experience :
Land Department, Shell Petroleum Corporation, Box 2099, Houston, Texas,
1933-1940, curing titles, buying liens, royalties, pipeline rights-of-way,
settling estates.
State Department, Division of Controls, 1940-1941, by Executive Order
transferred to Board of Economic Warfare handling export control policy
and action on various commodities including oil, machinery, copper, brass,
and bronze.
Naval Officer (Lt. (j. g.) to Lt. Com.) in Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
Navy Department, 1942-1945, administering petroleum supply programs
for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Lend-Lease programs. Commended by
Forrestal in 1942 for avoiding stoppage in war industry manufacture.
Also served as Naval witness before Truman Committee on oil transport.
•Served with the late E. R. Stettinius in these several jobs in a confidential capacity.
Duties involved handling important correspondence, reviewing reports, and advising on
policy questions which arose.
1600 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Experience — Continued
State Department, 1945-1950: Petroleum Division, 1945-1947 Chairman,
Petroleum Facilities Coordinating Committee, interdepartmental, han-
dling disposal surplus oil facilities abroad. 1947-1950, Special Assistant
for Politics-Military matters coordinating and preparing positions for
National Security Council, cabinet and subcabinet discussions and matters
involving relations with Department of Defense in Near East, Africa, and
South Asia.
Alternate Member. Department of State Loyalty Board, 194S-50.
Name: John William Sipes.
Place and Date of Birth : Washington, D. C, October 29, 1919.
Marital Status : Married — Two Children.
Education :
Lee-Jackson High School (Fairfax County, Virginia).
George Washington University, A. A. and A. B. degrees.
George Washington Law School.
Georgetown Law School, L. L. B.
Memberships :
George Washington University Alumni Association.
Georgetown University Alumni Association.
Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity. .
Pi Gamma Nu (Honorary Social Science)
U. S. Naval Reserves.
Kemper Lodge No. 64, A. F. & A. ML, Falls Church, Virginia.
First Baptist Church, Alexandria, Virginia.
Military Experience :
Lieutenant. USNR, 1942-1945, assigned as follows:
Communications Watch Officer — Vice Chief Naval Operations.
Communications Watch Officer — Commander, North Pacific Forces.
Communications Officer — XAS, Moffatt Field, California.
Experience :
Executive Office of the President, Office of Government Reports — Personnel
Officer, 1940-42.
Department of State, Division of Departmental Personnel, Recruiting and
Placement Officer, 1945-46.
Office of the Secretary, Executive Secretariat, 1946-48.
Office of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Legislative As-
sistant, 1919 to date.
Name : William Pennell Snow.
Place and Date of Birth : Bangor, Maine, July 23, 1907.
Education : Phillips Exeter Acad. ; Bowdoin College and Tufts College 1925-30.
Experience:
Employed by insurance company 11)31-32.
Appointed clerk in dist. accounting and disbursing office at Paris June 2,
1934.
Vice Consul at Paris October 17, 1934.
Also Asst. Dist. Accounting and Disbursing Officer at Paris October 2">, 1934.
Foreign Service Officer, unclassified, Vice Consul of Career and Sec. in the
Diplomatic Service, and Vice Consul at Paris October 1. 1935, in addition
to duties as Asst. Dist. Accounting and Disbursing Officer.
Foreign Service School September 21, 1936.
Vice Consul at Stockholm April 7, 1937; also Third Sec. at Stockholm
November 27, 1940.
Vice Consul at Callao-Lima December 23, 1940; also Third Sec. at Lima
April 26, 1941.
Second Sec. at Lima in addition tc duties as Vice Consul August 23, 194.",;
at San Jose February 5, 1945.
Consul at St. Johns. E. F.
Detailed to the National War College September 1947-June 194S.
Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, August 23, 1948.
Officer in Charge, British-Dominion Affairs, since August 1949.
Name: Arthur G. Stevens.
Date and Place of Birth : -May 23, 1912— Greenwood, Miss.
Education : Greenwood High School, and University of Mississippi, Duke Univer-
sity, B. A.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1601
Experience:
Assistant Secretary to Congressman Will M. Whittington, Mississippi,
1! 134-35.
Asst. to Executive Secretary, Central Statistical Board, 1985-38.
Assistant to Commissioner, Bureau <>f Labor Statistics, 1938-41.
Asst. to Economic Advisor for the White House, 1941-42.
Chief of Transportation Division, Munitions Assignment Board, Combined
Chiefs of Staff, 1942-45.
Budget Examiner, Bureau of Budget, 1945—46.
Asst. to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1946.
Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
1947.
Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.
Member :
Phi Delta Theta Fraternity.
Westmoreland Congregational Church.
Name : Alien B. Moreland.
Date and Place of Birth : November 7, 1911 — Dawson, Georgia. Legal Resi-
dence— Jacksonville, Florida.
Education :
University of Florida, B. B. S. in Business Administration.
Majored in Economics and Business Administration.
Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Society.
Georgetown Law School, LL. B.
Member Staff, Georgetown Law Journal.
Harvard University, M. A. in Government.
Majored in Government and Political Science.
Columbia University, M. A. in International Administration.
Majored in International Law and Administration.
George Washington Law School, LLM.
Majored in International Law and Administrative Law.
Experience :
Member of Bars of State of Florida and District of Columbia ; American
Society of International Law ; American Political Science Association ;
American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars. State and County
Deputy Assessor of Taxes (Florida) ; Advisor on economic affairs to
Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (General Hilldring) ;
Legislative Assistant to Assistant- Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations (Asst. Secretaries Cross and McFall).
Military Experience :
Commander, USNR. Head of Counter Intelligence Section, District In-
telligence Office, Seventh Naval District; Senior Naval Civil Affairs
Officer, Cherbourg, France ; Head, Government Section, Office of Island
Governments, Navy Department.
Name : Berry, James Lampton.
Date and Place of Birth : Columbia, Mississippi — May 10, 1908.
Education : Webb Sch. grad. ; University of Mississippi, B. A. 1929, M. A. 1931 ;.
Yale University graduate work 1932-34.
Experience :
Instructor in Political Science, University of Mississippi, 1930-31 ; Teaching
Assistant in Political Science, University of Illinois, 1931-32: appointed
Clerk in American Consulate at Durban, March 16, 1934 ; Vice Consul at
Durban, August 11, 1934; at Johannesburg, temporarily, July 7, 1936; at
Lourenco Marquez, temporary, September 1, 1936; at Durban, February 13,
1937 ; at Johannesburg, temporary, March 20, 1937 : at Durban August 6,
1937 ; at Lourenco Marquez, temporary, January 3, 1938 ; at Capetown, tem-
porary. January 22, 1938; at Durban, May 2, 1939; Foreign Service Officer
unclassified, Vice Consul of career, sec. in the Diplomatic Service, and
Vice Consul at Durban, July 15, 1939 ; at Port Elizabeth, temporary, July
18, 1939 ; at Durban, September 3, 1939 : at Calcutta, June 1, 1940 ; also sec.
to Commissioner of United States to India at New Delhi, September 16,
1941 : sec. to personal representative of the President at New Delhi, March
21. 1942 : sec. at New Delhi, May 16, 1942 ; class eight, July 16, 1943 : Army
and Navy Staff College, grad. 1945; country specialist in State Department,
February 1. 1945: Acting Assistant Chief. Division of Middle Extern
Affairs, April 12, 1945 ; July 1, 1945 ; Assistant Chief, Division of Middle
1602 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Experience — Continued
Eastern Affairs, September 25, 1945, Division of Middle Eastern and Indian
Affairs, August 16, 1946 ; Special Assistant to the Director ; Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs, September 7, 1947 ; Member Policy Planning
Staff, November 22, 1948.
Name : Belton O'Neal Bryan.
Date and Place of Birth: September 8, 1910 — Georgetown, South Carolina (of
parents born in South Carolina).
Education :
Duncan High School, Duncan, South Carolina.
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, B. A. 1934.
The Georgetown University, Washington, D. C, LL. B.
Admitted to District of Columbia Bar 1938.
Member of Pi Kappa Phi Social Fraternity.
Member of Delta Theta Phi Legal Fraternity.
Experience :
Employed by Federal Government since November 1933, in Coast and Geodetic
Survey, General Accounting Office, and Department of State ;
Commissioned in the United States Army Reserve in 1939 and entered on
active duty in October 1941 as Second Lt.
Obtained rank of Lt. Col. and subsequently reverted to Reserve Status in
June 1946.
Served in Ordnance Department and the Inspector General's Office.
Qualified as Pistol Expert.
Awarded Defense, Campaign and Victory Medals and two Army Commenda-
tion Ribbons.
Since leaving Military Service entei'ed Department of State as Executive
Officer to the Legal Adviser ; Assistant Legal Adviser ; and Special Assistant
to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.
Name : Robert F. Woodward.
Date and Place of Birth : October 1, 1908, at Minneapolis, Minn.
Education : University of Minnesota — B. A. 1930.
Experience
Manager of Printing Plant and Editor, 1927-1930.
Foreign Service Officer (unclass.), Vice Consul of career, and secretary in
the Diplomatic Service, 1931.
Vice Consul at Winnipeg, 1932.
Foreign Service School, April 1933.
Vice Consul at Buenos Aires, August 1933.
Vice Consul at Asuncion, temp., September 1935.
Vice Consul at Buenos Aires, November 1935.
Third Secretary at Bogota, June 1936 ; Vice Consul, June 1936.
Vice Consul at Rio de Janeiro, 1937.
To the Department, April 1939.
Acting Asst. Chief, Division of the American Republics, Nov. 1941 ; Asst.
Chief, July 1942.
Second Secretary and Consul at La Pas, Bolivia, Sept. 1942.
To the Department, June 1944.
Acting Asst. Chief, Division of North and West Coast Affairs, July 1944.
Second Secretary at Guatemala, August 1944.
First Secretary at Guatemala, June 1945.
Counsel of Embassy at Habana, December 1945.
To the Department. March 1947.
Deputy Director, Office of American Republic Affairs, March 1947.
Assigned to Army War College during 1949.
Exhibit No. 68
Headquarters of the Generalissimo, China,
Chungking, Szechvan, 12 January, 19',2.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The ^Yhite House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President : I am happy to have the opportunity afforded by Mr.
Lattimore's return to America on a short visit, to send you a word of greeting,
and to thank you for recommending him as my political advisor.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1603
Mr. Lattimore lias fully measured up to our expectations and has entirely
justified your choice. You unerringly detected the right man to select to act
as a Counsellor at a time When decisions which will affect the whole world for
generations to come are in the balance. He has not only a wide knowledge of our
language, history, and geography, lie lias in addition an invaluable understanding
of our contemporary political affairs. His absolute integrity is manifest in
everything that ho does or says, and I never have the slightest doubt that any
suggestion that he may make is based upon a genuine desire to assist China
to the utmost of his power.
The various Missions that you have sent to China are doing valuable work.
They, and the visits of various members of your Government, have greatly
helped to bring America closer to us. Personal contacts necessarily tend to
promote closer and more understanding relationship and friendship. You may
be assured that all the American Missions are going about their duties with a
zeal that promises permanently useful results.
Since the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Hongkong, the
Pacific problem has become more acute. It is fortunate that under your wise
and steadfast leadership, the future outcome of our concerted struggle against
treachery and barbarity is assured. I assure you that I shall do my utmost to
help bring about a world order based upon justice tempered with mercy.
Mr. Lattimore will personally convey to you my views on some important
matters upon which I have not touched above. If there are messages you wish
to send me. I should appreciate you entrusting them to Mr. Lattimore to be
conveyed to me upon his return to China.
Madam ChiaDg joins me in sending best wishes to you and Mrs. Roosevelt
"Vnnrs sincerely,
Chang Kai-e iiek.
Exhibit No. 69
ARCTIC RESEARCH LABORATORY ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, May 17, 18, 19, 1949
Arctic Research Laboratory, Point Barrow, Alaska
attendance
Members :
Commo. W. G. Greenman, Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves.
Dr. John C. Reed, Staff Geologist, U. S. Geological Survey, Chairman.
Dr. M. C. Shelesnyak, Head, Ecology Branch, ONR, Executive Secretary.
Dr. Laurence Irving, Scientific Director, Arctic Research Laboratory.
Dr. John E. Graf, Asst. Sec'y, Smithsonian Institution, vice for Dr. Alex-
ander Wetmore.
Prof. Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International
Relations, vice for Dr. Detlev Bronk (Johns Hopkins).
Dr. Walter H. Munk, Oceanographer, Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
vice for Dr. Roger Revelle.
Dr. J. Frank Schairer, Carnegie Institution of Washington.
Mrs. Yvonne Reamy, Adm. Asst. to Exec. Sec'y.
Consultants :
Prof. George Carter, Head, School of Geography, Johns Hopkins.
Dr. John Field, Physiology Department, Stanford University.
Dr. S. R. Galler, Head, Biophysics Branch. ONR.
LTCDR E. P. Huey, Office of Naval Research.
Dr. T. J. Killian, Science Director, Office of Naval Research.
Prof. G. E. MacGinitie, Director. William G. Kerckhoff Marine Laboratory.
Mr. Graham Rowley, Chief, Arctic Div., Defense Research Board, Canada.
Dr. D. Y. Solandt, Arctic Research Advisory Board, Defense Research Board,
Canada.
Dr. A. Lincoln Washburn, Exec. Dir., Arctic Institute of North America.
Absent :
Dr. Detlev Bronk, President, Johns Hopkins University.
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, General Research Office, Johns Hopkins.
Dr. Roger Revelle, Co-Director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography.
Dr. Alexander Wetmore, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution.
1604 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 8: 00 p. m., 17 May 1949.
Before the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting, it was moved by
Dr. Sehairer that the Board express its appreciation to the women of the Arctic
Contractors camp and the Arctic Research Laboratory for their hospitable
reception during the afternoon preceding the meeting. The motion was sec-
onded by D. Graf and passed unanimously.
The Chairman indicated that in order to facilitate the proper consideration
of the agenda, tbose attending the meeting would be divided into working groups
to consider various phases of the agenda. The teams, or working groups, were
assigned as follows :
Committee on Oceanography : Committee on Geophysics and Geology :
Dr. Walter Munk, Chairman Dr. T. J. Killian, Chairman
Prof. G. E. MacGinitie Dr. J. Frank Sehairer
Dr. John C. Reed Dr. A. L. Washburn
Committee on Medical Research : Committee on Anthropology and Socia
Dr. John Field, Chairman Sciences :
Dr. M. C. Shelesnyak Prof. Owen Lattimore, Chairman
Dr. D. Y. Solandt Dr. George Carter
Committee on Biology : Mr. Graham Rowley
Dr. John Graf, Chairman
Dr. S. R. Galler
Dr. Laurence Irving
Minutes of the Third Meeting
Dr. Graf raised the question of disposition of specimens. The Chairman
recommended that a paragraph be inserted in the minutes to the effect that type
collections would be given to the Smithsonian Institution but that the privile^p
would be retained of keeping compared specimens. Dr. Graf moved —
"That the minutes of the third meeting be approved as amended."
Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Sehairer and passed unanimously.
Minutes of the ARLAB meeting 8 February 19Jt9
Dr. Irving stated that he did not wish to be included in the list of those at-
tending this meeting, inasmuch as he did not arrive until the conclusion of the
meeting. The Chairman suggested that an asterisk be placed after the name of
the Scientific Director and a note be made to the effect that the Scientific
Director did not arrive until the conclusion of the meeting.
There was a brief discussion of whether this meeting should lie called the
"Fourth" meeting of the ARLAB, as indicated in the minutes. Dr. Sehairer said
that the meeting was merely a discussion on policy and planning of the ARLAB.
Dr. Graf moved —
"That a paragraph be inserted in the minutes to the effect that no formal action
was taken by the Board at this meeting and that it consisted merely of a discus-
sion, by the Board members, consequently it was not to be called the 'Fourth'
meeting."
Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Sehairer and passed unanimously.
Report of the Executive Secretary
This report consisted of a number of items which the Executive Secretary
wished to bring to the attention of the Board for discussion and suggestion.
(1) Contractor's Manual: a draft of this manual was made and submitted
to the Board with the agenda for final consideration and comment.
(2) Internal Administration of ARL Manual: A draft of this was submitted
to the Board for final consideration and comment.
(3) Report of Action based on recommendations that ONR seek out and at-
tempt to stimulate a university of proper stature and graduate interest which
would find itself in a position to support the laboratory on an operational basis.
In February at the invitation of Dr. Bronk, President of The Johns Hopkins
University, a meeting was held with Dr. Shelesnyak, Dr. Irving, Dr. Prof. Cloos,
Carter, Lattimore. Lee, Wilber, President Emeritus Bowman and others. Several
weeks later the University submitted to ONR a proposal for the operation of the
laboratory. This was included in the agenda submitted to the Board.
(4) Statement to the effect that a renewal of the contract with the Smith-
sonian Institution for the ARLAB is being processed and will be effected on the
first of July, the beginning of the fiscal year.
(5) Item 5 consisted of a proposal which the Executive Secretary wished to
submit to the Board. In view of the unique characteristics of medical research
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1605
and need for active medical research programs in the Arctic, and because of the
integrated activities with the planned Arctic Health program at College, Alaska,
the U. S. Public Health Service and Territorial Health interests, the Secretary
wished the Board to consider establishing a medical advisory group.
(0) Policy and program on library facilities, promotion of interests among
the other libraries and universities for forwarding material to the AJEtL in the
form of an association. It was the opinion of the Executive Secretary that
such an association would be in a better position to build up the ARL library than
individuals.
(7) Request from the Executive Secretary for a statement of policy on publi-
cations of research reports carried out at ARL, bulletins of activities and other
tvpes of publications.
(S) Request by Executive Secretary for statement on planning an educational
program for the laboratory relative to the matter of exhibits (periodic and pro-
gram exhibits) and local publications.
The Chairman stated that items (1) and (2) would be designated to a work-
ins group to consider and to report at the Thursday session of the meeting. The
group designated consisted of Dr. John Graf, Chairman, Prof. G. E. MacGinitie,
Dr. Laurence Irving, Mrs. Yvonne Reamy.
Commodore Greenman informed the appointed committee that the office of the
Director of Naval Petroleum Reserves and the Officer in Charge of Construction
have reviewed these two items insofar as administrative procedure is concerned
and that the committee need not consider that factor.
Dr. Shelesnyak said that the proposal for operation of the ARL as submitted
by Johns Hopkins was under negotiation. It would have to be renewed on a
fiscal year basis.
The Chairman stated that this was the first time there had been a contract
proposed specifically for operating the laboratory.
Dr. Shelesnyak said that, the laboratory was initiated under the leadership of
Dr. Irving, from Swarthmore College. Its operation and existence would be
completely impossible without Pet. 4, as all activities which are called "logistics
support" are provided by Pet. 4. Money for this support is made available from
ONR to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Certain activities of the laboratory of
an operations and "housekeeping" nature (clerical work, plant management, shop
facilities, etc.) were of a research nature and the Arctic Contractors which
provides these general services for Pet. 4, felt this type of activity was not
within their realm and did not wish to carry it. In August of last year, addi-
tional funds were made available to the Swarthmore contract for operational
support. However, no specific additions were outlined in the contract.
Dr. Irving indicated interest in the terms under which Johns Hopkins wishes
to undertake direction of the laboratory. He asked the Chairman for additional
time in which to study the proposal before discussion. The Chairman suggested
that this proposal be postponed until a later session of the meeting.
Regarding renewal of the contract with the Smithsonian Institution, Dr.
Shelesnyak stated that it is the policy of ONR to have advisory panels composed
of specialists in those particular fields. These panels are appointed to advise
the CNR regarding research and policy in these fields. This Board is an advisory
panel to advise the CNR regarding operation, policy and planning of the ARL.
The contract for the Board is renewed on an annual basis at the beginning of
the fiscal year. No action on this is required by the Board.
In relation to the medical advisory group suggested by Dr. Shelesnyak, the
Board was asked its opinion of such a group. He explained the function of
advisory panels. This particular panel would be composed of specialists in Medi-
cine who would report through the Board but would not necessarily be members
of the Board. He felt that perhaps the Chairman of such a group could be
a member of the ARLAB.
Dr. Killian explained the types of panels instituted by ONR. He did not feel
that paid consultants were necessarily the best consultants. Dr. Graf felt that
the Board might be limited to non-paid consultants. There followed a discussion
as to what type of panel constituted the best and most desirable type.
Dr. Washburn asked if a medical advisory group were any more necessary
than any other group and if such problems could not be handled when they
arose.
Dr. Shelesnyak replied that there is perhaps less information and less organ-
ized activity relative to medical geography in the Arctic than any other field. At
the same time there are whole series of groups with responsibilities for health
and medical research in the Arctic. In view of the fact that one of the functions
1606 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of the Board is in nurturing research in the Arctic, he believed the advice could
be gotten by having one member of the Board who would seek such advice from
colleagues but that this type of arrangement would not have the effect that
the appointment of a regular group would have.
The Chairman stated that if the need arose in any of the other disciplines the
establishment of such groups would not be out of line.
Dr. Lattimore said that one point worth considering is that if Johns Hopkins
takes over the operation of the ARL. it would be wise to avoid any appearance
of monopoly on their part and that proposing a group to consider medical problems
would be better than appointing or designating one person.
Dr. Graf said that the Navy had organized the laboratory ostensibly for de-
fense and from that point of view, medical research assumes an important
position.
The Chairman said that there had been some emphasis in some fields and not
others simply because there was no adequate representation in those fields, but
he did not favor any special emphasis given to any discipline beyond what was
appropriate.
Mr. Rowley asked if the proposed medical group was supposed to advise on
all medical problems or just those affecting ARL?
Dr. Shelesnyak replied that it was primarily concerned with medical research
in the Arctic as focused around the activity of the ARL. He felt the NPR camp
represented a highly industrialized scene where the impact of a high degree of
technology on a native population exists. Not too far away there are native
groups not under this impact and therefore he felt it rather unique and gives
somewhat of an accent to the problem.
After considerable discussion Dr. Graf moved —
"That a member of the ARLAB be designated to consider problems of medical
research appropriate to the ARL."
Vote : The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.
A committee to consider library facilities of the ARL was appointed by the
Chairman. This committee was for the duration of the meeting only and was in-
structed to report at a later session. Members were Dr. Killian, Chairman,
Dr. Schairer, Dr. Washburn.
In regard to the educational program, Dr. Field stated that (a) he was par-
ticularly interested in seminars as he felt under such isolated conditions the
need was more acute. He felt they gave opportunity for criticism of work and
for suggestions, (b) Talks on less technical levels for the entire Arctic Con-
tractor's camp were also desirable. Both types of discussions were needed.
Dr. Munk said he had noticed a strong tendency of people working on research
problems not to bother about what has happened in the past. He suggested any
educational program should include an attempt to familiarize people with past
work. Secondly, he felt the library should purchase accounts of classic expedi-
tions for reference as they contained much of value to current researchers.
Dr. Irving believed there was the question of just how far the library should
go in expansion. The task of building up a true research library would have to
be near university magnitude. He felt it might be more expedient to work
toward a university library at Fairbanks to which the researchers could turn,
or to work toward enlarging the University of Alaska library. He did not believe
the educational program harmonized with field research.
Dr. Shelesnyak said the laboratory should have every aspect of continuity and
as much of its own substance as possible in order to acquire a group of people
who will work in the field.
The Chairman appointed a group to consider an education program for the
laboratory, as follows: Prof. MacGinitie, chairman. Dr. Carter, Dr. Field.
The Board recessed at 10 : 30 p. m.
SECOND SESSION
The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 7 : 15 p. m., May 18. This
portion of the agenda was designated to acquaint the Board members and con-
sultants who were not acquainted with the organizational background in Arctic
Alaska with that background. Attendant at this session were employees of the
Arctic Contractors and local residents of Barrow Village.
Dr. Shelesnyak explained the organization of the Office of Naval Research and
its interrelationships with the Arctic Research Laboratory. He explained the
situation as one where the laboratory is far removed from the campus and from
ONR. ONR is engaged in basic research although not necessarily immediately
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1607
pertinent to the Navy. Illustrative remarks were accompanied by an organiza-
tional chart as the explanation progressed.
Commodore Greettman gave the administrative and organizational background
of Pet. 4 and how it is integrated with other branches of the Navy. He stated
that the Secretary of the Navy has supervision of all operations of Naval Petro-
leum Reserves. The Secretary established an operating committee to advise
NPK. NPR serves only as an administrative office as the Bureau of Yards and
Docks is the actual directing agency. The actual project manager is a group with
whom the Bureau of Yards and Docks has a contract to carry on the work.
Dr. Reed called attention to the fact that Commodore Greenman has done a
great deal to aid in the development of programs of other organizations such as
the Geological Survey, ARL, Army. Air Forces, and a number of others.
The Scientific Director of the ARL reported on the scientific and general
progress of the laboratory since the previous meeting. He reported that, after a
year's use, the design and construction have proved satisfactory and well suited
to its purposes. The local operating system of the laboratory was given credit
for the effective work of the staff. A more complete report was reserved for a
later session of the meeting.
THIRD SESSION
The third session of the meeting convened at 4 : 15 p. m. on 19 May 1949. Dr.
Graf moved —
"That the Chairman of the Board prepare a letter ot the Secretary of the
Navy telling of the trip and giving credit to such people as desired:'
Vote: Dr. Schairer seconded the motion and it pass unanimously. Dr. Graf
further moved —
"That the Chairman of the Board send a letter to personnel at various points
who were instrumental in making the trip a success."
Vote : The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.
The Scientific Director gave the second half of his report to the ARLAB. He
felt that the work done by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory over the course of
a year revealed that the periods assigned researchers for work have been too
brief to be entirely effective, and recommended that more economical and pur-
posive procedures be evolved if the work is to lead to justifiable research.
He felt that the practice of urging researchers to spend more time at Point
Barrow has discouraged them from viewing arctic research as part of a longer
career.
He was of the opinion that the examination of the research programs shows
the necessity for a senior scientist experienced in field and arctic research to
attend to the development of arctic research programs.
In regard to the building program, he stated to the Board that construction for
married people was postponed until the winter of 1949. Dr. Shelesnyak advised
the Board that materials have been ordered and all arrangements completed
and construction would be initiated in the summer of 1949 and completed before
winter 1949.
Dr. Irving stated that he did not think direction of research, critical stimula-
tion of interest in arctic research and routine direction of the laboratory were
too much for one man, although they could better be performed in a scheme of
rotation among a group of investigators within a university. He felt difficulties
resulted from incomplete information as to funds, construction, and research
projects.
He expressed dissatisfaction with the routine flow of information and stated
that in his opinion this deficiency has greatly retarded preparations for research.
Improvement, he added, appears to depend upon better use of the experience
of the operational staff of the laboratory and more appreciative attention to
their proposals.
Regardless of such difficulties, he stated that he believed the operating system
of the laboratory is well established. For the support of the ONR and for the
advice of the Board he expressed sincere appreciation on behalf of his colleagues
and himself.
Dr. Schairer moved —
"That the report of the Scientific Director be received by the Board and
filed."
Vote : Dr. Graf seconded the motion and it passed unanimously.
A discussion followed on the Johns Hopkins proposal for operation of the
laboratory. The proposal contained the position of administrative assistant.
1608 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Dr. Shelesnyak explained that this person would be employed by the home base
to expedite travel, administrative matters, etc. He added that the need for this
type of position had been pointed out by the SDARL and inasmuch as ONR is
now doing part of the work that should be handled by such a person, his employ-
ment was felt necessary.
Both Johns Hopkins and ONR feel that the proposed project is in one sense a
research project. It is research in how to maintain a distant laboratory in co-
operation between a university and government. The Board has continued to
point out the need for a graduate school for a home base.
Dr. Schairer said that if a stateside base existed, there would be a need for a
responsible person to accomplish a successful relation between the laboratory
and ONR.
Dr. Graf said that if Johns Hopkins was willing to take on the contract, the
Board should be willing to approve the university conditions, including what-
ever personnel they considered necessary.
Dr. Washburn said that as a consultant he was in favor of having a university
assume administration and specifically, the Johns Hopkins University.
Dr. Field stated that he would like to comment on the general policy of having
a university contract. He felt one of the greatest needs was to have a university
base where researchers can go with data and get adequate criticism and have
adequate facilities for research. He thought Johns Hopkins very well adapted
for this type of program.
After considerable discussion it was moved by Dr. Schairer:
"That the ARLAB advise the CNR that the Board approves the proposal of
Johns Hopkins University and recommends its acceptance."
Vote : The motion was seconded by Dr. Munk and passed unanimously.
The Board recessed for dinner at 6 : 20 p. m.
FOURTH SESSION
The Board reconvened at 7 : 30 with the Chairman calling for committee
reports from the Board as assigned in previous sessions.
Committee on Oceanography. — (1) The committee supported one phase in the
Archeological and Dendrochronological Research proposal, that dealing with
study of ocean currents from driftwood.
(2) The oceanographic program of the Hydrographic Office was reviewed and
the committee was in accord with the previously expressed view of the Scientific
Director that short periods of research were expensive and relatively unproduc-
tive. Whereas the committee considers present oceanographic research problems
of general interest, especially the collection of aerial photographs taken on
Ptarmigan of arctic ice conditions, the committee thinks the time has come to
make definite recommendations of long range goals.
There are essentially two oceanographic programs which might be carried out
from the ARL :
(a) Support of biological work at ARL.
(2) The oceangraphy of the Arctic basin.
It is regrettable that present oceanographic work has largely been confined
to studies of the shelf, when so little is known about the Arctic Ocean. The
fundamental oceanographic work in little known regions has been to measure
the distribution of temperature and salinity with depth, and from it to compute
circulation. The measurement of temperature and salinity from ice drifts has
the disadvantage of leading to oceanographic section parallel to the currents,
whereas the most meaningful sections are perpendicular to currents. To obtain
controlled sections perpendicular to currents one might, in winter, be able to
establish airborne oceanograph sections covering perhaps the region from Bar-
row to the Pole. This is largely a problem of logistics and furthermore one
that is not peculiar to oceanographers, but will have to be considered for any
type of studies in the Arctic Basin. The committee recommended that this
Board energetically pursue this problem on the appropriate level, and to help
designate the most suitable agency for organizing an airborne Arctic expedition.
The oceanographers should consider drawing up rather definite plans for such
an expedition, and to list the instruments and the modifications necessary, that
would be required. Such a program might include a limited amount of meteoro-
logical observations, plankton collections, and some bottom samples. The com-
mittee suggests that with concerted effort it might be possible to occupy an experi-
mental station in the winter of 1950.
Dr. Schairer moved —
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1609
"That the report as outlined should be submitted to the CNR and that the
Hoard accept and concur with the report of the committee."
Vote: Seconded by l>r. Graf and passed unanimously.
Committee on Medical Research. — Dr. Field as Chairman recommended that
(1) the work on lipid metabolism by Dr. Wilber be continued. (2) The work
of Dr. Wennesland and party on thermal adaption on tissue should be ap-
proved. (3) In regard to the proposal submitted by Dr. Levine, the committee
felt it would properly involve a large number of persons for a good many years.
The program properly should take about ten years. The proposal was not
focused enough for the Board to consider it and the committee suggested that
Dr. Levine be requested to confine activities to one held where results could more
efficiently be achieved.
Dr. Schairer moved —
-That the Hoard accept and concur with the report of the committee."
Vote : Dr. Graf seconded and the motion passed unanimously.
Committee on Biology. — Dr. Graf as chairman said the committee felt that the
projects submitted by Prof. MacGinitie and Mr. Spetznian were very meritorious
and although no request for continuation of the Swarthmore program had been
submitted by Dr. Irving, he felt it should be continued.
The Biological Survey of Anaktuvik Pass was recommended for acceptance.
The committee felt that in all surveys there should be specified the simple collec-
tion of forms. Such things as behavior, distribution, ecology, etc., should be
considered. This is useful to other workers in other projects and assures publica-
tion within reasonable time limits. This additional information will aid in
building the reputation of the laboratory.
The Ecological Studies of Marine Fauna proposal, with Prof. MacGinitie as
principal investigator, was considered excellent. The committee felt in connec-
tion with this it might be important to encourage projects in limnology. The
work might have very important applied aspects. The committee said that
projects where additional research will result in completion of well-run investi-
gations should be continued, and secondly that the Board should give study to
the possibility of working out two and three year projects. This would have a
very great effect on the planning of a project and would have the added advan-
tage of assigning funds in one year, removing that project from future competi-
tion for funds.
Dr. Galler added that the committee recommends that the attention be invited
of inland water specialists to determine some specific problems unique in Arctic
environments.
Dr. Shelesnyak moved —
"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee on
Biology"
Vote : Seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.
Committee on Geophysics and Geology. — Dr. Killian reported for the com-
mittee, giving a review and evaluation of the work in progress, and made rec-
ommendations on proposals as follows:
(a) Measurement and Study of Arctic Phenomena: This work divided itself
into two parts (1) a study of infra-red phenomenon! in the Arctic and (2) a
study of chemical and physical properties of sea ice. The first has been explora-
tory to date. The second could be made more valuable by the addition of
petrographic studies to reveal past history of the ice. In regard to Permafrost
studies, the work has just begun and good progress has been made by Dr. Mac-
Carthy in familiarizing himself with the area. This program will be enlarged in
the fall when additional investigators will attempt to study the nature and
distribution of permafrost. The committee believed that strong support should
be given to this program.
(b) Paleontological Studies: The committee recommended that this project
be made part of the planned program of ARL.
(c) Determination of Beach Conditions Relating to Photo-Analysis and Traf-
ficability Studies in the American Arctic: The program called for a widely varied
series of undertakings which the committee did not feel such a small group
could undertake in the three to four weeks proposed. They recommended that no
action be taken by < >NR until a clearer and more definitive proposal was sub-
mitted. The committee recommended that the work be encouraged in the study
of geomorphic influence by the Arctic.
Dr. Munk moved —
1610 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"That the Hoard accept and concur with the report of the Committee on Geo-
physics and Geology"
Vote : Motion seconded by Dr. Graf and passed unanimously.
Committee on Anthropology and Social Sciences. — Dr. Lattimore reported on
the following projects for the committee :
(a) Archeological and Dendrochronological Research : The committee felt this
proposal was thoroughly justified and was the type of project that should be
used as a pilot project. Its acceptance was recommended.
(b) Regional Geography and Climatic Research: This proposal was con-
sidered inadequate and it was noted by the committee that a rather negative
report had been submitted by the Branch Office. The committee concurs with
this report.
(c) Geographic Research Study of Point Barrow Area: There was no indica-
tion of the stature of the researcher and the committee felt such a project should
be undertaken by a more mature investigator with an adequate geographic back-
ground. The committee stated that in not encouraging this particular proposal
it did not wish to discourage the idea of undertaking both studies of adaptation
and social impact of the Eskimos at Barrow who are affected by the NPR
project.
(d) Medical and Biological Study of the Eskimo: This committee concurred
with previously expressed opinions of the Medical Committee that this project
was too ambitious for the personnel proposed.
The committee raised the question as to whether the Board should consider
the fact that social sciences are thus far on a lower level than natural or
physical sciences. From the point of view of a number of interests, it is not
too early to make an attempt to raise the social sciences somewhere nearer the
level of the natural and physical sciences.
The committee suggested that the Board recommend appointment of a com-
mittee with power to decide what should be classified as fundamental research
in the social sciences appropriate to the Arctic environment as a whole and
appropriate to research conditions available at the ARL and not only to set
up standards but to indicate priorities. Social sciences should not neglect
economics as the committee feels it is within the proper framework of social
sciences. The committee also felt that this proposed committee should include
Canadian representatives.
Dr. Schairer moved —
''That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee on
Anthropology and Social Sciences.,,
Vote : Seconded by Dr. Irving and passed unanimously.
Committee to Consider Manuals for Contractors and Internal Administration. —
Dr. Graf reported the committee was well satisfied with these proposed manuals
and agreement was also expressed by Dr. Irving. P'-of. MacGinitie also agreed,
adding that cooperation would be needed for their effective administration.
Dr. Schairer moved —
''That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee"
Vote : Seconded by Dr. Lattimore and passed una nimously.
Committee on Library and Publications. — Dr. Killian reported that the com-
mittee assumed that the primary functions of a research library at ARL is to
assist the research workers of a frontier field establishment to the fullest possible
extent. Among means by which this may be accomplished are —
(1) Act as repository of general scientific handbooks, guide books, basic
texts, and references.
(2) Through cooperation of other libraries to arrange for the long and
short term loan of books and publications.
(3) Subscriptions to a limited number of technical journals so that they
can be made immediately available.
(4) In cases where loan is not practicable, to secure photostats or reprints.
(5) To provide other visual presentation material, including moving pic-
tures, slides and micro-film.
The library problem should be continually studied. This can be done by a
anjall staff library committee to advise the SDARL. This committee should be
appointed by the SDARL and report to the ARLAB annually. A recommended
budget of $2,000 yearly was considered necessary by the committee. Close
coordination of the library with the ONR library in Washington, which will act
as representative for the ARL library, was recommended.
In regard to publications the Board was informed that there were no new
publications from ARL at this time. The committee felt that mailing lists should
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1611
be established as well .-is exchange lists. Monographs may be indicated later.
Dr. Killian reported that Dr. Washburn had indicated that a section of the
publication Arctic would be reserved for news notes from the ARL.
I >r. Lattimore moved —
"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."
Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Graf and passed unanimously.
Committee to consider Education Program. — Dr. Field reporting for the com-
mittee said it recommended a system of scheduled and professional seminars be
set up at ARL. primarily for the common benefit of the staff. These seminars
Should afford opportunity for discussion of work in progress or in contemplation.
All interested, competent persons in the area should be invited to attend.
The committee also recommended a series of lectures on a less technical level
designed for the benefit of the intellectual life of the community. Navy and
Arctic Contractor personnel should be cordially invited to attend these lectures
and to participate in the program.
Dr. MacGinitie added that a program should be formulated for the ensuing
year and should be flexible enough to allow for visitors to be included.
Dr. Lattimore moved—
"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."
Vote : The motion was seconded by Dr. Irving and passed unanimously.
Following the report of committee chairmen, The Chairman announced that
Dr. G. E. MacGinitie would take over as Scientific Director of the ARL upon the
expiration of Dr. Irving's appointment on 30 June 1949.
The Chairman stated that he had been requested to raise the question of hous-
ing and construction. There have been complaints about the adequacy of the
present BOQ, principally because of lack of privacy.
Members of the Board expressed the opinion that scientific workers have a
real need for privacy in their quarters, but Dr. Shelesnyak pointed out that
the facilities of Barrow are those of an advanced exploratory camp and not a
community. He stated that BuDocks and DNPR feel it would be desirable to
establish good living quarters but there is a temporary aspect to the entire pro-
gram of NPR. There are legal as well as financial limitations on the amount of
housing that may be constructed. The cordial relation of the ARL and Arctic
Contractors must be maintained. The long range position is jeopardized by
making special demands in housing. Housing occupied by ARL personnel is
identical with that of employees of Arctic Contractors in comparable positions.
A request for special housing was made by Dr. Irving through channels and
was forwarded without approval at each endorsement. An attempt is being
made to recruit more married couples. Two additional MOQs are to be con-
structed. A shop is to connect Buildings #250 and #251.
The Chairman said that as long as the matter of housing is a subject of dis-
cussion among the working personnel, it is up to the Board to note the fact and
to move toward recommending remedial measures for the situation. It is in-
cumbent upon the Board to push the need for improved quarters just as far as
it is expedient.
Dr. Graf felt that trying to make a special elite corps of the researchers would
result eventually in a loss to the laboratory-
Dr. Irving said that he wished to emphasize there was no suggestion that there
has been any discrimination against the laboratory personnel in the matter
of quarters. He added when the proposals for better quarters were returned
marked with disapproval, Dr. Shelesnyak wrote to the Chief of Naval Research
requesting consideration. The CNR answered that the matter should be referred
to the Board.
The Chairman said the Board would write to the CNR advising him of the
opinion of the Board.
Dr. Shelesnyak made a statement to the Board regarding the role of ONR in
arctic research. He said that from the earliest days of ONR it has been the
conviction of many in that office that the only method by which the vitality of
a government agency engaged in research administration by contractual rela-
tions with universities may be maintained is for that organization to sustain
a continuing influx of new professional personnel with an opportunity for those
associated with the ONR to return to academic centers. In Navy parlance, we
speak of the need for "sea duty" in order to keep able officers abreast of develop-
ments and better qualify personnel. To this end ONR has been attempting to
induce qualified scientists to join the staff of ONR on a lea ve-from-uni versify
basis and afford opportunity for others at ONR to re-associate themselves with
universities and laboratories outside of the government.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 9
1612 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
This original conviction has with time become increasingly firm and within
the past several months planning has been under way for the association of Dr.
John Field with ONR in the billet now occupied by Dr. Shelesnyak. Dr. Sheles-
nyak in turn is to be associated with a nongovernmental group. The Board
of governors of the Arctic Institute of North America feels it propitious to
establish a Washington-Baltimore office to be primarily concerned with arctic
research. The office will be housed on the campus of Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity and will be associated with that university. Dr. Shelesnyak has been in-
vited to be Director of that office and is planning to join the group on or about
1 September 1949.
Dr. Shelesnyak said that he felt the change in geographic location would
be a step toward the achievement of the goal of stimulating nurturing and
encouraging arctic research. The furtherance of this program demands the
cultivation of a university center with strong academic and professional guid-
ance. Such a center must, of course, work closely and constantly with the
federal agencies interested in research in the north regions. Without such
close collaboration it is certain that neither the university center nor the federal
agencies can achieve fullest effectiveness. Dr. Shelesnyak added that it was
his hope and definite intention to continue in as close a relationship as possible
with the research and activity of ARL and other research in the arctic, and
that he would be most unhappy if continuing demands were not made on his
time and energy for such counsel as he might be able to give in reference to
the ARL at Barrow specifically, and arctic problems of the Navy in general.
Dr. Washburn stated that lie would like to express the continuing interest
of the Arctic Institute of North America in the Arctic Research Laboratory.
Mr. Rowley expressed his appreciation at being invited to the meeting and
added that he had learned quite a lot as a result of the trip.
Prof. Lattimore said that Johns Hopkins University feels very much that it
hopes to be in the fore-front of those institutions which have been stimulated
by the Office of Naval Research and that if the contract between the university
and that office is activated, the university will he on its toes because of what
has been said at the meeting, because of the stimulus of Dr. Irving's leadership
at ARL, and because of the AINA establishing its Baltimore-Washington quarters
with the university.
The meeting adjourned at 11 : 50 p. m.
Exhibit No. 70
AN ANALYSIS OF MR. ALFRED E. KOHLBERGS CHARGES AGAINST
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York
22, N. Y.)
FOREWORD
The following pages contain a somewhat detailed analysis, made early in
1945, of an 88-page photostatic document prepared and widely circulated by
Alfred Kohlberg in November 19-14 which purports to show that the publications
of the American and Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations follow
the Communist Party ""line." In a court action brought by Mr. Kohlberg to
compel the American Council to make available to him the names and addresses
of its members, so that he might circulate this and other documents, he further
chai-ged the staff writers of the IPR with being "unpatriotic, biased, uninformed,
and incompetent."
While a superficial examination of Mr. Kohlberg's document reveals it to
be unscholarly and unscientific in its approach, the Executive Committee of
the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations felt that a careful
analysis of his charges should he prepared out of justice to the members and
friends who might be disturbed by an attack on the IPR's integrity. Although
this was prepared in February 11)4.1. it was not widely circulated at the time
because (a) it was a long document and might unduly burden the Trustees
and members at the expense of more important matters on the IPR program
agenda and (b) the officers of the Council did not desire at that time to broad-
cast voluminous documents about Mr. Kohlberg and incur the heavy expense
involved.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1613
Inasmuch as Mr. Kohlberg has thus far fell unable to accept any of the
IPR's efforts to moot his wishes hut apparently is determined to continue court
action, it has seemed wise to send this lengthy analysis to the Board and to
those members who wish it so that they might have the background in the event
of Court action leading to wholesome and unwholesome press publicity.
The manner in which materials have been selected from IPR publications to
buttress these accusations indicates little understanding of the aims and methods
of scholarship as exemplified by the publications program of the IPR. The
Institute, as a:i international, nonprofit, educational organization, does not
express opinions on public affairs; and it has consistently adhered to "the
principles of complete freedom of scientific inquiry, broad hospitality to all
points of view hut subservience to none." The analysis in the following pages
shows that principles of objectivity and fairness in the presentation of contro-
versial materials have been faithfully observed. The alleged parallel between
statements in IPR publications and the Communist "line" breaks down com-
pletely when the IPR publications of each period are viewed as a whole. While
it is natural that over a period of years a critic should be able to rind selections
which thoroughly parallel Communist views on some issues, there is also much
material that is highly critical of the Communist position. The same could be
said of reputable newspapers like the New York Times or the Christian Science
Monitor.
The small proportion of IPR publications which Mr. Kohlberg finds suitable
for quotation is perhaps the best indication of the weakness of his case. His
charges are based on selections from 33 articles and hook reviews, 3 pamphlets,
and one book, covering a seven-year period in which the organization published
1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. Fragmentary
excerpt from these articles and pamphlets are quoted in the SS-page document
on which he has hased his court case. These appear out of context and without
explanation. In the following pages these same excerpts are shown in context
and. where, as in some cases, they appeared as part of a symposium in which
opposing viewpoints were presented, that fact is set forth. Attention is also called
to many articles in IPR publications and to other quotations from the very
articles cited by Mr. Kohlberg, which express views directly opposite to those
which he seeks to attribute to the Institute. The fact is also brought out that
several of the publications criticized by Mr. Kohlberg, notably ^Yartime China,
were highly praised by Government officials and extensively used in Army and
Navy orientation courses. As a matter of fact, so useful were the publications
of the Institute to the war effort that the American Council was awarded the
Navy E in 1945.
Further evidence of the reckless nature of Mr. Kohlberg's charges is found
in his attempt to impugn the integrity, competence, and patriotism of the IPR
staff writers. In his petition for court action against the IPR he declares that
many IPR staff .writers had an extensive background of Communist activity
and that their articles presented untrue, false, and misleading facts. No evidence
is presented to support the charge of Communist activity because none exists.
Further proof of the irresponsibility of this charge is shown by the fact that
Mr. Kohlberg obviously has never taken the trouble to find out who the staff
members of the American Council are. Of a total of 25 authors and contributors
to IPR publications cited in his document, the following pages show that 13 had
never been on the staff of the IPR and only four were on the staff at the time
of his charges. Of these, only one was employed by the American Council.
Among the distinguished authors not on the staff of the IPR whose writings
were cited as incompetent or subversive by Mr. Kohlberg were : Nathan M.
Becker, formerly professor of economics at a midwestern university ; Brig. Gen.
Evans Carlson, leader of the famous Carlson's Raiders ; Tyler Dennett, former
president of Williams College ; Foster Rhea Dulles, professor at Ohio State
University: Edgar Snow, associate editor of the Saturday Evening Post; Owen
Lattimore, formerly political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Deputy Director for the
Far East, Office of War Information, and Director of the Walter Hines Page
School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University ; and George E.
Taylor, head of the Far East Department of the University of Washington who,
during the war, was Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Information,
and until recently was connected with the State Department.
Of the four persons on the IPR staff whose work was criticized by Mr. Kohlberg,
two — T. A. Bisson of the International Secretariat and Miriam Farley of the
American Council staff — now hold responsible positions on General MacArthur's
staff.
1614 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Another interesting sidelight on Mr. Kohlberg's criticism of the handling of
China by Pacific Affairs in the period before Pearl Harbor may be found in the
fact that the magazine was edited at that time by Owen Lattimore, noted Far
Eastern expert. If Mr. Lattimore was as unfair to China as alleged by Mr.
Kohlberg, he scarcely would have been called directly from this post to become
confidential adviser of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek upon the recommendation
of the President of the United States. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore's ap-
pointment was hailed by T. V. Soong, the present Premier of China, as "a major
token of increasing understanding between China and the United States."
Further evidence of the general competence of the Institute in handling
controversial issues with respect to China is demonstrated by the harmonious
cooperation between the China Council of the IPR and the Pacific and American
Councils. The Chinese delegation to the Hot Springs Conference of the IPR in
January 1945 contained many of the country's leading educators and political
figures, and a notable Chinese delegation headed by former Ambassador Hu Shih
cooperated with the Americans on the most friendly terms in the subsequent
meeting of the Pacific Council at Atlantic City later that year.
The first twenty pages of the analysis which follows document in detail these
and other facts which demonstrate the irresponsibility and inaccuracy of Mr.
Kohlberg's charges.
The rest is devoted to a detailed review of the publications from which por-
tions are quoted out of context in his S8-page document. In an effort to reconcile
the fact that IPR materials include various points of view, particularly on
controversial issues, he adopts the strange device of dividing the years from
1937 to 1944 into four periods during which he endeavors to prove that Institute
publications indulged in "severe criticism of the Chinese Government, alternat-
ing with praise, closely following the alterations of the Soviet Union's foreign
policy and that of the Communist press."
Needless to say, this claim collapses under careful scrutiny as shown from
pages 21-52, which follow. Even a hasty review of the books and magazine
articles published by the IPR, if read in toto and not out of context, reveals
the absurd inaccuracy erf such a charge.
In selecting materials for publication, the organization is guided by various
considerations, including the scholarly merit of the material, the importance of
the subject, and its public interest. So far as is humanly possible, it endeavors
to assure the accuracy of all facts appearing in its publications. Most of its
books and pamphlets are sent out in manuscript form to a number of competent
critics. It does not attempt to impose censorship on opinions, neither does it
solicit manuscripts exclusively from persons of a single viewpoint. On the con-
trary, believing that truth is arrived at only in an atmosphere of free discus-
sion, it aims to present information reflecting different and often conflicting
opinions.
It is hoped that anyone who is inclined to give credence to Mr. Kohlberg's
accusations will take the time to study the following pages and read the recent
biennial report of the American Council. Windows on the Pacific, before passing
final judgment on his charges.
September 1946.
a. introduction
On February 1?.. 1945, Alfred Kohlberg, Inc., through its president, Alfred
E. Kohlberg, submitted a petition before the Supreme Court of New York County,
requesting a judgment (1) enjoining the American Council of the Institute of
Pacific Relations from holding its regular animal membership meeting scheduled
for February 20, 1945, and (2) compelling it to make available to Alfred Kohl-
berg, Inc., the names and addresses of its members.1
The petitioner based his reasons for this demand on the charge that many
of the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were —
prepared by staff writers employed by tbe American Council, which writers
bail an extensive background of Communist activity, and which staff writers
in said articles presented inaccurate, untrue, false, and misleading facts,
opinions,* and conclusions which, in effect, constituted effective Communist
propaganda and which, being published and circulated during the course
of the war between the United States of America and the Government of
Japan, has given aid and comfort to the enemy by tending to create dissen-
1 The ITU won the case on May 8, Mr. Kohlherg has appealed it, however.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1615
sion and disunity among the Chinese people and between the Chinese Na-
tion and the United States Government who are allied in the war effort
against Japan.''
The petitioner further charged the staff writers Of the American and Pacific
Councils of the Institute with being "unpatriotic, biased, uninformed, and in-
competent."
As evidence for (his thesis, the petitioner cited an 88-page document, circulated
on November !>. in hi. by its president, Alfred Kohlberg. Of this document, 34
pages list excerpts from Institute publications, taken out of context, and 41
pages of it are devoted to ((notations from Communist and left-wing publica-
tions, which, it is alleged "follow the same line."
Instead of sending this document to the Secretary or officer's of the American
Council, it was mailed, together with an accompanying letter, to the trustees
and certain large contributors of the American Council and to four or five score
of other people whose names Mr. Kohlberg has declined to divulge. Although
the accompanying letter was addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, the Secretary-General
of tin1 Institute, it ami the document were mailed to the foregoing without prior
notice to. or consultation with, Mr. Carter.
After an exhaustive study of the articles cited in this document, and of many
other books, pamphlets, and articles published by the Institute during the seven-
year period in question, the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of
the American Council of the Institute believes that Mr. Kohlberg's charges are
invalid. Here are a few statements from other individuals and their opinion
of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Statements About the Work akd Program of the IPR
Sumner Welles — Formery Under Secretary of State:
" :: * I am glad to say that in the opinion of the officers of the Depart-
partment of State who are especially familiar with the activities of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of this Institute have been
of interest and value. The Institute has been making a substantial contribu-
tion to the development of an informed public opinion."
Herman Beukema — Colonel, U. S. A., The United States Military Academy,
West Point, N. Y. :
<•* * * i am convinced that no other civilian research organization
in the country presents as wide, thorough, and up-to-date coverage of the
Far Eastern field as that of the Institute of Pacific Relations."
Eugene Staley — School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C :
"The American Council of the IPR has made the most important con-
tribution of any organization to the knowledge and understanding in this
country of Far Eastern affairs. I can testify from personal experience to
the great value of its background publications to Government Agencies
when they were suddenly faced with the war emergency against Japan,
and of their present value to agencies planning Relief."
Raymond Swing — Radio Commentator, Washington, D. C. :
"The research work of the IPR has for years been acknowledged as an
invaluable source of information by men in and out of our Government and
other Governments on the Far East ; and an attack upon it should be incon-
ceivable. The charges you mention against the IPR (i. e., by Alfred E.
Kohlberg) would in effect indict official American policy to aid in the promo-
tion of unified China. It is so irrational as to be incredible and ludicrous."
James L. McConaughy— President, United China Relief:
"I have examined Mr. Kohlberg's charges against the American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, and do not believe they are valid. On my
recent trip to China, I found no evidence of any feeling that the American
Council was pro-Japanese or pro-Communist. I believe the publications are
scholarly and objective. I believe Mr. Kohlberg's efforts, if successful,
will harm American friendship for China, and American efforts for inter-
national peace."
Edward R. Embree — President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago, Illinois :
"The charges are absurd and sound as if they were motivated by a de-
sire to cause dissension among the United Nations. The Institute is devoted
to fact finding in conferences and publications and not to propaganda. The
1616 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
officers and members of the American Council are loyal Americans deter-
mined on the destruction of Japanese aggression and the creation of world
peace and order under the United Nations."
W. W. Waymack — Editor and vice president, The Des Moines Register and
Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa :
"It is obviously possible, very readily possible, for a person to approach
the broad and diverse activity of the IPR in research, in publication, and in
conferences, with the determination to pick out every expression that re-
sembled some other expression by a Communist, and argue that the IPR
was Communist. It would be equally possible for any person to set out in
the same way to bolster his already fixed notion that the IPR is pro-Japa-
nese, and in the same sense do it. Alternatively, it would be, I am sure,
quite as easy to apply the same methods and come out with the same sort
of "proof" that the IPR is anti-Communist or anti-Japanese or, indeed, pro
or anti nearly anything you might propose."
Galen Fisher — Former YMCA Secretary in Japan ; now retired, San Fran-
cisco, California :
"* * * I believe the Institute Staff and Board have been usually ob-
jective and thorough and have given the utmost aid to the war effort."
Huntington Gilchrist — American Cyanamid Co., New York, N. Y. :
"The Institute of Pacific Relations has rendered distinguished service for
many years as a private research organization. The officials of our own
State Department, and of Canadian, British, Chinese, and other governments
attended the recent Hot Springs Conference. The Institute should be proud
to stand on its record."
It is the further opinion- of the Executive Committee that Mr. Kohlberg's charges
are based upon evidence that is biased and insufficient.
1. The document of November 9 covers only a fraction of the material published
by the Institute during the seren-year period in question — less than 2 percent of
the articles which appeared in its periodicals, and 0.002 percent of its books. —
It bases its conclusions on about 33 articles and book reviews, 3 pamphlets, and
1 book, during a period when the publications of the organization totaled 1,961
articles and book reviews, and 384 books and pamphlets.
2. Air. Kohlberg charges that the staff employed by the IPR is pro-Japanese and
"unpatriotic." — It is interesting to note, however, that the Japanese Government
does not share this opinion. A Japanese Government spokesman, broadcasting
from Shanghai on February 20, 1945, said :
"The Institute of Pacific Relations, which, in prewar days proved itself to be
strongly anti-Japanese, is professedly an organization to serve as a clearing
house of international information on economic, political, social, and cultural
affairs."
The attitude of the IPR toward Japan was clearly stated in the following state-
ment, made on December 17, 1941. by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stan-
ford University, and at that time, chairman of the American Council of the
Institute :
"* * * rp|ie ;mmediate j0fo 0f the American people is the prosecution of war
against the military imperialism of Japan and the other Axis powers, whose
defeat is the condition of any peaceful adjustment in the Far East and elsewhere.
The tradition of the IPR does not permit 'neutrality' on this issue: on the con-
trary, military aagression, in complete disregard of the rights of other peoples,
contradicts everything the IPR has stood for."
Mr. Kohlberg also states that hi* study of IPR publications revealed "no
criticism of Japan in these seven years, except of her rural land system." — There
are numerous statements critical of Japan's policy, in IPR publications. One
example is the pamphlet, Know Your Enemy Japan of which nearly 200,000 copies
have been sold, and which is widely used by the Army and Navy. This pamphlet
includes such paragraphs as the- following:
"Japan is a dictatorship without a dictator. She has no Hitler, but dictatorial
powers are exercised by a ruling clique dominated by the Army. Like the Nazis,
Japan's dictators have but one object: oppression of their own people and
despoilment of their neighbors. * * *"
"The real ambitions of Japan's militarists are accurately described in the
words of the 'Tanaka Memorial' of 1927 :
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1617
"'With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall proceed to the
conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Eu-
rope. * * * In order to conquer the world, we must first fight China * * *.
Rut if we want the gainful control of China in the future, we must shatter the
United States' " (pages 17 and 10, Know Your Enemy Japan).
A study of editorials and broadcasts hased on articles from IPR publications
makes it dear that columnists and commentators have not had the same difficulty
in finding material critical of Japan.
Samuel Grafton — Radio Commentator and Columnist, New York Post, January
29, 1941 :
"The Far Eastern Survey for January 29 tells how Japan has recently
stopped publishing vital statistics, that her people may not read in black and
white the story of their death."
New York World Telegram — Editorial — April 14, 1943 :
"Whether or not one agrees with the recent report of the Institute of
Pacific Relations that 'Japan is our No. 1 enemy,' most Americans probably
share the Australian fear that it would be 'suicidal' to give Japan time to
consolidate her gains in strategic materials and bases."
3. A natural problem for those engaged in evaluating Mr. Kohlberg's charges,
is the question of his qualifications for passing judgment on the research findings
of dozens of authorities. — Mr. Kohlberg has released public statements on China
which would indicate that his factual information on that country is inadequate.
On his return from his last trip to China, for example, he reported on The Fighting
Condition of the Chinese Army. This report was released by the East and West
Association on February 7th, 1944. In describing his contacts with Army men
at forward headquarters, Mr. Kohlberg says :
"One morning I had breakfast with Lt. Gen. Chang Teh Nun, Commander of
the Fourth Army (known as the Ironside Army) at his headquarters in Changsha.
Gen. Chang is typical of the new spirit and the new leadership in the Chinese
Army."
Tlie New York Times of Monday, August 28, 1944, however, contained the fol-
lowing short release:
"Chinese Execute General for Changsha Dereliction : Chungking, China, Mon-
day, Aug. 28. — It was announced officially today that Gen. Chang Teh-neng,
commander of China's Fourth Army, was executed August 25 for dereliction of
duty during the defense of Changsha."
Furthermore, according to Mr. Kohlberg's own document of Nov. 9 (p. 45),
he was reported in the New York Times of November 25, 1938, as stating that
"according to information given by sources within the Chinese Government"
Soviet aid to China was to end. The full quote follows :
"Au agreement giving a free hand to Japan in China has been reached by
Russia, Japan, and Germany, according to information given by sources within
the Chinese Government to Alfred Kohlberg, president of the Art Embroidery
Linen Importers Association. He returned yesterday from a seven weeks' tour
of Chinese territory on both sides of the battle lines there.
"Mr. Kohlberg's understanding was that during the summer, Russia, Japan,
and Germany had arrived at an agreement by which Russia either joined the
German-Japanese alliance, or, if she did not go so far, made peace with Japan and
-Germany. The arrangement, he understands, calls for cooperation with Russia
by Japan and Germany rather than antagonism, and provides for withdrawal
of Russian support of Chinese forces."
As a matter of fact, however, further commercial agreements were signed
between representatives of the Soviet and Chinese governments in 1939 and
1940 : in addition four barter agreements were reached. In his study Far Eastern
War, 1937-1941. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1942, Professor
Harold S. Quigley (University of Minnesota) states:
"The Soviet Union and New Zealand were the only members of the League
Council to urge strong measures against Japan in 1938. Mr. Litvinov criticized
the Council's report [of September 30, 1938], which stated that sanctions under
Article 16 of the Covenant were left to the discretion of individual members of
the League. 'My Government,' he said, 'would be happy to take coordinated
measures but since other governments will not do so my Government is com-
pelled to accept the report.' Again, in May 1939, Ivan Maisky stated to the
Council, after the British and French representatives had declined to support
Chinese proposals of economic sanctions, that 'I would like to support the pro-
1618 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
posals put forward by the Chinese representative * * * China is the victim
of brutal and unprovoked aggression and she is fighting hard and heroically for
her independence * * * '
"The commercial accord signed by Sun Fo and A. I. Mikoyan in Moscow on
June 16, 1939, provided for the exchange of Chinese raw materials for military
supplies. A second agreement was signed in July 1940. Preceding and paral-
leling these broader conventions were four barter agreements, the first in Oc-
tober 1938 (2.r)0,000,000 rubles or approximately U. S. $50,000,000), the second
in February 1939 (U. S. $50,000,000), the third in August 1939 (U. S. $150,000,-
000), and the fourth in December 1940 (U. S. $50,000,000), a total of U. S. $300,-
000,000. Tungsten, antimony, tea, and wool were the principal Chinese products
desired by the U. S. S. R. In return China received planes, trucks, tanks, guns,
and bombs, transported along the Turkestan-Shensi and Vladivostok-Urga-Ningh-
sia land routes or by sea via Hanoi and Rangoon.
"The rapprochement of the Soviet Union and Japan, culminating in the Neu-
trality Pact of April 13, 1941, appeared to undermine this program of assist-
ance ' * * * . The Soviet Government, however, was not moved from its
policy of friendship and assistance to China. It assured the latter of its desire
to implement the barter agreements and gave proof of its attitude by sending
munitions, planes, and pilots" (pp. 256-58).
If. Mr. Kohlbcrg's charges and his document reval that he has little understand-
ing of the, aims and objectives of a scholarly organization like the IPR, which
map be described as follows: The Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., is a non-
partisan, nonprofit, international organization engaged in research and educa-
tional activities. It was founded in 1925 for the purpose of promoting scientific
investigation and rational discussion of the problems and mutual relations of
the peoples of the Pacific area, and is composed of National Councils in ten
countries with interests in Asia and the Pacific area. The American Council is
the IPR affiliate in the United States.
The Institute, governed by a Pacific Council, made up of representatives of
the various National Councils, does not engage in propaganda. It is contrary
to its policy to express opinions on public affairs, and a statement to that effect
is carried in most of its publications. The Institute does not, however, seek to
escape responsibility for the scholarly standards maintained in its publications,
nor for the selection of material which is published. Its policy in this regard has
been publicly stated as adhering to "the principles of complete freedom of
scientific inquiry, broad hospitality to all points of view but subservience to none."
In selecting materials for publication, whether articles, pamphlets, or books,
the Institute is guided by various considerations, including the scholarly merit
of the material, the importance of the subject, and its public interest. So far
as humanly possible, it endeavors to assure the accuracy of all factual statements
appearing in its publications ; and most of its books and pamphlets are sent out
to a number of competent critics — professors, State Department people, etc. —
before publication. It does not attempt to impose a censorship on opinions, nor
does it solicit manuscripts exclusively from persons who share a single view-
point. On the contrary, believing that truth is arrived at only in an atmosphere
of free discussion, it aims to present materials reflecting different and often
conflicting viewpoints.
Each issue of The Far Eastern Surrey, published by the American Council of
the Institute contains the following statement :
The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations does not express
opinions on public affairs. Responsibility lor statements of fact or opinion
appearing in the Far Eastern Surrey rests solely with the author.
The Institute does not feel it necessary to apologize for the fact that certain
materials which it has published are critical of conditions in China. It has, on
occasion, published materials criticizing not only the policies of China, but those
of Great P.rilain, Russia, and other Allied nations including the United States.
This it believes to be an integral part of the principle of freedom of scientific
inquiry. The same right of criticism has been freely exercised by other American
institutions, including the press, publishers' and research organizations.
The publications of the Institute have not shown any special bias against
China, as is shown by the fact thai (a) many criticisms of countries other than
China have appeared in IPR publications, and (b) that Institute publications
on China have included not only criticisms but also, as admitted by Mr. Kohl-
berg, praise of China and support for China.
There are, of course, occasional similarities in subject material between
articles published by the Institute and those appearing in the Communist press.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1619
But this docs not constitute proof thai the Institue is biased in favor of commu-
nism or that it is disseminating Communisl propaganda. Equal similarity ran be
found in the subjects covered by the IPR and the New York Times, Life, or The
Christian Science Monitor.
5. In his petition to the court, Mr. Kohlberg states that his study of IPR
publications revealed that many were "prepared by staff writers employed by the
American Council, which writers had an extensive background of Communist
activity, and whicb staff writers in said articles presented inaccurate, untrue,
false, and misleading facts, opinions, and conclusions * * *." He declares
that "* * * the refusal of the Executive Committee * * * to seriously
consider the said charges * * * constitutes gross mismanagement * *
and tends to give comfort and aid to the enemy of the United States, namely, the
Japanese Government during time of war, by enabling unpatriotic, biased, unin-
formed, and incompetent staff writers of tbe American Council and Pacific
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to continue writings which consti-
tute Communist propaganda, causing disunity, dissension, and misunderstanding,
both within the Chinese Government and among its peoples, and between the
Chinese Government and the American Government which are allied in the war
effort against the .Japanese Government."
Elsewhere in this report we shall give detailed attention to the material he has
quoted, and the facts and points of view expressed therein. In this section we
are interested specifically in the reference made above to "unpatriotic, biased,
uninformed, and incompetent staff writers * * *." These statements impugn
the integrity, competence, and patriotism of our staff and our contributors. A
few facts are presented below — it is our belief that the record speaks for itself.
In his selection of material Mr. Kohlberg quotes a total of 25 authors and
contributors. Of these 14 have never been employed on the staff of the IPR,
although they may have contributed to its publications or engaged in specific
studies for the IPR on Far Eastern subjects. An additional 7, although formerly
employed, are not now on the staff. Only 4 of the 25 quoted by Mr. Kohlberg
are now on the staff, and only one of these is working for the American Council.
It is of interest to glance briefly at the record and background of each of the
persons quoted in Mr. Kohlberg' s charges.
The following authors, cited by Mr. Kohlberg, are not now and have never
been, entployed on the staff of the IPR, although they have contributed to its
publications or special studies:
Nathan M. Becker: Formerly Professor of Economics at a midwestern Uni-
versity.
Col. Evans F. Carlson : A Marine officer who has given a lifetime of service to
his country- Hero of many engagements ; leader of the famed Carlson's
Raiders in the Solomon Islands campaign. Spent a year studying the Chinese
Army and the tactics of the guerillas. Author : The Chinese Army, Twin Stars
of China.
Tyler Dennett: In China several times. Former historical adviser, Department
of State ; former president of Williams College. Author : Americans in Eastern
Asia, Biography of John Hay (Pulitzer Prize).
Foster Rhea Dulles : Formerly a correspondent in China ; formerly on staff of
Christian Science Monitor, New York Post, New York Herald Tribune ; formerly
Professor of History at Smith. Swarthmore. Now a professor at Ohio State
University. Author: Forty Years of American-Japanese Relations. Behind the
Open Door.
Haldore Hanson : Formerly correspondent in Peking ; at present in the Depart-
ment of State. Author: The People Behind the Chinese GuerriUas.
Olga Lang : Spent some years in China. Author, forthcoming book to be pub-
lished by the IPR The Chinese Family.
Martin R. Norins: Formerly in Department of History, University of Cali-
fornia. Author: Gateway to Asia, Sinkiang.
Edgar Snow : Former China correspondent, New York Sun, London Daily Herald,
Saturday Evening Post. Lecturer at Yenching Universitv, Peiping. Covered
the Sino-.Iapanese war 1931-33 and 1937-41. Author : Red Star Over China,
The Battle for Asia, People on Our Side.
Guenther Stein: For many years China correspondent for various newspapers
including Christian Science Monitor. Formerly editor of China Airmail.
Author : Made in Japan.
Maxwell S. Stewart : Six years in China ; 4 years teaching Yenching University,
Peking; formerly Research Economist, Foreign Policy Assn.; now Editor,
Public Affairs pamphlets, Associate Editor, Nation. Author : Case for China,
1620 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Social Security, Building the Peace at Home and Abroad, America in a World
at War, Wartime China. _ ,, „
Anna Louse Strong: In China several times. Author: I Change Worlds, One-
Filth of Mankind. My Native Land.
Lt George Uhlmaxn : Enlisted in French Navy at outbreak of war ; after tall
of France returned to Peiping where he had lived for many years and served
with French Consular Service, joining Fighting French forces in Chungking
Nym Walks (Mrs. Edgar Snow) : Lived and traveled in China and the Par Last
from 1931-40. Author: The Chinese Labor Movement, China Builds for
Democracy. ,, ._ ,. . ,T„ ..
Wei Meng-Pxj- Formerly Professor of Political Science at the ISational Ivorth-
western University, Mukden ; at the same time the article cited by Mr. Kohl-
berg was contributed the author was making a study tour in the interior prov-
inces of China. „ .
The following authors quoted by Mr. Kohlberg are not now on the stall, but
were formerly employed by the IPR.
Robert Barnett : Rockefeller Fellow, IPR, 1939^10 ; visited China, returned to
work on IPR staff in 1941. Worked for United States Government Office of
Strategic Services. At present in China with U. S. Army Air Forces. Author:
Economic Shanghai — Hostage to Politics 1937-J/l.
Dorothy Borg: Research Associate, American Council, IPR, 1938-42. Wrote
articles for Far Eastern Survey, and directed school program of the American
Council. „ ,
Frederick V. Field : On staff of irR from 1928-40. Assistant Secretary, Ameri-
can Council, 1928. Traveled in Far East, China, Japan, and Philippines 1928-
30; China, 1931; Honolulu IPR, 1932; London 1933. Secretary, American
Council, 1934-10, Member Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of
IPR, 1940. Executive Vice Chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy.
Author: American Participation in the China Consortiums; Editor: Economic
Handbook of the Pacific Area; General Editor : Economic Survey of the Pacific
Area; Contributor to New Masses and Daily Worker.
Michael Greenberg : On IPR staff 1! M 1-42. At present with United States Gov-
ernment Foreign Economic Administration.
Owen Lattimore: Worked and traveled in the Far East, 1920-26; on a grant
from Social Science Research Council, Manchuria, 1929-30 : in Peiping under
Harvard-Yenching Institute and Guggenheim Foundation, 1930-33; Mongolia,
research in Peiping for IPR, 1934-35 ; Editor, Pacific Affairs, 1934-41 ; Political
Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, 1941-42 ; Deputy Director for the Far East, Office
of War Information, 1942-44. At present consultant OWI, and director, Wal-
ter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University.
Author: Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict, Mon-
gol Journey, Solution in Asia.
Harriet Moore : On IPR staff 1032-33 ; 1935-36. Assistant Secretary American
Council, IPR, 1943; Acting Secretary, 1943-44; member Research Committee,
IPR ; Secretary American-Russian Institute. Author : A Record of Soviet
Far Eastern Relations.
George Taylor : Taught 3 years at Nanking University, China, and 2 years at
Yenching University, Rockefeller Fellow, American Council of IPR, 1940-41.
Head of Far Eastern Department, University of Washington, Seattle (on
leave). At present Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Informa-
tion (1942-). Author: The Struggle for North China, America in the New
Pacific.
The persons listed below are the only ones of the 25 quoted by Mr. Kohlberg
who are on the staff of the IPR at the present time :
Edward C. Carter: Secretary of the American Council, 1927-33: Secretary-
General of the Pacific Council, 1934-. Editor: China and Japan in our Uni-
versity Curricula.
T. A. Bisson : On the staff of the Pacific Council since 1943, formerly with the
Foreign Economic Administration, and for 12 years Far Eastern Expert of the
Foreign Policy Association. Author: American Policy in the Far East,
Shadow Over Asia. Japan in China.
Miriam S. Farley: On the stall' of the American Council, 1934-. Formerly
Chairman, Board of Editors, Far Eastern Survey; at present editor, popular
pamphlets series. Author : The Problem of Trade Expansion in the Postwar
Situation. Speaking of India.
Y. Y. Hsu : On the staff of the Pacific Council 1941-. Author: Chinese View of
Wartime Economic Difficulties.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1621
The references cited above are not in any sense a complete review of the posi-
tions held, the publications written, or the other qualifications of the authors
cited. A compilation of favorable critical comment on their published works
would undoubtedly make a substantial volume in itself. It may be of interest,
however, to cite two typical reviews — one from the New York Times, one from the
Herald Tribune, of books by two of the authors mentioned.
New York Times — February 21, 1945
Re: Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore:
"Owen Lattimore is one of the best qualified of all Americans now writing
on Oriental affairs * * * devotes the greater part of Solution in Asia
to a review of recent political history in Japan and China."
New York IIekald Tribune (Sunday Edition) — June 5, 1938
Re : Japan in China, by T. A. Bisson :
"Japan in china (by T. A. Bisson, 1938) is an extraordinary book. It
is beyond all doubt the soundest and most scholarly volume which has yet
appeared on the more immediate background and origins of the Sino-Japa-
nese conflict, and on its earlier phases. Nor is it likely that its position in
this field will soon be usurped. For until the archives are thrown open and
the memoirs of those who have been close to the seats of power during the
last five years are published, it is difficult to see how any historian could
surpass Mr. Bisson's work. It represents the quintessence of years of pains-
taking research, and of lengthy conversations, during 1937, with leader and
rank and file in China and Japan, by a first-class authority on Far Eastern
social and political developments."
Colonel Evans Carlson — American Journal of International Law — January
1941
Re: The Chinese Army, Its Organization and Military Efficiency:
"To the layman who has been confused by the rival claims of Japanese
and Chinese military prowess in the present Sino-Japanese war, and more
especially by the excessive claims of the partisans of China or Japan, of
Occidental race, this handbook of information by Major Carlson will be most
welcome * * *. In the concluding chapter the author gives much credit
for China's awakened consciousness to the just and kindly leadership of
Chiang Kai-shek, their military leader * * *."
New York Times — January 28, 1945
Re : China's Wartime Politics, by Lawrence K. Resinger :
"This is an absorbingly interesting and important monograph which in-
cludes fourteen documents of outstanding significance, particularly with
reference to Kuomintang-Communist aims and relations, with which half of
them deal. It is heartening to serious students (and it behooves Americans
to become serious students) of contemporary China that the author and his
patrons of the Institute of Pacific Relations should have seen fit, in a study so
limited in scope, bulk, and chronology, to have used and rendered accessible
so many fundamental source materials.
Clearly written, cooly objective, essentially sound as to facts, this essay
presents the highlights, with comparatively few contrasting shadows, of
the period touched upon. Never does Mr. Rosinger wax enthusiastic ; never
is he ironical or condemnatory, never does he guess, suggest, or imply, and
rarely does he attempt explanation or interpretation. Facts are facts, with-
out nuances."
Finally, reference might be made to the many qualified persons at present
carrying on the work of the IPR. and to those others who have left the IPR to
assume important and responsible positions with the United States Government.
The latter group includes :
Catherine Porter : On the staff of the IPR, 1942-44, formerly assistant editor of
Pacific Affairs, and chairman of the Board of Editors of the Far Eastern Sur-
vey. At present Regional Specialist on the Philippines for the Office of War
Information.
W. L. Holland : On the staff of IPR, 1929-45, formerly editor of Pacific Affairs,
and International Research Secretary of the Pacific Council ; on leave at
present as Assistant Chief, China Outpost, Chungking, Office of War Infor-
mation.
William W. Lockwood : On the staff of the IPR, 1935-42; Secretary of the
American Council, 1941-42. Office of Strategic Services (1942). At present
in China with the U. S. Army Air Corps.
1622 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Russel G. Shiman: On the staff of IPR. 1933-41. United States Tariff
Commission, 19.41-43; Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, 1943-44;
UNRRA, 1944-45.
Philip E. Lilienthal : Pacific Council Staff 193S-42 ; in charge of International
Secretariat's Shanghai Publication Office, 1940-41 ; now with Office of War
Information, San Francisco.
Katrine R. C. Greene : American Council staff, 193S-42. At present with Ameri-
can Red Cross in North Africa.
Laura Mayer : Pacific Council staff, 1942-43 ; now with Red Cross in New Guinea.
Mary Healy : Pacific Council staff, 1942-43 ; now with Foreign Economic Admin-
istration in New Delhi, India.
Elizabeth Downing: Pacific Council, 193(5; Shanghai Publications Office, 1937-
38 ; American Council, 1941-43 ; at present with Office of War Information, New
York.
Barbara Wertheim Tuchman : American Council, 1934-36 ; at present with
Office of War Information.
Isabel Ward : Pacific Council, 1936 ; 1940-41 ; at present with OWI in San
Francisco.
6. The Kohlberg document attempts to prove that the IPR publications followed
a definite pattern with regard to China: i. e., that, prior to the Hitler-Stalin
pact of August 23, 1939, they praised China; from then till June 22, 191(1, they
abused China; from then till the summer of 194S, they praised China; and since
the summer of 1943, they have again concentrated on abuse of China. — This,
according to Mr. Kohlberg, represented shifts in the Communist Party line.
In order to prove his case, the author of the document has resorted to the
device of taking passages of articles out of context. Yet in a number of
instances, these same articles contain other paragraphs which, if similarly taken
out of context, could be used to prove the opposite. The IPR pamphlet, Wartime
China, is a good example of this.
The pamphlet sets out neither to '•praise'' China nor to "abuse" China, but
to present what, in the opinion of the author and many expert critics who read
it in manuscript form, is a balanced view supported by the best available evi-
dence. Mr. Kohlberg has taken from its pages quotations which indicate criti-
cism of China. However, as is demonstrated below, it is possible to select
numerous quotes indicating praise of the country and its leaders, which give
an entirely different picture. The fallacy of this method of selection is apparent,
and it illustrates the weakness of Mr. Kohlberg's assertions: Wartime China
states :
"We have been filled with admiration at the way in which the people of
China, in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have
stood up to the Japanese year after year without giving in * * *"
(page 6).
"From a military standpoint, the remarkable thing is that the Chinese
were able to maintain resistance in the face of great inferiority of arms
and supplies of all kinds. Comparatively little help has been obtained from
broad * * *" (page 10).
"Against this historical background, the degree of national unity that
has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership
is truly remarkable. Without it, the miracle of military resistance could
not have taken place * * *" (page 16).
"When measured against the handicaps which she has had to overcome,
China's war effort is truly impressive. Try to imagine that an enemy
power has occupied both sea coasts of the United States and most of the
country east of the Mississippi. The capital has been moved to Denver
and is flooded with refugees. Then take away nearly all of the factories,
railroads, highways, telephone and telegraph lines, electrical equipment,
coal, iron, and oil fields from the unoccupied area. Even so, we should be
better off than China for we should still have an abundance of skilled
labor and trained technicians and administrators. For the political picture,
go back to 1776 when our country consisted of thirteen "sovereign" states
with hardly any organized national government, and plenty of conservatives
who saw no sense in fighting for that new and unfamiliar idea, the 'United
States of America.' Keep up the enemy pressure for seven years with little
help from outside. That might give you a rough idea, in American terms,
of what China has been up against" (page 20).
"The fact that Chiang is President of the Republic Prime Minister and
Commander in Chief of the Army has led many people to think of him as
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1623
a dictator. This is hardly accurate. Although on paper his powers are
great, actually he serves as a sort of balance wheel, stabilizing the con-
flict ing forces of the various groups * * * " (page 42) .
"Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by trying to understand
the magnitude of the task which she faces in transforming an ancient
medieval society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate
her difficulties as well as her achievements can we deal fairly with China.
And we must remember that many of the difficulties which she faces today
and in years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China
fought our battle almost unaided" (page 63).
In his letter accompanying the November 9 document, Mr. Kohlberg termed
Wartime China as "from start to finish * * * a deliberate smear of China
and the Chinese Government." The above paragraphs would not bear this out,
however. Neither would such letters and reviews as the following:
Tyleu Dennet — April 6, 1944, former President of Williams College
Re Wartime China:
"Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about
the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but
it seems to me that be almost went out of his way to give all the extenuat-
ing circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It's about the best booklet
I have seen out of the IPR."
Field Artillery Journal — August 1944
Re Wartime China:
Wartime China, by Maxwell S. Stewart. American Council, Institute of
Pacific Relations.
Behind the Open Door, by Foster Rhea Dulles. American Council, Institute
of Pacific Relations.
"Here we have two splendid additions to the illuminating series of
pamphlets produced by this publisher. The first describes the stresses and
strains behind the fighting lines in China. The second is a popularly written
history of Japanese aggression from Perry's time to Pearl Harbor. Like
the rest of the series, these booklets are written by specialists in their
fields and have been carefully checked by experts; their scholarship is
sound."
American Sociological Review — December 1944
Re Wartime China:
"This Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlet on China by the editor of
the widely circulated Public Affairs pamphlets gives an authoritative, bal-
anced discussion of the problems, resources, personalities, and confusions in
that much misunderstood land."
7. Mr. Kohlberg is much more sensitive to criticism, of China than many
Chinese. — Unlike Mr. Kohlberg, the China Institute of Pacific Relations is not
hostile to the work and publications of the IPR. One of the basic practices of the
IPR has been not only to provide for criticism but to welcome and stimulate it.
The research publications and monographs of the National Councils and of the
International Secretariat are submitted to a number of competent critics before
publication, and at the International Conferences of the IPR every effort is
made to stimulate the frank expression of every point of view.
This procedure is important because neither the Institute itself nor any of its
National Councils express an "institute" point of view on any political or
economic questions. Every article, pamphlet, book, or oral statement rests solely
on the authority of the individual author.
There have recently been vivid examples of this policy of frank criticism at the
January 1945 International Conference of the Institute at Hot Springs, Va.
There was frank and forceful criticism of statements of American members by
French, British, and Dutch members. There were Chinese criticisms of American
statements, and vice versa. There were Indian criticisms of British statements,
and vice versa. Many of these will be reflected in the preliminary report of the
Hot Springs Conference which will be published sometime in April 1945.
At the Atlantic City meeting of the Pacific Council of the IPR in January 1944
there were likewise British criticisms of some of the articles of members of the
International Secretariat. There were similarly American and Chinese criticisms
of the International Secretariat. On one occasion there were criticisms of the
International Secretariat because it was too "pro-Chinese," too "pro-American"
and too "pro-British."
At Hot Springs, one Chinese member criticized the International Secretariat
for the writings of some of its members on Chinese problems. This was countered
1624 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
by the Chairman of the China IPR, Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, former Minister of Edu-
cation in China, who said that he personally had no sympathy with such criticisms,
that the essence of the IPR was frank criticism and freedom of speech. He felt
that criticism of China both by Chinese and by foreigners was an asset and that
he welcomed the criticisms of people of whatever school of thought, who were
interested in the problems of China and China's relationship to other countries.
There is a wide difference between friendly criticism and hostility. If the
Chinese IPR were hostile to the parent organization, it could take one or both
of the following steps: (1) it could cease or reduce its financial support of the
International Secretariat. As a matter of fact in both 1943 and 1944 the China
IPR made a larger financial contribution to the International Secretariat than
any other of the ten National Councils with the single exception of the American
Council. (2) It could either withdraw from membership in the Pacific Council or
give notice that it was considering withdrawal. It has adopted neither course.
On the contrary, its cooperation has been substantial and important. It con-
tributed several data papers to the Hot Springs Conference. It is actively coop-
erating in the International Research Program. The services of its National
Secretary in Chungking have been loaned for a period of six months to the
International Secretariat in New York without cost to the International Sec-
retariat for traveling expenses or salary.
At very large expense the China IPR sent a truly representative group of
Chinese to the Hot Springs Conference (January 6-17, 1945). They include the
following :
CHINA'S DELEGATES TO HOT SPRINGS CONFERENCE OF THE IPR, JANUARY 1945
Chiang, Mon-Lin — Formerly Minister of Education ; Chancellor, National Peking
University. New, Member Executive Council, National Southwest Associated
University ; President, Chinese Red Cross, and Chairman, China Institute of
Pacific Relations. Chairman.
Chang, Carson — Member, Peoples' Political Council.
Chang, Chung-Fu (1936) — Director, Department of American Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
Chen, S. C. — Professor of Sociology, National Southwest Associated University,
Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.
Chien, Tuan-Sheng (1939) — Professor of Political Science, National Southwest
Associated University ; Member, Peoples' Political Council.
Chow, S. R. (1939-1942)— Professor of International Law, National Wu-Han
University ; Member, Peoples' Political Council.
Hsia, Ching-Lin (1929, 1931, 1942) — Member, Legislative Yuan; Director,
Chinese News Service, New York. Address: Chinese News Service, 30 Rocke-
feller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.
Hu, Shih (1931, 1933, 1936)— Formerly : Ambassador to the United States;
Dean, College of Literature, National Peking University ; Member, Peoples'
Political Council; and Chairman, China Institute of Pacific Relations. Now,
Visiting Professor, Harvard University.
Lee. Kan (1936, 1942) — Commercial Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Washington,
D. C.
Li, Choh-Ming — Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.
Liu, Yu-Wan (1933, 1936, 1939)— Executive Secretary, China Institute of Paci-
fic Relations.
Lowe, C. H. (1931, 1936)— Director, India Office, Ministry of Information.
Ning, Eng-Chexg (1929: 19.31)— Chief Auditor, The Farmers Bank of China;
Member, Peoples' Political Council.
Poe, Dimon Hsueh-Feng — Professor of Political Science, National Central Uni-
versity ; Counsellor, National Supreme Defense Council.
Shao, Yu-Ling — Secretary, National Military Council.
Wu, Wen-Tsao — Professor of Sociology, Yenching University ; Counsellor, Su-
preme National Defense Council.
Yang Yunchu — Director, Department of Eastern Asia Affairs, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs.
Yeh, George — Representative, Ministry of Information, London.
Yuan, T. L. — Librarian, National Library of Peking.
Chinese Secretariat
Cheng. Pao-Nan — Director, Mid-West Rureau, Chinese News Service, Chicago.
Mrs. Enid Chen (1942) — Chinese News Service, New York.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1625
Helen Nelson Kxglund — Director, International Relations Speakers Bureau,
Chicago, 111.
T. C. Hsu — Chinese News Service, New York.
Eleanor Stbynski — Chinese News Service, Chicago, 111.
Many of the foregoing flew from Chungking to the United States specially for
the Hot Springs Conference.
When in 1943 the Secretary-General and the International Research Secretary
visited China on behalf of the Pacific Council, they went at the invitation of the
China IPR and were given every facility for consultation with Chinese scholars,
publicists and high officials of the Chinese Government. They both have been
invited to visit China again as soon as possible.
B. ANALYSIS OF MR. KOHLBERG'S DOCUMENT
Section I. p. 49 (1987-August 23, 19S9)
On page 4 of his document, Mr. Kohlberg states that the IPR was not critical
of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang from the time of the agreement, early
in 1937, between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and August 1939, when
Germany and the Soviet Union made their nonaggression pact.
By this statement, Mr. Kohlberg implies that the IPR is following the
"•Communist line." However, a careful study of the issues of the Far Eastern
surrey of that period of 2% years reveals that in no instance did the Survey
make comparisons, invidious or otherwise, between the Chinese Communists
and the Kuomintang and did not praise the Chinese Communists. References
to Chinese Communists had no political coloring.
In that period there were three articles relating to Chinese guerrillas. One
was a half;page in length, one less than a page, and one five pages. In none
of the three articles does the word "communist" appear. The guerrillas are
treated as Chinese, not as partisans within China of an alien ideology. The
three articles are factual descriptions of what Chinese termed "guerrillas,"
were doing to aid in the war against Japan. The three articles are " 'Guerrilla
Industries' May Displace 'Scorched Earth' Policy." page 179, Far Eastern Sur-
vey, 1938; "Chinese Guerrillas Spike Japanese Raio Cotton Hopes," page 201
of the same year ; and "The War Economy of China's Guerrillas," page 265 of the
same year.
Mention in other articles of Chinese Communists include neither criticism or
praise of cither the Communists or the Kuomintang. For example, an article
entitled "Revitalizing British Interests in China," states, on page 139 of the
1937 volume : "There is little doubt that the degree of political unification which
has been achieved by the Nanking Government, together with the stabilizing
effects of the financial reforms, would under any circumstances have served to
attract new British capital to China"; in an article entitled "China's Domestic
Transport System," page 255 of the 1937 volume: "* * * the excellent high-
ways of Kiangsi, for example, grew out of the needs of the recent anti-Commu-
nist campaign" ; in an article entitled "The War and Western Interests in North
China," page 231 of the 1938 volume: "Moreover, the widespread continuance
of guerrilla warfare has prevented the consolidation of the Japanese position
and the restoration of peace and order."
Had the Far Eastern Survey been following a "Communist line," it would have
taken opportunity to praise the Chinese communists at the expense of the Kuo-
mintang. This it did not do in the period under review, a period stated by
Mr. Kohlberg to be a time when the IPR was following the "Communist line."
Mr. Kohlberg quotes the Survey twice, presumably to support his contention.
The first is from an article by Frederick V. Field on page 57 of the 1937 volume
entitled "The Chinese Communists Re-merge." The sentence to which Mr. Kohl-
berg takes exception is apparently the following : "If this information is cor-
rect [that an agreement has been reached between the National Government
and the Communists] it means that for the first time since 1927 the Commu-
nists have been officially recognized, the government has agreed to give up its
anti-Communist campaigns, and — most important — an actual beginning to an
anti-Japanese military and political front has been established." To anyone
who was following Chinese affairs at that time, regardless of his political views,
this seems to be a mere statement of fact.
The other statement from the Far Eastern Survey quoted by Mr. Kohlberg in
this section of his document (page 7) seems to have no connection with his gen-
eral argument, and cannot therefore be dealt with. A study of the four issues
1626 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of Pacific Affairs quarterly of the year 1937 quoted in the Kohlberg document,
also fails to indicate that there was any following of the "Communist party
line."
Mr. Kohlberg quotes only from one article during the year 1937, namely, the
article entitled -'Soviet Society in Northwest China" by Edgar Snow. From
that article he quotes the sentence: "In Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet
Republic (by Martin Lawrence, London, 1934) the First All-China Soviet Con-
gress in 1931 set forth in detail the 'maximum program' of the Communist Party
of China — and reference to its shows clearly the ultimate aim of Chinese Com-
munists is a true and complete socialist state of the Marxist-Leninist concep-
tion." Mr. Snow's next sentence (not quoted by Mr. Kohlberg) reads, "Mean-
while, however, it has to be remembered that the social, political, and economic
organization of the Red districts has all along been only a very provisional
affair." This second sentence gives the point of the article, which as the title
indicates, is a description of the Chinese Communist area based on Snow's first-
hand knowledge of it. Mr. Snow writes for the Saturday Evening Post on the
subject of Chinese Communists, as well as other subjects. He has also written
several best sellers, published by reputable firms. But it is doubtful if this fact
makes these publishers open to the charge of following the "Communist line."
Note is taken below of all other articles and book reviews which touch on the
question of either the National Government of China or the Chinese Communists
during this period.
In the March 1937 issue there is an article entitled "The Dragnet of Local
Government in China" by Norman D. Hanwell, which, in pointing out the defects
of local government, is indirectly critical of the National Government.
In the issue of June 1937 there is no criticism, either favorable or adverse, of
either the National Government or the Chinese Communists. The matter is
ignored.
In the September 1937 issue, which contains the article by Edgar Snow referred
to by Mr. Kohlberg, the only other article referring to either the National Gov-
ernment or the Chinese Communists is an article entitled "Japan and China:
A War of Minds" by Robert S. Morton, in which the writer expresses his own
views as follows: "To many Chinese the Kuomintang now seems tame, even
reactionary ; and highly subservient to Japan in yielding territory and influence
repeatedly, without daring to risk its own position by real struggle for defense"
(page 312). "By most Chinese * * * Communism is opposed, whether do-
mestic or Russian" (page 312).
"Moreover, the predominant Chinese view is that internal Communism has
steadily lost ground for five years, despite the spectacular flight of guerrilla
bands through sparsely settled areas. A subcurrent of Chinese opinion is in-
clined to listen to Communists, not so much because of their social program or
their actual record in China, as because they denounce and oppose Japanese
imperialism more openly than does the cautions Chinese Government" (page 313).
The article praises neither the National Government nor the Chinese Communists.
In the same issue, in an article entitled "The New Era in Chinese Railway Con-
struction" by "Asiaticus," is a statement that "The only danger points which
signify yielding to foreign pressure by Nanking are to be seen in leaving North
China, menaced by the Japanese, to its fate, and a tendency to compromise
with the Japanese plans for usurping control of all railway interests in this
/one." Except for this statement the article is descriptive of accomplishments
in railway construction and does not praise or criticize the National Government.
The only hook review in this issue which falls within the current study is a
review of China Calling by the Reverend Frank Houghton, a British missionary.
The book is reviewed by, Eugene E. Barnett, and he quotes a sentence from the
hook "Probably no Chinese government has ever included so large a proportion of
energetic and public-spirited officials as those now at work in Nanking." Quoting
this statement was no "Communist line." Anyone who had association with the
government at Nanking at thai time would subscribe to the statement.
There is no article in the December 1937 issue which refers to the National
Government or to the Chinese Communists. The opening article, however, is
by Frederick V. Field. The title of the article is "American Far Eastern Policy,
1981-1937." Mr. Field, however, fails to mention either the National Govern-
ment of China or the Chinese Communists, although the subject of the article
gave him room to do so if he wished.
With regard to book reviews, Dr. Shuhsi Hsu is given an opportunity to
make objections, in more than two pages, to a review in the same issue of Dr.
Hsu's hook The North China Problem. In the review of that book the reviewer,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1627
Owen Lattimore, states thai l>r. Hsu describes the position of the Chinese Com-
munists as "virtually laying down their anus" and then Mr. Lattimore states,
•1 was in the Hod territory about two weeks before I read Professor Hsu's
book, and I saw no signs of any such docility. The Chinese Communists still
appear to think that they have improved their local footing in the Northwest
and at the same time won a stronger position in national politics by their
negotiations in Nanking since the release of Chiang Kai-shek from Sian, and
that as a result they will lie able to press their old demands for a general
national resistance against Japanese aggression."
Mr. Lattimore's review is an honest and unheated criticism of a book which
was obviously incomplete in its content, not only with regard to the Chinese
Communists but with regard to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, a subject on
which Mr. Lattimore is an outstanding authority.
The Lattimore review is followed by a review by a Chinese (Chen Han-seng)
of a book by Harry Gannes entitled "When China Unites: An Interpretive History
of the Chinese Revolution." Mr. Chen does not seem to approve of Gannes' treat-
ment of the Chinese Communists. The criticism of this aspect of the book, how-
ever, is less than one-half of a page out of a review of more than two and a half
pages.
Taking up the four issues of Paeific Affairs for the year 1938 :
The only item in the isstie for March 1938 which Mr. Kohlberg quotes is a
review of Edgar Snow's book Red star Over China, the reviewer being Mr. Ed-
ward C. Carter. The review on the whole commends the book, in common with
practically all reviewers of the book at the time of publication. Mr. Carter's
review, however, is not entirely favorable, pointing out "the author's tendency
to ignore the rem substantial achievements of the Nanking Government" (page
110).
Mr. Kohlberg fails to point out that ten pages in front of that review, four pages
are devoted to an attack on the Chinese Communists by W. W. Wheeler 2d, in
which Mr. Wheeler refers to the Chinese Communist forces as follows : * * *
"such unattached free-booting armies are an old and even stereotyped evil" and
"the present Communist army is notable chiefly for the length of its retreat, its
proclivity for plunder and its avoidance of pitched battle." In final paragraph
of this almost four pages statement is contained the sentence. "The bulk of the
Communist Army is recruited from vagabonds" (pages 101-104).
This issue contains two articles on the military situation in China. The
first, entitled "China's advance from Defeat to Strength" by "Asiaticus," praises
both Chiang Kai-shek and his armies and the Communist armies. The second
article, "The Strategy of the Sino-Japanese Conflict" by Herbert Rosinsky,
praises the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and refers favorably to ''guerrilla tactics"
and to the vindication of the Red Army's reputation by its "outstanding bravery
in the fighting in Shansi." In this connection it should be remembered that there
was every reason to praise both Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists at that
time. It seemed that unity had been achieved between them and during that
period Chiang Kai-shek's troops were doing magnificent fighting at Shanghai
and Taierehuang, fighting such as has not been attained by the National Gov-
ernment forces since then.
There is also an article in this issue "The Revolution in Chinese Legal
Thought" by N. H. van der Valk, which inter alia adversely criticizes the new
Criminal Code of 1935 of the Chinese government.
In Pacific Affairs of June 1938 no article deals either with the National Gov-
ernment or with the Chinese Communists.
Mr. Kohlberg quotes some statements made by Edgar Snow in this issue.
These statements occur in five pages given to Edgar Snow in which to reply to
more than six pages of criticism of Snow's "Red Star Over China" by "Asiaticus."
It is an indication of a dispassionate publication to permit two writers to air
their opinions pro and con on a controversial subject.
There are no book reviews in the June 1938 issue relating to either the National
Government or the Chinese Communists.
Regarding the issue of Pacific Affairs of September 193S, it is impossible to
perceive why Mr. Kohlberg quotes what he does from the article by Haldore
Hanson entitled "The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas" (page 285). This
article is a factual account of Mr. Hanson's visit to those places in North China
(not Communist Northwest China) where "self-defense governments" had
•sprung up everywhere in the wake of the Japanese Army," these groups being
led "jointly by Communist agents and patriotic University students." The
68970 — 50— pt. 2 10
1628 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
activities of these "self-defense governments" were watched during that period
with the greatest sympathy and enthusiasm by all Westerners in the cities of
North China, regardless of the political views of those people, because of their
effective hampering of the Japanese. This article is a factual recital of eye
witness experiences of a man of excellent reputation who has been serving for
the past two years or more in the Cultural Division of the Department of State.
Mr. Kohlberg quotes from an item in this issue entitled ''Why the Chinese
Communists Support a United Front." This is in its entirety an interview which
Nym Wales had with a Chinese Communist. It is in quotation marks to show
that everything said in this article was said by the Chinese Communist. It is an
interview and it is clearly published as such (page 311).
No other article of this issue deals with either the National Government or the
Chinese Communists.
Mr. Kohlberg quotes from two pages of comment made by Owen Lattimore
(pages 370-72) in regard to a criticism by William Henry Chamberlin (of four
pages in the June issue of Pacific Affairs entitled "The Moscow Trials" which
appeared under "Comment and Correspondence" ; a brief article which did not
refer to the Chinese Communists but only to the Moscow trials. Mr. Kohlberg
fails to point out that immediately preceding Mr. Lattimore's comment are four
pages of comment by Mr. "William Henry Chamberlin adversely criticizing the
Moscow trials. Again, this is the procedure of a dispassionate publication — to
print the opposing views in close juxtaposition so that both sides may have an
equal opportunity to reach the readers of the publication.
Mr. Kohlberg does not quote from Pacific Affairs of December 1938. This issue
does not have any material which might be regarded as following the "Commu-
nist line." However, in fairness to the Institute, Mr. Kohlberg might have re-
ferred to a four page editorial (pages 495-8) in which reference is made to the
practice of Pacific Affairs in presenting both points of view in regard to a con-
troversial subject. In the final paragraph of that editorial it is stated : "Wbile
'avoiding the practice of presenting every controversy through two 'selected'
spokesmen, we have also done our best to increase the representation, in Pacific
Affairs, of national points of view — a policy which is not inconsistent with our
major policy of trying, first and foremost, to establish the real course of events
and the real trend of development."
In Pacific Affairs for March 1939 there is one article dealing with the resistance
to the Japanese, "The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army," by Olga Lang (page
20). This is primarily a case study of Chinese who are fighting the Japanese.
Mr. Kohlberg quotes the final three sentences : "All of this does not mean that
the Chinese Army is already pei'fect. Far from it. Much remains to be done:
But what is important is that the way to victory is found." Mr. Kohlberg evi-
dently intends to suggest that a statement so favorable as this about the
Chinese forces early in 1939, is incompatible with recent statements regarding
the present malnutrition of the National forces of China, and the present neglect
of troops by some Chinese generals. The two statements are not incompatible.
A deterioration has taken place in the past two or three years in the treatment
of the Chinese forces by their leaders, just as there has taken place deterioration
in its resistance to Japan.
There is nothing else in this issue either praising or criticizing the National
Government of China or the Chinese Communists, not even among the book
reviews.
In the June 1939 issue of Pacific Affairs there are two articles dealing with
China's resistance: one, "The "Nature of Guerrilla Warfare" by Major R. Ernest
Dupuy (pages 13S-48), and the other, "The Failure of Civil Control in Occupied
China" by B. Ward Perkins (pages 149-56) . The first article is a study of aspects
of guerrilla warfare in history, and other countries, and its purpose is to discover
what one may hope for from guerrilla warfare in China. It is unemotional in
character. The second article is critical of the Japanese and speaks favorably of
the guerrillas.
The third article in this issue is "The War in China and the Soviet Press" by
Martin R. Norins (pages 157-68), from which Mr. Kohlberg quotes extensively
in his document. This article is composed of reports from Communist sources
and these reports are always identified as such. Taken in conjunction with the
preceding tiro articles it forms one of three serious studies, and to drop any one
of thon would result in giving a less complete picture of the situation that is
obtained from the three together.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1629
In "Comment and Correspondence" there are two Letters with regard to guer-
rilla warfare, one bv Captain Evans F. Carlson of the United States Marine
Corps (pages L83 84), and one by Haldore Hanson (pages 184-85), both of them
men who have had first-hand experience in guerrilla areas. The purpose of each
letter is to comment on Dupuy's article, "The Nature of Chuerrila Warfare," and
they deal with Dupuy's statements from a legal and technical viewpoint rather
than from a partisan viewpoint.
Quotations Critical of China in I. P. R. Publications, 1987-Auff. 23, 1939
The following excerpts demonstrate that in the period under review the I. P. R.
(American and Pacific Councils) published materials critical of both Kuomin-
tang and Chinese Government policies (as well as other materials commending
them).
As many of these quotations are from the Far Eastern Survey, it should be
noted that before 1941, the Survey was devoted to economic topics and avoided
discussion of political or controversial issues. Nevertheless the tenor of many
articles was clearly critical of Chinese Government policy.
Mr. Kohlberg's Period of Praise of China
"Merchant Capital and Usury Capital in Rural China," by Leonard T. K. Wu,
Far Eastern Survey, March 25, 1936
"Rural credit is the crux of the great financial problem facing China today"
(p. 63).
"Certain conclusions seem to the present writer, to be the only logical impli-
cations.
"(1) The operation of the present system of usury-merchant-landlordism must
lead to the disintegration of rural China. With interest rates as high as 100
percent or more * * * it is inevitable that the middle class peasants will be
reduced to small peasants, small peasants to poor peasants, and poor peasants
to hired or unemployed persons.
" (2) Under the present system, the bulk of the peasants are hardly able to keep
body and soul together. It is therefore absolutely impossible to expect them to
make any technical or other scientific advance in methods of production * * *
"(3) The pauperization of the peasantry and decline in agricultural produc-
tivity means a shrinkage in national purchasing power * * * Usury-mer-
chant-landlordism in China is destroying, instead of creating, markets * * *
(p. 68).
"Rural Bankruptcy in China," by Leonard T. K. Wu, Far Eastern Survey,
October 8, 1936.
"If any one problem can be said to overshadow all other internal economic
questions facing harassed China today, it is the rural crisis." (p. 209)
"The present state of rural China may be summarized in one word — bank-
ruptcy" (p. 209).
"The poverty and desperation of the peasants is indicated in the growing
restiveness which often spontaneously breaks out into open opposition. In
famine regions the eating of bark of trees and grass roots, and the sale of
children is commonplace" (p. 211).
"The central and fundamental cause of the rural crisis is what Chan Han-song
has aptly termed the contradiction between land owning and land using'. * * *
The dire need of no less than 65 percent of China's rural population is for
land" (p. 212).
"The Rajchman Report [report by Dr. Ludwik Rajchman to the League of
Nations] states : 'The number of tenants is on the increase, since owner-farmers
are being forced, because of the depression and the decline of agriculture, to
sell their land or to mortgage it on such terms as to leave them little better
than tenants.'" (p. 212).
(Note that the report of the eminent scholar, Dr. Rajchman, to the League of
Nations parallels Dr. Wu's findings as reported in the Far Eastern Survey.)
"Exorbitant rents, arising from this system of land tenancy, further provokes
the seriousness of the rural problem" (p. 214).
"The second structural cause of the rural crisis is the assessment of all kinds
■of exorbitant taxes and tolls. While the very lifeblood of the tenants and
partial tenants is poured into high land rents, that of the peasant proprietors and
small landlords is poured into stiff taxes and tolls" (p. 214).
1630 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Chinese Reconstruction in Practice-' by Frederick T. Field, Far Eastern Survey
December 19, 19S6
In this article Mr. Field surveys the efforts of the National Government toward
national reconstruction and finds them very inadequate.
"The aspects of reconstruction on which we have already touched— landlordism
and tenancy, taxation and cooperation— are those in which the social problem is
conspicuous. A survey of the application of the reconstruction program in these
fields throws grave doubt on whether fundamental reform can be achieved under
the present auspices. The compromise necessarily made in the interests of
political expediency and economic support seem practically to frustrate the basic
readjustments called for in blueprints * * *" (p. 268).
"In relation to the immense problem [of water control] the energy and
resources the government has devoted to it are pitifully insignificant" (p. 270).
"The key to understanding the whole current reconstruction movement is found
in the purposes and methods of the communications program * *. Con-
siderable emphasis has * * * been put * * * on highway construction.
Yet * * * the highwavs * * * have been developed less to supplement
the economy of the Chinese farmers * * * than to force the provinces into a
central federation bv military coercion. Unification of a sort has been achieved,
but it has been achieved in such a way as to * * * establish a military
dictatorship over an already oppressed people. * * * It is this factor which
throws doubt on the validity of the entire reconstruction effort. The evidence
would seem to indicate that below the surface of construction activities of the
sort represented by highways there remain all the fundamental maladjustments
of a feudal, agrarian society (pp. 270-71).
"The Financial Stability of the Nanking Government" by Kate Mitchell, Far
Eastern Survey, July 1, 1936
"Internally the Nanking Government faces problems fundamentally more
serious than those presented by foreign political and financial pressure. Its
political authority is far from complete, and there is increasingly widespread
discontent, aggravated by economic distress, at the Government's failure to take
action against the inroads of Japan. The majority of Chinese farmers are
increasingly impoverished. The extortionate demands of tax collector, usurer,
merchant, landlord and military leaders ; the ruining of the land by flood and
drought ; the decline in agricultural prices ; and the lack of rural credit facilities
have resulted in widespread bankruptcy" (p. 139).
«* * * 'rural reconstruction' remains largely a much used phrase rather
than an actuality. The problems of land ownership, land taxation and rural
credit remain untouched. The trend toward economic deterioration, though
slightly checked, has not yet been reversed * * *" (p. 139).
"On the credit side of the balance sheet a comparison of the financial organiza-
tion today with that in 1928 reveals a marked degree of progress * * *.
"On the debit side of the ledger, however, we find equally convincing evi-
dence. * * * Throughout its nine years of existence the Nanking Government
has never been able to escape from the perilous financial position of a govern-
ment fighting for its political life. Among the outstanding features of govern-
ment finance throughout this period have been a heavily unbalanced budget,
a current deficit necessitating large-scale borrowing by costly methods, the
expenditure of a large percentage of government revenue for military purposes,
lack of effective budgetary control over government expenditure and inability
to fix and enforce the areas of taxation for the various grades of govern-
ment * * * (p. 144).
"The whole question of the Central Government's financial position thus pro-
vides an excellent illustration of the many external and internal forces which
are complicating, if not completely blocking the way to political stability and
economic reconstruction in China. Predictions as to the future course of events
are extremely hazardous. Internally, Nanking's political power is challenged
both by the Southern and the Communist factions. There is no clear indication
as to which of several possible lines of action Nanking is likely to choose. Exter-
nally, the policies of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States are all uncertain
quantities, dependent perhaps as much on the course of events in Europe as on
conditions in eastern Asia. Barring the possibility of some form of foreign
assistance, it would seem that Nanking's only chance of continuing to finance
its operations and carry on the administration of government depends upon
whether such revenues as remain to it are devoted solely to the objective of
improving the economic welfare of the people and thereby eliminating the prin-
cipal cause for internal revolt against its political control" (p. 146).
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1631
Review of Chiang Kai-shek, by Qustav Amann. Reviewed by Bruno Lasher,
Pacific Affairs, March 1937
"Mr. Amann is especially successful in describing the miracle of how even so
much as is now visible of the structure of Chinas national government could
arise in so short a time. To have 'enthroned' the middle classes by giving them
workable instruments of rule, appears to Mr. Amann the outstanding achieve-
ment of Chiang Kai-shek. One of China's greatest strategists, the generalis-
simo is pictured nevertheless as the relentless enemy of 'neo-militarism.' This
is done by a literary form of flood-lighting which keeps in the shadow the
essential nature of the scene: the concentration of power in a small group
above the party, the suppression of public discussion, censorship in an extreme
form, devitalization of the labor movement — in short the adoption of many of
the methods if not the whole ideology of fascism" (p. SS).
The conclusion one reaches after a study of all of the material in both the
Survey and Pacific Affairs for the years 1937, 1938, and the first half of 1939—
during which period Mr. Kohlberg claims that the I. P. R. followed the "Com-
munist line" — is that views on both sides are presented; that there was both
criticism and praise of the National Government.
Section II The Period from August 23, 1939, to June 22, 19 '41
During this period, according to Mr. Kohlberg, the Institute of Pacific Relations
in general, and the American Council in particular, followed what lie called the
"< ommunist line," i. e., abusing (but not praising) the Chinese Government.
• In order to prove this, he quoted some lines from twro articles and book reviews
in Pacific Affairs and six short articles in the Far Eastern Survey. During
these twenty-two months the Pacific Affairs published approximately sixty-
five articles and one hundred reviews. Thus, Mr. Kohlberg could find fault with
less than three percent of the articles and tiro percent of the reviews in Public
Affairs. During the same period there were 47 issues of the Far Eastern Survey
in which there were published more than 2S0 articles. Thus, again, the articles
quoted by Mr. Kohlberg constitute only about two percent of the total number
of articles. Beside this, during the period under consideration, the Pacific Council
and American Council published many books which were ignored in Mr. Kohlberg's
accusations. Of the articles published in Pacific Affairs during this period, there
were twenty-five dealing more or less directly with China: Mr. Kohlberg used
only tiro of tin in. In the Far Eastern Surrey about ticenty-five of all articles
had direct relation to China, but Mr. Kohlberg used only six of them.
Furthermore, during the period under consideration until dune 24, 1941, the
editor of Pacific Affairs was Owen Lattimore, who left that post to become
confidential ad riser to- Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. If Pacific Affairs was
abusing the Chinese Government to the extent charged by Mr. Kohlberg. during
the period under consideration, it is strange that Mr. Lattimore on June 24, 1941.
lias recommended to such a position by the President of the United Stales and
stranger still that the Generalissimo accepted tin' recommendation. Yet accord-
ing to T. T". Soong, this appointment of Mr. Lattimore was regarded in Chungking
as "a major token of increasing understanding between China and the United
State*."
The aim of Pacific Affairs is to give information on the developments in the
Pacific area as broadly and as completely as possible. During this period in
question, the magazine published articles on China or on the Far East in relation
to China by the following authors :
E. Schumpeter, of the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research.
L. Rosixger. who is now an expert on the Far East of the Foreign Policy
Association.
E. Carlsox, famous colonel of the U. S. Marines, hero of Makin, Saipan, and
other battles.
N. Wai.es. a well-known writer on problems of China.
K. Blocii. writer on the staff of Fortune magazine.
T. A. Bissox. now with the I. P. R., formerly with the Foreign Policy Association
and with the Board of Economic Warfare.
E. K. Lieu. Chinese economist in service of the National Economic Research,
Chungking.
Franz Michael, Professor, University of Washington.
Pttilip C. Jesstp, Professor, Columbia University.
Wei Mexg-Pu. formerly Professor, the Northwestern University of Mukden.
W. Braxdt. an Australian economist.
1632 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Galen Fisher, former Y. M. C. A. Secretary in Japan.
Owen Lattimore, formerly Personal Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and later con-
nected with the Office of War Information, now Director, Walter Hines Page
School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
M. Nobins, in service with the Lihrary of Congress. Washington.
Anna Louise Strong, a well-known leftist writer, who has visited China
frequently.
It is clear, from this list, that it would have been difficult for Pacific Affairs
to have confined itself, even if it had been inclined to do so, to a Communist
line.
Let us now examine the record of the Far Eastern Survey. According to Mr.
Kohlberg, after August 23, 1939, this publication pursued a policy of abuse of the
Chinese Government. Yet the first signs of such "abuse1' listed by Mr. Kohlberg
are in articles published January 29, 1941, or seventeen months later. The quota-
tions used by Mr. Kohlberg for this period are confined to three months between
January 29 and May J, 19)1.
A careful reading of these (flotations does not reveal abuse of the Chinese
Government. It does, however, show concern over the possibility of a break in
the United Front in China, a concern shared, for example by the Neic York
Times. The following items from that newspaper, which certainly cannot be
suspected of folloAving the Communist line, reveal considerable interest in the
Kuomintang-Communist conflict, certainly no less than that appearing in the
Far Eastern Survey :
New York Times:
Jan. 8: Maj. E. F. Carlson reports military forces of China formidable and
national spirit high, but cites widespread economic corruption involving
trade in Japanese goods: reports Kuomintang-Communist crisis past and
United States popularity high, sees continued U. S. S. R. aid.
Jan. 10: Foreign aid and supply routes control give Chiang Kai-shek power
to deny 8th Route (Chinese Communists). Army request for mass transfer
from northern to southern China for national conference.
Jan. 12: Chinese army organ reports pact involving exchange of Chinese
minerals for U. S. S. R. military supplies.
Jan. 18: Chiang Kai-shek forces disband Communist-controlled new 4th
Route Army, hold its Commander General Yob Ting, and search for
General Kang Yang, following army refusal to move to north of Yangtze
River; Japanese Army spokesman reports Chinese troops moving against
4th Route Army.
Jan. 19: Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist representative in Chungking, states
further Chinese Government-Communist friction will be avoided and ex-
presses regret over 4th Route revolt: North Chinese Communist leaders
demand Chiang Kai-shek end attacks on Communist forces and lift block-
ade of the north Communist areas.
Jan. 21: 8th Route Army renews demands for transfer to Yangtze Valley
and release of Chungking and Communist leaders for supervision: Shang-
hai foreign circles fear free China rift will lessen foreign support.
Jan. 28 : Tass Agency reports Chinese Government dissolution of 4th Route
Army directed at Communist elements and might cause civil war.
Jan. 29: Chiang Kai-shek stares action toward 4th Route Army is based
on military discipline and reaffirms national unity.
Feb. 4: ChungkingiGovernment reduces 8th Route Army branch office, Kwei-
lin, Kwangsi.
Feb. 6: Kuomintang-Communist rift cited in editorial.
Feb. 21: Report continued Kuomintang-Communist armies strife in Anhwei
Province; Chungking denies rift.
Feb. 23: Hunan Province People's Political Council appeals to Communist
military and political leaders for full central government support.
Feb. 27: Domei reports Kuomintang-Communist clashes spread, Shansi Prov-
ince Nanking regime gain by Chinese dissensions.
Mar. 3: 6 Communist delegates refuse to attend opening session (of People's
Political Council).
Mar. 7: Chiang reported backing Council plan to arbitrate Government-
Communisl dispute. Chiang is confident of * * * continued British,
U. S. and U. S. S. R. aid.
Mar. 8: Chiang states Communists violated 1937 support pledges to Council.
Report military operations aided by continued Kuomintang-Communist
4th Army clash.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1633
Mar. 9: Chungking urges apportionment of future defense bank issues among
wealthy.
Mar. 10: Communist demands on Council published. Chiang says demands
cannot be met without destroying national unity and recalls 1937 pledges.
Council urges Chinese Government to improve Burma Road Administra-
t ion.
Mar. 12: Dr. Baker appointed Kunming-Burma Transportation Bureau Di-
rector to keep Burma Road open.
Mar. 1G: Kuomintang-Communist struggle background and U. S. S. R. role in
Sino- Japanese War discussed.
Mar. 17: Shanghai groups hold German agents responsible for Kuomintang-
Communist clashes. Sino-Japanese peace believed object of German in-
tervention.
Mar. 22 : Premier H. H. Kung denies report of Chinese military council
anti-Communist army organization and predicts early solution to Gov-
ernment-Communist conflict.
Mar. 23: Abstract of Chiang's speech to Council stating Communist de-
mands and Government stand.
Mar. 24: Takungpao reports wide government reorganization planned.
Mar. 30: Communist activity against Chungking and Nanking (pro-Japa-
nese) regimes reported.
Apr. 4 : Chungking Government issues manifesto stressing national unity
and trend to democracy.
May 1 : Chungking says USSR war materials transshipment ban does not
apply (to Chinese) since all supplies from USSR are Soviet-made.
It is worthy of note that the New York Times of May 2, 1941, includes the
following paragraph, which would seem to indicate that the Chinese did not
recognize the extensive "abuse" of their country by the IPR, which, according
to Mr. Kohlberg, existed during this period :
"Kuo Tai-ehi. foreign minister of China, honored by American Council, Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations ( and other organizations) in New York City."
Perhaps our Chinese friends were more aware than was Mr. Kohlberg of such
article as the following in publications of the Institute, which asked for more
help for China. As early as in December 1939, for example, Mr. Bisson wrote
in Pacific Affairs in an article entitled "Japan Without Germany" :
"The Chinese people are fighting for their own independence, but also for the
best interests of all the democratic, nonaggression nations. China does not
ask for military assistance. It merely asks that these nations, among which
the United States now holds a position of decisive power, cease being the ai'mory
of its assailant. The time for an answer is long overdue."
Kurt Bloch wrote in the Far Eastern Survey, April 7, 1941 :
"Since this information was received, no incidents of civil conflict have been
reported here except from Japanese sources. During this time, it is safe to
say that the weight of the American Government and of American public opinion
has been thrown on the side of China's continued united resistance."
Examination of Mr. Kohlberg's charges shows plainly that Section II of his
document has misrepresented the publications of the Institute and, that con-
sciously or unconsciously, he has selected only those quotations which suited
his preconceptions.
Section III — Mr. Kohlberg's "Third Communist-Kuoniintang Honeymoon"
This period, as defined in the Kohlberg document, began with Hitler's invasion
of Russia in June 1941, and ended with the Red Army's triumph at Stalingrad
on February 4, 1943. Mr. Kohlberg sees it as a period of "praise of China."
According to his letter to the Trustees of the American Council on December
28, however, articles published by the IPR continued to "praise China" for
several months after this — until the summer of 1943, to be exact — a discrepancy
which would appear to indicate that Mr. Kohlberg himself finds it difficult to
prove his own formula.
Mr. Kohlberg's "Third Commt-nist-Kttomintang Honeymoon"
Furthermore, the articles he lists in this section of his document fail to bear
out his contention that this period was one confined to "praise of the Kuomintang
and the central government of China. As is the case with respect to other
articles cited in his document, the material here, if read in toto, includes both
criticism and praise of the Chinese Government, the Kuomintang and the Com-
munists as well.
1634 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Kohlberg's document. quote. 1 excerpts of eight articles and one pamphlet.
Of these nine writings, two had nothing to do with China. In fact, one — a
letter of an anonymous journalist entitled "Why Were We Wrong" did not
contain even the word '•China." Except for Robert Barnett's "Isolated China,"
all the remaining six contained certain remarks critical of the Kuomintang
government. One, however (by Harriet Moore), may be regarded as defending
the Chinese Government; the other (by Lieutenant Uhlman) praises the Com-
munists, and reflected unfavorably on the Kuomintang Government's Chief of
staff.
The following are some of the findings which contradict Mr. Kohlberg's con-
tention that IPR publications confined themselves to praise of "China," during
this period.
Serious indictments of the Kuomintang as well as laudatory statements about
the Chinese people and Chiang Kai-shek were contained in both George Taylor's
article Chinese Resistance in North China and his pamphlet Changing China,
cited by Mr. Kohlberg. These also contain statements praising the Chinese Com-
munists. In his Oct. 10, 1941 article. Exposing Kuomintang Blockade of the
Guerrillas, the following may be noted :
"But now it is very difficult to move from one area to the other (i. e. from
the Kuomintang area to guerrilla territories) and much needed medical sup-
plies consigned to North China have not been allowed to pass through the Central
Government blockade. The success of the Japanese drive through lower Shansi
to the Yellow River can be explained partly in terms of failure to achieve
cooperation between the Central Government and the guerrilla forces north of
the River" (p. 232).
"There is a constant ebb and flow of political pressure from Chunking which
wishes to maintain resistance against the Japanese even up to the gates of
Peiping, but always hopes that the people of North China will not be won over
entirely to the cause of the Border Government" (p. 233) .
Praise of the Communists or guerrillas
'The Border Government, although it has suffered constantly from invasion of
its territories, today has as great a measure of political control as at any time
in its history. A government which can survive the occupation of nearly every
county seat in its area is one which has a firm hold on the imagination of the
people * * *. Although the charge has been made that too much time has
been spent in political propaganda, it must be admitted that the task of organiz-
ing the peasantry of North China iuto units which could be effectively employed
for military and other purposes was enormous" (pp. 236-7).
Again in Taylor's Changing China, 1942 :
Government dominated by landlords
"Today their (landlord-gentry's) sons are pilots in the air force, officers in the
armies, officials in the government. But because this class prides itself on not
doing what the peasantry had to do, work with his hands, the tradition has
carried over to the present, and most educated Chinese look down on manual
labor as something beneath their dignity" (p. 46).
New classes and gentry
"The new classes in China * * * are the industrialists, bankers, and mer-
chants * * *. They provide many of the new officials ; they have power in
the Central Government * * * As so many of them came from the gentry,
they are still strongly connected with the land * * *" (p. 47).
The peasantry and landlord and government
"On the back of the peasant is built the whole fabric of Chinese civilization.
He does the work, pays the taxes from which he gets no benefits, turns back
to the landlord fifty to sixty percent of his harvest as rent, and is robbed and
taken advantage of every way he turns" (p. 47).
Chiang Kai-shek and the landlords
"There was a deeper separation, however, in the Nationalist movement (1925-
27) than that caused by personal jealousy. This was the split between the
right and left wing of the Kuomintang * * *. The left wing * * *
wanted to base their power on the peasants and workers of China. The right
Wing included industrialists, bankers, and merchants who * * * were op-
posed to changing the system of land ownership. * * *
"The right wing, under Chiang Kai-shek, was alarmed, for many of the army
officers came from the families of local gentry. * * * The revolution (of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1635
1925-27) split * * * many thousands of Chinese Communists were killed,
and the righl wing of the Kuomintang * * * set up a government in Nan-
king without the Communists" (pp. 66-67).
Chiang's lack of interest in democracy
"He [Chiang] shared (heir [army Officers'] ideas * *. They did not have
the same interest as the intellectuals in democracy and they hated Communism.
They wanted to preserve the old order in the villages, for they came from the
landed gentry and they did not think that merchants and professors could build
a strong China. They bad a groat admiration for Italy and Germany * * *.
They wanted to build a new China by appealing to the old virtues and tradi-
tional institutions, not by building up a real democracy" (p. 68).
Kuomintang Government a one-man show ,
"The Nanking Government, or Kuomintang government, as it is often called, for
it was a one-party administration, soon emerged as a one-man show. That
man was Chiang Kai-shek" (p. 68).
Chiang and Communists on land reform
''There is much truth to the criticism that Chiang adopted no radical measures
to solve the land problem because be founded much of his power on the land-
lords and did not want to turn them against him" (p. 90).
''The Communists have not arrived at a solution of the land problem, either,
but they have made the lot of the peasant easier than it was before" (p. 91).
Guenther Stein's article, if read completely, is also found to contain comments
critical of the Kuomintang. In his account, Wartime Government in China, Mr.
Stein stated at the very start that "The war has made political reorganization
necessary for China." Yet he found "a comparatively small number of men,
mostly well-known and prominent in Chinese political affairs long before the
war, held the decisive positions. Little new blood has been added, and much
of the expansion of government activity has been carried out through a com-
bination of a number of functions and activities in the hands of already im-
portant political leaders."
Mr. Kohlberg's own marginal notes on the passages he lifted from the next
article listed — Y. Y. Hsu's China's First Two Years of a Tax in Kind — indicate
the critical nature of the article, despite the fact that this is supposed to be
a "Communist-Kuomintang honeymoon period."
And the Uhlman article, Land of the Five Withouts, likewise did not "praise"
the Kuomintang ; in fact, the Kuomintang Gen. Ho Ying-ching was referred to
therein as pro-Japanese.
Mr. Kohlberg also cited a statement by Under Secretary of State Welles on
American policy toward China. Although occasioned by an interview with an
American Communist leader, this constituted an important diplomatic declara-
tion. The Far Eastern Survey would certainly be unworthy of its name without
taking notice of such an announcement. To link it with a charge of Communist
leanings is tantamount to labeling as Communist, all neii'spapers headlining the
Russian Army's advance against Hitler.
There is no evidence here of any "period" in the sense indicated by Mr. Kohl-
berg. It may be noticed, however, that Pearl Harbor and developments after
America's entrance into the war influenced writers in this country. Immediately
after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, and the loss of Singa-
pore and the Dutch East Indies, Anglo-Americans were overwhelmed with a
sense of humiliation. They tended to become more critical of themselves and
tolerant of their allies. But with the turn of the war tide in the Pacific they
regained their confidence. With the return of Stilwell in May 1943, to confer
with the American Supreme Command on the strategy of the war on the Asiatic
mainland was the occasion for the American writers began to consider the poten-
tialities of China in the war.
Outspoken criticism of China began about this time. Mr. Hanson Baldwin
blazed the path by belittling China right and left. In contrast, however, critical
articles in the Far Eastern Survey, tried as a rule to evaluate not only the
weaknesses apparent in China's situation, but the positive sides as well.
Mr. Kohi.rerg's Second Period of Abuse of China
Section IV — The Period Since February 1948 (Abuse of China)
During the 1940-43 period in China, economic, political, and military deteriora-
tion had seriously reduced the fighting strength of the Chinese Government and
1636 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
its central armies. Recognition of this fact occurred first in Washington, but
by 1943, writers such as Pearl Buck, Hanson Baldwin, and T. A. Bisson were
informing the American public of the situation. In China itself, Kuomintang
leaders such as Sun Po were voicing criticisms of the politically and economi-
cally repressive policies of the Chinese central authorities. These persons were
calling attention to weaknesses in the government organization as the basic
problem, and not merely to lack of military supplies as the leading Chinese
authorities maintained. Yet all of the critics of Chungking's policies cited by
Kohlberg were at the same time demanding that more supplies be sent to China.
The warnings by American publicists were borne out by the military crisis
which developed in 1944. In half a dozen provinces, large Kuomintang armies
crumbled in the face of a well-planned Japanese offensive. This collapse seri-
ously affected the American position in China. General Stilwell was withdrawn,
and Ambassador Gauss resigned. A new set of American officials was sent to
China. Donald Nelson sought to ameliorate economic conditions, General Hurley
tried to overcome political disunity, while General Wedemeyer attempted to
strengthen the Chinese armies.
These developments have proved to be a central feature of the Pacific War
in 1944-45. For their potential effects on the remainder of the war, and even
more on the postwar future of the Far East, they might well be ranked as the
outstanding feature of this period. The question thus arises : Were those
writers and Far Eastern specialists who first called attention to this problem in
1913 at fault or were they in fact performing a necessary service, both to the
American public and to the United Nations as a whole? And following from
this — was it out of place that, among various American writers calling attention
to the problem, some of these should be staff members of the Institute of Pacific
Relations? Had this not been the case, the Institute staff might well be accused
of falling below the level of penetration displayed by outside writers in analysis
of Far Eastern conditions — the specific function of the Institute.
Pp. 2Jf-25 "China's Part in Coalition War." Far Eastern Survey, July 1J,, 1948,
pp. 135-141, T. A. Bisson
This is a critical article, as Kohlberg maintains. Yet the article states that
American aid to China has been "pitifully meager" and that China has had
"legitimate grievances." Kohlberg's document omits these qualifications.
Note that Kohlberg's "Timing" as to his parallel Communist sources (p. 25)
do not hold up, since they are all prior to the summer of 1943. The New Masses
articles, as cited, are dated October 7, 1937, February 8, 193S, and January 28,
1941, while the article cited from the Communist is dated March 1941. These
citations thus Mvc no validity so far as proving a pantile] in timing between
1PR articles and Communist-published articles. Moreover, the first two of the
critical articles from the Communist press fall icithin the period (prior to the
pact of August 23, 1939) when the Communist •'line" is stated by Kohlberg to be
one of praise for the Chinese government. In this ease, then, even the Communist-
published articles do not conform to the time divisions set up by KoJiUicvg.
Note also that Kohlberg labels the Bisson article "Blast #1." But the timing
falls down here, too. Pearl Unci's article in Life, critical of political repression
in China, appeared on May 10, 1943, two months before the Bisson article.
Kohlberg should therefore attribute "Blast #7" to Pearl Buck, not to an IPR
writer. In this article, "A Warning About China," Miss Buck, acknowledged by
even Mr. Kohlberg as a great friend of China, makes the following statements :
"American friendship for China has at this moment reached a popular
height which brings it tx> the verge of sentimentality. The Chinese are being
exalted into persons such as cannot exist in our fallible human race. A dose
of common sense is needed. If the close is not taken in time those who have
rushed to give gifts, those who have sold valued possessions, as some have,
to make a gift, are going to wake up one morning condemning China and all
Chinese, and then they will regret their possessions and feel ashamed of their
emotionalism, and isolationists will make the most of this disillusionment. But
the Chinese people deserve neither adoration nor condemnation. They do de-
serve understanding and help, and that we may give what they deserve, it is
necessary for a friendly diagnosis to be made now of China's present condition"
(p. 53).
"Already, undemocratic forces, which could not do their evil work so long
as China was hopeful of her place as an equal ally of the United States and
England, have been strengthened by our policy which has relegated Japan to
the place of a secondary enemy, allowing Burma to be lost and the line to
China cut. In the isolation and helplessness of China those in the government
f^TATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1637
there who were voices for the people and for democracy cannot speak loudly
and clearly as once they did, as they did when they were promising their people
effective aid from us. Division within China is deepening in spite of the fact
that the leadership and the genius of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek are not
yet being challenged." (P. 53.)
"And now come these reports from China, even from Chinese sources them-
selves, that there are signs that in China this is ceasing to be a people's war.
The great liberal forces of the recent past in China are growing silent. The
center of liberalism in China for the past two generations has been in the
students and teachers. Nowhere in the world have the young and intelligent
played so heroic a part as in China. Their courage, their self-sacrifice, even to
the lives of thousands who dared to oppose the officials, have provided the strong-
est correctives to bureaucracy and official corruption. Now those students are
ceasing to speak. As China becomes more isolated the power of bureaucrats is
growing. Oppressive elements in the government are becoming more oppressive.
Chungking is a place where free speech is less and less possible and those who
want to be free are going to other places.
"These oppressive influences extend even into the Generalissimo's family.
We who are the American people would be better pleased if we could hear the
voice of Madame Sun Yat-sen today. It was Sun Yat-sen who provided for the
Chinese people the clear direction toward modern democracy. Why is it neces-
sary for Madame Sun Yat-sen to be silent? The people believe in her. It is not
only fear, it is also hopelessnes which deepens the people's silence. Economic
conditions in China at this hour are so appalling that the persons who might
be the leaders for freedom are turning away from public service and are taking
up better paid jobs. More and more students, for example, are discreetly
specializing in money and banking. Cynicism is killing the spirits and hunger
is killing the bodies of those who were once such a strong and purifying political
force.
"Yet the Chinese people are agreed that certain evils now existing must go
and certain reforms must be established if China is to continue as a democracy.
The chief evil that must go is official corruption, first in high places but every-
where as quickly as possible. The only way to get rid of this corruption is to
put into the hands of the people the power to accuse and dismiss their officials
when corruption is proved" (p. 54).
"In this state of mutual uncertainty it is inevitable that certain forces are
for the moment strengthening themselves as they tend to do in similar periods
in any country. There is now no real freedom of the press in China, no freedom
of speech. The official implement of repression is an organization far more
severe than the secret service of a democracy ought to be, for insecurity of indi-
viduals in power breeds repression upon the people. These antidemocratic
forces are being strengthened now, and not only by China's isolation" (p. 54).
Previous references to the internal situation in China may also be found, as,
for example, in the leading article in The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury,
April 23. 1948. Under the heading 'U. S. -Chinese Views Seen As Diverging"
Earl H. Leaf, Managing Editor, says in part:
"Misunderstandings arise concerning the use or misuse of American supplies
sent to China. Communist sympathizers repeatedly charged that the U. S.
supplies were being employed to arm Central Government troops against the
Chinese Red Armies.
"Independent check-up on these reports has revealed some puzzling aspects
of the internal Chinese situation as, for example, the fact that Gen. Hu Tzu-nan's
troops, who face the Communists and have never yet fought a battle with the
Japanese, turn out to be the best-equipped, best-paid, and best-fed army in China.
Hence, some influential American officials, fearing civil war in China, reinclined
towards holding back supplies. Chinese army leaders have an explanation for
that situation, but many Chinese and American officials do not see eye to eye
about it."
In the same issue of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, in an editorial
(p. 4), it is stated:
"The foregoing hard realities (military) and many others, notably the alarm-
ing inflationary situation and growing malnutrition affecting even the Chinese
army, must be faced. There are other factors of encouraging sort. Nowhere,
it is agreed, is there any sign of surrender to or appeasement of the Japanese.
(Neither is there much sign that a war is on, aside from high prices and short-
ages— and 'fighting fronts' in China are mostly nonexistent except sporadically.)"
In August 1943, Reader's Digest published an article entitled "Too Much
Wishful Thinking About China," written by Hanson W. Baldwin, military
1638 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
analyst of the New York Times. The author discussed the average American's
conceptions of China, and states (pp. 63, 64) :
"Unfortunately, the China of such dreams is far from reality. Missionaries,
war-relief drives, able ambassadors, and the movies have oversold us. China
has become not merely China but the royal road to victory in the Pacific.
"China has needed no such overselling. Her people are plainly courageous ;
their patient fortitude and philosophic resignation are unmatched. But an
enumeration of her virtues should not blind us to her weaknesses : above all,
it should not lead us to a fallacious conception of Pacific strategy."
*******
"She has as yet no real army as we understand the term ; most of her troops
are poorly led and incapable of effectively utilizing modern arms. They require
intensive and protracted training, and capable leaders bound together by a
common loyalty to a common cause. Today there are few such leaders ; too
many of them are still old war lords, in new clothing, for whom war is a means
for personal aggrandizement and enrichment.
"The truth about China — known to a few, but not to millions of Americans —
is that the military situation there today is bad, has been bad for two years,
and will probably continue to be bad for some years to come."
*******
"The Chinese communiques are almost worthless for obtainng a true picture.
Had they suffered even half the casualties the Chinese have claimed, the Japa-
nese would by now have given evidence of a manpower shortage. Sometimes the
Chinese report battles where there are no battles ; often they exalt skirmishes
and guerrilla fighting to the status of campaigns. In the recent Tungting Lake-
Ichang fighting, for example, the Japanese almost certainly never intended —
as reports from China claimed — to try to take Chungking. Their objective
patently was the rich Chinese rice-bowl region around Tungting Lake ; they
took some of it, sacked it and retired. Yet Chinese communiques interpreted the
Japanese retirement as a great victory."
In quoting these above statements, we neither endorse nor criticize them.
They are presented simply to disprove the assertion that in discussing the situa-
tion in China the I R followed any "line," Communist or otherwise. The logical
fallacy in attempting to prove by analogy was pointed out by Miss Buck in a letter
to the New York Herald Tribune, published August 20, 1043. She begins by stat-
ing that she had welcomed Rodney Gilbert's reply (Herald Tribune, August 16
and 17, 1043) to Mr. Baldwin's Reader's Digest article. Then Miss Buck says:
"Mr. Gilbert himself, however, falls into the easy error of oversimplification.
That is, because one objects to Fascist tendencies in China, as one objects to them
elsewhere, he leaps to the conclusion that one must be pro-Communist. This
tendency to oversimplification is everywhere seen in these peculiar times in
which we live."
Contrary to the pattern laid down by Mr. Kohlberg, IPR publications during
the summer and fall of 1043 contained material favorable to or praising the
Chinese authorities. Among others, the following should be noted :
The Far Eastern Survey for July 28, 1043 — the issue immediately succeeding
that containing Bisson's article — carries a leading editorial article praising a set
of principles enunciated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on July 7. 1043. The
following quotations from this editorial article are pertinent :
"The destiny of China is one and the same as that of the United Nations — so is
China's policy. Those are the words of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, spoken
on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the war in China.
"What China sees as her policy and her destiny is that of contributing her full
strength, not only to bring the war to ;i success i'-il conclusion, but also to establish
a strong postwar organization which will ensure the peace.
«* * * jjjS (Chiang Kai-shek's) statement of China's hopes in this connec-
tion is forthright and challenging, and deserves wider attention than it has had
in the American press." There follows a long series of quotations from Chiang
Kai-shek's address (pp. 147-48).
This editorial article was signed by Catherine Porter, editor <>f the Far Eastern
Survey. It would indicate that the editor of the Survey was not seeking to
include only materials critical of < Ihina in the magazine during this period.
In a friendly analysis entitled "China's Political Development" (Far Eastern
Survey, October 6, 1043), N. C. Liu, Professor of Political Science at National
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1639
Wuhan University of China, discusses the meaning of "democracy," and its
applications in China. He concludes by saying:
"From the foregoing paragraphs, we may conclude that, since the downfall of
the monarchy, popular support for the republic has always been strong and that
the foundation for democratic government is thereby firmly laid; that we have
for the moment, indeed, only a partially representative government hut we are
ready to organize true responsible government in the near future; that restric-
tions are, to be sure, being imposed on popular rights and liberties in wartime, but
these will be swept away in time of peace; that, as the different parties are now
reconciled, there is no reason to suppose that they cannot adjust their political
differences in time to come; and that, as we had the traditional form of popular
participation in local affairs, legal codification is certainly a step forward. In
short, it may be accurate to say that China, being a republic, is dedicated to and
will make great strides toward democracy in the world of tomorrow."
The September 1&43 issue of Pacific Affairs, the first issue of this quarterly
which followed publication of Bisson's article, contains an article by Guenther
Srein entitled "Free China's Agricultural Progress." The first sentence of this
article reads: "The collection of rice and wheat, partly by way of land tax pay-
ments in kind and partly by compulsory purchase, has become one of the most
successful economic policies of the Chinese Government." Statistical data given
in the rest of the article is devoted mainly to proving the thesis stated in the first
sentence, although the conclusion stresses the need for agrarian reforms (pp.
339-343).
This article would again indicate thai the IPR publications of the period were
not concentrating on abuse of the Chinese central government.
Many of the criticisms contained in the Bisson article had been voiced by the
Chinese themselves. Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan and Kuomintang
leader, spoke as follows on September 8, 1942 (eight months before the Bisson
article), in a lecture delivered at Chungking:
•At present, grain collection has not yet reached its saturation point; the sys-
tem employed in levying and buying needs to be much improved. The share
contributed by most of the landowning class is still too light, while self-cultiva-
tors and tenant farmers are bearing too heavy a burden. Landowners as a
whole have reaped large fortunes these few years ; those who collect their rent
in kind and receive grain amounting to several hundred piculs a year are living
lavishly. Big landlords are proportionally much better off than in prewar days."
"* * * At present, big landlords are acquiring real estate with their unused
and unusable wealth from small landowners, mostly self -cultivators, so that the
wealth produced on the land becomes harmful rather than beneficial to the nation.
If they invested their money in industries, it would be quite different. P»ut in-
stead of doing so, they buy more and more farm lands. Land values are thus
bolstered up ten, twenty, fifty times ; but the agricultural products gathered
therefrom cannot be increased in any such proportion. Hence, nine-tenths of
the money sunk in such investments is lying idle from the nation's point of
view ; and, what is worse, the cost of rice, and with it the general cost of living,
are artificially raised to incredible heights in order to pay proper interest on
their uneconomic investments" (Sun Fo, China Looks Forward, John Day, 1944,
pp. 145-146).
Sun Fo is not averse to using the word "feudal," which Kohlberg takes excep-
tion to in the Bisson article. On page 224 he writes : "Not only the traditional
system of land tenure which still smacks of peasant feudalism, but also the
antiquated and inefficient method of small-farm individual tilling shall be
abandoned, and in their places substitutes state or common ownership of land
and collective and cooperative cultivation."
Note that in the first of the above quotations, Sun Fo is extremely critical of
the grain tax in kind. But Guenther Stein, one of the IPR writers cited by
Kohlberg, wrote favorably in Pacific Affairs (as cited above) of the grain collec-
tions. In this case, the "critical" IPR writer falls behind Sun Fo in his
criticism.
Sun Fo is also highly critical of the political repression and lack of democracy
which characterizes the Kuomintang Government at Chungking. On pages 108-
109 of China Looks Forward, he writes :
"Unfortunately, we have in the past assumed unwillingly the attitude and habit
of a ruling caste. The suppression of outside criticism against our party, and
even critisism by our party members is less than one percent of the Chinese popu-
lation. The Kuomintang is simply a minority in terms of population. But we
1640 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
have come to regard ourselves as if we were the sovereign power entitled to the
enjoyment of a special position and to the suppression of all criticism whatsoever
against us. It is dictatorship and tyranny which the peoples of the world today
are trying to destroy by means of sacrifices of their lives, and blood. For these
reasons, we must, first of all, reorientate our psychology and correct our attitude
of intolerance."
On page 119 of China Looks Forward he writes :
"I think there is something wrong with our method of approach. The San-
Min-Chu-I Youth Corps is supposed to train and organize the promising youth of
the nation for national service and leadership. This is done by instituting politi-
cal training and military discipline. Instead of guiding them to think for them-
selves, it has been drilling them to repeat by rote the San-Min-Chu-I political
creed. Instead of teaching them the methods of democratic practice and leader-
ship, it has been imposing upon them military regimentation in the name of
discipline. Discipline, of course, is required to habituate them to law and order.
But the thing may be overdone. As a result, the people we are turning out from
the various training centers become rather like puppets. The first thing they
learn to perfection is how to click heels at the mention of, or mere reference to,,
the Supreme Leader. Heel-clicking may be proper in the army, but it is not
appropriate in a democratic country. For instance, you don't see Englishmen
jumping up from their seats and clicking their heels at the mere mention of their
sovereign's name, or have you ever seen or heard that Americans at home or
abroad would click heels every time President Roosevelt's name is mentioned,
even at their political party meetings? The only examples of such practice that
I know of were Russian emigre officers when they spoke of their dead Czar, and
the German Nazis heil-Hitlering their Fuhrer. But why should we adopt the
outmoded practice of the Czarist Russians or imitate the behavior of our Nazi
enemies?"
P. 26 "Japan's Army on China's Fronts," Gucnther Stein, Far Eastern Survey,
July 14, 1943
Mr. Kohlberg here uses comparative "official Chinese figures" to prove that
Guenther Stein underestimated the number of Japanese troops in China. He
fails to note, however, that Guenther Stein's material was broadcast by short
wave from the Chinese government's station at Chungking. As such, his figures
were subject to censorship. If there was any marked discrepancy, the official
censors would doubtless have acted, especially on a matter dealing so closely
with military affairs. Actually, the discrepancy is more apparent than real .
Guenther Stein counted a total of 30 Japanese divisions "in use" at a given
moment. Kohlberg's figures state that 42 divisions were "used" in 1943, but not
all of these may have been "in use" at the time Stein made his estimate — based,
incidentally, on Chinese official sources.
P. 26 Far Eastern Survey, May 3, 194-i
Here Mr. Kohlberg quotes from a statement by Sun Fo as cited in the Survey.
His quotations carefully eliminate the serious political charges against the
Kuomintang made by Sun Fo in this statement. The quotations in the Survey
give Sun Fo's full meaning. A comparison of Mr. Kohlberg's selection with the
Survey article in this case offers the most striking evidence of bias on the part
of Mr. Kohlberg and not on the part of the Survey. He states one side ; the
Survey states both.
Mr. Kohlberg then omits all quotation from a parallel statement by Raymond
Gram Swing included in this Survey article.
P. 31 Behind the Open Door, by Foster Rhea Dulles
Mr. Kohlberg cites two paragraphs from this booklet, which run to 32 pages.
The citations indicate that the Soviet Union signed the neutrality treaty with
Japan "to protect Russia's eastern flank in order that she might be the more free
to defend her western front against the far greater menace of Germany." They
also state that both the United States and the Soviet Union "are equally con-
cerned in the defeat of Japan and the creation of a strong, independent China.
There should therefore be no conflict in the post-war policies of these two great
powers fronting the Pacific. It is highly important that they should reach a full
understanding on all Far Eastern problems. A cordial American-Russian rela-
tionship would contribute much to the future peace of Asia."
It is difficult, indeed, to find anything objectionable in these statements.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1641
Exhirit No. 71
COMPARISON (il MCCABTHY AND KoHLREKG
Kohlberg
Appointed Editor Pacific Affairs, 1934.
Accompanied E. C. Carter to Moscow.
"This trip apparently completed his
conversion to an admiration of the So-
viet Union's system of government"
(China Monthly. Oct. 1945).
"Lattimore told a friend (Freda Ut-
ley) in London in 1930 that he almost
lost his job for publishing an article
by Harold Isaacs, a Trotskyite" (China
Monthly, Oct. 1945).
"Lattimore continued with other du-
ties including service on the editorial
hoard of AMERASIA and the editorship
of Pacific Affair* until 1941" (China
Monthly, Oct. 1945).
Kohlberg's version of the Communist
line as allegedly followed by IPR and
IPR publications in reference to Chi-
nese government.
(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg dated
March 18, 1947, to members of AIPR :)
(1) "Beginning 1„37 and up to the
end of 1939, the IPR articles uniformly
praised the government of Chiang Kai-
Shek."
(2) "After the Hitler-Stalin alliance
of Aug. 23, 1939, the IPR soured on
Chiang Kai-shek and by 1941 were stat-
ing that in the government of China
'uncertain quarters were "pro-Nazi"
and were "willing to make peace with
Japan." 'Fascist ideas were popular-
ized among and praised by Kuomintang
members' ' (Compare Lattimore's
secret letter to E. C. Carter in the en-
closed article from Plain Talk).
(3) "Then came the day that shook
the pro-Communist world when Hitler
invaded Russia, June 22, 1941. That
day was a Sunday if I remember cor-
rectly and it caught Frederick V. Field,
formerly Secretary and now member
of the Executive Committee of the IPR
leading the picket line in front of the
White House with placards proclaiming
'FDR is a War-Monger. * * *'
This same day caught the IPR and the
Communist press equally flatfooted.
So the IPR and Communist line
switched again to the most fulsome
praise of Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang. * * * No longer did
they charge Chiang Kai-shek with
'negotiating to join the Axis.' This
praise of Chiang Kai-shek's government
continued until the summer of 1943."
(4) "Beginning in the summer of
1943, both IPR and the Communist
press changed to abuse of China."
McCarthy
McCarthy notes somewhere on page
231-35 in a hearing that Lattimore was
editor of Pacific Affairs from 1 !i: ',4-1941 .
McCarthy, in a hearing (p. 194)
quotes from Freda Utley's book Lost
Illusion "he [Lattimore] told me a few
months later in London how he almost
lost his position as Editor of Pacific
Affairs because he had published an ar-
ticle by the Trotskyist, Harold Isaacs.''
P. 220 (Hearing Record) introduced
Exhibit L-2 which connected Lattimore
with Amerasia editorial board.
(Page 4440, Cong. Record, March 30,
1950:) "In 1935 at the World Commu-
nist meeting in Moscow * * * the
so-called United Front or Trojan horse
policy was adopted — a policy calling
for the Communists to combine with
the governments in power and to get
into strategic positions so that Moscow
could control or at least exert influence
on governments in question. At this
time in 1935 * * * Chiang Kai-
shek made an agreement with the Chi-
nese Communists.
"From 1935 to 1939 the Communist
line was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.
"In 1939 after the signing of the
Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Stalin-Mat-
souka Pact, the Communist Party line
again became anti-Chiang Kai-shek.
"As the Senate will recall, this con-
tinued until June 22, 1941, the day Hitler
invaded Russia, at which time the Com-
munist Party line again switched and
was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.
"This continued until 1943. The
Senate will recall the Russian victory
at Stalingrad in the early spring of
1943 and the reversal in the course of
the war at that point. * * * The
Communist Party line again definitely
became anti-Chiang Kai-shek."
1642
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Lattimore Defended Purse Trials
(China Monthly, Oct. 1945) : The real
point, of course, for those who live in
democratic countries, is whether the
discovery of the conspiracies was a
triumph for democracy or not. I think
that can he easily determined. The ac-
counts of the most widely read Moscow
correspondents all emphasize that since
'the close scrutiny of every person in a
responsible position, folowing the trials,
a great many abuses have been dis-
covered and rectified. A lot depends on
whether you emphasize the discovery of
the abuse or the rectification of it ; but
habitual rectification can hardly do any-
thing but give the ordinary citizen more
courage to protest, loudly, whenever in
the future he finds himself being vic-
timized by "someone in the party" or
'■someone in the Government." That
sounds to me like democracy. Pacific
Affairs, Sept. 1938, p. 371.
Book jacket Solution In Asia quoted
by Kohlberg (China Monthly, Oct.
1945) : He shows that all the Asiatic
peoples are more interested in actual
democratic practices, such as they see
in action across the Russian border,
than they are in the fine theories of
Anglo-Saxon democracies which come
coupled with ruthless imperialism. He
inclines to support American newspaper-
men wlio report that the only real de-
mocracy in China is found in Commu-
nist areas.
Solution in Asia. The jacket.
Article, "I. P. R. — Tokyo Axis" by
Sheppard Marley in Plain Talk, Dec. 19,
1946 (attached). In which was dis-
cussed IPR as action and pressure
group.
Letter to Watertown Daily Times,
Watertown, N. Y., Dec. 6, 1946: At-
tacked Lattimore for his alleged shift in
attitude toward Chiang between 1943
and 1946.
Letter to members of IPR. March 18,
1947: "Members of our Board of Trus-
tees and our Staff managed to get con-
trol of the Far Eastern Division of the
State Dept., UXRRA, and OWI where
they loaded all three with pro-Com-
munists. Two of them, < Kvi'ii Lattimore
and John Carter Vincent, accompanied
Henry Wallace to China in 1!>44 and
talked that adolescent into reporting to
Roosevelt that 'we were backing the
wrong horse in China. * * *' "
On page 237 of the Hearing Record
McCarthy says: "Mr. Lattimore praised
the net result of tbe Moscow trials and
the blood purge by which Stalin se-
cured his dictatorship in 1936-1939 'as
a triumph for democracy.' "
I Page 4447, Cong. Record, March 30,
1950) : "This is what the editor says
about the book : 'He shows that all
Asiatic people are more interested in
actual democratic practices such as the
ones they can see in action across the
Russian border than they are in the
fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democra-
cies which come coupled with ruthless
imperialism. * * *' He inclines to
support American newspapermen who
report that the only real democracy in
China is found in Communist areas."
Article read into record by McCarthy
( Pages 4461 to 4463, Cong. Record ) .
(Cong. Record, p. 4441 :) •'The Senate
will recall the date of this letter, June
15, 1943, the time when Chiang Kai-
shek was our very badly needed ally in
the Pacific. * * * It was at this
time that Lattimore sends this highly
secret letter in which he twice urges the
strictest secrecy lie followed in getting
rid of any Chinese who are loyal to our
ally, Chiang Kai-shek. * * *"
(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "In 1944 he
I Lattimore] and John Carter Vincent
accompanied Henry Wallace on a tour
of China after which Wallace made his
report to the State Dept., recommend-
ing tlit- torpedoing on Chiang Kai-shek."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1643
"Owen Lattimore, Director, School of
Internationa] Relations, Johns Hopkins
University. Advisor to Pros. Roosevelt,
Pres. Truman, Henry Wallace, was
connected with pro-Communist Nat'l
Emergency Conference for Protection
of Human Rights; Washington Com-
mittee to Aid China, Writers Congress.
Defense of Moscow Purge Trials, Asso-
ciate editor of Amerasia. Maintains
liaison with heads of Communist
Party. Reportedly operative for So-
viet Military Intelligence in Far East."
See previous statement by Kohlberg.
(China Monthly, Oct. 1948:) "Latti-
more, head of OWI Far East Division,
San Francisco, sent orders to his su-
perior in New York (Joseph F. Barnes,
later Foreign Editor N. Y. Herald
Tribune * * *) to fire all Chinese
staff members who sympathized with
their own government and replace them
with Communist from the newly
launched New China Daily News, New
York Chinese language daily."
(Hearing Record, pp. 259-62:) As-
sociates Lattimore with Maryland Asso.
for Democratic Rights which he alleges
to he an affiliate of the Nat'l Emer-
gency Conference for Democratic
Rights.
Principal speaker at meeting of
Wash. Committee for Aid to China.
On Oct. 1, 2, 3, of 1943 meeting of
Writers Congress and Hollywood Writ-
ers of Mobilization at the Univ. of
Calif., L. A., campus in Westwood "ap-
pearing as the representative of the
Office of War Information was Mr.
Owen Lattimore."
"In the magazine Pacific Affairs of
Sept. 1938, Owen Lattimore described
the Moscow Purge Trials as a 'triumph
for Democracy.' "
(Pages 333-334, Hearing Record:)
"It perhaps should be mentioned here
that Owen Lattimore was formerly an
editor of Amerasia.
(Page 4445, Cong. Rec. :) "The tes-
timony will be that the head of the
Russian Intelligence told this witness
[the Russian General] * * * that
they were having excellent success
through the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions which the Soviet Intelligence
through Communists in the U. S. had
taken over. In connection with this he
particularly mentioned Owen Latti-
more. * * * "
(Cong. Record, p. 4440:) "This is a
letter * * * dated 6-15-1943 which
is when the line had again swung to
anti-Chiang Kai-shek. This is a letter
from Owen Lattimore, Director of
Pacific Operations, OWI. The odd thing
is that he is writing to his boss in the
government service, telling the story to
him, not writing to someone who is
working for him. * * *
"In it he directs the recipient of the
letter to get rid of the Chinese in OWI
who were loyal to either the Nationalist
gov't or Wang Ching-wei. * * *
"He then issues instructions that the
personnel be recruited from the share-
holders of the New China Daily News,
a Chinese Communist paper in New
York."
(Cong. Record, p. 4460 :) "In 1947 one
of the members of the Board [of IPR],
one of the good American members in-
sisted that there be an investigation to
determine the extent to which the Com-
munists had taken over control of the
American Council of IPR."
68970— 50— pt. 2-
-11
1644
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
(China Monthly, Dec. 1049, p. 243:)
"The White Paper and the State Dept.
categorically deny that Vice President
Wallace made any written report to
Pres. Roosevelt on his return from
China. In spite of this denial, Amb.
Hurley states that he read Mr. Wal-
lace's report which was shown to him
by John Carter Vincent who accom-
panied Wallace."
(China Monthly, Sept. 1946, p. 325:)
"Editorial suggestions (according to the
introduction) were made by John Haz-
ard, Owen Lattimore, Joseph Barnes,
Albert Rhys Taylor, and Dr. Treadwell
Smith. * * *"
Kohlberg's article "China via Stilwell
Road," China Monthly, Oct. 1948, has
the central idea that Stilwell was a
sucker for Owen Lattimore and others
such as Theodore White, John Fairbank,
and Joseph Barnes.
(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "Inciden-
tally in this connection the State Dept.
issued a press release * * * denying
the existence of such a report and stat-
ing as follows :"
(Article entitled "Who Is Respon-
sible for Chinese Tragedy" China
Monthly, Dec. 1949:) Main thesis is
that a pro-Soviet clique headed by
Dean Acheson was responsible for
yielding China to Communists.
(Letter to members of IPR. March
18, 1947 : ) "Our Board of Trustees (47)
scattered all over the country never
meets. The Executive Committee (10)
is chairmaned by a Californian who
never attends. The connections of the
others are as per attached sheet. Most
of our Trustees are of course not Com-
munists. * * *
(China Monthly, Dec. 1949:) "The
White Paper reveals in reports of Em-
bassy attaches Ludden, Davies, Service,
and George Atcheson a determination
to discredit, the National Government
and to build up a picture of the Chinese
Communists as ardent fighters for de-
mocracy."
(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) Upon his
return from this trip, Henry Wallace
wrote a book entitled Soviet Asia
Mission in which he pay tribute to
Owen Lattimore for his invaluable
assistance.
(Cong. Record, p. 4445:) "I think
Lattimore was as much responsible if
not more so for Stilwell's activities in
China than any other one individual."
(Cong. Record, p. 4446:) "He [a mys-
tery witness] points out that : the Lat-
timore crowd was responsible for the
indoctrination of Stilwell against
Chiang Kai-shek."
(Cong. Record, p. 4445:) "* * * I
am sure that if the Senator will sit
here and will listen to the material
which I am presenting he will be con-
vinced that the clique of Lattimore,
Jessup, and Service has been respon-
sible, almost completely — under Ache-
son of course — for what went on in the
Far East. * * *"
(Cong. Record, p. 4463:) "Since its
creation it has had on both Board of
Trustees and Executive Committee a
very sizeable number of outstanding
and loyal Americans. Membership on
the Board of Trustees or on the Execu-
tive Committee in no way in and of it-
self indicates any Communist sympa-
thies or leanings. * * * However,
as far as I know, the Board actually
never meets but does its business by
having the various members send in
their proxies.
(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "* * *
the reports from its foreign service of-
ficials in China during the war as given
in the White Paper read like extracts
from Lattimore's books. * * * These
Chinese Communists are represented
by Lattimore and his friends in the
State Dept., as 'democrats', 'liberal
agrarian reformers', 'progressives not
under Moscow's direction' or more re-
cently as 'detachable from' Soviet
Russia."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1645
(China Monthly. A.ug. 1949:) "Under
Philip Jessup's direction the Far East-
ern Survey of July 14, 1943, the first
blast in the campaign against the Na-
tionalist government of China was pub-
lished." "Referring to what is called
the two Chinas, it said in an article
Signed by T. A. Bisson. * * •"
(China Monthly, Any. 1949:) "One
is now generally called Kuomintang
China, the other is called Communist
China. However, these are only Party
labels. To be more descriptive, the one
might be called feudal China, the other
democratic China." (Bisson's state-
ment ) .
"This theme song of Democratic Com-
munist China and 'feudal fascist reac-
tionary' Nationalist China was taken
up the following month by the Daily
Worker, the New Masses, and others."
(China Monthly, Aug. 1949:) "When
charges of Communist-line activities
were made against the 1PR in 1947 he
signed a letter denying the charges and
questioning motives behind such
charges. When the question of ap-
pointing a committee to investigate
came before a membership meeting, he
voted against any investigation."
(China Monthly, Aug. 1949, p. 168:)
"Professor Jessup must therefore be
honored by our State Dept., as the initi-
ator of the smear campaign against Na-
tionalist China and Chiang Kai-shek,
and the originator of the myth of the
democratic Chinese Communists."
(China Monthly, August 1949,
168:) Communist fronts sponsored
Jessup according to Kohlberg :
The American-Russian Institute
National Emergency Conference
American Law Students Asso.
Nat'l Emergency Conference for
ocratie Rights
Coordinating Committee to Lift
Embargo
P.
by
Dem-
(Cong. Record, p. 4463:) "The first
blast in this campaign was fired in Jes-
sup's publication on July 14, 1943, in an
article signed by T. A. Bisson."
"Under him [Dr. Jessup] the Council
bi-weekly publication, Far Eastern Sur-
vey, pioneered the smear campaign
against Chiang Kai-shek, and the idea
the Communists in China were merely
agrarian reformers and not Commu-
nists at all."
(Page 4464:) "Prof. Jessup must,
therefore, be credited by the American
people with having pioneered the smear
campaign against Nationalist China
and Chiang Kai-shek, and with being
the originator of the myth of the "Demo-
cratic" Chinese Communists. From
that time onward we witness the spec-
tacle of this 3-horse team of smears and
untruths thundering down the stretch —
Jessup's publications, Far Eastern Sur-
vey, the Daily Worker, and Isvestzia."
(Jessup) (Cong. Record, p. 4460:)
"In 1947 one of the members of the
board, one of the good American mem-
bers, insisted that there be an investi-
gation to determine extent to which
the Communists had taken over con-
trol of the American Council of IRP
[sic]. That was very vigorously op-
posed. Keep in mind that at that time
Frederick V. Field was a member of the
Board. Hiss was then a member or was
shortly thereafter. One of the men who
vigorously protested, and sent a letter
over his name, which I have, objecting
strenuously to any such investigation,
was our Ambassador at Large, Philip
Jessup."
(Cong. Record, p. 4464:) "Prof. Jes-
sup must, therefore, be credited by the
American people with having pioneered
the smear campaign against Nationalist
China and Chiang Kai-shek, and with
being the originator of the myth of the
'democratic' Chinese Communists."
(Cong. Record, p. 4465:) McCarthy's
list:
American Law Students Asso.
United Students Peace Conference
Nat'l Emergency Conference for Dem-
ocratic Rights
National Emergency Conference
the
1646 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
(China Monthly, August, 1949, p. (Cong. Record, p. 4465:) "I have in
168 •) "[Jessup was] signer of letter in my hand a photostat of the N. Y. Times
the N Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1946, urging dated Feb. 16, 1946. * * * In this
'the cessation of atomic bomb produc- letter the brilliant Dr. Jessup urges not
tion > » only that we quit producing atomic
bombs but that we eliminate the neces-
sary ingredients which were produced
for the atomic bomb by 'means such as
dumping them in the ocean.' "
(Letter to Mr. E. C. Carter Dec. 26, (Cong. Record, p. 4464-65:) "The
1946:) "In my opinion this organization magazine Amerasia about whose Com-
( Committee for a Democratic Far East- munist line there can be no question for
ern Policy) ■ was set up by the a period of time had its offices right
IPR. * * * just as much as Amer- next to the offices of the Jessup publi-
asia was (which was also not officially cation for IPR."
connected although it made its office
with you in the early years)."
Exhibit No. 72
A CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
June 14 and 15, 1940, at the Parish Hall of Emmanuel Church, Cathedral and
Read Streets, Baltimore, Maryland
"freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly ... no unreasonable
search ... no arrest without warrant . . . right to trial by
jury . . . equal protection to all persons."
Called by Maryland Association for Democratic Rights, 19 Medical Arts Building
Program
friday evening, june 14
Opening Meeting 8 : 30 p. m.
"Democratic Rights and National Defense"
Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Temporary Vice Chairman,
Maryland Association for Democratic Rights.
Speakers:
Josephine Truslow Adams, Swarthmore College, Descendants of the American
Revolution.
Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People.
Charles I. Stewart, Member New York Board of Education, Director Ameri-
can Union for Democracy, Inc.
Morris Watson, Vice President, American Newspaper Guild.
SATURDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 15
Registration 1 : 00 p. m.
General Session 1 : 30-2 : 00 p. m.
Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris.
Address: Samuel L. M. Barlow, National Emergency Conference for Democratic
Rights.
Round Table Discussions 2 : 00-4 : 00 p. m.
ROUND TARLE I. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND LABOR
Issues Involved : National Defense and Civil Liberties ; the industrial mobiliza-
tion plan ; legislation and trade-unions ; antitrust prosecutions :
Chairman: Merle Vincent, President, Washington Committee for Democratic
Action.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1647
Speakers:
Richard Lindsley, United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers.
Charles W. Mitzel, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen.
George Engeman, Baltimore Newspaper Guild.
Harry Cohen, President, Teamsters Joint Council No. 62, A. F. of L.
ROUNO TABLE II. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND MINORITIES
Issues involved : The attack upon the foreign born ; Discrimination against the
Negro; the anti-lynehing Bill; anti-Semitism; civil rights of political minori-
ties ; intellectual freedom in the schools.
Chairman: Dean George C. Grant, Morgan State College.
Spcakeis:
Alan Cranston, Foreign Language Information Service.
Dr. Floyd Banks, Morgan State College.
E. Foster Dowell, Hollins College.
Wilfred T. McQuaid, Attorney.
ROUND TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND THE CHURCH
Issues involved : The Church and intolerance ; religion in a democratic society ;
freedom of speech for the clergy ; the responsibility of the Church in the face
of attacks upon minorities.
Chairman: Jesse A. Stanfield, Council of the Fellowship of reconciliation.
Speakers:
Rev. Gottleib Siegenthaler, Pastor, St. Matthew's Evangelical Reform
Church.
Roland Watts, President, Baltimore Peace Congress.
Rev. Jolm O. Spencer, Former President, Morgan State College ; Former
Chairman, Maryland Interracial Commission.
Business Session 4 : 00-5 : 30 p. m.
Reports by the Chairmen of Round Tables, with recommendations for action.
Election of Officers and Executive Committee.
The purposes of the Round Table Discussions will be :
(1) To point out the dangers threatening civil rights and the security of
democratic institutions in daily life and in the legislative assemblies of the
state and nation ;
(2) To determine the best and most fruitful methods of coping with these
dangers, suggesting a program of action to be developed by churches, schools,
labor unions, fraternal orders and other organizations.
Maryland Association for Democratic Rights
Affiliated to the National Emergency Conferenc for Democratic Rights
Franz Boas, National Honorary Chairman
TEMPORARY OFFICERS
Wm. F. Cochran, Chairman
Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Vice Chairman
Edna R. Walls, Secretary
Albert Lion, Jr., Treasurer
Bert L. Clarke, Executive Secretary
Mr. & Mrs. Leo Alpert
Mr. & Mrs. I. Duke Avnet
Dr. Floyd Bank
Walter Bohanan ■
Gertrude C. Bussey
Marthe-Ann Chapman
Savilla Cogswell
J. Marjorie Cook
Mrs. Henry E. Corner
Dorothy Currie
SPONSORS OF THE CONFERENCE
Fred D'Avila
Carrington L. Davis
Mrs. Emond S. Donoho
Jacob J. Edelman
Daniel Ellison
Dr. Ernst Feise
Mr. & Mrs. Bliss Forbush
Dr. Jonas Friedenwald
Helen Garvin
Mrs. Leon Ginsberg
Mr. & Mrs. A. Goldman
Richard Goodman
Sarah Hartman
Mary Hastings
Dr. Dwight O. W. Holmes
Mrs. Anne G. Huppman
Owen Lattimore
Mrs. Owen Lattimore
Clare Leighton
Edward S. Lewis
1648 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
sponsors of the conference — continued
Dr. & Mrs. Richard Lyman Maizie Rappaport H. Bowen Smith
Charles W. Mitzel Leon Rubenstein William Smith
Dr. Samuel Morrison Dr. Leon Sachs Win. F. Stark
Samuel R. Morsell C. A. B. Shreve Arthur K. Taylor
Rev. Joseph S. Nowak, Jr. Dr. Henry E. Sigerist
In his last speech to the Senate the late Senator William E. Borah said:
"So long as the Bill of Rights stands and is preserved in its integrity, so long
as we live up to its terms and conditions, there can be no denial of free speech,
of free press, no religious persecution, no arbitrary government, no concentration
camps, no breaking into homes, no unlawful arrests, no denial of personal liberty.
When so-called emergency legislation strikes at this sacred document in any
particular it should be stricken down without hesitancy. If doubts are to be
indulged in, they should be resolved against all possible encroachments."
This Conference has been called to provide an opportunity in these difficult,
hysterical times for people to stop and think things out clearly, for what is needed
now is clarity and courage, not suspicion and fear. The Maryland Association
for Democratic Rights hopes and believes that individuals and organizations
will want to join with it in its program for the defense of democratic institutions.
Exhibit No. 73
(Note. — The excerpts from letters included within this exhibit reflect the views
of the outstanding scholars and experts on Far Eastern history and politics.
Some of these letters were mailed directly to Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore or Mr. Lat-
timore's attorneys, and others are copies of letters sent to various Members of
Congress, the copies being sent to Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore or Mr. Lattimore's
attorneys.)
Excerpts From Letters and Telegrams From Scholars With a Professional
Knowledge of Owen Lattimore's Work
Nathaniel Peffer, Prof, of International Relations, Columbia Univ. Author:
Basis for Peace in the Far East; America's Place in the World.
I think if you canvass all the Far Eastern people in this country, including
all who have known Lattimore long and well, that you will have an almost
unanimous vote of confidence as to his character and integrity. I doubt whether
you will find anybody in that class in whose mind the question has ever arisen.
To say that he is a Russian agent is fantastic or lunatic. In any event it
mu,st be clear that the effect on himself, his family, and his career is or can be
tragic. In that sense the whole episode is dreadfully unfair.
If I seem to use strong language, please believe me, it is not stronger than
the feeling of most of us.
Derk Bodde, Asso. Prof, of Chinese, Univ. of Penna. Author: China's First
Unifier, etc.
I hope you will forgive me for speaking my mind very strongly but I can no
longer refrain from expressing my disgust and abhorrence at the antics taking
place in Washington which have culminated in the case of Owen Lattimore.
Knowing Mr. Lattimore as I have for many years, the charges are so utterly
ridiculous that it is hard for me to believe that any seriously minded person
can take them at their face value. If they deserved a hearing at all, the least
that could be done, on the grounds of common decency, would be to conduct the
hearings in camera. The present policy of splashing them across the headlines
of the world press not only throws unjustified villiftcation on loyal Americans who
are doing their best for their country, and drives intelligent men out of govern-
ment employment at a time when their knowledge and skills are most needed.
It also weakens our foreign policy by presenting the outside world with a pic-
ture of a divided America, and most important of all. makes a farce of the demo-
cratic process as it operates in this country. I speak with some feeling on
this last point, having recently returned from a year in China where I had the
chance to have contacts with numerous non-Communist Chinese intellectuals
who were once favorably disposed to the United States but no longer are so
today. I can well imagine these men, as they read the accounts of the Washing-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1649
ton investigations well played up in the Chinese Communist press, saying to
themselves: "If this is the best American democracy can show for itself, we
want no part of it." In short, what is new happening in Washington provides
Communists in China and elsewhere with unparalleled anti-American propa-
ganda.
Paul M. A. Ltnerargeh, Professor of Asiatic Politics, School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, Washington, D. C. Author : The Political Doctrines of Sun
Tat-Sen; The Ch'nia of Chiang Kai-Shek, etc.:
Having opposed the views of Owen Lattimore for some years with respect
to America's China policy, 1 feel that I am entitled to protest the fantastic way
in which Lattimore has heen injured without opportunity of previous hearing
or of subsequent redress commensurate to the damage done him.
I have opposed the weak and silly policy of the State Department toward the
Kuomintang, which I respect. I have regarded the Marshall mission as a wild-
goose chase. I have supported the pro-Chiang and anti-Lattimore viewpoint
for some years. But I draw the line at hearing the issue in this fashion.
If Lattimore is a "master spy," the Saturday Evening Post is a voice of Mos-
cow, General Marshall a traitor, and Elmer Davis a rascal.
There is a case against Lattimore's views. I have tried to make it as a
Federal Employee, as a G-2 officer in Stilwell's headquarters, as a Joint Chiefs
of Staff liaison officer to the OWI, and as a postwar private scholar. But the
case is one which can be made honestly against the views. To make it a charge
against the man reduces our republican and democratic processes to absurdity.
Allow me, sir, as a known opponent of Lattimore's viewpoint, to protest the
tactless melodrama with which he has been attacked. The Senate of the United
States will be the ultimate sufferer if careful and exact justice is not done
in this case.
May I recommend, sir, that when the charges of Senator McCarthy are aired
and dismissed, the Senate of the United States consider a resolution of apology
to each individual who has been hurt by this exercise of a prerogative which is,
after all. sacred first to the Senate as a whole and only thereafter to its
individual members. Such a resolution might help Lattimore somewhat ; it
will be enough if it deters comparable attacks in the future.
Andrew G. Truxal, President, Hood College, Frederick, Md. :
May I respectfully request that Dr. Owen Lattimore, on his return to this
country, be granted every privilege and opportunity to clear himself of the
charges being currently made aaginst him. As a former colleague of his dis-
tinguished father, Professor David Lattimore, at Dartmouth College, I know
the family and the charge that Dr. Owen Lattimore is the "top Soviet espionage
agent" is simply fantastic.
John K. Fairbank, Professor of History, Harvard University. Author : The
United States and China:
Senator McCarthy's allegation that Owen Lattimore is a "top Soviet agent"
seems to me completely incredible, on the basis of my long acquaintance with Mr.
Lattimore and with his writings. I have specialized on Chinese history since
1929, have known Owen Lattimore since 1932, and in the course of my professional
work have had occasion to read a very considerable amount of what he has writ-
ten, both in books and in articles. I have also heard him speak many times and
have had conversations with him many times. I have never heard him express
views or make statements which were disloyal in character, and I firmly believe
him to be a thoroughly loyal and law-abiding American citizen who is devoted
to the free, democratic way of life in this country.
Considering our urgent national need, in the dire struggle against Russia in
Asia, for expert knowledge of Asia such as Mr. Lattimore demonstrably possesses,
it seems to me the national interest demands that the accusation of disloyalty
against him he thoroughly investigated and publicly disproved, as I am confident
it will be, so that his future usefulness to his country will be impaired as little as
possible.
H. H. Fisher, Chairman of the Herbert C. Hoover Institute and Lihrary, Stanford
University; Director, Civil Affairs Training School, 1943-1945; Director,
Belgian-American Educational Foundation. Author : The Famine in Soviet
Russia; A Toicer to Peace, etc. :
I have known Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mrs. Esther Caulkin Brunauer for many
years. I know them to be citizens of wide knowledge and exceptional ability,
1650 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
which they have employed in the service of our country. They are incapable by
character and temperament of being Communists or Communist sympathizers.
Frederic C. Lane, Professor of History, The Johns Hopkins University ; Editor,
Journal of Economic History:
From one source or another during the last twenty-five years I have heard the
Communist line and observed its gyrations. Lattimore has not followed the Com-
munist line. He is an independent thinker with whom I have sometimes agreed,
sometimes disagreed. But I never had any reason to think him a Communist
or to doubt his good faith and loyalty.
B. C. Hopper, Professor of Government, Harvard University. Author : Sover-
eignty in the Arctic ; The War for Eastern Europe.
I worked intimately with Owen Lattimore for three years in the Council on
Foreign Relations, New York. And, naturally, I know his writing. It is beyond
belief that he could be a spy, a Communist (definitely a card-bearing member
of the party), or could have worked for the Soviet government against his own
country.
The use of such high-powered labels, upon what seems to be conjecture as
evidence, discredits the government machinery set up for social protection.
Robert I. Crane, Department of History, University of Chicago.
I do not know Dr. Lattimore personally, but I know his views and writings.
In them he is clearly not a pro-Communist. In fact, he has stood forth as an
unselfish American citizen trying to advise a more viable foreign policy that
would prevent China from going Communist. One may even differ with Dr.
Lattimore's opinions and still realize that he is sincerely trying to think our
foreign policy out in a constructive, pro-American fashion.
Mary C. Wright (Mrs. A. F.), The Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford
University, Calif.
You are not here dealing with an obscure individual whose views and connec-
tions are diffieut to pin down. Nor are you dealing with a politically naive
individual whose research is remote from contemporary issues and who might
therefore be the dupe of foreign agents. The way in which Mr. Lattimore's
views have developed and the direction in which he has made his influence
felt are perfectly plain, and they are sharply and fundamentally at variance
with Communist and Communist-front programs. Mr. Lattimore's work is char-
acterized to perhaps a greater degree than that of any other scholar in the Far
Eastern field by precisely that kind of free-ranging, creative thinking which is the
chief bulwark of free peoples against the subversion of their institutions. He is
the- last man who would tolerate any kind of strait-jacket, and it is literally im-
possible that he could associate himself with the ruthless discipline and dogma-
tism of the Communist Party.
This completely unfounded and unwarranted attack on him is itself a grave
threat to American liberty. I earnestly hope that your committee will lose no
time in investigating the facts and making public your findings.
Marion J. Levy, Jr., Assistant Professor of Sociology, Princeton, N. J.
I am writing you about Senator McCarthy's accusation that Owen Lattimore
was a "top Soviet agent." I have not known Mr. Lattimore intimately, but I
have long used his scholarly works, and I have had a number of personal con-
tacts with the man. At no time in my knowledge of either the man or his work
have ever know him to express views which were disloyal to our country.
Woodbridge Bingham, Columbia University. Letter to Senator Tydings.
At this time when Mr. Lattimore's good name is under suspicion I wish to
go on record as having the utmost confidence in his integrity as a scholar and
as a person. I cannot think of him in any way but as a loyal American.
May I take the liberty of appealing to you to see that Mr. Lattimore is com-
pletely cleared of whatever is unfounded in the current charges against him.
By so doing you will not only be of service to Mr. Lattimore and to those who
have a personal interest in him but also to those who are working for the best
interests of the United States in its international relations.
Harold Vinacke, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati.
Author: Far E<i*t in Modern Times.
As a student of Far Eastern history and politics over a period of twenty-five
years, I have had occasion to examine Mr. Lattimore's writings with some care.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1651
I have found myself in disagreement with Mr. Lattimore's views and findings
«n occasion. 1 have also found myself in agreemenl with him on occasion, in
case of either agreement or disagreement, I have never had any reason to be-
lieve that his views were not honestly and objectively arrived at. It is obvious
that there is a wide area of national foreign policy in which there may be honest
difference of opinion as to the expedient course to follow in protecting and ad-
vancing the interests of the United states. A case in point is the question of
recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. It does not follow that because
recognition lias been extended by the U. S. S. R. tb.it an advocate of recognition
by the United Stales would be seeking to promote Russian rather than American
interests. There is plenty of historical evidence that individuals of unquestioned
loyalty honestly come to what prove to be unwise or unsound conclusions as to
what the national interest requires. I believe that the record will show that Mr.
Lattimore's views, whether correct or incorrect, as to national policy, have been
derived from his own independent analysis of the existing situation in the Far
East and the response to the policy situation which he honestly believes will best
advance the interests of the United States. There is no evidence, on the record
as I know it, which would sustain the allegation that be is or has been, seeking to
promote the interests of the Soviet Union rather than the interests of the United
States. As I have stated above, I have on occasion found myself in disagreement
with some of his conclusions as to what would best serve American interests.
But that has never led me to conclude that be was not fundamentally motivated by
loyalty to the United States.
Hymax Kubijn, Assistant Professor of History, Brooklyn College.
The serious allegations made by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin impugning the
loyalty of Owen Lattimore can appear only as fantastic to those familiar with his
scholarly career. As a student of the Far Eastern field for the past twelve years
and a close follower of Mr. Lattimore's work, I wish to state that at no time
have I had cause to question his devotion to this country and the democratic way
of life. His numerous books and articles have in my opinion clearly presented
an over-all pattern of opposition to the policies of Soviet Russia. Charges of
"pro-Soviet" inclinations and beliefs against Mr. Lattimore based on bis pub-
lished writings can only proceed from distortion of his 'theses and removal of
quotations from context.
George B. Cressey, Chairman, Department of Geography, Syracuse University ;
Member. Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. Author : Field Work in
Mongolia, Tibet, and Interior of China — 1932-1929; Asia's Lands and Peoples,
etc.
May I express my deep concern over the unsupported attacks which are being
made on Owen Lattimore, Haldore Hanson, and others, without supporting
evidence. I am under the impression that under Anglo-Saxon law a person
is to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty, or certainly until specific
evidence is forthcoming. In a police state, on the other hand, guilt is assumed
as soon as anyone mentions rumor or suspicion.
I consider that these whole proceedings, including the attacks on the Secretary
of State, are the most effective device to impair our standing abroad and to
create a situation favorable to communistic propaganda. One might make a good
case for an assertion that Senator McCarthy and his associates are the most
effective agents for communistic agitation which are currently operating in the
United States.
Langdox Waexer, Curator of Oriental Art, Fogg Museum, Harvard University
I have known him (Mr. Lattimore) intimately, both in China and this country,
for some twenty-five years. I know him to be loyal and intelligent with an
uncommonly courageous and penetrating attitude and a sound analytical mind.
I have seen him in his social and professional contacts with Europeans and
orientals and can best describe his talk and his privately held opinions as being
unequivocally and patriotically American.
You have but to read his many books of travel and of political analysis to be
persuaded that the impression he firmly intends to convey is distrust of Commu-
nist and other authoritarian policies. This is quite as obvious in those passages
in which he is seeking a reasonable and sympathetic explanation of their psy-
chology as in those where he is more drastically critical of them. No doubt
among such voluminous writings, where the author bears constantly in mind
the need to be judgmatical, paragraphs may be lifted from their context in an
attempt to demonstrate sympathy with the enemy. But there cannot be any
1652 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
doubt with all the evidence before you, that even such passages are additional
proof of the author's sensitive regard for American democratic ideals.
It should not detract from the cogency of my argument to add that I have
frequently disagreed with Mr. Lattimore's conclusions.
Laurence Sickman, Vice Director and Curator of Oriental Art, Wm. Rockhill
Nelson Gallery of Art, Kansas City, Mo.
The extremely serious implications of Senator McCarthy's charges against
Owen Lattimore compel me to write urging a complete investigation of these
charges which, in my opinion, are utterly false and incomprehensible. I have
known Owen Lattimore personally since 1931 and as a specialist in Far Eastern
studies, I have had occasion to read many of his writings. I consider Mr. Latti-
more to be not only a loyal and forthright citizen but also a brilliant credit to
our country.
George Grassmuck, Boston University, Assistant Professor of Political Science.
It is my fervent hope that the current damaging attacks on the loyalty and
integrity of Owen Lattimore receive an early investigation and that his expected
exoneration gets as much publicity as did the remarks of his protected accuser.
Upon my return from wartime naval service in the South Pacific and occupied
Japan, I studied for three years (1946-49) at the Johns Hopkins University,
and took several Far Eastern seminars under Mt. Lattimore's direction. I
became well acquainted with his political and economic ideas by reading his
books and through informal conversations with him. During my last year at the
university, my office was next to his, premitting even more frequent discussions.
At no time during my stay at the Johns Hopkins University did Lattimore
impress me as a member of the Communist Party or as a "Russian espionage
agent."
Since leaving Hopkins I have been giving courses in international politics and
in governments of the Far East at Boston University. I use Lattimore's recent
book, The Situation in Asia, (Little, Brown & Co., 1949) as one of several
references in the Far Eastern course. There have been no classroom allegations
whatever that the book* was "Communist" or "pro-Russian."
Instead passages from the book show Lattimore's desire to see Oriental nations
become independent and free of Russian domination. On page 167 of The Situa-
ation in Asia, he states :
"Nor do the Russians start out with the advantage of being the 'favorite
foreigners' of the Chinese, as the Americans have long been. In the Chinese
folk tradition, the Russians have always been the most barbarian of the 'foreign
barbarians', the 'dangerous neighbors' with a common frontier. The fact is
that the Russians, like the Americans, are going to find that what counts in
China is the kind of government evolved by the play of Chinese political, economic,
social, and military forces."
In proposing a possible plan for dealing with Asia by helping to establish a
group of independent third force countries, Lattimore summarizes the scheme's
purported advantages by saying (p. 237) :
"On our side, we shall have given a fresh impetus to both capitalism, and
political democracy. We shall have a strong competitive advantage in being
able to help more people get what they want than the Russians can. We shall
have turned the disadvantage of an Asia that we are not strong enough to
control into the advantage of an Asia strong enough to refuse to be controlled by
Russia."
Mr. Lattimore's point of view is obvious to those who read his books. To
my mind it is not based on espionage but on knowledge, analysis, and loyalty.
Arthur F. Wright, Assistant Professor of Chinese History, Stanford University,
Stanford, Calif.
I am sure you and your committee must be aware that Mr. Lattimore is the
author of many books. These writings, which are basic works for the under-
standing of Inner Asia, are not the work of a "Russian Agent" ; they are
unmistakably the work of a free creative American intellect. They are honest,
clear presentations of the results of mature scholarship and profound thought.
I realize that investigating committeemen have no time to read books, but these
hooks :ire the "documents" on Mr. Lattimore. and they completely exonerate
him from the contemptible and malicious slanders of Senator McCarthy.
We in university circles in northern California are gravely concerned over
the threat to our free institutions presented by Senator McCarthy and his fellow
witch-hunters. Many of us feel that the traditions and the prestige of the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1653
Senate are jeopardized by the completely conscienceless behavior of Senator
McCarthy and his ilk. I think you owe it to the august body of which you are
a Member and to the people of this country to see this investigation through to
the end with maximum publicity on all findings. So far the practice of investi-
gating committees lias hen to publicize charges, give some publicity to rebuttals,
and then leave the case and rush off on another. It is time that this shoddy and
on-American practice is brought to an end and that some semblance of fairness
and justice is introduced. We look to you. Senator, to see that, in the conduct
of the hearings on Mr. Lattiinore, the dignity and good name of the Senate are
maintained and the principles of our common law heritage preserved.
Dr. George Boas, Professor of Philosophy. Johns Hopkins University. Author:
The Major Traditions of European Philosophy; Philosophy and Poetry; etc.
It may be of interest to your committee that the undersigned is a veteran of
both wars, having served in the Infantry in the First World War and in the Navy
in the second. As for his political opinions, they are, as you know, those of
a continued Democrat. He is horrified to find in the United States Senate
a man who will not hesitate to blacken the name of one who is at present, as
so often in the past, serving the interests of the United States and the western
democracies unselfishly and tirelessly. Those of us who hold no political position
can do little but appeal to those who are in the Government for help in such
matters as these. It is with such an appeal in view that I am writing you,
trusting that the force of public opinion may back you up in seeing that justice
is done.
John A. Pope, Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art.
The investigations now being conducted by your subcommittee, necessary as
they may be, could do no greater disservice to our country than to deprive it of
the services of a man of the stature of Owen Lattimore.
Shannon McCtne, Department of Geography, Colgate University.
Mr. Lattimore's recognition of the strength of Russian influence in Asia and
his labor to make this important fact known, and appreciated by American cit-
izens, so as to guarantee a more workable foreign policy in Asia certainly does
not make him "an agent of Russia" and hardly constitutes "disloyalty" to the
United States. His early analysis of the situation in Asia and his plea for a
more aggressive American policy coupled with reform in various areas of Asia,
which would negate the Russian influence, cretainly should merit praise rather
than condemnation.
If defamatory practices such as Mr. McCarthy has used are continued, the
United States is going to find itself either without trained specialists in foreign
affairs or with a group of spineless yes men who will counsel us falsely. The
result will be the loss of this country's present position as the leader of those
countries and peoples who believe in democracy.
Prof. William R. Amberson, University of Maryland.
I wish to express to you my confidence in my good friend, Owen Lattimore, and
my conviction that he is a loyal and devoted citizen of this country- These
are indeed strange days when a scholar of Mr. Lattimore's high standing can be
so irresponsibly attacked. I have known him in the work of the Chinese Indus-
trial Cooperatives as a man with wide knowledge and broad human sympathies,
contributing much to the study of pressing political and social problems, par-
ticularly in the Far East. He is an able representative of the American liberal
tradition. I trust that you and other Senators who also hold that attitude, or at
least respect it, will see that he has full opportunity to explain his position, and
establish his integrity, as we, his friends, know that he can do.
L. Carrington Goodrich, Professor of Chinese, Columbia University. Author:
A Short History of the Chinese People:
As one who has known Mr. Owen Lattimore both in China and the United
States for well over twenty years, I would like to associate myself with those
who believe wholeheartedly that he is every inch a loyal American.
Earl Swisher, Director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of Colorado.
I have known Mr. Lattimore for many years both in China and in the United
States, and am personally convinced that there is no question of his loyalty
and certainly he is no Communist. Moreover, as a scholar and authority on
the northwest frontier of China, Dr. Lattimore is a valuable man to the State
1654 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Department and to the Nation, at a time when every expert we have is needed.
It seems to me a grave mistake to malign able and patriotic statesmen for
political or publicity motives.
For the last few years, it happens that I have disagreed with certain phases
of the policy which Mr. Lattimore has advocated for the United States in the
Far East. We have had arguments about this and if occasion offers shall
probably argue again, but this is certainly no reason for me or anyone else to
smear his good name or to call him a Communist, which would mean nothing
more nor less than saying that he disagreed with me. He may be right, but cer-
tainly both of us can have our opinion. I should hate to have my character
damaged because others are of a different opinion. If individual Americans and
particularly qualified experts are not allowed to develop and* express opinions
on vital American questions, the functioning of democracy will be seriously im-
paired.
Thomas C. Smith, Assistant Professor of Far Eastern History, Stanford Uni-
versity, California.
There is not the slightest evidence to support the charges of Senator McCar-
thy in the whole of Mr. Lattimore's extensive published works : nothing that
remotely suggests the Communist Party line and, indeed, the very quality of Mr.
Lattimore's thinking — tentative, empirical, and open-minded, is, quite aside from
the question of content, distinctly uncommunist.
The clear intent of Mr. Lattimore's more controversial books is an informed
public and an effective American foreign policy, to both of which he has made
a distinguished contribution. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that this is not
the way of a man such as Senator McCarthy alleges Mr. Lattimore to be, but of a
man who takes the responsibilities of his citizenship seriously.
Harold J. Weins, Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University.
Like many other Far Eastern scholars, I have known three of the individuals
singled out by Senator McCarthy in his attacks. During my service in the U. S.
Navy and the OSS I have had some contact with each of them. These men are
Owen Lattimore, John Service, and Haldore Hanson. I am convinced of their
American loyalty. These men have had occasion personally to learn about
both the Chinese Nationalist regime and the Chinese and other Communist
regimes and the effect of their operations upon the welfare of the Chinese and
other Asiatic peoples. In the course of their official duty with the Government
they were required to give objective appraisals of the situation as they observed
it. Because the evolution of reform under previous regimes or under the
Chinese Nationalist regime has been slow and even retrogressive, an objective
observer did not need to be "leftist" or even very "liberal" to discover that
in the contemporary scene the Communist regimes often served the people under
their control in a more. beneficial manner. Such a conclusion on his part need
have no bearing upon his political affiliation or loyalty. I am anti-Communist
and I believe that communism in the long run will harm the Chinese if it is
not eliminated. Neverthless, although many of my interpretations of the Far
Eastern situation differ from theirs, I have come to some of the same conclusions
as have Service or Hanson or Lattimore.
Alexander Laing, Librarian, Dartmouth College. Author: The Sea Witch;
Clipper Ship Men; Jonathan Eagle.
The other possible explanation is that Senator McCarthy is deliberately en-
dangering his country in the conduct of its foreign policy, his Republican Party
in its public reputation, the repute and dignity of Congress, and the good name
of a distinguished scholar and public servant, all to make dubious political
capital of some sort for the Senator personally. If this is the case, he is a
depraved scoundrel, a dangerous and deeply evil man.
Claude A. Buss, Professor of History, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.
Through conversations with him (Lattimore) and through careful study of his
books and articles, I respect him as one of our most profound and original Ameri-
can thinkers about the situation in Asia. Whether he has seen fit to support
or criticize any particular aspect of our policy in the Far East, I have always
noted that his attitude has stemmed from his fundamental regard for our na-
tional welfare and our national interest. Whenever I have disagreed with
hirn, I have never doubted the sincerity of his conviction that his ideas were
best for the United States.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1655
I like to think that I worked closely with him in the Office of War Information.
When I succeeded him as Director of the San Francisco Office, I found the Office
permeated with a spirit of contributing wherever we could to the winning ot
the war We all— British, Chinese, and Americans— cooperated against a com-
mon enemy No one was more jealous of American rights— wherever threat-
ened—than Mr. Lattimore. Our broadcasts to China were dedicated to the
help of our ally and it was deemed essential to stiffen the morale of the armies
of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek. Most of our Chinese employees
were naturally sympathetic with the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Consul Gen-
eral and the head of the official Kuo Min News Agency were always accorded
both the most cordial welcome at our office and the most liberal use of our
facilities.
Nobtjtaka Ike— .Former student of Mr. Lattimore and Curator, Japanese Collec-
tion, The Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
As a student of his I had almost daily contact with Mr. Lattimore. I saw
him not only at the university, but on many occasions at his home. Thus, I
came to know him very well as a teacher and a friend. For a period of three
years, I heard him discuss the grave problems that confront us as a world power.
His ideas were always creative and original, scarcely the kind that would be tol-
erated in Russia today. I feel certain that if you would carefully examine
the things that Professor Lattimore has stood for, you would come to the con-
clusion that the eharges made against him are entirely without foundation,
Virginia Thompson Adloff, Author, 30 Sutton Place, New York 22, N. Y. Au-
thor: French Inrlo-China; Thailand; The New Siam; Postmortem on Malaya.
I should like to offer my testimonial as to the devotion to democratic ideals
and the hrilliant scholarship in regard to East Asian affairs which Mr. Lattimore
has consistently shown. Such an irresponsible attack as Senator McCarthy has
made upon Mr. Lattimore is not only crudely unjust, but a hlow to other scholars
striving to stmlv the Far East from an objective viewpoint.
(Note. — Excerpts from various communications from people with a knowledge
of Owen Lattimore's work:)
Frederica de Lacuna, Associate Professor, Anthropology, Bryn Mawr College.
Senator McCarthy's attacks on the State Department and on Prof. Owen Latti-
more have been truly vicious. Have we indeed come to such a pass that the cit-
izen who tries to serve his country loyally in a position of importance, as Sec-
retary Acheson and Professor Lattimore have done, are to be branded as traitors,
without the protection of our courts, by any Member of Congress hiding behind
his immunity? Not only do such attacks make it impossible for us to carry out
any coherent foreign policy, and so play into the hands of those who would like
to see the United States divided and impotent, but they are subversive to the
rights and dignities of our citizens. Again and again we have seen loyal Gov-
ernment servants slandered, what good work they might do nullified, their fam-
ilies subjected to anguish and to actual threats of violence, as a result of such ill-
considered accusations. How are we to get able men, or keep them, in respon-
sible Government positions if they are to be treated in this way?
Franz Michael, Professor, Far Eastern History, University of Washington.
Through radio and newspaper reports, I have learned that Senator McCarthy
has accused Mr. Owen Lattimore of being a bad security risk and has attempted
to throw doubt upon Mr. Lattimore's character and loyalty to the United States,
indicating that he has betrayed this country by spying for Soviet Russia.
I have been deeply shocked by the carelessness with which the Senator is en-
dangering the honor and reputation of a citizen who happens to be a colleague
of mine in the field of Far Eastern studies. I have known Mr. Lattimore since
1039 when I was a research asistsant at Johns Hopkins University at the Walter
Hines Page School of International Relations of which Mr. Lattimore is the
director. During the time of my work there, I came to know Mr. Lattimore
well and have the fullest confidence in his character and in his loyalty to this
country.
I have the greatest respect for your committee and have no doubt that Mr.
Lattimore will be able to refute without difficulty the charges made by Senator
McCarthy. However, I want to express my deep concern over a state of affairs
in which Senator McCarthy should think it permissible to play so irresponsibly
with a person's honor and good name.
1656 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Li.otd D. Musolf, Graduate Student, The Johns Hopkins University.
I am writing this entirely unsolicited letter in protest against the serious
charges made against Prof. Owen Lattimore by Senator McCarthy. As a grad-
uate student at the John Hopkins University between 1946 and 1949, and as a
student in one of Professor Lattimore's classes for one of those years, I wish
to express my strong belief that the charges are utterly groundless. In his bril-
liant lectures Mr. Lattimore followed no one's line. As a matter of fact his is
the most independent and original mind I have ever encountered. If his writ-
ings and actions are studied as a whole instead of by calculated and dishonest
exegesis, this readily will become apparent.
Schuyler Van R. Cammann, Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania.
In the first place, it is ridiculous to call Professor Lattimore a Communist. His
writings show that he has no illusions about the present government of Russia.
In such books as Situation in Asia he has presented the stupidities and limitations
of the Russian rulers just as shrewdly as he has pointed out mistakes in our own
Far Eastern policies. As a distinguished scholar with high integrity he does
not let ideological arguments distract him from seeking out and presenting the
truth as he sees it, and we all know that such freedom is denied to members of
the Communist Party. Furthermore, he speaks freely of Russian imperialism,
which would be heresy for a Communist. In any case, as a determined indi-
vidualist and shrewd thinker, with a keen sense of humor, it would be tempera-
mentally impossible for him to follow the strict (though amusingly shifty) dog-
mas of the "party line," or to hold to the fanatic, pseudo-religious beliefs of
Russian communism.
As to the idea of his being an espioriage agent, that is extremely laughable to
anyone who knows him and his manifold activities. With the amount of time
he puts into teaching, writing, and lecturing, and the amount of energy he pours
into these tasks, it should be plain that he would have no time or energy left over
for a spy's duties even if he were so minded, which of course, he is not.
I hope that a review of Professor Lattimore's real achievements and his free-
dom from the charges leveled at him by Mr. McCarthy will put the latter in his
place. It is rather low to try to cover one's own bad record by reflecting on the
reputations of others, but it is doubly contemptible to have made public accusa-
tions of Professor Lattimore when he was out of the country and unable to
answer the slanderous attacks as soon as they were made. His conduct reflects
on his party as well as his country at a time when we urgently need constructive
forces to lead us.
George McTurnan Kahin, Lecturer in Political Science, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity.
I am shocked at the outrageously false charges of Senator McCarthy that Owen
Lattimore is pro-Communist and a Russian spy. I would like to make the fol-
lowing statement.
For the last three and a half years (except the period June 1948-June 1949
when I was in Indonesia on a fellowship of the Social Science Research Council)
I have as a graduate student, and recently as a faculty member, been a member
of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins
University. During this period I have been closely associated with Owen Latti-
more. My field is political science with special emphasis on the Far East. This
has meant that my frequent contact with Professor Lattimore — in class, in semi-
nar, and in personal conversation — has largely concerned discussion of the domi-
nant social and political, problems of the Far East. Communism and Soviet Far
Eastern policy, being among the most important of these problems, were fre-
quently discussed by Professor Lattimore. Never in such discussions, or at any
time, have I heard Professor Lattimore indicate sympathy for communism or for
Soviet policies. He certainly did show strong and vigorous anti-Communist
feelings repeatedly, sustainedly, and unequivocally. Consistently he was severe
;in<l incisive in his criticism of Russian policies.
James P. Warburg, Financial Adviser, World Economic Conference, London,
1933; Director Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York; Author: The
Money Muddle; Foreign Policy Begins at Home; etc.
As one who is proud to be a friend of Owen Lattimore and as a citizen deeply
concerned over the irreparable damage done to innocent, loyal, and in this case
exceptionally valuable citizens, by irresponsible denunciation, may I respectfully
urge you to see to it that your committee after due investigation take whatever
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1657
action it may deem appropriate affirmatively to clear Lattimore in such a way
as to leave no rioulit in the public mind. When citizens of the character of Sec-
retary Acheson, Ambassador Jessup, and Owen Lattimore are denounced by a
United States Senator as bad security risks it is time for the Senate to reassert
its own dignity and to repair as best it may the damage done to the prestige of
the United States.
Yi i.h.i ai.mkr Stefansson, Explorer and Arctic Specialist
Protest most strongly McCarthy's Lattimore attack. Lattimore and men like
him are our best defense against communism and fascism.
Pearl Buck. Author: The Good Earth, etc.
Richard J. Walsh, President of John Day, Publishers.
We are indignant and dismayed at completely false charges against Owen Lat-
timore. We have known him for nearly twenty-five years both in China and
United States and have read his books and kept informed of all his activities.
We have often and recently discussed with him his views on Asia on which he is
leading expert today. We know that he is opposed to communism. The false
charges are all the more unfortunate for the United States because this country
needs the services of a man of his experience and wisdom. We urge immediate
investigation of what persons and interests are behind this destructive attack.
E. Cowles Andrus, M. D., Baltimore, Md.
My wife and I have known Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore since his association with
the Johns Hopkins University. I have full confidence in his integrity and
patriotism.
Mrs. Sanford V. Larkey, President City-County Democratic Club, 1010 Winding
Way, Baltimore 10, Md.
We are your constituents. We appeal to you to take appropriate action to pro-
tect one of your constituents — Owen Lattimore, a resident of Baltimore County.
We refer to the slanderous statements made on and off the Senate floor by Sen-
ator McCarthy whose irresponsible accusations against Mr. Lattimore have
shocked this entire community.
He has not as yet been able to present evidence for any of his charges and
when his victims have been able to reply he has been proved guilty of misrepre-
senting facts which are easily available to those who might wish the truth. It
is our opinion that such conduct is unworthy of a Senator. We therefore call
upon you to make your stand in this matter unequivocal and to initiate expulsion
proceedings against Senator McCarthy.
Edward A. Parks, M. D., Former Director Harriet Lane Clinic, The Johns Hop-
kins Hospital, Professor of Pediatrics.
It is a tragedy that Senator McCarthy is enacting. From his position of sen-
atorial immunity he is mortally injuring splendid American citizens. Although
Mr. Lattimore will be completely exonerated for the simple reason that he is
completely innocent of the charges made, he can never recover from the wound
inflicted and I am afraid that his great usefulness to this country with his vast
knowledge of conditions in the Far East will be permanently impaired. It is easy
for Senator McCarthy from a height which cannot be reached to toss out atomic
bombs indiscriminately but he ought to be made to pay in some way for damage
to the lives of patriotic citizens.
Margaret O. Young, Mr. Lattimore's secretary from 1938 to 1941.
No doubt you will receive many letters testifying to the integrity of Owen
Lattimore, and expressing indignation at the charges placed against him.
I want to add one more, and to say that I worked as Mr. Lattimore's secretary
from November 1938 until August 1941, and at no time was there the least indi-
cation of subversive activity. In my opinion he is a man of high principles and
broad outlook, and the charges against him are grossly unjust. Every effort
should be made to clear his good name.
Robert E. Sherwood. Playwright ; Author : The Petrified Forest; Idiot's Delight;
Roosevelt and Hopkins.
During the Se -ond World War, I became closely personally associated with
Lattimore in the Offi-e of War Information. He directed the part of our over-
seas activities concerned with the war in Asia and the Pacific. He was important
as a policy maker. I therefore have had ample opportunity to gain knowledge of
his opinions and his general processes of thought and I respectfully beg to assure
1658 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
you of my conviction that any charges or insinuations against his loyalty to our
country, our Constitution and our American way of life are as outrageous as
they are fantastic.
Elmer Davis, American Broadcasting Co., Washington 9, D. C. Director, Office
War Information (1942-1945) ; News Analyst, American Broadcasting Co.
Lattimore is accused of promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia, of
apparently preferring totalitarian government in Japan to the kind of democracy
Mac-Arthur is giving, of being a bad security risk and an old-time pro-Communist.
1 have known Owen Lattimore for years ; he was one of my leading associates
in the Office of War Information. He may have overestimated the nationalistic
aspects of the present Chinese Communist regime, but if he did. so did many
other people. To call him a pro-Communist or to say that he prefers totalitarian
government anywhere, is as ridiculous as to say that he is trying to ruin Chris-
tianity.
Rev. Louis M. J. Schkam, Immaculate Heart Missions.
I am a scholarly Roman Catholic priest, student of the University of Louvain,
Belgium, and the University of Leyden, Holland, and have spent the last forty
years in Mongolia and on the borders of Tibet. I am in America now to publish
the material on which I have worked for the past forty years.
It is in this connection that I am glad to cooperate with the Walter Hines Page
School of International Relations, so that this part of the world can be made
known through our publications to the Western World.
Edgar Snow, Contributing Editor, Saturday Evening Post.
I should like to add my protest to the hundreds you have doubtless received
from other loyal citizens, against the unfair and un-American persecution of
Owen Lattimore (and others) being currently conducted under the cloak of
senatorial immunity by Joseph R. McCarthy.
I believe you wish to be scrupulously just in your own part in this hearing and
for that reason may welcome this voluntary statement.
I happen to have known Mr. Lattimore for 17 years. In that period I have had
numerous opportunities to study and judge his character, as well as his work.
In my opinion he represents the highest type of American— devoted to democratic
ideals and principles, superior in his intelligence, a first-rate scholar, and wise in
the judgments he has offered to the American people concerning events which
affect our future and our lives.
I myself was born in Missouri in a family descended from generations of
Americans. Whatever I know of Americanism, and how to identify it in others,
derives fundamentally from what I learned from my parents' teachings and in
American schools. I know Mr. Lattimore so well that I can say that if he is
"disloyal" then my own teachers and parents were likewise. I do not find in any
of Lattimore's writings, nor in my recollections of any of our many conversations,
nor in my knowledge of his behavior, anything which would violate the good
conscience or the best standards of Americanism.
Aside from that, in my own work as a journalist I have been concerned with
matters on which Mr. Lattimore is regarded as a specialist. This experience as
a foreign correspondent has also equipped me to judge whether anyone is, or is
not, a Communist or a spy or an agent for Russia in an objective or a subjective
sense. In the present instance it is Senator McCarthy, not Lattimore, who is
serving, objectively, as a tool of Russia, however unwitting. They could not
(the Russians) conceive,of anything better calculated to advance their propa-
ganda aims than Senator McCarthy's current campaign, which is making a
shambles of the integrity and dignity of the entire United States Government.
Mr. Lattimore could not possibly be a spy for Russia. No Communist could
write the books he has written. No one could read them and assert that he has
been the "architect of our Far Eastern Policy."
Stanley Salem, Executive Vice President, Little Brown & Co. Telegram to
Senator Aiken.
As editor of Owen Lattimore's last three books I can vouch for the fact that
his greatest concern has been that the United Stales should not lose its position
as the leader of democratic principles in the Far East. I know you have been
thinking about the same problem within the United States and I hope you will
do everything possible to give Lattimore a chance to set forth the truth.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1659
Theodore Weeks, Editor of the Atlantic Monthly. (Letter to Senator Tydings.)
Forgive me if I speak personally, but so men must do when they arc troubled.
This is my twenty-fifth year on the start of the Atlantic and the twenty-fourth
in my friendship with Owen, and it saddens me to sec what a reckless accusation
flapping in the wind for a few days can do to smirch the record and the authority
Of a man who has given so much of his life to the work be loves. Owen Latti-
more is no Communisl : anyone who knows him knows that be is loyal to this
country ami that he has written and worked for its best interest.
Throughout Ids career, lie lias believed in The Open Door policy for the Chinese
and in the early l'.i-iO's. it was his hope as it was that of many Americans that
the country could he unified under Chiang Kai-shek. Even as recently as Jan-
uary 1950, in the Atlantic he wrote: "The Kuomintang, under the increasingly
jeaious and narrow leadership of Chiang, put up the worst possible defense of
cause that was originally good and should have won." He could not fail to
detect the increasing corruption in Nationalist China ; in this he was not alone —
ask any American who flew the Hump. * * * We accuse the Politburo of
telling Stalin only what Stalin wants to hear. Now it seems to me appalling that
there should be Americans in high places who try to make Mr. Lattimore the
scapegoat because he told the truth.
Sample Misquotations in Senator McCarthy's References to Lattimore
Writings
1. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quoting from Solution
in Asia, p. 139, said Lattimore wrote that the Russians had "a greater power of
attraction" for Asiatic peoples.
The correct phrase in the book is "a great power of attraction." The
book then adds that the United States has a potentially greater power of
attraction for the same peoples.
2. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 4458) quoting from Situation
in Asia, p. 53, said Lattimore agreed with Stalin's formula for revolution.
In the book, Lattimore explains this formula and points out that America
can prove it wrong.
3. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quoting from Situation
in Asia, p. 89, in reference to the Russian gutting of Manchurian factories, said
Lattimore claimed that "this has not diminished the Russian power of attraction
in Asia."
In the book, Lattimore called it "a ruthless example of the sacrifice of the
interests of non-Russian Communists to the paramount interest of the Soviet
Union." In an entirely different paragraph, the book says "On the whole,
however, the Russian power of attraction has not diminished, at least
potentially."
4. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 4459) quotes correctly from
Solution in Asia, p. 94, but says "The period referred to is the late thirties."
The period actually is the early thirties and Senator McCarthy has thereby
misapplied the quotation to distort my position.
(See explanation in last sentence above.)
5. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 444S) quotes correctly from
The Situation in Asia, p. 23S, but exactly contradicts the meaning of the pas-
sage by his remark "In other words, he says to America, 'Keep your hands off.' "
He further contradicts the meaning by not quoting the immediately pre-
ceding paragraph which expresses my confidence in American participation
in Asiatic affairs.
6. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 4469) quotes from a Lattimore
"article 'Asia Conquers Asia' in March of this year in which Lattimore refers
to Russian communism only as a 'hypothetical threat — a card unplayed.' "
The article was actually titled "Asia Reconquers Asia." It included
several different references to Russian communism. One passage, perhaps
distantly related to what Senator McCarthy quoted, reads : "As it is, we do
not even have a measuring stick for assessing what kind of strength Russia
has in the Far East or how much of it there may be. Whatever the Russian
strength, it remains behind the Russian frontier — undeployed, unexposed,
a card unplayed."
7. Senator McCarthy (Congressional Record, p. 444S) quotes correctly from
Situation in Asia, p. 147, about supplies going to the Kuomintang and then com-
ments, "This is Communist propaganda pure and simple." On the contrary this
statement is based upon the most reliable eyewitness sources : American news-
papermen working in China and is so credited in a footnote.
**8970 — 50 — pt. 2 12
1660 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 74
[Columbia, September 1949]
Disaster in China
(By James F. Kearney, S. J.)
Who or what has so vitiated the opinion of intelligent Americans on the
China question? Until recently, despite the dust that has been deliberately
thrown in American eyes by pink correspondents, the question could be stated
so clearly and simply that grammer school students could grasp it. Having
explained it to grammar school students, I know. Here it is, expressed in mono-
syllabic words : "If the Reds win out there, we lose. If they lose, we win."
Well, for all practical purposes, the Reds have now won, and in consequence
we and the Chinese have lost. For communism it is the greatest triumph since
the Russian Revolution ; for us, though few Americans yet fully realize it, it is
perhaps the greatest disaster in our history ; and the end is not yet. Who is
responsible? It wasn't a one-man job; short-sighted Chinese officials contributed
some 50 percent to the catastrophe, we the other 50 percent. There are those
who believe, though, that no Americans deserve more credit for this Russian
triumph and Sino-American disaster than Owen Lattimore and a small group
of his followers.
Owen Lattimore, confidant of two United States Presidents, adviser to our
State Department, author of ten books about the Far East, where he has twenty-
five years of travel and study to his credit, was born in Washington, D. C, but
after a few months was taken to North China. At twelve Iip went to study
in Switzerland, then in England, and returned to China as a newsman before
taking up exploration, particularly in Manchuria and Mongolia. He then
studied in Peiping, first on a fellowship from the Harvard Yenching Foundation
and later on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation fellowship, knows
the Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian languages well.
Returning to the United States at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war
in 1937, a year later he became director of the Walter Hines Page School of
International Relations of Johns Hopkins University, a post he still holds. In
1941 he was for six months President Roosevelt's political adviser to Generalis-
simo Chiang Kai-shek, then returned to the States to enter OWI, becoming
deputy director to the overseas branch in charge of Pacific Operations. In
June 1944 he and J. Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of
the State Department, accompanied Henry Wallace on a diplomatic tour of
Siberia and Free China.
So high does Owen Lattimore stand in Washington that it is said the only
two books on President Truman's desk when he announced Japan's surrender
were newsman John Gunther's Inside Asia and Lattimore's Solution in Asia.
Lattimore was next named special economic adviser to Edwin V. Pauley, head
of the postwar economic mission to Tokyo. Though not an authority on Japan,
he did not hesitate to criticize former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's plan,
adopted by MacArthur, to govern the Japanese people through the Emperor.
He believed that the Emperor and all his male heirs should be interned in China
and a republic set up in Japan.
In this thoroughly distinguished orientalist's career there are many disturb-
ing features. For example, in former Red Louis Budenz' March 19, 1949,
Collier's article, entitled "The Menace of Red China," we read, "Most Americans,
during World War II, fell for the Moscow line that the Chinese Communists
were not really Communists * * * but 'agrarian reformers'. * * * That
is just what Moscow wanted Americans to believe. Even many naive Govern-
ment officials fell for it. * * * This deception of United States officials and
public was the result of a planned campaign ; I helped to plan it. * * * The
number one end was a Chinese coalition government in which Chiang would
accept the 'agrarian reformers' — at the insistence of the United States. * * *
We could work through legitimate Far East organizations and writers that were
recognized as Oriental authorities. Frederick V. Field emphasized use of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * The 'agrarian reformers' idea started
from there. It took root in leading Far East cultural groups in the United
States, spread to certain policy-making circles in the State Department and
broke into prominent position in the American press. * * * The Communists
were successful in impressing their views on the United States State Department
simply by planting articles with the proper slant in such magazines as Far
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1661
Eastern Survey. Pacific Affairs, and Amerasia. Both Far Eastern Survey and
Pacific Affairs are publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Tins is not
a Communist organization."
Where does Mr. Lattimore come in? From 1034 to P.)41 he was editor of
Pacific Affairs. Freda Utley mentions him in two of her hooks. In her Last
Chance in China she tells how Moscow, where she then worked as a Communist,
was able to help ils friends and discomfit its enemies in the Far East thanks
to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that Mr. Lattimore was anions those
Americans who came to Moscow for help and advice (p. 193). In her Lost
Illusion (p. 1!>4) she refers to the same 1936 Moscow meeting: "The whole
staff of our Pacific Ocean Cabinet had an all-day session at the Institute with
E. C. Cartel-. Owen Lattimore, and Harriet Moore, leading lights of the Institute
of Pacific Relations. I was a little surprised at the time that these Americans
should defer so often and so completely to the Russian viewpoint. * * *
Owen Lattimore found it difficult at first to submit to the discipline required
of the Friends of the Soviet Union. He told me a few months later in London
how he had almost lost his position as editor of Pacific Affairs because he had
published an article by the Trotskyist Harold Isaacs. In later years in the
United States it did not astonish me to find the Institute of Pacific Relations
following the same general lines as the Daily Worker in regard to China and
1 Japan."
Henry Wallace never claimed to be an expert on the Far East. How much,
if any, of his report after returning from the Siberia-China visit was written
or suggested by the oriental expert, Mr. Lattimore, I do not know. One thing
emerges, however: after their return, the American policy which has proved
•so disastrous for both Chinese and American interests and so helpful to Russia
was put into effect and is still being pursued. Lattimore's Solution in Asia
was described by one reviewer as "an appeal to Chiang Kai-shek to free himself
from the galling yoke (of the Kuomintang) and to set free the democratic
forces which have proved effective in northwestern China," i. e., the Chinese Reds.
"That book is again referred to in an article by ex-Communist Max Eastman
and J. B. Powell in a June 1945 Reader's Digest article, "The Fate of the World
Is At Stake in China," wherein they blast the deception "that Russia is a
'democracy' and that the Chinese can therefore safely be left to Russian influ-
ence.-' Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous
conception.
Mr. Lattimore praised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge
by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39 as "a triumph for democracy."
UIe now urges our government, in Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the
spread of the "Soviet form of democracy" in Central Asia. His publishers thus
indicate the drift of his book: "He (Mr. Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic
peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they
can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories
of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism."
Does that sound as if Mr. Lattimore, a top adviser on our Far Eastern affairs,
is on our team?
The same article continues with a prophecy which has just about come true:
"If Russian dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China the cause of de-
mocracy (i. e., United States style) in Asia is lost. As is well-known, these
tentacles need not include invading Soviet troops, but only the native Communist
parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives
•from Moscow. When these Communist parties get control of a neighboring state
the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow-travelers call that a 'friendly govern-
ment." It is by means of these Communist-controlled 'friendly governments' —
not by Soviet military conquest — that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny
is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe."
That is perhaps good background for the current slogan of Mr. Lattimore and
his loyal followers, Edgar Snow, Ted White, Richard Lauterback, Harvard's
JFairbank, and many an ex-OWI man — that there's nothing much for America to
worry about because Mao Tse-tung's communism is a nationalist movement.
A moment's reflection should make it clear that the very last thing a real
Chinese nationalist would do would be to swallow hook, line, and sinker the
• doctrine of Karl Marx, a German Jew, who besides being a foreigner has
a system that goes counter to every Chinese instinct and every tradition in the
Chinese concept of society.
This recalls an incident a Belgian priest related to me in Shanghai a year
and a half ago. He had become a Chinese citizen, and when the Chinese Reds
1662 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
occupied his church in North China they followed the usual custom (which is
probably news to Mr. Lattimore) of putting up the pictures of Marx and Stalin
in the place of honor above the high altar, with those of Mao Tse-tung and
Chu Teli below. A Chinese Red then told the priest flatly, "We are going to
get rid of absolutely all foreign influence in China. Our policy is China for
the Chinese." I can imagine Mr. Lattimore saying, "Just what I told you!"
But the Belgian-Chinese replied, "And those two foreign gentlemen up there,
Marx and Stalin? When did they become Chinese citizens'?" The Red slunk
silently away.
If anyone is still puzzled by the contention that Chinese Mai'xists are pri-
marily nationalists, a glance at the Communist Manifesto will clear matters up,
"Though not in substance, yet in form," we read there, "the struggle of the
proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat
of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bour-
geoisie." That, I believe, shows us what is back of the present national slogan
our United States pinks apply to China's Reds. It's not authentic nationalism,
of course, as the Manifesto explains later : 'The Communists are reproached
with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The workingmen have no
country. We cannot take from them what they have not got."
The spurious nature of the nationalism of Mao Tse-tung was admitted by Mr.
Lattimore himself, perhaps unintentionally, in a tape-recorded speech he gave in
San Francisco, December 7, 1948: "The Chinese Communists never made any
bones about the fact that they are Marxists. They are Marxist Communists
in their international relations. They never question the Russian line. They
follow every twist and turn of it." That is an important admission by Mr.
Lattimore, since so many of his followers have been trying to tell us there is no
Moscow control over China's Reds. If they follow every twist and turn of the
Moscow line they are evidently not Chinese nationalists as we understand the
term, but pseudo nationalists.
A. T. Steele and Andrew Roth, of the New York Herald Tribune and the
Nation, respectively, after getting out of Red Peiping recently, declared that
the Chinese Red leaders are in every sense of the word Communists who stand
squarely and faithfully for the Moscow Party line, and will join the Kiemlin
in the coming world war III against the imperialist powers, particularly America.
They likewise agree that while Mao might possibly become an extreme nationalist
at some future date, another Tito, there is absolutely no evidence that this is
a factor to be seriously reckoned with for a long time, Mr. Lattimore to the
contrary notwithstanding. Spencer Moosa, latest newsman out of Peiping,
confirms their statements. The very first movie put on by the Reds in the
auditorium of the Catholic University in Peiping after they moved in this year
was the Life of Stalin. Need we say it was not anti-Russian? And so, instance
after instance shows the very close connection between Moscow and Chinese
communism that has been witnessed throughout the last twenty-eight years
by intelligent observers who have lived in Red China — where Mr. Lattimore
has never lived.
To the average American, whom pro-Red propaganda is intended to victimize,
it seems quite natural that Mao Tse-tung, a native of China who has never
visited Moscow, should think first of China's instead of Russia's interests. Yet
how many native-born Americans are there who, once they join the party,
think nothing of selling out their country and its secrets to the Kremlin? Such
is the strange mesmerism exercised by their Moscow masters. It is, then, no
harder to understand Mao's utter devotion to the party line than it is to
understand that of Foster, or Dennis, or Earl Browder. After all, remember,
a real Communist has no country. And surely Mao has proved he is a one
hundred percent Communist. Let's not be deceived any longer, then, by this
fake "nationalism" of China's Reds, which is the central thesis of Mr. Lattimore's
recent book, The Situation in Asia.
If a man who had written ten volumes about Africa, and thereby won a name
for himself as an authority, should nevertheless maintain that the Negroes
in Africa aren't really black but white, it would be a cause for wonder. Mr.
Owen Lattimore, who has written ten books on Asia and is called "the best-in-
formed American on Asiatic affairs living today," is doubtless well-informed
on many Asiatic matters but unfortunately, if we are to take his written words
as an index of his knowledge of China's Reds, he is very badly misinformed
about the true color of that most important body of individuals and their
whole way of acting. Which reminds me of a recent conversation with one of
Mr. Lattimore's OWI boys who had just returned from a three-years' corres-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1663
pondent assignment in China. I asked him why it was that practically all our
foreign uewsmen, though supposedly educated in the American tradition of
fair play, spoke entirely of corruption in the Chiang regime, but said nothing
about the corruption in the Mao regime? And this man, who was being paid
for giving his American readers an honest picture of conditions in the vital
Far East, answered, "Because there is no corruption in the Red regime!" I
laughed at him for wasting his three years in the Orient and passed him an
article showing that not only is the Red regime corrupt, but from every con-
ceivable American standpoint it is conservatively ten times more corrupt than
its corrupt opposite number.
It is probably of such men that Mr. Lattimore, in his Situation in China (p.
177 i. writes: "Hitherto American observers who have been acutely conscious
of secret police activities in Kuomintang China have had nothing comparable
to report from Communist China." The reason is that these official observer's
were allowed the freedom to observe the limited activities of KMT secret
police, while they weren't even permitted to enter Red China. Had they wished,
though, they could have learned a lot from people, some of them Americans,
who had lived in Red China. They would have heard for instance about the
"T'ing chuang hui," or eavesdropper corps, who after killing off all watchdogs,
creep up at night, next to the wall or on the flat roofs of North China homes,
to hear what is being said inside the family about the Communists. Children
.are rewarded for spying on their parents and, if anyone is believed to be guilty
of anti-Communist remarks, a terror gang swoops down at midnight and the
chances are the unfortunate victim will be discovered next morning buried alive
outside his home. This sort of secret police and terrorism combined has been
so universal in Red China that if Mr. Lattimore doesn't know about it he knows
extremely little of Chinese communism.
As far back as 1945 the predominant sentiment everywhere in Red areas was
fear, universal fear, fear at every instant, according to an official report of a
Frenchman, a former university professor from Tientsin who spent the years
from 1941 to 1945 in Red territory, and had been hailed before both Japanese
and Red tribunals. "It is not terror," he says, "for terror is a fear which shows
itself exteriorly. Here one must not allow his fear to be seen ; he must appear
satisfied and approve everything that is said and done. It is a hidden fear,
but a creeping, paralyzing fear. The people keep quiet. They do not criticize ;
they avoid passing out any news. They are afraid of their neighbor, who may
denounce them. They are afraid of the Reds who might hear and imprison
them. When the Reds impose a tax, it is paid without a word. If they requisition
anyone for public work, the work is done carefully and rapidly, without need
of any blows and curses as in the time of the Japanese, and wonderful to say,
without any need of supervision. (This is amazing to anyone who knows the
easy-going Chinese character.) I have witnessed groups of workers along the
big highways built by the Japanese, doing exactly the same kind of work they
did for the Japanese; but how different their attitude! There was no foreman
there to supervise, and yet everything was done carefully, with hardly a word,
without the least bit of joking." Mr. Lattimore, with his lack of background,
might interpret this as a sign of enthusiasm for the Red masters. But the
report states simply, "They were afraid."
What was true in 1945 in Red areas is also true today according to the very
latest 1949 reports that have filtered through the Bamboo Curtain : "There isn't
too much suffering from hunger in the city, but it is impossible to lay up any
reserves. The Communists search every house methodically and confiscate any
surplus. Anyone who complains or criticizes them disappears mysteriously,
"buried alive, it is said. No one dares say a word, even to his best friend. In the
country districts conditions are terrible. The Reds take everything : grain,
livestock, clothing, tools, and now all are being mobilized for army service.
Famine reigns everywhere together with fear. The people endure this with
clenched teeth, but when asked how things are going always answer, 'Every-
thing is going well.' " They had better !
These reports come from reliable people who were there and know what they
are talking about, and who ridicule the fairy tales Mr. Lattimore from his distant
and comfortable chair in Johns Hopkins spins for eager young Americans who
believe he is an authority on China's Reds. What, for example, could be further
from the truth than this statement in The Situation in China, p. 100 : "In China
it may be conceded (not by anyone who knows the situation, though, if I may
interrupt) that the Communists hold the confidence of the people to such an
extent that they can probably do more by persuasion, with less resort to coercion,
1664 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
than any previous revolutionaries in history. But the Communists cannot
indulge in experiments which the people do not accept, because the armed and
organized peasants would be able to resist them just as they have hitherto
resisted the return of the landlords," Sheer nonsense ! The only real landlords
left in Red areas are the Red leaders themselves, and the people know enough
not to try to resist these ruthless masters. For some reason, no one seems to
relish being buried alive ; and so the Communists can indulge in absolutely any
experiment they choose without the slightest open resistance from the peasants,
who are merely waiting patiently for better days.
Since Mr. Lattimore is patently in error on so many vital points connected
with the China Red question, it becomes more and more strange that his advice
on Red China should be followed almost slavishly by the United States State
Department. It has already brought China to disaster and may, if we continue
to follow it, also ruin America. It might be well to consider what advice he
has given for future United States policy so we shall know what a new litany of
Lattimore disasters awaits us.
He has a chapter on Japan in his Situation in Asia and, though he admits
General MacArthur is a first-class administrator, he dislikes his "fatherly
mysticism" and "old-line Republicanism," hints it would have been wiser to give
the Russians more say, considers the present policy as pseudo realistic and
bound to fail. "It's likely to blow up in our faces, like a humiliating stink
bomb," damaging MacArthur's reputation in the end. He doesn't like keeping
the Emperor, nor the type of democracy MacArthur is giving, apparently pre-
ferring for Japan the totalitarian type Mao Tse-tung is employing in China.
Mr. Lattimore doesn't like to see Japan made a bulwark against Russian expan-
sion, and believes that since she is possessed of the most advanced technical and
managerial know-how in Asia she will eventually make her own terms with
both Russia and China, without consulting the United States. "The Japanese,
watching America's failure to control the situation in China through the Kuomin-
tang, have been giggling in their kimono sleeves. In a queer way it has helped
to restore their self-respect for their own failure on the continent." He sees
no future for Japan apart from the future of Asia, since she needs the iron
and coal of Manchuria and the markets of China.
In this he is probably right; that is why it was always to America's vital
interest to see that the Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China
were preserved, though this adviser to our State Department did not think them
very imporant. He considers East Asia now definitely out of control by either
Russia or America, stating that it forms a group of "third countries," which
seem to resemble Nippon's ill-fated "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." He
believes Japan, then, will come to terms both with Communist Russia and Com-
munist China, and will end up by being more anti-American than anti-Russian.
If we had only adopted his plan for a Japanese "democracy" right after the war,,
what a deal of trouble we would have saved !
What, now, are his plans for the mainland? He was long in favor of a Chiang
coalition with the Reds, and blames our Eightieth Congress for spoiling that.
The result is now Communist control — which of course would have eventuated
just as well had his original coalition idea gone through. "We mustn't lay down
our own conditions for dealing with a Red China, he says, or we shall spoil
our favorable position with the Chinese. Has he never heard how Mao's Reds
detest Americans, and hold half a dozen United States consuls under house1
arrest? "We must at all costs avoid the appearance of wanting to punish the
Chinese people for having a government which we didn't approve for them in
advance." As if the Chinese were really anxious for a puppet Red regime.
We must not support any rump government, for that would be dividing China.
We must extend credits to poor Red China and help build it up by trade and
American engineering "know-how" as "Ford Motors and General Electric did
in Russia in the period between wars." But let's not lay down any conditions-,
for our aid, by insisting that Red China be hostile to Red Russia.
And if all that isn't enough to make Uncle Sam snspect that Owen Lattimore
is making a fool out of him in the interests of world communism, the expert
goes much further: "The new government of China will claim China's Big Five
position in the United Nations, including the right of veto. By the use of our
own veto we could delay China in moving into this position," but of course it
would be unfair to deprive Russia of another vote, especially since Russia has
had nothing whatsoever to do with imposing communism on China. See now
why the pinks are so strong on their insistence that the Bed movement in China
is purely nationalistic? And another vote for Mother Russia?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1665
Let's take Outer Mongolia, that voted unanimously to be annexed to Russia
in 1945 — each voter being required to sign his name on Ins ballot. "Mongolia,"
he says, "is between a Communist-ruled Russia and a Communist-controlled
China. Ii would be an advantage to American policy to be able to emphasize that
there is a country occupying 600,000 square miles of territory * * * inhabited
by people who are neither Chinese nor Russians. It is impossible to make use
of this advantage unless the separation of outer Mongolia is emphasized by
membership in the United Nations. * * * it is true that Mongolia as a
member of the United Nations would mean another vote for Russia; but would
tbis be a greater disadvantage than our present complete lack of access to this
key country between China and Russia?" (p. 226).
Yes. Mr. Lattimore. it would. Considering that the whole United States has:
but one vote in the United Nations, while Russia started out with three, it is
simply wonderful of Owen Lattimore to give a couple more Far East satellite
votes to our "cold war" enemy. Since he is one of the chief advisers to our
Far Eastern State Department Bureau, is it any wonder that disaster has been
piled on disaster in Asia for Americans while world communism engages in
frenzied applause? If Mr. Lattimore is permitted to turn over one Far Eastern
vote after another to Russia, Moscow will soon dominate the United Nations,
and then can safely discard the veto. Why should one man, whose writings
show he has no knowledge of the character of China's Reds, be allowed to go
on unchallenged promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia? True, he
doesn't say he wants a Red Asia; but the publisher of his Situation in Aria
indicates his intentions when on the jacket of the book they print a map of
Lattimore's Asia, including Japan, Sakhalin, all of China, the Philippines, 1 Qe
Dutch East Indies, Siam, Burma, Malaya, and India, in nice Soviet Red.
Exhibit No. 75
[From the New Masses, October 12, 1937]
China's Communists Told Mb — A Specialist in Fab Easteen Affaibs Inteb-
views the Leading Men of Red China in Theib Home Teekitobies
(By Philip J. Jaffe)
Fifteen days before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near
Peiping. I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tvngr
the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the in ;er-
view Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants to
swallow China. Its next stept will not be long delayed. You ask about the
future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's
invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable."
Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese
Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked
the most famous of the Communist commanders, General Chu Teh : "Why do
you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red
Army?"
Chu Teh replied : "A form of the united front has now existed for several
months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese
bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year fight against the
Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not be a
question of what the bourgeoisie wants ; they will have to have the Red Army.
In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops. China
must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists alone can
lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count ; it is the mass
population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a large army
to fight Japan, without at the same time enrolling the masses as the backbone
of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against Japan can
be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and workers, and
this only the Red Army can successfully carry out."
Two weeks later I knew that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders of
the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded
North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united front — that of military
cooperation — was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the
words of the official communique from Nanking, "the Chinese government and
1666 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years ; this is the official
conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor of the
former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District. Chu
Teh has been appointed commander-in-chief of the former Red Army, now called
the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Communist with
whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff in
Nanking.
Mao Tse-tung, political leader. — Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet re-
gion. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi
province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi-
starved villages, on bridgeless rivers and roads deep with gullies, we finally
passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yenan. We were greeted
at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old
friend of the Chinese people. While in Yenan, our party which included beside
myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore,
editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon
buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan,
when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san,
an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen ; the only two non-Chinese then in the region,
Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow, and
many Communist leaders. Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety
of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered
quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao,'' someone said — Mao Tse-tung, the polit-
ical leader of the then Cbinese Soviet Government.
We spent many hours with him after that evening — at interviews, during
meals, at the theater — and we were increasingly impressed by the complete
sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leaders
we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force,
a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet
restraint of his movements, and the beautiful hands, almost too delicate for a
soldier, but so dexterous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks
with brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall slim body with slightly
stopped shoulders are sure and well coordinated. Like all other Red Army com-
manders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers, eats
the same food, sleeps on the same sort of k'ang (a low, long bed of stone), avoids
all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It becomes
easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has as a leader.
This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the committee
ivhich organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920. Mao
was an important figure at that meeting.
Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics : the
evolution of Nanking's policy; the inner political struggle within Nanking; the
Sian incident ; the united front ; the student movement ; the role of other
powers in Far Eastern affairs ; and the perspectives of China's future develop-
ment, etc. But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the
American people, it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning
America and its isolationist policy.
"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he
began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect
like other capitalist countries: part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one
nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is
world-wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the
world proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American prole-
tariat, but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peasants
and workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to that
of other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well
as conflicting ones — common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that
each wants what the oilier has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great
Britain and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United
States. If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for
the Chinese people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers."
At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall
of Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, Leon Blum. We discussed
the probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the
world situation, despite the isolating distance. We took time off to answer a
host of questions, this time by him. What is the comparative strength of the
Socialist and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life-stories of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1667
John L. Lewis and Karl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions?
The Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far Bast?
Then Mao Tse-tung continued: "The Chinese revolution is not an exception, it
is one part of the world revolution, it lias special characteristics, but funda-
mentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles.
These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this
similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their
concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also con-
cerned with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your
people. The difference between our peoples lies in this : the Chinese people, unlike
the Americans, are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of
course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope com-
mon to all of us that our two countries shall work together."
Chu Teh, military leader. — Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world for
his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met
Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the Chi-
nese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mistaken
for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Political
University at Tenan, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist
principles. From 1022 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science,
philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German
freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding,
and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops.
His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found
hanging about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly
moves on to the next court in the hope that there his luck will turn. My greatest
disappointment at Yenan was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play
basketball with him.
Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personifica-
tion of the spirit of these armies which for ten years have been continuously
victorious in the face of overwhelming odds. His career has been devoted
mainly to the military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he
has taken part in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow
of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the present struggle against Japan. Begin-
ning with August 1, 1927, when, together with another famous Red commander,
Ho Lung, he organized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which
have now become legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in
Juikin, Kiangsi, bestowed upon him the title of commander-in-chief of the army.
Even in Nanking I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all
China.
There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong
peasant face, weather beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright
eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took
a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh.
"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety
thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending
from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yenan to Sanyan
there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region pro-
fessional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number
of part-time partisans is much larger ; their duties are to maintain order in their
districts.
"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand
come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited
on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas.
"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three
thousand soldiers, but it is bard to estimate the total figure ; we ourselves are
not certain about this. These partisan areas are located in southern Shensi
(southwest of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei
border, northeastern Kiangsi. the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwang-
tung-Hunan border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi- Szechwan border.
Connections with several of these are still maintained, but not with all ; and
these connections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this,
Chu Teh replied : "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout
China."
Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new
rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were
curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our
1668 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in
general well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is
not satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still
far from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-
liang before the Sian affair, it was only during the two weeks following the
actual incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached
us."
As Ohu Teh continued the conversation, punctuated frequently by his broad,
genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military
tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the
early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it
until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Man-
churian volunteers. Were they really well, organized or were they mere hungry
^'bandits"?
"At first," Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished
peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They
operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost
destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detach-
ments who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As
a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into
important detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been
some increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern
Fengtien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than
hitherto. New groups have recently been formed in Jehol and Chahar. About
three months ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian
volunteers ranged from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made
by the Japanese to the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are
Communists, Chu Teh said that this was not an exaggeration.
On the united front. — Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet
area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China
knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice
chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in imi>ortance
only to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with
Chiang Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou
En-lai joined the revolutionary movement in 1011. Upon his return to China
in 1024 from a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the
Whampoa Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said
that even today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked
why the united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai
said : "The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in
Europe or the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten
years. The Communist Party, representing the proletariat and peasantry, was
a revolutionary party with its own areas and military forces as well as its
own social, political, and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the
ruling social groups throughout the rest of China. But the position of the
Chinese bourgeoisie was such that the obstacles arising from their class posi-
tion could not forever bar a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie
•of China have at last come to realize that the Japanese invasion harms all classes
and that, standing alone, they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and
independence."
Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations
had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace
had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confiscation
of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army was
changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the peasants
the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a considerable,
though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet area. Technical
difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible. But Japan's
military aggression scattered all the major obstacles.
The land problem. — Ever since October 1985, when the main body of the
Communist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north
Shensi. their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a perma-
nent base for internal development, and second, and more important, to use this
base as a spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war
of defense against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that
the former Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under
Communist rule, started as one of the most economically backward areas in
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1669
China, the welfare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably.
There is not sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and beard, but a few
high spots, in the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region,
will perhaps shed some light.
Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist
mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on
his walls, l'o K'u said that he left the comi>ound just as he found it in the hope
that the missionaries would return.
In reply to several questions ou the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said
in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in
Shensi, all the good land along the river hanks was in the hands of rich
landlords who used the great famine of 1030 as a lever for confiscating this
land. From then until the Sian incident in December 193G, all this land was
divided among the peasants ; all taxation and levies were abolished ; democratic
liberty was extended to all ; peasants built up their own armed forces for their
protection instead of relying on landlords' forces ; and peasants enjoyed the aid
and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the land,
and develop consumer cooperatives.
"After the Sian incident when the united-front conversations had already
begun, the redivision of land among the peasants was stopped in districts occupied
after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of land is not
the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is thinly
populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The form of
•exploitation and, therefore, the main problem are usury and excessive interest
rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, therefore, have
been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in the Soviet areas
is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain with landlords to
further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending rate has been reduced
from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum of 2 percent. Even last
year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet government spent one hundred
thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while this year there will be an addi-
tional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."
Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment of
land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most simply.
He said : "It is not so much a question now of whether our land belongs to the
peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." The same
reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question of China as
•a whole. To all of them "it is not a question now of which general controls which
province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come under Japanese
control. If the latter should happen, the original problem disappears."
Life in the Special Administrative District. — Our visit, however, did not
consist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting
with interest how much cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had
seen on our trip, and how relatively well stocked they were. And the cheesecloth
covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet
areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the
■dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking.
Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved gaunt dogs of China, too weak even
to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of
that.
Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yenan, the
•present capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers:
Tingpien, Y'enchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic
groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study
classes, reading rooms, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are
regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear the
universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."
But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A
troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following clay, and they
graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own delighted
audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless wooden
benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, we sat
through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With perfect
realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful humor,
they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how to
unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education,
and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one
1670 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand-
mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao, Chu Teh,
and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as anyone.
The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a scene
from Gorki's Mother, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening
celebrated in Yenan, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such sub-
jects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent out
to the villages.
Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hun-
dred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University
and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of
me. "What is the position of woman in the U. S. A.? How do American workers
live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's
N. R. A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary movement
in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?"
And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-
Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what
Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.
This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reac-
tion throughout China. These people have traditionally considered Americans
as their friends and they do not want us to fail them now. A few days after
our arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells bet-
ter than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked
in the former Soviet regions.
"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I
speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I
want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the
effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll
in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in
particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by it
that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise
of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But
from the viewpoint of the emotion behind it. it is of value. It is a deeply pas-
sionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry
next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you to
know, came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could not
cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They later
gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day by day.
All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. There
has never been anything like this here before."
Exhibit No. 76
[From the Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
June 7, 1944]
China's Part in a Coalition War
(By T. A. Bisson)
(Mr. Bisson is a member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of
Pacific Relations)
The recent Chinese victory helps to swell the tide of United Nations' mili-
tary successes as the decisive summer of 1943 begins. It coincides with the first
significant Anglo-American triumphs in Europe, and links together the two
global fronts — East and West — more unmistakably and more prophetically than
ever before. Already, as the Mediterranean is cleared for United Nations-
merchant shipping, Japan girds herself for the sterner test which her military
leaders see ahead .
The Chinese victory is playing an even mure important role in the political
field, for it tends to ease the srrimis friction which had developed between China
and the other members of the United Nations. It was a victory won mainly by
Chinese armed forces. As such, it gives the lie to the alarmists, both in and oat-
side China, who were beginning to clamor that the economic situation had
become so bad that the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan was threatened.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1671
But tlic victory was also won in collaboration with the United States 14th Air
Force Command. As such, it was a demonstration that some American aid —
little enough in the face of the wwds of the Chinese front, and pitifully meager
when measured against the past contributions of China for the right against
Japanese aggression — was being practically effective in a current operation.
It is to be hoped that, in the wake of the recent Roosevelt-Churchill strategy
conferences at Washington, further military aid of a similar practical nature
has been scheduled for China. More than airplanes are needed. Preparations
for a Burma campaign should be already well under way if operations are to
begin this fall, as our military commentators have indicated.1
There are no sound reasons, moreover, for accepting the pessimistic conclusion
that China is unable to help herself, pending the arrival of military or economic
aid on a large scale. In a significant review of the Hupeh campaign, General
Ch'en Ch'eng declared on June D, from his headquarters at Enshih, that the initial
Japanese penetration of difficult terrain "was due to our negligence." 2 He then
went on to state that it was necessary for China "to coordinate the military,
political and economic aspects" of the war, and "to intensify preparations for
a counterattack."
From a Chinese commander in Ch'en Ch'eng's position, there are strong words.
They are a double rebuke. They imply, in the first place, that the Kuomintang
armies displayed a military passivity during the first phase of the Japanese
advance. They suggest, in the second place, that a more comprehensive and-
energetic mobilization of China's war potential is required in order to pass to
the attack. With both China and the other United Nations doing their full share
in the coming months, it should be possible to make the situation much more
difficult for the Japanese forces in China.
An easy attainment of these desirable ends should not be expected. They
can be accomplished only if the changes in policy required by a united war in the
Far East are made by China, as well as by the other members of the United
Nations. The disunity which featured this past winter is the result of a long
series of mistakes, omissions and failures, past and present, which have com-
bined to weave a network of frustration around "the China problem." There
have been legitimate grievances on the part of China. Some of these still exist
and should be remedied. Others are mixed with a past which at this time might
better be buried and forgotten.
FEARS ABOUT KUOMINTANG POLICY
There have been well-justified fears and apprehensions over the trend of
Kuomintang policy within China, shared by some of the keenest and most dis-
cerning friends of the Chinese people in countries abroad. These apprehensions
are based on a careful appraisal of conditions in China, as will be indicated in
some detail later on in this article. They cannot be lightly dismissed. They
affect not only the current prosecution of the war, but also the prospects for the
postwar emergence of a stable, united and democratic China.
It is essential that the mistakes of the United Nations in dealing with China,
as well as China's own shortcomings should be brought into the open and sub-
jected to critical examination. Innuendoes and behind-the-scenes speculation
and gossip, which have largely taken the place of frank and open statements in
recent months, have a much more serious effect than forthright exchanges on the
issues now uppermost. Frank appraisal of these issues becomes disruptive and
harmful only if used in bitterness and with a desire to wound. Critical exam-
ination should rather be directed toward uncovering mistakes and unhealthy
tendencies, and indicating the path to be taken to correct them.
MISTAKES IN UNITED NATIONS' POLICY
Present Chinese grievances are cast against an historical background in which
China suffered greatly from policies followed by western nations now engaged
in Che common struggle against Axis aggression. It is unnecessary at this time
t» eater into a discussion of this background, including China's long and painful
efforts to throw off the shackles imposed by the "unequal treaties." Fortunately,
the treaties recently concluded with China by Great Britain and the United
1 See, for example, Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, June 16, 1943.
; China Daily News, June 19, 1943. General Ch'en Ch'eng had been previously trans-
ferred (probably in February) from this vital sector to the Yunnan front, but was recalled
to command of the Hupeh operations after the Japanese offensive had developed.
1672 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
States, which provide for the abolition of the extraterritorial system, promise-
a speedy termiantion of this long-standing injustice.
Proper appreciation of this historiacl factor should lead to somewhat more-
generous policies in working out arrangements already made and others which
may prove necessary. It is advisable, for example, that agreements for the ren-
dition of leaseholds, such as Kowloon and Kwangchowwan, and for the return to
China of Hongkong be worked out now and announced as soon as possible. It
is also necessary that the postwar restoration of Manchuria and Formosa to
China be unequivocally indicated. A declaration that Korea shall obtain its
freedom is required in more formal terms than hitherto stated. Exclusion laws
on the United States' statute books are a standing affront to the Chinese.
Finally, China is rightfully interested in the postwar future of India and the
countries of Southern Asia. There can be no real independence for China in a
Far East that remains largely colonial or semicolonial.
These are not the burning issues of the moment, but they are directly related
to the task of winning the allegiance of all Far Eastern peoples, including the
Chinese, and therefore to an efficient and effective prosecution of the war.
MILITARY AID NEEDED
The issue of more immediate concern to China is that of military aid and sup-
'port. This question also has its historical setting. For some four years, nearly
up to Pearl Harbor. China held the fort against Japanese aggression virtually
alone. The aid rendered to her by the United States and Britain was almost
purely economic ; up to 1941, they had supplied little or no munitions of war to
the Chinese armies. During this period, moreover, the economic aid to China was
heavily outweighed by the stream of American and British strategic materials
flowing across the Pacific to the Japanese war machine.
All this formed the background to Pearl Harbor. Immediately thereafter,
China experienced a further series of chilling disillusionments. Within a few
months, Japanese forces had swept the British and Americans out of their Far
Eastern strongholds. Some of the circumstances attending this defeat which
directly affected the Chinese cut more deeply than the defeat itself. At Hong-
kong, the local Chinese population was not permitted a share in the military
operations, while in Malaya the attempt to enlist the Chinese in the defense of
the peninsula was made too late to be effective. Negotiations attending the entry
of Chinese troops into Burma were inexcusably protracted. When defeat came
in Burma, too, China saw the last of her road-and-rail links to the Pacific cut
for an indefinite period.
These factors reinforced the validity of China's demand for effective military
aid. Yet at the moment when the validity of her demand stood at its highest
point, and political barirers ("neutrality" or appeasement policies) had been
removed, the facilities for satisfying that demand suddenly became most cir-
cumscribed.
Some assistance has been rendered during the past 18 months. On the economic
front, the 500-million-dollar loan has been a positive psychological factor, even
though its full utilization has been made impossible by the inability to send
goods into China in large amounts. Small quantiiies of munitions and supplies
have been flown in from India. The former devastating bombings of Chungking
have ceased, as a result both of the appearance of an American air force in China
and of Japan's preoccupation with other fronts in the Pacific war. In addition
to their defense role, American planes have conducted modest bombing forays
and participated in tactical operations supporting Chinese ground forces.
It still remains true that the sum total of this aid is lamentably small. More
transport planes can be assigned to the India-China air route, both to increase
the flow of war materials into China and to expand the Ameriacn air forces now
operating from Chinese bases. It is probable that the increased emphasis on
the Pacific war fronts, recorded in the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences, includes
expansion of this air freight being carried into China.
The recent Burma campaign was thoroughly disappointing. Much larger air
and naval forces must be employed in any operation meant to be decisive in this
theater. To the Chinese, the effectiveness of military aid is measured by the
quantity of weapons reaching China and by the seriousness of the effort made to
reconquer Burma.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1673
CHINA MISPLAYS HER HAND
The strength of China's case is such that it requires no elaboration. Before
Pearl Barbor, the western democracies were already heavily indebted to China;
since then, the indebtedness has steadily increased. The importance of Chinas
position in the Far East, both during and after the war, requires that this account
be fully discharged in the shortest time possible.
There was no need to pass beyond the bounds of this argument. It rests on
unassailable foundations. It is unanswerable, save by action on the part of the
western democracies.
In the American forum of this past winter, nevertheless, the tragic fact is that
China badly misplayed her hand. Instead of conducting the debate along the
above lines, the representatives of Chungking called into question the basic
strategy of the war. On more than one occasion, in private as well as in public,
the demand was voiced that Japan rather than Germany should be made Enemy
No. 1. or that forces comparable to those being utilized in Europe should be sent
into the Pacific.
In choosing this ground for debate, China's representatives were committing
three basic mistakes. They were demonstrably wrong, in the first place, on the
point at issue. The consensus of expert military opinion is overwhelming on the
fact that the German war machine is more formidable than the Japanese.
United Nations' war potential— Russian, British, American— is predominantly
concentrated in the European-Atlantic theater of operations. With logistics
playing the great role which it does in this war, and in view of the acute shipping
shortage, it was inevitable that the choice be made to eliminate the nearest
enemy first.
Above all, this choice had been made early in 1942 ; by last winter, it had clearly
become the settled strategy on which the war was to be waged. To reverse that
strategy in the winter of 1942^3, after the North African campaign had begun,
would obviously have been unwise and dangerous. The demand that relatively
equal forces be dispatched to the Pacific is merely a variant of the same thesis,
with similarly dangerous possibilities.
APPEAL TO THE ISOLATIONISTS
In the second place, taking domestic politics in the United States into consid-
eration, the appeal to reverse the strategy of the war represented a tactical
blunder of the first importance. It brought under attack a policy to which
President Roosevelt was thoroughly committed. More, it made its strongest do-
mestic appeal to the political opponents of the administration. These were, at the
same time, the isolationists who had supported appeasement of Japan, who had
strongly opposed aid to China, in the pre-Pearl Harbor clays. It was no accident,
but a logical development, that these same elements should now be clamoring
loudest of all for a policy "to defeat Hirohito first." Diversion of much of the
United Nations' strength to the Far East, before Hitler was disposed of, would be
the surest path to defeat on both sides of the globe. The appeal to these forces
failed, as it was bound to fail, and China's cause thereby suffered a bad set-back
in the United States.
In the third place, it was equally an error to lead the argument along lines
which suggested that China wras in danger of imminent collapse. This plea,
strongly advanced by many Chinese in the United States this past winter, argued
a weakness on China's part which the stubborn resistance of previous years
belied. It verged on a propaganda claim which the best-informed students of
Chinese conditions were not willing to accept at face value, despite the admittedly
serious economic situation which prevailed.
The argument that "you must save us quickly or all is lost'' had dangerously
confusing implications. To some Americans it suggested that China might have
to be written off as an effective ally in the immediate perspective of the war, and
that she would have to be picked up again at a later stage when greater forces
could be ranged against Japan. Much the sounder position for China would
have been to put up a strong front, to dig in and fight even harder, at the moment
of crisis. China's representatives could then have argued from strength and not
from weakness.
DOUBTS RAISED IN THE UNITED STATES
The net results of this American forum on the position and prospects of China
in the war have been confusing and, to some extent, disheartening. As the
1674 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
debate proceeded, it tended to disillusion many of the groups in the United States
best able to. help China. It raised questions as to the political judgment of the
Kuomintang regime and the representatives of Chungking who were acting for
China in the United States. It weakened the case for more effective Chinese rep-
resentation in the highest military councils of the United Nations where the basic
decisions on strategy are made. In many quarters, it strengthened existing
reservations as to the methods and conditions which should be applied in the
extension of aid to China.
Still more, it left questions in the minds of many Americans as to what lay
behind the ineptness of the political tactics applied to Chinese relations with
this country. The answers to these questions must be sought, in large part, in
the changes which have occurred in China's political and economic life during
the past few years.
TWO CHINAS
At the outset of such an analysis, it is necessary to repeat an important gen-
eralization stressed by many commentators on Chinese affairs — that the
early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese
national unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms,
has not been fulfilled.3 This promise, in fact, died early in the war.
It received its best documentary expression in "The Program of National Re-
sistance and Reconstruction" adopted by an emergency session of the Kuomintang
Congress at Hankow, on March 29, 1938.4 The democratic provisions even of
this program, which was not without shortcomings, were not carried out, and this
high point of the first year of the war soon became a melancholy landmark.
Early in 1939 the Kuomintang conservatives became alarmed at the rapid re-
conquest and reorganization of territories behind the Japanese lines by the
Eighth Route and New Fourth, Communist-led, armies.5 Clashes, at first spo-
radic, soon became more frequent. Early in 1941, the New Fourth army was out-
lawed by the Chungking military authorities, following an abortive effort to
destroy its headquarters corps and crush its leadership. Central Government aid
to the Eighth Route army had meanwhile lapsed ; and the blockade of the Shen-
Kan-Ning Border Region by Kuomintang forces, numbering some 500,000 and
commanded by General Hu Tsung-nan, has since continued.
A year or more before Pearl Harbor, therefore, two Chinas had definitely
emerged. Each had its own government, its own military forces, its own terri-
tories. More significant, each had its own characteristic set of political and
economic institutions. One is now generally called Kuomintang China ; the
other is called Communist China.
However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might
be called feudal China ; the other, democratic China.6 These terms express the
actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the
two Chinas.
COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED
In an attempt to analyze these differences, it should be recognized at once that
one is not dealing with irrelevant abstractions. The institutions which char-
acterize one China as feudal and the other as democratic have the most practical
relevance to the leading problems of the day. They are, in fact, the determinants
of all policies, domestic and international, espoused by the two Chinas. They
explain, as will be indicated, why Kuomintang China is compelled to demand
immediate aid on a scale so great as to necessitate reversal of United Nation's
global military strategy. They also explain the declining rate of casualties in-
flicted on the Japanese by the Kuomintang armies, as contrasted with the in-
creasing rate of casualties inflicted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies.
According to official reports, the Kuomintang armies have inflicted on the
Japanese average annual casualties (in a total of GO months) of 354,93"), while the
3 See, for a recent example, Pearl Buck, "A Warning About China," Life, May 10, 1943,
pp. 53-56.
4 For text, see Amerasia, April 25, 1943, pp. 118-120.
5 It is important to note that the "reorganization" — involving land reform and electoral
procedures in local government — was as much opposed as the "reconnuest." For the
emergency of effective political unity in China required, on the part of the Kuomintang, the
acceptance of at least these minimal land and electoral reforms.
6 The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-
peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this
relationship.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1675
combined annual average Cor the Eighth Route (F>S months' total) and the New
Fourth (48 months* total) amounted to 113,338. For the last comparable year
(.Inly l'.Ml -June 1942), however, the absolute figures are respectively 182,0!J4 and
130,010. In other words, the Kuomintang armies show an average annual record
of 7(> percent of total casualties inflicted, hut in 1P41-42 their achievement falls
to only 58 percent of the total. On the other hand, the record of the Eighth
Route and New Fourth armies was lifted to 42 percent of the total in 1941-42, as
against an annual average of 21 percent.
The significance of this comparison is that it excludes the problems of blockade
and foreign aid. Indeed, in these respects, the advantage lies entirely on the
side of the Kuomintang armies. They are supported by incomparably larger
populations and richer territories. They have enjoyed the benefit of virtually
all the military and economic aid rendered China by foreign nations. Since
before Pearl Harbor, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies have been doubly
blockaded, by the Japanese on one side and by the Kuomintang armies on the
other.
The differences indicated by the casualty figures must therefore be explained
solely on the hasis of efficiency or lack of efficiency in the mobilization of the
human and material resources of the two Chinas. This question forces one back
to an examination of the institutions which differentiate the two regions.
DEMOCRATIC CHINA
The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Com-
munist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal
incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be
pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective.
Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one sup-
porting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which
has freed the peasant — the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over
most of China — from the crushing wTeight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest
charges as levied by a feudal economy.
But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to
work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the
final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this proc-
ess, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees,
for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a
strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.
Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils — village, town, and
district — and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old
autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. These councils and officials are
either unpaid or receive mere pittances wdiich leave them no better off econom-
ically than their fellow citizens.
It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free
competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price con-
trols are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would
be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful
eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within
limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entre-
preneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are
doing so.
By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed communism ; it is, in fact,
the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The
leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answTer to China's immediate
problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They
see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition
to modern nationhood.
FEUDAL CHINA
The declining curve of military achievement by the Knomintang armies is
correlated with a progressive decrease in the economic strength of Kuomintang
China. While this decrease is notable, there is no need to adopt the alarmist
view that collapse is inevitable. The human and material resources of Kuo-
mintang China are large. Its economic reserves are still considerable. So also
are its militai'y reserves and potentialities.
General Ch'en Ch'eng's use of the term "negligence" clearly implied that more
could he done with the military resources at hand than was being done. Concen-
08970 — 50 — pt. 2 13
1676 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
tration on the demand for more planes and guns from abroad, in other words,
was getting in the way of full utilization of the weapons and forces at hand.
General Ch'en Ch'eng has since given a specific illustration of this situation by
pointing out that the American planes were based too far from the fighting
fronts to be fully effective in the Hupeh campaign.7 An attitude of military
passivity is revealed by this failure to develop facilities for air action near tne
front. The alert, active seizure of opportunities open even to limited means is
evidently lacking.
These considerations also apply to the economic sphere, although the problem
is far more complicated and difficult. Here, too, General Ch'en Ch'eng's com-
ments go straight to the nub of the issue. He states that "there should be
unrelenting vigilance and intensified preparations for counterattacks through
military, political and economic cordination." 8
This'is a demand for more vigorous action on the home front, with an emphasis
sharply different from pleas for help from outside. As has already been seen,
questions of blockade and outside aid are not necessarily decisive for effective
military resistance, providing an efficient economic mobilization is accomplished.
In Kuomintang China, such a mobilization is severely handicapped by the
leaders' unwillingness to challenge the basic postulates of the feudal system.
No serious effort has been made to uproot the landlord-usurer system. With the
port cities and their nascent bourgeois class removed, the landlords have become
the economic mainstay of the Kuomintang regime.
BUREAUCRACY TIGHTENS HOLD
At the same time, the bureaucracy has taken over administration of a con-
siderable slice of industrial production. Many industries have become govern-
ment monopolies, not forced to maintain tbemselves in competition with private
industry. Industrial development under private initiative, valuable as an offset
to feudal relations, and needed in an economy of scarcity, was thus choked off
at the very time when stimulation of the entrepreneur was justified. The de-
clining numbers and strength of the industrial class weakened its challenge to
the landlord-bureaucrat regime, thereby putting new props under the tottering
structure of Chinese feudalism.
In these circumstances, there could be no real progress toward democratic
reform or wider civil liberties. Inauguration of constitutional government, con-
sidered for a time in 1938, was eventually shelved for the duration. Non-
Kuomintang representatives on the People's Political Council, which could have
evolved into a national legislature, have steadily decreased. Over the new
Political Councils in the provinces, Kuomintang control is carefully maintained.
In the so-called "new hsien system," embodying the program for instituting rep-
resentative local government, candidates will be limited to those who have
acceptably passed through Kuomintang training schools, while suffrage will be
indirect and linked to the household units of the pao-chia system. These develop-
ments do not promise to create effective popular checks on the Kuomintang
bureaucracy.
With no effort at reform of the land system or initiation of democratic proc-
esses, the two basic prerequisites for an efficient wartime economic mobilization
were lacking. As conditions deteriorated, successive measures looking toward
the institution of a "controlled economy" were introduced. The bureaucracy
steadily expanded until its relative cost, measured against the limited output
of the productive system, itself became a drag on the war effort.
Even so, it could institute neither price nor commodity controls that were
adequate to stay the course of inflation. Grain hoarding and speculation, the
key factor in Kuomintang China's inflationary problem, could be curbed by
nothing less than genuine popular participation in application of the controls.
This solution was barred. In a country predominantly agrarian, with the land-
lords still entrenched in their feudal positions, no centralized government organ
could send out the multitude of agents required to enforce its paper controls.
Turn as it would, the bureaucracy could not solve this problem, and the eco-
nomic foundations of the war effort were increasingly undermined.
It is at this point that the true relevance of foreign aid to an economy of the
Kuomintang model becomes evident. In order to conduct war on the basis of
such an economy, access to the outside world is imperative. Steady injections
7 New York Times, June 28, 1043. The same paper on June 29 carried Ch'en Ch'ens's
statement that China needed "jruns and equipment of all kinds." and would welcome "even
onethousandth part of one percent" of United States production.
'China Daily News, June 19, 1943.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1677
of foreign Supplies were in fact pumped into Kuomintang China np to Pearl
Harbor, although In declining amounts after 1940.
Tins extreme dependence on aid from the outside is a key which unlocks many
mysteries. It provides an adequate explanation for the declining rate of the
Kuomintang armies- military achievements. It also explains the persistent
outcry in Chungking Eor a reversal of United Nations' strategy, as expressed
in the editorials of its leading papers." The desperate need for outside assist-
ance fell by Kuomintang China could only he met by such a reversal of strategy,
since this alone would bring aid quickly on a large scale. And, finally, this
appeal was logically transferred directly to the United States in the propaganda
campaign conducted last winter.
Obviously, the resources available in Free China are much too limited to
encompass the defeat of Japan. Larue amounts of outside supplies are essential
if the Chinese armies are to be equipped for successful offensives. Until then,
however, the need is for the most effective utilization and development of the
resources at hand.
Elements within Kuomintang China are making efforts to achieve this end,
as indicated by the forthright statements of General Ch'en Ch'eng. Strong
forces are working to establish greater freedom for the entrepreneur, as a means
to increase industrial production. The industrial cooperative movement, once
freed of bureaucratic restrictions, would be able to forge ahead more rapidly.
With proper encouragement, these sound elements within Kuomintang China
can do much to overcome current economic weaknesses, although more thorough-
going reforms are necessary in order to effect complete mobilization.
A COALITION WAR— AND ITS REQUIREMENTS
The United States, as the arsenal of democracy, bears a heavy responsibility
for the war program of the United Nations. Its immense productive effort has
begun to register with increasing effect on the war fronts. As the German tide in
Europe recedes, the pressure on Japan will steadily increase. It is clearly essen-
tial That China, which has borne the heat and burden of the defensive in the
Far East, should have a full and significant share in the victorious offensives
that are now in the making. Toward this end, it would be advisable that China
be given an adequate voice in framing the decisions on strategic policy. But
China herself must change, if she is to make her full contribution to a coalition
war.
Realistic thinking on this problem will be stimulated if there is candid recog-
nition that two Chinas exist at the present time. The task of statesmanship is
to merge these two Chinas into one. To be sound and effective, such unification
must come on the high plane of social advance and democratic reform. Until
unification is achieved on this plane, China's full strength cannot be placed behind
the war effort.
It is also necessary to recognize that Kuomintang China is passing through
a serious crisis. The challenge is for a renewal of the forward-looking elements
in the party of Sun Yat-sen and a bold cutting loose from an archaic past. De-
fections of allegiance, already occurring, will tend to increase as reform is post-
poned, and the leadership of the China of the future may well pass to the pro-
gressive forces outside the Kuomintang.
These issues in China pose a delicate and difficult problem for the other mem-
bers of the United Nations. They are issues of such fundamental importance,
however, that they cannot be ignored. Not only does the effective prosecution
of the war during its final phase depend on the answers given. The future status
of China as a healthy and vigorous nation, in which the people's livelihood is
safeguarded by democratic processes, is at stake. Only such a China, moreover,
can bring to the family of nations that level of constructive statesmanship that
will be needed to guard the peace that the war has won.
Exhibit No. 77
Red Myths, Starring China
(By Louis Francis Budenz, for Collier's)
America will be rocked, during the coming year, by mounting espionage
revelations. Shock after shock is about to be given the American people as to
9 See excerpts in article by Guenther Stein, Far Eastern Survey, June 14, 1943, p. 117.
1678 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the extent their national security has been placed at the mercy of the Soviet
dictatorship, through native American traitors. The activities of Eugene Den-
nis, present secretary of the Communist Party, in the stealing of information
from the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, in itself constitutes
one of the gravest scandals that has ever hit this country.
Right now there is a gi-eat burning of documents in Communist conspiratorial
hide-aways and many feverish consultations as to how to cover up the widespread
looting by Moscow of our official files and secrets.
Along with this espionage, went an equally grave offense, which was carried
through with high success by Soviet agents; the winning of the confidence of
American public officials in order to influence and dictate American foreign poli-
cies. It is ironical that America's path in China has been exactly that mapped
out by Soviet agents here in the United States on behalf of Communist China.
The whole idea of "coalition government" — which American officialdom swal-
lowed hook, line, and sinker and which led to the withholding of real aid to
nationalist China — was concocted by Soviet Russia in order to defeat America
in the Far East. The orders to push this idea of "coalition government'' were
given to leading members of the Communist Party here, were printed in official
Communist publications, and then oddly enough became the patent medicine
of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.
I was one of those who took a leading part in arranging for this deceit of
American officialdom. I sat in the conferences that received the instructions
from the Soviet capital and was active in carrying them out, for the discomfort
and defeat of the United States.
Neither the espionage nor the deceit (which made American policy so often
that which the Kremlin wanted it to be) could have been so successful had it
not been for the Red myths which were created to befuddle the American
people.
No hoax has been more complete and convincing than that which deluded
the American people from coast to coast into the belief that the Chinese Com-
munists were a mild edition of agricultural reformer. These Moscow agents,
pledged by their own declarations to establish Soviet slavery over the millions
in China, were portrayed by so-called experts and distinguished authors as a
sort of Non-Partisan Leaguer such as functioned for some time in North Dakota.
A writer like Harrison Forman could say in his Report from Red China that
he saw "not the slightest tangible connection with Russia" among these Chinese
Communists. He could even tell us that "occasionally I saw portraits of Marx
and Lenin; but these seemed the relics of a revolutionary past." And these
were the words of a man who was accepted by the American people as one of the
leading authorities on China as late as 1945. What he wrote there could be
refuted by every fundamental document issued by the Chinese Communists
and their leaders when they were writing for themselves and not giving interviews
to hick Americans.
Had Mr. Forman and other American "authorities" familiarized themselves
with the Chinese Communist programs they would know that repeatedly they
stated their adherence to "the revolutionary doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Stalin." These "authorities" would have known, as a striking instance,
of the declarations of the Chinese Communists in 1937. This was at the moment
when these Reds were about to "make a new peace" with Chiang Kai-shek be-
cause their masters in the Kremlin were on the eve of signing a nonaggression
pact with Nationalist China. At every turn of history, the Chinese Communists
have acted in accord with the twists taken by Moscow, and 1937 is a big year in
this respect.
It's a big year because the Chinese Communists from 1931 up to that time had
openly proclaimed their complete domination by Moscow. They had called the
territory they occupied "Soviet China" and their military forces "The Red Army."
It is a big year because it is the time when the Soviet fifth column in the United
States will begin to put forward the hoax of the Chinese Communists being
something other than Russian Communists.
But at that moment, when Soviet Russia had ordered the Chinese Reds to
make a change in tactics, they told themselves that this alleged cooperation with
Chiang Kai-shek was only a subterfuge. Through one of their leading spokes-
men. Wan Min. these Reds pledged that no matter what cloak they put on, they
would always b<> "true supporters of Marxist-Leninist teachings." 'They further
declared, to'show their devotion to Soviet Russia, that they would always remain
•true pupils" of the great teacher, Joseph Stalin! (You may read this at your
own convenience in International Press Correspondence, September 18, 1937,
vol. 17, No. 40, p. 924. )
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1679
It was in early 1937 that Earl Browder called a few of the Communists func-
tionaries, including myself, to a "China conference" on the Ninth Floor of the
Basl 12th Street house of treason. There were ten people present, conspicuously
among them being the late Harry Gannes, then foreign editor of the Daily
Worker and a reputed Red authority on China. To us Browder brought the word,
which lie said he had received from abroad, that "the followers of Mao Tse-tung
have to be presented in a new dress." This had been made by Moscow one of
the chief tasks of the American Party. Browder had served as a representative
of the Communist International in China for a number of years, and stressed
that China was "the herald of the emancipation of all Asia from the imperialist
yoke and would be the key to the smashing of American imperialism." These
words, uttered by the then chief Communist agent in America at the time when
the Reds were supposedly endorsing Franklin D. Roosevelt, were to be heard
frequently in secret Communist sessions from that time forward. They were to
break into print on a number of occasions in The Communist, official theoretical
organ of the Soviet fifth column bere.
China was the key to the Soviet domination of Asia, Browder told us bluntly,
and a Soviet-controlled Asia "was the beginning of the end of American imperial-
ism." That is why Moscow, we were told, placed upon the shoulders of the
American Communist Party the responsibility of persuading the American people
and our government to have "a benevolent attitude" toward the Chinese Reds.
It was then that Browder, with a sarcastic grin, said that our objective was
to "picture the Chinese Communists as a mild variation of the North Dakota
Non-Partisan Leaguers." This could not be done all at once, we all agreed,
since a tremendous amount of emphasis had previously been put on the "revolu-
tionary aspects of the Chinese Soviets." But as a beginning, it was agreed that
the name of an "authority" would be used — a name that would sound good to
the American people. The first decision of our China conference, therefore, was
to publish "tens of thousands of copies" (as Alexander Trachtenberg, the Soviet
cultural commissar here put it ) "of the interview with Mao Tse-tung, Communist
leader, obtained by Edgar Snow, the well-known American writer and published
originally in the China Weekly Review of November 1936.
While that interview did not go so far as Mao Tse-tung was to go later, in
picturing his cause as that of a mild agricultural movement, he did stress greatly
the principles of Sun Yat-sen, the socialistic-democratic leader. It is ironic to
note that the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party was talking in
this language to Mr. Snow at the very time when Wan Min was writing in effect
that Sun Yat-sen's "principles" would be used only as a matter of strategy.
This idea of the upstanding Chinese Communists, the great agrarian reformers,
was peddled everywhere from that time on. It turned up in Washington, was
increasingly popular in certain sections of the State Department, and broke into
prominent positions in the American press. Everybody who was "in the know"
was ready to say that the Chinese Communists were entirely different from the
Communists of Soviet Russia and would never be anti-American nor puppets of
the Kremlin.
This propaganda was to reach its height around 1943, when the Communists
began the big campaign to see that the Cairo pact would be smashed. With the
same success with which they persuaded America to break its word to Poland
and also to agree to the Potsdam monstrosity, they proceeded to flood the United
States with the idea that there should be a coalition government in China. This
was "sold" by respectable authors throughout America. It was favored in some-
of the most surprising places in the field of public opinion. It was particularly
a pet theory of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, which did
everything the Communists would have wanted that Division to do.
And yet. Mao Tse-tung had stated in a special report "On Coalition Govern-
ment" made in April 1945 to the Seventh National Convention of the Chinese
Communist Party, that this slogan would lead to the destruction of Chiang
Kai-shek and the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." The "coali-
tion government" as a tactic aimed at the United States of America on behalf
of Soviet Russia was clearly emphasized as such in that report. The entire
history of Communist tactics throughout the world had been that all "coalition
governments" in which Communists joined are sabotaged by the and finally
conquered for Soviet imperialist purposes. The flood of document from Com-
munist China, which I could quote at length were it feasible to do so, had all
asserted the Marxist-Leninist aims of the Chinese Communists and their devo-
tion to Soviet Russia. Indeed, and most ironically, one of the main points made
by Mao Tse-tung in his coalition government report is that the Soviet Union has
changed the whole situation in China.
1680 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Interpreting this, the chief of the department of information of the Chinese
Communist Party, Lu Ting-Yi, places the New China on the side of the successes
of the Soviet Union, and against the American imperialists.
At the same time, in the first flush of victory, achieved through American
blundering, Mao Tse-tung now proclaims the Red advance in China to be against
American imperialism as well as against Chiang Kai-shek's gang of brigands.
He mentioned the great masses of people that will be brought into the struggle —
and puts them, in the world scales, against American Republic. Frederick V.
Field, the millionaire Chinese expert of the Communist Party, jubilantly writes
in the Political Affairs of July 1948: "Our Chinese comrades are destroying
American imperialism in the Far East. Let us, American anti-imperialists, at
least accept and make use of the historic contribution which they are making
toward our own welfare." This millionaire Communist agent chides American
labor for not being anti-American in its activities, and thus holding back from
"the new China which is developing under the leadership of the Communist
Party." A new enemy of tremendous strength in numbers is being forged in
Asia against the United States — and every agency of American life has aided
to make that enemy strong.
On December 7 last, it was discovered in Washington that there had been a
tragic lag in the delivery of promised war material and other goods to Na-
tionalist China. Fighting equipment valued only at .$63,000,000 had been de-
livered during the preceding eighteen months, whereas $220,000,000 in supplies
had been sent to Greece and Turkey in a similar period. This is merely an index
of the entire lag of American opinion and American governmental understanding
of the Chinese crisis. It is a measure of the powerful effectiveness of the Soviet
fifth column in the United States that it can report this and similar results in its
warfare against American imperialism.
How is it that American public opinion was drugged in this fashion? It was
the outcome of a most skillful and persistent campaign by the Soviet fifth
column coupled with an almost incredible amount of naivete on the part of
leading American citizens. I say this out of my own participation in much of
the planning on the part of the Reds, which went on at the 12th Street head-
quarters.
Our campaign was extensive but not complicated. It was simply to make
everybody ashamed of being for Nationalist China. This was done by playing
up the words "China's New Democracy" which was the title of a pamphlet written
by Mao Tse-tung in 1940. This pamphlet was designed to satisfy everybody
while at the same time educating the followers of the Chinese Communists to
an unbreakable alliance with Soviet Russia. When it was prepared for an
American edition, we had a special session on the Ninth Floor as to how to
handle some of its promises of the establishment of "dictatorship" and other
forecasts of a Soviet slave state. This was easily handled by editing out the
most flagrant verbiage, so that what Mao Tse-tung said on these points was
actually misrepresented in the American issue. The milder edition, with a
foreword by Earl Browder, went far to befuddle American liberals and not
a few American statesmen.
Nor was this campaign for Communist China merely a matter of persuading
good intentioned people to become mixed up. A special secret order was sent
out to the Communists, to be pushed in unions and in every occupation where
sympathizers were engaged, to see that books favoring Communist China were
widely sold. Arrangements were made — and I have sat in on some of them —
whereby the legs of book reviewers were to be pulled so that those words
which gave a break to the Chinese Comnmnists would receive favorable notices.
Back of all this was the popularization of the fiction that the Chinese Com-
munists had proved to be such bitter foes of Japanese imperialism. A lot of
noise was made about the statements in 1937 along that line when the agree-
ment with Chiang Kai-shek was reached. But writers of alleged high authority
were persuaded to forget that this pact of 1937 had only been reached because
Soviet Russia wanted it. It was also conveniently forgotten that when the
Kremlin entered into friendly relations with Japan, the Communists quit fighting
the Japanese entirely; they devoted themselves to harboring their forces for
the showdown with Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. I have distinctly
in mind a conference of American Communist leaders meeting in April 1941
to decide how to handle the Chinese situation after the Soviet-Japanese Pact,
at which a report was given that the Chinese Communists would preserve their
.strength as much as possible.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1681
One <>f the chief figures called upon by the Soviet fifth column to streamline
this campaign of confusion was Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who first became
conspicuous as Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Formerly a
Norman Thomas Socialist. Mr. Field became converted to the views of Moscow.
In turn, he became a writer for the New Masses, Communist weekly, a columnist
for the Daily Worker, official daily organ of the Communist Party, and now the
chief theoretical writer on Far Eastern affairs for Political Affairs, theoretical
organ of the Communist Party. This last distinction (following so soon after
Mr Field's service for the party at San Francisco, during the Conference of
the United Nations,) is a tribute by the Soviet fifth column to his services in
in
tluencing the opinion of many gullible American writers and publicists.
Two men of distinction who have seen eye to eye with Mr. Field for a long
time in regard to China, and who have enjoyed close personal relations with him
are Owen Lattimore, author of Solution in Asia, and Joseph Barnes, former
foreign editor of the New York Hearld Tribune and now editor of the leftist
New York Star. As a Communist, I have heard the names of Messrs. Lattimore
and Barnes frequently referred to in reports by Mr. Field, and always in the most
complimentary manner. They have been devoted adherents of the "poor Chinese
'Communists agrarian reformer'' theory.
It is somewhat startling, nevertheless, to discover a Mr. Lattimore as a specific
endorser of Dilemma in Japan, by Lt. Andrew Roth. Indeed, Mr. Lattimore
hails Mr. Roth as representing "the younger school of American experts."
Such an expert is this gentleman that he was a participant in the "borrowing"
of hundreds of secret documents from the files of our State Department, in tne
Amerasia case. That magazine had been established by Phillip Jaffe, of whom
I first learned from the Soviet secret police as a valuable friend. Reports to
the National Committee disclosed this publication to be organized for the pur-
pose of affecting opinion in favor of the Chinese Communists. Btut its main
objective was to make those contacts in the State Department and elsewhere
in Washington which would directly help in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. It
was no surprise to me, therefore, when in early 1945 the news broke that the
PBI had raided the Amerasia office, to discover scores of secret documents be-
longing to the State Department and also extensive photographic equipment
for reproducing such documents.
That day a session was held on the Ninth Floor. The danger involved in
the Amerasia disclosures was realized by leading members of the Soviet fifth
column to be considerable. Sitting in Browcler's room, in a little circle, seven
of them went over the steps that must be taken to becloud America's mind as
to what had actually taken place. The proposals which wrere adopted — brought
in appropriately by Eugene Dennis — who had been educated in espionage in the
Lenin School in Moscow — included these significant steps : 1. To get the aid of
men upon whom we could depend, Alger Hiss being mentioned, and at least
six other men of like position being considered ; 2. That the comrades con-
nected with the newspapers be instructed to do all they could to see that the
incident was played down and allowed to die out quickly ; 3. That the argument
be used everywhere by the comrades disguised as non-Communists that the
Chiang Kai-shek government was "rotten to the core" and that therefore any
information obtained against it was not injurious to America.
Secret instructions to this effect were dispatched at once to all sections and
districts of the party. They were very effective, at that. The Amerasia
defendents got off without difficulty, and there was a big celebration at Phillip
Jaffe's house in which toasts were drunk to the coming victory of communism
in China and the defeat of American imperialism. Several members of the
Daily Worker editorial board were present at this victory feast.
One of the reasons why there was no appreciation of the treason involved in
the Amerasia case was the effective work the Soviet fifth column had done
among the majority of the organizations dealing with the Orient. Through
infiltration, corruption, persuasion, or use of personal weakness, leading mem-
bers of most of these groups had come to see eye to eye with the Communists
on China. That is, they peddled the talk of agrarian reformers, coalition gov-
ernment, and other similar claptrap. Conspicuous among these was the Vice
President of the United States, Henry A. Wallace, who contributed to the Amer-
ican Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, a pamphlet in 1944 in which he said:
"The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their
willingness to refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs." That sen-
tence is familiar to me because it even provoked laughter on the Ninth Floor
of the 12th Street Kremlin. A separate Red Army, "Chinese Soviets", and
1682 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Communist forces which would hang hack during the Soviet-Japanese Pact were
not regarded by Mr. Wallace as evidences of intervention. In his zeal to defend
the Chinese Communists Mr. Wallace lately overshot his mark. In his most re-
cent book, Toward World Peace, the former Vice President continued to argue
that the comrades in China were agrarian reformers. The Communist organ,
Political Affairs, for May 1948, reluctantly and sadly had to take him to task
for this mistake. For now, since Mao Tse-tung has announced his union of
purpose with Soviet aggression, and his hostility to the United States, this fakery
is no longer serviceable. And so, Political Affairs writes: "No, the Chinese
Communists are really Communists, not agrarian reformers. It is precisely
because they are Communists that they express best of all the real interests of
the Chinese people." And that sentence proclaims in effect that all the previous
Communist propaganda, palmed off on the liberals and used by them to confuse
America, was a tissue of lies.
One of the most appalling developments out of all this was the apparent ac-
ceptance of these lies by the Far Eastern Division of our State Department.
On November 11, 1946, at the Far East luncheon of the National Foreign Trade
Council, the director of that office went so far as to strike a hard blow against
Nationalist China. In his address, Mr. John Carter Vincent indicted Nationalist
China as a place "unsound to invest private or public capital." This was based
upon the threat of civil war there, upon wasting of armaments, and on undem-
ocratic concepts of government existing there. Mr. Carter, unfortunately, neg-
lected to state what would occur if his advice were taken. Namely, the greatest
fiasco ever to greet America. That is precisely what has happened today and
it will cost the lives of thousands of our men eventually to make up for the
possible loss of China. It is distressing to note that Mr. Carter's utterance in
Washington came at the same time as the Communist Party's campaign to "get
out of China", which was headed by that veteran party liner, the late General
Carlson. It is constant attitudes of this kind on the part of Mr. Vincent Carter
that has made his name so warmly welcome in the secret councils of the Soviet
fifth column. I have never heard the former head of the Far Eastern Office of the
State Department mentioned in high Communist circles except with the highest
approbation.
The same deceit and disguise which led to these successes on China also
marked Red penetration of organizations dealing with this matter. The Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations is a case in point. This is an organization composed
of odds and ends of people in many countries touching the Pacific. The Ameri-
can Council, although not absolutely controlled by the Communists, has never
found anything wrong with Communist China and has never warned the Ameri-
can Nation of the grave danger to its security that will result from a Commu-
nist conquered China. Quite to the contrary, most of its publications have pre-
sented Communist China as a land of sweetness and light. One of its most
conspicuous directors has been Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and notorious Com-
munist writers such as the so-called James S. Allen, recently Foreign Editor
of the Daily Worker, have been on its list of authors. It may be added that
"Allen" is a former agent of the Communist International in the Phillipines and
has close conspiratorial connections with many Soviet agents in lands bordering
on the Pacific. Edward C. Carter, director of the Institute, for years, has had
such close associations with the Communists as to rob him of any critical at-
titude toward them. He has been a leading figure in the Russian,American In-
stitute, a contributor to Soviet Russia Today, and director of Russian War Re-
lief. Not satisfied with the penetration of organizations, organs of public opin-
ion, or the government, the Communists began a new campaign of their own on
China just before I left the party. It was designed to center the attention of
the comrades on China as the biggest of all tasks of the American Reds, and to
arouse them to the subsequent campaigns through other organizations which
they inaugurated. Well known party liners have also been vociferous in the
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, formed around the same time
and preparing the way by its complete echo of the partv position for further
American division in the face of the Communist advance in China.
"What is happening in China today is the most open expression of American
imperialism at work," said a secret memorandum sent to all Communists by
the New York State office just before I left the party. "Today, American im-
perialism, by armed force, is intervening in the struggle of the Chinese people
to establish a democratic Chinese Republic." Such allegations would be highly
comical were they not so tragic, when we view the hesitancy of America to defend
itself by taking a firm stand in the Chinese picture. The Committee for a Demo-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1683
eratic Far Eastern Policy echoed this sort of farcical charge, demanding that
the United Stales give no military aid to China since it would "in effect mala;
the President of the United States Commander in Chief of the Chinese Armies."
It is arguments like these when pressed by the gentlemen in diplomatic morn-
ing clothes that have made Washington sway hack and forth in tragic uncer-
tainty on China. It is certain harried editors looking around for material on
China who pick up a pamphlet by the supposedly respectable Institute of Pacific
Relations and use it for information, even though it is written by Abraham
Chapman. And who is he? None other than a most trusted Communist, who
under the name of John Arnold has written extensively for the Communist press
and served as a member of the State Committee of the Communist Party of New
York. That would be unknown to the unwary editor, guided by Comrade Chap-
man's discourse on the Far East.
Or to use another example, which came to my attention during my last days
in the party in 1943 : Hundreds of leading citizens in various communities received
in the mails early that year a pamphlet entitled "China's Greatest Crisis."
Its author, Frederick V. Field, was stated to be "a member of the Executive
Committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an au-
thority on Far Eastern problems. He is also Executive Vice President of the
Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the Editorial Board of
New Masses." The publisher was New Century Publishers, Inc., 832 Broad-
way, New York.
That was a rather impressive-sounding statement, and the publisher seemed
to be respectable enough in name. No one is opposed to anything "new." How
was the leading citizen of Kalamazoo, Mich., receiving such a pamphlet, from the
list of a certain religious organization of which he was a member, to know that
the New Century Publishers are the official publication society of the Communist
Party's theoretical organ and its most valued pamphlets? How was he to know
of Mr. Field's connection with the Communist movement except through the ref-
erence of the New Masses of which he might have heard vaguely?
This was the manner in which many patriotic Americans, who say quite
emphatically that no one can dictate their opinions, were hornswoggled into a
completely distorted view of the Chinese crisis.
It was out of all these pressures, Moscow directed, that President Roosevelt
was persuaded to amend our solemn pledge of China's integrity made at Cairo to
the Yalta promise that Soviet Russia would get Outer Mongolia and even a
chance at Manchuria. It is from such creation of confusion in the American mind
that we have promised aid to China and not given it in the measure it was)
pledged. Is it any wonder that the American Nation faces the greatest debacle in
its history, the possible loss of 470,000,000 people for our side in the battle for
American existence?
Exhibit No. 78
[From the Daily Worker]
Books
The Situation in Asia. By Owen Lattimore. 238 pp. Boston. Atlantic-Little,
Brown. $2.75.
"Situation in Asia" Criticizes U. S. Government Policy in Far East
(By David Carpenter)
Owen Lattimore's Situation in Asia is extremely critical of our government's
policies in that immense area of colonial and semicolonial peoples. He shows
that our government has done nothing but alienate the people's forces seeking
national liberation in Asia.
Lattimore, who is the director of the Walter Hines Page School of Foreign
Relations at Johns Hopkins University, points out that our dependence on the
Kuomintang has served only to make the United States hated by the Chinese
people. He contrasts, to our disadvantage, the reliance on the unpopular im-
perialist agent Syngman Rhee and the maintenance of U. S. occupation troops
in South Korea with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment
of a native peoples government in North Korea.
1684 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
He shows clearly that the efforts by the U. S. government to make Japan a
major bastion against the Soviet Union must end in failure.
Lattimore proposes that our government end its alliances with dictatorial
corrupt antipeople's forces in Asia. He urges that we stop intervention in
the internal affairs of the colonial and semicolonial countries. He asks that we
aid the peoples of Asia to achieve national independence.
* * *
All this is to the good as far as it goes. But Lattimore goes completely off
the beam in his efforts to explain the relationship of political and social forces
in Asia and their impact on world affairs. And as long as we fail to recognize
the reality of these relations so long will we be unable to help in the achievement
of those aims Lattimore proposes.
In the first place, Lattimore argues that the colonial and semicolonial peoples
struggling for national independence are developing a "third force" that seeks
to remain equidistant from American and Russian power. He refuses to admit
that the struggle is completely an anti-imperialist struggle, to drive out the
American, British, French, and Dutch capitalists who are subjecting their
native peoples to superexploitation for their raw materials and as markets for
capitalist products.
Lattimore admits that the Asiatic colonial and semicolonial peoples are
looking to the Soviet Union for examples of how oppressed peoples achieve inde-
pendence and are turning away from the United States because of its imperialist
line. But he makes this a contest of tactics which the United States can change
by adopting new methods.
* * *
Lattimore refuses to see that the reason the colonial people turn to the Soviet
Union for their example is precisely because of the overthrow of capitalism and
the establishment of socialism in that country. As Stalin points out :
"It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our
country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of inter-
nationalism that pariah nations, slave nations, have for the first time in the
history of mankind risen to the position of nations which are really free and
really equal, thereby setting a contagious example for the oppressed nations
of the whole world.
"This means that the October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era
of colonial revolutions which are being conducted in the oppressed countries of
the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the
proletariat."
The core of the leadership in the colonial struggle against imperialism and
the guarantee of the achievement of national independence lies in the growth
and development of the native Communist Parties, springing out of the ex-
ploited native working classes and leading the exploited working class and the
oppressed peasant masses. That is why the imperialists, under the leadership
of the United States, direct their main fire against the destruction of these
native Communist Parties.
Secondly, Lattimore makes the mistake of assuming that the relationship
of the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia is that of a struggle for
power. Here he falls into the trap laid by American imperialism, which would
like to hide the reality of its efforts to maintain its grasp of the resources and
manpower of Asia.
This approach to American-Soviet relationships obscures the truth. The
Soviet Union is not seeking world power. When the colonial peoples look for
alliances with the Soviet Union, it is because they see in that socialist country
the true defender of their national aspirations. When the Soviet Union aligns
itself with these peoples, it is not just a counteralliance to protect its own borders
against the attack of imperialism, it is fundamentally a defense of the national
interests of the peoples of these oppressed nations.
Because the peoples of the world recognize that an attack on the Soviet Union
is an attack on the defender of their own aspirations, because they see in such
an attack on their own efforts to break the bold of imperialism, they join with
the Soviet Union in a common front against imperialism. They have already
seen how the peoples of the Eastern European democracies were able to protect
themselves from the encroachment of imperialism and to begin their own in-
ternal development as the result of alliances with and protection by the Soviet
Union.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1685
In our own country, If we are t<> adopt the proposals Lattimore makes for
"the situation in Asia." it is necessary fur ns to loosen the hold of the im-
perialists on our government. Otherwise, our official policies will continue to
be thai of oppressing the colonial peoples in the interests of our monopoly
capitalists.
Exhibit No. 79
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Darien Center, New York, June 20, 1944-
Miss Rose V. Russell,
13 Astor Place. New York 3, N. Y.
My dear Russell : I am in receipt of your letter informing me of the informal
meeting in tribute to Dr. Bella Dodd inasmuch as she is leaving her position as
Legislative Representative of the Teachers Union.
I first became acquainted with Dr. Dodd when I became Chairman of the
Rapp-Coudert Committee and in the four years that I have held this position, I
have had occasion to contact Dr. Dodd on a great many occasions and would
like to say that she has always been fair in presenting her views and while at
times we have differed I have always found her very sincere and her word with
me has always been as good as a certified check.
I wish to extend to Dr. Dodd my best wishes for her continued success in her
new field.
Sincerely yours,
Herbert A. Rapp W. C.
Staten Island, N. Y., June 17, 1944.
Dr. Bella V. Dodd,
2o West 43rd Street. New York City.
Dear Dr. Dodd : Thanks so much for your gracious letter of June 12. Your
kind wishes are appreciated.
There are probably not many people in New York who have as divergent politi-
cal and economic ideas as you and I. I like and respect you as a person, however,
and I am happy to read that you don't think I am entirely bad.
Good luck to you in your new work, and best regards to you from
Yours sincerely,
Ellsworth B. Buck.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, June 22, 1944.
Miss Rose V. Russell,
Secretary, Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York.
Dear Miss Russell: I am writing these few lines to extend to Dr. Bella Dodd
my best wishes and may her future endeavors be successful.
I also wish to state that during the past four years as a member of the Legis-
lature, I have met Dr. Dodd on many occasions and while at times we may
have differed politically I have always admired her for her sincerity, honesty,
and integrity.
With every hope for a successful affair and with greeting to all.
Sincerely,
George Archinal.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, June 14, 1944-
Miss Rose V. Russell,
Teachers Union.
13 Astor Place, New York 3, Neiv York.
My Dear Miss Russell: I understand that you contemplate an informal
"Tribute to Bella Dodd" on Friday, June 23d. May I ask you to deliver the
following message to your guests assembled :
1686 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
During the many years that Bella Dodd has appeared in Albany as Repre-
sentative of the Teachers Union, I know of no one who has given more service
and been more effective in behalf of those employed in the school system and
education, generally, than has Bella Dodd. She has the regard, respect and
confidence of all members of the Legislature, regardless of party.
Sincerely yours,
Irwin Steingut.
The Assembly,
State of New Yokk,
Buffalo, New York, June 3, 1944.
Miss Rose V. Russell,
c/o Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, New York.
Dear Miss Russell: I regret exceedingly that I shall be unable to attend
the reception in honor of Bella Dodd to be held on Friday evening, June 23rd
at Manhattan Center.
I have had the pleasm-e of knowing Bella Dodd during my long tenure in the
Legislature and desire to state that the Teachers Union and education generally
will lose a most energetic figure in her retirement as Legislative Representative
of the Union.
While not always in accord or agreement with Mrs. Dodd, I always respected
her sincerity of purpose as well as her zeal for those things beneficial to the
education of our children and the welfare of the teachers.
Please express my regrets to Mrs. Dodd of my inability to be present.
Sincerely yours,
Harold B. Ehrlich.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
New York, N. Y., June 5, 1944-
Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.
(Att. Rose V. Russell.)
Dear Miss Russell: I was very pleased to note the forthcoming Teachers
Union "Tribute to Bella Dodd," who recently left her position as the Union's
Legislative Representative.
I have known Dr. Dodd for about seven years. She has the respect of prac-
tically every member of the Legislature, be they Democrat, Republican, or
American Labor Party. AVe know her for her sincerity, humaneness and per-
severance.
Regardless of political opinions or affiliations, she has earned the respect
of us all and we wish her well. I am most happy to say this about Bella Dodd
in writing and I would be happier to say the same things about her in person.
Sincerely,
Fred G. Moritt.
The Assemrly.
State of New York.
Albany, June 20th, 1944.
Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.
Members and Friends of the Teachers Union:
Permit me, on this auspicious occasion, to join in a tribute well merited and
attest to my respect and admiration for the inspiring leadership, unswerving
loyalty and devotion manifested by Bella Dodd, while serving as the legislative
representative of the Teachers Union of the City of New York.
I wish her the utmost of success in her new field of endeavor.
Sincerely,
Francis X. McGowan.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1687
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, Jtme 2, 1944.
Miss Rose V. Russell,
Teachers1 Union, Local 555, SCMWA-CIO,
IS Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.
Dear Miss Russell: I have received your communication of -May 31, informing
me of the Teachers' Union proposed informal "Tribute to Bella Dodd," to be held
on Friday evening, June 23, at Manhattan Center.
I greatly appreciate the invitation extended to me to participate in this great
tribute to a very noted person who has served the cause of education zealously.
Her efforts have contributed to the improvement of our educational facilities and
better schools for our youth. She is a great champion in the onward march of
democracy and people of all races, creeds, and religion pay honor to her for her
leadership and fearless struggle to better the lot of the masses educationally.
It was a pleasure to see Bella in action in Albany, as she buttonholed legislator
after legislator on the important questions affecting education and State aid for
education. She did an excellent job and much credit is due her for the tireless
hours, days, and months spent in winning over many of the legislators to a more
liberal viewpoint on the subject of education.
I will make every effort to personally appear at this reception to join in paying
glowing tribute to a heroine of the home front, one whom I admire and value her
friendship. If, because of my campaign for reelection to the legislature, I am
unable to attend in person, I will certainly forward a message of tribute to Bella
Dodd, to be read at the meeting.
With kind regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Hulan E. Jack.
New Yoek, N. Y.. June ?. 101',.
Miss Rose V. Russell,
Secretary, Teachers Union, Local 555, SCMWA-CIO,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.
Dear Miss Russell: I am delighted that you are tendering a reception t<>
Bella Dodd. The Teachers Union has gained immeasurably from her leadership
these past years, and the school system from her activities. All those interested
in improving the schools should be glad to do her honor.
My own contacts with Bella Dodd were many. I found her most sympathetic
with every effort to improve school conditions — with the attempts to eliminate
oversize classes, to keep playgrounds open all day long and in the summer, to
secure permanent teaching positions for substitutes, to work toward an earlier
retirement age for classroom teachers, to enlarge the Bureau of Child Guidance,
and to restore and expand work in the field of adult education. She and I have
fought together continuously for more funds for education from both city and
State.
Her primary interest was the children of this city and their welfare, and
of course this includes children of every race, creed, and color. She possesses
boundless energy and of course can be counted on always to help any social
cause. More power to her !
Sincerely yours,
Stanley M. Isaacs.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Brooklyn, N. Y., June .22. 10.',',.
Rose V. Russell,
c/o Teachers' Union.
13 Astor Place, Neic York 3, N. Y.
Dear Miss Russell : Please extend my sincerest and best wishes to Bella Dodd.
In- the short time that I know Bella Dodd, I have learned to admire her
a great deal. In my two years in Albany, I have found her to be a very valu-
able person to know because she is sincere, honest and possesses all the qualities-
of an intelligent representative for any group.
Her inspiring leadership in behalf of the Teachers Union has made it possible
to defeat many measures which, if passed, would be detrimental to the teachers
1688 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of our city and I know that she is responsible for many measures passing the
legislature which are beneficial to the teachers and to the children in the public
school system.
I sincerely hope that she will be a tremendous success in her new endeavor.
Sincerely,
Alfred A. Lama, A. I. A.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, June 13, 1944.
Miss Rose V. Russell,
Local 555, SCMWA-CIO.
13 Astor Place, New York City 3, N. Y.
Dear Miss Russell: I am indeed pleased to know that a reception is being
given in honor of Dr. Bella Dodd. I was present several years ago when Dr.
Dodd spoke before a group at Cornell University. In my brief remarks I paid
tribute to Dr. Dodd for her conscientious work in Albany. At that time I stated
that her associates could well be proud of her as she was a splendid person and
doing a sincere job. I would like to reiterate these same words upon this
occasion.
I am sorry that Dr. Bella Dodd is leaving the work in Albany, but I wish her
every success in the future.
Sincerely,
Stanley C. Shaw.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
New York, N. Y., June 9, 191,4.
Miss Rose V. Russell,,
c/o Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, New York.
Dear Miss Russell : I am happy to send a message in "Tribute to Bella Dodd"
who, for a number of years, was the Legislative Representative of the Teachers
Union for the State of New York.
It was my pleasure and good fortune to meet her and to work with her dur-
ing the years she was in Albany. I assure you that the cause of progressive
and enlightened social government will lose an able and energetic worker at the
Capitol of our State in the retirement or resignation of Mrs. Dodd from her
former position. The teachers in particular will lose a most energetic and
intelligent worker. The liberal legislators in Albany will miss her.
I trust that in her new work, that she will maintain her interest, not only
in improving the educational system in the City and in the State of New York,
but that she will continue her interest and activities on behalf of the liberal
and progressive legislation and government, in general.
Her advice and counsel to me on legislative matters has been of inestimable
benefit.
Sincerely yours,
William T. Andrews.
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, June 14, 1944.
Miss Rose V. Russell, >
Teachers Union, 13 Astor Place, Ncio York City.
Dear Miss Russell : I welcome the opportunity extended to me of joining
with the many coworkers of Dr. Bella V. Dodd in their tribute to her.
During the six years that I have represented my district in the Legislative, I
have found no one more conscientiously devoted to the welfare of the school
system than Dr. Dodd. Her sincerity and good faith were beyond question and
for that reason alone she had the respect and esteem of all my fair-minded
colleagues.
It is with keen regret that I learned of her decision to relinquish her position
as Legislative Representative of the Teachers Union for not only was she your
"representative" but she was also a faithful friend to every person interested
in a progressive school program.
Cordially yours,
Louis Bennett.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1689
The Assembly,
State of New York,
Albany, June 23, 19JtJ,.
Miss Bella Doni).
Teachers Union, Xew York City.
Dkae Miss Dodd : The interest you have had in the children of this State and
their education has always been an inspiration to me and your influence in the
Legislature will he felt for years to come. Godspeed to you.
Sincerely,
Daniel L. Burrows.
Exhibit No. 80
[From the New York Herald Tribune, Saturday, April 29, 19 — ]
Double Trouble in Asia
China and Indo-China are obviously critical areas on the map of ideological
conflict in Asia. From both these hot spots comes news of meaningful develop-
ments. Christopher Rand's report to this newspaper from Hong Kong on the
surprising extent and depth of anti-Communist activity on the Chinese main-
land reveals the immense task of digestion still confronting the Communists
and their collaborators. In Indo-China, on the other hand, the struggle against
communism is impeded by French reluctance to face squarely the fact that the
colonial attitude is as out of date in Asia as the dinosaur.
A Saigon dispatch reports that Dao Dai's first prime minister, Nguyen Phan
Long, has been obliged to resign because of French displeasure over his insistence
that American aid be given directly to Vietnam instead of being funnelled
through France. If this is the real and principal reason — and we sincerely hope
it is not — then we cannot but regret that the French and the Bao Dai govern-
ment have so exposed themselves to the Communist tirades that will inevitably
follow. To be sure, the Vietnamese are weak, inexperienced, and short of able
leaders. For the time being, the military burden is primarily a French respon-
sibility. Yet political factors are equally important. The grant of "independ-
ence" to Vietnam will become a mockery in the eyes of the Vietnamese people
and the world unless the Bao Dai regime is given at least equal consideration
with the French in the expenditure of such American funds and materials as
may be made available.
Mr. Rand's story says that a suge part of the Chinese mainland — perhaps
half or more — is now beyond the control of the Communist-dominated govern-
ment. Mr. Rand emphasizes that a major factor in peasant discontent is exces-
sive taxation — mainly in the form of grain levies. There are of course many
other causes : floods and famine, conscription, banditry, guerrilla activity, and
the Nationalist blockade. In the cities, business stagnation, heavy taxation,
and the high-pressure methods employed to dispose of Victory bonds have con-
tributed to anti-Communist feeling.
This is but one side of the China picture. The Communists have their strong
side, too, and it will be a long time before it will be possible to draw any sound
conclusions on the success or failure of their program. Mr. Rand points out
significantly that for the most part the resistance movement is without cohesion
or over-all leadership. It is at least evident that the Reds are experiencing
plenty of trouble. This hardly squares with the view of those disciples of
appeasement who insist that present United States policy — weak though it is —
is driving the Chinese people into the arms of the Communists.
Exhibit No. 81
The Curtis Publishing Company,
Paris, France, April 7, 1950.
Senator Millard Tydings,
U. S. Senator from Maryland,
United, States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : I am writing to you because Owen Lattimore was my
house guest during his visit to Moscow in 1936, about which Senator McCarthy
has raised questions before your subcommittee. Mr. Lattimore stayed with me
1690 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
because he was — and is — an old and valued friend whom I had known intimately
during my previous ten years in the Far East as correspondent for American
newspapers.
There was nothing mysterious about Mr. Lattimore's visit to Moscow ; he came
there as editor of Pacific Affairs, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions. As you probably know, the Institute was organized into national groups,
and the Soviet group was then an active participant.
As I had already worked in Russia for more than two years, I was able to help
Mr. Lattimore to meet some Russians. In particular, I introduced him to a Soviet
consular official I had met as a reporter, and who had spent some time in Mon-
golia, a country about which Mr. Lattimore was — and is — the foremost American
specialist. This Soviet official (whose name I have forgotten) was very helpful
to Mr. Lattimore — as he had been to me — and introduced him to other Russian
experts on Mongolia and Central Asia, and guided him through Moscow museums
and libraries devoted to these subjects. At that period, the great purges had
not yet started in Russia, and it was much easier for Americans to meet Russians
than it later became.
Knowing my interest, Mr. Lattimore gave me detailed reports of his meetings
with Russians. He was understandably impressed by the extent of Russian mate-
rial concerning Russo-Chinese border regions — which seem very remote to Amer-
icans but are not so remote to Russians.
In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator McCarthy mentioned an affidavit by
an unnamed Russian who has reported a conversation in 1936 with a Soviet intel-
ligence officer who boasted that his organization was getting valuable information
through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and especially through Mr. Lattimore.
This is interesting evidence that the Soviet intelligence organization was as
smart as I myself was at the time — because I, too, was getting useful background
material for my newspaper articles from the Institute's specialized reports and
from conversations with Mr. Lattimore and other Americans working for the
Institute.
But perhaps the Soviet intelligence officer mentioned by Senator McCarthy
was not quite so smart as he thought, because there is no doubt in my mind
that Mr. Lattimore learned considerably more from the Russians during that
Moscow visit than they did from him — and this information later became avail-
able through Mr. Lattimore to our own intelligence services and to the State
Department.
During my many years' friendship with Mr. Lattimore in China, he never
showed any special interest in Russia except insofar as the Russians were
concerned with Mongolia and Central Asia, his chosen field of research and ex-
ploration. To my certain knowledge, Mr. Lattimore devoted almost his entire
time during the 1936 Moscow visit to this same specialty. Those were the years
when it was popular in the United States to be a "pink," but I never saw* even
the slightest evidence that Mr. Lattimore was becoming even the mildest form of
fellow traveler.
You may use this letter, in whole or in part, in any way you see fit. My own
record is available in Who's Who in America. I think that my articles in the
Saturday Evening Post during the war — when it was not popular to be critical
of Russia — are sufficient evidence of my personal views about the Soviet system.
Sincerely yours,
Demaree Bess,
Associated Editor, The Saturday Evening Post,
2, rue Jean Mermoz, Paris, France.
San Francisco, Calif.
Abe Fortas.
Arnold, Fortas d- Porter, 1200 18 St., North west:
In 1946 I was the wife of Frederick Vanderhilt Field : I secured an inter-
locutory decree of divorce from him on Anril 1, 1949, in San Francisco, California,
and tills decree was made final on April 12th, 1950; I am not now, nor have I
ever boon a member of the Communist Party. I am certain that neither Owen
Lattimore. nor his wife Eleanor, attended any meetings or any party in our
home on West 12th Street, New York City, during the year 1946.
Edith Chamberlain Field.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1691
Exhibit No. 82
San Fbancjsco, Calif., April 26, J'JoO.
Mr. ABE FOBTAS,
Arnold. Fortas & Porter. Attorneys at Law,
1200 t8th Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Deab Siu: I confirm sending you the following telegram today:
"In 1946 I was the wife of Frederick Vanderbilt Field: 1 secured an inter-
locutory decree of divorce from him on April 1. 1949, in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, and this decree was made final on April lUth, 1950; I am not now. nor
have I ever been, a member of the Communist Party. I am certain that neither
Owen Lattimore, nor his wife Eleanor, attended any meetings or any party in
our home on West 12th Street, New York City, during the year 1946."
Very truly yours,
Edith Chamberlain Field.
Exhibit No. S3
In the Matter of Desideriu Hammer, Alias John Santo, Respondent in
Deportation Proceedings File No. A-6002664
[File No. A-6002664, Immigration and Naturalization Service]
[P. 75] Louis Francis Budenz, called as a witness in behalf of the Govern-
ment, being first duly sworn, testified as follows :
Direct examination by Mr. Boyd :
Inspector Phelan. You are informed that if you willfully and knowingly give
any false testimony in this proceeding, you may be prosecuted for perjury, [p. 76]
and the penalty for such offense is imprisonment of not more than 5 years or a fine
of $2,000, or both. Do you understand ?
" The Witness. I understand that fully.
Inspector Phelan. Will you state your name for the record?
The Witness. Louis Francis Budenz.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Mr. Budenz, have you ever been known by, or made use of, any other name
or names ? — A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz? —
A. Yes ; I have been a member of the national committee.
Q. When did you first become a member of the Communist Party? — A. Member
of the Communist Party in 1935 after the People's Front convention.
Q. Where did you joint the Communist Party? — A. I joined the Communist
Party in New York City.
Q. Were you issued a membership book? — A. Yes; I was, in October 1935, al-
though my first contact wdth the party was August, in that respect. I had to wait
until Earl Browder came back from Moscow to decide just how I would function,
whether as an under-cover [p. 77] Communist or open, and it was decided that
I should function openly, and then I received a card.
Q. When did you leave the party, Mr. Budenz? — A. 1945.
Q. Why did you leave the party in 1945?
Mr. Sacher. I object to that as incompetent in this proceeding.
Inspector Phelan. Overruled.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Please answer the last question. — A. I left the Communist Party because
I learned from experience that it is a fifth column of Soviet Russia, of Soviet
dictatorship, and that the Soviet dictatorship plans to dominate the world,
specifically aimed against the United States. Also, in this respect, I returned
to the Catholic Church, and I found after a long effort to reconcile communism
and Catholicism that this was impossible.
Q. Did you hold in positions or offices in the Communist Party? WTere you
a member of any committees?. — A. Yes, sir ; I held quite a few positions.
Q. Would you name them? — A. I was a member of the national committee for
6 years of my membership. I was labor editor of the Daily [p. 78] Worker
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 14
1692 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
from 1936, we will say, until late 1937 when I was appointed editor of the Mid-
west Daily Record, a Communist-controlled and -created paper, but supposedly
an organ of the People's Front. That was in Chicago. In 1940 I became presi-
dent of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc., which was created by the Communist
Party during the Hitler-Stalin pact as a defense measure, and shortly there-
after I became managing editor of the Daily Worker. I was in supervisory
charge of the Daily Worker, in other words, from 1940 on. I also have been
a member, without being able to give from memory the dates, of the State
committee, the national trade-union committee, the State trade-union committee,
the Illinois State committee, and some other offices of that character.
Q. These are all organizations of the Communist Party, these committees? —
A. Those are the State committees or national committees of the Communist
Party, and the trade-union commissions are the trade-union commissions of the
Communist Party at the time I served on them.
Q. Is the Daily Worker an official publication of the Communist Party? —
A. The Daily Worker is the official organ of the [p. 79] Communist Party
for popular uses, although from time to time it has denied that capacity. It is,
nevertheless, the official organ.
Q. Was this paper in any way subsidized by the Red International or the
Communist Party in Russia? — A. The Daily Worker was subsidized by the
Soviet Union for a number of years.
Mr. Sacher. I move to strike that out as representing nothing more than the
conclusion of this witness for which there appears to be no foundation of the
evidence.
Inspector Phelan. Sustained.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. You were the editor of the Daily Worker; is that correct? — A. I was the
managing editor of the Daily Worker.
Q. Was the paper in any way subsidized while you were the managing editor,
to your own personal knowledge?
Mr. Saoher. Subsidized by whom? You cannot just have a vacuum.
Mr. Boyd. I asked him.
Mr. Sacher I object to that on the ground that the witness has shown no
foundation for such a conclusion.
Inspector Phelan. Well, I take it it is a [p. 80] preliminary question.
Mr. Sacher. I do not care whether it is preliminary or not. The word "sub-
sidize" comprehends a conclusion. I object to it and move to strike it out.
Inspector Phelan. Denied.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
The Witness. It was subsidized by the Runag News Agency, owned by the
Soviet Government.
Mr. Sacher. I move to strike that out, Mr. Inspector, on the ground that there
is no evidence in the record under which that conclusion is based.
Inspector Phelan. I shall deny it at the moment, subject to it being con-
nected up as the matter proceeds.
Mr. Sacher. I note an exception to that, Mr. Inspector.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. In what manner was the Daily Worker subsidized by the Runag News
Agency?
Mr. Sacher. I object to that, unless the witness has evidence of the basis on
which he could arrive at, that conclusion.
The Witness. I have that.
Mr. Sacher. I suggest, therefore, Mr. Inspector, that the witness be required
to state first the basis of his knowledge.
[P. 81] The Witness. The basis of my knowledge is the records of the
United States Department of Justice under Attorney General Francis Biddle
and, secondly
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment, please. Mr. Presiding Inspector, I ask that you
admonish the witness, when counsel objects, to please withhold his comment.
The Witness. I shall be delighted, Counselor.
Mr. Sactieh. I move to strike out that answer of the witness, on the ground
thai the so-called records of the Attorney General of the Department of Justice
are the best evidence of the facts, and not the statements by this witness, if that
lie the basis.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1693
Inspector PHELAN. Counsel's objection is good. Sustained.
Mr. Boyd. I would like to ask the previous question.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. In what way was the Daily Worker subsidized by this Russian-controlled
' Inspector Phelan. Speak only of your own personal knowledge that you have,
in answering.
A. This is personal knowledge as president of Freedom of the Press Co.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
The Witness. As a member of the editorial board.
{P. 82] Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
The Witness. The Daily Worker for a number of years received free of charge
hundreds of thousands of words from Moscow, which every newspaperman knows
is about 13 to 15 cents per word. The Daily Worker was asked, consequently, and
the Communist Party, to file as a foreign agent as a result of this. As a matter
of fact, the decision was made that Earl Browder file as a foreign agent.
By Mr. P.oyd :
Q. Was this news furnished to any other paper in the United States? —
A. Not immediately. Later on, when Attorney General Biddle ruled that tins
had to be registered for, a new organization was created which carried on the
same activity. That also was ruled to be a foreign agent. They then sought
to sell to other agencies, but the Daily Worker continued to get for a very small
sum this information.
Mr. Sacher. In other words, do I understand correctly that the Daily Worker
paid for the news service which it got from this Runag News Co."? Is that the
witness' testimony?
The Witness. No, sir : it didn't.
Mr. Sacher. Didn't pay anything?
The Witness. It may have paid a small sum.
[P. 83] Mr. Sacher. That, to me, seems the best evidence of the fact that he
does not know what he is talking about. First he says they did not pay, then
they paid a small amount. Now he says theymay not have paid. W'hicb of the
three alternatives is this witness' testimony to be?
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Presiding Inspector, may I ask that you admonish counsel
that he refrain from asking this witness questions and commenting on his testi-
mony until the proper time? He will be afforded an opportunity of cross-examin-
ing the witness.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I believe we should proceed here subject to your
objection to each individual question. If the matter is not ultimately connected
up, it will be subject to a motion to strike on that account.
Mr. Sacher. In the interests of expedition, I will go along with you.
The Witness. The reason I stated that was that the policies changed from
time to time, very small nominal payments being made; so much so that it was
ruled that this was a foreign agency and would have to register as such.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Are you acquainted with the Trade Union Unity League? — [P. 84] A.
Yes. It was just being dissolved when I joined the party, but I knew of it as a
non-Communist.
Q. Mr. Budenz, have you ever been called upon to address Communist meet-
ings?— A. Yes, sir; great numbers, all over the country.
Q. Do you care to state some of the occasions on which you have addressed
Communist meetings?
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. I object to this on the ground that it is imma-
terial, irrelevant, and incompetent in this proceeding.
Inspector Phelan. What do you propose to show?
Mr. IJoyi). I propose to show this man's authority on communism, that he
addressed meetings from time to time on the subject.
Mr. Sacher. Mr. Inspector, I just want to say that a lot of ignoramuses have
addressed meetings on a lot of questions and one does not prove his authority by
the fact that he speaks about something. As a matter of fact, regrettahly there
are too many people who talk about things they know nothing about.
Inspector Phelan. I suggest that the witness he asked what various assi:fn-
ments he had in connection with the party as a foundation for possibly qualifying
him as an expert, as I understand you propose to do.
[P. 85] Mr. Boyd. I helieve the witness has pretty well covered that.
1694 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party of the
United States of America advocates the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence?
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. I object to that question on the ground that the
witness'' qualifications for such a conclusion have not been established.
Inspector Phelan. Overruled.
Mr. Sacher. I respectfully except.
The Witness. The Communist Party with its basic platform of Marxism and
Leninism stands for the overthrow of the Government of the United States by
force and violence. Of course, it is a fifth column of Soviet Russia.
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. I move to strike everything out after that first
sentence of his as being not responsive. He was asked only one question.
Mr. Boyd. If the presiding inspector please, it is responsive and the witness
has a right to complete his answer.
Inspector Phelan. Read the question, please.
(Question read by reporter.)
[P. 86] Mr. Sacher, The answer to that is either "Yes" or "No."
Mr. Boyd. Not necessarily at all.
Mr. Sacher. I submit that everything beyond the word "Yes" be stricken out.
Inspector Phelan. Answer "Yes" or "No" and then you may explain your
answer.
The Witness. To the same question?
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment, please. I respectfully suggest that, if you either
rule or you do not rule, either you say that the witness must testify "Yes" or
"No" and that is the answer to the question and then let another question be
placed, the propriety of which we can test, or else say you overrule me. I want to
know what you are doing. Are you ruling that the witness must now in response
to that question answer "Yes" or "No," or aren't you so ruling? Let us get
through with that first.
Inspector Phelan. What I am ruling is that he must answer "Yes" or "No,"
but he is at liberty to explain it. I think that is a proper answer.
Mr. Sacher. No ; I don't think, Mr. Inspector, that that is proper at all accord-
ing to court procedure. If the appropriate answer to a question is either "Yes"
or "No," then I respectfully urge that you rule that the witness answer yes or
no and then, after he answers, let counsel [p. 87] put whatever question he deems
appropriate to elicit anything else that he wishes in addition to that.
Inspector Phelan. I shall overrule that objection and you may have an ex-
ception.
Mr. Sacher. Thank you.
Inspector. Read the last question, please.
(The reporter read the question, as follows :)
"Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party of the United
States of America advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United
States by force and violence?"
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Will you please answer yes or no to that question and then qualify your
answer as you see fit? — A. Yes ; it does. That is the basic — —
Mr. Sacher. Your Honor, I have another objection to make, and that is this,
and that goes to the basis of these charges : The question that counsel now puts
to the witness is as to present advocacy of violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment. I invite your attention to the fact that the charges, the amended charges
as lodged yesterday, all read in the past. I call your attention to the following :
It says, "Upon the basis of this evidence, the Government proposes to lodge the
following additional charges as additional grounds to the [p. SS] deportation
of Santo, to wit : The act of October 16, 191S, as amended, in that he is found
to have been, after entry, a member of the following class set forth in section 1
of said act: an alien who was a member of and affiliated with the following or-
ganizations, associations, societies, and groups, to wit : the Communist Party of
the United States of America and the Trade Union Unity League, which organiza-
tions advised, advocated, and taught the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the United States," et cetera.
I therefore respectfully submit that, in view of the fact that the charges here
are that the two allegedly prescribed organizations acted in these respects in
the past, that this question is utterly immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent in
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1695
this proceeding, as the charges now stand, for the question under attack is one
which addresses itself to a present advocacy.
Mr. Boyd. 1 think my next question will answer thai objection.
Mr. SACHER. Let us not do that. Let us set to what the charges are. I think
it would be nice if we could try the charges first and then try what is in the
imagination of counsel some other time, but let's try these charges now. That
is what I urge, and 1 | p. 89] respectfully ask for a ruling at the hands of the
inspector on this specific question and move to strike out the witness' answer.
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled, again subject to a motion to
strike if it is not ultimately connected up with the issues in this case.
Mr. Sacheu. But the only issue, Mr. Presiding Inspector, is whether these
allegedly prescribed organizations did these things in the past, and this question
addresses itself exclusively to the present. Now, it seems to me that, if we are
still practicing in American courts, that we ought to distinguish between past
and present, you see.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I doubt that any single question can be asked
on any of these subjects which would cover the particular type of issue that
you speak of. I think this is all preliminary. I think all of us understand that
and we will expedite things.
Mr. Sacher. Let us get some things through my head, anyway. I want to
know, and I emphasized it yesterday, what it is that we are going to try. Now,
the very essence of due process is that an accused, and not only an accused, but
any litigant should know what specific charges he is being called upon to answer
in a judicial [p. 90] proceeding. All I am asking here is, in view of the fact that
the language of these amended charges is so clear in the casting of these events
in the past, that it be limited to the past and not to the present.
Now, frankly, I must say that I cannot see where you or anyone else can possi-
bly find any fault with that insistence. If you were prosecuting the case or
defending it, I cannot imagine that you would be willing to go along on the theory
that a client which charges something in the past justifies an incorporation as
to the events of the present. That is all there is to my argument. I want due
process ; that is all.
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled. If counsel fails to connect it
up, I will have it stricken.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
By Mr. Boyd.
Q. Mr. Budenz, did the Communist Party of the United States advocate the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence for the
entire period that you were a member; that is, from 1935 until 1945? — A. Basi-
•cally it did ; yes. The Communist Party in that respect
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. The witness has answered. I object to any fur-
ther elaboration.
Mr. Boyd. He certainly is entitled to qualify his [p. 91] answer.
Mr. Sacher. Is he going to qualify it in the sense of detracting from it or limit-
ing it. or what, or is he just going to elaborate on it? What is the witness going
to do?
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
The Witness. How was the wording? I want to continue my sentence. The
basic principle is Marxism and Leninism, which is this thing we have been speak-
ing of, but this is from time to time blurred by the fact that the Communist Party
is a fifth column of Soviet Russia.
Mr. Sacher. Now I move to strike that out as not responsive, Mr. Inspector.
It represents conclusions of the witness which have no foundation in the evidence.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Inspector, I am going to ask you to admonish counsel to let
the witness complete his answer and then, if he wishes to make an objection, in
the right manner to do so.
Mr. Sacher. No, sir; not when this witness undertakes with your aid and
assistance to violate proper rules of evidence. I will not succumb to any such
admonition if it should be made, and I am going to interrupt every time the wit-
ness violates the law here. I ask for a ruling, Mr. Inspector, on that sentence.
[P. 92] Inspector Phelan. I think counsel is entitled to object in the course
of an answer. However, again I shall overrule this objection.
Mr. Boyd. Would you read the answer, please?
Mr. Sacher. I respectfully except.
( The reporter read the answer, as follows : )
1696 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"A. Basically it did ; yes. The Communist Party in that respect-
The Witness. And never departs in any way from the policies laid down by"
the Kremlin in Moscow. The Communist official records prove that. The Com-
munist Party resolutions prove that. The Communist press proves that. No
Communist can show at any time a deviation in one small iota of the Communist
press or the Communist Party in the United States from the order sent out from
the Kremlin in Moscow by official statements. In the declarations by Soviet
leaders are the policies laid down by the Moscow government.
Mr. Sacher. I now move to strike all of that effusion from the record, on the
ground that it is not responsive to the question.
Inspector Phelan. Denied.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Did you, as the editor of the Daily Worker, [p. 93] receive instructions'
from Moscow in the form of news releases?
Mr. Sacher. Now, just a moment. I object to that question on the ground
that it calls for the witness' conclusions. If he wishes to prduce news releases
and then argue to you, Mr. Inspector, that in those news releases are contained
instructions, then we shall deal with the competency of that when we reach it, but
this question suffers from the double vice of first asking for the contents of writ-
ten documents which are not offered in evidence and whose failure to present in
evidence is not justified and, second, asks for the conclusion of the witness as to
what the nature, not merely the contents, but what the nature of the contents
of those documents is. On that twofold ground I object to the question as im-
material, irrelevant, and incompetent.
Inspector Phelan. Will you read the question, please?
(The reporter read the question, as follows : )
"Q. Did you, as the editor of the Daily Worker, receive instructions from;
Moscow, in the form of news releases?"
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled.
Mr. Sacher. You know, once in a while, Mr. Inspector, I would really like to-
hear a reason why [p. 94] you overrule, apart from the fact that maybe you
have been instructed to do so.
Inspector Phelan. I think occasionally I have stated reasons. I do not feel
that I should in every instance. We would be here too long. Proceed.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
The Witness. Yes, sir; every news release from Moscow is an instruction
and also the various statements of the Soviet leaders contained in the publica-
tions of the Communist International and the other publications received from
Moscow. That is recognized by the political committee of the Communist Party.
That is a recognized procedure.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Were you a member of the political committee of the Communist Party? —
A. No, sir; not the political committee; that is the executive committee of the
national committee. I was a member of the national committee, though not too-
often, but occasionally I sat in political committee meetings.
Q. Is the national committee of the Communist Party the higher governing
body of the Communist Party in the United States, or was it at the time that
you were a member? — A. Well, technically in the Communist Party you always
have to distinguish between the set-up and the fact, but [p. 95] technically the
national committee is the governing body in between conventions. The political
committee is the one that makes the decision in between sessions of the national
committee, but these decisions are never in conflict with the decisions of
Moscow.
Q. How were you appointed to this committee? — A. National committee?
Q. Yes; by whom? Were you elected? In what way did you become a
member? — A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated.
Mr. Sacher. I move to strike that out as not responsive. He was either
elected or appointed. Now, which way were you designated to that?
The Witness. It appears both, in the Communist movement.
Mr. Sacher. Which way were you elected?
Mr. Boyd. Just a moment, please. If you have any cross-examination, you
put it in at the proper time.
Mr. Sacher. Believe me it will be proper when it comes, but in the mean-
time let this man answer your questions responsively.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1697
Tin- Witness. Is counsel intimidating me, Mr. Examiner?
Mr. Boyd. He is trying to but he is not making much
[P. 96] Mr. Fanelli. I move to strike that from the record, Mr. Presiding
Inspector.
Inspector Phelan. What is the answer to the question?
(The reporter read the answer, as follows:)
"A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated."
Mr. Sacheb. Will you act on Mr. Fanelli's motion to strike counsel's statement
from the record?
Inspector Phelan. I have an objection that preceded that which I have not
ruled on yet.
(The reporter read the previous question and answer, as follows:)
"Q. Yes, by whom? Were you elected? In what way did you become a
member? — A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated."
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. By whom is this slate chosen?— A. This slate is chosen by the inner corps
of the political committee.
Q. How is it acted on? By whom?
Mr. Fanelli. Did you rule, Mr. Examiner?
The Witness. Excuse me.
Mr. Sacher. It seems that counsel ignores you as well as the witness. Nowr
someone ought to have some [p. 97] respect for the inspector. It should not
be limited to the respondent alone.
Inspector Phelan. Like the answer to which the objection was directed.
Proceed.
Mr. Sacher. Will you also say like the statement of counsel?
Inspector Phelan. I didn't hear that statement.
Mr. Sacher. Well, it is on the record. He made a statement that I am trying
to intimidate this witness, and Mr. Fanelli moved to strike it from the record.
Mr. Fanelli. It is not justified by anything that has occurred this morning.
Inspector Phelan. Strike it from the record. Proceed.
The Witness. Where are we, Mr. Inspector?
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Do you know whether or not counsel is a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Sacher. You are beginning to hit below the belt.
Mr. Boyd. I am not.
Mr. Sacher. I object, Your Honor, to — this witness will swear his mother
away. I object to that as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent in this
proceeding.
[P. 98] Inspector Phelan. Sustained.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Presiding Inspector
Mr. Sacher. That is foulest, dirtiest thing I have ever seen from any lawyer
in almost 25 years.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, the objection has been sustained.
Mr. Boyd. One of the charges is that this man has been affiliated
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. I object to any statements by counsel, and I
warn him now, if you open your mouth you will have a suit for slander on
your hands before this day is over. Now just get that straight, and I warn
you also that the laws of criminal libel in this State are such as to embrace any
false statements that you make in the presence of newspapermen when you are
on notice that your statements will be published in the press.
Now. with that notice, I warn you I will pursue you civilly and criminally
if you dare to utter or imply a word of slander against me.
inspector Phelan. The objection has been sustained. Proceed.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Do you know whether or not John Santo is or was a member of the Com-
munist Party?
[P. 99] Mr. Sacher. I object to that question on the ground that the witness
has not been qualified to give any such testimony.
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
The Witness. I know that John Santo was, while I was a member of the
Communist Party, a member likewise of the Communist Party. We were com-
rades in the Communist Party.
1698 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Did you ever attend any meetings of the Communist Party, the membership
of which was limited to Communist members only, at which John Santo was
present? — A. Oh, yes.
Q. When you referred to John Santo, to whom are you referring? If he is in
this room, will you please identify him? — A. the gentleman there between
Comrade Quill
Mr. Sacher. I move to strike that out. You foul-mouth ! Why do you refer
to him as comrade? You claim you aren't a comrade now. Why do you refer
to anyone like that now?
The Witness. Mr. Quill.
Mr. Sacher. That is better. Don't carry the Judas kiss in this place.
[P. 100] Mr. Boyd. Now please.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I have stricken it. Proceed.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that the witness be admonished to desist from such conduct
in the future.
Mr. Boyd. And that counsel be admonished not to intimidate this witness.
Mr. Sacher. Every time he is caught, he is being intimidated.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
(The reporter read the last question.)
Inspector Phelan. Let me interfere here. The witness in referring to Mr.
Santo will use the word "respondent," and in referring to counsel will use the
word "counsel." In speaking of others, I desire that he mention them by name
only.
Mr. Sacher. Prefixed only by the word "Mr."?
Inspector Phelan. Correct.
The Witness. Gladly. Mr. Santo is sitting right opposite me in a blue-serge
suit.
Mr. Boyd. Does the record show satisfactorily that the witness has
identified
Mr. Sacher. He has identified Santo. He was taken around to see him
outside the building before the hearing.
[P. 101] Mr. Boyd. I object to such a statement and ask that it be stricken.
Mr. Sacher. I am making a concession. If you do not want it, do not take it.
Mr. Boyd. I ask that part of the answer wherein he stated
Mr. Sacher. That is the concession. If you are not satisfied with it, go ahead
and have the witness walk around and put his band on Santo's head.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I think if we would take a calmer attitude we
will get along faster.
Mr. Fanelli. Could we have a 5-minute recess?
( A short recess was taken.)
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, we are here trying two basic issues of the fact.
One of them is an allegation that the respondent was connected with certain
organizations; the other involves the doctrines or teachings or character of those
organizations. I am addressing counsel for both sides. We are not trying the
conduct of any other person here as far as I am informed. This hearing is not
subject to tbe strict rules of evidence that are applied* by the courts. I per-
sonally am interested in just getting these facts.
I hope that all concerned will confine themselves to that. Counsel for both
sides will necessarily be [p. 102] allowed considerable latitude in the questions
that they may ask any witness. I see no escape from that in this type of a
proceeding. I think, if those matters are borne in mind, that we can carry this
hearing on in a more expeditious manner and probably in the end get closer to
a proper record and result. Proceed.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Now, Mr. Budenz, you testified that the Communist Party of the United
States has advocated tbe overthrow of the Government of the United States by
force and violence. Just how did they propose to bring that about? — A. By the
armed insurrection of a minority group. That is Leninism.
Mr. Sacher. Can the witness say bow small a minority is envisaged?
Mr. Boyd. You may bring that out in cross-examination, counsel.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Did the Communist Party of the United States of America distribute lit-
erature in the United States? — A. Oh, extensively; yes, sir; distributed litera-
ture extensively in all parts of the United States.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1699
Q. Did they have a literature department?— A. They have several literature
departments.
Q. Are you familiar with the literature which they [p. 103] distributed?— A.
With considerable issues; yes.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Presiding inspector, I have some pamphlets and books here
that I would like to have marked for identification.
Inspector Phelan. Very well. I observe that in the prior hearing there were
14 exhibits offered in evidence in rotation, without designating whether they were
Government's exhibits or respondent's exhibits. If counsel are agreeable, we
shall start marking future Government's exhibits as "Government Exhibit 15."
As to defense exhibits, we can either start with "Respondent Exhibit 1" or
Mr. Sacher. Letter them, perhaps.
Inspector Phelan. That will be excellent.
Mr. Sacher. That is agreeable.
Mr. Boyd. All right.
Inspector Phelan. These are being marked at this time, for identification only,
"15, 16, 17. 18, 10. 20. 21. 22. 23, 24. 2.1. 26."
(Whereupon the pamphlets and books above referred to were marked "Gov-
ernment's Exhibits 15 to 26" for identification.)
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Handing you what is marked "Government's Exhibit 15" for identifica-
tion, will you please state what it is and whether or not you are familiar with
it [handing same to witness]. — [p. 104] A. State and Revolution, by V. I.
Lenin. International Publishers, New York. I am familiar with that.
Q. Do you know whether or not that pamphlet, marked "Government's Exhibit
15." entitled "State and Revolution." was displayed and offered for sale by the
Communist Party of the United States of America?
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. I object to this unless a connection between this
organization and the specific sales is established. Otherwise, it represents the
witness' conclusion without any substantiating evidence.
Inspector Phelan. Overruled.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
The Witness. Yes : this is distributed widely by the Communist Party in one
form or another. It is in book form, too, in addition to this pamphlet. The
International Publishers are an outlet for the Communist Party, owned and con-
trolled by the Communist Party.
Mr. Sacher. I object to that, Mr. Inspector, and I wish to point out that, if
the title to a mongrel dog was involved in a $2 lawsuit, a witness would not be
permitted to testify that the dog was owned by one or another of the parties : and
I therefore move to strike from the record this witness' testimony [p. 105] as
to the ownership of the book publishers of Government's exhibit 15.
Inspector Phelan. Does the document show who issued it?
Mr. Sachek. Yes ; the International Publishers. That is all it shows, ac-
cording to the witness.
Inspector Phelan. The witness may answer and state how he knows the facts
of ownership.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Mr. Budenz, you have testified that the International Publishers are owned
and controlled by the Communist Party. Will you state how you know that
fact? — A. I know it from decision and discussions in the political committee and
the national committee, and the fact that representatives of the International
Publishers, as part of the party apparatus, appear at every Communist Party
convention and urge the sale of this literature as Communist literature, and the
International Publishers is a Communist outlet, a Communist organization.
Mr. Trachtenberg, who is the representative of the International Publishers,
has been many times a member of the national committee of the Communist
Party and also appears at every convention of the Communist Party in that
capacity. That is, as a representative of a Communist book firm.
[P. 106] Mr. Sacher. Mr. Inspector, I respectfully submit that, if that con-
stitutes the entire basis for the witness' statement in regard to ownership, that
it does not support the conclusion and that the statement in regard to ownership
should be struck from the record.
In that connection, I would like to point out that there probably isn't a book
publisher in America or a newspaper publisher in America who is not a member
of some political party and who either directly or indirectly attends, participates,
1700 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
or controls political parties and is in turn controlled by political parties, and yet
no one would assume to say that any of these publications is owned by those
political organizations.
On that basis, I move to strike the statement in regard to ownership from the
record.
Inspector Phelan. Denied.
Mr. Sacher. What is the ruling?
Inspector Phelan. Denied.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Have you personally seen these documents offered for sale, this document
offered for sale at Communist Party meetings? — [P. 107] A. Oh, many, many
times. This is a standard Communist work which is constantly distributed.
Q. Does the Communist Party have literature agents? — A. In the branches
they have literature agents. They also have a literature department in State
organizations, and each section of the party which feeds the literature to the
branches.
Q. What are the functions of these literature departments and literature
agents of the Communist Party?— A. To distribute, by sale, books of this char-
acter, pamphlets of this character.
Q. Is this one of the books that was distributed by the Communist Party
through its literature department? — A. That is one of those most extensively
distributed and most constantly distributed.
Mr. Boyd. I am now offering in evidence Government's Exhibit 15, State and
Revolution.
Mr. Sacher. Look ; I just want to suggest this. You have there exhibits run-
ning from 15 to 26.
Mr. Boyd. Would you like me to offer them all at once?
Mr. Sacher. To save time. You make an over-all offer, and I will make my
objections accordingly.
Mr. Boyd. All right.
By Mr. Boyd :
[P. 108] Q. I hand you what is marked "Government's Exhibit 16" for identi-
fication, and ask you what it is and whether you are familiar with it [handing
.same to witness]. — A. The Communist Manifesto, by Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels.
Q. By whom was it published? — A. International Publishers again.
Q. Are you familiar with this? ,
Mr. Sacher. Why don't we also get a concession that it will be testified that
he is familiar with the contents of all of these documents, that he will also
testify in regard to each of these subsequent documents substantially the same
as he testified in regard to Government's exhibit 15 for identification, and we
can save the time then.
Mr. Boyd. If you wish to make a stipulation to that effect, the Government
is agreeable.
Inspector Phelan. I think that is advisable.
Mr. Boyd. Will you put that in the form of a stipulation?
Mr. Sacher. It is stipulated that the witness' testimony in regard to Govern-
ment's exhibits 16 to 26, both inclusive, will be substantially the same as his
testimony in regard to Government's exhibit 15 for identification.
[P. 109] Inspector Phelan. That is as to
Mr. Sacher. His familiarity, the contents, the sale, the distribution.
Inspector Phelan. And the origin.
Mr. Sacher. And the origin.
Mr. Boyd. There is this about it, however. These books are not all published
by the same publishers.
Mr. Sachb;r. The books themselves will show that.
Mr. Kanelli. Let's make sure that is agreeable to the witness.
Mr. Sacher. I do not care about the witness.
Inspector Phelan. I think he should look at all of them and see if he is
familiar with them.
The Witness. I think a couple of these may not have been during the time I
was a member of the Communist Party. I would like to qualify the knowledge
I have of them.
Mr. Sacher. You probably won't.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1701
The Witness. The program of the Communisl [nternational, together with
the Status of the Communist [nternational, copyright 1929. That was before I
was a member of the Ctommunist Party, published by the Workers' Library Pub-
lishers, l am familiar with it and know that it was distributed by the I om:
munist Party. . ,,„,., . .,. . •_
Mr Sachhb. Well, If there is any one you are not [p. 110 1 familiar with or
thai was aot distributed, tell us that, because we are stipulating. That is why
we are stipulating that you would testify.
The Witness. Well, there is a slight difference.
Inspector Phei.ax. May I ask a question?
The Witness. I want to be exact.
Inspector Phelan. Were all of these documents distributed by the party, to
your own knowledge, during the time that you were connected with that
organization?
The Witness. Yes; some of these were not distributed in as large a measure
because, for instance, these resolutions of the Sixth World Congress, while still
available to Communists while I was there and accessible to their schools, was
Dot as widely distributed as some other documents. That is the only qualifica-
tion I would make.
Inspector Phelan. Are counsel ready to enter into that stipulation?
Mr. Sacher. Yes; that he would so testify.
Inspector Phelax. What is the stipulation for the record, please?
i Stipulation read.)
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, is that satisfactory?
Mr. Boyd. It is satisfactory to the Government.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
[P. Ill] Mr. Boyd. I now offer in evidence Government exhibits 15 and 26,
inclusive.
Mr. Sacher. I object to those exhibits, Mr. Inspector, on the ground that they
are immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, not binding upon the respondent,
and have no probative force or value in this proceeding.
Inspector Pheean. Overruled.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
(Whereupon Government's exhibits 15 to 26, inclusive, heretofore marked for
identification, were received in evidence.)
Mr. Sacher. Can't we have copies?
Mr. Boyd. I am sorry; there are none.
Inspector Phelan. Is there any objection to loaning them to counsel after
they are in the record here?
Mr. Boyd. I see no objection.
Mr. Sacher. Can we have them over the week end?
Mr. Boyd. Providing they are available to us at the hearing at all times.
Mr. Sacher. Oh, sure.
Mr. Faxelli. Mr. Presiding Inspector, may I ask, in view of the fact particu-
larly that I am ordinarily in Washington and Mr. Sacher is ordinarily in New
York and we are preparing this case together, I [p. 112] would ask counsel at
least to check insofar as there may be some extra copies of that around the place ;
we would like to borrow them.
Mr. Boyd. I will be glad to loan you duplicates of any of those books we have.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the fact, or referred to schools. Did the Com-
munist Party of the United States of America conduct schools in the United
States? — A. Yes; it conducted several characters of schools.
Q. Tell us about them. — A. Originally they had the workers' school all through-
out the country. They were open schools, open in the sense that they invited
members of the party in general and also those who were sympathetic or even
those whom they wanted to win to the party to attend these workers' schools.
Later these workers' schools were all changed over, being given specific names
like Jefferson School in New York and Lincoln School in Chicago and the like.
That was during the Browder period in part. Then, in addition to that, though,
they also had the secret schools; that is, the national training school, the State
training school, and the section training school. Those were secret schools for
members of the party only, those being trained to be [p. 113] leaders in the
party; and they were held at various camps and places like that, so they had
several different characters of schools.
1 702 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Did they use textbooks at these schools? — A. Yes; thev used textbooks
That is, they used different literature from time to time.
Q. Did they use any of this literature here at those schools?
Mr. Sacher. Now, just one moment. I am going to ask that the witness be
required to state whether he knows which of tbe proposed — I take it these are
other exhibits, Mr. Boyd.
Mr. P>oyd. The same ones.
Mr. Sacher. If it is the same ones, I am going to ask that the witness be
required to state in which of the many schools he has mentioned here he can
say that any or all of the exhibits have been or are being used. 1 am going to
object to an omnibus statement in this case.
Inspector Phelan. What is the question?
(The reporter read the question.)
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled. Let the witness examine the
exhibits and state which, if any of them, he knows were used in such schools
Mr. Fanelli. And which schools.
Mr. Sacher. Is that right?
[P. 114] The Witness. That is right.
Mr. Sacher. May I suggest that the witness refer to the publication by exhibit
number so that when we get to read the record we can see what it is's
Inspector Phelan. That would be helpful.
The Witness. Government's exhibit 22 was used in both schools.
Inspector Phelan. Which schools?
The Witness. Well, in all of the schools in one form or another.
Inspector Phelan. You refer to both types of schools, then?
The Witness. That is right. That is, under Marxism and Leninism it was
used. This was used as auxiliary reading, Government's exhibit 20. used as
auxiliary reading in all schools. In courses on Marxism and Leninism, wherever
they were held, this was referred to all schools, Government's exhibit 16.
Mr. Sacher. Why don't you take a quick glance at them? If your answer
is "all schools," just put it in.
Mr. Boyd. Take your time in perusing the exhibits.
The Witness. Government's exhibit 26, well, at least, was referred to in all
schools and used in the schools of the party proper. That is what I call the
[p. 115] national training and district schools.
This likewise, which is a companion piece, Government's exhibit 23, was used
in the same capacity as reading matter for the schools in general, as I recall,
but as a textbook in Marxism and Leninism in the national training school and
the section school.
Government's e: hibit 25 was used during my very early part of the party,
and I am not sure that it was used in the party schools.
Government's exhibit 24 was used as a side reference, at least, though not as
a textbook proper, mostly in the party schools. This [indicating exhibit 25]
was practically not used at all during my membership in the party in the
general schools.
That was the case likewise with Government's exhibit 17.
I have no knowledge of Government's exhibit 19 being used in the schools.
I have no knowledge of Government's exhibit 21 being used in the schools,
although reference to it was made because it was a document of the party,
but not as a textbook, certainly.
Government's exhibit 18 was used only as auxiliary reading in the schools in
both, but particularly in the party schools. This was for popular distribution,
[p. 116] however, rather'than for school work.
And this is a standard book for the schools in Marxism and Leninism, Govern-
ment's exhibit 15.
Inspector Phelan. Were those books sold to the students in these two types
of schools or furnished in connection with the courses of study?
The Witness. They were sold to the students ; yes.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Were what is marked "Government's Exhibits 16 to 26, inclusive'
A. Just a moment. There is a variation here, by the way, that you should bear
in mind. That is, when the Jefferson School came into existence, there was a
course in Marxism presented there which may not have used all of these docu-
ments. I can say, though, that there was used Government's exhibit 26, Govern-
ment's exhibit 15, Government's exhibit 23, Government's exhibit 16, Government's
exhibit 22.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1703
Inspector Phelan. When did that school come into existence?
Mr. Fanelli. Which school?
The Witness. The Jefferson School as distinct from the Workers School.
Well, Let ine try to recall. It was approximately, though the date may have to
be changed exactly, approximately 1941, 1940 — may be a [p. 1171 little later.
Inspector Phelan. Did the school operate locally in New York City?
The Witness. There had been workers schools through different cities of the
United States. They were done away with, and in their place were established
other local schools which had different names. That was under Browder's
leadership. These schools were the Samuel Adams School in Boston, the Jeffer-
son School in New York, the Lincoln School in Chicago, and some other schools.
Those are the ones that I recall.
Inspector Phelan. Were those schools open to the public in the sense that the
party was inviting people in to take the instruction which the schools offered?
The Witness. Oh, yes ; those were open schools. They had open public offices.
The other schools, the national training school and the State training school and
the section training schools, were secret ; that is to say, it was restricted t(5
people chosen by the officials of the party and held without any label or address
or anything like that. They were generally held at some camp when the camp
season was over with. Those were for training leadership in the party.
Inspector Phelan. How widely distributed was the other type of school? You
spoke of Boston and New York [p. 118], I believe. Were there other schools
throughout the United States?
The Wtitness. Yes; in certain cities throughout the United States. I just
cannot recall their names now or locations, but there were others.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed, Counsel. .
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Do you know whether or not they taught the overthrow of the Government
of the United States by force and violence at these schools to which you have
made reference? — A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fanelli. Could we have that question repeated?
(The reporter read the question.)
Mr. Fanelli. I just do not understand the question, Mr. Inspector. Could it
be rephrased? I do not know what "taught the overthrow" means.
Mr. Sacheb. Taught.
Mr. Fanelli. Oh, I misunderstood.
Mr. Sacheb. That being the case, I object to the question as calling for the
most ridiculous of conclusions.
Inspector Phelan. I will sustain that and I will ask the question.
Did you at any time have any connection with the [p. 119] management of any
of these schools, either the schools inside the party or the schools that were
open to the public?
The Witness. As a member of the State committee I passed on their cur-
ricula several times ; as a member of the national committee on the curricula.
Inspector Phelan. What governing body of the organization
Mr. Sacheb. May I suggest that you ask him what might appear in the cur-
ricula that would indicate that they teach the overthrow of the Government?
Inspector Phelan. I was leading up to that, Counsel.
What governing body of the organization was responsible for the over-all
direction of these two types of schools?
The Witness. Well, the national committee was generally responsible for
them all. The State committees were responsible for the schools in their own
localities. Wrhether they were open or secret — by the way, there was, however, a
special educational department, creators of special educational records. For
instance, "Pop Mendel" was the head of the educational department for the pri-
vate training schools.
[P. 120] Inspector Phelan. Did he sit on any of these governing committees
at that time?
The Witness. Well, he regularly reported to them from time to time.
Inspector Phelan. Do you know just how this educational director was ap-
pointed? What I am trying to get at is
The Witness. Oh, he was appointed by the national committee, and in the
States he was appointed by the State committee.
Inspector Phelan. Did you testify that you yourself had served on the national
committee?
The Witness. That is correct. Also
Inspector Phelan. For what period?
1704 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Witness. Well, I cannot recall the years at the moment, because there
was an interval there when I was made president of the Freedom of the Press
Co., Inc. ; and my impression is that during that interim I was not on the
national committee for certain defensive reasons.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Can you tell us about when you were on the committee? — A. I became a
member of the national committee about the year after I joined the party in 1936,
and I was a member all throughout the Chicago period.
Inspector Phelan. That would be up to about what [p. 121] year?
The Witness. That would be up to and including 1940. Now, if I remember
correctly — I may be a little bit mixed up in this — but, if I remember correctly,
when I became president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc., the understanding
was for defensive purposes that I would not be a candidate for the national com-
mittee ; and I wasn't for a couple of years, if I remember correctly. There was a
couple of years there where there was an interim I was not on the national
committee.
Inspector Phelan. During the time you served
The Witness. But in 1945, when I left the party, I was still a member of the
national committee.
Inspector Phelan. During the periods that you served on the national com-
mittee, was the party operating these schools of which you have spoken?
The Witness. Yes, sir.
Inspector Phelan. Was the party operating those schools under the direction
of a national committee?
Mr. Sacher. If it please the inspector, I would like to object to this whole
line of questions. I don't want to be discourteous to you, and I do not want to
retard the proceedings, so if you will grant me an exception to your complete
line of questions and answers I will appreciate it.
[P. 122] Inspector Phelan. The objections will be overruled and an exception
granted.
The Witness. Your inquiry was whether the national committee directed
these schools?
Inspector Phelan. During the time that you served on the committee.
The Witness. Yes, sir ; in a general way they directed the schools. Of course,
they allocated the direct running of the schools to educational departments, but
they, in general, supervised them and approved or disproved what the schools did.
Inspector Phelan. On what, do you base your statement that these par-
ticular exhibits or certain of them were used in those two types of schools?
The Witness. Well, that was a regular procedure, almost auxiliary. The
point of the matter is that Marxism, Leninism, whenever on the program of the
schools — and that was the heart of the school — would include certain of these
well-known documents which are part of the theory of Marxism-Leninism.
Inspector Phelan. You spoke of the curricula of the schools. What, in
general, would that embrace?
The Witness. Well, there would be public speaking ; there would be courses
in English, coursesS in parliamentary [p. 123] law for union activities, courses
in other things of that character. Some of them were courses in history, history
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sometimes, which was a special
textbook for that.
Inspector Phelan. Were there certain specified books to be used in connection
with certain specified courses?
The Witness. Oh, yes/
Mr. Sacher. That is true of Harvard University, too, I understand.
Inspector Phelan. I just want to get the record clear. Proceed, Counsel.
By Mr. Boyd:
0- I believe you testified that these exhibits IS to 26, inclusive, were offered
for sale by the Communist Party during the entire period you were a member
of the party. That is from 1935 t<> I!)!;"); is that correct?— A. A%couple of them
were not widely distributed, but in sreneral that is correct. I have distinguished,
I think, between the different exhibits.
Q. Did the party offer these exhibits for sale as a matter of raising funds or
for the purpose of spreading communism? — A. Primarily for the purpose of
spreading communism. That is why they are in existence, that is why the Com-
munist ||i. 124] Party exists.
Q. Who paid for the publishing of these books ; do you know?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1705
Mr. s.u'hkk. I suppose the World-Telegram publishes for the purpose of
publishing.
The Witness. The paymenl for these books, of course, was sometimes com-
plicated. That is. tlic party creates differenl corporations. The Daily Worker
is a special corporation, the International Publishers, Workers' Library Pub-
lishers. Technically t host1 corporations pay for them, but these reports <m
them, their finances, and the stabilization of them is all the party responsibility —
the national committee's responsibility.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Can you — —
Inspector Phet.an. May 1 ask a question for clarity here? Do I understand
that the national committee is the highest governing board of the party in the
United States?
The Witness. Well, in one way it is. The national committee is the board
Which functions between conventions, but the political committee, which is the
executive committee of the national committee, functions in between sessions
of the national committee and frequently when the words "national committee"
are used Lp. 125] it means political committee because the political committee
has power to issue statements even in the name of the national committee with-
out calling the national committee together. So a great many of these questions
are allocated in detail or in continuous operation to the political committee, which
is the executive committee, though, of the national committee.
Under the new constitution, because the Communists are always changing the
names of these different committees, it has a new name. I think it is called
the national board now, but it was formerly known as the political committee.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Referring to these books here, how about the Workers Publishers? Is that
owned and controlled by the Communist Party, or was it owned and controlled
by the Communist Party during the period that you were a member of the
party?
Mr. Sacher. I just want to interpose an objection on the ground, as I said be-
fore, that you could not prove the ownership of a dog with that kind of a question.
I think it is irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent.
Inspector Phelan. I will sustain it and suggest that the witness be asked
what, if anything, he knows as to any relationship between the Workers Publish-
ing Co. and the Party?
[P. 126] The Witness. The Workers Library Publishers is a corporation
formed by the Communist Party, or an organization formed by the Communist
Party, which reports regularly to the Communist Party, for which the Com-
munist Party is responsible financially and promotionally.
There are many such corporations formed by the Communist Party for defense
and other purposes, legal purposes.
Inspector Phelan. In what form does it report to the Communist Party and to
what governing body of the party?
The Witness. It takes the report of the financial standing to the national
committee, and then this is referred to the political committee for its detailed
examination.
Inspector Phelan. That is a periodic report, is it, at intervals?
The Witness. It is done from time to time. I do not know whether you call it
periodic. It generally is before the national conventions, and then it is — the
reports for the political committee are more periodic without reference to the
national committee.
I have been at certain political committee meetings on other matters where a
report has been made on the finances on one or the other of these corporations
or [p. 127] organizations.
Mr. Boyd. I would like these two books marked for identification, please.
(Whereupon the books referred to were marked "Government's Exhibits 27 and
28" for identification. )
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Referring to what is marked "Government Exhibit 27," will you state
whether or not you know what that is [handing same to witness]. — A. I know the
publication ; yes.
Q. The Communist ?— A. The Communist was then the official theoretical organ
of the Communist Party and continued so for a number of years until its name was
changed to Political Affairs.
1706 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. On the preface there appears : "The Communist, a magazine of theory and
practice of Marxism and Leninism published monthly by the Communist Party
of the United States of America, entered as second-class matter, November 2,
1927, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879."
Mr. Sacheb. Are you offering that in evidence?
Mr. Boyd. I am now offering in evidence Government's exhibits 27 and 28 for
identification.
Mr. Sacher. If it please the inspector, I heard Mr. Boyd read from this. That
is why I was anxious to [p. 12S] see this, in whicb it says on the top of this
magazine, "Entered as second-class matter, November 2, 1927, at the post office
at New York, N. Y."
Now, I am going to object to the receipt of this by yourself as inspector here,
on the ground that this cannot conceivably be used— 1 am referring now to
Government's exhibit 28 for identification — as a basis for any conclusion in this
proceeding for the following reason : Under the law the Postmaster General of
the United States is charged with the duty to exclude from the mails all matter
which advocates, teaches, et cetera, the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force or violence.
In view of the fact that this publication appears on the face of it that it was
received and passed through the mails by the Postmaster General, I respectfully
submit that the Government of the United States has placed its imprimatur on
Government's exhibit 28, and that which it itself saw fit to distribute through
the mails cannot now constitute any part of a basis for the deportation of any
inhabitant of the United States. That applies, of course, to both of the tendered
exhibits.
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled, and the documents will be
marked in evidence.
Mr. Sacher. I respectfully except.
[P. 129] (Whereupon Government's exhibits 27 and 28, previously marked for
identification, were received in evidence.)
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. Did Mr. Santo hold any office in the Communist Party at the time you were
a member of the Communist Party? — A. Well, in 1936 and 1937 he was a member
of the State trade-union commission.
Q. What is the State trade-union commission, Mr. Budenz? — A. That was an
organ of the Communist Party created to infiltrate the trade-unions and to discuss
their problems and to advance the Communist view in the trade-unions. It was
created by the State committee of the Communist Party of New York. These
commissions exist all through the country in every State organization of the
Communist Party.
Q. Did you attend any meetings of this commission at which Mr. Santo was
present? — A. Yes, sir; I was a member also at that time as labor editor of the
Daily Worker.
Mr. Sacher. You were a busy little man, weren't you? You got around every-
where.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Did Mr. Santo ever make any reports to this committee at any time you
were there? — A. Yes ; lie did on a couple of occasions.
[P. 130] Q. Do you remember the subject of those reports? — A. In a general
way. It is a long time ago.
Q. What was the subject of those reports? — A. The subject of those reports
was on one occasion I know
Mr. Sacher. I ask for a specification of at least the month.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. About when was this committee meeting held? — A. It is very difficult to
aive the month. I have met him at many meetings. In fact, many apartment-
house meetings, because the party meets in all sorts of ways.
inspector Phelan. Can you fix the year?
The Witness. Oh, yes ; the year is 1936 and 1937, in those years. It had to be.
.Mr. Sacher. Are those the only years you claim?
The Witness. Yes; those were the only years in that capacity.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Yon referred to one specific meeting. — A. Those were the only years I was
a member of the State trade union commission.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1707
Q. About when was this specific meeting to which Mr. Santo made a report?—
A Well, it had to be between the spring of 1936 and the fall of 1937.
[P. 131] Q. Where was the meeting held?— A. it was held in the Workers
School in 35 Easl Twelfth Street. That is the headquarters building of the
Communist Party.
Q. Who was present at this meeting?— A. We met in some of the offices of the
Workers School.
Mr. Sacheb. -hist a moment. I object, Mr. inspector, to the attempt by this
witness to drag in any other people, and I submit that the only question at issue
is the attendance of the respondent and of nobody else, and I therefore ask that
testimony concerning any others allegedly present be excluded.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, it might lie pertinent to determine whether this
was or was not a Communist meeting.
Mr. Sacher. Well, the witness has already said it was, and I take it that
counsel for the Government is not questioning veracity, and as yet there has
been no attempt to impeach this witness. That may come later.
I am not saying "'Yes" or "No," but for the time being the record does not
show any impeachment, so I think that it would be improper.
Inspector Phelan. I think the question is proper. The objection will be
overruled.
[P. 132] Mr. Sacher. I respectfully except.
The Witness. May I have the question again, please?
(The reporter read the question, as follows:)
" Q. Who was present at this meeting?
The Witness. Some of those present I can recall. Sam Nesain, formerly of
the unemployment council and now an organizer in a number of unions. I.
Rosenberg, of the shoe workers, United Shoe Workers. Michael J. Obermeier,
of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen.
Well, as members of the committee, there was also Irving Potash, of the
furriers, and Shulman, who is Louis Weinstock's colleague in the painters.
Offhand those are the people I remember.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. Was Mr. Santo present? — A. Yes; he made a report on the transport.
Q. And what was the subject of that report? — A. Well, in regard to the activity
of the transport workers at that time. The reason I recall his particular report
is that it dealt with the difficulty of collections in part ; that is, of dues collections.
Q. Did you say collections for what? — A. For the organizations.
Q. What organization? — [P. 133] *A. The transport workers; and, as a mat-
ter of fact. Rose Wortis, who was present — she was the director of the trade-
union work in the New York district — she was inclined to be critical of the fact
that the union at that time was not on a more stable basis. The report centered
around this idea.
Q. Was this a union meeting or was this a meeting of the State trade-union
commission of the Communist Party? — A. State trade-union commission of
the Communist Party.
Q. Were there any persons present at this meeting who were not members of
the Communist Party? — A. No, sir. These meetings were held by the Communist
Party every so often ; once a week or twice a month in this Workers School ;
and only members of the Communist Party active in the trade-unions, could
be in attendance.
Inspector Phelan. Were they especially called for or regularly scheduled
meetings?
The Witness. There was a regular schedule. Sometimes it was changed by
necssity, but it was a regular schedule of a certain evening in the week, or
twice a month. I don't rcall, and I think it was approximately one a week.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q. How did one become a member of this State trade-union commission? —
[P. i;J>4] A. Appointed by the State committee of the Communist Party.
Q. About how many meetings would you say you attended, conducted by
the Communist Party, at which Mr. Santo was present? — A. Well, I should say
four. I can remember — I should say that would be a correct estimate.
Q. And those four meetings were held between the years 1935 and 1940? —
A. No, no ; 19:16 and 1937.
Inspector Piielan. Were those all meetings of the same committee that you
have spoken of?
6S970 — 50 — pt. 2 15
1708 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Witness. Yes, sir; that was a regularly held meeting every so often.
Inspector Phelan. And these four meetings that you speak of, having seen
the respondent present, were meetings of that particular body?
The Witness. Yes, sir ; of which the directing agent was Rose Wortis. She
was present also. She is the trade-union director of the State organization
operating at that time under Jack Stachel.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. What was the purpose of the State trade-union commission? What were
its functions? — A. To discuss the problems in the unions where Communists were
active and also to discuss the progress of [p. 135] Communist activity in these
unions, including recruitment into the party, the advance of Communists to
official positions, the control of the unions by the Communists, and things of that
character. There came to these meetings general representatives of three
different unions of an evening. That is to say, sometimes the dealings would be
three to five people, sometimes one person, sometimes two, but generally three
unions were heard, the Communist representatives in three unions were heard
of an evening.
Q. Were heard by the members of the State trade-union commission? — A. That
is right.
Q. And this commission was comprised of how many persons, again? — A.
Well, of 10 to 15 people.
Q. Your membership in the State trade-union commission terminated in
about 1937? — A. When I went to Chicago ; yes.
Q. And how long were you in Chicago? — A. Oh, I was there until 1940, when
I returned to become president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc.
Inspector Phelan. I think this is an excellent point to adjourn until 2
o'clock is counsel are in [p. 135-A] accord.
I Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned for luncheon recess
until 2 p. m.)
[P. 136 J
AFTERNOON SESSION, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1947. 2 P. M.
Louis Francis Budenz resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Boyd:
Q. Mr. Budenz, you testified to attending a certain meeting in the trade-union
commission of the Communist Party in which Mr. Santo, respondent, made
a report? — A. That is right.
Q. And I believe you testified that he reported on dues collections? — A. Yes,
dues collection in the transport system. That was a review of that session.
Q. Dues collection for the Communist Party or for the TWU? — A. That was
in regard to the TWU, but he also reported on party recruitment.
Q. What party recruitment? — A. Communist Party.
Q. What did he say about party recruitment?
Mr. Sacher. Just a moment. Is this on the basis of a refreshment of the
witness' recollection during the lunch hour? Is that what this is based on?
[P. 137] Mr. Boyd. No ; I had no knowledge of it, so I certainly could not
have refreshed his recollection.
Mr. Sacher. My recollection is that this witness completed his testimony
of what he claimed transpired at this meeting of the spring of 1930 and the
fall of 1937, and he -
Inspector Phelan. I hadn't so understood it, counsel. I assumed that this
would be further developed.
Mr. SACHEK. That is just an exfoliation, so to speak. All right, if that is what
it is.
Mr. Boyd. I ask that counsel's remarks be stricken from the record.
Inspector Phelan. That may go out.
By Mr. Boyd:
Q; What did he say about recruitment, Mr. Budenz? — A. Details of it are
not longer fresh in my mind, but the idea was in regard to getting more mem-
bers of the party in that particular section of industry.
Cj. When you say the party, you mean- A. Communist Party. That was
cue of his assignments. That was his assignment in part, lie was the political
representative of the Communist Party.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1709
Q. Assigned to [P. loSj a. Transport. The assignments were made of
different Communists to different industries.
Q. Who made these assignments? — A. They were made by the different organs
tit' the party, the State committf I the New York party, in case of activities
within New York State, always under the direction of .lack Stachel, who was
the political committee's man at that time in charge of labor in general, labor
relations in general.
Q. Did you ever attend any other meetings of the Communist Party in which
Mr. Santo, respondent, was present? — A. Yes; I did.
Q. Will you please state when and where? — A. It was a convention of the
Communist Party, national convention secret session of the delegates. I am not
sure whether it was 1936 or 1938, but it is a matter of public record. It could
be checked.
Mr. Sa< her. You say it was secret. How could it be a matter of public record?
The Witness. Oh, the convention was public. But this particular session was
what you call executive, I suppose. Most of the sessions of conventions of the
Communist Party are of that character. But this was particularly so. And y.
delegation of [P. 139] Communists from the transport industry presented Pose
Warms, the New York director on labor, with a great display of roses. lied
roses, for her work in transport.
By Mr. Boyd :
Q. When you say her work in transport, what do you mean? — A. Her work in
directing Communists like Santo and others in their work in the transport
industry.
Q. Were you present at this meeting? — A. Yes ; I remember the roses on the
side of the stage.
Q. Was Mr. Santo present at this meeting? — A. He was one of the delegation,
or he was on the stage, but he did not speak.
Q. Was Mr. Santo a delegate to this National Convention of the Communist
Party?
Mr. Sachek. I object, unless (lie witness give-; the l,a is Cor Ids statement.
A. Well, i am not sure of that. As a matter of fact, anyway, he was present
there, as a Communist, at this particular session.
Q. Were you present as a < tommunist? — A. I was present there as a delegate.
Q. Did you attend any other meetings of the Communist Party at which Mr.
Santo was present? — [p. 140 1 A. Two other meetings, and large national com-
mittees of the Communist Party, around 1040 or 1041; that is, in those years.
On one occasion in which I was introduced to him again, we were all there
together, by Jack Stachel, in the back of the hall.
Mr. Sacher. Where was this ; when was,this?
The Witness. Well, it was 1940 or 1941.
Mr. Sacher. You were introduced to him then?
The Yv'itness. Yes.
Mr. Sacher. After having met him 4 years before?
The AYitness. Oh, yes.
Mr. Sachek. You were introduced 4 years after you had met him?
The Witness. That is common among Communists.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed, gentlemen. You may cross-examine later.
The Witness. Jack Stachel just said, "This is a good Bolshevik, Comrade
Santo," and told me, and we laughed and I said, "Well, of course, I know him."'
It was in the back of the fraternal clubhouse, the hall. I mean that is the hall.
the fraternity clubhouse in the forties, where this meeting of the enlarged
national committee was held, to my recollection.
[P. 141] By Mr. Boyd:
Q. You made reference to Pose YVartus : who is Rose Wartus? — A. Pose Wartus
is the director of labor work in the New York district of the Communist Party.
Q. of the Communist Party?— A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did she hold that position at the time of the convention? — A. Yes;
she did. She has held it for many, many years. She is in charge of the entire
labor activities of the Communist Party in the New York district, under the
direction of whoever is the national director, or for the political committee.
At that time. Jack Stachel. very frequently he was, though Roy Hutchins
supplanted him sometime or other.
Q. Directing your attention to these exhibits again, Government exhibits
In to 28, do these exhibits contain the doctrine of ideology of the Communist
Party of the United States of America?— A. What is that?
1710 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Do these exhibits, exhibits 15 to 28. inclusive, contain the doctrines and
ideologies of the Communist Party of the United States of America?
Mr. Sacheb. As to what time?
[P. 142| Mr. Boyd. As of the time that you were a member of the party.
In other words, between 1935 and 1945?
A. That is correct in general. The Communist Party has one basic principle
all the time.
Q. What is that basic principle? — A. That is the Marxism, Leninism, the
overthrow of all bourgeois, democratic governments by armed force.
Q. And is the United States Government considered a bourgeois government? —
A. It is considered the chief bourgeois democratic government.
Mr. Boyd. I have no further questions.
Cross-examination by Mr. Sacheb.
Q. Where were you born? — A. Indianapolis, Ind.
Q. Did you ever live in Terre Haute, Ind.? — A. No, sir.
Q. Were you ever known by any other name than Louis Francis Budenz? —
A. No, sir. * I may have written in the Daily Worker, but I don't even recall
that. Once in a while it was a practice, but I never passed myself off as any-
one but Louis Francis Budenz.
[P. 1431 Q. Are you married? — A. Oh, I am, indeed.
Q. What is your wife's name? — A. Margaret Rogers.
Q. Margaret Rogers Budenz? — A. That is correct.
Q. When did you marry her? — A. I married her in St. Patrick's Cathedral in
1945.
<Q. How many children do you have?— A. Four children.
Q You did not have those children between the time of the marriage in St.
Patrick's Cathedral in 1945 and this twelfth day of September 1945, did you?
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Presiding Inspector, I object.
Mr. Sacher. Wait a minute. I am on the track of something, and I want a
chance to go after it.
Inspector Phelan. Strike it out as argumentative. You may rephrase the
question.
Mr. Sacheb. I will rephrase the question, Mr. Inspector.
By Mr. Sacheb :
Q. Did you have the four children that you and your wife, Margaret Rogers
Budenz, have between the date of your marriage at St. Patrick's Cathedral in
1945 and this [p. 144] 12th day of September 1947?
Mr. Boyd. Just a moment. I would like to renew my objection. It is irrele-
vant, incompetent, and immaterial. (
Inspector Phelan. Same ruling.
Mr. Sacher. Mr. Inspector, I ask the same indulgence. I promise to connect
it. And I ask your indulgence. Now, for Heaven's sake, you cannot do this for
the prosecution and deny it to the defense. When you said earlier that you were
going to give us the same latitude that you gave the Government
Inspector Phelan. You know there is a way of asking that question that isn't
objectionable.
Mr. Sacheb. You tell me. I don't know.
Inspector Phelan. Shall I ask it?
Mr. Sa.cheb. Yes. Would ^ou be good enough to?
Inspector Phelan. How many children do you have?
The Witness. Four children. Four girls.
Inspector Phelan. Will you state the dates of the birth of each of these chil-
dren?
The Witness. Most decidedly. One of them was born on June 13, 1934, at the
time of the \p. 145] Toledo strike. The other, March 11, 1937. The other,
1943. The other, 1946.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
By Mr. Sacheb:
Q. Do you then say thai these first three children were had by you and Mar-
garet Rogers Budenz before you were married to her?
Mr. Boyd. Again, I object to this question.
Mr. Sacheb. 1 am leading to something. I will connect it in a moment. Give
me a moment or two and I will connect it.
The Witness. Yes, sir.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1711
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. You were not married to her at the time that you had these children; is
that it? — A. Not technically.
Q. What do you mean, "not technically"? What other way were you married
to her?
Mr. Boyd. Just a moment, please.
Mr. Sacher. I am going to prove bigamy against this man, and I ask for an
opportunity to prove that bigamy.
Mr. Boyd. I ask that this line of questioning be stricken as irrelevant, in-
competent, and immaterial. [P. 146] It has no bearing on the issues here.
Mr. Sacher. I waut to prove that this man committed the crime of bigamy in
the State of New York, and I want to prove that, because of the commission of
that crime, his creditability is impaired, and I therefore demand the oppor-
tunity to show that Budenz is a bigamist.
Mr. Boyd. If the man has not been convicted of the crime
Mr. Sacheb. But 1 have a right to show that he committed the crime. He has
been getting away with bigamy, and I want to show that he committed the
bigamy.
Mr. Boyd. I renew my objection, Mr. Inspector.
Inspector Phelan. Objection, in the absence of evidence of a conviction, is
sustained. You could ask him if he ever has been convicted of bigamy.
Mr. Sacher. Let me read you the rule of law.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
Mr. Sacher. In 70 Corpus Juris, at page 882, section 1005. it is said as follows
[reading] : "It is usually held that for the purpose of impeachment and as bearing
in his creditability, a witness may be interrogated in cross-examination as [p. 147]
to his commission of a crime or guilt thereof, where such crime reflects on his
integrity and creditability as a witness, subject, however to his right to refuse to
answer incriminating cpiestions."
Now, there is no rule of law, Mr. Inspector, either in the Federal courts or in
the State courts, which limits the right of impeachment on the grounds of
commission of crime to those instances where the man has been convicted of a
crime. The cross-examiner has a fundamental right to prove, through the
testimony of the witness himself, the commission of crime.
I grant you that I won't be entitled to prove the commission of the crime in
the absence of a conviction by any witness other than this witness himself.
But the rule is so old and so well established and so well known to every lawyer
in America that on the cross-examination of a Witness you may bring up his
commission of a crime that will bear on his creditability, regardless of whether
or not he has actually been convicted of it.
And I demand the opportunity to prove that Budenz is a bigamist, having
committed the crime of bigamy in the State of New York, and I am prepared,
as I told Mr. Boyd this morning, that I would prosecute him criminally [p. 148]
for libel. I am ready to answer to Budenz' charge of criminal libel if he denies
that he committed bigamy in the State of New York.
Now, I demand the opportunity to prove those facts.
Inspector Phelan. What does counsel have to say in answer to the argument
that that is a proper impeaching question?
Mr. Boyd. I think in this State you can attack him on proof of conviction.
But you can't attack a man in the matter that is being conducted here. I don't
think it is proper cross-examination.
Inspector Phelan. Well, I may say that my impressionable rule was similar.
However, this hearing is not conducted under strict rules of evidence, and for
that reason I will permit the question to be asked at this time.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this book and ask you whether you wrote this book [hands to
witness]. — A. I wrote it; yes, indeed.
Q. Do you have an extra copy which we can put in the record as evidence? —
A. No ; I haven't.
[P. 149] Q. What's the matter? Are you all sold out?
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked as "Respondent's Exhibit A" for
identification.
(Book marked "Respondent's Exhibit A" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher. Now I read you the following from page 15, respondent's
exhibit A for identification
1712 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Boyd. Pardon me just a moment. Has the book been admitted in
evidence yet?
Mr. Sachek. No. Do you want it in evidence?
Mr. Boyd. I certainly do.
Mr. Sacher. I will offer in evidence the following pages, Mr. Inspector. I
will offer in evidence pages 115 and 117 of respondent's exhibit A for identifica-
tion. Would you like to see it, Mr. Boyd?
Mr. Boyd. Yes, I would.
(Mr. Sacher hands book to Mr. Boyd.)
Mr. Boyd. I suggest that the book be admitted in its entirety and reference
be made to portions.
Mr. Sacher. No, Mr. Boyd. As the good lawyer that you are. you know that
the only propriety of the offering of anything in evidence is that it is material
and relevant to the inquiry being made. I [p. 150] am interrogating him
only in regard to matters which are on pages 115 and 117. That is the extent
of the thing which I admit. And I might say parenthetically, Mr. Inspector,
that there is no obligation on me even to offer that much. You always have a
right to ask a witness, "Did you ever write so and so and so" ; isn't that so?
Mr. Phelan. Yes.
Mr. Sacher. Then I withdraw my offer and ask the witness the following.
By Mr. Sacher :
I invite your attention to the following language at page 115 : "It was at that
time that I met Margaret, and we became husband and wife."
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, there is a long-distance call out here for Mr. Boyd.
If we can .lust have a short recess.
(Whereupon a 10-minute recess was taken.)
By Mr. Sacher:
The Witness. May I explain that to you?
Q. Just wait a minute. You gave nobody any mercy. Santo couldn't ask you
for mercy. Just answer the question.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed. What is the question?
[P. 151] By Mr. Sacher:
Q. Isn't it a fact that you wrote as follows at page 115 : "It was at that time
that I met Margaret and we became husband and wife. Little did we suspect
then, when our views of li^and more or less almost mocked at Catholicism,
that her understanding and intelligence would help us back to Bethlehem and
Rome. A Unitarian educated on a godless philosophy at the Univeristy of
Pittsburgh, and in the Freudian Psychoanalytic School for Social Work, Mar-
garet had no knowledge of Catholic history or philosophy. But hers was a
warm heart and a long-suffering patience. It was on the very day that I was
arrested at Toledo in the Autolite strike that our first daughter, Julia, was
born prematurely in New York.
"After her came Josephine, and then Justin. They were not reared in the
knowledge of the church and God, but had a respect for the beliefs of their
neighbors that testified to an effort at education of the heart."
I will ask you if you wrote that.
A. I did, but I want to explain it.
Mr. Saoher. Now, Mr. Inspector
Inspector Phelan. I am holding the hearing. Counselor.
Mr. Sacher. What are you doing? Are you acting as judge or prosecutor
here? I want an [p. 152] opportunity to run my examination as I see fit. And,
if this witness wants to make any explanations, lie can do it afteward, when he
is examined on redirect. At this moment T have had an impossible examina-
tion, and I will aot tolerate it. Mr. Inspector, that you or anybody else should
disrupt this cross-examination.
Inspector Phelan. Just a moment. I think any witness is entitled, after
he answers your question
Mr. Sacher. I am nor through. Thai is a foundation for another question. I
want to get the date that he refers to when he says, "It was at that time that
1 met Margaret and we became husband and wife." Am 1 entitled to ask that?
Inspector Phelan. Put your next question.
Mr. Sacher. All right.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1713
By Mr. Sachek :
Q. I ask you what is the time that you refer to when you say here, "It was at
that time that 1 met Margaret and we became husband and wife"? What year
was that? — A. That was in 1933, but we were not married technically.
Q. Wait a minute. Next question, who is Gizella I. Budenz? — A. She was
my first wife. Divorced woman.
[P. 153] Q. When were you married to Gizella Budenz? — A. Well, I don't
remember the exact year any more.
Q. Well, was it in 1916?— A. When T lived in St. Louis, Mo.
Q. Was it is 1916? — A. We were married in Terra Haute, Ind.
Q. Well. I asked you before whether you ever were in Terra Haute, Ind. and
you said "No." — A. You said, didn't I live there.
Q. Didn't you live there when you married her in Terre Haute, Ind.? — A. No.
Q. What year did you marry her in Terre Haute? — A. It was a Gretna Green
wedding.
Q. What is that? — A. A Gretna Green wedding. We went to Terre Haute.
Yen could do that and
Q. What happened? What did you do? Did you seduce her, or something?
Mr. Boyd. I ask that these remarks be stricken from the record.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I am just asking you questions, and you just answer them. Was it in
1918 that you married Gizella? — A. Yes ; it was.
Q. [P. 154] And did you remain married to Gizella until she obtained a
divorce from you on the ground that you deserted her and failed to support her
in the year 1938? — A. On the technical grounds of desertion
Q. Technical, my eye. Were you divorced by her on the grounds of desertion
in the year 1938? — A. Counsel is familiar with the legal procedure.
Q. Yes, or no? I ask you was it in the year 1938 that she divorced you? —
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. And it was from 1916 to 1938 that you remained in a state of marriage with
Gizella Budenz; is that right? — A. I' was separated from her for 7 years. I
was separated from her for 7 years, from 1931 on.
Q. Now, look, let's not go into what you were separated from her. You were
married to her and you remained married to her until you were divorced from
her. weren't you? — A. I was separated from her.
Mr. Sacher. I move to strike it out as not responsive. Mr. Inspector, I ask
the witness be directed to testify as to whether he was married to Gizella until
1938.
The Witness. Technically, I was. For 7 [p. 155] years.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Marriage. The holy sacrament is a technicality to you, isn't it, Mr.
Budenz? — A. Not since I became a Catholic. It was when I was a Communist.
Q. Well, you took up with Margaret before you became a Communist, didn't
you? — A. That's right.
Q. You testified that it was in 1933 that you took up with Margaret ; isn't that
right?— A. But I was
Q. Answer my question. Isn't it a fact that you took up with Margaret in
?— A. That's right.
Q. That was 2 years before, according to your testimony, yon became a member
of the Communist Party : is that right? — A. This is a matter
Q. Is that right, or is it not?
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Inspector, I think the attorney here should allow the man an
opportunity to answer the question.
Inspector Phelan. Give him an opportunity to answer.
[P. 156] Mr. Sacher, He will have all the opportunity in the world. It isn't
lack of opportunity that is bothering this poor man now.
Inspector Phei.ax. Answer the counsel's question.
Mr. Sacher. Wait a minute, Mr. Examiner.
Inspector Phelan. Answer the counsel's question. If you have anything else
to -ay. you will be given a later opportunity in the course of the questioning.
And I will ask counsel.
The Witness. That is right. I was already working with the Communists,
though.
Mr. Sachek. If it please the examiner, I now offer in evidence a certified copy
of the petition for divorce of Gizella I. Budenz, together with the decree nisi of
1714 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the Court of Chancery of the State of New Jersey, index No. 116-133, in the action
entitled "Gizella I. Budenz, petitioner, and Louis Francis Budenz,-' and I also
offer in evidence the final decree of divorce issued by the court of chancery on
the 13th day of July 1938 in the action entitled "Gizella I. Budenz against Louis
Francis Budenz." And in particular I invite Your Honor's attention to certain
allegations which I will refer to after you [p. 157] have received them in evidence.
I offer these in the following order as respondent's exhibits A, B, C, and D, re-
spectively. The petition for divorce will be A ; the decree nisi will be B ; and the
final decree will be C. Would you like to see them, Mr. Boyd?
Mr. Boyd. Yes, I would.
(Mr. Sacher hands papers to Mr. Boyd.)
(Petition for divorce, decree nisi, and the final decree marked "Respondent's
Exhibits A, B, and C," respectively, and received in evidence as of this date.)
Inspector Phelan. These documents will be admitted and are so marked.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Now, Mr. Budenz, Gizella says here in paragraph 1 of her petition, re-
spondent's exhihit A: '•Petitioner was lawfully married to her present husband,
Louis Francis Budenz, the defendant in this suit, on December 23, 1916, in the
city of Terre Haute and State of Indiana." Is that statement true? — A. That's
correct.
Q. She says in the second paragraph : "There were no children born of the
marriage; but in 1917, in St. Louis, Mo., petitioner and defendant adopted a
female child named Louise. Said adopted daughter is now 20 years of age and
is married." Was that statement true? — [P. 158] A. That is correct.
Q. In item 3 she says: "Petitioner and defendant lived together as husband
and wife from the date of the marriage aforesaid continuedly until September 1,
1930." Is that statement correct?— A. That's correct.
Q. And in paragraph 4 she says: "On September 1, 1930, petitioner anil de-
fendant were living together as husband and wife at 1360 Bryant Street in the
city of Rahway, county of Union, and State of New Jersey." Is that correct? —
A. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
Q. And then in paragraph 5 she says : "On September 1, 1930, defendant de-
serted petitioner and has, ever since that date and for more than 2 years last
past, and down to the date hereof willfully, continuedly. and obstinately de-
serted petitioner, and during said entire period — namely, from September 1,
1930, down to the date of the commencement of this action — defendant has
willfully, continuedly, and obstinately refused to live with the petitioner as
husband and wife and has during said entire period lived and still does live
willfully, continuedly, and obstinately separate and apart from petitioner."
Was that statement correct?— A. That is correct.
[P. 159] Q. And in paragraph 6, "at the date of the commencement of the
desertion afore-mentioned, petitioner and defendant were both bona fide resi-
dents of the State of New Jersey." Was that correct? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then in paragraph 9 she says: "Petitioner knows that defendant resides
at apartment 22, 328 Fast Fifteenth Street, in the city of New York, county of
New York, and State of New York." Did you live at that address at the time
of this petition, which was on or about August 1936? — A. I think so ; yes, sir.
Q. Were you living at that address at that time with Margaret? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Before that time, you had lived in Williamsburg; is that right? — A. Yes, sir.
Separately entirely from my first wife. From 193(1.
Q. I did not imagine you were operating a harem. One at a time is enough.
Mr. Sacher. Mr. Fanelli suggests that — I withdraw that. Mr. Fanelli has
withdrawn that.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Did you ever go through any civil ceremony of marriage with your present
wife, Margaret? — A. Yes, sir.
[P. 1601 Q- When did yon go through that ceremony? — A. Ob, civil?
Q. Yes. — A. Well, I was married by Monsignor Sheen in St. Patrick's Cathedral.
That was civil and religious too. There was a civil filing in the city of Yonkers,
where I live.
Q. Did you have to procure a certified copy of the decree of divorce from your
first wife, Cizella? — A. Well, that I don't know.
Q. Who attended to that for you, Monsignor Sheen? — A. No.
Q. Mr. Budenz, you will recall that the final decree of the court declared as
follows — and I read from respondent's exhibit C:
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1715
"The court having in this cause by :i decree nisi, bearing date and entered on
the 12th day of April A. D. 1938, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the peti-
li r. Cizella 1. Budenz, and the defendant. Louis Francis Budenz, be divorced
from the bonds of matrimony Eor the cause of desertion, unless sufficient cause
he shown to the court why said decree should not he made absolute within 3
mouths from the date thereof: and application being now made to the court by the
petitioner for an order that said decree nisi he made absolute and that a final [p.
Kil | and absolute decree he entered: and no cause to the contrary being shown
or appearing :
"It is thereupon, on this 13th day of July A. D. 1938, by His Honor, Luther
A. Campbell, chancelor of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the power and
authority of this court, and of the acts of the legislature in such case made and
provided, doth hereby order, adjudge, and decree that the said decree nisi be
made and become absolute, and that the said defendant, Louis Francis Budenz,
are divorced from the bonds of matrimony for the cause aforesaid and the mar-
riage between the said petitioner and the said defendant is hereby dissolved ac-
cordingly, and the said parties and each of them are and is hereby freed and
discharged from the obligations thereof."
Do you remember that language in the final decree of divorce?
A. Well. I don't remember all the language, but I remember that there was a
final decree of divorce.
Q. And that was the only decree of divorce, the one that I have just read,
and which is respondent's exhibit C, that was ever made by any court of com-
petent jurisdiction in this country or anywhere else, dissolving the bonds of
matrimony between you, Louis Francis Budenz, and your wife [p. 162], Cizella
I. Budenz; is that correct? — A. Well, I don't know. That is my impression. I
don't know all the papers that were served at that time. I know in 1938 I was
granted a final divorce in New Jersey.
Q. That is the only one; you wrere not granted it, you did not apply for it.
Your wife got it. — A. I mean she was granted it.
Q. That is the only divorce you know of between you and Cizella : is that
right? — A. Yes; that is the only one I know of. If that is the one, I don't know
that that is the one that you are quoting from. In 1938 she was given a final
decree of divorce on the basis of my having not lived with her for 7 or 8 years.
Mr. Sacher. May I ask for a short recess at this time?
Inspector Phei.an. Granted. Five minutes.
(Whereupon a 5-minute recess was taken.)
Mr. Sachbb. Mr. Inspector, at this juncture I wish to point out that, on the
basis of the statements contained at page 115 of the book of this witness, in
which he states that he and his present wife became husband and wife in 1933,
as testified to here on the stand, and in view of the fact that [p. 163] at the time
that he and Margaret became husband and wife he had another wife, he had a
wife living. I respectfully submit to you that under the provisions of section 340
of the penal law of the State of New York, which reads as follows : "A person who,
having a husband or wife living, marries another person, is guilty of bigamy,
and is punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or State prison for not
more than ■" years."
In that connection, Mr. Inspector, I call to your attention the case of Hayes
against the People, in 25 New York :'.!><>, in which the court sustained a con-
viction in a case where the second marriage, as in the case of this witness, was
a nonceremonial marriage. In these circumstances, Mr. Inspector, I respect-
fully submit that the respondent in this case has established, out of the mouth
of this witness himself, that he is a bigamist, a criminal. And on that ground
I respectfully request that all of the testimony given by this bigamist be stricken
from the record.
Inspector Phelan. Denied.
Mr. Sacher. If it please the inspector, in order to proceed with other cross-
examination of the witness, it will be necessary for us to examine these 10 to 15
exhibits that were introduced. And [p. 164] therefore, with your permission,
I would suggest that we defer this further examination, cross-examination of
the witness, until such time as we have had an opportunity to go over the
material for the purposes of cross-examination.
Inspector Phelan. I think that is a fair request. When would you suggest
that we call and finish this witness?
Mr. Sacher. We might just as well at this time discuss the question of an
adjournment. Tomorrow is Saturday, and I don't work on Saturday. Monday
and Tuesday are the high holy days, which I shall observe, so that I cannot be
1716 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in attendance on those days. I will, however, use some of the intervening time
to examine those exhibits, and I shall be happy to be ready to proceed with this
witness on Wednesday morning, so you need have no delay whatever in completing
his examination.
Inspector Phelan. In view of the fact that we won't convene again until
Wednesday, would it not be possible to continue on Saturday, thus giving us
an extra day?
Mi*. Sacher. I would love to do that, but ever since Hitler came to power, I,
as a Jew, insist on maintaining my Sabbath, just as other people maintain
[p. 165] theirs, and I would therefore like to observe the Sabbath tomorrow.
Inspector Phelan. In view of counsel's statement, we will not consider a
Saturday hearing. It was merely a suggestion that we might conserve time.
Is there any further proceeding that we could take today in order to take
advantage of the hour that remains?
Mr. Sacher. I don't know. Maybe Mr. Fanelli has some motions.
Mr. Boyd. Is that the only phase of cross-examination that you intend to
pursue? In other words, is there some other phase that you could take up today?
Mr. Sacheb. Mr. Boyd. I don't like to appeal for consideraton on this ground,
but if you have observed the pace at which I have been going in the last 40
minutes, I am not in condition to take up any further cross-examination. So
I would appreciate it if you wouldn't press on my going on any other matter.
I may have them on Wednesday.
Inspector Phelan. Is there any objection to excusing this witness until Wednes-
day and calling your next witness now?
[P. 166] Mr. Boyd. Well, there is only an hour before an adjournment now.
I think perhaps that this would be as good a time as any to adjourn.
Inspector Phelan. All right. The hearing is adjourned until next Wednesday
morning, at the hour of 10 : 30 a. m.
(Whereupon at 3: 05 p. m. an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, Sep-
tember 17, 1947, at 10 : 30 a. m.)
[P. 166-A] Index
WITNESSES
Direct Cross
For the Government : Louis Francis Budenz 75 142
EXHIBITS
For In
For the Government : identification evidence
15-26. Pamphlets and books 103 111
27-28. Books (2) 127 120
Respondent's :
A. Book 149 (withdrawn)
A. Petition for divorce — 157
B. Decree nisi 157
C. Final divorce decree — 157
[P. 167] United States of America, Department of Immigration, Immigration
and Naturalization Service. In the Matter of Charges against Desideriu Ham-
mer, alias John Santo, alias John or Jack Weiss. Ellis Island No. 99600/850
Central Office
70 Columbus Avenue, New York City, N. Y. September 17, 1947, 10 : 30 a. m.
Before : Hon. Arthur J. Phelan, Presiding Inspector.
Nathan Berak,
Stenotype Reporter, 80 Broad Street, New York City.
[P. 188] Appearances:
John F. Boyd, Examining Inspector,
Francis X. Walker, and
Maurice A. Roberts,
For the Department of Immigration.
Harry Sacher, and
Joseph A. Fanelli,
For the Respondent.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1717
Louis Francis Budenz, (idled as a witness on behalf of the Government, hav-
ing previously duly been sworn, resumed the stand and testified further as
follows :
Cross examination (continued) by Mr. Sacher:
Inspector Phelan. Respondent is present and all the counsel are present.
Proceed.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Did you work for the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery
Workers at any lime? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. In what years did you work for them?— A. Well, I do not remember ex-
actlv, hut it was in 1928, for example, 1929.
Q. How about the year 1930, Mr. Budenz?— [P. 1G9] A. 1930?
Q. Yes, how about 1930?— A. Well, I went with the Conference of Progressive
Labor Action.
Q. Don't you remember a strike in the year 1930 against the Kramer Hosiery
Mills in Nazareth, Pa.? — A. Oh, yes.
Q. What year was that?— A. 1929.
Q. Are you sure it was 1929?— A. Well, it began then. It have have ex-
tended over until 1930.
Q. What is your best recollection as to whether you were still there in 1930? —
A. Perhaps in' the early part of 1930 I may have been, although I am not quite
clear because I went with the Conference for Progressive Labor Action about
that time.
Q. Did you ever stop at the Hotel Easton in Easton, Pa., in the year 1930?—
A. Well, I don't recall.
Q. You mean to tell us that you don't remember whether you were in the
Hotel Easton in 1930? — A. I was in 1929, but I am not sure in 1930.
Q. You are not sure about 1930?— [P. 170] A. No, sir.
Q. Is there any reason why the year 1930 is blocked from your memory at this
time, Mr. Budenz? — A. No., sir.
Q. None at all? — A. Except that I am not quite certain about my connection
with the Conference for Progressive Labor Action.
Q. Suppose I show you this letter on the stationery of the Hotel Easton in
Easton, Pa., bearing date of May 14, 1930, and ask you whether you sent that
letter to anybody from that hotel on that date [handing to witness]? — A. I
refuse to answer that question.
Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer, Mr. Budenz? — A. First of all,
this is not a smear investigation. Secondly, it violates my constitutional rights.
Q. Which of your constitutional rights does it violate?
Mr. Boyd. If the presiding inspector please, I do not see that this line of
questioning is germane in the issues here involved.
Inspector Phelan. Well, I assume that it is preliminary.
Mr. Sacher. It is preliminary to establishing a number of things.
[P. 171] Inspector Phelan. The witness, if he declines to answer, will have
to state the grounds as counsel has asked.
The Witness. Well, counsel is trying to show — do you mean to say what
offense I committed?
Inspector Phelan. Well, let me see if I may clarify it, and counsel will cor-
rect me if I am wrong.
The only ground a witness may refuse to answer a question on, is on the
ground that it may incriminate him. Now, do I understand that it is your
desire to refuse to answer that question on that ground?
The Witness. It is.
By Mr. Sacher:
Q. In other words, Mr. Budenz, you refuse to answer whether you signed
this letter on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you ; is that right? — A.
That is right?
Mr. Sac her. I ask that it be marked for identification, please.
Inspector Phelan. What is the next exhibit in order?
(Letter dated May 14, 1930, marked "Respondent's Exhibit D" for identifica-
ton as of this date.)
[P 173] Mr. Boyd. May I see the document, please?
Mr. Sacher. Shall I wait until you have read it, Mr. Boyd?
Mr. Boyd. Please.
1718 .STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Sacher. I would just like to say, Mr. Inspector, that I am extending an
unusual courtesy to counsel for the other side when I permit them to look at a
paper that is not in evidence ; so I expect some reciprocity.
Mr. Boyd. You anticipate offering it in evidence, do you not? That is the
usual custom.
Mr. Sacher. No ; I haven't made an offer. You are entitled to look at it when
1 make the offer. Mr. Budenz will tell you that. He is a lawyer.
By Mr. Sacher:
Q. You are a lawyer, aren't you? — A. I was educated as one; yes.
Q. What do you mean you were educated as one? As a matter of fact, you were
graduated from a law school? — A. That is correct.
Q. What was the name of the school, Indianapolis Law School? — A. That is
right.
Q. And how long ago was that? — [P. 173] A. That was 25 years ago. Just
a moment, 35 years ago.
Q. Did you ever know a girl by the name of Louise Gahen? — A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you get to know her in the year 1930 while you were at the Easton
Hotel? — A. I refuse to answer that.
Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that? — -A. It may incriminate me.
Q. Is that what you learned in law school? Did you learn that in law school?
Mr. Boyd. This is not prober examination.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Or were you told by counsel here today? — A. I was not told by counsel
anything on this matter.
Q. Where did you learn that you have the right to testify on the ground that
an answer to my question may tend to incriminate you? — A. Because I see that
a smear is being developed here.
Q. Well, you are not objecting on the ground that it is a smear. You are ob-
jecting on the ground that that it may expose you to criminal penalties, aren't
you? Isn't [p. 174 1 that the ground of your objection, that an answer may
expose you to criminal prosecution and conviction? — Yes, sir.
Q. Isn't that the ground? — A. May I have the question again?
Q. Isn't the answer yes? — A. That is right.
Q. Would you care to tell the inspector which State or Federal statutes you
are afraid you will be incriminated under if you testify? — A. Well, that I am
Ji ere to state. .*
Mr. Boyd. I object to the question, if you please. After all this man is not
qualifying as an expert in law.
Inspector Phelan. I think counsel, that is calling for a conclusion.
Mr. Sacher. I think if I may briefly say this, Mr. Inspector, because I, lik-'»
yourself, am anxious to move ahead, but I believe that while a witness may not
be obliged to disclose the facts in bis answer on the basis of which a criminal
prosecution might take place, I do believe that in order that the court or adminis-
trative agent may determine whether the claim is made in good faith, that a
witness may be required to state under what [p. 175] law or statutes he fear;>
exposure to criminal prosecution and conviction.
Mr. Phelan. I think counsel is correct on that. The mere assertion of a con-
stitutional privilege without stating some basis is not in and of itself sufficient.
Mr. Boyd. I think the question calls for conclusion on the part of the witness
and I object to the question on that ground.
Inspector Phelan. Possibly counsel could rephrase the question.
Mr. Sacher. Well, Mr. Inspector, I think that a violation of one law is as bad
as another, as Epictitus used to say, and perhaps it is of no great consequence;
so I won't press the inquiry.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Did you ever spend any time with Louise Gahen in the State of Connecticut,
specifically in the city of Stamford and more specifically in the year 1930? — A. I
refuse to answer that on the same grounds.
Q. On what grounds is that, that you will incriminate yourself? — A. Yes.
Q. I show you this envelope and ask you whether this [p. 170] is your hand-
writing on that envelope Lhanding to witness]? — A. I am not sure. It looks
like it.
Q. You do not deny that it is your writing? — A. I do not ; no.
Mr. Sacher. I offer it in evidence.
(Envelope marked "Respondent's Exhibit E" and received in evidence as of
this date.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTt INVESTIGATION 1719
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. On this Respondent's Exhibit E, which hoars a photograph of the Hotel
Easton with the name Hotel Easton and the name of Easton, Pa., appear the
following words in your handwriting: "In ease of accident to Budenz, these
belong to Miss Louise Gahen." Is that right? — A. That is correet.
Q. You therefore knew Miss Gahen, didn't you? — A. Oh, yes; I said I knew
her. I said that originally, sir.
Q. And do you know what was contained in this envelope. Respondent's Exhibit
E, when you said, "in case of accident to Budenz, these belong to Miss Louise
Gahen" ; do you know what was in Respondent's Exhibit E? — A. Well, now, let's
see. I don't recall definitely now.
[P. 177] Q. Let us see if we can refresh your recollection. I show you these
papers and I ask you to be good enough to preserve them in the order in which
they appear here, and ask you to read all these letters from Louise to you and tell
me whether that refreshes your recollection as to what was in this envelope,
Respondent's Exhibit E? — A. I will have to refuse to answer this question.
Q. On what ground? — A. On the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.
Q. Do you think, Mr. Budenz, there is anything I can ask you that you won't
refuse to answer on the ground that it will incriminate you? — A. Oh, yes.
Q. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," as the Psalmist says. So let
us take these one by one. Did you ever stop at the Great Northern Hotel in the
city of New York in the year 1930? — A. Well, I may have. I don't recall.
Q. You do not deny it, do you? — A. No; I don't deny it. I don't recall it.
Q. Let me show you a letter and ask you whether that refreshes your recol-
lection as to whether you did stay in the Great Northern Hotel [handing-
witness]? — A. [Witness looking at letter].
[P. 178] Q. I show you this paper and I ask you to read it, and tell us whether
that letter from Louise refreshes your recollection as to whether you were in
the Great Northern Hotel at that time? — A. No ; it doesn't.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked for identification, please.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit F" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Can you tell the inspector how many times in the last 17 years you spent a
night in the Great Northern Hotel right here at 109-121 AY est Fifty-sixth Street
in New York City? How many times were you there in the last 17 years? —
A. Well, I cant' recall being there at all, to tell you the truth. I can't recall it.
Q. You connot recall it? — A. No.
Q. But you won't deny it? — A. No ; I can't deny it.
Mr. Boyd. If the Court please, this line of questioning is argumentative. The
witness has answered the question.
The Witness. I can't recall ever having been [p. 179] in the Great Northern
Hotel. I may have been and I may not.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Mr. Budenz, did you ever visit the city of Bernardsville? — A. I don't know
where that is.
Q. A little distance away from Easton? — A. Yes; I know where it is.
Q. You are familiar with the name Bernardsville? — A. I am indeed, yes.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, may I interrupt? I assume that you propose to
connect this questioning up with the issues of the case.
Mr. Sacher. Oh, sure. I tell you frankly that this is all directed ultimately to
establishing once again that this man has committed crimes under the Federal
laws with a view to impeaching his credibility. That is what this is heading for.
That is what my evidence is directed to here and I shall, of course, demand a full
opportunity, an adequate opportunity in any event to accomplish that purpose.
Inspector Phelan. Proceed.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. You are also familiar with the name of a sculptor by the name of George
Barnard; is that right? — [p. 180] A. No ; I am not.
Q. Never heard of George Barnard, the sculptor? — A. Except in a general way.
Q. Of course, you knew his name back in 1930, didn't you? — A. I think not; no.
I don't recall his name at all. I mean, I don't recall any intimate knowledge of
his name.
Q. Well, but you were, according to your book, anyway, you were quite a liter-
ate person, interested in literature, the arts, etc., weren't you? — A. To a degree,
but I don't know everyone who is engaged in this business.
1720 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. But George Barnard was an outstanding American sculptor, wasn't he?—
A. It doesn't recall to my mind anything specific. This is the first time that he
has been called to my attention in any specific way. I may have known it in a
casual way, but not in a specific way.
Q. Do you recall whether you registered in the Great Northern Hotel under
the name of Bernard, second name? — A. I refuse to answer that.
Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that? — A. That it may tend to
incriminate me.
Q. Do you remember an occasion when you told your [p. 181] wife, Gizella,
that you had registered at the Great Northern Hotel with Louise Gahen and
that you had registered under the name of Bernard because you got the idea
from the name Bernardsville? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or, did you ever tell her that you got the idea from the name of George
Bernard, the sculptor? — A. No, sir.
Q. You don't recall ever telling Gizella that? — A. No, I most decidedly did not.
Q. But you did spend time with Louise at the Great Northern ; isn't that right?
— A. I refuse to answer that question.
Q. Did you spend time with Louise in Stamford, Conn.?— A. I refuse to
answer that.
Q. As the ground of your refusal to answer that you transported her across
State lines for immoral purposes?— A. No, sir.
Q. Which constitutes a violation of Federal law? — A. No, sir.
Q. Is that the grounds? — A. No, sir; that is not the ground.
Q. What is the ground, then? Do you refuse to [p. 182] answer that, too? —
A. Well, I am being accused of living with a person in a hotel and I think that
that is technically an accusation that one can refuse to answer.
Q. How about the crossing of the State lines, does that bother you at all,
transporting a woman across State lines for immoral purposes? — A. No, sir.
Q. What crime do you claim you committed or you may be charged with
having committed by reason of spending the night in a hotel with a woman,
what crime, if not under the Federal statute for immoral transportation across
State lines? — A. Well, in various States there are various statutes on subjects
of that character.
Q. Of what character? Do you mean adultery, fornication; what do you
mean? — A. One or the other, and besides that, counselor, this is a very small
piece of business you are engaging in.
Q. You mean that white slavery is a small piece of business to you ; is that
what you are saying? Is white slavery in your opinion a small piece of busi-
ness?— A. No, sir.
Q. Is the Mann Act a small piece of business? — [P. 183] A. No, sir.
Q. Do you regard the violation of the Mann Act as a small piece of business? —
A. No, sir ; I do not.
Q. Would you regard a violator of the Mann Act as a person unworthy of
belief?
Mr. Boyd. If the Court please, I object to that question.
Inspector Phelan. Sustained.
Mr. Sacher. Exception.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you Respondent's Exhibit F and ask you whether you received this
letter from Louise Gahen [handing to witness I? — A. I do not recall.
Q. Do you recall whether the letter was addressed to you? — A. I do not.
Q. You mean the sunny waters, the white sand and sky where a few white
clouds
Mr. Boyd. Just a minute. I object.
Mr. Sacher. Wait a minute. I am not reading from the letter. I am just
refreshing my recollection. I am not referring to the contents of a paper now.
I am asking him apart from the paper.
[P. 184] Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I would like to seek some authority
that a witness may be impeached by evidence of acts which might be criminal
where they are not connected up directly with the issues of the case and where
there hasn't been any conviction. I am somewhat disturbed over that.
Mr. Sacher. If you wish to call a recess for an hour, I will go back to my
office and dig up 100 authorities, not one. As an elementary principle of law,
when any witness offers himself for testimony, you may contradict that witness
in one of a number of ways : One, by prior inconsistent statements ; two, by
evidence from the witness himself of specific acts of conduct which would con-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1721
stitute either crimes or immoral conduct, not only crimes but immoral conduct,
aud thai testimony is routined to eliciting from the witness, himself — in other
words, as I said the other day, it would he utterly incompetent to call third
parties to testify to these specific acts ; and the third method is by proof of
conviction of crime.
Now. I am pursuing the second method here.
Inspector Phelan. As to the limits of that second method, I am a little
doubtful. As to the limits of that second method I am doubtful that we aren't
going a little too far afield in this instance.
[P. 185] However, proceed for the present.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this letter and I ask you to read it very carefully and tell me
whether you received this one from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?- — A. I
refuse to answer.
Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that? — A. It may tend to
incriminate me.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked for identification.
(Letter marked '•Respondent's Exhibit G" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I ask you to look at this letter and tell me whether you received that
from Louise Gahen [handling to witness] ? — A. Same answer.
Q. Well, you haven't read it yet. You don't know whether it will tend to
incriminate you or not. Maybe it says something nice about you for once. —
A. Same answer.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that that be marked for identification.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit H" for identification as of this date.)
[P. 186] By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Did you know a doctor by the name of Dr. Kenworthy? — A. No, sir.
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether it refreshes your recollection
as to who Dr. Kenworthy wras [handing to witness] ? — A. No ; it doesn't.
Q. Was he an abortionist?
Mr. Boyd. I object to this line of questioning.
A. I have no idea, sir.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Did you receive this letter from Louise Gahen? — A. I refuse to answer
that.
Q. On the ground that it will incriminate you? Is that it? — A. That's right.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked for identification.
I Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit I" for identification as of this date, i
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this one from
Louise Gahen? Read it before you say it will incriminate you [handing to
witness]. — A. I refuse to answer.
[P. 187] Q. On the ground it will incriminate you? — A. Yes: that it may.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked for identification, please?
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit J" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. Now I ask you to read this one and tell us whether you received this one
from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]? — A. Same answer.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that it be marked for identification.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit K" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this one. I do not think you will say that that incriminates
you? — A. Same grounds.
Q. You refuse on the grounds that it will incriminate you? — A. Yes.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that this be marked for identification.
(LQtter consisting of two pages marked "Respondent's Exhibit L" for identi-
fication as of this date.)
[P. 188] By Mr. Sacher:
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise
Gahen. — A. These are letters generally presented in a divorce proceeding.
1722 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Well, you would know about that. You have gone through that. I wouldn't.
Just tell us whether you received that, Mr. Budenz.
Mr. Boyd. I object to remarks on the part of counsel and ask that they be
Stricken.
Mr. Sachee. I think they were as valid as the witness' observation.
Inspector Phelan. He is answering the observation of the witness, counsel.
The Witness. Yes; I was married to a divorced woman originally.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. We all know about that, but how about this letter? That is what we do
not know about and tbat is what we would like you to tell us. Did you get
that letter from Louise Gahen? — A. Same answer.
Q. That is, you refuse to testify on the ground it may tend to incriminate
you? — A. That is correct.
[P. 189] Mr. Sachek. May I have this letter marked for identification?
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit M" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I now show you another epistle and ask you whether you received this
from Louise Gahen [handing to witness] ? — A. Same answer .
Mr. Sacher. I ask that it be marked for identification, please.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit N" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise
Gahen [handing to witness]? — A. Same answer, for the same reason.
Q. That is, you refuse to testify on the ground that it may tend to incriminate
you ; is that it? — A. Yes.
Mr. Sacher. Will you be kind enough, Mr. Inspector, to mark this for identifi-
cation?
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit O" for identification as of this date.)
[P. 190] By Mr. Sacher:
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise
Gahen [handing to witness] ? — A. Same objection.
Mr. Sacher. I ask the inspector to mark that please.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit P" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise
Gahen [handing to witness]? — A. Same answer.
Mr. Sacher. I ask to have it marked for identification, please.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit Q" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this from Louise
Gahen [handing to witness]? — A. Same reply.
Mr. Sacher. Now, if it please the inspector, I respectfully request that the
inspector read this proposed exhibit, and I ask for the judgment of the in-
spector as to whether the objection of the witness is well founded, that that
letter may tend to incriminate him?
[P. 191] (Inspector reads letter.)
The Witness. May I give my ground, inspector?
Inspector Phelan. Yes, sir.
The Witness. The counsel for the respondent is endeavoring to show a con-
tinuous relationship, one letter with another, and this letter indicates that
relationship is continued, as explained by other letters.
Mr. Sacher. And the man has admitted that he knew Gahen. There is no
denial of that; so that a mere communication from her to him would not tend
to incriminate him, assuming that the contents of the letter do not contain any-
thing on the basis of which a prosecution could he based. Of course. I do
want to say tbat, if this letter goes in, I shall offer all the other letters by pro-
viding that the handwriting in the letters is the same.
Inspector Phelan. It seems to me that it is the witness' privilege to object to
all the letters on constitutional grounds, if it exists. Of course, as he has indi-
cated, if is a connected coarse of conduct, I assume. I do not think that a single
lei tor could be taken out of the series and accepted if the others are kept out on
the ground that he asserts.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1723
Mr. Sacher. Well, he is the best judge :is to [p. 192] whether he committed the
crime. I guess, :it this juncture.
Mr. Botd. I ask that the remarks <>f counsel l>e stricken from the record.
Mr. Sacheb. I am just staring what the Supreme Court <>f the United States
has said.
Mr. Boyd. I still ask the remarks be stricken from the record.
[nspector Phelan. They may go out.
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit R"* for identification as of this date.)
The Witness. It is my constitutional privilege to make this objection. That
has been made many times by many people.
By Mr. Sacheb :
Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this one from
Louise Gahen [handing witness] 1 — A. Same answer.
Mr. Sacheb. I ask that it he marked for identification.
(Letter marked '•Respondent's Exhibit S" for identification as of this date.)
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I am reserving [p. 193] a ruling on this entire
course of questioning. I would like to hear it briefly argued after the noon
recess
Mr. Sacher. You will have to give me an extra bit of time.
Inspector Phelax. On the point that I spoke of as to whether and to what
extent a witness can be impeached even out of his own mouth with regard to the
specific occurrences.
Mr. Sacheb. Oh, I will be glad to argue that.
Inspector Phelax. Incidentally, at the same time I would like to hear from
counsel for the Government on the same point.
Mr. Boyd. We will be glad to do so, Mr. Inspector.
Mr. Sacher. Will you please mark that?
Inspector Phelan. It is marked.
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I ask that it he marked for identification.
[P. 194] (Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit T" for identification as of
this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. I show you this one and ask whether you received that from Louise Gahen
[handing to witness]. — A. Same answer.
Mr. Sacher. I ask that that he marked for identification.
Inspector Phelax. That will be I".
(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit U" for identification as of this date.)
By Mr. Sacher:
Q. Do you recall being arrested in the city of Springfield, 111., in October
1933V— A. No, sir.
Q. You were not arrested in that city? — A. No. sir.
Q. Springfield,. 111.?— A. No.
Q. You had an adopted daughter by the name of Louise, didn't you? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Was she with you in Springfield, 111., in October 1933? — A. I believe she
was. I think she was.
[P. 195] Q. You were there at the time, were you? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. I show you this letter contained in an envelope hearing date October 7,
1933, and ask you whether this refreshes your recollection as to whether you
were arrested in the city of Springfield. 111. [handing to witness], in October
1933?— A. I was not arrested in the city of Springfield, 111., in October 1933.
Q. In what city were you arrested? — A. On what charge? I have been in
the labor movement. You know that.
Q. I am not asking you about the labor movement. These are extracurricular
activities we are asking you about now. — A. The fact of the matter is, well,
certainly proved by a number of your comrades, Counsel.
Mr. Sacher. I move that the witness be admonished.
Inspector Phelax. That may go out. Please answer the question.
The Witxess. The point of the matter is that I was not arrested in the city
of Springfield, 111., at any time.
By Mr. Sacher :
[P. 196] Q. Were you arrested on a morals charge anywhere in Illinois in
1933?— A. No. sir; I was not, at any time.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 16
1724 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. That letter doesn't refresh your recollection at all? — A. I was not arrested
on any such charge.
Q. What was the situation in regard to the statements made by your daughter
in this letter, can you tell the Inspector? I want to call one or two sentences to
your attention. Look at this down here and tell the inspector what it was about
[indicating]. — A. I refuse to answer that.
Q. On what ground? — A. Same ground.
Q. That it will incriminate you? — A. Yes.
Q. This is 3 years later after the event referred to with Louise Gahen, isn't
it ; isn't that right?— A. Right.
Q. So that 3 years later you still refuse to answer things on the ground that it
will tend to incriminate you; is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Mr. Sachee. I offer this letter for identification.
[P. 197] (Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit V" for identification as of
this date.)
By Mr. Sacher :
Q. The matter referred to in Respondent's Exhibit V for identification do not
relate to Louise ; is that right, Louise Gahen ; they have no connection with
Louise Gahen; is that right? — A. No, no.
Q. As a matter of fact, if you will look at the letter again you will see that
Margaret Rogers was with you at the time, the woman that is now your wife ;
isn't that so?
Mr. Boyd. I object to this line of questioning. No proper foundation.
Mr. Sachee. I am trying to refresh the witness's recollection as to something
that he has refused to answer on the ground that it will incriminate him.
Inspector Phelan. Counsel, I think that is going a little afield. I will sustain
the objection.
Mr. Sachee. Exception.
Can we have a recess for a few minutes ?
Inspector Phelan. Yes ; we will take a 5- [p. 19S] minute recess.
(Whereupon a 5-minute recess was taken.)
Inspector Phelan. Gentlemen, counsel for respondent has suggested that we
recess until 1 : 30 and then hand up authorities on the point as to whether this
questioning is proper, with the thought that we may save time by doing so, if
there is no objection on the part of the Government.
Mr. Boyd. No objection on the part of the Government.
Inspector Phelan. The hearing is recessed until 1 : 30 p. m.
(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned to 1:30 p. m., September 17, 1948.)
[Page 199] afternoon session
(1:30 p. in., September 17, 1947)
Louis Feancis Budenz resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
Inspector Phelan. Counsel for respondent and the Government are here.
Proceed. I would like to have counsel argue briefly the point* that was raised
just prior to the recess. I trust counsel can keep the argument down to 5
minutes for each side.
Mr. Sachee. Mr. Fanelli will present the argument.
Inspector Phelan. And the argument will not be recorded in the record.
(There was a discussion off the record on the objection of Mr. Boyd.)
Inspector Phelan. The objection is overruled. You may have an exception.
Mr. Boyd. Exception.
(Whereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
Inspector Phelan. The respondent and all counsel are present. Proceed.
Mr. Sachee. In regard to the witness, Budenz, I have one inquiry I am not
prepared to make at this moment. If it is agreeable to the Presiding Inspector,
I will Ite glad to call Mr. Boyd this evening and let him know whether I will
want .Mr. Budenz back tomorrow. I will call you before 6, if you want it so.
I I'. 200] Mr. Boyd. I would be agreeable to that but Mr. Budenz has other
activities. If at all possible, I would like to have you complete your cross ex-
amination today.
Mr. Sachee. If it were possible for me to do it I would love nothing better.
But I cannot at this moment. There is a bit of written material in regard to
which I have to interrogate him and I haven't got the writing here. And I
will call you and let you know later in the day whether I will have it or not.
If I don't have it today, then we can let him go.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1725
Mr. Boyd. I understand, then, that the defense has completed their cross-ex-
amination with the except ion of one item.
inspector Phelan. So I understand with the exception of possible questioning
on that further item, if counsel decides to do that.
It seems that counsel isn't prepared to go any further anyhow, so that, at the
moment, that leaves us in the position of going ahead with some other witness. If
later there is any argument or dispute, we will have to argue it or dispose of it
as it comes up.
Call your next witness.
Mr. Boyd. I understand that Mr. Budenz is [p 201] excused at this time?
Inspector Phklan. Unless he is recalled at some future date.
Mr. Sacher. The point is this: I will know this afternoon whether he is to
lie recalled or not. I would therefore suggest that, so you can have some con-
tinuity in the record, that if I am in a position this afternoon to indicate that I
want him back, I will indicate that to Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Boyd. Is there a possibility of calling him this afternoon?
Mr. Sacher. I do not think so, because I doubt if I will have it within an hour.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Budenz will not be available tomorrow morning in any event.
At least, he will not be available until tomorrow afternoon.
Mr. Sacher. All right. If this comes, I will be just as happy to have him in
the afternoon as in the morning.
Exhibit No. 84
List of Contributors to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941
Allen, E. W.: "The North Pacific Fisheries" June 1937.
Allen, J. S.: "The Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase". _ June 1938.
"Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines" March 1938.
"Asiaticus": "Soviet Relation with Japan" September 1941.
"China's Advance from Defeat to Strength" March 1938.
"The New Era in Chinese Railway Construction". September 1937.
"The Financial Cutting Edge in the Partition of June 1936.
China."
Angus, H. F.: "Canada and Naval Rivalry in the Pacific" June 1935.
"The Portent of Social Credit in Alberta" September 1936.
"Anon.": "On the Question of Being 'Pro' or 'Anti' " December 1938.
"The 'War Potential' of the Soviet Union" March 1939.
Ballis, W.: "Soviet Russia's Asiatic Frontier Technique: March 1941.
Tana Tuva."
Barnes, J.: "Soviet Sinology" September 1934.
"The Social Basis of Fascism" March 1936.
"The Wooden Horse Inside Geneva's Gates" December 1934.
Barnes, K.: "Another Perspective" December 1935.
"Eastward Migration Within the Soviet Union". _ December 1934.
Bell, Sir Charles: "Tibet and its Neighbors" December 1937.
Benitez, C: "The New Philippine Constitution" December 1935.
Bertram, J.- "'Neutrality' and Personal Opinion" September 1939.
Bishop, C. W. : "The Beginnings of North and South in September 1934.
China."
Bisson, T. A.: "Japan Without Germany" December 1939.
Boeke, J. H.: "The Recoil of Westernization in the East" September 1936.
Bloch, K.: "'Guns' and 'Butter' in Japan" December 1941.
"Letter to the Editor, concerning Sanctions December 1939.
Against Japan."
"Far Eastern War Inflation" September 1940.
"Guerilla Warfare" September 1939.
"Chinese Population Problems" June 1939.
Boeke, J. H.: "The Economic Crisis and Netherlands India". _ March 1934.
de Booy, H. Th.: "The Naval Arm of Diplomacy in the Pa- March 1935.
cific."
"The Life Lines of the British Empire" June 1937.
Bousquet, G. H.: "The International Position of Netherlands December 1939.
India."
1726 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
List of Contributors to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941 — Coa.
Brady, R. A. and Taylor, W. H.: "Policy Centralization in March 1941.
Japan under the Kokutai
Principle."
Bradley, A.: "Pacific Affairs Bibliographies" No. VIII: March 1941.
"Trans-Pacific Relations of Latin America."
Brancho, Jean- Yves le: "The French Colonial Empire and the June 1937.
Popular Front Government."
Brandt W.: "The United States, China, and the World Mar- September 1940.
ket."
"Economic and Living Standards — American June 1941.
and Asiatic."
"A British Observer": "To Have and to Hold" September 1938.
"A British Observer": "The Future Foreshadowed: China's December 1938.
New Democracy".
Britton, R. S.: "Chinese News Interests" . June 1934.
Brown, H.: (Letter) March 1939.
Burpee, L, J.: "Would Canada Support Britain?" June 1939.
Bywater, H. C: "Japanese and American Naval Power in the June 1935.
Pacific".
Campbell, P.: "The American Wheat Program" September 1934.
Canniff, A. W.: "The Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union". __ June 1938.
Carlson, Evans F.: (Letter) "The Guerilla War in China" June 1939.
"The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyuan"_ September 1939.
Cartwright, S.: "Legislation and Economics in Canada" September 1934.
Chamberlin, W. H.: "The Moscow Trials" September 1938.
Chang, C. F.: "Mukden— Where the Road to Madrid Began". March 1937.
Chapman, R. N.: "Suit to Test Hawaii's Status" December 1934.
Chen, Chia-Keng: "A 'South Seas' Chinese Reports on the December 1941.
Burma Road."
Chen, H. S.: "Conquest and Population" June 1937.
"A Critical Survey of Chinese Policy in Inner December 1936.
Mongolia."
"The Good Earth of China's Model Province"-- September 1936.
Christian, J. L.: "Trans-Burma Trade Routes to China" June 1940.
"Thailand Renascent" June 1941.
Chu, Coching: "The Aridity of North China" June 1935.
Chi, Chao-ting: "The Economic Basis of Unity and Division December 1934.
in Chinese History."
Cia. General de Tabacos de Philipinas: "A Denial of Some December 1938.
Statements by J. S.
Allen."
Coatman, J.: "The British Meat Trade and British Imperial June 1935.
Economics."
Cowie, D.: "The Arming of Australia and New Zealand" September 1938.
"British Defense of the South Pacific"- September 1935.
Creel, H. G.: "Soldier and Scholar in Ancient China" September 1935.
Davies, C. H.: "Tobacco-Planting in the Philippines" September 1939.
Dean, E. P.: "Toward a More Perfect Canadian Union" December 1940.
De Korne, J. C: "Sun Yat-sen and The Secret Societies" December 1934.
Dupuv, R. E.: "The Nature of Guerilla Warfare" June 1939.
Eggleston, F. W.: "Sea Power and Peace in the Pacific" September 1935.
"The Population Problems in Australia" December 1936.
Emerson, R.: "The Chinese in Malaysia" September 1934.
Farrelly, T. S.: "Earlv Russian Contact with Alaska" June 1934.
Field, F. V.: "The Documentation of the Yosemite Confer- December 1936.
6H.CC
"American Far Eastern Policy, 1931-37" December 1937.
Fisher, G. M.: "Main Drives Behind Japanese Policies" December 1940.
"The Cooperative Movement in Japan" December 1938.
Friedman, I. S.: "Indian Nationalism and the Far East" March 1940.
Friters, G. M.: "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independ- June 1937.
ence."
"The Development of Outer Mongolian Inde- September 1937.
pendence."
Fuchs, W: "The Personal Chronicle of the First Manchu Em- March 1936.
pcror."
.-[ATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1727
List <>i- Contibutors to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941 — Con.
Glazebrook, G. deT. : "British Empire Migration" December 1934.
Glazcr, S.: "The Moros as a Political Factor in Philippine In- March 1941.
dependence."
Go, Toshi: "The Future of Foreign Concessions in China" December 1939.
Goldenburg, H. C: 'Reform and Politics in Canada" March 1936.
Goodrich, L. C: "China's Greatest Book" March 1934.
Grajdanzev, A.: "Growing Difficulties with Raw Materials for
Special Steels" December 1940.
"A Sudden Increase of Defense Expenditures
in the Soviet Budget" December 1940.
"The Trans-Siberian Railway and the Prob-
lem of Soviet Supply" December 1941.
"Profit and Loss in Manchuria" June 1935.
Green, E.: 'Indian Minorities under the American New Deal"_ December 1945.
Green, O. M.: "Great Britain and Japan's War in China" June 1938.
Greenberg, M.: "The Soviet-German War and The Far East"_ September 1941.
Gull, E. M.: "The Powers and the Unity of China" March 1937.
Hager, R. "The Amenities of Travel"- December 1935.
Hanson, H. "The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas" September 1938.
(Letter) "The Guerrilla War in China" June 1939.
Handy, E. C. S. "Human Resource* and Civilization" September 1935.
Hall, R. E. "Americans Look at their Far Eastern Policv" June 1937.
Hanwell, N. D. "The Dragnet of Local Government in China". March 1937.
Hodson, H. V. "The Nemesis of National Planning" _ March 1936.
Holland, W. L. "Chi- Ming Chiao's Study of Chinese Rural Pop". March 1934.
Howard, H. P.: "The Diplomatic Prelude to the China War". September 1941.
Hsiang, C. Y.: "Mountain Economy in Szechuan" December 1941.
Hsu Shuhsi: "The North China Problem: Letter from the
Author" December 1937.
Hsu, L. S. : "Rural Reconstruction in China" September 1937.
Hubbard, L. E.: "A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union". _ June 1938.
Hubbard, G. E.: "Jellyfish and Crustacean" March 1936.
Hubbard, L. E.: "The Standard of Living in the Soviet Union". September 1938.
Button, D. G.: "Mexico and the Pacific" June 1938.
Isaacs, H. R.: "Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: A
Marxist View" September 1935.
Janeway, E.: "Japan's War Hunger" March 1938.
Jenkins, D. R. "Policv and Strategy of the New Zealand Labor
Party" March 1939.
Jessup, P. C: "Determinants of a Sino-Japanese Settlement:
An Impression of the I. P. R. Study Meeting". March 1940.
Kantorovich, A. J.: "The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway" December 1935.
Keesing, F. M.: "Standards of Living Among Native Peoples of
the Pacific" March 1935.
Kerner, R. J.: "America's Interest and Britain's Policv" September 1938.
Landon, K. P.: "The Problems of the Chinese in Thailand".. _ June 1940.
Lang, Olga: "Recent Russian Literature on Buriat Mongolia". March 1940.
"The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army" March 1939.
Lapomarede, Baron De: "The Setting in Malaysia" September 1934.
Lasker, B.: "The Philippines" March 1934.
"A German Analysis of Japan's Destiny" March 1934.
"Propaganda as an Instrument of National Policv". June 1937.
Lawrence, O. L.: "Competition in the World Textile Market". June 1934.
Leder, E.: "Fascist Tendencies in Japan" December 1934.
Lederer, E. : (Letter to Editor) September 1 937.
Leung, G. K.: "Cross-Currents in the Chinese Theater" December 1935.
Lew, R.: "French Neutrality during the Sino-Japanese Hos- December 1938.
tilities."
"Relations of China and Japan" June 1939.
"A French 'Ottawa'; The Imperial Conference" March 1936.
Lewis, A. B.: "Chinese Currency Policy" March 1936.
"Silver and Chinese Economic Problems" March 1935.
Lieu, D. K.: "China and the Silver Question" September 1934.
"The Sino-Japanese Currency War" December 1939.
1728 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
List of Contributors to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941 — Con.
Lilienthal, P. E.: Pacific Affairs Bibliography No. VII:J"Doc- March 1940.
umentation of the Virginia Bench Study
Meeting."
Lin, Yu: "Twin Loyalties in Siam" June 1936.
Lowdermilk, W. C: "Man-Made Deserts" December 1935.
Ma Ning: "Agrarian Democracy in Northwest China" December 1940.
MacGibbon, R. A.: "The Adoption of Wheat to Northern December 1934.
Regions."
MacKenzie, N.: "Legal Status of Aliens" June 1938.
Magistretti, W.: "Japan's New Order in the Pacific" June 1941.
Max, Alfred: "Against a Far Eastern Munich June 1939.
Matsukata, S.: "A Hist. Study of Capitalism in Japan" March 1934.
Michael, F.: "Japan's Special Interest in China" December 1937.
"The Significance of Puppet Governments" December 1939.
Miller, J. C: "The Drama in China's Anti-Japanese Propa- December 1938.
ganda."
Milner, I. F. A.: "New Zealand's Security in the South Pacific". June 1939.
Mirkowich, N.: "Economic Growth of the Pacific Area" December 1940.
Moore, H.: "The Soviet Press and Japan's War on China" March 1938.
Abstract of "America v. BorbezaKitai" by Kan- September 1936.
torovich.
"Years of Fulfillment" June 1936.
Nash, V.: "A Key to the Maze of Chinese Literature" September 1936.
Normano, J. F.: "Japanese Emigration to Brazil" March 1934.
Norins, M. R. : "Tribal Boundaries of the Burma- Yunnan March 1939.
Frontier."
"The War in China and the Soviet Press" June 1939.
Parrv, A. and Kiralfy, A.: "Soviet Submarines in the Far March 1937.
East."
Peffer, N.: "America from Across the Pacific" March 1937.
"America: the Jellyfish of the Pacific" September 1935.
Perkins, B. W.: "The Failure of Civil Control in Occupied June 1939.
China."
Phinney, A. : "Racial Minorities in the Soviet Union" September 1935.
Pollard, R. T.: (Letter to the Editor),., September 1937.
Porter, Catherine: "The Future of the Philippines" June 1940.
Powell, I. B.: "The Commonwealth of the Philippines" March 1936.
Price, E. B.: "The Manchurians and their New Deal" June 1935.
Okazaki, S.: "Moscow, Yenan, Chungking" March 1941.
Oudendyk, W. J.: "Is the Soviet Union's Position in the Far March 1937.
East only Defensive?"
Quigley, H. S. : "The Open Door and Neutrality" September 1936.
Rager, F. A.: "Japanese Emigration and Japan's 'Population September 1941.
Pressure.' "
Rasmussen, A. H.: "The' Wool Trade of North China" March 1936.
Reid, J. G.: "The Fall of the Manchu Dynasty" December 1936.
Robertson, C. J.: "The Rice Export from Burma, Sian and June 1936.
French Indo-China."
Roosevelt, N.: "Europe Lays Asia Open to Aggression" December 1938.
Rosinger, L. K.: "Soviet Far Eastern Policy" September 1940.
Rosinger, L. K.: "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile September 1939.
War."
(Letter) "The Guerrilla War in China" June 1939.
Rosinski, H.: "The Strategy of the Sino-Japanese Conflict"--- March 1938.
Rothe, C: "Tea Production and Tea Restriction" December 1935.
"Restriction of Rubber Production in Netherlands- March 1935.
India."
Ronan, W.: "The Kra Canal" ... September 1930.
Sarrant, A.: "The Indivisibility of Peace and the Inseparabil- December 1936.
ity of East and West."
Shaw, Glenn W.: "Contemporary Japanese Lieterature: A September 1935.
Foreigner's View."
Shepherd, Win. R.: "The Teaching of Modern Oriental His- September 1935.
tory in the West."
Shepherd, J.: "New Caledonia: Orphan of the South Pacific". December 1940.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1729
Lisa <f c<>\ iiuHiroRs to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941 — Con.
Schiller, A. A.: "Native Customary Law in (he Netherlands June 193G.
Eas1 Indies."
Schriekc, B.: "American Negro and Colonial Native: Educa- September 1937.
tion and 'Equality'."
Schumpeter, E. B.: "The Problem of Sanctions in the Far September 1939.
East."
Schweitzer, L.: (Letter to Editor) September 1937.
Sekiguchi, Y.: "The Changing Status of the Cabinet in Japan". March 1938.
Sekine, G.: "America's Strategy Against Japan" June 1941.
Shridharani, K.: "India in a (hanging Asia" March 1941.
Snow, E.: "Soviet Society in Northwest China" September 1937.
Perry, A. and Kiralfv, A.: "Soviet Submarines in the Far March 1937.
East."
Kiralfv, A.: "The Armed Strength of the U. S. in the Pacific". June 1938.
Soward, F. H.: "The Imperial Conference of 1937" December 1937.
Spencer, J. E.: "Kueichow: An Internal Chinese Colony" June 1940.
Stead, G.: (Letter) 1 March 1939.
Steiger, A. J.: "Stone Age Peoples in the" June 1941.
Stein, Gunther: "Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper June 1936.
Reader."
"China's Price Problem" September 1941.
"Japanese State Finance" December 1937.
"The Yen and the Sword" March 1939.
Stevenson, T. A.: "Canadian Foreign Policy" June 1934.
Steward, O.: "Air Communications and the Far East" September 1935.
Strong, A. L.: "Eighth Route Region in North China" June 1941.
Sun, J. C: "New Trends in the Chinese Press" March 1935.
Sutch, W. B.: "New Zealand's First Year of War" March 1941.
Taiwan Jiho (Formosan Magazine): "Cultural Policy in Tai- September 1941.
wan and the Problem
of Kominka."
Takeyania, Y.: "A Japanese View of Thailand's Economic December 1941.
Independence."
Taylor, G. E.: "Reconstruction After Revolution: Kiangsi September 1935.
Province and the Chinese Nation."
"The Powers and the Unity of China" December 1936.
"Mr. Taylor in Rebuttal" June 1937.
"America's Pacific Policy: The Role and the December 1941.
Record."
Taylor, K. W.: "The Canadian-Japanese Tariff War" December 1935.
Taylor, P. S.: "The San Francisco General Strike" September 1934.
Taylor, W. H. and Brady, R. A.: "Policy Centralization in March 1941.
Japan Under the Koku-
tai Principle."
Thurnwald, R. C: "The Price of the White Man's Peace"... September 1936.
Timperley, H. J.: "Makers of Public Opinion about the Far June 1936.
East."
Thompson, V.: "The Landward Side of Singapore" March 1941
Thorp, J.: "Colonization Possibilities of Northwest China and December 1935.
Inner Mongolia."
Toynbee, A. J.: "The Next War— European Asia" March 1934.
Utley, Freda: "Population and Conquest" March 1937.
V., C. K.: "The Second Chinese National Financial Con- September 1934.
ference."
Yak, S. P., Jr.: "Third Conquest of the Philippines?" September 1941.
Yalk, M. H. van der: "The New Chinese Criminal Code" March 1936.
Yandenbosch, A.: "Netherlands, India, and Japan" September 1940.
Van der Yalk, M. H.: "The Revolution in Chinese Legal March 1938.
Thought."
Van Kleck, M.: "The Moscow Trials" June 1938.
Wales, N.: "Why the Chinese Communist Support the United September 1938.
Front — An Interview with Lo Fu."
"China's New Line of Industrial Defense" September 1939.
Wang, Chi-chen: "Western Tides in Chinese Literature" June 1934.
1730 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
List of Contributors to "Pacific Affairs" March 1934 to June 1941 — Con.
Cang, Ching-chun: "Theodore Roosevelt and Japan's 'Monroe March 1936.
Doctrine'."
Wang, Yn-ch'uan: "The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of June 1936.
Dynasties in Chinese History."
Wang, Hu-ch'uan: "The Development of Modern Social Sci- September 1938.
ence in China."
Wei, Meng-pu: "The Kuomintang in China: Its Fabric and March 1940.
Future."
Weinberg, A. K.: "Potentialities of America's Far Eastern June 1939.
Policy."
Wertheim, B.: "The Russo-Japanese Fisheries Controversy". _ June 1935.
Wyte, Sir F.: "The Philippines as a Pawn in the Game". _ ' June 1934.
"The Institute of Pacific Relations and the March 1936.
Crisis in the Far East."
"Footnote on 'American Foreign Policy' " March 1938.
Winter, Ella: "What next in California?" March 1935.
Williams, W. Wynne: "The Settlement of the Australian June 1936.
Tropics."
Wittfogel, K. A.: "No. Ill: A Large-Scale Investigation of March 1938.
China's Socio-Economic Structure."
Wolfers, A.: "Nationalist Policies and the Strategy of Peace". . June 1934.
Wootton, B.: "Some Implications of Anglo-Japanese Compe- December 1936.
tition."
Wright, Q.: "The Legal Foundations of the Stimson Doctrine"- December 1935.
"A Pawn Approaches the Eighth Square" September 1934.
Wu, L. T. K.: "American Capitalism and Imperialism" March 1935.
Wye, C. K. : "Chinese Unification and Foreign Penetration" December 1935.
Yakhontoff, V. A.: "Mongolia: Target or Screen" March 1936.
Jamakawa, T.: "The Yosemite Conference and Japan" December 1936.
Yanaga, C: "Recent Trends in Japanese Political Thought'.'- June 1940.
Yanaihara, T. : "Problems of Japanese Administration in June 1938.
Korea."
Yokota, K.: "The Recent Development of the Stimson Doc- June 1935.
trine."
Young, A. M.: "The Press and Japanese Thought" December 1937.
(Letter) March 1939.
Exhibit No. 85
Signers of Letters From People Who Know Owen Lattimore's Work
William R. Amberson, professor of physiology, University of Maryland
E. Cowles Andrus, professor of medicine, Johns Hopkins University
Donald Andrews, professor of physics, Johns Hopkins University
Hollis Bautier, professor, University of Chicago
Knight Biggerstaff, professor of Chinese history, Cornell University
Carrol Binder, journalist
Woodbridge Bingham, associate professor of Far Eastern history, University of
California
Francis F. Beirne, author and columnist
Demaree Bess, staff writer, Saturday Evening Post
Eugene P. Boardman, assistant professor of history, University of Wisconsin
George Boas, professor of philosophy, Johns Hopkins University
Martin Toscan Bennett, consulting engineer
Derk Bodde, assistant professor of Chinese, University of Pennsylvania
Robert Blakely, editor, St. Louis
Dorothy Borg, research on Far East, New York city.
Hugh Borton, associate professor of Japanese, Columbia University
Adda Bozeman, professor of international relations, Sarah Lawrence College
Eleanor Breed, columnist
Norman Brown, director of South Asia Institute, University of Pennsylvania
Percy Buchanan, director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of Oklahoma
Pearl Buck, author
Gladys W. Bundy, lawyer and Republican clubwoman
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1731
Robert E. Bundy, town clerk, Bethel, Vt.
Claude Buss, professor of history, Stanford University
Gertrude Bussey, professor, Goueher College
John F. Cady, associate professor of history, Ohio University
John C. Caldwell, ex-deputy director, United States Information Service for
Korea
Schuyler Canunan, assistant, professor, University of Pennsylvania
Wm. Mansfield Clark, professor of medicine, Johns Hopkins University
Zacharish Chafee, Jr., professor of law, Harvard University
Melvin Conant, China program, Harvard University
James J. Corry, Jr., lecturer in Chinese, University of Michigan
Robert S. Cochrane, director, Station WMAR, Baltimore
John Hadley Cox. assistant professor, University of Michigan
Lester Cowan, moving picture producer
Olive Thompson Cowell, professor of education, San Francisco State College
Francis Cleaves, assistant professor of Chinese, Harvard University
Spencer Coxe, American Friends Service ( ?)
Robert I. Crane, professor of history, University of Chicago
George I!. Cressey, professor of geography, Syracuse University
Elmer Davis, radio commentator, American Broadcasting Co.
Lloyd E. Dewey, professor of finance, New York University
Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., lawyer
William Egerton. social sciences department, University of Chicago
Rupert Emerson, professor of government. Harvard University
Gertrude Ely, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
H. H. Fisher, chairman. Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University
Grace Frank, professor of Latin, Johns Hopkins University.
Julian Friedman. London School of Economics
John K. Fairbank. professor of history, Harvard University
Miriam S. Farley, research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations
Ludwig Freund, professor of political science. University of Chicago
Lewis Gannett, columnist, New York Herald Tribune
Charles S. Gardiner, research in Chinese History, Cambridge, Mass.
Gussie E. Gaskill. librarian, Cornell University
Meredith P. Gilpatrick, professor of political science, Ohio State University
Ann Gertler, assistant professor of Economics, Mount Holyoke College
Carrington Goodrich, professor of Chinese, Columbia University
Randall Gould, journalist
George Grassmuck, assistant professor of political science, Boston University
Mortimer Graves, secretary, American Council of Learned Societies
Louis Gottschalk, professor of history, University of Chicago
Morton Grodzius, professor of history, University of Chicago
Roger Hackett. China program, Howard University
J. W. Hall, instructor, University of Michigan
Ellen Hammer, Institute of International Studies, Yale University
Earl Parker Hanson, professor of geography, University of Delaware
G. W. Harrison, assistant professor. University of Florida
Richard Edes Harrison, cartographer
James R. Hightower. assistant professor of Chinese language and literature,
Harvard University
Everett Hawkins, professor of economics, Mount Holyoke College
Malcolm Hobbes, writer
W. L. Holland, secretary general. Institute of Pacific Relations
Paul Homan, professor of economics, U. S. L. A.
Richard Hooker, professor of social sciences. University of Chicago
Bruce C. Hooper, professor of government, Harvard University
Elizabeth Huff, head, East Asiatic Library. University of Chicago
Nobntake Ike. curator, Japanese Collection. Hoover Institute and Library,
Stanford
Gerald W. Johnson, author
David R. Jones, president, Bennet College
Arthur Jorgenson, former missionary in Japan
George McT. Kahin, assistant professor of political science, Johns Hopkins
University
George A. Kennedy, associate professor of Chinese, Yale University
V. O. Key. professor of political economy. Yale University
1732 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Norman Kiell, department of sociology and philosophy foundations, Teachers Col-
lege, Columbia University
Robin Kinkead, journalist, formerly OWI, San Francisco
Gerard P. Koh, associate professor of Chinese, Yale University
Yongjeung Kim, head of Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C.
Benjamin H. Kizer. lawyer, formerly UNNRA Director for China
Hyman Kublin, assistant professor of history, Brooklyn College
Lawrence Krader, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington
John D. Larkin, professor of political science and dean of University of Chicago
Alexander Laing, librarian, Dartmouth College
Jacob Landau, Overseas News Agency
Frederic C. Lane, professor of history, Johns Hopkins University
Carl T. Keller, Harvard-Yenching Institute
Willis J. King, Bishop of the Methodist Church
Marion J. Levy, Jr., assistant professor of sociology, Princeton University
Wavner Leys, professor, University of Chicago
Frederica de Laguna, professor of anthropology, Bryn Mawr College
Richard Lauterbach. author
Clare Leighton, author and artist
Paul Linebarger, professor of Asiatic Political School of Advanced International
Studies
William Lockwood, department director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton
Helen Lynd, professor of social sciences, Sarah Lawrence College
Clarence Long, professor of political economy, Johns Hopkins University
Donald McKay, professor of history, chairman of committee on international
studies, Harvard University
Shannon McCune, chairman, department of geography, Colgate University
Desmond Martin, research student and author
Maury Maverick, former Congressman and mayor of San Antonio
William Mayer, former military attache, Peking
Franz Michael, professor of far-eastern history, University of Washington
Broadus Mitchell, professor of economics, Rutgers University
Hans Morgenthau, professor of political science, University of Chicago
Saul Padover, dean of School of Politics, New School for Social Research
B. F. Penrose, professor of geography, Johns Hopkins University
Arthur Upham Pope, director, Asia Institute
John A. Pope, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington
Edwards A. Park, professor of pediatrics, Johns Hopkins University
Lucius C. Porter, ex-professor, Yenehing University, Peking
Earl II. Pritchard, associate professor of far-eastern history, University of
Chicago
Dale Pontius, Roosevent College, Chicago
Rodin B. Posey, professor of political science, Northwestern University
Hortense Powdermaker, professor of anthropology. Queens College
Karl Pritchard, associate professor of far-eastern history, University of Chicago
Hermann Pritchett, professor
Nathaniel Pefi'er, professor of international relations, Columbia University
Harold S. Quigley, professor of political science. University of Minnesota
Wilmot Ragsdale, foreign correspondent. Time and Life
Christopher Rand, foreign correspondent
C. F. Pernor, professor of economics. University of Michigan
Lloyd Reynolds, professor of economics. Yale University
Charles J. Rhoads, former Governor. Federal Reserve Bank. Philadelphia
Millard Rogers, assistant professor of Chinese art history, Stanford University
Lawrence K. Rosinger, research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations
Doris Russel, professor of English, Vassar College
Faston Rothwell, vice chairman, Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford,
University
Stanley Salmen, executive vice president and director, Little, Brown & Co.
Lawrence Sickman, vice director, Nelson Gallery, Kansas City
Dorothy Shields, professor of political economy. Goucher College
Father Louis Schrani, Immaculate Heart Missions
Harvey Schuman, publisher
Elbridge Sibley, Social Science Research Council
Charles Siepmann, professor of education, New York University
Ernest J. Simmons, professor of Slavic languages, Columbia University
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1733
Harlow Shaploy, professor of astronomy. Harvard University
Robert E. Sherwood, author and playwright
Stanley Speetor. Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington
Yilhjahmur Stofansson. Artie explorer and author
David Stevens, former director, division of humanities, Rockefeller Foundation
Edgar Snow, editorial writer. Saturday Evening Post
Rodger Swearingen, lecturer. University of Southern California
Leland Stowe, editor, the Reporter
Earl Swisher, history department, University of Colorado
Bradford Smith, author
Thomas Smith, assistant professor of far-eastern history, Stanford University
Herbert Bayard Swope, editor
Philip H. Taylor, professor of international relations, Syracuse University
S. B. Thomas, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
Virginia Thompson, far-eastern research, New York
Daniel Thorner, assistant professor of economic history, University of Penn-
sylvania
Elliott R. Thorpe, brigadier general, United States Army, retired
Nischa Titieve, associate professor of anthropology. University of Michigan
Alfred Tozzer, professor of anthropology (retired), Harvard University
Andrew G. Truzal, president, Hood College
Harold Vinacke, professor of political science, University of Cincinnati
James P. Warburg, banker and author
Royal J. Wald, research fellow, California
Langdon Warner, curator of oriental department, Fogg Museum, Harvard Uni-
versity
Richard J. Walsh, president, John Day Co.
William Stix Wassennan, chairman, Electronized Chemicals Corps.
George H. Watson, University of Chicago
Edward A. Weeks, editor of the Atlantic Monthly
George Wilson, social science department, University of Chicago
Thomas Wiener, department of Slavic studies, Duke University
Harold J. Wiens, assistant professor of geography, Yale University
Herbert F. West, professor of English, Dartmouth College
C. Martin Wilbur, associate professor of Chinese, Columbia University
John B. Whitelaw, professor of education, Johns Hopkins University
Arthur Wright, assistant professor of history, Stanford Unive sity
Mary Wright, curator of Chinese Collection, Hoover Institute and Library, Stan-
ford University
Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago
J. B. Whitehead, professor of electrical engineering, Johns Hopkins University
H. R. Wishengrad, Overseas News Agency
H. G. W, Woodward, professor of history, Johns Hopkins University
Joseph K. Yamigawa, associate professor of Japanese, University of Michigan
Margaret Young, formerly secretary of Page School of International Relations
Exhibit No. 86
Minutes of Fighting-Funds for Finland, Inc., 1940
The first meeting of the Maryland Committee for Fighting-Funds for Finland,
Inc., met on Tuesday afternoon, February 20, 5 p. m., at 516 North Charles Street.
Those present were Mr. Baldwin, Judge Leser, Dr. Lovejoy, Mr. Theodore Mar-
burg. Mr. Charles Marburg, Miss Poe, Mr. Porter, and Miss Snow. Mr. Charles
Marburg in the chair.
The names of those who had consented to serve on the committee were an-
nounced as follows : Dr. Harold N. Arrowsmith, Mi*. Rignal W. Baldwin, Mr.
George G. Carey, Jr., Mrs. Rufus Gibbs, Dr. W. Stull Holt, Mr. Wallace Lanahan,
Dr. Owen Lattimore, Rabbi Morris S. Lazaron, Judge Oscar Leser, Dr. Arthur O.
Lovejoy, Dr. Kemp Malone, Mr. Charles L. Marburg, Mr. Theodore Marburg, Mr.
F. Furnival Peard, Miss Mary Lee Poe, Mr. Alexander G. Porter, Maj. Gen.
Milton A. Reckord, Dr. F. C. Reynolds, and Miss Jessie L. Snow.
Mr. Charles Marburg announced that Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan had accepted
the chairmanship of the National Organization with headquarters at 120 Broad-
way. New York City. Quoting from a telegram from Mr. R. F. Seton-Harris,
1734 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
executive secretary of the national organization, "Fighting-Funds for Finland,
Inc is now actively forming in each State. Its charter calls for monies and other
donations to be outright gifts to the Republic of Finland without restriction for
the purchase of armaments and other munitions in defense of Finland * *
all organizing expenses are to be privately underwritten as far as possible, so
that funds will go in toto to the Finns." Mr. Seton-Harris also emphasized the
importance of speeding up organization plans in order that action could start at
once to rush collections to the courageous Finnish people.
Mr Theodore Marburg presented a statement for the press. A copy is attached
to these minutes. A letter written by Mr. Marburg which was to appear in the
Morning Sun the following day was also read. ,
Mr Charles Marburg announced that Mr. F. Furnival Peard, of the Mary-
land Trust Co., had consented to receive contributions for Fighting-Funds for
Finland. Inc., in Maryland. - _
The motion was made by Mr. Porter and seconded by Miss Poe that Miss Snow
be appointed the executive secretary of the Maryland Committee for Fighting-
Funds for Finland, Inc. The meeting adjourned to be reconvened the following
day, February 21, at 4 : 30 p. m.
Respectfully submitted.
Jessie L. Snow, Executive Secretary.
Exhibit No. 87
Quotations From Owen Lattimore' s Writings
"The spread of direct Russian control over Asia would be disastrous for the
countries of Asia as well as for America and Europe." ( "The Situation in Asia,"
by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949). Page 12.)
"No Chinese government can be genuinely independent if it is subject to
manipulation by Russia." (Statement signed by Mr. Lattimore together with
Senator Flanders, Senator Murray, and Professors Dulles, Fisher ,and Mac-
Nair, December 30, 1946.)
"At the same time, any new departure in United States policy in Asia must be
proof against the accusation of 'appeasing' Communism as a doctrine or Russia
as a state." (Article in "The Atlantic Monthly," January 1950, by Owen
Lattimore.)
"Those of us who have never been Marxists have many straightforward dis-
agreements with the Marxists." (Book Review in the "New York Herald Trib-
une" bv Owen Lattimore, November 30, 1947.)
"United States policy should aim to increase the ability of countries in Asia
to do without Russia, by encouraging a steady improvement of the three-way
economic relationship between Asia, Europe, and America, including the resump-
tion of the supply of raw materials from Asia, the sale of Europe's manufactures
in Asia, and American financing both of industrialization in Asia and recovery
in Europe. The American financing should be undertaken as a sound enterprise
in increasing production and consumption, not as a doling out of subsidies to
keep the economies of Asia and Europe stagnantly alive." (Article in "The
Atlantic Monthly," January 1950, by Owen Lattimore.)
"* * * American policy, to be successful, must operate through the United
Nations as much as possible and strengthen the United Nations as much as
possible. A two-world system of American allies and satellites, ranged against
Russian allies and satellites, is not enough in America's favor and may be too
much in Russia's favor. Only by working through the United Nations can the
third countries, which are already critically important in Asia and may become
important in Europe, be brought closer to the American side than to the Russian
side." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949)
Page 227.)
"The fact is that the American interest, of course and without further dis-
cussion, lies in making sine of the minimum expansion of Russian control and
influence." (Lecture by ( >wen Lattimore, Mt Holyoke C< liege. June 1948. >
"Nationalism is the only bedrock on which a political structure can he built in
China — or anywhere in Asia — today. It' we are as quick as the Russians and
the Communists of Asia are to build on that bedrock, then the new political
structures that are being built in China and all over Asia will incorporate many
features of capitalism, private enterprise, and political democracy in their 'third
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1735
country' architectural design, [f the Russians and the Communists continue to
keep ahead of us in accepting Asi;i on its own terms, there will be more socialism
in the superstructure." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little,
Brown & Co., HM'.ii. Page 180.)
"I do not believe that a spread of Communism anywhere in Asia (or indeed
in Europe or America ) is either invitable or desirable. * * * More than
that, 1 believe that the country which most people in Asia would like to imitate
and emulate is America rather than Russia." (Article in "China Monthly,"
December 1945, by Owen Lattimore.)
"What I believe in, and what my whole record shows I believe in, is the
spread of democracy, not the spread of Communism." (Article in "China
Monthly," December 1945, by Owen Lattimore.)
"[A safe American policy] would guarantee that the Chinese Communists re-
main in a secondary position, because it would strengthen those Chinese wdio are
opposed to Communism. * * *" (Article in "Virginia Quarterly Review,"
1940. by Owen Lattimore.)
"We shall have turned the disadvantage of an Asia that we are not strong
enough to control into the advantage of an Asia strong enough to refuse to be
controlled by Russia. We shall have given a fresh impetus to both capitalism
and political democracy." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little,
Brown & Co.. 1949 ) . Page 237. )
"The fact is that my comments and interpretations have always been so inde-
pendent that I have in my time been criticized by Chinese, Japanese,
Germans, Russians, and Mongols, as well as by intemperate American
writers. * * * The criticisms run all the way from calling me an arch-
imperialist to calling me a Red." (Article in "China Monthly," December 1945,
by Owen Lattimore.)
"A great part of Asia's hopes, however, will be fulfilled, and should be ful-
filled with American cooperation. We have everything to gain by being on the
side of hope." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown
& Co.. 1949.) Page 238.)
"Our cardinal need there is a LTnited China, carried forward on a current of
orderly reforms. There is no need for violent revolution ; but, unless the cur-
rent of orderly reforms is given a free channel, there will be violent revolu-
tion. It would be a tragic folly, and the culminating folly of two decades, if
American vacillation and failure to support the patriots in China — the hard-
pressed guardians of the American stake in evolutionary democratic prog-
ress— should let loose defeatism, civil war and revolution. America has no time
to lose. We must have a policy that does not limit us to defending the posses-
sions of the democracies, but pledges us to support and spread democracy
itself." (Article in magazine "Asia," April 1941, by Owen Lattimore. Page 162.)
Exhibit No. 88
ATTACKS OX OWEN LATTIMORE IN COMMUNIST PRESS
[From Problems of History of China, April 1949]
Voprosi Istorii (Questions of History, 1949)
The proclivity to libel and slander the struggle of the toilers of China in the
revolution of 192H-27 is explained not only by the fully understandable hatred of
the learned lackeys of imperalism towards the revolutionary movement of the
masses. Slander is also used in a given case to represent, despite the truth, the
Chinese bourgeoisie, who betrayed the national interests of the country, as the
progressive force of the Chinese national-liberation movement.
This notion in this or another form can be found in the writings of all the
authors we have named. Lattimore. the former American adviser to Chiang
Kai Shek in the years of the second World War, formulates it most clearly.
Lattimore advertises the clique of Chiang Kai Shek as "the bearer of the revolu-
tionary traditions" of the Chinese people. The mercenary rulers of Kuomintang
China, according to the affirmation of Lattimore, are the "sons and heirs of
the Chinese revolutionaries who were active twenty and thirty years ago"
[Lattimore. Owen and Eleanor. The Making of Modern China, p. 183. London,
1945]. The Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927 Lattimore holds
to be only a sensible craving to make a "pause" in order "to consolidate the
already achieved successes (?!) and to attempt to win with the help of negoti-
1736 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ations (with foreign powers — L. B.) that which still remained to be won (?)"
[Lattimore, op. cit., p. 138. Here are clearly manifested the causes of the Latti-
more's sympathy toward Chiang Kai Shek and Co. He is attracted by the re-
jection of this clique of traitors of the struggle with imperialist expansion, of
the struggle for a genuine liberation of China].
[In: The Pacific Ocean, a political, social, and economic quarterly review. No. 1.
Published by the State Social and Economic Press, Moscow, 1935]
Excerpts From an Article by N. Terentiev, Titled "Pacific Affairs''
* * * Mr. Lattimore asserts that the coronation of Pu Ee is a new step
forward in the direction of "supporting the independence of Mongolia." The
author's assertions, to a considerable extent, reveal that fact that this term is
applied by him to Japanese politics not in an ironical sense, but literally, and
that the reactionary forces in Inner Mongolia, having put themselves in the
service of the aggressive Japanese plans, are constantly and respectfully called
by him "conservative Mongolians." Analyzing the further invasion by Japan
into that portion of Inner Mongolia which remains under Chinese control, Mr.
Lattimore once again, with complete seriousness, speaks of "the politics of
Japan and Manchukuo supporting the conservative Mongolians on terms favorable
to the Mongols themselves" * * * (p. 218).
* * * Mr. Lattimore finds himself under the hypnotic influence of his own
theory concerning the struggle between land and marine (naval) tactcis in
the politics of the powers in relation to China and Eastern Asia, and from the
point of view of this theory he attempts to partially explain — and to a certain
degree justify — the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. * * *
* * * \ye ajso consider that Mr. Lattimore's scholasticism is similar to
Hamlet's madness, and finds its system with a rather obvious political
content" * * * (p. 217).
* * * Among the group of articles earning special attention is the declara-
tion of the editor of the Magazine, Mr. Owen Lattimore (the article "Mongolia
Enters World Affairs" in the March issue, the commentary "Japanese Europe"
in the June edition, and the commentaries "Empire and Exploitation," "Land
power of the Japanese Fleet" in the December edition). To begin with, let us
note that we are separated (divided) from Mr. Lattimore by insurmountable
differences in opinion, not only in a general world outlook, which is not worth
special mention, but also in the concrete evaluation of the current political
situation in the Far East * * * (p. 217).
* * * According to Lattimore, "a Japanese continental policy is unthink-
able without an active Mongolian policy (politics)," "a Japanese aggressive
policy in Inner Mongolia is inevitable," and in the same way evidently, is justi-
fied, the similar idea that "no less inevitable is a conflict between Inner and
Outer Mongolia." After all this, it appears that, "even though the government
of Outer Mongolia is strong * * *" and even "has for its leaders probably
the best people of the country," it still "unquestionably is a government of the
minority" (7) and cannot be considered stabilized until the generation which.
still remembers olden times has died out * * * (p. 218).
* * * A further development of these same ideas, in the December issue,
brings Mr. Lattimore to the decision that the Japanese militarists with Araki
at their head are acting on purely idealistic bases, that they "are sincerely work-
ing for the creation of a strong Manchuoko witn its very own sound financial,
industrial and trade organizations freely and profitably trading for itself with
Japan, but economically not (trained (exhausted) and in the future becoming
dependent on Japan" that the "military idealists" of the latter defend "the
Empire's structure, which can more properly be characterized as a federation,
than as plain (naked) exploitation," and that "the Pan-Asiatic movement" is
directed towards the "establishment of a group of Asiatic countries in Manchuria,
Mongolia, and Northern and Southern China, which will be under Japanese
political hegemony, but would not demand individual support from Japan, which
could divide and weaken Japanese military and economic resources." Mr. Latti-
more, it is true, emphasizes the conflict between military and civilian points of
view which exist in Japan, and leaves the problem open, of whether the victor
will be "Federation or Exploitation," but the very manner in which this problem
has been formulated by the author misinforms the reader concerning the actual
aims and methods of the Japanese Aggressive policy in Manchuria and China and
is direct apologetics for Japanese imperialism.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1737
in another of the articles mentioned earlier, the same land-naval theory blooms.
This brings Mr. Lattimore to the conclusion, that Japan is supposedly ready at
any moment To make concessions in naval matters, in return for "a betterment Of
her position in Manchuria, China, andJMfongolia." Mr. Lattimore even feels that
if the Japanese naval tonnage aorm were really to be raised, that would be
nothing more than a concealed defeat of Japan, which "not being able to estab-
lish (confirm) its new profitable positions on the continent, would be forced to
return to the less satisfactory policy of naval protection (defense) of a land
position." Even if we were to agree with the essence of this evaluation — and we
feel that Japan's refusal of the Washington Naval Act is an action which not
only strengthens Japanese pretensions for rule of the continent, but supple-
ments them with plans Of naval expansion, which Japan has no thought of
refusing — then the verbal peelings, heaped up by Mr. Lattimore, would leave us
alienated from his point of view (p. 219).
[In: The Pacific Ocean (Tikhii Okean), a political, social, and economic quarterly review.
No. 1. Published by the State Social and Economic Press, Moscow, 1936]
Excerpts From ax Article by A. Lifshitz Titled "The Magazine 'Pacific
Affairs' for 193.j"
* * * In this manner Mr. Lattimore once again returns to that apology
i apologetics) of the plundering Japanese politics in relation to Mongolia, which
is so precisely expressed in his above-mentioned book (The Mongols in Man-
churia). This conception of his is here again woven together with the scholastic
theory of the beginning of a new era of "land power" as opposed to "marine
(naval) power." which supposedly characterized the period right up to the be-
ginning of the 20th century. This "new era," in the author's opinion, must
logically lead to the "rebirth of Mongolia," evidently under Japanese protection.
Lattimore's concept stems from the thesis of the supposed readiness of the
Japanese to give the Mongols actual independence. In part, concerning Man-
churia, these fantasies of Lattimore's are criticized in the already mentioned
article by Grazhdantsev. and Lattimore himself was forced to admit, in a footnote,
that his original expectations did not materialize * * * (p. 169).
* * * However, inasmuch as we are speaking of the article in "Pacific
Affairs," it is not difficult to see that Lattimore's deliberations and especially the
conclusions which inevitably follow them (which ask to be made because of them i
are very close to the Japanese slogan of "the battle with the communistic threat,"
and that his article can and will serve as justification for Japanese aggression
in Northern China and in Mongolia (p. 170).
* * * Of course, Mr. Lattimore can say that he is not responsible for the
actions of the Japanese, but after all he is a politician and not an archeologist,
and cannot in his writings become diverted from the concrete and extremely
threatening surroundings in the region of Japanese operation, or from the crimi-
nal acts of aggression, either in preparation, or already completed by the Japanese
imperialists * * * (p. 170).
i Tlie article referred to is in No. 4 of Pacific Affairs "The Inner Gates of
China." i — Tr. note.
[Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, No. 4-5, 1946, p. 91-92]
Review of The Making of Modern China
(V. Maslennikov)
The author's approach to some of the questions of history of China is simplified
and superficial. * * *
* they fail to rightly evaluate the Opium wars and the transformation
of China into a semicolony of the capitalist powers. Their characterization of
the Taiping revolution and of the Boxer Rebellion is superficial. The anti-
imperialist character of the Boxer Rebellion is not pointed out. * * *
* * * as regards contemporary China: events are often characterized
wrongly or superficially. * * *
* * the well-known Japanese satrap Chian-Tso-Lin is an "honest military
governor." who ' never sold his native land."
1738 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
* * * nothing is said of the fact that Sun-Yat Sen was a democrat who
loved and was devoted to his country- * * *
* * * they say nothing on the character and role of the Chinese demo-
cratic movement which was primarily led by the Communist Party.
* * * they compare the period 1928-37 with the industrial revolution in
England. This does not correspond to reality.
* * * they endeavor to prove that the Gomindan regime is a preparatory
stage preparing the future development of democracy, and that its dictatorship
thereby differs from a Fascist dictatorship. * * *
* * * they fail to mention that the financial capital of USA endeavors
to strengthen its position in China and to occupy a position of power in its
economy. * * *
[From the Daily Worker]
Books
The Situation in Asia. By Owen Lattimore. 238 pp. Boston. Atlantic-Little,
Brown. $2.75.
'Situation in Asia' Criticizes U. S. Government Policy in Far East
(By David Carpenter)
Owen Lattimore's Situation in Asia is extremely critical of our government's
policies in that immense area of colonial and semi-colonial peoples. He shows
that our government has done nothing but alienate the people's forces seeking
national liberation in Asia.
Lattimore, who is the director of the Walter Hines Page School of Foreign Re-
lations at Johns Hopkins University, points out that our dependence on the
Kuomintang has served only to make the United States hated by the Chinese
people. He contrasts, to our disadvantage, the reliance on the unpopular im-
perialist agent Syngman Rhee and the maintenance of U. S. occupation troops in
South Korea with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment of a
native peoples government in North Korea.
He shows clearly that the efforts by the U. S. government to make Japan a
major bastion against the Soviet Union must end in failure.
Lattimore proposes that our government end its alliances with dictatorial,
corrupt anti-people's forces in Asia. He urges that we stop intervention in
the internal affairs of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. He asks that
we aid the peoples of Asia to achieve national independence.
All this is to the good as far as it goes. But Lattimore goes completely off
the beam in his efforts to explain the relationship of political and social forces
in Asia and their impact on world affairs. And as long as we fail to recognize
the reality of these relations so long will we be unable to help in the achievement
of those aims Lattimore proposes.
In the first place, Lattimore argues that the colonial and semi-colonial peoples
struggling for national independence are developing a "third force" that seeks
to remain equi-distant from American and Russian power. He refuses to admit
that the struggle is completely an anti-imperialist struggle, to drive out the
American, British, French, and Dutch capitalists who are subjecting their native
peoples to super-exploitation for their raw materials and as markets for capitalist
products.
Lattimore admits that the Asiatic colonial and semi-colonial peoples are look-
ing to tlic Soviet Union for examples of how oppressed peoples achieve independ-
ence and are turning away from the United States because of its imperialist
line. But he makes this a contest of tactics which the United States can change
by adopting new methods.
Lattimore refuses to see that the reason the colonial people turn to the Soviet
Union for their example is precisely because of the overthrow of capitalism and
the establishment of socialism in that country. As Stalin points out, etc.:
"It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our
country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of inter-
nationalism that pariah nations, slave nations, have for the first time in the
history of mankind risen to the position of nations which are really free and
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1739
really equal, thereby setting ;i contagious example for the oppressed nations of
tlic whole world.
"This menus that the October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era
of colonial revolutions which are being conducted in the oppressed countries of
the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the
proletariat."
The core of the leadership in the colonial struggle against imperialism and
the guarantee of the achievement of national independence lies in the growth
and development of the native Communist Parties, springing out of the exploited
native working classes and leading the exploited working class and the oppressed
peasant masses. That is why the imperialists, under the leadership of the
United States, direct their main hie against the destruction of these native
Communist Parties.
Secondly, Lattimore makes the mistake of assuming that the relationship of
the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia is that of a struggle for power.
Here he falls info the trap laid by American imperialism, which would like
to hide the reality of its efforts to maintain its grasp of the resources and man-
power of Asia.
* * #
This approach to American-Soviet relationships obscures the truth. The
Soviet Union is not seeking world power. Wheu the colonial peoples look for
alliances with the Soviet Union, it is hecause they see in that socialist country
the true defender of their national aspirations. When the Soviet Union aligns
itself with these peoples, it is not just a counter-alliance to protect its own
borders against the attack of imperialism, it is fundamentally a defense of the
national interests of the peoples of these oppressed nations.
Because the peoples of the world recognize that an attack on the Soviet Union
is an attack on the defender of their own aspirations, because they see in such
an attack on their own efforts to break the "Hold of imperialism, they join with
the Soviet Union in a common front against imperialism. They have already
seen how the peoples of the Eastern European democracies were able to protest
themselves from the encroachment of imperialism and to begin their own internal
development as the result of alliances with and protection by the Soviet Union.
In our own country, if we are to adopt the proposals Lattimore makes for
'"the situation in Asia,-' it is necessary for us to loosen the hold of the imperialists
on our government. Otherwise, our official policies will continue to be that of
oppressing the colonial peoples in the interests of our monopoly capitalists.
Exhibit No. 89
They Calleb Me a Spy
(By Emmanuel S. Larsen)
I often wonder how great a portion of the American reading public knows
what became of the "espionage" case that figured -so prominently in the head-
lines of the Nation's newspapers on June 7, 1945.
Since I was one of the six persons involved and was made the "goat" in the
final settlement of the case, I deem it timely to give my story to the American
people while its representatives in Congress are investigating the remarkable
circumstances surrounding the entire affair.
I was born in lv!iT. in San Rafael, Calif. My father was a teacher; he had
taken great interest in the Chinese revolutionary movement and had made the
acquaintance of many of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's adherents. In 1906, after the San
Francisco fire, we went to China where my father was to teach in the Imperial
University in Chengtu.
My boyhood in China was very much different from that of most other Amer-
ican children there, for I was taught by my parents to like and respect the
Chinese, among whom we were residing as guests. I attended Hua Yang Middle
School, and when I was not yet fourteen, I was already so completely Chinese
in my speech, thoughts and outlook on life that I can honestly say that what
goes on in the average Chinese mind is no "Oriental mystery" to me. I have,
of course, since then acquired sufficient of the American characteristics to
enable me to judge China rather impartially, and because my friends always
said I was mentally a Chinese I have, perhaps, been excessively conscientious
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 17
1740 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in my attempt to he strictly impartial in my career as an analyst of Chinese
affairs.
In 1911, when we were about to leave China. I did not have a single boyhood
friend of European stock; my playmates were all Chinese with whom I had
played, studied, fought, and dreamed. One particular boy. who was my con-
stant companion, schemed and talked endlessly of what we would do for China
when we grew up. Together we pored over the illustrations in the British
magazine Graphic; we compared the pictured splendor of the outside world
with the often pitifully low standards of living in China; and I frequently had
a hard time explaining such embarrassing questions as why foreign gunboats
were free to cruise at will on Chinese rivers and why foreigners in China gen-
erally treated the natives with such contempt. These little friends of mine,
not only then, but when we met in later years, placed so much confidence in
me and' expected such great things of me, that to this day I feel that I have
succeeded very poorly in fulfilling my promises to them.
When the revolution broke out, our family went to Denmark, where my father
wanted to visit his aged mother. He signed a five-year contract to teach in
a school in Denmark, and I thus received my high school education there and
later received my B. A. from the University of Copenhagen. In 191(>, we re-
turned to the United States, where my father entered the Chicago school system
and I found employment in the oriental art department of Marshall Field's
famous store. My daily contact with Chinese objects of art made me long for
China, and as a result of several applications, I was favored with an appoint-
ment to the Chinese Postal Administration when I was barely 20 years old.
My first station in China was Canton. After a year, I was sent to my old
home in West China ; there I had a thrilling reunion with my former classmates.
The western world was then in the throes of a devastating war, and I had
little to brag about in regard to western civilization; my Chinese friends, on
the other hand, modestly apologized for the chaos, into which the greedy war-
lords of China had thrown their country. Our somewhat more mature thoughts
and discussions now centered around plans to make China and America the
sister republics of all times by bringing together the peoples of these two great
nations. I had to confess that Chinese youth knew so infinitely much more
about America than our people knew about China.
In the summer of 1918, I registered for war service in the United States Army
and was on my way home when armistice was declared. Returning to work
in the postal service, mj duties took me on extensive travels through most of
China; I was stationed in Taiyuan. Peking, Foochow, Anioy. Hangchow, ami
Mukden. It was as postmaster in the port of Aruoy that I was called upon by
the Directorate of Posts in Peking to supply biographical information about the
many new military and political personalities who had suddenly come before
the public eye as leaders of the Kuomintang forces that were then threatening
the North China government. Amoy was an excellent locality for the study
of these new elements, for the port lay on the dividing line between the political
entities of north and south China.
Right from the start I became very fond of this minor part of my regular
duties, and the collection of current Chinese biographies thus became my prin-
cipal hobby since the year of 1923.
The politics of early revolutionary days were extremely involved; the many
groups and factions were interwoven in a confusing pattern due to the maneu-
vers of numerous minor leaders who for purely selfish reasons would climb tirst
on one bandwagon and then on another as the fortunes of the revolutionary wars
developed.
Outstanding and more clearcut, however, were the leaders of the Nationalists
who fought their way up to the Yangtze Valley in 1927. They were the forces
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, under the able military leadership of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek.
They had started out from Canton in 1924 after many local reverses. Dr. Sun
had tried in vain to obtain the support of the United States and Britain, but his
attempt to seize and utilize Chinese customs funds had been answered with
American naval gunfire. Bight then and there we had chilled the friendship
thai the Chinese Republicans had held for us; we had literally pushed Dr. Sun's
revolutionaries into the arms of Soviet Russia. Russian advisers and military
supplies, thereafter, streamed into Canton, and, in 1924, Chiang Kai-shek's
revitalized armies had finally been able to start their northward march. When
these armies reached the Yangtze. Dr. Sun had died, and Chiang felt that he could
no longer retain his Soviet Russian advisers. He dismissed Galen and Borodin
and many staff officers attached to their advisory mission; but large units of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1741
his armies had already been so thoroughly Indoctrinated in communism that they
refused to obey Chiang's headquarters; under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung,
Ho Lung, Chu Te and others, these pro-Communist troops fled to the hills of
central and southern Kiangsi and began to harrass the newly established Na-
tionalist Government in Nanking.
i was then stationed in Mukden, where 1 was postal accountant for the south-
ern pari of Manchuria. As an official of the North China regime, which con-
sisted «>!' a bewildering blend of modern diplomats and old-time warlords, I was
beset with misgivings corcerning my future as a Chinese official. I was begin-
ning to have great faith in Chiang Kai Ink's new government; our official re-
ports, read eagerly by all of us in the North China government, indicated that
the Nationalists had a very definite policy and were actually doing things. The
main item on their program was unification of China, and the next one was to
present to the outside world an orderly state with a balanced budget and thereby,
in an honorable and acceptable manner, accomplish the abolition of the unequal
treaties. To China's enemies, however, these were the very things that must
not materialize, Russia armed and aided the opposition to Chiang's government
because she wanted to see China sovietizecl ; Japan armed and aided the northern
generals because she liked these greedy weaklings and feared a strong and
unified China under Chiang. The British played their usual small die-hard
merehant-politics in China, and our Government did a pretty good job of fol-
lowing in their footsteps.
I held a good position in Mukden, with a fairly high salary and an excellent
residence; and I had been decorated three times by the North China regime, yet
I felt that I wanted to get out and go into business on my own. During 1926, on a
hunting trip in Manchurian Inner Mongolia, I had become acquainted with a young
and very brilliant Mongol lama, known as the Te-ch'ing-mu Lama, with headquar-
ters in the Ko-ken Monastery, in the Solun area of northwestern Manchuria. The
lama, who was a graduate of a university in Peking and spoke fluent Chinese, was
the spiritual leader of the many clans under the Khorchin League of Mongols. Im-
mensely we lthy, and with unlimited | ower and influence over bis Mongol herds-
men, he was eager to invest millions in model ranches and tanning factories.
After I had visited his headquarters several times and spent many pleasant
days roaming over the plains with him in my Dodge car, he prevailed upon me
to resign from the Chinese government and join him in the capacity of an
adviser. In the latter part of 1927 I, therefore, made careful preparations for
adequate export outlets, through British firms in Tientsin, and I spent six
months studying up on wool and sheep-breeding. With the aid of a Czechoslovak
engineer and several Australian sheepmen, we finally built three ranches, a
tanning factory, some roads, and imported merino rams and numerous cars
and trucks. I was the first American pioneer in that part of Asia. Soviet
Russians had been coming into the border town of Taonan for several years to
buy wool and furs ; they now streamed in bent on wrecking my business. But I
had a fairly well established partnership with the lama, the Chinese garrison
commandant and the Mongol resident prince. The Russians were constantly
telling the Mongols and the Chinese that Americans were swindlers and thieves
and urging them not to deal with me. The Japanese, on the other hand, owned
the stock in the Szepingkai-Taonan Railway, had staked off a Japanese con-
cession outside the city walls of Taonan, and strongly resented any American
establishing himself in this coveted area. As usual, China was the battle ground
of foreign powers, each with their eyes on rich or strategically important mor-
sels of China's perifery. Japan wanted the Taonan-Solun plains of Inner Mon-
golia as a jumping-off place for a huge mechanized army aimed at Siberia and
Outer Mongolia ; Russia wanted this area with its gentle grades from the Mon-
golian Plateau down to the fertile Sungary valley of Manchuria for exactly the
same reasons — conquest.
And just as the pattern would appear, the Japanese took Manchuria first
tin 1931 ) and then lost it to the Russians (in 1945). I did not stay long in
Mongolia ; in 1928, after the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, there was
a change of officials in Taonan, and the new garrison commandant was eager to
please the Japanese and forced me to leave. I went to Tientsin in the autumn of
1928 and joined the British-American Tobacco Co., which sent me to PeiphiL;
to take charge of their traffic department there.
. That same year I married a Russian girl I had met in Manchuria. I was
already fairly well conversant with the Russian language, and as a result of
my Russian marriage I became well acquainted with the various types of Rus-
1742 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
sians — Whites and Reds alike. I found the Russians by nature to be a fascinating
people; they are hospitable to the extreme; they love to laugh and joke, much
as the average American. But the Soviet Russians seemed to live under a
cloud of restraint: they were ever cautious in their conversation, and there was
hardly anything they dared to discuss freely. The few Soviet Russians thai
one met in the international Club and at parties were so noncommittal that they
were outright boring: it was simply impossible for an American to have anything
to do with them. It was obvious, however, that every adult Soviet Russian was
a ecu in Russia's political machine, and they went about their sinister duties in
China with clock-like precision, never daring to become friendly with Chinese
or westerners, and constantly spying on each other. A year or two among those
people would be the best cure for any American with a hankering for the Com-
munistic way of life. By apologists it was always explained that it was neces-
sarily so during the first years of the Russian revolution, where everyone was
engaged in a gigantic struggle ; the struggle must still be on. for I have ob-
served that the present-day officials of the U. S. S.-R. in Washington act in ex-
actly the same manner, keeping aloof from the people in whose midst they live
and discouraging even their children from associating with their American
schoolmates.
Five and a half years with the British-American Tobacco Co. ended with the
closing of the company's traffic branch in Peiping. I decided to return to the
United States and sailed for home in the spring of 1934. I went to Chicago,
where my father was still connected with the school system, but since condi-
tions for employment, especially in my particular field of interest, were extremely
poor at the time. I returned to China in the autumn of the same year. When I
got back to Peiping I met a Chinese friend of mine in the street who said he
had been looking for me for several months. He was an intelligence officer
in the Gendarmerie, the military police under the Ministry of War. He ex-
plained to me that when the Chinese forces retreated from Jehol in 1933, many
Chinese commanders had buried their large and fresh stocks of arms in the
vicinity of Peiping rather than risk a futile stand against the Japanese. Sub-
sequently some of these commanders had secretly gone back to their caches and
unearthed their munitions hoards which were now finding their way into the
hands of all sorts of lawless elements. General Shao Wen-k'ai of the Gen-
darmerie wanted me to assist in the apprehension of Chinese officers involved
in this illicit arms traffic. He had selected me for this work, my friend told
me. because of my fluent Chinese and my knowledge of personalities in Chinese
military circles. He offered me a handsome salary and commissions on all
seizures ; but what intrigued me most was the fact that the Gendarmerie's per-
sonalities files were made available to me, and I was able to check on the ac-
curacy of information. I had collected patiently as a hobby during the past 11
years. In some instances, of course, I found that I was way off, while in others
I was right on the beam ; the most amusing, however, was to find some of my
own earlier reports to the Chinese government copied verbatim and tucked
away in the secret files. General Shao, a highly intelligent man and a student
of Buddhist philosophy, accorded me all the usual privileges of a foreign "guest"
and I had a high regard for this modest and ascetic looking officer. It was,
therefore, painful to me to learn many years later that during the Japanese oc-
cupation of North China, he had become a puppet official. I have often won-
dered whether he and a number of his men did not join the Japanese the better
to keep an eye on them. For his whole organization, prior to the invasion, was
much feared by the Japanese, and be himself was extremely anti-Japanese.
In the early part of l!).'i."> the Japanese found out that I was working for the
Chinese Gendarmerie; the Japanese military attache in Peiping contacted me
and offered me the alternative of quitting the Gendarmerie or possibly getting
run over by a Japanese military truck. I was then seeking a divorce from my
Russian wife, who had fallen under the spell of a young German aviator, and
since I intended to return to the United States anyway, I told the Japanese
attache that I would be glad to accept a good riddance visa for travel via Japan
on my journey home.
Back in the Luited States, I discovered that no matter how much Chinese a
man knows about China, he would not qualify for any official position without
the stamp of approval of the men who control positions in the Far Fastern field.
I, therefore, went to the University of Chicago, enrolled for a brief course.
qualified for one Rockefeller scholarship after another, and in the course of
-ix months found myself in Washington, a candidate for the position of research
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LCT5 KLTY I.W I-.S'I l< ,.\T1<)\ 1743
analyst in Chinese affairs in the Office of Naval Intelligence. I was employed
by the Navy in October 1985, and served almost nine years as Chinese analyst.
During the war, I became acquainted with almost all the naval officers serv-
ing in the Far Eastern branch of the Intelligence system. One of these was
Lt. Andrew Roth, a brilliant young boy who had been commissioned a junior
lieutenant after completing the Navy's special course in the Japanese language.
The feet that lie had been commissioned and accepted for work in Naval In-
telligence placed him in the status of a man whose loyalty to the U. S. govern-
meni was not doubted by the authorities and whom 1 had no need of fearing.
My friendship with Roth was neither very intimate nor of long duration, but — as
was the general practice — we frequently went to lunch together and occasionally
got together in the evening over a glass of beer or a pot-luck dinner, ending up
with a good argument, ranging anywhere from Japanese Shinto to my Chinese
personalities file.
On- day Ruth came to my desk in the Navy Department around noontime and
asked me whether I had had my lunch : I told him that I hadn't. He then asked
me if I would like to walk uptown with him and have lunch, and I readily
agreed. When we had crossed Pennsylvania Avenue at 17th Street, and I was
about to suggest going into the Trianon Cafe. Roth stopped me and asked me
whether I knew a man named Philip Jaffe. For the moment I could not recol-
lect where I had seen the name but was sure that I did not know any such
person. He then explained that Jaffe was publisher and editor of the magazine
"Amerasia." and I then remembered having often seen the name. Roth told me
that he was well acquainted with Jaffe and knew that he and I would have a lot
in common since Jaffe also was interested in Chinese personalities and would
be in a position to trade information with me. I was particularly interested
in the biographies of the Communist leaders in China, Roth knew, and he sug-
gested that we get together. I asked him how that would be possible, and he
smilingly informed me that Jaffe was in Washington that day, and he, Roth,
was just then on his way to have lunch with him and would be glad to bring me
along and introduce me.
We walked over to the Statler Hotel and met Jaffe in the lobby. First we had
a cocktail in his room and then we had lunch in one of the dining rooms. While
eating, we discussed the conditions under which we could trade information
concerning Chinese personalities. Jaffe said he would visit Washington about
once a month and would then ask me for biographical notes or background ma-
terial on personages he had in mind, and if I didn't have such information ready
on my cards, he would pick it up on his next trip. Likewise I was to give him a
list of personalities I was studying, and he would try to supply them to me on
his next trip. Thus started my relations with Jaffe, ever so innocently, as far
as I could see, and I was quite happy to have a new source of information.
Incidentally, I may mention here that the personalities information available
from official sources was generally negligible and very similar to the tedious and
euphemous stuff that one may find in any Who's Who. What I valued in my
collection was the off-the-record "dirt" on a man's character, hitherto unpub-
lished information about his past career, earlier political affiliations and the
real reasons for his switching from one faction to another. Most of the China
experts in Naval Intelligence did not believe in the importance of collecting such
data, and I had a hard time explaining to one of my superiors that China, as
many other countries, was governed not so much by ideologies as by personalities.
After that I began to read Jaffe's magazine Amerasia with greater interest,
I found that all the government agencies in Washington that handle Far Eastern
affairs subscribed to Amerasia and took its comments and opinions quite seri-
ously. I was several times called upon to give my own opinion to superior officers
regarding Amerasia articles that interested them: at times I found that the
general picture presented by Jaffe corresponded pretty accurately with that
given us by our naval and military attaches in China : however, it generally
resembled much closer that of our State Department's field representatives in
China. In the June issue, 1044. Jaffe published a strong criticism of Joseph
Grew, particularly attacking his book: My Ten Years In Japan. A that time
I had not read Mr. Crew's book, nor was I well acquainted with the opposing
Far Eastern policy groups in the State Department. In fact I had just then
started to think of asking for a transfer to the State Department. Nor had I
ever given Jaffe any information except Chinese personalities notes of my own
origin. I had. however, noticed that Roth took a strong interest in Jaffe's article
on Mr. Grew: Roth told me that he was working on a book, in which he also
would attack Grew. I personally did not like Mr. Grew's postwar policy, but
1744 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
had nothing to do with it at that time. On his next trip to Washington, .Taffe
invited ruy wife and me out to a Chinese restaurant for dinner and told us that
he was worried over reports that Joseph Grew had been unduly angered by
Jaffe's June article. Jaffe did not explain how he had obtained this informa-
tion, but it had very obviously come to him from someone in the State Depart-
ment. He asked me whether I thought he ought to go and talk to Grew and I
told him that it certainly could do no harm to meet Mr. Grew face to face and
clarify the sorest point in dispute. I understand that Jaft'e did go to see Grew,
who told him that much of what he had written in Amerasia was wrong due to
sheer ignorance of fact ; to which Jaffe had answered that it was regrettable
that not more facts were made available to the press.
Since I severed my connections with the government service, I have been
asked several times by the FBI and members of the congressional committee
investigating the Jaffe case, whether I ever heard Roth discuss secret and con-
fidential matters with Jaffe or whether I ever saw Roth carry out government
documents from the Navy Department I must admit that on the few occasions
that I was together with Roth and Jaffe, I never did hear them discuss anything
that could possibly violate the government's Secrecy Act. Perhaps this discreet
attitude was an act put on specially for my benefit, but that is, of course, purely
conjecture on my part. It is a fact, however, and a very strange one at that,
that after introducing me to Jaffe for' the purpose of exchanging personalities
data. Roth never once asked me how I was getting on with Jaffe or in any other
way even hinted at the matter. As time went by, I thought this strange but
finally put it down as just so much gentleman's and naval officer's discretion
on his part.
As to carying out documents from the Office of Naval Intelligence I can only
say that there existed at that time a sort of caste system, which differed be-
tween officers and civilian experts ; the former wore gold badges which en-
titled them to cary out anything without inspection, whereas the latter wore
green badges and were not permitted to remove any documents from the building.
Therefore, if I wanted to take a voluminous document home and read it over
the week end. I had to ask an officer to carry it out for me and then hand it to
me when we got out of sight of the guards. This was a rather frequent occur-
rence. I would say. and although officers and analysts trusted each other im-
plicity, the usual practice was for an officer to examine the material the civilian
employe was removing temporarily from the premises. Many a time have I
brought home the papers on which I had worked all day and then continued long
into the night with my work at home.
On September 1, 1944, when I was transferred to the State Department, I felt
that nine years with the Navy Department had been pleasant and instructive
I had learned a lot about the merits of the various intelligence systems employed
throughout the world and had developed many improvements of our system ; I
had also brought to a high degree of perfection my personal reference cards on
Chinese leaders and political groups and had presented the Navy with copies of
my most important cards and subsequently built up a separate file especially
adapted for use by the officers of the Intelligence services. I had, however,
reached a grade in my civil-service status beyond which I could not go, and I
was eager to take a hand in the shaping of our policy toward China. My transfer
to the State Department gave me precisely this opportunity; I was attached to
the planning and research unit which was entrusted with the drafting of basic
postwar policy toward China, Japan, Korea, Siam, and the various Far East
dependencies.
Coming from Naval Intelligence, where policy was, perhaps, not always clear-
cut, bul always typically American and largely free from politics, it was amazing
and bewildering to step into State Department and find that there was little
general policy, while every clique and group had its own preconceived policy to
suit its particular political aspirations. There was within the Far Eastern Divi-
si< a a clique generally known as the pro-Japanese faction, although this is
strictly speaking a misnomer, since none of its members were actually pro-Japa-
nese. It was more a case of their being ignorant of the affairs of China and the
psycl ology of the Chinese people and more accustomed to dealing with the Jap-
anese. They were, therefore, suspicious of the Chinese, and favored a strong
postwar Japan as the main stabilizer in Asia rather than a strong China. One
fairly good reason for that was that they feared China would go communistic
and play power politics hand in hand with Soviet Russia against the interests
of the United States. Another, and less well-founded reason, was their fear that
a victorious postwar China, fully emancipated in the family of nations, would be
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1745
a haughty block of 47") millions which would sonic day present a much greater
threat to us than that of which sassy little Japan had been capable. The chief
proponents of this so-called pro-Japanese policy were Joseph Grew, his close
adviser, Eugene Doom#n, and many lesser lights, mostly yes-men, with which
the department is so stuffily packed. Meeting with these men on the policy com-
mittee was often an experience bordering on the farcical; the wording of policy
derisions was often watered down till it became meaningless and valueless ; there
were provisions for this and that to happen or not happen, so that no matter what
happened, our diplomats would be able to wiggle out of what they had meant,
and the same policy would be applicable to diagonally opposite purposes. Per-
haps I am the one who is just ignorant of the ways of diplomacy, but I still have
to see a single instance of good results accruing to this country's foreign rela-
tions from the "slimy" code of diplomacy.
Then there was within the crew on the China Desk a group of men, who
for some reason or other had chosen to champion the cause of the under-
privileged Chinese, as if the latter hadn't been able to take pretty good care
of himself for thousands of years in one of the greatest democracies of all
mankind. Time and space are insufficient in this article to give an outline
of village and other self-government throughout the ages in an ancient de-
mocracy where coolies have risen to rule an empire and where the principal pre-
requisites for advancement were scholarly learning and the respect of the
people. There have, of course, always been tyrants and power politicians who
usurped Ihe power that was not rightfully theirs: we have such men in our
country this very day. But Chinese history and legend alike is rich in stories
of the ultimate downfall of such men who did not live according to the code
of the inherent and truly democratic ethics of the Chinese. And if such men
have come to power in recent times, their downfall is no less certain in a
modern China, where political emancipation and material advancement have
been in geometric progression during the last decades. But the average American
does not realize that China is such a large country with so massive a population,
living on so different a standard, and largely without the means of communica-
tions that we possess, that political advancement to match our standards can-
not be brought about overnight. The period of political tutelage imposed by the
Kuomintang undoubtedly is beginning to seem unduly long to the educated
people of China and must appear horribly long-drawn-out to the average Ameri-
can observer. But the principal gripe of the Chinese masses is one rising out
of economic discontent, and to understand the reasons for the latter one must
take into consideration many, many factors, foremost of which is the terrific
impact of China's head-on collision with the western world barely a hundred
years ago. With the fall of the Manehu empire came fantastic and distorted
ideas of a new freedom. Since the country was — and to a certain extent still
is — divided geographically and dialectic-ally, regional leaders first sprang into
prominence ; their contribution to national advancement and social reform was
erratic and of little value and often a direct deterrent to real progress that
could only come through national unity. Chiang Kai-shek, therefore, held
fanatically to a program of national unification first as the foundation for polit-
ical emancipation. I sincerely believe this policy is correct, and had it not
been for evil foreign influences in China, unification would have been realized
many years ago.
But all this is the problem of the Chinese people, and I cannot see where it
becomes the problem of a few minor career men in the United States Government.
Their functions as servants of this Republic are to maintain smooth and pleasant
relations with the properly constituted and duly recognized foreign governments
with which this Nation comes into contact. Instead they set themselves up as
the reformers of China, critical of every political appointment that Chiang,
as head of the Chinese state, makes from time to time. I can see where the
urgency of the war effort imbued them with the importance of keeping our
ally. China, in the fight, and. undoubetdly, this gave the anti-Kuomintang ele-
ments in our Stare Department a marvellous opportunity to further their par-
tiality to all opponents of the Nationalist government. It tended to unduly
encourage the opposition which, as a result, looked in vain to this country for
the aid that could not possibly be extended to it. Nevertheless, this was wrong
and constituted a betrayal of their duties as diplomats, and I believe it has
done considerable harm to our relations with China as well as to the internal
situation in China. A constant critical attitude, on our part, toward the de jure
government of China, and a consistent flow of moral support to the Communists,
tended to unduly encourage the opposition to our war ally. When Gen. Patrick
1746 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Hurley resigned as Ambassador to China in December, 194.J, he was right when
he charged that members of the "China Group" within the State Department
had deliberately sabotaged his official policy in China.
In the spring of 1945, I was at the height of my activity in research and policy
planning in the State Department. 1 worked hugely on postwar problems of
Manchuria and Korea. My chief was Dr. Blakeslee, and my colleagues were
Dr. Hugh Borton. Mr. Paul Josslyn, now consul-general in Singapore, and Mr.
Robert Feary. Our group in general was conservative and in no way partial to
any particular ideology. We were analysts confronted with problems that had
to be tackled realistically from the point of view of serving the best of American
interests in a postwar world, yet with the greatest possible understanding of
the problems of the people within the countries we dealt with. When we met on
the policy committee, however, we won- scaled around a conference table with
foreign service members of the Japanese and Chinese sections of the Far East
Division. We wrote papers on policy, submitted them to the committee for dis-
cussion, made changes in conformity with motions that were voted on. and
finally filed our completed papers with the higher authorities. In general, the
system was good and the problems were well handled. However, it happened
fairly frequently, especially with papers concerning postwar policy toward China,
that the China group of foreign service officers fought stubbornly against any-
thing that favored the Kuomintang in the slightest. Thus, for instance, before
our forces in the Pacific had launched the attack on Japan proper, and while
it was still generally believed that the China coast was next in line for invasion, a
paper on Manchuria was submitted to the policy committee; the problem was
what we would do with the Manchurian administration if we were to invade
that area and seize it and Chuugking troops would be unable to penetrate Com-
munist-occupied North China and take over Manchuria from us. Were we to sit
tight and govern Manchuria for an indefinite period, or were we to hand it to
any local Chinese faction, even the Communists? The author of the paper was
Mr. Feary, and his proposal was that we ought to hand over Manchuria to the
Chinese Communists if Chiang Kai-shek's troops were not there to take it over
at once. The proposal struck me as outrageous, since wTe had promised China at
the Cairo Conference that Manchuria would revert to China, and by that we
unmistakably had meant to the properly constituted government of China. I
launched the initial protest and obtained sufficient support to defeat the proposal.
Mr. Feary was furious. He was a well-meaning fellow with a good record in the
Embassy in Japan, but he knew nothing about China or Manchuria and had most
likely been strongly influenced by the China group of the foreign service. And
for one who was not really familiar with Chinese affairs, such influence was
almost to be expected, for the officers in the department relied largely on dis-
patches from the held, and the writers of such dispatches, such as John Service,
Emmerson, Davies, and Luddeu, were all violently critical of the Chungking gov-
ernment and full of praise for the Communists and the Democratic League.
Chief believer of these field reporters was John Carter Vincent, then chief of the
China Section in the State Department ami now head of the Far East Division.
After the policy meeting concerning Manchuria, a tall, young foreign service
officer of Scandinavian extraction pulled me aside and warned me in a friendly
way that I would soon get into trouble if 1 opposed the anti-Kuomintang group
in the China Section. This voting man died recently, but long before his death I
had already made a statement to the above effect before the congressional in-
vestigating committee in Washington. Not long after the incident, I met Roth
in the street one day, and he told me that he had heard from a young man
named Friedman that John Carter Vincent suspected me of being "too close to
the Chiang Kai-shek crowd." I resented the remark, since I had never had any-
thing but purely social relations with the Chinese Embassy in Washington, and
1 wondered whether Roth was merely testing me out with a fabricated story or
whether Vincent actually had expressed such suspicion to Friedman. For that
reason I did not take it up with Vincent.
A few days later, some time in the latter part of May. I came home from
office in the afternoon and found Andrew Roth in my apartment, chatting with
my wile. He seemed extremely nervous and told me that he and his wife had
originally intended to meet at our apartment somewhat later for a friendly
chat, but that he had just received some startling news which he was in a
hurry to tell his wife. He said that whereas he had been ordered to Honolulu
by tiie Navy, his instructions had suddenly been cancelled: he expressed the
belief that the Navy had changed its mind about his transfer because of his
book, which he had submitted to the naval authorities for inspection prior to
publication.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1747
Since Roth was early, and didn't know where his wife was shopping, he had
to wait an hour or so. during which time ho had little to say hut continued to
evince considerable uneasiness. Then his charming and talented wife arrived.
happy and smiling, only to become dumbfounded and strangely peeved aboul the
news of the Navy's sudden change of plans. I tried to say something comfort-
ing to her about the Navy prohahly having a better job for him or, perhaps.
wanting merely to postpone his departure for Hawaii until his hook had been
passed, but she brushed my remark aside in a peeved manner that indicated
complete menial preoccupation and fear of some danger. It is possible that
both Andrew and Rene Roth were aware, at that time, that they were being
shadowed: however, they said nothing about it. I myself felt perfectly at ease,
for I was not even faintly aware that I was on the brink of any trouble. Yet
it was not long after that when the sensational "espionage" case broke.
The 6th June, 1!)4.">. was an exceptionally chilly day in Washington. When I
left my office in the State Department, I decided I would walk home. Usually
I did not allow myself this luxury, as I was always in a hurry to get home and
do a few hours' work on my private card Hie.
Ahout seven o'clock. I had just sat down to dinner with my wife, Thelma.
and little daughter, Linda, when there was a knock at the door. I went to
the door and found two men who asked me in a very business-like manner
whether I was Emmanuel S. Larsen, to which I answered in the affirmative.
They immediately stepped into the apartment and informed me that I was
under arrest. I couldn't believe it and asked them if this was some sort of a
joke, but they assured me that it was no joke and that they were agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Naturally I asked them what the charges
were, hut they simply stated that I would find out in due course. In the mean-
time they proceeded to search my apartment from end to end. In a private
filing cabinet they found about 4,000 of my Chinese biographical cards and a
numher of copies of Government documents from various agencies, all dealing
exclusively with Chinese personalities. During the search which lasted till al-
most midnight, I was painstakingly questioned by the agents concerning my
relations with Jaffe and my possible knowledge of and relations with com-
munists and other subversive groups. I made a clean breast of my relations
with Jaffe and had no difficulty in denying that I had ever had any relations
whatsoever with parties advocating the overthrow of our present government
and constitution. I explained that I had. in fact, no experience in or under-
standing of these phases of American politics, except for the few individuals
who appeared to me to he working in favor of the Chinese Communists, and I
knew of them only through my work in the Far Eastern research field. A
female agent had entered the apartment with the others, probably in the ca-
pacity of a stenographer ; she and a male agent kept my wife separated from
me throughout the search. From time to time I saw Thelma seated in the sun
porch with the agents, and it appeared that the stenographer was typing her
answers to questions posed by the agent. On one occasion my wife signalled
to me and asked me if I objected to her making a statement, and I told her
that I had no objections and that she was free to tell all she knew, as I pre-
ferred the truth to be known. My six-year-old daughter had moved about the
apartment for several hours, ignored, distressed, sensing that something was
wrong, and occasionally moving close to me only to press my hand and look
pleadingly up into my eyes. Eventually she had fallen asleep in an easy chair
in the bedroom, her little face pale and her hair in disarray. About midnight,
when the agents prepared to take me away. I was permitted to transfer the
sleeping child to her lied.
I was not handcuffed: merely taken out and placed in a car. There were
several cars lined up on the street outside the apartment, and at the entrance
stood silent and grim agents, all tall, dark and handsome, giving the appearance
of a movie version of the capture of the Touhy gang. In the K Street field
headquarters of the FBI. I was photographed — oh yes, with large numbers on
my chest — then fingerprinted and then grilled again till about three o'clock. By
this time I was terribly exhausted and sleepy. I had suffered from a slight
headache and sore throat that day and had hardly eaten any lunch ; I had walked
home from office and had missed my dinner; furthermore I had been placed in
such mental anguish as does not come to many people in their lives, for in the
K Street building I had been solemnly informed that I was charged with viola-
tion of the espionage act, and remember, there was a war on ! Frankly, I did
not understand what it was all about. On the way to the office of the U. S.
Commissioner. I began to turn the matter over in my mind. Could it be that
1748 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
they arrested ine on an espionage charge because I had been working at home
on copies of official documents? Or was it because I knew Jaffe? And what
was this about Jaffe, seeing that they had asked me so many questions about
my possible knowledge of his political affiliations? Was it possible that I had
been associating with a man who was, perhaps, involved with the Nazis, the
Japanese, or even the Soviet Russians? Of course, there were no answers to
all those questions in my mind, and with the sense of futility comes a strange
inclination to lapse into an apathy. I was in such a condition when I was taken
into the Commissioner's office, and I believe I must have been there for a few
minutes before I suddenly realized that I was sitting next to John Service of
the State Department and Lt. Andrew Roth of the Office Naval Intelligence.
I began to understand things now. My mind became wide awake again. I
knew that Service had known Jaffe, and it dawned on me that here I was, ar-
rested together with every other government employe who had had anything
to do with Jaffe. And then, on the other hand, how could that be? Why did
I not see there Mike Michael Lee and John * Emerson and Franklin Day
and all the other persons Jaffe had spoken of as his friends in Washington? The
whole thing was still a puzz ;j to me. I turned around and asked John Service
in Chinese what it was all about, and he told me very curtly to shut up. When
it came to the arraignment, there was considerable discussion between the FBI
agents and Commissioner Turnage. All the mumble-jumble about article this
and that of espionage act did not seem to convey much to the Commissioner;
at least I heard him say that he still didn't quite understand "what in the hell"
the boys were charged with. There was more explaining on the part of the
agents, and then we were finally asked to stand before the Commissioner and
hear the charge read.
After that, the U. S. Marshal took charge of us, handcuffed us all together and
transported us to the D. C. Jail. It was then about five o'clock in the morning
of the 7th June. On the way to the jail, the radio in the Marshal's car was
blaring forth the news of the arrest of six spies in a sensational conspiracy to
steal secret and vital information from the U. S. government. I was completely
dumbfounded. Upon arrival at the jail, we were ordered to strip off every
stitch of clothing and were then given a cold shower bath. After that, we were
given blue denium prison overalls and our shoes. We were then taken up to
the tiers and locked in individual cells. Neither Roth nor Service had spoken
a word to me ; on the contrary, they had seemed quite hostile to me. I con-
sidered this quite significant and began to review in my mind the time when Roth
came to my desk and asked me out for lunch, and then introduced me to Jaffe.
Now I had heai'd on the radio that the other three arrested were Jaffe, Miss
Kate Mitchell and Mark Gayn. As I lay down on the bed in the cell, shivering
with cold and exhaustion, I took mental stock of the names mentioned. Mark
Gayn I had never met in my life, hadn't even the faintest idea of what he looked
like, so I could not possibly have conspired with him. Kate Mitchell I had met
twice in Jaffe's company, but I had hardly said a word to her and really might
have considered that I did not known her at all. To John Service I had only
spoken twice in my life, once when Mr. Ballantyne introduced me to him in
one of the corridors of the State Department and another time when a group
of "China hands" in the Department went out together for lunch. On both
occasions I had merely said hello and the usual formalities about being glad to
meet him after reading all his reports from China. Then there remained Roth
and Jaffe. With neither of these had I conspired ; if there had been any con-
spiracy, it must have been between Roth and Jaffe and not by me with either
of them. The subsequent events in the preparation of the defense bore this out,
for my attorney found it impossible to get together with the attorneys of the
others involved. Gayn got his attorneys from the paper he worked for in Chi-
cago; Miss Mitchell got her high-powered attorneys from Buffalo, where her
uncle appeared to be prominent and influential ; John Service hired his own at-
torneys and received generous financial aid from the China group of the foreign
service officers in the State Department; Roth's and Jaffe's attorney's worked
together; and my attorney, whom I told I had no money to pay him, took my
en so like a brave soldier, left completely out in the cold by his professional col-
leagues. My attorney was Arthur J. Ililland. a Lutheran of Norwegian extrac-
tion, and a man who has an enviable reputation in the courts of Washington, D. C.
Hilland's first demand on me was that I tell him the truth without concealing
anything and without the slightest deviation from facts. Like Mohandas Gandhi,
who was a practicing lawyer for twenty years in South Africa, Ililland believes
that if you gel your fads straight the law will take care of itself. And when
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1749
Hllland got the facts from me. his next move was to take me straight into the
Justice Department for a conference with Assistant Attorney General Mac-
Inerny, and the prosecuting attorney in the case, Mr. Hitchcock. It was not long
before Hilland and I were invited in for another conference, and then another.
I, on my part, felt that I had nothing to conceal and nothing to worry about.
My principal worry had been my wile's difficulty in raising a $10,000 bail in
order to gel me out of that comfortable D. C. Jail, from which most others
walk out. with or without permission. Over and over we discussed the facts
of the case as far as I knew them, and it became evident to the Justice Depart-
ment that there were no grounds for indicting me on any espionage charges,
and the charges were dropped. A grand jury — before which, for some reason or
other, my attorney advised me not to appear — indicted Jaffe. Roth and me on
charges of removal and possession of official documents, while it completely
cleared Gayn, Mitchell and Service. The Grand Jury proceedings are secret ;
yet it has been reliably reported to me that Service testified before the Grand
Jury that I was the one who had given Jaffe the documents that were found
in his pi ssession. If he said this, it was a lie, and it seems strange that in this
country, where there is supposed to be justice for all, one man can testify
against another without giving the accused an opportunity to defend himself.
Service went scot-free and even received apologies in writing from both Mr.
Joseph Grew and Secretary Byrnes. When I read of this in the papers, I
wanted to confirm my status with the pro-leftist ''China group" in the State
Department ; I called Mr. Drumright on the phone ; Drumright, I would say,
is an excellent diplomat, and as impartial as one could possibly expect an
American official to be; his answer was brief and to the point; all he said was:
"Vincent wouldn't touch you with a ten-foot pole."
That was really all I wanted to know. I was now convinced that John Service,
because of his strong anti-Kuomintang and his pro-Communist leanings, had
received not only financial aid from his friends in the State Department but
also sufficient pull to obtain quick and complete vindication. This seemed en-
tirely unfair to me, because from a word dropped here and a hint there I had
myself come to feel pretty certain that Service, whom Jaffe knew and ad-
mired, was Anierasia's real pipeline from the State Department. I may, of
course, have been wrong in this assumption, for I had no definite proof. There
may have been others, for Jaffe had many contacts throughout the various
government agencies in Washington.
I lay awake nights and hoped for a speedy trial and a real knock-down, drag-
out fight which would bring the real culprits to light. August and September
went by, slowly, painfully. For some five or six weeks I had remained on the
State Department payroll as "on leave with pay" ; now I had passed to the
status of "on leave without pay." I owned a tiny piece of property on the Civil
War battlefield, near Manasses, and I used to go down there every day for weeks
at a time and work like a madman, repairing the little house on it, for no other
purpose than to work up a good sweat and forget my troubles, and at least to
get tired enough to be able to sleep at night.
Then suddenly one day I had a bombshell explode over me in the form of a
news report that Jaffe had pleaded guilty to the possession of government docu-
ments and had been ordered to pay a fine of $2,500. His brief hearing or trial
in court had apparently implicated no one: yet I felt that his small fine, meas-
ured by his plea of guilt, must have been the result of an arrangement. I went
up to the Justice Department for further conferences with Mr. Hitchcock, trying
to sound him out on the matter of whom Jaffe had implicated. Hitchcock was
pressing me hard for some sort of confession so as to get the case over with,
but his attitude was still the same friendly one as from the very start, openly
admitting to me that he did not believe I was guilty of any disloyalty. I, there-
fore, concluded that Jaffe had not implicated me ; and since no other arrests
were made, it seemed that Jaffe, perhaps, had not been made to implicate anyone
in the settlement of his particular case.
The Justice Department felt that they had insufficient evidence against Roth,
while against me they at least had the evidence consisting of documents seized in
my apartment. Technically, therefore, I was guilty of a crime, although this
crime of taking home official documents was being committed daily by alm<><r
every government employee, except, perhaps, those who were more interested in
cocktail parties than their work and completely forcrot the war effort the moment
they left their offices. Mr. Hitchcock, therefore, suggested that if I did not enter
a plea of guilty I might enter a plea of nolo contendere. The idea of this was at
first repulsive to me; I thought I had suffered enough as a result of a humiliating
1750 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
arrest and attending publicity constantly referring to me as a spy. I had
lost my livelihood because of a blunder: if there really was any espionage — and
I don't know even now whether there was or not — then it was most unfortunate
that it was not proven, unfortunate for the welfare of the nation and unfortunate
for me, because I would then have been completely exonerated. I, therefore, felt
that the Justice Department owed me some sort of compensation for charging me
under the espionage laws and then dropping those dreadful charges, and I
thought the minor charges of possessing documents in the best of faith might
conveniently be dropped.
But there just had to be a goat somewhere; I don't usually accept the part
willingly; but it so happened that in October there appeared an article in one
of the Washington papers to the effect that Representative Dondero of Michigan
was about to launch a bill in the house to order an investigation of the "'espionage"
case. 1 sort of welcomed this investigation and felt that it might clear me
completely; but I also realized, since my case had not been settled yet, that an
example might be made of me. I immediately went -to see Mr. Dondero; at first
he was extremely skeptical; but through mutual friends in high places he was
assured that I had never in any way whatsoever been affiliated with communistic
or other subversive activities, either in this country or abroad. Unfortunately.
for the same reason, I was unable to give Mr. Dondero any information that he
wanted about Mr. Jaffe's and Lt. Roth's alleged subversive activities, but I was
able to and willingly did acquaint him with the truth of the "espionage" case
as well as I knew it. After my conversation with Mr. Dondero, I felt that it
would, perhaps, be better to make some sort of a settlement right now, before
he let go his blast in the House. I told my attorney that I was in favor of
entering a plea of nolo contendere and. at the worst, pay some sort of a small tine.
He was against it in principle and was all for righting the case to the bitter
end. even if we had to go to the supreme court. But he argued that if that
was the way I felt, and my wife agreed with me, then he would make no
objections and would help me see it through as well as he could manage it. That
same night we informed the Justice Department that I was ready to enter the
plea of nolo contendere. The following day I requested Secretary Byrnes to
allowT me to resign from my position in the State Department, and the answer
came through with my resignation accepted "for personal reasons." A few days
later, on the second of November 1945, I went before Judge Proctor in the U. S.
Court for the District of Columbia. The Justice Department's attorney. Mr.
Hitchcock, told the court that he was convinced there had been no disloyalty on
my part and that he. therefore, recommended a small fine. The court fixed the
tine at $500; and with the knowledge and consent of the Justice Department, the
fine was paid immediately by an attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Jaffe ; the
same attorney likewise reimbursed me for bond expenses and my own attorney's
fees. !
When I walked out of that courtroom into the sunshine and fresh autumn
bn eze, I felt like a free man again, yet I could not get away from the smarting
stigma of the fine. I couldn't help brooding over this for a few days. Then my
mother, who had been hospitalized in Washington with a broken leg since
August 9, came home to our apartment, and all of a sudden we were busy with
preparations for a trip by car to Florida, to bring mother back to her home in
St. Petersburg. From there, my wife and I and our little daughter visited Miami
for the first time in our lives. We stayed 10 days in a hotel right on the beach,
and at no time have ever loafed so luxuriously, without a care in the world, for
a brief spell.
On the morning of one of our last days in Miami, the papers brought news of
Pat Hurley's resignation as Ambassador to China and his indignant outburst
against the persons in the State Department who, he claimed, had sabotaged
his important work in China.
I sympathized with Hurley in his indignation and knew there were sound
reasons for it. because I had seen a good deal of what was tiding on in the Far
Fast division of the State Department. His indignation was over the cross
purposes to which he and the members of his staff were working in China. His
instructions and the United States policy, at the time of his departure for Chung-
king, were to bring the Kuomintang and the Communists together, in order to
prevent the Allied war effort from being jeopardized on the Asiatic mainland.
His modus operandi was fairly simple; by sheer personality he was to get the
two parties first to agree that they would agree, and then, by maintaining a
reserved but correct attitude toward the Reds, he was to make it clear that the
United States, in war plans and operations alike, intended to deal solely with
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1751
the Nationalist government, to which he had been accredited. The effect of this
on the Communists was calculated to discourage them in any hopes for further
m<>r;il support from official or private elements in the United States ami make
if clear that United States military supplies could not he given to Red units even
for the purpose of fighting the Japanese as long as the Communist Army remained
independent of the Kuomintang and in open rebellion against it.
But when Hurley arrived in China, he found himself surrounded by State
Department field officers who resented the intrusion of a noncareer man and
who. furthermore, had come to admire the Chinese Communists, among whom
they had lived as observers over long- periods. These field officers probably
never at any time made any openly and admittedly hostile move against Hurley
and his policy through the official correspondence channels, although the latter
constituted their principal means of opposing him. But in the course of their
relations with, and their interviewing, of Communist leaders, they showed sym-
pathy with the Red cause in China by listening attentively to all the anti-
Kuomintang gripes and reporting them faithfully and painstakingly to the
Department, with personal assurances that the information was reliable. They
also discussed with the Communist leaders the possibilities and probabilities of
the supplying of United States military aid to the Communist forces in the coastal
provinces in the event of an Allied landing in Japanese-occupied China. The
effect of all this was. of course, to encourage the Communists in their alternative
of holding out against Chiang's government rather than getting together with
the Kuomingtang in a wholehearted anti-Japanese war effort and the formulation
of a new Chinese constitution. Thus Hurley's strenuous attempts at mediation
were made of no avail — in fact they were wilfully sabotaged. And hack in the
State Department, his reports were discredited by John Carter Vincent and his
crew. These men often expressed openly their hatred of Hurley and discussed
means of getting him out of the ambassadorship.
I do not have the documentary evidence, and feel certain that nothing would
he made available to me on request, since even Hurley was denied the use of the
Department's files when he wanted to testify before the United States legislature.
But I do have a fairly good recollection of some of the outstanding reports and
attached comments that would bear me out in my contention that Hurley's
assistants in China sympathized so openly with the Reds and were so consistently
critical of the de jure Chungking government — to which they had been officially
accredited — thac they did considerable harm to our good relations with China.
One of the pet themes of the field officers was the question of whether the
Chinese Communists had any liaison with Soviet Russia. Over and over again
it was reiterated that the Chinese Communist Party was divided into three fac-
tions, (a) the political faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, (b) the army faction,
headed by Chu Te, and (c) the International or pro-Soviet faction headed by
the soldier poet Ch'en Shao-yu (better known by his pen-name Wang Ming) : anil
it was unmistakable in all reports, as late as 1944 and 1945, that Wang Ming's
pro-Soviet faction had lost its influence since the alleged dissolution of the Rus-
sion Third Internale. Chou En-lai, the Communist representative in Chungking,
late in 1944, went out of his way to stress the point to one of our observers that
whereas we here in America thought the Chinese Communists had close liaison
with Moscow, this was, in fact, untrue, since there were no representatives of
the Chinese Reds in Moscow. This was faithfully reported, without any com-
ments indicating doubt of the truth of Chou's statement: yet only four months
later it was confirmed that for years one of the Communists' earliest leaders, Li
Li-san, had been living in Moscow as liaison officer and that radio communica-
tions with Moscow did exist and that three Russians in Yenan were responsible
for the functioning of the radio equipment.
A mystery closely associated with liaison was that of actual Soviety aid to
the Chinese Communists. It has been steadfastly denied by anti-Kuomintang
publishers that aid of any sort was rendered in recent years. Yet I remember
distinctly that in the early part of 1944, when the "Kazak incident" occurred in
the Altai region of Sinkiang province, it was generally known, and it was duly
reported by one of the department's field officers that Soviet Russia was involved.
The Kuomintang armies were at that time surrounding the Communist forces in
Shensi and Kansu, and it appeared that Russia engineered the Kasak revolt in
order to draw Nationalist troops into Sinkiang and thus relieve the pressure
on the Chinese Communists. These are the things the American public has never
been allowed to know.
About the same time, namely early in 1944. there was wide speculation in Allied
Councils as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war or not in Asia. Dr.
1752 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister in Chungking, told an official of this country that
he was convinced that when Germany was defeated, the Russians would attack
Japan, but that the mode and locality of their offensive would be for the sole
purpose of serving communistic interests in Asia. Soong warned us that our real
headaches would then commence. Officers in the China Section of the State De-
partment discredited this warning and preferred to believe the Communists who
contended that they were in no way receiving the support of Russia ; they also
preferred to believe John Davies who reported that the Chinese Communist Party
was dominated by a faction with a non-Russian orientation . And finally, as late
■as the spring of 1945, when Ambassador Harriman returned from Moscow to
Washington, they preferred not to believe him when he reported that, in his
opinion, Soviet Russia would support the Chinese Communists in the event of
Russo-Japanese hostilities in Asia.
The best evidence, however, that the "non-Russian orientation" story was
clever propaganda, is the record of Communist military success in Manchuria
since the entry of Russian forces into that territory-, and particularly since their
withdrawal northward. The American public must surely have read and under-
stood that Japanese munitions, seized by the Russians, were allowed to fall into
the hands of the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria who robbed China of her
principal war prize, namely the return of 40 million Chinese citizens to Chinese
central government control.
One of my principal objections is to the manner in which our diplomatic field
officers have conducted themselves in China by appearing overzealous in their
willingness to listen to and report the most long-winded expressions of discontent
on the part of anti-Kuomintang elements, while they have hardly ever bothered
to record any of the Kuomintang's arguments against its opponents. I remember
how our Consul in Kweilin interviewed General Li Chi-shen on the subject of
the Democratic League, and then waxed hot in his report in an effort to faithfully
impress the Department with all the abuses that General Li had heaped upon
the Chungking government. It appeared strange to me that a United States
official should have seen fit to be receptive to such violent criticism of the regime
to which he was accredited. These field officers seemed to believe anything that
the Communists told them. Thus, just as John Davies believed that the Com-
munists had a non-Russian orientation, John Service tried hard to convince Wash-
ington that the Communists were pursuing a policy of avoidance of civil war.
I remember that Ambassador Gauss did not quite subscribe to this and argued
that the steady expansion of Communist fortifications showed that the Reds
intended to take over control of all China. And I also recollect that in trying to
discredit Ambassador Gauss's analysis of the Communist-Kuomintang dispute,
Mr. Vincent suggested that it was rather the failure of the Kuomintang to enlist
popular enthusiasm for the reforms championed by the Communists that was
largely responsible for the present difficulties in China.
The "Democratic League" was represented in official dispatches as a moderately
liberal political organizatizon although there were rumuors that many of its
members in the working committees were communists. Because this organization
did not openly declare itself a 100 percent for the Chinese Communist pro-
gram, its members were able to operate throughout Nationalist China. In the
latter part of 1944, General Chu Te told John Service that he thought the Demo-
cratic League was an organization determined to introduce some good reforms but
that he did not believe the movement would amount to much and particularly
that it would not denounce the Kuomintang government. This was indeed a
strange statement to forward to Washington without comments, since we were
daily reading other reports of the League's regular denouncements of Chiang and
his government and for its plans for the overthrow of the Kuomintang. And
when the Communist representative arrived in Chungking on the 24th January,
1945, to present Yenan's proposals to Ambassador Hurley, it was made quite clear
by the Communists that the Democratic League was to be included in a confer-
once of all parties. Thus the Communists had suddenly come out strong for the
League, yet I failed to see within the ensuing months any report on this important
change in the League's political affiliations.
TYPICAL CASE OF BIASED REPOUTING
The encouragement, extended to the Chinese Communists by our officials and
writers, was such that the Reds in China, at the time of our 1944 Presidential
election, declared they would sit back and wait for greater United States pressure
on the Kuomintang. The two southern cities of Kweilin and Liuchow, where the
United States Army maintained large airbases, where then being attacked by the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1753
Japanese, and Communist Chou said openly that if Chiang's armies couldn't hold
back the Japanese, and these two cities were lost, he was sure the United States
would put some real pressure on the Kuomintang.
It was obvious from the reports that our officials in the field had given the Com-
munists to understand that wherever American military action was contemplated
in China. Communist forces would be utilized if Nationalist forces were not on
the spot at the time of operations. Secretary Ludden of our Embassy in Chung-
king reported at the end of the year L944 that in certain areas the Communists
were then well organized and ready for action against the Japanese "when cir-
cumstances and equipment permit." It must be remembered that, at the time,
Ambassador Hurley was trying hard to discourage the Communists from too
strong a stand; yet morale boosting encouragement appeared to flow from the
United States to Yenan through a number of secret channels, and the anti-Kuomin-
tang clique in the China section of the State Department was able to see its views
on their enemy Hurley well expressed when the Communist newspaper "Hsin
Hua Jib I'ao" in Chungking said :
"We deeply regret the statements, made by General Hurley as he does not
understand the popular demand for democracy. * * * And if the United
States fails to supply the strongest Chinese forces — the Communists — with arms,
the war will be prolonged and losses increased. We are of the opinion that
General Hurley will aggravate disruption, promote civil war and postpone
victory."
Exhibit No. 90
[From the New York Times, Tuesday, October 31, 1944]
Alius Herd 40,000 Nazis Toward Meuse ; 3 Japanese Cruisers Bombed at
Manila; Stilwell Recall Bakes Rift With Chiang — Long Schism Seen —
Stilwell Break Stems Fkom Chiang Refusal to Press War Fully — Peace
With Reds Barred — Generalissimo Regards Their Armies Fighting Japa-
nese as Threat to His Rule
The following account of the recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell is by the
Chungking correspondent of the New Y'ork Times, who has just returned
to this country. It was delayed and finally cleared by the War Depart-
ment censorship in Washington.
' (By Brooks Atkinson)
Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, relieved of his command in China, Burma, and India,
before leaving Chungking on October 21 made a final swift tour of some of the
military bases in his command and then flew directly toward Washington in his
silver-colored transport plane facetiously dubbed "Uncle Joe's chariot."
For the last two months negotiations had been going on between President
Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalis-
simo ( !hiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese ground
and air forces under the Generalissimo and to increase China's participation in
the counteroffensive against Japan.
Although the Generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's
appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American
commander except General Stilwell.
pressed for reform
His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At
a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang (National party)
Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal
ultimatum to Amercans who were pressing him for military and governmental
reform.
He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-
lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced
by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese
Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go
back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor.
President Roosevelt agreed to the Generalissimo's demand for General Stil-
well's recall. Dividing the huge China-Burma-India war sector in two, the War
Department appointed Maj. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of
1754 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Commander of United States Army
Forces in China and Lieut. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan. General Stilwell's Chief of
Staff in India, as Commander of United States Army Forces in India and Burma.
After a career of more than twenty years largely devoted to military affairs
in China and two years and eight months as commander of the United States
Army Forces in China, Burma and India and as Allied Chief of Staff to the
Generalissimo, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell has now concluded a busy and constantly
frustrated attempt to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat
efficiency of the Chinese forces.
Uncle Joe speaks Chinese. He knows more about China than most foreigners.
He is more intimately acquainted with the needs and capacities of the Chinese
Army than the Generalissimo and Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War and
Chief of Staff, because he has repeatedly heen in the field with the troops.
He is commonly regarded as the ahlest field commander in China since "Chi-
nese" Gordon. The second retreat with Stiwell seemed the final one. It was
not from the enemy hut from an ally.
The decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications for
China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in the
Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to dis-
count China's part in a counter-offensive.
Inside China it represents the political triumph of a moribund anti-democratic
regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in
driving the Japanese out of China. America is now committed at least passively
to supporting a regime that has become increasingly unpopular and distrusted in
China, that maintains three secret police services and concentration camps for
political prisoners, that stifles free speech, and resists democratic forces.
THE MAIN DIFFEEEN* E
The fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell
has been that the latter has been eager to fight the Japanese in China without de-
lay and the Generalissimo has hoped that he would not have to.
In no other way is it possible to understand the long series of obstructions and
delays that have made it impossible for General Stilwell to fulfill his original
mission of equipping and training the "unlimited manpower" resources of the
Chinese Army.
The Generalissimo has one positive virtue for which America is now indebted :
he has never made peace with the Japanese, although there have been times
when his Ministers thought the future looked hopeless. But the technique of pre-
serving his ticklish balance of political power in China keeps him a passive man.
Although he is the acknowledged leader of China, he has no record of personal
military achievement and his basic ideas for political leadership are those of a
war lord. He conceives of armies as political forces.
In an enormous, loosely strung country populated chiefly by ignorant peasantry
he maintains his authority by preventing any group from becoming too power-
ful. A few well-equipped armies under a command not entirely loyal to him
personally might upset the military and political balance inside China and curtail
Ids authority.
The Chinese Communists, whom the generalissimo started trying to liquidate
in 1927, have good armies that are now fighting guerrilla warfare against the
Japanese in northeast China. The generalissimo regards these armies as the
chief threat to his supremacy. For several years he has immobilized ?>00,000 to
500,000 (no one knows just how many) Central Government troops to blockade
the Communists and keep them from expanding.
Distrusting the Communists, the generalissimo has made no sincere attempt to
arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war. The generalis-
simo's regime, based on the support and subservience of General Ho. Dr. H. H.
Rung, .Minister of Finance, and Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, has re-
mained fundamentally unchanged over a long period and has become bureaucratic,
inefficient, and corrupt.
Most of the armies are poorly fed and shockingly maltreated. In some parts
of the country the peasants regard the armies as bandits and thieves. In Honan
last Spring tiie peasants turned against the Chinese armies during the Japanese
offensive in revenge for the ruthlessness with which the armies collected rice
during the famine years.
.oost of China's troubles now are the result of her having been at war with
.Japan for more than seven years and totally blockaded for two and one-half.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1755
The reason nothing is done to alleviate the miseries is that the generalissimo
is determined to maintain his group of aging reactionaries in power until the
war is over, when, it is commonly believed, he will resume his war against the
Chinese Communists without distraction.
Bewildered ami alarmed by the rapidity with which China is now falling apart,
he feels secure only with associates who obey him implicitly. His rages become
more and more ungovernable and attack the symptoms rather than the causes
of China's troubles.
ACQUIESCENCE IN REGIME
Since the negotiations with General Hurley began the generalissimo's attitude
toward America has become more resentful and Amercian criticisms of China
is hotly rebuked. Relieving General Stilwell and appointing a successor has the
effect of making us acquiesce in an unenlightened, cold-hearted autocratic political
regime.
Into this stagnant, baleful atmosphere General Stilwell came in February 1942,
animated by the single idea of righting the Japanese immediately. Like most
foreigners who know the Chinese people, he loved them, for they are the glory
of China. From long experience Stilwell had great confidence in the capacities
of the Chinese soldiers, who even then were fighting on nothing.
In November 1941 the Magruder Military Mission had already made an
agreement with the generalissimo to train and equip the Chinese Army on the
theory that it would then become unnecessary to ship thousands of doughboys
to Ogh< on Chinese soil. The war in China was initially handicapped by the
decision to fight Germany first and Japan second. General Stilwell was never
able to get 1 percent of the American Army for use in his C-B-I theatre and
was never able to get all the equipment he has wanted, because it has always
been needed elsewhere.
On March 3, 1942, less than a month after he had arrived in China. General
Stilwell was plunged into the calamitous Burma campaign without notice.
He had to return to Chungking to induce the generalissimo to come to the front
to vest him with sufficient authority to command the troops.
Even then the command was never secure or efficient. There were other
troubles. At a time when the troops needed transport, most of China's trucks
were hauling civilian loot out of Burma up the road into China, where goods
were worth huge sums of money.
When at last Stilwell got out of Burma into India he did persuade the gen-
eralissimo to let him feed, train, and equip the Chinese soldiers who finally
arrived. After training of a year and a half, those soldiers were the backbone
of the Chinese divisions who got Myitkyina back last August and are uow pushing
toward Bhaino to free the Burma road. Inside China everything Stilwell has
tried to do has been obstructed and delayed.
The generalissimo and his staff, like the United States Air Force, which they
get free and which asks for nothing except food and airfields, which we equip
with buildings and installations. But the Chinese Government hedges and hesi-
tates over anything involving the use of its armies. Foreigners can only conclude
that the Chinese Government wants to save its armies to secure its political
power after the war.
A nervous and driving field officer who is impatient with administrative
details and political tangles, General Stilwell is no diplomat. He goes straight
to the point in his dealings with anybody. He is plain and salty. He is per-
sonally incapable of assuming a reverential mood toward the generalissimo,
and he is impatient with incompetent meddling in military command. Although
General Stilwell is anything but arrogant, the generalissimo complained that
the American was trying to subjugate him.
But with the situation in China as it is, no diplomatic genius could have
overcome the generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle
with the Japanese. Amid the intrigue and corruption of China's political and
military administration. General Stilwell has been a lone man trying to follow
orders, improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, force open the Burma
Road, and get China back into the war.
Now he has been forced out of China by the political system that has been
consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system that is undemo-
cratic in spirit as well as fact, and is also unrepresentative of the Chinese people.
who are good allies.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 18
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
News Publishing Co.,
Wheeling, W. Va., March 25, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : The matter of the controversy which has arisen over the
Wheeling Intelligencer's report of Senator McCarthy's speech in Wheeling has
come to my attention.
I do not approve of the manner in which it has been handled. Our newspapers
have no desire to become involved in a political controversy. Our only interest
is in accurate reporting, and there is no reason why we should withhold any in-
formation concerning the authenticity of stories appearing in our columns.
I have today talked with Mr. Frank Desmond, the reporter who wrote the
story in question. He tells me there can be no doubt that Senator McCarthy
did use the figure "205" in referring to his list of men in the State Department
who have been named as members of the Communist Party, and members of a
spy ring.
We, of course, have no knowledge as to the accuracy of the figure. As I have
stated above we are only interested in the fact that our reporting was accurate.
Very truly yours,
Austin V. Wood.
[From the Wheeling (W. Va.) Intelligencer, Friday, February 10, 1950]
McCarthy Charges Reds Hold United States Jobs — Truman Blasted for
Reluctance To Press Probe — Wisconsin Senator Tells Lincoln Fete Here
"Chips Down"
(By Frank Desmond of the Intelligencer staff)
Joseph McCarthy, junior United States Senator from Wisconsin, was given
a rousing ovation last night when, as guest of the Obio County Republican
Women's Club, he declared bluntly that the fate of the world rests with the clash
between the atheism of Moscow and the Christian spirit throughout other parts
of the world.
More than 275 representative Republican men and women were on hand to
attend the colorful Lincoln Day dinner of the valley women which was held in the
Colonnade Room of the McLure Hotel.
Disdaining any oratorical fireworks, McCarthy's talk was of an intimate, homey
nature, punctuated at times with humor.
But on the serious side, he launched many barbs at the present set-up of the
State Department, at President Truman's reluctance to press investigation of
"traitors from within," and other pertinent matters.
He said that recent incidents which brought traitors to the limelight is the
result of an emotional hangover and a temporary moral lapse which follows
every war. However, lie added :
"The morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist and this
cloak of numbness and apathy needs only a spark to rekindle them."
Referring directly to the State Department, he declared :
"While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State Department
who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a
spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary
of State as being members of the Communist Party and who. nevertheless, are
still working and shaping the policy in the State Department."
1756
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1757
The speaker dwelt at length on the Alger Hiss case and mentioned the names
of several others who, during the not so many years, were found to entertain
subversive ideas hut were still given positions of high trust in the Government.
"As you hear of this (Hiss) story of high treason," he said, "I know that you
are saying to yourself — well, why doesn't Congress do something about it?
"Actually, ladies and gentlemen, the reason Cor the graft, the corruption, the
disloyalty, the treason iu high Government positions — the reason this continues
is because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 14(),U30,000 American
people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.
"It is the result of an emotional hangover and a temporary moral lapse which
follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected
to the tremendous evils of war feel.
"As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless
and innocent people and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war,
they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war."
At another time, he declared :
"Today, we are engaged in a final all-out battle between communistic atheism
and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as
the time and, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down — they are truly down."
In an informal quiz with his audience, the Senator answered a number of
questions dealing mostly with the plan of Secretary of Agriculture Brannan to
destroy millions of tons of potatoes, eggs, butter, and fruits; he gave forth-right
views on the old-age and social-security problems and a number of other topics.
McCarthy was introduced by William Callahan, executive director of the Ohio
Valley Republican organization. Mrs. Eherhard, president of the women's group,
presided, while program director, Mrs. Robert J. Harshman, introduced Calla-
han. State Senator William Hannig led the group singing.
The invocation was delivered by the Reverend Philip Goertz, pastor of the
Second Presbyterian Church, and the benediction was pronounced by the Reverend
W. Carroll Thorn, of St. Luke's Episcopal Church.
Senator McCarthy arrived by Capital Airlines at the Stifel airport late yester-
day afternoon and was greeted by former Congressman Francis J. Love and
Tom Sweeney, Jr., who drove him to the Fort Henry Club.
[From the Nevada State Journal (Reno), February 12, 1950]
McCarthy Blasts State Department — Senator Teles Repi'Bltcans Acheson's
Staff is Full of Traitors
(By Edward Conners)
Senator Joseph A. McCarthy of Wisconsin last night indicted the Democratic
State Department as full of traitors and dubbed Dean Acheson's defense of
Alger Hiss in his reference to the Sermon on the Mount as one of the greatest
blasphemies in history.
The ex-Marine, who has been a thorn in the side of the Truman administration
ever since his whirlwind campaign and election from Wisconsin after being dis-
charged from the service in 1945, told more than 400 Nevada Republicans last
night in the Mapes Hotel that democracy is being sold out from within —
especially within one of our most vital governmental functions, the State
Department.
Last night's crowded banquet room was filled with Republicans from through-
out Nevada observing the birthday of Abraham Lincoln, the founder of their
party and to hear one of the more aggressive and progressive national leaders.
communists
Senator McCarthy, who was introduced to the mixed crowd of both Bourbons
and interested citizens from all sections of Nevada, cautiously referred to mem-
bers of the State Department staff in the light of being out-and-out Communists
but left no doubt in the minds of the audience as to their absolute loyalty to
the United States Government and democracy.
Warming up to the subject he chose as his theme last night the Senator startled
many of the already stern faces among the audience with a resume of the Com-
munist program to dominate the world and made his declaration that two such
1758 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
world-apart ideologies as communism and democracy evidently cannot exist in
the world as it is today.
He said that two vast camps are indulging in a great armament race but that
i he "mad moment has not yet arrived for civilization to destroy itself."
But that the crucial moment in the world's history is at hand and that civiliza-
tion as we know it today is squaring off for "a show-down tight," was a point the
Wisconsin solon drove home to his audience last night.
In referring to Acheson's blasphemy, Senator McCarthy said that the stand
taken by the Secretary of State could well be the spark that "would sweep from
power the intellectuals" who have sold out to the Communists.
Following Alger Hiss* sentence to Federal penitentiary for a ."-year term. Ache-
son made the voluntary statement to the press that he would "not turn his back"'
on his former staff member and in explaining his loyalty to the convicted Fed-
eral official, he referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount in which he did not
quote the passage directly but implied that he was, only following the admonition
laid down in the ageless Sermon.
FIFTY-SEVEN CAKD CARRIERS
Senator McCarthy, who had first typed a total of 205 employees of the State
Department who could be considered disloyal to the United States and pro-
Communists scratched out that number and mentioned only "57 card-carrying
members," whom Acheson should know as well as Members of Congress.
He did not divulge the names of any of the 57, but dispatched a lengthy
telegram to President Truman yesterday morning asking that each of those
known to Congress to be pro-Communist and now employed by the State Depart-
ment be exposed and expelled.
However, he did refer to at least four ex-members of the State Department
who are still in positions of national and international responsibility and whose
loyalties are very much in doubt.
They include John W. Service, who, Senator McCarthy said, declared that
"communism is the only hope of China," while he was serving in China for the
United States Government.
CHALLENGED
"This same man," who the Wisconsin Republican said was tossed out by Am-
bassador Joseph Grew and then reinstated by Acheson after his recommendation
for China, "is now on his way to Calcutta, India, to help shape and determine
Indian policy" as far as American foreign policy is concerned.
Officials of the State Department in Washington, D. C, yesterday challenged
Senator McCarthy to divulge the names of the 57 "card-carrying Communists"
now in the employ of the State Department, and the Wisconsin solon indicated
before he reached Reno that he might do it.
Last night, however, he named, in addition to Sex*vice, Gustavo Duran, Mrs.
Mary Kenny, and Harlow Shapley, none of whom he referred to as Communists
but whose activities and loyalties he questioned and all of whom were given a
clear bill of lading by the Senator's chief target in last night's speech, Dean
Acheson, Secretary of State.
He referred to the screening board which President Truman set up as a se-
curity measure against Communist infiltration into high Government offices and
made pointed remarks that of 300 that this board certified for discharge from
their positions, Acheson fired only 80 of them, the Senator declared.
Affidavit of Paul A. Myers
To Whom It Man Concern:
State oe West Virginia,
County of Ohio, to wit:
This day Paul A. Myers, personally appeared before me Lucille M. Bock, a
notary public of said county, and being by me first duly sworn says:
As program director of radio station WWYA. I read the attached 13-page
speech script before it was delivered by Senator Joseph .McCarthy on February
9, 1950. I reviewed our tape recording of the delivered speech before WWVA
broadcast it on the same evening and again reviewed it, against the script, on
the following day. 1 certify that the tape recording was the same as the
- iTE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1759
attached script with the exception of interpolations and connective wonts, such
as a's, ;!i)d .-hhI's. and the's, which to my way of thinking did not materially
change the meaning of the text.
1 have initialed each page Of the attached photostatic copy Of Senator Mc-
Carthy's speech.
Paul A. Meyers.
Taken, subscribed, and sworn to before me this the 25th day of April 1950.
[seal] Lucille M. Bock.
My commission expires February 3, 1052.
I. allies and gentlemen, tonight as we celebrate the one hundred forty-first birth-
day of one of the greatest men in American history, I would like to be able to talk
about what a glorious day today is in the history of the world. As we celebrate
the birth of this man who with his whole heart and soul hated war, I would
like to be able to speak of peace in our time — of war being outlawed — and of
world-wide disarmament. These would be truly appropriate things to be able to
mention as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.
Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a
long peace — and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes
with war. But this is not such a period — for this is not a period of peace. This
is a time of "the cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two
vast, increasingly hostile, armed camps — a time of a great armament race.
Today we can almost physically hear the mutterings and rumblings of an
invigorated god of war. You can see it, feel it, and hear it all the way from
the Indochina hills, from the shores of Formosa, right over into the very heart
of Europe itself.
The one encouraging thing is that the "mad moment" has not yet arrived
for the firing of the gun or the exploding of the bomb which will set civilization
about the final task of destroying itself. There is still a hope for peace if we
finally decide that no longer can we safely blind our eyes and close our ears to
those facts which are shaping up more and more clearly * * * and that
is that we are now engaged in a show-down fight * * * not the usual war
between nations for land areas or other material gains, but a war between two
diametrically opposed ideologies.
The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic
Communist world is not political, gentlemen, it is moral. For instance, the
Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire
economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin's invention of the
one-party police state as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less
momentous.
Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to divide
the world. With only these differences, however, the east and the west could
most certainly still live in peace.
The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism * * *
invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable
extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world
triumphs — and well it may, gentlemen — this religion of immoralism will more
deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political
system.
Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in clear-
cur, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who believe
in a god, can exist side by side with their communistic state.
Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for
mentioning such things as love, justice, humanity or morality. He called this
"soulful ravings" and "sloppy sentimentality."
While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late thirties, Karl Marx
boasted that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time,
hundreds of millions of people and vast areas of the world have come under
Communist domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin
brags that this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about
to completely subjugate it.
Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism
and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as
the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down — they are truly down.
Lest there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly to
the leader of communism today — Joseph Stalin. Here is what he said — not back
1760 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in 1928, not before the war, not during the war — but 2 years after the last war
was ended : "To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out peace-
fully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has either
gone out of one's mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly and
openly repudiated the Communist revolution."
This is what was said by Lenin in 1919 — and quoted with approval by Stalin
in 1947 :
"We are living," says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but in a system of states,
and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for
a long time is unthinkable * * *. One or the other must triumph in the
end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between
the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.''
Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to
say that the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to realize that
the Communist world has said the time is now? * * * that this is the time
for the show-down between the democratic Christian world and the communistic
atheistic world?
Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those
who wait too long.
Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peacef
there was within the Soviet orbit, 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the anti-
totalitarian side there were in the world at that time, roughly 1,625,000,000
people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 80,000,000,000 people under the
absolute domination of Soviet Russia — an increase of over 400 percent. On our
side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000. In other words, in less than 6
years, the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us.
This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American
defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said,
"When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be from enemies from without,
but rather because of enemies from within."
The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this
country each day losing on every front.
At war's end we were physically the strongest nation on earth * * * and at
least potentially the most powerful intellectually and morally. Ours could
have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction * * *
shining proof that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortu-
nately, we have failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.
The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our
only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores * * * but
rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well
by this Nation. It has not been the 1<jss fortunate, or members of minority
groups who have been traitorous to this Nation * * * but rather those
who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had
to offer * * * the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest
jobs in government we can give.
This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men
who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been
most traitorous.
Now I know it is very easy for anyone to condemn a particular bureau or de-
partment in general terms. Therefore, I would like to cite some specific cases.
When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in
China a young man named John Service. His task, obviously, was not to work
for communization of China. However, strangely, he sent official reports back
to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek * * *
and stating in unqualified terms (and I quote) that "communism was the only
hope of China."
Later, this man — John Service — and please remember that name, ladies and
gentlemen, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning
over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, how-
ever, he was never prosecuted. However, John Grew, the Under Secretary of
State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after,
his successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State. This man,
John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged
that communism was the only hope of China, was not only reinstated in the
State Department, but promoted * * * and finally, under Acheson, placed
in charge of all placements and promotions. Today, ladies and gentlemen, this
man Service is on his way to represent the State Department and Acheson in
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1761
Calcutta, by far and away the most important listening post in the Far East.
That's one case. Let"s go to another — Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as (I
quote) "a notorious international Communist," was made assistant to the Assist-
ant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs. He was taken into
the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Communist
International Brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure and criti-
cism, he resigned in 194G from the State Department. And, ladies and gentle-
men, where do you think he is now? He took over a high-salaried job, as Chief
of Cultural Activities Section in the office of the Assistant Secretary General of
the United Nations. •
Then there was a Mrs. Mary Jane Kenney, from the Board of Economic War-
fare in the State Department, who was named in a FBI report and in a House
committee report as a courier for the Communist Party while working for the
Government. And where do you think Mrs. Mary Jane is — she is now an editor
in the United Nations Document Bureau.
Then there was Julian H. Wadleigh, economist in the Trade Agreements Section
of the State Department for 11 years. And who was sent to Turkey and Italy
and other countries as United States representative. After the statute of limi-
tations had run so he could not be prosecuted for treason, he openly and brazenly
not only admitted but proclaimed that he had been a member of the Communist
Party * * * that while working for the State Department he stole a vast
number of secret documents * * * .and furnished these documents to the
Russian spy ring of which he was a part.
And, ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men
in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Com-
munist Party and members of a spy ring. I have here in my hand a list of
205 * * * a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State
as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still work-
ing and shaping policy in that State Department.
One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is
that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blue-
prints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity
because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.
In that connection I would like to read to you very briefly from the testimony
of Larry E. Kerley, a man who was with the Counterespionage Section of the
FBI for 8 years. And keep in mind as I read this to you that at the time he is
speaking there was in the State Department Alger Hiss (the convicted traitor),
John Service (the man whom the FBI picked up for espionage), Julian Wadleigh
(who brazenly admitted he was a spy and wrote newspaper articles in regard
thereto).
Here is what the FBI man said : "In accordance with instructions of the State
Department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI was not even per-
mitted to open an espionage case against any Russian suspect without State
Department approval."
And some further questions :
Mr. Arens. "Did the State Department ever withhold from the Justice De-
partment the right to intern suspects?"
Kerley. "They withheld the right to get out process for them which, in effect,
kept them from being arrested, as in the case of Schevchenko and others."
Arens. "In how many instances did the State Department decline to permit
process to be served on Soviet agents?"
Kerley. "Do you mean how many Soviet agents were affected?"
Arens. "Yes."
Kerley. "That would be difficult to say because there were so many people
connected in one espionage ring, whether or not they were directly conspiring
with the ring."
Arens. "Was that order applicable to all persons?"
Kerley. "Yes, all persons in the Soviet espionage organization."
Arens. "What did you say the order was as you understood it or as it came
to you?"
Kerley. "That no arrests of any suspects in the Russian espionage activities
in the United States were to be made without the prior approval of the State
Department."
Now the reason for the State Department's opposition to arresting any of this
spy ring is made rather clear in the next question and answer.
Senator O'Connor. "Did you understand that that was to include also Ameri-
can participants?"
1762 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Kerley. "Yes, because if they were arrested that would disclose the whole
apparatus, you see."
In other words they could not afford to let the whole rang which extended to
the State Department, be shown.
This brings us down to the case of one Algier Hiss who is important not as an
individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group in the
State Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing how he
sold out the Nation which had given him so much. Those are rather fresh in all
of our minds.
However, it should be remembered that the facts in regard to his connection
with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then Under
Secretary of State Berle 3 days after Hitler and Stalin signed the Russo-German
Alliance Pact. At that time one Wittaker Chambers — who was also part of the
spy ring — apparently decided that with Russia on Hitler's side he could no longer
betray our Nation. He gave Under Secretary of State Berle — and this is all a
matter of record — practically all, if not more, of the facts upon which Hiss' convic-
tion was based.
Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word
in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely" — at which
time the matter was dropped. And this, you understand, was at a time when
Russia was an ally of Germany. This condition existed while Russia and Ger-
many were invading and dismembering. Poland, and while the Communist groups
here were screaming "warmonger" at the United States for their support of the
Allied nations.
Again in 1943 the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss.
But even after that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.
Then late in 1948 — on August 5 — when the Un-American Activities Committee
called Algier Hiss to give an accounting, President Truman and the left-wing-
press commenced a systematic program of villifigntion of that committee. On
the day that Truman labeled the Hiss investigation a "red herring," on that
same day (and listen to this, ladies and gentlemen) President Truman also is-
sued a Presidential directive ordering all Government agencies to refuse to turn
over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities of any
Government employee to a congressional committee.
Incidentally, even after Hiss was convicted it is interesting to note that the
President still labeled the expose of Hiss as a "red herring."
If time permitted, it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss was
Roosevelt's chief advisor at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill health
and tired physically and mentally * * * and when, according to the Secre-
tary of State, Hiss and Gromiko drafted the report on the conference.
According to the then Secretary of State, here are some of the things that Hiss
helped to decide at Yalta. (1) The establishment of a European High Com-
mission; (2) the treatment of Germany — this you will recall was the conference
at which it was decided that we would occupy Berlin with Russia occupying an
area completely circling the city, which, as you know, resulted in the Berlin
air lift which cost 31 American lfves ; (3) the Polish question; (4) the relation-
ship between UNRRA and the Soviet; (5) the rights of Americans on control
commissions of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary: (6) Iran; (7) China — here's
where we gave away Manchuria; (8) Turkish Straits question; (9) interna-
tional trusteeship; (10) Korea.
Of the results of this conference, Arthur Bliss Lane of the State Department
had this to say: "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes.
To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."
As you hear this story of high treason, I know that yon are saying to your-
self— well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it. Actually, ladies
and gentlemen, the reason for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the dis-
loyalty, the treason in high government positions — the reason this continues is
because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American
people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.
It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which
follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been sub-
jected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass
murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the crime
and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has
always been thus after war.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1763
However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist.
This cloak of Dumbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them.
Happily, this has Anally been supplied.
As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty
to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all
crimes— being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of trust— high
treason. The Secretary of Stat.' in attempting to justify his continued devotion
to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to
Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefor.
* * And the reaction of the American people to this would have made the
heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.
Thus this pompous diplomat in striped pants, * * * with a phony British
accent, tells the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism,
high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, this blasphemy was just great
enough to awaken the dormant, inherent decency indignation of the American
people.
He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end
only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the
national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in
government.
Affidavit of James K. YVhitakf.r
To Whom It May Concern:
Statk of West Virginia,
Couniji of Ohio, to wit:
This day James K. Whitaker personally appeared before me, Lucille M. Bock,
a notary public of said county, and being by me first duly sworn says as news
editor of radio station WWVA I was in charge of the tape recording of Senator
Joseph McCarthy's speech at the Hotel McLure, Wheeling. W. Va., on February
9, 15)50. At the hotel I followed the prepared script as I listened to the speech.
I certify that the delivered speech, as recorded by me, and on that evening
broadcast by the Station WWVA was in the same form as the attached photostat
of the prepared script — with the exception of the usual added connective phrases
and the addition or deletion of such words as a's, and's, and the's which, to my
thinking did not materially change the meaning of the text.
I have initialed each page of the attached photostatic copy of Senator Mc-
Carthy's speech.
James K. Whltakek.
Taken, subscribed and sworn to before me this the 25th day of April 1950.
[seal] Lucille M. Bock.
My commission expires February 3, 1952.
Ladies and gentlemen, tonight as we celebrate the 141st birthday of one of
the greatest men in American history, I would like to be able to talk about
what a glorious day today is in the history of the world. As we celebrate the
birth of this man who with his whole heart and soul hated war, I would like to
be able to speak of peace in our time — of war being outlawed — and of world-
wide disarmament. These would be truly appropriate things to be able to men
as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.
Five years after a World War has been won, men's hearts should anticipate
a long peace — and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes
with war. But this is not such a period — for this is not a period of peace. This
is a time of "the cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two
vast, increasingly hostile, armed camps — a time of a great armament race.
Today we can almost physically hear the mutterings and rumblings of an
invigorated Cod of War. You can see it, feel it and hear it all the way from the
Indochina hills, from the shores of Formosa, right over into the very heart of
Europe itself.
The one encouraging thin;: is that the "'mad moment' has not yet arrived for
the firing of the gun or the exploding of the bomb which will set civilization
about the final task of destroying itself. There is still a hope for peace if we
finally decide that no longer can we safely blind our eyes and close our ears to
those facts which are shaping up more and more clearly — and that is that we are
1764 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
now engaged in a show-down fight — not the usual war between nations for land
areas or other material gains, but a war between two dimaetrieally opposed
ideologies.
The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic
Communist world is not political, gentlemen, it is moral! For instance, the
Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire
economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewies, Lenin's invention of
the one-party Police State as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less
momentous.
Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to
divide the world. With only those differences, however, the East and the West
could most certainly still live in peace.
The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism —
invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable
extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism. if the Red half of the world
rriumps — and well it may, gentlemen — this religion of immoralism will more
deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political
system.
Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in
clear-cut, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who
believe in a God, can exist side by side with their Communistic state.
Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for
mentioning such things as love, justice, humanity or morality. He called this
••soulful ravings" and "sloppy sentimentality."
While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late 30's, Karl Marx boasted
that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time, hundreds
of millions of people and vast areas of the world have come under Communist
domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin brags that
this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about to completely
subjugate it.
Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between Communistic atheism
and Christianity. The modern champions of Communism have selected this as
the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down — they are truly down.
Lest there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly
to the leader of communism today — Joseph Stalin. Here is what be said — not
hack in 192S, not before the war, not during the war — but two years after the last
war was ended : "To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out
peacefully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has
either gone out of one's mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly
and openly repudiated the Communist revolution."
This is what was said by Lenin in 1919 — and quoted with approval bv Stalin
in 1947 :
'We are living," says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but in a system of states,
and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for
a long time is unthinkable * * *
"One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that and supervenes,
a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois
states will be inevitable."
Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to
say thai the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to idealize that the
Communist world has said the time is now? . . . that this is the time for the
showdown between the democratic Christian world and the communistic atheistic
world?
Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those
who wait too long.
Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace, there
was within the Soviet orbit, 180 million people. Lined up on the antitotalitarian
side there were in the world at that time, roughly 1 billion 625 million people.
Today, only 6 years later, there are SO billion people under the absolute domi-
nation of Soviet Russia — an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure
has shrunk to around ."OO thousand. In other words, in less than six years, the
odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us.
This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and Ameri-
can defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once
said. "When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not he from enemies from
without, but rather because of enemies from within."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1765
The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this
country each day Losing on every front.
At war's end we were physically the strongest nation on earth— and at
leas! potentially that most powerful intellectually and morally. Our could have
been the honor of heing a beacon in the desert of destruction— shining proof
that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortunately, we have
failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.
The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because
our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores — hut
rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so
well by this Nation. It has not been the less forunate, or members of minority
groups who have been traitorous to this Nation— but rather those who have had
all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer — the finest
homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government we can
give.
This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men
who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been
most traitorous.
Now I know it is very easy for anyone to condemn a particular bureau or
department in general terms. Therefore, I would like to cite some specific cases.
When Chiang Kai-shek was lighting our war, the State Department had in
China a young man named John Service. His task, obviously was not to work
for the Communization of China. However, strangely, he sent official reports
back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek —
and stating in unqualified terms (and I quote) that "communism was the only
hope of China."
Later, this man — John Service — and please remember that name, ladies and
gentlemen, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning
over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely,
however, he was never prosecuted. However, John Grew, the Under Secretary
of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after,
his successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State. This
man, John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previ-
ously urged that Communism was the only hope of China, was not only rein-
stated in the State Dept, but promoted — and finally, under Acheson, placed in
charge of all placements and promotions. Today, ladies and gentlemen, this
man Service is on his way to represent the State Department tnd Acheson in
Calcutta — by far and away the most important listening post in the Far East.
That's one case. Let's go to another — Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as
(I quote) "a notorious international Communist," was made assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin-American affairs. He was taken
into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Com-
munist International brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure
and criticism, he resigned in 1046 from the State Department. AND. ladies and
gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high salaried job as
Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the office of the Assistant Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations.
Then there was a Mrs. Mary Jane Kenney, from the Board of Economic War-
fare in the State Department, who was named in an FBI report and in a House
committee report as a courier for the Communist Tarty while working for the
Government. And where do you think Mrs. Mary Jane is— she is now an editor
in the United Nations Document Bureau.
Then there was Julian H. Wadleigh, economist in the Trade Agreements
Section of the State Department for 11 years— And who was sent to Turkey
and Italy and other countries as U. S. representative. After the statute of
limitations had run so he could not be prosecuted for treason, he openly and
brazenly not only admitted but proclaimed that he had been a member of the
Communist Party — that while working for the State Department he stole a vast
number of secret documents — and furnished documents to the Russian spy ring
of which he was a part.
And ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men
in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Com-
munist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 —
a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being mem-
bers of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shap-
ing policy in the State Department.
1766 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is
that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blue-
prints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of ac-
tivity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.
In that connection I would like to read tc you very briefly from the testimony
of Larry E. Kerley, a man who was with the Counter-Espionage Section of the
FBI for 8 years. And keep in mind as I read this to you that at the time he is
speaking there was in the State Department Alger Hiss (the convicted traitor),
John Service (the man whom the FBI picked up for espionage)., Julian Wad-
leigh (who brazenly admitted he was a spy and wrote newspaper articles in
regard thereto).
Here is what the FBI man said :
"In accordance with instructions of the State Department to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the FBI was not even permitted to open an espionage
case against any Russian suspect without State Department approval."
And some further questions :
Mr. Abens. -'Did the State Dept. ever withhold from the Justice Dept. the
right to intern suspects?"
Kerley. "They withheld the right to get on process for them which, in effect,
kept them from being arrested, as m the case of Shevchenko and others."
Abens. "In how many instances did the State Department decline to permit
process to be served on Soviet agents?"
Kerley. "Do you mean how many Soviet agents were affected?"
Arens. "Yes."
Kerley. "That would be difficult to say because there were so many people
connected in one espionage ring, whether or not they were directly conspiring
with the ring."
Arens. "Was that order applicable to all persons?"
Kerley. "Yes, all persons in the Soviet espionage organization."
Arens. "What did you say the order was as you understood it or as it came
to you?"
Kerley- "That no arrests of any suspects in the Russian espionage activities
in the United States were to be made without the prior approval of the State
Department."
Now the reason for the State Department's opposition to arresting any of
this spy ring is made rather clear in the next question and answer.
Senator O'Connor. ""Did you understand that that was to include also Amer-
ican participants?"
Kerley. "Yes, because if they were arrested that would disclose the whole
apparatus, you see."
In other words they could not afford to let the whole ring which extended to
the State Department, be shown.
This brings us down to the case of one Alger Hiss who is important, not as
an individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group
in the State Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing
how7 he sold out the nation which had given him so much. Those are rather
fresh in all of our minds.
However, it should be remembered that the facts in regard to his connection
with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then
Under Secretary of State Berle three days after Hitler and Stalin signed
the Russo-German alliance Pact. At that time one Whittaker Chambers — who
was also part of the spy ring — apparently decided that with Russia on Hitler's
side he could no longer betray our nation. He gave Under Secretary of State
Berle — and this is all a matter of record — practically all. if not more, of the
facts upon which Hiss' conviction was based.
Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word
in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely" — at
which time the matter was dropped. And this, you understand, was at a time
when Russia was an ally of Germany. This condition existed while Russia
and Germany were invading and dismembering Poland, and while the Com-
munist groups here were screaming •"warmonger" at the United States for rheir
support of the Allied nations.
Again in 1943 the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss.
But even alter that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.
Then late in 1948 — on August 5th — when the Un-American Activities' Committee
called Alger Hiss to give an accounting. President Truman and the left-wing
press commenced a systematic program of vilification of that committee. On
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1767
the day that Truman labeled the Hiss investigation a "Red Herring" — on that
same day — and listen to this, ladies and gentleman — President Truman also
issued a Presidential directive ordering all government agencies to refuse to
turn over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities
of any Government employee to a congressional committee.
Incidentally, even after Hiss was convicted it is interesting to note that the
President still labeled the expose" of Hiss as a "Red Herring."
If time permitted, it might he well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss
was Roosevelt's Chief advisor at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill
health and tired physically and mentally — and when, according to the Secretary
of State, Hiss and Gromyko drafted the report on the conference.
According to the then Secretary of State, here are some of the things that
Hiss helped to decide at Yalta: (1) The establishment of a European High
Commission; t-) the treatment of Germany — this you will recall was the con-
ference at which it was decided that we would occupy Berlin with Russia
occupying an area completely circling the city, which, as you know, resulted
in the Berlin airlift which cost 31 American lives; (.">) the Polish question;
(4) the relationship between UNXRA and the Soviet; (5) the rights of Ameri-
cans on control commissions of Rumania. Bulgaria, and Hungary; (6) Iran;
I 7 I China — here's where we gave away Manchuria : (S ) Turkish straits question ;
i'.m international trusteeship ; il(J> Korea.
Of the results of this conference. Arthur Bliss Lane, of the State Depart-
ment had this to say : "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my
eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."
As you hear this story of high treason, I know that you are saying to your-
self Well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it. Actually, ladies
and gentlemen, the reason for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the
disloyalty, the treason in high Government positions — the reason this continues
is because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140 million American
people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.
It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which
follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been sub-
jected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass
murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the
crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic.
It has always been thus after war.
However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist.
This cloak of numbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them.
Happily, this has finally been supplied.
As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty
to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable
of all crimes — being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of trust —
high treason. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued
devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world,
referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore.
* * * and the reaction of the American people to this would have made
the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.
This this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent,
tells the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high
treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, this blasbphemy was just great enough
to awaken the dormant, inherent decency indigation of the American people.
He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will
end only wdten the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from
the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in
government.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
To Dean H. Acheson, Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,
D. C, Greeting:
Pursuant to lawful authority. You Abe Hereby Commanded to appear before
the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
1768 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first
Congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10:30 o'clock a. m., at the subcommittee room
F-53, United States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records,
reports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the
Department of State or any officer or employee thereof (or, in the absence of
the originals thereof, true and correct copies thereof) of the categories de-
scribed in Appendix I hereto (which is attached hereto and is made a part
hereof) which pertain to any individual named in Appendix II hereto (which
is a sealed instrument attached hereto and made a part hereof).
Hereof fail not. as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties
in such cases mule and provided.
To Joseph C. Duke, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States,.
to serve and return.
Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March,,
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.
(Signed) Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.
Washington, I). C. March 29, 1950.
I made service of the within supena by personal service to the within-named
Dean H. Acheson, at Department of State, Washington, D. C, at 2 : 42 o'clock
p. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.
Joseph C. Duke,
Sergeant at Arms, Senate of the United States.
Appendix I
1. The personnel file maintained by the Department of State or any sub-
division thereof in the regular course of the personnel administration thereof
concerning each present or former officer or employee thereof or consultant
thereto named in App ndix II hereto.
2. A copy, duly certified to be true and complete, of the transcript of each
proceeding before (a) the State Department Loyalty Board, (6) the Loyalty
Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, or (c) any other board or
body established pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 9835, dated March
21. 1947. as amended, to hear or determine questions concerning the loyalty to
the United States Government of officers and employees of the United States,
involving as a party thereto any person named in Appendix II hereto.
3. Every document and paper received by, or originated within, the State
Department, in the period from January 1. 1940, to date, which shows, with
regard to any person named in Appendix II hereto —
{a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation
concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of
the United States ; or
(6) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation con-
ducted by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the LTnited States
with regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty
to the United States Government of any person so named.
Appendix II
This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph
McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20. 1950. This list is confi-
dential and is not being printed in the public record.
1XITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
To J. Howard McGrath,
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C, Greetings:
Pursuant to lawful authority, You Are Hereby Commanded to appear before
the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first
Congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10:30 o'clock a. m.. at their subcommittee room
F-53, T'nited States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records,.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1769
reports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the
Department of Justice, any division, bureau, office, or subdivision thereof, or
any officer or employee thereof (or, in the absence of the originals thereof, true
and correct copies thereof) of the categories described in Appendix 1 hereto
(which is attached hereto and is made a part hereof) which pertain to any
individual named in Appendix II hereof (which is a sealed instrument attached
hereto and made a part hereof).
Hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties
in such cases made and provided.
To Joseph C. Dike, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States,
to serve and return.
Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March,
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.
(Signed) Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.
Washington, D. C, March 29, 1950.
I made service of the within subpena by personal service to Mr. Peyton Ford,
on behalf of the within-named J. Howard MeGrath, at Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C, at 4 :05 o'clock p. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.
Joseph C. Duke,
Sergeant at Arms, Senate of the United States.
Appendix I
Every document and paper received by, or originated within, the Department
of Justice or any division, bureau, office, or subdivision thereof, in the period from
January 1, 1940, to date, which shows, with regard to any person named in
Appendix II hereto :
(a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation
concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of
the United States ; or
(6) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation con-
ducted by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
with regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty
to the United States Government of any person so named.
Appendix II
This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph
McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. This list is confi-
dential and is not being printed in the public record.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Congress of the United States
To: Harry B. Mitchell, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C.
Greeting :
Pursuant to lawful authority, You are Hereby Commanded to appear before
the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first
congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10: 30 o'clock a. m., at their committee room F-53,
United States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records, re-
ports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the
Civil Service Commission, any agency or subdivision thereof, or any officer or
employee thereof (or, in the absence of the originals thereof, true and correct
copies thereof) of the categories described in Appendix I hereto (which is
attached hereto and is made a part hereof) which pertain to any individual
named in Appendix II hereto (which is a sealed instrument attached hereto and
made a part hereof).
Hereof fail not. as you will answer your default under the pains and pen-
alties in such cases made and provided.
To Joseph C. Duke, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States,
to serve and return.
1770 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March,
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.
(Signed) Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.
Washington, D. C, March 29, W5C.
I made service of the within subpena by personal service to the within-named
Harry B. Mitchell, at room 441, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C, at
11 : 15 o'clock a. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.
Joseph C. Duke,
Sergeant at Arms, Semite of the United States.
Appendix I
1. All documents and papers tiled with or maintained by the Civil Service
Commission or any agency or subdivision thereof in the regular course of its
duties concerning the appointment, employment, compensation, promotion, re-
tention, fitness, efficiency, service, or separation from service of each present
or former officer or employee of the Department of State named in Appendix
II hereto.
2. A copy, duly certified to be true and complete, of the transcript of each
proceeding before (a) the State Department Loyalty Board, (ft) the Loyalty
Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, or (c) any other board or body
established pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 9835, dated March 21, 1947,
as amended, to bear or determine questions concerning the loyalty to the United
States Government of officers and employees of the United States, involving as
a party thereto any person named in Appendix II hereto.
3. Every document and paper received hy, or originated within, the Civil
Service Commission or any agency or subdivision thereof, in the period from
January 1, 1940, to date, which shows, with regard to any person named in
Appendix II hereto:
(a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation
concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of
the United States : or
(6) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation conducted
by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States with
regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty to the
LTnited States Government of any person so named.
Appendix II
This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph
McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. This list is con-
fidential and is not being printed in the public record.
Department of Justice.
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
"Washington, June 16, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senatok : This will refer to your letter of May X, 1950, with regard
to the loyalty tiles of the State Department relative to the so-called SI individuals
identified through numbers by Senator McCarthy in his speech on the Senate
floor on February 20, 195Q, and identified hy name in the subpena of the Senate
subcommittee.
Following are the names of the individuals whose State Department files are
being made available to your subcommittee:
(Here are set forth the names of all (lie individuals whose files were re-
viewed and who are identical with the individuals identified by Senator Mc-
Carthy in his speech on the Senate floor on February 20, 1950.)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation furnished me a record of all loyalty
materia] furnished the State Department in these cases. The State Department
files have been checked, and 1 can assure yon that all of the reports and memo-
randa furnished the State Department are contained in the files.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford.
Deputy Attorney General.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1771
There are set out below memoranda concerning data extracted from
the State Department loyalty tiles relative to L08 individuals. These
memoranda were prepared in L947 by invest igators for a subcommittee
(d' the House Committee on Appropriations of the Eightieth Congress.
These individuals are identified only by numbers.
No. l
He was born in New York City in 1918. He was employed as an economist and
analyst with OSS and the State Department since June 1945. Previous to that
lie had worked tor the Treasury Department and the War Production Board. He
is now in research and intelligence.
An undated memorandum in the tile, which according to T. L. Hoffman, of
• s ., was prepare 1 during the week of October 13, 1047, recommended that this
subject le terminated as a security risk. The memorandum states that he was
an active member and officer of the American Student Union; that he advocated
military opposition to Germany in 11)87. and opposed conscription in the United
States of America in 1940. He has been closely associated with several subjects
of a Russian espionage case, and has two brothers who are Communist Party
members.
No. 2
The subject was born in 1903 in Flushing, N. Y. He was employed on June 1,
1942, with OSS as a geographer. In September 194."i be was transferred to the
State Department where he is presently in research and intelligence.
The investigative file on this subject has in it information from a Government
investigative agency indicating that the subject possesses radical political views,
according to neighbors and confidential informants. Three informants reported
him a member of several Communist-front organizations and stated be associates
openly with Communists. The report in which this information is included is
dated July 3, 1942.
A CSA report of April 18, 1946, contains information obtained from another
Government agency. The information of that Agency is set out in a report dated
April 22, 1942. and indicates that numerous witnesses, including college pro-
fessors and police officers in California, testified that the subject is a radical and
fellow-traveler, if not a Communist. He was very friendly and sympathetic to-
ward Harry Bridges and strongly opposed moves to deport him. He was also
a friend of Ralph Friedman. Secretary of the Communist Party in northern
California.
A CSA report of November 13, 1948, sets out information obtained by inter-
viewing subject's present and former associates in Washington. Several of his
former associates in OSS state he is "left of the New Deal." Another associate
stated that subject favors the Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang Regime
and favors Russia in most respects. The subject reportedly told another associate
that he thought Union members should have the right to strike against the
Government. A State Department official described him as being extremely Left
and said he seemed to be sympathetic to Russia in the Communist experiment.
Another Government official said the subject blamed the capitalists for all ills,
and further blamed the State Department for all the trouble with Russia during
the war and praised Russia and her foreign policy.
Eleven subsequent investigative reports were prepared between November 13,
1P46. and September 22, 1947. with most of the witnesses confirming the above-
mentioned statements regarding the subject. As of November 1, 1947, the subject's
case had been referred to the State Department Loyalty Board but no action had
been taken on it.
No. 3
The applicant came to the United States from Hungary in 193S and was nat-
uralized in New York City in August 1944. She has been employed since October
T.I44 as a translator and script writer with OWI and the Office of International
Information and Cultural Affairs.
A report of January 3, 1947, states the subject was an active member of the
International Workers Order, a Communist-front organization. One former
employer said he discharged the subject for being argumentative and inclined to-
ward communism. Another former employer said she is a radical and boasted
of being a Communist. A third informant said the subject had told him that
communism is a very good thing. A fourth informant said the subject always
argues over politics and stated communism was right for this country. A fifth
68970— 50— pt. 2 19
1772 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
informant said she is oversympathetic to communism. Two references on her
application for citizenship were members of the IWO and contributors to Com-
munist periodicals.
Another reference on her State Department application refused to recommend
the subject, questioning her loyalty and saying she is inclined toward communism.
A report of April 24, 1947, contains the statement made by the subject's super-
visor with the State Department, "I feel sure she is a fellow traveler." This
supervisor later, on reinterview, changed his mind saying she is loyal but liberal.
(This supervisor was subsequently discharged for security reasons.)
The subject has been a contributor to the Hungarian Communist magazine
NOK.
A memorandum in the file dated June 19, 1947, stated that investigation to
date had failed to prove or disprove the allegation that the subject is a Commu-
nist, but that if a decision is necessary, the recommendation would be unfavor-
able as to retaining the subject on the rolls.
A report of June 27, 1947, stated that most of the informants who previously
gave derogatory information were reinterviewed and they reiterated their state-
ments.
Further investigation was conducted and set out in report of September 17.
1947, but no further substantiating information concerning the subject's Com-
munist activities was obtained.
Tbe file reflects no further action in this matter, but, on October 20, 1947, T. E.
Hoffman advised that an unfavorable security recommendation was being pre-
pared.
Yo. 4
She was Associate Business Economist with OPA from November 1941 to
August 1944; with FEA from August 1944 to August 1945; and since that time
has been employed as an Economist with the State Department.
Confidential files of several governmental agencies were checked by CSA in
August 1946 and disclosed that she had been affiliated with —
1. The American Student Union
2. The National Youth Congress
3. Young Communist League
4. Washington Committee for Democratic Action
5. Washington Book Shop
Several associates of the subject were interviewed and stated she is a liberal
but of unquestioned loyalty. On March 11, 1947, she was given clearance in-
security purposes. Subsequently, she was interviewed by CSA and she admitted
having been a member of the above-mentioned organizations, but also stated that
she had changed her views and had no contact with them since 1941 or 1942.
A memorandum dated June 18, 1947, from CSA to Mr. Peurifoy suggested thai
"if sufficient time could not be devoted to a further investigation of tbe subject,
her services should be terminated."
Further investigation has been conducted since June 18, 1947, but no additional
evidence has been obtained to change the recommendation and the case is still
j lending.
No. 5
This is an example of the failure of the Evaluation Section to take action on
considerable derogatory information available relative to security, and expendi-
ture of many weeks of additional investigation with no conclusion reached.
The subject was born in New York City in 1900. He was employed by the
Foreign Economic Administration from August 1942 to August 1945 and has been
employed by the State Department since that time in Research and Intelligence
An investigative report dated May 4, 1946, reflected eight persons, including
six professors at Harvard and University of California, a Naval officer and a
fellow student, stating that the subject has strong Communist sympathies. They
stated he frequently expounded these sympathies and is either a Party Member
or a fellow traveler.
Examples of comments by associates of the subject who were interviewed are
as follows :
A professor at the University of California stated :
"I am acquainted with (subject i as a friend and student * * * I have
known him since Sept ember of 1937 * * * I would not trust him
I could not prove that Harry Bridges was a Communist * * *
I would not trust him either. (Subject) was a radical. He was a mediocre
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1773
Student. I teach the course on Russia and that is how I know about these
fellows who are Communists. (Subject) told me that I was too hard on
the Bolsheviks. He ran with the radicals and there is no question but
what he is a radical and I would nor hire him. There is something about
him that arouses my intuition and that causes me to be afraid of his out-
side connections * * * I would not recommend him to the Govern-
ment".
A fellow student of the subject's at the University of California stated.
"I have known (subject) since 1939 as a friend and fellow student. I am
surprised that he gave me as a reference because he should have known his
Communist ideas would have come out. He was definintely a Communist
* * * I felt like he was getting some money from the Communist Party
and the other fellows did too because they would say that (subject) wasn't
preaching communism for his health, and that it was a business with him.
He was very sincere and I believe he was really sold on Communism
* * * I would not recommend (subject) to the Government because I
feel he is a Communist and very sincere in his beliefs."
The subject was discharged from a Navy School during the war for poor grades
and for pro-Communist activities. Two former associates of his with FEA
criticized him as lacking in ability and being a disagreeable associate.
A memorandum dated May 15, 1946, from CSA to the Office of Controls states,
"investigation disclosed evidence of a material nature tending to affect adversely
the subject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its institutions.
It reveals that the subject is unmistakably identified with Communist activities.
"The records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel show that he was given a
Special Order Discharge on March 27, 1942, 'under honorable conditions', but
confidential information obtained from a reliable source reveals that the subject
was discharged because it was found he was an ardent student and advocate of
Communist doctrines. The investigation indicates that in view of the danger
inherent to this situation, the acknowledged qualifications of the subject are
insufficient to merit employment in the Department of State."
The file reveals no action taken on the memorandum of May 15, 1946. A
report of March 25, 1947, reflecting interviews with State Department associ-
ates and neighbors of the subject indicated the subject is quiet in regard
to political matters and none of the persons interviewed seemed to know his poli-
tical sympathies. One person said that on several occasions he has seen let-
ters addressed to the subject from the Soviet Embassy. He also stated that
several publications have geen observed in the subject's mail which caused him
to be suspicious of the subject's political leanings.
An official of Georgetown University advised he had hired the subject to con-
duct an evening class in Chinese and later learned that the subject was con-
nected with Communist groups on the west coast.
A report of investigation conducted on April 20, 1947, reflected subject took
graduate work at the University of California during the years 1937 to 1940,
but that no degree was awarded him and he failed in the examination for his
PhD, (it is noted here that on his Form 57 he stated he had received a PhD
Degree from the University of California). Four members of the faculty at the
University confirmed the subject's Communist leanings.
Another report was submitted by the New York Office on May 5, 1947, but
failed to confirm the subject's communistic views.
A memorandum dated June IS, 1947 was prepared by CSA to the attention of
Mr. Peurifoy. This memorandum summarized the entire case against the
subject and recommended that his services be terminated. Another memoran-
dum dated July 21, 1947, was prepared by Wilson of CSA to Boles, also of
CSA. and was as follows :
"In Mr. Bullock's absence I am assigning to you the case of (No. 5). This
case was evaluated on June IS. 1047. and recommendation was made (sub-
ject) be terminated from the Department: however, Mr. Peurifoy did no-
feel that there was sufficient evidence against (subject) in view of the fact
that he had not been shown to commit any overt nctx or t-> affiliate himself
with Communist organizations. I believe thai full consideration should be'
given to the testimony of several Catholic Priests in this case. How-
ever, it does appear that the case could lie developed and that further in-
vestigation is in order".
A report of September 4. 1947. by the Washington Office set out results of an
interview with the subject. During the interview, the subject stated that he
1774 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
•would pnTVr a Communisl regime in China to their present form of govern-
ment, although his views may he contrary to the State Department's policy.
He admitted having subscribed to the Daily Worker in 1940, and stated that
he is a member of the American Veterans Committee, Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions and World Citizens Movement, Inc.
Four subsequent reports have been submitted: On September 12, 1947, by the
Washington Office; on Septemher 39. 1947 by the Philadelphia Office; on Sep-
tember 30, 1947 by New Vork City Office, and another on October 15, 1947, by
the Washington Office.
The report of September 12, 1947, consisted of 20 pages summarizing pre-
vious investigations conducted of the subject since 1943.
The report of October 15, 1947, disclosed that the subject's previous position
in an Area Division was abolished in August 1947, and he was transferred to
the Division of Research replacing an employee with less seniority who was
terminated. The report also states that a State Department officii' 1 who knew
the subject in China as well as here, said the subject's work was below par ;
that he is a mediocre, dull and slow-thinking individual, and that he is the
only man in the Government he knows of whom he would speak unfavorably.
Another State Department official said he "considers subject weak as to
ability, common sense and public relations."
In spite of the extensive investigation conducted, and the considerable
derogatory information obtained, the subject was transferred in August 1947
to another Division when his previous position was abolished and he replaced
another employee who was terminated.
No conclusion had been reached in this rase, as of October 20. 1947. after a
year and a half of investigation.
No. 6
She is employed with the Division of Central Services.
A report of December 31, 1940 reflects that witnesses describe her as being
"liberal," "pink," "no more of a security risk than many others he has come
into contact with if kept under proper supervison." She has been quoted as
saying "Everyone in Russia has equal rights'' and that in this country the minority
groups were persecuted.
On January 7, 1947, a memorandum summarizing the investigation stated
that nothing had been developed tending to affect adversely subject's loyalty.
The file reflected that she was a shareholder in "Presentation, Inc.," the organi-
zation created by Carl Marzone which was the subject of a separate investiga-
tion by the State Department.
A memorandum of August 8, 1947 recited in detail subject's connection with
the United Public Workers of America. It indicates that she was at the April
1946 conference of the UPWA at Atlantic City, New Jersey, when the pro-
Russian resolution was passed. She, reportedly, favored the resolution and
subsequently supported it locally. Reportedly, she also opposed the President's
loyalty order in local union meetings.
This case is pending.
\o. 7
She is a biographical analyst in the Biographical Information Division.
The files of a Government investigative agency indicate that a person by the
same name as subject of 141S Madison Street, NW.. made application for mem-
bership in the American Youth for Democracy and the Sweethearts for Service
Men organizations and has submitted her membership fees to the American
Youth for Democracy Headquarters in Baltimore.
Her husband lived in New York City in 1941. An individual with his name
was a Communist Party Election Petition signer. Apparently to date (October
10. 1947) no effort has been made to identify the above election petition signer
as the subject's husband though the information has been on hand for several
months.
The file reflects that subject did some work for the Political Action Committee
in 1944 in Michigan and is active in the UPWA. Her acquaintances feel that
she is a liberal Roosevelt Democrat but do not think her a Communist.
She has been under investigation since December 1946. Investigation is pres-
ently pending in the Evaluation Section.
Vo. 8
She was an analyst in OSS from July 1943 to August 1945, and has been
employed in the Division of Map Intelligence since August 1945. Investigation
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1775
by CSA Dii January 22, 1946, disclosed an old acquaintance of subject as saying
th.it the subject has communistic leanings, and is a friend of (0-1), who the
informant believes is a Communist. The subject reportedly told the informant
it would be a good idea if we had communism in this country.
Upon interview by a CSA agent, the subject denied being a Communist, hut
admitted having expressed an interest in communism, stating "I am interested
in everything".
On an application lor a passport to Brazil in 1941, and on her Form 57, the
subject gave as a reference (0-2). This individual has been connected with
many Communist-front activities.
On November 21, 1946 a full Investigation of the subject was requested of
CSA by Mr. Bannerman; A memorandum dated June IS, 1947 from CSA to
Mr. Puerifoy listed the evidence against her as stated above, but pointed out
that other available information should be checked before making a security
recommendation.
An investigative report dated September 2<>, 1J>47. set out a reinterview with
a previous informant and that person reiterated her statements about the subject
having communist leanings, and informant also said the subject regularly read
the newspapers I'M and the Daily Worker when she lived with the informant
in 1944.
Several other persons interviewed reported favorably on the subject.
No. 9
This is an example of the failure of the Evaluation Division to recommend
obvious leads for investigation. It is also a case of a questionable security risk.
Subject was appointed to a very important position prior to fidl security inves-
tigation.
The subject is also an applicant for a position as Foreign Service career officer.
and is presently a Foreign Service reserve officer under the Informational and
Cultural Program. He was appointed to this position in September 1947 and
was assigned to Milan, Italy, where he is engaged in the educational program.
He was a major and, subsequently, lieutenant colonel in the U. S. Army from
May 1943 to August 1946, where he was assigned to the educational program in
Italy. •
Subject's file reflects that on April 13, 1942, he was granted a passport to
travel in South America representing the Division of Cultural Relations of the
State Department. Assistant Secretary of State (X-l) at that time, raised the
question as to the advisability of granting him a passport and finally approved it.
A memorandum dated April 13. 1942. from the Passport Division to Charles M.
Thomson. Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, stated: "A pass-
port will be issued to (No. 9) today in accordance with the Assistant Secretary's
instructions, which read as follows:
" "This is the conclusion. It is a flimsy case either way. I don't think the
man is politically dangerous — merely a fool.
" T see no reason for not granting the passport. I can think of several
for not giving him the job — but that is already done.'
"I may add that I consider the synopsis of (No. 9's) activities, as prepared
by Mr. Pattee of your office, as belittling (his) association with various radical
activities of the past, probably because of a lack of familiarity with the set-up and
activities of such organizations."
The basis for doubt regarding the issuance of the passport was a report sub-
mitted by another Government agency to the Department concerning the ap-
plicant.
Investigation conducted in connection with the application of subject for
Foreign Service Officer disclosed the following activities on his part :
* * * Member of Trade Unions Delegation to Soviet Russia in 1927.
(This delegation was repudiated by William Green, President of the A.
F. of L.)
* * * A sponsor of the New Theater Guild (Communist-front organi-
zation).
* * * A member of the American Civil Liberties Union.
* * A member of the Supervisory Committee on Progressive Education
Association.
* * * Organizer of the Chicago Branch of the North American Commit-
tee to Aid the Spanish Democracy.
* * * Member of League of American Writers.
* * * Member, American Society for Cultural Relations in Russia.
1776 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE: LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
All the above organizations have been identified as Communist-fronts or heavily
infiltrated with Communists.
The subject has written, and collaborated in writing, with several individuals
on books and articles showing Russia in a very favorable light.
He was superintendent of schools in a small city and revolutionized the edu-
cational system there. He is reported to have introduced a Russian primer in
the school after having visited Russia in 1927. The Daily Worker has mentioned
him in a very favorable light on a number of occasions. He signed a petition
to the Secretary of Labor in 1935, requesting right of asylum for John Strachey,
well-known British radical. The records in the industrial detail, Chicago
Police Department, listed him as a Communist in 1930.
A summary memorandum was prepared by CSA on July 9, 1946, and stated in
the first paragraph : "Investigation discloses evidence of a material nature tend-
ing to affect adversely the subject's reputation, ideologies, and his loyalty to the
Government of the United States and its institutions."
A memorandum dated August 6, 1946, from "Counsel — ACOPS" to "Security
Officer" regarding the applicant, stated :
"1. The file in this matter has been turned over to me by (A-R) for
ACOPS. After reading the file, and after conversation with (No. 9), who
was sent by A-R to see me, I reached the conclusion that the CSA recom-
mendation, on the entire record, would not merit submission of the case as
a security case. Since CON has not had an opportunity to make its recom-
mendations on this matter, I am sending to you the file and all supplementary
material received by me for your consideration and report.
"2. I note that the report of Special Agent Pirro purports to be based al-
most entirely on the (writings) of Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling. * * * I call
your attention to the fact that Mrs. Dilling was indicted for conspiracy
involving allegations close to treason, and that she would hardly seem to be
an authority, whatever the merits of any particular allegation might other-
wise be, as respects the loyalty to the United States of people she attacks.
With reference to the CSA language with respect to the teaching of 'hatred of
God' I call your attention to the fact that (subject) states that he has been an
active Quaker for many years. I believe that the CSA Special Agent should
be informed of the foregoing."
It appears that the writer of this memorandum was Mr. Klaus who was Coun-
sel— ACOPS at that time, and the "A-R" referred to in the memorandum appears
to have been Assistant Secretary of State Russell. It is noted that the report of
Special Agent Pirro, referred to in the memorandum, was a report of 13 pages
which had only 2 pages of notes from Mrs. Di! lings' writing and in the report
Agent Pirro pointed out having verified her statements knowing she did not
have "clean hands" herself.
On August 12. 1946, a memorandum from T. E. Hoffman to R. L. Bannerman
stated in the first paragraph, "I have re-read the CSA report and have noted
the additional material forwarded by Mr. Klaus, and it is my opinion that the
available information is not sufficient to regard the subject as a security risk."
The above recommendation was continued on August 22, 1946, by Air. R. L.
Bannerman to Mr. Klaus by memorandum.
A CSA report of August 22, 1946, related to "a protest of the Roman Catholic
Church against the subject's assignment to educational duties with the Allied
Military Government in Italy." A high official (X-3) of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference said that he was convinced that the applicant was not a
suitable person for a position in charge of education in Italy and not a suitable
representative of our Government.
Notes of a conference between (X-2). Papal Secretariat of State, "Vatican
City, and Lieutenant Colonel Gayre of the British Army, indicated the following
regarding the applicant and two of his associates:
Gayre indicates that these men are wild theorists who lick the stability
and background for the job, and who are constantly opposed to Gayre's
moderate program. Vhey are reportedly Leftists who would veer entirely in
that direction if given the opportunity.
The informant pointed out that Lieutenant Colonel Gayre was applicant's
supervisor in Italy when the latter was with the Army. He also referred
to the appointment of Adolfo Omodeo as Rector of Naples University, and
one Ferretti as Rector of the University of Palermo. Informant stated that
both of these individuals are known Italian Communists and were selected
for their positions by the applicant.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1777
The applicant's file reflects that he was given a "good" efficiency rating on
April 30, 1947, by an American Consul (X-4) in Italy. In preparing the rating
the consul expressed the feeling that he was nol overenthusiastic about the sub-
ject but made no mention regarding his being considered a security risk; how-
ever, an efficiency report of March 27, 11)47, submitted by a Foreign Service in-
spector (X-5) states in part, "The Inspector has seen too little of (the applicant)
to judge either his work or his philosophy but would he inclined to consider him
decidedly of the liberal school. (The applicant) expressed an interest in re-
maining in the work of the Department of State once his assignment as a reserve
officer terminates. The Inspector was not sufficiently convinced of outstanding
ability Oil the part of (applicant) to spread American influence and culture in
Italy, or elsewhere, to warrant a recommendation on his part toward continuing
(the applicant) beyond the anticipated period of service as a reserve officer. The
Inspector even feels that (applicant) might. conceivably get involved unwisely
in political matters within this period. lie is a pedantic, tedious, conceited, im-
practical, pompous man who would enjoy the pleasures of the Right, but popu-
larity with the Left." The grade rating that was given by the Inspector was
"satisfactory."
The committee investigator noted that: in spite of considerable derogatory
information in the tile, there is a notation on file that only a spot check is to be
made in connection with the subject's application for the position of Foreign
Service career officer. This spot check would merely include a check of the FRI
and Un-American Activities Committee records. It also was noted that the
former Assistant Secretary of State has never been interviewed although the
file shows he made the statement in 1942 that he could think of several reasons
for not employing the subject. Likewise, there appears to be no intention of
interviewing the American Consul in Italy and the Foreign Service inspector, the
latter especially, since he has expressed derogatory comments regarding the
subject.
No. 10
This is a case of pressure from a high Department official to give clearance to a
subject although derogatory information is available.
The subject was appointed in December 1945 as a translator for "not over a
year." He had previously been a special attorney with the Justice Department
and was in the U. S. Marines for one year during World War II.
A report of another investigative agency, under date of January 9, 1940.
advised that the subject has homosexual tendencies and made suicide attempts
in 1936 and 1942.
A memorandum dated January 22, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman recommended
terminating the subject's services which could be done rather easily becatise of
his appointment being of a temporary nature. He was terminated February 19,
1946, and appealed the termination.
A memorandum dated April 1, 1946, from J. A. Panuch stated that he had
interviewed the subject and reviewed various affidavits and letters of reference
submitted by this subject and he rescinded the termination action of February
19, 1946. A memorandum from Mr. Panuch, dated May 28, 1946, to Mr. Fred
Lyon, of the Office of Controls, referred to an opinion expressed by Mr.
Lyon on May 27, 1946, that the subject was an undesirable employee because of
moral depravity, and requested substantiation of Lyon's charge in writing with
evidence additional to what was already in the file. Mr. Lyon's memorandum
of May 31, 1946, to Mr. Panuch pointed out that dismissal of charges against
the subject was premature because —
1. No complete CSA investigation had been made to determine the sub-
ject's current personal conduct.
2. No interviews were had with two witnesses who had originally re-
ported homosexual tendencies on the part of the subject and later denied
their statements in affidavits.
3. The subject is known to have an arrest record in the District of
Columbia for disorderly conduct. The facts regarding this arrest had not
heen checked.
Mr. Lyon pointed out that this is another case where it is necessary to either
resolve all doubts in favor of the individual or the Department, and he favored
the latter.
A memorandum of June 19, 1947, from the Foreign Activities Correlation
Division to CSA stated information had been received from a Government
security agency to the effect that the subject had been an enlisted man in the
1778 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Marines and while such had shown undue interest in naval activities and had
pro-German sentiments during the war. The memorandum also stated that
investigation by another Government agency exposed him as a flagrant
homosexual.
A CSA report of September 2. 1947. set out considerable information con-
firming the subject's homosexual activities and tendencies. It also relates an
interview with an attorney who originally reported the subject a homosexual
to a Government agency and who subsequently on March 2, 1!>40, signed tin
affidavit contradicting his former statement. In connection with the affidavit
he informed an investigator that the subject had approached him and begged
him to sign a document he had written. He said he refused, but that a short
time later Mr. Joseph Panuch, representing himself to be from Assistant Secre-
tary of State Russell's office, called him by telephone on behalf of the subject
and said the subject was being ruined by statements that he had made about
him. Mr. Panuch reportedly said that everyone else who had made state-
ments against the subject's character had retracted them and the informant
was the only one holding out. Mr. Panuch then reportedly asked the informant
to make an affidavit rescinding the statements made by him to another Gov-
ernment agency. It is noted that although Panuch said everyone else had
rescinded their statements against the subject, the key witness to an incident
of perversion by the subject did not sign an affidavit until March 18, 1946,
whereas the informant's affidavit was signed March 2, 1940. The CSA investi-
gation developed quite conclusively that the subject had homosexual tendencies.
On September 12, 1947, a form memorandum from CSA to the Personnel
Division stated that the subject is a homosexual.
He was still on the Department rolls as of October 29, 1!>47.
No. 11
There is nothing in the file of this former employee to indicate when he dis-
continued working for the Department. Mr. Hoffman has advised that he
resigned. Previously, the file reflected that he was a close associate of suspected
Soviet agents. Most of the derogatory information was developed in late 1940.
The index card reflects that this case was closed August 30, 1946, and makes no
reference to any interest in the subject subsequent to that date.
This is another illustration of the fact that the index cards do nor reflect
the status of the cases.
No. 12
This former employee's file is perhaps the largest physically in the files of
CSA. Among other things, the file reflects that he furnished material to a
known Soviet espionage agent and that he has had consistent contact with a
long list of Communists and suspected Soviet agents.
<>n July 24. 1940, a recommendation for dismissal was made. In September
1940 further information was requested. As of October 15. 1947, there was
nothing in the file to indicate whether this individual was with the Department
or not, or what the final action was in his case. Inquiry of Mr. Hoffman elicited
the information that he did not know what had been done in this case except
that he understood the subject was no longer with the Department.
This subject was, in all probability, the greatest security risk the Department
has had. It was subsequently determined from the Division of Departmental
Personnel that he had resigned December 13, 1946.
No. 13
This employee was one of those dismissed under the McCarren rider. Never-
theless, there is no copy of the dismissal Letter in his file. That he had been
dismissed only became evident from review of a subsequent hearing afforded
him. The file was found in the closed section but the index card, though re-
flecting a previous closing of the case, did not reflect it was subsequently opened
and subsequently closed as a result of dismissal. This is just one of the cases
thai illustrate the lather lax manner in which the Personnel Security Branch
reopens and closes cases without CSA records reflecting accurately what has
taken place.
No. V,
The tile reflects that this former employee signed Communist Party election
petitions on a number of occasions.
On January 13, l!t47, she was given a hearing. A memorandum dated March
21, 1947, from Mr. Robinson to the Security Committee said that the decision
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1779
as to whether or not she was to be dismissed must resl on a policy decision of
the Assistant Secretary for Administration as to what should be considered
grounds for dismissal.
■•That decision is whether substantial evidence of Communistic affilia-
tions, past or present on the pari of an employee, without equally substantial
refutation or a substantial evidence of a change of heart, is, in and of
itself, sufficient to classify the suh.jeet as a security risk and to warrant
dismissal. I believe that, in the light of all the circumstances, the decision
should be in the affirmative at this time."'
The memorandum of April 15, 11147, relates that the Security Committee de-
cided that she was not a security risk. The decision was made to terminate
her employment on the grounds that she was an undesirable employee.
Mr. Fitch, in a memorandum for the rile dated April 23, 1947, stated that
Mr. Goodrich advised that she had resigned effective April 25, 1947. This case
has been cited because Mr. Robinson's memorandum, quoted above, indicates
his philosophy concerning who constitutes a security risk. It would indicate
that he is inclined to accept a change of heart as sufficient to nullify positive
evidence of a prior definite Communist activity.
No. to
Investigation in this case has been conducted after sufficient evidence had
been obtained to indicate that he is not a suitable employee for the State De-
partment.
This individual was employed by UNRRA prior to August 2G, 1947, when he
tiled his application for a position with the State Department.
A CSA report, dated September 23, 1947, includes an interview with a reference
of the applicant's who stated that he would not recommend the applicant be-
cause of his morals, criminal record and association with Communists. A check
was made by the CSA Investigator at the Rikers Island, N. Y., Penitentiary, and
it was verified that the subject had been arrested and convicted in 1928, 1931
and 1939 on charges of nonsupport. The investigation in this case was still
continuing in Washington with several leads outstanding as of October 31, 1947.
No. 16
The subject applied for a clerical position in November 1946. A derogatory
report was received from the Detroit office of CSA on January 23, 1947, which
stated that subject is a psychopathic case, a personnel problem, and has been an
unsatisfactory employee in other places where employed.
A report from Detroit on January 28, 1947, reflects that she made attempts
at suicide in 1937 and 1946, and that she has been carried as a psychopathic case
on the records of the Detroit Department of Public Welfare since 1930 ; however,
additional investigation was conducted at Boston, Mass., in March 1947 and as of
October 2. 1947, leads were still pending in Washington, D. C.
A check of the records of the Personnel Division of the State Department
revealed that she was appointed, on December 26, 1946, to a clerical position.
This appointment was made "subject to investigation" but the Personnel Division
had received no reports from CSA.
No. 17
This man is a Foreign Service applicant.
A report dated September 19, 1947, from New York shows beyond any doubt
that the applicant is a fourflusber, unreliable, and not truthful. Nevertheless, on
the .same day, additional leads were set out and there is no indication that the
investigation will not be terminated until all references of prior employers and
schools have been checked.
No. 18
She is an applicant for a position with the Office of Information and Educational
Exchange.
A report in the file reflects that she was with Foreign Service from May 11,
1943, to April 13, 1944, and was not a very satisfactory employee. Her record
indicates that she jumps from job to job. A report of September 4, 1947, reflects
that most of her recent employers have not been satisfied with her work. Her
investigation continues.
Mr. Hoffman, when questioned concerning the desirability and necessity of
continuing to investigate an individual who obviously is an undesirable em-
ployee, stated that the policy was to continue until all the investigation was com-
pleted. This is in line with the policy as already set out in this report.
1780 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
No. 19
He is an applicant for the Office of Foreign Service with the Foreign Service
Institute as an instructor. He is, apparently, presently employed as a linguist
with the Interior Department. The file reflects that he is a brilliant linguist,
but a psychopathic case, and unfit for teaching though possibly quite satisfactory
on linguistic research.
One office reference is suspected of having Communist Party connections. A
memorandum from another governmental investigating agency dated June 10,
1947, shows subject has a possible Communist Party connection. Reports of
June 20 and 23 reflect that he had been a poor instructor. Reports were still
coming in as of September 8, 1947. The ease was still pending on October 7, 1947.
No. 20
He is an applicant for a position with the Office of Information and Educational
Exchange.
In an evaluation report of February 19, 1947, it is indicated that be had been
an employment risk. He belonged to numerous "liberal" organizations such as
the "American League for I eaee and Democracy," and the "National Federation
for Constitutional Liberties.*' His associates say that he is a liberal, not "red"
hut rather unstable. He, his sister and father all apparently spent time in
mental hospitals. A report dated July 7, 1947, shows that his health is uncertain.
As of September 29, 1947, he was still being investigated. In this instance,
there appears to be no justification for continuing this investigation.
No. 21
This is an example of expenditure of considerable investigative effort after
substantial derogatory information was available.
This individual is an applicant for a position in the Division of Research for
Europe. He was born in Posen, Poland, in 1913, and was naturalized in New
York City in 1942. He was with OSS from May 1942 to May 1946, and with
UNRRA from May 1946 to January 1947.
Information received from another Governmental investigative agency on
May 2, 1947, indicates that subject was a contact of E-l, a known Communist,
and suspected Espionage Agent. In speaking of going to Germany when he was
with OSS, he had told her, "I think the Russians will dominate the situation,
they deserve to. The inefficiency of the AMGOT in Italy is terrible."
A highly confldental source revealed that in August 1942, a known Communist
who solicited money from Local No. 203 of the United Federal Workers of
America for Allied War Relief received a contribution from the subject. A re-
liable informant reported that he was a member of the Washington Look Shop.
Considerable investigation has been conducted since the above information
was furnished on May 2, 1947, and the matter had not been decided for or against
the applicant as of October 15, 1947. Two witnesses who worked with him said
he has definite Leftist tendencies and associated with Communists while in Italy.
Several others stated that he is a Liberal.
It is noted that an Agent of the Washington Office of the CSA, who has handled
most of the investigation in this matter, stated that he has spent three weeks
to a month on it and still has work to do. and that other Agents have worked a
total of about two weeks on the case. All of this investigative effort had been
expended after May 2, 1947, when the derogatory information concerning him
was received.
No. 22
This is another example of an applicant investigation being conducted after
considerable derogatory information was already in the file. He is an applicant
for Foreign Service Career Officer, and was employed by the State Department
in 1936 and remained to 1940, and was then with the National Defense Advisory
Committee for OPA from 1940 to 1!)47.
On June 2'*., 1947, the following information was received by CSA from another
Governmental investigative agency :
1. Confidential informant reported him as a member of the Communist
Party (but this was denied by the subject on interview).
2. His name appeared in the indices of the Washington Chapter of the
American Peace Mobilization (he denied being a member during interview).
3. He is reported to have attended the Youth Internationale in Russia in
19.34 or 193"">. (This lias not been confirmed and subjecl denies it.)
4. An informant in the State Department states he received a number of
unfavorable reports on the subject from 1936 to 1940 — one to the effect he
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY LNVESTIG ALTON 1781
was intensely interested in everything pertaining to Russia even though not
pertinent to Ins work.
5. He was discharged from the A. F. of L. Federation of Government
Employees on charges of Communistic activities.
6. He and his wife were on the membership rolls of the American Peoples'
Mobilization.
7. He has been an active member of the American Civil Liberties Union
and actively participated in a protest against the discharge of Myra Collins,
a colored Government worker accused of Left Wing agitation.
8. He has been associated with the following persons who are active in
Communist Front organizations :
I'M (C-3), active in the United Federal Workers of America, and a
member of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and
American Peace Mobilization.
(6) ( C-4) , member of the Washington Society for Democratic Action
and i he American League for Peace and Democracy.
i c i (C-5), a member of the American League for Peace and Democ-
racy.
(d) (C-6), a left-Wing Socialist.
9. He is said to have been a member of a central group spearheading an
attack on J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI.
In spite of the substantial derogatory information above set out, this individ-
ual was still being investigated as an applicant as of October 6, 1947.
No. 23
This applicant was an Economic Adviser in Japan for the War Department from
November 1945 until the date of the application.
He worked with (E-2) and (E-3) at the Treasury Department. The latter
speaks highly of him. Two government investigative agencies list his affiliations
with questionable organizations. He was apparently a member of the "American
League Against War and Fascism" (later the American League for Peace and
Democracy). He was a member of the "American League for Peace and Democ-
racy." In 1936 he was a member of the "United Federal Workers of America"
and was still active in 1943.
A confidential informant associated with the subject in Japan said that he had
a poor personality and would make a poor Foreign Service officer.
A former supervisor of bis in Ankara spoke very unfavorably of him. The
file contains an unfavorable memorandum dated July 30, 1947, and unfavorable
reports dated August 7, August 22, and September 8.
He apparently belonged to questionable groups in college. His parents are both
Russian born. A penciled note on top of the file says "Needs checks only," thus
indicating that if the checks revealed no derogatory information be is being given
security clearance. If be is not being given security clearance, there appears to
be little necessity for continuing the investigation.
No. 24
The file reflects that this Foreign Service applicant while with OSS handled
unvouched funds in a very questionable manner. When he left OSS, he was in-
debted to that organization for approximately $26,000. The legal counsel for
CIG is reportedly now attempting to collect this. There is a possibility that this
indebtedness was due to a misunderstanding of instructions on the part of the
subject.
The subject has worked for (E-3), (E-4), (E-2), (E-5), (E-6), and (E-7),
all of whom vouched for his loyalty. Credit records indicate that persons de-
scribe him as irresponsible. (E-2) said that he had sent subject to Lisbon
for the Treasury Department. (C-7) also vouched for him.
A reference hinted that he would want to check the subject carefully before
recommending him. A letter from the applicant, dated April 16, 1947, states that
he is a Deputy Chief in the Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department,
at $7,5S1 per annum.
When in Lisbon subject attended a party given by a suspected Russian under-
cover agent against the Ambassador's recommendation. Several acquaintances
report that he has a gift for antagonizing people.
There is no indication of any action as of October 10, 1947, being taken since
the report dated September 24, 1947, which indicates that he may possibly be
satisfactory from a loyalty standpoint but otherwise a very undesirable em-
ployee. Investigation is apparently pending.
1782 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Xo. 25
Consideration is still being given this applicant, although he is a known
Communist Party member, and a recommendation has been made that his
brother, who is now employed by the Department, be dismissed for security
reasons.
He has filed application for a position as Administrative Officer at $8,179 per
annum. Investigation of his case was started on April 9, 1947. Another Gov-
ernmental investigative agency advised, on April 13, 1947, that a reliable inform-
ant said subject, who is employed by the Civil Service Commission, is a member
•of the underground Communist group in Washington, D. C. This informant
further advised that the subject and his wife paid a social call on December 11,
L945, on a functionary of a Soviet Espionage ring in Washington, D. C, and on
December 29, li)45, his wife contacted the wife of another Soviet Espionage
functionary and identified herself by saying her husband was acquainted with
the functionary. The informant also advised that a brother of the subject was
a member of, and active in. the Jackson Heights, Long Island. Branch of the
Communist Party in 1944. Further information was obtained to the effect that
the subject himself has been a member of the Communist Party.
Subsequent investigation was conducted and reports were submitted on May
14, 19, and June 27, 1947, without further evidence being developed. This case is
presently in a pending, inactive status awaiting action concerning his brother.
No. 26
This is a pending investigation of an applicant for the position of Commodity
Specialist in the State Department. He was with UNRRA from April 1, 1944,
to October 15, 1946, handling procurement of commodities.
A Government investigative agency has reported that it has received informa-
tion from a highly confidential source that the subject has been in contact with
several subjects of a Russian Espionage case. Although this investigation is
.still pending, the Personnel Department advised upon inquiry by the Staff that
it has no action pending regarding employment of the subject, and the Office
of Foreign Personnel likewise advised that it was not considered employing
subject.
No. 21
This applicant worked for the Foreign Economic Administration for three
months in 1945, and was with the War Department from July 1944 until June
1946. Investigation at these two agencies resulted in unfavorable recommenda-
tions of the applicant; however, several leads were outstanding as of September
29, 1947, although upon inquiry the Personnel Department advised that its records
failed to disclose that this applicant is being considered for a position. The
Foreign Personnel Department had no record of the applicant.
No. 28
He is a Production Supervisor of Motion Pictures for OIE in New York City.
Request for investigation was made on August 8, 1946, and CSA sent a memo-
randum to New York City on August 13, 1946, stating that a man by the same
name from 174(5 East 13th Street, Kings, New York City, signed a Communist
Petition in the State of New York in 1942. There were no reports submitted as
of October 2, 1947.
No. 29
This employee lias been with the Government since July 1942. The Un-
American Activities Committee records show that a person with the same name
as the subject residing in New York City, signed a Communist Party Election
Petition in New York in 1940. A memorandum furnishing tins information is
dated October 28, 1946. Nevertheless, to date (September 29. 1!)47). no efforl
to check out this information lias been made.
#0. 30
This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.
A memorandum of December 20, 1940, shows that the House Un-American
Activities Committee records reveal that an individual of the same name as
the subject residing in New York City was a signer of a Communist Party
Election Petition. As of September 20, 1047. nothing had been done to determine
if the signer of the Election Petition and the Departmental employee were
identical- I
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1783
No. SI
He is with the Office of [nformation and Educational Exchange in New York
City. On November 1. I!i4t>, New York advised that a man of the same name
as subject of 7 43 Alabama Avenue, Kings, New York City, signed a Communisl
Party Election Petition in 1942. However, to date ( September 20, 11)47) no
effort had been made to identify the signer of the Election Petition although
it would he a relatively simple matter to determine if the .subject and the
signer were identical.
No. 32
She is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York
Oity. She was born in Russia in 1896; became a naturalized United States
citizen in 193S. From July 1934 to April 1940 and from February 1941 to May
1941, she worked for the Anitorg Trading Corporation. From June 1941 to
August 1041 she worked for the National Maritime Union. She listed an Amtorg
employee as a reference. The War Department records are the only ones that
have been checked to date. She was with OWI from February 1945 to February
1!M6 and since that time has been with the State Department.
No. 33
She is a good example of a subject about whom little is known in spite of what
is construed as a complete investigation. In this instance, the applicant fur-
nished reference and recited her school history. Though the references were
interviewed and the high-school attendance verified, no effort was made to
interview her school associates or her neighbors. Under the circumstances, it
could not be anticipated that anything unfavorable would likely be developed.
In this connection, further reference is made to the case of No. 34. In his
case, no suspicion was attached to him as a result of his investigation. The
suspicion arose only because of his activities while employed at the State Depart-
ment. His investigation could hardly have developed such information inasmuch
as no one other than his references was interviewed concerning his character
or loyalty.
No. 34
He is a messenger in the Division of Central Services detailed to the Division
of a Protective Services.
In a memorandum dated June 30. 1947. the Division of Protective Services'
Chief called attention to the fact that the subject evidenced an unusual interest
in the mail. The following appeared in the memorandum:
"In a recent discussion with one of the members of the Division, he is
supposed to have remarked that the two least Democratic countries in the
world are the United States and Great Britain and that he would like to
go to Russia."
He was cleared originally for employment on June 2, 1946, as a result of
an investigation which consisted of the following:
"His military certificate of discharge was reviewed, the Personnel Office
was consulted concerning his previous record with the State Department, the
records of the Registrar's Office at Howard University were examined, three
references were interviewed, the customary name checks were made with
the Police, FBI, credit, Passport Division, and Un-American Activities
Committee.*'
In this connection it will be noted that aside from the three references, no
one was questioned during the course of his investigation concerning his actions,
attitudes and beliefs.
His investigation is pending.
No. 35
This applicant graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1940 where she
majored in Bible study. She has had a long list of employers. Everyone con-
tacted to date has reported favorably concerning the applicant. Nevertheless,
a very extensive investigation is being conducted to find all her previous em-
ployers though in a couple of instances she was employed there many years
ago and for a very brief period. This is an example of where an additional
amount of Investigator's time is being consumed in interviewing individuals
who, in all probability, will be unable to furnish much pertinent information and
therefore there is nothing to indicate that such interviews are *t»sirable or
necessarv.
1784 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Xo. 36
Iu this case a supplementary lead was set out to determine when this applicant
left the Navy though examination of his application shows that the year 1947
was inadvertently given instead of 1946 because he was employed from 1946 on.
This would tend to illustrate the point that so much investigative attention is
directed toward every minute of previous employment that very little of the
limited agent time is left for more searching inquiry into the applicant's past
associations, etc.
No. St
This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.
In this case though nothing was developed to cast suspicion on the subject a
needlessly exhaustive investigation was made. This was done though there are
numerous important uncovered leads outstanding in other cases. This is an
example of where closer supervision would result in a better utilization of avail-
able man power.
No. 38
This case clearly shows the desirability of interviewing applicants prior to
extensive investigation. This person had filed application for a clerical position
in the State Department.
Investigation of her background was conducted on May 21, June 3, 4, 5, and
16, 1947, at Jefferson City, Canton, Shelbyville, Chillicothe, and St. Louis — all
in Missouri. Finally, on June 16, a personal interview of applicant was con-
ducted by the CSA representative in St. Louis and he gave an unfavorable recom-
mendation of the applicant on the basis of the interview. Nevertheless, he stated
after reporting on the interview that he would submit a supplemental report
after checking one more employment record.
The case was still pending as of September 25, 1947. On November 6, 1947,
the Personnel Division advised that this applicant is not being considered for a
position.
No. 39
The report of interviewing agent dated September IS, 1947, was unfavorable.
The report of August 12, 1947, had been unfavorable. The file reflects that the
applicant is uncertain as to his prior history ; nevertheless, investigation of this
case was continuing as of September 29, 1947.
No. 40
This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in
New York City.
His application is very sketchy. There has been no investigation. (C-8) is a
reference. Though he is 43 years of age, his file reflects no history prior to June
1941.
Case is awaiting a report from the New York Office.
No. 41
This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in
New York City where he has been since September 25, 1942.
His case is typical of that of many of OIE employees in New York.
Though 47 years of age, there is no data in his file as to his whereabouts prior
to October 1941. As a result, nothing as to his past activity has been checked,
nor can it very readily be checked until he is interviewed.
No. 42
She is a typist with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in
New York City and has worked on a part-time basis since April 22, 1947.
She has been in the United States since 1930. She is not a citizen and has
applied for her first papers.
There are gaps in her employment record but she indicates that she was with
the Russian Embassy in Turkey from 1920 to 1923. Since 1944 she has been with
the Russian Children's Welfare Society.
No. 43
This is a case of failure to closely follow and supervise an important security
case.
The subject is employed in a responsible position in the Broacasting Division,
World-Wide News Unit, OIE, New York City. An investigation was requested of
the New York Office of CSA on August 8, 1946. A 13-page report was submitted by
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1785
the New York Office on December 4, 1946. A summary of the investigation was
prepared by CSA on December 10, 1!)40, which is as follows:
"Investigation discloses evidence of a material nature tending to affect
adversely subject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its
Institutions.
"It revealed that when subject was employed as a reporter for a newspaper
from 1936 to 1939, he held an office in the American Newspaper Guild. Sub-
ject was very liberal in his political thinking and associated himself at times
with the Left-Wing element of this organization.
"Investigation further revealed that when the subject was employed as a
rewrite man for a newspaper, from 1930 to 1936, he was reported to have
been Vice President of the Newark Chapter of the American Newspaper
Guild during and after his employment by this paper. He was further
reported to have been one of the leaders of the strike of the editorial staff
employed by this paper which occurred in March 1934, and lasted until April
1935. ' According to one informant, however, subject could not be called
an agitator in this strike, as the consensus was that it had been thoroughly
justified. The informant further stated, though, that the subject definitely
identified himself with the Left group and because of his office in the Guild,
his Leftist or Communist Party Line policy dominated the affairs of the
Guild. This informant hesitated to definitely state whether or not the sub-
ject was communistic in his political thinking, but it was his opinion that
he was exceedingly liberal, pro-Labor and 'slightly pink.'
"Investigation further revealed, according to an informant who was
Managing Editor of a newspaper on which the subject was employed, that the
subject is communistic. This informant commented that he had often
engaged the subject in conversation along Communist lines and that he was
very outspoken and fanatical on the subject. Subject is very pro-Labor, anti-
Capitalistic, and definitely followed the Communist Party line. Informant
also stated that in the latter days of subject's employment on the newspaper,
he had found him very unreliable on reporting news coverage of any indus-
trial, labor, or political situation. Subject was reported to have colored his
reports with communistic theory, and did not give complete and unbiased
coverage to such stories.
"Investigation also disclosed, according to another informant who knew
subject very well, that subject and his brother are definitely communistic.
In P. i37 subject was reported to have been the principle organizer and strike
leader of a strike amongst the editorial staff of a newspaper of which inform-
ant was Associate Publisher. While this strike affected only eight people,
during the first week of the strike, subject organized 50 to 75 people to
picket the office. During the strike Mr. Milton Kaufman, of the New York
Chapter of the American Newspaper Guild, was in conference on several
occasions with the subject. Subject appeared to be taking orders from Mr.
Kaufman who is reported to be a well-known Communist.
"Investigation would seem to indicate that serious consideration should
ba given the determination whether subject should be retained in the Depart-
ment of State."
A review of the report of December 4, 1946, disclosed, in addition to what is in
the summary, that another investigative agency advised that a reliable informant
said in November 1944, that a well-known Communist in Newark, N. J., advised
him that the subject was a Communist Party member.
On January 23, 1947, R. L. Bannerman requested further investigation to be
conducted by CSA. There are, however, no subsequent reports in the file since
the report of December 4, 1946, although this could certainly be classified as an
important security case.
No. kk
This is a case of appointment to an important position from the security stand-
point without prior security clearance. The subject was born in 1901 in Ger-
many. His Form #57 indicates he obtained a B. S. Degree from the University
of Detroit in 1931. He was employed by the Soviet Purchasing Commission and
its subsidiary Autostroy from 1932 to July 1945. At the time of application in
September 1946, he was employed by the Department of Commerce.
On interview in June 1947 by a CSA Investigator, Victor Kravchenko stated
that the applicant had to be a Communist Party member, or a strong sympa-
thizer in order to hold a position with the Soviet Purchasing Commission as long
as he did, or in fact, for any appreciable length of time.
1786 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
There was no indication in the file that security clearance had been given in
this case; however, contact with the Personnel Division disclosed that he was
appointed on January 2, 1947. for a position as Economic Analyst in Research
and Intelligence.
No. J/5
This individual has been a Correspondence Research Clerk in the Division of
Public Liaison since March 1947. She was formerly with the Office of Foreign
Liquidation Committee and with the "War Department.
There are no indications in the file that any investigation has been conducted
regarding her background; however, information was received on October 9,
1947, from a former supervisor in the War Department to the effect that she is
a Communist.
The file was reopened on the basis of this information, but no report was
submitted as of October 31, 1947.
No. J,6
This is another example of employment of a person to a responsible position
without full information.
The subject was born in 1910 at Cleveland. Ohio. He was with the LaFollette
Civil Rights Committee from June 193(5 to June 1940, and subsequently with
OPA, the Board of Economic Welfare. RFC. OSS, and was appointed to the
Department as an Assistant Chief in the Division of Occupied Areas at ss.47S.75
per annum. Investigation of the subject was conducted by CSA intermittently
from December 1946 to August 1947, and disclosed that most of his close asso-
ciates and friends have records as fellow travelers or Communists, and he is
classified by most persons interviewed as a Leftist. No definite evidence of
Communist activities on his part was obtained, but he admitted to a Government
Investigator in 1942, having contributed money to the American League for
Peace and Democracy.
There is no record in the file that he was given security clearance prior to
his employment.
This case was in the hands of the Evaluation Section as of October 31, 1947.
and no report had been submitted subsequent to August 13, 1947. There is a
memorandum in the file, dated January 3, 1947, by Bannerman. which stated
that Leo Carney called on December 30, 1940. inquiring as to whether the Se-
curity Office had disapproved the subject for appointment. The memorandum
indicates Garney as saying that I'anuch had disapproved him. There is no
further explanation as to these statements of disapproval of the subject, but
it is noted that he was appointed.
ATo. 47
The subject came to the United States from Germany in 1940 and was natural-
ized in Alabama in 1943. He was in the United States only from August 1943 to
January 1946, after which he was a Civilian employee of the War Department
in Germany. He was appointed to the State Department in November 1946 on
the basis of an advance security clearance.
On January 7, 1947 a Government investigative agency informed that it has
no file on the subject, but has information that bis brother and sister may be
possible agents of the Comintern and that they are active in Communist activities.
Through investigation by CSA, it was determined that the subject was an
instructor for one year at Olivet College and was a close friend of a Professor
there who was known for his pro-Communistic views. This College is known
as being very liberal.
A memorandum, dated February 6, 1947. prepared by CSA, stated "investiga-
tion discloses evidence of a material nature, tending to affect adversely the sub-
ject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its Institutions."
Another investigative report was submitted on April 8, 1947. but no subsequent
action was taken until the subject submitted his resignation on May 20. 1947.
\o. 48 [
This is another case of appointment to an important position from the security
standpoint without prior investigation.
This individual applied for a position with the Department on June 4, 1947;
was immediately appointed and assigned to Warsaw, Poland, as a Secretary to
the Ambassador. She left the United States for Warsaw on June 11, 1947.
Investigation disclosed that the subject, who is an American citizen, served in
the Polish Women's Army from 1941 to 1940. Interviews with her references
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1787
were excellent as to loyalty and character excepl for one who fell thai the appli-
cant's loyalty to Poland was equal to that of her loyalty to the United States.
Neighborhood investigation disclosed thai the applicant was a member of a
heavy drinking group with loose morals. She appears to Lave a reputation in
her neighborhood as being a heavy drinker and promiscuous. The investigation
is continuing.
No. 'i'.i
The subjecl is a Research Analyst in the Division of Research for the Far
East. In December 1!»42 he was transferred from a clerical position in the
Lost Office Department at New York City to the Board of Economic Warfare, on
request of the latter agency. lie was made an Intelligence Clerk with that
agency. On June 7. 194.") he was recommended by E-21, who is a suspect in a
Soviet Espionage case as a candidate for Administrative Interne Training.
.Nevertheless, no investigation has been conducted of the subject in this case
although he appears closely tied in with the Espionage suspect.
*******
The following individuals, numbers 50-65, inclusive, comprise some of the
more important security cases in the Department who are not grouped under
specific categories or specifically referred to in the section of the report on
CSA.
No. 50
He was. until .Inly 25, 1947. with an important policy board.
A memorandum of August 1, 1947 requested clearance as he was to go to
Paris on a conference. A note dated September 15, 1947, said "Cleared for
UNESCO Placement." The subject was described in reports by various witnesses
as "interested in Communism as an experiment but bis political philosophy is
in keeping with liberal new-deal social reform under Democratic processes of
Government"; "he is a very ardent New Dealer"; "be is a live liberal"; but
an informant who also lived at the International House at one time said "He
was one <>f those accused of being a Red here but the people who do get up and
talk Communism are refuted."
The file reflects that he is a friend of (C-9) whose father is suspected by
many as being a Communist. One of his associates is (C— 10).
A penciled note addressed to "David" and signed "M" dated January 2S,
1947. inquires if subject is having another mental breakdown (File reveals he
did at one time) and says "Place before Committee as security hazard — possi-
ble break and embarrassment if Congress gets on this."
No. 51
He is employed in the Office of an Assistant Secretary.
Nothing derogatory was developed by Ins investigation. A memorandum
of August 2. 1946, by Mr. Bannerman indicated that subject is friendly with
(E-8) and, by surveillance, had been placed in contact with a member of an
espionage group. He was approved for appointment September 25, 1946.
A memorandum of December 13. 1946. indicates that subject had General
Hilldring intervene with Assistant Secretary Russell on behalf of (E-8) and
(E-9). (E-8) is very closely tied up with Soviet espionage agents and (E-9)
bad a very bad record of Communist Party connections.
In iaie 1946 or early P.»47 (E-8) went with the Intergovernmental Committee
on Refugees and his appointment investigation was discontinued.
(E-9), whose file reflects that he was without any doubt an active Communist,
was employed by FEA in 1942. From there he was transferred to the Auxiliary
Foreign Service. While with the Auxiliary Foreign Service, he became an
applicant for a position in the State Department in February 1946.
In a memorandum to Mr. Russell, dated November 6, 1946, General Hilldring
said that be needed I E-9 ) badly in a peace expedition. He was transferred to
the Foreign Service November 12, 194<'>.
A memorandum dated November 25, 1946. indicated this individual bad been
ordered removed on November 1". 1946, and to be out of the Department no
later than November 15. 1946. He was observed working as late as November
20, 1946. and had access to classified material as late as November 22. 1946.
A memorandum of November 27. 1946, pointed out that No. .",1 was pushing
this individual's appointment and possibly he and this individual were both
associates of (E-10), an alleged Russian espionage agent.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 20
1788 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
No. 52
He was formerly a ranking official and presently occupies a high diplomatic
post.
A memorandum dated April 24, 1947 from another Government investigative
agency says "Nothing in addition to information previously furnished." The
other information referred to is not in the file. Mr. Hoffman is of the opinion
that it is being held somewhere by one of the higher officials of the Department.
He was unable to locate it after a search of several days.
A raincoat, believed to be the subject's, was found on September 28, 1946, by
guards in the men's room of the State Department Building. In the pockets were
papers which were believed to be those of a Russian language student. The
subject does not know Russian and is not studying Russian and there is appar-
ently no explanation for the papers found in his coat pocket. A State Depart-
ment investigator wrote the following memorandum pertaining to the subject
on October 25, 1947 :
"In connection with my investigation into affairs of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, I am in receipt of information which appears to be most in-
criminating against a State Department personality. My informant stated
that (X-6, a special emissary) for Franklin D. Roosevelt, has divulged the
following story and that, furthermore, information relating to this incident
is in possession of (U. S. Senator X-7).
"In April 1945 (X-6) told my informant he was in London and was to
depart shortly for Tehran. A few minutes before his plane left the airport,
50 miles from London (X-8, a high official in OSS) arrived at the airport
seeking him. (The OSS official) told (the President's representative) that a
telegram, which had been prepared by President Roosevelt to send to
Chungking, China, had been 'picked up at Moscow' ; that an investigation
had n eelutW the possibility that the leak of information could have oc-
curred in Washington, because the information in the telegram reached
Moscow before the actual telegram left Washington. (The OSS official)
stated that (a high official of the State Department, No. 52) had been ob-
served contacting a man in Washington, and that this man, after leaving
(the Department official) had been followed to the Soviet Embassy. (The
OSS official) was clearly disturbed by this occurrence and warned (the
emissary) against divulging information of a secret nature which might
reach (this Department official — No. 52)."
This case is in a pending status.
No. 53
Lie is a ranking official in the Office of Financial and Development Policy.
He was appointed August 12, 1946.
On September 30, 1946, a Government investigative agency reported that
subject was scheduled as a speaker before the Maryland Citizens Council in
Baltimore on a given date. Many members of this group were members of the
Communist Party and others were individuals who had followed the Communist
Party line.
He had been with the Treasury Department and very closely associated with
(E-2), (E-3) and (E-7). He was, reportedly, particularly close and harmonious
with the first mentioned individual who was a reference on his application.
Subject, reportedly, recited the fact that several people in his office were re-
cently dismissed by the Department and he said that the procedure in ousting
the individuals was rather vicious.
He has recpiested the appointment of (No. 100), a classmate at Harvard, who
is also presently being investigated by the State Department. That classmate
appears to be closely associated with the (E-2) crowd.
The subject, in collaboration with two others, wrote a book for the National
Planning Association. One coauthor, a former editor of the New Masses, has a
very questionable background. A review of the book by Foreign Activities Cor-
relation concluded "Aside from this sympathy through half-truths, there is no
evidence, after a brief perusal of the book, of anything in it inimical to the
United States."
This investigation is pending.
No. 5h
He holds a high position in the Department.
A memorandum dated March 22, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman to Mr. Russell (at
that time Assistant Secretary for Administration) summarized the investiga-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1789
tion of this individual to that date and pointed out that he had been affiliated
with the magazine Amerasia from May 1!>:',7 to November 1941. This magazine
consistently followed the Communist Party line. It was under the direction of,
and its articles and activities controlled by, Philip Jaffe and Frederick Vander-
bilt Field.
Field has been outstanding in Communist activities and has been head of
the American Peace Mobilization. He has been a contributing columnist for
the Daily Worker.
.Faffe has been active with Communist-front organizations and lectured at the
Jefferson School of Social Activities. He was also treasurer for the National
Council tor American-Soviet Friendship. When affiliated with Amerasia, sub-
ject worked closely with these individuals.
Not mentioned in the memorandum, cited above but previously developed was
the fact that the subject was closely related with the Institute of Pacific Ref-
lations which has been composed of both loyal and questionable individuals.
The recommendation made in the memorandum of March 22, 1946, follows :
"On behalf of the above information, it is recommended that action be
instituted to terminate subject's services with the State Department. It
is suggested, to achieve this purpose, that an appropriate officer of the
Department should inform (subject) that his continued presence in the
Department is embarrassing to the Department and that he be given an
opportunity to resign. If (subject) should not resign voluntarily, action
should be instituted under Civil Service Rule XII to terminate his services
with the Department."
T. E. Hoffman in a memorandum dated June 18, 1947, summarizing the case,
included information subsequently developed that subject requested a Communist
sympathizer (C-ll) to accept a position with the Board of Economic Warfare.
Reportedly, subject has been visited on several occasions by (C-12), an alien
allegedly sympathetic to the Communist cause. Subject has also since recom-
mended two former employees of the Amerasia Editorial Board to positions with
the State Department. This memorandum concludes with the following two
sentences :
"It is not believed by this office that the information at hand raises a
reasonable doubt as to (subject's) loyalty to the United States and, accord-
ingly, security clearance is recommended. However, this office intends at
a later date, when the personnel is available, to review the issues of Amer-
asia Magazine from 1937 to 1941 and to determine if the contents of the
articles are such as to have a bearing on the security status of subject."
Note. — In this connection, in October 1947, Hoffman advised that he has
time to date to accomplish this review.
A report dated August 18, 1947, recorded an interview with a former member
of the Editorial Board of Amerasia, believed to be very reliable, who pointed
out the radical viewpoints of most of the members of this Board. He classified
subject as "far to the left — awfully close to a fellow traveler" and later modified
this by referring to him as "radical liberal." The file reflects that an individual
by subject's name, located in the National Press Building (Note: Subject was
located there in 1941), was a subscrihed to the Daily Worker and also a member
of the Capital City Forum.
(C-13), an alleged Communist Party member, has twice worked for subject.
One of subject's associates, when interviewed, said that he "went through the
usual left-wing stage, as did most of the young people identified with the As-
sociation during their twenties and thirties."
There is no indication that further investigation is contemplated in this case.
No. 55
This individual was employed in March 1944 as Division Assistant in the
Division of Internal Security. . She had been employed for a number of years
by the American Association of University Women in connection with Interna-
tional Education. In July 1946 she was assigned to a position as a representative
to UNESCO at $8,778. Her previous highest salary with the American Associa-
tion of University Women was $4,000 per annum.
This case was assigned for investigation by CSA in November 1943. Inter-
views with references and a check of school records resulted in nothing deroga-
tory. The case was reopened for security investigation on April 28, 1947, on oral
information received by CSA concerning her husband reportedly being a Com-
munist. He is employed in a responsible position with the Navy Bureau of Ord-
nance.
1790 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A CSA report on August 1~>, 1047, indicated as a result of contact with seven
associates and former supervisors of subject that she reportedly was a Liberal.
Her husband, according to the informants, has a highly confidential position with
the Navy Department and was possibly present at the Bikini Atom Bomb Test.
The House Un-American Activities Committee advised on August 18, 1H47,
X-9, an admitted former Communist Party member, was formerly associated with
the subject in Communist Party activities in Washington, D. C. Interview with
this informant by the CSA Agent indicated that the subject's husband had ad-
mitted to him in 1929 or 1930 that he was a member of the Communist Party in
Baltimore, Maryland. The informant also advised that the subject had associated
with a group of known Communists. The informant said he had not seen the
subject for over ten years.
On July 16, 1947, it was ascertained that in 1941 a Senate Investigating Com-
mittee had stated the subject and her husband were members of the Communist
Party. On September 15, 1947, a Government investigative agency advised that
early in 1941 a reliable informant reported the subject as a Communist. Fur-
ther, that the subject had been recently contacting a subject of a Soviet Espio-
nage case.
This investigation is in a pending status.
Xo. 56
The subject was born in 1909 in London. England. He came to the United
States in 1934 and taught at Amherst College from September 1934 to June 1936
at $2,500 per annum. He also taught at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville,
New York, from September 1936 to June 1942 at $3,000 per annum. Since June
1942 he has been employed by the U. S. Government — first, by the Board of Eco-
nomic Warfare, then by the Foreign Economic Administration, and subsequently
by the War Department. He is now a Special Assistant to an Assistant Secretary
of State at $8,750 per annum.
Investigation disclosed that he was a student of Harold Laski, from 1927 to
1931, and he was in bis employ as a research assistant from 1931 to 1933. He
was naturalized in the United States in 1944. Subject was highly recommended
by several witnesses although several stated he is a Socialist and anti-Fascist.
A former Department employee. E-9, about whom derogatory information has
been obtained by CSA, recommended the subject very highly and the subject in
turn had recommended E-9 highly.
The subject wrote a book which the CSA investigator reviewed and reports
is anti-Capitalistic as well as anti-Fascist. In 1937 the subject contributed a
book review to the publication "Science and Society" which on its face says "A
Marxian Quarterly."
A memorandum of February 2.j, 1947, points out. in addition to the above, that
the subject is a friend of (E-ll), a suspect in a Russian Esponiage case. Further
investigation was requested in this memorandum.
A memorandum dated June 16, 1947. from CSA to Mr. Puerifoy. summarizes
the above information, pointing out in addition that the subject's sister was re-
p rted a Communist Party member in 1944, and an individual believed to be a
relative was a Communist Party member in England. It has not been definitely
established whether that individual is a relative of the subject.
Although this is a pending case, there has been nothing in file since June 16,
1947.
ATo. •»?'
He is presently employed in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Derogatory in-
formation concerning this individual, which appears in bis file, is confined to
reference to a speech he made in New York City in 1946 at a meeting sponsored
by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy. It is fairly well estab-
lished that the meeting was a Communist-controlled and sponsored gathering.
(»n the program with him was Andrew Roth and K. W. Stephan Fritehman.
The first mentioned of these two individuals was remembered as having been
accused of turning over Government documents to outside sources and was de-
termined to be a close associate of such individuals as Philip Jaffe. The latter
named individual has taken a prominent part in numerous Communist front
organizations.
Subject was also a reference for (C-14i who has been described as a "pink."
(' 14 also is known as a contact of Philip Jaffe.
Case closed August 12, 1947.
- \!i: DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1791
No. 58
The tile indicates that he is presently assigned to UNESCO.
information received October 22, 1946, from several sources, indicated that
subject associated and was in sympathy with various left-wing elements. An-
other informant stated that he is a friend of 0-15 who was removed from the
Department on the basis of his long record of Communist activities. An in-
formant stated that the subject and No. .".4 were trying to secure a position
for C-15 in the Cultural Relations Division of the Department even though
his record as a Communist was well known.
Note. — No. .".4 and subject were both in Cultural Relations at the time.
The informant also said that subject was trying to place C-16, an alleged
London Communist, in that Division. Several informants pointed out that the
subject had. on several occasions, appeared on programs with pro-Soviet
individuals.
An article in the Daily Worker. 1!)4('>, indicates that he addressed a meeting
concerning films for UNESCO along with Thomas J. Brandon of the Film Coun-
cil of America, a well-known Communist propagandist.
A letter from a Government investigative agency of June 20, 1946, indicates
the subject, when still with Cultural Relations, prevented the American Federa-
tion of Labor representative from being included on a list of educators for Japan.
The informant in this matter indicated the belief that the A. F. of L. representa-
tive^ name was omitted deliberately.
This investigation is pending.
No. .55
He is with the Division of Occupied Areas.
His wife is with the Division of Research and Intelligence. The- file reflects
that the subjects are regarded as liberals and possessors of leftist views but
contains very little derogatory information.
He has an application on file for the Foreign Service. A memorandum dated
December 3. 1946, pertaining to the subjects contains the following last two
paragraphs :
■The Security Office has carefully reviewed the entire files on the subject
cases. On the basis of present available information, the Security Office is
of the opinion that there is insufficient, information to warrant a recom-
mendation for termination action.
"However, in view of the fact that both (subjects) are known to be close
associates of individuals linked with Soviet aspionage activities, this office
will continue to keep their cases under active consideration.-'
Then, on February 11, 1947, Mr. Hoffman prepared the following memorandum
concerning the female subject:
"The subject was approved for top-secret material on this date, inasmuch
as her case had been carefully considered by the Security Office, and it had
been decided that there was insufficient information to warrant termination
of her services."
Mr. Hoffman, when questioned concerning this clearance, stated:
"If there is not enough to dismiss them, then they cannot be denied access
to top-secret material."
It would appear to logically follow from this that anyone in the State Depart-
ment who lias not been dismissed should be given access to top-secret material,
and that the maintenance of a list of employees having access to top-secret mate-
rial is not of too much importance.
No. GO
This person has been employed as an Executive Secretary with the State
Department since July 1945. Prior to that, she had been employed by the Politi-
cal Action Committee, Foreign Economic Administration, National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and the Treasury Department. For some time, she was associated
with C— 17, a well-known Left-Wing Social Worker. She is also a friend of two
female employees of the State Department who are also under investigation for
Left-Wing associations.
Another Government investigative agency informed in February 1947 that the
subject has been in contact with E-10, a Soviet Espionage subject.
This investigation is in a pending status.
No. 61
This individual has been with the State Department since August 4, 194:5, and
is now with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.
1792 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Interest in the subject developed from remarks of Congressman X-10, appear-
ing in the Congressional Record, listing Communists employed by the State
Department.
On May 3, 1944, she was reported as being very close to C-18, a Political
Action Committee official. On April 28, 1945, she was reported as having rented
an apartment to the brother of No. 12, a Russian espionage suspect, during her
absence. On September 5, 1940, she was interviewed concerning her interest
in having this espionage suspect employed by the State Department.
On December G, 1940, she furnished a 42-page statement (actually an auto-
biography with 5 pages of references included) in which she disclaimed any
interest in Communism. She explained her interest in Russia as being academic.
The material developed centers principally on the subject's contacts with sus-
pected Soviet espionage suspects, with Communists, and visiting Russian dele-
gates during the San Francisco Conference, together with the fact that she has
allegedly criticized the Secretary of State and favored the Soviet in reports.
The subject agreed that she was responsible for the State Department having
employed No. 12, but stated that it was because of his ability only that she had
recommended him. State Department officials are presently (October l!»4Ti
being interviewed concerning their knowledge of her ideology and beliefs. A
number indicate suspicion of her but have little specific information other than
her criticism of Secretary Byrnes and her unnecessary close association with
the visiting Russian delegates. Some of the individuals interviewed expressed
the belief that there was nothing wrong with her thinking but that she was
merely too vigorous in her beliefs.
Investigation is pending.
A'o. 62
He is a Regional Specialist, P-0, in OIE. He was, allegedly, a former corre-
spondent for a publication of short existence which had been created by No. 12
and E-12, alleged Soviet espionage agents. He and his wife are close associates
of E-13 and E-14, who also are alleged espionage agents. He has continued
to be a close associate of No. 12 and, reportedly, rode to and from work with
No. 12 when that person was still employed with the State Department.
Investigation is pending.
No. 63
He is presently assigned to the Office of American Republic Affairs. He entered
the Foreign Service in 1939.
A memorandum of August 19, 1940, indicated he worked with the Editorial
Board of the American Foreign Service Journal during 1938 and 1939.
A memorandum of the same date indicates that another Governmental agency
had received information that he was a recognized section leader of the Com-
munist underground. A subsequent check with this Agency (September 30,
1947) developed that in 1939, when he was with the Foreign Service Journal,
he had a small Communist Party unit meeting in his home. The source of this
information said that he was a leader of this Communist underground unit.
His investigation is pending.
No. 6Jt
He is presently in the Division of International Labor, Health and Social
Affairs. He was transferred to the State Department from OSS.
A report by another Government investigating agency made in 1941 while
the subject was with the Bureau of Labor Standards. Department of Labor,
reflected that as of January 21, 1941, he was on the active indices of the Wash-
ington Committee for Democratic Action and as of February 17, 1941, on the
active indices of the American Peoples Mobilization. He was listed in the "Call
for National Negro Congress" pamphlet distributed in Chicago in 1930. When
interviewed in 1941, the subject denied connection with the first two organiza-
tions but verified that his name had been used as a sponsor for the National
Negro Congress with his consent though he was a trifle vague as to the cir-
cumstances in which his name was given.
The oss investigation indicated the subject was on the liberal side. The
records of the un-American Activities Committee indicate he was a member
of the Marion Anderson Citizens Committee. No recent material from the
Government Agency which investigated him in 1941 appears in the file.
A Mcmoradum of October 10, 1!>47, by Mr. Hoffman states that an informant
said that subject was urging the Visa Division to issue a nonimmigration visa
to a French Communisl leader. This labor leader intended to come to the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1793
United States to attend a labor union's conference. The informant did not
know if subject's interest was personal or if be was acting on behalf of his
division chid'.
No. 65
She is employed in the Division of International Exchange of Persons.
A previous employer said that she was "dishonest with time," untruthful,
untrustworthy, and also "wrapped up in Communism"; that she finally had to
let her go under unfavorable circumstances, and that she later married a man
who was. reportedly, a Communist.
A summary memorandum of December 3, 1946, advised that the risk in-
volved in employing subject required careful consideration. Her application
was dated Almost 15. 1946, and a report with derogatory information was dated
November 6, 1948. It should he noted at this point that subject was employed
regardless of the above derogatory information.
A Memorandum of April 3, 1047, bears a penciled note which says "she is a
friend of Xo. 11 of State Department. She and husband are contacts of a sub-
ject in the ( — ■ — ) case."' The case referred to is a current important espionage
ease. Further contact with another Government agency failed to develop ex-
actly how close the subject was with the subjects of the above espionage case.
A report of June 27, 1947, reflects that the former employer quoted above
was not as certain as he had previously indicated about the subject's Com-
munist connections, though her remarks concerning the subject's associations
and acquaintances were still derogatory.
This case is pending.
The following individuals, listed as Numbers 66-77, inclusive, are employed
in divisions under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence. In addi-
tion, Numbers 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 44, who were referred to in the section of the
report on CSA, are employed in Research and Intelligence.
No. 66
The subject was employed as an Analyst by OSS from June 1944 to October
194."), when he was transferred to the State Department. Since his transfer he
has been assigned to Research and Intelligence.
He was born in Russia and naturalized in San Francisco in 1929. An investi-
gation conducted in 1946 by CSA consisted of checks of employment and school
records, and interviews with three former supervisors on non-Government jobs.
Two of these supervisors recommended subject unfavorably. Three references,
with Russian names, all in Government employment, recommended him favorably.
On the basis of that investigation he was given security clearance. Subject sub-
sequently became the subject of a security investigation as a result of his room-
mate, one of his references, having in his possession a State Department report
which he had no authority to possess. This information was furnished the
State Department by a Navy Department Official who had seen that individual
with the State Department official confidential report in his possession.
Investigation was instituted on the basis of this information.
No. 67
The above subject was employed by OSS from July 1942 to November 1943,
and in the U. S. Navy from November 1943 to March 1946. In 1946 he was
employed as a P-7 Consultant with the State Department in the Division of Re-
search. An investigation, including only checks with reference, employers,
and schools, was conducted in April 1946 and revealed no derogatory information
as to loyalty. He was cleared on May 16, 1946, as to "character, ability, depend-
ability, general reputation, and loyalty." One reference, a Navy Captain, said
"he was hard to handle, and the reason he was sent to Siberia was to get him
out of Washington where he persisted in going over the heads of his immediate
superiors to get nssi-nments of his choice." This statement was concurred in
by a Navy Lt. Commander.
In June 7. 1946, a Government investigative agency advised that the subject
is a known contact of E-15, a subject in a Russian Espionage case. The subject
has played bridge and exchanged language lessons with persons in the Soviet
Embassy, Washington, D. C. He is also a known contact of Jessica Smith of
Soviet Russia Today.
This investigative agency further reported on June 7, 1946, that E-16, a known
Soviet Espionage Agent, was arrested with his wife in Finland in 1933 and while
in custody E-16's wife requested the American Consul to forward on her behalf
1794 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
a request for funds from the subject in Michigan. Further, on March 15, 1934,
subject wrote Congressman X-ll, requesting his assistance in the case of
Arvid Jacobson.
There is no indication in the file that any investigation was conducted on this
subject by CSA on the basis of the above information furnished by another
Government Agency; however, on September 11, T.)47, the subject was granted
"top secret" clearance on the basis of a memorandum written by Moyer of CSA
to Hoffman of CSA. This memorandum states ''the derogatory information in
this case, from the standpoint of security, consists of the following:
"(1) Report from Physical Security Section relating to the loss and
recovery of official classified papers in February 1947.
"(2) In 1934, subject addressed letter to Congressman in behalf of an
acquaintance of known Communist sympathies being held in Finland on
espionage charges.
"(3) Information received from in June l!)4(i as follows:
"(a) (Subject) known contact of (E— 15>.
"(b) (Subject) known contact of Jessica Smith of Soviet Russia
Today.
"(e) In the summer of 194.~> (subject) was transferred from OSS to a
new assignment with ONI, which assignment would take him to Sibera,
Russia. (Subject) indicated that his assignment, presumably with
ONI, had included liaison with, and training of, Soviet Marines stationed
at a Russian Port. (Subject) also advised that at one time be played
bridge and exchanged language lessons with persons in the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington, D. G.
"In my opinion, the information related above is not sufficient to with-
hold top secret clearance. With reference to point (1), thei-e appears to
have been certain mitigating circumstances, and there is no indication that
any disciplinary action was taken, with reference to point (2), the political
and economic situation was somewhat different, and there is no indication
that (subject) was in sympathy with the acquaintances* political philosophy.
Moreover, we do not know the outcome of the incident. With reference to
points 8 (A), (B), (C), the words 'known contact' mean nothing, especially
since the subject was apparently connected with Rusisan affairs in ONI and
would naturally seek out persons who possessed a knowledge of the language,
etc. While the CSA file did indicate an interest in Russia on the part of
the subject, there is no evidence of Communist sympathy. Likewise, there
is no indication of subversive activity or affiliation with any Communist
groups or fronts. The subject is highly recommended. In conclusion, the
subject has been given security clearance to a responsible position, the satis-
factory performance of his duties necessitating access to top secret material.
To be consistent, in the absence of additional highly derogatory informa-
tion, I feel that top secret clearance should be given. Even in cases where
highly unfavorable information is developed, I think the remedy would be
to withhold security clearance in the first place, or if subsequently developed,
adequate for dismissal."
It is to be noted that the above security clearance was given without any
further investigation, which would appear advisable on the basis of information
of a serious nature furnished by another Government investigative agency. It
is especially so in view of the fact that the original clearance in this case was
based on an investigation of a rather sketchy nature including interviews with
references, employers and check of school records.
No. 68
She was a research analyst with OSS from July 1944 to September 1945,
when she was transferred to the State Department, where she is in the Divi-
sion of Research. She has been active in Local #3 of the United Public Workers
of America in the State Department, and until 1946, was a member of the Wash-
ington Hook Shop. For many years she has been a close friend of B-10, a sub-
ject in a Russian Espionage case, and they both reside in the same apartment
building.
Several informants interviewed by CSA commented favorably as to her loyalty
1o the United States and she was given security clearance on April 14, 1947, and
again on June 18, 1947. On July 11. 1947 a Governmental investigative agency
advised that it had received information from a highly confidential source of
information, whose reliability is unquestioned, that the subject has been con-
verted to communism by E-10.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1795
The case was reopened mi the basis of this information, but there were no
further reports in the file as of October J, 11)47.
Vo. 09
He is a special assistanl in Research and Intelligence.
Be was with oss from February 194." until he entered on duty in the Depart-
ment in October 1945. lie was born and educated in Germany; he came from
England in 1938, endorsed by Harold .1. Laski. He was naturalized .May 28,
1943.
From April 1980 to February 1943, he was with the Institute of Social Re-
search described as a Communist organization despite its camouflaging and
carrying on in a clandestine manner.
During a meeting of the German-Austrian Secretariat, held in 1946, the prom-
inent trade union offices in Germany were discussed and subject expressed the
belief that it would be dangerous for an AF of L representative to go to Germany.
He believed that in the United States Zone anti-Communist propaganda in the
unions was unnecessary. He expressed the belief that if the AF of L man were
admitted, then the World Federated Trade Union should also be admitted.
The latter is the organization that has had active Russian participation and is
suspected of being Communist-dominated.
A letter from a Government investigative agency dated June 18. 1946, is some-
what indefinite as to the status of the Institute of Social Research. It is ap-
parently an organization of German-Jewish refugees. During the war, it was
associated with the Russian Economic Institute whose aim was to increase the
understanding of contemporary Russia.
This case is pending.
No. tO
She was employed by OSS in the Division of Research from June 1942 to
September 1945, at which time she was transferred to the State Department
where she is a branch Chief in Research and Intelligence.
A USA investigation was satisfactory, from a security standpoint, except for
one former supervisor who gave his opinion that she was a Communist. He
said, however, that he had no tangible reason for this statement.
She was dismissed as an instructor at Hunter College in 19"7 for unsatisfactory
services. For some time she has resided with No. 14, a former State Depart-
ment employee, whose resignation was requested because of Communist activ-
ities; however, the subject was cleared for top secret material on February 11,
1947. and The case is in a closed status.
No. 11
He is presently employed in the Division of Research for Europe.
The latest typed material appearing in his file is dated December 19, 1944.
Prior to this he was investigated and nothing derogatory was developed. A
card dated May 19, 1947, indicates he tried to get a job in the State Depart-
ment for a former roommate of Shura Lewis. Shura Lewis is the individual
who recently received so much newspaper publicity as a result of her supposedly
Communist talks given before local high-school students, and who has been
actively investigated by another Government agency. The case was assigned to
the Special Unit on June 11. 1947. As of October 1947. the only material in the
file was in the form of penciled notes.
Investigation is pending.
No. 72
This employee is presently in the Acquisition and Distribution Division under
the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.
Subject's file reflects no derogatory information: however, it is noted that
subject has been active with the UPWA and that one of her references, 0-19,
has been affiliated with Communist-Front organizations.
A pencilled note of September 11. 1946, says that a Government investigative
agency is working on the case and that subject is connected with the above-men-
tioned reference in some way. This agency has suggested that there is a strong
possibility of a* close tie up between this individual and the aforementioned refer-
ence. A memorandum of October .°>0, 1946. indicated advance security clearance
was given and "additional investigation" is being made. There is nothing sub-
sequent to this in the file; the papers are in the closed section of the files, the
index card reflects that the case was closed October 18, 1946.
1796 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
No. 73
He lias been with the State Department since November 16, 1927, and is pres-
ently with the Acquisition and Distribution Division under the Special Assistant
for Research and Intelligence.
An investigation in 1940 developed no derogatory information concerning this
subject. An undated but apparently recent memorandum from J. H. Finlator,
a special agent, to Mr. Fitch follows : "Two employees of the Department who
recently admitted to me that they are homosexuals told me that they believe
the following persons of the Department also to be homosexual: (H-l), (H-2),
and (H-3). One of these informants admitted having relations with (H-5)
of D. C. and stated that (subject) has the reputation among homosexuals as being
homosexual.
"A third informant advised me that (H— 1) goes to homosexual parties,
associates with homosexuals and is 'undoubtedly homosexual'."
Subject's case was opened September 12, 1947, and assigned to Agent Finlator.
All of the above-mentioned individuals are presently employed by the State De-
partment and investigations have been opened on all of them. H-l, H-2, and
H-3 are in the Division of Communications and Records. H^ is in the Division
of Protective Services.
Concerning the above file, it should be mentioned at this point that a review
of the file reflects Agent Finlator has had numerous cases of this type assigned
to him and apparently has handled a number very successfully inasmuch as he
has, on several occasions, secured the questionable members' resignations.
According to persons interviewed in CSA, Finlator has been very successful
in obtaining admissions from this type of individual. In this connection, it might
further be mentioned that homosexuals are regarded as security risks inasmuch
as they are obviously easy blackmail victims. It is understood that having them
classified as security risks was largely brought about by the insistence of Mr.
Fitch as Mr. Robinson, reportedly, originally expressed the belief that though
they were undesirable employees, they could not actually be considered security
risks.
No. 74
He is a biographic analyst in the Biographic Information Division.
He was an alien until December 10, 19k!. The subject received notice of
termination because he was not a citizen.
B. M. Poole of the Biographic Information Division requested that the De-
partment Security Committee reconsider their decision that his services be
terminated because he was due to be naturalized in August 194G. On July 31,
19-hi. the Security Committee again disapproved the subject's employment and
said that he had no unusual qualifications. This employee was transferred
from OSS and nothing is known of his activities prior to 1941 that can be
checked.
On August 27, 1946, Mr. Hoffman said in a note to Mr. Bannerman that Arch
Jean, Chief of the Division of Departmental Personnel, stated that SA-E had
submitted justification to DP for continued employment of subject and that
the case was being cleared subject to a July SA-E report. Mr. Hoffman on
May !>, 1947, staled that an additional clearance for top secret matter was being
given, pending investigation. There is no indication of any investigation or
that any leads had been set out though the case is in a pending status.
No. 75
He is presently employed by flu- State Department as a Research Analyst
assigned to Research and Intelligence.
His background investigation developed nothing of a derogatory nature. He
was with Army Intelligence from 1944 to June 1946. On April 7, 1947, he was
given a security clearance.
He has been a very close associate of E-17, former War Department Em-
ploye" who was dropped for security reasons and who is believed to have passed
information and material to Soviet agents. One of his associates at the War
Department, with whom lie has since been in contact, is 0-20, .who is active
with "liberal" groups. He has also been a close associate of 0-21 who is said
to be a Communisl sympathizer. He is also a close associate of C-22, an in-
dividual of alleged radical beliefs.
This case is [lending.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1797
No. 76
This individual is presently employed in Research and Intelligence.
A report of another Government agency indicated that in 1943, when subject
was with the National Resources Planning Board, he allegedly cursed a war
veteran and the United States Government.
Informants were quoted as saying he and his wife maintained a Communist
and un-American attitude. It was claimed that his wife admitted being a mem-
ber of the Communist Party at the University of Wisconsin. He reportedly sub-
scribed to In Fact and Soviet Russia Today. He is a close friend of E-15 and
others in a major espionage case.
A note in the tile indicates that as of February 25, 1947, Agent J. H. Finlator
was working on the case. Another penciled note stated that the case should
not be worked on until the FBI had given clearance as it might upset their in-
vestigation. This case has been open since early 1945. On September 25, 1945,
Robert Bannerman, at that time Security Officer, said there was not enough
evidence and they would have to let him slide through.
tfo.77
He was born in 1916. He was with OSS from January 1942 to December 1945,
when he was transferred to the State Department where he is presently a Chief
in Research and Intelligence. An investigation of his background was conducted
by CSA in April 1946. This investigation consisted of interviews with refer-
ences and a check of college records.
Subject was given advance security clearance on May 8, 1946. In the file on
the subject is a copy of a memorandum dated August 30, 1946, to Assistant Chief
of Air Staff-2, from X-12, Colonel, AC, Acting Chief Air Intelligence Division.
This memorandum states the following:
"1. During the latter half of August 1946 Major (X-13), A. C, under-
going final briefings prior to his departure to assume a position as an Air
Attache at Rome, Italy, was directed to the U. S. State Department for
orientation.
"2. At State (subject) undertook, for better than an hour, to belabor
Major (X-13) for his imbalance toward Capitalism and to excuse it on the
basis that the Capitalistic Press of the United States was undoubtedly the
source of (the Major's) bias. Further (subject) proceeded to 'sell' the ad-
vantages Communism would bring to the United States and to Iitaly were
it the system prevalent.
il3. (Subject) may have been slyly trying Major (X-13) and experimenting
with the mentality of a typical Army Air Officer * * * if, he (X-13), got
the impression that State wanted the United States Air Attache to favor
Communism over the established U. S. Government, then (subject) is wrong.
If (subject) is wrong, then he should not be advising Air Force Attaches
going into the field."
In a memorandum dated September 9, 1946, from Bannerman to Klaus, it is
pointed out that subject strongly supported the appointment of C-23, a strong
pro-Communist, to an OIC Post in Belgrade.
A memorandum dated September 20, 1946, from Bannerman to Klaus, refers
to an interview had with subject regarding the briefing incident mentioned in the
memorandum of Colonel X-12. It was pointed out in the memorandum of Ban-
nerrnan's that this should have been routine briefing of about fifteen minutes'
duration but actually lasted \\i, hours. It developed that Major X-13 is a strong
advocate of Capitalism as it exists in the United States. After his opinions were
solicited by subject, the latter then proceeded to conduct the interview in the
manner of a professor trying to show an errant student the fallacy of his political
thinking, and pointing out that he (the subject) believes the most effective form
of Government is one closely approaching state socialism. Subject admitted that
it was cjuite possible the Major could have misinterpreted Ins remarks as a
preference for Communism or Socialism on his part.
There is no indication in the file that any type of action was taken on the
basis of Mr. Bannerman's memorandum of September 20, 1946.
On October 20. 1947. a CSA investigator in Philadelphia, advised that the pre-
vious evening he attended a meeting sponsored by the Sunday Night Forum (a
liberal organization) at which the speaker was J. Raymond Walsh (a well-known
liberal). He spoke on "The Witch Hunt in Washington," and during his talk
stated that a close personal friend of his came to New York City recently and had
a talk with him about the purge in the State Department. This friend told him
he was going to resign from the OSS Section of the State Department that week
1798 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
because of the prying of the investigators. On the basis of this information, the
ease was reopened for investigation inasmuch as the speaker identified his friend,
as the subject.
Individuals listed as Numbers 78-89 inclusive are employees of the Office of
Information and Educational Exchange. Number 90 is an apparently qualified
person for the position on the Russian desk who was rejected although the
investigation was favorable. He is listed because the statement has been made
That the foreign language positions are extremely difficult to till and, conse-
quently, some questionable security risks, as well as aliens, have been retained
by OIE. In addition to Numbers 78-81). Numbers 3 and 4:;. who were referred
to in the section of the report on CSA, are employees of OIE.
No. 78
Subject is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New
York City in a highly responsible position.
Subject's Form 57 includes as references No. T!> find C— 24.
The tile indicates subject is the center of a Communist or extremely liberal
group which has control of the type of material being broadcast. Numerous
fellow employees cited examples of subtle news distortion and attitudes pointing
out divergencies of broadcast from the Stare Department policy.
Material in the rile indicates C-24. of the Radio Program Branch, sided with
subject when N-14 called his attention to a broadcast very critical of the Pope.
A memorandum of June 18, 1947, from Fitch to Peurifoy. initiated by Good-
rich, shows that action will be held in abeyance pending findings by OIE's own
investigating Committee. CSA has no knowledge concerning whether or not
OIE has accomplished anything in its investigation. (A Lengthy report, dated
February 17. 11)47. by one of the New York Agents of CSA, is being set forth as
an appendix in some detail because it gives a good picture of the general per-
sonnel situation in the International Broadcasting Division as well as the sub-
ject's activities. Inasmuch as most of the information in this report was given
in the strictest confidence by loyal employees of OIE, it is strongly recommended
that it not be made a matter of public record. However, there is set out below
from a CSA memorandum of June 18, 1!)47 a summary of the information de-
veloped by investigation. It is suggested the Committee may wish to use it
rather than the appendix in recorded hearings.)
The subject is presently employed as a Policy Information Specialist. CAF-13,
in the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. State De-
partment, New York City. Subject is responsible for the control of script and
news material which is used in the broadcasts of the Voice of America pro-
grams and is in charge of the Policy Control Desk which acts as a clearing
house or monitoring desk for all scripts which are used on the broadcasts to
Europe.
"1. From the standpoint of the investigation the Special Agent handling
the investigation in New York was aware of the difficulties which would
be experienced in contacting persons in the IPD Office in New York who
would be presumed to give reliable information concerning the subject.
However, the Special Agent was able to locate and interrogate numerous
witnesses who stated in substance that the subject has (gathered together
in this office) a mixture of 'fellow travelers." pseudo-liberals and outright
Communists. These witnesses stated that this group is a closely knit sect
the members of which protect each other and continuously assail anyone
who dares to disagree with their way of Thinking. It is alleged that
the subject is the spearhead and dominant leader of this group and will
quickly come to the defense of these persons when anyone makes any
attempt to criticize them personally or the work which they do. It is also
stated by these informants that it has been obvious that the script which
is cleared through the Policy Control Desk which is under the supervision
of the subject, has, from time to time, been altered or changed in a very
subtle way and that it has been noticed that the alteration is invariably
favorable to the Soviet Union or to the Communist Party line in the United
States. One witness stated that there is a multitude of small clues which
point to this group as a bunch of pseudo-liberals whose work is damaging
and who almost terrorize the rest of the personnel in the Division and
stated thai it is unhealthy to oppose this group and that they conduct
themselves in a most clever and insidious way and that it is very difficult
to get anything on them.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1799
"Two of Our witnesses pointed OUt thai as a result of poorly screened
material for the broadcasts these news stories at times had been at cross
purposes with the State Department's policy and they at times have even
hindered the execution of (he foreign policy of the State Department. The
informant referred to a story concerning the State Department's policy
regarding some bases in the Arctic and stated that a release of this news pre-
maturely by the 1 1 > I > Division had tipped oft the rest of the world regarding
this information.
Another witness stated that the subject and (associates) are dominating
almost the entire personnel of the IBD because the Daily Guidance Bulle-
tins and the MRD's emanate from (subject) (who) is the person who inter-
prets and enforces these directives. He also stated that (subject) has very
powerful connections in Washington and is constantly backed up in * * *
decisions whether it regards the protection of (subject's) personnel sched-
uled for dismissal for inefficiency or infractions of rules or whether it in-
volves anyone who dares to question (subject's) instructions.
•'!'. The script referred to herein which contains evidence of tampering
or alteration has been made available to CSA for analysis and upon com-
pletion of this investigation the report of investigation will include a sum-
mary of the findings regarding this material.
"3. Without exception the witnesses contacted in the investigation to date
have been highly critical of the subject and indicate that (the subject) is
not suitable for the position which (subject) holds both from the standpoint
of administrative ability as well as loyalty to the United States and have
been very outspoken in their criticism of (subject's) administration of the
Policy Control Desk of IBD in New York."
"4. Due to the fact that another investigative committee within the De-
partment is presently making inquiries concerning the operation of the IBD
Division and the use of script and other material used on the Voice of
America programs it is believed advisable to coordinate the evidence of
this committee with the current investigation and therefore in view of the
necessity for additional investigation of this case it is believed inadvisable
to make a recommendation concerning the subject at this state of the in-
vestigation."
No. 79
He has a ranking position in OIB.
The memorandum concerning the activities of the Office of Information and
Educational Exchange in New York City, which was reported as it appears in
another file, puts this individual in a poor light but there is nothing in his file
concerning this information. In fact, there is nothing in the file of a derogatory
nature. I Hiring the course of his investigation, one witness commented that he
was "somewhat left of center".
He was given security clearance June 16, 1947.
No. 80
He is a Music Director in OIE.
A report furnished by another investigative agency on June 5, 1945, reflected
that he changed his name in June 1081). H's file reflects that he received a draft
classification of 4-P because of psychoneurosis.
His mother, with whom he lives, attended a number of Communist front
organization meetings. Witnesses reported that the subject and his mother
provided a coffee kitchen for protesters. This refers to a group of tenants who
are accused of being a Communistic inspired protest group.
Subject's municipal service file indicated that he was employed from Decem-
ber 1988 r<> March 1939 by the State, County and Municipal Workers of America.
This organization has been accused by X-15 and others as being a Communist-
dominated organization. His connection with this group was ont listed on his
Form "7. Upon interview, subject denied that he had been employed by this
organization and explained that he had taken a course of study from that
organization in training for work as a social investigator. It was his under-
standing that it was the only course of its type in New York. In 1938 he studied
music in the New School for Social Research under Hans Eisler, the individual
who lias received considerable recent publicity due to his appearance before
the House un-American Activities Committee. There is no indication from the
file that his association with Eisler stemmed out of anything other than a
mutual interest in music. Concerning his being classified 4-F, his mother
v ■.as quoted as saying that they did see to it that they kept him out of the Army.
1800 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
When applying for a position as playground director he said on November 28,
19.39, "* * * When conducting the chorus of the State, County, and Municipal
Workers of America". He subsequently denied that this was a correct statement
of his activities with the singing group with which he was connected.
An individual bearing his name at a certain address in New York City, listed
with the Department of Information and Records, New York City, requested
on June 29, 1939 that his address be changed to Apartment I. A-3 in care of
Seabrook. This card was not signed but was printed. On August 29, 1939
an individual with the same name as the subject's and the last-mentioned address,
signed a Communist Party Election Petition. The investigating agent, however,
after comparing printing and handwriting, is of the opinion that it was an
individual other than the subject who resided at that address at the time and
had signed the Petition. Concerning the change of address card, the Agent
stated "the conclusion was drawn that an error had been committed either
through the negligence of the clerk in the Muncipal Civil Service Commission
or through the deliberate attempt (by the individual bearing the same name and
address) to benefit by the applicant's identification.
On April 10, 1947, complete security clearance was given the subject.
Note. — Concerning the above case, the Investigative Staff is of the opinion
that it is fairly well established that the subject was not the signer of the Com-
munist Party Election Petition. However, it is noted that the subject's forth-
rightness and honesty, at least, are somewhat subject to question as a result of
the contradictions apparent from his execution of forms in subsequent interviews.
No. 81
The subject was employed by OWI as a news editor in March 1942 and was
transferred to the State Department when that agency was taken over by the
Department. Investigation disclosed that in December 1944, when C-25, a
known Communist of the OWI Office in London was discharged after a Hatch
Act investigation, the subject was vigorous in opposing this action. In June
194(5, while attending a meeting of the National Committee to Win the Peace,
which was attended by a number of well-known Communists and sympathizers,
he was arrested for disorderly conduct.
CSA also advised that they had information from another Governmental
investigative agency that a highly confidential source reported that on the
morning following the subject's arrest, two members of the Soviet Underground
discussed ways and means of assisting subject to get out of the predicament or
to hush up the matter. The informant indicated that the circumstances leading
up to this information clearly indicates that subject is of importance and stands
high in Communist circles.
The above information was set out in a memorandum dated June 17, 1946, and
a full investigation of the subject was requested. There was no indication that
he had been given a full investigation before. Subsequent investigation disclosed
that two former associates of the subject with the Newark Evening News stated
in June 1947 that the subject was a very aggressive leader of the Local of the
American Newspaper Guild and they stated that they would not rehire the subject
nor recommend him for a Government position.
This case is still pending and no decision has been reached.
The subject was given a hearing on July 10, 1947, at which he denied any Com-
munist or pro-Communist activities, and no admissions of a derogatory nature
were obtained from him.
No. 82
She is employed with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in
Now York City.
Her tile reflects that she was born January 20, 1919 in Sofia, Bulgaria.
A memorandum of September 2, 1947 recites that an informant, a very intelli-
gent reputable person, had advised that the subject married a United States
soldier stationed in Bulgaria, who was uneducated and of no background though
she has money, furs, and jewelry. Upon her arrival in this country according to
informant, she immediately began trying to associate herself with the State
Department. She allegedly has a brother in England who is a radio announcer
with definite Communist Party leanings.
This investigation is pending.
No. 83
He is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New
York City.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1801
He signed ;i Communisl Party Election Petition, as did his parents, on August
3, 1939. When voting in 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941, he did not indicate a Demo-
crat or Republican Party affiliation as is customary in that state. In this con-
nection it was pointed out in the file that the Communist Party had not heen on
the ballot in New York since 1936. When questioned concerning his signing the
election petition, he said he did not recall signing the petition but when con-
fronted with the fad that he had, he said that it must have been at the request
of a friend.
On November 4, 1041, the Civil Service Commission recommended his removal
from the Government. This was never acted upon and on November 30, 1942,
he was advised the Commission had reversed its decision. The file reflects no
other derogatory information.
The form giving security clearance, on October 8, 1947, was checked "Results
of investigation are completely favorable to subject."
No. S4
This individual is employed with the Office of Information and Educational
Exchange in New York City.
She has been with the Government since September 1944. Her parents are
Russian born. Investigation developed no derogatory information concerning
subject, however, only her college attendance and previous employers were
checked.
Her sister, according to the file, is a known Communist.
No. 85
This is an illustration of lack of follow-up even though subject appears to be
possible security risk.
The subject has been employed by the Department with OIE in New York City
since December 1945. Information was received by the Department from con-
fidential sources indicating that he may be affiliated with Communist front
groups, and that he may have Communist sympathies.
On April 16, 1947, the New York Office of CSA was requested to investigate the
matter and they were provided with a report of another Government agency.
No report had been received from New York since September 25, 1947, and there
was no indication in the file that the matter had been followed up with New York.
No. 86
She is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange as a consult-
ant in New York City.
A Government investigative agency memorandum of May 1, 1947, stated that
a confidential source advised that her reputation was lurid, that she was a lead-
ing light in the America First Movement, was a Nazi sympathizer and active in a
Falange Movement.
No. 87
This individual has been employed by the Office of Information and Educa-
tional Exchange since February 1943 on a "when actually employed" basis.
The file reflects that he purportedly came from Italy in late 1942 and entered
the United States illegally. He is Bulgarian. He lived for six months with
C-26, editor of a supposedly Communist controlled Bulgarian language news-
paper. He is a close associate of known Communists.
Subject attended the Military Intelligence Training Course at Camp Ritchie,
Maryland, and Indiana University.
Another Government agency reported that the subject was reluctant to bear
arms against the enemy and that he faked his inability to understand and speak
English, etc., indicating he was a poor soldier. The wife of a reference said she
felt the subject "is a bit 'Leftist.' "
He was issued a Certificate of Naturalization October 8, 1945. In his petition
for naturalization he stated that he entered the United States in New York Citv,
May 6, 1941.
The case is presently pending.
A'o. 88
The file reflects subject is an employee of the Information and Educational
Exchange in New York City. He was born in Hungary. He offered to donate
$1,000 to Helen Bryan of the Joint-Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. She is the
same individual and the Committee is the same organization that were brought
before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Though subject is a
1802 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
medical doctor, he worked in a variety of war plants before going with OWL
His record in this country starts in November . 1988. His investigation is
pending.
No. 89
This Foreign Service applicant has been with the Office of Information and
Educational Exchange.
The file reflects that his girl friend, E— 18, was known as a "'campus radical"
at Syracuse University. Close social friends of subject and his girl friend are,
and have been for some time, E— 13, C-27 and C-28, all of whom have Com-
munist connections.
A report of October 29, 19-l(i indicates subject has a poor personality and is
"very slow." as well as being a close associate with the above individuals.
His investigation is pending.
Aro. 90
This is an instance where an apparently good" -security risk was passed up
although he was highly recommended for an OIE position.
The subject was born at Kiev, Russia, in 1877. He was investigated in the
fall of 1946 for a position on the Russian desk of the OIE. Investigation dis-
closed that he was a refugee from the Red Revolution in Russia and that he
was naturalized in New York City in 1927. He is reportedly an expert on Rus-
sian affairs, having studied them for a period of many years. He was employed
by OSS as a consultant from February 1942 to December 1942 and then requested
to resign.
The subject stated that he was forced to resign because of Communist pres-
sure, and that C-29 of the Jewish Telegraph Agency and Vladimar Stepanovasky,
an NKVD Agent in the United States, had openly stated that he was too anti-
Soviet to be employed by OSS.
The subject's immediate .supervisor with OSS reportedly told him he was
forced to terminate the subject's services due to circumstances beyond his con-
trol. One of the subpect's references and a high State Department official con-
firmed the subject's statement concerning his dismissal from OSS. The subject
was very highly recommended by several witnesses as an able man and as a
democratic American who supported Democracy for Russia and opposed Com-
munism. There is no indication in the :ile that the subject was employed.
Contact was had with Mr. Ryan, of the Division of Personnel, and he advised
that according to his file the subject apparently "did not have qualifications for
the job."
Individual listed as Nos. 91-95, inclusive, are in the Foreign Service. Nos.
9 and 48, who were referred to in the OSA section of the report, are also in the
Foreign Service.
No. 91
He was born in 1913. He practiced law from September 1936 to September
1942. He was with the Board of Economic Warfare from September 1942 to
November 1943 and has been with the State Department as a Senior Economic
Analyst in the Foreign Service from November 1943 to the present time. In
addition, he is an applicant for the position of Foreign Service* career officer.
Prior to 1947, no previous full investigation had been conducted of his back-
ground.
Investigation from February 1917 to June 1917 disclosed that he has always
associated with known Leftists and was highly recommended by C— 30, C-31,
C-32 and C-33, all known fellow travelers. In California, his closest associates
for several years were C-34 and C-35, also active fellow travelers.
A former law associate of the subject refused to recommend him for federal
employment. The informant said subject's public relations are bad, he is Lacking
in polish, does not meet people well, and is so far to the Left that he would advo-
cate any Liberal cause.
The tile discloses a request of December 12, 1946, by a Department official, for
a Foreign Service inspector to investigate an alleged irregularity on the part of
the subject in his sale of a personal automobile at a fantastic black-market price
in Spain, and the subsequent purchase of another automobile at the official price
on the statement that it was to be used for official purposes. This car is appar-
ently not being used on official business. There was no report in the file on the
requested investigation.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1803
In a letter of January 30, 1947, Foreign Service Inspector X -5 mentioned that
he had previously submitted an efficiency rating of "unsatisfactory" on the sub-
ject, advising that he was "convinced (subject) was a rough type of lawyer who
might look upon his own personal benefit in trustee operations and should not
be continued in the Foreign Service."
A Superior Court judge in California, who knows subject well, said subject
is a Leftist, and his associates were always of the same type. He said further
that he would not have the subject in any responsible Government position if he
had anything to say about it.
Another California judge said the subject associated with fellow travelers and
be would definitely not recommend him.
Th^re have been no reports in the files since June 6, 1947, but the case is still
pending.
»0. 92
This individual was employed at an American Mission in the Far East during
1947. He is a United States citizen of foreign-born parents.
Information was obtained by a Consul General that the subject may be fur-
nishing information to a Russian Agent, and two sources of information reported
that the subject has represented himself as an American Intelligence Agent. At
the Mission where he was employed he had access to confidential information.
On the Consul General's recommendation, he was relieved of his assignment
where he was a security risk, but he is still in the Department.
Xo. 93
This person was employed as a file clerk by the American Embassy in Paris,
France, in December 1946. She went to Paris in November 1946 with her hus-
band who was studying there. Both the subject and her husband are known
contacts of two suspects in an investigation of Soviet espionage activities in the
United States.
Another Government investigative agency advised that the subject's husband
has transmitted back to the United States Communist literature of party fronts
in France and in a communication he listed principal functionaries of the Com-
munist Party in France.
Investigation conducted by CSA in March 1947 developed no derogatory infor-
mation concerning the subject. A memorandum in the file dated July 16, 1947,
stated that the subject recently sent a copy of a Communist publication to one of
the Soviet espionage suspects who had previously given the subject names of
well-known Communists she could contact in France.
On July 30, 1947, CSA requested the Embassy in Paris to investigate the sub-
ject's activities there.
Xo. 94
This is a case of clearance on insufficient investigation and failure to reopen
the case for investigation although derogatory information was received.
The subject was employed as a news analyst with the American Embassy in
Moscow in 1946. CSA had conducted an investigation in November 1945 which
included contacts with references, two former teachers and two former super-
visors in the Army. Nothing derogatory was obtained from the persons con-
tacted. Information was received from a Government investigative agency on
April 26, 1946, that the subject had informed the son of a known Communist
Party member in Philadelphia that "all American Newspapers said horrible
things about the Russians and that if one reads the Russian newspapers, he
learns that these things are not true." At that time the subject is reported to
have said he felt that he now has a wonderful opportunity in being able to
analyze the Russian news.
No action was taken on the basis of the above information, and on July 17,
1847, Congressman X-16 told Assistant Secretary of State Peurifoy that subject
and Ids wife, both very procommunistic, are employed in our Embassy in Moscow
and should be removed.
The case was re-opened on the basis of the information received from the Con-
gressman, but there was nothing further in the file as of October 13, 1947, other
than check of the records of the Un-American Activities Committee.
No. 95
He is employed by the Consulate General at Casablanca.
The investigation was initiated for the purpose of clearing him to perform
cryptographic duties. The file reflects that he is a heavy drinker, evasive and
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 21
1804 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
possibly engaged in questionable financial transactions concerning foreign ex-
change. A foreign service inspector rates him as "unsatisfactory."
The College he allegedly attended has no record of his claimed two years'
attendance.
There is no indication that any action is being taken to dismiss this employee
and no indication at the time the file was reviewed, as to whether or not he would
be cleared for performing cryptographic duties.
Individuals listed as Nos. 96, 97, and 98 are examples of persons employed
for responsible positions even though substantial derogatory information was
available prior to appointment.
No. 96
This is a case of apparent pressure from a high official in the Department to
employ the applicant in spite of derogatory information.
The applicant was born in 1909 ; he was appointed late in 1946 and was as-
signed to the Office of Assistant Secretary Hilldring at $8179.80 per annum.
He was in the United States Army from December 1942 to May 1946 and rose
from the rank of private to captain. He was employed as a civilian in the War
Department after May 8, 1946, at a salary of $6230 per annum and subsequently
raised to $7102. The maximum salary he ever received prior to going into the
Army was $57 per week with a newspaper.
Advance security clearance was given him on October 29, 1946, and on Novem-
ber 5, 1946, the following memorandum from the Office of Controls to the Per-
sonnel Division was prepared :
"Reference is made to the case of (subject), born 1909, applicant
for the position Advisor, Standard of Living Policy, with the Department.
Further reference is made to CON's Memorandum of October 29, 1946, and
the remarks transmitted therewith, giving advance security clearance on
(subject).
"(Subject) was confronted with the discrepancies, as outlined in the
above-mentioned remarks, by CSA. In reply to various questions with re-
gard to discrepancies in his education (subject) stated that the records
revealed by CSA were correct. He further stated that he did not have his
records available hence the discrepancies. (Subject) stated that he was not
disqualified from University for poor scholarship. He stated that he
was maintaining a "B" average and the reason for his leaving was due to
a misunderstanding with regard to prelegal requirements. The CSA in-
vestigation disclosed that (subject) was disqualified from this law school
in May, 1934, for poor scholarship.
"With reference to (subject's) employment by the News Company
and his statements that he made from $100.00 to $350.00 per month, (sub-
ject) stated that his salary was $57.50 per week plus $8.00 per week for car
expenses. He further stated that in spite of his official titles with that
company be did as a matter of fact, 'work in connection with tbe publication
and editing.' The CSA investigation reflected no information to substan-
tiate the afore-mentioned claim.
"(Subject) was asked to explain tbe discrepancies with regard to his
claim that he received from $60.00 to $150.00 per month for employment in
the law office of . The CSA investigation had revealed that his sal-
ary was $50.00 per month. (Subject) stated that it was true that he was
employed on a part-time basis and that his salary may have only been the
amount as shown by the investigation, however, he believed that the average
was much higher. Pie further stated, 'He was not an Attorney at this time
but a law student.'
"(Subject) claimed on Form 57 that he was engaged and associated in
the private practice of law from 1936 to 1942, however, the CSA investiga-
tion failed to substantiate these claims and further revealed that (subject)
was not admitted to practice law in the State of California until January
1944. (Subject) was confronted with this discrepancy and asked for an
explanation. In reply be stated, T am very sorry but the above statement
was a mistake with reference to the years 1936-1942.' * * * 'In no way
did I mean to convey the impression in my application that I was practicing
law during this period.'
"It is apparent, from the facts as set forth above, that (subject) attempted
to build 1 1 t » his past experience and earning power at the time he executed
Form 57 for employment with this Department. In practically all employ-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1805
ments and experiences listed, (subject) made statements that varied from
the facts as borne out by CSA investigation.
"On the basis of the investigation conducted by CSA and in view of the
statements made by (subject) when confronted with discrepancies as re-
vealed by the investigation, it would appear that the position to which sub-
ject has' been appointed is not commensurate with his background, experi-
ence, earning capacity, etc. It would appear that (subject's) application
should be given careful consideration before he is employed by the De-
partment."
On November 20. 1946. Robert J. Ryan of the Personnel Division submitted
a memorandum to the Office of Controls stating "The investigative file on (the
subject) forwarded with your memorandum to DP of November 5, is returned
herewith, the comments of Mr. Huinelsine attached."
The attached item is a three-inch by five-inch slip of white paper with the
notation "To, DP (Mr. McCoy) I can't see that the attached info altered the
case enough to reopen. CHH"
Attached also, is a memorandum from Bannerman to Morse Allen "For the
file — If Humelsine is so little concerned with the quality of Department per-
sonnel there is little we can do. I believe he is more interested in the politics
of the situation. RLB 12/2/46."
No. 97
The subject has been employed in various Government agencies since 1937.
His last position prior to joining the State Department in 1946 was with OPA
as regional executive officer. He is presently an Assistant Director under the
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
An investigative report, dated May 3, 1946, listed one reference as giving
derogatory information concerning his personality and ability.
A report of May 11, 1946, lists an associate of the subject with OPA as
refusing to recommend him because of his domineering personality and having
some question as to his integrity.
A report of June 15, 1946, sets out that another associate of subject, with
OPA, has given very derogatory information relative to his personality, and this
associate also stated that the subject was a poor administrator. Two other
associates confirmed the statement as to the subject's disagreeable personality
and his being a poor administrator. Still another associate said the subject
promised him he would get the informant a promotion in OPA if the informant
helped obtain a commission in the Armed Services for the subject through the
informant's relatives who had high positions in the Armed Forces. This
informant also stated the subject had made improper advances to girls in
the OPA Office.
A memorandum dated June 26, 1946, from CSA to the Office of Controls
stated "investigation discloses no evidence of a material nature tending to affect
the subject's character, ability, dependability, general reputation and loyalty
to the Government of the United States and its institutions, and would seem
to indicate that the person merits consideration for employment in the Depart-
ment of State."
On the basis of the above memorandum, the subject was employed by the
State Department.
A memorandum dated November 8, 1946, from the Office of Controls to the
Personnel Division summarized the derogatory information concerning the sub-
ject and recommended careful consideration be given to retaining him. No
action appears to have been taken on the basis of that memorandum.
Another memorandum, dated April 18, 1947, from CSA to the Personnel
Division, stated "investigation reveals unfavorable information relating to the
character or suitability of the subject," and this memorandum completed the
file on the subject.
The subject is still employed by the Department.
This is a good example of an instance where substantial derogatory informa-
tion was available to reject the applicant, but the derogatory information is of
such a nature that there will be difficulty in getting rid of the employee on the
basis of that information.
No. 98
This man is a Foreign Service applicant.
A former employer said, "He entertained quite advanced or even radical
tendencies and beliefs politically." A reference was noncommittal as to his
1806 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
loyalty. An informant (reference) said that he was, while with UNRRA, a
supporter of the Communists in Greece. There is a strong indication that he
sent greetings to the Daily Worker on May 4, 1934. Two reliable sources vouched
for his political radicalism in the 1930's. A report dated April 10, 1947 indi-
cates he is definitely a leftist. The subject closely associated with at one time,
and used as a character witness, an individual with doubtful business ethics
and an associate of Communists.
A note of June 6, 1947, indicates the subject was appointed statistician,
Grade CAF-11, resubmission with termination in Grade CAF-11 at $5,750 per
annum on August 29, 1946.
The file contained the following: "To be investigated when volume of work
permits." This case is still pending. The natural question in this case is why
he was employed by the Greece Mission in June, July, and August in view of
the above facts.
Individuals listed as Nos. 99-102, inclusive, are" examples of applicants who
are still being investigated although substantial derogatory information is
available.
No. 99
This applicant is presently associated with the Americans for Democratic
Action, a supposedly anti-Communist liberal organization.
Several references state he is a liberal but anti-Communist. One informant
states he is a friend of C-36, of FCC, a reported Communist. He is a member
of the National Lawyers Guild and Washington Book Shop. His wife belongs
to the League of Women Shoppers. The applicant is a subscriber to New Masses,
and has closely associated with members of the American Peoples' Mobilization
and Washington Committee for Democratic Action. A relative of his has a
financial interest in the Daily Worker.
Inquiry at the Personnel Department reflects that he was not employed inas-
much as security clearance was not given soon enough and he accepted another
position. Mr. Ryan of that Office advised that Under Secretary Clayton's Office
has requested completion of the investigation in this case in the event he is con-
sidered for a position in the future. The case was still pending on October 31,
1947.
No. 100
He is an applicant for a P-8 position with the State Department.
He has been employed by the Treasury Department from April 1940 to the
present time, except for military leave from July 1942 to December 1942. He is
highly recommended by E-3 and is an apparent prodigy of E-2. Both of these in-
dividuals are allegedly engaged in Soviet espionage activities.
CSA has received information from another Governmental agency to the effect
that the subject was one of many contacts of E-19, subject of a Soviet espionage
case.
One of subject's references refused recommendation of him because of his as-
sociation with two pro-Communists.
Little investigation has been conducted as of October 1947 and the case was
pending with several leads outstanding.
No. 101
This man is an applicant for a P-7 position.
Investigation was initiated June 25, 1947. The file reflected that he studied
under Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, 1927-1929. In 1933
he wrote an article "Applied Marxism in Soviet Russia'' which was an objective
review of the principles of Marxism as applied by Lenin and Stalin. He pointed
out that much progress had been made in Russia up to that time and predicted
lhat program would continue to be made "toward the completion of the founda-
tion of the classless socialist state". One of his former associates of UNRRA
praised him and referred to his excellent educational background. In this con-
nection investigation at the University of Wisconsin revealed that he was dropped
for poor scholarship at that school in 1921, readmitted in 1923 and dropped again
in 1924. Prior to coming with the Government in 1942, applicant's top salary
was $3,700 per annum. On his application he indicated that he would not accept
]<ss than $8,500 per annum. His only position in excess of that has been with
UNRRA. A coworker at the War Foods Administration in a report dated Sep-
tember 3, 1947, expressed reservations concerning his loyalty. The report reads
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1807
"He stated further that the applicant admitted his loyalty to the Government,
had been questioned on two occasions when he was asked about the articles on
Russia and the Communist activities of his father. It was alleged by the ap-
plicant that he was mistaken for his father who has the same name and who is
known to biive attended some Communist meetings." The applicant traveled to
Russia in 1936.
As of October 15, 1947, the investigation was still pending.
No. 102
This man is an applicant. He is presently #iployed by Twentieth Century
Fox and, as such, made a study of Greece. From July 1942 until November
1946, he was employed by the Chicago Sun. He was associated with E-20. This
individual was involved with Philip Jaffee in the case in which confidential
documents were allegedly turned over to outside sources. The applicant was
dropped from Northwestern and Wisconsin Universities for poor scholarship.
He was a participant in a round-table discussion on a Northwestern University
program in 1945. In this discussion he took the side of the Chinese Communists
as opposed to the Chinese Government. He has been quoted for some time as
being a great admirer of Russia. On July 16, 1944, he was quoted as saying
"Henry Wallace is the outstanding symbol of American Democracy." On July 8,
1945, he indicated that Russia "has much of economic and social democracy
to teach."
However, in spite of the above information, no one interviewed during the
course of his investigation raised any question as to his loyalty.
His investigation is pending.
*******
Numbers 103-106, which follow, are typical of numerous cases where some
question as to the person's loyalty exists, but where little information actually
exists on which to make an evaluation.
No. 10S
He is with the Division of International Security Affairs.
A memorandum of July 25, 1947, indicated that Under Secretary Robert Lovett
had raised some question about the security of the Division of International
Security Affairs. The file indicates that the subject visits socially with a well-
known leftist, CC-37. It further indicates that he was a member of the American
Committee for Democratic Action and his wife was very active in the Washington
Committee for Aid to China.
This case is pending.
No. 104
She is in the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commission.
A memorandum of December 9, 1946, stated that one informant had said that
subject had criticized our foreign policy. A number of informants have empha-
sized that she entertains negroes and whites, both men and women, in her apart-
ment. However, none of these informants appear to be able to furnish any
information pointing out anything irregular with these meetings.
Another Government investigative agency reported that her brother was sus-
pected of having Communist sympathies. She has been an officer in one of the
Locals of the United Public Workers of America. She has been very active in
behalf of the Union. In 1943 she was employed for a couple of months as a
clerk for a liberal Senator (X-17). The memorandum mentioned above con-
cludes as follows :
"Investigation would seem to indicate that the risk involved in employing
the applicant requires careful consideration."
No. 105
He is on the Special Projects Staff.
The file reflects, as indicated in a memorandum of February 26, 1947, that
numerous confidential informants reported he "was pro-Communist, radical, left-
wing, of dubious background, etc." His father is regarded as very liberal.
The file developed no tangible proof of any Communistic activities on the part
of the subject. He was given security clearance on the date of the memorandum.
No. 106
This individual is a Chief in the Division of International Labor.
Information was received in October 1946. that the subject was a member of the
Washington Book Shop in 1941, and that he is a fellow traveler. Substantial
1808 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
investigation was conducted, but as of June 18, 1947, when the last report was
prepared, the allegation had not been proved or disproved and the case is still
pending.
* ***** *
Numbers 107 and 108 are cases of individuals who left the Department, one by
resignation and the other by reduction in force, a year or more after considerable
derogatory information was available and on which action was not taken by
the responsible officials.
No. 107 *
This is another case of failure to take action on unfavorable information until
many months after the information was available.
The subject was born in New Jersey in 1919 of Russian-born parents. She was
employed as a correspondence secretary at the White House from November 1940
to April 1944. She was a typist for the Soviet "information Bulletin, Soviet
Embassy, Washington, D. C, from May 1944 to February 1945. Her salary at the
White House was $2,700 per year.
In February 1945, she appeared at the Personnel Division of the State Depart-
ment and requested a job, indicating her willingness to accept a position for
$1,800. After she had been employed by the State Department for one month
she specifically requested a job in the office of a certain high official and was
transferred to that office from the Personnel Division. Her duties in that office
were the receiving, screening, and distribution of all cablegrams for the high
official. She also handled important documents of international and economic
significance.
In her Form 57 she gave as references the names of two employees of the Soviet
Embassy. The above information was set out in a memorandum dated July 27,
1945, in the file of the subject.
A memorandum dated November 17, 1945, from the Office of Controls, to Assist-
ant Secretary Russell, pointed out the above facts and stated that for the subject
to bave been an employee of the Soviet Embassy she must have been accepted
politically by them. The memorandum further stated that she is a member of
the Washington Book Shop and subscribes to the Soviet Information Bulletin.
The memorandum suggested that these facts be brought to the attention of the
official for whom she worked. There is no indication in the file that this action
was ever taken.
On February 12, 1947, the Security Office disapproved clearance for the subject
to accompany the American Delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign
Ministers.
In a report of March 6, 1947, the CSA investigator points out a number of in-
stances of untruthfulness on the part of the subject found during the investiga-
tion which he reported in 25 pages. The investigator commented that "in the
entire course of this investigation it is apparent that the subject exaggerates,
deviates from truthfulness in varying degrees, and in a number of instances
has made misstatements of facts so as to place herself in a more favorable posi-
tion." The report also states that a former supervisor of subject at The White
House said he had caught the subject in several lies and would not recommend
her for a position of trust and confidence. Several other witnesses referred to her
as a liar.
She reportedly associated closely with two women who were known to be pro-
Communists. One of these women was interviewed and recommended the subject
highly. Several witnesses reported the subject as pro-Russian. One informant
said the subject had described John Foster Dulles as a Fascist and she was against
General Bor, the anti-Communist General of Poland, and also disliked General
Mihailovitch, of Yugoslavia.
A memorandum of April 1, 1947, from the Office of Controls, to Counsel-ACOPS,
summarized the information against the subject and recommended her transfer
to a position where she would not have access to highly classified information,
and if such position could not be found for her, it was recommended her services
be terminated.
A memorandum of April 9, 1947, from Mr. Peurifoy to Mr. Robinson stated
that Mr. Peurifoy had reached the conclusion that she should be transferred to
other work. There is no indication in the file, however, that this action was
taken.
On June 18, 1947, a memorandum was prepared in CSA to Mr. Peurifoy again
summarizing the facts and recommended the removal of subject from the rolls
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1809
of the Department. There is no indication in the file that action was taken on
the basis of this memorandum.
On August 8, 1947, a memorandum from Arch K. Jean, of the Personnel Divi-
sion to the Office of Controls stated that the subject had submitted her resigna-
tion from the Department effective at a subsequent date.
No. 10S
This is a case of lack of follow-up on unfavorable security information and also
indicates poor supervision.
The subject was employed with OWI in July of 1944 and, subsequently, was
transferred to the State Department as a Public Affairs Officer in OIE. In the
file was a form memorandum, dated December 17, 1946, from the Office of Con-
trols to the Foreign Personnel Division, which approved him for appointment
purposes.
Another memorandum of the same date, from the Office of Controls to the
Foreign Personnel Division, suggested careful consideration be given to his
employment as investigation indicated his suitability for employment was ques-
tionable. The memorandum further suggested he be interviewed and requested
to explain the following items discovered during the course of the investigation :
1. His arrest in 1935 for passing three worthless checks totaling $100.00.
2. His "no" answer to Question 28 on Form 57 (this is a question regard-
ing whether applicant has been convicted of any criminal offenses).
3. His dismissal from a Missouri college.
4. His alleged failure to make restitution to that Missouri college of
funds advanced to him for which he gave a note. ■
5. His giving of a worthless check to a Tulane University Professor in
1934.
6. His alleged padding of expense accounts while traveling for another
college in 1930 and his dismissal therefor.
In addition to the above, several persons interviewed stated that they could
not recommend the subject because of the activities mentioned above.
The Direcor of a Psychopathic Hospital in Iowa stated, in response to request
for information by a CSA Agent, that the subject was examined in 1935, and was
diagnosed as possessing a "psychopathic personality." This Director further
said, "although in a certain number of cases, there is an improvement with
maturity the lack of constitutional stability always makes such individuals a
poor risk for a responsible position."
There is no indication in the file that the subject was ever interviewed, and
he remained on the rolls until he was the victim of a reduction in force in
October 1947.
Appendix for Case No. 78
The following is from CSA report dated February 17, 1947, partly paraphrased
where necessary to protect informants, etc.
X-1S stated that his confidential files contained nothing on the subject and
that his personal contacts with the subject are very infrequent so that he is
unable to give anything definite about her. He stated that the efficiency ratings
"Excellent" received by subject may as well be disregarded and that there is
very little use to contact any of the references or supervisors given by subject
in her Form 57. To clarify the above statement, he offered, in a very guarded
and discreet manner, an explanation which is based only upon his impression,
and it was very difficult for him to substantiate with concrete facts in all the
details. He stated that since the start of the organizaion, it appeared that the
personnel in the Policy Information Division consisted mostly of a very closely
allied group, some of whom knew each other before they joined the organization,
or became very chummy after joining it. This is substantiated by a superficial
check of Forms 57 from that Division which disclospd an amazing frequency in
use of names of the same people for references. It almost is "I refer to you
and you refer to me." The informant stated further that practically on every
occasion when someone from that Division was considered for dismissal, because
of inefficiency, uselessness, or even for outright violations of the U. S. Civil
Service Regulations — for example, falsifying information on Form 57 and
others — the entire Division or at least the most prominent members of it, would
rush to the culprit's defense, claiming he or she was indispensable and irre-
placeable. Such clannishness amongst the members of the Division oversteps
the harmony desired in any organization and acquires an entirely different and
undesired aspect. He stated that through his association with the Division and
1810 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
his analysis of it, he still cannot draw a definite conclusion regarding it. It
might be that its members are only a bunch of liberals banded together, a group
of opportunists who are trying to feather their own beds and who are acting
in consort, or even some radicals who are protecting the inefficient and are
making friends for themselves, facilitating thereby their subversive work. At
any rate, the informant stated that to contact the individuals mentioned as
references would be a. useless task for they all give the most flattering informa-
tion about each other. In view of the above, various other heads of the Inter-
national Broadcasting Division sections were contacted.
X-19, before expressing his opinion on the subject, gave a brief outline of
his relationship with the Policy Information Desk and his opinion of it. He
stated that when he started to work with OWI at the outbreak of the war, he
felt an apprehension about the personnel connected with it. He felt that although
on the whole the personnel consisted of men and women loyal to the United
States and eager to sincerely help in the prosecution of the war and to protect
the interests of this country, there was also a group, and a substantial one,
which did not fall in this category. . He found many "fellow travelers" if not
outright Communists who were organized in a very closely knit sect, members
of which protected each other and continuously assailed anyone who disagreed
with their way of thinking. This informant attempted to "combat them" but
they were too strong for him and as a result he was transferred to another job.
Upon returning to New York and his present job, he discovered that although
some of the members of the sect were gone, the majority still remained and con-
tinued their "unhealthy activities." He also stated that it was difficult to furnish
concrete evidence, at least in a strong enough form, to prove that the subject
and the rest of her crowd were Communists. However, there are a multitude of
small clues which point to them as a bunch of "puseudo-liberals" whose work is
damaging and who "almost terrorized" the rest of the personnel. "It is un-
healthy to oppose them" and they conduct themselves in a most clever and
insidious way that it is difficult to get anything on them. The informant further
stated that it appears that through her extreme intelligence and cleverness, the
subject is the center of this group, to which also belonged some of their asso-
ciates who no longer are in the employ of the State Department : they include
C-24, C-38, C-39, C-40, and some others who were regarded as undesirable and
dangerous to the State Department. Informant stated that C-24 and C-38
still keep in touch with the subject, visiting the office in the evenings and are
very much in evidence on various farewell and oher parties. He added that
it appears that subject No. 79 is very much under the influence of subject,
backing her up in everything, including her attempts to get rid of personnel
(even some not employed under her supervision) who dare to disagree with
her. Informant indicated he would have been in favor of subject's participating
in guiding the International Broadcasting Division's operations but for the fact
that he has no confidence in her.
X-20, a third informant, was very careful in selecting his statements, attempt-
ing to commit himself as little as possible. He said in his opinion, subject was
definitely not a Communist and that he did not suspect her in purposely distort-
ing the policy of the State Department ; at least he did not see any definite
pattern in any possible ''mistakes" made in either selecting the material or
in the "Guidance Bulletins" issued by the Policy Control Desk. On the other
hand, he thought that at times the material suggested could have been selected
better, as well as when some articles taken for the MRD * were contracted for
the reason of saving space, some parts of them which were removed were the
"core" and without them the meaning was changed entirely. However, again
the informant indicated that he thought this was due to the "moderate ability"
of the people involved in preparation of MRD's and not to a definite purposeful
pattern of subversive activity. He mentioned, however, that the faulty se-
lected material was at times at cross purposes with the State Department policy
and at times even hindered its execution. He referred to an incident where
the release of some news items has tipped off prematurely the Department's
policy regarding some bases in the Arctics. It was apparent during this inter-
view that the informant did not want to commit himself one way or the other.
A fourth informant. X-21, said the subject is "The head" of the group of "pseudo-
liberals," even Communists, to which C-38, C-24 and C-40 also belonged. She
is their "moving spirit" and "protector" and heads any and all persecutions
against anyone who disagrees with her and who may at one time or another
♦MRD — Master Radio Desk.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1811
question the material in her Daily Guidance Bulletins and MRD's. The in-
formant indicated that many of the Daily Guidance Bulletins which are written
by subject are constructed in such a way as to make the broadcast material
prepared in a form advantageous to Communist policy line and to the U. S. S. R.
He said subject and her crowd are domineering almost the entire personnel of the
IBD because the Daily Guidance Bulletins and the MRD's emanate from her
and she is also the one who interprets and enforces them. "She has very power-
ful connections in Washington" and is constantly backed by them whether in
protection of personnel scheduled for dismissal for inefficiency or infraction
of rules (provided they belong to the crowd) or assailing of anyone who may
dare to question her instructions. The informant's opinion of the subject is
definitely unfavorable, and he also stated that because of his not infrequent
disagreements with the subject, he has incurred her displeasure and is made
a victim of frequent attacks by her.
A fifth informant, X-14, termed the entire Policy Information Section as a
hunch of "pseudo-liberals" and "fellow travelers". Specifically, he referred to
some instances when MRD's emanating from the subject contained instructions
on material to be used for broadcasting, regarded by him as definitely in dis-
agreement with the official policy of the State Department and detrimental
and harmful to it. He stated that unfortunately he cannot make any direct
accusations of the subject being a Communist or purposely sabotaging the De-
partment's policy in favor of the U. S. S. R., but that the results are just as damag-
ing whether she does it consciously or unconsciously. He also stated it is very
difficult, practically impossible, to collect concrete evidence to substantiate his
feeling of distrust of the subject but that a close study of the MRD's issued
by the subject and the material upon which they are based would be the best
way to illustrate the point. He further stated that by omission of either a few
words in the material usually taken out of newspapers or of the source of the
information, the meaning is sometimes confusing or even reversed entirely
from the original and always favoring the line of propaganda by the U. S. S. R. or
its satellites. He stated that some of the commentators and producers have
come to him from time to time and inferred that they refused to present on
the air some of the material sent to them via MRD's because they considered
it detrimental to the United States.
A sixth informant, X-22, indicated that his opinion of the subject, based on
several years of association with her, is an unfavorable one. He said he
examines all the material submitted to him after it has had the subject's OK
and on numerous occasions he was forced to make corrections or changes be-
cause he felt that if it went on the air in its original form, it would under-
mine the policy of the State Department. He explained that the violation was
never a gross one, but a few words omitted here, changed just a bit there, have
changed the meaning intended for the broadcast, always favoring the U. S. S. R.
The informant stated he felt the members and employees of the Department,
who are paid by the American taxpayers, should observe the interests of the
United State s first and not the interests of any foreign country. He added that
his attempts to safeguard the interests of the State Department have caused the
ire of subject and she made every attempt to discredit him in accusing him of
all sorts of mistakes and infractions allegedly made by him, and that she made
her accusations through her Daily Bulletin. He also stated that some of the
sincerely loyal workers are either "terrorized" by subject or are very appre-
hensive and bewildered. He said he cannot accuse subject of being a Com-
munist, but that the work she is doing is playing into the hands of the Com-
munists, and he considers her too clever and too intelligent to be unaware of
what she is doing.
A seventh informant, X-23, refused to comment on the subject because of
short association, but he expressed apprehension regarding the way security is
handled (the examination of material), stating he can't help but feel that the
Policy Control Desk and the subject are lax in performing their duty.
(The following observations were made by the CSA investigator as set out
in his report of February 17. 1047. i
From the above statements made by the informants contacted, the following
brief resume might be construed ; it would appear that the subject of this in-
vestigation belongs to a rather closely knit group of individuals, superior and
subordinate to her, and constituting a substantial part of the employees of the
Policy Information Desk. This group is termed as "pseudo-liberals", "fellow-
travelers", and "almost outright Communists" who unfortunately are placed in
the most critical positions in the entii'e International Broadcasting Division.
1812 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
This group, especially the subject is charged with the responsibility of com-
posing Daily Guidance Bulletins which instruct all the various Desks as to the
type of material to be used in the daily broadcasts abroad, indicating which
materia] should be stressed, played up to, or modified. It is also issuing the
Daily MRD's with definitely prepared material, and it is also reviewing and
correcting the material prepared for the broadcast by all the Desks. From the
accusations made by the informants, it appears that the Policy Information
Desk, and especially subject, have influenced the radio broadcasts to acquire
a more pro-Communist and pro-U. S. S. R. aspect, thereby undermining the official
policy of the State Department. This has been done — not in a crude and self-
evident way— but very cleverly and insidiously through putting stress on the
wrong kind of material, through selecting the material disproportionately in
far greater quantities from the left wing press in comparison with the true ratio
of it in the entire field of newspapers, through cutting out the punch lines—
which changes the meaning of the articles, and using similar means which, if
taken up one by one separately, would not show the subject and her crowd as
Communists, but collectively are weakening the State Department foreign policy
and are definitely damaging it. One of the informants contacted indicated that
a te'egram has been received from a Foreign Service officer in the P>alkans who
pointed out that the work of the Foreign Service was hampered, instead of
facilitated, by the wrong kind of material broadcast to the country in which
he was stationed.
It also appears that subject and her crowd exert a very strong influence on
many employees of the IBD, even some not in her section, thvouih constantly
protecting "her people" regardless of their ability and usefulness, attacking
people who question any of her instructions or who just don't belong to her
crowd, and through attempting to replace the latter category with her "own
people."
In view of the fact that very little concrete evidence was presented by the
informants to substantiate the charges against the subject, which is due to "her
clever and insidious way of operating." suggestion was made by the majority
of them that an unbiased and competent party be delegated to examine the
following documents : all the Daily Guidance Bulletins issued by subject and all
the MRD's issued daily, the latter to be compared with the material from which
they were taken. However, your Agent was cautioned that it was necessary
to examine this material, not for one day only, but for some appreciable length
of time Ca month or two), and that whoever will make this examination should
personally see to it that all the right material would be submitted for inspection —
this so that no material could be withheld or substituted. Example was given
that it was always evident when some material was submitted for examination
to the Congressional Committee, for a few days before that and for the period
covered by this Congi'essional check-up, the tone and content of material changed
appreciably.
Neighborhood investigation and contact with former employers developed no
information concerning Communist activities on the part of subject or her
husband. One former employer said he would not reemploy her because she
was not good in publicity work; and as a writer, she had numerous limitations.
He indicated that in private business, her present top salary would be not more
than $80 per week. In all sincerity, this former employer said he could not see
the subject employed in her present capacity which he considers entirely "out
of her class."
A memorandum of February 6. 1917, by an employee who caught the change
illustrates how changing a few words can change the entire meaning in a com-
mentary. A commentary dealing with the new youth directive regarding Ger-
many contained the following two sentences: "But Democracy is not a doctrine
as National Socialism was a doctrine. Democracy means basically nothing el*e
but the honest acceptance of a handful of rules for life in the community." On
the Daily Report on Radio Output for February 4, 1047. these two sentences
appeared as follows: "Contrary to national socialism, democracy is not a doc-
trine: basically, democracy means only the honest acceptance of a handful of
rules for communist life." The employee who noted this change brought it up
with the subject who stated, "So you're going to make a fight about it? If so. I
will be forced to protect my people." (This Daily Report had been prepared
by one of the subject's assistants.) Inasmuch as the employee who noted the
change was responsible for preparation of the material in this commentary, he
would be blamed for the "change" if it were noticed in Washington.
The following additional information is taken from the CSA Agent's report
of March 10, 1947 :
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1813
Informant X-19 pointed out to the Agent that in examining copies of MRD's
and Daily Guidance Bulletins, it would be preferable to examine those in the
middle months Of liUfi rather than the last months, because after October 194G,
"when the ax fell," there was a more cautious attitude on the part of the subject
and her personnel. He also said that he has gained the impression that subject
No. 79 has not consulted in the past, and is not now consulting the Area Division
at the Department in formulating or in interpreting the Department's policy
toward the U. S. S. R., which would appear rather strange since the policy of
the Department is formulated upon the Area Specialist's advice. This informant
expressed the hope that the Policy Information Desk be abolished, not only
because he has no confidence in the personnel employed by it, but also because
he feels it is an unnecessary superstructure, the elimination of which is also
desired for administrative reasons.
Another example of the effect of selection of material for broadcasts by the
subject and her personnel cited to the Agent is the following :
A Telegram from Budapest February 23, 1947, pointed out that many Hun-
garians not Marxist in outlook listen to the Moscow radio for reports and com-
ment on developments in Hungary, because the American radio does not include
such reports and comments. The telegram stated that failure to report and
comment on Hungarian developments reduces the size and enthusiasm of the
Hungarian audience and also suggests either that America is uninformed ; or
that what the Moscow radio says is true ; or that America has no interest in
Hungarian developments. The telegram suggested the situation should be recti-
fied. The informant took up the matter with the Head of the Hungarian Desk,
C-41 (who has since been dismissed for security reasons), and that individual
pointed out in defense of himself that his broadcasts are prepared strictly in
accordance with the Daily Guidance Bulletins, and that he cannot put in any
material which is not approved by them.
A report on examination of Daily Guidance Bulletins and MRD's by CSA
apparently had not been prepared as of the time of the Staff survey.
The State Department has furnished this subcommittee the follow-
ing data on the employment of the persons named publicly by Senator
McCarthy as well as the persons cited by Senator McCarthy in his
81 cases :
1814 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
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Mar. 7, 1919
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Nov. 12, 1945
Sept. 20. 1945 (transferred from OSS under E, 0.9621)
Sept. 20, 1946 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)
Apr. 4, 1924
Jan. 2, 1917
Never employed in the Department of State
Sept. 12, 1946.
lug. 15, 1946
Jan. 30, 1945
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1818 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Department of State,
Washington, June 19, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
My Dear Senator Tydings : In reply to your request, I enclose for the use of
your subcommittee the analyses made by this Department of the assertions of
Senator McCarthy in speeches at Washington, April 20; Chicago, May G; At-
lantic City, May 15 ; Rochester, May 25 ; and on the Senate floor, June 6.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peurifoy,
Deputy Under Secretary.
Enclosures :
1. Press Release No. 401, May 12, 1050.
2. Press Release No. 501, May 15, 1950.
3. Press Release No. 529, May 20, 1950.
4. Press Release No. 540, May 25, 1950.
5. Press Release No. 553, May 26, 1950.
6. Press Release No. 558, May 27, 1950.
7. Press Release No. 614, June 9, 1950.
[For the press, Department of State, May 12, 1950. No. 491]
For Release at 7 P. M., E. D. T., Sunday, May 14, 1950. Not To Be Previously
Published, Quoted From, or Used in Any Way
The following letter has been sent to the more than 500 full members of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors :
May 12, 1950.
As a member.of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, you undoubtedly
heard or read Senator Joseph McCarthy's speech before the ASNE convention
in Washington on April 20.
While the Secretary dealt with the same general subject in his subsequent
speech, he of course did not undertake to deal with the specific allegations made
by Senator McCarthy.
I am therefore attaching an analysis, point by point, of some of the inaccura-
cies contained in the Senator's speech.
Sincerely yours,
Edward W. P>arrett,
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
Analysis of Senator McCarthy's Speech to Asne
1. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "First, as to the figure 205." He
then went on to assert that he had made it clear that he never claimed to have
the names of 205 known Communists allegedly working in the State Department.
The facts. — In a radio address at Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950,
Senator McCarthy stated : "And, ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the
time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as
active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in
my hand a list of 205 * * * list of names that were made known to the
Secretary of State as being members (if the Communist Party and who neverthe-
less are still working and shaping policy in the State Department." He was
quoted to this effect by the Associated Press, and subsequently two officials of
the radio station over which he spoke signed affidavits saying that they followed
Senator McCarthy's speed) and that this was what he said.
2. Senator McCarthy si.vrf to the ASNE. — Two hundred and five persons "were
named as had security risks" and were "listed by the President's own security
board and the forerunner of the present Loyalty Board as dangerous to our
Government." He- also stated that this "President's own security board" was
"gotten rid of by Acheson in favor of a weaker hoard."
The fuels. — In 10-15, approximately 3,000 employees were transferred to the
Department of State from other agencies. An ad hoc committee responsible to
Assistant Secretary of state Russell, under Secretary of State Byrnes, was set
up to carry our preliminary screening of these 3,000 people. On July 15, 1946.
this committee filed a report listing 285 tentative disapprovals in categories
ranging all the way from automatic disapproval of aliens to disapprovals in the
basis of derogatory information.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1819
The report specifically stated, however, th.it :
"Any disapproval of the 285 may be reversed ami subsequently approved
if the further Investigation resolves the investigation in favor of the em-
ployee. This is reported in order that the total disapproval basis may be
thoroughly understood ;ind docs not mean on the surface there are or were
285 people in the Department against whom charges would eventually be
preferred."
Today all of these transferees into the State Department originally screened
for further consideration or action are either no longer in the State Department
or have been thoroughly investigated and cleared for employment. Those still
en the roll, dumber 40. Those 40 have, of course, been checked under the
President's Loyalty Program by the FBI.
This departmental screening group, which Senator McCarthy referred to as
the "President's own security board", was not abolished by Secretary Acheson.
It automatically went out of existence in the fall of 194G upon the completion
of its screening job, at which time Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State. The
present Loyalty Board was established by Secretary Marshall in the summer of
1947.
3. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNB. — "What is wrong with the misnamed
Loyalty Board? Perhaps the case of George Wheeler, whom you will recall as
having recently sought asylum from democracy behind the iron curtain, may
explain why Communists, bad security and bad policy risks are retained on
the Government payroll. Wheeler was first unanimously rejected by the Loyalty
Board. * * * Later the Loyalty Board reversed itself and passed him and
sent him a letter of apology."
The facts. — At no time has the case of George Wheeler ever been considered by
a security or loyalty hoard of the Department of State. Mr. Wheeler was one of
a group of former FEA employees in Germany who in September 1943, were
transferred temporarily to the rolls of the State Department. In February 1946,
that whole group was transferred to the War Department, and in fact Mr.
Wheeler's transfer to the War Department was even earlier — in December 1945.
During his brief time on the State Department payroll, Mr. Wheeler's case was
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. All these facts were
set out in a departmental press release a week before Senator McCarthy made
bis misstatements.
4. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "There are 600 clerks in the United
States who have access to those [loyalty] files daily * * * yet five Senators
cannot crack a file cover."
The facts. — Access to loyalty files is normally limited strictly to FBI and other
Government officials and their responsible subordinates when, and only when,
particular files are needed in the proper execution of their duties.
5. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "First, let's look at that perennial
joiner, Dr. Philip Jessup, our Ambassador at large. * * * Why does he
always join Communist fronts? Why not anti-Communist organizations?"
The facts. — Dr. Jessup testified, before the subcommittee, that he had joined no
Communist-front organizations, whereas the organizations to which he did belong
included the following :
The American Legion (He is a former commander of Utica Post, No. 229.)
The American Philosophical Society
The Foreign Policy Association.
The American Bar Association
6. Senator McCarthy said to the ASXE. — "* * * Dr. Jessup had control of
the magazine Far Eastern Survey, when the Communist Campaign in 1943 was
initiated therein to smear Chiang Kai-shek and deify all the Communists. * * *
I pointed out that he was head of the Research Advisory Board having complete
control of the magazine during the height of the Communist Party line cam-
paign. * * * Mr. Jessup's aide-de-camp was a Mr. T. A. Bisson, another
expert on Far Eastern Affairs. He has spent considerable time in the State
Department."
The facts. — Dr. Jessup was not Chairman of the Research Advisory Committee
of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1943. He was
merely one of 50 trustees of the American Council. Mr. T. A. Bisson never was
an employee of the Department of State.
7. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "* * * I am going to leave here on
the table a number of photostats of checks representing Communist money —
thousands of dollars — which was paid to his organization. * * * The Com-
munists knew what those thousands of dollars were being paid for." As docu-
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 22
1820 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
mentation, Senator McCarthy provided photostats of two checks signed by
Frederick Vanderbilt Field totaling $3,500.
The facts. — At that time, Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University
of California, was Chairman of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific
Relations; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the Motion Picture Export
Association, was Treasurer; and Mr. William R. Herod, now President of the
International General Electric Co., was Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce,
of Time and Life, were sponsors of a drive during that period for funds on behalf
of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Field's con-
tributions, according to Senator McCarthy's own figures, totaled only $3,500,
as compared with a total expense for the two-year period of approximately
$200,000. About half of hte amount was met by contributions from the Rocke-
feller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation. Generous donations by large in-
dustrial concerns made up a large portion of the remainder.
As Ambassador Jessup stated on April 3, 1950, "Surely these gentlemen would
never have accepted payment from Mr. Field or anyone else for selling the
Communist Party line."
8. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "Now, let's briefly discuss the architect
of our far-eastern policy, this man Owen Lattimore.
The faets. — Senator Tydings asked Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall, and
Acheson whether this description was true or false. They all replied that it was
false.
9. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE. — "The Afghanistan Government asked
the United States in December of 1949 to send a preliminary mission to Afghanis-
tan to investigate the possibility of economic development under United Nations
technical assistance program. Owen Lattimore was selected to head this
mission."
The facts. — Neither the United States nor the Department of State had any-
thing to do with the sending of this mission to Afghanistan. It was sent by the
United Nations at the request of the Afghanistan Government.
Senator McCarthy's statement is a repetition of a similar statement previously
made on the floor of the Senate, citing the Library of Congress as the source of
his information. On April 11, Senator Green of Rhode Island read on the floor
of the Senate a letter dated April 10 from Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of
Congress, regarding Senator McCarthy's original quotation of this alleged infor-
mation from the Library of Congress. Dr. Evans' reply said :
"I bt'g to report that the Library of Congress knows of no information to
the effect that the Afghanistan Government ever made a request to the State
Deparment in relation to the Owen Lattimore mission ; to the effect that the
United Nations consulted the State Department on Dr. Lattimore's appoint-
ment to the mission ; to the effect that the State Department recommended Dr.
Lattimore for this assignment, or to the effect that Dr. Lattimore's expense on
this trip and any salary or fee which may he involved are a charge on the
United States, except in the sense that the United States is one of the con-
tributors to the United Nations Treasury.
"It is our understanding that the Afghanistan Government made a re-
quest to the United Nations in December 1949, for a technical assistance
mission, that the United Nations responded by sending a preliminary survey
mission to investigate the possibilities of a program of technical assistance
and general economic development, and that the United Nations Secretariat
chose Dr. Lattimore as one of the members of this preliminary survey
mission."
Dr. Evans' statements are completely in line with the facts as known to the
Department.
10. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE — "* * * about three weeks ago I
made a statement to the effect that Owen Lattimore had been requested by Ache-
son to, and did furnish to the State Department a document to act as a guide for
Ambassador at Large Jessup insofar as Asiatic policy was concerned." He also
referred to this document as "Lattimore's instructions to Jessup," and gave
the impression that the Secretary and the Department attempted to conceaf the
document by calling it confidential.
The Faets. — The Department publicly and fully explained in press conferences
on March 31 that, Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who sub-
mitted written memoranda in response to requests made in August 1949, by
Ambassador Jessup. These memoranda were used as background material by a
consultants' committee consisting of Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1821
and Ambassador Jessup in their study of United States foreign policy in the Far
East. Mr. Lattiinore as director of the Walter Hines Page School of Interna-
tional Relations at John Hopkins, was also one of 25 private individuals partici-
pating in a round-table discussion on October (5, 7, and S, 1949, arranged by the
Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views with informed pri-
vate citizens on United States foreign policy toward China. The 31 who sub-
mitted memoranda were :
Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Prof. Hugh Borton, Columbia University
Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington
Former Ambassador William Bullitt
Former Under Secretary Castle
Former Consul John A. Embry
Prof. Rupert Emberson, Harvard University
Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City
Prof. John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City
Prof. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University
Former Under Secretary Grew
Col. Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck
Roger Lapham, former Administrator, ECA, China
Prof. Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University
Prof. Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of Inter-
national Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations
Prof. Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Va.
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, N. Y.
Mr. James Rowe, Washington
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City
Prof. Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
Prof. Karl* A. Wittfogel, Columbia University
Prof. Mary Wright, Stanford University
Admiral Yarnell
The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended
the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to discuss Far East
Policy :
Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Evanston, 111.
Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
W7illiam R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York,
N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Re-
lations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Port-
land, Oreg.
George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Co., New York,
N. Y.
Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York, N. Y.
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minn.
1822 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard Uni-
versity, Cambridge, Mass.
William S. Robertson, president, American and Foreign Power Co., New York,
N. Y.
John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York.
N. Y.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.
N. Y.
Eugene Staley. Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern Cali-
fornia, San Francisco, Calif.
Harold Stassrn, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicngo, Chicago, 111.
George E. Taylor; University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincin-
nati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
All of the memoranda and all of the views above referred to were of course
submitted to confidence by their authors, and the Department could not expect
these people to be frank unless it respected that confidence. The Department
would not and did not, however, in any way interfere with publication of any
memorandum by its author. In fact, the substance of Mr. Lattimore's article
wag published in an article which he wrote for the January 1950 issue of the
Atlantic magazine.
11. Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE — "Here is the Comintern program for
Asia: (1) The armies of Chiang Kai-shek must be destroyed; (2) The United
States must be forced to withdraw from Korea; (3) Force the withdrawal of
the United States forces from Japan; (4) Prevent the formation of a Pacific
pact against Communist aggression. * * *
"That is the official Communist Party program. There is nothing secret
about it.
"Here is Jessup's program, in this document. There is nothing secret about that
either, since we forced the State Department to make that puMic. What does
Mr. Lattimore advocate as a foreign policy for Asia?
"(1) Abandon Chiang Kai-shek.
"(2) Get out of Korea.
"(3) Get out of Japan.
" (4) Deny the need of a Pacific pact.
"Is this striking parallel the result of master planning or is it pure accident ?
I leave it to you gentlemen to decide."
Senator McCarthy thus stated that Owen Lattimore's memorandum as sum-
marized by Senator McCarthy to parallel the Comintern program "is Jessup's
program."
The Facts. — There is no "Jessup program" distinct from United States foreign
policy. The United States record and policy in the Far East, as it relates to
the points made by Senator McCarthy, is well known. In the light of the Sena-
tor's charges, however, it may be summarized :
(1) The United States poured tremendous amounts of aid into China in efforts
to bolster the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
(2) The United States has led the fight for a free, democratic Korea ; took its
case to the United Nations ; and, since the establishment of this government, has
contributed substantial economic and military support.
(3) The United States as the principal occupying power in Japan will not
enter into any peace treaty which makes impossible adequate protection of United
States' security interests in the Western Pacific.
(4) The United States has publicly indicated that it would look with sympathy
upon a regional alliance of Pacific nations, provided the impetus for such an asso-
ciation came from the nations themselves.
12. Senator McCarthy said to the A8NE. — "This letter from Lattimore to
Joseph Barnes, dated June 13, 11)43, * * * was an order to Barnes to get rid
of all Chinese employees with OWI who were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and sup-
plant them with Chinese loyal to the Communists."
The Facts. — Mr. Lattimore, of course, is not connected with the Department of
State, but all OWI correspondence is now in the custody of the Department.
At the time Senator McCarthy publicly read from it, the document in question
was classified "Secret." It has subsequently been declassified and the letter in
its entirety was read into the record before the Senate subcommittee on April 6.
Moreover, the Department sent Senator McCarthy a copy of the letter on April 10.
The letter does not say what Senator McCarthy asserted it did. What it does
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1823
say is : "In the circumstances, we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese
personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists, we must
be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused
of being Communists * * *. For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many
unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably
assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other
hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere
else." (A copy of the letter is attached.)
Office of War Information,
111 Sutter Street,
San Francisco, Calif., June 15, 19J{3.
Mr. Joseph Barnes,
Office of War Information,
224 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Joe: In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee
there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It
is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent
official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am
marking this communication "secret."
When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was
quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and tnat this trouble would
take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that
certain of the personnel with whose services we dispensed had connections out-
side the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely im-
portant from the point of view of security that intelligence information should
not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in
Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable.
Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but prac-
tically an open conduit.
However, it is not only a question of Chinese government agencies. There is
also a well-organized and well-financed organizatb n among t e ( hinese in this
country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be traced
back to the history of the Chinese Revolution as a wnoie. To present it in the
fewest possible words : Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years by
Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Ya^-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close
connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now the
fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese politics
with connections which he has nourished for many years among Chinese com-
munications abroad including those in the United States.
Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on
the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Japa-
nese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and financial
investments which are under the control of the Japanese, because of his years
of political organizing work Wang Ching-wei knows all of these connections and
can apply pressure through them.
On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomintang or
Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged vi'h maintaining
political and hnancal connections with Chinese overseas. This Overseas Bureau
also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is
able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day
in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those
of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able
to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in
America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus
able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.
Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically un-
affiliated. There are of course Communists but they have neither the money nor
the organizaiton of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely
unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound product of Chinese politics and the
American envirr ni^'t. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country,
without cone -ivr g that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has
a monopoly ' isht to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Ameri-
cans ; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of them.
They are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down for them
under orders ; like Americans, they often give moral and financial support to a
scattered number of causes some of which may even conflict with each other to a
certain extent.
1824 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei organizing group and the Kuomin-
tang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides
have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into
its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is anxious not to
be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group work-
ing on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics, not
only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are trying
to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Communists.
This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time that it puts
pressure on the accused.
One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America
is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organiza-
tion of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three
thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential
thing about these laundrymen is that in that in the nature of their business
they are independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one
hand fairly well insured against Communist idealogy, since the small-business
man of whatever nationality is likely to be a man who has made his way by
his own initiative and enterprise and is therefore suspicious of collectivist
economic theories. On the other hand these Chinese small-business proprietors
are reluctant to submit themselves unquestionably to the control of the vested
interests which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuo-
mintang. The New China Daily News, would probably not come under much
pressure if it were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers
in America with a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or sup-
ported by a patron like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays
dividends on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America
receive subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, re-
ceive subsidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace
back to the group within the Kuomintang, winch was at one time headed by
the late Hu Han-min, a leader of a right-wing faction within the Kuomimtang.
The Hu Han-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are
now regarded in China as "old fashioned liberals" — liberal, so to speak, short
of the New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than
the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are en-
gaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are
intensely jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily
News which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese
public in America buys it for its own sake.
It would be r.'sii to say that there are no Communists connected with the New
China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the-
politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied
to the chariot wheels of Moscow; but when it comes to resisting the trend
toward totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support
parts of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This
is so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that
it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaries, supporting the pro-
gram of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance,,
conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and
independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent
judgment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democ-
racy within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which some-
times tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurns advise from Chinese
abroad at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.
In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-husiness man — •
like the laundryman — rather than the very few wealthy merchants, who most
conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America,
some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei
and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better
idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.
In the circumstances we have to he extremely careful about our Chinese per-
sonnel. While we need to avoid peeraiting any Chinese Communists we must
be careful not to be frightened out of luring people who have loosely been ac-
cused of bring Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring
people who are pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei group or to one or other of the
main faction within the Kuomintang. After all, as American Government
agency we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1825
Chinese Government, but should not get In the position of committing ourselves
to the Kuomintang, the political party which control the Chinese Government, as
if it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize both the im-
portance of this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the opera-
tional level.
For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we
can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand
by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do
not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.
Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently
to these requirements. Mr. Chi I have known for many years. Until his family
estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was
brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of
modern western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the
national unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political
organizaton there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Com-
munist : I also know that because of his seniority, his background of independ-
ent wealth, and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by
party bureaucrats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi
trusts and of whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their
relationship of the old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as
Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an
honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty
with either man, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage
to any Chinese faction.
The retention of both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security
of the work of OWI as well as a guarantee of the confident fulfillment of direc-
tives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I
know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work
on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their orgin and give you the full
details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be
able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics,
to their source ; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after
getting rid of people now attached, we would he forced to hire people who would
actually be nominees of factions not under our control.
It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report
to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced
agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.
In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in
San Francisco.
Once more I urge you to observe the strictest confidence in acting on this let-
ter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under moral
obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their oi'ders from
some source other than the American Government.
Yours,
Owen Lattimore,
Director, Pacific Operation.
[For the press, Department of State, May 15, 1950. No. 501]
1. Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — "* * * The skeleton files which
the President has given to the Tydings Committee * * * were inadequate,
* * * many of them had been completely rifled * * * [and] there is no
way of knowing whether or not any file was complete." He also said that "in
order to get at the truth, they must get not only the skeleton State Department
loyalty tiles, but the Civil Service and the FBI files."
The Facts. — A charge of tampering with records is a very serious charge. It
has been described by the courts in this country as "highly improper." (State ex
rel Department of Agriculture, Petitioner v. McCarthy, Circuit Judge, Respondent
(238 Wisconsin 258, 270, 299 N. W. 58, 65 (1941). The files which have been
made available to the subcommittee by the President are complete. They con-
tain the material collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and trans-
mitted to the State Department through the Civil Service Commission. These
files were reviewed by a representative of the Department of Justice before they
were turned over to the subcommittee. A representative of the Department of
Justice has also attended the meetings of the subcommittee at which the tiles
1826 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
were discussed. If Senator McCarthy believes any material has been deleted,
it is his duty to bring to the attention of the subcommittee, and the FBI any evi-
dence he has to back up his charge.
2. Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — Senator McCarthy described that
portion of Owen Lattimore's memorandum on far eastern policy which dealt
with South Korea and then said : "That is Lattimore's plan for South Korea.
That is now the plan of the Lattimore-Acheson Axis for the entire Far East."
The Facts.— Mr. Lattimore's relationship with the Department of State from
1933 to date and the circumstances under which he and 30 other people supplied
memoranda containing their views on far eastern policy have been described
many times. These facts of public record are not reflected in Senator McCarthy's
statement.
The facts concerning Mr. Acheson's position on South Korea are also a matter
of well-known public record. On January 20, 1950, Mr. Acheson wrote a letter
describing the adverse effects the defeat of the Korean Aid bill by a vote of 193
to 191 would have on our foreign policy. This letter which was the basis of a
successful attempt to obtain aid for Korea is quoted below. It speaks for itself.
3. In his speech at Atlantic City, Senator McCarthy made other misstatements
which will be refuted in the near future.
[For the press, Department of State. May 20, 1950. No. 529]
For Release at 7 : 00 P.M., E.D.T., Saturday, May 20, 1950, Not To Be Previously
Published. Quoted From or Used in Any Way
The Department of State today made public the following analysis of the speech
delivered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in Chicago, May 6, 1950, on "Com-
munism in Government" :
1. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — Senator McCarthy referred to the De-
partment of Stare's files being examined by the Tydings Subcommittee as "SKinny-
ribbed bones of the files" ; "skeleton files" : "These purged files" ; "phonv files" ;
"1947 and '48 files instead of 1949 and 1950."
The Facts.- — The files transmitted to the Tydings Subcommittee are the full and
complete State Department files current as of the date transmitted. They con-
tain all information relevant to the determination of employee loyalty or security.
Under the Federal Employees Loyalty Program, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation is the agency charged with responsibility for conducting investigations
into the loyalty of State Department personnel.
A representative of the Department of Justice has been present at the meet-
ings of the Tydin.as Subcommittee. The files were viewed by a representative of
the Department of Justice before they were turned over to the Subcommittee.
The files made available to the Subcommittee contain the material collected by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and transmitted to the State Department.
2. Senator McCarthy said in Chicago. — "Now from page 37 of the House Re-
port I quote the following : '* * * almost anyone and everyone in the State De-
partment had access to the files. * * *' "
The Facts. — The report to which Senator McCarthy referred is a report of the
House Appropriations Committee investigators, dated January 27, 1948, which
accompanied the list of 108 cases which were the basis of Senator McCarthy's
speech of February 20, 1950. Senator McCarthy misquoted this report.
The report said: "* * * most everyone and anyone in the Division has ac-
cess to the riles * * *"
The Division that the House investigators were talking about was the Di-
vision of Security. That is the division charged with the physical and personnel
security program of the Department and the Foreign Service, and -it is there-
fore essential that its staff have access to the files when needed. Senator Mc-
Carthy, by substituting "the State Department" for "the Division of Security."
crudely misquotes the language of the report in order to give an entirely false
impression : namely, that any and everyone in the Department has access to
tl" tiles- whereas as a matter of fact such access is strictly limited to employees
<^' the Division when required and to a very small Dumber of employees out-
side the Security Division, such as the members of the Loyalty Security Board.
Senator McCarthy substituted t lie entire State Department for the Division of
Security, a crude misquotation for the purpose of giving an entirely false im-
pression. It is not only a misquotation, it is a quotation out of context, a quota-
tion over two years old made without reference to the facts as they exist at the
present time.
3. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "Tell them to take the list of names
which I have given * * * the Secretary of State * * *."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1827
The Facta.— Despite Under Secretary of State Peurifoy's reiterated requests
Bincfi February 11, 1950, that Senator McCarthy furnish the Department with a
list of names of the "205" or "57" accused State Department employees. Senator
McCarthy has never furnished the Department or the Secretary of State such a
list of names.
4. Senator McCarthy said a Chicago.— Describing the Federal Loyalty Pro-
gram. Senator McCarthy said, "First of all, it permits each Department to in-
vestigate its own people. Those doing the investigating know little or nothing
of communist techniques, even less of about how to conduct an investigation
* * * •'
The Facts. — The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the agency charged under
Executive Order 9835, issued over three years ago, with responsibility for con-
ducting loyalty investigations under the Federal Loyalty Program.
5. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.— Describing loyalty investigations, Sen-
ator McCarthy said, "in dozens of cases, in dozens of cases — for instance, recom-
mendation from Alger Hiss on State Department employees was all that was
needed to completely clear them — like accepting a recommendation from Dillinger
in hiring a hank clerk."
The Facts. — There is not a single instance of this.
6. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "You will recall a former State De-
partment employee by the name of George Wheeler recently retired behind the
Iron Curtain after making typical communist name-calling statements damning
and cursing the United States. This man, George Wheeler, who had been assigned
tremendously important work by the State Department had first been given a
completely clean bill of health by the Loyalty Board even though his file would
have convinced anyone who could add two and two that he was a full-fledged
communist."
The Facts. — At no time has the case of George Wheeler ever been considered
by a security or loyalty board of the Department of State. Mr. Wheeler was one
of a group of former FEA employees in Germany who in September 1945 were
transferred temporarily to the rolls of the State Department. In February 1946
the whole group was transferred to the War Department, and in fact Mr. Wheeler's
transfer to the War Department was even earlier — in December 1945. During
his brief time on the State Department payroll, Mr. Wheeler's case was under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. All these facts were set out
in a departmental press release a month before Senator McCarthy made his mis-
statements.
These facts were also contained in the Department's analysis of Senator
McCarthy's April 20th speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in
which the Department pointed out twelve glaring McCarthy inaccuracies. Sen-
ator McCarthy on May 15 replied to the Department's statement by citing two
alleged inaccuracies in the Department's analysis of his speech. He was silent
as to the remaining ten. Of the two so-called inaccuracies he cited, one per-
tains to the case of George Wheeler. As to George Wheeler, Senator McCarthy
said that the Department should "admit that Wheeler was on the pay roll and
given an absolutely clean bill of health by whatever Government Loyalty Board
cleared personnel for the State Department." Two comments may be made
thereon : first, as of the date of Mr. Wheeler's brief employment with the De-
partment the present loyalty program, under which the Department's loyalty
board was established, was not in existence; second, Senator McCarthy's impli-
cation was that the Department's Loyalty Board was at fault. Even Senator
McCarthy should see the irrelevancy of his attributing to the State Department
matters under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
7. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "Mr. Service, you will recall, was
picked up by the FBI in connection with the Amerasia case * * * The papers
carried the story that J. Edgar Hoover, who is not noted for overstatements, that
J. Edgar Hoover stated that this is a 100 percent air-tight case of espionage."
The Facts. — On May 1, 1950, Deputy Under Secretary of State Peurifoy in a
letter to Mr. Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General, asked whether
Mr. Hoover, in fact, made any similar statement. Mr. Ford, on May 8, 1950,
replied : "Yon are advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which
has been attributed to him."
The exchange of correspondence is attached. (See pp. 8, 9.)
S. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.—'-* * * the State Department
which is about to hear the case of Service is now busily giving Mr. Service's
lawyer the secret documents which the President has denied the Senate, this so
that he can properly defend Mr. Service."
1828 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Facts. — The Department has categorically denied this. Mr. Service has
been furnished copies of documents which he himself had prepared for the
Department in the course of his duties as a foreign service officer.
Relevant excerpts from a letter of May 4, 1950, by General Conrad E. Snow,
Chairman of the Deportment's Loyalty Security Board, to Mr. Whitelaw Reid,
editor of the New York Herald Tribune, are attached. ( See page 9. )
9. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "First take the case of Philip Jessup,
the State Department's Ambassador at Large. Now, here was really a great
joiner, especially Communist-front organization * * * organizations which
the President's own Attorney General and Congressional committee have labeled
as agents of the Communist Party."
The Facts.— In view of Senator McCarthy's repeated assertions the Depart-
ment wrote to Mr. Morgan, Counsel of the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, investigating Senator McCarthy's charges, to see if Senator
McCarthy had supplied them with any information to back up these charges. Mr.
Morgan replied that Senator McCarthy has not supplied any such material. The
only documentary material supplied to the committee concerning the organiza-
tional affiliations or associations of Ambassador Jessup was provided by Senator
Hickenlooper, a photostat of one letterhead of the American Law Students As-
sociation listing Professor Philip Jessup of Columbia University on the Associa-
tion's "Faculty Advisory Board." The American Law Students Association is
not listed by the Attorney General and does not appear on the list of "Citations
by Official Government Agencies" issued in 1948 by the House Committe on Un-
American Activities.
The correspondence with Mr. Morgan is attached. (See pp. 10 and 11.)
Dr. Jessup testified, before the Subcommittee, that he had joined no Commu-
nist-front organizations, whereas the organizations to which he did belong
included the following :
The American Legion. (He is a former commander of Utica Post No. 229.)
The American Philosophical Society.
The Foreign Policy Asociation.
The American Bar Association.
On April 6, 1950, the Utica Post No. 229 passed a resolution condemning Sen-
ator McCarthy's attack upon their past commander, Philip C. Jessup. A copy
of this resolution is attached. It will be noted that a copy of it was sent to
Senator McCarthy with the admonition that "his reckless and despicable conduct
in this instance cannot be condoned by any right-thinking American and should
never be repeated if he hopes to retain a shred of public respect." (For copy
of resolution, see pp. 11 and 12.)
10. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "Jessup * * * was largely in
charge of a publication known as the Far Eastern Survey, the publication of
the American council of the Institute of Pacific Relations ; that he was in charge
while it was spewing forth the perfumed Communist Party line sewage * * *.'1
The Facts. — Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr. Jessup's relationship
with Far Eastern Survey based on the single fact that in 1944 Dr. Jessup served
on the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council of the Institute
of Pacific Relations.
Senator McCarthy's allegation that Far Eastern Survey followed the Com-
munist Party originates in discredited contentions made by one Alfred Kohlberg
in 1944. The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations investigated
Kohlber's charges. In a document circulated to its members, it was demon-
strated that Kohlberg had ignored the overwhelming number of facts that did
not support his contention. The document showed, among other things, that
Kohlberg had quoted, in connection with "Far Eastern Survey, and other publi-
cations, from less than 2 per cent of the articles published and from less than
.002 per cent of the books published. In April 1947, the membership of the Amer-
ican Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in a vote of 1163 to 60 over-
wl ilmingly repudiated Kohlberg's charges as "inaccurate and irresponsible."
11. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "I have brought with r.ie photo-
static copies of checks representing thousands of dollars of Communist money
paid to Jessup's organization." As documentation he provided photostats of
two checks signed by Frederick Yanderhilt Field totalling $3,500.
The Facts. — This is another repetition of a refuted charge made by Senator
McCarthy many times before. Senator McCarthy repeats it although it has
already been refuted. The inference is that the Institute of Pacific Relations
had been "bought" with Communist money. At that time, Dr. Robert Gordon
Sproul, President of the University of California, was Chairman of the Ameri-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1829
can Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice
President of the Motion Picture Export Association, was Treasurer; and Mr.
William R. Herod, now President of the International General Electric Company,
was Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce, of
Time and Life, were sponsors of a drive during that period for funds on hehalf
of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Field's con-
trimitions, according to Senator McCarthy's own figures, totalled only $3,500, as
compared with a total expense for the two-year period of approximately $200,000.
About half of the amount was met by contributions from the Rockefeller Foun-
dation and Carnegie Corporation. Generous donations by large industrial
concerns made up a large portion of the remainder.
12. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "Mr. Lattimore, as the nation knows
has long been referred to as the architect of the State Department's Far Eastern
policy, the architect whose shadow lingers over the corpse of China."
'1 he Facts. — Senator Tydings arked S -cretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall and
Acheson whether this description was true or false. They all replied that it
was false. These letters were made public by Senator Tydings on April 29,
1950. The person responsible for long and repeated use of the term "architect
of the Far Eastern Policy" is Senator McCarthy who employed the term in his
testimony before the Subcommittee.
13. Senator McCarthy said at Chicago. — "* * * so that you will have a
full picture of the extent to which Lattimore shaped our dismal policy of failure
in the Far East, I call to your attention a secret document which he furnished
to the State Department in August of 1949, a document which the State Depart-
ment itself labeled as a guide for Ambassador at Large Jessup * * *."
The Facts. — This is another repetition of a refuted McCarthy charge.
The Department publicly and fully explained in press conferences on March
31, that Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who submitted written
memoranda in response to requests made in August, 1949, by Ambassador Jessup.
These memoranda were used as background material by a consultant's com-
mittee consisting of Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and Ambassador
Jessup in their study of United States foreign policy in the Far East. (Mr.
Lattimore's memorandum was never singled out, or labeled as a guide for Am-
bassador Jessup.) Mr. Lattimore as director of the Walter Hines Page School
of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, was also one of 25 private indivi-
duals participating in a round-table discussion on October G, 7, and 8, 1949,
arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views
with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China.
The 31 who submitted memoranda were :
Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Professor Hugh Borton, Columbia University
Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh. American Council on Education, Washington
Former Ambassador AVilliam Bullitt
Former Under Secretary Castle
Former Consul John A. Einbry
Professor Rupert Emberson, Harvard University
Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City
Professor John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
T>r. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City
Professor Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University
Former Under Secretary Grew
Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeek
Roger Lapham, Former Administrator, ECA China
Professor Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University
Professor Owen Lattimore, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Oliver C. Lockhard, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
■C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson. Richmond, Virginia
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, New York
Mr. James Rowe, Washington
1830 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City
Professor Aniry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
Professor Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University
Professor Mary Wright, Stanford University
Admiral Yarnell
The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended
the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to discuss Far Bast
Policy :
Joseph W. Ballantine, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University,
New Haven, Connecticut
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colgrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Evanston, Illinois.
Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
John A. Fairbanks, Committee on International and Regional Studies.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company,
New York, New York.
Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Washington.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International
Relations. Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore, Maryland.
Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank.
Portland, Oregon.
George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross. Washington, D. 0.
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company.
New York, New York.
Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia
University, New York, New York.
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minne-
sota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company.
New York, New York.
John D. Rockefeller, III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York,
New York.
Lawrence K. itosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.
New York.
Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern
California, San Francisco, California.
Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle. Washington.
Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cin-
cinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
All of the memoranda and all of the views above referred to were of course
submitted in confidence by their authors, and the Department could not ex-
pect these people to be frank unless it respected that confidence. The De-
partment would not and did not. however, in any way interfere with publi-
cation of any memorandum by its author. In fact, the substance of Mr. Latri-
more's article was published in an article which he wrote for the Januarv
1950 issue of The Atlantic magazine.
14. Senator McCarthy said nt Chicago. — "But let me give a brief resume
of the official Communist Party program for Asia — there is no secret about
that. Number 1, destroy the armies of Chiang Kai-shek. Number 2, get the
United States out of Ko-ea. Number •".. tore* the withdrawal of United States
forces from Japan; and Dumber 4, prevent the forma ion of a Pacific Pact
against Communist aggression*
"Now. what does Lattimore tell .Jessup our policy in Asia should be? Listen
to this if you will: Number 1, Abandon Chiang Kai-shek: number 2, get out of
Korea: number •"». withdraw United States forces from Japan: and 4, deny
the need of a Pacific Pact."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1831
'/'//<■ Facts. — This is another repetition of ;i refuted McCarthy charge.
The United Slates" record and policy in the Far East, as it relates to the
points made by Senator McCarthy may he summarized as follows:
(1) The United States poured tremendous amounts of aid into China in
efforts tn bolster the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
(2) The United States has led the lighl for a free, democratic Korea; and has
taken its case to the United Nations; and. since the establishment of this
government, has contributed substantial economic and mili ary support.
(3) The United States as the principal occupying power in Japan will not
enter into any peace treaty which makes impossible adequate protection of
United States' security interests in the Western Pacific.
(4) The United States has publicly indicated that it would look with sym-
pathy upon a regional alliance of Pacific nations, provided the impetus for
such an association came from the nations themselves.
Following is the material referred to on pages 3 and 4:
Exchange of correspondence between Mr. John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under-
Secretary of State, and Mr. Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General
(referred to on page 3) :
May 1, 1950.
The Honorable Peyton Ford,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.
Dear Mr. Ford : In bis address on April 20, 1950, to the American Society
of Newspaper Editors at the Hotel Statler in Washington, Senator McCarthy
said :
"One of those arrested was John S. Service. He was never convicted;
he was never tried; he was never indicted.
"J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, publicly stated at the time of
the arrests that this case was a 100-percent airtight case of espionage.
At the time the case broke John S. Service was picked up by the FBI.
Mr. Hoover made that statement, and he seldom errs on the side of over-
statement, as you well know."
The Department of State is naturally interested in whether or not this
statement of Senator McCarthy is an accurate one. As a result, I would ap-
preciate it if you would inform the Department as soon as possible whether
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made any statement
similar to that attributed to him by Senator McCarthy.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Petjrifoy, Deputy Under Secretary.
May 8, 1950.
John E. Peurifoy, Esquire,
Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Pki kifoy : This is on reply to your letter dated May 1, 1950, inquiring
as to the accuracy of a statement alleged to have been made by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the time of the arrest of John S.
Service and other suspects involved in the so-called Ame»-asia case. You are
advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which has been attributed
to him.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.
Excerpts From General Snow's Letter to the New York Herald Tribune
(Referred to on page 3)
Because of the reputation of the New York Herald Tribune for fair and objec-
tive reporting, I am taking the liberty of calling your attention to the headings
of two articles which appeared in your issues of May 3 and 4, respectively,
regarding the conduct of the John S. Service case by the Loyalty Security Board
of the Department of State, of which I am Chairman. * * *
1832 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Nor is it true that Mr. Service is being given any illegitimate advantage in
the matter of access to papers. Mr. Service has not been given and will not be
given access to the loyalty or personnel files which were gathered by the FBI
and other investigatory bodies and which were refused by the President to the
Senate Committee. Mr. Service is entitled, however, as a matter of elementary
fairness to see and put in evidence, any reports or other papers in the files of the
State Department which were prepared by him or in connection with the missions
on which he served, which may be material to his defense. Action by the Depart-
ment of State is necessary to permit him to show them to counsel. To date, the
only confidential do: uinents in which this action has been taken are documents
actually written by Mr. Service himself. This is all there is to that part of the
story.
The Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State is a judicial body set
up for the purpose of giving to an employee accused of disloyalty, or of being a
security risk, a fair hearing. While under the regulations he has no opportunity
to confront and cross-examine witnesses who have given confidential information
to the Board, or even to see a transcript of their statements, he is advised of the
substance of the accusations, and must be given a fair opportunity to defend him-
self, not only by his own testimony, but also by the production of any witnesses
or of any documentary evidence that may tend to establish his innocence of the
accusations. The Board has an obligation to give him the fullest opportunity to
prepare and present his defense.
Exchange of Correspondence Between Mr. John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under:
Secretary of State, and Mr. Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel, Foreign
Relations Subcommittee Investigating the State Department
(Referred to on page 4).
May 16, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee,,
The Capitol
Dear Mr. Morgan : In connection with the analysis of Senator McCarthy's-
speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors forwarded on May 12,.
1950, to the Society by Assistant Secretary Barrett, Senator McCarthy has stated,.
as quoted on May 15 by the Associated Press :
"The State Department also states that Jessup belonged to> no Communist
front organizations. I gave photostatic proof to the committee that he was
affiliated with five organizations listed by the Attorney General or congres-
sional committees as fronts for the Communist Party.
"He was a director of one of the worst of such organizations named by the
Attorney General, namely, the China Aid Council of the American League for
Peace and Democracy."
At Atlantic City on the same day he said :
"* * * Now, the thing they forget is that I have presented to the Com-
mittee photostats showing that he belonged, that he was affiliated with not
one, but with five Communist front organizations ; and that he not only
belonged to, but was a Director of one of the worst of the lot, named as such
by the Attorney General. * * *"
In view of these assertions of Senator McCarthy, it would be very much ap-
preciated if you could make available to this Department copies of the photostats
which the Committee has received from him.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peurifoy.
May 17, 1950.
Mr. John E. Peurifoy,
Deputy Undersecretary, United States State Department,
Washinc/ton, D. C.
Dear Mr. Peurifoy : Reference is made to your letter of May 16, 1950, referring
in turn to the remarks, as quoted by the Associated Press, of Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy relative to Dr. Philip Jessup, as follows :
"The State Department also states that Jessup belonged to no Communist
front organizations. I gave photostatic proof to the committee that he was
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1833
affiliated with five organizations listed by the Attorney General or congres-
sional committees as fronts for the Communist Party.
"He was a director of one of the worst of sneh organizations named by the
Attorney General, namely the China Aid Council of the American League-
for Peace and Democracy."
*******
«* * * n0W) the thing they forget is that I have presented to the Com-
mittee photostats showing that he belonged, that he was affiliated with not
one, but with five Communist-front organizations ; and that he not only be-
longed to, but was a Director of, one of the worst of the lot, named as such
by the Attorney General. * * *"
Relative to your request for photostatic copies of the material stated to have
been turned over to the subcommittee by Senator McCarthy, you are advised that,
after a careful and diligent search of our files, we find no record of any material
having heen turned over to the subcommittee by Senator McCarthy indicating
that Dr. Jessup has been associated with Communist-front organizations.
For your information, however, in the course of Senator Hickenlooper's exam-
ination of Dr. Jessup, he offered in evidence, at page 530 of the transcript, a
photostat of a letterhead of an organization known as the American Law Stu-
dent's Association on which "Prof. Philip Jessup" of Columbia University is listed
on the "Faculty Advisory Board," along with other named individuals. The sub-
committee has been supplied no other documentary material concerning organiza-
tional affiliations or associations of Dr. Jessup.
After hearing of Senator McCarthy's statements referred to above, I immedi-
ately called his office requesting the photostatic material to which he referred'.
Again on May 16, 1950, I called Senator McCarthy personally, advising that the-
subcommittee had not been supplied the photostatic material concerning Dr,
Jessup to which he had referred and requested that he supply the same for our
record. As yet, I have not been supplied the photostats in question.
Should they be received by me, I shall be glad to make copies thereof available-
to your office.
Sincerely yours,
Edward P. Morgan",
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department.
Resolution Condemning Attack LTpon Past Commander Philip C. Jessup
Adopted at a Regular Meeting of Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, Held
on April 6, 1950
(Referred to on p. 4)
Whereas Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, is proud to number among the-
list of its Past Commanders a distinguished comrade, friend, and charter member,
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, whose record of patriotic devotion and continued
helpfulness to our country over a period of many years Is a source of great satis-
faction, pride, and distinction to Utica Post and to its entire membership; and
Whereas the sterling character, splendid reputation, and unquestionable loyalty
and patriotism of Past Commander Philip C. Jessup, both privately and in his
public capacity as U. S. Ambassador at Large, have recently been subjected
to scurrilous, unprincipled, and wholly unjustifiable attack by one Joseph Mc-
Carthy, who in so doing has sullied the office of U. S. Senator which he pres-
ently holds: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, and its entire member-
ship shall and do strongly resent, eondemn, and decry the unprincipled, unjusti-
fied, unsportsmanlike, un-American, and intolerable conduct of Senator Joseph
McCarthy in his wanton attempt without proof or reason to smear and destroy
the good reputation and high standing of so devoted and patriotic a citizen
as our esteemed and valued friend and comrade, the Honorable Philip C. Jessup,
U. S. Ambassador at Large ; and be it further
Resolved, That Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, and its members in
meeting duly assembled feel privileged at this time to reaffirm their continued
trust and confidence in, their esteem and devotion to, and their lasting friendship
for a distinguished public servant, a loyal patriot, and a great citizen, the Hon-
orable Philip C. Jessup, a Past Commander of this Post; and be it further
Resolved, That this resolution be inscribed upon the Minutes of this meeting,
that a copy thereof be delivered to our comrade, Ambassador Jessup ; that a sec-
1834 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
nnd copy be delivered to the public press; and that a third copy be mailed to Sen-
ator McCarthy with the admonition that his reckless and despicable conduct in
this instance cannot be condoned by any right-thinking American and should
never be repeated if he hopes to retain a shred of public respect.
[For the press, Department of State, May 25, 1950. No. 549]
Fob Release at 7 : 00 P. M., E. D. T., Thursday, May 25, 1950. Not To Be
Previously Published, Quoted From ob Used in Any Way
The Department of State today made public the folowing analysis of some of
the factual inaccuracies in the speech delivered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy
at Atlantic City, May 15, 1950, to the Sons of the American Revolution :
(1) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — '[as to] the skeleton files
which the President has given to the Tydings -Committee * * * I have
made photostats of a report [of House investigators] * * * based partly on
FBI investigations of the files * * * they set forth in some detail 1,hat * * *
some of them have been completely rifled * * * that practically everyone in
the Division had complete and free access * * *" [Emphasis supplied.]
The Facts. — This charge has already been demonstrated to be false. It was
previously made by Senator McCarthy at Chicago, on May 6, 1950, and the Depart-
ment commented thereon in its press release of May 20. It was there pointed out
that the files transmitted to the Subcommittee were complete files; that Senator
McCarthy was referring to a report submitted by invesigators of the House
Appropriations Committee in 1948 and that the Senator had misquoted the
language of the report by substituting "the State Department" for "the Di-
vision of Security." It is noted that the Senator at Alantie Civ repaired his
quotations by using "the Division" in place of "the Department of State."
At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy added one new element. He refers to
an "FBI investigation of the files." The "FBI investigation" he refers to was
a survey of the Security Division made for the Department by the FBI at the
Department's request. In the language of the House Investigators, who con-
ducted their investigations in the Fall of 1947 :
'In April 1947, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the request of the
State Department, made a survey of the Security and Investigations Di-
vision
* *
There was no suggestion, either expressed or implied in either the FBI or the
House Report, that the condition of the files in 1947 was purposeful or sus-
picious. Senator McCarthy's use of the word "rifled" in speaking of the files
was entirely without substantiation. The constructive criticism and sugges-
tions invited from the FBI and the House Investigators have been of great help.
In 1950 these files are as rigidly controlled, accurate, and complete as it is
possible to make them. The files delivered to the Subcommittee are complete
files — State Department reports, FBI reports, interrogations, hearings, admin-
istrative memoranda, even pencilled working papers — everything. On May 10
when the committee started examining the files, Senator Tydings is quoted as
saying:
"These 81 files contain not only all of the data which the State Depart-
ment investigators have assembled, but also all of the loyalty data which
the FBI has gathered and referred to the State Department and which has
been made a part of these files.
"Thus the Committee will have the complete record from all
sources * * *."
(2) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — "Now to those in the State
Department who say that Soviet Russia's aims have changed in the last few
years and that she no longer wants to enslave America * * *."
The Facts. — Senator McCarthy insinuates that there are those in the State
Department who do not realize that Soviet aims and propaganda are directed
against America's free institutions.
The Cnited States is si riving, by all possible means, to preserve these free
institutions. The Department and its personnel have no illusions about the
methods or the aims of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party here or
abroad.
Ambassador Jessup — whom Senator McCarthy has accused of having "an
unusual affinity for communist causes" — expressed the viewpoint of the entire
Department when he told the press of India and the world at New Delhi, Feb-
ruary 23, 1950:
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1835
"Since the end of the Second World War, history lias recorded the extension
of a new imperialism that has brought more than a dozen countries under the
domination of a single expanding power. The device used by this expanding
power in extending its imperialism is to hold out the glittering promises of com-
munism as a beacon light for the rescue of peoples who are suffering from eco-
nomic underdevelopment or who are trying to remove the shackles of the old
traditional kinds of colonialism. However, where communism gains control, it
becomes immediately apparent that the peoples are not allowed to determine
their own future, hut must conform to a single policy laid down in Moscow."
Similarly. Counselor George Kenuan wrote in an article appearing in the
March issue of The Reader's Digest:
• The Russian leaders believe our downfall is inevitable. They would do
anything they can to hasten it. * * *"
On March 13, 1950, Secretary Acheson said at Berkeley:
"We can see no moral compromise with the * * * theses of interna-
tional communism : that the end justifies the means, that any and all methods
are therefore permissible, and that the dignity of the human individual is of
no importance as against the interest of the state.
"To our minds, these principles mean, in their practical application, the arro-
gation to individual human leaders, with all their inevitable frailties and limi-
tations, of powers and pretenses which most of us would be willing to concede
only to the infinite wisdom and compassion of a Divine Being. They mean the
police state, with all that that implies; a regimentation of the worker which is
hardly distinguishable from slave labor : a loss to society of those things which
appear to use to make life worth living: a denial of the fundamental truths
embodied in all the great religions of the world."
(3) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — (Referring to Mr. Owen Latti-
more:) " * * * the architect of our eastern policy, Owen Lattimore."
" * * * Mr. Acheson's architect."
" * * * this architect of the new Lattimore-Acheson Pacific plan
* * *'■
The Facts. — This characterization of Mr. Lattimore also has been repeatedly
disproved. On April 29, 1950, Senator Tydings released letters he received from
Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson conclusively showing that the
description of Lattimore as an architect of our Far Eastern policy is false.
Although it appeared widely in the press at the time, the text of this corre-
spondence is attached, because of Senator McCarthy's twice renewed disregard
of the facts.
(4) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — " * * * after all, doesn't
Mi-. Lattimore * * * say in his secret instructions to the State Depart-
ment * * *"
The Facts. — As has now been publicly set forth by the Department several
times, Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who submitted written
memoranda in response to requests made in August, 1949, by Ambassador Jessup.
Mr. Lattimore was also one of 25 private individuals participating in a round-
table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public
Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on
United States foreign policy toward China.
Allowing for duplications on the two lists, over 50 non-Departmental persons
participated in the two projects. Included were former Ambassadors William
Bullitt and Joseph Grew, General George C. Marshall, Harold Stassen, and
many other prominent and informed citizens representing many shades of
opinion. Their opinions had never been treated or referred to as "instructions"
until Senator McCarthy began to foreshadow his reiteration of the theme in
March 1950 when he referred to Mr. Lattimore as the "top adviser" of the De-
partment.
As early as March 31, immediately after Senator McCarthy's references on
the Senate floor to Mr. Lattimore, and long before his ASNE speech of April 20,
the Department made public the full facts about the Lattimore memorandum.
The names of the participants submitting memoranda were :
Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution.
Professor Hugh Borton, Columbia University.
Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University.
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington.
Former Ambassador William Bullitt.
Former Under Secretary Castle.
Former Consul John A. Embry.
68970—50 — pt. 2 23
1836 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Professor Rupert Emberson, Harvard University.
Dr. Charles B. Pahs, New York City.
Professor John K. Fairbank, Harvard University.
Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City.
Professor Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University.
Former Under Secretary Grew.
Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China.
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Roger Lapham, Former Administrator, ECA China.
Professor Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University.
Professor Owen Lattimore. Director of the Walter Hines Page School of
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington.
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations.
Professor Wallace Moore, Occidental College. Los Angeles.
Professor Edwin O. Relschauer, Harvard University.
C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration.
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Virginia.
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, New York.
Mr. James Rowe, Washington.
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City.
Professor Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky.
Professor Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University. .
Professor Mary Wright, Stanford University.
Admiral H. E. Yarned.
The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31 listed
above, attended the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to dis-
cuss Far East Policy :
Joseph W. Ballantine, The Brookings Institution. Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University,
New Haven," Connecticut.
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colgrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Evanston, Illinois.
Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
John A. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Har-
vard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company. New
York, New York.
Arthur N. Ilolcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Benjamin II. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Washington.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Re-
lations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
Ernest B. MacNaughtOn, chairman of the Board, First National Bank,
Portland, Oregon.
George C. Marshall, President. American Red Cross. Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New
York, New York.
Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia
University, New York.
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Edwin (). Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard Uni-
versity. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company,
New York, New York.
John D. Rockefeller, HI, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York,
New York.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York,
New York.
Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern Cali-
fornia, San Francisco, California.
Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1837
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
The full facts were reiterated, and again documented with the names of the in-
dividuals involved, in the Department's analyses of the Senator's ASNE and
Chicago speeches. Despite this, Senator McCarthy has repeated this discredited
charge on each occasion, and at Atlantic City repeated it again.
(5) Senator McCarthy *<ii<l at Atlantic City. — "I have presented to the Commit-
tee photostats showing that he (Dr. Jessup) helonged, that he was affiliated with
not one, but five Communist-front organizations, and that he not only belonged
to, but was a director, a director of one of the worst of the lot named as such by
the Attorney General."
The Facts. — Senator McCarthy has submitted no photostats as of this writing.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel of the Tydings Subcommittee, to which
Senator McCarthy said he gave "photostatic proof,'' has informed the Depart-
ment :
• ■* * * -\ye fjn(j no record of any material having been turned over to the sub-
committee by Senator McCarthy indicating that Dr. Jessup has been associated
with Communist-front organizations.
"For your information, however, in the course of Senator Hickenlooper's ex-
amination of Dr. Jessup, he offered in evidence, at page 530 of the transcript, a
photostat of a letterhead of an organization known as the American Law Student's
Association on which 'Prof. Philip Jessup,' of Columbia University is listed on
the "Faculty Advisory Board', along with other named individuals. The Subcom-
mittee has been supplied no other documentary material concerning organizational
affiliations or associations of Dr. Jessup.
"After hearing of Senator McCarthy's statements referred to above, I imme-
diately called his office requesting the photostatic material to which he referred.
Again on May 16, 1950, I called Senator McCarthy personally, advising that the
subcommittee had not been supplied the photostatic material concerning Dr.
Jessup to which In- had referred and requested that he supply the same for our
record. As yet, I have not bee:i supplied the photostats in question."
The Department checked by telephone again today with Mr. Morgan's office.
The photostats referred to by Senator McCarthy have not been received by it.
With regard to the general charge, this has been repeated and refuted at least
three times. Senator McCarthy originally claimed that Doctor Jessup had an
'•unusual affinity" for Communist causes. Before the ASNE, he claimed Dr.
Jessup was a "perennial joiner" and at Chicago he said the Doctor was a ''great
joiner" of Communist fronts. Doctor Jessup himself discussed Senator Mc-
Carthy's original charge in careful detail in his statement before the Subcom-
mittee, and the Department refuted the ASNE and Chicago repetitions in its
analyses of both speeches.
In renewing this charge at Atlantic City, Senator McCarthy added one inno-
vation : that Doctor Jessup belonged to and was a director of "one of the worst"
Communist fronts cited by the Attorney General. In a supplementary statement
to the Associated Press on the same day, Senator McCarthy said :
"He was a director of one of the worst of such organizations named by the
Attorney General, namely the China Aid Council of the American League for
-Peace and Democracy."
Ami assador Jessup is not and has never been a director of the China Aid
Council. This charge evidently is based — intentionally or carelessly — on the fact
that imt Mr. Jessup, but his wife, was listed in 1944 as a Director of the China
Aid Council. However, at that time, Mrs. Jessup was taking no active part in
the work of the Council and attended no meetings. Prior to 1942, Mrs. Jessup
had been active in the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans, formed
under the sponsorship of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to raise money for orphanages
in China. * * * This organization has never been cited by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In 11)42 Mrs. Jessup
turned her attention to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia,
for which she worked full time until 1946. Meanwhile, however, the China Aid
Council absorbed the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and con-
tinued as of 1944 to carry Mrs. Jessup's name on its letterhead.
Dr. Jessup is a member of a number of highly respectable non-communist-
front organizations, including Utica Post, No. 229, of the American Legion, which,
on April 6, 195o, resolved that the Post and its entire membership ;
"* * * strongly resent, condemn and decry the * * * intolerable con-
duct of Senator Joseph McCarthy in his wanton attempt, without proof or
1838 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
reason, to sruear and destroy the good reputation (of) Phillip C. Jessup
* * * »
(6) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — "(This) publication was being
supervised by Mr. Jessup (and) was being used to spearhead the smear against
the anti-Communist forces in China * * *."
The Facts. — This twice refuted yet now reiterated statement refers to Dr.
Jessup's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication, Far
Eastern Survey. In the Department's analyses of the ASNE and Chicago
speeches, it has been demonstrated that :
1. Senator McCarthy has merely parroted thoroughly discredited charges
leveled by one Arthur Kohlberg against the Institute of Pacific Relations (an
organization which the Rockefeller Foundation has referred to as "The most
important single source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific
Area and the Far East").
2. Dr. Jessup never "supervised" the Far Eastern Survey.
(9) Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City. — "I have presented to the Com-
mittee checks totaling $3,500 which represent Communist money paid * * *
the Institute of Pacific Relations *■•**. I have gotten photostats of ad-
ditional checks which now total $6,500.00 of Communist money * * * ."
The Facts. — The charge, expressed or implied, that the Institute of Pacific
Relations was bought and paid for by "Communists" is among the most thorough-
ly refuted charges the Senator has advanced. The Institute of Pacific Relations^
and the Department have repeatedly presented the facts in careful detail.
Senator McCarthy's evidence consisted of photostatic copies of checks signed
by Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Mr. Field's contributions to the Institute of
Pacific Relations were made in the course of a campaign for funds sponsored
by Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce,
of Time, Life and Fortune. At the time, Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President
of the University of California, was Chairman of the American Council of the
Institute of Pacific Relations ; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the
Motion Picture Export Association, was Treasurer ; and Mr. William R. Herod,
now President of the International General Electric Company, was Chairman of
the Finance Committee.
Characteristically, however, Senator McCarthy included among the new photo-
stats shown at Atlantic City a $500 check from Field payable, not to the Institute
of Pacific Relations, but to the American Council on Soviet Relations. The
American Council on Soviet Relations is a well-known organization listed as
subversive by the Attorney General. The Institute of Pacific Relations is in
no way related to it. The two organizations have never before been thus con-
fused.
As pointed out in previous releases, the Institute's expenses averaged $100,000
a year; therefore, Mr. Feld's $8,000 represented only a drop in the bucket as
compared with total expenses of $300,000 for the three-year period.
Text of Letters on the Lattimore Issue
April 17, 1950.
Dear General Marshall : It has been stated by Senator McCarthy during
the course of the hearings now being held by the subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee under S. Res. 231, that Mr. Owen Lattimore is
"the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy."
It is important for our committee to determine the truth of this contention
for whatever bearing it may have on other evidence adduced in the Lattimore
matter. For that reason, I would appreciate it greatly if you would inform me at
your earliest possible convenience of the extent to which, in your opinion.
Dr. Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the
extent that Dr. Lattimore influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period
in which you were Secretary of State.
I am addressing a similar letter to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Hull and Mr.
Byrnes.
Thanking you for your kindness in giving the committee this information,
I am
Very respectfully,
Millard E. Tydings.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1839
April 22, 1950.
My Dear Senatob Ttdings : I have received your letter of April 17 in which
you refer to a recent statement, in connection with the hearings of the sub-
committee on Foreign Relations under Senate Resolution 231, that "Owen Latti-
more is the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy." Your letter then
asks the extent to which, in my opinion, "Lattimore was the principal architect
of our Far Eastern policy" during the period in which I served as Secretary
of State.
The statement referred to above is completely without basis in fact.
So far as I and my associates can recall I never even met Mr. Lattimore.
I take the liberty of commenting on the harmful effect on our foreign relations
of such statements, charges or insinuations broadcast with so little regard for
the truth. They undoubtedly confuse our friends abroad, undermine and weaken
our position before the world and actually lend assistance to the powers that
would destroy us.
Faithfully yours,
G. C. Marshall.
April 24, 1930.
Dear Millard: I have your letter of the 17th asking the extent to which, in
my opinion, Mr. Owen Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern
policy" or the extent he influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period
I was Secretary of State.
I do not know Mr. Lattimore. If he ever wrote me about the Far Eastern
policy the letter was not called to my attention. If, while I was Secretary of
State, he discussed our Far Eastern policy with any officials of the department
concerned with that policy, in their discussions with me, they did not quote him.
Early in December 1945, General George C. Marshall went to China and
thereafter his reports to the President and me influenced our policies in China
and the Far East. I do not think General Marshall was influenced by Mr.
Lattimore.
To my former colleagues, I take the liberty of adding that, regardless of the
merits of complaints as to what has heretofore occurred, the President and the
Secretary of State have given proof of their desire to restore the bipartisan
policy in our foreign affairs, and I earnestly hope the members of the Senate
will cooperate in that effort.
When I was Secretary of State I found I could talk to Senator Vandenberg
with the same freedom with which I talked to Senator Connally and to my assist-
ants, and I profited by his advice. I am sure that in his absence other Repub-
lican Senators will cooperate just as did Senator Vandenberg. It is extremely
important at this time, in view of the tenseness of the situation in world affaii'S,
that we do not give to either our friends or enemies abroad the false imnression
of a serious division among us in our policies as to the Soviet Government.
Seldom in history have our people been so united on any issue.
I hope that, regardless of our differences on domestic issues, our political
leaders can present a united front in our foreign relations.
Sincerely yours,
James F. Byrnes.
April 20, 1950.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I have your letter of April 17 in which you in-
quire concerning the extent to which, in my opinion, Dr. Owen Lattimore was
"the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent he influenced
our Far Eastern policy while I was Secretary of State.
In my opinion, he was in no sense the "principal architect" of our Far Eastern
policy during the period I served as Secretary of State. Although his position
in academic circles as a student of and writer on some aspects of Chinese life
and history was. of course, known to us, I am not aware that during this period
he had any appreciable influence on our Far Eastern policy. I do not remember
having consulted with him on that subject or on any subject at any time.
Sincerely yours,
Cordell Hull.
April 27, 1950.
My Dear Sknator Tydings : In a letter dated April 17. 1950. you asked that I
inform you of the extent to which, in my opinion. Mr. Owen Lattimore was the
1840 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"principal architect of our Far Eastern policy," or the extent to which he in-
fluenced our Far Eastern policy during the period in which I have been Secretary
of State. On April 17 Mr. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote you
in full detail concerning Mr. Lattimore's connections with this department in
the past. The Far Eastern policy of this Government, like all other foreign
policy, is the responsibility of the Secretary of State and has been made by me
in my administration subject, of course, to the direction of the President.
I welcome this opportunity to state personally and categorically that during
the period in which I have been Secretary Mr. Lattimore, so far as I am concerned
or am aware, has had no influence in the determination of our Far Eastern policy.
There is clearly no basis in fact for describing Mr. Lattimore as the "principal
architect" of our Far Eastern policy. I might add that, so far as I am aware,
I have never met Mr. Lattimore.
The Far Eastern policy of the United States has at all times been determined
after careful study by the responsible officers of -the department and an objec-
tive evaluation by me of all of the facts available to this Government. The
Department of State has explored all avenues to arrive at the relevant facts.
The measure of the participation of Mr. Lattimore, so far as this department and
I are concerned, is fully and fairly indicated in the letter of April 17 from Mr.
Peurifoy.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Acheson.
[For the press, Department of State, May 26, 1930. No. 55S]
Senator McCarthy's Rochester Charges
On February 0, 1950, Senator McCarthy charged at Wheeling, West Virginia :
"While I cannot take time to name all the men in the State Department who
have been named as members of the Communist Party and as members of a spy
ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of
State as being members of the Communist Parry and who nevertheless are still
working and shaping the policy of the State Department."
During the following months ho has made numerous other charges. He has
said that the Department has followed the Communist Party line, that the archi-
tect our foreign policy has been Mr. Owen Lattimore, and he has made many
charges against Ambassador Jessup and other persons, both in and outside the
Department. He has repeated these charges over and over again, even though
they have been shown to be clearly without basis in fact.
To date his irrepressible and irresponsible charges have not resulted in the
disclosure of a single Communist in the State Department. They have resulted
in great harm to our foreign policy abroad, and in serious injury to the persons
unjustly accused. The Department feels that his charges would have had an
even worse effect abroad if they had not been answered as strongly and effectively
as possible. Accordingly the Department has been carefully analyzing the in-
accuracies in each of Senator McCarthy's statement and setting forth the facts
as we understand them. It will follow this procedure with respect to his speech
at Rochester last night.
An analysis will be made available in the near future. In the meantime, the
Department points out that Senator McCarthy said in advance of the speech
that he would disclose State Department files on Lattimore. Instead, he dealt
with the clearance by the Civil Service Commission of two former Chinese em-
ployees of the Office of War Information.
The record has been set straight a number of times on some of the assertions
which the Senator repeated again last night. The facts, however, unfortunately
do not deter him in his reckless course.
The Senator's campaign does, however, seem to be getting further and further
afield from his original assertion that there were Communists in the Department.
He no longer talks about 205 Communists in the Department, or 81, 57, 3 or even 1.
As State Department officers have often said before, if there are any Communists
in the Department, they will be fired. The Department does not believe there
arc any.
Even Mr. McCarthy now seems to agree.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1841
[For the press, Department of State, May 27, 1950. No. 558]
For Release at 7 p. m., e. d. t., Sunday, May 28, 1950. Not To Be Previously
Published, Quoted From, or Used in Any Way
The Department of State today made public the following analysis of some
of the tactual inaccuracies in the speech delivered by Senator Joseph R. Mc-
Carthy at Rochester, N. Y., on May 25, 1950, to the National Convention of the
Cat holie Press Association of the United States :
1. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "When I began the presentation of
the ease against Owen Lattimore, the State Department's architect of our Far
Eastern policy, * * * I informed the Senate that Lattimore in a letter to Joseph
Barnes * * * instructed him, in effect to get rid of all Chinese employees in the
Office of War Information who were loyal to * * * Chiang Kai-shek, and to re-
place them with Chinese Communists * * * Later when addressing the Ameri-
can Society for Newspaper Editors, I furnished them complete copies of and
discussed the Lattimore-Barnes letter."
TIic Facts. — In the first place, as the Department of State has reiterated time
and time again, Mr. Owen Lattimore is not an employee of the Department of
State.
In the second place, Mr. Lattimore is not the "architect" of the State Depart-
ment's Far Eastern policy. Four Secretaries of State have publicly contra-
dicted this assertion.
In the third place. Senator' McCarthy originally lifted completely out of con-
text, from a document then classified as secret, a passage purporting to support
his charge that Mr. Lattimore instructed Mr. Barnes to replace pro-Chiang
Kai-shek employees of the Office of War Information with Communists. As a
result. Senator Tydings publicly read the entire letter into the record, and on
April 10 — ten days before his speech to the American Society for Newspaper
Editors — the State Department sent a copy of the letter to Senator McCarthy.
The letter did not say what Senator McCarthy asserted it did. What it did
say was : "In the circumstances, we have to he extremely careful about our
Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists,
we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely
been accused of being Communists. * * * For our purposes, it is wise to recruit
as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be
reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on
the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from
somewhere else."
2. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "* * * Keep in mind those three
names — Dr. Chi, Mr. Chew Hong, and the New China Daily News. Those names
are the key to this (the Lattimore-Barnes) letter and the State Department's
fraudulent cover up * * * I am therefore submitting to you the secret files on
those two men * * *"
The Facts. — At Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, Senator Mc-
Carthy asserted in a speech:
* * * While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State
I>epartnient who have been named as active members of the Communist
Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 — a
list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being mem-
bers of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and
shaping policy in the State Department.
The next day, he said he had the names of "57 card-carrying members of the
Communist Party" allegedly working in the Department. Later he talked in
terms of 81 security risks of various sorts. Eventually, he said he would stand
or fall on his ability to prove that there was one "top Soviet espionage agent"
in the State Department.
To date, Senator McCarthy has utterly failed to prove that there is a single
Communist or pro-Communist in the State Department, and he now appears to
be reduced to an attempt to divert attention with two seven- and eight-year-old
memoranda dealing with the Civil Service Commission clearance for Office of
War Information employment of two Chinese.
3. Senator McCarthy mid at Rochester."* * * Edward Barrett, Mr. Acheson's
publicity chief * * * was Mr. Lattimore's superior when both worked in the
Office of War Information."
1842 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Facts. — In a letter to Senator Brewster, entered in the Congressional
Record of May 2, Mr. Barrett, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Puplic
Affairs, stated :
"* * * I Was in charge of the Overseas Branch of Office of War Informa-
tion during the last part of the war, and I am proud of what I did toward
helping to make that agency an effective psychological warfare arm of the
Government. Owen Lattimore worked under me for a hrief time during
the. war, but he left the Office of War Information a few weks after I be-
came his superior. I have not seen him since * * *"
4. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "* * * Our disaster in China * * *
is the disaster to which Mr. Acheson refers as the 'dawning of a new day.' "
The Facts. — Here, again, Senator McCarthy lifts completely out of context
a single phrase in order to completely distort the meaning of Secretary Acheson's
hour-long address before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. The Sec-
retary, in discussing the Far Eastern situation, emphasized the extent to which
nationalism had "become the symbol both of freedom from foreign domination
and freedom frorn the tyranny of poverty and misery."
Developing this theme, he added :
"Since the end of the war in Asia, we have seen over ."00 million people
gain their independence and over seven new nations come into existence in
this area.
"We have the Philippines with twenty million citizens. We have Pakistan,
India, Ceylon and Burma with 400 million citizens, southern Korea with
twenty million, and within the last few weeks, the United States of Indo-
nesia wi th 75 million. * * *
"Cor.'munism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that
has ever been devised and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism
which would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what
we want them to keep and develop which is their own national independence,
their own individual independence, their own development of their own
resources for their own good and not as mere tributary states to this great
Soviet Union. * * *
"So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new
day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are
on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. * * * So
what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawn-
ing, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out.
But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of
the Asian people. It is hot a decision which a friend or even an enemy from
the outside can decide for them."
5. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "* * * I am enclosing in the folder
for each of you photostats of five Communist-front organizations with which
Jessup was affiliated. You will note that Mrs. Jessup appears on the Executive
Committee of a sixth Communist-front organization. The reason for including
this with the photostats on Philip Jessup is because of the close affiliation of
Philip Jessup with this organization also."
The Facts. — At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy asserted that he had presented
photostatic proof of such affiliations to the Tydings subcommittee, but counsel
of the subcommittee informed the Department of State that such proof had not
been submitted. The following analysis of the photostats produced by the Sena-
tor at Rochester reveals :
(1) American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations : Dr. Jessup has been prom-
inently connected with the activities of this organization. It is not a Communist
front. Senator McCarthy's only "evidence" against it was a single citation by
a California Legislative Coommittee in 1948, on the ground that the Council
"* * * received funds (from) Frederick V. Field * * *."
(2) Coordinating Committee to Lift the Spanish Embargo : Ambassador Jessup
has never heen affiliated with this organization in any way. At Rochester Sen-
ator McCarthy presented reproductions of there full pages and a part of a
fourth page of a brochure entitled, "These Americans Say : 'Lift the Embargo
against Republican Spain'." The full twenty-page document is and purports to
be merely a compendium of public opinion concerning the Spanish embargo.
The only reference to Ambassador Jessup in the "photo-reproductions" pre-
sented by Senator McCarthy was a seven-line quotation from a statement by
Charles C. Burlingham and Ambassador Jessup in The New York Times of
January 31, 1939. A week earlier the Times had printed a three-column letter
from Henry L. Stimson recommending the lifting of the Spanish embargo. On
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1843
January 26, the Times published a letter of rebuttal by Martin Conboy. It was
from a three-column statement which the Times headlined as "Text of Reply of
Burlingham and Jessup to Conboy's Letter" that the Burlingham-Jessup quota-
tion was taken. The quotation in question reads:
"It (lifting the embargo) would further mark a return to our historic
policy of avoiding intervention in European civil wars by following a strict
hands-off policy instead of taking the affirmative action which, as events
have demonstrated, inevitably affects the outcome of a struggle in which we
profess not to be concerned."
The Burlingham-Jessup quotation was "photo-reproduced" by Senator Mc-
Carthy in such a way as to indicate that it constituted a full page of the
brochure, whereas it was actually only one among eleven similar statements by
private individuals included on the page in question of the original brochure.
Furthermore, it was only one of a total of thirty-one such quotations in the
brochure as a whole, including statements by Henry L. Stimson, John DewTey,
Helen Keller, Raymond Leslie Buell, Dorothy Thomphon, A. F. Whitney, and
William E. Dodd.
(3) National Emergency Conference and National Emergency Conference for
Democratic Rights: Senator McCarthy's "photo-reproductions" show that Am-
bassador Jessup, along with more than 280 other private citizens, was listed as
a sponsor of a "call" for a National Emergency Conference, to discuss matters of
alien registration, in 1939. They also show that Ambassador Jessup's name was
carried in the letterhead of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic
Rights, as a sponsor, in February 1940.
With regard to the National Emergency Conference, Ambassador Jessup testi-
fied before the Tydings Subcommittee that he had no recollection of the confer-
ence, that he did not attend the meeting for which the "call" was issued, and that
he "certainly had no knowledge at the time that it was subversive." It was not
until four years later that the Conference was first cited by the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities.
With regard to the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights,
Ambassador Jessup testified that he did not recall the organization or any
participation in it. This organization was first cited in 1943.
(4) American-Russian Institute : Ambassador Jessup has never been a member,
sponsor, or officer of this organization. Senator McCarthy's "photo-reproduc-
tions" show Ambassador Jessup's name along with those of 285 other individuals
on one list of "sponsors" and with 99 others, on a second list of "sponsors."
These lists, however, were not lists of sponsors of the American-Russian Insti-
tute itself. They were lists of the sponsors of two dinners given by the organi-
zation— one in lC44, dedicated to American-Soviet postwar relations, and the
other, in 1946, for the presentation of a posthumous award to Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
Concerning the first of these two dinners, Ambassador Jessup told the Tydings
Subcommittee :
"I do recall * * * that I was asked by Mr. William Lancaster, a
prominent New York lawyer, to permit my name to be used as a sponsor
of a dinner which was to be held on October 19, 1944. I had met Mr.
Lancaster particularly through his activities on the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, at a time when General Frank McCoy was President and Senator
Alexander Smith and I were members of the Board. I accepted that invi-
tation in 1944, but was unable to attend the dinner."
Concerning the second dinner, he testified :
"The dinner in question was one given on May 7, 1946, on the occasion
of the presentation of its first annual award to Franklin D. Roosevelt which
was accepted on behalf of his family. A search of my files has failed to
reveal any information concerning this incident, nor do I remember attending
the dinner. From approximately February to June of the year 1946, I was
seriously ill in a hospital in New York City, so it is unlikely that I attended."
Ambassador Jessup specifically declined invitations to speak at dinners of the
Institute in 1948 and 1949. Meanwhile, the New York organization had been
expressly excluded from the Attorney General's first published lists of sub-
versive organizations and it was not included until 1949.
(5) American Law Students Association: This organization, which Ambas-
sador Jessup served as a Faculty Adviser for about two years, was a perfectly
innocent group. It was not and has never been cited as a communist front.
As "evidence" to the contrary, Senator McCarthy produced at Rochester a
photostat of a letterhead of the association carrying the customary union shop
1844 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
printer's label. This label was identified by Senator McCarthy in a typewritten
notation as "Union label No. 209 which is the Communist print shop label."
He also handed out at Rochester a mimeographed statement in which he
flatly asserted, without giving any supporting evidence, that the association was
"affiliated" with three organizations cited as communist or communist front.
He then devoted three single-spaced typewritten pages to a listing of various
citations, not against the American Law Students Association, but against the
three organizations with which he asserted it was "affiliated."
The fact that the association has never been cited in any way by any agency
speaks for itself.
(6) China Aid Council: Ambassador Jessup has never been affiliated with
this organization. Senator McCarthy had previously charged, at Atlantic City,
that Ambassador Jessup was a director of "one of the worst" communist-front
organizations, and identified that organization, to a press association as the
China Aid Council. At Rochester, however, he -presented a "photo-reproduc-
tion" indicating that, not Ambassador Jessup, but Mrs. Jessup, was at one time
on the Executive Committee of the Council.
The Department, in its analysis of the Senator's Atlantic City speech correctly
asserted that, intentionally or carelessly, the Senator had confused Dr. Jessup
with his wife. The analysis then pointed out that Mrs. Jessup's association with
the organization came about through her interest in the activities of an organiza-
tion sponsored by Madame Chiang Kai-shek — the American Committee for Chi-
nese War Orphans.
It will be noted that Senator McCarthy's letterhead presented as evidence
shows that the "Council" was combined with this Committee for orphans. Mrs.
Jessup's part in the Committee's work was to organize a tea business — the tea
was called 'May Ling" tea (after Mme. Chiang) — and the profits went directly
to orphanages. After 1042, Mrs. Jessup took very little active interest in the
Committee, because from that year until 1046 she was working full time for the
American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) in Philadelphia, Spain, and
France. She did not attend meetings or keep in touch with the work of the
China-Aid Council.
It will be noted that, of the six organizations in question, two are not com-
munist-fronts, and two are organizations with which Dr. Jessup has had no
connection. For the fifth organization, Dr. Jessup was a sponsor of two dinners
which he did not attend. He signed a "call" which resulted in the formation of
the sixth organization but had no further connection with it.
6. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "They (the State Department in its
analysis of Senator McCarthy's American Society of Newpaptw Editors speech)
quote me as having stated that at the height of the communist party line cam-
paign on the part of the Far Eastern Survey that Dr. Jessup was head of the
Research Advisory Council. The 'facts' they give were that he was not the
Chairman in 1943 * * *. Now here is a photostat to show that he was head
of the Research Advisory Council in 1044 * * *"
The facts. — The identifiable date in Senator McCarthy's American Society of
Newspaper Editors speech was 1043. However, in his subsequent Chicago
speech, Senator McCarthy broadened his charge and was again met with the
facts. In its analysis on May 20, 1050, the Department stated :
"Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.- — 'Jessup * * * was largely in
charge of a publication known as the Far Eastern Surrey, the publication of
the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations ; that he was in
charge while it was spewing forth the perfumed Communist Party line
sewage. * * *'
"The Facts. — Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr. Jessup's rela-
tionship with 'Far Eastern Survey' based on the single fact that in 1044 Dr.
Jessup served on the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council
of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
"Senator McCarthy's allegation that 'Far Eastern Survey' followed the
Communist Party originates in discredited contentions made by one Alfred
Kolhberg in 1044. The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions investigated Kohlberg's charges. In a document circulated to its
members, it was demonstrated that Kohlberg had ignored the overwhelming
number of facts that did not support his contention. The document showed,
among other things, that Kohlberg had quoted, in connection with 'Far
Eastern Survey,' and other publications, from less than two percent of the
articles published and from less than .002 percent of the books published.
In April 1!)4T, the membership of the American Council of the Institute
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1845
of Pacific Relations in a vote of 1163 to 6G overwhelmingly repudiated
Kohlberg's charges as 'inaccurate and irresponsible.' "
At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy repeated these charges all over again. In
its analysis, the Department added this characterization of the Institute of
Pacific Relations i>y the Rockefeller Foundation: "The most important single
source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific area and the Far
East."
7. Senator McCarthy said at Rochester. — "I have succeeded in digging up
photostats of another $3,000 making a total of $6,500 (of 'communist money')
paid to support the publication which Mr. Acheson's Ambassador-at-Large
Jessup supervised."
The Fact*. — Senator McCarthy's charges and implications that the Institute
or its publication were bought and paid for by "communist money" have been
repeatedly refuted by the Department. About half of the Institute's budget was
met by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, while Mr.
Field's contributions were only a drop in the bucket as compared with the gen-
erous donations of large industrial concerns.
In 1941 Ambassador Jessup was Vice Chairman of the American Council, Ray
Lyman Wilbur was Chairman. The Treasurer was Francis S. Harmon.
In addition to Henry R. Lu#e, of Time, Life, Fortune, William H. Herod,
President of the International General Electric Corporation, Philo Parker, of
the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, and other outstanding bankers, industrialists,
lawyers, etc.. the Institute's Committee on Financial Support included both
Frederick V. Field and Alfred Kohlberg, the New York importer who has ad-
mittedly been one of Senator McCarthy's principal sources of information. Dur-
ing this period Mr. Kohlberg also was a member of the Institute's Committee on
Corporate Membership, the purpose of which was to increase the donations from
larger organizations.
For the 1042-43 period, the persons responsible for over-all and financial affairs
included the same distinguished names referred to many times before — Dr. Robert
Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California ; Mr. Francis Harmon,
Vice President of the Motion Picture Export Association ; Mr. Herod ; Mr. Juan
Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Luce.
Senator McCarthy at Rochester handed out as part of his "proof" the same
photostat he used at Atlantic City — a check for $500 signed by Field and made
payable to and endorsed by the American Council on Soviet Relations. The
American Council on Soviet Relations is a well-known organization listed as sub-
versive by the Attorney General. The Institute of Pacific Relations is in no
way related to it. The two organizations have now been twice confused by
Senator McCarthy.
[For the press, Department of State, June 9, 1950. No. G14]
The Department of State has already characterized as absolutely false the
statement by Senator McCarthy that a photostat which he produced on the Senate
floor June 6 constituted proof that three men individually listed by the FBI as
Communist agents in 1946 are still working for the Department.
It has pointed out that the Senator's charge was based upon the completely
erroneous belief that a 1946 chart referred to in the photostated document, a
chart purportedly evaluating Departmental personnel in terms of Communist
"agents," "Communists," "sympathizers," and "suspects," was prepared by the
FBI.
Furthermore, the Department has stated that the chart in question was not
prepared by or received from the FBI, but was merely a working document pre-
pared in the Department's Security Office as a basis of further personnel investi-
gations in 1946.
The Department has also stated that no persons purportedly identified on that
chart as Communist "agents," "Communists" and the like are now employed
by the Department except those whose loyalty has since been thoroughly checked,
evaluated, and reviewed under the President's Loyalty Program.
Since the issuance of this statement to the press by the Department, on June
6, 1950, a thorough review of the chart and report in question, together with a
careful inquiry into the circumstances of their preparation and the status of
personnel involved, has been made by the Department.
1846 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The following analysis of Senator McCarthy's speech is based upon the facts
developed by that study :
1. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6. — "The Bureau (FBI) sent to
the State Department on that date (May 15, 1946) a detailed statement listing
what they considered as No. 1, Soviet agents ; No. 2, Communists ; No. 3, Com-
munist sympathizers ; and No. 4, suspects."
The Facts. — As previously stated by the Department, neither the chart itself
nor the report of August 3, 1946, in which Senator McCarthy has cited a reference
to the chart, was prepared by, or sent to the State Department by, the FBI, and
tbis has been verified to the Department of State both by the Department of
Justice and by the FBI. On the contrary, the chart and the report were prepared
within the Department of State itself. The chart was prepared on May 15,
1946, and the report on August 3, 1946.
The Department of State itself, after consultation with the writer of the
report, with the former Security Officer under whose direction and in whose office
the chart was prepared, with certain of his then subordinates familiar with the
chart, and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and after reviewing working
papers which are still in our file, has conclusively determined that the chart was
not prepared or furnished by the FBI, but was prepared as an investigator's
working document in the Department of State in 1946 and by employees of the
Department of State. Interview with the writer of the report, who is still in the
Department, and the Security Officer with whom he had a conversation about
the chart established that the writer of the report drew from his conversation
with the Security Officer the unintentionally erroneous conclusion that the chart
was prepared in the FBI.
2. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6. — "The function of the FBI is
merely that of a fact-finding body. * * * This is the only time it has been
brought to my attention that the FBI has departed from its function and said,
'We will evaluate our own evidence in our files and give it to the Department.'
Apparently, the reason was that they must have been seriously disturbed by what
they had in their files. * * * "
The Facts. — This statement is patently false. In the first place, as previously
stated, the chart in question was not prepared or submitted by the FBI to begin
with. Information from the FBI was included with information from other
agencies — OSS, Civil Service, etc., in the files which the State Department per-
sonnel consulted in drawing up the chart ; but there was no FBI evaluation of the
State Department employees.
In the second place, since the FBI had nothing to do with the preparation of
the chart, it obviously could not have talked to itself in the manner described by
Senator McCarthy about the "evaluation" of "evidence" concerned. Since the
issuance of the State Department's first statement in this connection, the FBI has
verified to the Department the fact that it not only had nothing to do with the
preparation of the chart but that it also had nothing to do with evaluating the
personnel indicated on the chart as purported "Agents," "Communists," etc., or in
any other way. Thus, Senator McCarthy's assertion that the FBI took unprece-
dented action in the matter is utterly unfounded, and his inference that the FBI
took such action because it was "seriously disturbed" by the contents of its files
is pure fantasy.
3. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6. — "The submission of the list
of Soviet Agents, Communists, and so forth, to the State Department by the FBI
mot with such little favorable activity on the part of the State Department that,
so far as I know, the Bureau has never submitted a like chart since that date."
The Facts. — Though the chart in question had not been submitted to the Depart-
ment by the FBI back in 104(> or at any other time it was, as a matter of fact, a
working list of Departmental personnel on whom the Department's Security
Officer at that time (May 15, 1946) had received allegations which, in the opinion
of the Security Officers by whom the chart was prepared, warranted further
investigation. Virtually the entire activity of the Security Officer and his top
men at that time was directed toward the utilization and full development of the
leads and information received from the FBI, from departmental investigation
and other sources, particularly relating to the people listed on the 1946 chart.
Moreover, on the basis of the findings and recommendations contained in the
"Secret" report in which the chart was referred to, energetic steps were taken
toward an improved Security set-up of the Department, including the successful
direction of such investigations as that leading in 1946 to the firing, followed
by trial and conviction, of Carl Marzani.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1847
4. Senator McCarthy told the Semite on June 6. — "This (the language of the
report) is not the language of McCarthy; it is the language of the State Depart-
iiH'iit's top investigators."
The Facts. — The language was not the language of any one of the Department's
"investigators"; it was the language of an administrative officer of the Depart-
ment, assigned by Assistant Secretary Russell, in charge of the Department's
security program, to undertake, on a highly confidential basis, a study in Wash-
ington of the operations of the Department's organization in 1946 for dealing with
problems of personnel security.
5. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6 — "The man who makes this
report says in effect, 'The only way we are going to get rid of the other Com-
munists is accidentally by a reduction in the force.' * * * From all the in-
formation we have been able to obtain, none of the men who were labeled by the
FBI have been fired, but were allowed to resign * * *"
The Facts — The writer of the report said no such thing directly or by impli-
cation. His report dated August 3, 1946, in fact was intended to, and did, explore
the means for making existing security procedures more effective, especially
against the penetration of foreign intelligence agencies into the Department of
State. His reference to reduction in force as a factor in eliminating persons
named on the chart was factual — but it did not exclude other methods. Such
other methods, including resignation — which the Senator himself contradictorily
names as the only method — and firing, where investigation supported this action,
were effectively employed. No case today remains unresolved.
6. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6 — "The FBI wisely refused
to submit top secret information to the State Department on these dangerous
individuals * * * apparently not trusting the State Department to that
extent * * *
The Facts — The FBI has never refused to make available to appropriate officers
of the State Department through established liaison channels information con-
cerning State Department personnel.
7. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June <1 — "At least three of those
listed as Communist agents by the FBI three years ago are still holding high
positions in the State Department * * * Those names are included among
the 106 names that I gave to the (Tydings) committee * * * Those names
1 have checked and I know the persons are working in the State Depart-
ment ***!*** have the proof that those men are working in the
State Department as of this very moment."
The Faots — This statement is absolutely false. The Department of State has
in its possession the working chart itself dated May 15, 1946. Of the 20 persons
hypothesized on the chart as "agents", there is only one who — after thorough
reinvestigation including a full FBI investigation, and clearance under the
Department's Loyalty and Security procedures — is still in the employ of the De-
partment. That one does not hold a "high position" ; his grade is GS-9. Fur-
thermore, that one is not on the list of 106 Senator McCarthy gave the Tydings
Subcommittee.
8. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6 — "You will note that I
am * * * only referring today to those who are listed as Communist agents.
I hope to be able to give the Senate a complete picture of how many of the total
of 106 agents, Communist sympathizers, and so forth, are still on the State
Department's payroll * * *"
The Facts — Any person among those listed on the old 1946 working chart re-
ferred to by Senator McCarthy who is still employed in the Department of State
has been the subject of careful investigation and has been cleared for security
after thorough study of his case either by the Division of Security, acting with
the benefit of the FBI's information, or by the Loyalty Security Board of the
Department. Each loyalty derision by the Department's Loyalty Board has
been post-audited by the Loyalty Review Board, and in no case was the recom-
mendation of the Department's Board changed.
9. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6 — "Take, for example, case
No. 1, which I presented on the Senate floor, the name has not yet been made
public, so we shall not use it now. The committee has the name. In that case
the Loyalty Review Board made what is known as a post audit, and, after
looking at the post audit, they said. *We are not satisfied with the findings.'
They sent it back to the State Department Loyalty Board, and that Board said
'The case is closed.' That man is still on the State Department payroll."
The Facts— Once again. Senator McCarthy's alleged quotations are not quota-
tions—they are typical misstatements. The Loyalty Review Board did not advise
1848 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the Department of State that they were "not satisfied with the finding" in this
case; they did make a procedural recommendation, and thereafter the case was
not "closed." On the contrary, appropriate action was taken by the State De-
partment Loyalty Security Board, and clearance in this case was again post-
audited by the President's Loyalty Review Board. The Loyalty Review Board
has in no way criticized or changed the final action and findings of the Depart-
ment's Loyalty Security Board.
10. Senator McCarthy told the Senate on. June 6 — "* * * In the Office of
"War Information, Mr. Owen Lattimore * * * went to bat for one Com-
munist * * * who had been officially turned down by the Loyalty Board
* * * and another Chinese who had been rejected by one member of the
board * * *"
The Facts — As the Department pointed out in its analysis of the Senator's
Rochester, New York, speech on May 25, he now appears to be reduced to an
attempt to divert attention with 1943 Civil Service Commission clearances for
Office of War Information employment of two Chinese.
As for Mr. Owen Latimore. both Mr. Lattimore himself and the Department
of State have repeatedly reiterated that he is not an employee of the Department.
At Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy asserted
in a speech :
»* * * While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State
Department who have been named as active members of the Communist
Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 — a
list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being
members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working
and shaping policy in the State Department."
The next day, he said he had the names of "57 card-carrying members of the
Communist Party" allegedly working in the Department. Later he talked in
terms of a "big three" and of 81 security risks of various sorts. He told the
Tydings Committee to investigate 106 cases. Eventually, he said he would stand
or fall on his ability to prove that there was one "top Soviet espionage agent"
in the State Department.
And then, on June 6, we hear of 106 names on a four-year-old working chart
and three "agents" purportedly still at large in the Department of State.
But the record — the facts — speak for themselves : Senator McCarthy has ut-
terly failed to show that there is a single Communist or pro-Communist in the
State Department. His numbers change ; his credibility does not.
The following document was received by the Foreign Eelations Sub-
committee from Mr. Seth TV. Richardson, Chairman of the Loyalty
Review Board :
United States Civil Service Commission*,
Washington 25, D. C, September 21, 19$S.
Memorandum : No. 19.
To All Executive Departments and Agencies.
Subject : Classification according to Section 3, Part III, of E. O. 9835 of Organi-
zations Previously Designated by the Attorney General as within the pur-
view of the Executive Order.
The Attorney General has furnished the Loyalty Review Board with informa-
tion classifying the organizations which he has listed within the Executive Order
under the following categories : d) Totalitarian: (2) Fascist: (3) Communist;
(4) Subversive; (5) Organizntions which have "adopted a policy of advocating
or approving the commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their
rishts under the Constitution of the United States": and (6) Organizations
which "seek to alter the form of government of the United States by uncon-
stitutional means."
Enclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of the consolidated list
prepared by the Attorney General of organizations previously designated as
w'tMn Executive Order 9835 by the Attorney General's letters of November 24,
1947, and May 27, 194S (clarified on August 4. 1948), according to the classifica-
tions of Section 3, Part III, of the Executive Order.
Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1849
Consolidated List of Organizations Previously Designated as Within
Executive Order No. 9835 by Letters of November 24, 1947, and May 27, 1948,
According to the Classification of Section 3, Part II, of the Executive
( >RDEB
Totalitarian :
Black Dragon Society
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Ohuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
l>ai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art
Society <>f Japan)
Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin,
Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in
America Military Conscripts Association)
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society— a group of Japanese War
Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jikyoku lin Kai (Current Affairs Association)
Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry wbo
have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group of Southern
California War Veterans)
Niehihei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
Nortl wc>t Japanese Association
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans
of Russo-Japanese War)
Shinto Temples
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)
Fascist :
American Patriots, Inc.
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP. Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
Association of German Nations ( Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance ("Deutsche-
Amerikanische Einheitsf ront )
Citizens Protective League
Dante Alighieri Society
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione
Nazionale Conbattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America)
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsge-
meinschaft)
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League ( Kyffhaeuser Bund),
Kvffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)
Mario Morgantini Circle
Communist :
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
American League Against War and Fascism
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Committee for European Workers' Relief
American Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Council for a Democratic Greece
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American League for Peace and Democracy
American Peace Mobilization
1850 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
American Polish Labor Council
American Russian Institute (of San Francisco)
American Slav Congress
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
California Labor School, Inc., 216 Market Street, San Francisco, California
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, aka Central
Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian
Women
Citizen Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliates
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Communist Party, U. S. A.
Communist Political Association
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Dennis Defense Committee
Friends of the Soviet Union
George Washington Carver School, New York City
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, including People's Radio Foundation Itic
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish People's Committee
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Labor Research Association, Inc.
League of American Writers
Macedonian-American People's League
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Ohio School of Social Sciences
People's Educational Association
People's Institute of Applied Religion
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Proletarian Party of America
Revolutionary Workers League
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
School of Jewish Studies. New York City
Sea tile Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for
European Workers' Relief
Socialist Youth League
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1851
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
Young Communist League
Subversive :
Communist Party, U. S. A.
Communist Political Association
German-American Bund
Socialist AVorkers Party
Workers Party
Young Communist League
Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the
commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States:"
Columbians
Ku Klux Klan
Protestant War Veterans of the United States
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Organizations which "seek to alter the form of government of the United States
by unconstitutional means :"
Communist Party, U. S. A.
Communist Political Association
Socialist Workers Party
Workers Party
Young Communist League
United States CrviL Service Commission,
Washington, D. C, April 25, 1949.
Memorandum No. 43.
To All Executive Departments and Agencies.
Subject : Attorney General's Letter of April 21, 1949, Listing Additional Organ-
izations Designated Under and Classified in Accordance with Section
3, Part III of Executive Order 9835.
Part III of Executive Order 9835 prescribing, procedures for the administration
of an employee loyalty program in the Executive Branch of the Government re-
quires the Department of Justice to furnish this Board with —
the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,
group, or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appro-
priate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist,
communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or
approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their
rights undgr the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter
the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."
In performance of said requirement, the Department of Justice has furnished
to this Board a supplemental letter from the Attorney General containing the
names so designated by him.
Part III of said Executive Order also requires this Board "to disseminate such
information to all Departments and Agencies." A copy of said letter, dated April
21, 1949, from the Attorney General, is accordingly enclosed, and a copy is also
being sent to each other Department and Agency of the Government.
Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.
Enclosure.
Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D. C, April 21, 1941.
The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board, Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Richardson : By letters of November 24, 1947, and May 27, 1948,
you were furnished lists of organizations which were designated under Part III,
Section 3, of Executive Order No. 9835, as well as those organizations which had
68970— 50— pt. 2 24
1852 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
previously been declared to come under the provisions of Executive Order No.
9300, issued February 5, 1943, entitled "Establisbiug the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee to Consider Cases of Subversive Activity on the Part of Federal Em-
ployees," and under other relevant authority.
As stated in my letter of November 24, the organizations heretofore named
do not represent a complete or final tabulation. The study of investigative
reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a continuing one. The or-
ganizations named herein as coming within the scope of Executive Order No.
9835 are designated as a result of the same careful review of recommendations
made by officials of this Department which has been outlined to you previously.
The organizations designated below are classified in accordance with the
categories set forth in Section 3, Part III, of Executive Order No. 9835. As in
the case of organizations previously submitted, the designation is predicated
upon the dominant characteristics of each. It must be borne in mind, of course,
that while an organization may fall within more than one of the specified cate-
gories, it is necessary for the purpose of the Executive Order to segregate them
on the basis of dominant characteristics.
The organizations designated are :
Fascist :
American Nationalist Party
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
Committee for Nationalist Action
National Blue Star Mothers of America
Nationalist Action League
Communist :
Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Jewish Labor Council
American Russian Institute, New York
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute of Soathern California, Los Angeles
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Comite Coordinator Pro Republica Espanola
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Detroit Youth Assembly
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Michigan School of Social Science
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Commitee
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Progressive German-Americans, aka Progressive German-Americans of
Chicago
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
United Spanish Aid Committee
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the
commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the
Constitution of the United States" :
American Christian Nationalist Party
Association of Georgia Klans
Knights of the White Camellia
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated
Organizations which "seel; to alter the form of government to the United States
by unconstitul tonal means" :
Industrial Workers of the World
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
From time to time I shall continue to furnish you with the names of additional
organizations which this Department, after appropriate consideration, regards
as coming within these categories, in accordance with the directive contained in
Executive order No. 9835.
Sincerely,
Tom Glare, Attorney General.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1853
United States Civil Service Commission,
Washington, J). V., July 21, 19J,9.
Memorandum No. 44.
To All Executive Departments and Agencies.
Subject: Certain Organizations and Groups Connected with Organizations Pre-
viously Designated and Classified by the Attorney General under
Section .".. Part III of Executive Order 1)835.
In a letter dated July ■_'<>. 1941), the Attorney General has advised the Loyalty
Review Hoard concerning the designation of certain organizations and groups
which are affiliated with or otherwise connected with organizations which have
been previously declared to come within the scope of Executive Order 9835.
The Attorney General states that the United Spanish Aid Committee, designated
in his letter of April 21, 194!). as a Communist organization, is more properly
referred to as the United American-Spanish Aid Committee, and that the previous
listing is hereby changed to reflect the designation of the United American-
Spanish Aid Committee.
The Attorney General also states that other groups which are affiliates of
•or otherwise related to organizations heretofore declared to come within Execu-
tive Order 9835 are hereby designated as follows :
Communist :
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American-Spanish
Aid Committee)
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the
North American-Spanish Aid Committee)
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a
Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
The Attorney General states further that the designation of the Communist
Party, U. S. A., and of the Communist Political Association includes, of course,
all of the state and local branches and factions of the parent groups. Thus
the Florida Press and Educational League bears the same designation as its
parent body, the Communist Political Association. The Daily Worker Press
Club and the Yiddisher Kultur Farband are also included in the designation
of the Communist Party, U. S. A., within Executive Order 9835.
The above information furnished by the Department of Justice is transmitted
to you in accordance with Part III of Executive Order 9835 which requires the
Loyalty Review Board "to disseminate such information to all Departments
and Agencies." This information is also being sent to each other Department
and Agency of the Government.
In accordance with regular practice, this information will be published in
the Federal Register. Title 5. Chapter II, Appendix A.
Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Revieic Board.
United States Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C, September 21, 19J/9.
Memorandum No. 49.
To All Executive Departments and Agencies.
Subject : Attorney General's Letter of September 26. 1949, Concerning Change in
Name of an Organization Designated and Classified under Section 3, Part III,
of Executive Order 9835
Part III of Executive Order 9835 prescribing procedures for the administration
of an employee loyalty program in the Executive Branch of the Government
requires the Department of Justice to furnish this Board with —
"the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement,
group or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appro-
priate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist,
communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or
approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their
rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter
the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."
In performance of said requirement the Department of Justice has furnished to
this Board a supplemental letter from the Attorney General designating the
Independent Socialist League, successor to the Workers Party, as coming within
the same categories as the Workers Party.
1854 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Part III of said Executive Order also requires this Board "to disseminate such
information to all Departments and Agencies." A copy of said letter dated
September 26, 1949, from the Attorney General is accordingly enclosed, and a
copy is also being sent to each other Department and Agency of the Government.
Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.
Enclosure.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D. C, September 26, 19 J/9.
Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board, Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr, Richardson : In the Department's letter to you of November 24,
1947, transmitting organizations declared to come under the purview of Part III,
Section 3, of Executive Order No. 9835, there was included the organization
known as Workers Party. In its official organ, Labor Action of April 1949, the
Workers Party announced that at the fifth national convention it had voted to
relinquisb the name of the Workers Party and adopt the name of the Independent
Socialist League. The new organization, Independent Socialist League, which
represents but a change in name and is devoted to the same aims and purposes
of its predecessor, the Workers Party, is therefore designated as coming within
the same categories of Executive Order No. 9835 as the Workers Party itself.
Sincerely,
J. Howard McGrath,
Attorney General.
There is incorporated by reference the publication Citations by
Official Government Agencies prepared and released by the Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of
Representatives dated December 18, 1948 :
Department of State,
Washington, June 23, 1950.
Mr. Robert L. Heald,
Assistant Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcomniittee,
United States Senate.
My Dear Mr. Heald : It is understood that the Tydings subcommittee desires
statistical figures of the work of the State Department Loyalty Security Board.
The most recent figures that have been compiled are those of May 1, 1950,
which indicate that the Board since its inception to May 1, 1950, has
received 304 cases from tbe Civil Service Commission. Of these 304 cases 230
bave been cleared by the Board without preferring charges, or, in other words,
without hearing. 37 of the cases bave been cleared after the preferring of
charges. In most of tbese cases there was an actual hearing but in several in-
stances tbe employee elected to file a written statement and not to demand a
bearing. In 3 of the 304 cases the employee was found by the Board to be a se-
curity risk, in each case, of course, after a hearing. In 7 of the 304 cases the
employee resigned with charges pending. 4 of the 304 cases were lost to the juris-
diction of the Board by transfer to other Departments. Tbe Board had on May
1st 23 cases pending on which no decision had been reached.
It will be noted that the above figures differ somewhat from the figures given by
me in the hearing before the subcomniittee, at which time I spoke of 246 cases
decided by the Loyalty Security Board, of 30 loyalty hearings, of 2 cases
found to be security risks, and 5 resignations with charges pending. The differ-
ence between these1 figures and the figures now given is due to the fact that I have
now included in the computation not only the cases which were submitted to the
Hoard as loyalty cases but also the cases which were submitted to the Board
purely as cases involving security risk. Of course it will be noted that the
present report is to May 1, while the previous report covered only to March 1.
Sincerely yours,
Conrad E. Snow,
Chairman, Loyalty Security Board.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1855
Washington, D. C, May S, 1050.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I am tending you herewith some material which
1 hope will be of use to the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relation Com-
mittee in examining I he charges which Senator McCarthy has made against my
wife. The enclosures include :
1. A statement which I have written about myself;
2. A rile of testimonial letters, most of which were written at my request,
together with a copy of my request for the letters ; and
3. A copy of the statement about me which was released by the Navy
Department on March 13, 1950.
Respectfully yours,
Stephen Brunaueb.
Enclosures.
Affidavit of Stephen Brunauei;
District of Columbia, to wit :
On this 11th day of May, 1950, before me, the subscriber, a Notary Public in
and for the District aforesaid, personally appeared Stephen Braunauer, signed
the attached declaration in my presence, and made oath in due form of law that
said attached declaration is a true statement of the matters and facts set forth
therein.
He has also initialed each page of said attached eight-paged declaration in my
presence.
Subscribed and sworn to before me.
[seal] Herbeet A. Englee, Notary Public.
My commission expires January 1, 1951.
I, Stephen Bruuauer, residing at 3417 Quebec Street NW., Washington, D. C,
make the following declaration because of certain statements and insinuations
made by Senator Joseph McCarthy on March 13 and because of questions asked
by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper on March 27 before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This subcommittee was appointed under
Senate Resolution 231 to investigate charges of disloyalty in the Department
of State.
I am employed by the Department of the Navy as Chief Technical Administrator
of Explosives Research and Development, Bureau of Ordnance. I have never
been employed by the Department of State. My wife is a State Department
employee, and in a previous appearance before the subcommittee has already
dealt more than adequately with the statements and insinuations made about her.
Since insinuations about me were used against my wife, I wish to show that they,
too, are without basis in fact.
In support and corroboration of my declaration, I am attaching a file of testi-
monial letters, most of which I requested from the writers as a means of furnish-
ing the subcommittee with detailed information about my work, character, loyalty
and integrity.
I am a loyal American. I came to the United States from Hungary in 1921, at
the age of 18, because I wanted to make my life in this country, which I con-
sidered the land of hope and freedom. I became a citizen on September 1, 1927.
In 1942 I became an officer in the United States Naval Reserve and entered upon
active duty on October 23 of that year, serving until November 13, 1946. I sought
military service, although I could have continued my work as a civilian scientist
throughout the war period, because I felt that I must participate wholeheartedly
in the defense of the United States. I have remained in the Department of the
Navy as a civilian employee because I believe that I have a contribution to make
to the national defense through the development of more effective explosives.
I am still a Reserve officer. I belong to Volunteer Ordnance Component W-l of
Washington, an ' attend its meetings regularly. At an appropriate place in this
declarat'on I shall describe more fully some of the contributions which I have
made and ; m now making to the national defense. The members of my immediate
family are all in the United States. My mother has made her home with me
in Washington since 1930; my brother and his wife arrived in this country on
1856 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
December 27, 1948, as political exiles from Communist-dominated Hungary; my
wife and children are native Americans.
I am not a Communist. I am not a Communist sympathizer. On the contrary,
I am bitterly opposed to communism. At one time in my life, more than 20 years
ago, I was a member of the Hungarian Section of the Young Workers League in
New York City, for a period of about 3 years, from 1923 or early 1924, to the end
of 1926 or early 1927. Since dropping out of this organization I have not belonged
to any organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General nor to any or-
ganization cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
In this declaration I am describing more fully certain aspects of my life and'
work which seem to me especially significant in refuting charges that I may
be disloyal or a security risk.
First, I wish to summarize the evolution of my political opinions since coming
to the United States.
From my arrival in New York in October 1921 until I moved to Washington
in February 192S I was occupied mainly in obtaining an education. I had grad-
uated from high school in Budapest with the highest honors. In New York I
studied at City College and at Columbia University and supoprted myself, and
even sent money back to Hungary to help in the education of my younger brother.
When I arrived in America I spoke no English. I was a lonely young man, and
had few opportunities for personal contacts with native Americans. In the midst
of my work and study it was not easy for me to gain an intimate and first-hand
understanding of the culture and institutions of my new homeland. One illus-
tration of the slowness with which a newcomer learns American customs was the
fact that when, in June 1925. a few days before graduation from Columbia, I
was notified that I had been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, I had no idea what this
meant. I had to go to the University Library to look up the meaning of Phi
Beta Kappa.
At the age of 20, I had spent two years in New York in new surroundings work-
ing and studying intensively, and I wns starved for companionship. When I was
sought out and befriended by some Hungarian Communists, my ignorance of the
American way and my loneliness helped them to persuade me to Join their group,
the Hungarian Section of the Young Workers League. Social activities — dances,
singing, and sports, especially soccer, which I had played as a boy in Hungary —
occupied most of our time, and I was able to have some of the fun I had missed
so badly during my first two years in America.
Thus, although the Yoiing Workers League was an adjunct of the Workers
Party (the forerunner of the present Communist Party), it was some time before
I became critical of their ideas. The leaders of the League got me to write a
few articles in the Hungarian Communist newspaper and to give some talks to
Hungarians in Naw York and neighboring towns. I believe that I wrote five or
six articles and I delivered a number of lectures. By this time I remember very
few details of that period, because long: ago I put my experience in the Young
Workers League behind me and forgot it almost completely until 1947. when r
discovered that this episode of my past had become an issue in connection with my
security record.
Since Senator Hickenlooper asked a question of my wife about her belonging
to the Young Workers League, I should like to state here that this question is
probably based on mistaken identity. In 1920 I married Anna Friedmann, a
Hungarian girl, in New York. She was a member of the Young Workers League
and in fact she had been instrumental in bringing me into that organization.
Her brother, about whom Senator Hickenlooper also inquired, also belonged to the
Young Workers League. I understand that he is an active Communist, but I
should like to state that I have not seen him for twenty-two years. My first wife
and I were separated in 192.S. and we were divorced in 1931. I married Esther
Caukin. my present wife, in 1931.
In 1924 the Workers Party was in turmoil over the American Presidential elec-
tion, the issue being whether to have their own candidate or to support La Fol-
lette. The Young Workers took part in the debate, though they were not per-
mitted to vote at the Workers Party meetings. I wrote two articles for "Uj
Eloe" supporting the minority v*ew. which ^g tla' La toilette should be sup-
ported. The majority, led by William Z. foster, intended to run a Workers'
Party candidate but, as we were given to understand, its decision was overruled
by Moscow. Even though the side I had supported won, I felt disillusioned be-
cause I believe in majority rule. Also, I did not like the idea of Moscow direct-
ing the American Communists. As the months went by I found more and more to
criticize in the ideas and methods of the Communists. At the end of 1926 or
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1857
possibly early in l'.»27 I dropped ou1 of the Young Workers League. I did not
write a letter of resignation, but told them I was leaving, and stopped paying
dues and attending meetings.
From 1'.'27 li> 1933 I went through a period of transition from Communist
ideology to liberalism. In that period I still had some radical tendencies, but
they played a very unimportant part in my life as compared with my scientific
work and professional advancement. One of the instances I can recall of my in-
creasingly critical attitude toward communism is that when I was at Johns
Hopkins in 1931-32, I gave a talk to a group of students on Science in the Soviet
Union. In it I condemned the Soviet attitude toward science, especially con-
demning Science at the Crossroads, a Russian book which had just been translated
and published in New York.
The complete break came in 1933, when I spent almost a year in Germany doing
postgraduate study. I was on leave of absence from the Department of Agricul-
ture. My wife and I were vigorously opposed to the Nazi regime and when we
observed the Communist tactics, which at times opposed the Nazis and at times
supported them, I decided that I could no longer approve of any Communist ideas
or methods but must oppose communism completely and activiely. In common
with many other Americans in the early 1930*s I thought for a time that the Com-
munist system might be all right for Russia, but as more information came out of
the Soviet Union I came to the conclusion that this view was incorrect, also, and
that communism was not working even there.
In her testimony before the subcommittee my wife explained how she came to
substitute for me as a speaker before the Washington Chapter of the American
Friends of the Soviet Union in 1934. I corroborate her statement and add that
except for this event and except for attending the two meetings of the organiza-
tion at which my wife presided, I had no relations with the organization.
I wish to quote here a passage from the testimonial letter of Dr. George Gamow,
Professor of Physics at the George Washington University, who escaped from
Soviet Russia and came to this country in 1934 ; and who has known me ever1
since his arrival in Washington :
"I can assure you that, as a man who came from Soviet Russia, I have a
very good nose to scent communistic sympathies, and I am certain that
neither Stephen nor his wife, Esther, fall into that category. As a matter of
fact, Stephen told me many years ago that in his youth he was interested in
that kind of ideas, but realized very soon that they lead to perish rather
than to the benefit of humanity."
I repeat here that since 1027 I have not belonged to any organization which
has been listed as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States or
by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. I am a member of the
American Chemical Society, the Washington Academy of Sciences, the Philosoph-
ical Society of Washington, Sigma Xi, and Phi Beta Kappa. From 1928 until
1930 or 1931 I belonged to the International Friendship Club sponsored by the
Friends Meeting at 1811 Eye Street NW.. in Washington. This was a local
social club whose membership represented all political views as well as several
nationalities and races. Since 1943 I have belonged to the Parent-Teachers
Association of the Phoebe Hearst Elementary School, the school which my
two daughters attend. This is the extent of my participation in organizations.
In addition to the foregoing description of my political evolution, I wish to
answer the three questions which Senator McCarthy raised in his statement
before the subcommittee on March 13, and then comment on his assertions
regarding the views of various investigative agencies about me.
As to the questions :
(1 l Have I been the subject of a constant investigation by Government
agencies over a period of ten years? The answer is probably "Yes." I know
I have been investigated several times, and the explanation is simple. I have
held a number of different posts during the past ten years, for each of which
an investigation was required. Early in 1941, while I was still in the
Department of Agriculture, I was asked to become a consultant to the Na-
tional Defense Research Committee, and was investigated. I was investi-
gated again in 1042 before being commissioned an officer in the Naval Re-
serve. In 104.") I was cleared to the Manhattan District, but do not know
whether a special investigation preceded the clearance. I was investigated
again under the President's Loyalty Program as a civilian employee of the
Navy Department. The result of all these investigations was stated in the
announcement given out by the Navy on March 13 that I had been thoroughly
1858 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
investigated and was not charged with disloyalty. Among my testimonal
letters there are many written by Naval officers who have worked with me
and observed me closely. I quote here a paragraph from the letter of
Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Jr., USN (Ret.) who was formerly Chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department :
"On at least one occasion Commander Brunauer's loyalty was questioned.
There were made available to me, as I recall it, all data in the possession
of the Office of Naval Intelligence and, I believe, of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation concerning Commander Brunauer. After considering these
data, together with my own observations of him, and after discussing the
situation with my Deputy Chief, I was satisfied in my own mind that Com-
mander Brunauer's loyalty was above reproach. On tbat basis I continued
him in his responsible position involving classified work and subsequent to
the war approved of his being placed in a civil status to do similar work.
I am not certain whether his transfer to a civil status was finally accom-
plished before my det achment from the Bureau in September 1947 or after
it, but the step in any event had my approval."
(2) Was I a close friend and collaborator of Noel Field, "known Commu-
nist who recently and mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain"?
The answer is "No." I was never a close friend of Mr. Field, although I
knew him from 1928 through the early thirties. At that time he appeared
to be a liberal in politics. In 1934 after I returned from Germany I met
him at a social gathering and learned that he had become a radical in his
views. He did not say that he had become a Communist, and I had no
further knowledge of his political views until they were referred to in the
press during the past year. The last time I saw Noel Field was at the end
of 1945 or early 1946 during the visit that he and his wife made in Wash-
ington after the war. About 30 or 40 of their former friends and acquain-
tances gathered to hear about the relief work they had done in France and
Switzerland during the war. There was no discussion of politics, and I
exchanged only a few words with Noel Field during the entire evening.
To the best of my recollection, that is the only time I have seen him since
he went to Geneva to work for the League of Nations in 1935 or 1936. As
to the term "collaborator," I have never collaborated with Noel Field on
anything.
(3) Have I admitted to associates that I was a member of the Communist
Party? I can answer this question by referring to the information contained
in the testimonal letters. I have told some of my friends of my early con-
nection with the Young Workers League. I described my relationship with
the Communist movement to the Loyalty and Security Board of the De-
partment of State when I appeared as a witness for my wife, on July 28,
1948; and I described it to the Navy after I become aware that my early
Communist connections caused some questions as to my present loyalty.
However, until Senator McCarthy mentioned the findings of the House Un-
American Activities Committee in 1947 and "a Senate Investigating Committee
in 1941" I did not know that my political views had been the subject of con-
gressional investigations. If I had known this. I would have sought to clarify
my political views and would have taken whatever steps were possible to clear
n i.v record.
The account of my political development and the answers to Senator McCarthy's
allegations should be looked at against the background of my scientific work and
my efforts for the national defense which, together, have occupied by far the
largest part of my time, energy, and thought for the last twenty-two years.
From 1928 to 1942 I did scientific work in the Department of Agriculture,
concentrating upon fundamental research in physical chemistry. During the
first five years most of my spare time was devoted to graduate study, and I
obtained the M. S. degree at George Washington University in 1929 and the
Pli. D. degree at Johns Hopkins University in 1933. In this period of 141.^
years I made some scientific contributions and some practical contributions.
The latter related to the production of artificial fertilizers; the former to the
processes of catalysis and adsorption which are of fundemental scientific impor-
tance and which also play an important part in industry. I published about
twenty scientific articles, several of which received considerable acclaim in
scientific circles. I also wrote a book called Adsorption of Gases and Vapors,
which was published by the Princeton University Press in 1943 and the Oxford
University Press in P.I44. For my scientific contributions in the Department of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1859
Agriculture the Chemical Society of Washington awarded rue the Hillebrand
Prize for 1945.
From October 1942 to August 1946 I was an officer in the Naval Reserve on
active duty. I started as a Lieutenant and was assigned to the Research and
Development Division of the Bureau of Ordnance. At that time Lieutenant
(j. g.) W. E. Land and I were responsible for the work on explosives. Together
we built up explosives research and development until, by the end of the war
there were close to fifty men, officers and civilians, engaged in this work under
my supervision. In addition, hundreds of men were collaborating with us in
the National Defense Research Committee and within the services on the de-
velopment of explosives. This work led to the development of new explosives
which I recommended for adoption by the Navy, and the Navy accepted my
recomendations. These new important explosives included one, which has been
adopted for all underwater weapons of the Navy ; another, which has been
adopted for the antiaircraft weapons of the Navy ; and a third one, which has
been adopted as a filler of bombs by the Army. A considerable number of the
testimonial letters attached to this statement deal with my contributions during
the war. I quote here two paragraphs from one of these letters, which I received
from E. Brigh Wilson, Jr., Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, who
is Visiting Professor at Oxford University this year. Professor Wilson, whom
I have known well since 1942, is recognized as one of the most brilliant scientists
in the United States and is considered by those who are associated with him as
an American of unquestionable loyalty and highest integrity. Immediately upon
reading about Senator McCarthy's charges on March 17, in Oxford, he wrote
to me:
"Knowing your wartime work as I do I can say that there was no more
devoted, self-sacrificing, and sincere patriot in all Washington than you.
The job you did was magnificent and deserves the undying gratitude of all
Americans and not a treatment like this.
"Your mobilization of scientific assistance for the solution of problems
connected with explosives was a highlight of my acquaintance with the
services."
For my contributions to the Navy during the war I was awarded the Com-
mendation Ribbon by the Secretary of the Navy and was decorated by the Brit-
ish Government with the Order of the British Empire.
Since September 9, 1946, I have held my present position in the Department of
the Navy. When I joined the Navy in 1942 I expected to return to scientific re-
search after the war. However, the Navy wanted me to stay as a civilan scien-
tist, and I stayed because I thought I could make some useful contributions to
the national security.
Before discussing my main work for the Navy since the war, I wish to men-
tion my activities in Hungary in 1946, where I was on temporary duty on techni-
cal intelligence work. From May 10 to August 10 of that year I was assigned
to the United States Naval Representative in the Allied Control Commission for
Hungary. I believe I was able to make a unique contribution because of being
a scientist and a Naval officer and also a native of Hungary. The attached tes-
timonial letters in Group II give a fairly detailed account of those activities in
which I engaged that were not highly classified. These letters show especially
what impression I made on people who were very sensitive to political attitudes.
I quote here a brief description of part of my work in Hungary contained in
the letter from Rear Admiral W. F. Dietrich, USN (Ret), who was my com-
manding officer at that time:
"In the years 1945-46, I was US Naval Member of the Allied Control
Commission for Hungary, with headquarters at Budapest. During 1946,
from about the latter part of May until early August, Commander Stephen
Brunauer, then permanently attached to the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy
Department — in which position he remained on in civil status — came to
Budapest and served temporarily under me for a little more than two
months. At this time the Office of Research and Inventions, Navy Depart-
ment, was fostering a technical survey into developments during the past
war in former enemy countries and the outstanding scientists in the various
fields. Brunauer, born in Hungary, and had received his basic education
there, knew not only the language but also had former colleagues of his
youth in university, some of whom were well acquainted in the scientific
advancements. Thus, Brunauer was particularly valuable in connection
1860 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
with taking the survey in Hungary, and in writing up the leading Hungarian
Scientists, giving a biographical outline of their accomplishments, political
behavior past and present, etc. As a result of this work, which had to be
cleverly and expertly handled, so as not to arouse Soviet and Hungarian
Communist opposition, several of these scientists are now in this country.
Others, seeing that the West was interested in their welfare, also escaped
the Iron Curtain and are today in Britain, France, Sweden, and Switzer-
land, even South America. Still others, encumbered by large families or
parents well in years, stayed back, but are either now in Russia or living
in constant fear that they will be transported there as research workers."
Most of the scientists referred to by Admiral Dietrich who are now in this
country as a result of my activities came to the Gaorge Washington University
to begin with ; some stayed there and others went to such places as Johns Hopkins
University, National Fireworks, Inc., etc. They are doing outstanding work and
some of them are already making significant contributions to aspects of science
which are today of great importance to America.
My main work since the war has been to maintain and build up on a peace-
time basis the explosives research and development program of the Navy.
There have been three phases (if this work, the preparations for the testing of
the atomic bomb against ships ; the consolidation and reorganization of research
on explosives, and the continuance of the development of explosives.
The Bureau of Ordnance participated actively in the Bikini tests in 1946, its
main job being to prepare and apply the instruments for measuring the effects
of the atomic explosions at Bikini. I was appointed by Admiral Hussey, who
was then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, as Officer in Charge of this work.
At about this time, the first legislation on the control of atomic energy was
being considered by a special committee of the Senate. Senator Ball and I
discussed this problem many evenings. When he drafted a bill on the subject
I helped him. In February 1946 I was called before the Senate Committee on
Atomic Energy to testify on the pending legislation. In my testimony I touched
briefly on several points but I went into detail on only one point, which was
closest to my heart and to my personal interests. I urged that the military
should not be excluded from the control of atomic energy, since they have a vital
interest in its use.
Parallel with my activities when I was head of the Bureau of Ordnance
Instrumentation Group for the Bikini tests, and more intensively later, I worked
on building up an adequate postwar research organization in the field of ex-
plosives for the Navy. I feel that I was instrumental in persuading a con-
siderable number of the leading scientists in this field to come to the Navy or
to continue their work for the Navy and the other services, and as a result the
Navy and the National Military Establishment now have an adequate organiza-
tion to carry on explosives research and development during peacetime.
While I cannot reveal the nature of my contributions to the field of explosives
since the war, I can state that they are considered to be of major significance
by those who are familiar with my work.
The foregoing account of my scientific work and military service is offered as
positive evidence of my loyalty to America and my trustworthiness as an
official of the United States Government. I hope that I have described my be-
liefs and my activities fully enough and that no doubt is left in anyone's mind
about my loyalty and my security status.
Stephen Bkunauer.
[Enclosure 2]
Dear : Please forgive me for writing a form letter to you. I am sending
out close to a hundred of these letters, and it would be impossible to do it if I
wrote a separate letter to each of you.
You doubtless read the charges Senator McCarthy made against my wife and
me on the thirteenth of March. You doubtless have your own opinion on the sub-
ject. I do not know how good the press service is where you are at present, so
I enclose here a copy of the official Navy press release about me. The Department
of State made a similar statement about my wife.
I expect to be called before the Senate sometime next week to clear myself of
Senator McCarthy's charges. (No definite date has been fixed as yet.) I should
like to enlist your help in clearing myself.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1861
Would you be willing: to write a letter about me to Senator Tydings? The way
I visualize it, the letter should contain the following information :
(1) a brief statement of who you are and what sort of work you are engaged
in at present;
(2) how long you have known me ; what sort of connections we had with each
other ;
(3) what you think of my character, my loyalty, my reliability, and my con-
tributions ; and
(4) anything else you wish to state.
The letter should be addressed to the Honorable Millard Tydings, United States
Senate, Washington, D. C. However, I would appreciate it if you would mail it
to me, together with a copy for myself. I would not like to swamp Senator
Tydings with individual letters arriving at separate times. It would look like an
attempt to exert pressure on him. What I should like to do is to collect all letters
and hand them over to Senator Tydings at the time of my appearance before the
Subcommittee.
I would deeply appreciate it if you would act urgently on this matter. How-
ever, even if your letter does not arrive prior to the hearings, I can still collect
the late letters, and transmit them to the Subcommittee later.
With grateful thanks for your help, and with best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Stephen Brunauer,
3417 Quebec Street NW., Washington, D. C.
March 17, 1950.
List of Testimonial Letters
In order to facilitate the work of the investigation, I have arranged the 104
letters I received to date (May 8, 1950) into three groups. In Group I have been
placed the 30 letters that I consider the most important for my case. In Group II
I collected the 13 letters that have bearing on my activities in Hungary in 1946,
and the consequences thereof. Group III contains the rest of the letters.
1. Senator Joseph Ball, Washington, D. C.
2. Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Jr., U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Chief of the Bureau
of Ordnance
3. Dr. E. Bright Wilson, Professor of Chemistry, Harvard U diversity
4. Dr. R. E. Gibson, Director, Applied Physics Laboratory. Johns Hopkins
University
5. Dr. L. R. Hafstad, Director of Reactor Development, U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission
6. Dr. John Von Neumann, Professor of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, N. J.
T. G. F. Strollo, Ordnance Engineer, Explosives Res. and Dev., Bureau of
Ordnance
8. Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Har-
vard University
9. Dr. S. B. Hendricks, Head Chemist, Plant Industry Station, Beltsville, U. S.
Dept. of Agriculture
10. Dr. George Gamow, Professor of Physics, George Washington University
11. Dr. G. K. Hartmann, Chief, Explosives Department, Naval Ordnance
Laboratory
12. Dr. P. M. Fye, Associate Chief, Explosives Department, Naval Ordnance
Laboratory
13. Dr. R. J. Seeger, Chief, Aeroballistics Department, Naval Ordnance
Laboratory
14. Dr. F. J. Weyl, Acting Chief, Division of Mathematical Sciences, Office of
Naval Research
15. Dr. Edward Teller, Professor of Physics, University of Chicago
16. Mr. S. J. Porter, Director of Research and Development, National Fireworks,
Inc.
37. Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, U. S. N., Commander, Carrier Division six, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet.
18. Rear Admiral F. I. Entwistle, U. S. N., Deputy Commander, Western Sea
Frontier
19. Dr. D. P. MacDougall, Division Chief, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
1862 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
20. Dr. B. D. Van Evera, Professor of Chemistry. Coordinator of Scientific Ac-
tivities, George Washington University
21. Dr. F. G. Brickwedde, Chief, Heat and Power Division, National Bureau of
Standards
22. R. W. Hummer, Chemist, Dow Chemical Company
23. Rear Admiral K. H. Noble, U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Assistant Chief of Bu-
reau of Ordnance for Research
24. Professor Theodore Von Karman, Formerly Chairman of Scientific Advisory
Board, U. S. Air Force
25. Dr. Richard Courant, Professor of Mathematics, Head of Department, New
York University
26. Mr. Norman MacLeod, Research Director, Old and Barnes, Inc.
27. Captain S. H. Crittenden, Jr., U. S. N., U. S. Pacific Fleet.
28. Dr. W. E. Land, Deputy Section Head, Explosives Res. and Dev., Bureau of
Ordnance
29. Captain J. H. Sides, U. S. N., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
30. W. Edwards Deming, Adviser in Sampling, Bureau of the Census
GROUP II
31. Mr. Ferenc Nagy, Herndon, Virginia, Formerly Prime Minister of Hungary
32. Dr. Aladar Szegedy-Maszak, Washington, D. C, Formerly Minister of Hun-
gary to the United States
33. Rear Admiral W. F. Dietrich, U. S. N. (Ret.), Washington, D. C, Formerly
U. S. Naval Representative, Allied Control Commission for Hungary
34. Dr. Alexander Szasz, Bank of America, San Francisco, California. Formerly
Counselor of Hungarian Legation, Washington, D. C.
35. Dr. Zoltan Bay, George Washington University, Formerly Professor of
Physics, Technical University of Budapest
36. Dr. Sandor A. Hoffmann, National Fireworks, Inc., Formerly Associate Pro-
fessor of Chemistry, Technical University of Budapest
37. Dr. Leslie Kovasznay, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University, For-
merly Associate Professor of Aerodynamics, Technical University of
Budapest
38. Dr. John Farago, George Washington University, Formerly Assistant Di-
rector in Charge of Research, Chemical Institute of Budapest
39. Mr. Charles Pulvari, George Washington University, Formerly owner of the
firm Charles Pulvari, Inc., Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Buda-
pest, Hungary
40. Dr. Laszlo J: kely, Forest Hills, New York, Formerly Minister in Charge of
the Cabinet Office of the President of Hungary
41. Miss Agi Jambor, Philadelphia, Pa., Concert Pianist
42. Dr. George Papp, George Washington University, Formerly Associate Pro-
fessor of Physics, Technical University of Budapest
43. Mr. George Kovach, General Manager, Great Northern Hotel. New York,
N. Y., Colonel in the Military Intelligence, U. S. Army Reserve
GROUP III
44. Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Commander in Chief,
U. S. Atlantic Fleet
45. Dr. Ralph Connor, Vice President in Charge of Research, Rohm and Haas
Company
46. Captain A. A. Burke, U. S. N., Research and Development Board. National
Military Establishment
47. Mr. H. R. Kimble, Physical Science Administrator, Bureau of Ordnance
48. Dr. C. R. Naeser, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, George
Washington University
49. Dr. T. L. Brownyard, Physical Science Administrator, Bureau of Ordnance
50. Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons. U. S. N., Office (if the Secretary of Defense.
51. Dr. J. G. Kirkwood. Professor of Chemistry, California Institute of Tech-
nology
52. Mrs. Dorothy Bandow, San Antonio, Texas. Formerly Secretary of Dr.
Stephen Brunauer
53. Dr. S. R. Asp'mall, Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Williams College
54. Mr. Datus Smith, Director, Princeton University Press
55. Dr. Eugene Wigner, Professor of Physics, Princeton University
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALiY INVESTIGATION 1863
56. Dr. R. II. Cole, Professor of Chemistry. Head of Department, Brown Uni-
versity
57. Dr. J. S. Coles, Associate Professor of Chemistry, Brown University
5S. Dr. J. O. Hirsehfekler, Professor of Chemistry, University of Wisconsin,
Director. University of Wisconsin Naval Research Laboratory
59. Mr. N. II. Bullard, Head Engineer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern,
California
60. Mr. O. H. Loeffler, Ordnance Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
61. Mr. Eliot B. Coulter, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, U. S. Department
of State
62. Mr. Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, U. S. Department
of State
63. Captain W. M. Moses, U. S. N. (Ret.), Wilton, Connecticut
64. Mr. J. S. Harper, Chemical Engineer, Laurel, Mississippi
65. Dr. E. H. Cox, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Swarthmore
College
66. Dr. F. O. Rice, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Catholic
University of America
67. Dr. K. F. Herzfield, Professor of Physics, Head of Department, Catholic
University of America
68. Dr. A. H. Blatt, Professor of Chemistry, Queens College
69. Mr. J. E. Levy, Chemical Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
70. Dr. R. D. Bennett, Technical Director, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
71. Captain W. B. Moore, U. S. N., Bureau of Ordnance
72. Mr. Lester Glickman, Engineer, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
73. Dr. W. M. Cady, Head, Physics Branch, Naval Ordnance Test Station, In-
yokern, California
74. Mr. J. S. McCorkle, Physicist, Bureau of Ordnance
75. Dr. Henry Eyring, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, University
of Utah
76. Mr. W. F. Skinner, Assistant Director of Research, Naval Mine Depot,
Yorktown, Va.
77. Dr. E. H. Eyster, Associate Division Chief, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
78. Mr. R. W. Harris, Ordnance Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
79. Miss Jacqueline Kitchens, Mathematical Analyst, Bureau of Ordnance
80. Dr. P. C. Cross, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, University
of Washington
81. Dr. W. D. Kennedy, Senior Research Chemist, Tennessee Eastman Company
82. Dr. R. A. Beebe, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Amherst
College
83. Dr. L. R. Rumbaugh, Deputy Technical Director, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
84. Dr. L. H. Farinholt, Associate Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University
85. Dr. W. A. Noyes, Jr., Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Univer-
sity of Rochester
86. Dr. J. J. Stoker, Professor of Mathematics, New York University
87. Mr. R. L. Woodard, Administrator, Koppers Company
88. Colonel C. H. M. Roberts, U. S. A., Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Depart-
ment of the Army
89. Mr. J. T. Manley, Director of Research, Naval Mine Depot, Yorktown,
Virginia
90. Mr. E. C. Kenton, Manager, Evans Research and Development Corporation
91. Dr. Elijah Swift, Jr., Division Chief, Explosives Research Department,
Naval Ordnance Laboratory
92. Miss Katharine Love, Chemist, U. S. Department of Agriculture
93. Dr. R. H. Brown, Instructor of Mathematics, Columbia University
94. Dr. D. V. Sickman, Division Chief, Explosives Research Department, Naval
Ordnance Laboratory
95. Dr. F. H. Westheimer, Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago
96. Mrs. Hazel P. Marsh, Formerly Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Ordnance
97. Captain J. A. E. Hindman, U. S. N., Bureau of Ordnance
98. Dr. Urner Liddel, Director, Natural Sciences Division, Office of Naval
Research
99. Dr. B. H. Sage, Professor of Chemical Engineering, Head of Department,
California Institute of Technology
100. Dr. W. E. Lawson, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
101. Mr. C. L. Tyler, Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office, U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission
1864 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
102. Dr. M. A. Tuve, Director, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie
Institution of Washington
103. Dr. K. O. Friedriehs, Professor of Mathematics, New York University
104. Commander J. I. Cone, U. S. N., Commander Destroyer Division 12, U. S-
Pacific Fleet
[Enclosure 3]
The Navy Department announces that Dr. Stephen Brunauer, who has been,
charged with being a Communist, served as a Commander, United States Naval
Reserve, in the Bureau of Ordnance during the war, commencing in 1942. Sub-
sequent to discharge, he was employed in the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy De-
partment, where he is now serving in a civilian capacity. As an employee of
that Bureau, Dr. Brunauer has been thoroughly investigated, and as a result
of this investigation, administrative decision was made that there was not
sufficient evidence to warrant Dr. Brunauer's being charged with having been
disloyal and for that reason his case has not been referred to the Loyalty Board.
While a commissioned officer during the war and later as an employee, Dr.
Brunauer has made noteworthy contributions in the field of explosives. He is
regarded as an eminent expert in that field and his ability in the field of research
is highly regarded.
March 13, 1950.
Department of State
Washington, July 6, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator Tydings: You have asked me to inform yonr subcommittee'
concerning the circumstances of the appointment of Dr. Harlow Sbapiey to the
United States National Commission for UNESCO. Dr. Shapley was designated
by the Executive Committee of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science on May 20, 1947, to serve out the unexpired term of Dr. James Bryant
Conant as the representative of that association on the national committee. On
June 27, 1947, he was again designated by the association and has now served
out his term, which expired April 15, 1950; Dr. Shapley was not, under Public
Law 565, seventy-ninth Congress, eligible for reappointment.
Section 3 of Public Law 565 provides, in part, "Such Commission [United
States National Commission for UNESCO] shall be appointed by the Secretary
of State and shall consist of (a) not more than sixty representative of principal
national, voluntary organizations interested in educational, scientific, and cul-
tural matters * * *." The Secretary of State has appointed to the National
Commission in every instance the person designated by each such organization
to serve on the Commission. This seems to be in accord with the intent of Con-
gress as expressed in the legislative history of the act. In the course of debate
concerning the legislation, Congressman Karl Mundt (Republican, South Dakota )
said:
"* * * it seems to me if we are going to have an advisory commission
that is worth its salt it should bo an advisory commission that is not ob-
ligated to anybody, not obligated to the Secretary of State, not obligated
to any political party, not obligated to any point of view, but one which
reflects and represents the views of the organizations to which in turn these
delegates are supposed to carry the inspiration and the message and the
information of UNESCO,
"Consequently, I want people selected from these organizations in whom
the organizations have confidence. I want the Secretary of State to choose
the man nominated by these various organizations so that they can go to
the advisory conferences, consult and advise with the Secretary of State, so
that our Government officials may have the benefit of this great cross section
of information."
Oongivssman Mundt, whose interest in and support of the principles of UNESCO
extends over many years, sponsored H. Res. 215, introduced on April 9, 1945,
and agreed to by the House of Representatives on May 22, 1945. This resolution
urged the participation of the United States in the creation of an international
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1865'
framework within which educational and cultural relations could he considered
and promoted in their various aspects.
It should he added that Dr. Shapley was appointed as a member of the United
states Delegation to the Preparatory Conference for UNESCO at London in
1945 under former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. His participation in the
work of UNESCO has stemmed from the outset from Ills position as a scientist
and member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peurifoy,
De pit ty Under Secretary.
The following letters were received by the Foreign Relations Sub-
committee in response to its invitations to the persons publicly charged
by Senator McCarthy to either appear before the subcommittee as a
witness or else submit a statement of their position :
Old Westbtjbt, Long Islaxd, N. Y., May 10, 1950.
Edward P. Morgan, Esq.,
chief Counsel. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee;
United States Senate. Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : I have your letter of May 4, 1950, acknowledging the re-
ceipt of the documents submitted to the subcommittee on March 30, 1950, and
offiering me the opportunity to reply to Senator McCarthy's charges in public.
I appreciate your offer and the spirit in which this opportunity is afforded me.
You will recall that, in my letter of March 30, 1950, I explained to Senator
Tydings the difficulty of my position. As a member of the United Nations
Secretariat. I am required to observe the spirit and suhstance of article 100 of
the United Nations Charter. That article reads in part:
"In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff
shall not seek nor receive instructions from any government or from any
other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any
action which might reflect on their position as international officials re-
sponsible only to the Organization."
For the above reason, and because I must leave on May 17. 1950, for Italy and
Switzerland on official United Nations business, I do not feel that I can take
advantage of the opportunity offered me by the subcommittee. I expect to
return to the United States in late July.
I should tell you that I have caused to be sent to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, a copy of the letter and memorandum of March
30, 1950, which I sent to Senator Tydings. I have also sent a copy of that letter
and memorandum to Mr. Willard Barber of the State Department. I am enclos-
ing herewith a copy of the memorandum, in affidavit form, which I have sub-
scribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before a notary public of the State of New
York. I do this to indicate that that memorandum contains all the pertinent
facts known to me and to show that I have no hesitation whatsoever in adhering
to them under oath. I should be only too happy, of course, to answer any ques-
tions pertaining to, or make any additional statements in explanation of, the
the facts which I have given in the memorandum when and if you, Senator
Tydings, or other members of the subcommittee request it.
Respectfully yours,
Gustavo Duran.
Enc. affidavit.
By registered mail.
Memorandum to Senator Tydings
On March 14. when I read the first reports on the charges made against me
Senator McCarthy before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, I issued
a statement denying the specific charges that had come to my attention and stat-
ing that I was not and never had been a Communist. I also said that I suspected
that the so-called United States Army Intelligence Report on which Senator
McCarthy was basing most of his allegations was nothing more than a literal
translation of an article published in the April 9, 1946, issue of the Madrid news-
paper Arriba which is the mouthpiece of the Falange Tarty of Franco Spain.
I have now had an opportunity to examine in detail the testimony of Senator
McCarthy before the subcommittee, and my suspicions as to his sources have
been fully confirmed.
1866 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
I had thought that those accusations had long since been laid to rest. Both the
charges and the exhibits which appeared to substantiate them were found to be
entirely baseless and misleading by the State Department Security Committee in
1946. Even the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which had first
given publicity to the charges, decided against pressing the matter any further.
You have before you the letter, dated September 14, 1946, of Mr. Donald Russell,
then Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Personnel Affairs, in which it is
stated that the Security Committee, after reviewing the entire record as pro-
cured from all available sources, recommended favorably on me.
With only one or two easily refutable exceptions, Senator McCarthy has come
forward with no new charges, and no additional material with which to support
his accusations. I therefore cannot understand why the conclusions of the Secu-
rity Committee and Mr. Donald Russell are not equally as valid today as they
were in 1946. For the sake of clearing the record once and for all, and in
the hope that these unfounded accusations will never again arise to disturb
the peace to which my family and I are entitled, I wish to lay before you
and the subcommittee the facts as they are known to me, and as they are known
to the Security Committee and to all those responsible persons who have
known me intimately for a period of many years. In this connection, I am
attaching a biographical sketch of my family background and career.
The testimony of Senator McCarthy is based on (a) a United States Military
Intelligence Report, dated June 4, 1946, which, in turn, is based on a report given
the United States Military Attache at Madrid by the A. C. of S., G-2, Spanish
Central General Staff; (ft) a report made by Mr. Indalecio Prieto on August 9,
193S, before the National Committee of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, and
subsequently incorporated in a pamphlet entitled "How and Why I left the
Ministry of National Defense"; (c) statements made by Lt. Edward J. Ruff,
Assistant United States Military Attache in the Dominican Republic; and (d)
information allegedly obtained directly by Senator McCarthy or by his assist-
ants.
(a) As I pointed out in my statement to the press, the Spanish Army Intelli-
gence Report which was incorporated in the report of the United States Military
Attache was a literal reproduction of a scurrilous attack on me published in
the April 9, 1946. issue of the Madrid newspaper Arriba, which is the mouthpiece
of the Falange Party of Franco Spain.
The article in Arriba was published as part of the campaign of the Franco
Government to counter disclosures that had been made by the United States
State Department on the relations between Nazi Germany and Franco Spain
during the last World War. These disclosures were actually excerpts from
the captured records of the German Foreign Office, but the Franco Government
broadcast the story in Madrid, first on February 28, 1946. and subsequently on
March 3, 1946, that I had personally fabricated the disclosures. The Franco
Government, which had paid no attention to me for seven years, suddenly under-
took to make me an agent of Moscow and to smear my character in the vilest
possible way.
A clipping of this article was forwarded to the United States Government by
the United States Naval Attache in Madrid, under Intelligence Report No. 135-
46 dated April 15, 1946. I have a photostatic copy of the article in my possession,
a copy and translation of which I am attaching hereto. Comparison of the article
with the wording and very order of the Spanish Military Intelligence Report shews
that both documents are identical.
When in May 1946 the United States Military Attache requested information
on me from the Intelligence Service of the Spanish Central General Staff, the
Franco Government, feeling that at that moment it would serve its purposes to
smear my character, and being unable to produce a single instance of substan-
tial evidence, resorted to sending to the United States Military Attache a literal
copy of the Arriba article. Apparently the Military Attache had no knowledge
that the article had been already transmitted by the Naval Attache at the time of
its publication, and therefore accepted the Spanish Military Intelligence report
as a bona tide document based on actual facts. Aside from the misrepresenta-
tions concerning my character and beliefs, the report contains such gross inac-
curacies regarding easily ascertainable facts, such as my birthplace and resi-
dence, that had the Military Attache taken the precaution of checking these
facts, he would have questioned the validity of the report.
Having established the unreliable character of Senator McCarthy's chief
source of information, I would like to examine the charges one by one.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1867
1. The newspaper Arriba charged, and (he so-called Intelligence Report re-
peated verbatim, that I came to Madrid "for the first time in the 1920's from the
Canary Islands in the company of * * * Nestor." As stated in my bio-
graphical sketch, and as shown by the enclosed photostatic copy of my birth
certificate dated April ::. 1940, which was extended by the very same government
that six years later gave the Canary Islands as my birthplace, I was born in
Barcelona. I resided with my family continuously in Madrid from 1910 till
1 '. )•_".>. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has in its files a list of the various
domiciles of my family. This information, which was provided by me, can be
easily checked.
2. Arriba said, and the so-called Military Intelligence Report repeated verbatim,
that "as a friend of Nestor" I became "employed as a pianist in the company of
Antonia Merce, the Argentinita." Actually, I was not employed by Antonia
Merc6 as a pianist, nor was I recommended to her by Mr. Nestor. Madame
Merce asked me to compose the score of a ballet, as she asked several other
Spanish composers. My score was performed in various European capitals,
and it was for the purpose of conducting it that I accompanied her during her
tour of Germany in 1927.
Incidentally, the stage name of Antonia Merce was actually "La Argentina,"
and "La Argentinita" was the stage name of a lesser dancer whose real name
was Encarnaeion Lopez. Both dancers have appeared in New York. Had the
report been prepared by a reliable official source, and not improvised by a journal-
ist bent on libel, such confusion in identity could not have been made.
3. Arriba and the so-called Report go on to say that my "repulsive morals"
caused me "to incur the fury of the Berlin police," that I was ousted from Ger-
many, and that "similar trouble happened to me in other European capitals."
Actually I have never been arrested at any time in any city on any charge, or
ever been reprimanded by an officer of the law, except for once passing a stop
sign in Mineola, Long Island.
As regards the loathsome immoral tendencies that Arriba and the so-called
Report have atributed to me and that Senator McCarthy has echoed, I chal-
lenge Senator McCarthy or anyone to repeat that charge, not in classified re-
ports or privileged statements, but to my face.
With respect to the charge that I was known under the name of "El Porce-
lana," the first time in my life that I had ever heard that appellation applied
to me, or for that matter to anyone, was when I read the scurrilous Arriba at-
tack. General Franco's pressmen who invented this particular piece of nonsense
must feel proud to know that it has been picked up and echoed by a Senator of
the United States of America.
4. Arriba, the so-called Military Intelligence Report, and Senator McCarthy
charge that I returned to Madrid upon the Proclamation of the Spanish Republic
(1931) under the cover of a representative of Paramount Pictures, but actually
as an agent of the GPU. I returned to Spain in May 1934 from Paris, neither
as an agent of the GPU nor as a representative of Pai'amount Pictures but simply
as a person who returned home because the Spanish section of Paramount Pic-
tures with which I had been working in Paris had been discontinued, as that
company's records will show.
5. Arriba states, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy repeat, that
"such meetings took place in Duran's home at 104 or 106 Santa Engracia St.,
that the police had to make their appearance more than once." Any accurate
police record would have given the correct number, which was 100, and would
have mentioned the fact that that apartment was my father's home, and would
have indicated that nothing took place at that address nor at any other place
at which I or a member of my family has resided, which would call for police
intervention.
6. Arriba, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy charge that alleged
records of the Madrid Police concerning me were probably destroyed "by his
friend Serrano Poncela, Chief of Madrid Police, in October and November of
1936." The alleged police records on me never existed because I have never
done anything that would call for an entry on any police record. In order to
justify the lie that these records did exist a second lie had to be invented that
they were destroyed. I have never met Mr. Serrano Poncela, nor any chief of
the Madrid Police, nor any chief of police anywhere.
7. Arriba, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy charge that I "formed
part of the High Russian General Staff," that I "went to Moscow with a delega-
tion of the male and female members of the Red Army," and that later I "was
for some time in Paris." I was never a member of any Russian Staff; I have
68070 — 50 — pt. 2 25
1868 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
never been in Moscow or any Russian territory ; and, after the Spanish Civil War,
I did not go to Paris until eight years later, when, in 19-17, I was sent there on
official duty by the United Nations.
At the end of the Spanish Civil War, through the intervention of Messrs.
Abington Gooden, the British Consul General at Valencia, Alexander Hanson
Ballantyne, Third Secretary of the British Embassy at Valencia, and Woodruff
Wallner, American Consul at Valencia, I was evacuated from Spain aboard the
British Cruiser Galatea and the Hospital Ship Maine and transported to England.
8. With regard to the United States Military Attache's comment at the end
of his report, I never, in the entire course of the Spanish Civil War, held any
command in any International Brigade. As for the statement of the Attache's
incognito informer, that I murdered two innocent persons, it is a complete lie.
(&) With regard to the allegations based on Mr. Prieto's statement of 1938, I first
learned that this statement had been made when ex-Congressman J. Parnell
Thomas made his charges against me before the House on March 28, 1946. In
the eight years that elapsed between the dates of Mr. Prieto's and Mr. Thomas'
statements, I saw Mr. Prieto on a number of occasions. He was a guest at my
house and our relations were cordial. At no time did he ever give me any
indication that any one of my actions, past or present, had come in for criticism
by him.
Immediately after Mr. Thomas had made his statement before the House, I
wrote to Mr. Prieto requesting an explanation of Mr. Thomas' remarks. Mr.
Prieto cabled as follows :
"Letter 29 received yesterday answered it today as follows : 'I affirm that
the statements of Mr. John Parnell Thomas are not founded on any words
said by me to him, with whom I have had no contact, nor to any person what-
ever. I have never accused you of being agent of the Russian police nor
member of the Comintern and I never said anything whatever to anyone
which would give a basis for believing it.' Referring to your telegram of
today I add that I have not given to the Committee, with which I have never
had any contact, any information concerning you or any other person."
When I learned, however, that Mr. Prieto had actually referred to "a certain
Duran" in a report he had made on August 9, 1938, before the National Committee
of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, I wrote to him again asking whether I
was supposed to be that person. Mr. Prieto replied on April 12 that while I was
the person referred to in his report, his statement did not imply that I was an
agent of the Secret Russian Police or a member of the Comintern. Concerning
my supposed Communist leanings, he went on to say :
"The facts described in that part of the report demonstrated how certain
pressures were brought to bear, against my will, on government officials
working under me. * * * I myself had to endure pressures of that kind
without sufficiently defending myself against them."
Subsequently, Mr. Prieto stated to Messrs. Robert Willson Wall, Jr., and
Richard Godfrey, Attaches to the American Embassy at Mexico City, that he
had appointed me as head of the Madrid Zone of the Military Intelligence Service
( SIM) at the proposal of General Miaja, then Commander of the Army of Madrid ;
he then reiterated that he (Prieto), like others in the Government who were
equally hostile to communism, had been subjected to Communist pressures.
The facts concerning my brief assignment to the Military Intelligence Service
(SIM) are as follows :
As already stated, I was an officer of the regular army of Spain under a legally
constituted Government recognized by all countries with the sole exceptions of
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. A coalition of political parties — right wing
republican, center republican, socialist, communist and others — composed that
Government.
As a soldier, I bad sworn allegiance to that Government. It was therefore my
duty to follow instructions from my superior officers, and through them from the
Minister of National Defense.
Approximately six weeks after the conclusion of the Battle of Brunete (July-
August 1937) in which my unit had actively participated. I was ordered by my
immediate military superior. Colonel Heredia, Chief of the XVIIIth Anny Corps.
to report for instructions to General Miaja, Chief of the Army of Madrid. When
I reported to General Miaja he told me that I had been appointed by the
Minister of National Defense (Mr. Prieto) as head of the Madrid Zone of the
Military Intelligence Service.
As General Miaja will confirm, I objected to the assignment because I felt
that I might best serve the interests of the Spanish Republic in my capacity as
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1869
n Division Commander on active duty at the front, and because I had a deeply
rooted aveersion towards the proposed type of activity. My objections were
overriden and I was ordered to report to the Chief of the General Staff, General
Vicente Rojo y Lluch, and to the .Minister of National Defense (Mr. Prieto), at
Valencia.
When, a few days later, I reported to the Chief of the General Staff at Va-
lencia, I indicated again my objections to the assignment. The Chief ol Staff
told me that he had consented reluctantly to my appointment and only on con-
dition that it be not considered permanent.
I then reported to Mr. Prieto and was instructed by him to receive technical
advice and opinions from experts, for the organization of the Military Intelli-
gence Service in the Madrid zone ; these experts from whom I was to take
advice would be designated by the Chief of the National Intelligence Service.
When I reported to the latter I was informed of the experts whose advice I
was expected to follow.
I returned to Madrid at the beginning of October 1937 and, after a week of
preliminary orientation, assumed my new duties. Daring the period of about
two weeks of my actual tenure of office, a few temporary appointments were
made at the recommendations of the experts. However, the operational stage
of the service had not even begun when about the middle of October 1937, I was
ordered by the Chief of the Genera] Staff to report back to the XVIIIth Army
Corps. The Chief of the General Staff, making preparations at that time for
the Battle of Ternel (December 1937-January 1938), requested my return to
active duty in order that I might reassume command of and reorganize my
Division which was slated to participate at that Battle.
The decision was very much to my liking and seemed wholly logical to me,
Mr. Prieto has asserted that he was subjected to various pressures and maneu-
vers to keep me in Madrid. I was completely unaware of such pressures and
maneuvers and had no part of them. Whether justified or not, I had the repu-
tation of being a successful military commander with a capacity for organization.
Tins simple fact can explain why I was ordered to Madrid in the first instance,
and why I was recalled to the active front when an important military operation
was impending.
General Vicente Rojo y Lluch, Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the
Spanish Republic, and now an Honorary Brigadier General of the Bolivian Army
and a Professor of History of Strategy and Tactics at the Command and General
Staff School of Bolivia, can verify the above account.
(c) Concerning the charges made and the opinions expressed by Lt. Edward J.
Ruff. Assistant United States Military Attache in the Dominican Republic, all
of them are merely repetitions of the charges that have been previously answered
in this memorandum.
The charges are said by Lieutenant Ruff to have been submitted "by a Spanish
refugee who also served in Duran's promotion board in Spain." I do not know
what is meant by this phrase. If it is meant that there was at any time a promo-
tion board in any of the military units under my command, this part of the state-
ment is as false as the rest. If the reference concerns the promotion board of
the General Staff, my successive promotions in the Spanish Army were made
exclusively at the recommendations of my immediate superior officers and for
strictly military reasons.
((/ ) The statements made by Senator McCarthy based on information allegedly
obtained by himself were (1) that I was taken into the State Department from
my job "as a lieutenant-colonel in the Communist International Brigade"; (2)
that I am "actually with the International Refugee Organization engaged in work
having to do with screening refugees coming into this country"; (3) that my
naturalization "took about six weeks"; and (4) that I obtained employment
in the United Nations upon the recommendation of "a member of the present
Presidential Cabinet."
(1) As stated in the attached biographical sketch, I was a reserve noncommis-
sioned officer in the regular army of the Spanish Republic when the Civil War
broke out, and consequently I served in the regular army throughout the war.
I was never a member of any "International Brigade." During the years prior
to my employment in the State Department, I resided in England for over a
year. After arriving in the United States. I worked successively in the Museum
of Modern Art of New York City, and in the Pan American Union, Wa hmgton,
D. C.
rl) It is a matter of public record that I have never been employed by the
International Refugee Organization nor have I had anything whatsoever to
1870 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
do with screening refugees coming into this or any other country. Had the
Senator consulted the telephone directory of the United Nations, he would
have found the Department and Section in which I work.
(3) As regards my naturalization, I arrived in this country on May 28,
1940 and resided here continuously for two and one-half years prior to attain-
ing citizenship. I declared my intention to become an American citizen at the
time I received my immigration visa on April 30, 1940. I fully complied
with the period of residence required by the Naturalization Statute, contrary
to Senator McCarthy who presumes to know that I obtained my naturalization
in "about six weeks."
(4) Finally, in obtaining employment in the United Nations, I neither sought
nor received any form of support from any official of the United States Gov-
ernment.
At no time have I hidden the fact that I actively participated in the Spanish
Civil War. When in 1940 I was registered for the draft in the United States
Army, I gave a detailed statement on my military career in Spain to the Local
Draft Board #750, at Mamaroneck, New York. This period of my life has
also been mentioned in every application I have filed for employment.
I would like to add that there are many people in responsible positions in
this country, iu England, in Spain, and in Latin America who have known me
for many years and who can testify as to my moral integrity and beliefs with an
authority that the sources quoted by Senator McCarthy do not possess.
Finally, I wish to state that I chose to become an American because I believe
in and unreservedly adhere to the institutions and ideals of this country. My
wife is an American citizen by birth. My children are American and are being
brought up in accordance with the best American traditions. The obscene and
false accusations that have been made against me harm not only myself but
also my wife and children. I have faith that the sense of justice of the Senate
of the United States will correct this situation once and for all and will allow
me to live in the decency and privacy to which I am entitled.
Gustavo Durax.
March 30, 1950.
State of New York,
County of Nassau.
Sworn to before me this 10th day of May 1950.
Anna M. Wilson.
Harvard College Observatory,
Cambridge, Mass., May 9, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : I thank you for your letter of May 4 and the subcommittee's
kind offer to afford me an opportunity to reply in public to the charges by
Senator Joseph McCarthy. Since I have never been on the payroll of the State
Department, and since my activities seem to be wholly irrelevant to the current
political attack on the Government, I have no desire to dignify the irresponsible
slanders by appearing publicly in defense. I should be glad, however, to submit
a statement, if the subcommittee would like, providing I can be informed as to
the nature of the charges against me. When they were made 2 or 3 months ago
they changed from hour to hour and day to day.
When I heard that the Loyalty Hoard proposed to examine again the rec-
ords of all who had been named by Senator McCarthy, I wrote a letter to my
acquaintance, Mr. Seth Richardson, Chairman of the Board, enclosing copies of
two publicly issued statements. I enclose copies of both of these statements
herewith.
Again with my thanks for the opportunity to reply publicly and in person.
Very sincerely yours,
Harlow Shapley.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1871
April 7, 1950.
Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
The President's Loyalty Review Board,
White House Offices, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Richardson : From a press report I learn that the President's Loyalty
Review Board, or some similar agency, plans to look into the loyalty evidence
of all the individuals named hy Senator McCarthy during this past month
or so Of accusations. I enclose copies of statements I have made in reply to
the McCarthy charges. Also a requested response to the attack hy Mr. Ober.
of Baltimore, of last spring. This item, "Flying Samovars," was printed in
June in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. It comments on the Waldorf Confer-
ence : but all phases of that "Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace"
are presented in a pamphlet Speaking of Peace which is probably in your com-
mittee's possession. If not, and it could be of any service with respect to the
various participants, I shall be glad to have a copy sent to you.
I believe that the nature of the Waldorf Conference was the chief subject
matter at a small dinner we both attended in New York City a year ago.
Sincerely yours,
Harlow Shapley.
April 22, 1950.
Mr. Jonx O. Toerner,
Chairman, Catholic Activity Committee, St. Joseph Council,
521 West 207th Street, New York 34, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Toerner: I am sincerely glad to have your letter and the enclosed
pamphlet. I have no doubt but that you sent me your letter and this printed
statement in complete good faith. I appreciate the quotation from the encyclical
of Pope Pius XL As the holder of the Pope Pius XI Prize for my scientific and
civic contributions, I am naturally sensitive to the statement by this great
leader.
I note that you say in your first sentence that I am "unfortunately listed with
pro-Communist organizations." I agree with you. It is very unfortunate, since
I do not belong to any pro-Communist organization. In the days when Russia
was our ally I helped, as did a million of Americans, with Russian relief; and
I helped sponsor American-Russian friendship, as did General Eisenhower and
many other distinguished Americans. Also I have fought hard, and will con-
tinue to fight hard, for the defense of all antitotalitarian activities, and against
the abuses of constitutional civil liberties and human rights in America. It is
true that in these days of hysteria, and of overwhelming suspicion of our fel
lowmen, the abuses of civil rights have largely involved adherents to left-wing
movements. Here in America the minority persecutors have not yet gone after
the fascists or the extreme rightists.
The American-Russian Institute, of which I am a trustee, along with several
distinguished Wall Street lawyers and other patriotic Americans, is not the
slightest partisan or pro-Communist, but an educational organization of some
twenty-three years' standing, serving to give information about Russian politi-
cal, economic, and demographic affairs to American business, government, and
educational groups (Reader's Digest, General Electric Company, and the like).
In blind mistake it is listed by the Attorney General as suspect, but that does not
force me to run to cover.
I had hoped, and still hope, that some organization such as yours would have
something to say (and I mean this seriously and sincerely) in response to Drew
Pearson's comments on the relation of Senator McCarthy's rather wild red and
publicity hunt to Father Walsh of Georgetown. Perhaps it has been answered.
But I really need to know the answer. I want to treat it fairly, and I hope it
is published.
Certainly your organization is not very proud of the career, for the past two
months, of* Senator Joseph McCarthy. Americans like sportsmanship; bravery;
honesty.
I enclose a copy of a statement that was printed about his attack on me.
Sincerely yours,
Harlow Shapley.
1872 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
In Response to a Headline Attack by Clerk Dorgan and State Assemblyman
M< Carthy of Boston, Requesting Harvard University To Discharge the
Undersigned as One Unfit To Hold a Post in Harvard University
(The account published in the Harvard Crimson on March 22 was followed on
March 23 with the following reply)
The attack on me by Mr. Dorgan and the two McCarthy's 1 is both tiresome and
rather comic. Tiresome, because they parade the old allegations fabricated
by J. Parnell Thomas 2 and his agents, which are as untrue and misleading today
as they were a year ago. I have no desire to argue with Dorgan and the Mc-
Carthy's in the interest of their headlines. Comic, because all this noise is
made about one who has never met an American Communist and knows only
three or four Americans who have been at times defenders of all things Russian.
(I know "scientifically" half a dozen European scientists who are said to be
Communists. )
In spite of this hysterical nonsense, however, I shall not retreat from my will-
ingness to work for humanitarian causes, and in the interest of preventing war
and of maintaining civil rights and freedoms in America.
The first wild and roaring charges against me by Republican Senator Mc-
Carthy, a month ago, contained six misstatements in four sentences — perhaps
the indoor record for mendacity. The only thing right was my name. He mod-
erated the charges in the course of a few days to almost nothing, thus admitting
his complete irresponsibility. It seems to me that his methods are a decided
menace to the Republican Party, a dishonor to the United States Senate, and a
positive danger to America at this critical time.
Harlow Shapley.
Flying Samovars
To the Editor of the Bulletin :
It is simply a matter of survival. Shall we gamble away our western culture
that generations of artists, scientists, and industrialists have helped to build?
Shall we rely on peace through threat and force, the temporary peace of the
bully, or shall we seek peace and survival through peaceful means? We hear
of the greatest of all peacetime armies in Russia. We find our own country,
already the mightiest Nation in the history of the world, officially boasting its
atomic bombs, showing off its all-powerful Navy, strutting with its world-girdling
air forces, striving to grow mightier and more deadly. Is it any wonder that
some of us who have watched history, who have invested a bit in current civil-
ization, who are willing to recognize hysteria as hysteria — is it surprising that
we are willing to look for alternatives to the force method, that has such a sad
record of futility?
As one involved in international scientific work and responsibilities, along
with many others I feel some obligation to concern myself with the social crisis.
If conferences on ways of attaining international good will should be a part of
our contribution, we shall not hesitate to plan meetings for the study of peace,
notwithstanding Mr. Ober's 3 nervous displeasure or continued attacks by the
defamatory section of the Press.
No matter how loudly Mr. Hearst and his kind shout that the New York con-
ference was Communist planned or Communist operated, the statement is com-
pletely false. More than anyone else, I personally planned the conference (be-
ginning two years ago) and presided at all the major meetings. By no feat of
distortion can I be made out as communist, or fascist, or reactionary Republican.
I am :i member of no political party. No one could be more opposed than I to
totalitarianism, whether it emanates from dictator, political bureau, or those
who advocate minority-suppression legislation.
The peace conference fell on unfortunate times. We did not foresee a year ago
that the Government would in March be selling the Atlantic Pact to a worried
Europe and that a terrifically expensive armament program must be glamorized
and justified. How to do it? Frighten the public. Scare the togas off the
Congressmen. Smear all antimilitarists. In transparent ways, sometimes,
1 The other is Senator .Toseph McCarthy, of Wisconsin.
2 New Jersey Congressman, now in a federal prison in Connecticut.
3 Mr. Ober, attorney of Baltimore, has asked Harvard to do something about Professors
Ciardi and Shapley. The University vigorously declines to do so.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1873
buflt-up fears are employed. A Cabinet member publicly rumors a submarine
off the coast — and Congress conies through with the big appropriations. Then
no more of the submarine scare. Soon now more billions must be voted. What
will be the panic technique this time — flying samovars?
Frankly. I am sorry thai \\e had to witness the Government's deliberate stack-
ing of the Conference with guests only from eastern Europe and the pulling down
of an American iron curtain against western Europeans, thus thwarting a major
goal of UNESCO, and setting the stage for red-baiting. I am sorry the Na-
tional Manufacturers Association could not carry out its truly intelligent plan
of showing America to the visiting communists. I am sorry that we must re-
peatedly point out what should be obvious — that all of our work in science and
the arts — of the past, of the present and the future — will mean nothing at all if
the trend toward war is not stopped or diverted.
In the oponing address at the New York Conference for World Peace. I em-
phasized the fact that both Russia and America are so obsessed with each
other's shortcomings that they overlook, or choose to ignore, their own short-
comings. I pointed out that racial discrimination in America is perhaps our
most embarrassing social fault. The totalitarian curb on individual freedoms is,
in the opinion of America, the primal curse of the Russian system. One country
is said to export communistic social doctrines, the other economic imperialism.
But why not both practice tolerance, seek adjustments, and turn our fighting
instincts and our human wealth to war on the real enemies of all mankind —
to war on poverty, disease, ignorance, and baseless suspicion.
The conference in New York, bravely sponsored by more than 500 leading
American citizens, was impressive to those who took part. Serious, sincere,
critical but friendly, all the meetings, from the initial dinner to the conclusion
in Madison Square Garden, were oversubscribed, and hundreds sought to par-
ticipate that could not be admitted. Much of the American public, however,
obtained from press and radio the impression that something evil and dangerous
was happening.
After the first World War, the minority persecution died down when the
disgraceful furor, that had been whipped up largely by the Attorney General of
that time, had become tiresome. Perhaps we have now reached the crest of
this unthinking hysteria.
If more tolerant times come again and international disaster is averted, not-
withstanding the militarism of Russia and the United States, then the various
American conference for world peace may be remembered as events that turned
us toward thoughts of saving ourselves, instead of risking the destruction of
civilization, through attempting to solve world problems with bombs and poison.
June 1949.
Harlow Shapley.
Williams College,
Department of Political Science,
WUliamstoicn, Mans., May 9, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : Thank you for your letter of May 4, which did not reach
me until yesterday afternoon. May 8, due no doubt to current delays in postal
deliveries. I appreciate your consideration, and that of the subcommittee, in
offering me an opportunity to reply in public to the charges made against me by
Senator Joseph McCarthy, or to submit a statement to the subcommittee. For
persona] reasons arising out of family problems and my teaching duties, I prefer
to do the latter, as follows :
Senator McCarthy's allegation that I am. or have ever been, a Communist or
Communist sympathizer is a falsehood. On March 14, 1950, upon reading of
his accusation in the dailv press. I released the following statement to AP, UP,
NBC, and the Now York Times:
Senator McCarthy is mistaken in supposing that I have ever held any
post in the Department of State or the Foreign Service. He is perhaps con-
1874 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
fusing this with my lectures at the National War College, to which I was
invited by Maj. Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, Lt. Gen. H. R. Bull, and Vice Adm.
H. W. Hill. I am as opposed to communism as is Senator McCarthy, but I
do not believe we shall ever be in agreement as to the definition of "Commu-
nist-front organizations."
Senator McCarthy's references to various alleged "Communist-front organiza-
tions" to which he alleges that I belong, or once belonged, is a garbled and inac-
curate rehash of accusations made against me by Martin Dies and by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities early in 1943 when I was employed by the
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. These accusations were investigated at length by the Kerr committee, a
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Senator Clinton P.
Anderson, of New Mexico, former Secretary of Agriculture, and in 1943 a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives, was a member of the Kerr committee. In
referring recently to the McCarthy charges, he spoke favorably of my testimony
(see the Congressional Record, March 27, 1950, p. 4162) and was quoted in the
press of March 28, 1950, as saying :
If you were to sit down with Schuman for five or six hours, Joe (McCar-
thy), and talk to him, you would be convinced of his loyalty and intelligence.
I think he's a fine American.
The stenographic transcript of the hearings before the Kerr committee was
not published (except for those portions relating to three other individuals) but
is, I presume, available in the files of the House Appropriations Committee,
Seventy-eighth Congress, second session. In its first printed report of April 21,
1943, the Kerr committee asserted that in my case it had found no evidence of
disloyalty or unfitness to hold Federal office.
My own evaluation of the motives and morals of Senator McCarthy need not
here be set forth, since it is identical with the judgments already publicly
expressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Mr. John Peurifoy, Dr. Philip
Jessup, Judge Dorothy Kenyon, and Professor Owen Lattimore. I have no infor-
mation which is relevant to the current inquiry into alleged disloyalty in the
Department of State and the Foreign Service.
With gratitude for your fairness and courtesy (and that of the committee)
which seem to me to be in the best American tradition, I am, Sir,
Very truly yours,
Frederick L. Schuman,
Woodrotv Wilson Professor of Government , Williams College.
New York, N. Y., May -15, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Chief Counsel,
Subcommittee Of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Investigating the State Department.
My Dear Mr. Morgan : Last Monday I received your letter dated May 4 but I
have been and still am unable to reply thereto because of the absence from his
office of my attorney, Mr. Clifford J. Durr, with whom I wish to consult by mail.
I wish now only to assure you that I appreciate the opportunity offered me
by the subcommittee to reply to the charges made against me by Senator Mc-
Carthy, and that I shall communicate with you later after I have been able to
get in touch with Mr. Durr.
Very truly yours,
Mary Jane Keeney.
The subcommittee has never received any additional information
from Mrs. Mary Jane Keeney.
The following letters were received by the Foreign Relations Sub-
committee from Mr. Louis F. Budenz.
Crestwood, Tuckaiioe, N. Y., May 8, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Counsel, Senate Subcommittee Investigating State Department,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
U. S. Capitol, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : In connection with your investigation of the Amerasia case,
it may be of value to your committee to know that according to my direct knowl-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1875
edge. Robert William Weiner, alias for Welwel Warzover, was involved at least in
supervising the financial arrangements for the defense in that case.
When 1 state that this arises from my direct knowledge, I mean to indicate
that I heard statements to that effect from Mr. Weiner and others on the Ninth
Floor of the Communist Party headquarters during the discussions of the
Amerasia case.
Mr. Weiner. as you may know, is an illegal alien, who has been for years in
charge of the conspiratorial funds of the Communist Party.
Very truly yours,
Louis Francis Budenz.
Crestwood, Tuckahoe, N. Y., May 5,1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Capitol,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : The involvement of Robert William Weiner, whose real
name is Welwel Warzover, in the "arrangement" of the Amerasia case, as it
came to my official attention when editor of the Daily Worker, was as follows :
As I testified in the open hearing connected with the charges against Owen J.
Lattimore, there was a number of hurried but official conferences of subcommit-
tees of the Politburo on the Amerasia affair during a number of weeks after the
arrests occurred. I was called into several of these conferences, in order that
I would be informed as editor of the Daily Worker as to the trend of these official
discussions and decisions.
Later on, if the committee so desires, I shall be willing and ready to testify
to each one of these conferences in which I participated. In one of them, specifi-
cally, Robert William Weiner was in the process of reporting on the financial
aspects of the case and its "arrangement" when I entered the conference, which
was held in Jack Stachel's room on the Ninth Floor of Communist Party head-
quarters. I had been called there by Stachel.
Weiner then said that he had and was assuming direction of the financial
arrangements for the defense in this case and also the "specific financial arrange-
ments for the settlement of the case satisfactorily."
It was the latter statement which struck me then and remained in my memory.
Every financial transaction of any size had to be supervised by Weiner, if con-
nected with the Communist Party activities. In that connection, I had known
that he had paid certain ex-Communists — and one specifically — to refrain from
giving information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Dies
committee.
The other reports on the "settlement" of the case at this session expressed satis-
faction that arrangements were being made through "Kate Mitchell's Uncle" and
other sources, to assure a "settlement" such as the Communist Party desired.
One active participant in these discussions was the late Joseph Brodsky, counsel
for the Communist Party.
You will recall that I found it impossible to give this and other testimony on
the conferences officially held by the Communist leaders on the Amerasia case
because the executive session was finally subject to interruption. I was unable,
on that account, to go into the matter of the reports on the activities of some of
the participants in the affair which may be of importance, and to which I alluded
in my open testimony.
For the same reason, I did not get time to introduce three exhibits which I had
with me at the time of the executive session. These are being sent under separate
cover by registered mail. They have to do with Communist praise or commenda-
tion of Owen J. Lattimore's writings and opinions.
The latest of these is taken from the Daily Worker of February 15, 1950. In
a review by David Carpenter, whose underground activities have already received
some attention, you will note the emphasis that is put on Mr. Lattimore's intro-
ductions to the two books reviewed. Those introductions are indeed viewed as
more important than the books themselves. For several reasons pleasing to
the Communists, yon will note, Mr. Lattimore's observation on the Russian con-
quest of Outer Mongolia is given special consideration.
Another article is taken from Political Affairs, the official theoretical organ
of the Communist Party, for November 1946. It is written by Frederick Vander-
bilt Field, and you will .note on page 995 that he commends Mr. Lattimore as
1876 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"the well-known liberal writer" and also agrees with Mr. Lattimore's view that
the United States had been "a hitch-hiking imperialist" in the Far East.
The third selection is taken from the July 1945, issue of Soviet Russia Today,
written by Harriet Moore of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Amerasia.
You will note the emphasis put on Mr. Lattimore's tribute to the "democracy" of
Soviet Russia. You will also note the warm commendation given his book, Solu-
tion in Asia, by Trud, the Soviet publication. This is significant since the alleged
supplement to that publication, known as New Times, is actually the Communist
Internation magazine in disguise. It is designed to give directives to Communists
throughout the world.
As stated in my wire to you, I shall be able within two weeks from today to
submit to the Committee additional data of this character.
Very truly yours,
Louis Francis Budenz.
The additional material, referred to by Mr. Budenz in his letter of
May 5, 1950, has never been received by the subcommittee.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Washington, June 22, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : Reference is made to your letter dated June 15, 1950, in which
you request to be advised whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation has inter-
viewed Father James F. Kearney and, in the event the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation has conducted such an interview, whether any information has been re-
ceived concerning the sources of Father Kearney's information.
Father Kearney was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on
January 20, 1950, and he advised that he had no direct knowledge of Lattimore's
activities and that the principal source of his information had been Alfred Kohl-
berg of the American-China Policy Association in New York City, who, according
to Father Kearney, had charged that Lattimore screened applicants for positions
in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.
If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesistate
to communicate with me.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
Deputy Attorney General.
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C, May 26, 1950.
Edward P. Morgan, Esq.,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United. States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : This will acknowledge your letter of May 17. 1950, to Mr.
Ford transmitting copies of the transcript of testimony of Louis F. Budenz given
at the public session of your subcommittee on April 20, 1950, and in executive
session on April 25, 1950.
The testimony of Mr. Budenz before your subcommittee has been compared in
the Criminal Division with the reports furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation of interviews with Mr. Budenz concerning Dr. Owen Lattimore. It appears
that the information which Mr. Budenz has furnished to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is substantially similar to the testimony which he gave before your
subcommittee.
Your cooperation in making the transcript of Mr. Budenz' testimony available
is appreciated.
Respectfully,
James M. McInerney,
Assistant Attorney General
(For the Attorney General).
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1877
Department of State,
Washington, July 8, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate.
My Deak Senator Tydings : This refers to a telephone conversation between
Mr. Morgan and Mr. Fisher in regard to the case of Mr. Haldore Hanson. Ac-
cording to a statement made by Senator McCarthy on June 2, 1950, Mr. Budenz
its alleged to have given some testimony to your committee in executive session
which, in the opinion of Senator McCarthy, "is to the effect that this man Hanson
was an important part of the Communist organization in the United States"
(Congressional Record, p. 8113).
For your information. Mr. Hanson was first thoroughly investigated and
cleared by the Department, and then received a full field investigation by the
FBI under the Loyalty Order. Mr. Hanson was cleared by the Loyalty Security
Board of the Department on July 26, 1948, and his case has been post-audited.
However, it will be appropriate for the Board to review the case in the light of
the recent public hearing and concomitant developments. Therefore, in view of
the fact that no such information as referred to by Senator McCarthy was
available to the members of the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of
State when it previously considered the case of Mr. Hanson, it is highly de-
sirable that the relevant testimony on the part of Mr. Budenz be made available
to the Department of State so that it can be determined whether Senator
McCarthy's statement had any basis in fact. If it is possible to do this, please
inform me so that I can indicate the name of the person qualified to inspect
this transcript. Upon receipt of this information the authorities of the Depart-
ment concerned will take whatever action appears to them to be appropriate.
Sincerely yours,
Carlisle H. Humelsine,
Acting Deputy Under Secretary.
New York, N. Y., April 15, 1950.
Senator Millard Tydings,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : I have been requested by the persons whose sig-
natures appear on the enclosed statement to forward this letter to you with the
request that it be made part of the record of your hearings on the case of Mr.
Owen Lattimore.
The persons named wish to make it clear to your committee that they have
signed the statement in their personal capacities only and not on behalf of the
institutions with which they are connected.
In addition to the original signatures, I am enclosing a typed list of the
names arranged in alphabetical order. A copy of this list is also being sent to
Mr. Lattimore and his legal representatives.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Senator Millard Tydings
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : We the undersigned individuals are each profession-
ally concerned with teaching scholarly research connected with Asiatic studies
in the United States, and Owen Lattimore is known to us as a professional col-
league in this field. Among us as indhiduals there is a diversity of personal
opinion concerning American foreign policy, and as individual American special-
ists we also differ among ourselves in the degree to which we agree with Mr.
Lattiniore's personal views, but we are each fully convinced of his personal
integrity as a scholar and his loyalty as an American citizen, and we deplore
and condemn the irresponsible presentation to your committee of unsubstantiated
charges against him. Both in our own professional work and in the development
of a healthy public opinion on American foreign policy, we deeply believe in
the vitality and strength of our democratic tradition of freedom of expression
and diversity of opinion. We urge that your committee publicly affirm its belief
1878 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in these principles, strive to reach a definite view as to Mr. Lattimore's loyalty
as an American citizen and make this view widely known to the public.
Name (arranged alphabetically), position, and university:
Virginia Thompson Adloff, Research, Institute of Pacific Relations, N. Y.
Knight Biggerstaff", Professor of Chinese History, Cornell University
Woolbridge Bingham, Associate Professor of Far Eastern History, Uni-
versity of California
Eugene P. Boardman, Assistant Professor of History, University of Wis-
consin
Dorothy Borg, Research, New York City
Hugh Borton, Associate Professor of Japanese, Columbia University
Percy Buchanan, Director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of
Oklahoma
John F. Cady, Associate Professor of History. Ohio LTniversity
Schuyler Cammann. Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania
James J. Corry, Jr., Lecturer in Chinese, University of Michigan
John Hadley Cox, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan
Robert I. Crane, Instructor, University of Chicago
George B. Cressey, Professor of Geography, Syracuse University
John K. Fairbank, Professor of History, Harvard University
Miriam S. Farley, Research Associate, American Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions
Charles S. Gardiner, Research in Chinese History, Cambridge, Mass.
Gussie E. Gaskill, Librarian, Cornell University
Meredith P. Gilpatrick, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University
J. W. Hall, Instructor, University of Michigan
Ellen Hammer, Institute of International Studies, Yale University
G. W. Harrison, Assistant Professor, University of Florida
James R. Hightower, Assistant Professor of Chinese Language and Litera-
ture, Harvard University
W. L. Holland. Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
Elizabeth Huff, Head, East Asiatic Library, University of California,
Berkeley
George A. Kennedy, Associate Professor of Chinese Langauge, Yale Uni-
versity
Gerard P. Koh, Associate Professor of Chinese Language, Yale University
Lawrence Krader, University of Washington
Marion J. Levy Jr., Assistant Professor of Sociology, Princeton University
Lucius C. Porter, Ex-professor, Yenching University, China, now at Beloit,
Wis.
Earl H. Prichard, Associate Professor of Far Eastern History, University
of Chicago
Harold S. Quigley. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota
C. F. Remer, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan
Millard B. Rogers, Assistant Professor of Chinese Art History, Stanford.
University
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Research Associate, American Institute of Pacific
Relations
Laurence Sickman, Vice-Director, Nelson Gallery, Kansas City, Mo.
Stanley Spector, Far Eastern Institute, TTniversity of Washington
Rodger Swearingen, Lecturer, University of Southern California
Earl Swisher, History Department, University of Colorado
Philip H. Taylor, Professor of International Relations, Syracuse University
S. B. Thomas, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City
Daniel Thorner, Assistant Professor of Economic History, South Asia Re-
gional Studies Program, University of Pennsylvania
Mischa Titiev, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Michigan
Royal J. Wald, Research Fellow, California
Harold J. Wiens. Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University
C. Martin Wilbur, Associate Professor of Chinese History, Columbia Uni-
versity
Arthur Wright, Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University
Joseph K. Yamagiwa, Associate Professor of Japanese, University of
Michigan
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1879
Arnold, Fortas & Porter,
Washington, D. 0„ May 11, 1950.
Edward P. Morgan, Esquire,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan: You will recall that during the testimony of Dr. Owen
Lattimore a request was made that we submit to the Committee copies of his
correspondence to the Soviet Ambassador and the Chief of State of the Mongolian
People's Republic when, in 1947, Dr. Lattimore was undertaking to obtain entry
into that country to pursue his studies and research. Copies of that corre-
spondence are enclosed, for the Committee's files.
It is also requested that Dr. Lattimore supply to the Committee such corre-
spondence as he engaged in in the matter of Dr. Walther Heissig. In response
thereto, we are submitting on Dr. Lattimore's behalf the following:
Letter from Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore from Peiping of February 7, 1946.
Dr. Lattimore's response to Dr. Heissig of March 11, 1946.
Letter from Arthur F. Wright and Mary C. Wright of June 6, 1946.
Letter from William Hume, of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, to Dr. Latti-
more of June 19, 1946.
Letter from Dr. F. D. Lessing, of the University of California, to Dr. Latti-
more of June 19, 1946.
Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. John Kullgren of June 21, 1946.
Letter of Dr. Lattiinore to John Carter Vincent of June 21, 1946.
Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Ambassador Stuart of January 23, 1947, with
enclosure.
Letter of Ambassador Stuart to Dr. Lattimore of February 7, 1947.
Letter to Dr. Lattimore from Floyd E. Masten of December 27, 1946.
Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. Masten of January 23, 1947.
Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of June 9, 1948.
Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Dr. Heissig of July 12, 1948.
Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of March 14, 1949.
Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. Frank Reel of April 14, 1949.
Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of May 18, 1949.
As to this category of communications relating to Dr. Heissig, it would be
appreciated if the committee would return them after they have served their
purpose in order that they may be returned to Dr. Lattimore for his files.
Sincerely yours,.
Paul A. Porter.
Enclosures.
February 11, 1947.
His Excellency Ambassador N. V. Novikov,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, B. C.
Dear Mr. Ambassador: In view of the fact that there is no exchange of
diplomatic representatives between the United States and the Mongolian People's
Republic, I am taking the liberty of asking for your assistance in the following
matter.
This summer, from June to September, I should like to travel and study in the
Mongolian People's Republic, accompanied by my wife and my sixteen-year-old
son. I have accordingly written to Marshal Choibalsang, asking if his Govern-
ment will grant me the necessary permission. I enclose the original letter in
English, together with my own rough translation into Mongol. I should be deeply
grateful if your Embassy will do me the courtesy of transmitting these letters to
the .Mongol Ambassador in Moscow, so that they may be forwarded to Ulan Bator
Khota.
The time is now somewhat short for arranging a visit to the Mongolian
People's Republic for June-September of this year. As in any case I wish to
continue my studies this summer, it would be well to have alternative plans in
case I cannot go to Mongolia this summer. I therefore venture to add some
further details and an alternative plan of Havel and study for your consideration.
If I should not receive permission to visit the Mongolian People's Republic this
summer, I wish to request from your Embassy a visa to travel, t< gether with my
wife and son. either to the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR or the Kazakh SSR. In
making the journey. I suggest travelling by ship to Vladivostok, and from there
by railway, or by air if it should Ik- possible, in order to shorten the travelling
time.
1880 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
My reasons for my first plan of visiting the Mongolian People's Republic, and
for my alternative plan of visiting the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR or the Kazakh
SSR are as follows :
For twenty years I have been a student both of the history and of the con-
temporary problems of the Far East. My wife and I have travelled extensively in
Manchuria, in Inner Mongolia, and in Sinkiang, in addition to living for many
years in China. I am especially interested in the minority peoples both of China
and of the Soviet Union.
I believe that one the one hand the Mongolian People's Republic, as an inde-
pendent state which is politically and economically of an intermediate charac-
ter, may have an important part to play in stabilizing .normal, peaceful, and
mutually profitable relations between neighboring Far Eastern states, although
the governments of these states differ widely from each other. On the other
hand, I believe that the national minority policies of the Soviet Union may
contain many valuable lessons which could be applied, mutatis mutandis, in
solving the national minority problems of China and also in working out
solutions for similar problems in a number of colonial countries in Asia.
Unfortunately the necessary material, for the use of historians and social
scientists, is little known and not sufficiently studied in this country. I should
therefore like to contribute to the study and discussion of all these problems on
the basis of personal travel and observation.
I believe that my published writings, over a period of twenty years, will show
that my methods are scientific and objective ; that is, that I study both the
historical data of the processes of change, and the contemporary evidence of
things as they actually exist, before expressing personal opinions. Under sepa-
rate cover I am sending you a copy of Solution in Asia, my most recent book
(which is written in popular rather than in academically scholarly style) in
which I have marked passages referring to the Mongolian People's Republic and
to the national minority policies of the Soviet Union.
I have twice visited the Soviet Union. Once was in 1945, when I accomppanied
Vice President Wallace. The other time was in 1936, when I travelled via Siberia
from China to Europe. At that time I was editor of Pacific Affairs, published by
the Institute of Pacific Relations. I spent about ten days in Moscow and Lenin-
grad, and had a number of meetings with Soviet specialists on the Far East and
Central Asia, arranged for me by Dr. V. E. Motylev, who was at that time the
representative of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and
also Director of the Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas.
Both my wife and I speak Chinese fluently. In addition, I speak and read
the Mongol language fairly well, though I am not an advanced scholar in that
language. I read Russian fluently, and with a little practice should be able to
speak satisfactorily. My son has already begun the study of Russian, and would
assist me both as photographer and as secretary.
Thanking you in advance for your courtesy in helping me to send my letter to
Marshal Choibalsang.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
February 11, 1947.
His Excellency Marshal Choibalsang,
Ulan Bator Khota, Mongolian People's Republic.
Dear Marshal Choibalsang : In July 1945 when I was accompanying Vice
President Wallace, I had the honor of meeting you in Ulan Bator Khota.
For twenty years I have been studying the history and problems of China.
Mongolia, and Central Asia. I have travelled a great deal in Manchuria, Inner
Mongolia, and Sinkiang. but have not been in the Mongolian People's Republic
except for the two days that I was there in 1945 with Vice President Wallace.
In view of the fact that the Mongolian People's Republic is an important
country in Eastern Asia, and in view of the fact that people in America know
very little about the Mongolian People's Republic, I should like to spend several
months in the Mongolian People's Republic studying its history, political and
economic organization, education, and cultural life.
If your Government will grant me permission I should like to spend the
months from June to September in the Mongolian People's Republic accompa-
nied by my wife and sixteen-year-old son.
In view of the lack of exchange of diplomatic representatives between our
two countries I am sending this letter to you through the courtesy of the Soviet
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1881
Ambassador in Washington, to be delivered to tbe Mongol Ambassador in Mos-
cow.
Hoping to receive your permission to visit your country and to have the pleas-
ure of meeting you again.
Yours very sincerely.
Owen Lattimore.
Fu-jen University,
Peiping, 1th February 19.'i6.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University, North Charles Street,
Baltimore, Maryland, U. S. A.
Dear Sir: I hope you have already returned safely to the United States.
On the very day after our pleasant conversation — for which I wish to thank
you once more — I plunged into the business of purchasing books and have al-
ready been able to accumulate a small number. At the moment, however, the
book market, offers a rather meager assortment, because booksellers are holding
back until the Chinese New Year festivals are over.
On the 22nd of January I mailed you the first two parcels of books through
the kindness of a friend. Their contents you will find on the attached book list.
Meantime I have got together, partly through purchases and partly from dupli-
cates in my possession, a complete series of publications appearing in Kailu
(given out under the direction of Bokekesik). These I shall dispatch within
the next few days. I was also able to lay hands on an extremely rare Kdke
sudur edition of thirteen volumes, with 1985 pages. Since these Kailu publica-
tions, collectively and individually, were printed in very small editions, they
are very scarce and their prices accordingly high. At the next mailing oppor-
tunity I shall also send you a set of the Mongolian monthly periodical, Koketuy
(Blue Banner), which was published in Manchuria, as well as a few political
propaganda magazines from Inner Mongolia.
The purchase and supply of Mongolian prints from Inner Mongolia is com-
plicated and very slow, since this region is still occupied by the Communists
and it will be some weeks before direct contact can be made. However, even
then it will be difficult to procure successive series of all Mongolian publica-
tions, since the Kalgan Press has been dissolved and many books burned.
I have also obtained a big number of new Japanese publications for you and
have already included a few small ones in the first two parcels.
I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me some money as soon as pos-
sible, since I am now hardly able to cope with the continually increasing book
prices with my own small capital. I have made inquiries here and have been
given to understand that you can send me any amount of U. S. currency by
means of traveller cheques. Please do not send any money through the bank,
because then I shall only receive for one American dollar C. N. C. $500- instead
of the official Peking exchange rate of approximately 1300.-.
It would also be of great advantage if you were to confirm, by letter, the fact
that you have commissioned me to purchase books for the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity on this and that scientific field in the Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese
languages. Such a confirmation would not only minimize difficulties when pur-
chasing bigger amounts of books from Japanese, but would also facilitate mailing
then* and would, likewise, have a certain helpful significance for me.
Many years ago you began the printing of bibliographies in Pacific Affairs with
the "Personal Chronicle of the First Manchu Emperor" by Fnchs. May I now
rcontribute thereto with a "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese
Occupied Areas from 1039-1945," which is on the verge of completion and will
be sent you in the near future. It not only contains dry titles, but also brief,
historical introductions to every section.
Of those books already sent you, I would like to recommend to your special
attention the last chapter in Mongyol un uysayatan kiged teiike sudur about the
autonomic development of Inner and Outer Mongolia, because therein the Japa-
nese viewpoints are clearly recognizable. Also of interest is the Japanese propa-
ganda magazine, "Tallin on-u qoyinaki mong7ol ayimagtan" (The Mongol Tribes
after Fifty Years), wherein valuable material for a history on Japanese politics
in Mongolia and their plans is contained.
Once again my very best thanks for the interesting conversation in the Hotel
de Wagon Lits. Please acknowledge receipt of the first two parcels of books.
In. the hope of hearing from you shortly, I remain, dear Sir,
Yours respectfully,
W. Heissig.
1882 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
Contents of first two parcels :
1 Ex. Tiisiinei-un jasay-un c-iqula-yi quriyaysan bicig. (Administration),
36 pg.
1 Ex. Yeke jegiin aziya-yin bayiduyan. (Propaganda), 67 pg.
1 Ex. Ayimay qubiyaysan jakidal-un bicig. (Administration), 162 pg.
1 Ex. Lii oboytan-u jokiyaysan baya keiiked-lin iigiilel-lin bicig, (Educa-
tion), 118 pg.
1 Ex. Giing-iin juu-yin gegen-u suryal, (Lamaistic), 33 pg.
1 Ex. yurban bodylya kemekii bicig (32 pg.), (Education).
1 Ex. Tabin on-u qoyinaki mongyol ayimaytan, (Pol. Propaganda), 250 pg.
1 Ex. Sine jil-un qous uyangya (Eolklore), 36 pg.
1 Ex. Eng-iin medel-iin jayun setub (Pol. Propaganda), 95 p.
1 Ex. Boyda-yin suryal-i sengggregiilkii bicig, (History), 162 pg.
1 Ex. Oyirod-un galdan bosuytu qayan-u teiike, (History), 16 pg.
1 Ex. Mongyol iisiig-un yosun i todorqayilan altan toli (Grammar), 18 pg.
1 Ex. Mongyol-un ysayatan kiged teiike sudur (Modern History), 259 pg.
1 Ex. (in Chinese), (Lit. History), 161 pg.
1 Ex. (in Chinese), (Chrestomatre), 82 p.
1 Ex. (in Chinese), (History), 206 pg.
Total : 16 Vol.— US $11.50.
March 11, 1946.
Dr. Walthek Heissig,
Fu-jen University, Peiping, China.
Dear Dr. Heissig: Your letter of 7 February and the first shipment of Mongol
books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgement to Lt.
Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he
would still be in China or might already have returned to this country. I am
now writing to tell you how much I appreciate your energy and promptness
in sending me such interesting material immediately. I am arranging to send
you U. S. $200 through Col. William Mayer, who is an officer on the Headquarters
Staff of General Wedemeyer in Shanghai * * * I am not quite sure when
this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many
delays, owing to shortage of crews to fly the planes, and therefore am sure
that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shang-
hai. I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see
whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from
China. * * *
In addition to the initial sum of $200 which I am sending I shall of course
be prepared to send further funds for book purchases as soon as you let me
know the amount you need. The first shipment is excellent in character and
shows that you fully understood the range of my interests. I am just as much
interested in material of a propaganda character as I am in historical and
literary material, since one of my purposes is to attempt to reconstruct as far
as possible the Japanese propaganda and political approach toward the Mongols.
I am also interested in any statistical and factual material on population, eco-
nomics, trade, etc.
I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my
agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.
With regard to bibliographical articles in Pacific Affairs I shall be glad to
recommend your "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occu-
pied Areas 1939-1945" to the present editor of Pacific Affairs. I myself have
had no connection with Pacific Affairs since 1941, but of course I am still closely
in touch with the Institute of Pacific Relations and I think I can assure you
that the present editor will be interested in your material.
Please give my respects to Dr. Fuchs.
Thank you again most cordially for your promptness and energy.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1883
March 11, 1940.
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that Dr. Walther Heissig is fully empowered to act as my
agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books
and manuscripts.
Owen Lattimore,
Director, Walter Hines Page School of International
Relations, The Johns Hopkins University.
12 Fang Chia Hutung,
An ttng men nei,
Peiping, June 6, 1946.
Dear Professor Lattimore : May we ask for your assistance in an urgent
matter which concerns all scholars of the Far East. Dr. Walter Fuchs and
Dr. Walther Heissig have been ordered deported to Germany and will be in-
terned on June 10, prior to their departure. Local foreign and Chinese scholars
are doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed.
But after careful investigation we have found that the final decision will in
some curious way rest with our State Department.
Both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig have been appointed to professorships at
Yenching University : Dr. Fuchs, Professor of Manchu and Dr. Heissig, Professor
of Mongol. President Leighton Stuart has personally appealed to the Chinese
authorities to retain both men here.
We have been authoritatively informed that the future careers of these men
and their continued usefulness for Far Eastern studies depend upon the opinion
which American scholars express to the State Department. We have cabled
Dr. William Hung, who is at present at Harvard, and we hope he has already
communicated with you. Dr. Hung is fully acquainted with the local situation,
and before leaving China in the spring did all he could to help these men. Dr.
Stuart's support of them should be ample proof that they in every way deserve
the support of American scholars.
We hope that you will intercede immediately with the State Department
to forestall this deportation which would deprive us of two outstanding experts.
Their inclusion in the deportation list can be based only on oversight or faulty
information. It is up to us, their American colleagues, to correct that mistake
before it is too late. We have good reason to believe that the State Department
will attach great weight to your opinion in this matter, owing to the Depart-
ment's increased interest in the development of Far Eastern studies.
We are writing on this matter to Professors Goodrich, Lessing, Hummel
and Gardner. If you know of other scholars willing to appeal to the State
Department in this matter, we should be very grateful to you for sending this
information to them.
Yours truly,
Arthur F. Wright.
Mary Clabaugh Weight.
Harvard — Yenching Institute,
Cambridge, Mass., June 19, 1946.
Professor Owen Lattimore,
Walter Hinds Page School. Baltimore, Md.
Dear Professor Lattimore: I arrived in Cambridge about two weeks ago
and shortly after my arrival I received a cablegram from Mr. Arthur F. Wright
in Peiping. It was stated that Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walter Heissig were
in danger of immediate deportation from Peiping to Germany. It was suggested
that American scholars interested in Far Eastern studies be mobilized to inter-
cede with the American Department of State on the behalf of these two scholars.
Dr. C. S. Gardner, to whom I have shown the cablegram, expresses his kind
interest in the matter and has already written to the Secretary of State and
will probably communicate with you as well as other American scholars inter-
ested in Chinese studies.
I have now received a letter from Mr. Wright dated June sixth, in which he
gives more detail about the matter. It seems that Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig
68970 — 50— pt. 2 26
1884 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
were to be interned on June tenth, to be shipped to Tangu and then to Shanghai,
until they were to leave China. Chinese and foreign scholars in Peiping have
been doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least de-
layed, "But after investigation," says Mr. Wright, "We have found that the
final decision will in some curious way rest with our State Department."
When I was in Peiping I had already heard rumors about the possible intern-
ment of Drs. Fuchs and Heissig. I tried to get some of the Chinese authorities
interested in these two scholars and I thought they would be safe from then on.
The new turn of events is indeed a surprise to me.
I may state that to the best of my knowledge these two scholars had more
or less nominal connections with the Nazi Party, but their interests and activities
■during the period they have been in China were confined only to scholarly pur-
suits. Dr. Fuchs is a German sinologist especially gifted in Manchu literature.
Dr. Heissig is an Austrian Mongolist. He is probably not as well known as
Dr. Fuchs. His recent papers are mostly published in Monurnenta Serica.
According to Mr. Wright's letter, Dr. Heissig's long book on the Genkhis Khan
Epic appeared on the fourth of June. Of course, I have not seen the book.
Mr. Wright is a Fellow of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. He and his wife
were both interned by the Japanese in Weihsien. They were not released
until after the Japanese had surrendered.
Dr. Gardner is of the opinion that it would be perhaps better not to have
an organized petition to the State Department. It would be better for each
scholar interested in the question to write individually to the State Department.
I am inclined to agree with Dr. Gardner, and it is my hope that you may do
something to help.
With kindest regards.
Very sincerely yours,
William Hung.
University of California,
Department of Oriental Languages,
Berkeley, Calif., June 19, 19^6-
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Dear Mr. Lattimore : I enclose a letter I wrote to Mr. Vincent which I hope is
self-explanatory. I wonder whether you would join the group of American
scholars who are trying to stave off the worst from these two men. I learned
today that the repatriation has been postponed for some time so it would not be
too late to take action on their behalf.
I understand that you have inquired after Dr. Heissig. All I know about him
is contained in the enclosed letter. If you wish to have a list of his publications
I can supply it. Today I received a volume of several hundred pages published
by him (it is just off the press), entitled "Bolus Erike." It is a Mongolian
chronicle of the 18th century. I am preparing a review of it for the JAOS.
Professor Boodberg authorizes me to state that he shares my views regarding the
scholarship of both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig.
I hope that you, Mrs. Lattimore and David are enjoying the best of health.
It would be pleasant to have some news of you.
I am scheduled to give a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute in the last
half of October and the first two weeks in November. Following the lectures I
plan to go to China on the first ship sailing after November loth. I will stay in
China until August or September of 1947 at which time I shall resume my duties
at this University. I am looking forward to the trip to China and hope that
the political situation will not interfere with my work there.
With kindest regards to you and all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,
F. D. Lessing.
(1) Author: Rasipung suy.
Ansd. : 13 July 40, Sydney, N. S.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1885
University of California,
Department of Oriental Languages,
Berkeley, Calif., June 17, 1946.
Mr. John Carter Vincent.
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Vincent : My colleague, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, has permitted me
to use his name in introducing myself to you.
I have just received a letter from Mr. and Mrs. Arthur F. Wright, dated
Peiping, June 6, to the effect that two scholars, Dr. "Walter Fuchs, a German, and
Dr. Walther Heissig, an Austrian, residents of Peiping, China, are going to be
repatriated within a few days. I am anxious to join the group of American and
English scholars who have appealed or will appeal to the State Department on
behalf of these two men.
I have known Dr. Fuchs for twenty-two years and I have not the slightest
doubt as to his scholarly and personal qualifications. I met him first in 1924
when he was an assistant in the Far Eastern Department of the Museum fur
Volkerkunde in Berlin, where he had a very fine record. Since that time I have
followed his scholarly development with growing respect. I have read his many
contributions in the field of Sino-Manchu studies and I share the admiration
of my American colleagues who have had an opportunity to use these works.
Among these persons I wish to cite Professor Knight Biggerstaff, of Cornell
University. Ithaca, New York, whose sound judgment can be relied upon.
My personal relations with Dr. Fuchs have been merely sporadic, but I have
always regretted that a closer contact was not possible. As to his political
activities I cannot make a statement based on personal observation, but I have
indirect evidence which leads me to believe that he has never harbored pro-Nazi
views. I base this opinion also on my acquaintance with his family. I have
reason to believe that his antecedents would have prevented him from siding
with the enemy.
I do not know Dr. Heissig personally, but I have received several letters and
reprints of his articles from him since December of last year. The letters furnish
me with a clear picture of his scholarly achievements and projects so far, and
the reprints give me a clear insight into his methods. I am impressed with
the soundness and erudition as demonstrated by his writings, and I am sure
that we can expect from him many important contributions in a much neglected
field. He is about thirty-five years old now. People who know him speak
very highly about his moral character and personality.
To send these people back to what was formerly Germany and Austria would
be tantamount to wrecking their scholarly careers and depriving American and
international scholarship of the results of a highly specialized but very important
work in a field in which they are generally recognized authorities. I understand
that very few, if any, collections of Oriental books and manuscripts are left in
Central Europe for the pursuance of research, and it is imperative for the con-
tinuance of their research that they have access to original sources.
I wonder whether it would not be better to secure, in some form or other,
their cooperation in the development of Oriental studies in this country, or in
an American institution in the Orient. I feel that the problems of the postwar
period especially in Orientology are so pressing and the scarcity of experienced
workers is so great that no honest, well-trained worker can be spared, and we
just cannot afford to waste the life work of anyone qualified and ready to work
with us. The very fact that judicious Dr. Leighton Stuart has singled out these
two men and appointed them professors at Yenching University should vouchsafe
for their reliability and capability.
I trust that it will be possible for you to take immediate action on behalf
of these two men.
Very sincerely yours,
Ferdinand D. Lessing,
Agassis Professor of Oriental Languages.
Musquash Lake, Maine, .21 June 19J,6.
Mr. John Kullgren
2800 Woodley Road, N. W., Washington, D. C.
Dear John : We are on our way through to Nova ScOtia, and yesterday in
Bangor we picked up a batch of mail, in which was your letter, mentioning
1886 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Torgny's MS and also Heissig and Fuchs. I was very much relieved to hear
the Obergs had got the money I sent them, and I hope I shall be able to find a
publisher for the MS, though on a thing like that you never know. I very much
appreciate your taking the trouble to bring the MS.
You must have had a fascinatingly interesting time, staying in Peiping as
much as three weeks. I was there only three days, and wasn't nearly satisfied !
About Heissig and Fuchs, I'll write to the State Department. I don't feel
that I can give a carte blanche recommendation for the clearance of men when
1 don't know yet whether the military have cleared them. However, in the
case of Heissig I had already cabled Chu Chia-hua, Minister of Education. The
Chinese certainly need scholars in Manchu and Mongol; and if Yenching is
willing to offer them .iohs, so much the better, as their work will also be available
to American scholarship.
We'll be back in Baltimore about August 1.
With regards to both you and your wife,
Very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
Musquash Lake, Maine, 21 June 19^6.
Mr. John Carter Vincent,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear John Carter : We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and in Bangor
yesterday a batch of mail caught up with us. In it were letters from John
Kullgren, who is, I believe, still a civilian employee of the War Department, and
from Arthur F. Wright, writing from 12 Fang Chia Hutung, An Ting men nei,
Peiping — both writing about the cases of Walther Fuchs and Walther Heissig,
the first a German scholar in Manchu (and in several other languages), and the
second a German scholar in Mongol.
Both men have been accused of Nazi intelligence activities in the part of
China occupied by the Japanese, where they spent the war years. Fuchs, how-
ever, has now been offered a professorship in Manchu at Yenching University,
and Heissig a professorship in Mongol. President Leighton Stuart of Yenching
has interested himself on behalf of both men.
Fuchs and Heissig are, however, both liable to deportation from China by
the Chinese Government. The question is whether American scholars should
show an interest on their behalf, and express their interest to the Department
of State.
My feeling is that political clearance of these men depends primarily on
the opinion of them formed by the Army's investigators in China. Without
knowledge of their views, I should certainly not recommend the admittance of
either man to America. On the other hand, I can see good reasons why both
men should be allowed to stay in China. The Chinese are seriously short of men
trained in the Manchu and Mongol languages. If these two men can be em-
ployed at Yenching, their work will be accessible to American scholarship also.
Since Leighton Stuart has already interested himself in their behalf, I be-
lieve that a favorable expression of interest on the part of the American
Embassy would be appropriate.
Regards to Betty. We'll be back about August 1.
Sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
January 23, VM1.
Ambassador Leighton Stuart.
American Embassy, Nanking, China.
Dear Mr. Ambassador: A friend has shown me a clipping from a Shanghai
paper, already several months old. indicating that at that time Walter Heissig
had nut vet been either cleared or sentenced as a Nazi. This news was a sur-
prise to me, as I had earlier heard that he had already been repatriated to
Austria. Because I believed he was no longer in China. 1 had taken no further
steps to help him; but if he is still in China, and if you should think that he
deserves help. I should lie glad to do anything further in my power.
My attitude in the matter is that I do not want to do anything to help any
man who was a genuine Nazi. I do not. however, believe in persecuting people
who merely because they were in a position where they were under the control
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1887
of Nazis complied enough to "gel by." The aewspaper clipping which I saw
indicated that you were sufficiently convinced of Heissig's good character to
offer him a position at Yenching.
I am glad to have this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the team-
work between you and General .Marshall. I am convinced that we may yel sec a
coalition Governmenl in China in which "coalition"' does not consist of the
appointment of powerless men who are only nominally not members of one
dominating party, and does consist of the grant of proportionate power as well
as proportionate representation to all major political movements and regional
interests in China.
Wishing you every success.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
The Foreign Service of the United States of -America,
Nanking, February 7, 191ft.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Walter nines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Dear Mr. Lattimore: I have your letter and am writing at once to explain
that I had made active efforts on behalf of Walter Heissig before coming into
my present post. This was based on what I had known of him and had learned
from others who knew him better. When, however, the American military
authorities demanded his detention for investigation because of information
they had, there seemed nothing more that I could do. I understand that the
inquiry was as thorough and impartial as would be expected under these circum-
stances, but I have no inside knowledge as to the evidence against him.
Thanks for your kind words about what General Marshall and I have been
atempting. It was no slight compensation in all these difficulties to have the
opportunity to know him at close quarters. I wish it were possible to discuss
these problems with you and in the light of the latest developments benefit by
your opinions.
With warm personal regards,
Very sincerely yours,
Leiohtox Stuart.
Stuart Letter Askixg Heissig Stay, ix Court
(Shanghai, Dec. 30, 1946)
*******
Dr. J. Leighton Stuart's letter to the Chinese repatriation authorities, asking
Walter Heissig's exemption from repatriation, was submitted as evidence to the
four-man United States military commission trying the Ehrhardt case at the
Ward Road Jail yesterday.
Stuart, in his capacity as dean of Yenching University, stated in his corre-
spondence dated June 6, 1946, that Heissig had been appointed adviser to the
new University library for frontier studies and asked for his exemption.
Defense Counsel Paul Premet also brought out the point that Owen Lattimore,
American expert on Far Eastern affairs, had commissioned Heissig as his agent
for purchasing available materials on Mongolia.
MUELLER TAKES STAXD
Dr. Herbert Mueller, another one of the accused, took the stand yesterday,
denying that his office had any connection with Bureau Ehrhardt, and had not
engaged in propaganda work between May 8 and August 15, 1945.
The accused further stated that he had no military status, and was not a
Nazi party member. He claimed that he did not conduct intelligence work
either before or after the German surrender.
After VE-day, Colonel Hidaka, Japanese intelligence officer in Peiping, told
Felix Altenburg, a codefendanf in this case, that he would convoke newspaper-
men's meetings, and also mentioned Mueller's name as he was a DXB corre-
spondent, he told the court.
1888 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The so-called press conferences, sponsored by Colonel Hidaka, were de-
scribed by Mueller as a kind of debate club where American magazines and
newspapers were provided. During the gatherings, topics discussed were purely
academical, the defendant alleged.
AN "OLD CHINA HAND"
The 61-year-old German suspect often ran his fingers over his face and tugged
at his moustache. He said he first came to China in 1912, and came back again
in 1924 as a correspondent of a German paper, Frankfurter Zeitung, which, he
said, was similar to the Christian Science Monitor in the United States.
Mueller became a correspondent of the DNB (Deutsches-Xachrichten-Bureau)
since January 1, 1924, when the German news agency first came into existence,
he told the Commission, adding that DNB was amalgamated from Wolf-Telegraf
and Telegraf-Union.
The accused .recounted that he liquidated his agency bureau in Peiping after
May 1, 1945. He also said that he had paid off his staff members with 3 months'
salary. After the German capitulation, he started a new office, he continued, but
the news reports he issued were censored by a bogus Chinese Government office
controlled by the Japanese.
Mueller will be examined again today at 8 a. m.
January 23, 1947.
Mr. Floyd E. Masten,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy.
Dear Mr. Masten : Many thanks for your letter of December 27. I am delighted
to have this opportunity of thanking you for the Monogolian books which you
mailed to me on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig. I am also glad to know that you
are going back to China again. Since you have imperiled yourself by making the
offer, I shall almost certainly pester you with requests of one kind or another.
After the great difficulty of publishing books and research work during the war
in China, a number of good publications are beginning to come out, and I am
anxious to get hold of those which deal with Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria.
I should appreciate it very much if you would write me your frank opinion
of Dr. Heissi.u. He made a very favorable personal impression on me on the
one occasion on which I saw him ; but it is always possible to be fooled. I have
tried to help him as far as I coidd on the question of being repatriated from
China. My feeling is that as a German he was in a position where he had to
comply with requests for reports when these were demanded of him. On the
other hand, the volume of scholarly work which he produced while in China would
indicate that he did not have much time left over for spying. My attitude in
such matters is that I see no need for persecuting people whose choice was between
martydrom and stringing along with the Nazis who had control over them. I
like to be cautious, however, because I decidedly am not interested in helping
to save the skins of people who really believed in the Nazi cause and really worked
to make it succeed.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
The Foreign Service of the
United States of America,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy, 27 Dec. Jf6.
Dr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore. M&\
Dear Professor Lattimore: Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed
you some Mongolian boo'ks, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased
for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm
curious to learn if the same ever reached yon. I'm returning to China next
Spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you. I would be
happy to help you.
My address in China will be c/o American Consulate General, Shanghai, China.
Very truly yours,
Floyd E. Masten, Attache'.
(Return address on envelope:) Flovd E. Masten, Am. Embassv #1. P. M., N. Y.,
N. Y.. APO 528.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1889
Dearing Farm,
Bethel, Vermont, July 12, 1948.
Dr. Waltiier Heissig,
(13b) Landsberg (Lech), Hindcnburgring 12,
American Zone, Germwny.
Dear Dr. Heissig : Your letter of June 9 has reached me safely and I am de-
lighted to be in touch with you again. I am particularly encouraged to know that
in spite of all difficulties you are able to some extent to keep up your Mongol
studies. I shall of course continue to keep in touch with your case, though I
must frankly say that my influence is extremely limited.
I am writing this from the country, where I am working for the summer.
Consequently, I do not have most of my Mongol books with me. The Japanese
book about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria may be with some other Japa-
nese books which I lent to a colleague who reads Japanese. I am writing to
Baltimore to see if he can identify the book. If so, I shall ask him to have photo-
stats made of the two inscriptions which you need. Otherwise, this may have
to wait until I get back to Baltimore at the end of August.
I was out in California 2 weeks ago, and there had a very pleasant visit with
Arthur and Mary Wright.
Yours very sincerely,
(136) Landsberg (Lech), Hindenbtjrgrixg 12,
June 9, 1948.
Dr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University, W. Hines Page School of International Relations,
Baltimore.
Dear Mr. Lattimore : Thank you so much for your kind letter which I received
the other day. I am very thankful that the interest you have shown on my
behalf and I sincerely hope that your efforts will prove successful.
I was greatly relieved by your information that you received all books pur-
chased formerly at Peking. That I could not finish my biography of all the Mon-
gol modern publications published during the war makes me feel sorry. But
there remained many other things I could not finish. But Lowenthal's informa-
tion is right : I am able to keep my knowledge intact. I am working in a very
limited way during my leisure on the biography of the lamaist missionary Neyici
toyin who was in the seventeenth century the great adversary of Shamanism
in Eastern Mongolia. I have with me the Peiping xylograph of his Mongol bi-
ography and am transcribing and editing it, as well as preparing an English
translation. The problems arising from it are fascinating: it is the only Mongol
authentic source which tells us about the ways in which the subjugation as well
as amalgamation of Shamanism has been done. But as long as I am here
nothing final is to be expected.
It might be of some interest to you that Messrs. Roever, Reel and Donovan,
Attorn., Boston, Pemberton-House, Pemberton Square, will file or have already
filed a habeas corpus writ for the whole case in which I am involved. Besides
that it was sent to Judge Sears, International Institute of Buffalo, 610 Delaware
Avenue, Buffalo 2, N. Y., Judge of the Appellate Court of the State of New York
and a former presiding judge at Nuremberg, an elaborate statement about the
particular phase of the Peiping group. I do not know what Judge Sears under-
took, as we have no answer. It may interest you to contact Judge Sears and
obtain the brief for further information.
In the last paragraph of your letter you proclaimed your willingness to do
something for me. My chief aim is to leave my present whereabouts in order
to proceed in my research work. The present ratio of nourishment in Germany
does not help to remain fit for work, however. I may ask you in the next weeks
to help me in obtaining some material concerning the seventeenth century in
Mongolia.
Very sincerely yours,
Walther Heissig.
P. S. — Amongst the books I have purchased for you was also a small booklet in
Japanese language about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria. It deals about
two stone inscriptions concerning early Lama missionaries in Mandju, Mongol-
Tibeton, dated 163S and 1658. Of the text of these two inscriptions I urgently
would need fotostats. Could you kindly arrange that for me?
Heissig.
1890 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Landsberg (Lech), Hixdexburgring 12, H.IIH9.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.
Dear Mr. Lattimore : I feel ashamed that I trouble you again with a letter
within such a short time. Yet I think it necessary to inform you about the
present state of my affairs because you showed all the time such friendly interest
in my fate.
Developments here in Germany were the following :
(1) Few weeks ago a Reviewing Board under Judge H. Pitchford, of the Judge
Advocate Office, Munich, reviewed the Nanking Case by order of the War Depart-
ment as well as of the Judge Advocate General, Heidelberg. The results of this
review were: (a) All prisoners convicted in the Nanking case (amongst them I)
are not guilty ; (&) did not commit any war crime ; (c) would not have committed
a war crime even assuming all facts charges with were true.
(2) Result of this review were handed over to JAG Heidelberg, where a Colonel
Fleischer is the officer in charge of this case. He promised to deal with this case
within the next weeks. Colonel Fleischer informed at March 3d, 49, a spokesman
of the Evangelical Churches, that General Clay does not intend to intervene in
the form of clemency and that instead of it the outcome of our procedures before
the Circuit Court of Washington concerning habeas corpus will be waited for.
Development in U. S. A. were the following now :
(1) Our lawyer, Mr. Frank Reel (Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Boston, Pember-
ton House), filed an appeal against the denial of habeas corpus with the Wash-
ington Court of Appeal. There was already one session, in which the president
of the court declared that he was much more bothered about the legal situation
uncovered there than he had ever expected to be. Final decision is still pending.
(2) In the cause of this procedure our lawyer had to publish all legal material
pertaining the question of jurisdiction, etc. Amongst them were some very
peculiar documents from the side of the respondents, i. e., Mr. Royall, Forrestal,
etc. From these documents, held until now as restricted or secret material, but
uncovered now by the course of legal procedure, the following things could be
detracted : (a) the trial at Shanghai was held for purely political reasons. Tele-
gram, April 19, 1946, sent by the China Command to Washington asking permission
to start a trial against Germans, has the following passus : "Local political situa-
tion makes trial by United States military commission in China strongly advis-
able" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 3).
(&) Upon this telegram granted Washington, War Department, with telegram,
July 6, 1946, authority to the United States Forces, China Theater, to try "viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war and German soldiers, civilians * * *
who are charged with violation of the German surrender terms " (cf. Respondents
Exhibit No. 4) . Authority was granted to try the Germans "provided the Chinese
Government acquiesces."
(c) The Chinese Government acquiesced not earlier than November 26, 1946,
to try before an American Military Commission war criminals only who had com-
mitted crimes against Americans. At that time I and the other men of the
Nanking case were already arrested by the American authorities for several
months, served with charges, and the prosecution had at that time already nearly
finished their part. When at the beginning of the trial in the early days of
October a Chinese defense counsel, Mr. Yang, of Shanghai, asked for dismissal of
the accused on the basis that no authorization by the Chinese Government could
be shown, the court ruled against him, although at that time existed in reality
no such authorization. I, furthermore, have to point out, that Washington had
made distinct discrimination between "the violations of the laws and war" and
"violation of the German surrender terms," and that the Chinese Government at
November 26, '46, acquiesced only to trial of war criminals. Yet we were charged
with violation of surrender terms, for which no authorization was given by the
Chinese and which constitutes no war crime.
(3) When Mr. Frank Reel, our American lawyer, inquired with the War De-
partment about the finding of the Munich Reviewing Board, he was answered that
"although action is being considered, probably in the nature of clemency, as yet
no final action had been taken," (letter of Mr. Reel, February 16, 1949). To this
Mr. Reel gives the following commentary : "My guess is that the opinion to that
effect, that the prisoners did not commit a war crime, even assuming all facts
charged were true, may never be published, and that instead clemency will be
granted so that the habeas corpus remedy ceases to exist."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1891
In spite of the fact that we legally are already for nearly three years impris-
oned innocently and unjustified, nobody seems now willing to take the responsi-
bility for set us free. Public opinion seems to be stronger than justice.
I wrote all this in details to you because I think it is now the time to do some-
thing about. Already many Senators and leading people took an interest in this
case. It will over a long be impossible to prevent leaking the truth out.
The turning point seems to be that the same person who as Judge Advocate of
the China Theater conducted the trial in Shanghai, is today in an responsible
position in the War Crimes Section of the War Department. But is it justified
that the face of somebody is saved for the price of the fate of IS men who accord-
ing to the finding of all law experts are not guilty and no war criminals.
It might interest you, that a professor of the Law School of the University of
Chicago, Mr. Ernest W. Puttkammer, working on his own about this case, came
to the same opinion as the Reviewing Board at Munich. Now Mr. P. has offered
his services, as well as that of some colleagues of him of the University of Chi-
cago, to the Judge Advocate General in Heidelberg for making an expert's opinion
about the legal situation.
Thus things from the legal point are clear but nobody wants to take the re-
sponsibility— and I am still here and wonder how long that shall continue al-
though it is now black on white that I am not guilty and no war criminal.
The facts I presented to you are no allegations ; you can find them printed in the
booklets presenting the exhibits for the proceedings before the appellate court.
Mr. Reel, of Roever, Reel and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House, will gladly
give you access to this.
I beg you to understand me why I wrote you in such a length. I sincerely hope
that there is a way to bring this stagnant situation to a solution. To create a
legal scandal is in nobody's interest ; there must be a way to solve all this mix up.
I hope you received my letter as well as the paper about Nayici toijin. Please
let me know what you think about. Once more, forgive me for stealing so much
of your valuable time with this my letter.
Sincerely yours,
Walther Heissig.
April 14, 1949.
Mr. Frakk Reel,
Roever, Reel, and Donovan,
Pemberton House, Boston, Mass.
Dear Mr. Reel : I have received a letter from Mr. Walther Heissig, of Hinden-
burgring 12 Landsberg (Lech) Germany, informing me that you have been
representing him in an appeal against his sentence by a Military Court in
Shanghai. I knew Mr. Heissig slightly in China, and have intermittently been
in correspondence with him since. Naturally, not having seen any of the official
documents, I, of course, know his side of the case only and his protestations that
he is innocent.
If you have satisfied yourself that he is innocent, and if you think there is
anything I can do to help see that justice is done, please let me know.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore, Director.
Landsberg (Lech), Hindenburgring 12.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., U. 8. A.
Dear Mr. Lattimore : Thank you so much for your kind letter of April 20th.
I am very much delighted about the news that you shall bring my Neyici Toyin
edition to print. I hope it can be done. As already announced in my previous
letter, I shall forward to you the final manuscript (which contains only minor
changes) within the next few weeks. I am, of course, well aware of the fact
that my notes— i. e., the English of my notes — need to be brushed up. But I
hope that will make not too great a difficulty.
I have to thank you too for your quick consent to the translations of your
two books by Mr. Albricht and me. Would you kindly let me know soon of the
results of your inquiry about the copyright situation, as I should like to convey
this to the interested German publishers. I hope that the copyright situation
1892 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
will not make insurmountable difficulties, because I have learned that in many
cases of translations of American books the copyright situation made no diffi-
culties at all.
Your consent for having the books translated by Mr. Albricht and me is for us
a good asset in further negotiations with the publishers. In case it should be
necessary, I perhaps shall have to ask for a more explicit authorization to do
the translations, yet I do not think it necessary.
In the meantime I think you will have heard from my attorney, Mr. Reel, about
my legal situation. Since my previous letter I have learned that a Senate com-
mittee, consisting of the Senators Mr. Richard B. Russell, Estes Kefauver, and
with Raymond E. Baldwin as a chairman, is going to investigate the legal situation
of the whole China case.
And now I want to beg you for the favour to get a copy of your newest book —
Situation in Asia — which was due for (Ea ar).
Once more, thank you very much for all your kindness, and I hope you will let
me know soon more about the possibility of having the Neyic Toyin Monogr.
published.
Finally I send you my congratulation to the enlivening of Mongol Studies at
your University, which doubtlessly is due to your efforts.
I remain, yours very
Sincerely,
Walther Heissig.
Department of State,
Washington, June 22, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
Chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate.
My Dear Mr. Morgan : I understand that some question has been raised as to
what part the Department of State has taken in financing three Mongolian
scholars at Johns Hopkins University. As stated in Mr. Peurifoy's letter to
Senator Tydings of April 17, 1950, the Department has paid $3,200 to Johns Hop-
kins University pursuant to a contract, a copy of which is attached, entered into
with the University under authority of P. L. 724 (79th Congress). No other
payments have been made by the Department. As stated in Mr. Peurifoy's letter,
it is understood that the Mongols referred to work on this project, and that the
Department's $3,200 supplement much larger sums made available by the Amer-
ican Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Foundation.
Sincerely yours,
Adrian S. Fisher,
The Legal Adviser.
Enclosure: Contract SCC-1S55.
Contract SCC-1S55 Negotiated : B. M.
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Johns Hopkins University
Memorandum of Agreement made as of the 14th day of March 1949, between
the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government) acting
by the Assistant Secretary of State of the Department of State (hereinafter
referred to as the Department) executing this agreement ; and the Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, Maryland, acting by the Provost of the University (herein-
after referred to as the University).
WITNESSETH I
Whereas the Congress of the United States has vested in the Secretary of State
the authority to make grants or furnish such other gratuitous assistance as he
may deem necessary or desirable to nonprofit institutions cooperating with the
Foreign Service Institute in any of the programs conducted by the Institute to
achieve its objectives, to wit : to furnish training and instruction to officers and
employees of the Foreign Service and the Department and to other officers and
employees of the Government for whom training and instruction in the field of
foreign relations is necessary, and to promote and foster programs of study
incidental to such training.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1893
Whereas the University 1ms been organized and is now operating on a non-
profit basis, and is cooperating with the Institute in its language training program.
Whereas it has been found that the making of a grant or contribution to the
University pursuant to the terms hereof and for the specific purposes of obtain-
ing for the Foreign Service Institute adequate teaching materials in the Mongo-
lian language of such a nature that they can be used both in the Institute and in
field posts abroad: permitting the assignment of an employee of the Foreign
Service, now detailed to the Institute, to the University to work with native
Mongolian speakers and a linguistic scientist to acquire the ability to instruct
Other Foreign Service personnel in Mongolian; assisting the University to de-
velop the Mongolian language project to the point that it will be able to obtain
private grants to carry on the work beyond the present year and thus prolong
an activity of continuing value to the Department through the Foreign Service
Institute; and furthering tne progress of instruction in linguistic science in this
country along lines of value to the Institute in its language training programs,
is a project of both immediate and future value to the Government and is within
the authority granted by the Congress of the United States in Section 703 of
the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the premises and of the mutual
agreements herein contained, it is mutually understood and agreed that :
ARTICLE I
The Government does hereby make a grant or contribution of three thousand
two hundred dollars ($3,200) to the University to be used by said Insitution
for the purposes hereinabove specified, provided, however, that the Department
and the University may agree to the expenditure by the University of the sum
made available hereby for related purposes if the University shall in writing
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Department that it would be preferable
and advisable to make such expenditure in lieu of the one originally contem-
plated.
article n
Payment of the sum specified above in Article I hereof shall be made to the
Tniversity immediately following the execution of the contract.
article III
The University undertakes to carry out diligently the activities designed to
effect the purposes of this agreement, summarized as follows :
1. To maintain and make available at the University two native speakers of
Mongolian for a sufficient period of time to enable linguistic scientists to make
a descriptive analysis of the Mongolian language and develop teaching materials
in spoken Mongolian.
2. To develop and make available to the Foreign Service Institute compre-
hensive teaching materials in Mongolian, including a descriptive grammar of the
Mongolian language and instructional materials in the form of notes, mimeo-
graphed text materials and recordings.
3. To furnish to an employee assigned by the Institute full access to facilities
involved in the project sufficient to enable said employee to acquire the ability
to instruct other personnel in the Mongolian language.
4. To assist the University in developing the project to such a point that pri-
vate grants may be obtained to continue the work beyond the present year and
thus continue to be of value to the Department through the Institute's language
training activities.
5. To further the progress of instruction in linguistic science along lines of
actual and potential value to the Institute in its language training program.
article IV
The activities of the University under this agreement shall be subject to such
reasonable supervision by the Department, through the Institute, as the Depart-
ment may desire to exercise.
1894 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ARTICLE V
The University shall make reports to the Department, through the Institute,
for administrative purposes at such times and in such detail as the Department
may require.
ARTICLE VI
The University shall return to the Government on or before September 30, 1949,
any balance of the sum made available hereby to the University unused and un-
obligated prior to June 30, 1949, and shall also return at the earliest possible date
any additional balance which may subsequently be found to be not needed to
liquidate outstanding obligations, provided, however, that if the University shall
demonstrate in writing to the Department that an extension of time for the ex-
penditure of the sum made available hereby is necessary or desirable, such ex-
tension may be granted by the Department and provided further that, to the ex-
tent the University is authorized to use the sum made available hereby for
administrative purposes, the University may, notwithstanding the terms of this
article, retain sufficient funds for administrative expenses to permit it to render
a final report and accounting to the Department.
ARTICLE VII
If the Department deems it in the best interests of the Government to termi-
nate this agreement, the Department may terminate it by giving he University
sixty days' notice in writing, and if for any reason beyond the control of the
University, the University is unable to perform all of the conditions of this
agreement, the University may terminate it by giving the Department sixty
days' notice in writing. In the event that this agreement is terminated, under
this provision, the University shall return to the Government any balance of
funds received from the Government which is unused and not obligated under
contracts made by the University. It shall also return at the earliest possible
date any additional balance which may subsequently be found to be not needed
to liquidate outstanding obligations.
ARTICLE VIII
No member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall be
admitted to any share or part of this contract or to any benefit that may arise
therefrom, unless it be made with a corporation for its general benefit.
ARTICLE IX
The Contractor warrants that he has not employed any person to solicit or
secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, broker-
age, or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall give the Government the
right to annul the agreement, or in its discretion to deduct from the contract
price or consideration the amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage,
or contingent fees. This warranty shall not apply to commissions payable by
contractors upon agreement or sales secured or made through bona fide estab-
lished commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Contractor for the
purpose of securing business.
ARTICLE X
The Contractor, in performing the work required by this contract, shall not
discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color or national origin.
ARTICLE XI
If any dispute shall arise in the execution of the terms of this agreement, it
shall be subject to appeal within thirty days to the Secretary of State or to his
duly authorized representative, whose decision thereon shall be final on the
l>ar ties concerned.
ARTICLE XII
When the nature of this contract is such that it is subject to the provisions of
the Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036 or the Eight Hour Labor Law, 37 Stat.. 137
the Contractor agrees to be bound by these laws.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1895
In witness whereof, the Government and the University have executed
this agreement as of the day and your tirst above written.
Fob the Contractor, the Johns Hopkins University:
P. Howard Macauley, Provost.
For the Government of the U. S., Department of State :
Bruce L. McDaniel,
Chief, Procurement and Smiply Branch.
March 1049.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Washington.
Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
I'niti (1 Statt s Senate,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator: Reference is made to your letter dated June 14, 1950, in
which you request that the Subcommittee Investigating the State Department be
furnished conies or the contents of certain documents which Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy stated on March 30, 1950, on the floor of the Senate that he was turn-
ing over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Senator McCarthy referred on page 4437, column 2 of the Congressional Record
for March 30, 1950, to a document, the original of which he was turning over
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This document is quoted in full except
for signature and date in the Congressional Record on page 4437, columns 2
and 3.
Your next reference is another statement which Senator McCarthy indicated
may have likewise been turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This
reference appears on page 4437. Another statement with regard to same in-
cident appears on page 4440, column 2, paragraph 3. Both these statements are
to the same effect, that the two persons making the statements were house guests
of the Lattimores during the month of June 1945. They were introduced by
Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore to John S. Service, an official of the State Department,
and Lt. Andrew Roth and a girl whose name was not remembered. After these
two people arrived at the Lattimores' home, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and their
house guests John S. Service and Andrew Roth spent considerable time by them-
selves discussing what appeared to be a manuscript. One of the house guests
making the statement was upstairs in the Lattimore home and upon leaving
Mrs. Lattimore's bedroom saw Roth fastening a briefcase at the entrance to the
next bedroom. This person was under the impression that she was followed
upstairs by Roth. The next day she learned that John S. Service and Andrew
Roth were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The other house
guest who made the statement to Senator McCarthy stated that he recalled
these facts substantially as set forth except for the episode wherein the other
house guest was upstairs in the Lattimore home, at which time she saw Mr.
Roth. In addition, the second house guest sometime later learned that Latti-
more's explanation of the arrest of Service and Roth was that they had been
declassifying documents in favor of their friends and that this was a common
Washington practice and they were arrested because of some feud with persons
in Washington.
The third reference appearing in your letter is one to a statement on page
4440. column 2 of the Congressional Record. This apparently refers to the letter
dated June 15, 1943, from Owen Lattimore to Mr. Joseph Barnes of the OWI.
It is my understanding that you have a copy of this letter.
Your next reference is to the affidavit of a former General in the Red Army,
which reference appears at page 4445, column 3. This former General in the
Red Army is purported to have stated to an investigator for Senator McCarthy
that he had a conversation during the middle 1930's with a high official in Soviet
Intelligence in which they discussed the difficulty in getting good intelligence in-
formation from Mongolia and the Far East. The high official in Soviet Intelli-
gence told the General that they had had excellent success through the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations which Soviet Intelligence, through Communists in the
United States, had taken over. In particular the high official mentioned Owen
Lattimore and one Joseph Barnes as Soviet men connected with the Institute.
Your next reference is the one appearing on page 4446, column 1 of the Con-
gressional Record in which Senator McCarthy mentions an affidavit of the editor
1896 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of a Chinese newspaper, the original of which was to be handed to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The pertinent portions of this statement are as fol-
lows:
"As a result of early Russian offers to China, i. e., to give back every-
thing the < zar had taken from China, this made a hit with Chinese students.
Lattimore was one of the young 'white men' that went along with Chinese
students. There were several student uprisings, in which Lattimore was
involved. He enjoyed a kind of leadership therein.
"These Mongolian contacts gave him a close contact with Buddhism and
with Mongol lamas on the Chinese Russian border. Chinese lamas are noto-
rious homosexual and was the kind of company he seemed naturally to tend
to.
"There were always a number of Russians back and forth on the Russo-
Chinese border.
"The I. P. R. was started by men who were sincerely interested in China's
welfare. I belonged to the organization but left it when it was obviously an
organ of Jap. propaganda.
"My first unpleasant contact with Lattimore was in the late '30's when
it was obvious the I. P. R. became infiltrated with Communists. L. was
among the group that began to turn 'Asia' magazine into first a pro-Jap
propaganda sheet. It had been founded by Willard Straight, American
Consul General, in Manchuria, in 1912, thereabouts. 'Asia' magazine was
carried by son Willard. Jr. & later of 'Amerasia.' Lattimore had written
for the old 'Asia,' very much for 'Amerasia.' 'Amerasia' from the start
backed the 'Moscow-line.' There was the combination of Willard Straight
Jr.'s mother's money, Pearl Buck's editorship & writing ability & Latti-
more's political shrewdness. Straight is a confessed 'card carrying' Com-
munist. Vanderbilt Field came in as an angel for 'Amerasia' & I. P. R.
"In this group Lattimore was probably the 'mastermind' that built the
group that formulated the pro Chinese-Communist policy that took over,
infiltrated, and gradually dominated the far eastern division of the State
Department. In this group are included Alger Hiss, Service brothers,
Jessup, Lattimore, etc.
*******
"Later on Dec. '41 or Jan. '42 Lattimore arrived in San F. on way to-
China. I was N. B. C. specialist on Orient. I didn't trust him but inas-
much as he was special envoy to Chiang Kai-chek I invited him to appear
on network. I heard of banquet to be given him by I. P. R. The hostess was
Anita Whitney a well-known 'big-wig' among San Francisco Communists.
I raised question, over phone, of his being entertained by Anita Whitney &
other Communists & he became angry & as a result refused to broadcast.
"I understood that Lattimore was sent to China by F. D. R. upon recom-
mendation of Mrs. Roosevelt & Wallace.
"1 had a report back from Chinese officials indicating Chiang was dis-
pleased & Chiang to dismiss L. smoothly appointed him a Chinese offidal &
sent him to Roosevelt.
"On an occasion when L. came through San F. on way to China, the radio
doors was closed to us & given over to the left-wing crowd. Hornbeck was-
'kicked upstairs' by being made ambassador to Holland.
"This crowd indoctrinated Stilwell against Chiang. (This story is told
by the Alsop's.)
"In the Spring of 1942 I persuaded the N. B. C. to put on the 'Pacific
Story.' I chose as producer Arnold Marquis, of Hollywood & the writers-
Sifield & Warren Lewis. The scripts written from my books. After the first
few programs a strange influence caused us to discontinue. A few weeks
later the program was reestablished under Owen Lattimore under same
producer who carried it on for one to two years with who carried the Chinese
Communist line.
"(Dates should be verified.)
"These facts to the best of my memory."
If I can be of any further assistance please do not hesitate to communicate
with me.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
Deputy Attorney General.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1897
The following material has been inserted in the record at the request
of Mrs. Freda Utley :
1717-20 Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C, May /.'/, 1950.
Dear Senator Chavez: My attention has been drawn to certain statements
yon made about me in the Senate, on page 7056 of the Congressional Record for
May 12th. You therein falsely stated:
(1) "That Freda Utley points to the fad that Dr. Lattimore failed to follow
the Moscow line as proof that lie is a Communist." Yon further stated that
I was "trying to prove * * * that Dr. Lattimore * * * is a Communist
because he did not follow the party line."
Evidently yon never read my testimony and must have been misled by who-
ever it was wrote your speech. If you will look at my testimony I said the
exact opposite of what you aver. I prefaced my series of extract from Latti-
niore's writings by saying that they showed that he did follow the Communist
Tarty line. Nowhere in my testimony did I ever say, or imply, or in any way
indicate, as you asserted, that "Lattimore is a Communist because he did not
follow the Party line."
(2) You also asserted that I had "swallowed the Nazi line," asserting as-
proof that I had refered to "the outbreak of hostilities after the Nazi-Soviet
Pact in 1941 as the time when Russia attacked Germany." This again is untrue.
I attach herewith a copy of the transcript of my testimony from which you
will see that in the pages referring to Lattimore's switch ( in conformity with
the Communist Party line) following Germany's attack on Russia, I refer no>
less than five times to "Germany's attack on Russia," or to "Hitler's attack on
Russia." The references are underlined in red pencil. In the final reference
to this event, at the bottom of page 744 of the official transcript of my testimony,
the recorder made what is obviously a typographical error, when he wrote
"after Germany attacked Russia." 1 have already taken steps to correct this
error, together with a number of other typographical errors in the transcript,,
such as the mispelling of Ludden's name and the word "million" instead of
"billion" twice on page 760 of my testimony.
Concerning the recorder's error of which you have made use, I cannot conceive
that anyone, who was not wilfully trying to misrepresent my views, could have
made the assertion in the speech which you gave on the Senate floor. Five
references in a few short pages to "Germany's attack on Russia" are sufficient
evidence that I did not, as you assert, say that Russia attacked Germany. To
anyone not deliberately intent on misrepresenting my views, the sixth reference
to Russia's involvement in the war must have appeared as an obvious typing
error.
I shall await your apology and your correction of your errors concerning my
testimony in the Lattimore's case on both counts. I am in the meantime sending
a copy of this letter to Mr. Morgan, the Counsel of the Tyding's committee, to
Senator Brewster, and to the press.
Yours truly,
Freda Utley.
Copy of Official Transcript of Pages 742 to 745 of Freda Utley's Testimony
Before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee, on May 1, 1950.
Page 742 : Nor is this the only evidence that Lattimore followed the Party-
line in denouncing the war in Europe prior to Germany's attach on Russia, as
an imperialist struggle in which both sides were equally guilty.
While Lattimore was one of the editors of Amerasia, in 1939 and 1940, follow-
ing the Stalin-Hitler Pact, it published articles directly echoing the Communist
Party Line, for which Mr. Lattimore must assume partial, at least, responsibility.
Senator Tydings. Do you know whether or not they published at the same
time any articles that showed a contrary point of view?
Mrs. T'ti.ey. No. I will state that almost categorically, but in the time at my
disposal, I have had no time to read every article in Amerasia.
It abused Italy and France and urged America not to be drawn into the Euro-
pean war, while urging that it take action against Japan. Following Germany's
attack on Russia, in June 1941, it switched over to the opposite side, like all
Communist organs, and urged American participation in the war against
Germany.
1898 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
I have here several pages of extracts from Amerasia and I feel that my testi-
mony will be far too long if I read them all.
Senator Tydings. Put them in the record at this time.
I would like to ask a couple of questions.
Does this appear over Mr. Lattimore's signature?
Mrs. Utley. No.
Senator Tydings. Did they appear over anybody's signature?
Mrs. Utley. Yes. The particular articles I have mentioned, one was by William
Brandt, entitled '"The Embargo Threat — a Diplomatic Maneuver," was published
in the March 1940 issue of Amerasia.
Senator Tydings. Read the others and identify them.
Mrs. Utley. Next is one by Harry Paxton Howard which explained and
justified the Stalin-Hitler Pact. I don't want to impose on your time by reading
it all.
Senator Tydings. Don't read it, but let me ask you another question. During
the period to which you refer, evidently you have-had some opportunity to read
these magazines, is that right?
Mrs. Utley. Durinsr what period?
Senator Tydings. Have they been handed to you, or did you read them your-
self, Mrs. Utley?
Mrs. Utley. I bave been looking them up now, in the last few days.
Senator Tydings. Looking them up in the Amerasia Magazine?
Mrs. Utley. Yes, sir.
Senator Tydings. Have you found any articles in there that were published
by people other than Mr. Lattimore, that presented any contrary view?
Mrs. Utley. No.
Senator Tydings. Nothing in the magazine at all except articles of one kind
during this period?
Mrs. Utley. Yes.
Senator Tydings. How many of these articles to which you refer were over
the signature, or over the masthead of the editor of the magazine, who, as I
understand it, was then Mr. Lattimore, is tbat correct?
Mrs. Utley. Mr. Lattimore was only one. The managing editor was Frederick
Vanderbilt Field.
Senator Tydings. Who was the managing editor?
Mrs. Utley. I think that was Frederick Vanderbilt Field.
Senator Tydings. How many other editors were there I have not read it.
Mrs. Utley. About half a dozen. I cannot recall all their names. One was
Lillian Peffer, wife of a professor at Columbia University
Senator Tydings. Why attribute all of that to Mr. Lattimore if he was only
one of six, and wasn't the managing editor?
Mrs. Utley. Senator Tydings, if you are on the board of a magazine that con-
tinually publishes only one view — actually Mr. Lattimore got off the board in
1941, when he took up Government service.
Senator Tydings. Why give him the responsibility when you say there were
six on the board? Do you know whether or not they approved these articles?
Do you know whether or not they disapproved these articles? Do you know
whether or not he saw the articles before they were published ; because if he was
only one of seven editors it would appear to me that in getting up a newspaper or
magazine like Amerasia, or the Saturday Evening Post, that some of the articles
could be published in there that might not be known to all of the editors on the
board, and I am asking as to information — whether or not you can show any
connection between this Mr. Lattimore and these particular articles, or do you
just surmise it?
Mrs. Utley. Senator Tydings, I have already read out an article in Mr. Latti-
more's own
Senator Tydings. I am not asking about that.
Mrs. Utley. Which says the same kind of things as Amerasia
Senator Tydings. There is only one fact I want to ask you now, whether or
not you know that Mr. Lattimore sponsored, directly or indirectly, these articles
for publication in Amerasia?
We have had a lot <>f opinion evidence here. I would like to get a few facts
woven into it.
Mrs. Utley. The point I am making, Senator Tydincs, is that xVmerasia
echoed almost exactly the same language I read you from Mr. Lattimore's
writings.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1899
Secondly, surely, if one is in disagreement with the total line of a magazine,
it is the duty of one to set off the editorial board.
Senator Typings. I don't think that always follows, but your observation can
stand.
Mrs. Utley. I would say that if Mr. Lattiniore, in Anierasia, had continued
to write along these lines following Hitler's attack on Russia, his views could
really be considered honest and consistent. But, once the Soviet Union was at
war with Germany, you could find no more articles by Mr. Lattiniore, saying
that the war in Europe was one between two lots of master races, as he said
previous to Germany's attack on Russia.
Senator Typings. Of course, I don't want to take advantage of your opportu-
nity to testify, but let me point out, Mrs. I'tley, that even in our Congress, when
Britain and France were at war with the Fascists, the Axis, and when Russia
was invaded, we had Lend-Lease even before we got into the struggle, to give
our money and substance to Russia and all the other countries, so that every-
body who then took that particular side of the controversy would not necessarily
be a Communist, because a good many of my colleagues in the Senate would be
under very serious charges if that were true.
Mrs. I'tlky. May I make very clear, on that point, Senator Tydings, that I
personally was against American intervention in the European war, because I
considered it would lead to the domination of Stalin. I want to make clear, I
want to make a clear distinction, and one which I think the Attorney General
made several years ago, and which was to the effect that you could tell a Com-
munist as distinguished from an isolationist, or whatever word you use, non-
interventionist, by his attitude before and after Germany attacked Russia. The
people who went on consistently opposing American intervention, and kept on
saying the usual things about the European war, and people who did not change
their line after Germany attacked Russia can be perfectly honest people and are
perfectly entitled to that opinion; but, those who switched directly the moment
that Russia was involved in the war, the Attorney General said, he thought you
could spot them as Communists.
Political Sctf.nce Quarterly, December 1050. Review of the High Cost of
Vengeance. Review Written by George N. Shuster, President of Hunter
College
Freda Utley has scattered pieces of her heart over many a page. She is an
economic historian with a warm soul, a passion for social crusades, and a gift
for becoming very rational at unexpected moments. Accordingly she has at
regular intervals troubled the slumbers of the more progressive sections of our
population. Years ago, when communism1 was the ikon in many an intellectual's
bedchamber, she announced that Stalin was not her candidate for the job of uni-
versal YMCA director. Today when the same sections are still pretty smug
about Germany, she fires some fairly angry cannon at them.
One must discount a part of what Mrs. Utey says. Her motherly soul, hav-
ing caught a whiff of democracy as meted out to Teutonic survivors of the most
recent version of Armageddon, confers virtue on nearly every German and vice
on a good many other people. The prostitutes of the fatherland are at least, neat,
clean, and feminine. General Taylor, who was given the impossible assignment
of wearing undertakers' gloves in Nuremberg with a genuine West Pointer non-
chalance, is dubbed a "Communist sympathiser." The French as she sees them
are overdone crepe suzette dripping with diluted sauternes. It would be fear-
fully easy to point out these matronly shortcomings and pass on.
The trouble is that Mrs. Utley is dead right about the important things. She
has found out that "democracy" was sold down the river in Germany by a platoon
of experts in ideological hocus-pocus, while the American people thought they
were financing peace, freedom, brotherly love, and other comparable commodities.
She also does a first-rate report on the dismantlement program. It is of course
not a systematic study — which would probably be dull as well as premature —
but it is a very able and conscientious analysis of typical cases. I suppose that
for many Americans dismantlement may have something to do with German
fireplaces, for all they care. But when we read that Social Democracy in the
Western Zones has just taken a fearful beating at the polls, and go on to wonder
whether nationalism may not be rearing its ugly head in Germany again, it will
help to let Mrs. Utley tell us that the explanation of what has happened is that
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 27
1900 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the Social Democrat clung to his devoted admiration of the British Labor party
way past the point of German endurance. Four years ago the British had an
unparalleled opportunity in Germany. They could have held in their hands the
power that in all probability might have made Westphalia the cornerstone of a
new and pacific West European Federation. But the heirs to the crown of Win-
ston Churchill played for pennies and now have only holes in their pockets.
Mrs. Utley's indictment of them (and to be sure, also of the United States) on
charges of gi-oss stupidity and bad ethics is complete and devastating. Here are
offenses against humanity which no brave new world can live down, and it is
high time we had a look at them.
Mrs. Utley also has her say about the Nuremberg trials. These grandiose ex-
periments in how to coat your defeated enemy with justice no longer rate the
empty spaces in the educational supplement, and I am not sure that this book
makes any very startlingly novel statements. But what it does offer is a pretty
effective survey of the way in which German public opinion has responded to
the advertising copy which the trials and the tlenazification proceedings were
expected to produce. This survey is not very exhilarating, but I believe that on
every topic of real importance it is correct.
There is enough truth in this book to make it worth staying up with. I believe
it will be followed by many another in similar character. At any rate, Mrs.
Utley has earned her laurels as a pioneer, and the subject with which she deals
is of tbf utmost importance.
George N. Shuster.
[Saturday Review of Literature, August 13, 1949]
The High Cost of Vengeance
(By Freda Utley, Henry Regnery Co. Reviewed by W. L. White)
Freda Utley has written both a very angry book and a very important one.
To put her thesis in simple terms, she is very angry because she does not like
Nazis, and is therefore horrified to find that the present Allied Occupation of
Germany which was supposed to stamp out National Socialism, has neverthe-
less adopted policies the inevitable result of which has been to convince an in-
creasing number of Germans that maybe after all Hitler was right, and that
his only mistake was that he lost the war.
While the study of human behaviour is not yet an exact science, nevertheless-
its basic principles are beginning to be understood. We know that if certain
pressures are put, either on an individual or a nation, its behaviour will then
fall into an easily predictable pattern. The frightening memory of the almost
incredibly vast Nazi crimes against humanity should be preserved, not as a
measure of the vengeance we should take against the German people, but as a
measure of the gravity of the mass-schizophrenia which has gripped a once
civilized nation, a disease which clearly had its origin in our treatment of that
nation after the Treaty of Versailles, and which it is now our task to cure.
It is one which calls not for mawkish "forgiveness' but for cool, scientific
understanding ; not for a sentimental turning of the other cheek but for self-
discipline and detachment, which will enable us to perform the most badly
needed job of "social engineering" of our time.
How are we measuring up? Well. Miss Utley, in this badly needed volume of
Western democratic self-criticism, points out sadly that —
"the very same people who would insist at home in America that juvenile
delinquency and adult crime are the result either of being underprivileged
or of an unhappy childhood, and that criminals should be psychoanalyzed
and reformed, not starved, reviled, and imprisoned, want to continue pun-
ishing the whole German people for their past."
Possibly the most valuable chapter in Miss Utley's book is her first, in which
she points out that "the tragedy of modern history is that the Germans have
always been kicked around when they were pacifically minded," so that in-
evitably "the apostles of violence have again won leadership * * follow-
ing the failure of the democrats and the anti-militarists to win a fair deal."
But her well-documented chapters on Western Germany today are scarcely
less vital. In spite of the fact that production per acre in Germany is already
50 per cent higher than in the United States. Western Germany can never pro-
duce according to our E. C. A. experts, more than 50 per cent of the food it
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1901
needs. And to get the rest Western Germany must export at least two billion
dollars worth Of manufactured goods annually. Yet we make this impossible
by limiting her production of steel, which deprives Europe and the world of
vitally needed machinery and construction materials. Instead we expect Ger-
many to produce for export only such things as textiles and ceramics. Hooding
the world with German toys at a time when it needs German locomotives and
steel girders.
*******
After its final Chapter, the American reader puts down Miss Utley's important
work of democratic self-criticism with a feeling of regret and shame on two
scores. The first is that we seem now to be abandoning our original "goat-
pasture" policy not so much because we are ashamed of it, as we should be, but
because we see that stone-age vengeance is a spiritual luxury whose cost in
dollars is too great even for a nation so rich as ours. Secondly we seem, at
last, we seem to be seriously tackling the job of reconstructing a truly demo-
cratic Germany largely from the somewhat sordid motive that, if we fail at our
task of "social engineering" the Soviet Union certainly will succeed with their
competitive brand.
Of course the sum of all Allied mistakes in Germany cannot for an instant be
compared to the coldly calculated Nazi crimes against humanity during the
war. The difference is however that our cruel stupidities are not being per-
petrated in the name of our peoples by a dictatorship. They are the acts of free
and democratic governments, for which every citizen is directly responsible.
So we can never say — as did the Germans in 1945 and with some reason — "We did
not know," or "This was not our doing."
Candid Shots — Ex-Communist Undaunted in Fight for Unfashionable Cause
(Paul Jones in Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 7, 1950)
The last time Freda Utley was in Philadelphia, we sat next to her at dinner.
The occasion was a meeting of the local branch of the Centralverein, before
whose members she gave an address later in opposition to the dismantling policy
in Germany. The Centralverein is a liberal organization of German-American
origins, now a century old. Its ancient hail near 5th and Gerard, is hung with
pictures of Bishop von Kettler and other worthies whose views on social reform
we recognize best in the Revolution of 1848. Since that glorious failure deter-
mined a great deal of the early German immigration to the United States, it
stands for something very solid and real in their tradition.
Miss Utley. whose name came up recently in connection with the Senate inves-
tigation of the charges against State Department personnel, had just returned
from occupied Germany, after a visit which made another of her interesting
books. ,
For some reason, talented women are able to give a much better first-hand
picture of what a place is like and what it feels to live in it than their mascu-
line opposite numbers. * * * In the same way, when we told Freda Utley that
we had read the story of her life in Russia and she asked us what we thoueht of
it. we said at once : "The best thing since Emma Goldman." It is fact that "Lost
Illusion" is far and away the most interesting book by an ex-Communist we
have seen. This is because Freda was neither a tourist nor a wide-eyed innocent.
She had a good job in the Soviet bureaucracy; she had married a Soviet citizen,
who was later spirited away by the secret police, never to be heard of again*
she had a baby to care for, and a house to keep. She was not, therefore, free
to wrap herself in clouds of heavy thought, to the exclusion of common sense.
We suppose that the mechanics of food distribution, or the wonders of Soviet
housing, look a little different to the woman who has to cope with these things.
The cafe theorist can comfort himself with propaganda pictures and with the
reflection that everything will be straightened out by 2250 A. D. His wdfe has
to stand in line or take her chances in the maternity ward of 1950.
Miss Utley is a handsome woman with almost limitless energy marked by a
dauntless determination not to be downed. In spite of a life more than usually
unlucky, we could see no sign that she was ready to give in on any point that
engaged her integrity.
We say she was unlucky, because she was an active and open Communist long
before if was fashionable to be even pink. At just about the time when she
1902 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
threw over the philosophy of Lenin, the Soviets began to be accepted, under
the Popular Front idea, as really splendid chaps. Her forthright views about
her erstwhile associates and the things she said and wrote about her expe-
riences in Russia and China were not calculated to make her a popular writer.
Now that the tide has turned, as far as Russia is concerned, she is wrapped
up in another minority crusade, the effort to show that a revengeful peace
policy can only defeat its own ends. "The High Cost of Vengeance," a basically
sound book, founded upon personal observations among Germans, rather than
on bull sessions at the Press Club, has got her in wrong again, though not with
the thoughtful reader.
However we must say that she seems to thrive on adversity, and when last
we saw her, was as stout-hearted as ever in defense of what she believes to be
right.
The following "Chronology of events" was furnished the Foreign
Relations subcommittee by Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney for
John S. Service:
Chronology of events
Date
Movements and activities of John S. Service
Other movements and activities
191ft
Apr. 18
Transferred from Shanghai to Chungking.
Arrived Chungking.
May 3 ..- -
May 16
Ambassador Gauss arrived Chungking.
Dec. 22
\91fi
Jan. 20 ... .
Sent on trip to Rangoon.
Returned to Chungking via Burma Road.
March
General Stilwell arrived in Chungking.
April -
July S
Trip through central Szechwan.
Ordered on extensive travel through
northwest China.
Promoted from FSO-VIII to FSO-VIT.
Returned to Chungking after visiting oil
fields and Honan famine areas.
Left Chungking for leave in United States.
Arrived at home in California.
Commenced consultation in Department
(FE).
Prepared memorandum on situation in
China pointing to postwar policy prob-
lem (Doc. 103).
Completed consultation and returned to
home in California.
Departed for Chungking.
ArrivedChungking.
Detailed to Lanchow "listening post."
Assigned to General Stilwell.
Commenced duty with Stilwell's head-
quaiters in Chungking.
Trip to New Delhi and North Burma
front.
Trip to Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi.
Travel in southwest provinces.
Temporarily at Chengtu and returned to
Chungking.
Oct. 20
Nov. 2 . .._ ..
Nov. 26
Dec. 16
1943
Jan. 19
Jan. 23
Feb. 24
Apr. 12
May 3
May 10
Aug. 10
Aug. 18
September
December
19U
January.
February
Apr. 17
•
Jap? commence campaign on Yellow River
May 18 .
front.
Japs capture Loyang.
May 27 _
Japs commence Yangtze valley campaign.
Juno 18
Japs capture Changsha.
June 20 ..
Comprehensive memo on situation in
China with recommendations (Doc. 157).
June 21-2-1
Vice Presidenl Wallace visit to Chungking.
Do .
Approval for Yenan mission.
July 7
FDR message to Chiang recommending
July 15
Stilw ell command of all forces.
F 1 > l; me sage to Chiang notes agreement in
July 16.
July 22
Promoted from FSO-VI1 to FSO-VI.
Arrived Yenan with first section of i rnited
States Army observer irroup.
principle.
A.ug. 8 . .--
.lips capture Hengyang.
Aim 10
FDR nominates Hurley as personal repre-
sentative.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1903
Chronology of emits — Continued
Date
Aus!. 23.
Aug. 28.
Aug. 29.
Aus. 30.
Sept. l (?)_
Sept. 6
Sept. 22-26.
Oct. 10
Oct. 19.
Oct. 21.
Oct. 23.
Oct. 24.
Oct. 29.
Nov. 1..
Nov. 7..
Nov. 10.
Nov. 12
Nov. 18.
Nov. 19.
Nov. 22.
Nov. 30.
Dec. 10.
Dec. 19_.
Dec. 26 (?).
Dec. 28... .
194$
Jan. 2
Jan. 7.
Jan. 9.
Jan. 14.
Jan. 18.
Jan. 31.
Feb. 3..
Feb. 4.
Feb. 6.
Feb. 11.
Feb. 17.
Feb. 19.
Feb. 26.
Mar. 1.
Mar. 9.
Mar. 10.
Mar. 30.
Apr. 3...
Apr. 4...
Apr. 8 ..
Movements and activities of John S. Service
First recommendation that consideration
be given to arming Communists.
Memorandum recommending stronger at-
titude toward Chiang (Doc. 193).'
Ordered to return to United States.
Departed Yenan.
Departed Chungking.
Arrived Washington, commenced consul-
tation (CA).
Completed consultation and departed
Washington for leave in California.
Arrived Washington and ordered to
Chungking for detail to General Wede-
meyer.
Departed Washington for Chungking
Arrived Chungking.
Other movements and activities
Memorandum prepared with Ludden at
Wedemeyer's request stating military
necessity for flexible policy (Doc. 204).
Left Chungking; arrived at Yenan under
Army orders to report on expected
Communist Party Congress.
Ordered to return to Washington.
Departed Yenan.
Departed Chungking.
FDR again urges Chiang to give command
to Stilwell.
Lishui captured by Japs.
Ambassador Gauss proposed to Chiang
desirability of broadening base of Gov-
ernment by a "war council."
Hurley interview with Molotov at Mos-
cow.
Hurley arrives at Chungking.
Discouraging reports by Stilwell to Mar-
shall.
Stilwell recalled.
Gauss resigned as Ambassador to China.
Hurley flies to Yenan.
Hurley and Mao sign five-point draft agree-
ment.
Kweilin captured by Japs.
FDR to Hurley instructing to press for im-
mediate unification of armies.
Kuomintang three-point counterproposal.
Hurley appointed Ambassador to China.
Communists reject Kuomintang proposals.
General McClure interview with Chen
Cheng (Minister of War) on proposal for
guerrilla operation in Communist area.
Colonel Bird (OSS) discusses McClure
proposals with Communists in Yenan.
Communists propose additional four points.
Mao Tse-tung makes secret proposal
through Wedemeyer that he visit United
States for talk with FDR.
Hurley telegram to FDR blaming break-
down of negotiations on McClure pro-
posals for arming Communists.
Hurley summary report to Department.
Proposal for Political Consultative Con-
ference seemed about to be accepted by
Communists.
Hurley reported Chinese desire to negotiate
with Russia and offered to be middleman.
SecState cautions Hurley on assuming re-
sponsibility as go-between or adviser.
Yalta Agreement on Far East.
Hurley and Wedemeyer leave Chungking
for consultation in Washington.
Acheson telegram summarizing situation
and recommending that deadlock be
broken by direct action in giving some
arms to Communist.
Chiang announces People's Congress to
convene November 12, 1945.
Communist Party rejects further negotia-
tions because of C hiang plans for People's
Congress.
OSS raid on Amerasia offices in New York.
Hurley departed Washington for China.
1904 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Chronology of events — Continued
Date
Movements and activities of John S. Service
Apr.9
Apr. 12
Apr. 15_.
tation in Department (FE).
Apr. 18
Met Gavn for first time
Apr. 19 -.
Met Jaffe for first time
Apr. 23
Do
Apr.
Mav
25.
May
May
May
June
June
June
6__
7__
15.
Julyl..
July (?).
Aug. 6_
Aug.
Aug.
Aug. 12.
Aug.
Aug.
Sept. 7.
Sept. 14.
Sept. 22.
Oct. 2.
Oct. 10.
Oct. 11.
Oct. 12.
Nov. 26.
Nov. 27.
Do-
Do.
Nov. 28..
Dec. 5-10.
Dec. 15...
Apr. 16.
Apr. 18.
1946
Julv 19.
Auir. 26.
Talked to IPR, New York.
Completed consultation and was assigned
to Office of the Foreign Service for pre-
paratory studies connected with pro-
jected legislation on the Foreien Service.
Letter of commendation from Wedemeyer.
Promoted from FSO-VI to FSO-IV.
Given permanent assignment to Depart-
ment, continued work in OFS.
Arrested by FBI.
Placed on leave with pa .
Appeared before grand jury in Wash-
ington.
Grand jury returns "no true bill."
Appearance before Foreign Service Person-
nel Board.
Returned to active duty and temporarily
assigned to FE as liaison officer with ad-
ministrative divisions in connection
with arrangements for reopening offices
in the Far East.
Received letters from Byrnes and Grew.
Assiened to staff of United States political
adviser in Japan.
Departed from Washington.
Arrived in Tokyo with Acheson
Hospitalized in Tokyo.
Transferred from Tokyo to Wellington.
Discharged from hospital.
Other movements and activities
Acheson ordered to return to United
States.
Hurley interviews Stalin at Moscow.
Harriman in Department urges caution on
Stalin assurances.
Kennan in Moscow states Soviet assurances
only good for short term.
Department cautions Hurley and instructs
to press for early military and political
unification— before end of war.
Hurley informs T. V. Soong of Yalta Agree-
ment.
Kuomintang-Communist negotiations re-
sumed: committee of seven visits Yenan.
Hurley report that Communists will pre-
sent no difficulty if treaty signed with
Russia.
Sino-Soviet Treaty signed.
Hurley brings Mao Tse-tung from Yenan
to Chungking to reopen negotiations.
Hurley submitted report that basic agree-
ment had been reached and departed
from Chungking for U. S.
Hurley in conversation with Secretary
Byrnes says nothing of disloyalty or
sabotage by Acheson and Service.
Representative Dondero in speech on
House floor charges Amerasia "white-
wash."
Mao Tse-tung returns to Yenan.
Hurley in conversation with President and
Byrnes makes first statement that he had
not had full support but agrees to return
immediately to China.
Hurley, in conversation with Byrnes, men-
tions Acheson and Service for first time
but again agrees to return immediately to
China.
Congressman DeLacy makes speech in
House criticizing Hurley.
Hurley announces resignation and issues
statement criticizing Foreign Service.
General Marshall appointed President's
Special Representative.
Dondero again attacks Amerasia case.
Ilr .rings conducted by Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on Hurley charges.
President's policy statement establishes
principle of conditional aid.
House passed H. R. 430 introduced by
Dondcio for investigation of Amerasia
case.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1905
Chronology of events — Continued
Date
Movements and activities of JohnS. Service
Other movements and activities
Sept. 6
Sept. 18...
Sept. 28...
Oct. 15
Oct. 23....
Nov. 13
1H7
ms
Apr. 14.
Jan. 7.
Jan. 10.
19J>9
Feb. 11.
Mar. 21.
Oct. 19
Nov. 21
1950
Jan. 5
Feb. 3
Feb. 12
Feb. 20
Mar. 11_
Mar. 14.
Mar. 16.
Mar. 23.
Mar. 24.
Mar. 27_
Mar. 30.
Departed from Japan.
Arrived at home in California
Left San Francisco for Wellington.
Arrived at Wellington.
Reclassified as FSO-3.
At Wellington.
At Wellington.
Promoted to FSO-2.
Left Wellington on transfer to Washing-
ton.
Arrived Washington and commenced
duty with Foreign Service Selection
Board.
Completed Selection Board duty and
assigned to Division of Foreign Service
Personnel as Special Assistant (actual
duties to consult Foreign Service officers
in regard to their efficiency reports).
Assigned to Calcutta as officer in charge
Left Washington for leave in California
en route to Calcutta.
Departed from Seattle by ship for India.
Received cable recalling to Washington.
Arrived Yokohama.
Departed Tokyo for Washington.
Arrived Washington, D. C.
Larsen article published in Plain Talk.
House Judiciary Subcommittee reports on
investigation of Amerasia case.
Discussion of Service case by House Sub-
committee on Appropriations.
Publication by Congressman Judd of
Service memo. No. 40, Oct. 10, 1945.
Attack by Senator McCarthy on Service
on Senate floor.
Lincoln Day speech by Senator McCarthy
at Reno, naming Service.
McCarthy speech in Senate giving details
of 81 cases but not including Service.
McCarthy charges against Service pre
sented to Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committe.
Senator McCarthy repeats testimony
before Tydings subcommittee re Service.
REJXLY, RHETTS & RUCKELSHATJS,
Washington, D. C, June 21, 1950.
Senator Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman of the Subcommittee,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee Appointed Under Senate Resolution 231,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : You may recall that during the course of Mr.
Service's testimony before your Committee in public session, he made reference
to the fact that the possibility of American landings on the coast of China
was a subject of widespread interest and discussion in the spring of 1945. In
that connection, as an example of general public interest in and discussion of
this possibility, he referred (Transcript of Proceedings, June 22, 1950, p. 2086)
to a press conference at which Admiral Nimitz was reported to have mentioned
the possibility of such landings. In order to complete your record on this par-
ticular point, I should like to refer you to the publication in which Admiral
Nimitz was so quoted, with the request that you include this letter in the record
of the Committee's proceedings.
1906 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION'
This press conference was referred to in the magazine The China Monthly
for April 1945, at p. 25, and the account of Admiral Nimitz' press conference is
as follows :
"Admiral Nimitz Suggests Landing on China Coast
"Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who recently came to Washington for im-
portant strategy conferences, intimated on March 8, 1945, that a China coast
landing may precede the invasion of Japan proper. In a press conference
he said :
" 'I believe that we should plan the war against Japan in such a manner
that our chances of success are greatest and our casualties least. In
planning the final assault on the empire, we will need more than one position
from which to attack. We will need a number of positions. It well may
be that some of these positions will be in China."
Respectfully yours,
C. E. Rhetts.
Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus,
Washington, D. C, June 27, 1950.
Senator Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman of the Subcommittee,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign. Relations,
Subcommittee Appointed Under Senate Resolution 231,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Tydings : You will recall that during the course of the
hearing in executive session before your Subcommittee yesterday, June 26,
Senator McMahon requested, and you directed, Mr. Service to supply to the
Committee for inclusion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, certain
excerpts from published materials reflecting General Hurley's views (1) as to
the desirability of effecting a unification of the forces of the Chinese Central
Government with those of the Chinese Communist party, and (2) as to whether
he personally agreed with the views expressed to him by Marshal Stalin and
Molotov that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists and that the
Soviet Union was not interested in the Chinese Communists.
I enclose herewith material bearing on the questions, consisting of certain
extracts from the so-called China White Paper, extracts from the transcript
of the minutes of a press and radio news conference held by General Hurley on
April 2, 1945, and certain excerpts from the transcript of testimony taken before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945.
Respectfully yours,
C. E. Rhetts.
The following are extracts from United States Relations With China, pub-
lished as Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Released
August, 1949 (pp. 563-564) :
Secretary Hull to the Ambassador in China ((Jauss)
893.00/S-3144
Washington. September 9, 1944.
1. Careful consideration lias been accorded to your messages by the President
and by me. and we are in agreement with you that at the present time, a frank,
friendly, and positive approach should be made to Chiang Kai Shek on the mat-
ters of governmental and related military conditions in China.
*******
4. Further, we note with approval that you utilized the opportunity afforded
by conversation with Chiang to mention your idea of a coalition council as de-
scribed by you. Please tell Chiang that the President and I feel your sugges-
tion is timely as well as practical, and worthy of eareful consideration; that
we are concerned not alone with reference to nonsettlement with the Chinese Com-
munists but also with regard to reports of dissidence and dissatisfaction among
non-Communist Chinese in other areas of the country; that we are not con-
cerned with Chinese Communists or other dissident elements as such, but are
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1907
anxious. OD behalf Of the Tinted Nations and on our own behalf, and also on
behalf of China, that, under the leadership of a strong hut tolerant and rep-
resentative government, the people of China develop and use the spiritual and
physical resources at their command to carry on the war and to establish a
lasting democratic peace, and to achieve this, factional differences can, and
should be, settled and merged by intelligent cooperation and conciliation. It
is our belief that a most effective means to achieve this end would hi' a council
or some body which represents a II influential elements in China, with full powers,
under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek. However, we recognize that Chiang
may have in mind some means of achieving the same result which would be
equally or more effective.
Further, you may make use as you wish of such portions of the cogent argu-
ments expressed in your telegrams, as coming from us, and also the views which
were well expressed by Acheson on August ninth in his conversation with
Sun Po.
Kindly inform General Hurley, General Stilwell, and Mr. Nelson with regard
to the matter. You are authorized to invite one or more of them to go with
you to call upon Chiang if you feel that it would serve a useful purpose.
Hull.
n. the effoet at mediation
Initial steps
Upon arriving at Chungking in September, General Hurley came to the con-
clusion that the success of his mission to unify all the military forces in China
for the purpose of defeating Japan was dependent on the negotiations already
under way for the unification of Chinese military forces. Accordingly, shortly
after his' arrival he understook active measures of mediation between the
Chinese National Government and the Chinese Communist Party.
In December 1944 General Hurley commented as follows regarding his early
efforts at reconciliation :
"At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist
party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government in Russia. He
is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the
Chinese Communist Party as Communist at all and that (1) Russia is not
supporting the Communist Party in China, (2) Russia does not want dis-
sensions or civil war in China, and (3) Russia desires more harmonious re-
lations with China.
"These facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the
Communist Party in China is not an agent of the Soviet Government. He
now feels that he can reach a settlement with the Communist Party as
a Chinese political party without foreign entanglements. When I first
arrived, it was thought that civil war after the close of the present war or
perhaps before that time was inevitable. Chiang Kai-shek is now con-
vinced that by agreement with the Communist Party of China he can (1)
unite the military forces of China against Japan, and (2) avoid civil strife
in China."
With respect to specific steps taken by him. General Hurley reported in De-
cember 1944 that with the consent, advice and direction of the Generalissimo and
members of his Cabinet and on the invitation of leaders of the Communist Party,
he had begun discussions with the Communist Party and Communist military
leaders for the purpose of effecting an agreement to regroup, coordinate and
unite the military forces of China for the defeat of Japan. He continued : "The
defeat of Japan is, of course, the primary objective, but we should all understand
that if an agreement is not reached between the two great military establishments
of China, civil war will in all probability ensue."
The fire-point draft agreement, November 10, 19^4
Following discussions with Chinese Government and Chinese Communist
representatives in Chungking, General Hurley on November 7, 1944, flew to
Yenan for a two-day conference with Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The Communist leaders
were impressed by the fact that General Hurley had taken the initiative in making
this flight and cordial relations were established at once. As a result of these
discussions there was evolved at Yenan a five-point draft, entitled "Agreement
Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and
1908 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the Communist Party of China," which was signed by Mao Tse-tung as Chairman
of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party * * *
and by General Hurley as a witness. This important agreement read as follows :
"(1) The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Com-
munist Party of China will work together for the unification of all military
forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction
of China.
" (2) The present National Government is to be reorganized into a coalition
National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties
and nonpartisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for
reform in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promul-
gated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is
to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of
representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.
"(3) The coalition National Government will support the principles of
Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for
the people and by the people. The coalition National Government will pursue
policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice,
freedom of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assem-
bly and association, the right to petition the government for the redress of
grievances, the right of writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence. The
coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make
effective the two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.
"(4) All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of
the coalition National Government and its United National Military Council
and will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The
supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.
"(5) The coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality
of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-
Japanese parties."
The three-point plan
General Hurley felt that this Five-Point Draft Agreement, which he promptly
submitted to the National Government, offered a practical plan for settlement with
the Communists. National Government leaders, however, said that the Commu-
nist plan was not acceptable (pp. 73-75).
*******
General Hurley reported that he was conferring daily with the Generalissimo
and members of his cabinet "endeavoring to liberalize the counterproposal.
We are having some success. The Generalissimo states that he is anxious that
the military forces of the Communist Party in China and those of the National
Government he united to drive the invaders from China. The Communist
leaders declare this is also their objective. I have persuaded Chiang that
in order to unite the military forces in China and prevent civil conflict it will
be necessary for him and the Kuomintang and the National Government to
make liberal political concessions to the Communist Party and to give them
adequate representation in the National Government" (p. 76).
*******
Mr. Harriman feared that Ambassador Hurley might give Chiang Kai-shek an
"overoptimistic account of his conversations with Stalin" and he thought it
might be advisable to suggest to General Hurley that he should he careful "not
to arouse unfounded expectations." On April 23 Secretary Stettiniua instructed
Ambassador Hurley as follows :
"I attach great importance to Marshal Stalin's endorsement at the present
time of our program for furthering the political and military unity of
China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. However, at the same time
I feel, as I have no doubt you do also, the necessity of facing the probability
that Marshal Stalin's offer is given in direct relation to circumstances that
are existing now and that may not long continue. The U. S. S. R. is at
present preoccupied in Europe and the basis for her position in Asia follow-
ing the war is not yet affected by the Communist-Kuomintang issue to an
appreciable degree. In view of these circumstances I can well appreciate
the logic of Marshal Stalin's readiness to defer to our leadership and to
support American efforts directed toward military and political unification
which could scarcely fail to be acceptable to the U. S. S. R. * * * Con-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1909
sequently I believe that it is of the utmost Importance thai when informing
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the statements made by Marshal Stalin
you take special pains to convey to him the general thought expressed in
the preceding paragraph in order that the urgency of the situation may be
fully realized by him. Please impress upon Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
the necessity for early military and political unification in order not only
to bring about the successful conclusion of the Japanese war but also to
establish a basis upon which relations between China and the Soviet Union
mav eventually become one of mutual respect and permanent friendship"
(p. 98).
ii
The following are excerpts from the transcript of minutes prepared by the
State Department of a Press and Radio News Conference, Monday, April 2, 1945,
held by General Hurley :
'•A. * * * You gentlemen should know though — I believe you all do know,
that it is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China
supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. That was generally referred to as
the people's three principles of China. The three principles are government
of the people, by the people, and for the people. All the demands that the
Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has
led to the statement that the Communist party in China are not, in fact, real
Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same
principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and con-
ceded to be objectives also of the National Government.
"Q. Sir. I am not sure that I understood that last sentence. You said the
Communist Party is supporting the same principles as the National Government
of China.
"A. Yes.
'•Q. Could you tell us what is the divergence between them? How do they
differ?
"A. Well, as a matter of fact, the divergence between the parties in China
seems to be not in the objective desired because they both assert that they are
for the establishment of a government in China that will decentralize authority
and conduct itself along democratic lines, employing democratic processes. The
divergence between them is the procedure by which they can be achieved. To
go a little further, the Communist Party would like for the National Govern-
ment to inaugurate certain reforms immediately and to do this, they have sug-
gested a bipartisan coalition government. The National Government, that is,
the Kuomintang Party, has stated that it has a program outlined by the liber-
ator of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whereby the authority of the government of
China is to be returned to the people of China under a constitution and not to
an aggregation of political parties. The National Government of China contends
that it is now in the process of a meeting being held on the 5th of next month,
a program whereby it will return control of the government to the people. The
National Government claims that it would not be justified in turning over the
authority of government to any organizations or political parties, or any coali-
tion of politicians but that it is the attitude of the National Government to
return the control of China to the people and let the people select their own
leaders.
"Q. General, what is the real difference between the Chinese Communists
in China and the Communists in America, Britain, and elsewhere?
"A. Well, I know the difference between the Republicans and Democrats in
Oklahoma, but you are getting too deep for me when you are trying to make
me outline the difference between foreign political parties."
*******
"Q. Is this Communist delegate who has been appointed to the Chinese dele-
gation really a Communist as far as you know?
•A. I think he is. I do know that he was their representative at Chungking
and that he is now in Yenan and I have had many conferences with him. Now,
to say whether he is a real Communist as you understand Communism. I would
not say that. I don't know because there is a question whether any of the
Chinese Communists are real Communists, but I do say this : that he does belong
to the Communist Party and does cooperate with and serve that Party. Now,
to determine what is the degree of Communism and what kind of Communism
it is, I could not give you a definition of that."
*******
1910 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
in
The following are excerpts from the transcript of testimony taken before
the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Far
Eastern Policy, December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945 :
"General Hurley. At that time our policy in China was clearly defined and
could be stated roughly as follows: (1) To unify all anti-Japanese military
forces in China, and (2) to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to
establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government," (p. 32).
*******
Senator Connally. It was part of your instructions, was it not, also to try
to get union between the so-called 'communists' and the Chiang Government,
so they could both fight the Japanese V
"General Hurley. Yes, sir" (p. 39).
*******
"Senator Connally. Did General Stilwell ever tell you that his purpose in
advocating the arming and unification of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's
forces was to destroy the Government of China? Did he ever tell you that?
"General Hurley. No, sir (p. 44).
"Senator Connally. I was talking about the devision of opinion between
General Stilwell and yourself. It was rather sharp, was it not?
"Ceneral Hurley. It was not.
"Senator Connally. It was not sharp?
"General Hurley. No, sir (p. 46) * * *
"Senator Connally. What did they (Stilwell and Chiang) disagree about, if
you do not mind stating — about the Communist army, or not?
"General Hurley. As I recall, at that time Ceneral Stilwell and I were not
in disagreement in regard to the Chinese Communist armies. * * * So far as
I know. General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue, and we have
never had a controversial word between us (p. 47) . * * *
"Senator Connally. General Stilwell did advocate, however, the unification
of the Communists with the Central Government in fighting, making a united
front against the Japanese?
"General Hurley. He had been advocating that for two and a half years and,
so far as I know, had not gone to the Communists as I had done. I think
that he advocated everything that I advocated in that connection. * * * I
•think he was in favor of unification of the forces. I certainly was, and we
had no controversy on that" (p. 90).
*******
"General Hurley. If the Chinese Communists had been armed at that time,
if they had been armed by us or by Russia or by Great Britain, it would in
my opinion have made the collapse of the National Government inevitable, and
the documents I have asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain
I think will prove that the object was to arm the belligerents and withdraw
support from the Government, which in my opinion was contrary to the American
policy (p. 130).
"Senator Bridges. Whose objective was that, General Hurley? (p. 130).
"General Hurley. I have stated that it was the objective of the Communists,
the Communist armed party, and please distinguish between them and the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republics, because they are different. * * * Russia is not
_ supporting the Chinese Communist Party. * * *" (p. 130).
* ******
"Senator Connally. If you had succeeded in your unification program, you
would have been willing to arm the Communists, then, would you not? (p. 184).
'•Ceneral Hurley. Oh, yes. (p. 185).
"Senator Connally. If they were going to fight with you?
"Ceneral Hurley. Oh, yes, yes.
'•Senator Connally. Yes.
"Ceneral Hurley. Through their own government.
"Senator Connally. Why, certainly, certainly.
"General Hurley. I certainly was willing to arm them through their own
government. Any time the National Government wished to arm the Communists
I would have been in favor of it, but I was not in favor of arming a belligerent
against the government that we were committed to uphold" (p. 1S5).
* ******
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1911
"General IIikuy ;: * * very early in our negotiations I had an under-
standing with Hit' Russian Government in regard to ;i rapproacheinenl between
China and the Soviet. Russia has said from the beginning that the < hinese
Communists are not in fact Communists .-it all, thai Russia does support the
National Government of the Republic of China and the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek, that Russia desires closer anil more harmonious relations with China.
This attitude of Russia was finally solemnized in the Sino-Soviet Pact last
summer" (p. 33 I.
*******
"General Htjklet. Both the Communist armed party and the National Govern-
ment have adopted the slogan which represents their objective — 'a government
of the people, by the people, and for the people.' Both the Communists and the
National Government state that their objective is to make effective in China all
the rights of man enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. All the
parties of China contend that their purpose is to make democratic processes
effective throughout China" (p. 33).
*******
"General Hurley. * * * Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov * * * indi-
cated to me that they do not consider the Chinese Communists as Communists at
all. Oh, yes — there are some of them who are Communists, but the general rank
and hie of the Communist Party, the heads of the Soviet Government do not
consider as Communists. Two: They advised me at that time that they were
not aiding the Communist Party in China against the Republic of China. Three:
That they would support the National Government of the Republic of China, and,
a little further than we had agreed to go, the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. Finally : that Russia desired closer and more harmonious relations
witli China (p. 40L).
"Senator Connaixy. I helieve you stated a while ago that you thought that
Russia was observing and living up to its treaty with China.
"General Hurley. 1 do (p. 40N).
"Senator Austin. * * * This Chinese armed party occupies a large area
in China, does it not? (p. 72).
"General Hurley. It claims to.
"Senator Austin. As a matter of fact, are there not segments of this armed
party scattered over all of northern China as far down as the Yellow River?
"General Hurley. Yes, sir"
* * * * sjc * *
"Senator Austin. And are they unified so that the Army of this Chinese
armed party would be a great threat to the unification of China under the
Rebulic?
"General Hueley. Yes, sir. That is true even if we do not arm them with
lend-lease, and if they are successful in getting some of the Japanese arms. But
without aid from Russia, aid from the United States, aid from Britain, or the
acquisition of Japanese arms, they are not an insurmountable threat.
"Senator Austin, is it your opinion that they are getting financial aid from
any of these sources that you have just mentioned? (p. 73).
"General Hurley. I would have to answer that question in the negative"
(p. 74).
*******
"General Hurley. * * * please distinguish between them and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different, and all of this time Marshal
Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire
period of the vicissitudes through which we passed so far as I know they have
kept their word to me, that, as I stated yesterday. Russia— and this is my own
analysis, it is not a quotation— does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist
party as Communist at all. Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist
Tarty. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the
division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer
and more harmonious relations with china (p. 130).
* I have read that the Soviet has transgressed certain matters that
involve the territorial integrity and the independent sovereignty of China*; hut
frankly I have no evidence that would convince me that that is true 1 believe
that the United States and Russia are still together on policy in China" ( p. 131).
*****
"Senator Wiley. It is your judgment— from what you testified tlrs morning
1 gained it— that American and Russia are both playing on the level in the
r ar Last .•' (p. H'A).
1912 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"General Huklet. Yes, sir. * * * Our Government saw some time ago
the possibility of a victory in Europe before a victory over Japan. Consequently
it was the purpose of our Government to try to find an amicable basis, in our
next point of contact with Russia, which is Manchuria ; and that amicable basis
was worked out I think satisfactorily in the Sino-Soviet Agreement and in the
exchange of letters that accompanied it ; * * * " (p. 164-165).
*******
"Senator Connally. * * * Now, as I understand it, there is a popular
theory going around over the country that Russia is supporting the so-called
Communists in China. You view is that that is not true? (p. 177).
"General Hukley. I would say this, in answer to that question, Senator — that
I have the word of both Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov that they are
not (pp. 177-178).
"Senator Connally. * * * Anyway, so far as you know, the Russians are
not cooperating with the so-called Communists in China — as far as you know?
"General Hurley. That is as far as I know" (p. 178).
*******
"Secretary Byrnes. * * * During the war the immediate goal of the United
States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions
in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan.
Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is
the development of a strong, united and democratic China" (p. 189).
*******
"Secretary Byrnes. * * * We believe, as we have long believed and con-
sistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also
believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large
and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government
of China" (pp. 189-190).
*******
"Secretary Byrnes. * * * To the extent that our influence is factor, suc-
cess will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shift-
ing conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Govern-
ment, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions" (p. 190).
*******
"Secretary Byrnes. If I understand correctly what Ambassador Hurley has
stated to me, and subsequently to the press and to this Committee, he entertains
no disagreement with this conception of our policy" (p. 190).
[A carbon copy of the following memorandum was recovered in the offices of Amerasia]
The Stilwell Affair and Hurley's Appointment
This information, classified as Top Secret ("Byes Only"), is supplied by
John S. Service. Especial caution must be shown in the use of the two White
House messages to Chiang Kai-shek, whose text is given below.
*******
Early in July 1944 the U. S. Command in Chungking received a Top Secret
message from the White House to be conveyed to Gen. Chiang Kai-shek. The
message was taken to Chiang by Brig. Gen. Ferris. For fear that the text
might be garbled by Chiang's own translator, John Service accompanied Ferris
as interpreter. On arrival at Chiang's place, the two Americans asked Chiang
to exclude all others from the room. Chiang listened in silence, and later said
he would transmit his reply to the White House through his own channels. The
message, as paraphrased by Service on May 19, 1945, was:
The situation in China is desperate and calls for drastic steps.
The President, therefore, suggests that all armies in China, including
those of the Communists, be placed under an American commander. Al-
though the President knows of Chiang's dislike for General Stilwell, he
nevertheless believes that Stilwell's experience and record make him the best
man for the job. The President would give Stilwell the necessary rank —
make him a four-star general.
Chiang's reply was apparently transmitted through H. H. Kung, who was
then attending the Bretton Woods conference. About ten days after the Presi-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1913
dent's first message, another message arrived in Chungking. It gives a fair
indication of Chiang's reply to the White House. The second message, also
transmitted to Chiang by Ferris and Service, said in essence:
I am glad that you are in principle agreed to my suggestion for an
American commander over all the forces in the China theater. Although,
as you say, there are political factors which must be considered and there
is also the important question of timing, I believe that the situation is so
urgent that we should not delay; the political questions can certainly be
solved. I agree with your suggestion for a high ranking political representa-
tive who can discuss these military and political matters, and I am looking
now to find such a man who can have your complete confidence. [Service's
words are apparently garbled in transcription from shorthand.]
Service is not sure who was responsible for the choice of Hurley, but believes
that Harry Hopkins, as FDR's chief adviser, had his hand in the selection.
Hurley arrived in Chungking in September — a few weeks after Stilwell became
a four-star general. At first Hurley was friendly with Stilwell. but eventually
went over to the Chinese view that Stilwell must be fired for the sake of Sin-
American amity. Stilwell today believes that Hurley stabbed him in the back
by strongly urging the President to recall Stilwell.
Asked for some of the reasons for the Stilwell-Chiang rift, Service listed
these :
(a) At various times, Stilwell recommended to Chiang a drastic reshuffle of
the Chinese command. All these suggestions were invariably ignored. Stilwell
regarded Ho Ying-chin as one of the main obstacles to army reform advocated
by the U. S. Stilwell also thought badly of Gen. Tu Li-ming [Service is unsure
of this name], who was in command on the Salween front, and once, in anger,
Stilwell suggested to Chiang that the best thing to do with Tu is to shoot him.
(&) There were a number of controversies dealing with orders issued by
Stilwell or Chiang. The Chinese divisions in Burma, for instance, were receiv-
ing order from Chiang of which Stilwell knew nothing, or which were in direct
conflict with the orders issued by Stilwell. This completely muddled up the
military picture in Burma. One controversy dealt with Chiang's insistence
that the battle for Burma be fought not by the Chinese but by the Allies, landing
at Rangoon. Stilwell's efforts to explain that he had nothing to do with the
formulation of the campaign plans for Burma remained fruitless.
(c) Chiang continually complained to Hurley that "his subordinate" was not
carrying out his orders.
id) Chiang insisted that before the Communist armies were given any aid, or
put under an American commander, a political settlement had to be arrived at.
Chiang, however, made any such settlement impossible.
(e) A sharp conflict developed over the use of lend-lease, Stilwell insisting on
retaining control over the supplies and arguing that there was no sense in
spreading these precious supplies thin among the untrained Chinese troops.
Stilwell's point was that the Chinese armies have to be carefully weeded and
trained before U. S. equipment is given to them. Wedemeyer, incidentally, has
managed to retain control of the lend-lease supplies.
There is nothing new in these points, but they give confirmation to the reports
already published in this country. At present, Service says, there is some im-
provement in the Chinese army, for some units had been given "diluted training."
Troops thus trained, of course, do not come up to the standard of the divisions
trained at Rangar (?), India, where the Chinese were given regular GI training.
Every Chinese division now is accompanied by a team of TJ. S. advisers and
instructors — perhaps ten to a division. Unless I am mistaken, Service said that
the Mars Force has been disbanded, and split into teams assigned to instruct
Chinese units.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Washington, June 19, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : This is in response to your letter of June 7, 1950, request-
ing advice concerning the nature and preparation of the chart which Senator
McCarthy referred to in his address upon the Senate floor on June 6, 1950.
1914 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
You are advised that the document referred to by Senator McCarthy was not
prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It may lie that the State
Department will be in a position to furnish your committee information con-
cerning this document. This Department does not have a copy in its possession.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
Deputy Attorney General.
Department of State,
Washington, June 28, 1950.
The Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator Tydings : When I appeared before your subcommittee on
June 21, 1950, you requested a copy of the report entitled "Survey of Depart-
mental Personnel Security Investigations," which was prepared by Mr. Samuel
Klaus on August 3, 1946. A copy of this report is.attached for your information.
The names of the persons who were either employed by the Department, or were
applicants for positions, as well as the names of the informants, have been elim-
inated from the report, in accordance with our understanding.
This report was prepared after Mr. Klaus, who was then assigned to the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Administration, had conducted a survey of the
departmental personnel security investigations. You will note that the state-
ments on pages 1 and 2 point out specific limitations of the survey and the
report. Subsequent to this report and in early 1947 the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, at my request, conducted a much more thorough and complete
survey of the Department's Division of Security and Investigations. The com-
pleted FBI report was submitted to me on April 28, 1947. You will remember
that when I appeared before your subcommittee on June 21 I stated that the
FBI report, together with statements of actions taken on their recommendations,
had been furnished to Senator Lodge. It is my understanding that Senator
Lodge will make all of the information available to your subcommittee.
The conditions mentioned by Mr. Klaus do not exist today. Corrective action
has been taken through a realinement of the security responsibilities of the De-
partment, a reorganized Division of Security, and the establishment of loyalty
and security standards. The details of these actions have previously been made
available to your subcommittee. You, will observe that on pages 29 and 30
of the Klaus report reference is made to a chart alleged to have been prepared
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No such chart was ever received by
the Department of State from the FBI, nor was such a chart ever prepared by
the FBI. After consulation with the writer of the report, with the former
Security Officer, under whose direction and whose office the chart was prepared,
with certain of his then subordinates familiar with the chart, and with the FBI,
and after reviewing working papers which are still in our file, we have con-
clusively determined that the chart was not prepared or furnished by the
FBI, but was prepared as an investigator's working document in the Depart-
ment of State in 1946 and by employees of the Department of State. The inter-
view with the writer of the report and the Security Officer with whom he had
a conversation about the chart, established that the writer of the report drew
from his eonversation with the Security Officer the unintentional, erroneous
conclusion that the chart was prepared by the FBI.
Furthermore, on June 14. 1950, Mr. Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, advised the Department by letter that the FBI did not send
any such chart to the State Department and made no evaluation of information
as was indicated in the Klaus report. While the letter from the FBI was made
available for the record when I appeared before your subcommittee on June 21,
a cony of that letter is attached for your convenience.
With respect to the persons indicated on the chart and in the report as
"agents," "communists," "sympathizers," and "suspects," the FBI, as indicated
above, made no such evaluation. It should be emphasized that the chart, was
prepared by the Department's Security Officers merely for working purposes.
The chart showed the names of employees on whom the Security Officers had,
in May 19-l(i, received allegations which, in their opinion warranted further
investigations. You are assured that none of these persons are now employed
by the Department, except those who have since been investigated and who have
been checked and evaluated under the Loyalty Program.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1915
Copies Of the Department's Press Releases of June 6 and June 51, 1950, per-
taining to tlif report, are attached for your information.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peubifoy,
Deputy Under Secretary.
Attachments: As stated.
United States Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. ('., June 1',, 1950.
By special messenger.
Hon. James E. Webb,
Under Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Webb: Recent newspaper articles have come to my attention contain-
ing statements made by Senator Joseph R, McCarthy, wherein he quoted ex-
cerpts from the State Department report prepared by Mr. Samuel Klaus of your
Department which referred particularly to an alleged "FBI Chart."
The comments made by Mr. Klaus in his report concerning this alleged "FBI
Chart," as they appeared in the newspapers, were completely erroneous. This
Bureau did not send any such chart to the State Department, and, of course,
made no evaluation of information as was indicated in the report. The author
of the report took occasion to criticize the FBI in this report. This Bureau
does not claim to be infallible; however, it appears that, if the State Depart-
ment had any questions concerning the report, the matter should have been dis-
cussed with us at that time. I want to point out that the erroneous statements
made by Mr. Klaus were highly embarrassing and prejudicial to the FBI.
As you are aware, this Bureau cooperates fully with your Department through
established liaison channels. I thought you would he interested in knowing the
true tacts in this matter, and they are being furnished to you for whatever action
you may deem desirable.
Sincerely yours,
John Edgar Hoover, Director.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Washington, June 18, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings.
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator: In response to your question as to the dates of various
searches made by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the offices of
Amerasia and the residences of the subjects in the case, the following data is
submitted :
The offices of Amerasia, Room 1141, 225 Fifth Avenue, New York City, were
entered by Bureau Agents on March 20, 1945; March 27, 194."); the night of April
23-24, 1945; May 14, 1945; and June 6, 1945. On this latter date Philip Jaffe
and Kate Mitchell were arrested there.
Mark Gayn's residence. Apartment 16 B, 302 West Twelfth Street, New York
City, was entered April 5, 1945; April 27, 1945; April 29, 1945; May 30, 1945;
the night of June 4-5, 1945, and June 6, 1945. On this last date Gayn w&s
arrested.
The apartment of Kate Louise Mitchell. 127 East Fifty-fourth Street, New
York City, was entered on March 31, 1945. and April 2, 1945.
The apartment of Philip Jaffe, 49 East Ninth Street, New York City, was
entered on April 2, 1945, and April 6, 1945. The apartment of Emmanuel Sigurd
Larsen, No. 207, 1650 Harvard Street NW, Washington, D. C, was entered April
6, 1945.
Apartment 227 at 1650 Harvard Street NW, Washington. D. O, was entered
prior to June 4. 1945. on which date Larsen moved into that apartment, and also
on June 6. 1945, when Larsen was arrested.
The residence of Andrew Roth in Arlington. Va., was never entered. An
examination of his effects which were being transported from Arlington, Va.,
to New York City was made on June 1 and 2, 1945. Andrew Rotb was arrested
on the street in Washington, D. C, June 6, 1915.
68970— 50— pt. 2 28
1916 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The residence of John Stewart Service was entered June 6, 1945, when he
was arrested there.
In response to your question concerning a conversation bet wen Philip Jaffe
and John Service in a Washington, D. C, hotel (Question No. 5), the conversa-
tion was overheard through facilities of a technical installation in Jaffe's hotel
room, May 8, 1945.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
Deputy Attorney General.
Office Memorandum — United States Government
Date, April 18, 1945.
To: The Director.
From : D. M. Ladd.
Subject: Phillip Jaffe; Espionage (C).
Mr. Gurnea and the writer attended a conference at the office of General
Holmes, which was attended also by Major Matt Correa and Fred Lyon, at which
time Mr. Gurnea discussed developments in the above-entitled case with these
gentlemen. We advised the conference that you had instructed that they be
brought up to date on the developments and that the question of policy with
reference to the future handling of the matter be determined.
After the discussion, Major Correa and General Holmes both stated that they
were of the opinion that the investigation should be continued for the next two
months or so for the following reasons :
1. In order that any other persons in either the State, Navy, or other Govern-
ment defendants who might be involved could be determined.
2. In order that continued check might be made in New York for the purpose
of endeavoring to determine whether, in fact, Jaffe is obtaining this material
for the use of the Russian Government.
3. If information is developed as suggested under item 2, even though it might
not be possible to utilize this in any prosecution, it would still be of tremendous
value in any diplomatic dealings between this country and Russia.
Both General Holmes and Major Correa requested that, at such time as it is
deemed feasible to break this case, they both be advised in advance, in order that
they may properly notify other departmental officials who will have to know of
developments, inasmuch as they have not been discussing the details of this
matter with their superiors. Major Correa stated that Admiral Thebaud of
ONI has not in any way been advised of developments in this matter, and
that he felt it would be necessary that some notice be given to him just im-
mediately prior to any arrests. The gentlemen were assured by Mr. Gurnea and
myself that they would be appropriately informed prior to taking any such
steps.
General Holmes and Major Correa both stated that, in the event developments
in the case at any time indicated a necessity for immediate action, of course,
the Bureau had blanket authority from both of them to act in such an emergency
provided they were immediately notified prior to making any arrests.
Both of these gentlemen expressed complete satisfaction with the developments
to date and appeared to be following this case with considerable interest.
Cahill, Gordon, Zachry & Reindel,
(Cotton & Frankein),
Washington, D. C, June 13, 1950.
Edward P. Morgan, Esq.,
Counsel, Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Investigating Loyalty of State Department Employees,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : In response to your request I enclose herewith on behalf
of the executors of the estate a photographic copy of a portion of Mr. For-
restal's personal papers together with an affidavit of Eugene S. Dufield who has
custody of various of Mr. Forrestal's personal papers at the present time.
Very truly yours,
Mathias F. Correa.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1917
State of Ohio,
Hamilton County, ss.:
Personally appeared before me, a notary public, in and for Hamilton County,
Ohio, Eugene S. Duffield, who, being duly sworn, deposes:
I currently hold, on behalf of the executors of the late James Forrestal,
various of bis personal papers in order to arrange them for possible publication.
Among them is a page headed, "'2S May 15)45 — Lieutenant Andrew Roth."
A photographic copy of this page is attached. Among the papers temporarily
in my possession, this page contains the only reference to the case mentioned
therein that I have discovered. My careful reading has covered everything
through September 1945 and I have scanned the balance of that year.
I understand that, at the request of the Department of Justice, a typed copy
of this page has previously been furnished to that Department.
Eugene S. Duffield.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 10th day of June 1950.
[seal] Marie F. Wingfield,
Notary Public, tcithin and for Hamilton County, Ohio.
2S May 1945 Lieutenant Andrew Roth
Major Correa reported to me that the Department of Justice has evidence to
the effect that Lieutenant Andrew Roth has been furnishing confidential and
secret documents to a man named Jaffe, head of a publication named "Amerasia"
in New York City. Jaffe has had intimate relationship with the Russian Consul
in New York.
Other Departments of Government involved are the Office of Strategic Services,
the Department of State, and the Foreign Economic Administration.
Major Correa reported that it was proposed that Lieutenant Roth should be
taken into surveillance Wednesday. He said that the FBI thought that unless
speedy action were taken important evidence would be dissipated, lost and de-
stroyed. I pointed out that the inevitable consequence of such action now would
be to greatly embarrass the President in his current conversations with Stalin,
because of the anti-Russian play-up the incident would receive out of proportion
to its importance, particularly in view of the fact that the people involved were
members of the American Communist Party.
I asked Captain Vardaman to see to it that the President was informed in this
matter and then I called Mr. Edgar Hoover and suggested that he advise Mr. Tom
Clark and have him also see that the President is in full information of all of
the facts in the matter as well as their implications.
JF : HCO.
5-29-45.
The staff of the subcommittee interviewed certain persons and sub-
mitted the following memoranda on the results of those interviews :
May 19, 1950.
Memorandum re Interview With Joseph W. Ballentine
On Friday, May 19, 1950, 1 interviewed Mr. Joseph W. Ballentine, at the Brook-
ings Institute, where he is now employed. At the time of the Amerasia arrests
Mr. Ballentine was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department
and Larsen was employed in that Division.
Mr. Ballentine stated that he had no information about the Amerasia case and
that as a matter of fact he was in San Francisco at the time the arrests were
made. He also stated that he knew very little about Mr. Larsen since Mr. Larsen
had first been employed under an independent section and had later been trans-
ferred to the Far Eastern Division. For this reason Mr. Ballentine stated he
had not made the customary check into the employees background.
I specifically asked Mr. Ballentine about Larsen's story about going to him
with statements about Jaffe and both of them subsequently going to see Acting
Secretary Grew. Ballentine stated he could never remember any incident of
this character and it sounded to him of sufficient importance that if it had
happened he would have remembered.
Ballentine added that to the best of his recollection he had never heard of
Jaffe or Larsen's association with him prior to the arrests. I also asked Ballen-
tine about the Far Eastern Division and whether it was divided into pro-Chinese
Communist cliques and pro-Chiang cliques. Ballentine stated that to the best
1918 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of his knowledge there were no such cliques that senior officers in the Division
were all in accord. He did state that some of the junior officers were divided
as to who would make the most effective fighting force in China to help us
in the fight against the Japanese, but the entire emphasis was on who would help
us most again -t the Japs and not who should be supported in China.
Robert L. Heald.
May 22, 1950.
Memorandum re Interview With Robert Bannerman
Mr. Robert Bannerman was interviewed with a request that he advise of the
knowledge and information which he personally has concerning the Amerasia
case since allegedly he had participated in some investigation thereof in the
State Department.
Mr. Bannerman advised that he had been employed in the office of the Chief
Special Agent on work not relating in any way to the Amerasia case. On June
21, 1945, he was appointed Security Officer of the State Department and was
assistant to the Director of the Office of Controls. Bannerman thought that this
was done about three days after the arrests in the Amerasia case but it is to be
noted that the arrests were made June 6, 1945. According to Bannerman, he
had a desk but no staff, no files, and no office set-up.
The title Assistant to the Director of Office of Controls was merely a title
because the Office of Controls had not yet been set up. Until February of 1946,
as Security Officer, Bannerman had no staff except those individuals which he-
borrowed from other offices. During this period, most of his work was screening,
with a committee, the approximately 4,0(J() individuals who had been taken into
the State Department from wartime agencies such as FEA, Research and Analy-
sis of OSS, etc. As Security Officer for the Department of State. Bannerman at
that time had no personnel security work within his jurisdiction. As a matter
of practical fact, Bannerman was working under Fred Lyon.
Bannerman had no knowledge of the Amerasia case until the arrests and
no official knowledge of it until after the arrests when until sometime during the
fall of 1945, he assisted the FBI agents in running down the documents in the
State Department. The documents which were found in connection with
the case and which seemed to have emanated from the State Department, were
checked by the FBI to determine their validity if they were originals and to
locate the originals where copies were seized. Bannerman assisted the FBI
agents in doing this by making arrangements with the proper personnel in the
appropriate division of the State Department. Bannerman had nothing to do
with the action to lie taken against the personnel or the policy to be followed
by the Department of State in connection with the case. In other words,
Bannerman has no first-hand knowledge of the case and conducted no investiga-
tion of the facts of the case. Insofar as Bannerman knows, the State Depart-
ment in no wise conducted an investigation of the case but the case was duly
investigated by the FBI. According to Bannerman, Assistant Secretary for
Administration. Julius Holmes, took an active interest in the case and would
be the former State Department official with direct knowledge as to the State
Department position and handling of it.
Bannerman has no personal desire to appear as a witness and does not feel
that he has any information or knowledge to which he can personally testify
which would be of value.
Bannerman is presently with the Central Intelligence Agenev and is located
in Room 200, 2210 E St. NW.
Lyon L. Tyler, Jr.
May 25, 1950.
Memorandum Re William J. Donovan
We interviewed Gen. Donovan at his apartment, 4 Sutton Place. I informed
Gen. Donovan that the subcommittee understood that he was leaving shortly
and was anxious to obtain, before his departure, information from him con-
cerning his knowledge Of the Amerasia case.
Gen. Donovan asked if we had talked with Archhold VanBuren and when
we replied in the affirmative, he indicated that his information was no more
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1919
than ihai which VanBuren probably rave us. Gen. Donovan verified VanBuren's
story concerning tbe events during which VanBuren and Major Monigan took
to Gen. Donovan the documents which Bielaski had brought in from the Amer-
asia office. Gen. Donovan advised that be look the matter up with Stettinius
ai Stettinius's apartment at which time Assistant Secretary of State Holmes,
VanBuren, and Major Monigan were also present. Gen. Donovan advised that
he knew nothing of the case thereafter except that he kept after them (the
State Department and Fred Lyon) to do something about the matter.
Gen. Donovan discussed his belief at the rime that "John Doe" warrants should
have been obtained and statements under oath gotten from the principals. He
indicated that he felt that the matter was incorrectly handled because when
any agency conducts an investigation, the matter does not remain confidential
and opportunity to cover up, etc.. arises.
Gen. Donovan mentioned that in discussing the matter with Fred Lyon he
asked if the State Department had any idea who might have been responsible
for this material emanating from the State Department. When he pressed Mr.
Lyon for some suggestions or suspicions. Mr. Lyon suggested that it might have
been John Carter Vincent. Gen. Donovan then queried us as to whether Vincent
did not have a wife who was a Communist.
Gen. Donovan suggested that we should see Pat Hurley. Shortly after the
discovery of the Amerasia case. Gen. Donovan went to London and he met Pat
Hurley at the airport there. Hurley being on his way to Moscow and China.
Donovan told Hurley what Fred Lyon had said about Vincent because he knew
that Hurley thought Vincent was "his boy."
Gen. Donovan advised that he was going to call Fred Lyon to tell him that he,
Gen. Donovan, had told us about Lyon's suspicion about John Carter Vincent.
Gen. Donovan suggested very clearly that he thought we should talk to Gen.
Hurley, and that the committee should call as witnesses Fred Lyon and John
Carter Vincent.
Lyon L. Tyler, Jr.
May 17, 1950.
Memorandum Re Frederick B. Lyon
I interviewed Frederick B. Lyon, Foreign Service Officer, now with the For-
eign Service Inspection Division of the State Department. I informed Mr.
Lyon that his name, as he probably knew, bad been prominently mentioned in
the press as one of those who should be called as a witness and who reportedly
could furnish testimony concerning the Amerasia case. I informed Mr. Lyon
that on behalf of the subcommittee, I desired to determine from him the nature
of any testimony that be would be able to give and to determine the extent
of his personal knowledge of the facts of the matter.
Mr. Lyon advised me that upon returning recently from Manila, P. I., he
saw stories in the press about the Amerasia case and naturally was interested
therein. He stated that be had seen a column by Sokolosky in which he,
Lyon, had been mentioned as a witness who could give testimony. Mr. Lyon
told me that he was shocked to see himself so considered. Mr. Lyon furnished
the following information to me concerning his part and pointed out that he
couldn't see where he could furnish any information of pertinent value.
Because of the indirect interest in the investigation of the case and the lapse
of time. Mr. Lyon's recollections are described by him as vague and unclear.
He understood that Gen. Donovan had come to see Secretary of State Stettinius
and turned over to Stettinius certain papers which OSS had gotten hold of,
that apparently emanated from the State Department. Secretary of State
Stettinius called Assistant Secretary Julius C. Holmes and turned over the
material to Holmes and either Stettinius or Holmes decided that the matter
should be referred to the FBI for immediate investigation. At this time, Mr.
Lyon was in the departmental service and was in charge of the Foreign Activity
Correlation Division which handled liaison with the various intelligence agen-
cies, such as FBI, OSS, G-2, ONI, etc. Additionally, since Assistant Secretary
Holmes had only recently returned to the department after some years absence,
Mr. Lyon had an office across the hall of Mr. Holmes in order to serve as a
sort of informal adviser to Mr. Holmes on procedures and policies than in effect
relating to the administration of the State Department. For these reasons,
Mr. Lyon believes that he served to facilitate Assistant Secretary Holmes' action
in turning the matter over to the FBI for investigation. Mr. Lyon could
1920 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
not recall exactly, but he thinks that he may have accompanied Mr. Holmes
to the FBI to introduce him to Director Hoover.
Thereafter, of course, Mr. Lyon as liaison officer of the State Department
with the FBI, facilitated and assisted the FBI investigation within the State
Department by making proper arrangements for them to interview individuals
and review material. In no sense did Mr. Lyon conduct any of the investi-
gations within the State Department. Any results of the investigation were
results produced and obtained by the FBI and would therefore be in the pos-
session of the FBI and not of Mr. Lyon, or, insofar as he knows, in the pos-
session of the State Department. As a matter of personal knowledge Mr. Lyon
is unable to testify to any of the facts in this case. He conducted no inter-
views, he reviewed no material, he took no action on behalf of the State De-
partment and was only connected with the case as liaison with the investignr-
ing officers, namely the FBI agents. Mr. Lyon, of course, would be reluctant
and feels that he is unauthorized to testify to the procedures used by the FBI
and feels strongly that any information in this regard should come from the
FBI itself.
In discussing the matter with Mr. Lyon, it was quite clear that he is not a
primary witness to any evidentiary fact relative to the activities of the subjects
or the handling of the prosecution of the case or the handling of the personnel
from an administrative point of view.
It appears that since Mr. Lyon was liaison with the FBI and would have
been in constant touch with the FBI on any of the investigations within the
State Department, that there has been some confusion leading to the pre-
sumption that Mr. Lyon would have conducted or participated in the conduet-
ing of the investigation. Such a presumption is erroneous. How Mr. Lyon
came into the picture is unknown to him except to the extent that we surmise
it occurred as above suggested.
Lyon L. Tyler, Jr.
May 10, 1950.
Memorandum Re Interview With Judge Proctor
I talked to Judge Proctor on Wednesday, May 10, 1950, concerning proceedings
held before him in the District Court when Jaffe and Lai\sen were fined. I
pointed out to Judge Proctor that there had been some indication in the case
that the Justice Department had not disclosed to him all the facts in the case. I
specifically wanted to know whether the attorneys in the case had ever had
any informal meeting with him and discussed facts other than those shown on
the transcript of the proceedings.
Judge Proctor stated that he had no independent recollection of the case.
His records did show that on the day before, he was contacted by Mr. Mdnerney
of the Justice Department. However, he does not recall what was discussed,
but he is reasonably sure that the facts of the case were not discussed since he
has no record of Mr. Jaffe's attorney being present. Judge Proctor did state
that as far as he recalls, therefore, he had no information concerning the case
other than that given him in open court.
Judge Proctor also pointed out that there had been nothing special about the
Saturday morning hearing. He stated that he was on duty that morning and
would therefore be the judge who would handle the case. The only possible
need for the prior meeting would be to make arrangements to bring the case up
out of order since it was not calendared for hearing on that date. Judge Proc-
tor stated that it was his practice to hold hearings on Saturday morning in
cases in which it would accommodate the attorneys or the parties in the case
if it were possible.
Judge Proctor also indicated that while he hoped the Committee would
not find it necessary to call him. he would be willing to appear if needed and
would testify substantially as set out in this memorandum.
Robert L. Heald.
Information on the following people, who were believed to be Wash-
ington contacts of Philip Jacob Jaffe, was developed by the staff of
the subcommittee :
Alvin Barber
Alvin Barber was born February 6. 1905, at Xewburg, New York, of American
parents. From October 1942 through the Amerasia investigation he was em-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1921
ployed by the Foreign Economic Administration and its predecessor the Board
of Economic Warfare. At the time of the investigation he was Chief of the
Supply Adjustment Section in the office of Economic Programs of PEA. He is
known to have been a contributor to Amerasia and from February 1935 to
December 1941 lie was a research associate Cor the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tious. He was a personal contact of Philip Jaffe on Jaffe's visits to Washing-
ton, D. C.
Joseph Bernstein
Bernstein at one time was listed as an employee of Amerasia. At the time
of the FBI investigation he was a writer of official publications for the Com-
munist Party.
Thomas Arthur Bisson
Thomas Arthur Bisson was born in New York City November 8, 1900. He
first weut to the Orient in 1924 as a Presbyterian missionary. Since 1929, how-
ever, he has been identified in this country with the Foreign Political Association
and with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was employed by the Board of
Economic Warfare in January 1942 but resigned from that organization sub-
sequent to investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Civil
Service Commission. He is a very close associate of Philip Jaffe and was formerly
on the editorial board of Amerasia.
Chao Tiiif/ Chi
At the time of the Amerasia investigation Chao Ting Chi was Secretary General
of the Foreign Exchange Control Commission of the Chinese Ministry of Finance,
and director of economic research for the Central Bank of China. His perma-
nent residence is New York City. He was married to Harriet Levine, a cousin
of Philip Jaffe and apparently was successful in concealing from the Chungking
government the fact that he, like Jaffe, was connected with the Communist acti-
vities in this country. Jaffe is known to have corresponded with Chi under an
alias of Phillips.
Philip C. Curtis
Philip C. Curtis is a native-born citizen of the United States, born May 26, 1907.
At the time of the Amerasia investigation he resided in Washington, D. C. He
was a telephone contact of Philip Jacob Jaffe. An FBI check at the time of the
Amerasia investigation indicated that Curtis' most recent employment had been
with the Office of Strategic Services.
Frederick Vanderbilt Field
Field, who has been prominent in numerous Communist organizations, was a
founder with Jaffe of Amerasia, Inc., and prior to dissolution of the corporation
in 1944 owned 50 percent of the stock. He was President of the corporation and
apparently frequently advised with Jaffe concerning the contents of publication.
Field, like Jaffe was a lecturer at the "Jefferson School of Social Science" and
also a director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.
John Thomas Fin it
John Thomas Find was reportedly born July 15, 1S96, in Cleveland, Ohio.
There is no birth record in Cleveland, however, which can be verified. His father
was an American citizen of Dutch and Chinese descent. At the time of the
Amerasia investigation he was employed as a Chinese translator in the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C, and had been so employed since February
11)42. He spent several years in China and is well acquainted with Thomas
Arthur Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations who was formerly on the
editorial board of Amerasia and who is a close associate of Philip Jacob Jaffe.
Find was a known contact of Emmanuel Larsen, Lt. Andrew Roth, and Kate
Louise Mitchell. Official documents bearing routing to Find were found in Jaffe's
office.
Irving 8. Friedman
Irving S. Friedman is known to have been a contact in the Treasury Depart-
ment of both Jaffe and Chao Ting Chi who is married to Jaffe's cousin Harriet
Levine. Friedman was born January 31, 1915, is a United States citizen and
was formerly a member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was an economic
analyst in the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.
1922 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Julian Richard Friedman
Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately
upon graduation from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy he was hired
by the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international
economic affairs. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he held the rating
of divisional assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, chief of the division
of Chinese affairs of the office of Far Eastern affairs of the United States De-
partment of State. Friedman was a known contact of Lt. Andrew Roth and
it was through Friedman that Roth was able to first introduce John Service
to Jaffe. Friedman had an active interest in the affairs of the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
Donald Porter Geddes
At the time of the Amerasia investigation Geddes was described as a former
writer and lecturer employed as editor of Pocket Book, Inc., and formerly em-
ployed by Columbia University Press. He was a contact of Philip Jaffe, Kate
Mitchell, Mark Gayn, and also of Joe Bernstein, a known Communist writer.
Randall Gould
Gould during the Amerasia investigation was publishing a weekly newspaper
in New York known as the Shanghai Evening Post. Prior to the Japanese con-
quest of Shanghai this newspaper had been published in that city. Mr. Gould
was also active in the insurance business of New York. Mr. Gould was a contact
of Jaffe and apparently quoted from and referred to Amerasia articles in his
newspaper.
Michael Qreeriburg
Michael Greenburg, alias Menahem Greenburg, was identified as a telephone
contact of Philip Jaffe. At the time of the Amerasia investigation Greenburg
resided in Arlington, Virgina, and was employed by the Foreign Economic Ad-
ministration. He was born in Manchester, England, November 28, 1914, of
Russian parents and came to the United States at the outbreak of the war in
Europe in 1939. His sister, Esther, at the time of the Amerasia investigation
was the organizer for the Lancashire district of the Communist Party of Great
Britain. Prior to entering the employ of the UJnited States government in 1942
Greenburg was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Chew Sick Hong
Chew Sick Hong was born December 10, 1910, in China and entered the United
tates in 1920 as the son of a native-born American. At the time of the Amerasia
investigation he was assistant news editor in the overseas branch of the Office
of War Information in New York City and was so employed since December
1941. He is well recognized in Chinese circles in New York as a Communist
and met at the home of Philip Jaffe in New York City on April 22, 1945, with
Earl Browder, president of the Communist Political Association ; Y. Y. Hsu,
of the Institute of Pacific Relations ; and Tong Pi Wn, Chinese Communist
delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.
Y. Y. Hsu
Y. Y. Hsu is a citizen of China born in China May 1, 1902. At the time of the
Amerasia investigation he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Kate Louise Mitchell
Kate Louise Mitchell, coeditor of Amerasia, is a native-born citizen of the
United States, born in Buffalo, New York, September 1, 1908. She was affiliated
with the Institute of Pacific Relations since 1933. She is reportedly wealthy,
and has lectured at the School for Democracy in New York City which re-
portedly was Communist-sponsored. Kate Louise Mitchell did most of the
actual writing of the articles which appeared in Amerasia. Miss Mitchell was
apprehended at the time the FBI made its arrests in the Amerasia case but
was "no-billed" by the grand jury.
Ohaidur Rahman
Obaidur Rahman was a secretary in the Indian Agency General of the Embassy
of Great Britain in Washington. D. C. At the time of the Amerasia investiga-
tion he had been a contact of Jaffe for a considerable period of time. When
he was transferred from Washington to India by way of London early in 1945
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1923
it was indicated that he might carry material of a secret nature for Jaffe.
Rahman is Anti-British.
Ali.v Simon Reuther
Alix Simon Reuther was a contact of Philip Jaffe both in New York and Wash-
ington. At the time of the Amerasia investigation she was news editor in the
domestic branch, Foreign News Bureau. Office of War Information, Washington,
D. C. She was born in Frankfort Main, Germany, in 1903, and was naturalized
in this country in May 1940. Between 1936 and 11)89 she was employed by the
Spanish (Loyalist) Information Bureau in New York City.
Lairrenee Kaelter Rossinger aka Larry Rossinger
Left-wing Rossinger has been employed as a teacher, research worker, and
writer in New York City. At one time he was employed by the Indian Govern-
ment Trade Commission and was also affiliated with the Foreign Policy Asso-
ciation. He is reported to have leftist inclinations. Rossinger was a contact
of Jaffe.
Howard Salsam, also known as Howard Selsam and Paul Salter
Salsam was director and instructor of the "Jefferson School of Social Science,"
an organization sponsored by the Communist Party in New York.
Charles Nelson Spinks (USNR)
Charles Nelson Spinks was born in Berkeley, California. May 14, 1900. He
went to Japan as an instructor in English at Tokyo University of Commerce in
1936. He returned to the United States in 1941 and was commissioned Lieuten-
ant (j. g. ), USNR, January 19, 1942. At the time of the Amerasia investigation
he was assistant to the head of the Japanese section of the Far East Division of
the Office of Naval Intelligence. Spinks was on the Far East Committee of the
State, War, Navy Control Commission, and was loaned to the Department of
State on a part-time basis to prepare studies on far-eastern questions to be
brought before the State, War, Navy Control Commission. Spinks was a contact
of Lt. Andrew Roth, and on April IS, 1945, Philip Jaffe instructed Larsen, in
whose office at the State Department Spinks shared space, to obtain notes of the
meetings of the State, War, Navy Control Commission, and furnish them to Jaffe.
Larsen introduced Spinks to Jaffe.
Tung Pi Wu
At the time of the Amerasia investigation Tung Pi Wu was an elderly Chinese
who had long been a member of the Communist Party of China. He came to the
United States in April 1945 to attend the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization. Arrangements were made through Y. Y. Hsu for Tung Pi
Wu to meet with Earl Browder and Philip Jaffe at the latter's residence in New
York City, April 22, 1945.
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, June 26, 1950.
Honorable Millard E. Tydixgs,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman : The Secretary of the Defense has referred to me for
reply your letter of June 15 requesting further information regarding the case
of former Lt. Andrew Roth.
In this letter you inquired as to the reason Lieutenant Roth was not ordered
to stand trial by a general court martial. This was due to a policy of long
standing, and still in effect, that uniformed Naval personnel ascertained to be
involved with civilians who would be subject to criminal prosecution in the
Federal courts, would be made available to the Federal authorities for prosecu-
tion. The case of former Lieutenant Roth, therefore, was in line with general
operating policy in such matters and constituted no deviation from normal
procedures.
I hope that the foregoing will be of assistance to your subcommittee.
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours.
Francis P. Matthews.
1924 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Department of Justice,
Office of the Assistant to the Attorney General,
Washington, May 16, 1950.
Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee of Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : Reference is made to your letter to the Attorney General of
May 9, 1950, asking that your Subcommittee be furnished a copy of the trans-
script of grand jury proceedings of the so-called Amerasia case ( United States v.
Philip J. Jaffe, et al.) for its consideration and study.
Reference is also made to the letter of James M. Mclnerney, Esquire, Assistant
Attorney General, dated May 10, 1950, advising you that photostatic copies of
documents seized from the premises of some of the defendants in this case will
be available for your perusal in Room 4220 in the Department of Justice within
the next few days.
When the members of your Subcommittee come to this Department to examine
the documents in question we will gladly make available to them a copy of the
transcript of grand jury proceedings in this case.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.
Department of State,
Criminal Division,
Washington, May 10, 1950.
Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
Chairman, Subcommittee of Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : During the course of my testimony in executive session
before your committee last Thursday, May 4, 1950, you requested that I furnish
photostatic copies of certain documents.
Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a photostatic copy of the Demurrer,
Motion to Quash, and Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on September 28, 1945,
on behalf of the defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen. I am also enclosing a
photostat of a newspaper article which appeared in the September 28, 1945, issue
of The Evening Star entitled "Larsen Charges FBI Made Illegal Search of Home
for U. S. Files."
With respect to the request of your committee that the documents which were
seized from the premises of some of the defendants be made available to your
committee, I have discussed this with Mr. Peyton Ford and we hope to have
photostatic copies available for your perusal in Room 4220 of this Department
within the next few days.
During the course of my testimony there was some discussion with respect to
the classification and importance of the documents seized. This discussion may
have left some members of the committee with the impression that the importance
or nonimportance of the documents may have been an important consideration
in the disposition of the case. Such of course is not the fact, because the indict-
ment returned against the defendants charged them with conspiring to embezzle,
remove, retain, etc., official government documents without respect to their classifi-
cation or relation to the national defense. In any event, the maximum penalty
under the conspiracy statute would be the same in either case, the net result being
that the government had one less element of proof to establish at the trial.
Respectfully,
James M. McInerney.
[From the Evening Star, September 28, 1945]
Larsen Charges FBI Made Illegal Search of Home for U. S. Files
Charging Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had illegally and secretly
searched his apartment in the 1600 block of Harvard Street NW„ Emmanuel
Sigurrl Larsen this afternoon filed motions in District Court attacking the charge
against him of conspiracy to unlawfully remove Government records and files
under which he and two others were indicted in August.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1925
In a motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Larsen, a specialist in the China Division
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department, also accuses the FBI of
telephone wire-tapping and charged the FBI with search and seizure without a
warrant.
In an affidavit accompanying the motions, Mr. Larsen says FBI agents
forced him to show them his private files and he claims he heard whispered con-
versations between them, indicating they already knew where his files and other
items were kept.
Lt. Andrew Roth, formerly on active duty as an intelligence officer in the Navy
Department, yesterday filed a demurrer attacking the indictment and asked for
a bill of particulars,
Lt. Roth was one of two other men indicted with Mr. Larsen. In the demurrer
he charged the indictment is "vague, indefinite and uncertain."
Named with Mr. Larsen and Lt. Roth in the conspiracy indictment was Philip
Jacob Jaffe, New York editor of Amerasia Magazine. All three are out on bond.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Holding a Criminal Term
Criminal No. 75457
United States, plaintiff vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, et al., defendants
Service of copies of the following is hereby acknowledged this 28th day of
September 1945.
Motion to quash.
Demurrer.
Motion to suppress evidence and for return of evidence.
Affidavit of Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.
Attorney General of the United States,
R. M. Hitchcock,
By Donald B. Anderson, Special Assistant.
notice to calendar
The Clerk of said Court will please calendar the above motions and demurrer
for hearing on Thursday. October 18. 1945, at 10 o'clock. A. M.
Arthur J. Hilland,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Holding a Criminal Term
Criminal No. 75457
United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants
MOTION TO QUASH INDICTMENT
Now comes the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and with leave of court
first had and obtained, hereby withdraws his plea of "not guilty" entered herein
August 30. 1945. and says that the indictment herein is defective and insufficient
to require him to plead thereto and he moves the court to quash the indictment,
and as grounds therefor says :
1. The use in the indictment of the alleged alias "Jimmy Larsen" is prejudi-
cial to said defendant, as shown by the affidavit of said defendant filed herein.
2. The evidence upon which the indictment was returned by the Grand Jury
was illegally obtained as shown by said defendant's affidavit and motion to
suppress evidence filed herein.
3. The allegation that the defendants agreed to commit "certain offenses"
against the United States is vague and uncertain.
1926 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
4. The "certain offenses" which the defendants are alleged to have agreed
to commit are not stated in the indictment.
5. The ingredients of the "certain offenses" which the defendants are charged
with having agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.
6. The indictment does not specify or identify, with reasonable certainty,
the property, et cetera, referred to in paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
in the indictment.
7. The alleged overt acts are insufficient to make out an offense of conspiracy
to commit certain offenses against the United States.
8. It does not appear either from any allegation of fact in the indictment or
from their nature and extent that the alleged overt acts were in pursuance of
the alleged conspiracy and were done in order to effect the alleged objects of
the same.
9. The indictment alleges conclusions rather than allegations of fact.
10. The indictment is bad for duplicity.
11. The facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute a crime against
the United States.
12. For other reasons apparent of record.
Arthur J. Hilland,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, T^Yashington, D. C.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Holding a Criminal Term
Criminal No. 75457
United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et ah, defendants
DEMURRER
Now comes the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and with leave of court
first had and obtained, hereby withdraws his plea of "not guilty" entered herein
August 30, 194"), and demurs to the indictment herein and says that said indict-
ment is bad in form and substance and that the same ought to be dismissed and
this defendant released from custody, and as grounds therefor says :
1. The allegation that the defendants agreed to commit certain offenses against
the United States is vague and uncertain.
2. The certain offenses which the defendants are alleged to have agreed to
commit are not stated in the indictment.
3. The ingredients of the certain offenses which the defendants are charged
with having agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.
4. The indictment does not specify or identify, with reasonable certainty, the
property, et cetera, referred to in paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the
indictment.
5. The alleged overt acts are insufficient to make out an offense of conspiracy
to commit certain offenses against the United States.
6. It does not appear either from any allegation of fact in the indictment or
from their nature and extent that the alleged overt acts were in pursuance of
the alleged conspiracy and were done in order to effect the alleged objects of the
same.
7. The indictment alleges conclusions rather than allegations of fact.
8. The indictment is bad for duplicity.
9. The facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute a crime against the
United States.
10. For other reasons apparent of record.
Wherefore, the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, demands judgment dis-
missing the indictment and discharging him from custody.
Arthur J. Hilland,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1927
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Holding a Criminal Term
Criminal No. 75457
United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FOR RETURN OF EVIDENCE
Now conies the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and moves the court that
all the evidence, tiles, documents, papers, goods, and chattels relating to the
alleged offense in the indictment and obtained or seized by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, he suppressed and that the Attorney General of the
United States and the United States Attorney in and for the District of Colum-
bia and their and each of their assistants be restrained from using any of said
evidence, files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels aforesaid upon the trial
hereof, or any information directly or indirectly obtained therefrom, or by
means thereof, and further moves the court that any statement, oral or written,
which the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any of them procured
from said defendant, be suppressed and that the Attorney General of the United
States and the United States Attorney in and for the District of Columbia and
their and each of their assistants be restrained from using any such statement
or any part thereof upon the trial hereof, or any information directly or in-
directly obtained therefrom, or by means thereof, and further moves the court
that all the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized from said de-
fendant be returned to said defendant, and for such other and further relief as
to the court may seem just and proper, and as grounds therefor says :
1. Said evidence was obtained by and through the lawlessness of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
2. Said evidence was obtained in violation of said defendant's rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
3. The search and seizure of said evidence by agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation were made without any search warrant, subpoena, or order of
court authorizing said search and seizure.
4. Said evidence was obtained by means of or with the aid of information
acquired by secret and illegal search of said defendant's home by agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to his arrest and the illegal seizure of
said evidence.
5. Said evidence was obtained by means of or with the aid of information ac-
quired by unauthorized interception of telephone messages and conversations
with the aid of or by means of the tapping of telephone wires by agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
6. The statements procured from said defendant were not made freely and
voluntarily by said defendant.
7. Said statements were induced by illegal detention of said defendant and
obtained in violation of his rights under Section 595, Title 18, United States
Code Annotated.
8. Other reasons apparent of record.
Arthur J. Hilland.
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.
DEMAND FOR JURT TRIAL
The defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, hereby demands trial by jury of
the issues of fact, if any, created by the foregoing motion and supporting papers
and the Government's answer thereto.
Arthur J. Hilland,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.
1928 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Holding a Criminal Term
Criminal No. 75457
United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants
affidavit of emmanuel sigurd larsen
City of Washington,
District of Columbia, ss:
I, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, being first duly sworn, on oath say that I am
a citizen of the United States, a resident of the District of Columbia, forty-eight
years of age, and one of the above-named defendants.
On June 6, 1945, after arriving home from work in the State Department,.
I had just sat down to eat my dinner at about "seven o'clock p. in. when there
was a knock at the door. I went personally to open the door of my apartment
and two men forced their way in with the words "You are under arrest," after
asking me whether I was Emmanuel S. Larsen. I was dumbfounded and asked
them what I was under arrest for. They refused to answer my question but
said that I would find out in due course.
They opened and displayed their badges and identified themselves as FBI
men. Two of them gave their names as Winterrowd and Zander.
In the meantime, about four other men walked in and the room seemed en-
tirely full of men. My wife and five-year-old daughter were practically speech-
less and I exercised the utmost self-control in order to prevent my family from
hysterics.
The two men mentioned by name then told me that they were going to make
a search of the apartment occupied by me, namely, Apartment No. 227, at 1650
Harvard Street, Northwest, of which I was then and there in exclusive posses-
sion and control and occupied the same with my wife and daughter, having
leased the same in my name as a tenant as of June 1, 1945, from the Harvard
Hall Apartments, Incorporated.
They told me to hold up my hand and searched my person, asking me whether
I carried any weapons. Two were in front of me and the rest of them behind
me. As an illustration of the extent of my surprise, I may mention that I went
through all this and discovered only twenty minutes later that I was about to
choke on a morsel of food that I still had in my mouth unchewed. I did not
carry any weapon and nothing was found on my person that required removal
by them.
Immediately thereupon they asked me whether I had my files in my house.
I answered that I did have private files, and they ordered me to take them
to the files. When I opened the file case they asked me what was in the
file case, and I told them that the case contained a mixture of strictly personal
material and a number of papers, mostly published material, and some official
papers pertaining to the work I had been doing for the Government almost
ten years.
They asked me how it came about that I had official papers at mv residence,
and I told them that as far as I knew from ten years experience in the Gov-
ernment all men who were interested in their work pursued considerable study
at home, inasmuch as official time often did not allow of the reading of lengthy
reports. They asked me whether I had information relating to the national
defense of the United States, and I was able to assure them that I did not
When the agents started the search, I protested bv asking why the H
I had to have my personal and private files and clothes drawers searched
lhey had not at that time shown me any search warrant, nor any arrest warrant
nor did they at any time present any such warrant to me.
I may add that upon repeated queries to my part as to why T was under arrest
and as to why my apartment was being searched they answered again and again ■
You wdl find out in due course. Being unfamiliar' with the legal procedure of
arrests and searches, having never been subject to such before in mv life I was
as a loss under the circumstances to take the right attitude or to know what to
do m the matter.
I had that day been treating myself for a sore throat and a rather violent
headache and there was a time during the search. I estimate at about eisht-
tlnrt.v. when my head was literally reeling. The agents allowed me to go to the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1929
kitchen and take a drink of water while they watched me, but they would not per-
mit me to take an aspirin.
Their questioning, first couched in a gentlemanly tone, latter became extremely
Sharp and harsh, although I had from the start answered all their questions.
one of the agents, a man, and a female agent, took my wife, Thelma Earles
Larsen, out en the sun porch in the said apartment and questioned her. At one
time I heard the questioning when I was brought back to the living room from
the bedroom, and she looked at me. She rose up from her seat and asked me
whether I had any objection to her making a statement. I remember kissing
her on the cheek and telling her to tell the truth, as I knew she would, and
that otherwise I had no objection.
I want to add very emphatically that at this time I was under great mental
stress due to the unrelenting search and questioning that I was under myself,
particularly by the two agents mentioned by name. The door from the apart-
ment to the hall was opened from time to time, an agent came in, whispered
instructions, and went out again. The rooms were littered with drawers, enve-
lopes, books, and other material that was removed from filing cabinets, closets,
and bookcases.
At one time while talking to two of the agents, I overheard two other agents
talking in a whisper about the location of certain material. I recognized the
location and the material by their description in that one of them said : "Those
OSS reports are in that second drawer," and thereby I realized that a previous
search, obviously unauthorized by law, had been made of my apartment because
on the occasion of this search none of the agents had previously been into
the contents of that drawer.
In another instance during the search of my clothes closet in the bedroom,
one of the agents looked up on the top shelf and saw there a leather case. An-
other one of the agents said to his colleague : "That is all right ; that is the vase."
In the leather case concerned I have stored a valuable Chinese vase. They
could not have known of this unless they had previously searched the apartment
then occupied by me or the apartment previously occupied by me in the same
apartment house building, on the same floor, namely Apartment No. 207, which
I had occupied from August 1941 until June 1, 1945.
The realization of the privacy of my apartment having been violated made
me extremely bitter, as a result of which I felt very sick. Over a period of
time I felt so sick that I do not remember to this moment what passed, probably
an hour or so, nor what I said during that period.
I recollect only vaguely that I shuffled from room to room at their orders and
answered the questions about files that they removed and spread all over the
floors. This search went on until about 12 o'clock midnight, at which time I
was informed that I would be taken to FBI Field Headquarters, which is over
here on K Street.
When we emerged from the apartment house, there were about four cars
parked around the doors and a number of agents standing by. I was so confused
that I remember practically no details, nor do I remember exactly the route we
took or the manner in which we entered the FBI headquarters.
However, I remember that after we had gone up to the fourth or fifth floor
I was to be fingerprinted and photographed. Immediately prior to the finger-
printing, I do remember that one of the agents, after examining my hands, gave
my right hand a twist, which hurt me, and in surprise I asked him what was
the matter. He did not answer me. Instead, he asked me what was wrong
with my third and fifth finger on my right hand. At the same time he ordered
an entry to be made to the effect that I had two broken knuckles, whereupon
the fingerprinting man proceeded to fingerprint me and the photographer took
four pictures of me.
After that, I was taken into one of the rooms at the south end of the building,
I believe, on one of the upper floors, and there I was questioned. I sat at a
wide desk, and opposite me sat Agent Winterrowd. He told me that whatever
I said might be used against me and that I was to realize the importance of this,
after which I begged him to let me know at this time what I was being charged
with, but he told me again that I would hear the formal charge in full detail at
a later time.
He said he merely wanted to help me, and that if I knew what was good for
myself I would cooperate with him and give him the utmost help in his investi-
gation and thereby make things much easier for myself. His manner was harsh
and demanding, and he maintained this attitude throughout three hours or more
of unceasing questioning. I determined this time approximately by my arrival
1930 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
at midnight and my departure from the FBI Field Headquarters immediately
after questioning at about three-fifteen. _
Up to this time, I had had nothing to eat since noontime and, having suffered
with a headache all day, I had practically eaten no lunch. I just took a glass
of milk and a sandwich, and that is all I had had the whole day.
Mr Winterrowd had before him a list which appeared to be questions arranged
in a very systematic formation. Therefore every question embarrassed me to
the utmost in the matter of exact dates and numbers of occasions and other
details, of which no person normally keeps any record. Under my condition
at that time I was still less able to remember offhand such dates and details,
being for the moment in the agony of hunger and exhaustion from questioning.
To summarize the causes of this exhaustion, I must make it emphatic that I
stood on my feet for almost five hours and bent over files and drawers placed
on chairs aiid the floors in my apartment.
At the FBI Headquarters I was not allowed to relax for a single second.
I would have given anything to lay my head down on my arms and obtain suffi-
cient rest to gather my wits. I debated with myself in favor of the easiest
way out, namely, to answer all questions with as little arguing as possible to
get* it over with. Foremost on my mind of all things was the matter of getting
it over with and getting out of that place. I really did not care very much where
1 was to go as long as I could get out of that place.
Around three o'clock I had worn out two stenographers, who had complained
that they could not carry on any longer, and a third lady was brought in. This
had the effect on me of creating a sense of complete hopelessness. I remember
practically nothing of the last part of the questioning, except that I was taken
with an obsession that I must get out of that office as soon as possible. This
was the result of the high-pressure methods they used on me, namely, allowing
me little time to answer questions, prodding me to deliver answers as snappily
as they read the questions off the yellow sheet lying on the table.
At one time one of the agents resorted to a sort of flattery, stating that they
could not imagine that a man with my education and background and with my
specialty as demonstrated through the work they had seen on my personality
cards and papers would be guilty of serious charges, and that they therefore
said they wanted me to understand that if I talked freely I would indirectly
be aiding my case.
On other occasions during their cross-examination of me the agents said to
me that if I knew what was good for myself I would cooperate freely with them
by telling them everything I knew and answering their questions in detail. The
tone of voice in which this was said to me reminded me of the rough and cheap
treatment given ignorant persons who would not on their own accord normally
tell the truth or answer questions voluntarily.
I resented this attitude and told Mr. Winterrowd that I was definitely aware
that he did not believe what I said and that it infuriated me. He refused to
reply to that. He resumed his questioning only to make it more pointed and
the prodding more unpleasant and threatening.
While I was leaving the apartment I remember one thing, namely, the progress
the agents were making in the packing and removal of my files, including a six-
drawer wooden cabinet containing several thousand personality cards which I
had been collecting as a hobby since 1923, measuring four by six inches, and also
my personal and private typewriter.
"After the questioning at the F. B. I. Field Headquarters, I remember seeing a
typewritten transcription of the statements I had made in answer to the said
questioning. I remember correcting errors which were outstanding. In the
making of the statements I was considerably excited at times when I noticed
that the stenographer was putting down what Mr. Winterrowd was saying and
not. what I was saying, and he would precede such sections in the report with
"Put this down," and I objected with the words: "Who the h— - is making this
statement, you or IV* It was as a result of this that I was obliged to object to a
number of things that were quite faulty in the statement when they showed me
the tvped transcription.
I do not recall signing the typewritten transcription but I recall correcting
parts of it. immediately after which 1 was taken downstairs. Then I recollect
riding in a car with the agents and being taken up to the U. S. Commissioner's
office. 1 may have been unduly worried during that ride for I recollect abso-
lutely nothing aboul the number of people in the car, the route taken, nor whether
I was handcuffed or not. 1 do not remember anything about it. I do not
remember whether I sal in the front or back seat. I do not remember anything.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1931
I do remember thai we were obliged to walk upstairs three or four floors to
the U. S. Commissioner's office, and the exorcise caused a genuine revival of
my mental faculties. 1 also remember remarking that at that time my headache
had disappeared but that I fell completely depressed and dumfounded. Sit-
ting in the anteroom of the Commissioner's office I was startled by the flash of
the photographer's bulb. Then 1 realized that next to me was sitting John
Service and Andrew Roth. I turned to John Service and asked him in Chinese
what this was all about but received no answer.
Then we were taken before the Commissioner and there was a peculiar inci-
dent. There was a great discusison around his desk as to the meaning of the
charges being preferred against us, and while we were being taken in I overheard
the Commissioner say : "I will be darned if I still understand what these men are
charged with." Thereupon someone lifted the top sheet of the papers that had
been placed before the Commissioner and showed him on a second sheet where the
charges had been spelled out in some detail, and that indeed was the first time
that I heard read off a piece of paper, although not actually directed at me, the
charges upon which I had been arrested, namely, conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act.
The shock of that charge was so terrific that I had difficulty in my speech when
soon after the Commissioner repeated the charges, set bail at ten thousand dollars,
and I attempted to make him reduce the bail. I literally was unable to speak
at that time. I did enter a plea of not guilty and thereupon was swiftly taken
downstairs, handcuffed to one of the other persons involved. I think it was John
Service.
From the time of my arrest, about seven p. m. on June 6, 1945, throughout the
night and until after I had been arraigned before the United States Commissioner,
I was without the advice of counsel and without opportunity to obtain the advice
of counsel, and without opportunity to communicate with friends or relatives.
They wold not even allow me to talk to my wife without the presence of officers.
When I said Good-bye to her, I tried to say a few comforting words to her, but
they pulled me away and they said : "Come on ; let's go."
They did not even give me the opportunity to undress properly and place in her
bed my small daughter. I was permitted to pick her up from a chair at midnight
where she had fallen asleep in pitiful disarray, pale and tired, surrounded by an
unsightly litter of open drawers, books, papers, and other debris. I merely lifted
her from that chair and put her into her little bed, without opportunity to undress
her.
My wife at that time was being held in another room and was not permitted
to move freely about the apartment.
In the FBI Headquarters they removed from my person my wallet, all my
identification papers, a small pocketknife that they had previously overlooked
in the search for a weapon, my fountain pen, my comb, and my glasses — every-
thing.
Without my glasses I was unable to read. They returned my glasses to me at
the time when they wanted me to look over the typed transcription of the ques-
tioning, and I held on to those glasses throughout the subsequent period of my
imprisonment.
I remember that in the statements supposedly made by me the introduction
and the final paragraph were completely dictated by Mr. Winterrowd. He
said : "This is necessary because you do not understand and you may not get
the wording of these technicalities right."
In going through my books in my apartment the agents found several small
Chinese volumes and asked me to tell them truthfully what the interpretation of
the title on the cover would be. I did so, and in one instance in the case of a
small red volume, I said : "This is a book in which the Chinese Communists
have tried to make clear their stand." They looked at me in great disgiist, and
I spared no details in making it clear to them that as an analyst of Chinese
affairs I was called upon to study the position of all parties in China and report
on them, and therefore the possession of Chinese Communist propaganda meant
absolutely nothing. I had partially read that book in the hope of finding in
it the names of the principal Chinese Communist spokesmen, but failing to do
so and thus failing to gain any material that I might enter in my biographical
cards, I had discarded the book as practically useless to me.
I have never been in any litigation, and therefore I do not know the details
concerning my constitutional rights. I have spent twenty-four years of my life
in China and five years in Europe. That makes twenty-nine years abroad,
leaving me only ten of my adult years in the United States and about eight years
in my childhood.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 29
1932 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A partial inventory of the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized
by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from my apartment at 1650
Harvard Street Northwest, District of Columbia, on June 6th and 7th, 1945,
is hereto appended as Exhibit A and by reference incorporated in and made
a part of this affidavit.
My full name is Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen. I have no other name and have
never had any other name, except the nickname "Jimmy" by which some of
my friends, relatives, and fellow workers have called me from time to time. I
have never used the name "Jimmy Larsen" and have never been called by that
name except among and by persons who knew my name was Emmanuel Sigurd
Larsen. I have never been convicted of any crime and have never associated
with a criminal class. I am informed and believe and therefore say that the
use in the indictment of the alleged alias "Jimmy Larsen" is prejudicial to me,
because when the indictment is read to the jury it might suggest to the minds
of the jury that I have a criminal record or that I belong to or associate with a
criminal class.
On or about June 11, 1945, in his office in the Harvard Hall Apartment House
at 1650 Harvard Street Northwest, District of Columbia, of which he was then
the resident manager, one E. R. Sager told me that sometime prior to June 6,
1945, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation came to Mr. Sager at a
time when my wife, child, and I were absent from my apartment in that build-
ing and told him that they wished to search my apartment. Mr. Sager told me
that he admitted them to the apartment, using the duplicate key filed on
the keyboard in the manager's office, and that lie saw two agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation enter into my apartment at that address
and then and there search the same. Mr. Sager, at that time and place, told
me that in the absence of my wife, child, and myself agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation entered and searched my apartment at that address a
couple of times prior to June 6, 1945, when I was arrested and they again
searched my apartment and seized my files, documents, papers, goods, and
chattels in the manner hereinbefore set forth. On the night of September 24,
1945, I had a telephone conversation with said E. R. Sager, I having called
him at his said office, and he again told me that agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation had entered my apartment in the manner aforesaid prior to
June 6, 1945. I believe the statements Mr. Sager made to me as aforesaid, and
I expect to be able to prove, by his testimony, at the hearing of my motion to
suppress evidence and for the return of evidence, filed herein, that agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation did unlawfully enter and search my apart-
ment aforesaid prior to June 6, 1945, as well as on that date.
(S) Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 27th day of September, 1945.
[seal] (S) Genevieve M. Foreman,
Notary Public, D. C.
Arthur J. Hilland,
Shorehani Building, Washington, D. G.
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.
Exhibit A
Partial inventory of the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the home of defendant
Emmanuel S. Larsen ; namely, Apartment 227, 1650 Harvard Street North-
west, District of Columbia, on June 6th and 7th, 1945, commencing at about
7 P. M. on June 6, 1945, which is referred to in and made a part of the affidavit
of Emmanuel S. Larsen :
2 Folders on China.
2 Folders on Intelligence Studies.
1 Folder on Japanese Personalities.
1 Folder on Mongolia.
1 Folder on Miscellaneous Personalities.
1 Folder on India.
1 Folder on Emmanuel S. Larsen.
1 Folder on Manchuria.
2 Folders on Chinese Geography.
Each and all of the foregoing folders contain numerous papers and
pamphlets.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1933
1 Six-Drawer Wooden Cabinet containing about 3,000 to 4,000 cards, each
measuring 4x0 inches, and containing biographical information about
Far Eastern Personalities.
Other miscellaneous papers, pamphlets and books.
1 Underwood Typewriter.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia,
Criminal Division No. 1
Criminal No. 75,457
The United States vs. Philip Jacob Jaffe et al.
Saturday, September 29, 1945.
The above-entitled cause came on for the purpose of defendant named above
to be afforded to change his plea formerly entered to the indictment herein.
Before :
Honorable James M. Proctor, Associate Justice, The District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia, at 10 : 30 o'clock in the forenoon on
the above date, there being
Present :
Robert M. Hitchcock, Esquire, Donald B. Anderson, Esquire, and James M.
McInerney, Esquire, on behalf of The United States ;
Philip Jacob Jaffe, the named defendant herein, and Albert Arent, Esquire,
of the District of Columbia Bar, and Arthur Sheinberg, Esquire, of the Bar of
the State of New York, his counsel.
The following proceedings and transactions were then had :
proceedings and transactions
The Court. What is there about this matter of Jaffe, gentlemen?
Mr. Hitchcock. An indictment was returned at the July term charging this
defendant, with two others, with having committed the offense of conspiracy.
On August 30, all defendants entered pleas of "not guilty" before Mr. Justice
Schweinhaut.
It is my understanding that the defendant Jaffe, who is present, desires to
withdraw his plea of "not guilty" and change his plea to one of "guilty."
Mr. Arent. That is correct.
The Court. That is correct?
Mr. Arent. Yes.
The Court. Are you a local attorney ?
Mr. Arent. Yes. I am.
The Court. I understood a gentleman wTas coming from New York.
Mr. Sheinberg. I am New York counsel.
The Court. And you gentlemen are ready to enter that plea and it will be
accepted.
You may take the plea, Mr. Clerk.
The Clerk or the Court. Philip Jacob Jaffe, in case No. 75,457, in which you
are charged with violation of Section 88, Title XVIII, United States Code, which
is conspiracy to embezzle, steal, and purloin property, records, and valuable
things of the record and property of the United States, do you wish to withdraw
your plea of "not guilty" heretofore entered and enter a plea of "guilty" to the
indictment?
The Defendant. Yes.
The C^urt. What disposition are you moving with respect to the case?
Mr. PIitchcock. I think counsel for the defendant has an application to make
in respect to that in which the Government will join.
The Court. What is it?
Mr. Arent. Your Honor, may I make a brief statement just setting forth
the situation ?
The Court. Please make it brief because 1 do not expect to hold any extended
session here this morning.
Mr. Arent. Your Honor, this indictment charges this defendant and others
with conspiring to obtain various Government papers. The Government does
not contend that any of this material was used for any disloyal purpose.
1934 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
I would like to say a word or two about Mr. Jaffe, the character of the man,
and the situation out of which this whole matter arose :
Mr. Jaffe has for many years been a student of Far Eastern affairs. He is a
graduate of Columbia University with an A. B. and M. A. degree, and has given
lectures at such institutions as Harvard, Yale — Harvard, Vassal", Dartmouth,
and other schools. In 1937 he helped to found a magazine dealing with the Far
East called Amerasia and, among his cofounders of this magazine were dis-
tinguished academic people, scholars, political scientists like Owen Lattimore,
head of the Walter Hines Page School of Diplomacy and International Rela-
tions at Johns Hopkins ; William Stone, former Vice President, Foreign Policy
Association: and Professor Peake, of Columbia; Professor Reischauer, of
Princeton : and Professor Colgrove, of Northwestern. The magazine has a lim-
ited circulation amongst scholars and specialists in Far Eastern affairs and has
found a place in the leading libraries and educational institutions of the country.
For over eight years Mr. Jaffe served as managing editor and editor of this
magazine and carried on his work without cohipensation and at considerable
financial sacrifice. During this period, the magazine Amerasia was one of the
few voices warning of the dangers ahead with .Japan, and Mr. Jaffe himself was
active in such organizations as the Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese
Aggression, of which Mr. Henry L. Stimson was the head.
If Mr. Jaffe has transgressed the law, it seems he has done so from an ex-
cess of journalistic zeal
The Court (interposing). There is no doubt but what he has.
Mr. Arent. We recognize, technically, the violation — and not from any desire
to enrich himself, as demonstrated by the character of the publication, or any
intent to jeopardize the welfare of his country.
Mr. Jaffe's conduct has not been of the type which normally brings about
criminal prosecution, even though a technical violation of the law is involved.
In all of his life Mr. Jaffe has had, heretofore, no experience of any kind with
the criminal courts — he wants none. He has suffered severe humiliation and
hardship from vicious and unjust publicity that stigmatized him with accusa-
tions of espionage, whereas the indictment charges a relatively minor viola-
tion which arose out of his anxiety to be accurately informed in the field of
his scholarly and journalistic interest.
For personal and family reasons, such as the very grave illnes of his wife, he
is reluctant to go through with the ordeal of the trial. He pleads "guilty" in the
belief that your Honor, upon acquainting yourself with the facts, will realize
he already has suffered far more than his due, and that this Court will show
consideration and mercy in the sentence it imposes.
Thank you.
The Court. That is a very clear statement.
Mr. Hitchcock. Is your Honor prepared to dispose of the matter today?
The Court. I think I would like to hear what the attitude of the Govern-
ment is.
Mr. Arent has asked the Court for consideration and sympathy in the assess-
ment of sentence. Does he mean by that that he wishes the Court to consider
probation?
Mr. Hitchcock. That you will have to ask him.
The Government is prepared to review the matter and, if you see fit, if you see
fit to receive them, to make recommendations.
The Court. I think it would be well, perhaps, if, in view of the statement
that has been made, which I understand you approve of as a correct state-
ment
Mr. Hitchcock (interposing). In substance, yes. Your Honor.
The Court. In substance, it would look to be a case which might properly go
to the Probation Officer for his investigation and report, and take the usual
course of such cases with a view to possible probation, and. if that is done that
will give Mr. Jaffe an opportunity to make a showing there on the records which
are kept by the Court in such matters and which is referred to the Court. I
think that would be the better way in which to handle it.
Lei il take its regular course this morning, the course in which the Court is
willing to consider probation after the reference to the Probation Officer.
Is that approved by you?
Mr. Hitchcock. I assume thai prior to the imposition of sentence, which I
think counsel hoped to be disposed of today inasmuch as we have the facts
pertinent to the subject that perhaps even the Probation Officer would get not
only from this District but would have to go to New York for, your Honor may
wish to hear what the Government has to say.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1935
Would your Honor be willing to listen to Government counsel and consider
any suggest ion made?
The Court. Of course 1 will listen to Government counsel and consider any
suggestion he made.
Bui I am wondering whether or not — do you have a written statement?
Mr. Hitchcock. No, your Honor: no written statement.
The Coubt. How long would it lake you to make a hrief statement of the
Government's case?
Mr. Hitchcock. Less than rive minutes.
The Court. Well, I think I will sit here. Possibly we can dispose of it today.
Mr. Hitchcock. I think I would prefer that if you feel you could do so.
The Court. Very well. I will be glad to listen to you. I do not like to be in
a hurry, but I am the only Judure sitting today.
Mr. Hitchcock. The indictment, as counsel has pointed out, was returned
during the July Term this year and charges this defendant, together with two
others, with having conspired to commit a certain offense against the United
States, particularly the taking and removing from Government files, primarily
the State Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Strategic Services and War
Information, certain documents that belong to those various agencies.
The use to which they were put was, as I understand it, largely background
material that Mr. Jaffe in the conduct of his Amerasia magazine used to assist
him in publishing articles and preparing arguments that would lend to its weight
and, perhaps, its circulation. The magazine, we know as a matter of fact, was
a losing proposition financially.
Mr. Jaffe, as editor and owner of the magazine, the sole owner of the magazine,
enlisted the services of the two codefendants and perhaps others who were
employed, one or both, by the State Department at the time the indictment was
returned, or until shortly before the indictment was returned, and, in the instance
of one of the codefendants prior to that time or to September last, or by the Office
of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department.
At the time the arrest was made in June of the defendant Jaffe, there were
several hundred documents that on their face showed they emanated from these
various Government agencies and copies of other documents that obviously had
emanated from Government agencies.
That is. substantially, what the facts are.
The Court. Let me ask you this question, please : Is there any evidence that
the use to which these documents were put would be a use whereby injury or
embarrassment would come to the Army or the Navy in the conduct of the war?
Mr. Hitchcock. We have no evidence of that, your Honor, and, furthermore,
no evidence that they were intended to.
The Court. Was there anything in the nature of publication that had that
tendency?
Mr. Hitchcock. There was not, your Honor, so far as we know. So far as we
know, there was nothing in the use put of these documents that had that ten-
dency nor is there anything that we have in our possession that would indi-
cate— in fact, quite to the contrary — that the defendant intended that they should
have that tendency. To us, it was largely to the purpose of lending credence or
variety to the publication itself, and perhaps increase its circulation and prestige.
The Court. Was there any kind of compensation paid to the Government
officials?
Mr. Hitchcock. There was no compensation paid to one. In the case of the
other codefendant, there is evidence to the effect that with respect to an ancil-
lary matter, namely, that this codefendant had made, over the period of years,
lie having been in the Far East during that time certain card indices in re-
spect to Chinese officials, keeping them up, to date on their activities, upon their
beliefs, politics, etc., and that the defendant Jaffe did pay to the codefendant
Larsen or to his wife small amounts of money over a period of months, which
is the only evidence we have to the effect they were paid, and that payment
was for the transcription and typing of this particular card index, these par-
ticular cards, which were the personal property of the codefendant Larsen —
they were not the property of any Governmental agency.
As a matter of fact, we believe it was through these contacts, in their inception,
that this further complaint was made whereby Larsen and the other codefendant,
and perhaps others, removed from the files for his use and made accessible
and available to him the documents themselves.
Our quarrel is that the documents themselves, which is actually the property
of the United States and various departments, were actually taken and re-
1936 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
moved to Jaffe's office and there retained by him and undoubtedly use by him —
else, why take them?
The trial in this case, I assume, would involve four months. The disposition
started today here may well resolve the trial of the case in its entirety — I
don't know. Now that the war is over there is the difficulty of changing per-
sonnel, the difficulties of proof, of identifying documents, and the sources of docu-
ments, those difficulties will all be increased.
We recognize that the defendant has no criminal record of any description
and, after discussing the matter with counsel, who have been very fair with the
matter, the Government agreed, if the Court would care to consider same, it
would like to make a recommendation in the case.
The Court. I will be glad to have your recommendation.
Mr. Hitchcock. Namely, the imposition of no jail sentence but that a sub-
stantial fine be imposed.
The Court. Will Mr. Jaffe pay the fine?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes. Our information is to the'effect that the defendant Jaffe
is a comparatively well-to-do man. He is the sole owner, we understand, of a
prosperous greeting-card business, conducted largely by mail, and
The Court (interposing). What is the penalty under the statute?
Mr. Hitchcock. The penalty under the statute is a fine not to exceed $10,000
or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both.
The Court. The regular conspiracy statute; the general conspiracy statute?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes ; Section 88.
Our belief is, the defendant not being criminal in his tendencies, we believe
probation would serve no useful purpose in the case.
The Court. Is that the course you ask the Court to take?
Mr. Arent. Yes, your Honor.
I would like to offer one argument for making the fine perhaps less than
what the Government may consider substantial, and that is this : The publicity
in the early stages of this and before the indictment was returned did the man
so much harm, made such serious accusations, that a very substantial fine would
leave in the minds of a great many people the thought that this man was guilty
of espionage ; something he would spend a lifetime erasing.
We think a more modest fine may make the public realize
The Court (interposing). What would you consider a "modest fine" having
$10,000 as a maximum?
.Mr. Arent. I see that New York counsel agrees with me: $2,000 would be a
modest fine.
May I urge in connection with prompt disposition this : The defendant's wife
was operated on for cancer two months ago. The pendency of these matters is a
great strain on her. If the thing were cleared up completely it would certainly
serve the purposes of the defendant very well. I can see no harm to the Gov-
ernment flowing from any such action.
The Court. Well, I think I understand the matter sufficiently to dispose of it
without further delay.
The question is : Both sides desire that course be taken?
Mr. Hitchcock. Apparently there is no dispute except the difficulty between
what is termed by defendant's counsel a modest fine and the statement of the
Government as to a substantial fine.
The Court. I did not ask you what a substantial fine was, but I think if I
get. the defendant's idea of it I can perhaps reach a fair conclusion.
Well, I regret, Mr. Jaffe, that you in your zeal to carry on your work, which
was evidently for a trustworthy purpose, that you were misled to do these
things which of course did tend to break down the fidelity of Government em-
ployees and officials in the performance of their work. I think you realize that.
That is one of the reasons why you feel disposed to plead guilty. Looking back
on the matter, you see that is wrong and certainly it is.
I accept without any doubt the assurance both of your counsel and of the
Government attorneys that tbere was no thought or act upon your part which
was intended or calculated or had a tendency to injure the Government or the
military forces in the prosecution of the war. It would make quite a difference
to ne if I did not have that assurance and did not know, confidently, that that
was true. Nevertheless, it is serious, as I have indicated, to interfere with or in
any way influence in any manner, whether the motives are good or bad, the
duties ami the fidelity of Government employees. I am sure you realize that.
I do not want to lecture you and have no intention to. I simply want to
indicate, briefly, the considerations which lead to this sentence I am about to
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1937
Impose : In view of what counsel has suggested as the course or the nature of the
punishment, and the suggestion made by your own counsel with reference to it, I
will impose a fine of Twenty-Five Hundred dollars.
That will be the judgment in the case.
Are you prepared to pay that fine now?
The Defendant. Yes.
The Court. Then you may settle it with the Clerk.
Mr. Hitchcock. Your Honor, the Government appreciates your coming in
and taking care of tlie matter this morning.
Mr. Ajbent. Of course counsel for the defendant takes the same view.
(The Court then recessed.)
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
I. H. S. Middlemiss, Official Court Reporter for the District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia, hereby certify that the foregoing is
the official transcript of the proceedings had in said Court on the date herein-
before stated incident to the changing by the named defendant of his plea to the
indictment filed herein and the proceedings then and there had with respect the
disposition of the case by the Court.
H. S. Middlemiss,
Official Court Reporter.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia,
Criminal Division No. 2
Criminal Action No. 75457
United States vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, defendant
Washington, D. O, November 2, 19^5.
The above-entitled matter came on for plea and sentence before Hon. James
M. Proctor. Associate Justice, at 12 : 10 o'clock p. m.
Appearances :
Arthur J. Hilland, Esq., for the Defendant.
R. M. Hitchcock, Esq., Department of Justice, for the United States.
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Hitchcock. If the Court please, this is the second defendant in what
has been known as the Jaffe case, Jaffe himself having been disposed of on a
sentence by Your Honor under a plea of guilty on September 29, if I recall cor-
rectly. The Government has indicated that a plea of nolo contendere is ac-
ceptable and I would like to say what we feel about it.
The Court. He has offered to enter that plea?
Mr. Hitchcock. Yes ; and the Government feels the plea should be accepted.
The Court. Very well.
Mr. Hitchcock. Your Honor will recall that this indictment, which was
returned in July, alleged that the defendants committed four offenses against
the United States, that is, to unlawfully remove documents and records from
the departments and agencies of the Government. Mr. Larsen, together with
the other two defendants, Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Roth, entered a plea of not guilty
on the 30th of August and subsequently on September 28 this defendant filed
motions to quash, motions to suppress, and a demurrer which are still outstanding
and I assume will be withdrawn.
The Court. That would necessarily be so.
Mr. Hitchcock. That is, if this plea is accepted. As I told Your Honor in
the Jaffe case, there was no element of disloyalty involved. Mr. Jaffe, who
was the procurer, these two being employees of the Government, being a man of
considerable means
The Court. Yes.
Mr. Hitchcock. And who was and is the principal defendant and as I told
you at that time I felt accepting a plea in Mr. Jaffe's case and imposing a fine
rather than probation or imprisonment might resolve the entire case.
1938 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
This is the second defendant. Mr. Larsen is a man of little means and really
no means except the rather modest salary he was drawing.
The Court. He does not hold that position now?
Mr. Hitchcock. No, he does not.
The Court. Has he been disconnected from the public service?
Mr. Hitchcock. He has been disassociated with the public service. Whether
that will be permanent or not I cannot say. I am inclined to think it will. He
has had no means of income at all.
We feel that Mr. Larsen, together with the defendant Roth, were corrupted by
Mr. Jaffe. Of themselves they never would have been involved in these series
of violations.
The Court. Did they receive compensation for this?
Mr. Hitchcock. No, Your Honor. There was one element in the case when
Mr. Jaffe was here that Mr. Jaffe did pay small sums of money to Mr. Larsen
and Mr. Larsen's wife for the transcribing of information contained on some
personnel cards made available to Mr. Jaffe by Mr. Larsen which has no con-
nection except as to their acquaintanceship or knowledge. There was nothing
criminal whatsoever.
The Court. Who was the third man?
Mr. Hitchcock. Lieutenant Andrew Roth, formerly of the United States Navy.
The Court. He was attached to the State Department?
Mr. Hitchcock. He was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence to which
Department Mr. Larsen was attached until last September, at which time he
was transferred to the State Department.
The Court. What has become of the Roth case?
Mr. Hitchcock. Mr. Roth has a motion for a bill of particulars and a demurrer
on file which has been adjourned from time to time. I think the final adjourned
date will be in a week or ten days. I believe there will be a disposition of that
case within a short time.
That very briefly, Your Honor, is our reason together with what I told you
before which may deserve repetition now, that the war being over and these
agencies closing the file in this case with the countless documents involved would
involve at least four months work with very uncertain results.
The Court. Mr. Hitchcock, what is your recommendation as to sentence?
Mr. Hitchcock. Our recommendation as to sentence is that this defendant
should be fined a substantially less sum than Mr. Jaffe. We had the sum of $500
in mind. Mr. Jaffe was fined $2,500 by Your Honor. If I understand your
question correctly, my recommendation in this case would be of a fine substan-
tially less than that in view of their financial discrepancies.
The Court. It would be a fine that he can pay?
Mr. Hitchcock. A fine that he could pay, and our thought on that is a fine
of $500 on the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere.
Mr. Hilland. I believe Mr. Hitchcock has covered pretty much what I might
have said, Your Honor, had I been heard first. He has pointed out, in sub-
stance, this: This charge did not arise out of any career of crime. Mr. Larsen
is a man of good character and excellent reputation, and he has had a hobby
for a number of years of collecting and recording information on Chinese per-
sonalities. He pursued that hobby after he became a Government employee.
He started in that in 1923 when he was in China and this charge grew out of
the pursuit of that hobby. That is what happened.
There is one matter that I wanted to clear up. I do not think Mr. Hitchcock
intended to use the word "corruption." There was no corruption about the
payment of money or anything of that sort.
The Court. I assume he means
Mr. Hitchcock (interposing). If I may interrupt, what I said was that Mr.
Jaffe corrupted this defendant and I have extreme doubt there were any corrupt
motives on the part of Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Hii.land. I think the term should be misuse or abuse of friendship, misuse
of Mr. Jaffe's friendship with Mr. Larsen.
The conduct involved was one that would not normally result in criminal
prosecution but. as Your Honor knows, it was not the charge that we had here
originally. Everyone concedes the original charge should never have been
brought. There was no indictment on that charge and, of course, because of the
seriousness of the original charge all of these defendants have suffered gravely;
the charge that will probably attach to them the rest of their lives, even though
they were innocent of it.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1939
As Mr. Hitchcock lias pointed out, Mr. Larsen is a man of most modest means
and together with the oilier punishments he has endured, a fine of $500, as has
been suggested, would be very severe and a substantial punishment to him.
The COUBT. You may stand, Mr. Larsen.
1 have do comment to make about the ease. It is a ease which probably has
been given very serious consideration throughout and probably they have the
public interest as much at heart as I have in this case and I am, therefore,
inclined to accept their recommendation with respect to the disposition of it. Of
course, that is induced by what is undoubtedly the past good record of this
defendant. I do not assume there is any record of any kind against him.
Mr. Hitchcock. There is none.
The Court. There is not anything I need to say about it. With an intelligent
defendant such as this gentleman is I would be lecturing him and I am not a very
good lecturer, so I will refrain from any comments on it.
The sentence will be as recommended. I guess we omitted taking the formal
plea. I will accept that plea of nolo contendere.
The Clerk. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, in Case 75,457, in which you are charged
with violation of Section 88, Title 18, of the United States Code, do you wish to
withdraw your plea of not guilty heretofore entered?
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
The Clerk. And enter a plea of nolo contendere?
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
The Court. The fine will be $500.
Mr. Hitchcock. May the record show, Your Honor, that the motions made by
Mr. Hilland and I are now withdrawn?
Mr. Hilland. Yes, if the Court please.
The Court. Yes.
Mr. Hilland. I suppose technically that would be all that would be needed
because when we started out we withdrew our plea of not guilty theretofore
entered.
The Court. That is withdrawn and the plea of nolo contendere is now entered.
I assume the defendant will pay that fine now.
Mr. Hilland. Yes, I understand he will.
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
I, Jeanette Rawls, one of the Official Court Reporters of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, hereby certify that I reported by
stenotype the proceedings had in Criminal Action No. 75,457, United States vs.
Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and that the foregoing pages 1 to 8 are a true and
accurate transcript of my stenotype notes in said proceedings.
Dated this 2d day of November 1945.
Jeanette Rawls.
Official Court Reporter.
Department of Justice,
Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Washington, June 19, 1950.
Honorable Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : This will acknowledge your letter of June 14, 1950 inquir-
ing as to what the records of the Department of Justice may reflect concerning
the status of the entity which published Amerasia during the year 1945.
According to the information available to us, Amerasia, Inc. was dissolved on
January 21, 1944 as recorded in the Certificate of Dissolution on file with the
County Clerk, New York County, file number 1229-1937. On and after this date,
Philip J. Jaffe, published the magazine Amerasia as a sole proprietorship.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
Deputy Attorney General.
1940 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Office of the Editor
America
national catholic weekly
329 West 108th Street, New York 25, N. Y.
June 26, 1950.
Mr. James J. McInerney,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. McInerney : Thank you very much for your long letter explaining in
detail the question of the documents in the AmeraHa case. I am enclosing a
clipping of your letter as it appeared in America for July 1st. This will correct
the oversimplified version of the facts we have previously given.
My own impression is that you might have protected yourself against the mis-
understanding if you had made a somewhat more guarded denial of the existence
of the "documents."
Sincerely yours,
Rev. Robert C. Hartnett, S. J.,
Editor.
[From America, July 1, 1950]
correspondence
The Amerasia Case
Editor : Your June 17 editorial on the Amerasia case has been brought to my
attention. One paragraph reads as follows:
"If Senator Tydings' attitude bred mistrust of the Administration's han-
dling of the loyalty investigation, on May 31 James M. McInerney, Assistant
Attorney General, did his best to deepen public suspicion of the Democratic
party's motives. As spokesman for the Justice Department he denied that
the documents publicized by Mr. Andrews existed. Two days later he re-
canted. The documents, as described by Mr. Andrews, did exist, he admitted,
and were found in the offices of Amerasia. The Herald Tribune's ace corre-
spondent, who first broke the news of the secret Yalta agreements, had scored
again."
In the interest of truth and accuracy I should like to set forth the facts with
respect to this matter.
I read Bert Andrews' article on the morning it appeared in the New York
Herald Tribune. Neither I nor three associates could identify the "documents"
on the basis of the descriptions set forth in the news story. Later that same day
several reporters inquired of me concerning the "documents" in question. At that
time I told them that I did not recognize the "documents" as they were described
in the morning news story.
I would like to discuss briefly the news stories upon which your editorial was
apparently based. In Mr. Andrews' story, one of the "documents'* was described
in the following terms :
"One document, orer the signature of former Secret art/ of State Cordell
■Hull, seemed, on the surface, to picture Amerasia, a magazine plugging for
Soviet interests in Asia, as a veritable bible on what to do in the Far East."
[Emphasis added.]
The date and addressee were not stated, and among the very large number of
documents in this five-year-old case I did not recall one over the signature of
Mr. Hull which "seemed, on the surface to picture Amerasia * * * as a veri-
table bible on what to do in the Far East." There was found in the Amerasia
office a cable which merely quotes five paragraphs from the July 1944 issue of
the magazine, without any comment, endorsement or observation of any kind. It
was one of hundreds of press clips sent to our representatives abroad by the
Public Relations office of the State Department for the purpose of keeping them
informed of the news developments here. I am sure you will readily agree that
it would he difficult to associate this news despatch with the testimonial described
by Bert Andrews.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1941
Another "document" is described by Mr. Andrews in these words :
"One document tells exactly where more than a score of American sub-
marines were in the last stages of the war in the Pacific, and il was taken
out of the Navy Department at the time when top admirals shuddered at the
thought of the slightest leak about their undersea plans. [Emphasis added.]
There is no such "document" in the Amerasia case and no such "document" was
ever taken out of the Navy Department under the circumstances described in the
newspaper article. What Mr. Andrews refers to is a personal note by an uniden-
tified person, summarizing a speech on the Far East made by Mr. Grew before
State Department personnel about six weeks after a tour of the Far East, in
which he stated that some twenty-five American submarines in the Tshushima
Strait were doing great damage to Japanese shipping.
The third "document" mentioned in the newspaper article was described thus:
"One document was in the most highly secret category of all — "for eyes
only — and it was a message from the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."
No such "document" as described is contained among the Amerasia exhibits.
However, there was found a personal note which refers to such a message and its
transmission. Not being a Government document, this memorandum bears no
classi ication, of course, and from its appearance it may have been prepared by a
newspaperman. Its author was never identified.
The fourth and last "document" was described in the newspaper article as
follows :
"One document disclosed the complete operations plan of a hush-hush
Government agency on certain matters."
When queried with respect to this "document," I advised the newspaper reporters
that its description was too vague to hazard an opinion as to whether or not it
was included among the Amerasia exhibits.
The distinction as to whether the information existed in the form of Govern-
ment documents or in unidentified personal notes is a necessary one, since it is
obvious that Mr. Andrews' article, my answers to the press and your editorial
references are predicated upon and deal exclusively with the contents of stolen
"Government documents."
I would like to make it clear that I did not recant, as stated in your editorial,
and most certainly did not admit the existence of the "documents," as described
by Mr. Andrews. It is my opinion that both Mr. Andrews and the public were
misinformed as to the true facts and their significance.
James M. McInernet,
Assistant Attorney General.
Washington, D. C.
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C, June 29, 1950.
Eu\vard P. Morgan, Esquire,
Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Capitol Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgan : Enclosed for your information and such use as you may
deem appropriate is a mimeographed copy of the presentment returned and filed
by the Special Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York on June 15,
1950. This copy differs from the copy previously furnished to you in that it sets
out the names of the signers thereto.
This Special Grand Jury, as you know, was in existence for its full legal dura-
tion and devoted its attention exclusively to espionage and related matters.
Respectfully,
James M. McInernet,
Assistant Attorney General
(For the Attorney General).
Enclosure No. 79352
1942 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
[Distributed by the Federal Grand Jury Association for the Southern District of New
York, 101 Park Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.]
Presentment of Conclusions of Grand Juey Investigation into Espionage
(Submitted to and accepted, approved, and ordered filed by Judge John W. Clancy,
June 15, 1950)
Whereas the undersigned constitute all the members of the December 16, 1948,
Special Federal Grand Jury of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York, impaneled to inquire into espionage and sub-
versive activies ; and
Whereas this Federal Grand Jury has heard a volume of testimony concern-
ing the activities of many men and women, associated with or having knowledge
of a continuing conspiracy against the security of the nation ; and
Whereas this testimony and evidence have led this Special Federal Grand
Jury to ceratin conclusions it deems proper and important to be brought to the
attention of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments of the United
States Government for such action as may be necessary or appropriate, the under-
signed members of this Grand Jury respectfully show and allege as follows :
1. The safety of this nation and its institutions is being jeopardized because :
(a) The underground activities of communists in this country, organized in a
continuing conspiracy and using effective techniques to extend their influence
beyond their ranks, have greatly increased during the last five years ; and
because
(6) The nation, confronted with an entirely new situation in its history — a
situation in which for the first time the loyalty of certain of its own citizens
has been diverted to a foreign ideology — has not as yet deviled adequate means
to combat this menace ; and because
(c) There has been and is now a concerted attempt on the part of many, both
communists and disloyal Americans aided by "fellow travelers," to conceal the
truth from the American people.
This conviction was arrived at by the Grand Jury after an experience in which
it came face to face with the evil that is communism. Its substitution of the
false for the true as the standard of judgment has introduced into human affairs
a new attack on man's integrity.
The American people cannot afford to tolerate evil of this character partic-
ularly in their government nor on the other hand can they deny their fellow
citizens those civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But among such
civil rights is no the rights to be employed by the government and the people
are correct in demanding that all entrusted with the welfare and safety of the
country be above suspicion.
2. This Grand Jury in a presentment submitted on April 26, 1949, warned the
American people against the prevalence and increase of espionage activities.
It specifically stated that existing laws applicable to espionage are "inadequate
and unrealistic." It stated that these laws were loosely drawn. The Grand
Jury now repeats that such laws are riddled with loopholes. Previously it
recommended that new legislation or the amendment of existing legislation be
enacted promptly. The Grand Jury now repeats that recommendation. Such
legislation — the Internal Security Bill which embodies satisfactory provisions —
has already been passed by the House of Representatives and is now in Senate
Committee. It should be speedily brought to passage and made the law of the
land.
3. The Grand Jury, in the same presentment, stated: "Having seen at first
hand the difficulties in arriving at the truth concerning espionage violations,
when witnesses have been alerted by publicized charges and countercharges,
the Grand Jury recommends that all investigating bodies conduct their inquiries
into espionage in secret." It repeats that recommendation. The latter does not
imply that when such investigations are completed secrecy should thereafter
prevail. It does imply that the half-public, half-secret operation of any investi-
gatory agency is both confusing and harmful; and that no permanent good can
be served unless a conclusive report is presented to the American people which
will he convincing in its thoroughness and its honesty.
4. The Grand Jury system was anciently established as the representative
of the people, to insure law and order and to protect the people against injustice,
maladministration and lawlessness. The Grand Jury is vested with the broadest
and most unlimited powers, and has no legal responsibility for its decisions.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1943
unless corruptly made, to any public officer or to any branch of the Government.
It not only can but it must conduct inquiry into violations of the Federal laws
on its own initiative and, acting alone, it has the power of suhpoena. Where
ii knows evidence t xisis which has not been presented to it, its duty is to order
such evidence produced.
The very existence of this grand-jury system is a bulwark of independence.
The grand jury's purpose is at once to ferret eat the guilty and to protect the
innocent whether the former is shielded by powerful influences or the latter
is unjustly accused.
This Grand Jury has been surprised at the prevalent ignorance of its func-
tions, an ignorance that apparently extends into areas where the Grand Jury's
cooperation should be sought. The individual citizen himself in or out of the
Government not only has the right but the obligation, when he has evidence of
the law's violation, to present this evidence to a grand jury.
By law. this Grand Jury expires on June 15, T9."H), after serving its maximum
legal term of eighteen months. It believes this time limitation is wisely estab-
lished for no group should be longer entrusted with such powers. But the
experience and insight which it has acquired have been valuable adjuncts in its
deliberations and in the establishment of a record available to any successor
grand jury- From such experience, this Grand Jury is convinced that a similar
body should promptly be impaneled so that it can immediately equip itself with
the necessary knowledge to assay all evidence of espionage and subversive
activities presented to it.
This Grand Jury, therefore, strongly recommends the impaneling of a new
Grand July in the Southern District of New York to carry on both the work
which now remains uncompleted and that which will arise in the future.
5. In its IS months, this Grand Jury has had an intimate insight into the opera-
tion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has come to have the highest
regard for the efficiency, the thoroughness, and the honesty with which its affairs
are conducted under J. Edgar Hoover. In the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the nation has one of its most potent agencies to protect its security. The present
Congress should be commended for its recent action in strengthening the hand
of Mr. Hoover in this vital work.
6. The Grand Jury is not convinced that the Loyalty Boards established by the
Government are sufficient protection against the infiltration of communists or of
the communist-inspired into governmental departments.
It is further convinced that the security of the country, is not adequately
protected if a Loyalty Board limits its inquiry involving governmental employees
to a determination of the individual's loyalty. Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, on
his retirement as Secretary of Commerce, called public attention to this inade-
quacy and stated that, since all governmental departments "today deal with secret
information," each and all their employees should be good security risks, and
hence should be screened by standards that include "the company they keep and
stability of character."
The Grand Jury endorses Mr. Whitney's position and recommends that Con-
gress study means to insure against the government's employment of any indi-
vidual who is "a poor security risk;" and meanwhile repeats that no citizen is
invested with the right to work in government.
7. This Grand Jury has been greatly disturbed by certain court procedures in
recent trials concerning communism and espionage. The maneuverings of
defense lawyers have not only violated the decorum of judicial procedure but have
furthered the communist objective of establishing anarchy by undermining re-
spect for the courts. Yet in pretrial and trial hearings of espionage cases, such
attorneys under existing laws are often in a position to force on the prosecution
the dilemma of choice between not proceeding or proceeding at the expense of
revealing information injurious to national security. This choice is particularly
grave when the nation is nt war.
The Grand Jury recommends to the proper authorities that a competent and:
exhaustive study be made by legal experts to determine if this situation cannot
at least be mitigated.
8. The Grand Jury has been shocked at the lack of cooperation shown by certain
lawyers who have appeared before it as witnesses, who refused to answer ques-
tions on the ground of self-incrimination, and who disregarded their obligations
as citizens To further the ends of justice. If such a position is taken by any
governmental employee, he or she would be ipso facto dismissed. Lawyers arc
officers of the court.
1944 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Grand Jury, repeating its recommendation of April 1949, urges the judi-
ciary and bar asosciations to take measures to disbar lawyers who refuse to
answer questions on grounds of self-incrimination before judicial bodies, grand
juries, or governmental boards of inquiry.
9. The Grand Jury, acting on its own authority, instituted an investigation
into the Amerasia case. In the time legally available to it, it has not been able
to conduct as exhaustive an inquiry as it would desire. It has examined a
number of witnesses, always with counsel of the Department of Justice present.
The Grand Jury, sworn to secrecy, may speak to the American public either
through an indictment or a presentment and hence now advances the following
conclusions :
(a) The Office of Strategic Service, which precipitated the Amerasia
case, acted in a responsible manner.
(&) The officials immediately concerned between that time and the
arrests of the six accused, acted in a responsible manner. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation properly performed its duty, a duty which was not
only conditioned on bringing criminals to justice, but on the equally im-
portant considerations of thwarting further crime and protecting national
security.
(c) The Grand Jury has found no evidence that any official acted im-
properly in regard to the delay in the arrests.
(d) The Grand Jury also has found no evidence to indicate that the De-
partment of Justice was remiss in its prosecution of the case. If laws
governing espionage had been different, the Grand Jury believes that the
prosecution procedure would have been entirely different. Other telling
factors involved certain legal procedures which, if followed, might have
revealed to the enemy information that it was essential should be withheld.
The determination of many of the legal issues involved, in particular the-
admissibility of evidence, would require a long and intensive study.
(e) The number of government documents seized is not important, save as
a demonstration that precautions against their theft from governmental
departments were entirely inadequate. It is important, however, that P
certain number of these documents pertained to national defense and that
others of a different nature, in the hands of the enemy, would have aided it.
(/) The Grand Jury believes that the American people have been poorly
served by the compounding of confusion through disclosures of half-truths,
contradictory statements, etc., in this and similar cases.
(g) The Grand Jury believes that, at this juncture, it would be salutary
if the Justice Department would issue a public statement of the details
of its handling of the case beginning with the time of the arrests, including
a complete list and description of all documents or papers found in the
office of Amerasia by any government agent or in the possession of those
arrested ; and the reasons for the various steps taken by the prosecution.
10. As Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, Thomas
J. Donegan has served this Grand Jury, as he did its predecessor, from the day
of its impaneling to that of its discharge. It has always been cognizant of his
high purpose, his unquestioned probity, his unremitting zeal, and his devotion
to duty. His knowledge of communism and the laws relating to the prosecution
of espionage and subversion is expert. The country owes him a debt of gratitude.
11. Now, therefore ,the Grand Jury respectfully petitions the court to accept
this presentment and order it filed, authorizing the foreman and the secretary of
the Grand Jury to send copies of it to the members of Congress and to the
proper officers of the Executive Department of the Government, and to permit
such other use as may properly be made of this document.
Dated : New York, N. Y., June 16, IO.jO.
(Signed by) John Gilland Brunini, Foreman; John G. Kilbreth, Asst.
Foremen; Hugh V. Doran, Secretary; Robert L. Barrows; Joseph
P. Christianson ; Mrs. Evelyn Zorn Dingwall ; James Sumner
Draper; Raymond C. Fowler; Robert Frese; G. Leonard Gold;
Henry E. Grant ; Harold C. Hahn ; Richard Brown Jones ; Murray
Kanner; Francis Keally ; Samuel B. Leight; Sidney Leshen ; Her-
man E. Nathan; Bernhard K. Schaefer; Harry Scherman ; John
Schreiber ; Siegfried Stern ; Wheeler Williams.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1945
Mount Vernon, N. Y., May 12, 1950.
To Whom II May Concern:
I certify that I have attended Mr. John Huber, 15 Oourtland Street, Mount
Vernon, N. Y., on several occasions in the last three weeks. It is my honest
opinion that Mr. John Huher, though physically sound, is on the verge of a
mental collapse, probably induced hy the terrific strain that he has heen under.
In view of those findings I recommended that Mr. Huber should take a 2-3
weeks vacation with complete isolation from the outside world.
Luke Berardi, M. D.
July 5, 1950.
Hon. Millard E. Tydings,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Tydings : In connection with your inquiry of July 3, 1950, con-
cerning Theodore Geiger, an ECA employee, I would like to state that he has been
investigated as to loyalty and security by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Such an investigation is required by Section 110 (c) of Public Law 472, "The
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948," which prescribes as follows :
"(c) No citizen or resident of the United States may be employed, or if
already employed, may be assigned under this title for a period to exceed
three months unless such individual has been investigated as to loyalty and
security by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has
been made to the Secretary of State and the Administrator, and until the
Secretary of State or the Administrator has certified in writing (and filed
copies thereof with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs) that, after full consideration of such
report, he believes such individual is loyal to the United States, its Con-
stitution, and form of government, and is not now and has never been a
member of any organization advocating contrary views."
In accordance with these provisions of the law and after full consideration
of the information developed, Mr. Hoffman certified in writing his belief as to the
loyalty of Mr. Geiger.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) William Foster,
Acting Administrator.
There is incorporated by reference that portion of the record of the
hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate held March 23, 1948, appearing on pages 23 through 25,
dealing with loyalty review procedures in the Department of State.
There is incorporated by reference the record of hearings before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Departments, Eightieth Congress, second session, held March 10
and 12, 1948, which went fully into charges against the State Depart-
ment and its handling of loyalty cases.
There is incorporated by reference that portion, being pages 169
through 201 and 206 through 210, of the record of the hearings be-
fore the subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Eightieth Congress, second session, held January 28, 1948, dealing
with the handling of personnel security and loyalty cases in the State
Department.
There is incorporated by reference the speech made on the floor of
the House, August 2, 1948, by Congressman Jonkman, entitled "De-
partment of State" which appears in the Congressional Record for
that date at page 9793.
1946 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Department of State,
Washington, July 10, 1950.
Mr. Edward P. Morgan,
chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee, United States Senate.
My Dear Mr. Morgan : In response to your inquiry, the following is submitted
in description of the position which Mr. Haldore Hanson holds in the point 4
program :
Under departmental announcement No. 41, dated February 21, 1950, Mr.
Haldore Hanson is Chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff of the
point 4 program. He works under the supervision of an Administrator for the
point 4 program, who is to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate in accordance with Public Law 535, Eighty-first Congress, second session.
Pending appropriation for the Administrator of point 4, Ambassador Waynick
has been brought back to Washington and is serving as Acting Administrator.
Three staffs are provided for this Administrator : a policy staff, a projects staff,
and a management staff. Mr. Hanson's responsibilities are limited to the proj-
ects staff. He advises the Administrator on the cost and feasibility of proposed
projects and on problems which may arise in administering them. He also re-
views the carrying out of projects by other government agencies.
I hope the foregoing information will be of use to you.
I am enclosing a copy of Public Law 535 and departmental announcement 41.
Sincerely yours,
Adrian S. Fisher, the Legal Adviser.
Enclosures :
1. Public Law 535.
2. Departmental announcement 41.
[Public Law 535 — 81st Congress]
[Chapter 220 — 2d Session]
[H. R. 7797]
AN ACT To provide foreign economic assistance
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign
Economic Assistance Act of 1950".
Title I
Sec. 101. This title may be cited as the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1950".
findings and declaration of policy
Sec. 102. (a) Section 102 (a) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. is
amended by striking out in the fourth sentence thereof "trade barriers" and
inserting in lieu thereof "barriers to trade or to the free movement of persons";
and by inserting in the fifth sentence thereof the word "further" before the word
"unification".
(b) Section 102 (b) (1) of such Act is amended by inserting a comma and the
phrase "increased productivity, maximum employment, and freedom from re-
strictive business practices" after the word "production".
GUARANTIES AND LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Sec. 103. (a) Section 111 (b) (3) (ii) of such Act is amended to read as
follows :
"(ii) the Administrator shall charge a fee in an amount determined by
him not exceeding 1 per centum per annum of the amount of each guaranty
under clause (1) of subparagraph (v), and not exceeding 4 per centum per
annum of the amount of each guaranty under clause (2) of such subpara-
graph, and all fees collected hereunder shall be available for expenditure in
discharge of liabilities under guaranties made under this paragraph until
such time as all such liabilities have been discharged or have expired, or
until all such fees have been expended in accordance with the provisions of
I his paragraph ; and",
(b) Section 111 (b) (3) (iv) of such Act is amended to read as follows:
"(iv )as used in this paragraph, the term 'investment' includes (A) any
contribution of capital goods, materials, equipment, services, patents, pro-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1947
cesses, or techniques by any person in the form of a loan or loans to any
enterprise to be conducted within a participating country, (B) the purchase
of a share of ownership in any such enterprise, (C) participation in royalties,
earnings, or protfis of any such.enterprise, and (D) the furnishing of capital
goods items and related services pursuant to a contract providing for payment
in whole or in part after the end of the fiscal year in which the guaranty of
such investment is made : and".
(c) Section 111 (b) (3) (v) of such Act is amended to read as follows:
"(v) the guaranty to any person shall be limited to assuring one or both
of the following: (1) The transfer into United States dollars of other cur-
rencies, or credits in such currencies received by such person, as earnings
or profits from the approved project, as repayment or return of the investment
therein, in whole or in part, or as compensation for the sale or disposition of
all or any part thereof; and (2) the compensation in United States dollars
for loss of all or any part of the investment in the approved project which
shall be found by the Administrator to have been lost to such person by
reason of expropriation or confiscation by action of the government of a
participating country. When any payment is made to any person pursuant
to a guaranty as hereinbefore described, the currency, credits, asset, or
investment on account of which such payment is made shall become the
property of the United States Government, and the United States Govern-
ment shall be subrogated to any right, title, claim, or cause of action existing
in connection therewith."
(d) Section 111 (b) (3) of such Act is further amended by striking out the
words between the second and last provisos therein and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "It being the intent of the Congress that the guaranty herein
authorized should be used to maximum practicable extent and so administered
as to increase the participation of private enterprise in achieving the purposes
of this Act, the Administrator is authorized to issue guaranties up to a total
of $200,000,000".
(e) Section 111 (c) (2) of such Act is amended by striking out "$150,000,000"
and inserting in lieu thereof "$200,000,000".
(f ) Section 111 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new subsection :
"(d) The Administrator is authorized to transfer funds directly to any central
institution or other organization formed to further the purposes of this Act by
two or more participating countries, or to any participating country or countries
in connection with the operations of such institution or organization, to be used
on terms and conditions specified by the Administrator, in order to facilitate
the development of transferability of European currencies, or to promote the
liberalization of trade by participating countries wTith one another and with
other countries."
PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY
Sec. 104. (a) Section 112 (a) of such Act is amended by striking out the period
at the end thereof and inserting a comma and the following: "and (3) minimize
the burden on the American taxpayer by reducing the amount of dollar purchases
by the participating coimtries to the greatest extent possible, consistent with
maintaining an adequate supply of the essentials for the functioning of their
economies and for their continued recovery."
(b) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 112 of such Act are hereby repealed.
(c) Section 112 (1) of such Act is amended to read as follows :
"(1) No funds authorized for the purposes of this title shall be used for the
purchase in bulk of any commodities at prices higher than the market price
prevailing in the United States at the time of the purchase adjusted for dif-
ferences in the cost of transportation to destination, quality, and terms of
payment. A bulk purchase within the meaning of this subsection does not
include the purchase of raw cotton in bales."
(d) Section 112 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsections :
"(m) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the pricing provisions of
section 112 (e) of this title "and section 4 of the Act of July 16, 1943 (57 Stat.
566) shall not be applicable to domestic wheat and wheat flour procured under
this title or any other Act providing for assistance or relief to foreign countries,
supplied to countries which are parties to the International Wheat Agreement
of 1949 and credited to their guaranteed purchases thereunder.
68970— 50— pt. 2 30
1948 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"(n) It is the sense of Congress that no participating country shall maintain
or impose any import, currency, tax, license, quota, or other similar business
restrictions which discriminate against citizens of the United States or any
corporation, partnership, or other association substantially beneficially owned
by citizens of the United States, engaged or desiring to engage, in furtherance
of the purposes of this title, in the importation into such country of any com-
modity, which restrictions are not reasonably required to meet balance of
payments conditions, or requirements of national security, or are not author-
ized under international agreements to which such country and the United
States are parties. In any case where the Department of State determines that
any such discriminatory restriction is maintained or imposed by a participating
country or by any dependent area of such country, the Administrator shall
take such remedial action as he determines will effectively promote the purposes
of this subsection (n)."
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 105. (a) Section 114 (c) of such Act is amended by striking out the period
at the end of the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the
following : "Provided further, That in addition to the amount heretofore author-
ized and appropriated, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for carry-
ing out the provisions and accomplishing the purposes of this title not to exceed
$2,700,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951 : Provided further. That
$600,000,000 of the funds appropriated hereunder shall be available during the
fiscal year 1951 solely for the purpose of encouraging and facilitating the opera-
tion of a program of liberalized trade and payments, for supporting any central
institution or other organization described in subsection (d) of section 111, and
for furnishing of assistance to those participating countries taking part in such
program: Provided further, That not more than $600,000,000 of such funds shall
be available during the fiscal year 1951 for transfer of funds pursuant to sub-
section (d) of section 111: Provided further, That, in addition to the foregoing,
any balance, unobligated as of June 30, 1950, or subsequently released from
obligation, of funds appropriated for carrying out and accomplishing the pur-
poses of this title for any period ending on or prior to that date is hereby
authorized to be made available for obligation through the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1951, and to be transferred to and consolidated with any appropria-
tions for carrying out and accomplishing the purposes of this title for said
fiscal year."
(b) The last sentence of section 114 (c) of such Act is amended to read as
follows : "The authorizations in this title are limited to the period ending
June 30, 1951."
(c) Section 114 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsections :
"(h) Tlie President is authorized to transfer to any department or agency
any portion of the funds allocated for assistance to Germany from appropria-
tions authorized by subsection (c). This portion may be used for expenses,
not otherwise provided for, necessary to meet responsibilities of the United
States related to the rehabilitation of occupied areas of Germany, including the
furnishing of minimum civilian supplies to prevent starvation, disease, and unrest
prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation. This portion may be expended
under authority of this subsection or any provisions of law, not inconsistent
herewith, applicable to such department or agency and without regard to such
provisions of this title as the President may specify as inapplicable.
"(i) As agreed upon by the Secretary of State and the Administrator, a part
of the German currency now or hereafter deposited under the bilateral agree-
ment of December 15, 1949, between the United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany, or any supplementary or succeeding agreement, shall be deposited
into the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) special account
under the terms of article V of the said bilateral agreement. In quantities and
under conditions determined by the Secretary of State after consultation with
the Administrator, the currency so deposited shall be available for meeting the
responsibilities of the United States in the occupation of Germany."
COUNTERPART FUNDS
Sec. 106. (a) Section 115 (b) (6) is amended to read as follows :
"(6) placing in a special account a deposit in the currency of such country,
in commensurate amounts and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1949
to between such country and the Government of the United States, when any
commodity or service is made available through any means authorized under
this title, and is furnished to the participating country on a grant basis: Pro-
vided, That the obligation to make such deposits may be waived, in the discretion
of the Administrator, witli respect to technical information or assistance furn-
ished under section 111 (a) (3) of this title and with respect to ocean trans-
portation furnished on United States flag vessels under section 111 of this title
in an amount not exceeding the amount, as determined by the Administrator,
by which the charges for such transportation exceed the cost of such transpor-
tation at world market rates: Provided further, That such special account, to-
gether with the unencumbered portions of any deposits which may have been
made by such country pursuant to section 6 of the joint resolution providing for
relief assistance to the people of countries devastated by war (Public Law 84,
Eightieth Congress) and section 5 (b) of the Foreign Aid Act of 1947 (Public
Law 3S9, Eightieth Congress), shall be used in furtherance of any central insti-
tution or other organization formed by two or more participating countries to
further the purposes set forth in subsection (d) of section 111 or otherwise
shall be held or used for purposes of internal monetary and financial stabili-
zation, for the stimulation of productive activity and the exploration for and
development of new sources of wealth, or for such other expenditures as may
be consistent with the declaration of policy contained in section 102 and the
purposes of this title, including local currency administrative expenditures of
the United States within such country incident to operations under this title:
Provided further. That the use of such special account shall be subject to agree-
ment between such country and the Administrator, who shall act in this con-
nection after consultation with the National Advisory Council on International
Monetary and Financial Problems and the Public Advisory Board provided for
in section 107 (a) : And provided further, That any unencumbered balance re-
maining in such account on June 30, 1952, shall be disposed of within such
country for such purposes as may. subject to approval by Act or joint resolu-
tion by the Congress, be agreed to between such country and the Government
of the United States ;".
(b) Section 115 (e) of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new sentence : "The Administrator shall also encourage emigration
from participating countries having permanent surplus manpower to areas,
particularly underdeveloped and dependent areas, where such manpower can
be effectively utilized."
(c) Section 115 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsection :
"(j) The Administrator shall utilize such amounts of the local currency
allocated pursuant to subsection (b) as may be necessary, to give full and
continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media,
so as to inform the peoples of the participating countries regarding the assist-
ance, including its purpose, source, and character, furnished by the American
taxpayer."
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
Sec. 107. (a) Section 3 (c) of the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of
1950 is amended by striking out "June 30, 1951" and inserting in lieu thereof
"June 30, 1952".
(b) Section 3 (d) of such Act is amended by striking out the period at the
end and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "and $100,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951."
(c) Section 4 of such Act is amended by striking out "June 30, 1950" and
inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1951."
Title II
AID TO CHINA
Sec. 201. This title may be cited as the "China Area Aid Act of 1950."
NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
Sec 202. Funds, now unobligated or hereafter released from obligation, ap-
propriated by section 12 of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1948", approved April 19, 1949 (Public Law 47, Eighty-first
Congress), are hereby made available for furtherance of the general objectives
1950 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of the China Aid Act of 1948 through June 30, 1951, and for carrying out the
purposes of that Act through economic assistance in any place in China and in
the general area of China which the President deems to be not under Communist
control, in such manner and on such terms and conditions as the President may
determine, and references in the said Act to China shall, insofar as applicable,
apply also to any other such place: Provided, That, so long as the President
deems it practicable, not less than $40,000,000 of such funds shall be available
only for such assistance in areas in China (including Formosa) : Provided
further, That not more than $8,000,000 of such funds (excluding the $40,000,000
mentioned in the foregoing proviso) shall be available for relief on humanitarian
grounds through the American Red Cross, or other voluntary relief agencies in
any place in China suffering from the effects of natural calamity, under snch
safeguards as the President shall direct to assure nondiscriminatory distribution
according to need and appropriate publicity as to source and scope of the
assistance being furnished by the United States : Provided further. That not more
than $6,000,000 of such funds (excluding the amounts mentioned in the foregoing
provisos), shall be available for allocation to the Secretary of State, to remain
available until expended, under such regulations as the Secretary of State
may prescribe, using private agencies to the maximum extent practicable, for
necessary expenses of tuition, subsistence, transportation, and emergency medi-
cal care for selected citizens of China for study or teaching in accredited
colleges, universities, or other educational institutions in the United States
approved by the Secretary of State for the purposes, or for research and related
academic and technical activities in the United States, and the Attorney General
is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate regulations providing that such
selected citizens of China who have been admitted for the purpose of study in the
United States, shall be granted permission to accept employment upon applica-
tion filed with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.
Title III
AID TO PALESTINE REFUGEES
Sec. 301. This title may be cited as the "United Nations Palestine Refugee
Aid Act of 1950."
Sec. 302. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to make contributions
from time to time before July 1, 1951, to the United Nations for the ''United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East."
established under the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations
of December 8, 1949, in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate $27,450,000 for
the purposes set forth in this title.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 303. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed $27,450,000 to
carry out the purposes of this title.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law. the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such time as an appropria-
tion shall be made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to make advances
to the Secretary of State, not to exceed in the aggregate $8,000,000. to carry out
the provisions of this title. From appropriations authorized under subsection (a)
of this section, there shall be repaid to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
without interest, the advances made by it under authority contained herein. No
interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation in implementation of this section.
NATURE OK ASSISTANCE
Si i 304. (a) The provisions of sections 301, :*< Hi. and 303 of the Act of January
27. 1948 10- Stat. ot. are hereby made applicable with respect to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to
the same extent as they apply with respect to the government of another country :
Provided, That when reimbursement is made by said Agency, such reimburse-
ment shall he credited to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized for paying
the compensation, Havel expenses, and allowances of any person assigned
hereunder.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1951
( b) Departments and agencies of the Dnited States Government are authorized,
with tin1 approval of the Secretary of State, to furnish or procure and furnish
supplies, materials, and services to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near Basl : Provided, That said Agency shall make
payments in advance for all costs incident to the furnishing or procurement
of sueh supplies, materials, or services, which payments may be credited to the
current applicable appropriation or fund of the department or agency con-
cerned and shall he available for the purposes for which sueh appropriations
and funds are authorized to be used.
Title IV
Sec 401. This title may be cited as the "Act for International Development".
Sec. 402. The < Congress hereby finds as follows :
(a) The peoples of the United States and other nations have a common
interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples.
Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life,
the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of inter-
national understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.
(b) The efforts of the peoples living in economically under-developed areas
of the world to realize their full capabilities and to develop the resources
of the lands in which they live can be furthered through the cooperative
endeavor of all nations to exchange technical knowledge and skills and to
encourage the flow of investment capital.
(c) Technical assistance and capital investment can make maximum
contribution to economic development only where there is understanding
of the mutual advantages of such assistance and investment and where there
is confidence of fair and reasonable treatment and due respect for the
legitimate interests of the peoples of the countries to which the assistance
is given and in which the investment is made and of the countries from
which the assistance and investments are derived. In the case of investment
this involves confidence on the part of the people of the under-developed
areas that investors will conserve as well as develop local resources, will
bear a fair share of local taxes and observe local laws, and will provide
adequate wages and working conditions for local labor. It involves con-
fidence on the part of investors, through intergovernmental agreements or
otherwise, that they will not be deprived of their property without prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation ; that they will be given reasonable
opportunity to remit their earnings and withdraw their capital ; that they
will have reasonable freedom to manage, operate, and control their enter-
prises ; that they will enjoy security in the protection of their persons and
property, including industrial and intellectual property, and nondiscrimina-
tory treatment in taxation and in the conduct of their business affairs.
Sev.. 403. (a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States to aid the
efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their
resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the
exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital
to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and
capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living,
creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity, and expanding purchasing
power.
(b» It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that in order
to achieve the most effective utilization of the resources of the United Sates,
private and public, which are or may be available for aid in the development
of economically underdeveloped areas, agencies of the United States Government,
in reviewing requests of foreign governments for aid for such purposes, shall take
into consideration (1) whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate part
of a program reasonably designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated
development of the country or area concerned ; < 2) whether any works or facilities
whi'-h may be projected are actually needed in view of similar facilities existing
in the area and are otherwise economically sound; and (3) with respect to
projects for which capital is requested, whether private capital is available
Cither in the country or elsewhere upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts
to finance such projects.
Sec 404. (a) In order to accomplish the purposes of this title, the United
States is authorized to participate in multilateral technical cooperation programs
carried on by the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and
1952 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
their related organizations, and by other international organizations, wherever
practicable.
(b) Within the limits of appropriations made available to carry out the
purposes of this title, the President is authorized to make contributions to the
United Nations for technical cooperation programs carried on by it and its related
organizations which will contribute to accomplishing the purposes of this title
as effectively as would participation in comparable programs on a bilateral basis.
The President is further authorized to make contributions for technical coopera-
tion programs carried on by the Organization of American States, its related
organizations, and by other international organizations.
(c) Agencies of the United States Government on request of international
organizations are authorized, upon approval by the President, to furnish services
and such facilities as may be necessary in connection therewith, on an advance
of funds or reimbursement basis, for such organizations in connection with their
technical cooperation programs. Amounts received as reimbursements from such
organizations shall be credited, at the option of the appropriate agency, either
to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the obligation, or to an
appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes
for which expenditures were made.
Sec. 405. The President is authorized to plan, undertake, administer, and exe-
cute bilateral technical cooperation programs carried on by any United States
Government agency and, in so doing — ■
(a) To coordinate and direct existing and new technical cooperation
programs.
(b) To assist other interested governments in the formulation of pro-
grams for the balanced and integrated development of the economic re-
sources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas.
(c) To receive, consider, and review reports of joint commissions set up
as provided in section 410 of this title.
(d) To make, within appropriations made available for the purpose, ad-
vances and grants in aid of technical cooperation programs to any person,
corporation, or other body of persons, or to any foreign government or
foreign government agency.
(e) To make and perform contracts or agreements in respect of technical
cooperation programs on behalf of the United States Government with any
person, corporation, or other body of persons however designated, whether
within or without the United States, or with any foreign government or
foreign government agency : Provided, That with respect to contracts or agree-
ments which entail commitments for the expenditure of funds appropriated
pursuant to the authority of this title, such contracts or agreements, within
the limits of appropriations or contract authorizations hereafter made avail-
able may, subject to any future action of the Congress, run for not to exceed
three years in any one case.
(f) To provide for printing and binding outside the continental limits
of the United States, without regard to section 11 of the Act of March 1
1919 (44 U. S. C. 111).
(g) To provide for the publication of information made available by the
joint commissions referred to in section 410, and from other sources, regard-
ing resources, opportunities for private investment capital, and the need for
technical knowledge and skill in each participating country.
Sec. 406. Agreements made by the United States under the authority of this
title with other governments and with international organizations shall be reg-
istered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with the pro-
visions of article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
Sec. 407. In carrying out the programs authorized in section 405 of this title —
(a) The participation of private agencies and persons shall be sought to
the greatest extent practicable.
(b) Due regard shall be given, in reviewing requests for assistance, to
the possibilities of achieving satisfactory results from such assistance as
evidenced by the desire of the country requesting it (1) to take steps neces-
sary to make effective use of the assistance made available, including the
encouragement of the flow of productive local and foreign investment
capital where needed for development; and (2) to endeavor to facilitate the
development of the colonies, possessions, dependencies, and non-self-
governing territories administered by such requesting country so that such
areas may make adequate contribution to the effectiveness of the assistance
requested.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1953
(c) Assistance shall be made available only where the President deter-
mines thai the country being assisted —
(1) Pays a fair share of the cost of the program.
(2) Provides all necessary information concerning such program and
gives the program full publicity.
(3) Seeks to the maximum extent possible full coordination and inte-
gration of technical cooperation programs being carried on in that
country.
(4) Endeavors to make effective use of the results of the program.
( 5 i Cooperates with other countries participating in the program in
the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills.
Sec. 40S. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations
as may be necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this title.
Sec. 409. The President shall create an advisory board, hereinafter referred
to as the "board", which shall advise and consult with the President or such other
officer as he may designate to administer the program herein authorized, with
respect to general or basic policy matters arising in connection with operation of
the program. The board shall consist of not more than thirteen members to be
appointed by the President, one of whom, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall be appointed by him as chairman. The members of the
board shall be broadly representative of voluntary agencies and other groups
interested in the program, including business, labor, agriculture, public health,
and education. All members of the board shall be citizens of the United States ;
none except the chairman shall be an officer or an employee of the United States
(including any agency or instrumentality of the United States) who as such
regularly receives compensation for current services. Members of the board,
other than the chairman if he is an officer of the United States Government,
shall receive out of funds made available for the purposes of this title a per
diem allowance of $50 for each day spent awray from their homes or regular
places of business for the purpose of attendance at meetings of the board or at
conferences held upon the call of the chairman, and in necessary travel, and
while so engaged they may be paid actual travel expenses and not to exceed
$10 per diem in lieu of subsistence and other expenses. The President may ap-
point such committees in special fields of activity as he may determine to be
necessary or desirable to effectuate the purposes of this title. The members of
such committees shall receive the same compensation as that provided for mem-
bers of the board.
Sec. 410. (a) At the request of a foreign country, there may be established
a joint commission for economic development to be composed of persons named
by the President and persons to be named by the requesting country, and may
include representatives of international organizations mutually agreed upon.
(b) The duties of each such joint commission shall be mutually agreed upon,
and may include, among other things, examination of the following:
(1) The requesting country's requirements with respect to technical as-
sistance.
(2) The requesting country's resources and potentialities, including mu-
tually advantageous opportunities for utilization of foreign technical knowl-
edge and skills and investment.
(3) Policies which will remove deterrents to and otherwise encourage the
introduction, local development, and application of technical skills and the
creation and effective utilization of capital, both domestic and foreign ; and
the implementation of such policies by appropriate measures on the part
of the requesting country and the United States, and of other countries,
when appropriate, and after consultation with them.
(c) Such joint commissions shall prepare studies and reports which they shall
transmit to the appropriate authorities of the United States and of the requesting
countries. In such reports the joint commissions may include recommendations
as to any specific projects which they conclude would contribute to the economic
development of the requesting countries.
(d) The costs of each joint commission shall be borne by the United States
and the requesting country in the proportion that may be agreed upon between
the President and that country.
Sec. 411. All or part of United States support for and participation in any
technical cooperation program carried on under this title shall be terminated by
the President —
(a) If he determines that such support and participation no longer con-
tribute effectively to the purposes of this title, are contrary to a resolution
1954 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations that the continuance
of such technical cooperation programs is unnecessary or undesirable, or are
not consistent with the foreign policy of the Lmited States.
(b) If a concurrent resolution of both Houses of the Congress finds such
termination is desirable.
Sec. 412. The President may exercise any power or authority conferred on
him by this title through the Secretary of State or through any other officer or
employee of the United States Government.
Sec. 413. In order to carry out the purposes of this title —
( a ) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a person who, under the direction of the President or such other
officer as he may designate pursuant to section 412 hereof to exercise the
powers conferred upon him by this title, shall be responsible for planning,
implementing, and managing the programs authorized in this title. He shall
be compensated at a rate fixed by the President without regard to the
Classification Act of 1949 but not in excess of $15,000 per annum.
(b) Officers, employees, agents, and attorneys may be employed for duty
within the continental limits of the United States in accordance with the
provisions of the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949.
(c) Persons employed for duty outside the continental limits of the
United States and officers and employees of the United States Government
assigned for such duty, may receive compensation at any of the rates pro-
vided for the Foreign Service Reserve and Staff by the Foreign Service Act
of 1946 (60 Stat. 999), as amended, may receive allowances and benefits not
in excess of those established thereunder, and may be appointed to any class
in the Foreign Service Reserve or Staff in accordance with the provisions
of such Act.
(d) Alien clerks and employees employed for the purpose of performing
functions under this title shall be employed in accordance with the provisions
of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.
(e) Officers and employees of the United States Government may be de-
tailed to offices or positions to which no compensation is attached with any
foreign government or foreign government agency or with any international
organization : Provided, That while so detailed any such person shall be
considered, for the purpose of preserving his privileges, rights, seniority, or
other benefits, an officer or employee of the United States Government and
of the United States Government agency from which detailed and shall
receive therefrom his regular compensation, which shall be reimbursed to
such agency from funds available under this title: Provided further, That
such acceptance of office shall in no case involve the taking of an oath of
allegiance to another government.
(f ) PIxperts and consultants or organizations thereof may be employed as
authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 55a), and
individuals so employed may be compensated at a rate not in excess of
$75 per diem.
(g) Such additional civilian personnel may be employed without regard
to subsection (a) of section 14 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1946
(60 Stat. 219), as amended, as may be necessary to carry out the policies
and purposes of this title.
Sec. 414. No citizen or resident of the United States, whether or not now in the
employ of the Government, may be employed or assigned to duties by the Govern-
ment under this Act until such individual has been investigated by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has been made to the Secretary of
State: Provided, however, That any present employee of the Government, pending
the report as to such employee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be
employed or assigned to duties under this Act for the period of three months
from the date of its enactment. This section shall not apply in the case of any
officer appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Sec. 415. The President shall transmit to the Congress an annual report of
operations under this title.
Sec. 416. (a) In order to carry out the provisions of this title, there shall be
made available such funds as are hereafter authorized and appropriated from
time to time for the purposes of this title : Provided, hoivcver, That for the pur-
pose of carrying out the provisions of this title through June 30, 1951, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated a sum not to exceed $35,000,000, including
any sums appropriated to carry on the activities of the Institute of Inter-American
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1955
Affairs, and technical cooperation programs as defined in section 418 herein under
the I'nited States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat.
0). Activities provided for under this title may he prosecuted under such
appropriations or under authority granted in appropriation Acts to enter into
contracts pending enactment of such appropriations. Unobligated balances of
such appropriations for any fiscal year may, when so specified in the appro-
priation Act concerned, be carried over to any succeeding fiscal year or years.
The President may allocate to any United States Government agency any part
of any appropriation available for carrying out the purposes of this title. Such
funds shall be available for obligation and expenditure for the purposes of this
title in accordance with authority granted hereunder or under authority govern-
ing the activities of the Government agencies to which such funds are allocated.
(b) Nothing in this title is intended nor shall it be construed as an expressed
or implied commitment to provide any specific assistance, whether of funds,
commodities, or services, to any country or countries, or to any international
organization.
Sec. 417. If any provision of this title or the application of any provision to
any circumstances or persons shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder
of the title and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances or
persons shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 418. As used in this title —
(a) The term "technical cooperation programs" means programs for the inter-
national interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute
to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and pro-
ductive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas. Such activities may
include, but need uot be limited to, economic, engineering, medical, educational,
agricultural, fishery, mineral, and fiscal surveys, demonstration, training, and
similar projects that serve the purpose of promoting the development of economic
resources and productive capacities of underdeveloped areas. The term "techni-
cal cooperation programs" does not include such activities authorized by the
United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6)
as are not primarily related to economic development nor activities undertaken
now or hereafter pursuant to the International Aviation Facilities Act (62 Stat.
450), nor pursuant to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 128),
as amended, nor pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 194S (62 Stat. 137),
as amended, nor activities undertaken now or hereafter in the administration of
areas occupied by the United States armed forces or in Korea by the Economic
Cooperation Administration.
(b) The term "United States Government agency" means any department,
agency, board, wholly or partly owned corporation or instrumentality, commission,
or independent establishment of the United States Government.
(c) The term "international organization" means any intergovernmental organ-
ization of which the United States is a member.
Title V
INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S WELFARE WORK
Sec. 501. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President
not to exceed .$15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, to enable him to
make contributions to the United Nations, or any subordinate body thereof, in
such manner and on such terms and conditions as he may deem to be in the
interests of the United States, to support permanent arrangements within the
United Nations structure for international children's welfare work.
(b) If at any time during such fiscal year the President deems it to be in
the interests of the United States, he is authorized to make contributions, out
of any funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization contained in subsection
(a), to the International Children's Emergency Fund to carry out the purposes
of the International Children's Emergency Fund Assistance Act of 1948 upon
such terms and conditions as he may prescribe ; but such contributions shall
not exceed the limitation provided by section 204 of such Act.
(e) No additional appropriation shall be made under the authorization con-
tained in such Act of 1948.
(d) Funds appropriated by the second paragraph of title I of the Foreign
Aid Appropriation Act, 1949, shall remain available for the purposes for which
appropriated through June 30, 1951.
Approved June 5, 1950.
1956 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Department of State Departmental Announcement 41
Establishment of the Interim Office fob Technical Cooperation and
Development (Point Four Pbogeam)
1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs the Interim Office for Technical Co-
operation and Development (TCD).
2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department
for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assist-
ance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in
preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point
Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely
upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other com-
ponents of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance
programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the
Administrative area for the performance of service functions.
3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for —
(a) Developing over-all policies for the program.
( b ) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
(c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus
and making necessary adjustments.
(d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds
for United States bilateral programs.
(e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies
and with other United States agencies participating in the coordinated program
or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activites.
(f) Reviewing instructions to the field.
4. The Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies
governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance
programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of
employment, and utilization of training facilities.
5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assist-
ance programs for —
(a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for
individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
(b) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from
any other source.
(c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
(d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate, and
give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
(e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
(/) Proposing program changes.
(g) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities, and
reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.
Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection with
the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administration Aid
programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected by this
announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where circum-
stances require.
6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has —
(a) Action responsibility for —
1. Developing the United States position concerning the international
organizational machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance
activities ;
2. Developing the United States position concerning the relative propor-
tions of contributions to be made by the United States and by other countries
to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations;
3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts.
(&) Advisory responsibility concerning —
1. The character and scoi>e of technical cooperation programs undertaken
by international organizations;
2. The amounts of United States contributions to the special technical
assistance accounts of international organizations;
3. United States positions on program allocations from such accounts
by international organizations.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1957
The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with Inter-
national organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for
direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized
agences and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or
United States agencies on operating program matters as requested by the
Interim Office. The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding
arrangements with respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American
states.
7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical
assistance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set forth
in the Organization Manual of the Department.
( '/ ) The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the
International Bank and Monetary Fund.
(b) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the
International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation
Organization.
(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.
8. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and
technical exchange activities under the United States Information and Educa-
tional Exchange Act of 10-48, and under the Act of August 9, 1939, authorizing
the President to render closer and more effective the relationship between the
American republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific
economic development projects, is transferred from the Office of Educational
Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development.
Activities which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of
Educational Exchange. The functions, personnel and records of the Secretariat
of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are
transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for
Technical Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions con-
nected with the publication of "The Record" and the corresponding personnel
and records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.
9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Department's
representative on, and the Chairman of, the Interdepartmental Committee on
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical Co-
operation and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.
10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs
advise the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the
economic feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the stand-
point of their respective specialized interests ; make or arrange for such economic
studies and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Develop-
ment may require ; and maintain liaison with United States and international
agencies and with private organizations on matters within their respective fields
of interest as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance
programs.
11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Coopera-
tion and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other paragraphs
above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future, carried
on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises all responsi-
bilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Institute's program.
The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development and the Bureau
of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for developing such working
arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration of the Institute of
Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated technical assistance
program.
VI. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists
of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated
officers :
Director : Leslie A. Wheeler. Ext. 3S71.
Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief: Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011,
5012.
Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief: Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext.
4571, 4572.
Technical Cooperation Management Staff: Richard R. Brown, Director
of Executive Staff, E. Ext. 2155.
(February 21, 1950.)
1958 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
Date : May 26, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12 :35 p. in.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reporters: E. Wake and E. Mover, court stenographers reporting.
Board members : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles, member ;
Arthur G. Stevens, member ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Testimony of John S. Service
( The Board convened at 10 :05 a. rn. )
The Chairman. Are you ready to proceed?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman. The Loyalty Security Board will -be in order for consideration
of the case of John Stewart Service, whose representative is Mr. Charles E.
Rhetts, member of the firm of Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus, 1120 Tower Build-
ing, Washington, D. C. Miss Annette Pettis of the Foreign Service staff will
assist counsel in the handling of the documents which will be in the case.
The Secretary of State has been granted by Congress the right, in his absolute
discretion, to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Depart-
ment of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the United States.
(Title I, Public Law 490, 79th Cong., 2d sess. ; title I, Public Law 166, 80th Cong.,
1st sess. ; title I, Public Law 597, 80th Cong., 2d sess. ; Public Law 17'.). 81st Cong.,
1st sess. )
In order to give effect to this act. the Secretary of State has promulgated
regulations and procedures setting forth the revised loyalty and security prin-
ciples of the Department of State and hearing procedure of the Loyalty Security
Board. This document, a copy of which was forwarded to Mr. Service on
March 27, 1950, sets forth in detail the categories of persons deemed to constitute
security risks.
On July 9, 1947, the Secretary of State promulgated departmental announce-
ment 611 establishing a Personnel Security Board consisting of three members
to review security and investigative records of departmental and foreign service
personnel whose cases are to be considered for termination as security risks.
Subsequently, Conrad E. Snow was designated chairman, Theodore Achilles and
Arthur G. Stevens, alternate members of this Board, and Allen B. Moreland, legal
officer.
Mr. Service is specifically charged as follows :
"The specific charges are that within the meaning of section 892. 2.f of Regu-
lations and Procedures of the Department of State, you are a member or. or in
sympathetic association with the Communist Party which has been designated
by the Attorney General as an organization which seeks to alter the form of
government of the United States by unconstitutional means ; and further that
within the meaning of section 393. l.d of said regulations and procedures you are
a person who has habitual or close association with persons known or believed to
be in the category set forth in section 393.1.a of said regulations and procedures
to an extent which would justify the conclusion that you might, through such
association, voluntarily or involuntarily, divulge classified information without
authority."
The procedure for healings under the Regulations and Procedures of the De-
partment of State specifies :
1. A notice setting forth the nature of the charge in factual detail, setting
forth with particularity the facts and circumstances relating to he charges so
far as security considerations will permit, in order to enable the employee to
submit his answer, defense, or explanation.
2. A right to answer the charges in writing, under oath or affirmation, within
a reasonable period of time, not less than 10 calendar days from the date of
receipt by the employee of the notice or ;
:'». A right to have an administrative bearing on the charges before the Loyalty
Security Board not less than 15 calendar days after notice of "the charges,
and
4. A right to appear before the Loyaltv Security Board personally, to be repre-
sented by a counsel or representative of own choice, and to present evidence on
own behalf.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1959
It should be pointed out thai the transcript of the hearing will not include
all materia] in the file of the case, in that it will nut include reports of investiga-
tion conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which are confidential;
that also the transcripl will not contain information concerning the identity of
confidential informants or information which will reveal the source of confidential
evidence; and that the transcript will contain only the evidence in the letter or
charges and interrogatory, if any, and the evidence actually taken at the hearing.
It is understood Mr. Service has presented to the Hoard a written statement,
which is within his right under the procedure, and that, after introduction at this
time, it will facilitate the further examination of the witness.
Mr. Rhetts. Yes. Mr. Chairman, and I should like, before doing that if I
might, to make a short statement about the other material we have already
submitted.
The Chairman. Counsel may make a statement.
Mr. Rhetts. We submitted to the Board yesterday afternoon three copies of
a document book, which is in several parts and which I should like briefly, if
I may, to describe for the record. When you open the book to the immediate left
are two sets of papers, one is a paper headed "Chronology of Events" which is
designed to indicate in skeleton form, for the Board, basic dates. The left-hand
columns show the movements and current activities as of any current movement
of Mr. Service. In the right-hand column are listed other events and activities
which have a bearing upon and against which Mr. Service's activities were
carried on.
I think this may be of value to the Board as a reference document so that you
may readily see where Mr. Service was at any given point and time under
discussion.
Behind this document, on the left-hand flap, there is a numerical sequential
list of numbers of the documents which are going to he dealt with in the course
of the hearing. Not all these documents will be introduced in evidence. The
first 100 documents include not only items that we introduce in evidence but vari-
ous working papers that are in our actual tile but they are included so that as we
refer to document numbers, the Board can get a general idea what the paper
is we are talking about by reference to this list.
The second series of numbers in this list, which begins with 101 and go through
227, are a list of the reports prepared by Mr. Service during the period, roughly,
between May 1942 and April 1945 on a whole variety of matters ; that is to say,
they represent reports and memoranda which he, partly as a Foreign Service
officer attached to the Embassy and later while attached to the staff of General
Stilwell, prepared in the ordinary course of business, and you will have occasion
to refer to these at some length.
This list of documents, I may say, is not a complete collection of all the work
product of Mr. Sexwice during this period. It represents all we have been able,
by the most diligent research, to lay our hands on and collect out of the files of
the State Department.
Then the series of documents on your right, as the folder opens, with tabs from
10 to 95. are excerpts from certain of the basic documents, such as material
contained in the Congressional Record and material published in various maga-
zine articles and the like, substantially consisting of the sources of various
charges that have been made against Mr. Service.
We shall have occasion to refer to these from time to time and I think you
will find they are readily usable because, for example, if you want to open docu-
ment 31 you may pull that tab and then there are subnumbers setting forth
different excerpts.
Behind this is a copy of a personal statement by Mr. Service, and on the
reverse side of the folder, to the left, there are a series of excerpts from some
of the reports prepared by Mr. Service during the period involved, these represent-
ing, in our view, certain key documents which we will want to actually have
incorporated in the transcript and will be accordingly offered.
Tin the right-hand side of the back cover of the folder is an excerpt from the
Congressional Record for May 22. 1950, which contains the report of the Hohbs
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, which was made in 1946 as a
result of a resolution introduced by Representative Dondero, together with what
purports to he all the testimony which was given before the closed hearing's
before that subcommittee. This material has very imnortant hearing on this
case.
Finally, behind that material are certain excerpts from the so-called white
paper, entitled "U. S. Relations with China," a publication of the State Depart-
ment.
1960 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Now I should like at this time to offer in evidence this document book with
certain exceptions. I propose to offer in evidence the entire book with the excep-
tion of documents 198, 206, and 207, and with the exception of Mr. Service's
personal statement, which I propose to offer separately in just a moment.
The Chairman. Will you identify 198, 206, and 207?
Mr. Khetts. You will find them, if you will turn your document book over, in
that series, 198, 206, and 207. I may say that I wish them to be available to the
Board and we will make use of them but for certain reasons I will be glad to
make known, I do not offer them in evidence at this point.
The Chairman. This book with all its contents may be accepted as an exhibit,
and so marked and we will not at this present time incorporate any portion of
it in the transcript.
(Document book was admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit I.)
Mr. Rhetts. As the proceeding goes along I shall propose from time to time
to offer and ask there be included in the transcript^ certain portions of this book.
The Chairman. You have some statement to make with reference to Mr. Serv-
ice's own statement?
( Off the record. )
The Chairman. Counsel desires me to make clear that this exhibit, as well as
all other exhibits, will be incorporated in the record of the case but not neces-
sarily printed in the transcript except insofar as offered by counsel from .time
to time during the hearing.
Mr. Rhetts. That is my understanding.
The Chairman. Will you proceed?
Mr. Rhetts. If I might make one further statement before we come to testi-
mony. I should like very briefly to suggest to the Board the general scheme by
which we at least propose to go at this case. As we see it, the case divides-
itself into about three grand divisions, the first of which is what we have, as a
shorthand term, characterized the China charges. These are charges which
Gen. Patrick Hurley is said to be the grandfather and appeared originally in the
course of General Hurley's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, in December 1945.
These charges of General Hurley, relating to Mr. Service, consist in general
of charges that he was pro-Communist, that he undertook to sabotage American
foreign policy in China, as General Hurley was attempting to execute it, and
that Mr. Service, along with other Foreign Service officers, was in general en-
gaged in attempting to defeat the accomplishment of American foreign policy.
These charges by General Hurley have been repeated over and over. They
have been picked up by Congressman Dondevo, repeated by him, and picked up
by Congressman Judd, and repeated by him. They have appeared in one form
or another in various magazines such as Plain Talk, an article purported to be
written by Mr. Emmanuel Larsen and published by Mr. Joseph Kamp, America
Betrayed, and most recently they have been repeated over and over by Senator
McCarthy, so that we shall attempt to deal (1) with this area of charges, as
they made the first major division.
The second major division in the case, as we see it, arises out of Mr. Service's
involvement in the so-called Amerasia case. Consequently, we shall propose to
deal with that general subject matter as the second large division.
The third area of charges relate to certain allegations that have been made
about Mr. Service during the period when he was on duty in Tokyo in the year
1945, and so we shall deal with that as a third major division.
As far as we are concerned, we are ready to proceed with the first division,
which we shall treat generally as China matters.
The Chairman. May I insert a question which I should have asked earlier as
to the oral elucidation of the charges made for the benefit of the counsel for Mr.
Service.
Mr. Moreland. Mr. Seiwice has been informed that various allegations have
been made that he is pro-Communist. The allegations have indicated that this
is reflected in his writings and that while serving in China and Japan he con-
sorted with Communists; and further that while in the United States he con-
sorted with alleged Communists and Communist sympathizers and turned over
to them classified documents without authority.
lie has further been informed that the members of the Board are concerned
with Ins associations with the following persons: E. S. Larsen, Mark J. Gayn,
Kate L. Mitchell, Phillip J. Jaffe, Thomas A. Bisson, and Andrew Roth.
Mr. Riietts. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to insert at this time a letter on
behalf of Mr. Service which was written to Mr. Peurifoy, Assistant Secretary
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1961
of State, by Mr. O. Martin Wilbur, associate professor of Chinese history at
Columbia University.
The Chairman. That may be accepted.
(Letter, dated March 28, L950, from Mr. C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia Univer-
sity, to Mr. John R. Peurifoy was admitted in evidence and marked "exhibit 2.")
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to oiler at this time document No. 93-1.
The Chairman. In exhibit 1?
Mr. Rhetts. Which is a portion of Mr. Service's personal history statement;
thai is. it is that portion of it which deals with the China affairs. It represents
the first 34 pages of the statement which appears in the document book. I ask
that this lie incorporated into the transcript at this point.
The Chairman. You say that is numbered 93V
Mr. Rhetts. No. 93. It shows up under your tab "Personal statement."
The Chairman. In the book as part of the record it shows up not as 93 but
under the tab.
Mr. Rhetts. That is right.
The Chairman. The first 34 pages of the document 93 may be inserted in the
record, and at this point I think we should have Mr. Service take oath and
swear to the truth of what he says.
Mr. John S. Service, having been duly sworn, testified in his own behalf as
follows :
Mr. Rhetts. With reference to document 93-1, which has been ottered for
inclusion in the transcript, this is your own personal statement you offer to the
Board under oath?
Mr. Service. That is correct.
"Personal Statement of John S. Service — Part 1
"You gentlemen, I am sure, already know a good deal about me but perhaps
you will allow me first to give a consecutive summary of my background and
career.
"My parents were missionaries in China. In 1906 my father had been sent to
Chengtu, the capital city of the extreme far western province of Szechwan to
set up the work of the YMCA in that field. Chengtu is about 1600 miles inland
due west of Shanghai. Here I was born in 1909.
"My first visit to the United States was when I was 6 years old. My father
spent his furlough on a year's assignment to the central YMCA at Cleveland,
Ohio, and I attended first grade in a public school in one of the suburbs of Cleve-
land. Just after my seventh birthday we returned to Chengtu and I remained
there for the next 4 years. Chengtu was extremely remote, and the foreign
community was small. There was a school operated by a Canadian mission
for the children of missionaries but my mother and father were determined that
I was to have an American education. The only solution was for my mother to
teach me at home, using an American home-study course. This decision of my
parents seems, as I look back on it, a typical one. They were anxious that their
children not lose their American heritage although forced to grow up abroad.
At a very early age I became an omnivorous reader and probably grew up with
more knowledge of American history and America generally than many children
living in this country.
"By my eleventh birthday I had completed the Calvert course and it became
difficult for my mother to carry me further. I was sent to Shanghai where the
Shanghai American school was the largest and had the reputation of being the
best school in China for American children. I remained here for 4 years. In
1924 my parents were given their second furlough. We lived in Berkeley, Calif.,
which was my father's home. I attended Berkeley High School and graduated
in June 1925 at the age of 15. In the fall of that year I returned to China
with my parents and worked as an apprentice draftsman in the architectural
offices of the YMCA National Committee of Shanghai. In the winter of 1926 I
commenced a trip alone through southeast Asia, India, and Europe, which brought
me back to the United States in time to enter Oberlin College in Ohio in the
fall of 1927.
"During college I proved that I could be a good student if I was interested.
I was active in sports, being captain of two teams, was president of the men's
honor court and was active in other extracurricular activities. I partially sup-
ported myself by waiting tables and by summer jobs. After graduation in 1931
I returned to Oberlin for a year of graduate work in the history of art, thinking
at this time that I would like to prepare myself for college teaching. The experi-
1962 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ence was sufficient to convince me otherwise and I became interested in the
Foreign Service. In September 1932, after some independent study, I took the
written examinations in San Francisco, passed them and came to Washington
for the orals in January 1933 which I also passed. I learned in Washington
however, that there was no likelihood of early appointment to the Foreign Service.
I therefore returned to China, where my parents were now living in Shanghai,
and applied for a Foreign Service clerkship. In June 1933 I was appointed clerk
in the consulate at Kunming, in tbe then very isolated Province of Yunnan in
the extreme southwest of China. This was a small post ; the staff was one
vice consul, myself, and two or three Chinese clerks. I did the typing, filing,
coding, and gradually took over miscellaneous duties such as the handling of
commercial letters and most of the citizenship and visa work. My fiancee, who
was a classmate of mine at Oberlin, came out to China and we were married
and had our first child. In July 1934 I was made a noncareer vice consul. I
have always considered this experience at Kunming to have been valuable.
Since it was a small post I had an opportunity to learn something about, every
phase of Foreign Service work. I gained detailed knowledge of an area of China
which was later to become extremely important and which at that time was a
case study of Chinese war-lord politics. Twice I was left in charge for brief
periods.
"In October 1935 the first appointments to the career service were made and
1 was commissioned Foreign Service officer, unclassified (C). Having already
indicated a willingness to volunteer for the specialized China branch of the
Service, I was transferred directly to the Embassy at Pieping as a language at-
tache. I arrived in Peiping with my family in December 1930 and for the next
2 years my duties were to study the language, history, geography, economics, and
laws of China. My childhood knowledge of Chinese gave me something of a head
start but it bad been a poor dialect and I had never learned to read Chinese.
I worked hard and I believe made a good record as a student, not only of the lan-
guage but also of the background subjects.
"China has always had a deep interest for me. To a technician in the field
of foreign relations — which is one of the basic functions of a Foreign Service
officer — it presents uniquely complex and difficult problems. For this Board,
there is of course no need to have these problems spelled out in detail. But a
few words may be permitted since in a very real way it was my inevitable in-
volvement, as a reporting officer on the spot, in trying to find solutions to these
problems — solutions which would best serve the long-range interests of the
United States and be within American capabilities and willingness to act — ■
which has led to my present difficulties.
"China is the world's greatest mass of humanity. Weak, burdened with prob-
ably insoluble economic problems, loosely organized, backward in every mod-
ern sense, it has been undergoing a tremendous upheaval and revolution in every
phase of its life. In scope, breadth, rapidity, and in the mass of people involved
this is one of the great changes of history. After a chaotic period of war-lord
division, two modern parties (one Marxist and having a history of strong Russian
influence in its early period) had emerged. They had worked together briefly,
then split and fought each other bitterly but inconclusively for 10 years of civil
war. Although Japanese aggression forced their temporary union in a united
front in 1937 the contest for leadership of this underlying revolution and for
the mastery of China was never abandoned; at best it was but partially
submerged.
"American policy toward China had a long background of missionary activity,
cultural interest, and trade. The factors of idealism, commerce, and strategic
interest had led to our traditional concern for maintaining China's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, to the open door doctrine and, by our retention of the
Philippines, to actual involvement in the power contest in the Far East. As
we have realized since the day of Theodore Roosevelt, our enforcement of these
policies was hampered by our national repugnance for war or forceful methods.
Realistically, therefore, there was a desirable aspect to a balance of power in
the Far East between Russia and Japan. This balance was upset by Japanese
aggression commencing in 1931 against Manchuria and setting off the chain of
events which led up to Pearl Harbor. With the certainty of Japan's eventual
defeat and its elimination as a power factor in the Far East, it was obvious
that Russia would be left as the dominant power in Asia and the necessity of a
strong, united, and independent China became, far more than ever before, an
imperative of American policy.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1963
••one could not be in Peiping in \u:u\ and 1 1>.*IT without a developing awareness
of these problems. I read very extensively and as my interests were scholarly
rather than social I found most of my friends among the large groups of news-
paper correspondents, professors, students, and researchers who were either
residing in or continually passing through Peiping. By this time we were in
the midst of the events leading up to the Sino-.Japanese War and Peiping was
close enough to he an excellent observation post, .lust after my arrival in
December 1935, I saw the student riots which in one sense marked the beginning
of Chinese active resistance. In December 1936 the kidnaping of the gen-
eralissimo at Sian was to result in the united front which in turn provoked
the final Japanese assault. The shooting phase of the war commenced only
a few miles outside of the city of Peiping and I visited some of the battlefields
with the newspapermen. It was during this period that I became acquainted,
on the basis of mutual interest in the reporting and analysis of events, with
such persons as Owen Lattimore (then with the IPR), F. McCracken Fisher
(then with CP), Haldore Hansen (AP), Frank Oliver (Reuters), Arch Steele
(New York Herald Tribune), Edgar Snow (Saturday Evening Post), and Frank
Smothers (Chicago Daily News). At this time I also became acquainted with
Colonel Stilwell who was military attacha" at the Embassy, Maj. David 1>.
Barrett and Capt. Frank Dorn, his assistants. During this period I briefly met
T. A. Bisson, who was traveling on a Guggenheim fellowship and collecting
material for his book Japan in China.
"In December 1937 I completed my language study assignment and was trans-
ferred to the consulate general at Shanghai where I arrived in January 1938.
The consul general was C. E. Gauss, later to be our Ambassador to China, and
the executive officer was Richard P. Butrick, at present Director General of the
Foreign Service. Shanghai, with the exception of a part of the foreign settle-
ments, was under Japanese occupation and hostilities were still proceeding in
the lower Yangtze area. After a brief trial my superiors apparently concluded
that I was able to serve as emergency and relief officer and for the next 3 years
I was rotated through the consulate general. Whenever an officer went on
leave I took over bis job ; when one particular section became swamped, I was
put in to help. I served in every section of the consulate general at least twice
and occupied every position except that of consul general for at least a brief
period.
"On my own time and under considerable difficulties I prepared myself for
the optional third-year examination in Chinese and the related background
subjects which is taken by very few officers. A large number of my friends and
associates continued to be newspapermen, writers, and research students. Ac-
quaintances which I made at this time included such men as Robert Barnett,
then with the IPR, William Johnstone, Hallett Abend, and Tillman Durdin (New
York Times), J. B. Powell of the China Weekly Review, Randall Gould of the
Shanghai Evening Post, Larry Lehrbas of the Associated Press, Robert Bellaire
of the United Press, and many others.
"During this period I read most of the books published regarding China
and subscribed to most of the magazines dealing with China. These latter
included Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, published by the Institute
of Pacific Relations, and Amerasia which had just been established by a group
of men, several of whom I bad known.
"In May 193S my family, which had been evacuated from north China the
previous August, returned to Shanghai. We had a great many friends because
of my background, particularly in the American missionary community but also
in American business circles and among Chinese. I became active in American
community church affairs, joined the Junior Chamber of Commerce, was presi-
dent of a luncheon club at the foreign YMCA, was a member of the two American
clubs and resumed track athletics which I had kept up intermittently since
college. In 1940, I followed my father who had been an active Mason and took
my degrees in a lodge under the Philippine Constitution which had an almost
wholly Chinese membership. In November 1940, events in the Far East seemed
to be moving to an inevitable show-down and our families were evacuated to the
United States. I was not to be reunited with mine on a permanent basis for
almost 6 yea rs.
"During this period the situation in China was hopeful. China was much
more unified than ever before and was amazing herself and her friends with
her success in fighting off or at least delaying the Japanese. My own views,
privately expressed to my colleagues and friends, were in support of stronger
aid to China and in opposition to the sale of ore and scrap iron to the Japanese.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 31
1964 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
In relation to Europe, my views were also strongly interventionist. I was out-
spokenly critical of the German-Soviet pact and entirely sympathetic with the
Finns. I was critical of the Neutrality Act, strongly supported lend-lease and the
destroyer deal and privately favored the fullest possible support and, in fact,
outright military participation on the side of the Allies in Europe.
"In the spring of 1941 I volunteered for duty in the Embassy at Chungking
about May 3, 1941, as third secretary. The Ambassador at this time was Nelson
T. Johnson, under whom I had served at Peiping. Shortly afterward, however,
he was transferred to Australia and his place in Chungking was taken by Mr.
Gauss. The counselor of the Embassy who arrived at about the same time was
John Carter Vincent, later to be Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs,
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and, presently, Minister to
Switzerland.
"When I arrived in Chungking the Embassy was seriously understaffed. The
work of the office was being constantly interrupted by almost daily Japanese
air raids and the limited staff available had to spread itself thin to keep abreast
of the more urgently pressing work. My first assignment was in the consular
and general affairs section. Later after more staff arrived I moved into the
press and translation section. Next I served a period as chief of chancery,
or administrative officer. During all this period, however, I was acquiring
background and developing contacts and moving more into the reporting field.
There were few China-trumed officers on the staff and I believe that it was
the Ambassador's desire that I concentrate on political work. Toward the end
of 1941 I moved into a small house shared by the Ambassador and counselor and
from that time on functioned as a sort of general assistant, handy man, and
drafting officer. One fairly frequent assignment was to accompany the Am-
bassador when calling on the Minister of Foreign Affairs or other high officials
and to prepare the memoranda of conversation. This type of work and the
dispatches and telegrams which I prepared for the Ambassador's signature were
of course subject to his closest scrutiny and I believe I convinced my superiors
of my accuracy and objectivity.
"My boyhood at Szechwan (in addition to spending my first 10 years in
Chengtu, my parents had lived in Chungking from 1922 to 1924) gave me imme-
diately a great number of Chinese and missionary contacts. I could speak the
local dialect and I was able to move about more easily than most officers. Ac-
cordingly, I was used to make a number of trips for the Embassy. In April 1942
I was invited through Chinese official contacts to make a trip through central
Szechwan. When the first lend-lease representative arrived in Chungking I was
assigned by the Ambassador to assist him and accompany him on tours of
Chinese arsenals and industrial plants.
"The Embassy was a focal point through which passed all American visitors,
officials, and missionaries. Most of these people I met in the normal course of
events and from many of them, particularly the missionaries going to or coming
from various places in China, I was able to pick up information on conditions.
Also, many men whom I had previously known were among the correspondents
in Chungking and I soon became thoroughly acquainted with the others. It
was the policy of the Ambassador to treat responsible correspondents with a good
deal of frankness. Also, because of their constant traveling and their broad
contacts, we were often able to obtain from them corroboration or amplification
of information which we received from our own sources. One factor of course
which always had to be considered was that they were subject to the rigid
Chinese political censorship, which was anxious to keep reports from reaching
the American public which would be contrary to the exaggerated picture being
painted of China by Chinese propagandists. This policy of giving background
information was perhaps even more important in the case of visiting cor-
respondents who could remain only a short while and who lacked the detailed
background of permanent correspondents. Very often these visitors had great
difficulty in visiting places or seeing people except as the Chinese Ministry
of Information was willing. Some of these visiting correspondents whom I
remember were Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce. Ray Clapper, and Vincent Sheean.
All of these people visited the Embassv and in most cases the Ambassador him-
self or some of us on his staff gave them a thorough fill-in.
"There was. as T look back on it. a gradual change in the character of our work
and in the tenor of our reporting from Chungking during this period of 1941^42.
We could see from month to month, even from our limited observation point of
Chungking, a deterioration within China. The united front between the Kuomin-
tang and the Communists which, although an unnatural arrangement, had been
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1965
effective in 1937-3S had gradually fallen apart until a definite break came with
the now fourth army incident of January 1941. This split was accompanied in
Kuomintang territory by an increasing concern with internal affairs and the need
for chocking the growing Communist power. The closing of the Burma Road
and the isolation of China were important factors but not the whole explanation
of Chinese inability to take effective measures against inflation, speculation, and
official corruption. The disastrous defeat of the Central Government armies in
the Chungtiaoshan area of north China in the summer of 1941 was a mark of the
decline in quality and lighting spirit of the Central Government conscript armies.
"After Pearl Harbor China was our ally and her effectiveness in the war became
increasingly our concern. The Central Government, at first jubilant over our
entry and then despondent over the early Allied reverses, seized the opportunity
for heavy demands in the way of financial and military aid. Ambassador Gauss
expressed the view at this time that we should keep enough strings on the $500,-
000.000 loan to at least be able to advise on its use.
"Stilwell arrived in the theater in March 1942 and came to share the same atti-
tude : that the mere random giving of generous aid would not solve China's prob-
lems and that we should try to make sure that the aid was effectively used. On
all sides, political, military, and economic, there was a constant effort to urge
reforms which would strengthen the position of the Central Government and
increase the potential of China's war effort.
•'One of the important questions which any political reporter had to be con-
cerned with was, of course, the relations between the K-iomintang and the Com-
munist parties. The two parties had not actually broken off relations and were
theoretically cooperating in the war. The Communists therefore were allowed
to maintain official representatives in Chungking. These people had access to
the press and to foreigners, and I met them soon after my arrival in the normal
course of events. The head of this Communist delegation at the time was Chou
En-lai. He was later replaced by Tung Pi-wu. This is the gentleman about
whom Mr. Earl Browder was recently questioned before the Senate subcommittee.
You may recall that Mr. Browder was asked whether he attended a meeting with
Tung Pi-wu and Philip Jaffe in the spring of 1945. Mr. Browder admitted meeting
with Tung but declined to state who else was at the meeting and also declined
to state whether I was present. I shall have more to say about my acquaintance
with Mr. Tung later, but I may state here that I did not attend any meeting with
Tung, Mr. Browder, and Mr. Jaffe in New York in 1945. There was not a great
deal of activity at this period, however, on the question of relations between the
two parties. My reporting on the subject was only a very minor part of my work.
However, since I had been charged with associating with Communists, I assure
the Board that I have indeed associated with Communists and that I have asso-
ciated with as many and as prominent Chinese Communists as I could discover.
That, as I shall point out a little bit later, was a part of my job even in 1911 and,
as I shall indicate later, it eventually became my full-time job. Up to this time,
however, I had never to my knowledge met a Communist of any sort, Chinese or
foreign.
"My community activities in Chungking included membership in the predomi-
nantly Chinese Chungking Rotary Club and participation as a charter member
in the establishment of a Masonic Lodge in which the great majority of members
were Chinese in official positions. There was little conventional social life in
Chungking but bridge was a popular relaxation. I was on friendly bridge-partner
basis with T. F. Tsiang (now the Chinese representative to the UN), Quo T'ai-ch'i
(then Minister of Foreign Affairs), C. T. Wang (formerly Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Ambassador to Washington), and a large number of others in posi-
tions of influence and knowledge. I do not mention these associations with any
boastful intent. Nor do I claim that I was an intimate of all these men — although
our relations were cordial and informal and they were often frank in discussing
Chinese affairs and personalities. But I do think it important to point out that
my contacts — who inevitably contributed to by knowledge and views — were not
one-sidedly concentrated among Communists or other opponents of the Central
Government but on the contrary were unusually broad and close, whether with
missionaries, businessmen, newspapermen, or Chinese officials. I believe that
my associates will agree that just as I eventually came to have the opportunity
of being the most widely traveled officer stationed in China, I also came to know
more Chinese more intimately than probably any other.
"In the summer of 1942 I was invited by the Minister of Economics to attend
a meeting of the Chinese Engineering Society at Lanchow in the far northwestern
province of Kansu and to accompany a party of engineers, officers of the National
1966 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Resources Commission, and Chinese newspapermen to visit the newly discovered
oil field near the border of Sinkiang. These oil fields had not been visited by
any non-Chinese since they had commenced operation. In addition, the trip
would allow me to travel through an extensive area which had not been visited by
American officers for a number of years. This included the so-called blockade
zone around the Communist district in Shensi and Kansu Provinces. The trip
finally extended into 4 months and covered five Provinces. For most of the time
I was the only foreigner with a large official party of Chinese and had unusual
opportunities for meeting Chinese and for obtaining information. In the latter
part of the trip — I returned from Kansu alone — I visited a great number of
missionaries and was able to obtain extremely detailed accounts of conditions
in their areas.
"This trip made a deep impression on me. More clearly than in Chungking, I
was able to see the effects of inflation, official corruption, speculation, thought
control of students and professors, the workings of the secret police, the operation
of a vicious conscription system, and the disastrously heavy military impositions
which in some areas were forcing farmers to abandon land. I traveled through
the Honan famine area where the people were starving while the troops, mer-
chants, and officials prospered. I saw the active trade across the Japanese lines
with luxury goods coming from the Japanese areas and strategic materials
going in the opposite dii'ection. I passed through the blockade zone around the
Communist area, saw the lines of blockhouses and the idle concentrations of
Central Government troops. I talked to missionaries living in the blockade area
and to Chinese who had been across the lines into the Communist districts and
learned that conditions were enough better to attract a movement of refugees
who crossed the blockade lines at the risk of their lives.
"None of the Chinese I traveled with were Communists. Most were Govern-
ment servants of some category. Nor, by any stretch of the imagination, were
the numerous missionaries. But from every source I received the same general
picture of the decline of the Kuomintang and the eventual conflict between the
parties in which many seemed to feel that the Communists were the more dynamic
and more preferable of the two.
"I returned to Chungking in late November, wrote the most important reports
on the oil fields and the Honan famine and returned to the United States on leave.
After a month in California I arrived in Washington in January 1943 for a short
period of consultation. Here I was the first man from the Embassy staff at
Chungking to have returned since before Pearl Harbor. I had had unequaled
opportunities for travel and observation. I was asked to confer with and be
interrogated by the numerous Government agencies concerned with China. Sev-
eral newspaper people were sent to me by the Press Section for background
information and the director of the office approved a request from the IPR for
me to talk to one of their research staff. In the course of my consultations I
met Dr. Lanchlin Currie, then an executive assistant to the President, special-
izing on far eastern affairs.
"Several officers noted my pessimistic view of the situation in China and its
possible implications for us in the event of civil war. It was suggested that I
summarize these in memorandum form. I did so and would like to put in
the record at this time a copy of my memorandum of January 23, 1943 (document
103). In this I pointed out the dangers of the trend in China ; the facts that a
civil war would seriously interfere with the war against Japan, might well
result in a Communist victory and woidd be likely either to involve us with the
Soviet Union or force the Communists into their hands. I proposed, therefore,
that it was urgent for us to find out by direct observation something about the
Chinese Communists, who had been blockaded since 1939. With our present
knowledge of subsequent events, it may be hard to realize that when this
memorandum was written in January 1943 it was, as far as I know, the first
suggestion that internal factors in China would probably lead to a civil war and
Communist victory in China, and the first calling of attention to the problem
the United States would have to face being accused of giving military aid to
one side against the other. My views of the importance of getting reliable
intelligence concerning the Chinese Communists was. however, accepted.
"This memorandum, I have subsequently felt, was a sort of milestone. As
possibly the first to point the issues, I came to be regarded (erroneously because
of my very subordinate position) as a leader, or at least forerunner, of an
attitude on policy which has wrongly been interpreted as pro-Communist. Having
pressed the need for direct and comprehensive knowledge concerning the Chinese
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1967
Communists, it was perhaps inevitable that I should be given an increasing
amount of tins work until it finally became a full-time assignment.
"At the conclusion of my leave I returned to Chungking in early May 1943
and was sent again t<« Lanchow, where the Embassy by now was regularly
stationing an officer as observer. One reason for maintaining this post was
thai it was a strategic point for information concerning the Communists. The
Embassy also agreed that if opportunity presented T might make an attempt
to enter the Communist area, although any such venture would probably have
to be disavowed by the Embassy and made on my own responsibility.
"In Lanchow I did a good deal of general political reporting on numerous
aspects of the situation in the northwest, for which I was commended by both
the Embassy and the Department.
"On August 10, 1943, I was recalled from Lanchow and assigned by the Depart-
ment's orders to General Stilwell. The Department's instructions made it clear
that I was to be completely under General Stilwell's orders for duties, move-
ments, or station. This point is of some importance. My complete subordina-
tion to the Army was never questioned by the Department of State or by
Ambassador Gauss. It was not, however, understood by General Hurley who
has accused me, I understand, of disloyalty to him.
"Several other officers were assigned to Stilwell at the same time, and one
officer. John Davies. had been with him since he fii*st assumed duty as com-
manding general of the theater in early 1942. We functioned in a loose way
under Mr. Davies and were assigned to duties and in places for which we seemed
best experienced. I was assigned to Chungking where I worked as a consultant
to G-2 and otherwise as the chief of staff instructed. My duties were multi-
farious and never very clearly defined. When necessary, I acted as a liaison
between the headquarters and the Embassy. I advised OSS and many of the
other agencies coming into the theater concerning projects which they were
considering. I helped G— 2 in appraising Chinese intelligence. I furnished oral
and written background information to the headquarters on Chinese political
situations and personalities. I was a headquarters member on a psychological
warfare policy committee.
"One definite duty which I was given was to act as liaison between the head-
quarters and the Chinese Communist official office in Chungking which was by
that time headed by Tung Pi-wu. The Army's primary interest at this period
was in intelligence regarding Japanese forces of north China. The Communists
were permitted to operate a radio station in Chungking for communication with
their own headquarters in Yenan. G-2 would give me its questions. I would
take these over to the Communist office and a few days later pick up the reply.
"Another general assignment was as a sort of public relations officer for
Stilwell. His staff could, of course, handle the military aspects about which I
was not in any case intimately informed. But some of Stilwell's greatest
problems arose out of the political background in the theater. Understanding
of these was essential to intelligent press reporting. In many ways this was
the most complicated of all theaters and Stilwell's great problem of gaining
Chinese cooperation could not be divorced from the Chinese political back-
ground. We therefore had Stilwell's directive to work closely with the press
and to give them background information regarding the situation in China,
particularly as it affected the war.
"These various duties still left me with a great deal of time. My own primary
interest was political reporting. My position and my background in Chungking
gave me unusually broad and numerous contacts, foreign and Chinese and in
every walk of life. Association with the foreign correspondents was often a
productive relationship, as they sometimes had access to people whom I could
not reach and because they were continually traveling. I continued to expand
an extensive circle of Chinese contacts, largely among newspapermen but also
with members of such groups as the liberal wing of the Kuomintang, the minor
parties making up the Democratic Leagtie, and various military figures or their
representatives.
"Living in Army billets hampered this Chinese contact work and I moved into
an apartment in- the city with Solomon Adler, the United States Treasury
representative. Except for perhaps an hour or two at the headquarters in
the morning, I spent practically all of my time outside of the office and gen-
erally had both lunch and supper in Chinese restaurants with Chinese friends.
"With this background I found myself doing a great deal of voluntary political
reporting of information which I picked up. This reporting was clone by informal
1968 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
memoranda. With General Stilwell's approval I gave copies of these memo-
randa to the headquarters and Embassy in Chungking and sent a copy to Davies,
who had his office in New Delhi. A fourth copy I kept for my own personal
files. I placed on these memoranda my own informal classification. This was
based on a number of factors, such as the need for protecting my sources, the
desirability of allowing attribution, and the question of whether circulation
among our various allies, including the Chinese, and numerous American Govern-
ment agencies was wise. Often, of course, the information contained should be
considered confidential only for a short time ; if it related to future events the
need for confidence would be removed as soon as the event took place or became
generally known. In some cases, the need for classification would be removed
after correspondents or other public sources learned of the same information.
Also, an important factor was that a great deal of the information contained
in the memoranda was inevitably critical of persons or situations in China.
"Probably only a minority of these memoranda were directly useful to the
headquarters. Most of them were on political rather than military subjects.
They might be used, if at all, only as background information. If the head-
quarters desired to make further distribution it would transmit my memoranda
through such an agency as JICA (Joint Intelligence Collection Agency) which
would attach a covering sheet giving a summary, evaluation, and its own classi-
fication. I rarely knew anything about this disposition or the evaluation or
classification determined by the Army. Actually I am sure the great bulk of my
memoranda never were forwarded by the Chungking headquarters.
''Probably a much greater proportion of my memoranda were of direct interest
to the Embassy. I was much less restricted in my movements than most of the
Embassy officers and had only a light burden of routine duties. The Embassy
reporting officers used these memoranda as working materials. If the subject
matter was new or was thought sufficiently worth while, they would write a
dispatch for the Ambassador's signature transmitting my memorandum as an
enclosure. The dispatch would summarize and comment on the material in my
memorandum, sometimes agreeing or disagreeing or adding material which the
Embassy might have from other sources. Usually I never knew what use the
Embassy had made of any particular memorandum, whether it had been trans-
mitted by despatch in to the Department, whether the Embassy agreed or differed,
or what classification it had assigned. At this time, of course, I was detached
from the Embassy, had only casual contact with it, principally in a liaison
capacity, and I did not have access to the Embassy files.
•'A large part of my political reporting during all this period was in the field
of Kuomintang-Communist relations. I also kept in close touch with the minor
parties who were attempting to take a more active role in the Chinese situation.
The Embassy simultaneously was doing some reporting on the same subject but
I think it fair to say that my contacts were becoming so well established that I
supplied a large part of the Embassy's material.
"\s general handy man and consultant for headquarters I was sent on a
number of trips. In the fall of 1943 I made a trip to India, stopping in Kunming
and visiting the Burma front, where the Leilo was being pushed southward.
For 2 months in the winter of 1943-44 I accompanied an American engineer
officer on an extensive trip through the southwestern provinces of Yunnan,
Kweichow. and Kwanssi. His purpose was to make a thorough reconnaissance
of all highways in that area. Mine was to interpret for him. act as guide and
assistant, and observe political and economic conditions. Early in 1944 there
were serious problems in Chengtu connected with the construction of B--9
bases involving a labor fore- of over 300,000 and the influx of a large body Of
American Vir Force personnel. I was sent to Chengtu, and made a number
of recommendations, some of which were adopted. Another trip I made was
° "In March 1944 the Chinese Government asked the headquarters to send
American officers to Sinkiang to investigate an incident which had taken place
between Chinese troops and Kazaks in a remote area where the border between
Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was in dispute. The preliminary information
furnished by the Chinese was highly misleading. Asked by the chief of staff
for advice and all the information I could obtain, I made a number of reports
and in the final one of these, dated April 7, 1944. I summarized in the most
complete form up to that date my views as to the policy we should follow in
China toward the Kuomintang, the Communists, and Russia. A part of tins
statement has already appeared in annex 47 of the white paper but I believe
that the complete text of that part of my memorandum which refers to policy
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1969
may be of interest and I would like to have it included in the record at this point.
In this memorandum I suggested that the Kuomintang policies gave every
indication of proving suicidal and that our overdose involvement with the
Kuomintang would probably throw the Communists toward the Soviet Union
and contribute to the Russian domination of Asia which we wished to present.
(Here present for record pases 7, S. and 9 of enclosure to document 142 as
marked.) My recommendation to headquarters that we not become involved in
the incident by sending investigators was accepted. This was one of the few
occasions on which my advice was actually sought and followed. I say this
because there has been a great deal of misunderstanding of my duties in head-
quarters and the usual term "political adviser" was, by and large, a misnomer.
The Embassy forwarded this memorandum to the Department and, although the
Department did not comment specihcally on my policy recommendations, it gave
it a special commendation with a rating of excellent. (A copy of this com-
mendatory instruction No. 698, June 21, 1944, is submitted for the record.)
"By the spring of 1944 military considerations were making it imperative
that we get fuller information from north China and have ready a ground-
work for possible military operations in the area. This meant, as a first step,
the establishment of direct liaison by our own observers in the Communist area.
The Fourteenth Air Force was already extending its strikes into north China.
The bases for B29's were built at Chengtu. These planes would have to cross
hundreds of miles of Communist guerrilla territory. For these air operations,
we needed intelligence on Japanese air strength and defenses in the area, prompt
and comprehensive weather information, and arrangements for the rescue of
air crews. The theater was planning on the basis of an eventual landing by
American formes on the China coast. In such event there would have to be
effective action by all Chinese armies to assist the landing. And we would
have to cooperate with whatever Chinese forces we found on the spot, whether
Central Government or Communist. Finally, we needed the completest informa-
tion on Japanese strength, movements, and defenses. The areas of the greatest
Japanese concentrations and the area of greatest strategic value to us was north
China, where the Communist guerrillas controlled the countryside and concern-
ing which Kuomintang intelligence, by our experience, was insufficient and un-
reliable.
"Several attempts by headquarters to obtain permission to send observers into
the Communist areas had already met with flat refusals, even though these re-
quests were based solely on the need for intelligence. There had not been up to
this time any proposal or request to supply arms to the Chinese Communists. The
Central Government insisted on its rigid blockade. A preliminary opening wedge
was forced by the association of foreign correspondents who argued for months :
'Why, if the Communists, who have been blockaded from the outside world com-
pletely for the past 5 years, are as weak and as bad as the Central Government
says, can't we be allowed to visit them?' About May 1944 the issue became so
embarrassing to the Central Government that permission was granted for cor-
respondents to visit the Communist area. The government, however, remained
adamant to the Army's request. The visit of Vice President Wallace in June 1944
gave an opportunity for high-level pressure and on President Roosevelt's instruc-
tions Mr. Wallace secured Chiang Kai-shek's agreement. The fact that because
of my familiarity with the background I was present, by order, at this interview
has always, I am sure, been one of the factors in apparently convincing the
Chinese that I was the primary instigator. The interview is described on pages
556-557 of the white paper.
"In June 1944 I prepared a detailed summary of the situation in China with
suggestions regarding policy. This was my most extensive analysis of the
weaknesses of the Kuomintang. I recommended a realistic policy and conditional
aid with active efforts to promote the liberal croups in China in an endeavor to
bring about reform of the Kuomintang. In this again I pointed out that con-
tinuation of the current trend of the Kuomintang would hamper the effective
prosecution of the war and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan imme-
diately and Russia eventually. I believe that the inclusion of this memoran-
dum in the record (document 157) will be of value in indicating the develop-
ment of my thinking during this period. In this connection it should be remem-
bered that in April the Japanese had commenced an important campaign south-
ward from the Yellow River which, during May, resulted in their completing
their control of the important Peking-Hankow Railway, and that toward the
end of Mav they had commenced a campaign southward from the Yangtze River
which on June 18 had captured Changsha and gave every indication that they
1970 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
would be able to continue southward capturing our advanced air bases and seal-
ins off all of eastern China. This situation was in reality dark.
"On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to
be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of mes-
sages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in China,
Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge of
the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in
Burma and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was con-
sidered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that there
should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal pro-
cedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore
ordered to accompany the chief of staff and to translate the telegram phrase by
phrase to the generalissimo himself. This was, in effect, a proposal that the
Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if General
Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies this would include the Communists
and that thev would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American equip-
ment. This was. so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On July 15
there was a second telegram from the President which I again was required to
interpret for the chief of staff. I have been sure since then my presence on these
unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity toward me and
to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very unwelcome demand.
"As the white paper (pp. 66-67 t reveals, Chiank Kai-shek agreed in principle to
the appointment of Stilwell as commander but requested that the President send
a high level representative to discuss the military and political problems involved.
This was the origin of the Hurley appointment and I believe it is clear from the
background that Hurley's principal mission was to persuade the generalissimo to
accept Stilwell as commander of all Chinese armies as a means of unifying the
Chinese war effort and of furnishing equipment to the Communists to make them
a more effective force in fighting the Japanese.
"Following the receipt of Chiang's approval of the mission to Yenan, I was
active under Colonel Dickey, chief of G-2, in planning the organization of the
observer group. This was made a joint enterprise with representation from all
of the agencies in the theater which had particular interests in obtaining informa-
tion from North China. These included the Twentieth Bomber Command (B-
29s), Weather, Air-Ground Aid Service (rescue of air crews) G-2, OSS, and other
intelligence units. The headquarters inquired from the Embassy whether it
would be interested in having a State Department man included for the purpose
of political intelligence. Ambassador Gauss was in favor of such participation
and recommended, after consultation with the State Department, that I be in-
cluded in this capacity. It was on this basis that I accompanied the first group to
go into Yenan by air' on July 22, 1044. The commander of the observer section
was Col. David D. Barrett. Our orders were that apart from the collection of all
types of intelligence we were to be strictly observers. While we were to investi-
gate and report on the possible desirability and the types of arms which the
Communists forces might need, we were not to negotiate, offer any aid or supplies
or make any commitments of any kind. Colonel Barrett and I made this clear to
the Communist leaders during our initial interviews and there was never any
doubt of this status while I was at Yenan.
"Immediately after arrival I commenced a thorough attempt to become ac-
quainted with and to interview all of the principal Communist leaders and to
report in a systematic way on the political organization, policies, program, propa-
ganda, extetit of popular support, etc. of the Chinese Communist Party.
"The Communists received us cordially and cooperated thoroughly on our
various projects such as setting up weather reporting, interrogating Japanese
prisoners, and collecting Japanese order of battle .and other intelligence. They
gave us extensive facilities for travel and permitted us greal freedom of move-
ment and observation. All in all. we were favorably impressed. I remained in
Yenan for.'! months and during this period of course associated outside of our own
group entirely with Communists. In fact. I had numerous long and detailed
interviews with almost every one of the ranking Communist leaders from Mao
Tse-tung on down. These interviews and my observations at Yenan were thor-
ough- reported in memoranda which I prepared and which were forwarded to
G-2 iii Chun-kins where copies were furnished to the Embassy which, in turn,
transmitted most by despatch to the Department.
"By late August we felt that we had verified our first favorable impressions
sufficiently to make a recommendation that it would be worth while to give small
quantities of equipment useful in guerrilla operations to the Communists as an
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY I \ YI.STIGATION 1971
anti-Japanese fighting force. Such a recommendation was contained in my
memorandum of Augusl 29 (Document 177 1. Aside from the military considers
t ions. I expressed the belief thai Impartial aid would be a constructive force in
stimulation of reform and in prevention of civil war. An important background
was. of course, the deteriorating military situation in South China where the
Japanese had captured Eengyang and were moving into Kwangsi Province.
"By early October we had accumulated a great deal of information on Com-
munist strength by direct observation, by field trips of American officers and
correspondents, and by interrogation of American air crews and other foreigners
who had traveled for long distances through the Communist guerrilla areas.
This information was so overwhelmingly conclusive that on October 9 I wrote:
" From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a
magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw
the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in
China's future. I suggest the further conclusion that unless the Kuomintang
goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise
proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet
shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant
force in China within a comparatively few years.'
"I would like to have this document l No. 192, enclosure No. 3) made a part
of the record.
"General Hurley had arrived in Chungking on September 6 as the President's
special representative. Although public statements had indicated that he was
to try to bring about some agreement between the two parties and a unification of
the two armies, we learned in Yenan in early October that the only immediate
subject of negotiation was a demand by Chiang that Stilwell be recalled and that
Hurley was swinging to support of Chiang in the hope, apparently promoted by
T. V. Soong. that Chiang would cooperate on the other issues if Stilwell were
removed.
"Against this background and my conviction that the Communists were now
too strong to be dictated to, I wrote my memorandum no. 40 of October 10, to
which General Hurley later took such violent exception. He has called it va-
riously "a plan to let fall the government he was sent to support" and
"a plan to bring about the collapse of the Central Government." I believe
that a fair reading of this memorandum will convince anyone that it was
not meant to be, and in fact was not, an argument for the abandonment or, as
Senator Met larthy has called it, for the 'torpedoing' of Chiang and the Central
Government. Rather it was an attempt to refute the argument so commonly
advanced that we were dependent on Chiang and that if he were to fall Chinese
resistance to Japan would collapse. I did not advocate the abandonment of
Chiang but rather a more realistic policy toward him. It is interesting to
note that the gist of my argument had already, without my knowledge, been said
by General Stilwell in his reports to General Marshall in September and October
(see white paper, pp. 6S-69). In essence I was advancing the argument which
we stated more clearly in February 1!)4."» that the end and primary objective of
our policy was not the support of Chiang but the revitalization of the Chinese
war effort and the attempt to bring about a relationship between the parties
which migh remove the threat of civil war and unify the country.
"General Stilwell was recalled on October 19 and just before his departure or-
dered my return to the Tinted States. I left Yenan on October 23 and spent one
night in Chungking. I informed General Hurley of my presence and placed my-
self at his disposal if he wished to talk to me concerning the current Communist
attitude. He asked me to dinner and kept me through the evening. My chief
concern was to tell him of the confidence and strength of the Communist atti-
tude and he repeatedly told me that he was in China to see that they were
brought into the war effort and did receive some arms. His whole attitude was
to minimize the difficulties in bringing the two parties together.
'T proceeded immediately to the United States and arrived in Washington on
October 29. 1944. Here I was the first man to return after having visited Yenan
and observed the Chinese Communists. I was sought after by the various Gov-
ernment agencies whose work related to China, by newspaper people, and by
the general category of "Far Eastern experts." Agencies such as OSS or MIS
called me for several sessions at which their experts or research people could
interrogate me. An example of a report of such an interview is Document 201.
Following these interviews individual members of these agencies would some-
times follow up their own particular line of inquiry by seeing me in the Depart-
ment of State.
1972 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Several newspaper and magazine writers were sent to me by the Press Di-
vision of the Department. 1 remember particularly a reporter for a women's
magazine and from Pathfinder. Henry Luce, who had received a letter from his
bureau chief in China, asked me to come up to New York to talk to him and I did
so after consultation with my superior. While in New York I talked to Law-
rence Salisbury, who had formerly been a close friend in the Foreign Service and
was at that time with the IPR editing Far Eastern Survey. I was called
separately to talk to Dr. Currie, Harry Hopkins, and Henry White of the Treas-
ury. None of these men appeared to differ with my general views, although
Harry Hopkins was pessimistic and discouraged over the situation and seemed
to feel that there was probably little that could be done. Nevertheless the White
House continued to press for unification of the Communist and Kuomintang
armies.
"My first talk to the IPR was given during this period. The institute asked
that I give an off-the-record talk at its Washington office. This invitation came
through and was accepted by John Carter Vincent, then head of the Division of
China Affairs. The meeting was quite a crowded one and included a number of
people from other Government agencies and from outside the Government, and
several newspapermen and writers. I remember Selden Menefee and a New York
Times man. The chairman of the meeting, I believe, was William C. Johnstone.
It was at the conclusion of this meeting that I first met Lt. Andrew Roth,
who, along with a number of others, came up and introduced himself to me.
There was no time for more than an introduction and I did not see Andrew
Roth again till my next return to the United States in April 1945.
"It may be pertinent to point out that I had no regular duties assigned to
me in the Department. I did not attend policy meetings nor prepare any policy
memoranda or papers. I was spending full time being available to officials and
others who had a responsible interest in China and wanted recent background,
particularly on the Communists. My superiors knew that I was expressing my
own personal views freely and they apparently considered that I had sufficient
judgment and discretion.
"An interesting sidelight on classification concerns a map of the Communist
areas which the Communist Chief of Staff gave me just before I left Yenan. I
specifically asked him whether he wished any classification to be put on it. He
said certainly not : 'The Japanese know where we are.' Furthermore, I found
out that similar maps were being given to the newspaper correspondents and
to American visitors to Yenan. I carried this map around with me when I was
being interviewed by the various agencies and showed it freely to anyone inter-
ested. The OSS and Army both wanted copies. I therefore loaned it to MIS
for reproduction. Later I found out that they had classified it — either as confi-
dential or secret. I expressed some surprise hut the Army insisted on retaining
its classification. Exactly the same map was given to Harrison Foreman, one
of the correspondents at Yenan, and appears as a full page illustration in his
book.
"When I had returned to Washington it was expected that my assignment with
the Army, which had been at Stilwell's personal request, would be terminated.
The Department was considering an assignment to the Embassy at Moscow. I
completed my consultation and left Washington about November 19 for leave
at my home' in California. John Davies in the meanwhile had remained in
Chungking with General Wedemeyer, the new theater commander. During the
last few days of December, while I was on leave in California, the Department
asked whether I would lie willing to go back to China and instructed me to re-
port at once to Washington. There I found that John Davies had bad a clash
with Hurley which required his immediate transfer out of China and that
Wedemeyer desired my assignment as a replacement. The Department, I
learned, had made its release of me to Wedemeyer contingent on Wedemeyer's
agreeing that one of my principal duties would be reporting on the Chinese
Communists and thai for tins purpose I would spend a major part of my time
in Yenan.
"I believe that the facts concerning my return to China in January 1945 are
pertinent and deserve emphasis. By the time that General Wedemeyer asked
for me and the Department agreed to send me back with the condition that one
of my principal functions would be reporting on the Communists, the voluminous
reports prepared during my assignment to Stilwell and during my first stay at
Yenan from July to October 1!)44 had received wide dissemination and had been
available to all the concerned parties. On these reports I had received numerous
commendations, llv views on the situation in China and my general attitude on
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1973
policy were well known, through my reports and through personal interviews,
to: the White Bouse < Harry Hopkins and Lauehlin Currie) : the Department of
State (Mr. Grew, Under Secretary; J. W. Ballantine and E. F. Stanton, Director
and Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs); the Army (Head-
quarters in Chungking, Genera] Bissel — then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in
Washington, and responsible officers working on the Far East in OPD) ; and
to other officials such as General Donovan of OSS. Some of my memoranda,
specifically such as No. 40 of October 10, had caused discussion and had not
been wholly concurred in by some of the recipients such as the Embassy in
Chungking and the Department. I had not at any time, however, been told
that my views were considered improper or contrary to American policy or that
I should modify them or restrain my expression of them. I did not flatter my-
self that General Wedemeyer's request and the Department's action in approv-
ing my return for the primary purpose of observation and reporting on the
Communists necessarily meant 'acceptance of my views. But at least they
seemed to be an indication of confidence in my value as a reporting officer.
•'.Ti'si before I left the Department I was called in by the Chief of the Division
of Foreign Service Personnel, Nathaniel P. Davis. He noted that I bad been
separated from my family for over 4 years and said that the Department wast
hesitant about asking me to return to China. I told Mr. Davis that with the
war still proceeding I was willing and happy to return since General Wedemeyer
had indicated that I could be of service to him. However, I called attention to
the difficulties of the Embassy staff and John Davies in their relations with
General Hurley. Mr. Davis said that he was familiar with the situation in
Chungking. He emphasized that I would be working for the Army and not for
General Hurley, and that I would have the Department's understanding support.
"I arrived back in Chungking on January 18, 1945. General Wedemeyer
wished to make me more definitely a part of the Headquarters organization
than had been the case under General Stilwell. I commenced work on much
the same lines as under Stilwell, doing voluntary political reporting and acting
as consultant for G-2 and other intelligence agencies. I also was used by
Wedemeyer as a drafting officer for communications dealing with policy matters
having political significance. G-2 brought me closer into its operations and
I was cleared for intelligence of the highest category, the exact nature of which
cannot be mentioned. I was invited to attend Headquarters' briefing sessions.
"One or two days after my arrival General Hurley sent for me. He had a
copy of my memorandum No. 40 and delivered me a lecture to the effect that I
was very much 'off base' and that he intended to do all of the policy recom-
mending in the future. He said that his mission in China was to uphold Chiang
Kai-shek and the Central Government. I did not attempt to discuss the matter
in detail — in fact, I was given very little opportunity to say anything. At the
conclusion of the talk he said something to the effect : 'If you confine yourself
strictly to reporting we will get along, but if you try to interfere with me,
I will break you.' In this talk he mentioned that he had made the same threat
to John Davies but had relented because he did not wish to ruin a young man's
career. This interview was of course reported by me to General Wedemeyer,
who told me that I was working only for him and should 'carry on.'
"It was General Hurley's practice during this period to have occasional
meetings of representatives of all the different United States Government
agencies in Chungking. I was assigned to be one of the Headquarters repre-
sentatives. The most notable features of these meetings were General Hurley's
long discussions of his instructions from the President and of the progress being
made in his negotiations. It was common comment among those attending that
Hurley's accounts of his instructions changed from week to week and came
more and more to emphasize the upholding of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central
Government. He minimized the difficulties of the negotiations with the Chinese
Communists and continually gave what we knew to be an unrealistic, optimistic
view of their progress and likely success.
"By early February it was obvious that the negotiations between the two
parties had reached an impasse and broken down. Both Hurley and Wedemeyer
prepared to return to the United States for consultation. Raymond P. Ludden
had returned from a long trip from Yenan into the guerrilla areas and was in
Chungking. We had a talk with Wedemeyer in which we expressed our opinion
that military considerations made it undesirable for the Army to become com-
pletely tied up with the Central Government. For instance, there might be
problems in the fairly near future of operations in occupied China, possibly by
landing operations on the China coast, and that we should be free to cooperate
1974 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
with whatever Chinese forces we found on the ground. Wedemeyer said that
he agreed and would appreciate a written statement. Furthermore, he ordered
Ludden to return to the United States at the same time so as to be available
for consultation in Washington on these matters. Ludden and I proceeded to
write our memorandum. This was done only after considerable discussion be-
tween the two of us, since we well knew that it might involve us in serious
trouble with Hurley. The result was our memorandum of February 17 (Docu-
ment 204) which I would like to place in the record.
"This memorandum marked a definite .stage in our thinking. It was obvious
that Hurley's attempt to negotiate on the basis of acceding to the wishes of
Chiang had failed. We felt that the situation had reached a stage of urgency
where we could make headway only by taking positive action and in effect
telling instead of asking Chiang. Far from being a proposal to arm belligerent
opponents of the Kuomintang, as Hurley later charged, it was a proposal to
arm anyone who offered reasonable expectation of providing real resistance
to what was, after all, the real enemy — Japan.
"After Hurley had left Chungking, George Atcheson, the Counselor of the
Embassy, expressed the opinion to several of his staff and to me that there had
been inadequate reporting on the situation and that the Department had
received an incomplete and nonobjective picture of the negotiations from Hurley.
Acheson suggested that we prepare a telegram summarizing the whole situation
and making recommendations for overcoming the impasse that had been reached.
It was agreed that I would prepare the initial draft since I was intimately
familiar with the subject and had more time available. The telegram which
we prepared is the one of February 26 which Hurley has objected to and on
the basis of which he accused Atcheson and me of sabotage and disloyalty. ( Put
in the record. White Paper 87-92. ) We included in the telegram the statement
that the presence of Hurley in Washington would afford an opportunity for dis-
cussion of the questions we raised. When it was shown to Hurley he is reported
to have been extremely angry and to have held me primarily responsible.
"This telegram follows substantially the same lines as the memorandum
drafted a few days earlier by Ludden and me. At Atcheson's instructions, this
telegram was shown by me to Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff General Gross, who
was then in acting command, and he gave it his hearty endorsement.
"Meanwhile in Chungking it appeared that the meeting of the Communist
Party congress was imminent. I proposed that I proceed to Yenan for observa-
tion and reporting. This was strongly supported by Atcheson and approved by
the Headquarters and appropriate orders were issued. I flew to Yenan about
March 9. I resumed my contacts with the leading Communists and prepared a
large number of memoranda, chiefly descriptive of various phases of then-
program and policies. One important development was the admitted Communist
aggressiveness in their attitude toward the Kuomintang and in their plans to
meet the expected situation at the end of the war. They were, for insance,
actively moving into southeast China and were making preparations for a quick
thrust into Manchuria as soon as the opportunity was ripe. In early April I
received urgent but unexplained orders to return to the United Sttaes at once. I
left Yenan about April 4, passed quickly through Chungking, and arrived in
Washington on April 12. There I found that Hurley had forced my recall by
going to Secretary of War Stimson, the Department of State having told him
that it had no authority to give me orders while I was under assignment to the
Army.
"My return to Washington terminated my assignment to the Army and I was
detailed to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs for a brief period of consultation.
As mi the two previous occasions this meant spending my time being available for
interviews by people working on China in various Government agencies and
branches of the State Department. I had no other assigned duties and did not
attend policy meetings nor write any policy memoranda or papers. I emphasize
this because of General Hurley's statements that after my return from China I
was placed over him in a supervisory capacity."
Mr. Rhetts. Now, certain documents are referred to in the first 34 pages of
this document which has just been included in the transcript and I should
like at this point to offer certain of them also for inclusion in the transcript.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to introduce first, document No. 103, which is
referred to on page 14 of the personal history statement and which is the
memorandum dated January 23, 1!>4.:. entitled "Kuoinintang-Comnmnist Situa-
tion." and I ask that it be included in the transcript.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1975
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
"An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chung-
king and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most care-
ful study should be given to the interna] political situation in China, particularly
tlit4 growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
"The 'United front' is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible
to find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as
present tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both
civil and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is
deteriorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is
a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political
indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only
a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition of
'communism' but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward
forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether
civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until
after a victory over Japan.
"The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching.
Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort
by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation
therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the
present time a large and comparatively well trained and equipped portion of
the Kuomintang Army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to
blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are
well established by multiple lines of block houses and these large forces remain
in a condition of armed readiness. Farther south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North
Kiangsu) the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which
have gone on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take
the initiative, continue.
"On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and
forced in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it
considers the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there
was extreme tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of
1942. The Communists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yun-
nan that saved them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends
claim, furthermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthen-
ing of its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to
fighting Japan. This strengthening of the position of the Kuomintang will be
course assist it in reestablishing its control over areas which will then be
opened to it. A logical part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon
as an opportunity is found, of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Suc-
cess in this move would weaken the Communists and make easier the eventual
recapture by the Kuomintang of the Communist guerrilla zones. To support
this thesis the Communists point to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomin-
tang publications for the immediate abolition of the 'border area.' Another
factor sometimes suggested as tending to provoke an early Kuomintang attack
on the Communists is the desirability, from the Kuomintang point of view, of
disposing of them before China finds itself an active ally of Russia against Japan.
"The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort
should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access
may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases.
The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of
Russia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but
fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shansi indicate that the
Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese 'mopping
up' campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-
Communist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, al-
though the fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has empha-
sized the anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever 'collaborationist' elements
there may be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the
Kuomintang. This activity in Shansi and the difficulties of the Japanese there
contrast with the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.
"Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situ-
ation are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being
averted, the eventual defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese will leave the
Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most
of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shan-
1976 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
tung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei. In addition the Communists will be
in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from
Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some
Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of
elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are
of uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's
fear of their power, and the power of whatever underground organization the
Communists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indi-
cated by the size and activity of its various secret police organs.
"But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one
reason why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the
present time, is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the
Japanese. Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have
apparently been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am
in possession of a secret Kuomintang publication describing the 'Communist
control of Hopei.' It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such
means, for instance, as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that
if the Communists fail to 'cooperate' (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang
domination) they must be 'exterminated.' I hope to make a translation of this
pamphlet which would appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang
indication of the policy it will pursue in these areas. It seems reasonable to
question, as some thoughtful Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla
zones, after several years of political education and what must be assumed
to be at least partial 'sovietization,' will accept peacefully the imposition of
Kuomintang control activated by such a spirit and implemented by military force
and the political repression, and secret police and gendarmerie power, which
are already important adjuncts of party control and which are being steadily
strenghtened and expanded.
"Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew
of the well-known late editor of the Ta Kung Pao) consider the likelihood
of civil war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Com-
munists are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang
armies for 10 years in Central China and that they will be much stronger yet
if it proves that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population
in the guerrilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful
Communist infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such
as those of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolonga-
tion of the struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kuomintang, or for
either side, impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of
the average, nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomin-
tang may indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and effectiveness of its conscript
troops.
"Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to ques-
tion whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the
future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's
advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the
Kuomintang government large quantities of military supplies which, judging
from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will
be available for civil war to enforce 'unity' in the country by military force.
These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may
be in China (in support of the Kuomintang Army) if there should be a civil
war ; and wonder what will be the attitude of Russia, especially if it has become
by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.
"But ignoring these problematical implications, there can be no denial that
civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the
present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This
blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously
and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the con-
tinuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already serious
economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. If there
is civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course greater.
"There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-
weary, overconscripted and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist
propaganda and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democ-
racy which the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist
government would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is
probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1977
for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Com-
munist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation
with Russia than with Great Britain and America.
"For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United
States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation
in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.
"The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with
John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that
foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force
that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful
foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs, no matter how tactfully
made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion,
official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of
leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.
"The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be
the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our
propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy
against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope
of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the
Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.
"Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist
army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might
intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support
be given by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Com-
munists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies
receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.
"Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomin-
tang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I
have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no
doubt that they would welcome such action.
"This visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with
comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the
situation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the
following pertinent questions : How faithfully have the Communists carried
out their united front promises? What is the form of their local government?
How 'Communistic' is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities?
Has it won any support of the people? How does it compare with conditions of
government in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the
people in such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced
labor compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is the military and
economic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the
Allied cause? How have they dealt with problems such as inflation, price control,
development of economic resources for carrying on the war, and trading with the
enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to
the degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?
"Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conflicting reports and
reach a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information
regarding conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such
information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to
scope and probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had
a limited knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have
been able to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the
Communists. They also suffered from language limitations and were unable
to remain in the area for an extended period.
"I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Com-
munist area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or
two men might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence
at Yenan or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is
important that they not be required to bn^e a report on a brief visit during which
they would be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a
sufficient time to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day
observations.
"There is mail and telegraphic communication between Yenan and Chungking,
and similar communication between various parts of the Communist area. The
officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if it
is thought desirable, make periodic reports.
1978 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to introduce document No. 142, which is referred
to ou page 20 of the personal statement. This is headed : ''Excerpt from mem-
orandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, forwarded to Department as en-
closure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2401, April 21, 1944, under title '"Situation in
Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-a-vis China and the Soviet
Union" :
The Chairman. What number?
Mr. Rhetts. No. 142 ; and I ask that it be included in the transcript.
The Chairman. It may be. '
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
"We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they
are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with
Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military
relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and
postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian
aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a care-
ful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the
Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia
we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in
our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.
"As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are
faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an
active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are
accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be
characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among
the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly
may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and exter-
nal policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to
serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia. By so doing. Chiang may be dig-
ging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national
groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.
"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United States
want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia ; nor does it want to see
Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.
"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give,
in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of
China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the
military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other sup-
port beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-
Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists — who probably hold
the key to control, not only of North China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria
as well — that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies
with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that
American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself
by any means available: in other words, the extension of her direct power or
influence.
"It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in
its dealings with China :
"1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations ; avoid all
appearand*" of unqualified diplomatic support to China, especially vis-a-vis Russia ;
and limit American aid to Cbina to direct prosecution of the war against Japan.
"This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and eco-
nomic rehabilitation — unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within
China.
"2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China.
Try to lil the Communists into the war against Japan.
"In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese
war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope lies
in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friend-
ly toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China, and
lake the view that economic collaboration with the United States is the only hope
tor speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital that we do not
lose this good will and influence.
"3. Use our tremendous and as yet uflexploited influence with the Kuomintang
to promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of
progressive reform.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1979
"There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomlntang knows
thai ii is dependent on us; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihila-
tion : is is inconceivable that ii will turn toward communistic Russia : and Great
Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Com-
munists will ho a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to sot its house
in order.
"The Communists would undoubtedly plan an important part in a genuinely
unified China — one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice
of military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic
and unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States and that
the United States, by virtue of a sympathy, position, and economic resources,
would enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power."
Mr. Khetts. I should like to offer document 192, which is referred to on page
25 of the personal history statement. This is an excerpt from a report pre-
pared by Mr. Service and it is entitled "The Present and Future Strength of
the Chinese Communists.'' and dated, on the second page, October 9, 1944. I
ask it be included in the transcript.
The Chairman. It may be.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Reports of two American officers, several correspondents, and twenty-odd
foreign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Com-
munist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual
observation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from
those facts an important conclusion.
"The Japanese are being actively opposed — in spite of the constant warfare
and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gaining
in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the
concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this
simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence.
"This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla warfare
aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobilization
the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers, have
become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people themselves.
They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly fight with
them. There is complete solidarity of army and people.
"This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what
amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has
been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the
peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform, and good government. It
has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness, and a sense
of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-
respect, self-reliance, and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The
common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.
"The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign
invaders but because they deny this revolution. The people will continue to
fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains.
"Just as the Japanese Army cannot crush these militant people now, so also
will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organi-
zation, knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they
have been fighting for, these people — now some 90,000,000 and certain to be
many more before the Kuomintang can reach them — will resist oppression. They
are not Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at
present they regard the Kuomintang — from their own experience — as oppres-
sors; and the Communists as their leaders and benefactors.
"With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated.
Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democ-
racy. This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people: a Com-
munist victory will be inevitable. If, as the Communists hope, the Kuomintang
turns to democracy, this established popular support will ensure influential
Communist participation in national affairs. If the Kuomintang continues its
present policy of quarantine without itself instituting thoroughgoing democracy,
the better condition of the common people in the Communist areas will be an
example constantly working in Communist favor.
"From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support
of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must
draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share
68970 — 50— pt. 2^—32
1980 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in China's future. * * * I suggest the further conclusion that unless the
Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform,
and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none
of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will
be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years."
Mr Khetts. I introduce document No. 204, which is referred to on page 32
of the personal statement. This is a memorandum entitled. "Military Weakness
of Our Far Eastern Policy," and it is addressed to the Commanding General,
USAF, etc, and hears the date, on the third page, February 14, 1945. I ask it be
included in the transcript.
The Chairman. I may be entered in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"American policv in the Far East can have but one immediate objective : the
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of
American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations
should be subordinate.
"The attainment of this objective demands the of'ective mobilization of China
in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a
supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic re-
sources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone
of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources the attainment of our
primary objective will be unecessarily delayed.
'"There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Govern-
ment the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation
in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political
disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has
for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the
generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary,
has not been ahondoned. In the present situation in China, where power or
self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the
Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources
against the Japanese through fear that it will weaken them vis-a-vis other
groups. A recent instance is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of
the southern section of the Hankow-Canton railway. Equally, the Kuomintang
is jealously intent on preventing the strengthening of other groups: witness
the blockade of the Communists.
"The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the
United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable
preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our
policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim.
On the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and
undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced
the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to support it and it alone.
The Kuomintang Government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of
American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide,
it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.
"We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand
the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable in-
fluence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by
this time that the effort to solve the Kuoinintang-Communist differences by
diplomatic means has failed; we should not be deceived by any 'face-saving'
formula resulting from the discussions because neither side is willing to hear
the ones of failure. We should also realize that no Government can survive in
China without American support.
"There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform
by which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the
Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread
secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain helpless
to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that
we are champions of the status quo.
"At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support
for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:
" 'The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and fac-
tions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and
thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological pref-
erences for one side or the other.'
o
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1981
"A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military
aid to the Central Government ; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It
would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available
means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a tirm
rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China
would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions
Of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, no
longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won whole-
heartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united
ally.
••Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force
in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish
our primary mission. In spite of hero-worshiping publicity in the United States,
Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly
supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves
oft' from millions of useful allies ; many of whom are already organized and in
position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to
Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the
country. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifesta-
tion of a condition which is potentially present throughout China. Other im-
portant groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Com-
munists— agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic insti-
tutions— but the Communists are the only group at present having the organiza-
tion and strength openly to foster such 'revolutionary' ideas.
"Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position
from which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the gener-
alissimo is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and
able to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the gener-
alissimo is but one means to an end ; it is not an end in itself, but by present
statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end.
There should be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility
of approach to our primary objective may be restored."
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I should like to inquire of the Board whether it has
obtained copies of all of Mr. Service's efficiency reports. Those reports could
not be made available to him, of course, under Foreign Service regulations but
we have asked that they be made available to the Board.
The Chairman. The efficiency records of Mr. Service are in the hands of
the Board and will be considered by the Board as part of the evidence but will
not be made part of the transcript of the record. They will be made available
to the Review Board with the rest of the confidential reports in this case.
Mr. Rhetts. As distinguished from the efficiency reports, Mr. Service has also
received during the course of his service, numerous letters of commendation,
which of course are made available to the Foreign Service officers. It is my un-
derstanding that the Board has received at least some of these letters. We
have also sought to obtain copies of these letters.
I may add that the copies that have been supplied to Mr. Service are among
his effects, which are not in this country at the present time, so that we have had
to attempt to locate as many of these as we can and obtained some of them from
the Department. Since we may have some letters which for one reason or
another did not get into the hands of the Board, I should like to offer all we
have at this time ; that is to say, I should like
The Chairman. Before you do that let me say for the record that the Board
has before it letters of commendation of Mr. Service which may be introduced
in evidence if you wish.
Mr. Rhetts. As to these, I do wish to introduce them in evidence as exhibits
for inclusion in the record because these can possibly be made part of the record
as an exhibit which would be available also to us. Since I have a complete set
of them, I will be glad to offer all that. I think it includes what you have plus
others.
The Chairman. If you have a complete set of letters of commendation, you
may offer them, if you wish, as exhibits or for the transcript.
Mr. Rhetts. I haven't a complete set but I think I have a more complete set
than you do. We still don't have all the letters of commendation given.
The Chairman. If they are not confidential, you may offer at your discretion.
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I would like to introduce, as exhibits, documents
301, 302, 303. 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, and 310, and all of them being copies
of letters of commendation of Mr. Service.
1982 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Let rue say for the record, the communications referred to by
counsel are the ones taken from the document list contained in exhibit 1.
(The following copies of letters of commendation were admitted in evidence:)
Document 301, photostat of letter from Charles B. Rayner, Board of Economic
Warfare, Washington, D. C, dated January 2, 1943, to Mr. Max Thornberg, De-
partment of State, Washington, D. C, marked "Exhibit 3."
Document 302, photostat of letter from George Ateheson, Jr., American
Charge d'Affaires at Chungking, dated August 16, 1943, to John S. Service, second
secretary of Embassy, care of General Stilwell's headquarters, Chungking, and
marked "Exhibit 4."
Document 303, copy of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated October 1, 1943,
to Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Ex-
hibit 5."
Document 304, photostat of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated October 21,
1943, to Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked
"Exhibit 6."
Document 305, copy of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated June 21, 1944, to
Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhibit 7."
Document 306, copy of letter from JGE, dated January 13, 1945, to Hon. Patrick
J. Hurley, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhiibt S."
Document 307, photostat of letter from A. C. Wedemeyer, lieutenant general,
United States Army, dated May 10, 1945, to the Honorable the Secretary of
State, Washington, D. C, marked "Exhibit 9."
Document 308, photostat of memorandum from E. T. Wailes. dated June 20,
1947, to Mr. G. Ackerson, Jr., marked "Exhibit 10."
Document 309, photostat of letter from Donald R. Heath, American Minister
to Bulgaria, dated April 1, 1949, to Mr. Donald W. Smith, Chief, Division of
Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State, marked "Exhibit 11."
Document 310, photostat of letter from Christian M. Ravndel, Director General
of the Foreign Service, dated April 4, 1949, to John S. Service, Esq., American
Foreign Service Officer, care of Department of State, Washington, D. C, marked
"Exhibit 12."
Mr. Rhetts. I should also like to offer as an exhibit at this time document
No. 50, which is a letter addressed to the Board, dated April 18, 1950, signed by
Dr. H. C. Mei.
(Document 50, letter from Dr. H. C. Mei to the Loyalty Security Board, dated
April IS, 1950, was admitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 13.")
Mr. Rhetts. Now I should like to question Mr. Service if it is agreeable
to the Board.
The Chairman. I think so.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Service, General Hurley, former Ambassador to China, has made
various charges against you in the course of hearings held before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945. In that connec-
tion I should like to introduce into the transcript of the record at this point
document 35-1.
"(1) Hurley. I have said that I approved the policy of the higher echelon of
the policymaking power of this Nation. I said * * * that this policy had
been defeated by career men in the State Department, and they were able to say,
in China, that the policy that I was supporting in China was not the policy of
the United States Government, but my own policy. (P. 15.)
"(2) Connally. Well, do you charge, then, that notwithstanding the Presi-
dent's policy, and notwithstanding the Secretary of State's policy, that there
are some men in the State Department that overruled the President and over-
ruled the Secretary of State, and that they carry on negotiations with foreign
countries without the knowledge of the Secretary and the President ; and is that
what you charge? (P. 15.)
" (3) Hurley. Of course, the Senator has made the charge very broad. (P. 15.)
" (4) Connally. Well, I am not making the charge ; I am asking you a question.
"(5) Hurley. Well, I did not umke that charge. I have made the statement
that the policy of the United States in China was defeated to some extent — oh,
it was not quite defeated, because my directive was to prevent the collapse of
China during the Mar. and we did ; my directive was to sustain the leadership of
Chiang Kai-shek — we did ; my directive was to harmonize the relations between
the military establishments of the United States and of China — we did; my
directive was to keep the Chinese Army in the field and contain as many Japanese
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1983
a> possible, i" protect our men on the beaches and in the jungle — and we did;
our directive was to harmonize diplomatic relations between our Embassy in
Chungking and the < rovernment of the Republic of China — and we did, during the
war. (Pp. 15-16.)
"(6) Connaixy. Dp to thai time, those subordinates in the State Department,
with all their endeavors, were not able to defeat your policy, because you suc-
ceeded : and so you say in all these enterprises, is that right?
"(7) Hvkiky. Yes. sir. (P. 16.)"
Q. I ask you to look at this document, Mr. Service. This is an excerpt from
the hearings to which I just referred. It sets forth in general the most general
version of General Hurley's charges, does it not, Mr. Service? — A. I would say it
does ; yes.
Q. 1 would like to ask there be included in the transcript, at this point, docu-
ment 35-2.
"(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10. 1945)
"(1) Coxnai.i.y. * * * It has also been testified over here that the foreign
policy of the United States in China, in effect — I do not know, I am not quoting
words, because I do not know exactly the words — but, in other words, that the
foreign policy out there had been circumvented or paralyzed by reason of the
activities of these men, Acheson and Service. Now, was any change in the for-
eign policy brought about by these men, in anywise ? ( P. 259. )
•(2) Ryknes. No: no change in the foreign policy. As a matter of fact, I
must say that after that, in calling for information, as late as December 30, after
the receipt of the Service cable — after that there was a statement from General
Hurley in December, about December 24, a very fine statement according to my
views, of the policy, and it was after the receipt of Service's message in October.
(P. 260.)"
Q. I ask you. does this represent again in the most general terms the refutation
of these charges by the then Secretary of State, Ryrnes? — A. That is correct.
General Hurley has said we defeated American policy in China and Secretary
Byrnes says there was no change in foreign policy.
Q. In reference to General Hurley's charge that Foreign Service officers, in-
cluding you, interfered with it, sniped at and sabotaged and generally sought to
defeat American foreign policy. Will you describe to the Board what you were
doing during the period when General Hurley was attempting to make this
policy effective? — A. General Hurley has said that I particularly was responsible
for the failure of his efforts in China because I sabotaged and undermined him,
opposed him, and advised the Communists not to agree with the proposals.
Actually, I wasn't in China during the critical periods of General Hurley's nego-
tiations. If the Board will refer to the chronology of events on page 3, General
Hurley arrived in Chungking on September 6, 1944. At that time I was in Yenan
as a member of the observer group where I was doing political reporting. I
knew nothing of General Hurley's mission at that time and I wasn't charged
with negotiations or wasn't conducting negotiations.
General Hurley's first task in Chungking was to harmonize relations between
General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. He did nothing else until General Stil-
well's recall on October 19. Immediately after General Stilwell's recall, I was
ordered to the United States and I went through Chungking on October 23 and
departed from Chungking on October 24 and arrived in Washington October 29.
General Hurley did not commence his attempts to negotiate or conciliate be-
tween the Kuomintang and the Communists until after I left Chungking, about
the 1st of November, which can be confirmed by the white paper. He commenced
active efforts to negotiate the differences between the two parties on November
10 and on November 7 he actually flew to Yenan and on November 10 obtained
Mao Tse-tung's signature to a 5-point draft agreement.
The various complications, I don't think you are interested in here but by the
time I had completed my consultations and my leave and had returned to Chung-
king, on January 18, 1945, General Hurley had already telegraphed the Depart-
ment on January 14, blaming someone else for the breakdown. On January 23,
however, subsequently to my arrival in Chungking, on January 18, a new pro-
posal was put out for a political consultative conference and that appeared about
to be accepted. It wasn't accepted. It was refused by letter of March 9 from
the Chinese Communists but that was because of actions taken by the Nationalist
Government and Chiang Kai-shek and this letter from the Communist Party was
written while I was in Chungking, before I arrived at Yenan.
The next period of active negotiations between the two parties, with General
Hurley as intermediary, did not commence until August 1945 when I had been,
1984 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
for several months, out of China and wasn't connected in any way with far eastern
or China matters.
Q. Now I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document
No. 35-3, consisting of two pages, also of excerpts from the hearings.
(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)
"(1) Chairman. * * * These subordinates in the State Department, with
all their endeavors, were not able to defeat your policy, because you succeeded,
so you say, in all these enterprises. Is that right. (P. 16.)
"(2) Hurley. Yes, sir.
" (3) Chairman. It was only after the war? (P. 16)
"(4) Hurley. No, sir — during the war, during the war. On the 30th of
October 1944, a Mr. John S. Service, of the State Department, wrote to the
State Department, and I believe it is his report No. 40, a general statement of
how to let the Government that I was sent over there to sustain fall ; and that
report was circulated among the Communists whose support I was seeking for
our policy ; and that was during the war. (P. 16)
"(5) Hurley. * * * The professional Foreign Service men sided with
the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of Nations whose
policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplo-
mats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the
collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United
States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to
decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army
unless the Chinese Communists were given control. (P. 21.) •
"(6) Hurley. The career men continuously told the Communist armed party
and the world that America was betting on the wrong horse, that the American
policy which I was upholding in China did not have the support of the United
States Government. This made my situation impossible. (P. 32.)
"(7) Hurley. * * * The career men opposed the policy; that they con-
tinuously advised the Chinese Communist armed party; that they recommended
in my absence that the Chinese armed party, a belligerent whose purpose was
to destroy the government that I had to sustain, lie furnished lend-lease arms
and equipment, and because I opposed that as destructive of the government that
I had been directed to uphold, they charged me with making my own policy in
China and said that it was not the policy of the United States Government.
(P. 3A.)
"(8) Hurley. * * * Nor will I recite at this point the communications of
these gentlemen with the Communist armed party which was seeking to defeat
the purpose for which I was sent to China. (P. 38A.)
"(9) Bridges. * * * What was the first date that your suspicions were
aroused, or anything came to your notice whereby agents of the United States
Government, either in the Embassy in China or in the State Department here in
Washington, were undermining the policies of our country or sabotaging your
efforts? (P. 89.)
"(10) Hurley. The first that came to my attention was the report of Mr.
John S. Service dated October 10, 1944, and numbered 40. That was the first
outward evidence I had of a plan not to uphold but to cause the collapse of the
Government of the Republic of China. (P. 89.)
Q. Would you refer to document No. 35-3, Mr. Service, and I should like to ask
you whether these charges of General Hurley were in substance repeated in
Plain Talk magazine for October 1946?—
A. Yes, they were.
Q. At this point I should like to have inserted in the transcript Documents No,
17-2, 17-3, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, and 17-14, which are excerpts from the article in
Plain Talk to which I referred.
"Article in Plain Talk Entitled 'The State Department Espionage Case'
by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, Page 27
17.2: "* * * Many sensational though little-explained developments, such
as the General Stilwell affair, the resignation of Under Secretary Joseph C.
Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-Soviet bloc in
the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced with the Case
of the Six, as the episode became known."
17-3 : "Behind the now-famous State Department espionage case, involving
the arrest of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the Nation
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1985
on June 7, 1945, is the story of a highly-organized campaign to switch American
policy in the Ear East from its long-tested course to the Soviet line."
17-5 : "* * * It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the
espionage case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investi-
gate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major
operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it."
17-6 : "* * * How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been
seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate
Government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China
to introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United
States Government?"
17-7 : "* * * Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation
of LTnder Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Ache-
son? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick
Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?"
17-14 : "The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been
relieved of his command, on October 30, 1944, John S. Service submitted his
report No. 40 to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General
Hurley in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that
report was 'a general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent
over there to sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I
was trying to harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government.' "
Q. Were these charges also repeated in substance by Congressman Judd, on
October 19, 1944?— A. They were.
Q. I should like to introduce at this point document 20-4, an excerpt from
Congressman Judd's remarks as they appear in the Congressional Record for that
date.
"Remarks of Congressman Judd, Congressional Record, October 19, 1949,
Pages 15282-15283
"The memorandum illustrates the conniving against highest officials of the Gov-
ernment of China, being carried on even during the war by representatives of
our Government. The Chinese Government had the right to expect that the
representatives of the United States, its ally, would do their best to help it with
its overwhelming problems, which it knew better than anyone else it could not
possibly solve without sympathetic understanding and support from us. Instead,
officials of the United States were insisting that our Government intervene to
coerce the responsible heads of the Chinese Government into so-called cooperation
with a Communist rebellion."
Q. Were these remarks repeated by Senator McCarthy on the floor of the
Senate on January 5, 1950 — A. They were.
Q. I should like to introduce at this point, document No. 31, which is an
excerpt from Senator McCarthy's remarks as they appear in the Congressional
Record.
"Remarks of Senator McCarthy, Congressional Record, January 5, 1950,
Page 90
"Mr. McCarthy. I wonder if the Senator could shed some light on a certain
subject. I read in a local newspaper a short time ago that the man in charge
of promotions or placements in one branch of the State Department is named
John Service, the same John Service who in 1944, according to Gen. Patrick
Hurley's papers, advocated that we torpedo Chiang Kai-shek, and who officially
as a representative of the State Department, said that the only hope of Asia was
communism. The same John Service was later picked up by the FBI on charges
of espionage. He was not tried, he was not convicted, but was brought home,
promoted, and put in charge of personnel and placement in the State Depart-
ment.
"As I said, I read this in a local newspaper, the Times-Herald, and I wonder
if the Senator could shed any light on that particular situation, as to whether
or not the situation still exists, in other words, whether this man, John Service,
who in 1944 said, 'Let us scuttle Chiang Kai-shek' and who said the only hope
of Asia is communism, this man who was picked up by the FBI, for espionage,
who was accused of having had a sizable number of secret documents in his
possession which he was handing over to the Communists, is still in charge of
personnel and placement, as he apparently was about a month ago when the
article appeared in the newspaper."
1986 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Were these remarks also repeated by Senator McCarthy before the Tydings
subcommittee on March 15? — A. They were.
Q. And were these same charges repeated by Senator McCarthy on the floor
of the Senate on March 30, 1950 V — A. They were.
Q. At this point I would like to introduce documents 39-9, 39-16, 39-17, 39-23,
39-24, which are excerpts from Senator McCarthy's remarks appearing in the
Congressional Record on that date.
Document 39-9
"(P. 4438:) * * * In connection with this, it will be remembered that
John Service, as Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military
commission to Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, you will recall that
Stilwell demanded that Chiang Kai-shek allow him to equip and arm some
300,000 Communists. Chiang Kai-shek objected on the grounds that this was
part of a Soviet plot to build up the rebel forces to the extent that they would
control China. Chiang Kai-shek promptly requested the recall of Stilwell and
President Roosevelt relieved Stilwell of his command. It was at this time that
Service submitted his Rei)ort No. 40 to the State Department, which, according
to Hurley, was a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang Kai-shek
government with the end result that the Communists would take over."
Document 39-16
"(P. 4440:) When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Depart-
ment had in China a young man named John S. Service. His task, obviously,
was not to work for the communization of China. Strangely, however, he sent
official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally
Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope of
China."
Document 39-17
"(P. 4440:) * * * Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. How-
ever, Joseph Grew, the Undler Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecu-
tion, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson,
took over as Under Secretary of State, this man — John Service — who had been
picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the
best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but pro-
moted. And finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and
promotions."
Document 39-23
"(P. 4443:) Not till I have completed my answer. J. Edgar Hoover did a
phenomenal job in the Service case, and if the Department of Justice had done
an equally good job, Service would not be in the Far East trying to turn the
whole business over to Russia."
Document 39-24
"(P. 4445:) * * * but I am sure that if the Senator will sit here and will
listen to the material which I am presenting, lie will be convinced that the
clique of Lattimore, Jessup, and Service has been responsible, almost com-
pletely— under Acheson. of course — for what went on in the Far East, although
there were other individuals taking part."
Q. Now, will you comment for the Hoard, Mr. Service, on the charge which
appeals in paragraph No. (4) of document 35 S that your memorandum No. 40
which, for the information of the Board, appears as document No. 193, consti-
tutes a plan, or proposal, as General Hurley put it, for letting fall the govern-
ment which he was sent to sustain, or that it was planned for bringing about the
torpedoing, as Senator McCarthy said, of Chiang Kai-shek's government? — A.
Memorandum No. I<> was certainly not a plan or proposal for bringing about the
collapse of China's Government. It doesn't even propose withdrawal of support
of that government. The memorandum was a limited discussion of one particular
phase of our problem in China and was an attempt to meet a persistent line of
argument that China and China's resistance would collapse and cease if any-
thing happened to Chiang Kai-shek or to the Central Government.
I feel it is necessary to consider this memorandum against the background
of circumstances and events which occurred in China. In October of 1944 China
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1987
was in extremis. If the Board will refer to our chronology of events on page 2,
in the spring of l!i4-l, in April, the Japanese commenced ;i systematic scries of
campaigns to seal eff all of eastern China. They drove through central China
from the North clear to the south to capture our advanced air bases and cut
off the coast of eastern China. Yon see the main events outlined — that means
the Yellow River front. They took Loyang on May 18.
Having completed the occupation of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, in late .May,
they commenced from the Yangtze River south to Canton in order to seal off
northeastern China. They took Ghangsha June 18. On July 7 the situation
began to look so dark it was obvious the Japanese could accomplish almost any
objective they picked for themselves.
President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek recommending that
Geueral Stilwell, the commander in the theater, he placed in command of all
Chinese forces. This was a drastic effort to force some sort of military unity in
China so that the two armies, which were blockading and opposing each other,
would he unified, and so that we could have perhaps more of a fighting chance of
stopping the Japanese and holding part of China.
There were a long series of telegrams on this subject — repeated requests from
President Roosevelt that the Generalissimo implement his agreement, which
he had given in principle. This proposal to put Stilwell in command of all forces
was the "genesis" of the Hurley mission and it was the primary task which
General Hurley was to accomplish..
The Japanese campaign continued. In August they captured one of the most
important forward air bases. They moved on. They were moving up toward
Kweilin without heavy opposition; they would soon be in a position where they
could threaten Chungking or move toward our main base at Kunming.
By the time this memorandum was drafted, the Y^enan mission had been in
the Communist areas for 2y_> months so all members had done extensive travel
in the actual guerrilla areas. We had talked to a large number of rescued
pilots, who had traveled long distances and we talked to foreign correspondents
and other travelers, so in addition to our own observations in Yenan, we had
a broad basis for coming to a conclusion that the Communists were so strong
and such an important factor that they could not be ignored and would have
to be expected to play an important part in China's future.
These views are summarized in my memorandum, in Document No. 192.
Early in October we heard at Yenan by scuttlebutt — by rumor — that the only
subject of negotiation in Chungking was the Generalissimo's demand for the recall
of Stilwell and that there was a great deal of weight being given by some of the
negotiators, and certainly encouraged from the Chinese side, that we simply
had to support Chiang Kai-shek, and that if Chiang went down, China went
down, and that we were in a sense dependent on Chiang Kai-shek.
Against this background I wrote my memorandum, saying we are not de-
pendent on Chiang Kai-shek ; Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on us ; that for us to
waste time talking about who is going to be the commander is just a waste of time,
and that we should adopt a more realistic, and, if you wish, hard-boiled policy
toward Chiang Kai-shek. It was not, I repeat, a proposal to let fall or a plan
to cause the collapse of the Central Government.
Q. Mr. Chairman, in view of the importance of this memorandum to all the
charges in this area. I should like to ask that Document No. 193 be included in
the transcript at this point.
The Chairman. That may be done.
Report No. 40
U. S. Army Observer Section, APO 879,
October 10, 19J,!,.
Subject : The Need for Greater Realism in our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
To : General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI.
1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to express
myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have seen it.
Although in Yenan I am only a distant observer of recent developments in
Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the continued frankness
which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding the stronger
policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang Kai-shek and
the Central Government.
2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines
suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it have
both military importance and far-reaching political significance ; the two aspects
1988 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of the high
level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agreement and
mutual support between our political and military branches. But this will be
ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by the President.
3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the
American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the in-
formation of Mr. Davies.
/S/ John S. Service.
Enclosure :
Memorandum, as stated.
"MEMORANDUM
"Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of
the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our
cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in
China, that we take a more realistic line.
"Kuomintang Government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its
military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster.
Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwilling-
ness to submerge selfish power-seeking in democratic unity, and the statements of
Chiang himself to the Peoples Political Council and on October 10, are sufficient
evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership.
"With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within
China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the Party was never lower, and Chiang
is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.
"In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American
support for survival. But me arc in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.
"We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air-bases and
cannot hold any section of the seacoast. Without drastic reforms — which must
have a political base — its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively no matter
how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms because
its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own undemo-
cratic power.
"On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chines regime,
because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of
Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang's attitude pre-
vents the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or Provincial
troops, who should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies.
"We n< cd not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The Party and
Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and its their only hope for
continued power.
"But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally traitorous
relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue sowing the
seeds iif future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for eventual con-
solidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of pop-
ular resistance.
"We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang Government. All the other
groups, in China want to defend themselves and tight Japan. Any new govern-
ment under any other than the present reactionary control will be more coopera-
tive and better able to mobilize the country.
"Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend
to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the government which
are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our
support the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively losing
the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. Ignored
by us, and excluded from the Government and joinl prosecution of the war, the
Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by
more direct opposition.
"We need not support the Kuomintang for inti rnational political reasons.
The day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the 'Big
Four' is past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia
propaganda loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present
Kuomintang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British
Empire in the Far East.
"On the contrary, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his
unreasonableness. The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1989
be much better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even
in books like 'China's Destiny', hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating
minority nations (such as the 'Southern Peninsula'), and protecting the 'rights'
and at the same time national ties of its numerous emigrants (to such areas
as Thailand, Malaya and the East Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in power
of the present Kuomintang can only mean a weak and disunited China — a sure
cause of international involvements in the Far East. The key to stability must
be a strong, unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic
foundation.
"TFc need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American
or democratic groups. All the people and all other political groups of im-
portance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the sal-
vation of the country, now and after the war.
"In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American-
educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers,
Military, and Secret police cliques which control the Party and are Chiang's
main supports are the most chauvinist elements in the country. The present
Party ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books 'China's Destiny' and 'Chinese
Economic Theory', is fundamentally anti-foreign and anti-democratic, both
politically and economically.
"Finally, we feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has. kept
around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable and obstructive. Chiang's
own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extravagant
demands and unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff and blackmail.
Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has fought only
passively — not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought to have us
save him — so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. In the
process, he has 'worked' us for all we were worth.
"We seem to forget that Chiang is an Oriental ; that his background and
vision are limited ; that his position is built on skill as an extremely adroit
political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes
kindness and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument
of force rather than reason.
"Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot
hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we
cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without
consideration of the opposition forces— Communist, Provincial and liberal.
"The parallel with Jugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more
and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Com-
munist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing
occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone as it was
to seek the solution of these problems through Nikhailovitch and King Peter's
government in London, ignoring Tito.
"We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This
is an old trick of Chiang's.
"There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government ; but it will not be
the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion,
but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up for
this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent — and at the same time in-
creases the weight to our influence. The crisis is- the time to push — not to relax.
"We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting
time in futile discussion as to who is to be American commander. This is an
obvious subterfuge.
"There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is
that no one who knotos anything about China and is concerned over American
rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang.
"We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk
only to Chiang. This puts the trump card in Chiang's hands.
"Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit
to the Communist capital at Yenan would have a significance that no Chinese
would miss — least of all the Generalissimo. The effect would be great even if
it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more
than a mere demonstration ; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the
Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.
"Finally, if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations
with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary
abandonment of our strongest weapon.
1990 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were
shown obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not
be misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards : they are not the
people. The Kuomintang Government could not withstand public belief that the
United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition
of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance.
"More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time
we started playing them.
"October 10, 1944. "John S. Service."
Q. I take it, Mr. Service, when you prepared your memorandum you had no
consciousness you were making a proposal which was in any way inimical to
the best interests of the United States in the conduct of the war at that time? — A.
Certainly not. The most effective conduct of the war was a primary considera-
tion but this was not in any way different from the policy which General Stilwell
had been following and which we had been following in China.
Q. In fact, it wasn't any different from General Stilwell's policy but precisely
what General Stilwell's policy was. — A. Certainly, as can be seen in the white
paper on pages 68 to 70. General Stilwell said : "It is not a choice between
throwing me out or losing Chiang Kai-shek and possibly China. It is a case of
losing China's potential effort if Chiang Kai-shek is allowed to make removals
now."
Q. As a matter of fact, the telegram which you are reading from, which appears
on page 68 of the white paper, was sent on September 26, 1944, wasn't it? —
A. That is correct.
Q. Almost a little over 2 weeks before you prepared your memorandum of
October 10, 1944? — A. That is correct, but I should point out I of course had
absolutely no knowledge of these telegrams by General Stilwell until I read the
white paper.
Q. Yes, but the fact that General Stilwell had sent the telegram of September
26, taking substantially the identical position which you took subsequently in a
telegram dated October 10, tends to indicate that you were in complete unity with
General Stilwell, who was indeed your superior at that time. Is that not cor-
rect?— A. That is correct.
Q. I should like to introduce at this point, into the transcript, document No.
35-5.
"(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10,
1945)
"(1) Hurley. President Roosevelt sent me to China, first as an officer in the
United States Army, as his personal representative, with a directive to («) pre-
vent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China ; (b) keep
the Chinese Army in the war; (c) harmonize relations between the Chinese and
American military establishments; (d) bring about closer and more harmonious
relations between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Govern-
ment.
"(2) That part of our mission was accomplished. It was not accomplished
without the relief or removal in China of some very admirable Americans, who
either could not go along with the American policy or were incompatible with
the officials of the Chinese Government with whom we had to deal * * *
(p. 29-30).
"We had in China a secondary objective («) to unify the anti-Japanese mili-
tary forces in China; (6) to prevent civil war in China; (c) to support the
aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united,
democratic government.
"(.'5) On these objectives we also had the opposition of most of the cnreer
diplomats. * * * Notwithstanding this opposition we did succeed for the first
lime during China's 8 years of war against Japan in reestablishing discussions
between the Communist armed party and the National Government. We did
bring Mao Tse-tung * * * and Chiang Kai-shek * * * together in con-
ference. * * * We did prevent civil war among the factions of China, at
least as long :is we remained there (p. 30-31).
"(4) Hureey. At that time our policy in China was clearly defined and could
be stated roughly as follows:
"1. To unify all anti-Japanese military forces in China, and
"2. To support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for them-
selves a free, united, democratic government (p. 32)."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1991
Q. I ask you to examine that document, the various statements there by General
Hurley of the American policy objectives in China. Do you disagree with any of
these stated objectives of American policy as General Hurley described them to
the Senate? — A. I certainly did not
Q. As a matter of fact, did you agree with all of them? — A. Yes.
Q. Did your views differ from General Hurley's in certain respects as to how
these policy objectives might most effectively be accomplished? — A. We raise a
question in a way when we ask if my opinions differ, because General Stilwell
and 1 never had any discussion on the matter and there was never any pointing
up of issues at the time.
Q. By General Stilwell, I take it you mean General Hurley?— A. General Hur-
ley. I mean. I would say though that — and Secretary Byrnes has said the same
thing — actually there was no disagreement in objectives. American policy in
China was clear and all of us agreed in it. We differed however on the best
methods to achieve that policy. General Hurley put great emphasis on one
particular feature, and that was support of Chiang Kai-shek and central govern-
ment, and he believed that by persuasion along he would induce Chiang Kai-shek
to make the concessions necessary to bring about a coalition government and a
unification of Chinese armies.
At the first we all agreed that that had to be tried, but eventually as the negitia-
tions had gone on for some time with no success and as became apparent later
with only a worsening of the situation, some of us believed that we had to take
more direct action and in effect tell Chiang Kai-shek instead of asking him, and
that is the only disagreement wdiich we had on China policy with General Hurley.
Q. When you say "in effect tell'' Chiang Kai-shek rather than ask him, you
mean, I take it, that the United States influence or United States economic and
military aid had to be conditioned upon Chiang Kai-shek's taking reciprocal action
which was necessary in the interest of promoting the war against Japan? —
A. Basically the point at issue was the use of the Communist armies. We were
hampered in making our aid conditional during the war — there were some who
recommended it in a drastic form. I always argued that you can't stop aid to
an ally during the middle of a war, so that the only way that we could attack
this question of the use of the Communist armies if Generalissimo Chiang wouldn't
agree was to simply tell the Generalissimo, as we did in the case of Yugoslavia,
we are going to arm any forces that are in position to actively engage and resist
the Japanese. That is the position which we reached about the middle of Feb-
ruary 1945.
Q. At this point I would like to introduce document 35-21, which is an excerpt
from the testimony of the Secretary of State Byrnes.
Mr. Moreland. In the transcript?
Q. Into the transcript.
Document 35-21
Hurley — Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 7,
10, 1945
"(1) Byrnes. * * * During the war the immediate goal of the United
States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions
in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan.
Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the
development of a strong, united and democratic China (p. 189).
"(2) Byrnes. * * * We believe, as we have long believed and consistently
demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the
most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it
must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organ-
ized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China (p. 189-
190).
"(3) Byrnes. * * * To the extent that our influence is a factor, success
will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting
conditions in such a way as to encourage consessions by the Central Government,
by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions (p. 190).
"(4) Byrnes. * * * If I understand correctly what Amabassador Hurley
has stated to me, and subsequently to the press and to this committee, he enter-
tains no disagreement with this conception of our policy (p. 190).
"(5) Byrnes. That phase of our policy upon which Ambassador Hurley has
placed the greatest emphasis is our support of the National Government of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (p. 191)."
1992 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I would like to call your attention particularly to paragraph marked ''(5)'r
in this document, Mr. Service. I take it that Secretary Byrnes is there referring
to what you have just testified to, namely that General Hurley emphasized above
all others supporting Chiang regardless of this— regardless, period. — A. That is
correct. The Secretary has given a very concise and clear summary in the para-
graphs above of American policy, to which all of us subscribed, and he comments
without elaboration that the phase on which Ambassador Hurley placed the
greatest emphasis was the support of the Nationalist Government. I think I
should say that General Hurley's own concept of his instructions developed,
changed from time to time. The clearest indication of this in public form is on
page 71 of the white paper. General Hurley himself said that his original
instructions — General Hurley, I should say, said in August that his instructions
from the President were: "(1) To serve as personal representative of the Presi-
dent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) to promote harmonious relations
between Chiang and General Joseph Stilwell and to facilitate the batter's exer-
cise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction; (3) to
perform certain additional duties respecting military supplies; and (4) to main-
tain intimate contact with Ambassador Gauss."
As will be seen from the following material in the white paper and from thu
exerpts which we just discussed, by the beginning of 1945
Q. By "excerpts we just discussed"' you refer to document 35-5 V — A. 35-5.
Mr. Achilles. Isn't that 35-21, 5?
A. No.
Q. Secretary Byrnes' statement is 35-21 ; 35-5, it is General Hurley's various
statements of objective, I believe.
Mr. Achilles. Right.
A. By tbe passage of several months, Ambassador Hurley's own account of
his instructions, which were oral, had developed a great deal.
Q. Yes. Now I would like at this point to introduce document 35-4 in the
transcript.
Document 35-4
(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10,
1945)
"(1) Wiley. (2) That there were in tbe Department certain individuals
that you mentioned ; that these individuals were cognizant of the policy laid
down by the State Department and by two Presidents, but that they apparently
did not coperate with you in carrying out that policy ; is that correct? (p. 159).
"(2) Hurley. That is correct (p. 159).
"(3) Wiley. (3) Were these individuals motivated in your judgment by
simply a disagreement as to the validity of the policy, or do you think there was
back of their motives something else? And if you have any information or
facts that would clarify the answer, I would like to have it (p. 159).
"(4) Hurley. I think, Senator, your first question that these men disagreed
with the American policy is correct, but my contention with them * * *
I was] that when the "die is cast," when the decision is made, when the policy
is announced by duly constituted authority, it becomes the duty of every one of
us to make that policy effective; and I chai-ge that these gentlemen did not do
that. They continued to snipe the policy and tried to defeat it. * * *
(p. 100).
"(5) Wiley. * * * Was there anything back of this 'inability,' to put it
that way, on their part, to play ball with you as the American representative, to
carry out the President's foreign policy'/ Was there anything back of it except
simply their own stubbornness, their inability to see that it was their obligation to
play ball, or were they disloyal, or were they conniving with the Communists, or
what was the picture-.' (p. 1G0).
"(0) Hurley. They were disloyal to the American policy. I would not say
they were disloyal to the United States Government. I think possibly that
some of them were imbued with the crusader spirit, that they believed that it
would be best for China to destroy the National Government and the leadership
of Chiang Kai-shek, but I tried to tell them that I could not argue, while I
could recommend to Chiang Kai-shek and the Government the changes that I
thought should take place — which I did, and a lot of changes did take place —
that while I might agree with them on a lot of their criticism, our directive,
mine and theirs, was to prevent the collapse of the Government and to uphold the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1993
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and, whether I believed in it or not, as soon as
thai policy was made by my superior it became my duty to make it effective
(p. 161)."
Q. I direct your attention particularly, Mr. Service, to paragraph (6). Mr.
Hurley is there referring to the various Foreign Service officers whom he had
asserted had been disloyal to him, and I direct your attention particularly to
the sentence, "I would not say they were disloyal to the United States Govern-
ment." That is a quote. "I would not say they were disloyal to the United
Slates Government." Then, "I think possibly that some of them were imbued
willi the crusader spirit * * *." I take it from that statement of General
Hurley that whatever he thought about you and other Foreign Service officers,
he at least did not regard you as disloyal to the United States Government. Is
that a fair reading of his testimony*.' — A. Yes. He says that we were — he said in
the previous sentence we were disloyal to the American policy. To that I
would add a footnote — as he conceived it — but he goes on to say that we were
not disloyal to the United States Government.
Q. Yes. Now then, with regard to the suggestion that you and others were
disloyal to the United States policy, I should like to introduce document 35-7
into the transcript, which are excerpts from the testimony of Secretary of State
Byrnes concerning particularly Mr. Service's report No. 40 — that is to say,
document 193 — and I ask that that be included in the transcript.
The Chairman. It shall be included.
Document 35-7
(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5,
6, 10, 1945)
"(1) Btbnes. The specific action of John Service to which Ambassador Hurley
referred in his conversation with me was the preparation of a memorandum on
October 10, 1944. I have also read this memorandum.
"(2) Before I turn to its contents, I wish to call attention to a few facts,
as they have been presented to me. At the time this memorandum was prepared
by Mr. Service, he was not attached to the Embassy at Chungking. Although
he retained bis status as a Foreign Service officer, he was attached to the staff
of General Stilwell as a political observer in Yenan. He was at the time
administratively responsible to General Stilw7ell and not to the Embassy
(pp. 196-197) * * *.
"(3) Btbnes. Ambassador Hurley, as of that date * * * was not in
charge of the United States Embassy in Chungking.
"Under these circumstances, it seems to me, it cannot he said that anything
Mr. Service wrote constituted insubordination to Ambassador Hurley (p.
197) * * *.
"(4) Btbnes. The Service report was addressed to General Stilwell. It was
also routed to the Embassy in Chungking. The Embassy forwarded it to the
Department without endorsing its conclusions, but with a noncommittal cover-
ing memorandum indicating that it represented the views of a single political
observer (p. 19S) * * *.
"(5) Btbnfb. It is not my purpose to dwell at greater length upon the two
documents. In my opinion, based upon the information which has thus far
been presented to me, there is nothing in them to support the charge that either
Mr. Atcheson or Mr. Service was guilty of the slightest disloyalty to his superior
officers (p. 198).
"(6) What it amounts to is that within proper channels they expressed to
those under whom they served certain views which differed to a greater or
less degree from the policies of the Government as then defined. Of course,
it is the duty of every officer of the United States to abide by and to administer
the declared policy of his Government. But conditions change, and often change
quickly in the affairs of governments. Whenever an official honestly believes
that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views
to his superior officers (p. 199).
"(7) I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Depart-
ment of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to
refrain from submitting through proper channels an honest report or recom-
mendation for fear of offending me or anyone else in the Department. If that day
should arrive, I will have lost the very essence of the assistance and guidance
I require for the successful discharge of the heavv responsibilities of my
office" (p. 199).
1994 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
Q. I take it, Mr. Service, that this testimony of Secretary Byrnes may be said
to reveal he not only did not regard you as disloyal to the United States Govern-
ment but not even to, nor to American policy, but not even to General Hurley
personally. Is that your understanding of this testimony"/ — A. That is correct.
Secretary Byrnes says there is nothing in them to support the charge that
either Mr. Ache&on or Mr. Service was even slightly disloyal to his superior
officers.
Q. Now, in that connection, as to who your superior officer was, I should like
to introduce document No. 35-6, and I ask that that be included in the transcript.
Document 35-6
Hurley — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 5, 6, 10, 1945
"(1) Connally. Was Mr. Service serving under you in China at that time?
"(2) Hurley. Well, that is disputed, sir. He w. is in the State Department, and
I was Ambassador.
"(3) Connally. Well, where was he!
"(4) Hurley. He was in China (p. 16).
" (5 ) ( 'on n ally. Well, was he not under you?
"(6) Hurley. No, sir. If he had been, I would have taken him out immedi-
ately. I could not control him. He said he was serving the commander of
American forces in China — anything to oppose the American policy of sustaining
the Government of the Republic.
"(7) Connally. Well, what was his status? I do not know him. I never heard
of him until you brought him up; but what was his status out there? Was
he attached to the Embassy, or was he the adviser to the American general, or
what was he?
"(8) Hurley. He was a foreign-service diplomat, who had been assigned as
political adviser to the American general.
"(9) Connally. Well, then be was not directly under your organization?
"(10) Huiley. Well, eventually he was * * *"(p. 17).
Q. In this document General Hurley seems to suggest that there was some
question whether you were responsible to him or to General Stillwell, does he
not? — A. He does.
Q. Was there in fact any question whatsoever as to who your superior was
and under whose orders you were operating? — A. Absolutely none. My original
instructions clearly stated I would be completely under Army orders and all
during the period from August 18, 1943, until April 12, 1945, I traveled and
performed all my duties under Army orders.
Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point documents num-
ber 94-1, 94-2, and 94-3. These documents consist of three letters from Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson, the first of them dated June 2H, 1943, the second consist-
ing of two pages dated November 22, 1944, and the third dated January 5, 1945,
all of which relate to this particular question. I ask that they be included in
the transcript.
The Chairman. It shall be done.
Copy : ap
Document 94-1
War Department,
Washington, June 29, 19^3.
The Honorable the Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Political factors have proved to be of major importance
in the prosecution of the war in the China-Burma-India Theater. Lt. Gen.
Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of the U. S. Army Forces in that
theater, is therefore urgently in need of having trained political observers as-
signed to his command to supplement the work done by his military intelligence.
General Stilwell lias indicated the names of certain Foreign Service Officers
who would be of assistance if sent to the theater for this purpose, as follows:
To be sent to the U. S. Embassy, Chungking, China, for detail to the Com-
manding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India: Raymond P. Ludden,
John S. Service, John K. Emmerson.
To be sent to the U. S. Mission at New Delhi for detail to the Commanding
General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India: Kenneth C. Krentz.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1995
The duties of these officers would not only be to collect Chinese, Indian, and
Japanese information of interest to General Stihvell, but also to be of service to
commanders in the field in matters affecting relations with the various Burmese
factions, British colonial administrators, the Free Thais, the French in Indo-
China, and the Indo-Chinese.
Any assistance that you can give in connection with this matter will be
greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Henet L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
Document 94-2
Copy : ap
War Department,
Washington, November 22, 1944.
The honorable the Acting Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Secretary : I refer again to your letter of November 8, 1944 in regard
to the release of three of the four Foreign Service Officers who have been
attached to the United States Army Forces in China, Burma, and India.
Your need for the restoration of these officers to regular Foreign Service duty
is very evident. It was presented in full to Generals Sultan and Wedemeyer, the
Commanding Generals of the India-Burma and of the China Theaters, respect-
ively, and their views on the matter have now been received .
Unfortunately the only officer who, it appears, can be spared is Mr. Ludden,
and General Wedemeyer indicates his regret at losing his services. Nevertheless
when he returns from the field in approximately two months General Wedemeyer
states that in accordance with your request Mr. Ludden will be given prompt air
transportation to Washington.
As for Messrs. Davies, Service and Emmerson, who, as you know, are all
detailed for duty in China, General Wedemeyer indicates that it is his convic-
tion that unless these three officers are retained, military activities will be
hampered. I therefore hope that their assignment to the China Theater need not
be changed.
There is no political adviser assigned to the India-Burma Theater at the
present time. General Sultan speaks of the former China-Burma-India Theater
as having been full of political complexities and of your Foreign Service Officers
having been an indispensable link with the State Department in connection there-
with, as well as of the superior manner in which they performed their duties.
Being without a poltical adviser not only would hamper our military activities,
he states, but the British, who have a regularly assigned poltical adviser at
Southeast Asia Command Headquarters and thoroughly understand such a posi-
tion, would not comprehend General Sultan's having to secure advice from the
American Mission in New Delhi. On the basis of the assignment of a really
qualified poltical adviser to the India-Burma Theater being a necessity, he
earnestly requests that Mr. Max Waldo Bishop be assigned by the State De-
partment to the India-Burma Theater. At the same time he appreciates your
need for having the services of all possible Foreign Service officers and will
keep the situation constantly in mind so that as soon as the need for a political
adviser is at an end this will be reported.
I am very aware of how great your need is to have as many of your Foreign
Service officers as possible returned to regular duty. At the same time, these
two theaters (India-Burma and China) have the most unusual political problems
confronting them constantly, and your help in the matter is a real necessity.
In view of the above I trust that the request of General Sultan to have
Mr. Max Waldo Bishop assigned to the India-Burma Theater, and General
Wedemeyer's desire to retain Messrs. Davies, Service, ami Emmerson in the
China Theater can be acceded to.
Sincerely yours,
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 33
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
1996 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Document 94-3
Copy : ap
War Department,
Washington, January 5, 19^5.
The Honorable the Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Secretary : I refer to your letter of December 26, 1944. with respect
to the Foreign Service Officers assigned as political advisors in the China Theater.
As the State Department has already been advised, General Wedemeyer has
informed the War Department that Mr. John Davies is preparing to leave
Chungking for assignment to the Moscow Embassy. General Wedemeyer is very
desirous that Mr. Davies remain in Chungking, however, until the arrival
of Mr. John Service who, it is understood, should be ready to leave Washington
for China early in January.
Your letter indicates that the Embassy in Chungking is now sufficiently staffed
so as to obviate the necessity of having a political advisor detailed to the U. S.
Forces in that city, although you believe that the retention of one or two officers
in Chinese Communist territory is advantageous, and you raise the question of
releasing any or all of the Foreign Service Officers. Your need for Foreign
Service Officers and your request that three out of the four advisors assigned
to China Theater be released was communicated to General Wedemeyer in
November. As I advised in my letter of November 22, 1944, he indicated that
unless three of the original four advisors were retained, military activities
would be hampered. Since that time military and political problems in the
China Theater have increased. However, General Wedemeyer has again been
queried as to whether he can relinquish the services of the Foreign Service
Officers now assigned to his headquarters. Your indication that if General
Wedemeyer requests the retention of Mr. Ludden you believe favorable consid-
eration could be given thereto, as well as the question of his and Mr. Emnier-
son's proceeding to the United States for leave and consultation has also been
submitted to General Wedemeyer. You will be informed as promptly as possible
of his reply.
Sincerely yours,
Henry L. Stimson.
Secretary of War.
( Off record discussion, short recess. )
Q. I also offer for inclusion in the transcript document No. 94-4, which is a
copy of the telegram from the Department of State to the Ambassador at Chung-
king detailing Mr. Service to the Army in accordance with the Secretary of War
Stimson's request.
[Telegram sent]
Department of State,
Washington, Aug. 10, 1943, 10:00 p. m.
American Embassy, Chungking, 1081 :
Monroe B. Hall, Class VI, New Delhi, has been directed to proceed to Chung-
king as soon as possible for consultation with General Stilwell after which he
will return to New Delhi. He will be stationed at New Delhi but will be
subject to instructions from General Stilwell.
John K. Emmerson, Class VII, Lima, has been designated Second Secretarv of
Embassy at Chungking.
Ludden at Kunming is designated Second Secretary of Embassy at Chungking.
He will retain Commission as Consul at Kunming. Should proceed upon arrival*
of Langdon. This transfer not made at his request nor for his convenience
Transposition expenses, per diem, and shipment effects. Kunming to Chung-
king, authorized subject Travel Regulations. Air travel authorized. Expenses
chargeable "Transportation, Foreign Service."
Hall, Emmerson, Ludden, and John S. Service are attached to the staff of
the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India, and are sub-
ject to instructions from General Stilwell and authorized to travel to anv coun-
try or place which he may designate.
While Department has authorized expenses for Hall, Ludden, and Emmerson
m proceeding to Chungking, it assumes, as in the case of Davies, the Army will
provide travel expenses and per diem for such missions as General Stilwell will
direct for all four officers.
Hull.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1997
(Off-record discussion.)
Q. Now, Mr. Service, you were assigned by the State Department to the com-
manding general of the CBI theater on August 10, 1943. How long did you
remain attached to the commanding general of the CBI theater? — A. I was
returned to active duty in the State Department on April 12, 1945.
Q. And in the meantime General Stilwell had been recalled on October 19,
1944, had lie not? A. That is correct.
Q. And you returned to the United States at that time, did you not? A. Soon
after that time, under Army orders.
Q. And you were subsequently recalled to China by General Wedemeyer, were
you not? A. Yes; and returned to China under Army orders.
Q. But you remained attached to the commanding general, CBI theater,
throughout? A. That is correct.
Q. And until April 12, 1945? A. (Nodded yes.)
The Chairman. The answer then is "Yes" to the last question? A. Yes.
Q. In that connection I ask you to refer to document 35-7, which has already
been introduced into the transcript, and particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.
Secretary Byrnes makes it clear, does he not, that you were in no sense and at
no time a subordinate of General Hurley but of the commanding general of the
theater? A. That is right.
The Chairman. May I interrupt? Do you intend sections 2 and 3 to be writ-
ten into the transcript?
Q. No, not again, just refer to them, since that has already been included in
the transcript.
Now referring back to document 35-6, particularly paragraph 10, General Hur-
ley seems to close that colloquy with Senator Connally by the suggestion that
you eventually were a subordinate officer, but as a matter of fact you were not,
ever? — A. I never was subordinate to Ambassador Hurley.
Q. You never were during his entire tenure of office as Ambassador a mem-
ber of the staff of the Embassy or in any way responsible to General Hurley? —
A. I was never administratively a member of the Embassy staff. The final
orders under which I returned from China to the United States were issued
by the Army, they were Army orders.
The Chairman. I have a question here.
Mr. Stevens. Could you clarify for us or have it clarified, the relation to exist
between General Stilwell and Mr. Hurley as a personal representative of the
President? Did Mr. Hurley, in other words, feel that General Stilwell was re-
sponsible to him in his mission? A. I have never seen such a statement. I do
not believe that the military commander of a theater would normally be con-
sidered subordinate to a personal representative of the President. I would say
that General StilwelPs immediate superior was General Marshall, and eventually
the President as Commander in Chief.
Mr. Achilles. May we just clarify for the record the dates that General
Hurley stayed in China? Is it correct that he first arrived in China as the
President's personal representative on September 6, 1944?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. When he was made Ambassador to China, that was done while
he was in China?
A. No.
Mr. Achilles. He didn't return to the United States?
A. He was continuously in China from September 6 until the date of his ap-
pointment as ambassador, which was November 30, 1944. He did not actually
present his credentials until one of the first days of January 1945, but he func-
tioned as ambassador from November 1930. He left China on February 19, 1945,
and returned to the United States for consultation. Page 5, if you have it.
Mr. Achilles. And then he returned again?
A. To Chungking. The date is not here but it was about April 22 or 23, 1945.
Mr. Achilles. And then he remained?
A. Which was after I had left China, it seems to me, and then he remained in
China until September 22, 1945, when he returned to the United States for the
last time.
Mr. Achilles. For the last time, yes.
Q. Now, you have testified, Mr. Service, that you were recalled to Washington
under Army orders at about the same time as General Stilwell was recalled on
October 19, 1944, and I believe that you also testified that you thereafter re-
mained attached to the commanding general of the CBI theater during the period
while you were back in the United States, and that thereafter you returned at
1998 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
General Wedemeyer's request to China to continue to serve on the staff of the
commanding general of the theater. Will you describe to the Board how you
came to be attached to General Wedemeyer's staff after General Stilwell was
recalled? — A. There were four of us Foreign Service officers who had been as-
signed to General Stilwell at his request. At the time of General Stilwell's recall,
I believe that the State Department assumed that our assignment would be termi-
nated and that we would come back to active duty under the State Department.
I believe in the very first days of November the State Department addressed a
letter to Secretary Stimson asking for the return of all of us or all but one
officer. To that letter Secretary Stimson replied in document 94-2, saying that
General Wedemeyer wished to retain at least three of us — Davies, Service, and
Emmerson. It was on the basis of that request that my assignment with the
Army was continued and never terminated.
Q. Well, particularly do you know what caused the revision of plans and the
occasion for your return to serve with General Wedemeyer after you were under
the impression that you were about to discontinue that work? — A. It had been
expected when the Department assumed that I would be released that I would
be assigned to Moscow, to the Embassy there. Subsequently, in late December,
while the negotiations with the Army were still proceeding, John Davies, who had
remained in Chungking, had a disagreement with Ambassdaor Hurley, in which
Ambassador Hurley's reaction was so violent that it became necessary to remove
John Davies from Chungking immediately. The State Department telephoned
to me out in California, where I was on leave, and asked if I would be willing
to return to Chungking and how soon, if I could leave in a few days. I said,
"Of course."
Q. Were you advised that General Wedemeyer had particularly requested
A. Certainly.
Q. Requested that you be detailed to fill this vacancy? — A. That is right, that
is correct, and there was another consideration which I think should be men-
tioned which influenced the State Department in its willingness to release me
or to extend my assignment, and that was the very important consideration of
receiving intelligence on the Chinese Communists. That was a field in which I
had done a great deal of work. I had a solid basis of personal acquaintance
with the principal Communist leaders. The State Department did not feel that
they were in a position to send an Embassy officer up there, so that from the
State Department's point of view the only way they could continue to receive
reports, direct reporting on the Chinese Communists, was by having a State
Department man assigned to the Army, so that the Army would detail him to
Yenan a good deal of the time. We do not have that letter but it is in the file
in which it is very clearly stated as a condition of my return to China, that
I would spend a large part of my time in Yenan and that the principal duty
would be reporting on the Chinese Communists.
The Chairman. Who in the State Department made that telephone call? —
A. Mr. John Carter Vincent, who at that time was Director of — I am not sure,
he was either Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs or possibly Director of the
Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
Q. Now at the time of your return, then, to serve with General Wedemeyer,
Ambassador, or rather General Hurley had already become Ambassador, had
he not? — A. That is correct.
Q. Now, at the time of your return at General Wedemeyer's request, do you
know whether he had knowledge of your report No. 40, which is document No.
193, which has been introduced into the transcript? — A. By "he" you mean
General Wedemeyer?
Q. General Wedemeyer, yes.— A. I cannot positively say that he had knowl-
edge of it, but I am convinced that he must have had knowledge of it because
the paper had been discussed in headquarters, it was well known to the Assistant
Chief of Staff for G-2.
Q. Who wras that? — A. Col. Joseph Dickey. It was well known to Ambassador
Hurley, who had already taken violent exception to it in discussions in Chung-
king. General Wedemeyer was familiar with my views, and I have always
taken it for granted and I am sure it is correct that he certainly knew of my
memorandum No. 40.
Q. So you think that — in your opinion anyway- A. My conviction.
Q. It is your conviction that General Wedemeyer was familiar with your re-
port before he requested your return to China? — A. Certainly.
Q. For service on his staff? — A. That is right.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION" 1999
Q. Did he ever discuss — did he ever at any time discuss this with you, this
memorandum* or this report, or the views expressed in it? — A. He certainly
discussed the views I expressed in it. We had a number of discussions on general
policy questions.
Q. Did he ever indicate that he regarded the general policy view that you ex-
pressed as being in any way inimical to the interests of the United States? —
A. Quite to the contrary. He welcomed the views, and our document No. 204
was written at his specific request, and he said that he agreed with the views that
he put forth.
Mr. Stevens. May I ask a question, please. Mr. Service? You mentioned a
letter that specified your return and assignment to General Wedemeyer. Can you
give us enough identification of that so that we may obtain it? — A. It is a letter
to which Secretary Stimson's letter of January 5 is a reply. It will be a letter
in the last days of December or early January.
The Chairman. December 26.
A. You will note here — this is the letter of Secretary Stimson — that the
The Chairman. You are reading from what document?
A. 94-3.
•"Your letter indicates that the Embassy in Chungking is now sufficiently staffed
so as to obviate the necessity of having a political advisor detailed to the United
States forces in that city, although you believe that the retention of one or two
officers in Chinese Communist territory is advantageous. * * * "
And in subsequent discussions in Chungking with General Wedemeyer he
acknowledged, he stated himself that that had been one of the purposes, one of
the conditions of the State Department agreement about continuation of my
assignment with the Army.
Q. That is that you should continue your intelligence reporting activities on
Chinese Communists — A. That is right.
The Chairman. The direct answer to the question asked is that the letter in
question is of December 26, 1944? — A. That is right.
Q. I should like to have included in the transcript at this point document S4-2,
which is an exhibit from the Congressional Record for May 1, 1950, setting forth a
broadcast by Mr. Henry J. Taylor.
"Document S4-2
Taylor, Henry J. — J/S record — Cong. Rec. May 1, 1950,
pages A3322-A3323
'First, Ambassador Hurley told me that John Service had already been relieved
of his duties once in China, and sent home, by Supreme Commander Lt. Gen.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, another fine American. Nevertheless, State Department
officials in Washington sent John Service back to China, through another chan-
nel, to the Communist area of Yunnan — by bypassing Wedemeyer, and without
the knowledge or consent of Ambassador Hurley * * *
'•When Service reached America, he was arrested by the FBI. He wasn't just
questioned by the FBI. He was arrested by the FBI, as Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
would verify to you. For J. Edgar Hoover is not afraid of anybody. That's what
makes him a great American."
Q. I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, were you ever relieved of your duties
in China and sent home by General Wedemeyer? — A. The telegram ordering my
return is from Marshall.
Q. That is the telegram ordering your return in April 1945? — A. That is correct.
Q. So that that is the only order that you know of for your return to the
United States, your dismissal from attachment to the Army? — A. That is correct.
Q. At any time prior to that were you ever sent home bv General Wedemeyer? —
A. No.
Q. Were you ever at any time returned by the State Department to the Commu-
nist area of Yunnan, China, by bypassing General Wedemeyer and without the
knowledge of or consent of Ambassador Hurley? — A. No. After I left China in
April 194."') on Army orders I never returned to China.
Q. And before that time you had never been ordered back by General Wede-
meyer and returned to China? — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. I notice that in that exhibit that you quoted from, 84-2, that
it states that you were returned to China without the knowledge of Ambassador
Hurley. Do you know anything about whether Ambassador Hurley knew you
were going back? — A. I did not return to China after my recall.
2000 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Evidently Ambassador Hurley is alleging in this statement
that you at some time previous to your final return from China
Mr. Stevens. Could this not have made reference to your return, I think it
was in October, to the United States, and then your order from California out
again?
The Chairman. That is the point that I was about to make.
Q. May I ask this question? If the reference in this document is to your
return to China in January 1945, could that possibly have been by bypassing Gen-
eral Wedemeyer? — A. No, because we have from this correspondence — no, it was
at his request.
Q. That is, you went at that time at the specific request of General Wede-
meyer?
The Chairman. That already clearly appears in evidence, that you returned
to China at the request of Wedemeyer. I just wanted to find out whether that
return to China was with or without the knowledge of Ambassador Hurley?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. Let us suppose it was without the knowledge of Ambassador Hurley, is
there any possible reason why lie should have known about an officer who had
been attached to the commanding general's staff since August 1943 and who
remained so attached, and who was merely returning to the theater? — A. Since
my assignment to the Army was not broken, there was no reason for the State
Department to consult the Ambassador. It was merely a matter of continuing
an assignment which already existed and of which the Ambassador knew.
Q. So that the only time you ever went to China when General Wedemeyer
was commanding general was at his specific request, is that correct? — A. That
is correct, and under Army orders.
Q. And under Army orders. And that after your recall to the United States
in April of 1945 you have never again been to China, is that correct? — A. That
is correct.
Q. Now returning again. Mr. Service, to document No. 3.~>-3, which has
already been introduced into the transcript. I direct your attention particularly
to paragraph 4 of this document, where General Hurley states that your report
No. 40, which is document No. 193 in evidence here, was circulated among the
Communists, whose support he was seeking for our policy. In this connection I
also direct your attention to document 35-12, and I ask that that be introduced
into the transcript at this point.
"Doc. 35-12
( Hurley — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee December 5,
G, 10, 1945)
"(1) Connally. Now, you said in your statement the other day in the press
that these subordinates, these Foreign Service men, had been continually advis-
ing the Communists that your views did not represent the views of the Govern-
ment. How did they advise them — in writing, or by personal contact? * * *
You make the statement that they communicated with them. Now, how did
they communicate with them? (p. 179).
"(2) Hurley. By writing and by talking and by being with them (p. 179).
"(3) Connally. Can you say what officials of the Communists thev con-
tacted and talked with? (p. 180).
"(4) Hurley. Well, I would not know exactly. I do not think they all con-
tacted the top officials, but they did contact, and I have told you that it is con-
tained in Public Document No. 30.
••(.">) Connally. Oh, I know !
"(6) Hurley. Signed by John Service, and dated October 10; and you can
get it. in writing, sir.
"(7) Connally. That was addressed to the Secretary of State; that was not
addressed to the Communists?
" (8) Hurley. No, sir ; it was addressed to Stilwell.
"(9) Connally. He was not a member of the armed Communists, he was our
officer, was he not — Stilwell?
'•(10) Hurley. That is right, but I say this document that proves it is
addresed to him * * *.
"(11) Connally. Yes, but I want to know. You have made the charge, your-
self, and I want to know what you have to say about your statement that they
were continuously advising the Communists. Now, they would not advise the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2001
Communists through the State Department; they would advise them directly,
either in writing or personally. Now, which was it? Do you still adhere to the
statement thai they were advising them continuously that your views did not
represent the Government's views'.' (p. 180).
"(12) Hurley. I most certainly do ! (p. 181).
'•< 13) ( onnaut. Well, would you mind telling us whom they saw?
"(14) Hurley. All right, I will begin again. I will repeat. A telegram sent
by George Atcheson on the 28th of last February, in which he said
"(15) CONNALLY. To whom V
"(16) Hurley. To the Secretary of State.
"(17) Conn ally. Oh, well, I want to know.
" ( 18 ) Hurley. Well, you know, it is in writing, sir.
"(19) CONNAIiY. Why. certainly.
"(20) Hurley. And you ask me to prove what is in that, and I have given
you a writing.
" ( L'l ) Conxally. All right. I was asking what communications they had had,
not with the State Department but with the Communists. All right, we will not
pursue that any further. We have to go ou*t and find it out, ourselves (p. 181)."
Q. In his document General Hurley in substance repeats your charge that you
had circulated or that this report was circulated among the Communists. Did
you ever disclose the contents of document 193 to anyone in the Chinese Com-
munist Party? — A. I did not.
Q. As a matter of fact, when was its first disclosed to the Chinese Communist
Party and the world, as General Hurley says, according to your information? —
A. When Congressman Judd put it in the Congressional Record on October 19,
1949, stating at the time he did so that the copy was furnished him by General
Hurley.
Q. That. I may say, appears on page 152 3 of the Congressional Record for
October 19, 194'.).
Now again with reference to document No. 35-3 and General Hurley's statement
in paragraphs 6 and 7 that you and other career men continuously told the
Communist armed party and the world that America was betting on the wrong
horse and that the American policy which General Hurley was upholding in
China did not have the support of the United States Government, did you ever
make any statement in substance or effect to anyone in the Chinese Communist
Party to this effect?
The Chairman. What was that quotation you just gave?
Q. It is in paragraphs 6 and 7 of document 35^-3. — A. There are several things
there to answer. Certainly I never said to the Chinese Communists or to anyone
else that Ambassador Hurley was not representing American policy. In fact,
I don't understand how a junior officer could make such a statement. The fact
that the Ambassador is the Ambassador and continues to be the Ambassador is
the — you can't argue the fact that he represents American policy. I have never
made a statement to the Communists that we were backing the wrong horse.
The Chairman. Or that the American policy which you were upholding in
China did not have the support of the United States Government ?
A. That is right.
Mr. Stevens. Did you ever make any statements which could be so inter-
preted by the Communists?
A. Well, the Communists knew, as the correspondents knew and everyone knew
that there was discussion and debate as to where we went next. That debate
was going on in the press. The debate was going on in American circles. As
to whether or not we could cooperate with the Communists in any form, for
instance if we landed on the coast of China whether or not we would take more
positive measures in China — now the Communists knew that we were not all of
one mind but as for saying that we were backing the wrong horse, definitely
not, because I always argued, if I was asked I always said that we were not
committed to all-out support of any one party or faction in China. That was our
line, that we were not there to take part in a civil war, we were all-out for a
united and democratic China.
Q. Now. to the extent that this debate to which you refer had been going on,
did you express any views that you may have had in that debate to the Chinese
Communists or did you express them in your discussions with American officials? —
A. I made no secret of the fact that I was favorably impressed by the Chinese
Communists. I made no secret of the fact that I thought that we would have
to work with them in a military way, but those were exactly the same things
that our official policy was recommending. We were trying to unify their forces,
2002 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
trying to bring about a coalition government. But I did not express those views
in a critical way of Ambassador Hurley.
Mr. Stevens. Did you ever in your talks with the Communists indicate that
Mr. Hurley's interpretation of the policies were wrong?
A. Certainly not. In fact, I have urged the Chinese Communists not to engage
in personal attacks on Ambassador Hurley, which they were commencing to do
even while I was in China, because, I said, that is the worst possible way for
you to win American friendship or support, if that is what yon want, to attack
the American Ambassador, because he is the American Ambassador, he does
represent America.
Q. As a matter of fact, in expressing the view that the United States should
utilize the Communist forces in the fight against Japan, did you understand at
any time from any of your contacts with General Hurley that that differed in
any way from his objectives? — A. It did not.
Q. As a matter of fact, did General Hurley ever say anything to you about
the subject? — A. Certainly.
Q. What did he say? — A. When I returned from Yenan the first time
Q. That is when? — A. On October' 23, 1944, I was instructed to make myself
available to Ambassador Hurley when I passed through Chungking if he should
wish to talk to me about the current attitude, the policies, objectives of the
Chinese Communists.
Q. Now, this is at the time you were on your way back to the United States? —
A. That is correct.
Q. Coincident with General Stilwell's recall? — A. Yes. General Hurley was
desirous of talking to me, called me over to his house, and I spent most of that
evening of October 23 having dinner and talking with him. My chief concern was
to tell him of the confidence and feeling of strength of the Chinese Communists
and their determination to receive a share of American arms and some sort of
recognition as a fighting force against Japan. Ambassador Hurley repeatedly
told me that they don't need to worry, that is what I am here to do, that is one
of the things I am here for, is to be sure and make sure that they do receive
arms.
Q. This he told you when? — A. On the evening of October 23. 1944.
Mr. Achilles. Had General Hurley then read your memorandum of October 10,
your memorandum No. 40? Did you discuss that with him?
A. I believe he had not read it at that time. Actually I brought that memo
down with me from Yenan on that occasion, and I had delivered one copy to the
Embassy and one copy to the headquarters, but I did not — I was not at that time
delivering copies or furnishing copies for General Hurley since he was the
President's representative and was not the Ambassador.
Mr. Achilles. Did you express the same views to General Hurley that you had
in the memo?
A. I don't think that our discussion ever covered that point, that particular
point of whether or not the major objective of policy was to support Chiang
Kai-shek, no.
Q. As a matter of fact, did you do much of the talking on that occasion? — ■
A. I did very little of the talking.
Mr. Stevens. Do you intend to direct yourself to (7) in the document 3n-3,
the last three lines particularly? "* * * they charged me with making my
own policy in China and said that it was not the policy of the United States
Government." Did you so charge? And to whom, if so?
A. I did not so charge.
Mr. Stevens. As a matter of fact, did you ever make any statement of any
kind at any time that suggested in any way to the Communists that General
Hurley was making his own policy independently of the United States policy?
A. We were living in a very heated atmosphere where a great deal of debate
and discussion was going on all of the time.
Mr. Stevens. But what I wanted to know was. were you debating it with
the Chinese Communists?
A. No. no. certainly not. sir. In my document 204, the memorandum which
Mr. Ludden and I prepared on February 14, we stated at the conclusion:
"Support of the Generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in
itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the
means with the end."
Q. Now that memo, was that addressed to the Communists in any way or shown
to the Communists? — A. No.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2003
Q. That was addressed to the commanding general of the theater, was it not? —
A. But that can he interpreted, in reply to Mr. Stevens' question, that can be
interpreted, if you so wish to interpret it. as a criticism of General Hurley and
an inference that General Hurley is not following the basic objectives of Ameri-
can policy by contusing the means with the end.
Mr. Stevens. One other question. Did you ever show to anyone a copy of this
memorandum 40? Anyone who was not a member of the United States Gov-
ernment or its establishments?
The Chairman. Anyone in China?
Mr. Stevens. Anyone in China ; that is correct?
A. I did not.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Q. Coming back to your reference a moment ago
Mr. Stevens. May I interrupt again? Do you know of anyone who did, Mr.
Service ? Any member of the United States Government forces that did or gave
access of that document to someone in China?
A. I do not know of anyone; no.
The Chairman. Do you suspect someone?
A. I believe that it may have been shown; yes.
Q. Your position is that you have no personal knowledge? — A. I have no
personal knowledge.
The Chairman. This suspicion that you have — was it with any connivance of
yours ?
A. It was not. it was when I was physically absent from China, or from
Yenan.
Q. Or from China? Physically absent from China? — A. It was after I left
Yenan. It was not shown to the Chinese Communists at that time.
Q. According to your belief. — A. According to my belief.
The Chairman. Let's clarify this matter a little bit. To whom do you sus-
pect that it was shown?
Q. I would like to suggest that if he has any suspicions I would like to avoid
having him discuss suspicions in this proceeding.
The Chairman. I don't think we should interject just suspicions into the
transcript, perhaps.
Q. Winch. I may say, is quite a different thing — I would advise him to dis-
cuss with you freely.
The Chairman. The witness seemed to have some hesitation on the point and
I just wanted to make sure that it had nothing to do with revelation by him to
the Chinese Communists.
A. It did not.
Mr. Stevens. Or to anyone outside United States Government forces?
A. I was not — I did not show it to anyone outside the American Government.
The Chairman. Or you were not involved in its being shown to anyone?
A. That is right.
Q. And to the extent that you have any grounds for believing it may have been
shown, it was at a time, you say, when you were not in China at all ; you were
physically absent from China? — A. That is correct.
Q. Not merely physically absent from Yenan but absent from China? — A. I
left China the next day after I left Yenan. so the only thing I can say with
positive knowledge is that it was not while I was in Yenan.
Q. And that if it was shown to anyone, you had no connection or participation
in it? — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. And is it fair to say that whoever it was shown to was not a
Communist?
A. If it were shown to anyone, it was not a Communist.
Q. At least as far as A. As far as I know.
Q. More particularly, what you mean to say is that to the extent you have
any reason to helieve it was shown to someone, you have no reason to believe
it was shown to anyone in the Communist Party. — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. All right.
Q. I would like to return just a moment — a short time ago we were discussing
the question of whether or not you had in any way indicated that General
Hurley did not represent the policy of the United States or that you had indicated
to Communists or anyone that the United States was backing the wrong horse,
and in that connection you referred to your memorandum, which is document
No. 204, and said that that might have been interpreted as a criticism of General
Hurley. What I want to find out is, that memorandum was addressed exclusively
2004 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
to your superior officer, the commanding general of the theater ; is that cor-
rect?— A. That is correct.
Q. Did you ever show that memorandum to anybody in the Communist Party
or anybody other than American officials?
The Chairman. In China? We are restricting our questions here to apply
to when he was in China?
Q. That is right. — A. I did not show that to any Chinese or any Chinese
Communists. I discussed the memorandum, some of the contents of it, with a
very reliable friend who was an American correspondent. He did not read the
memorandum but I discussed the contents, particularly that section where we
draw the parallel between China — suggest a parallel between China and
Yugoslavia.
Q. Now in that connection
Mr. Stevens. Would you mind inserting the name?
A. Mr. Harold Isaacs of Newsweek.
Mr. Stevens. Is that the only person?
A. That is the only person.
Q. Now, insofar as you discussed the general views expressed in that memo-
randum with this American correspondent, did you understand that to be a
proper and authorized activity as part of your functions on the staff of the
commanding general of the theater? — A. I would say that discussion of back-
ground material, particularly concerning the political situation in China, was
habitually and with authority discussed with the correspondents. And as far as
this relates to my own personal views, which is what it was, it was quite proper
for me to discuss them with the press, and with a reliable correspondent. It
did not purport to be an expression of official views, of the Army's views —
nothing except our own views on policy there and the situation in China.
Mr. Stevens. This was a memo which was prepared jointly by you and Mr.
Ludden; was it not?
A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Therefore it reflected more than your personal views ; did it
not?
A. Yes ; we were in the same status, working together.
Q. As a matter of fact, did it represent your personal views and the views of
your commanding general, as you best understood them? A. He told us that
he was glad to have it; that it pointed out certain things that he agreed with
and danger he wanted to avoid, but it was not discussed win Mr. Isaacs on that
basis.
Q. No ; I am addressing myself to a slightly different qeustion.
You say it reflected your personal views. Did not the views expressed also
reflect, as you understood them, the views of General Wedemeyer? — A. Well,
certainly, but I never told anybody that General Wedemeyer agreed with this.
Q. I understand that : that is not what I am asking.
, Now, you have indicated that it was the general policy, it was authorized
policy, and that you and others were authorized to discuss background material
of political character with the American representatives of the press in China.
Do you regard discussion of the general views embodied in this memorandum with
members of the press as any deviation from that authorized? — A. None whatso-
ever so long as I do not represent to the press that those are the views of
General Stilwell, or General Wedemeyer.
Mr. Stevens. What people did this authorization, to authorize you to talk to
newspaper people and others about your personal views'.- Was it ever anything
in writing? How did you get that instruction and know the latitude that you
could go to in talking to the press?
A. The status and duties of the political officers assigned to the Army were
very loose and vaguely defined. The principal officer of the political officers
was John Davies, who went out to China with General Stilwell when he first
went out to take over command of the theater. John Davies had oral instructions
from General Stilwell, and he functioned in a very important way as Stilwell's
public relations officer, particularly on political background. When we came
in, particularly when I came in in August 1943, I was serving really under
Davies, who was the senior of the political officers, and John spent most of his
time in India and I spent my time in Chungking. I became in a way the head-
quarters, Chungking headquarters, political public relations officer ; press agent
in a way, you might say, for the press. I tried to keep the press informed of
the political background, the political problems that the Army was encountering.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2005
Mr. Stevens. The latitude that was given you was given you on oral instruc-
tions from Da vies ; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. O. K.
Q. On this general matter of dealing with the press, since we have got into
it at this point, I would like you to describe to the board a little bit more fully
what you understood to be the general scope of this somewhat vaguely defined lati-
tude that you mentioned and how it came about. — A. I covered it fairly well in my
first statement.
Q. Yes. — A. I think if you read Secretary Stimson's letters, particularly the
first letter — well, and even the following letters — there is continual reference
to the political problems in that theater. We had a continual effort to get — I
am speaking only of China — we bad a continual effort to get Chinese cooperation.
General Stilwell wanted to fight an active war : the Chinese, generally speaking,
hoped to hold out by a passive war. General Chennault was technically under
General Stilwell's command but at the same time was in independent relationship
to the Generalissimo. The Chinese preferred to follow General Chennault's
recommendations of an air war rather than a land war because it would require,
shall we say, far less effort on their part, and you had various forces hauling
and pulling. The Chinese imposed rigorous censorship, largely politically moti-
vated : the Air Force put out its own propaganda to try to get its view across —
the Chennault-Stilwell feud, if you wish. You had Chinese propaganda in the
United States, you had Madame Chiang coming back to the States and appealing
to the American people over the head of the President, you had an American
welter of emotion, really, after Pearl Harbor about China. China had been a
neglected ally, we had been selling scrap iron and oil to Japan, and after Pearl
Harbor they were the heroic allies who had been fighting alone all those years,
and there was a great deal of misunderstanding about China in the United
States.
All of this had a direct bearing on what General Stilwell was trying to do. It
was to his advantage and it was vital to him that the American press be informed
of the true situation of China, the difficulties tbat he was facing, the fact that the
Chinese promised one thing but usually didn't deliver it, that there were com-
mitments to open a campaign, for instance in the Salween front and in western
Yunnan, to coordinate with the campaign which he was directing from India
and north Burma. To accomplish all this it was necessary that we work closely
with the correspondents and the policy was, in military matters as well as in
political background matters, to deal with them very frankly and to give them
all the information that was necessary, so that they could understand what was
ffoing on in China.
Q. Now, referring to the line of questioning that was brought up a moment
a go
The Chairman. By the way, we have reached 12 : 30. Is this a stopping point
or do you want to go on with a question ?
Mr. Achilles. There were one or two questions on that point we were just
discussing.
The Chairman. Let's have them.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. You state that you discussed the purport and substance of this report 40
with the correspondent, but you did not give him a copy?— A. That was a different
report, sir. My 204, which is unnumbered actually in my series, but it is doc-
ument 204.
Q. You did not give any correspondent a copy? — A. No, sir.
Q. Did you give correspondents any copies of your other reports in Yenan? —
A. Yes, they were allowed to read some of them, descriptive ones, informative
ones.
Q. Did they include classified material? — A. Technically yes, everything was
classified.
Q. You say you allowed them to read them. Did you at any time let them have
copies to take out of your presence? — A. I don't recall ever doing tbat ; no. You
say "out of my presence"?
Q. To keep overnight or anything like that?— A. No; I may have said to some
person. "You sit here and read this ; I have to go down the hall a minute."
Q. You didn't allow them to take any of them away? — A. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was this access to your descriptive reports known to your
superiors, on the part of the correspondents known to your superiors?
2006 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. Well, to my superior John Davies certainly.
The Chairman. He was the one under whom you were acting directly?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stevens. By means of your general instruction which you had got from
him, or did he know specifically about the ones you were letting people read?
A. No, because he was one or two thousand miles away. I mean, it is a
question of judgment.
The Chairman. It was the sort of things you understood he knew you were
to do?
A. That is right.
Mr. Rhetts. It was the sort of thing, if I understand correctly, that you
understood from him that General Stilwell wanted you and him to do.
Mr. Stevens. With regard to the problem as discussed in the personal state-
ment with regard to the classification of documents, mostly which you classified
yourself, as I understand it
A. That is right.
Mr. Stevens. I think it might be well when we reconvene if you ask for a
fuller explanation on that subject.
A. Fine.
The Chairman. Any more questions?
Mr. Achilles. No, that is all.
The Chairman. We will adjourn until 2 : 30 p. m.
(The board adjourned at 12 : 35 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
Date : May 26, 1950—2 : 30 p. m. to 5 : 15 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reporters : E. Wake and E. Moyer, court stenographers, reporting.
Board members present : C. E. Snow, chairman ; T. C. Achilles, member ; A. G.
Stevens, member ; and A. B. Moreland, legal officer.
(The board reconvened at 2 : 30 I'M)
The Chairman. You may proceed whenever you are ready.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
( ( iontinuation of testimony by Mr. John S. Service.)
Q. Now, Mr. Service, in connection with the preparation of your reports, you,
I believe, testified that you invariably put a classification on those reports at
the time you prepared them. Is that correct*.' — A. That is correct.
Q. Can you describe to the board the considerations which in the first instance
affected the determination for classifying any particular document at any par-
ticular level from unclassified to secret? — A. I think, to answer the question
completely, we ought to examine the character of these memoranda as to just
what they really were. I was really a free agent with very few assigned duties
and because I was interested — because I had a great many contacts and because
the information was sometimes useful to the army as background information
and generally useful to the Embassy as political reporting material, I would put
down such information that I thought of interest in these memoranda.
Now, if I had been working in an organization like the Department of State,
or as a regular member of the staff of headquarters, assigned to a particular
section. I would not be writing independent personal information memoranda.
I would be preparing, if I were in G— 2, a paper for the signature and forwarding
action by the Chief of Staff. G-2. My initials might appear on it as drafter,
but the signature would be his.
These were very different from that. They were strictly personal observa-
tions— reports of persona] conversations, or sometimes my personal views. I
put a classification on these things, sort of an informal classification or recom-
mended classification, based on a number of factors. The principal reason was
that these things should he locked up rather than left around for anybody to
read, or the Chinese, working in headquarters, to read.
They were on economi • political subjects. They were often critical of
Chinese personalities and Chinese conditions. They usually contained informa-
tion from informants who had to he protected to some extent. We had inter-
allied arrangements for exchange of some categories of information. These sen-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2007
erally were not the sort of thing which we wanted to exchange with our Chinese
allies as they were critical of the Chinese and, generally speaking, they were
not things we wanted to hand to the British, with whom we exchanged certain
categories of information.
Q. May I interrupt. Am I correct in believing that certain arrangements
which existed between the American Government and the Chinese and the
British, such as the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency and other interallied
arrangements, contemplated that material of certain types of classification would
be automatically circulated through that distribution machinery whereas mate-
rial of other classifications would not? Is that correct? — A. Yes.
Q. Were you therefore motivated in part, as you suggested, by whether you
wished it made available to others of our own allies in determining classifica-
tion?— A. That is right. Most of my work was reporting on the Chinese Govern-
ment. Obviously we did not want to hand it to them through official channels.
Q. What other types of consideration, if there were any, affected your deter-
mination to place any particular classification on a document? — A. Sometimes
if I had advance information — if I had knowledge of something which was not
at that time known by other people, I would make it classified. Later on when
it became general knowledge and known to the correspondents, and so on, there
was no longer any necessity for considering it classified.
The Chairman. Were there any other considerations that affected these deter-
minations?
A. I think I have covered most of them.
The Chairman. You might refer to the page in your statement that covers
that point.
A. Page 17 or IS of my statement discusses this question.
The Chairman. That is the last paragraph on page 17?
A. Yes.
Q. Now I show you document No. 197 and ask you to state what it is —
characterize it.
The Chairman. Are you going on to another subject?
Q. No ; it is the same subject.
A. I would like to say something else on the same subject if I could ; that is, in
a military theater, and under these conditions, practically all material or reports
were classified. However, it was normal practice, for instance, to brief the
correspondents before an operation was going to take place and keep corre-
spondents informed and to give them, in those briefing sessions, the most highly
classified material so they would know what was going on. They would be
taken into the confidence of the commanding officer and told : This is what the
plan is ; this is what we are going to try to do.
The Chairman. Was there any provision for declassifying documents for-
mally— removing classification lines?
A. I think, generally speaking, it was left to the discretion of the responsible
commanding officer as to whether information should be given out.
The Chairman. No formal steps?
A. I don't believe there were, but the Chief of G-2 could certainly give any in-
formation which he thought appropriate to give.
Q. Mr. Service, I show you Document No. 166 and ask you to state for the
Board in general what that document is. — A. This is an Embassy dispatch which
transmitted a memorandum of mine, transmitting in turn the notes of a large
number of correspondents, notes of their interviews with Communist leaders.
Q. By "correspondents" you mean "newspaper correspondents"? — A. Yes.
Q. State who the correspondents were — A. Guenther Stein, Christian Science
Monitor; Maurice Votaw, Israel Epstein, representing the New York Times at
that time.
Q. Your memorandum transmitted notes taken by these American corre-
spondents on what? — A. Notes of their interviews with Communist leaders.
Q. Your memorandum transmitting these foreign correspondents' notes, what
classification does it bear, if any? — A. Secret.
Q. And what classification does the Embassy dispatch bear? — A. Secret.
Q. You were transmitting notes taken by American correspondents in a docu-
ment which you in turn classified secret. Is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. The notes taken by the American correspondents were notes they were
sending back to their papers to be printed in the press. Is that correct? — A.
Yes ; but the point is at that time they had not had an opportunity to publish them.
Q. They had not been sent out yet? — A. That is right.
2008 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. But were they subsequently, as soon as they could get them into channels? —
A. Subsequently, after they left China. They could not publish them because
of the Chinese censorship.
Q. But when it was physically possible to get them back to the United States,
the respective papers published them? — A. Yes; and they wrote books.
Q. Before they could get published in the United States, you transmitted it
under the classification of "secret"? — A. Yes.
Q. Would you have hesitated to discuss with other correspondents in China,
the contents of those notes? — A. Certainly.
Q. Or interviews with tbe Chinese Communist leaders? — A. Certainly I would
not discuss with Mr. Harold Isaacs what Mao Tse-tung had said to another
correspondent such as Guenther Stein.
Q. I didn't make myself clear. Would you have hesitated to discuss with
other correspondents in China the contents of these interviews with various
Communist leaders, whether the interviews had been interviews held by you or
other correspondents? Would you regard that as the type of material which was
in any substantive way intended to be protected by classification "secret" so
that it could not be talked about with anyone? — A. No.
Q. The point being that the nature of the material was such, it was going to
be published sooner or later anyway, and, for example, would this document
here — would the reason for your classifying the transmission as "secret," does
that mean you did not want it to get into the hands of the Chinese Government? —
A. It should not get into the hands of the Chinese Government and it should not,
of course, get into the hands of other persons ; that is, the actual notes. In other
words, the confidences of these people had to be respected. They were giving
me their complete notes of everything they were getting.
Mr. Achilles. You would consider yourself bound by the classification that
you put on any particular document just as much as anybody else?
A. Yes, depending of course on whether the information in that document
was still of a confidential nature.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have any occasion at the time to write to anyone
outside China concerning the subject matter or printing of these reports?
A. Absolutely not. I am the world's worst correspondent even with my own
family and with my own family I was completely discreet. I am not an habitual
correspondent with anyone outside my own family and when I was trying to
get in touch with my mother recently to find out if any letters I had written
her would throw any light on my attitudes and opinions during this period.
I was completely unsuccessful because my letters during- that period don't show
it.
Mr. Achilles. Was your correspondence at the time subject to military or
other censorship?
A. I wasn't granted authority to censor my own mail and every letter I wrote
had to have on the envelope the signature of an officer authorized to censor.
The Chairman. Proceed.
Q. Unless the board has further questions I propose to drop this particular
point.
I think I will just deal with one other facet of this before we go on and that
is this: When you put a classification on a document or report which you pre-
pared, what then happened to those reports? Whom did you send them to? —
A. Generally I prepared four copies of these memoranda. I had no clerical
help. Usually I sat down to a typewriter and wrote them out — original and
three carbons. One copy I gave to headquarters, one copy I gave to the Em-
bassy— by agreement with the Army — and one copy I sent to John Davies, who is
senior political officer, stationed in New Delhi, and that was my arrangement
with the Army.
Q. You gave one to the Embassy and you sent one to John Davies. As a
matter of fact, did you do that or did you keep one copy for your file and send
all three to headquarters with the request they cause it to be distributed? — A.
The practice differed from time to time. When I was physically in Chungking I
usually took the copies to the Embassy myself. When i was in Yenan
Q. When you were in Chungking did you mail the copy to Davies? — A. I
mailed it through G-2 channels. I actually put it in an envelope and took it
to G-2 and they put the necessary stamps on it so it would go down by military
pouch to Yenan.
Q. When you were in Yenan A. When I was in Yenan I prepared four
copies and sent three copies to G-2 at the headquarters in Chungking and if
you will look at some of my headquarters reports
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2009
Q. Document 11)3 will show this. — A. "It is requested that copies of this
report he transmitted, as usual, to the American Ambassador at Chungking and
headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies." G-2, in those
cases, forwarded two additional copies, one to the Ambassador and one to
Davies.
Q. Did you know, after you sent the copies to G-2 or after you personally
delivered copies to the Embassy, we will say, did you have any knowledge there-
after what classification the Army, in one case, or the Embassy, in another,
might put on the document which you had already classified? — A. No, I did not.
I didn't know what use they might make of it or what classification they might
put on it. I wasn't working as an integral part of G-2 and I wasn't physically a
part of the Embassy and I was denied access to the Embassy files so that I never
had any way of knowing what they did with my reports.
Q. So that, answering my question, you did not know what classifications they
put on them. — A. That is correct. They did not always follow my recommended
classifications.
Mr. Stevens. You were denied access to the Embassy files. Did you ask for
it and was it denied or was it customary for you not to?
A. It was an instruction by the Ambassador that the officers assigned to the
Army, no longer being part of the Embassy staff, would not have access to the
Embassy's file. He agreed that if we requested specific information, and if he
thought it suitable, he would have it made available to us.
Q. This rule was not only applied to you?— A. No.
Q. It was a general rule applied by the Ambassador generally to persons not
members of the Embassy staff. Is that correct? — A. That is correct. I am
going to show some samples of the Embassy or Army use of these reports.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
A. Document 120 is a report by the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency which
transmits one of the memoranda which I prepared. I would like to show it to
you. The underlying part is my memorandum.
The Chairman. Marked '"secret."
A. The chief of G-2 presumably thought that that was worth forwarding.
Most of my things were simply retained in G-2. He turned it over to the
Joint Intelligence Agency for forwarding to Washington.
The Chairman. They marked it "secret"?
A. They marked it "secret", yes, and they also attached that cover sheet which
gives an official evaluation of the source. It gives a summary and some com-
ment. Now that final document has changed character from my original
memorandum because it contains official Army views and comments and evalua-
tion of my memorandum.
The Chairman. By the addition of the cover sheet?
A. Yes ; by the addition of the cover sheet.
The Chairman. Thank you.
A. Similarly, I have here a document No. 161, which is a dispatch 2760 from
the Embassy at Chungking to the Department of State transmitting a memoran-
dum which I have prepared on June 28, 1944. My memorandum simply attaches
a translation of a published document of the Chinese Communists summarizing
their military operation during the month of May 1944.
Since that was a published document, put out by the Chinese Communists and
published in their newspaper in Chungking, I did not classify my memorandum
but the Embassy forwarded it to the Department of State under confidential
dispatch. I would never have had any hesitation in letting any correspondent
who wished to see it, sit down and read it. Of course I did not have any
knowledge of the fact that the Embassy had forwarded it under confidential
dispatch.
Mr. Achilles. Did the Embassy comment in the dispatch?
A. Yes ; they made some comment and I presume that is the reason why they
changed the classification on my material.
I have other examples here but you may not wish to see all of them. Here is
another type of thing, a report of mine which was unclassified which has been
stamped ••.secret" by Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.
Q. Refer to the document number. — A. Document 94, subject : Communist In-
terception and Use of Radio Bulletin. They intercepted something on the Radio
Bulletin, misquoted it and put it in the press. There are quite a large number
of these instances where classification has been either upped or generally raised
by either the Department or some other agency which received copies of my
memorandum.
2010 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Have you any example where they lessened the classification?
A. No ; I don't see any here.
Mr. Achilles. As far as the physical security of the reports are concerned,
except for the copies which you kept and the ones which you delivered to the
Embassy, when you were in Chungking, the other copies were in G— 2 channels.
Is that correct?
Q. At least their distribution was carried on by G-2. — A. G-2 might make
further distribution, just as the Embassy might or might not forward the ma-
terial and a copy was sent to Mr. Davies in New Delhi, and there again I don't
know what became of it after it left my hands.
Q. Similarly, G-2 may have sent the material elsewhere within the theater
or directly back to the War Department where in turn it might have further
distribution that you know nothing about? — A. Yes.
Q. Has this Board further questions on this particular feature?
The Chairman. Not at this time.
Q. Returning, Mr. Service, to document No. 35-3, which is General Hurley's
charges, I direct your attention particularly to paragraph (5) of that docu-
ment where General Hurley asserts it was the policy of the professional Foreign
Service officers to side with the Communist Armed Party and imperialistic bloc
of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Did yon
ever recommend or entertain the belief that China should be kept divided against
herself? — A. Certainly not. Quite the contrary, in all our arguments and rec-
ommendations for unifying the armies and eventually seeking a coalition govern-
ment, we were doing our best to prevent civil war and prevent the division of
the country.
Q. Did you ever openly or otherwise advise the Communist Armed Party, to use
General Hurley's language, "* * * to decline unification of the Chinese Com-
munist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given
f-ontrol"? — A. I did not; in fact, General Hurley's statement there is incom-
prehensible.
The whole problem was never discussed in those terms. The original pro-
posal by President Roosevelt, starting in July 1944. was that the American com-
mander, General Stilwell, be put in command of all Chinese forces. After Stil-
well's recall the idea of an American commander over the Chinese forces was
dropped. However, the National Government proposed, as one of the conditions
for the coalition that the Communist forces only be placed under an American
commander. The Communists, who had agreed to an American commander for
all forces, refused to agree to the idea there would be any discrimination. They
said they would be glad to have an American commander if he commanded both
armies but not as long as the Nationalists would not accept an American. There
was never any proposal made that the Communist forces would be anything
more than about 20 percent of the unified Chinese army and no one — even the
Communists I knew — ever proposed or thought a Chinese Communist should be
a commander of that unified army.
Q. It was never your thought or proposal or suggestion in any way that the
Chinese Communist Party should resist unification except upon the terms that
they control? — A. No, it certainly was not my idea or recommendation.
Q. I would like to read to you a statement by General Hurley, a message from
Hurley for the eyes of the Secretary of State alone, dated January 31, 1945.
The Chairman. Will that be offered in evidence?
Q. I am reading it right now. I will show the Board the document. It isn't
complete yet.
The Chairman. Are these from the files of the State Department?
Q. It is a photostat.
The Chairman. Describe what it is.
Q. This is a photostat of a message which I have just described, or, more par-
ticularly, it is a photostat of a portion of it, which is part of General Hurley's
papers that were in the Department. It was formerly classified "secret" and it is
now unclassified.
The Chairman. I think it better be offered.
Q. I would suggest at the present moment — I subsequently wish to offer this.
Since there are certain pages left out I hope to obtain a fuller version of it. At
t lie moment I would just like to read a statement out of it to show the Board it
actually appears (here, as I read it. rather than offering the whole document.
The Chairman. You may read the document.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2011
Q. General Hurley states on page 8 of this document:
"In conclusion of this part I of my report on the background of the Communist
negotiations, 1 wish to state that in all my negotiations with the Communists
I have insisted that the United States will not repeat nor supply or other-
wise aid the Chinese Communists as an armed political party or as an In-
surrection against the National Government. Any aid from the United States
to the Chinese Communist Party must go to that party through the National
Government of China. The Chinese Communist Party has never indicated
to me that they desire to obtain control of the National Government until,
if and when they achieve control through a political election. The Com-
munist Party demands the end of the one-party government by the Kuo-
mintang. The Chinese Communist Party is willing for the Kuomintang to still
have a vast majority of the government offices. The Chinese Communist Party
demands representation, both for itself and other anti-Japanese political parties
in China, in the policy-making agencies of the government."
I gather from that that on January 31, 1945, General Hurley did not understand
the Chinese Communist Party to he demanding that it be given control of the
government of China. Is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. I will show the board what I read is the passage right here [handing docu-
ment to the chairman].
The Chairman. All right.
Q. As I said, I later propose making further use of it but at the moment it seems
to be incomplete.
Now referring to document No. 35-4, and particularly paragraph 6 of that docu-
ment, where General Hurley asserts he would not say you and other Foreign Ser-
vice officers, of whom he complained, were disloyal to the United States Govern-
ment. I should like to ask you whether if General Hurley had seriously believed
you were giving the Chinese Communist Party the type of advice and information
he charged, would he not have been expected to regard you as disloyal to the
United States Government as well as disloyal to what he called "American pol-
icy"?— A. He certainly would.
Q. Would you regard such action as disloyal to the United States? — A. Yes ; if
I were doing all the things General Hurley accused me of.
Q. With reference to General Hurley's charges, in document 35-3, paragraphs
(6) and (7), that you continuously advised the Chinese armed party he was mak-
ing his own policy in China which was not the policy of the United States Govern-
ment. I believe you have testified you never made any such statement or sug-
gestion. Is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. I would like to show you document No. 198 to look at and ask you if there
is anything in this document that bears on such charges? — A. Yes; there is.
In the early part of the memorandum I describe how the Chinese communist
radio had been broadcasting certain statements that had been made by American
correspondents traveling in their area. These statements were very laudatory
and at least one of the correspondents said that he would recommend that
American arms be furnished to the Communists.
In paragraph 4 I state :
"If the question of accreditation of Harrison Forman ever does arise, how-
ever, it may be of interest to note that his remarks here quoted are actually
a very mild version of statements made in numerous public speeches in which
he promised large-scale American help. It is of questionable wisdom and dis-
cretion under the present circumstances in China for any American to make
extravagant public promises of American aid to the Communists. The effects
are especially unfortunate when made, not to the better informed leaders in
Yenan, but to the less informed and more anxious fighting forces in the for-
ward areas."
Q. Now, I would like to introduce at this point document No. 35-8. I ask it
be included in the transcript.
(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee December 5,
6, 10, 1945
"(1) Hurley. When I left China to come to the United States for a con-
ference. I was confronted in Washington by a report from Mr. George AtchesOn,
whom I had left in charge of the Embassy, addressed to the Secretary of State,
in which he recited nearly all of the policies that I had upheld as the just policy,
but in addition to that he recommended that instead of following my policy of
not arming belligerents against the Government that we were upholding that we
68970 — 50— pt. 2 34
2012 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
furnish lend-lease to the Communists, and in that, Mr. Chairman, Mr. George
Atcheson said that he had the support, the acquiescence, of every official mem-
ber of the American Embassy in Chunking. (P. 41-42.)
"(2) Connally. * * * Did Mr. Atcheson point out that the purpose of
furnishing arms to the Communists was to get them to unite in fighting the
Japanese, or not? (P. 42.)
"(3) Hurley. * * * It is true. (P. 42.)
"(4) Connally. * * * Now I am asking you what his reasons for that
were. Were his reasons that they would aid in lighting the Japanese? (P. 43.)
"(5) Hurley. They were already fighting the Japanese. (P. 43.)
"(6) Connally. What were his reasons? (P. 43.)
"(7) Hurley. His reasons were that that would destroy the National Gov-
ernment of the Republic of China, and the John Service report is for that pur-
pose, and as soon as I left, George Atcheson and everybody attempted what they
had been trying to do when the President sent me to China, and that was to de-
stroy the Government of tlie Republic of China. (Pr 43.)
"(8) Connally. He said that in the letter? (P. 43.)
"(9) Hurley. No, he did not, but he did use all of my arguments for unifica-
tion. (P. 43.)
"(10) Hurley. * * * the report of George Atcheson has a lot of the policy
that I had outlined for the heads of the American services in China. In fact,
1 think that is the first time any career man announced that our policy was to
assist in the establishment in China in proper ways without interfering in internal
affairs of a strong, united, democratic China. * * * but, what Atcheson
recommended to the State Department, and what he said he had concurrence
in with every official in the Embassy, was that we supply lend-lease arms and
munitions to the armed Communist Party. * * * (P. 49.)"
Q. Are you familiar, Mr. Service, with the telegram referred to by General
Hurley here? — A. Yes, I am.
Q. Is that telegram set forth in full, pages 87 to 92 of the white paper?" —
A. It is.
Q. I ask that this telegram be inserted into the transcript at this point.
The Chairman. What paragraph in document 35-S does this refer to?
Q. The whole document is in reference to this telegram.
The Chairman. Document 35-8, if I am looking at the right paper, is Hearings
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Q. The beginning first paragraph: "When I left China to come to the United
States * * *" It is part of General Hurley's testimony — it is discussing this
telegram of February 26.
The Chairman. Oh, yes ; I see. It may be included in the transcript.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
"It appears that the situation in China is developing in some ways which are
neither conducive to the future unity and peace of China nor to the effective
prosecution of the war.
"A necessary initial step in handling the problem was the recent American
endeavor to assist compromise between the factions in China through diplomatic
and persuasive means. Not only was unity correctly regarded as the essence of
China's most effective conduct of the war, but also of the speedy, peaceful emer-
gence of a China which would be united, democratic, and strong.
"However, the rapid development of United States Army plans for rebuilding
the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, the increase of additional aid such as that of the
War Production Board, the cessation of Japanese offensives, the opening of the
road into China, the expectation that the Central Government will participate
at San Francisco in making important decisions, the conviction that we are
determined upon definite support and strengthening of the Central Government
alone and as the sole possible channel for assistance to other groups, the fore-
going circumstances have combined to increase Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of
si length greatly.. They have resulted in lack of willingness to make any coin-
promise and unrealistic optimism on the part of Chiang Kai-shek.
"Among other things, this attitude is reflected in hopes of an early settlement
with the Soviet Union without settlement of the Communist problem, when
nothing was ultimately offered except an advisory interparty committee without
place or power in the Government, and in recent appointments of a military-
political character, placing strong anti-Communists in strategic war areas, and
naming reactionaries to high administrative posts, such as General Ho Kuo
Kuang, previously commander in chief of gendarmerie, as chairman of Formosa :
and Admiral ( 'ban Chak, Tai Li, subordinate, as mayor of Canton.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2013
"On their part, the Communists have arrived .-it the conclusion that we are
definitely committed to the support of Chiang Kai-Shek alone, and the Chiang's
hand will not he forced by us so that we may be able to assist or cooperate with
the Communists. Consequently, in what is regarded by them as self-protection,
they are adopting the course of action which was forecast in statements made
by Communist leaders last summer in the event they were still excluded from
consideration, of increasing their forces actively and expanding their areas to
the south aggressively, reaching southeast China, regardless of nominal con-
trol by the Kuomintang. We previously reported to the Department extensive
movements and conflicts with forces of the Central Government already occurring.
"It is the intention of the Communists, in seizing time by the forelock, to take
advantage of east China's isolation by the capture of the Canton-Hankow Rail-
way by Japan to render themselves as nearly invincible as they can before the
new armies of Chiang Kai-shek, which are being formed in Yunnan at the pres-
ent time, are prepared ; and to present to us the dilemma of refusing or accept-
ing their assistance if our forces land at any point on the coast of China. There
is now talk by Communists close to the leaders of the need of seeking Soviet
aid. Active consideration is being given to the creation of a unified council of
their various independent guerrilla governments by the party itself, which is
broadcasting demands for Communist and other non-Kuomintang representa-
tions at San Francisco.
"Despite the fact that our actions in our refusal to aid or deal with any group
other than the Central Government have been diplomatically correct, and our
intentions have been good, the conclusion appears clear that if this situation
continues, and if our analysis of it is correct, the probable outbreak of disastrous
civil conflict will be accelerated and chaos in China will be inevitable.
'•It is apparent that even for the present this situation, wherein we are pre-
cluded from cooperating with the strategically situated, large and aggressive
armies, and organized population of the Communist areas, and also with the
forces like the Li Chi-shen-Tsai Ting-k'ai group in the southeast, is, from a mili-
tary standpoint, hampering and unsatisfactory. From a long-range viewpoint, as
set forth above, the situation is also dangerous to American interests.
"If the situation is not checked, it is likely to develop with increasing accelera-
tion, as the tempo of the war in China and the entire Far East is raised, and
the inevitable resolution of the internal conflict in China becomes more impera-
tive. It will be dangerous to permit matters to drift; the time is short.
"In the event the high military authorities of the United States agree that
some cooperation is desirable or necessary with the Communists and with other
groups who have proved that they are willing and in a position to fight Japan, it
is our belief that the paramount and immediate consideration of military neces-
sity should be made the basis for a further step in the policy of the United
States. A favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter should be afforded
by the presence of General Wedemeyer and General Hurley in Washington.
"The initial step which we propose for consideration, predicated upon the
assumption of the existence of the military necessity, is that the President inform
Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to
cooperate with and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can
aid in this war against the Japanese, and that to accomplish this end, we are
taking direct steps. Under existing conditions, this would not include forces
which are not in actual position to attack the enemy, such as the Szechwan
warlords. Chiang Kai-shek can be assured by us that we do not contemplate
reduction of our assistance to the Central Government. Because of transport
difficulties any assistance we give to the Communists or to other groups must
be on a small scale at first. It will be less than the natural increase in the flow
of supplies into China, in all probability. We may include a statement that
we will furnish the Central Government with information as to the type and
extent of such assistance. In addition, we can inform Chiang Kai-shek that
it will be possible for us to use our cooperation and supplies as a lever to restrict
them to their present areas and to limit aggressive and independent action on
their part. Also we can indicate the advantages of having the Communists as-
sisted by the United States instead of seeking direct or indirect help or interven-
tion from the Soviet Union.
"Chiang Kai-shek might also be told, if it is regarded as advisable, at the time
of making this statement to him, that while our endeavor to persuade the various
groups of the desirnbility of unification has failed and it is not possible for us
to delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war any longer,
we regard it as obviously desirable that our military aid to all groups be based
2014 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
upon coordination of military command and upon unity, that we are prepared,
where it is feasible, and when requested, to lend our good offices to this end,
and although we believe the proposals should come from Chiang Kai-shek, we
would be disposed to support the following :
"First, formation of something along the line of a war cabinet or supreme
war council in which Communists and other groups would be effectively repre-
sented, and which would have some part in responsibility for executing and
formulating joint plans for war; second, nominal incorporation of Communist
and other forces selected into the armies of the Central Government, under the
operational command of United States officers designated by Chiang Kai-shek
upon General Wedemeyer's advice, upon agreement by all parties that these
forces would operate only within their existing areas or areas which have
been specifically extended. However, it should be clearly stated that our de-
cision to cooperate with any forces able to assist the war effort will neither
be delayed by nor contingent upon the completion of such internal Chinese
arrangements.
"It is our belief that such a modus operandi would serve as an initial move
toward complete solution of the problem of final entire unity, and would bridge
the existing deadlock in China. The principal and overriding issues have become
clear, as one result of the recent negotiations. At the present time, Chiang
Kai-shek will not take any forward step which will mean loss of face, personal
power, or prestige. Without guarantees in which they believe, the Communists
will not take any forward step involving dispersion and eventual elimination of
their forces, upon which depend their strength at this time and their political
existence in the future. The force required to break this deadlock will be
exerted on both parties by the step we propose to take. The modus operandi
set forth in these two proposals should initiate concrete military cooperation,
with political cooperation as an inevitable result, and consequently furnish a
foundation for increasing development toward unity in the future.
"The political consultation committee plan, which could function, if adopted,
side by side with the Government and the war council, would not be excluded by
these proposals. It should be anticipated that the committee would be greatly
strengthened, in fact.
"Of course, the statements to the Generalissimo should be made in private, but
the possibility would be clearly understood, in case of his refusal to accept it,
of the logical, much more drastic step of a public expression of policy such as
that which was made by Churchill with reference to Yugoslavia.
"The fact of our aid to the Communists and other forces would shortly become
known throughout China, however, even if not made public. It is our belief
that profound and desirable political effects in China would result from this.
A tremendous internal pressure for unity exists in China, based upon compro-
mise with the Communists and an opportunity for self-expression on the part of
the now repressed liberal groups. Even inside the Kuomintang, these liberal
groups such as the Sun Fo group, and the minor parties, were ignored in recent
negotiations by the Kuomintang, although not by the Communists, with whom
they present what amounts to a united front, and they are discouraged and
disillusioned by what they regard as an American commitment to the Kuomin-
tang's existing reactionary leadership. We would prove we are not so committed
by the steps which we proposed, we would markedly improve the prestige and
morale of these liberal groups, and the strongest possible influence would be
exerted by us by means of these internal forces to impel Chiang Kai-shek to
make the concessions required for unity and to put his own house in order.
Such a policy would unquestionably be greatly welcomed by the vast majority
of the people of China, even though not by the very small reactionary minority
by which the Kuomintang is controlled, and American prestige would be in-
creased by it.
"The statement has been made to a responsible American by Sun Fo himself
that if Chiang Kai-shek were told, not asked, regarding United States aid to
Communists and guerrillas, this would do more to make Chiang Kai-shek come
to terms with them than any other course of action. It is believed by the
majority of the people of China that settlement of China's internal problems is
more a matter of reform of the Kuomintang itself than a matter of mutual con-
cessions. The Chinese also state, with justification, that American noninterven-
tion in China cannot avoid being intervention in favor of the conservative
leadership which exists at the present time.
"In addition, by a policy such as this, which we feel realistically accepts the
facts in China, we could expect to obtain the cooperation of all the forces of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2015
China in the war ; to hold the Communists to our side instead of throwing them
into the arms of the Soviet Union, which is inevitable otherwise in the event
the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan; to convince the Kuomintang that
its apparent plans for eventual civil war are undesirable; and to bring about
some unification, even if not immediately complete, that would furnish a basis
for peaceful development toward complete democracy in the future."
Q. Will yon describe to the board the background of this telegram about which
General Hurley complains and your connection with the telegram? — A. You mean
the background of events in China or the actual background of
Q. Certain circumstances that gave rise to the sending of the telegram. —
A. The immediate background was that General Hurley, while Ambassador,
had done very little reporting. His first real report was a telegram of January
31, over 2 months after he became Ambassador, and in such reporting as had
been done, the charge d'affaires felt that an overoptimistic picture had been
presented of the likelihood of success.
After Mr, Atcheson became charge he felt that it was his duty to make a full
report to the Department, which up to that time had been impossible to make,
and to point out his conviction and the conviction of the rest of us there that
the situation was worsening rather than improving, so he suggested to some of
the political reporting officers that they prepare a comprehensive study of the
situation and make some recommendations.
Although I was not actually working in the Embassy, I shared the views Mr.
Atcheson and the other officers had and I had been doing a good deal of report-
ing and was, in some ways, more intimately familiar with the details, and also
I had fewer routine duties, so after we consulted together it was decided that
I would prepare the original first draft. I did so and, after consultation
with the other officers, some revisions were made and finally we presented to
Mr. Atcheson and he suggested further revisions, and this is the telegram which
we are here discussing.
The Chairman. Have you put that in evidence?
Q. Yes. It appears on pages 87 to 92 of the white paper material which is in
your document book.
The Chairman. In the white paper, pages 87 to 92.
Q. Yes. Now. in his testimony, document 35-8, General Hurley states that
the reasons for the proposal contained in this telegram of February 26 to furnish
lend-lease assistance to the Chinese Communists was that "* * * that would
destroy the National Government of the Republic of China * * *" and that
your report No. 40 was also for that purpose. He also adds, I believe, that it
was made just as quickly as he left China. Will you state the reasons that were
advanced in the telegram itself for the proposal to furnish lend-lease assistance
to the Chinese Communists? — A. The reasons were to try and break the dead-
lock and the increasing tension between the two parties and force a coalition
and unification of the armies, to promote the war effort and avoid civil war, and
unify the country. We pointed out that the attitude of the Central Government
is hardening and the Communists are reacting in the opposite way by hardening
their own attitude and by preparing to defend themselves by seizing more terri-
tory, particularly in southeast China : that we are denying ourselves of military
forces which can be useful ; if the situation is not checked it is likely to develop
with increasing acceleration, as the tempo of the war in China and the entire
Far East is raised, and the inevitable resolution of the internal conflict in China
becomes more imperative.
We then recommend that we privately tell the Generalissimo that military con-
siderations impel us to commence moderate military cooperation with the Com-
munists and that we believe that this statement by us will impel the Generalis-
simo to agree and when the fact of military cooperation becomes known, the
Central Government will agree to something along the lines of a coalition gov-
ernment.
Q. Was this telegram in any sense, as General Hurley implied, done behind his
back? — A. It was not done behind his back because we say in the telegram:
"The presence of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer in Washington
will afford favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter." There was no
effort to circumvent or bypass General Hurley.
Q. On the whole matter of supplying arms to the Chinese Communists, will
you indicate to the board what views General Hurley expressed to you on this
subject? You have already mentioned in part one conversation you had with
General Hurley touching on this matter. I suggest you refer to any others you
may have had. — A. I don't recall that we had any other conversations on the
subject of military aid to the Communists.
2016 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. In the first conversation you had with him, as I recall your testimony,
he assured you he regarded as one of the purposes of his presence in China to
bring about unification of the military forces and engage the Communists more
actively in the war against the Japanese. — A. That is correct, and repeatedly, in
his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he says also that
was one of his objectives.
Q. General Stilwell certainly favored supplying arms to the Chinese Commu-
nists in order to engage them in the war against the Japanese; did he not? — A.
He did.
Q. I would like at this point to introduce document 35-9 and ask that it be
included in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
••(Hurley— Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5,
6, 10, 1945)
"(1) Shipstead. Did they succeed in getting lend-lease to the Communists?
"(2) Hurley. They did not.
"(3) Shipstead. Did you know of your own knowledge that they tried to?
"(4) Hurley. Yes, sir. I can prove it by their record, that they recommended
that I be reversed, and that we furnish lend-lease to the belligerent enemy of the
Republic that I was instructed to uphold.
"(5) Connally. That was during the fighting, though; was it not?
"(6) Hurley. Yes, sir.
"(7) Connally. The war was still going on?
"(8) Hurley. Yes, sir.
"(9) Connally. It was part of your instructions, was it not, also, to try to
get union between the so-called Communists and the Chiang government, so
they could both fight the Japanese?
"'(10) Hurley. Yes, sir (p. 39).
"(11) The Ambassador continued by pointing out that the United States has
endeavored to use whatever influence it possesses to point the way toward a
unification of military forces that would enable China to bring her full military
power to the task of defeating Japan. He said that there had been some progress
along these lines and that the United States still expected more favorable results
(Hurley press conference, April 2, 1945) (p. 40B).
"(12) Connally. Did General Stilwell ever tell you that his purpose in ad-
vocating the arming and unification of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's
forces was to destroy the Government of China? Did he ever tell you that?
"(13) Hurley. No, sir (p. 44).
•(14) Connally. I was talking about the division of opinion between General
Stilwell and yourself. It was rather sharp; was it not?
"(15) Hurley. It was not.
"(10) Connally. It was not sharp?
"(17) Hurley. No, sir (p. 40). * * *
"(18) Connally. What did they (Stilwell and Chiang) disagree about, if
you do not mind stating — about the Communist army, or not?
"(19) Hurley. As I recall, at that time General Stilwell and I were not
in disagreement in regard to the Chinese Communist armies. * * * So far
as I know, General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue, and we have
never had a controversial word between us (p. 47). * * *
"(20) Connally. General Stilwell did advocate, however, the unification of
the Communists with the Central Government in fighting, making a united front
against the Japanese?
"(21) Hurley. He had been advocating that for 2Vj years and, so far as I
know, had not gone to the Communists as I had done. I think that he advocated
everything that I advocated in that connection. * * * I think he was in
favor of unification of the forces. I certainly was, and we had no controversy
on that (l). 90). * * *"
Q. In this document General Hurley indicates that he was in no disagreement
with General Stilwell: does he not? — A. That is correct. General Hurley says
that he had no disagreement with General Stilwell in regard to the Chinese Com-
munist armies, and "* * * General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the
The Chairman. What paragraph are you reading from? — A. Paragraph (19).
Q. Also in paragraph (21) be makes it pretty clear, does he not, that he and
General Stilwell were in complete agreement on this question. — A. That's right.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2017
Q. Now, I ask you to refer to document No. 35-11 where General Hurley indi-
cates, I believe, that from the beginning h<> was of the opinion that lend-lease
supplies given to any organization in China, other than the National Govern-
ment, was weakening that Government and would bring about its collapse; does
he not? — A. That is what he says.
Q. Can you reconcile the views expressed by General Hurley in this docu-
ment No. 35—1 1 and the views expressed in document No. 35-13, particularly
paragraph (11) ? — A. I would say they are inconsistent.
Q. As a matter of fact, did you ever propose that aid to the Central Govern-
ment be discontinued? — A. I never made any such proposal; in fact, we re-
peatedly said it should not be discontinued. Even in the telegram of February
26 from Charge d' Affairs Atcheson, we make it clear that aid to the Central
Government should not be discontinued and that the arms supplied to the Com-
munists would be far smaller in quantity and would probably be really a
natural increase of the supplies coming into China. In my Document 204,
which I drafted with Mr. Ludden February 14, 1945, we state specifically that
discontinuance of aid to the Central Government would be unnecessary and
unwise.
Q. I ask you to look at Document 35-14. This is the testimony of Secretary
Byrnes, expressing his views as to the propriety of the February 26 telegram ;
isn't it? — A. That's right.
Q. I ask that Document No. 35-14 be introduced into the transcript.
The Chairman. No objection.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"(Hurley — hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December
5, 6, 10, 1945)
'(1) Byrnes. When Ambassador Hurley departed from the Embassy at
Chungking, Mr. Atcheson, as counselor, automatically assumed charge of the
.Embassy's affairs. On February 28, 9 days after the Ambassador's departure
from Chungking and 3 days before his arrival in Washington, according to the
records of the Department, Mr. Atcheson sent his telegram. It contained a
broad and thoughtful analysis of the situation in China as it appeared to him
in the light of the shifting circumstances of the moment. It concluded with
the recommendation that these shifting circumstances required a readjustment
of our immediate strategy.
"(2) In his telegram, Mr. Atcheson distinctly stated that 'a favorable oppor-
tunity for discussion of this subject should be given by the presence of General
Wedemeyer as well as General Hurley in Washington.'
"(3) The officer in charge of an American mission in a foreign country bears
the responsibility for full and accurate reporting of the factors and events which
are necessary to the intelligent formulation and execution of United States
foreign policy. He is further responsible for the submission from time to time
of recommendations with respect to this policy. If his reports and recom-
mendations are to be useful, it is clear that they must reflect his free and honest
judgment (p. 195). * * *
"(4) Byrnes. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Atcheson failed in any
way to observe the letter or the spirit of these rules and traditions. His tele-
gram of February 28 was a full and free report of the current situation in China
as he saw it. His recommendation was an honest effort to assist the Depart-
ment of State in the formulation of its future policy in China. There is nothing
to indicate that he sought to circumvent his superior in making this report and
recommendation. On the contrary the telegram expressly suggested that this
was a matter upon which the views of Ambassador Hurley should be sought by
the Department in Washington (p. 196). * * *
"(5) Vandenberg. Can I ask you in a general way, then, whether the telegram
did represent a recommendation of a sharp and distinct change in our Chinese
policy? (p. 212).
"(6) Byrnes. Yes. As I have stated, while it analyzed the conditions, it made a
recommendation that would have involved a change. And as I say, when I
called for it. investigating it. I was impressed by the fact that it was written 9
days after the Ambassador's departure, and that in the message Mr. Atcheson
said that he felt that it should he called to the attention of Ambassador Hurley
and General Wedemeyer. who were in Washingon, so that the matter could be
discussed by the Department in the light of their views (p. 212).
2018 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"(7) Vandenberg. Was this sharp change in policy which was recommended
the result of anything that had happened since Ambassador Hurley had left?
(p. 212).
"(8) Byrnes. Evidently that was the opinion of Atcheson, who was then in
charge of the Embassy (p. 213).
"(9) Vandenberg. You mean it did not refer to the situation prior to Hurleys
departure from China?
"(10) Byrnes. Oh, it referred to the situation existing at that time as to
our efforts to have unity among the Chinese factions and how we could best
bring all of the manpower of China into the war against the Japanese.
"(11) Vandenberg. That was the general problem that General Hurley had
been dealing with.
"(12) Byrnes. Exactly. It impressed me, when I called for it, that here
are two men (Atcheson and Hurley) who have been considering a question of
how to bring about unity between the factions in China, the objective being to
secure unified action by all Chinese forces against the Japanese, and there was a
difference of opinion as to the methods to be pursued. That is the impression
that it made upon my mind (p. 213). * * *
"(13) Vandenberg. And the views submitted by Atcheson in his wire were
contrary to the American policy? (p. 215).
"(14) Byrnes. It was providing a change.
"(15) Vandenberg. That is what I mean.
"(16) Byrnes. It was suggesting a change in policy; not that something had
been done that was contrary to the policy.
"(17) Vandenberg. And you think it was perfectly appropriate for Mr.
Atcheson, in his temporary assumption of top authority, to take advantage of the
opportunity to send this report to the Department?
"(18) Byrnes. I hink that the man in charge of an Embassy owes it to the
Department, if he believes there is a change in conditions that should be brought
to the attention of the Department, to send it (p. 21.3).
"(19) Green. Was there any suggestion on the part of either of these two.
men that they would act in any way contrary to the policy of the State Depart-
ment until and unless that policy was changed?
"(20) Byrnes. No; your statement is exactly right. That is what they were
doing — submitting, making a suggestion to the Department based upon their
views, but in the one case with the express request that it be called to the
attention of the Ambassador.
"(21) Green. Do I understand the justification for that is that they simply
represented their views, submitted them to the Department for the Department's
approval, but were ready to carry out any policy that the Department instructed
them?
"(22) There was nothing to indicate that they were not willing to carry out
any policy of the Department. To me it is important that if from our repre-
sentatives abroad we are to receive full and free expression, the best judgment
that a man has, we cannot say to him, 'You have got to be entirely a "yes-man"
to the policy of the Secretary of State,' but we should say to him, rather,
'If conditions have changed and you believe that that policy should be modified,
it is your duty to make the suggestion.' The suggestion may or may not be
accepted — it was not, in the case either of Mr. Atcheson or Mr. Service — but
nevertheless I would dislike greatly to think the foreign officers whose duty it
is to advise us to the best of their ability of conditions and make recommenda-
tions would be prevented from doing so by any fear of offending me. Why, they
do it constantly, and I read the reports that come to me. They come to me with
recommendations, as in one of these cases, from the head of the office. About half
a dozen of the things suggested by Mr. Service were wrong and should not be
adopted. I must read the suggestion, I must read the recommendation, and in
the light of all the information which I have, reach my own conclusion.
"(23) Green. It seems to me that is the correct policy. I am very glad to
have this enunciation of it ( pp. 227-228).
•ML' li Connaixy. When an ambassador is temporarily absent from his post,
of course, the charge* d'affaires, or whoever is designated to take his place, is in
tart the act Lng ambassador, is he not?
"(25) Byrnes. Yes.
"(26) Connaixy. And if things were moving — out in that area they were
moving pretty rapidly, were they not, in February?
"(27) Byrnes. Very. Very.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2019
"(28) CoN.NAi.i v. The war was progressing, and the attitude of the Communist
army and the Communist forces was of the highest importance; we were ap-
proaching the climax of the war?
"(29) Byrnes. If our minds go back to that time, your statement is certainly
correct.
"(30) Coxnally. If things were happening out there, so that somebody —
the acting ambassador — suggested a modification not of the objectives but of the
methods of achieving the objective* was it not appropriate for him to indicate
that to the Department, to the Secretary, especially when he advised him to con-
sult General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who was the military commander
there?
" (31) Btbnes. I thought so : I think so now (pp. 258-259) ."
Q. Now I ask you to look at Document No. 35-17. Here again Secretary
Byrnes indicates he can perceive no conflict in policy objectives between the
drafting of the February 26 telegram and General Hurley's, does he not? —
A. That is correct.
Q. I ask that this document, No. 35-17, be introduced into the transcript.
The Chairman. No objection.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
"(Hurley — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December
5,6,7,10,1045)
"(1) Conn ally. One other question. As I understand from your testimony and
from our general knowledge of this subject, there was no divergence between
the objectives that the Government's policy contemplated, as between Mr. Ache-
son and General Hurley ; the objective was to try to unite the Communist
forces with the Central Government's Chinese forces, so that they would all
fight the Japanese, is that correct? (pp. 223-224) .
•(2) Byunes. There is no question about that; the objective was the same
(p. 224).
"(3) Connally. The objective was the same; the only divergence then was,
as I understand you, a difference as to the manner in which that could be brought
about, is that right?
"(4) Btbnes. That is right. There is a serious difference as to the method
to be pursued.
"(5) Coxnally. But the objective of both parties remained the same?
"(6) Byrnes. There is no question about that (p. 224)."
Q. Now I request you to look at Document No. 35-16. I ask you, with reference
to General Hurley's statement that his resignation as Ambassador to China
was brought about by the alleged disloyalty of Foreign Service officers in China,
whether the testimony of Secretary Byrnes, in Document No. 35-16, bears on this
question? — A. It does.
Q. Will you characterize Secretary Byrnes' comments. A. The Secretary
points out in paragraph 3 that when he had his first interview with General Hur-
ley, on October 12, 1945, the Ambassador made no criticism of his staff. No : I am
sorry. Pardon me. It was on October 12 that the Ambassador made his first
comment that he had not been supported by employees of the State Department
and the Embassy. At the time the charge was not specific and General Hurley
was satisfied with Secretary Byrnes' assurance that if any man was opposing him,
he would be withdrawn. Of course by this time both Mr. Acheson and myself
had been out of China for 6 months.
Then in paragraph 5 Secretary Byrnes says that during the second conversation,
about November 26, Mr. Hurley for the first time mentioned Mr. Acheson and
myself. Secretary Byrnes asked him to go back to China and forget what Mr.
Acheson and Mr. Service wrote back in October 1944 and February 1045.
Q. Now referring back to Documents 35-3 and 35-4 where General Hurley
makes his broad charges that you and others were proponents of the Chinese
Communists, is it your understanding that General Hurley regarded the Chinese
Communists as being affiliated with or under control or in any way responsive
to the Russian Communists?. — A. We have General Hurley's repeated statements
that both Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov agreed entirely with American policy and
were not supporting the Chinese Communists and did not consider the Chinese
( 'ommunists to be Communists at all and that Russia desired harmonious and close
relations with China and would support the Chinese National Government. He
makes it very clear, therefore, that he did not think there was close cooperation
between the Chinese Communists and Russia.
2020 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I asked you to look at Document No. 35-11 and then at Document No. 35-18
where I believe he expresses these views. Am I correct that 35-18 is as extensive
an expression of General Hurley's views that the Chinese Communists are not
really Communists and the Russians are not really interested in them. Is that
a fair statement? — A. It is an extensive and repeated statement of that view.
Q. I would like to ask you if you shared General Hurley's views that the Chinese
Communists were not real Communists at all and that they were, as is some-
times said, "vegetarian" Communists.— A. In Document 225, there is a memoran-
dum I drafted at Yenan on March 23, 1945. I make it very clear that there is
contact between the Chinese Communists and Moscow despite the Chinese Com-
munists denials. I give various ways in which this contact exists. I conclude :
"In spite of all these possibilities for contact, the Chinese Communists consistent-
ly deny they have any relations with the Soviet Government and complain they
know less than anyone else about such subjects as about what the Soviet Union
will do. The first part of this statement may be true. I know nothing to disprove
it. What contact does exist is between the two parties, not governments. I think
it likely that such contact exists."
That was Document 225.
Q. That was the memorandum of March 23, 1945. Is that right?— A. That is
correct.
In Document 168 which I prepared on August 3, 1944, I state : "The Chinese
Communist Party claims it is Marxist. By this the Communists mean their
ideological and philosophical approach and dialectical methods are based on the
Marxist approach. Marxism thus becomes to them chiefly an attitude and ap-
proach to the problem. It is a long-term view of political and economic develop-
ment to which all short-term considerations of temporary advantage or prema-
ture power are ruthlessly subordinated."
Q. I take it then it was your view that the Chinese Communist Party was es-
sentially Marxist? — A. Certainly.
Q. And in no sense vegetarian? — A. No; and I point out numerous instances
where their thinking exactly follows the Russians.
Q. What was the date of that memorandum? — A. August 3, 1944.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. I ask you to refer to Documents 39-17 and 39-23.
The Chairman. Have we now finished with General Hurley's?
Q. No, no ; it is just that — I am not finished with General Hurley by any
means. I would like to ask that these two documents be introduced iuto the
transcript at this point, 39-17 and 39-23.
The Chairman. They will be introduced.
Q. I will withdraw that. I have already put them in earlier in the proceeding.
The Chairman. You refer to Hurley but it is McCarthy.
Q. It is McCarthy speaking.
The Chairman. Hurley's words?
Q. I will show you what I have in mind by referring to these in just a minute.
I gather however that while General Hurley seems to suggest that — while Gen-
eral Hurley understands the Chinese Communists not to be oriented toward the
Russian Communists, Senator McCarthy seems to think that you were pro-Soviet
Communist, does he not? — A. He does, very mistakenly.
Q. So that to that extent Senator McCarthy and General Hurley have parted
company. I take it it is fair to say that, is that right? — A. That is right.
Q. Now I would like to introduce at this point Documents 26-1 and 26-2 and I
ask that they he introduced into the transcript. This document refers to the
testimony of Mr. Budenz before the Senate Tydings committee, where he indi-
cates here what is the Russian Communist Party line.
The chairman. Is this 26-1? Did you say 26-1?
Q. Yes — no, excuse me ; it should he just 26.
The Chairman. The reference to the New York Times?
Q. That is right, reporting a quote of Mr. Budenz.
(The material referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 26
(Article in New York Times, April 21, 1950, Lattimore accused by Budenz as a
Red ; General backs him ; by William S. White, p. 2C)
"In 1!):'.7, then, at a meeting called by Earl Browder, it was brought forward
under instructions to name the Chinese Communists no longer
that we were now
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2021
as Red Communists, but we were to begin to represent them, as Browder said, as
'North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers.'
"Field was presenl at that meeting and made a report at which he commended
Mr. Lattimore's zeal in seeing that Communists were placed as writers in
'Pacific Affairs.'
"'line was to attack CHIANG'
"'It was decided.' Mr. Budenz went on, 'that the line was to attack Chiang
Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, an article was discussed, to be put in one of the
organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations — and it did so appear — by T. A.
Bisson, declaring that Nationalist China was feudal China and that Red China
was democratic China.'
"Mr. Service, a State Department foreign officer, has been accused by Senator
McCarthy of Communist associations and his loyalty file is currently under
review pending his own testimony before the subcommittee.
" 'Service has been referred to as Lattimore's pupil,' Mr. Budenz said, 'but
1 have no knowledge of his political affiliations.' "
Q. Now Mr. Budenz there indicates what he understood to be the Soviet or
rather the International Communist Party line and with respect to the Chinese
Communists, both in 1937 and also again in 1943, does he not? — A. Yes.
Q. He indicates that the Communist Party line then was adopted that the
Chinese Communists should be regarded as simply agrarian reformers and
most comparable to the North Dakota non-Partisan Leaguers, does he not? —
A. Yes.
Q. That is generally conformable to the views General Hurley entertained,
is it not? — A. That is correct.
Q. So that to the extent anybody was pursuing the Communist Party line, it
appears to have been General Hurley, wasn't it? — A. Yes.
y. What was your attitude? Did you ever regard or indicate the Chinese
Communist Party to be mere agrarian reformers? — A. I never did. I never
used the phrase "'agrarian reformers."
Q. It was extensively used, was it not. during that period? — A. It was.
Q. But you state you never regarded them as mere reformers? — A. That is
right. I always considered them as Marxist Communist Party, and I never used
"Communist" in quotes nor said "so-called Communists."
Mr. Achilles. Was that view of the agrarian reformers at that time being
extensively carried in the press by correspondents in the Chinese Communist-
held areas?
A. I would have to check my memory, sir. I don't think that it was. Actually,
of course, there was very little appearing in the press at that time. The cor-
respondents didn't get out of Communist territory until late 1944, and the first
books and writings based on direct observation were in early 1945. The phrase
"agrarian reformers" was used fairly frequently in articles, magazines, here
in the States.
Mr. Achilles. Would you say that the origins of those articles were primarily
in this country rather than in China?
A. Yes, a good many of the articles were certainly ideologically influenced in
the States. A lot of them were based on old writings about Chinese Communists,
written in the 1938-39 period when the blockade was not yet established. A lot
of them were based on conversations with people who had come back, with Army
people, the newspapermen themselves, and American officers.
Mr. Achilles. The Chinese Communist leaders were taking that line at the
time, or did they admit the connection with Moscow? You say they did not
admit direct connection with Moscow but they did, as I understand it, claim they
were Marxists?
A. They always insisted they were Marxists and Communists. Almost every
correspondent who went up there said, "Why don't you change your name?"
They said, "Why? We are Communists. Why should we change ourname?"
Enclosure No. 1 of document 177 is a memorandum of conversation which I
had with Mao Tse-tung, the memorandum of a long conversation I had with Mao
during a whole afternoon and evening on August 23, 1944, and I brought up the
the same qestion. I mentioned that the name "Communist" wouldn't be very
reassuring to American businessmen. We were talking about economic develop-
ment after the war and the need for American help. Mao laughed and said they
had thought of changing their name but after all they were Marxists and they
2022 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
weren't ashamed of it and why should they try to conceal it. They did subse-
quently in their publicity try to popularize the Chinese version of their name,
which of course would have meant nothing to Americans or to foreigners, and to
call themselves "Kungchantang."
Mr. Achilles. Would you say then that this concept of the Chinese Communists
as liberal agrarian reformers was one which had its origin primarily in the
Moscow party line rather than the Yenan party line?
A. They insisted all of the time that they were Marxists but they could quote
Marxists scriptures to prove that in a backward agrarian society such as China
the correct interpretation of Marxism involved first getting rid of their traces
of feudalism and moving into a capitalistic democratic state as a step toward
eventual socialism, but they couldn't jump at one step to socialism, and their
only proper program in this intermediate phase, which they insisted would be a
natter of decades, was a moderate program which would keep support of all
classes on the united-front basis, which would permit the development of private
enterprise, political democracy, and so on.
Mr. Achilles. But the point I am really interested in is whether this concept
or this at least propaganda concept of it as being non-Marxist was Moscow
Communist Party line and not the Chinese Communist Party line?
A. I can't answer the question specifically. They didn't talk very much about
communism or Marxism. You had to probe them to get them to explain that what
they were doing was all according to the book of Marx, and the whole program
was united front, a moderate program, and that is the only thing they talked
about. The average correspondent who went up there and looked around, said,
"Why, this is wonderful." He was not concerned with the question of whether or
not they were Marxists or real Communists, so that he was apt to go away and say,
"Why, these people are cutting rents and taxes, reducing interest, trying to stim-
ulate private enterprise, developing cooperatives."
The Chairman. I judge that your answer to the question is that it might
have its origin right there in China by a misunderstanding of the newspapermen
who took a superficial view of it?
A. That is correct.
The Chairman. But it was not your view?
A. It was not my view.
The Chairman. All right.
Q. Referring, Mr. Service, to charges by Senator McCarthy which are indi-
cated in documents 39-7 and 39-8 and 39-16 and 39-17 and 39-23, I would like
to ask you whether you ever expressed the view that communism represented the
best hope of China or the best hope of Asia, as Senator McCarthy has charged? —
A. I never made any such statements as that communism was the best hope of
either Asia or China.
Q. Did you ever entertain such a view or belief? — A. I never did.
Q. Do you now? — A. I do not, most definitely not.
Q. Would you undertake to summarize for the Board what views you did
express as to the prospects, if you like, of the Chinese Communist Party? — A.
Well, I would say that the best summary is contained in document 192, which I
drafted on October 9. 1944. I detailed the steps by which utilizing the opportu-
nities of the war and their mastery of guerilla tactics the Communists had been
able to build up a very, very strong popular support. And in the last paragraph
I say :
* "From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a
magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must rlraw
the conclusion that flic Communists will have a certain and important share in
China's future. * * * I suggest the further conclusion that unless the Kuo-
mintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and
otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of
which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be
the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years."
Q. That. I take it, was a political prediction based upon your observation of
political facts? — A. That is correct.
Q. Was it in any sense a statement of your aspirations or hopes? — A. It cer-
tainly was not.
The Chaibman. But you did feel that the Chinese Communist forces could be
integrated with the Nationalist forces?
A. Integrated into a coalition government, yes.
The Chairman. In spite of the fact they were Marxist Communists?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2023
A. Marxists committed for the time being to a moderate program and at that
time showing a strong nationalistic orientation, strong desire for American aid
and cooperation and postwar economic rehabilitation.
Q. Can you refer to any of your writings in which you both recognize this
strong probability of Communist domination unless the Kuomintang took steps
to bring about reforms in which you expressed any view as to either the possibility
of orientation toward Russia or the desirability of it?
The Chairman. Is that question clear? Do you understand the question?
A. I don't.
The Chairman. Will the reporter read the question.
(Reporter repeated the question.)
A. As I would say that right from the very beginning, from the memorandum
which I drafted January 1943, which is Document 103, one of my primary con-
cerns was to keep China from falling completely into the Russian orbit. We
had a situation of Japanese elimination being inevitable and no one, or no
country, left to balance Japan — the certainty that to balance Russia — the
certainty that Russia would be the dominating power, and the very greater
necessity than ever before of trying to build a strong and independent China and
one which would not be forced or allowed to go into the complete Russian
orbit — completely into the Russian orbit.
Q. I wonder if it might be possible to take a short recess?
The Chairman. Yes, certainly ; about 10 minutes?
( Recess from 4 : 05 to 4 : 15 p. m. )
Q. Shall we proceed?
The Chairman. Yes, if you are ready.
Q. Before the recess I had asked a very awkward question which I would like
to make a new attempt at. You have indicated that based upon your observation
of political factions in China, you foresaw that the Chinese Communist Party
was clearly in the ascendant and that its ascendancy would increase unless the
Kuomingtang took some sort of steps to bring about basic reforms in China.
Is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. And while foreseeing the increasing growth of the Chinese Communist
Party you have indicated that you did not recommend that development or in
any way desire to bring it about. Is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. Now, I had asked you whether you could refer to any of your memoranda
or writings of the time which expressed your concern about the possibility of
China's becoming increasingly within the orbit of Soviet Russia, and I would
like to ask you to refer to Document 142, which is a dispatch dated April 21,
1944, signed by Ambassador Gauss, transmitting a memorandum prepared by you
under date of April 7, 1944. Now is there any expression of views in that mem-
orandum which bears on the question before us? — A. Yes; I believe there is.
The Chairman. Do yon want to read that into the record?
Q. Read it to the Board. — A. I quote from page 7 of my memorandum.
Q. This is not in your book, sir. (Mr. Rhetts submitted a copy to the chair-
man.)
The Chairman. You refer to pages which appear as No. 142 in exhibit 1.
Q. Yes ; I misfired. — A. I commence with the second paragraph of the excerpt
before you :
"As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we
are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an
active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are
accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be
characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among
the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly
may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by internal and
external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too
weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may
be digging his own grave: not only North China and Manchuria, but also national
groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.
"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United
States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia ; nor does it
want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.
"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give,
in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of
China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the
military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other
support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal
2024 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists — who probably
hold the key to control, not only of North China, but of Inner Mongolia and
Manchuria as well — that we are on the other side and that their only hope tor
survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not
already ) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore
protect herself by any means available : in other words, the extension of her
direct power or influence."
Mr. Achilles. Coming back, if we might for a minute, to the conclusion of
Document 192 in which you expressed the belief that unless the Kuomintang
did various things which it showed no signs of being able or willing to do the
Communist would be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few
years, did you believe that their inclusion in a government with the Kuomintang
would change that situation or that they would still be the dominant force?
A. I thought that their inclusion in a coalition government would, say, stimu-
late the Kuomintang and encourage the liberal forces which were considerable
in China, so that it would be unlikely that the Communists would gain complete
control, that there would be a chance for survival in China of moderate, pro-
American liberal forces whom we desired to see maintained, who would be com-
pletely eliminated if there was going to be a civil war which we believed would be
won by the Communists, that it would be a modified transfer of power, a gradual
transfer of power rather than a complete transfer of power which would come
about through a civil war, which is the bitterest kind of conflict that there
usually is, driving both parties to extremes.
I believe that it is correct to say that we anticipated that, as the dominant
and most dynamic force, the Communists would substantially be the strongest
force, evenually become the strongest force in a coalition government, but there
would be or there was a good chance of its being the kind of government that we
might be able to work with, that would not swing over completely to the other
side. Of course, this was in 1944.
Mr. Achilles. Yes, I realize that.
A. We might have kept China, shall we say, in the status of a buffer, might
have kept it from going completely the other way. It was a gamble, we knew it
was a gamble, but faced with the alternatives it was the only possible thing.
Chairman. All right.
Q. Now I would like to introduce at this point documents 33-1, 33-2, 3, 33-4,
and 33-5, and I ask that these all be introduced in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 33-1
(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero. Congressional Record,
December 10, 1945, p. A5403)
"Bishop Yu-pin had just returned from the San Francisco Conference where
he had served as unofficial adviser to the Chinese delegation. Previously arriving
in this country on Easter Monday 1943 he remained here until November 1944
and returned to the United States in April to attend the conference.
"The prelate said there was every indication that Service was working in the
interests of the Communist Party and that it was upon his advice that General
Stilwell approached Chiang Kai-shek in person no less than three times to ask
that the Chinese Communists be armed with American lend-lease supplies."
Document No. 33-2, 3
(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record,
December 10, 1945, p. A5403)
"The prelate disclosed that when Service was appointed political adviser to
General Stilwell, the American Communists immediately began howling for this
Government to demand that the Chinese National Government arm the Chinese
Communist soldiers.
"Meanwhile Service was doing a pretty job of finagling with the Chinese Com-
munists. Bishop Yu-pin said, and kept urging Stilwell to send a representative to
provinces in which they were active to investigate the part they were playing in
the war against the Japanese."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2025
Document No. 33-4
(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, Decem-
ber 10, 1945, p. A5404)
• 'Vinegar Joe,' playing into Service's hands, the bishop continued, appointed
Service himself to the job. The report Service submitted to Stilwell, the prelate
said, landed the Communist soldiers in glowing terms.'
"But, the bishop emphasized. Communist guerilla warfare actually was but
a minor part in the battle against the enemy."
Document No. 33-5
(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, Decem-
ber 10, 1945, p. A5404)
"Following his report to Stilwell, Service kept urging him to go to the Chinese
generalissimo with the demand that the Communists be armed. Cognizant of
the situation in China, Vinegar Joe hesitated to do so, the bishop said, but finally
consented when his political adviser insisted.
"STILWELL SHOCKS CHIANG
"Bishop Yu-pin said that Chiang Kai-shek was astounded at the American
general's velvet-gloved demands because the latter knew that to arm the rival
faction could result in but one thing — an immediate outbreak of civil war and
the possible destruction of the National Government of China.
"Although Stilwell's first Service-inspired visit failed, Service did not lose
heart, the bishop said, but allowed some time to go by before he again urged a
second visit by Stilwell to the generalissimo. Again the Chinese leader refused,
and it was then, the prelate said, that Stilwell was informed that if the demand
was repeated, there was no other alternative but to ask that President Roosevelt
recall him from China.
"Stilwell Tries Three Times
"Undismayed. Service kept hammering at Stilwell that the Chinese Commu-
nists were getting a raw deal, and again insisted that the demand be resub-
mitted for the generalissimo's reconsideration.
"And it was on this third visit to his good friend, with whom he had broken
bread on many an occasion, that Stilwell was informed by the generalissimo he
was asking Roosevelt to relieve him of his duties in China.
"Service, the bishop said, was a definite detrimental influence during his as-
signment in China."
Q. Now, these documents relate to certain charges attributed by the Washing-
ton Times-Herald to Bishop Yu-pin. Do you know who Bishop Yu-pin is? — A. He
is actually the archbishop of Nanking at the present time. He is also the
Mr. Achilles. At the present time, now? — A. I believe at present he is the
archbishop, at that time he was the bishop. He is the honorory chairman of a
magazine called China Monthly, which is a propaganda publication published in
the United States for which Kohlberg is one of the frequent contributors. He is
an intimate of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, functions in a way
as an adviser to them and as an emissary for them on semiofficial missions abroad.
He is a member of the People's Political Council of the Chinese Government. He
was an adviser carrying a diplomatic passport to the Chinese delegation at the
San Francisco Conference.
Mr. Achilles. You say he was a member of the People's Advisory Council, that
was in 1945 or now?
A. In 1945 I know that he was. I am not sure now. With the changes in China
I assume that the organization is no longer in existence.
Q. Now. it is evident from these documents which have just been introduced
that Bish Yu-pin regards you as a pro-Chinese Communist, is that not so? — A. Yes.
Q. Would you care to comment on the charges made in this article? — A. Well,
he made a number of charges in the article. He says, for instance, I "lauded
the Communist soldiers in glowing terms"— I did report that our military observ-
ers and newspaper correspondents and other contacts and sources had found the
Chinese Communist troops generally to have high morale, good organization and
2026 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
training, and considerable effectiveness in the type of guerrilla operations in which
they were engaging. I believed that the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist
forces was very thoroughly documented by our American military observers and
has been pretty well demonstrated by subsequent events.
It is interesting to find in Bishop Paul Yu-pin's own China Monthly magazine,
the issue for June 1945, an article by a Catholic priest, Father Cormac Shana-
han. who visited the Communist area in 1!)44, the statement : "Allied military in-
telligence reported the fighting spirit of the Communist soldiers. This we saw
for ourselves."
Now the main part, it seems to me, of the archbishop's interview is that I was
the chief figure behind General Stilwell's request that the Chinese Communists
be armed, and he says that I specifically was responsible for three separate de-
mands by General Stilwell that the Chinese Communist forces be armed. He
goes on to say that General Stilwell was warned after the second request that
if it was repeated the generalissimo would have to- ask for his recall. However,
according to him, I persisted and forced General Stilwell to make a third request
and caused the generalissimo to request his recall.
In the first place. I never made such recommendations during the period
before Stilhvell's recall. The first suggestion I made that we would have to
face the problem of arming the Communists was in a memorandum which I
wrote on August 29. 1944. Even my memorandum No. 40 of October 10 does
not say anything about arming the Communists. I therefore never instigated
or put pressure or urged General Stillwell to demand that the Communists
be armed. The only explanation, possible explanation I can find for the arch-
bishop's statements is the series of telegrams from President Roosevelt to the
generalissimo which commenced in a telegram of July 7, 1944. We have re-
ferred to those before, I think. That is on page 68 of the China white paper.
These telegrams were for the eyes of the generalissimo alone. Stillwell was
in Burma, the chief of staff in Chunking was worried about using any of our
interpreters or any of the generalissimo's interpreters. I was the only person
available that had sufficient command of Chinese and could be trusted, so I
was ordered to accompany General Ferris when he delivered the first and
second of these messages on July 7 and July 15, and I was the interpreter trans-
lating these telegrams phrase by phrase to the generalissimo. It may be that
because of my presence and because of the Central Government's dislike of me —
for instance, I was credited with being the chief instigator of the observer
group to Yenan that they may have jumped to the conclusion that really I
had a great deal more to do with these telegrams than I did. Actually I had no
knowledge of it beforehand, I had no part in preparing them or instigating
them. I was just as surprised as the chief of staff himself was when the first
one came.
The whole picture that the archbishop draws of my being an important figure,
an influential member of Stillwell's staff, is completely erroneous. I was not
even the principal one of his political officers, and none of us had any effect,
any substantial effect, I am sure, on his own thinking. He had intimate knowl-
edge of China, going back 20 years, or about 20 years. He didn't need us to
tell him about China. And, in fact, my own direct contact with General Still-
well was extremely limited. There was simply no truth in what the arch-
bishop says.
Q. Now, the archbishop also says that you were throughout this time, I
think he says, finagling with the Communists. Will you tell the Board just
what you were <loing with the Communists? — A. The only thing that I was
doing with the Communists was acting as the political reporter, getting
acquainted with their leaders, trying to find out what they were thinking, and,
more important, what they were doing.
Q. You were seing as many of them as you could? — A. I was seeing every
one of them that I could and spending a good deal of my time with them, but
purely as a reporter. There was never any misunderstanding of my status,
either on the part of headquarters or on the part of the Chinese Communists.
Q. Your contacts with the Chinese Communists, however, were part of your
official duties, is that not correct? — A. At that time they were the major part of
my official duties.
Q. So that if you can call an intelligence officer's associating with the per-
sons from whom he seeks to obtain intelligence "finagling," you were finagling
with the Communists? — A. I won't agree with your definition but- — for instance,
if I can interrupt you, in document 177, which I referred to before — it is a dis-
patch from the Embassy transmitting my memorandum of conversation with
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2027
Mao Tse-tung on August 23, 1044. In my memorandum of conversation I
referred to the fact that General Mao asked me a number of questions about
the United States, American policy, and so on, and I made the following
statement :
"This and other questions about the United States were addressed directly
to me. I therefore made it clear in most explicit terms that I had no official
authority and that my replies were only my purely private and completely
unofficial opinions."
And that was the basis on which I approached the Chinese Communists from
the very beginning. They knew when we were sent and arrived in Yenan,
that I had no representative capacity, no authority to negotiate, or to discuss
any sort of agreement, or on the equipping of the Communists, recognition
of Communists, or anything of that sort. I was purely there as a pair of ears
and eyes.
Q. Will you look at document 33-6. the first paragraph. This is an excerpt
from the article appearing in the San Francisco Examiner for June 10, 1045,
by Mr. Ray Richards, where he says, where he refers to John S. Service who
allegedly made a special mission to Moscow a year ago to aid the Red group
in the United States Embassy there in weakening the will of Chiang Kai-shek
not to submit to north China Communist demands. Have you ever been in
Moscow? — A. I have never been in Russia or Moscow. I would like to call your
attention to the fact that the next paragraph of this quotation goes on to say
that the information was supplied by an important attache of the Chinese delega-
tion to the World Security Conference.
Q. And that important attache is presumably whom? — A. From the similarity
of the information that has been given to this man and to the Times-Herald,
and so on, I believe it to be Bishop Yu-pin.
Q. Now, will you refer to document 35-10? In this excerpt from General
Hurley's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he charges
that after you were relieved from duty on General Wedemeyer's staff at his
insistence, you and George Atcheson were placed in positions of supervision
over him. Were you ever put in any position in Washington or any place else
which might remotely be regarded as supervisory of General Hurley? — A. Never
in any position which by any stretch of the imagination could be called super-
visory. I was never assigned duties or put in a position where I was concerned
with policy even on a low level.
Q. You returned from your assignment to General Wedemeyer on what date? —
A. I returned to Washington on April 12, 1045.
Q. And what wTas your assignment in the Department upon your return? —
A. I was temporarily assigned to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, where I
was used for consultation as customary with officers returning from the field
who have information which may be of interest to various Government depart-
ments in Washington.
Q. Will you describe just a little more in detail what this term "consultation"
means? What you do when you are assigned to consultation? — A. You are
given no regular duties, you don't become a part of the union organization. You
are literally just available.
Q. You are available to consult with whom? — A. In the first place with the
interested officers of the division or the office to which you are attached, then
to other divisions of State Department — and there were quite a number who
were interested in one way or another in China, and then, too, other agencies,
and there were a great many during the war who were concerned with China.
Q. Such as? — A. Such as MID of the Army and also OPD of the Army, ONI
of the Navy, and the various branches of OSS, OWI, and FEA. I think I have
mentioned enough.
Q. So that when you were assigned consultation, you were available to and
did talk with these various groups about such information as you brought back
from your assignment in the field? — A. That is right.
Q. Now, General Hurley in this document 35-10 states that when you and
George Atcheson were returned to the United States, one of you was made
Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division and the other Assistant Chief of
the Chinese Division. Did you ever occupy either of these positions? — A. I
never have. As I said, on this occasion I was not given any position in the
organization. I spent actually very little time in the State Department. I
continued my consultation only until about May 8 on which date I was assigned
to the Office of the Foreign Service, which is an administrative branch of the
State Department. My duties there were to assist in some preliminary studies
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 35
2028 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
that were being made preparatory to recommending the revision of the Foreign
Service Act, or Foreign Service legislation, I should say.
Q. And you remained on that assignment from May 8? — A. Until the time of
my arrest on June 6.
Q. And then at the time of your arrest on June 6 you were put in the position
of leave and had no further active duties of any kind in the Department from
then until when? — A. After my arrest on June 6 I was on leave until my return
to active duty following clearance by the grand jury.
The Chaieman. This George Atcheson, who has been referred to in this recent
testimony, is the man who was killed in the plane crash in the Pacific some
years ago?
A. That is correct ; 1947, I believe. I returned to active duty in the Depart-
ment on August 12, 1945.
Q. What was the assignment you were next given?- — A. At that time the war
was ending and we found ourselves — the State Department found itself rather
unprepared for the sudden need to reopen our offices in the Far East, particularly
in what had been occupied China and in Japan. I was assigned temporarily to
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and I acted as a leg man or liaison man between
the FE and the various administrative divisions of the State Department.
Q. By "FE" you mean? — A. Office of Far Eastern Affairs. I was, you might
say, an expediter, a person to follow up. My jobs were to promote, expedite the
making of travel arrangements. We arranged special cars for people trying to
get out to the west coast quickly, arranged transportation across the Pacific,
arranged for the shipment of supplies, some of which had to be sent out by air,
of cryptographic material, Foreign Service regulations, files of Foreign Service
circulars.
The Chaieman. Did you have anything to do with assignment of personnel? —
A. I had nothing to do with assignment of personnel myself. I was a carrier
of messages between the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and the Division of For-
eign Service Personnel concerning their requirements of personnel and their
recommendations. I was not in the position of recommending personnel my-
self. I was simply the man who provided the continual follow-up contact, be-
cause it was a matter of tremendous urgency and it was a desperately hard
business to find personnel. I had several conferences a day, I think, with officers
in FP on particular problems of getting this man who might be in South America,
or this man who might be in some post in Europe. FP would say, "We can't
get this man." I would go back to FE and say, "How about somebody else?"
and I would go back
Q. All right, now how long did you engage in this type of work? — A. September
7, 1945, I was assigned to the staff of the United States political adviser in
Tokyo and I departed from Washington on September 14. Now, of course, those
last* few days I was engaged primarily in getting ready to leave, but roughly
speaking I was on this temporary liaison job from August 12 until September
14, my departure.
Q. Now, when questioned as to any activities of yours which tended to be
supervisory of or in any way interfere with General Hurley, the general indi-
cated one example of this interference was a telegram addressed to him by
Secretary of State Stettinius on February 6, 1945. Where were you on that
date? — A. I was in Chungking.
Q. How long had you been there? — A. Since January 18.
Q. Did you have anything to do with this telegram of February 6 that General
Hurley complains about? — A. I did not. I had no knowledge of it until I read
it in the white paper many years later.
Q. It would not have been possible for you to have been the author or instigator
or in any way connected with it. would it? — A. No.
The Chaieman. In what paragraph does General Hurley refer to that? — A.
That is in this 35-19. It is paragraphs 6 and 7 and 8.
Q. Now will you refer to Document 35-10? In this document General Hurley
refers to another cablegram from the State Department which he seems to indi-
cate was an example of your interference or supervision of him, does it not? — A.
Yes.
Q. General Hurley, when questioned further about this, recognized that you
were in Tokyo at the time of this cablegram, does he not? — A. That is what he
states, yes.
Q. He states that you were an adviser to General MacArthur, who in turn, as
he put it, was Commander of Asia, and therefore above him. Did you have any
connection with political work or political advice to General MacArthur during
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2029
your tour of duty in Tokyo? — A. No; I did not, but there is a great deal of con-
fusion in Genera] Hurley's mind over this telegram. The telegram that he refers
to in paragraph 4 of 35-10 is actually the telegram which was sent to him by the
Department of State alter it had received a telegram from George Kennan
in Moscow on the 23d of April, and had discussed the interview with Stalin with
Mr. Harriman, Ambassador Harriman in the Department here on April 19, and
both of those officers were
Q. By interview with Stalin, you mean an interview? — A. That Hurley had
with Stalin about April 15 and both Kennan and Ambassador Harriman were
very much concerned that Ambassador Hurley was taking far too optimistic a
view of Mr. Stalin's statements — all this is contained on pages 96, 97 and 98 of
the white paper — and therefore Secretary Stettinius sent his telegram to Am-
bassador Hurley, which as Ambassador Hurley says "was contrary to the in-
structions that he had received."
The Chairman. Where was the reference in here to a telegram from Japan
and MacArthur? I did not see that? — A. It isn't there.
The Chairman. You said it is in 35-10. I don't care about any additional
exhibit, but I was looking for it in the exhibits we are supposed to have.
A. I am sorry, it is in 35-19, paragraph 9, Senator La Follette inquires of
General Hurley where these people were. He says, "Were these people in China
now or in State Department or both?'' Hurley said, "Both. I think by that
time Atcheson, Service, and Emmerson had been appointed as advisers to the
Supreme Commander in Asia."
The Chairman. You say 39-19?
Q. 35-19. I am sorry.
The Chairman. It is my mistake. — 35-19, paragraph what?
A. Paragraph 9. This is 35-19.
The Chairman. O. K., thank you.
Q. Now I should like to introduce at this point into the transcript document
35-20.
(Tbe matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document 35-20
(Hurlev — Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 7,
10, 1945)
"Connaixy. In your statement you say that the professional diplomats con-
tinually advised the Communists that your efforts in preventing collapse of the
National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. Do you
mean that they went directly to the Communists and made these representations
from time to time? (P. 82.)
"(2) Hurley. I mean they did more than that, Senator. I mean that when
the program was prepared for President Roosevelt to go to Yalta that there is a
paper dated January 29 on American policy in Asia, and one paragraph of that
paper — it is listed among those I wish — provided, if the military, in landing on
the coast of China, found the Communists instead of the National Army, they
would have the right to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the
American landing force. With that I was in agreement. But imagine my con-
sternation when I saw a general movement of Communist troops from a territory
just described by Senator Austin, all moving toward a certain port in China.
Then I read that some naval officer had been arrested here, and the Commu-
nists not only knew the naval port but they knew the most secret plan of the
United States, and I picked that up, not from our career men, but from the
Communist armed party in China, and I have asked for that record in what
I have submitted to you (p. 83).
"(3) Connaixy. You approved the policy that was outlined in the paper, but
you did not like the leak, is that it (p. 84).
" (4) Hurley. I do not like to be leaked on.
"(5) Connaixy. Who leaked? Do you know who it was that gave the leak?
"(6) Hurley. No, sir; I only know that it did leak.
"(7) Connally. You cannot base any charge, because you do not know who it
was who gave it out? (p. 84).
"(8) Hurley. * * * if the military, in landing on the coast of China,
found the Communists instead of the National Army, they would have the right
to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the American landing force.
With that I was in agreement (p. 83).
2030 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"(9) Hurley. I have never contended that in a landing you would not use all
forces available to you. I believe that was essential. I am not quarreling with
that as a policy. I am quarreling with the fact that it became known to the
Communists and started a big movement from their territory in the north and
northwest to the seacoast (p. 84).
"(10) Hurley. The committee asked me to advise them who are the men who
are guilty of the leaks from the State Department, which leaks are designed to
defeat the foreign policy of the United States. Personally I have been on the
perimeter of America's influence since we entered the war. I, therefore, could not
have intimate or personal knowledge of what has been transpiring in Washington.
I do recall that certain career men were arrested on information supplied by the
FBI. Usually the FBI does not cause arrests in suspicions. They usually base
their arrests on fact (p. 170)."
Q. This document deals with General Hurley's charges that you were engaged
in improperly supplying information to the Chinese Communist Party. Did you
ever supply any information
The Chairman. In what paragraph does that appear?
Q. It commences with paragraph (1).
The Chairman. That is Connally.
Q. That is right. Connally asks him the question. Connally is asking him
this question as to what these people actually did, and then in the next para-
graph Hurley tells him what they did.
The Chairman. In paragraph 1 Connally simply refers to testimony we have
already considered previously.
Q. Connally is saying in this statement :
"In your statement you say that the professional diplomats continually advised
the Communists that your efforts in preventing collapse of the National Govern-
ment did not represent the policy of the United States. Do you mean that they
went directly to the Communists and made these representations from time to
time?"
And then Hurley —
"I mean they did more than that, Senator."
And then he goes on —
"I mean that when the program was prepared" for the President, and he goes
on to indicate that somebody leaked to the Chinese Communists the possibility
that we were going to land troops on the southeast coast of China, and Hurley
says he does not like to be leaked on. Connally says, "Who leaked, do you know
it was, who gave the leak." He says at that point, "No sir, I only know that it
did leak." Connally says, "You can't seem to base any charges on that." and
Hurley came right back, "Yes." His implication certainly is, despite the fact that
since he does not know and he can't make any charge, he indicates nonetheless
it was some of these Foreign Service officers who, as he put it, leaked on him.
The Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Q. Now, what I want to ask you, Mr. Service, is whether you ever supplied any
information to the Chinese Communists or to anyone else outside the United
States Government that the United States contemplated making landings on the
coast of China? — A. I never supplied any such information. As a matter of
fact, when this policy decision was reached, as General Hurley says, on January
29, I was in Chungking and I had no knowledge of any such paper or such deci-
sion being reached. It was generally understood from repeated public statements
during the war that we would eventually land in China. I never had the
slightest idea of any definite plans. For instance, I see from the China Monthly,
in the April 1945 issue, that Admiral Chester Niniitz, who recently came to
Washington for important strategy conferences, in a press conference on March
8, 1945, made the following statement :
"I believe that we should plan the war against Japan in such a manner that
our chances of success are greatest and our casualties least. In planning the
final assualt on the Empire, we will need more than one position from which to
attack. We will need a number of positions. It may well be that some of
these positions will be in China."
The article was headlined something to the effect that Nimitz promises China
landing.
Actually in my conversations with the Chinese Communists, it was very ap-
parent right from August 1944, the time I first went to Yenan, that they them-
selves were hoping to be on the spot when we landed, and I tried to discourage
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2031
that. For Instance, in my conversations with Mao Tse-tnng on August 23, 1944,
quoted from my Document 177, I find the following in my memorandum:
"I noted his emphasis on American landing in China and suggested that the
war might well he won in other ways and a landing not necessary."
In September l'.UI 1 had a long conversation with Chu Teh, commander in
chief of the Chinese Communist forces. This memorandum is contained in
Document 186, and I quote: "He (Chu Teh) argued at length the necessity for
an American landing on the China coast. He attempted to refute my suggestion
that if might he easier and quicker to defeat Japan from the sea by claiming that
the shipping and manpower required would be too great to be practical."
The Chairman. Did you at that time have any knowledge of the Manhattan
project ?
A. I certainly did not, sir. My first knowledge of that was the newspapers
that were published the day before — the day I appeared before the grand jury.
When I came out of the grand jury I saw the extras.
Now I mentioned a while ago that the Chinese Communists gave indications
from at least August 1944 of their plans to move to the southeast part of China,
as General Hurley alleges they (\[(\ only after they found out about some plans
of ours. In my document No. 180, which contains a memorandum of conversa-
tion on August 31 with General Chen Yi on August 25, General Chen said that:
"This section of southeast China may be of great importance to the war against
Japan because it must be the site of American landings. If the Kuomintang
cannot hold it, the Communists can. Now however the situation may be chang-
ing. The possible near collapse of the Kuomintang in these areas and the im-
portance of the areas to the United Nations war effort must be considered."
That is the end of the quotation from General Chen Yi. I go on in my memo-
randum to say :
"It would be a mistake to assume that the Communist consideration of the
problem is all on a high-minded and unselfish plane, as indicated here."
I don't think that there is any need of mentioning all these various instances
where the Chinese Communists with increasing openness as time went by dis-
cussed quite frankly their plans to try to be on the coast, the part of China
where they thought we were going to land, but in a memorandum on March 4,
1945. I state that Communist forces are aggressively expanding in south China.
In our telegram of February 26, this was a factor which we mentioned, the Com-
munist expansion.
Q. That is, toward the southeast, the coast? — A. That is right. Here is a
memorandum of conversation, again with General Chen Yi. Chen Yi, by the
way, was commander of the Communist new Fourth Army, now the mayor of
Shanghai. Chen Yi is saying: "Give us a year — this is March 11, 1945 — and
we will have all of east China from the borders of Manchuria to .Hainan."
Then they say: "When that has been accomplished the Communist forces will
be at least as strong as the Central Government and it will be the Kuomintang
which will be blockaded."
I go on to say. and this is in March 1945: "Conflicts between the Central
Government and Communist forces are widespread. The Communists admit
fairly heavy losses to their units around Canton but claim that these are more
than balanced by growth in the Shanghai area, south An-hwei, Che-kiang, Fu-
kien, Hu-nan, and north Kwang-tung. Open civil war seems to be expected
without fail by the Communists."
My only point in going into so much detail is that there was never any secret
as far as we were concerned of the Chinese Communist intentions for a long
time, and their movements were not dictated by any leaks from us. In any
case, there were no such leaks and we did our best to discourage them from the
idea that they would be successful in meeting us if they made a drive to south
China.
Q. Now, I would like to introduce at this point document 39-4 and ask that it
be included in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document 39-4
"Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator McCarthy)
"(Page 4437) : To indicate to the committee the importance of this man's posi-
tion as a security risk to the Government, I think it should be noted that he is
one of the dozen top policy makers in the entire Department of State on far-
eastern policy.
2032 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"He is one of the small, potent group of untouchables who year after year
formulate and carry out the plans for the Department of State and its dealings
with foreign nations ; particularly those in the Far East."
Q. You have already covered this point in part but would you comment gener-
ally upon Senator McCarthy's charge here that you were "one of the small,
potent group of untouchables who year after year formulate and carry out the
plans" and policies of the State Department? — A. Well, to this board there
would hardly be any need to elaborate on that. !No one man makes policy of
course unless it is the President. The State Department makes policy, the State
Department recommends policy, and the State Department is a sort of gather-
ing together, a grinding mill of a great deal of grist from a great many sources.
As a reporter in the field I was a minor participant in the process of providing
grist for the policy-making mill, but I have never been assigned to the Depart-
ment of State in a position which was connected or concerned in any way with
policy. My assignments to the Department have been temporary and have
been very brief. I was here for a few weeks' consultation while on home leave
in 1938, again on consultation while on home leave for a few weeks in 1943,
again on consultation for a few weeks only in 1944, I have already explained
my assignments during 1945, which were, first, a brief period of consultation,
and then administrative duties in the Office of Foreign Service, and then again
administrative duties in connection with the reopening of the offices in China.
The next time I came to Washington, the only time I have ever been assigned
to the Department in Washington, was in 1949, when I was assigned to the
Division of Foreign Service Personnel, but again in a position without any
administrative or executive authority. I was a special assistant to the Chief of
Foreign Service Personnel, but my duties principally were to advise Foreign
Service officers on the contents of their files and their standing in the service.
I was not concerned with the assignment or transfer of personnel.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Has anybody any questions they want to put in at this time
before we adjourn?
(None.)
No, no questions until tomorrow. Thank you. We meet tomorrow at 10 a. in.
(The meeting adjourned at 5 : 15 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : Saturday, May 27, 1950, 10 : 15 a. m — 1 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.
Reporter : Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S — Reporting.
Members of Board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles ; Arthur
G. Stevens, and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service : Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, firm of Reilly,
Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.
( The Board reconvened at 10 : 15 a. m. )
The Chairman (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session. I will
read into the record the pertinent portion of the telegram from the Department
of State to the American Embassy at Chungking, dated 10th of August 1943 :
Restricted
Department of State,
Washingon, Aug. 10, 19J/3, 10 p. m.
American Embassy,
Chungking :
Ludden at Kunming is designated second secretary of Embassy at Chungking.
He will retain Commission as Consul at Kunming. Should proceed upon arrival
of Langdon. This transfer not made at his request nor for his convenience.
Transportation expenses, per diem, and shipment effects, Kunming to Chung-
king, authorized subject Travel Regulations. Air travel authorized. Expenses
chargeable "Transportation, Foreign Service."
Hall, Emmerson, Ludden, and John S. Service are attached to the staff of
the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces. China-Burma-India, and are sub-
ject to instructions from General Stilwell and authorized to travel to any coun-
try or place which he may designate.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2033
"While Department has authorized expeiises for Hall, Ludden, and Einmer-
son in proceeding to Chungking, ii assumes, as in the case of Davies, the Army
will provide travel expenses and per diem for such missions as General Stilwell
will direct for all four officers.
Hull.
Mr. John Stewart Service, having previously heen sworn as a witness in his
own behalf, resumed the stand and continued his testimony as follows:)
Questions by the ChAirman:
Q. Mr. Service, at one or another of your returns to Washington from China it
has been stated that you were interviewed by the Interview Section of the-
Military Intelligence Service in the War Department, date unstated. Did you at
any such interview advocate taking United States aid away from Chiang Kai-
shek and giving it to the Communists instead? — A. I think, General, that is
Military Intelligence Section. I certainly never at any time recommended dis-
continuing aid to the Central Government and to Chiang. In fact, on numerous
occasions I argued against such proposals which were made by some people.
Therefore, my answer is that I never made the statement so alleged.
Q. Did you at any such interview represent that the Chinese Communists
were free of Soviet influence? — -A. I never made any such statement. I did,
however, say. I believe, that they were not strongly oriented toward the Soviet
Union at that time, that they were following a moderate program, that we might
expect that they would, because of the strong nationalistic bias, because of their
independent history which has resulted in their not having to rely on the Soviet
Union for the past 10 years, we might expect them to maintain a somewhat in-
dependent position with the Soviet Union.
Q. In your statement on page 27 you refer to Document 201, just below the
middle of the page, as an example of a report of such an interview which you had
with either the OSS or the MIS, would that be a fair sample of the report that
you made to the Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Service? — A.
It would be a sample, sir, because I usually went to these sessions with no set
speech. I simply want to be interrogated by their own experts, their own people
who were working on China and these subjects were extremely various and maybe
in one session they might cover the whole gamus of information or topics of
interest. This is a fair sample.
Q. Has that been put in the transcript, or might it be introduced in the trans-
script in connection with this paragraph of the statement?
Mr. Ehetts. I may say, the only problem on that, General, is that these
are mostly documents which have been located in files and which presumably
have to go back into the State Department files.
The Chairman. This report seems to deal more particularly with the puppets,
the puppet governments in China.
Mr. Rhetts. A copy could be made of this document so the copy could be in-
troduced as an exhibit.
The Chairman. Is there any other report which would confirm the testimony
that you have just given with reference to the nature of your reports to the
Military Intelligence Service on your return, or is this the only one you have,
Mr. Service? — A. We have one or two others, sir, but most of these briefing
sessions were not policy talks. In fact at most of them, like the OWI and some
of the other agencies, I prefaced the meeting with the statement I was not there
to discuss policy, that these meetings were simply factual discussions with their
research people who were interested in getting news, information, facts.
The Chairman. In view of the nature of this report, I do not think it will
be necessary to introduce it at this moment.
Mr. Rhf.tts. In that connection. General. I think I ought to make clear to
the Board what our situation is on tins documentation problem. You see, this
whole series of documents, from 101 to 227. are the documents which represent
the product of research to try to find the various reports, memoranda, that
Mr. Service has written. Those have simply been extracted from the files of
the State Department and brought together for use in this proceeding and
presumably must go back into those files.
Now. what we have done, those reports .ire right here in this file cabinet
and they will be, of course, available to the Board for its inspection. We
didn't try to make copies of all of them. We have made copies only of the
few which appear in the document book, so as to any others, why they are
all available for the examination of the Board. And as to any of them that
the Board, for example, would like to have brought into this case separately,
2034 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
it would be a question of making some copies of them, you see. But they are
here and they are available for the use of the Board, even though they are
not being physically introduced in the record as such.
The Chairman. With reference to that statement just made by counsel, I
would like to say that any report — which either counsel or members of the
Board think is material to any issue in the hearing — should be introduced
either as an exhibit or read into the transcript.
Mr. Moreland. You have the problem of classifications on some that you
haven't been able to get declassified.
The Chairman. Yes ; insofar as classification forbids
Mr. Rhetts. But even apart from that, General, if I may suggest, this series
of documents from 101 to 227 is 6 inches or 8 inches deep. We think they are
all material to this proceeding. On the other hand, the physical problem of
reproducing all of them was simply beyond our capacity. Consequently, we
have not tried to have them all so that they cannot all be physically a part of
this record, though we use them in part to make available for the inspection
of the Board and to refer to, and they will be used as the raw material for
the testimony. But I don't know how we can actually put them into the record
in the technical sense that you have in mind.
The Chairman (off the record). Will you now then offer for the record, but
not for the transcript, documents numbered 101 through 227 as identified in
your exhibit 1?
Mr. Rhetts. That is correct, in the document list containing exhibit 1.
The Chairman. That offer will be received and the documents will be at-
tached to the FBI file in the possession of the Board and made available not
only to the members of the Board but to the Loyalty Review Board.
You have now, I take it, found a report characteristic of Mr. Service's reports
to the Military Intelligence Section on his return from China.
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, General, document 202, which is another memorandum pre-
pared in this case by the OSS, a memorandum of one of these consultative con-
ferences with Mr. Service.
The Chairman. What date?
Mr. Rhetts. Dated November 8, 1944. Actually this document consists evi-
dently of the notes taken by two different people that attended this conference —
because you have in effect two sets of notes on the same conference. On page 2
of the second set of notes is certain material which I believe bears on the precise
question that you were interrogating Mr. Service about.
The Chairman. Is this document identifiable as No. 202?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, 202 in our document list.
Mr. Service. I think the material from the point marked on that page to the
end will be of interest.
The Chairman. Yes, I think you're correct. It just bears on the subject and
I'd like to insert into the transcript at this time that portion of document 202
which begins with: "What hope of the KMT and CP coming together? Only
through thorough reform of the KMT," to the end of the next page of the report.
Mr. Rhetts. In that connection, General, might I just ask two questions of
the witness on this point?
The Chairman. Surely.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Service, did you prepare this memorandum?— A. I did not. I nevel
saw the memorandum prepared by the agencies in any of these interviews or
interrogations.
Q. So that these represent notes taken by someone who attended the confer-
ence?— A. Yes.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Have you examined these notes to ascertain if they accurately represent
your report at the time? — A. The only ones I have ever seen, sir, are these. I
think we have three altogether, which are notes of interviews in OSS, Research
Analysis Branch. I have never seen any.
Q. You didn't get my question. Do these notes which I have just inserted in
the record accurately represent what you reported at the time?— A. In some
respects they do not.
Q. Would you point out in what respects they arc inaccurate? — A. Well
Mr. Rhetts. When you say "in some respects," in general you are referring
to these particular notes here?— A. I think there is one point here.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2035
Q. Just sit down and take that from the point marked [handing Mr. Service
the document], the point I introduced, and read it through to yourself and call
our attention to any inaccuracies in it. — A. The only statements in this section
lo which 1 lake exception is this one: "(After meeting broke up, JAC asked if
KMT reports of Communists lighting them and .IS said that this was only in
self-defense, usually when the KMT men went into Communists' areas to take
the harvests. I "
This is undoubtedly an extreme abbreviation of considerable discussion. And
I don't believe that I ever made the statement that these conflicts arose only
from such circumstances as mentioned here.
Q. Otherwise than that the paper is an accurate, although abbreviated, report
of what you said? — A. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. I take it you're referring to only that portion of it which the
general has asked to be inserted in the record. You have not read the whole
document? — A. That is correct.
Q. Mr. Service, after your return to serve General Wedemeyer did you in your
reports to him ever report that the Chinese Communist leaders are not real
Communists but only Chinese farmers, or, in other words, that the Chinese Com-
munist movement is a democratic agrarian movement not directly connected
with the Soviet Union? — A. Could I ask you to repeat the first part of that
question.
(Reporter read the portion requested.)
A. The answer to that is "No." Now would you read the second part?
(Reporter read the portion requested.)
A. No; I never made any such statement. In fact, I reported quite to the
contrary. I reported on their ties with Moscow and I never made a statement
that they were merely a democratic agrarian movement.
Q. I think you have already put in evidence, yesterday, reports that you
made to the same effect as you have just testified. Am I correct, Counsel, that
you have covered that point?
Mr. Rhetts. That is correct.
The Chairman. You state on page 22 of your statement that document 157
represents your criticism of the Kuomintang. You say that you prepared this
summary of the situation in China in June 1944 and that it is your most exten-
sive analysis of the weaknesses of the Kuomintang. It has been alleged from
various quarters that you have drawn excessively on the weaknesses of the
Kuomintang. What I'd like to know at this moment is if document 157 — which
represents, as I understand it, your view on that subject, your most complete
view, the most complete statement of your view — has been introduced into the
record.
Mr. Rhetts. There has been an oversight there. General ; at the outset of
the proceeding yesterday morning I thought that I had introduced into the tran-
script all of the documents referred to here, but I see that I have not. I should
like at this time to offer for inclusion in the transcript document 157.
The Chairman. That may be admitted.
Mr. Rhetts. It appears in your document book.
The Chairman. That will be copied into the transcript at this point.
(The material referred to is as follows :)
The Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy
i. the situation in china is rapidly becoming critical
A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has teen as much political as mili-
tary, has so far ban < minently successful.
Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.
1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale
military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there
was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real
mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps
rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China.
2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow
strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the
continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Com-
munist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won
for him outside of China by his Allies, this policy had the advantage that as
long as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take
the steps necessary to energize an effectiv war. It would thus remove any
2036 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
active or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual
extension of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit
the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.
Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang
would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so
far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death
by slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And
China cannot, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined
Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China.
B. The position of the Kuomintang and the generalissimo is weaker than it
has been for the past 10 years.
China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army
and the government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes
of growing political unrest. The generalissimo is losing the support of a China
which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected
strength during the first 2 years of the war with. Japan. Internal weaknesses
are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the process of
unification.
1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There' is general feeling
of hopelessness.
2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away
from the larger cities, and government mandates and measures of control cannot
be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the government
to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.
3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoral-
ized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.
4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily
from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not
only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress, the weight of years
of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and
leadership they once had.
5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other
arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever-
increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may
increase in scale and find political motivation.
6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and
with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their positions. Their
continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Govern-
ment is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.
7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one im-
portant instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher
plane the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence
and are thus creating a "new warlordism."
8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows
no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time ; the
inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.
0. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its
selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to
revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing
ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and cliquism
within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership is
turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers clique.
10. The generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a harden-
ing of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfor-
tunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader — shown, for instance, by "China's
I >estiny" and his book on economics — have forfeited the respect of many intel-
lectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his
dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.
These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased by
the defeal in Honan and will be further accelerated if. as seems likely, the Japa-
nese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of East
China south of the Yangtze.
In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is
<■ asing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role in
which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.
C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by
its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2037
Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the
Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious
signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This
truth is emphasized by the lailnre <>t' t lie Kuomintang to come to grips with the
situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive
Committee.
1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to per-
petuate their own power overrides all other considerations.
' The result is the enthronement of reaction.
The Koumintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country
for democratic reform. The writings of the generalissimo and the party press
show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism
remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-hearted
attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-govern-
ment based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in
Manchuria and other areas under their control.
Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution
and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation
of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions
of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the
educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character
to the existing but impotent People's Political Council are ignored.
On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means
as compulsory political training for government posts, emphasis on the political
nature of the army, thought control, and increasing identification of the party
and government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, Ein Reich,
Ein Fuhrer" — even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.
The Kuomintang shows no intensive or relaxing the authoritarian controls on
which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the para-
phernalia of a police state — the multiple and imnipresent secret police or-
ganizations, the gendermerie, and so forth — it continues to strengthen them as its
last resort for internal security. (For the reenforcement of the most important
of these German-inspired and Gestopo-like organizations we must, unfortunately,
bear some responsibility.)
Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears
may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomin-
tang, despite the pretext — to meet foreign and Chinese criticism — of conducting
negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans
which can only result in civil war. In so doing it shows itself blind to the facts :
that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success without
outside assistance is most problematic; that such a civil war would hasten the
process of disintegration and the spread of chaos ; that it would prevent the
prosecution of any effective war against Japan ; and that the only parties to
benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Preparations for
this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets which augur
ill for future unity and democracy.
2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective
steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.
It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one
of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation.
It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation — all
of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate
political connections.
It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of
wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have
intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy — as for instance
ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations.
It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft pro-
duction to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for specu-
lators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive
process.
It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the
manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under
Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid
for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.
It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and in-
creases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of land-
2038 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
lords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down in
corruption and inefficiency to the point that possibly not more than one-third of
revenues collected reach the government. It continues to spend huge government
funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.
At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempt-
ing palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and
foreign currency.
It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as the
growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents and ruinous interest
rates, and the impact of inflation.
3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly
short-sighted hy progressive estrangement of its allies.
By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail — most inappro-
priate to its circumstances — and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly
and to extend whole-hearted cooperation — which its own interests demand —
the Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States.
It had already alienated its other major potential ally, Soviet Russia, toward
which its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Commu-
nists. The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report
that Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permit-
ting Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.
It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is dependent
as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is endangering not
only itself by its rash foreign policy : There are indications that it is anxious to
create friction between the United States and Great Britain and Russia. When
speedy victory — and any victory at all — demands maximizing of agreements and
the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage of the war effort
of the United Nations.
4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided, to let
America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from
active participation.
Its most important present contribution is to allow us — at our own and fan-
tastic cost — to build and use air bases in China.
It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the
purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan, '
even though needed to support the American-Cbinese campaign in North Burma,
the purpose of which is open a "life line" into China and facilitate the eventual
landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of
obstruction.
It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also
failed with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often
not been transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known
to have been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purposes. China has displayed
a dog in the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and
deteriorating in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused
to make available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to
exist in China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interests
directly served.
It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transpor-
tation. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese
capture of Burma and west Yunnan ; now it is crippling Chinese internal trans-
portation on which military activity must depend.
It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial
demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made
these excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in
China (against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) con-
tinually add to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot
be used in China at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded
for postwar use.
It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtaining
supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers, some
of whom have been known to have official connections. It has permitted the
imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic
exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through
American credits. Tt seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies
that can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be
devoted to other essential military items.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2039
It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to
collect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is
exemplified by the disappointing fruits of promised cooperation by Chinese
espionage organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large
sums) ; by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by
American observers to the actual fighting fronts ; and by the steadfast refusal
to permit any contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious
to the urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this
intelligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for
the fact that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-
range bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives.
In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which
works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and
the strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It
starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military
effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds
of the people as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow
the suggestion that the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately
fed, medically cared for, trained, and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary
political considerations — the concentration on the continuing struggle for power
in China, and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.
For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the
only kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively — a people's
guerrilla war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of
the Kuomintang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people,
as it is of the Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in
order to concentrate on the perpetuation of its own power.
The 'condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown
most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy
armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers,
absence of support by the people — who have been consistently mistreated — lack
of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the officers through such practices
as trade with the occupied areas.
If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership
does not want to fight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go
further and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming
the battleground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces.
This helps to explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese
and puppets. Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese
attack, maintain its own position and power, save the east China homes of
practically all of its officials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in
the coastal cities.
If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership —
which means the generalissimo — a cynical disregard of the added cost of the
inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.
D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in
the composition and nature of the party.
In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has
lost its power of leadership ; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against
Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China ;
and tchy it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.
The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition
and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American de-
scription becomes ever more true : the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative
political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power
against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economi-
cally, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords,
the militarists, the higher ranks of the government bureaucracy, and merchant
bankers having intimate connections with the government bureaucrats. This
base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer com-
mands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who
as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the
Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.
The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded
above is clear.
The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is
no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience
2040 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of the war. is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the
party's selfish shortcomings.
It cannot fight an effective war because this impossible without greater reli-
ance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national
energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present
conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater
political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as
the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude ; the threat of
foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only
real reform can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy,
though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomin-
tang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it
would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely
guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in
its present state of passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national
interests to their own selfish ends.
For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted coop-
eration to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily
requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable
to carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large-
scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort
will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liber-
alizing influence.
The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from
the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's
economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are incap-
able of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this objective
elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of an order
which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern centraliza-
tion. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party with
the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization — such as connec-
tions with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no objec-
tion to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups in
occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of
which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups.
This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely
of luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore
not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between
the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.
E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure; if that
failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both to
our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East.
The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present
leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which
could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its
preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result,
to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this
disintegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be
expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take
steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the
case : Prescisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efforts
to maintain and monopolize control.
The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because thev run
counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin.
Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecu-
tion of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous
to American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we might welcome
the fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive
government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.
But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the Kuomin-
tang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China of a
vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing
China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets
might be able to occupy this vacuum — at much less cost than by a major mili-
tary campaign— it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank
position and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be
prolonged and made more difficult.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2041
Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China which
would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government — an indispensable
precondition for stability and order in the Far East.
China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major liability.
F. There arc, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the
present trend* of the Kuomintang leadership ichich, if given a chance, might
avert the threatened collapse.
These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the government and the party
responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army officers ; the small mer-
chants; large sections of the lower ranks of the government bureaucracy; most
of the foreign-returned students ; the intelligentsia, including professors, students,
and the professional classes ; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who make
up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo ; the minor
parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy great
prestige ; the Chinese Communist Party ; and the inarticulate but increasingly
restless rural population.
The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous.
A Kuomintang official recently admitted that resentment against the present
Kuomintang government is so widespread that if there were free, universal elec-
tions SO percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these groups
are nebulous and unorganized, feeling — like the farmers — perhaps only a blind
dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and varying
political beliefs — where they have any at all. They are tending, however, to
draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the change of the
status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by the Kuomintang
with every means at its disposal.
The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act in-
dependently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such
might be the case in a miiltary putsch — a possibility that cannot be disregarded.
The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the
greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself
more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang,
the Japanese or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much
larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. A
disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of the
minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial war-
lords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese politics
and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.
The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem
in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires em-
phasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will to
fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism,
the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies
which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually supported
by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all important
Chinese problems, military, economic, and political.
It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective
unity — certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must
be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well — lies neither
with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic
combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within
the Kuomintang. and the probably large sections of the Communists who would
be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the
resurrection of a united front.
Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure
that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken
in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government — and only such
a government — will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring
national morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription
and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a govern-
ment— and only such a government — will automatically end the paralyzing in-
ternal dissention and political unrest. Such a government — and only such a gov-
ernment— will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase produc-
tion, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end cor-
ruption, hoarding, speculation and profiteering.
2042 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
It is of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic
government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve
the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as,
only as, the government moves toward democracy.
II. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPING CRISIS WHAT SHOULD BE THE AMERICAN
ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA?
It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China
can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic
effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we can
afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost
certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately
and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward
China.
A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on
us and will be forced to appeal for our support.
We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand it will
be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military sal-
vation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explanation
of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism. The
Kuomintang — and particularly the Generalissimo — know that we are the only
disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.
The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well-worn,
but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past and will say
in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan — on what
are falsely stated would have favorable terms. They have claimed and will
claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan saved
Russia, Great Britain and ourselves — ignoring the truth that our own refusal to
compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl Harbor and
our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and will con-
tinue to complain that they have received less support in the form of materials
than any other major ally — forgetting that they have done less fighting, have
not used the materials given, and would not have had the ability to use what they
asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay the blame on
us for their difficulties — distorting the effect of American Army expenditures in
China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only a minor factor in
the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese economy.
But however farfetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have
several embarrassing effects.
1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war
effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged,
and possible Russian intervention attracted.
2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public
opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse.
(In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we
have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but
also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better part
of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)
3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose
international prestige, especially in the Far East.
On the other hand, if we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own
terms we would be buttressing — but only temporarily — a decadent regime which
by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems.
Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate
day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a
situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice
between two such unpalatable alternatives.
B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.
Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to
ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in
no position — and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able — to turn down
or render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward
China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can
be tremendous.
C. There are three general alternatives open to us.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2043
1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether.
2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he
asks for it.
3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take
the necessary steps for its implementation.
D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objec-
tives in China.
The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play
an important and perhaps decisive role in:
1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus
hastening the defeat of Japan.
2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political
and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhancing
the chances of its orderly postwar recovery.
3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor
in postwar east Asia.
4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the proressive, independent, and
democratic China.
E. We should adopt the third alternative — a coordinated and positive policy.
This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation
in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.
The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds — but
also for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air
bases and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We
cannot afford to wash our hands of China.
The results of the second alternative — which, insofar as we have a China
policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing — speak for themselves.
The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered
away with negligible, if any, effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic
collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to
increase China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used
for the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted
and ruinous policies.
The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the
rejection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and
advising China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only
question is whether we give this help within a framework which makes sense,
or whether we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded
manner. In the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not
know what the left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated
policy will be dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving
any appreciable benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addi-
tion to these already troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond
those of indolent short-term expediency. But most important is the possibility
that this haphazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be
enough to save the situation ; even with it. China may continue toward collapse.
F. This positive policy should be political.
The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past to
ignore political considerations of direct military significance or whether we are
to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political
forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objectives.
We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward
collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be
brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political re-
form within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process
of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our
influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.
m. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLITICAL POLICY, THOUGH DIFFICULT IN SOME
RESPECTS, IS PRACTICAL AND CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY MANY MEANS
A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such a
way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as distinguished
from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost all sections
of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation in China and
the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate and immediate
stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. This tact and
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 36
2044 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
sensitivity will be required not only of the top policy-directing agency but of all
other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned in direct rela-
tions with China.
B. There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all Ameri-
can Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.
The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government
agencies— State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations— de-
tracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence
when it is most needed.
It must be recognized — and it will be even more the case under the policy pro-
posed— that all our dealings with and all our activities in China have political
implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity of
policy and synchronization of action. It's attainment will require intelligent and
forceful direction both in Washington and in Chungking.
The logical person to coordinate activities in Chungking is obviously, because
of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding per-
son in Washington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Depart-
ment, who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet
member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close consul-
tation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of the
State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operating
in China.
C. Since all measures open to us should not he applied simultaneously, there
should be careful selection and timing.
Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be
deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more forceful
or direct and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to change
its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand.
D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive
policy include the following:
1. Negative. — (a) Stop our present "mollycoddling" of China by: Restricting
lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing train-
ing of the Chinese army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, or
stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can be
reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become more cooperative in
carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being
reasonable on financial questions, or allowing us freedom in such military re-
quirements as establishing contact with the Communist areas.
(b) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige
internationally and in the United States. Such "face" services only to bolster
the regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of
China as one of the "Big Four" served a useful purpose in the early stage of the
war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its
justification.
We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the
meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and
the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference.
Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign
of either stupidity or weakness.
Abandonment of glib generalities for hardheaded realism in our attitude to-
ward China will be quickly understood — without the resentment that would
probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be
given when praise is due.
(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such
lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid. and political support. We can make
it clear without having to be very explicit that we stand ready to help China
when China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of
publicity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar
economic aid will not be extended to buld up monopolistic enterprise or support
the landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.
(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police
organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite
of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results
in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming in-
creasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusions Chinese liberals, who
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2045
look to us ms their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang
leaders in pressing for democratic reform.
2. Positive. — (a) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese
leaders in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy
and unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military.
financial and other policies. Such suggestions will hear great weight if they
come from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as
the visits of Vice President Wallace to China and II. II. Kung to the United
States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of Con-
gress regarding affairs in China.
(b) We should take up the repeated — but usually insincere — requests of the
Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are
provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and
support from us. While the Kuomintang will he reluctant to accept the advice
we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.
(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every
practical means available.
The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of report-
ing American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent
political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism.
We should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other
more direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include
recognition and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within
China. Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive
and objective plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese
nationalistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expan-
sion of the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.
A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The
present diversion — by Kuomintang wishes — to technical subjects should be
rectified and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical
political subjects such as American Government administration. We should
increase our aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means
already explored, such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and
opportunity for study or lecturing in the United States.
Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service
representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure
a center of American influence and contact with Chinese liberals and returned
students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American
Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chinese,
favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for.
Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been close,
as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.
(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States
toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The
most obvious means would be making background information available, in
an unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research
workers. Without action on our part, their writings will become known to
Chinese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups.
We should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section
above to promote dissemination in China.
(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the
Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can — and should for
its maximum effect— be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition
which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.
Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as dis-
tinguished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration
for special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in
international commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in
the United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation
to Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House.
We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural
relations, and other lines of work in China.
(f) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists.
This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, publicity
on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued
pressure for the dispatch of observers to North China. At the same time we
should stress the importance of North China militarily — for intelligence regarding
2046 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data,
and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should
consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to
North China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist
and guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based an urgent military grounds
do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers
anyway.
(g) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other
armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the
Japanese.
(h) We should continue to press — and if necessary insist — on getting American
observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible
assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his
treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.
(i) We should publicize statements by responsible Government officials indi-
cating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitude toward such questions as
the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is
interesting, for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regarding
American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuomin-
tang that publication in China was prohibited.
This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measui"es will occur
to the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China
develops.
E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.
This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of
the conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public
opinion in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals,
minor party leaders, and the Communists can advance.
F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in
an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.
What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned
expension of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases uncon-
sciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal
groups; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area;
we have a weak cultural relations program ; and the OWI has made some
attempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.
G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention In
Chinese affairs.
It must be admitted that some of the measures proposed would involve taking
more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they
do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. If we choose to make
lend-lease conditional on a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom
to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as
imperialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for
instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomin-
tang— as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.
Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The
Chinese have abused their fredom to propagandize in the United States by the
statements and writings of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and
through Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of
the Chinese Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have
freely criticized American policies and American leaders. And they have
attempted to dabble in American politics— through Madame Chiang, Luce. Willkie,
and Republican Congressmen. They have had and will continue to have freedom
to try to influence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we
will try to do it in China.
(Off the record.)
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. It is stated somewhere in the record that General Stilwell ordered your
return to the United States in October 1944 just before he himself returned.
I'm not sure that it's clear in the record why General Stilwell ordered your
return. Was it due to any criticism of your activities? — A. It was not due to
any criticism whatever of my activities. I don't know all of the reasons why
I was ordered hack. Actually I was up in Yenan at the time and not physically
present with General Stilwell. I don't think I— I didn't talk to him until
after he had returned to the United States. I think that General Stilwell
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2047
assumed that probably my assignment, which had been more or less a personally
requested one, would be terminated. I had been in China, away from the
United Stales, at thai time for over a year and a half, a year and 9 months,
and I think that was the motivation of his giving the orders to bring me back.
Q. As far as you know, your services were completely satisfactory to General
Stilwell? — A. I know they were, sir.
Q. Did you receive any rating or commendation or anything on account of
your service? Perhaps it's already in the record. Did you have any Army
rating as a result of your service? — A. No; we received no Army rating or
efficiency reports. General Stilwell was a busy man and not one for personal
details. I have some letters from General Stilwell but they are on the high
seas. I don't have them with me. I think we could confirm from the associates
of General Stilwell and his wife that he was satisfied with my service.
Q. I refer to page 26 of your statement and your reference there to the Memo-
randum No. 40 of October 10. I think that has been put into the record.
Mr. Rhetts. Yes ; that is Document 193.
Q. Referring to page 31 of the transcript, I'm just wondering if I have noticed
a typographical error. At the bottom of page 31 it reads : "In this talk he men-
tioned that he had made the same threat to John Devies but had relented be-
cause he did not wish to ruin a young man's career. This interview was of
course reported by me to General Wedemeyer, who told me that I was working
only for him and should 'carry on'." Is that correct? — A. Yes, sir. That is,
my interview with General Hurley was reported by me to General Wedemeyer,
who was my superior.
Q. That is all right then. I think I had a confusion of generals in my mind.
I thought they were talking about the same general who made the remark. No,
I'm still in difficulty, this was not the statement of General Hurley but is a
statement by General Wedemeyer. How could you report General Wedemeyer's
statement to General Wedemeyer? Will you examine that?
Mr. Rhetts. At the beginning of the paragraph General Hurley sent for Mr.
Service.
Q. It is General Hurley's threat and not General Wedemeyer's? — A. That is
right. In the first part of the paragraph we will have to insert "General Hur-
ley" instead of "he" in each case and when we get down to the next to the last
sentence "In this talk General Hurley mentioned that he, General Hurley, had
made the same threat to John Devies but had relented because he, General
Hurley, did not wish to ruin a young man's career. This interview was of
course reported by me to General Wedemeyer."
Q. I understand it now. I was confused before. On page 33 of your statement,
just below the middle of the page you refer to white paper 87-92 with the nota-
tion it be put into the record. Is that in the record?
Mr. Rhetts. It is in the record in the sense I offered it entirely. I offered
the entire book for the record. It is as an exhibit. It is not copied into the
transcript, but as an exhibit.
Q. What I refer to is the text of the telegram from George Atcheson, which
was drafted by Mr. Service.
Mr. Rhetts. That is correct. During the course of discussion of this telegram
yesterday afternoon we did insert it in the transcript.
Q. Those are the questions that I wanted to ask in connection with part I of
your examination. Have you gentlemen some questions?
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Mr. Service, the part of the charges which we are interested in at the
moment is that your official writings in China were influenced by Communist
sympathies. We have gone into certain aspects of that at considerable length
but there are various aspects, some of a personal nature, which I would like
to have a little more information on. According to your introductory state-
ment, you were born in China of missionary parents. May I ask what faith your
father was? — A. My father's family and my father were Baptists.
Q. Were you also a Baptist? — A. No. My mother was Presbyterian and neither
one of my parents had a very strong denominational feeling. I was not bap-
tized until my father thought I was old enough to know what it was about and
wished it and I asked to be baptized when I was 12 by a very old family friend.
So I was actually baptized by a Methodist clergyman. The church in Shanghai
was an American community church which was a rather unusually successful
interdenominational church and I always considered that church in Shanghai
as my home church.
2048 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Does that mean you are a Methodist or interdenominational, or what? —
A. Technically I suppose I'm a Methodist. I have no very strong feeling on
the matter. I have always picked my churches largely on the preacher, on the
sermons. Generally I'm attracted toward Congregational churches. In Wash-
ington we usually attended the church on Connecticut Avenue.
Q. I see in your statement that you attended first grade in a public school
in the suburbs of Cleveland and that thereafter you were educated at home
by your mother in China, until you again came to the United States at the age
of 11. Is that correct? — A. No. sir. I went to Shanghai to boarding school at
11 and I did not return to the United States until just before my fifteenth birth-
day.
Q. When you were at the American school in China, at Shanghai, was that
for 4 years? — A. Yes.
Q. Were the students there principally Americans or were there a lot of
Chinese as well? — A. There were no Chinese in the school. There were a few
non-Americans but the school was supported largely by American mission boards
and by American business organizations for their own children. And the for-
eign children were very strictly limited in number. I would say that at least 90
percent of the children were Americans.
Q. At that time did you have many Chinese friends, or were your friends
principally Americans at that point? — A. At that period, you mean in Shanghai?
Q. Yes. — A. I had no Chinese friends at Shanghai. I was in a boarding
school, completely American atmosphere, and I knew a few of my father's as-
sociates in the YMCA but I didn't know their children, generally, or their
families. I couldn't say that I had any Chinese friends while I was in boarding
school in Shanghai.
Q. You were 15 when you returned to the United States to high school? — A.
That is correct.
Q. You attended Oberlin College, I see by your statement. While you were in
college were you interested in political or social matters? — A. Very little. I'm
afraid that, for the first two and a half years at any rate, my chief interests
were (a) athletics, and (b) social, but I think in a different sense than the
one you mean. Toward the end I became interested in study and I had very
little time for political activities. When I say political activities, I joined a
cosmopolitan club which they had there but it was almost moribund. I belonged
for a short time to what they called the Oberlin Peace Society, but that again
was not an active organization.
Q. What was the nature of that society? — A. The president of Oberlin at that
time, Ernest Hatch Wilkins, was quite a strong — I suppose you would say —
pacifist, and he invited I think Kirby Page to come to Oberlin and give a talk.
This would be in 1830, I think. Kirby Page had the idea, as I remember it af-
ter all these years, that if enough people and enough countries around the world
would get together and say we don't want war, that there won't be any more
wars, and in this optimistic naive view we organized Oberlin Peace Society
which I think bad about three meetings and talks and, as far as I know, just
folded up. We took no Pacifist oath. It was not an active organization at all.
Q. You were in college, I believe, from 1927 to 1931, is that correct? — A. I
graduated — well. I entered as a freshman in 1927 and graduated in 1931 and I
stayed for an additional year of graduate study, which carried me into June 1932.
Q. During the period you were in Oberlin was there to your knowledge any
interest in communism or any communist groups? — A. Absolutely none whatever.
Q. Was there any particular interest in socialism either academically or
otherwise? — A. I don't remember ever discussing the subject or hearing it dis-
cussed. Oberlin actually is a rather conservative school as far as the student
bodies go. It's an old Republican school and every 4 years they have a Republican
convention. The student body in all polls has traditionally gone Republican.
They are more conservative than the factually actually. They come from upper
middle class homes, most of them. But this was before the real days of the
depression and I think that oberlin would be considered a very politically
unconscious student body, at that time, sir.
Q. You say that, if anything, the students were more conservative than the
faculty. Were any of your professors, as far as you recall, particularly inter-
ested in communism or socialism? — A. Certainly not in communism. There may
have been one economics professor, who was an elderly man near retirement, who
might be considered as having leanings toward socialism.
Q. Did you have any particular close contact with him in his courses? — A.
No.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2049
Q. In college did you generally mix freely with your associates, or were you
the type who was inclined to keep to himself?— A. I think I mixed extremely
freely. I knew every man in my class. There were perhaps 160 men. I was'
Dominated for class president 2 years and was a runnerup. I was active in a
good many student organizations, student activities. I think that probahly I
knew as large a number of student body as well as anybody else did in college.
Q. Following completion of your year of graduate work, you took the Foreign
Service examinations, is that correct, in the following fall? — A. Yes.
Q. And since there was then a delay in appointing persons who had passed the
examinations to the Foreign Service, is it correct that you returned to China
and reported as clerk in Kunming? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was in 1933?— A. Yes. I worked for a short while in a bank in
Shanghai, an American bank, while awaiting appointment as clerk.
Q. And you served at Kunming until when? — A. I was commissioned Foreign
Service oflicer in early October 1935 and was ordered immediately to Peiping.
I couldn't leave at once and did not reach Peiping until early December 1935. At
the time of my appointment I was actually absent from my post because of the
death of my father in Shanghai. I had to return to my post and make arrange-
ments for my family's travel.
Q. Upon the completion of your language studies in Peiping, you were assigned
to Shanghai in what year? — A. The orders, I believe, are dated in December
1937. I reached Shanghai in January 1938.
Q. And you served at Shanghai until your assignment to Chungking in 1941,
is that right? — A. Yes ; that is correct.
Q. During those years what was the prevailing political situation in China,
during the years from 1933 until 1941? I realize that it's quite an extended
period as far as Chinese politics are concerned, but during your period in
Kunming, for example, what was the situation in that part of China? — A. It's
a little hard to limit an answer to a question like that. In 1933 when I arrived
in Kunming it was a semi-independent province governed by a typical Chinese
war lord, General Lung Yun. He issued his own currency, managed his own
foregin relations, maintained his own army. In every respect he was independent
and only owed nominal allegiance to the Central Government. Access to Yun-
nan Province where Kunming was located was only possible, only easily possible,
through French Indochina and French influence was fairly strong there.
During the spring of 1935, I believe, the Chinese Communists had broken
out of their encirclement of the Kuomintang armies in southeast China and
Kwangsi Province and detoured, zigzagged through the various provinces of
southwest China and then came through Yunnan past, almost below, the walls
of Kunming actually, and we had to evacuate all the women and children very
hurriedly late one night.
The Central Government armies followed the Communists on the long march and
established their control over these provinces of west China as a result. So
that in the period, the last period that I was in Kunming the Central Govern-
ment was in the process of really taking over the province for the first time.
Q. You say the Communists passed through Yunnan. Were they at any time
in control of Kunming? — A. No, sir. They did not take the city. They were in a
great hurry to beat the Central Government armies to the Yangtze River cross-
ing. They had sidestepped the Yunnan armies and the Kuomintang armies and
they had an open field ahead of them and they went through just as rapidly as
they could.
Q. Did you have any contact with any of the Chinese Communists at that
time? — A. None whatever. It would have been impossible. There were no
Communists above ground in those days and, as far as I know, there were
never any in Kunming. We never had any contact at all with them in those
civil war days. It was actually a civil war going on at that time.
Q. To what extent were the teachings of Sun Yat-sen influential in Chinese
thought in Yunnan: — A. We get into problems of the nature of Chinese society,
if you will. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's principles were certainly known to and
read by a narrow group of intellectuals. They were not influential on the mass
of them and they were not influential with the tuen Government of Yunnan,
which was purely a robber-baron type of government out for self-aggrandizement
and maintenance of its own power. There was a headquarters branch of the
party in Kunming.
The Chaibman. Which party?
A. Kuomintang Party.
2050 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. The Kuoruintang was then the leading proponent of Sun Yat-sen's philoso-
phies?— A. It was and it was the party of the National Government but it had
party headquarters in Kunming in Yunnan Province and had to be subservient to
the local war lord or it could not maintain itself.
Q. The local government then was not particularly under the influence of Sun
Yat-sen's philosophy? — A. It paid lip service to it.
Q. Were any of your associates there of that intellectual group who were
sincere followers of Sun Yet-sen or strongly influenced by his teachings? — A. I
didn't have a great many Chinese friends during this period in Kunming. I knew
several Chinese students, exchanged lessons with them, helped them with some of
their work, and they were certainly, if not members of the Kuomintang, at least
believers in Sun Yet-sen's Three Peoples' principles. But I was a clerk in the
Consulate. I was not in a position to mingle or meet with very many Chinese.
My associates at that time were chiefly with the foreign community.
Q. To pass on to Feiping at the time you were there, what was the prevailing
political philosophy in Peiping in those years? — A. "Peiping is an old sophisticated
capital which is not generally politically active, or politically interested. Most
of the people of Peiping have watched governments come and government go and
it is not as, for instance, Canton might be called a center of political activity. It
was, however, a large university center and a good many of the students at that
time, the university students, were politically interested but particularly on the
question of resistance to Japan.
Very soon after I arrived in Peiping the students of all the universities staged
demonstrations, the purpose of which was to demand that a Central Government
take more active steps to stop the creeping Japanese aggression which was
proceeding particularly against north China.
Q. Was there any noticeable Communist influence in Peiping at that period? —
A. It has been repeatedly alleged that Communist sympathizers were active
in promoting this student agitation but if that is true they were not doing it
as Communists, not openly. I have known a good many of the student leaders
and none of them were Communists so far as I know. In fact they will deny
that they were Communists. But because it was not the policy of the Central
Government at that time to stage riots which might aggravate the Japanese, a
lot of these people were accused of communism and were imprisoned on that
basis for some time.
Q. What is your own opinion as to whether they were actually Communists? — -
A. My own opinion would be that very few of them were Communists. I have
known several of those people who took an active part in those student demon-
strations who worked all through the war for Kuomintang organizations in
Chungking, although they were imprisoned by the Kuomintang authorities in
19.35 and charged with being Communists.
The chief line at that time. 1935, was the united front. And there were a lot
of people who thought the united front was a fine idea.
Q. That was the official government line? — A. That was the Communist line.
And there were a lot of people who sincerely supported the united-front idea,
who were not Communists.
Q. During your period in Peiping, what in general were your principal associ-
ates? Were they other people in the Embassy, other Americans, or Chinese?; —
A. Well, I was spending 8 hours a day studying Chinese and the question of
time spent, well, my principal associates were my Chinese teachers with whom
I spent these 8 hours or so a day. They were representatives of the old scholar
class. They had very little political inclinations of any sort. One of them was
a Manchu who had been a member of the Imperial clan, who had actually been
some sort of a minor attendant in the Empress Dowager retinue. And another
man was an old scholar who had taken degrees in the last days of the Empire.
Outside of my studies, my principal associates were the other language students.
Q. Were any of your teachers in any way. would you say. communistically
inclined? — A. Not in the least. I would say that none of them were even
Kuomintang inclined. Outside of the teachers, my principal associates were
the other language students. We had a group of embassy students. There
was another group of Marine Corps and Navy students. They had finally
a group of American Army students. All of these people knew each other well,
associating together a great deal. And finally, of course, there were students
from the other embassies whom we naturally saw a good deal of. I didn't belong
to the social clubs in Peiping. Actually, I spent about 8 months living in the
hills about 20 miles outside of Peiping where we lived in a very isolated way
during the winter and spring.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2051
Then there was a very large group in Peiping at that time of, I might call them,
students, men holding fellowships who had come to Peiping because it was
the cultural center of China, to do historical or other research, to do writing;
and, in addition, there was a fairly large group of newspaper correspondents
coming and going. Several of them had Peiping as a more prominent base,
something like — well, Arch Steele of, at that time, the Chicago Daily News, now
of the Herald Tribune. For instance, his wife lived in Peiping and he would
make his trips and come back to Peiping and go out from Peiping. There
was a Swiss correspondent, very well known, named Bosshardt.
Then there was John Kullgren, who represents the Swedish newspapers, and
there was a very large group of these men who were writing, studying China,
writing about and studying China.
Q. I notice in your statement that you list various persons who were study-
ing reporting on China, including Owen Lattimore. How well did you know
Owen Lattimore at that time? — A. I knew him very slightly, actually, at that
time. I was surprised that he remembered knowing me at that time, but
he did mention recently, I think, in some testimony, that he had met me first
of that time. He was a well-known character. There was the aura of expert-
ness about him. I met him at various social functions. I heard him talk once
or twice.
Q. When did you next come in contact with Mr. Lattimore? — A. I think my
next meeting with Mr. Lattimore was in 1941, in the summer of that year,
when he arrived in Chungking as the adviser to the generalissimo.
Q. Did you see much of him in 1941? — A. Very little. Our Embassy at that
time was on the south bank of the Yangtze River, across the river from the city.
He lived in the city at the far end so it was very inconvenient for us to get to-
gether. Transportation was scarce and difficult. I don't believe I saw him more
than three times, perhaps four times, during that year. I was in and out of
Chungking a good deal. He actually made a point of avoiding close contact
with the Embassy because of his position with the Generalissimo. He didn't
want the Chinese to think he was being a pipeline or was running back and
forth.
Q. He was there as the adviser to the Generalissimo? — A. Yes. And he was
taking great pains to maintain that status and, as I say, to disassociate himself
from the Embassy.
Q. When did you next come in contact with him? — A. My memory on this is
not very clear but when I was on leave in California in December 1942, it might
have been January 1943, Mr. Lattimore was I believe at that time head of the
Pacific operations for OWL They had their offices in San Francisco and I have
a hazy recollection of just stopping and speaking to him, saying hello when I
was visiting some friends in the OWI offices there in San Francisco.
Q. And after that? — A. The next time was in October 1944 when I returned
to the United States. He was. I believe, at the off-the-record interview which
I had with members of the IPR here in Washington. During that visit to the
United States he invited me to come down and see him and spend the night
at his home in Baltimore. And I did so. I don't remember the exact date but
it would be probably about the middle of November 1944.
Q. Under what circumstances did you give that off-the-record talk at the
IPR? — A. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much
sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having
visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these
interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspaper men were sent
to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New York
to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White, and
various other people. And the IPR asked — —
The Chairman. Will you just explain IPR?
A. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR?
The Chairman. Afterward, yes.
A. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was
then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to
come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in
the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling
me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be
all right with me.
Q. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR? —
A. That is right.
Q. And authorized by the Department? — A. That is correct. And it was quite
a customary thing. We had a great many officers who did exactly the same when
2052 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
they came back from the field and had news, information of interest. I believe
that Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from
Sinkiang. I know that Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to
give a talk when he also returned from China in June 1945. And I'm sure there
are many other instances of Foreign Service Officers being authorized by the
Department to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record back-
ground sessions.
Q. And to return to Owen Lattimore, when did you next come in contact with
him? — A. It's hard, after all these years, for me to remember all of the indi-
vidual contacts, of course. The next time that I saw him was during the spring
of 1945, in April or May. I can't remember the exact circumstances of seeing
him, but during one of those contacts he asked me if I would come down and see
him again. I was invited eventually to come down the first week end in June.
I went down for a week end then.
Q. If I understand correctly, your contacts with Mr. Lattimore consisted of a
few meetings with him in Peiping during your language student period, a few
meetings in Chungking when he was there as adviser to the Generalissimo, one
meeting in San Francisco when he was with OWI, one or possibly more than one
meeting in November when you were in Washington in November of 1944, and
spending the week end with him in the spring of 1945. — A. I spent a week end
with him in '44, one night.
Q. And the week end of June 1945.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. I would like to ask if you could give us some idea as to how many of
these meetings you had alone with Mr. Lattimore, or were they group discus-
sions?— A. Well, in the language-student period in Peiping I never say Mr.
Lattimore alone. There was always some social occasion or a lecture by him
or something of that sort. In Chungking, again I don't believe that I ever —
I'm sure I never saw Mr. Lattimore alone. I was usually accompanying Mr.
Vincent or someone else on calls in the city and we would stop in and see
Owen. On one occasion we got caught by a very bad storm which made it
impossible tor us to cross the Yangtze River and we went back to Mr. Latti-
more's house and asked if he could put us up for the night, and we slept
on a couch in his living room. I saw him once or twice at the Embassy
when he called at the Embassy, but there again it was not alone.
During 1944 — pardon me, in 1942 — my recollection is that it was just a
casual conversation when I was being taken around the office by one of the
OWI staff, an old friend of mine whom I was visiting, and there again it was
not a solitary conversation. In 1944 I don't remember that anyone was at
his home that weed end. And that night I stayed there there was nobody,
but his wife was there, of course. In 1945 I never saw him alone. There
were other people present that week end and there was no solitary conversation.
Q. One last question. Would you characterize your relationship with him
as one of casual friendship, or how would you classify that relationship, sir? —
A. Yes ; I would call it casual. It would be a casual friendship, based on
mutual interests in the Par East and in China. I have always been interested
in the extreme western and northwestern part of China. My father was one
of the founders of the West China Border Research Society. lie made several
trips to that borderland, acquired over the years probably the most complete
collection of Tibetan articles which have been in several museums here in
the States. I myself have traveled some in the Tibetan country. I traveled
up to the border of Sinkiang. I visited the caves Sir Aurel Stein handled on
the Han and Tang Dynasty manuscript. I have been along the southern
border of Mongolia. I have been interested in all the books on Mongolia
and central Asia, and we have a considerable interest in bases for exchange
of views and talk about that part of the world.
Questions by Mr. Achili.es:
Q. Throughout the years that you knew Owen Lattimore, did you regard
him as a particularly well informed person on China? — A. I don't like to dis-
cuss Mr. Lattimore very much. On his specialty, which is Mongolia and central
Asia, lie is of course probably the outstanding American expert. In fact there
are very few oilier people who can be called experts, there are very few other
Americans who can be called experts on that part of the world. I don't think
that Mr. Lattimore is a profound scholar. I think he is rather superficial in
his views. He has a very active mind but his views are apt to shift a bit.
I don't think his views on current affairs and China in general are particularly
noteworthy. They are always interesting because lie has a very facile mind,
a very quick mind, always has new ideas and states them very dramatically.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2053
Q. Have his views on China had any influence on your own? — A. None what-
ever, sir. In fact I haven't known his views until after I have formed my own
views. In 1941 I did not discuss China with him. Well, he won't talk about
China. By the time I saw him again in 1944, in November '44, my views were
formed and I had not seen any writings or had any contact with him.
Q. It has been said that you were a student or pupil of Owen Lattimore. —
A. There is absolutely no truth in any such statement.
Q. To get back to Peiping, I noticed among some of the other correspondents
and people particularly interested in ( 'liina that you mentioned are F. McCracken
Fisher of the UP. What would you say his nolitical views were? — A. You're
thinking about the political views about China, are you?
Q. China or Soviet communism? — A. Well, he's certainly not a Communist
or a Communist sympathizer. You have to remember, I think that a man who
is a strong conservative in the American terms, and on American affairs gen-
erally, finds himself in China or has found himself during the past few years
in China being sympathetic toward what might normally be called a much more
liberal point of view. Practically all of the Foreign Service officers and even
men such as George Atcheson and former Ambassador Gauss were all extremely
conservative men in American terms.
But the conditions in China of inadequecy and inefficiencv. corruption if you
wish, the failure of the Kuomintang, and the aspects of the Communists which
produced better government was winning popular appear, made these people
recognize that whether one liked the Communists or not they were doing a better
job than the Kuomintang. They were not Communists or pro-Communists. I'm
afraid I don't make myself clear.
The Chairman. You mean these people were not Communists? — A. That is
right.
Q. Fisher particularly? — A. Fisher's attitude would be of that sort.
Q. Which sort? — A. Of being himself a conservative. But if you would trans-
fer him to China I would assume that he — I know you would find him critical
of the Kuomintang, in general agreement with the views held by most of us.
The Chairman. By who?
A. By most of us who were in China.
Q. Haldore Hanson is another. What would you say of his views? — A. At the
time I knew him up to the end of 1937 he hadn't yet visited the Communist
areas. He was, as all the rest of us were, bitterly critical of the Japanese
war, very sympathetic toward the Chinese. I think that Haldore Hanson is a
man who probably, at that time at any rate, read the New Republic. But he
certainly is no Communist or no pro-Communist. He was a much more definite
liberal in the American sense of the word than McCracken Fisher.
Q. Or Frank Oliver, of Reuters?— A. [Shaking of head.]
The Chairman. Your answer is?
A. No. I haven't seen him for years. And I don't remember well enough
to make much of a guess as to what his views were in those days. He is an
Englishman. In American terms he would be a liberal. But not by any stretch
of the imagination would he be Communist.
Q. Or Arch Steele, of the New York Herald Tribune? — A. Arch Steele would
be conservative by everything.
Q. Or Edgar Snow of the Saturday Evening Post?— A. Well, he is not a Com-
munist. He is a leftist. He was at that time, of course, the only American who
had visited the Communists in the northwest. He was in the process of writing
Red Star Over China.
Q. You say he visited the Communists areas prior to that? — A. Well, during
that period.
Q. During that period? — A. Yes.
Q. And Frank Smothers, of the Chicago Daily News? — A. It's awfully hard to
characterize all these people in very definite terms. In the first place we usually
didn't discuss American politics with each other and I have no idea of what their
attitudes were.
Q. I notice that you mention becoming acquainted with Colonel Stilwell who
was then military attache at the Embassy. Was that the same Stilwell who was
later General Stilwell? — A. That is correct.
(Off the record.)
(At this point, 11 : 45 a. m. the Board recessed and reconvened at 11 : 50 a. m.)
Q. How7 long was Colonel Stilwell military attache to Peiping? — A. He was
military attache during the entire period I was there. And he continued as mili-
tary attache until I believe about 1939. I saw him occasionally when he passed
through Shanghai during the years 1938 and 1939.
2054 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Had he served in China previous to that? — A. Yes. He had been in China
for a good many years. I can't give you his record in detail but I believe that
soon after the First World War he was assigned to the Fifteenth Infantry which
we had stationed permanently in Tientsin. He served one tour of duty there
and then was assigned to Peiping as an Army language student, which for the
Army is a 4-year detail. I believe he had a second tour with the Fifteenth In-
fantry before he became the military attache. But he had spent the greater
part of the period from the early 1920's up until 1935, when I first met him, in
China.
Q. As far as you know, did General Stilwell have any pronounced political
views or orientation? — A. Not in a party sense. General Stilwell was a terrific
individualist. He had a great conviction that — well, a great sympathy for the
common soldier. He was an infantryman and he was the type of officer who
always believed that everything should be done for the soldier. He had an
obsession, almost, against brass. He hated pretention. He hated fuss about
rank. I have never discussed political matters with him.
The Chairman. Did you intend your question to refer to Chinese politics,
Mr. Achilles?
Q. No. In general did he bave any strong views about Chinese politics? — A. He
had a great impatience with inefficiency, the Chinese ideas of "face," covering up
things. He had a great admiration for some things which the Chinese Army was
able to do. He was impatient with a great many of the Chinese commanders,
even in this early period. I remember bearing him talk about the terrific fight
which the Chinese were putting up in Shanghai and I heard him discuss some
of the other Chinese battles, such as Taierhchuang at the same time he was
scathing in his comment on some of the Chinese military leaders in this period
for failing to put up a fight for retreating before the enemy attacked them for
giving up strong positions. But I don't remember in this period of ever hearing
him discuss Chinese political matters.
Q. During your service in Shanghai, what were your principal duties? — A.
Well, it's almost impossible to enumerate then all, sir. Ambassador Gauss was
very much interested, I think, in junior officers and when I first arrived in
Shanghai, I was put in the Visa Section as a subordinate there under a non-
career officer. It was an assignment which several other Foreign Service offi-
cers had balked at. I got along well with this officer who was an experienced
visa man. And I suppose I got a good report on my trial period. At the same
time I was given several additional chores ; one of them was to prepare a weekly
summary of the press in Shanghai. It was a job which had been given several
officers and not handled apparently completely satisfactorily.
I had a commendation from Mr. Gauss on the first one of these I prepared
and within 2 or 3 months I think I was assigned to another section — and I
can't at this time remember exactly which section — to fill the vacancy caused
by an officer going on home leave. And thereafter during all of the 3 years
and 3 months that I was in Shanghai I functioned as a relief officer and you
might say an emergency man to go into a section which was temporarily swamped
and help them out, take the place of anybody going on leave, I did all the jobs —
accounts, invoices, leaves, citizenship, ran the land office for a while, had several
periods in the political section, did a great deal of protection work in connection
with our properties that were occupied by Japanese troops throughout eastern
China, acted as assistant to the executive officer, handled the routine of the
amalgamation, amalgamating the commercial attache and agricultural attache
in 1939.
Q. How much political reporting did you do from Shanghai? — A. I didn't do
a great deal because I was in the political section — well, I was generally in all
of the sections for only 2 or 3 months when somebody was away and the
political section was a fairly large one. Shanghai was probably the largest
consulate general we had in the world at that time. And we were generally
three or four officers in the political section and of those posts I was the most
junior. I was still a Foreign Service officer unclassified at that time. So
that most of the reporting I did was routine reporting, assigned reporting.
It was to go over and and see so-and-so and talk to him, write up this, it was
secondary political reporting.
Q. Did you have many Chinese contacts at that time? — A. Yes; I had a
number, but not very many in connection with my political reporting — because
of my junior status I was not contacting important officials. Most of the work
I did was from newspapers and that sort of thing. I had a good many Chinese
friends, social friends, particularly through the Masonic lodge and organiza-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2055
tions like that, and I came to know a good many. They were mainly Chinese
businessmen or Chinese professional men.
Q. You were at that time a member of the Masonic lodge? — A. Yes. I joined
it during that period in Shanghai.
Q. I note that the membership was largely Chinese. But was Masonry in
China substantially the same as Masonry in the United States? — A. Yes. There
wore a number of lodges in the main cities — American lodges affiliated with
mostly Massachusetts constitution. But the Philippine Grand Lodge established
a branch lodge in China, about 1930 I believe. And there were two lodges in
Shanghai under the Philippine Grand Lodge. The membership of most of those,
the greater part of the membership of those lodges was Chinese who had studied
in the United States.
Q. Were your Chinese associates at this period any particular group? Were
they primarily your lodge associates, or were they any other particular group? —
A. Well, numerically the lodge associates would be the greatest number. There
were also Chinese friends who had been associates of my father in the YMCA.
I didn't know most of those people intimately because generally they were much
older than I. There was another group of Chinese whom we met through
Chinese in the office. We had quite a large Chinese staff. Most of those people
were business people. We had several Chinese in fairly high positions in the
commercial attache's office, for instance, and we met Chinese through them or
in connection with our commercial work.
I had two tours of duty in the commercial section, the economics section.
Then there were some friends whom I had known or were friends of people
whom I knew in Peiping, younger people. Some of them were university people
in Shanghai, at St. John's University.
Q. Were any of your Chinese associates at that time, as far as you know,
Communists? — A. None whatever.
Q. I note that your statement lists a number of American acquaintances that
time, Robert Barnett of the IPR ; William Johnstone, Hallett Abend, and Tillman
Durdin of the New York Times ; J. B. Powell of the China Weekly Review ;
Randall Gould of the Shanghai Evening Post ; Larry Lehrbas of the Associated
Press ; and Robert Bellaire of the United Press. Do you recall whether any of
them had any particular political biases or views? — A. Some of them I would
call more liberal than the others and some of them I would call definitely con-
servative. None of them were Communists or pro-Communists or strongly
leftist in sympathy, as far as I know.
The Chairman. You say "or strongly leftist"?
A. Yes.
Q. I notice that in your statement you subscribed at that time to a number
of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern Survey.
What is the character of that? — A. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publi-
cation put out by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations
containing articles written by a very large number of people on subjects related
to the Far East generally.
Q. And Pacific Affairs? — A. Pacific Affairs is a quarterly published by the
International Council of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps — I'm
not sure of the exact wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Q. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that the
Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do you
have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the IPR
first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking?- — A.
No : I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its magazines, I have
had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never attended
its periodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Certainly
it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable
type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were
some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period,
but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when
that was or how influential those people were.
Q. Did you at any time in China meet Frederick Y. Field? — A. I have never
met Frederick Field or had any contact with him in any way, not even to the
point of attending a meeting where he was present, so far as I know.
Q. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed to the
magazine Amerasia. How would you describe that magazine? — A. I subscribed
to it just after it was established, I think.
2056 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. When was it established? — A. I think in 1936 or 1937. I'm not sure of
the exact date.
Q. Do you recall who established it? — A. I remember receiving some circulars
giving the board of editors ; a number of them were people I knew personally
or knew of, who had a good reputation, and on that basis I subscribed to it for,
I think, 2 years.
Q. Who were the persons connected with it that you knew personally? — A.
I believe that William W. Lockwood was one of the original members. No, I see
that he was not. I have the names of the editorial board as of March 1937.
Q. Will you read the names? — A. Frederick Y. Field
The Chairman. And indicate as you go along whether or not you were
acquainted with them. — A. I was not acquainted with Mr. Field. Philip J. Jaffe,
I was not acquainted with Mr. Jaffe and knew nothing about him. T. A. Bisson,
I had met him in Peiping in 1935 : I had read his book, Japan in China, and had
read various other articles which he had written. - And I believe at that time
I also had read his bdok on — I have forgotten the title, but it is American
policy in the Far East, or something of the sort.
Q. You had known Mr. Brisson at that time? — A. Yes.
Q. Where did you first meet him? — A. I first met Mr. Brisson during the
winter of 1937. during the summer : yes, during the winter of 1937 in Peiping.
He was traveling at that time. I think, on a Guggenheim grant, and had just
been visiting in Manchuria. He came down to Peiping to collect material. He
was writing a book on Japanese aggression in China. At that time Haldore
Hansen was living temporarily with me. My family had been evacuated. I
had a large house and Haldore Hansen had just had a very rigorous detention
by the Japanese Army and was in need of a place to recuperate, so Haldore
Hansen was staying temporarily with me.
As I remember it, Mr. Hansen, who was also beginning to write his book, was
very anxious to see Mr. Bisson, to meet him, and we invited Mr. Bisson out for
a lunch, I believe at my house. There were several other people present. I don't
remember who they were now ; and we spent several hours talking with Mr.
Bisson. That was the only time I had met him.
Q. Did you have an impression at that point as to Mr. Bisson's political slant? —
A. None at all. We were talking about Japanese aggression against China and
his observations in Manchuria and he had no disagreement on anything like that.
Q. Would you give the other names — the other people?
Mr. Stevens. Pardon me, did you have any reason to frame any judgment
at all about his beliefs or along political lines?
A. There was no basis or reason to form any judgment on political lines.
Mr. Rhetts (off the record). I should like to offer as an exhibit document
Xo. 32, which is a listing of the editorial board of the magazine Amerasia for the
years 1937, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1843, and 1944, as they have been taken from the
masthead of the magazine.
The Chairman. That may be introduced.
(Carbon copy of listing of members of editorial board of Amerasia magazine
for years 1937, 1940. 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944. was admitted in evidence and
marked -'Exhibit 14.")
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Will you give information concerning the other names on the list? — A.
The next name is Ch'Ao-ting Chi. I did not know him. The next name is Ken-
neth W. Colegrove. I had never met Mr. Colegrove but I had read his writings
and understood that he had a reputation, a good reputation, as a scholar in the
Far East. The next name is Owen Lattimore, who was at that time living in
Peiping, who I knew personally.
The Chairman. You have already covered Lattimore.
A. The next is Cyrus H. Peake, who at that time I believe was a professor at
Columbia University, whose writings, I had also read and was familiar with.
The next one is Robert K. Reischauer. I knew his family well. They were
missionaries in Japan. Mr. Reischauer had been a senior at Oberlin when I
was a freshman and his younger brother had been a housemate of mine all
through college and was one of my best friends. Robert Reischauer was at
that time at Harvard. The next two names are William T. Stone and Hester
Lorn, neither of whom I knew.
Q. Among the editors at that time was Frederick Y. Field, who I believe is
a self-asserted Communist. Also there was Philip J. Jaffe. T. A. Bisson, and
Owen Lattimore who have all been accused of being Communists. In reading
that magazine, were you conscious of any Communist propaganda line at that
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2057
time? — A. None whatever. They favored active support of (he Chinese Govern-
ment. They wen- critical of American aid to Japan. Actually, of course, tlie
magazine contained a great number of articles by very many people outside of
the editorial board :it that period — all the articles were signed articles and they
published articles by a great many different people.
Q. At some point in all of our lives we have had occasion to become aware
of Communist philosophy and Communist propaganda. At what point in your
career, would you say, you had lirst come to be aware of Soviet Communist ob-
jectives and propaganda? — A. It's very hard, sir, to pick a certain point or date.
Could you clarify the question a little bit?
Q. I'll try. What we had really in mind is that we would like to know when
you first became conscious of Soviet Communist objectives, since I gather from
a later part of your statement that you had occasion later to compare Chinese
Communist policies with Soviet Communist policies, and I was wondering
when you first became aware of what Soviet policies and objectives really were?—
A. Well, I would say in the course I took during college in political science. In
that course I learned enough about Communists to be very definitely sure that
I was not and would not be sympathetic to communism, and was not a Commu-
nist. But in my thinking in China and the Far East it was not entirely based
on ideology but based partly on the relations between powers, between the power
balance and relationship in the Far East. I can't pick a date when I first
became aware of the problems involved — but they were always there — that we
didn't want China to be dominated by Russia. I certainly always had the con-
viction that Russia was latently aggressive. The example of Outer Mongolia
was always present there from the early 1920's.
Q. Did you have occasion at any time in China to undertake a study of Soviet
Communist policies and objectives? — A. Not in those terms; no.
The Chairman. How about Marxism?
A. After I left college I don't suppose I read any Marxist books or any
Communist literature until during this period when I was reporting on the
Chinese Communists, when I did so to inform myself more thoroughly. I did a
little research when I was working on the Chinese Communists, so I would be
inforrued and could recognize what they were saying or compare its relationship
to Lenin and Stalin — compare its relationship to their writings.
Q. You had not at the time you were in Shanghai had occasion to make any
srudy of Communist propaganda ? — A. None at all.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. May I interject a question there on this point, on the general inquiry that
Mr. Achilles is making as to when you began to become, if you like, really
sophisticated about Marxism or at least Russian adaptations of Marxism, did
I understand your testimony to be that — well, before coming to that, would you
say that as of today you're reasonably alert and reasonably well informed about
the main lines of Marxism and Communist Party tactics and operations in par-
ticular?— A. I certainly think so, sir ; yes.
Q. What I'd like to get at is when did you begin to apply whatever intensive
research or other process you utilized to acquire that expert advice which you
now have?
Mr. Achilles. That is what I was trying to bring out.
A. I think during the period 1944-45.
Q. The period 1944 to '45 when you were engaged as an intelligence officer
reporting on the Chinese Communists? — A. That is correct ; yes.
Q. Is it your position that in connection with your work you had to study
up on the subject in order to be able intelligently to appreciate what people were
saying, what Communists were saying? — A. That is right, and so I could
evaluate what I was being told and put it in its proper background.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Prior to that time you had not been sufficiently familiar with the doctrines
and techniques of Communist propaganda to be able to recognize it when you saw
it? — A. Well, I think I was reasonably intelligent at recognizing propaganda,
of recognizing Communist propaganda, but I was not a student of communism
nor had my work at this point put me in touch with Communists or communism.
Q. But in any event, you did not recognize Communist propaganda in Amerasia
at that time?— A. I did not.
Mr. Rhetts. You're speaking of 1937?
Q. Yes. — A. I would be very much surprised if an examinaton now would show
any very definite line in Amerasia at that time, because if there had been a very
positive line I'm sure that I would have recognized it.
2058 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Did the material in Amerasia or these articles in the Institute of Pacific
Relations publications have any particular influence on your thinking? — A. No,
I don't remember that they did. For one thing they covered a wide area, the
whole Far East. They were not specifically limited to China, and when they
did relate to China they were written, most of them, after the events occurred.
So that a man on the spot usually knew of them and had drawn his own con-
clusions and points of view before he read about them in some magazine published
much later.
The Pacific Affairs is a quarterly and it doesn't deal with current affairs
Aery much. I'm very sure that they had no influence at all on my view of things
in China.
Q. During the period you were in Chungking what were your principal duties? —
A. I don't know how to answer that without repeating a good deal of material
that is here in my personal statement.
Q. Will you just summarize it? — A. The Embassy was very short-staffed and
I was the most junior officer. I started in, because of the urgent need, as a
general consular officer and in what little citizenship or other routine work
there was. I acted as protocol officer in getting passes and driver's licenses and
gasoline permits and all that sort of thing from the Chinese authorities. Later
I moved into what you might call the translation section and acted as the
Chinese secretary, checking translations of notes to and from the Foreign Office,
checking translations of newspaper articles and other published material, and for
a period I actually read all the editorials and all the local papers — about 10 a
day — and dictated very short summaries. It was the sort of thing we didn't
have a Chinese at that time who was capable of doing. A Chinese could sit
down and translate an editorial but it would take half a day to do it and then
you spent the other half a day to put it into readable English.
All this time I was doing some political reporting. And as additional officers
were assigned to the Embassy, I moved more and more into the political report-
ing. For a while I acted as chief of chancery, executive officer, reviewing corre-
spondence, and having supervision of files and codes and so on. But by early
11)43, or I guess about early 1942, I was spending practically all of my time
on political reporting and drafting, accompanying the Ambassador at times when
he interviewed the Minister of Foreign Affairs or someone like that. The Am-
bassador traveled with some difficulty between the Embassy and the south bank
in the city and the Ambassador didn't speak much Chinese so it was customary
to always have a Chinese-speaking officer to go with him when he had to visit
the city.
Q. Who was the Ambassador then? — A. Mr. C. E. Gauss.
Q. During that period in what groups were your Chinese contacts? — A. Well,
they were developing. I arrived in Chungking, of course, with very few Chinese
friends. One group was again old friends of my parents. My father had served
in Chungking and organized the YMCA and the Chinese YMCA secretaries and
other people connected with the YMCA knew my father. Another group was the
Chinese members of the Rotary Club, which I joined. The Rotary Club in
Chungking was at least three-fourths Chinese. They were mainly business
and professional men. We had informal Masonic meetings for a period and
then we organized a Masonic lodge in Chungking and there again it was almost
entirely Chinese and the members were Government officials, businessmen, pro-
fessional men, officials of the Chinese Government. I met a number of — in fact
I met most of the Chinese who were connected with the Ministry of Informa-
tion and th Chinese officials of news agencies — they had a sort of club to which
I belonged for a while. It was an informal club.
Then I became acquainted gradually with the junior officers in the Chinese
Foreign Office and got to know some of them quite intimately before I left.
About 1942 I began to become acquainted with many of the working Chinese
newspapermen, reporters, junior editorial writers, on some of the leading
Chinese papers.
The Chairman. Does that cover that question?
A. Yes.
The Chairman. Shall we adjourn for lunch?
Mr. Rhetts. We have one witness, Mr. Johnson.
Thereupon, Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, being produced, sworn, and examined
as a witness in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as follows :
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Johnson, will you state your full name and address for the record? — A.
My name is Nelson Trusler Johnson and I have been employed with the Govern-
ment of the United States since 1907, mostly in China. My last post in China was
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2059
that of Chief of the Mission beginning in February l!>3i> and ending in May 1941.
I then went to Australia as American Minister and was there from September
1941 until April l'.)4.~>. I retired from the Foreign Service on the first of April
194C and have been temporarily employed by the Department of State since that
date and acting as Secretary Genera) to the Enr Eastern Commission, which is an
international organization established for the purpose of formulating policy in
connection with the occupation of Japan.
Q. When did you become Chief of Mission in China, sir? What year was
that?— A. It was— I presented my credentials, I think, on February 2, 1940.
Q. In 1930?— A. Yes; 1930.
Q. You're acquainted with Mr. Service, are you? — A. Yes; I know Mr. Service.
I think my first acquaintance with his family was when I met his father and
mother out in Chungking back in the early twenties. Then when I was in Peiping
as Chief of Mission Mr. Service came to Peiping as a language attache. I have
forgotten the exact year, but I think it was about 1935. I'm not too certain
about that year. He was there for the usual 2-year period of study, passed his
examinations, as I recall, with ease, and then was assigned to the field as a vice
consul and has continued in the career service since that time.
Mr. Achilles. Pardon me. may I ask a question at that point. Did you ever
have any indication that Mr. Service's parents were in any way communistic-ally
inclined? — A. None whatever. I said that I met the parents there. I didn't
know them but they were engaged in, I think, the YMCA, wasn't it?
Mr. Service;. Yes.
A. In western China, and I never heard the slightest report that the Service
family was engaged in anything other than the most respectable and most re-
spected occupations in China. If there had ever been any reports of that
kind I'm certain that I would have heard some gossip about it. I never did.
In fact they were held in the highest respect by those who knew them and by the
Chinese.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. After Mr. Service graduated as a language attache and was assigned to the
consulate, was his work in general under your administrative supervision at
all? — A. No; it was not. And he did not come under my personal observation
again until he was assigned to the American Embassy or that portion of the
American Embassy which was temporarily stationed at Chungking. In April
1941, just about, well, I think it was less than a month before I left to go to
Australia, Mr. Service arrived on that detail. I saw something of him during
those days when I was getting ready to leave. I do not recall that I saw him
again until I met him here in Washington in 1945.
Q. Now, during the period that you had occasion to know him in China, first
in Peiping and later in Chungking, did you have an opportunity to form a
judgment about his general competence and his general political orientation
at all?— A. Well, I would put it this way, that during the period that Mr. Service
was attached to the Embassy as a language attache there was nothing that
occurred that would have attracted my attention in any way, shape or form
to his political activities because unless there was something peculiar about
them I would not have paid any attention to them. He was a member of the
group of students attached to the Legation at the time I mentioned who came
under my observation who were intelligent and who did their work with credit
and who were, insofar as the reports which came to me from those who I had
immediate supervision over their studies, intellectually honest.
There was no occasion, so far as I can recall, for my being interested at all in
Mr. Service's political orientation or outlook. Certainly when I was associated,
on occasions, with Mr. Service and his wife and those of his group of students,
nothing ever happened, nothing was ever said, nothing ever came to me, that
indicated that I should be in any sense of the word interested.
Q. In that connection, sir, if— during this period in Peiping— Mr. Service had
been in any way active politically and communistically inclined, would you have
expected that his immediate supervisors would in turn have reported to you
would have brought that fact to your attention? — A. Well, I would certainly
expect that that would happen because the reports on the personnel attached to
the Legation were all signed by myself once a year and, as my mind goes back to
those days and to the preparation of those reports, they were discussed among
the senior members of the staff and those who came into immediate contact with
the subjects of the reports so that if there had been anything peculiar about
any of these young men I would have known it.
68970— 50— pt. 2 37
2060 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
I remember one or two who were peculiar and who eventually disappeared in
that strange way that mist has of disappearing in the morning for this reason
or that reason. Their reasons were never too clear but it was my recollection
that their disappearance was due chiefly to lack of interest in their work or
lack of interest in the particular subject of Chinese which they were concen-
trating on.
Mr. Achiixes. Did you have at any time any indication that Mr. Service was
opposed to or not in sympathy with American policy toward China at the
time? — A. None whatever.
The Chairman. Now the question you originally asked, counsel?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. With respect to this particular period you mentioned, sir, I take it you are
referring to the efficiency reports which are annually made on each of the Foreign
Service officers? — A. The efficiency reports that .were made on the personnel in
the Embassy at Peiping that ran all the way from those immediately junior to
me on down to the last messenger.
Q. In that connection, am I correct in believing that the matter of prepara-
tion of these annual efficiency reports in the Foreign Service is a matter which
is given very careful attention? — A. In my own particular case I tried to give
them a special personal consideration because I had served for 2% years, I think
it was. as an inspecting officer — through the years 1921', 1923. 1924, and I know it
was a phase of the work that I was particularly interested in. I had been
interested in the personnel of the Foreign Service. I have been connected with
it quite a long time. I have seen it grow. I have been sympathetic with it. I
have been interested in the kind of young men that have come out to the Far
East and interested themselves in the service in the Far East.
I was instrumental in a small way when I served in the Department in working
over the regulations for that service. I helped somewhat in the discussions con-
nected with the examinations for those young men. And I have been extremely
interested in the type of young men. the kind of young men. and the kind of
work that they were doing. So that when we prepared these efficiency reports or
these personnel reports once a year I tried to give them a special consideration
for that reason.
Now, of course, in preparing an efficiency report yon sometimes are reporting
on personnel who you're not too intimately acquainted with. But you have to
build it on that. And you should build on that. I have always understood that
these reports were given very serious consideration here in the Department.
And I have always felt myself that if the man in the field didn't put some of
himself into it that they were of no use here whatever.
Q. Turning to the later period in Chungking when Mr. Service became attached
to the Embassy there, did you, during the course of your conversation and con-
tact with him at that time, have any basis to reach a judgment about his political
views and outlook? — A. The time that Mr. Service was with me in Chungking
of course was a very short one, extending from about the middle of April 1941
until I left. I left in about the middle of May. And during that period of time
he was just newly attached. There was no occasion for me to have any reason
to read anything. I don't know whether he wrote anything during that time
that I should have i*ead. But I'd like to say that during that period of time
when I was preparing to leave and when I saw and greeted Service — as a young
man in whom I had been interested and who was now rejoining my staff in
a sense — I welcomed him there and I certainly did not at any time have the
slightest indication from anybody or do I recall anything that he ever said to
me or he ever said in my presence that would have alarmed me in any sense
of the word as to his political views.
I'd like to say in this connection I have been in the service a long time and as
young men come on in the service they all come with new ideas, ideas that are
the product of their own environment, the product of their own training. And
(be first thing that I recognized or have tried to train myself to recognize in
relation to the personnel that I have had to deal with was their right to see
things as they saw them, and I certainly expected them to speak to me of them
as they saw them and not as they thought I would like them to see them. It just
happens that in this case there was never any occasion, as far as I know, for
Mr. Service to make any reports to me about things that he saw. But I have
been curious about this matter, of course, and I have within recent months
turned up memoranda which have been attributed to Mr. Service and which
have been printed in the volume issued by the Department of State having
special reference to "United States policy with regard to China," and I believe
STATE DEPAKTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2061
vulgarly known as the white paper. And I have read these memoranda with
special reference to what I might have thought about them if they had been made
to nie or had heen made under my supervision. And I'd like to say this, that I
couldn't find in those memoranda anything that I would not have forwarded
to the Department of State if it had been made by one of my subordinates at
thai lime.
New. I'd like to say that I don't necessarily agree with the judgment of my
young men. I don't necessarily agree with Mr. Service's judgment in interpret-
ing some of the things he reports at times. And I would think, at least I hope
I would have exercised my right to express my disagreement with that judgment,
but I would not have considered that it was my duty or my right in my relation-
ship with the Department of State to suppress views which young men who
have been trained in the service to see and try to see honestly and I have always
believed that Mr. Service was honest intellectually, and I don't remember any
of my young men that I didn't consider honest intellectually. And I have never
been known consciously to have been deceived by them. But I have never be-
lieved that, and I don't believe after reading those documents that there is any-
thing in them that I wouldn't have forwarded and let the chips fall where they
went; if the Department considered that the views therein expressed and the
judgment therein expressed flowed with its judgment, that was something that
I felt was the proper function of the leaders of the Department of State and not
mine. I never interpret it as just my job in the field to present only my point of
view.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. You say you would have forwarded those documents? — A. I would have.
Q. Did you see anything in any of the documents which you have read which
indicated to you any disloyalty to the United States? — A. I saw nothing in those
documents that indicated to me that the writer of those reports was in any sense
of the word disloyal, either to the United States or to his office, as a reporter on
what he saw.
Q. Well, did you see anything that would have indicated to you that he was a
security risk? — A. No, sir; I did not.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. You're speaking now of documents written after your departure from
Chungking? — A. I'm speaking now of documents written after my departure
which had nothing to do with my period there, documents which I have read out
of personal curiosity because I have been interested in a young man who was
attached to my staff and in whom I had a personal interest and in whose train-
ing I had had an interest. And naturally I have been sort of personally con-
cerned in knowing what was behind all this business. I wasn't conscious of any
training of people to grow up here as traitors, spies, and disloyal people. And
so I have read those documents. That is all, however, that is the whole of my
reading of Mr. Service's writings.
Q. Did you — I take it, due to your long service in China, you have continued
to keep familiar with our policy toward China, even while you were serving in
Australia? — A. Well, only insofar as I could be familiar with it in such speeches
or such reports as the press gave me. But I have not had anv access to any of
the files since. And I have particularly tried to refrain from it.
Q. You would say, would you not, that particularly in recent years you have
had occasion to keep familiar with United States policy toward China? — A. Yes.
Q. And in reading these documents of Mr. Service, are there any of those that
you would consider to be antagonistic to American policy towards China at the
time as you understood it? — A. I would have to read those documents over again
and think of them in that light because I did not read them for that purpose.
Q. But you had no such impression from reading them? — A. No, I have
no such impression. My impression was that the reports were written by a
young man who was trying to see things as honestly as he could and who was
trying to tell the story as honestly as he could. I think those reports do per-
haps contain some recommendations which must have been contrary to the prac-
tice that you found. But I do not consider that recommendations are necessarily
in opposition to policy.
Q. Would you consider any of those recommendations of an improper na-
ture?— a. Certainly not. I have never considered any recommendation made by a
member of my staff as being improper. Perhaps I have never seen any, perhaps
I wouldn't recognize an improper one, but I would certainly — if a recommenda-
2062 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
tion caine along with which I didn't agree or I had other views with regard to it,
I would parallel it with my own and give it to the Department of State to choose.
I wouldn't call the young man in and say "Take them out." I certainly did not
see in those documents any recommendations that I would have considered im-
proper for him to make, whatever I might have thought of it— what's the word
I want, whatever I might have thought of the judgment upon which the rec-
ommendations would have been made.
I might not have agreed with the conclusions upon which those recommenda-
tions were made but I certainly didn't consider them improper. I thought they
were very proper. I would have felt that a young man having those conclusions
and having those views, if he didn't make the recommendations, was not doing
his duty.
Q. In other words A. That is what he was there for, it seems to me. At
least that has always been my belief in the work of the Department of State.
How else can the Secretary of State or any of those who advise him judge it?
How can they judge the situation that exists abroad, which they have to deal
with, if they can't get the picture as accurately as possible? There is no single
truth. You have got to see it in all of its phases. You have got to see it from all
of its angles.
White lights are made up of many colors. You can't judge white light by black
or blue or red, but put them all together and it's white. You have got to put all
of these recommendations and all of these views together for the Government or
the Secretary of State to make his decision as to how he is going to act or what
he is going to do and it would seem to me that it would be highly improper for—
well, that the improper thing would be to try to guide these, for some single
source in the field to guide these young men or guide the reporters in such a way
that the facts as they saw them never got there. Does that say anything? That
is my view anyway.
Q. Yes, I understand it— A. That is my view, for good or bad. And I have
always encouraged such young men as I had about me to go out and see things
as they saw them and express them as they saw them, leaving to myself if I saw
fit to disagree with them or approve. And it seems to me that is the function and
honesty the reporter in the field should follow.
Q. Having spent part of your service in China as an inspector, it's correct is
it not, that one of the principal functions of an inspector is to judge the character
of the persons that he inspects? — A. That is correct, the character and, as I
recall the old form, "the character and the ability and the reputation of the
person upon which you report" was very much a part of the report that you
prepared and I did not— well, in fact all Foreign Service officers attempt to make
themselves aware of the character and the reputation of the personnel abroad
and in their own staffs in order to give the Department an honest appraisal.
Q. From your personal contact with Mr. Service, what would be your appraisal
of his character? — A. Well, my appraisal of his character would be that he was
honest intellectually, that he was morally courageous, that he was intellectually
curious, that he was trustworthy, and I would say loyal.
Q. Have you any reason at all to doubt his loyalty? — A. None. I have never
had any reason to doubt his loyalty, up to this moment, none whatever. I have
valued his friendship, I have valued the friendship of his family. He has a
very charming wife, the daughter of an Army officer who came and joined our
little group of personnel there in Peiping and Mr. and Mrs. Service while there
as students bore themselves very well in the community and were liked and
respected. And to the best of my knowledge and belief throughout his service he
has enjoyed the respect of those around him.
Q. Did you ever have any occasion to question in any way Mrs. Service's
loyalty? — A. Never. My children have played with their children and I have a
very high regard for the character of the children, which the Service family are
bringing into the world now to carry on the Service tradition.
Q. What would be your estimate of Mr. Service's reputation in China at the
periods you knew him?— A. Well, I would have said that it was very high. I
never heard anything to the contrary. I have never known anything to the con-
trary. I may say the greatest shock I ever had with regard to anybody that I
have served with is the accusations that were made about Mr. Service. And
I still don't know anything about them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)
(The Board adjourned at 1 p. m. )
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2063
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
1 >ate : Saturday. May 27, 1950—2 to 5: 30 p. m.
Place: Room 22fi4. Now State.
Reported by : E. L. Koontz, CS/Reporting.
Board members present: Conrad E. Snow. Chairman, Theodore C. Achilles,
Arthur G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
In the case of John S. Service : Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney.
(The meeting reconvened at 2 p. m.)
(After being duly sworn, former Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss testified in
behalf of John S. Service as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Gauss, will you state your full name and address for the record? — A.
My name is Clarence Edward Gauss. I live at the Wardman Park Hotel.
Q. What is your present position, sir?— A. My present position is member of
the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, a Government
corporation.
Q. Would you describe briefly, sir. your prior positions with the United States
Government? — A. Yes. I entered the Department of State in 1906 and retired
from the Foreign Service on the 31st of May 1945. I retired as Ambassador. I
entered the Department as a clerk at $900.
Q. And at the time of your resignation from the Foreign Service your position
was what? — A. Ambassador. I was Ambassador to China, and from about the
middle of November 1944 until the end of May 1945 was on leave of absence,
terminal leave I suppose you would call it, prior to retirement.
Q. So that the period of your incumbency in the Ambassadorship in Chungking
was from A. From the spring of 1941 through about the middle of November
1944.
Q. And immediately prior to that what position?— A. Prior to that I had been
a minister to Australia for about — oh, 8 or 9 months is all I had down there,
worst luck.
Q. And immediately prior to your A. Immediately prior to that I had been
consul general in Shanghai from 1936 until early 1940 and I went down to Aus-
tralia and then went to Chungking as Ambassador in the spring of 1941.
Q. Yes. Am I correct in believing, sir, that the Board of Directors of the
Export-Import Bank is by law a bipartisan board?— A. That's quite true. I am
one of the Republican directors.
Q. Now, would you state to the Board when you first met Mr. Service? — A.
Well. I think Mr. Service came to me at Shanghai sometime in 1938, I couldn't
say when but my recollection is somewhere along in there, and if my memory is
correct he was still there when I left early in 1910.
Q. Yes. So that he served under you there for a period of approximately A.
A vear and a half.
Q. A year and a half. And at that time was your relationship to him such
that you had an opportunity to observe him closely? — A. Very much so.
Q. Then when was the next period of your association with Mr. Service? — A.
The spring of 1941 I believe Mr. Service was in Chungking when I arrived, if he
wasn't he came a few days later.
Q. Yes. — A. And lie remained attached to the Embassy from the spring of
1941 until the summer of 1943, when I think, I being in California in the hospital,
not knowing anything about it. the Army grabbed him and attached him to
military headquarters. He was detached from the Embassy ; attached to military
headquarters, but in his work with military headquarters he still continued to
give us at the Embassy copies of his political information. He was, in a measure,
a liaison officer between the headquarters and the Embassy and we saw quite a
bit of him although I had no responsibility for him after the middle of 194.",.
Q. Now, coming back, first, to the period during which he served under you
at the consulate in Shanghai I believe you have indicated that his relation to
you was such that you had an opportunity to observe him very closely? — A. Oh,
yes.
Q. Would you care to characterize for the Board your general impression of
him at that time with particular reference, first, to his competence as a Foreign
Service officer, and, second, with special reference to his political orientation,
if any, that came under your observation? — A. Well, gentlemen. I believe that out
of Shanghai you probably will find in your State Department records an efficiency
report on Mr. Service, which, I am quite sure. I prepared, and I think it will
show you that I considered him one of the outstanding, if not the most efficient
2064 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and promising younger member of the Foreign Service that had come to my
notice. I had a very high regard for him, so had members of my staff. When he
first came to us we put him on — we would call it administrative work, and, as I
recall, why he reorganized several of the departments of the consulate general.
All you had to tell him was what you wanted and it was done. We knew, of
course, that he had been born and raised in China. He had considerable know-
ledge of China and the Chinese, and just as soon as we could we put him in what I
called our political office. At that time, I should explain, the Japanese were in
occupancy of Shanghai, but not in actual occupation of the International Settle-
ment. We had a great deal to do in the way of protection of American nationals
at Shanghai at that time. We had a political office, which not only reported
such political information as we gathered there but also had a great deal to
do in negotiation with the Japanese for the protection of American interests. As
I recall, we put Service in that office some time before I left Shanghai and he
was' continuing there to show the same ability that he had in other places. He
was outstanding. I don't know of any officer in my whole 39 years of service
who impressed me more favorably than Jack Service and I have had an awful
lot of young officers with me.
The Chairman. Would you like to examine the efficiency report to refresh your
recollection?
A. I am sure I would be glad to see it again. I think it will bear out my
statement.
Q. I think it probably will. — A (after looking through efficiency report). Yes.
Q. Is there anything you would like to add to your statement [indicating ef-
ficiency report] ? — A. No ; I don't think so. That was a rating that I gave to
Mr. Service as a junior officer. After all, you had various grades of officers there
at the post, and he was one of the very junior officers, and he had a very good
rating.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Gauss, would you also comment, if you can, on any opinion that
you may have formed of Mr. Service's political orientation or political views,
and I should say that you are doubtless aware at this point in time we are par-
ticularly interested in any possible Communist leanings that he might have
exhibited? — A. No; Mr. Service never in my observation exhibited any Commu-
nist leanings.
I would like to make this statement, and, General, I am rather surprised that
it isn't in that efficiency report. But one of the first things that impressed me most
about Mr. Service was this: He was born and raised abroad. Now, I think Mr.
Achilles would bear me out there in submitting in the case of so many American
boys born and raised abroad they become international in their outlook ; they
get away from their American side, and you find them in China — and it is par-
ticularly true, if Jack will forgive me, of language officers in Japan and China
and in the Orient — first thing you know they are pro this or pro that; anti this
or anti that. Jack Service impressed me particularly during my whole period
of contact with him of going right down the middle of the road as an American.
He was objective in his approach to all of the political problems that we had.
Now I don't mean to say he was ostentatiously American, but he thought in
bis whole analysis, his political information and everything else, he thought as
an American. And, to me, that was one of the most refreshing things that I
could have had in my whole service. For instance, at Chungking I had an
officer who was so pro Chiang Kai-shek that he would just go red in the face when
anybody said anything in criticism of the existing government. You couldn't
deal — you couldn't use an officer like that. But Jack Service impressed me at
Shanghai and at Chungking as one of that type of Americans that could go right
down the middle of the road as an American who recognized that he was abroad
to recognize American interests and look at things from the American standpoint.
There was no suggestion in any case of pro or anti anybody. He liked the
Chinese as we all did. He got along with them.
Mr. Achilles. In his Chinese contacts, would you say that he had any particu-
lar groups that he associated with more than any other?
A. Now, Mr. Achilles, I would like to go very positively into that particular
question because the only thing that I know about of Mr. Service — of complaint
against him — is the McCarthy statement that he associated with Communists. In
Chungking, Mr. Service was a political officer of the Embassy. His job was to
cover the waterfront. His job was to get every bit of information that he pos-
sibly could, and he went over to the Chungking side of the river every day and
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2065
he saw everybody that lie could. Now it was difficult to get information in those
days. We had a censorship. They had all these wonderful stories about Chinese
victories which never proved to be true. Hollington Tong used t<> give out this
information to the press and your Chinese press was censored, you couldn't get
information, you had to go out and get it yourself. Jack Service's job was to go
ever to the other side of the river and to see everybody that he could. He would
see the foreign press people. He saw the Chinese press people. He saw any-
body in any of the embassies or legations that were over there that were sup-
posed to know anything. He saw any people in the foreign office or any of the
other niinisteries. He went to the Kuomintang headquarters and talked with
whoever he could see there. He went to the Ta Kung Pao
The Chairman. Would you spell that?
A. T-a-k-u-n-g-p-a-o, which was the independent newspaper. He went to this
independent newspaper, he was in touch with those people. He went to the Com-
munist newspaper. He went to Communist headquarters. He associated with
everybody and anybody in Chungking that could give him information, and he
pieced together this puzzle that we had constantly before us as to what was going
on in China, and he did a magnificent job at it.
Now I would say this: During the period that Mr. Service was within the
Embassy I had information — I don't know whether we ever mentioned it to
Service or not — but I had it through my counselor that Chiang Kai-shek had
commented that officers of our legation were going into Communist headquarters,
and I was asked whether I wanted to prohibit them from going into Communist
headquarters, and I said : "No, I want them to go wherever they ought to go to
get the information that we need. We will do it openly and if Chiang Kai-shek
has any comment to make on it let him make it to me and not indirectly." I
told the counselor of the Embassy who reported that to me that he was not to
give any instructions that Jack was not to go into the Communist headquarters.
Mr. Achilles. His contact with the Communists at that point was strictly in
accordance with his official duties?
A. Strictly in accordance with his official duties. I didn't tell him to go there,
but I expected him to go there, that was his job, and you didn't have to tell
Jack Service what his job was. or how to do it. He did it. I would like to
make that very plain. I would like to make very plain the fact that during the
period he was there I was told that Chiang Kai-shek objected to some of our
people going into the Communist headquarters, and I said we would not pro-
hibit them from doing it.
Now. there was a representative in Chungking at that time of the Communist
Party, who was recognized by Chiang Kai-shek, that representative, Chou En-lai,
is now Foreign Minister to the Communist government in China, and was a
frequent guest at most of the foreign embassies in Chungking. The British
Ambassador, who was later British Ambassador here, had Chou En-lai constantly
in his house at dinner. I knew Chou En-lai when I went to Chungking but
I never entertained him. I had no more contact with him than to speak to him
lightly on the steps of the Soviet Embassy when be would be going in. or
I would be going in to some official reception, that's all.
Questions by Mr. Bhetts :
Q. In that connection though I take it you expected Mr. Service to maintain
all the contacts with him that were possible. — A. I e::pected him to maintain
those contacts.
Q. Now in eonnection with your comments a moment ago, Mr. Gauss, you
were referring to the fact that some people were pro this or anti that, and
you indicated that in the case of Service, on the contrary, lie was entirely
objective. In that connection, was it your observation, in the light of your
knowledge of events and political affairs in China, that a person who made
statements critical of the Kuomintang at that time was in any way nonobjec-
tive? — A. Oh. no, I would not say it was nonobjective.
Q. In other words, your own judgment would be any objective reporting would
include necessarily the making of critical A. It did. Unfortunately, he had
to say a lot that was not favorable to the Kuomintang.
Q. Now General Hurley, as you may know, has preferred very serious charges
against Mr. Service on account of his activities in China. General Hurley has
stated in the course of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in December 104." that Mr. Service was one of a group of Foreign Service
officers in China, which included George Acheson, who sought to subvert or
defeat American policy in relation to that country; that he exhibited pro-
2066 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Communist affinities and that he, in effect, was seeking to bring about the down-
fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government. While I recognize that you cannot have
personal knowledge of the period subsequent to your departure, but inasmuch
as you were the Ambassador who immediately preceded General Hurley as
Ambassador I wonder if you woidd care to comment on those charges insofar
as your observation of Mr. Service's activities can shed light on them? — A. I am
sorry General Hurley isn't here because I would call him a liar to his face.
There was never at any time any suggestion of disloyalty on the part of Mr.
Service or George Acheson or any of the other members of my staff in Chungking
with reference to American policy in China or any desire to bring about the
collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek government.
The Chairman. I might say for the record here that General Hurley has been
invited to be a witness before this Board — just for the record, that's all.
A. I have no objection to General Hurley being informed of exactly what I
have said here.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Did you at any time question Mr. Service's personal loyalty to you? — A. I
never expected any personal loyalty, Mr. Achilles, from Mr. Service or any other
member of my staff. I considered that their loyalty was to the American Govern-
ment. Now, outside of that, I would say that I had no occasion to question Jack
Service's loyalty to me as his chief, or his respect to me as his chief.
Q. Nor to United States policy? — A. Not for one instant. Let me say this, too :
I encouraged the younger officers of my staff, especially the political officers, to
do a little thinking on their own. Now Service was not a political adviser; he
was a political observer, a political reporter, and a political analyst. And I never
discouraged, I encouraged, these younger officers when they were doing this
political work to give us the benefit of their thinking, encouraged them to think
and say what they thought, and they were probably freer to do that with me
than they were with my successor.
Q. Mr. Service has told us that during the time he was at Shanghai he sub-
scribed to magazines known as the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, pub-
lished by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the magazine Amerasia, all of
which, it is alleged, at some point have contained considerable Communist propa-
ganda. Were you familiar with those magazines at the time you were in Shang-
hai?— A. No; I was not familiar with those magazines at the time I was in
Shanghai. I heard about them and I was always sore because the Department
of State didn't send them out to us. We never got anything; we had to go and
get everything ourselves. I would like to know what went on. Occasionally, you
would see a reference in the press to some article, but we never saw the maga-
zines.
Q. You never had occasion then to form any judgment as to whether those
magazines contained Communist propaganda in any way at that time? — A. No,
as a matter of fact, I never saw those magazines until I retired from the Service
and came down here to Washington and was interested in what was going on
and I then subscribed for them. I wanted to know what was going on in these
magazines.
Q. At the time you did subscribe to them were you conscious of any improper
propaganda in them? — A. No; I considered that Amerasia was very distinctly
anti-Chiang Kai-shek and rather, perhaps, favorable or complimentary toward
the Communist regime in China, but I never had any impression of their being
Communist propaganda. I didn't read them very carefully. I looked over them
to see what they were. I bought one on the newspaper stand one day, this
Amerasia, to see what it was like; I wanted to follow it. Pacific Survey — what
do they call it — the Far Eastern Survey?
Q. The Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. — A. I knew Lawrence Salsbury
who was editing the Survey. He used to be on the Survey. I never saw anything
in any of those publications that particularly disturbed me. I thought a great
many of the people who were writing them didn't know what they were writing
about.
Q. I take it from the efficiency reports, the outstandingly favorable reports
that you gave Mr. Service, that you never at any time had occasion to question
bis character or personal integrity? — A. Not one bit. As I have said before, I
considered him the outstanding younger officer who had served with me for 39
years.
Q. That is high praise. — A. He deserved it. I believe that I must have said it
in some of my later reports. I believe I wrote one or two reports in Chungking
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2067
on Service. I am not sure whether you have them or uot, but I think I said it.
Q If 1 might say so, you have the reputation in the service of being a tough
chief _A. I don't think I was a tough chief. I think I was fair to my men, and
I think I wanted them to get on. There was room at the top for everybody and
I encouraged these men to do a lot of thinking of their own and to be free to
come in and talk. But I was tough in some respects, I'll admit, but that's an-
other thing.
Q. I don't have anything else.
Mr. Stevens. Now, I take it from your earlier remarks concerning the respon-
sibility that Mr. Service had to keep himself informed in China you would have
considered it just as much his responsibility to read and to get his hands on any
information that had a bearing upon that responsibility as well?
A. Oh, yes. quite. As a matter of fact, Jack Service because our, I think, gov-
ernmental authority on Chinese communism. I don't believe that there was in
the Army or the Navy anyone, and certainly not in the Foreign Service, who had
made the study of that whole movement in the way that Jack Service did, who
had translated these speeches and these pronouncements, and these edicts, and
everything else that came out of Communist headquarters, and be did the whole
thing. He had to spend a tremendous time documenting that thing to make him-
self what he needed to be — an expert on that situation— that's part of his job.
The Chairman (to Mr. Rhetts). Do you want to proceed?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Gauss, you have indicated that during the period when you were
Ambassador in Chungking, Service was until August 1943 a member of your
staff?— A. That's right.
Q. And that thereafter he was detached and attached to the staff of General
Stilwell?— A. That's right.
Q. You also indicated that even after his becoming attached to the Army
nonetheless copies of his political memoranda were furnished to the Embassy? —
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And did you have occasion to read some of those or a substantial number of
them as they flowed into the office?— A. Oh, yes, yes, and a great many of them
were sent into Washington with covering dispatches, with or without comment
that we might have in the Embassy on what Jack had to report.
The Chairman. The Ambassador's statement is borne out by an efficiency
report which he signed dated August 1, 1942, and I think perhaps it would be
well if it can be read into the transcript.
Mr. Rhetts. I would welcome it.
The Chairman. I won't read it at this time, but I will just indicate to the
stenographer that it can be — unless the Board desires to hear it.
Mr. Stevens. I would just like to caution here as to the use that the Board
makes in putting materials that have come in on Foreign Service officers generally
into the transcripts of the record. I would like to know how far, in your opinion,
Mr. Moreland, we are privileged to do that? To summarize the contents, pos-
sibly yes : I just wonder whether it is within our prerogatives to do the other.
Mr." Moreland. Perhaps an excerpt of the last pai-agraph would be sufficient.
Mr. Stevens. I think that is perfectly permissible.
Mr. Achiixes. I have read the report and I am satisfied that what the Am-
bassador has said accurately reflects what is in it.
The Chairman. I will read then portions of the efficiency report dated August 1,
1942 [reading:]
"He is, in my opinion, one of the ablest and most promising younger officers
of the China corps and the service in general.
"At present he is assigned to duty as immediate assistant to the Ambassador
on political and Chinese-language work; scruitinizing the Chinese press, making
special inquiries and investigations, preparing dispatches and reports, etc. He
has also become familiar with the administrative work of the Embassy, and is
an all-around officer, capable of stepping in and filling any position.
"He is thoroughly dependable ; has a fine sense of loyalty and responsibility ;
is tolerant, just, well balanced ; thoroughly devoted to his duties ; industrious,
cooperative, shows initiative, is ambitious, and displays force and will power.
He has an acute mind, and is thorough and exceedingly painstaking in all his
work. He has a good political sense ; keen in his analysis of political develop-
ments and situations, his judgment is particularly sound and just. I have fol-
lowed the practice throughout my career of encouraging younger officers to frank
2068 STATE DEPARTMENT EA1PLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
examination and discussion of the political findings and conclusions of the office.
Mr. Service has shown an admirable response in this direction, being frank and
constructive in his analysis and criticisms and at the same time showing appro-
priate modesty and restraint.
"At the moment of writing this report, he is absent on a trip to the northwest
with a group of Chinese engineers attending an engineering and economic con-
vetion at Lanchow. If the Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Wong Wen-hao
(one of the ablest men in the government) carries out plans to proceed to the
Chinese oil fields in Kansu he has indicated that he will be glad to have Mr.
Service accompany him. No other foreigner is to attend the convention or make
the proposed trip. The confidence and respect in which he is held by the Chinese
is reflected in the invitation extended to him in this instance. He has accom-
panied other groups of Chinese on tours in Szechuan province when Dr. Wong
was present and the present invitation is the result of Dr. Wong's observation of
him on those occasions.
"Mr. Service in my opinion is one of the best equipped and most able of the
younger officers of the service ; head and shoulders over most of his colleagues of
equal seniority in the service. I could ask for no more efficient or satisfactory
staff officer. He is the outstanding younger officer who has served with me over
my 36 years of service.
"I rate him : Excellent."
This is signed by C. E. Gauss, American Ambassador.
A. I wrote it. I didn't realize I had gone into such detail about him at that
time, but I wrote it and I still stand by it. I had forgotten about this trip to
Lanchow that Jack made, and Dr. Wong Wen-hao, who is mentioned in there
as Minister of Economic Affairs, was one of the outstanding men in the National-
ist Government, one of the finest Chinese that I know, a man of great integrity,
who appreciated what America was trying to do for China, and who appreciated
Service.
Mr. Achilles. The Chinese officials mentioned in there were all officials of
the Nationalist Government?
A. Oh. yes. Yon see, we had no contact with the Chinese Communists except
through that one man. Chon En-lai, down in Chungking until the summer of
1944 when during the visit of Vice President Wallace to Chungking Chiang Kai-
shek finally yielded on a demand that we would have a military mission in
Yenan, which was the Communist capital, a military mission for the purpose
of gathering military information on what the Japanese were doing in Man-
churia and north China. At that time I urged on General Ferris, who was the
deputy chief of staff in command in Chungking, and on Colonel Barrett, who
was to head that mission, and the only language officer I believe that was
on it — I urged that I would like to have Jack Service go along as attached to
the headquarters as a language man. which was designed to get him up there
to see if he could verify the information that we had had down in Chungking
as to what the Communists were doing in China. I didn't believe these darn
rascals. I had developed — I would say I liked objective officers on my staff,
but I admit I had developed a hate for Comnmnists many, many years before,
and I just was unwilling to accept a great many of the reports that we got on
what the Communists were doing in the way of agrarian reform, in the way
of building up the village councils, in the way of helping the people, troops,
and so on. With all stories which we had. there was no verification from people
that we had in confidence, no verification on the spot. We got hold of every-
body who ever came through there and made them talk, but I wanted Jack Service
to go tip there because with his political mind he could give us then an estimate
of that situation, and he was sent, and he was the only civilian on that group.
I was afraid the Chinese might object to having a civilian officer being on that
group, hut it was all done by the military, and lie was sent as an interpreter,
I suppose, weren't you. Jack?
Mr. Service. It was never specified,
A. Language officer was what I suggested he might lie sent as.
The Chairman. Did that encourage him to make friends with the Com-
munists that he met?
A. You bet your life, that was his job, to make friends with them in the
sense, General, that you have got to make friends with these people if you are
going t<> gel them to talk. They have pit to feel that you are friendly, other-
wise they will clam up. That doesn't mean to say that you have got to pro-
nounce Communist views, bu1 you have at least got to be sympathetic with
them ami lie willing to hear what they have to say and encourage them to talk.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2069
The Chairman. I believe Mr. Service has reported from time to time that it
was his impression that the Chinese Communists were at that time doing mere
toward fighting the Japanese than the Nationalist Government. Was that
impression shared with other members of the Embassy?
A. We didn't know. It was one of the things that those people went up there
to find out.
Q. And yon relied on his report then in that respect? — A. On his report, yes,
and everything else that we got.
Q. You had other confirmatory reports. I take it'.' — A. Oh. yes. that was the
general tenor of all of the information that we were getting, hut, of course,
they couldn't expect as much from the Communists as might have been the case
if they had had arms and ammunition.
Now, I don't know whether I am going ahead of things or not here, but there
was at one time out there quite a feeling that our forces, the American Govern-
ment, should give arms and ammunition to these Communist forces. I don't
believe that Jack Service ever expressed that opinion, but it did come to us in
the Embassy, and, as a matter of fact, it was an opinion that was shared by a
great many of the military people, and I believe by some of this other group of
officers that were connected with headquarters — I mean Foreign Service officers
who were connected with headquarters. In any case. I think your files will show
that as Ambassador I called this to the attention of the Department of State —
that there was considerable feeling about this arming of the Communists out
there. As a matter of fact, I feel General Stihvell was even accused of it at one
time, and I expressed the view that if we had to land on the coast of China, and
there came into contact with Chinese forces fighting the Japanese, we might give
them assistance without reference to the brassards on their arms, but outside
of that I was opposed to any military aid to the Communist forces in China except
it be by agreement with the recognized Nationalist Government. I think the
white paper will show some indication of an opinion in that respect. I don't
recall that Jack Service ever expressed any opinion on it in my day.
Mr. Achilles. I believe the record shows that he subsequently did from the
Embassy.
A. Well. I am sure he will be able to give you the answer on that.
Mr. Achiiles. You say that view was held by a considerable number of officers
in China at the time?
A. Oh, yes, I think it was probably held by Stilwell.
The Chairman (to Mr. Rhetts) . Go ahead.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. As a matter of fact, on that point, Mr. Gauss, as you suggest, the white
paper confirms that impression of yours which General Stilwell ultimately did
come to view it. — A. Stilwell never expressed himself that way. Stilwell wanted
to get control of the troops, Communist troops, quarantine the Communist troops
facing the National Government troops, and not facing the Japanese where they
should have been. When the big Japanese push came clown from the north the
comment was made that the Communists hadn't stopped them — the Communists
had nothing to stop them with. At that time I remember particularly the military
opinion was that we should give arms, equipment to the Communist forces, if
necessary fly it over there.
Mr. Achilles. One question at that point. In the light of subsequent events,
how would you evaluate the accuracy of Mr. Service's reports on conditions there
now? — A. I would say they are just about as close to being 100 percent accurate
as any human being could present. Those that I saw, mind you — I saw nothing
after I left Chungking in 1944, and I admit that I haven't read much of the
white paper.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. One further question on that line, if I may. I take it from what you have
said that after this military mission did go to Yenan. to which Service was at-
tached, the reports that came back tended to confirm the information which you
mentioned you had been reluctant to accept; namely, that the Communists were
doing a pretty good job of. first of all, obtaining popular support, and with their
limited means fighting Japanese in a guerrilla way. — A. Those reports I should
say were very largely oral. For a long time after they were up there we got
nothing. Then I think one or two things did trickle through. You see, you could
only send them out when you sent a plane up. And it wasn't very long after
that when I left Chungking, so whether or not I received much in the way of
written reports from Jack Service after he got to Yenan I can't say. hut I did
2070 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
talk with him whenever he came down and I also talked with Colonel Barrett,
who had been my military attache' — I talked with him when he came down. Gen-
eral Hurley had returned, but I got nothing out of him.
Q. Now, in connection with this subsequent matter, Mr. Gauss, it has been
alleged that while Mr. Service was in China he was in communication with a
Mr. Philip Jaffe, who was the editor of the Amerasia magazine, and it has been
further suggested that in virtue of that communication he could have been in
some way supplying Jaffe with large quantities, or at least quantities, or classi-
fied Government documents. I should like to ask you whether, subsequent to
Service's attachment to the Army in August 1943, he had had access to the
files in the Embassy, as he had formerly had access to them when a member of
the Embassy staff? — A. Oh, no; neither Mr. Service nor any other member of
that Foreign Service group attached to headquarters had access to the files. I
recall the counselor of the Embassy coming to me with that question. I don't
think it was in reference to Jack Service — I think it was with reference to the
head of that group coming into the Embassy, and he just asked me the question,
whether they were to have access to the files. The answer was "No," that if they
wanted any information from the Embassy they could talk to either the political
officer there or to the counselor or to me, and if we had anything we could give
them that was going to be helpful we would give it to them, but they didn't have
free access to the files. As a matter of fact, Jack Service didn't have free access
to all the files at any time. My counselor and I had our confidential files — I
mean our secret files, if you want to make a classification. Jack may have been
instrumental in writing some of those, but they were kept by us, and there were
only two of us that had it.
Q. Yes. Now, in that connection one of the charges made by General Hurley
against Mr. Service, and, presumably, against George Atcheson, and others, was
that they disclosed to the Chinese Communists classified information, informa-
tion concerning American policy. In particular, General Hurley has charged
that a memorandum that Mr. Service wrote in October 1944 was shown to the
Chinese Communists. I would like to ask you whether on the basis of your
knowledge of Service, and your knowledge of the way your Embassy ran,
whether you ever had any reason to believe that there was any possibility that
Service might be engaged in such an operation? — A. No. Emphatically no.
Q. In view of the fact that George Atcheson's name has been so closely linked
with Mr. Service's in the charges made by General Hurley, and in view of the
further fact that George Atcheson is dead, I wonder if you would care to com-
ment here on George Atcheson from the point of view of his activities in rela-
tion— whether he, for example, in your opinion, ever undertook to defeat Ameri-
can policy. — A. Oh, heavens ! Anyone who makes a suggestion like that is
just beneath contempt. Of course, on the one hand. I had with me, in my
39 years' service, Jack Service as the youneer officer : on the other hand, the
senior officer whom I had the greatest of confidence and trust in and who proved
himself worthy of that confidence and trust and in my opinion was one of the
outstanding senior officers in the Service was George Atcheson. Go into your
efficiency records and you will find that I have said that, and no more loyal,
patriotic American served in our Foreign Service than George Atcheson.
Q. I think it fair to say then you would regard such charges as inconceiv-
able.— A. Absolutely inconceivable, no basis at all, a figment of an imagination
which is seeking its own glorification, if you can follow that through.
Q. Very good, I would just like to ask one final question, Mr. Gauss: I wonder
if you could tell the Board something about the general policy which you as
Ambassador and your subordinate Foreign Service officers were expected to
pursue in the matter of dealings with American press representatives in pre-
senting them with information concerning political events in China which were
known to the Embassy? — A. Well, during the period that I was Ambassador I
never held press conferences, but any reputable representative of the press —
American, even British — who wanted to come in and talk to me was always
welcome. We gave them anything we had in the way of leads because they
gave us information that they had in the way of leads. We never disclosed
to them anything in the way of confidential or secret information, of course, but
we did help them because we wanted the picture that came back here to be as
accurate as we could have it. and I consider it is part of the duty of a chief
of mission to try to keep press representatives on the track. Now. they would
sometimes come in with wild ideas and you could explain the situation. We
were never quoted and I don't think there was ever any abuse of any confidence
that we gave any of those people when we talked to them. Now I say we never
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2071
gave them secret information, but we could tell them what was going on and I
know in many oases I sent them off on trips from Chungking down to Kunming,
and suggested they would rind a situation down there worth looking into and
they went there and they did.
Q. Now in that connection, when you say "We never told them secret or confi-
dential information," are you referring to what you would regard as subsequently
secret information as distinguished from information which may be recorded in
a document somewhere which has been stamped "secret" or "confidential"? —
A. I don't mean that type of information that was recorded in a document marked
"secret" and "confidential," I mean information that came to us in strict confi-
dence. For instance, unfortunately something I read in the white book, George
Atcheson went over and talked to Sun Fo ; Sun Fo made some comments there
on Chiang Kai-shek and his failure to meet the situation. We would never tell
that to the press, but I could get pressmen in who might be representing United
Press or Associated Press and we would talk about a situation and I would tell
them : "There is a dissident element operating in Yenan which is building up for
a secession from the National Government ; I think it would be a good idea
for you to go down there and look into that."
Q. The report you had on that situation might very well be marked "secret"
in terms of its transmission? — A. I even told Chiang Kai-shek that.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Did you ever have occasion to believe that Mr. Service was disclosing any
information? — A. No, sir; no information. I had no indication that Mr. Service
was ever disclosing any information, but I will tell you that a situation existed
for months in which I was absolutely certain that everything we were sending
into Washington that had any vital importance at all was immediately reported
back to Chungking. I took occasion twice to make representations to Washing-
ton on that. In the first place, I think they traced the source ; in the second
place
Q. What was that? — A. It stopped at the White House.
Q. This was information you had sent in from Chungking to Washington? —
A. Information that I or my military or naval attaches had sent in.
Q. Which in Washington was given to Chinese sources here or what? —
A. Which in Washington was given to sources which conveyed it to the Chinese.
I had the wife of the premier, if you call him that, the president of the executive
Yiian in China at Chungking, say : "We know what you are reporting to
Washington."
Q. Those leaks were appearing here or were any of them, as far as you
know, in China? — A. Those leaks were purely here, purely here, they could not
have been in China, and the result of them, of course, when anything like that
occurred was to simply close your source of information, so that in the end we
had to be very careful in disclosing our source of information, and for that
reason the information didn't have the value when it got here that it might
have had if we had been able to say who had told us.
Q. Were you successful in getting action to stop the leaks here? — A. No, sir.
The first case was one of suspicion, which I reported from out there, and I
think there were in the Government at that time a lot of these people who were
dogooders who said : "Now the Ambassador out here reports so-and-so ; why I
have got my friend who is Fu Man Chu over here in the Supply Mission and all
you have got to do is sit down and talk to these people and they will straighten it
out." I think it was that type of leak that first came.
In the second case, I think it was a personal relationship, which I have never
been able to prove and which I believed existed, a personal relationship between
a hireling of the Chinese Foreign Minister here and friends of his in the White
House who didn't intend to give information by way of disclosure of secret
information, but it was so easy talking amongst these people to get it out of
them. Of course, that immediately went to T. Y. Soong and after T. V. Soong
left H. H. Kung and it was immediately out in Chungking. So for a time I was
completely frustrated as to what I could send to Washington.
Q. Did you have any reason to suspect that information sent in by the Em-
bassy was being communicated to other unauthorized sources beyond the Chi-
nese?— A. No, no suggestion of that. Occasionally you would get a rather inkling
in your talking perhaps with your British colleague that you had said something
which had been mentioned, but that would be a normal sort of a situation, and
perhaps you would even mention it yourself if he had asked you, or he would
come toddling down and ask you about something which indicated, of course,
2072 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
it had been given through the Department. It was not a leak, it was a com-
munication of information.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Did you allow the same liberties, discretion, and the like, to your political
officers, sir, as you exercised yourself with regard to the handling of informa-
tion with the press, as you just stated you handled it yourself? — A. No. I
would with my counselor, but I don't think you would find that any of my
political officers were in a position to give the full picture to the press. They
might ask about it : "After all, I am going over to see so-and-so ; do you mind if
I mention so-and-so." Something to trail on, something to help while they were
getting the other side of the picture or making inquiries. Now, often you
could give them a report we had and ask them if we had anything on it that
could help them. There was a certain amount of information that they could
naturally give, but over-all, no.
Q. Were they specifically instructed as to how they were to handle themselves
at that time, or did you leave it to their discretion? — A. Yes; I left it to their
discretion. I never had any occasion to give any instructions. They were not
to communicate to these people secret information that the Embassy had, but
the whole proposition was we had a cut-out puzzle there and we were filling in
pieces constantly and we might have this, that, and the other thing from a purely
Chinese source, unofficial source, and their idea was to fill in all those crossword
puzzles and those cut-out puzzles, and get the information if they could — an
over-all picture was never given.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. I wonder here, Mr. Gauss, if you may not be thinking on somewhat higher
plain than possibly — at least what I was trying to inquire about. I understand
what you have been describing is the extent to which you discussed the
over-all A. Over-all.
Q. The over-all political picture and political developments? — A. Yes.
Q. But, let us take down to a slightly lower level where it is a matter of more
or less factual reporting on particular factual situations. — A. Yes.
Q. For example, let us suppose in the case of Service, let us suppose that he
had had an interview with say Mao Tse-tung at a time when other newspaper-
men who happened to be in Yenan also interviewed Mao Tse-tung. Would you
have regarded it as improper for him to talk with members of the press about
what Mao Tse-tung had said the Communist policies were in their general political
programs, matters of that type, factual though no political character? — A. Are
you speaking of an interview in which there were others present, newspapermen
Q. No. Let me suggest to you just the type of interview I have in mind.
For example, you will recall at one point the newspaper people also went up
to Yenan. — A. Oh, yes; yes.
Q. Now let us suppose Mr. Service had an interview with Mao Tse-tung, in
which Mao describes what the official Communist program is and what their
policies with respect to this and that will be, and he does that in a private
interview with Service. Later, he has a similar interview with a newspaper-
man, but there is a discussion of perfectly factual character about what the
political program is. — A. Those sorts of things I don't think he would go out and
inform the newspapermen of what his interview was with Mao Tse-tung. If he
gave him anything in confidence he certainly wouldn't divulge it. But as a
general proposition of what the Communist policy was in his discussions he might
have some knowledge of it, he might mention it in his conversations with news-
papermen of reputation and integrity.
Q. You wouldn't have regarded that as improper or exceeding the general
discretion which you would expect him to exercise? — A. Oh, no; no.
Q. Or describing purely factual situations. I mean if he says there is a
famine in Ho-nan or something of that sort, describing factual matters that
he has observed you would regard that as A. No. Generally —
Q. Appropriate to discuss with members of the press? — A. Oh, in a general
way ; yes. In a general way ; yes.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman (to members of the Board). Any further questions.
Mr. Achilles. No.
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, very much. It has been very
helpful. Nice of you to come in on a Saturday afternoon.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2073
Mr. Gauss. Oh, it is the best tune for me. Good day.
(Former Ambassador darWee E. Gauss alter testifying In behalf of John
S. Service left the hearing til ihis time.)
(Mi-. John s. Service testified in his own behalf as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Aciin.i.i ss :
Q. Now you have listed anions the correspondents that you knew in Chung-
king Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce. Kay Clapper, and Vincent Sheehan. Were
there any other correspondents at that time that you recall seeing much of
in Chungking? — A. Well, I listed these people as visitors who stayed only a
short while. There were correspondents coming and going. I can't recall all
of them now. There was Sonya Tamara I think of the Herald Tribune, Eric
Sevareid — there were a number of people there with Time and Life who came
and went. There was a man from one of the small magazines. There was 'a
man named McEntire from the Reader's Digest.
Q. During the time you were in Chungking did you know a Chinese actress
by the name of Val Chao?— A. Yes.
Q. During what period of time did you know her? — A. Early 1944 until the
time I left China I think.
Q. Did she, to your knowledge, during the time that you knew her have any
Soviet associates? — A. No; not at all that I know of.
Q. Did you ever discuss political matters with her? — A. Not in any detail, no;
do you mean Chinese political matters?
Q*. Yes.— A. No.
Q. Did you ever by any chance disclose to her any classified information? —
A. Certainly not.
Q. After you went to Yenan, I believe you listed yesterday certain correspond-
ents who came through there, one of their names I believe was Epstein of the
New York Times. — A. Well, he was representing the New York Times on a
sort of temporary basis during that trip. He wrote for the Allied Labor News
and I think several publications, a number of Canadian newspapers, if I
remember rightly. He was a man who had lived in China and had had various
jobs with newspapers, and the news agencies in China and he wasn't a permanent
member of the staff of any news organization that I remember, he was a local
employee.
Q. Did he, to your knowledge, have any particular political bias? — A. Yes.
He was leftist, hut I discussed the question with him once about whether or
not he was a Communist, and he insisted and assured me and gave a good
many reasons why he was not a Communist.
Q. What was your own opinion of his views? — A. I accepted his statement
that he was not a Communist.
Q. And I believe you mentioned Guenther Stein of the Christian Science
Monitor, is that it, as being there? — A. That's right.
Q. And did you form any opinion of his political views? — A. I would have
said that he was a very conservative person by nature.
Q. How much of him did you see while you were there? — A. "Well, I saw
a good deal of him up at Yenan because he was by far the most assiduous of
the correspondents. He was a German originally, naturalized British at that
time, and he had a Germanic thoroughness about him. When he interrogated
a person he usually prepared a long list of questions beforehand and went
through and tried to get all the information on that he could possibly get in
the most laborious and methodical way. Dr. Stein was a useful source of
news, and some of my memoranda here transmit long sections of his notes
of interviews which he had had with Communist leaders before we arrived up
there.
Q. He was already there when you arrived? — A. They arrived there several
weeks before we did, and so they had already covered a great deal of the ground
and the quickest way for me to get fairly comprehensive news was to forward
the views these men had of their own news.
Q. How long was he there after you arrived? — A. I had no recollection of his
departure. He may have been there until I left.
Q. And you saw a good deal of him during that full period? — A. Well, partic-
ularly during the first weeks I was in Yenan. After that, the correspondents
were living some distance from us. During the first 2 weeks we were billeted
next door to each other, one compound next to another compound.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. We are talking here about the 1944 period? — A. That's right. Subse-
quently, we were moved over nearer to the Communist military headquarters
2074 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and the correspondents were about 2 or 3 miles away. In Chungking it is hard
to make a guess — I suppose I may have seen Stein once a week or something
like that. Just as I saw most of the other correspondents. The correspondents I
saw most of in Chungking and knew best were Brooks Atkinson, and Teddy
White.
Q. Was Stein considered a reputable correspondent? — A. Very. He had un-
usually good contacts with some of the more important Chinese leaders like T. V.
Soong. In fact, Guenther Stein had been an employee of T. V. Soong's at one
time.
Q. Did you ever give him any classified information? — A. I never gave him
any; no.
. Q. Would you say that your views in the early days that you were at Yenan
were influenced by information which he gave you? — A. No, I wouldn't say they
were. In fact, I differed from Guenther Stein on a good many points, and I
believed that he was far more willing to accept what he was told than I was.
I criticized his book very severely because so much of it is just repetition of things
that he was told.
Q. On what points, if you can recall, did you differ with him? — A. Well, chiefly
that he took a very idealistic view of the Chinese Communists and I didn't.
Q. How do you mean "idealistic"? — A. He was the man who made the state-
ment, I think, that "this is the most modern place in China," and he would not
agree that they were actually far-seeing, shrewd planners of what they were going
to do. He would not accept the fact, which I knew to be a fact, that they had
made their preparations in 1937 for the coming war and had foreseen the oppor-
tunity that would exist for them to expand their control of the guerrilla areas in
north China.
Q. Was he inclined to consider them agrarian reformers as distinct from
Marxist Communists? — A. That is such an oversimplification that it is hard to
analyze — I mean hard to reply to. He certainly didn't think they were merely
agrarian reformers, and he had agreed, he recognized the theoretical Marxist
basis, but he was not inclined to accept the idea that they had planned it this
way and that this was a long-range program toward control of China. His atti-
tude is a little bit like Agnes Smedley. You haven't read Agnes Smedley's book
on China?
Board Members. No.
A. She makes some sort of a statement that these were the most Christian
people she had ever met. Guenther Stein was stricken with the sweetness
and light theory about the Chinese Communists.
Q. At that time had you ever met Philip Jaffe? — A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall ever hearing Stein speak of Jaffe at that time? — A. No, I
never heard Stein speak of him at all. I don't think that Stein had ever
been in the United States at that point : I don't know.
Q. At that time had you ever known Mark Gayn? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or Lieutenant Roth? — A. We are speaking of the first period I was in
Yenan?
Q. The first period. — A. No, I had never heard of Gayn or Lieutenant Roth.
Q. You had not heard Stein speak of those names? — A. No.
Q. When you reported to General Stilwell, as I recall, you had been personal
friends in Peiping before? — A. I would say acquaintances rather than friends.
Q. Acquaintances. During the time that you were attached to General Stil-
well, was he actually in the theater most of the time, or his command covers
India as well at that point? — A. That's correct, his command covered c
thing like 4,000 or 5,000 miles from India through China. He spent ver>
of his time in Chungking. More of his time in India and Burma than he
in Chungking.
Q. How much of the time, would you say during which you were under h
command, were you physically in the same place in Chungking or elsewhere
in the theater? — A. Two months out of fifteen, perhaps.
Q. How were your relations with him? — A. Very friendly and informal, but
I saw him very seldom. I was not bound by military regulations. If I wished
to see him, I could go directly to him. He called me "Jack," had me at his house
once or twice. It was not a military relationship — a friendly one.
Q. Did you ever have occasion to differ with him particularly on policy ques-
tions? — A. None at all.
Q. After he was replaced by General Wedemeyer, how much of the time
were you and General Wedemeyer physically in the same place? — A. I arrived
in Chungking on January 18, 1945, and General Wedemeyer left Chungkin-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2075
for the United States on February 19, 1045. I believe that he spent practically
all of that month in Chungking, so that I was in the same city with him for
1 month.
Q. Had you ever known him previously? — A. I had never met him before.
Q. And about how much did you see of him personally? — A. Considering
the short period, I saw more of him than 1 bad seen of General Stilwell. Gen-
eral Wedemeyer wanted to use the political officers in a different way really.
He used me for drafting of a number of communications, political or semi-
political nature. He also made arrangements for me to attend the regular
headquarters briefing sessions each morning, and I attended several meetings
in headquarters, something which I had not done very much under General
Stilwell.
Q. How would you describe your relations with him, I mean, primarily official
or personal or friendly or A. They were more official. They were on a
friendly basis, again quite an informal basis, but without the background of
friendship that I had with General Stilwell.
Q. Were there any pronounced differences between General Wedemeyer's views
and General Stilwell's views? — A. I didn't discuss the matters with General Wed-
emeyer well enough to make a thorough answer to that. There certainly was
a difference in circumstances. General Wedemeyer was more concerned in get-
ting along with the Chinese. He didn't want — nobody at that time wanted any
more trouble. The Stilwell recall had caused a good deal of bitterness and hard
feelings and the general attitude was to try and patch up the harm that had
been done. So that the attitude of headquarters was very much more friendly
and cooperative as far as the Chinese were concerned. At the same time the
situation in China had changed a great deal. The Japanese drive had ground
to a halt about the first of December 1944, and they had overextended them-
selves, and apparently were being pressed in other places so as to abandon
any further attempts to capture Chungking, and the heat was off. The hump
had been built up at this time so something like 100,000 tons of supplies were
coming in a month, far more than had ever come in under General Stilwell, and
it was an era of attempts on both sides at cooperation. To a far greater extent
than before the army and the political branch of the Embassy were pulling to-
gether and General Wedemeyer recognized General Hurley and the Ambassador
as the President's representatives sent out for a special purpose to negotiate dif-
ference between the two parties and try to bring about unification of the armies,
and he was not pursuing an independent line.
Q. Did you ever have any pronounced differences of opinion with General
Wedemeyer? — A. None whatever.
Q. You say that General Wedemeyer was inclined to take his guidance from
General Hurley on policy questions? — A. Yes, he recognized General Hurley as
the boss really as far as the question of negotiations between the two parties
went, and of any efforts to utilize or try to utilize the Communist forces.
Q. As I recall, your only personal contact with General Hurley in 1944 was
the evening you spent with him on your way back to the United States? — A.
That's correct.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Up to that time you had no differences with General Hurley? — A. None
whatever, and even on that occasion we had no differences, we agreed com-
pletely.
Q. When did you have your first difference with General Hurley? — A. I don't
know whether we could dignify it by the term "difference" with him. After I
returned to Chungking in January 1945 I received word that General Hurley
wanted to see me. I presented myself at his office ; he was not — he did not have
bis offices in the Embassy — and on that occasion he had with him a copy of my
memorandum No. 40, Document 193. He discussed it with me, told me that he
was there to uphold Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government, and that he
would do all of the policy recommending. I don't think you want me to go into
great detail.
Q. No ; I just want to get the occasion. — A. He told me on that occasion that
if I interfered with him in any way, which I took to mean making any policy
recommendations at all, he would break me.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. That was on what date? — A. It would be about January 20, sir, I don't
know the exact date.
Q. 1945?— A. 1945.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 38
2076 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. It was on your return. And did you have occasion between then and your
return to the United States in April to make any policy recommendations? —
A. Yes, sir ; the memorandum which Mr. Ludden and I prepared jointly on
February 14, our Document 204, is a policy recommendation.
Questions by Mr. Snow :
Q. That was at the General's request, wasn't it? — A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rhetts. General Wedemeyer's request.
Questions by Mr. Snow :
Q. General Wedemeyer's, I see. — A. The telegram which I helped to draft, Mr.
Acheson's telegram of February 26 is, of course, a policy recommendation.
Q. And that was after General Hurley left? — A. Yes. But you asked me be-
tween January and April.
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. General Hurley was only temporarily out of China at that time.
Mr. Achilles. What, so far as you recall, were the nature of General's Hur-
ley's instructions — that no one was to go to Yenan again ?
A. I have no knowledge of any such instructions.
The Chairman. What was the question?
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. What was the nature of General Hurley's instructions — that no one should
proceed to Yenan? — A. He could not give any such instructions except concern-
ing his own staff.
Q. No authority to give such instructions to General Wedemeyer or people
under his command? — A. He could ask General Wedemeyer to issue such in-
structions but military personnel and the accredited correspondents in the thea-
ter were under- the army control, and General Hurley could not issue instruc-
tions directly to them. He could ask, as I say, General Wedemeyer, but I know
of no such instructions ; standing instructions in the military theater are that
you don't travel on army planes without orders.
Q. I think that he did issue such instructions and that he was highly incensed
to find out that you had proceeded to Yenan at a later date. — A. Shall I de-
scribe the conditions of my going to Yenan, sir?
Q. First, I am trying to find out anything we can about such instructions
as he may have given — you knew of no such instructions? — A. I knew of no
such instructions.
Q. You knew of no such instructions. Would you tell us then of the circum-
stances of your trip to Yenan? — A. Now, we knew in Chungking that the Com-
munist Party congress was about to convene in Yenan. It was the first congress
they had had since 1934, I believe — 1935. In view of the situation in China
we expected it to be a particularly important meeting. I had spoken once to
General Wedemeyer in February about going to Yenan and he said : "Yes, we
want you to go. I know that State Department wants you to go, but as long
as General Hurley is here I do not think it wise. Later on it will be all right."
He did not want to have any argument with General Hurley at that time.
There had already been several frictions between the two of them. As I say,
about the first of March we expected the congress was about to convene. I
talked to Mr. Acheson, the Charge d'Affaires, and he agreed that of all the
times to be in Yenan for political reporting this was it. So I wrote a memo-
randum on that to the Chief of Staff, indicating request for orders.
Miss Pettis. Two hundred and twelve was the number.
A. I wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General Gross. This memo-
randum first had the approval of the Chief of G-2, and had the approval of Mr.
Acheson, suggesting the desirability of my proceeding to Yenan. It was approved
by the Chief of Staff, official Army travel orders were issued to me, and I
proceeded about March 8 by Army plane to Yenan. Can we insert this in the
transcript?
The Chairman. Is this a copy?
A. It is a copy of my memorandum. I, unfortunately, do not have the actual
orders. I am told they are not in Washington. They were theater orders
and those are not forwarded to Washington. I have copies in my personal
possession among my effects — those are not available to me at the present time.
Mr. Rhetts. I hand the Board Document 212. which is a copy of Mr. Service's
request for Army orders travel to Yenan dated March 4, 1945.
The Churman. it may be put in the transcript, if you would like.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2077
Mr. Rhetts. Again, this is one of those things of which we do not have copies.
We can have it put into the transcript.
The Chairman. This is a secret document — any harm in that?
A. Nothing has heen declassified.
Mr. Achilles. I don't think that's necessary. I have read it and found it to
be as described.
The Chairman. So that we do not need it to be made an exhibit.
Mr. Rhetts. You would like me to simply show that it has been exhibited to
the Board. Of course, this is amongst the papers, all of which were introduced
into the record this morning.
The Chairman. Oh, yes ; it is included in that list of papers.
A. This is in the 101 to 227 series.
The Chairman. O. K.
A. I think the only point that needs emphasis is that I went to Yenan under
Army orders after the most complete consultations with the Chief of Staff
personally, with the Embassay, and with G-2.
The Chairman. Where was General Hurley at this time?
A. He was in the United States.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Now, General Wedemeyer had returned to the United States with him? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did I understand you to refer a few minutes ago to differences which had
arisen between General Hurley and General Wedemeyer? — A. We are getting
into a field there that is still classified material.
Q. To your knowledge, did your recommendations to General Wedemeyer
have anything to do with his disagreement with General Hurley? — A. No, sir;
the disagreement took place while I was away from Chungking. If we look at
the chronology on page 4 starting with December 19 in the rightdiand column
and going down through January 14 in the right-hand column, I suggest that the
Board might wish to request some of that material.
Mr. Rhetts. Perhaps we could merely make the suggestion to the Board that
it might seek to obtain through its own channels information bearing on this
point which we understand to be available in the I'ecords of the Department.
The Chairman. Referring to what?
Mr. Rhetts. The subject matter of Mr. Achilles' inquiry here.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Are those documents in the State Department's records or the War De-
partment's records? — A. State Department's records.
Q. I think it might be useful for the Board to take a look at t.hnso (tr»onmon^
The Chairman. Very well.
(Discussion off the record.)
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Going back on the record again, the Board will endeavor to obtain those
and examine them. You say this disagreement between General Hurley and
General Wedemeyer was not due to any recommendations of yours? — A. Abso-
lutely not.
Q. I think that's all I have at this point.
The Chairman (to Mr. Stevens). Have you some questions?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. All right, no further questions on this point. Do you have
some questions you want to ask on this?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, General, there are two points I would like to cover. The
first is a question that grew out of a line of questioning by General Snow of
Mr. Service earlier in the day. General Snow referred to certain interviews
with Mr. Service conducted by the Interview Section of Military Intelligence
Service in Washington, at dates not specified, and General Snow inquired of
Mr. Service, as I recall it, whether in any of those interviews he. Service, had
indicated that he regarded the Chinese Communists, as I recall the phrase
was something like "democratic farmers" or. in other words, the implication
being that they were essentially democratic — liberal democratic groups and not
true Marxian Communists. In that connection. I should like to offer for inclu-
sion in the transcript at this point Document No. 20-1, which is an excerpt
from the Congressional Record for October 19, 1949. and, in particular, the
remarks of Congressman Judd at the time he first made known to the world
the contents of Document 193. At that time he took occasion to criticize Mr.
2078 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Service's use of the word "democratic" democracy in connection with the
Chinese Communists.
Document No. 20-1
(Remarks of Congressman Judd, Congressional Record, October 19, 1949,
p. 15283)
"The memorandum repeats the Communist propaganda slogan 'democratic'
or 'undemocratic' eight times. It portrait* the Communists in China as more
democratic than the government — as more willing to cooperate irith us, and
equates Chiang Kai-xliek's reluctance to arm the Communists and take them into
the Government with unwillingness to cooperate with ourselves."
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, if you can explain to the Board
the context and the specialized meaning, if any. -that the terms "democratic"
and "democracy" had in relation to the Chinese Communists in China during
the period in question. — A. To explain fully what I meant would require quite
a dissertation on China in the background and particularly on conditions of
government in the Kuoinintang-eontrolled areas. When I and some other
reporters were saying that the Communists were democratic, or more demo-
cratic our yardstick, of course, was the conditions in the rest of China ; none
of us, certainly never at any time said they had a developed democracy or a
complete democracy. They had made a start at the very lowest level of village
and county, smaller than county, district level. In Document 182. which trans-
mits a memorandum which I drafted on September 4, 1944, on the subject of
the growth of the new fourth army I say :
"The conclusion, therefore, seems justified that the peasants support, join,
and fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that
the Communists are fighting ' for their interests and because the Communists
have created this conviction by producing some tangible benefits for the peasants.
"These benefits must be improvement of the social, political, or economic condi-
tions of the peasants, whatever the exact nature of this improvement it must be
in the broader sense of the term as the serving of the interests of the majority
of the people toward democracy."
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Were you at that time aware of the Soviet Communist use of the words
"Soviet democracy" as something to describe their own system? — A. Yes.
Q. And in your use of those words how were you applying it in the case of the
Chinese Communists? That is, were you referring to them as democratic in the
American sense, or in the Chinese sense, or the Russian sense? — A. Since you
put the question in those terms I would say in the Chinese sense. It is certainly
not American, and it was an improvement of what I conceived to be the Russian
sense, and in my fairly extensive study of the development of Soviet control of
their areas in my Document No. 183 transmitting a memorandum which I drafted
on September 10, 1944, entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control
on a Guerrilla Basis" in a report, incidentally, which was rated excellent by the
Department, I go into considerable detail to show that the use of democratic
methods in the very lowest echelons where they have direct contact with the
peasants and people hasn't hampered in any way the Communist control at the
top. In that respect it might be considered to approximate the Communist
Russian definition of democracy as perhaps used in the satellite countries,
although those examples were not in existence at that time.
Q. But the system was one, was it not, of rigorous control from the top? — A.
On the higher levels, yes. You had party control and the party was the strongest
influence ; however, they went to great lengths to get other groups into the
Government.
Q. But in the Communist areas did the people enjoy any political democracy
with respect to their choice of rulers or were they subject to direct control from
the top? — A. On the local level they had far more choice than they had ever had
before — the village governments, the local organizations.
Q. (to the Chairman). Do you have any questions?
The Chairman. You have finished. No. (To Mr. Rhetts.) You had another
question, did you?
Mr. Rhetts. Whenever you have finished I would like to pursue this a little
further.
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2079
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Would you elaborate a little bit on your last answer, that is, when you say
they did enjoy political rights on the lowest level will you describe what they did
enjoy, what officials did they elect, and how did it work out? — A. The most exact
way of answering the question, of course, is the text of this paper (Doc. No. 183).
Q. Very well, why don't you read from portions of it?
The Chairman. Is the paper in evidence?
Mr. Rhetts. It is one of the 101 to 227 series, which is in evidence but has
not been put into the transcript.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Would you like to read a portion of that into the transcript? — A. I can read
portions of it.
Q. Is this a classified document? — A. Yes, sir. It is declassified.
Q. You may read a portion into the transcript, if you wish. — A. Shall I
identify it?
Q. Yes, identify the paper. — A. This is an excerpt from document 183, which is
dispatch 3022 from the Embassy at Chungking transmitting a memorandum pre-
pared by me at Yenan on September 10, 1944, entitled "The Development of Com-
munist Political Control in Communist Guerrilla Bases."
Mr. Achilles. What you are reporting on is a statement of announced Com-
munist policies, is that it, or of actual practices?
A. Not only announced policies but our observations of them after a period of
almost 2 months in the Communist areas.
Q. And according to your observation these policies were being carried out? —
A. Yes, sir.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Rhetts. Let's treat this like another one of those documents and put
the whole thing in.
(Mr. Rhetts submitted Doc. 183 for insertion in the transcript as follows:)
Embassy of the United States of America,
Unclassified. Chungking, September 29, 1944.
No. 3022.
Subject : Transmitting Report on Development of Communist Political Control
in Communist Guerrilla Bases.
The Honorable The Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D. C.
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report (No. 26,1 September 10,
1944) entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerrilla
Bases," prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy on de-
tail to General Stilwell's Headquarters, who is now in Yenan, Shensi (seat of the
Chinese Communist regime) as a member of the United States Army Observer
Section.
A summary of Mr. Service's report will be found in the opening paragraph
thereof. The report constitutes a comprehensive and revealing account of Com-
munist political and administrative policies and measures and accordingly seems
to merit careful scrutiny.
In connection with this general question, it would seem only fair to observe
that a good many Chinese, whether Kuomintang officials or civilians, take issue
with the thesis that the Chinese Communist Party is democratic or that genuine
democracy is being practiced in the Communist-controlled areas. A recent ex-
ample is to be found in the editorial columns of the influential Ta Kung Pao
which, in commenting on the scene at Yenan, charged the Chinese Communist
Party with possessing "almost carte blanche powers over all Party, political and
mili-affairs" (see enclosure to the Embassy's despatch 2856, August 9, 1944).
For what is probably a typical Kuomintang point of view of the "democracy"
of the Chinese Communists, reference is made to the enclosure to the Embassy's
despatch 2:»<;3. September 15, 1944.
Respectfully yours,
C. E. Gauss.
Enclosure :
Ozalid original to the Department.
800-Communist.
EFD/ept
1 Copy of Report No. 26, dated September 10, 1944.
2080 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
(Enclosure to despatch No. 3022, dated September 29, 1944, from the American
Embassy, Chungking, China)
[Confidential]
Report No. 26.
IT. S. Army Observer Section, APO 879,
September 10, 1944-
Subject : The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerrilla Bases.
To : Commanding General, Fwd, Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.
Summary. Communist influence predominates in the guerrilla bases because
the Communists took the lead in establishing the governments, because there has
been no important organized political opposition within the areas, and because
the Communists have been supported by the peasants and liberals. The Com-
munists have used their influence in a democratic way and to further democratic
ends. End of Summary.
1. The Chinese Communist Party has overwhelming political influence in
the various guerrilla bases. In effect, this influence amounts to control.
Although the governments of these bases are nominally independent of each
other, their form of organization, and their policies and administrative programs,
are all similar. Furthermore these policies are identical with those of the
Communist Party.
It is sometimes suggested that this fact of Communist control is a refutation
of Communist claims of democracy. Considering the history, political develop-
ment, and present situation of these bases, I do not believe that this criticism
is valid.
2. The political history of the guerrilla bases has been discussed at length
with a number of Communist leaders. These include :
LIU Shao-ch' Member of the Political Bureau. Communist Party.
LIN Pai-ch'u Chairman of the Shcn-Kan-Ning Border Region Govern-
ment.
NIEH Jung-chen Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Military Region
(General NIEH played a leading part in the establish-
ment of the government of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar
Border Region, which is identical in extent with the
Military District).
CH'EN Yi Acting Commander of the New Fourth xVrmy. Political
Commissar of the Shantung Military District.
YANG Hsiu-feng Chairman of the Government of the Shansi-Hopei-Honau-
Shantung Border Regions. (At the outbreak of the war
Dr. Yang was a professor in the National Normal Uni-
versity at Peiping and a member of the National Sal-
vationist Group. He was a leader of the first popular
resistance in Central Hopei. He joined the Communist
Party in 1939).
3. From these talks it appears that the political development in the different
bases has followed a generally similar pattern. I have therefore attempted
to give a generalized account of this development which will fit all of the bases.
There have of course been minor differences from base to base. In Shen-Kan-
Ning there was a Soviet-type government established several years before the
war: even after the government was reorganized in accordance with the United
Front agreement, the Kuomintang never made any attempt to set up its Party
organization. Shansi-Hopei-Chahar was set up at a very early stage of the
war when there was still some degree of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation;
sonic Kuomintang Party Organization was maintained and there has been rela-
tively greater Kuomintang participation than in other bases. In Shantung
and the areas under the New Fourth Army, the Kuomintang attempted for a
while to maintain its own separate governments; the Kuomintang therefore
regarded the Communist governments as illegal and has never been willing
t<> allow participation as a Party.
4. The political development of the Communist bases has been, in general,
along the following lines.
There had never, even before the war, been much political progress in the
area which has come under the influence of the Communist Party. All of it
is rural. Much of it is mountainous, isolated, and backward in every respect.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2081
Shansi, Shantung, and several other sections were "warlord satrapies" where
the Kuomintang had never been able to develop a widespread and effective or-
ganization. What formal Kuomintang organization did exist in all these north-
ern provinces was expelled by Japanese pressure in 1935 (by one clause of the
Ho-Umetsu Agreement ). In none of them had the Kuomintang, which was (a)
chiefly Southern and Central Chinese and (6) tied to the large cities, established
itself on a broad base among the rural population. And in none of these prov-
inces had there been permitted the development of any other political party.
Political control had always heen from above, by small groups; there was no
political foundation for democracy.
As the Japanese Army advanced through North China at the beginning of
the war. most of the provincial aud local governments collapsed. The officials
and leading Kuomintang members — usually the same men — fled south with the
Central Government troops. Many of the wealthy landlords also fled south,
or took refuge in the large cities where there were foreign Concessions or which,
even under Japanese occupation,, were relatively cpiiet. North China, outside
of the large Japanese-occupied cities, became a political void.
The Communist Armies rapidly overran these areas in their westward advance
during late 11)37 and 1938 which extended from Shensi to the sea. They came in
behind the Japanese into this political vacuum. Some areas they had to
fight for, but many fell into their hands because the Japanese had ignored them
or had passed on in their swift southern advance which they hoped would defeat
the Central Government and bring an early end to the war.
After occupation it was necessary that organized governments he set up to
administer these areas and to enable them to serve as supporting bases for the
Communist armies. The Political Department of the 8th Route Army ( in other
words, the Communist Party) set about this task as rapidly as possible. Inten-
sive propaganda and indoctrination of the peasants could create support for
the Army's government. But it could not immediately produce leaders. What
local government and Kuomintang leaders there once had been had mostly left.
The influential local citizens (landlords and gentry) had either fled (the Com-
munist name frightened them into continuing this even after the immediate
Japanese danger was passed), or those who did remain were dubious of Com-
munist promises and skeptical that resistance against the Japanese had any hope
of success. So these people cautiously remained in the background.
The only important, politically conscious, and experienced group that the Com-
munists found in the areas and willing to join them were large numbers of
liberals and intellectuals. Most of these were university professors and students
from the great educational center of Peiping. Since the student demonstrations
there in December 1935, they had been demanding resistance against Japan. In
the first great tide of war enthusiasm they had left Peiping and other cities
ahead of the Japanese occupation and gone into the countryside to organize
popular resistance. Most of these groups had stayed behind after the Govern-
ment and its defeated armies fled south. But they were not organised, and were
operating individually or in small groups with whatever following their eloquence
could attract.
A few of these people were Communists. A larger number were nominally
Kuomintang members. Many belonged to no party. But the great majority of
them were strongly liberal and in favor of the Communist plan of people's
guerrilla warfare based on democracy. This was, in fact, what they were already
actively trying to start. The need of coordination and the organization of
governments which could serve as bases was obvious. Most of these groups there-
fore willingly — by inclination and by the logic of circumstances — -accepted Com-
munist leadership and joined with them on a United Front basis.
The first governments were thus mainly composed of these two elements,
the Communists and these unorganized liberals, with the addition of the few
influential local citizens who remained in the regions and could be persuaded
to cooperate. These cooperating local elements were also liberal in tendency,
as would be indicated by the fact that they had not fled and were nondefeatist
enough to believe, in this gloomy and uncertain time, in the possibility of
resistance.
The "democratic*' nature of these first governments was "confirmed" by the
followers of the Communist armies and these liberal groups and by numerous
mass meetings organized by them, which often went through the gesture of
voting (by acclamation) for the government which had been set up.
The liberals were very useful in this early stage for providing the bulk of
the immediately needed administrative officials and hsien magistrates. As
2082 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
democratic machinery was not yet set up, they were appointed to these posts
by the government, or in very newly occupied areas by the political officers of
the Army (who among many other duties fulfill the function of our Army's
civil-government officers) .
Most of the partisan bands which had gathered around the liberals were
absorbed into the Communist Army; this was one important source of their
rapid growth in this early stage of the war.
The Communists were not only the leaders in setting up these governments;
they were also the only group ready with a complete and well-thought-out
program. They were preparing for a long war and had determined that they
would fight behind the enemy lines with guerrilla tactics. Mao Tse-tung's
famous booklet, Protracted Warfare, was published at this time. (The broader
question of the motives behind these Communist tactics, of choosing a theater
where they could be separated and independent of the Kuomintang and develop
warfare on a democratic basis, is outside the scope of this discussion.)
In brief, the Communist plan was the following : The apathetic peasant had
to be aroused by convincing him that he had something immediate and concrete
to fight for. It was also necessary to create a well-rounded, productive, self-
sufficient base that could survive being cut off from the cities. This demanded
the support of all classes and the return and cooperation of the landlords, local
capitalists, handicraft entrepreneurs, and merchants. These conditions dic-
tated moderate policies. Even if there had not been the United Front pledges
to the Central Government, extreme policies would frighten away what little
local capital existed and leave the base economically disorganized and unable
to support the Army. Politically it was also desirable to bring all classes into
unified resistance and to prevent the possibility of division by the Japanese,
llie most effective measure as far as the farmer was concerned was the reduc-
tion of rents and interest. Rut this reduction was to be moderate and limited;
and the government would protect the interests of the landlord by guaranteeing
the payment of these reduced rates. Private enterprise was guaranteed non-
interference and was offered assistance to increase production. Thus the fears
of the landlord-merchant group would be calmed. Finally democracy would be
instituted. This would interest all groups in joining the government, through the
democratic process, in order to protect or advance their own interests in such
matters as rent and interest reduction and taxation.
The Communist leaders stress the importance and precedence of these meas-
ures: first and basic, limited rent-interest reduction to win the active support of
the peasants, who are the bulk of the population ; second, democratic self-govern-
ment to bring all classes, particularly the landlord-merchants, into active par-
ticipation and hence support of the government. This conception of the im-
portance of democracy as a means of obtaining the participation and support
of the capitalist groups is interesting and significant in the study of present and
probable future Communist policies. They have no illusions that China can
hope to build a proletarian state in anything like the near future.
This Communist program was logical and, objectively viewed in the light of
the circumstances, reasonably fair to all. Even though it. was only carrying
out unenforced laws as far as rent reduction was concerned, it might have been
opposed by the landlord-conservative (or even the orthodox Kuomintang)
groups. But there were not at the time — for reasons described above — important
participants in the governments. The liberal groups, without any strong
organization or alternative program of their own, followed the Communist lead.
The original Communist program was therefore adopted by these impromptu
coalition governments as they were established, first in Shansi-Hopei-Chahar
and later in other areas.
The program worked out as intended. As the government became well estab-
lished and showed ability to withstand Japanese attack, and as the peasants
through education (by the Communists) in their new democratic powers began
to exhibit interest in more drastic rent-interest reduction and progressive tax-
ation, the landlord-capitalist group was driven to active participation to pre-
serve its own interests.
Within 1 year most villages were under elected governments. By 1939-40
the democratic election of hsien governments was general. And by 1942 most
of the bases were governed by popularly elected Peoples Political Councils.
In all of these grades of government there is substantial, though not large,
representation of both the land-lord capitalist and peasant-laborer groups.
This landlord-capitalist participation has been rewarded (by means of Com-
munist support) with some reduction of the early high tax rates on large
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2083
incomes, and more extensive government assistance to private productive
enterprise.
Tins institution of political democracy has not, however, been accommpanied
by political development along definite party forms. '
The landlord-capitalist element lias formed pressure groups without unified
party organization or leadership. Their main object has been merely the
preservation of their own interests.
The Kuomintang has not established itself in an organized manner because
(1) it had no strong original foundation in the regions and (2) the central
Kuomintang authorities (Chungking) have generally taken the attitude that
these are "traitor areas" and "illegal" governments. When the Kuomintang
has tried to come back into some of these areas, it has done so with the back-
ing of military force and government mandates abolishing the governments
already set up and functioning. Such was the case, for instance, when the
Central Government sent LU Chung-lin into Hopei to reestablish the Hopei Pro-
vincial Government. There seems to be no evidence that the Kuomintang has
ever sought participation in these governments in a democratic, cooperative man-
ner. Its attitude has been "all or nothing." The one exception is in the Shansi-
Hopei-Chahar region. Its government was given recognition by the Central
Government in January 1938. The recognition was later apparently rescinded
(the attempt to set up a conflicting government under LU Chung-lin in Hopei
woidd appear ipso facto to have been a cancellation of its authority) and its
present status of legality vis-a-vis the Kuomintang and the Central Govern-
ment is obscure. At the beginning a regular, recognized Kuomintang organiza-
tion was set up. This still remains in existence, although the obscurity of its
legality in Chungking's eyes is similar to that of the government. In any event,
this Kuomintang branch has never found wide support and is reportedly in a
languishing condition. Shansi-Hopei-Chahar is the only area in which there is a
Kuomintang organization.
The increasingly politically conscious peasants have tended to gravitate toward
the Communist Party. This can be regarded as natural. In the first place they
regard the Communists as responsible for setting up the bases and for the prac-
tical improvement in their social-political-economic condition. In the second
place, there is no other party with anything to offer the peasants or actively
seeking their support. Even if the Kuomintang were active in these areas, it
could give little practical attraction to the peasant.
It must, of course, be recognized that the Communists have controlled all polit-
ical indoctrination and propaganda and have not discouraged this tendency of
the peasants to regard them as their benefactors. Furthermore, the Communist
Party has actively expanded its Party organization in its newly won areas and
has established branches down to the villages. Of the approximately 1,000.000
present members of the Party, it is claimed that more than one-half are peasants.
It is reasonable to assume that most of these are in North China.
The only other important group, the liberal-intellectuals, have also failed to
set up a separate party organization. They have remained in close support and
cooperation with the Communists. Some have actually .joined the Communist
Party. But it seems that this tendency is not at present encouraged — since the
overwhelming domination of the Communist Party is something that the Com-
munists, for political reasons described below, wish to avoid — and that many
of those outside the Communist Party might as well, as far as thinking goes,
be considered in it.
Even without party organization or their own following, this liberal-intellec-
tual group has remained politically important as holders of elective offices. Rea-
sons for this can be assumed to be (1) the shortage of men in the areas with
their qualifications of education and experience and (2) during their first ap-
pointed terms they generally made a good impression on the people by their pa-
triotic enthusiasm, democratic leanings, and honesty. Thus many of them have
continued to hold posts as magistrates and high administrative officials.
The actual situation, therefore is that no strong opposition has developed to
the Communists and they have remained the undisputably dominant political
factor.
This dominance tended to become so pronounced that in 1940 the Communist
Party decided, as a purely Party measure, to restrict itself to one-third of the
membership of any elective government body, and to advocate that the other two-
thirds be divided between Kuomintang and nonparty members. The one-third
limitation on the Communists was a maximum, not a minimum, limit. It was
hoped that this would improve the all-round representative character of the
2084 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
governments, thus helping to keep the support of the numerically small landlord-
merchant groups and countering Kuomintang charges of monopoly and violation
of the United Front.
This self-restriction of the Communist Party has not had much effect on its
leading role. It generally elects its solid one-third (in a few areas it actually
continues to hold slightly over this ratio in the Peoples Political Councils).
The Kuomintang representation is made up of individuals who were former offi-
cials or Kuomintang members but now have no Party machine back of them and
are usually of liberal tendencies. It is usually difficult to find enough of these
persons, with suitable qualifications, who are willing to join the government:
with the present situation between the two parties, a "regular"' Kuomintang
member knows that he jeopardizes his Party standing and will be accused by
Chungking of being a "Communist" if he participates in an "illegal" "Commu-
nist" government. As a result the Kuomintang (it would be more correct to say
"nominal Kuomintang") representation in most- governments is below the
sought-for one-third. The remainder of the government is then made up of a
few representatives of the landlord-merchant groups (who may also find some
representation through the Kuomintang members) and a larger number of the
liberal-intellectuals.
The typical composition, then, is one-third Communists, plus a few liberal
Kuomintang (or ex-Kuomintang) members, plus a large number of liberal-
intellectuals, and finally a relatively small group of the landlord-merchant group.
With this strong representation and a predominantly liberal and sympathetic
majority, it is not surprising that the Communists have been the chief initiators
of the policies followed by the base governments. Furthermore, since the Com-
munist Party holds the same dominant position in each government, and since
it is the one connecting link between these separate governments, it has secured
the adoption by all of them of its program.
5. Related to this development of predominant Communist influence in the
guerrilla bases are a number of other factors which should be mentioned, even
though detailed study of some will be left for following reports.
(a) The Communists have kept their program moderate and within the
limits that the liberal-Kuomintang and liberal-intellectual groups affiliated
with it would continue to support. This has promoted unity. It has also
increased and held support. It might also be said that it has robbed any im-
portant potential opposition of any issues.
(ft) Tbe Communist program has introduced democracy and improved the
economic condition of the great majority of the population. This is the first
experience the people have had of these benefits, and their politics! 1 experience
has not had a chance yet to go beyond the stage of being grateful. Nobody
opposes Santa Claus.
(c) The Communists at times have played a balancing role. In areas where
the landlords were too successful in gaining control over local governments,
either through the old awe in which they were held by the peasants or their
power over their tenants, the Communists have stepped up their assistance
to the people through indoctrination in democracy and active support of the
people's organizations. On the other hand, in areas where the peasants
"felt their oats" and used their new political powers to monopolize the local
governments, the Party used its influence to obtain the election of landlord
representatives. Wherever used this policy makes grateful friends. And the
Communists admit that when they use their influence to aid the election of a
landlord, it is a progressive landlord — in other words, another supporter of
their policies.
(d) The Communists have accepted and incorporated into their own program
some proposals put forth by other groups. An example was the policy to "refine
the Army and reduce the Government" (generally translated as "rationaliza-
tion"), which was originally introduced into the Shen-Kan-Ning Peoples Politi-
cal Council by a landlord representative. The Communists make much of this
willingness to accept suggestions from others as an indication of their de-
mocracy. And they explain incorporation into their own program as the most
expeditious and sure means, since they are the only party to all governments,
of having these improvements universally put into effect. There is a great deal
of merit in these arguments. But it must be recognized that the Communist
Party, in a very smart and hard-headed political way, gets the credit for these
improvements because the original introducer is not widely known and soon
forgotten and it becomes known as another item of the Party program.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2085
(e) The Communist control of propaganda lias already been mentioned.
This propaganda, except in special instances, does not attack the Kuomintang
or other groups. But it does tend to put these other groups in a bad light. And
it invariably works to promote the Communist Party.
(/) Finally, tbe Army is the army of the Communists. This is important
because the political effect of the 8th Route and New 4th Armies is tremendous.
This effectiveness conies in several ways. Tbe Political Department, which
is used in indoctrination of the people, especially of newly occupied areas, is
highly organized and experienced, and under wholly Communist leadership
(contrary to the rest of the Army). But even greater than this direct effect
is tbe example of the behavior and attitude of the army toward the people, its
volunteer character, its completely different attitude of unity with the people,
its high morale, and the fact that it fights.
6. I have attempted to show that tbe political control of tbe Communist Party
in the guerrilla bases has developed from its leadership in establishing and
holding these bases, the absence of strong opposition, the adoption of moderate,
democratic policies which have benefited the great majority of the population,
and political astuteness combined with control of propaganda and the influence
of the Army. The policies of the Communist Party have been democratic, and
there is little which, under the circumstances, can be called undemocratic in
its methods.
The question may be asked whether the Communists would have been so
democratic in method if they had been faced with stronger opposition. The
question is hard to answer because there has never been a strong opposition
willing to cooperate on a democratic basis. In the one area where the Kuo-
mintang has an organization, it has been allowed its own newspaper and other
democratic freedoms. But this opposition was weak. In areas where the Kuo-
mintang came in with military force to oust the Communists, the Communists
won out because they had the democratic support of the people. The Kuomin-
tang did not have this support and was unable to obtain it. This fact, together
with difficulties connected with the war, forced the Kuomintang to withdraw.
The next question is logically the future. I believe that tbe Communist
influence with the people in the guerrilla bases is now so great, and rests on such
a strong democratic basis, that the Communists will be willing to contest their
political control there with any other party on a democratic oasis; and that
they will accordingly content themselves with democratic methods, including
freedom of propaganda, provided that the other party or parties do the same.
John S. Service.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G8C.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I take it then. Mr. Service, in using the word "democratic" you used it
advisedly insofar as you were referring to tbe fact that in the Communist areas
they had for the reasons you have outlined instituted measures bearing the
formal characteristics of democracy at the very lowest levels of the administra-
tion of the areas they controlled? — A. That's correct.
Q. And am I not correct that in various of your reports, which have already
been discussed here, in which you spoke of the growing strength of the Chinese
Communists, you refer to this phenomenon as one of the sources of their
strength? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. But I take it also that you did not suggest that this type of "democracy"
bears any resemblance to the completely developed type of democracy which we
think about when we use the term in this country? — A. That's correct.
Q. Because of the fact that in the higher echelons of policy determination that
remain firmly in the hands of the Communists themselves? — A. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. Now I would like to turn to another matter. Yesterday the Board
will recall that I read a short excerpt from a message from General Hurley for
the eyes of the Secretary of State alone, dated January 31, 1945. At that time I
explained that I did not then propose to put the entire document in the record
because there were certain technical problems about it. The technical problems
are these: This document has been declassified and it has been reproduced
photostatically. For some reason, in tbe mechanical process of photostating,
what is probably a page, or at least it is the concluding few paragraphs of
General Hurley's telegram, simply didn't get fastened into this document.
2086 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Have they been since added?
Mr. Rhetts. I am convinced that it was the intention to have the entire
thing reproduced. There are a few paragraphs that aren't here, but which do
appear in another copy of the document which I have here.
( Discussion off the record. )
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this time to introduce into the transcript docu-
ment 321, which is a copy of a message from General Hurley for the eyes of the
Secretary of State alone, dated January 31. 1945, together with supplemental
comment on the telegram by the Embassy staff at Chungking.
The Chairman. No objections.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
[Confidential]
Urgent (321)
(Following message is from Hurley for eyes of the Secretary of State alone:)
3i January 1945.
Preamble
This Embassy is not repeat not equipped to make reports of the nature that
I am now entering upon. The Embassy has but one stenographer. America
has never heretofore attempted to use its good offices in actual negotiations to
bring about a unification of the military forces of China. We have official
personnel who have communicated with, observed and reported on the Com-
munists but we have no personnel who have negotiated with the Communists
for the unification of the Communist and National forces. For that reason we
have no official personnel in the Embassy, except myself, prepared to make
either decisions or reports on the subject which I am covering. I make this
statement not as a criticism but as a statement of fact.
We are fighting a relentless enemy. That, in my opinion, justifies our action
in attempting to unify the forces of China to help us defeat the enemy. A unifi-
cation of the military forces of the Communist Party and the National Gov-
ernment would have a battle effect, equal at least, to one fully equipped American
army. The result of unification of the Chinese military force is worthy of
much more consideration than it has heretofore received from America. As I
have heretofore reported to you, my negotiations with the Communists have
been with the advice, approval and direction of both the Generalissimo and the
American Commander, General Wedemeyer. Conducting these negotiations
between factions in China is viewed, by some of our diplomatic staff, as an
unusual and unjustified departure from State Department procedure. My posi-
tion is that the ends ire seek justify the departure.1
These reports are being dictated by me to an army stenographer. There is
no process in the Embassy through which I can pass the reports to improve their
com position or substance. I do not have the time to properly edit the reports.
My reports are going to you literally from the typewriter to the radio.1 As
you know, I am conducting meetings of the representatives of all American
agencies in China with a view of eliminating overlapping and conflicts. We
hope to be able to coordinate American activities in China. I am conducting
regular military conferences with the American military commander and
the Generalissimo. I am also carrying on the routine duties of Ambassador.
It is difficult for me personally to attend so many conferences and also to do my
own reporting. I have wired the Department suggesting a set-up for this
Embassy which I hope will have attention as early as convenient, as I have no
desire to make this a one-man job.1
Part I
As indicated by my message to you No. 107, 24 January 1945, conversations
have been resumed between the National Government and the Chinese Com-
munist Party. It should be frankly stated, however, that in the very first meeting
both sides stated with great emphasis the obstacles to any practical agreement
between the two factions. Dr. Soong for the Government and Chow En-la i
for the Communists are both able debaters.
At this point I begin giving background that will provide correct outline of my
participation in and the progress of the conversations between the National
Government and the Communist Party. I had been talking to the Generalissimo
1 Italicized portions shown on original draft but not on file.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2087
at periods during the Stilwell controversy of the necessity of uniting China's
military forces so that instead of fighting or watching each other the forces of
t lie Nationalist Government and those of the Chinese Communist party could be
united to drive the Japanese from China. I was advised that the crimes com-
mitted by the Communists were so grave that reconciliation seemed impossible
although the Generalissimo said he was willing for me to negotiate with the
Communist Party leaders in an effort to bring about unity.
On 11 September 1!)44, I received a telegram from General Chu Teh, Com-
mander in Chief of the Chinese Communist troops, inviting me, on behalf of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party and the new 4th and 8th
Route Armies of Communist troops, to go to Yenan, in the Communist area, for a
personal investigation and a visit with the Communist leaders. I immediately
made this invitation known to the Generalissimo. For a number of reasons he
wished me to postpone the visit but he did not decline to permit me to meet with
the Communist leaders. I then began rather extensive work with a committee
which had been appointed by the Generalissimo and the National Government to
confer with the Chinese Communist leaders. The members of this Committee
were Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, now Minister of Information, and General Chang
Tze-chung, Director of Political Training of the National Military Council. I
found these two gentlemen were committed to the proposition that China must
remain under one party rule, according to the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, until a
period of tutelage would make it ready to support a democratic government.
They were of the opinion that the time had not arrived to institute a bi-party
or multi-party government. After much work with these gentlemen and with Dr.
Soong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Generalissimo, I evolved five
points, some of them rather innocuous, to which the National Government Com-
mittee agreed. These points were suggested by me after conferences with the
local representatives of the Communist Party and after meetings between these
representatives and the representatives of the government. I was only begin-
ning to understand the issues involved. On the 7th of November, I flew to
Yenan with the advice and consent and by the direction of the Generalissimo and
General Wedemeyer. My reception by the Communist leaders was enthusiastic.
They expressed great admiration that I had come into Yenan at a time when it
was necessary for my plane to be covered by fighter escort. This seemed to be
of great significance to them. In opening our first formal meeting, Chairman
Mao Tse-tung stated that our meeting was so important that I had risked my
life to come to see him. That fact, he stated, impressed him with the earnestness
of our desire to see all Chinese military forces united to defeat Japan and to
prevent civil war in China. For two days and two nights we argued, agreed,
disagreed, denied and admitted in the most strenuous but most friendly fashion
and pulled and hauled my five points until they were finally revised and were
signed by Mao Tse-tung to be presented by me as the Chinese Communist pro-
posal to the National Government. I had been able to limit the inclusion of
unnecessary details in the five points so that the whole document could be written
on one page.
By agreement this document was to remain secret until the negotiations were
closed or until Mao Tse-tung and I would agree to its publication. The docu-
ment is still secret. The National Government has taken every precaution to
keep it from becoming public. Therefore, the State Department should know
that it would be injurious to our negotiations if this document should become
public. I have outlined the document in reports to the President. This is the
first time I have given the entire document. I am giving it now because I feel
it essential that the State Department be fully informed if I am to expect direc-
tion, cooperation and support in these negotiations. The five point proposal of
the Communist Party to the National Government is dated November 10, 1944
and is, in full as set forth in EMBTEL 142, Jan. 31, 7 PM. :
"Agreement Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang
of China and the Communist Party of China
"1. The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist
Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces in
China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.
"2. The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition
National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and
non-partisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reforms
in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and
2088 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
made effective. At tlie same time the National Military Council is to be reorgan-
ized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of
all anti-Japanese armies.
"o. The Coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun
Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the
people and by the people. The Coalition National Government will pursue poli-
cies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, free-
dom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly
and association, the right to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances, the right of writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence. The
Coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make
effective those two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.
"4. All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the
Coalition National Government and its United National Military Council and
will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies
acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.
"5. The Coalition National Government of Cbina recognizes the legality of
the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese
parties.
"(Sgd) Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of China.
Signed : November 10, 1944.
"(Sgd) Witness Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Represent at it re of the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Signed : November 10, 1944."
I was also authorized to say to Chiang Kai-shek that the Communists
pledged themselves to support and sustain his leadership both as Generalissimo
and as President of the Government.
In Yenan I had contracted a heavy cold. The day after I returned (Nov. 11) I
was confined to my room. I sent a signed copy of the Communist proposal to
Dr. Soong and the other members of the National Committee and requested that
it be translated and given to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Soong and
Dr. Wang came to my room in a state of considerable perturbation. Dr. Soong
immediately said "You have been sold a bill of goods by the Communists. The
National Government will never grant what the Communists have requested."
He then pointed out all of the defects he found in the proposal, only one of
which seemed to me to have merit and that was that the Communists really
meant to say that they desired a coalition administration whereas they had
actually asked for a change in the name of the Chinese Government. This
seemed to me to be trivial and could easily be corrected. I maintained that
the offer made by the Communists did outline at least a basis upon which to
construct a settlement. Drs. Soong and Wang saw the Generalissimo before
I did. They had convinced him that a settlement on the basis suggested by the
Communists was impracticable. The Generalissimo's argument was that he
could not agree to a Coalition Government without acknowledging the total
defeat of his party by the Communists. He also said that the proposed plan
would be in conflict with the program outlined for China in the will of Dr.
Sun Yat-sen. He said that acceptance of the plan would have a serious effect
on the war effort and would cause controversy at a time when the situation in
China was already precarious. I, of course, had deep sympathy with him be-
cause I well understood that the National Government must be maintained.
The collapse of the National Government would have caused chaos.
The Generalissimo was kind enough to say that the basis for settlement that
I had obtained from the Communists would, in his opinion, be accepted as a
settlement of the same kind of a controversy in Washington or in London but,
owing to the peculiar Chinese psychology, it would mean total defeat for him
and Ids party. I suggested to the Generalissimo that he revise the Communist
offer and call the result a bi-party, or a multi-party, or a party representative
government thus avoiding the use of the word "coalition." I believed that an
agreement between the National Government and the Chinese Communist party
would strengthen the government both politically and militarily and would
prevent the collapse which, at that time, .was widely predicted and to many
informed people seemed imminent. My arguments were ineffective as were also
the arguments of General Chow En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist party, who had accompanied me from Yenan to
Chungking. The government finally and definitely declined the Communist
offer <>1' settlement. The government made a three point counter-proposal. The
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2089
three point counter-offer of the government was submitted to me on November
Hist and I. in turn, presented it to General Chow. The three point counter-
proposal of the government is. in full, as set forth in EMBSTEL 143 Jan. 31,
8 I'M.:
"1. The National Government desirous of securing effective unification and
concentration of nil military forces in China for the purpose of accomplishing
the speedy defeat of Japan, and Looking forward to the post-war reconstruction
of China agrees to incorporate, after reorganization, the Chinese Communist
forces in the National Army who will then receive equal treatment as the other
units in respect to pay. allowance, munitions and other supplies; and to give
recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a legal political party.
"2. The Communist Party of China undertake to give their full support to
the National Government in the prosecution of the war of resistance, and in
the post-war reconstruction, and give over control of all their troops to the
National Government, through the National Military Council. The National
Government will designate some high ranking officer from among the Commu-
nist forces to membership in the National Military Council.
''3. The aim of the National Government, to which the Communist Party
subscribe, is to carry out the three People's Principles of Sun Yet-sen for the
establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by
the people, and will pursue policies designed to promote the progress and de-
velopment of democratic processes in government.
"In accordance with the provisions of the 'Outline of the Program for the
Prosecution of the AYar of Resistance and Reconstruction,' freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association, and other civil
liberties are hereby guaranteed, subject only to the specific needs of security
in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan."
Dr. Wang stated, in a meeting, that the three point counter-proposal of the
government was prepared by me and that it represented my idea of a fair
compromise. To this statement I replied publicly that there was not one word
of the counter-proposal that I considered mine, and that I had not presented
it as my idea of an equitable compromise. I did not denounce the document.
I disclaimed its authorship. The three-point proposal was not, of course,
acceptable to the Communists. I did argue that the three-point proposal with
General Chow En-la i and attempted to persuade him that it would be advisable
on the part of the Communists to accept the three-point proposal and begin
cooperation with the National Government to effect a unification of National
and Chinese Communist forces for the defeat of the enemy. I pointed out that
the government's three-point proposal did provide for the recognition of the
Chinese Communists as a legal political party in China. At this time, in the
discussions, the Chinese Communists began to charge the Chinese Government
with bad faith. They said the Chinese Government had no desire to effect a
unification of China and that the Chinese Government was in correspondence
with Japan and. with support of the imperialistic governments of Southeast
Asia, intended to keep China divided against itself. The charges and counter-
charges of that period are too numerous to be recited here. All the atrocities
committed in China during the civil war and much of those committed during
the war of resistance were charged to the Communists by the representatives
of the National Government. Chow En-lai returned to Yenan without having
made any notable progress in his negotiations with the government.
In conclusion of this Part I of my report on the background of the Communist
negotiations, I wish to state that in all my negotiations with the Communists
I have insisted that the United States will not repeat not supply or otherwise
aid the Chinese Communists as an armed political party or as an insurrection
against the National Government. Any aid from the United States to the
Chinese Communist Party must go to that Party through the National Govern-
ment of China. The Chinese Communist Party has never indicated to me that
they desire to obtain control of the National Government itself, if and when
they achieve control through a political election. The Communist party demands
the end of the one-party government by the Knomintang. The Chinese Commu-
nist party is willing for the Kuomintang to still have a vast majority of the
government offices. The Chinese Communist party demands representation,
both for itself and other anti-Japanese political parties in China, in the policy-
making agencies of the government. If proper representation is given to the
Chinese Communist Party in the National Government that Party will agree
to submit its army to the control of the National Government.
2090 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
On the other side of the ledger there is opposition to the unification of the
military forces of China within both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Com-
munist Party. Members of the Chinese Communist Party oppose unification
with the Chinese National Government on the ground that the Government
is incompetent, corrupt and destructive of the welfare of China. The Kuomintang
party points to the fact that it began as the party of Sun Yat-sen, the party of
reformation in China, and has brought China through a revolution and through
nearly 8 years of the war of resistance. They believe themselves to have been
successful. They believe that they have served China well and are naturally
reluctant to surrender their one-party control of China.
There is honest opposition among some of our own military on the ground
that the Communist armed party is stronger than the National Army and we
should deal directly with the Communists bypassing the National Government.
This opposition is, in my opinion, based on erroneous and unsound premises.
In addition to these factors, all of the representatives of the so-called imper-
ialist colonial powers of southeast Asia are opposed to unification. The policy
of the imperialist powers appears to be to keep China divided against herself.
The comment offered here is comment on the draft telegram merely as a
report, which is the immediate task at hand, and we leave for later discussion
the question of suggestions in regard to the negotiations.
We think that part I of the telegram is clear and precise (with the exception
of one portion which will be discussed hereafter) and will provide the Secretary
of State with a valuable background picture of the course of developments. We
have not endeavored, as we usually do with draft telegrams, to work over the
language for the sake of seeking greater conciseness or of condensing because
we feel that it will be useful to the Secretary to have as full a description of the
negotiations as it is possible to provide him. We feel too that, because of your in-
timate connection with and knowledge of this matter, you can draw in your own
words a picture which might be made confused rather than clarified if we en-
deavored to suggest any radical changes in phraseology.
On page 3, line 14 we suggest "biparty" and ••multiparty" instead of "bi-
partisan" and "multipartisan". The same suggestion is made in regard to page
6, line 19.
In the last paragraph on page 8 we suggest eliminating the numerals in paren-
theses for the sake of clarity. For example, the sentences following (2) , (3) , (4) ,
and (5) do not seem to be matters on which you have insisted in your negotiations
with the Communists whereas the clause following (1) does seem to be such a
matter.
We would question the statement in the next to the last paragraph of the
telegram that there is opposition among our own diplomatic representatives.
There is no one on the staff who believes we should bypass the National Govern-
ment in dealing with the Communists. From a recent conversation with Mr.
Service ( who is not substantively a member of the Embassy staff) I am convinced
that he does not think we should bypass the National Government in dealing
with the Communists.
II
As regards comment about the staff in the preamble:
We would question the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph. We have
not heard anyone on the staff express an opinion that your conduct of the
negotiations is an unusual and unjustified departure from State Department
procedure. We do not believe that any member of the staff holds such opinion.
There is no member of the staff that I know of who has not wholeheartedly
hoped for the success of your negotiations and the benefit to the war effort which
will obviously result therefrom.
We are at this moment endeavoring, by making these comments, to vitiate the
second sentence of the third paragraph that there is no process in the Embassy
through which reports can be passed for consultation on composition, and so forth.
The preamble is very damning to the staff. If I were in the Department I would
imply from your comments that you feel that the staff is of little, if any, use and
should be replaced. We hope that this is not the interpretation which you had
in mind. But if it is we do not cavil about it; we feel that we are not in good
position to offer comment.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2091
III
We fee] thai your statemenl of the case of putting forth every feasible effort
to bring unity to China and unity to the military forces of China to assist in
defeating the Japanese is excellent. We feel also, from what we have heard and
observed of the situation, that your statemenl of the position and attitude of the
Kuomintang and the Communists toward each other is also excellent and suc-
cinct; We are sure that the Secretary will he very pleased indeed to. have this
outline of the negotiations and will consider it to be a clear, forthright, and gen-
erally excellent account of them.
(This memorandum has been written in cooperation and consultation with
Messrs. Ringwalt, Yuni, Boehringer, and Freeman.)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now. Mr. Service, we have discussed General Hurley's charges set forth
in Doc. 35-3, and particularly paragraph 5 of that document wherein General
Hurley has stated that you and other Foreign Service officers who were pursuing
the Chinese Communist Party line were seeking to keep China divided against
herself. Now I refer you to page 9 of Document 321, the last paragraph of that
page, where General Hurley says:
"In addition to these factors, all of the representatives of the so-called im-
perialist colonial powers of southeast Asia are opposed to unification. The
policy of the imperialist powers appears to be to keep China divided against
herself."
Now that is in this telegram to the Secretary of State in January 1945.
General Hurley appears to be making a quite different suggestion, does he not,
as to who was trying to keep China divided against herself. This does not sug-
gest that this is a Communist Party proposal, does it? — A. No.
Q. I suppose he refers by the "so-called imperialist colonial powers"' to Britain,
does he?_ France? — A. He believed that the British wanted to keep China di-
vided and weak, yes.
Q. Was it his belief that the British and the Chinese Communist Party were
to that extent following the same line? — A. No, I can't follow his reasoning.
The Chairman. Just a minute. I would like to call counsel's attention to the
fact that the same expression occurs in 35-3, paragraph 5, in which he yokes
together the professional Foreign Service men, the Chinese Communist Armed
Party, and the imperialist bloc of nations all in one sentence.
Mr. Rhetts. That's correct.
The Chairman. This other quotation you have read doesn't seem to be any
different from that.
Mr. Rhetts. Except that here he seems to suggest that this is only the
policy of the proposal of the imperialist powers — he drops the Communist out
here.
A. In the same telegram he has already said that the Chinese Communists
are not seeking to gain power except by political means.
Mr. Rhetts. You see, I read another excerpt from this yesterday where he
showed that he was satisfied that the Chinese Communist Party was not seeking
to achieve dominance and control of the Government of China, but only wished
participation in it, and indeed subordinate participation.
The Chairman. What we are trying to get at is the view of Mr. Service and
not of Mr. Hurley.
Mr. Rhetts. If I may suggest to you. sir. I want to get at possibly what Mr.
Hurley may think he is charging Mr. Service with.
The Chairman.. All right.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Moreover, General Hurley has also charged that you and other Foreign
Service officers were seeking to arm the Chinese Communists and that you
were seeking to arm the Chinese Communists for the purpose of bringing about
the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, has he not? — A. Yes.
Q. Now I should like to read this paragraph from General Hurley's telegram :
"There is honest opposition among some of our own military on the ground
that the Communist armed party is stronger than the National army and we
should deal directly with the Communists, bypassing the National Government.
This opposition is, in my opinion, based on erroneous and unsound premises."
Would you say that General Hurley suggests in any manner there that any
person who sought to arm Communists even by bypassing the National Govern-
ment was in any way seeking to defeat American policy? — A. No.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 39
2092 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Here General Hurley recognizes that an honest opinion can be properly
held by certain of our military leaders, does he not? — A. Yes.
Q. Now I should like to refer you to the comment of the Embassy on this
telegram of General Hurley.
Mr. Achilles. May I ask at this point : This telegram was sent by Hurley
while he was Ambassador?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, sir. It was dated January 31, 1945.
Mr. Achilles. Then how does it happen that the Embassy is commenting on
his telegram in the same telegram? Doesn't the whole telegram
Mr. Rhetts. The Embassy's comment is attached. When you read the docu-
ment, sir, you will see that General Hurley goes to some length to say that he
is having to send this telegram through Army facilities because the Embassy
has no facilities to type a telegram or to comment on it. That all appears in
the document.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. The paper just offered consists of a draft of a telegram from
General Hurley to the Department of State, and of a comment thereon by the
Embassy at Chungking, both of which papers were found among the Embassy
papers at Nanking at the time of the evacuation.
Go ahead.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to read frome page 1 of the Embassy comment
on this draft as follows :
"We would question the statement in the next to the last paragraph of the
telegram that there is opposition among our own diplomatic representatives.
There is no one on the staff who believes we should bypass the National Govern-
ment in dealing with the Communists. From a recent conversation with Mr.
Service (who is not substantively a member of the Embassy staff) I am
convinced that he does not think we should bypass the National Government in
dealing with the Communists."
The Chairman. May I ask, did you have anything to do with drafting that
comment? — A. No, sir. I did not know about the telegram at that time.
Mr. Rhetts. May I say, sir, that the concluding paragraph of this comment
states :
"(This memorandum has been written in cooperation and consultation with
Messrs. Ringwalt, Yuni, Boehringer, and Freeman.) "
A. I would like to add, however, that the drafter of the memorandum of
comment is Mr. George Acheson whose initials appear on the original.
Mr. Rhetts. That's all, I have no further questions.
The Chairman. You have a witness waiting?
Mr. Rhetts. He is waiting.
The Chairman. No further questions at this time from the Board. You
may produce your witness. Let's have a recess.
(After a 5-minute recess the hearing reconvened.)
(Mr. John Paton Davies, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service,
after being duly sworn, testified in his behalf as follows :)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts.
Q. Will you state your full name and address? — A. John Paton Davies, Jr.,
home address : 1707 Duke Street, Alexandria. Ya.
Q. And will you state your present position? — A. I am a member of the
Policy Planning Staff of State Department.
Q. You are a Foreign Service officer. I believe? — A. Yes, sir : I am.
Q. AVill you describe for the Board briefly your general background and the
course of your career in the Foreign Service with a limitation, bearing in mind
that we are interested primarily in the China phase and subsequent to 1941? —
A. I entered the Service in 19.->>2. and after a year at a Canadian post I was
transferred to China where I became a China language officer, that is, a
specialist in Chinese affairs. I served subsequently in Mukden, Hankow, and
then was transferred to the Department. Shortly after the outbreak of the
war I was assigned to the Embassy at Chungking and detailed to the staff of
the commanding general in tlie China-Burma-India theater. I served in this
capacity until early January 1!>4."> when I was transferred to Moscow where
I served in the Embassy there until 1947 and returned on transfer to the
Department to my present position.
Q. Now will yon describe the general nature of the functions which you
performed during the period while you were attached to the staff of the com-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2093
manding general in the CB1 theater? — A. To give an adequate Impression of
that 1 should perhaps go back to my personal relationship with General Stilwell.
I believe it was in 1934 when I first met General Stilwell. 1 was a language
officer at that time and the General was military attache.
The Chairman. This was where'.'
A. In Peiping. In 1938 1 saw him again in Hankow. At that period Hankow
was under attack by the Japanese. He was then Colonel Stilwell, was then
military attache observing the Japanese offensive on Hankow. I was a vice
consul in the consulate there. We worked very closely together, I doing political
reporting, he doing military reporting. We exchanged information constantly,
an 1 worked very closely with a group of Americans and journalists of other
nationalities. We used them to obtain information and we often helped them
out with stories. It was on the basis of this considerable acquaintance and
intimate Contact with General Stilwell that he initiated the request through the
War D partment for my assignment to him in early 1943 to be detailed to his
staff. This was, so far as I know, the first arrangement whereby the military took
on to the staff of a commanding general a State Department officer. My func-
tions were not clearly defined. They were left up to General Stilwell. When I
reported to General Stilwell in the field early in 1942 at Maymyo, Burma, he was
in the midst of the Burma campaign. I asked him what my instructions were.
He said he was busy fighting a war and he left that pretty largely up to me. He
said he expected me to keep him out of diplomatic trouble, and let it go at that.
That was the general basis on which my functions were laid. I received very
few specific orders from General Stilwell as to what I should do. My problem
was to make a job for myself largely. I began to do political reporting in Burma
almost immediately upon my arrival. That was a familiar field for me. I also,
with his approval, maintained contacts with the press people. This was a
familiar relationship between the General and myself ; 1942 was a very bad
year for the General.
The Burma campaign was, of course, a fiasco and the high command of the
American forces in the CBI theater was scattered in retreat. After General
Stilwell emerged from the Burmese jungle he assigned me to do political reporting
and to follow the economic situation generally in India. From that developed
a rather intensive coverage of Indian affairs throughout my period in the theater.
From time to time he would request me, during the 3 years of my stay with him,
to go over the Hump into China. He would discuss with me briefly the political
situation there and accept the reports which I developed for him. Maybe you
would like to lead me out more specifically.
Q I was going to say I would like to direct your attention — When you
joined his staff you were the only one at the outset, I take it? — A. Yes.
Q. Now could you indicate to the Board what has been referred to as the
political adviser group, how it came about that other officers, other political
officers were attached to his staff? — A. I discussed with General Stilwell the
work which I was doing. It became very ramified. It involved not only strict
political reporting, it involved also production of indoctrination pamphlets on
the Chinese scene for the troops. It involved maintaining contact and political
guidance with his commanders in a very scattered theater. For one example the
Ramgarh Training Center where Chinese troops were being trained. Later, as
we began to prepare for the offensive in Burma there was a wmole operation that
was separate in Burma that required guidance in civil affairs in that area for
which our people were very poorly prepared. There was a whole propaganda
operation. We became intimately connected with the policy guidance on OWL
In fact, the General gave us the authority to guide that whole operation. He also
drew on me for advice on the OSS operations. The necessity of a larger staff
than one person soon became very evident, and I discussed that question with
the General. The General then felt that more men were needed for this particular
function, particularly as this was such a widespread, far-flung theater. He then
took up the matter with the War Department, I believe, in 1943, and the request,
as I recall, originated from the War Department for the assignment of three
other officers.
Mr. Achilles. Were the officers assigned suggested by name by you to General
Stilwell. or were they his own selections?
A. They were in agreement. We discussed several names. He specifically
asked for Service. There was a complete agreement on that, that was the one
man he wanted. He knew Service, of course, quite well. I don't think he knew
the other two men. I recommended them. I think he looked into their records
and accepted the recommendations.
2094 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. The addition of other people, as I understand it, came to fruition roughly
in August of 1943?— A. Yes.
Q. Now, can you describe something of what the organization of that group
was after additional people were added to the assignment? — A. The organization
was extremely loose. It was very casual. That stemmed, I think, really from
two things. One is that we had no positive guidance from the Department as to
how we should operate, how we should function. We were in a very peculiar
position. We were not like the political officers in Europe who were all senior
officers who went out and maintained direct communications with the Depart-
ment themselves. We were junior officer that were assigned to the Embassy,
detailed over to the military. Therefore, our position was rather anonymous
in the field so far as our chain of command into the State Department was con-
cerned. As far as the military was concerned, .there, again, our position was
rather vague, and there was no real provision or requirement for a chain of
command amongst the political advisers. That grew out of the fact, I think
fundamentally, that General Stilwell did not operate on a tight staff concept.
His headquarters was his musette bag, and because of my peculiar relationship
with General Stilwell, from being a long-time acquaintance with him, the head-
quarters generally did not attempt to exercise any particular administrative
control over our arrangements. For my part, I did not wish to put myself up
as boss man over three other brother officers who were the same rank as myself.
Finally, the threater itself was a very decentralized type of operation.
The Chairman. Did you say "decentralized"?
A. Decentralized type of operation with different problems in India, different
problems in China, different problems in Burma, and I felt that we could be
most effective if each officer went out to perform a specific function, as it were,
on a basis of a tacit understanding growing out of a common training that we
had had together. By and large I think it worked fairly well.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. In that connection, is it correct that you throughout this operation, you
more or less were active at the same places that General Stilwell was ; that is,
were you attached pretty much to him personally, wherever his personal head-
quarters was you were? — A. No. I suppose I spent more time in India at his
rear headquarters than I did at his forward headquarters or with him, who was
very peripatetic, who spent most of his time in a politically inactive area which
was the Burma jungle. I also made several trips down to southeast Asia head-
quarters where I maintained liaison at Mountbatten's headquarters.
Q. Well, would you say that you were in any sense the sort of lead officer of
this group of officers, even though you didn't set it up on a boss-man basis in
terms of such chain of command as there was to Stilwell? — A. That was tacitly
accepted by Stilwell and was tacitly accepted by the officers in the Military
Establishment.
Q. Would it be fair to say that in terms of any expressions of desire on General
Stilwell's part as to what he wanted to seek from particular members of this
group that he would tend to pass the orders or the request through you, or was
he dealing independently with each one of them? — A. Oh, he depended upon me
to give the general line of what I knew he wanted clone.
Q. Now can you give the Board some idea of the — this will be a very large
assignment — but some general sketch of the nature of, and the relation of
political problems to military problems in the theater? — A. Of course, the
theater was a relatively minor theater in the war. militarily speaking. It
was probably the most complex political-military theater in the war. That is
to say, Stilwell's authority extended from Moslem Karachi off into Communist
China by definition of the expanse of his theater. It involved, first, the colonial
problem in the Indian subcontinent ; the relations between not only the British
and ourselves, tut I he British, ourselves, and the Indians, and at that time the
Indians were a very difficult political factor. The Dutch were operating from
there into Indonesia clandestinely. Technically, and initially, Stilwell's theater
included Indochina. There was that problem there which involved French colo-
nialism. Then, of course, in China there was this looming civil conflict which
underlay the whole social political structure in which we were trying to conduct
a war.
Q. Xow in that connection, can you characterize the general political objectives
which Stilwell sought to pursue in order to advance his primary military
objectives? — A. Well, we could leave this as merely secondary importance.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2095
Q. In China? — A. The situation in India, thai was a base problem. In
China, which was what he hoped to become an area of military operations,
his problem was to make the Chinese Army an offensive force, which it was
not. That involved Lend-Lease to gel the arms there, and it involved a greater
degree Of unification and control over the Chinese armies over which he theo-
retically had some degree of command. It involved persuading the Generalissimo
and the Chinese Communists that if thai was possible to forgel their internal
civil conflict and join together in fighting the Japanese. Both of them claimed
that they were fighting the Japanese very hard. We felt that there was much
more that could he done on both sides. So in that sense his first problem before
his theater could become an effective offensive theater was the political problem
of the vitalization of the Chinese military forces.
Q. How did he seek to accomplish this political feat? — A. Well, he tried all
sorts of means and it was just try one and if that tailed just try another. He
tried persuasion; thai wasn't very effective. He tried to use Lend-Lease as a
bargaining force to persuade the Chinese to become more aggressive, but that
wasn't very effective. As I recall, he did not get much support from Washington
on that. He sought to obtain later, just before I left, a unified command over
both the Chinese National Government troops and the Communist troops, and in
that he failed, of course.
Q. Well, now, in the process of his attemptst to solve these political ques-
tions which had to come preliminary to any real offensive military operations,
can you describe for the Board something of what his policy was and what you
understood, well, first, what his policy was on the matter of dealing with the
media of public information, the press, and others who had to report on these
political problems. — A. He realized, of course, that in a democratic society, even
during war, that public opinion in this country is necessary for the support of
the war effort, an intelligent public opinion. He felt that the American people
were being misled about many of the realities in China. He felt that made his
job more difficult. He felt that there was a group of Chinese Government publi-
cists in this country and their American friends who were oversimplifying,
perhaps, the problems which confronted him. He was, therefore, in his own
press conferences very frank with the press about the internal situations in
China, the political situation. I have sat in on press conferences with him when
he was exceedingly, by my standards, indiscreet in his discussions of the Chin-
ese political situation. He indicated very clearly to me that he wished me to brief
the press, and, subsequently, that the other members of the State Department
who were detailed to his staff should do likewise. That was based on a very sound
democratic tradition of an informed and enlightened public opinion of one's own
country. These orders of his to me were oral, there were no written orders on
that score. In fact, I don't recall any specific written directives to do a certain
job of one type or another that I received from General Stilwell.
Our relationship was of such long standing and on such a personal basis that
his instructions usually were oral and often they were only a response to a
suggestion that I had made. He on three ocasions sent me to the United States
for the specific purpose of this briefing, on two planes, one within the Govern-
ment. He was anxious that I should come back and report to the State De-
partment what his problems were; that I would do. Then, he was also anxious
that I should talk to x-epresentative Americans, in fact, I remember one occa-
sion when he was here himself, and at his request, I believe it was, I arranged
with Eugene Meyer for a dinner which Mr. Meyer was only to glad to give.
Mr. Achilles. Mr. Meyer was then publisher of the Post?
A. He was then publisher of the Post. For the dinner were present, I should
say, maybe six or eight correspondents, and after dinner there trooped in, oh,
I should say about 20, and Stilwell held forth on the military problems that
he was confronting in a very, very frank way, and then turned to me and asked
me to carry the political picture that confronted him. That was, I think, in
'43 — it may have been in "42.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. May I interrupt just at this point? Would you think it fair to say that
most of the information which both of you were discussing was probably re-
corded somewhere in a document that bore some classification stamp on it?—
A. Oh, certainly. The only purpose of a briefing of that type is to provide mate-
rial that is not readily available in the already open press.
Q. I interrupted you. You were referring to this occasion I think you were
going to indicate. He said that there were others. — A: Subsequently, I was sent
2096 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
back on other trips specifically for this purpose. General Stilwell did not send
me back for my health. He sent me to do these jobs. As I say, there were no
written instructions. I was orally directed to do these things. The only written
indication that I have is a travel order in one case, which gives a hint of this,
in which it is stated that (looking at travel order) I should proceed without
delay to Washington, D. C, on temporary duty for the purpose of carrying out
his special instructions, that's all that was said.
The Chairman. Were those instructions in part to orient the press?
A. Yes, sir ; so much for the United States. In the field, of course, again we
operated as the general line had operated in Hankow, that was with more than
his permission, it was his desire that we work very closely with the American
press and with non-Americans likewise that we considered reputable. We were
very frank with them in these briefings. The only restraints that we reserved
were those in our own judgment we felt that material which originated from the
State Department, War Department, containing directives, policy guidance, ex-
pressions of view of high American officials should not be shown to the press, but
the material which was reportorial about the local situations, political, social,
economic — those we felt were the grist for the press mill to provide an enlightened
American public about the events that were transpiring in his theater.
The Chairman. Did you place any limitations on the press as to reproduction
of any of the things you told them? You say you were very frank — was it under
agreement to secrecy in any respect or was it all intended for publication?
A. Most of it was intended for publication. Some of the material, of course —
this is a familiar technique throughout the Government in agencies which deal
with sensitive material — 'Sometimes information is given for background, some-
times it is given for attribution, and so forth. I think in all instances during the
war such information as we did give was given for background.
The Chairman. That meant they could reproduce it if they
A. Well, generally, that was a question of judgment. There was some mate-
rial— after all, we know that some reports which were classified "secret"' were
extracts from the New York Times, so it is a question of reproduction backward
into the open again. That type of material, of course, there wouldn't be any
objection to, if it were overt material.
The Chairman. I imagine then from what you say some things you told them
in confidence; other things you told them were for their own background, for
publication or not, as they saw fit?
A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. So you gave them this substance with no identity as to source, is that
correct? You gave them the substance of some of the material, but you did not
attribute source, or things of that nature, which would have caused you to
classify it in some instances? — A. Well, that would be overt material, you
mean?
Q. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. You would give them substantive material, but not indicate the
source from which you obtained it? — A. Oh, I see what you mean.
Mr. Rhetts. Which might be the really confidential part of the material — I take
it that's what Mr. Stevens had in mind.
A. That is, I don't recall the specific instance, but that is a conceivable
category.
Question by the Chairman :
Q. I take it that in political reporting which you were doing very frequently
you have material which in itself is not classified at all, not subject to classifica-
tion, but which becomes classified solely from the fact that it is attributed to
somebody which might disclose your source? — A. I see; surely, yes. I get that
point, yes.
Q. So in such cases you would feel free to give the information. — A. Provided
the source were not compromised.
Q. But not compromise the source. — A. Oh, yes.
Mr. Rhetts. I take it from something you said a moment ago, Mr. Davies, that
even apart from that type of material it was common practice, was it not, to
classify anything that anybody wrote practically without regard to its sub-
stance or sources — it was given some sort of a classification during wartime in
a large part ?
A. There was a tendency to grossly overclassify.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2097
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Let me ask you as to your own practice in that respect. Did you make some
written reports from time to time to General Stilwell? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you put a classification on them V— A. On my own reports?
Q. Yes. — A. I put my own classification on them. However, I have seen
reports in headquarters with classifications being put on by sergeants and
corporals.
Q. What would you put on "secret" and "confidential" in some cases? — A. Oh,
yes.
Q. Sometimes "secret" and sometimes "confidential?" — A. Oh, yes. I was
guilty of the same vice of overclassilication. I think it was epidemic.
Q. Now would you afterward feel free to reveal to the press some of the
information contained in those reports without regard to the fact that it was
also contained in a report which you had classified as secret or confidential? —
A. That would depend entirely on my judgment of the circumstances.
Q. Absolutely, you would make it a matter of judgment? — A. Indeed.
Q. You wouldn't in every case didactically refer to the classification on the
paper, but use your judgment as to what you would reveal and not reveal? —
A. Precisely, and I believe that is very much the procedure now in Washington.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. On that point. Mr. Davies, you have indicated you never had any general
instructions from General Stilwell on the point, but was it your understanding
that that was entirely conformable to his own policy and represented his desires
as to how you should conduct yourself ?— A. Emphatically so. That, I think, he
considered — at least as far as I myself am concerned in the situation and the
others in their varying degrees — one of our principal values to him, as persons
who were trained in the area who could give an interpretation which perhaps
not always showed good judgment but in what long term the policy should be,
and, nevertheless, who did have a familiarity with the subject matter.
Questions by Mr. Achilles:
Q. I was going to ask whether in your personal practice you had ever per-
mitted a correspondent to read classified material for background information? — ■
A. Yes.
Q. Was that considered normal procedure? — A. Yes, throughout the theater.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. In such a case you might indicate certain information contained in the
report was not to be made public? — A. Yes.
Q. Such as the source? — A. There, again, it was the question of the judgment
of the material before you; the correspondent to whom you were giving it, a
correspondent like, shall we say, Arch Steele, of the Herald Tribune, who was a
long-time operator there whom we had worked with very closely and whom we
trusted, we knew him extremely well. There was a man we had great confidence
in and we didn't have to make many reservations in what we showed him;
others we would say : "Now be sure this must not be attributed to us or to the
Government."
Q. Or the source must not be revealed? — A. Or the source must certainly not
be revealed ; some newcomer would have to be told the source should not be
revealed.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Did this course you followed with General Stilwell deviate from the pro-
cedure you followed on your various Foreign Service posts, Mr. Davies? — A.
No. Would you like two examples?
The Chairman. Yes.
A. The first time I encountered this practice was in 1935, I believe, at
Mukden. There was a situation — the Japanese had come in and were in
control of the country. American correspondents were having great difficulty
in getting into the country and in filing information that could get through.
Japanese propaganda was trying to build up a certain picture of Manchukuo.
My consul general at that time and later authorized me whenever we had
visiting Americans — William Henry Chamberlin, for example ; there ai'e several
others that slip my mind — J. P. McAvoy, John Gunther. Our files were open to
them, with discrimination, but material that was classified. The highest classi-
fication at that time was strictly confidential and it was put down on the table,
and they were left to take notes on it, and they were told : "The only thing you
2098 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
must not do is to reveal that you got it from the American consulate." This, we
felt, was an essential operation, or my boss did, for the education of the
American people about the realities of Manchukuo, which was then being pub-
licized in very false colors by the Japanese propaganda agencies. That is one
example.
During the foreign ministers conference in Moscow in 1947 Ambassador
Bedell Smith set up a large file of material collected from our own reports,
some of which was classified, for the benefit of American correspondents, not all,
because some we didn't know very well, who came in to cover the foreign min-
isters conference, and they were allowed to come up and take notes and obtain
background material from the official material from our files, with the under-
standing, of course, that it was not for attribution, and that the American
Government was not going to be embarrassed by this. We felt again that this
was an essential operation, operation prophylaxis, for the American public on
the internal situation in the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. Now this practice to which you have just referred was also
known to and practiced by the other officers who were working with you on this
assignment to General Stilwell?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Under oral instructions from you, Mr. Davies, or was that
just a practice that was
A. Under oral instructions from me.
The Chairman. And that would include instructions to Mr. Service?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rhetts. That is, I take it, you made clear to him that this type of
activity was a part of his job in relation to that in China, just as it was a part
of your job in India and Burma?
A. That it was the general's desire.
Mr. Rhetts. That is was what the general wanted him to do?
A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Now his ability, or your ability, to follow this sort of practice, applied
not only to materials which you had prepared but which were available to
you, Mr. Davies? — A. As I say, there, again, it was regarded as matter of judg-
ment in our case.
Q. But you exercised the judgment? — A. We exercised the judgment that was
delegated to us, on our best judgment we made the decisions of what could or
what should not be shown.
Q. That related not only to material which you had classified, but material
which had been classified by someone else that was made available for your use,
and was a part of your file? — A. Theoretically that was true. In practice I don't
think that we ever showed any material that was not our own because we were
the only ones in the theater command who were writing political commentary.
Q. I see. — A. In other words, we would not show a military report that was
out of our field. In fact, we may have had some in our files, but it was not
our practice t<>
The Chairman. Is this a fair statement of the practice : The mere fact that
you as a political reporter had written a report and marked it "confidential" at
the top did not thereafter foreclose you from making it public to the press?
A. Not at all.
The Chairman. In other words, you thereafter exercised your judgment?
A. That's right.
The Chairman. The same judgment you exercised when you marked it confi-
dential V
A. That's right. In effect, we were declassifying.
The Chairman. You classified it and you declassified it to suit yourself ac-
cording to your own judgment?
A. That's right.
Quest ions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Did yon have occasion to make any material you received from Mr. Service
available to the press? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever give anybody copies of his material? — A. Not that I recall.
Q. You never transmitted them to any unofficial person? — A. Not to any unoffi-
cial person that I recall.
Q. Do you think there is any chance of your having transmitted any of his
reports to any unofficial person? — A. I doubt it because the people we were deal-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2099
ing with were mostly- — the people with whom we would transfer documents
for holding would be only officials, I mean send copies in to would be officials.
For instance, we would send copies of our reports to the Embassy. We would
st Mid them back somel imes directly to the Department, extra copies to the I >epart-
ment. -Many of my reports were sent to the OSS, and some to the OWI when they
dealt with propaganda. So they went to oilier agencies in transmission.
Questions by the Chairman:
Q. Did you ever incorporate part of your reports in a press statement, a writ-
ten press statement to the press? — A. We made no written press statements
Thar I recall.
Q. But you did the next thing to it — you permitted them to come in and take
notes from your reports? — A. Oh, yes.
Q. Which is practically the same thins? — A. Which is practically the same
thing.
Q. Except they did the writing instead of you? — A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Achiij.es ;
Q. You are not certain you never transmitted any of Mr. Service's reports
to any unofficial person? — A. I will say I am reasonably certain I never did.
Q. Now is there anything that raises a doubt in your mind? — A. Only this:
that we would occasionally lower classification — not lower classification, but
lower what we would call strictly reportorial stuff, with perhaps no sources
that would be compromised, which would embarrass us. We might loan a paper
to somebody to bring back that afternoon, somebody that we trusted. I don't
recall myself ever having done that.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. But you wouldn't see anything reprehensive in doing it? — A. I wouldn't
see anything reprehensible in doing it, but I don't recall I ever did it. Perhaps
it was never necessary. Perhaps the information could be gotten right from
sitting at a table and taking notes.
Q. There is no distinction between taking notes on the premises or off the
premises as far as the principle is concerned? — A. As far as the principle is
concerned, no, sir.
Mr. Achilles. If you did have occasion to ever send any of his reports to any
private individual, what individual or type of individual might it conceivably
have been, or what would be the circumstances? You say you are not positive
you ever sent any of his reports to a private individual. I am trying to elucidate
under what circumstances such a thing might have happened.
A. Well. I can't conceive of the circumstances under which I would send them
to a private individual, send a report to them.
The Chairman. When you say that, do you mean to elude the press; are you
trying to think of somebody besides the press?
A. I am thinking of the verb "send" ; that is to say, to put in the mail or to
pass by a third courier to somebody. I can't conceive of ever having done that.
I don't recall ever having done that.
Mr. Achilles. But you are still not positive that you never did?
A. That was a very free and easy theater, but I don't recall ever having
done it.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I take it that in pursuing this general practice which you have described
in detail, in which the basic principle was that you and the other officers engaged
in this work were expected to use your judgment and discretion in relation to
the particular persons whom you briefed and the nature of the material that
you could therefore appropriately show them, 1 suppose that throughout you
recognized that, given that latitude for the exercise of judgment, you expected
that if you exercised it in a manner which your superiors found unacceptable
you would pay for it? — A. Yes; we never got any — I never got, and so far as I
know the other officers who were working with me never received, any com-
plaint or reprimand from the general or any officer in headquarters over the way
we were operating, which was general knowledge.
Mr. Stevens. I want to come back to the word "send" now, not by a third
person, but would you have loaned a copy of Mr. Service's report by hand to
a correspondent to have taken out overnight, or 2 or 3 hours? — A. I don't recall
having done that, but depending on my judgment of the correspondent and the
material at that time. I would not exclude the possibility of doing that.
2100 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stevens. That would not have been anything which would have been
so unusual for you as to remember it ; in other words, it may have been a practice
that was followed? — A. Yes.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. The real point is you would not have considered it reprehensible in any
way?
Mr. Stevens. That's right.
A. Depending on the circumstances, the individual involved, the material
which was passed on, and so forth.
Q. Again, it is a question of the exercise of judgment? — A. Precisely.
The Chairman. Are you going on to a different subject now? We were sup-
posed to stop at 5, and it is now nearly 5 : 30.
Mr. Rhetts. I was about to suggest that I am about to turn to another sub-
ject now, and let's leave this matter of the policy. "
The Chairman. Any other question on this particular matter we have been
pursuing?
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. I would like to ask a question or two, if I may, about the times when you
were in China. Take the period from October 1944 — were you in China from
October to January or at any time in there, Mr. Davies? — A. I was in China
the latter part of 1944, and left early January 1945.
Q. Where were you then, Mr. Davies? — A. I was in Chungking, and then I
went up to Yenan, and then I came back to Chungking, and then I departed for
Moscow.
Q. You went back then to New Delhi, did you?— A. I went back to New Delhi,
awaited my orders there for transfer to Moscow, and then proceeded from
New Delhi.
Q. You went there early in January from China? — A. From China — from
Chungking.
The Chairman. Anything you would like to ask? We are cleaned up for
the moment.
Mr. Rhetts. If it is your proposal to recess, I would like at this point to
introduce a document which deals with the matter we have just been dis-
cussing, namely, the policy on dealings with the press and other sources.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to offer for inclusion in the transcript Document
No. 323, which is an affidavit by Paul L. Jones, colonel of the Infantry Reserve,
dated May 23, 1950. Colonel Jones was the public-relations officer for the
theater, and his testimony on this point, as a military man, 1 think, is highly
relevant to this question and should go in at this point.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. I just wanted to ask the witness : Did you know Colonel Jones? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he was public-relations officer at that time? — A. Yes, sir. He was a
very close friend of General Stilwell and the whole Stilwell family.
Q. And he was familiar with this practice you have been telling us about? —
A. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It may be admitted.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 323
San Diego, California.
May 2Srd, 19.50.
To : The Chairman of the Dept. of State Loyalty Security Board.
From: Paul L. Jones, Col.. Inf. Res., 3876 La Cresta Drive. San Diego, Cali-
fornia.
Subject: Public Relations Policy in the China-Burma-India Theatre from 1942
to 1945.
1. At the request of Mr. John Service, I am submitting this statement of
C-B-l Theatre Public Relations Policy :is Theatre Public Relations Officer under
the late Genera] Joseph W. Stilwell during the period •"> June 1!>44 to 4 Feb. 194">.
Prior to this appointment I had been Asst. Theatre Public Relations Officer for
almost a year.
2. In order to have this report on the C-B-I Theatre have any meaning, it is
necessary to state as briefly as possible the problems facing the Public Relations
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2101
Section of the Theatre Headquarters. The C-B-I was a then l re of complex
animosities. The British despised and mist rusted the Chinese; the Chinese
reciprocated in kind. The British and the Indians and the Burmese were con-
stantly at odds. The Americans were caughl in the middle. The relations
between the British, Indian Government, the Chinese, and the Burmese were
of such a nature thai fighting the Japs was a very minor secondary operation.
The American fighting forces found themselves involved in a battle for which
they had had NO training, for the war in C-B-I was a war of international
politics. American correspondents, in the early part of the American stay in
Asia, wishing to write the truth about China for American papers would come
to India, write their story, have it passed by the British POLITICAL censors
and then send it to America. The Chinese returned the favor by allowing
American correspondents to file derogatory stories on the British from China.
This continued until orders were issued from Washington, on pressure from
the British and < hinese Governments, that all stories written about either the
British or the Chinese must he cleared by censors of the country about which
the story was written, regardless of where they were tiled. It was always
necessary for an American correspondent to clear any story written on China
with the Chinese even though it had cleared American censorship; stories on
the British or Indian stories must he cleared with the British censors. I make
a rather strong point of this condition for it is the reason for much of our
censorship. The American policy of censorship had to do with information
which would have proved injurious to the war effort in Asia. The British and
Chinese censorship was based on political issues which had little or nothing
to do with the actual fighting. The war in China (during the time I was Public
Relations Officer at least) was a war of the printed word. I have been in Mr.
Hollington Tong's office (then Minister of Information for the Chinese Govern-
ment) when he would read the daily communiques of the United States, Britain.
and Russia and then sit down and write the one on the Chinese Armies along
the lines of those released by the other three allies. This was then released as
the official communique1 of the Chinese Government for the day.
3. The above paragraph on the situation is all too brief to set the scene, but
it may serve to explain the Theatre's attitude on certain information which was
freely given to accredited correspondents and which, because of the political
situation in China and our Theatre, carried the stamp of classified material.
It was very difficult to explain to American newsmen who had been to the other
fronts of the world why certain things were forbidden them from Asia. To clear
this point, the newsmen were briefed by competent personnel on the situation in
China at that time. It must be borne in mind that all American correspondents
in the Theatre had been cleared by the War Department Bureau of Public Rela-
tions prior to their coming to the Theatre, and I know of no case where a cor-
respondent released background information of a classified material which was
not either passed by the Theatre Censors or the War Department Bureau of
Public Relations. Certainly none has ever been released, under any condition,
which hurt the NONEXISTENT war effort against the Japs during my period in
the Theatre.
4. During this period, the State Department of the United States had attached
to our Headquarters as political advisors Mr. John Da vies and Mr. John Service.
Both of these men had spent many years in China and knew the history, the
language, the courtesies, the people, and the Government. As it is impossible
for a man to know a country whose language he does not speak, in the three years
our group was in the Theatre, we of the Public Relations Office and the Head-
quarters were very dependent on these men for assistance in clarifying the
American position in China to the correspondents in the Theatre. This was in
line with the policy set down for the Theatre by the Commanding General, Joseph
W. St dwell. The General's attitude was that the American people deserved to
know the truth; that the American people did not want any information re-
leased that would cause the life of a single American or Allied soldier ; that the
American people were not interested in news which if published would delay
the end of the war a single day ; but that the American people did deserve to
know, and were paying enough to know, that all reports released by the Chinese
were a loner way from the facts of the case.
5. Therefore, in spite of the fact that much of this material was considered
classified because it was politically objectionable to the Chinese it did become
necessary for us to release information to correspondents as background and
informational material so that they could understand and write intelligently
on the problems we faced in Asia and what the future held forth. Both Mr.
2102 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Davies and Mr. Service assisted in this phase of our work and were expected
to do so. In many cases I have referred correspondents to them for historical
and political background on China, past and then present, which my office was
unable to furnish the writers because of lack of knowledge.
6. I feel I am on very safe ground when I say that neither of these two men
had any extensive knowledge of the military plans of the Theatre, for in visiting
with them from time to time I was surprised at how little they knew of the
military problems. Their knowledge, for which we were thankful, was in the
political field ; and there the personnel of our Headquarters, with a few excep-
tions, was woefully lacking. The American Army has never been trained to fight
a political battle, and this lack of training made us the only Army in Asia which
did not know the political objectives of its country- Perhaps we had none, but
we would be better off today if we had had.
7. In closing, I beg forgiveness of the Committee for inserting a personal
observation. It seems tragic to me that men like General Stilwell (whose re-
port to the War Department in 1945 predicted the downfall of the Chinese Na-
tionalist Government) and men like Mr. Davies and Mr. Service should be
maligned from some quarters of our Government because they were intelligent
enough to understand and warn our Government of what was coining in Asia.
Had we heeded their warning, the condition in China in my opinion need not be
what it is today. It is irony that these men are being blamed, in part, for the
sitnuation They predicted. It seems odd to me that we expect our public people to
do the best job they know how for our country and then we blame them when they
do. Won't such treatment make it impossible to get good people in the Govern-
ment in the future?
8. May I say again that this is an all-too-brief account to clearly explain the
problem'. For' the sake of the record, I have made every effort to keep it brief.
If clarification or further details are desired, I shall be glad to assist in any
way.
9. I certify that the above is true and factual insofar as I had knowledge as
Public Relations Ofheer of the China Burma India Theatre.
Submitted by :
(S) Paul L. Jones, Col., Inf. Res.
The Chairman. I think we can recess until Monday at 10 a. m.
(The meeting recessed at 5 : 30 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Review Board Meeting in the Matter of John S. Service
Date : May 29, 1950, 10 :40 to 12 noon.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reported by E. Wake, CS/Reporting.
Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, chairman: Theodore C. Achilles,
member ; Arthur G. Stevens, member ; Allen B. Moreland. legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, firm of Reilly,
Rbetts & Kuckelshaus.
(The meeting reconvened at 10: 40 a. m.)
(After being duly sworn Mrs. Annette Blumenthal testified as follows:)
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. What is your full name please?— A. Annette Blumenthal.
(>. And your residence? — A. 2805 Webb Avenue, the Bronx.
Q. .Mrs. 'Blumenthal. will you state briefly, for the benefit of the Board, your
business association with the Institute of 1'acihc Relations? — A. I worked for
them for 'i'j years and when I left I was subscription manager of their maga-
zine "Public Affairs" and their bulletin "Far Eastern Survey."
(„>. Would you give dates? — A. I started working there on a part-time basis
in 1933— in March 1933— and I left in June 1942.
Q. In the course of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations,
did you become acquainted with Mr. Philip Jacob Jaffe? — A. Yes.
Q. What was his connection?— A. I don't think he was ever connected with
the institute. He started publication of a magazine "Amerasia." I don't remem-
ber when it was started. I started Working for Mr. Jaffe on a very part-time
basis; in fact, I devoted only my lunch hour to working for him on the sub-
scription list of Amerasia.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2103
Q. What was the relationship, if any, between the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions and Amerasia? — A. None thai I know of.
Q. How did yon happen to meet Mr. Jaffe? — A. Their offices were in the same
building as the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-seventh Street.
Q. New York City?— A. That's right.
Q. What did he employ yon to do with reference to the publication "Amer-
asia"?— A. The girl that was in charge of the office was ill and their subscrip-
tion list became very tangled up I would say and he asked me to straighten it
up for him and the girl did not return to the job and he asked me if I could
continue working during the lunch hour. I did that for 2 or 3 years.
Q. What years? — A. If it were 3 years it would start in 1939 to 1942 — until
I left.
Q. Now in connection with this work that you did for Mr. Jaffe, did you see
any papers or did you actually copy papers for him? — A. I did manuscript typing,
not Mr. Jaffe's work alone but any writers that offered manuscripts for the maga-
zine.
Q. I pass you certain papers and ask if you can identify them as photostats
of papers which you may have copied for Mr. Jaffe? — A. During the time I
worked for him or after I left the office?
Q. During the time you worked for him. — A. I left in 1942 and I did work at
home afterwards.
Q. Let me inquire as to that. Tell us about the work you did for him at
home after you left the office? — A. One time he wrote a book and asked me to
type the manuscript. Later on he asked for other material to have copied and
I would copy it and return it to him.
Q. What date would you give to that? — A. Mostly on and off between 1942
and the spring of 1945.
Q. Did you at any time type any reports which were purported to be signed
by Mr. John Service? — A. I wouldn't remember the signatures but I could identify
the papers if I saw them.
Q. I pass you some photostats which may be photostats of papers which you
have seen. — A. It is very hard to identify these. If I had the copies I had made
myself I could recognize my typing — the general run of my typing, but the con-
tents don't seem familiar at all. If I had my own papers I could identify them.
Q. Do you know where your copies are? — A. I know that they were held in the
State Department at one time because I identified them down here in Washington.
Q. I have handed you a report No. 16, dated March 17, 1945, containing at the
end the signature of John S. Service and entitled: "Subject: Plans for Relief
and Rehabilitation Organizations of the Communist Liberated Areas." Are you
able to identify that as a document you copied? — A. No, I couldn't remember it.
Q. You have looked at that paper? — A. Yes sir, I looked at it before. There
were no headings on these papers originally? These are the only headings?
There were no State Department headings?
Q. No. — A. I think the papers I worked on were all marked "State Depart-
ment" or "OWL"
Q. Did you work on any papers without headings? — A. I cannot remember.
Q. You have looked at that paper and you are unable to identify it? — A.
Definitely.
Mr. Rhetts. May I see this paper so I will know which one you are talking
about.
Q. I piiss you one No. 1.1. dated March 10, 1945, which also purports to have
the signature of John S. Service and which is entitled: "Subject: Policy of the
('hiii' se Communists Toward the Problem of National Minorities." — A. No, I can
not identify it.
Q. I pass yen a photostat of a paper numbered 17. dated March 17. 1!»4.">, bear-
ing the signature of John S. Service and entitled: "Subject: Clarification of
Communist Territorial Claims by Direct American Observation." Can you
identify it? — A. I am afraid not.
Q. I p;;ss yon a photostat of paper No. 21, dated March 21. 1015. bearing the
Signature of John S. Service and entitled: '•Chiang Kai-shek's Treatment of the
Kuangsi Clique." Can you identify it? — A. No. I cannot.
o. Vim cannot? — A. No. I cannot.
Q. I pass you an original document, dated March 22. 1945, No. 22, hearing
the signature of John S. Service, and entitled: "Subject: Recent Appointments
by the Generalissimo Contradictory to Announced Intentions of Peaceful Set-
tlement of Internal Issues," and ask if you can identify that as a paper you
copied? — A. No, I cannot.
2104 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now I hand you two original papers fastened together, one of which ap-
pears to be dated September 28, 1944, bearing the signature of C. E. Gauss, No.
318, subject : Transmitting Reports of : Interview with Mao Tse-tung ; Need
of American Policy Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and
Desirability of American Military Aid to Chinese Communist Armies, which
contains as an enclosure original report No. 15, dated August 27, 1944, subject :
Interview with Mao Tse-tung, bearing the typed signature of John S. Service,
and the further report of August 23, 1944, without title or signature, and report
of September 3, 1944, numbered 20, subject: The Need of an American Policy
Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party,
bearing the typed signature of John S. Service, and report of August 29, 1944,
No. 16, subject : Desirability of American Military Aid to the Chinese Communist
Armies, bearing the typed signature of John S. Service, and ask if you can
identify any portion of that as a paper which you copied for Mr. Jaffe? — A. No,
I cannot identify these papers either.
Q. I pass you a communication No. 3181, dated November 24, 1944, Trans-
mission of Reports on Conditions in the Communist Area and on Kuomintang
Communist Relations, which contained as an enclosure report No. 39, dated
October 9, 1944, subject : Present Strength and Future Importance of the Chinese
Communists bearing the typed signature of John S. Service ; report No. 42, dated
October 11, 1944, subject : Celebration of October 10 in Yenan, containing the
typed signature of John S. Service, and memorandum of October 11, 1944, Cele-
bration of October 10 in Yenan, having no signature on it ; a report No. 43,
dated October 12, 1944, subject : Comments of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Gen-
eral Chou En-lai on the Internal Situation in China, containing the typed sig-
nature of John S. Service ; and memorandum of October 10, 1940, Conversation
with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, bearing the typed initials "J. S. S.," and the re-
port No. 46, dated October 16, 1944, subject Communist Comment on the Gen-
eralissimo's October 10 Speech, containing the typed signature of John S. Service
with a translation from the Yenan Chieh Fang Jib Pao, October 12, 1944, entitled
"Yenan Observer Criticizes the Dangerous Character of Chiang Kai-shek's
Speech," and ask if you can identify any of those papers as papers you copied
for Mr. Jaffe V — A. No, I cannot identify it either.
Q. While you are reading that I will read into the records a quote from this.
Don't let it bother you. I am going to give you next photostats of four reports,
one numbered 13, dated March 15, 1944, subject : Communist Views In Regard to
Sinkiang, bearing the signature of John S. Service ; one dated March 16, 1945,
numbered 14, subject: Communist Views in Regard to Mongolia, bearing the
signature of John S. Service ; No. 18, dated March 18, 1945, subject : Establish-
ment of Unified Labor and Women's Organizations for the Communist Liberated
Areas, bearing the signature of John S. Service, and one dated March 19, 1945,
numbered 19, subject : Communist Report of Kuomintang "Exile" Government
Organizations for the Shen Kan-Ning Border Region, bearing the signature of
John S. Service, and ask you the same question as to whether or not you can
identify any of these reports as papers which you copied for Mr. Jaffe. — A. I am
afraid I cannot identify these either.
Q. In your relations with Mr. Jaffe, did you know him as a Communist? —
A. I never discussed Mr. Jaffe's political views. I never knew whether he was
or was not a Communist. I was an employee in the office and I had no idea
what his political beliefs were.
Q. Did you know Mr. John S. Service? — A. No, I did not.
Q. You have never met him? — A. I don't believe I ever did. He was a mem-
ber of the Institute of Pacific Relations, if I remember correctly. He may have
been in the office at one time or another but I never met him.
Q. And in connection with these reports, you had no connection with Mr.
Service? — A. No.
Q. Do you recollect you copied any reports that bore his name? — A. I am sure
I did copy some that bore his name.
Q. Can you fix the time when you did that? — A. It would he in the spring of
1945. That was when I did that particular work for Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Do you remember whether or not you copied reports that bore the classi-
fication "secret" or "confidential"? — A. Yet, I did.
Q. Did any of those reports bear the name of John S. Service? — A. I am sure
some did.
Q. Did Mr. Jaffe make any explanation how be came by "secret" reports or
"confidential" reports bearing the signature of John S. Service? — A. None
whatsoever.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2105
Q. Were von ;it one time interrogated by the FBI on these reports? — A. I
was asked to appear before the grand jury in 1945 in connection with the
reports.
Q. Did you identify some? — A. I did.
Q. Were you shown some copies of reports hearing the name of John S.
Service?— A. Yes.
Q. Were you able to identfy them? — A. I was able to identfy my own copies
of the reports.
Q. Did you have them? — A. The FBI had all of them. They had taken them
from Mr. Jaffe's office. I believe.
Q. Did you have any connection with the taking of these copies from Mr.
Jaffe's office? — A. No. Mr. Jaffe brought the material to my home and he called
for them when they were ready.
Q. And with reference to the investigation by the FBI, you had no connection
except to testify as you stated before? — A. That's right.
Q. Did you have any knowledge whatever of the source of the documents
bearing the name of John S. Service, which you copied? — A. No, I did not.
Q. Or of any others of the reports? — A. No. I did not. The fact that they
were marked "secret" or "confidential" meant absolutely nothing to us because
in our work for the Institute of Pacific Relations we would get papers on and
off bearing that sort of heading and we would mimeograph two or three hundred
for circulation so it did not seem queer to me at the time. I would not question
it. I mean. I didn't question it.
Q. All the papers bearing the name of John S. Service came to you through
Mr. Jaffe?— A. That's right.
Q. Not through the Institute of Pacific Relations? — A. None at all.
Q. What did you do with the copies that you made for Mr. Jaffe? — A. Mr. Jaffe
came to my home and collected them when ready.
Q. How many copies would you make?— A. I believe an original and three or
an original and four. I don't remember.
Q. Did he state to you what he intended to do with them? — A. No; he did
not.
Q. You have no knowledge, I take it, from what you have just said, as to how
Mr. Jaffe got possession of these documents bearing the, name of John S. Service? —
A. No.
Q. Or any of the other documents which you copied? — A. All I know is that
he brought them to me and said he was in quite a rush for them and the quicker
I could have them ready and called him, the better it would be.
Q. Did he say that all the time? — A. There was a rush job on all of them
and the quicker I could do it, the hetter.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall when the name of John S. Service first came to your
attention?
A. In my work for the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Achilles. Do you remember approximately what date?
A. No ; that I would not remember. I believe he was a member of the organi-
zation, and if he was we would send him our bulletin or the Far Eastern Survey,
and his name would he one of the names appearing on the subscription list.
He would receive it as a member or as a subscriber.
Mr. Achilles. WTould you be able to make an estimate of the number of
documents bearing his name that you copied?
A. No.
Mr. Achilles. What form did Mr. Jaffe give you his documents in? Were
they originals or carbon copies?
A. No: I had no carbons at all. They were all originals. There was a
tremendous amount of mimeographed material bearing the heading of OWI
and they were mostly excerpts of articles run in different Chinese papers and
although I did not copy them all in sections, I copied maybe half pages of one and
quarter pages of others and on others he wanted the full contents copied.
Mr. Achilles. The documents Mr. Service signed would not be the mimeo-
graphed ones?
A. No ; they would b° State Department.
Mr. Achilles. You say they were original signed documents?
A. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. You spoke of the number of the Institute of Pacific Relations
documents being marked "secret" or "confidential." Were those documents
originating in the Institute of Pacific Relations or were they originating in
governmental sources?
2106 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. Not from governmental sources at all. They were either office copies, let
us say, on economic viewpoints in a certain country or part of a manuscript
or whole chapter of a manuscript as a rule. Nothing originated at the office.
Some may have heen originated by Mr. Carter or Mr. Field or any one of the
people employed there but none of them were Government papers.
Mr. Achilles. And when some governmental papers of the same classifica-
tion were given to you to copy, did that attract your attention at all as being
unusual?
A. No, because of my contact with things marked "secret" and having sten-
cils and making maybe two or three hundred copies. They would be marked
for circulation and we made two or three hundred copies. So it did not seem
queer at all.
The Chairman. You say you terminated your work for the institute in 1942?
A. In June 1942.
The Chairman. To that date were you aware that the institute was in any
way Communist led?
A. No. As far as I was concerned, I was definitely under the impression it
was a nonpartisan organization. They would publish articles in their magazine
and in the Fortnightly Bulletin giving pros and cons on different subjects.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Field, up to that date, have anything to do with it?
A. He was secretary to the American Council during my employment there.
I don't remember the exact years.
The Chairman. Do you know whether or not he was a Communist?
A. No, I do not.
The Chairman. Could you amplify any further the reasons for your impres-
sion that Mr. Service was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
A. The name was just familiar. It just seems to stay there. I am quite sure
he was a member of the institute. His name did come to my notice at that
time. If he wasn't a member, then he was a subscriber to either their magazine
or their bulletin but I am almost positive he was a member.
The Chairman. What was the difference between a subscriber and a member?
A. A subscriber would just pay for the subscription to either the magazine
or the bulletin and a member would contribute anywhere from $5 upward to
the organization and if they contributed $5 I think $5 would entitle them to the
Fortnightly Bulletin and I think a $10 subscriber was entitled to both plus any
other papers or documents the institute circulated among their members.
The Chairman. You have no recollection as to what type of membership Mr.
Service may have had? — A. No.
The Chaikman. You may inquire.
Mr. Rhetts. Thank you. Can I have these original documents?
(Mr. Moreland handed papers to Mr. Rhetts.)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I believe, Miss Blumenthal, you testified a moment ago that as to papers
bearing the signature of Mr. Service, which you may have typed for Mr. Jaffe,
it was your distinct recollection that all of those were original State Depart-
ment papers?— A. Not all of them — some of them.
Q. I would like to inquire to see what you mean by original State Department
papers. I show you document 177 which is the original of dispatch 3018, dated
Chungking, China, September 28, 1944, and I would like to ask you whether
that is the type of paper which you regard as an original State Department
paper? — A. I don't recall if I did any on this type of paper. The ones I remem-
ber distinctly were all 8-by-ll standard size and it was on a much heavier paper
and it wasn't flimsy at all.
Q. Did such papers bear a printed or reproduction of printed headings such
as "Embassy of the United States of America." or "State Department"? — A.
State Department I do remember. I don't remember if There was any Embassy
of the United States of America.
Q. Are you familiar with the process of reproducing documents called the
ozalid process? — A. No; I am not.
Q. Was i he Board able to obtain a specimen of an ozalid?
Mr. Achilles. We will ask Mrs. Ivey to get a specimen.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Q. I will come back to this question.
I believe you testified that it is your recollection that the papers which you
typed for Mr. Jaffe, which may have borne the name "John S. Service" on them,
were all typed by you during the spring of 1945? — A. That is correct.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2107
Q. Is it possible for you to place the dates a little more specifically? — A. I do
know it was before May 24 because on May L'4 1 gave birth to a little girl so
it couldn't have been after that. I think it was mainly between February and
April. 1 think it was over a 2-montb period.
Q. Mainly between . — A. February and April 1945.
Q. By "April" do you mean the first of April or the end of April? — A. I
wouldn't know. I think it was at the end of April. I don't think I did any-
thing for Mr. Jaffe in May.
Q. Ycm referred to copies being prepared between February and April. Can
you give us some idea of how frequently Mr. Jaffe brought papers to you for
copying? — A. I don't know. The first time he came up I think he brought 50 or
60 pages of typing.
Q. Can you place at all what the first time would be? — A. It is quite a long
time back but I am quite sure it was about February. I think that is what I would
say. That is in my mind, between February and April but I cannot remember
exactly.
Q. Your recollection I believe you indicated is that the first time, which you
place in February, he brought some 50 or 60 pages'? — A. I mean sheets. I don't
mean documents — I mean pages.
Q. Do you have a recollection as to whether any of these Service memoranda
were among that batch? — A. No, I am quite sure they were not. I believe they
were mostly all — they were long sheets of yellow paper — mimeographed material
headed OWL That was the first batch.
Q. Can you place when you think you began seeing papers that bore the name
of Service on them? — A. Later on I did get papers marked "State Department."
I don't know if there were any other papers from any other divisions but I did
have State Department papers.
Q. Is it your recollection that any material bearing Service's name, which you
typed, were a part of these State Department papers? — A. Yes, I believe there
were some.
Q. Which would bear State Department or other printed headings at the top
and would show it was from a Government department. — -A. I believe there were
some but how many I do not know.
Q. Do you remember any other names which appeared on any of the documents
that you copied for Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, the only reason I remember Mr. Service's
name is because it is a familiar name. I came across it before in my work in the
office.
Mr. Stevens. In your work for the office •
A. The Institute of Pacific Relations.
Q. I believe you testified you were questioned by the FBI at the time of the
Amerasia arrests? — A. That's right.
Q. And I believe you testified you then appeared before the grand jury? — A.
In Washington ; yes.
Q. Have you been subsequently interviewed by the FBI ? — A. No.
Q. Not since? — A. 1945. I came to Washington twice in 1945. The first time 1
appeared before the grand jury and the second time I don't remember if I ap-
peared before the grand jury but I did come down but I don't remember what
happened.
Q. But you are quite sure you have not been interviewed by other FBI agents
since that time? — A. Not until Mr. Reynolds came up and asked me to come down
to Washington.
Q. Can you recall whether in any of your interviews with the FBI in 1945
you then told the FBI that you recalled typing documents which bore the name
of John S. Service? — A. I don't think they asked that question directly. They
did show me copies of typewritten papers and asked me to identify. I did. I be-
lieve, by putting my signature to them.
Q. Have you ever told the FBI that you recall typing papers bearing the signa-
ture of Mr. Service and also papers bearing the Signature of tbe American
Ambassador in China? — A. I may have said I typed papers bearing Mr. Service's
signature. That question was put to me. I don't know if I was ever questioned
about papers with the American Ambassador's signature.
Q. Referring again to document No. 177, I ask you to look at page 4 of this
despatch and I invite your attention particularly to the typed words "C. E.
Gauss" above which is his signature in ink. J >o you think that you ever copied
any documents which bore the signature of < '. E. Gauss? — A. I may have. The
name is not completely new to me. It seems to click. I am sure I have seen the
name before.
68970 — 50— pt. 2 — —40
2108 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Do you ever remember typing any documents which bore the handwritten
signature of Mr. Service? — A. I wouldn't recall; no. I don't know if they were
handwritten or just typewritten.
Q. You have no recollection whatever?— A. No.
The Chairman. Counsel has asked for a copy of ozalid paper and Mr. Tan-
quary has appeared with such a copy. Will you give it to counsel please.
( Off the record conversation. )
Mr. Stevens. Do you ever remember Mr. Service having contributed any articles
to the Institute of Pacific Relations, to your knowledge, while working for them?
A. He may have. I am not positive. Thinking back, in 1936 the Institute
of Pacific Relations had a conference and I think one of the pamphlets written
was called Manchuria 1931, and that was written by John Stewart. I don't
know why but I think at the time the impression was that John Stewart was the
same party as John Service. That is the only connection I can think of Mr.
Service's writing anything for the Institute, if it. is one and the same party.
Mr. Stevens. You stated you remembered typing materials that bore the head-
ing of the Department of State. Do you remember typing any material signed
by Mr. Service that did not bear the heading "Department of State"?
A. I don't recall.
Mr. Stevens. You don't recall whether you did or did not?
A. I don't recall whether there were two types of papers. I know there were
some Department of State papers that did have Mr. Service's signature but
whether there were any without, I don't remember.
Mr. Stevens. Did you question any personal notes on the material you copied
for Mr. Jaffe?
A. No.
Mr. Stevens. You stated a little bit ago that you were certain Mr. Service was
a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. What makes you certain he
was a member rather than a subscriber?
A. I didn't say he was a member. I said I didn't remember whether he was
a member or subscriber. I remember his name from the Institute of Pac'fic
Relations. I am quite sure I didn't say I was positive he was a member. No ;
I don't think I did.
Mr. Achilles. You were dealing with circulation matters for the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
A. That's right.
Mr. Achilles. Miss Blumenthal, you stated a little while ago that you be-
lieved the original typed documents, signed by Mr. Service, had been on paper
size 8 by 11.
A. Yes ; I believe they were.
Mr. Stevens. And did the headings of those papers, as you recall, read "De-
partment of State" or American Embassy, Chungking," or what?
A. I don't remember whether they bore "American Embassy" or not. I do
remember there were papers marked "State Department." There were also
identifications and classifications on top before the contents started. What
those classifications were I don't know.
Mr. Stevens. Do you recall copying any original papers bearing Mr. Service's
name on legal-sized paper?
A. It is possible because I have quite a bit of legal-sized paper. I may have
made a mistake on the 8 by 11 size. It may have been on legal size but I think
there was some 8 by 11.
•Mr. Stevens. The reason I ask is that documents prepared in the State De-
partment are frequently on 8 by 11 paper, whereas documents from State Depart-
ment offices abroad are ordinarily on legal-sized paper. You state you are not
certain?
A. Not positive. If I saw the papers — not exactly the papers but my copies,
I could identify my own papers *>y the way I type as typists can identify the
papers by the type of machine th«-y use but whether I can identify the material
I typed from individually, I doubt very much if I could.
(Off the record.)
The Chairman. Do you wish t' examine Mr. Tanauary?
Mr. Rheti-s. I would like to as* a question beforehand.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts .
Q. In the last few minutes, Mrs. Blumenthal, you began discussing documents
bearing Mr. Service's signature. I take it, from my previous question, that
when you used the word "signature" you do not necessarily mean his hand-
written signature? — A. No, I do not.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2109
Q. You mean a document thai has typed upon it the name "Service"? — A. That
is correct.
Q. A little while ago, when we were inquiring about the type of State Depart-
ment papers that you may have copied — I show you document No. 177, which is an
original despatch from the Ambassador in China — you stated, I believe, that the
things you type were on much thicker paper than this. — A. Naturally.
Q. Than paper upon which this dispatch is written. Now, I have here a three-
page document, headed No. 13, and dated April 12, 15)50, which is an ozalid repro-
duction of typewriting on ordinary paper and I ask you if that is the type of
paper that you think you copied from? — A. This is not the same type of paper.
It was a still heavier paper. I don't know if it was originally typed on this
paper or whether it was offset copies but it was definitely heavier paper than
this.
Q. Now I show you document 321, which is a positive of a photostat of this
material and I ask you if that is the type of paper? — A. This is the type of paper.
I definitely worked with this type of paper.
Q. I see. So that what you were given in the way of State Department papers
was a photostat of a State Department document which photostat would re-
produce the official department heading at the top of the page and you copied
from photostats of the State Department. — A. Not all hut a good many were
photostats. There was mimeographed paper and all kinds.
Q. I am directing my attention exclusively to the State Department papers. —
A. I believe most of them were on that type of photostat paper.
Q. Were you ever in Mr. Jaffe's office at Amerasia? — A. Definitely; I worked
there.
Q. Did he have photostat equipment in that office? — A. Not that I know of —
not during the time I worked there.
A. Did you work in the office of Amerasia? — A. In the office. They main-
tained two offices in the building. One was Mr. Jaffe's and Miss Mitchell's private
office and the other was just a private room consisting of two desks, at one of
which the office manager worked and I occupied the other.
Q. This was during a period which came to a close some time in 1942? —
A. June 1942.
Q. June 1942. Were you ever in the Amerasia offices in 1945? — A. No.
Q. Or 1944?— A. No; definitely not.
Q. So that as of that latter period, you simply don't know whether they had
any facilities for photostating or otherwise reproducing documents? — A. No.
The Chairman. May I ask counsel, is the paper you just used in evidence?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes it is.
(Off the record.)
Mr. Rhetts. I have no further questions.
Mr. Achilles. Just one or two further questions. You described some of the
documents which you received and copied as being original documents. I am
not quite clear whether by that you mean original typed and signed documents;
that is, with the handwritten signature, or were they in some other form with
stereotyped signature? — A. Truthfully I couldn't say myself. It is so many years
since I handled the material and many came in mimeographed form. Some came
photostated. There may have been original copies with signed signatures, I
cannot recall. If I saw my own papers I could tell you whether I typed them and
in that way you could trace their source but I would not make any statement
I am not sure of. I don't remember. I know what the contents of some were —
the general idea — but I don't think I remember the State Department papers.
I remember what was in the mimeographed papers — the type of work.
Mr. Achilles. That is all.
The Chairman. That will be all. You have nothing further counsel?
Mr. Rhetts. No.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mrs. Blumenthal.
( Mr. Harold z. Tanquary being duly sworn, testified as follows :)
The Chairman. Your name is?
A. Harold Zimmer Tanquary.
The Chairman. You are an employee of the State Department?
A. Yes sir.
The Chairman. In what position?
A. Control officer in the Reproduction Section, Central Services.
The Chairman. Counsel has some questions he desires to ask. .
2110 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Are you. iu your position as control officer in the Reproduction Section,
familiar with the various methods and techniques for reproducing papers which
are utilized in the State Department generally? — A. Yes sir.
Q. Now I show you document 321, which has previously been shown to Mrs.
Blumenthal, and ask you to state by what process that document has been pro-
duced, if any? — A. By microfilm on 35 milimeter film and evidently on the auto-
matic machine similar to the one we have downstairs.
Q. I am asking you by what method has the content of this paper been re-
produced and what do you call this paper? — A. Well, it is a very good grade of
photostat paper.
Q. Is that a photostatic reproduction or something? — A. No sir; it is micro-
film.
Q. Can you tell us what the difference between that paper and photostat paper
is? — A. It is a little bit lighter. It has a higher grade of rag content. It has
to be a stronger paper to go through the machines — the filming and exposing of
the paper through the developer, the fixer, and the drier.
Q. "Would you say that, from the point of view of a person who is not expert
in these matters, the glazed surface of this paper and the general thickness
of the paper could easily be mistaken for a photostatic reproduction? — A. Yes
sir.
Q. Is it fair to say that this is substantially like a photostat paper is in most
respects, comparable to what a positive reproduction of a photostat would
be? — A. That's right.
Q. Will you describe the ozalid process of reproduction of a typewritten docu-
ment?— A. Any transparent piece of paper such as a maximum of about 13-
pound paper — what we generally speak of as lightweight paper 13, 15, or 16.
Generally it takes 13 and 9 as flimsy material. It does not necessarily have to
be carbonized on the back, such as this ; in other words, using any carbon image
on lightweight paper would produce ozalid copies.
The master is placed on presensitized paper and fed into the machine where
light will penetrate through the transparent master onto the presensitized paper.
The color and density of the ozalid copies are determined by an adjustment
of the machine allowing so many feet of paper or sensitized material to travel
so many feet per minute.
The master is stripped off from the presensitized paper after it passes by
the light tube. The presensitized paper is carried up by tapes past tubes of
ammonia fumes where the sensitized paper is developed, and thence by same
tapes to be ejected as finished copy.
Q. I show you document No. 177 which is an original despatch. — A. That has
all been carbonized.
Q. This paper has had a carbon reversed on the back side of each sheet, has it
not? — A. Yes sir.
Q. You say that is not a necessary technique in order to be ahle to make an
ozalid reproduction? — A. No, sir; but it makes a better ozalid reproduction.
Q. Referring again to document 177 and the first page thereof, this document
bears, does it not, certain stamps, "Division of Communications and Records,"
and other routings as well as certain handwriting in the upper right-hand
corner, indicating distribution which was to be made of that document. Is that
correct? — A. That's right.
Q. If this piece of paper here — page 1 of this document — were to he repro-
duced by the ozalid process, would the reproduction show the handwriting here
in the upper right-hand corner? — A. This would he very faint because light is
so intense that it will penetrate this and. therefore, expose the presensitized
paper which will leave only a faint outline. I mean, with the adjustment of the
machine you can make this come up.
The Chaibman. Let me inquire, paper 177 just referred to, is that numbered
from your numbering system or the numbering on the paper?
Mr. Riietts. This is our numbering system. This document is in evidence
as an exhibit as No. 177.
Q. I ask you to look at page 4 of document 177 and I ask you— this bears the
typed words "<\ E. Gauss," doesn't it? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And above it is a handwritten signature, is there not? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would the ozalid reproduction process reproduce that handwritten signa-
ture?— A. It would be very faint.
Q. It would be faint but it would reproduce? — A. It would reproduce.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2111
Q. I show you document No. 2181 which consists of four typewritten pages
bearing the handwritten signature of John S. Service, and then, following
that, four pages which arc identical with the tirst except thai they arc on a
different type of paper and I ask you whether the last four pages of this document
were prepared by the ozalid process? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you unmistakably identify them as having been prepared by that
process? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could those last four pages have been reproduced by any other process; I
mean, is it possible in other words that these four pages were reproduced by
any process other than ozalid? — A. No, sir.
Q. Can you tell whether these last four pages were prepared from the first
four pages? By that question I mean, can you, by inspecting the first four
pages, ascertain whether they were placed on top of the presensitized paper
and had light pass through them? — A. They are identical copies unless there
were some notes that were entered later.
Q. I direct your attention to the first page of the reproduction. In the upper
left-hand corner there is reproduced certain handwriting which is to the fol-
lowing effect: 'Copies to MID-2, ONI, OSS, CA." Is that correct?— A. Cor-
rect, sir.
Q. And that same handwriting appears on the first page of the original docu-
ment, does it not? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. On the other hand, on the first page of the original document, besides the
initials "< >SS" there is the figure "2." is there not ? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does that appear on the ozalid reproduction? — A. No, sir.
Q. On the original there appears the figure "2" beside the letters "CA." Is
that correct? — A. Correct.
Q. Does that appear on the reproduction? — A. No, sir.
Q. On the original underneath the word "CA" appear the letters "CB." Is
that correct? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do they appear on the reproduction? — A. No, sir.
Q. There are at least one, two, three, four impressions or rubber stamps ap-
pearing on the original copy, do they not? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do any of those appear on the reproduction? — A. Well, this one here is
so faint it won't show.
Q. One of the rubber stamps which appears beside the third paragraph of
this document is very, very faintly reproduced on the reproduction. Is that
correct? — A. I believe it is 1945.
Q. One of the other rubber stamps A. Well, this one here
Q. The one at the bottom of the page A. There is a faint outline of the
document. It is extremely faint.
Q. You would not recognize it unless you had the original to compare with? — -
A. It isn't a good ozalid copy. It could have been run at a faster speed.
Q. Regarding the handwritten initials which appear in the upper right-hano
corner of the original, showing the routing of this document, do those symbols
appear on the reproduction? — A. No. sir.
Q. They did not come through at all, did they?— A. No, sir.
Q. Were you employed in the Department in 1945? — A. No, sir.
Q. When did you come?— A. In 1948.
Q. So that you would have no knowledge of the practices with respect to
reproduction of documents in the spring of 1945? — A. From what I heard, sir,
there was an ozalid process at the time. Almost all the documents were ozalid
and photostated.
Mr. Service. May we have a recess?
The Chairman. You said we would adjourn at 12. I think we will have to
adjourn for the noon hour at this point because two of the members of the
Board have appointments at 12 o'clock.
Mr. Rhetts. It appears that we may want to ask this gentleman some further
questions so if he would like to come hack
The Chairman. He will come back.
Mr. Rhetts. I propose we take a 5-minute recess
The Chairman. The Board will have to adjourn at this moment.
Mr. Rhetts. Then perhaps Mr. Tanquary will return for just a few minutes
after the luncheon recess.
The Chairman. At what time?
Mr. Morelaxd. Two o'clock. We have Mr. Kennan coming in at 2 o'clock.
Mr. Rhetts. Can you be here at 1:45? We may have further questions.
Mr. Tanquary. Yes sir.
( Meeting adjourned at 12 noon.)
2112 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : May 29, 1950, 1 : 45 to 5 : 30 p. m.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. O
Reporter : Edna C. Moyer.
Members of Board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur
G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service : Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruckelshaus.
(The meeting reconvened at 1 : 45 p. m.)
(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Tanquary :)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
The Chairman. Proceed.
Q. Will you take the stand, Mr. Tanquary? I show you again document 321,
which I showed you before the luncheon recess, and I believe you testified this
morning that this is not a photostat or reproduced by photostatic process but is
instead a photographic reproduction of the microfilm. — A. That is right, sir.
Q. I believe you also testified that the paper on which this photographic repro-
duction of the microfilm is made is heavier and of higher rag content than photo-
stat paper? — A. Yes, sir, that is right.
Q. It is also accurate that the gloss on this photographic reproduction of a
microfilm is heavier or shinier? — A. It is the gloss on the drum that it goes
around to dry them.
Q. Is this a heavier gloss than appears normally on a photostatic reproduc-
tion?— A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have with you copies of a photostatic reproduction of a document? —
A. There is a pbotostatic reproduction [handing a paper to the attorney].
Q. I ask that that be marked for identification as '"Document 325," a photostatic
reproduction consisting of one page, which is headed at the top, "American
Embassy, Stockholm, June 3, 1949." Now, do you have another copy of
this? — A. Yes. sir [handed the copy to the attorney].
The Chairman. Just add for the record, if you will, that this paper is in
itself not relevant to the case.
Q. That is coi rect, it is not relevant except in connection with this technical
matter which we are discussing. Tbe substantive content of this document is
wholly unrelated to this case. I hand to the Board the document which has
been marked for identification as "Document 325." Now you also showed us this
morning a copy of an ozalid reproduction. Do you have that? — A. [Handed a
paper to the attorney.]
Q. I hand that document to the Board.
The Chairman. Are you going to give that a number?
Q. I think we will. I ask that there be marked for identification as "Document
320" a three-page ozalid reproduction, a document headed "American Consulate
General, Tientsin, China, April 12, 1950."
The Chairman. The contents of which are not of themselves revelant to the
case.
Q. Now, Mr. Tanquary. would you say that an ordinary typist who is in-
expert on the various techniques of reproduction might easily confuse a docu-
ment such as Document 325, which you ideutitfied as a photostat, with Docu-
ment 326, which you have identified as an ozalid reproduction? — A. Very easily,
sir. I mean, they would not be able to tell. They would know that this is some
photographic process.
Q. "This" being 325? — A. 325, resemblance between these two, knowing that
there was some kind of photographic reproduction.
Q. When you say "these two," you are saving resemblance between 321
A. 321 and 325.
Q. Now directing your attention particularly to the possibility of confusing the
reproduction process used in 3LT>. which is a photostat, and 326, which is an
ozalid, would you say that those two might easily be confused by an inexpert
person as being the same type of document? — A. That is right, sir.
Q. Is it fair to say that the weight of the paper in the two is approximately
the same? — A. Approximately the same.
Q. I have no further question.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Tanquary.
(The witness was dismissed.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2113
Mr. Rhetts. Now I should like to offer at this point in evidence documents
marked for identification .".i!.~i and 326.
The Chairman. How about 321? It is already in?
(Off-record discussion.)
Mr. Rhetts. I also offer in evidence as an exhibit Document 321, and ask that
those be marked as exihibits.
(Document marked "325," headed "American Embassy, Stockholm, June 3,
1949." was submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15.")
(Document marked "326," headed "American Consulate General, Tientsin,
China. April 12, 1950," was submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 16.")
(Document marked "321," headed "The Following Message Is From Hurley for
the Eyes of the Secretary of State Alone, 31 January 1945," was submitted in
evidence and marked "Exhibit 17.")
The Chairman. Now are we ready for Mr. Kennan?
Mr. Moreland. As soon as he arrives.
The Chairman. Can Mr. Service go on the stand? Mr. Service is on the stand.
Mr. Service, some reference was made by Mrs. Blumenthal on the stand to an
article written by a John Stewart. Did you write any articles under the name
"John Stewart"?
A. I have never written any articles under the name "John Stewart."
The Chairman. Did you write articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations?
A. I have never written any article for the Institute of Pacific Relations nor
for any other publication.
The Chairman. Were you a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
A. I can't answer that question definitely unless I consult my own records.
I am a type of member, the type which I believe is the cheapest and lowest in
the scale and involving least participation.
The Chairman. Which is what?
A. I believe it is subscribing member, but I would have to check to state with
certainty the type the membership is.
The Chairman. You say you are that. Were you that in 1942 to 1945?
A. No, sir ; I believe I was not. I was a subscribing member from about 1936
or 1937 until about 1941, I believe, and after I went to Chungking during the
war it was impossible for us to receive any magazines and I discontinued all of
my subscriptions, including my subscription to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
I did not resume that subscription or subscribing membership until about 1946.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall what dues you paid for your subscribing mem-
bership?
A. The cost of the membership at present is $15 a year. I believe in those
earlier years from 1937 or 1938 to 1941 it was probably $10, but it might have
been even less than that.
Mr. Achilles. You have never had a membership in which the dues involved
were more than $15 a year?
A. Never. I couldn't afford it.
The Chairman. All right. Bring the witness in.
(Mr. Kennan, having been duly sworn, testified as follows :)
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Mr. Kennan, your full name, please? — A. George Frost Kennan.
Q. And your residence? — A. Washington, D. C.
Q. Your connection with the State Department? — A. I am the counselor of
the Department.
Q. And would you for the record detail in general briefly your experience
in connection with the State Department? — A. Yes, sir. I entered State Depart-
ment 24 years ago this year and shortly after my entry into the Foreign Service
was detailed to undergo special study as what they called a "Russian expert."
In those days that meant a pretty long course of preparation; normally 3 years
of academic training and a year of special preparatory service in the field, so
that it was normally a four and a half year course of study. After that I served
for 2 years doing research and reporting work on Russian matters in Riga,
Latvia, because we had no representation in the Soviet Union at that time. When
we recognized Soviet Russia. I went in there in the very beginning, even in ad-
vance of the establishment of a mission, with Mr. Bullitt when he went to present
credentials, and since then a good deal of my services has been in the Russian
field. I have served altogether three times in Moscow and at times in the Depart-
ment in connection with the Russian matters.
Q. How many years have you served in connection with Russian matters? — A.
I have served 9 years in what is now the Soviet Union ; about 5 of those were
2114 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
served in Moscow. I think that is correct. I have also had just before and during
the war 7 years of service in other places, mostly in Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Lisbon, Algiers.
Q. Mr. Kennan, the Loyalty-Security Board on May 25, 1950, asked you to
review certain writings and reports of Mr. John Stewart Service, which were put
into your possession. As an expert witness for the Board in that connection, were
you given possession of certain documents, about 120 of them, which had for
identification numbers attached running from 101 to 227? — A. That is correct.
Those ait- exactly the numbers that I had.
Q. And have you made a review of those documents and are you able to
give the Board your opinion with reference to the Communist attitude re-
vealed by those documents, if any?— A. Yes; I have; I have reviewed them as
carefully as I could within the limits of the time available to me, which meant
that each one has had individual attention, and, there are notes here which I
could show you if you like. It was a considerable job but there are notes on each
one of the documents. They run into quite a number of pages.
Q. Would you like to offer those in connection with your testimony? — A. I
would be happy to. They should be retyped. Many of them I typed myself and
just X'd out mistakes and that sort of thing, but they are certainly at the dis-
posal of the Board if it can make any use of them in any way ; I would be happy
to have them used.
(Typewritten copy of notes submitted by Mr. Kennan was admitted in evi-
dence and marked "Exhibit 18.")
Q. Making such use of those notes as you desire, will you state to the Board
what you rind in these reports? — A. I will, indeed. I should say, I think, that
in addition to going through these reports I have also given attention to a number
of documents which I thought would be expressive of the Moscow Communist
Party line or of the attitudes taken in conversation by Soviet officials during
that same period in order that I might have a basis for comparison. The
reports here were written by Mr. Service, as I see it, in a number of capacities,
some as an official stationed temporarily in the Department, some as a consular
official in Chungking, and Lanchow, some as a political adviser to General Stil-
well in Chungking, and I think the largest group were written from Yenan in
Communist China where Service was stationed for long periods, as I under-
stand it, with the observers' section of the United States Army.
Q. Just to put dates to the period, they begin, I take it, in 1942 and end in
1945? — A. That is correct. They range, the ones that I had access to, from May
1942 to March 1945, according to my copies. They break down roughly as
follows : 37 of them are purely factual, involving no comment ; another 53 are
reports of an essentially factual nature, the material presented objectively
and with a minimum of comment or interpretation ; 3 of them are special OSS
interrogations ; 14 of them are generally interpretative in nature, that is analyz-
ing a given situation or an event but of relatively minor importance; 20 of them
may be classed as important studies, interpretations and analyses of major
problems. I have, of course, given most attention to those 20 as the ones that bear
most on the question you have raised.
Now in reviewing those I would like to tell you something of the nature of the
reports and the considerations which seemed to me to be applicable to the deter-
mination of the question you have before you. I think we should note first of all
that all of these reports without exception were written during the period when
this country was at war. You will all remember that it was the policy of this
Government and it was very frequently expressed that we should concern our-
selves primarily with the winning of the war and that we should not allow
ourselves to be diverted from this purpose by any ulterior considerations. Uur
goal in the Far East in particular was primarily, first and foremost, the un-
conditional surrender of Japan.
Now it is against this background that I think we have to measure the fact
that these reports were throughout severely critical of the Central Chinese Gov-
ernment. The picture you get of that Government from the reports is that it
was dominated less by an interest in bringing the war with Japan to a successful
conclusion as rapidly as possible, less by such an interest than by a determination
on the part of the genei-alissimo and Ins leading advisers to cling to their own
position of power in China and to arrange things in such a way that they might
continue to cling to it when the war was over.
You get the impression that following our entry into the war the generalissimo
felt that he could depend on us not only to win that foreign war for him but
also to help him perhaps in the future in an internal Chinese struggle against
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2115
the Communists ; that for this reason he felt that his own military forces, those
who at any rate were mosl loyal to him and on which he placed the greatest
value, need no Longer be jeopardized in the war against Japan but could be
held in reserve for what he undoubtedly envisaged as the coming internal struggle
within China against the Communists; that for that reason he put inferior and
unreliable forces in the front line, gave them no dynamic military leadership,
did not conduct the war against Japan with full determination. It appears
from the reports that Service and others — I know other United States observers,
whom he quoted in his reports, were out at that time, had the impression that
the Chinese Government was relying on our support not only to help it in a
future military conflict against the Chinese Communists but also to relieve it of
the necessity of making internal reforms which would have been necessary really
in order for it to remain in power on a basis of popular approval. If it could
avoid making those reforms it would be able to retain a sort of monopoly position
in Chinese political life, and you have from the reports the impression that that
was exactly what was in the minds of the Central Government leaders: that
with our help they felt that they could dispose of both problems and at the same
time be able to avoid venturing into reform projects which might have been
dangerous to it.
Now it was Service's view, as I gather it from the reports, that such a policy
represented a state of affairs which was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of
the prosecution of the war against Japan and highly dangerous because of its
lack of realism to the prospects — dangerous to the prospects of future stability in
China. In one report he wrote :
"Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia
by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will
render ( 'hina too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By doing
so Chiang may be digging his own grave ; not only in North China and Man-
churia, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into
the arms of the Soviets."
Now I believe that he had the impression that it was all the more important
that he should make these weaknesses in the Chinese Government apparent,
and its policies apparent to people in our Government because it was the delib-
erate policy of the < 'hinese Government, as he saw it. to conceal this state of affairs
from the United States public opinion, and he felt that unless he and other
American observers did their part in bringing this situation to the attention of
people at home, it would go unnoticed. I believe that those are the reasons why
the reporting was of a nature highly critical of the generalissimo and the
Kuomintang. Now I am unable to say from my own knowledge of the history
of these matters that it was unjustly critical. My impression is that the facts
were substantially as they are here described by Mr. Service in these reports.
To the extent that the critical note rings out more sharply than it might otherwise
have done, I must say that I find that myself explainable by the natural tend-
ency of all official observers, a tendency that I know very well from my own
reporting experience in Moscow and Nazi Germany, to try to debunk the official
propaganda of a foreign government which you feel is trying to put something
over on your own government. I know that our reporting about Russia was
always more critical than it otherwise would have been because we always felt
we must at all costs reveal to our own Government the falseness and dangerous-
ness of the line which the Soviet Government was trying to put across to us, and
I know that I myself have written report after report trying to break down what
I felt was a false concept and build-up in the minds of the people here at home.
It is true that during this period the Soviet press and Communist Party line
was also severely critical of the Chinese National Government. Many of its
critcisms coincided in one area or another with ones which you can find in these
reports. I have given special attention to that and have thought it over very
carefully. I can't find any particular significance in it. The Russian Communists
and those that follow their line are by and large, it seems to me, excellent critics
of their adversaries, very shrewd and very penetrating. They are often as good
and accurate and as telling in their criticism of others as they are hypocritical
in their defense of their own policies.
I know from my experience that a large portion of their criticism of the Nazi
and Japanese Governments during the war not only coincided with our own but
won our admiration. 'When we read the Russian press we thought, "These boys
really know something about picking an adversary to pieces." I think therefore
it is not surprising that criticisms of our own observers in China should have
happened to coincide with ones which wei'e being voiced in the Communist press,
2116 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and I find no coincidence there that goes beyond what you might have expected
by the circumstances.
I think it is also clear from these reports that the attitude reflected in them
was not expressive, insofar as it criticized the Central Government, was not
expressive of any Communist inspiration or guidance. The material is free from
the exaggerations and distortions, from these peculiarly nasty little spins on
the ball which the Communist propagandists invariably give to anything they
write and which are the hallmarks of practically any material that has Com-
munist origins. We can almost always trace it by certain trains of thought,
of avarice, and distortion and certain peculiar nastiness of touch that those
fellows have.
Let me give you an example. The Soviet propagandists, I noted, in their
treatment of the relations between the Chinese Government and the Japanese at
that time gave the impression that important elements in the Chinese Govern-
ment were out-and-out paid agents of Japan endeavoring as they sit under direct
orders from Tokyo to provoke a conflict or exacerbate the conflict between the
Chinese Communists and the Chinese Central Government. In other words, the
Communist propagandists were saying the generalissimo's own entourage con-
tained important elements, paid agents, up to their neck in a purely subversive
type of treason.
There were no such suggestions in Service's reports. They contained no such
extremes and distortions. They treated of the same subjects but in a moderate
and dispassionate way. In certain important instances these reports take issue
with the party line, with the Communist Party line. A notable one is that of the
frequent defects to the Japanese of front-line commanders and units on the
Chinese side. The Communist Party line alleged that this was by prearrange-
ment between the Chinese Government and the Japanese, that the Chinese Gov-
ernment wanted these forces to go over in order that it might in that way
insinuate the Chinese forces into the areas held by the Japanese, so that when
the Japanese finally collapsed and left forces, there would be Chinese Govern-
ment in that area capable of dealing with the Chinese Communists who had or-
ganized the territory among and underneath the noses of the people and among
the Japanese lines.
Mr. Service takes issue with that view in his reports and interprets the de-
fects as arising more probably from the fact that it was the policy of the generalis-
simo to place in the front line the forces of the war-lord allies of his in China,
which forces were mostly composed of mercenaries and therefore had a poor
morale and little conviction and were not very loyal to the generalissimo, the
reason for that being on the generalissimo's part that these were troops that
didn't matter and if they got shot up in the conflict with Japan that was a
matter of relatively little importance to him. I simply cite that as an example
of a direct conflict between these reports and the Communist Party line at that
period. Now, so much for the attitude with respect to the Central Government
in China.
I think I ought to treat also the attitude then toward the Chinese Commu-
nists themselves. I think again we must be careful to bear in mind the setting
against which the reporting took place. We were at that time allies with Rus-
sia, our Government was giving aid on a colossal scale to the Russian Commun-
ists, who were the center of the movement. It could therefore not have — there
could have been at that time no implication that the granting of aid to Commun-
ists or the conducting of relations with Communists in wartime was in itself
anything surprising or out of the way from the standpoint of American policy.
1 simply cite that because I recall for part of that period I was in Moscow
where we had a huge lend-lease mission, and anything that interferred with
the tremendous flow of aid coming in there was dimly viewed indeed, and I got
my own fingers burned at one time for asking why the Soviet Government needed
2 years' supply of film strip in one shipment on the lend-lease. In other words,
I am simply emphasizing that at that time all this was not only legitimate but
was sacrosanct in the case of the Soviet Government.
Mr. Service seems to have been advocated in these reports from the beginning
that we should consider supporting the Chinese Communists in their effort
against the Japanese. He did not urge initially that we do this — or at any time,
I think — without adequate investigation and study of the Chinese Communists
themselves. In 1943 the reports were urging the Department to send observers
to the Communist -held areas in order to find out about conditions there and
help us determine our policy with regard to Chinese Communists. There was
obviously no intent at that time to influence the Government along pro-Corn-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2117
munist lines, because Mr. Service complained in those reports that the infor-
mation then available to our Government stemmed in part from journalists "who
appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists" and that therefore we
ought to have our own people in there to get unbiased reports, and he warned that
any brief visits by United States officials might not he fruitful because these
officials would be, if they only went for 2 or 'A days, and I quote again, "'would
be under the influence of official guides." meaning Communist officials. It seems
to me, therefore, that the initial reports urging our Government to make a study
of the Communists in China, to send observers there to learn about it, were
not written in any pro-Communist spirit, since they warned us clearly of the pit-
falls and cited dependence on pro-Communist observers as one of the reasons
why we ought to have ones of our own there.
During the period before he himself proceeded there, he obviously had exten-
sive contact as a reporting officer with Communist representatives in the China
controlled by the National Government, and he reported extensively their state-
ments to him. Most of these were reported in what we can call deadpan fashion,
they were simply relayed to the Department. Some of them were comment.
I would like to point out that the matters discussed, the matters treated in
the views of these Communist officials, which he reported to this Government,
were matters of the highest importance in the conduct of the war against Japan.
The Chinese Communist forces were part of the forces opposing the Japanese
forces in the Far East. Anything we could find out about the territory from
which they were being directed, about conditions in the Communist area, and
about the merits and failings and policies and views of the Communist leaders
was obviously highly pertinent to the war effort, and there was no greater
impropriety in tapping this source of information than was involved in our
own efforts in Moscow at the same time to tap the views of the Soviet leaders
and to report them faithfully to this Government.
As I gather from the documents, Mr. Service went to Yenan in the summer of
1944, and from that time on there follows a series of reports from Yenan extending
into the spring of 1945. Many of these reports again were purely factual and
dealt with matters which were not really ones of political interpretation — some-
what strictly military or economic. Others were of high importance from the
standpoint of interpretation of events. Like me and other official observers who
went to the Communist areas at that time, he was impressed with a number of
phenomena — and which compared favorably with those which he had known in
the China under the control of the Nationalist Government — and he was im-
pressed with superior morale, discipline, earnestness of intention, frankness of
approach, and integrity of administration among the Communists. I think he
was impressed with the greater determination evident in their effort against
Japan. They had penetrated the areas back of the Japanese forces ; they had
organized those areas politically — all that called for daring and courage and for
good morale, which there is no question about that they had. He felt that it
would be desirable for our Government to take a greater interest in the Com-
munists, to help them in their operations against Japan, and to try to build up
such a relationship with them as could constitute one of the foundations of our
postwar policy toward China, if I interpret the reports correctly.
He felt that the Chinese Communist Party, and I quote here, "must be counted
under any circumstances a continuing and important influence in China." He felt
that a hopeful future could be seen for China only if some sort of accommodation
could be found between the Communists and the Central Government, that the
Communists were already too strong to be defeated by force of arms by the
Central Government in a civil war, that therefore some sort of political accom-
modation would be necessary eventually, that it was important for this that we,
as far as we were concerned, have relations with both sides and not just with one.
He said that if the conflict then in progress — namely, the World War — were to be
followed by civil war, there could be expected to emerge out of such a civil
struggle only, and I quote again, "a more progressive Kuomintang government or
a Communist state, probably of the present modified Chinese Communist type."
Then, as the prospects for a more progressive Kuomintang government became
dimmer, he became increasingly concerned for the future. He believed in the fall
of 1944 that the Communists were then sincere in seeking Chinese unity, in the
hone of American and on the basis of American support — that is, that if we gave
them our support they might, accept it sincerely — "But," he wrote, "this does not
preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order
to survive an American-supported Kuomintang attack." In the early part of his
period of service there he felt that basically, as I read it from these dispatches,
2118 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
basically the Chinese Communist Government had in it enough learnings toward
democracy to make it probable that if it could survive, if it did survive and con-
tinued in power after the war, its power and development along the lines should
not be those of a monopoly of power by a single party.
Now it seems to me in reading over these reports that there was in them and
in certain places a certain naivete with respect to the Soviet Union and perhaps
with respect to the forces which were already at work though not on the surface
within the International Communist movement and within the Chinese Commu-
nist movement in particular. The indications of that attitude toward the Soviet
Union are conflicting. There are a few which indicate a certain ignorance of
Soviet conditions, of the full extent of the ferociousness of the concentration
of power within tbe Soviet sphere and the full ruthlessness and relentlessness of
the Soviet Government. There ai-e other indications which would point to a
greater understanding of it, but there are certain ones which I would say simply
indicated a lack of knowledge of how really bitter things were inside the direct
sphere of Soviet power.
When I say that there were also certain signs of lack of appreciation for the
deeper forces which were at work in the International Communist movement
and perhaps among the Chinese Communists, I mean it this way. In the Rus-
sian Communist movement, all of us are convinced that the factors which have
forced this movement to become more and more ruthless, more dictatorial, more
addicted to a monopoly of power, more intolerant of any rival opinion or opposi-
tion opinion, that those factors were planted in it at a very early date, actually
at the time of the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1904 and 1905.
and that the principles of party organization and of methods which were adopted
at that time by Lenin were ones which carried with them a sort of logical com-
pulsion toward a greater and greater concentration of power, toward greater
and greater excess on the part of the regime toward its enemies and toward the
situation we have got today.
Now it may be that the same thing is operable in the Chinese Communist
movement to the extent that Those Chinese Communists did have their ideological
origin in Moscow ; that they, in other words, had been infected by some of those
same things. You don't see in the earlier ones of these reports from Yenan any
recognition of that possibility. I notice that in the later reports from Yenan,
if I do not misinterpret them, there seems to have been a modification of Mr.
Service's opinion and he is beginning to doubt that things will work out quite
that happily and to feel that power itself and the struggle for power is going to
play a much larger part in the motivation of the Chinese Communist movement.
However, you have to bear in mind in connection with that that he himself
had predicted at an earlier date, as I just read to you, that if it were to develop
into a Chinese civil war with ourselves on the side of the Chinese Government
forces, that the Chinese Communists would be pushed along that direction and
pushed into the direction of a closer association with Moscow.
Now I must say that I do not have sufficient knowledge about the Chinese Com-
munist movement and I don*t think the world does, I don't think the data are yet
available on which to make such a judgment, to determine whether those things
which were true of the Russian Communist movement were also true of the
Chinese Communist movement. I think it is too early yet in the story for us to
know whether the path on which the Chinese Communists have now embarked
led from inner compulsions which would have been there anyway or whether
it stemmed from the attitudes which we took during the war and immediately
after the war, so that I cannot be sure in my own mind that the view reflected
in these reports might not have been accurate and that if we had not supported
the Central Government at all after the war, if we ourselves had taken a more
or less equal attitude toward the two regimes, it is possible that these things
would not have turned out in the way that they did.
With regard to this area which I have defined as that of a certain naivete, if
we can call it that, or certain ignorance of relationships within the Communist
world, I would like to point the following factors which I think hear on them.
In the first place it is my own experience that only or as a rule only those who
have actually resided and worked in the Soviet Union for a long time can have
a fully adequate picture in their own minds of the way that system works, of
the jealousy of the central power, of its intolerance, and its insistence on an
implicit obedience by everyone who is under its sphere.
In the second place. I think I detect in his report another thing with which
I am familiar from my own experience, and that is a tendency, when we are
critical of a regime about which we are writing to be indulgent toward others
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2119
who are Lts critics. I know that in Nazi Germany in the thirties many honest
liberal observers tended to find themselves at one in their criticisms and their
hatred of the Nazi regime with the German Communists and with the Soviet
representatives, and they tended to take a much more indulgent view of Soviet
Russia because it was against Nazi Germany than they did of Nazi Germany
itself. I think there may have been something of the same sort of thing in (Tuna.
There is no question about it in my mind that the behavior of the Chinese Govern-
ment throughout those years to an honest American observer was irritating and
alarming. It provoked a sort of debunking attitude on the part of those Americans
who were there. In that they found themselves often at one with the Chinese
Communists in their critical attitude toward that regime. There was a certain
natural tendency to assume that another great government like the Russian
Government which stood on the side and which was itself to some extent critical
of tlie National Government must really be better. I think that is the thing
which has affected all of us and I am to a certain degree guilty in that respect
myself.
For example, all of us who served in the Soviet Union were outraged by the way
the Russians treated the Chinese consular officers in the Russian provincial towns.
That is. they treated all consular officers that way, isolating them, putting
floodlights on their houses day and night, guards all around them, not permitting
them to have a single unofficial contact in the town, that sort of thing, but they
were worse toward the Chinese. When you read these reports you find that the
Chinese were applying precisely the same treatment to the Russian representa-
tives in China. Who was guilty of starting it, I don't know. I think it is old
Asiatic practice and to look for the origins of it is like trying — well, a sort of
ehieken-and-egg procedure. All I can saj' is that we in Moscow sympathized
with the Chinese representatives in their plight out in the Russian provincial
towns. I see here that our representatives in China sympathized with the Soviet
representatives in their plight in the Chinese provincial towns and I think they
both reflect something of the same human reactions.
Finally I would like to point out that these deviations toward an attitude
indulgent of the Soviet Government and indulgent of the Chinese Communists
were no greater than what we might call the danger of the times, that is, the
deviations from reality in this respect which were common to the statements
of practically all the great war leaders on the Allied side, common to the
statements and views of very many people here in Washington. I am sure
that the views that Mr. Service expressed at that time in these reports would
have been found if anything slightly on the conservative or reactionary side by
a number of important people that I could mention here in Washington at that
particular period. They are not nearly as "starry-eyed," if I may use that
term, as things that you will find for instance in books that were published by
prominent people here, by ex-Ambassadors, by people in Government life. This
was a time, we must remember, at which Mr. Churchill was advocating a policy
with respect to Tito which is almost directly analogous to that which is advo-
cated in these reports with respect to the Chinese Communists, although at that
time Tito was entirely a Communist loyal to Moscow and no one remotely en-
visaged the possibility that he would not be at a later date. Churchill too advo-
cated that we not take a negative attitude toward him. that we supply him with
arms and that we try to establish a relationship with him which could be fruitful
for the postwar period. In general in our whole treatment of the Chinese prob-
lem at that time by prominent people in our own Government — I am thinking of
people who came to Moscow and with whom we spoke there — you found a degree
of unrealism certainly no smaller in these matters than that reflected in the
reports.
I have to recall that when General Hurley came there in 1945 and talked with
Stalin, he sent back a telegram to Washington which I, who was the Charge
d'Affaires in Moscow, thought so unrealistic that I had to follow it up with
another telegram myself warning our Government please not to be mislead
by this, in that the Soviet Government was going to behave well after the war,
and trying to explain — I said here: "It would be tragic if our natural anxiety
for the support of the Soviet Union at this juncture, coupled with Stalin's use
(if words which mean all things to all people and his cautious affability, were
to lead ns into an undue reliance on Soviet aid or even Soviet acquiescence in
the achievement of our long-term objectives in China." You could cite other
examples of that sort of thing. The advocacy of the rapprochement between
the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Government itself was one which was
carried forward at that time by very important people.
2120 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Again I am constrained to recall that General Hurley himself wrote that there
was no stronger advocate of negotiations between the Communists and the
Chinese Government than himself and that he had done more in an effort to
bring about a just settlement between the Communists and the Government
than any other man, and that he believed he was the best friend that the Chi-
nese Communists had in Chungking. Now that was not — at this time it was
made — in any sense a remarkable statement. I think that was the general
policy of our Government at that time and the general atmosphere in which
these reports were written.
Now in trying to judge the reports against that background which I have
just described, I tried myself to determine in my mind what should be the
central point of inquiry, that is, what was the most important thing to deter-
mine about these reports. It seemed to me that the important thing was to find
out whether they represented Mr. Service's honest opinion and whether they
stemmed solely from a desire to give the Department that opinion or whether
they resulted from some ulterior motive or some ulterior source. It seemed
to me that if Mr. Service was reporting honestly and conscientiously the views
at which he had arrived on the basis of an open-minded examination and
analysis of the facts, that he had before him, then it was up to the Department
or his military superiors to tell him if they felt that his judgment was faulty
or inadequate to the reporting function which he was fulfilling, that is, if his
reports were found out to have, were discovered to have a bias which rendered
them not useful or dangerous to this Government. It was really the matter of
his superiors to determine that. They were then at liberty to dismiss him
from the Service for incompetence or they were at liberty to transfer him
to another field of endeavor where hP might have signed invoices or performed
some technical function but not carrying on this reporting. If instead of
doing that they encouraged him to go on with it, as they did by repeated
instructions of commendation signed by high people here in the Department.
it did appear to me that then he had no choice but to conclude that the con-
tinuation of this activity was his duty in war time and that he would not be
subject to reproach later for having done it to the satisfaction of his superiors.
For that reason in my own examination of these documents, I tried to con-
centrate on that. My conclusion is the following: I find no evidence that the
reports acquired their character from any ulterior motive or association or from
any impulse other than the desire on the part of the reporting office to acquaint
the Department with the facts as he saw and interpreted them. I find no
indication that the reports reported anything but his best judgment candidly
stated to the Department. On the contrary the general level of thoughtfulness
and intellectual flexibility which pervades the reporting is such that it seems
to me out of the question that it could be the work of a man with a closed
mind or with ideological preconceptions, and it is my conclusion that it was not.
Such faults as it may reveal on analysis in the light of hindsight today, which
is admittedly a great deal easier than foresight, are ones which appear to
me 'to be explicable in the light of the background against which the reports
were written and to have been ones which could and would have been corrected
had he by that time had the opportunity for a wider area of service and one
which included the Soviet Union as well as China.
Now those, Mr. Chairman, are my honest opinions. They are as objective
as I can make them and I hope that they are adequate to the purpose here.
The Chairman. The Board is very grateful for this very exhaustive and
fine presentation of the contents of these reports. Mr. Achilles, do you have any
questions?
Mr. Achiltj s. The characterization of the reports has been so complete that
there is very little to ask. Very briefly, did you And in any of his reports any
indication that his thinking, his presentation was influenced by such themes as
are common to international communism, Communist propaganda?
A. No; I can't say that I did. The problems of the Chinese Communists at
that time in the middle of the war were so different from those of the average
Communist Party anywhere else in the world that the discussion of them in
these reports seems to me to have had relatively little relevance, let us say, to
the problems and aims of the French Communist Party or Italian Communist
Party or the international Communist movement in general.
Now I am glad you asked me that because there was one thing that I neglected
to mention in this presentation which I would like to bring out. Throughout
a large part of this period I am quite convinced that the Soviet Government
was not able to give very much attention to the Chinese Communists, that it
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2121
was not giving them aid, «>n the contrary, if it was giving any aid to China it
was going certainly primarily to the Chinese Central Government, and it was
simply too preoccupied with the tremendous pressures of its own war effort
and the resistance of the German attack to bother about these fellows <>ut there
at all. I think it entirely plausible that they felt themselves a that time pretty
much on their own and wore themselves uncertain how their relationship
The Chairman. Meaning the Communists?
A. Yes : that the Communists felt themselves on their own and were themselves
uncertain how their relationship with the Soviet Government was going to shape
up when the war was over. Now that being the case, I think it is quite plausible
that during those years they wandered further from the typical Comintern
outlook of affiliation with the Soviet Government than perhaps any Communist
Party iu good standing has ever wandered, and they were also at that time
engaged in the war with the Japanese and in the Far East a very considerable
battle threatened their own power in China against the Chinese Central Gov-
ernment. For that reason I think it is no wonder that they gave an impression
of sincerity and of concentration on purposes which are not normally associated
with the Communist movement throughout those years, and these reports which
I think reflect quite faithfully what were the real reactions, at least the state-
ments, the actions of the Chinese Communists at that time, in these reports I
think it is natural that you don't find much reflection of the sort of thing you
asked about.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have any impression that Mr. Service's thinking was
influenced by Soviet ideology?
A. Not by Soviet ideology at all. I think you do find in some of these reports —
he had to deal with the Communists, he talked with them a great deal — I think
in many instances he was subject, as I think perhaps any sensitive and intelligent
man would have been, to the sway of the atmosphere which they exuded, especially
since it was one that had a greater appeal in many respects to many of us than
did the atmosphere in the camp of their Chinese adversaries, but I can find
absolutely no indication of any connection there with Soviet influences at all.
Such influences as are reflected in this reporting are solely Chinese Communist.
There is only one report as I recall it which — one or two there might have been
which stemmed from statements of Soviet colleagues, and those were reported
objectively and much as many of the rest of us might have reported them from
any other place in the world.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Did you find any indication in Mr. Service's reports or a desire on his part
for extension of Soviet domination into Asia? — A. None whatsoever. On the
contrary I find that as one of the possibilities to which it seems to me he points
with a certain alarm in several instances in these reports. I don't know whether
I can find at this moment instances of that in my notes, but I may be able to here.
He says, for example, and I quote — well, it is the same quote as before so I don't
need to do it except to reiterate that,
"Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern
Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form,
will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia."
Mr. Rhetts. Would you refer to the document number?
A. That is number 142. I would gather from that that he viewed the continued
existence of China as a possible counterweight to Russia as a desirable thing.
Q. Just one minor question. You characterized his reports as being somewhat
less "starry-eyed" than other prominent people including ambassadors. Would
you care to name any of those? — A. Well, 1 would say, for example, that Mr.
Davies' book on "Mission to Moscow" reflects an understanding of Soviet reali-
ties and international Communist realities much further from actuality than
these reports.
Q. The former Ambassadors Nelson Johnson and Clarence Gauss have also
testified. Would you include either of them in that category? — A. I am not
familiar enough with their thinking to know whether that would apply to them
or not and I did not have them in mind when I made the statement. I was re-
flecting that when I read even my own reports from Moscow at that time I fine.
a slight sense of shame at the extent to which I felt obliged to moderate those
reports in the Soviet favor if they were to get any audience in Washington and
not appear to be extreme and anti-Soviet and to condemn themselves. I wish
today I had been blunter — and we must remember that all of these were written
in that period.
2122 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. You have never as far as I recall been charged as being pro-Coninn
yourself. Have you ever been as far as you recall? — A. No, I don't recall
I ever yet been charged with that.
Q. Have you ever been charged with being anti-Communist? — A. Yes, ir
I have, many times. I served in the Russian field all through the thirties \ ^
we were all alleged to be married to Russian emigre princesses and to be a gr> up
of black reactionaries. I might point out at the present time that as far as I
know or until recently I was of all the citizens of our country the public enemy
No. 1 in the Soviet and international Communist press. When I recently visited
South America that became very evident, because the walls of every city in
Brazil, as far as I know, of any size, even those that I did not visit, were nil
covered with enormous tar smears saying, "To death with Kennan," and I was
buried four times in effigy by Brazilian Communists while I was in Rio, so that
I don't think I am very popular.
The Chairman. Did you find any indication in any of the reports that Mr.
Service was attempting to torpedo or sabotage or in any other way oppose the
official American policy in China?
A. No, sir, I did not. and I must say that I can find no indication whatsoever
of that. There was nothing in any way underhanded about these reports. In
them his views are fully exposed to all of his superiors for what they are. The
line of conduct they recommended would have been one disagreeable to the
Chinese National Government and he repeatedly warns in his reports that
it would be exactly that, that they would not like it, and he warned that if we
were to send observers to Yenan that would not be appreciated in Chung-
king, and if we were to give military aid to the Chinese Communists, that would
also go down hard. He recommended, if you will, a different policy from the
one that we followed in certain respects, not in all respects, that is, his recom-
mendations were different from what was actually followed but that
The Chairman. Can you specify that?
A. We did not. as I recall it. ever get military aid to the Chinese Communists
on any scale that could be called a realization of his recommendations. We
continued to give aid on a very considerable scale to the Central Government
of China after the war, although it was embarked on policies which not only
Mr. Service but many others of our representatives in China viewed as danger-
ous and hopeless. I am thinking here, for example, of General Wedemeyer who
warned the Chinese Government very sharply in 1945 that it did not have the
military potential to reassert its authority in Manchuria and North China
by force of arms and that if it attempted to do this, the entire future would
be uncertain.
Now. as I understand, these reports of course cease in the spring of 1945,
but I am sure the tenor of them was that we should not attempt to back a Chinese
Central Government which had not created for itself a greater appeal to popular
approval in China against the Chinese Communists in a civil war and in an effort
to reassert its authority all over China by force of arms.
The Chairman. I refer to American policy in China and I refer also and
particularly to General Hurley's mission.
A. I cannot find that he does. In fact, I read over specifically today the
charges which General Hurley makes here which I suppose relate to Mr. Service.
He does not say who, but he says "Foreign Service officers in China," and I sup-
pose it is that. He charges them, as I understand it, with :
"The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist
armed party and the imperialist block of nations whose policy it was to keep
China divided against herself."
The latter part of that I can certainly find no indication of, that there was
any siding with a wider group of nations who were determined to keep China
divided. On the contrary, the reports certainly urged anything, or urged con-
sistently all the way through a political accommodation between the Chinese
Government and the Chinese Communists which might avoid a Chinese civil
war. In that respect, what bewilders me here is that they advocated, itseems
to me. the same thing that General Hurley was advocating, which was political
accommodation. It was perhaps only a question of on whose terms, that is.
whether il should be entirely on the terms of the Chinese Central Government
or whether there should be a recognition of the political interests and legit-
imacy of the Chinese Communists as a movement. Now, my understanding
of Mr. Service's reports was that he never went at any time in the reports, as
far as I can see. into the question of whether the Chinese Communists ought
on moral grounds to have their legitamacy recognized. He advocated that it be
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2123
recognized because they were already so strong that it was impossible to over-
, them in any way by force of anus and a political accommodation was
lily alternative to a civil war. He also did not feel that a hopeful future
1 he based on the Chinese Central Government in the absence of a reform
iini.
, ;ini not a very good person to .judge the rights and the wrongs of that
attitude, hut as to how possible it might have been or might not have been for
the Chinese Central Government to carry on a reform program, but that the
Central Government could not clean up on all of China by force of arms and
win a civil war against the Communists without the involvement of this country
on a scale which would really have been beyond our resources seems absolutely
clear to me and reflects not just the views of Mr. Service but the views of people
like General Wedemeyer and I am sure others of very high American officers
who had to do with China at that time. As I see this difference it could only
be this, that General Hurley felt that we should have been giviug greater back-
ing to the Central Government in its differences with the Communists than Mr.
Service and others would have recommended.
The Chairman. Have you any questions?
Mr. Stevens. No.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Counsel.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Kennan, in connection with this line of inquiry which General Snow
has just been pursuing, in particular General Hurley has singled out a report
No. 40. which is document No. 193 in the list that you have, General Hurley has
stated that that memorandum in particular constituted in his judgment — and
he has stated this, I may say, in the course of hearings before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee in December 1945 — he has stated that this was a plan
to bring about the fall of the Central Government, and that charge in turn
had been picked up by Senator McCarthy and others and elabarated on. I wonder
if you have any particular notes on 193V — A. I do, indeed. I would like to refresh
my memory from the document itself.
Yes, my notes on it were here that :
"Service's denunciation is strong but based exclusively on the urgency of aid-
ing the American war effort in the Pacific. There is no indication of political
bias toward any faction but only against Kuomintang corruption and power pol-
itics. There is a tendency to underplay the usefulness of the Kuomintang to the
United States war effort and to discount any worth in the movement as an in-
teresting parallel to Yugoslavia."
If I might be excused, I would like to run my eyes over this again (referring
to report 40).
The Chairman. Would you do that again, please.
A. (After reading the report.) Mr. Chairman, may I make a further state-
ment with respect to this, since we are getting into the actual question of the
content of these reports. I think that what is said here in one part is extra-
ordinarily penetrating, and that is:
"Encouraged by our support the Kuomintang will continue its present course,
progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more
impotent."
That has been directly borne out by the course of events. There is no question
about that. It goes ahead and says:
'Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution
of the war. the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their
own interests by more direct opposition."
That you can give as you like, that has happened. I have never known myself,
never felt able really to judge, I have always been skeptical about it, I have
never known whether any sort of a tolerable political accommodation could
have been reached between the Chinese Communists and the Central Govern-
ment in China. In other countries the Communists have never been comfortable
bedfellows for anybody, and the ideologic instructions under which they work tell
them to enter into alliance with political groups only for the sake of ruining these
groups from the inside, and eventually emerging the sole victors.
Now there is a question of judgment here as to whether it would have been —
the Chinese Communists were enough different from other Communists so that
they would have gone into any coalition effort in good faith, and all I can
say. I believe that there were some hesitations in Mr. Service's mind about
that but as I gather it from the reports he felt that this was the only possibility,
the only alternative possibility to a civil war which probably would have ended
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 41
2124 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
only in the complete Chinese Communist triumph. I think I should explain
that I mean, at the time I would have been skeptical about the possibility
of the lion and the lamb lying down together and anything resembling a real
regime coming out of it, but on the other hand I don't know Chinese realities
remotely as well as he does, and you can balance off the knowledge of Chinese
realities on the one hand against the knowledge of the international Communist
realities on the other.
Mr Achilles. On that point General Hurley's writings indicate that he
had no qualms about the desirability of the Chinese taking the Communists
into the government. Had he had enough experience with Soviet communism
in Moscow and so on so that he should have known better or was he too new
to that? ,_ ■ . ..
A. His visits to Moscow consisted only of one or two brief stays in that
capital, to my knowledge, and talks with Stalin and Molotov. I don't think
that that was enough to enable him to know what he was talking about when
he reported on the views of the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, there was
ample advice available to him which he showed no desire to tap on these subjects.
I mean, it is not surprising to me that Hurley didn't know that he was being
given the usual run-around and the usual patter by Stalin and Molotov, but I
think that if he had been a wiser and more thoughtful man he would have
asked some people who would be familiar with those conditions for some years
for commentary on those.
Q In that connection I take it that what you have commented, that the
essential question of judgment as to whether there was any future in attempting
to effect a political accommodation is an open question. Is it not fair to say,
however Mr. Kennan, that that question of judgment as a matter of official
American policy had been decided by the President and by the State Department
and that General Hurley accepted, if he had not been a partial architect of,
the judgment that we should seek to effect that political accommodation?— A.
That is quite correct, and it is my understanding that General Hurley had in
a sense launched the most vigorous phase of our effort to bring precisely that
about and went himself to Yenan and brought these Communist leaders down
in his own plan and worked very vigorously toward the implementation of that
o' So that although that may have been questionable judgment, it was the
unquestioned policy of the United States Government to seek to effect that
accommodation?— A. Yes. ,-.,.•,
0 Referring back to this Document 19:? and to the other aspects of it, do
you see any evidence in that document which would support the charge by Gen-
eral Hurley that it was a plan to bring about the fall of the Central Govern-
menP— A No. My understanding of the document was that Mr. Service said
we should not fear the fall of the Central Government and not permit ourselves
to be blackmailed by the threat of it, but not that he himself advocated it.
Q And. indeed, does not the document further suggest that this is the only
way to avoid the fall, as he saw it?— A. Let me just finish my reexamination
because among IliT documents I don't want to speak about this until I glance
at it again.
(Reread the document.)
1 must say that I found in this document a strong belief that the Chinese
Government' as it existed at that time did not have in it the qualities which
would have made it possible for it to play a constructive role in the future of
China and that we would not help to create those qualities in it by aiding it our-
selves in the policies that it was then conducting, but I did not find in it a spe-
cific desire that the Chinese Government as existed then should fall from
power entirely.
Now again I would say, reverting to a prior questions about conflict, about
General Hurley's assertion that this involved some disloyalty to United States
policy, that I could find in going through his reports no indication in anything
there other than a desire to make plain to our Government what Mr. Service
felt our policy should he. Now that has never been considered in Government
practice to have in it any impropriety. It would have been, rather, improper
if for some reason or other he had failed to tell the Government of his own true
thoughts aboul it. had concealed them from the Government in any respect or
for s<auo motives of his own, and I would have found an impropriety in this
only if he had been doing this on behalf of somebody else and had not let the
Government know the real motives of his making these recommendations. To
my mind they stand or fall on the question of whether they were honestly made
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2125
and honestly believed, and if then they were that, then the only other question
could be, about them could have been whether they reflected good judgment or
had judgment, and that was a question, as I say, for the Government, which
the Government was at Liberty to examine. I would feel very alarmed for the
future of Foreign Service reporting if we ever were to permit the implication
to creep in that a policy recommendation contrary to the policy that was ac-
tually adopted by the Government was a Sign of disloyalty to the Government
purposes, because as ones who perhaps in making policy every day in this build-
ing here we know that — as most of us who are in this position — probably the
majority of things we recommended are never accepted, but we must continue
to recommend them and out of that discussion and difference of opinion will
emerge a policy which people then loyal will accept.
I also gather from what General Hurley wrote here that there is an indica-
tion that these observers iu Yenan had given the Chinese Communists a false
picture of what to expect from our Government. I do not find any indication
of that. On the contrary, I notice in one report here that there were warnings
given to the Chinese Communists that they should not hope for too much, that
no decisions had been made, and that there was a specific effort to keep them
from getting their hopes too high and being carried away.
The Chairman. You mean by that, in his talks with the Communists he had
indicated that, as you just stated, to them? — A. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Not that the report itself had been made available to the
Communists?
A. No, no. There would, I believe, have been an impropriety if one had gone
to the Chinese Communists and promised them a line of conduct on the part
of our Government which had not yet been sanctioned in any policy determina-
tions at home, but I can find no indication of that in the reports. Rather, on
the contrary.
The Chairman. Any further questions?
A. It was in Document 186:
"Every effort has been made to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to
point out the practical difficulties in the way of direct cooperation, and to suggest
that Japan may he defeated in other ways than as the Communists insist, a slow
process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland."
Q. Now, on the basis of your examination of these documents, Mr. Keunan,
I should like to call your attention that Senator McCarthy and others have
charged that Mr. Service during this period was trying to turn the Far East
over to Russia, and it has been further asserted that Mr. Service expressed the
view that communism was the best hope of China or the best hope of Asia, vari-
ously. Do you find anything in any of his writings that tended in any way to
support such statements? — A. No; let me think of those. Trying to turn it all
over
Q. Trying to turn the Far East over to Russia? — A. No; I find the direct
contrary to that proposition in these reports. The second was that
Q. That communism was the best hope of Asia? — A. No; my understanding
of what he said in these reports was that the best hope in China, to which his
observations were restricted, was a regime which would be considerate of the
interests of the opposition elements including the Communists, which is quite
a difference.
Q. Yes. By the way, Mr. Kennan, will you state to the Board whether you
are acquainted with Mi1. Service? — A. I had never met Mr. Service before he re-
turned on this occasion, and I have never spoken with him except concerning
the technical arrangements for my appearing here. I purposely did not discuss
anything that I was going to say on this occasion with him or with anyone that
I thought might be in communication with him and have never discussed the
content of his reports. I had also not read the reports before this except insofar
as they were contained in the white paper, so that they came to me fresh.
Q. And you have no discussed these reports with Mr. Service at any time? —
A. No : at no time.
Q. Or discussed them with me? — A. No; at no time.
Mr. Moreland. Or members of the Board?
The Chairman. That is also true of the members of the Board?
A. It is also true of the members of the Board. I had meant to make that clear
myself.
I am sure that the only thing I could add, I think, to what I have said so
far voluntarily about the reports is that in their entirety there is no question
about it, aside from the question of whether they might have a bias in favor of the
2126 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Communists, that they represent an absolutely outstanding job of reporting,
on general Foreign Service terms. Many of them have nothing to do with this
mutter whatsoever. They are an excellent series of reports and recognized as
such by the Department. I don't know whether that has any bearing: that
is why I didn't mention it before, except that people who write excellent reports
are not apt to be guilty of the great oversimplifications which have been sug-
gested by some people.
Q. Just one question. I believe that during the early forties, as you testi-
fied earlier, the officials of the Soviet Union had generally expressed the view
that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists and that they did not
really regard them as true Communists at all. While necessarily over-simplifi-
cation, is that generally a correct characterization of the Soviet Communist
Party line, that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists? — A. That
seems to have been a line taken in conversation by certain of the Soviet leaders
during the war. I don't recall ever having seen itin the very carefully controlled
written line that they put out, and it is my belief that it was not part of that.
Q. It was at any rate, I take it, clearly the line as put out by Messrs. Stalin
and Molotov to General Hurley? — A. That is General Hurley's report, and he
reported — I was not there that night, Mr. Harriman went up with him and left
that following morning — that Molotov agreed that that was the line that he
and Stalin were taking, that these were not real Communists and that — just as
you described.
Q. Did you detect any indication anywhere in Mr. Service's writing that he
did not regard the Chinese Communists as true Communists? — A. Yes: I had
the impression that particularly in the earlier period of his stay in Yenan he
thought it possible the influences of their experience as a political movement,
the extent to which they had been thrown upon themselves in their long march
around China, and isolation during the war. and the pressures of purely Chinese
psychological influences on them might have changed them in such a way as
would make them untypical of the majority of Communists, of all the other
Communist parties approved by the Kremlin, and might reconcile them to ruling
by means which would be more like what we would consider democratic for a
long period even if they came to power in China.
Q. In that connection do you recall any of his reports which commented par-
ticularly on whether or not the Chinese Communist Party was even though
modified by its peculiar experiences essentially a Marxian political party? — A.
Yes. There was one from Yenan in the earlier period there. I would have to
look it up to be able to cite the exact one to you which did comment on that
point. Just a moment now. It was No. 168, I believe. My recollection is
that in that report he said that he believed that the Chinese Communist Party
aimed for an orderly and prolonged progress toward eventual socialism and
not for violent revolution, and that it would consider the long-term interests of
China and would not seek for an early monopoly of political power. I believe
however that those views changed in the course of his service in Yenan and
that in the latter part of his service there he felt that there was less liklihood
that they would not strive for monopoly of power. I hope I don't misquote him
on that. I have here this report — let me see if I can find some of the passages that
are pertinent. He did not say that they were not Marxists, I think I should add,
but it was a question of what interpretation they would give to their own
Marxism, and if you will permit me I will read this report, the passage that I
recall.
"The Chinese Communist Party claims that it is Marxist. By this the Com-
munists mean that their ideology, their philosophical approach, and their
dialectal method arc based on Marx materialism. .Marxism thus becomes to it
chiefly an attitude and an approach to problems. It is a long-term view of
political and economic developments to which all short-term considerations of
temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly subordinated. This
interpretation of .Marxist materialism means to them a certain logical develop-
ment of economic society. It also means that this natural sequence cannot he
short-circuited. To try to do so would he disastrous and a violation of their
basic principles of Strategy. Thus socialism in their view cannot be evolved
at one jump from the present primitive agrarian society of China. It can
come only after considerable development of the Chinese autonomy and after
it has passed through a stage of at least modified capitalism. Their communism
therefore does not mean the immediate overthrow of private capital because
there is still almost no capitalism in China. It does not mean the dictatorship
of the proletariat because there is as yet no proletariat. It does not mean
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2127
collectivism of farms because the political education of the peasants has not yet
overcome their primitive individualistic desire to till their own land."
And he goes on at some length here to describe the view, ending with this
(•(inclusion :
"By tiiis view the Communist Party becomes a party seeking orderly demo-
cratic growth toward socialism, as is being attempted for instance, in a country
like England, rather than a party fomenting immediate and violent revolution.
It becomes a party which is not seeking an early monopoly of political power
but pursuing what it considers the long-term interests in China. It bases this
seemingly idealistic policy on a rigid interpretation of materialism which holds
it to be a violation of those materialistic principles to attempt to force the
country into socialism before the natural development of the country's economy
makes socialism possible."
That is the end of that quote.
Q. That, of course, is essential Marxism doctrine, too, is it not? — A. I would
say subsequent history has borne out this analysis insofar as it related to the
internal economic policies of the Chinese Communist Government. I don't think
that Government has at the present moment any intention of collectivizing all
( Jhinese agriculture or stamping out all Chinese capitalism. There is no question
about that. It has a judgment here which I think has not actually materialized
today and that is that "It is a party seeking orderly democratic growth to-
wards socialism." However I must bear in mind in connection with that state-
ment that he had prior to that time said that if this thing ended in a civil war
with ourselves backing the central government of China these Chinese Com-
munists would be impelled more in the direction of Moscow, and that after this
time also his reports reflect greater skepticism on this point of whether you
would expect a democratic development in the Chinese Communist Party.
Q. I have no further question.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennan, for taking your valuable
time for our benefit. You did a very fine report.
(The witness was dismissed, a short recess was declared, and the Board re-
convened to hear continuation of testimony by Mr. John Davies.)
The Chairman. We will recommence questions by Mr. Stevens.
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. Mr. Davies, you will remember on Saturday I asked you about your trip to
Yenan? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Sometime between October and January. I wonder if you are familiar
with Mr. Service's memorandum 40. about which Mr. Hurley commented a con-
siderable amount in his Senate testimony.
The Chairman. That is Document No. 193.
A. Yes. I recall this document. I had not seen it, I think, since 1944.
The Chairman. Would you like to have a chance to look at it?
A. Well, I can identify it.
Q. Did you receive that when you were in New Delhi or in Yenan, sir? — A. I
probably got this in Yenan. I think by that time — I have forgotten, when was
St dwell relieved?
Mr. Service. October 19.
A. I may have gotten that in New Delhi. I doubt if it would have gone through
that quickly. If not, I probably saw it in Yenan or Chungking.
Q. Did you ever discuss the contents of that memorandum with other than a
Government person in Yenan, sir? — A. No. It was certainly our firm policy
not to discuss with any Chinese any American official documents. We went so
far as to mark our documents, many of them, "for American official eyes only,"
some such phraseology as that, because we suspected that some reporting docu-
ments by Foreign Service officers were being shown to Chinese officials in Chung-
king, and it was an established policy with us that we should not reveal to any
Chinese in any position what we were reporting about the internal affairs in
China.
Q. Would you have revealed that to any newspaperman, sir? Would you have
shown that document to anyone other than an official of the United States Gov-
ernment?— A. This document I don't think I would have. I can't conceive of
having shown this one because this was obviously a pretty hot document.
Q. Your answer then would be that you did not? — A. That I did not.
Q. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Achilles. You never gave a copy of that or sent a copy of that to anyone
not in an official capacitv?
A. No.
2128 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Who was examining? Were you, Mr. Counsel, examining?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you proceed?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. We had, I believe, at the end of the proceeding on Saturday been discussing
again this matter of the whole matter of policy and dealings with the press, and
I believe the last thing we did was introduce an affidavit by Colonel Jones, who
was the public relations officer for the theater, so unless the Board wishes to
pursue that general subject matter further, I would propose to go on to some
other topics.
The Chairman. Very well, proceed.
Mr. Stevens. May I ask, sir, Document No. 323 is the one you were talking
about, that yon introduced on Saturady, is it not?
Q. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stevens. Was that placed in as a part of the transcript or as an exhibit?
Q. It is part of the transcript.
Mr. Stevens. Right.
Q. Now, Mr. Davies, I wonder if you can summarize in some way for the
Board the general views which the political advisers group, that is the group
of political advisers attached to General Stilwell, came to hold regarding the
type of solution of the political problems in China which the United States ought
to seek to accomplish in order to further our interests in the prosecution of the
war there? — A. I think that those views are fairly well summarized in the white
paper on China. I don't see much point in reiterating those. You are familiar
with them.
Q. But you would say that the views that are expressed there, and I take it
you refer particularly to the annex 47 which deals with this phase.- — A. Yes.
Q. Fairly represents the thinking of your whole group on this question? —
A. Yes. There is one point in the summary or in the white paper which I would
like to elaborate on a bit. I might say that I was the only one of the so-called
political advisers who attempted to discuss in any detail the broadest problems
of international politics, although the interpretations which I advanced were
in no way binding on my colleagues, as they were simply the reporting efforts
of one or of another junior officer. I believe I am accurate in stating that Mr.
Emmerson went along with what I had to say regarding the international scene.
I believe that Mr. Service shared with me a basic assumption that the U. S. S. R.
would be the principal power rival of the United States in the Far East and that
as such the U. S. S. R. was, although at the moment our ally, also our future
enemy.
During the period 1943-45 this was not a theme which was widely proclaimed
for obvious and sound reasons. However, it was introduced into our reporting
at various times. You will find hints of it in the excerpts from our memoranda
which I just referred to published in the white paper. I would, with the Board's
permission, like to read several further paragraphs from my reports in an en-
deavor to throw more light on our attitude toward the U. S. S. R. In a memo-
randum dated September 17, 1943, I discussed Soviet policy in review of global
policy, and I had this to say:
"Absorbed in their struggle with the Germans and realizing that they can-
not depend upon Britain and the United States to defeat the wehrmacht for them,
the Russian policy appears to have been less political than that of the British
and the Chinese. In its singleness of purpose — confined to the defeat of the
enemy — it has resembled ours.
"Rut while we follow such a policy from Choice, the Russians have done so
from necessity. A mortal struggle for survival leaves little slack for political
picking and choosing. British policy in 1940 and 1941 and Chinese policy before
Pearl Harbor had the same attributes of simplicity.
"Once the Russians feel, however, that they have won their fight for survival
and that they have some leeway for maneuver, it will not be surprising if they
begin to make their military strategy subservient to an over-all political policy.
Thai point may already have been reached.
"It is perhaps not too early to suggest that Soviet policy will probably be
directed initially at establishing frontiers which will insure Russian security
and at rehabilitation of the U. S. S. R. There is no reason to cherish optimism
regarding a voluntary Soviet contribution to our fight against Japan, whether
in the shape of air bases or the early opening of a second front in northeast
Asia. The Russians may be expected to move against the Japanese when it
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2129
suits their pleasure, which may not he until the final phases of the war — and
then only in order to he able to participate in dictating terms to the Japanese
and to establish new strategic frontiers.
"At this point ii may be worth while to insert comments on our bargaining
position. As the Soviet Union's peril diminishes its need for our aid diminishes.
In direct proportion as the Kremlin feels its need of American assistance lessening,
our bargaining position becomes weaker and we are less able to persuade the
Russians to act as we desire. We appear to have made little use of our bar-
gaining strength with the Soviet Union, because, perhaps, we were not prepared
to force through what we wanted and because we would not have been prepared
to exploit our advantage even had we done so. Now we find our bargaining
strength with the Russians slipping away. * * *"
A few months later in June, June 24, 1943, I had this to say :
''It would only be natural that, should Chiang attack the Communists, the
latter would turn for aid to their immediate neighbor, the Soviet Union. And
as such an attack would probably not be launched until after the defeat of Japan,
the Communists might expect with good reason to receive Russian aid.
"This would he so because following the defeat of Japan Russia would no longer
be threatened on its eastern borders, because the Kremlin's present need of Chiang
Kai-shek's cooperation would have passed, because Stalin would then presumably
prefer to have a friendly if not satellite Chinese Government on his flank, and
because the Soviet Union would then have surplus arms in abundance for export.
"A central government attack would therefore in all probability force the Com-
munists into the willing arms of the Russians. The position of the political doc-
trinaires who have been subservient to Moscow would be strengthened by such
an attack. The present trend of the Chinese Communists toward more or less
democratic nationalism — confirmed in 6 years of fighting for the Chinese mother-
land— would thereby be reversed and they could be expected to retrogress to
the position of a Russian satellite.
"In these circumstances they would not be a weak satellite. With Russian
arms, with Russian technical assistance and with the popular appeal which they
have, the Chinese Communists might be expected to defeat the central govern-
ment and eventually to take over the control of most if not all of China. It may
be assumed that a Russo-Chinese bloc, with China as a subservient member of
the partnership, would not be welcomed by us. The effect of such a bloc upon
the rest of Asia and upon world stability would be undesirable."
Then on February 19, 1944, 1 observed :
"Nowhere does Clausewitz's dictum that war is only the continuation of
politics by other methods apply with more force than in the Asiatic theater. If
we are to plan intelligently the conduct of our war against Japan we must clearly
define and understand our long-range political objectives in Asia.
"Presumably we seek in Asia (1) the greatest possible stability after the war,
and (2) an alinement of power favorable to us when we again become involved
in an Asiatic or Pacific war."
That is the end of the reading.
Q. Now, in that connection you say that you were satisfied that Mr. Service
in general agreed with those views, that, they represent views held by him as
well as by you? — A. Yes: I was convinced of that, and still am.
Q. Do you have knowledge that Mr. Service shared the views that you have
just expressed? — A. We had discussed these questions back and forth. He left
to me the reporting on the broader, international picture, but this general ap-
proach became really the tacit basis upon which the further development of our
political ideas with respect to the local situation was worked out.
Q. And I take it that insofar as Senator McCarthy, for example, has charged
that Mr. Service thought to turn the whole Far East over to Russia, you would
say that that was not any part of his objective, if he shared the views that
you just expressed? — A. It would he fantastic because this was the basic
assumption, that there was the power conflict with the Soviet Union as the
force which would challenge us in a power rivalry at the end of World War II,
and that our next problem would be to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming
the dominant power in Asia.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Davies, did you send copies of your reports, such as the
ones you have read, to Mr. Service?
A. Yes ; copies — well, let me go on. Two of these reports I believe were written
before Mr. Service joined me, but he went through the whole files and we dis-
cussed this general outlook together, so he was familiar with these and he
expressed general agreement.
2130 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stevens. Did he express on any of the points you raised disagreement?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now I would like you to look at document No. 35-5. I show you document
35-5, which is already in evidence here, which represents a statement by General
Hurley of the policy objectives or slightly varying versions of the policy objec-
tives which he sought to pursue in China.
(Mr. Davies read document 35-5.)
Q. Now I would like to ask you whether on the basis of your knowledge of
Mr. Service's writings and your knowledge of his views apart from his writings,
whether Mr. Service ever was in disagreement with any of these stated policy
objectives? — A. I can't see that he ever was, so far as my knowledge of Mr.
Service's reporting and his personal ideas, and so on.
Q. Now referring to document No. 35-3, General Hurley has charged that
Mr. Service and other Foreign Service officers in China were pro-Communist.
Did you ever hear Mr. Service make any expression of view which would render
any support to this charge by General Hurley? — A. American Foreign Service
officers are trained to be pro-American first. They are dedicated to that proposi-
tion. They evaluate foreign situations — and I say this of Mr. Service now
specifically. He evaluated the local Chinese situation, the political factors that
were there in terms of what was best for American interests. I never heard
him say anything which in my interpretation of the word would be regarded
as a bias toward the Chinese Communists. I think that his comments were
made as objectively as he knew how to make them, and in that sense I don't
see how he could be regarded as pro-Communist.
Q. Do you know who Bishop Paul Yu-pin is, Mr. Davies? — A. I know who he
is. I don't know him.
Q. You don't? — A. I am not acquainted with him.
Q. Do you know what his relationship was in 1945 to the Kuomintang, if he
had any relation to it? — A. As I recall it, it was a very close relationship with
the Chinese Government officials and the Kuomintang. I couldn't go into it any
deeper than that because my memory on that question is not detailed.
Q. It has been charged by Bishop Paul Yu-pin, as well as by others including
Congressman Dondero and Senator McCarthy, that Mr. Service in effect kept
hammering at General Stilwell to force General Stilwell to make demands on
Chiang Kai-shek to arm the Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party
forces. Can you tell the board just how close a personal relationship Mr. Service
had with General Stilwell? — A. General Stilwell had very few personal inti-
mates. He took very few people into his confidence, including his intimates.
His habit was to listen and to make up his own mind, and one was not always
certain what his own conclusions were as a result of one's own comments. As
for Mr. Service and his relationship with General Stilwell, I believe that General
Stilwell had a feeling of considerable friendship for Mr. Service but obviously
he regarded Mr. Service as a junior officer whose views he would listen to,
take under consideration, but General Stilwell always made up his own mind
as to what he was going to do.
Q. During the period Mr. Service was attached to General Stilwell's staff,
Mr. Service was first in Chungking from August of 1943 until about July 1944 —
is that approximately correct according to your recollection? — A. According
to my recollection ; yes.
Q. And then at that time he went to Yenan with the observer mission, did he
not?— A. Yes.
Q. And was there until October 1944 when General Stilwell was recalled,
is that correct? — A. As I recall it.
Q. During that period, did Mr. Service have frequent opportunity for personal
contacl willi General Stilwell? — A. I was not in Chungking at the time, so I
can't answer it except as I knew from what .Mr. Service had told me, which was
thai il was not frequent.
Q. As a matter of fact, was General Stilwell in Chungking very much? — A.
General Stilwell was — he went to Chungking always reluctantly and left always
as soon as he could. I don't recall whether General Stilwell was there
Q. I am talking roughly now about the period August 1943 until roughly
the — well, the year from the middle of 1943 to the middle of 1944. — A. Yon are
being very subtle with me now! Wasn't he in Burma then? I have forgotten.
Q. My impression is that he was engaged in fighting somewhere but I don't
recall. — A. Yes. I imagine he was in the depths of the Burma campaign. Is
that ■
Q. My impression has been that he was largely engaged during that period in
actual military operations elsewhere. — A. Yes.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2131
The Chairman. Is that your impression?
A. Yes. I don't recall definitely; but yes, when the Burma campaign was
going on — and that was in late 1943, 1 believe, and early 11)44, and that is the
period you are covering, isn't it V
Q. Yes. — A. The great complaint was that General Stilwell was down in the
mud in Burma all the time, instead of up in his headquarters in Chungking.
When he was in Chungking, as I said, he kept very much to himself. When one
saw him, he listened, made his own decisions, but he was a man who operated
and lived quite a lonely life with very few intimates. I would not consider
Mr. Service as one of General Stilwell's real intimates.
Q. Now, during the period from July, end of July 1944 until Octoher 19, 1944,
which is when General Stilwell was recalled, Mr. Service was in Yenan. Was
General Stilwell, as far as you know, ever in Yenan during this period.? — A. No,
he was not in Yenan during this period.
Q. So that any attempts by Mr. Service to influence General Stilwell would
have had to have been largely through the written reports that he prepared, is
that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. Are you familiar with — as I understand, all of the reports which Mr. Service
prepared, copies of all reports which Mr. Service prepared were sent to you, is
that correct? — A. That is right.
Q. Do you have any knowledge of Mr. Service's insistence in any of these reports
to General Stilwell that General Stilwell make demands on Chiang Kai-shek to
arm some 300,000 Communist troops? — A. I do not recall any such recommenda-
tion. Certainly there would be no insistence or importunities on the part of a
junior reporting officer to a theater commander.
Q. Bishop Paul Yu-pin is reported to have said that Mr. Service made at least
three such insistent demands, kept coming back at General Stilwell, and finally
caused General Stilwell to go to Chiang Kai-shek and make these demands on
Chiang, and that thereafter Chiang requested President Roosevelt to recall
General Stilwell. Does that accord with either your understanding of the
circumstances under which General Stilwell was recalled or is it consistent
with any activities of Mr. Service that you knew about? — A. On the basis of my
information, that is a ridiculous charge. General Stilwell, I might add, had been
trying to obtain control over Chinese troops since 1942. That was the beginning
of his attempts to get control over the Chinese armies because he had very little
confidence in the Chinese generals with whom he was associated and he felt that
there was no discipline in the higher echelons of the Chinese Army and that the
only way the Chinese lighting forces could be made effective was to have them
brought under American control. That was irrespective of what political stripe
the Chinese troops might be, whether they were Central Government troops,
provincial troops, dissident ti'oops in the southeast, or Communist troops.
Q. Referring back to your testimony for a few moments ago about General
Stilwell's personal relations with his associates, whom would you regard as
possilily the person who was on most intimate personal terms with General
Stilwell. in terms of his associates around him? — A. I should think General —
now Colonel — Frank Dorn, who had been an assistant military attache with
General Stilwell in 1938, who was a China language officer from the Army, who
had been General Stilwell's aide when General Stilwell first went out to China
after Pearl Harbor, and who was later in command of the operations on the
Salween River operating from Yunnan Province.
Q. Referring to Document No. 33-6, a newspaper reporter by the name of
Ray Richards has stated. Mr. Davies, that Mr. Service allegedly made a special
mission to Moscow, roughly in the summer of 1944, to aid the Red group of the
United States Embassy there in weakening the will of Chiang Kai-shek not to
submit to North China Communist demands. Do you know whether Mr. Service
was ever in Moscow? — A. He was not. He was never in Moscow.
Q. And you have personal knowledge that he could not have been there during
the year 1044?— A. I do.
Mr. Achilles. From the contents that looks like a journalistic slip, it is in-
tended to he Chungking rather than Moscow.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Do you have any? (None.)
Thank you very much.
Mr. Davies. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. You have been very helpful.
(The witness was dismissed, the board adjourned for a short recess and
reconvened. )
The Chairman. Go ahead.
2132 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcrip Docu-
ment No. 46, which is an affidavit of Arthur W. Grafton, consisting of 12 pages,
dated April 24, 1950. May that be included in the transcript?
The Chairman. That may be included in the transcript.
(The material referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 40
Affidavit of Arthur W. Grafton
State of Kentucky,
County of Jefferson, ss:
Arthur W. Grafton, being first duly sworn according to law, states upon his
oath as follows :
I am a practicing lawyer of Louisville, Kentucky. I was born in 1907 at
Hsuchoufu, China. My father, the Reverend Thonras B. Grafton, was a native
of Mississippi, and my mother, Lettie Taylor Grafton, was a native of Louis-
ville, Kentucky. Except for a year in America when I was five and another
year when I was twelve, in the course of my parents' sabbatical furloughs to the
United States, I spent the first seventeen years of my life in China. For four
school years (1919-1920, 1921-1924) I attended high school in the Shanghai
American School, my parents at that time being stationed at Haichow, Klangsu
Province. During the course of my years in China I became well acquainted
with John Stewart Service, who was likewise a missionary's son and went to
Shanghai to school.
In 1924 I returned to the United States and for four years attended Presby-
terian College of South Carolina, Clinton, South Carolina, from which I graduated
in 1928. In that year I came to Louisville, attending Jefferson School of Law
from which I graduated in 1930. I have been continuously engaged in the prac-
tice here since my admission to the Bar in the fall of 1930, except for a short
period from January to June, 1942, when I was counsel for the Defense Plant
Corporation in Washington, from June 1942 to August 1!)45 when I was on active
duty with the Army Air Forces, and from August 1945 until December 1945
again with Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Washington.
In June 1942 I was commissioned a First Lieutenant in tbe Army Air Forces,
went to the Air Forces Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and
beginning about the first of July 1942, was assigned to the Current Intelligence
Section of A-2 of the Headquarters, Army Air Forces in Washington. There
I was also assigned to the China-Burma-India Treater of operations, with the
primary duty of keeping the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and his
Washington staff informed daily as to significant developments in the CBI
Theater. I remained at this station until March of 1943. At that time I pro-
ceeded under order to New Delhi, India, where I was assigned to the Rear
Echelon Headquarters of the Commanding General, CBI Theater (General Stil-
well) and placed in the G— 3 Section under then Colonel later General Frank A.
Merrill. Late in June of 1943 I was transferred to Kunming, China, where I
was Assistant G-3 in the headquarters of the Commanding General of what was
known as the Y Forces Operations Staff (YFOS), commanded by Colonel later
Brigadier General Frank A. Dorn. November 25, 1943, I was transferred back to
Delhi, and assigned in the Intelligence Section of the newly established head-
quarters of the Commanding General for the Army Air Forces in the India-
Burma sector of the CBI Theater (General George E. Stratemeyer). In March
of 1944 I moved with his headquarters to Hastings Mill outside of Calcutta
Where I remained stationed until sent home on furlough in April of 1945. My
orders to return to General Stratemeyer's headquarters at the conclusion of
leave were cancelled and superseded while I was in the United States due to V-E
Day intervening, and I remained unassigned until shortly after VJ-Day in
August when I was relieved from active duty.
During my entire tour of duty in Washington, India, and China. I was charged
wilh the responsibility of keeping informed as to the general situation in
India, Burma, and China, as such situation affected current military opera-
tions. Beginning in Washington in July 1942 I was required to and did study
all available curreni information concerning our own and the enemy's actions
in China in order to keep the Commanding General and his staff informed. This
included the study of radio and written reports from the military headquarters
in the theater, as well as State Department reports reflecting upon political de-
velopments. More than any other theater, the CBI Theater was one in which
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2133
the political situation played a major role. In 1942 we had no combat troops
of our own in China except for a very small Air Force detachment of the 10th
Air Force under General Chenault. This force was gradually built up between
1942 and 1945 into the 14th Air Force, but at no time did it constitute a major
military force in comparison to our forces in other theaters, and the existence
and effectiveness of the 14th Air Force was in large measure wholly dependent
upon the cooperation of the Chinese and the ability of the Chinese to provide and
protect suitable bases from which the 14th could operate.
Except for the action of the 14th Air Force (severely restricted as to the scope
of its operations by the difficulty of supply over the Hump) our forces in China
were largely bystanders without the means to influence the outcome of the
st niggle for the Chinese mainland. The actual fighting with the enemy depended
upon the Chinese themselves and General Stilwell's staff was primarily con-
cerned with encouragements and advice to the Chinese and such supplies as
could be gradually built up over the Hump. The Chinese effort or really lack of
effort was in turn dictated almost entirely by political considerations, and an
understanding of at least the major forces in the political background was an
absolute essential to any sort of study of the military problems we were con-
sidering. In fact, the more one studied and learned about the political forces
at work, the more it became apparent that events in China were going to be
dictated by political rather than military moves. Increasingly, therefore, it be-
came necessary for me to devote time and attention to the political reports which
came to us principally through the Embassy in Chungking and through General
Stilwell's political advisers who were in turn members of the Embassy Staff
detached to him for that purpose.
From the military intelligence standpoint, evaluation of the information coming
out of China was impossible without an understanding of the political situation.
In the first place, we bad very few primary sources of intelligence of our own.
Detailed information as to the enemy Order of Battle, both Air and Ground, their
capabilities and intentions, originated almost wholly from Chinese sources and
was traditionally edited and colored for the purpose of further political ends.
We knew from experience that most of this information was fed to us not for
the purpose of informing us as to the facts, but for the purpose of influencing
particular attitudes or actions on the part of the Americans. The daily com-
muniques issued by the Chinese Ministry of Information at Chungking were
almost wholly fictional and fanciful and were never given any substantial credence
by our Intelligence Staff. To a lesser degree, official intelligence reports made
to us through Chinese Army channels were likewise suspect and had to be weighed
against the known political objectives.
When I got to India in March of 1943 I was delighted to learn that Jack Service
and John Davies were acting as political advisers to General Stilwell. I had
known John Davies like Jack Service in China as a boy, and I knew them both to
have an exceptionally broad understanding of Chinese thinking and politics.
Knowing them personally, and particularly knowing their background in China,
I felt that they coidd be of tremendous help in the job of sifting the wheat from
the chaff in the intelligence reports which were emanating from Chinese sources.
I read every report which came into our headquarters from these two men during
my entire tour of duty in the theater.
In the spring of 1943 Davies was primarily stationed in Delhi and Service was
in China. Service's reports came through the office of General Stilwell's G-2 in
Chungking, who I believe at that time was Colonel Dickey. I am sure that Colonel
Dickey was the G-2 later in 1943 and during 1944.
In June of 1943 when I reported to General Dorn's staff, I found our prob-
lem more than ever tied to and dependent upon the Chinese political situation.
The YFOS was a headquarters set up by General Stilwell in Kunming for the
purpose of directing the operations of an Infantry training school and an Artillery
training school in the Kunming area, where, according to plan, some fifteen
divisions of Chinese troops were to be trained and equipped to combat efficiency.
In addition, this staff was charged with the duty of preparation of a plan, in
collaboration with the Chinese military headquarters in Kunming, for an ulti-
mate launching of an attack on Burma from the Chinese side with a view of
making a juncture with the X Forces, which was a name assigned to the Chinese
divisions being trained in India, and which were designed to and ultimately did
attack the Japanese in northern Burma through the Ledo Road.
After the establishment of the Infantry and Artillery schools, it was the duty
of YFOS to negotiate with the Chinese concerning which troops were to be trained
2134 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and equipped and to make estimates as to the progress of the training and the
combat capabilities of the troops as trained.
The Chinese army then, as now, varied widely in quality as between divisions
and armies, being largely the reflection of the personality, ambitions, and politi-
cal power of their commanders. We obviously wanted to get the best divisions
possible assigned for this training, but were constantly faced with the fact
that political considerations in China dictated what troops were made available
and when.
The determination of which divisions we would try to get for training and the
estimate as to whether or not particular troops would be assigned was largely
a question of understanding Chinese politics. Repeatedly we were promised
that particular divisions would be moved into the training area and repeatedly
these promises were broken or countermanded. The best troops, according to
our information, were largely immobilized in northwest China facing the Com-
munists and were not made available either for training for eventual combat in
Burma or even for the important task of guarding the forward fields of the 14th
Air Force from possible enemy ground action. The units that actually were
assigned for training were far below these troops in numbers, physical condition,
equipment, and morale, and as a result the target date for the beginning of
actual operations from the China side was repeatedly postponed. It was one long
frustration and in the end the attack which had been originally planned for
early 1944 only materialized in 1945 and contributed but little to the recouquest
of northern Burma.
While I was in Kunming, Jack Service was there on at least two occasions.
The first, to the best of my recollection, was in July, and on that occasion he
and I renewed our boyhood acquaintance and discussed the military and political
situation in China at considerable length. Jack at that date had spent con-
siderable time in northwest China in the general area where the Nationalist
armies were engaged in containing the Communists, and personally knew a great
•leal about the strength and disposition of the Nationalist forces there. I had
previously noted his reports on this subject and was glad to get from him first-
hand information as to general conditions in that part of China. He was also
able to give me some highly useful information as to the nature and position
of the various Chinese political parties then engaged in the constant straggle
for power within the Nationalist Government, and filled me in on the personali-
ties of a great many of Chinese political and military figures whose names ap-
peared in the many reports which I was studying.
Another occasion in Kunming when I had a chance to talk with Jack at length
was in November 1943, just prior to my return to India.
I did not thereafter have contact with Jack until in April of 194") when 1 was
returning home on leave. At that time he was likewise returning to Washing-
ton to make a report on the situation in China, and he and I traveled in the
same plane from Calcutta as far as Casablanca. In the three days we were
together then he told me about his recent visit to Yenan and what he had learned
of the Chinese Communists first-hand and his general impression, most of which
bad already been embodied in a series of reports which had come to me through
Colonel Dickey's office in Chungking. Some of these reports have since been pub-
lished, excerpts at least appearing in the State Department publications con-
cerning our relations with China.
During all these limes both in the consideration and study of the reports
which Service prepared and in the personal conversations and consultations
with him. I never had any reason to doubt nor do I now doubt bis complete
loyalty to the United States. In the face of the almost complete frustration to
Which we were all subjected by reason of the tactics of the Chinese Government,
it was probably impossible for anyone to remain completely objective in report-
ing on the Chinese, but within this general limitation. I felt that Jack's report-
ing was the kind of objective, accurate, and searching analysis of the existing
situation that was most sorely needed. I have had but little opportunity to check
on the accuracy of the details contained in these reports, but the correctness of his
over-all estimates of tbe situation was repeatedly borne out by the day-to-day
events. Particularly it seems that his long-range predictions as to the course
of political affairs in China were srartlingly accurate, especially when considered
in the light of the apparent capabilities of tbe Nationalist forces and tbe apparent
weakness ami geographical isolation of the Communists.
In none of tbe many conversations with Jack did I detect any indication of
personal Communist leanings on bis part, or any indication of sympathy with the
aims of Soviet Rusia and world communism. He expressed the conviction that
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2135
the Chinese Communist had found a way to gain and hold mass support from
the people. We al the same time had prepared an intelligence estimate to the
effect that the Japanese could at Will overrun our forward airfields in China.
[f his opinion was pro-Communist, then ours was pro-Japanese. Events shortly
demons! rated that both estimates were accurate. In my judgment Jack's reports
were nothing more nor less than objective conclusions on a subject vital to
every phase of our effort in China based upon first-hand observation by a man
singularly well trained by background and experience to understand the reac-
tions and probable attitudes of the Chinese people.
Such reporting was in my judgment invaluable. If we needed or could have
used intelligence reports tinged with wishful thinking and ostrichlike ignoring
of the basic facts, we were abundantly supplied with them through both Chinese
military and political sources on the Nationalist side.
Since charges have been leveled at Jack Service based in part at least upon his
reports on China, I have reread such of the reports as I could locate, and I
am still unable to detect in them anything which would remotely justify the
slightest suspicion that Jack was doing any more than the job that wTas expected
of him by the Commanding General to whom he was attached, and that was to
ascertain the facts, interpret them in the light of his broad Chinese experience,
and express whatever conclusions resulted therefrom. The only thing to be
regretted is that we did not have more men doing as good a job as Jack did,
and that his reports and those of the few who saw as clearly as he did were not
given more serious consideration in the making of our over-all plans for Asia.
I understand that there is some criticism or suspicion directed at Jack because
certain of his political information was disclosed to and known by the press both
through correspondents accredited to the theater and through reporters and edi-
tors located in this country. Without knowing what particular information is
thought to have been wrongfully disclosed. I do think it important that people'
generally realize that in most operating theaters, according to my understanding,,
and in the CBI Theater, according to my personal experience, there was a very
wide range of disclosure to the accredited corri pond nts of the American press
of the type of information that for general security purposes was classified all
the way from Restricted to Top Secret. The policy of keeping the press repre-
sentatives thoroughly briefed was one initiated from the very top. The fact that
the CBI Theater was, as heretofore stated, as much influenced by local politics
as by enemy action, made it apparent to the respective officers in charge that
political background was an essential to an understanding by the American
press and people of the manifold difficulties confronting military operations. The
representatives of the press in the theater were, with but few exceptions, men
of understanding, capacity, and discretion, and in many instances were as well
informed or better informed through their own sources than the military head-
quarters which they visited. There was a constant interchange of information
along these lines which was helpful to a high degree. Not only, therefore, was
there a general understanding that the accredited American correspondents were
to be taken into our confidence in regard to most of our military operations, but
we were permitted to discuss freely with them our information and personal
ideas as to the political situation. On more than one occasion I was specifically
directed by my superior officers to brief correspondents on matters which came to
my knowledge through classified documents, and nearly all of the political re-
ports to which I have referred were classified either Confidential or Secret.
The political advisers to General Stilwell were naturally the best sources for
this type of information for the correspondents, and it was only natural that
they tended to discuss these matters at length. Not only was it well known that
such discussions took place, but I am under the impression that they were
encouraged by the commanding officers involved. I certainly never heard
anyone criticized or reprimanded for frank discussions with American
correspondents.
So far as I can recall there were but two military subjects which were
beyond the range of permissible discussion. One was anything relating to
plans for future military operations and the other was any discussion of the
intelligence gained from radio intercepts. These two subjects, however, were
restricted within the ranks of military personnel themselves, and even in General
Arnold's War Room in Washington, where admittance was only to the highest
ranking Air Force officers, these two subjects were never discussed or hinted at.
I would be very much surprised to find that there was any substantial amount
of information contained in the political reports which I received that was not
well known by at least a half a dozen of the better-informed correspondents
2136 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
for the American press who were operating in China and India during the times
that the reports were current.
Dated at Louisville, Kentucky, this 24 day of April 1950.
(S) Arthur W. Grafton,
Arthur W. Grafton.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and
County aforesaid, by Arthur W. Grafton, to me personnaly known, this the 24 day
of April 1950.
Mr commission expires December 19, 1951.
( S ) Lillian Fleischer,
Notary Public, Jefferson County. Kentucky.
Mr. Rhetts. Now I would like to offer document No. 47, which is the text
of a communication from Col. David D. Barrett, assistant military attache, at
Taipei, Formosa, to John S. Service, dated April 1950.
The Chairman. It will be included in the record, in the transcript.
(The matter referred to as follows :)
Document No. 47
"Text of Communication From Col. David D. Barrett, Assistant Attache at
Taipei, Formosa, to John S. Service, April 1950
"Over 1 year ago at request of Department of State I made detailed report on
subject of your radio and my letter should be on file. During period we served in
Yenan your views and recommendations on subject of Chinese Communists were
set forth in reports submitted through official channels and I believe these should
be carefully considered in connection with any investigation of your loyalty. In
my opinion, these reports indicated that you, like myself and some others
serving in China at that time, were deceived to some extent by Chinese Com-
munist advocacy of agrarian reform, by careful soft-pedaling of their adherence to
Marxian doctrine, by ardent professions of support of democratic ideals and
undying friendship for the United States, and by other plays intended to gain
United States support. I never saw in these reports any signs of disloyalty or
desire to hurt the United States. In our discussions of Chinese Communists
while we were in Yenan our primary consideration was part they could play in
fighting common enemy and I do not believe any idea of helping communism as
such ever occurred to you any more than it did to me. Seems to me essential to
bear in mind that Chinese Communists and Soviet Union and other nations and
groups then fighting on our side presented much different picture than from what
they do today. In my association with you in Yenan and elsewhere in China
theater I always considered you highly security-conscious and intensely loyal
to your country. As for charges you passed secret documents to unauthorized
persons anywhere it would require more convincing proof than has apparently
ever been presented to agencies hitherto investigating you to make me believe
them. Above included in written affidavit which follows by pouch."
(Mr. Robert W. Barnett, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address, please, sir? — A. Robert Warren
Barnett, 4225 Forty-ninth Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. John Service, Mr. Barnett? — A. Yes.
Q. Will you describe when you first met him and the nature of your associa-
tion with him since that time?
The Chairman. Before you do that why don't you qualify Mr. Barnett? Just
state what he is doing.
Q. What is your present position, Mr. Barnett? — A. Mr. Chairman, I am now
an employee of the Department of State. I am assigned to the Office of China
Affairs, where I have the title of Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs. I have
been working in the Department of State since the fall of 1945, and until my
assignment to the Office of China Affairs I was in the economic part of the
Department working primarily on Japanese questions.
Q. And you came with the Department in the fall of 1945? — A. That is
right.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2137
Q. What were you doing prior to that time? — A. I was in the Department
of the Army, the War Department, immediately prior to coining to the State
Department.
Q. In what capacity? — A. I was in the Military Intelligence Service of G-2,
and I had been assigned there in May of 1945. Prior to that time I had been
on the staff of General Chenault in China for .some 22 months, where I was
the assistant A-2 in charge of all combat intelligence for the Fourteenth Air
Force Headquarters. Trior to then I was in Army schools in this country.
(>. Now. I believe you have stated that you were acquainted with Mr. Service.
Would you tell the Board when you first met him and describe your associa-
tion with him since that time? — A. My father happens to be the general secre-
tary of the Young Men's Christian Association in this country, and prior to
that he was the head of the YMCA iu China. Mr. Service's father was a secre-
tary of the YMCA, too. Our families were intimately acquainted with each
other for many years. The Services were stationed in Szechwan and my family
lived in east China in Hangchow and Shanghai. In 1922 I entered the Shanghai
American School, which was an American institution and mainly supported
by the missionaries throughout China that wlanted an American school to
which to send their children, and also supported by the business community
and some of the official American community in China. Sometime following
1922, I think it must have been about 1925, the Service boys — there were several
of them — started coming to Shanghai, and I first became acquainted with Jack
in Shanghai in the mid or late twenties. I forget exactly what year it was.
.lark was 2 or 3 years ahead of me in high school and. grammar school. He
was active in the Boy Scouts and various campus activities, and we got to know
each other quite well, but not terribly intimately at that time. Jack went away
to college and so did I. and our oaths did not really cross in such a way that
we could get acquainted with each other well until 1940, when Jack was assigned
to the consulate general in Shanghai and I was in Shanghai writing a book
on Shanghai under the joint sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation and the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
My book was to be a part of the so-called inquiry series and was published in
1941. Jack was on Consul General Lockhart's staff and I saw a good deal of him
socially. I didn't see too much of him in connection with my research because
Jack's* interests were not primarily economic and my connections with the
consulate were primarily with Bland Calder and some of his Chinese assistants.
The consulate general's staff was very cooperative in assisting me to make con-
tact with members of the British and American and the Japanese business com-
munity and also in providing me with statistical and factual information which
would have been quite difficult for me to have compiled myself in the short period
that I was in Shanghai.
Jack was at that time hoping to be assigned to west China, and the next time I
saw him was in 1942 when I was sent out by United China Relief to do an economic
survey of China. The survey was intended to assist United China Relief in
developing a program of relief for free China after the Burma Road had been
lost. Jack was very helpful to me at that time in making contacts with members
of the Chinese Cabinet people, like Wang Chung Ilui — I believe he was Foreign
Minister at the time — T. F. Chiang, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, the Kungs —
in fact, the whole range of people in Chungking who were anxious to establish an
effective working arrangement with the people in this country who were inter-
ested in going on supplying relief to the Chinese.
As you know, United China Relief was supported primarily by existing relief
agencies but had been brought together through the active intervention of Mr.
Henry Luce, who was the principal angel of the enterprise, coming in with
financial assistance in a magnitude that would make it worth while for the
agencies to work together rather than to work separately. My trip to China that
time was a brief one. I was there only six weeks.
The next time I saw Jack was in the fall of 1943, when I had been assigned to
General Chenault's headquarters, and Jack, I believe, had just been assigned to
General Stilwell's headquarters, and we of course were very glad to see each
other for personal reasons, hut since his functions were largely in the political
sphere and mine were exclusively in the military sphere, we did not have con-
tinuous or very close connections with each other during the war. In fact, I left
Kunming during my 22 months' assignment out there only once prior to preparing
to leave the theater. It was in early March that I had occasion to go to Chung-
king, and while in Chungking I saw Jack, together with a great many of my other
friends there.
2138 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The occasion for my going, if you wish me to just continue in this manner
Q. Go right ahead. — A. The occasion for my going was to obtain theater clear-
ance for a manuscript which I had prepared at the request of General Cheunault
and General Glenn. This manuscript was entitled, "'An Orientation Booklet
for United States Military Personnel in China.'' It was written at a time when
we thought that the war might last another year or two and it was intended for
use by officers and noncommissioned officers already in the theater or who were
expected to arrive in the theater. The Burma Road had quite recently been
opened and we expected a huge expansion of American personnel in China.
For some 15 to 18 months it had been one of my functions at the Fourteenth Air
Force Headquarters to give daily briefings to General Chennault and weekly
briefings on the military and economic and political situation in China to all
transient personnel passing through Kunming who had any right to this kind
of information. We had generals coming in and we had Intelligence sergeants
coming in on Friday mornings, map room, and so on, so it was not very much
of a trick for me to put in the manuscript what I knew to be the answers to the
questions which this type of officer had on his mind.
I am sorry I don't have a copy of the book with me, but it breaks down into
some 12 to 14 chapters something on the historical background of the war,
organization of the Japanese Army, the organization of our own forces, the econom-
ics of the war, the combat record, our own combat record, the history of the cam-
paigns that the Japanese had fought, some comment on the place of the China
war and the Pacific war, and I had written a chapter on the Chinese political
situation which I knew had to be handled discreetly, because although the
booklet was classified ''■Restricted" we intended to print 10,000 copies of the
booklet and it was quite certain that at least 1 copy would fall into the hands
of the Chinese.
I chose to write this political chapter in such terms that neither the Kuomin-
tang Party leaders nor the Chinese Communist Party leaders could find offense
in it. That was a hard thing to do, but I thought it was a possible thing
to do, because at that time both parties argued that they stood on the principles
of the San Min Chu I of the Sun Yat Sen, so I described Sun Yat Sen's position
in Chinese history, the development of the Kuomintang, an explanation of the
way they applied the political doctrines of Sun Yat Sen to the China situation, and
then concluded with a section on how the Chinese Communists had interpreted
the same principles as their body of doctrine.
This manuscript was cleared by the Fourteenth Air Force Headquarters, the
A-2 Colonel Williams, and the Chief of Staff General Glenn, it had been read
by other members of the headquarters: Hank Byroade. for instance, was in
headquarters at that time. I went to Chungking to clear this manuscript and it
was read there by the G-2 Colonel Dickey, members of the G-2 staff, and other
general headquarters staff officers, and generally cleared through all of these
people with a few revisions and amendments, but it was felt that the political
adviser to General Stilwell's headquarters should have a crack at it and approve
it if possible, and that was Jack, so I had a professionl reason for calling on
Jack. I let him see the manuscript and he kept it a couple of days and he
returned it to Colonel Dickey with a recommendation that this political chapter
be deleted from the book on the grounds that whereas it was a fair and fairly
innocuous treatment of the problem of the Kuomintang-Communist ideological
friction, the Kuomintang would find offensive any Government publication which
recognized the existence of the Communists. Now that was unquestionably the
case, and I had not thought of that. Actually a few weeks later the theater
headquarters under General Wedemeyer brought out a directive which pro-
hibited the discussion of any political issues at all by military personnel in
China. With that amendment in the manuscript, the manuscript was cleared, I
brought it back and it was published. I would be glad to give you a copy at
some time.
Q. I don't think that will be necessary.
( ( H't'-reconl discussion.)
Q. Now, based on your knowledge of and acquaintance and association with
Mr. Service, and apart from the instance that you have just given concerning his
acute sensitivity to avoid political friction between the Kuomintang and the
Chinese Communists, would you be able to express an opinion to the Board as
to whether Mr. Service has ever to your knowledge expressed any views or in
any other way conducted himself so as to indicate that he was a Communist or
a Communist sympathizer? — A. To my knowledge Jack has never done or said
anything which would lead me to think that he was either a Communist or
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2139
favored the expansion of Communist influence and power anywhere in the world.
Jack has, in my opinion, been critical of the Kuomintang Party in the Govern-
ment of China only where he felt that those criticisms had a bearing on what the
United St:ites could do to strengthen Chinese potential as a country which would
be alined with our own in the preservation of a peaceful and progressive world.
The criticisms that he has made of China have not been different from criticisms
that many people have made, including many Chinese.
Q. Would you say, including many non-Communist Chinese? — A. Certainly.
Q. So far as your knowledge of him goes, do you have any reason to doubt
that he is an entirely loyal American citizen? — A. None whatever.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Mr. Barnett. you mentioned that you were in Shanghai, I believe at one
point, writing a book under the joint auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation
and Institute of Pacific Relations. What was your connection, the extent of
your connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations? — A. In 1937 I received a
Rockefeller Foundation fellowship to study Chinese at Yale University. I held
that fellowship for 2 years, and at the end of that period of time I was looking
for a job. I heard at that time that the Rockefeller Foundation was grant-
ing fellowships to a number of people — I don't know whether it was four or
six — but a number of people who would serve internships in the Foreign Policy
Association, the Council of Foreign Relations, and the Institute of Pacific
Relations. Two of these fellowships were to the IPR and were for 1 year. It
didn't pay very much. I think it was $1,500 a year. I got one of those two
appointments as an intern on the staff. Being an intern, I was treated as a
staff member and acted as a staff member. I wrote for the Far Eastern Survey.
As a matter of fact, I believe I wrote the first comprehensive analysis of the
Chinese industrial cooperative movement. That was a movement which had
the warmest kind of support from the fellow travelers who were keenly inter-
ested in supporting the Chinese Communist cause in this country. My analysis
happened to be very critical of the Chinese industrial cooperatives on the
grounds that it could not succeed as an economic venture because cooperatives
are too weak in an inflationary situation to be real cooperatives. They had
to be subsidized by the government or by big financial interests in order to
survive at all.
The other enterprise that I was particularly interested in was an analysis
of economic conditions in Shanghai, and my series of articles on that subject
interested the foundation, and when my internship expired the foundation found
the money to send me out to Shanghai to write the book on Shanghai.
So that was my connection with the IPR before going out. WThen I came back
from the trip to the Far East — I was not only in Shanghai but Japan and Hong-
kong and Chungking as well — I was employed by United China Relief to work
as a member of the committee, executive secretary of the program committee
of the United China Relief, and I worked in that capacity for some months,
almost a year.
Q. That was still the IPR or United China Relief?— A. United China Relief
paid my salary, but the program committee's headquarters of operation was in
the same building with Institute of Pacific Relations.
Q. About how long was your connection, such as it was, with the IPR? — A. I
would like for these purposes to consider my period of duty with the United
China Relief as being a part of my duty with the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions. That is not the case, but since the headquarters were the same. I would
like to discuss my associations with those, the United China Relief connection
the same as the Institute of Pacific Relations connection. Bearing that in mind.
I had an association with the Institute of Pacific Relations from the early fall
of 1939 until the fall of 1942.
Q. About 3 years. — A. And during that period of time I was abroad twice.
once under the Rockefeller Institute of Pacific Relations auspices, and the
second time under the United China Relief auspices only.
Q. Had you any knowledge at that time of Communist infiltration in the
IPR? — A. I was aware of course that Fred Field wrote for the New Masses and
was occasionally, I believe, a contributor to the Daily Worker. His views on
China and the Far East were in my opinion identical with those of Mr. Browder.
There were other members of the staff whose political views and prejudices
corresponded very closely to those of Mr. Field. However, during that period
of time there were on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations people who
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 42
2140 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
disagreed violently with Mr. Field. I do not like to name names but I will
in this connection, Kurt Block, i'or instance, who is now on the staff of Fortune,
agreed on practically nothing with Fred Field. Russell Shiman, who was the
editor of the Far East Survey, during that period disagreed with Fred. I dis-
agreed with Fred. The IPR had a staff during the period from 1938 to 1942,
when I ceased to have a close connection with it, which reflected practically
every prejudice in the whole spectrum of American opinion on far eastern
questions. The IPR headquarters in New York was a very stimulating place
to study far eastern questions and be exposed to expert discussion on far
eastern matters.
Q. May I interject? What I really was getting at is that you did recognize
that influence in Field's and some other staff members' writings? — A. Certainly.
Q. Did you find any similarity at any time between the views Mr. Service
was expressing and that type of view as expressed in the IPR? — A. Well, it is
very important to be exact in what you are talking about in this connection.
For instance, Field, Jaffe, and Service probably were all advocating an embargo
on shipments of scrap iron to Japan during that period of time. I would have
to document that, but I think that that is correct. But Stimson was too, and
Stimson organized an organization called the American Committee for Non-
Participation in Japanese Aggression. Literally, I mean, that was the name
of the organization. A whole missionary group supported that enterprise.
A large proportion of the business community supported the American Com-
mittee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. So did the majority of
the academic community. So a correspondence of views with Communists
during that period of time did not necessarily indicate any sympathy with
communism.
Q. Did you see anything in his writings which did? — A. In whose writings?
Q. Mr. Service's? — A. I don't think I have ever read anything of Mr. Service's
ereept what appeared in the white paper.
The Chairman. No questions? Did you have anything further?
Mr. Rhetts. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnett.
Mr. Barnett. I hope I have not taken too much of your time.
The Chairman. Not at all.
( The witness wyas dismissed. )
Mr. Rhetts. I should now like to offer for inclusion in the transcript a twro-
page affidavit signed by Col. Samuel B. GriffithJI, colonel, United States Marine
Corps, dated April 19, 1950, as document 54.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 54
Newport, R. /.; 19 April, 1950.
Statement of Col. Samuel B. Griffith, II, Colonel, United States Marine
Corps
1. I have known Mr. John S. Service since late 1935. Mr. Service came to
Peiping, China, in December of that year as as language officer at the American
Embassy. I was then a captain in the United States Marine Corps assigned to
the office of the American naval attache as a Chinese language student. During
the next two years a firm friendship, which had grown stronger with the passage
of time, was established between our families.
2. I know Jack Service intimately. My wife and I frequently visited his home
in China. We have since exchanged visits when possible. I believe that Jack
Service is an exceptionally intelligent man. and an able and conscientious Foreign
Service officer. I have every reason to believe this, and no reason whatsoever to
believe otherwise. Mr. Service has always struck me as a keen observer and a
reserved and reflective man whose opinions as to Chinese affairs based on a
thorough background knowledge, are entitled to attention and respect.
3. Mr. Service lias never given me any reason to doubt that he is a loyal
American and a devoted public servant. The idea that be could harbor "dis-
loyal" thoughts, or utter "disloyal" sentiments, or bo -pro-Communist" or in any
sense be a "poor security risk," could not be entertained by anyone who knows
him.
4. I have served nearly 5 years in China, both before and since the last war.
I have always tried to keep myself informed of the Chinese situation to the best
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2141
of my ability. After the war I bad several assignments which assisted me in
doing this: One of these was as Nanking Liaison Officer on the staff of the
Commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, Admiral Cooke. If it. is alleged that des-
patches written from China during the war, and later printed in the State De-
partment •white paper' lend credence to the charge that Mr. Service is "dis-
loyal," I would say that they reflect a keen appreciation of conditions, which
having had their inception many years ago, were readily apparent to those who
served in China after the war and who were attempting to arrive at the truth.
5. My long and intimate association with Mr. Service makes it possible for
me to state that he is too loyal to his Department and his country to obscure or
distort facts, or to render opinions not based on a realistic appraisal of those
facts, or to make recommendations not consonant with the interests of the
United States Government, of which he is, in my opinion, an outstanding
diplomatic officer of unimpeachable integrity.
Samuel B. Griffith II,
Colonel, United States Marine Corps,
Staff, Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
State of Rhode Island,
County of Newport:
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of April, A. D. 1950.
Benjamin D. Olson, Notary Public.
My commission expires June 30, 1951.
Mr. Rhetts. I would like at this time to ask the Board whether it does not
have a letter addressed to Gen. Conrad E. Snow, dated May 10, 1950, signed
Brooks Atkinson?
Chairman. The answer is yes.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask that this letter be included in the transcript
at this point as document number 97.
Chairman. It may be so included.
Document No. 97
The New York Times,
Times Square, May 10, 1950.
Mr. Conrad E. Snow,
Chairman. Loyalty Security Board
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Snow : Since I will be traveling in other parts of the country for
the next two or three weeks I am afraid I shall not be available in person for
the hearing of John S. Service. In the circumstances I wish to accept your invita-
tion, contained in your letter of March 23, to send a letter in support of him.
My association with Mr. Service was confined to the years of 1942-44 when
I was in China as war correspondent for the New York Times and he repre-
sented the State Department there. We were interested in many of the same
problems and I was closely associated with him personally and professionally.
I encountered him everywhere I went in China, placed a high value on his
ability, respected his opinions and comments and liked him personally.
Six years having elapsed since we were in China together I cannot remember
in detail our conversations and activities. But everything I know about Mr.
Service testified to his complete loyalty to the interests of the United States.
Those were war years, and I was interested primarily in everything that boi"e
on the prosecution of the war in China as it affected the United States and the
chances of a speedy victory. As an observer for the State Department, Mr.
Service doubtless had attitudes that extended beyond the war. I am not now
acquainted with them except through the quotations from his admirable and
lucid reports contained in the. State Department's published volume of China
material. But there is not the slightest doubt of his thorough loyalty to the
United States in the years that I was associated with him ; and I also think
the course of events in China since 1944 has proved the remarkable accuracy of
his analyses at that time.
Apart from his loyalty, which cannot be questioned by anyone who knows
him, I have a high regard for the quality of his work. During the time of my
association with him, he was alert, keen, indefatigable, hard-headed, and objec-
tive. My only complaint as a reporter was that Mr. Service was too punctilious
about State Department security and declined to tell me everything he knew.
He never permitted me to see classified material and was cautious and guarded
about matters that he regarded as confidential.
2142 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Since the subject of Russia has been dragged into the dispute about Mr.
Service's loyalty I suppose I must mention it. I am sure we discussed Russia,
since we must have discussed everything in one way or another, but I cannot
remember anything either one of us said. I assume from tins that nothing was
said that seemed to me in any way remarkable. In those days Russia was one
of our fighting allies and I personally hoped that relations with Russia were
going to be pleasanter after the war was over. Owing to the long lapse in time
I do not know now whether that was Mr. Service's opinion. But if it was it
would not have been disloyal to the United States. On the contrary, I should
have regarded it as evidence of his loyalty to American interests. I regarded
the Chinese Communists as people who were valuable to us because they, too,
were fighting Japan. If that was Mr. Service's attitude, as I think it was. I
should have regarded it as sound and realistic in terms of American wartime
necessities.
I have no doubt that a full investigation of Mr. Service's work and attitudes
will prove that he is a reliable, loyal, and valuable servant of the United States.
Sincerely yours,
Brooks Atkinson.
BA : cr
State of New York,
County of New York:
Sworn to before me this 10th day of May 1950.
E. LeRoy Finch,
Notani Public State of New York, residing in Suffolk Co.,
Suffolk Co. Clk's No. 62-',.
Commission expires March 30, 1951.
Mr. Rhetts. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point a two-
page latter dated April 21, 1950, addressed to Brigadier General Conrad E. Snow,
etc., and signed by Eric Sevareid, Chief Washington Correspondent, Columbia
Broadcasting System.
The Chairman. It may he so included in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document 49
Oklahoma City, Okla.. April 21, 1950.
Brig. Gen. Conrad E. Snow,
Chairman, state Department Loyalty and Security Board.
Washington, D. C.
Dear General Snow: John S. Service has told me that among the questions
raised in the review of his loyalty case is the question of his relations with
journalists in his capacity as a Department career officer dealing with policy
matters concerning the Far East. I would like, therefore, to go on record with
this statement of my own journalistic relations with Mr. Service, whom I regard
as one of the ablest diplomatic officers I have known in some thirteen years of
professional work involving very frequent contacts with department personnel
in many parts of the world.
In the summer of 1943, when I was chief Washington correspondent of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, my company sent me on a short reporting trip
to India anil China, and I was, of course, duly accredited by the War Depart-
ment's Division of Public Relations. I believe I first met Mr. Service in Chungking
in September of that year. I sought from him, as I sought from every American
authority, civilian or military, all the information I could get as to the political,
economic, and military condition of China. This was the common, day to day
practice of all responsible reporters. As I recall it, Mr. Service talked witli me
quite freely, though I do not remember him giving me any specific information
which was not at the same time commonly known to other American officials in
Chungking, and as a matter of course given by them to the accredited cor-
respondents for what was generally called their "background" knowledge
of affairs. If Mr. Service had ever given me any very special or unusual informa-
tion I think I would remember it, but I do not.
I do remember, however, once asking a small group of American officials about
a document which I had heard had been prepared as a kind of summary of the
Chinese warlords and military leaders in their various regions, together with
I heir estimated political attitudes and. I think, their estimated military strengths.
I was new to China and ignorant of the overall picture in those terms and thought
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2143
I would be better prepared to understand and report the general problem if I
could read tins paper. I have a clear recollection that Mr. Service hesitated, on
some manner of security grounds, probably because he felt the document should
be given out, for our background knowledge, only by the military authorities.
1 believe 1 was shown it, though I do not now remember by whom — it was not by
.Mr. Service — and, of course, if I used it at all, the information was never used
in any objectionable manner.
It should be remembered that Chungking was a small place; Americans, both
civilian and military correspondents all lived rather closely together, and all
felt themselves involved in a common cause. I suspect there were very few real
secrets between them of any nature. I know that various military leaders, such
as General Stilwell, and General Chennault and others, most freely answered my
questions and told me, as they told other reporters, a great many things of a
highly secret nature as far as the enemy was concerned, things involving troop
placements and future operations and so on. But this was never regarded as
an unusual procedure, there or in any American theater of war with which I
became acquainted. Nor was it unusual in Washington during the war. General
Marshall, for example, used to see a group of us every three or four months and
often told us of our military plans in considerable detail, information which
certainly would have aided the enemy, but which we were trusted to use only for
our own background guidance. So far as I know, none of that group ever violated
such a trust. Certainly Mr. Service, though he helped me to understand the
basic forces at work in China, never gave me information of as secret a nature as
that I received from the afore-mentioned general officers.
I knew all the American and foreign correspondents living in Chungking at
the time, men who were, presumably, of many differing political persuasions.
Never, at any time, from any one of them did I acquire any manner of suggestion
that Mr. Service had any allegiances except his obvious allegiance to his work
and his superiors and his government. Had he possessed any other allegiances
I am certain I would have heard some references to that, in view of the intimate
conditions in which we all lived and worked.
It was my clear impression at all times, that Mr. Service was held in highest
esteem by everyone I knew in China and India, as an unusually able and valuable
American government servant.
I was. therefore, completely surprised when he was first publicly referred
to as being under somebody's suspicion of disloyalty. Nothing that I have read
or heard concerning him since these suspicions were first put about has led me
to change my high regard for him in the slightest degree.
Sincerely yours.
Eric Sevareid,
Chief Washington Correspondent,
Columbia Broaden st in g System.
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript as
document No. 89 a 4-page affidavit dated Paris, May 2, 1950, signed by Theodore
H. White.
The Ch \iriian. It may be so included.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 89
Paris 21, RrE de Berri — 8,
May 2d, 1950.
Republic of France, City of Paris.
Embassy of United States of America, ss:
Chairman, Loyalty Security Board,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Sir: I hope you will let me bring to your attention information about Mr.
John Service which I, as a responsible citizen and one closely associated with
American Military Headquarters in China during the war, feel should be entered
on his record.
I am writing this letter in whatever confidence and trust covers the proceedings
of your board, and hope no part will be made public without my prior permission.
During the war years, I was a war correspondent accredited to Gen.
Joseph W. StilwelTs headquarters in the CBI theater, and later, after General
Stilwell's relief, accredited to those of Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer. I write
now having frequently heard General Stilwell speak of his affection and trust
2144 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in Mr. Service and knowing that were the general alive today he would certainly
stand publicly in Mr. Service's defence.
There seem to me, on reflection, to be two pertinent sets of facts that should
be placed on record.
The first concerns itself with the press policy of our command in China during
the war. I can speak on this with some degree of authority for I was President
of the Foreign Correspondents Club of China in the years 1944-1945 and this
club included all uniformed U. S. War Correspondents permanently stationed
in the theater ; and because, although it may seem immodest to say so, I was
closer to General Stilwell than any other newspapermen at the time. Mr.
Service served on General Stilwell's staff and operated within the frame of
the General's press policy.
It is difficult to recreate the atmosphere that prevailed in Chungking through-
out the war. But it was an atmosphere in which our Theater Command found
itself cramped at every turn by the unending publicity and propaganda of the
Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. Any description of the corrup-
tion, ignorance, and incompetence of the Kuomintang armies which we were
supposed to reorganize must sound now. so many years later, as slightly hys-
terical. But I know that General Stilwell and other Americans permanently
in China were driven almost to the point of desperation by the fictions emanating
from the Chinese Ministry of Information and planted in the American press.
It was to counteract these distortions of truth that General Stilwell decided
that all possible nonoperational information at his headquarters he made avail-
able to American and Allied correspondents.
General Stilwell's policy was to treat American newspapermen assigned to
him as part of his operating team, a necessary part which had to be kept
informed were the American people to be well informed. This policy of the
General pervaded his entire staff, not only its political section but its vastly
more important military section.
Most of the information we wanted was made available to us from the very-
top. I believe I do General Stilwell no dishonor when I say that he made avail-
able to American newspapermen documents marked "Secret'* and even "Top
Secret" when he thought the interests of the public information overrode the
technicalities of diplomacy. What memoranda and reports I remember seeing
attributed to Mr. Service were always made available to me by people higher
than he in the Theater hierarchy.
Such practice was current in other war areas ; it is still current in many em-
bassies and American outposts around the world. It is, within limits, a good
custom and never was it more necessary to the American press than it was in
China. It would, literally, have been impossible to ascertain or report the sim-
plest truths about the war in Asia had it not been for General Stillwell's policy.
This wise policy of treating American newsmen with confidence was con-
tinued by General Wedemeyer when he took up the command in October 1944.
A word, too, should be said about the process of classification. Many things
were classified as "Restricted," "Confidential," or "Secret," simply to keep them
out of Chinese hands. It was impossible for our government to publicly submit
a report or utter a communique which gave the flat lie to the government of
Chiang Kai-shek, our then Ally. Much matter was therefore first classified
and then made easily available to those interested or needing to know for any
public purpose. I know that sometimes excerpts of my dispatches were classified
by the Army ; I know that great bales of OWI reports on the Chinese press, with
quotations, were classified.
What information Mr. Service may or may not have given Mr. Gayn or any
other American newspapermen. I do not know. Mr. Gayn was then writing
articles for the Saturday Evening Post, as I remember; I should think it quite
normal that if he asked the Stare Department's experts on China for information
they should give him what they could; and, since information arriving from
China was classified, that they should try to conduct themselves with the same
judgment of classification that prevailed at the point of origin of the information.
I cannot remember ever, once, having heard a single detail of military opera-
tions from Mr. Service or any other member of the political staff. Usually,
they did not know military matters. Moreover, the press had direct access
to the General and his commanders for operational information. With the
political staff we traded views and ideas, and if any political information
pass( (| from them to us, it was more than balanced by political information which
we brought them in return.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2145
I should like to pass to a second set of facts: those concerning Mr. Service's
mission in China.
Early in the war. the State Department assigned to General Stilwell's staff
a number of political intelligence officers to aid him in the tricky politics of
China, whose forces we were attempting to reorganize for war against the
Japanese. Service was among these, and, like the others, was subject to mili-
tary orders and discipline.
It was under General Stilwell's orders that Service made these trips to the
Chinese frontal areas under conditions of- great hardship and personal danger,
which won him his wartime reputation as one of the ablest American agents
in the Orient. And it was under General Stilwell's orders that he was sent to
Yenan, then the Chinese Communists' headquarters, in the summer of 1944.
Mr. Service's mission in Yenan was an intelligence mission : to wriggle his
way into the confidence and affection of the Chinese Communist leaders, to
learn what they were doing, their strength, their ideas. Mr. Service speaks an
almost flawless Chinese and is, as I remember him, a man of ingratiating
personal charm. The Chinese Communists accepted him as a friend and ex-
posed through him to our government more of their thinking, then we have
ever before or since learned about any Communist group. Moreover they made
available to us combat intelligence, vital against the Japanese, which saved
numberless American lives.
It is now twelve years since I started, as a foreign corresepondent, to report
the doings of American diplomats abroad and the mechanics of our statecraft.
I have never seen a more skillful technical performance than Mr. Service's in
gaining the confidence and learning the inner workings of a potentially hostile
group.
I do not know what, specifically, Mr. Service reported to the State Department
from Yenan. But I remember long conversations with Mr. Service during those
days and I can testify that never was he carried away by the then prevalent
sweetness-and-light theory of the Chinese Communists. He saw them as hard,
cold men, vigorously seeking power. He saw them as more able, less corrupt,
more shrewd, fundamentally stronger men than Chiang Kai-shek. I submit
that this was, in retrospect, first-class reportage.
Writing now from abroad, I do not know the specific charges against Mr.
Service. I notice in press dispatches a passing reference to a meeting of his with
Tung Pi-wu of the Communist party in the United States. I do not know whether
such a meeting took place. But I do know that Tung had been sent to the U. S. A.
to represent China at the U. N. at the personal insistence of Ambassador Patrick
Hurley, on the urging of our State Department. And that Mr. Service's assign-
ment, which was to keep an eye on the Communists and learn their thinking,
would normally have pressed him to seek Tung out and chat.
It is so very difficult six years later to recall now from Paris the persons and
policies of Chungking, China, in 1944 and 1945. I have not seen Mr. Service, to
the best of my recollection, since early 1945.
Of his political views then I remember above all his devotion to what we in
America consider the basic civil liberties, his conviction that in any civil war
the faintest liberties the Chinese might hope for would die ; that such a civil war
would drive the Communists of China directly into Russian hands ; and that such
a civil war should be avoided at all cost.
I remember him personally as a fine and honest man, loyal, and devoted beyond
the trace of doubt to our Republic.
In my opinion, sir, he deserves well of it.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Theodore H. White,
Theodore H. White.
21 Rue de Berri, Paris, Seme.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this May 2, 1950, day by Theodore H. White.
s/ Imogene E. Ellis,
Imogene E. Ellis,
Vice Consul of the United States of America.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated March
28, 1950, addressed to the Honorable Dean G. Acheson, and signed by John K.
Fairbank, professor of history, Harvard University. I should say to the Board
that this letter which was addressed to the Secretary of State is not in our posses-
sion. A copy of it was furnished to us, and we have requested the Department of
State to see to it that this letter, together with the other communications relating
2146 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
to Mr. Service, of which we may have no knowledge, be furnished to the BoarcL
The Chairman. Its receipt will be verified and furnished to the reporter.
Mr. Riietts. Very well. Then I offer at this time as Document No. 66 a copy
of the letter addressed to the Secretary of State, to which I have just referred, and
ask that that be included in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 66
March 28, 1950.
The Honorable Dean G. Acheson,
The Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Acheson : Having known John S. Service over a long period and in
connection with his work in China during the war, I wish to submit my firm
conviction that he is an entirely loyal public servant who deserves the strongest
support in the effort to clear his name of recent charges of disloyalty.
I saw Mr. Service on numerous occasions in the period between October 1942
and December 1943, when I was attached to the American Embassy in Chungking
on assignment from the Office of Strategic Services and with the title of Special
Assistant to the American Ambassador. During this time I had a number of
long talks with Mr. Service, in addition to seeing him casually on a day-to-day
basis. At no time did I ever hear him express any sentiments or make any
statements which were disloyal, subversive, or anti-American in character. On
the contrary, he impressed me as having a most unusually strong concern for
the national interest of the United States. I never heard him at any time express
any belief in or attachment to Communist or Marxist doctrines. Every impression
that I formed of him was of a man thoroughly devoted to the American way of
life, to his country and its Government, and to the proper performance of his work
in the Foreign Service. I have seen Mr. Service a number of times in the years
since this period in Chungking and the above impression has been confirmed on
every occasion.
As a professional student of Chinese affairs, T have furthermore been im-
pressed with the foresight and clarity with which Mr. Service observed and
analyzed the Chinese scene, as evidenced in his writings published in the White
Paper on United States Relations with China. There is no more loyal act than a
statement to one's superiors of truths which are unpleasant for them to hear.
But since no policy founded on wishful thinking can be a safe one, Mr. Service
deserves the thanks of all patriotic American citizens for his courage in stating
the truth of the situation in China as he saw it, even though it was not at the
time and has not since been palatable to some Americans. In stating the truth as
he saw it, he performed his duty with courage; and the soundness of his
appraisal of the Chinese scene has been in my judgment amply borne out by the
record of history.
In the dire struggle in which we are unavoidably engaged against Russian
expansion in Asia, it is of the utmost importance to our national defense and
welfare that a man of Mr. Service's abilities remain available for effective
Government service in the field of his special training. I therefore feel it a
patriotic duty, and I believe many other academic specialists on the Far East
will recognize a similar duty, to testify in defense of the realistic and fearless
approach to the hard facts of our far eastern position which Mr. Service's record
represents.
Yours very sincerely,
Jonx K. Fairbank,
Professor of History, Harvard University.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated May
1. 1950, addressed to Hie Chairman of the Loyalty and Security Board and signed
by Knight Biggerstaff, professor of Chinese history, Cornell University.
The Chairman. It in y he inserted in the transcript.
Mr. Rhetts. I am asking whether you have it.
The Chairman. Oh, yes, we have it.
Mr. Rhetts. I ask that that be included in the transcript at this point as
Document 88.
The Chairman. It may he so included in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2147
223 Thurston Avenue,
Ithaca, \. Y., May 1, 1950.
Chairman, Loyalty and Sk< cuity Board,
Department of state. Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Sir: I first met John Stewart Service in 1935 or 1936 when he was
assigned to Peiping for language study by the U. S. Foreign Service.At that
time I was in Peiping doing historical research in the Palace Museum archives.
During the months we were both in Peiping I saw him frequently and was im-
pressed with his keen, inquiring mind and his desire to understand China and
the Chinese people. This, however, did not particularly surprise me because
I had earlier met his father, Roy Service, an able and devoted YMCA worker
in China.
As far as I can recall, I did not see John Service again until a few months
after I joined the Department of State in October 1944. Thereafter I saw him
occasionally in the State Department, or at the houses of friends. In prepara-
tion for and in the course of my research while a Country Specialist in the Divi-
sion <>f Territorial Studies of the State Department, I read a great many of the
reports that had been sent to the D* partment by the American p]mbassy and
Consulates in China over a period of years. Some of these reports were im-
pressive to a professor like myself not only because of the thoroughness of the
research and the breadth of observation on which they were based but also
because of the keen understanding of Chinese problems they demonstrated.
Among the best of these were a number written by John Service. In fact,
Service's reports seemed to me to be models of their kind. Referring to a mass
of information gathered from many sources, which he carefully analyzed and
considered against the background of his extensive experience in and under-
standing of China, these reports seemed to me to provide the type of objective
and thoughtful "intelligence" which is essential if our government is to have
the information required for policy decisions. In none of Servk-e's writings
that I have read, nor in any of my personal contacts with him did I ever see
the slightest evidence that he was either a Communist or an advocate of Com-
munism.
In April 1945 I left Washington for Chungking, where I spent a year on the
staff of the American Embassy. I have seen John Service only a few times since
then ; but I have never had any reason to change my favorable estimate of his
ability and integrity as a Foreign Service Officer or to question his loyalty and
devotion to his country.
Sincerely yours, [S] Knight Biggerstaff,
Knight Biggerstaff,
Professor of Chinese History, Cornell University.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated May
11, 1950, addressed to the Chairman, Loyalty and Security Board, and signed by
Phillips Talbot.
The Chairman. We have such a letter.
Mr. Riiktts. I should like to ask that that letter be included in the transcript
at this point as Document No. 96.
The Chairman. It may be so included.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 96
The University* of Chicago,
Department of Political Science,
Chicago 88, III.. May 11, 1950.
Chairman, Loyalty and Security Board,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir: It has come to my attention that Mr. John Stewart Service has
been asked to reappear before the Loyalty and Security Board. I request the
opportunity through this letter to express my personal view as to the loyalty and
character of Mr. Service.
I came to know Mr. Service well during my tours as a United States Naval
Intelligence officer in India and China from 1941 to 1945, especially from 1943
onwards when I served as Assistant Naval Attache to the United States Embassy
at Chungking. Our contacts have continued since the war, when I have been a
newspaper correspondent and student of Asian affairs.
Official duties during the wartime period gave me occasions to be informed
of analyses and recommendations presented by Mr. Service respecting some of
2148 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the very complex problems related to the conduct of the war in Asia. At times
these assessments did not agree with those expressed by other American
officials.
It was then my firm feeling, however — and it remains so today — that Mr.
Service reached his judgments on the basis of a superior intellectual grasp of the
situation and a sense of devotion to his duty and to his country. When he felt
the need to criticize, I believed, and still believe, that he so expressed himself
in order to bring about more effective American policy planning.
In my view Mr. Service showed himself an industrious, able, and highly prin-
cipled officer of the United States Government. I regarded him and continue
to regard him as a thoroughly loyal American citizen.
Yours very truly,
[s] Phillips Talbot.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to include in the transcript at this point as Docu-
ment 311 a one-page letter addressed to Brig. Gen. Conrad Snow, and so forth,
and signed by Nathaniel Peffer, professor of international relations, Columbia
University.
The Chairman. It may be so inserted.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. 311
Columbia University in the City of New York,
Department of Public Law and Government,
May 11, 1950.
Brigadier General Conrad Snow,
Loyalty Board, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir : I take the liberty of writing with reference to John S. Service.
Let me identify myself first by saying that I am a professor at this University,
that I have been concerned with studying the Far East for thirty-five years
and have lived in China many years. Further, I know John Service only
casually. I did know his mother and father years ago ; they are, incidentally,
upright, honorable, decent human beings and good Americans.
I want to speak of John Service only as reflected in his official reports which
I have read in the White Paper. From all I know of the period in China —
and I have gone over the evidence pretty carefully — I should say that they were
accurate, intelligent, and an intellectually honest analysis of China at the
time. I got back to China myself only in 194<i. Everything I saw, looking
with as much detachment as possible, confirmed what he had written.
It seems to me fantastic or a reflection of a perverted mind to see in what
he wrote evidence of communist affiliation. If what he wrote constitutes such
evidence, then nearly every American in China between 1945 and 1950 was a
communist agent — including, or perhaps putting first, George Catlett Marshall.
If you doubt that last statement, read General Marshall's statement of January
7, 1047, when he started home.
I repeat, I do not know John Service well personally, but I am confident that
in the mind of every professional student of the Far East there is nothing in
Ihe record of his views which gives any reason to believe that he was anything
but a detached observer.
I repeat that 1 think the overwhelming majority of professional students of the
Far East — diplomatic, military, commercial and academic — not only would agree
with what I have just said but shared his views as reported to the State De-
partment. Unless some evidence can be thrown up to show some direct personal
connection with Russia or the communist party, I think it is monstrously unjust
to attack this man.
Respectfully yours,
(S) Nathaniel Peffer,
Nathaniel Peffer,
p . j. p Professor of International Relations.
Mr. Rhetts. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point as
document No. 90 an open letter dated Paris, May 4, 1950, addressed to Senator
Tydings. and purporting to be signed by Joseph Alsop.
The Ohaibman. It may be so inserted.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2149
China and McCarthy
joseph alsop tells chiang story, attacks senate methods, upholds
loyalty of accused
The following is a letter to Senator Millard E. Tydings, chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating charges of Communist infil-
tration in the State Department, from Joseph Alsop:
Dear Senator Tydings: After long hesitation, I am impelled by the appalling
effects in Europe of the McCarthy witch to offer my testimony to your commit-
to', for what it may be worth.
I do so for two reasons. First, I have already sharply criticized the conduct
of our affairs in China on several occasions. Second, I was intimately involved
in the events which led to the loss of China, whereas Senators McCarthy, Wherry,
and Taft and their informants are offering second-hand evidence. This evidence
is so obviously corrupted by political and other pressures that it is a duty to
correct the impression conveyed.
Stating the case as briefly as possible, I think it fair to say that the really
crucial years in China were those when General Joseph W. Stilwell commanded
the China-Burma-India Theater, from 1942 until 1944. In this period, Profes-
sor Lattimore, who was always at best a fringe figure, played his most important
role in our China policy, as personal adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
In this rather brief assignment, he accomplished nothing, but he was quite
obviously loyal both to the American Government and to Generalissimo Chiang.
Professor Lattimore had no part whatever in the real debate about China
policy, in which the different points of view have been fantastically misrepre-
sented by Senator McCarthy and his friends. No informed person ever supposed
that offering blank checks to the National government of China would accomplish
anything. Those who advocated a strong policy of aiding the National govern-
ment only did so with the proviso that the aid given would be closely controlled
by American representatives on the spot, as it was during the short and successful
period of General Wedemeyer's command. It should be noted that the Congres-
sional advocates of postwar aid to China specifically rejected the responsibility
involved in this sort of local on-the-spot control in the first major bill appropriat-
ing funds for the purpose during General Marshall's period as Secretary of State.
Returning to the vastly more important war period, the other school of thought
was composed primarily of General Stilwell and his political advisers. General
Stilwell. so far as one could judge, was chiefly animated by his personal detesta-
tion of Generalissimo Chiang, arising from their disagreements. His political
advisers, among whom was Mr. John Stewart Service, were operating on a more
reasoned theory, however.
They asserted, first, that the National government was too feeble and cor-
rupt ever to be reformed, even with direct American help and under direct
American pressure. They said, second, that he Chinese Communists were there-
fore bound to win in the end, no matter what measures might be taken by the
United States. In the third place, they argued that the Soivet Union, insofar
as it had intervened in China at all, had given all its assistance to the regime of
Generalissimo Chiang rather than to the Communists who received no tangible
Russian aid whatever until the war was over. Fourthly, they suggested that
the Chinese Communists might be induced to declare their independence of the
Kremlin if they were treated as friends and allies by the United States.
Opening friendly relations and offering aid to the Chinese Communists was
frankly admitted, at the time, to be a bold gamble. The gamble now looks better
than it did then. On the one hand, the Yugoslav Communists, whose experience
was precisely what the experience of the Chinese Communists would have been
if they had received American aid, have now rebelled against the Kremlin. On
the other hand, the recent behavior of the Japanese Communist leader, Nosaka,
a wartime refugee at Yenan and intimate friend of Mao Tse Tung, clearly sug-
gests that the idea of independence of the Kremlin must have been in the air
in Communist China in war time.
My right to speak, if I may be said to have a right to speak, derives from the
fact that in wartime I was one of the chief American opponents of the school
of thought I have summarized above. As a member of the staff of the American
Volunteer Group, as chief of the lend-lease mission to China, and finally as an
assistant to Dr. T. V. Soong, I did everything in my power to present the pro-
Nationalist point of view in influential quarters in Washington. Those who
wished to develop an American policy of friendship toward and aid to the Chinese
2150 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Communists were finally and decisively defeated with the dismissal of General
Stilwell, in October 1944. This occurred many months after I had finally suc-
ceeded in getting into uniform, as amember of General C. L. Chennault's staff
in the Fourteenth Air Force. But although I had long before become a mere
junior officer in the Air Force, the effect of my letters ot Harry L. Hopkins and
the other representations I had made was acknowledged by implication in Gen-
eral Marshall's first instructions to General Wedemeyer.
These are, so to speak, my credentials. Having known the situation in war-
time China far more intimately than any of the pro-McCarthy witnesses you have
yet heard, I think it my duty to say that while I disputed the judgment, I never
had the faintest doubt of the loyalty of any of the American officials or others
whom McCarthy attacked. They were serving the United States to the best of
their ability, with courage and fidelity. This should be sufficient to protect them
from the kind of vulgar attack McCarthy has made, even if their judgment was
incorrect.
Although our views clashed so sharply, I was particularly well acquainted
with Mr. Service. To the best of my knowledge, although I thought then and
think now that he was gravely in error, he was a most conscientious and decent
American public servant. It is difficult, of course, to offer hard evidence to
support such contemporary impressions. But I may cite one fact, at least, to
show how erroneous it can be to judge situations from the viewpoint of a later
time. Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace has been, in effect, a pliable
stooge for the American Communist party for more than two years. From
this, many people have inferred that Wallace was a Communist stooge in war-
time. In fact, however, nothing could have been more contrary to the party
line in wartime than to urge the dismissal of General Stilwell, yet Wallace recom-
mended the dismissal of Stilwell and his replacement by Wedemeyer in a tele-
gram from China to President Roosevelt in the late spring of 1944. Incidentally,
the telegram was sent with the full knowledge of Mr. John Carter Vincent, who
entered no protest whatever, although he too has been under attack as a Com-
munist stooge,
In conclusion, there are two points which I feel I must make. First, I do not
think I was wrong in opposing the policy of gambling on winning the friend-
ship of the Chinese Communists and iudusing them to declare their independence
of the Kremlin. I do not think I was wrong, simply because I and the others
who took the same view could not possibly foresee that when this policy of
winning the friendship of the Chinese Communists had been defeated with the
dismissal of General Stilwell, there would be a long period after the war during
which we had no China policy at all. None of the men now under attack by
Senator McCarthy had any important responsibility, to my knowledge, for this
singular hiatus. Speaking for myself, if I could have foreseen that the only
alternative to a policy of gambling on the friendship of the Chinese Communists
was a kind of vacuum of policy, I should have been on the other side in the
struggle in China. The gamble on the Chinese Communists, although unneces-
sary, in my opinion, was at least a reasonable gamble, such as could be reason-
ably advocated by entirely loyal Americans.
Second, I should like to suggest to your committee that if the test of loyalty
is following the line of the Communist party, you had much better launch an
investigation of Senators McCarthy, Wherry, and Taft than an investigation
of Messrs. Baltimore, Service, and Vincent. Let the test be a tabulation of the
key votes on the three Senators above-mentioned on the great postwar measures
of foreign policv. and especially of their votes on key amendments by which
bills can be nullified. Unless I am gravely mistaken, such a tabulation will
show that these three Senators, and most of the others who have joined them
in the present clamor, have voted the straight Communist party line on every
major issue of foreign policy, as laid down in The Daily Worker, ever since
the end of the war. If temporary agreement with the party line is to be made
the test of loyalty, let these men lie called to the liar, to explain their records.
In summary. I do not attempt to excuse or palliate the grave American mis-
takes in China, which I have often before denounced, but I submit that we
may as well abandon all hope of having honest and courageous public servants,
if mere mistakes of judgment are later to be transformed into evidences of dis-
loyalty to the state. And I submit further that the members of the Senate
who are now persecuting these men who made, as I think, mistakes in China,
have far more to explain, excuse, and rationalize in their own records, I still
believe that the loss of China was unnecessary, but I flunk it far more im-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2151
portant thai we should not destroy the decent traditions of American political
life. These now seem to he endangered.
Very sincerely yours,
Joseph Alsop.
Paris. May J,. 1950.
Mr. Rhetts. That is the end of the documents I have to offer at this
point.
The Chairman. It is now 5:30 and I think we can adjourn until
10 tomorrow.
(The Board adjourned at 5 : 30 p. m.)
Exhibit 18
service
1. 5-14-42. Chungking.
Two memos.
The first is solely report to Con. Gen. of conversation.
Second is a similar report but with some interpretive comment, which
is factual and does not reveal bias.
Subject of both memos is the "Chinese Industrial Cooperatives."
2. 7-24-42. Chungking.
Despatch (called for) on propaganda and psychological warfare by
Chinese Gov't. Generally factual and detailed. Received commenda-
tion from Dep't. Repeats some communist criticism of Chinese
Government organs, which was probably accurate, as commies have
generally been perceptive and keen as critics of others, even when
(and especially when) thev were guilty of the same things, or worse.
3. 1Z23-43,
Memo praperad in Dep't. A key document. This is a thoughtful and
well-written memo pointing to the clanger of impending civil war
in China, from both military and political standpoints. While it
relays, perhaps somewhat naively, certain communist suggestions
for bettering the situation, it does not recommend that the sugges-
tions be accepted and followed up. On the contrary, it recommends
that U. S. officials be detailed to the communist-held areas to provide
the answers to a number of questions concerning the communists
and conditions in the area they hold. There was obviously no intent
to influence the Government along pro-communist lines, for the au-
thor complains that such information as is available stemmed in part
from journalists '"who appear to have a bias favorable to the com-
munists." And he warns against any brief visits during which our
representatives "would be under the influence of official guides."
4. 2-11-43.
Inner-departmental memo drafted by S. and Smyth. Repeats briefly
warning of unfavorable course of events in China and points out that
"one possible course of action" might be sending U. S. representatives
to Communist areas. Warns that Chinese Gov't, will probably not
sanction this, but will be resentful if it is done without its consent.
5. 8-6-43.
Despatch from Lanchow. Called for report on Gold Market and Trad-
ing. Purely factual. No political implications.
6. 8-6-43. Lanchow.
Reporting experience of an American agricultural expert. Completely
non-political. Points out exaggerated hopes for Chinese government
organs for U. S. aid and tendency to enlist that aid even when they
have no real need for it.
7. 8-16-43. Lanchow.
Reporting forced organization of professional people in Lanchow, for
purposes of extortion and political supervision. Unsparing of Party,
but factual. Essentially non-political.
8. 8-17-43. Lanchow.
On evidences of anti-Russian and anti-communist feeling in Chinese
officialdom. Seems to be purely factual. In describing the restric-
tions placed upon the local Soviet consul, Service was perhaps unaware
that this sort of treatment had been accepted general practise in the
Soviet Union for at least a decade. Nevertheless, despatch contains
no statement condemning Chinse Gov't for this treatment.
2152 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
9. 8-17^43. Lanchow.
Service states that Soviet diplomatic representative has been very
friendly to himself and to Capt. Tolstoy "and has been willing to
discuss general problems with an openness and apparent frankness
rather unusual for our Russian colleagues." Otherwise, report con-
tains no independent comment by Service, and is restricted to a re-
counting of the views expressed by the Soviet representative.
10. 8-18-43. Lanchow.
Military notes. Purely factual. Describes deplorable state of Chinese
troops passing through city, and brutality with which they were
treated ; but description is impassive, and without independent
comment.
11. 8-18-43. Lanchow.
A report on political unrest and banditry in Kansu. Little relation to
communists. Report is detailed and factual.
12. 8-19-43.
Embassy at Chungking refers in a despatch to certain of Service's re-
ports. No comment on communists involved. Service speculates
on Chinese government's plans with respect to communists. No bias
apparent.
13. 8-20-43. Lanchow.
On reception of U. S. broadcasts in Kansu. Factual and objective.
14. 8-20-43.
A long report on activities of local Chinese police with regard to foreign-
ers : restrictions of movement, observation, curiosity, suspicion, etc.
Speaks of Chinese police using "Russian treatment of aliens as a
model."
114. 9-10-43. Stilwell mission.
Reporting statements made to Stilwell by Chinese (Nationalist) General,
obviously sympathetic to communists. No independent comment.
Views expressed by General are somewhat similar to those expressed
by Service in item 3.
116. 9-23-43. Chungking.
Two interpretative memos by Service concerning Eleventh Plenary Ses-
sion of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
The memos subject the decisions of the gathering to a searching and
skeptical scrutiny, but the conclusions were borne out by subsequent
events.
(Note — these memos should be compared with communist publicity
at the time.)
117. 9-29-43. Chungking. Stilwell.
Describes the circumstances of the withdrawal of the communist repre-
sentative from a meeting of the People's Political Council, as repre-
sented bv a communist source. Service adds no comment of his own.
118. 10-27-43. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo asserting, and stating reasons why Chinese public opinion will
be offended if Burma campaign is not soon inaugurated. No apparent
relation to communist problem.
119. 10-28-43. Chungking. Stilwell.
Describes the bickering and bad blood between the Government and
the minority groups over the composition of the Committee for the
Establishment of Constitutional Government. Report is objective
and describes the Committee as "not a bad one" : but states that "it
is a rather unfortunate omen that the committee is storting its exist-
ence with a background of petty and acrimonious politics."
120. 11-13-43. Stilwell. (Military report).
Report on "willingness of Chinese Military leaders to become puppets."
An important memo, which should be compared with communist line
of the same period. Service rejects the communist thesis that the
Kuomintang was encouraging defection to the Japanese-occupied area
in order to improve their prospects for combating the communists after
the war. Says this is the result rather than the design. Says large-
scale defections are due primarily to Chiang's policy of placing in
front line war-lord forces which are of doubtful loyalty to himself
and which, being mercenaries from the beginning, are naturally
amenable to Japanese promises of better pay and treatment.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2153
121. 2-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Unimportant. Relaying of report that airport construction is causing
discontent in a certain district.
122. 2-3-44.
Memo from Kuomintang source about conspiracy against Chiang. Ques-
tions Kuomintang tendency to blame communists.
123. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Also about plot against Chiang. Adduces further proof that plot ex-
isted, and that is was an inner-army affair.
124. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
A further report about the dissatisfaction caused by airport construction
and Government's policies concerning compensation to land owners
and conscription of labor. Factual.
125. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Giving background on certain feelers for direct negotiations between
Government and communists. Factual. Reflects, like all of this re-
porting, good contacts in the communist camp.
126. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting information released to correspondent by Government on ex-
tent of Jap-controlled area. Points out that Government spokesman
listed certain communist-controlled areas as entirely Jap-controlled,
evidently communist domination the more humiliating. Service points
to this as indication of bitterness now existing between two factions.
127. 2-16-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting interview with Madame Sun-yat-sen. Factual.
12S. 3-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Further report, detailed and objective, on Chinese unrest in Chengvu
arising out of construction of U. S. air bases. It is evident that Chinese
officials somewhere along the line are pocketing funds appropriated for
compensation of conscripted labor, knowing that resulting bitter-
ness will attach largely to Americans ; but Service does not charge this
directly.
129. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Commentary on a report submitted by an OWI official from Kweilin..
Contains following significant passage :
"The war in China has stimulated political consciousness to the
point where loose separatism, which is the goal of the provincialists
and which will mean a return to the chaos of the early years of the
Republic, is impossible. By present indications it does not seem
likely that the existing Kuomintang Government will collapse dur-
ing the war. But if the present conflict is followed, as does seem
likely, by civil war * * * out of this civil war * * * there
can be expected to emerge either a more progressive Kuomintang
Government or a communist state, probably of the present modi-
fied Chinese communist type."
130. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Another interview with Madame Sun Yat-sen. Purely factual. No in-
dependent comment.
131. 3-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
An excellent analysis of T. V. Soong's position — thoughtful and objec-
tive^— acknowledged with special commendation by the Department.
132. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Commentary on another personal incident in the Chiang entourage. Ex-
tremely moderate in tone, ending with the suggestion that "the real
importance of this story, and of the many similar ones regarding the
misdoings of the Soong-Kung family, is the readiness of the public
to believe them."
133. 3-13-44. Military.
Review of second edition of Chiang's book— "China's Destiny." Points
out changes since first edition. Severely critical of book ("a bigoted.
narrow, strongly nationalistic effort at a special interpretation of his-
torv") — says that it reflects "unchanged a bitter anti-communist
bias."
134. 3-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on Chinese Territorial Claims in North Burma. Detailed, au-
thoritative, analytical. "Chiang may have great ambition and vi-
sion. But his statesmanship does not ordinarily go far beyond
shrewd, realistic, but often short-sighted bargaining."
2154 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY IXYESTIGATTO
135. 3-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on the rumored plan to reduce China's armies. Service i
tical about this.
"China remains a country where life is valued very little, - iere
corruption is deep-rooted and prevalent, where economics have been
consistently ignored or not understood, where power derives from
military strength and that strength is measured in numbers, where
the interests and welfare of the people have not (except, perhaps
in Communist North China) been a concern of their rulers and
where the basic, overriding consideration is the struggle for power.*'
136. 3-20-44. Military.
Discusses incident of bombing of Chinese forces in Sinkiang, obviously
by planes having something to do with the Soviet Union. Reflects a
certain naivete about Soviet Union in assumption that Soviet Ka-
zakhs might have taken initiative in Sinkiang and that Soviet Gov-
ernment might have been "willing to lend a little unofficial assistance."
137. 3-23-44. Military.
Reporting views of Chiang Kai-shek; critical of Chiang's attitude but
offers explanation for it. Concludes Chiang is responsible for situa-
tion in China and will continue in his present ways until the U. S.
formulates and applies a strong China policy. Analysis appears ob-
jective and unbiased. (Chiang mentions Amerasia.)
138. 3-22-44. Military.
More about bombing incident in Sinkiang. Warns against U. S. in-
volvement, particularly if we want to run convoy through that area.
139. 4-5-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
More on bombing incident. Without particular interest.
140. 3-26-44. Military.
Transmitting report prepared by Englishman who had been residing
in communist area.
141. 4-4-44. Military.
Memorandum. Miscellaneous news items. Purely factual.
142. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Chungking Embassy despatch transmitting memo on situation in
Sinkiang. Specially commended by Department. Objective analysis
of Chinese Nationalist Government's motives in the Sinkiang incidents
and the success of the move. Service's recommendations include :
"We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in
Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a
careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular sup-
port of the ( iiinese communists. But in determining our policy
toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The
initiative must be kept firmly in our hands." * * * "Chiang un-
wittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia
by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present
form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight
to Russia. By doing so, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not
only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as
Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets."
143. 4-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Tranmistting text of an interview with General Lung Yun. No com-
ments.
144. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo reporting views held by leaders of some of the minor parties of
China. Service's comments relate only to the relative importance of
these minor parties and are purely factual.
145. 5-18-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Service's critique of a Military Intelligence Despatch. Objectively
points out fallacies in the MI despatch. Outlines activities of Na-
tionalist Government in attempting to discredit the Communists in a
purely factual manner. Makes three points: 1) that there is a
fundamental conflict between Communists and Japanese and puppets;
2) Knomintang is attempting to convince foreign opinion that Com-
munists are in league with Japs and puppets; 3) that Knomintang
actually is in contact with Japs and expects puppet support. Justi-
fies his points factually. (Rated Very Good in Department.)
ATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2155
0 14. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on plan r<> being Chinese-Amerieau tecbnieiana to China. States
objections to plan factually. Totally nonpoliticnl.
14", ...20-14." Chungking. StilweH.
Memo offering possible drawbacks to U. S. Army plan to pay benefits
to families of Chinese soldiers killed in Burma. Nonpolitical.
148. 51-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo recounting rumors of domestic trouble in the Chiang Household.
Factual reporting.
14S>. 5-11-44. Military.
Transmitting a speech of Chou En-Lai : summary without comment.
150. 5-12-44. Military.
Memo on effects of Japanese victories in Honan. States objectively
various interpretations which will be placed upon this in Chinese
circles.
151. 5-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Military
Transmitting translation of statement of League of Democratic Parties.
Summary without comment.
152. 5-25-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Recounting views of Lin Tsu-han, Chairman of Yenan Border Govern-
ment. Presented without comment.
153. 5-25-44. Military.
Transmitting information on the status of communist negotiations with
the Central Government as received from the communists. Presented
without comment.
154. 5-31-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Factual account of an interview with Counselor of French Delegation
at Chungking. Reported without comment of political nature.
155. 6-9-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo of interview with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, presenting Marshal's
views without comment as to their validity. Purely factual.
156. 6-7-44. Military.
Presentation of the views of David An on Chinese Tratment of Koreans.
Reported without comment or interpretation.
157. 6-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Important memo, widely circulated with favorable comment in Depart-
ment. Strong denunciation of the weakness, corruption and venality
of Kuomintang. Apparently written partly from exasperation
at the Nationalist Government but criticism appears to be justified.
Only political bias visible is that of American official trying to turn
China into an asset to the American war effort. Encourages Ameri-
can contact with communists as with other minor parties and liberal
elements to stimulate the Kuomintang to a reform program. No
interest displayed in Communism as a movement in itself. Contact
with communists areas desirable from an intelligence standpoint in
the war effort. * * * "We should select men of known liberal
view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations and other lines of
work in China."
158. 6-23-44. Military.
Memo of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and V. P. Wallace,
J. C. Vincent, Gen. Ferris, Owen Lattimore and JSS. Factual account.
159. 6-24-44. Military.
Reporting communist agreement to the sending of a U. S. "observers'
section" to Yenan. Objective report of communist views on the mat-
ter, presented without bias or comment.
160. 7-6-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on communist map showing contraction of communist-held terri-
tory. Service cites contemporary Central Government map which
contradicts Communist claim. Illustrates distortions of Central Gov-
ernment map and comments that communist map may not be more
than generally true and may not give whole picture. Objective, with-
out political coloration.
161. 7-11-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo transmitting a report from communist sources on communist
military operations against Japan during May 1944. Relayed with-
out evaluation although several Japanese news items are submitted
in conjection with the report as some possible confirmation of com-
munist claims. No political implications.
68970— 50— pt. 2 43
2156 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
162. 7-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo transmitting a personal letter from Chinese intellectual express-
ing disillusionment with present Chinese regime and hopes of con-
structive American aid. JSS feels letter reflects present state of
mind of large part of Chinese intellectuals and liberals. Objective
presentation, pointing out strength as well as weakness of viewpoint.
163. 7-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Transmitting a statement of Chinese intellectuals "Appeal for Revolu-
tionary Democratic Rights." Covering memo indicates approval of
intellectuals' denunciation of Kuomintang suppression of freedom of
speech, thought, study and expression.
164. 8-26-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Yenan.
Memo of first impressions of Yenan. Is highly favorable in comparison
with Kuomintang-held areas. "There is a bit of smugness, self-
righteousness and conscious fellowship" * * * but "most modern
place in China." "What is seen in Yenan is a well-integrated move-
ment, with a political and economic program which it is successfully
carrying out under competent leaders. * * * One cannot help
coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful and that
it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people
that it will not easily be killed." Service understandably favorably
impressed by comparison between Yenan and Kuomintang areas in
matter of material conditions, morale, and efficiency.
165. 8-26-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Memo of conversation with Mao Tse-Tung in Yenan in which Mao
sounded Service on the possibility of opening an American consulate in
Yenan. Factual reporting.
166. 9-1-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Transmitting reports of interviews with various Chinese communist
leaders. Factual.
167. 9-1-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Transmitting report of interview with Chief of Chinese General Staff.
Factual account of diametrical opposition of views between com-
munists and National Government.
168. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Important memo outlining Service's interpretation of communist motives.
Inclines to think the best of communists. Offers arguments in op-
position to this attitude but explains why he does not feel the oppos-
ing arguments are justifiable. Believes the CCP aims for orderly
prolonged progress to eventual socialism, not violent revolution, and
in achieving that aim will not seek an early monopoly of political
power but considers first the long-term interests of China. Service
shows a certain naivete in his grasp of Marxist doctrine and ignorance
of some changes incorporated in that doctrine during and after Lenin's
time. e. g., that capitalist development is an unavoidable stage of
economic development. Service believes the CCP will initiate (or had
initiated) a type of NEP program which will last indefinitely into the
future — ignoring or ignorant of the fate of NEP in the USSR. Ap-
pears to be an objective analysis of the situation. (The conclusions
appear to be what might be expected from one judging on the basis
of Chinese experience only, not with reference to experience with
communist seizures of power elsewhere.) The Chungking Embassy
takes issue with Service's views that the CCP is not aiming for a
monopoly of power in the near future.
169. 8-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo reporting on economic conditions in communist-controlled North
Shensi. Tone is favorable toward achievement but information is
presented in factual manner without comment.
170. 9-19-44. Chungking Observer Section in Yenan.
Memo on ('Inch Fang J Hi Pao, communist newspaper in Yenan. Sub-
mitted without comment save that the paper was well edited and of
high caliber. Unimportant.
171. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
.Memo summarizes lectures given by the Communist General, Chief of
Staff of 18th Group, to officers of United Slates Army Observers Section
regarding the situation behind the enemy lines in North China.
Service comments only on the fact that the communist army is a
political army as much as it is military. Factual.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2157
17:2. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report designating communist-controlled areas of China. No political
comment.
173. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting report of a reception given the Observers Section. No
political comment. Unimportant.
174. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on communist charges against General Yen Hsi-shan. Details
given factual without apparent bias.
175. 7-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Reporting on inauguration of daily news broadcasts from Yenan,
Purely factual.
176. S-24-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting map of communist border area. No comments.
177. 9-28-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Well conceived analysis of the strength of the communist movement with
the recommendation that American military aid be extended to the
Communist forces, to aid in the struggle against Japan. Service
expects the Kuomintang will object to such aid and stated the United
States must soon formulate a policy to decide the question of this
aid. keeping in mind that "the nature, policies, and objectives of the
CCP are of vital long-term concern to the United States" ; the "CCP
under any circumstances must be counted a continuing and important
influence in China." Arguments in favor of extending aid are pre-
sented factually. The interview with Mao transmitted with this
despatch indicates Service's views regarding the question of United
States relationship with the CCP parallel to a certain extent those of
Mao himself. Service specifies his reasons.
178. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lecture by communist military leader on strength, distribution,
and arms of Communist forces. Factual account.
179. 10-13— 44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lectures by communist military leader on operations of 8th
Route Army. Factual account without comment other than to point
out the importance the communists attach to political programs as
the basis of their military strength and success.
180. 9-29—44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on possible usefulness of old communist bases in Southeast China.
Objective account of facts.. Specifies in connection with communist
reasoning on matter that "it would be a mistake to assume that the
communist consideration of the problem is all on the high-minded
and unselfish plane." No political bias apparent.
181. 10-2-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo on personal impressions of communist leaders. Highly favorable
of the personal qualities of these men. (Strikingly like the impres-
sions of the old Bolsheviks which foreign observers acquired at the
time of the Russian Revolution.) Service's favorable attitude obvi-
ously in part stems from the contrast with Kuomintang leaders.
Apparently unaware of the potential dangerousness of the type of
character molded in the communist school, especially when the CCP
holds the reins of power. Objective in all.
182. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on the popular appeal of the communist party. Outlines tactics
employed by the Communists which win popular support, i. e., reduced
rents, elimination of banditry, popular election of officials, and con-
verting the army from instrument of oppression to one of aid to
peasantry. Service views the accomplishments with favor tempered
with reserve. Can find no other explanation of popular backing of
the communists.
(NB. Service apparently considers "democracy" as synonymous
with popular support, a definition which would apply to Hitler's
regime as well. On basis of this definition, Service's opinion that
the CCP is democratic is justifiable.)
2158 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
183. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Extremely well-balanced report on the development of communist politi-
cal control in areas under their domination. (Rated Excellent in
Department.) Report is well-rounded, presents a factual picture and
appears to be very perceptive in divining the purpose of communist
actions in many fields. Explains both how the communist program
wins popular support and at the same time serves communist interests.
No political bias evident and no effort to condemn or praise. Factual
reporting. (Should be noted that CA's comments in Department on
Service's reporting consistently put communist in quotation marks,
implying something distinct from the Soviet brand. No evidence of
this attitude has yet appeared in any of Service's work.)
184. 10-9-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Reports decision of CCP to change its name in foreign publicity to avoid
the stigma of "communism." Service interprets it as a desire '.'to
allay any foreign fears and to win foreign good-will." No political
comment otherwise.
185. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting communist views on treatment of Japan. No comment
made but appears to be evident that Service accepts sincerity of com-
munist spokesman and feels views expressed are honest aims of CCP.
186. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Interview with CIC of communist military forces. Service states, "I
am in general agreement with the views expressed by such com-
munist leaders as Gen. Chu. Every effort, however, has been made
to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to point out the practical
difficulties in the way of direct cooperation and to suggest that Japan
may be defeated in other ways than as the communists insist, a slow-
process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland." Chu's views
followed the usual pattern that cooperation with the Kuomintang was
impossible and U. S. strong role necessary in China.
187. 9-2'M4. CI ungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report of interview with Hungarian national. No political content.
188. 9-23-44. Yenan.
Memo on the orientation of the Chinese communists toward the USSR
and toward the U. S. Key document. Essentially, reasons that CCP
orientation is exclusively pro-China. Ties with the USSR are of the
past. Interests of the CCP are best served by cultivating ties with
the U. S. which can aid the industrialization of China. USSR can't
and China can't do it alone. Service states, "I believe that the Chinese
Communists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the
basis of American support. This does not preclude their turning back
toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive Amer-
ican-supported Kuomintang attack." Service's account appears to be
an eminently fair statement of communist views as evident at that
time — his conclusions, a reasoned choice between the lesser of two
evils. Reveals ignorance of some of the finer points of communist
doctrine, particularly in regard to the manner in which Marxism is to
be anlied outside the USSR.
189. 10-1-44. Yenan.
Transmission of communist newspapers. No comments.
190. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo on communist success in eliminating banditry. Cites communist
explanation for this situation — economic improvement, mobilization
of entire population in the war effort and removal of feudal basis of
banditry — as only apparent explanation for its elimination. Objective
reporting.
191. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Reports of impressions of American medical officer and several foreign
correspondents <>n popular support in communist areas. Presented
without comment.
192. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Transmission of memos on conditions in communist areas and on Com-
munist-Kuomintang relations. Service's observations are, that the
communists arc fighting the Japanese, successfully because they have
the people behind them mobilized. Mobilization based on economic,
political and social revolution, gains of which the people will fight to
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2159
keep. Kuomintang will be unable to repress these mobilized people
or the communists as long as the latter have popular support. Com-
munists will continue to be important part of China's future and
unless Kuomintang institutes extensive reforms (unlikely) Commu-
nists will be dominant force in China in a few years. Service's obser-
vations have been borne out by subsequent events.
li»3. 10-10-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Important memo on need for realism in U. S. relations with Chiang.
Anti-Chiang, not pro-communist. Holds Kuomintang dependent on
U. S., U. S. not dependent on Kuomintang. We do not need it mili-
tarily, we do not need to fear its opposition or fall or its international
importance. Chiang does not represent pro-American or democratic
groups, we owe him no gratitude and he understands only force. Need
hard-boiled policy toward him to aid U. S. war effort. Only reference
made to communists is that "we cannot hope to solve China's problems
without consideration of the opposition forces, Communist, Provincial
and liberal." Service's denunciation is strong but based exclusively
on the urgency of aiding the American war effort in the Pacific. No
indication of political bias towards any faction, only against Kuo-
mintang corruption and power politics. A tendency to underplay
usefulness of Kuomintang to the U. S. war effort and discount any
worth in the movement.
194. 10-10-44. Yenan.
Memo on communist interception of State Department radio bulletin.
No political comments.
195. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Memo on present communist attitude toward relations with Kuomintang.
Service displays great insight into tactics of communists in increas-
ing demands as the situation turns more in their favor. Reveals acute
observation and understanding of the power politics involved. No
personal comments of political nature appended.
196. 10-15-44. Yenan.
Memo regarding censorship of escape stories coming out of communist
territory. Unimportant.
197. 10-17-44. Yenan.
Memo transmitting the published policies and administrative program
of the CCP. No comments.
198. 10-18-44. Yenan.
Memo on communist propaganda use of statements of foreign corre-
spondents. Deplores the extravagant statements made by some prom-
ising American aid to the communists, but comments on the fact
that many correspondents have been converted to a procommunist
attitude. Unimportant.
199. 10-21-44. Yenan.
Transmitting communist newspapers. No comments.
200. 11-8-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views
on Japanese communists. Appears to be purely factual information.
Service states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese
communists, apparently out of Yenan to Chungking for relay else-
where. No elaboration.
201. 11-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service on Washington consultation. Views on prob-
able developments in North China in the event of a U. S. landing.
States that communists will cooperate with allied troops as long as
allies do not interfere with their politics. Will not allow military
considerations to prejudice their political program. Service suggests
however "that it would be well to put out a rather large number of
U. S. officers," since the communist area is decentralized. Chiefly
factual evaluations.
202. 11-8-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service while on Washington consultation. Predomi-
nantly factual information. Service states "China's first need is eco-
nomic development, and U. S. must do it. Russian help would divide
China but U. S. will unite them." * * * "Chinese communists are
not radical at present. They are still Marxists, but are against sub-
jectivism. Marxism points to ideal socialism." Little political
comment.
2160 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
203. 2-12-45. Chungking— for Wedemeyer.
Military only.
204. 2-14-45. Chungking — for Wedemeyer.
Memo on military weakness of our Far Eastern policy. States recom-
mendations to aid communists parallel Churchill's policy in Yugo-
slavia, aiding the faction which would assist most in the war effort.
Support of Chiang is only a means to an end but we tend to confuse
the means with the end. We must clarify issue to restore our primary
objective, defeat of Japan with smallest possible loss of life. Well-
constructed analysis of situation.
205. 2-14-45. Chungking.
Recount of the current status of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations.
Purely factual reporting.
206. 2-16-45. Chungking.
Views of Russian ofhYials in China. No comments.
207. 2-17-45. Chungking.
Memo on Kuomintang hopes to make a deal with Russia. Service's opin-
ions are contradicted by later events but analysis is interesting. Feels
USSR will not deal with Kuomintang in view of its decided objections
to the regime, no likely quid pro quo exists and besides Chinese Com-
munists are stronger than Kuomintang. Unaware that USSR would
be willing to sacrifice interests of a local Communist party for Soviet
interests.
208. 2-17-45. Chungking.
View of Sun Fo. No comments or analysis.
200. 2-10-45. Chungking.
Memo on Chinese feelers regarding Formosa. Purely factual.
210. 2-28-45. Chungking.
Criticism of proposal to declare Shanghai an open city. Military interest
primarily. Good analysis. No political application.
211. 2-28-45. Chungking.
Views of Captain (Joseph) Alsop. Diametrically opposed to Service's
opinions. Alsop argued on the line that U. S. long-range interests
were more important than the immediate ones of winning the war ;
that long-range interests involved allying China on our side as a
balance against Soviet influence— our greatest threat — and destruction
of the Chinese communists. Believed in necessity of getting involved
in the inevitable civil war which would follow from U. S. complete
backing of Kuomintang against communists.
212. 3^-45. Chungking. Military.
Request to visit Yenan. No political coloration.
213. 3-21-45. Chungking.
Memo of communist attitude toward Central Government. Notes change
in CCP attitude toward U. S. cooperation in China and possibility of
cooperation wtih Kuomintang. Service notes this change dates from
Stilwell's departure. Communist expansions southward followed be-
lief that U. S. would support only Chiang. Notes communists seem to
be expecting large-scale Japanese activity in North China and are get-
ting out of way of these Japanese efforts to consolidate on mainland.
Communist determination to control China proper growing.
214. 3-13-45. Yenan.
Views of Mao Tse-tung. Factual reporting. Opinions similar to those
expressed in earlier papers.
215. 3-14-45. Yenan.
Memo on communist expectations of Soviet aid and participation in the
Pacific war at a late date. Probable course of military tactics to be
followed by communists. Notes that communists will strive to gain
control of Manchuria, that they have already infiltrated the area, be-
cause (if its industrial importance. ( Feeling that CCP did not expect
CSSR to strip Manchuria, as CCP intended to have benefits of its
industrial potential.) Factual analysis.
216. 3-16-45. Yenan.
Transmission of communist views regarding Sinkiang. Relayed without
comment.
217. 3-16-45. Yenan.
Communist views on Mongolia. Transmitted without comment.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2161
218. 3-16-45. Yenan.
Policy of the Chinese communists toward the problem of national
minorities. Service states that while communists claim their pro-
gram is based on Sun Yat-sen's, in actuality it is based directly
on that of the Russian communists (from whom Sun got most of his
ideas). Service feels that some of these ideas (Stalin's "Marxism
and National Question") may be unworkable in China because some
of China's minority nations exist closes to other strong states and
because China is weaker than Russia was at time of 1917 revolution.
219. 3-17-45. Yenan.
Communist plans for a relief and rehabilitation organization in com-
munist liberated areas. No comments. Purely factual.
220. 3-17-45. Yenan.
Evidence to substantiate communist claims as to the extent of terri-
tory under their control. American observers evidence. No political
comment. Purely factual reporting.
221. 3-19-45. Yenan.
Comments on communist report of Kuomintang exile government organi-
zations in parts of China. Analysis of moves shows no political bias.
Factual reporting.
222. 3-20-45. Yenan.
Transmitting information regarding dealings of Chinese Central Gov-
ernment military officials with the Japanese. No political coloration
evident.
223. 3-21-45. Yenan.
Memo on Chiang Kai-shek's treatment of the Kwangsi Clique. Decid-
edly critical of Chiang's activities. Service's interpretation not
necessarily accurate — CA disputes some points. Memo involves no
mention of our references to communist movement. Factual
reporting.
224. 3-22-45. Yenan.
Significance of personnel appointments made by Chiang. Service in-
terprets these appointments are signs that Chiang is preparing for
civil war with the communists, rather than peaceful cooperation.
Factual.
225. 3-23-45. Yenan.
Memo on contact between the Chinese communists and Moscow. Service's
interpretation is good. Gives known facts and distinguishes between
governmental contacts and contact between communist parties. Ap-
pears to be a realistic view of situation. Service feels communists
probably do not have relations with Soviet Government but contact
between the Soviet CP and the Chinese is likely to exist.
226. 4-1-45. Yenan.
Statement of communist policy to be adopted by the communist con-
gress as given by Mao and other leaders. Offered without political
observations other than to point out high-lights.
227. 3-18-45. Yenan.
Memo on establishment of unified labor organizations and women's
groups for the communist liberated areas. Factual account with com-
ment that this step constituted a direct challenge to the Central Gov-
ernment, almost bringing the future conflict into the open. No political
bias evident.
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
Date : Tuesday, May 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12 : 30 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reported by : E. L. Koontz, court stenographer.
Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C Achilles;
Arthur G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
In the case of John S. Service : Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney.
(The meeting reconvened at 10 a. in.)
(Col. Frank Dorn. called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, being duly
sworn, testified as follows : )
2162 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record. Colonel Dorn? —
A. Col. Frank Dorn, Department of the Army, Chief of Information, Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.
Q. You are a colonel in the United States Army? — A. Right.
Q. YsTill you state your present duties? — A. My present duty is Acting Deputy
Chief of Information in the Department of the Army.
Q. Now, would you state for the Board what your duties were during the
period from 1941 to 1945; in general the positions you held? — A. In 1941 I was
aide-de-camp to General Stilwell, who at that time in the early part of 1941
was in command of the Third Corps in California. Later, I went to Washington
with him and after Pearl Harbor when he went to China on his mission, leaving
Washington in February of 1942, I accompanied him on tbe trip. I was his
aide until about October of 1942; then became -artillery officer of the theater;
later, deputy chief of staff of the theater, that is, the China-Burma-India theater ;
and later what they called chief of staff of the yoke force in Yenan Province.
From that, I became commanding general of what they called the Chinese
Combat Training Command which was stationed in Yenan Province, and left
China in January of 1945 to come back to this country. I was then in head-
quarters Army Ground Forces for about 3 months. Then, accompanied General
Stilwell to the* Philippine Islands. Later, to Okinawa and went in with the early
troop arrivals in Japan in late August of 1945. I remained in Japan until the
end of 1945.
Q. I believe you indicated that during a portion of the period you were com-
manding general of — what were the forces? — A. The name of them was the
Chinese Combat and Training Command, which was an American establishment
set up to work with the Chinese troops primarily in Yenan Province at that
time for training purposes, equipment, supply, what advice we could give them.
Q. At that time, I take it, you were a temporary brigadier general? — A. Yes.
Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. John Service? — A. Yes. I have known
him for about 15 years.
Q. For about 15 years. Would you summarize for the Board the nature of your
acquaintance and association with Mr. Service during this period? — A. I first
knew him when I was a language student in Peiping. I have forgotten whether
it was late 1934 or early 1935, about that time, and he was in Peiping at that time.
I ran into him occasionally in China during that period until 193S when I felt
China to come back to this country. I lost touch with him, ran into him again
when I went out to China during the early war period.
Q. And after you met him again in China during the war period would you in-
dicate to the Board something of how frequently you happened to see him and
what the nature of your association with him was in terms of intimacy of your
knowledge of him. — A. I saw him — I guess the best way to put it — I saw him off
and on during that period over there. Sometimes it would be more frequent than
others and there would be perhaps a long period where I might not see him.
However, I was acquainted with the work he was doing more than I might say
with him personally during that period.
Q. That is, you saw the memoranda and reports which he was preparing and
turning into the Army headquarters as part of his work as a political observer? —
A. Well, either that, or else in discussions of the staff heard the results of the
reports which was more or less the same thing.
Q. Now. on the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service over 15 years, and the
relationship which you have described, I should like to ask you, first, whether you
have ever bad any reason to believe that Mr. Service was in any way disloyal to
the United States? — A. I had no reason of any kind to think it at all.
Q. Did you ever have any reason to believe from any statements he ever made
or any of bis conduct that he was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer? —
A. Never had the slightest idea that he migld be and no reason to come to any
conclusion of that kind.
<>. Were you aware that Mr. Service in the various reports which he sent
back to the Army headquarters during the period when he was attached to the
Army observers' mission at Yenan, that he reported generally favorably on the
morale of the Communist areas, ami also that he reported favorably on their
fighting qualities in relation to the Japanese? — A. I was aware of that in a gen-
eral way. not having seen any of those reports.
Q. Were such reports also made by the members — strictly military members of
that mission? — A. Yes. As far as I know, they were from talking to them and
from some that I have read.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2163
Q. I wonder if you could indicate to the Board something of your personal
relationship to General Stilwell? I have gathered from your testimony that you
wore in a sense attached to him personally during quite a period. — A. I would say
that, to use the expression, that I was "very close" to him in a personal way as
well as in an official way. I had known him for a number of years, and had been
With him — he was in China when I was a language student acting s assistant
military attache and I had very close connection with him and his family as well
and still do with the family.
Q. It has heen charged by Bishop Paul Yu-pin that Mr. Service insisted and
repeatedly demanded that General Stilwell go to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
and demand the arming of some 300,000 Chinese Communist troops. Bishop
Paul Yu-pin has stated that Mr. Service put pressure on General Stihvell once,
and then went hack at him a second time and kept hammering at him until he
finally forced General Stilwell to make these demands on General Chiang
Kai-shek — could you comment on that assertion? — A. I have never heard General
Stihvell say that Mr. Service had put this pressure on him.
Q. Do you think it likely that had Mr. Service been attempting to pressure
General Stilwell in this fashion that it would come to your attention V In view
of your relationship with General Stilwell? — A. I think in all probability it
would because although General Stilwell had spent most of his time in India
after 1942, nevertheless he came through where I was stationed in Yunnan Prov-
ince I would say, on an average of perhaps every 2 months and always stopped
off and usually stayed at my house with me. We talked things over in a very
general way and sometimes in a very detailed way, and I am sure that he would
have mentioned something about it.
Q. From your knowledge of General Stilwell and your knowledge of Mr. Ser-
vice would you say that Mr. Service was — in terms of the entire scheme of things
in the theater at that time — a particularly potent or significant influence on
General Stilwell personally — A. No ; he was not.
Q. Are you familiar with the general views that Mr. Service expressed in his
report concerning the desirability of furnishing arms to the Chinese Communist
forces*: — A. Only in a most general way.
Q. I wonder if you would indicate to the Board what your general under-
standing of those views was? — A. Well, since I have not seen any of those re-
ports that's not an easy one to comment on. However, I know that the general
feeling of the officers that were at Yenan and of many others in the theater was
that the objective, after all, was to defeat the Japanese and as quickly as possible,
and use any troops who were able bodied and who would fight for that purpose.
So that the big majority of our people in the theater, as far as I know, looked
on the Communists, Chinese Communists, more or less as another party ; in fact,
I frequently made the remark myself to Chinese that you might compare them to
the Republicans and Democrats in this country, which was wrong, I realize now,
but we felt that if we could get manpower we could do things and we didn't have
manpower in the Chinese Nationalist Army.
Q. When you said a moment ago "our people" I take it you referred primarily
to the military people? — A. To the military.
Q. Who felt that any able-bodied troops that were willing to fight should be
encouraged to do so? — A. Yes. As an example, if I may digress a bit, in some
of the troops I was working with in the Salween River area the divisions were
depleted down to the strength of 1,500 men. Well, you are not going to accom-
plish much with that and our effort was to get replacements.
Q. Could you place for the Board in time roughly when General Stilwell came
to view that it would be desirable to utilize the Chinese Communits forces in
the war against Japan, and, as an incident to that, of course, to furnish them
with arms necessary to permit them to fight? — A. As I recall, that would prob-
ably have been in late 1943 or early 1944. At that time one of the plans for
the final consummation of the war called for an American landing on the coast
of China. t<> ns ■ as a base to attack Japan. Naturally, the whole object would
be to use whatever we could in CBI to open ports for American troops to use as
landing points, and because some of the better ports, and, of course, closer to
Japan, were in the north. General Stilwell. and, I believe, other members of the
staff, gradually came to the idea to utilize the Communists for the purpose of
moving over to the east to be ready to receive American landings.
Q. In placing that, do you happen to recall the date on which General Stilwell
was recalled to this country? — A. He left China in October of 1944: — roughly
October 10.
2164 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. And you would place, as I understand your testimony, you would place the
time when he came to view the Chinese Communist forces should be brought into
play more actively against the Japanese, to have been late '43 or early '44? —
A. That's as I recall.
Q. Yes. Now, were you familiar with the — Who was the head of the observer
mission at Yenan, if you recall? — A. I don't recall who was the head of the early
one. I know Col. David Barrett went up there, and I believe, as I remember,
he took it over.
Q. Were you in close touch at all with the work of that observer mission? —
A. No ; only my hearing reports from other members of the staff or from Gen-
eral Stilwell himself.
Q. Did you ever hear it suggested that Mr. Service was supplying information
to the Chinese Communists of any improper character? — A. No ; never.
Q. It has been charged, Colonel Doni, that while Mr. Service was in China he
was in some way in communication with a man by. the name of Philip Jaffe, who
was in this country, and who was editor of a magazine called Amerasia. The
charge seems to be that Mr. Service was communicating or sending to Mr. Jaffe
classified Government documents, including State Department and other docu-
ments. I wonder if you would care to comment to the board on the possibilities
of Mr. Service being in communication with Mr. Jaffe, bearing in mind your
knowledge of the restrictions on communications generally which prevailed in
the theater. I suppose we might consider several possibilities. The first possi-
bility, if it can be called possibility, would be that he was transmitting such
documents to Mr. Jaffe through the mails. Would you comment to the Board
on that suggestion? — A. I would say that it would be virtually impossible to do
that for many reasons. The first thing that everything had to go back by air,
back to this country, and Mr. Service in Chungking, assuming that he tried it,
would have to put mail on a plane from Chungking to Kunming. There it would
be changed to fly over the hump to some airfield in Assam ; would have to be
changed again probably at Karachi, or possibly Delhi, and then when it got on
the regular ATC run, either through middle Africa or north Africa, and across
the Atlantic, every time the plane flew around 8 or 9 hours the crews are changed,
so that it would be necessary to have a very complicated and almost impossible
arrangment inasmuch as no one would know who the crews were who were
going to take over the plane, even if the plane itself went all the way through.
Then, when the plane arrived in this country, there was an inspection of all
material that wasn't pouched properly, so I don't see how it could be done.
The Chairman. What you mean is that it could not be done by any regular
method ; any communication could go through the regular channels, I assume.
A. No ; because mail was opened and censored.
The Chairman. Where was that done?
A. It was done at the source. For instance, Chungking headquarters would
censor — not all. They would spot-check it, of course, out-going mail, and then
it was subject to censorship again when it arrived in this country.
The Chairman. Was it spot-checked by being opened and read?
A. Yes ; opened and items cut out. Well, if any — I can't imagine anybody
taking that risk because it would be impossible to accomplish it, I think.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Well, in the matter of the mails, am I correct in believing that in addition
to the spot checks that all mail had to be initially censored before it was sent
at all? — A. That's right. However, certain officers, the senior staff, didn't have
their mail censored, but they had to sign on the outside of the envelop their
name and official title, which would indicate, in effect, an affidavit that the
material inside was proper.
The Chairman. How about political correspondents, like Mr. Service, did he
have thai authority to sign his own mail, so that it wouldn't be censored?
A. I don't know. However, I would like to add that though that meant it
wouldn't be censored at the source that did not prevent it from being censored
when it reached this country or censored possibly in India as it went through.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. So much for the mail. I think you have also testified on the other pos-
sibilities— by posting the regular mails would be one, and you have indicated
the type of censorship that was applicable, and that in your view it would be
a very foolish risk for anyone to take who sought to improperly transmit informa-
tion that way. Another possibility, of course, would be some sort of a private
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2165
ami illicit personal courier system. I wonder if you could comment on what
the possibilities of that type of an operation would have been? For example,
who could he have used for any kind of transmissions by some illicit personal
courier system? — A. Well, to begin with, if it weren't an authorized courier
he would never be allowed to go back because be would have to travel under
orders and be would never get the orders, so the only type of courier that could
be used would be an official one, and I think everyone is familiar with the
instructions and restrictions on what they carry. So an official courier, I
don't believe, could accept casual mail from anyone.
Q. Well, now, what would the possibilities bo, for example, you have indicated
that anybody moving would have to be moving under military orders. — A. Right.
Q. So that, presumably, he would have to develop some illicit arrangements
with somebody who otherwise was traveling under military orders if you were
to accomplish this thing. Now what would you consider the possibilities of
such a system utilizing, we'll say, the crew of airplanes, that is, pilots or copilots,
or whoever the other members of the crew might be? — A. Well, I think that
would be virtually impossible because though he might be able to give a number
of the crew leaving Chungking mail or documents, that crew would have to pass
it on in Kunming.
Q. You mean to another crew? — A. Yes.
Q. That is, a crew on a plane from Chungking to Kunming ended its run
there? — A. Normally.
Q. And then another crew would take over for the next leg of the run? — A.
That's true, and when it came to Kunming, which was an enormous air operation,
both combat and air transport, it would be almost impossible to know what
crew was going to be handy to take it on, because they were- coming in and out
all the time, and, again, every time the crew changed I don't see how anybody
would know who they would be, so that it would be a system that would be
practically impossible to establish.
Q. Let's see if I can explore that a little further : You have one crew from
Chungking to Kunming? — A. Normally.
Q. Then you have some one of several possible crews on the next run from
Kunming to somewhere in Assam? — A. Yes.
Q. That is over the hump. — A. Yes.
Q. Then would the same thing prevail ; that is, some one of a large number of
possible crews on the next leg of the run from Assam to Karachi? — A. Right,
either Delhi or Karachi.
Q. Yes. And then would the same thing prevail — that you would have again
the chance of selecting some one out of a large number of possible crews from
Karachi to A. Probably Khartoum, and then someplace either in north Africa
or central Africa, possibly Accra on the Gold Coast, and then Ascension Island,
and Natal if it were the southern route, and then with stops all along the way up
to Miami, and then, of course, when landing in Miami would be subject to
anything.
Q. By "anything" you mean? — A. In the line of the crews.
Q. Inspection? — A. Yes; and examination. So, as a physical proposition I
don't see how it could be done.
Q. Do you know whether the individual members of the plane crews were also
subject to searches of their accompanying personal effects at any check points
along the route from Chungking to the United States? — A. Well, I know they
were when they arrived in the United States, all of them, and whether they were
checked at any points I wouldn't be able to say. The probability is that where
they entered a new country there was some kind of a check.
Mr. Rhetts. I think I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. As I understand, Colonel, you came with General Stilwell in March 1942
to China? — A. That's right: we arrived.
Q. You were then aide-de-camp? — A. Yes.
Q. At a later date you were detached as aide and given an executive position
on the staff?— A. That's right.
Q. And what was that position? — A. First, as artillery officer for the theater.
Q. And then later what was the date of that?— A. That was in October of 1942.
Q. And then later on did you make a still further change? — A. Then I was
made Deputy Chief of Staff of the theater with headquarters in Chungking.
Q. Now that was at what time? — A. That was either March or April of 1943.
Q. Did you come back with Stilwell in October?— A. Of 1944, no ; I did not. I
remained for 3 months and then left.
2166 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now, during the period while you were aide to General Stilwell, and later
on when you were Deputy Chief of Staff, you were familiar with the various
political reportings that were going on in the staff?— A. In a general way always
and sometimes in a detailed manner.
Q. You did not regularly read the reports? — A. No; not regularly hecause
after I went from my station at Kunming I was away from the theater head-
quarters, so that's why I did not read them regularly.
Q. But while you were with the staff you heard them discussed? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you have conversations from time to time with General Stilwell? — A.
Yes.
Q. I don't mean Stilwell — I mean Mr. Service? — A. Occasionally, yes, sir.
Q. Did you discuss the political situation in China with him? — A. Well, I
don't remember any particular time we did, but I would say, "Yes," because we
all discussed it continuously, because the political and the military were so closely
involved, and it was our work — it was our main -topic of conversation anyway.
Q. So that I take it over that period until yon were sent on detached service
you were familiar with the general tenor of Service's reports? — A. Yes.
Q. Even though you didn't read the reports themselves? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever either in your discussion of his reports with other officers
or in your examination of the reports or in your discussions with Mr. Service
discover any indication that Mr. Service was attempting to talk Tito or in
. any other way oppose the policy of the staff? — A. No, sir.
Q. General 'stilwell's policy? — A. No, sir; never.
Q. And I take it from what you have already said that you discovered nothing
in his attitude which indicated that he wTas pro-Communist? — A. I never found
anything. I looked in those reports— straight intelligence reports reporting on
the situation that existed.
Q. And I also gather from what you have said that the reports were in general
in harmony with the feeling among the military officers on the staff? — A. In a
general way, yes: because we knew that the Chinese Communist troops were
better men* physically, they were better fed, they were better clothed. They
had better morale that the Nationalist troops and any reports bearing out on
that would simply be in line with what we had already had.
Q. So the reports were, as far as you were able to judge, factually accurate? —
A. As far as I knew.
The Chairman. Any questions?
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Now it has been stated to us, Colonel, that you were probably as close to
General Stilwell as anyone who was with him throughout this period. It has
also been stated that General Stilwell was not in the general environment Mr.
Service was for a very large part of the time that he was in the theater. Would
you consider that Mr. Service was one of General Stilwell's intimates? — A. No,
sir ; I would not.
Q. Would you consider that Mr. Service had a marked influence on General
Stilwell1,? — A. No, sir; I would not, and, if I may, I would like to add that
when General Stilwell made up his mind no one had a marked influence on him.
Q. Yes. I think that's all.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. You have indicated. Colonel, that it would be practically impossible for any-
one to devise a system of sending communications by plane crews or anything like
that. Would it be possible for someone to send messages by an American offi-
cial returning to this country, and thus evading censorship? — A. Yes; I sup-
pose it would, if that person had authority to go through the inspection at Miami
without having his baggage and oilier material he might be carrying inspected,
but that would normally have to he a pretty high-ranking military person, or a
pretty nigh-ranking civilian official, if it were a civilian, and normally those
people are responsible people who are not going to open themselves to any risk
of that kind. You might get by with it once by mere chance, hut I don't see
how you could work it regularly.
Q. Weic there many such people who were traveling frequently between the
theater and the United States? — A. There were official couriers.
<). No, I mean not couriers, but just high-ranking military or civilians who
might not be subject to inspection? — A. Well, we had a great many people come
out and visit out there, most of whom didn't accomplish much. I suppose on
their return they would pass through without inspection.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2167
Q. Were there any individuals wlio were frequently traveling back and forth? —
A. Not individuals; no. Occasionally, a staff officer would be sent back for a
conference in Washington. I would say that an individual — well, I think of
General Merrell as one — I know he made. I believe, at least three trips back in a
period of 3 years. Well, that is not very frequent.
Q. Were returning American correspondents subject to inspection on such
trips? — A. Yes. They were supposed to be. I assume that the inspection was
carried out.
Q. That's all.
The Chairman. Further questions?
Mr. Khetts. No ; I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Colonel.
Mr. Khktts. Thanks a lot.
(Col. Frank Dorn left the meeting at this time.)
(Lt. Col. Joseph Kingsley Dickey, called as a witness in behalf of John S.
Service, being duly sworn, testified as follows :)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address, Colonel Dickey? — A. Joseph
Kingsley Dickey, lieutenant colonel, United States Army ; resident 2801 Chesa-
peake Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Q. Would you state your present duties in the War Department? — A. I am
not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Q. Would you state for the Board what your duties were between the period,
we'll say. 1941 to 1945? — -A. 1941 I was in Japan as a Japanese language student
for the United States Army. I came back from there in September of 1941 to
the city of San Francisco where I joined then Colonel Reuchlin, and we ran
a school for the teaching of Japanese to Nisei. The school was subsequently
moved to Camp Savage, Minn., and I remained there until June of 194.3. Then, I
came to Washington for a month and I left there the twenty-sixth day of July
for China, and I arrived in China. I believe it was. the thirtieth of August.
1943, and I went to Chungking about the fourth of September, and that was my
residence until 1945.
Q. And what was your post in Chungking? — A. Chungking I was the G-2 Chief
of Intelligence.
Q. In the headquarters of the commanding A. In the headquarters at
Chungking.
In the headquarters at Chungking. Now, you are acquainted with Mr. Serv-
ice, are you not? — A. I am.
Q. Would you state to the Board when you first met Mr. Service, and describe
in general your association with him since that time? — A. Well, the exact time
of the meeting, I don't quite remember whether it was a meeting discussing
psychological warfare early in September or whether or not I met him over
in Delhi, as I went immdeiately back to Delhi. I believe we came back on the
plane at that time. It was either one of those two times I met him first — that
was in September of 1943.
Q. That was in September 1943. At that time what was Mr. Service doing?—
A. Service was the political adviser to our headquarters.
Q. He was attached to it? — A. Attached to the headquarters; that's right.
Q. To the headquarters staff. Now, subsequent to that time would you give
a brief account of your association with Mr. Service? — -A. Well, our work
was rather close together. Mr. Service worked in Chungking a good deal
of the time and he used to be — since he was the political associate for our
headquarters he was turning in reports on things happening in China which
would funnel through my office and went to General Stilwell and to the head-
quarters group there. He also acted in the capacity — when we had requests
regarding political things they were usually handled by Mr. Service who went
to the Embassy and got them. I believe Mr. Service did run one mission for
us in which he and some other chap went on a sort of exploratory trip down
inward the southeast over to French Indo-China — am I correct in that?
Mr. Service. Yes.
A. And then at the time we set the mission up to go to Yenau, Mr. Service
went up there as the political observer.
Q. Now, during this period was he in his capacity as member of the political
advisory group, would you say that his dealings with the military staff were
primarily through you?— A. I would say "Yes."
2168 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now, during the period when he was in Chungking before he went with
the observer mission to Yenan, could you give a little fuller description to the
Board of the t.\pe of work that he was doing? — A. Well, it was writing of con-
ditions in China the way it appeared to a man who had access to the military
people there, and who knew China, and knew the political figures, knew the
civilians, he was writing more or less general impressions of things that were
going on and results that might be expected from things that were occurring.
He was our liaison man with the Communists. Chou En-lai had a headquarters
there in Chungking and in general we relied upon him for the political, the
nonmilitary side of the life there.
Q. Now when you say he was your liaison man with the Communists, whose
office there was headed by Chou En-lai, could you elaborate a little bit on that
for the Board please? — A. Well, in China, of course, the very live question
was the Communists — -what was their contribution to the war? At that time
we were absolutely blind north of the Yellow River. The National Govern-
ment control went up as far as the Yellow River and stopped. That made our
intelligence — from there on north we knew nothing. That was more or less
Communist territory. So we cultivated them to find out what they knew and
what they could give to us. They didn't give us very much military stuff. There
was a ?reat deal of political life evidently.
Q. And, as I understand, it was Mr. Service's job as a part of the military staff
to obtain intelligence, of a political character at any rate, from the Communists? —
A. That is right.
Q. Then, when you refer to his later going to Yenan I take it that that also
was after you moved north of the Yellow River, and this mission was for the
purpose of obtaining intelligence on the ground from and about the Commu-
nists?— A. Three things: weather, intelligence, and to help our downed Air
members were the reasons always given why we went up there.
Q. Yes. Now, as G-2 in Chungking did you receive all the reports which
Mr. Service wrote for the headquarters? — A. I did.
Q. And you had to read them all. did you? — A. I did.
Q. Be familiar with them? — A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you could, in general, characterize these reports from the point
of view of their general objectivty as intelligence reporting, and any political
orientation that they may have exhibited on the part of the author of these
reports? — A. Well, these reports were not only read, but were studied with a
great deal of interest in our headquarters. The political reporting seemed to us,
who, as I said, had only a superficial knowledge what we could see around the
city talking to people, to be accurate, seemed to be objective in their case. The
questions of future in China, we never felt competent to pass on that, we used
to read these with a good deal of interest. These reports were circulated in our
headquarters and then used to remain on file in my office. The new officers who
came in to responsible positions were usually given this file to read.
Q. Did you or any of your military superiors regard Mr. Service as being pro-
Communist? — A. No.
Q. Did you ever have any, or do you now have reason to believe that Mr. Service
is a Communist or pro-Communist or Communist sympathizer? — A. No.
Q. I would like to show you, Colonel Dickey, what has been introduced in
evidence here as Document 193, which is the report No. 40 of Mr. Service, and
a^'-v you if you recall that report? — A. (After reading some of report.) Do you
wish me to read the whole memorandum?
Q. Well, if you care to refresh your recollection about it, I suggest you do. —
A. (Reading.)
Q. I ><> yon have, any independent recollection of this? — A. Well, this reads
familiarly to me. I have read the white paper on China, whether or not I read
pari df it in there — that's from my past recollection.
Q. I take it that when this report was filed by Mr. Service, in accordance
witli your habitual practice, you read it at that time? — A. That's right.
Q. I take it, however, from what you have just testified that you have no clear
recollection of it now? — A. No.
Q. General Hurley has testified that this report was a plan to bring about the
downfall of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek and Senator McCarthy and others have re-
peated this charge. Do you have any recollection that when this report was
received at headquarters that it was regarded as such a plan? — A. No, I have no
it collection of that, nor do I, thinking back, think it would have been regarded as
such.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2169
Q. I take it that had you received anything which yon so regarded there is some
possibility that it would have remained in your memory more vividly, would it
not?— A. "That's right.
Q. Do you recall that General Stilwell ever regarded this as any plan to bring
about the downfall or torpedoing of Generalissimo Chiang's Government? — A.
No. I can't remember the message, even General Stilwell's connection with it.
I can only presume that it went to him and returned to him.
Q. Vmi were also G- 2 in Chungking after General Stilwell was replaced by
General W, demeyer, were you not? — A. That's correct.
Q. Do you have any recollection that General Wederneyer ever expressed any
criticism of Mr. Service for this report or indeed for any other report that he
ever filed? — A. No.
Q. On the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service and your familiarity with
his memoranda and reports as they were filed with you, did you ever see any-
thing in his writings or hear him make any statement which would suggest to
you that Mr. Service believed that communism was the best hope of Asia? —
A. No, never.
Q. Or anything to that effect?— A. No.
Q. You have just read this Document No. 193, do you now regard it as a
plan to bring about the fall of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?— A. No.
Q. On the basis of your knowledge as a G-2 in Chungking would you have
regarded the conclusions in that report as either incredible miscalculations or
misrepresentations, as Congressman Judd has charged? — A. I would not. I
would say that they were more or less what the Americans generally thought,
usually they were much more vitriolic than this is after they had been out there
awhile.
Q. Now I would like you to look at Document 35-5, Colonel Dickey, just this
one page. Now, this represents the testimony of General Hurley before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he expresses differing versions of
his conception of the American policy objectives in China. From your knowl-
edge as G-2 in Chungking of Mr. Service's activities and reporting could you
state whether Mr. Service ever disagreed with any of those policy objectives': —
A. I would say he did not. I would say lie agreed with all of these objectives.
Q. You would say he agreed with all of them? — A. Yes.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. With further reference to that document you were just looking at, Docu-
ment 35-5, I note a statement in there by General Hurley that certain Ameri-
cans could not go along with the American policy or were incompatible with the
officials of the Chinese Government with whom we had to deal. Was Mr.
Service unable to go along with the American policy?— A. I don't think he
ever was.
Q. Was he incompatible with the officials of the Chinese Government with
whom you had to deal?— A. No; on the contrary, Mr. Service was the only one
we oftentimes had to deal with them ; for instance, on one important message
he was interpreter for the Generalissimo.
Q. I also notice that General Hurley says that "their objectives had the oppo-
sition of most of the career diplomats" — did their objectives have the opposi-
tion of Mr. Service? — A. As they are stated here, I don't think that I ever ran
into anybody who had any opposition to these objectives.
Q. Thank you.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Colonel Dickey, I wonder if you could state to the Board whether or not
in the light of your knowledge of affairs in China at that time Mr. Service could
be regarded in any sense as the principal or even an important force in bringing
about the creation of the Army Observers Mission in Yenan? — A. I am afraid
T would hav1 to qualify my answer on that. He had a great deal to do with
the thinking of us people in the headquarters as to the desirability and the way
that we could do it if we approached the Chinese, different means of approaching
them, we could get up there, but it was only as advice to us as how to get up
there, I believe.
Q. That is, military had quite independent reasons for seeking A. Oh, we
were very independent, we did not — we said the political side of it was entirely
the Embassy's and it was for that reason, I believe it was upon Embassy repre-
sentation that Mr. Service himself went up there. The military reasons were
quite different.
2170 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. But you had no reservations about Mr. Service being the man chosen by the
Embassy to do this job? — A. None at all. In fact, we were very glad that he
was going.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. It has been reported that Bishop Paul Yu-pin has stated that Mr. Service
kept hammering at General Stihvell to make demands on Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek for the arming of some 300,000 Communist troops. Bishop Paul Yu-pin
is reported to have said that Mr. Service exerted great pressure on General Stil-
well and came back at him at least three times in order in effect to force Genera]
Stilwell to make these demands on the Generalissimo as a result of which the
Generalissimo brought about General Stilwell's recall. Do you have any knowl-
edge of any such pressure brought by Mr. Service op General Stilwell ?■ — A. First,
I don't think any American could have brought any pressure on General Stilwell.
He was a very independent man. And, secondly, he himself considered himself
probably the best political observer in China, and what other people fed him
was for him to note. I don't believe he other than listened to things to pick up
new things, but you must remember General Stilwell himself had had a long
background of China and had traveled in China extensively. What people like
Mr. Service could give him was merely to bring him up to date on it.
Q. Do you know what opportunities Mr. Service had, apart from the reports
which were filed with you, to bring pressure to bear on General Stilwell? — A.
Well, if General Stilwell was at our headquarters he would have the opportunity
to go to see and talk with him. He wasn't at our headquarters very much while
I was there, he was in Burma most of the time.
Q. Would you have known of the occasions which Mr. Service would have had
to confer personally with General Stilwell? — A. I believe I would. I think
the arrangements would have been made through my office.
Q. If Mr. Service were engaged in attempting to bring about such pressure on
General Stilwell do you think it likely that it would have come to your atten-
tion?— A. It might have and it might not have, I would have to equivocate that
answer. I probably would not have been present.
Q. Did you ever at any time while you were in China, Colonel Dickey, learn
or hear any reports to the effect that Mr. Service was transmitting classified
information to the Chinese Communists? — A. I did not.
Q. Did you ever hear it charged that anyone was doing that? — A. Let me
broaden that question a little bit : Do you mean by transmitting classified infor-
mation— do you mean documents or just talking about things that were classified,
it's hard to make a distinction?
Q. Yes, well, I refer to documents. General Hurley has charged, for example,
that Mr. Service showed Document 193, which you have just read, to the Chinese
Communists. — A. When you say that Mr. Service is the originator of these
things, probably the first classification that was put on them was when they
came into the military unless he placed it on there himself.
Q. Did you ever hear it suggested that this document or any other documents
had been shown by Mr. Service to the Chinese Government? — A. No, I didn't.
Q. If information to that effect had come to General Hurley's attention, would
you suppose that that information would, in turn, have been reported to you? —
A. Perhaps not directly. I think I would have heard of it; yes. You see, secu-
rity also comes under the G-2.
Q. In other words, had Mr. Service, or anyone else on your staff, been engaged
in such work, or even reported to be doing so, it would have been your job,
would it not, to have conducted the necessary investigation to find out whether
it was true? — A. That's correct.
Q. And, if found to be true, to take some corrective action? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you, as the G-2 in Chungking, give Mr. Service access to highly clas-
sified material? — A. I did.
Q. Have you ever had any doubt whatsoever to his complete reliability to be
i rusted with access to such material? — A. No.
Q. Do you recall what Mr. Service's views were on the general problem of
supplying arms to the Chinese Communisl forces?— A. Well, I believe Mr. Service
was of the opinion that we should utilize all the forces we could in China to fight
the Japanese. Remember, during the war we were there to fighl Japan, and we
were certainly trying to use every pressure against Japan we could. Japan was
the enemy in '43, '44, and '45.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2171
Q. That being so, was it your impression that he favored utilizing the Chinese
Communist forces as well as the Nationalist forces? — A. Yes.
Q. Was that view entertained hy General Stilwell? — A. I helieve it was.
Q. And by others of the military staff V — A. Oh, yes.
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Service — whether it was his proposal to arm the
Chinese Communist independently of the National Government V — A. I don't ever
remember him having proposed that. If lie did. he wouldn't have gotten very
far. It was understood hy everybody that General Stilwell was the Chief of
Staff to the Generalissimo. In other words, it was the Central Government
whom we were working with and you always had to work through the Central
Government for anything you did. If he made such a proposal. I don't remember
it.
Q. I take it that as far as you know, Mr. Service's views on this question
were not at least more — did not differ from General Stilwell's, as best you
understand? — A. No. As far as I know they didn't differ at all. Let me say in
that connection if he had he would have written it, and they would have been
somewhere in these records because there are written records.
Q. That's the only way he had to get his views across? — A. That's correct.
Q. It has been charged, Colonel Dickey, that while Mr. Service was in China
he was in communication with a Mr. Philip Jaffe, who was in this country, and
that he in some manner or another transmitted to Mr. Jaffe various classified
Government documents. I wonder if you would care to comment for the Board
in the light of your knowledge as G-2 of the restrictions on communications, both
of the mails and of persons, what the possibilities of such communication by
Service with Jaffe might he? — A. Well, Mr. Service was in the anomalous posi-
tion of being both State Department and working with the military. As a civilian,
any mail that appeared anywhere in the mail systems would have been subject
to Chinese censorship. It is very hard to get mail out, as a matter of fact,
going hy air, so if he sent it straight mail, which I doubt he would do, since all
civilians who wished would be able to get their stuff into the governmental
channels, he would hardly dare to do it that way.
Q. In that connection, if I might interrupt you, do you know whether Mr.
Service had authority to initially censor his own mail, that is, put it A. I
don't know how the Embassy worked that. As far as the military is concerned,
no. No civilian, to the best of my recollection, was ever allowed to do that.
Q. Well, now, he was attached to your staff, was he not? — A. That's right.
Q. So that A. You see, he could go over to the Embassy and give them
mail to go back through the Embassy pouches.
Q. Through the Embassy pouches, yes, but in terms of anything that he would
deposit in the regular American mail system A. Well, that's the Army
system.
Q. That was the Army system?— A. That's right.
Q. As I understand it, officers of certain ranks had authority by writing on
the outside of the envelope to make the initial censorship of their own mail, and
of their own and others, and that we may call the censorship at the source.
Do you know whether Mr. Service had that authority in the theater? — A. No, he
wouldn't be allowed that. It was the military officers who had that.
Q. You had to be an officer with military rank? — A. That's right.
Q. Well, now, I interrupted you, would you care to go ahead with your com-
ment on the physical possibilities of transmission? — A. Well, the way of getting
these things out through regular channels with the Chinese mail system, as I
said, of course, everything would be censored, or he had the opportunity to send
it through our channels or through State Department channels, which one he
used I really don't remember, and what arrangements the State Department
made with their own pouches again I am in ignorance. That was none of our
business. On military you have just asked me about — an officer certified on the
outside that he had censored that.
Q. And after the initial certification mail was subject to further censoring? —
A. Yes, it was subject to some further censoring— whether or not it was was a
matter whether or not that letter happened to be picked up later on by censors
along the route.
Q. Determined by spot check? — A. By spot checks, yes.
Q. But any mail that he deposited into the Army mail system would have to
be censored by someone else at the source? — A. That's right.
Q. Do you have any knowledge whether Mr. Service had access to the Embassy
files after he became attached to the military headquarters? — A. To the best of my
recollection he did have access to the Embassy files. Mr. Service kept us aware
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 44
2172 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of what the Embassy was doing and likewise he was to keep the Embassy in-
formed of what we were doing.
Q. On what do you base the recollection that he had access to the files in the
Embassy? — A. Well, I can remember him coming over and telling us about
some of the messages or something that they were going to send back.
Q. Those he could, presumably, have obtained by discussion with the Embassy
staff in relation to a particular problem, could he not? — A. That's right, he
could have.
Q. That does not necessarily imply that he had free access to the files on his
own? — A. That's correct. It is merely supposition on my part.
Q. I understand. As a matter of fact it has been testified by the Ambassador
that he did not have access to the files — that all non-Embassy people did not, and
I recognize that you are only speculating.
I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Colonel, the disappearance of General Stilwell from the Chinese scene was
due, was it not, to some demand he made on Chiang Kai-shek? — A. I have to say
in that respect, General, that even though I had been an officer with him I was
rather dark on the whole thing. The negotiations there — what was done was
done very secretively. General Stilwell did not confide very much in his staff.
I don't believe his own Chief of Staff could give you an answer, and I learned
more by reading his book than by living in the house there.
Q. So that from your own knowledge at the time you can't testify on that? —
A. No, sir, I can't.
The Chairman. Have you any questions?
Mr. Stevens. Yes, a few questions.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Colonel, it is the usual practice, is it not, for a G-2 to obtain information
from all sources possible and place an evaluation on that information? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Any materials, therefore, submitted by Mr. Service were subject to that
same sort of treatment. In other words, you gaged his reporting abilities, his
objectivity, etc., against the sources that came to you from elsewhere? — A. That's
right, sir.
Q. Can you tell us whether any of the reports that you remember having
read of his appeared not to be objective and to be so out of line with the tenor of
the times and the general reports that you were getting as to cause suspicion on
your part? — A. No, sir, I can't think of a single instance.
Q. I think it lias been stated to us earlier that the materials that wei-e prepared
for the commanding general by Mr. Service were prepared in, I think it was four
• •(•pit's — one to the general, one to Mr. Davies, one to the Embassy, and one that
Mr. Service retained in his own file. I think it was further stated that the copies,
aside from the one that he retained, came through your channels in dispatch —
A. Could I qualify that, sir?
Q. Yes. — A. That during the period he was in Yenan and, of course, while
he was in Chungking
Q. In Yenan, I did not recall, but that would have happened in Yenan,
would it? — A. Yes. In Chungking he could give it right to the Embassy or
sen- 1 it to Mr. Davies.
ij. Now, how did that material come to you? Did it come already in envelopes,
and sea led. or did it come open, or can you recall? — A. Well, now, I have
got this perhaps not too exact. A plane used to go to Yenan, our own plane,
and conic directly back. Then, the material was brought directly to our head-
quarters. Now, the first time I saw it, of course, was after it had been opened
and was ready for distribution, things that were felt of immediate interet to me.
Tin speaking now of my own staff there. It was brought to my attention.
1 ut our own people handled it throughout, our own headquarters personnel.
In other words, mail people went down and met the plane, and brought it to
our headquarters where it was handled as mail, except anything other than
letters was broughl immediately to our section lor processing. In other words,
we were held responsible for what went up to Yenan and what came back — my
own particular office was.
Q. You were also held responsible, I take it, for anything that came through
that channel as to whether it was to he dispatched further or A. That's right.
STATS DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2173
We made the further distribution of it other than plane mail going back and
forth.
Q. Now, when was it that General Wedemeyer appeared on the scene? — A.
Well, it was the end of October, or the first of November, just a matter of days
in there.
Q. Did you have the responsibility for briefing him when he arrived with regard
to things that had happened prior? — -A. That's right.
Q. Do you know what of Mr. Service's materials were specifically called to
his attention? Can you remember anything or would you have given him a
composite report which would have contained materials possibly reflecting Mr.
Service's comments? — A. No, sir; I can't remember specifically. As I said, Mr.
Service's reports after they were circulated in our headcpiarters came back and
I used to have them in a file there which I imagine I gave him to read, but I
can't state that definitely. I did, of course, do a good deal of verbal briefing.
Q. Yes. Do you know much of Mr. Service's association with General Wede-
meyer during the short while that they were together, that they were in the
same theater? — A. No; I don't. He didn't have too much chance to see General
Wedemeyer during that period that General Wedemeyer came to our head-
quarters, as Mr. Service was in Yenan most of the time.
Q. I see. Did you know of Mr. Service's l'elations with the American press
during this period in Yenan? Were you any way involved in his relationships,
in briefing sessions or anything else with the American press? — A. Not in Yenan
I wouldn't have been ; no.
Q. That wouldn't have been
A. No, that would have been done by Colonel Barrett who was on the spot.
Q. I see. I have no more questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Did you have a relationship with respect to the briefing of correspondents
at any other place than Yenan? — A. No, no briefing with relationship to them.
I remember after they came back there was some flurry where they wanted to
get back to the States rather quickly and I refused them passage.
Q. What I was referring to was the liberty that the correspondents had or
that the political reporters had to discuss what they had observed with cor-
respondents, were you familiar with that? — A. No. We took a rather careful
position there that anything regarding China was a matter for the Chinese to
censor, that we were not going to be placed in the position of censoring Chinese
news by our own reporters because we took one definite stand : If it had military
implications or violated military security we took out the material that they
had. If it concerned Chinese politics and things like that, had we not had the
Chinese censorship available we would have censored, that's true, as allies,
but since they were, in turn, censored we took the stand: You do the censoiing
of what you consider objectionable, we will not.
Q. How would the Chinese go about censoring a conversation or a briefing
session between, say, a political reporter like Mr. Service and the American
correspondents still on the staff, connected with the staff? — A. Well, they
wouldn't have had any opportunity to sit in on that. A briefing could have been
a conversation.
Q. Yes. — A. But it was the writings, everything was written, every dispatch
had to go through Chinese censorship.
Q. That is, dispatched to the home papers? — A. That's right, sir, anything
that was to go out for dispatch.
Questions by Mr. Service :
Q. Just as any mail the correspondents might wish to send back was also
subject to Chinese censorship if it went through open channels? — A. If it went
through open channels, if it went back through our couriers it was not subject
to Chinese censorship.
Q. Subject to yours? — A. Subject to ours.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Was there objection on your part to a political reporter like Mr. Service
giving background information in a briefing session to American correspondents
orally on Chinese matters, not military matters? — A. No, not at all.
Q. Was he expected to do that sort of thing? — A. I don't know if it was
actually assigned as part of his duties, certainly there was no objection
interposed.
2174 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Achilles:
Q. Colonel, you have read Document 193, which is Mr. Service's Report No.. 40
of October 10, 11)44?— A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Service has stated that he ascertained later that General Stilwell had
prior to the date of that report transmitted substantially the same recommenda-
tions to Washington. Do you recall from your own knowledge whether General
Stilwell had expressed similar views? — A. You place me in a hard position, Mr.
Achilles ; I lived with General Stilwell. In other words, a good deal of things
were said at the table. What was said in messages and what was said in table
conversations is a little bit hard
Q. I was referring to his official reports. — A. Most of his official reports I
never read. They were his "eyes alone" message, as back here, and "'eyes
alone" we were not circulated, of course.
Q. They went as "eyes alone"? On pages 68 and 69 of the white paper are
given extracts from certain messages from General Stilwell in September 1940;
do you have that? — A. I have it ; yes, sir.
Q. Could you state from your knowledge whether those represented General
Stilwell's views, personal views at that time or the views of his staff as a
whole? — A. I would say that they were General Stilwell's personal viewpoint.
This reads like him. General Stilwell did not make use — in other words, a
staff paper being drawn up and then revamping it and then sending it, lie wrote
his own material. And you see he came there early in September and remained
I here until he was sent home working on this type of thing by himself with
General Bergin, and General Merrill came up there, but they actually worked
in the general's quarters, and we, of course, were down at headquarters. This
was, of course, a separate thing from our normal activity. This reads like the
general himself ; undortbtedly, he wrote this himself. I would say.
Q. You would say that was the general's statement himself rather than
reflecting Mr. Service or his staff, that was the general's statement himself? —
A. Oh. yes.
Q. You have stated that as (-2 you were responsible far the security of the
intelligence material in the headquarters at Yenan. — A. Well, of anything classi-
fied, our counterintelligence, you see, is responsible for.
Q. While you were G-2 in Chungking do you recall any cases of violation
or alleged violation of security with respect to material furnished by Mr.
Service? — A. No ; I can't think of any. There was an occasion after the war
was all over — no, right after General Stilwell had left when we had some people
there writing up the history now of the history during General Stilwell's time,
during which a man lost a notebook which could have contained some of Mr.
Service's material, as the fellow had made extracts from all of the different
things available, and he lost that on the street.
Q. Was that an official, or a newspaperman? — A. It was an official, one of our
officers, but he had it in a musette bag. He was all through and yet he lost his
notes. He was sent home in a great hurry, rather harsh disciplinary action
taken.
Q. In your capacity as G-2 did you have any view of the public relations
director? — A. Yes, I did in Chungking during General Stilwell's time in office
there. Public relations were actually a branch of my own office. In other words,
I had people there who handled it and I consequently, had knowledge of policy
and. in general, what was goiim on. I usually received a general briefing; under
General Wedemeyer we made it a separate office.
Q. Your public relations activities were also under your responsibility as
security officer? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there any cases while you were there of alleged improper briefing
by .Mr. Service of any correspondents or persons? — A. I don't quite get your
implication, Mr. Achilles, of improper briefings.
Q. That is, the improper disclosure of classified information to correspond-
ents or others? — A. No. I can't remember anything like that. You oftentimes
take a correspondent quite a bit into the bosom of the family so that he is able
to write more intelligently. I refer, for instance, to reporters coming and asking:
"Is this a good time to leave Chungking? Are things going to be quiet here?
Is it safe to go down to the front? Is trouble going to break out in this spot or
lliis spot?" Now, that is highly classified, and yet you will tell them: "If I were
you. I would go to this spot." You have got to move them to the spots where things
are happening. It is highly classified, no douh' about it. but you tell them.
Q. I have nothing further.
The Chairman. We will take a short recess.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2175
Mr. Rhetts. Is the board finished with the witness for the moment?
The Chairman. Yes. Were you through with the witness?
Mr. Rhett. Yes.
The Chairman. Well, then, we can excuse the witness. Thank you very much,
Colonel. It is very kind of you to come in on a holiday.
A. II is quite all right.
( I.t. Col. Joseph Kingsley Dickey left the meeting at this time.)
(After a brief recess the meeting reconvened.)
( Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, being
duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Sprouse? —
A. Philip 1). Sprouse. Westchester Apartments, Cathedral Avenue, Washington.
Q. What is your present position? — A. I am the Director of the Office of Chi-
nese Affairs.
Q. Of the Department of State?— A. Of the Department of State.
Q. Will you tell us, Mr. Sprouse, what your position was and where you were
during the period from roughly, well, from 1941 to 1945? — A. Well, suppose I
begin really at the beginning of the war with Pearl Harbor — I was on my way
back to my post in Hankow. At the time of Pearl Harbor I came back to
Washington, stayed here until April of that year, then went to Chungking,
arrived in Chungking early May 1942. I was in Chungking from May 1942 until
the middle of June 1944 — at the American Embassy in Chungking in June of that
year.
Q. What was your position in the Embassy at that time? — A. I was the third
secretary of the Embassy at that time. Iu June of that year I was transferred
to the American consulate general at Kumming, where I stayed until late Novem-
ber 1944.
Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Mr. Sprouse? — A. I have known
Mr. Service very closely since December 1935 when he first arrived in Peiping
where I was at that time.
Q. You were also a language student? — A. No; I was a language student later.
Q. Later? — A. Later, but I was in Peiping. I arrived in Peiping in October
1935 ; Mr. Service arrived in December 1935, I believe.
Q. And would you care to summarize for the board, if you can, in general,
your relations with Mr. Service since that time? — A. Well, for the 2 years, a little
bit more than 2 years, I think, that Mr. Service was a language student I knew
him extremely well. We were very close friends. I knew his family. While
I wasn't a language student our relationship was very close and very friendly,
and I think in the beginning of 1938 he was transferred to Shanghai. I stayed
on in Peiping until 1940. At one time, I think it was in '38, I went home on
leave, came back to the United States on home leave. I passed through Shanghai
on my way back to Peiping. I think I was in Shanghai for perhaps 2 weeks
between boats. I stayed with Mr. Service and his family. In 1940 I was trans-
ferred from Peiping to Hankow. I passed through Shanghai again en route to
my new post : I think it was approximately 10 days or 2 weeks that I stayed
with Mr. Service and his family again. The next time I saw Mr. Service was,
I think, '42, May '42, when I arrived at the Embassy in Chungking. Mr.
Service was at that time living with Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Vincent, who
was the counselor of Embassy. In the first few days until I got a place to stay
I stayed in the house with Mr. Service and the Ambassador and Mr. Vincent.
Then, later, I moved to another house. Sometime during that summer Mr.
Service was sent out on an observer trip — I would say that lasted 3 months
approximately — and he came back sometime in the fall. At that point I was
living with Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Vincent, and Mr. Service stayed there —
I don't know whether it was 2 weeks, .'! weeks, or 4 weeks, something like that.
We were closely associated during those days.
Then, later, when Mr. Service was made political adviser and attached to
General Stilwell's staff our liaison as political advisers waswery close, that is
between the Embassy, and I saw Mr. Service almost daily, 1 would say, when he
was in Chungking.
Q. And I take it during the earlier period when both you and he were attached
to the Embassy in Chungking you were in daily contact? — A. Oh, yes, in daily
contact.
Q. Do you feel on the basis of your association with Mr. Service you are thor-
oughly acquainted with his mind and his outlook, particularly in political mat-
2176 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ters? — A. I think so. I don't think you could live with a person, I don't think
you could visit his home, I don't think you could see him in daily contacts and
know the work he was doing, without being as certain as you could be about any-
thing about another program.
Q. In the course of all your dealings with Mr. Service have you ever had any
occasion to beileve that he was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer? —
A. Not the slightest.
Q. Have you ever had any occasion to question his loyalty to the United
States?— A. Not the slightest.
Q. Were you familiar with the political reporting which Mr. Service was doing
both while he was attached to the Embassy prior to August 1943, and there-
after while he was attached to General Stilwell's staff doing political report-
ing?— A. I think I am in a particularly good position to comment on that because
when I was at the Embassy I was in the political reporting section, and the
reports of Mr. Service which were submitted to General Stilwell; that is, copies
of the reports which were submitted to General Stilwell were also submitted by
Mr. Service to the Embassy, and the same thing was true of other officers that
we had on similar details, and also officers that we had as Embassy observers
in these outlying posts which were not consulates, they were simply stationed
in various provincial cities as Embassy observers, they were all forwarded to
the Embassy, and it was my job to summarize them ; that is, in a covering dis-
patch to submit to the Department and to add any comment that the Embassy
might want to. I might add that all those covering dispatches, obviously, were
signed by the Ambassador himself. So that during that period from August
1943, or even earlier when Mr. Service was in Lanchow — he was earlier sta-
tioned in Lanchow as one of those Embassy observers, of course, I saw all the
reports that he wrote. We transmitted all of them, or practically all of them
to the Department. We did the same with Mr. Service's reports when he was
attached to General Stilwell's staff, always with a covering dispatch on them.
So I was thoroughly familiar from say the time he went to the field, left Chung-
king and went to Lanchow ; also during the period from August 1943 when he
was attached to General Stilwell's staff up until the middle of June 1944 when
I was transferred to Kumming. It is only since that date I think when I came
back to Washington on home leave in the winter of 1944 and 1945 that I saw sub-
sequent reports that he wrote during that period. I have seen them since then,
but I didn't see them at the time— at a later period.
Q. Now, on the basis of your familiarity with those reports could you tell
the board whether you ever saw any evidence in any of them that Mr. Service
was in any way seeking to defeat or sabotage American foreign policy in
China? — A. I would say definitely not because Mr. Service — I think you have
to go back to tie atmosphere of Chungking during that period which really
started when I was in the Embassy in Chungking. In 1943 you began to see
the signs of decay and the deterioration on the part of the National Govern-
ment, and these things are things that came to us from Chinese within the
Government, even extending to Cabinet members who were distressed about
the situation, and it seems to me that it all boils down to the role of a Foreign
Service officer who was reporting from the field, which is fundamental to our
jobs. You report what you think objectively is the case, and it is up to your
chief, the chief of mission, whether it is the Ambassador or the charge to
transmit that to the Department or to make such comment as you want, and
I know of no indications that Mr. Service was doing anything which would
be contrary to the long-range objectives of this country and I think that was
the general feeling.
I might add at this point, at the risk of having Mr. Service blush, that Mr.
Service was considered the sort of one or two top-ranking political reporting
officers and other China language officers from the standpoint of his compe-
tence and from the point of his knowledge of China, the history, the language,
his almost indefatigable quality of turning out tremendous quantities of work
and extremely valuable work, and I do know we received many commendations
from the Department on his reporting during the period that I was there.
Q. I believe you testified that y< u were consul in Kunming during what
period, Mr. Sprouse? — A. From late June 1944 until lata November 1944, and
then again from the first of September 194." until December, through most of
December 1945, a period of about 4 months each time.
Q. So that you were the consul in Kunming on August 1, 1944? — A. I was
the No. 2 officer. There was a consul general there, and I was the consul.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2177
Q. Who was the consul general? — A. Consul general was Mr. Langdon who
is now consul general in Singapore.
Mr. Achilles. Pardon. Where were you between the time you left Kumming
on that assignment and the time you returned there?
A. I came homo, Mr. Achilles, in late November 1944. I think I had 80 days'
leave and 1 was in the Department under temporary assignment working on
the revision of our China language course for the postwar period. Then, I was
all set to go back to Chungking when I was practically removed from a plane.
I was going up to General Hurley, but was sent to San Francisco — this was
in April 1945 — sent to San Francisco as a member of what they called the
International Secretariat, as the liaison officer with the Chinese delegation —
I think you remember that period, which lasted from some time in April until
early July 1945. Then, I was here during a period of waiting for passage
out — I mean it was a matter of priorities at that point. I think I was here
for say 2 or 3 weeks waiting for a plane out in July and I returned to Kunming
and — this got rather complicated. I returned to Kunming just about VJ-day
on way to Chungking. I was to be sent to one of these observer posts at
Chengtu. The Embassy in Chungking ordered me to stay in Kunming. They
changed their minds at the last minute and sent me to Chengtu, and after 24
hours I was returned to Chungking to take the place of a language officer who
was going out to take on Jap surrender ceremonies, and I took his place on
September 1, 1945, at Chungking.
Q. Now do you know, was Mr. Service attached to the consulate at Kunming
in 1944? — A. As far as I know, Mr. Service was never attached to the consulate.
His brother was attached to the consulate at Kunming sometime in 1944.
Q. I wonder if you can recall a dispatch which was sent from Kunming, No.
58, dated August 1, 1944, entitled: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek — Decline of
His Prestige and Criticism of and Opposition to His Leadership." — A. I think
I can deliver on that because I think, looking at the title, that I wrote it mysell.
Q. Are you reasonably certain of that? — A. Reasonably certain, yes. I might
assemble material over a period of months on this particular subject because
it was on of the things that was important on the China scene, and I know Mr.
Service could not have submitted a dispatch from Kunming in the first place
because he was not assigned there, or detailed there, to my knowledge.
Q. Now referring to Document IT, which is an article appearing in Plain
Talk magazine for October 1946, I should like to read to you a quotation from
page 34 of that article : "The substance of some of Service's confidential mes-
sages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before
they arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of Mr.
Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports entitled 'Gen-
eralissimo Chiang Kai-Shek — Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of and Oj-
position to His Leadership.' " I take it, therefore that you are quite certain
that Mr. Service was not the author of this dispatch No. 58? — A. If it is a report
that was submitted he couldn't possibly have been because I was there during
that period. As I remember, I did not see Mr. Service during the period that
I was at Kunming.
Q. And you think you are the author of a dispatch bearing that title? — A. I
couldn't swear it, hut I remember I did write one sometime during that period
with a title somewhat similar to it.
Q. Now, Mr. Sprouse, at the time Mr. Service was arrested by the FBI on
June 6, 1945, in connection with the so-called "Amerasia Case," certain documents
were found, documents and papers were found in his desk here in the State
Department — among these it appears that there was found "a handwritten
letter dated May 27. 1945, addressed to 'Dear Jack' beginning: 'Kung Hai' etc.,
and ending 'Yours, Phil.' " I wonder if you know from that identification who
was the author of that letter. — A. As a matter of fact. I am certain I can
identify this letter because it is a letter that I think was written on the occasion
of Mr. Service's promotion sometime in maybe April or May 1945, in which I
wrote him congratulating him on his promotion and I can identify it even
more by the enclosure because this thing came to my mind when I saw Mr.
Service in July 1945 when I returned from San Francisco. I might go back
and pick up a little background and explain this letter because Mr. Service
has no connection with this letter except as the recipient.
Q. Well, glad to have you do so, but I am mostly interested in ascertaining
whether you were the author? — A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. And your name is Philip? — A. Yes.
Q. Are you called "Phil" by your friends? — A. Yes. Might I add that "Kung
Hai" means congratulations in Chinese, if that has any pertinence.
2178 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now, another item found in Mr. Service's desk at that time is reported to
have been ;i "handwritten letter" "77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., Decem-
ber 11, 1944" addressed to "Dear Jack, I heard that you were back," etc. contains
the following: P. S. •'heard that Phil is on way here, etc." Do you know anyone
who at that time lived at 77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass.?— A. I can't say
definitely, but it seems to me that there was a Chinese girl named Yang Kang
who was one of the two outstanding Chinese literary figures, that is among the
female side <>f the vista. She was over here on a fellowship of some kind, a
scholarship to Radcliffe and her address was Brattle Street, I am almost cer-
tain. I had known the girl in Chungking. She was literary editor of what was
then the leading Chinese newspaper, the Ta Kung Pao, and she would have been
here during that time, so it is easily possible that this reference is to me during
the time I was in the States.
Q. Were you about to return to the States? — A. I was. I was coming home on
leave during November and December 1944.
Q. So that it seems possible to you at any rate that reference to "Phil" is a
reference to you? — A. It could easily be.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. I understand from your testimony that you were very familiar indeed
with all of Mr. Service's political reporting in China? — A. Very familiar during
the period that I was in Chungking, and then reporting that Mr. Service did
after I left Chungking — when I left in June 1944 I saw those reports subsequently
in the Department.
Q. That reporting was factually accurate, as you remember it? — A. From the
standpoint of facts, I would say it was accurate, because, obviously, in all report-
ing you run into the question of interpretation, judgment, and so forth. I might
not agree with all of it but I never saw any reason — the arguments were equally
valid on all sides and I dare say the same thing is true on what any officer
does there is bound to be a difference of opinion.
O. With respect to the controversy existing between the Nationalist Government
and the Communist forces in China, were the reports impartial? — A. I would
say — of course, there, again, you get into the interpretation. To my mind, they
were largely objective reports, and there might be some conclusions that Mr.
Service reached that I wouldn't agree with ; there might be conclusions that I
reached that he and the Ambassador wouldn't agre° with, but there was never
any feeling on the part of anyone that Mr. Service was doing anything but re-
porting in an objective fashion.
Q. And you saw no indication in that reporting that he was himself pro-
Communist? — A. Not the slightest.
Q. And that, also, is true of your conclusions reached by your conversations
with him? — A. Very definitely, sir.
Q. And your knowledge of his political attitude? — A. Yes, sir.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. The materials which were submitted by Mr. Service to the General he was
attached to, General Stilwell, you stated, I believe, that it was your job to sum-
marize those and transmit them over through the Ambassador? — A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Service at any time request that you dispatch any materials to
the United States other than through normal channels of the Embassy? A. — No,
sir ; never. The only thing we had from Mr. Service were official reports.
Q. That's all.
Questions by Mr. Achit.t.es :
Q. Mr. Sprouse, what were the security restrictions in the Embassy in Chung-
king during 1944 on the transmission of personal mail to the Department? — A.
Well, it seems to me that we bad two means, as well as T remember. One, of
course, was by APO. in which you bad to sign. They were subject to censorship,
of course by the Army itself, in which you bad to sign your name and your title
and the name of your organization. The other means was, I think, by open letter
through the pouch. I can't swear to this, but it seems to me that the Chief of
Chancery had to approve that, and they were forwarded unsealed, so the Depart-
ment itself back here could check on any mail that went through, because you
were always told to be extremely careful because you see these pouches went out
by plane ever the hump into India and you had frequently cases of planes being
downed, and. of course, there was always that chance that a plane would crash
and the mail would be lost, in which case some of this material would fall into
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1279
the hands of either the Japanese or agente of the Japanese, so I would say to that
extent there was a very careful security check on what was sent hack.
Q. Personal mail from people in Chungking sent through the pouch was also
subject to censorship in the Department? — A. If I rememher correctly, we had
to forward mail in a sealed cover, and the letter itself, if it was personal mail,
had to lie forwarded unsealed. I am almost certain of that, hecause I thought it
was a little bit of a vote of nonconfidence in the personnel. Obviously, if they
were in effect in Chungking they must have been in effect with respect to the use
of the Department pouch everywhere.
Q. It has been charged that Mr. Service was in communication from China with
a Mr. Philip J. Jaffe in the United States. Can you ever recall seeing any com-
munication of Mr. Service in China with Mr. Jaffe V — A. No, sir; never.
Q. Do you ever recall him mentioning the name Jaffe? — A. No, sir; never re-
member the name even being mentioned.
Q. That's all.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. There were certain differences of opinion between the Embassy staff and
General Hurley. — A. I didn't serve under General Hurley, sir, and I can answer
only by sort of second hand, but I know that there definitely were, because Mr.
Hurley apparently charged that people on the Embassy staff were sabotaging his
policy. That came out in his hearings here in December 1945.
Q. But you were during that period A. I left Chungking in June '44 and
I think General Hurley came out in August or September '44. I was in the
Consulate General at that point. The first time that I saw General Hurley
was when he passed through Kunming on his way back to the United States.
I think maybe sometime in that fall, I'm not certain, I saw him at the airport —
my consul general and I went out to the airport.
Q. That was after you ceased seeing Mr. Service's reports? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. No further questions.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I would like to ask just one more question : Do you recall, Mr. Sprouse,
whether after Mr. Service was detached from the Embassy and attached to the
headquarters of the commanding general of the theater he had free personal
access to the files of the Embassy? — A. If I remember correctly, he did not. It
seems to me the Ambassador took the stand — I can't swear to this, again, but
it is a sort of ha/.y memory — that the people on General Stilwell's staff who
were his political advisers were not a part of the Embassy staff as such, and
if they wanted things out of the file they had to get permission to get them.
They didn't have access to the files in the sense that the regular Embassv staff
did.
Q. When you say "get permission," is it your recollection that they would
ask some one of the officers of the Embassy to obtain the information that they
desired for transmission back to Army Headquarters. — A. Yes. I would say
they would either have to go to the Ambassador or to me or to someone in the
political section.
Q. That's all.
Ihe Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sprouse.
[Mr. Philip D. Sprouse left the meeting at this time.]
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327,
which is a receipt signed by the Assistant Treasurer of the American Institute
of Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for
the year ending February 1951 in the amount of $15.
(Received and marked "Document 327 — Exhibit 19.")
The Chairman. The meeting will recess now.
(The meeting recessed at 12 : 30 ». m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case or Mr. John Stewart Service
Date : Wednesday, May 31, 1950
10 : 25 a. m. — 1 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building,
Washington, D. C.
2180 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Reporter : Violet R. Voce, Dept. of State, C/S — Reporting.
Members of board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur
G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruckelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 10: 25 a. m. )
The Chairman. (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session.
Thereupon Mr. Emmanuel S. Larsen, being produced, sworn, and examined as
.a witness in behalf of the Loyalty Security Board, testified as follows:
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Your name is Emmanuel S. Larsen? — A. Yes, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.
Q. And you spell that with two "m's"? — A. Yes.
Q. You're a voluntary witness in this case at the request of the Board, is that
right? — A. That is right, yes.
Q. Desiring to be of as much assistance to the Board as you can? — A. Yes.
Q. You were taken to China at a very early age, were you not? — A. Yes, I
believe I went in 1906. My father went out there as a professor in the old
Imperial Chinese — of what was equivalent to a university at that time — Keo
Teng Hsich Tang. That is Tang.
Q. You were then about 11 years old? — A. No, I was about 9 years old.
Q. And your father was a teacher in this university that you mentioned? — A.
Yes.
Q. You remained there until you went to college?— A. No, I remained there
until 1911, early part of 1911, when the revolution broke out in China.
Q. And then you went to college in Copenhagen? — A. Then my father went to
Copenhagen to visit his old mother and he took over the management of a school
on a 5-year contract, so the family got stuck in Denmark for 5 years.
A. And during that period?— A. And during that period I completed high
school and took my B. A. from Copenhagen University.
Q. Then in 1915 or thereabouts you returned? — A. In 1915, in May.
Q. You returned to China with your father? — A. I returned to the United
States with my father.
Q. And then did you go to China? — A. Then I worked for some time for Mar-
shall Fields & Co., in their oriental department. I was in the appraising depart-
ment because of what remained of my knowledge of Chinese characters. And
from there I went to China in October 1916 to join the Chinese Postal Admin-
istration as a Junior Assistant.
Q. And you remained in China until 1935? — A. Yes, I remained until 1935. I
was home on two occasions in between.
Q. And would you roughly outline for the Board your occupation in China
from 1916 to 1935?— A. From 1916 to the end of 1927 I was with the Postal
Administration, stationed in Canton a year and in Chengtu a year, my old
boyhood home, and a few months in Shanghai. I had resigned to go home to
the war but when I got to Shanghai the armistice was signed and I was in
North China in Taiyuanfu. Then a year in the dh'ector general post in Peiping
and a year in Taochow and 2 years in Amoy, opposite Formosa, and home on
leave 1 year, 1923 to 1924. And a year in Hangchow as postal accountant, and
then approximately 2 years in Mukden as postal accountant and the deputy
commissioner for South Manchuria.
While on a vacation, a hunting trip in 1927, I met a Mongolian lama in Man-
churia, Inner Mongolia, Chinese educated, who took a liking to me for some
reason or other and invited me to come up there and start a wool and skin
export company. At the same time he gave me an advisorship in which capacity
I was to build some roads and put up two sheep ranches and import some
Merino ruins, some trucks and tractors, some seeds, and so on, a small tannery.
I was with him from January 1, 1928, until about October of the same year.
In the meantime, the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, had been Assassinated
and there was a change of officials and a rather pro-Japanese group came
into Taonan, the town in which I made my headquarters in Inner Mongolia.
They horsewhipped me in the street and let me know very emphatically that
no Americans were wanted around that area.
So I left, went down to Tientsin, and William B. Christian, of the British-
American Tobacco Co., appointed me to go to Peiping to be acting traffic manager
of the British-American Tobacco Co. at their railway junction near Peiping,
called Fengtai. I was with them from October 14, 192S, until March of 1934.
I forget the exact date when I left. At that time reloading at the Fengtai
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2181
junction was no longer necessary and I was ordered transferred to Hankow, but
I did not care to go to Hankow and I resigned and was given a bonus by Mr.
Christian and sent home.
Q. That was in 1935?— A. In 1934, March.
Q. During that period while you were in China, did you at any time know
John Stewart Service? — A. Yes, I did, but very, very slightly.
Q. When was that? — A. That was approximately 1907 or 1908. My old resi-
dence in Chengtu, when I was a boy, was flooded and Mr. Robert Service, John's
father, very kindly took us in as refugees for a day or so. I think we were there
one or two nights and, as far as I remember, the baby in Mrs. Service's arms was
John Stewart, with whom I did not conspire at that time.
Q. That was the only occasion that you met him during your period in China? —
A. Yes. I don't believe I ever met him in China after that.
Q. Now, after your return from China to the United States, you went with
the Office of Naval Intelligence? — A. Yes. first I went to the Library of Con-
gress on that Rockefeller scholarship project, I think it was called, the writing
up of the Ching Dynasty biographies and the translation of Chinese history.
And I held that for about a month and a half.
Then I was approached by Naval Intelligence. I had not made any appli-
cation to them. And that was at the time when Admiral Ellis Zacharias was
a commander and was in charge of the Far Eastern Desk.
Q. What year was that?— A. That was October 1935.
Q. And you were with the Office of Naval Intelligence for some time? — A. Un-
til August 31, 1944.
Q. For some 9 years, in other words? — A. Nine years, approximately.
Q. Then you went with the State Department? — A. Yes.
Q. In 1934?— A. In 1944.
Q. And you were with the State Department about a year? — A. About a year,
yes.
Q. In the State Department you were country specialist in the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs? — A. Yes.
Q. And did you, in connection with your year in the State Department, know
or meet John Stewart Service? — A. Yes, I did on two occasions. One day after
the Far Eastern Division meeting I was introduced to him by Mr. Ballantine.
I just managed to say "How do you do," that is all.
Q. And the other occasion? — A. The other occasion was when we went to
lunch one day. I think Mr. John Carter Vincent asked me to go to lunch with
him.
Q. And those were the only two occasions when you met him? — A. Those were
the only two occasions.
Q. The only occasions that you had occasion to meet with him or to hear
him?— A. That is right.
Q. Now, after you returned to the United States you engaged in a voluntary
collection of Chinese data on your own account, did you not? — A. Yes, sir. I
would prefer to correct the first few words, "after your return to the United
States." I started that in 1923, early in 1923. At that time Sun Yat-sen's
revolutionary group in Canton and his army headed by Chiang Kai-shek as
the rebel group by the Peiping Government that I operated under as postmaster
of Amoy. And the postal administration, that is the director general of the
postal administration, wrote me a letter and said "Go down and meet these peo-
ple and try to find out who they are and how many of them have been affiliated
with communism in Russia." And I took a small camera I had and went down
and I ate with them and went on a hunting expedition with them and in gen-
eral just hung around them until they almost got fed up with me. But during
that period I managed to collect background material on biographies of about
55 of the leaders of that movement.
Q. That became a hobby with you? — A. That became a hobby. After some
time I was told by Peiping to drop it. Instead of throwing my carbon copies
away I set up a card system and used it later in China. From time to time
I added to it. I gave the American military attache, Colonel Drysdale, the bene-
fit of that file and also used it and augmented it at a later date, which I forgot
to mention, in 1934 and 1935, very late in 1934 and 1935 when I worked for the
Chinese military gendarmerie.
Q. In that connection or in some connection, in March 1944 were you intro-
duced to one Philip J. Jaffe? — A. Yes. In March 1944.
Q. Was that the correct date? — A. I don't remember whether that was March
1944.
2182 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Would you give such date as you remember? — A. Yes. It may be
thereabouts.
Q. Were you introduced to Mr. Jarre by one Lieutenant Roth? — A. Yes, that
is right. I was in Naval Intelligence then.
Q. You were then working for the Office of Naval Intelligence? — A. Yes.
Q. After meeting Mr. Jaffe, from time to time you exchanged information
with him? — A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell the Board the circumstances of that, Mr. Larsen? — A. You
mean the meeting, the first meeting with Jaffe?
Q. Yes, and go on from there and tell the arrangements you made with
Jaffe. — A. Andrew Roth came to my desk one day and asked me whether I was
going out to lunch and I said "Yes," and he said "Well, let's go out together."
That was a very common practice, as I'm sure it is in most offices. At the time I
had complete faith in the integrity and character ef Andrew Roth because he
was a naval officer in uniform and I went with him. We walked up Seventeenth
Street and he asked me whether I still kept up my card file. I said '•Yes.*'
He said "Do you have much on the Chinese Communists?" and I told him "No,
1 don't." He said "I know a man. I just want to ask you, do you know Philip
Jaffe?" I said "No, I don't know him, but I seem to know the name though."
He said "He is the publisher and the editor of the Amerasia magazine." And I
told him "Yes, I think I have seen it there, the name." "He has been in China
and has been living among the Communists and has collected quite a bit of ma-
terial and he has a hobby very much like yours," he said. "He collects bio-
graphical material. Would you care to meet him?" I said "Certainly, that is
the way I build up my file." He said "Well, let's go to the Statler Hotel. He
is in town today and I'm sure he would like to meet you."
Why, I didn't think there was anything strange about that at the time. And
when I met Jaffe we had lunch. We talked over the manner in which I had
built up my file and I told him I would be very eager to exchange material with
him. We made a system whereby he would come to Washington once in a while
or if he had anything special he woxild write to me. He never did write to me,
though. And we would then hand each other lists of persons we were inter-
ested in, particularly information we required on persons. And we began that,
oh, I believe it was probably July.
Q. In 11)44? — A. Yes, 1944. I remember there was quite a lapse of time before
he came down the first time. And I gave him a great number of duplicates I had.
Q. Duplicates of what? — A. Of my cards, the Chinese personnel cards, some
Mongolians, some special cards on Japanese spies among the Mohammedan
population in northwest China, and miscellaneous things, Tibetans, Indians also.
Q. Did you from time to time show Mr. Jaffe certain documents which you
had in your possession? — A. I did on a few occasions, yes.
Q. And some of those documents were reports from Mr. John Service? — A.
That I don't know. I doubt whether there were any reports. It may be there
was one — if Mr. Service wrote material on personalities 1 would say there
might have been some, but I don't remember that.
Q. Well, you had previously been interrogated by the FBI on this subject,
haven't you? — A. Very emphatically, yes; very much so.
Q. And you gave a written statement to the FBI? — A. Yes ; I did.
Q. Did you not state in that statement that among the documents you. showed
Mr. Jaffe were some classified documents written by John Service? — A. I have
no copy of that and I do not remember exactly what was said. That is on the
night of June 6, 1945. I would have to refresh my memory from that document,
if it is available.
Q. Well, what is your recollection? Some of these papers are confidential
and the Board can't reveal the papers themselves. But I'd like to get your
recollection, your best recollection, if you did not show some classified documents
written by John Service to Jaffe. Just give me the benefit of your recollection. —
A. No; I cannot say that I did not. I showed him some in November 1944.
Specifically, I remember there was a change of government in Chungking and
there were a great number of charges hurled against the Chiang Kai-shek gov-
ernment that it constituted no more than "old faces and new windows." Well,
there was a report to that effect from the field, giving a very excellent descrip-
tion of the various men who came into the government and some erroneous
material. I remember I checked it as quite faulty in spots but that was inevitable.
There are false spots in all reports. And I discussed that with Philip Jaffe when
he came to my house. And I made the indiscreet blunder of allowing him to see it.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2183
He asked me if he could take it with him because it was too long to just jot
down notes from. He wanted some of that information. It was not secret.
I would challenge the secrecy of that particular dispatch and many others on
the grounds that I think a secret document constitutes knowledge that is re-
stricted to a few and is not to be given to the general public. That would he
very good if it were so but if the information, the knowledge contained in the
document, is popular and public knowledge, knowledge for, say, a month or so,
and it is known generally to 475,000,000 people, it is not imp rtant as a secret
in a document. Of course I did not have the authority to declassify documents.
So in such instances, as I told the FBI right at the beginning: Yes; I'm guilty
of an indiscretion in that matter. And I would prefer to tell the truth and then
I feel that I have little reason to worry after that. So if I'm on trial here, I'm
quite willing to repeat those admissions.
Q. I want you to understand you are not trial.— A. I'm glad you say that.
Nevertheless. I want to add, although you have not asked me : Did you, Emmanel
Larsen, give 1,700 or 2,000 or 3,000 documents— it's already pretty old-fashioned
to talk about 1.700 documents. A man is more up to date if he talks about 3,000
documents. But, Mr. Snow, I'll tell you that when this case broke I was per-
mitted by Mr. Hitchcock to see the documents and they were stacked on a table
either two stacks — they must have been 10 or 12 inches high in each, and I said,
"How many are there there?" And he said, "There must be three or four hun-
dred." Now, how they grew to 1,700 or 3,000 is entirely a mystery to me. But I'll
refer to them as the 3,000 documents because they are being referred to in that
manner at present by Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Wherry, and various others, Mr.
Ferguson, and people who have questioned me.
Q. With further reference to your statement that you might l>e on trial,
the Board understands that you are seeking to help the Board in the case now
before it and this is not any questioning with reference to yourself at all —
A. Oh, I'm sorry ; I realize that.
Q. I'm reading from a statement which you made and signed and gave to
the FBI, as you have testified. — A. I see.
Q. On June 7, 1945? — A. Yes; it probably was June 7. It was early in the
morning.
Q. And in that statement you state : "Of the classified documents that I have
shown to Mr. Jaffe I remember some written by Mr. John Service." — A. I did
write that. I have forgotten some of those things.
Q. "On the subject of Communist relations with the Chinese Central Govern-
ment."— A. Yes ; that may he.
Q. "I helieve those documents were mostly classified as confidential and
I showed them to Mr. Jaffe because he had known them in advance." Do you
remember making that statement?— A. Yes: that is right. He said at one time
to me that he knew of that entire story. I cannot say for sure whether he
stated to me that he had seen the document or had received a copy of fthe
document or that he had a copy of the document, but he intimated that he
knew of that report.
Incidentally, let me add this — and I'm not adding this in defense of anyone,
because the implication clearly is here that someone else had given him such
a report or a similar report or a report paralleling the official report, and there
has been a great deal of misunderstanding among all the people who have investi-
gated the Amerasia case.
In a discussion with Senator Ferguson, I believe it was, I pointed out that
any intelligence work or any field work by State Department or other American
officials in the field would necessarily depend upon other men not in the State
Department who work in the field. There is very little in the way of a first-
hand report hecause, if you knock it down, the first-hand report means that
you, Mr. Snow, are sitting here and you see me and see what I do and ihear
what I say. But if I do these things down on G Street you will have to depend
on a second-band report. And it was the practice — I'm sure Mr. Service will
not deny that — that when, let us say, Mr. Service was back in Chungking —
he had been in Yenan and had followed the political development there — and
he was back in Chungking. Naturally he was interested in the continuity of
the development he had been studying and reporting on.
Then let us say that Correspondent Smith comes hack. Naturally Mr. Service
will set hold of Mr. Smith and find out what the developments are. I doubt
very much whether he would definitely refuse to put into his report the material
that Mr. Smith gave him. Mr. Smith, on the other hand, is going to send that
2184 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
report home. Mr. Service's report may be a paraphrase of Mr. Smith's findings,,
his general findings.
I don't make the following as an accusation but this manner of reporting
works in reverse too. If Mr. Service goes to Yenan and comes back there is
nothing criminal about that. I have done it. I have been in intelligence work
plenty in my life and there is nothing criminal in contacting a newsman in
Chungking and saying, "Look; here is what I find. Some of these things I'm.
not quite clear about. What is the background of this," and so on. Well, a
reporter with a good photostatic mind can record even without scribbling on
paper the essence <f Service's findings; whether be did that or not, I don't
know. But that i:' my presumption, that I have given as a theory of why reports
were frequently similar.
I remember when I was in Naval Intelligence a naval attache sent in a very-
confidential report on something that was not at all confidential because hundreds
of thousands of Chinese knew about it. Nevertheless, a report came in and was
published in the papers. The same time I was reading it at my desk it was
published in the newspapers. One of our better reporters will give it in exactly
the same way. Some call it collusion. But — what the heck — the men work out
there and they get the material. That is the main point.
Q. Was it in that spirit that you exchanged this information with Mr. Jaffe? —
A. Yes.
Q. Let me read one more sentence to see if you recall it : "I loaned him, to-
peruse, — such reports that I thought would not harm." Correct? — A. Correct.
That is right.
Q. "They were recent documents, all March 1945, relating to the position of
the Chinese Central Government and Communist forces in the Province of
Shansi?— A. That is right.
Q. "Some of them were classified and others were not classified and they were
official copies." — A. That is right. They were copies.
Q. In that connection, and in order that you may be of as much service as
possible to the Board in this connection, I'm going to show you certain papers,,
certain official papers, which were originally drafted by Mr. Service and copies
of which were found among Mr. Jaffe's papers at the time he was arrested. I'm
going to show you these papers to see if you can help the Board by identifying
any of these papers as the papers which you may have seen or may have let
Mr. Jaffe see. Would you help the Board in that way? — A. Yes; I would.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. May I ask a question. Just as a matter of clearing my mind on a few
of the points I'd like to ask you this : When you were in Naval Intelligence, you
were then working on the China desk over there, were you, Mr. Larsen? — A. Yes ;
China desk and Manchuria.
Q. You had access there to materials from what sources — just Navy, or State
and Navy, and all the rest of the sources concerning such matters? — A. First of
all I'd like to tell you that I had access to no secret material because I was not
in uniform. That statement may be verified from Naval Intelligence. I had
access to no secret information. When they had secret information and they
brought it to a civilian analyst they did it in a very funny way. Sometimes there
was garbled information that required the attention of a man who knew Chinese.
They they would bring the report and cut a hole in the piece of paper and cover
up everything but the pertinent part and very often I would tell these officers
"I can't handle the thing out of context. I have to see a little more of the text
to know what it is before I can handle it." Well, they would have to go back
and get authority to let a civilian analyst see a secret and top-secret report and
telegram.
Q. .My question is the information that came to you came from sources other
than the Navy? — A. I know. I remember your question, sir. I'm coming to
that. The information coming to me emanated from, let us say, practically all
departments. There were some from the State Depart ment. some from OSS, some
from VY:ir Department, some from Commerce Department, and some from
Treasury Department.
Q. When you joined the Department did you know persons over here prior to
your coming? When you joined the Department of State did you have contacts
with them in connection witli your work prior to joining the Department of
State's staff?— A. Official contacts?
Q. Yes ; official contacts. — A. Well. I can only say that I went, officially from
the Navy Department to the State Department on a few occasions to see a man bv
the name of Boggs who was the chief geographer. I worked on maps in Naval
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVEST! CATION 2185
Intelligence. But I don't believe I was ever sent officially, nor did I go over pri-
vately, to contact them about any work.
Q. In connection with your employment in the Department of State, will you
explain to me just what the job was that yon held over here, under whose direction
you worked, the things that will let me get the picture in my mind as to where you
were located and how you were there provided the tools with which to do your
work. I mean the flow of materials. — A. When 1 went over to the State Depart-
ment in September 1944 I was classified as country specialist, and it was a
research unit that I was attached to that was under orders to scrutinize current
events and make basic postwar policy.
Q. Where was that unit located in the Department? — A. It was located in
the Walker- Johnson Building, up here on New York Avenue.
Q. It was under the administrative direction of what section, sir? — A. Well, I
understand that we were first under the political — I forgot the correct title of
that, hut this was under Mr. Pasvolsky, Leo Pasvolsky. But then, as far as I
remember. January 1 we were made the Research and Planning Unit of the Far
Eastern Division and we worked directly under Joseph W. Ballantine, who was
the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
Q. Was Mr. Ballantine's office and the principal desk officer's office located
in the Walker-Johnson Building? — A. No; they were located in the other
building, on the other side of New York Avenue.
Q. In the main State Department Building? — A. Yes: in the main State De-
partment building. And we went over there three or four times a week and held
policy meetings in the meeting room next to his office. The head of the Research
Unit was Dr. George Blakeslee.
Q. The information that you utilized in your work came to you to Dr. Blakeslee,
or to whom? How did you get that information? — A. I came to Dr. Blakeslee
and Mr. Hugh Borton.
Q. And they routed it to you, or did it come automatically to you, when it hit
there? — A. Well, secret and such highly confidential material would come on in
and we would have very little time to study it. The messenger would wait for
it and we generally had to sign a little slip "Received" and the "Returned," giving
the exact minutes it took us to read it.
Q. That information was not left in your possession to study, sir? — -A. No ; not
if it was in original and we would sign or initial the originals and that is why our
initials also are on all originals.
Q. Supposing it had been reproduced? — A. Then I could request a copy of the
division would request copies. And then they would send sometimes several
copies. I never knew exactly why they sometimes sent two or three copies.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Could you tell us why you happened to transfer from Navy to the State
Department? — A. Well, it was sort of a combination of circumstances. One
thing that I must say was decisive was that I was a P-5 in the Navy Department
and I was told that I could never rise above that. That would be the limit
placed on civilian research analysts. And I think you will agree that every
man has a right to have a little ambition. And I though it over and it worked
on my mind for a long time and I thought what the heck,, to work as a P-5 and
sit the rest of my life at this sanie desk here and do the same thing — well, I
tried in June 1943 to join the Army to get a majority and become a lecturer on
intelligence systems in the Charlottesville Military Government School. But
Commander Martin, a friend of mine in the Navy, talked me out of it at the last
minute, just a few days before I went over to get commissioned, and they got
me an increase. So I stayed. Then in 1944 I happened to go in to see Mr.
Hornheck. I've known him for many years, since 1924.
Q. Mr. Hornheck was then? — A. He was in State. He was not the Chief of
the Far Eastern Division any longer. He said "I don't know that I can do
anything for you." I mentioned to him "Is there any chance of me coming
over to the State Department to work?" He said "I think there is a vacancy
in that Research and Planning Unit if you would like to" apply for it. But I
certainly can't give you any encouragement." And I made application and
told him "Navy Intelligence will block it, so I don't think anything will come
out of it." He said "If they want to get you they can transfer you by Executive
order."
So I came in a few days later and Dr. Blekeslee and Mr. Hugh Borton sent
for me. And they questioned me for several hours in the manner in which I
would go about a postwar settlement of Manchuria.. That was, so to speak,.
2186 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
my examination subject with particular references to how Japanese private
investment in Manchuria should be handled. And I broke down various classi-
fications, those that had been grabbed from the Chinese and given to the Japanese
and those that had been legally bought, and so on. He paid my judgment was
very fair and he liked my attitude and he said he would recommend me.
The next day I was going on 2 days' leave. I had a lot of leave accumulated
and we went down to my wife's home near Roanoke and when I came back my
colleague in the Navy Department called me to his unit and he said "Jimmie,
how do you like being a member of the State Department," and I said, "I don't
know." He said, "Well, you are. An order came down Friday or Saturday
saying that you had been transferred by Executive order." So it all happened
very easily like that.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Now, you have mentioned occasions on which you got copies of these papers,
these classified papers. Those papers, I take it, you could retain? — A. Yes;
retain or destroy. They were always mine.
Q. And among those were the copies you have testified Mr. Jaffe borrowed on
some occasions to look over? — A. Yes.
Q. Who was A. S. Chase? Was he connected with your State Department
employment? — A. He was after Mr. John Carter Vincent became Chief of the
China Desk, Mr. Chase — no, that is not right. Let's see, Mr. Ballantine was
Chief of the Far Eastern Division and Mr. Vincent was Chief of the China
Desk and Mr. Chase was the assistant.
Q. Did you get some of these copies through him? — A. Oh, no.
Q. Now, then, I'm going to show you first a paper which is known as Service
Report No. 14 on Chinese Communist Party views on Mongolia, dated March
16, 1945, and known in this proceeding as Document 217, and ask you if you
ever saw that report? — A. No, I'm sure I never saw that report.
Q. Now I'll show you a
Mr. Achilles. You mean the substance of the report or the original?
A. I'll read it more carefully now. There are certain things in here. I was
a member of the Basic Policy Committee concerning Mongolia. I did not write
any papers on Mongolia, so there is a possibility that this went to Mr. Paul
Josslyn and that I did not see this at all. Of course I do not remember this
paper at all. That is the subject that we discussed at the Policy Committee
meeting but I do not remember reading this.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Let me show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of that paper which was
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and see if you ever saw that. — A. That is the
same thing. No.
Q. So you have no knowledge with reference to that paper? — A. No.
Q. I'm going to show you what is known as Service Report No. 13, dated March
16, 1945, on Chinese Communist Party views in Sinkiang, which is known as
Document No. 216 in this proceeding. And I'll ask you if you ever saw that
report? — A. Yes, I think I saw this report. I remember the substance of it.
I can't say for sure that I saw it but I remember the substance of this with
regard to Sheng Shih-tsai. Yes, I remember the substance of this.
Q. Now, I'll show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of that paper, which was
found among Mr. Jaffe's papers, and ask you if you remember seeing that report?
Did you show that report to Mr. Jaffe or allow him to see it or borrow it? —
A. This was March 16, 1945. No, I did not have any copy like this. I did not
work on Sheng Shih-tsai but I took notes from the material coining in regarding
data that would fit into the biography of such men as Sheng Shih-tsai. I did
not take notes of the substance of the report to the extent that I would copy
what was secret. I may mention to you that in all these notes that I took and
in any material that I showed to Jaffe there was never anything that was of
national importance, of military importance, of danger to the Allied Military
<"orps. .
Q. T call your attention to the fact that that report is unclassified. — A. Yes.
Q. And T ask you again if you think you showed that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No;
I did not. I'm pretty sure 1 did not show that to Mr. Jaffe or give it to Mr. Jaffe.
I don't think I handled this beyond seeing it in the Department.
Q. When you say you did not show that report, do you mean also that you
did not show Mm an ozalid copy of that report? — A. Y^es, I'm sure.
Q. Now I refer to Service Report No. 15, dated March 16, 1945, on Chinese
Communist Party Policy on Minorities, which is known as Docunnent No. 218 in
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2187
this proceeding and :isk you if you saw that report? Or did you see an ozalid
copy Of it? That is, by the way, an unclassified report. — A. I remember this
SUbjecl very well. 1 doubt very much whether this is one of the few reports I
gave to JalVe, although it is not Classified it is considerably off the track of my
hobby. I was particularly interested in reports that were originally in person-
ities. biographical material, listing new members of the Government, their back-
ground, the background of their affiliations, their present doings, and so on.
Q. But 1 take it the reports you showed to Jaffe were not necessarily reports
you were so much interested in but were reports in which he was interested in. —
A. I don't know how to reply to that statement. I'm not evading it. You say
you take it that way. He never requested any report from me.
Q. By name you mean? — A. So that would imply that I would have to say to
him "Mr. Jaffe, what are you interested in?" I never did.
Q. How did you find out what to give him or what to show him? — A. Well, in
the course of a discussion concerning a certain man, a certain personality or a
certain list of new Government members. Say my contention was that they were
liberals and definitely a departure from the old composition of the Kuomintang
Cabinet. Mr. Jaffe on several occasions claims they were not at all. And to
enlighten him I brought out my cards and very often I had the same information
far long in advance than that that was sent in. Why was it sometimes my
own wording in it? AVhy? Because when I was in Naval Intelligence I pre-
pared hundreds of cards and sent them out to the military attache, my cards, for
nothing. I gave them as a present to the Navy Department. They sent them
out to Chungking and when the members of the United States Foreign Service
wanted information they could get it from those cards. And their attache stooped
as low as to send in personality reports, verbatim copies of my cards that I had
given him when he went out.
Q. What is your testimony on this particular paper? — A. I remember the subject
but I'm sure I never gave J*:ffe this. May I see the ozalid?
Q. This is a photostat of the ozalid copy of the same paper you have ben look-
ing at and this is a photostat of the paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's poses-
sion. — A. This is a major political discussion and contains very little, if anything,
on personalities. I would normally throw this aside because my hobby, be it ever
so crazy, is personalities. One Congressman, I think, inquired as to whether
I was a screwball on the subject and I told him I was no more screwball on this
than he is a screwball in representing the people of his State.. I had a theory
there that China was not governed particularly by any ideology. Was not, but
it is very much now, and that personalities were very important. The armies
were strictly warlord armies, even during the war, under Chiang Kai-shek. And
I think I quite rightfully maintain that the study of political developments and
the probabilities of this or that development through a study of the personalities
wa s the best way of determining what was going to happen.
Therefore, Mr. Stanton frequently called me and said "Jimmie, grab a cab, go
home and get the cards on so-and-so. I want to see all the dirt you have on that
man, see what we can expect from him as a new Minister or Assistant Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs, what are his past affiliations, whom will he buck,
whom he will stick to, and whom he will not double-cross, and so on.
Q. What is your conclusion on that? — A. I cannot swear to it that I did not
show this, but I'm pretty positive that I did not. It is not in my field. If I
were working here now and I got this I woiild read it with interest concerning
China and I would throw it aside as of no interest to my particular hobby.
Q. Now I'm going to show you Service Report No. 18, dated March 18, 1945.
on Labor and Women's Organizations, which is known in this proceeding as
Document 227, and ask you if you showed that to Jaffe. — A. This is the report
itself?
Q. Yes, this is the report itself. Did you ever see that or an ozalid copy of
it? — A. No, sir; I don't think I ever saw that.
Q. Well, just as a further check on that I'll also show you a photostat of the
ozalid copy of that which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. No, no. Labor
organizations, no; don't know it. I don't know that document at all. I don't
remember seeing it ever.
Q. I now show you what is known as Service Report No. 16, dated March IT,
19-15 on the subject of relief and rehabilitation organizations, known in this pro-
ceeding as Document No. 291, and ask you if you have seen that or an ozalid copy
of that report? — A. I never saw that. I have no idea of Mr. Arnold. I never
was introduced to the intricacies of UNRRA while I was in the State De-
partment.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 45
2188 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I'm also handing you an ozalid copy of that, a photostat of an ozalid copy
of that, which was found among Mr. Jaffe's possessions, and ask you if you
snowed that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No; you see there were policy meetings in which
Mr. Moffat was very active that concerned deeper political problems that were
of current interest, political and economic problems. I was not present at those
meetings. I did not handle this. This subject would not come to me, at least
as I remember it, it did not.
Q. Now I show you what is known as Service Report No. 17, dated March 17,
1945, on Communist territorial claims, known in this proceeding as Document
No. 220, and ask you if you saw that ? — A. No ; I don't remember the story or
the importance of the area to our military observers. I doubt whether this would
ever have been routed to me in the regular course of events.
Q. I'll also show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same paper and two
typed copies of the same paper and ask if you recall showing or loaning to Mr.
Jaffe such papers?— A. Implying that I typed the copies, you mean?
Q. No, no implication at all. I'd just like your information on the subject.
Did you type copies sometimes — A. I typed a copy of one, viz, Sun Fo's speech,
which was highly confidential until after it was published in the newspapers.
Q. Do you recall handling any of those? — A. I do not recall handling them.
Q. I now pass you Service Report No. 21, dated March 21 1945, on the treat-
ment of Kwangsi clique. I will also show you the photostat of an ozalid copy
of the same paper and the photostat of a typed copy of the same paper, which
was found among Mr. Jaffe's possessions. — A. That is an original, but this was
not found in Jaffe's possession.
Q. That is right, only the ozalid and the typed copy were found. — A. I remem-
ber the report but I'm pretty sure that I didn't have any copy of this. Li Tsung-
jen and Pai Chung-Hia were my two particular hobbies. I remember the sub-
stance of this report. There probably were a number of reports on this subject,
both Military Intelligence, Navy Intelligence. State Department, and OSS, on
the subject of the treatment of Kwangsi clique, the shabby treatment of the
Kwangsi commanders Li and Pai who came up north to help Chiang fight the
Japanese in spite of the fact that up until the middle of 1936 they had been in
violent opposition to Chiang. And I personally was a sympathizer with the two
because I know General Pai personally and had the inside story of his life
from him.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. In this connection you say there were reports from other sources? — A. Yes,
there were other reports. This was a favorite subject and the reports were true.
Q. Those reports came over your desk from the other sources as well ? — A. Yes,
I have seen reports on that. They must have come over my desk because I
remember seeing a number of reports on this subject, but I can't say that this
one here — I don't know whether I ever took this report home. I took a great
many reports home and I took them back. I had a gold badge and I was entitled
to take them home. Many of these reports were extremely long and if I sat and
read, say, 40 reports in the office it would be 4 : 30 and then I wouldn't have done
a stroke of work. Therefore I took them home and I lay on my couch with a
cup of coffee and my pipe and I read them and 1 made annotations — naturally
the copies and not the originals — in the margin where I compared them with my
cards and when I thought they were a little bit off on the information and where
I found information that was vital to the correct analysis of that man I very often
took little data, not in the way of a long discussion but the exact data of whom
he was affiliated with, and so on.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Would you look at the ozalid copies, the photostats of the ozalid copies and
of the typed copies and let us know if by chance you showed them to Mr. Jaffe? —
A. I don't know, but I'll volunteer a method of chocking it. I still have the type-
writer. I don't type as well as this here. I still have the typewriter and I can
see at a glance I didn't type this. But I still have the typewriter that I have
had during the last 12 or 13 years and you're welcome to check this with my
tyi>ewriter.
Q. Rut it is your opinion that it is not your typewriter? — A. It is my opinion,
yes.
Mr. Stevens. How about the ozalids?
A. No more than the original.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2189
Q. It is your opinion that you did not let Mr. Jaffe see the ozalid? — A. I did not.
I'll tell you when I come to one that I think I can remember showing him. I
have not denied to you that there were such, and I have nothing in particular to
hide.
Q. That is the assistance the Board is seeking from you. — A. The secrecy, with-
out any intention of casting aspersions on the Loyalty Board, of these hearings
I'm considerably disillusioned about because when I went before the Hobbs
committee they told me, "You can say anything you know and you can even tell
us things you don't know but which are opinions and little things you have
heard and little gossip and this and that and tell it all to us and we are not
asking you to certify anything or to put it together, but we will do that. We may
have other parts of the .iigsaw puzzle." And I spoke rather freely and the testi-
mony was published and has become public property. So far as that is concerned,
I'm beginning to doubt whether any testimony can in the long run be secret.
Q. Well, you will give us the benefit of your knowledge without respect to
secrecy, would you not? — A. Yes, I will. However, I must tell you I'll be ex-
tremely cautious in repeating things I have heard because I don't wish to involve
anyone. I think it's extremely unfair to involve anyone in this huge mess and
I heard so many things and they are of little value. I would like to stick to facts.
Q. Let me say with reference to the policy of this Board that this proceeding
is a confidential proceeding and the Board does not make public any transcript
of that hearing. However, a copy of the transcript is given to counsel for Mr.
Service and we can, of course, make no promise that it will not be made known
because Mr. Service can make any disposition of it, as he sees fit. That is the
policy of this Board. — A. I'm really not worried about it. I just made the
point to show that I'm aware of that.
Q. Now, then, I will show you Service report No. 19, dated March 19, 1945,
on the Kuomintang exile governments, which is known in this proceeding as
Document No. 221. Did you see that report? — A. I don't remember seeing that.
Q. I'll also show you the photostat of an ozalid copy of the same report which
was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you let Mr. Jaffe see that
ozalid copy or take it. — A. No. This is purely theory on whether those newly
established little Shen Kan-Ning local governments were bona fide governments
or just a sort of sham. I didn't go into that, nor did I use it for my official
work in the State Department.
Q. We won't need to have the contents of the article described because we
already have that in the record, so you won't need to outline it, except as you
need to to make your answers understandable. — A. Yes.
Q. I now show you photostats of two typed copies and carbon of a Time
article by Mr. Theodore White, which has no number in this proceeding. It
appears to be a MID document. These are photostats of the papers which were
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. No ; I certainly never saw this. This was a
manuscript of an article for Time magazine, apparently.
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder if this document has any kind of a reference document
number that can be used.
The Chairman. It may be referred to as Q-211.
Mr. Rhetts. Could we have some other number that isn't repeated?
The Chairman. J-139-F.
Mr. Rhetts. All right.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Did you see that? — A. No; quite honestly and certainly I don't know this
one.
Q. And you never let Mr. Jaffe have it? — A. I don't think I ever handled it
or saw it.
Q. I now show you a photostat of two typed copies and a carbon of a docu-
ment known in this proceeding as 157 on Kuomintang China and the American
policy. The original is an OSS paper. I'll show you the original and photo-
stats of copies that were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. This is an original
here?
Q. Yes : that is the original. — A. Of course reports came in in that purple ink.
No ; particularly with reference to this statement here. It's an interesting point
but I never did say this. I have not seen this document. It is a secret OSS
document and I doubt whether it would come to me. This copy ; no, sir.
Q. I now show you what is known A. I may mention OSS sent very few
documents to the State Department, as far as I was concerned, when I was in the
State Department. It was very rarely that I saw an OSS document. When it
2190 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
was, it was generally something heavily loaded with personalities and my col-
leagues promptly gave it to me and told me I could do with it whatever I liked.
"This is your hobby, we are not interested in it," they would say.
Q. I now show you two documents known as Service Reports No. 3 and No. 7,
dated October 4, 1944, on Chinese Communist Political Views. These two copies
are known in this proceeding as Document No. 1G6 and are photostats of typed
copies from MID. — A. I wouldn't get them in the first place. No material was
received indirectly. I would never receive State Department material from MID.
Q. Well, would you look at this and see if you recognize it? I'll show you the
original paper and photostats of two typed copies found in Mr. Jaffe's posses-
sion.— A. Th original of the State Department papers, the dispatch, I have seen.
Q. You have seen that? — A. Yes, I have seen that. I know that report. The
remarks of Guenther Stein and Maurice Votaw ; yes, I remember it very clearly.
This would normally have come to me in the Naval Intelligence Office where I was
in July 1944.
Q. Is it your recollection that it did come to you ? — A. Yes ; I remember this.
It is Mr. Gauss's report.
Q. Would you look at the photostats of the typed copies and let us know
whether you showed that or loaned that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No. I never received
photostats in this form here.
Q. No ; don't misunderstand me. You aren't supposed to have received the
photostats. The photostats are just the possession of the Board. The question
is whether or not you handed the typed copies of which that is a photostat. —
A. Oh, I see. That is possible, because that is one question I discussed with him.
I asked him about the reliability of these men. That was the first indication I
received that Mr. Jaffe was very close with the various reporters out there, as
listed here, viz, Mr. Epstein, Maurice Votaw, and one other — Guenther Stein.
Q. So you may possibly have given that report to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I may possibly
have shown him this or shown him entries in my card file from it. I can't say
for sure. I certainly remember this report. This report I had a great interest in.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. You mentioned a moment ago that your colleagues would send such informa-
tion to you promptly and tell you that this was something that you were inter-
ested in and which they were not interested in. Are you referring to State
Department colleagues, your colleagues in Naval Intelligence, or who? — A. I was
referring in this particular instance to State Department colleagues.
Q. Did the State Department collegaues know that you were taking material
home at night? — A. Yes. My boss even told me one time to take the Korean
policy papers home, and it would have been a very bad thing if the arrests would
have been made when I had the Korean policy papers home. Blakeslee in-
formed the FBI about that and they promptly called him and verified it. ''Did
you on one occasion tell Mr. Larson to take papers home?" He said "Yes, he
brought them back though. We had them the next morning." I had a gold
badge and was entitled to take papers home.
Q. Your colleagues stated to you they were not interested in thein? — A. They
were not interested in personality material.
Q. Did you not mention earlier, sir, that Mr. Stanton would say to you to go
get in a cab A. I do not consider him a colleague in my particular branch.
He was Assistant Director of the Far Eastern Division and he was over in the
Department. When I say "colleagues" I mean those who worked with me on the
Policy Committee and the Research and Planning Unit, viz., Borton, Mr. Josslyn,
Dr. Blakeslee, and Mrs. — what her name was I forget now, the lady who worked
there.
Questions by the Chaibman:
Q. 1 now show you Service Report No. 156, dated November 1". 1943, on the
Willingness of Chinese Leaders to ho Puppets, which is a copy of the original an-1
then I'll also show you a photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession. Did you see this paper anil did yon make its contents known
to Mr. Jaffe? A. No, sir: I don't think so. I don't remember this document.
Q. The paper you're looking at is a Summary of the document.— A. I see. No,
sir.
Q. Do I understand you to say you saw the original? — A. No: I don't think I
over saw this paper, no, sir.
Q. 1 show yon now Service Report No. 5„ dated August 3, 1944, on Communist
Policy Toward the Kuomintang, which is Documenl Xo. 168 in this proceeding,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2191
and ask you if you saw that paper or a typed copy of the same. I give you a
photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you
sec that paper and did you hand a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe? — A. Yes; I remember
seeing thai report. But I don't remember — there is no personality material in
here. It's just the question of whether the Chinese Communists were pursuing
a policy of self-limitation. That was a great problem at that time to me in my
official work.
Q. Tins paper that I'm showing you a photostat of is combined with another
document. — A. Yes: that is right. This document came into the State Depart-
ment, this original, as a report from Mr. Service and had a covering dispatch
from Mr. Gauss. I have not read the paper yet but I believe this is the one.
I shall try to verify it now. This is the one in which Mr. Gauss said he did not
quite agree with Mr. Service.
Q. Will you tell us. after you look at the photostat, if you handed a copy of this
to Mr. Jaffe?— A. No, sir; I did not. I did not hand this to Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Now I pass you Service Report No. 1, dated A. I know this dispatch very
well. It was an important problem at that time.
Q. Now I show you Service Report No. 1, dated Jnly 28, 1944, known as Docu-
ment No. 164 in this proceeding, on The Impressions of the North Shensi Com-
munist Base. — A. I don't remember this report.
Q. I show you the photostat of a handwritten copy of the same report which
was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. I don't remember this report here.
I remember vaguely reading Mr. Service's material in this connection. I think
you would find that one of these came to me and I saw it, but I doubt whether I
even got copies of it. I wouldn't request it.
Q. Your testimony is you did not give that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. Yes, I feel sure of
that.
Q. I also show you Service Report No. 2, dated July 27, 1944, known as Docu-
ment 165 in tins proceeding on the conversations with Mao Tse-tung. I ask if
yon saw that paper or gave a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe? — A. It was written on
August 27, my birthday, the very day when I learned that I was transferred to
the State Department. I had very little to do with it. However, it must have
come in sometime after I was in the State Department. And I do remember the
subject of this report on conversations with Mao-Tse-tung.
Mr. Rhetts. May I interrupt a minute. Are you looking at the right paper?
He now has before him Document 16">, which is a despatch to which there is at-
tached Service Report No. 2 on Conversations with Mao Tse-tung, dated July
28. 1944.
Q. Would you look at that and state whether yon saw it? — A. Mr. Service's
report is as of July 28. covering despatch of August 26. No; sir; this is con-
cerning the station of an officer at Yenan. I did not have anything to do with
that. That was wartime policy. I didn't give a hang whether the station went
down or not. It had nothing to do with me and my work. It had nothing to
do with regard to my hobby on Chinese personalities. So I'm positive I did
not handle this matter at all. I'm sure I never have taken it home and I'm sure
I never have shown it to Mr. Jaffe.
Mr. Morelaxi) [Off the record].
Q. I now show you a document which has no number in this proceeding but
can be identified as Q-268, dated June 12, 1944, Service Report on Economic-
Political Effects of the Japanese Drive, together with a photostat of an oznlid
copy of the same. We have not the original in this case, Mr. Larson. All
we have is the photostat of an ozalid copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's pos-
session. Did you see that? — A. Was this document published in the white
paper, because it's rather fresh in my memory, this sentence that: "The col-
lapse of the Government, even though it would not come soon, might become
only a matter of time." Well, of course that was stated in probably a number
of despatches. That is my only key to recognition of this document here.
You know it's very difficult : I hope you will realize it's very difficult to remem-
ber. I don't have a bad memory at all. I have a particularly good memory
for telephone numbers and dates, historical dates, and Chinese names, but I
can't say that I remember many of these here. In many instances, while I
have said I'm inclined to believe that I have handled this document, it is be-
cause I remember sentences in there that are familiar to me and it's no use
denying that I haven't but it would be very difficult for me to say, yes, I took
that document and showed it to Jaffe. But I'll tell you if I come across one.
I'll repeat that again I'll try to volunteer to say if I did.
2192 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. About this one, do you think you showed this one to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No ; I
did not. I'm sure I did not. I remember the text there but it's outside my
field. It is concerned with the effects on the Chinese Nationalist economy of
the Japanese push down through China. That was a thing that we all had
to consider in naval intelligence. For instance, I was ordered to make general
reports once a month on tlie possible effect within the next few months of the
advance of the Japanese. Well, in a case like this I would have to read a despatch
like that and form an opinion as to whether they were now losing so much revenue
by occupation of the ports that they would not be able to sustain the army and
their general economy.
Q. That is Service report dated September 21, 1944, on charges against Gen-
eral Yen Hsi-shan, which is to be identified as Document 174 in this proceeding. —
A. If this is the story told — now I haven't looked at it yet — if this is the story
told by Michael Lindsay, then I have seen it. General Yen Hsi-shan is a per-
sonal friend of mine. A bigger crook probably does not exist and I have made
a very close study of his life and have written his biography, and I cannot find in
here any reference to Mr. Michael Lindsay. But it seems to be the same story.
No, sir, the other story was expressly — I don't know whether it was written by
Mr. Service or someone else, the story of Yen Hsi-shan's perfidious trickery in
Shansi. The particular charges were — I'm sure Mr. Service will remember the
story
Q. I don't think we need to tell the story here. — A. Well, if I can verify that,
then I'll verify the document. I'm trying to give an example of how I do this
here. No, sir ; this is not the story. This is a different story.
Q. I'll show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same paper and ask you
if you ever gave that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. This is a photostat of an ozalid?
Q. Yes, and I'll ask you if you loaned an ozalid copy of that paper to Mr. Jaffe?
This ozalid was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. No, sir; strike it out. I
don't know this one here. Furthermore, I remember the occurrence was in the
spring of 1945. the crossing of the railroad by arrangement between the Japanese
and Yen Hsi-shan.
Q. I show you now Service Report No. 31, dated September 23, 1944. on Post
War Treatment of Japan, Document 185 in the proceeding, together with a
photostat of a carbon copy of the same which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.
Did you see this paper and did you give a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe? — A. Yes. I did
see this paper. I entered some cards on Susomo Okano and it is possible that I
made a copy of those cards, 5 x 6 or whatever they are, for Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Did you give him a copy of this paper? — A. I don't think I gave him a copy
of it. He asked me about Okano; if I knew anything about Okano. He is now
known as Nosaka.
Q. Do you think you may possibly have given Mr. Jaffe a copy of this paper? —
A. No, I doubt this very much. Well, yes, apparently I must have because —
please correct that. I must have because I see my own personal handwriting
on this here. That is definite then.
Q. You gave Mr. Jaffe a copy? — A. Yes, it must be. That is definite, it is my
own handwriting. There can be no doubt about it. I don't remember the
dispatch myself but I see my handwriting, that is enough. It says "entered in
biographical notes," and so on. That is quite definite then.
Q. Now, then, I show you a paper which is identified as Document No. 133 in
this proceeding, subject Chiang Kai-shek's book. I'm not sure of Mr. Service's
connections with it. It is dated March IS, 1944. — A. It's a discussion on his
book China's Destiny. I don't remember this. I remember plenty talk about the
book itself, but I don't remember this here.
Q. Did you see this paper? — A. I remember seeing something on that before
I came over to the State Department, viz., when I was in Naval Intelligence,
March 18, 1944. I don't remember this paper here.
Q. I show you a pbotostat of two carbon copies of this paper which were found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you gave copies of this paper to Mr.
Jaffe? — A. No; I did not. I did not bother with Chiang Kai-shek's book. I
never read it all the way through. I had it on my desk in Naval Intelligence.
Q. I now show you a paper which has no number in this proceeding on Chinese
Trade in Strategic Materials, dated November 27, 1942, and ask you if you saw
that paper or a carbon copy of it, of which I hand you a photostat, which was
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.
Mr. Rhktts. RF-294 is the identifying number.
A. No ; this was way off my track.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2193
Q. You didn't see that or give a copy to Jaffe? — A. No, sir; I doubt whether
that ever came to me. I don't remember this despatch at all.
Q. I now pass you Service Report No. 40, dated October 10, 1944, on Greater
Realism in Relations with Chiang Kai-shek, which is Document No. 193 in this
proceeding, together with a photostat of a typed copy of the same which was
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see this report and did you give a copy
of it to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No; I don't know of this document. I don't think a
copy of this would have come to me in the Department. No ; I don't recogni/e
it by the viewpoints expressed.
Q. I show you a typed copy of the same, which was found in Mr. Jaffe's pos-
session. Did you give that to Mr. Jaffe?— A. No, sir.
Q. You did not pass that to Mr. Jaffe?— A. No, sir; I did not. I'm quite sure
of that.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 15, dated 27th of August, 1944, on an inter-
view with Mao Tse-tung, known as Document 177 in this proceeding. This may
be the document you already looked at. — A. It is. May I look at it again?
Q. Yes.— A. Yes, I saw that.
Q. Did you give a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?— A. I doubt that very much. How-
ever, I may have extracted some personality material. I see here I have some
information that I'm very well acquainted with. No, I don't think I gave him
a dispatch. It's a very long dispatch with many, many other matters in it.
Q. Have you seen the photostatic copy of the carbon copy of that paper that
was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession? — A. I would say no, for the simple reason
that I always made a tick at the side. Whenever I had entered any personality
material I made a tick at the side of the name so I didn't have to bother with
it again when I came across it. There is no tick here in this copy and this is
the one I would have handled. The original, while it might come to me for a
very short period in the Department, eventually a copy would come to me and
if he photostated a copy I had given him, then it very definitely would have
had those ticks.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. But if he typed from a copy you gave him it would not have the ticks? —
A. If he typed, yes.
Q. If he typed from a copy you gave him? — A. That is right, if he typed from
a copy I gave him : But then I cannot say I recognize this as a copy I gave him.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. But you may possibly have given him a copy of this particular document?—
A. I may have given him a typed version of the particular information on per-
sonalities but that is very brief in there. It's only a paragraph this long ( indi-
cating), listing Peng Teh-huai, and so on. But would he bother to photograph
another document
Q. He didn't do any photographing. These photostats were made for us of
the documents found. — A. I see. Well — no, I don't think I gave him the docu-
ment.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 34, dated September 28, 1944, on Communist
orientation to the U. S. S. R. and the United States, which is Document 1SS in
this proceeding and I ask you if you saw this paper? — A. "Any orientation
which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union
seems to be a thing of the past" — I remember that sentence. Although I did not
agree with that and yet it stirred up something in my mind. But in general I
can't say that I recognize this document. It would be entirely wrong for me to sit
here and say that I banded this document and gave it to Jaffe or showed it to
him because I don't recollect that in the least.
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of that paper which was found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give him a typed copy? — A. I don't think
so. I do not think I gave or showed him this.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 10, dated March 13, 1945, which is Document
214 in this proceeding, on Views of Mao Tse-tung and ask you if you saw that
paper. — A. No, sir, I don't remember this, "Wallace and other American states-
men", no.
Q. I show you a photostat of the typed copy of this paper which was found in
the possession of Mr. Jaffe and ask you if you gave him or allowed him to copy
that paper? — A. No, sir. I do not remember showing or giving that copy of
Jaffe. I don't remember even reading that despatch there.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 20, dated March 20, 1945, on the Yen Hsi-
shan dealings with the Japanese which is Document No. 222 in this proceeding.
Did you see that paper? — A. Yes, sir. This is Mrs. Michael Lindsay's report.
2194 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper and ask you
Mr. Jaft'e's possession and ask you if you gave him that copy or allowed him
to make a copy of it?— A. I did not allow him to make a copy, but I did show him
this report. I remember that.
Mr. Stevens. Did you allow him to take it with him, sir?
A. No, I doubt whether I did.
Q. But you may have?— A. My interest was the evaluation of Michael Lind-
say's and bis wife's veracity, which I doubted at the time. I looked upon much
of his stuff as propaganda.
Q. You may have allowed him to borrow that report?— A. I know I showed
it to him. I asked him who Michael Lindsay was. He told me he knew him
very well. I remember I discussed it with him.
Q. But you may have allowed him to take it?— A. I cannot remember whether
I let him take the report, sir.
Q. Now I show you Service Report No. 26, dated April 1, 1945, on Communist
congress policy, which is Document 226 in this proceeding. Did you see that
paper? — A. I don't remember anything so far.
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper and ask you
if you gave the typed copy to Mr. Jaffe or allowed him to borrow the typed
COpy? — a. No, I don't remember these references at all in here.
Q. Will you look at the typed copy, of which you have a photostat, and tell me
if you gave the typed copy to Mr. Jaffe or allowed him to borrow it? — A. No,
no, sir. It's not my typing either. My typing had more X's in it than any of
these.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 38, dated 9th of October, 1944, on Popular
Support of the Eighth Route Army, which is document 191 in this proceeding,
and ask if you saw that paper? —A. Never heard of Major Casberg. I don't
recognize it at all.
Q. I show you photostats of two typed copies of the same paper which were
found in Mr. Jaft'e's possession and ask if you gave those copies to Mr. Jaffe or
allowed him to borrow such copies? — A. No, sir. I have not seen it. I never
have seen it. I'm positive I have never seen it.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 22, dated March 22, 1945, on Recent Appoint-
ments by the Generalissimo, which is document No. 224 in this proceeding. Did
vou see that paper? — A. Yes, I saw that.
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper which was found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask if you gave him that copy or allowed him to
borrow it? — A. Yes, I remember when this came in I made some entries, partic-
ularly regarding General Ho Ying-chin and Admiral Chan Chak. Yes, I remem-
ber that.
Q. Did you loan a copy of that paper to Mr. Jaffe? I show you a photostat
of a copy found in his possession. — A. That I do not remember. But I know
I know I made some entries in my cards on Tang En-po, whom I know very well
who was Garrison Commander in Chungking, Hu Tsung-nan, yes, I saw that
dispatch and I handled it and I jotted some notes from it, but I do not remember
giving it to Jaffe. I made entries on Tang En-po, Liu Shih, Ho Ying-chin, Hu
Tsung-nan, and Chan Chek. But I don't remember giving it to Jaffe.
Q. But you may have? — A. But he undoubtedly has received typed slips for
. those persons.
Q. From you? — A. From me. He was appointed on such-and-such a date.
Q. May you possibly have given him a copy of the original? — A. No, I don't
think so,' because it was very clearly indexed there and the biographical material
was not involved in the discussion and 1 want everyone to understand that I
did not freely give him material just to give him material. When I gave him
material it was because it was too darned complicated to sit and type 20
pages of the argument in favor of such-and-such a position or analyze it, and
I let him see it and let him read it, and if he could get the implication by read-
ing if. all right. I took it back to the Department of State and returned it to
the file, which was usually the burn file of these copies. Nobody wanted copies
when you brought them back. There was no place for them except the burn
basket and I committed many many documents to the burn basket. There was
no place for them except the burn basket. Everything I had in my home, for
instance, all went back when I was through with it.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 39, dated the 9th of October, 1944, on Present
Strength and Future Importance of the Chinese Communists, which is docu-
ment No. 192 in this proceeding. Did you see that paper? — A. Yes, I remember
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2195
seeing Mr. Friedman's note stating that Mr. Service's summary would include
that not only should steps he taken to— yes, I remember seeing that.
Q. Now, then, I show you a photostat of a typed copy of this paper which
was found in Mr. Jaffe'S possession. Did yon show the paper to Mr. Jaffe
or permit him to make a copy of it? Or did you give him a copy?— A. No, sir.
This is not a report that I ever got a copy of, I'm sure. I have seen this report.
It was circulated through the Department. I was always very eager to read
the notes by Mr. Friedman or Mr. Chase or Mr. John Carter Vincent attached
to the despatch when it was circulated for the simple reason that such reading
would give me guidance to the policy of my superiors.
Q. What did you say about the copy, the photostat?— A. It means nothing
to me. I have never seen this. I don't recognize it at all. I don't think I took
this despatch home at all or showed it to Jaffe. It's a long and involved affair
and I doubt whether you could find a little kernel of biographical material in
here. Because Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung said so-and-so, it did not always
cover an important biographical report.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 16, dated August 29, 1944, which is a part
of Document No. 177 in this proceeding. You have already seen one part of
No. 177. It's on the subject of American aid to Communist armies. Did you
see that paper?— A. Yes; I saw that. I saw this report, I remember it. No,
sir; I would not handle this. I would not bother to take it home.
Q. I show you a photostat of the typed copy of the same paper found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession and ask if you gave Mr. Jaffe a copy? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or did you permit him to see it? — A. No, sir.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 20, dated September 3, 1944, which is an-
other part of Document 177 in this proceeding, on American policy regarding
the rise within the Chinese Communist Party, and ask you if you saw this
paper? — A. Yes; I'm sure I saw this here. I'm sure that I did not give this to
Mr. Jaffe or show it to him.
Q. I show you in that connection a photostat of a typed copy of the same
paper, found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. — A. I don't quite understand why this
is less than the other, or is it not? I haven't seen that. No; I haven't shown
it to Jaffe. I just wondered why one was four pages and the other less than
three. It may be an extract.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 19, which was dated August 31, 1944, and
is Document No. 180 in this proceeding on use of old Communist bases in
southeast China, and ask if you have seen that document. — A. No, sir; I
wouldn't have been interested in it, anyway. I was a busy man in those days.
Q. I will show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same which was found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give a copy of this to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No. sir ;
I didn't handle this at all.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 22, dated the 4th of September 1944, known
as Document 182 in this proceeding, on the Growth of a New Fourth Army, and
ask you if you saw this paper. — A. I doubt it very much. When I left Naval
Intelligence I left behind me interest in armies, movement of troops, strategic
areas, bases, and so on.
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's
possession. Did you give that to him? — A. No, sir; I did not give that to him.
Q. I show you Servh e Report No. 37, which was dated October 2, 1944, known
as Document 190 in this proceeding, on Eliminating Banditry, and ask if you
saw this paper? — A. No, sir; I never saw these names or reports. I wouldn't
have been the slightest bit interested.
Q. I show you a photostat copy of the same and ask you if you saw this or
gave it to Jaffe. — A. I do not believe I saw this, showed it to Mr. Jaffe, or
loaned it to him.
Q. I show you Service Report No. 26, dated September 10, 1944, which is Docu-
ment 183 in this proceeding, on the Communist Political Control in Bases. Did
you see this paper? — A. Yes. I saw that. I believe it was one of the first times
I saw Liu Shao-chi mentioned in that report because he is a theorist in the first
place and in another dispatch on him it was from that dispatch that actually
created the interest in him. I had gathered a little information from Agnes
Smedley's book. She knew who Liu Shao-chi was, but I remember this was a
surprise to me when I saw him mentioned because practically no one knew
of him and I asked Jaffe about him. I asked what he was. That was one of
the men that Jaffe fell down on and did not supply me information on. When
I gave him the list I sent it back several times and asked him why he didn't
know the background on Liu Shao-chi's education. If he is a Communist theorist
2196 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
he must have been educated in Moscow. I remember this dispatch. With a
certain amount of personal risk I may have shown it to him but I don't remember
Showing it to him.
Q. You didn't show it to Jaffe? — A. I don't remember showing it to him. I
doubt whether I would because a dispatch like tbis is quite a long dispatch
with considerable discussion of these persons and their policies. And I would
read it and for reasons of simplicity I would take out, after reading, just what
I wanted and put it in my card files. I would type it on a slip and eventually
write it into my cards and it would be confusing to take the dispatch and show
it to anyone, even a day after, because then you would have to reread it and
point out parts or let him photostat it deliberately and I would not do that.
I never did that. I never had any understanding to let Jaffe have anything to
photostat.
Q. I now show you Service report, a paper on a New Democracy Booklet by
Mao. I have an ozalid copy of the same. This is Document Q316F188A55. It
has no document number in this proceeding. It's an OWI paper, Did you ever
see that? — A. I know the book but I don't remember reading about the book.
I have a copy of the book. You can buy it. I think I sot it from IPR or somewhere.
Q. Did you let Jaffe have this paper? — A. No, I did not.
Q. Or a copy of the same? — A. I'm sure if I offered it to him he would not
bother with it. He knew the Communist literature pretty well.
Q. I now show you despatch 2790, dated July 20, 1944, which is Document
172 in this proceeding, on Chinese Liberal Hopes of Reform. Have you got
that? — A. I'll have to admit I don't know Miss Yeng Kang. I don't know the
name. I don't think I have her in my file. I don't know the story here. No,
I don't know this.
Q. I have a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same which was found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession, which I'm showing you. You did not give that to Mr. Jaffe
that copy, or that ozalid? — A. No, sir, I don't think so.
Q. I show you despatch No. 2604, on Domestic Troubles in Chiang Kai-shek's
Household, which is known as Document 148 in this proceeding. Did you see
that? — A. I know this story quite well. I read the despatch when it came in but
I know I didn't give it to Jaffe. When I had dinner with Jaffe some time after
this had come in he asked me "Is it true that Chiang Kai-shek kept a mistress
and had considerable trouble with his wife?" and shortly thereafter a state-
ment was made to the press by Madam Chiang and General Chiang, as far as I
remember, and it came out in the press. It was somewhat hushed up but it did
come out. But I didn't give him anything on it.
Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of this paper and a photostat
of a photostat which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you transmit
either a typed copy or a photostat to Jaffe? — A. No, sir, I did not. I don't
think I ever made an entry in my own card about that scandal for the simple
reason that I doubted it very much myself. It is possible, but I thought it was
not exactly the type of material I wanted. I don't care if he had a mistress or
not. It worries me very little. And it would be much more interesting to me
to know what political affiliations he had.
Q. I show you despatch No. 2351 of March 23, 1944, on Chiang Kai-shek's
Responsibility, and something else — I don't know just what the rest of the head-
ing is — which is Document 137 in this proceeding and ask you if you saw that
paper? — A. I don't think I ever saw that. I have heard of this report. Isn't
this the one that Mr. Dondero mentioned? I don't think 1 have seen this
despatch.
Q. I'll show you a photostat of a typed copy of this despatch which was found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you gave him this copy or permitted
him to copy it? — A. This could look like my handwriting. Yes, I remember
the story of this. It is possible that I may have shown him this despatch.
Q. Did you say you see your handwriting on the copy? — A. Yes, it could look
very much like my handwriting. I'm inclined to helieve it is.
Q. In thai event, you gave him the copy? — A. In that event I did.
Q. B 'cause the photostat is a photostat of the copy which was found in his
possession. — A. I'm trying to find the reference. Yes, it's my system of making
an arrow to anything important. It is not personality material.
Q. Now, then, finally I show you A. In other words, I would say that this
dispatch I did see and there are indications here that I did show this or lend
this to Jaffe.
Q. You did more than that, you gave him a copy because the copy turns up
with your handwriting in Jaffe's possession? — A. If you loan a man $10 and he
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2197
doesn't return it that doesn't mean that you save him $10. He did return in
time the things I loaned him but he apparent Ly had some at the time of the arrest.
And the FBI confronted me with that and asked me whether that was possible
before I had seen any of the dispatches, before I knew his place had been raided.
Remember, I was arrested on the night of June 6 and was held incommunicado
until I was released from the District Jail on bail. But I corresponded with no
one. I didn't talk to Mr. Service nor did I discuss the matter with Mr. Service.
I did not know really what the case was. I did not know until I think the
second or third morning that Jaffe had been arrested too.
Q. I pass you Document 134 on Chinese Territorial Claims to the North, which
is dated March 18, 1944. I don't know that it has any number. I'll ask you if
you saw that paper? — A. I remember the subject. It was my field while I was
in Naval Intelligence, Burma and the boundary question.
Q. That is a photostat of a carbon copy of the paper which was found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession. Did you give that carbon copy to Jaffe? — A. I don't think so,
It was not my subject, later on but it was at the time in Naval Intelligence —
Burma, and I know I made maps for Naval Intelligence on the British claims
and the Chinese claims on the borderline.
Q. Do you think you may have given Mr. Jaffe a copy of that? — A. I don't see
why I would. I doubt that very much.
Q. Now, just as a concluding question on this phase of the examination, let
me say as we went over these some 40 documents we found 2, I believe, no, 3 in
which' you stated positively that you did give Mr. Jaffe copies and perhaps 3
more that you were somewhat doubtful about. At the time you were examined
by the FBL and your recollection was of course fresher than it is now on the
subject, I believe you were able to identify some six or eight documents as docu-
ments which were ozalid copies of Mr. Service's Yenan reports, which you said
you did give to Mr. Jaffe. — A. That is right.
Q. Now, those documents have all been among these that we have been over
but you have not recognized them apparently.— A. Yes, they could be among the
doubtful ones that I don't remember now.
Q. So it is apparent, is it not to you, that your recollection then being fresher
than it is now, that you were able at that time to identify some documents that
you are not able to identify then? — A. Yes.
Q. Your recollection is now that you did give to Mr. Jaffe some six or eight
documents of ozalid copies of Mr. Service's Yenan reports? — A. That is right,
yes, sir.
(The board adjourned at 1 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewaet Service
Date : May 31, 1950, 2 : 10 p. m. to 5 : 30 p. m.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building.
Reporter : E. C. Moyer.
Members of board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles ; Arthur
G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts
and Ruckelshaus.
(The board convened at 2 : 10 p. m. to hear continuation of testimony by Mr.
Larsen. )
The Chairman. Would other members of the board like to ask questions?
Mr. Stevens. Not at this moment, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Mr. Larsen, this morning we went over perhaps 40 documents and reports
of Mr. Service which had been found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. You had identified
perhaps three of those of which you believed he had been given copies and
perhaps three or four others of which you might have shown or given him
copies. Have you any idea yourself how those other reports of Mr. Service
might have gotten into Mr. Jaffe's possession? — A. No, I have no knowledge that
I can put down as definite knowledge.
Q. Do you have any theories even if it is not definite knowledge? — A. Yes, of
course I have a theory on that.
2198 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Would you care to state what it is? — A. I was told by Jaffe on two occa-
sions that he was in a great hurry because he was going to have a meeting or
meet with other persons. It is pure conjecture of course to feel or to think, to
theorize on that, whether he had contacts — he mentioned Roth on several occa-
sions, on meeting Roth, and he said on two occasions, "I am not staying at the
Statler, I am staying with John K. Fairbank", and I remember he said on one
occasion, "I am staying with Franklin and Tootsie." I said, "Who were they?"
This was Benjamin Franklin Ray and his wife. And he mentioned that he
knew Michael Lee. He is the man who is now somewhat on the spot from the
Commerce Department. I can't think of any others now but my theory is from
the conversation that time that he did receive reports from FEA, which were
first from BEW and
The Chairman. What does that stand for?
A. Board of Economic Warfare and then later it was called FEA, which
meant Foreign Economic Administration. And, as I say, it is conjecture on
my part when I feel very convinced that Roth was the man. I now give you
an idea of how I arrived at that conclusion. It wouldn't hold up in court, but
Roth was Jaffe's most intimate friend. He was a kind of foster son to Jaffe.
I did not know that until after the case had broken, and then I discovered that
Jaffe had put Roth through school and that he had helped him get into Naval
Intelligence. Well, I figured that whatever Roth was doing or Jaffe was doing
Roth would be willing to help him with, inasmuch as they were still friends and
inasmuch as they collaborated on that book of Mr. Roth — I forget the name of it
now, something about Japan, I read parts of it, I didn't think much of it, Roth
had never been in Japan or China — and I do know that from conversation at a
luncheon party in the Statler Roth and Jaffe discussed the book endlessly and
Jaffe did say to Roth : ;'No, no ; it is no good ; that last chapter is absolutely no
good. I will have to take that with me and work on it." All right. My conclu-
sions therefore are that those two worked together and apparently shared the
strongly pro-Chinese Communist ideology, but beyond that I can't make any
statement because it would be false.
Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant Roth had access to Mr. Service's reports
in ONI? — A. Oh, yes; oh, yes, definitely. They circulated in the basket, as we
called it, and they went to every office and every analyst in the Far Eastern
Section, as it was called. Furthermore, if I may interrupt, I have seen reports
in various places, in the newspapers, in Dondero's office, in FBI, and so on, of
the nature of the reports, the stolen documents, or rather the documents found
in Jaffe's place, and I have seen — I have noticed that the subject of a great num-
ber of the reports was Japanese shipping and Japanese ships and location of
Japanese ships. I know that that was Roth's particular business in OWL He
was assistant at the desk for Japanese ships. It would be a strange coincidence
if there was another person at that desk who had given them to Jaffe and that
Roth was entirely innocent.
Q. Well, Mr. Service's reports did not, as far as I recall it, concern Japanese
ships; did they? — A. I don't think so. The only item dealing with Japan that I
remember in Mr. Service's reports was the question of Susumu Okano, and I
forget the other men there, Japanese Communists who were staying there in
Yenan and who outlined their postwar policy in three or four stages to either
Chinese Communists or directly to some of the Foreign Service officers there. I
don't remember exactly whether they told it to Mr. Service or Mr. Service
reported it as received from the Chinese, but nevertheless that is the only con-
nection with Japan. Now there was quite a bit of material concerning Japan,
Japanese forces, interrogation of Japanese prisoners, and so on. They wouldn't
have come to Service, wouldn't have come to other divisions than those that
handled Japanese affairs or American military affairs. It depended on subject
material, of course — questioning of Japanese prisoners.
Q. In your statement to the FBI on June 7, 1945, you stated, I believe, "Of
the classified documents that I have shown to Mr. Jaffe I remember some written
by Mr. John Service on the subject of Communist relations with the Chinese
Central Government." — A. That is a very broad title.
Q. "I believe those documents were mostly classified as confidential, and I
showed them to Mr. Jaffe because he appeared to know of them in advance.
He knew them by name and number." — A. There were two dispatches. I cannot
remember the details of that now. You see, 5 years have elapsed since that
time and apparently a couple of them that were rather fresh in my memory
at that time — I can't remember now. I would have no reason to conceal any
point on that score, but Jaffe did tell me at one time, "I have seen that report."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2199
Q. Well, I am merely interested A. "I have seen a report on that subject,"
something like that.
Q. What I am interested in. is how he knew in advance of these reports by
name and number. You say there were two instances in which he referred to
them by name or number?— A. He mentioned — I don't know name or number
and title of the dispatch, and, you see, that would be more correct — what was
it I said? Name and number? I tell you, I was in a very bad condition that
night, I was yanked away from my dining table and my whole world seemed
to collapse over me when they stepped in and said, "You are under arrest." I
said, "There must be a joke." They said, "No ; it is no joke." From 7 until
nearly 5 next morning — how would you feel if you were questioned? Do you
not think that you would feel somewhat strained and nervous and excited? I was
thinking of my wife at home, of the condition she was in. So my language was
probably not legally, strictly to the point, and therefore I wouldn't heckle a lot
about the exact words.
Q. No; I am not interested in the exact wording, but in your recollection;
do you recall whether Jaffe indicated such knowledge on one occasion or more
than one occasion? — A. Oh, it was just one or two occasions.
Q. One or two occasions? — A. He mentioned that he knew of a report, and
I believe I asked him, "How do you know about that?" And he said, "Oh, well,
you know these newspapermen, they collaborate"— that is where I got the idea —
"Epstein and Edgar Snow and so on, they collaborate out there with any Foreign
Service officer on these little bits of information that all together form a complete
jigsaw puzzle."
Mr. Stevens. Can you place a time tor that, sir?
A. Well, it was probably — it was fresh in my memory that time — probably
some time there in the spring of 1945.
I also was rather surprised to be told when I went to New York in August
194(5 — i bad dismissed this Amerasia case as a damn bad dream, and I had
gone down to Florida. My father was living in St. Petersburg and I was
helping him build his new house. I was knee deep in concrete when two
ex-FBI men came, told me they were now working for Plain Talk magazine,
Don Levine. They wanted me to go up and write my story of the Amerasia
case. I told them, "Nothing doing." Well, they told me this would clear me,
would help me rebuild myself. The first day I turned them down flat and they
were going back, but the next day they got my wife and myself downtown. We
talked it over and they prevailed upon my wife to see the light and make me
go up there, so I agreed. For $300 I would write them my story and they would
pay my expenses, I would fly up. I flew up to New York. And then I sat in
the New Yorker and typed my story. And when I handed it in on the 3d
or 4th day, Don Levine nearly blew his top. He said, "Why, you haven't got
any story here. That is no good. This will have to be rewritten." I said,
"Well, I admit that it is somewhat hastily written, it is more rambling chronology
of what I know, but that is what I want to put down."
Q. Pardon me, I would like to come to that A. Yes?
Q. That "Plain Talk" thing. — A. I am coming to that point. And then, that
is exactly the point I am coming to, he said, "Now, let me tell you, you may
not know an awful lot about these fellows, but let me tell you one of these things
here is this." And they said, "We have investigated Roth and Service very
carefully, and as far as we know Service was sending copies of his reports direct
to Jaffe." I said, "By golly, that I didn't know." And they hardly believed
me and I had a hard time convincing them that I was in no collusion or any
conspiracy with Mr. Service nor with Mr. Roth nor Mark Gayn. I didn't know
Mark Gayn, I had never seen him in my life, and I had seen Kate Mitchell
once — once or twice. I dichrt know what she was, up there. I thought she
might be an employee. I didn't know anything about Kate Mitchell. I never
talked with her, never had anything to do with her. I said, "Hello." I sent
Amerasia once or twice.
Q. What I am really trying to find out is how Mr. Jaffe was familiar with
Mr. Service's reports. — A. Do you want my theory on that?
Q. Yes. — A. It is no more than theory. I think when the Foreign Service
officers in the field got hold of a topic, naturally that was the thing that occurred
in China, and everyone knew about it — everyone except the United States Gov-
ernment. That is, the United States Government had not yet been officially
informed on the subject. Therefore it was cause for and call for a report on
the subject. Now it is impossible to imagine — I will not — well, put it the other
way, it is reasonable to imagine that there was collaboration between the Foreign
2200 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Service men and the various correspondents on the subject. That is putting it
very mildly. I will say it is impossible to imagine that there was not some
collaboration, since Mr. Service could not be in Yenan all of the time, and then
Votaw or Epstein or these others came down and they compared notes on these
things.
Q. But these newspaper stories would not give the names and numbers of
official reports. — A. I don't want you to think that I am vicious when I say that
it is possible that Einmerson and these men at times showed their entire dispatch
and asked for the opinion of, and that maybe there were some, if not exchange
of copies, free exchange of ideas and evaluation of these situations and these
reports went in.
Q. Do you recall any instances where newspaper correspondents referred to
reports by name and by number? — A. No, no ; I do not.
Q. In your same statement to the FBI you said : "When I met Jaffe for lunch on
May 28, I gave him a list on the notes of personalities and on that evening Jaffe
came to Larsen's home and Larsen gave him some newspaper translations. He
advised that when he visited Jaffe at the hotel that Jaffe expressly asked him
for Jack Service's last reports, which he apparently knew. These were the
Sixth Kuomintang Congress and the other on the Election of Officers to the Fourth
People's Political Council." — A. I didn't even remember that but I guess that
is right. I said it at that time. I suppose it is right. I had forgotten it.
Q Did you have those reports with you at your house? — A. That I don't know,
I don't know whether I had them or not. I may ask you, for my own informa-
tion, did you find those reports among them, among Jaffe's material?
Q. I have not been able to identify those positively from this list. This has
short titles. — A. I would say, I dare say there were 100 reports on the PPC —
People's Political Council — during the year or two 1944-45. There must have
been a great many, but I can't say which one it was. They were all about the
same. The squabbles about the formation and number of members, the manner
of selection of members because they were not elected, they were selected.
Q. Turning to your article in Plain Talk A. May I interrupt and treat that
not as my article. I objected strenuously to that article when it was published.
I asked — my last words were, "Don't put it as the Espionage Case because I will
be a damned fool to call it an espionage case when I don't for one moment feel
that there is espionage involved. At the very worst it was the purloining of
documents, but I don't think there is any espionage nor has the Government
proved any. Furthermore the Government dropped the espionage charges, so
why should I call it espionage? I have referred to it in mine as 'espionage' —
espionage in quotation marks — and I want you to put it that way." They said,
"Well, that would defeat the cause," and this, that, and the other.
Q. What I was interested in was one statement in that article which is similar
to the statement which you have just made, in which it was stated that, in the
course of the investigation, "it was found that John S. Service was in communi-
cation from China with Mr. Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential
messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York
before they arrived in Washington." — A. I can answer that question by referring
to you the copy of my original manuscript which I have given to Mr. Peurifoy,
in wliich there is no such wording, as far as I believe, and that is Mr. Don Levine's
wording. They rewrote that article so I hardly recognized it. I had no feud with
the Government, with the administration, with General Marshal, and he made
it into that.
Q. Do you know of any basis for that statement of Mr. Levine's? — A. No; I
don't; except that it could have been as a result of questioning me, that had
Jaffe ever said that he had any reports — but that would not imply that he had
sent them from China because I knew nothing about that. I had no idea until
long after the case broke and I met these men out there, I was told for the first
time that he had been sending his reports from China, and they put that in.
Q. But you have no personal knowledge? — A. No, sir. No, sir; I have no
knowledge of that. I have nothing even to substantiate a suspicion on it.
Mr. Achilles. I think that is all I have.
Mr. Stevens. One question, sir. You have mentioned your files that you main-
tained at home.
A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Did you in the normal course of preparing those files declare
either as notes for your master copy or otherwise the source from which the
material was taken to go on your card?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2201
A. No; I never put any source. Never. I can prove that because I have a
great number of those notes.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, have you still your card file?
A. Yes ; I still have my card file. What was that question— did I still have my
card file?
The Chairman. I didn't hear your answer.
A. Yes ; I still have my card file. It was seized by the FBI and then it was
kept by them over a period, oh, for a period of almost a year, and it was sent
to OSS for OSS to check whether there were any entries in that card file that
were obviously from OSS documents, and it was likewise checked by the State
Department, I was told, and by the Navy Department, and by Military Intelli-
gence. They found five cards on which they had made some green markings —
markings in green ink — and I got a little hot about that and I said, "Hell, that
stuff is public knowledge." The entries, let us say now because I don't re-
member, the dates or names, let us say this is an entry as of April 14. I got a
lot of that material from the press, and I happened to have my very voluminous
clipping file where I had done clipping since 1936, and I went home and it took
me a day of so, and I dug up the clipping file for those, of those five cards, and
brought them back to the FBI and said, "Here you are. What was the date
on that card here? April 14. Well, this is the Washington Post, April 13,
and let's compare the texts." There was an abstract from that in the same
wording, so the FBI got quite tired of the whole thing, said, "All right, we had
intended you to delete the information before you take back these cards, but in
consequence " So I took back all my cards without any one single exception,
not one kept by the Government.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Has anybody any more questions? [None.]
Counsel for Mr. Service would like to ask you some questions now. They have
that privilege in this proceeding.
A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. What was the last time you saw Mr. Service, Mr. Larsen, before you came
in here this morning? — A. I don't remember exactly, but I would say it was
about, maybe, April 1949. I had a little office on Seventeenth Street, and the
Far Eastern Information Service — I supplied information to newspapermen,
magazine writers, background information, and I had a man working with me,
a man there by the name of Otto J. Dekom. He later — I got rid of him and he
went and worked for the Pat McCarran committee. Dekom and I that day
went to lunch, and we turned around going westward on I Street. We were
going to the New Baghdad Cafe to have some Near East food. And there I
met Service on the side of I Street with, I think, one or two other persons, and
they went into the Little Garden Shop, or Little Tea Shop for lunch, right
there between Seventeenth and Eighteenth on I Street. We didn't say "hello"
to each other ; I just recognized him as he passed by.
Q. You did not speak to him? — A. No ; we did not say "hello" to each other. I
don't think he even remembered seeing me, but I am convinced it was him.
Q. You saw him on that occasion and he did not see you, and you did not
speak to him? — A. He did not, I think, see me.
Q. When was the last time before that? — A. The last time before that was
sometime in May. I can't fix a date, but it was
Q. What year? — A. 1945. Jaffe was in town and I remember I took my
wife and also, I think, my little daughter went along too. We had a Chinese
dinner downtown and I was through with him — he said he had to see someone
else by Sunday — I believe it was Sunday, it may have been Saturday, but it
was, some way or other it seems to me it was a Sunday, he called me about 11
or maybe 11:30 and said "Do you have something on so-and-so?" I don't
remember the name.
Q. Is this Service you are talking about? — A. No; I am talking about Jaffe
calling me, and he said he was at the Statler Hotel. I said, "I thought you
had gone home." He said, "No, I am leaving in a little while; it is urgent."
I went to the home file and I saw it. I did not know whether I had it or not.
I said, "What do you want me to do, read it to you?" "No, I would like to see
the whole thing on four persons," And I said, "All right, I will hop a bus."
I am not very far away from the Statler there. I had my pass and went out
and got on a bus and went down. I didn't know what room he was in, so I
went to the desk, asked them what room was Philip Jaffe in, I got a number,
2202 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
went around to the elevator entrance, and there I saw jaffe standing — I don't
remember whether anyone else was there or not— he was standing there and
Mr. Service, it seems to me, was wearing his hat and topcoat. I said, "Hello."
"Hello. You know Mr. Service?" "Yes, I know Mr. Service. Here are the
cards." I had them, I think in a small envelope and I remember only saying
to him, "Be sure you let me have them back because they are important cards."
He said, "All right." Then I went home. That is the last time I saw Mr.
Service and greeted him.
Mr. Achilles. When was that, did you say? — A. I don't know, the FBI has
a record of those meetings. I didn't keep a record of them.
Q. You recall it being May 1945? — A. Yes; it was May, pretty close to the
time of the arrest there.
Q. You actually saw him the night you were arrested, didn't you? — A. I beg
your pardon.
Q. You actually saw him the night you were arrested, didn't you? — A. Saw
whom?
Q. Service. — A. Yes ; that is right.
Q. In the office of the A. In Mr. Turnage's office.
Q. So that the last time you saw him was in Commissioner Turnage's office.
A. I beg your pardon ; it was not intentional.
Q. And the next time was the occasion in May 1949? — A. Yes: that is correct.
Q. And you saw him but he did not see you and you did not speak? — A. Yes;
on I Street. That would be absolutely correct, yes.
Q. Incidentally, did you see ever see me before you walked in here this morn-
ing?— A. What is your name please?
Q. Rhetts. — A. No, I don't think I did.
Q. Now, I wonder if you would tell the Board whether you have any reason to
all to believe that Mr. Service is a Communist? — A. No, I have no reason to be-
lieve he is a Communist.
Q. Have you ever had any reason to believe that he Avas a Communist sympa-
thizer or fellow traveler? — A. I can't answer that very clearly whether I had
any justifiable reason to think that he was a Communist sympathizer, but I can
answer that there was a time that I believed that he was extremely enthused
over the performance of the Communists.
Q. By the Communists you mean Russian Communists? — A. No, the Chinese
Communists. No, I never had any idea that he was enthused over the Russian
Communists.
Q. Now, you referred to this article which appeared under your name in Plain
Talk magazine. I show you Document 17, which is a copy of that article. I
believe you intimated a moment ago that you had very little to do with the actual
content of that article. I wonder if you would describe in detail for the Board
first of all how you came about to write it. You mentoined that you were in
Florida. — A. It was in Florida, and two gentlemen came down. I didn't know
them. They introduced themselves as Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Higgins.
Q. K-i-r-k-patrick? — Yes, in one word, and Mr. Higgins.
The Chairman. Hi-g-g-i-n-s? — A. Yes. I remember initials of Mr. Kirkpat-
rick, W. T. I am pretty sure of that. And I did not seem them first. They went
to my residence in St. Petersburg, and my wife was sitting in the garden. They
came in, said, "Are you Mrs. Larsen?" She said to them, "Yes." They said they
had come from Plain Talk magazine to get hold of me and ask me to write an
article, and my wife said to them, "T would have thought yon were a couple of
FBI men. You certainly look like it." So they kind of got red in their faces
and said, "As a matter of fact, we were FBI men. We both worked on the
Anieiasia case and we resigned in November 1945 and we have been working
with Plain Talk magazine, that is Don Levine and Mi-. Alfred Kohlberg, who kind
of financed the magazine, and we have come down because these two gentlemen
in New York, Levine and Kohlberg. believe that you are the key man in this
case and thai you would have a valuable story and they wanted to publish that
story in their first issue." This is the first issue. Well, as I told you. I didn't
want to, and eventually I went up. They told me several things and they in-
duced me to go up. They mentioned that my story would help clear me, clear
me <>f being a Communist and a spy and sympathizer and an assistant collabora-
tor with Jaffe, and so on. Secondly, well, they told me, they said that they
thought I had a good radio voice and they might possibly put me into radio
work and gel me a number of contracts that would result in a little financial
rehabilitation of myself. That, however, did not materialize, and I can state
that according to my judgment there was no attempt on the part of those gentle-
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2203
men to so further than just get my story, rewrite it as a power piece of anti-
administration propaganda, and throw it on the street.
Q. When you say "these two gentlemen," are you referring to Kirkpatrick and
Higgins? — A. No; they were just cogs in the wheel, they were research analysts
in New York. I am referring to Don Levine and Mr. Kohlberg. Mr. Kohlberg
never as much as asked me to become a member of the China-America policy
association, lie scut me from time to time not complete files of their material
put out but occasionally he sent me some when he thought of me.
Q. Now, let's see if we can move hack just fox a moment. When these gentle-
men. Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Higgins, came, did they make— they gave you these
various reasons why you should come and do it? — A. Yes.
Q. Then did they make financial arrangements with you for it? — A. Oh, yes;
right on the spot. * They told me, "We will go now" — when I agreed that second
a Cternoon — "We will go now and pay for your plane ticket. All you have to do is
hop aboard the plane."
Q. Did they make some sort of a contract with you as to what you would be
paid for the articles when you wrote them? — A. Yes; they made a contract I
would be paid $300.
Q. $300? — A. Yes; they didn't make a written contract, they promised me
three hundred.
Q. And they were to pay your transportation to New York? — A. Yes; and they
booked a room for me and paid for the room, too ; otherwise I paid my own ex-
penses there. As a matter of fact, I had to borrow a few dollars from my father
when I left.
Q. Will you describe in detail for us your dealings with Levine and Kohlberg
after you got to New York? — A. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. The spelling of that Kohlberg?
A. K-o-h-l-b-e-r-g.
Shall I describe my meeting with him?
Q. Your dealings with him. — A. The first evening — I think it was the first
evening I was there, I was eager to get to work and start writing. Mr. Kohlberg
picked me up and took me out to his residence, out north of the Bronx, a very
lovely residence. He is a very wealthy man, and his family members were all
away. He was the only one in the house — the housekeeper, maid, was there, and
we had a nice little dinner with a cocktail, and later we sat up until about 1 :30
and talked, and he asked me — well, I would say very much the same way as you
gentlemen here have asked me, what I knew about the Amerasia case. I knew
at that time much less than I know now. Of course, I have added to that knowl-
edge by reading papers, magazines, and hearing testimony and talking to Senators
and Congressmen, but I wras frankly quite shocked at that time. He said, "Do
you mean to say you have been a dupe and have associated with a man like Jaffe
if you don't sympathize with him?" I said, "I resent that." [Laughter.] "I
don't see that you can't, with all your intelligence — you are undoubtedly a bril-
liant businessman — you ought to be able to get it into your head what I told
you over a period of 1 hour, that I had in common with him that interest in
Chinese personalities." He said, "Oh, don't get hot. I didn't mean it that way."
Well, I wras extremely nervous and worried and I just didn't feel like playing
games with any inquisitors, and I felt that I was facing inquisitors who were
extremely purposeful. Many things I told them voluntarily that I thought
might be of interest were not of interest to them because they did not bear on
Republican views of the Democratic administration. I told him I didn't give a
damn about the Republican view, sorry I am not politically-minded at all on
American affairs. I came home in 1935 after 24 years in China, 5 years in Den-
mark, and only 11 years in the United States since my birth. I never voted. I am
inclined to feel that if I meet a Republican and he is a nice fellow according
to my code, he is all right for me. If I meet a Democrat who is a nice fellow,
he is all right with me. But I have formed no battle plan one way or another,
no political plan in my mind. Therefore, if you are seeking collaboration in
Republican attack on the administration, I did not have the inclination of that.
You might point out to me something. I agree with you it seems very strange, yes,
but I don't know the background of it, I don't know the many ramifications of it
I don't see where it fits in here. And that attitude on my part is very clearly
proved in my manuscript because my manuscript was strictly my story. In fact,
I entitled it. "They Called Me a Spy."
Q. Do you have a copy of that manuscript? — A. I don't have it with me here
but I think Mr. Peurifoy has a copy. I believe he has.
68970— 50— pt. 2 46
2204 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Do you have any copies? Unfortunately, the copy Mr. Peurifoy has isn't
available to me. — A. It isn't? No, but if you want a copy, I have one extra photo-
stat at the Statler, photostat of it, and if you want it I would be glad to send
it. If you write me your addi*ess I will see that it is delivered to you.
Q. Actually I would like to — it would be very useful if you had it a while — in
the course of this proceeding. I would like to ask you some questions but since
you haven't it with you A. I don't have it with me ; no.
Q. When did you write this manuscript that you did write? You told us
A. About the 8th of August.
Q. This first evening you went out and spent the evening with Mr. Kohl-
berg and had this chat which you describe. — A. Yes.
Q. And then what ? — A. They left me alone for about 3 days.
Q. Back in your hotel? — A. Yes. I sat there and worked in the room.
Q. And that is when you wrote this manuscript? — A. Yes.
Q. And this was early August of 1940? — A. Early August. August 8 that I
came np there, so it must have been 9, 10, and 11, like that.
Q. Yes. And then you turned this manuscript over to whom? Mr. Kohlberg
or Mr. Levine? — A. To Mr. Levine. Mr. Kohlberg was rarely in the office,
editorial office. He came in usually around 4 or 5 in the afternoon.
Q. Now, would you before going further, can you tell us anything about the
nature of your dealings with Mr. Kohlberg before you got your manuscript
written? If you had any dealings with him? — A. No.
Q. Excuse me, Mr. Levine. — A. With Levine, I see. Well, of course, it was
more repetition of what Kirkpatrick and Higgins had said. "I will see that you
are given considerable publicity and this will clear you and you have come out
with a straightforward story. You have not denied the actual extent of your
implication." Very nice talk like that. "Go to it, my boy, go back and finish
it up," and so on. And then when Q. He was going to help you further
on tins, what you referred to as your financial rehabilitation? — A. That is right,
that is right.
Q. And you wrote your manuscript and you say you called it what? — A. "They
Called Me a Spy."
Q. "They Called Me a Spy." — A. And I started roughly like this : Many Amer-
ican readers must wonder what became of the Amerasia or the State Depart-
ment "espionage" case — espionage in quotes.
Q. And after you wrote this manuscript you turned it over to Mr. Levine? —
A. Yes.
Q. And what happened then? — A. Then he told me, "Now, go and sleep." I
had not slept much. Incidentally, the American Legion had a convention and
they were in the hotel, and it was a very hectic week there. They banged on my
door many times every night. And I may add, wild women suddenly burst into
my room, threw themselves on the bed, and I had to take one and throw her out,
and finally I kept my door locked all the time. So when I was through with that
I was really very tired. Incidentally, I came up with a case of diarrhea, and
I fought that while I was up there. I went to a drug store and got some med-
icine, some drops to take.
The Chairman. May I interrupt? When you gave him a copy, did you keep
a copy yourself? — A. Yes. I kept a copy, and that is the one that has been
photostated.
Then when I went there and I handed it to him, he threw up his arms, he
said, "Good God, man, this is a hell of a mess!" So I said, "You don't like
my writing, eh?" He said, "It is not that. I mean to say this whole this is
nothing but a rambling chronology." I said, "What did you tell me when I
came? 'Put down the facts of the Amerasia case, your background and so on.'
I did exactly as you told me. If I haven't elaborated on the points that you
would prefer, then say so and let's add that to it." He said, "What about this,
and that" and he mentioned a number of things. I said "I don't know about these
points."
Q. Can you recall any of the tilings he referred to? — A. Well, it was Marshall's
policy, and I really didn't have the facts at my fingertips. The exact dates, etc.
I would have to carry with me an enormous tile of newspaper clippings, and I
didn't do that. I carried with me a few of my notes and I couldn't supply all
that. I said, "If you know of these things, dig up the dates locally and find
them. That is a mere routine job." "Well, you should have commented on
them." I said, "All right, what 'kind of comment do you want?" We talked
back and forth. He said. "I will tell you what you do. You go home and sleep.
You look bad. You go home and sleep and then I will rewrite this and you
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2205
come in tomorrow." And I remember I came in the next day and he was. still
working on it. He told me, "Could you go and loaf another day?" I said, "Oh,
sure; with pleasure." And then I went out and got some tickets to various
theaters. By that time I had slept enough, and then I went back again. He
said, "Now, have a look at this."
Incidentally, he told me that day, "We prepaid your room and that is up
today." I said. "Yes ; and I want to tell you something, Mr. Levine. My father,
when he left Washington, he left most of his furniture stored in Manassas, down
on a farm there, and I have arranged a friend of mine who drives a fruit truck
from down there somewhere, Clearwater, he is going back and he is going to
drive my father's furniture down. We can load it in the truck when it goes
back empty, and I have to be back tomorrow morning at 5. I have to leave for
Florida." So he said, "All right, then let me give you some money," but I said,
"Now, how about this title here?" We had a battle over that and I remember
Q. You mean by this time he had rewritten it? — A. He had rewritten it,
and rewritten it as the State Department Espionage Case. And Mr. Kohlberg
came in, stood in the other window and he was less insistent than Levine was,
and he kept on telling me — Levine kept on telling me that it would defeat the
whole purpose of the article if we did not call it the Espionage Case and I
said, "Well, you could grant me that one concession because it is hurtful to me
to call it that, but you could grant me the concession of putting espionage in
quotation marks." He said, "All right, we will see if we can work it out that
way."
And remember, that was August, oh, say, 18th or 17th, something like that,
and, as a matter of fact, I had my suitcase along with me that afternoon. I went
straight from his office, walked over because I couldn't get a taxi in a hurry, and
walked over to the Pennsylvania Station from Madison Avenue, and got on the
train and came down to Washington. And then there was an elapse of time
between August and October when this appeared. It appeared about October 6,
I think it was. I thought it would be out September but it was not, and in
October it came out, and when I got the first copy and I looked at it, I was
disgusted. My wife was disgusted.
Q. You mean because of the title? — A. Because of the title, and when I read
the whole thing there I found that they had not changed many things I had
objected to, they had not left them out.
Q. Had you gone over the rewrite of the article as well as A. Yes, I had.
Q. As well as the matter of the title? — A. Over the rewrite; yes.
Q. And was it — how much did it differ from what you had written? — A. It
differed — in form it differed completely but in items I will say there were five
or six items that I did not know about previously, but they had taken the trouble
during that afternoon to show me, bring me the files and show me, "We have
this" and "We have that," incidentally
Q. Was that stuff then that you considered you knew about after they had
shown you these files? — A. Yes.
Q. You were willing to make the statement on your own responsibility? — A. I
was willing to let it go into the article, trusting that they were well-informed
on it and that they were not simply fooling me on the subject.
Q. In other words, whatever they showed you was sufficient so that you were
willing to publish the material as facts under your own name? — A. That is right,
you might say that.
Q. Now I wonder if you would just take a look at the article. I would like
to go over it with you to see what
(Mr. Larsen and Mr. Rhetts looked at Document 17-X, Exhibit 20.)
A. The General Stilwell affair, I had nothing to do with. I had not discussed
it with General Stillwell.
Q. Let's try to get at it from the beginning. — A. Nor had I mentioned the
resignation of Joseph Grew.
Q. You state here in the second full paragraph of the article that A. I did
not say
Q. Just a moment. — A. I did not say, "I have devoted many months."
Q. Just a moment. I will turn these in for the record later, but at this point
I would like to introduce into the transcript document 17-1.
The Chairman. You mean the whole thing?
Q. No, 17-1.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
2206 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Document No. 17-1
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)
"I have devoted many months to a plodding investigation of the case in which
I had become entangled, primarily to rehabilitate my reputation and to establish
my complete innocence. I have collaborated with Congressman George Dondevo
of Michigan, who sponsored the creation of the House committee which is about
to undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances of the disposition of the State
Department espionage case, and have offered my fullest cooperation to the chair-
man of that committee, Congressman Samuel Hobbs."
Q. Now in this paragraph beginning with, "I have devoted many months to
a plodding investigation"— A. Yes.
Q. Had you in fact devoted many months to a plodding investigation of it? —
A. Yes, I had not devoted many months by going to an office every day, in that
manner, but during the months prior to my going to Florida I had had occasion
to talk to a number of people who knew about the case and I had discussed
it very widely with them. Such people
Q. You state there that you collaborated with Congressman Dondero. — A. That
is right.
Q. Would you tell us something about the nature of that collaboration with
Congressman Dondero? — A. I did not know Mr. Dondero but I heard one day
day that — I better give you the right sequence. In March 1046 I was here
in Washington and I heard that they wanted men for Korea. I had worked
on Korea both in the Navy Department and in the State Department, and
someone gave me an introduction to go to the War Department and I went over
and they examined me.
Q. Do you happen to know who that was that gave you that introduction? —
A. I don't know. I guess it was Maj. Gordden Link. And then I went in to see
the military government division that had control of appointments for Korea
and they examined me and I asked them, "What about this Amerasia case
I was involved in?" They said, "We don't care. We have investigated you very
thoroughly and we don't worry about that." Then I had my shots and I was
ready to go, I think it was in April I was to go, and then an article appeared
in the Journal American, New York Journal American. This article was written
by Ray Richards, who has an office downtown in the Times-Herald Building,
and he had written roughly as follows : "Now why would the United States
Government send a Communist spy to Korea? Mr. Dondero is going to make
an investigation of this matter." So I immediately took a copy of this article
and I telephoned various friends, said, "Where is Richards? Is he in New
York?" And they said, "No, he is in the Herald Building, 608." So I rushed
up there to him and presented myself, and he just let me stand up, and he
said, "So ! How much did Joe Stalin pay you to spy on the United States
Government?" I said, "You are crazy!" He said, "You dare to tell me that?"
I said, "Yes, I dare tell you that. I came home here with the idea that American
newsmen were of a very superior quality, namely that before they write any-
thing they investigate. You apparently have not investigated." Well, so and
so. I said, "Do you want to talk further to me?" He said, "Yes." I said,
"Please offer me a chair."
Now I forgot to tell you that I had been up to Dondero that morning before
going to Ray Richards, and I had a very similar session with him. He refused
to talk to me and he turned his back on me and he walked up and down the floor,
and I am that type of person, probably because of my stubborn Danish background,
that I don't easily — I get angry slowly but when I get mad it is not very easy to
push me off or around or what. So I told Mr. Dondero, "All right, so you think
I am a spy and you are going to investigate me and you are going to cause a
hubbub about me and damage my reputation when I am looking for a job. You
have ruined it already. You are going to listen to me." He said he didn't want
to, so I followed him up and down the floor, and I put my arm on his shoulder.
He resented that, I said, "Let's get together, Mr. Dondero, because I am a kind
of — well, I have a little bit of the Chinese psychology. I can't help it, I grew
up out there, and beware of me if I get hysterical. I could put you on the spot.
I could refuse to leave this place, and you would have to call the marshal to throw
me out, and that would be a nice scandal, and I would tell everything to the
paper." I said, "You are a representative of the people in a democratic govern-
ment. You like to make statements but you don't like to listen. You don't like
to question a man. I am yours for questioning. Do you want to start or do
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2207
you want me to lie down on the floor and cause a scandal?" He said, "All right."
He -aid. "By golly. 1 begin in believe you." "Mr. Dondero, some of your friends —
Mr. H. Carl Andersen, he lived in Minnesota, he lives on Harvard Street, he is
my very close friend, and he has told me of you as 'George.' I asked him, 'Who
is'this George?' George Dondero, of Michigan.' " I said, "Do you want to call
Carl and ask him about me?*' So he said "Yes." By golly he called. And he
said, "Yes, I know Larsen and think very highly of him." I said, "Would you
like to call another man who is a good friend of mine, I knew him when I was In
China— Walter Judd?" "Oh," he said, "a very close friend of mine." I said,
"Call him, let us not play around any more." And he got very nice to me and
before I left he shook my hand and he promised me that he would do something
to make good for what he had — what harm he had done to me, and he asked me
would I be honest and tell him my story and would I go before his — it wasn't
the Hobbs committee — but he said when a committee is appointed, tell what I
knew, and I said "Yes." "Of course you know everything is secret and confi-
dential"— it didn't turn out quite that way, but I went before the House com-
mittee and since then Dondero has to all purposes been extremely friendly toward
me. He has called me on occasion, asked me what he could do, asked me if I was
looking for a job. I said, "Yes, don't tell me you have a job." He said, "No, but
if you are looking for a job I will permit you to give my name as a reference."
"Thank you, Mr. Dondero." Those are my relations with Dondero.
My relations with Ray Richards turned out very similarly. Before I left
there he said, •Well, I realize in other words that you are not the Communist
you were made out to be." I said, "You are darn right I am not, I never was
a Communist." "Well, did you consider these people in the State Department
as pro-Communist?" I said, "No, I considered that many of them were anti-
Chiang." And he said, "Well, they reported that the Communists were up
and coming, that they were the right thing for China. Do you believe that?"
I said, "No, I don't." And I have repeated this statement over and over when
they have tried to trip me. They have said, "Well, don't you think they have
sabotaged the State Department policy out in the Far East? Don't you think
they are pro-Communist?" I have said, "Well, let's put it this way. If I have
at any time felt that they were too anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Kuomintang,
then it has been my personal opinion, but you must remember this : No state-
ment to this effect on my part would stand up in court or stand up before any
investigating committee. No statement of this kind would clinch the argument
of whether there was a pro-Communist group in the State Department, for
the simple reason that I sat in the State Department and I was not out there."
If anyone asked me, "Mr. Larsen, could you state for certain whether your
judgment was absolutely reliable in this matter inasmuch as you were in the
State Department, not out in the field, and that this type of reporting was pro-
Communist, or could you state that it was perhaps not pro-Communist and
just realistic reporting?" I said I could not state that because I was not out there.
It might have been real strict reporting.
Q. You are referring to the type of reporting that Mr. Service made? — A. Yes,
that is what they always were after. I did not like to discuss this
Q. You are referring to the type of reporting? — A. That Mr. Service and Mr.
Davies and Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Ludden and so on made, the field officers at
the time.
Q. So that you have always said that you had no basis for asserting that it
was pro-Communist? — A. That is right, I can repeat that at any time.
Q. It might have been purely objective? — A. Yes.
Q. You told that to Dondero? And Richards? — A. Yes, and he did not like
it and Richards did not like it and McCarthy did not like it, Mr. Wherry did
not like it. and Mr. Ferguson just a few days ago did not like it either. They
all gave me the impression, all these people, having question me once they
don't seem to want to have much to do with me after that.
Q. Let us come back to the article here. We were trying to go through it.
At this point I would like to introduce into the transcript Document 17^1.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17^1
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)
"* * * iu the course of my own explorations. I have uncovered sufficient
material to convince me that further probing into the matter might assume pro-
portions even more far reaching than those of the Pearl Harbor investigation."
2208 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now I draw your attention, Mr. Larsen, to the portion which begins, "In
the course of my own explorations," and you state that you have uncovered
enough material to convince you that further probing might assume propor-
tions ever more far reaching than those of Pearl Harbor. — A. That is a lot
of bunk, in my opinion. I know, yes, I have let that go in there. In the brief,
opportunity I had to look over that article that afternoon, the manuscript as it
was rewritten by Don Levine, I was lax in putting my foot down. I pencil-marked
many things.
Q. You did not write that? — A. I did not.
Q. That sentence? — A. I did not write that sentence.
Q. Now I would like to introduce document 17-5.
Mr. Achilles. That has been introduced.
Q. I want it in again.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-5
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)
"* * * It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the espionage
case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But
from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation
performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it."
Q. I refer you to this part : "It is the mysterious whitewash of the A. I
never used "whitewash."
Q. Of the chief actors," etc. — A. I never used "whitewash." I never used it.
I was not the author of that term, although I seemed to think at that time
that someone was guilty because I had personally seen two very large heaps of
documents that I had not given Mr. Jaffe, and I certainly thought that there
must be someone who gave that to them. They did not walk there by themselves,
and I felt that someone had been let off. This is a rewording of those hitter
thoughts of mine, that I had been made a scapegoat and had been taken in and
one of those fined $500 and had gone down in history as the spy, the principal
culprit in this case.
Q. I take it your testimony now is that you had no factual basis for believing
that there was a mysterious whitewash of Mr. Service in any case? — A. No.
Q. Did you haveany reason to believe that the failure of the grand jury to
indict him was whitewash? — A. Yes; I did.
Q. Now will you tell us what your basis for that was?— A. That was a state-
ment made to me when I was up in New York that time.
Q. You mean with Levine and Kohlberg?— A. Yes; in August 1940 in conversa-
tion with Mr. Levine and Mr. Kohlberg. I can't remember exactly which one of
us said it, but we talked so much, we were together for lunch, and whenever
we met we used the few moments available to us to discuss the case, and it was
said to me at that time that the grand jury, before which I did not go for some
reason or other — I never did know why my attorney did not take me before the
grand jury. Before the grand jury Mr. Service appeared and was asked, "Did
you or did you not give some documents to Mr. Jaffe?" According to what I was
told, Mr. Service said, "Yes." And they asked him, "Will you then explain why
you should not be prosecuted under such and such laws for giving classified
material to unauthorized persons?" And Mr. Service is supposed to have
taken out of his pocket a piece of paper on which the documents that he admitted
giving to Jaffe — I don't know at all whether this is true or not, but I was told
about it — they were listed and there was a date that somewhat preceded the date
of the arrests, and the document was signed. I believe they told me, by one George
Taylor in OWL This document was a declassification certificate, namely making
these documents or declassifying these documents as of the date on that letter,
for which reason the transfer of the documents would not be a crime, and that
there Mr. Service's case folded up.
Ami then I was told — possibly now that is conjecture on my part but I
thought a lot over what they told me and I think they might have told me the
following to incite me to some vicious feeling against Mr. Service, and I don't deny
that I did have a darn bad feeling against Service after that story was told to me,
namely that the grand jury asked Mr. Service, "All right, then, do you have any
idea of who could possibly have done this?" And he said, "I can only imagine that
the man responsible for transfer of all these documents is Emmanuel Larsen."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2209
"Well," I thought, "that is ;i line thing." I had no association with Service. I
don't see how he could say :i thing like that. He cleared himself, got a nice
letter of congratulation, and here I am, hunted. There was considerable emotion
involved in thai case, so I don't have to beg your question but I will beg you
gentlemen to pardon me if I have been dreaming about this and thinking about it
unnecessarily. And finally, I have tried to pin these men down, and they have
tried to deny even that they said it, and I say, "You know damn well, Don, you
told me that" one time." And he said, "Well, I remember hearing about it, but did
I tell you that?" And I have thought to myself, maybe it wasn't so. And there-
fore when Service was ordered home from India, my wife and I talked it over,
and I said to her, "I think it is tough on Service. I can appreciate it because
of what we have gone through. It makes it very easy for us to appreciate what
Service now is going to go through. He is going to be yanked home and I am
not going to use any of that rubbish that was hearsay and rumor and so on,
because the grand jury is secret and the proceedings cannot come out of the
grand jury." I remember even that I went to James Mclnerney one time and
asked him, "Is that true?" and he refused to answer me. He said, "You know
that is secret. I couldn't tell you that." Anyway I doubt it very much.
Q. Did Levine tell you where he got this detailed account of Service's testi-
mony before the grand jury? — A. No; he didn't. Unless — I can imagine he
got it from Kirkpatrick, because they worked on the case in the FBI. I don't
know if they would know about the grand jury testimony. I am not acquainted
with the law in that way.
Q. As you understand it, Levine told you first of all that Service was able
to show before the grand jury that someone by the name of George Taylor
Lad declassified the documents he showed to Jaffe? — A. That is right.
Q. And secondly that Service testified before the grand jury that you were
the person ? — A. And implicated me by a — in a vague manner.
Q. And in this way you developed a considerable animosity toward Service?—
A. I certainly did. I must say that right now it has worn off, and every day
I am less inclined to believe — I had nothing to do with him, I have never been
together with him, talked to him until today, and I have
Q. Do you today have any reason to believe that Mr. Levine's account to you
is anything but a lie? — A. I can't say that I am sure of it, but if I am testifying
and his magazine turned out to be sensation seeking and not of my liking, and he
on subsequent occasions was extremely insistent upon my altering my text. For
instance, when I wrote the story in January 191S of the Democratic League,
which was a truly liberal group in China, that was infiltrated by Communists —
I was one of the few who knew it at an early date, not through State Depart-
ment information but through secret Chineses sources that gave me some
documents from China in Chinese that proved that the Communists had the
plan. In fact, it was the Communist plan to infiltrate it and use the front
organization. So after I had left the State Department, years after, I dug into
my file, I was showing Dekom that, and I said, "Let's write an article on that,"
and we wrote the article.
Now I found that Mr. Don Levine is not quite the trustworthy man in many
of his human relations I first thought him to be. I hate to say this, but the
fact is that I didn't — he didn't pay me the .$300, and he paid me $200 and told me
the expense account at my hotel, which we had not made quite clear, had run
over $100, including rent of the typewriter, and that therefore I would have to
bear that, so I got only $200 out of that article, and I paid my own way back to
Washington and I billed him for it afterwards.
Q. Did you ever get that? — A. I got that ; yes.
Q. Now let us turn back at the moment to this article, if we may. — A. Inci-
dentally, he ordered me to write a number of other articles — this is just in sub-
stantiation of my statement that Mr. Levine is difficult to deal with. The
agreement was if I ever wrote an article I was to get $50. Well, in Christmas
1948 he still owed me $95, and he came to Washington, and I went over to the
Shoreham Hotel to see him, and we were to make up our minds where we were
to go for egsmog, and so on. And then I said to him, "Don, do you have a check
for me?" He said, "Oh Jimmy, I forgot that damn check. It will be in the mail
when I go back. I will put it in the mail and you will get it just in time for the
end of the Christmas days." That check I have not received yet. I compromised
on the $95 again about the — well, when did my article on the Far Eastern Com-
mission appear? September 26 I mailed it to him.
Q. What year was that? — A. Last year — 1949 — and I said to him — he called me
from New York and said, "You have until September 26 to get in your article
2210 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
on the Far Eastern Commission." I said, "All right, what is the arrangement,
Don'.'" He said, "Well, you know what I have been paying you" — I understood
the normal sum — "this time it will be more. We are in better shape now." He
always told m<e it was because they were about bankrupt. "We are in better
shape now, I will make it double." So I thought that mean .$100, so I agreed,
so I said, "Thank you, Don, that is O. K., I will write it for that." Then I said
"Don, there is another little matter. I am going to write you a letter about it,
but just let me mention it on the phone. You owe me 95 bucks. If you are not
too broke, send me some of that. I am broke." So he said, "Well, all right, you
write me a letter, see if you can compromise on that a little bit, and I might
fix it." So I thought, "All right, I will get $100, I won't strain those fellows,
because if I make it $50 I will wait a year and won't get it," so, believe it or not
gentlemen, I said, "Don send me $25 and we will call the whole account quits."
So he did send me $25, and when he got my manuscript he sent me $50 for the
article on the Far Eastern Commission and he has not paid me any more, and
if he would give me a thousand dollars today I wouldn't write a darn word
for him.
Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript A. That perhaps is irrele-
vant but I want you to know my relations with him were not too pleasant.
Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document 17-6,
17-7, and 17-8.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-6
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)
"* * * How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seek-
ing to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate govern-
ment of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to
introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United
States Government?"
Document No. 17-7
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)
"* * * whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of
Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Ache-
son? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley
into a blind alley and retirement?"
Document No. 17-8
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)
"* * * The answers to all of these questions came to me as I unraveled the
main threads of the tangled State Department Espionage Case. But many more
questions still remain to be solved."
Q. I would like to have you look at this document, Mr. Larsen. Now you
state here that the answers to all of these questions came to you as you
unraveled the main threads — A. Let's take this from the beginning, Mr. Rhetts.
"How did it come to pass," and so on, they want to introduce Earl Browder,
William Z. Foster — take my word for it, I never mentioned those fellows, I am
not the author of that.
"How did it transpire" — I never wrote anything about how it transpired —
"that Marshall" — I did not mention Marshall. That is what I objected to.
Q. So you are not the author of the second paragraph? — A. That is right.
Q. And the next one is, "Whose was the hand which forced the sensational
resignation of Under Secretary Grew?" — A. I did not worry the least bit about
Mr. Grew's resignation. I never asked the questions.
Q. Did you write that paragraph? — A. I did not write that paragraph.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2211
Q. Did Levine write it?— A. Undoubtedly, unless he had Mr. Toledano help
him.
Q. Mr. who? — A. Ralph Toledauo, the author of that recent sensational book —
what is it?
Mr. Achilles. Seeds of Treason.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was Toledano A. Yes ; he was the rewrite man.
Q. I see. — A. To put it very crudely, Mr. Don Levine was a volcano of the
oil well and Toledano was the engineer who harnessed the wealth. That is the
way they worked together.
Q. So that, so far as the last paragraph here, the answer is, "The answer to
all of these questions came to me," and so forth — I take it then that none of
the answer to any of these questions came to you since you did not A. I did
not ; they did not.
Q. Since the questions never occurred to you? — A. That is correct.
Q. Then you did not write that paragraph either?— A. No ; I did not write that
paragraph either. On this — or rather I would say that my discussion with Don
Levine and Mr. Kohlberg tended to show that whereas I had tried to get to the
bottom of this case — naturally I was interested in finding out who did perpetrate
the principal transmitting of these documents, and although I had worked on
that I had not arrived at any very clear conclusions. That I did not like. That
was a bad story- — a weak story, as he called it.
Q. Now I would like to introduce into the transcript Document 17-10.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-10
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 29)
«* * * The search in the offices of Amerasia yielded a trove of more than
100 files containing, according to Congressman Dondero, top secret and highly
confidential papers stolen from the State Department, War Department, Navy
Department, Office of Strategic Services, Office of Postal and Telegraph Censor-
ship, and the OWI at a time when we were at war with both Germany and
Japan."
Q. And I direct your attention, Mr. Larsen, to this material beginning here,
"The search in the offices of Amerasia yielded a trove of more than 100 files
A. I will ask you, how would I know what transpired in the search of Amerasia?
Q. That is the question I was going to ask you. [Laughter.] Did you know? —
A. No; I did not know. Mr. Dondero, who is mentioned here, had apparently
been in very close collaboration with Don Levine. In every detail of the dis-
cussions with Mr. Don Levine, Dondero's name was mentioned. "Dondero has
a list of this," "Dondero," Dondero was his informant.
Q. Pie stated to you that Dondero was his source for some of the informa-
tion?— A. Yes; he stated that, yes.
Q. Some of the information? — A. Yes. And therefore I permitted that to go
in. He said, "Dondero said" because I had been up to Dondero's office and
Dondero had said those things to me, too, but I didn't remember details of it,
but Levine had very detailed lists and stacks of what, shall I say, recounts
all the results found by Dondero.
Q. Now beginning at this point here and going all the way down that column
The Chairman. That isn't very clear on the record.
Q. I know, I am going to offer the whole thing as an exhibit. Beginning
with the material, the words, "The search in the offices of Amerasia" — this is on
page -9 of the article — and the remainder of the first column, all of the second
column A. You see, these documents ■
Q. First, second, third, fourth, and fifth.— A. Those are the lists that I saw
up there, and that Dondero of course had called out to me too, and I said, "Yes,
I haven't seen them, I don't know those, but go ahead, investigate "
Q. You did not write those two columns? — A. No; I did not write those,
I didn't know of those.
Q. Mr. Levine or Toledano wro'te those? — A. One of those two.
Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point Document 17-
11 — — A. Incidentally, if you are interested in a remark on this paragraph here,
"Fifth. Another stolen document, particularly illuminating, and of present great
importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing com-
2212 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
plete disposition of the units in the Army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located,
how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and
showing their military strength. It is easy to visualize the consequences of this
information in the hands of the Communist forces in China, then and now," those
documents were disseminated by the Military Intelligence in many printed
copies — not printed but mimeographed copies — -and they were interesting inas-
much as they showed the names of the commanders and the names of the sub-
ordinate commanders, division commanders, and vice division commanders, and
so on.
But I told Mr. Don Levine that time, "Aha, so you got this information. I
don't see why you bother to mention that. I will tell you one thing. Those docu-
ments, I saw them many times. They were spread all over the place. Damn
little security regarding them, that was a fact. They were not the actual
distribution. I discovered that many times because I had checked them very
carefully with my boss, Major Bales, in the Naval Intelligence, and if one of
those reached Jaffe, all right, whom was he spying for? If he was spying for,
let us say, the Japanese, believe me, they knew very well where the Chinese units
were much better than we knew here. Remember, they had Chou Fu-lai's
puppets and so on, they had spies all the way through. They took over Tai Li's
assistant No. 2, Tai Li's office, Ting Mo-tsun, and he became a spy for the puppets
and they had the complete lay-out. Through him they got the complete Chinese
intelligence set-up which had been rebuilt as of March 1938.
Q. You say you checked this with your boss at Naval Intelligence? — A. Yes;
I checked these things back in 1936, 193S, 1940, 1943, and we always found them
very inaccurate. There was another element of inaccuracy in those military
statements, disposition statements, namely the time element. By the time they
reached us, there had been large movements and they were not the same.
And may I finish this sentence. I told Don, If you think this is an important
document, I could tell you a few things. If Jaffe were spying for the Japanese,
it would have been unnecessary. They would have laughed at him if they had
sent them that. If he were spying for the Russians, as apparently all the im-
plications are, remember those were handed out to the military attaches, and
Panyushkin in Chungking got copies of them to. They weren't worth a damn.
The Russians had them all. They would get them in 2 months or so from Jaffe —
they would not be worth a single penny in intelligence parlance."
Q. Now, have you finished on that point? I do not mean to interrupt. — A. No;
that is quite right.
Q. I have asked that there be included in the transcript at this point Document
17-11.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-11
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 194G, p. 32)
«* * * TnP question as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war against
Japan was uppermost in Allied councils in these days. China's foreign minister,
T. V. Soong, told our Ambassador Gauss that he was convinced that Russia would
attack Japan when Germany was defeated, but would do so for the sole purpose
of sovietizing the Far East. Soong warned that America's headaches would
commence only then. It was a warning which Washingon completely dis-
regarded."
Q. T refer you, Mr. Larsen, to this material on page 32 of the article. — A. That
is right ; I gave that.
Q. You are the author of that? — A. I gave this to Don Levine; yes.
Q. How did you know about (hat conversation? — A. Oh, I knew about that
from studying the reports while I was in the State Department.
Q. Well A. That was. if you want my personal comments on that
Q. We would be glad to have them. — A. That was a report which I considered
rather interesting and I considered at that time when I read it as quite true. It
gave a good picture of Russia's attitude. She would come into the war when
Germany was defeated, or in other words very late, and only for her own sake.
And I was only interested in the report, I only remembered it because it stuck
in my mind as an important warning to the United States that had not been
given any consideration at all here. It had not been public;zed, it was not made
the subject of a discussion in the Postwar Policy Committee — remember, I was
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2213
a member of the Postwar Policy Committee — and that referred to the end of the
war and the postwar situation.
Q. Did yon have any authority to disclose the contents of this dispatch? — A.
No; I did not. You are right on that point. I was, of course, afterward not in
the State Department, but still, you are right, I had no authority to discuss that
or to disclose it.
Q. Now, I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document
17-12.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 17-12
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 32)
"* * * John Stewart Service, a junior colleague and friend of Mr. Davies,
who was stationed as a field representative in China and acted as political
adviser to General Stilwell, tried hard to convince Washington that the rebel
Communists were pursuing a policy of avoiding civil war."
Q. I refer you now, Mr. Larsen, to this paragraph here [indicating]. — A. That
is correct. That is, as far as I remember that, the advice given from the field
at that time to the State Department, or the information was that the Commu-
nists were pursuing a policy of avoidance of civil war. Mr. Gauss did not agree
with that, but Mr. John Carter Vincent attached a note about the size of this
here [indicating 5-by-8-inch paper], something like Mr. Chase's note that we
saw on the dispatches, and that note said, roughly, Mr. Gauss is wrong. Mr.
Gauss sent it in under covering dispatch, and said, "I do not agree with Mr.
Service," and outlined the reasons. He said, "I cannot see, in view of the fact
that the Communists are building turrets and fortresses along all the railways,
and that they are infiltrating large areas of the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled parts
of China — I cannot see that they are pursuing a policy of" — what was it he
called it here? — "avoidance of civil war." But Mr. John Carter Vincent said
Mr. Service is right, and Mr. Gauss is wrong, not exactly in those words, and a
vague line to the effect that the real cause of all this trouble is that the Kuomin-
tang or Nationalist Government is not bringing about the reforms that the Com-
munists championed, and that it was not at all a case of Communists making
trouble in China, but it was Chiang Kai-shek's backwardness that was causing
the trouble.
Q. As a matter of fact, do you know what period of time you are talking
about, that you were talking about here when you were reporting that Service
A. Yes ; it was spring of 1945.
Q. And it is your impression that the report he was sending them was that
the Chinese Communists were in the spring of 1945 trying to avoid the possi-
bility of civil war? — A. It was my opinion that that report was not correct. I
•did not agree with that.
Q. You think that this was a report written by Service in the spring of
1945? — A. Yes. From memory, I would say that was a report.
Q. But not a report written much earlier? — A. No; it was written — all I can
tell you approximately is Mr. Service probably wrote it in February.
Q. February of 1945? — A. Because I remember he came home at the end of
March or early April and sat in on one of our morning meetings.
Q. Sat in on what? — A. On one of our early morning Far Eastern Division
meetings. That is at the time Mr. Ballantine introduced me to him in the
■corridor.
Q. You mean a meeting of your unit or some staff meeting? — A. General staff
meeting in the State Department. That is where I first saw him ; that is where
I figure the time he came home.
Q. What is it you recall? Something he said at this staff meeting? — A. No;
but I recall that Mr. Service came home around the beginning of April — I am not
sure ■
Q. Yes, it was in April. — A. But I remember in April, somewhere around the
1st of April we had one of these Friday morning Far Eastern Division meetings
where all officers and analysts got together, and I remember seeing Mr. Service
in there.
The Chairman. You were not present at the meeting? — A. Oh, yes, I was
always present at those meetings.
2214 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. So you heard what he had to say? — A. I don't remember
whether Mr. Service had anything to say that day or not. I think Mr. Emmerson
gave a little talk that day.
Q. Did Mr. Service ever attend any meetings of your policy committee? —
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Well, now, let us go along with this article here. I would like to intro-
duce into the transcript document 17-14.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 17-14
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 33 )
"The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been re-
lieved of his command, on October 30, 1044. John S. Service submitted his report
No. 40 to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General Hurley
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that report was
'a general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent over there to
sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I was trying to
harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government.' "
Q. I refer you to this [indicating]. — A. I did not write that at all. I didn't
know any No. 40. I had no record of any document. That is Mr. Don Levine's
stuff.
Q. That is Mr. Levine's? — A. His authorship.
Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document 17-13,
and A. I strongly disagreed with the idea of writing the article this way and
mentioning document or report No. 40 because it gave the impression that I
still had documents or copies of them and could quote the number. I didn't.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 17-13
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 33)
"Then came the Stilwell incident. John S. Service, Stilwell*s political adviser,
accompanied a highly secret military commission to Communist headquarters at
Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, old 'Vinegar' Joe demanded that Chiang
Kia-shek permit him to equip and arm some 300,000 Chinese Communists and
put them in the field alongside the Nationalist armies against the Japanese.
Chiang Kai-shek saw in this American proposal a Soviet plot to build up the very
rebel forces which had been waging civil war against his government. He
requested the recall of General Stilwell."
Q. Now I ask you to look at this document 17-13. I ask you whether you
wrote that?— A. No, I did not.
Q. Mr. Levine wrote that? — A. Levine wrote that.
Q. I now ask that there be included in the transcript documents 17-16 and
17-17.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. 17-16
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 34 )
"The Espionage case itself had its origin with the appearance in the December
1944 issue of Amerasia of an article containing unadulterated passages from
an extremely confidential report to the Office of Strategic Services. Two
employees of the OSS were struck by the passages which they had read in the
original and became curious as to how the information turned up in the columns
of Amerasia. A preliminary investigation conducted by OSS disclosed that
various other secret documents were in possession of Jaffe. Kate Mitchell, and
Mark Gayn, all of Amerasia."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2215
Document No. 17-17
(Article in Plain Talk, entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 34)
"The FBI then took charge of the affair. As established by Congressman
Dondero, the Government agents spent several months on the ease. In the
course of their quest, it was found that John S. Service was in communication
from China with .Mr. Jaft'e. The substance of some of Service's confidential
messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York
before they arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of
Mr. Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports, entitled
"Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek — Dicline of His Prestige and Criticism of an
Opposition to His Leadership."
Q. I am referring now to this [indicating]. — A. In justifying the entry of these
items regarding Stilwell. such as the one that we have just looked at. "Then
came the Stilwell incident. John Service" and so on, about "Vinegar" Joe
demanding Chiang Kai-shek permit him to equip and arm 300,000 Chinese Com-
munists, with regard to those statements I said to him. "How do you know these
things? I remember vaguely something about that, but how can we put this
in, "Report 40' and so on?" And he said, "I have this material here." And
he showed me extracts and retyped items from dispatches, and he had a very
voluminous steel file — remember, that is before anything was published about
Stilwell. He also had in there even photostats of a letter written by General
Stilwell to Mrs. Stilwell in which General Stilwell said, "I get so damned mad
with these people that sometimes I feel I would love to take off my uniform
and shoulder a rifle in the army of Chu Teh."
The Chairman. Who was that, army of A. Gen Chu Teh. Now that was a
photostat of a letter. It was in May, it seems to me.
Q. That Levine had in his file? — A. Yes. And I said to myself, "It is amazing.
Maybe there was a plot, maybe there was a great pro-Communist element out
there in China." If that letter was genuine — of course, it may be, Joe Stilwell
was a man of terrific temper and maybe he wrote that not at all as a Communist
but on the other hand he did write it to his wife, and it does make a bad impression
when you see things like that.
I am mentioning that to give you gentlemen an idea of the extent to which
they tried to substantiate and did substantiate many of the things they were
telling me about and they were telling me that I ought to know and that they
were surprised that I didn't know.
Q. Now referring back to this document 17-16 and 17-17, which is this material
[indicating], will you look at that? — A. Yes. I don't know anything about that
article which later has been mentioned as a transcript of a secret OSS report on
Thailand that was the beginning of the Amerasia investigation that touched off
the authorities to the fact that Jaffe had inside information. I don't know any-
thing about that.
Q. Now the next paragraph A. I may add that I never saw that report on
Thailand and I never gave it to Jaffe, so it is out of the question. It was news to
me when I went up there and I don't even know that Mr. Dondero had mentioned
it to me, but I certainly read plenty about it later.
The Chairman. Then I take it you didn't write these two paragraphs you
refer to?
A. I haven't seen the first paragraph.
Q. Document 17-16, you didn't write that, is that correct? — A. That is right.
Now you see, that is also presented here in a manner that would indicate
Q. You are referring now to the portion that begins, "The FBI then took
charge" A. Yes. "In the course of their quest, it was found that John S.
Service was in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe."
Q. Did you write that? — A. I did not write that, that it was found, I did not
write that at all, that Mr. Service was in communication with Mr. Jaffe. They
told me about it and it is not in my original manuscript.
Q. Did they give you the facts which supported that assertion? — A. No. they
did not.
Q. Nonetheless you permitted it to be pubUshed under your name? — A. Yes,
on the grounds that my knowledge of the case was insufficient, and as Mr. Levine
said, we were collaborating on the article. When two men collaborate on an
article there inevitably will be information available or known to one and not
to the other, and therefore correctly the article should have been signed by
him with me.
2216 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. The fact is though that his name does not appear anywhere in connection
with the article. — A. It does not appear.
Q. And he gave you no factual material? — A. No, he gave nie no factual ma-
terial on that score.
Q. To support this, nothing to support the assertion that it was found that
Service was in communication A. Not then and never since.
Q. In the course of any of your discussions with Congressman Dondero, did
he ever give you any factual information tending to support this charge? — A.
No, no. I may mention that Mr. Dondero, undoubtedly a very excellent man
and good lawyer, and so on, he is totally blank when it comes to Far Eastern
affairs and knowledge of what went on. He doesn't know the slightest about
it. Neither did anybody on the House committee. They asked me the most
asinine questions.
Q. Now, the next sentence in this paragraph states that "The substance of
some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the
offices of Arnerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington." — A. That
is the same implication. That is not of my doing.
Q. You didn't write that?— A. No, sir.
Q. Mr. Levine wrote it?— A. I suppose so, either he or Mr. Toledano.
Q. Did they give you any information to support that, any factual informa-
tion to support this statement? — A. No, they didn't.
Q. Now the next sentence states that among the papers found in the posses-
sion of Jaffe was document No. 58, and so forth. — A. What page is that on?
Q. The next sentence. — A. Fifty-eight. No, again just like Document 40, I
knew of no documents under numbers, I didn't know what that was, that dis-
patch, Decline of his prestige and criticism of and opposition to his leadership,
I did not know of that.
Q. You never heard of that? — A. No, I don't think so; I don't think I ever
handled that dispatch.
Q. Did they show you a copy of that? — A. No, they did not : but Mr. Dondero
showed me a photostat of the list that he had in his office.
Q. Did he tell you this Document 58 was one of Service's secret reports? — A.
Yes, he said so.
Q. Dondero said? — A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you what made him think it was one of Service's reports? — A. No,
I don't remember his elaborating on that. He merely said that Document 58 —
and I have clippings and so on where I have them filed together and tried to
piece it together so I know only from the newspaper reports and the lists that
the congressional committee had, that they were such. I don't know, I haven't
seen them myself. I haven't seen these documents myself.
The Chairman. I haven't seen them myself, you said?
A. I haven't seen them myself.
Q. Now I will ask to be included in the transcript Document 17-18.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-18
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 35)
"* * * an(| ^at a£ one time Jaffe had in his possession a message sent by
Ambassador Hurley to his wife, advising her not to rent their home in Chesa-
peake Bay for the summer, inasmuch as he expected to return to the United
States before the end of the summer."
A. All this about Lattimore I did not put in. I did not say a word about
Lattimore. I don't know Lattimore at all.
Q. You are referring now to material appearing at the bottom of column 1,
page 34, and top of column 2 of the article? — A. That is right.
Q. Now I ask you to look at this [ indicating ]. — A, All this about Philip Jaffe,
alias Phillips, I didn't know about that. Thev had a complete file, dossier, on
Jaffe.
Q. You are referring now to all of the remainder of column 2 on page 34? — A.
That is right.
Q. And you said you were not the author of that either? — A. I was not the
author of that.
Q. And now I ask you to look at Document 17-18, which is this material right
here [indicating]. — A. I did not know about any message sent by Ambassador
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2217
Hurley to his wife. I don't see how that possibly could ever come to me, but I
was told about that.
Q. Did they show you the message? — A. No; I don't think they showed me the
message. I still don't know what it was about, but they told me there was proof
that hie didn't expect to go back out.
Q. Well, that message, as I read the context here, was referred to merely to
show what an extensive A. File Jaffe had.
Q. File Jaffe had.— A. That is right.
Q. But you merely took Levine's word that Jaffe did have such files? — A. Yes;
they told me, "We have been through the lists and, to a certain extent, transcripts
of the documents"
Q. Which documents? — A. All of the documents found in Jaffe's possession.
Q. Levine told you he had been through them? — A. Yes; they said they had
been through them. There, you see, were the experts who had handled the case
while I was mixing concrete in Florida. You don't learn much about the State
Department by mixing concrete down there. In fact, I sweated out a lot of dates
and details of things I had seen in the State Department when I worked down
there.
Q. Where or did Levine indicate to you how he had obtained access to the files
or the materials found in Jaffe's possession at the time of his arrest? — A. I don't
remember how he told me that, but I remember he said he had together with
Dondero had had access to lists and descriptions of the documents.
Q: At this time — this was August, after the Hobbs committee investigation,
was it not? — A. Yes; because the Hobbs investigation was during the spring
and
Q. It was during May of that year, wasn't it? — A. Yes ; 1946.
Q. And we are now talking about August 1946? — A. That is right. I don't
know whether the official report was out or not. I would have to check that.
Q. No. — A. I think I have a copy of that at home.
Q. The official report, however, does not contain any of the testimony. — A. It
doesn't? I see.
Q. Testimony or lists of the documents. — A. They still got them through
friendly relations with their Congressmen.
Q. With Congressman Dondero.
(No response from the witness.)
Q. Now I ask that there be introduced into the transcript 17-19, 20.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document Nos. 17-19, 20
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 35.)
"When John Stewart Service returned from China, Miss Mitchell gave a party
at which he was present. He had previously attended a special press conference
held by the Institute of Pacific Relations in which he supported the position of
the Chinese Communists."
Q. And I refer you to [indicating]. — A. No, I didn't know that. I wasn't
present. I certainly didn't know about it.
Q. You had no personal knowledge?- — A. No personal knowledge whatsoever.
You may put that down definitely. That is something he told me
Q. "He" meaning Levine? — A. All right, if you say so, but I did not know of it.
Q. By "he" you mean Levine? — A. Levine.
Q. You are not the author of that? — A. I remember he had that in there,
he had talked about it, and I said, "I don't know. If it is anything to you,
Don, it is at least to me, it is a good item in proving that I did not conspire with
Service."
Q. And did you know anything about the second sentence there, to the
effect that Service had attended this A. Special press conference?
Q. Press conference in which he supported the position A. No, sir; I
meant to say that but I thought it covered
Q. You didn't write that in? — A. No, sir ; not the least bit.
Q. That is also Levine or Toledano, correct? — A. That is right. Don Levine
or Toledano. I am not sure which one of those two.
The Chairman. Did you meet that last gentleman during your conference
up there.
A. Yes ; I met him there. He was in the outer office and he was a very bril-
liant writer. I don't like the stuff he writes but he is a good writer. He is a
Puerto Rican, a young fellow.
2218 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now I ask that there be included in the transcript Document 17-21.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 17-21
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case,"
by Emanuel S. Larsen, October 1916, p. 38)
"The grand jury proceedings are, of course, secret. But it has been reported
to me that John Service had accused me of furnishing Jaffe with documents
found in his possession, which was a complete and vicious fabrication."
Q. I refer you to the bottom of column 1, on page 38, Mr. Larsen. You have
already testified I believe, on this point [indicating]. — A. Yes.
Q. I believe you have already testified that Levine described to you what pur-
ported to have occurred in the proceedings before.the grand jury, in which Mr.
Service A. Yes.
Q. Incriminated you? — A. It was true what was written here. It had been
reported to me that John Service had accused me. It had been reported. The
fact is that it had been reported by Mr. Levine. It is typical of Mr. Levine's
style.
Q. Now I ask that we introduce into the transcript document 17-22.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. 17-22
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case,"
by Emanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 38)
"According to Congressman Dondero, for some unaccountable reasons the
Government attorneys presented to the grand jury only a part of the evidence
in their possession."
Q. I refer you to this sentence here [indicating]. — A. How would I know
that?
Q. Did you write that? — A. I didn't write that, I didn't write a single word
about that.
Q. Did Mr. Levine or Mr. Toledano or Mr. Kohlberg? — A. One of them, one of
them just have.
Q. Did they tell you all the evidence had not been introduced? — A. They said
they had heard that and that they wrote that down in there, and I made some
lines there in the original document, in the original of their rewrite.
Q. Would you think it fair to say, Mr. Larsen, that your willingness to accept
these very damaging statements against Mr. Service and have them published
under your name was due to the animosity which you had formed as a result of
Mr. Jaffe's — —A. I wanted to say a minute ago that was partly it. Second
was that
The Chairman. You didn't finish your sentence. Mr. Jaffe's what?
A. Due to the animosity created within me by the rumors that had been given
me. I was, I dare say, unduly lax in criticizing the manuscript of the rewritten
article. One reason — another reason for that was that I was under great pressure
of time. I had less than 2 hours to catch my train. The last day — they served
the finished document to me the last day. There was not even a chance to rewrite
paragraphs. Also I was considerably worried about how I would get back,
whether I would have money enough for the trip. They gave me my check in
the last minute, and I was sick and in a great hurry to get away from the whole
thing. I thought, "All right, they have these files here and they have this fulsome
evidence and they have impressed me with the fact that it seems that they have
gone into it very thoroughly, very thoroughly into it, whereas I have not had occa-
sion to go into it." Where could I go if I went into it V Justice Department, Mr.
Mclnerney, although ho was very friendly toward inc. he could take out docu-
ments, he didn't give me any information, he didn't show me anything. If I
came to the State Department, T had been given the cold shoulder. In a remark
John Cuter Vincent said to me, "I wouldn't touch you with a 10-foot pole."
Q. He said that to you. — A. Yes. lie did. Mr. Donderdo turned to me — that
was just after the arrest and when I was released — "I hear from Mortimer
Graves they have collected a fund of $5,000 to defend the State Department
people in this case lint Mr. Craves tells me, I am sorry I have had news, you
are not to benefit from that fund." Oh, oh. I went to the phone when I got
home and I called Mr. John Carter Vincent but Mr. Drumright answered the
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2219
phone ami John Carter Vincenl was right there ai the desk, and I heard him
say. •"Iliis is Larsen." "Whatdoes he waul ?" "He wants to know what are you
going t<» do aboul this whole ease? Are yon going to do anything for him?"
And then Drumright turned around to the phone and said. "John Carter Vincent
says he WOUldn'1 touch you witli a 10-foot pole."
Q. This is who. Mr. Drumright? — A. Mr. Drumright was one of the State
Department officers connected with far eastern affairs.
Q. You referred to the fact that a $5,000 fund had been raised. Who told you
any such fund ha<l been raised? — A. Mr. Mortimer Graves of the American
Council of Learned Societies.
Q. He told you they had raised a $5,000 fund?— A. Yes. lie said about $5,000.
I remember that figure.
Q. Are you sure it was not $500? — A. It is a long way off. Five hundred is —
I can ask him again. You see, Mr. Mortimer Graves was the one who granted
me this scholarship to the Library of Congress and he was the one who recom-
mended me for entry into the Naval Intelligence, and recommended to Admiral
Zacharias that I be excused from serving the rest of my scholarship on that
Rockerfeller project. And therefore he considered me as one of his proteges. He
was in that field of procuring far eastern men, men with far eastern knowledge
for the various Government departments.
Therefore when the case broke and I came out from the District jail, I decided,
"I am not going to answer any phones," because the reporters and women
came to the door, and my wife held them all off. But finally the second or third
day there was a phone call which rang so persistently that I took it. Mortimer
Graves. He said, "Larsen, are you doing anything now?" I said, 'Certainly
not." He said. "All right, would you like to come down here and work on our
card files and put them in order, classify the files on the various men in the
far eastern field as you know them and as they are listed, collect all the
material from their scholarship letters and put them on cards"; just like we
do with Chinese personality cards. I said, "Sure, I would love to." He said,
"I don't have much money but I know I have $75 right now that would last
you for a week or two, and then I will see if I can get up something." So I went
down there, started to work at once, and it was the second or third day after
I had been there that he called me up and said, "I have some bad news for you.
There is a fund being collected and I am the custodian of that fund,'' and to the
best of my knowledge he said that would run to abount $5,000 collected from
various people within the State Department for the defense of the State De-
partment men involved in this case, but that bad news was that I was not to
benefit from that fund. My heart sort of sank within me, and I thought, "All
right, another bad stroke."
At the end of the week he said, "How are you coining along"? I said, "I
have finished that project." He said, "All right, now as to whether you can
contiue or not. I don't know, but say come in Monday, and let us see, or give
me a ring first." So I gave him a ring Monday, and he said, "Well, come down
tomorrow and I will see if I have some more for you." He said, "I have a little
tail end of another fund, $60. You do this little job." I had it done in about
3 days. He said. "Well, all right, don't worry. Don't came in for the rest of
the week and don't come in until I call you again." And I thought I sensed a
cooling in his attitude toward me, although I have always liked him very much.
I went in some time ago and told him, "You remember that time? I just
wanted a little understanding with you because I am tired of this going around
wondering, 'And how is that man toward me now'? I don't give a damn if I
have a clash with you, let's have it out. If we are friends, and you still have
decent regard for me, all i i He said, "I have very high regard. I will try
to get you one of the Pakistan scholarships," and I am registered for that at
present. I did mention to b!-ii this $5,000 fund and he didn't deny it.
But I was rather bitter hat time. I thought. "Here we go. we are excluded
on every point." Even the defense, the lawyers don't want to get together
will my lawyer on the defense. Roth's lawyer didn't want to have anything
to do with us, Jaffe's law er would not have anything to do. And then I read
later about the Lattimore ni" itation. Everyone has asked me, "Were you there"?
I said. "No. I wasn't." I am very glad I wasn't. It is one link in my proof
that there was no collusion, no conspiracy to remove documents.
Q. As a matter of fact. Mr. Larsen. you complained about why the Service
lawyer and other lawyers wouldn't get together with your lawyers — it was your
theory that you were not .igaged in any conspiracy, why would you want to get
together with the other J wyers? — A. We wanted to know what the case was
CMlTO — E0 — lit. 2 47
2220 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
about. We thought they might know something about it. We didn't know — in
any battle it is good to know something about your enemy, and we thought we
might get something interesting. Now, if we had gotten together then — let's take
it this way. If we had gotten together then I would have discussed with Jaffe the
fact that'l discovered that my apartment had been illegally entered and that my
wire, my telephone had been tapped. As Fred Woltman said to me over the phone
a few davs ago. "Jiirmie, you sure blew up that ease when you made that motion
that the evidence was all obtained illegally." And I told Fred Woltman, "Yes, I
apparently did." I didn't know at that time anything about the others, and I
had nothing to do with them. I bad no inclination to go and tell them, "Look,
boys, I found out something about my case." I thought, "To hell with them.
They don't want to work with me, I don't want to work with them either."
Well, now Ferguson asks me. "What would you have done"
Q. This was Senator Homer Ferguson'.' — A. [Nodded] "What would you have
done if you were an investigator?" I told him, -Tf I were an investigator and I
thought that the Nation's security was at stake, 1 would enter illegally, because
I have done so when I was an invest gator for the Chines,' in Peking." I violated
all the treaties and extraterritoriality and everything. 1 went up to Kalgan with
a couple men and pistols, took an army officer and shoved him on the train and
took him down to Peking. One of Chu Lin's officers.
Q. So that you had no compunction about violating constitutional rights of in-
dividuals if you were investigating V— A. No. He asked me, "Why. then, did you
make that motion?" I said, "Because I was fighting for my life and I was irri-
tated by so many things that were asked me and said against me."
You know how I discovered that? My father bought a vase in Chengtu in 1908,
or I think it was 1007. a black and white vase. He gave that vase to me, and I
had it in a little box on top of a shelf in my closet. When the FBI men came to
my residence on the night of .June 6, they said, "Have you any documents?" And
I said, "Yes." "Show them to us." I said, "Why should I show them to you?"
They said, "By virtue of this" and I found I was taken in and I sin wed it to
them. "Why do you have them?" -Because, to take stuff home to read it. Long-
winded stuff, can't read it in the office." We went around. "Where is it?" "Here
is one." I took it out of an envelope marked "Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-Wu" — and
files on these Communists. And then one of the investigators, namely Mr. — I
can't — oh, Sander, said. "What is in that box up there?" The other fellow said,
"That is a vase." And I am hard of hearing but it just happens that although I
had my back turned to him I heard that.
Q. It was in a box? — A. It was in that box, in the little box. what you call an
old hat box my father had. My father had a top hat in that when I was a boy
and it has been in that top-hat box ever since.
I heard that and I stopped dead. I could hardly get going again. I thought,
"(>h !" And then, "If the other one knows, then he lias been in there." So I let
it go, and in my old Chinese way I went about it in a pretty easy way. And one
day I went down to the house manager, Mr. Sager — he is a man who likes a drink.
When I wanted somehing done in the apartment I bought him a drink. So I
bought him a bottle of Southern Comfort. It always did the trick. I said. "Sager,
I got a little stock of this in. I have one bottle for you." He said, "Oh." I sat
down, smoked my cigarette, and said. "Say, tell me. Sager, how many times did
those fellows from the FBI come in here and approximately when?" So he said.
"Oh. you know about that?" I said, "Sure, I know about that. You tell me."
So he told me how he let them in with a pass key and he mentioned something
about wire tapping. I hadn't thought about that. I said, "Who was that?"
There was a girl present when lie fixed those wires. "It was Miss Garvey." I
said, "I have to talk to her." She is a little lame on one side, just been married to
one of Chennault's fliers who had come back, ami she told me the story of how
they wire tapped, from what time, since when. So immediately I called Hilland.
my lawyer, and I said "Here. I have something here. Now I am going to throw
the muck back" at them. Enough of this nonsense. I don't see how I can extricate
myself. I have some faults but they have some. too. They will have it. If they
want to fight, let's fight. I can't pay you but I have a Chinese who will put up
$10.(i(Ki. a little Chinese laundryman I befriended one time." He forged a guy's
name on a lease. He took it over and then he extended the lease on his own
signature, whereas lie should have had the man who had originally taken
the lease over extend it.
(„>. This was the Chinese laundryman?— A. Yes. I helped him get out of it,
went to various people, the rent people, real-estate agent, and I told him, "This
is done in China all of the time. He is not a crook, just scared he would lose
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2221
the place. Now you want to use this like a blackmail case, now you want to put
a hell of a pressure on him to gel $35 more rout." Ho said. "O. K. put $35 on,
tear up this lease, and sign this one."
This Chin Chew, the Chinese, when my wife was away in her home, he said,
"I am going hack to China and I have sold my six laundries including my fac-
tories out in Front Royal"— he did laundry for all laundrynien here, most of
them don't do the laundry, just ironing — and he said, "I have sold it all and I
have $43,000. I will put up $10,000 for you, Jimmie, for your defense." And I
really had a cheval de bataille there to go to see him with, and so I said to Mr.
Hilland, my lawyer. ••Let's go up and bruise him up a little." I said when 1
went up. "What are you going to prosecute me for? I am going to make a motion
von not it all illegally. I have ten thousand bucks from a friend and I will go to
the Supreme Court.'"' He said. "You know, if you just had one Government
pencil marked 'United States Government' in your house, we can slap you in jail
for 1 year with a one-thousand-dollar fine." I said. "All right, that is why I am
tried.' Nevertheless. I still will fight the 'battle of the badge.' ' I had the gold
badge and I had a right to take stuff home and have it in my home. "It still
doesn't make me a thief." All right, then. I didn't know that in the next room
they had Jaffe in. They said. "Pardon me, just a minute." They went in and
immediately made Jaffe agree to plead guilty before he would walk out on the
street and discover I had tiled a motion to light it on the grounds that they had
obtained the evidence illegally.
On the other hand, I went out and I think it was the next day I discovered
that Chin Chew came with his passport and said he was going back to Canton
and he was sorry but he had to withdraw the money to deposit it in some busi-
ness in New York and I was left without funds. Then they started to work
on me. "Will you enter a plea of nolo contendere?" I said, "No."
They discussed the merits of such a plea and finally, one day, I believe it must
have been the early days of October — no, the latter part of October — the Justice
Department attorney, Mr. Robert M. Hitchcock, said to me, "Jaffe's lawyer has
come to us, and he says he feels very guilty about you. You are poor and he
lias some money and he realized that if he had never asked Roth to go and
seek you out for that intercourse with those personality files, you would never
have known him, never been involved in the case. Now you are run down, you
have lost your reputation, your job, you have no money, etc., can't even pay your
lawyer. So he says, 'If Larsen were to enter a plea of nolo contendere he might
he fined, that is probably what was frightening him off from that plea,' but if
he were to do that, Mr. Jaffe tells us he would he willing to pay this fine for you."
I said, "Oh, no, and get linked up with him. No."
Mr. Achilles. It was Hitchcock who told you Jaffe would pay the fine?
A. Yes, I did not get that from Jaffe. So I said, "You are just eager to get
a conviction, to get some sort of settlement of the case. I know every lawyer
wants that. I make no bones about that. Now let me see. I would have him pay
my fine and my lawyer: it would make me look pretty bad, I think."
So I went home and told my wife. At that time I had lost a lot of weight,
couldn't sleep at night, never slept at night. I was so thin and nervous and
we had no money for the groceries. After a few days of acute difficulties, a
man came with a bill, and so on, and — well, I would be away, out of it, and I
wouldn't have one or two thousand dollars that I owed Hilland and wouldn't
have that hanging over me
Q. He also agreed to pay your attorney's fees? — A. Attorney's fees and the
line and little incidentals such as transcript or report of what was the legal
papers and, namely, we got a transcript of Jaffe's court papers, $27 it cost. All
right. Then we talked it over night after night, and one night my wife said to
me, "Maybe that would be the way out of it." So I went to Hilland. He is a
fine, honorable man. He said. "Now. Jimmie, don't do it hecause you owe me
$2,000," hecause that is what it was up to date. I said. "I know that. In other
words, you are advising me not to do that." "Hitchcock told you all the fine
things, and now I will tell you all the bad things I learned today from British
case history, and so on." I said. "Nevertheless. I came here with my mind
made up. I will enter a plea of nolo contendere and scram out of town, become
a taxi driver somewhere, or something else." He said, "Don't do that. But all
right, if you want to do it, let's do it." So that was ( htober 22.
Then we did two things. He notified Hitchcock that day, October 22, "Larsen
is going to enter a plea of nolo contendere."' I went that day or next day, I went
home. said. "I want to talk to Mr. Bvrnes." I had trouble getting him — every-
2222 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
body else but Mr. Byrnes. Finally I got him, told him I wanted to resign, and
said I would send in a letter
Q. You are referring to Secretary of State Byrnes? — A. Yes. "I want to send
my resignation and will it be accepted without prejudice?" I said, "You don't
have to accept it but I would like to have it accepted that way."' He said,
"Certainly You send it in, say it is "personal reasons.' and I will reply 'personal
reasons.' ' I said, "I understand that is the right etiquette in State Department :
If you are going down to defeat or you have gone down to defeat not to compro-
mise the Department." He said, "That is very nice of you, that is correct."
Because I had agreed to go to court, I will admit risk, defeat, and also I knew
if I got lined then I would more or less automatically be dismissed from the
Department.
I am through with the story. I was permitted to resign and went to court
November 2 after a sudden warning Friday afternoon, and in the session on
November 2, 1945, I was not asked whether I had given any documents. I was
not asked whether I knew about any Communist affiliations. I was merely
asked whether I was E. Larsen, whether I had withdrawn — y^vx emphatic — ■
whether I had withdrawn my motion, whether I was now willing to enter a
plea of nolo contendere. I said. "Yes." And he said, "I will not lecture to you.
You are a grown man. I hue you $500."
(A short recess was declared, after which the Board reconvened.)
The Chairman. Have you finished this particular line?
Mr. Rhetts. No I have not, General.
The Chairman. You have not finished?
Mr. Rhetts. I have not finished going over this article.
The Chairman. Will you please go on with that then?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I believe you testified at the outset of the cross-examination. Mr. Larsen,
that while you entertained the view that some of Mr. Service's reports were
reporting favorable on the Chinese Communists, that you never had any reason
to believe that it would be pro-Soviet communism? — A. That is right.
Q. 1 ask that there be introduced into the transcript at this point, Document
17-9.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 17-9
(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by
Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 194<>, p. 28)
"* * * There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a lead-
ing figure in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Depart-
ment * * *"
Q. I refer you to this sentence here, "There I found myself sitting," etc. —
A. I did not say "pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State I ►epartment."
Q. You did not write that? — A. No : I did not write "pro-Soviet."
Q. Did Mr. Levine show you any evidence to indicate that Mr. Service was
part of a pro-Soviet group? — A. No; he didn't, but he spoke of the "pro-Soviet
group" continuously.
Q. I believe you testified you never did have any reason to believe that
Service was pro-Soviet, let alone a leader of the State pro-Soviet group? —
A. That is right.
Q. Yet you permitted this A. Well
Q. Yet you permitted this article to be published under your name although
it represented a statement directly contrary to what you thought; is that
correct? — A. That is right. May I advance a theory in my defense?
Q. Please do. — A. That I don't know — I have no copy of his manuscript,
Mr. Don Levine's manuscript. I don't know whether I remember after seeing
the manuscript during that short interval in the afternoon there before my
departure from New York exactly what was left as it was and what was
amended a little bit, a word changed here and there. I have no way of
checking on that now.
Q. So that you don't even know whether you even saw this in the revision
of the manuscript that was shown to you? — A. That is right.
Q. You think it may have been added? — A. He did not give me — yes; I am sure
about some additions, some items. I didn't see them even in the revision.
I am sure about some items. I can't say for sure about this one, that they
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2223
were added, because I didn't even remember seeing them when I saw the firsl
issue Of the Plain Talk magazine. I thought, "Now. where did he get that? He
didn't even have that in his rewrite."
Q. I>o yon think you can point to any of those now that yon know were not
even in the revision that was shown to you? — A. I saw one here a little while
ago. There was something in here about Mr. Jaffe, that he had paraded under
the name, alias. Of J. W. Phillips. I don't think he had that in the original
rewrite manuscript. That is all on page .'54. second column, just about in the
middle Of it. I didn't know the history of this, from 34 to 36. He had been
a member of the editorial hoard of China Today. I don't think I ever saw
China Today.
Q. The question is whether that was in the revision of the article which —
A. That is what I referred to. I don't remember seeing anything about that
story, that history of the evolution of the Amerasia magazine and the charges
that as editor of China Today he has posed as Mr. Phillips.
Q. Now. coming back to this material on page 28, which is Document 17-9,
that we were just talking about A. Page 38?
Q. Yes. page 28.— A. Oh, 28, I see.
Q. Wherein it is stated that Mr. Service was a leader of the pro-Soviet group,
will you try to recall whether or not that statement was in the article as revised,
which Mr. Levine showed to you, and see whether you can recall anything about
it? — A. To the best of my knowledge I do not remember seeing that in the text,
because I would have objected to that. I would have said the group, the anti-
Chiang group, or group favorahle to the Chinese Communists who were at that
time known as the Chinese Agrarian Reformers. We all fell for that at one time.
Q. You think that had you seen that in the revised text you would have objected
to it?— A. Yes, I would have objected to it. I can only say that if it were in the
text, if we could get Don Levine to reveal the text and he could show that that
was in there, then it was gross carelessness on my part to overlook it. I do not
subscribe to that statement. I do not believe and I did not believe then that
there was a pro-Soviet group in the State Department. I do not believe there was
a pro-Soviet group in any other sense in the State Department or in the United
States, in any other sense than a group that was, like all other Americans, very
happy that the Russians were our allies during the war.
Q. You are aware, are you not, Mr. Larsen, that this statement, like all the
other statements in this article, have been repeated by Senator McCarthy as a
part of the charges which have been made against Mr. Service? — A. Yes, I am
aware of that : very much so.
Q. As I understand you, you repudiated the authorship of this and all other
statements we have discussed? — A. Yes, I would. Yes, I would.
Q. Now I would like you to look at the material on page 32, column 2, beginning
with "The pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose views" and going down
to the bottom of the column. Were you the author of that material? — A. Little
bits here and there. He has taken a word and a clause here and there and —
let us take it from the beginning. "The pro-Soviet group in the China Section,
whose views were reflected by Amerasia, and whose members were in touch with
Jaffe and Roth"— I didn't write that.
Q. You did not write that? — A. I did not write that.
Q. What you have just quoted? — A. I did not write that. "Secretary Ludden
of" — I mentioned Ludden as one of those who reported that now we were ready
to arm and equip the Communists in case of an invasion of north China coast.
So far as I know there was no plan to invade the north China.
Q. But you had seen reports from Ludden to this effect? — A. I had seen reports
from Ludden recommending the arming of the Chinese in north China, and I
was very much amazed because I had worked in Naval Intelligence on a detail
reporting and surveying of the leading beaches along the south China coast,
south of Shanghai, south of the Yangtze River.
Q. Now you say you had mentioned Ludden's name? — A. Yes.
Q. But you didn't, did you, mention it A. Not as a member of the pro-Soviet
group, no.
Q. Now, then, you say in the next sentence, "So was John Davies, a native of
Thengtu, who acted as State Department" A. No; that is his wording, that
is his authorship.
Q. Then the next paragraph, you state that "He"- — referring to Davies —
"seemed to believe and report almost anything in the way of information against
the Knomintung and Chiang Kai-shek, swallowing whole and relaying nearly
everything about the Chinese Communists" gave him. Were you the author of
2224 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
that? — A. I had something to that effect, that everything that was against the
reputation of the Kuomintang was carefully reported and that the dispatches
in general carried laudatory remarks on the up-and-coming Communist Govern-
ment.
Q. Was Mr. Davies reporting things that the Chinese Communists told him? —
A. Yes. Mr. Davies had
Q. Was he in China? — A. Yes, he was in China. He had sent in a numher
of reports. I remember he was the author of the report stating that the Chinese
Communists definitely had a non-Russian orientation. I was a little shocked
at that report for a very simple reason.
Q. You are sure that this was a report of Davies? — A. Yes; I am sure. I was
shocked that he reported that the Communists had a non-Russian orientation
because I had in my hand since the latter part of 1943 the minutes of a congress
held in Yenan on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern. It is a printed
document, printed on very poor paper, a kind of cheap Chinese bamboo paper and
in very poor English and very obviously printed in Yenan. And, I was told
and I am quite ready to believe, printed for consumption in the English-speak-
ing countries. But I was told by my Chinese friend who brought it home from
China and gave it to me in 1943, that it was suppressed in this country because
the Communist line as dictated by the Kremlin was to influence the people of
the United States to believe that there was no Russian orientation among the
Chinese Communists and that they were not Soviet, Russian Communists, but my
document that I still have is a very valuable document, clearly said, "Nov/ the
Comintern is abolished." Mao Tse-tung made that speech May 26. The Comin-
tern was abolished on May 23. He said, "It does not matter. Whereas we have
received instructions from the Soviet Union over a long period of years, the
change will not be very significant, but we will not any more receive instructions
from the Comintern." He didn't say that they wouldn't receive any more in-
structions, but he said they would receive no more instructions from the Comin-
tern. "Nevertheless," he said, "Communism is Marxist Leninism," and he said
it over and over.
And when I read that, just like any person would reading it, I said, "Well, this
was said by the Communists on May L6 in Yenan, and it was printed and pub-
lished, was labeled 'printed October 1946'" — what did I say, 1946? I meant
1943, in October 1943 — "and yet our State Department men continued to report
that there was no Soviet orientation and our popular writers on China, Edgar
Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and so on, continued to say the same
thing." Was that then stupid, ignorant reporting or was it deliberate writing?
That was a question that came to my mind again and again in 1944 and 194:")
because the document was never sent in. I never saw it in the State Department
when I went there. I never saw it in Naval Intelligence. No such document
was ever given any publicity. I heard from the Chinese that it was suppressed
in the United States. Therefore, gentlemen, will you excuse me if I had the
effrontery to suspect that there was a deliberate attempt to confuse the American
public and possibly the American Government on the subject of the Chinese Com-
munists and their policies?
Q. Now, Mr. Larsen, I would like you to look at the last sentence of this
article on page 39, where you are referring to a conference with Mr. Jaffe in
October. "He dropped a remark which one could never forget."— A. What pago
was that?
Q. Page .".!), the last paragraph, in the article, "'Well, we've suffered a lot,'
he said, 'but, anyhow, we got Grew out.' "
The Chairman. Do you offer
Mr. Rhetts. There is no exhibit but the entire document.
A. That is right : that is what he told me. That was not October 1945; that
was October 1940.
Q. You did write that portion? — A. That is right, I wrote that portion.
Q. That was in this manuscript? — A. No, no; let me see, that date is wrong.
It was in 1946 after the case broke and after I had been sentenced, and the
whole c.iso was over, that I went to see .Mr. .laffe. I can't remember the date,
hut I went to see him to ask him, just man to man, "Philip, what was behind
this case and what were all these charges against you and to what extent were
you involved'.' Are you interested in telling me or not, and are you a Commu-
nist'.-" And he said, "I am not a Communist. I am not involved in the way
they infer, and 1 would like to call myself a Socialist. I disagreed with Mr.
< '.icw's policy and the idea of getting that damned Emperor back in Japan" —
in a sense I disagreed with that too while I was in the State Department — and
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2225
he said. "After all, we did get Crew out." 1 said, "Uh huh." I said. "In other
words, you did work on that." And of course if you know of Mr. Roth's book.
That was an attack on Grew and Grew's policy and the postwar policy of putting
the Emperor back, bul remember, gentlemen, I have nothing to do with Japan,
I didn't give a hoot one way or the other whether they put the Emperor back in
Japan because it was not my official function, and I was not a sympathizer with
th m and ran around and helped them with material they were interested in.
Q. Were you interested to get Grew out of the Department? — A. No; I was not.
I liked drew. He was nice to me. I spoke to him personally on one occasion
regarding Mr. Jaffe.
Q. You wrote this last paragraph of the article? — A. I wrote that in my story.
Q. That will appear somewhere in your manuscript? — A. That is right.
Q. Entitled -They Called Me a Spy":— A. That is right.
Mr. Achilles. Did Mr. Jaffe indicate at all how he or anybody else got Mr.
Grew out?
A. Well, by attacking his policy and publishing some magazines. My
relations
Q. Can you be more specific? — A. My relations with Grew were very pleasant.
I only discussed Mr. Crew with Jaffe twice. At that time when he said, "We
did get Grew out" — not meaning in "we" I, because I did not conspire with him,
bur "we," him, the group, Jaffe's group and his sympathizers. Jaffe never
treated me as a sympathizer. I had many pointed arguments with him and told
him, "That is nothing bur the damned Kremlin line," in many things he said,
lb' told me 1 was misguided and appeared too pro-Chiang Kai-shek and so on.
I am not pro-Chiang Kai-shek. I know Chiang Kai-shek's regime's corruption
better than many others. I have always challenged some of these people who
spoke against Chiang Kai-shek. I have said. "All right, I will give you 2 hours
fast talking, and you tell me what you know about Chiang's corruption, and you
give me 2 hours and I will tell you a lot more, but I also know the good points
in Chiang's regime."
Q. Mr. Larsen. I would like to read to you an excerpt from an article that
appeared in Collier's magazine from March 19, 1949, over the signature of Mr.
Louis Francis Budenz. where he states as follows :
"Jaffe, whose magazine faithfully followed the Moscow line on China, pleaded
'guilty.' After paying his fine, he entertained his codefendants (some of whose
indictments had been dismissed) and members of the Daily Worker's staff at
a party. Toasts were drunk that night to 'the coming victory of communism
in China and the defeat of American imperialism.' "
Did you ever hear of any such victory celebration? — A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever attend any party A. Oh, no.
Q. That Jaffe had? — A. Oh, no, definitely no. If I had been invited I would
never have gone.
Q. I would like to offer as an exhibit at this time document marked "17-X,"
which is a complete copy of the Plain Talk article.
The Chairman. That may be introduced.
(Document marked "17-X," article entitled "The State Department Espionage
Case." Plain Talk magazine, entered in evidence as exhibit 20.)
Q. Now I would like to inquire from the Board. I have quite a number of other
question that I would like to ask Mr. Larsen. It is now 5.
The Chairman. Have you any questions you would like to ask on this phase
of the examination?
Mr. Stevens. No, sir; but I would like to ask one, however, which I failed to
ask this morning, and I would like information on before we break up.
Mr. Riietts. Yes ; I was going to inquire, if I might, whether it would be
possible for Mr. Larsen to come back tomorrow?
The Chairman. You have been very good to come voluntarily today.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, General, it is perfectly all right, so long as it is not
too early in the morninsr. I would like to get after my check.
The Chairman. At 10, would 10 be all right?
Mr. Larsen. 9?
The Chairman. 10?
Mr. Larsen. Could you make it 11? That gives me a little extra time.
The Chairman. Yes : you can make it 11.
Mr. Larsen. 1 haven't done quite my duty to Pathfinder magazine yet.
The Chairman. If you would like to make it 11. it would be satisfactory.
Mr. Larsen. I am on their payroll this week and I feel I have absented myself
too much.
2226 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. 11 will be satisfactory.
Mr. Labsen. 11. Thank you, sir, I will be here at 11.
The Chairman. Now you have a quest ion V
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. I wonder if you would eare to outline first. Mr. Larsen. the financial rela-
tionship that may have existed between yon and Mr. Jaffe regarding use of
your cards and other material. How did that develop? And give us a story
on that. — A. He wanted to remove great numbers of my cards and I never lend
them to anyone. If I loan one out, I generally have trouble getting- it back,
just like a hook. So when I enumerated a lot of my cards, in 1!)44 before
I was with the State Department, he said, "Could you bring these up to date
and tvpe them out for me and give me a set?" There were several hundred
cards. And I said, "All right. I haven't got time to do it hut I will have a
stenographer" — my wife wasn't working at that time so she volunteered to do
it, and he paid her, I think it was 50 cents apiece. I remember on several
occasions he gave her $20 and $15 for the number of cards — there were stacks,
but there was no — let me dispel any idea in your mind that there was a regular
fee or a bribery for the theft of documents, for the delivery of documents.
There was no such thing at all. And he in addition gave my daughter I believe
$2 in the period of 2 years, one Christmastime and one birthday, I think it was,
and he gave my wife one or two boxes of chocolates. And if you want to ask
me, as some of these fellows in the Senate and the congressional committees
have asked me, "What did I think of Jaffe?" I want to make it very emphatic
that I thought Mr. Jaffe was a very fine gentleman. I still today in spite of
everything that has happened and every evil suspicion that has entered my
mind about him utilizing me, I still have a soft spot in my mind — in my heart
for that matter, because I thought he was considerate, gentle, not a lousy con-
spirator as it has been made out. He never on one occasion asked me. "Will
you procure me that document?" In other words. "Will you commit a little
crime for me?" He never did. I am guilty of showing him documents and
loaning them to him voluntarily largely because I couldn't be bothered tran-
scribing or going into it very extensively on- a typewriter. I had enough of
that.
Q. These are cards that he obtained from you. Were those ones he selected,
that he requested, or did you supply him with some he would be interested in?—
A. He never selected or requested any. I want to repeat that again. He never
selected or requested any. Wlren I showed him voluntarily some dispatches,
discussed them with him, he said to me. "Can I copy this, or can I take some
notes?" "It will take a long time,'-' I said, "I just don't feel like typing. I will
get it into my cards and will give you the essence of it the next time you come."
He said. "Would it be awfully bad if I took it with me. I will bring it back."
That is where I made my mistake. I let him take such documents, with the
exception of some that were found in Amerasia.
Q. Let me understand. Most, of the cards you supplied to Air. Jaffe were
those he requested? — A. After I voluntarily showed them to him.
Q. I see. Did you have any idea— —A. I am not trying to protect .laffe. but
that is a fact.
Q. Did you have any idea of what Jaffe was doing with your cards, where they
reposed, what use he was making id' them? — A. Not much. When I visited
Amerasia once I saw the cards in a very prominent position on his library
table. T opened the drawer and said, "What is this?" It was labeled "Chinese
personalities."
The Chairman. I would like to read yon -,\ paragraph a part of a paragraph in
ibis statement to the FBI of June 7. 1945, and ask you for your comment.
"Jaffe offered to compensate me for the work I did for him and presented me
with amounts which averaged $75 a month since March 1044."
A. No. yon see.
The Chairman. By cash payment.
A. General," that is not a correct statement. That is n paraphrasing of a
number of questions and answers, namely, these two FP>I men. when they took
me to the field office at about 2. 1 or 2 in the morning, they sat and belabored
me witli questions and then said. Do you remember how much that would be?"
"Well," I said, "over a certain period when he was still building up his cavil file
from mine. lie almost got a duplicate of my card tile. In fact. I gave him some.
I wasn't interested in Chinese in America.
The Chairman. Yon started your answer before I quite finished reading. Let
me finish the whole thing. I will read that sentence again.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2227
"Jaffee offered to compensate me for the work I did for him and presented
me with amounts which averaged $75 ;i month since .March 1!»44 by cash payment.
The work involved for this payment included the typing of several thousand
cards from my card file. Mr. Philip Jaffe never offered me any remuneration
for any Government papers."
A. That is right, and how did we arrive at that .$7.1 average a month?
Because there was no $75 payment. I didn'1 rely on any $75 payment. Fifty
cents a card, and sometimes a card was actually two or three cards front and
back. T. V. Soong's history, for instance, was 20 cards.
The Chairman. In other words, you slate the same payment you have already
testified about?
A. That is right. They asked me what would I say it averaged. My wife
kept house, and when she typed, say 150 cards in a month, why that would average
about 7">. hut there were months when she didn't type one card.
The Chairman. That is all. Do you have some questions?
.Mr. Achilles. No.
The Chairman. It is 10 minutes past 5 and we can go to. 5:30. No we have
a meeting at 5 : 15. We will have to adjourn at this point because we have a
5 : 15 meeting.
Mr. Moreland. Vv'e can call that off.
The Chairman. You can call that off. We can go on until 5:30. Is that
satisfactory?
A. That is all right with me.
Questioning by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I believe you have testified, Mr. Larsen, or from something you said I
gathered you had in recent times had conferences with Senator McCarthy and
Senator Ferguson? — A. March 18, yes.
Q. What was March 18?— A. That was McCarthy. March IS. He sent for me.
Q. He sent for you? — A. Yes : he sent for me.
Q. I wonder if you would care to tell us about that. — A. It was a very brief
conference. I went over and he received me very nicely, and then he started
to a>k me, "How did you get involved in the Amerasia case?" I barely got
started when the phone rang. I started again, and the phone rang again, some-
body came in with a message, he had a conversation with a woman about a
cocktail party, and I remember him saying, "Tell them I am dead or gone to
France or China, I have had a baby, or something," He said those things. "Tell
them anything, I am busy." And then a few minutes later, we hadn't got
anywhere yet, he mentioned the espionage case. And I started to say, "Mr.
McCarthy, I don't like the word. I called it the "Stolen Documents Case,' " and
then a young man was introduced to me. "This is Don Surine." No remarks
about that. And one of his young investigators. So I said. "All right, glad
to meet you. Mr. Surine." He said, "Will you take Mr. Larsen downstairs?"
So we went downstairs to room 5-A in the Senate Building, down in the base-
ment. That is their chamber of horrors, or whatever you call it. It is bristling
with dictaphones and recording machines. There must be 8 or 10 of tliem
around there. We sat down at a desk, he sat on one side and I sat right opposite
him. And then he started.
He said, "You might tell me something about yourself." I said, "Yes; with
pleasure." And he started very much like McCarthy. "How in the world did
you get involved in this case?" I said. "1 didn't get a chance to tell the Senator,
hut I got involved in this case through an introduction from Roth," and so on.
He said, "Now maybe we had better do tins right." I noticed he had a piece of
paper with a great number of questions, and he had loose-leaf paper, he was
going to chalk up what he thought. He started, "How old are you, where were
you born?" That is as far as he got, and then he said, "In this espionage
case " I said, "Pardon me, Mr. Surine, in this theft-of-document case, if
you prefer to call it theft. 1 call it loan or transmission of official documents."
He said. "Why?" I said, "Because, you remember, the Government stuck its
neck out and withdrew it. were not able to prove espionage charges. I personally
am not aware of any espionage angle and I would he a fool to call it 'the
espionage case.' "
He stood up and he roared at me. "Are you defending Amerasia?" And I
said. "No, Mr. Surine, I am not defending Amerasia, but I am sorry to say
that I am defending myself. I consider that I came in here and I have to
defend myself in spite of double jeopardy and whatever the good words are
for those lovely laws that should protect me." And he kept standing up and
2228 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the phone rang, and obviously the master upstairs, namely Professor McCarthy,
gave him some instructions, because he said — he took the phone — "Uh huh,
uh huh, all right, all right," put it down, so almost simultaneously we said,
"I think I'll have to go home." I thought, I am not subpenaed, I don't have
to take this stuff, I can walk out of there anytime, just like I could walk
out of this place any time I please — I hope so. And he said, ''Yes, I am
leaving now, I will have to leave, I will have to talk to you later. Thank
you very much for coming in, Mr. Larsen."
And I went out and I thought, the heck with that Gestapo stuff. There
was another remark that I have forgotten to mention. He said, "Now, in giving
your testimony, if you give me evidence we wanted— you are guilty just like the
rest of them— I said, "You called me in here to convince me of my guilt?" He
.said, "Well, I mean to say, if you string along with us, then it will go much
easier with you." And that is what got me pretty hot. so when he mentioned
the espionage case, I started on my version of it, of what it should he called.
Then I walked out and I got on the streetcar right outside the Senate house
door, and I was riding home about 5 : 30 or 6, and then I thought, "Yes, this is
the hunch who want to go to work on me or any other member of the group.
They will go ahead but I will not be a party."
Q. What group? — A. The group, the six people who were arrested, involved
in that. "I will not be a party to any accusations, anything in the way of
definite statements that will ruin them, and if I am hailed before the Tydings
Committee I will get it out somehow that whereas I did one time think that their
reports were strongly anti-Chiang and going extremely enthusiastic over the Com-
munists, I am not sure whether I was right or not, whether it was realistic
reporting." And I formed those thoughts in my head and I thought, Hunim,
maybe I should inform Mr. Peurifoy." Why did I think of Peurifoy? I haven't
had so much to do with him. I had one or two things. I went and applied
for a job
Q. In that connection, I wonder if I might interrupt, did you discuss at all
with either Senator McCarthy or Mr. Surine this Plain Talk article? — A. Didn't
;;et to it. Didn't get to talk about it at all. I began to — he said, "Why, we are
going to base the base on the Plain Talk article," and I wanted to say to
Suriile, "Don't you do that because I am going to kick about that article," but
he ignored that and went on with this
Q. Did you say that? — A. Yes, I did say that but I didn't get down to telling
him how I had written it and he had written it different
Q. You just told him? — A. He probably didn't know what it really involved,
that statement by me, that I didn't think he ought to. I said the same thing in
McCarthy's office but I got overruled with objections, with interruptions I mean.
Q. I wonder if you could just tell us, you said you did the same thing in
McCarthy's office, can you recall — A. It was very confusing. I got halfway into
my statement about the statement that I didn't consider the Plain Talk article
as a good basis for the attack because it was vulnerable, and we got no further.
I tried it again with Surine. I was very disgusted I hadn't put over the point.
When I got home I discussed it with my wife. 1 said 1 made the objection to
the article being used but never got to the stage to explain why and they didn't
seem interested. They said. "You don't need to worry" about one thing and
another. McCarthy said, "We will ask the questions and you will answer them,
and you will say nothing else."
Q. Did you have any further conferences with either Senator McCarthy or Mr.
Surine? — A. Never.
Q. I believe you mentioned also something of Senator Wherry. — A. Yes, Mr.
Dondero
Q. Does that have any bearing on this? — A. Yes, Mr. Dondero went to the
House Disbursing Office to get a check, and my wife from October until May 15
was working in the House Disbursing Office temporarily holding down a job of
another girl, hut of course they have local patronage so as soon as the other girl
was available my wife had to go out. And Surine went in — I mean Dondero,
Representative Dondero went in and met her and said, "Yes, yes, you are Mrs.
Larsen. I know your husband. He is a fine man" and all that. She said, "That
is certainly nice to hear somebody say that. Tell him I would like to see him.
Tell him to get in touch with me tomorrow morning, come to see me." Next
morning 1 called Dondero and he said, "Come up to my office." The person
present besides Dondero was Kent Hunter. I don't know him, was introduced
to him for the first time. He is a newspaperman, violently
Mr. Achilles. When was this.
A. Oh, it was before May 15.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2229
Mr. Achilles. Of this year?
A. Yos, while my wife was still up there, maybe about the first of May. And
Kent Hunter seemed to know the story of John Service very well and he knew
the story — for the first time I learned the story of the visit to Lattimore. He
asked me, "Why weren't you invited?" I said, "That is easy, I don't know
Lattimore." All right. Then Dondero said to me. "Would you care — I don't
want to question you myself but a very good friend of mine is Senator Wherry."
I said, "I have heard of him." He said, "He is particularly interested in the
homosexual side of the attack on the State Department and he wants to ask you."
So I told him, "Well, let's get this straight. I am no homosexual and I don't
know any homosexual." "He is interested in Lattimore." I said, "I don't know
Lattimore. I could give you no information on Lattimore, but I am willing to
go over there lest you think I am scared." "Let's go over there." So we started
over. He had to go to the Capitol for some documents, walked through and said
•'hello" to my wife, walked on over to the Senate, and when we got in there, Mr.
Wherry told me in a rather humorous vein, "You know I am the expert on homo-
sexualism." I said, "Uh huh, very interesting." He said, "Do you know what
kind of a guy Lattimore is?" I said, "I am sorry, I don't know what kind of a
guy Lattimore is, particularly with reference to homosexualism." "Well, what do
you know about Lattimore?" I said, "That is a big order. I have read most of
his books. I will tell you right frankly that a book called the Mongols of Man-
churia is a famous textbook. It is nonpolitical, especially as regards the Com-
munist-Kuomintang dispute, because it was written before that time. I consider
it a very fine book. I have always used it. I lived in Mongolia, in that area
where the Manchua who went up into Mongolia to fight Gol Dan during Kanghsi's
time, they didn't return from that expedition and they settled do\yn there and
became Mongols, married Mongolian women, and they are still living there, and
they are to all purposes Mongolian, and they speak Mandarin, fluent Peking
Mandarin. I verified that statement. Nobody else in the world I knew knows
about that. They are a very small group. I was among them and I admire
Lattimore for his intimate knowledge of the Mongols."
That was not very interesting to them. I don't think it is so interesting
to you either, but nevertheless the picture is that he was very disgusted with
my lack of knowledge. Here I was in the State Department. "Had you ever
seen Mr. Lattimore in the State Department?" "No, sir." "But you knew that
he was connected with the State Department?" "No, sir, I never in the State
Department heard anyone mention him as connected with the State Depart-
ment. I never saw material in the State Department written by Lattimore, of
any kind."
Q. Did he ask yon about Mr. Service? — A. Oh. yes. "Do you know John
Service?" I said, "No, I don't know him." "Could you say that he is a pro-
Communist?" I said. "No." 1 said. "I have felt at one time that he leaned
strongly toward the so-called agrarian reformers, as they were known, and
I myself was guilty of the same thing. Yes, it looks like they are, but I will
repeat the statement to you as I have made to others who have asked me:
I don't think I could say for certain that Mr. Service's statements and reports
were not realistic reports because I was not out there myself at that time."
He said, "When in the hell were you out there?" "From 1900 to 1935,. with
certain intervals abroad." So the interview ended rather brusquely.
Mr. Wherry struck me as one of these very hearty old men, slapped me on
the back, said, "Well, if I call you again you will come in?" I said, "Certainly
I will." Goodbye and thank you very much. We hope you will cooperate with
us in this case." "Yes, to the best of my ability." "Fine." He never called
me back again.
Now the third one, Mr. Ferguson
Q. Senator Ferguson? — A. Senator Ferguson of Michigan called me some time
ago when I was not home and the following morning I got in touch with his
office, and he asked me if I could come immediately. I went over there and
we talked about 20 minutes, and it was roughly the same story. He asked me.
he said to me. "Now, you won't be mad with me, Mr. Larsen, if I ask you a very
humiliating question?" I said, "No. I won't get mad." He said, "All right.
How could you have been so naive — I am putting it mildly, but if I were to
use the word that came to my mind, so stupid — as to deal with a man like that."
I gave him the same answer. "I thought, very honestly, thought very highly
of Mr. Jaffe, I did not suspect he was a Communist spy, still do not quite
believe it. I had a common interest with him. I do not believe I was too
stupid. I was indiscreet, yes, put me down for that, but I will answer your
2230 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
question in this way. I was not stupid and I was not criminal in my dealings
with Mr. Jaffe," and he didn't seem to like it very much. He said. "I don't
think you have very much you can give me." I said. "That is up to you. Mr.
Senator. You are perfectly welcome -to ask nie a lot more of embarrassing,
humiliating, and pointed questions." He said, T think I will have to get
home. If we need you again, Mr. Reed, my assistant here, will call you."
They have not called me.
Q. And you did not discuss the Plain Talk article with either Wherry or
Ferguson? — A. No.
Q. Didn't attempt to? — A. No, I didn't attempt to. I answered their questions.
The Chairman. It is now 5:30. We will adjourn. Thank you very much.
We will see you again tomorrow at 11?
Mr. Larsen. 11 o'clock.
(The Board adjourned at 5 : 30.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
Date : Thursday, June 1, 1950, 11 : OS a. m. to 12 : 45 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reported by : E. L. Koontz, court stenographer, reporting.
Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 11 : 08 a. m., Gen. Con-
rad E. Snow, chairman, presiding.
Board members present: Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C.
Achilles, member ; Arthur G. Stevens, member.
Also present : Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Appearances : Charles Edward Rheets, Esq., for Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus,
appearing on behalf of Mr. Service.
(The meeting reconvened at 11 : 08 a. m.)
Mr. Rhetts. Is Mr. Larsen here this morning?
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen advised us this morning that some other engage-
ment prevented his being here this morning, but we could get in touch with him
at 6 o'clock tonight as to the possibility of his appearance tomorrow morning.
Mr. Rhetts. His "possible" appearance tomorrow morning or probable? Does
he intend to return?
Mr. Moreland. Mr. Larsen phoned this morning and indicated that he had an
appointment today with a prospective employer and that whether or not he could
come tomorrow would depend on his conversation with his prospective employer
and he indicated that if he couldn't come this week — this is a possibility — he
could come next week.
Mr. Rhetts. Well, in that event, since we have to put off further cross-
examination of Mr. Larsen I would like to call another witness. I assume that
we shall proceed with other witnesses?
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Rhetts. In anticipation that Mr. Larsen will eventually return for fur-
ther examination. T would like to call in Dr. Mortimer Graves at this time.
(Mr. Mortimer Graves, called as a witness in behalf of Mr. John S. Service,
being duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Graves? — A. Mortimer
Graves; office address, 1219 Sixteenth Street, Washington, D. C.
Q. And what is your occupation, sir? — A. Administrative secretary of the
American Council of Learned Societies and have been for 25 years almost.
Q. Now. are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Dr. Graves? — A. Yes, I am
acquainted with him. We are not. closely acquainted and never have been closely
associated.
Q. At the time Mr. Service was arrested in June of 1045, did you participate in
any way in the collection of any funds to assist Mr. Service in his defense at
that time? — A. I acted as treasurer for a group of his friends who asked me if I
would accept contributions from them and convey them to Mr. Service or his
representative, in this case I believe his sister-indaw. all of which I did.
Q. Could you indicate to the Board how this came about? — A. When the notice
of the six arrests appeared in the newspaper I realized, of course, that T really
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2231
knew three of them. Mr. Larson had held a fellowship under us about 1934, and
1 had followed his career. It was my job l<> know everybody who was working
in the far eastern field— that was part of my field, Far East, Russian, Near East,
and so forth. I knew Mr. Larson. I knew Mr. Roth, I knew who Mr. Service was.
1 think 1 have met him but 1 am not completely certain. I saw the opportunity
to employ Mr. Larson, since he was free, on work of mine, which I did with the
consent of my own superiors.
Q. This is after he resigned from the State Department? — A. Well, this was
immediately after the husiness started and before we knew anything much about
it. I happened to he discussing the question with a group of Mr. Service's friends
at that time; naturally, people talked about this thing. This was exciting news,
and they asked me if I would act in the way I have said, that's it.
Q. In' other words, as I understand it, you happened to he with persons who
were personal friends of Mr. Service's and they requested you to perform this
function as treasurer of this fund? — A. Precisely. I was naturally in more or
less constant touch with people in the far eastern field, that's my job.
Q. Ami how was the fund raised'.' Can you describe just briefly the mechanics
of it? — A. Yes. The first suggestion was that 20 friends of John Service he
discovered who would make themselves responsible for a sum of $50 apiece, that
is to say. a total of a thousand dollars. We — at least the friends, not so much I-
began to find people who would take this responsibility, and found a number of
them, and the $50's began to come in. Now in some cases some of these people
would just write out a personal check and send if in. In other cases it seemed
to me they probably went around and collected it in smaller amounts from other
friends of Mr. Service's hecause in some cases they came to me with the cash
in hand in smaller bills and that is obviously what had happened. I kept no
record because the group had said Mr. Service was sensitive about the matter.
He didn't want to know who was helping him. There were, of course, people,
friends of his. who couldn't afford to make contributions, at least couldn't afford
to make substantial contributions and they wanted this element of anonymity
preserved in the gift which presumably is the reason they asked me to act as
treasurer. So that I never made available to Mr. Service, or any of his repre-
sentatives, any information about who it was that was giving this money. It
came into me in increments of $50 and it certainly never reached the $1,000 that
we were shooting at. because Mr. Service refused to take — or at least his sister-
in-law refused to take — the second installment that I tried to send her. I have
in my mind a figure of S77.~i, that is sheer memory, but I have every reason to
believe that it is substantially accurate.
Q. That is the total amount of money that was raised? — A. I am not quite
certain whether that is the total amount or whether that is the amount that I
turned over to Mr. Service's sister-in-law. whose name for the moment escapes
me. in the amount of $500. and I tried to make a subsequent payment and she
sent the check back whereupon I found myself under the necessity of returning
this fund to the donors, and since I kept no real record of it. aside from three
or fonr persons whom I could remember, I spent most of th° next year asking
people whom [ met : Did you contribute to this Service fund because if you did I
owe you $10. and giving them $10 back.
Q. To the best of your recollection, then, you gave Mr. Service's sister-in-law.
who is. I believe, Mrs. Service A. Wright, naturally. I don't know what her
first name is
Q. To the besr of your recollection you gave her one check for $.">00 which
she accepted? — A. Y'es.
Q. And a subsequent check which she returned? — A. Yes — well. I'm not, I
think that's the story. I might have given her two subsequent checks, but I
don't believe so.
Q. Now, as I understand it from your testimony this fund was raised exclu-
sively by persona] friends of Mr. Service and was raised exclusively to be de-
voted to assistance to Mr. Service: is that correct? — A. Absolutely, there was
never any other question. It was a John Service Friendship Club.
Mr. Achii.i.ks. It had nothing to do with Mr. Larsen?
A. Nothing at all to do with Mr. Larsen. I employed Mr. Larsen. because he
was free, on records which I had to have brought up to date, but I employed
him from other funds, funds in my own office, a small amount in my office which
I could trace, but it was certainly not a verv lan_re amount.
2232 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. So there was no suggestion at any time that this fund was being raised to
be devoted to anyone other than Mr. Service? — A. Not the slightest; no. This
was a completely friendly effort on behalf of Mr. Service by his friends.
Q. I believe you also indicated a moment ago that the funds came in in vary-
ing amounts, the largest of which I believe you said was $50? — A. Well, there
were $50 increments. It may have been that at sometime somebody gave me
two of these increments, but certainly no larger sum than that.
Q. No larger sum than $50. — A. As I say, the people — each member of the
group made himsulf responsible for seeming and giving to me $50.
Q. You indicated that your original objective was to raise a thousand dollars
and at some point Mr. Service through his sister-in-law declined to accept
further funds, and you abandoned your original target. — A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct? — A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you would care to tell the Board what occurred after this?
You had some money left on your hands — what happened next? — A. You see,
I had this two-hundred-odd dollars, and when Mr. Service refused to accept
it he suggested that it be turned over to Mr. Larson. I asked the donors whether
they would agree to that — I asked a couple of them, I don't: think I asked all
of them — and their reaction was immediately to the effect that they had raised
it for Mr. Service and that they didn't want it paid to Mr. Larson.
Q. Did Mr. Service talk with you about this problem personally?— A. I think
Mr. Service made this suggestion.
Q. Do you know what occasioned this suggestion that the balance of the funds
be made available to Mr. Larson?— A. Well, I shouldn't know, excepting that
he was the one person who at that time was still in serious difficulties, I suppose.
Q. Do you recall what Mr. Service may have said to you in that connection? —
A. No. I think it was more or less in the nature of an off-hand remark on his
part, and whether it was a telephone conversation or a conversation in my office
I couldn't say at this time, but I have a very definite recollection of the fact that
at least two' of the donors said: "No. indeed, this is for Mr. Service, and for
nobody else."
Q. Now, in a news story appearing in the Wasington Post from May 0, 1050,
it is said that Mr. Louis F. Budenz had stated on the previous day that the
former treasurer of the Communist Party, one Robert W. Weiner, who was
also known as Mr. Welwel Warsover, was active in leading a drive to raise funds
for the defense of the six defendants in the Amerasia case. Did you ever hear
of Mr. Weiner or Warsover? — A. To my recollection I had never heard of him
until I read this news report, nor had the slightest connection with him. never
knew that he had assisted in it.
Q. You have indicated that the donors of this fund expressed a desire for
anonymity, but would you care to state to The Board whether any of the funds
which came to you as treasurer were from Mr. Weiner or from Mr. Warsover
either directly or indirectly according to your knowledge. — A. To my knowledge
they could hardly have possibly been unless he paid a $5 contribution to one
of the people making the collections.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q I think perhaps there is something in your testimony that escaped me,
hut as I understood your opening remarks Mr. Service was the least known
of the three to you?— A. To me, yes.
Q How did it then happen that he was the only one with whom you be-
came concerned in the raising of funds?— A. He wasn't the only one with whom
T became concerned, General. I knew, as I said, Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth.
I could tell a longer story if you want to listen to it, but the fact is that
my records on Chinese people due to the war— I mean Americans who know
Chinese — were Very much out of date, most of the people that I had recorded
had "one into Government and I had no records. I was looking for somebody
who knew the situation with respect to the Chinese people— American students
of China, to bring my records up to date. When Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth
wore temporarily out of employment, and since I was not dealing with any secret
matter of any kind, this was an opportunity for me to get a man who would
bring my records up to date, so that I employed Mr. Larson, as I said before,
for a Short time, as long as T could afford it, from funds that T had for the
purpose of my records and he did a good job. I asked Mr. Roth at the same
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2233
time if he would like to work on this operation and Mr. Roth said "No,"
that he had other things to do, and that sort of thing. Mr. Service I didn't
know so well, but I did know, it is my business to know, most of these people
in the Chinese field who happened to be friends of his, and in the course of
my discussion of the matter with these people, whom I saw regularly more or
less, this question of special assistance to Mr. Service arose. Now, the only
reason to get the special operation in the ease of Mr. Service is that Mr. Service
did have this group of friends who wanted to do that for him and the others
did not.
Q. They made the suggestion to you, I take it then? — They made the sug-
gestion excepting that, in general, I probably said, as I usually do: "Well, is
there anything we can do about this thing?"
The Chairman. Any questions?
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Had you known Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth for a long time? — A. Mr. Lar-
son— in 1933 or '34 I put on an enterprise at the Library of Congress in the
compilation of a biographical dictionary of China which appeared in two volumes
and is called Eminent Chinese of the Ching Dynasty and is a major work in the
Chinese field in the last quarter of a century. At that time I had a series of
fellowships to give to people to work on this enterprise. Mr. Larson held one
of those fellowships for a year or probably a year and a half, so that it was
necessary at that time for me to have a dossier on him and to make the ap-
pointm ;.t for this fellowship. After that, of course, I more or less knew him
because, again, it was my business to know these people and, in general, to dis-
cover what they were doing, so I had a dossier on him. From time to time
he would come into my office, as he still does, as indeed most of these people
still do.
Q. How about Lieutenant Roth? — A. Roth? Much the same story excepting
that I followed his career. He probably had a couple of little fellowships from
us for summertime study or something like that. So far as I can remember he
had no such large fellowship. But, again, it was my business to know these
youngsters. I still know most of them, and I would meet him probably once or
twice a year. They would come into my office and talk over problems — when
they were looking for jobs or for fellowships or publications 1 was the person to
whom they would appeal.
Q. Were you concerned with the political orientation of these people? — A. No.
Of course, we have never had the facilities for making any such investigations
and, of course, in those days this wasn't the kind of thing that arose. Our con-
cern was always with the development of a body of Americans scientifically com-
petent in these areas and that still is my concern.
Q. You didn't consider the effect of their possible political orientations on the
material that they were furnishing to the Council? — A. No; this was a question
that would never arise with us, certainly, not then. I mean probably now when
we are a little more awake to that kind of thing you would raise questions which
you wouldn't have raised 15 years ago. I don't think the question ever occurred
to us.
The Chairman. Were you aware, or did you have any knowledge of any other
funds raised on behalf of any of the six persons arrested?
A. Not to my knowledge. I know of none.
The Chairman. No further questions?
Mr. Rhetts. I have none.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for coming in.
(Mr. Mortimer Graves after testifying left the meeting.)
Mr. Rhetts. Well, now, what is the pleasure of the Board? Shall we return
to Mr. Service in connection with this phase of the case?
The Chairman. It is all right with the Board if that is what you would like.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask Mr. Service to take the stand and at the
outset I would like to offer for inclusion in the transcript at this point Document
93-2, which is part 2 of Mr. Service's personal statement, and deals with the
Amerasia phase of the case. This consists of page 34-a through 43 of the
personal statement.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
2234 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Document No. 93-2
'"Personal Statement of John's. Service — Part 2
"During my period of consultation after my return to the Departinenl on April
12, 1!)4.">, I saw a number of newspapermen and writers on China. This was in
the normal course of events and a part of the usual function of officers on con-
sultation who have newly returned from the field and are in a position to give
background information. One of the people I remember seeing was Lawrence
Rosinger of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall that he was having an
interview with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs and as their
discussion apparently concerned recent events in China 1 was called in to
answer some questions. Another contact. I remember, was Raymond Swing,
who was referred to me by my superior, Mr. Vincent, for background informa-
tion in regard to some news report of the day. After discussing the particular
point, Mr. Swing asked me for some comment on General Hurley and an opinion
as to whether his negotiations were proceeding successfully. This I declined to
discuss and referred him back to Mr. Vincent. Another press contact was with
two members of the editorial staff of Fortune magazine which was preparing an
exhaustive article on China. These researchers had approached General Olm-
stead who was G-5 on General Wedemey< r's staff and was then in Washington.
General Olmstead had referred them to me for political background.
"I mention these instances, and I know there were many others, as indication
that it was current policy to permit responsible officers to give background
information to the press. At this time, of course. I had just returned from Yenan
and was in possession of a great deal of recent information of great interest.
"Shortly after my arrival I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record
basis with the research staff of the II'R in New York. This invitation was in a
brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F.
Stanton, Deputy and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting.
This meeting with the II'R took place on April 25. I believe that there were ten or
twelve people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A.
I isson, Lawrence Rosinger. and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give
a prepared talk and most of the time was spent in answering questions and in
general discussion.
"About April 17 or 18 I was looked up in the Department of State by Mark
Gayn. I had never previously met Gayn but we shared a China background and
he had been at Claremont College with my brother. I had read at least one of
his books and seen articles on the Far East which he had written for Collier's.
< >n this occasion lie told me that he had a contract for a series of articles for the
Saturday Evening Post and I had no reason to doubt bis bona fides. We had lunch
together, and he said that he had an extra bed in his apartment in New York
which he would hi- glad to have me use if I ever visited that city. As background
to this meeting with Gayn it should be mentioned that soon after I left Wash-
ington the previous November I had received a letter from Gayn saying that he
had hoped to see me in Washington but had missed me by a few days. This was
our only previous contact. Gayn did not mention to me his close association with
Jaffe.
"About this same time I had received an invitation from Lieutenant Roth, whom
I bad met the previous November on the occasion of my talk to the IPR at Wash-
ington, for supper at his home on the evening of April 19. During that day he
tele) boned me saying that Philip Jaffe was also going to be at his home that
evening but was anxious to see me before then, since there would be a number
of people at the party and probably little opportunity to talk. Roth asked that
I telephone Jaffe at bis hotel and I did so. I knew of Jaffe as the editor of
Amerasia but I had never previously met him nor had any contact by correspond-
ence or otherwise with him. However, as be was the editor of a well known
specialist magazil a the Par Past I saw no reason why I should not meet and
talk to him on a background ! asis as with any Other reputable newspaperman
or writer.
"In view of the later unhappy consequences of my meeting with Mr. Jaffe. I
think I should emphasize at this point that this was in no sense abnormal, since
it was entirely conformable to the policy concerning relations with the press
which I had pursued under instructions in the field attached to General Stilwell's
Headquarters and also the policy of the Department permitting Foreign Service
officers to provide background Information to members of the press.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2235
"Tlu' only time that we found suitable was for me si dp ;it his hotel in the
late afternoon and to go together to Roth's.
■When I prepared to leave the office before going over to Jaffe's hotel I had
on my desk a number of my personal copies of memoranda written during my
last visit at Venan. My eye alighted on a reporl of an interview with Mao Tse-
tung about the end of March in which .Mao had given details of the current Com-
munist position and the probable line to be taken at the imminent Communist
Party Congress: It occurred to me thai Jaffe would probably be especially in-
terested in recent news from Venan and particularly in recent statements of the
Communist position in the controversy going on in China. I therefore put in my
pocket my persona] copy of this memorandum which contained nothing except
the Communists' own presentation of their position. I believe this was my mem-
orandum of April 1. Document 226. During the conversation Mr. Jaffe, as I
expected, asked concerning the present Communist attitude and instead of try-
ing to remember in detail I let him read the memorandum which I had brought
with me. Jaffe was extremely interested and asked at once if I did not have
other similar reports about Venan which it would he possible to show him.
Since many of these memos were purely reportorial, containing only statements
or observations available to and continually being obtained by newspapermen on
the spot. I agreed to let Mr. Jaffe see some of this type of material. It was
agreed that I would have lunch with him the next day at the hotel. I remember
very little about the evening at Roth's except that a number of people mostly
interested in the Far East were there, and there was some discussion of a hook
on Japan which Lieutenant Roth was in the last stages of completing. I am
under the impression that as the party at Roth's broke up he gave Jaffe a por-
tion of the manuscript to read. This was later published, after Navy clearance,
under the title of 'Dilemma in Japan.' There was also some discussion during
the evening of a book on China which Jaffe was writing. This was published
in the fall of 1945 as New Frontiers in Asia.
"The following- day I went through my personal copies of my Venan memo-
randa ami carefully selected several. I think about eight or ten, which were
purely descriptive and did not contain discusison of American military or politi-
cal policy. These I considered it would be appropriate to allow Jaffe. as a writer,
to see. I took these with me to lunch, which I found that Jaffe had ordered in
his room. Roth was also there. Jaffe surprised me by saying that he was leav-
ing Washington that afternoon and wished to take the memoranda with him for
several days. I hesitated, hut after considerable discussion and in view of the
nonpolicy and purely factual nature of the papers, allowed Jaffe to keep them. It
was arranged that I would pick them up when I visited New York.
"It was not usual to allow writers to have access to this type of factual ma-
terial for background purposes, since reading the material or taking notes on it
was always more satisfactory from the viewpoint of accuracy than merely re-
lying on one's memory and oral recital. It was not, however, customary to loan
such material and I have always regretted having turned it over to Jaffe, al-
though at that time I had no reason to doubt his responsibility.
"Gayn learned that I was coming to New York for the meeting with the IPR
end telephoned me that he was planning a small party and wished me to spend
the night and to arrive early enough for supper. I agreed to do this and found
at his home on the evening of April li I about ten or twelve people, including Mr.
and Mrs. Jaffe. .Miss Kate Mitchell, William Sloane, a newspaper correspondent
who had been in China, named Pepper Martin, and his wife, and Mr. and .Mrs.
Geddes who hail just completed a book on President Roosevelt, and the editor
of the Sunday book review section of the Netc York Times.
"Tl e next day I saw various old friends in New York, had my meeting with the
research staff of the 11*11. and stopped in at Mr. Jaffe's office to pick up my
memoranda. I slept that night again at Gayn's and learned to my surprise thai
he had been shown my memoranda by Jaffe and that they worked very closely
together and pooled their information.
"About May .'! Jai'i'e again visited Washington ami got in touch with me to
request my help in getting him a copy of an FCC monitor report of a broad-
cast summary from Venan of an important policy speech given by Mao Tse-tung
to the Communist Party Congress. I told Jaffee that I did not handle such
material and had no idea whether it was classified. I suggested thai he
come to the Department and that I would introduce him to the responsible offi it
who would he able to give him a copy if permissible. Jaffe came to see me and
I took 1 im in to the executive officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs. Mr. A.
Sabin Chase, and explained what Jaffe wanted. Mr. Chase had a copy of the
6S970 — 50 — pt. 2 48
2236 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
monitor report, and said that it was quite customary to give such material to in-
terested writers, and gave Jaffe a copy on the spot. The Yenan radio was very
weak and the reception of its broadcasts often badly garbled. This was the case
with this particular speech. Late in the afternoon Chase called me and said
that FCC had received a much clearer second broadcast. Chase recalled that
Jaffe had been interested and asked how be could contact him. I said that I
knew where Jaffe was staying and would be glad to take it to him. This was
just about closing time in the afternoon. I picked up the monitor report from
Mr. Chase, walked over to the Statler Hotel where Jaffe was staying, and called
him from the lobby. My recollection is that he came down in the elevator, I
handed the report in an envelope to him, and left. The care with which the
FBI interrogated me about this incident gave me the impression they had ob-
served my handing Jaffe the envelope and had attached great significance to it.
"About May 8 Jaffe was again in Washington and called me up. I think it
was during this visit that Jaffe said that he was well acquainted with T. A.
Bisson and that Bisson hoped I would be able to come up to New York some
week end and have a Sunday lunch at his home. I was already annoyed at
Jaffe's rather aggressive manner and put him off with some statement that I
would prefer to have an invitation direct from Bisson. A few days later Jaffe
telephoned me and said that Bisson would like me to come up on Sunday, May 19.
At the same time he gave some excuse why Bisson was unable to contact me
directly. I agreed to go and arranged to spend the Saturday night at Gayn's.
Later Jaffe telephoned again and said that the Gayns were spending the
evening at Kate Mitchell's and that I should come there to meet them. I did not
go up to New York until in the evening and arrived at Miss Mitchell's about 10
or 10:30 p. m. Although so described in Plain Talk, the party was certainly
not for me. There were a number of people there whom I had never met and
do not remember. They had already finished dinner and the party was watching
a crap game (which I do not play). I had one or two drinks, and then went
home with the Gayns.
"The plans, it developed, were that the Jaffes, Miss Mitchell, and the Gayns
were also going to Bisson's. Jaffe picked us up the next morning and drove
us all there in his car. The Sunday lunch was a picnic in the Bisson's garden
at their home on Long Island. One of my few memories is that Gayn and
Jaffe got into an argument over the relative freedom of the press in the United
States and Russia. Jaffe followed the Party line while Gayn opposed it. Dur-
ing the afternoon we took a short walk down to a nearby beach. Miss Mitchell
outlined a book which she was writing on China, and said that she was particu-
larly interested in getting material on the recent trend of the Kuomintang toward
greater emphasis on Chinese classical ethics and philosophy. She asked for
suggestions on recent material and from memory I mentioned several publica-
tions and other public materials which I knew of. This was the only conver-
sation with Miss Mitchell of which I have any specific recollection.
"On May 29 I was invited by a Miss Rose Yardoumian, whom I had met at
the Washington office of the IPR and at several social functions, to attend a
farewell party for Andrew Roth, who had been transferred to the Hawaiian
Islands. I had not known that Jaffe was coming, and was rather surprised
when he again telephoned me and asked me to see him in his hotel and go with
him to the party. I do not like to be "monopolized." I agreed, however, to stop
by the hotel and go on to the party with Jaffe. Apparently his reason for
wanting to see me was to press the request for information on the trend toward
Confucianism of the Kuomintang. I recalled that a Confucius society had
been established in Chungking under very high official auspices in 1942 or
1943 and suggested that be look up newspaper tiles, especially the Chinese News
Service, as the event had been given great official publicity at the time. Jaffe
was afraid that it would be difficult to find tiles that old and wanted me to
look up nny dispatches on the subject. I agreed that the Embassy had certainly
reported on the matter hut explained that I could not and would not think of
taking from the files or turning over to him any official dispatches. I did agree
that if I had an opportunity I would try to find the approximate dates to help
him in a search of newspaper files (incidentally, I never did anything about it).
Continuing the same line, I mentioned that he could get some material on this
subjecl from a study of Kuomintang propaganda. This was a topic on which
I had prepared a very exhaustive report while on duty in the Embassy. Jaffe
again pressed me to allow him to see my report and again I explained to him
that this would he impossible. I remembered a few common wall slogans which
seemed pertinent to his subject and mentioned them to him. This party on
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2237
May 2!> was the last time I ever saw Jaffe. I have had no communication with
him since.
"It may seem unusual that 1 was so accessible to Jaffe, Gayn, and these other
people. The fact, however, is that my family was still in California and 1 was
Staying alone in a small downtown apartment. I had most of my meals with
friends and if I received an invitation and did not have a previous engagement I
usually accepted.
-Since my return from China I had had several casual contacts with either
Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, whom I had known since 1936 in Peiping, and they had
spoken of having me down for a week end during November 1 44. I was finally
invited for the first week end in June. Without my knowing it in advance, Roth
and Rose Yardoumian were also invited for the same week end and Mrs. Lattimore
suggested that we come down together. Roth, I remember, was very pleased
by the invitation because he was about to publish his book on Japan (it had
already been cleared by ONI) and was very anxious to become better acquainted
with Lattimore and to have Lattiinore's comments on some sections of the book.
We went to Baltimore on Saturday afternoon and that evening was spent in
general discussion. As I recall it, Lattimore took the galley proofs of the book
with him when he retired for the night. I do not remember ever reading the
galley proofs myself. The next day we took a walk through the woods in the
morning, and several friends of Lattiinore's from Johns Hopkins University
came for a picnic lunch. This is the incident described in McCarthy's statement
of March 30 concerning Lattimore. I do not recall that we spent any of the time
by ourselves : on the contrary I spent my time being sociable with people whom I
had not previously met. I had no documents with me, but Owen had previously
mentioned that some of his graduate students were doing research wrork on
Chinese Communism and were searching for recent Communist publications. I
bad told Owen that I had a new edition of Mao's papers and he had asked if he
could borrow it. I took the volume with me on this trip and left it with Latti-
more. This book was my personal property.
"I was arrested by the FBI just after leaving the office on the evening of June 6.
When informed of the charges, I told the arresting agents that I was not guilty
and of course wished to do what I could to clear up the matter. I was forthwith
interrogated extensively and gave a detailed voluntary statement. I have asked
that this statement be made a part of the record. The following clay my sister-in-
law obtained the services of a bondsman and I was released from detention in
the District jail. Subsequently a fund of $500 was raised by various friends to
cover the cost of the bondsman's services.
"With my attorney's approval I requested a personal hearing before the grand
jury and appeared briefly on August 3 and again on August 6. On August 10
the Department of Justice announced that the grand jury had returned a no true
bill in my case. On August 11 I appeared before the Personnel Board of the
Foreign Service and immediately afterward was informed that I would be re-
instated on active duty as of August 12 (I had been on leave with pay since the
time of the arrest)."
( Mr. John S. Service, a witness in his own behalf, being duly sworn, testified
as follows :)
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Rhetts. The Board has supplied to Mr. Service typewritten copies of cer-
tain documents which were shown to Mr. Service when he appeared before the
grand jury in the summer of 1945 and about which he was questioned before
the grand jury. I should like to ask the Board at this time to furnish me with
the actual documents which were shown to Mr. Service at that time, or such
reproductions of them as the Board has in its possession.
The Chairman. Can you identify the documents?
A. Yes, sir. Documents consisting of Documents 216 through 220. and Docu-
ments 221, 22.°). and 227. They have been numbered in this proceeding.
Mr. Rhetts. In short, we were given typewriten copies of documents. I
should now like to have the original documents which were in question, if the
Board has them.
The Chairman. This will be done.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. As I understand it. the documents which Mr. Moreland has just handed
me consist of photostats of ozalid reproduction, is that correct V
The Chairman. Correct.
2238 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you a photostat of an ozalid reproduction, Docu-
ment 21t>. and I ask you whether the ozalid reproduction was one of the docu-
ments which were shown to you by the grand jury, and about which you were
questioned V — A. I believe it was: yes.
Q. This, as I understand it, is one of the documents which was found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession at the time of his arrest V — A. That is what I was told by Mr.
Hitchcock during a grand jury hearing.
Q. And I believe we have been further advised here by the Board that that was
the case, is that correct?
The Chairman. Correct.
Q. Now, did you give this ozalid to Mr. Jaffe at any time? — A. I did not.
Q. Had you ever seen this ozalid before it was shown to you in the grand
jury? — A. No; I did not.
Q. That is an ozalid reproduction of one of your memoranda, is it not? — A.
That is correct.
Mr. Stevens. Had you seen any ozalid of that?
A. No: I had not. I had not had occasion to consult the files of the Division
of Chinese Affairs where such ozalids would be kept. I was familiar with the
subject matter since I myself had written it, and while I was on consultation in
the Division of Chinese Affairs, or actually in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
I was not on the routing list, so that I did not have material going over my
desk.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of this memoranda in your personal
hies?— A. Yes, I did.
Q. In it — and I am referring to the period from April 12. 1945, onward after
your return here from China? — A. Yes. I had a personal copy which I had
brought hack with me from Chungking with authorization of the Army head-
quarters there.
Q. Now I show you a photostat of an ozalid reproduction of Document No.
'_'17. Mr. Service, and I ask you whether this ozalid was one of the papers shown
to you before the grand jury about which you were questioned there? — A.
I believe it was ; yes.
Q. This is a reproduction of one of yotir memoranda, is it not? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you give tins ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of this memorandum to
Mr. Jaffe?— A. No, sir.
Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of this memorandum before this
ozalid was shown to you before the grand jury? — A. I am positive that I never
did. As a matter of fact, I was very surprised when they showed me these
ozalids because I had never realized how the Department had reproduced these
memoranda. I brought them in in the form of typewritten originals without
bavins placed a reverse carbon behind them, which is customary in making
ozalids. and I was very surprised to see that they had succeeded in reproducing
them by the ozalid process at that time.
.Mr. Achilles. May T ask at that point whether these two documents. 21(1
and 217, were ones which had first been brought to the Department by you by
hand?
A. Yes, sir. I brought them back with me from China, and immediately after
my arrival in the Department of State — I arrived here on April 12. and probably
that same day. or at the latest the next day, I delivered the originals myself
by hand, as I remember it, to Mr. Sabin Chase, who was. I think, in the position
of being executive officer for the Division of Chinese Affairs.
The Chairman. Were these two reports Yenan reports?
A. Yes they belong to the 1945 series of Yenan reports.
Mr. Stevens. Is that the series which you brought back by hand?
A. I didn't bring the entire series, sir. I brought hack, well, I couldn't tell you
now. Some of die 1945 series were prepared in Chungking and some of the
early ones which I prepared at Yenan were forwarded to Chungking. I brought
lack the latter pari of the series, which had not previously been delivered to the
Embassy in Chungking. I brought those back at the Embassy's suggestion since
it was far faster.
Mr. Stevens. Will von he able to identify those, Mr. Service, that you brought
hack?
A. I can't positively no. [ don't believe so.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2239
Tlie Chairman. Bui you have stated these ones were ones you broughl back?
A. res. I :ini not quite sure where the group would commence. It would
commence, I think, after my Report No. 10, I am not sure, or it might even include
my Report No. 1<».
Questions by .Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you the original of this Document No. 217, which we have
just been discussing and 1 ask you to state what distribution was made of that
document according to the handwriting appearing at the top of the paper?
The Chairman. Will you first indicate if it appears, please, the date of receipt
of that original by the Department?
A. The earliest date I find stamped on here is April 27, 1943. There is a story
hack of That, sir, and I think that — I hope that Mr. Chase, if he arrives here in
time, will be able to clarify it. These were handed to Air. Chase and he was
swamped with work, and I was told that they simply got to the bottom of his
basket and stayed in the bottom of his basket for a long period before he did
anything about putting them in circulation or getting them reproduced and it
was only after some of the other officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
checked on the reports and what had happened to them that they were put into
circulation. They did not go to DC/R first because I handed them directly to
the officer on the desk and he did not put them into circulation and send them
down to DC R until the 27th. apparently.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Questions by Mr. Riietts :
Q. Returning to my question about the distribution of the document, which is
indieated.A. Well, there are two series of distribution symbols. Up at the
top of the page I see the following: Copies to: MID, 2 ONI (with no number
written after it, presumably one copy), OSS, 2: CA, 2. That distribution was
normally written on by the responsible officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs
who determined the number of copies that should be made to guide the Reproduc-
tion Section.
Q. That listing there would be the clue to how many copies the reproduction
section would make of the document, is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. Presumably, as to this document, the reproduction section would have
made seven ozalids of this original paper, is that it? — A. They would make at
least that number. I believe it was customary to make a few extras because
there are other offices that have authority to request copies and so on. Now,
over at the top right-hand corner there is a series of personal initials and
divisional symbols showing divisions to whom this was routed. I see the initials
of: Everett F. Drumwright, Paul W. Meyer, Edwin F. Stanton, and then the
initials of the divisional symbols. CA for China Affairs under it name of Mr.
Chase : then the divisional symbol DC/L.
Q. What does that mean, if you know? — A. I would say it is a liaison divi-
sion. I am not sure, liaison division of DC, I think.
Mi-. Achilles. I believe that's correct.
Mr. Rhetts. Liaison between what and what?
A. I am sorry. I am not
Mr. Achilles. As I understand it, that is the section of the Division of Corn-
munications and Records which is responsible for transmitting copies to other
Government agencies.
Mr. Rhetts. I see. Thank you.
A. The next symbol is FC/L. which is the Division of Foreign Activity Cor-
relation. Under that divisional symbol there are these various personal initials:
H. J. C. : V. A.: O. S.. what appears to be "E. S." and C. P. E. Then, the last
divisional symbol DC/R which is the Records Branch of the Division of Com-
munications and Records.
Mr. Achilles. Do those same distribution symbols appear on the ozalid copy?
A. Some of them do. The ozalid copy clearly shows the series of distribution
symbols which I mentioned irst and they appear at the top closer to the left-
hand side of the page. In other words, copies to MID. ONI, OSS, and CA.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. However, it shows two copies to MID, does it not? It does not reflect the
numerals 2 beside OSS or beside CA. does it?— A. No; which would indicate
that those might have been added later, the numerals there.
Q. Or that they did not come through in the ozalid reproduction? — A. Yes;
since we know that the ozalid process reproduces rather poorly handwritten or
pencil writing.
2240 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. In other words, the indications for distribution to MID and
the other agencies were added to the original before it was reproduced?
A. That's correct.
Mr. Achilles. Whereas the others were added to the original afterward?
A. Probably, although we can't say with certainty because some of these
initials here are written in pencil rather faintly and might not be reproduced by
the ozalid process, but it is probably correct that the officer in the Division of
Chinese Affairs received the document, wrote on the instructions for distribution
to MID, ONI, OSS and CA, and it then probably went to the reproduction division.
Mr. Achilles. Presumably all of the ozalid copies would have those same indi-
cations of distribution which were penciled on the original before it was
reproduced ?
A. That's right.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
. Q. To complete your answer, do any of the divisional distribution which you
described beginning with E. F. D. and ending with DC/R — do any of those appear
on the ozalid reproduction? — A. They do not, but
Q. And that, you suggest, is accounted for by the fact that they were added
on the original after it was reproduced.
Mr. Rhetts. Is there anything further on that document the Board wishes
to ask?
Mr. Achilles. Can you think of anything which would appear on any ozalid
copy of that document which would indicate whether that particular ozalid copy
was a State Department copy or one which was furnished to MID or another
agency ?
A. Just to cheek that we are looking at the same, this is document 217. Yes;
written at the top is "return CA," this would tend to indicate to me that it is one
of the two ozalid copies which were made for CA.
The Chairman. Is that also true of 216?
A. Yes, sir. It also appears on the ozalid, the writing at the top "return CA."
The Chairman. Now let me ask you as to 216 and 217 — if you gave copies in
any form to Mr. Jaffe of these two documents?
Mr. Rhetts. We can go into this now, General, or deal with that whole
problem later.
The Chairman. Would you like to reserve that question for the moment ?
Mr. Rhetts. It had been my intention to cover that phase of it after going
over the actual documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.
The Chairman. Very well, we will take it later.
Mr. Achilles. One further question on those distribution symbols : Is there
anything to indicate those words "return to CA" were written on the original or
only on the ozalid copy — do they appear on the original as well?
A. No, sir ; they do not appear on the original and customarily such instructions
would not be written on the original since the original must be sent eventually
to DC/R for filing there. It would only be written on an oxalid copy or some
reproduced copy which is to be retained in the files of a working division rather
than DC/R.
Mr. Achilles. Then it appears that those words •'return CA" were written on
the ozalid and appear here due to photostatic reproduction and, therefore, those
words would not appear on the ozalid copies furnished to other agencies.
A. No; they would appear only on the two ozalids, I assume, which were made
for CA, and, in fact, I remember very clearly in the grand jury when I was shown
these documents that the "return CA" was written on, as I remember, in red
pencil. It was not a part of the reproduced document, the letters weren't on
there as part of the ozalid.
Mr. Achilles. And you were shown before the grand jury the actual ozalid
that was found?
A. That is my recollection.
.Mr. Achilles. That was said to have been found in Jaffe's posession?
A. That is my recollection.
The Chairman. You conclude, then, from this marking that in the case ol these
two papers the ozalid copies which were before the grand jury were actually
taken from CA files?
A. Well, they were intended to be a part of CA files. The very fact that "re-
turn to CA" was written on them implies that CA had sent them to some other
unit or branch or office, otherwise there would be no necessity to write on them
"return to CA."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2241
Mr. Rhetts. Is that necessarily true? May that have been written on there
in the Division of Reproduction?
A. That is possible. Of course, it is possible. I really can't give a positive
answer to that.
The Chairman, win ever put "return to CA" on there was probably somebody
in CA who intended to get the paper hark; right?
A. That's a hypothesis.
Questions hy Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Now I show you, Mr. Service, a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy
of document 216. That is a copy of one of your memoranda, is it not? — A. It is.
Q. Were yon shown this ozalid before the grand jury and questioned about it? —
A. I believe I was.
Q. Did you ever give that ozalid or any other oxalid reproduction of that
document to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I did not.
Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of that memorandum before
it was shown to you by the grand jury? — A. No; I did not.
Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of that memorandum in your own per-
sonal tiles? — A. I did.
Q. Will you state what distribution of the document is indicated by it?
The Chairman. Now is this going to he a repetition of what you have put in
before?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes. sir.
The Chairman. Just ask then, if it is the same distribution, to shorten the
examination.
Mr. Rhetts. Well, I don't know if it is the same.
The Chairman. Do we need to go into the individual distribution list of
each document separately?
Mr. Rhetts. Well. I proposed to, because one of the things I wish to show
here is the opportunities for others than Mr. Service to have had an access.
The Ckairmax. My only object is to shorten the examination, not to engage
in a debate. Do as you like, hut make it as short as you can.
Mr. Achili.es. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be useful to go into that in some
detail because in the case of documents lilt; and 217 I think we have established
that the ozalid copy physically in Jaffe's possession was one of the two copies
meant for CA.
The Chaikmax. Yes. if you can reach the same conclusion more rapidly in the
other documents I would appreciate it.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, directing your attention to the original of document 218, am I correct
that this shows distribution: 2 copies to MID, 1 to ONI, 2 to OSS, 2 to CA?—
A. That is correct.
Q. And then on the right-hand side of the paper it shows divisional distribu-
tion similar to that which you have indicated for document 217, is that cor-
rect?— A. It is generally similar except that a copy does not seem to have been
sent to FC/L.
Q. Now on the photostatic reproduction of the ozalid. does this also indicate
"return CA"?— A. It does.
Mr. Achilles. Thus indicating again, does it not, that the ozalid copy in
Jaffe's possession was one of the CA copies.
Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of Document
No. 219 and I ask you whether this is a reproduction of one of your memoranda? —
A. It is.
Q. Were you shown this ozalid hy the grand jury and questioned about it? —
A. I believe this is one of those I was shown.
Q. Did you ever give that ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of that memo-
randum to Mr. Jaffe ?— A. I did not.
Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of that memorandum before it
was shown to you hy the grand jury? — A. No ; I had not.
Mr. Stevens. You had had a copy of that in your own file?
A. I had a copy ; yes.
Q. Now directing your attention to the original of this document it shows
distribution: 2 copies to MID, 1 copy to ONI, 2 'copies to OSS, and 2 copies
to CA: does it not? — A. It does.
Q. And it also shows in the right-hand corner certain divisional distribution
within the State Department: does it not? — A. Yes.
2242 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now does the ozalid reproduction of this document indicate "'return
CA"?— A. Yes; it does.
Q. Thus indicating that the ozalid found in Mr. Jaffe's possession was one of
the two copies of the ozalids which were sent To CA? — A. That is correct.
Q. I now show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid reproduction of
document No. 220 and ask you whether that is a reproduction of one of your
memoranda? — A. It is.
Q. Were you shown this ozalid at the grand jury and questioned about it": — ■
A. I believe I was ; yes.
Q. Did you ever give this ozalid or any other ozalid to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I
did not.
Q. Did you ever see this or any ozalid reproduction of that memorandum
before it was shown to you in the grand jury? — A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of that memorandum in your personal
files? — A. Yes; I had a personal copy.
Q. Directing your attention to the original of the document 220 it shows
distribution of 2 copies to MID, 1 to ONI, 2 to OSS, and 2 to CA ; does it not?—
A. It does.
Q. And it also shows certain divisional distribution within the State Depart-
ment on the right-hand corner? — A. It does.
Q. Does the ozalid reproduction of this document indicate also the words
"return CA"?— A. It does.
Q. Indicating that this ozalid also was one which was found in Jaffe's
possession, was one of the two ozalids distributed to the ("A: is that correct?
The Chairman. Now in that connection two other copies of this same paper
were found in Mr. Jaffe*s possession — typed copies. Will you look at those and
see if they can be identified?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of two pages of typpewriting
and I identify it by referring to certain handwriting in the upper right-hand
corner which shows 110b, that is to say, lower case "b", not capital "B", and
ask you if you have ever seen the document of which this is a photostatic
reproduction? — A. No; I have not.
Q. This is a copy of one of your memoranda, is it not?
The Chairman. Can you say more definite: This is a copy of your report
which is Document No. 220?
A. Yes; it appears to be. At a glance it appears to be. I haven't checked
it exactly, but it appears to be a copy my Report No. 17, which is Document 220.
I have noticed a number of typing mistakes and so on. There may be other
errors in copying.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Achilles. I have got a question: Can it be told by comparing the repro-
duction of the typewritten copy with the original of the same document whether
the typed copy was a carbon copy of the original or was typed subsequently?
Can that be told by the arrangement of the paragraphs and spacing?
A. Oh, yes; this is definitely not a carbon copy of the original because it — For
instance, take the very first words — the date and number are placed differently
on the copy than they are on the original. It is on a different kind of paper.
It is on short paper, whereas the original was on long paper. The margins are
different and as I mentioned a while ago there are certain obvious typing mis-
takes, copying mistakes even in the title. The fourth word in the copy is "terki-
torial" instead of "territorial".
Mr. Aciiili.es. And the typed copy which you had in your possession was a
carbon copy made when the original was made?
A. That is true; that is correct; it was an exact carbon copy of the original.
I typed all those thinus myself on a portable typewriter and I never made any
addit ional copies at all. I did them all at once.
.Mr. Acuities. You never had an occasion to make a subsequent copy of that?
A. Never.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Now I slmw you a photostatic reproduction of two typewritten pages also
bearing the words" ".March 17*. L945— No. 17" and on the right hand side of this
photostat there are in handwriting the figures 118a, lower case, and I ask you to
tell the Board what that is? — A. I believe that is an exact duplicate of the copy
which you have just shown me, a photostat of the typed paper.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2243
The Chairman. ! >oes that contain the saine misspelling? — A. It docs.
The Chairman. That answers my question.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Now I show you n photostatic reproduction of ;ui old ozalid copy of 1 >ocument
221 and I ask yon if thai is a reproduction of one of your memrandums? — A. It is.
Q. Were you shown this ozalid at the time of your questioning lit fore the grand
jury? — A. I believe 1 was.
Q. l>id you ever give this ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of this memoran-
dum to Mr. Jaffe?— A. I did not.
Q. D d you ever see this or any other ozalid reproduction of the memorandum
before it was shown to you in the grand jury'.' — A. No: I did not.
Q. Directing your attention to the original document, this shows distribution
as follows: .MID. two copies: ONI, one presumably; <>SS. two copies; ('A. two
copies : do sit not'.' — A. It does.
Q. And it also in the right-hand corner shows certain divisional distribution
within the State Department? — A. That's correct.
Q. Now directing your attention to the photostatic reproduction of the ozalid
does this show "return ("A" as on the other documents? — A. No; it does not.
Q. Did you have your carbon copy of this memorandum in your personal tiles? —
A. Yes: I had a personal copy.
Mi-. Achilles. Is there anything that you can see on that ozalid copy which
would indicate in any way whether that came from CA or some other unit?
A. No. sir : I don't think I can see anything on here that would tie this particu-
lar ozalid or the ozalid from which this was copied to CA, or any other specific
division.
Mr. Achilles. Thank you.
The Chaibman. May I look at it a minute'.'
(The Chairman read the ozalid.)
Mr. Achilles. I can see no indication from those copies as to which agency
that might belong to.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now. Mr. Service, I show you the photostatic reproduction of an' ozalid
copy of Document 223. and ask you if that was one of the ozalids which was shown
to you and about which you were questioned before the grand jury? — A. This is a
reproduction of one of my reports, and I believe it is one of those concerning which
I was interrogated by the grand jury.
Q. Did you furnish that or any other ozalid to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I did not.
Q. Had you ever seen that or any other ozalid reproduction of your memo-
randum before it was shown to you in the grand jury? — A. No.
Q. Did you have your own copy of that memorandum in your personal file?—
A. 1 did, '
Q. Directing your attention to the original of document 223, it shows distribu-
tion : Two copies to MID: one presumably to ONI; two, to OSS: and two, to CA ;
does it not? — A. It does.
Q. In the right-hand cornet it also shows certain divisional distribution within
the State Department of the original? — A. That's right.
Q. Does the ozalid copy indicate "return CA"? — A. It docs.
Q. So that this indicates that this oZ:ilid was one of the two ozalids made and
distributed in CA? — A. That's correct.
The Chairman. Now. in that connection, are you going to go on to the typed
copy ?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman. Let me say for the record that a typed copy of the same paper
was found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts;
Q. I show you a four-page photostatic reproduction of certain typewritten
material beaded March 21, 1945, No. 21, and I ask you if you ever saw the type-
written material of which that is a photostatic reproduction? — A. I did not.
Q. Is that a copy of document No. 223? — A. It appears to he.
Q. It is not a carbon copy, however, is it? — A. No. sir: it is not.
Q. Of the original? — A. No, sir; it is not a carbon copy of the original.
Q. It is on different size paper, is it not? — A. It is on different size paper and
different arrangement of the heading, and actually with the omission of some of
the typewritten symbols on the original.
2244 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. That is to say it is not an exact copy of the original document ? — A. Not an
exact copy.
Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of document
227. I wish to correct that — 227 is not an original of Mr. Service's memorandum
No. IS, it is a typed copy of the original, so that it is not correct to say that I have
shown you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of document 227. Instead
I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of your original mem-
orandum No. 18, dated March 18, 1945, and ask you if that ozalid was shown
to you in the grand jury. — A. I believe it was.
Q. L>id you ever give that or any other ozalid copy of that memorandum to
Mr. Jaffe?— A. I did not.
Q. Did you ever see that or any other ozalid reproduction of your memorandum
before it was shown to you in the grand jury? — A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have vour carbon copy of that memorandum in your personal files? —
A. I did.
The < 'h airman. You haven't asked about the "CA"?
Mr. Rhetts. That's correct, excuse me, there is nothing on it. On the photo-
static copy of the ozalid it shows distribution of two copies to MID; and one,
presumably, if this is faithfully reproduced, the distribution on the original,
one each to ONI, OSS, and CA, does it not?
A. Yes. But it should be noted that the ozalid reproduction is perhaps not
complete there and not clear.
Q. That is, the numerals beside each of these symbols may not in every case
have been reproduced by the ozalid? — A. That is right.
Q. Is there anything on this — does this bear the words "return CA" on it? —
A. No. sir ; it does not.
Q. Is there anything on the face of that document that indicates to what
agency or division it was distributed? — A. I see nothing.
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. No, I see no indication.
Mr. Rhetts. Now, I would like at this point to ask the Board whether there
is any allegation from the FBI or elsewhere that Mr. Service ever transmitted
any documents other than the documents which have just been discussed to
Mr. Jaffe?
The Chairman. The meeting will recess.
(The meeting was recessed at 12 : 45 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Review Board Meeting in the Matter of John S. Service
Date : June 1, 1950, 2 : 30 to 5 : 35 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reported by : Elizabeth Wake, court stenographer, reporting.
Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 2:30 p. m., Gen,
Conrad E. Snow, chairman, presiding.
Board members present : Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C.
Achilles, member ; Arthur G. Stevens, member.
Also present: A. B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service : Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts. firm of Reilly,
Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.
The Chairman. Are you ready to ask your questions?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman. Ask your question again for the record and we will eliminate
the quest ion and answer at the end of the morning session.
Mr. Rhetts. Were you questioned before the grand jury about any other
documents than the ones we have just discussed?
Mr. Service. As far as I can remember, I wasn't.
Mr. Rhetts. Were you asked general questions as to whether you supplied
any other documents, do you recall?
Mr. Service. No, I don't recall.
Mr. Rhetts. I would like to ask I lie Board whether it has any evidence or
whether there is any evidence that Mr. Service has transmitted to Mr. Jaffe any
other documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2245
The Chairman. The Board has evidence before it that some parts of Mr.
Service's reports, or copies of them, were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. The
Board is interested as to what extent, if any, Mr. Service is responsible for
these copies being in Mr. JalTe's possession.
Mr. Rhetts. May I inquire, Does the Board refer to documents about which
it questioned Mr. Larsen yesterday?
The Chairman. Yes; the same.
Mr. Rhetts. Very well ; I would like at this time to question Mr. Service about
the remainder of those documents.
Tlif Chairman. Let me add this: That I understand from Mr. Service's state-
ment, which has been made part of the record this morning, that he admits he
loaned to Mr. Jaft'e copies of about 8 or 10 of his reports. The Board would like
to have identified, if possible, the 8 or 10 reports of which copies were loaned to
Mr. .laffe.
Mr. Rhetts. I think, General, if you refer to Mr. Service's statement, I do not
knew of any place where he indicates he loaned Mr. Jaffe 8 or Id of his personal
copies of these reports. He does state that he recalls for certainty that
The Chairman. I refer to page 38 of the statement: "The following day I
went through my personal copies and car fully selected several, about 8 or 10."
1 understand from the rest of the statement that he loaned the 8 or 10 to
-Mr. Jaffe.
Mr. Kuetts. You are correct. I had not recalled whether lie attempted to
specify the number. What is your request?
The Chairman. As to the 8 or 10, we would like to have them identified as far
as possible, aud we would like to know whether or not Mr. Service had any con-
nection with any of the other Service reports which were found in Mr. Jaffe's
possession; and if so, under what circumstances?
Mr. Rhetts. Very well: I will undertake to elicit all that information as we
go along in the examination of these documents.
In view of the request the Board has just made it may be well, before going on
to additional documents, that I go back and ask Mr. Service some questions with
respect to the first eight that we have just discussed, to cover one of the points
which you raised.
(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Service:)
Questions by Mr. Riietts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I believe you testified that you recall specifically having
lent to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of your memorandum reporting on a con-
versation with Mao Tse-tung. What date, do you recall, did that memorandum
bear?— A. April 1, 1945.
Q. It would have been your number A. It was my report No. 26.
Q. Now you have also testified that in response to Mr. Jaffe's request you also
showed him certain additional memoranda which you had in your personal files.
Are you able to recall which of your memoranda you showed Mr. Jaffe? — A. No;
not with certainty. I could not recall it in 1945 and I cannot recall now exactly
which ones I allowed him to see. I remember going through my reports and
exercising a judgment in each case as to whether or not the material was such
as would be appropriate to allow him to see it lor background purposes ; in other
words, if the material was factual and was available to the other correspondents
in Yenan and presumably was being incorporated in the books which at least
two of them were writing at the time. I concluded that it would be permissible
to allow Jaffe to see my personal copies, which were the only notes I had of my
observations and conversations at Yenan.
The Chairman. Were the reports you allowed them to see exclusively Yenan
reports ?
A. Yes, sir, because I had no other personal copies in my possession except
these personal copies of reports which I had written in Yenan.
The Chairman. Among the reports, copies of which were found in Mr. Jaffe's
possession, could you indicate for the record how many of these were Yenan
reports? I take it that the eight you already discussed this morning were all
Yenan reports.
A. They were.
The Chairman. What other documents, among the list found in Mr. Jaffe's
possession, were Yenan reports?
A. Would you like me to list them, sir?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. Has Mr. Service been shown a complete set of the documents
found in Jaffe's possession?
2246 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Yes; Mr. Service has a list of the Service papers found in
Mr. Jaffe's possession. This is the same list Mr. Larsen was examined on
yesterday.
A. The list was not in any chronological order that I can see, sir, and in a
little time I will straighten them out. Would you like me to straighten them?
The Chairman. You may go through the list as it is and indicate when you
come to a Yenan report.
A. The first item on the list?
The Chairman. Following the part that you have testified about this morning.
(Off the record.)
The Chairman. We have already Documents 217, 216, 21S, 227, 219, 220. 223.
and 221 as Yenan reports. What other Yenan reports are in your list of docu-
ments V
A. Suppose I just give the list of 1044 reports. _
The Chairman. Are those Yenan reports? Let me ask you before you do
that, did you have with you copies of the 1P44 reports?
A. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Why not complete the list of 1945 reports first?
A. All right. My report No. 10, document 214: my report No. 2(1. document
222: my report No. 26, document 226; my report No. 22, document 224. I think
that is all, sir, for 1945.
The Chairman. You also had with you. when you returned, copies of your
1944 Yenan reports?
A. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you show any of those?
A. I may have shown one or two of those.
The Chairman. What about the 1944 Yenan reports?
A. Report No. 3, document 166 ; report No. 7, document 167 ; report No. 5,
document 168; report No. 1, document 164; report No. 2, document 165.
(Off the record.)
A. Report No. 13, document 174 ; report No. 31, document 185 ; report No. 40,
document 193; report No. 15, document 177; report No. 34. document 1SS; report
No. 38. document 191. Excuse me, sir. in that list the document appears twice.
There is no need to list it twice. Report 39, document 192; report No. 16, docu-
ment 177: report No. 20, document 177; report No. 19, document 180; report No.
22. document 182: report No. 37. document 190; report No. 26. document 1S3.
That is all of the Yenan reports that I see, sir.
The Chairman. It was from among that group of reports that you showed
him, as stated in your statement, some 10 or a dozen reports?
-V Yes. sir; the ones that I allowed him to see were from among those two
lists.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have at the time copies of other of your Y'enan reports?
Did you have in your possession at that time copies of others of your Yenan
reports not on this list?
A. Yes, I had very nearly a complete file. There were some reports which
I did not have. I am not sure just how many may have been missing but I had
a number of reports in my own possession which are not listed here.
Mr. Achilles. Have you a complete file from the time you first went to Yenan
with the military mission?
A. Yes, from the time of my arrival in Yenan on July 22, 1944, I think, until
T left Yenan on about October 23, 1944. and again from the time of my arrival
in Yenan, I think, in the spring of 1945 until my departure. T am not sure. I
may have had in my possession my file copies of all the reports which I wrote —
personal memoranda I wrote in the spring of 1945, from my arrival in Chungking
until my departure.
Mr. Achilles. And you had those copies here in the Department with you?
A. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. What happened to those copies?
A. Well, 1 understood that the FBI had searched my office after my arrest
and removed the entire contents, or practically the entire contents that seemed
to pertain to me in any way. They returned some of the material to me fairly
soon after the arrest and another hatch of material was returned to me after
the grand jury action, and a final hatch was retained by the Department of
Justice. I inquired of one <>f the attorneys handling the case about the matter
and he said they would all be returned to me as my personal papers. They
wished to retain them temporarily until the case was concluded against some
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2247
of the other men arrested, and he promised me they would be returned to me
after that time.
I had to leave the country and the next time I returned to the 1'nited States
I got in touch with the Department of .Justice. They found the record and
promised to return the papers, but they told me they were not able to locate
the papers, so those papers are still in possession of the Department of Justice.
The oilier papers which were returned to me — I have a few packed amongst
my effects — copies of any memoranda or anything of that sort that I had
written. I left in the Department of State with the Director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs in 1945 and search has been unsuccessful in locating these.
The Chairman. Were these personal copies that you retained marked with
the classification indication?
A. Not with any official stamp. I simply typed it on when I put the paper
in the machine and started typing. They had not been through any official
hands — through any hands except my own. They had not been processed by
the Army Headquarters or the Embassy, so they did not bear any official stamp.
The Chairman. Such classification as they bore was merely the classification
yon put on at the time you wrote the report?
A. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Stevens- Were there any of those documents which you can recall in
which you had two carbon copies in your file?
A. No. sir.
Mr. Stevens; Only one?
A. If I can elaborate, I did all my own typing on a portable machine which
is not too good for making copies. I am not a stenographer. I am a one-handed
typist and ir is quite a chore and I never made any extra copies. When I came
back from Chungking I went through my files and tried to build a complete set
as far as I could but there was only one copy of everything. I don't have any
recollection of having more than one copy. I cannot conceive of any reason
why I should. Most times I typed the four copies necessary for my distribution.
Mr. Stevens. Did you have in any of those files — your personal files — any
copies made from any other sources than your typewriter? Did you have any-
thing prepared in the Department — any transmittal notes coming from the Em-
bassy or G— 2?
A. No. sir: not to my recollection at all. This is strictly a one-man operation.
I did all my own typing and never received copies back from anyone. Could
you elaborate what you mean?
Mr. Stevens. My point is simply this; Were there in your personal files any
of the critiques that had been prepared by the Embassy or G-2 or anyone else?
A. Absolutely not. In almost every case I never saw those transmitting
despatches. I had no knowledge of those. I usually did not know if any use
had been made of them.
Mr. Stevens. But one of those was included in your personal files.
A. No ; I am positive of it.
The Chairman. At the time of your arrest, did you have in your personal
files all the papers you had originally come back with?
A. As far as I know, I believe I did. I occasionally loaned these reports to
officers at other agencies, specialists who wanted to pursue some particular
subject they were specializing in. I remember several people coming over from
R. & A.. Research and Analysis of OSS and if they were interested in one par-
ticular thing I would let them borrow it but as far as I know, those copies had
been returned. I don't remember any being on loan.
Mr. Stevens. Gan you identify any people to whom you gave any of those
copies. Mr. Service?
A. Yes, I loaned some to Mr. Wilber, who was head of the Political Branch —
I am not sure of the exact title now — but head of the Political Branch of the Far
Eastern Section of Research and Analysis
Mr. Rhetts. Of OSS?
A. Yes; and there were at least two other men who came to the Department
and had further consultation with me but I cannot identify their names. They
were junior analysts
Mr. Stevens. From OSS?
A. I believe from OSS and I have a vague recollection also of somebody in
MID but I met a great many people in those days and I went to interrogation
sessions and there were three or four people and it was a case of quick intro-
ductions and I don't remember the names of these people. There was one
2248 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
fellow, short and dark, as I remember, and bristling hair. I might recognize
him if I saw him but that is as far as I can go.
(Off the record.)
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Stevens. Before we get into detailed examination now, I wish Mr. Service
would comment upon the statements which have been made as to his access to
documents that were in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, which were not a
part of his personal file. I would like you to put that in.
Mr. Riietts. Would you like to put it in now? It is a topic I was going to
cover later.
Mr. Stevens. I would like it before we get into a detailed examination of this.
We have taken up the fact that he has had his Yenan reports and we would like
the other point handled at this time.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. You returned to Washington on April 12, 1945. Is that correct? — A. That
is correct.
Q. Will you describe in detail for the board what your assignment was —
where you were physically and what you did from April 12 on to June 6, 1945? — A.
I was placed on consultation with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. As I re-
member, the Director of the Office, Mr. Ballantine, was away and I was told
to sit at his desk, which was at the end of one of the corridors in the old State
Department Building. It would be in the southeast corner. The set-up in those
offices, you may remember, was that there was a small anteroom usually where
there were two stenographers, right at the end of the hall, and two large offices
opening off, one at each side.
Mr. Stanton, the Acting Director, had the office across the reception room,
and I sat in Mr. Ballantine's office with a Mr. Turner, whom I believe was also
in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on temporary status. I believe Mr. Turner
took the desk and most of the time I simply used a large table in the office.
I wasn't assigned any specific duties or any regular duties. I wasn't a part
of the permanent working organization. I was spending practically all my time
outside of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, going over to various other Govern-
ment agencies and I made several visit, for instance, to the Pentagon Building,
Research and Analysis, ONI, etc., and therefore, it wasn't particularly necessary
for me to have a desk, and I did not see the material that was normally circulated
through the office.
Q. You did not? — A. I did not. I should explain that the Division of Chinese
Affairs was about halfway down the hall from the suite of the Director and the
Deputy Director where I was sitting. I have forgotten the room numbers but
I have a very clear iik-ture in my mind that I am sure could be verified.
The Division of Chinese Affairs is in a very large room opening off the hall
with the Chief of the Division in a small office in one corner and the Assistant
Chief in a small office off the other corner with three or four officers in the main
room and three or four secretaries and stenographers.
Q. Were the files of the Chinese Affairs Division in that large room also? — A.
Yes, sir. I was coming to that point. The working files of the Division of
Chinese Affairs was in a hank of tiling cabinets along the wall between this large
office and the corridor that faced out into the room. There must have been 10
or 15 filing cabinets and there was a large table near one end of the room,
I think.
As I was saying, I think I knew all the officers in the Division of Chinese
Affairs, so I was in and out of the office for personal conversations, and occa-
sionally called down for what might be called consultation, specific points that
some officer was interested in. I could— theoretically I did have access to the
files hut I don't believe that I ever did go to the files to get out any material
because I wasn't doing any research work. I wrote one or two memoranda dur-
ing that period but they were just memoranda on spot things that came up on
the day's business.
I remember writing a memorandum, for instance, on a broadcast that Mao
Tse-tung made on May 1, pointing oul the further development of the lines that
were obvious lines. They were obvious when I was in Yenan in March and
April, lint that was nothing that required my going to the file.
I think that if I had been going to the tiles to get any amount of material
or going to the files fairly often, it would have been obvious and it would
have been observed by some of the people in this large office since there were
live or six people sitting in that large office in plain view of the files..
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2249
Q. Was there someone in charge of the files? — A. It was quite informal ac-
tually. H an officer was busy he mighl call liis secretary and tell her 1<> get
something and she would go to the tiles and get it but generally somebody want-
ing something looked at the tiles, arranged by subject and each subject was de-
fined, but mosi people working there knew the general lay-out so they would go
and take what material they needed or return it or gave it to the secretaries to
return. 1 bad no secretary or stenographer and there was a woman named Mrs.
Savage who worked there as one of the secretaries, who had something to do
with the tiles but I don't believe anyone was commissioned as file clerk at all.
Q. Hid you have any occasion during thai period to obtain material from the
Division of Communications and Records? — A. No, sir: not that I remember, on
any occasion. I wasn't doing any work that required my going to the files.
Q. There again you would have had, theoretically, in fact, access to them as
you desired material? — A. As a Foreign Service officer I was able to get ma-
terial from the tiles but I was on consultation and the only thing that I was able
to cent ribuU — the only thing that people were interested in — the reason of my
being on consultation was the fact that I had just come back from Communist
territories and was the only person available who had had that experience and
knew them by direct observation. That is the one subject on which people were
consulting me and I bad my own personal file of my reports which I continually
referred to and used in those consultations and it was far easier for me to
simply thumb through my own personal copies and pick out the one pertinent
to our discussion.
I think there was one occasion when I did go to the files in CA, when Mr.
Walter Robertson was being assigned to Chungking as Minister Counselor. Mr.
Vincent asked me to talk to Mr. Robertson. He had never been to China; he
wasn't a Foreign Service officer : he was new to the Government ; he was a banker
from Richmond, Va., and he asked me to give Mr. Robertson some fairly basic
briefing, and on that occasion I remember digging out from the CA files one or
two of the more comprehensive memoranda which I had written.
We could verify when Mr. Robertson left, and just a day or two before he
left my recollection is that one of the things I dug out of the files and suggested
he read was that memorandum I wrote in June 1944. I believe it is our Docu-
ment 157. I believe that I did get that from the CA files and turned it over to
Mr. Robertson.
I think if 1 might say a little more along that same line, the rather special
character of my consultation — the fact that I did not have any duties in the
Division or Office — for instance when I was in the Department on consultation
in January 1943, I was given specific duties, and that is sometimes done. I
was assigned to writing these summaries — tags — on some of the despatches
coming in from the field and I was also assigned to writing one on the situation
in China, which is Document 103. That was a project that required a great
deal of research and I had a great deal of recourse to the CA files during the
visit in 1943 but on neither my visit of 1944 of consultation or 1945 was I per-
forming any research or other duties that would require access to the files.
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document 157 and ask you to tell us what
that is. — A. Well, it is a hectograph document, apparently a copy of a memo-
randum which I wrote, I think, on June 20, 1944, and it is our Document 157.
Q. This is our Document 157. Do you have a copy of the document you
actually wrote? Is this a copy of the document you wrote — an exact copy?—
A. As far as I can see, it is.
(„>. Does it have your name on it? — A. No, sir; it does not.
Q. Did the document you wrote have your name on it anywhere? — A. It would
have had my name on the end.
(,>. This is not an exact copy of the document you wrote? — A. No, I don't
have the original copy for comparison. Certainly the heading is different and
leaves off everything at the end.
Q. This is not an exact copy of the document you prepared? — A. That is
correct.
Q. I believe you indicated that your name does not appear anywhere on that
document, does it — A. No.
Q. And does the document indicate where it was prepared? — A. Well, there
is written in handwriting at the top "Not to be shown outside CSS," and I
know this was obtained from DRF and I believe from the files in their possession,
Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.
The Chairman. L:jt me say for the record that the document referred to has
to do with Three papers which were found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe, all
2250 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
identical r<> typed copies and one carbon of a document on the subject of a
Kuomintang China and American policy.
Mr. Aciiili.es. Did Mr. Service just state this was a hectograph copy'; in other
words, this is not the document found in Jaffe's office but a hectograph copy of
which typed copies were found in Jaffe's possession?
The Chairman. Yes.
Q. Even that is not correct. You say it appears on the face of it — it says, "Not
to be distributed outside OSS." — A. "Not to be shown outside OSS."
Q. Now I show you photostaic copy of certain typewritten material headed
"Kuomintang China and American Policy." Underneath that heading appears
the wording: "Written in China June _!4. 1!)44. by John S. Service." This docu-
ment consists of 13 pages and in handwriting at the top right-hand corner
appears the number "1.1." This. I understand, is a photostatic copy of a type-
written copy found in Jaffe's possession.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Q. Referring back to Document 157, you attempted to locate, did yon not. the
original of the document which you prepared. — A. I requested the Department
io locate it : yes, sir.
Q. And is Document 157 the best thing they could find — the nearest approxi-
mation to your original document they were able to locate? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it does contain, as far as you know, the substance of what you wrote? — ■
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But does not bear anywdiere an indication of your name or your author-
ship?—A. Yes.
Q. The document marked "15," which I have shown you. does indicate on its
face that it was a report prepared by you ; does it not? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever see the document? — A. I never saw the document from which
this was copied or reproduced.
Q. Was the document, which you prepared, prepared in the format of your
other reports and addressed to the "Commanding General, -Military Headquar-
ters"?— A. Memoranda were addressed in various ways. I don't know how this
may have been addressed. Some of them were not addressed to anyone.
Q. Where were you when you wrote the memorandum of June 24. 1".)44? — A. I
was in ( Chungking.
Q. And you were then attached to the military headquarters, were you not? — ■
A. That is correct.
Q. You think you may or may not have addressed it to the military head-
quarters?— A. I cannot tell.
Q. You don't know?— A. No.
Q. Is there any indication on the face of this photostatic document, which
I will refer to as Document 15, that it was copied from the Document 157? —
A. Although the heading is different and the title is different, I notice repetition
of several obvious mistakes, apparently copies of typing mistakes. About 2 inches
from the bottom of the first page, for instance, both documents have the word
"newsreel" where the obvious meaning was "reversal." It appeared one was
copied from the other.
Q. Although the Document 15 has your name at the top of it. whereas 1 document
157 does not ?— A. That's right.
Q. Is Document 15 an exact copy of Document 157? — A. No, not exactly.
(.). Is it, apart from the fact that if bears your name, an exact copy? — A. I just
mentioned the heading and the subject are different.
Q. Did you ever see Document 157 until it was obtained in the course of these
proceedings? — A. No sir.
Q. Did you ever see that document in any form other than the form in which
you originally prepared it? — A. No sir.
Q. Now I show yon two additional sets of papers, one of which is marked, in
the upper right-hand corner ".".IP." and one of which is marked in handwriting
"No. '.»."." Do these appear to be copies of the same document as No. 15? — ■
A. Exactly the same.
Q. Your testimony with respect to that would be the same ns with respect
to document 13? — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. Were they all three made of the same typing?
A. Thai seems to lie. If you look at the very top of the page you have "Kuomin-
tang China and American Policy — written in China" and if you look at the
capital "C" of China you will see it is blurred in the same way in all three copies,
indicating they are all of the same typewritten text.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2251
The Chairman. Did yon have with you, on your return, a copy of your report
on Kuomintang China and American Policy?
A. Yon are referring to the same document we have just discussed?
The Chairman. Yes.
A. No; I did not.
Mr. Achilles. If I might try to clarify the situation on that last document,
Mr. Service, you have transmitted :i report dated June 24, 1944, on that subject,
"Knomintang China and American Policy." You had prepared a report?
A. Yes. sir : I had prepared a report.
.Mr. Achilles. The documents which we have here include one which is
apparently an OSS reproduction or excerpt from the report which you have
written?
A. That's right.
Mr. Achilles. And the others are reproductions in slightly different form
apparently on the OSS report?
A. That is the assumption since it contains some of the same rather unusual
mistakes.
Mr. Achilles. Is there anything on the photostatic reproduction to indicate
that that might have been obtained by Mr. Jaffe from State Department or from
OSS, either one?
A. I see nothing at all to indicate origin.
Mr. Achilles. In examining these documents I note from the fact that the
hectograph copy bears the notation "Not to be shown outside of OSS," and
from the fact that the same mistake of the word "newsreel" is used where it
should obviously be "reversal" that the typewritten copy was presumably made
from an OSS copy.
(Off the record.)
The Chairman. Mr. Counsel. I turn over to you from the files of the Board
documents which have been numbered B-l to B-52, inclusive, which are the
various documents relating to Mr. Service, which have been found in the pos-
session of Mr. Jaffe. or rather, they are photostatic copies of such documents.
This morning you examined Mr. Service with reference to documents which
"have been numbered B-l to B-ll, inclusive, and in order to keep the records
straight, I will indicate what those documents are.
B-l is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 217 ; B-2 is a photo-
stat of the ozalid copy of your Document 260; B-3 is a photostat of the ozalid
copy of your Document 218 : B-4 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your
document 227; B-5 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 219;
B-6 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 220; B-7 is a photostat
of a typed copy of the same paper; B-8 is another photostat of the typed copy
of the same paper; B-9 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your document 223;
B-10 is a photostat of the typed copy of the same paper; B-ll is a photostat
of the ozalid copy of your Document 221.
These documents are turned over to you to enable you to examine Mr. Service
with reference to the rest of the documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession which
related to Mr. Service.
Mr. Rhetts. Before going any further with the examination on these docu-
ments. I think I should go back and ask Mr. Service a series of questions re-
lating to Documents B-l through B-ll, which I did not ask this morning and
which I think should be asked.
The Chairman. Very well.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. You testified, Mr. Service, that you recalled specifically giving Mr. Jaffe
one document in particular which you have identified as a memorandum con-
cerning the views of Mao Tse-tung A. My memorandum No. 26 of April 1,
1945.
The Chairman. Can you identify that by a "B" number? — A. That is B-35,
sir.
Q. B-35 is the identifying symbol. B-35 is not the document you gave,
or is it?
Let us come to that. Then you further testified that you recall giving some
additional documents, possible 8 or 10, but that you could not now or could not
in June 1945 identify precisely which of your personal copies you showed to Mr.
Jaffe. — A. That is correct.
Q. I should like to show you document B-l, and ask you whether you have
any recollection at all as to whether you might have shown that document to
Mr. Jaffe? — A. That is not quite right, not that document.
68970— 50— pt. 2 49
2252 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. You answer that question and I will give you the next one. — A. I believe
that I probably showed Mr. Jaffe my personal typed copy of this memorandum.
The Chairman. That is all right.
Mr. Achilles. But not the ozalid copy of which that is a photostat — A. No
sir. I never saw the ozalid. I never had it in my possession.
Q. I show you document B-2 and ask you whether you think you may have
shown to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of this memorandum? — A. I believe this
is one of which I showed Mr. Jaffe my personal typed copy. It is the type of
informative material derived entirely from Chinese Communist sources.
Q. When you say that you believe you did, you mean by that that you have
any present recollection or do you mean it is of the type you would have
shown?- — A. I cannot say that I have any positive recollection. There was a
series of reports — memoranda that I wrote dealing with Communist thinking
about certain geographical areas. This one is on Sinkiang. The one we just
discussed was on Mongolia. There was another I wrote on the minorities
question and it is my recollection I allowed him to see the whole series, which is
a group of informative descriptive memoranda or material entirely from com-
munist sources and available to any correspondent or any other person in Yenan.
Q. I show you Document B-3 and ask you if that is one of the memoranda of
which you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy ? — A. Yes ; I
think I may have shown him my personal carbon copy on that.
The Chairman. Just as a matter for the record, both B-l and B-2 are un-
classified.
Mr. Achilles. B-l and B-3.
The Chairman. B-l and B-3.
A. I may say, if I may, it is incomprehensible to me now, looking over these
three, why I marked it "secret." The type of material is the same and the sources
are the same and if I considered the suitability of giving the material — back-
ground information — to a writer on China, I would have been guided more by
the content type of material than by the typed rating up there.
Q. Which you, yourself, put on it? — A. Yes.
Q. I show you Document B-4 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr.
Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum? — A. I would say that I
may have possibly shown him my typed one. I don't have the same certainty
with this as with the three just mentioned.
(Off the record.)
Q. This Document B-4 is also unclassified ; is it not? — A. I see no classification
on it. It is quite likely this was amongst the group I showed him.
Q. I show you Document B-5 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr.
Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum. — A. I cannot say. I rather
think I did not. It discusses plans rather than events which had already taken
place.
Q. I show you Document B-6. May I ask whether you may have shown Mr.
Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum? — A. I do not believe I did.
(Off the record.)
Q. I show you Documents B-7 and B-8 and ask you whether or not they are
merely copies of Document B-6? — A. Yes.
Q. So that your answer with respect to them would be the same that you gave
with respect to B-6? — A. That is correct.
Q. I show you Document B-0 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr.
Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum? — A. I may have. It is
historical material. It does not discuss American policy.
Q. I show yon Document B-10 and ask you if this is not a copy of Document
B-.9 — A. It appears to be.
Q. So that your answer with respect to this would be the same? — A. Yes.
Q. Now I show you Document B-ll and ask you whether you may have
shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum? — A. Yes, I
think I did. This is a matter of public knowledge.
Q. The classification on this is what? — A. "Confidential."
Q. You placed that there yourself? — A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Service, what do you mean by "a matter of public knowl-
edge'"?
A. It is available to every newspaper man. It is no secret that they were
setting up these exiled government organizations. They had similar organiza-
tions for the Manchurian Provinces, for instance.
Mr. Achilles. Why did you classify it "confidential"?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2253
A. Well, because I make some comments on their probable motives for doing it
which should not be attributed to me and should not he in the hands of the rhinese
for circulation among all the various agencies and allies in Chungking.
Mr. Achilles. But yon still thought your comments on that were not of
such a nature as to make it improper to give to a newspaperman for back-
ground.
A. No, sir, I did not. I mention the Communist view which I state I think is
extreme — the Communist view for preparation of civil war. I said it is much
more likely that the Central Government would use them for selecting representa-
tives t<> political bodies like the projected congress. By having a sort of dummy
organization they would be able to nominate delegates to the Congress. It is
common political usage.
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-12 which consists of a 2-page
covering memorandum, dated Chungking, China, 13 February 1944, bearing the
name "John S. Service" at the end together with an enclosure of 22 pages, which
is entitled "Article Written by Theordore H. White for Time Magazine." This
is a photostatic copy of typewritten material. Can you tell whether that is an
exact copy of a memorandum which you prepared?
A. I cannot tell whether it is an exact copy without having the original here
to compare it with. I do not have the original.
Q. Did you ever give the material, of which this is a photostatic copy, to Mr.
Jaffe? — -A. Absolutely not. I did not have any copy of this in my possession
in 1945. This was written in Chungking, February 1944. I did not retain any
personal copies of this memorandum.
Q. You had no personal copies of it? — A. No.
Q. And you never showed it to Mr. Jaffe in this form or any other form? — A.
No, I did not see this until this time — after my writing.
Mr. Achilles. Was your memorandum transmitted to the Department?
A. There is apparently no record of its having been transmitted to the Depart-
ment since DC/R did not locate any dispatch transmitting it.
Mr. Achii less. May I examine the document V
The Chairman. That being so, how did this document arrive in this country?
A. I have no idea unless it was reported through other channels such as the
Army Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, which is part of the Army. Some of
our reports in China, I believe, were given to OSS and OSS may have forwarded
some of them.
Mr. Achilles. I see nothing on the document to say that it was transmitted
officially either to the State Department or any other Department.
Q. I call your attention, Mr. Service, to a covering sheet on this document
which bears the signature of James M. Horan, major, AGD, and ask you what
that covering sheet states? — A. It states as follows: "This document comprises
an excerpt from a confidential report now on file in the Intelligence Library,
Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff."
Q. That would suggest that your memorandum and enclosure was in fact
transmitted by the military headquarters at Chungking to the War Department in
Washington, would it not? — A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Where did you find that information that you have just given? —
A. That was on a sheet attached to the photostat, sir.
Mr. Achilles. I see.
The Chairman. I take it, Mr. Achilles, you examined the photostat without
looking at the cover sheet.
Mr. Achilles. That is correct.
Q. Now I show you Document B-13 and ask you if this does not appear to be a
copy of Document B-12? — A. It appears to be an exact copy.
Q. And I show you document B-14 and ask you if it does not appear to be a
copy of B-12? — A. It is an exact copy.
Q. So that the answers you have given with respect to Document B-12 apply
equally to B-13 and B-14?— A. They do.
Q. Now I show you Document B-15
The Chairman. For the record, I wish to say at this point that Documents
B-15, B-16. and B-17 have already been covered in the testimony. The testimony
was, as I recall, Mr. Service, that you did not have a copy of this document in
your possession. — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. And that you did not give a copy to Mr. Jaffe?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Stevens. You did not have a copy so therefore you could not.
A. I didn"t have one.
2254 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now I show you Document B-18 which consists of a photostatic copy of a
typewritten cony of what appears to be all or some portion of a despatch from
the American Embassy at ( Chungking to the State Department, together with
44 pages of material, including a photostat <>f a typewritten copy <>f a 1-page
memorandum dated September 8, 1944: subject, •'Communist Criticism of Chiang
Kai-shek's Opening Address to the People's Political Council," and bearing the
name "John S. Service" at the end, which encloses certain translations of a
Chinese newspaper.
The Chairman. What number is this?
Mr. Rhetts. B-18.
Q. I ask you whether you ever showed any of this material to Mr. Jaffe? —
A. If I understand your question correctly, the answer is "no." This is an
Embassy despatch and I did noc at any time ever show Mr. Jaffe. nor any other
person outside the Government, an Embassy despatch. As for the part of this
which appears as an enclosure memorandum I "wrote, which I believe is my
memorandum No. 25, that is the type of material which I would have considered
quite proper to show to Mr. Jaffe. I don't have any specific recollection of
whether I did or not. I would have shown him my own personal carbon copy
of my memorandum.
The Chairman. What is the date of the memorandum?
A. September S, 1944. It is simply reporting public newspaper criticism of a
speech by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and I believe is unclassified, and
although it may have been transmitted by classified despatch. I don't know,
there is no indication here of th-1 classification of the original despatch.
Q. Did you ever see any of tin's material — this translation? — A. No. sir.
Q. Called Status of Conversations on the Communist Issue.
A. I am sure I never saw the whole despatch or any part of it except of course
my memorandum, which is an enclosure.
Q. But all this other material, consisting of some 20-odd pages of translation,
did you ever see that before in your life? — A. No. sir.
The Chairman. Is there any indication as to what agency of the Government
this despatch is addressed to?
A. It is addressed to the honorable, the Secretary of State.
Mr. Rhetts. It is a typewritten copy of a despatch and the first page of the
typing is single spaced. The second page is single spaced and runs for a half
page and cotninues on to the next page, which is typed and double spaced, and
the fourth page is double-spaced typing down to the middle page, and stops in
the middle of a sentence and goes on to the final page which is again in single-
spaced typing and bearing at the end. in typing. "Respectfully yours. C. E. Gauss."
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that?
Mr. Rhetts. * * * indicating it was typed by a number of different people
and in no sense an exact copy of an original dispatch, nor that the content may
be exact.
Mr. Achilles. I notice no handwritten signature appears on this photostat.
Mr. Service, were any dispatches from Chungking at that time sent in on 8 by 11
paper?
A. No, sir. All I have ever seen were sent on the long legal size paper.
Mr. Achilles. This appears, I believe, to be a copy subsequently made of a
dispatch rather than a carbon copy of the original.
A. That is correct.
Q. Now I show you document P.-19. Mr. Service, which a insists of a one-page
covering memorandum, dated October 4. 1944. Chungking. China, bearing in
typewriting at the end "'Joseph K. Dickey, Colonel, GSC. Forward Echelon.
USAF CItl." and enclosing an excerpt from a memorandum evidently prepared
by you and bearing in typewriting at the bottom, the words "John S. Service.''
which memorandum encloses memorandum of interviews and conversations with
prominent Communist political and military leaders held by Gunther Stein.
Maurice Votaw, John Service, and Isaac Epstein, and I ask you if you ever saw
the document of which this is a photostat? — A. No. sir : I never saw the document
of which this is a photostat.
Q. The attachment is an excerpt from a memorandum which you prepared, is
it not? — A. Yes, it appears to be practically the full text of my Memorandum No. 3
from Yenan. dated July 30, 1944.
Q. And that is Document No. 106?— A. It is part of Document 166.
Q. This excerpt here leaves off the heading of your memorandum? — A. It
leaves off all the heading.
STATS DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2255
Q, Ami retains the remainder of the text? — A. Yes. sir.
Q Did you ever show this material to Mr. Jaffe? I am referring to Document
B-l'.>. »r the material of which it is a photostat — A. No, sir : I never had it in my
I ssession.
Q. Did yon ever show your own carbon of your memorandum on this subject
to Mr. Jaffe?— A. I am reasonably certain 1 did not because although it is merely
interviews with correspondents and a couple of interviews with me of exactly the
same character, it would have been, you might say. a violation of confidence to
the newspaper correspondents for me to have given Mr. Jaffe access to the notes
of Mr. Epstein or notes of other correspondents. They were generous in turning
over their notebooks to me when I lirsr arrived in Tenan so that I could very
quickly get the advantage of their stay of 3 or 4 weeks in Yenan previously.
The Chairman. I understand from your testimony. Mr. Service, that you had
carbon copies of your reports that appear as enclosures in both B-18 and B-19.
A. Ses, sir.
The Chairman. But that you did not show either of those to Mr. Jaffe.
A. No, sir; and of course the carbon copy which I had in my possession — the
memorandum — it was in different form.
Q. The carbon copy of your memorandum which is contained in B-19? — A. In
166.
Q. It was in a different form than it appears in B-19? — A. That's right.
The Chairman. I notice your report appears as an enclosure in B-19. your
Document 1 « ^ "> in this proceeding. Is there any document number to your report
which" appears in B— 181
A. No, sir. No, I am sorry we have no document.
The Chairman. What is the date of 166?
Mr. Rhetts. The date of 166?
The Chairman. Your report which is Document 166.
A. My memorandum No. 3.
Q. No. lor. is a despatch enclosing A. It encloses two reports.
The Chairman. I should have asked what is the date of your Report No. 3?
A. It is July 30, 1944. It was forwarded to the Department by a Chunking
despatch 2923, dated September 1. 1944. and I see the stamp of the Office of Far
Easter Affairs, indicating it was received in the Department prior to September
19, 1944.
The Chairman. What about the classification of B-19? Is it unclassified?
Mr. Rhetts. B-19 itself bears no evidence of any classification. That may
have been left off in the course of the copying.
Mr. A( Hi! its. I iv tice a cover sheet to the effect that this is an excerpt from a
secret report now on file in the Intelligence Library MID.
Q. Now I show you document B-20. Mr. Service, which is a photostatic copy of
four typewritten pages of material headed. "Subject : China — Communist — Kuo-
mintang Relations," which commences with a quote •"Brief" and bears thr> type-
written word- "V. F. Meisling. Major. Infantry. Acting Executive. JICA CBI
Branch." There follows certain material which is evidently an excerpt from a
memorandum of yours and bears on the top of page 2 the words "John S. Service."
and I ask you if you ever saw that before? — A. No, I never saw the report of
which this is a reproduction.
Q. I take it you did not give the report, of which this is a reproduction, to Mr.
Jaffe? — A. Certainly not. I never had it in my possession and never even saw it.
Q. Did you ever irive to Mr. Jaffe your own copy or any copy of the sub-
stantive content of this document? — A. This appears to lie a drastic con-
densation of a memorandum which I wrote in Chungking on November 3. 194."..
which i> our Document No. 120. I had no copy of that memorandum of Novem-
ber 3 in my possession and could not and did not show it to Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Now I show you Document B-21. This document consists of three separate
sets of papers which are stapled together. < 'hie consists of four pages and is
headed "Department of State. Division of Chinese Affairs." and bears the date.
September 26, 1944." The second page of this material bears the heading at
the top of the page "U. S. Embassy. Chungking, September 8, 1944." It is
addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typewritten signature at the
bottom of page 3, "Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss." Can you indicate wbat
the first page of this material is? — A. Well, the first page is a summary and
comment on the dispatch, apparently dratted by Mr. Chase in the Division of
Chinese Affair-. As Mr. Larsen mentioned yesterday, if a dispatch came in
from the field that seemed to be of particular interest, one of the officers in the
Division of Chinese Affairs, and I believe it is customary in other divisions.
2256 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
was assigned the chore of digesting it and commenting on it before it was
circulated. Mr. Larsen mentioned that he was particularly interested in these
comments by the officers of CA since it gave a clue as to the policies or thinking
of the Department on the policy.
Q. The first page of this material appears to be one of those summaries
and comments? — A. That's right.
Q. And the remaining three pages appear to be copies of the dispatch? —
A. The remaining three pages seem to be a typewritten copy. It isn't a carbon
copy but a typewritten copy of dispatch 2944.
Q. Did you ever see that dispatch prior to June 6, 1945? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or this covering summary and comment? — A. No.
The Chairman. Is there any report of yours in there?
A. Yes, the dispatch No. 2944, enclosing my Report No. 5 as an enclosure.
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that a moment?
A. The dispatch and my report appear as our Document 168.
Mr. Achiixes. I notice again that the copy of the dispatch is on short paper
and indicates no handwritten signatures so I assume that that again is a copy
subsequently made of the dispatch and presumably also of the summary
memorandum on the first page.
A. That is correct. You can also see, by comparison with the summary
memorandum, that it isn't an exact copy. The summary memorandum was
typed on 54)y-S paper whereas this is full-sized letter paper.
Mr. Achilles. That is correct.
Q. Now the second set of material, stapled together here, consists of five pages
of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material which bears the heading,
"U. S. Army Observer Section, APO 879, August 3, 1944, subject: Communist
Policy Toward the Kuomintang," and bears at the end of the material, on
paee 6, the typewritten words "John S. Service." Does that appear to be the
substance of your Report No. 5? — A. Yes, sir. It is not an exact copy.
Q. Does it bear the number? — A. It does not bear the number and omits the
last paragraph.
Q. But otherwise it contains the substance of your Report No. 5, which was
in fact transmitted by Dispatch No. 2944?— A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you ever seen the material, of which that is a photostatic copy? —
A. No, sir.
The Chairman. I take it the dispatch is your Document No. 168?
A. That is correct.
Q. And I take it, therefore, you never gave that material to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I
did not.
Q. Did you ever give Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of your Report No. 5. —
A. I don't think so ; no.
The Chairman. You did have that in your possession?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now I show you the third set of papers that are a part of this document,
P>-21, consisting of four pages stapled together, bearing the heading, "Subject:
The Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang," in handwriting. At this ma-
terial is a photostatic copy of handwriting and I ask you if you ever saw that
before? — A. No, sir, T do not recognize the handwriting and I have never seen it.
Q. You did not give that to Mr. Jaffee, did you? — A. No, sir.
Q. What do these notes appear to be? — A. These handwritten notes appear to
be excerpts from the memorandum — my Report No. 5.
Q. I show you Document B-22, which consists of two sets of papers, stapled
together, one consisting of seven pages of photostatic reproduction of type-
written material headed, "Subject: First Informal Impressions of the North
Shensi Communist Rase." The material under this subject continues for the
first 31/, pages and in the middle of page 4 appears the words, "Subject: Desire
of Chairman of Communist Central Committee for Continued American Repre-
sentation of Diplomatic Character at Yenan." I ask you if you ever saw the
material, of which this is a photostatic copy, before? — A. No, sir, I never have.
Q. Can yon indicate to the Board what this material appears to be? — A. It
appears tobe a copy — I should say an excerpt from my Report No. 1, written at
Yenan on July 28, 1944.
Q. All of it? — A. I should say that the first 3% pages are an excerpt from my
Report No. 1. The second half — the lower half of page 4 is an excerpt of my
Report No. 2, written at Yenan on July 28, 1944, and the last two pages
Q. Just a moment. I should add. in terms of my attempts to describe this
document, that the last two pages are headed, "Subject : The Communist Policy
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2257
Toward the Kuomintang." — A. Which is an excerpt of my Report No. 5, which
was described under B-21.
The Chairman. We are talking about B-22?
A. Yes.
The Chairman. That contains parts of
A. Of three reports.
The Chairman. One, two, and five?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. And the document itself is a dispatch?
A. It is just a sheaf of excerpts without any identification — excerpts from
three different reports.
The Chairman. These are carbon copies?
Mr. Rhetts. Those are photostatic reproductions of typewritten material.
Q. Does your name appear anywhere in this sheaf of excerpts, Mr. Service? —
A. I don't see it anywhere.
Mr. Achilles. Did you prepare those excerpts?
A. No, sir ; I have never seen them before.
Q. I take it, therefore, you did not give them to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I did not.
Q. In any form? — A. In any form.
Q. The other portion of this Document B-22 is a photostatic reproduction
of two pages of handwritten material headed, subject : '"First Informal Impres-
sions of the North Shensi Communist Areas by an American Observer from
Observer Group, July 1944." I ask you if you ever saw that before? — A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting? — A. I do not.
Q. Are you satisfied it is not your own? — A. Absolutely.
Q. Does this refer to any memorandum or report that you have prepared? — ■
A. Yes; this is an excerpt of my report No. 1, drafted in Yenan on July 28,
1944.
Q. That is the same report that we have been referring to in the other portion
of this Document B-22?— A. Yes.
Q. I believe you already testified you have never shown that report to Mr.
Jaffe in any form? — A. Excuse me, I understood you to ask me if I had ever
shown these documents (17 pages of typewritten material). I am sorry. I
misunderstood your question because this memorandum, No. 1, of which I
had a personal copy in my possession may be one I did show to Mr. Jaffe. It
is purely first impressions and I might say that prior to this time it had already —
some parts of it had already appeared in print.
Q. Some parts of what — your memorandum? — A. I would not say some parts.
It was obvious from an article written in Life magazine that the author had
read this memorandum. The similarity of language indicated someone had
shown it to him.
0- Who was the author of the article in Life magazine? — A. Theodore White.
0- Did you show him your memorandum? — A. I did not.
The Chairman. What was the date of your report No. 2?
A. July 28, 1944.
The Chairman. The same as No. 1?
A. I might say my impression of the classification of the early Yenan reports
is that when we first went to Yenan — the Observer Group first went up — there
was no release of information of the fact that we were there. The press corre-
spondents were not, for instance, allowed in their dispatches during the first
weeks we were there, to mention our presence. Therefore, there was an abnor-
mally high classification on early reports. Later on it became general knowledge
and it was allowed to be mentioned in the press and the need for classification of
some of our reports was reduced. The classification of "secret" on this is influ-
enced, I am sure, partly by the fact that the whole matter of our presence there
was a secret at that time.
The Chairman. You have testified that you might have shown a copy of your
report No. 1 to Mr. Jaffe. What about 2 and 5?
A. I think I already testified on 5 that I would not, and similarly on No. 2,
that I would not show that. No. 2 was a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in
which he indicated his desire to have continued American representation. That
was as close to a diplomatic note up there that we had. It was a request from
the head of the Communists which I was forwarding to the Embassy.
Q. I show you Document B-23 which is a photostatic reproduction of three
pages of typewritten material, headed : "First Informal Impressions of the North
Shensi Communist Areas by an American Observer from Observer Group," July
1944.
2258 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. Isn't that Document B-22?
Mr. Rhetts. B-23.
Q. Appearing above it in handwriting is the word "Service." I ask you if you
ever saw that document before ? — A. No, I never have.
Q. Or the document of which it is a reproduction? — A. No.
Q. What does that appear to be? — A. Well, actually, this is practically identi-
cal with B-22 in that it contains excerpts from three separate reports; from my
report No. 1, "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Area
by an American Observer from the Observer Group" ; from my report No. 2, "De-
sire of Chairman of Communist Central Committee for Continued American
Representation of Diplomatic Character at Yenan," and report No. 5, "Communist
Policy Toward the Kuomintang." I haven't compared it to see if they are the
identical excerpts but it may well be a copy of the handwritten excerpt.
The Chairman. Is this paper a copy of the same material that is in your
Document 165?
A. Well it is excerpts, sir, from several documents, 165, 164, and 168.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Q. So that insofar as the substantive content of this Document B-23, your
testimony relating to Document B-22 is applicable to this document? — A. That
is right.
Q. You never saw the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction? —
A. That's right.
Q. Now I show you Document B-24 which consists of what appears to be a
photostatic reproduction of dispatch No. 2667 from Chungking, dated June 12,
1944, and signed by C. E. Gauss, which dispatch encloses a memorandum No. 76.
dated June 2, 1944, bearing the typwritten words at the end, "John S. Service."
Now, I ask you if you ever saw the dispatch of which this is a copy, prior to
June 6, 1945? — A. I do not believe I ever did see the dispatch.
Q. In the handwriting on the first page of this dispatch, what is indicated
there>?<— A. It isn't awfully clear, "2 War, 1 Navy, 1 FCL, 2 CA, 1 JA, 1 POL
files." Also there is written on the face of it "Not sent to OWI," followed bv
the initials FPL."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of an ozalid, isn't it?
Mr. Rhetts. I do not know. It could be the photostat of the original or it
could be a photostat of an ozalid.
A. I would say it is more likely to be a photostat of the original because of
the clarity of the signature at the end.
Mr. Moreland. It is a photostat of an ozalid copy.
Mr. Achilles. If that was a photostat of an original, that would be the first
original document we have yet found in Jaffa's possession.
A. Somebody who was in CA at that time may be able to tell us ; for instance,
"FPL," which is Frank Lockhart, who was liaison officer of OPI.
The Chairman. I may say for the record that this is a photostat of an ozalid
in possession of the FBI.
Q. Did you ever show this dispatch, of which this is a copy, or the ozalid of
which this is a copy, to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir.
The Chairman. Is there any indication on that paper as to whose copy this
ozalid was?
A. No. sir. There again it might be a question of somebody, who was in the
Office of Far Eastern Affairs or Chinese Affairs, knowing whether it was custom-
ary for these instructions regarding routing to OWI to be written on one of
the FE copies or CA copies or the original. My own gu^ss would be, and it is
purely a guess, that it was probably written only on the ozalid that circulated
in the Division of Chinese Affairs.
. The Chairman. This is probably one of the CA ozalids.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now attached to this dispatch is a copy of a memorandum of yours; is it
not? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever give the copy, of which that is a reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe? —
A. No, sir; I did not have it in my i>ossession. I did not have a copy of this
memorandum with me.
Q. So that you could not have given Jaffe the substance of this? — A. No ; I could
not have
0- And did not?— A. No.
The Chaibm w. I think we have to adjourn at this point.
(Meeting adjourned at 5:35 p. m.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2259
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : Friday. June 2, 1950, 10 : 10 a. m. to 12 : 40 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.
Reporter : Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S reporting.
Members of board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur
G. Stevens. Allen B. Moreland. legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruckelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 10: 10 a. m.)
The Chairman \Mv. Conrad E. Snowl. May we proceed?
Mr. Moreland. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say that Mr. Larsen has indicated
that he will appear at 2 o'clock this afternoon.
The Chairman. Thank you. You may proceed, Counsel.
Mr. Rhetts. Will you take the stand, Mr. Service?
Thereupon, Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and
sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further, as follows :
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Continuing our examination of the documents which were under discussion
at the close of yesterday's session, I show you Document B-25, which is a
photostat of an ozalid copy of dispatch No. 2986, dated September 21, 1944,
and which consists of three pages and is signed by C. E. Gauss. Attached to
this is a four-page memorandum which is report No. 13, dated August 19, 1944,
and bears at the end the typewritten words "John S. Service," and attached
to this memorandum are five pages of material headed "Hsin Hua News Agency,
English Broadcasts.". I show you this Document B-25, Mr. Service, and ask
you whether you ever gave the ozalid, of which this is a reproduction, to Mr.
Jaffe?— A. No; I did not.
Q. Did you ever see this dispatch prior to June 6, 1945? — A. To the best of
my knowledge, I did not.
Q. I ask you to look at the original of this dispatch, which is document 174;
this shows distribution : MID, 2 copies ; ONI, 1 copy ; Foreign Activity Correla-
tion, 1 copy; Special Political Affairs, 1 copy; OSS, 2 copies; CA, 2 copies, does
it not? — A. Yes. It also shows, Political File, 1 copy.
Q. Now, the enclosure to this report No. 13 is a memorandum prepared by
you, is it not ? — A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever show your own personal copy of this report to Mr. Jaffe? —
A. I doubt very much whether I did. I believe I did not.
The Chairman. Did you have a copy of it?
A. Yes, sir ; I had a personal copy of this. It is based on published informa-
tion, but I don't believe that I would have shown my personal copy of this to
Mr. Jaffe.
Mr. Moreland. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
A. I might mention that this dispatch No. 29S6, which is our document No.
174, was received into the Department of State prior to October 11, 1944. It
bears the stamp of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date.
The Chairman. Is there indication on the ozalid copy as to whose copy that
was?
A. There is written up on the top "Not sent to OWI," with the initials "FPL."
Mr. Achilles. Do you know whose initials "FPL" are?
A. Frank P. Lockhart, who was acting as the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
liaison officer with < >WI at that time. I think.
The Chairman. Would that indicate to you whose copy this ozalid was?
A. I rather believe, sir, that sort of notation was written only to CA or
FE copies, but I'm not positive on that point. That is a sort of question that
Mr. Chase might he able to help us on, or somebody else who was in the Division
of Chinese Affairs at that time.
Questions by Air. Rhetts :
Q. Now. Mr. Service. I show you document B-26, which consists of three pages
of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is
labeled "Report No. 31."' dated September 23, 1944, and various typewritten words
at the bottom ■•John S. Service." Attached to this is a 2-page memorandum
labeled 'Memorandum of a Part of a Conversation With Po Ku on September
2260 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
12, 1944." I ask you if you ever gave the material, of which this is a photostatic
reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?
In that connection I direct your attention to the material written by hand
in the upper right-hand corner which says : "See : Okano, Susomo in Biographical
Notes." Do you recognize that handwriting? — A. No, sir; I do not.
Q. Is it yours? — A. No ; it's not.
Q. Now, to revert to my question, which I didn't give you an opportunity to
answer, did you ever give the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduc-
tion, to Mr. Jaffee? — A. I'm sorry, I don't understand your question exactly.
Q. My question is whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the three pages of typing,
of which this is a photostat? — A. No, I did not give him these three pages of
typing, of which this is a photostat.
The Chairman. Will you explain what, if anything, you may have given him?
A. It's possible, sir, I may have allowed him to see my personal copy of
this memorandum. This is a memorandum based entirely on statements by the
Chinese Communists, which were not given in confidence to me and were avail-
able to other people, simply their statements and views regarding postwar
treatment of Japan. This is the type of material which I think I would have
been willing to allow Mr. Jaffe to see or any other interested writer.
Q. I take it that with respect to this, as with respect to all the others except
the one memorandum you have no actual recollection that you gave them to
Jaffe? — A. No; and I'm positive that I did not give him the original sheets of
which this is a photostat because there are several typing mistakes, and so on,
here.
Q. Is that an exact copy of your original memorandum as you prepared it? — A.
Well, I don't know, sir, since I don't have my original copy here. But I don't
believe it is.
Mr. Achilles. Is this the document which Mr. Larsen admitted having given
to Jaffe? Is it the one where he recognized the handwriting as his own?
Q. Yes; it is one of those. — A. The dispatch 3092 which transmitted my memo-
randum. Memorandum No. 31, of which this is a copy, to the Department reached
the Department prior to November 18, 1944, since I see it is stamped by the
Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Will you examine the photostat of the carbon copy which you have, which
bears the handwriting identified by Mr. Larsen as his, and see if there is any
indication where that copy was prepared? — A. I see no indication, sir.
Q. There are no marks on it indicating any division of the State Department? —
A. No. It is merely a typewritten copy and, except for the handwriting on here,
I see no other indication of origin.
Mr. Rhetts. May I inquire, according to the information in possession of the
Board, this does not purport to be a photostat of an ozalid copy?
The Chairman. No. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Mr. Rhetts. A carbon copy of something?
The Chairman. Yes : typed material.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Referring to the original dispatch which transmitted your report No. 13r
the distribution of this dispatch is indicated as follows, is it not? MID, 2 copies;
ONI, 1 copy ; OSS, 2 copies ; Foreign Activity Correlation, 2 copies ; Political File,
1 copy ; Japanese Affairs, 2 copies ; and CA, 2 copies. Is that right? — A. That is
correct.
Q. The stamp appearing on the face of the dispatch also indicates that this
document, the original dispatch, went to the Division of Territorial Studies, does
it not? — A. Yes, sir; it does.
Mr. Achilles. I can see no indication on the photostat as to the source of the
carbon copy.
Q. Now I show yon document B-27. which consist of six pages of photostatic
reproduction of certain typewritten material. It is dated March 25, 1944, and
after Hie first full paragraph of the materia] on page 1 are the typewritten words
"V. F. Mesing, Major, Infantry."
The Chaieman. This is the photostat of a carbon copy.
Q. Thank you. Now I ask you, Mr. Service, if you ever saw this material,
of which this is a photostatic reproduction? — A. No, sir; I have never seen it
before.
Q. Will you describe very briefly to the Board what it appears to be? — A. I
believe it is a copy of a report forwarded by Joint Intelligence Collection Agency
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2261
■
at Chungking. I think that the name "V. F. Mesing" is a typing mistake and it
should be "V. F. Meisling," whose name has appeared on several other copies of
JICA reports.
Q. When you say "forwarded by JICA," where was it forwarded? — A. For-
warded to the War Deportment by JICA. The report itself appears to be an
excerpt and extensive quotation of a memorandum which I prepared in Chung-
king on March 18, 1944, and which appears as our document No. 133 in the
proceeding.
Q. Since you have never seen the material, of which this is a reproduction, I
take it that'you did not give that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir; I did not; and I did
not have a copy of my memorandum with me in the United States.
Q. So you did not give your personal copy of your memorandum or in any
way give him this material in substance? — A. No, sir; I did not. I could not.
Q. I show you document B-28 and ask you if this appears to be another copy
of the same material? — A. Yes, sir; it is.
Q. I invite your attention to the cover sheet on this document and ask you
to indicate what it states? — A. The cover sheet is signed by James M. Horan,
Major, AGD, and states, "This document comprises an excerpt from a secret
report now on file in the Intelligence Library, Military Intelligence Division,
War Department, General Staff."
The Chairman. Have you indicated that this is a copy of your document No.
133?
A. It's an excerpt, sir. The material is excerpted from our document 133.
Q. Now I invite your attention also, Mr. Service, to an additional page attached
to this document B-28 which is headed, "Secret, Joint Intelligence Collection
Agency. China-Burma-India, Intelligence Report," and I ask you to look at the
material at the lower right-hand corner of this document which indicates the dis-
tribution of the document made by MID, and ask you to indicate what that is,
the distribution shown here? — A. It shows the following distribution: FE/SEA,
original ; Special BR, 2 copies ; CIG, 1 copy ; ONI, 3 copies ; OSS, 1 copy.
The Chairman. Is there any indication on the photostat whose copy this
was?
A. I see none, sir.
Q. I take it that, with respect to the material involved in B-28, your answers
are the same with respect to B-27 of which it is a copy? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now I show you document B-29 which consists of five pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is dated "Chung-
king, November 27, 1942, No. 758," and addressed to the Secretary of State and
bearing the typewritten words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Q. Thank you. Attached to the first page are three pages headed "Subject:
Chinese Trade in Strategic Materials with Japan," and bearing the typewritten
words at the end "John S. Service." The last page of this material is headed
"Wolfram," and at the bottom appears the words "Source : No. 758, Chungking,
November 27. 1942, BEW File No. 520866," and I ask you if you ever saw the
material of which this is a photostatic reproduction?
A. I never saw the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction be-
cause this is not typed in a way the Embassy submitted the original dispatch.
It is typed on short paper instead of long paper.
Q. Do you think you ever saw the actual Embassy dispatch before June 6,
1945. the dispatch of which this appears to be a typewritten copy? — A. Yes, sir;
I probably did, because this was prepared, the original dispatch, on November 27,
1942, when I believe I was still in the Embassy in Chungking, in which case I
probably would have seen the dispatch when it was prepared. I can check
the dates here. No. sir : I left Chungking on November 26, 1942, so that lets
it out. Since the dispatch was dated November 27, 1942, I probably never even
saw the original dispatch.
Q. I ask you whether you gave material, of which this is a photostatic copy,
to Mr. Jaffe'?— A. No, sir ; I did not.
Q. Referring to the attachment which appears to be a copy of a memorandum
prepared by you, can you identify that as a memorandum you did prepare, Mr.
Service? — A. Yes, sir; I remember the subject. It bears my initials. I believe
it is a copy of a memorandum which I prepared after that long trip I took
through the northwestern provinces of China in the summer and fall of 1942.
Q. Did you ever show your own personal copy or any other copy of this memo-
randum to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I had no personal copy of this memorandum. I
never showed any copy to Mr. Jaffe.
2262 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Will you look at the last page of this material and point out the portion
which indicates the source and tell us whether that suggests where this
material came from? — A. Well, this last line reads, or contains the words "BEW
File No. 520866." BEW to me would indicate the Board of Economic Warfare.
This type of file number is not a Department of State file number. And this
would indicate that either the original — that it either originated in the Board
of Economic Warfare or from someone who had access to their materials who
know their file numbers. Nobody in the Department of State would ordinarily
know their file numbers.
Q. AVas there any Board of Economic Warfare in 1942, Mr. Service? — A. Cer-
tainly, sir.
Q. Did they have any offices in Chungking ?— A. Well, I can't state with cer-
tainty whether they had established their offices in Cungking by that time.
They certainly were represented. They certainly had representatives visiting
Chungking by that time and they eventually had a fairly large office there.
But, as of '42, I'm not sure.
Mr. Achilles [examining document]. This does appear to be a BEW copy, or
at least to have been obtained from BEW. I note that it is typed on short paper
and the photostat does not show the handwritten signature, so I assume that
that is a copy made subsequent to the transmission of the dispatch.
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-30. It consists of four pages
of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material. The first page is dated
10th of October 1944. In this case it is Report No. 40, and it bears the type-
written words "John S. Service" at the bottom. Attached to this are three
pages of typewritten material headed "Memorandum" and bearing at the end
the typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask you if you ever showed the
material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I'm
certain I did not.
Q. Did you ever show him your own personal copy of that memorandum? —
A. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand the last question. You asked whether
I had shown the paper, of which this is a photostatic copy, to Mr. Jafi'e?
Q. Yes. — A. I did not.
Q. Did you ever show him your own personal copy of this memorandum? —
A. I'm certain that. I did not, sir.
Q. This is the report which has been also known in these proceedings as
Document No. 193, is it not?— A. It is a part of 19413S, sir; 193 is an Embassy
dispatch which transmitted a copy of this memorandum.
The Chairman. That is a report of which you had a personal copy?
A. I believe I did.
Q. Actually, as Document 193 appears in the document book, it consists only
of your report, does it not? And is not the transmitting dispatch? — A. Yes, sir;
I should have said that this is the same material as appears in Document 193.
Q. Now I show you Document B-31.
Mr. Achilles. Before we leave B-30, may I examine it. I see no indication
whether B-30 is a photostat of a carbon copy of the report or a copy made
subsequently.
A. I might say at that point that my typing, I'm sure, is a lot cleaner than
that typing there. I'm positive it is not a photostatic reproduction of my per-
sonel carbon copy because the typing is extremely amateurish there and even
though I'm not a professional I would be sure that I had done a better job
than that.
Q. I show you Document B-31. which consists of 11 pages of a photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material. It is dated August 27, 1944. and is Report
No. I.". At the bottom of the second page it bears the typewritten words "John
S. Service." The remaining pages are headed "Interview with Mao Tso-tung"
and are dated August 23, 1944. I ask the Board whether it has information as to
precisely what this is?
The Chairman. This is a photostatic copy of a carbon copy of typed material.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the material of
which this is a photostatic reproduction? — A. No; I did not give him the ma-
ferial, the paper of which this is a photostatic copy.
Q. I »o you have your own personal copy of this report? — A. I did at that time,
sir : I do not know.
Q. That is. you bad it on June 6. 194."?— A. Yes ; I think so.
Q. Do you recall whether it was in this form, by which I mean can you
ascertain whether this could be a carbon copy of the memorandum you pre-
pared'.- — A. Well, I have already said, sir. that I did not give the paper, of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2263
which this is a copy, a reproduction, a photostatic reproduction; does that not
answer your question, sir?
Q. It does not answer the question I'm now asking. I'm asking you whether
this material here appears to he an exact copy of the memorandum as you
prepared it.— A. Well, I don't have any copy; that is. I don't have my own copy
here to compart'. It may he a copy, but it is certainly not an exact copy.
Q. I'm trying to find out whether it appears to he an exact copy, in short,
a carbon copy or the original of the memorandum you actually prepared. — A.
No. sir ; it is not.
Q. It is not an exact copy? — A. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you have a personal copy of this report?
A. Yes. sir.
Q. This is now B-31. Do you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your
own personal copy of this report? — A. No; I think I did not. I think I should
mention, sir, if I may, that this is one of three, and the State Department re-
ceived this memorandum of mine, as one of three enclosures to dispatch No.
301S. That dispatch was received in the Department prior to October 27, 1944,
since I see the stamp by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date. I also
notice that the other two enclosures to that dispatch also appear among the
list which has been furnished to me of my reports which were found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession. And it seems certainly a coincidence that he should have
copies of all three enclosures to that single dispatch. This dispatch appears
as our Document 177.
Mr. Aciiili.es. It's a dispatch to the State Department?
Mr. Riietts. No, sir. You mean B-31?
Mr. Aciiili.es. Yes, B-31.
Mr. Rhetts. B-31 is not a copy of the dispatch to the State Department. It
is merely a copy of Report No. 15, which I believe you will find gives no indica-
tion as to what its source is.
Mr. Achilles. I should like to examine that. Information in possession of
the Board indicates that that is a copy of a document on file in MID.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B-32, which consists of eight pages, photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is dated September
28, 1944, which is known to be Report No. 34 and bears at the bottom thereof the
typewritten words "John S. Service." The remaining six pages are headed
"Policies of the Chinese Communists affecting their attitudes toward the Soviet
Union and the United States." There is also a cover sheet attached to this docu-
ment signed by James M. Horan, major, AGD, stating that "this document
comprises an excerpt from a secret report now on file in the intelligence library
of Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff." And at-
tached to that is a small sheet of paper indicating distribution: POL, 1 copv;
RUSS. SPC. LIB. HQAAF, SPEC. BR. I ask you whether you gave the material,
of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe ?— A. Well, I'm not sure
I understand your question.
Q. Before asking that question I'd like to ask the Board if it can identify
what the material is which is reproduced here.
The Chairman. It is a photostat of a typed paper, a carbon copy.
A. I am sorry I am not sure I understood your question exactly.
Q. What I want to know is whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the paper which is
photostatically reproduced here? — A. No, sir; I'm sure I did not.
Questions by the Chaikman :
Q. Did you show him a personal copy of the report? — A. I may have allowed
him to see my personal copy of this memorandum. It is a memorandum based
entirely on Communist material and Communist sources. It's the same type of
material which I had used in background talks, for instance, before the Institute
of Pacific Relations here in Washington in November 1944 and on various other
occasions. I'm sure it was alluded to in most of my talks and interrogations and
questions.
Q. What is the classification of your report?— A. There is no indication at all
of classification. The only copy that the Department of State has been able to
locate came from the files of DRF, and I assume from the files of Research
Analysis Branch of OSS. They have stamped it secret, hut it is obviously their
own stamp. Yes, I do see a typewritten "secret" at the top here.
Q. Then the repport is classified "secret"? — A. Apparently it was.
2264 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Rhetts. But you do not know what classification you may have put on the
report yourself?
A. Well, the only copy that we have now is this copy which apparently was
made by OSS. It's not my original copy nor a carbon copy of my original copy.
Mr. Achilles. As to the material in the report, do you feel that you would
have classified it secret?
A. Well, I may have, sir, in September 1044. At that time, of course, I had
not been to the States, had not been discussing this material. By April of '45,
when I first met Mr. Jaffe, a great deal had been written about the Chinese Com-
munists. At least 10 or 12 correspondents had visited Yenan and had come out
or had written or sent out articles about it. The fact of our mission up there
was no longer even restricted and, as I say, by that time this was old stuff, by
April 1945.
So, even though it might have been reasonably classified fairly high in Sep-
tember, there was no longer any need for classification of that type of material
by the spring of '45. You see, by April '45 Guenther Stein was on the verge of
publishing his book, all of these correspondents had extensive articles, for
example, Life magazine, the New York Times, and so on, had very much the
same material.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B-33, which consist of five pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, dated March 13, 1945, Report No. 10, sub-
ject: "The views of Mao Tse-tung: America and China." It contains a short
summary following which appears the typewritten words "John S. Service" and
thereafter the remainder of the material which is headed "Memorandum, con-
versation with Mao Tse-tung." At the end are the typewritten initials "JSS."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. Tliank you. Now I ask you whether you think you may have shown the
material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir;
I did not.
Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of
this memorandum? — A. It's quite possible; yes. It's merely an account of con-
versation in which General Mao discussed the situation in China in terms
similar to the way he was discussing it fairly frequently with correspondents
and other visitors to Yenan.
Q. Is this the memorandum of conversation with Mao which you earlier
testified that you recalled showing to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir.
Q. It is not? — A. No, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. What is the classification of this document? — A. It does not appear on
B-33, but I see the original was classified secret.
Q. I notice that that report is dated March 13, 1945. Could you indicate why
you gave the secret classification at that date? — A. No, sir; I don't see any
justification for such a high classification.
Q. Does it contain any comment by you on the views expressed or the situation
indicated by Mao? — A. It contains a little, a very brief comment, but none which
reflects on American policy or criticizes American policy.
Q. Does it contain any information of military value? — A. None whatever.
Interestingly enough, this may be part of the reason — this is a quotation of Mao :
"American's intentions have been good. We recognize that when Ambassador
Hurley came to Yenan and endorsed our basic five points he could not have en-
dorsed them unless he know that President Roosevelt thought likewise." That
is just quoting Mr. Mao. At that time these basic five points in the draft agree-
nint of November 10, 1944, were becoming general knowledge but had not yet
been officially admitted. They had not been released by the two parties.
Now, I'm not quite sure when those facts were released. They were well
known in Chungking and the Chinese Communists were talking about them
fairly freely but I don't think that we had admitted the fact that Ambassador
Hurley had endorsed them. When I say "endorsed them," shall we say "counter-
signed them." That may have been the reason why I put some classification on it.
Q. Was the existence of those five points public knowledge in April? — A. Well,
it was known to every correspondent, sir. I don't think that the American Gov-
ernment had officially admitted the fact that Ambassador Hurley had endorsed
them in any way. I can't answer your question specifically, sir.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2265
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you document B-34, which consists of three pages of photo-
static reproduction Of typewritten material. — A. Excuse me. We have to do
some research but you will find, certainly in the books that were written very
soon after this period, the five points are mentioned and also Ambassador's Hur-
ley's trip, and so on.
Q. I show you document B-34, winch consists of tbree pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material bearing the date March 20, 1945, No. 20 and
bearing the typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask the Board what further
identification it has of this document.
Mr. Moreland. This is a typed copy.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. Did you give the typed copy, of which this is a photostat, to Mr. Jaffe? —
A. No, sir; this is in a different form from the copy which I had, the personal
copy which I had in my possession.
Q. Did you prepare, from the personal copy you had, any further copy and give
thwt to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir; I never gave any of my personal copies to anyone.
Q. Do you think you may shown your personal copy of this report to Mr.
jaffe? — A. It's possible, but I doubt it, sir. I don't think I did.
Mr. Stevens. What is your reason for doubting that, Mr. Service?
A. There is nothing particularly secret about the information in it, but it wasn't
the type of material which I understood Mr. Jaffe was interested in seeing. He
was interested, as I remember, in mainly what the Communists were saying,
what their policies were, what they were doing. And this is a different type of
material.
Mr. Achiixes. Yen Hsi-shan is not a Communist?
A. No, sir.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B-35, which consists of six pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, dated April 1, 1945, No. 2G, bearing toward
the bottom of the first page the typewritten words "John S. Service," followed by
"Memorandum of Conversation with Communist Leaders," and at the end the
typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask the Board what further identifica-
tion it has of this document.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy of
which this is a photostat?- — A. No, sir; I did not. It's not typed in the form in
which I prepared my memorandum.
Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this
memorandum ?— A. Yes; I think it was this memorandum which I showed him
on my first meeting with him.
Q. This is the one, is it, that he asked to retain to read through?— A. Yes.
Yes ; I think he did retain it.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Did he retain that paper at your first meeting or did you afterward include
it in the papers you allowed him to retain at the second meeting? — A. Well, I'm
not positive on that point, sir. I think that probably I allowed him to keep it
along with the others.
Q. Not at the first meeting, but at the second meeting? — A. Well, he just kept
it after the first meeting and then retained it with the others after the second
meeting. I believe that is what happened, but I can't state for certain.
Q. What is the classification of this document? — A. There is no classification
appearing on document B-35.
Q. But that is a typed copy of a paper which bears the classification of what? —
A. Of secret, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Which document bears the classification secret? — A. The original, sir, which
appears as our document No. 226.
Q. In other words, that was your own classification, Mr. Service? — A. Yes; it
was my own classification.
Q. Would you explain why, having it classified as secret, you allowed Mr. Jaffe
to keep a copy? — A. I'd say the reason probably was that this is in one sense
advance information on issues that were probably going to be discussed and
decisions made at the party congress, the imminent party congress of the Com-
munist Party.
2266 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. When was the congress held? — A. The date of the congress was not defi-
nitely announced ; bnt when I had the interview on April 1 — actually the inter-
view was on March 31 — I say that "Chou En-l'ai twice made pointed remarks to
the effect that it was unfortunate that I could not stay in Yenan another 10 days,
that I would find the stay worth while and interesting. (I took this to be a
hint the party congress is to be convened within that time.)"
We had been expecting the congress to be convened ever since about the 1st of
March. That was the reason first why I had gone to Yenan. They would not
announce a definite date — the reasons they didn't specify, but I understood they
feared there might be Japanese bombings. They feared there might be a Kuo-
mintang fomented disturbance, something of that sort. So the meetings were
to be quiet, without any public announcement. I assumed by late April that the
meetings probably bad already taken place. Actually, we find that they didn't
take place until a little bit later than that, about the 1st of May, possibly,
although I'm not sure — they may have delayed the release of Mao Tse-tung's
speech until the 1st of May, when the meetings were over. But there was every
indication that they would be held within the next few days. And I imagine
that was the only reason for a classification of secret at the time I wrote the
report.
Q. Really, the essence of your answer is that you classified the document
secret on April 1 because it related to an event which was expected to occur
shortly?— A. That's right.
Q. And that by April 10 you believed the event had taken place? — A. April
20 ; yes, I thought it probably had. And it may have — I'm not sure. As far as
I know, the first publicity was put out about the 1st of May, bnt because of the
Communist tactics the congress may well have been over by that time.
(At this point, 11 : 30 a. m., the Board recessed and reconvened at 11 : 38 a. m.)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-36, which consists of seven pages
of photostatic material dated October 0, 1944, subject : American Officer and
Foreign Correspondents Report Active Popular Support of the Eighth Route Army
at Front. Toward the bottom of the first page appears the typewritten words
"John S. Service," followed by certain material prepared by M. A. Casberg. major.
Medical Corps.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mi-. Jaffe the typed copy of
which this is a photostat? — A. No, I did not. This is not written in the same
form in which I submitted my memoranda.
Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this
memorandum and the enclosure? — A. May I hear that question again, sir?
Q. I say, do you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your own personal
copy of this memorandum with the enclosure? — A. I very much doubt it. I
think I did not.
The Chairman. You had a personal copy?
A. I had a personal copy ; yes, sir.
Q. Would you indicate why you doubt that you would have shown him this? —
A. Well, I doubt it mainly because it contains at least an excerpt from Major
Casherg's report. The other material, of course, is mainly by newspaper cor-
respondents and their discussions, accounts of their trips. I have no idea of
what classification was put on Major Casberg's original report.
Q. What classification did you put on yours? — A. I put secret on mine and I
made most of them secret at the time. This report was dated in October, this
report of correspondents.
Q. October of what year? — A. Of 1044. And the material in it had been
written up and made public by the correspondents by the spring of 1045. This
general material had been alluded to by me many times in conversations and
interrogations and in the background talks which 1 had been authorized to give.
Q. But you do not believe you showed your own copy of this memorandum
to Mr. Jaffe?— A. I think I did not.
Q. Now I show you Document B-37, which consists of seven pages of photo-
static reproduction of typewritten material. I ask you whether or not Docu-
ment 15-37 appears to be identical with Document B-36? — A. It does.
The Chaih.max. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of B-36.
Q. So that the discussion relating to B-36 is fully applicable to B-37? — A. That
is correct.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2267
Q. Now I show you Document B-3S, which consists of two pases of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material dated .March 22, 1945, No. 22, and at the
bottom of the second page is the typewritten words "John S. Service." Will the
Board tell us what identification it has for this documenl ?
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typ id original copy.
Q. 1 ask you. Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy of
which this is a photostat? — A. This is not in the form in which 1 prepared my
memorandum.
Q. So that your answer to my question is? — A. No.
Q. Do you think you may have shown to .Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of
this memorandum, Mr. Service?— A. It's quite possible I did: yes. I can't say
for sine, though. It simply lists a number of public appointments of officials
in China.
Q. Do you know what classification you placed on your own memoran-
dum?— A.* Well, the only copy which we have been able to find was the Depart-
ment of State file.
The Chairman. This is your Document No. 224?
A. Yes, sir. The Department has found my original copy and I notice it bears
the typewritten classification, which was my own classification, of secret.
The Chairman. You say they found your report. Is this just as you prepared
it or is it a copy that you are looking at, this Document 224?
A. Document 2l!4 is the original document of my memorandum.
Q. And you typed that yourself? — A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Why did you classify that secret if it just related to public announced
appointments? — A. Well, because it is critical of the generalissimo and of the
Central Government, and it was customary to put a classification on those to
limit their circulation and to restrict attribution. However, it was the type of
material which was discussed for background with the press in China. It was
known to the press.
Q. Would the same critical comments be made by you and through the cor-
respondents?— A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B—39, which consists of two pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, dated October 9, 1944, Report No. 39, bearing
at the bottom of the second page the typewritten words ''John S. Service." Will
the Board give us further identification of this'.'
The Chairman. This is a photostat of the typewritten original.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original,
of which tins is a photostat? — A. I did not. I say that because this is in a
different form from the way I prepared my memoranda.
Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of
this report? — A. I may have, yes. This was exactly the same material which I
had used repeatedly in background talks. The appraisal of the popular support
and strength of the Chinese Communists — it was not American policy. It is
purely an attempt to appraise the strength of the Communists in China.
Mr. Stevens. Does that refer to the populace strength, military strength, or
what?
A. The point was made their military strength depends on the popular support.
Having the popular support they are able to wage guerrilla warfare and are
therefore a military factor. But that was written, of course, in October 1944
and by April 1945 it was old stuff. I myself had probably said that almost
verbatim in my background talks to the IPR twice; I said the same thing to
numerous groups all over official Washington; the same things had been written
by correspondents who had been out in China, and who had traveled through the
country and you will find very much the same material written of course in the
books and articles by the people up there which already appeared by April 1945.
Q. Do you know what classification you placed on this memorandum in October
1944. when you wrote it? — A. I do not have the original or a carbon copy of the
original. I notice the Embassy which transmitted it as an enclosure to Despatch
No. 3191 on November 24, 1944, classified it as secret.
The Chairman. Is that Document No. 192?
A. Yes. it's a part of Document 192.
Q. I show you Document B^40, which consists of three pages of photostatic re-
productions of typewritten material, dated August 29, 1944, Report No. 16, and
bearing the typewritten words at the end "John S. Service."
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 50
2268 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten origi-
nal, of which this is a photostat? — A. No, sir; I'm sure I did not. This is not
exactly in the form in which I prepared my original memorandum.
Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this
memorandum? — A. No, I'm quite sure I did not.
Q. Do you care to indicate why you're sure that you did not? — A. Well, I dis-
cussed the policy considerations and as I went through them and my memoranda
and selected the ones which I thought would be appropriate to let Jaffe see,
I exercised in each case judgment based on the subject matter. And I selected,
to allow him to see, informative, descriptive ones and I eliminated ones which
dealt with policy or recommended policy and, therefore, I think that I did not
allow him to see this one. This one, of the three enclosures to Despatch No. 3018,
which is our Document No. 177 — I don't think I let him see that.
Q. Now I show you Documuent No. B— 41, which consists of three pages of
photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated September 3, 1944, Report
No. 26, and hearing at the bottom of the third page the typewritten words "John
S. Service."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typwritten original,
of which this is a photostat V— A. No, sir, I'm sure I did not. I did not. It's
not in the form in which I prepared my reports.
Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this
memorandum? — A. No, I think I did not.
Q. Your basis for thinking that is what? — A. Well, this again is a memorandum
discussing policy. The subject is a Need for American Policy Toward the Prob-
lems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party.
Q. Now I show you Document B— 42, which consists of six pages of photo-
static reproduction of typewritten material dated August 31, 1944, Report No. 19.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.
Q. At the bottom of the fourth page appears the typewritten words "John S.
Service" and then there follows certain notes relating to a map which accom-
panies this Report No. 19. I ask you whether you ever showed Mr. Jaffe the
typewritten original, of which this is a photostat? — A. No, sir, this is not in the
same form in which I prepared my memorandum. I did not, sir.
Q Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this
memorandum? — A. I doubt very much whether I did. I think I did not.
The Chairman. This is a copy of your document No. what? — A. Our Document
No. 180, sir.
Q. I refer you to Document 180, which is the original of a Despatch No. 3020 ;
the distribution of this despatch to which your Report No. 18 is an enclosure is
shown as follows: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy: Foreign Activity Correlation,
1 copy ; OSS, 2 copies ; Political Files, 1 copy ; and CA, 2 copies. Is that right? —
A. That is correct.
Q. Now I show you Document B-43 which consists of six pages
Mr. Aciiili.es. I'm sorry. Could you repeat the answer on B-42, as to who
you had shown this, whether you had shown Mr. Jaffe your copy of that?
A. I believe I did not.
Q. Document B— 4.*!, which consists of six pages of photostatic reproduction of
typewritten material, dated September 4, 1944, Report No. 22, bearing at the
bottom of the last page the words "John S. Service-' in typewriting.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.
0- I ask you whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original of which
th;s is a photostart, Mr. Service? — A. No, I did not.
Q. Do you think you showed him your personal copy of this memorandum? — A.
It's possible that I might have. The material is entirely of a historical account
or description or account of the development of the New Fourth Army. It is a
type of material which I was using and had used in these background talks. I'm
sure, for instance, that much of the subject matter was mentioned in those talks.
Mr. Achilles Was the information contained in it of military significance at
the time?
A. Well, only a sense that any discussion of the strength of Chinese Communist
armies was of military significance. However, those were claims which they
were advertising to the world as vigorously as they could by every means
available.
The Chairman. This is a copy of your Document 182 and is classified as secret?
A. Yes, sir.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2269
Mr. Achilles. What was the date of this report?
A. My memorandum is dated on September 4. 1!)44. It was transmitted to the
Department by Despatch No. 3058 from Chungking, dated October 13, 1944. The
only copy thai we have at present is an ozalid and it doesn't show the date stamps
of the various divisions in the Department so it's impossible for us to say on
what date it was received in the Department. But I assume it would be in late
October 1944.
Mr. Rhetts. The ozalid, which is our Document 182, shows distribution, does it
not, as follows : MID, 2 copies ; OSS, 2 copies ; ONI, 2 copies ; foreign activity
correlation, 1 copy ; political file, 1 copy ; and CA, 2 copies?
A. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Achilles. It's unfortunate that Mr. Jaffe did not use a date stamp.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B-44, which consists of four pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material dated October 2, 1944, Report No. 37, and
bearing in the middle of the first page the typewritten words "John S. Service,"
followed by material headed "Memorandum."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten
original, of which this is a photostat? — A. I did not. This is not the form in
which I prepared my memorandum.
Q. Do you think you may have given Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of
this memorandum? — A. I quite possibly did. I can't say for certain.
Q. You quite possibly did? — A. Yes, I may have.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. What is the classification of this document which I take it is your Document
No. 190? — A. We do not have my original memorandum, but it was transmitted
to the Department by Chungking's dispatch No. 3094, dated October 25.
Q. 1944? — A. Yes, 1944. The dispatch carries the classification of "confiden-
tial."
Q. Is that probably the classification you gave the original? Is that what
you classified it originally? — A. I assume so, sir; although there is no certainty
on that. The Embassy sometimes raised the classification on my memoranda
but I imagine that "confidential" was probably my original classification.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I show you Document B-45, which consists of seven pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material dated September 10, 1944, Report No. 26,
and bearing at the bottom of the last page the typewritten words "John S.
Service."
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the carbon copy of
which this is a photostat? — A. No, I did not. I did not. It is not in the form
in which I prepared by memorandum.
Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this
memorandum? — A. I may possibly have. I can't say for certain.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. In each case where you say you may have shown him, do you mean that you
may have let him borrow the copy to take home with him, as you have testified in
your statement? — A. That is correct, sir. This is again a descriptive report
based entirely on Communist sources, discussing to some extent the success of
the Communist Party in getting control in the guerrilla areas, their political
methods used, etc. I don't consider it at all complimentary to the Communists.
It's a type of material which was really the backbone of the briefing sessions
in the background talks which I had ijiven on the Communists.
Q. I take it that this is a copy of your Document No. 1S3. What is the classi-
fication of Document 183?
Mr. Rhetts. Document 1S3 is in the hands of the reporter, not this one.
Q. Can you tell from recollection what the classification is, or shall we await
its return? — A. That, if I remember rightly, sir, may have been given a high
classification by the Embassy. I'm only speaking from memory, sir. This was
the only form in which we have the memorandum now, of course, which is as an
enclosure to a dispatch from the Embassy in Chungking. And, as I remember
it. the Embassy made considerable comment on my memorandum. They did not
agree with it entirely. And they may have put a classification of "secret" on it.
I rather imagine that they did. Of course, I had no knowledge of the Embassy
dispatch, and it wasn't until these proceedings when I saw the Embassy dis-
2270 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
patch that I learned that they had not agreed in all respects to agree with my
memorandum.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I show you Document B-46, which consists of four pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material ; the first page is dated Chungking, May
27, 1944, and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typed and
handwritten signature of C. E. Gauss. Attached to this dispatch is a one-page
memorandum bearing the typewritten words: "John S. Service" at the bottom,
followed by two pages of material headed "Summary of new democracy," by
Mao Tse-tung.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of an ozalid copy.
Q. Now, I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the ozalid copy
of this document, of which this is a photostat? — A. I did not. In fact, I have
never seen the ozalid. This is a dispatch prepared by the Embassy, of which I
did not have any knowledge.
Q. Have you ever seen the dispatch or an ozalid copy of it prior to June 6,
1945? — A. I'm sure I never had.
Q. The enclosed material is a copy of a report prepared by you; is it not? —
A. That is correct. It's a copy of a memorandum which I prepared on May
14, 1944.
The Chairman. Does that have a document number?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you think you ever showed to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of your
report, which is attached to this ozalid reproduction of the dispatch? — A. I did
not and I could not have since I did not have in my possession a copy of this
memorandum.
Q. Is there anything on the face of the dispatch here which suggests in any
way what disposition or distribution might have been made of it from the
State Department? — A. I see that the ozalid had on the face the writing "For
background use only. Please return," followed by the initials "FPL." which
I assume are the initials of Frank P. Lockhart, whom I believe at that time was
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs liaison officer with OWL And I might suggest,
therefore, that this was a copy sent from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to
OWI, although that is just pure conjecture.
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that please. This document indicates that it
was lent to someone by Mr. Lockhart and apparently there is no way of ascer-
taining whether or not it was returned to him.
The Chairman. It would indicate, would it not, that it was an OWI copy
at one time?
Mr. Achilles. Owing to the fact that Mr. Lockhart was FE liaison officer with
OWI.
The Chairman. Would that be a fair interpretation of that fact?
A. I suggest it, sir, I think so.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you document B-47, which consists of 4 pages of photostatic
reproductions of typewritten material; the first page is dated Chungking, July
26, 1944, and is No. 2790 and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears
the typewritten words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss." Attached is a 1-page memo-
randum dated July 11, 1944, No. 94, and bears at the bottom the typewritten
words 'John S. Service." The remaining 2 pages of the document are dated
July 3, 1944.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of an ozalid copy, an ozalid copy of the
dispatch with enclosures.
Q. I ask you whether you ever gave Mr. Jaffe the ozalid copy, of which this is
a photostat. Mr. Service? — A. I did not, and I do not believe that I ever saw
the original dispatch or any ozalid of it.
Q. Before now? — A. Before these proceedings, yes.
Q. Do you think you may have ever given Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of
Report No. 94, winch is an attachment to this dispatch? — A. I did not give
him any copy of this and I could not have, since 1 had none in my possession.
<„>. I invite your attention to document 162, which is the original of this dis-
patch. It shows distribution, does it not, as follows: MID. ^ copies; ONI, 1
copy; CA, 2 copies; Foreign Activity Correlation, 1 copy; Political files, 1 copy;
is that correct? — A. That is correct, yes.
Q. It also bears the stamp on the face of it, does it not, of the Division of
Territorial Studies? — A. It does.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYER LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2271
Q. Indicating that the original was distributed to the Division of Territorial
Studies? — A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. Does it indicate in any way that that particular ozalid was
a copy which was furnished to the Division of Territorial Studies? I should
like to examine it. I see a notation on here "Not sent to OWI," with the initials
"FPL."' but 1 sec nothing to indicate whether the particular ozalid copy was in
fact sent to the Division of Territorial Studies.
The Chairman. Is there any indication on there as to whose particular paper
this was?
Mr. Achilles. I see the initials ".TWA." Do you know whose initials those
were? — JWA initials appear on almost all of these dispatches filed in DC/R
and I believe it to be someone in DC/R. You see it here, for instance, on this
stamp '•Division of Communications and Records."
Mr. Achilles. I see nothing that would indicate whose particular copy this
was.
Mr. Stevens. Is it not a fact, Mr. Achilles, that if this was the one in which
the handwriting of JPL was On, it may very well have been the copy that CA had?
,11'L was in CA, was he?
Mr. Rhetts. You mean FPL.
A. FPL was in FE. That is Lockhart.
Mr. Stevens. Would that be a fair interpretation, Mr. Achilles?
Mr. Achilles. It would be hard to say whether it was a FE copy or a CA
copy or whether they both used the same copies. Ordinarily it would be the
original to FE, would it? — A. As I understand it, sir, the original — and I think
we can see that from the stamps on the face of the original dispatch — would be
routed to FE, but none of the ozalids. The ozalids were made up according to
those instructions: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; CA, 2 copies, foreign activity
correlation, 1 copy ; political files, 1 copy. And those ozalids would go only to
those offices and CA then forwarded copies generally to Territorial Studies
perhaps, I'm not sure.
Mr. Rhetts. Well, this particular dispatch indicates that the original one
went to Territorial Studies at some point, does it not? — A. It does.
Mr. Moreland. (Off the record.)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I show you document B-48, which consists of three pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material, bearing the date May 23, 1944, No. 2604,
addressed to the Secretary of State and bearing on the first page the typewritten
words "C. E. Gauss." And attached to
Mr. Achilles. May I interrupt for a moment. Now that we have finished with
the ozalid copies I'd be grateful if Counsel could read as briefly as he reasonably
can the description of the remainder of these documents.
Q. Beginning at the bottom of the first page is the enclosure to the dispatch
dated May 10, 1944, and at the end of the page appears the typewritten words
"John S. Service." Will the Board state what this is?
Mr. Moreland. It is a photostat of typed material.
Q. It is an original typed copy. I ask you if you ever gave Mr. Jaffe the
original typed copy, of which this is a photostat? — A. I did not. I did not
have any copy of my memorandum, which was included there, in my possession.
Q. Did you ever see the dispatch of which this is a copy before June 6, 1945? —
A. To the best of my knowledge, I never did.
Q. Now I show you Document B-49, which is two pages of photostatic repro-
duction of typewritten material bearing the date "Chungking, May 23, 1944." and
bearing at the end the typed and handwritten signature of "C. E. Gauss,"
and I ask the Board what this is?
Mr. Moreland. It is a photostat of an original document.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you ever gave to Mr. Jaffe the original
dispatch, of* which this is a photostat? — A. I did not, definitely. I never saw
the orginal document, as far as I know.
Q. This document. Document B-49, is a copy of the dispatch which was a part
of Document B-4S, is it not? — A. That is correct.
Q. Except it does not also have attached a copy of your memorandum. — A. That
is right. I think it was interesting to note that it was distributed only to CA
and was recei ved in the Department on June 7, 1944.
Questions hy Mr. Achilles :
Q. You say you did not have with you in 1945 your copy, any copies of that
material? — A. I had no copies of that material.
Q. Therefore you could not have given them to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I could not.
2272 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I show you Document B-50, which consists of four pages of photo-
static reproduction of certain typewritten material. The first page is dated
March 23, 1944, and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the type-
written words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss." Attached is a three-page memoran-
dum dated March 20 and bearing at the end the typewritten words "John S.
Service." Will the Board tell us what this is?
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you ever gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy,
of which this is a photostat? — A. I did not.
Q. I direct your attention to the handwriting, which appears in the upper
right-hand corner of the first page of this material, which says "Amerasia,
Criticism on page 2 of Enclosure." Do you recognize that handwriting? — A. No,
sir.
Q. Is it yours? — A. No.
The Chairman. For the record I'll state that that is the handwriting that
has been identified by Mr. Larsen as his own.
Q. Do you think that you may have ever shown or given to Mr. Jaffe your
personal copy of the memorandum which is attached to this dispatch? — A. I
did not, and I could not have, since I did not have any personal copy of that
memorandum.
Q. Now I show you Document B-51, which consists of six pages of photostatic
reproduction of typewritten material. The first page is headed "Joint Intelli-
gence Collection Agency," and part way down the page are the words "V. F.
Mei sling, Major, Infantry, Administrative Officer, JICA/CBI Branch." The
second page bears the reproduction of the signature of Maj. James A. Horan,
AGD, stating that "This document is an excerpt from a confidential report now
on file in the Intelligence Library, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart-
ment, General Staff." The third page is a reproduction of the first page and the
fifth page bears at the bottom the words "John S. Service" in typewriting. The
last page is mostly blank, evidently indicating a map was there, and certain
notes appear at the bottom.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Q. Did you give to Mr. Jaffe the carbon copy of which this is a photostat? —
A. I did not. I have never seen this document and had no copy in my possession
and no copy of my memorandum which is excerpted here.
Q. So that you could not have given Mr. Jaffe this material in any form? — A. I
could not have, and did not.
Q. Now I show you Document B-52, which consists of a large sheaf of papers,
the cover sheet of which is dated October 4, 1944, and indicates that Joseph K.
Dickey, Colonel, GSC, B"orward Echelon, USAF/CBI, is transmitting attached
reports obtained by Mr. John S. Service. These reports include notes of inter-
views furnished to Mr. Service by Guenther Stein, Maurice Votaw, I. Epstein,
among other papers.
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a typed copy.
Q. Mr. Service, I show you now Document B-19, and I ask you whether or not
Document B-52 appears to be identical with Document B-19? — A. It does.
Q. Well, the testimony you gave yesterday with respect to B-19 is in all re-
spects applicable to your testimony with respect to Document B-52? — A. That is
correct.
Q. Document B-52 appears to contain more pages than Document B-19, does
it not? — A. It does.
Q. I suggest the witness be given an opportunity to compare them in some
detail since they are very bulky.
The Chairman. All right. Did I understand Mr. Service to say that among
his personal properties he had only one copy of each document? — A. That is
the best of my recollection, sir.
The Chairman. I notice that the FBI picked up from your residence at the time
of your arrest more than one copy of some of the documents.
Mr. Stevens. Not residence, his office.
A. I cannot explain that. I was i . give: any chance f:> c< :';rm t'.ie list of
material they had found in my desk, but I cannot recollect any instances and can-
not think of any reason why I would have had more than one copy.
The Chairman. I'll have to give you a chance to reflect on your answer to this
question.
(The Board adjourned at 12 : 40 p. m.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2273
TRANSCRirT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service
Date : Friday, June 2, 1950, 2 : 07-5 : 30 p. in.
Place: Room 2254, NS.
Reported by: E. L. Koontz, CS/Reporting.
Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 2 : 07 p. m., Gen. Conrad
E. Snow, chairman, presiding.
Board members present : Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles.
member, Arthur G. Stevens, member.
Also present : Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Appearances: Charles Edward Rhetts, Esq., for Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus,
appearing on behalf of Mr. Service.
(The meeting reconvened at 2 : 07 p. m.)
(Emmanuel S. Laren, called as a witness by the Board, being duly sworn,
continued testifying as follows : )
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now. Mr. Larsen, just after the close of the session 2 days ago I asked you
if you would be good enough to bring with you today a copy of your manuscript
entitled "They Called Me a Spy." Do you have that with you?— A. No; I don't
have it with me.
Q. Do you not any longer have a copy? — A. Yes; I have a copy of it. I sent a
very brief note to my father and asked him to return it immediately.
Q. I see. Your father has your only copy? — A. My father has it. Yes.
Q. And you have requested your father to return it to you? — A. Yes; I have
requested him.
Q. I wonder if you would be good enough to make that available to the Board
when you receive it? — A. Yes; I will, definitely.
Q. I will undertake to see that some copy of it is made so that you will still
have a personal copy. — A. Thank you.
Q. But may we rely on you to supply a copy of that to the Board when you
obtain' it? — A. Yes ; you may rely on me.
Q. Now. Mr. Larsen, do you know Mr. Frank Bielaski? — A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know a man by the name of Brooks? — A. Brooks? No.
Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 100-5.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document 100-5
"(excebpt from congressional record, house, may 22, 1950, p. 7544)
''Mr. Brooks. I do not know. I think there is a man who can possibly cast
some light on that. I think Larson, who was convicted will probably tell all
he knows about it. I have never talked to Larson.
"Mr. Feichax. Is he incarcerated?
"Mr. Brooks. No. He got fined $500. He stopped in Mr. Dondero's office.
He was being blocked from getting another job with the Government. He was
all set to be sent out by the Army, he was set to be sent to the Far East. They
had hired him. The newspapers got hold of that, and with a little publicity they
stopped him.
"I know that he would like to get hack in the Government service. Right
now he is in the humor to tell anything he knows with some reservations. He
is not going to tell what all his own motives were. He can he helpful. He
knows the relationship between Jaffe and Service. Service denies that he knew
Jaffe. Larson said he knew him well. He said Jaffe had something to do
with getting Roth's commission put through. How, I do not know."
Q. I show you, Mr. Larsen, the transcript of certain testimony given by the
House committee on May 10. 1946, and direct your attention to this Document
100-5. — A. Apparently this Mr. Brooks is one of the members of the committee
that questioned me in v.: — no : I will tell you I haven't read — I haven't had time
to read all of this here yet.
Q. I will advise yon that Mr. Brooks was a witness before the committee? —
A. I see. I don't remember meeting any Mr. Brooks.
Q. Although he testified under that committee by the name of Brooks, it
transpired that his name was Frank Bielaski. — A. I see.
2274 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now in this document that I have shown yon, Mr. Brooks or Mr. Bielaski
indicates that he knows you and has knowledge of your desire to testify before
the Hobbs committee and also purports to state that you have particular knowl-
edge of the relationship which existed between Mr. Service and Mr. Jaffe ;
does he not? — A. I don't know anything of that because I don't know Mr. Brooks,
so I can't say what knowledge he had. I had never met him, had nothing to do
with him. As far as this testimony of Mr. Brooks is concerned : "He got fined
.$500" — if that refers to me, that's rigid. "He stopped in Mr. Dondero's office" —
that's right. "He was being blocked from getting another job with the Govern-
ment"— that's right. Do you remember I told you at the last
Q. Yes ; I am referring now particularly to his statement that you were in a
humor to tell anything you know and that you are not going to tell what all
your motives were, but that you do know the relationship between Jaffe and
Service, and that you knew that Service knew Jaffe well. — A. No ; I did not speak
to Mr. Brooks and I did not say that to him.
Q. I want to show you a picture which appeared in the Washington Daily News
for Monday, May 22. — A. I have that clipping.
Q. A picture showing Mr. Bielaski. Do you recognize the man we are discuss-
ing now from that picture? — A. No, sir.
Q. You never saw the man whose picture appears there? — A. Never saw him.
As far as I know I have never seen Mr. Bielaski or the man in this picture here.
Q. I ask that this clipping be introduced as an exhibit.
(Received and marked "Document 328, Exhibit 21, clipping from the Washing-
ton Daily News of Monday, May 22, 1950, showing picture of Mr. Bielaski.")
Q. You are absolutely certain you never saw Mr. Bielaski or talked to him? —
A. To the best of my knowledge I have never seen Mr. Bielaski alias Mr. Brooks.
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that you had personal knowledge that Jaffe knew
Service well? — A. I don't have the testimony of the Hobbs committee, and off-
hand I don't remember whether they asked me that question, but there is a pos-
sibility that I did state the fact that I once saw Mr. Service with Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Now Mr. Brooks testified before the Hobbs committee on May 10, 1946,
and you testified before the Hobbs committee on May 13, 1940? — A. Yes.
Q. 'Did you at any time before your appearance in the Hobbs committee tell
anyone that you had personal knowledge that Mr. Jaffe knew Mr. Service well? —
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Did you, in fact, have any personal knowledge of how well Mr. Jaffe knew
Mr. Service? — A. No; on the contrary, I knew only that I had seen Mr. Service
at that brief moment with Mr. Jaffe in the Statler Hotel lobby, and I have very
carefully pointed that out to everyone who has questioned me.
Q. And you had not further knowledge of any relationship between Jaffe and
Service except your knowledge of seeing them together for that brief moment? —
A. That's right.
Q. Do you know what Mr. Brooks or Bielaski would be referring to when he
stated you were in a humor to tell anything you know, although not what your
motive? were for doing so? — A. No.
Q. Now I believe you also testified before the Hobbs committee on May 13,
1946, is that correct? — A. I am not sure, but I believe that was approximately ■
Q. I refer you to page 7545 of the Congressional Record for May 22, 1950.—
A. I presume they got the date right there?
Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point, Document
100-9a.
The Chairman. It may be done.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document No. 100-9
"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)
" ( I document 100 !)a. p. 754.S :)
"Mr. Larsen. I grew up with (hose boys, and many of them are now big
generals. I went to school with some of them. I know them well, but I can
judge them fairly and impartially, because I am not tied in with them in any
particular way right now. I earn my money from the United States Government.
T do not have to be partial to them, observing them at a distance. So I think
I was much more impartial than these people in the State Department who are
forcing a pro-Communist policy so as to enhance their own little group at the
bead of which I consider Dean Acheson stands as a leader. What his ambi-
tions are. I do not know. I beard be wanted to become Secretary of State and
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2275
President of the United Stales, and that he hopes to do so with the aid of the
liberal element and the CIO and all the people who are making our greatest
miseries right now.
"Mr. Hancock. Did you ever hear him say anything to indicate his feelings,
Dean Acheson?
"Mr. Laesen. I never met Dean Acheson, but in discussing official affairs,
I was a member of the policy committee for China and Manchuria. We often
discussed things which were pooh-poohed as impossible. You could not put that
over. Dean Acheson will never let that go over. Whatever that was, it was
always not in favor of the Communists. He would not allow it to be put over.
I will give you a concrete example. They are afraid of you gentlemen up there.
We know that. We know that in all our policies. We have to not only consider
the public, that is what they say, in America, but we have to consider what
Congress would do to us if we went ahead with this.
"In April and May 1945, we had not invaded Japan yet. It was not known by
anyone except the high command that we were going to invade Japan and not
China. At that time it was all the time speculated upon which part of China
we would invade. South China near Formosa and then fight our way up—
but the geography is against it, or would we invade North China? If we did,
we would come in contact, first, with the Chinese Communists. There was a
good share in the State Department that was all in favdr of arming the Com-
munists. They were so keen on arming the Communists, when they consider
that they were allied with the properly constituted government, I cannot under-
stand : it would be aiding and abetting a regular party, and quite apart from
their sympathies. They should have had a better understanding of the interna-
tional relations and the possibilities. They pursued that policy. I felt day
by day I was being pushed outside a little bit. They went to lunch. They had
their meetings. I was with them at some lunch meetings where they talked
openly about defeating this crowd like Hurley, do everything to get him out.
They sabotaged Hurley. You may take my word for that. They sabotaged
Hurley. I have given certain little notes and evidence to Hurley that I had
committed to memory and helped him with his speech. It was a pity he did
not launch it more systematically. He spoiled that for me.
'• < Document 100-9b, p. 7552 : ) "
Mr. Hancock. Can it be true that Service has been sent out of the country?
Mr. Laksex. Yes. indeed : that is true.
Mr. Hancock. Who would designate him? The Secretary of State?
Mr. Larsex. Dean Acheson, who liked him.
" (Document 100-9c, p. 7553 : )
"Mr. Larsen. I do not care if I never make money in this life. I have never
made any. As a P-6, I got $6,200 a year. I had to entertain Chinese officials.
I have a little girl. I had to dress nicely. I managed to pay $25 a month for a
little piece of property. If I had not bought that, I never would have had any-
thing. These fellows are selfish. I do not believe these men are truly pro-
Communists. I do not think Vincent is really pro-Communist in his heart.
He is just an ambitious person meaning to utilize that at some future date just
like they say Acheson has schemed to use it.
"They have all ganged together. It is a pyramid where he is at the top."
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I draw your attention particularly to your statement — by the way,
your testimony before the Hobbs committee, was that under oath, do you
recall? — A. No; I don't think it was. It was a little — a very friendly little
party. We sat around a small table all in easy chairs. I think we were six or
seven altogether, and just chatter. There was no, as far as I remember — I was
not at a committee testifying in the full sense of a committee being in session.
It was more that they had invited me in to talk it over with me.
Q. They evidently made a transcript of the testimony, did they not? — A. Now,
that, I don't know. I don't remember anyone there taking notes.
Q. Well, the material before you purports to be the questions and answers
recorded at that time, does it not? — A. It appears so; yes.
Q. Now, in that you stated to the committee that the committee could take
your word for that — you state : "You may take my word for that. They
sabotaged Hurley." Now to whom were you referring by "they"? — A. I can't
answer that because I am not sure what the conversation was about. I am read-
ing back here: "You may take my word for that. They sabotaged Hurley." It
is rather incoherent, some of this stuff here.
2276 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Did you intend to refer to Mr. Service as one of the persons, one of the
antecedents of this pronoun "they"? — A. I think that would be unwise for me
to say now, inasmuch as I don't remember the details of this here.
Q. Well, why don't you read it over with some care and see? — A. Yes; I have
read it over.
Q. You have read it over. — A. But there is a possibility that I referred to
Mr. John Carter Vincent and Mr. Service, there is a possibility.
Q. Well, now, will you tell the board what evidence you had that Mr. Service,
or anyone else for that matter, but Mr. Service in particular, sabotaged Hur-
ley?— A. Well, I believe they asked me about Hurley's testimony before the
S nate committee in December 1945, and they asked me whether I had any
knowledge of conversations or other intentions to get rid of Hurley.
Q. Well, on that point there is no indication in that testimony that they
asked you that, is there?— A. I have a feeling that this is written from memory
and I think they should be asked to produce some sort of a statement before
they put this down as legal and dependable testimony. I have not been through
•this, as I said, and I have been advised by an attorney to make no comments
on it, and I think I shall follow that advice.
Q. Well, I ask you again what evidence did you have that Service did, in
fact — well, I will ask you this : Did you or did you not make the statement
that is ascribed to yovi here, namely : "You may take my word for that. They
sabotaged Hurley." A. No; I don't, think I will answer that question for the
simple reason that I don't know for sure. If I had a copy of my testimony —
and I am sure you gentlemen will agree with me — if I had a copy and I was cer-
tain that that was what I said I would say so, I would have to say so. But
I am not certain and I don't want to incriminate myself and make a statement
now about something which does not satisfy me.
Q. All right, let me ask you this : Did you, in fact, all apart from whether
this is or is not an accurate transcript of the testimony you gave — did you, in
fact, have any evidence that Mr. Serv:ce ever sabotaged Hurley? — A. I have no
evidence that he did sabotage Mr. Hurley, but I have a slight indication that
he didn't like Mr. Hurley.
Q. What indication did you have? — A. Well, for instance, he attended a lunch
one time. We went to the Tally-Ho Restaurant. Mr. John Carter Vincent sent
me a note and asked me whether I wanted to go to lunch with him. and I am not
sure whether I walked over with Mr. Service or just with Mr. John Carter Vincent.
But, anyway, we had lunch together and after we had put our trays down Mr.
Vincent mentioned something to the effect that Hurley was making a thorough
ass of himself, and that it was about time we thought of some way of getting
rid of him. I don't remember my exact answer, but I believe I said something
to the effect that, well, I was new in the State Department and I was only a
country specialist, and that I would start to hire and tire ambassadors when I
became Secretary of State.
Mr. Stevens. Let me see. You went to lunch with Mr. Vincent. Who else
was at that lunch?
A. I remember Mr. Service was there. I don't remember whether Mr. Emerson,
■or who it was— some third person went with us.
Mr. Stevens. Have you any idea as to the time? Can you fix a time in there?
A. Sometime in April '45.
Questions by Mr. Riietts :
Q. What did Mr. Service say on that occasion? — A. I don't think he said
anything.
Q. What basis can you have for the conclusion that Mr. Service didn't like
Mr. Hurley? — A. Mr. Hurley had told me that he believed they had worked
against him in the field.
Q. Well, on that occasion, on the occasion of this luncheon, there was nothing
that occurred that led you to believe that Mr. Service didn't like Mr. Hurley? —
A. Except the faci that he was present there.
Q. The fact that he was present at the luncheon at which Mr. Vincent made
this remark? — A. And that I do not remember him making any statement to the
effect that he didn't want to be a party to that.
Q. Did you have any other basis for believing that Mr. Service tried to
sabotage Mr. Hurley? — A. No; I don't remember now any other basis.
Q. Now, you state in the next sentence of this document : "I have given certain
little notes and evidence to Hurley that I had committed to memory and helped
him with his speech." Will you tell us what little notes and evidence you gave
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2277
!.. Mr. Hurley and when? — A. I did not help him in his speech because his speech
was made while I was in Florida.
Q. What speech are you referring to?— A. Well, I am not referring— they are
referring to it, so we might ask them.
Q. "Them", who? — A. The members of the committee who made public this
statement here. That would probably be the best manner of unraveling this
question. ,
Q. Well, did you give certain little notes in evidence which you had com-
mitted to memory to General Hurley?— A. Well, yes, considerably later.
Q. When was that?— A. Oh, it was in December '45. It may have been a week
■or two after the testimony.
Q. Now what was that evidence and notes?— A. That I would have a hard tune
remembering now. Five years is a long time. It is easy to have this pop up, but it
is difficult to remember. * I wouldn't commit myself on it. It would be futile, I
think.
Q. I wonder if you would tell us a little bit more about whatever assistance you
rendered to General Hurley at that time?— A. No other assistance to General
Hurlev. You can be sure of that. You can verify that from General Hurley.
Q. You cannot recall at all now what the notes and evidence was that you gave
to General Hurley? — A. No; maybe he can.
Q. In the next sentence you say here : "It was a pity he" — referring to Gen-
eral Hurley — "did not launch it more systematically. He spoiled that for me."—
A. Yes : I am glad you asked that because I was just going to mention it. It
seems to me that sentence is incomplete as far as I am concerned. It could
not just pop out of me like that. It must have been in answer to questions
posed to me by members of the committee. I presume that they asked me — well,
it has been said to me since exactly those words, so I recall them and I recall
them now: namely, recently by Senator Ferguson: It is too bad that Hurley
went about his business of preferring charges against certain members of the
State Department in a rather headlong manner in 1945. He didn't prepare any-
thing and he simply went before the Senate and made a lot of statements that
consisted mostly of generalities and brought no dispatches or no proof or any-
thing with him* and on the spot he could not even mention a single— I believe
he said "report" or "dispatch" or "incident" to substantiate his charges. Well,
now that same thing I heard before. Mr. Dondero was the first man who was
interested in the Hurley testimony of 1945, and when I first got the volcano
out of Representative Dondero's mind and he settled down to talk to me in a
friendly manner he poured out a long story of what he knew about the case
beginning as of the Hurley testimony.
Q. What case is this you are referring to?— A. The Amerasia case, more popu-
larly known as the State Department espionage case, thereby involving the State
Department, and at that time we talked back and forth probably rather un-
guarded. It was more an enumeration of what we thought one way or another.
I haven't read this here [indicating] and it is possible there will appear evidence
in it when I read it, and it is possible that certain things I have said have been
suppressed ; namely, that I took quite a strong stand to explain that I knew of
no espionage nor of any conspiracy or concerted action or special element in the
State Department that was tolerated as such that General Hurley referred to.
Q. Well, when you say: "It was a pity he did not launch it more syste-
matically" A. it is quite possible I said "it was a pity" for him in the
oriental sense of the word — I am sorry for him that he didn't make it in a
better organized manner.
Q. Well, do you have any reason to believe that had he organized his case
better, that he had a good case to make that he was being sabotaged by Mr.
Service and others? — A. That I don't know.
Q. What did you mean when you said: "He spoiled that for me"? — A. I don't
understand that sentence. That is supposed to be a quotation of my words, but
I don't get that at all.
Q. Well, it suggests it meant that you were very disappointed that General
Hurley was not very successful in his efforts.- — A. I tell you what I will do — I
will go into it very thoroughly. I will take my lawyer and go through this and
have him demand the transcript, or whatever there is, and then I will answer
you on it. I will ask your permission to do that, and, if you will excuse me
then. I will leave today a litle early and go into this matter.
Q. No. I would like to go ahead with some other questions, but I point out to
you that Congressman Hobbs, of Alabama, who introduced this material into
the record has stated that it was a transcript, a verbatim transcript, of the
2278 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
testimony taken before his committee.— A. I don't think there was anyone present
at that time taking a transcript, at least I didn't see anyone. He must have
sat behind a screen then.
Mr. Achilles. There is one sentence on that same page of Congressional
Record that catches my eye, a statement attributed to you : "So I think I was
much more impartial than these people in the State Department who are forc-
ing a pro-Communist policy so as to enhance their own little group at the head
of which I consider Dean Acheson stands as a leader." Do you recall making
that statement?
A. I do not recall that. I think those words are pretty well put together with-
out being direct transcript ; therefore. I prefer not to comment on them.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. If that is an accurate transcript of what you stated before the Hobbs
committee, did you have any actual basis for making such a statement? — A.
I don't think it would be wise to answer that question. I will be my own lawyer
today for the time being until I bring my own attorney in here.
Q. Now, if you will refer to page 7550 of this Congressional Record that is
before you, Mr. Larsen, in column 2 at the top you state that you will supple-
ment your statement "by supplying additional names of persons who were in.
communication with Jaffe." Did you ever supply that additional information to
the Hobbs committee? — A. Which one is that in, column 2, you mean, at the top
there— Mr. Chelf?
Q. At the bottom of column 1 Mr. Chelf says : "I wish you would give us
the names of these fellows from whom he was obtaining this information" and
so forth, and then you state at the top of column 2 : "I will supplement my state-
ment with whatever I can remember on that point. I will do it at once today
when I get home." Did you ever supply that subcommittee with information? —
A. I never went back to the committee. They never sent for me either. I was
there only once and that must be on that date here.
Q. Could you supply to this Board the names of additional persons of whom you
have personal knowledge that Mr. Jaffe was communicating with and obtaining
information from them? — A. Yes ; I could do that. I believe I did that the other
day in the course of questioning.
Q. Is that a complete list so far as your knowledge, the one that you — —
A. Well, let me reiterate the names. I knew from Mr. Jaffe himself that he fre-
quently stayed at the home of John and Wilma Fairbank.
Q. No point in going over it again, if that testimony you gave the other day
was complete. — A. I see. And another one was Benjamin Franklin Raye, and
a third was Michael Lee. I don't think there were any others that I knew of.
Q. Now, I wond.'r if you would explain to the Board again in some detail, Mr.
Larsen, the exact nature of the arrangements that you and Mr. Jaffe made to-
gether after you were introduced to Jaffe by Lieutenant Roth. I believe you tes-
tified in general that you agreed that you would supply him biographical infor-
mation on Chinese personalities, is that correct? — A. That is correct; yes.
Q. And he was to supply you with what? — A. Biographical information on
Chinese personalities.
Q. The same thing. Now what arrangements were made between you on that?
Was Mr. Jaffe to pay you any money for your part of this? — A. No; there
was no question of any payment.
Q. Was the arrangement confined exclusively to exchange of this biographical
information? — A. That is right, exclusively.
Q. Now I believe in your testimony before the Hobbs committee you indicated
that the only kind of information that you did in fact give to Mr. Jaffe was this
type of biographical information on Chinese personalities, is that correct? —
A. I think that's probably correct.
Mr. Rhetts : I will introduce at this point in the transcript Document 100-7 —
7a, 7b, and 7c :
(The matter referred to here follows :)
"Doc. No. 100-7
"(Excerpt from Congressional Record — House May 22, 1950)
"(Doc. 100-7a, p. 7546) :
"Mr. Hancock. Did you remove any of those documents?
"Mr. Larsen. No. I did take home a number of those that contained lists of
personalities, the new Cabinet, and such lists I took home because I would not
waste official time sitting doing it. I spent my time at home.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2279
"Mr. Springer. Did you prepare those cards to ho left in the State Department?
"Mr. Laesen. Yes. I prepared cards both for the Navy and State Departments,
hut I kept my own as a basic tile.
"(Doc. 100-7b, p. 7549:)
"Mr. Fellows. Where did he get it from?
'•.Mr. Larsen. Jaffe trot it from all the contacts he had here. He never got
anything from little personality material that I gave him, he never got anything
else because I have not worked with any other material.
"Mr. Fellows. Jaffe had contacts in
"Mr. Larsen. In every important agency here. In the Office of Strategic
Services, in the War Department, in the Navy Department — remember, I left the
Navy Department September 1944, I went to the State Department.
'•Roth was always with him. He is the man who introduced me to him, Jaffe,
and then tried never to appear with Jaffe when I met him down here.
" (Doe. 100-Tc, p. 7550 : )
"Mr. Hancock. Did you return all of these documents, or did you keep some as
a reference?
"Mr. Larsen. Any list of any personality material or any story of any person,
I took home, if I worked on it at all. Sometimes I would not take it, I would
just make a note and say that so-and-so is connected with the Communist Party. I
found out later he was a member of the Secret Service. Sometimes I went to the
extent of typing them off.
"Mr. Hancock. And would you take all of those papers back?
"Mr. Larsen. Of course. I let him see five documents that I listed one time
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They were fresh in my memory at that
time. He had not returned them to me — they concerned only personalities. He
was to comment on that particular subject."
A. Thereby meaning I remember that I insisted that I had given him no
military and naval information such as is claimed, submarines, position of
Japanese ships, and other items not related.
Q. Well, did you give him any information that was not related exclusively
to material on personalities? — A. No; I don't think so. It was always related
to how exclusively anything relates to or does not relate to personalities, a
very debatable subject. I think we could stay until late tonight and still couldn't
settle that question.
Q. Now, did you supply Mr. Jaffe with any documents originating in de-
partments other than the State Department? — A. No; I don't think so. To the
best of my knowledge, no.
Q. I believe at the time of your arrest a large quantity of documentary
material, classified material, was found in your apartment, was it not? — A. Yes.
That is quite another question.
Q. Did that all relate to personality information? — A. Now it is quite possible
that it did not all relate to personality because I had geographical material there.
I had myself written the geography of Hunan, Kweichow, Yunan, and various
other provinces.
Q. Now in Document 100-7c you are testifying before the Hobbs committee. I
helieve you indicate some five documents, which you say you listed for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and which Mr. Jaffe had not returned to you. —
A. Yes.
Q. Now, were those documents related to this personality information? —
A. Yes.
Q. Now I show you, Mr. Larsen, Document B-2. This is a document which
the Board showed you the other day. It is a photostat of a Report No. 13, of an
ozalid copy of Report No. 13 prepared by Mr. Service, and I want to ask you
whether there is anything in that document that relates to personality infor-
mation?-— . TAfter reading:] The answer is "Yes."
Q. I wonder if you would call attention to what portion of it relates to
personalities? — A. Very important, glad you showed it to me. It was the refusal
of the Soviet Union to enter into a treaty with Sheng Shib-tsai when he asked
for one in the face of growing central government pressure in the early summer
of 1942. He was a warlord.
Q. Now does that cast any light A. Yes, yes, very much.
Q. On this general biography or personality? — A. It is the vital point in his
biography.
Q. Do you know whether you gave this document, the document of which this
is a photostat, to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I don't know; I don't remember, but if I did it
would have referred to that Sheng Shih-tsai problem. The history of Sheng
2280 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Shih-tsai, if I may say, is roughly as follows : He was a Manehurian warlord!
and not a native of Sinkiang. He ran away from Manchuria in 1932 after the
Japanese had taken over. He fought a rear-guard action in Manchuria from
later 1931 to the spring of 1932 together with a general known as Ma Chan-
shan.
Q. Just one minute : Now I would like to show you a document A. Just one-
second, this is important.
Q. It is not important to the history of this proceeding, the history of this
General. — A. Yes : it is. It is important in my answer. Sheng Shih-tsai finally
fled into Siberia and with about 4,000 Manehurian troops worked his way, with
the knowledge and help of the Russian Communists — worked his way over to
Sinkiang, then into Sinkiang with Russian knowledge and agreement, and set
himself up as an independent warlord and governor of Sinkiang Province. Iu
that capacity Sheng kept the authority of the Nationalist Government out of
Sinkiang as much as he could. He was, therefore, one of the last warlords to
openly oppose Sheng and, as such, he was of the greatest interest to all analysts-
in Far Eastern Affairs inasmuch as Sinkiang is a vast territory, was an in-
tegal part of China, and its loss to Russia would mean the beginning of gradual
encroachment on China. Therefore, I follow Sheng Shih-tsai's biographical
career very closely. I probably have more on him tban any other American.
Q. Have you finished? — A. Yes.
Q. Now I would like to show you Document B-l, which is the photostat of
an ozalid copy of a report by Mr. Service report No. 13. I believe you were
shown this day before yesterday and I would like to ask you if there is any
material in that document bearing upon personalities or relative to a biographi-
cal file. — A. [After reading.] I remember reading a report on Mao Tse-tung's
views and Po-Ku's view in this connection. I presume that if I handled this
it certainly had something to do with the personalities mentioned.
Q. Is that the type of document you might have given to Mr. Jaffe as within
the category of personality information that you have described? — A. I would
not have given it to him.
Q. Are you sure you did not'. — A. I am not sine I did not loan it to him or
allow him to see it, but I would not give it to him.
Q. Well, if you allowed him to see it, you did so because it was the type of
personality information that you were exchanging with him? — A. That is right.
Q. In other words, it would be within the category? — A. Let's see the date
on this.
Q. Within the category of information? — A. That's right.
Q. Which you describe as personality information?— A. Correct.
Q. Now I would like to show you Document B-3, which is a photostat of an
ozalid copy of a report prepared by Mr. Service which is No. 15 dated March
16, 1945, and I would like to ask you whetber that memorandum contains any
personality information of the kind that you referred to. — A. [After reading.]
Yes ; it does. It does not mention any personalities but it gives the opposing
views ; namely, the views expressed by the Nationalist Government opposed to
those of the freedom or autonomy leaders of Sinkiang and other northwestern
provinces, but particularly the leader Mahsud who later became Governor of
Sinkiang who was at the back
Mr. Stevens. Is that name mentioned in there, sir?
A. No ; the name is not mentioned.
Questions by Rhetts :
Q. Is that the kind of information you entered on your personality card? —
A. Extracts of it. the essence of the information, because one would hear
milch about a man who stirred up considerable trouble, but it would not
always be easily discernible what his actual policy was. That would then come
out in a general summary or policy statement.
Q. You knew that this related to some individual, even though his name is
not mentioned there? — A. Oh, yes: I would know.
Q. Is that the type of information you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe?— A. An
extraci from that might have been put in Ma Pa-fang's tile, who was the
leader of the Mohammedan group in Kan su and Ch'inghai province.
(). Would this document be the type that you would give to Mr. Jaffe as a
personality document? — A. Not as a type of any document that I would give to
Mr. Jaffe. or loan to him, but it would be typical of a good summary of what
was going on in the northwestern part of China where they had these minority
groups.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2281
Q. You say it was not the typo of document you would give or loan to Mr.
.laiivv — A. It would be the type of document from which I would extract the
salient points whether they were for autonomy, whether they were for con-
tinued union with China, and that type of question.
Q. That is the type of informmation you entered on your own cards? —
A. That's right.
Q. But is it the type of document that you would lend to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I
would say no document is the type of document I would lend because, theoreti-
cally. 1 would not lend any document if I could possibly avoid it. I believe I
explained that very carefully and lengthily last time I was here in my own
defense.
Q. Let's get apart from the theoretical — — A. And I don't see any particular
point in trying to break me down on this question.
(„>. Well, I am trying to find out, Mr. Larsen, is what all is A. Yes, I
Q. All is comprehended within the category that you use in your mind as
A. Yes; I am very willing — —
Q. As personality information. — A. I am very willing to help you and I am
not here in any inimical mood, but I have to protect myself and I have been
warned of Mindszenty methods, namely, of asking me the same question a great
number of times, which eventually would or might involve me in statements that
could be held against me, for instance
Q. Well, I have only a desire to get from you the truth, I don't want to trick
you into any statements. — A. That's right. For instance, last time you pointed
out that I had made certain statements or certain statements were attribued
to me in my article in Plain Talk of October 1946, and you asked me on three oc-
casions, I think — it might have been four — whether I had any authority to men-
tion those occurrences, or those affairs that I had become acquainted writh
through my association with the State Department. Is that right?
Q. I asked you in relation to one document, which was evidently a dispatch
from Ambassador Gauss, relating the conversation with T. Y. Soong. — A. Yes.
Well, I very willingly agreed, and I will repeat, namely, that I had no authority
to mention the State Department affairs in my article. However, you surely
must be sufficiently well versed with the law and the routine matter of self-
defense, and intelligent enough in general to understand that when a man is
accused of being a Communist and being a spy and associating with Communists
and spies, then it is his duty to himself to take everything at his disposal
and place it before the public, because it was before the public that I was tried
principally at that time, to show that he is not a Communist and that he did
not agree with anything that had the least bit of a pro-Communist slant, and.
therefore, and on those grounds I rather willingly agreed at that time to ex-
press some of those views regarding State Department matters which I now
say again should not have gone into an article, should not have been brought
before the public. Do you agree with that point of view?
Q. I understand, Mr. Larsen. — A. It is very serious for me, but not very much
to you. You might be able to build up a legal point on that and my lawyer ad-
vised me they probably are building up a legal point, but then you can go before
a committee and say : "Yes, I put those in the article, and I realize I should not
have put them, but I was fighting for my life there."
Q. Now I would like to showT you another document, Mr. Larsen, which is B-5,
which is a photostatic copy of an ozalid copy of Service Report No. 16, dated
March 17. 1945, and I would like to ask you whether there was any material in
that might be called personality data or biographical data. — A. You showed me
this document last time.
Q. Yes; you were shown that, I think, by General Snow. — A. Yes. [After
reading.] Offhand I don't see any personality material in here, but I do
see references to the Kuomintang's policies on the subject material, namely,
relief and rehabilitation in Communist areas. I know the men of the organ-
ization from the very heginning right up to the end of the story when finally
the Chinese established the collateral to UNRRA, namely, CINRRA, Chinese
National Relief and Rehahilitation, it starts with a C instead of a U. CINRRA
eventually became an organization under Tung Pi-wu, and there was quite a
story on that. I don't care to go into that, but if you want me to I will. It is a
long story.
Q. No. All I am really interested in is finding out whether this document here
appears to have any personality A. Y"es, it does.
Q. Personality information within the meaning of that term as you use it?- — A.
Yes, it does : it does have some. The answer is yes, although it didn't mention
2282 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the personalities here. Involved in this were all the men on the Communist side
from Tung Pi-wu, who handled UNRRA and CINRRA affairs, and all the men
on the Nationalist Chinese side, and all the men in the United States who handled
the UNRRA affairs, the chief of that out there being Benjamin Kizer and Ben-
jamin Ray.
Q. Well, now, is the information in that document the kind of information
that you supplied to Mr. Jaffe as a part of this exhange of personality data? — A.
No, I wouldn't say so.
Q. Do you know whether you have supplied Mr. Jaffe with A. No, I don't
know.
Q. Ozalid copy of that? — A. No, I don't know. I might make a note or two
for my own concerning Chou En-lai — it is the only name mentioned here, but
it is very fleetingly mentioned — "preliminary discussions in Yenan were con-
ducted by Chou En-lai."
Q. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Larsen, is what is the kind of informa-
tion which was comprehended within your arrangement with Mr. Jaffe. Now
if this is personality information, as you use that term, I suppose that this is
the kind of document that you would show or lend to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I think I
see what you mean, and I should answer that quite clearly. Personality mate-
rial in my sense and of value to me in making my cards more than merely a
"Who's Who" would comprise data on the career of a person, his political affilia-
tions, and wherever such affiliations cannot be immediately determined certain
utterances, certain political steps he has taken, which when pieced together
eventually form the complete jigsaw puzzle of his life. Right now no man could
sit down and write the biography of General Snow because they do not know
everything that has happened and they do not know what will happen in the
near future of Mr. Snow. If anyone would have written my biography, let
us say, prior to my arrest. I might have been painted as a very fine fellow and
a very loyal American, but I doubt whether that picture would be painted of me
now, to be quite frank. Therefore, the pieces are put together — I am not the
final compiler of the biography of Mao Tse-tung or any other Chinese. That
will be done by me if I outlive Mao, and by someone else if I should die before
Mao.
Q. Now, is there the name of a single person mentioned in this Document
B-5? — A. Oh, yes, yes, a single and very important person, Chou En-lai. I am
not quibbling, but that was the first indication
Q. Where it says the "preliminary" — —A. First indication that it says there
was top-notch approval of the idea.
Q. Just a minute A. Yes.
Q. Are you referring to the place where it says : "preliminary discussions
were conducted in Yenan under the chairmanship of General Chou En-lai"? — A.
That's right.
Q. Now is that the kind of personality information which you exchanged with
Mr. Jaffe?— A. Yes, sir.
Q. So that you would say that this document is the type of document that
was comprehended within your arrangements with Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, there was
no arrangement with Mr. Jaffe for any document. The answer is "no" to that
last question.
Q. Well, you had an arrangement to exchange information wtih Mr. Jaffe,
did you not? — A. That's right, but not documents.
Q. And you carried out that arrangement by, from time to time, lending him
documents, did you not? — A. No, that was extracurricular.
Q. Well, what do you mean by extracurricular?— A. That was incidental to
the discussion of a certain personality that I made the indiscreet step — I think
I mentioned that last time too — and let us not waste too much time or repetition —
and allowed him to see it, for which I have taken considerable punishment.
Q. Well, can you tell us is this document, or is it not, one which contains the
type of information which you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir, I cannot
answer it that wey. If you soy: Does this document contain information, then
T will answer it "yes."
Q. This document represents an example of the type of personality information
which you were interested in and. I take it. that is correct? — A. That's right.
Q. And I take it that is the type of personality information that Mr. Jaffe
was interested in? — A. Yes. he was.
Q. So that this is the type of document which you might have, as you say, as
an extracurricular incident to your exchange of information supplied to Mr.
Jaffe? — A. I don't remember that I ever showed him this document, I doubt it
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2283
very much. I don't know where lie got this here. This is a State Department
document, isn't it?
Q. Yes. — A. I will tell you I am extremely sorry I cannot answer you exactly
on this. I am not trying to dodge an issue, but I am protecting myself against
tailing into a trap.
'}. Yes. — A. I was warned to curtail this meeting at any moment when I fell
that 1 was about to fall into a trap that might incriminate me, and place me
under double jeopardy and for that reason I shall curtail the interview at 3: 30.
Q. You feel that you are going to be falling into a trap about 3 : 30? — A. Yes, I
do feel on or about 3 : 30 I shall be dangerously exposed since you persist in this
type of question.
Q. Well, do you feel that the type of questions which I am asking you are
unfair to you, sir? — A. Yes. I think, considering that I am here without an
attorney. I realize your point is to gather sufficient evidence to protect Mr.
Service against very serious charges which I myself — and you may put that in
the record and repeat it anywhere and quote me — I do not believe they are true.
I will once more summarize what I have said at the past meeting — that I have
undoubtedly, through questioning and pressure and promises, and through my
personal animosity to Mr. Service, and Mr. John Carter Vincent — that stems from
no personal clash with these two gentlemen, but that was tired within me by a lot
of very poisonous talk that was poured into my ear and poured into my wife's
ear — agreed that these two men were very much against me, and I believe that
as a result of all this I have been extremely unfair to them, and have said many
careless things that I should not have said, and that I will now clearly explain on
the basis of what I believe at that time, and what I believe now of the general
case against Mr. Service; namely, that I do not believe that Mr. Service is a
Communist and I never believed he was a Communist. I did believe at a time
that Mr. Service's reports were slanted very favorably towards the Chinese
Communists, but my voluntary admission, and, mind you, gentlemen, I am not
giving this for your sole pleasure — I have given it to Mr. Dondero, Mr. McCar-
thy, and his assistant, Mr. Ferguson, and the Republican Party's lawyer, I believe
his name is Morris, he called on me once, I have his name here — I have stated
that I cannot got out against Mr. Service. First, I don't know Mr. Service.
I know nothing about Mr. Service except that his reports seem to me slanted
in favor of the Communists and strongly against Chiang Kai-shek, and as an
expert, as they very kindly called me, what did I think of that. I pointed out —
I was fair enough to point out to all of them, although I didn't have to— that I
could very well have been wrong for the simple reason that I sat with my feet
under a desk while he was in the field. I could not certify that that was not
realistic reporting, and I warned them against building the case against Mr.
Service on the Plain Talk magazine because it was not written by me as it is.
It is very easy to change a paragraph and give it a different meaning, to add a
few points, change the tense of a verb and so on. I have come between two very
large wheels, namely, the Republican Party and the Democratic administration;
as Mr. Service does not know— but as my friends all know, who know me — I have
always been a liberal.
I don't know whether I mentioned to you that when I was in China I wrote in
British and Chinese newspapers from time to time against the oppressive,
unequal treaties of extraterritoriality. I had the spirit to write that because I
went with Chinese boys in Cheng chow, and I grew up with them, slept with them,
went and slept with them at their houses. I am not a homosexualism but when
my best friend's father died, then I attended the funeral feast, which lasted
several days, and we slept in the same room and talked about what we would do
for China when we grew up. I have always heen a freedom-loving man, and I
have hated many of the things that I came home here to America to see in the
political life. I have never been a Communist. I can brag about this : that from
the very earliest time I knew something about communism that many others did
not know.
Q. I wonder if I might interrupt, Mr. Larsen? — A. Yes.
Q. I don't mean to be discourteous, but do you care to continue with the ques-
tioning that I would like to ask you? — A. No; I am not trying to filibuster you
out of questioning. If you have an important question to ask, I don't mind
stopping and you make your point.
Q. Well, I have a number of questions I would like to ask you. — A. Well, I
can finish in one minute. The idea, or the reason for telling you this is that I
voluntarily came to the rescue of Mr. Service. I don't want you to think that
anyone put any pressure on me. What revolted me was McCarthy's assistant's
68970 — 50- pt. 2 ol
2284 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
methods — he, himself, was kind enough — I spoke very little to him, and he spoke
so very little to me. But his assistant's methods — he is pulling a raw one on me
right now — I will handle that later. I will handle that personally — Don Surine —
very personally in time. I volunteered by notifying Mr. Peurifoy that I had been
called, and I didn't like the methods used by Mr. McCarthy's assistant, for
which I hold Mr. McCarthy responsible, and I promptly told him that I would
not testify to the detriment of Mr. Service, and I will tell you again my reasons
for this.
Q. I might say, Mr. Larsen, you have already given sufficient testimony by
your article and by your testimony before the Hobbs committee to the detriment
of Mr. Service that would be rather hard to undo except by getting at the facts,
which is what I have been trying to do. — A. I see. You are free to do that legally
in any way you like. However, my reasons, to continue, were two: one, that
I knew nothing for certain bad against Mr. Service. Second, that Mr. Peurifoy
was put on the spot in a very nasty way. I observed the manner in which he
was dragged up there, and the administration was embarrassed.
Q. I don't know A. And I could not forget that Mr. Peurifoy had been the
first one in the United States Government to stand up for me in spite of every-
thing that I had done to embarrass the State Department ; namely, when General
Wedemeyer wanted me to write a report for him he went to work and investigated
me, and Mr. Peurifoy was the first one to give me clearance as far. as not being
a Communist, a traitor, and a disloyal this, that, and the other. The second
one was the old Ma Perkins of the Civil Service who said that there is nothing
against my record in the Civil Service.
The Chairman. What time are you referring to?
A. I am reierring to March 19.
The Chairman. What year?
A. This year, when I immediately went to Mr. Peurifoy. The recommenda-
tion he gave me and the little lift he gave me, I might say, helped in my morale
more than anything else, but I didn't get any job out of it yet — occurred in 1947, I
think it was.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I would like, if possible, to return to this examination, if you would be
willing. — A. I would prefer not to.
Q. 1 would like to ask you to look at this document B-6 which I have before
you. — A. All right, let us have a look at it until 3:30. (After reading.) I don't
remember this report here.
Q. Now what I want to ask you about it is whether it contains any of this
personality information. — A. I only remember in this document a reference to
the statement : "Over a hundred Americans crossing the Japanese-held railways
have been made safe."
Q. Now what I am interested in is not what you remember about it, but in
reading now. — A. That might involve the personality, the rather mysterious
history of young Mr. Hummel, young Dr. Hummel, the son of Arthur W. Hummel,
in the Library of Congress, for whom I worked, and who frequently contacted
me on the matter of where his son was. His son was lost with these Com-
munists for half a year — Mr. Service knows the story much better, I am sure.
And I was interested in the subject, but I don't remember the dispatch itself.
Q. Well, would that be the kind of information that Mr. Jaffe was interested
in? — A. No; I don't think I
Q. Interested in as personality information? — A. No; I don't thing so; I doubt
it very much ; don't remember it.
Q. Do you know whether you gave him that document'.'' — A. I am pretty sure
I didn't.
Q. Well, now, I would like to show you document K-4, which is a photostatic
reproduction of an ozalid of Mr. Service's report No. IS dated March 3, 1945.—
A. Yes ; you showed we that the other day.
Q. General Snow questioned you about it, I believe. — A. Yes.
Q. Now I would like to know whether there is any personality information
in that document. — A. < »n the surface of it. you can state that there is practically
nothing. I don't see any names. However, the Labor problem in Nationalist
China versus Communist China was one of great importance. I am not a
Socialist, but I was interested in the very haphazard manner in which the labor
problem was handled in China. There was no labor party, but there was a
Government Office of Labor. In other words, labor was regimented, and I am
in sympathy with whatever Mr. Service and others reported on that matter.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2285
Then came this dispatch, namely, the counterpart; remember Communist China
was also China. 1 was as much interested in Communist China as in Nationalist
China, and here comes the establishment of unified labor and women's organiza-
tion in Communist areas — it is a question I was very much interested in. The
Nationalists
Q. It will fall in the category of personality information?— A. Yes; it would.
The labor leader Chu is now with the Communists. He was a Nationalist hefore.
lie was one of the first to quit.
Q. Is this the type of information that Mr. Jaffe was interested in? — A. I
think lie might have been interested in certain points in it. I for one knew —
and the State Department did not seem to know — that Chu was a Communist.
As late as 1940 I knew that Chu was a Communist. I knew a woman who knew
him very well and she said he was a Communist.
Q. Do you think you may have given this document to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No; I
don't think so. I doubt it very much.
Q. Why not? — A. Oh, because I think I would be able to extract the bit of vital
information from that better than he would. I don't think he would know the
connection. I wouldn't have any purpose in giving it to him unless I were at the
time giving him a card specifically on labor leader Chu.
Q. Now I want to show you Document 193, which contains Mr. Service's Report
No. 40, dated October 10. 11)40.— A. I think I say that the other day.
Q. I want to ask you whether that type of document contains the personality
information which you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe? — A. I don't think I ever had a
copy of this here. I remember seeing this in the State Department.
Q. Do you think you ever gave a copy of that to Mr. Jaffe? — A. No, sir, I don't
think so.* To the best of my knowledge, I don't think I ever had a copy even at
home of this here. I wish that could be verified from the material. Of course, it
could not be verified. I might have taken it home and taken it back, but I don't
think I ever had a copy of it. It is a very long, very interesting — I looked at it
the last time. There were many things in here that I would have liked to have
known.
Q. Certainly not personality information? — A. Oh, yes.
Q. Personality information as you use it? — A. Oh, yes, yes, sure.
Q. That document would be within the classification of personality information
as you used it? — A. It could — "our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek" — -what do you
suppose that means? It means Chiang Kai-shek's dealings with us, too. [Read-
ing :] "In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American
Democratic" — you mean I should not be interested in that? I certainly was.
Q. Was that the kind of thing Jaffe wanted to exchange with you? — A. I have
no doubt that he would be interested if I had given it to him.
Q. Well, do you know, as a matter of fact, whether or not you did give it to
him? — A. I don't think I gave it to him. I am fairly positive I did not give that
to him. I don't think I ever had a copy of that. I looked at it pretty carefully
the last time I was here, and I glanced over it now again ; no.
Now, Mr. Rhetts, I am not simply trying to run away, but I will tell you I have
been without a job for 5 years — I have my first job right now. 1 am getting about
a hundred dollars a week for an analysis of the Pakistan-Kashmir-India dispute.
There is one article out in Pathfinder this May 31, and I have not delivered as
I should to them, and they have been extremely kind to me, although I understand
they are largely a Republican outfit.
The Chairman. You would like to be excused at this time?
A. I would like to be excused on the grounds that I have been rather vague,
considering that this is confidential — I have been rather vague about where I go
at this time.
The Chairman. In view of your request to the chairman
A. I have simply said: "I am out to testify — some Government committee has
asked me to testify."
The Chairman. For the record, the witness asked to be excused at 3 : 30 when
he came in this afternoon, ami in view of that request the chairman feels obliged
to excuse him if he wishes to go at this time.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Might I ask you a few questions on a different phase of the matter? — A. Yes.
Q. The security regulations in effect in the Department in 1945 have been con-
siderably criticized A. That's right.
Q. Quite possibly with some justification, in the Hobbs committee report and
elsewhere. I believe you had a gold pass at the time? — A. That is right.
2286 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Which entitled you to take out documents without inspection? — A. Yes.
Q. When you had the documents at home what arrangements did you have for
their safeguarding? — A. I had them in a steel cabinet that I bought specially.
I bought it at an auction. I am sure you could pry it open, but it is a very good
steel cabinet. It is just as good as the the one in the State Department that
we had in the policy committee room. In fact, it is a little better. The one
in the State Department — there were no keys for those three or four cabinets, so
with Dr. Blakeslee's permission I personally brought a screwdriver and took
out the whole lock mechanism, took it down to Fourteenth Street, and I think
it was $10 I paid. I was remunerated later. I had three keys made for each
cabinet, and I bought them, and I gave one key to Dr. Blakeslee, one to Dr.
Hugh Barton, and kept one myself, and I will tell you how long I had that key.
I had that key until well after the time that I had been arrested. After I had
been released — in fact, let's not bring us this subject because it isn't good for
the State Department. But after I was released on bail, then I though, uh-uh,
I still have my papers, my personal papers in the cabinet in the State Depart-
ment, and, although I had been arrested, I walked in through the State Depart-
ment, walked upstairs, told Dr. Blakeslee : "Here I am to take my personal
papers" and he said: "All right, go ahead." So I unlocked the cabinet, went
into the lower drawer, took out all the papers that were mine — don't worry, I
didn't take anything that was the Government's — I had, in the colloquial, a
"belly full" of that, so I took strictly my own papers. I had many things there,
I even had my own university document and so on. I took them, while Dr.
Blakeslee was standing near by and working over something, and I said : "Now,
I want to show you." He said : "That's all right." I took it, packed it up,
it was a big bundle [indicating] about like that. I took them and walked
out of the State Department. I surrendered my pass and got a receipt for that.
The Chairman. We don't want to hold you here.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. One or two questions on the same point. When you took documents home
at night, did you bring them here the next day or did you leave them? — A. Some-
times I brought them the next day back to the State Department, the next
morning. There were occasions when I sat up until 1 or 2 o'clock and read
most of that material. My wife got a little bit fed up with me and she said:
"I see you have a lot of stuff here. Don't read that tonight, let's go to a movie."
Well, then one thing and another Saturday and Sunday, and they might have
been at my house a week, then I brought them back. And there were copies,
I must admit. You haven't asked me that question, I want to volunteer that.
There were copies that were marked "retain or destroy" and I had kept copies
of them, just simply kept them in my house Intending sooner or later to make
an entry — but how get around to homework when you have a family and a little
daughter. So they were sort of permanently stuck there. I had some probably
for a year, but they weren't of national, vital interest.
Mr. Rhetts. You understood that entitled — meant you personally "retain or
destroy"?
A. No, I didn't misunderstand it as such, I understood that it meant in my
official capacity to retain it in the office or destroy it, but I'm not the only one.
All the Reserve officers in the Navy Department retained secret-confidential dis-
patches. There would be a hell of an exposure if we put all that out — what was
done during the war. They took copies of everything, they even had the secretary
make copies, if no copies available, and put them in their briefcase and took
them home. On June 8 it was a fairly mild day, there was no cause for fires
in many stoves, but there were lots of fires in Washington, documents were being
destroyed.
Mr. Achilles. Well, I see in the Hobbs committee report, the statement:
"When Larsen was arrested at his home in Washington, D. C, the documents
found in his possession and seized by the FBI included 03 from the files of or
prepared by the State Department, including 14 originals or duplicate originals
and ."> copies of a secret classification."
A. I doubt that. I don't think there were any originals. Originals you were
never allowed to take out, you were never allowed to get your hands on.
Mr. Achilles (reading) :
"Thirteen originals or duplicate originals and three copies of a confidential
classification. One hundred and forty-four from- the files of, or prepared by,
ONI, including seven originals or duplicate originals of a secret classifica-
tion "
A. Yes ; my own work.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2287
Mr. Achilles (reading) :
••And 24 originals or duplicate originals and 3 copies of a confidential classi-
fication; 8 from the files of, or prepared by MID, including 1 secret original
or duplicate original and 1 copy of a secret classification and 2 copies of a
confidential classification; 9 from the files of, or prepared by the War De-
partment, including 2 copies of a secret classification and 3 originals or dupli-
cate originals of a confidential classification; 8 from the files of, or prepared
by. OSS, including 1 original or duplicate original of a confidential classi-
fication."
Could you tell me how you happened to have such an accumulation?
A. I believe I wrote more than 93 documents when I was in Naval Intelli-
gence. I wrote a fortnightly review ; remember I was 9 years there as naval
attache. By simple arithmetic you would arrive at quite a number of dispatches,
hundreds of them, reports; I don't think I kept copies of any of them unless
they dealt with personalities. I made some special points on personality a few
times, reports, and they encouraged me to do that. I kept copies of them. I in-
tended to keep them forever, not for my personal benefit, but in the hope that
one day I cold use them in a higher position. My ambition was to be Chief of
the Biographical Section of the State Department, and I missed the boat. It
was given to two men who knew nothing about it and who after the Amerasia
affair approached me and asked me if the State Department could copy my cards.
First, whether I would sell them the cards; then, whether they could copy
them, and I volunteered the information, and I went to the State Department
and I met Mr. Oss, O-s-s, that's his name, Van Oss. I met Mr. Van Oss out-
side the State Department when I was refused admittance to the State Depart-
ment and gave him personality material from time to time that was vial to
the State Department.
Questions by Mr. Achili.es :
Q. Well, did the security regulations in effect at the time permit people to
keep classified documents outside the Department? — A. No, no; not in general.
I would say the security regulations were maintained in a rather lax manner
and I was myself a contributor to that laxity ; there is no doubt about that
They were much better in ONI. For instance, in ONI I had no such thing
as a gold badge, I had a green badge, all civilians had a green badge. There-
fore, when I wanted to take a document out then I gave it to one of the officers
and he carried it out and when we sat down on the streetcar together he said:
"Here you are, my boy,'' and I took it back the next day or whenever I was
through with it.
Q. But you still had 144 copies of ONI documents at home? — A. Yes; that is
not a very great many considering how many I wrote there. They were not
secret from an American security point of view — whether the Yangtze flows
30 miles or 31 miles from the Mekong and the Salween does not matter much
to this country, it has been no secret for hundreds of thousands of years. That
was the type of material I had; namely, the geographical write-ups, because
this country lacked a complete military geography of China. I collaborated with
the Army men on this type of work. I was loaned by ONI to the Army carto-
graphers, a red-headed man by the name of Metz, M-e-t-z, or something like
that, and we worked together over a period of quite a few years, and I gath-
ered material, sometimes I took all my stuff, took it down, worked on it at
the Navy Department, took it over to the War Department, and carried it back
with me. with photostats and material he had given me.
Q. I think that's all I have to ask.
The Chairman. You wish to retire?
A. I wish to retire because I made an appointment with him and guaranteed
that I would help him look over the final copy that has to be in before 6
o'clock this afternoon. I dare say I can do it in about an hour, but I don't
want him to get desperate.
The Chairman. Let me say again for the record at this point that the wit-
ness appeared voluntarily at the request of the Board, not of the counsel for
. ir. Service, and the purpose of this appearing was not to defend Mr. Service,
but to tell the Board such facts as he knew in the case.
A. That's right.
Mr. Rhetts. I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if the witness will be able to
return. I have not finished with the examination I would like to make of him.
The Chairman. You are entitled to an answer.
A. Yes ; I will return. I have promised you that document and I will return
with that, and I will return for other questioning, if you think it is important
2288 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
to your case. I will not deny you anything that is of vital interest. Your
business is distinct and separate from the Security Board's or Loyalty Board's,
and I will return, but allow me to arrange it by telephone ; I don't know what
will go on tomorrow.
The Chairman. I think at this point we can go off the record.
Mr. Rhetts. I would prefer to stay on the record.
The Chairman. If you like.
A. I have another piece of business. It is no secret. It is a very voluminous
job of 495 pages written by General Modelski, who was military attache for the
Polish Embassy, and he came to this country and immediately got in touch with
General Eisenhower and told him that he had come here as Communist Polish
military attache source to be able to escape from Poland with his family and
work together with the United States Government, and in the course of his story
he tells how he collaborated with this Government and eventually helped the
FBI steal the files of the Polish
The Chairman. I think this material has no business on this record.
A. It does.
Mr. Riietts. I just would like to know when the witness can come back.
A. It does ; it has some bearing. That job is now nearing completion and I have
been promised a fee of $4,000 for it. I haven't had a fee for anything for an
awful long time, so I want to impress upon you gentlemen that my time is
extremely valuable to me. I have done practically nothing during the last few
months but answering phone calls and being interviewed by correspondents and
Loyalty Boards and so on, and I can't stand much more of it.
The Chairman. Therefore, your request is we arrange by telephone for the next
meeting. We will do that.
A. And I will accommodate you to the best of my ability.
The Chairman. That will be done. Thank you very much.
A. Even if Mr. Rhetts should want a private conference with me, that's all
right too.
Mr. Riietts. No ; I would just like to question you further here in connection
with the facts of certain of these matters that were testified to.
A. If I should find it necessary to bring an attorney with me, may I do that?
Mr. Rhetts. It is entirely agreeable to me. I don't know what the disposition
of the Board is.
The Chairman. Of course, you are not under any attack before this Board.
A. No ; I don't like the word "attack." You gentlemen have
The Chairman. What I mean by that, Mr
A. You gentleman have not taken that attitude.
The Chairman. You are not on trial here.
A. No. I feel as if I have been but I may be wrong on that point. I have been
questioned in a much more thoroughgoing way than I have been by the others
because they were not qualified ; therefore, their testimony and their records
are shabby and inaccurate, downright untruthful, and that is the background of
my thorough disgust with all questionings.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you for what you have done.
A. Thank you, sir. I hope I haven't offended you gentlemen in any manner
whatsoever because it has not been intentional.
The Chairman. You certainly have not.
A. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Rhetts. I will get that docu-
ment for you.
(Mr. Emmanuel S. Larsen, having duly testified, left the meeting at this time.)
(After a brief recess the meeting continued as follows :)
The Chairman. All right, proceed, Counsel.
Mr. Rhetts. Now at this point I should like to introduce into the transcript
document 100-12d, which is an excerpt from the testimony of Mr. James Mc-
Inerney, present Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of
the Criminal Division, which was given before the Hobbs committee.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. 100-12
"(Excerpt from Congressional Record — House, May 22, 1950)
"(Doc. 100-12d, p. 755S:)
"Mr. Feighan. What prompted you to arrest Service?
"Mr. Hitchcock. Jim, I think you ought to answer that. I was out of town
on trial when this feature of it broke.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2289
"Mr. Hobbs. You mean on a trial.
"Mr. McInebnet. The evidence on Service was thin. They said there was in
Jaffe's office, as I recall it. copies of his confidential reports. When we arrested,
or made the searches, we found copies of his report. We interviewed Larsen,
and Larsen admitted he had given Service's copies to Jaffe, and Service had not
given them. Service was very much surprised that Jaffe had that report. It
was on that thin allegation that we authorized on Service, and the same way
with Gayn.
-(Doc. 100-12e. p. 7r,r,9:)
'•Mr. Springer. From all of the investigations you made, from your grand-
jury investigation and everything connected with it, do you feel that all of these
secret documents that you came in possession of had come through Larsen?
"Mr. McIxerney. I do not know whether I could go that far.
".Mr. Hitchcock. They did not. Take your FCC, Office of Strategic Service,
or a few of them, the ONI, the BEW, and perhaps one or two others, they
could not have come from Larsen. Larsen was never employed there. He had
no access to them. So far as we know, he had never been near the places.
"Mr. Hancock. I asked that a moment ago. You said these documents were
routed through the State Department.
"Mr. Hitchcock. Some of them, particularly the ONI documents, were routed
to the State Department, and, insofar as they pertained to Chinese affairs,
Larsen would have had access to them from September 1, 1944, not prior to. that.
"Mr. Springer. Have you been able to discover any other person who could
have distributed these documents?
"Mr. Hitchcock. We had two of them before the grand jury. In Gayn's
case, he told us they got them through the area director for area 3, authorizing
this girl or woman in charge of the office to give them to Gayn. We immediately
sent out subpenas for those two people.
"Mr. Fellows. A fine system.
"Mr. Hitchcock. That completely left us stymied. These people were in
position of authority. He said he classified them ad hoc, made no record of it,
and after authorized the handing them out to Gayn.
"Mr. Springer. Did you find anyone that had distributed any of these
documents?
"Mr. Hitchcock. No.
"Mr. McInerney. I might add, at the time of the arrest, we told the agent
who handled these as laboratory documents, to see if we could process a repre-
sentative number of them for fingerprints and try to establish a chain of custody
from the chief of Jaffe. They were all old documents. We came up with no
principal. We did get a couple of prints on some documents we found in Gayn's
apartment. They were Gayn's fingerprints on the OWI stuff. We did not get
any evidence which would assist us in tracing the custody.
"Mr. Hitchcock. You realize that many of these documents, that they refer
to, date to 1936, from there on. That is why I suggested that you may be inter-
ested in seeing them. We have boxes full of them. WTe have all of them, booklets
on health in the Japanese Empire in 1938, for example, completely innocuous,
and negative as regards any national defense character at all. Although there
were some in the later period, referring principally to political matters in China,
one man's judgment might say, when a nation is at war, that political matters
pertain to national defense ; others say it pertains to military operations, or
manufacturing for military purposes or things of that character, those are ques-
tions of fact for the jury.''
Mr. Rhetts. I should also like to offer at this point document No. 324, which
is a mimeographed copy of the release of a "Statement of Robert M. Hitchcock
before the Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee Investigating
the State Department, May 26, 1950," and I should like to read into the tran-
script a paragraph appearing on page 4 of this release as follows : This is
Mr. Hitchcock's testimony (reading) :
"When Jaffe was arrested June 6, 1945, his brief case contained eight ozalids
[copies similar to photostats] of Service's Yenan reports which were clearly
identified as State Department property. Before the grand jury, Service denied
any knowledge of Jaffe having these copies and said there was no reason in
the world why he [Service] would have given them to Jaffe because he could
have given Jaffe his own personal copies.
"Furthermore. Larsen subsequently admitted that he had obtained the ozalids
from the State Department and delivered them to Jaffe. The personal copies
2290 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
which Service admitted lending to Jaffe never were part of the State Department
files."
(Document 324, in full, is as follows :)
324
"Statement of Robert M. Hitchcock Before the Subcommittee of the Foreign
Relations Committee Investigating the State Department, May 2b\ 1950
The first I heard of the Amerasia case was June 7, 1945, the day after the
FBI arrested the six defendants in New York and Washington. I read of it in
the papers. I was assigned to the prosecution of the case about a week later
by Mr. Mclnerney and was assisted by Donald B. Anderson, an attorney in the
Criminal Division, a former FBI special agent, and a former district attorney
and county judge.
"Victor Woerheide, another attorney in the "Criminal Division, also was
assigned to assist. The warrants for the arrest charged conspiracy to violate
the Espionage Act.
"The FBI, in connection with the arrest of Jaffe and Kate Mitchell at the
Amerasia offices, had seized several hundred papers, many of which were clearly
the property of one or more Government agencies, most of them of the State
Department. Many others of the seized papers later were clearly established to
be copies of similar records. The bulk of them were classified, as, for example,
restricted, confidential, secret, etc.
"In Gayn's apartment, when he was arrested, the FBI seized 60 items, of
which 22 were Federal Communications Commission reports or copies pertaining
to interrogation of Japanese prisoners of war. About 20 were typewritten copies
of State Department papers, and 18 were correspondence or papers which were
wholly personal.
"Copies of some of the items found in Gayn's apartment were found in the
Amerasia offices. When Gayn was arrested, he made a statement that he knew
some of the material seized was not generally available to the public.
"He said he intended using it for background and no other reason. When he
was asked where he got it, he said that in some instance he did not recall, and
that in others, as a reputable newspaperman he could not disclose the sources.
"Later, after Gayn had requested permission to appear before the second
grand jury, Anderson and I interviewed him in the presence of his attorney. He
told us that he received the FCC reports from the New York office of the Office
of War Information, that the reports had been lent to him, that many other
reports previously had been lent to him and returned by him and that he had
intended to return those which were seized.
"We asked him from whom he had obtained the reports.
"He told us from or through George Edward Taylor, deputy director of
Area 3, OWI, and from Taylor's subordinate, Elizabeth Downing. While the
case was in progress, Miss Downing married and thereafter was referred to as
Elizabeth Barker. Taylor and Elizabeth Barker were interviewed and corrob-
orated Gayn's story. They were called before the second grand jury and again
corroborated his story.
"Gayn testified before the second grand jury and was no-billed. FBI surveil-
lance showed that Gayn and Jaffe were rather close.
"It further showed that between March 21, 1945, and May 31, 1945, Gayn
met with Jaffe, Roth, and Mitchell separately and together on several occa-
sions. On two occasions he was with Service. Service stayed at Gayn's New
York apartment one night. At most of these meetings still others were present.
Many of the meetings were obviously social. These meetings proved nothing
except mere association.
"These reports of associations, together with the seized documents, made up
the case against Gayn. There was no evidence that Gayn had ever received any
material from any Government employee other than Taylor and Elizabeth
Downing (Barker). Taylor testified that he had authority to release such docu-
ments as were lent to Gayn.
"Gayn was wholly unacquainted with Larsen. Furthermore, those FCC and
OWI reports were somewhat generally available to writers on newspapers and
other publications.
"Gayn appeared before the grand jury in the first week of August. He waived
immunity, testified, and was examined thoroughly and was no-billed.
"Now as t<> the case of John Stewart Service.
"Service was a State Department employee who had spent most of his life
in China. He was loaned to General Stilwell in August, 1913, and remained
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2291
with General Wedemeyer, successor to General Stilwell, until he was recalled
through Genera] Hurley in April 19-15.
• When he was arrested, the FBI obtained from him a written statement. In
it he slated that, alter he was assigned to the Army, he was engaged in general
political reporting, consisting mostly of interviews with Chinese Leaders. His
reports, he stated, went to the Commander in Chief of the United States forces
in China and the United States Embassy at Chungking. He stated that he kept
a opy for himself with the full knowledge of the Enihassy and Army head-
quarters.
'In March 1045, he stated, he was sent to Tenan, the headquarters of the
Chinese Communists who were holding a party congress, and made further
reports, largely of conversations with Chinese Communist leaders.
'•These reports, he stated, were distributed in the same fashion and in addi-
tion a copy was 1 nought back to the State Department. When he left China
in April 1945, he claimed he had permission from the adjutant general at Chung-
king to bring back his personal files and copies of his reports, which he kept
in his own desk in the State Department.
•Service stated that he met Jaffe for the first time on April 19, 1945, and
that they were introduced by Roth. He said that he knew Jaffe was the editor
of Amerasia and assumed that Jaffe wanted to learn the latest news from China.
He took along his personal copy of the report of a conversation with Mao-tse-
tung, chairman of the central committee of the Chinese Communists. This con-
versation took place March 31, 1945, at Yenan and in it Mao-tse-tung detailed
the policies expected to be adopted by the Party Congress.
"Jaffe showed deep interest and asked if he had any other reports, Service
stated. He explained that as he regarded them as simply "reportorial" and
not involving United States policy, or affecting United States security, he
supplied Jaffe the next day with more of his personal copies.
"Jaffe said he did not have time to read the reports and asked if he could take
them to New York. Service consented, saying that he was going to New York
the next week and could pick them up then.
"Service did go to New York and stayed at the Gayn apartment. He stated
that he had first met Gayn April 18, 1945, but that he had previously had some
correspondence with Gayn and that he had gone to college with Gayn's brother.
•< hi April 2o, Service stated, he failed at the Amerasia office and picked up the
reports that he had lent to Jaffe on April 19 and 20. He added that Jaffe was
in Washington May 3 and that he communicated with Service and said he would
like to get a copy of the FCC monitored report of a broadcast of Mao Tse-tung's
recent speech at the party congress.
"Service said he took Jaffe to the State Department, obtained permission, got
a copy of the broadcast and gave it to Jaffe at the State Department. Later in
the day, a corrected version came in. several copies were run off and one was
given to Service. When he left his office, he said, he went to Jaffe's hotel, gave
him the copy and left.
"In the filing cabinets in her office — to which Jaffe had the keys — there were
many items of Government origin. These were indexed in about 18 separate
folders. The captions were in Kate Mitchell's handwriting or printing. Some
of these were :
" 'Chinese Claims in Burma ; Japanese Who's Who (Military and Diplomatic) ;
War Prisoners' Comments; Kuomintang-Communist Relations; Chinese Com-
munist Party; Sinkiang (Sino-Soviet Rel.) ; Interviews With Returned Visitors
to China and Japan.'
"In addition to the presence of Kate Mitchell at places where other subjects
were present, as already mentioned in connection with Gayn and Service, she
was with Jaffe on many occasions, both at the Amerasia offices and at their
respective homes.
"One of these was of significance. On May 5, 1945, Kate Mitchell went by
automobile with Jaffe to Mrs. Blumenthal's home in the Bronx. Jaffe went in
alone. He came out about a quarter hour later with a large envelope. Jaffe
let Miss Mitchell out near the Amerasia offices and she went into the building
with the envelope. Mrs. Blumenthal testified before the grand jury that she
had typed for Jaffe copies of Government documents.
"When Miss Mitchell was arrested, she admitted that she had. or could have
had. access to the various files and cabinets in the Amerasia offices where Gov-
ernment documents were found. When arrested, she initialed some documents
and said that she knew the source of them but refused to divulge it. Later she
told us and the grand jury that it was her understanding that Jaffe obtained
them from Larsen.
2292 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"There was no evidence that she ever received a single document from any
Government employee or from Gayn. She was not in Washington during 1945
at any time prior to her arrest.
"She signed a waiver of immunity, testified before the grand jury, was
thoroughly examined, and she was no-billed.
"Now as to the case of Roth.
"When the arrests were made in the Amerasia offices on June 6 the FBI agents
found a copy made on Roth's typewriter of a letter dated March 3, 1943.
"The letter was from William Phillips on a letterhead which read : "Office of
the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, New Delhi,
India.' It was addressed to the Secretary of State and it enclosed a copy of
a letter of the same date to President Roosevelt. The subject was the conflict-
ing British and Indian points of view and the possibility of Indian freedom after
the war, and it suggested a solution to the then present impasse as a 'step in
furthering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.'
"The agents also found two letters in Roth's handwriting on plain stationery.
The date line of one was 'American Mission, New Delhi, January 21, 1944.' This
letter was addressed to the Secretary of State and was signed 'Merrell.' It
contained a summary of political comment in the Indian press for the week
ended January 15, 1944. The other letter had an identical source and addressee.
It was dated March 14, 1944, and contained reports on the vote of the Central
Legislative Assembly on March 13, 1944, passing a motion, 50-48, calling for a
reduction in the budget.
"They also found in Roth's handwriting, on Hotel Statler stationery, a copy
of a letter bearing the date line 'American Mission, New Delhi, February 4, 1944.'
"It was addressed to the Secretary of State and was signed 'Merrell.' It re-
referred to a resolution passed by an informal conference of Congress members
of the Madras Legislature and made comments on it.
"They also found two sheets of plain stationery in Roth's handwriting with
the date line 'Bombay, August 11, 1944, Subject : Congress socialist reaction
to Mr. Gandhi's recent political moves.' It was signed 'George D. Lamont,
American Consul.'
"In addition to associations and meetings previously mentioned, there were
some meetings in Washington between Roth and Jaffe, between Roth and Larsen.
and between Roth, Jaffe, and Larsen. Two of these had some significance.
"On March 21, 1945, Jaffe and Roth drove to a parking lot at the Library of
Congress in Roth's car. They remained there about 25 minutes, talking and
examining papers. They then went into the Library of Congress. After a few
minutes, they came out, got back in Roth's car and drove to Roth's home in
Arlington, Va.
"In addition, Roth introduced both Service and Larsen to Jaffe.
"The items of documentary evidence, as I have mentioned, were not of recent
date, were innocuous in content, and there was no evidence as to who first
secured copies from the State Department or where Roth got them. The ones
on Hotel Statler stationery indicated that Roth may have obtained them from
Jaffe, rather than Jaffe from Roth. Moreover, Roth never worked at the State
Department and had no access to the files of the State Department.
"In addition, Roth published a book, Dilemma in Japan, in the summer of 1945
and, when he was arrested, he said it was the manuscript of that book that he
and Jaffe had at the Library of Congress.
"In addition, Roth was never observed giving to or receiving from any of the
subjects in the case any material of any kind.
"Both Larsen and Roth were at one time employed by the Office of Naval
Intelligence. Larsen transferred to the State Department August 31, 1944.
Not a single ONI document or copy after that date was recovered from any
of the subjects. Approximately 50 ONI-source items were recovered at the
Amerasia offices. Larsen had more than 100 such items in his apartment when
he was arrested.
"After Jaffe and Larsen entered their pleas, I interviewed them both in the hope
of making a case with which we could go to trial against Roth.
"Larsen, who manifested considerable animosity toward Roth and manifested
no desire to protect him, could tell us not one thing detrimental to Roth that
would assist us in prosecuting. Jaffe completely exonerated Roth. Jaffe was a
close friend of Roth and may well have lied to me. However, the point is that
we got nothing from either Jaffe or Larsen.
"We nolle prossed the indictment as to Roth on February 15, 1946. We had to
do something then because Roth's attorneys had secured an order requiring us
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2293
to supply a bill of particulars of the case against Roth, and we were ordered
to proceed to trial.
"It was ruy opinion then, and it is my opinion now, that we had no case against
Roth with which we could have gone to trial with the slightest likelihood of
success.
"On January 23, 1946, I wrote the FRI, reviewing all the evidence against
Roth and stating that it was the opinion of all the attorneys who had worked
on the case that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a trial and that a nolle
presequi should be entered. I asked their opinion as to the proposed disposition.
On January 28, the FBI replied in substance that it had no recommendation and,
entirely properly, assigning as the reason that it was entirely within the province
of the Department of Justice to make such decisions.
■•Roth did not appear before the grand jury. The grand jury voted 13 to 7 to
indict him. Twelve votes are necessary to indict.
"The proceeding before the grand jury disclosed that many documents were
declassified for the purpose of releasing the information, although the documents
on their face did not show that they had been declassified.
"In many instances no record was kept as to what documents had been de-
classified. One Government officer testified that ad hoc declassifications were
made. Many of these documents had wide circulation. By that I mean that
many duplicates were made — in one instance I recall 500— and distributed to
various agencies.
"In this connection we were unable to determine in many instances from just
what agency the seized document had been taken and in some instances it was not
possible to determine whether or not any copies were missing from agencies to
which copies had been routed.
"Testimony before the grand jury showed that classifications were not stand-
ardized. Usually this writer in a foreign country made the classification.
In part, this was governed by his desire to have the matter transmitted, for
example, by wire or plane, because top classifications had precedence.
"Apart from the records of the ONI and the State Department, where Larsen
and Roth were employed, we were at a complete loss to ascribe to any of the
subjects arrested the removal of records from the Office of Strategic Services,
the Military Intelligence Division or the Bureau of Economic Warfare, for
example.
"Several hundred documents were recovered in the Amerasia offices and
Larsen's apartment when Jaffe and Larsen were arrested. Part of them showed
clearly that they were the property of various Government agencies. Part
clearly were established as being copies of documents originating in various
Government agencies. Most of them were from the State Department. Some of
these seized at the Amerasia offices had notations in Larsen's handwriting. Some
bore his fingerprints.
"I never had the slightest doubt that if we could use these documents and
copies in evidence at a trial, we had a better than good case against Jaffe
and Larsen.
"The New York defendants, Kate Mitchell, Jaffe, and Gayn, after their arrest
demanded hearings before a United States commissioner, and by law they were
entitled to them.
"We did not want to present our evidence at that time in a public hearing
because the tremendous work of tracing those documents back to their sources
had by no means been completed, because of our disappointment that incrimi-
nating statements had not been made by the defendants when they were arrested,
and because we did not want to show how little or how much we had against
any defendant.
"To avoid preliminary hearings we decided to present what we had to a grand
jury just as quickly as possible. This was done, as I recall, on June 21, 1945.
"About that time the attorneys representing the various defendants com-
municated with us and asked for a conference.
"The matter was discussed by Mr. Clark, Mr. Mclnerney and myself, and we
mutually agreed that they should have the opportunity of conferring with us.
"I have never known an instance where such a request was made by reputable
attorneys in or out of Government service and was denied.
"The conference was arranged for June 27, 1945, as I recall. The attorneys
representing the defendants were there. The assistant attorney general in charge
of the- criminal division (Mr. Clark), Mr. Mclnerney, Mr. Woerheide and I were
present.
2294 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"The defense attorneys made the claim that their clients had done nothing more
than was the general practice, in that magazines, newspapers, radio commentators
and columnists were constantly obtaining information from people in various
Government agencies and that, this being so, if any agency was going to put a
stop to the practice, there should be some warning short of prosecution.
"In this connection they argued that their clients were beinn' discriminated
against, in fact they claimed that their clients were being persecuted because
they disagreed with the State Department policy relative to the Far East, par-
ticularly China.
"The claim was made that these defendants had done no more than many
reputable writers were doing and had been doing in the past. They asserted
that a great injustice had been clone to their clients by arrest and the Nation-
wide publicity attendant on the arrests. They argued that a further great injus-
tice would be done if indictments were returned upon which convictions could
not be obtained.
"The defense attorneys insisted that the information in many of the seized
documents already had been published in whole or in part in many publications.
"They pleaded with us to look into the matter further and in connection with
their claim of the innocence of their clients, they reminded us of our obligation
to protect the innocent as well as to punish the guilty.
"The suggestion was made that if the grand jury then considering the case
voted to indict any or all of the defendants, a sealed indictment might be reported,
which would mean that there would be no immediate publicity on the indictment.
Attorneys representing some defendants strenuously objected to this on the
ground that even a sealed indictment would have to be opened sometime.
"In addition, one of the attorneys stated that he wanted to request that the
grand jury permit his client to waive immunity and testify. Such requests are
invariably granted, for it gives the prosecutor an opportunity to thoroughly
question a defendant under oath without defense counsel being present and
therefore without objections to questions. This procedure has at times resulted
in making a strong case of a weak one.
"The grand jury considering the case was due to terminate its work July 2,
and Mr. Clark, Mr. Mclnerney and I discussed the matter in full detail and
mutually, without any disagreement, arrived at the conclusion that every
defendant, through his attorney, should be advised that if he so desired, he
would be permitted to testify before the grand jury on signing a waiver of
immunity.
"We further mutually and without any disagreement arrived at the conclusion
that we would either wait until the latter part of July, when the next grand
jury would be in session, or would obtain an order extending the life of the
grand jury then in session another month or 6 weeks, and that we would leave
it to the grand jury as to which it preferred. This was done, and the case was
withdrawn from that grand jury.
"In connection with this conference on June 27, we obtained the assurance
of the defense attorneys that they would not insist on preliminary hearings and
would produce their clients, if they decided to have them appear before the
grand jury, for examination by us at the Department of Justice before their
grand jury appearances.
"Kate Mitchell's attorneys formally requested that she be permitted to go
before the grand jury and agreed that she would sign a waiver of immunity. We
notified every other attorney that such a request had been made by one of
the defendants and that if, under the same conditions, their clients wanted
to waive immunity and testify before the grand jury, they would have the same
opportunity.
"In addition to Kate Mitchell's request, such a request was made in behalf
of Gayn, Service, and Jaffe. As to I. arson and Roth, one of them declined
and the other did not reply. Which was which I don't remember.
"Jaffe's attorney later withdrew his request. Later in July. Mr. Anderson
and I interviewed, at the Department of Justice. Gayn, Kate Mitchell, and
Service. They were interviewed separately and on more than one occasion,
always in the presence of their counsel.
"The second grand jury heard testimony for approximately 1 week. As I
recall, it started on July ,10 or 31 and continued until August 8.
"Every hit of evidence we had, including every document seized, was sub-
mitted to that grand jury. We presented all that was presented on the one day
to the first grand jury and, in addition, all that had been developed since that
day.
STATE DEPARTMEM EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2295
"Roth was indicted by a vote of 13 to 7. Jaffe and Larsen were indicted
14 to t>.
'•The House Judiciary Subcommittee report in 1946 stated :
"•The cases were ably presented before. the grand jury, but the net result of
months of hard work was indictment of only 3 of the 6 accused, and in no case
was the Government able to muster more than 14 of the 20 votes of the grand
jurors.'
"Between March and June 6, the investigators had made several entries, not
during office hours in the offices of Amerasia. These, of course, were without
the permission and without the knowledge of Jaffe and Kate Mitchell.
"'The investigators had also entered the apartment of Larsen and during the
same period, surveillance of office and home telephones was maintained.
"Nothing is clearer under Federal law than that evidence secured as a result
of illegal searches will be suppressed upon the application of those whose con-
stitutional right to the privacy of their homes, their persons and their effects
has been violated.
•Moreover, evidence obtained as the result of leads secured in this manner
will be suppressed.
"We knew that once the story broke, Jaffe's counsel would undoubtedly con-
clude that similar entry had been made into the Amerasia offices. We had not
the slightest doubt that similar motions would be made to suppress everything
seized June 6 at the Amerasia offices.
".Mr. Mclnerney and I realized that the Amerasia case as regards successful
prosecution was collapsing. We concluded that the only thing to do to save
what could be saved, which was the result of at least 6 months' difficult and
careful work by the FBI and more than 3 months' work by attorneys in the
Criminal Division, was to see if Mr. Arent would agree that Jaffe plead guilty
to the indictment upon the best terms the Government could get. Mr. Mclnerney
called Mr. Arent and asked him to come over to the Department.
•"In the meantime, we decided that we were under no obligations to tell Mr.
Arent either that the motion papers had been served and filed by Larsen's attorney
or that any searches without legal process had been made at the Amerasia offices
prior to June 6.
"When Arent arrived we told him we had further considered his previous
offers to plead Jaffe and asked if he had anything further in mind.
"He repeated the arguments made on June 27. He further argued that Jaffe's
wife was seriously ill and could get no better while this case was pending.
"After considerable discussion, he said that Jaffe would plead guilty if the
Department would recommend a fine and no jail sentence.
"We asked him if he had the authority to make a commitment to that effect
and he assured us that he had the necessary authority. We told him that we
would recommend acceptance of a plea of guilty and would recommend a sub-
stantial fine and no jail sentence.
"We asked if this was a firm commitment which under no circumstances would
be withdrawn. He said that it was. He also said that he insisted that our
recommendation as to the the fine would not be perfunctory, but made in good
faith to the court, with a genuine effort on our part to have the court follow
our recommendation.
"We gave him that assurance, and we then asked him when he could get
Jaffe down from New York City to enter the plea. He said he would do it any
time we could arrange it. We asked if he could have Jaffe down the following
morning for that purpose. He said he could.
'Mr. Mclnerney then called the district court and ascertained that Judge
Proctor would be available the following morning, which was a Saturday.
"We concluded these arrangements in this manner because we did not want
Mr. Arent to leave our office unless and until all arrangements had been com-
pleted, because he knew that once he left the office he would read in the news
papers that Larsen had filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from him.
"In other words, we did everything possible within our powers to insure that
there would be no withdrawal by Mr. Arent of commitments made with respect
to Jaffe.
"The next morning, Jaffe appeared in court. Mr. Arent in substance implied
that Mr. Mclnerney and I had maneuvered him into pleading Jaffe guilty whereas,,
had he known of the Larsen motion, he never would have done so.
"We asked him if he was going to keep his word. He said that he was and
that he certainly expected we were going to keep ours as regards doing every-
thing in our power to have the sentence consist of a fine.
2296 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"We secured adjournments of Larsen's motion. We took the position that
legally we had enough evidence that had been secured from the Amerasia offices
to make a case against Larsen.
"While Larsen might successfully suppress evidence taken from his own
apartment on the claim that his constitutional rights had been violated, he had
no standing in court to make any complaint as to the method by which the Gov-
ernment secured documents seized at the Amerasia offices. And Jaffe's plea of
guilty was assurance that no motion would be made by him.
"By that I mean that it is only the person whose constitutional right to pri-
vacy has been violated who has any standing to assert his rights successfully.
Consequently, we felt there was enough in the documents seized at the Amerasia
offices, some of which hau Larsen's handwriting on them and some of which bore
his fingerprints, to warrant the belief that we had a fair chance to secure a guilty
verdict against Larsen.
"After prolonged negotiation with Larsen's attorney, we agreed to recommend
that the court accept a plea of nolo contendere and to recommend a small fine.
"We agreed to do this because our case was not what could be termed a strong
case, but primarily because Jaffe was the principal figure in the case and he had
corrupted Larsen. We felt that Larsen should not receive as much punishment
as Jaffe. Moreover, Larsen had been discharged from the State Department in
the meantime, was out of a job, and had few prospects of getting a job.
"I have never believed that Jaffe's sentence was adequate for what he did. I
know that had we not disposed of Jaffe's case as we did, there would have been
no conviction of Jaffe and, of course, no punishment, even to the extent of a tine.
"That same House Judiciary Report in 1946 stated :
" 'After a most painstaking study we certify that there is no evidence, nor
hint, justifying adverse criticism of either grand jury, any prosecuting attorney,
FBI, judicial, or other official.'
"There was not the slightest connection between the Amerasia case and my
association with my present firm. On the last day of 1946, Lyman M. Bass made
an appointment to meet me. My family and I then resided at Dunkirk, some 45
miles from Buffalo. The courts were flooded at that time with portal-to-portal
suits, and he asked me if I would be interested in coming with his firm to handle
them. I said that I would, and on January 2, 1947, I agreed to come, and on
January 24 did come into the firm.
"On January 2, 1947, Mr. Bass introduced me to various members of the firm.
I can't remember whether Mr. Mitchell was there that day or not, but if he
was, that was the first time I met him. I repeat that there was no connection
of any character between me and my present firm or between me or any member
of my present firm while the Amerasia cases were being processed, and for a
period of fully 1 year and 4 months after the grand jury refused to indict Miss
Mitchell."
(Mr. John S. Service, called as a witness in his own behalf, being duly sworn,
continued testifying as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, will you take the stand? Now, Mr. Service, you have
just testified concerning a series of documents Nos. B-l through B-."»2, and yon
have identified several of those documents as being copies of memoranda of yours
which you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe, although you have stated you have no
present recollection concerning them. Will you tell the Board whether you ever
loaned or gave or otherwise showed Mr. Jaffe any other classified Government
documents? — A. Well, I would say, sir, that I never gave or showed Mr. Jaffe
any classified Government documents. I never showed him at any time any. dis-
patch, telegram, or memoranda prepared in the Embassy or prepared in the
headquarters or prepared by anyone other than myself.
Q. In other words, apart from your personal copies of your memoranda you\
never showed Mr. Jaffe any document of any kind whatsoever? — A. That's
correct.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Well, just a minute, there was one case, one incident that I think you
told about in your statement where you assisted him to procure under author-
ity a document, I'm not sure whether it was classified or not. I refer to a
document that you assisted him to get from CA. — A. Sir, my recollection of that
incident is that he wanted this report of a broadcast.
Q. By Mao Tse-tung?— A. By Mao Tse-tung; and I took Mr. Jaffe to the
Division of Chinese Affairs, introduced him to the office and my recollection is
that the officer handed the paper to him.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION* 2297
Q. Yes: Mini then you afterward took a revised copy to him? — A. Yes, sir. I
don't believe that was a classified document. It was a report of a news broad-
cast I didn't think it came within the bounds of the original question.
Q. Now, have you recognized that paper anywhere among the papers found
in Mr. Jaffe's possession V — A. It was not in those papers about which I was
questioned this morning, sir. It would not be a Service report in any way.
Q. No.
Questions by Mr. Achilles:
Q. Did you say that you had never given him copies of any classified Govern-
ment documents'? My question is prompted by the fact that your own copies of
classified documents were in that sense classified Government documents. —
A. Well, I was trying to make a distinction between my personal memoranda
and a dispatch or an Army report transmitting — commenting upon, agreeing, or
disagreeing or evaluating my memoranda, and that's why I went into detail
to say that I had never shown him a dispatch coming from the Embassy or any
paper originating in the State Department or any paper originating or bearing
any official Army classification or term.
The Chairman. The classified papers that you did give him were all classifi-
cations put on those papers by you yourself?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. Did those include copies of any other of your own memoranda
other than those about which you were questioned this morninlg?
A. If I understand your question correctly, sir, you are asking if I may have
shown Mr. Jaffe some of my personal copies of memoranda about which I was
not questioned this morning?
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
A. Well, it would take some time to review a complete list of my memoranda.
I don't even have a complete list of my memoranda. I do not recall that I handed
Mr. Jaffe any memoranda other than those about which I was questioned this
morning. But so far as I know there is nowhere in existence, except possibly
in the list of materials found in my desk, and even that is not absolutely com-
plete. I don't have any list of all my memoranda.
Mr. Stevens. The list found in your desk, sir, did not include the ones you
prepared other than in Yenan, did it?
A. No ; it did not ; and I did not show Mr. Jaffe any memoranda other than
personal copies which I prepared in Yenan because I did not have any copies
other than Yenan.
Mr. Achilles. Then, so far as you know, you did not show him copies of any
other of your memoranda than those about which you were questioned this
morning?
A. That's correct, sir, so far as I know. I can't answer the question with
absolute definiteness because I can't remember with any certainty exactly what
I showed him beyond one single paper. If I did show him anything else he
apparently, shall i say, did not consider it of sufficient interest to make a copy.
We might assume that.
Mr. Achilles. That's all I have now. I may wish to come back to that later
because it is naturally relevant; that is, we are interested in ascertaining as
nearly as we can exactly which reports you did show him.
A. Quite, sir.
Mr. Stevens. And those, according to the records you had, would relate to the
ones you prepared at Yenan. You did not have other than those in your per-
sonal files?
A. As far as I remember, I had no copies of other memoranda other than the
ones I prepared at Yenan and I think I mentioned this point before: I had
copies of the several memoranda I had prepared at Chungking in January or
February of 1945 before I went to Yenan. In other words, I had for 1944 the
Yenan series, and for 1945 the complete or very nearly complete series which
included eight or nine which I prepared in Chungking before I went to Yenan.
Is that clear, sir?
Mr. Stevens. Yes.
A. We have been speaking generally of all the 1945 memoranda as Yenan
memoranda, and technically there were eight or nine prepared before I went to
Yenan.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
2298 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
four sheets, and includes various sections of an address by Mao Tse-tung, which
that is? — A. Well, it is not labeled as coming from the FCC, but I recognize it as
an FCC monitor report of a Yenan broadcast in English Morse. It goes on for
four sheets, and includes various sections of an address of Mao Tse-tung, which
was broadcast on May 1.
The Chairman. What year?
A. 1945, sir. There are several sections.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time, Document 34,
although it is a document which, like the documents in the 101 to 227 series,
has to be returned to the Department tor their tiles.
The Chairman. It may be received for identification for the moment. What
use do you intend to make of it? What is the connection of it?
Mr. Rhetts. This is the copy of the FCC broadcast which Mr. Service
The Chairman. Referred to in the statement?
Mr. Rhetts. This is the copy of the FCC broadcast which he delivered to Mr.
Jaffe.
The Chairman. The paper I referred to a moment ago. O. K. ; it may be
admitted.
A. It bears no classification.
(Received and marked '"Exhibit 22, Document 34" :)
Far Eastern Section, Free China, May 1, 1945.
Yenan
Congress of Communist Party Meets
Yenan reports the following in English Morse :
"Yenan, Mat 1. — The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party was held in Yenan in the latter part of April. This is one of the most
important events in the history of modern China.
"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve
of the counteroffensive to save the Nation from the crisis which is the conse-
quence of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly
to defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free,
democratic, unified, strong, and prosperous new China.
"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates.
"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu,
Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao
Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the Congress.
Jen Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the
Congress.
Agenda Items
"There were four items in the agenda : The political report by Comrade Chu
Teli, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi,
and the election of members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party.
"Since its foundation in 1021 the Chinese Communist Party held six national
congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, Jan-
uary 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war and
struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present Seventh Congress could be
convened.
"At the convention of the present Congress, the power of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige
among the people of China are higher than at any period in the past.
Total Strength
"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 mem-
bers but also has under its leadership the 8th Route, New 4th, and other anti-
Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 people's
volunteer corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Man-
churia, North, Central, and South China with a total population of 95,500,000.
"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing
these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore the Chinese Communist party
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2299
and Liberated areas under it s Leadership have really become the center of
gravity of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese National Salvation Move-
ment and struggle Cor liberation. The present Congress will undoubtedly have
an extremely important influence on the future development of the war of
resistance and internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North
America, May 1, 1945, 9 : 30 a. m. EWT.)
COALITION GOVERNMENT NEEDED, SAYS MAO
Yenan reports the following in English Morse: "Yenan, May 1. — On the
'Coalition Government' was the title of the political report given by Chairman
Moa Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party to the Seventh Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party.
"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and
nonparty representatives to form a provisional democratic coalition govern-
ment so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis,
mobilize and unify the national forces of the war or resistance to effectively
collaborate with the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor,
and to secure the thorough liberation of the Chinese are the basic demands of
the Chinese people at present.'
"National Assembly
'•China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the
war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the
National Assembly based on a broad, democratic foundation should be called to
form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature, embracing
more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This Govern-
ment will lead the liberated people of the entire Nation to build up an independent,
free, unified, prosperous and strong new country. 'After China has had a demo-
cratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the
basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the
Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assemblv.'
I)ii mediate Formation
'•Mao Tse-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a
coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the anti-popula-
tion group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tse-tung, is not only 'a fundamental
obstacle to the mobilization and unification or the strength of the Chinese people
in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.' '
MAO REVEALS POSTWAR PLAN FOR CHINA
The following is Yenan's continuation in English Morse of the political report
given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Com-
munist Party held in Yenan, the first part of which was reported under the
heading, "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao," on Page PA 2 of yesterday's.
May 2, Daily Report :
"In his report Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the
Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is
divided into two sections, namely general and specific, and furnishes the answers
to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the thorough
annihiliation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a half-way compromise,
Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret understandings and
dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang Government and
the Japanese secret emissaries.
No compromise
'•He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang Govern-
ment must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any com-
promise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the 8th Route
and New 4th Armies and other people's armies. Moreover, wherever the enemy
has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily develop
anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies in the
fighting.'
"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resist-
ance to the Japanese aggressors from them. 'The Chinese people should in self-
defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile
68970— 50— pt. 2^—52
2300 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
People's Freedom
"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their
struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese
people is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang Gov-
ernment has deprived the people of their freedom and hound them hand and foot,
rendering them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors.
"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their free-
dom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom.
The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic
force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.'
Unification of People
"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided
China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is
not 'absolutist unification by dictators' by the 'democratic unification by the
people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy,
and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.'
"With regard to the people's armies, Mao pointed out that without any army
which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed.
The 8th Route and New 4th Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the people.
Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently suffered
(words missing) oppress the people and discriminate against other troops should
be reformed. Mao Tse-tung declared : 'As soon as the new democratic coalition
government and the united high command is formed in China, troops in the
Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But all Kuomintang
troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.'
Private Capitalism
'■'Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Tarty in the entire period
(words missing). The new democracy approves the development of private
capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory
propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, namely to carry out the principle of 'tillers own
their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life of
the people in the country'.
"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas
the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and
peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance.
"Mao also declared : 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to
carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and interest
will be carried out throughout the country and then (words missing). Then
appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the (words miss-
ing) "tillers own their land".' (Next paragraph garbled in transmission — Ed.)
"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be protected', while on the other hand
'guarantee's are given to (words missing) profits from proper commercial
(enterprise — Ed.)' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities will
certainly be (words missing) widespread (development — Ed.) of a private cap-
italistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and
cooperatives.
"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the
industrialization of China 'will (afford — Ed.) a very great amount of foreign
investments.'
Culture and Education
"With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out (words miss-
ing) respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made (words
missing). He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of
illiteracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out
that the ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.'
National Minorities
"Concerning the national minorities problem Mao Tze-tung pointed out that
.'national minorities should he helped (astrisks supplied by Yenan — Ed.) to
attain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally.
Their language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be
respected.' <J
"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'accord-
ing to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow every
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2301
school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists,
and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees,
Will lu> protected by the Government.'
••Mao Tze-tung in Ins report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' (words,
missing) principle of the Chinese Communist party in diplomatic policy, declared-
Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic relations
with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and postwar prob-
lems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, commercial inter-
course, investments, (words missing) of thorough extermination of the Japanese
aggressors, upholding of world peace (words missing) for equal and independent
status of the Nation (words missing) interests and friendship of nations and
peoples.'
International Conferences
"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was (words missing) Moscow,
Cairo. Tehran and Crimea international conferences, Hao Tze-tung said, that
the Chinese Communist party (words missing) the Crimea Conference on this
question. The Chinese Communist party 'welcomes the San Francisco United
Nations Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delega-
tion in order to express the will of the Chinese people.'
'Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords (word missing) with the
policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese
-and Oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of
(word missing) be adopted in the Orient and China."
Jf-Point Program
'•He said that. '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and
the Japanese fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly extermi-
nated. There should be no half-way compromise; (2) (words missing) the
vestiges of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least
trace to remain ; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war
not allowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship (word missing) must be
abolished (words missing) after its abolition it should at first be supplanted
by a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole
Nation. (Words missing) territories have been recovered the regular coalitioii
government executing the popular will should be set up through free and un-
restricted elections."
.Soviet Union
"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '(We are of the opinion —
Ed.) that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity towai'ds
the Soviet Union and swiftly improve (Sino-Ed. ) Soviet diplomatic relations.'
"On behalf of the Chinese people Mao Tze-tung expressed (words missing)
which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people
in China's Avar (words missing) liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal
Stalin's speech (words missing) and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.'
"Mao Tze-tung added : 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet
Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific
question.' "
Diplomatic Relations
"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations Mao Tze-
tung said : 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great
Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese
aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples
to China, deserve our thanks. (Words missing) will or Chinese people and
thereby injury and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign
•Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of
the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'
''Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by (words
missing), Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome (words miss-
ing) Chinese people on a footing of equality. But, he pointed out, China 'defi-
nitely cannot rely on an (words missing) equality (words missing) being given
by the -good will of foreign governments and peoples, (words missing) and
actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese
people to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic
country, -which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong.
2302 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the
policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force?
Far Eastern Countries
"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard
to the countries in the Far East: After the (words missing) unconditional
surrender of the Japanese aggressors all democratic (words missing) of the
Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japa-
nese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people,
thorough extermination of the Japanese (words missing) would not be pos-
sible to guarantee peace in the Pacific (asterisks supplied by Yenan — Ed.).
'The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct,
and the Chinese people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation
(words missing).' With regard to Thailand she 'should be dealt with accord-
ing to the measures of dealing with a fascist tourncoat'." (Yenan, in English
Morse to North America, May 2, 1945, 9:30 a. m. EDT).
Mr. Rhetts. I would like to introduce at this point Document No. 20-3.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document No. 20-3.
"(Remarks of Congressman Judd, Congressional Record, October 19, 1949,
p. 15283)
"After Mr. Service was transferred from China at the insistence of our Am-
bassador, General Hurley, he was involved in the Amerasia case. Suitcases
of documents from his office were found by the FBI in the office of a notoriously
pro-Communist magazine. The case was hushed up under circumstances never
yet disclosed or explained. Since then he has been promoted several times and
is now chairman of the committee within the State Department which makes
recommendations for all promotions."
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. In this document, Mr. Service, Congressman Judd says that suitcases
of documents from your office were found by the FBI in the Amerasia office.
Do you care to comment on that statement? — A. I don't know of any documents
from my office found in Mr. Jaffe's office. He may mean my "office" there to
refer to the Department of State. If we believe the press reports there were
a large number of copies.
Q. Did you have suitcases of documents in your office? — A. I certainly did
not.
Q. Your personal office? — A. No.
Q. Or in your desk? — A. No.
The Chairman. The Board is perfectly well aware of the fact that no docu-
ments were found in Mr. Jaffe's office possession which came from Mr. Service's
office ; you don't need to labor that point.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript Docu-
ment 100-16a, and Document 100-16b, the course of colloquy between Mr.
Gurnea and Mr. Hancock in the testimony before the Hobbs committee.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Document 100-16
"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)
"(Doc. 100-16a, p. 7566:)
"Mr. Hancock. Were any of these papers found in the possession of Roth?
"Mr. Gurnea. Roth at the time of his apprehension was preparing to go to
Honolulu on transfer. He had already given up his apartment. His wife
had gone to New York, where she was staying with her parents, and Roth
was waiting orders to proceed.
"He did not know at that time that the orders to proceed were being held
up in view of this case. He was practically on the street with his clothing and
suitcase.
"Mr. Hancock. Did you not say fingerprints were found on some of these
documents?
"Mr. Gurnea. In Jaffe's possession. Some were in his handwriting. There
were three documents in his own handwriting.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY. INVESTIGATION 2303
"Mr. Chelf. Of Service?
"Mr. Gurnea. Vis."
"(Due. 100-16b, P- 7566:)
"Mr. Gubnea. I was afraid you mighl have that impression. However, let
me correct it. They wore not fingerprints of Roth. They contained latent
fingerprints of Gayn, Jaffe, and Larsen. The handwriting examination dis-
closed numerous specimens of Larsen's handwriting on the documents and three
Of the reports, three of the documents were in Roth's handwriting, one of them,
I recall, was a copy of a document in Roth's handwriting prepared on stationery
of the Siuiler Hotel.
"Mr. Hancock. Were those documents copies of official reports?
"Mr. Gubnea. Found in Amerasia. Many were copies.
".Mr. Hancock. I mean the ones written by Roth, were they copies of State
Department or Navy Department documents?
"Mr. Gubnea. That is true.
"Mr. Hancock. Apparently so, you do not — — "
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. The testimony of Mr. Gurnea and Mr. Hancock before the Hobbs com-
mittee appears in document 10O-16a and it appears, does it not, that Mr. Gurnea
is referring, in general, to documents bearing the fingerprints or handwriting
of Lieutenant Roth? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then. Mr. Chelf interjects with the question: "Of Service?" and Mr.
Gurnea answers ''Yes," does he not? — A. He does.
Q. Will you refer to document 100-16b, and I ask you whether it is not made
clear there that Mr. Gurnea is, in fact, talking only about documents in Mr.
Roth's handwriting? — A. That is correct.
Mr. Rhetts. I do this, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of making clear that
the reference to Service in this testimony is either a typographical or other
mistake and that I believe, on the face of the testimony of the representative
of the FBI, is evidence that he was not intending to refer to any documents
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession bearing the handwriting of Mr. Service.
Mr. Achilles. It looks as if he were referring to Service documents, but Roth's
handwriting.
Mr. Rhetts. I do not even draw that implication from it necessarily.
In that connection I will also draw the Board's attention to document 100-12d
and the testimony of Mr. Mclnerney who states that the only evidence against
Mr. Service was the fact that documents of memoranda prepared by Mr. Service
were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. I take it bad any memoranda bearing
either the handwriting or fingerprints of Mr. Service been found Mr. Mc-
lnerney would have regarded that as evidence.
(Doe. 100-12d and doc. 100-12e were submitted for inclusion in the transcript
as follows : )
"Document No. 100-12
"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)
•(Doc. 100-12d, p. 7558:)
"Mr. Feighax. What prompted you to arrest Service?
"Mr. Hitchcock. .Tim, I think you ought to answer that. I was out of town
on trial when this feature of it broke.
"Mr. Hobbs. You mean on a trial.
"Mr. McIxeiixf.y. The evidence on Service was thin. They said there was in
Jaffe's office, as I recall it, copies of his confidential reports. When we arrested
or made the searches, we found copies of his report. We interviewed Larsen, and
Larsen admitted he bad given Service's copies to Jaffe, and Service had not
siven them. Service was very much surprised that Jaffe had that report. It
was on that thin allegation that we authorized on Service, and the same way
with Gavn."
"(Doc. 100-12e, p. 7559:)
"Mr. Springer. From all of the investigations you made, from your grand
jury investigation and everything connected with it, do you feel that all of
these secret documents that you came in possession of had come through Larsen?
"Mr. McTxerxey. I do not know whether I could go that far.
"Mr. Hitchcock. They did not. Take your FCC, Office of Strategic Service,
or a few of them, the ONI, the BEW, and perhaps one or two others, they could
2304 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
not have come from Larsen. Larsen was never employed there. He had no
access to them. So far; as we knew, he had never been near the places.
"Mr. Hancock. I asked that a moment ago. You said these documents were
routed through the State Department.
"Mr. Hitchcock. Some of them, particularly the ONI documents, were routed
to the State Department, and insofar as they pertained to Chinese affairs. Larsen
would have had access to them from September 1, 1044, not prior to that.
"Mr. Springer. Have you been able to discover any other person who could
have distributed these documents?
"Mr. Hitchcock. We had two of them before the grand jury. In Gayn's
case, he told us they got them through the area director for area 3, authorizing
this girl or woman in charge of the office to give them to Gayn. We immediately
sent out subpenas for those two people.
"Mr. Fellows. A fine system.
"Mr. Hitchcock. That completely left us stymied. These people were in posi-
tion of authority. He said he classified them ad hoc, made no record of it,
and after authorized the handing them out to Gayn.
"Mr. Springer. Did you find anyone that had distributed any of these docu-
ments?
"Mr. Hitchcock. No.
"Mr. McInerney. I might add, at the time of the arrest, we told the agent who
handled these as laboratory documents to see if we could process a representative
number of them for fingerprints and try to establish a chain of custody from the
chief of Jaffe. They were all old documents. We came up with no principal.
We did get a couple of prints on some documents we found in Gayn's apartment.
They were Gayn's fingerprints on the OWI stuff. We did not get any evidence
which would assist us in tracing the custody.
"Mr. Hitchcock. You realize that many of these documents, that they refer
to, date to 1936, from there on. That is why I suggested that you may be inter-
ested in seeing them. We have boxes full of them. We have all of them, book-
lets on health in the Japanese Empire in 193S, for example, completely innocuous,,
and negative as regards any national-defense character at all. Although there
were some in the later period, referring principally to political matters in China,,
one man's judgment might say, when a nation is at war, that political matters
pertain to national defense; others say it pertains to military operations, or
manufacturing for military purposes or things of that character, those are
questions of fact for the jury."
The Chairman. If you will refer to document 100-16b you will note that Mr.
Gurnea makes clear that he referred to Roth's handwriting, not Service's.
Mr. Rhetts. That is the question I just asked. It is document 100-16b.
I should like at this point to introduce as an exhibit, but not for inclusion
in the transcript, document 100-3, which is the testimony of Mr. Brooks describ-
ing the circumstances under which he made a raid upon the offices of the Amerasia
magazine on the night of, I believe he says, March 11, 1945.
The Chairman. What are you asking — to have something inserted in the
transcript?
Mr. Rhetts. No, sir. I am asking to have it as an exhibit in the transcript.
Chairman. It may be made an exhibit.
(Received and marked "Document No. 100-3, Exhibit 23," excerpt from Con-
gressional Record — House, May 22, 1950, testimony of Mr. Brooks.)
Mr. Rhetts. I should also like to introduce into the transcript at this point
Document No. 83, which is a two-page affidavit signed by Archbold Van Beuren,
dated May 1, 1950.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document No. 83
"Affidavit of Archbold Van Beuren
"State of New York,
County of Neiv York, ss:
"I, Archbold Van Beuren, being first duly sworn, depose and state:
"1. During the year 1045 I was employed in Washington, D. C, by the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS) and held the position of Security Officer of that
organization. In that capacity I was responsible for maintaining a security
system designed to assure that information and documents containing material
affecting the national defense should not come into the hands of unauthorized
persons.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2305
'"2. Some time during tin* latter part of February 11)4.") an employee in the
Research and Analysis Division of OSS called to my attention that an article
dealing with Southeast Asia had appeared in the magazine Amerasia and that
this article bore evidence of having been based upon or in part copied from a
Classified OSS document.
'•:!. Upon receiving this information and after consultation with my superior
officers, I caused an investigation to he made under the direction of Mr. Frank
B. Bielaski. an investigator attached to my office, with a view to ascertaining
how the information contained in this classified document might have become
available for publication in the magazine Amerasia. It was discovered that the
OSS document in question had been widely distributed among various govern-
ment agencies and that many people had properly had access to it in different
government agencies.
"4. On the night of March 10, 1945, Mr. Bielaski and others acting under his
direction gained access to the offices of Amerasia in New York City and there
discovered a large number of classified government documents. Inspection of
these documents indicated that most of them were government-prepared copies
of documents either originating in the State Department or which had been dis-
tributed to the State Department by other government agencies, such as OSS,
MID, ONI, and others.
"5. At the time of this inspection on March 10, 1945, Mr. Bielaski removed
certain of the documents and reported to me on the following day, March 11, 1945r
as to the results of his investigation.
"6. I presented the results of Mr. Bielaski's investigation, together with the
classified Government documents which he had removed from the offices of
Amerasia, to my superior, Maj. Gen. William Donovon, the head of OSS, in
the late afternoon of March 11, 1945, and later that evening, in company with
General Donovan and another officer of the OSS, presented the results of Amerasia
to Secretary of State Stettinius and Assistant Secretary of State, Julius Holmes.
'"7. Thereafter, the Office of Strategic Services had no further connection
with the investigation and I had no direct knowledge of any further develop-
ments in the case until it was publicly announced on June 6, 1945, that the
FBI had arrested Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and Mark Gayn in New York
City, Lt. (jg) Andrew Roth, Emmanuel Larsen, and John S. Service in Wash-
ington, D. C.
"(s) Abchbold Van Betjren.
"Subscribed and sworn to before me. a notary public in and for the State
and county aforesaid, by Archbold Van Beuren, to me personally known, this
the 1st day of May 1950.
"My commission expires March 31, 1951.
"(s) Vicki Regan,
"Notary Public in the State of Neio York. No. 24-3232725. Qualified in
Kings County. Certificate filed with notary public, New York and
Kings Counties Clerks and Registers. Commission Expires March
31, 1951."
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, where were you on March 10, 1945? — A. I was in Yenanr
China.
Q. And you had been in China how long? — A. Well, I had been in China
since sometime in January. I arrived at Chungking on January 18, 1945.
Q. And you returned to this country when? — A. I returned to this country on
April 12, 1945.
Q. Now where were you prior to January 18, 1945?— A. Well, I was en route
from Washington between January 7 and January 18. I was in Washington
from January 2 to January 7, 1945 ; prior to that, for about 45 days, I was on
leave in California.
Q. And prior to that you had been? — A. On consultation with the Department
of State from about October 29, 1944, to November 18, or 19, 1944.
Q. And prior to October 29? — A. I had been in China.
Q. You had been in China? — A. For the year and a half preceding.
Mr. Rhetts. I offer these documents, if it pleases the Board for the purpose of
showing that at a time when whatever arrangements Mr. Jaffe may have had
for obtaining Government documents Mr. Service was out of the country.
Now I ask that there be introduced into the transcript at this point Documents
39-1, 39-18, and 39-25.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
2306 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Document No. 39-1
"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950 — remarks of Senator
McCarthy)
"(P. 4437:) * * * I could not help but remember that at the time of the
Service case we also had an apparently able Attorney General. It will be
recalled that in that case the FBI, after months of painstaking work by scores,
or perhaps hundreds of agents, developed what J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the
Department, publicly referred to as 'a 100-percent airtight case' of espionage and
treason.
"J. Edgar Hoover, as everyone knows, is not known for overstating his case.
I am sure we all agree that he is the ablest law-enfoi-cement officer in this Nation
and, I think, in the world. When he stated that after the tremendous amount
of labor put into that case, it was a 100-percent.airtight case of treason and
espionage, I believe most of us would be willing to rely on his judgment on the
case.
"Strangely, however, after the arrest of six suspects in that case of treason,
there was an unusual sequence of events, resulting in a most fantastic finale. The
curtain was rung down when a young Department of Justice attorney disposed
of Hoover's six 100-percent airtight cases of treason with a statement to the
effect that he could cover all of the facts in that case in less than 5 minutes,
and then proceeded to assure the court that there was not the slightest indication
of disloyalty.
"Obviously, with that treatment by the administration of the carefully in-
vestigated and developed case which the head of the FBI called a 100-percent
airtight case of treason, I felt that the Department of Justice was not the correct
place to take what I consider an even more dangerous case."
Document No. 30-18
"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950 — remarks of Senator
McCarthy)
"(P. 4440:) It will be recalled that J. Edgar Hoover at the time said this was
a 100-percent airtight case against Service, Roth, and their codefendants."
"Document No. 39-25
"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950 — remarks of Senator
McCarthy)
"(P. 4454:) Let me state in this connection that, as the Senator will recall,
John Service was arrested. That is the case which Hoover says was a 100-percent
airtight case. Joseph Grew, who was then Under Secretary of State, was very
vigorous in insisting on the prosecution of Service. Grew resigned. Dean
Acheson took over. A few days later John Service was reinstated. He is the
man who was accused of stealing these documents. Subsequently, he was put
in charge, so far as I can determine, of personnel, promotions, and placements
in the Far East. The man who stole the documents for Amerasia, an outfit
which is clearly Communist controlled, and who was the subject of this espionage
case was picked up by Dean Acheson, and was not only reinstated but was
placed in the position of controlling placements and promotions of personnel
in the Far East. This may explain why men like Lattimore were assigned such
important jobs in the East."
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now I ask you, Mr. Service, do you have any knowledge of any public state-
ment made by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the effecl that there was a 100-percent
airtight espionage case against you? — A. I have no knowledge of any such
statement by Mr. Hoover.
Q. Have you attempted to obtain any information from Mr. Hoover as to
whether he ever made such a statement? — A. I have.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2307
Q. I show you document 53-1, and I ask you if this is a copy of a letter which
you sent to Mr. Hoover on this subject? — A. It is a copy of a letter I addressed
to him on April 12, 1950.
Mr. Rhetts. I ask that document 53-1 be introduced into the transcript at
this point.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 53-1
Washington, D. C, April 11, 1950.
J. Ed ;ar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. G.
My Dear Mr. Hoover : As a result of a postaudit of the action of the Depart-
ment of State Loyalty Security Board clearing me of any charges of disloyalty
to the United Stares, the President's Loyalty Review Board recently remanded
my case for further consideration and my personal appearance hefore the Loyalty
Security Board.
At the time of this action I was en route to a post in India, and the Depart-
ment notified me to return to Washington for a bearing before the Loyalty
Security Board.
At about the same time, Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin made various charges
against me on the floor of the Senate and before the Tydings subcommittee which
was set up to consider Senator McCarthy's charges against various individuals.
Since my return to this country I have familiarized myself with the charges
against me and I am presently engaged in assembling documentary and other
materials so that I may establish before the Loyalty Security Board that these
charges are without foundation in fact.
One of the charges made against me by Senator McCarthy occurred in the
course of a speech delivered on the floor of the United States Senate on Wednes-
day, March 29, 1950. At this time Senator McCarthy attributed to you certain
statements concerning the so-called Amerasia case. You may recall that I was
one of the persons who was arrested in connection with that case and that after
presentation of my case before the Grand Jury, that body returned a no true
bill in my case.
Senator McCarthy attributed two statements to you. The first, appearing
at 96 Daily Congressional Record, p. 4437, is as follows :
"* * * it will be recalled that in that case the FBI, after months of painstaking
work by scores, or perhaps hundreds of agents, developed what J. Edgar Hoover,
the head of the Department, publicly referred to as a '100-percent airtight case'
of espionage and treason."
While I have been unable to locate any statement by you substantially to this
effect, it may well be that you did express the view that there was a "100-percent
airtight case" against some of the persons who were indicted in the Amerasia
case.
The second statement attributed to you by Senator McCarthy is of a different
and more specific character. This statement, appearing at p. 4440 of the Con-
gressional Record for the same day, March 30, 1950, is as follows :
"It will be recalled that J. Edgar Hoover at the time said this was a '100-percent
airtight case against Service, Roth, and their co-defendants'."'
If Senator McCarthy's statement is true and you did in fact make this state-
ment concerning a "100 percent airtight case against Service" it would, of course,
be highly relevant to the departmental consideration of my loyalty to the United
States.
You will, I am sure, appreciate that because of your official position any
statement by you expressing an opinion that there was a "100-percent airtight
case" or any other kind of case of espionage or other malfeasance against me
would carry great weight, and that an improper attribution to you of any such
an expression would necessarily be highly damaging to me.
I assume that you have never made any such statement as the one attributed
to you by Senator .McCarthy and in view of its great importance to me in the
proceedings in which I am now involved. I would be grateful to you if you would
advise me whether or not you ever made the statement concerning me which has
been attributed to you by Senator McCarthy either in the form attributed to
you or substantially to that effect. If this statement is untrue I should appreciate
an expression from you which will make this unmistakably clear.
2308 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
In view of the pendency of these proceedings at the present time, I would
appreciate the favor of an early reply addressed to ine in care of my attorneys,
Heilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus, Tower Building, 1401 K Street, Washington, D. C.
Sincerely,
John S. Service.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. And I ask yon if yon received an answer to that letter [Doc. 53-1]? — A. I
did.
Q. I show yon Document 53-2, and ask you if this is the reply you received
from Mr. Hoover? — A. It is.
Mr. Rhetts. I ask that Document 53-2 be included in the transcript at this
point.
The Chairman. It may be admitted.
Mr. Rhetts. In this connection I should like to ask the board to inspect the
•document of which the original is there [indicating] and ask permission to
introduce into this proceeding copies of the original.
Chairman. It may be admitted.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 53-2
United States Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau op Investigation,
Washington, D. C, April 18, 1950.
Mr. John S. Service,
c/o Reilly, Rhetts, and Ruckelskaus,
Tower Building, HOI K Street, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir : In response to your letter of April 12, 1950, I wish to advise that
I have made no public statement on the Amerasia case since the period wherein
the arrests occurred.
At the time of the arrests a release was issued by the Attorney General's
Office wherein certain of the details of the case were attributed to me. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation does not pass on the evidence it collects during
its investigations, but this evidence is turned over to the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice. I presume that they must have been satisfied with
the evidence presented to them by the FBI as they authorized the arrests to be
made in this case.
Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover, Director.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to introduce Document 53-3 for inclusion in the
transcript at this point, a copy of a release by the Department of Justice, dated
June 6, 1945, which I represent to the Board that I obtained from the Depart-
ment of Justice within the last month.
For immediate release
Wednesday, June 6, 1945
"Document No. 53-3
"Department of Justice
"The Department of Justice announces the arrest by Special Agents of the FBI
of six persons, including a Naval Reserve Lieutenant, until recently on active
duty, and two Department of State employees in Washington, and the editor of
Amerasia magazine in New York City, on charges of conspiring to violate the
Federal Espionage Statutes through theft of highly confidential documents.
"Director J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI stated that the investigation was under-
taken at the request of the Departments of State and the Navy. Since receipt
of the original complaint by the FBI, the three departments have fully cooperated
in the investigation.
"Those in custody in Washington are Lieutenant Andrew Roth, U. S. N. R.,
who was formerly assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence; Emmanuel Sigurd
Larsen, specialist in the China Division of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, De-
partment of State; and John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer of the
Department of State who, until recently, was stationed in China.
"Three others under arrest in New York are Philip Jacob Jaffe and Kate
Louise Mitchell, coeditors of Amerasia, which printed information from the stolen
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2309
documents, and -Mark Julius Gayn, nationally known writer who used some of the
material in his articles.
"The documents recovered by the FBI include originals and copies of papers
from the Departments of States War, and Navy, the Office of Strategic Services,
Office of War Information, and the Federal Communications Commission. Their
security classification ranged from restricted to top secret.
"The arrests culminated two and one-half months of intensive investigation by
the FBI. Investigation disclosed that data removed from the Government's con-
fidential tiles usually was turned over to Jaffe at meetings in Washington and
New York.
"The magazine's office is at 22;") Fifth Avenue, New York. Established in 1937,
Amerasia's announced purpose was to promote the study of Pacific affairs.
"Those in custody are to be taken before United States Commissioners imme-
diately in Washington and New York on charges of conspiring to violate Section
31, Title 50, U. S. C. A., which covers the unauthorized possession or transmittal
of national defense data. The maximum penalty upon conviction is two years'
imprisonment and $10,000 fine.
"background
"Lieutenant Andrew Roth was born April 23, 1919, in The Bronx, New York
City. He received degrees from the City College of New York and Columbia
University, and at the latter school he was an honor student, in the summer of
1939 Roth studied Chinese at the University of Michigan. He worked as a re-
search associate for Arnerasia in 1941 and in September of that year joined the
United States Navy. Following a course of study in the Japanese language at
Harvard University, he was commissioned as an ensign on August 28, 1942, and
was transferred to Washington for duty with the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Since January of this year he has been a full lieutenant, but is not presently
on active duty. His most recent address was 1614 Queen Street, Arlington,
Virginia.
"Emanuel Sigurd Larsen was born August 27, 1897, at San Rafael, California.
He was educated in China and Denmark and received a Doctorate of Philosophy
from the University of Copenhagen in 1916. From then until 1927 he worked for
the Chinese Postal Administration at Peiping, after which he served a year as
adviser to Teh-Ching-Mu, Chief of the Mongol Clans at Kokenmiao, Inner Mon-
golia. His next six years were spent as traffic manager for a British-American
tobacco company in China. From October 1934 to February 1935 Larsen was
with the Chinese Secret Service at Peiping, handling investigations of the illicit
arms traffic and intelligence operations in Manchuria. Larsen returned to
the United States and was employed until March 1943 by the ONI as a civilian
senior analyst on affairs in China, Indo-China, Thailand, and India. On Au-
gust 31, 1944, he became a specialist in the China Division of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs, Department of State. His address is 1650 Harvard Street,
Northwest, Washington.
"John Stewart Service was born at Chengtu, Szechwan, China, on August 3,
1909. His father, an American citizen, was engaged in social welfare work in
Shanghai. A graduate of Oberlin College in Ohio, Service worked for a while
for a bank in Shanghai, but since 1933 he has been with the Department of
State in the Foreign Service. His posts have included duty at Yunnanfu, Pei-
ping and Chungking, China, and until recently he had an assignment with the
American military forces in that country. He resides in the 700 block of Eight-
eenth Street, Northwest, Washington.
"Philip Jacob Jaffe was born in 1897 at Mogilev, Ukraine, Russia, and was
naturalized as a United States citizen in New York on May 4, 1923. In addition
to being editor of Arnerasia he is president of a printing firm specializing in
stationery and greeting cards. For several years Jaffe had been active in
organizations prominent in Far Eastern affairs. Jaffe lives at 49 East Ninth
Street, New York.
"Kate Louise Mitchell was born September 1, 1908, at Buffalo, New York. She
was graduated from Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania in 1932. During the
1930's, Miss Mitchell traveled extensively in Europe and the Far East and she
has written several books, among them "Industrialization of the Western
Pacific." "Japan's Industrial Strength," and "India Without Fable." Her ad-
dress in New York is 127 East Fifty-fourth Street.
"Marl: Julius Gayn, whose name originally was Mark Julius Ginsbourg, was
born April 29, 1908, at Barim, Manchuria. He entered the United States for
2310 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
permanent residence in October 1941, and was naturalized November 8, 1943, at
New York. Gayn is a free-lance writer and his articles have appeared in
several widely circulated magazines. At the time of his arrest he was planning
to go to Russia, India, and China as a newspaper correspondent. His address
is 302 West Twelfth Street, New York."
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript copies
of an exchange of correspondence between Mr. John E. Peurifoy and Mr. Peyton
Ford ; Mr. Peurifoy's letter being dated May 1, 1950, and Mr. Ford's letter being
dated May 8, 1950 ; this exchange of correspondence having been released to the
press by the Department of State as a part of its release No. 529, dated May
20, 1950.
The Chairman. It may be admitted.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
May 1, 1950.
The Honorable Peyton Ford,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.
Dear Mr. Ford : In his address on April 20, 1950, to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors at the Hotel Statler in Washington, Senator McCarthy said :
"One of those arrested was John S. Service. He was never convicted ; he was
never tried ; he was never indicted.
"J. Edgar Hoover. Director of the FBI. publicly stated at the time of the
arrests that this case was a 100-percent airtight case of espionage. At the time
the case broke John S. Service was picked up by the FBI, Mr. Hoover made that
statement, and he seldom errs on the side of overstatement, as you well know."
The Department of State is naturally interested in whether or not this state-
ment of Senator McCarthy is an accurate one. As a result, I would appreciate
it if you would inform the Department as soon as possible whether the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made any statement similar to that
attributed to him by Senator McCarthy.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Peurifoy,
Deputy Under Secretary.
May S, 1950.
John E. Peurifoy, Esq.,
Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Peurifoy: This is in reply to your letter dated May 1, 1950, inquir-
ing as to the accuracy of a statement alleged to have been made by J. Edgar
Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the time of the arrest
of John S. Service and other suspects involved in the so-called Amerasia case.
You are advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which has been
attributed to him.
Yours sincerely,
Peyton Ford,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.
Mr. Rhett. I should like at tins point to introduce document No. 100-1.
Document No. 100-1
"Excerpt from Congressional Record — House, May 22, 1950, p. 7538
"Mr. Dondero. The Members will remember at the time that matter came up
at least the public press indicated that some statement was made by the FBI
that their case was airtight. We now discover that it was not airtight.
"Mr. Horbs. I have no such recollection, and I do not believe that any rep-
utable person would make such a statement.
"In compliance with my promise concerning tlie FBI I have since looked
through my hie and found this quotation from a memorandum furnished me
by the FBI dated May 29, 1945 :
" 'In addition to the above, there are many contacts and associates of this
group who are known to have been instrumental in this conspiracy to extract
confidential documents from the Government files in Washington. However, as
Act it is not believed there is sufficient admissible evidence to prosecute these
individuals at this time. It is anticipated that a considerable amount of addi-
tional evidence will, of course, be developed following such time and if prosecu-
tive action is instituted against the above four principals.'
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2311
"Six arrests were made on June 6, 1945.
"I can find no record of the witnesses from the FBI who appeared and testified
before the grand jury. All these records were returned to the court.
"Mr. DONDKBO. I only refer to the statement that appeared in the public press
at the time; I do not say that it was made by the FBI ; I do not know, of course.
"Mr. Hobbs. There are a great many statements appearing in the public press
that I would not like to be called upon to vouch for.''
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this point to introduce document 100-12, and
I should like to refer also at this point to document 100-12-d, which has already
been introduced into the transcript.
(Please see page 03 of this transcript for Doc. 100-12, which includes Doc.
100-12d, p. 755S, and Doc. 100-12e, p. 7559, Excerpt from Congressional Record- -
House, May 22, 1950.)
Mr. Rhetts. I offer all these documents to show that not only did Mr. J.
Edgar Hoover never say that he had a 100-percent airtight espionage or any
other kind of a case against Mr. Service, but that the testimony of Mr. Hitch-
cock, the prosecutor in charge of the trial of the Amerasia case; Mr. Mclnerney,
the then First Assistant and presently Assistant to Attorney General of the
United States ; and Mr. James McGranery, then Assistant to the Attorney
General and presently United States district judge, testified before the House
Judiciary Committee that there was no case at all against Mr. Service, and that
the only possible evidence against him was the fact that some reports prepared
by him were found in Jaffe's possession, and that Larsen admitted giving those
to Jaffe.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, you have already testified iu your personal, statement
concerning your acquaintance with the various persons who were arrested in
connection with the Amerasia case. I would like to ask you to explain iu
somewhat further detail something about your association with some of these
persons. I should like to ask you, first of all, about your associations with
Lieutenant Roth? Will you undertake to explain to the Board in some detail
the circumstances under which you first met Lieutenant Roth and of your sub-
sequent association with him? — A. It is rather hard to do that, sir, without
a good deal of repetition of what is already in my personal statement. I met
Lieutenant Roth, for the first time, at the conclusion of the off-the-record ses-
sion with the IPR in Washington about the middle of November 1944. There
were a number of people that came up to greet me or meet me at the end of
the affair, some of them were people whom I had met or known before and
hadn't had a chance to speak to me. Several of them were people whom I had
never met. Lieutenant Roth was one of those. He was wearing naval uni-
form, I remember, and simply introduced himself.
Mr. Stevens. One of those whom you had not met before?
A. That's right. I had never met him before ; I had never beard of him
before. He introduced himself, said he was working in ONI on the Far East
and made some polite remarks about having enjoyed my talk, or something
of the sort, and said that he hoped he would meet me again. Actually, I left
Washington a few days later and did not meet him during that visit in Wash-
ington. The next time that I met him was quite soon after my return to
Washington in April 1945. I remember being somewhat surprised. He tele-
phoned me, I think, asked me to come out to his house. He said he was having
a group of people for supper. I remember being somewhat surprised he had
found out how soon I had arrived, and he gave a quite reasonable expla nation
that it was through some associate that he was working with in the office at
that time, the brother of Da vies, who is the brother of the naval officer working
in ONI. I accepted the invitation to supper. I had no reason to refuse. I think
that the supper was to be on April 19, which would have been just a week
after my arrival. It was during the day, I think — the morning of the party
that Lieutenant Roth called me at the office and said that Mr. Jaffe was in
town and was very anxious to have a chance to meet me and talk to me and
was afraid there wouldn't be an opportunity at the party because there were
going to be a large number of people there, a considerable number of people
there, would I be able to see Jaffe, would I give Jaffe a ring. I gave Jaffe a
ring at the hotel as requested.
The only arrangement we could make was for me to stop at the hotel early
and we would go on to the party together. I saw Roth the next day.
The Chairman. You say you went to the party?
A. I went to the party; yes.
2312 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. That was on the 19th of April?
A. I must say. General, that
The Chairman. I believe you so stated in your statement.
A. When I was interrogated by the FBI I told them I wanted to cooperate and
assist as far as I could in clearing up the matter, and they, of course, wanted a
full detailing of my contacts with Mr. Jaffe particularly, but also with some of
the other people in the case, and I couldn't positively remember the dates. But
the agents had little black books and I would say : "Well, after a few days I
think I had supper at his house." The agent would look at the book and would
say: "Would ir nave been April 19, for instance V" and since he obviously knew
the date, and I couldn't disagree with him, I usually accepted his dates so
that
The Chairman. You went to the Statler Hotel first and saw Jaffe and then
accompanied Jaffe to Roth's?
A. That's right.
The Chairman. Were you carrying a small brown bag at that time?
A. I imagine I was carrying a brief case. I practically always do. I was on
consultation. I don't like loading my pockets and any officer recently arrived
or on consultation working on travel and various other things — I often carry a
newspaper or magazines. It is customary for me to carry a brief case, and I
think that's what I had. I don't usually
The Chairman. Was it a zipper case?
A. Yes ; I usually have a zipper case. It is this type [indicating] of case that
I like, sir.
Mr. Rhetts. You are exhibiting to the Board a leather brief case with a zipper,
are you?
A. Yes, sir. The one I was carrying was not this identical one, but it was the
same general type.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Was that the occasion on which you stated that you took a copy of one
report you showed Mr. Jaffe? — A. That's correct.
Q. I suppose you carried that in your brief case? — A. Probably almost certain.
Q. And you think you may have left that report with Jaffe on that occasion? —
A. Yes ; I believe I did.
Q. And did he put it in a manila envelope and carry it in his pocket? — A. That,
I cannot say, sir ; I don't remember. I don't believe I was at the hotel for very
long before we went on to supper at Roth's and he didn't want to sit down and
road it and study it in detail then and there.
Q. At any rate, you think you may have let him have it on that occasion? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. All right; go ahead. — A. The next day I had agreed to have lunch with
Jaffe, and I remember being rather surprised that Roth was there. I didn't
seem to remember that I had known of Roth being invited. Roth was present at
the lunch with Jaffe at the Statler Hotel on the following da v. Now I saw
Roth
The Chairman. You say Roth was present at that luncheon?
A. Yes, sir; as far as I can remember.
Mr. Rhetts. Was he in uniform?
A. Yes ; he had to be in uniform during the war. I don't ever remember seeing
him out of uniform. I remember at some social function — and I'm not sure where
this was — he was not wearing a regulation necktie and there was some kidding
a i lout the fact that he didn't have a regulation necktie on, but so far as I know
he always was in uniform.
The Chairman. Now this occasion, the next day, you are telling us about
now. was it the occasion on which you left the other 8 or 10 memoranda that
you told us about with Jaffe?
A. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. May it please the Board, I have no objection here, but I rather
had in mind to try to go through each of these individuals seriatim We can
scramble them up if you prefer.
The Chairman. We were asking about this occasion.
Mr. Rhetts. I was trying to delineate, if possible, all his associations with
Roth and then I proposed to come back and also take you over the same ground
so far as Jaffe. It is a matter of Indifference to me.
The chairman. In this case it would save a good deal of unnecessary duplica-
tion, I would think.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2313.
Mr. Rhetts. Very well. It seemed to me it might be easier to deal with the
associations on a separate basis.
The CHAIRMAN. Since they were associated with tbese two gentlemen at the
same time 1 don't see any point in doing it twice.
Mr. Km: ns. I am entirely agreeable and at the Board's disposal.
Mr. Stevens. I bad been delaying some questions about Roth expecting that
we would gel the story that way. If we are going to talk about Mr. Jaffe along
wiili it too. I think maybe as these occurrences come along, General, I bad better
put in a question.
(Discussion off the record.)
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. I would like to know from Mr. Service if Lieutenant Roth related to you.
when lie telephoned you about having dinner with him, what his position was.
Whether he had any relationships with the Department of State? Were you
aware of the capacity in which he was working in the Navy? — A. I remembered
having met him the previous year at the IPR meeting at which he told me that
be was working for ONI, and, of course, he was wearing a Navy uniform and
the fact of his presence at an IPR meeting meant that he had to be at least a
member of the IPR and probably a person working on far eastern matters because
that was the type of person that attended. Subsequently, I made some enquiries
about Roth, but I am not sure that I had made those previous to his inviting me
to dinner.
O. Was it a practice of yours then when you were back here on consulation to
dine with people whom you knew so slightly? — A. Well, I was living downtown
in a small apartment; if a person was interested in the Far East and officially
connected and so on — I was quite used to having invitations from people that I
had just barely met whom I didn't have any background of personal acquaintance
with. And if I didn't accept an invitation I would go out and eat dinner by myself
in some restaurant downtown and I usually accepted invitations I am afraid.
I may have known something about Roth from somebody like Donald Davis, for
instance. I did later, and I can't say positively whether I made any particular
inquiry about Roth or whether I simply accepted his statements that he was an
officer'in the ONI interested in the Far East.
(Discussion off the record.)
(The meeting was adjourned at 5 : 30 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of Mr. John Stewart Service
Date : Monday. June 5, 1950, 10 : 05 a. m.-12 : 35 p. m.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building. Washington. D. C.
Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, court stenographer, reporting.
Members of Board : Mr. Conrad E. Snow, Chairman ; Mr. Theodore C. Achilles;
Mr. Arthur G. Slovens : Mr. Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service : Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruck >lshaus.
The Board reconvened at 10 : 05 a. m.
Chairman (Mr. Conrad E. Snow): The Board will be in session. At the
close of the last session I believe Mr. Stevens was asking Mr. Service some ques-
tions. He would like to ask some further questions.
Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and
sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows :
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. I believe you mentioned that Roth called you soon after you returned and
suggested dinner. I believe you stated further that you're not sure whether you
knew precisely the job that he had at that time but that you thought you bad
heard through John Davies' brother. — A. Well, I know that John Davies' brother
was a mutual friend and that I saw John Davies' brother a good deal.
Q. D.d you have any idea of who was going to be at dinner that night? — A. As
I recollect he simply said that he was having a bunch of far-eastern people, and
that sort of social activity was quite general. I mean far-eastern people run
around in the same circles.
2314 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I believe in answer also to a question from counsel you mentioned that
Lieutenant Roth called you and said that Mr. Jaffe was going to be there and
asked that you call prior to going out that night. Did you know who Mr. Jaffe
was at that time? — A. Certainly I knew who he was. 1 never met him, but his
name was quite well known.
Q. Can you recall the substance of that conversation with Roth, what led you
to call this man on such short notice, and to go by? — A. Well, it's not a conversa-
tion which, of course, made any impression or meant anything to me at the
time. As I stated the other day, my recollection is that Lieutenant Roth called
me and said something about "Phil Jaffe is in town and is going to be at my
house this evening. You know who Jaffe is, don't you?" And I said: "Yes; I
heard of him." He said: "Jaffe would very much like to meet you and talk to
you, but I'm afraid there won't be much time or opportunity tonight at my house,
and he would very much like to see you sometime during the day." My recollec-
tion is that Roth suggested that I call Jaffe and" that is my recollection of what
happened. That's the way it happened.
Q. When he mentioned Jaffe's name, could you let us know something about
what you knew about Mr. Jaffe at that time? Did you need an explanation
from him as to what Jaffe's connections were? — A. No, I didn't need any explana-
tion of Jaffe. He, of course, had been out in Peiping in 1936 or 1937. I didn't
meet him at that time.
Q. How did you know he had been there, Mr. Service? — A. Because I met some
of the other people who were in that — I'm not sure how I did. Peiping is just
a small place and you see Owen Lattimore went up to the Communist territory
with Jaffe and Bisson, as I remember, and I'm not sure whether I talked to
Owen when he came out or whether I got a secoud-hand report of their trip.
Also, of course, I was a subscriber to Amerasia for a while in those early days
and I undoubtedly had read of Jaffe's trip. I think anybody working or special-
izing in the far-eastern field would know Jaffe's name quite well.
0. Did you have any idea of Mr. Jaffe's political ideologies at that time? —
A. No. I hadn't been reading Amerasia during the war really. At the time I
got to Chungking in 1941 we would see occasional references to Amerasia, the
sort of material that State Department sent out, summary of editorials and
summary of material written about China. Well, a couple or three issues of
Amerasia, maybe when I was here in 1944. I had been particularly, shall we
say, pleased because Amerasia gave by far the fullest treatment to the whole
Stilwell recall in a way which was very favorable to Stilwell and later gave
very favorable comment on Ambassador Gauss. And I must admit that when
Jaffe sought an introduction or when Roth put me in touch with Jaffe that
was the idea that was perhaps paramount in my mind at the time that this
was the guy that had done a very fine job on reporting the Stilwell recall.
Q. Did you know anything about his affiliations? — A. None whatever. I meant
to answer that question more specifically. I didn't know the history of the
Amerasia magazine at that time. I didn't know that this boiled down to just
Mr. Jaffe, in fact. In fact. I was rather surprised to find that out from Lieutenant
Roth. I think I was walking back from lunch the next day, on the 20th, and
it was when I found out that Amerasia magazine had become Jaffe, with Kate
Mitchell as his assistant.
Q. At the dinner, did you know many of the people who were there? Had you
met them before? — A. I can't honestly tell you who was there, now. Most of
the people
The Chairman. What are you referring to now, the lunch?
Q. No, the dinner at Roth's home. — A. I beileve that most of the people were
juniors in the research field, working in the Navy and MID. MID had a huge
research shop. I met an awful lot of these people casually. I had already met
them in these sort of briefing sessions in 1944 and perhaps there in 1945 too.
Q. The people you had dinner with? — A. That is my recollection of the type
of people. I can pull some names out of my head, but I couldn't say positively
whether they were at Roth's that evening or whether they were at some other
party I went to during that same period.
Q. One other question with respect to the telephone call that you made to
Mr. Jaffe at Lieutenant Roth's suggestion. Can you recall Ihe substance of that
conversation, Mr. Service? — A. The telephone call with Jaffe?
Q. Yes, your call to Jaffe. — A. As I remember it. it was extremely brief and
I was given a room number and he said that he thought that Jaffe was there
right then. So I just called immediately. I said, "This is Jack Service. Andy
Roth has just said that you were very anxious to get together with me and meet
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2315
pie before this evening. What time do you have free?" or something of that
sort. And I didn't have any time or he didn't have any time. There wasn't
any arrangemenl that we could make except, well, to stop by the hotel and
then we would go mi together.
Q. hid he ask yon during that conversation about any particular matters
relating to China? — A. My recollection is that he did not. It was just a conversa-
tion to try and find some mutually convenient time to meet. It's very hard to
he absolutely positive about any of these things because at the time they were just
incidents that didn't mean anything. I'm quite positive there was no conversa-
tion except in an effort to find a mutual satisfactory place to meet.
Q. I'd like for us to he as clear as we can in citing these particular points.
Mr. Service, because I would like to get from you whatever you can recall
about these early associations.
.Mr. Achilles. l>id you make any inquiries at all as to Roth's reputability
in the Department V
A. Well, we will have to skip ahead a little bit in the chronological sequence
here. It was some time, well. I don't remember the date, and I don't think
it is specified here. I don't think I even tried to guess at it here [indicating the
chronology]. If must have been fairly soon after this April 19 supper at Roth's.
He called me one morning in the office and wanted to know if I could meet him.
He suggested the park between the two Interior buildings. He seemed to be
quite excited. I said, "Sure, Andy," and walked over there and he told me that
he wanted to know if I knew of a telegram from Moscow warning the Depart-
ment against accepting at face value everything that Hurley had reported that
Stalin had said to him.
lis a telegram that I think is in the white paper here. I had not seen the
telegram and knew nothing about it. And this struck me as so strange that as
soon a- I got hack to the Department — I walked right back to the Department —
I spoke to Mr. Stanton about it and he knew about Roth and he knew Roth
was working over in ONI. And I told him what Roth had asked me and he said
that it seemed very strange that a lieutenant over in ONI should know the
telegram which I myself had not seen and which I think had a pretty high classi-
fication probably. And Mr. Stanton thought for a while and then he said that
Harriman had just returned and had brought with him a young naval officer
as an aide and that undoubtedly this young Navy officer, who was the assistant
naval attache, had, therefore, some sort of relation with ONI. He had discussed
the matter with Roth and he dismissed it as far as I could see.
He certainly didn't give any appearance of being concerned about Roth or
about Roth's having it. I knew that some of the other officers in China Affairs
were acquainted with Roth. I'm not sure at what point I found that out. I
knew that Friedman, for instance, was a good friend of his because they
mentioned him.
Q. Did you make that telegram available to Roth? — A. I certainly did not,
sir. I never saw it myself.
Questions by Mr. Achili.es :
Q. Stanton indicated no doubts as to Roth's reliability? — A. Absolutely none.
Q. Did you make any inquiries of anybody in the Department about Jaffe's
reputability? — A. Not at that time, no. Somewhat later on I did.
Q. Do you remember about when? — A. It would be about the end of April, I
think.
Q. What led you to make the inquiries then? — A. Well, it's hard to find the
exact words that can express it. I wouldn't say that I was suspicious of Jaffe
hut I just didn't like Jaffe very much. I was perplexed by his rather aggressive,
nosy manner, and I asked somebody, I'm not sure who it was, about Jaffe. And
they said he was not a good guy to be around too much, or something of that
sort. No, that isn't quite right.
Q. You don't remember who the person was that you asked? — A. No, sir;
I don't.
The Chairman. Do you know when it was?
A. Well. I was saying a minute ago, sir, I think it was probably about the end
of April or early May.
Q. Or whether it was one of the far eastern people or one of our press people? —
A. No, it wasn't.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Was this after you let him see the copies of your report? — A. Yes, sir; yes,
it was. At the same time I gained the impression that people knew Jaffe and
O&870 — 50 — pt. 2 53
2316 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
there wasn't anything very definite or positive. The person who I spoke to hail
pretty much the impression that I had at the time of Jaffe, that he was a nosy
guy and overaggressive — and that was the impression I got.
Q. You regarded Jaffe as a member of the press, did you? — A. Certainly,
entirely. And you might say a little bit more than that, a member of the research
student expert branch of the press.
Mr. Stevens. You can recall this conversation but you cannot recall with whom
you had it?
A. No, sir ; it's very, very hazy.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. I take it, from something you said, that you treated the members of the
Newspaper Guild, that is the press, and writers on China as people in the same
general category? — A. Yes.
Q. People who were entitled to background information? — A. That is right;
sir, yes.
Q. Did you in your treatment of such people, or were you accustomed to give
them as background information, information which they were not supposed to
use which was classified in a sense but to which you thought they were entitled
to as background information but were not supposed to publish? — A. Certainly.
That is what background information very often is, sir: just exactly that, mate-
rial which will give them an understanding and enable them to write intelligently
without going off in a wrong tangent — which they cannot use directly or which
they cannot quote.
Q. That is the definition of background information, is it? — A. Well, it's
Q. Let's put it this way, how would you define this material? — A. It's a very
important part of background information. I would say a good deal of back-
ground information is of that character.
Mr. Achilles. Would you ordinarily give background information to a news-
paperman without getting some indication as to whether he could be trusted
to observe the confidences?
A. Well, that of course is a matter of judgment in each case of reputation.
I think if you inquired among people in the far eastern field and could have
them put themselves mentally back to that period they would most of them say
that Amerasia at that time had a pretty good reputation. I talked to Dr. Blakes-
lee recently and we were discussing the affair — because of course Mi-. Larson was
working for Dr. Blakeslee — and Dr. Blakeslee said, "You know, I used to read
Amerasia and it had pretty good dope. It was a pretty authoritative magazine."
And I think that most of us at time thought that it was a good magazine.
Q. In other words, his relationship with Amerasia was the key to his credi-
bility with you? — A. Yes, sir; that is right. I knew nothing else about him
except his connections with Amerasia.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Service, from what we have heard during this hearing and
the documents Jaffe, had, Amerasia should have been an authoritative magazine,
should it not?
A. The answer is "Yes, sir."
Questions by Mr. Rhetis:
Q. I think, although the session on Friday started with this matter of Roth,
it may be better to go back and deal really first with Jaffe. since he is the
central character here. I wonder if you could, going back to your first meeting
with Jaffe — you have testified that at Lieutenant Roth's suggestion you tele-
phoned Jaffe and you made this arrangement to call at his hotel and proceed
to Roth's for the dinner. — A. That is right.
Q. I wonder if you can ted the Board whether yon can recall what the nature
of your conversation with Jaffe was on that first occasion. Did you drive to
Lieutenant Roth's name? — A. As I recall, we went by taxi.
The Chairman. .Now you're referring to the dinner? — A. That is right.
Q. Can you recall anything of the nature of the conversation you had with
J; ffe at that time? — A. When yen say "at that time." are you referring to the
conversation at the hotel before we went out. sir, or are you referring to the
conversation at the dinner?
Q. From the t'me yon went and picked him up, met him first at the hotel. — -
A. I hate to have to keep referring to the fact I hat t his is ."> years ago and it's very
hard to divide conversations or separate the d" < rent conversations. As I
recall. Jaffe Started out 1 y asking me aid t some of the Communist leaders just
personal information. He had I ecu there and he knew them or had known
them years before and he asked me about them— and I'm just, for instance,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2317
I think he asked me about Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and the other people,
how they were. Then he went on to inquire about what their current program
01" policies were, what their attitude was in the recent negotiations.
Q. Do you think this started rigid off at your very tirst meeting with him?—
A. Yes: my recollection is that.
Q. You do have a recollection on the point?— A. I have a general recollection
that the first thing he wanted to know is how are things in Yenan and he
asked details referring back to his previous visit there, and how was so-and-so
and he asked, for instance, about this American doctor who was up there, an
American of Syrian extraction named Ma Hai-Teh. And after that sort of
initial catching up on the personal news then he started asking for information
on their current attitudes.
The C&aibman. What was the last syllable of that name?
A. Teh.
Q. Now. did this conversation take place at the hotel before you started to
Rotn's home, or was this something that was the running content of your con-
versation that night — A. No; I think this was all at the hotel. I don't remember
anything about any discussion with Jaffe during the evening at Roth's.
Q. Did you return from that dinner with Jaffe, or did you proceed alone at
the end of the evening? — A. No: I think that a group of us came in a taxi
together.
Q. Came hack? — A. Yes : came back from Roth's.
Q. To downtown? — A. Yes: I think we probably took a taxi. We may have
dropped off somebody, but we separated at the Statler Hotel, as I recollect it.
I walked a few blocks over to where I was staying.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Did you get no tip during the course of his questioning of you with regard
to the more current events that the man might have been a little bit better
informed than a normal correspondent might he who was sent in that area
to work? In other words, were there no suspicions raised in your mind by any
of his questions that indicated that he was very well informed indeed? — A. Well.
that was April 1945, sir, and there was a fairly extensive amount of published
material already available in articles and by conversations with newspaper
people who had returned. No: I would say I didn't have any suspicion that he
had unusual or illicit sources of information. He was obviously well informed.
But that was one of his main interests.
Q. Will you reflect again on your return from the Roth's home. Did Mi-.
Jaffe go directly to the Statler Hotel and then you went your separate way,
or were there any stops in between, do you know, can you recall? — A. I would
say that if there were any stops it was only to drop off people who had joined
the taxi, had come in the taxi party for a ride.
Mr. Rhetts. Do you have any recollection on the point ?
A. No. sir : I don't have any positive recollection.
Q. Were you alone with him at all after you left Roth's house, just the two of
yon in a taxi, or can you recall? — A. I can't recall definitely, no. My belief is
that I was not. but I just don't have any positive recollection and, after all.
it was wartime and taxis were hard to get and on a number of similar occasions;
everybody who was going downtown in the direction would get the taxi together.
And there was certainly no conversation with Jaffe that I had any recol-
lection of.
Q. You had made arrangements with him during the earlier part of the eve-
ning to see him the next day, is that right? — A. I think it was in the early part
of the evening, yes. As a matter of fact. I think it was probably while we were*
still at the Statler Hotel before we went to Roth's house.
Q. Did he make any specific requests for types of information or anything:
during that meeting which caused you to go through your records the next day
for material? — A. Well, you see I had this memoranda, my personal copy of this
memoranda, in which Mao had given a sort of preview of what the Congress
was supposed to decide and Jaffe was a very enthusiastic sort of person win-
said "Don't yon have anything more of this sort, any more material that it would
be all right for me to see?" I didn't specify in very great detail. I wasn't in a
position to specify in a very great detail.
Q. Did he say "it would be all right for me to see?" — A. "If you could show
Die" I think probably was the way he put it.
.Mr. Rhetts. Are you now talking about a conversation you had <>n the night
of the dinner?
A. That is right, sir.
2318 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Why did you take this particular single document along with you? Re-
member I asked you earlier whether he made any specific requests. Why did
you select this one? — A. He made no specific requests. And my recollection of
it was it was just accidental. If I had not had the papers out on my desk, if
I had not had to put them away, if I had not happened to alight on that thing I
never would have. It's just a sort of a spur-of-the-moment idea — well, this is
something that Jaffe is certainly going to he interested in and if lie wants to
know about the present Communist attitude I'll just take this along. That is
the dope there. In fact when I put it in my pocket or put it in my brief case — -
I don't know which — to take it with me I had no plan or thought-out intention
of showing it to him or letting him read it. It was more simple to have it
along for my own reference and guidance if he wanted detailed information
on what the Communists were thinking as of that time.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Well, now, then, on this occasion, on the evening of the 19th you made a
date to have lunch with him the next day at the Statler Hotel, is that correct? —
A. That is right.
Q. Now, will you try to recall and describe to the Board and as completely
as you can everything that went on at this luncheon, to the extent that you
can recall what you said and what Jaffe said, try to tell the Board.
Mr. Stevens. I believe Roth was there, too, is that right?
A. My recollection is that I was there, I arrived there first and then some-
time later, maybe 10 minutes later or something, Aoth arrived there.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. What time did you arrive at the Statler Hotel? — A. I have no idea, except
it was a luncheon engagement, sir.
Q. Did you arrive there just at lunch time, or did you arrive somewhat ear-
lier?— A. Well, I arrived at whatever was the agreed time, but I'm sorry I can't
remember what it was. It was not, as I remember it, particularly early.
Q. It was not a fairly early hour in the morning? — A. My recollection is that
it was not ; no. It was just a luncheon engagement. But the FBI undoubtedly
knows, if they had Jaffe under surveillance they know all the facts of it. If
you have some specific details that you would like me to confirm or to refute
that may be easier for me because I have no positive recollection on the matter.
Q. Do you remember roughly what time yon came down to the Department
that morning? — A. I believe
Q. You did come to the Department first, didn't you, before going over there? —
A. No: I don't have any recollection of what time except I kept normal office
hours, fairly normal office hours. I didn't have to get to a desk at a certain hour
because I didn't have any regular duties. If I didn't have an appointment or an
engagement until later in the morning I might do something else before I came
into the office, but I don't have any positive recollection of what time I got to the
office on April 20. I may have gone to some other place, I may have had a meet-
ing in some other agency or some other place in the early morning. 1 may have
gone direct to that before I came to the Department.
The Chairman. You mean you may have gone to the hotel?
A. No ; I may have gone to another meeting ; for instance, if I had a meeting at
OSS in the early part of the morning I may have gone directly there before
coming to the State Department.
Mr. Rhetts. Do you have any recollection that you did such a thing, or are
you just speculating here?
A. Yes: I don't have any recollection. Mr. Achilles asked me if I can remem-
ber what time I came to the office that day. The answer really is 1 don't re-
member what time I got to the office.
Mr. Achilles. I believe you said in your statement that the following day you
went through your personal copies of other memoranda and selected several
which you I bought appropriate to allow Jaffe to see. I'm wondering about how
long that took.
.Mr. RHETTS. Might I ask, are you referring now to the morning of April 20?
.Mr. Aciiii.iis. Yes; the morning of April 20.
A. Well, I was very familiar with the material. I didn't read each one over
as I went through them. I remember very clearly going through them. I
imagine I did it rather hurriedly. It wasn't a very involved or lengthy process.
1 was fairly familiar with the material.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2319
Questions by Mr. Achuxes:
Q. Did you do anything else that you fecal] thai morning, other than go
through your papers and talk to Mr. Jaffe? — A. I'm sorry, sir, I can't remember
what I did on the morning of April 20, 1945.
(}. How long would yon say you had spent with Mr. Jaffe that morning before
Roth arrived? — A. Well, I was thinking it was 10 or 15 minutes.
The Chairman. Is that a guess on your part?
A. That is purely a guess, sir. I don't remember.
Q. Did yon have lunch in Jaffe's room, or downstairs in the hotel? — A. My recol-
lection Is that the lunch was in his room. He ordered it in the room.
Q. How long would you say it was after Roth arrived before you had lunch? —
A. I think it was quite a while because the service was rather slow. But there
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Did you go over these reports individually with Jaffe after yon arrived at
this place? — A. Yes : I think we went over some of them anyway.
Q. That would take quite a while, wouldn't it? — A. Well, going over them — I
mean 1 showed Jaffe the report and told him roughly what it was about. I
don't think we went over it by reading them or anything like that.
Q. Have you told us how many of these reports roughly you think you brought
with you? — A. My recollection has been that it was, as I stated in here [indicat-
ing statement], 8 or 10, but I have no positive recollection. As I remember it,
they were in one envelope and not a very bulky one.
Q. You brought them in your brief case? — A. Oh, I'm sure I did, since I always
carried a brief case. But I wouldn't — I'm not in any position to — how should
I say — argue the figure of 8 or 10.
Q. Did Roth bring any papers to that meeting? — A. I can't remember, sir.
I don't remember whether he did or not.
Q. Did he leave with you at the time you left after the luncheon? — A. Roth?
Yes; my recollection is that we left together and walked down toward the State
Department building together.
Q. Was he carrying any packages at that time? — A. I don't know.
Q. Nothing that you noticed? — A. No. I just don't remember, sir. I don't
remember whether he had a brief case or whether he had anything in his hands.
Mr. Stevens. Well, then, if you left together, was Roth aware of the fact
that you had left your copies with Mr. Jaffe for him to take to New York?
A. I believe he was, yes.
Questions by Mr. Achilles:
Q. There wasn't any interchange of papers either way, between Roth and
Jaffe? — A. I don't remember any.
Q. Would you recount your conversation with Mr. Jaffee, leading up to your
leaving the copies with him, Mr. Service? — A. My recollection was that at that
time there was no statement, no understanding on my part that Jaffe was going
to keep them or take them to New York.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. When you left this material with Mr. Jaffe on that occasion, did you give
him any instructions as to whether or not he could use the material? — A. In what
sense do you mean, use it, sir?
Q. I mean in the sense of instructions as to what to do with background
material, whether he could .use them in his publications, or whether you were
giving them to him as background material, as to which you already testified. —
A. I don't remember that that point was specifically discussed. I think it was
just understood and taken for granted that I was allowing him to have the
materia] for background information. I think he did ask me if I could write-
for the magazine and I told him of course I couldn't write any articles for him.
And that itself was in effect saying the same thing that he couldn't use my
writings directly.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. l>o you have any independent recollection about the conversation that took
place at lunch that day? — A. I have little bits and pieces of recollections of
conversations with Koth, with Jaffe. with other people, but it's very difficult
to separate these out and to say "Now this was this conversation on this date
and this was the conversation on that date." I cannot recall anything about that
2320 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
particular conversation. I have a general recollection of bits and pieces of
numerous conversations.
Q. This was all you can remember about that? — A. I remember only little
bits and pieces of conversations I had.
Q. This is as good a time as any, if your recollection is of that character, to
try to get what recollection of these bits and pieces of all your conversations
with Jaffe you had. Will you try to tell the Board what you do recall, just the
nature of the various types of conversations that you had with Jaffe, the Board
bearing in mind that you cannot relate any particular item of conversation
to any particular date? — A. Well, I believe, for instance, that one time Jaffe asked
what was going on in China, what the news was, and I mentioned the very
obvious fact, which is well known in China, that the Communists were spreading
out, moving aggressively toward the southeast part of China — that was partly
itself in self-defense and partly excused in their minds by the argument that
they were helping the war effort by being ready to cooperate with our forces
if we should ever land. That was a fact that was well known at the time.
Certainly we discussed, or be asked me about their plans for setting up a more
or less independent government. That is a subject that was mentioned in one
of my late memoranda.
Questions by Mr. Achili.es :
Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which he asked you to leave the
copies with him? — A. How do you mean, sir, the circumstances?
Q. What led up to that request on his part? What conversations were
there? — A. Well, about all I can remember is that he was very interested and
very appreciative of my allowing him to see this material and, as I say, I
thought I was just allowing him to read it and he would return it to me and
later in the conversation apparently he said, "Well, I have got to go back to
New York today and I really want to have a chance to look this over and
I'm not going to be able to sit down right now and read them. I have got to do
something else, see somebody" — I have forgotten what the excuse was — "so
can't I take them back to New York with me?" And I had a great deal of
hesitation. I did not like the idea of him taking them to New York with him.
And there was some discussion about that and finally I agreed in view of the
content and nature of the things, to allow him to take them up to New York
and read them. I don't remember much more about that than what I have
stated in my statement to the FBI and in my personal statement here.
Q. Do you recall at all how many of them be read in the hotel? — A. Well, as
I say, I don't think he read any of them completely, because he looked them
over and we looked them over together, discussed the contents of them very
briefly there, but that was it. He didn't sit down and try to read or study
any of them right then and there. I had supposed lie was going to do that in
the afternoon.
Q. When you were going over them with him, was Lieutenant Roth there, or
was that before Roth arrived? — A. I believe it was before Roth arrived, sir,
but 1 can't be positive because I think we did that as soon as I arrived there.
Roth came in later.
The Chairman. Can you put together the bits and pieces of recollection you
have? The counsel asked you that question. Can yon do that?
A. I started out and I can't remember anymore.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Yon mentioned a moment ago that he asked you if you would write some-
thing for the magazine Amerasia. What was that conversation? — A. Well, I
have just a very hazy recollection that he asked me if I would write for the
magazine and I said, "No, of course can't write lor the magazine." For in-
stance, lie told me that the magazine was getting to lie too much of a job for him
and it would take up too much of his time and be would like to turn the maga-
zine over to somebody. He asked me if I wouldn't be interested in taking over the
magazine. I forget what the proposition was that he suggested. It was a sort of
a partnership, or he would allow me to run it and he would be the financial
angel, or something of thai sort, some sort of a deal like that. And 1 said to him
right away that I thought he was joking and when he returned to it I told him
1 wasn't interested in leaving the Foreign Service. I thought that he had
jumped to the conclusion — apparently as a lot of other people had — that I was
thinking of leaving or would be willing to leave the Foreign Service.
There was a general assumption that I bad, shall we say, gotten a sort of a bad
deal from Ambassador Hurley. The fact was well known that I had been jerked
-TATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2321
out of China very suddenly and quickly. I told him that I had no intention at
tliat time of resigning, of leaving the Foreign Service, and as long as I was in
i he Service I couldn't do anything for his magazine, or take over his magazine.
Q. Now, what other items, if any
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. May I interrupt. I think you testified that when you were in China there
were times when you used to make it possible for newspaper people occasionally
to sit -at your desk and read a document, but never to take one out. Now, if that
was the general custom, will you express for the Board these discussions and
the hesitations that arose in your mind in times of leaving these things with a
person whom you did not know as well, for him to take them to New7 York or to
keep in the afternoon for that matter? — A. Well, I helieve when I testified before,
sir, that I indicated that we would not insist on being physically present if a
man was reading something. We didn't generally turn a paper over to him to
keep or retain or keep overnight, hut that we would say "You can look at this"
and we might go off and do some other job or go down the hall or something
like that.
Q. Yres. I gathered the inference from that, Mr. Service, that that was in your
quarters, that that was either in your office or in some place like that, that you
did not give to a correspondent a document to take out for his own personal use
or perusal, to take out of your office or quarters. — A. Well, if I had said that it
was always in my quarters I gave a mistaken impression. I didn't mean to say
that. There were times when, for instance, I would go over to the press hostel —
that is where the correspondents lived in Chungking — and there were occasions
when I have let them see a paper in their room, when I was discussing a matter
with them, hoping to get additional information from them on the same point.
I might say. "Well, here is what I have been able to get on this business.
What have you got?" or "What can you get?" And those interviews were some-
times in Chungking because transportation would be extremely difficult and the
correspondents generally had no means of getting around except by foot, really.
And I would be over to the press hostel almost daily. And there have been occa-
sions when I allowed a man to see a paper in his own quarters, his living quar-
ters, for instance, in the press hostel.
Q. To come back to the point about this. Here you were not getting from
Mr. Jaffe the same sort of information that you were seeking in Chungking or in
Yenan, I take it. leaving documents in a hotel or allowing him to take them to
New York. Will you just recall for us what A. I can only say this, Mr.
Stevens, that I hesitated a great deal at the time. I did not like doing it, and I
have regretted for 5 years that I was talked into it.
Mr. Achilles. You realized, did you not, that allowing him to take the copies
to New York would give him ample time to have other copies made?
A. I realized that later, sir. I didn't think of if at the time. I had been used
to trusting people, I'm afraid, before that time. I had no idea that he was
accumulating material in this form in which he was making copies.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. That is as I understand, you did not leave the copies with him for the
express purpose of having copies made of them? — A. Absolutely and certainly
not : I did not.
Q. That wasn't suggested? — A. No. sir, most definitely not. And I never would
have agreed to it at all. I can't think of anything more foolish for a man to do
than To make copies of things.
Q. Have you covered with your recollection the inclusive question that counsel
asked'.- Will yon put together all the bits and pieces you now recall? — A. I
covered most of the specific things that I can remember.
The Chaibman. The Hoard would like to have a short recess now.
i At this point, 11 : 05 a. m., the Board recessed and reconvened at 11 : 15 a. m.)
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder if I might just refer to one thing here, which relates
to a line of questioning which Mr. Achilles was pursuing a short time ago. defer-
ring to document 100-loB — and I'm referring particularly to page 7563 of the
Congressional Record, the second column, about a quarter of the way down, I'm
referring, Mr. Service, to the testimony of Mr. Gurnes, of the FBI. hefore the
House committee, in which Mr. Gurnes states, "On April 20. 1945, Service was
observed to enter the Statler Hotel carrying a brown brief case. < >n that occasion
he remained in Jaffe's room all morning. At the time of his departure he was
accompanied by Andrew Ruth."
2322 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Now you recall Mr. Achilles was asking you a short time ago how early in
the morning you thought you went to the Statler Hotel to meet Mr. Jaffe. Does
this statement by Mr. Gurnes accord with your recollection of the occasion. Mr.
Service?
A. No; it certainly does not. I do not recall any lengthy conversation with
Mr. Jaffe on that occasion.
The Chairman. May I say to counsel the information of the Board is that Mr.
Service arrived at 9 : 30 in the morning. I*d like to have his comments on that
information.
Mr. Rhetts. Is it the Board's information that he arrived there at 9 : 30 and
remained there throughout the morning?
The Chairman. That is right. The information of the Board also is that
Mr. Roth arrived slightly after noon, after 12.
A. I have not been trying to misstate the facts. I have been trying to recall
them as to the best of my recollection, and thaf was my effort in 1945. Ami
inevitably in going over those events again I have been guided a great deal by
my statement which I made in 1945 when my memory was much fresher.
Now one thing that has perplexed me has been that 1 have had in my mind
that my giving the documents, my loaning the personal copy of my memoranda,
to Jaft'e ; and his talking me into allowing him to take them to New York were
on two separate occasions and that has perplexed me. And I think that the an-
swer may be that I went to the office early, sorted out — which I have indicated
before I did rather hurriedly — the papers which I thought woud be all right for
Jaffe to see, took them over to the hotel, expecting to pick them up al lunch time.
And that is why I was surprised and annoyed that at lunch time Jaffe had not
gone over them and wanted to keep them for a further period of time. But I'm
positive that I did not spend all the time from 9: 30 until noon in the hotel with
Jaffe.
Mr. Achilles. Are you positive of that?
A. I am. I'm really very sure, sir. I can't prove it ex ept that I didn't spend
any extended length of time with him.
Mr. Rhetts. When you say you're positive, on what do you base the determina-
tion that you have a present positive recollection?
A. Well, I'm only trying to reconstruct very hazily events of 5 years ago and
I'm trying to arrive at the best reconstruction I can give, but I do not recall any
extended conversation, as there would have been if I had spent the whole morn-
ing there.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Mr. Service, you mentioned earlier that you did talk over some of your
reports with him. Pick any of those which you say you may possibly have shown
him and give us an idea as to how you might have talked over a document like
that with him. What, in time, would it take to do that sort of thing? If you
had as many as 8 to 10 documents, have you any recollection as to the degree of
conversation you may have had, whether any of those reports that you showed
him gave reason for questions being raised in his mind, which did not relate
specifically to the report and that you had to discuss out? — A. No: I don't think
there was any extended conversation of that type because you cannot have that
kind of a conversation until after the other man has read it, has re d the report,
and I recollect I said "Here are series of articles, series of memoranda on their
policies on different problems," such as Mongolia and Sinkianff.
Q. Did you take these off specifically with the purpose of letting him read
them or talk from them as a matter of briefing Mr. Jaffe? — A. I took them over
with the purpose of letting him read them.
Q. Could you take any report — take the one that you took over the night
before, could you give us an idea as to how you would have discussed such a
document with him? — A. That would be just pure speculation, sir.
.Mr. Rhetts. Excuse me. are yon referring to the document he took over the
night before?
Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.
Mr. Riiktts. I wasn't aware there was any testimony that he took any docu-
ment ( he night before.
.Mr. Stevens. My understanding is that the Mao document was taken the
night before and was left overnight.
A. I think that is correct.
Mr. Rhetts. Yon mean you took the Mao interview on the very first
occasion?
A. That is right. We mentioned that before.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2323
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. As the record stales here, you would have gone earlier in the day and your
recollection would be that you had. You do not know or remember whether
yon had any discussions with him aboul the contents of these papers before
leaving them? — A. I recollect, sir. that we didn't discuss any of the papers in
detail, that I more or less showed him what they were, gave him a brief idea
of the contents, but there was no detailed discussion of any of them. But I can't
remember any certain time.
Q. Mr. Service. I would like for you to reflect upon this point and maybe we
can come back to it a little bit later in our questioning here. I would like, if you
could recall, a little bit more detail about the discussions that you had with Mr.
Jaffe either before leaving him. if you did in fact leave before Mr. Roth's
arrival — how you may have spent your time that morning, if after you left ■
A. I certainly would like to he able to remember, sir. I'll do my best. I have
no specific memories right now.
The Chairman. All right, Counsel may proceed with the next question.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. So far as the general question that I put to you a while ago and which has
l>een recurrently before you as to whether you can recount for the board any other
topics or subjects which you think you may have discussed with Mr. Jaffe on one
or more of these occasions, have you now covered everything that you can pres-
ently recall? — A. Well, there are several points that are mentioned in my state-
ment to the FBI and in my personal statement that I haven't mentioned.
Q. But apart from those? — A. Apart from those I don't remember any ; no.
The Chairmax. Is there anything in your statement to the FBI that is not in
your present statement? If so, I think you ought to mention it for the record here.
A. I see nothing in the statement of the FBI which is not in my personal state-
ment.
Q. Coming back to April 20, after you finished lunch, I believe you testified that
you and Lieutenant Roth left the Statler Hotel together. Will you describe what
then occurred from the time you left the Statler? — A. We walked back toward the
State Department Building, the old State Department Building, and I remember
expressing some surprise to Roth that Jaffe was so friendly and that he was so
quick to try to interest me in taking over or managing or editing the magazine
Amerasia. And he told me something about Jaffe's interest in the magazine as a
sort of a hobby, and that he had gone out to China years before and had become
very much interested in China and made a sort of a hobby out of the whole subject
of China.
He mentioned that he himself had worked for Jaffe and Amerasia for a short
while. He told me something about Jaffe. I asked him how Jaffe could afford it,
and so on, and he said that Jaffe had a fairly prosperous business and that it didn't
require a great deal of his time and attention. He had fun out of running the
magazine. I asked him about Jaffe's political sympathies. Roth said he was a
left winger but that he was not a member of the Communist Party. As I remem-
ber it, he said that he believed we should — I forget how he put it, but Russia was
deserving of sympathy and, therefore, he was a member of some of these organiza-
tions like — what is it? — the Russian-American Institute of Friendship or some
similar thing. He mentioned his connection with that. But he made a definite
statement that Jaffe was not a Communist. I remember that very clearly.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. When Mr. Jaffe talked with you about possibly taking over the operation of
the magazine, did Jaffe make you any financial offer? — A. I don't recall that any
specific figure was mentioned at all. I didn't let him get that far. I wasn't seri-
ously contemplating that. I seem to recall his saying that he would be sure that
I would he better taken care of than I was at that time in the State Department.
But I think it was enirely on those rather vague terms.
Q. To go back for a moment, with regard to the time when you indicated-
to Mr. Jaffee after hesitation that you were willing to leave the documents
with him and pick them up in New York, did yon have any specific date that
you were going to pick those up in New York? — A. Yes, I think I did at that time.
I think I had already been invited to go up to the IPR. I'm not sure.
Q. What lapse of time, do you recall, would that be from the time you
agreed to let him have them until you were going to pick them up? How long
was he going to be able to retain possession of those documents? — A. I think
I went up to New York on the 24th.
2324 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. P^ive days? — A. Four days. There was simply no other way of returning
them conveniently before that.
Q. Did you mention to anyone in the Department, when yon got back, the fact
that yon had taken this particular step in leaving those documents with him
for 4 days? — A. No, sir: I did not.
Mr. Rhetts. Have you completed your account of this conversation with
Lieutenant Roth after your luncheon on the 20th of April?
A. Well, he said something about expecting to go back working for the maga-
zine again, as I recall it. He intended to go back.
Mr. A.CHHXES. Whose intention was that?
A. Roth's intention. I don't remember anything else. It wasn't a very long
conversation. We were just walking down from the Statler to the old State
Department Building.
Questions by Mr. Riiett :
Q. When you left Jaffe, did you then make any arrangements to see him again :
that is. at that time did yon m k > any engagement for any future meeting with
him? — A. Not at that time. \s I remember it. it was mentioned that I would
be going up to talk to the I.'R and that I would get in touch with him then.
<v>. To pick up these memoranda? — A. That is right.
Q. All right. When was the next time that you saw Jaffe or you had com-
munication with him? — A. Yell, actually the next time I saw him was the
evening when I attended a party and spent the night at Gayn's house.
Q. When was that? — A. Let me refresh my memory, sir. That was the eve-
ning of the 24th.
Q. You had no communication with him in between times? That is, in between
the 20th and the 24th, or do you recall? — A. Not as far as I can recall, I didn't.
I hadn't known that he was going to be at that party, actually.
Q. You did not have any communication then? — A. I don't think so. But again,
let's see, Gayn had telephoned me and said that he wanted me to come up early
enough that evening to attend a small party which be was having at his
apartment.
Q. And Jaffe was present at this party? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you have any recollection of having any particular conversations with
Jaffe on that occasion that you can describe to the Board? — A. No. sir. We
didn't have any. He made an arrangement for me to stop by at his office a
certain time the next day, but I don't remember any separate conversation with
him. There were about 10 or 12 people in a very small room all sitting around
in a very small group.
Q. Can you tell us a little bit more about this party, since we are at that
stage, this evening at the Gayn's on the 24th? Who was there, if you can
recall? — A. I have listed the people attending as well as I could remember them.
Q. In other words, you have indicated the full extent of your knowledge in
your statement? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. The next day when you went — you did go to Jaffe's office to pick up your
memoranda the next day. didn't you? — A. Yes.
Q. Can you recall anything that occurred at that meeting? Tell us what
occurred, to the best of your recollection.
The Chairman. This is the 25th?
Q. Yes. — A. Well, he showed me around their offices. They had a fairly large
library workroom. I remember meeting a woman who happened to be there
reading or working named Ralf Suess, I think, who bad a year or two previously
written a book called Sharks Fins and .Millet. I had never met her before. We
had a little conversation. I remember meeting and saying hello to Kate Mitchell,
who was there.
Q. Is this the first time you had met her? — A. No. she had been at the party at
the Cayn's the night before. Jaft'e on this occasion was preparing an article
on the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference and he wanted to
know if I could tell him offhand the biographic information on several of the
people. T didn't have much to contribute. I told him a few details from memory
about their public records. Bui I didn't stay there very long. He said he had
finished reading my papers and handed them back to me.
Q. Did he indicate that he made copies of them? — A. He certainly did not.
Questions by Mr. A< -hili.es:
Q. Did yon see any photographic equipment? — A. No, sir, I did not. I can't
remember Jaffe's office. I have quite a clear recollection of coming down a
narrow corridor and on the right hand side there was this library workroom
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2325
ami at the end of the corridor was Miss Mitchell's office. But I didn'1 sec any
photographic equipment of any sort. I saw none at all.
Q. Do you recall, as of that occasion, any more fully the number of documents
which he gave you hack'.- — A. 1 asked him if they were all there and he said
they were and I don't even recall opening the envelope.
Q. Reverting to your meeting with Jaffe on April 20. do you recall whether
you let him take all of the copies which you had brought with you that day,
or did you let him take only some of them'.'' — A. No. I let him take all that I had
taken over, sir. I had taken over only the ones that I thought it permissible for
liini to read and after we had the discussion and he had not read them that
morning and wanted to retain them I let him retain them, all the copies.
Q. Coming back to the April 25 meeting, you presumably did at some point
look in the envelope to ascertain whether they were all there or not, didn't you,
Mr. Service? — A. Frankly, sir, I didn't even have a list of the ones I had given
him.
Q. In other words, you did not check at any time to make sure that you had
gotten them all hack? — A. No, sir. But since I was using these and referring
to them fairly frequently in the subsequent month and a half before the arrest,
I think I would have noticed if they were missing. I think I would have noticed
if any of them had been missing, and I didn't notice that any were missing.
Mr. Stevens. Did you keep your records in your office in any particular order,
or did you just keep all of your reports in a hatch? — A. In a batch, sir. I orig-
inally had them all arranged in numerical order, I'm sure, but I usually was in
a hurry to dig something out and put it back and I didn't keep them in any
orderly way.
Questions by the Chaihman :
Q. At this point I'd like to recall to your recollection the fact that the FBI
appear not to have found a copy of your Report No. 40 in your possession. Have
you any comment to make on that? — A. I can't understand it, sir. I'm perplexed.
But 1 have no explanation.
Q. That was one of the reports, I believe, you testified you did not give to
Jaffe. — A. That is correct. I don't like to speculate — there was discussion about
that report with several people in the Department. I can't remember who they
were. One officer, for instance, had a discussion with me one time as to whether
or not this recommended discontinuance of aid to the Central Government, and
I said to that officer "No. it did not." And we dug up the report to look at it.
Now, I'm not positive if we went to my copy or whether he had the Depart-
ment's copy. But I remember on at least one occasion discussing this report,
Report No. 40. with officers in the Department.
Q. Is it possible at that time that you let your copy go? — A. It's possible, sir,
I can't say positively that I did. But I do remember discussing that report
during that period.
Mr. Achilles. Having had some hesitation about allowing Jaffe to take the
copies to New York, you must have had considerable confidence in him not to
check through them when he gave them back to you to see that they were all
there. Would you care to comment on that?
A. I would say I simply had confidence. I usually trust the people I'm deal-
ing with. I had no list of the reports I let him see. I didn't prepare a list.
Mr. Rhetts. You prepared no list?
A. No.
Mr. Stevens. Did you observe anything in the offices of Amerasia which
would have flagged your mind as to the fact that they gave you any idea of
the source of material they had for any articles? Did they discuss any of their
methods of getting information with you? Was there any discussion of that
sort with either Miss Mitchell or with Mr. Jaffe?
A. No. sir ; there wasn't on that occasion. The only discussion I ever remem-
ber along that line was an inference I derived from Gayn one time that he was
having some documents declassified for him.
Questions by the Chaihman :
Q. For whom?— A. For Gayn, by OWL
Q. Who was having them declassified? — A. Gavn.
Q. For himself?— A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Was there any discussion about exchanges of information be-
tween Gayn and Jaffe?
A. On this occasion when I stayed with Gayn he told me the first time that
he and Jaffe were very close and were in effect pooling their information, that
2326 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
anything that one of them got in the way of information they gave to the
•other, and so on. That's what Gayn told me the first time.
Q. Was Gayn supposed to be connected with Amerasia? — A. No, sir.
Q. Only in this way you just testified? — A. Gayn indicated that he had read
these reports which I had loaned to Jaffe and I was rather surprised. He said,
"Oh, well, we are very close friends and we work together." That was the first
knowledge I had of that.
Q. What was Gayn supposed to be doing? — A. Gayn was a free-lance writer;
had written articles for various magazines. Fairly recently he published a
series of articles in Collier's magazine ; and had one article published in Col-
lier's shortly after the arrest, as a matter of fact,
Q. On China? — A. It was on the effects of the bombing in Japan. He made a
study of the psychological and morale effects of the bombings, as I remember.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Would you recount at this point the extent of your association with Gayn
irp to that time? — A. I left Washington about November 19, 1944. and went out
to California for leave and I think I was with my mother in Claremont when
I received a note from Gayn saying that he had come down to Washington and
hoped to meet me and was sorry that he just missed me and hoped he would
have a chance again, or something of that sort.
Although I had never met Gayn personally, we shared a sort of common China
background and he had been at Pomona College with my brother, which college
my brother also attended We had mutual friends. I don't recall whether
I ever wrote back in reply to that note or not. I may have in a casual way.
acknowledging it. I think on April IS. 1945, I received a telephone call from
Gayn. He was here in Washington. It was the late forenoon and he wanted
to know if I was busy and if I could have lunch with him. I said "Yes, I'm
free."
He came over to the State Department and met me and we went up to one
of the small eating places, the Tally-Ho or the Trianon, one of those eating
places on Seventeenth Street, near the State Department building. And he
was friendly. We talked about various people we knew. Recent news from
China — and then he invited me to come up and stay with him in New York
If I were ever going up there. He said he had this extra bed in his apartment.
There is not much more I remember about that first meeting. When I accepted
the invitation to attend this off-the-record session with the IPR research staff.
I believe I sent a message up to Gayn inquiring whether or not it would be
■convenient — I probably telephoned — to spend the night there with him. My
recollection is that a day or two later, perhaps the next day. he. came back and
asked me to come up early enough because he wanted to have a few China people
in for a small party.
Q. But you had not seen him, as far as you can recall, between the time
you had lunch with him and the time you spent the night with him? — A. Nor
I had not.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Was that party for you, Mr. Service? — A. Well, I suppose presumably it
was ; I don't know.
O. Did you know what people were going to he there? — A. No. I didn't, sir.
I didn't know who was going to be there except I think he may have mentioned
Pepper Martin. He was a correspondent whom I knew down in China when
I was there. T can't say positively whether he told me. I'm sure he didn't
tell me about Jaffe because I was surprised that Jaffe was there.
Q. When Mr. Gayn informed you that he had bad an opportunity to see your
documents that you had loaned to Mr. Jaffe, what was your reaction to that,
Mr. Service? Can you recall? — A. Surmise. It surprised me.
Q. Did that cause you to have any further feelings one way or another about,
Mr. Jaffe, and the fact that you had loaned him the documents at all, as to
his trustworthiness? — A. Well, I was a little annoyed. T would say that it
did. I didn't show him any documents after that either, sir. It was not the
kind of thing I would expect.
O. Did Jaffe ever indicate to you that be had done that, that he had let
Mr. O-ivn sec your documents? — A. I'm not sure that it was ever mentioned.
Mr. Rhktts. After this occasion on the 25th of April, when you picked up your
memoranda, can you recall what was your next communication with Jaffe?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2327
A. Mv recollection is that it was this occasion early in May when he wished
to get a copy of the broadcast of Mao Tse-tung's speech to the Communisl Con-
gress. Mv recollection was thai that was about May 3. I think that I had a
phone call from Jaffe. I'm not sure. I seem to recollect that that was the occasion
when I had breakfast with him. I'm not positive though. And Jaffe said, could
1 get him this. I said thai I didn't know whet hero it was classified or not and in
any case I didn't handle that sort of material and I thought he ought to come
over to the State Department with me and I would introduce him to the man
who handled it. And that man. if he could release it, probably would. And that
was what happened. I took him over and introduced him to Mr. Chase. Mr.
Chase said -certainly." and gave him a copy.
Q. You say you had breakfast with him? How was that arranged, Mr.
Service? — A. By telephone.
<>. From New York or in Washington? — A. Oh, no; I'm sure it was here in
Washington. I don't remember whether he called me up in the afternoon or
evening or just when he called me.
Q. He requested no other report except this one at that breakfast? — A. As I
recall, on this occasion that was the only thing that he wanted. I don't remember
any other. On a later occasion he wanted something on this Confucius Society.
Q. Take them in order, please. That is all you can recall on this one ; is that
light? — A. That is right, sir. He was very anxious I think at this particular
time to publish in Amerasia contrasting statements or policy statements which
had recently been made by Chiang Kai-shek for the Central Government and
Mao Tse-tunji's statements for the Communists.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. This is on May 3? — A. Yes. Now, as I mentioned the other day, my memory:
of the date, identification of the date, was really based on the little black book that
the FBI agent had, as I recall.
Q You have stated in your statement, as I recollect, that Jaffe was in Wash-
ington on May 3 and again on May 8. Have you got the two occasions separated
in your mind," or are they mixed? What occurred on each of those two occasions
to identify them in your mind? — A. I cannot separate them. They may be the
same occasion. I think that Mr. Gurnea's testimony here indicates that it may
have been the eighth.
Q. How do you happen to remember the date May 3? — A. Because the broad-
cast was about May 1.
Mr. Rhetts. The broadcast of Mao's speech? — A. Yes.
Q. Let's examine in some detail what you did on that occasion, whether it
would lie .May 3 or May 8. Do you remember what time you went to the Statler
Hotel that day —
Q. Was it in the morning? — A. In time for breakfast.
Q. Did you have breakfast with Jaffe? — A. Yes. I did.
<„>. On this occasion? — A. Well, I remember having breakfast with Jaffe once.
Q. After breakfast what did you do? — A. As I remember it, he walked down
with me to the State Department. He came down so that I could take him up
to the L>ivisi<>n of Chinese Affairs so that he could obtain a copy of this broad-
cast if it were available.
<„>. At this* time do you remember whether you were carrying an envelope
or something of that sort? — A. I almost certainly was carrying a brief case, sir,
but I have no positive recollection. It is my habit to carry a brief case.
Q. You went to the State Department, and then after that what did you do? —
A. My recollection is that we had a very brief conversation in the hall. I don't
remember any lengthy conversation. I don't even remember taking him to my
office.
Q. What was the purpose of that? — A. Well : I think that it was on this-
occasion that he said that Mr. Bisson, who was a friend of his, hoped I would be
aide to come up to his place on Long Island some Sunday.
Q. Well. I mean that wasn't the purpose of you going with him to the State
Department, was it? — A. No. The purpose of going to the State Department
with him was just to introduce him to the Division of Chinese Affairs so he would
be able to inquire about obtaining a copy of this broadcast.
Q. He made that inquiry on his own? — A. Well, I took him in and introduced!
him to the officer in the I division of Chinese Affairs.
Q. Did you then leave him? — A. No, I stayed by and we walked out into the
hall afterward and my recollection is that we parted there in the hall,, just out-
side of the Division of Chinese Affairs.
2328 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Then he lefr the building? — A. I don't know where he went after that. He
left me. Whether he called on anybody else in the Department I have no way
of knowing.
Q. It is the information of the Board that these events you just described
occurred on May 8?— A. That may very well be, sir: I have no positive way of
identifying the date.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q You mentioned a few minutes ago that he expressed a great interest at this
time— whether it was on May 3 or May 8 — in the conflicting statements between
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he ask for any other information, other than this FCC broadcast? Did
he ask you to provide him more background information for him at that time? —
A. I don't think he did. I don't recall that he did. He was just getting material
for one article which he had in mind, which he -wanted to put out in the next
issue. The deadline was very close and he was in a hurry.
Q. Did you ever call his attention to the fact that you disliked this business of
him showing your papers to Mr. Ciayn?— A. Well, as I mentioned a while ago, I
don't think we ever discussed it. That was water over the dam and I wasn't going
to give him or show him anything more. I don't remember that I discussed it
with him.
Q. You had made that determination at that time, Mr. Service? — A. I had.
Q. That you were not going to give him anything else? — A. Certainly I had.
Q. Mr. Service, I take it you mean that you were not going to let him see any
additional reports, is that the substance of what you meant when you said you
weren't tfoins to give him anything else? You were not going to let him read any
more of your reports? I'm trying to fix somehow in this chronology of events
the suspicions that may have been in your mind as to his reliability as a person
to whom you would provide background information. I would appreciate any
help you may give me on that point.— A. Well, it's very hard for me to name a
specific date or describe specific phases that my attitude toward him went
through, but I was annoyed that he had apparently been so free as to show them
to someone else. I was annoyed at his eagerness, shall we say. He was over-
aggressive, overpressing. I was annoyed at the way he had handled the affair
before, when I had thought to just let him read them and return them in a short
while and when he had done this business of saying he hadn't had time to read
them, so maybe borrow them and take them away.
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Jaffe at any time about the report
that was prepared for Mr. Wallace on his visit to China, Mr. Henry Wallace V—
A. Well, it may well have been referred to in some connection. I don't remember
it specifically. I don't remember specifically ever mentioning that. Also, it is a
little incorrect to say it was actually prepared for Wallace. That is Document No.
157, which was prepared shortly before Wallace arrived. I have forgotten whether
that was a purely voluntary effort or whether someone suggested it might be well
to have available, for when ~\lv. Wallace arrived there, for the information of
himself and his party, a rather complete up-to-date summary of the situation.
Now. incidentally, I might tell the Board that when we discussed this Document
157 before, the Department of State could not locate its original copy.
Mr. Rhetts. When you say "We discussed this document" you mean when it
was testified about here in this proceeding?
A Yes, sir, that is correct. The original which was transmitted to the Depart-
ment under cover of dispatch No. 2733 from the Embassy at Chungking on July 1,
1944, has now been located. It was located the other day in the Division of
Chinese Affairs, I think. And the Board might be interested in seeing; the
original for several reasons. The peculiar mistakes that we noticed in the OSS
copy and in JafTe's copy do not occur in the original. That word which occurred
in both the other copies as "newsreels" is clearly "reversal" in the original. Also
it was rated excellent, this dispatch, and in its present form the dispatch has at-
tached to it a memorandum signed by Mr. Grew to the Secretary calling it to the
Secretary's attention.
Q. Was that report signed by you? — A. The original memorandum was, yes.
Mr. Rhetts. But not the copy attached to the dispatch?
A No. no. The original memorandum was signed by me.
Q. Do you remember .Jaffe's telling you that he had obtained a copy of that
Deport?— A. No, sir; I don't remember that. I do remember that in January
104") the article was published in Collier's by (Inyn, which seemed to indicate
that at that time, in January or perhaps December, whenever he wrote the
- \TE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2329
article, Gayn had seen that memorandum. And I asked Gayn about this once,
whether he had ever seen the copy, and I received a very evasive reply from
him. But 1 don't have any positive recollection of discussing it with Jaffe.
Can yon give me any more details, sir?
Q. Well, there is evidence before the Board that Jaffe did discuss that report
with you and told you that he had given a copy to Gayn. — A. I honestly must
say that if lie ever said that it has slipped my mind. 1 don't recall it. I have
m. recollect ion of ever having found out how Gayn had seen it, if Gayn had.
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. Knowing the type of report that it was, would that not have flagged in
your mind that something was wrong somewhere V — A. Well. no.
Q. Would you have thought that that sort of document would have been one
that would have been discussed with Mr. Gayn by someone in the Department
or in any department V — A. It would not have caused very great concern, par-
ticularly if it had been only my memorandum which was shown him and not
the dispatch representing the views of the Embassy or the memoranda which
were also written and attached giving the Department's views.
Q. You didn't know about that dispatch and so forth, I take it? — A. I had
never seen the dispatch and I had never seen the memorandum. But the
memorandum itself is a personal one and it's not really an official expression
of the Embassy's views or the Army's views or anyone else's views.
The Chairman. What is the document number in that case? Do you know?
A. No. 157.
Q Do you recall whether the memorandum found in Jaffe's possession was
the memorandum or the dispatch? — A. It was just the memorandum.
Mr. Rhetts. That was the the one which was a hectograph reproduction,
evidently prepared by the Research Analysis Branch of OSS.
A. To continue with your question, there was a very definite attitude on the
part of some offi ials in Washington during the war that, because of Chinese
censorship, because of the d.fficulties of getting very many correspondents to
China, because of the success of Chinese propaganda in this country, and par-
ticularly visits like Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's, that information had to be given
to the press, that background information, so they could give a complete picture
of the situation in Ch'na which was bad and deteriorating.
Hanson Baldwin's article which was a famous one, for instance, well, Hanson
Baldwin never went to China. This had to be based entirely on information
which was given to Hanson Baldwin here. And there were numerous other
articles written during the same period. There were other articles written
then by people who didn't get to China but there were people in responsible
positions who gave them the background information.
Now, I was fairly sure that Gayn and — judging by what the chairman has
just told me — Jaffe also had some knowledge of the contents of tl at memo-
randum, but since I knew what was the policy in some very high quarteis to
give background information and since they didn't wan; to ted me where
they got it. I assumed they were using their journa'istic prerogative in not
disclosing their sources, so I did not pursue the matter nor was I particularly
alarm d about it.
Q. You say you knew of this policy, you knew it by seeing Baldwin's article,
or had someone specifically expressed this policy to you when you returned,
Mr. Service? How did you gain your knowledge? — A. I would say, first, that
it was plain from the circumstances but also that I had direct knowledge from
officials, some of them outside the State Department, that there was such a
policy.
The Chairman. What do you mean "officials outside the State Department"?
Do yon mean United States officials?
A. Yes, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles:
Q. You mentioned that this practice was followed within high quarters.
Would you care to elaborate in what particular quarters? Do you mean in the
State Department or outside the State Department? — A. I was thinking par-
ticularly outside the State Department.
Q. Could you give any further indication of what those quarters were? —
A. I'd very much prefer not to, sir, if I may be excused.
Mr. Rhetts. To continue, after this occasion, either May 3 or May 8, which-
ever it was. when Jaffe came to the State Department and obtained the release
on the Mao broadcast and you then left him somewhere out in the corridor and
2330 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
went on about your business, can von tell ns about the next time you saw
Jaffe?
A. Well, as I recall it, sir, at the time of our parting there we were standing
at the top of the stairs and the conversation was to the effect that Mr. Bisson
hoped very much I would be able to spend Sunday out at his home in Long-
Island and I tried to put Jaffe off by saying I would much rather have the
invitation direct from Mr. Bisson rather than second hand. I don't remember
how soon afterward it was, hut my recollection is that Jaffe called by telephone
.'ind gave some excuse for Bisson's not calling me direct ami said that Bisson
would like to know if I could come up and have Sunday dinner with him, Sun-
day lunch, picnic, on May 19 I think it was.
Mr. Achilles. Could I interrupt at this point to ask if you would recount the
extent of your association with T. A. Bisson up to this date?
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder if you would mind, before coming to that, just let
us develop this one point.
Mr. Achilles. Yes, go ahead.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Actually didn't you see Jaffe that same day. whether it was May 3 or
May 8?
Mr. Stevens. Yrou mean after the FCC broadcast thing was turned over?
Q. Yes. — A. Yes, sir, just before closing time that afternoon Mr. Chase, who
was the officer from whom Jaffe had obtained a copy of the Mao broadcast that
morning, telephoned me. I was at my desk in the State Department. And he
said that a revised addition had come through. The first one was very badly
garbled. The radio was very weak and it didn't come through good. A revised
and much clearer text had come from the FCC and he recalled that Mr. Jaffe
had been very much interested and had gotten a copy that morning. As I
recall, he asked me if I knew how he could get in touch with Jaffe so he could let
Jaffe know in case he wanted a copy of this revised text of it. I recollected that I
said to him "I'm going to leave the office pretty soon. I know where Jaffe is
staying and I'll pick it up and take it over to him," which I did. I went by
Chase's office and picked up a copy and walked over to the Statler.
My recollection is that I called Jaffe on the phone from the lobby. He
came down and I met him in front of the elevators and handed him the clean
text and left him immediately. Jaffe had someone with him. I'm not sure
who it was. Mr. Larsen mentioned he may have been there. I have no positive
recollection that he was there with Jaffe. But it was just a momentary meeting
handing him the text of Mao's speech.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Do you remember Rose Yardoumian being in that party? — A. Yes. I know
her. It's possible, if she were there, she probably would have been there with
Lieutenant Roth. But I don't have any positive recollection of who was there.
Q. Who was she? — A. Rose Yardoumian was the office secretary of the Wash-
ington branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations. She was the office manager
or whatever you want to call it.
Q. Why would she have been there with Roth? — A. She was quite a good
friend of Roth's. I just don't imagine she would have been there alone. I think
almost every time I saw her Roth was around or at the same function.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Would yon describe your association with Mr. Bisson? — A. Well. I testi-
fied earlier, you may remember, that in the fall or winter of 1937 in Peiping
I had met Bisson. Mr. Haldore Hansen was staying temporarily with me and
he particularly — I also for that matter — was anxious to talk to Bisson or hear
from Bisson of his experiences and impressions of Manchuria, which I think he
had just been visiting.
The next time I saw Bisson was at this background session with the research
staff of the IPR on April 2.". 1945. Bisson had attended that meeting and
had taken a very prominent pari in the discussion.
Q. You had not seen him between the time in Peiping and the meeting there,
the IPR meeting? — A. I have no recollection of seeing him in between.
(J. Have you maintained any kind of correspondence with him? — A. None at
all, sir. During the meeting of the IPR. as I said, he took quite a prominent
part in the discussion. And he was particularly interested in the draft con-
stitution which the Kuomintang was planning to promulgate. I think in No-
vember 1945 to go into effect, and he had obviously made a very thorough study
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2331
of ir. I had Dot. He held forth at some length on the features of the constitu-
tion and the features of it which he thoughl were doI in Line with American
ideas of democracy. Later he subsequently wrote an article incorporating many
of the things he said, the things lie said in that discussion.
Q. What was his occupation? — A. Well, he was a research man employed as a
member of the staff of the — I think the II'R. He had heen for years with the
Foreign Policy Association. He received various grants and scholarships
for Ins assistance in writing his various books. For instance, when he came to
China his trip was financed by the Guggenheim Fellowship. He was originally,
in his early days in China, a member of the faculty in the University of Nanking,
a missionary institution. He met and married a missionary woman out there.
Q. And did yon see him between that meeting of the IPR and the time you
spent the week end with him-.'— A. No. As 1 say, the invitation was received
in a rather annoying second-hand manner through Jaft'e. I seem to remember
being called by Jaffe several times preliminary to this May lit luncheon at Bis-
sim's. The final arrangement was that — well, the final plans were made sort of
by stages in different conversations. The final arrangement was that I would
spend the previous night at Gayn's because lie wanted to start out fairly early
and it would he too late if I took a train.
Then the final arrangement was that there was going to be some sort of a party
at Mitchell's place. The Gayn's would be at Kate Mitchell's and they hoped I
would come up and go directly to Mitchell's to meet the Gayn's there, since they
would not he at home. The party at Mitchell's was most definitely not for me. I
arrived there late in the evening and, as 1 remember it. didn't stay very long.
There were a number of people there I didn't know. I didn't pay much attention
to them.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. On this occasion, on May 3 or May S, which you mentioned as May S as I
have stated, do you recall a conversation which you may have had with Jaffe
on the subject of American cooperation with the Communists in the event of a
landing by the Americans in China? — A. Well, the subject of course was one of
very great interest. It was one that everyone was discussing. It was one of the
primary problems. I stated awhile ago that I have a general recollection of talk-
ing to Mr. Jaffe at some time regarding the Communists' efforts to expand toward
the Southeast, to be in control of the coast there, the areas there, in the event
that we did make a landing. But the whole question of policy was still under
debate at this time and I don't recall that I knew what it was myself. For in-
stance, it was just about May sometime that one of the officers who was working
in tins same unit that Larsen worked in came to me and said that he was pre-
paring a paper on whether or not we would cooperate with the forces we found
on the ground if we went into Manchuria. Now, I never knew what decision
was taken on that paper. I never sawr it in final form. Is it suggested, sir. that
I divulged to Mr. Jaffe what policy was?
Q. I'm trying to get your recollection, what discussion you had, if any, with
Jaffe on the subject. — A. I'm sure we discussed it in general terms because
everyone who was interested in China was discussing it in general terms. But
I don't recall that I had any ideas myself of what American policy decisions
were, so that I'm positive I didn't discuss it with him in any specific or definite
terms.
Q. You were not advised as to what the American decision had heen in that
respect? — A. That is right. Does that answer your question?
Q. Yes ; that answers my question.
(The Board adjourned at 12: 35 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Mattes of John Stewart Service
Date: June 5, 1950 — 2: 1<> p. m. to 5 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building.
Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro, court stenographer, reporting.
Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles,
Arthur G. Stevens. Mr. Allen P.. Moreland, legal cfficer.
Counsel for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruekelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 2 : 10 p. m., June 5, 1950. )
68970 — 50 — r>t. 2 54
2332 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Mr. Service. I was asking you before lunch about some plans for United
States cooperation with the Communists in China in the event of a United
States landing. While you were with General Wedemeyer's staff there were
some plans drawn up for cooperation with the Chinese Communists made up
by the staff'.' — A. Well, there weren't any of which I had any knowledge. There
was that proposal which I think was drawn up by General McClure, but that was
in Decemher 1!»44 and January 1!)4.~>, before I was in Chungking. We made
reference to that before this proceeding.
Q. Well, those were plans drawn up for the staff as to what to do if the
United States made a landing in the territory of the Chinese Communists? —
A. Not exactly. That was planned, as I remember it, but I have never seen the
original text. That was a plan for a joint Chinese-American guerrilla operation
in north China, I think. I don't know of any plans drawn up for joint action in
landing. It was generally assumed as a matter of practicality that if there were
to be any landing, which was frequently talked about — I mentioned a public-
press-release statement of Admiral Nimitz in the spring of 1!>4.~> — it was assumed
we would be forced to cooperate with whoever we found on the spot because of
necessity.
Q. Do you recall discussing any such plan with this Mr. Jaffe? — A. I have
no specific recollection of discussing it with Mr. Jaffe. The question, as I men-
tioned this morning, was one which was continually being talked about.
Q. Do you remember any proposition, any pressure that the Chungking Gov-
ernment had been putting on the United States to agree to take in Kuoniintang
officials wherever the United States landed in China? — A. Yes, I have a vague
recollection. I think that may be mentioned in one of my reports. I am not
sure. It may have been mentioned in that telegram of February 26 which we
drafted. I would have to refresh ivy memory, but I have a general recollection
that the Kuomintang was trying to uret m to make that commitment that we
would take in their officials if we landed at any point on The coast of China.
Q. Do you remember any discussion of that subject with Mr. Jaffe? — A. Of this
particular desire of the Kuomintang Government to have us agree?
Q. Yes. — A. No, I don't have any specific recollection. I think that I should
point out, if you don't mind, that I was discussing China all the time during this
period. I was living and breathing China, and I was in contact with a great
many different people, and it is extremely hard for me to pick out from one con-
versation to another — even my conversations with Jaffe or Gayn were not par-
ticularly unusual or different. I was having conversations along the same line
with a great many people, and I have done my best to forget Amerasia. I would
like to remember all these details, but I can't recall any conversation with Mr.
Jaffe on this point.
Mr. Rhetts. On this point, I believe you indicated this morning that in terms
of trying to recall general subjects that were discussed — I believe you indicated
that you did recall discussing in general the problems of Chinese Comnranists'
forces' movements toward the southeast.
A. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. You recall that much?
A. Yes.
Mr. Rhetts. I take it that your last response to General Snow's question was
simply that you have no specific recollection of this discussion of this proposal
to have Kuoniintang officials accompany any American landing forces.
A. I have no specific recollection of that point — discussing that with anyone.
It is entirely possible, sir, that I might have. I have forgotten all about that
whole business until you mentioned it — about the issue of that particular facet
of the whole problem.
Mr. STEVENS. One question. When you talked in the IPR. in your cff-the-
record discussion, can you recall anything like this having come up there? Did
you discuss this point about the rumor that the Chinese in the southeast
A. I am sure that I gave a general summary of the situation in China, in which
I certainly would have mentioned — I'm speculating, sir, hut I would not have
given a summary of China without mentioning the fact of the Communist push
in that direction.
Mr. Stevens. Weil, would (lie fact that the Nationalist Government people de-
sired to have representatives in the Communists' area — would that have been a
pari of the briefing? I think you have testified earlier that in some of your re-
ports about Chiang Kai-shek wishing to have puppet forces in these areas for
purposes of after the war ■
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2333
A. That was the Communist argument, with which I didn'1 agree entirely.
1 1 might have been mentioned, sir. This question of pressure from Chiang Kai-
shek to get us to agree to take in Kuomintang civil government representatives —
it might have been mentioned as a part of the problem which we were lacing —
the policy issues which we had to confront. It would not have been unusual
to mention it as background information that we were facing pressure on this
point and we bad to decide whether we were going to accede or whether we
were going to cooperate with the forces we found in occupation. If the forces
we found in occupation were anti-Kuoniintang. we would certainly have gotten
oil' on a very bad loot tor cooperation with the local forces if we had arrived
there carrying Kuomintang officials to take over. It was the same sort of
argument that Mr. Larsen mentions and describes completely erroneously in his
Plain Talk article in relation to Manchuria; and, as I mentioned this morn-
ing, that paper was being drafted in Mr. Larsen's unit in May, as to whether or
not we would cooperate with whoever we found on the ground or whether we
would take in the Kuomintang, and. as I said, somebody came to me in the
early stages of the preparation of that paper, but I never saw it in final form
and didn't know what the final decision was. I feel sure that if something like
this subject of the KMT pressure on us — Kuomintang pressure on us — had
been mentioned, it would have been mentioned purely as background informa-
tion, and with specification.
The Chairman. What do you mean ••specification"?
A. Well, specification that it wasn't something that could be attributed or
written, but simply as a background to the policy problems that had to be
decided. I have no recollection of mentioning it, however, but. as I say, it is
quite possible that I might have.
Questions by Mr. Uhetts:
Q. Now I think this morning, in our attempt to go through chronologically
here, we hail got up to the occasion of your going to New York for the purpose
of having Sunday lunch with Bisson. I believe you mentioned you arrived in
New York on the night of A. The 18th of May, I believe.
Q. The 18th of May, and that you went to Miss Mitchell's apartment to pick
up the Gayns, or rather stayed a short time and then went home with the
Gayns, where you stayed at their apartment. — A. That's right.
Q. Now was Jaffe at the party at Miss Mitchell's'.' — A. He was.
Q. Did you have any conversation with him on that occasion? — A. I don't
remember any conversation at all. My only recollection of the party was that
it was very dull and they were playing a game of dice on the floor and I stood
on the outskirts ami had a couple of drinks and said hello to people. I don't re-
member any real discussion going on at the party at the time I arrived or
during the party.
Q. Then the next day. I believe you testified in your statement, Jaffe and
Mitchell came and picked you up in a car and took you and the Gayns and drove
out to Long Island. — A. That is correct.
Q. Now will you describe the — first of all, was there any significant con-
versation or discussion on the trip out? By "significant conversation" what
I mean is was there any discussion of Chinese affairs or far eastern affairs or
policy matters, or any general subject matter with which we have been dealing? —
A. No. I don't remember. There were six people in the car. rather crowded,
and I had never seen that part of New York, and we went across one of the
bridges and I was interested in looking around, and I asked a number of ques-
tions about the part of the city we were driving through — the buildings, and so
on. Sometime during that day — it was either going out or perhaps coming
back — Gayn was talking about the book he was writing, based on the experiences
of a fellow in < >YYI named John Caldwell, but that isn't particularly relevant
to our proceeding here.
Q. Well, tell us about the Luncheon party at Mr. Bisson's — who was there, what
was the nature of the discussion on that occasion. — A. Mr. and Mrs. Bisson,
as I remember it. Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Miss Mitchell, the two Gayns, and myself.
We sat out in the garden, I think we had several beers, discussed — I am not
sure now just what we did discuss, except I am sure that this discussion dealt
wirh China and the Far East. About the only thing I can remember about the
conversation at Bisson's was that we got into an argument on "the question of
freedom of he press which turned into a rather violent, acrimonious discussion
between Gayn and Jaffe. which I have mentioned in my statement. Jaffe sur-
prised me by taking the straight party line — in other words, that they had real
2334 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
freedom of the press in Russia, but they did not have real freedom of the press
here. Gayn disagreed with him.
Q. Did you participate in that argument? — A. No. Well. I expressed my
opinion that we had freedom of the press here as contrasted with Russia, hut the
two main participants got so heated that the rest of us became mere spectators.
After lunch we took a short walk down to the beach.
Mi-. Stevens. Who do you mean by "we" now?
A. I think it was Miss Mitchell. Mr. Bisson, myself. I am not sure whether
the Gayns went along or not. I'm quite sure that Mrs. Bisson and Mrs. Jaffe
did not. The beach, as I remember it. was 2 or 3 blocks from the house. I
never had visited it before, and haven't been back there since, hut it is my
recollection it was a short walk down to the beach to a couple of rowboats. We
walked along the beach a while and Miss Mitchell told me about the book that
she was working on — the philosophical development, trend of Kuomintang think-
ing, and particularly its increasing emphasis on the Chinese classical philoso-
phy— a rejection of western social science thought — and she was discussing mate-
rials— possible sources of material on that general subject.
Q. Can you recall anything about the occasion? What did you do after you
took this walk to the beach? — A. I am not sure that we stayed and had tea
tbere or not. We went back to the house and left some time in the afternoon.
Q. Then what did you do? Drove hack to the city? — A. Drove back to the
city. It is my recollection they took me right to the railway station and I
came back to Washington that evening, which would indicate that we probably
got into town by 4 or •") at the latest, if I came back by train that evening.
Q. Now what was the next occasion that you had any dealings with Jaffe?
Mr. Stevens. Did Mr. Jaffe ask you for any reports or did he ask you for any
additional information during these meetings?
A. No, sir; it is my recollection the oidy time he asked me for anything was
at a later date — on or about the 29th. I don't' remember him asking me for
anything during this meeting.
Mr. Stevens. You mentioned this morning how long you had known Mr. Bis-
son. Would you know anything about his political leanings? Do you have any
idea about his affiliations?
A. None at all. I wouldn't have had any particular reason to be suspicious.
He had a missionary-university background, he had worked for years with the
Foreign Policy Association, his books, like American Policy in the Far Fast, bad
been textbooks.
Mr. Stevens. But you bad no reaction as to whether he was liberal conserva-
tive, or where he might fit?
A. Well, I would say he was liberal, hut I thought you were particularly in-
quiring whether I had any indication of extreme left wing or Communist. I
bad no indication of that. I think that his writings celarly indicate that he took a
liberal point of view, or at least that was my impression.
Mr. Stevens. But not extreme liberal?
A. No.
Mr. Stevens. You made no additional arrangement with Mr. Jaffe at that time?
He did not make a future appointment with you?
A. No, sir, I do not think so.
Q. Now when did you next bear from Jaffe, if you recall? — A. Well. I think
ii was again in the evening — it was late in the afternoon on May 29.
<,>. Incidentally, these dates — are they your present independent recollection or
are they based on your reference to the statement that you gave the FBI 5 years
ago?— A. Tins particular data is based en my statement to the FBI. but it has
been con '.nned. of course, by published accounts in the Hobbs committee trans-
script and so on. This party was being given by Miss Rose Yardoumian and her
housemate — I am not sure who the housemate was — as a farewell party for the
Roths. Roth was being transferred to Pearl Harbor, and Miss Yardoumian or
someone suggested that there would be a combination of forces, because they lived
way out in Fairlington, out beyond Park Fairfax, a place where I had never been
at that time, and as I remember the suggestion was that a number of people who
were going from downtown meet Jaffe or get in touch with Jaffe and ride out
in the car with Jaffe. At any rate, I did that and we went out with the car
lull, as I remember it. and went oul and came back with Jaffe.
Q. D ) you remember any of the people who were in the car": — A. I can
remember various people who were at the party, but I can't be sure of which
'lies were in the car. It may well be that the Roths might have been in the
car. I am not sure.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2335
Q. All right — A. There were some people thai went to thai party, I think,
aamed Burns, husband and wife, both of whom worked in MID. There \v;is a
ni.iii named Johnson, and Ms wife, who also worked in MID. There was quite
a large group of 20 people or more in the party.
Mr. Stevens. This lady who invited yon to this farewell party — did Mr. Jaffe
call you about going out with him?
A. Well, I have been trying here to remember whether Jaffe called me or
whether Miss Yardoumian or someone else made the suggestion. 1 think — I am
not sure whether it is mentioned here in my statement — at any rate, the sug-
gestion was made. I couldn't say positively whether Jaffe called me and said,
"Let's go out together." or whether the suggestion came from somebody who had
been arranging the party.
The Chairman. Was that party in Fairlington Village?
A. Yes. sir.
Mr. Acmi.i.Ks. Would you tell us the extent of your acquaintance with Miss
Yardoumian up to that point?
A. Well. I had met her at a number of these functions. I met her first, I
think, in 1!>44. when I had a meeting with the IPR here in Washington. I am
reasonably sure that she must have been at Roth's party on the 19th of April.
She was a close friend of Roth's and quite a part of the same group, more or
less. I am sure that I saw her one or two other times, but I cannot recall the
exact circumstances.
.Mr. A< iiii.i.ES. Did you ever have occasion to confer with her individually, or
did you meet her only in groups?
A. I don't remember ever talking to her individually except once, after the
arrests, when I stopped by the office of the IPR to simply inquire for news of
.Mr. Roth- — whether he had gotten bail, whether he was out of jail, wdiat had
happened to him — and we had a very brief conversation there. She had been
in contact with him. and his wife, I think, had succeeded in arranging bail, and
if was just a very, very brief passing by. That is the only time I remember
ever having seen her alone. I think on one occasion I may have seen her in
the IPR. There was some visitor here in Washington down from New York.
I think it was Miss Ida Pruitt, whom I had known in Peking, and who was
connected with Chinese industrial cooperatives, and I think Miss Pruitt wanted
to see me and she was over in the office of the IPR, and I went over, met her
there and we went out to lunch, and we saw Miss Yardoumian on that occasion.
I'm trying to give all the details I can. A lot of these seem to be rather
irrelevant.
Q. What went on at the party at Miss Yardoumian's ? — A. Nothing. It was
just a great big bunch of people, and I helped out in the kitchen pouring drinks.
0. Did you have any discussion on that occasion with Jaffe? — A. No, sir;
I don't think so. I spent most of the evening over at one end of the room, and,
as I remember it. Jaffe was at the other end of the room.
The Chairman. What was the relationship of this party and the conversation
that I think you told us you had with Jaffe about Confucianism? Is that the
next day?
A. I am not sure whether that was in the hotel before we started out, whether
ir may have been in the taxi or during the evening. I remember that it was
some time during that evening when he brought this up. I think we had some
discussion in the hotel before we started out. in which he asked specifically if I
wouldn't give him some reports that had been written on the Confucian Society,
and I told him of course not. that they were Embassy dispatches, and I had
quite a discussion with him and explained to him the impossibility from my
point of view or any point of view of taking material from the files and allowing
him to see it.
The Chairman. Did you dig up some?
A. No. sir : I never did.
The Chairman. Didn't you say something about some slogans that you
A. Oh. well, out of my memory there. He went on to the subject of this
trend of the Kuomintang on their propaganda, and it is true it is quite noticeable.
They had a number of special slogans they used to paint upon the walls in big
characters, and out of my memory at that time I recalled several of these
slogans.
Q. These were slogans that were painted on the walls of buildings in China? —
A. Yes. they used to have them on the walls of the compounds. Chinese houses,
of course, are all built facing in, with a wall all around them. It is built around
a courtyard.
2336 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Jaffe on that occasion.
about the whereabouts of Stilwell at that time?
A. The whereabouts of Stilwell?
The Ciiaikmax. Y'es, whether he was in the Pacific or not?
A. This would be in May?
Tbe Chairman. Yes.
A. I had called on him on at least one occasion here that spring. He was com-
manding general of the Ground Forces.
The Chairman. He was in the District?
A. His headquarters were down at Fort McNair. He went out to the Pacific
for some time, but I am not sure it was that early. Of course, he was out in the
Pacific at the end of the war. He took over the Tenth Army on ( )kinawa.
The Chairman. Did you have any conversation with Jaffe on that subject?
A. I can't recall any. I don't understand what connection it would have had.
The Chairman. Was Stilwell known publicly to be here at that time'.'
A. Well, he had been commanding general of the Ground Forces.
Mr. Achilles. Do you remember when he was appointed to that position?
A. As commanding general of the Ground Forces?
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
A. Well, I'm only talking from memory now. but he came back from China
in late October and then went out and took quite an extended vacation in
California, bis home, and it must have been fairly early in 1945 that he took
over. I called on him at his office very soon after I came back from China,
in April. Now Stilwell was very anxious to get a fighting job. He was un-
satisfied and restless in the staff job and desk job. and he was determined to get
a final crack at the Japanese, and I think that some time during the spring
he did go out to the Pacific, and as a result of that he was more or less on the-
ground when General Buckner was killed, the commander of the Tenth Army,
and General Stilwell was put in command. I don't remember whether he ever
came hack to Washington.
Mr. Achilles. But you did see him in Washington?
A. Yes, I saw him in April.
The Chairman. This is now May 29 which I am talking about.
A. Well, I don't recall whether General Stilwell was here or not, sir.
The Chairman. Wasn't he. as a matter of fact, on the Pacific at the time
and due to have a meeting with MacArthur in Japan?
A. I would have to refresh my memory on the time. As I was just saving,
he did go out there. When was the Okinawa campaign? I could remember if
I could get soin ■ key dates here. I can't even remember now what his purpose
was except to attempt to get himself a fighting command out in the Pacific.
The Chairman. That was before the Japanese surrender?
A. Oh, yes: it was before the Japanese surrender. He was in command in
Okinawa during the last stage of the ( Hdnawa campaign. Since General Buckner
was killed there in action. Stilwell was put in command.
The Chairman. Do you recollect any conversation with Jaffe about Stilwell's
whereabouts now?
A. I can't recall in what connection the subject would have come into the
conversation.
The Chairman. At any rate, let me ask you this question: You were not
informed particularly as to what Stilwell was doing at that time, or were you?
A. Well, I have been dredging my memory here, and I do remember that he
was going out to the Far East to get himself a command, and I think that that
probably came to me in the personal conversation with Stilwell: if not with
Stilwell, then with one of Stilwell's close associates. Stilwell was a very frank,
outspoken person. I remember him talking about his dissatisfaction with his
job and how lit' wanted to get a righting job to do.
Mr. Achiii.es. Did you have any knowledge of General Stilwell's personal
plans that was not public knowledge? — A. Well, I am not sure just what was
public knowledge then. I am sure that whatever knowledge I had of his plans
was on personal or through personal friendly contact with him. But as to what
may have been, during wartime I assume that a four-star general's movements
are usually not public knowledge. T don't remember.
Mr. Stevens. Did you know precisely what he was going out to do?
A. My recollection is that he was going out to try to get a job. General
Stilwell's hope always was — personal hope— that if there were to be any landing
on China that he would he the man leading it, in north China or elsewhere. He
never made any secret about that. That was sort of "Uncle Joe's" dream, and I
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2337
think he would have liked nothing Letter than to have been at the head of the
troops inarching hack to Peking. Bui 1 don't remember discussing that point with
Jaffe. It was pretty general knowledge — Stilwell's hopes of being in on the
finish in China. After all. lie had been there from the start. He made no secret
of it himself.
Q. Well, now. coming hack to the party of Miss Yardoumian'S, did you return
from that party to Washington with Jaffe? — A. Yes. with a full taxi, as I
remember it.
Q. Jaffe and others?— A. Jaffe and others.
Q. And what did you do when you got hack to town? Did you disperse at that
point or did you see anything further of Jaffe on that evening V — A. As 1 remember
it, we dispersed in front of the hotel. I have a sort of vague recollection of Jaffe
walking down toward my place with me. He wanted to get some night air or
something. There was some discussion about getting a little exercise, and he
walked down toward my rooming place with me.
Q. Any discussion take place on that occasion that you can recall — I mean
what the nature of your conversation was? — A. No, sir.
Q Then you left him that night, and when did you next see him? — A. I don't
think I've ever seen Jaffe since then.
Q. You don't think you have ever seen him since this night of May 20? —
A. No, sir. I didn't see him at the time of the arrest, I didn't see him between
May 20 and the arrest, I have never seen him or had any contacts during the
arrest, or any correspondence or any other communications with him.
Q. Now referring to Document 17-17. which has already been put in evidence
here, you will recall that Mr. Larsen or Mr. Levine, as it now appears, stated
in this Plain Talk article that it was discovered by the FBI that you were in
communication from China with Mr. Jaffe. This charge has been repeated by
Senator McCarthy. In that connection, I would like to introduce into the tran-
script at this point Document 30-26, which is an excerpt of certain remarks by
Senator McCarthy on the floor of the "Senate on March 30, 1050.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
"(Congressional Record. Thursday. March 30, 1050, remarks of
Senator McCarthy, p. 4454)
"Another document stolen from Military Intelligence consisted of 22 pages;
and 1 of the documents, of considerable interest, which was found in bis pos-
session and that apparently reached Jaffe before it reached the State Department,
was John Service's Report No. 58, a report highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek.
Does the Senator follow me? Before that document reached the State Depart-
ment from Service, he had first mailed it to Philip Jaffe."
This charge has been further repeated by one Joseph Kamp in a pamphlet
entitled "America Betrayed," and in that connection I would like to introduce
into the transcrip at this point Document 58-1.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Documext No. 58-1
"Kamp — America Betrayed
"The FBI evidence showed that Service had been in improper correspondence
with Jaffe from China, and that Max Granich, a Russia agent, working under
\ rassili M. Zubelin, General Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Washington,
had been assigned to act as go-between for Jaffe and Service."
Q. Now you already testified. Mr. Service, that you first met Jaffe on April
10. 1045. is that correct? — A. That is correct.
Q. Did you ever have any communication of any kind with Mr. Jaffe prior
to April 10. 1945? — A. I had no communication of any kind with Mr. Jaffe.
Q. Directly or indirectly? — A. Directly or indirectly, unless it could be called
subscribing to bis magazine for 2 years, but no direct personal contact of any
sort prior to April 10, 104o.
Q. At the time you were interrogated by the FBI on June 6. 1045. were you
questioned as to whether you had ever been in communication with Jaffe from
China? — A. I don't remember any specific questioning on that point. I do re-
member that they seemed quite surprised when I insisted repeatedly to them that
I had never met Jaffe before April 19, 1045. By "they" I mean the agents who
interrogated me.
2338 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now with reference to Document 39-26 and Document 17-17, both of which
have already been introduced, in which it is asserted that among the papers
found among Jaffe's possessions was a Report No. 58 entitled "Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek — Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of, and Opposition to,
His Leadership." Did you ever write a report hearing that title? — A. I have
no recollection of ever having written such a report.
Q. Have yon during the course of preparations for this proceeding discovered
in the tiles of the State Department such a report? — A. No, sir, because we have
requested the State Department to locate only the reports which I wrote, and
they found no such report among the reports which I wrote.
Q. In the course of the list of documents which was inspected here the other
day there did appear such a document so captioned, indicating that it was a
despatch prepared by the consul in Kunming on August 1, 1944, did there not? —
A. That is correct.
Q. And that is the document which Mr. Sprouse testified was probably a
report prepared by him, is it not? — A. That is correct.
The Chairman. May I ask you about a visit you had to the home of Owen
Lattimore in Baltimore? Could you tell us about that?
A. I was asked the other day, sir, about early contacts with Owen Lattimore,
but I am not sure that we pursued the subject up to the point of the week end
with him. We will have to check the testimony. However, I think that the
week end is mentioned on page 42 of my personal statement.
The Chairman. Oh, yes ; in June some time.
A. It was the first week end in June. I do not know the exact date.
The Chairman. At that meeting Roth was also present?
A. Roth was also present.
The Chairman. And Miss Yardoumian?
A. And Miss Yardoumian.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Achilles. Had you seen Owen Lattimore after your return to April until
this week end?
A. I'm under the impression that I had a very brief casual meeting at some
time or other, but I do not know the exact circumstances. He was coming fairly
frequently to Washington in those days. One of my very good friends was John
Fairbank, and I have a vague recollection of going to a cocktail party or some-
thing that Fairbank may have given, that I may have seen Lattimore, but I'm
under the impression that I did see Mr. Lattimore in some group in some very
brief way during that period.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have any private discussions with him?
A. I don't recall any. If you recall my statement, at the bottom of page 42,
I mentioned that on some previous meeting — I don't recall the exact circum-
stances— Mr. Lattimore had mentioned one of the projects his research students
were working on — a historical study of the Chinese Communist Party and
Chinese communism — and he wanted to know if I had any recently published
materials that might be useful, and for that reason I took with me on this
week end a collection of recently published — a collection of Mao Tse-tung's
speeches in the papers that was published in Yenan, and I took that with me
to Baltimore and left it with Mr. Lattimore.
Q. That was a book? — A. Yes, a very large, fat book.
Mr. Stevens. But you did have no personal reports of your own at that time?
A. No, sir; none. If I could just say a word there, Mr. Lattimore has never
been curious or never requested access to papers or documents. He has never
asked me to show him anything. The only request I have ever had from him
was this one — whether I had any recently published materials on Chinese Com-
munists.
Q. Now referring to Document 58-1 and the statement in that booklet by Mr.
Kamp that the FBI evidence showed that you had been in improper correspond-
ence with Jaffe from China, and that Max Grenich, a Russian agent working
under Vassili M. Zubelin, had heen assigned to act as a go-between for you and
Jaffe, do you know who Max Granich is? — A. I did not know at the time I read
this, a few weeks ago: I had to inquire. To my knowledge, I never met him
and never heard of him before, nor do I know or have I heard of Mr. Zubelin.
Q. Now referring to document 92, which has already been discussed, and I
refer particularly to the statement in this newspaper article attributed to Mr.
Budenz to the effect that one Robert \V. YVeiner. alias Welwel Warzover. sup-
plied money for the defense of the six persons arrested in the Amerasia case.
Did you ever have any connection at all with Mr. Weiner or Mr. Warzover? —
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2339
A. No, sir; I never heard <>f him until Mr. Budenz publicized this — mentioned
this.
Q. So far as any contribution to your defense, that statement is incorrect? —
A. Entirely incorrect. I received no funds whatever of which I did not know
the origin in detail, except the $500 which was raised anonymously, I was told
by intimate friends, and was paid over to my sister-in-law to reimburse her for
advancing the cost of my bond. I received no other assistance but only from
from closc> personal friends. I can elaborate if the Board wishes.
Q. Now you testihed that you never saw Jaffe again after this evening of May
29, 1!M.">. Your testimony. I believe, has been that the last time you had seen
Gayn was on the occasion of your visit to the Bissons on A. 19th of May.
Q. On May 19. Will you tell the Board — have you seen Gayn since that time. —
A. Yes. I have seen him several times since then.
Q. Well, would you describe those occasions, if you can? — A. Well, I saw him
once. The next time after May 1!) that I saw him was probably in late July 1945.
His attorney was extremely anxious to have a brief consultation. He bad under-
stood that I was planning to request an appearance before the grand jury. I
went up to New York and had that meeting. It was a brief one. They were
chiefly concerned with finding out whether I had known any incriminating evi-
dence against Gayn or had tended to incriminate him in my statement to the FBI.
I told them that I had given the FBI a factual statement, as far as I was able
to do so, without any effort to fasten the blame, whatever there was, on anyone.
I did not see Gayn during the grand jury hearings, and the next time that I saw
him was. I believe, toward the end of 1945, when he arrived in Tokyo as cor-
respondent. He looked me up in the office, I had a very brief conversation with
him. We had one or two other very casual contacts. He was living at the
press club, and I was at the press club with friends on one or two occasions. So
we had no extended conversations. In fact, I did my best to avoid any further
contacts with him. He was rather anxious to establish himself on a basis of
friendship and invited me to a meal. I eschewed any further contact with Mr.
Gayn and I haven't seen him since about the end of 1945, as far as I can remem-
ber. It may have been early 1946. I can't state with absolute certainty the
dates.
Q. Now Roth was present at the May 29 party at Miss Yardoumian's, of
course. — A. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. I think we started to trace Roth, hut we left it somewhere
before that.
Q. We can go back.
Mr. Achilles. Could we go back and review your contacts with Roth?
Mr. Stevens. I think we took Roth through the luncheon in the room at the
Statler and the conversation on that day. Now, any contact after that date?
A. I think the next contact I mentioned, there was that occasion when he
wanted to meet me in the park between the two Interior buildings, and on that
occasion I reported as being surprising that he should have knowledge of this
telegram from Moscow about the interview between Stalin and Hurley. I recol-
lect seeing Roth at a party which I believe was given by Donald Davies, who was
then a lieutenant, and I may have seen Roth on at least one other social
occasion.
The Chairman. You have already placed him at the party at Owen Lattimore's.
A. I was working up to that.
The Chairman. This was before that?
A. Yes. I don't recall any other, you might say. significant or important
contacts. He, of course, was' at the party on the 29th of May at Miss Yardou-
mian's. and it was fairly soon after that — the first week end in June — when
I found that he had also been invited to the Lattimores: and as I recall, Mrs.
Lattimore suggested and got in touch with me. saying that Roth and Miss
Yardoumian were coming down and it would be very much easier for their
meeting us and taking us out to their house if we came together. The Latti-
mores lived in the far suburbs, a couple of miles or so from the end of the street-
car lint-, as I remember it. and usually when people are coming out. the Latti-
mores meet them at the end of the line and drive them out to their house.
So we got together and made arrangements, and I think we met at the railway
station, at Union Station, trying to catch a certain train, and rode down together.
I have discussed the week end in the personal statement. We came back early
Monday morning, as I remember. The next time — I'm sure it was the next
time — I saw Roth was the night of the arrest, when he was brought into the
United States Commissioner's office some time after I had arrived them. I saw
2340 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
him briefly, but I don't recall speaking to him, at a bearing before the Commis-
sioner on the 14th of June 1945, and I don't believe I have ever seen Roth since
that date. Roth wrote me a brief letter, or. perhaps 2 years ago, when I was
in New Zealand. He had been in Indonesia for quite a while and had gotten
very well acquainted with a New Zealand correspondent who worked with the
Chicago Tribune, a fellow named Pope, and it may be that Pope was returning
to New Zealand and brought this letter with him. It was a note saying how
much he had enjoyed working with Pope and hearing the news about us — I
should say "me" instead of "us" — he didn't know my wife — and it was probably
the first time in history that the Nation and the Chicago Tribune bad worked
so closely together. He mentioned bis wife — that his wife had divorced him.
I don't think I replied to that note. That is the only subsequent contact I have
had with Roth.
Mr. Stevens. Did you ever exchange any information? Did he ever ask you
to exchange any additional information after you met in the park?
A. Roth was interested in Japan; he wasn't interested in C.iina. II" tried
to discuss Japan and particularly tried to discuss the Communists in Yenan —
the Japanese People's Emancipation League — and I told Roth I didn't know much
about the subject, and he had finally got in touch with other people. I think, and
got some information which was used in the book from other sources. But I gave
him no information at all. And I knew too little about Japan and wasn't par-
ticularly interested in Japan. I had no idea at that time I would ever serve
in Japan.
Q. Now about Miss Mitchell. You testified. I believe, that you met her for the
first time on the occasion when you visited Jaffe's office on April 2~> or there-
abouts.— A. Well, I think I met her the first time, actually, at Gayn's party the
night before.
Q. And then you mentioned seeing her this next day at the office. You men-
tioned going to her apartment the night of approximately May 18. — A. Yes.
Q. And then she was with you the next day at Bisson's, on May 1!). — A. Yes.
And the only conversation with her of which I have any recollection at all was
on that walk down to the beach, when she was talking about the new book she
was writing.
Q. And have you seen her since May 19? — A. No, sir. I have no recollection of
any meeting after that.
Q. Have you had any communications with her? — A. None whatever.
Q. Now about Mi'. Larsen. Will you describe to the Board your contacts with
him? — A. Well, I may say that I have no recollection of the childhood meeting
that Mr. Larsen described, when I was an infant. My recollection of our first
meeting here in Washington, which was the first meeting since my childhood,
is roughly similar to Mr. Larsen's description the other day, except that as r re-
member it he bad just come out of the office of the Director of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs, a Mr. Ballantine, and I was waiting to go in, and they walked
to the door together. Mr. Ballantine introduced us and we said "How do you
do." and Larsen said something about "You probably don't remember me when
we were in ChengtU when you were a small boy." Now T must say that my re ol-
lection of this one luncheon with Larsen differs radically. I do not believe that
Mr. John Carter Vincent was there. I don't know who I went out to lunch with,
but. as I remember it, the eating place was one of those small places on Seven-
teenth Street that was quite crowded. Larsen was there with someone else and
we joined forces and sat together at the same table. Mr. Vincent didn't usually
go to that place. I have had lunch with Mr. Vincent, but usually at the Cosmos
Club or some place like that. And there are several details which Mr. Larsen
gave the other day that don't fit my rei ollection of the occasion at all. But that
was. as I recollect, the only contact that we bad between April and June — on this
occasion when we at least sat at the same table in a group of four or six people at
this eating place on Seventeenth Street. About May 8, when I took over in later
afternoon a copy <»f the FCC report of Mao Tse-tung's broadcast, I have a vague
recol'ection that Larsen was there with Jaffe, but that's something I would not
be positive about.
Mr. Achilles. Either at that luncheon or at any other time did Larsen ever
question you about your reports to Yenan?
A. Xo. I believe that this luncheon meeting — the occasion when we happened
to meet — was some days after 1 bad seen Jaffe with Larsen in the Statler Hotel,
in tli" lobby, and I have a vague recollection of mentioning the fact that I had
seen him with Jaffe and bis dropping the suhioct and not pursuing it. I said
something about "I didn't realize you were a friend of Jaffe's," or something of
that sort, and getting a very negative response from h'm.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2341
Mr. Achilles. Did he indicate any particular knowledge of your reports — the
substance of them?
A. No; we* never had any discussion of them that I recall.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have occasion in the Department to discuss your reports
with Larsen?
A. Never, sir. And, incidentally, the statement which he makes in the Ilobbs
committee testimony, that I attended several meetings of his group, is completely
untrue: I never attended any meetings of any group, and I think that he verifl d
that point here the other day. He said the only meetings he knew I attended were
,u, dings of the whole staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
Mi-. Achilles. Julian Friedman hail been mentioned once or twice. Was he
in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at that time?
A. Specifically, he was in the Division of Chinese Affairs.
Mr. Achilles. Could you tell us how well you knew him or how much you
saw of him?
A. I knew him very slightly. I don't remember having any contact with him
outside of the office, although I may have gone out to lunch with him. We often
did go out with associates.
Mr. Achilles. You did not. therefore, know him personally other than casual
contact in the office?
A. That's right. I don't remember his being present at any of these parties
or social functions that I have attended.
Mr. Achilles. Did he indicate any particular knowledge of the substance of
your reports?
A. Yes: a great deal. He was working with them and he was very much
Interested in discussing a number of them. He wrote a great many of these
memoranda summarizing them.
Mr. Achilles. Did he indicate any particular political views of his own?
A. Well, in this sort of context, sir, one doesn't discuss very much except
China. I don't have any idea of what his political views were with relation to
the I'nited States or Europe. Certainly, with regard to China, he took the
same general view that I did. He was a person of a great deal of enthusiasm
and perhaps likely to go to extremes. He used to follow the practice, for
instance, of putting the word "Communist" in quotes, something which I never
did. I don't think that is significant, but I think it is perhaps typical. Refer-
ring t<> the Chinese Communists.
Mr. Achilles. Did he have any Communist sympathies himself?
A. I don't remember any discussions that would disclose that. He was a
friend of Andy Roth's.
Mr. Achilles. Was he also a friend of Jaffe's?
A. I am not positive of this point, sir.
Mr. Achilles. I believe that earlier in your statement in connection with your
consultation in the fall of 1944 you mentioned being asked to talk to various
other Government officials outside the Department, one of whom was Dr. Currie.
Was that Dr. Lauchlin CurrieV
A. Yes. sir.
Mr. Achilles. Could you tell us what you discussed with Dr. Currie then?
A. No: I can't recall any specific content of the conversation at that time.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall whether yuu saw him again in lt)4.~» or not?
A. Yes. I did.
Mr. Achilles. Once or more than once?
A. I believe more than once, sir. I knew him officially. I had known him
since the beginning of 1943.
Mr. Ac cii.i.ks. Did you have any particular discussions with him or was your
contact with him purely social?
A. My guess is that I probably saw him more than once — perhaps twice or
three times — in the office. I remember going out to his home on one occasion.
1 took a cab. I remember it was a terrible place to get to. I don't think I
had as much contact with Dr. Currie in 1945 as I did earlier, because he wasn't
primarily concerned with Chinese affairs in the late period in the war. In
fact, lie was just leaving or coming back' from a trip to Switzerland in 194.">.
Mr. Achilles. As far as you can recall, he wasn't particularly interested
in China when you saw him in li>4.">7
A. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Achilles. You also mentioned talking to Harry Hopkins in 1!»44. Could
you Tell \is the circumstances of your conversation or conversations with him?
A. Hopkins' office called up and asked if I could come over. I, of course, did
2342 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
so, had about a 45-minute conversation with him almost entirely about my trip
to the Communist areas. This, of course, was in 1944, when I had just returned.
I went into complete details for him. He was interested in our impressions
and views as to their program, probable strength.
Mr. Achilles. Did you see him again In the spring of 1945?
A. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. Achilles. And in your statement you also mentioned talking to Harry
White in 1944. Can you tell us about your conversation or conversations with
him?
A. Yes. He asked me to come over. I was somewhat surprised. I never met
him before. It was the time, as I recall, when we were having very, very
serious difficulties with the Chinese Government with making any arrangements
on exchange rates for financing our expenditures over there. In the early part
of the war they had insisted on a very artificial exchange rate of 20 Chinese
dollars to one United States dollar, which was absolutely impossible. They had
no reverse lend-lease arrangements and it was becoming so expensive that it
was very hard for us to justify. Later we made an agreement to renegotiate
every 3 months, but there were a good many continuing frictions. Dean Acheson's
brother, Edward Acheson, had been out there for a while as a sort of financial
adviser to headquarters. Y\re bad a Treasury attache out there, and tbere was.
as I say, a continuing difficulty in negotiations over this financial problem. On
this occasion when Mr. White asked me to come over, he was apparently at the
end of his patience and he expressed himself very strongly on the Chinese atti-
tude of lack of cooperativeness, wanting my opinion of why we shouldn't dis-
continue financial aid. I went into considerable detail. You can't drop an
ally during the middle of a war. As uncooperative as they may have been,
we must continue. He seemed to expect a more forceful answer from me. I
think he was disappointed because I disagreed with him. I don't know.
Mr. Achilles. Did he suggest discontinuing lend-lease aid or just financial
aid ?
A. Just financial aid. We were paying the Chinese Government at that time
something like $25,CH )0,000 a month to reimburse them for expenditures which
they were making for us for feeding troops and things like that — building air-
fields and building barracks — and I think his idea was that the Chinese should
do that and pay for it themselves and we should stop paying them for it. I
don't recall that he had any suggestions of drastically stopping aid.
Mr. Achilles. Did you see him in the spring of 1945?
A. No, sir ; I only recall seeing him that once, which must have been 1044.
Q. Returning to Mr. Larsen, you may recall that Mr. Larsen testified here
the other day that Isaac Dow Levine had told him what purported to be an
account of your testimony before the grand jury, and in particular told him
that you testified before the grand jury from some list, indicating that a docu-
ment which you had shown to Jaffe had been declassified by a person by the
name of Taylor.— A. Just a minute, sir. He didn't say that I had testified that.
Q. You were out of the room. Well. I'll tell you that Mr. Larsen so testified.
I will also tell you that he testified further that Mr. Levine advised him that
before the grand jury you testified that Mr. Larsen is the probable source of the
documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. I will now ask you whether you
did give such testimony before the grand jury? — A. I gave no testimony, sir.
regarding declassification of documents by George Taylor, because I had no
knowledge of them. With regard to the second part, I was asked by the FBI.
by the Department of Justice, and, if I recollect correctly, by the grand jury
or the prosecutor at the time of the grand jury hearing if I knew how Mr. Jaffe
had received these documents, and I said I did not know — I mean for my sake,
but I was unable to say that Mr. Larsen or anyone else had. Now they did ask
me. I believe — of course. I have not seen my testimony there — I believe they
asked me whether some of these documents particularly 'the ones that were
shown to me — whether they would have been available or accessible to Mr.
Larsen. I believe I answered that I assumed that in connection with his work
he would have had some accessibility to them. I said that I could not say that
be or any other particular person had given. That is the best of my recollection,
sir.
Q. Now. turning to Mr. Bisson, you testified that in your earlier meetings
with .Mr. Bisson — your first meeting with him in Peking in 1037, and your next
meeting with him at the luncheon on May 19 — A. No, sir; the next meeting was
the Il'R.
Q. Yes. — A. On April 25, 1045. The next meeting after that was the lunch-
eon on May 19.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2343
Q. Yes. Will you describe to the Hoard what subsequent contacts you had
with Mr. Bisson? A. Late in 1M4.". 1 was in Tokyo as a member of the staff of
the United siaies political adviser when the United States Strategic Bomb
Survey Group arrived in Japan. This was a large group of experts, civilian
and military, covering a great many tields. to make a detailed analysis of the
effects of our bombing campaign against Japan, not only the physical effects, hut
the effects on the whole economy, morale, health, and so one. Bisson was a
member of that group — the Strategic Bombing Survey — and I recall meeting him
only once during that stay there. There were a number of, you might say,
far-eastern experts asembled in Tokyo at that time. There was the Pauley
Reparations .Mission, of which Lattimore was a member, and several other
people whom I had known previously. There was also the predecessor to the
Far Eastern Commission — at that time it was called the Far Eastern Advisory
Commission — which also contained a number of research people — old-time
research people in the far-eastern held. And at somebody's sugestion we had
a sort of yet-together evening, at which I would say there were a dozen or fifteen
of these people, all of whom had known each other earlier. Many of them had
been connected with the IPR. There was an international group. There were
several New Zealanders, several Americans, and Bisson was present at that
evening. I don't recall any other meeting with him until perhaps March or April
of 1946. He left Tokyo. As a matter of fact, he was billeted in an entirely
different building and his officers were in an entirely different building. We
had dm physical chance for contact, really, during that first visit.
In April 1!»4(>. he returned to Tokyo as a civilian employee of the Government
section of SCAP, and I believe that I happened to meet him just at the time
of his arrival when he was checking in at headquarters. It was a purely acci-
dental meeting. He was being assigned to a new billet, he didn't know where
it was, and I volunteered to take him around to it. I took him there and saw
him to his quarters and. left him. To my recolection, that's the last contact
I had with Bisson. We never corresponded with each other and never had
any real friendship or intimacy at all.
Q. Now I would like to introduce document 39-G into the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Document No. 39-6
"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950 — Remarks of Senator
McCarthy, p. 4438)
"He [Service] was a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the
Communist chairman of the editorial board of the infamous Amerasia."
The Chairman. We might have a short recess,
i AYhereupon, a short recess was taken.)
Q. Now. with reference to this statement by Senator McCarthy that you were
a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, do you care to make any
comment on that statement, Mr. Service? — A. I believe I have already testified
that. I have never met Mr. Field: never had any contact or association with
him in any way.
Mr. Achilles. Never corresponded with him?
A. Never corresponded with him or, as far as I know, attended a meeting
where he was present.
Q. Do you know Mr. E. C. Carter?— A. Slightly.
Q. Will you tell the Board who he is and what the extent of your association
with him has been. — A. I am not sure of what his actual title was. I believe
that it was probably something like executive secretary of the International
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, or it may have been executive secre-
tary of the American Council. At any rate, he was an influential administrative
connection with the IPR. Well, I have known him so vaguely and so little that
it is hard to detail the few times I have seen him actually. My first clear recol-
lection of meeting him was sometime in Chungking, possibly in the summer of
1041 <>r lb4"_'. We made a trip to China, I believe, in company with a Mr. Wil-
liam Holland, who was also working with the IPR. and as I remember the
circumstances, Mr. Carter made a call on the American Embassy. At that time
I think the Embassy was on the south bank of the Yangtze River, across the city
from Chungking. And after lunch — at any rate, after his call — Mr. Carter was
returning to the city to call on some Chinese officials, and I was also going to
the city, so I took him along — I provided transportation for him, which was a
2344 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
very difficult problem in Chungking. I wasn't with him on his calls. I simply
provided transportation to whichever government office he was going. The next
time I saw him was in late 1944. probably November. I visited New York and
called on a very old friend of mine, a former Foreign Service offrer named
Lawrence Salisbury, who was at that time working part time with the IPK and
editing their biweekly magazine called Far Eastern Survey.
During that call on Mr. Salisbury, I have a vague recollection of being shown
around the office, stopping for a moment in Mr. Carter's office just to shake his
hand and say ' II >w do you do." We had no conversation beyond the social
amenities. In A ril 1945, after I returned to Washington — quite soon after my
return — I received a brief note from the IPK, signed by Mr. Carter, asking
whether I would be able to give one of these off-the-record background talks to
their research staff in New Y'ork. I discussed the matter, as I have testified here
before, with the acting head of the Office of Far-Eastern Affairs, he approved
my acceptance, I made a very brief reply to Mr. Carter accepting his invitation,
and eventually saw him when I visited New York to give the talk — to have the
meeting, rather. I don't believe that he attended this meeting of the research
staff, but that I saw him either before or just afterward for a few minutes.
He had some discussion with me about paying my expenses. I think he said
that they did not usually pay any fee, which I understood and did not expect,
but they would be willing to pay my actual out-of-pocket expenses. As I re-
member it, I told him I was staying with a friend — I had a bed with Gayn— I
was having most of my meals Vith friends, and the only expense that I had
incurred was the railway fare, and I think that he gave me a check to cover
the railway fare. All that is rather indistinct memory, hut I do seem to recall
such a transaction. I have never seen Mr. Cartel1 since that day in April 194.1,
as far as I know, nor have I had any other contact with him.
Q. Now turning to the subject of inquiry this morning, with particular ref-
erence to the morning of April 20, 194"). I believe you testified that to the best
of your recollection yon did not. as the rep it of the FBI surveillance indicates,
according to the testimony of Mr. Gurnea before the Hobbs committee— that
you did not spend the entire morning with Mr. Jaffe. That was your testimony. —
A. That is correct.
Q. I should like to ask the Board whether it has any information available
to it as to what may have occurred at that time which might be used to refresh
the recollection of this witness, who has testified that he simply has no recol-
lection that will substantiate this assertion
The Chairman. The Board has no information as to what went on.
Mr. Achilles. There is clearly such a difference between spending 10 or 15
minutes with Jaffe before Roth's arrival for lunch, and spending the time from
9: 30 until 12 o'clock or slightly thereafter, that I should think you would be able
to recall in somewhat vague detail how that time was spent if you were there.
A. Well, I'm positive, sir. that I wasn't there, but I can't prove that I wasn't
there by showing what else I was doing on that particular morning.
Q. I believe yon testified that it may be that yon did go by there at some
earlier point in the morning. — A. I believe that that is correct.
<„>. I believe you indicated that that possibility might well be the fact because
of your recollection that you had supplied these memoranda to Mi'. Jaffe on one
occasion and expected to pick them up on the occasion of the luncheon. — A. The
next immediate occasion, yes.
Q. So that I take it from your testimony this morning that you think it quite
possible that you did in fact go there earlier in the morning — that is. well before
the time you were there for lunch ; is that correct? — A. Yes, I think it very likely
thai that is what actually happened.
Mr. A( itii.i.KS. And yet neither in your statement to the FBI in 1945 nor in your
statement for these hearings did you mention seeing Jaffe on that day except
going to lunch with him.
A. There was, shall we say. nothing in my mind at the time unusual Or excep-
tional about these contacts which would have impressed them firmly on my mind.
It would be very hard for me to say now what I was doing (i or 7 weeks ago.
Now, frankly, as I have said here. I was very dependent on the notes that the
FBI had as to dates, and I have no recollection of the FBI agent who was in-
terrogating me saying. "Well, did you go there early in the morning?" If he
bad, I mighl have refreshed my memory and I could have confirmed the exact
fact. Put I do recollect strongly my disappointment and annoyance when Jaffe
said well, he hadn't had a chance to read them and couldn't he keep them and
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2345
take them with him; he had to go back thai afternoon. Now in trying to recon-
struct the events during the past few weeks, my basis for recollection has been
chiefly the statements I gave to the Fl'.l when my recollection was relatively
fresh, in 1!M.">.
Q. You do not recall the FBI questioning you about any discussion with Jaffe
during that morning? — A. No. sir. And if the FIJI had the dates and times down
there. I don't remember any argument at all. They actually supplied ;ill of these
dates. I think.
Q. By •■all of these dates" you mean the dates used in your statement? — ■
A. Yes. I'm positive that I never spent any such length of time. I have no
recollection of any such lengthy conversation with Mr. Jaffe, and I do have some
memory of my disappointment at the lunch that he had not read them and that
he wasn't willing to return them then.
Mr. Achilles. Even after this questioning may have refreshed your memory,
yon are still positive that you had no such protracted conversation with him
on that day?
A. That is correct; to the best of my recollection. I had no protracted conver-
sation with him on that day.
Mr. Achilles. Again on the basis of refreshed recollection, can you recall
going there at !>::;<> in the morning briefly and leaving the hotel and returning
for lunch?
A. No. I can't say that I have a definite recollection. 'My memory is that the
conversation regarding the papers was very brief and more or less explanatory;
that there wasn't and sitting down and reading them over and discussing them in
detail.
Mr. Achilles. And still to the best of your recollection, it took only about 10
or 1") minutes going over the reports before Roth arrived?
A. Well, we didn't really go over them, sir, because he said well, he hadn't read
them, he had been doing something else. I don't recall the details of the discus-
sion, of course.
Mr. Achilles. He did say that he had not had time to read them?
A. That is my recollection, yes.
Mr. Achilles. Wouldn't that indicate that you probably had given them to
him at an earlier time?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Achilles. And you testified that you had not given them to him the aight
before, except the one?
A. That is correct. I think it very likely, witb the impression in my memory
here, that what actually occurred was that I went to the office, selected the
papers which I thought he would like to see, went to the hotel, left them with
him. expecting that he would spend that morning perusing them and that I
would pick them up at lunch. I arrived at lunch — he's a very bland and pleasant
fellow ; he was very sorry, he had done something or other, he hadn't had a
chance to read them, he had read one or two, and couldn't he keep them a little
while longer.
Mr. Stevens. Are you rationalizing this, or do you remember?
A. As I said this morning, I have been puzzled ever since I saw my statement.
wh:ch was onl within the last few weeks.
Q. Are you referring to the statement you gave the FBI? — A. Yes. I have been
puzzled because I have a memory that I had expected Jaffe to have returned
those and to have returned those to me at the lunch, and I was disappointed
that he had not read them and was unwilling to return them. Therefore. I must
have given them to him at an earlier time, but my statement to the FBI does not
mention any earlier time, and that is one point that has bothered me.
Q. Is it a fair statement, therefore, that you presently accept the hypothesis
that yon may have called on him earlier because it squares with your recollection
that you expected to get them back at lunch time? — A. That is correct.
Q. But that that is not your present recollection of that event in the past? —
A. That is correct. I did not uive these papers, did not intend to loan them to
him for him to take away : it was my expectation that he would look them over
hurriedly while lie was there — while he was at the hotel here in Washington. I
had no expectation when I agreed to let him see them that he would take them
away to New York.
Mr. Achilles. I am not trying to plant anything in your testimony, but merely
trying to refresh your recollection on this point. Do you recall, if you saw "affe
earlier in the morning, his saying anything to the effect that he would not then
have time to read them, would you leave th m with him in the morning and he
would give them back at lunch time, or anything to that effect'.'
2346 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. Well, that is the general impression that I have had — that he wished to
read them for a short while: he wasn't able to read them and return them to me
on the spot, because, after all, eight or ten reports would be quite a bit of reading.
It was my expectation that they would he returned to me later in the day when
I saw him again.
Q. If I may say so, sir, in terms of the precise question you have just asked,
I understand it that is what his testimony has been; that that is why the hy-
pothesis that lie was there before the luncheon meeting makes sense to him.
That is the way I understood it.
.Mr. Achilles. But regardless of what time you actually gave the copies to
.Taffe, you were anticipating that because of the length of the material it would
be necessary to leave them with him rather than just to go over them with him?
A. Yes, I expected to leave them with him for a short while. I didn't expect
to sit there beside him, and I think it highly unlikely that I had had the whole
morning free, because I was fairly busy : I was meeting a good many engagements.
Mr. Achilles. You have no recollection whatever of anything* else that you
might have done that morning?
A. Nothing that I can pin to April 20, sir.
Mr. Achilles. It was a fairly significant date — the day after you met .Taffe and
the date that you did make available these reports to him.
A. If I had known at the time what the after elfects would be, why the date
might have been marked-; but by the time it was marked in my memory, it was too
late for me to remember the details.
Q. Can you recall. Mr. Service, what you did on the morning of April 20,
1950? — A. I don't have the slightest idea, sir.
Q. April 20, 1950, is almost exactly as many days ago as April 20, 194~>. was
prior to your arrest, is it not, this being June 5, 1950? — A. Yes.
Q. I'm serious in my question. I wish you would try to recall what you did
on April 20, 1950. — A. No. sir, I don't remember. I wouldn't have any "way of
checking to find out what I was doing on that day.
The Chairman. Of course, the memory of events, as to a specific date, has
to be tied to some specific event in order to be remembered. If you had done
anything on May 20 last, you would remember it if there had been anything
special — any special event like, for instance, occurred at this particular time you
testified on.
Q. I suggest to you, as a matter of outlook, that the witness' testimony has
been that at the time the event occurred it wasn't an event of special significance;
it only assumed significance after June 6, 1945. — A. I might say that I talked to
the FBI agents there. Well, the arrest took place about 0 p. m., I think, and
we must have talked until about 2 a. m. I don't recall any issues or discussion
over this particular point as to whether I had spent the whole morning or a long
period with Mr. .Taffe; and I submit that if we had gone over the reports together
and had read them all and discussed each one, I would have a much better rec-
ollection of what reports I gave him: because if I were allowing a man to see
something for background information, I wouldn't normally sit clown and go
over it with him line by line and point by point; I assume that he can read it
and digest it ; let him do it.
Q. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript Document 39-14.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Document 39^-14
"(Congressional Record, Thursday. March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator
McCarthy, p. 44.",'. 1 1
" * * * This committee report indicates that a number of the members of
I lie giand jury voted for the indictment of Service and Mitchell on the espionage
charges, but that the required number of 12 did not so vote."
Q. And I should like to read to the Board a short excerpt from the Hobbs
committee report, which is set forth in document 100. It appears particularly on
page T.">34, column one, of the Congressional Record for the date involved in
I >ocument 100 :
"After the second grand jury bad heard all of the oral evidence for or aaginst
all six of the defendants and considered ail of the documentary evidence, fewer
than half of the required 12 voted for the indictment of any one of the three,
Mitchell. Gayn, and Service. * * *"
At this point I should like to refer to Document 324. which has already been
introduced it no the record. This is the testimony of Mr. Hitchcock, who was
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2347
he prosecuting attorney in charge of the Amerasia case, and tins is the testi-
mony Mr. Hitchcock gave before the Tydings subcommittee of the Senate < !ommit-
tee on Foreign Relations on May 26, 1950. I quote from page 4 of Document 324 :
"Service signed a waiver of immunity and testified before the second grand
jury early in August, and he was do billed unanimously."
The Hoard will readily perceive i offer this as refutation of the charge by
Senator .McCarthy thai some of the grand jurors at least voted for the indict-
ment of Mr. Service. Now after your voluntary appearance before the grand
jury and the grand jury's unanimous return of a no true hill against you, Mr.
Service. \ou returned to active duty in the Foreign Service? A. That is correct,
Sir.
Q. Now did you at that time receive a letter from Secretary Byrnes? — A. Yes, I
was returned to active duty on August 12, 1945, and I believe that Secretary
Byrnes' letter was dated August 14, 1945.
Q. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript as Document
36-A a copy of the letter, dated August 14, 1945, addressed to John S. Service,
Esq., and signed by James F. Byrnes. I do not have the original of this letter —
Mr. Service has it among his personal effects somewhere — hut this copy appeared
in the hearings hefore the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions in the Eighty-first Congress, on pages 297-298.
The Chairman. It may be admitted.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Document No. 36-A Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' Letter to Service,
Dated August 14, 1945
(Excerpts from hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priations. House of Representatives, 81st Cong., State Department appropria-
tion bill, 1950, pp. 297-298)
"August 14, 1945.
"John S. Service, Esq.,
American Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
"My Dear Mr. Service : I am advised that the grand jury, after hearing the
testimony of witnesses, has found nothing to warrant an indictment against you.
"One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is the investigation by a
grand jury of criminal charges. By that process you have been cleared.
"I am advised that at the time of your arrest you were placed on leave of
absence with pay. I am happy to approve the recommendation of the personnel
board that you be returned to active duty. You have now been reassigned to
duty in the Department for important work in connection with far eastern
affairs.
"I congratulate you on this happy termination of your ordeal and predict for
you a continuance of the splendid record I am advised you have maintained since
first you entered the Foreign Service.
"With all good wishes,
"Sincerely yours,
"James F. Byrnes."
Q. Did you also at that time, Mr. Service, receive a letter from Under Secretary
Joseph C. Grew? — A. Yes, I did.
Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point a copy of a letter,
dated August 14. addressed to John S. Service, Esq., and signed by Joseph C.
Grew. This letter also appears in the same hearings of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Document No. 36 B Joseph C. Grew Letter to Service Dated August 14, 1945
"(Excerpt from hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priations. House of Representatives — 81st Cong., State Department appropria-
tion bill, 1950, p. 298)
"August 14, 1945.
"John S. Service, Esq.,
American Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
"Dear Service : The Secretary has just told me of the letter he has written
you expressing his pleasure at your complete vindication. I just want to add a
personal word of my own.
68970— 50— pt. 2 55
2348 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"When I learned, only a few days before your arrest, that your name had
been coupled with thefts of official documents I was inexpressibly shocked.
Having known you for some time and of the high caliber of your work I could
not believe that you could be implicated in such an affair. As the Secretary has
stated, you have been completely cleared of any such imputation by operation of
our democratic machinery of investigation and law enforcement.
"I am particularly pleased that you are returning to duty in the field of your
specialization, far eastern affairs, where you have established an enviable
record for integrity and ability.
"With all good wishes,
"Sincerely yours,
"Joseph C. Geew."
A. No, we never had any discussion of them that I recall.
Mr. Achilles. Did you have occasion in the Department to discuss your
reports with Larsen '?
A. Never, sir. And, incidentally, the statement which he makes in the Hobbs
committee testimony, that I attended several meetings of his group, is com-
pletely untrue ; I never attended any meetings of any group, and I think that he
verified that point here the other day. He said the only meetings he knew I
attended were meetings of the whole staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Achilles. Julian Friedman had been mentioned once or twice. Was he
in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at that time?
A. Specifically, he was in the Division of Chinese Affairs.
Mr. Achilles. Could you tell us how well you knew him or how much you
saw of him?
A. I knew him very slightly. I don't remember having any contact with him
outside of the office, although I may have gone out to lunch Avith him. We often
did go out with associates.
Mr. Achilles. You did not, therefore, know him personally other than casual
contact in the office?
Q. Now I would like at this point to introduce Document 39-12 and to refer
also to Document 39-17, which has already been introduced into the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. 39-12
"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator
McCarthy, p. 4439)
"Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew very urgently insisted upon a prosecution of
the six individuals who were picked up by the FBI on charges of conspiracy
to commit espionage. He thereupon immediately became a target in a cam-
paign of vilification as the culprit in the case rather than the six who had been
picked up by the FBI."
Q. I should like to, in connection with these two documents — 39-12 and 39-17 —
I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, whether you have made any further in-
quiries from Mr. Grew concerning these charges by Senator McCarthy. — A. I
have.
Q. In what form did you make those inquiries? — A. I made them by letter.
He was out of the country at the time — in May, I think, of 1950.
Q. I show you Document 52-A and ask you if this is a copy of the letter which
you sent to Mr. Grew. — A. This is. I notice it is dated April 13. My recollec-
tion was incorrect when I said it was in May.
Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript Document 52-A, which is a
two-page letter dated April 13, 1950, addressed to the Honorable Joseph C. Grew,
signed "John S. Service."
The Chairman. It may be so included.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 52-A
5700 Broad Branch Road NW.,
Washington 15, D. C, April 13, 1950.
My Dear Mr. Grew : After the Grand Jury in August 1945 cleared me of impli-
cit ion in the Amerasia case. I was deeply appreciative of a letter which you
wrote me in which, as you will recall, you stated in part :
"When I learned, only a few days before your arrest, that your name had been
coupled with thefts of official documents I was inexpressibly shocked. Having
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2349
known von for some time and of the high caliber of your work, I could not believe
that yoii could be implicated in such an affair. As the Secretary has stated, you
have been completely cleared of any such imputation by operation of oiir demo-
cratic machinery of investigation and law enforcement."
There is nothing I dislike more than having to refer to this whole unhappy
episode. However. Senator McCarthy, in his charges against me on the floor of
the Senate and before the Special Subcommittee investigating his charges, has
repeatedly linked your name with the case in a manner which I know is wholly
incorrect. For instance, on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950, Senator
McCarthy said :
'•Later this man, John Service, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department informa-
tion. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the
Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign.
Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of
State, tins man, John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had
previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only rein-
stated in the State Department but promoted."
Variations of this statement, all to the effect that you insisted on my prosecu-
tion, have been repeated by Senator McCarthy on several occasions.
In view of what has heen brought to light concerning the case, it is obvious
that the duties of your position required you to approve having the fullest investi-
gtaion and prosecution of those guilty. I cannot believe however, that prior to
the completion of the investigation and Grand Jury action you could have insisted
specifically on my prosecution. Certainly you could not have insisted on such
prosecution after the Grand Jury action in returning a no true bill.
I realize that you have already, in a general way, refuted these false state-
ments by your letter to me of August 14, 1945, which I have referred to above.
However, in view of the continuing and irresponsible statements of such per-
sons as Senator McCarthy, it would be of very great help to me and, I believe,
also to the Department of State if you would he good enough to inform me that
there is no basis for the statement that you at any time insisted on my
prosecution.
If you feel in a position to give me any statement, I would like to use it in
presenting my case to the Department's Loyalty Security Board, which has called
me for a hearing on charges largely arising out of those made by Senator
McCarthy. I would also like to use it in a possible hearing before the Senate
Suhcommittee, but, of course, will not do so unless you approve.
Very sincerely yours,
John S. Service.
Q. And did you receive an answ7er to this letter, Mr. Service? — A. I did.
Q. I show you Document 52-B and ask you whether this is the letter which
you received in answer to document 52-A. — A. It is.
Q. I show to the Board the original of this letter, signed by Mr. Grew, as well
as a copy thereof, and ask permission to introduce into the transcript at this
point Document 52-B, wdiich is a copy of the letter signed by Mr. Grew.
Mr. Stevens. We have made a comparison with the original.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
Document No. 52-B
Beau Rivage, Palace,
Ouchy-Lausanne, Switzerland, April 11, 1950.
Mi-. John S. Service,
5100 Broad Branch Roarl NW.,
Washington 15, D. C.
Dear Mr. Service : Your letter of April 13 has this moment reached me and I
hasten to reply without delay.
My letter to you in August 1945, and that of the then Secretary of State,.
Mr. Byrnes, after the Grand Jury had cleared you in the Amerasia case, should
be sufficient to clarify your position at that time and to substantiate the fact
that you had been completely cleared, by due process of law, of the charges
against you. My recollection is that I further stated that you would be reinstated
in the Foreign Service without any implication of an adverse nature against your
fine record, although I have not now the text of that letter before me other than
the part you have quote. That is the way democracy works.
2350 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
There are inaccuracies in the public statements quoted in your letter.
I did not "insist on your prosecution" apart from that of the other five persons
involved. Having- been informed as Acting Secretary of State by supposedly
reliable authority that an agency of our Government had what it considered com-
plete evidence of guilt, I quite properly ordered the arrests, which of course
presumed prosecution. I did not at that time know the names of the persons
involved, including yours, and I did not wish to know them until the order had
been carried out, for justice must not discriminate. When I learned that you,
who stood so well in the Foreign Service, were one of those charged with the theft
of official documents, I was, as I later wrote you, inexpressibly shocked. It
was a great relief to me when you were cleared by the Grand Jury, and a great
satisfaction to see you reinstated in the Foreign Service with no stigma whatever
on your record.
I was not "formed to resign" as Under Secretary of State. Myths about this
have arisen. For some time I had wished to retire. The war was then over ;
I had completed 41 years of service ; I had passed the usual age limit ; and I was
at that time in ill health and was facing a possible major operation. It was
therefore entirely on my own initiative that I insisted on retiring, even though
Secretary Byrnes strongly urged me to continue in service.
Those are the facts, and you may use this letter in any way you wish.
With the best of wishes to you,
Very sincerely yours,
Joseph C. Grew.
Q. I may say to the Board that I introduced this exchange of correspondence
between Mr. Service and Mr. Grew to indicate that Senator McCarthy's charges
in this respect are wholly without foundation. Have you recently been interro-
gated by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Service? — A. Yes;
two agents called on me several weeks ago.
Q. And in the course of that interview did they
Mr. Achilles. Could you describe more specifically the approximate times?
A. On which they called on me?
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
A. I would say the latter part of April, sir, but that's just a guess. Mr. Rhett
informs me that it was just after his baby was born, which means that it was
after May 8 — perhays about May 10 or 12.
Q. In the course of that interview were you questioned about your possible
membership in or affiliation with an organization known as the International
Workers Order? — A. Yes; I was.
Q. Will you describe the interview that you had on this point? — A. Well, the
agent who mentioned it the first, time used only the initials IWO and wanted to
know whether I had at any time been affiliated with the organization. I had to
ask him what IWO meant. I had never heard of it before. When he told me it
was the International Workers Order, I still said I had never heard of it before,
had no knowledge of it, and to my knowledge had never signed any subscription
list or had in any way been affiliated with it at all.
Q. Did these agents indicate to you that they had information indicating that
someone by the name of John Service had been a member of the IWO? — A. They
did. I said, "Well, it must be some other John Service; it could not be me."
Q. I have no further questions relating to the Amerasia phase of this case.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. I believe you referred this morning to a doctor who was with the Commu-
nist forces in China, possibly of American origin, named Ma Hai-teh. — A. Yes.
Q. When you returned to the United States in April, did you bring anyone in
the United States any communication of any kind from him? April of 1945. —
A. I have a vague recollection of Dr. Ma, and I think that this would have been
in 1944, asking me to drop a note to his parents, with whom he had not communi-
cated for years — they lived in some small town in South Carolina or North Caro-
lina— just to say that he was well and we had seen him, and so on. I don't have
•any recollection of bringing any mail or communication, although I am sure that
if I did it would have been censored.
Q. Do you know if Dr. Ma had a brother in the United States at that time? —
A. Yes ; I think he did.
Q. Do you remember his name? — A. Well, Ma's name originally was Hatim,
perhaps.
Mr. Rhett : Do you know how to spell it?
A. No, sir.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2351
Q. Did you ever meet his brother?— A. Yes: I think I did. His brother must
have been going through Washington and looked me up. l do have a vague recol-
lection Of his brother looking me up to talk about his brother out in China.
Q. Was bis brother in the Armed Forces ; do you recall? — A. I think so. I think
Ke was. I can't remember where this meeting took place. It must have been
here in Washington, I think.
Q. But you, to the best of your knowledge, did not bring any packages or com-
munications of any kind from l>r. .Ma to his brother? — A. All I can say is that
if I did it would have been censored. I seem to remember bringing back a letter
with photographs of Ma and Ins Chinese wife and little Chinese child. Now, the
only way I would know the letter contained photographs would have been through
censoring and inspection. But I do think that I did have his request to do some-
thing like that.
Q. When he gave you the letter, if there was such a letter, was it sealed or
unsealed? — A. No; it would have been unsealed, I am quite sure. You see, there
was no mail service out of Yenan, and the Army planes were the only channel or
the only factilities for contact with the outside world, really, and the Army per-
mitted us — permitted the plane to go back and forth, and we carried with us for
the Communist people in Yenan, but it was all done on the basis of their deliver-
ing an open communication to us. It was Colonel Barrett in the early days who
would have been the final censoring and approving authority.
Q. You say that any letters you may have had to Dr. Ma's brother were
censored. Was that in Chungking or in the United States? — A. Well, I would
say they were censored at the source there in Yenan.
Q. Who would that have been done by? — A. Generally by the commanding
officer. In 1944 it was Barrett. I think in 1945 it was Lieutenant Jones, who
happened to he the senior officer when I was there in 1945.
Q. You stated that you may have brought such a letter. Can you recall in
fact whether you did or did not? — A. Well, with this refreshing of my memory,
I do remember meeting the brother, and I have a vague recollection of his
showing me, and he was looking at these pictures, but I have no very clear
recollection of the whole episode or of the details.
Q. Do you recall ever having seen the brother subsequent to that one
occasion? — A. No; I don't believe I ever have. Wasn't his brother a doctor?
Q. I don't know. — A. He was a doctor or a medical corpsman or something
like that.
Q. The information in the possession of the Board indicates that there was a
person named Corp. Joseph M. Hatem. Is that the person? — A. That's prob-
ably it.
Q. If you did bring him a letter, have you any recollection as to whether it
was a correspondence-size envelope or a package or larger envelope of any
kind?— A. No; I don't.
Q. That is all.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Mr. Service, in the course of your testimony I think you stated that
these personal copies of your reports were limited to one of each report. I
note that the FBI appear to have seized and returned to you two copies of some
of the reports. I refer to Report No. 13, dated March 1G, 1945 ; No. 15, dated
March 16, 1945: No. 16, dated March 17, 1945, No. 17 also dated March 17,
1945; No. 20, dated March 20. 1945; No. 21, dated March 21, 1945; No. 22,
dated March 22, 1945 ; and No. 26, dated April 1, 1945. With the sole exception
of Report No. 17, which I have just referred to, in which case there were
three copies, I also note that there appear to have been two copies of report
No. 26, dated September 10, 1944. I wonder if you would like to comment on
that fact. — A. I believe; sir, that the explanation is that, whereas I had previ-
ously been in the practice of sending a copy of all these reports to Mr. Davies,
that practice was discontinued after I left Chungking, in early March 1945,
and went to Yenan. I have a record of having transmitted to Mr. Davies his
copy of my reports through March 6, 1945. I have no record of sending to him
the later copies which I had intended for him at the time of writing.
Q. Then that would account for your having not only your own copy but
the copy you made for him. — A. That's right. It does not account for there
being three copies of that Report No. 17. That's inexplicable. I don't know
why that might have been.
Q. No further questions on this subject.
2352 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. The one that was prepared in 1944, I take it you have no recollection as
to why that may be either. — A. No, sir, I don't. I don't know why I just hap-
pened to have an extra copy of that one.
Q. I would like to ask one additional question. This morning, when you
told us about Mr. Jaffe's suggestion that you might be interested in taking over
the magazine editing, did he ever in any subsequent discussion with you raise
that matter again? — A. No, I don't recall that he did, because I gave him a very
definite reply — negative reply. I was asked by a number of people during that
period if I would be interested in a job of one sort or another. There were
two newspapers who indicated an interest in having me work for them'. I had
at least two publishing firms approach me to see if I wouldn't write a book, and
my answers were negative in all cases.
The Chairman. That will be all on that subject. You may proceed. We
will adjourn promptly at 5 tonight.
Mr. Achilles. Is my understanding correct that we have not finished this
stage in the hearings on the Amerasia case? We are still on that.
Mr. Rhetts. I'm finished, as far as I'm concerned.
The Chairman. The Board has two witnesses that we would like to have on
this phase of the question, but they won't be available until tomorrow ; but
otherwise, I understand this phase is finished.
Mr. Stevens. I have one last question for this afternoon. When you were
giving your briefing sessions here in Washington to various Government agen-
cies and some correspondents you may have referred to, were you ever informed,
directly or indirectly, from what we now know as SA-M here as to the type of
information that was given to newspaper people in the United States or were you
following the practice as you knew it to exist at the time you were abroad?
A. I never had any instructions on briefing from SA-M or any other office in
the Department of State on that question. I was following the practice which
I had followed in the field, which I was acquainted with while working for the
Army.
Mr. Rhetts. In view of the fact that it is 10 until 5 now, Mr. Chairman. I
would just as soon suggest that we recess 10 minutes early, since, so far as I am
concerned, we should turn next to the Japanese phase of the case.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Achilles. I still have a few more questions on this phase of the case,
but I would be glad to let them go.
Mr. Rhetts. It is entirely all right.
The Chairman. All right, tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, to resume at 10 a. m.,
June 6, 1950.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : June 6, 1950, 10 : 10 a. m. to 12 : 40 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building.
Reporter : Edna C. Moyer.
Members of the Board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles,
Arthur G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Rnckelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 10 a. m. to hear continuation of testimony by Mr.
John S. Service.)
The Chairman. The Board will come to order. I think the first thing on the
docket this morning is some questions you had in mind.
Mr. Achilles. Yes, but I would prefer to have them at a later point.
The Chairman. Then we will proceed by the introduction of photostats of cer-
tain documents that were found by the FBI in 1945 in Mr. Service's possession,
as to winch the Board would like some elucidation. I will say that for the record
Mr. Service has had copies of these documents overnight, so that I would like
now at this time to ask for the explanation, such explanation as he desires to
give. I will take these documents in chronological order.
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder, General, should we number them so that we can talk
about them?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2353
The Chairman. Yes; would you like to introduce them into your numbering
system?
Mr. Moeeland. Our numbering system. The first one will be B-53.
The Chairman. B-53 will be the document dated March 7, 1945; B-54 the
document dated March 31, 194."i : B-55 the document dated April 2, 1945; B-56
the document dated April 16, 1945; B-5T. the document dated April 19, 1945
Mr. Rhetts. .iust 1 second — ."it; is two things here.
The Chairman. Is it? Two papers in B-56; B-57 is the document dated April
19, 1!>4."»; B-58 is the document dated May 14, 1945.
Referring then to B-53, it appears to be a photostat of a letter dated March
7. 1945, signed "Max" with a typed signature, "Max Knight." This letter refers
to a chance to see Mr. Service's reports in some office.
Will you
Mr. Rhetts. Might the letter, General, be introduced into the transcript?
The Chairman. If you desire — well, all of these, if you desire. I see no ob-
jection to it. Yes ; they may be introduced into the transcript inasmuch as there
is to be testimony regarding it, it might be the more realistic way.
Mr. Rhetts. I thought since the whole paper is more revealing than references
to it. it might be useful.
The Chairman. Since the questions are regarding the paper, I think it would
be appropriate for it to go into the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
[Copy of photostat]
Document N'o. B-53
FBI Laboratory
100-367360 0399
1350 Euclid Avenue, Berkeley 8, Calif.,
March 7, 19 >to.
Mr. Jack Service,
Care of Neil Brown, O. W. I.,
APO 627, Care of PM, New York, N. Y.
Dear Jack Service : I do hope you don't resent that I now trouble you long
distance. But my conscience bothers me ; I know how I would feel if I were in
Dr. Schwartz's shoes (and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunate cir-
cumstances, including J. S'. ).
I had hoped to have a chance to see you again before you left — you sure move
fast, and it seems you get across the sea sooner than we get across the bay.
Actually I have little to add to Kurt's story; I just may add his address: 173
Route Mayen ( Hwa Ting Lu I — that's the place where the kindergarten is. Per-
haps you may want to add his address to your other addresses, in case there is
a chance to use it. Kurt's name is also known to Carlson who used to work in
Opintell. and tn Fit h : and Lyman Hoover actually knows Kurt. I had a letter
from Lyman a few weeks ago.
If you think it possible to write to Kurt, even just greetings so he sees he is not
forgotten. I know it would be a great lift for him and Martha. He knows your
name. I feel lousy to suggest this to you, and I would feel guilty if I didn't.
So here you have my dilemma.
Next month I will celebrate the fourth anniversary of my arrival — and last
week my folks (father and mother) arrived in the U. S. from England on the
quota : it took me all these four years to get them here, but now I am the happiest
guy between the two coasts.
From time to time in the office we have a chance to see reports which include
your name, so we are currently reminded of you. What an interesting job
you have !
Well, once again, I hope you won't mind all this too much — but I feel if
anyone can appreciate the circumstances it's you.
Verv sincerely yours,
(S) Max
Max Knight.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Would you explain who this Max Knight is and give us such comment
as you desire to make on the letter? — A. I think it might be better if I try and
tell the whole story rather than just limit it. Max Knight was originally a
2354 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Czech. I had met him in probably the very early months of 1941 in Shanghai
when I was working in the visa section of the consulate general in Shanghai.
He had, as I remember it, he had excellent credentials and papers indicating
that he was an anti-Nazi refugee who had ^escaped from Prague just ahead of
the German occupation. He had got to Shanghai and was applying for a visa
and was very much afraid that if he did not get out of Shanghai he would suffer
when the war started and Japan came into the war against us. Meeting all
the qualifications, he d'd receive a vis;: in Shanghai.
I had forgotten all about him and he meant nothing to me at the time except
a rather interesting visa case, and late in 1944 when I was out in California,
I was asked by the OWl to consult with their office out there, and to talk to their
office in San Francisco, and at ;; meeting in one of these interrogation sessions
really, this man Knight appeared. I had forgotten him. I did not recognize
him. hut he introduced himself to me after J~he meeting and reminded me
where we had met and said that, lie told me that he work working there in the
OWI office in San Francisco. Pie was very anxious to know whether it would
he possible for me after my return to China to send just a message of greeting
to some people who were fellow Czechs still in Shanghai. Those are the people
referred to here. It was. of course, at that time perfectly possible to send
letters from Chungking to Shanghai, although there1 was no way to send letters
from the United States to Shanghai. He didn't give me any letter.
Mr. Rhetts. Will you explain why?
A. Well, the American post offices would not accept any letters for occupied
territory.
Mr. Rhetts. Shanghai was in occupied territory?
A. That is right. He didn't ask me to send any letter. He didn't send any
letter except in the hope that I might myself he able to write a little note — these
things had to be addressed in Chinese usually to tnese people — saying that I
had seen Mr. Knight and he was well, and so on. I have no recollection whether
I ever did that or not. This letter is simply to remind me really of his request
and to see — he apolog:zes for having bothered me.
Now the reference at the bottom. ''From time to time in the office" — the
office refers to the OWI in charge of Pacific operations out in San Francisco —
''we have a chance to see reports which include your name." I am not sure
whether he means that some of the reports which I had drafted were circulated
to OWI ; I know some of them were. I suppose all he is referring to
Q. Was he working for OWI? — A. He was a staff member in the office in San
Francisco: yes, sir. I do not know what has become of him. I have never
seen him since that time. I have never heard from him. He was at that time
in process of being naturalized.
I notice in the first paragraph, "I know how I would feel if I were in Dr.
Schwarz's shoes, and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunte circum-
stances, including J. S." I>r. Schwarz is apparently his friend who is still
stranded in Shanghai, and Mr. Knight is simply saying that the forces of cir-
cumstances— he refers to simply the success in receiving a visa in the consulate
general in Shanghai, and I happened to be the visa officer.
Q. Thank you. The next paper
Mi-. Rhetts. I wonder if I might just ask one. You stated that it was pos-
sible— although it was impossible to send mail from the Pmited States to
Shanghai, it was possible to send it from Chungking to Shanghai?
A. That is right.
Mr. Rhetts. You mean that, although Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese,
the Chinese mail system went right on working right across the enemy line;
is that correct?
A. Well, it was — the administration was separate in the two areas, but they
exchanged mail continuously. It was always possible to communicate from
Shanghai to Chungking and even send telegrams.
Mr. Rhetts. In the regular course of events?
A. Yes. It was usually done through Macao or some place like that.
The Chairman. Macao being a Portuguese possession?
A. That is right.
Q. The next paper is B-."4. dated March Ml. Did you have anything further
on that one? The earlier one?
Mr. Rhetts. No.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2355
[Copy of photostat]
Document No. B-."»4
fbi laboratory, 100-367360-0391
March 31, 1945.
Mr. John S. Service,
U. (S>. Office of War Information,
APO No. 879, c/o Postmaster.
Dear Jack : Many thanks for yours of March 8th together with the power for
Mr. Brooks which I have passed on together with the new manuscript, of which
lie also has the first version as well as the first copy of the new or supplemental
version. The letters which you sent and which were most interesting have been
delivered. Many thanks. Many people have come back, like John Davies, Ludd,
and Emmerson. and we have had various discussions on a sad but not pessi-
mistic note. Everything that you can send will, of course, be much appre-
ciated. I suggest that you might cooperate with my colleague Bill, who is now
ir charge of the office.
With best regards,
Yours,
2 enclosures.
s/ John.
Q. This appears to be a photostat of a letter to Mr. Service signed "John"
and bearing fbe typed words "2 enclosures"' at the bottom, which do not appear
with the document. The paper refers to a '"new manuscript." Can you explain
what this letter is and from whom received'.' — A. Yes, sir. This letter is from
Prof. John K. Fairbank, now professor of far eastern history at Harvard Uni-
versity, and at that time Deputy Director of the Far Eastern Branch of OWI.
I ain not sure of the exact title, but that was the substance of his position at
that time.
I must say that this letter perhaps meant nothing to me when I saw it and I
had to get in touch with Dr. Fairbank, and we have tiled to piece out our
memories and reconstruct it. The Mr. Brooks referred to is Brooks Atkinson,
of t' e New York Times, who had been in China as foreign correspondent for
the New York Times throughout most of the war.
The manuscript was a manuscript of a book which Atkinson and Fairbank
were considering assisting in having published. It was a manuscript, a story
of the life, you might say, of a woman in Chungking, Kung Peng. She was
the daughter of a well-to-do family — in fact, as I remember it, an official
family — who had gone to Yenching University, American missionary university
in Peking, of which Ambassador T.eighton Stuart was the president for many
years. While there she became interested in communism and had broken with
her family and during the war herself was attached to the office of the official
Communist representative in Chungking and served largely as their contact
or liaison with the foreign press. She was an intelligent, thoughtful person with
a go< d command of English, and Atkinson particularly, I think, thought that
there might be some interest in her story as to how she became a Communist,
how a person with her background became attracted to this movement in
China and really forsook, gave up her family, made for a Chinese girl a very
serious break. I don't know how the other first sections of the manuscript
reached the United States.
Q. It was written by Brooks Atkinson'. — A. No: the manuscript was written
by her. I think it was during the period when I was home in the United States
from October 1944 to January 1945.
Q. What happened then? — A. The first section of the manuscript — I was in
the United Stafes then, but when it was turned over to a publisher who thought
he might be interested, it developed that it was necessary for her to have an
attorney or agent in the United States who could make agreements and sign
contracts, and Brooks Atkinson agreed to act as her agent, but he would have
to have a signed power of attorney from her. and this is the power that is re-
ferred to in the second line: "together with the power for Mr. Brooks." As I
remember it. the unsigned power of attorney was sent out to me: I took it to
her: and she signed it; and then I returned it to Mr. Fairbank through OWI
channels.
The letter coes on here to say, "The letters which you sent and which were
most interesting have been delivered."
2356 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. Could I interrupt to ask, Did you bring the manuscript, or
was that already in this country?
A. I have no recollection of bringing the manuscript. I think that it was
brought here, as I say, before I returned to China. It was after the manu-
script had been read or looked over that this problem arose of her needing an
attorney here in the United States. Now the sentence which I just read, neither
John Fairbank nor I had any recollection of what specific letters may have
been referred to. Dr. Fairbank was particularly coneeerned with while he
was in China — he had been in China from I think 1942 and 1943 in the OWI
there, and he was particularly concerned with assistance to academic figures,
university professors, intellectuals who as a result of the long war were getting
very much out of touch with the rest of the world, very discouraged, losing
morale. They were perhaps suffering the most as members of the white-collar
class with the inflation in China. They were practically on dole and very de-
pendent on whatever largesse they might receive from the Kuomintang govern-
ment. He helped a great many of these people through official grants from
the OWI funds in cultural relations funds to come to the United States, and
he has a continued interest in that and has maintained probably the most
extensive contacts with non-Communist Chinese liberals.
Now one problem in relation to these people was that their families and
associates and friends in China were really unable to write to them through
Chinese postal channels. Chinese censorship was extremely rigid and severe.
Most of these people were in some degree critics or accused of being critics of
the Central Government, and as grantees of the United States Government
we used to sometimes transmit mail for them, opened, and send it in unsealed
envelopes; and that was usually done through OWI channels. WTe had some
reference here the other day, I think, when Mr. Sprouse was testifying, to a Miss
Yang Kang, who was one of these people whom Fairbanks had helped to come
to the United States. She was in Radcliffe at that time, and I am sure that
from time to time I forwarded to OWI, through OWI channels, some letters
for her. These letters, I might say, being forwarded open, were a source of
information to us as views of these people, their comments on what was
happening in China, and even today the Division of Chinese Affairs finds the
correspondence between the people like Fairbank and Yang Kang as liberals
in China a very important source of information on what is going on in China.
Fairbank has continued to cooperate in that way, and I myself have seen several
letters over the past year which he has received from professors in Peiping, and
so on. This refers to that type of letter, but we have no idea what specific
letters may have been involved.
Mr. Achilles. Were those letters which you had brought with you or which
you had sent from Chungking?
A. No : I am sure these are letters which I bad sent from Chungking.
Mr. Achilles. Were any of them to Mr. Jaffe?
A. No, sir ; no, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Or Mr. Gayn?
A. No, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Or anyone else connected with the Amerasia case?
A. No, no. Do you wish me to continue with this letter?
Mr. Achilles. Who is this "colleague, Bill"?
A. Bill Holland, who at that time was Chief of the OWI office in Chungking.
Mr. Rhetts. Before you go on to another letter. General, I would like at this
time to have included in the transcript a telegram, which was just handed to
me, which is from Professor Fairbank: and it deals with this letter.
The chairman. It may be admitted. Do you want it in the transcript?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman. Shall I read it so the Board can hear it?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
The Chairman, (reading) :
"Western Union, Cambridge. Mass., Reillv, Rhetts, and Ruckelshaus, Rm. 1120
Tower Bldg.. Wash., D. C. :
"Attention Rhetts colon from description read to me over phone of mysterious-
sounding letter of March 194") and its contents and signature comma eye am
inclined to think that eye wrote it, and while eye cannot recollect details very
definitely eye believe it referred to an autobiographical manuscript written at my
suggestion by Miss Kung Peng in Chungking beginning in 1943 and completed
partially in 1944 and probably brought to this country by Miss Yang Kang in
autumn 1944 Stop. Eye believe eye showed manuscript to one or more publishers
hut found it necessary to secure author's power of attorney which eye believe
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2357
was made for Brooks Atkinson of New York who also knew author and also
necessary to secure supplemental manuscript to meet publisher's suggestions
Stop Reference to letters delivered does not recall anything to mind hut I
imagine any Letter from above-mentioned author would have been sent me for
delivery to Yang Kang then studying at Radcliffe College Stop. For your infor-
mation during wartime eve frequently used indirect references in personal letters
which would pass through hands of others and tone of this one does not surprise
me Stop. Eye will be glad to come and testify to anyone any time at my expense.
Just let me know. Regards. k~„a,,
"John K. Fairbanks."
Anv further questions?
I now pass to B-55, which appears to he a photostat of a hand-written letter
dated April 2, 1045, to Mr. Service, signed "Jim."
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
[Copy of photostat]
Document No. B-55
F. B. I. LABORATORY 100-367360—0401
Cinepac File WJB
6/6/45
Fnited States Pacific Fleet (&4 Pacific Ocean Areas
headquarters of the commander in chief
Staff, CINEPAC, Adv. Hqtrs. Box No. 5,
Fleet Postoffice, San Francisco, April 2, 1945.
Dear Jack : Your returning boss gives me a chance to get this line off to you —
I've been luxuriating here on Guam for almost 2 months. I'm in the Future
Plans Section technically but mostly am getting an education in what goes on in
the Pacific and trying to keep up in China— the former is fascinating, the latter
difficult. If you could find a safe way to send me an occasional copy of your
memos I'd be grateful — maybe you'll find it practical, maybe not. So far as I
can find out this is the only opportunity I'll have to communicate with you —
until and unless Lud and Emmerson come through.
What goes on these days in the old country? I got a chuckle out of the news
this morning that old Tung Pi-wu is going to be a delegate to the S. F. conference.
Best to the boys — specially Sol, if he's about.
Jim.
Q. The letter refers to the possibility of a "safe way" to send him a copy of
your memos. Will you explain this letter, please? — A. This letter is from James
K. Penfield, a fellow Foreign Service officer. He is class 2 and has been
counselor of Embassy at Prague for the last 2 years.
Mr. Stevens. He is class 1.
A. Our list is out of date. At that time Mr. Penfield had been assigned for
a brief period to the headquarters of Admiral Nimitz. The original motive for
assigning him was that it might be useful to have on Admiral Nimitz's staff
a Foreign Service officer familiar with China. Mr. Penfield is a China service
officer who had previously been serving in Chungking and in the Division of
Chinese Affairs here in the Department. Mr. Penfield of course didn't know on
April 2 that I was on the verge of leaving China. In fact, it is rather interesting
that he didn't know it from General Wedemeyer because his first words, "Your
returning hoss" I believe referred to General Wedemeyer who went back to
China in April 1045 via the Pacific. Now in reference to
Mr. Achilles. General Wedemeyer actually carried the letter? Is that what
he means, "returning boss"?
A. I believe so, yes. I did not receive the letter in China, however. It must
have been forwarded to me here, since I left China before General Wedemeyer
arrived.
Mr. Achilles. Penfield was assigned as what? Political adviser?
A. I am not sure he had any title. He was just a Foreign Service officer
attached to the staff of Admiral Nimitz. He didn't stay there very long. They
didn't know just how to use him apparently, and there was not the opportunity
for him as there had been for us in China to do much political reporting, as he
was far removed from China. His headquarters were in Guam and I am not
2358 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
sure but sometime in the summer of 1945, it must have been June or July, Mr.
Penfield was returned to tbe Department.
Q. He had opportunity to see your reports through official sources? — A. Oh,
certainly, while serving here in the Department. I think he had been Assistant
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. He was intimately familiar with
what I had been doing in China and he is simply indicating the very obvious
utility of his being supplied those reports in Guam since he was interested
in China and he was there to assist the Navy in any way he could in regard to
China, giving advice on conditions in China, and so on.
Q. What did he mean by "safe way"? — A. I think he simply means by a con-
venient, suitable way of forwarding these things — from Chungking. If they
had simply gone Army channels they would have gone all the way back to the
United States and then there would be a problem of transferring them to the
Navy channels, and then getting them to him in Guam without perhaps getting
stuck on the way by going through other hands. "Normally the only distribution
that I had done in Chungking had been to give them to the Embassy, which I
did directly, or when I was in Yenan through G-2, but there it was a matter
of physical transmission, somebody taking it over, and to John Davies, who
was in the theater. When John Davies moved out of the theater in early 1945
we again had a problem of transmission, and they were sent to the Department,
and then, as I showed Mr. Achilles or Mr. Moreland the other day, Mr. Bohlen
forwarded them through the Department pouch, but it simply was a .physical
problem of forwarding anything from me in China to Penfield with the Navy
in Guam.
Q. Did you ever forward anything? — A. No, sir; I didn't receive this letter
until after I had returned from China. I wasn't writing any more reports and
I never sent anything to him.
Q. Did you ever send any copies of your memoranda to anybody except as
you have described through official channels? — A. No, sir.
Mr. Rhetts. Might I ask a question?
The Chairman. Just a minute.
Mr. Achilles. This "safe means" that he refers to, does that refer to official
channels, that is, some safe official way of communicating from Chungking to
Guam?
A. That is right. I am sure that is what it means. It not only means safe in
that sense but also something which is not going to get tangled up and stopped
en route by having to go through some uninformed low echelon G-2 or some-
thing like that that doesn't know what these things are, doesn't know where
they are to go.
Mr. Achilles. He says, at the end of his letter, "I got a chuckle out of the
news this morning that old Tung Pi-wu is going to be a delegate to the S. F.
Conference." Is that the same person who I think has been referred to as a
Communist member of the Chinese delegation?
A. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Achilles. Was that Pi-wu a friend of yours or Penfield, or what caused
that reference?
A. Everybody who had been in China through the war knew him. since he had
been the Chinese Communist representative in Chungking through most of the
war. I think that the chuckle over that is because Mr. Tung was an old Chinese
scholar type with a very scraggly moustache in Chinese style, rather slow,
ponderous, not at all the quick, alert, intellectual type of somebody like Chou
En-lai was. Of course, that is the reason why the Central Government nomi-
nated Tung Pi-wu, I assume, but he was not the person who was going to make
the best impression or be the most forceful in debate.
Mr. Achilles. Did you see him in the United States in 1945?
A. Yes, I saw him on one occasion.
Mr. Achilles. When was that and what were the circumstances?
A. I am not sure what the exact date is. It was some time in early August
1945.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Was that here in Washington?— A. Yes. here in Washington.
Q. How did yon happen to see him? — A. His secretary called me up and asked
if they could see me and they also had received an invitation from a Captain
Linebarger, who had heen in the Army in G-2 in Chungking and knew them, and
as I remember it the final arrangement was that I would pick them up. I
was also going to Captain Linebarger's dinner. I would go to their hotel, pick
them up and escort them to Linebarger's dinner.
Q. It seems to have been almost a habit of yours in those days.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2359
The Chairman. Which, go to dinner?
Q. Picking up people in hotels, taking them, going to dinner with them.
Thai was the only time that you saw him? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did yon have any particular conversation with him that evening or was
it merely a sort of social function? — A. I had some conversation in the hotel. As
a matter of fact. T discnssed the whole question of whether I should see these
people at all with the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs at this time,
and he agreed that I should see them. There is quite a background to that.
I of course had had a long and fairly close contact with Mr. Tung in China
and with the secretary who was accompanying him. I had known them in
Chungking when he was official representative. I of course had known him also
in Yenan. because he was in Yenan all of the time that I was there and I had
actually commenced the trip from Yenan back to the States in April with these
two men when they were coming to the United States to attend the San Fran-
cisco Conference as members of the Chinese Government delegation.
Q. Who was the other one?— A. The other man was Chen.
Q. Was he Tung Pi-wu's secretary? — A. Yes. Now having known these people
for a long time and having made the start of the trip to the United States with
them, they would have thought it very strange if I had avoided them or had not
seen them. It was a matter of very elemental courtesy, you might say, involved.
Also, my arrest and the whole case had been treated in China, particularly, as
one having a political background.
The Chairman. Your arrest? Not at this time?
A. In June 1945 : yes.
The Chairman. This occurred in
A. In August.
The Chairman. You are telling about an August occurrence?
A. Yes. And we felt that for me to pointedly avoid any contact with them
w<mld confirm those beliefs, particularly on the part of the Chinese Communists,
so that we concluded that, the thing to do was to simply see them in a normal
way, not conspicuously, not go out of my way, but if they sought me, yes, I would
see them.
Q. But you attended no other meeting at which A. No, sir.
Q. In San Francisco or A. No, sir.
The Chairman. Finish your sentence?
Q. At which they were present. — A. No, sir.
Q. You said you started your trip to the United States with them. You did
not arrive together? — A. No; we had a great deal of trouble with flying condi-
tions. We came from Yenan down to a place called Sian. This was in early
April, and there was very heavy icing on the planes. We made several attempts.
That is. we were flying in a C-47 headquarters plane. We made several attempts
to get off the ground or really to get out, and at a certain elevation we got so much
ice we couldn't get higher and couldn't get above it, so we finally had to go
back to Sian. I managed during the day to get out alone on an empty troop
carrier plane which was able to get above the icing conditions by flying at 21,000
feet, and we flew that for 2 or 3 hours, sharing an oxygen mask with the radio
operator, but the rest of the party had to stay behind and they never did catch up
to me. I came on through.
Q. Did you bring any documents for them? — A. No, sir ; no, sir.
Q. That is all.
The Chairman. I refer now to No. B-56, which appears to be a photostat
of a draft of a typed letter dated April 16, 1945, addressed to "Dear Annalee
and Teddy." unsigned.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
[Copy of photostat]
Document No. B-56
F. B. I. Laboratory
100-367360 0397
WJB
6/6/45
Washington, April 16, 1945.
Dear Annalee and Teddy : The optimistically pleasant speculations we al-
lowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of inineaa*t at 879 Ghm
were 180 degrees off.
2360 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION"
The paper tiger roared loudly enough around here to drown out the very gen-
eral eppooitiee — but appreciably timid — opposition. And, based on nothing fewfe
the Tiger's modest modest account of his achievements, the big boss said : "Keep
it up". After that, the table pounding in regard to yours truly was only a matter
of course.
Especially disappointing was the "political sense" in the narrow meaning, by
the man I had hoped would fight.
I am now assignedd to a safe job here but have been urged to bide my/ time.
The Tiger's support ended on the 12th, the day of my arrival. And there is
now some a feeling that ftep-ufelieafi effiee hekiere good jobs should go to good
party members.
[Second sheet of B-56]
Dear Annalee and Teddy : The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed
ourselves that last evening of mine at 879 were ISO degrees off.
The Chairman. It refers to a "paper tiger," to a "safe job," and to "good
party members." Would you explain what this is all about?
A. This was a draft of a letter which I believe was never sent to Annalee
Jacoby and Teddy White, who were correspondents for the Luce publications
in China.
The Chairman. Who made the draft?
A. I did, sir. When I was ordered out of China we received at headquarters
in Chungking very cryptic orders signed "Marshall" and saying that I was to
he in the United States by a certain date. Nobody had any explanation, nobody
knew what it meant. The fact that I was not simply detached from the Army —
I rniidit have been, you see, simply detached from headquarters and assigned to
the Embassy, and the fact that I was to be in the United States by a certain
date gave some basis for thinking that the Army had another job in mind for me,
and we didn't know. Some people thought that I was being removed at Hurley's
request, or demand, and other people thought, well this type of order from people
in headquarters, this type of orders seems to indicate you are being taken home
in a hurry for some other important rush job or could it be maybe something in
the Pacific. It had been considered at one time that I would go out to Nimitz's
headquarters, as Penfield later did.
Now the first paragraph refers to those conjectures, that perhaps I was being
brought home for another job, possibly at Nimitz's. "The optimistically pleas-
ant speculations we allowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of
mine at 879" — that is Chungking, APO 879. We never could put names of
places, we always had to use APO numbers. "* * * were 180 degrees off" —
in other words, were completely wrong about this business. Now the next
paragraph —
The Chairman. Who was the "paper tiger"?
A. "The paper tiger"
The Chairman. That is the next paragraph.
A. Yes, sir. General Hurley was given a great many nicknames by the Chinese
and this "paper tiger" and the phrase "small whiskers" which is used some place
in this or one of these other letters were both Chinese nicknames for General
Hurley.
Now what I am really saying in this paragraph is that when General Hurley
returned in February of 1945 for consultations and decisions as to whether we
would take a new tack in China or continue his attempts to negotiate on the
same basis of acceding and following the wishes of Generalissimo Chiang, that
Ambassador Hurley won the argument and that having won the argument it was
only a matter of course for him to bring about the removal of myself or anyone
else who he felt was not sympathetic with his approach to the problem.
Mr. Achilles. In other words, the argument between Hurley and yourself,
or between Hurley and
A. Well, it wasn't really an argument. It was differences, as Secretary Byrnes
said, on tactics, not on policy, on ways of trying to achieve our objective.
Mr. Achilles. Was it a conflict again between General Hurley and yourself
or General Hurley and the Department on tactics or whom?
A. Well, I am thinking here primarily of myself, sir, but I think that if the
State Department on the working level, the Division of Chinese Affairs level or
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2361
Office of Far Eastern Affairs level was inclined probably — although I am not
intimately informed on this — to rather accept tbe view which was expressed in
the Atcheson telegram of February 2G, but that tbe decision was made at much
higher level. As I say, the big boss said, "Keep it up," and the President ac-
cepted General Hurley's accounts of the great progress wbicli I think General
Hurley quite sincerely thought he was making, and which we in our telegram of
February :M did not think was being made.
Tbe ( haibman. Ob, yes ; what is tbe "safe job" you refer to?
A. The sate job simply refers to a job which would keep me out of arguments
and debate. It was a job in tbe Office of Foreign Service doing this preliminary
work for the revision of the Foreign Service Act.
The Chairman. Who were the "good party members"?
Mr. A< im.i.Ks. .lust a second. This letter is dated April 18. You had not then
completed your consultation, had you?
A. No, sir, but I think that I bad already been told that I would go into OFS
when the consultation was over.
Tbe Chairman. Who were the "good party members"?
A. I should finish the other sentence. I had been urged to bide my time. Of
course, I had been living and breathing China, as I said yesterday. I was all
wrapped up in China — felt very strongly about the whole issues involved. I
yielded nothing to Mr. Judd of Mr. Bullitt or anyone else in my concern at that
time over what I foresaw would be the loss of China, and frankly I was some-
what disappointed (a) that I could not have an active job in China or have a
job connected with far-eastern affairs, but it was obvious that with General
Hurley in China I could not go there and it would have been unwise for the De-
partment if I bad been put in any work here connected with the Far East.
New I go on to say that "the Tiger's support ended on the 12th" — that refers
of course to the death of the President who had appointed General Hurley, and
the letter goes on to say, "And there is now some feeling that" — and you will
see if you hold it up to the light that what I bad typed and had crossed out there
was that "Republican office holders," but I thought it unwise to say "Republi-
cans" are going to lose their jobs, so I said a far worse thing and said, "good
jobs should go to good party members," but what I mean was the feeling at that
time, soon after President Truman came in, that the new administration would
be a little more politically minded in making appointments and that some of
the Republicans who were then holding very high jobs would probably be moved
out in favor of Democrats.
Mr. Achilles. In other words, you were referring to the Republican Party
and not the Communist Party?
A. Absolutely. Or Democratic Party. "Good jobs should go to good party
members."
Mr. Achilles. I understand.
The Chairman. I refer now to
A. I think that if we could review the press and some of the columnists and
political chit-chat of that period, I think we could confirm that that was common
feeling when President Truman took over.
The Chairman. Referring now to B-57. which is a photostat of a typed letter
from Arthur R. Ringwalt and signed "Arthur," to Mr. Service, dated April 19, this
letter refers to a check for $225.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
[Copy of photostat]
Document No. B-57
FBI LABORATORY— 100-367360 0398
The Foreign Service of the United States of America
American Embassy,
Chungking, April l'J, 19-bo.
J. S. Service, Esq.,
Department of State, Washington.
Dear Jack : Enclosed is a Treasury check for .$225. I sold your stuff for
U. S. $425, the balance being the $200 I advanced. you just before you left Chung-
king. I hope this is satisfactory.
GA.left today. Was sorry to miss him. Maybe he can get us home soon. I
hope so as "Small Whiskers" is due in at any moment.
2362 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Wrote to Dick today complimenting him on some good work he has just com-
pleted in connection with keeping some missionary out of jail.
If the Dept. contemplates setting up some sort of organization dealing with
world affairs which might grow out of the San Francisco Conference, I might
be interested. If you think advisable, you might mention my name to the proper
people.
Otherwise nothing much new.
Yours,
s/ Arthur,
Arthur R. Ringwalt.
The Chairman. Would you explain this letter?
A. Yes, sir. It was the invariable rule that no one took anything out of
Chungking that was not absolutely essential and usually officers came out of
Chungking with very little more than the clothesthey wore. It was so hard to
get any supplies of any kind in Chungking that it was in the first place an un-
friendly act to deprive people there by taking out any clothes or toilet articles
or supplies of any sort. In the second place, you could sell anything in Chung-
king at that time for a fantastic price. You could sell a used suit of clothes for
$100 equivalent, or a fountain pen for about $90, a $25 wrist watch for about 10
times its price.
Now in the Embassy we separated the sheep from the goats, shall we say, by
whether or not they gave first chance at their things to their fellow officers. In
other words, a man was transferred, and if he played ball he called in everybody
in the Embassy and said, "Now, what do you need?" and he didn't charge them
more than a replacement cost. What he did not sell or dispose of to his fellow
officers, then he was by the rules of the game free to dispose of them to the Chinese
second-hand man, and it was a very thriving business.
Now I came to Chungking very hurriedly, and the last nieht I was there we
had one of these quite common affairs, everything was put out in my room and
everybody in the Embassy came in and picked what they thought they could use,
and everything that I had left I turned over to Arthur Ringwalt and asked him
to call in the Chinese and dispose of it. Arthur advanced me $200 and this
letter was to forward me an additional $225, since he had received $425 from
the Chinese second-hand man for whatever I had left with him.
Mr. Achilles. The things you disposed of were solely personal effects?
A. Oh, yes ; clothing and anything — shoelaces, shoe polish, toilet articles. We
took out everything of that sort we could with us because it was extremely hard
to obtain them there and the things you could get were usually very poor quality.
Now the next paragraph, if you wish me to continue, says, "GA left today."
That is George Atcheson, George Atcheson had been transferred from Chungking
very hurriedly because of Ambassador Hurley's resentment of the February 26
telegram and it was essential to get him out of Chungking before General Hurley
arrived. The letter goes on to say, "Maybe he can get us home soon." That is a
reflection of the morale of the Embassy at that time. They all wanted to get
out and get home. He goes on to say, "I hope so as 'Small Whiskers' is due in
at any moment." "Small Whiskers," I have already mentioned, was a Chinese
nickname for General Hurley and this simply refers to the strong desire of
practically all Foreign Service officers who had any contact with General Hurley
during that period to avoid if possible working under him.
"Wrote to Dick today complimenting him on some good work he has just com-
pleted in connection with keeping some missionary out of jail." Dick is my
younger brother who was a Foreign Service officer and I think at that time was in
Cheng-tii.
The last paragraph simply mentions Mr. Ringwalt's interest in getting some
job outside of the China field. He hoped that there might be some new branch
set up which would be a broader one than simply a country division as a
result of the San Francisco Conference, and he is inquiring whether I can help
him on it. Mr. Ringwalt — I am not sure whether I identified him or not, he is a
Foreign Service officer, class 3, and now first secretary in London.
Mr. Stevens. "If you think advisable, you might mention my name to the
proper people." What does be mean by that, Mr. Service?
A. Well, be doesn't know whether or not there is going to be this sort
of organization that he is thinking of, and he doesn't know of course who the
people would be who would be heading it up. lie is in Chungking and he is as-
suming that there will be something like the Bureau of FN Affairs; I imagine
thai is what be is thinking of.
Mr. Stevens. He means then, mention my name to whoever will be in charge.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2363
A. Of setting up what he anticipates will be a new branch to deal with the
United Nations affairs.
Mr. Km its. New branch of what?
A. Of the State Department.
The Chairman. We refer finally to B-58, which is a photostat of a type-
written letter addressed to Mi'. Service and signed "Julian."
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
[Copy of photostat]
Document No. B-58
FBI LABORATORY— 100-367360 0404
The United Nations Conference on International Organization
May 14, 1945.
Dear .Tack : I met your wife the other evening, and your delightful children as
well. Phil had arranged with Carolyn to bring Messrs. Tung and Chen to Berke-
ley, and we had dinner together along with Martin Wilbur. During the course
of conversation, Carolyn mentioned her need of a washing machine in Washington.
I told her that if worse comes to worse you might be able to have my family's
machine which is now up on Long Island. Carolyn got all excited about
this suggestion, and she said that she would write you about it. If you have been
looking for one in Washington, I suggest that you continue to do so. You should
also inquire about the possibility of new machines coming on the market in the
near future. If your efforts in Washington all lead up a blind alley, then it would
be practical to consider shipping my family's machine — if you want it — from
Long Island to Washington. I just thought that I should explain this to you in
case Carolyn's letter discourages you from continuing your search for a machine.
The Conference is rather dull, and I find it very depressing. I imagine that
this conference may go down as one of the most reactionary international
gatherings in history. The only consolation I can find is that the fantastic
views on international organization — views which are in essence quite contrary
to real and sound international organization — may contribute to breaking
down such outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-state system of
international relations. But they offer nothing in place of these traditional
elements of world affairs.
Phil is keeping the most disgraceful company these days. It is practically
certain now that he'll return to Chungking as Minister Counselor and Hurley's
house boy. He's taking his job seriously and even shows some compassion over
the inconveniences which members of the Chinese delegation occasionally have
to endure. He is first-rate on seeing that T. V.'s car turns up at the right place
at the right time.
John Carter has been introducing me around as the labor attache for Chung-
king. The local liberal and labor groups have had me out for a party to meet
the right-minded people. Saturday I was introduced to Taranov, Soviet trade-
union representative on the World Trade Union Council. He told me that he
didn't know that north China was called "Communist" China. He asked whethei
they were "Communists" or not. He stated that the Soviet Government favored
unity in China and that United States and Soviet Union should cooperate in
bringing about such unity. I am planning to bring John Carter together witn
Taranov and another Soviet trade-union leader, Kuznetzov (who is the head of
the Soviet trade-union movement and an important figure in Soviet high policy).
WTe may not learn much, but we might get some better line on Soviet psychology
on the Pacific, specifically, the China question.
Not much else to say. I won't go into detail about the Conference. It isn't
too difficult to read between the lines in the press to see what is happening
here.
Best regards,
s/ Julian.
The Chairman. This letter refers to the United Nations Conference at San
Francisco, speaks of it as "the most reactionary international gathering in his-
tory" and refers to what it calls an "outmoded concept," "sovereign equality and
nation-state system of international relations." refers to somebody by the name
of "Phil" "keeping the most disgraceful company" and also to "right-minded
people." Will you explain those references, please?
G8970 — 50— pt. 2 56
2364 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. I think that the Julian is Julian Friedman, but I had had no recollection of
this letter until after I saw this photostat. If I had been asked whether or not
I had ever received or written a letter to Friedman, I would have said no. The
apparent purpose of this letter really is to tell me of this offer of his family's
washing machine. Everybody in tbe Division of Chinese Affairs knew that I was
trying to find a house for my family here in Washington, which was quite a prob-
lem here in Washington, which was quite a problem in 1945. My family was still
out in California, and that I was frying to buy various things which we needed
or expected to need for the house, like a washing machine. And then he goes
on — or rather, I don't have any idea of what he means in the second paragraph.
I don't recall ever discussing the matter with him. When he came back here
after the conference was over I had already been arrested, I was not in the
Department, and if I saw him during that period it was very, very briefly and
probably just discussing my case, and so on. So that I can't offer any explanation
of what he means here by this "most reactionary international gathering in
history," or his views on "outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-
state system of international relations."
The third paragraph, the "Phil" I believe must be Phil Sprouse — it is just
conjecture.
The Chairman. It is not Phil Jaffe?
A. Oh, no, sir. Phil Jaffe was not at San Francisco. Phil Jaffe was, as we
know, in New York and Washington. Phil Sprouse was one of the liaison
officers assigned to the Chinese delegation. I am not sure what Friedman's
job out there was. He may have also been some sort of a liaison officer. I
think that he is just poking some fun at Sprouse here because of the necessity
of his spending most of his time looking after the physical needs and desires of
the Chinese delegation, and some of them were rather demanding. T. V. Soong
had a reputation of being a rather demanding and insistent person, and you
see a reference to Phil Sprouse's being first-rate at making sure that T. V.
Soong's car turns up at the right place at the right time.
The next paragraph, "John Carter'' is John Carter Vincent, who was out there
with the delegation. He says, "John Carter has been introducing me around
as the labor attache for Chungking." It was already the plan that Friedman
would go out to China as labor attache to the Embassy, which he subsequently
did in September 1945, I think.
The Chairman. Who were the "right-minded people" referred to?
A. CIO — I don't know. Certainly knowing Friedman I would assume that
it is the liberal or left-wing group of labor people, but that is
Mr. Stevens. You don't know whether that is CIO or someone else?
A. No ; that is purely a conjecture.
The Chairman. It did not, as you see it, refer to communism?
A. I am sorry; I don't, sir. I have no knowledge that Friedman was a
Communist himself.
Mr. Achilles. Later in the same paragraph he refers to various members of
the Soviet Delegation. Do you think those might have been the ones he was
referring to as "right-minded people"?
A. Well, I doubt it, because the "right-minded people" is tied up with the
local liberal and labor groups. I am sorry, I am just speculating here. I am
not in a position to know.
The Chairman. Did you ever reply to this letter as far as you remember?
A. As far as I remember, I did not ; no.
Mr. Stevens. Did you not state a few minutes ago you do not remember
receiving it?
A. Yes : ;is far as I recall I did not. I am a very poor correspondent.
Mr. Achilles. But you have no recollection of any kind of a reply to this?
A. No.
The CirAiRMAN. You have a witness outside. That concludes this phase of
the examination.
Mr. Stevens. We have a witness outside, Mr. Chase.
(The witness was produced and, having been duly sworn, Mr. Augustus Sabin
Chase testified as follows:)
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Mr. chase will he asked to testify for the Board at this point. Now. would
you give your full name and address, please? — A. Augustus Sabin Chase. My
temporary address, you mean, in Washington?
Q. Yes. — A. University Club. I expect to be leaving today or tomorrow to go
back to my home for a week and then return.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2365
Q. Now, you would Like to make some preliminary statement about your recol-
lection as to the Pacts in this rase. Would you make that for the record at this
moment?— A. Well, yes, since my statements arc under oath, I would like to have
the following prefatory statemenl made part of my testimony, namely, that in
1945 in connection with this same case I testified twice before juries
The Chairman. Grand juries'?
A. That was my understanding, that they were grand juries, formally, and also
informally before the FBI agents at a time when my recollection was much
clearer than it is now of any details connected with the case, and that in order
to protect myself against possible basis for charges of perjury, I would like to
say that everything 1 say from now on is to the best of my recollection only and
that in any case where it substantially differs from my previous testimony it is
not due to any fault or intention but purely to lapse of memory. I think that is
all I want to say.
The Chaieman. Now I will ask Mr. Achilles to conduct the examination since
he is more acquainted with the knowledge of this witness.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. I realize that you have been questioned about the case, as you say, twice
before. The case has been examined several times, but it is again under exam-
ination and the purpose of these hearings is to develop every possible fact we can
regardless of previous investigations. That is why we have asked you to come in
since you were, I believe, in the Division of Chinese Affairs in the spring of
1H4.-).— A. That is right.
Q. Would you tell us when you took up duty in the Division of Chinese
Affairs'- — A. I came back from internment on the exchange vessel in the autumn
of 1943. took some leave, and then I think technically was assigned immediately
to the Division of Chinese Affairs but actually physically I was loaned to the
Pentagon. I was over at the Pentagon to work with the Army Intelligence for
about 6 months, and as I recall I physically took up duties in CA about May
1943.
Q. What was your capacity in that Division in the beginning of April 1945? —
A. I think at just about that time I had been made a Deputy Chief of the Divi-
sion. I forget the exact date. Up to about that time I had some title that I
forget, which was just one of the desk officers in the Division, largely handling
incoming political material from the field. And when I was appointed Assistant
Chief of the Division, it really involved no change in my duties, as I recall it.
There were, I think, two other Assistant Chiefs, Mr. Paul Meyer and Mr. Everett
Drumright.
Q. V, bo was Chief of the Division at that time? — A. John Carter Vincent.
Q. And could you briefly describe what your duties were? — A. Well, I should
say that the duties to which I gave at least SO percent of my time were handling
incoming communications from the field and other places, including both classified
and unclassified material, a large amount of it was dispatches and reports from
our Foreign Servicers in China, and my duties consisted of reading the material
and figuring out what sections of the Department and other departments of the
Government should receive copies, and then indicating the distribution of the
number of copies thereon. There was also a mass of other material, unclassified,
such as newpapers and clippings and various things. I was handling a very large
quantity of documents at that time.
Q. To what units of the Department or other agencies of the Government did
you normally distribute the incoming documents? — A. There my memory is a
little vague. As far as I can recall the Division of Chinese Affairs of course
saw practically everything. The officers in the Division concerned saw it and
then among the outside agencies I think we had a general rule that both MID
and ONI received copies of everything, but if there was some reason for excep-
tion, such as something- connected with the relations or the atitude of the De-
partment toward the War Department, or some reason why we might not want
to send a copy to MID, that might be considered separately, but as a general
rule I think everything went to those two agencies. We sent a great deal of
material to OSS but not everything, a lesser amount to OWI, and I think those
were the principal offices. Of course matters that concerned finance or political,
economic matters, we would send to the Departments or agencies, FEA.
Q. Would you also describe briefly the mechanics of that distribution? For
example, when an original dispatch came into the Department from Chungking,
would it come first to CA or where in the Department would it go? — A. My
.
2366 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
recollection was that it would go first normally to an office which I think was
DC/R or C/R — I was always confusing the two.
Q. DC/R. — A. I know there was a lady there named Miss Bradshaw that I
worked a great deal with, and she would send down the originals, as I recall it, to
CA, where they would be stamped, and then most of them I think would come
immediately to my desk.
Q. You would indicate the distribution to be given to each dispatch? — A. I
would.
Q. You would? — A. Yes. I am not sure but at some point we changed the
procedure occasionally. I am not sure but at some point DC/R would auto-
matically route copies because we had a standing rule, because I think at tins
time in question the originals came and I would put on all the distribution
and the number of copies
Q. You would classify both the units to receive copies and the number of
copies to be made? — A. Yes.
Q. And then where in the Department would the copies actually be made? — ■
A. I don't recall the name of the office. I remember going down, I think, to the
basement in the Old State Department where they would reproduce ozalids. I
don't remember the name of the office in which they were accepted.
Q. Was reproduction of these dispatches made only by the ozalid process or
by any other process? — A. There were two processes that I remember, namely
the ozalid and hectograph. As I recall the most of the dispatches from China
at that time were the ozalid process.
Q. And then who was responsible for distributing the ozalid copies? Was that
the unit which reproduced them or CA? — A. For distributing them?
Q. Yes. — A. As I recall it, we had nothing to do with the mechanics of dis-
tributing them. We merely indicated and DC/R would then distribute them,
except that we got back to CA, I think, we normally had two copies made for our
own Division purposes. Those would come to me, I guess, as I recall it. and
I think I would send one copy then to the interested officer and the other, as far
as I recall, but I am very vague on it, was put in a chronological file in the
1 ^vision's files.
Q. How did other units of this Department who were concerned get copies?
Would they be sent one of the CA copies or the original or some other copy? — A.
As I recall it we would — -let me see, I think we tried both methods. I think
where it was essential that the fact that another Division, interested Division,
had seen the original, where it was advisable to have that noted on the original,
we would have the original routed, but we also as I recall it occasionally provided
copies to other Divisions for working purposes, so that they could pass on the
original quickly.
Q. When Mr. Service reported to the Department in April 194~>, did he report
to you? — A. There my memory is very vague. I recall being much interested
to hear that he would he back, I had been intei'ested in reading his dispatches. I
have a feeling that I was absent for a week, perhaps for a few days about the time
he came back. I also know that a bunch of his dispatches brought back by
himself were given to me, and my guess is that Mr. Service handed them to me
directly. I wouldn't swear to that — either handed them to me directly or some
other officer in the Division, or gave them to me. I remember talking briefly with
him and saying that I was interested in his reporting but not having any very
extended conversation with him.
Q. Do you recall what was done with the copies of his reports that were given
to you. whether those were put into the mill? — A. These are the originals you are
speaking of?
Q. The originals of his reports. — A. I don't recall that point. It could have
been. I was pretty well swamped with work at that time, as I recall it, and
having these dispatches given to me directly was an exceptional procedure. I
should say at first that my normal procedure when originals came in was to
glance at them hastily to see if they were about any immediate matter of urgency
requiring immediate action. If they were, if it was very urgent. I didn't even
wait lor copies but I would route it immediately to the officers who should take
the action. If it was urgent but not quite that urgent, we would rush them to
DC/R to have copies made. We had a priority basis whereby they would be
made very rapidly. If they wrere not so urgent, more background interest, they
would sometimes lie in my desk for a couple of weeks, possibly longer.
As I recall it, the CA stamp, the Divisional stamp was not put on by myself,
presumably by one of the secretaries, perhaps Mr. Vincent's secretary or one of
the clerks. In the case of these dispatches in question, the fact that they didn't
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2367
have ilic stamp on them might not have occurred to me and I could have — I looked
ai them and as I recall it none of them were of the type demanding action.
They were all interesting. I had a habit of when there were several dispatches,
all on related subjects, of trying to read them together. And I might add, one
el' my duties in the Division was to attach a tag commenting on the dispatches and
suggesting, inviting attention to certain sections, sometimes summarizing them,
and where there were several dispatches on a related subject, why, I would
route them around together. For that reason, a large group of dispatches I
might well have, having once seen there was nothing demanding urgent action
in them, let them wait with the idea that I wanted to read them together and
wanted to put together the different related dispatches. Whether I actually did
that I don't know, but it would have been a very likely procedure.
Q. I would like to show you a photostat copy of an ozalid reproduction of some
of the reports which Mr. Service brought back from China. The first document
is B-l. Do you recall [showing the copy to Mr. Chase] seeing that report among
Mr. Service's reports at the time? — A. I couldn't possibly say whether that was
among those or not. I mean, just from the subject — you mean that — I have no
clear— the separate topics of the dispatches are no longer clear in my mind.
Q. Could you recognize from the distribution indication? — A. That looks to
me like my handwriting there. I would recognize the
The Chairman. What does the handwriting say?
A. Copies to MID. 2 ; I think ONI ; OSS ; CA.
Q. And do you recall whether that is your handwriting, where it says, "Re
turn to CA"?— A. I think it is.
Q. Do you recall who that was routed to and who was to return it to CA? —
A. I can't possibly recall that. I might repeat that at that time I was swamped
under an avalanche of documents and I didn't recall individual documents.
Absolutely impossible.
Q. I know that it is difficult for you to recall after this lapse of time, but
these particular documents are of considerable importance, because these are
photostats of the ozalid copies of Mr. Service's reports actually found in Jaffe's
possession, and we are anxious to ascertain who in the Department actually
had possession of those ozalid copies.
I should like to show you Document B-2 and ask whether you recall or
whether you saw that document, and if so, to whom it might have been distri-
buted? — A. Well. I don't recall the document other than the fact that this writ-
ing looks like my writing, "Return to CA". Then it is the type of document
which Mr. Service had turned in. I think it is his style of dispatch. Other
than that, I couldn't say I specifically recall it.
Q. I should like to show you document B-3 and see if you have any recollec-
tion of the persons or units in the Department to whom that ozalid copy might
have been sent. — A. Well, national minorities would include, I assume. Tibetans
and Mongolians. I think it very likely would have gone to TS, or Territorial
Studies.
Q. Division of Territorial Studies. — A. Division of Territorial Studies, and
there were so many divisions and sections that I don't recall — there might have
been others that I would have thought were interested in that. It is conceivable
since it is Tibet bordering on India, it is conceivable that it might have gone to
the office under which India was at that time.
Q. I show you Document B— 4 and ask whether you have any recollection of
whom that might have been distributed to. — A. Does it give the classification?
It seems to be unclassified. I think it would have depended somewhat on the
classification. If it had been secret, I don't know whether we would have sent
it to the Department of Labor automatically or not. I can't recall what our
policy was. I remember there was some Labor section in the Department. I
don't remember the name of the office. I think we would have sent it there.
Q. If it had been sent to the Department of Labor, would there be any indi-
cation on that? — A. Yes. The fact that there is not one there makes me think
that it was not sent there, unless it was sent after I left. This evidently was the
routing that I had indicated at the time.
Q. Would that have goen to the Division of Territorial Studies? — A. Could
that have gone?
Q. Do you think it would have? — A. Well, may I expand on that a little?
Q. Please. — A. I think it perhaps is a point of some importance. I recall
that when the Division of Territorial Studies was formed, for a time we didn't
send them much as far as I can recall. I also recall that there was some feeling
among some of the offices in FE and CA that the officers of this new Territorial
2368 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Studies section had just gone in from outside and they were not as cognizant
of the need for security, not security conscious.
Q. When was that established? — A. I don't know. I have forgotten. I think
it was established, say, not longer than a year before April 1945. I also think
that it changed its name once or twice, and I remember that our feeling was that
some of the men were entirely trustworthy in the division, and that is the Divi-
sion— from the point of view of intention but that they had not been schooled
in security, and we had to be careful about routing stuff to them. I also remem-
ber that they approached someone, probably Mr. Vincent, about getting more
material, and I have a vague recollection that we reached a new policy in regard
to that, and under which we provided them with much more than we had been
giving them.
Q. Was Dr. Blakeslee the head of that Division? — A. As I recall, he was.
Q. Do you recall approximately the time when it was decided to send more
material than they had been receiving V — A. I don't — if you want me to try to
guess?
Q. Approximately as to whether it was before or after the middle of April
1945? — A. I would say it was before that, probably February or March 1945.
Q. But you are not able to recall whether this particular document was sent to
them? — A. No; I am not.
The Chairman. What was that?
Q. That was B-4.
I show you Document B-5 and ask whether you have any recollection of the
agencies or the units or persons in the Department to whom you might have
routed that document? — A. I am afraid I am even vaguer on that, but on the
other side, I do recall what — I assume that there must have been some division
in the Department interested in that relief and rehabilitation, but I don't
recall what it was.
(Off-record discussion.)
Q. I show you Document B-6 and ask whether you have any recollection of
whom in the Department that might have been distributed to. — A. It is marked
"secret." I thing at the time I would have certain qualms about sending it to
TS, but on the other hand I think very likely having reached the agreement that
we perhaps did let them see it.
Q. That was the type of material which might be sent to TS? — A. Yes; I
think so. Possibly other divisions. I haven't read the dispatches now so I
don't know whether it concerned territories bordering on other areas, so that
I might have sent it to other political area divisions.
Q. I believe that refers to territorial claims by the Communists as to the
areas under their control. — A. Internal, in other words. Well, then, I would not
have.
Q. You don't think that you would have sent it to other geographical divi-
sions?— A. Not under those circumstances.
Q. I show you document B-7 and ask whether you have any recollection or
can tell to whom in the Department that might have been distributed?
The Chairman. B-7 is not an ozalid, or B-8. The next one is B-9.
Q. I am sorry, I meant to show you B-9, and ask you whether you have any
recollection of the people or units to whom that might have been distributed. —
A. Well, on the face of it, I can see no specific reason for routing it outside
of FE and CA but I don't recall the type of material that TS requested from us,
and it might have been sent to TS, hut it would not logically to me now seem
the type that they were specifically as interested in as they would have been in
the others that we have discussed.
Q. That concludes this particular serious of ozalid documents.
The Chairman. That was B-9.
Q. I am sorry, I have one more, B-ll, which I show you and ask whether
you have any recollection of persons or units to whom that might have been
distributed. — A. I should think this was somewhat between the last one men-
tioned and the others, with slightly greater possibilities that it might have
been sent to TS, seeing that it is regional and involves a regional aspect.
Q. Would that have gone to any other units of the Department? — A. I can't
say. I definitely would not want to say that it could not have gone but my
recollection is too hazy as to what divisions there were in the Department then
and what they were interested in.
Q. Several of these documents which I have shown you were marked "Return
to CA." Was any sort of a check list kept as to whether copies sent to other
units in the Department were actually returned by them? — A. As I recall it,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2369
we had an informal method of putting in the files when OA copies wore loaned
out a slip of paper, such and such dispatches copies loaned to such and such a
division, and those would be torn up when they were returned. We were pretty
well swamped with work, and I would admit that I for one probably did not
watch those things closely enough, as closely as I should have had I had more
time to keep up with the procedure. It is not clear in my mind whether one of
the girls working in the Division was assigned thai duty or not. I am not
Certain.
Q. Do you recall any operation in the spring of 194o that came to your
attention that there were any substantial numbers of CA copies of documents
which had not been returned to the tiles? — A. All I recall was that when the
case first broke and an FBI inspector started talking to me about it, we looked
in the files and there were a number missing, as I recall it, at that time. I had
a great number of talks with the FBI inspectors who came to see me on many
days.
Q. Was that subsequent to the arrest on June 6 or prior to that? — A. It was
all subsequent.
Q. You spoke of several of those documents having been distributed to TS? —
A. Well, just a minute. To the best of my recollection.
Q. Yes. — A. I would like to add that very definitely, because it is not clear
in my mind what arrangement we did finally decide on for TS, but to the best
of my recollection the ones which I indicated very likely did go to TS.
Q. Do you know who in TS those would have gone to? — A. I don't know, I'
wouldn't want to say. I didn't know enough about the TS organization.
Q. Was Mr. E. S. Larsen in TS at that time?— A. Yes.
Q. Have you any idea whether they would have gone to him or whether he
would have had access to them? — A. I can't answer that definitely. My belief is
that he did have access to some of them and I have what I think is a recollec-
tion of talking with him at one time about some of them, but I wouldn't swear
to that.
Q. I show you document B-25, which is a photostatic copy of a dispatch from
the Embassy in Chungking. China, the ozalid copy of which was found in Mr.
Jaffe's possession, but of which it has ben established that Mr. Service did not
have the copy. Do you recall or can you recall from examining this document
whom in the Department or in other agencies that might have been distributed
to?— A. Well, it would have naturally gone to MID and ONI, probably to OSS,
and I see here in my own handwriting OSS. I see no other indication in the
Department other than CA, and from the title I can see no reason why it
should have gone outside CA, outside FE and CA.
Q. You can see no indication on the document itself as to anyone else that it
might have been sent to? — A. It is MID two copies, ONI, I really can't make this
out. FC — I don't know what that could have been. And OSS it was sent to,
and CA. There is something else written here, just above, very faint, and I
don't think that is the name of another office.
Q. Were original dispatches ordinarily sent to TS? Or only reproduced
copies? — A. I don't recall that. If they were, if originals were sent to TS, I
think it was rather late in the day, probably not before about the time we are
speaking of.
Q. I show you document B-24, another photostatic reproduction of an ozalid
copy of a dispatch from the Embassy in Chungking and ask whether you can
indicate who in the Department might have received copies of that? — A. Well,
I think we would obviously have sent it to the Division of Japanese Affairs and
to presumably some economic section. I am not certain of that because it, as the
context indicates, is partly economic in character, and I notice here that it was
sent to JA, and that is Japanese Affairs Division. I am not quite clear what these
other — this is not my writing here.
Q. Then you are unable to ascertain whether it was A. Whether it was
sent to an economic?
Q. To Japanese Affairs and Chinese Affairs? — A. I don't know now, I can't
recall. Is that FE or FC? If it was FC, I don't know what it means. This
first, to War and to Navy, FE, CA, and JA. The indications are that it was not
sent to any other divisions within the Department other than those listed here.
Q. Thank you.
Mr. Chase, you have stated that the FBI inquired as to the distribution of a
number of these and some of the documents shortly after the time of the arrests.
As a result of the investigation which you presumably made at the time, did you
2370 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
develop any information as to how the documents in question might have gotten
into Mr. Jaffe's possession? — A. No, nothing that was definite.
Q. Were any steps taken at the time to increase the effectiveness of the secur-
ity regulations? — A. Yes, as I recall it, at this particular period — it rather coin-
cided with the movement in the Department to check up on security. I think
there were two moves in that direction. One was perhaps a month or two hefore
April, another one after April which was more rigid, involving the distribution
of a pamphlet to everyone giving instructions on security, certain rules we were
to follow, and as I recall it, it also involved a change in it where the keys to the
cabinets were to be kept. I think after this move, which I am not sure was before
April or after, the keys were then kept in Mr. Vincent's safe, if I recall correctly.
Q. Turning to another phase of the proceedings, can you tell the Board what
the practice was in OA at the time concerning dealings with newspapermen.
Did members of the Division ordinarily- — were they expected as far as their
duties to answer inquiries from the press? — A. My recollection is that we were
pretty cautious in that respect and that we had instructions to clear with a cer-
tain division before — I think the press man was supposed to clear with some
other division before he contacted lis. I personally saw very few members of the
press and I think usually they talked with other officers. Mr. Vincent.
Q. What was the policy with respect to officers returning from the field, their
dealings with the press? — A. I don't recall any specific instructions with regard
to that. There may have been, but that was not a matter that I was directly con-
cerned with, that my desk particularly would have been — if there was such an
instruction I don't know what it was.
Q. I was not so much interested in specific instructions as in the general
policy. — A. I think as a matter of general policy that the division would have
advised returning officers to be very circumspect in their talks with newspaper-
men.
Q. Did Mr. Service at any time in the spring of 1045 consult you as to any
particular dealings with the press? — A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did he ever consult you as to the reliability of Mr. Jaffe? — A. Not that I
recall. I think I can answer that question definitely "No."
Q. Were officers called in from the Far East on consultation expected to dis-
cuss the fields with which they were familiar with other Government agencies
at this time? — A. I think our policy was to encourage them to talk with other
Government agencies who had a legitimate specific interest in the matter.
Q. What was the policy with respect to their speaking on the subjects with
which they were familiar with outside agencies, such as the Institute of Pacific
Relations? — A. I don't recall. I think you are getting rather out of my field in
these questions because my job there was more or almost all research. I was
not one of the officers who primarily was concerned with handling personnel
who came back.
Q. Would that normally have been the responsibility of someone higher up
in FE? — A. I don't know. I should think it would be either Mr. Vincent or Mr.
Paul Meyer. I remember Mr. Paul Meyer was also one of the Assistant Chiefs
of CA, and as I recall it he had more to do with personnel than I did, but I can't
say.
Mr. Stevexs. Territorial Studies, as you mentioned a number of times as spe-
cial to you, Mr. Chase, did Territorial Studies get broken down and sections
of it incorporated into the geographic divisions?
A. As far as I can recall it didn't; that is. up to the time that I left the De-
partment. I left about July VM~>, I think, to take leave at my home; and then
I came back for a few days in September, as I recall it ; and then went out to the
field; and, as far as I can recall, up to the time of my departure for leave in
July that had not happened.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Blakeslee was concerned with matters relating to the Far
East and research and statistical matters?
A. That is my understanding.
Mr. Stevens. Was he during this entire time associated with Territorial
Studies or office of Far Eastern Affairs?
A. There again my memory may be wrong. As far as I can recall, he was
organizationally with the Territorial Studies, but his relations were very close
with FE and ("A. We had — I remember there were a number of committees to
discuss the formulation of policy to be advised on postwar problems, and many
of those committees were attended by both Mr. Blakeslee and by members of
FE and CA.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2371
Could I add one thing there? I said that I am thinking primarily of the phys-
ical set-up because I can't recall in the rooms which FE and CA occupied any
desks which were taken ever by Mr. Blakeslee or other members of TS. Possibly
they were made a part of FE and CA but remained physically where they had
been. Of that l am not certain.
Mr. Stevens. During the time when Mr. Service was in the Department on
consultation, was it the practice to refer to him, or to others on consultation, as
a ma iter of normal course materials coming from the field?
A. I don't think so. I remember personally finding Mr. Service's dispatches
of great interest and thinking I would like to discuss them with him more at
length. I also have. I think, a fairly good recollection that I saw very little
of him; and I kind of wished he had come around more than he did. I don't
recall having seen him very frequently. He dropped in — for a guess I can only
imagine recalling his coming in perhaps a couple of times after he first came.
Thai is. into the large room where I was working.
Mr. Stevens. Can you remember on the documents on which you wrote "Re-
turn to CA" : would it have been the practice to have sent them to other units
in the Department or were they confined pretty strictly to FE?
A. The copies marked "CA"?
Mr. Stevens. Yes ; the copies marked "CA."
A. I think we would usually do that only where there was a special call from
some other division or an afterthought that some other division might be inter-
ested in it and it was not on the original routing, or possibly it may have been
a method whereby we would want to insure that copies that were sent to Terri-
torial Studies came back quickly. I don't recall.
Mr. Stevens. That would have been principally when you were sending the
document outside the FE channel, in other words?
A. Yes. I think that we usually would have been where some other division
expressed a wish to see it; we might say, "We have an extra copy; you can
take that for a while."
Q. That could have been because they had had the original routed to them
or any other way to call their attention to the document? — A. Yes.
The Chairman. Counsel would like to ask some questions.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. What was the administrative set-up of FE, Mr. Chase? It contained the
Division of Chinese Affairs. Were there other divisions in the Office of A.
Yes; as I recall it there were four Divisions: Chinese Affairs; Japanese Affairs;
Southeast Asia — or some such name — Affairs ; and Philippine Affairs. And
there were also some specialists, research, partly economic people who were at-
tached to FE as FE, I think, rather than to the specific divisions.
Q. Was Territorial Studies not a division within FE? — A. I can't answer that
point. I don't know. I always thought of it as a separate division, but I am not
sure whether organizationally it was brought within the framework of FE or
not.
Q. I may say to the Board that it would have been my impression that Terri-
torial Studies was a part of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Does the Board
have any exact information on the administrative situation at that time?
Mr. a'chilies. I am also not clear. I w7as the Chief of the Division of British
Commonwealth Affairs; and I know that there was a similar British Division
of Territorial Studies ; but, as far as I can recall, it had nothing to do with the
Division of British Commonwealth Affairs or the Office of European Affairs. I
think they were separate research divisions which dealt with the geographic
offices but which were not a part of them.
Q. And were administratively
Mr. Achilles. Separate.
Q. Separate and under some other office rather than the geographical.
Mr. Achilles. Yes; that is my understanding.
Q. Do you recall. Mr. Chase, whether Territorial Studies developed out of or
was formerly a part of Special Political Affairs Division? — A. I don't recall.
It would be just pure surmise and guessing.
Q. Now in the early part of your testimony you referred to Mr. Service's
dispatches. Am I correct that that is not technically correct. A dispatch, as
I understand it, is a paper sent by an Ambassador? — A. Yes, you are right.
Q. And the papers to which you referred were simply memoranda, were they
not ? — A. Yes ; a form of report.
Q. Yes. They were not technically dispatches, the group of papers which
Mr. Service turned in in the spring of 1D4.J? — A. I think that is right.
2372 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Now, Mr. Achilles showed you certain documents and asked you whether—
he showed yon certain documents in the B series which are photostats of ozalid
reproductions of Service's memoranda and asked you whether by examining
the documents you could determine what distribution other than that indicated
by copies to ONI, MID, and so forth, and I should like to refer now to Document
B-l, and I show you Document 217, which is the original memorandum of which
Document B-l is a copy, and I direct your attention to the stamp which appears
on the left-hand side of this document and ask if you can tell us what that is. —
A. Well, it seems to be the receipt stamp which I suppose would have been put
on by— it says "Department of State"— by DC/R or the mail room.
Q. Can you make out the letters here on the bottom of this stamp V— A. I
need glasses for that. It looks to me like "II," two "I's" or two "L's"— there
are two vertical lines.
Q. Let me show you also Document 216, which. is the original ot Document
B-2, and I ask you if that bears a similar stamp on the left-hand side?—
A. Yes ; that is evidently the same liaison office.
Q. It is what?— A. Department of State, April 27, 1945, FC ; it looks like
FC/L, Liaison Office, it looks like.
Q. Now, is the stamp on 217 A. It is obviously the same.
Q. The same? — A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what the Liaison office was?— A. Well, if it is the Liaison
Office that I think, I recall it was the office which was passing on material
from State to War and Navy and back again, but I am not certain.
Q. I show you Document 21S, which is the original of which Document B-3
is a copy, and that bears the same stamp, does it not? — A. Yes. Might I put
in a statement here?
q yes. — A. Which is extraneous to what you ar espeaking of but I would
like to mention it. Seeing the original refreshes my memory in regard to
distribution. I remember that on the right column here we also indicated indi-
viduals and sometimes other divisions that might see the original, I think might
wish to see the original, but for whom there was no reason to supply epics.
and as I recall it, not only myself but other people to whom this — other officials
to whom this dispatch came in the process of its routing might think of some
other office which was entitled to and interested in seeing it and they might
add the name of an office.
Q. I show you Document 219, which is the original of which Document B-o
is a copy, and I ask you whether that also bears on the left-hand corner the
stamp, "Department of State, Liaison Office"? — A. Yes; it does.
Q. Thus indicating that this document went there? — A. Yes; it does.
Q. Now I show you Document 220, which is the original of which Document
B — 6 is a copy, and I ask you if the same stamp appears on this document? —
A. Yes ; it does.
Q. Thus indicating that the original of this document also went to the Liaison
Office?— A. Yes.
Q. I show you Document 223 which is the original of which Document B-9
is the copy and ask you if the same stamp appears on the left-hand side of this? —
A. There seem to be two stamps here. Let's see — yes, that is the same stamp,
April 27, and there seems to be an additional stamp there.
Q. An additional stamp which is A. Which is the same stamp apparently
but at a later date, May 12.
Q. This would indicate that the document had gone to the Liaison Office on
two separate occasions? — A. Yes, I should think so.
Q. Now, I show you Document 221, which is the original of which Document
B-ll is a copy, and ask you if the same stamp appears on this document?—
A. Yes ; it does.
Q. Showing that it also was in some way distributed to the Liaison Office.
Now Mr Achilles questioned you about Document B-2-".. which was on ozalid
reproduction of a dispatch, No. 2986. I now show you Document 174. which is
the original of dispatch No. 2986, and I ask you whether or not the distribution
symbols appearing on the face of this original indicate that it was distributed to
the Special Political Affairs— whether it is a division or office, I don't know. —
A Yes I also notice that the writing "SPA-1" is not my writing. It looks to
me as if it was pn.bal.lv put in by DC/R, Miss Bradshaw— that is a guess— for
the reason that sometimes I would forget to put an office on or she would phone
me as to whether I might want to have included on the distribution some other
office.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2373
Q. Yes, and I direct your attention to the Stamp in the upper left-hand corner
and ask you whether that does not indicate that this original was in fact in
the Office of Special Political Affairs? — A. The stamp would certainly indicate
that.
Q. Can you make out the date? — A. I think it is November 2, 1944.
The Chaikman. We will have to adjourn at this point. Have you further
questions you would like to ask?
Mr. Rhetts. If you would bear with me for just two questions
The Chairman. O. K.
Q. Can you tell us. Mr. Chase, whether when an official had returned to the De-
partment from the field and was on consultation, whether it was normal practice
to route to such officers the incoming flow of materials that were distributed to
the regular officers in the Division? — A. If he was detailed to the Division.
Sometimes when they came back they were detailed for a time to the Division.
Q. I am asking about when you are on this so-called consultation? — A. Con-
sultation? We would not have automatically have routed everything. I think
any dispatch which concerned matters in which he had been reporting extensively
or matters in which he would throw light, we might very well have called him
and asked him to look over the dispatch and give his comment.
Q. But he was not on any regular distribution? — A. There wTas no regular
distribution.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. No further questions.
A. I said, no regular distribution as far as he was concerned in any dis-
tribution.
Q. Yes.
The Chairman. Adjourned until 2 : 30.
(The Board adjourned at 12:40 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case or John S. Service
Date : Tuesday, June 6, 1950—2 : 30 to 5 : 30 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State.
Reported by : E. Wake, CS/reporting.
Board members present : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles,
member ; Arthur G. Stevens, member : Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service : Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, firm of Reilly,
Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.
( The Board reconvened at 2 : 30 p. m. )
(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Augustus Sabin Chase.)
The Chairman. Mr. Chase, during the time Mr. Service was in the Depart-
ment on consultation, at the end of 1945, did he have access to the files of the
Division of Chinese Affairs?
A. I would not say that he or any other officer had carte blanche access. I
know that if he had come to me and asked to see certain papers that were in
his field of duties. I certainly would have seen no reason to refuse him.
Mi-. Achilles. Would he have had to come to you to obtain documents?
A. No ; I don't think we had it systematized to such an extent. I think any
officer of the Division that he would go to I think would have authorized him
Mr. Achilles. But he would have had to go to some officer of the Division?
A. Normally it would have come through me or possibly Mr. Drumright,
sitting next to me.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall whether Mr. Service ever asked for ozalid copies
of his reports?
A. No ; I do not. He could have, because as I have said, there were such a
large number of documents and so many people coming in, that I could not
recall it but I certainly don't recall it.
Mr. Achilles. When the reports that Mr. Service brought back with him were
turned over to you. either by Mr. Service or some other officer in the Division,
do you recall how many copies there were of those reports.
A. As far as I know there was only one of each. I don't recall their being
more than one copy. Certainly there were no ozalids made at that time.
Mr. Achilles. But you don't recall as to whether the reports which he actually
brought with him were in more than one copy?
A. I don't recall.
2374 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stevens. If Mr. Service had wished to take a number of documents out
of the files it certainly would have been observed, would it not, by the persons
who were in the places where the files were? I mean there couldn't have been
a large number removed without
A. He would have had to ask the aid of one of us because there is a large
number of filing cabinets and he would have had to come .to one of us.
Mr. Stevens. You don't recall which one?
A. No.
The Chairman. Do you remember the date on which you received the originals
of the reports that Mr. Service brought back with him?
A. No.
The Chairman. Would it be in April?
A. I don't even recall that. I assume it would have been in April — when he
returned.
The Chairman. I believe your examination of the originals this morning
showed that the ozalids were prepared about April 27.
A. Well, the only stamp, marked April 27. that I recall seeing is that of the
Liaison Office. It* could not have been later than that date. It might have
been before.
The Chairman. The ozalids had been prepared by that day?
A. The stamp would indicate that. They reached the Liaison Officer on the
27th.
Mr. Achixi.es. That was the office that actually transmitted the reproduced
copies to other agencies?
A. At least to War and Navy. I don't know about the other offices.
Mr. Achilles. Let me understand this — the fact that the original shows a
stamp of the Liaison Office as of April 27 — if that is the date — would not neces-
sarily indicate the ozalid had been prepared by that time, would it?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. That is an original. I just ask you whether that is indicative
of the fact to you?
A. Yes ; it is.
The Chairman. Will you look at one of those ozalids shown you this morning,
if counsel will produce one. it doesn't make any difference which one — No. B-l
for instance — and see if you can tell from it the date on which the ozalids were
prepared as near as you can.
Mr. Rhetts. You want to show him B-l, the photostat?
The Chairman. The original too of the same date. Taking those two papers
together, can you tell (a) when your office received the original, and (o) when
tlie ozalids were prepared?
A. I don't think I can tell you offhand.
The Chairman. Doesn't it appear there what date the office received the
original?
A. It is the date of the Division of Chinese Affairs, May 10.
The Chairman. That is when the original came to CA?
A. That is when it was recorded coming to CA.
The Chairman. Is it stamped by the Department?
A. It has the Department of State '•Liaison" April 27. Now, as I think I
said this morning, I guess this is one which was handed to me by another officer
or Mr. Service. It was abnormal — it wasn't the usual way of doing things and
I wasn't the one that usually put on the Chinese Affairs stamp. It might not
have occurred to me that should lie done immediately and this Chinese stamp
could have been put on later I think. It is a matter of routine to show
Mr. Stevens. Was it customary for you to place that stamp on before it was
sent to be reproduced, if those things were handed to you? I think you testified
this morning you might have kept the copies together to read.
A. Yes; I might. As far as I know. I did not put the stamp, "Division of Chi-
nese Affairs," on them. T am pretty certain I never did. I think they appeared
in my box usually with the stamp, the stamp having been put on by one of the
girls in CA.
Mr. Stevens. But you had to take a look at them and put a stamp on before
being sent to Reproduction?
A. Yes: but in this case, if delivered to me personally, I could have put the
distribution on first without seeing that they had not been entered and recorded
"Chinese Affairs Division."
The Chairman. What is your testimony as to the date of the preparation of
the ozalids?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2375
A. I don't think I could give any answer except by pretty careful study of the
stamps and thinking back.
The Chairman. Can you give two offside dates?
A. Well, I should judge that the copies were probably made sometime prior
to April 27, because I don'1 think that we would have sent the original on to
the liaison office to go to the Army and Navy without having copies made. I
sec up here the Division of Administration, Management, Reproduction stamped
2 days. April 27 and April 30. It could have been made on the 27th perhaps
and the original immediately sent to the Liaison Section.
Mr. Achilles. -May 1 examine that document.
A. Also it is not quite clear in my mind — the ozalid process — whether ozalids
came in just the original or whether there was another copy that came in from
the field of some sort from which other copies could have been made.
Mr. Achilles. From the fact that Document No. 217 is stamped by the Repro-
duction Section. Department of State, April 27, 1945, and by the Liaison Office
also on April 27, 1945, I would assume that the ozalid copies were made on April
27 and sent to the Liaison Office for distribution the same day.
A. I should think so.
Mr. Stevens. Could we possibly examine one or two of the others that were
given at the same time to see if that same set of circumstances prevails.
Mr. Rhetts. At the risk of including argumentation in the record here, Mr.
Achilles. I wonder if the fact that the original shows the stamp of the Liaison
Section on that date, whether that is any indication ozalids were delivered to
the Liaison Section on that date. I suggest perhaps only the original went to
the Liaison Section on that date.
Mr. Achilles. My impression would be that the original and the ozalid copies
were sent from the Reproduction Section to the Liaison Office, the original
indicating the agencies and the number of copies to which the ozalids would be
sent.
A. This communication has just the same stamps as the previous one.
Mr. Ac hilles. Are they both dated April 27?
A. They are both dated April 27.
Mr. Rhetts. What document is this?
The Chairman. B-2.
Mr. Achilles. Document 218 is the original document.
Mr. Rhetts. It is the original of which B-3 is a copy.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. Does Document No. 219 bear the same stamps?
A. Yes ; just the same.
Mr. Achilles. The same dates?
A. Yes; both April 27th.
Mr. Rhetts. I might say that 219 is the original of which B-5 is a copy.
Mr. Achilles. And document 220?
A. Also the same two stamps — the same dates — April 27.
Mr. Rhetts. This is the original of which B-6 is a copy.
Mr. Achilles. And document 223?
A. Also the same.
Mr. Rhetts. This is the original of which B-29 is the copy.
A. I notice one of those is specifically marked "DC/R," Miss Bradshaw. I
dnnt know if I am speaking out of turn but as far as record procedure is con-
cerned, if she has not already been interviewed, she probably would have a
pretty good idea of procedure.
The Chairman. Now then, your conclusion as to the date of the preparation
of the ozalid copies, as shown you, is that they were made on the 27th of April?
A. I should think that was probable ; yes, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Mr. Chase, did you ever meet Mr. Philip Jaffe?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Achilles. Mr. Service has testified that early in May he brought Mr. Jaffe
to the Department to inquire concerning a copy of a report broadcast from
Yenan, and that he at that time introduced Mr. Jaffe to an officer of the Division
of Chinese Affairs, which he believed was yourself. Do you recall any incident
like that?
A. I don't think so but it was 5 years ago, to begin with, and in the second
place, I have a poor memory, and in the third place, such things were fairly
common occurrences so the mere fact that I don't recollect it would not prove
that lis not the case. I just don't remember.
2376 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Stevens. Do you mean it was a common occurrence for FCC broadcasts
to be made available to press people?
A. 1 didn't mean that but I meant people coming in to see me of the type — I
mean — Foreign Service officers bringing in journalists wasn't uncommon. As I
said before, I didn't see newspapermen but there would probably be a large
number of people who came in to see me during that period and about whom,
if you asked me now if they came in, I wouldn't have any recollection.
Mr. Achilles. Were you familiar with Mr. Jaffe"s case at that time?
A. I believe I was. I think I had already heard of him.
Mr. Achilles. Were you familiar with the magazine Amerasia?
A. I think I had seen it and read a few copies, yes. I didn't follow it closely.
Mr. Achilles. Were you aware that Mr. Jaffe was the editor at that time?
A. I don't think I can recall that clearly enough to say. The chances are
I would have known he was connected with the paper. I am not sure.
Mr. Achilles. In other words, the name at that time did not mean anything
in particular to you?
A. Not very much.
Mr. Rhetts. I might say to the Board that Document No. 34, which Mr.
Moreland is now trying to reach, does not purport to be the form in which
the monitor broadcast came from the FCC to the State Department. This
document here is a State Department press summary.
Mr. Service. This is taken from a weekly report put out by the FCC which
contains all the reports — the significant material received during the week,
whereas the actual paper which was requested by Jaffe was material that kept
coming in, something similar to that where the physical form is different.
Mr. Achilles. Mr. Chase, I show you document 34 which is an excerpt of
the transcript of a broadcast from Yenan dated May 1, and ask if you recall
seeing that or a similar transcript of that broadcast.
A. No I do not and as far as I can recall. I wasn't aware any such thing was
broadcast.
Mr. Achilles. Did the Division of Chinese Affairs at that time receive from the
FCC transcripts of foreign broadcasts?
A. I don't recall tliis type of paper.
Mr. Stevens. I would like to ask in particular about the type of paper. Did
you receive FCC monitor broadcasts at that time?
A. May I ask a little bit more about the monitor broadcasts. What did that
mean — stuff taken off the air by FCC? I do recall some type of monitoring
material. I don't recall what type it was or what the agency was that put it out.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall if such material was classified or unclassified?
A. I do not.
Mr. Achilles. Was such monitoring material from the FCC, do you recall,
generally available to officers in the Division?
A. Well, if what I am thinking of was this FCC monitoring material, I
think the probability there was that it was available to all officers of FE and CA.
Mr. Achilles. I recall, the classification on such material during the war
was "Restricted." Do you have a recollection as to whether such material was
made available to correspondents?
A. It certainly never was through my desk. Whether any of the other officers
called for it and made it available, I do not know. I should qualify that by my
original remark that everything I say is to the best of my recollection.
Mr. Achilles. But you don't recall dealing ordinarily with this type of
material?
A. No ; I do not. The only thing I do think I recall is that type of material—
I would have given less attention to and less time to it than reports coming
in from our officers in the field.
Mr. Achilles. Would such a broadcast as this by Mao Tse-tung have been
considered of any particular significance by the Division of Chinese Affairs?—
A. I should think it would have, particularly if this was the first text of what he
had said — that they had seen.
Mr. Achilles. But you don't have any recollection of seeing a recording of
that particular broadcast — A. No.
The Chairman. O. K. — A. I wonder if I could make one correction of a state-
ment I made this morning?
The Chairman. Certainly.
A. It has no particular bearing but I thought for the sake of accuracy in the
record that I would like to make it; that is, when you asked me about my duties
in CA, I think I said that 80 percent of my time about was given to these duties of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2377
handling incoming material. It is true that was the largest — took up the most
time of any single type of work I had but I think 80 percent is too much and
it is probably nearer 40 or 50 percent and my other duties included preparing
memoranda for Mr. Vincent and other officers and also I generally had the
job of protOCO] Statements when there were anniversaries and such things, and
several other jobs.
I mention that for the sake of accuracy and also to indicate that I have been
considering the mass of documents I have coming over my desk and I didn't have
quite the time to handle them that my first statement would have indicated.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Chase, with reference to some questions that were put to you a short
time ago concerning Mr. Service's access to the files of CA, the divisional files
were physically located in a room which you occupied, weren't they? — A. They
were in front of my desk.
Q. So had Mr. Service, for example, been a frequent visitor to those files,
you likely would have noticed it? — A. I would certainly have noticed it and
remembered it.
Q. Referring now to document No. 34, it was suggested by Mr. Achilles, ac-
cording to his best recollection, that this type of material during the war was
usually classified "Restricted." Does this Document No. 34 bear any indication
that it bore any classification at all? — A. No ; it does not.
Mr. Achilles. So that it appears to be an unclassified document? — A. Yes.
Q. Now with reference to the testimony of Mr. Service, as I believe was indi-
cated to you, he has testified, according to his recollection, he brought Mr. Jaffe
to the office of the Division of Chinese Affairs and there obtained from you a
copy of this material, it appearing not to be restricted and material suitable
for giving members of the press. I believe you testified that vou have no recollec-
tion of that?— A. No.
Q. You haven't. By that, do you mean to testify that you have any recollection
that the event did not occur, or do you merely mean to testify that you have no
recollection that it did occur? — A. I have no recollection it did occur.
Q. If Mr. Service has so testified, would you think it likely the event may have
occurred? — A. Certainly. I mean I have always had respect for Mr. Service's
integrity and if he remembers it clearly I would think it must have occurred.
That would be my honest opinion.
Q. That is all.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for coming in.
( Joseph W. Ballantine, being duly sworn testified as follows : )
The Chairman. Mr. Achilles will ask the questions.
Q. Mr. Ballantine, would you tell us what your official position was from the
beginning of April 1945 until July of that year?— A. I was Director of the Office
of Far Eastern Affairs.
Q. Of which the Division of Chinese Affairs was a unit, is that right? — A. Yes.
Q. During that period, as I recall, you were assigned to the delegation at the
San Francisco conference? — A. That is correct.
Q. Do you remember when you left Washington for San Francisco? — A. I
would have to refresh my memory. I went on the train with all that large
group of people that went by train.
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Service had returned to Washington before
your departure? — A. Yes; I think he had, yes. I am not positive. I would have
to refresh my memory.
Q. Do you recall whether he reported to you when he arrived in Washing-
ton?— A. No; I do not recall that he reported to me in particular. I had in my
mind his reports in the field.
Q. But you don't recall whether he personally came in to see you on his
return from China? — A. I don't recall but I will presume he did, but I have
no definite recollection.
Q. Mr. Service testified lie brought back from China with him certain copies of
his report. Do you remember whether you actually saw the reports which he
brought back? — A. I think I saw some reports that he brought back but whether
they were reports he brought back or whether — my memor is confused as to
whether I have in my mind reports he had written from the field previously
or whether he had brought them back at that time.
Q. Have you any knowledge of the disposition by the Department of the re-
ports which he brought back with him? — A. No; I have no knowledge other than
that they were disposed of in the usual way and through the usual channels.
2378 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. When officers from the Far East were called to the Department for consulta-
tion, what were they generally expected to do while they were in Washington?—
A. Well, they usually had thein sit in on our weekly conferences of the staff or
they would meet with the different people in the office and give their impressions
and then we would try to bring them up to date on the different points of view.
Q. Were they normally expected to confer with far-eastern specialists in the
other branches of Government while here on consulations? — A. I don't think so.
I don't know. You see, there was such a tremendous amount of multiplicity <>f
agencies at that time that had relations with the Far East and it had always
been traditional for them to see people such as John Mosher in the Department of
I ommerce when opportunity permitted, and of course various offices in the De-
partment not only in relation to political matters but in relation to their admin-
istrative concerns.
I don't recall to wdiat extent individual officers called on OSS people. I don't
think there was a practice of calling on ONI and MIS to any extent unless they
were asked for by MIS or ONI.
Q. What was the FE policy at the time with respect to officers home on con-
sultation addressing staffs of organizations such as the Institute of Pacific
Relations? — A. I think the general policy of FE was that officers were expected
to confine themselves to factual observations and to matters that were entirely
consistent with official policy ; that is to say, it was one thing for an officer to
report his views to the Department — his own views on what should be done —
but certainly it wTas never a part of the policy of FE or any part of the Depart-
ment for officers to express, outside or to their superior officers or within de-
partmental circles, policies that were inconsistent with policies that had been
estahlished by the Department of State.
Q. But was it the practice at the time for officers home on consultation to
meet with the staffs of organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations? —
A. No.
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Service, during that period of consnltation, did
attend a meeting with the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?—
A. I do not know.
Q. Do you recall what the policy was for relations between officers home on
consultation and members of the press? — A. The practice certainly wasn't —
well. I will put it this way: Certainly there was no practice of officers here on
consultation discussing matters of policy with the press.
Q. How about matters of a nonpolicy nature connected with the area in which
they were stationed? — A. Well, insofar as I know, the same policy governed
all officers of the Department at that time. At that time my recollection is that
if the press representative wanted to see an official of the Department of State,
he had to arrange for an interview through an officer of Current Information
and the nature of the questions which the press correspondent wanted to ask
would be cleared with the Office of Current Information before any action was
taken with respect to such a request.
The Chairman. Were any specific instructions issued by your office on that
subject to returning servicemen?
A. I don't know that any specific instructions were issued other than that the
instructions that were based on arrangements made for Current Information
were circulated all through the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Stevens. But not regularly, I take it, Mr. Ballantine. I think it is common
practice, isn't it, for any new regulations to he circulated and once circulated,
it becomes a part of the regular file of the office that received it. Now my
question is: Was any effort made to instruct the people coming home from the
field for brief periods here as to their course of action with respect to press
representatives'.' Was any positive step taken?
A. I do not know of any positive step that was taken. Of course there was
a provision in the Foreign Service regulations about discretion in talking with
the press and I think it was assumed from the very inception of people entering
the Service that they were supposed to he discreet at all times in talking with
representatives of the press. That was so fundamental. I don't think there
was any occasion for this as far as I know — for any specific injunctions to
Foreign Service officers home on consultation.
Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Philip Jaffe?— A. No.
Q. Did you, in 194."), know his name or who he was? — A. Yes; I think I did
know that he was editor of Amerasia.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Service ever consulting you as to Mr. Jaffe's reliability? —
A. No.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2379
The Chairman. Do you recall what the provision of the Foreign Service regu-
lations, that you refer to, was? Could you refer us to it?
A. I think that the reference is a little hit narrower perhaps, now that I recall
it, than what I suggested. The provision related to making public utterances
rather than interviews with the press — with correspondents — referring to
speeches being cleared I think with the Department other than that of a purely
ceremonial nature and of course there was always the sort of thing, the instruc-
tions that we could not write anything for publication without clearance from
the Department. I would understand that to imply that we were not to talk.
Mr. Stevens. That would have been your interpretation?
A. .My own interpretation.
The Chairman. Do you know what is meant by "background information"
so called ?
A. Yes ; I think so.
The Chairman. What is that?
A. Background information is information that a person could get through
publicly ascertainable sources if he had the time and the facilities and the know-
how to get. and that background information was such that we frequently gave
a fill-in to the press. If a correspondent would come up and see me, for example,
and a Foreign Service officer, based on his knowledge of the country, acquired
in the held, gave information on the career of some person who had just been
made Prime Minister, that would be background information.
The Chairman. Background information given to the press sometimes included
material which the press would agree not to publish?
A. I don't think so. I think whatever you told the press was material they
could publish lint the only restriction was that they would not father it on to
you ; that is. they would not quote and have it ascribed to an officer of the De-
partment of State.
The Chairman. What about classified information? Does the press ever re-
ceive classified information with the instructions they can publish it as back-
ground information ?
A. No, not that I know of, and I don't know of any case where classified in-
formation would be given to the press without specific authorization from the
superior officer.
The Chairman. A superior officer would have the power to authorize it?
A. I would not consider myself superior enough to authorize it. I would want
to take it to the Secretary of State. There might be some particular reason for
giving it out.
The Chairman. At what echelon do you think it could be authorized?
A. I would say that an Assistant Secretary of State — -he might himself — he
would have to get clearance from the Secretary but if an Assistant Secretary of
State would authorize it, I would feel that was his responsibility.
Mr. Stevens. Was it general practice or your own general practice? Was
that common in the Department?
A. I think it was general practice.
Mr. Stevens. You mentioned a few moments ago that the officers who came in
from the field were not to seek discussion with OSS, ONI, or somebody else. I
believe that was your remark. Suppose OSS or MID or ONI were to request
an officer to come over and discuss the situation he found in the held and the
persons requesting were persons who were in a position to utilize
A. I think you misunderstood me. I did not mean to imply that an officer from
the field was not to seek discussion with the various agencies. I said the agen-
cies had become so multiplied that it was difficult for a person in the field to
have gone around. I don't think it is general practice for officers coming in
from the held to go and see those various agencies but I certainly think that if
one of those agencies had requested the presence of an officer that it would be
only courtesy to comply.
Mi-. Stevens. Mr. Ballantine, what was the organization that Mr. Blakeslee
had and what was its relationship to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?
A. That relationship was different. It differed in two separate periods. In the
earlier period that organization was headed under Mr. Pasvolski, Postwar Plan-
rung Committee. Later on that organization consisted of a large number of
specialists from the educational fields that had been taken into the State Depart-
ment in connection with postwar planning. Later on that organization was
broken up and the specialists in the various fields were assigned to the respective
regional divisions to which they belonged.
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 57
2380 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
As a result, that group, under Mr. Blakeslee, came into the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs. Prior to their coming over there had been set up, however, a Far Eastern
lnterdivisional Area Committee which consisted of those specialists plus regular
officers of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs plus other specialists for some ad hoc
discussions of some particular problems about which they were concerned.
We often had officers from the Office of European Affairs come over in con-
nection with matters relating to southeast Asia because they were colonial prob-
lems involved and there were sometimes economic experts that came in for a
particular discussion.
Dr. Blakeslee was a special assistant to the Director of the Office of Far East-
ern Affairs. After that reorganization took place, he served as chairman of
that
Mr. Stevens. Can you tell us when that second phase was reached, when the
group was picked out and a part of it came to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?
A. I do not recall exactly when that
Mr. Stevens. You don't know whether it was in 1944 or 1945?
A. No, it would lie rather difficult for me — I don't recall.
Mr. Stevens. Did Dr. Blakeslee and his people have access to any usable in-
formation that came from the field that had a bearing on their problems?
A. They had access to most documentary material that had a bearing on their
problems.
Mr. Stevens. Would Mr. Service's reports have been made available to them
as a matter of course?
A. I should think so, yes.
The Chairman. Counsel?
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Do you recall when the San Francisco Conference commenced — what
time? — A. No, but I think it was the latter part of April that we left for San
Francisco. It was in the last week of April.
Q. Would April 25 sound right to you? — A. Yes.
Q. So you presumably left Washington prior to April 25 for the opening?-
A. About 5 days.
Q. About 5 days. So you would probably have left about April 20? — A. Yes.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. No further questions. Thank yon very much, Mr. Ballantine.
( Ten-minute recess. )
(Michael J. McDermott, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)
The Chairman. What is your full name, Mr. McDermott?
A. Michael James McDermott.
The Chairman. And your residence?
A. Washington, D. C.
The Chairmax. Your position in the Slate Department is?
A. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.
The Chairman. Can you explain to the board what is meant by "background
information" that is made available to the press as such?
A. Thei-e are really two categories of background information. There is a
category that applies when you send a correspondent to an official of the De-
partment. The official gives him information which is really of public knowl-
edge and in the encyclopedia, and that sort of thing, which the expert is supposed
to have at his fingertips and it saves the correspondent getting it out of the books.
Excluded from that is any indication of what action the Department will take
on a particular matter. That is not cricket. Sometimes correspondents try to
get that in a background category.
The other category — we very often have conferences with American corre-
spondents whom you can depend on, and we want to give them information
which they can use in their stories.
The Chairman. Which they cannot?
A. Which they can use in their stories but cannot divulge the source. It may
be very desirable for the public to have the knowledge conveyed, but it would
be bad in our relations with the foreign governments if it were known that a
high official of the Department had actually said these things.
The Chairman. Is this latter category classified information from the tech-
nical sense?
A. No, it is not classified because there is no way of controlling it. The infor-
mation is given with the expectation that it will be used and, therefore, it cannot
be classified.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2381
Mr. Stevens. Let us see if we understand what thai means. You mean by
that the Classified informal ion
A. My conception is information which falls in the category of "top secret,"
"secret," "confidential," and "restricted."
Mr. Achilles. But gives information in documents that have been so classified.
Is thai properly given to correspondents for background but not for publication?
A. I think it is apparent that when one is discussing a situation on the basis
of his knowledge that he discusses it frankly and reading it off his mind and
not off documents. The person doing the talking must of course have an aware-
ness of what should or should not be said.
Mr. Achilles. I understand from that last information that at times infor-
mation, although it may also be contained in documents that are classified "top
secret," "secret," "confidential." or "restricted," may nevertheless be given to
the press as background information not to be used.
A. Most certainly because in many documents classified as "secret" there is
a great deal of information that is not secret.
Mr. Achilles. In other words, the mere fact that a document is classified as
a whole does not mean that nothing in it can be told to the press. Is that right?
A. The document itself — the content of it cannot be divulged. If the informa-
tion is available elsewhere it can certainly be discussed. Should a document
pertaining to secret information also have a report of what appeared in the
press. I would not be precluded from using the press information.
Mr. Achilles. Mr. McDermott, how long have you held your present position?
A. Since 192S.
Mr. Achilles. And the information you have just given us is applicable over
that whole period?
A. Yes, I would say so. I would say that since the outbreak of the war every-
body has been much more careful in not revealing information as he receives it.
The Chairman. And that decision you make on the basis of the information
itself rather than on the basis of whether it happens to appear in a classified
document?
A. If it is in a classified document, I don't use the document.
The Chairman. You don't use the document?
A. If it is within my general knowledge, I use my discretion whether it is
secret or unclassified.
The Chairman. That information
A. General information I have in my head. I don't deal with documents when
dealing with the press unless a document has been declassified.
The Chairman. Are you familiar with the rules of declassification?
A. No.
.Mr. Stevens. Your interpretation of what background information means,
sir, as just given, has that ever become a part of the regulations for the guidance
of people who either are in the Department or who come from the field to the
Department on consultation?
A. It is for the possession of everybody who has had any dealings with the
press.
Mr. Stevens. Has it ever been written?
A. No, I don't recall that it has been written.
Mr. Stevens. Have you ever served as a Foreign Service officer?
A. Not as a Foreign Service officer. I have served on special assignments
for the Department.
Mr. Stevens. People working for you, or you quite often, I believe sir, send
correspondents to see particular people in the Department about subjects?
A. That is right.
Mr. Stevens. Do you ever stipulate to those people precisely the type of ques-
tions that should be answered or do you leave that to the judgment of the
officer?
A. It varies depending on how well I know the officer and if the officer has
had similar contacts before.
The Chairman. But if you have confidence in the officer and he is a discreet
officer, you do that?
A. I do that.
Mr. Stevens. This particular judgment is exercised by you, and by the other
persons that deal with the press under you?
A. That's right.
Mr. Achilles. In the course of your duties, do you ever have occasion to send
correspondents to Foreign Service officers temporarily in the Department on
consultation?
2382 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. I don't recall that I have. When ambassadors and ministers return from
abroad it is our present practice to contact them and arrange for a press con-
ference.
Mr. Stevens. If an individual newspaperman knew an ambassador was here,
is there a stipulation that the newspaperman must come through your organiza-
tion before contacting an ambassador or Foreign Service officer?
A. The ambassadors, having been through the mill a number of times, usually
tell the correspondents they better contact me. Then the ambassador contacts
me and we arrange, to save the ambassador's time, to get the correspondents
in a group. There is nothing to prevent a correspondent from approaching a
Foreign Service officer or approaching an ambassador and talking with them.
Mr. Stevens. Is there anything to prevent correspondents from approaching
an officer in the Department?
A. No.
M. Stevens. They do it?
A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. Is there anything in writing that the officer is supposed to in-
form your office if he is contacted by a press man?
A. No, there is nothing.
Mr. Stevens. Is it, therefore, in your judgment, left to the discretion of the
office to which this person is to be assigned for consultation to give appropriate
guidance in handling such matters?
A. I don't know. I have never gone into it.
The Chairman. In the last analysis it is a question of the discretion of the
officer concerned, isn't it?
A. I would say in the first and last analysis that we have to put absolute de-
pendence on the good judgment of our officers.
Mr. Achilles. You say you don't ordinarily arrange appointments between
Foreign Service officers in the Department on consultation and press corres-
pondents?
A. No, not ordinarily, no. Referring to the category of Foreign Service officer
(•dining home for consultation, usually the press does not even know he is here.
Unless there is something newsworthy in connection with an officer coming back
to the United States, I am not interested eitber.
Mr. Achilles. Do officers in the Department or officers home for consultation
generally or some times inquire of you as to the reliability of newspaper people?
A. Yes, they do very often.
Mr. Achilles. Did Mr. Service ever inquire of you as to the reliability of
Philip Jaffe?
A. Not to my recollection.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rhetts. May I ask a few questions please?
The Chairman. Of course. Go ahead.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. McDermott, I wonder if you can tell us — you have given us a descrip-
tion of what is called background information. Isn't it a fact that it is a regular
common practice for officials of the Department of State to give to correspondents
information of a charter which is definitely classified, subject to the restric-
tion that they shall not print it but it is available to them so that they may
interpret more properly known events? A. Do I understand your suggestion
is that officers of the Department of State deliberately put classified information
in the hands of correspondents?
Q. Yes. — A. No '; it isn't done to my knowledge.
Q. It isn't done to your knowledge? — A. That's right.
Q. As I understand it, by classified information, you mean information that
is embodied in a document that bears the stamp "top secret," "secret," "confiden-
tial," or "restricted."' — A. You are asking if this is not a general practice?
Q. Yes. — A. It isn't a general practice. It may be an exception.
Q. Is it occasional? — A. It isn't a general practice and if there are violations
I don't know of them.
Q. ('an you tell us what is the term or origin, in the journalistic field, for
information supplied to a correspondent which he may not use at all except
for his own information and assistance to enable him to interpret other avail-
able information? — A. The Secretary of State may talk to correspondents off
the record if there is any indication what his course will be, what his thinking
is, and ask them not to publish that.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2383
<j. That is not an uncommon practice?— A. It is done
Q. That is called, technically, off the record?— A. That is off the record.
Q. Is it a frequent practice for officials of the Department to give the press
of-the-record information, which information may very well be classified in-
formation?— A. The Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State occa-
sionally discuss matters off the record with correspondents. It isn't a matter
of divulging information thai has been clasified hut a frank exposition of how
they view a situation, and perhaps an indication of how they intend to handle
it. If it were classified information they are the people who are competent to
declassify the information. It isn't off-the-record background.
The Chaibman. Is it not from time to time?
A. The Secretary may do it and the Under Secretary may. The other officials
in the Department don't.
Q. No other officials in the Department ever do that? — A. No.
Q. Do you not have occasion from time to time to arrange for officers in the
Department to brief members of the press with off-the-record information so
as to enable, them to properly interpret events which may not yet have occurred?—
A. No sir.
Q. You have never had any request to do that?— A. The Secretary has had
off-the-record conferences and the Under Secretary
Q But nobody else? — A. The Secretary and the Under Secretary hold off-the-
record conferences. The conferences I arrange with other officials of the Depart-
ment are background conferences at which correspondents are given a picture
of the situation as the official sees it and there is no divulging without authoriza-
tion of classified information. We are not so rash as to tell a lot of people a lot
of secret stuff for any purpose.
Q. Now you testified that normally you had no requests to refer correspondents
to Foreign Service officers who were here on consultation and you later indicated
that normally there was no news attached to it and a correspondent would not be
interested. What about the situation of a Foreign Service officer who has re-
cently returned from an area which is newsworthy? Is it not a common practice,
tinder those circumstances, when the correspondents know that such an officer has
returned from an area that is newsworthy — is it not common practice to refer
correspondents to such officers for information? — A. I don't object to the wording
hut I want to set you right. It is common practice if a Foreign Service officer
returns from a part of the world where he has newsworthy information, like
Paxton. who left his post and traveled overland through the mauntain passes
into India. We arranged for him to see the correspondents. That was news-
worthy.
Then there was the case of Angus Ward returning from Mukden. We arranged
for him to see the correspondents. That was newsworthy.
Q. So when they come from an area that is newsworthy, you do arrange for
them to see the correspondents? — A. Yes ; and I usually run over with the officer
what he will talk to them about.
Q. Is that an invariable practice? — A. It is normal practice.
Q. Do you recall, Mr. McDermott, during the war, during the years 1944 and
104"). when there was considerable public interest in the Chinese Communists and
their aetivities and plans and programs? — A. I recall there was.
Q. Do you recall that certain Foreign Service officers had been assigned to
he up in the Communist areas, and to learn what the Communists were doing?—
A. I have some vague recollection. I had some knowledge of it.
Q. I wonder if you recall arranging a press conference for Mr. Ludden, some
time in 194">. who had returned from observing some of the guerrilla warfare
activities of the Chinese Communists? — A. No: I don't recall it.
Q. When you say you are quite sure you did not. you are referring to yourself
personally, or are you referring to your office? — A. I have no recollection of such
a press conference. I have no recollection of any press conference having been
held at which the subject was activities of the Communists in China.
Q. Are records kept of press conferences that are arranged through your
office? — A. They are now but they were not then. We did not have the steno-
graphic assistance to do it. Also I might say that I am not a good witness for
that period. I was too occupied in other things.
Q. Do you think. Mr. McDermott. that if it were a common practice for
officials of the Department to brief members of the press, off-the-recovd discus-
sions of materia] that is classified would come to your attention? — A. Yes; I
think it would. I usually know what the officers tell the press even though the
officers don't tell me.
2384 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Are you familiar with the practice, in this respect, that is pin-sued in the
field; that is, iu the various Embassies and missions abroad?- — A. No; I am not
familiar with what they do abroad.
I would like to amend my previous statement about the background informa-
tion. That is information I have given to the press for publication. It may be
that if the Secretary or a qualified officer of the Department is holding such a
background conference, that there might be in his remarks some information
that has come out of classified documents. There is no indication to the press
that the information had been so classified.
Q. Do you make any distinction here between press conferences and interviews
with particular correspondents or does your testimony apply equally to large
groups or single individual correspondents? — A. My testimony applies to things
1 arrange, and know about. What people do on the Q. T. — I don't pretend to
know or keep tabs on what individual officers tell their friends.
Q. As I understand it, notwithstanding this suggestion or amendment to your
earlier testimony, it is still your belief, is it, that the practice of disclosing to
correspondents genuinely classified material ; that is, material, the substantive
content of which is classified for their use, not to be published, not alone to be
attributed, is not ordinary common practice? — A. That is not an ordinary prac-
tice. I think the officer who would do that without authorization would run the
very considerable risk of getting into difficulties.
Q. When you say "without authorization" that perhaps begs the question.
What I am trying to get at, isn't it a common practice for officers to do it with
authorization? — A. I doubt if any officers would do that.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. McDermott. You have been very
helpful.
Can we clear up this issue with a few questions from the Board?
Mr. Rhetts. Which issue, the one we are on now?
The Chairman. Amerasia.
Mr. Rhetts. The issue now before the Board will take a long time to clear up
as far as I can see. I feel we will have to get some witnesses here, General,
io deal with the line of testimony that has been opened up by the last two
witnesses.
The Chairman. You probably want to bring in Mr. Emerson then. Where is
he from?
Mr. Rhetts. He is a Foreign Service officer now at the National War College.
The Chairman. Do you want to introduce your statement?
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript docu-
ment No. 93-3, which is part 3 of Mr. Service's personal statement.
The Chairman. It may be introduced into the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"Personal Statement op John S. Service — Part 3
"When I was returned to active duty in the Department on August 12, 1945, I
was informed that I would probably be assigned to the staff of the United States
Political Adviser in Tokyo. In the meantime I was detailed for temporary duty
in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Here my job was to act as liaison between
FE and various administrative offices of the Department in connection with the
physical preparations for the imminent reopening of our Far Eastern offices in
enemy and occupied territories. It was in no sense a policy job and I was not
even reading telegrams and reports from China. My time was taken up with
such problems as arranging lor immediate shipment of supplies, copies of circular
instructions and Foreign Service Regulations, consulting with the Division of
Cryptography so that the offices would be equipped to receive and send tele-
grams, and discussing with the Division of Foreign Service Personnel the re-
quirements and suggestions of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to staf-
fing problems.
"On September 7, 1945, I received my orders dor Tokyo. I left Washington on
September 14 with Mr. George Atcheson, who bad been appointed the United
States Political Adviser, and arrived in Tokyo with him on September 22, 194-"i.
"There were already a number of Japanese specialists assigned to Mr.
Atcbeson'S staff and several arrived on the spot almost simultaneously with us.
As the only officer without Japanese background I was assigned as administrative
and executive officer. My first duties were to obtain office space and to procure
equipment and supplies, to train new and inexperienced clerical staff, to set
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2385
up a filing system, and to perform all the other chores of organizing and running
a new office under unusual and difficult conditions. After the office was set up
and running I continued in tins capacity of executive officer. 1 did no independent
political reporting, which was left entirely to the .Japan specialists on the staff,
and 1 never at any time took part in policy discussions in Headquarters or
between our office and Headquarters. The only reporting work 1 did, and this
for only a short period, was to prepare a weekly summary of events in .Japan
compiled from press and other public sources. As soon as additional Staff arrived,
this was turned over to them.
••Que of the duties assigned to our office by SCAP, and carried for a long time
almost single-handedls by Mr. John K. Emmerson, was the preparation of a
weekly report on the rapidly emerging new political parties of Japan. In
connection with this work it was customary for the leaders of these parties to
keep in touch with Mr. Emmerson and to call periodically on him at the Office
of the Political Adviser. The Communist political prisoners had of cottrse
been released from prison in accordance with the SCAP directive soon after
the occupation. One of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, Nosaka,
had spent most of the war at Yenan with the Chinese Communists. Emmerson
and I had become acquainted with him there in the course of our reporting
work. Nosaka applied for and received permission to return to Japan. Neither
Emmerson nor I had anything to do with this. Soon after his arrival, which
was probably early in January, Nosaka called with one or two of the other
Japanese Communist leaders at our office to see Emmerson. Having known me
in Yenan. Nosaka, while talking to Emmerson, inquired about me and Emmerson
sent word to me. I came down to the office where Nosaka and Emmerson were
and had a brief conversation devoted, as far as I can remember, to his experiences
on his trip from Yenan to Tokyo. There was nothing about this conversation
to cause any comment nor was there anything noteworthy in Nosaka's calling
at our office. Such calls and contacts between the Communists and our political
reporting officers were occurring regularly as part of their political reporting
work. I do not remember any occasion where I made statements which could be
interpreted as expressing an extremely favorable view of the Japanese Communist
Party, as being enamored of Communist theory, or as advocating support of the
Japanese Communists. Indeed. I could not have made such statements because
I did not hold these views.
"I continued as executive officer until I became ill in April 1940. After four
months' hospitalization, I was transferred to Wellington, New Zealand, as First
Secretary, where I arrived in October P.)4<>.
•'There is very little of pertinent interest concerning my tour in New Zealand.
I appeared to gain the full confidence of the Minister, Avra M. Warren, and he
came to leave most of the routine operation of the mission in my hands. For
eight months after his transfer I served as Charge d' Affaires ad interim until the
arrival of his successor, Robert M. Scotten. In May 1948 I was promoted to
Class II, an event of considerable satisfaction to me since I felt that in a sense
it put a seal on the events of 1945.
"In December 1948 I was transferred to Washington and informed that I
had been appointed to serve as a member of the Foreign Service Selection Board
convening in Washington January 10, 1949. Following the completion of the
Selection Board work, I was assigned to the Division of Foreign Service Personnel
as Special Assistant to the Chief. Here my duties were chiefly to counsel Foreign
Service Officers either by mail or personal interview concerning their personnel
records. In November 1949 I was assigned as officer in charge of the Consulate
General at Calcutta. Since I was engaged in assisting with the preparations for
the convening of the 1950 Selection Boards I was not able to leave Washington
until early February. I spent a month in California on leave and sailed from
Seattle mi March 11. On March 17, I received orders to return to Washington by
air for this hearing."
Mr. Rhetts. While I had planned to have Mr. Service testify first, if Mr.
Emmerson is here we will take him out of order.
(Mr. John K. Emmerson, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Question by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Emmerson?—
A. John K. Emmerson, 4121 Jenifer Street NW.
Q. And what is your present position, sir? — A. Well, I am a Foreign Service
officer on detail to the National War College.
Q. What was your position from the middle of 1945 until, say, September
1946?— A. Well, in the middle of 1945 I was here in the Department. On
2386 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
September 1 I was assigned as a political adviser to Admiral Nimitz on Guam
but on my arrival there, tbe first part of September, I was immediately detailed to
Tokyo on the staff of the political adviser to General MacArthur, and remained
until February 1946, when I was transferred back to the Department as As-
Sistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs.
Q. Will you state in some additional detail the nature of your duties in
Tokyo? — A. Yes. In Tokyo George Atcheson was the acting political adviser at
that time and I was attached to his staff since I was a Japanes-language
officer and had been in Japan for 6 years before the war. I performed the
general duties of a political reporting officer. My principal work during that
5 months' period in Japan was political reporting on the beginnings of poltical
party movements in Japan after the war and the personalities involved in various
political parties, and by special order of General MacArthur our office pre-
pared a weekly political party report which I wrote during the time I was in
Tokyo.
Q. And in connection with that work, I take it~you had occasion to maintain
the contacts with the representatives of the various political parties in Japan? —
A. That's rght. Since I speak Japanese it was easy to make such contacts, and it
seemed to be important at the time, so I made special efforts to get personally
acquainted with the political leaders in all the parties which were active and
operating at that time during the occupation.
Q. You are acquainted with Mr. Service, are you not? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. How long have you known Mr. Service, and describe, if you will, some-
thing of the nature of your relationship. — A. Well. I think — I don't know when
we first met. It was one time in Tokyo when he was going through to China.
But the time I actually served with him was in China when I was detailed
to General Stilwell's staff at the end of 1943. I first met Mr. Service I believe
in July of 1944 on that assignment when I was in Chungking and I went up to
Chungking from New Delhi and then we saw each other intermittently over
that period until I went to Yenan in, I believe, October of 1944 where he had
been for several months. He, however, left Yenan, I believe, the day after I
arrived so we were not in Yenan at the same time.
Then he returned to Chungking I believe just a few days before I left to
come back to the States in February of 1945, and then we were together again
in Japan when I was asigned to Tokyo and he came out with George Atcheson
the week or so after I had arrived.
Q. What was the name of the State Department office there or whatever your
group was? What was it called? — A. At that time it was called Office of Political
Adviser and then became known as Diplomatic Section. SCAP.
Q. What were Mr. Service's duties in the Office of Political Adviser? — A. His
duties were those of executive officer. He became the executive officer of the
Political Adviser's office and had all the duties that went with that, running
the office and general administration.
Q. His duties were related to administration and not to direction of the sub-
stantive operations of the office? — A. That's right; in Tokyo, yes.
Q. Were those his duties throughout his stay in Tokyo? — A. As far as I know
they were, until I left. He remained on in Tokyo after I left in February 1946.
Q. Mr. Emmerson, the Board has supplied information to Mr. Service that a
confidential informant has stated that he knew Mr. Service while Mr. Service
was solving in Tokyo and that Mr. Service and others had conversations in the
Office of the Political Adviser with various leaders of the Japanese Communist
Party and that these conversations aroused considerable comment. Can you give
the Board any information on what the alleged conversations might have
been? — A. Well, the only one that I know of was when Sanzo Nosaka arrived
at the office. He. as you know, was the leader of the Japanese Communist group
in Yenan and had come to north China sometime in 1943 — in 1942 or 1943 — any
way he was the leader of the group which organized the Japanese propaganda
school in Yenan.
When he arrived in Japan, either the end of December or the first part of
January of 1946 — 194." or 1946 — I am not sure of the exact date, but there was
a good deal of publicity in the Japanese press when he arrived.
Mr. Service and 1 had met him in Yenan when he was running the propaganda
school for Japanese prisoners. One of our projects was to get as much informa-
tion as possible not only on the propaganda which that group was doing but
also intelligence out of Japan. They were getting periodicals and magazines
and other information light out of Japan at that time, so that both of us had
personally met Mr. Nosaka in China.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2387
The morning after his arrival in Tokyo he called on the Office of the Supreme
Headquarters and then came to the Office of the Political Adviser and, as I
recall it. asked to see me by name and I went out to the reception room and
spoke to him. Then I believe Mr. Service came in and we chatted for a very
row minutes ami he departed.
I believe with him at that time there were one or two other Japanese. I
believe one of the other Japanese Communists was with him at the time.
Q. Do yon recall how Mr. Service happened to be present? — A. As I recall
it, since he had met both of us in Yenan. he asked whether Mr. Service was
there and I said he was and if I am not mistaken. I went to his office and said
Mr. Nosaka wanted to say "Hello" and he came into the room and they ex-
changed a few words and that was it. There was certainly no discussion of
any consequence at all. It was purely an exchange of greetings.
Q. \V:is Mr. Nosaka a frequent visitor to your office? — A. No; he wasn't a
frequent visitor. I saw him several times and during that period I saw him
at headquarters, in the office of the Government section, and also I would see
him in our office once or twice. He came in company with Mr. Tokuda, one of
the three other leaders of the Japanese party, and considerable information was
obtained, which formed the basis for these various reports.
Mr. Achilles. Information was ohtained by you?
A. By me, yes. They discussed their party programs and plans and policies.
Those were all duly reported in the political party reports which I was sending in.
The Chairman. Plans — you mean the Japanese Communist Party?
A. Yes, the Japanese Communist Party.
O- And the intelligence you obtained from them was what you embodied in
these weekly reports to General MacArthur? — A. That's right, because I had
a section on each one of the parties, beginning with the Democratic Liberals,
the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party, and so on. That was a continuing
report that went in every week and treated each of the political parties on
the basis of the information obtained.
Q. So I take it that Mr. Nosaka's visits to the Office of the Political Adviser
were strictly a matter of business and provided the source of intelligence which
it was your function to supply to General MacArthur? — A. Yes, and they were
known to Mr. Atcheson and to headquarters. There was no secret ahout it.
Q. Do you have any recollection that this meeting between Mr. Service and
Mr. Nosaka caused any comment amongst your colleagues in the Office of the
Political Adviser? — A. Not that I know of. Nosaka had received a great deal
of publicity in the Japanese press, on his return from China at that time, and
everybody knew who he was.
Q. Have you ever heard it suggested that this visit, this occasion on which
Mr. Service met Mr. Nosaka, aroused any unfavorable comment in any quarter? —
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did you ever hear there was any comment about it in military circles as
distinguished from your office? — A. He called, at the same time, on the office
of the Supreme Headquarters.
Mr. Achilles. Do you know whether Mr. Service ever had any other meetings
with Mr. Nosaka?
A. Not that I know of. He may have been present at one other occasion when
I saw Nosaka.
Mr. Achilles. Have you ever heard anything to the effect that Mr. Service
and Mr. Nosaka held other meetings?
A. No.
Q. Now apparently the same informant who supplied the information, which
I have just indicated to yon. has also stated that Mr. Service took an extremely
favorable view toward the Japanese Communists. Do you have any information
on that subject? — A. I have no information on that subject at all.
Q. Did you ever hear Mr. Service express any extremely favorable views toward
the Japanese Communists? — A. No.
Q. Yon were the political reporting officer of the office? — A. That's right,
Since Mr. Service was a Chinese-language officer and had specialized in Chinese
affairs before, he did not. as far as I know, do any political reporting during that
period.
Q. YTou think it likely, had he heen seeking to in any way to influence official
policy in a manner favorable to the Japanese Communists, he would have made
his views known to you? — A. I should think so because I was writing reports and
they all of course went out under Mr. Acheson. He went over and approved all
2388 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
political reports from the office, but Mr. Service never at any time came to me
or tried to influence the reports in the office.
Q. During this period in Tokyo, did you see a great deal of Mr. Service? — A.
Yes, we were in the office together. I mean we saw each other every day.
Q. Would you think that, you saw enough of him so that you would he likely to
be privy to his mind in terms of his views on such matters as this? — A. I should
think so.
Q. It is my understanding this same informant indicated that Mr. Service
seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theories while in Tokyo. Did
you have any occasion to see any evidence that would support that assertion? —
A. No ; I saw no evidences of that.
Mr. Achilles. Have you ever been stationed in Moscow? — A. Yes; I have.
Mr. Achilles. Was that before or after this period in Tokyo?
A. That was after— from 1!>47 to 1949.
Mr. Achilles. As a result of your assignment in Moscow — I am assuming that
you are familiar with Soviet Communist ideology. and propaganda, the frequent
expressions and use of words, etc. — A. Yes.
Mr. Achilles. On the basis of your present knowledge of Communist ideology
and propaganda, would you say that Mr. Service at that time had indicated or
given any evidences of thinking along those terms or shown sympathy for Com-
munist control of China or Japan?
A. I don't know. Sympathy for Communist control of China or Japan — I don't
think so.
Mr. Achilles. Or Soviet control?
A. Certainly not.
Mr. Achilles. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Will you state the date on which you left Japan?
A. It was in February 194fi. I have forgotten the date but I came with the
Far Eastern Commission on the steamship Alt. McKinley in February 1946.
The Chairman. Did you know, during the period while in Japan, of any other
contacts Mr. Service had with the Japanese Communists than the one you have
spoken of?
A. No, I do not. As I say, he may have been present at other interviews which
I had with Nosaka.
The Chairman. Aside from these?
A. Aside from those in which I was present myself I know of no other contacts
which he had.
The Chairman. And do you know of other cases other than these two instances
in which he showed any interest in the Japanese Communists?
A. None except an academic interest which we all had in what was happening
and what they were doing and the progress of their movement.
The Chairman. When you say "academic interest" you mean factual interest?
A. Yes; from the point of view of a Foreign Service officer who is supposed
to be extremely interested in all these political developments but he was no
more interested in the Communist Party than in the Socialist Party or the
Liberal Party or the others.
The Chairman. In the pursuit of the factual interest of which you spoke, he
relied on your reports rather than seeking out his own information?
A. As far as I know, except the reports that came into our office from the
Government and various other sources. It was, insofar as I know, an intellectual
interest because he wasn't personally concerned with writing reports himself.
(At this point the Board went into executive session.)
Mr. Rhetts. I have no further questions.
Mr. Achilles. I would like to ask just one question. Did you ever meet a
person by the name of Thomas A. Bisson?
A. Yes ; I think I met him purely in a casual way when he talked about renting
a house which I had at one time.
Mr. Achilles. Where was ibis?
A. In Washington in 1942. I may have met him at one time in Tokyo, but I
certainly did not talk with him. and I don't know him except two casual meetings.
Mr. Achilles. Do you remember how long he was in Tokyo during the period
Mr. Service was assigned there?
A. I do not. because I don't know when he went to Tokyo. I believe he was in
Tokyo for quite some time.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall whether Mr. Service knew him?
A. I don't know.
Mr. Achilles. Not to your knowledge?
A. That's right
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2389
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ermnerson. Mr. Achilles, can you
finish up your questions on the preceding issue?
(Testimony by Mr. Service as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Achilt.es :
Q. Mr. Service, you have testified, I believe, that you did not have in your
possession at any time an o/.alid copy of your reports. Is that correct? — A. That
is correct. When you say "in my possession." you mean '"to retain"?
Q. That, is correct. — A. I may have had one or two in my hand at some time,
but I never had any in my possession to retain .
Q. Did you ever give any one any ozalid copies of your reports? — A. I never
gave any one ozalid copies of my reports at any time. I mentioned one instance,
which I recall, when I was asked by Mr. Vincent to have a brief talk with Mr.
Robertson, who was going out to China as Minister Counselor at Chungking, and
I think at that time, according to my recollection, I had someone dig out, in the
Division of Chinese Affairs, several of my earlier memoranda which I used in my
conversation with Mr. Robertson and left with him, but I never gave any ozalid
copies to people outside the Department.
The Chairman. When you say "left with him"
A. It took place in Mr. Vincent's office, and the long report I left with him
to read.
Q. But you never gave Mr. Jaffe ozalid copies of your reports? — A. I did not.
Q. Or Mr. Larsen? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or Mr. Gayn?— A. No, sir.
Q. Or Lieutenant Roth? — A. No. sir.
Q. Yrou have also testified, I believe, on Miss Mitchell? — A. I did not.
Q. You have also testified, I believe, that you did give a carbon copy of one of
your reports to Mr. Jaffe on the evening of April 19, 1945, and that the following
day you allowed him to keep perhaps 8 or 10 copies of other of your reports? — ■
A. That is correct. Those are my personal carbon copies.
The Chairman. Just a minute. Your testimony wasn't that you gave him cop-
ies or allowed him to keep copies but that you allowed him to take them for a
limited period.
A. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you allow him to take that first report with him, to
retain it V
A. Not to retain it.
The Chairman. To retain it overnight.
A. I believe I did. I wasn't positive on that point, but to the best of my
recollection I did, there being no opportunity for him to read it at the time
that I met him.
Q. Prior to your meeting with Mr. Jaffe on April 19th, you had no knowledge
of whether or not he was editor of Amerasia? — A. That is correct.
Q. And you did not or did you make any inquiries of anyone in the Department,
either in Mr. McDermott's office or the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, as to his
reliability as a journalist? — A. I did not prior to that meeting on the 19th.
Q. Did* you subsequently? — A. Yes; subsequently I made some inquiries. I am
not sure exactly from whom.
Q. Someone in the Department? — A. Yes; and some people outside the De-
partment.
Q. And do you recall what in general was the nature of their replies to your
inquiries? — A. I think I testified regarding one inquiry I made to Lieutenant
Roth, who assured me Mr. Jaffe was not a Communist. He called him, I believe,
a left-winger. I remember specifically an inquiry of a newspaper correspondent,
who I knew quite well out in China, who had at one time been a Trotskyite. As
I remember, he did not believe that Jaffe was a Communist, but he did not like
him. That inquiry was not made until sometime after these events took place.
Q. But you made no inquiry about him prior to April 20? — A. No. sir ; I had not.
Q. Could you explain why you gave a journalist, about whose reliability you
had no information, copies of your reports to read? — A. Part of the reason was
the substantive nature of the reports. The material was of general knowledge
and had been used repeatedly in talks and was already largely duplicated in
writings by correspondents on visits to China and by other writers who visited
China.
The second reason was, I believe, that I had been accustomed for at least 2 years
previously, or very nearly 2 years previously, to dealing on the basis of mutual
confidence with a large number of correspondents and members of the press, and I
2390 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
had never had any reason to believe the confidences had been violated; and I
think it should be borne in mind for 2 years previously, or very nearly 2 years
previously, I had been in a very unusually independent position for a young
Foreign Service officer.
Q. What criteria, if I might ask again, did you use in deciding which of your
reports you felt it appropriate to show Mr. Jaffe? — A. The general criteria was
that they were informative, factual, descriptive, and containing material describ-
ing the Chinese Communists, what they were doing, what their program and
policy was, whether it was the type of material which had been used in such talks
as the background talks to the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
whether it was the type of information which was available to correspondents in
Yenan.
Q. Have you ever, subsequent to June 6, 1945, shown any classified material
to a correspondent whose reliability you had not inquired about? — A. I have
never, since April 20, shown any classified information of any kind to any cor-
respondent. I have never at any time shown any correspondent a copy of a
dispatch or a telegram or an official memorandum of the State Department, or
similar official papers of the United States Army or any other Government agency.
The only papers I have ever shown a correspondent are these personal copies
of my personal memoranda which did not purport to be other than my personal
views or observations.
Q. And since that time you have not shown any unofficial person any copies
of your own memoranda or similar memoranda? — A. I never have. I might say
I have never followed the practice of keeping personal copies of dispatches which
I wrote for anyone else's signature, and since these events I have had several
occasions to warn junior officers and to dissuade them from keeping copies of
dispatches which they have drafted.
Questions by Mr. Stkvens :
Q. I believe you have testified, have you not, Mr. Service, that your instructions
in the field with respect to your relationships with press representatives were
oral? — A. That is correct.
Q. Were you ever informed by any person in the Department as to any oral
rules or regulations with respect to your contacts with the press when you were
in Washington on consultation? — A. I never received such instructions from
anyone in any form.
Q. You did not seek them either? — A. No, sir ; I did not. I might say also, if I
may, that I have never, either during my period with the Army nor during my
duty with the Department of State prior to my arrest, prior to June 194r>, been
criticized or reprimanded in any way concerning any relations with the press.
Q. When you were given authorization — I believe you stated you were given
authorization to appear before the Institute of Pacific Relations? — A. Yes, sir;
I did so testify.
Q. Were you instructed by the person who gave you authorization as to the
substance of your talk? — A. I do not recall any instructions whatsoever con-
cerning what I should say.
Q. Do you interpret that as meaning to use your discretion as to materials
you may utilize; that is, the subject matter which you might utilize? — A. Yes.
That is why there was no prepared text in any sense, and I was never asked
for any.
The Chairman. For a moment that closes that phase of the case as far as the
Board is concerned. Do you have anything more you wish to offer at this time,
or do you wish to go ahead with the Chinese affairs?
Mr. Rhetts. Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss to know how to proceed here because
of new materials that have come into the proceeding and into lines of testimony
that have been given by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. McDermott. I feel now we
must develop this subject matter at some length, so that I am not prepared to
leave the present phase of this as it stands. I mean, we can go ahead with this
Japanese material now.
The Chairman. Counsel is at liberty to produce evidence at any time. I am
inquiring as to the present disposition of this case, whether you wish to go ahead.
Mr. Rhetts. I will go ahead now with the further material on this. Will
yon take the stand, Mr. Service, please.
Mr. Service. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript Document 10-3.
( The matter referred is as follows : )
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2391
"Document No. 10-3
"(Remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, October 10, 1045.
p. 9553)
"From these known facts, the case bears all the earmarks of a whitewash.
Congress should inquire into this case. Who is responsible for its liquidation?
What is behind it? This is the same crowd who opposed our national defense
program in l!>4o and 1941. This means that from now on Soviet agents can carry
on espionage with inpunity. This is an open invitation to subversive elements
in our Government to continue, expand, and increase their activities and defy
all consideration of national security. This is the same crowd which is now
vilifying General MacArthur. This is not the cause for which enormous sacri-
fices in blood and treasure were made unstintingly by our country. Congress
must inquire into this matter. The people look to us for action."
Q. I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, whether you have ever had any
occasion to vilify the work of General MacArthur, as is indicated in this state-
ment by Congressman Dondero? — A. I certainly have not, and I think anyone
who is acquainted with the status of the Office of the Political Adviser in
Tokyo, during this period I was there, would realize that we were in no position
whatever to vilify the activities of General MacArthur, who was the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, in any way. General MacArthur received his
orders and instructions, as I recall it, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Achilles. I believe the allegation made in this particular document is
not that you were supervising General MacArthur but that you were vilifying
him.
Q. I should like to refer further to Document 10-3 and ask you, Mr. Service,
whether you ever at any time opposed the national defense program in 1940
and 1941? — A. I certainly did not. I wasn't in a position to write dispatches
or other papers on the subject. I was a junior officer assigned to the consul
general in Shanghai, and I believe nil my friends who knew me at the time
would be able to testify that my sympathies were entirely interventionist, you
might say, during that period. I was extremely happy over the destroyer deal ;
I was privately critical, among my friends, because of the Neutrality Act which
hampered our aid to Europe ; I was an enthusiastic supporter of lend-lease ;
and I would have been willing for our Government to go much further if public
opinion had supported it, since I believed we would have to be in the war
eventually and that it was really in a sense our war. I did not, of course, make
any public statements during that period nor write for publication.
Mr. Achilles. What was the Communist attitude toward the war during
that period?
A. The Communist attitude at that time was that it was an imperialistic war,
and the Communists attacked every step we progressively took to ready ourselves
and bring ourselves into a position to enter the war.
Q. Have you ever at any time been engaged in any program vilifying General
MacArthur? — A. I have never been engaged in any such program. I never have
vilified him.
The Chairman. General MacArthur?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Documents
58-3 and S4-3.
( The matter referred to is as follows : )
"Kamp — America Betrayed
"Acheson and Service were sent to backstop General MacArthur in Japan,
although MacArthur rejected Service."
"(Taylor, Henrv J. — J/S Record — Congressional Record, May 1, 1950, pp. A3322-
A3323)
"After all this, Service was assigned to Japan to tell General MacArthur. of
all people, how to negotiate with Russia. General MacArthur reportedly re-
jected Service."
A. I might say I have been asked many times about General MacArthur by
many people who know I have been in Japan, and I have always expressed my
2392 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
honest opinion that he did a splendid job in Japan. The occupation was handled
magnificently.
Q. Referring to Documents 58-3 and 84-3, Mr. Service, I believe you indicated
you were transferred by the Department of State from Tokyo to a post in
New Zealand largely because you had been in extremely ill health during the
last 4 months of your stay in Tokyo?— A. That's right. I was hospitalized the
last 4 months in Tokyo.
Q. Do you have any knowledge that General MacArthur either rejected you,
when it was proposed" to send you to Tokyo, or that he ever had any connection
with your transfer from Tokyo to New Zealand?— A. No, sir; he could not have
rejected me, because the Department of State would not have sent me if he had
made any objection ; and on the first day I was there he received me extremely
cordially. I might say, when I was returning to Washington for these hearings,
his headquarters was extremely kind in making available for myself and my
family living quarters at the Imperial Hotel, which is a billet reserved for people
of considerable rank, rooms in which are made available only by specific authori-
zation of General MacArthur's own office.
Q. In connection with these charges that have been made by Mr. Kamp and
Mr. Henry J. Taylor, did you make any effort to obtain an expression of facts
from General MacArthur?— A. I did not personally, sir, but I understand the
Department of State has made such an inquiry.
Q. And has a paraphrase of the reply, which the Department of State received,
been made available to you? — A. It has.
Q. Is that document 322?— A. That is correct.
Q. I should like to ask at this time that Document 322 be included in the
transcript at this point.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
"Paraphrase of Part of a Communication From Tokyo
"With reference to the recall of Mr. John Service from Tokyo, General Mac-
Arthur has indicated that he was not connected in any way with that action which
he understands was made on the Department of State's own initiative because of
Mr. Service's prolonged illness. The General has stated also that he did not
reject the proposal of the State Department that Mr. Service be assigned to
Japan. He further indicated that he has not had personally any connection
with this incident."
Q. Now, Mr. Service, in your personal statement, which has already been in-
cluded in the transcript, you have described the circumstances of your meeting
Mr. Nosaka in Tokyo. This, I take it, was an attempt to describe the incident
of your meeting Mr. Nosaka in the office of the political adviser, as has been
charged in one of the papers furnished to you by the Board. Is that correct? —
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you ever, after this occasion which you have described, see Mr. Nosaka
again?— A. Yes, very briefly, on two occasions. I might say here that I have
no recollection of being present at any meetings with Mr. Nosaka at which Mr.
Emmerson was present other than the initial one, which Mr. Bmmerson described.
I did not usually sit in or take part in these conversations which the political
reporting officers were continually having with Japanese leaders. My own
duties were extremelv heavy and it wasn't part of my work to engage in political
reporting, so the only time I remember seeing Mr. Nosaka in the office of the
political adviser was this occasion when he made the initial or courtesy call
and asked to see me since he had met me in Yenan. That is the occasion I
describe here.
I remember some time after that passing him on the street. I remember
exactly where it was and which street it was. I don't remember the name
but it* was one of the places where the main street goes under the elevated
railways. I was walking very hurriedly toward the office and somebody said
"Hello", Mr. Service." Mr. Nosaka spoke English quite well, and it was Mr.
Nosaka, and we stopped on the sidewalk and shook hands, and the conversation
was only a minute or two. I think he described the difficulties in locating office
quarters. He was out trying to find an office or something of the sort.
Then when I was in the United States Army hospital in Tokyo-^I have no
idea of the date except it must have been the latter period of my stay there
when I was convalescing— I had a call. One of the Japanese hospital orderlies
came up from the reception room and said that there was a Japanese to see
me and I went downstairs to the reception room lobby and to my surprise it
was Mr. Nosaka, who said he heard I had been sick for a long time and in
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2393
the Japanese way said he was very sorry and that lie hoped it was nothing
about Japan or anything like that that caused my illness and he wanted to
present to me a Japanese hook which he had jusl written about his experiences
iu China during the war. I. of course, don't read .Japanese so it was only a
courtesy gift.
The conversation lasted a few minutes. He left and I have never seen him
since but ai none of the three meetings — they could not he designated as talks —
did he discuss the political affairs of Japan or the activities of the Communist
Party.
I might say that I had a number of calls in the hospital from Japanese
whom I have met even though I have known them only slightly.
The Chairman. You mean Japanese who had been in China?
A. No; Japanese whom I had met in Tokyo.
The Chairman. Did you meet any Japanese Communists in Japan outside
of Mr. Nosaka?
A. You may recall that Mr. Emmerson's recollection was that another Japanese
Communist accompanied .Mr. Nosaka at that initial call at the office of the
political adviser. I have no recollection of meeting that other person or at
any time meeting any other Japanese Communists. I think it quite likely that
somebody may have brought Mr. Nosaka to our office and maybe accompanied
him. He was the leader of the party and it would be quite normal for somebody
to be accompanying him hut in any case my own interest in the conversation
was simply that he had asked to say "How do you do," and I greeted him and
left after a few minutes.
The Chairman. But you made no connections with the official Japanese Com-
munist Party of any sort?
A. Not at all.
The Chairman. Do you speak Japanese?
A. No. I, of course, learned a few words while there but I did not study
the language.
Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document No. 48
which is a 2-page affidavit, dated April 20, 1950, signed by W. J. Sebald.
(The matter referred to is as follows :)
"JAPAN.
City of Tolnio ss:
American Consular Service.
"Before me, Lora C. Bryning. Vice Consul of the United States of America
in and for Tokyo, Japan, (inly commissioned and qualified, personally appeared
William J. Sebald, Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan, who, being
duly sworn, deposes and says:
"1. I arrived in Tokyo, Japan, on January 8, 1946, for the purpose of taking up
my assignment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer attached to the staff of
the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan. Among other Foreign
Service Officers assigned to the United States Foreign Service establishment in
Japan was John S. Service, whose duties in the Mission, to the best of my
recollection, were primarily concerned with the general administration of the
office with part time devoted to the duties of political liaison officer. Foreign
Service Office John K. Emmerson served in the capacity of political reporting
officer.
"2. Sometime during January 1946 I recall Mr. Emmerson asking me, in view
of the probability that I would succeed Mr. Emmerson as political reporting
officer, whether I would be interested in meeting Sanzo Nosaka alias Sanji
Okano, a Japanese communist leader who had recently returned to Japan from
Yenan. China, via Koi-ea. It appeared that Mr. Emmerson had previously
met Nosaka at Yenan. While I was being introduced to Nosaka, Mr. Service
entered the room for the purpose of discussing another matter with Mr. Emmer-
son, with the result that his meeting with Nosaka, whom I understand Mr.
Service had also met at Yenan during the war years, was unexpected and
casual. The conversation, as well as I can remember, was of a casual nature
and did not go beyond the usual greetings which would normally be exchanged
with an acquaintance whom one has not seen for a long period of time.
"3. I have no knowledge of any subsequent meeting between Mr. Service and
Nosaka. I would most probably have learned of such meeting had one taken
place.
"4. I did not consider the presence of Nosaka in Mr. Emmerson's office a
circumstance of an unusual nature, as Mr. Emmerson was charged with prepar-
ing a weekly report for the Department of State with respect to the development
2394 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION '
of Japanese political parties, copies of which were invariably forwarded to
General Headquarters for information. Interviews of a similar nature were
arranged by officers of General Headquarters and Mr. Emmerson with numerous
party leaders of all shades of political opinion, a procedure which I would con-
sider normal for any Foreign Service Officer engaged in political reporting.
"5. For approximately the first five months of 1946 (during the remainder of
his stay in Japan Mr. Service was a patient at the 49th General Hospital) I was
in almost daily contact with Mr. Service in the Office of the United States
Political Adviser for Japan, and also was with him upon many social occasions.
Furtbermore, I saw many reports, telegrams, memoranda, and other documents
drafted by Mr. Service during the course of discharge of his official duties,,
and had numerous official and unofficial conversations with him upon matters
pertaining to the Japanese situation. In consequence, I have no reason whatso-
ever to believe that Mr. Service was other than a loyal officer of the United
States Government. Nor was there any reason to consider that Mr. Service
was not fully indoctrinated in and carried out the highest security require-
ments of the Foreign Service of the United States.
"Further deponent saith not.
"/S/ W. J. Sebald.
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this twentieth day of April A. D. 1950.
"/S/ Lora C. Bryning.
"Vice Consul of the United States of America."
Q. Now, after you became ill, I believe you were transferred from Tokyo to
New Zealand? — A. That is correct. The original plan was to transfer me to
Manila but when my illness continued, the Department apparently decided
to move me entirely out of the Orient and try to put me in a healthier climate for
a while so that I could recover my health.
Mr. Achilles. Before we leave Japan, you have stated, I believe, that Mr.
Bisson came to Japan as a member of the bombing survey.
A. That is my recollection. I believe that is correct.
Q. Would you tell us the extent of your contacts with Mr. Bisson in Japan? — -A.
My recollection of his first stay in Japan is that 1 saw him only on one occasion
and I believe that it was the evening of a reunion of quite a large number of people
who had been interested in the Far East. The next time he was in Japan, ami I
think it was probably early April, I saw him once.
Mr. Achilles. You said ''people interested in the Far East." Wasn't practically
everybody in Japan at that point interested in the Far East? Could you specify
further as to the nature of the gathering?
A. They were mostly academic — people of some academic background — research
background in connection with the various organizations such as the Institute
of Pacific Relations or foreign policy organizations. The group, for instance,
included Americans. Owen Lattimore was there that evening. There was a
Japanese who had been in IPR in New York before the war. There was a man
from New Zealand. I am not sure whether a man named Boxer was there, an
English former army officer. They were people mostly attached to the Far
E.i stern Advisory Commission or Pauley mission.
Mr. Achilles. Will you continue as to any other contacts you had with Mr.
Bisson V
A. Those two are the only ones of which I have any recollection.
Mr. Achilles. Which was the second one? I think you were interrupted.
A. The first was the end of 194f> or the beginning of 1946.
Mr. Achilles. At this gathering?
A. Yes, at this informal gathering. The second one was in April !!>!<; when he
had just arrived in Tokyo as a civilian employee of the Government section of
SCAP. I may have passed him in the corridors or seen him in the hotel, that
son of casual contact, but I have no recollection of him ■
.Mr. Aciiii.i.ks. Did you have any close association with him during that latter
period?
v. No. i did not. He was, as I say, working in the Government section of bead-
quarters and my work did not put me in touch with that section of SCAP at all.
Some of the political reporting officers had contact with the Government section
but whatever contacts I had with SCAP were almost entirely with the Adjutant
( leneral's < HIice and some of the administrative officers whom we had to approach
in connection with the transmission of our messages. All our intelligence, in and
out. went through intelligence facilities and there were fairly frequent problems
concerned with that.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2395
We were dependent <>n the Army for supplies, quarters, billeting of our person-
nel, and. in the latter stage when commissaries were set up, to arrange for commis-
sary privileges and I handled most of that generally through the Adjutant Gen-
eral's Office.
Mr. Achilles. But yon did not have occasion to see Mr. Bisson either officially
or unofficially?
A. No.
The Chairman. It is now 5: 30. Do yon want to proceed with New Zealand?
A. He was in an entirely separate billet, located some distance from where I
was living.
The CHAIRMAN. I assume New Zealand would be quiet short.
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, it would he quite short hut I would he delighted to adjourn
now.
The Chairman. We will adjourn at this point.
i The meeting adjourned at 5: 30 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security P>oard Meetings in the Matter of John Stewakt Service
Date :June 7, 1950 — 10 a. m. to 11 : 10 a. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building.
Reporter : Goodwin Shapiro.
Members of the board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman : Theodore C. Achilles ;
Arthur G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Counsel for John Stewart Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts
& Ruckelshaus.
(The board reconvened at 10 a.m., June 7, 1950.)
The Chairman. The hoard will be in session.
(U. Alexis Johnson, a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been.
duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Will yon state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Johnson. —
A. U. Alexis Johnson, 2019 Rosemount Avenue NVY.. Washington 10.
Q. What is your present position, sir? — A. Deputy Director, Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs, in the Department.
Q. And are you a Foreign Service officer? — A. I am a Foreign Service officer;
yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell us what your post was or what your position was or positions
were during the period from about September l'.»4."» to September 1946. — A. In
the latter part of August 1945, while consul at Manila, I was detailed by the
Department to GHQ — that is, General MacArthur's headquarters — to accompany
them to Japan, and came to Japan on September 2, 1945, at the time of the
surrender. Under general headquarters orders I proceeded to Korea about
17 of September 1945, where I was attached to General Hodge's headquarters.
I returned to Japan under orders of the Department during the middle of October
1945 to open and establish at Yokohama the Yokohama branch of the Office
of the United Slates Political Adviser, at which post I was commissioned as
consul in charge, and remained in that position throughout 1946.
Q. Now are yon acquainted with Mr. Service? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. I wonder if you would tell the board how long you have known Mr. Service
and something of the extent of your acquaintanceship and your relationship
with him. — A. I wasn't personally acquainted with Mr. Service until I returned
to Japan in October 1946. However, we had entered the Foreign Service at
approximately the same time and I had met him casually before that time and
knew him well by reputation in the Foreign Service as he was serving in China
and I was serving in Japan roughly from the period of 1935 until the outbreak
of the war.
Q. When you said you were not personally acquainted with him until you re-
turned to Japan in 1946, I take it you meant 1945. did you not? — A. 1945; I'm
sorry. That should be corrected to October 1915. When I returned to Japan in
October 1945, he was serving as executive officer in the Office of the Political
Adviser at Tokyo and I was serving as consul in charge of the office at Yokohama,
and I had repeated and frequent contact with him officially in connection with
the problems of reopening the office, personnel, and everything related thereto;
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 58
2396 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and the problems that he faced at Tokyo and the problems I faced at Yokohama
being very parallel, I looked to him for my guidance and principal contact at
Tokyo, our relations being, although not in name, being roughly similar to that
of a diplomatic mission to a consulate.
Q. In that connection, when you say Mr. Service was the executive officer of
the Office of the Political Adviser at Tokyo, was the executive officer purely an
administrative officer or was he in charge of any of the substantive functions of
the office? — A. Purely administrative in its broad sense — that is, everything
having to do with the running and the operating of the office.
Q. The mechanical operations. — A. The mechanical operations, but not sub-
stantive operations ; yes.
Q. During the period that you were consul at Yokohama did you have occasion
to visit Tokyo from time to time? — A. I visited Tokyo frequently — at least sev-
eral times a week, often daily throughout a week.
Q. That frequently?— A. Yes.
Q. Would you say that on the basis of that relationship that you have just
described that you were reasonably familiar with what was going on in the Office
of the Political Adviser in Tokyo? — A. Yes, in general.
Q. It has been charged by a person whose name we do not know who evidently
must have been in Tokyo at the time, that Mr. Service took an extremely favor-
able view toward the Japanese Communists while he was serving in Tokyo. Did
you ever have any occasion to hear Mr. Service express any views on that line? —
A. None whatsoever. In that connection, if I may go on, I, of course, saw Mr.
Service frequently, officially as well, we being officers interested in the same
things, and to the best of my recollection, insofar as we ever discussed Japanese
politics, the question of Japanese Communists was never raised in any way, and
I had certainly no reason to believe that he adopted what you might term any
favorable view toward Japanese Communists.
Q. This same person is also alleged to have said that during his duty in Tokyo
Mr. Service seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theory. In any of
your contacts with him did you every have any basis for believing he was
enamored of Communist theory? — A. Most emphatically, no.
Q. In the course of any of your conversations did you have occasion to form
any view as to what his general or his particular political outlook and views
were? — A. No, none other than the objective view of a situation that you would
expect any Foreign Service officer to take.
Q. Now this same source of information is reported to have said that Mr.
Service and others talked to leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in the
offices of the political adviser in Tokyo and that this conversation with these lead-
ers of the Japanese Communist Party aroused very considerable comment. Do
you recall any such conversation that you ever learned about which was the
subject of any considerable comment around the office? — A. I have no recollec-
tion of anything of that nature.
Q. Do you, as a matter of fact, have any personal knowledge of whether leaders
and other persons active in the various political parties did have occasion to
come to the offices of the political adviser during this period? — A. I don't have
personal knowledge of it, but simply from what I had when I was present in
the office, I received the impression that leaders of all political parties in Japan
were — let's say instead of all political parties, political leaders in Japan were
visiting the Office of the Political Adviser in the same way that they would any
United States mission abroad.
Q. Do you happen to know who was the political reporting officer for the
office at that time? — A. Well, Ambassador Atcheson was doing considerable of
it himself, and I think Mr. Emerson was doing most of the workingdevel
work at that time. I simply don't recall the organization clearly enough at the
moment to say anything beyond that. Certainly, Mr. Service wasn't doing
any political reporting insofar as I knew at that lime.
Q. I have no further quest inns.
.Mr. Achili.es. As far as you know, Mr. Service indicated no intellectual or
other sympathy of any kind either with Japanese communism or Soviet com-
munism.
A. < 'ertainly not.
The Chairman. No. questions. Thank you very much.
(Roberl A. Fearey, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service,
having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. 'Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Fearey. — A. Robert A.
Fearey, 5422 Broad Branch Road XW.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2397
Q. And what is your present position, Mr. Fearey? — A. I am a desk officer in
the Office Of Northeast Asian Affairs.
Q. Arc you :t Foreign Service officer? — A. No, Department.
Q. Will you tell the Board what your position was roughly from September
ifMn to September 1946. — A. My technical title was, I think, economic analyst,
but the position I held in the register of the office of the political adviser was
special assistant to the political adviser.
Q. Political adviser where? — A. Political adviser to General MacArthur in
Tokyo.
Q. In Tokyo. And you were throughout the approximate period of a year
that I have mentioned — you were in Tokyo? — A. I was in Tokyo from mid-
October 1945 through May 1946.
Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Mr. Fearey? — A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us when you first met Mr. Service and something of your
acquaintanceship with him since that time? — A. I think I first met him- — I
couldn't he positive of this, but I think it was in 1945 — the spring of 1945, when
he came back from China, and I saw him occasionally at meetings or in the
halls of the old State Department building. Since that time I knew him in
the office of the political adviser in Tokyo, and I have seen him officially since
his last return from India, and off and on during the last year or so.
Q. Now, during the period that you were in Tokyo, what was Mr. Service's
position there? — A. He was executive officer — I believe was his formal title —
in the office. His responsibilities were to administer the office, assign work,
and keep things running.
Q. Now it has been charged by a person whose name is unknown to us that
while Mr. Service was in Tokyo he took an extremly favorable view toward the
Japanese Communists. Do you have any information which will either support or
not support or iu any way cast any light on the accuracy of this assertion? —
A. No, I have no information that would support that at all.
Q. In the course of your work there did it ever come to your attention that Mr.
Service was energetically or otherwise exhibiting an extremely favorably view
toward the Japanese Communists? — A. Not at all.
Q. Tins same person is also alleged to have said that during his service in
Tokyo Mr. Service seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theory.
On the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service during this period, do you have
any evidence to support that assertion? — A. None whatsoever.
Q. Did you ever hear him express any views tending to indicate that he re-
garded communism as a desirable way of life? — A. No, I didn't.
Q. Now it has also been stated by this same anonymous source that Mr. Service
and others talked to leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in the offices of
the political adviser in Tokyo and that this conversation aroused very con-
siderable comment. Did any such conversation ever come to your attention? —
A. I can vaguely remember hearing that Nosaka had called the office and that
some officers had seen him, but the information came to me in a purely inci-
dental fashion. Nobody made anything of it and it just didn't strike me par-
ticularly at the time at all.
Q. As a matter of fact, did you have any knowledge whether Nosaka and
other leaders of various political parties called at the office of the political
adviser frequently or from time to time? — A. Yes, it was my impression — I
wasn't working in that particular field, but it was my impression that political
leaders in Japan called quite frequently on political officers in the office.
Q. But as far as you know, any conversation that Mr. Service may have had
with Mr. Nosaka wasn't regarded as some untowrd event which attracted
widespread comment? — A. No, I never had any indication that it was attracting
comment or was out of the ordinary.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, did he come to see Mr. Service or some
other officer? The information I received didn't indicate that.
A. I just heard maybe in a luncheon conversation a day or two later that he
had called and seen some officer. I don't think Mr. Service was even mentioned
as having been one of those officers.
Q. I have no further questions.
Mr. Achiixes. From your personal knowledge, you have no reason for be-
lieving that Mr. Service at that time was sympathetic in any way with
communism?
A. No reason whatsoever.
2398 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. Was your association with him especially close so that you
probably would have been conscious of that if he had been?
A. I think I would have been. I don't see much of Mr. Service outside of
the office. Living in a rather tightly knit community, we saw each other rather
frequently, but I wouldn't say he was a particularly close social friend; but
being as closely knit as we were, I think anything of that sort would have
come to my attention if it had been occurring.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to invite the Board's attention to a letter which I
addressed to General Snow on April 26, 1950, in which I pointed out that in
connection with these charges one of the persons who served in the office of
the political adviser with Mr. Service at this time was Mr. Max Bishop, a Foreign
Service officer now on duty in Washington, and I requested that because of his
opportunity for knowledge relating to the very matters that are charged here — I
requested that the Board call Mr. Bishop as a witness to testify under oath
at this proceeding. I should like to ask the Board whether Mr. Bishop will be
available to testify.
The Chairman. The Board has requested Mr. Bishop to give testimony, and
he has declined to give it because he said he could add nothing to the case.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this point to ask the Board whether or not it
has received a letter dated April 17 from Sir Patrick Duff.
The Chairman. Yes, we have such a letter.
Mr. Rhetts. I should like to ask that that be placed in the transcript at this
point as document No. 45.
The Chairman. That will be done.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 45
Devonshire House,
Mayfair Place, London, W. 1.
11 April, 1950.
Tel : Grosvenor 6101
Dear Sir: May I introduce myself by saying that from 1945 till towards
the end of last year, when I retired from the public service at my own request,
after reaching the age of 60, I was High Commissioner for the United Kingdom
in New Zealand. Since then, my Government has appointed me Chairman of
a newly constituted body called the National Parks Commission : the Archbishop
of Canterbury has nominated me a Church Commissioner for England : and I am
a Director of the National Bank of New Zealand and of Dalgety and Co.
The successive American Ambassadors in New Zealand during my time there
were Mr. Patten, Mr. Avra Warren, and Mr. Scotten, who all know me: and
Mr. Ray Atherton has known me for many years both in London and in Canada-
I have learned today with deep concern that my friend Mr. John S. Service is
shortly to face hearings before the Loyalty Security Board regarding imputations
of his having had Communist associations. I hope that you, Sir, will not think it
an intrusion on my part if I venture, as an outsider, to write you a few of my
impressions of Mr. Service's record and performance in New Zealand.
We were often at one another's houses, and my wife and I met Mr. and Mrs.
Service constantly at the various official and social occasions to which members
of the Diplomatic Corps are subject in the capitals to which they are accredited.
1 have, myself, unusual affection and respect both for Mr. and Mrs. Service, and
I doubt whether any two representatives of their country have ever been held in
more general esteem than these two were in New Zealand. I cannot recall any
particular incident demonstrating anti-communist feelings on his part; but his
whole attitude to life and all his social relationships make any imputation of
communist leanings on his part to my mind fantastic. New Zealanders, as you
may know, are very far from being tainted with communism. Mr. Service, as I
have mentioned, was universally popular; and. as one of your own Statesmen
has said, "You cannot fool all the people all the time."
I hope that you will not feel that it is presumptuous or irregular of me to
write to you in this manner. If I have been at fault in so doing I beg that you
will not lay my fault at Mr. Service's door, but that you will attribute it to my
affection for Mr. Service personally, and my esteem for one whom I regard as a
most distinguished servant of his country and— I like to think— a friend of my
own country.
Yours very truly,
Patrick Duff.
6TATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2399
P. S. — I recall that Lady Duff and I were dining one night in Wellington with
Mr. and Mrs. Service. It was a completely private and informal party; and it
happened to be Her Royal Highness Princess Elizabeth's birthday. At the end
of dinner. Mr. Service rose and invited his guests to drink the health of the
Princess. This graceful act of courtesy, which touched my wife and myself not
a little, may seem just the gesture of a diplomat, as I recount it in cold type.
But it is hardly the type of gesture, 1 should fancy, which anyone of communist
leanings would go out of his way to make!
Mr. Rhetts. I should like at this time to introduce into the transcript Docu-
ment No. 55, which is an unclassified dispatch, dated March lis, 1950, and signed
by Robert M. Scot fen. Howard Elting, Jr., Osborn S. Watson, Meade T. Foster,
and Armistead M. Lee.
The Chairman. It may be entered in the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Document No. 55
Foreign Service of the United States of America
Security : Unclassified.
Priority : Air pouch.
To : Department of State.
From : Wellington. 163. March 28, 1950.
Kef. :
Subject : Statement in support of John S. Service.
The undersigned, who comprise all of the officers of the American Embassy,
Wellington, who had the privilege of serving with John S. Service at this mission,
wish to record our appreciation and support of the forthright statements made
in his defense by Deputy Under Secretary Peurifoy, as reported in the Bulletin
of the Department of State and in the Department's daily wireless bulletin.
During his tour of duty in Wellington as First Secretary and, for a time,
charge d' Affaires, Jack and Caroline Service won the universal respect and affec-
tion of a wide circle of acquaintances, both New Zealanders and Americans, but
more particularly of those who worked with him at this mission. We regarded
him and his wife as ideal representatives of the United States abroad. This
view has also been expressed to us on many occasions by i ffi ials of the New
Zealand Government.
Since we had complete confidence not only in his ability and his discretion but
also his unqualified loyalty to the United States, we feel that the aspersions
that have been made against him affect the entire Foreign Service. Accordingly,
we wish to add our wholehearted endorsement to Mr. Peurifoy's statement that
"the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Department go out to them."
Robert M. Scotten.
Howard Elting, Jr.
Osborn S. Watson,
Meade T. Foster.
Armistead M. Lee.
Mr. Rhetts. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript Docu-
ment No. 56, which is a dispatch dated April 3, 1950, signed by Robert M.
Scottten.
The Chairman. It may be made a part of the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Document No. ~>>>
Foreign Service of the United States of America
Security : Restricted
Priority: Air pouch
To : Department of State
From: Wellington 212 April 3, 1950
Ref :
Subject: Reaction of New Zealand government officials to Senator McCarthy's
atta<k on Mr. John S. Service
Previous reports have mentioned the dismay and indignation with which New
Zealanders who knew Mr. John Service when he was First Secretary at this
2400 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Embassy have reacted to the news of his sudden recall, while en route to India.
To answer the charges of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In view of the keen
interest which this matter has aroused in official Wellington, a fuller report
appears to be in order, particularly with regard to the comments made to
officers of the Embassy by ranking officials of the New Zealand Government.
The gentlemen whose comments are summarized below are among the best-
equipped individuals in New Zealand to judge the issues involved. Thy knew
Mr. Service intimately during the period of his service in Wellington. They are
thoroughly familiar with the facts and the arguments bearing on the current
controversy over Hie China policy, in which Mr. Service's name is involved. In
particular, they have all read, in whole or in part, the Department's "White
Paper" on China, including despatches written by Mr. Service from Chungking.
They were all fully acquainted with the Amerasia incident, in whi^h Mr.
Service was exonerated of the charge of having given classified information to a
magazine editor. Finally, they were most of them personally acquainted with
Brigadier General Hurley when he was American Minister in Wellington.
It might be mentioned here that none of these officials, as far as the Embassy
is aware, has ever been suspected of being sympathetic to Communism. They have.
on the contrary, made it abundantly clear that they are genuinely alarmed
over the growth of Communism in Asia. Moreover, they have all manifested on
many occasions a sympathetic understanding of the United States and an
approval of the broad objectives of American foreign policy.
Mr. A. D. Macintosh, Secretary of External Affairs, told an officer of the
Embassy that his own reaction, and that of his associates, was one of intense
indignation. He had felt so strongly on the subject that he had at first consid-
ered writing personally to friends in the Department of State, notably Mr.
Hickerson, expressing his complete confidence in Mr. Service. He had decided,
however, especially after reading Mr. Peurifoy's statement (which greatly
cheered him) that this gesture would be superfluous, since it was, evident that
the Department was standing solidly behind Mr. Service.
It was scandalous, he thought, that the character and loyalty of capable public
servants, such as Mr. Service, could be impugned without the slightest evidence,
for the sake of domestic party politics. In his opinion, based on an intimate
acquaintance, Mr. Service could never be classified as even a "fellow traveler."'
He was, said Mr. Macintosh, a true liberal, in tho best sense of the word.
The comment of Mr. Foss Shasahan, Secretary of Cabinet and Deputy Secre-
tary of External Affairs, although made at a separate time and place, was very
similar to that of Mr. Macintosh. Apart from the distress which he felt
because of his own personal attachment and admiration for Mr. Service, he
thought it scandalous that a diplomatic officer should be penalized, and his
loyalty called into question, because his opinions did not agree with those of
hi's chief. Mr. Shanahan made it clear that he was referring here to Mr. Service's
position in the Embassy at Chungking under Brigadier General Hurley. In his
opinion, history had vindicated the correctness of views expressed at that time
by Mr. Service and his colleagues: the tragedy of the situation was that their
advice was not taken. He noted that the Economist, in its review of the White
Paper, had singled out the Service dispatches for special quotation. (The fact
that Mr. Shanahan was so explicit in his endorsement not only of Mr. Service's
character and loyalty, but also of his judgment, as a political reporting officer
in China, is especially interesting because: (a) Mr. Shanahan's own area spe-
cialty has been the Far East, (b) he is known to take more pessimistic view of
the new regime in China than most of his colleagues; (e) his deep antipathy
towards Communism is strengthened by his religious convictions, as a staunch
Roman Catholic, and (d) he was a particularly close friend of Mr. Service
during the latter's tour of duty in Wellington.)
Mr Andrew Sharp, Second Secretary in the Department of External Affairs,
took it for granted that the McCarthy indictment of Mr. Service was simply a
revival of the Amerasia affair and that behind both was the figure of General
Hurley, embittered by the fact that Mr. Service and those of his viewpoint had
been proved correcl in their judgments.
Mr. Leicester Wei:b, Director of Stabilization and Marketing, confessed that
having just finished reading the White Paper, he had been astonished that
Mr. Service could now be attacked, for, in his view, the despatches of Mr. Service
from Chungking were a complete vindication of his ability and judgment.
Mr. Webb considered that the issue raised by Republican attacks on Service,.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2401
Vincent, Butterworth, and the other Far Eastern experts involved far more than
the careers <>f the officers in question, and their immunity from domestic political
skirmishing: it was a vital concern of Australia. New Zealand, and other Pacific
countries if the very men who had seen the China situation correctly were now
hounded from positions of influence by those who still identified China with
Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Webb was not alone in expressing this last sentiment. It was either
stated or implicit in the comments of the other officials quoted above. They
all spoke with an intensity of feeling which was based not merely on their per-
sonal attachment to Mr. Service, but on their concern over the effects on Ameri-
can foreign policy, and. by consequence, on the security of New Zealand, if the
current Republican campaign against State Department personnel succeeds.
They made it quite clear that they could not regard this whole controversy as a
domestic affair, concerning only the United States.
In view of the apparent unanimity of these reactions, it might reasonably be
suspected that these comments have been deliberately selected as coming from.
persons known to be admirers of Mr. Service and friendly to the present admin-
istration of the Department of State. It can he stated positively, however, that
of the many New Zealand Government officials and private citizens who knew
Mr. Service and who have, on various occasions, raised the matter in informal
conversations with officers of the Embassy, not one has expressed the slightest
degree of credence in the McCarthy charges.
This same reaction is evident in editorial and radio comments on Senator
McCarthy's accusations. While these have not, so far touched in the individual
case of Mr. Service, they have with one exception ' expressed contemptuous dis-
belief in the Senator's charges against Departmental personnel.
Two of the most influential papers in the Dominion, the New Zealand Herald
(Auckland) and the Christchurch Press, have remarked that the Senator has
simply made himself ridiculous in suggesting that such men as Dr. Jessup and
Professor Lattimore are pro-Communist, adding that he has recklessly endan-
gered American prestige abroad in the hope of gaining partisan political advan-
tages. In the weekly foreign affairs commentary over the New Zealand Broad-
casting Service, Mr. Graham Miller identified the McCarthy accusations with the
campaign of Republican elements to replace Mr. Acheson's Far Eastern policy with
what be described as "dangerous belligerency" as manifest in the campaign for
military intervention in Formosa. If these elements succeeded, he thought the
consequences for New Zealand might be disastrous.
A final comment seems to merit recording because it was made by one who,
as Professor of Political Science at Victoria University College, Wellington, and
as a frequent writer, public lecturer and radio commentator on international
affairs, has a considerable influence on local public opinion. Professor Robert
Parker is not, of course, a Government official, nor did he know Mr. Service per-
sonally, having been in Australia at the time of the latter's tour of duty at this
post. He is, however, a keen observer of American affairs and the controversy
over China policy.
Professor Parker remarked that in his opinion the greatest danger in current
Congressional inquisition lay in the possibility that it might, drive independent
and liberal minds out of the Department and the Foreign Service. Viewing the
issue solely from the standpoint of efficient public administration (Professor
Parker's specialty) and leaving aside the aspect of civil justice, he thought that
this tendency would dangerously reduce the efficiency of the service as an instru-
ment of national policy. Even if one were to consider American foreign policy
in its narrowest interpretation, as one of combatting Communism, this could only
be done, he said, by men who understood what they were fighting, which in turn
required that they be able when the occasion demands, to associate with Com-
munists. If officers were intimidated into limiting their associations and color-
ing their reports to fit the official "line" or the preconceptions of their superiors
he felt that the result would be a diplomatic service quite asmonolithic, and just
as inefficient as a source of objective intelligence, as that of the U. S. S. R.
Robert M. Scotten.
1 The one exception was an editorial in the Grey River Aran? (Labor) of Greymouth,
•which confined itself to observing that where there is smoke, there must be fire. This is a
small provincial paper with strong Roman Catholic leanings.
2402 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. I note in both the documents signed by Mr. Scotten and others
Mr. Rhetts. That is document 55.
The Chairman. And 56.
Mr. Achilles. In Document 55 there is a quotation from Mr. Peurifoy's state-
ment that "the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Department go out to
them," presumably Mr. and Mrs. Service; and the statement in Document 56
referring to Mr. Peurifoy's statement states "that the Department was standing
solidly behind Mr. Service." Mr. Peurifoy's statement naturally does not, and
cannot, relate to this Board, which, in these matters, is separate from the
Department. Our function is to examine into all the facts in the case and to
get at the truth of the matter. We can hardly be described as standing solidly
behind the witness with whom we are concerned.
The Chairman. That's entirely correct.
Mr. Rhetts. Now that is all I have on this latter phase of Japan and this
relating to Mr. Service's duty in New Zealand.
The Chairman. Have you anything more to offer today?
Mr. Rhetts. So that it seems to me we are at a point where we need to go
back now to— so far as I am concerned, at any rate, the next step would be to
go back to some of the loose ends that are left from the so-called Amerasia,
phase of this inquiry.
The Chairman. Have either of the other members of the Board any questions
on the Japanese phase?
Mr. Achilles. I have a few questions on Mr. Service's career since New
.Zealand.
The Chairman. While you were in Japan, were you acquainted with one
Philip Keeney, Mr. Service?
A. No, sir ; I have no recollection of ever having met Mr. Keeney.
The Chairman. He was a member of the Reparations Commission, I under-
stand.
A. No, sir ; I do not recollect ever having met him.
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder if we could have a 10-minute recess. This has been a
very long, drawn-out procedure.
(Whereupon, a 10-minute recess was taken.)
Mr. Achilles. Mr. Service, I notice in your opening statement that you state
you were transferred to Washington in December 1948 to serve as a member of
the foreign Service Selection Board, convening in Washington January 10, 1940.
What were your duties as a member of that Board?
A. Under the Foreign Service Act of 194G. promotions of all Foreign Service
officers are to be based strictly on merit, and the machinery for determining
merit provided by section 021 of the Foreign Service Act are to be selection
boards to make recommendations on the basis of which the President shall
nominate officers for promotion, to be confirmed by the Senate. Now the regula-
tions which have been promulgated by the Secretary of State to implement the
act have provided in the past that these selection boards are made up of five
members — this was the case in 1949, when I served — of four Foreign Service
officers and one public member from outside the Government service. There
are entirely new boards convened each year, and the board serves, of course, only
1 year. It is a very carefully drawn up plan to insure as far as possible the
most complete objectivity and fairness and elimination of any bias or favoritism.
I was appointed by the Secretary to be a member of what was called Selection
Board B, which considered the records and recommended promotions of the lower
three classes of Foreign Service officers — in other words, classes 6, 5, 4.
The Chairman. How many of those boards were there?
A. There were two boards, sir. Board A handled the two classes 2 and 3
and recommended promotion for classes 2 and 3, and the lower board, of which 1
was a member, recommended promotions for classes 4, 5, and 6. Now the
regulations governing the setting up of the boards specified that the Foreign
Service officers named for this duty shall be men of good record, representing as
far as possible the most varied experience and who have demonstrated experience
in the ap] raisal and handling of personnel. I might say that this is not a duty
which anyone seeks. It is an extremely arduous and difficult task to rate your
own fellow officers, and I had no previous knowledge of my choice for the job
until I received a telegram appointing me.
Now the duties of the hoard members are to independently read the complete
personnel efficiency tiles of all the officers in one class who are eligible for pro-
motion. The ho, •iitl members do that independently, without consultation on
particular cases. They give each officer whose record they read a rating varying
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2403
from ">. the highest rating, to 1, the bottoic rating. After every member of the
board has made his careful study and independent appraisal of the efficiency file
of all the officers in the class, there is opportunity for discussion among the
board members concerning the cases which each member has recommended for
promotion. After that discussion the board members may alter their original
ratings, but they musl announce to all the board members and to the official ob-
servers from the other departments — Commerce, Labor, Agriculture — who are
present their reasons for making these changes. When al! of the individual rat-
ings are finally fixed, the score-; of the live members of the board are combined,
and the men receiving the highest ratings are recommended for promotion in
the order of the toiai score they have received. The recommendations of the
selection board go next to the Board of the Foreign Service.
.Mr. Achilles. .May I interrupt a moment V There are five members of the
board?
A. Yes, Sir.
Mr. Achilles. And the vote of each member of the board is equal?
A. The vote of each member of the board is exactly equal, sir.
Mr. AcHir.i.ES. And you were going to say what happens to the board's recom-
mendations V
A. Yes. The recommendations of the board are next transmitted to the Board
of the Foreign Service, as specified by section 211 of the Foreign Service Act.
which is composed of the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of administra-
tion, two other Assistant Secretaries of State designated by the Secretary, the
Director General for the Foreign Service, and one representative each, occupying
positions with comparable responsibilities, from the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Labor. The Board of the Foreign Service considers the recom-
mendations of the selection board and has the power to require the selection board
to reconsider the whole list or to answer questions with regard to certain officers
whose names have been placed on the promotion list. The selection board, if so
required, must make appropriate reconsideration, but if it does not alter its recom-
mendations the Board of the Foreign Service must either reject the list in toto
or accept it in toto. If the Board of the Foreign Service approves the recom-
mendations of the selection board, the recommendations then go to the Secretary
of State, and if his approval is given, to the President, and if he approves, then
to the Senate for confirmation and promotion.
Mr. Achilles. That's all.
The Chairman. Now we will go into recess until 2 :30 this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 p.m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : Wednesday, June 7, 1950, 2 : 35 p. m. to 3 : 55 p. m.
Place : Room 2254. New State Building, Washington, D. C.
Reporter : Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S, reporting.
Members of board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles ; Arthur
G. Stevens ; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Counsel for Mr. Service : Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts and
Ruckelshaus.
(The board reconvened at 2 : 35 p. m.)
The Chairman (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The board will be in session.
Thereupon Mr. John K. Fairbank, being produced, sworn and examined as a
witness in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as follows:
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your name and address for the record. Mr. Fairbank? —
A. John K. Fairbank, living at 41 Winthrop Street. Cambridge. Mass.
Q. What is your present position? — A. Professor of history at Harvard
University.
Q. Would you be good enough to indicate to the board your background of
your general held of interests and activity? — A. I have been working on China
as a subject of study since 1029. I began this study after graduating from
Harvard and had a year at Oxford University, where I was a Rhodes Scholar.
I then continued study of the Chinese language and Chinese history in Peiping
in 1932 up to the end of 1935, the first year on the end of the Rhodes Scholarship,
2404 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
the second year on savings, the third and fourth years on a Rockefeller scholar-
ship. I then returned to Oxford in 1936 and got the degree of a D. Phil, and
began teaching at Harvard in the fall of 193<5. I continued there as an instructor
in history, giving a course on the Modern Far East, until August of 1941, when I
took leave to join Prof. James Phinney Baxter and Colonel Donovan in the
Office of the Coordinator of Information, Research and Analysis Branch, which
was then being set up.
1 lived in Washington at 1306, Thirty-fourth Street NW., from October of
1941 until August of 1C42, when I was sent to China. And that first year under
COI I became especially attached to the office of Lauchlin Currie, who was
handling the AVG.
The Chaibman. Meaning?
A. American voluntary group in China. And acted as a sort of liaison between
him and the Research and Analysis Brand). And also in the course of that
year I made it a point to meet all workers on Chinese and far eastern studies
in Washington, as I had made a point before that to meet all such people in
academic life.
I then went to China in August 1942 under the Office of Strategic Services — that"
was the new name for the Coordinator of Information — and specifically under
an organization called the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of
Foreign Publications, which was operating as a subsidiary of OSS with OSS
funds but representing all interested agencies in Washington so as to centralize
the inflow of publications from foreign countries.
My job was to develop a flow from China of research materials which would
help the war effort against Japan. Essentially that would be Japanese publica-
tions secured, we hoped, through occupied China. In order to secure publications
more easily in China I arranged to be the representative of the Library of
Congress in China and was given the title also of special assistant to the
Ambassador in Chungking On arrival in Chungking I set up an office under
the Embassy called the American publications service of the American Embassy.
My object being to secure materials, I knew that I must also give out materials
and also I worked for the Cultural Relations Division of the State Department.
The name of that department changed from time to time. It was under Mr.
Willis Peck. My wife had become the second employee hired by him in that
Division of the Department in the late fall of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
Consequently her work in Washington and mine in Chungking had some coll-
ection which was of interest to us both. Shall I continue with my activities
in Chungking?
Q. Yes, do. — A. Having become established under Mr. Gauss — and I convinced
him that I was not trying, as my predecessor had, to run an independent show
or to be an intelligent service collecting information through non-Embassy
channels, I proceeded to develop contact with the various branches of the
Chinese Government and also with the communities, particularly in Chungking
and in Kumming. It happened that, having taught one year in Tsinghua Uni-
versity in Peiping the year 1C33-4. I had a wide acquaintance among Chinese
professors. I proceeded to develop a number of projects for making American
printed matter available to them, academic journals, mainly on microfilm.
This microfilm project was set up to obviate the difficulty of transportation
over the Hump. We. imported lenses, made microfilm projectors, and then
imported microfilm. The project was not very successful. The microfilm was
difficult to read and I don't think it accomplished its end. However, I worked
hard on it for the in months or so that I was there. It did establish contact
with the university professors very widely.
I returned from Chungking in December of 1943. I can go into details of the
Chungking office later on if it is of interest. T was technically under some
authority of Captain — later Commander and Admiral — Miles, who was my
landlord, but who left me strictly alone, as I did him. much to the satisfaction
of the Ambassador.
T traveled during that year to Chengtu, to Chungking, to Kweilin, had jaun-
dice for a month or two and dysentery. I saw Mr. Service at those times when
he was in Chungking, which were not very frequent, but I had a number of long
talks with him.
Mr. Achilles. Had you known Mr. Service previously?
A. I think T met him first in Peiping. I won't swear to that; I had known
most of the Foreign Service officers in Peiping when I was a student and they
were too — Davies and Penfield. If I did meet him it was very briefly. I made
his acquaintance really in < !hungking at this time. I saw a good deal of Sprouse,
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2405
Clubb, and others in the Embassy, one of whom was always in charge of my
operation, which was under the Embassy's aegis.
I then returned from China in December of 1943. Since ihe IDC operation
had 110 need for personnel at home. I was open to transfer or to continuing in
R and A of < >SS. I decided to transfer to OWI and I eni 'red the office of what
was then called. I believe, area :>.. meaning the Far East. In that office the posi-
tion of Deputy Director for the Far Fast at that time I think was held by Owen
Lattimore, who was in San Francisco with a bureau which produced the radio
broadcasts out of San Francisco. The Assistant Deputy Director was George
Taylor, who was in the Washington office in the Social Security Building and
whose staff produced a weekly central directive draft which was then cleared
with the Department of State and provided the policy guidance for the OWI
operation. The operation itself was mainly in New York, where publications
were broadcast to Europe, and so on.
I joined that in March 1944. For a long time I acted as head of this office off
and on. signing myself as Acting Assistant Deputy Director. I continued in
that job mainly in charge of contad between Washington and New York in the
effort to get the Xew York people to follow the Washington directive week by
week. During the rest of 1944 and until August 1945, I lived throughout this
period at the same house mentioned above in Georgetown, 1306 Thirty-fourth
Street, with my wife.
In May 1945 my wife was sent to Chungking as the first Cultural Relations
Officer. 4n the Embassy. In August 1945. after the end of the war, I was also
sent back to China with a view to taking charge of the OWI operations there.
I arrived there by way of Europe in late September or early October 1945 and
had the position of, I think, executive director. William Holland, who had been
l.( ad of the office, came home shortly after my arrival there. I took over from
Mr. Darlington completely in December 194.1 on the occasion of an unfortunate
incident in the Shanghai office when an unauthorized news release was put out;
and I was therefore in charge of this operation which was called the Interim
Information Service — something with four letters — for a while and then it be-
came the United States Information Service in 1946.
Our chief task was to reoccupy the cities on the coast, setting up offices. And
I continued with that until July of 1946, part of the time in Shanghai, partly
in Nanking under the Embassy, and partly traveling. I returned in July 1946
and took terminal leave and severed connections with the Department of State
in August, I believe.
The Chairman. When were you taken over by the Department of State from
OWI?
A. Nominally, early in the autumn of 1945, but operationally we maintained
an independent budget throughout that fiscal year and I was responsible for an
operation which was not completely part of the Embassy until June 30, 1946.
Well, that is the framework. You can go back over it.
Q. Just to complete it, after you withdrew from the Department in August of
1946. what did you do? — A. I resumed teaching at Harvard in September '46. I
also published an article in the Atlantic Monthly called Our Chances in China,
which I think was widely read. And I inaugurated at Harvard a program called
Tegional studies, which is concerned with the application to China of all the
social science disciplines as well as language and history. I had been doing this
ever since. I was then associate professor and was made a full professor in
1948.
In V.'4s I published a book The United States in China in a series edited by
Sumner Welles and others called the American Foreign Policy Library put out
by the Harvard University Press. My volume was given a prize, first prize I
think.
Q. What was it? — A. The Wendell Willkie Memorial Building Award by the
American Political Science Association as the best book published in the United
Srates on the subject of international policy, international relations, in 194S.
But fortunately only up to a period before the appearance of Sherwood's Roose-
velt and Hopkins.
In 1947 my wife and I went to Europe as delegates to the tenth conference
of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Stratford upon Avon. In the spring
of 1947 I had become a trustee of the American Council of the Institute of
Pacific Relations and have remained one ever since. In 1949 I was coauthor with
three others, including Harlan Cleveland of ECA, of a small book called Next
Sftep in Asia. I have written various articles and given various speeches.
The Chairman. On that and related subjects'.'
A. On the subject of China invariably.
2406 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Before coming back, while we are on your own personal background, Mr.
Fairbank, bave your writings — such as your book The United States in China
or any of your other writings — had any attention in terms of their pro- or anti-
Communist leanings? — A. I have been characterized by various epithets from
both sides, the China magazine or the China monthly.
Mr. Service. The China monthly.
A. In an article by Alfred Koblberg I am listed with others with opprobrius
epithets as a stooge of the Kremlin and the like. The publication of the Amer-
ican Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy of New York, which has now
been listed by the Attorney General as subversive, in a review of my book char-
acterized it as essentially imperialistic. And I have been sent a clipping of a
magazine published in Moscow, called New Times I believe, which castigates me
as a spy and intelligence agency for imperialism, something like that. That
was with reference, I believe, to The Next Step in Asia. My section of that
as galley proof I sent to Mr. Fosdick as my contribution of a memorandum in
connection with the meeting, which I believe was in October last year, of special-
ists on the Far East in the Department of State. It happened that that galley
prof was available just in time when we had been asked to submit statements
and said as much as I could say at that time. I think that is all for your
question.
Q. I believe you testified that you really became acquainted with Mr. Service
in Chungking during the latter part of 1942 and early 1048. — A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you could indicate to the board just what the nature of your
acquaintance with Mr. Service was and how familiar you became with him? —
A. I knew Mr. Service as one of a number of friends in the Embassy, the Ameri-
can Government Service. John Davies I had known in Peiping. I saw Mr.
Service a number of times. I don't recall the dates, and we had the usual type
of conversations in which we were talking about the situation in China, giving
our opinions.
Since I was not working on American policy I usually didn't try to press for
secret information from my colleagues. But I never hesitated to raise the gen-
eral questions of how things were going and where they were going. Since I have
submitted a letter to Mr. Acheson on this subject, perhaps I could just repeat
my general view here for the record.
In these conversations with Mr. Service I covered the usual range of ques-
tions— in one respect, what the evaluation of the Communists in China was,
what their strength was, to what it might be attributed, what their future would
be, and the valuation of the Kuomintang regime in the same way, the evaluation
of the American interests in China, what we should try to do, our relations with
the British, and everything else.
The Chairman. These are subjects of discussion, you're giving us. with Mr.
Service? — A. Yes. I'm characterizing in a general way the type of discussion
that I, in a general way, recall having had over this period of several sessions. I
never received any indications in any of these discussions that Mr. Service
had any doubts about the desirability of the American democratic system. I
never had any impression that he favored the Chinese Communists in an emo-
tional way. I felt that he was a man of strong feeling but his feelings were those
of an American and these feelings were against the evil features which he saw
around him in the nationalist regime against totalitarian features of govern-
ment in general and in favor of the various types of freedoms that Americans
generally believe in, the American institutions of civil liberties and law. In
other words, I never had any feeling whatever that he was off base or he was
emotionally committed or emotionally upset or. however you might like to phrase
it, had come under the influence of communism or Chinese Communists.
Now, at that time the Chinese Communist line was always to harp on civil
liberties in the Kuomintang area, always to inveigh against censorship, concen-
tration camps, lack of election process, and all these things. And when the
Communists expressed such criticisms which were all designed to appeal, of
course. I for one — and I think the other Americans that I know there — tended
to agree. So I could say as between the Communist delegation in Chungking and
the journalists in the press hostel there was a common line in the sense that
the journalists in the press hostel were against censorship and the Communist
delegation in Chungking, who spent a great deal of time in contact with
them through one or two people, were also, of course, against censorship on the
part of the Kuomintang.
This is getting off the subject of Mr. Service, but our conversations were in
that, atmosphere and that is I he characterization I would make of his attitude.
STATE DEPARTMENT! EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2407
In other words, one of complete loyalty, and I would stake my reputation on
his loyalty. I could state it in many ways but I flunk the idea is plain, I would
back him up 100 percent. I would not think that he would be a disloyal
American citizen. And I also believe that be was sufficiently intelligent to avoid
being misled and avoid being a well-meaning but misguided American citizen.
Q. A tew days ago, Mr. Fairbank. a .Mr. Emmanuel Larsen testified here and,
although I do not have the actual transcript of what he said before me, I'll
undertake to try to the best of my recollection io tell you the substance of what
he said and if I am incorrect perhaps the Board will check me if my recollec-
tion is faulty.
In the course of examination of Mr. Larsen I asked him whether he knew
of any other persons from whom Mr. Jaffe, Mr. Philip Jaffe, obtained informa-
tion in Washington. Mr. Larsen's response was that he knew of several people
with whom Mr. Jaffe had contacts. As I recall it. he was not precise in asserting
that these were people from whom he obtained information, although that was
a permissible inference, I believe, from his response. He listed numerous people
with whom he thought Mr. Jaffe was in contact and among other things he
srated that he knew that on either some or several occasions Mr. Jaffe had indi-
cated to him that he was staying with you and your wife here at Washington
when Mr. Jaffe would be visiting Washington.
Mr. Achilles. That is. staying here with Mr. Fairbank?
Q. Yes. Mr. Jaffe, when he would visit Washington, would either frequently —
or sometimes in any case — stay with Mr. Fairbank and his wife here in Wash-
ington. I wonder. Mr. Fairbank, if you would care to comment on that testimony
of Mr. Larsen's? — A. I'd be very happy to. Now. that statement is a lie, and I'm
very happy to have this opportunity to deal with it because I assume that I'm
under oath and subject to laws of perjury and so on. My acquaintance with
Mr. Jaffe, if such it may be called, has been limited to two casual meetings, as
far as I can remember. I may have been in the same room with him more
than twice. I do not regard him as a friend of mine. I wouldn't even call him
an acquaintance. I have never liked the man, never made any effort to see him,
and in fact never have seen him except on two occasions that I can recall at
the moment and possibly certain others when we were at the same meeting
somewhere.
He never, very definitely never stayed at my house in Georgetown. He never
stayed at my house anywhere else. He never stayed at any place, any house
that I have ever stayed at overnight, as far as I can remember. He has
never been in a house in which I was living, has never been in my house, as far
as I can remember.
I made a practice of getting my staff and people working on the Far East
in Washington to come to cocktail parties in large numbers during the war as
a means of contact and morale building. I don't recall that he was ever included
in one of those cocktail parties or any other similar meeting. It may be that
he walked into the office of OWI at some time and I may have seen him. I have
no recollection of that. I have exchanged very few words with him.
As to the two times I do recollect, the first is when I first set eyes on him
at Princeton University at a meeting which I think was under the auspices of
the Institute of Pacific delations and I think that was before the war. This
could be traced by looking at what meetings they may have had. I had heard
his name and I remember meeting him at that time, conversing with him.
That was perhaps in 1938 or 1939. It may be 1940. I had also previous to that,
about 1937. contributed a brief article to a magazine, the second issue as I
recall, of Amerasia. I haven't looked back at that article since the Amerasia
question lias been in the newspapers. But it was solicited from me by a professor
at Columbia, and my recollection has been, ever since I find it erroneously,
that tlds professor and the other professors like Professor Colegrove of North
Western, were the actual inaugurators of Amerasia.
I had a discussion with my friend in Cambridge about 2 weeks ago and
this friend said. "No, Amerasia was begun by Jaffe and Field." And be sent me
a note giving the masthead of the magazine at the time wdien I published this
article. So that my supposition that it was just professors and not Jaffe and
Field, who I thought later took it over, was just wishful thinking on my part.
At that time, however, my contact was not with Mr. Jaffe in relation to this
article put in Amerasia. And, incidentally, my article in Amerasia was mainly
a historical comparison of the Japanese invasion of China with the British and
French wars of the century before on which I was a specialist at that time.
That was in 1936 or 1937. It did not deal with policy that I recall.
2408 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
That first recognition on the name of Jaffe was followed by a complete lack
of any contact with him over the years, as far as I can recall.
The second meeting, which I referred to of the two, occurred in New York
I think in the winter of 1948-49, at the apartment of Mildred Price, who has
been the executive secretary of an organization called the China Aid Council.
I had been giving some speeches in New York, I believe, and was invited by her
to come to her apartment and see some people. Prof. Ernest Osborne was the
chief person mentioned. Mr. Jaffe was also there. I did not like him any better
at that time than I had before. We did not have very much of a conversation.
I may say that the China Aid Council, to which I had given my name as a
sponsor about 19-17 or 1948, had been an agency for sending some funds and
some medical supplies to Madam Sun Yat-sen, who in turn sent some of these
to the international!) peace hostels or hospitals in the so-called liberated areas.
In other words, to Communist China. This China Aid Council operation, I
believe, had Jaffe as its treasurer — who was connected with it. I let my name
be used by this group, which was headed at that time by Mrs. E. C. Carter,
because I believed in maintaining what contact we could and also I felt confident
that Mildred Price, the executive secretary, and Mrs. Carter, the head of it, were
not Communists. And it did not seem to me that they were being fellow travelers
in the usual sense of trying to do Communist work for them.
In other words, this China Aid Council seemed to me a useful thing operating
in the field of medical supplies and splitting its donations between the two parts
of China. Mildred Price made a point of helping the Mui Tsai School, the head
of which I met in China, Dr. H. C. Tao, and other worthy organizations which
were not Communist but were trying to do things like mass education and were
in the category of the Democratic League type of people before the Democratic
League was put under pressure and became part of the Communist situation, in
other words, as of 1946.
I may also add that in the last year the Communists or fellow travelers ele-
ment in the China Aid Council have succeeded in taking it over and ejecting
Mildred Price and Mrs. Carter and other such people. This take-over was ef-
fected by people I could mention who are active in the Committee for Democratic
Far Eastern Policy and who, to my view, are Communists. The take-over in-
cluded taking over Madam Sun Yat-sen at the Peiping end, who to the best of my
judgment was not an organized Communist disciplined member when I knew
her in Chungking.
In other words, the China Aid Council has ceased to exist except as some-
thing in mothballs. I think there is two or three hundred dollars in a bank
account ; there is no office any more, and that is the end of it. It has been de-
stroyed by the Communist element that were in it evidently before and decided
to take it over. My connection with this new thing called the China Welfare
Appeal has been entirely negative throughout. In other words, I have never
responded to their requests nor had anything to do with them. It has consisted,
my point of contact with Mr. Jaffe, of that one brief evening in which we did
not converse.
Q. In connection with your remarks a little while ago in which you indicated
that you had always supposed that Amerasia was started at least by a number
of professors and your friend indicated the fact that it was started by Mr.
Jaffe and Mr. Field, I show you Document No. 32, which is an exhibit in this
case, and refer particularly to the column headed "March 1937", which is the
masthead for the beginnings of Amerasia. You see there, of course, that your
recollection was not entirely incorrect because it did have a number of the aca-
demic group that you had in mind. — A. Yes.
Mr. Stevens. This Mrs. Carter, was that Mrs. Edward Carter?
A. Yes, Mrs. E. C. Carter. Mr. Carter was for a long time the Secretary
General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Were you acquainted at all with Mr. Frederick V. Field?— A. I met him
twice at least and I should say my acquaintance with him is about as extensive
as my acquaintance with Jaffe. I remember meeting him I believe in the IPR
oflice, which was on Fifty-second Street, I think in 1936, when I first returned
from China. At some time later I remember having a conversation with him
over a drink in a bar. This may have been during a conference that we were
both attending. I assume it is. I recall no contact with Frederick Field beyond
these two specific instances and maybe one or two or three other casual meet-
ings and one other that I can recall and no contact with him of a social nature.
MATH DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2409
The one other thai I recall is a meeting of the trustees of the American Council
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which 1 believe was early in 1947.
At that time an Investigation had been made by the existing trustees prior
to the meeting of Mr. Fiehl and of the accusations raised by Mr. Kohlberg
against the institute of Pacific Relations American Council. On that investi-
gating committee was Mr. Huntington Gilchrist of the American Cyanamid
Co., a businessman, and other such persons. And I remember his stating
at this meeting with reference to Mr. Field that he had found no evidence that
Mr. Field in his activity in the Institute of Pacific Relations American Council
had brought in any Communist bias or tried to deal with things from a leftist
or Communist point of view as opposed to the best interests of the organization
of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
At any rate, at that meeting there was discussion of what to do about Field and
I participated in that discussion. And the discussion went along on two lines.
On the one hand he obviously is a detriment to this organization and we as
trustees owe it to the organization to really drop any connection with him. You
can't have an organization with a man of that sort on the Board. On the other
hand was the more human point that he had been such a staunch supporter of
the organization and that he had occasionally given money or that he had
worked hard and at one time was Secretary, which I believe myself was before
he had moved entirely to the left, in the early 1930's. I believe this progress
was gradual for a time.
And I remember making a statement myself which I later felt was not — well,
I felt somewhat foolish about it because I felt I was rather emotional. I said
that "We shouldn't, just because there is concern about leftists at this point,
suddenly just scuttle this man who has been doing, according to the trustees, a
proper job for the organization." Well, I had decided not long after that, in
the course of not too many months, that that was an unwise and rather foolish
view.
I may say that I have been in many discussions with my brother-in-law, Mr.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who is death on Communists in general and I have
been working out, as I think my written articles indicate since my return from
China, when I have had opportunity to express myself, a position which takes
account of the Chinese Communists' good points but develops an American .
policy. I could go into that at length if you wish.
Q. You mentioned that Mr. Kohlberg had made some uncomplimentary re-
marks about you. Are you acquainted with Mr. Kohlberg? — A. I have met him
on several occasions. One I remember chiefly was a radio television show of a
"people's court," so-called, in which 12 individuals were brought in off the
street. It was presided over by Mr. Basil O'Connor, who I was told had been
Mr. Roosevelt's law partner. Mr. Kohlberg was on one side with two others
and I on the other side. The issue was whether we should give increased mili-
tary aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government. This, I believe, was in 1948. Our
side got a twelve-to-nothing decision against Kohlberg.
The Chairman. Your side was maintaining what?
A. That we should not give military aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government
any more beyond that amount already given.
Q. In what year? — A. In 194S. And I recall at the time telling Mr. O'Connor
that if Mr. Kohlberg brought forward any of his libelous epithets concerning
me I would retaliate in kind and they would have to put the show off the air.
Mr. Kohlberg was very courteous all through and at the end of the show he
paid me the compliment of saying "I don't think you and I really disagree,"
whatever that meant. I have seen him on one or two other occasions. I was
in a debate with Senator Bridges on the Town Hall of the Air last December.
Mr. Kohlberg was back stage and I saw him in the elevator or somewhere.
Mr. Rhetts. I'd like to show you what has been introduced as an exhibit
in this <-as'j. document No. B-54.
The Chairman. What was your question about it?
Mr. Rhetts. I would like to know if that is your signature?
A. I would recognize this as my signature.
Mr. Rhetts. I should say this is a photostat of a letter found in Mr. Service's
desk here in the State Department at the time he was arrested on June (J, 1945.
You recognize the handwritten signature "John" theer as your own?
A. Well. I would say it certainly is very similar to my signature. If T looked
at it casually I would say it is. Of course any signature could lie forged, but
I don't see why it should be.
2410 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. Do you recollect writing the letter?
A. I wonder why this letter has no letterhead on it? It's addressed to the
United States Office of War Information so presumably if I wrote it it was
sent out through that channel. APO 879 was Chungking.
Mr. Service. Yes.
A. I would be inclined to acknowledge this as my letter. The contents of it
seem certainly mysterious and when I first heard about this, about a day ago,
of course I had some difficulty in wondering what it dealt with. In thinking
about it I have been able in my own mind to recall what I might call a project
to which I think this refers and which I think will explain most of the aspects
of it.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. I believe that you have forwarded a telegram addressed to me which
outlined your reconstruction of that project. — A. Yes.
Q. And probably what the meaning of this letter was. That telegram has
been introduced into the transcript as document 330. And I take it that your
account of the reconstruction of the meaning of this is as you outlined it in
that telegram.— A. Yes. I can explain this. I think, in a few words. It goes
back to 1943 when I was in Chungking and it concerns making the acquaintance
of the Chinese Communist, Miss Kung P'eng. Kung is the surname. This girl
was a chief liaison officer between the Communist headquarters in Chungking
and the press hostel and foreigners generally. I think almost any American
who worked in Chungking at that time would recollect meeting her. I'm sure
all journalists would. I did not make her acquaintance until June or July of
1943, alter I had been in Chungking about 9 months. The circumstances were
that I had been developing channels for Japanese-language publications from
Japan and I had found most of these channels fairly dry.
There was a General Wang who was helpful and I therefore had come to
the conclusion that I might do well to open out some relationship with the
Chinese Communist delegation to see if they could get anything through their
areas, which would be Japanese publications of the type we wanted to have
in Washington. I had not seen consciously any Chinese Communist delegation
members until that time, but in addition to those valid official reason for con-
tact with them, I think I also had a personal motive of curiosity. I wanted to
see what they were like or what they had to offer, what they had to say.
At any rate, on my own initiative about that time, June or July 1943, I passed
the word, I think through my office manager, the way you do things in a Chinese
office, that I would like to see one of these people. And this young woman
came around. I, like the press hostel people I have mentioned, found her a
very stimulating individual. She had gone to an English girl's college, St. Mary's
in Shanghai, and later to Yenching University in Peiping. She was from
a middle-class background but was an ardent and very idealistic Communist
worker in constant danger of abduction, and so on, as she went about the
city — something like a social worker in reverse.
She would come to the living quarters of the American foreign community
and have hidden tracts in her handbag of the latest thing received by radio on
some incident. I don't believe she made any converts for the cause of com-
munism but she was a well-known figure in the city and she certainly repre-
sented the Communist views of the liberal ideals because she was full of
righteous indignation against all the evils that could be mentioned.
I also became acquainted with her fiance, whose name was Ch'iso Mu. His
surname was Ch'iso. Her fiance was even more a typical long-haired intellec-
tual, fiery, Marxist, full of saving the world and a very attractive individual,
a lively mind, full of ideas. In the course of this acquaintance, which was I
might add perhaps unnecessarily one of the very great many acquaintances
which I made in Chungking, I on my initiative again suggested to Miss Kung
that she ought to write some biographical record of how she had become a
Communist. It seemed to me that this would have a good deal of significant
information for an American reader because i! would be in first-person terms.
Ir would lie an example of Chinese youth, raised in the western type of educa-
tional institutions with a middle-class background, who — through idealism or
the motives of revolution — became an ardent convert to communism. This oc-
curred, 1 think, in the student movement of 1935.
Well, then her story went on to describe how she turned down a fellowship
to come to the United States, which was the normal goal of all Chinese students,
and went over to join the Communists in liberated areas to see if she could
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2411
qualify to be one of them. And then it wenl <»n to describe how she was farmed
out to a peasant village and learned to Live in peasantry. This whole thing was
very graphic, iii simple terms, and it seemed to me would have value in e
plaining how the Communists were getting their power and how they were
building up with the youth of China.
Well, at my prompting she tried in the midst of a great deal of her activity
to draft a biographical piece. And at the time 1 left China, in December 1943,
she had shown me a copy of a couple of chapters which dealt with tin' subject 1
just mentioned, her education and her early experience and joining the Com-
munists. After I left China I had expressed the hope that she would finish this
and send it hack. And these things I remember quite clearly.
Now, my recollection is— and this, of course, could be reconstruction, but I
believe that this manuscript was brougb.1 hack eventually hy another Chinese girl,
Miss Yang Kang, so I might briefly describe this other Chinese. She is a woman,
of course, K) or 50 now. This person was the literary editor of the independent
newspaper in Chungking, the Ta Kung Pao. And. as the literary editor of this
newspaper she got around always among the journalists and was interested
in printed matter from the United States which my office was distributing. I
made her acquaintance, I think, in the summer of 1943, not before.. She appeared
to he a vigorous Chinese liberal, as that word lias been used; 1 mean a person
who is not a Communist, not a Kuomintang member, but was interested in the
ideals of the west, believed in the things of literacy and freedom of speech, and
such things.
I imagine in retrospect she was probably mere leftist than I realized, I don't
know. But in any case, she had a respected position in the community in this
newspaper job and I liked her as a friend. When I came hack to this country
in the spring of 1!'<44 — that is I arrived in January 1!)44 — in some way a possi-
bility came up for Miss Yang to receive a fellowship which was available at
Radcliffe College in Cambridge for a Chinese woman student. I do not recall
how that possibility came to my attention, whether I was asked to suggest someone
or whether I took more initiative than that. I don't recollect. I haven't tried
to get the rile, which I suppose I could, really, if we had to do so. We could get it
from Radcliffe College.
At any rate, there being almost no candidates and this girl being recommended
by her teachers at Yenehing University, the missionary teachers, she received
this fellowship and arrived in the United States in the autumn of 1944. I believe
it was by that means that this manuscript was brought. I'm making this awfully
long-winded, I'm afraid. The point is that Brooks Atkinson, as I recollect, who
was also in Chungking as a correspondent at this time, and also Miss Kung had
expressed an interest in the manuscript she was writing.
I made this effort at this time in the spring of 1944 to see if any publishers
would he intere-sted in this story of a Chinese youth who had become a Communist.
And I believe that I got in contact with William Sloane. now a publisher in New
York, of Sloane Associates. That is more or less an assumption on my part. He
was one person that 1 think I would have gone to. I don't recall definitely doing
it. tmt he had been in China on an OWI arrangement for the American Publishers
Association or a similar body in 1(.)4:'» when 1 made his acquaintance.
In any case, no publisher could see possibilities in this manuscript without
more being added to it. And even then, of course, it wouldn't be too good a bet
because it was too brief and sketchy. But it was necessary — and this I believe
I recall — to have a power of attorney to have any dealings with the publisher.
And Brooks Atkinson, again to the best of my recollection, came to be the logical
person u> hold the power of attorney, he being a man from New York and easily in
touch with publishers and outside government as a publicist. Well, I think that
is my background and so en in this letter.
In reference to the text of it. Mr. Brooks — in other words, I believe refers to
Brooks Atkinson, and "which I have passed on" I take it refers to giving him the
power of attorney. "Together with the new manuscript" means that she sent
something more; "of which he also has the first version as well as the first copy
of the new or supplemental version" I assume that there may have been an edit-
ing effort made or something. That's just reconstruction. Nothing ever came of
this manuscript. It eventually was returned to Miss Yang and Miss Yang went
back to China in the autumn of 1948 — no, in the summer of 1948 I think it was.
Now perhaps we can take it from here on questions on this letter.
There is one thing more I'd like to say. When I first heard this on the phone
it seemed to me completely mysterious. So I was of course struck with the fact
68970 — 50— pt. 2 59
2412 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
that it had such indirect terminology and it was written in double talk. They
are just talking about Mr. Brooks instead of Brooks Atkinson. And at first I
thought it might be Brooks Darlington, this man in OWL I'd like to say in
reference to that and to my writing that letter in that way that my experience
in China had given me a habit of avoiding making statements in a letter which
could be seen casually and completely understood by outsiders because the Chi-
nese office was wide open to all the secretaries and people you were working with.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Do I understand from your testimony that probably Mr. Service had sent
you this new manuscript V — A. My asumption is, from this letter and to the best
of my recollection, that I had probably taken the initiative and written to Miss
Kung P'eng some way asking that more be sent back. Now, whether I involved
Mr. Service in this problem I don't know. It may well be that I took the initiative
and asked him as a favor to get this thing, that we thought it might be useful
in this project.
Q. Do you recall what the letters were which it refers to "which you sent out
and which were most interesting have been delivered"? — A. No; I don't.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall who Bill was, who was referred to here?
A. I assume that would be Bill Holland. The reference is very plain,
saying he is "my colleague," meaning OWL And it says "he is with you," mean-
ing in Chungking. He had been sent out in the fall or early spring, I guess he
arrived in the early winter of 1944.
Q. And what do you refer to when you say "Everything that you can send will
of course be much appreciated"? — A. Could you give me the reference just before
that, please?
Q. Yes. "Many people have come back, like John Davies, Ludd, and Emmer-
son, and we have had various discussions on a sad but not pessimistic note.
Everything that you can send will of course be much appreciated." — A. I imagine
this would refer to Mr. Service writing me a personal letter.
Q. About what? — A. About the situation, about how things were going. Now,
as to "various discussions on the sad but not pessimistic note," this may have no
reference to this particular situation, but if I recall correctly, I recollect spend-
ing an evening with three or four of the people who were working on China
and just trying to face the problem. I think possibly some of those mentioned
there were present, people who had come back recently. All of us were more
or less in touch with what was going on because that was our business, but we
were trying to face the problem of what could be done when we saw that we
were stuck with the regime that was losing power. But the essential thing is
what could be done to save American policy from getting into great difficulty.
Q. Had you read Mr. Service's reports on China? Had you read his reports
on the Chinese situation? — A. Certainly not regularly. The reports of that type
were not open to me as a regular thing. In the State Department where I had a
contact, both as an official working on the Central Directive and also as a friend
of people who lived there, I would sometimes be shown a document which had
come in from the field.
Q. That is, the OWI was in possession of some reports through regular chan-
nels, were they not? — A. The OWI received some documentation from the De-
partment of State, I believe.
Q. But you don't recall specific ones? — A. Maybe we received it only for us
to see and return, not for our channels but only for us to see and return. And
we did have a system of liaison officers who went to the Department to see what
was there and then came back.
Q. But I judge you don't recall specifically Mr. Service's reports? — A. No. But
I do recall, in my contact with Mr. Currie, his referring to having seen a report
from Mr. Service. I mean I don't recall the particular instance but I would
say that occured, in the same way I'd contact John Carter Vincent and John
l>;ivies when they were in the Department.
Mr. Stevens. You were then a Government official yourself?
A. Yes, I was. And I was in charge of policy directives for propaganda to
China.
Q. Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)
(The Board adjourned at 3: 55 p. m. )
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2413
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Secubitv. Hoard Mketing in the Matter of John Stewart Serykk
Uate : June S, 1950, 10 : 10 a. m. to 11 : 15 a. in.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building'.
Reporter : Goodwin Shapiro.
Members of the Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles;
Arthur G. Stevens; and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Counsel for John Stewart Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts
& Ruckelshaus.
i The Board reconvened at 10 : 10 a. in., June 8, 1950.)
The Chairman. The Board will be in session. You are offering a witness this
morning?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes.
(Congressman Richard Boiling, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart
Service, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts:
Q. Will you state your name and address, Mr. Boiling, for the record? —
A. Richard Boiling, 524 Pierce Street, Kansas City, Mo.
Q. And will you state your present position, sir? — A. I am a Member of Con-
gress from the Fifth District of Missouri.
Q. Roughly, between September 1945 and September 1946, could you tell the
Board where you were and what your position then was? — A. In the latter part
of 1945 I was for most of that period in Tokyo, Japan. I was an assistant to
the adjutant general in the headquarters of the commander in chief of the
Southwest Pacific — the Pacific — and the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers. General Mac-Arthur. For a short period of about a month I was back
in the United States, around Christmas and the early part of January, on leave,
and when I returned to Tokyo I was an assistant to General MacArthur's chief
of staff.
Q. You were in the Army at that time? — A. That is correct. I was a major
in the Army.
Q. Now during this period did you become acquainted with Mr. Service? —
A. Yes : I did.
Q. I wonder if you would indicate if you recall when you met Mr. Service and
something of the nature of your acquaintance with him from that time onward. —
A. Well, my job as an assistant adjutant general was primarily dealing with
personnel, and one of the things that I did was to process people as they came
into the area — people who were assigned to the headquarters or merely to the
area — and I met Mr. Service, as I remember — I do not remember the date,
but it was fairly early in that period — as he came into Tokyo. My memory
does not serve me well enough to say how soon our very brief acquaintance
ripened, but I can say I knew him well enough so that I can say we had dinner,
I think, once or twice, had several drinks together, and spent an evening
or so together.
Q. So that I take it he was well enough known to you that any general dis-
cussion involving him would have been noted by you. — A. Yes ; I believe so.
Q. Now it has been alleged by an unnamed person that during Mr. Service's
duty in Tokyo he met with certain leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in
the Office of the Political Adviser and had some conversation with these persons,
and that this meeting and conversation attracted general comment. Can you
tell the Board whether you ever heard of such a meeting and whether to your
knowledge there was any widespread comment about any such meeting? —
A. When I first became aware of the alleged meeting, I think it was about 2 weeks
ago. I had no consciousness of there having been a meeting nor of there having
been any discussion of it.
Q. And would you mind stating how you became aware of it about 2 weeks
ago? — A. Well, Mr. Service came to see me, and I subsequently talked to you.
And in those two conversations I was informed of the — I guess the allegation.
Q. So that that being the case, I take it your testimony is that at the time
no such meeting ever came to your attention? — A. No such meeting ever came
to my attention. It could be. It is possible that it could be a fault in memory,
but I think it is rather doubtful that it is, because at one time or another during
my service as an assistant to the chief of staff I was somewhat involved in
a rather notorious case at that time of an Army newspaper which was purported
2414 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
to be heavily infiltrated by people who followed the Communist line, so I was
at least somewhat conscious of the problem as it affected our headquarters.
Q. Now it has been testified here that a meeting did take place under roughly
these circumstances : A Japanese Communist leader by the name of Nosaka
did visit the offices of the political adviser, according to Mr. Emerson, who
testified here the other day, not infrequently, and that Mr. Emerson had
occasion to interview him along with other political leaders of other parties in
connection with a weekly report which he submitted to the supreme commander
on current developments among the political parties in Japan. It has been
further testified that Mr. Nosaka called and that Mr. Service had known Mr.
Nosaka in Yenan, China, where Mr. Service had previously served, and that
when Mr. Nosaka called at the office, Mr. Service was called in and greeted
him and exchanged amenities. From your knowledge of the situation in the
headquarters at that time, would you regard it as particularly unusual for any
members of the staff of the Office of the Political Adviser to meet Mr. Nosaka
at that time? — A. To the contrary, it would have" been unusual if they hadn't,
I think.
Q. Now it has also been alleged that during his service in Tokyo Mr. Service
was extremely enamored of Communist theory. On the basis of your association
with him. did you ever hear him express any views which would suguest that
this was true? — A. No, I recall no such views. If appropriate. I would like to
enlarge a little on that.
Q. Do. — A. Aside from finding Mr. Service a pleasant person personally. I had
spent at that time, I suppose, about almost 4 years in the Pacific, in the Army,
and was staying on in Japan because I was interested in the problems of de-
mocratization of Japan, and I quite naturally had considerable interest in what
was happening in China and what might happen in" China; and one of the rea-
sons that I pursued the acquaintance not only with Mr. Service but also with
his chief of mission, Mr. George Atcheson. was to inform myself as much as I
could from talking with people who had had some first-hand experience in the
Chinese political scene, and it is a story that I have used a great many times
since in discussing the Chinese problems, which is certainly with us, and I did
talk with Atcheson at some length. I felt that, let's say. on domestic matters
that he and Mr. Service might differ somewhat, one being what I would describe
a conservative, and the other a liberal, but that in their asscsment of what had
happened factually in China and what was likely to happen, I have often re-
peated it as a story for political purposes that they agreed precisely as to what
had happened, and my general conclusion from that was that both of them
were pursuing what they thought to be an approach to the Chinese problem that
was in the best interests of the United States, and they agreed, as I remember
it, with some precision. That is the best way I can state that.
The Chairman. As to the facts?
A. As to the facts and the interpretation of the facts, I might say.
Q. Now it has also been asserted by the same anonymous source that I men-
tioned that Mr. Service exhibited an enthusiasm for the Japanese Communists
while he was in Tokyo. Did any such manifestation ever come to your atten-
tion?—A. No.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Did you in any way come to associate Mr. Service with pro-
Communist, either Japanese or Chinese or Russian
A. No, sir ; my impression of him was that he was consistently pro-Ainerican.
Mr. Achilles. Did you ever have any indication that General MacArthur was
dissatisfied with Mr. Service's work?
A. I did not, sir.
Mr. Achilles. Or any indication that Mr. Service was in any way disloyal
to General MacArthur in the policies he was pursuing?
A. No. No, sir; I think not. I don't believe I had any conversation with him
which concerned any policies, which was entirely apart from this, which was
the Japanese constitution and the way it was given to the Japanese. I think
he is one of the people I did not discuss that with.
The Chairman. You didn't hear from him any vilification of General Mac-
Arthur?
A. No. sir ; I did not.
The Chairman. Or didn't hear from anybody else that he had been under-
stood to vilify General MacArthur?
A. No, sir.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2415
Tl c Chairman. No further questions. Thank you very much for coining up.
i The witness was excused, i
Mr. Kiikiis. Now if the Board please. I would like to have included in the
transcript at this point a 5-page affidavit, signed by Charles L. Kades, dated
Juno 7. 1950.
The Chairman. It may be added to the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Doer mi vi No. 323
In the Matter of John Stewart Service
State of New York,
County of .Y< w York, ss.:
< Shakles L. Kades, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that :
1. I am a member of the bar of the State of New York with offices at 67 Wall
Sneer in the City, County, and State of New York;
2. I was a Colonel. Infantry, assigned to duty with the United States Army
Forces, Pacific, in .Japan from August 26. 194r>, until September 30, 1946, as deputy
to Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, Gen-
eral Headquarters. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and continued
thereafter to serve as a civilian in that post from October 1, 1946, until May 3,
1949.
3. The primary mission of the Government Section was to advise the Supreme
Commander on the status of and policies pertaining to military government in
Korea and the internal structure of civil government in Japan. Specifically,
it was the function of the Section to make recommendations for: the demilitari-
zation of the Japanese Government: the decentralization of government and
the encouragement of local responsibility ; the elimination therefrom of feudal
and totalitarian practices which tended to prevent government by the people;
and the elimination of those relationships between government and business
which tended to continue the Japanese war potential and to hamper the achieve-
ment of Occupation objectives.
4. The Government Section was also specifically chai'ged with staff responsi-
bility for all matters relating to the removal and exclusion of Japanese person-
nel fr»m national and local elective and appointive posts and influential political
and economic positions, and for the encouragement of the formation and activities
of democratic political parties and the abolition of those whose activities were
inconsistent with the requirements of the military occupation and the objectives
of the United States.
5. Within the Government Section there was created in October 1945 an
External Affairs Unit to effect: (1) the severance of Japanese governmental
and administrative authority and control over areas outside of Japan proper
formerly occupied or controlled by Japan; and (2) the severance of direct
relations between the Japanese Government and other countries. Neither of
these tasks was assigned to the Government Section in the General Order which
established the Section. But the first fell within the Section's sphere under
its responsibility to advise on the structure of civil government in Japan; the
second task was assumed by Government Section because what was later to
become the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, SCAP, was at the
time purely an United States Department of State mission serving as Political
Adviser to the Supreme Commander but having no General Headquarters staff
functions. Among the functions of this Department of State mission (com-
monly called "Polad") was the preparation of a weekly political report to Wash-
ington. This report was written generally by Mr. John Emmerson, a Foreign
Service officer with Polad. and contained a comprehensive survey and analysis
of the organization, platforms, and activities of political parties, political
leaders, and other personalities who were participating in public affairs, as
well as a summary of the political, economic, and social developments during
the immediately preceeding week. Because of the nature of this report and
its relationship not only to political parties but also to the removal and exclusion
of ultranationalists from public service, both of which functions were under
the general supervision of the Government Section, anil because of the external
affairs function of the Government Section, during this period I was frequently
in contact with various officials of Polad. including George Atcheson (the
Political Advisor), John Stewart Service (his Executive Officer I . Messrs, Max
2416 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Bishop and John Ernmerson, and others, including U. Alexis Johnson, later Chief
of the American Consulate at Yokohama.
6. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any statement that NOZAKA,
Sanzo (one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party) was often a
visitor at the offices of Polad or any comment whatever concerning his appear-
ances at the Polad office. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any
statement connecting Nozaka or any other Communist with Mr. Service in any
way in Japan. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any criticism of
Mr. Service of any nature by reason of his associations. On the contrary, the
opinion generally held of him was that he was devoting himself (until he
became ill) to his duties of administration and that he had a reserved disposi-
tion, rarely associating outside of business hours with officers of staff sections
at General Headquarters.
7. Actually, there would be no cause for comment among any Allied personnel
if Nozaka had visited Polad. The reports by Mr. Ernmerson required interviews
and conferences with leading personalities in Japan, regardless of party or other
affiliation. Moreover, Nozaka visited the Government Section at General Head-
quarters, conferring on numerous occasions with the Chief of the Political Affairs
Division which was created early in the Occupation to make recommendations
for Election Law revision, promote the development of democratic practices by
political parties and to dissolve and prevent the formation of antidemocratic
societies, associations, and organizations. Not only Nozaka, but also Tokuda,
Shiga, and Dobashi (other leaders of the Communist Party) came to answer
our inquiries, make reports for our use and to keep us generally informed on
current developments, as well as to ask questions, to make complaints, and
to object to certain occupation policies. Memorandums for the record were
often made of the substance of these conversations. If Nozaka absented him-
self for any long period of time from such interviews and conferences because
he was the scholarly type of Communist, spoke English, and was more voluble,
but less militant and excitable than his colleagues, I would send for him to
ascertain, if possible, why he had been absent and what he had been thinking
about, and doing, what he was contemplating and generally obtain his view
of events for whatever it was worth. Not until the very recent shift in Japanese
Communist Party tactics toward terrorism and open defiance of the Occupation
was there any disposition to ostracize Communist leaders. For example, when
the Under Secretary of War, General William H. Draper, came to Tokjo, for
an inspection of the Occupation, a round table with members of the National
Diet of all political complexions was arranged at which Nozaka was present
and at which both spoke freely and frankly. It is also perhaps worthy of note
that it has always been customary for Japanese to come to General Headquarters
and confer in offices of the Occupation, rather than for Occupation personnel
to go to Japanese governmental or political party offices. Therefore, it would
be expected that Nozaka would come to Polad or GHQ whatever the purpose of
the visit.
8. Although I never heard any comment or criticism concerning any of the
above-mentioned meetings, I have no doubt that certain Japanese, especially
among those influential politicians and financiers removed or excluded from
public service, would consider a visit by Nozaka or any Communist leader a cause
for adverse comment which would quickly cast a shadow of suspicion upon anyone
having any political intercourse with him. Such a state of mind is inherent in
any police state, such as Japan was prior to the occupation, where even "danger-
ous thoughts" were prohibited and persons were punished severely for the com-
mission of the crime of being suspected of having them. It is, therefore, within
the realm of possibility that some politically gullible American having naive
prewar ties with such Japanese lent his ear to their comment that it was not
comme il faut to receive Nozaka and, being an indoctrinee of Japan's old and
discredited order, was duly impressed.
Charles L. Kades.
Sworn to before me this 7th day of June 1950.
Grace A. Beggs.
Grace a Beggs, Notary Public, State of New York, No. 24-0222800, Qualified in
Kings County, Cert. Fiied with Clerk of N. Y. County, Registers of Kings and
N. Y. Counties, Commission Expires March 30, 1951.
Mr. Rhetts. If the Board please, several days ago when Mr. Larson was on the
stand he referred to the original manuscript which he prepared, which was then
extensively revised by Mr. Levine, and he referred to the fact that a copy of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2417
this manuscript had been made available to the Department of State. Although
Mr. Larsen agreed to obtain an additional copy and furnish it to me, I wonder
if the Board has been able to obtain a copy to which Mr. Larsen referred.
The Chairman. A complete search has been made and no copy has been found,
nor is there any information that the Department has every had a copy.
Mr. Rhetts. The Board will also recall that when Mr. Larsen left, shall we
say, prematurely in the course of his cross-examination, he indicated that he
would be willing to return if arrangements could be made with him for that
purpose. In view of the fact that we are now in the eleventh trial day on this
case, I am not disposed to insist on Mr. Larsen's return for further cross-exami-
nation. If he is willing to come, fine, but I shall not be disposed to press the
matter. I do not know whether the Board has had any further communication
with him or not.
The Chairman. The Board has been in communication with Mr. Larsen, but he
has not as yet been able to come before the Board because of his preoccupation
with the Senate committee.
Mr. Rhetts. Well, I should like to ask leave to introduce into evidence in this
case the original manuscript of his article if he supplies it to me, as he has
promised to do.
The Chairman. That will be granted.
Mr. Rhetts. Now at this time I would like to ask Mr. Service to take the
stand again.
The Chairman. Very well.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Service, did you see an article which appeared in the Washington Daily
News for 2 days ago, Tuesday, June 6, 1950, under the by-line of Frederick
Woltman?— A. I did.
Q. This article refers to a so-called Amerasia document which is alleged—
there does not appear to be any indication in this newspaper story as to pre-
cisely where a certain document was found. The document referred to appears
to be certain notes on what is called an "Eyes Alone" message, and the news
story indicates that you were referred to in these notes. Does this news story
bring to your mind any aspect of this case which has not heretofore been
touched on? — A. Yes; it brought to my mind that I had had some conversa-
tion with Mr. Gayn at one time touching on this general subject.
Q. I wonder if you would describe to the Board the whole background of
this conversation and what occurred? — A. As I recall, the first day that I met
Gayn, on April 19, 1945, he told me that he had a contract with The Saturday
Evening Post for a series of articles, I think he said, dealing in general with
the Stilwell recall, and he said that he was then in the process of collecting
material. I told him that I had not been in Chungking at the time of General
Stilwell's recall and had been out of Chungking for several months, as a matter
of fact, that I did not know the details of the final jsvents that led up to the
i-ecall. When I was in New York, on April 24 and April 25, 1945, you will recall
that I testified I spent the night of April 24 with the Gayns in their apartment
in New York. I remember that after we had had breakfast on the morning of
the Ll5th — we had breakfast in the apartment there — in the Gayns' apartment —
we were sitting around, and Gayn returned to this subject of his article — the
articles which he was planning for The Saturday Evening Post — and he men-
tioned his difficulties getting the true story — accurate story- He referred to the
fact that here had been a great number of versions of the Stilwell recall and the
reasons for the Stilwell recall in various magazines. The Luce publications
particularly had published extensive reviews and purportedly authoritative
accounts of the reasons for the Stilwell recall. I think Congressman Judd has
made a statement — if I remember rightly, it was in the House, but at least it
was given great publicity — making some very, misleading statements, and there
had been over the previous H months since the recall a great deal of discussion
and what amounted to a campaign of vilification, really, against General Stil-
well over the whole matter.
The first American press reaction, of course, had been one of shock and sur-
prise over the. Stilwell recall, and it was quite apparent that the critics of the
administration, critics of American policy, particularly the friends of China — -
the China lobby — had obscured the issue and put a great many half truths and
untruths about General Stilwell and about the whole affair. I told Gayn again
that I didn't know the late events that took place in Chungking, but I think I
asked him whether he was familiar with the genesis of the final conflict or
2418 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
issue. I was thinking particularly of the request or suggestion hy the American
Government that General Stilwell be placed in command of all the Chinese armies
as a means of unifying and making more effective the Chinese war effort.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall when that became public knowledge?
A. Yes. sir; that had become public knowledge at the time.
Mr. Achilles. In the fall of 1944?— A. In the fall of 1!)44. But the whole
matter had since that time been obscured by this campaign of — I called it vili-
fication : I think that's a fair word. He wasn't very thoroughly informed and
he asked me if I could
Q. You are referring to Gayn now? — A. Yes. He asked me if I could explain.
So I mentioned the original exchange of telegrams, commencing in July, of
winch I had had some knowledge, pointing out that since those first telegrams
I had had no knowledge at all. He asked if he could take some notes because
he thought that it was very important, and I said to him at the time that this
was material which I could tell him just so that he would have an accurate
starting point or foundation, but that lie could hot use the material as coming
from me or could not use it unless he got other suhstantiation ; it was purely
background information, so that he would not go off on a line as so many of
the writers were doing in regard to the whole affair. I was interested in having
this series of articles which were to be published by the Saturday Evening Post
on the beam, out of fairness to General Stilwell, out of fairness to our own
policy at the time, and, you might say, as an offset to a great deal of the incor-
rect speculative accounts that had come out. I told him about the early two
messages, speaking entirely from memory, of course. I had no copies or notes
or anything else. As I recall, his wife sat off to the side of the room and made
some notes. Apparently, judging from this, she made extremely complete notes.
I never saw the notes that he had, and I do remember cautioning him on the
question of the use of this as background material — cautioning him that these
originally had been what were called "Eyes Alone" messages. Now I think
I ought to say here that "Eyes Alone" is not a security classification. Security
classifications are "Top Secret," •Secret," "Confidential," "Restricted," and
"Unclassified." I have the security manuals here if anybody wishes to refer
to them. "Eyes Alone" was a distribution instruction commonly used in the
Army for messages which they did not wish to have widely distributed or some
particular subject which they did not wish to have distributed to the staff of
the headquarters, or something of that sort. Now, of course, "Eyes Alone" is
a misleading term. Anyone knows that a message like this was prepared by
various people in Washington, perhaps at a fairly low level, probably prepared
in the War Department, O. K.'d at various steps up to General Marshall, Secre-
tary Stimson had taken it over to the White House, and there it went through
I don't know how many channels, how many hands. Then, of course, you have
all the procedure of putting it into the cryptographic machinery, transmitting
it to China, decoding it, passing it through the code clerks, the stenographers,
and the personnel of the' headquarters, including the adjutant's office, the chief
of staff, commanding general, and so on. A message of this sort, furthermore,
is not transmitted in a highly secret code usually, because the message is given
verbatim to a foreign government.
Mr. Achilles. Some messages may be. Not all "Eyes Alone" messages.
A. No, but at any rate there is, I think it is correct to say. a special category of
code for one type of message since the full text is given to a foreign government,
and after it goes to the foreign government the security in that sense is lost
since there is no way of knowing what distribution it may receive after it
gets into the hands of the foreign government. In this particular case we heard
back through Chinese channels of these messages. Some of them reached the
foreign correspondents in Chungking through Chinese Government channels.
The Chairman. P>y that you mean that although the original message bore
an "Eyes Alone" characterization it had become widely known through other
offices of the Government through Chinese sources?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean after it was once delivered. — A. Yes, that's right. Now, also,
of course, these instructions on distribution — these instructions are more or
less sometimes temporary. After it becomes generally known, "the original in-
struction is not binding.
The Chairman. Well, the whole concept is, isn't it, that it should be pro-
tected until its delivery to the foreign government?
A. That is correct ; sir, yes.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2419
The Chairman. s«> thai il reaches the foreign government before it reaches
tin' general public
A. That's wli.ii Lin trying to say.
Q. Now this was a discussion you had with Gayn? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Did you ever have any similar discussion of this matter with Jnffe? — A.
Not to my knowledge, sir; no. not that I recall.
Q. I believe in response to a question from Mr. Achilles you have indicated that
at the time when you had this discussion with Gayn in May of 1945. — A. With
Gayn in late April.
Q. Late April— the matter had also— thai is. the fact that the proposal had
been to pur General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armies was public
knowledge. — A. It was. I'm sure, published in at least one of the stories — I think
the New York Times carried the fact in a story of Stilwell's recall which was
published at the end of October — October 31. 1044. That story was written by
Brooks Atkinson, who was in Chungking at the time of Stilwell's recall, and I
knew he had received very, very complete fill-in briefing on the whole series of
events and exchange of messages leading up to the final recall.
Mr. Achili.es. By whom was he given a briefing'/
A. I wasn't present, and I don't have direct personal knowledge. I do know
that it was a very authoritative, responsible fill-in briefing. Also, that there had
been articles written by the United Press and by the Associated Press corres-
pondents at New Delhi at the time of the recall which also, I believe, mentioned
the essential fact, which was the American request, originating in telegrams
from President Roosevelt, that the American commander, General Stilwell, be
put in command of all Chinese armies. I know that those correspondents — I
know from second-hand that those correspondents received similar complete
briefing, and I read at least one of their stories. I know from Theodore White,
who was in Chungking, that he also had a similar opportunity to learn all the
facts and. I believe, to see the actual documents.
Mr. Achilles. Was there anything which you told Gayn at that time which
had not been previously published or
A. I think the only sort of things that I mentioned to Gayn — and this was
just to tell him the story — were small details, such as the fact that I was in-
terpreter and that we insisted on giving the message directly to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek rather than forwarding it through channels and allowing it to
go through other hands. Those are the only facts, I believe, that had not been
published, and those were just color ; they weren't essential at all.
Mr. Achilles. In other words, there was nothing substantive that you told
Gayn.
A. No, sir. I don't know whether it is pertinent to the account that Mr. Theo-
dore White has written in his book, Thunder Out of China, published early in
1946, I believe, which indicates the extent to which he had been briefed. It refers
to the language of the document, and so forth.
The Chairmen. Will you refer us to that publication.
A. The hook is Thunder Out of China, by Theodore H. White and Anna Lee
Jacoby. puhlished by William Sloan Associates, Inc., and I refer particularly to
pages*218-2i'."..
Q. I have no further questions on this point.
Mr. Achilles. I have no further questions now. I would like to take a look
at the book.
(Brooks Atkinson, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, hav-
ing been duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address. Mr. Atkinson? — A. Brooks
Atkinson, 120 Riverside Drive. New York City.
Q. And what is your present position, sir? — A. Drama critic of the New York
Times.
Q. Now, did you serve in Chungking during the war years? — A. Yes; I was
there from Decemher 1042 until the end of October 1044.
Q. As a correspondent for the New York Times? — A. War correspondent for
the Times.
Q. Now I should like to ask you whether in late October 1044 you obtained
knowledge as a newspaperman of the circumstances — the details and the cir-
cumstances— leading up to General Stilwell's recall? — A. Yes, I knew that pretty
completely.
Q. And did that include detailed knowledge concerning the proposal that
General Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies? — A. Yes.
2420 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I wonder if you would care to explain in detail, if you will, the knowledge
that you had on that subject. — A. Well, yes, I'll do the best I can. It was 6
years ago, so I can't remember in detail everything that went on, but I knew
from several sources for a matter of a month or 6 weeks that negotiations were
going on between Pat Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of putting
Stilwell in practical command of the Chinese troops. In other words, Stilwell
felt — we all felt, including myself — that the Chinese were not fighting the war
and Stilwell was handicapped by not having command of the troops. I knew
about those negotiations and I knew finally that the negotiations had broken
down on account of a peremptory telegram from Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek
which Stilwell delivered.
Now I would rather not divulge my sources, if that's agreeable to you people,
for two reasons : One, that newspaper ethics traditionally protect sources.
Another reason is that other people are involved, and I don't like to involve
them unless they know about it. But the principal reason is that after all
these years I really can't remember what one man said and what another man
said. You can readily guess the nature of my sources. They were both American
and Chinese. They were authentic and legitimate, and it was the practice of
the American Army to keep American correspondents as well informed about the
politics of the war and the economy of the war and things of that kind as
was legitimate. So I feel that I had a very complete knowledge of what was
going on at that time. In fact, I brought along here a story that I wrote when
I came home. I came home for the specific purpose of writing a story about
Stilwell's discharge from China, which I couldn't write in China on account
of the Chinese censorship. And this story, which is in the Times for October 31,
1944, begins with a general summary of what the situation was between Stilwell,
Chiang Kai-shek, Pat Hurley, and Roosevelt at that time, although it naturally
does not go into the minute details of the negotiations, which I wasn't too
familiar with anyway, and which, if I knew, I wouldn't feel at liberty to divulge.
The information I had was for background use. Now this story, you might
be interested to know, was held up by the Army censor here in Washington for
3 or 4 days. Stilwell's retirement had been announced — I think I can remember
the day — it was on a Saturday or a Sunday, because I just arrived on a Sunday.
It seems to me Stilwell's retirement was announced in the papers on Sunday,
but with a loose and very vague explanation of why. Now I had the story in
my pocket — that's why I came home — and gave it to the New York Times, which
sent it to the Army censor here in Washington. And it was "hot stuff" and he
naturally avoided passing it, if possible, and it was finally passed and published
on the 31st — that's Tuesday.
Mr. Achilles. Could we have that made a part of the record?
A. Yes, I brought that for evidence. The managing editor told me at that
time that finally the censor took the story to Roosevelt together with another
story by Preston Grover of the AP. Preston Grover was the AP correspondent
in New Delhi. He had been briefed on what had happened to Stilwell before I
left New Delhi. I wrote the story and I brought it home in my pocket to give
to the AP. The managing editor told me that Roosevelt decided that the facts
were substantially as I had stated them in this article, and that since I was
in the country I was entitled to have the story censored and printed. But Pres-
ton Grover was still in New Delhi and they had to cable his story back to him
in New Delhi and have it censored there and then recabled to this country.
I remember that very vividly because it gave me about 10 hours' beat on him.
Q. I would like at this point to ask that a photostatic reproduction of two
pages of the New York Times for October 31, 1944, be put in evidence as an
exhibit, numbered document 334, and in that connection I should like to read
two paragraphs from the story by Mr. Atkinson which has just been referred to.
The Chairman. The paper may be made an exhibit and you may read as you
request.
A. This is merely an excerpt from the story, which is a long one, running over
onto page 4 :
"For the last 2 months negotiations had been going on between President
Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and General-
issimo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese
ground and air forces under the generalissimo and to increase China's par-
ticipation in the counter offensive against Japan.
"Although the generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General
Stilwell's appointment as commander, he decided later that the would accept
any American commander except General Stilwell."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2421
A. That next paragraph may be pertinent, if you will read that.
Q. The next one, yes:
"His atttitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile.
At a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang [National
Party] Central Executive Committee this month lie announced the terms of his
personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and gov-
ernmental reform.
"He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American
lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced
by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese
Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go
back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor."
(Photostatic copy of New York Times, pages 1 and 4, dated October 31,
1944, marked "Exhibit 24" in evidence and appended to this transcript.)
A. I would like to add where I said about my sources — I said being vague
about it. but I should say that about this particular episode nobody in the
Embassy was a source, as far as I could remember. I know Mr. Service wasn't;
he was in Yenan at the time. I had no communication with him. The other
people I knew in the Embassy, I can't remember that anybody gave me any in-
formation on this particular subject. My sources were outside of the Embassy
on this particular point.
Mr. Achilles. But you were briefed by official sources in order, presumably,
that the American people might get the facts?
A. Exactly.
Q. In that connection, Mr. Atkinson, is it a fact that your briefing included
the fullest disclosure of all the facts leading up to the recall? — A. Yes; I be-
lieve so.
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, do you know whether General Stilwell had
knowledge that you knew the full facts? — A. Oh, yes. In fact, I came out from"
Chungking as far as New Delhi in his party. We bad two planes, and he knew
why I was coming.
Q. And you were coming back for the express purpose of publishing this
story? — A. I was. This story was known to many other people, too.
Q. I was going to ask you about that. I believe you mentioned Preston Grover.
He was the AP correspondent in New Delhi? — A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether the UP correspondent in New Delhi was also fully
briefed on this matter, as you were? — A. I'm quite sure. There was Derrel
Berrigan, if I'm not mistaken. At least I knew that he knew it.
Q. And you were quite certain that he also A. He knew the story. I don't
know the circumstances as well as I do about Preston Grover, who asked me to
bring his story home for him.
Q. Now after you left New Delhi, was Mr. Service on the plane with you re-
turning to the United States? — A. We met in New Delhi and had taken a plane
that night, and I remember it because I was very surprised, but in a way I wasn't
surprised because Service always turned up where things were hot, and as far
as I knew, he was in Yenan, but here he was on the plane on the way home,
presumably on the same business I was.
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Service knew that you had been fully briefed
on this story? — A. Well, I had my story written at that time and I showed it to
him on the plane. I can't remember, naturally, all the conversation, but he
knew why I was coming heme, and I'm sure I must have told him everything
I knew.
Q. One further question on this point. After you published the story on
October 31, 1944, was the matter of the circumstances of the Stilwell recall there-
after a subject of wide public interest? — A. Yes.
Q. Would you be able to say whether by April 1945 the full details of the actual
circumstances of the recall were widely known amongst persons knowledge-
able?— A. I think the general story was available to the public in various forms,
not only in what I had written myself and a series of articles that I wrote after
this one article, but I remember Berrigan of the UP had a series of articles which
covered the same material, and — well, I can't cite other instances now. The
Saturday Evening Post had some kind of a story which more or less — it was the
same story that I wrote. The reason I remember it is because the fellow who
wrote it arrived in Chungking just about the day I was leaving, and when his
story finally appeared — it seems to me it was in the spring of 1945 — he wrote
me a letter and said he apologized for telling the same story that I did, but after
2422 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
all there was only one story and there wasn't very much more to be added to it.
That's how it sticks in my mind.
The Chairman. What was it?
A. I can't remember. His iirst name was Sam, but the rest of his name I have
forgotten.
Q. Was it Mark Gayn?— A. No.
Q. I take it, when we refer to this story, that included particularly the fact
that the President's proposal was that General Stilwell be placed in command
of all Chinese armed forces under the generalissimo? — A. That's right.
Q. Now turning from this particular question, I believe you have already written
a letter to the Board, Mr. Atkinson, but I wonder if you would care to state again
your knowledge, based on your association with Mr. Service, of Mr. Service's
general political orientation, with particular reference to whether you ever
detected any disposition to be a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or
otherwise oriented toward the Communists. — A. Well, I have already touched
on that in an affidavit which I sent, which you may remember. But* Jack and
I were very close associates in China for 2 years, and there were two or three
other members of the Embassy, and we were all very congenial and we were
together all the time. Now I really can't remember any conversation we had on
any subject. It just seems to me there was a complete intimacy on all political
and intellectual, social, and artistic topics. Jack is 100 percent loyal to this
country, he is a very keen collector of information, and it seems to me the facts
have borne out that he is a very sound — he can produce very sound evaluations
of evidence. As to communism, I can't remember anything we ever said on the
subject. I can say for myself that I was much less bitter about the Communists
at that time than I am now. We were war allies.
I admired very much the war that they were putting on, and it seemed to me
.after this association and after meetings that we had had that politically the
relations with Russia might be happier after the war than they were before.
Now I can see that was naive. Nevertheless, that was my attitude in those days.
I think it was an attitude that many people had. My whole interest in the sub-
ject was winning the war as far as America was concerned. The reason I tell
you what my opinions were is because I don't remember that Jack's conflicted
with mine in any way. I am glad to have a chance to come here in case you want
to discuss this in any more detail. But he wasn't a Communist then, I can swear,
any more than I was, and I wasn't, and he is not now and never has been.
Q. In that connection, Mr. Atkinson, in connection with your own statement
that you are not and never have been a Communist, do you know whether the
Soviet Uion looks on you with any particular favor? — A. Yes. I have been there
twice — 1936 and again in 104;") and 104ti — and both times I had the honor of being
denounced by the press as soon as I got home. It is a matter of record.
Mr. Achilles. By the press?
A. By the Soviet press. As a matter of record, they take a very dim view
of me, which gives me a great deal of feeling of security.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. I would like to ask you something about the relationship
between the press in the China-Burma theater and the military authorities. In
other words, whether or not it was a custom there at that time for the authorities
to brief the press on matters which the press wasn't permitted to publish.
A. Yes. In fact, we had a few — the accredited correspondents who are
distinguished from those who are not accredited to the United States Army —
we had a few press conferences in Chungking with General Stilwell and, when
he wasn't there, with General Hearn, who was his deputy, and I would sav
most of that stuff was off the record.
The Chairman. Did that include stuff that would normally be clnssified?
A. I think so ; yes.
The Chairman. And was that known as background information?
A. Yes.
The Chairman. How would you define ••background information?"
A. Background- information is information which you were no1 at liberty to
use as such, but just intended to clarify your mind and put things in their
real proportion.
The Chaibman. Now that briefing was given you by the military authorities
and also by their political observers attached to the military authorities?
A. Those were entirely with General Stilwell and General Hearn. and we had
a few of those conferences, but they were finally given up for a plain reason:
there was nothing to say, nothing was going on. and there wasn't any news.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2423
We could never print the stuff because wo had two censorships: we had the
American Army censorship and the Chinese censorship, and only pretty routine
stuff could get through those two censorships.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for coming down.
(The witness was excused. I
The Chairman. Do you have any other witnesses?
Mr. Rhetts. As far as I am concerned, we <;in lake a recess.
The Chairman. We will recess until Wednesday of next week, at 10 o'clock.
i Whereupon, at 11 : 15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m.,
June 14, 1950.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Matter of John Stewart Service
Date : June 14. 1950. 10 : 10 a. m. to 11 : 40 a. in.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building.
Reported by : H. B. Campbell, court stenographer, reporting.
Members of the board : Conrad E. Snow, chairman ; Theodore C. Achilles ;
Arthur G. Stevens ; and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Counsel for John Stewart Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts, &
Buckelshaus.
(The board reconvened at 10: 10 a. m.)
The Chairman. The hoard will be in session.
(After being duly sworn. Col. John Owen Beaty testified in behalf of the
loyalty security board as follows:)
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. What is your full name, Colonel? — A. John Owen Beaty.
Q. Are you a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army? — A. Colonel in the
United States Army Reserve.
Q. Your present residence? — A. Dallas, Tex.
Q. And you have come here at the invitation of the board to testify in this
case?— A. Yes.
Q. Colonel, would you give us a brief review of your military experience? —
A. I volunteered at the outbreak of the World War I. I was a student at
Columbia at the time that I sent my application in for the first officers' training
camp. So many more Virginians volunteered than they could take into the
training camp that they wrote me to stay on in New York and to come for the
second training camp, so I actually entered the 27th of August 1917 in the Fort
Myer officers' training camp, where I was commissioned second lieutenant in
November 1917 and had many kinds of little jobs.
When the war ended I was commanding officer of the American detachment at
Hailing Road. Norfolk, England. I remained in France until August — the end
of July or August — was discharged from the Army August 27, 1919, retained the
commission with lapses and one thing or another, but essentially retained the
commission, recalled as captain in 1941 for approximately 5 years, Military
Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff, advancing through the
grades, and during several of those years was member of the General Staff Corps.
That is enough detail.
Q. Since then you have retained your commission?- — A. Since then I have re-
tained my commission and have been on active duty two periods of 3 and 2
months and several shorter periods, most recent of which was the 3rd and 4th
of June in this current month. I was in uniform the 3rd and 4th of June.
Q. Now, referring to 1945, you were at that time on duty in the Pentagon?—
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. In the Military Intelligence Division? — A. That is correct.
Q. What was your function? — A. I wish Chief of the Interview Section. The
Interview Section was, as you know, designed to give us the information
brought back by returning officers and members of the Navy Department, State
Department, war correspondents, refugees, anybody we thought would give us
late information on areas or topics in which we were interested.
Q. In that connection you had occasion to interview John Stewart Service? —
A. Yes.
Q. Had you ever met him beforef — A. To the best of my memory I didn't
know be existed until our liaison said— he returned from China and he came
over and was interviewed by a group upon my invitation.
2424 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Do you remember who else was in the group? — A. No, sir. I interviewed
more than 2,000 such people. My office was not an office of record. The people
who came made the records. You see, we would invite people from appropriate
services and branches. For instance, most interviews the Transportation Corps
would have a representative present and Quartermaster and many of them and
various experts would come according to tbeir interests and they kept the records.
Q. So you took no notes? — A. No, sir. In the first few weeks or months I did
do it but there seemed to be some belief, which I shared, that for us to maintain
a little set of files would be a waste of time and duplicate effort and these other
people who were making the notes and preparing intelligence didn't have us do
it. So we had the function with regard to getting the people there. Notes were
made by the North African Branch, the Far Eastern Branch, Transportation, or
any of the various units that would come. Navy sometimes would come.
Q. Were all the people who were present military people? — A. No; they were
properly qualified civilians.
Q. Who did the civilians represent? — A. Any of these, almost every intelli-
gence branch or section would have a few officers in it and also some professional
career people.
Q. Were the civilians all employees of the Army? — -A. I am not quite sure.
Perhaps Navy would send a civilian or not, but for the most part civilians were
there. People coming in from the Navy were usually in uniform. I can't
give you a positive answer on that.
Q. Were there any of the press there? — A. Oh, no; the interviews were
always classified in some degree, "restricted" or up.
Q. Now, can you state of your own recollection anything that Mr. Service
stated at this interview?- — A. I remember it particularly well because we had
previously interviewed returning from that area perhaps 20 individuals. They
had not been connected — they were not working together, they would come at
different times on different missions. I say approximately 20, I am not sure
of the number. Naturally you understand that. From those interviews we had
built up a picture of the area generally referred to as North China.
I was struck, and I remember that others I met — I mentioned it to others that
the remarks of Mr. Service were so diametrically different from all the other
information it was startling. I happened to remember saying something like
this, "Well, you don't know what is on the other side of the mountain. Nineteen
people tell you the oaks and one tells you the pines are on the other side of the
mountain." I remember stating that and I have said that same thing several
times since in discussing it.
Now, as I said, I can't guarantee that we had talked to 19 or 20, it might
have been 15 or it might have been 22 or 23, but we had talked to many others
returning from the area.
Q. Had you talked with any others who had been with the Communist forces
in Yenan? — A. I couldn't trust my memory after this many years. I interviewed
over 2,000 and I was present at almost all of them except possibly a few that
were when I was on leave, and we didn't have much leave at that time.
Q. You can't recall anybody besides Mr. Service who had come from Yenan? —
A. I couldn't say where individuals came from specifically after this many years.
Q. You were going to tell us what Mr. Service said. — A. Without presuming
to quote exact words, the best of my memory is that we should not fool along
with Chiang Kai-shek's Government, that the so-called Communist Government
of North China, in his opinion, had no connection whatsover with Soviet com-
munism, was an independent, mature, well-functioning group, were only the
best hope of China and collaboration with them was the best thing we could do
in the China field— the sense is that. I am not presuming to quote the words he
said because, as you know, the lapse of time is considerable.
Q. I may have misled you as to date. Was this 1944 or '45? — A. My memory
is that it was the spring of '45, but as I said, I have no notes on it. To the
best of my knowledge and belief it was the spring of '45.
Q. Mr. Service came back twice, once in '44 and once in '45 and I am not quite
sure which is the occasion you refer to. — A. I can't swear to the date. The
best of my knowledge and belief would be in the spring of '45.
Q. Just for your information, in an attempt to refresh your recollection, the
first return was in October '44 and the second return was in April '45. — A. I
think it was much more likely the second return. As I said, I can't swear to a
date on it but my belief is that it was in the spring of '45.
Q. Have you told us all that you can recollect of this statement? — A. I think so.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2425
Q. Did you have any further connection with Mr. Service after that?—
A. No, sir.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Can you recall any person who was at this session with you, Mr. Beaty? —
A. I believe — understand the circumstances under which we met we might not
all be present, by my principal assistant was Maj. Daniel Ryan. I think it likely
that he was present.
Q. You do not know positively whether he was or not? You can't recall? —
A. I can't recall whether he was or not.
Q. Can you give us the names of any others of the 19 to 23 that you might
have interviewed who had come from any area close to Yenan? — A. I am afraid
I can't, sir. As I said before, we got these people in from this general area
and much time has passed and many of them — I cannot say for certain.
Q. You say other parts of the War Department, or those who attended, kept
notes. What do you mean by that, Colonel? Are their notes somewhere in
the War Department to your knowledge? — A. I would say this, it is quite
possible that some people attended these interviews without making notes. In
other words, if they found something they thought useful they would make
notes and add them to their intelligence files. If they didn't there would be no
reason for their doing it.
Q. I believe you testified that you made the comment afterward about the
19 A. I recall that.
Q. Do you remember to whom you made that comment? — A. I believe I made
it to Major Ryan, but whether or not I made it to him in discussing the interview
that he had been at or in breaking information to him about the interview,
I don't recall.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. In your capacity as head of the unit, that covered arranging interviews
from all theaters? — A. Oh, yes, all theaters. Of course, we bothered only with
strategic theaters. We didn't presume to be covering the whole world. To the
best of my knowledge and belief we interviewed nobody from Dutch Guiana —
only where the War Department was directly concerned.
Q. Did you by any chance arrange any interviews about that time with
General Hurley when he came back from China ?— A. I was ordered not to
interview General Hurley. I want to say this in defense of the War Department,
it was the only time I received that certain order. I was given carte blanche
except in that one case.
Q. Did your interviews ordinarily include generals or did they start lower
down? — A. We interviewed privates first class and sergeants and people who
according to experience they had had, as represented to us, as reported to us
by the people in position to know — no, rank had nothing to do with it. It was
being in a strategic area or having been in experiences which would likely prove
fruitful.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Did you interview General Stilwell when he came back? — A. No, sir.
Q. General Wedemeyer? — A. No, sir. Those are a little out of our reach. We
interviewed higher ranking people outside than we did within the War Depart-
ment. For instance, our chief was just a major general. We didn't go above
major general in interviewing. We interviewed ambassadors and others of high
rank, but within the War Department
Q. Did you interview Ambassador Gauss? — A. No, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Have you any idea of whether there should have been any special order not
to interview General Hurley? — A. No, sir. I was just told by a man several
steps above me, a couple steps above me, not to interview him. But I think he —
I know he got it from higher up. I don't know that he did but the way he told
me and everything was that he was told — he was a brigadier general, and he told
me not to interview Hurley in the War Department.
Q. I know it is a long time ago, but you can't recall any further details of what
Mr. Service may have said? — A. Not precisely, sir. I have given you essentially
the idea, that this Communist development in North China was highly independ-
ent of any Russian connections and a much better bet for American collabora-
tion and assistance and so forth than the Chiang Kai-shek Government. Beyond
that at this time I couldn't presume to make a quotation.
2426 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. In connection with your duties did you read any reports from the theaters — ■
written reports? — A. I did occasionally, sir; not comprehensively.
Q. I wonder if you happened to have read any of Mr. Service's written re-
ports.— A. I don't recall, sir. I did not study all the things coming in on any one
area but I was from time to time, by people I was working with, furnished mili-
tary attache and other reports with marked passages on them. Sometimes I
would read the entire report, you see, many of the intelligence documents for
perusal, to keep me informed so I could do my interview work better. But I
don't recall at this date whether I did or didn't read any one of them from that
area at that time.
Q. Did Mr. Service state at the time that he had been to Yenan among the
Communist forces? — A. I don't recall whether he stated that or not.
Q. Did you know that to be a fact? — A. He was sent to us through liaison
channels from the State Department as having been in the north China area.
Q. But you don't recall where in the area he was stationed: — A. I don't know
his itinerary at this date. I don't recall his itinerary. He may have mentioned
the route he followed or the stops he made, but I made no record of the Chinese
names.
Q. You yourself have not been to China':— A. Not in that part of China, sir, and
nowhere in China to amount to anything.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Did you have an interview with Colonel Dickey? — A. I am not sure, sir.
As I said before, having interviewed 2,000 and more than 2,001)
Q. I am trying to identify some of the 23. Do you ever remember interviewing
Col. Frank Dorn? — A. I don't think I remember the name, sir. The name is
familiar to me but in what connection I don't know.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Do you remember ever interviewing any other State Department em-
ployees?— A. We interviewed a lot of State Department employees, but I don't
recall them by name at tins date, not having made any record whatsoever.
Two thousand people passing through, there bas to be something striking before
you remember.
Q. Do you remember anybody by the name of Davies? — A. No, sir.
Q. Or Emmerson? — A. My memory is not — remembering or not remembering
is not significant.
Q. Do you recall interviewing anybody who said they had been among the
Communist forces in Yenan: — A. Who specifically made 'that statement I could
not say. My impression is yes, but 1 can't recall the name. We kept no diaries
and made no notes. All that was discouraged.
Q. Colonel, the board is very much obliged to yon for having come all the way
from Texas to testify. We want you to understand we appreciate it.
I will now turn you over to Mr. Rbetts.
Questions by Mr. Riietts :
Q. I wonder if you can explain to us in a little more detail. Colonel, what
ibis Interview Section was. I don't understand it myself. — A. I will be happy
to. It was to get foreign information on any subject in the world to people who
needed it more quickly than through channels. For instance, a member of the
Quartermaster Corps had representatives at all of our meetings of people from
the South Pacific. Incidentally, gun rust and things of that sort, getting informa-
tion of that sort by direct interview of a man who in many cases had flown
in by plane got vital information to the people who needed it an estimated 6
weeks before it could have come in a roundabout process. In other words, we
were a little short-cut to help out with last-minute information.
Q. You indicated that one function was to assist in obtaining information
more quickly than you could get it through channels. Was this not a part
A. 1'ut through ordinary printed reports, reported channels.
Q. What was the composition of this Interview Section? Could you tell US
that? A. There were two officers, a secretary, that was all, because"' we didn't
make notes ourselves. We simply contacted the agencies to find the people
and arranged an interview, usually in a room something like this, and all the
records were made by the people who came to the interview.
<_>. As I understand it the Interview Section was an administrative machinery
< • signed to bring experts in particular fields who were in (lie Military Intelligence
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2427
Dn tsion in contact with Individuals who had knowledge in those fields. — A. That
is right.
Q. Ate you yourself "a far eastern expert in any souse, sir? A. No, I have
been there only casually. As i said, 1 don't claim to be an expert in any of these
fields, but in the several areas which we worked in I read and interviewed for a
period of over .'> years — developed a certain familiarity.
Q. I take it that, for example, in the case of Mr. Service that the people whom
you would invite to attend an interview with him would We the people in your
Far Eastern Branch of MID. whatever it was called, who were dealing with the
substantive aspects of far eastern intelligence. — A. Yes. sir; that is essentially
true. As I said before, we had contacts in seven branches. Finance, Quartermas-
ter. Adjutant General. Transportation, Chemical, and so on. and several of those,
such as Transportation and Quartermaster, attended a very large proportion
of those interviews. I have no knowledge of how many. Others like Adjutant
General attended very lew. We would notify them according to whether we
thought they would have an interest in the topic.
Q. Were these interviews primarily designed to elicit factual information about
a particular area which a man had visited? — A. I should say so, to get the facts
of an area or resources or equipment or any of the things thought generally nec-
essary for an army.
Q. They were not primarily, or were they, designed to provide an occasion for
discussion of what the United States policy, the political character, ought to be
toward an area? — A. I can hardly answer that one. It is possible that some
questions might have been of that nature. At one time in G-2 — we reorganized
rather frequently — we had a Political brauch. It is possible that questions of
a political nature were asked. I can't say.
Q. Can you tell us what you referred to. the fact that you had interviewed
some approximately 20 other people who had come from what you described
generally as North China? By that do you mean the areas controlled by the
Chinese Communists'? Is that what you had in mind when you referred to
North China? — A. I am afraid at this time I couldn't answer an exact question
on that. I couldn't put a line, and I don't know that I could then exactly, where
controls went through.
Q. I believe you testified that the views which Mr. Service expressed in this
interview that you referred to were diametrically opposed to the reports that
you had received from those approximately 20 other people. — A. "Diametrically
different from any" I said.
Q. "Diametrically different from"? — A. They were different.
Q. Can you tell us something of what these 20 others reported to you? What
were the A. Only the briefest summary, that this represented Russian pene-
tration. Communist, Russian, Soviet penetration.
Q. What represented that? — A. The North China Communist movement was
allied with Russia, Soviet Russia.
Q. In what sense do you recall that this alliance with Russia was described? — ■
A. I couldn't say now.
Q. Was it your understanding that these approximately 20 other people had
reported that the Chinese Communists were operating with Russian troops or
under Russian command? — A. I am afraid I can't give you exact details after
this much time.
Q. You can see what I am trying to find out. What were the views of the
others? — A. The exact details as to how the Russian influence was originated
or was operated. I don't know. But I got the general impression from interviews
that North China Communists had been in touch with Moscow and hadn't grown
up as an independent movement, as I gathered to be the case from Mr. Service.
Q. Now can you recall over what period these interviews with the approx-
imately 20 other people from that area took place? — A. I began interviewing — I
was named Chief of this Interview Section at the beginning of '43. I believe per-
haps in January the set-up was made, perhaps in March before we were operating,
so I shall say approximately March '43 to and beyond the spring of '45. I had
been interviewing some 2 years at this time.
Q. You couldn't place interviews with this approximately 20 any more ac-
curately than that it occurred during the period while you were Chief of this
Section? — A. Two and a fraction years prior to that time.
Q. Do you have any recollection that this approximately 20 people who had
been interviewed indicated that they had personal knowledge <>t' the situation
in the Communist areas of China? — A. No more than that if there had not been
strong reason to believe they hadn't we wouldn't have invited them.
68970— 50— pt. 2 60
2428 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. You can't think of who any of those people were?— A. No, sir, I made no
notes on the period.
Q. Now, I wonder — you have indicated that the best you can recall as to them
is that they reported that the Chinese Communists were allied with or in some
way under the control of the Soviet Government. — A. I didn't say '"under con-
trol." I said "in communication with" or something of that sort. They had
contacts, to the best of my knowledge and belief, derived from previous
interviews.
Q. Did yon, understand Mr. Service to report to you at his interview that the
Chinese Communists were not in communication? — -A. No; his knowledge and
belief they were not.
Q. That there was no communication? — A. I wouldn't say "communication"
but no connection, no tie. The exact details again
Q. What did you understand him to be reporting when you say that there
was no tie? Do you mean that they were not under — did you understand
him to say that they were not under the control or the dominance or the influ-
ence A. Yes ; I think he said that they were an independent movement, an
independent and. indigenous movement, not Moscow connected. That is to the
best of my knowledge and belief.
Q. Not Moscow connected. — A. I think that is about all I can say on that.
Q. Apart from tins aspect of the matter, that is to say, the relations between
Moscow and the Chinese Communists, can you recall what any of these approxi-
mately 20 people reported to you on other subjects which differed so greatly
from Mr. Service's report? — A. No.
Mr. Achilles. Can I get one thing clear? These 10 or 20 people approxi-
mately were specifically from North China Communist areas, 'not people from
all over China, or were they people from any part of China?
A. As I understand it, these people I am referring to had some presumed
knowledge of or connection with North China principally, of course, returning.
It might be we would occasionally talk to a person who had derived knowledge
but. for the most part we dealt with people who had been in the areas. The
details I cannot recall.
Q. I take it that the approximately 20 people that you are referring to here
when they were interviewed, the people, we will say. from the far eastern area,
MID, would probably have been invited to attend their interviews also. — A. There
would have been no other purpose for holding them.
Q. I believe you testified you had never read any of Mr. Service's reports. —
A. Not recalling by name, but these things came in and there woidd be no
special reason for my recalling the name of the person who wrote them if they
were submitted to me.
Q. Do you know whether any of the people in MID who were working on sub-
stantive aspects of far eastern intelligence were particularly impressed between
the divergence of Mr. Service's reports and the reports of other people? — A. My
impression is yes, but I can't give you names. I believe if you were to consult
the roster of MID, the Military Intelligence Division, at approximately that
time you might arrive at a lead as to who would have been the sort of person
who would have been invited.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. You can't give that to us?— A. I don't have that; I didn't keep it. That
would be in the Record Section over there. In other words, people came and
went in all of the branches. Whether Colonel X was there at a given time I
wouldn't know now.
Q. May I ask one question? With regard to the reports that you saw was
it a normal practice for reports coming from the various areas of the world to
come across your desk or did you receive selective ones, or what? — A. I received
all of certain types of intelligence.
Q. What types were those?— A. Intelligence summaries and things of that
sort. 1 saw them all, I think, or a large number. Reports sent in by military
attaches and others, I certainly did not see them all because no one person could
see them all. The volume of them was so great that it was — experts of certain
areas, it was all that experts of a certain area in a certain subject could do. Rut
I saw reports from those who thought for some purpose it would be desirable for
me to see them. That is all I can say at this time.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Now, Colonel, you also indicated that your recollection of this interview
with Mr. Service included a recollection of statements by him to the effect that
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2429
we shouldn't fool around any longer with Chiang Kai-shek. I wonder if you
ran elaborate a little bit on what you understood the substance to be. — A. Just
that.
Q. When you say "fool around with him any longer." — A. Not give him any
more help.
Q. Not give him any more help. lTou understood him to recommend complete
abandonment of any aid to the Central Government of China? — A. To Chiang
Kai-shek. He may not have expressed it in exactly those words but that is
what 1 got from it.
Q. Now I wonder if in view of the fact that you were not dealing substan-
tially with far eastern matters, I wonder if it is possible that you might have
received an impression slightly different from that which one somewhat more
expert in that held would have received. — A. I don't believe so, sir. This was
considered a very sensitive spot that I held. I should say somewhere along the
line I wouldn't have been there for 2,000 interviews — but I believe I can trust my
judgment on my impressions.
Q. I take it it was not your function to record the results or the content of
these interviews, but rather to arrange them, so that it was not part of your job
to report accurately precisely what was said at these interviews to anyone. —
A. If I were called in by a superior officer and asked what the score was I could
have told him, certainly for a short time on any of them, but as a number of
them passed and the years passed details have slipped except for a few which
were very striking for some reason or another.
Q. I take it, then, that you are pretty satisfied that your recollection on this
point could not be faulty. — A. Yes, I am sure.
Q. You are quite clear that his proposal in this group was to completely aban-
don American aid to the Central Government of which Chiang Kai-shek was
the head. — [The witness nodded his head.]
The Chairman. The reporter cannot get your answer when you nod your head.
Will you answer the question?
A. That was the substance. As I said before, I am not quoting words, but
that was the impression I derived from his interview.
Q. That would have been a very startling proposal, would it not?— A. It was
to this working group in the Military Intelligence; if I may express an opinion,
it was to me.
Q. Was that the type of problem which was discussed in these interviews, such
fundamental matters of high political policy? — A. I can't generalize on these
interviews.
Questions by Mr. Stevens.
Q. You said it was to the working group — A. I mean — when I said the "work-
ing group" I speak of colonels, lieutenant colonels.
Q. This was so startling as to cause discussion of it afterward? — A. When I
said "the working group" I didn't mean to say for a moment that General Bissell
was ever at one of these interviews. In other words, you asked what the people
in MID did, whether there was any — whether it surprised them, meaning the
working group, meaning the people who would come and make notes.
The Chairman. The point Mr. Stevens is making is, did you discuss it with
the working group afterwards?
A. No, I discussed it with one, but I think it was Major Ryan.
Q. He is a member of your staff. — A. Yes. Whether I discussed it with others,
I think it is likely, but I can't remember whether I spoke to A or B at that time
on it.
Q. Can you remember that you did speak to A or B? — A. I can't remember
whether I spoke to A or B on it, but I know I spoke to one person, making that
figure of speech about the trees. I think that was probably to Major Ryan.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts.
Q. I would like to show you, Colonel, Document No. 204, which is a memo-
randum prepared by Mr. Service and Mr. Ludden, dated February 14, 1945,
entitled "Military Weakness of Our Far Eastern Policy." I ask you to read
through that document.
The Chairman. Take your time, Colonel, and read it. (The witness read
the document referred to above.)
Q. For the information of the Board, this is in your document book.
The Chairman. What is your question?
Q. Does that seem to express the general type of views that you recall Mr.
Service expressing? — A. Well, the interview was in more detail. This— I am
2430 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
not sure this particularly was brought in the inerview or was not brought in
the interview.
Q. Well, you have indicated, for example, that his proposal was to abandon
Chiang Kai-shek, that is to withdraw all aid and support. My question is
whether the general subject that is discussed here is in any sense — is in sub-
stance what you recall Mr. Service talking about at that time? — A. There is a
relationship. This is more subtle, more carefully prepared, perhaps, than a
question-and-answer interview, but the idea of a coalition government including
the Communists was not approved of by people that I knew in Military Intelli-
gence.
The Chairman. Was it discussed at that interview?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Is it your understanding that the idea that the United States ought to
promote and assist and encourage the formation in China of the coalition gov-
ernment was not in accordance with American policy? — A. Insofar as I recall
the words "coalition government" did not come in" at the interview. I can't say
that it did or it didn't. I don't recall that it came up at the interview. In other
instances it came up, especially with regard to Europe. The people I knew in
military intelligence didn't believe in the coalition government including the
Communists.
Q. Do you know what the policy of the United States Government on that
question was at this time? — A. No, sir ; I can't say.
Q. Was it your belief that such a coalition government would have been con-
sistent with "what you understood American policy to be? — A. I don't know
whether I ought to say anything about the policy of the Government. Should 1?
The Chairman. I don't think it is really germane to this issue. I don't think
we need to trouble the witness.
Q. I suggest, General, since what we are discussing here is policy and Mr.
Service's alleged views
The Chairman. Ask your question if you wish, but I would suggest what we
need is the witness's recollection of what was said at the time.
Q. I should like to— as I understood you to say a moment ago, Colonel, the
idea of a coalition government which would include Communists was not a
part of your understanding consistent with American policy. — A. You showed
me this paper. There is something in here — if we would say a certain thing the
internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be
forced to make concessions of power and permit a united front to make a
coalition. That is taken from this paper.
Q. Now what were you saying about that?— A. I said I didn't think that was
by any means the same thing. It was merely allied to and might be sort of
corollary — in other words, it was nothing shockingly different between this
and the interview, not the same thing.
The Chairman. Consistent, you mean?
A. Consistent, yes ; consistent with the interview.
Q. Did you regard this suggestion for using American officers to encourage such
a coalition as some departure from American policy? — A. That is Government
policy. Should I answer that question?
The Chairman. You can use your discretion.
A. I wouldn't be considered disloyal if I answer that question?
The Chairman. Oh, no.
A. That was regarded by us, by myself— I say "by myself." certainly by many
people around me— as being an entering wedge of communism into the areas.
Q. Now, I invite your attention, Colonel, to page 2 of this document, of this
Document 204. — A. The same one I have?
Q. Yes, the third full paragraph.— A. At the bottom?
Q. No, the next to the last paragraph. — A. "We cannot hope "
Q. No, "A similar public statement " — A. Page 2 on mine is different.
Q. I am sorry, page 3, "A similar public statement by the Commander in Chief
with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessa-
tion of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary
and unwise." Now this was a memorandum written on February 14, 1945. That
hardly squares with your suggestion of Mr. Service's views that we should com-
pletely withdraw from Chiang Kai-shek, does it?— A. As I said, I am not sure that
he said in those words we must completely withdraw aid.
Q. Or in substance?— A. What I gained in substance, we wouldn't lose anything
if we would withdraw from the non-Communists.
MATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2431
Q. Here he says ii would nol only be unnecessary to do that but would be
unwise to do so. A. Well, What about that? Thai, to me — understand, I may
be an artless man — thai is inconsistent with the portion of the paper which
suggests the coalition government, because the coalition government lets the
Communists in. So to me, as I say, I am not saying it for other people but to me
those two parts of the paper look in different directions.
Q. Now is it your view that the suggestions embodied in this document and
the suggestions which you recall Mr. Service as having made in this connection
were some evidence of bis disloyalty to the United States Government? — A. As
I s.-c it — but of course 1 am a Virginian-born, Texas brought up — again what the
policy of the United States was, as 1 said a while ago, was something that I don't
think we should undertake to determine, but from considering what I consider the
merit to be anil having read and studied documents such as Mr. Stalin's great
speech on the loth of March 1939 and other documents, and having known others
in the War Department who did. the honesty and fervor with which he expressed
his methods of penetration which you can see yourself if you care to read that
book. "Leninism." the last document in that book published in New York, thou
you can see the coalition government is one of Stalin's penetration methods. In
other words, a coalition government, including Communists is the kind of Ameri-
canism that I feel, with the kind of international knowledge as I have, recom-
mending the coalition government was a startling — including communism — was
a startl'ng thin".. Whether the man is innocent or duped or unpatriotic I will
not judge. Rut it was a startling thing tor a man to propose a coalition govern-
ment including Communists when he knows the history and doctrine of
communism.
Mr. Acun.i.Fs. Your recollection is that Mr. Service proposed that as a part
A. You mean the coalition government? I don't recall that. That is suggested
here.
Q. Now, I take it that the answer to my question is that in substance that such
a proposal did evidence in your mind at least some departure from what you
regarded as Americanism.
A. Or from good judgment. I am not going to say more than that the thing
was wrong according to my knowledge and training and experience — it is wrong.
Q. Were you familiar during that time or are you now familiar with the views
held by General Stilwell on this same question?
A. I don't think I ought to go into the General Stilwell issue. I wouldn't like
to say how much I knew or didn't know at that time. We did not interview
General Stilwell. But I decline to answer on General Stilwell. I didn't interview
him myself.
The Chairman. The only question was whether you are familiar with it
or not.
A. Not in enough detail to give answers. I am afraid what I could give on
General Stilwell would be not valuable.
Q. Have you read the so-called white paper, accurately called "United States
Relations with China"? — A. No.
Q. Published by the State Department. — A. When was that published?
Q. It was published in August 1949. — A. No; I have not. I can say positively
I have not if it was published then.
Q. Were you familiar during this period with the views of General Hurley
on this same question? — A. I didn't see him. * .
Q. Were you familiar with his views? — A. Not then.
Q. Are you now? — A. Incidentally only. He has been making speeches and
so on so that I am aware of his views.
Q. As a matter of fact, are you aware that one of the principal purposes
for which General Hurley was sent to China by the President of the United
States was to bring about just such a coalition government? — A. I don't know.
I am not aware what the purpose was.
Q. I would like to show you, Colonel, Document 225, which is a memorandum
prepared by Mr. Service on March 23, 1945, and is entitled "Contact Between
the Chinese Communists and Moscow." I ask you to read through that docu-
ment. It is not in the document book.
The Chairman. Have you got a report number?
Mr. Service. My number is 23 of the 1945 series.
(The witness read the document referred to above.)
Q. Does the factual material contained in that memorandum relating to con-
nections between the Chinese Communists and Moscow accord with your general
recollection of what Mr. Service reported at this interview a short time later? — A.
2432 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The details here of which I have no recollection whether they were or were not
satisfied at the interview, I don't know, but remarks such as "There is now no
travel between the Soviet Union and Yenan. The Kuomintang bogey of Soviet
military supplies to Chinese Communists is now dead." I should say that things
like that are in accord with the interview.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that that factual reporting was not
accurate?— A. I couldn't say so. As I said, I wasn't there.
Q. I take it that the substance of the reporting in that memorandum cor-
responds in general with what you have testified to. — A. Not in full, I should say,
but certain places like that "bogey of Soviet military supplies to Chinese Com-
munists is now dead," "no travel between the Soviet Union and Yenan," certain
statements like that correspond to the gist of the interview, as I recall. I don't
recall, though it may have well been said at the interview, some of these other
tilings.
Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is whether the substance of what you
recall Mr. Service reporting at this interview corresponds with or differs from
the report set forth in this memorandum. — A. It corresponds in part.
Q. In what part does it not correspond?— A. When I say it doesn*t correspond
1 don't claim to remember everything in these interviews which were customarily
from an hour to 2V2 hours long. We met at various times of the flay, often to
2 o'clock, and would talk back and forth and back and forth for a couple of hours.
Q. Let me see if I can make myself a little clearer in my question. What I
am trying to find out is whether there is anything in this memorandum which
differs in substance from what you can recall Mr. Service as having reported at
this interview. — A. I can't undertake to answer that. sir.
Q. Is it your recollection that he reporled something different at the interview
from the substance of what is set forth here?— A. All I can say is that the gen-
eral impression given at the interview was there was no connection whatsoever
that he knew of between the Communist authorities in North China and Moscow.
That was the general impression of the interview.
Q. How would you characterize this report here?— A. Well, certain parts of
it might indicate that, like "No travel between the Soviet Union and Yenan" and
"military supplies to Chinese Communists is now dead." "It is probably impossible
for any planes to My from bases in Outer Mongolia to North Shensi," and so on.
Now all that, I would say, is in harmony with my impression. On the other hand,
toward the end when he drops a hint that while there is no contact between the
governments, there may be some contact he doesn't know about between the
parties, I don't recall that as having been brought into the interview, but I am
not saying it wasn't. The question might not have been asked. It may have
been brought in ; I have forgotten.
Q. Let me ask you about that memorandum. Would you say that this memo-
randum reflected a writed who was trying to, if you like, sell the proposition that
there was no connection between the Chinese Communists and Moscow? — A. I
don't wish to comment on this memorandum at the present time.
Q. Is there anything inconsistent between the views and reports set forth in
this memorandum and your recollection as you have testified to it here of Mr.
Service's statements in the course of his interview? — A. I answered that — just
answered it. Almost the same question I just finished answering.
The Chairman. I think the witness has answered that question before. He
went to some extent to explain the two parts that you wanted him to recollect
was in accord, and the other he didn't recollect.
Q. 1 am now asking a different question, as to whether there is anything
here inconsistent as to what he recalled Mr. Service to have reported at the
interview? — A. I answered that, too. I said with regard to this question about
the parties that I didn't recall that that had been brought out at the interview.
Whether it was or was not I didn't recall.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. No further questions, Colonel. We are very much obliged to
you and thank you for coming.
A. I am through now and can return to my family?
The Chairman. Yes, sir: thank you very much. I am very glad to have seen
you, Colonel.
(The witness was dismissed.)
(Recess.)
i After being duly sworn Josiah W. Bennett testified in behalf of Mr. Service
as follows :)
The Chairman. State your full name and address.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2433
A. Josiah W. Bennett; I am now living at 2713 Seventy-third Place, Hyatts-
ville, Md.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. What is your position, sir? — A. I am on the public affairs staff of the
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
Q. Of the State Department?— A. Of the State Department.
Q. Now, will you tell us what your position was in the spring of 1945, that
is to say. ronghly from January to June, if you like? — A. I was employed by
the War Department as a military intelligence research analyst. That was
my official title. I was working in the Economic Branch of MIS in the War
Department, and that branch handled intelligence matters concerning political
and economic affairs in the entire Far East.
The Chairman. In the entire Far East?
A. In the entire Far East.
Q. And were you devoting your attention primarily to far eastern intelli-
gence?— A. Entirely.
Q. Entii-ely. In the course of your work did you have occasion to see reports
and memoranda prepared by Mr. Service in China? — A. Yes. MIS received, I
think, the most pertinent reports from the State Department. There was regu-
lar machinery set up whereby extra copies were made and circulated to us and
since during most of the period I was working on China, or matters related to
China. I had an opportunity to see Mr. Service's reports.
Q. Now during the spring of 1945 did you have occasion to attend any inter-
views which had been arranged by the Interview Section of Military Intelli-
gence with Mr. Service ?• — A. I can't be sure of the date but I do remember I
attended at least one. One remains in my mind because it was the time I
first met him.
Q. When you first met him, and you may have attended more than one of
these interviews if they occurred? — A. I may have, but I can't be at all certain.
To explain why, there was a never-ending series of these interviews. Everyone
returning from the Far East in any capacity at all, in the Army or in private
capacity, if it was thought he had some information which he might be able to
give us, would be brought in and one or more of us from the office was busy
almost every day attending one of these functions.
Q. In that connection how long had you been in this work in the office of
Military Intelligence? — A. I joined it at the end of June, I believe, in 1942,
if my memory serves me. I kribw it was in the early summer.
Q. And you remained there until when? — A. Until August 1946.
Q. Now you have just indicated that throughout this period there was a
never-ending series of interviews with all types of people returning from China.
Did you either at the interview with Mr. Service, which you attended, or at
any other interview form the impression that the information or the views
expressed by Mr. Service during the course of this interview were different or
in conflict with the views of other persons whom you had interviewed and who
had returned from the Chinese Communist areas? — A. My recollection of the
interview is not very accurate, I mean not very exact. It was the function
of these interviews to provide information and intelligence and if there were
controversies they would be more about points of fact, because it wasn't normal
for views to be expressed. So far as my recollection of Mr. Service's interview
goes, I remember it only as being more or less as what he said in his report
earlier. There is nothing I can remember as being different from what he said
in his reports.
Q. From what he said in his reports, and either on factual or on policy views
did you form any impression of any violent difference between Mr. Service's
reports and the reports of others who had opportunities for knowledge about
the Chinese Communist territory ? — A. No.
Q. It has been testified in this meeting, Mr. Bennett, that at some interview
in the spring of 1045, held in the Military Intelligence Division, or Service,
whatever it is. that Mr. Service expressed the view that we should quit fooling
around with Chiang Kai-shek and should withdraw all aid from the Kuomintang
or Central Government. Did you ever hear Mr. Service express such a view? —
A. I certainly don't remember it.
Q. Do you think such a view, if expressed, would have stuck in your mem-
ory?— A. It probably would. It was a rather drastic statement to make and
I should think personally Mr. Service's position making such a statement would
have made an impression on my memory and the others there.
2434 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Do you think that even had you not attended the interview where such
a statement or expression was made that it likely would have come to your
attention from others of your colleagues who had attended the interview?—
A. Very likely.
Q. That, again, because of the drastic nature of such proposal if it had been
made*.' — A. Yes.
Q. Now. it has also heen testified here that at this interview, which I have
referred to, Mr. Service expressed the view that in suhstance that there was no
connection between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists. Did
you ever hear Mr. Service express a view to that effect? — A. No. As a matter
of fact, I am not sure whether it was from his reports or not, hut it seems
to me I remember constant references to a Tass mission, to various other people
who might possibly be a liaison with the Russians. As I say, I don't know
whether it is in Mr. Service's reports.
Q. Did yon, in the course of the one interview that you are certain that you
attended during the spring of 104.",, take any notes on the discussion? — A. No;
I don't think so. I am pretty certain.
Questions by the Chaibmak :
Q. Who was chairman of the meeting? — A. Well, there was the regular pro-
cedure in MIS and it was a gentleman whose name I don't remember, whose
job was to organize these interviews. He usually acted as the man who
introduced the speaker.
Q. Was it Colonel Beaty? — A. It could be. I am sorry I don't remember
the name. I don't think it was a general.
Q. Not Colonel Beaty? — A. It was a colonel.
Q. It was a lieutenant colonel? — A. I think so. but I am sorry I am not sure.
The man I remember was a rather oldish man.
Q. White hair?— A. Yes.
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. And the work of this colonel was exclusively administrative, was it, that
is, to arrange, set up the meeting at which substantive experts in technical fields
would then attend and ask questions? — A. He used to pop in the office or call up
and say such-and-such a person would be available at such-and-such a time, who
was going to go, and then he might be there and he might not. If he was there
he would act as chairman of the meetings.
Q. I believe you have indicated that you did not take notes at this interview
that you asserted you attended. Was it not your practice ever to make notes
on these interviews? — A. It was quite commonly done and I think maybe notes
were taken by someone else in our office, but I don't remember them taking notes
on this interview.
Q. Was that because there was nothing particularly noteworthy in it? — A. Well,
I wouldn't exactly say that. It was a very interesting discussion of first-hand
experience with the Chinese Communists, but it wasn't anything that I remember
that was worth recording. It was more or less supplementing what we had read.
Q. In other words, there was nothing new there that you had not already seen
in his reports? — A. Yes.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. You attended all of these meetings on the Ear East, did you? — A. No, I
didn't attend all of them.
Q. I was wondering whether there was anyone else besides Mr. Service who
came back after having had experience with the Communist procedures in
Yenan? — A. There was one of our colleagues.
Q. Who was that?— A. Captain Domke.
Q. Any others? — A. I don't know whether Colonel Barrett came in or not.
Colonel Barrett was there. I have seen him: I can't remember whether I saw
him at that time.
Q. As far as you can recollect did the observations of Mr. Service differ in any
material way from the observations of these others you have spoken of? — A. No,
not as far as 1 can remember.
Q. No further questions. Thank you very much.
( The witness was dismissed and the Board adjourned at 11 : 40 a. m.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2435
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Secumts Board MeetjSng im the Matter of John Stewart Service
Date: June 15, 1950, LO: 10 a. in. to 11: 50 a. m.
Place: Room 2254, New Stale Building.
Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro, CS Reporting.
Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman. Theodore C. Achilles, Ar-
thur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Counsel for John Stewart Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Esq., for Reilly,
Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 10: Id a. in., June 15, 1950.)
The Chairman. The Board will he in session.
(Thomas Dawes Blake, called as a witness.)
Questions by Mr. Rhktts ;
Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Blake.— A. My name is
Thomas Dawes Blake. I live at 3026 N Street NW.
Q. And will you state what your present position is. — A. I am the Washington
representative of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. of New York.
Q. Now were you formerly employed by the State Department? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When were' you with the State Department? — A. I joined the State Depart-
ment in March of 1942.
Q. I wonder if you would describe for the Board your work with the State
Department from that time until you left.— A. When I joined the Department
I was hired by Mr. Howard Bueknell, who was then the No. 2 man in what we
called then the Division of Current Information, which was the Press Relations
Division of the Department, ami still is, under a new name; I think it is special
Assistant to the Secretary — McDermott's office — now. From March of 1942 until
June of 1943 I was on what you might call a rotating shift. That Division
maintained 24-hour service, and one week I would work from 4 o'clock in the
afternoon to 1 or 2 in the morning : another week from midnight until 9 or 10 in
the morning ; and a third week from 10 o'clock in the morning until 7 or 8 at
night. The night side — we were primarily concerned with handling the queries
of reporters that came in after hours, watching the tickers. Any news develop-
ments that came over the tickers we would notify the appropriate officials of
the Department. In many cases the press knew about it before you wrould catch
it on the ticker, and to endeavor to get an answer, if possible, would require
getting, of course, the proper clearance either from the official himself or further
up the line. The day side of the shift was concerned with putting out the Depart-
ment's Radio Bulletin.
In June of 1943 I was put in full charge of the Radio Bulletin and taken off
the night shift, and later that year, in September, I developed the so-called News
Digest, which, I believe, is still circulated throughout the Department. I had
those two jobs up until January of 1944. Mr. Marvin Mclntyre, who had been
secretary to President Roosevelt, died in December, and in January Mr. Roose-
velt picked Mr. William Hassett, who had been Mr. Early's assistant, to succeed
Mr. Mclntyre. Mr. Early asked me to come to the White House as his assistant;
the State Department consented, and I spent from the end of Jamiary until after
the inauguration in 1945 as Mr. Early's assistant. After the inauguration, Mr.
Stettinius, who was then Secretary of State, requested Mr. Early to release
me hack to the State Department, and I came back here charged with two
specific jobs : one was the attempt to get news out of the Department. In other
words, we had found in the past that in many cases the news — I won't say it
was forced out, hut it was sort of thrust upon us. The press would ask a
question and we would give the story, and this was an attempt to get as much
information in the hands of the press without waiting for them to ask us about it.
The other job I had was what you might call press agent for the Department
in the legislative program of that year, which included renewal of the trade
agreements, the Mexican water treaty, Bretton Woods, British loan, and so
forth.
That job consisted in endeavoring to get the State Department and the admin-
istration side of the picture presented to the public through the press and radio.
On top of that, in April of 1945, when the United Nations Conference opened, I
was in charge of the the press relations end of things back here, as Mr. Mc-
Dermott and Mr. Bueknell, who was the second man, were out at San Fran-
cisco. I did those three jobs through, I would say, the end of July through the
2436 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
1st of August, when the other boys came back, and in August Justice Jackson
requested the State Department to loan me to him to set up the press relations
end at the Nuremburg trials, which I did, and spent about 6 weeks abroad. My
work was purely on a physical basis. I did not stay for the trials themselves.
It was a question of picking the proper rooms, getting the equipment — a house-
keeping job. When I returned, the Far Eastern Commission was just being
formed, and General McCoy, who was the first Chairman of it, asked me to serve
as the press relations officer on the Commission. I did that along with my work of
press relations as No. 2 man to Mr. McDermott. Actually, Mr. White and myself
about divided the responsibilities, and I continued in that work up until April
of 1946, when I resigned from the Department.
Q. Now during the entire period of your actual service in the Department
were you administratively part of Mr. McDermott's division or office or whatever
it was? — A. Let's put it this way : when I was out on loan to these other Govern-
ment agencies, I was still on the State Department payroll, and I assume such.
Q. When you were here, you were under Mr. McDermott V — A. Oh, absolutely;
when I was here I was under Mr. McDermott.
Q. I gather that your activities were primarily concerned with relations between
the press and the Department. — A. That's correct.
Q. Incidentally, was Mr. McDermott during this period primarily active on
the matter of relations between the press and the Department or was he con-
cerned on a broader front? — A. Well, of course, Mr. McDermott was the head of
the Division, but during the period that — practically that entire period the
actual relations with the press — the setting up of the Secretary's press confer-
ence, the handling of the various individuals in the office who were, like myself,
dealing with the press — were in the hands of the No. 2 man. The first one
was Mr. Bucknell, the Foreign Service officer, and then Mr. Homer Byington,
Jr., and later on during that period at San Francisco, by me. Mr. McDermott
and Mr. White were primarily concerned with the relations with the OWI, with
censorship, and, as you put it, on a somewhat higher plane than direct conver-
sation with the press.
Q. Now, as I understand it, from approximately April 1945 on until— — A. The
end of July.
Q. The end of July, you were the man in charge in the Department on matters
of dealings with the press. — A. That's right.
Q. I wonder if you could tell the Board some of the general methods by which
news was dealt with — methods by which relations between the press and various
officers in the Department A. Of course, the first obvious relation with the
press was through the Secretary — in that particular period with the Acting
Secretary, Mr. Grew — in his press conferences, and secondarily, of coiirse, by the
issuance of the State Department releases, which in many cases required ex-
planation, which would be handled either by the Secretary or by the press officer
of the Department or, in the case of a rather complicated release, the appropriate
officials of the Department would be present when the release was given out to
answer any questions that were brought up. In many cases they might give
vthat we call a background discussion of what led up to the release so that the
correspondents would have a better idea of what lay behind it, rather than just
a brief account of the actual happening in the release. Then, of course, where
you were constantly busy — but constantly, I mean — around the clock — because
newspapermen don't know any hours, without any regard for a 9 to 5 routine
here. There were queries coming in here by person or telephone, and those
were handled mainly through my office, through me or one of the subordinates.
Where the answer was known, if we could dig it out as a matter of policy, why
we would quote it to the man, refer him to the source. If there was no knowl-
edge of the past policy, why then we would endeavor to get it for the reporter
either ourselves or, in many cases, sending the reporter direct to the official in
the Department who could give him the direct answer.
Q. In that connection, Mr. Blake, was it in your exeprience a common practice
for members of the press to deal directly with a particular officer in the De-
partment whom they knew would have particular knowledge of the matter in
which they were interested? — A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether there were any regulations indicating that the
press people should not go directly to particular officers or, similarly, that partic-
ular officers should not deal with members of the press who came directly to
them? — A. I know of no such regulations. Perhaps I can best describe the
work of the office as a service organization. We tried to run it in order to get
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2437
the information to the press in the quickest way possible. If one of the old-
time correspondents who knew his way around the Department wanted informa-
tion, he would in many cases go to the man on the desk, and the man on the
desk, having known the man before, would never bother to let us know.
Q. By "the man on the desk" I take it you mean A. The appropriate person
in the Department.
Q. The departmental officer dealing with the substantive affairs. — A. That's
right. In many cases, of course, reporters are inclined to be somewhat lazy
and they woukf use us to dig out information for them and more or less condense
them and present them to them. We were there as a service organization. In
other words, if the press wanted something, it was up to us to get it for them
if it was humanly possible. And that is true also as far as the officers of the
Department were concerned. They knew that that was our function and they
cooperated with us to the fullest extent.
Q. Would you think it fair to say that it was a common and regular practice
for officers of the State Department, including Foreign Service officers, to talk
to members of the press about matters about which they had knowledge?— A.
That is correct.
Q. Would you also think it fair to say that the range of matters that could
appropriately be discussed with members of the press was something which
was left to the discretion of the officer involved? — A. Absolutely; it is the only
way you could do it.
Q. In that connection, I wonder if you could tell us what the general practice
was at this time concerning the extent and range of the matters which officers
of the Department could appropriately discuss with the press. I have in mind
particularly this question : Was it a frequent practice for officers of the Depart-
ment to discuss with members of the press and to disclose to them information
of a character which they were not at liberty to publish but which was given to
them for their background information so as to enable them to interpret known
events more properly? — A. That was what I myself strove to do constantly. In
my talks with departmental officers I urged them to adopt that policy, the reason
being that it has been my experience that you can't keep anything secret. I
think that that is very difficult. And if a situation arises in which the Govern-
ment has two alternative methods of handling it or two alternative policies,
it is much better to take the press into your confidence and outline to them
the danger of one policy, the advisability of possibly taking the other one, just
to keep the press from getting off on the wrong foot and stirring up a hornets'
nest. That was a very successful method of handling the matter. I can cite
numerous instances.
Perhaps the one that comes to my mind now is the matter of our relations
with Spain. There was some opposition in the press to the fact that we were
giving aid to Spain. Spain was getting oil, when the eastern seaboard motorists
were down to L' .gallons a week, whatever the ration was. Well, you couldn't
come up as a State Department and say that the reason we are doing it is
because the stuff we get from Spain not only helps us in the war but keeps them
out of German hands. We don t like them, we think they are terrible, but we
have to do it. But you could tell that to the press as a reason for your policy,
which would keep particularly the good, sound press away from hammering at
you for sleeping in the same bed with a man like Franco.
Q. Now in that connection, would you say that it was a frequent and common
practice t<> disclose to the members of the press material which was in fact
classified in the sense that it was recorded in a classified document somewhere,
but with the admonition that it could not be printed but was available only
for background information? — A. Yes, yes. I'm quite certain that it was very
seldom that the press saw an actual document, unless in a paraphrased version.
But, obviously, the expert in the Department who knew all the facts was able
to talk of his own knowledge, which was based on material presumably obtained
in classified documents.
Q. In that connection, would you say that it was a common practice for
officers below the level of the Secretary and the Under Secretary to have dis-
cussions of this character with the press? — A. Oh, yes; they would have to.
I mean, putting it this way, if they are discussing a problem that is based on
classified material, they would obviously have to use that to make any intelligent
discussion.
The Chairman. The question had to do more with the status of the officer.
Would an officer below the rank of Secretary A. Very definitely, sir; that
2438 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
goes right down the line to certainly the chiefs of the various divisions and to
the men on the particular desk, as we called it then.
Q. One further question. Do yon recall. Mr. Blake, whether it was a customary
practice when, we'll say. a Foreign Service officer returned from some area which
was of great public interest to arrange press conferences for such officers? —
A. Well, that was my particular job when I came back in 1045 — one of the
two jobs I had. Harlan Clark made a trip up into Yemen, certainly one of
the first United States officials and one of the few white men to get up there.
and when he came hack 1 arranged a press conference for Clark. And Raymond
Ludden came hack from China, where he had been with the Communist forces,
and I arranged a press conference for Ludden. That was in line with the
specific job given me, as I say, to get the news out of the Department. Those
press conferences, particularly Ludden's, were well covered by the press. There
were several others. 1 can't remember offhand. It wasn't with every Foreign
Service officer who came back, hut certainly Ludden's trip with the Communists
behind the Japanese lines, and Clark's trip into Yemen was of definite news
interest.
Q. Do you happen to know. Mr. Blake, whether it was a regular practice for
persons who came back from the field, again from areas where there was great
public interest, to hold discussions with other groups outside the Government?
I have in mind particularly, for example, the Institute of Pacific Relations, which
has a research staff, which, of course, was primarily interested in matters of
the Far East. Do you happen to know whether officers of the Department had
frequent occasion to hold discussions with such groups to bring them up to date
on events that were occurring? — A. Of my own knowledge. I don't know whether
that is true, because that did not come within the scope of the activities of the
division I was associated with.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by the Chaieman :
Q. Do you recall making any arrangements for Mr. Service to speak to the
press or to have contact with the press? — A. I myself recall no such occurrence.
Whether the people below me made it, I don't know.
Q. Assuming that Mr. Service came back from Yenan. from behind the Jap-
anese lines in Yenan, in April 1945, would it have been natural for your office
to refer correspondents to him? — A. It would have been, sir.
Q. You don't recall any such incident? — A. I don't recall, no. At that par-
ticular moment I was up to my neck in the legislative program and I was run-
ning the office by more or less remote control : let's put it that way.
Q. It would have been natural, I take it, from what you have told us for press
people or literary people — writers — to approach Mr. Service. — A. It would have
been very natural : yes, sir.
Q. And it would not have been discountenanced by the Department? — A. No,
sir. I know of no regulations at all which would prevent either the press from
talking to a returned Foreign Service officer or a Foreign Service officer talking
to the press.
Q. That officer, under the practices of which you have spoken, would have
been free to reveal at his discretion such information as he thought would make
proper background material for their use? — A. Entirely up to his discretion;
you had to rely on the officer.
Q. And he was free to tell them things which he could not. under an injunc-
tion, publish? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Blake.
(The witness was excused.)
Mr. Rhktts. I would like at this point to introduce as an exhibit document
338, which is a photostatic copy of a news article appearing in the New York
Times for Friday, .March 23. 1945, which reports a press conference held by Mr.
Raymond P. Ludden.
The Chairman. It may be introduced.
(Photostat of news article appearing in the New York Times. Friday. March
23, 194.1, reporting a press conference held by Mr. Raymond P. Ludden, marked
"Exhibit 25" and appended to this transcript.)
(John Paton Davies, recalled as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service,
having been previously duly sworn, testified as follows:)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Mr. Davies. you recall that yon testified earlier in this hearing, on Satur-
day. May 27. 19."»0. In the course of your testimony you referred — and I am now
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY I \\ KS TTGATTON 2439
referring in part to pages 98 and 99 of the transcripl for the afternoon session
of .May i!7. L950, and also at page 117 of the transcript — you referred to an early
occasion <>n which you were assigned to the consulate general at Mukden, and
under the instructions ol* your consul general you maintained a very active
policy of informing the press very fully as to events that were occurring at thai
time; and I believe you testified "Japanese propaganda was trying to build
up a certain picture of Manchukuo. My consul general at that time and later
authorized me whenever we had visiting Americans — William Henry Chamber-
lain, for example : there are several others that slip my mind — .1. P. McAvoy,
John Gunther. Our tiles were open to them, with discrimination, hut material
that was classified. The highest classification at that time was strictly confi-
dential and it was put down on the table, and they were left to take notes on
it. and they were told: 'The only thing you must not do is to reveal that you
go! it from the American consulate.'' 1 wonder if you could tell us who was
your consul general at that time. — A., At the time I went to Mukden it was
Joseph Ballantine, and Mr. Ballantine was my consul general for about a year
during my tour at Mukden. It may have been more than a year. I don't
recollect, but the records will show. He was succeeded by Mr. William R. Lang-
don, who is now consul general in Singapore. The correspondents whose names
I gave there. I do not recall whether all of them were briefed there during the
period of Mr. Ballantine or whether during the period of Mr. Langdon, but it
was a procedure into which I was inducted by .Mr. Ballantine, first he himself
briefing such American correspondents as came there, and then later turning
the job over to me in cooperation with him: and finally when Mr. Langdon came
there, he continued the same procedure.
Q. So that the policy you referred to was a continuing one and was not in
any way altered by one man or the other? — A. Oh, no; it became the policy
of the consul as long as I was there.
Q. Incidentally. Mr. Davies, in your testimony and others we refer to the
term "briefing the press." I'm not sure that we have been entirely clear what
we intended to embrace for that term. The type of dealings with the press
that you have testified to earlier — were those so-called briefings confined to
formal meetings with correspondents as a group or does that include the kind
of dealings that you have individually with a correspondent, perhaps at luncheon
or in an informal way, not characterized by a press conference? — A. Well, my
experience is that the terminology used for official contacts with the press
is pretty loose. Insofar as this situation about which we have just been talking,
the so-called briefings, if we use that term, were in the office, they would be over
the lunches, they would be in the afternoon at tea parties, or they would be
at dinners: it depended on the circumstances: and what they were told was
dependent on the judgment of the officer who was imparting information to
them.
The Chairman. The question also included this phrase: Would it also cover
individually the press correspondents as well as in a group?
A. Yes. it was individually. In most of these cases— these Manchurian situ-
ations— there was no real press call, and the names that I have mentioned were
visiting correspondents whom we did see individually.
The Chairman. So they were briefed individually generally.
A. In the cast of Mukden, they were briefed individually.
• Q. And I take it. referring to the later phase, during the period of your service
with General Stilwell during the war — I take it your comments are equally ap-
plicable there: that is, the circumstances under which you would impart in-
formation to representatives of the press varied from the most informal type,
over luncheon, to a meeting in your office. — A. Yes.
The Chairman. Let's be a little more definite about that. This practice into
which you were inducted at Mukden — did you carry that same practice into your
relationships on the staff in the Ghina-Burma-India theater when you went there?
A. Yes. sir; I believe that I testified that it was General Stilwell's wish that
I perform that function.
The Chairman. That was definitely indicated to you by General Stilwell?
A. Definitely indicated to me by General Stilwell. In fact, it was orders
that we should operate that way. I might carry that on down as I did in my
earlier testimony. I believe I referred to a period in Moscow in 1947, under
Gen. Bedell Smith. In that period also the contacts were with groups of cor-
respondents and again with individual correspondents.
Q. During the period of Mukden to which you referred, General Stilwell was
then Colonel Stilwell and was in Mukden at that time, was he not? — A. He was
in Peking at that time.
2440 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. I believe you have already testified that in the carrying out
of this practice on the staff of the China-Burma-India theater you instructed
Mr. Service definitely to perform this function with reference to the knowledge
which he possessed.
A. I passed on General Stilwell's desires in that respect to Mr. Service.
Q. I have no further questions.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Would you repeat— it has come up in various ways, hut I wonder if you
could state again Hie primary purpose of these briefings of the press. — A. They
go back to really a broad interpretation of the functions of American officials
abroad— American representatives abroad. And, incidentally, I might say that
as I recall it, this philosophy was developed for me by Mr. Ballantine ; that is,
that it is the duty of an American offi ial not only to represent his Government
in dealings with foreign governments, foreign officials, but it is also to report to
his own Government about conditions in the country in which he is operating ;
and, secondarilv, inasmuch as we are a democracy, it is desirable; and inasmuch
as the efficient 'and sound operation of foreign policy is based on an informed
American public, it is not only desirable, it is necessary, that the American
public have as manv of the facts of the situation abroad which the American
Government is confronted with so that they can form intelligent judgments.
It "-oes rather deeply and profoundly into the whole democratic concept of
governmental operation. With a blind public, the American Government's
hands in endeavoring to cope with a situation abroad are very badly tied.
Q. Essentially, you would put it that the purpose was to see that the American
people got as accurate and truthful information as possible 7— A. That is exactly
right We may have made errors in judgment in the interpretation, but this
was our honest, best effort to interpret for American correspondents and the
American public what we thought was the objective situation that we were con-
fronted with.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
Mr Rhetts. At this time I would like to introduce two documents, one of
which is document 339-A, which is a letter dated June 11. addressed to Joseph
C. Grew and signed by Raymond Dennett, secretary of the American council,
Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. I don't think you gave the year.
Mr. Rhetts. Dated June 11, 1945. I show the Board the original of this-
letter and ask permission to introduce as an exhibit a copy of this letter.
The Chairman. That may be done.
(Copy of letter dated June 11, 1945, addressed to Joseph C. Grew, signed by
Raymond Dennett, secretary, American council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Inc., marked '-Exhibit 26," and appended to this transcript.)
Mr Rhetts. I also would like to introduce document 339-B, which is a letter
dated June 18, 1915, addressed to Mr. Dennett and signed by Joseph C. Grew,
and I show the Board the State Department copy of that letter and ask per-
mission to introduce a copy of that copy as an exhibit.
The Chairman. That may be done.
(Copy of letter dated June 18. 1945, addressed to Raymond Dennett, signed
by Joseph C. Grew, marked "Exhibit 27," and appended to this transcript.)
Mr. Rhetts. I offer these letters, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of indicating
that meetings with the IPR staff such as bad been testified to here were a common
and frequent practice.
(Joseph Close Harsch, called as a witness.)
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Harsch? — A. Joseph Close
Harsch, 2808 N Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Q. And what is your position, sir? — A. I am at present acting chief of the
Washington Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor.
Q. In that capacity or in your earlier capacities as a journalist have you
had occasion to deal with officers of the State Department in an effort to obtain
news in the field of foreign affairs V — A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if you could describe to the Board something of the general nature
of the type of relations which you have had with officers of the State Depart-
ment as an incident to your getting of news. — A. I wonder if it would be in or-
der for me to preface that by saying that I have been off and on a Washington
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2441
correspondent for roughly 20 years, during which time I have tended to write
more in the field of foreign affairs than any other field, and that, while I have
never limited my activities exclusively to foreign affairs, and therefore the
State Department, except for a brief period back about, I should say, 1935,
1936, I9S7. when I was exclusively covering the State Department, I have never-
theless during that period of 20 years devoted. I should say, over half my time
to the held of foreign affairs and have followed it constantly.
The Chairman. In the course of that time have you worked for several pub-
lications?
A. Not several, sir. T have been connected with the Monitor constantly since
T.iL,(.t. ex-ept tor a brief period of 9 months in 1939, when I was on leave of ab-
sence, serving with the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees,
and from 1943 to 1949. when my principal connection was with the Columbia
Broadcasting System, although I continued to retain a relationship with the
Monitor and write for them principally in foreign affairs. In the course of this
work I have frequently known members of the Slate Department staff, both in
Washington and overseas. I have many personal acquaintances, and I think
I can say friends, in both the Department and the Foreign Service. I have seen
them frequently in their offices, over the luncheon table, in their homes, and
in my own home, as my guest and as their guest, here and abroad.
Q. Now in the course of your normal activities as a news gatherer, do you
have occasion to get in touch with officers of the Department to obtain news
from them about particular events or situations? — A. Oh. yes: frequently.
Q. In that connection, do you always go through the press office of the State
Department or do you frequently communicate directly with the man whom
you know is the officer who has knowledge of a particular matter? — A. May I
divide the answer in two parts? There are two phases to the task of report-
ing what goes on in the field of foreign affairs. One side is gathering and
using the routine information — that is, the information which comes from the
formal press conference and from the formal release. In that field it is my
custom to attend press conferences when possible, and I frequently go to the
formal — what do you. call it — press conference section? I don't know what the
technical term is.
I go there to obtain handouts, I go there to ask what speeches are coming,
when; what Ambassador is returning from overseas. For the routine informa-
tion I go to that office. Otherwise I have virtually no occasion to go to that
office. That is, if I am interested, say, in the question whether there is going
to be a Japanese peace treaty and what the views may be of different people
involved, my method of procedure in that case would be, if I had the time to do
it in such a thorough manner, to talk to several people in several different
places. For example, I might well call Mr. Graves at the British Embassy
and invite him to lunch or something and chat over with him the problem.
Then I might well go to the Pentagon Building and talk with someone there on
the military side of the matter. And then I would either come to see or
invite to have lunch with me someone in our Far Eastern Division and discuss
it with him. In that kind of operation my activities would be purely direct,
from myself to the individual in question whom I wanted to see.
Q. Now in the course of dealings of this latter type that you have just dis-
cussed, has it been your experience that officers of the Department frequently
discuss freely with you information of a character which they admonish you
may not be printed or published but which they give to you for your background
information to assist you to interpret known events? — A. Can you specify that
question a little more?
Q. Well, is it in your experience to have an officer of the Department — of the
State Department — discuss with you matters which are, we'll say, classified in
the sense that they are not available to the general public, but which they
discuss with you freely so that you may orient yourself to the situation under
discussion, without being able to print the matter that has been disclosed to
you ? — A. Yes : that is one of the principal forms of contact between Government
officials and — I hate to sound snobbish, but what you might call the — what would
be a fair and accurate word? It is very difficult. What level of the press?
The distinction, I suppose, would be in the British sense between the reporter
and the correspondent. The reporter is the man who merely takes official
published information and records it. The correspondent is the man who seeks
the perspective behind the official news. In obtaining that kind of information
and doing that kind of writing, you are constantly going to people in responsible
positions and seeking and obtaining from them what we usually call guidance.
2442 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
That is the kind of information which cannot be, for many and varied reasons,
attributed to specific authority.
I will give you several examples, if you like, of how that operates. Before the
Secretary of State went to London on Ids last foreign trip, lie was kind enough
to accept an invitation from a group of Washington correspondents to dine at the
home of one of them. There were about 15 of us present. At the end of dinner he
\ ave what you could call a briefing, in which he told us a great deal which could
not possibly be attributed to him or published in factual form, but which made
it possible for those present to write more intelligently about what was going on.
He was very free with us. All during the war there were a series of meetings
of that type with General Bradley, with General Marshall, with Admiral King,
at which we were told a great deal of information which in written form would,
I assume, have been highly classified. That is, we were taken into the confidence
of the highest authorities in order that we could more accurately convey to the
public the true proportion and inclination of our affairs in the war. That is a
very common practice.
This type of information gathering is, of course, not limited to relations be-
tween a correspondent and the highest officials of Government of the type I
have described. In my work, in the work of anyone working as I do, you are
constantly talking to all kinds of people at levels of Government. I am con-
stantly being put in possession of ideas, pieces of factual information which could
not in the general interests be attributed to an individual or to the Government,
and my writing is based on that kind of information frequently ; yes.
Q. And I take it that it is common that when such information is given to
you, you are told, "Now this is off the record; you cannot print this." — A. I am
told what can be used and what cannot ; yes ; of course.
The Chairman. I notice you were careful to say cannot be "attributed" to
any person. Does it also include information which you cannot publish at all?
A. Yes. Oh, yes. Oh, heavens, yes ! In those sessions during the war with
men like General Marshall and Admiral King, we were constantly given infor-
mation which could not be published in any form, and we were specifically told
that it could not be published in any form. I will give you a recent example of
how this works. In connection with the incident of the shooting down of the
American plane in the Baltic, I received a query from my editor, after the State
Department note said that the plane had been shot down over the Baltic, inquir-
ing of me what did I know or could I discover what could be printed about why
the plane was over the Baltic. I proceeded to telephone to individuals in the
Defense Department who are authorized to speak to the press. I posed to them
ail the questions I could think of pertinent to the affair. 1 received answers. In
some cases the answer was, "I will tell you this oft* the record; it may not be
used." That is, the individual talking to me specified what information he was
giving me which was usable without attribution and what information he was
giving me which was for my own information only in order that I might in my
own mind have a better sense of perspective about t: e affair. And when I wrote
my story on that I was very careful, of course, to use only that information
which was usable without attribution but not the information that was given me
exclusively for my own information and guidance.
Q. And there again I take it, Mr. Harsch, that you have indicated this type
of information comes not merely from top Government officials but others down
the line, and that there, too, you are frequently given information which you
may not publish at all. — A. Oh, yes; from all levels. May I cite an example,
not directly connected with the Department itself, of how that operates? When
I have made trips overseas it lias Veen my practice to call first upon the American
Ambassador wherever 1 wont. If 1 went to a specific country in which I was
interested and about which I wished to write, I would go to the Ambassador. I
would go from the Ambassador to other members of Ins staff. I have obtained by
that method a great deal of extremely valuable information, much of which is
C< ofidential, much of which is totally off the record, most of which could not
be attributed. 1 have written many stories, without attribution, based on ma-
terial given to my by junior officials of an Embassy. Sometimes, because I
thoughl it was in the general public interest, I haven't even specified the country
in which some particular indcident took place. 1 have brought in many sources
of information. It has been information used in the interest of, I think I'm
justified in saying, public enlightenment. In the course of that, I might add that
1 have been shown documents which are confidential documents, in order that
1 might be better informed and could write more intelligently.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2443
Q. And in your experience, would you sny that this was a practice" not confined
to yourself but to correspondents generally in whom officers of the Govern-
ment thought they could repose confidence? — A. Of course.
Q. 1 have no further questions.
.Mr. Achilles. Mr. Harsch, how would you describe the purpose, as you see it,
for which officials brief correspondents, as you described'? What would be the
essential purpose of that operation?
A. The essential purpose on the part of the official?
Mr. Achilles. Yes.
A. In order that the activities of the Government of the United States might
be more accurately presented to the public. If I may volunteer a thought which
there seemed to be in the question and to which I may not have responded
adequately or fully, this matter of the extent to which a correspondent of my
type uses the conventional facilities of the press information office — the office of
public information — 1 think I told you in sufficient detail that I use it for ob-
taining hand-outs, for going to press conferences, and for that kind of thing.
In my search for what we call, in the profession, background information or
guidance. I don't think it would occur to me to use it. 1 suppose that if I were
a cub reporter starting out in Washington, as the State Department is now
constituted. I would go there first and seek to make my contacts with individuals
through that agency. The agency did exist, of course, in the days when I first
covered the State Department. And I can recall one instance recently when I
was seeking, with the object to publish, certain specific information which wasn't
on the public record, and because I was seeking for publication information not.
on the public record, I thought it a consideration to the individual I wanted to see
to clear through the official agency. That is the only occasion I can recall on
which I have ever gone to see someone via the official channel of information;
on all the other occasions I have telephoned the individual directly.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
i The witness was excused.)
James B. Reston, called as a witness.
Questions by Mr. Rhetis:
Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Reston? — A. My full name
is fames B. Reston. 3340 Dent Place.
Q. And will yon state your present position? — A. My position is diplomatic
correspondent of the New York Times, in the Washington bureau.
Q. How long have you been engaged in newspaper work, Mr. Reston? — A. Oh,
since 1934. as full-time employment.
Q. And have you been in Washington throughout your career? — A. No, I have
been here since 1941, with many assignments abroad for periods of up to a
year, 6 months.
Q. Yon say yon have been here since 1941. Have you been with the New
York Times all during that period? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as diplomatic correspondent for the Times, I take it yon are largely
preoccupied with reporting on foreign affairs. — A. That's right, sir.
Q. In the course of your work, I suppose you have frequent occasion to com-
municate with officials of the State Department in an effort to obtain news of
interest. I wonder if you could describe to the Board something of the general
character of your dealings with officials of the Department. — A. Yes, I would
be glad to. I think I should say before I do so, however, that my job is not
a typical job, in that my job is not to report primarily the spot-news announce-
ments out of the Department of State; it is a job primarily of explanatory
reporting, and therefore does not concern itself in the normal way with merely
taking the announcements of the Department of State; it is rather a job of trying
to explain, perhaps, the background of some particular announcement that may
have been made by the Department of State. With that in mind, my job is a
job of contacting perhaps the person who knows most about the area or the
problem which happens to he news at that time. If at the present time one is
concerned about the reaction here to the Schuman plan and the prospects of
how far the British reaction to that plan might influence the relations between
this country and Britain, why I would go direct to the man in charge of the
British section who is concerned and make a primary study of the problem and
talk to him on what we call a background basis; that is to say, that he would
explain, to the extent of his ability and with the limitations placed upon him
by his own job, what the facts in the situation were, but not for attribution
to the Department of State. That is the normal course that one follows.
68970— 50— pt. 2 61
2444 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. And I take it that in the course of conducting operations such as you have
described, it would not be your normal practice to go through the Press Rela-
tions Office of the State Department, but rather go directly to the man who
knew A. Well, it would differ a great deal. For example, a case came up
last week where there was a question of a report from London that the United
States Government had promised to give military aid to the British in Malaya.
Well, I did not happen to know the man who was on the Malayan desk. There-
fore, in that instance I did go through the press department and ask who is
the man who is on the Malayan desk and asked them if they would advise
him that I did wish to talk to him. But that I would not say is the normal
procedure for someone who has been doing this as long as I have. We usually
have run into somebody like Ted (Mr. Achilles) in an assignment overseas,
and if it affects something like the North Atlantic Treaty, on which Ted has
been working, why we go to Ted directly, and that would be on my job 90 percent
of the time.
Q. In other words, when you know who the man is who is the expert in
the field, you go directly to him. — A. That's right. Most news develops in
certain fields and one does get to know these men quite well.
Q. Now in the course of your dealings with officers of the Department, do
you have occasion, Mr. Reston, to have furnished to you information of a
character which is classified in some way and which you are admonished that
you may not perhaps even publish at all, but which is nonetheless furnished
you for your guidance?- — A. Well, that has happened, but it is certainly not a
normal procedure. I mean it has happened from time to time. I have handed
to me clippings of the New York Times with things marked "classified" on them,
for that matter. One example of when a classified document was made avail-
able to us, although I don't think — maybe it wasn't classified — I'll tell you what
it was and you would know about it : On the day after the Schuman plan
was announced, for some reason or other it wasn't apparent to us why the
text of that announcement wasn't made available — wasn't published in the
following morning's papers. That seemed to be quite a journalistic oversight
to a member of this Department, who called up to inquire if I knew of any
reason why a record like the Times would not publish a document of that im-
portance. I said I had assumed that the document had not been made avail-
able; that Mr. Schuman had put it in but had not made it available for publi-
cation. I was told that that wasn't true: that if I wanted the document I
could have the document. I came here and I was given the document. That
document, however, wasn't a classified document.
Q. Apart from documents, is it a frequent practice for you to receive informa-
tion with the admonition that this information can't be published, but that you
were told about it for your background information? — A. Well, that hapi>ens
from time to time, although in my own operation I always try to resist that
because I'm in the job of disclosing information; I'm not paid to carry around
in my head information which may amuse or give me a sense of being in on
things but which I can't publish. I think it is the normal procedure for most
journalists to say, when somebody suggests that you be told something off the
record, that you would rather not discuss the matter in that context. What is
much more likely is that you will be given the background of a situation, which
is understood to mean by people who cover this Department or other that one
may use the information on one's own responsibility, but one may not attribute
it to the source which gives you the information nor attribute it to the Department
of State or to Government sources.
Q. Do you know whether some of the information that is given to you in that
manner is information which is embodied somewhere in so-called classified
documents?— A. Oh, yes, I'm sure that much of that information is. I am not
aware now — I don't even know what the classification order of this Department
is, but by the very nature of it, much of it — some of it would be bound to come
from embassies, and I would assume that material which came from embassies
would be classified in one category or another.
Q. In the course of your activities, do you have occasion to maintain con-
tacts with officers of the Department at various levels — that is, below the level of
Secretary or Assistant Secretary and chiefs of divisions? — A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you maintain such contacts as a normal course of your operations? —
A. You mean do I see people like Achilles and people like that in sort of normal
social contacts from time to time?
Q Yes. and do you see officials below the level such as is occupied by Mr.
Achilles in your efforts to obtain news? — A. Well, I do from time to time, but
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2445
it isn't tlic normal procedure. I usually go either to the head of a section of
the Department or the head Of a desk. That would depend a great deal on the
kind of story. I mean, for example, when there was difficulty about Panama,
when we were asked to withdraw our forces from Panama, that carried me into
a Geld where I wasn't well acquainted, and therefore I went wherever I could
got information, which meant precisely to this level you are talking about —
the level of the man at the desk area rather than at the ■
The Chairman. Do you sometimes talk with members of the Foreign Service
who have returned from abroad, for that purpose?
A. Well, not as a normal thing, unless I happened to know the man personally
and knew he was back and particularly interested in the place from which he
had come. That would not be a normal thing.
The Chairman. Put it would not be extraordinary.
A. It wouldn't be at all extraordinary, no. As a matter of fact, especially
when a man gets back from abroad, usually his associates will give a party for
him of some kind, and one very often runs into people and talks to people who
are just back. But it wouldn't be a normal thing for me to search out that person
unless one of two things were true: either he were a close personal friend or he
were coming from an area which happened to be very much in the news at the
time. In either of those events, of course, one would try to see him.
The Chairman. In that connection, would you suppose, for example, a man
who in the spring of 1945 just returned to this country from the headquarters of
the Chinese Communists in Yenan, China, would be such a person as people
might well seek out because of the news value of the area from which he had
just returned? — A. Oh, yes; I would think very definitely, because of the contro-
versial issue at that time — very definitely.
Mr. Achilles. How would you define your purpose in seeking background
information from officials?
A. Well, I think that we are coming more and more into a time when issues
are becoming more complex and of more concern to the people of this country,
and therefore I think we in the newspaper business, or any of us who reflect
very much about it, are pretty unhappy about the ability of the traditional classic
methods of reporting news to convey to intelligent people the true nature of
many of these issues. Therefore, those things are happening, I think. I think
we are, on the one hand experimenting — we on the Times are certainly experi-
menting— with the very thing that I'm trying to do. We are experimenting with
going away from the normal method of presenting news. Instead of the staccato,
rather overdramatic tendency of taking the most striking fact and throwing it
into the first paragraph and basing one's headline on that, we are trying to
experiment with the gathering of the background information and presenting the
sense of the issue, the sense of the meeting, whatever it is. One cannot do that
by the normal method any more.
Well, let's take the situation at the present time. Supposing Mr. Acheson
had just come back from London and made the series of speeches that he has
made, the whole sense of what he is trying to do might very well he lost unless
we were told in a perfectly proper manner, it seems to me, that when Mr.
Jessup got to London lie found that people were disturbed about all the war
talk in this country, that there was some tendency toward neutrality among
certain sections of the European people, and that therefore we felt that it was
essential to try to develop that the purpose of our policy was peace and not
conflict. Well, unless somebody says that to you. in the hurly-burly of our
business one might just go on reporting what Acheson said each day, and the
tendency would be, very likely, to report almost the very 0] p site of what Mr.
Acheson is trying to make clear. For example, in all these speeches that have
been made since the Secretary got hack, as you look at them, there is inevitably
a section in which the Secretary says our purpose is peace, but we are really
responding to what seems to us an outrageous and somewhat aggresive policy
of the Soviet Union. Well, under the classic way of reporting that, unless you
Know what it is that Acheson was trying to convey, the tendency is to put the
lead sentence on "Acheson says Russia has outrageous, aggressive policy,' and
thereby you are doing precisely the opposite of what the ecretary of State is
trying to do. Therefore, there must he. it seems to me — you ami I have hatted
this around many times before — there must lie. it seems to me. a recognition on
the j art of a department whose policy depends upon the consenl of the people
that the job of the responsible official and the newspaper reporter and comple-
mentary 90 to 95 percent of the time and absolutely antithetic the other 5 per-
cent or 10 percent of the time. Put unless we have some cooperation — and I
2446 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
might add we do not get nearly as much as I think we ought to get — I do not see
how you can get consent for an effective foreign policy in a democracy. That's
my own judgment.
Mr. Achilles. There are occasional slips, are there not, when some cor-
respondent misuses information given him in confidence?
A. Yes, there are.
Mr. Achilles. Roughly, what would be your guess as to what percentage of
information given to newspapermen in confidence was misused?
A. My guess would be a very, very small percentage — a small percentage.
We are beginning to see certain bad things developing, I think, Ted, in the sense
that your so-called scoop artists in our business are the people who make their
living by trying to convey the idea that "you cannot get the truth by reading
your press, but if you will listen to me on Sunday night, everything will be all
right." There is a tendency for those people to trade upon the good relationship
which has been built up over the years between a responsible official and a
responsible journalist. For example, we have had certain institutions in this
city for a long time which rested upon a realization that there had to be this
area of confidence between officials and reporters, such as the Overseas Writers
Organization, such as smaller background conferences — 10, 15 men — and at those
conferences we would be told things that could not be attributed publicly to
officials. There we have been seeing a tendency for that information not to be
misused by the persons who were there, but for other persons, who, perhaps,
worked for people like Drew Pearson, to find out from some correspondent
what was said off the record to somebody else and then by that means eventually
to get it but to the public. But the percentage of men who are given information
in confidence and the percentage of inforamtion given in confidence which is then
put out publicly is, I would say, infinitesimal.
Mr. Achilles. You would feel, therefore, that the public interest required
this interchange of background information between officials and the press
despite the risk of occasional misuse of information?
A. Oh, yes ; I think you have got to take many more chances than you are
taking on that. I think we can illustrate these things in many, many ways,
but that is certainly my conviction : that if we keep our mind on the 5 percent
where the job of the official is antithetic with the job of the reporter, I should
have thought that we would have distorted the whole process. I mean, after all,
under our system, as I understand it, we are the direct contact between the Execu-
tive and the people, or certainly one of the direct — the major direct contacts,
and unless that contact is maintained and rests upon a basis of confidence, I
don't think the system will work effectively.
Mr. Achilles. That's all.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
The Chairman. That closes your presentation of evidence?
Mr. Rhetts. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We will adjourn until Monday for a very few questions which
the Board would like to ask, which it is not in a position to ask at the moment.
We will adjourn until Monday at 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2
p. in., Monday, June 19, 1950.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewart Service
Date : June 19, 1950, 10 : 10 a. m. to 12 : 25 p. m.
Place : Room 2254, New State Building.
Reported by : H. B. Campbell, C/S, reported.
Members of the Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore Achilles, Arthur
G. Stevens, Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.
Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruckelshaus.
(The Board reconvened at 10: 10 a. m.)
The Chairman. The Board will be in session.
At this point we will introduce into the record Documents Nos. B-59 through
B-77, which are photostatic copies of documents found by the FBI in Mr. Serv-
ice's office on June 0, 1945.
(Discussion off the record.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2447
Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service witness previously produced and sworn
in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
Questions by the Chairman:
t». The Board wishes to ask certain questions with reference to these docu-
ments. 1 show yon hist Documenl No. B 59, which is a photostat of a sheet of
paper bearing handwritten notation "John S. Service 144-1/2-S." The notation
"Mr. Macatee" lias been crossed out. Can yon tell us what this document was?
A. The writing is not in my handwriting. The name at the top which has been
crossed out is "Mr. Macatee" who at that time was Assistant Chief of the Division
of Foreign Service Personnel. The number appearing under my name is the room
number which I was occupying at that time in the Old State Department Build-
ing. This is apparently a slip of paper which lias heen attached to some letters
or something else which had been forwarded to me through the Department of
State messenger service. I assume that it came from FP. It was quite likely
that my mail, was being sent to the Foreign Service mail room and they had
simplv clipped or tied a piece of paper to it.
Q. I pass you No. B-bU which is a photostat of a letterhead of "The Road
House, Chattanooga Hotel of Distinction. Chattanooga. Tenn." on which is a
memorandum referring to some hopes of a deal with the Soviet. Would you
explain what that document is?— A. At that time, in May and June 1945, I was
occupying a small one-room apartment of a woman who was working in the
office of Far Eastern Affairs. She was a secretary there, married to a man in
the army, an officer, I believe at officers" training school, and she had gone down
there, down to some place near the camp, where he was in training to visit him.
Since the apartment was empty she suggested I occupy it and pay the rent while
she was away. I think that this camp where her husband was was Fort Benning
and I think that this is undoubtedly a paper which was in her apartment, either
that she had picked up on some previous trip down there or something of that
sort. It was an odd piece of paper which I found in the apartment. Now during
this period 1 was trying to write a rather comprehensive memorandum of my
thinking about China and about Chinese policy.
Mr. Achiilks. The handwriting is yours?
A. The handwriting is in my writing and this apparently — these are apparently
scribblings of ideas or thoughts that occurred to me some evening while I was
there in the apartment.
Q. What is the reference to a ''deal with the Soviet"?— A. I say that the "Sino
hopes" — this was at a time when it was being suggested, proposed that the Chinese
Government should try and make a treaty with Russia, and I say the Sino hopes
to make a deal with the Soviet. I indicate I don't think there is very much hope
in their success of making this deal unless it is on the basis of giving the Chine" •
Communists some participation in the Government. If this is done Russia will
have the credit with the Chinese Communists of getting them — giving them a
share in the Government.
Q. That was stated in there? — A. I perhaps would have to read the. whole
thing. I am trying to explain it as I go along.
Q. It is in your handwriting. Perhaps you should read the item you are ex-
plaining first and then explain it. — A. I will read it. "Sino hopes of deal with
Soviet. Not much hope — can only be on basis of letting CP in. Russia will
have the credit — not us."
Then there is a line drawn across the page indicating a new thought. I again
quote: "China in revolution — still fluid — uncrystallized — incomplete. In this
situation Russia's attraction is greater."
There is another line drawn and again I quote : "In China we meet — we must
accommodate ourselves." Now to go back to my attempt to explain the thoughts
here. 1 am referring to t!:e fact that the Central Government was currently hoping
to make a deal, in other words, to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union settling the
oustanding issues between them. I say that I do not think there is very much
hope of Chinese success in doing this unless it is on the basis of giving Chinese
Communist Party a share in the Government. If this is done Russia will gain
the credit of broadening the base of the Government and unifying the country
and we will not have the credit.
Q. I think that takes care of it. I pass you Document B-Gl, which appears
to be a photostat in triplicate of a letter of May 16, 1945. addresesd "My dear
P'eng," and also a letter of the same date addressed "Dear Jo-Fei," which also
appears to be in triplicate, and a handwritten letter "Dear Jack," dated May 27.
Would you explain who that correspondence is from and how it happens to be
2448 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
in triplicate? What it concerns? — A. I might, sir: on this matter of being in
triplicate, I think that there were not three originals but these are simply
identical, but these are duplicate photostats of the same paper. That happens
very often in this material. If you examine these carefully you will see that
the material that is photographed is identical, so that really it is only one copy.
I think the Board will recall that when Mr. Philip Sprouse testified before the
Board we touched on these letters. The last paper here is a letter from Mr.
Sprouse concerning which he testified. He was at that time a liaison officer
at the San Francisco Conference, taking charge of liaison with the Chinese
delegation. I am referring to the handwritten note dated May 27, starting "Dear
Jack, First Kung Hsi, Kung Hsi on the latest promotion" and signed "Yours,
Phil."
Mr. Achilles. What does that "Kung Hsi'' mean?
A. That is Chinese for "congratulations." He is saying congratulations on
the latest promotion I received on May 15 of that year. Mr. Sprouse goes on
to say in the next paragraph "Enclosed a letter which CK wish**; passed on to
Kung Peng." That CK refers to Chen Kang who was in San Francisco with the
Chinese delegation.
Q. Was he a Communist? — A. Yes. he was the secretary to the Communist
member of the Chinese delegation there.
"Trust you can do the necessary." Well, these are the letters, one of them is
from Chia Kang and apparently on the back of the same page is a letter to a man
in Chungking named Jo-Fei. It also concerns an invitation to a World Youth
Council and World Trade Union Conference. I apparently did nothing about
forwarding these letters since they were found in my desk. I don't remember
having taken any action on forwarding them. I don't know how I would have.
Q. You had no means of communication which enabled you to forward them? —
A. That is correct.
Mr. Achilles. These letters were intended for someone in San Francisco?
A. No, they were forwarded by this man Chen in San Francisco and he wished
them forwarded to Chungking but I had no appropriate means of having them
forwarded to Chungking and I had done nothing about them.
Mr. Achilles. Apparently he gave them to Mr. Sprouse in San Francisco.
A. And asked Mr. Sprouse if he could send them on somewhere.
Q. I pass you now
Mr. Achilles. What was the date of Mr. Sprouse's letter?
A. May 27. The date of the letters which he was forwarding were May 16.
Apparently Sprouse himself had held them for a considerable time.
Q. I pass you B-62, which is a photostat of a handwritten note dated June 4,
194.1, addressed "Dear Jack" and signed by "Rose." I ask you what that docu-
ment is. — A. This, I believe, is a brief note from Miss Rose Yrardoumian. This
is written on June 4, 1945, which, I believe, would be the Monday after the week
end at Owen Lattimore's where Miss Yardoumian and Mr. Roth and myself had
been the guests who had spent that week end with the Lattimores. She says, "I
took four tickets from you and paid you for three. Here's the money for the
fourth and thanks very much for getting them for us." I have no recollection
of what the tickets were, whether they were theater tickets or concert tickets or
what it was, but I assume I had been buying some tickets for myself and since I
knew — she told me she wanted some and I must have picked up some tickets for
her at the same time.
Q. I pass you B-63, which is a photostat of a check on the Commonwenltb
Bank of Detroit, payable to you in the amount of $20, signed by Inez E. Larson.
Would you explain this check, please? — A. Miss Larson was a recently employed
Foreign Service clerk who was assigned to the office in which I was working for
training purposes before going out to her first field post. The office where I had
been working was the Office of Foreign Service.
Mr. Aciiilt.es. That is not Mrs. E. S. Larsen?.
A. No connection in any way with Emmanuel Larsen or his wife. She was act-
ing as my stenographer and she had needed cash one day. It was too late to get
to a bank. I happened to have some cash in my pocket so I gave her $20 and
she paid me by writing this check. I was questioned very thoroughly on this
point by the Department of Justice in 194."). That is why my memory happens to
be so clear. Miss Larson went soon after this to Stockholm. I don't know where
she is now, but I am sure she would be able to affirm it.
Q. I pass you A. Incidentally, if I may interrupt. Miss Larson I mentioned
had just come to the State Department. She had been employed by the FBI just
prior to her employment by the Department of State.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2449
Q. I pass you B-64, which is a photostat of a piece of paper containing the
handwritten address "Corp. Joseph N. Hatem." Will you explain that refer-
ence?— A. We touched on this matter before. My recollection is not very clear
whether I brought a Letter home or whether I simply brought .an oral message
which 1 wrote to the family in the United States of this American doctor who had
been in Yenan for some years. I do remember that his younger brother, I think,
who was a Medical Corps man, I believe an enlisted man in the Army, came to see
me to inquire of his brother in China. I assume that I suggested that he give me
his address. I notice that this is not in my writing, and I am sure that this
is simply the slip of paper on which he wrote out his full name and address.
Mr. Achilles. You don't remember whether you did actually transmit a letter
from China to him or whether you wrote him one based on news of his brother?
A. My memory is not clear, sir, because you remember I came back to the
United States twice, once in '44 and once in '45. My belief is that in 1944 Dr.
Hatem in China asked me to drop his family a line and say that I had seen him
and he was well, and I did that. In 1945, I may have brought back a letter. I
remember, for instance, the pictures I mentioned before, pictures of this doctor
and his Chinese wife and Chinese child. As I said before, any letter that I
brought would have been opened and would have been approved by censorship in
China.
Q. I pass you B-65, which is a photostat of a two-page handwritten letter dated
March 16. addressed to "Dear SP." It is unsigned unless it would be the initial
"K." I will ask you what that is. — A. I believe that this is a letter written by
Miss Yang Kang. who has been mentioned several times in testimony before the
Board here by Mr. Sprouse and by Mr. Fairbank. She was at that time on a
scholarship at Radcliffe. She had formerly been the literary editor of the leading
independent Chinese newspaper.
Q. Where? — A. In Chungking. Her coming to the United States had been
assisted and facilitated by Dr. Fairbank as part of our cultural relations pro-
gram. I am not sure who the person is that she is addressing here. The initials
"SP" don't mean anything to me after a long lapse of time. But it is obviously
a letter to some friend in China which she hoped that I would have some means
of forwarding. I notice the letter is dated March 16 and I very obviously did
not forward it.
Q. Did you forward any letters over that period? Was this a custom of yours
or was it just a vain hope on the part of the writers? — A. Well, I think — I don't
have any specific recollection of forwarding any letters. It is obvious, I think,
that letters occasionally were forwarded, but I don't remember that I forwarded
any at all.
Q. I pass you B-66, which is a photostat of a 3-page handwritten letter
dated March 16. '45. addressed "Dear P and M" and signed by the letter "K." Is
that the same person? — A. The handwriting is the same and of course the sig-
nature initial "K" is the same, so I believe that this letter is also written by
Miss Yang Kang to friends in Chungking wdiich she hoped to have forwrarded.
Q. Which you did not forward. — A. I did not.
Q. If anything had been forwarded, as you suggested a moment ago that per-
haps something was forwarded by somebody, would that be through the diplo-
matic pouch? — A. No sir, it would probably have been — well, you say "through
the diplomatic pouch," the OWI, as I mentioned the other day, and officers of the
OWI sometimes transmitted open communications to and from the people who
were in the United States on grants from them. Now presumably that would
have gone through the diplomatic pouch as a semioffical communication.
Q. And in the case of this girl it might have? — A. Yes.
Mr. Stevexs. Would that have been subject to censorship?
A. Well, it is subject to censorship by the officers. It is subject to the judg-
ment of the officers transmitting it. You might call that censorship. You see,
we could send all of our personal letters those days through the pouch, but they
h.ad to be left open and they were subject, I believe, to some sort of censorship
here in the Department.
Mr. Stevfns. Subject to review as to whether they were to be transmitted? Is
that correct? Both here and overseas?
A. That is correct.
Q. I pass you B-67. which is a photostat of a one-page handwritten letter
dated February 2. 1945, Chungking, addressed "Dear Jack". The signature is
illegible to me. Would you explain this letter? — A. This letter is from a man
named Shafer. He was an old friend of my family's, Czech by nationality, who
had fought in the Austro-Hungarian Army, had been drafted in the Austro-Hun-
2450 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
garian Army in the First World War, taken prisoner by the Russians and
escaped and made his way across Central Asia into China where he arrived in
1019 or 1920.. He had worked in Shanghai as an architectural draftsman and,
as I say, was an old friend of my family's. During the period I was in Yenan
I found that he was there in the Communist territory under detention. He had
decided to get out of Shanghai and get into free China and his sympathies
were entirely on the allied side and he had been having some difficulties in
Shanghai. He had been actually acting as providing cover for some Chinese
secret activity in Shanghai. Because of the rather unusual route that he took
and because of his Czech nationality the Chinese Communists were suspicious
of him, and as I say, had him under detention. They finally released him, they
could find no reason to continue to hold him. and he was absolutely destitute and
penniless, had nothing but the clothes he was wearing. So I loaned him some
money out there in China so that he could outfit himself and live for a while until
he got a job, and he finally got a job in the American Army. This is simply a note
to me telling me that he has written a letter to his brother Charles who was
living in the United States as an American citizen, asking his brother Charles
to pay this money to my wife, who was here in the States.
Q. I pass you B-68, which is a photostat of a one-page handwritten letter
from 77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., on December 11, 1944, addressed to
"Dear Jack", signature again appears to be "Yang Kang." This is the same
girl you previously testified about? — A. Yes; and this letter is also alluded to
in previous testimony by Mr. Sprouse. This letter is from Miss Yang Kang who,
as I have already said, was a Chinese woman in the United States on a fellowship
at Radcliffe College.
Q. Did this have any connection with the letters which she bad forwarded to
you for transmittal? — A. I don't think so since this is dated December 11, 1044,
and the ones she sent me were March 10, 1945. The postscript is as follows :
"Heard that Phi] is on way here unless he has arrived." As Mr. Sprouse stated
before, he is the Phil referred to.
Q. I pass you B-69, which is a photostat of a letter addressed to "Dear Jack"
from Mark Gayn, dated May 1, 1945, in which there is a reference to a mutual
friend, "Mr. H. in Chungking." Will you explain the reference in the letter? —
A. Well, the letter concerns his negotiations with the editors of the Saturday
Evening Post magazine concerning this story which he was expecting to write
for them concerning the situation in China and Stillwell's recall. "Mr. H."
refers to Ambassador Hurley, I assume.
Q. Did he ever write that article? — A. No, sir ; he did not.
Q. Did you furnish any information to him for that article? — A. As I testified
here before, I discussed with him some of the early background of the events
leading up to General Stilwell's recall, the American suggestion that General
Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese forces.
Q. I pass you B-70, which is a photostat of a 1-page typewritten letter
dated May 7, 1945. on stationery of the Manhattan Co. of 40 Wall Street, New-
York, addressed "Dear Mr. Service," signed by "A." A. Pronounced Suehs-
dorf. Mr. Suehsdorf, the writer of this letter, was vice president of the Bank
of Manhattan Co. and was the father of a man named Adolph Suehsdorf, who
was employed by the OWI and had been stationed at Yenan. During my second
stay in Yenan, in March 1945, I had shared a room with this man's son. I got
to know him very well, sharing a room with him for a month, and when I got
back to the United States I dropped a short note to his parents saying that I
had known their son and liked him, that he was well, and so on. It was quite
a customary thing during the war. particularly when people were in remote,
isolated places like Yenan where mail communications were very slow and
difficult and infrequent, when I got back and knew somebody and thought prob-
ably their wife or their family would appreciate recent news I got in touch with
them. It was simply the elder Mr. Suehsdorf's thanks for my having written
him.
Q. I pass you B-71. which is a photostat of a 1-page typewritten letter
dated .May 24, 1945, from West Roxbury, Boston, Mass.. addressed "Dear Jack"
and signed by the initials which appear to be "R. L.," or "R. V. L." — A. The ini-
tials are R. I'. L. and are the initials of Raymond P. Ludden, a Foreign Service
officer who had been, like me, attached to the Army in China and who had also
been a member of the observer group in the Communist areas. The first part
of the letter discusses a proposal that he might be sent to the Army-Navy Staff
College. The assignment had actually been offered to me but there was some
technical difficulty because my family was on the West Coast and it would
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2451
have been difficult for the State Department to order them here on the basis of
this assignment, it was therefore decided to give me a permanent assignment
to Washington so I could be reunited with my family. I suggested thai Mr. Lud-
den might be a good man for this Army-Navy Staff College assignment. The
Department accepted the suggestion and he eventually did go to that Army-Navy
Staff College.
Q. I pass you B-72, which is a photostat of a typewritten note on stationery
Of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 22, 1!»4."», and signed "Larry,"
and ask you to explain that communication. — A. The signer of this note is Mr.
Lawrence E. Salisbury, who had been a Foreign Service officer and whom I had
known very well in the Far East and here in the Department. He bad retired
from the Foreign Service a short time prior to writing this letter and was spend-
ing part time lecturing at Yale and part time editing Far Eastern Survey maga-
zine for the Institute of Pacific Relations. This note is simply a congratulatory
note after my promotion in May 1945.
Q. I pass you B-73. which is a photostat of a letter addressed "Dear Jack"
from Mark Gayn, dated May 22, 1945.— A. The letter starts off in a rather
misleading way. He said, "This letter is completely off the record." The back-
ground is that Mr. Gayn was expecting to be sent out as a foreign correspondent
by the Sun, apparently, and he wanted very much to have his wife either accom-
pany him or spend sometime in the same area since be expected to be abroad
for a year or longer, or perhaps on a semipermanent basis. At this time, 1945,
it was very difficult, in fact almost impossible, to get approval for travel of wives
as such. A few people were successful in getting their wives to India or to China
il their wives had their own separate employment. Apparently, reading the
letter. Mr. Gayn was hoping to have his wife go out to India as a correspondent,
but he wanted his efforts to have bis wife get out to India kept off the record
since if it were known by passport granting authorities that both he and his wife
were trying to get in the same place they would probably be less willing to grant
the rule for her. I believe in the papers found in Mr. Gayn's possession there
should be a reply from me in which I declined to give him any assistance, to give
him any channels.
Q. At this point I will read into the record from among the papers found in
Mark Gayn's apartment the following, which is taken from a photostat of a type-
written letter signed "Jack" :
"Good news that you may be heading for my old stamping grounds !
••Regarding the passport for Sally. Unfortunately, I don't know anyone per-
sonally over in Mrs. S' menage. Failing the direct contact, I know the State
Department well enough to know that there is not much use asking. They re-
fuse to answer hypothetical questions and will take the attitude : the case must
be decided on its merits — let the person apply directly.
"However, I did talk to the people in the appropriate geographical branch,
including an officer just back from India. The view was that the passport would
probably be issued (at least they would raise no objection — and they would nor-
mally be consulted) as long as the woman has a reasonable reason for going
(which they agree she does in this case) and can arrange her own transportation
(as you say Sally can).
"So I would say that the prospects are hopeful.
"How are the Chinese reacting?
•'My breakfast was ruined this morning by reading J. B. Powell and Max East-
man in the Reader's Digest. What a stinker !
"Be sure to let me know when you are coming down to Washington.
"Cheers.
Jack."
I pass you B-74. which is a photostat of a Chinese map and charts on which
all the writing is in Chinese. Will you explain this document? — A. This is un-
beaded but it is apparently a chart, a table, really, prepared by the Communists,
of Americans who had traveled through their different areas. They give the
dates and places and transliteration as closely as they could do it in Chinese of
the names of the Americans.
Q. What is the purpose of the map? — A. Well, this was simply to show the
numl^er of their areas which they control which had been visited by Americans.
Q. Do you recall how you got that and what you proposed to do with it? —
A. It was simply given to me by the Communists and I didn't do anything with
it really. It was just a part of this tremendous compilation of material
which
2452 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. Did you incorporate it in any report? — A. Some of the material may have
been referred to in a general way. I wrote one report, my Memorandum No. 17,
March 17, 1945, which is our Document No. 220 in these proceedings, entitled
"Verification of Communist Territorial Claims by Direct American Observation."
In that I made some reference in a general way to the areas under Communist
control which had been visited in one way or another by Americans.
Q. I pass you B-75, which is a photostat of two sheets of paper bearing
Chinese characters set up in the form of a table, and ask you what that is? —
A. These are rough statistics which were given me by one of the officials of the
government district in which Yenan was located. I had had a long interview
with him and the notes will be found, I think, also in this material that was in
my desk. These are statistics of the various government subdivisions of the
various counties which comprised the Yenan area.
Q. The source of this is from the National Government? — A. No, the source
is one of the Communist government officials for that area. The second chart
here is the population figures for the various counties.
Q. We will have a 5-minute recess at this point.
(Recess.)
Q. I now show you certain documents which were found in your apartment
by the FBI on June 6, 1945. I show you first Document B-78, which is a photo-
stat of a small book entitled "Our Task in 1945," containing Chinese characters.
The contents of the book appear to be a speech given by Mao Tse-tung before
the People's Congress on December 5, 1944. Will you explain that document? —
A. As I testified before, I had been assigned the duty of political intelligence,
concerning political reporting of the Chinese Communists, for a considerable
period and particularly during my stays at Yenan in the summer-fall of '44 and
again in the spring of '45 that was my full-time job. I therefore made every
effort, in connection with this work, to collect all of the materials concerning
the Chinese Communists that I could get. I had — and I think the material
that was found in my desk, for instance, will bear me out — probably the most
complete collection in existence at that time of translated and some untrans-
lated materials concerning the Chinese Communists, their own speeches, publica-
tions, party publications and so on. This belongs to the same category and is
a booklet which was put out by the Chinese Communists and is the text of a
speech given by the leader of the party before a meeting in Yenan in December
1944, which was simply part of the reference material concerning the Chinese
Communists which I had been collecting.
Q. I pass you B-79, which appears to be a photostat of a typed copy of a
State Department code and ask you to explain how that happened to be in your
possession. A. It is most definitely not a State Department code. There were,
as the Board will recall, four Foreign Service officers who were assigned to the
Army in the Far East, in the China-Burma-India theater. We were stationed
in widely separate places. Mr. Davies was in India most of the time, I was in
Chungking, another man was in Burma very much of the time, and another man
was in Yunnan. All mail had to pass over what was called the "hump" and
over what was at one time Japanese-occupied territory. So there was some
need for care in using names of people and places. There was some correspond-
ence between us. Mr. Davies, for instance, would write us through Army chan-
nels or would communicate with us by telegram, sometimes giving us instructions
or suggesting certain things that we should do, certain reports that we should
write, and Ibis was a list of pseudonyms for us to use in such correspondence.
Mr. Achiixes. This was purely for use in correspondence? It had no con-
nection with cryptography?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. And the results were given you by the Army for your personal retention? —
A. This had nothing to do with our official reports.
Q. I mean this was a copy you were supposed to have in your possession and
was furnished you by the Army? — A. It was a list of names which we simply
made out and arranged among ourselves mutually.
Q. So it was not given you by anybody, it was simply an arrangement which
you made? — A. That is right.
Mr. Achilles. May I see that a minute?
Q. Yes. I note that the document is not classified.
Mr. Achilles. Who does "Snow White" refer to?
A. "Snow White" was Madam Chiang Kai-shek. That was not a suitable name
to use. however, because that is the com-paon theater nickname, so we adopted a
second pseudonym rather than using the obvious one.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY I WKSI KiATION 2453
Mr. Achilles. Was there any particular significance in using "Harvard" as a
code for "Communist"?
A. None whatsoever. This is simply a list of names that John Da vies and Ray
Ludden and John Emmerson and I arranged between ourselves for use in cor-
respondence since that correspondence might conceivably fall into enemy hands
if a plane was lost over the hump.
Mr. Achilles. Or using "asylum" as the code word for Washington?
A. None wbatever, sir. It is sophomoric perhaps.
Q. 1 pass you Documenl No. B-80, which is a photostat of a card index of
Chinese personalities. What is this index?— A. When I arrived at Yenan we
were slatting out on ;i completely new field. There were a few of the leading
Communists whose names were known on the outside but there had been no
American contact with the main group of Communists in Yenan for many years
a u< I there had never been any systematic biographic information or reporting
done. As I moved around and got acquainted and learned about this man or
that man by reading a paper, by reading a Chinese Communist newspaper or
publication, or interviewing them I simply made up these little sheets of paper.
jotting down on each card under a man's name what pertinent information I
picked up on him. It was a biographic file on Chinese Communist personalities.
Most of the information I have here is simply the positions a man held as far
as I could find out. Sometimes I would put down other details, although they
are hard to come by, such as a date or background and so on. That date of
his birth, I mean.
Mr. Achilles. Did you and Mr. Larsen collaborate in any way either with
this card file or A. We did not. I have never seen Mr. Larsen's identity
rile — never heard of it before this case. As far as I know he has never seeii
my very rudimentary file which I had prepared for my own use.
Q. I pass you document B-81, which is a photostat of an address book of
yours. I notice a reference to Lattimore "Supper for Rose," the address of
Mark Gayn's 302 West Twelfth, the address of Corporal Hatem and of Phil
.Taffe. 2l'."> Fifth Avenue, another address of Lattimore at Roland View Road,
Ruxton. Baltimore; Eugene Vinogradoff. Commissariat of the Chinese Depart-
ment, Moscow : and Rose Yardumian, which appears to be a telephone number.
Would you explain those addresses? — A. The first item which you mentioned,
•Supper for Rose," is written apparently on what was an engagement pad, a
date hook, opposite the 3d of June. Now that date I was spending a weekend at
Mr. Lattimore's and the supper for Rose is incomprehensible because we all
had supper together at the Lattimores'. I wonder if there hasn't been a typing
mistake. I notice there are certain obvious typing mistakes on the copy.
Q. Wasn't this copy as it was in your possession? — A. No sir.
Q. This is copied from a notebook — A. This is copied from something written
by hand.
Q. This is not a photostat of the notebook? — A. No, it is a three-by-five pad.
These pages are simply copies of addresses, people whom I knew or might be
needing at some time, wishing at some time to get in touch with. They are all
arranged alphabetically, as is normal in an address book.
Q. I think they are all people with whom we are familiar except that one
from Moscow, if you will explain that. — A. The man Vinogradoff was a member
of the staff of the Russian Embassy in Chungking. He was called a press
attache for the Russian Embassy but was generally understood to be rather
important, a more important official than his title or status would indicate. I
got to know him quite well in Chungking. In fact, had success in becoming
acquainted with several of the Russian officials there who gave me information
from time to time that I reported. I see that a memorandum which I wrote
on February 16, 1945, which is our Document 20G in these proceedings, mentions
some conversations with Mr. Vinogradoff in which, for instance, he expresses a
diametrically opposite view on China and China policy from that which Ambas-
sador Hurley was almost at the same time getting from high Russian officials in
.Moscow. Mr. Vinogradoff, for instance, was telling me. "We will do nothing
to assist, support, or encourage the present Government in China." He was
talking to me with considerable frankness. When I left Chungking Mr. Vino-
gradoff insisted on giving me his address, his permanent address at the Commis-
sariat of Foreign Affairs, in the hope that at some future time we might resume
our acquaintance.
Mr. Achilles. Did you ever communicate with him afterward? — A. I never
communicated with him or heard from him. I never had any contact with him
of any sort. I may say. however, it was a useful contact while it existed in
Chungking for information and for views as to Russian Soviet attitudes.
2454 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Q. I now show you certain documents which were found in the apartment of
Mark Gayn by the FBI on June 6, 1945. The first of those is a photostat of a
typed carbon copy of a letter of transmittal of October 4, H>44, and of certain
enclosed reports prepared by John S. Service on Chinese Communist political
views, and ask if any of these papers came from your files or were in any way
communicated by yon to Mark Gayn.
Mr. Rhetts. Does this document have a number?
Q. I should have referred to its as Document No. B-82. — A. I notice that the
first page of this document indicates that it is a military report forwarded to,
I assume, the War Department by Joseph K. Dickey, colonel, GSC. I believe
that it will be found that this was identical with a document which was also
found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and concerning which I have already been ques-
tioned under the Document No. B-19 and also B-52. I think that the answers
which I gave on a previous occasion I will also repeat for this, that I did not
transmit this document either to Mr. Jaffe or Mr. GaiTn.
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that?
Q. Could you tell us what the source appears to be, Mr. Achilles?
Mr. Achilles. It appears to be a War Department document transmitted from
Chungking by Colonel Dickey. It appears to be a typed carbon copy. Do we have
Document B-l!) here? Is that an ozalid or a carbon?
Q. That was a typed copy — ozalid.
Mr. Moreland. Both B-19 and B-52 were typed copies.
Mr. Achilles. As I recall, this is a document of which you did not have any
copies, did you? — ■ A.I had no copies, I had never seen this document in this form
and, as I said, never had any copies.
Q. I show you B-83, which appears to be a photostat of typed copies of nine
documents, beginning September S, 1944, and various other dates in 1944. I
will ask you if any of these appear to be copies of your reports? If they are,
whether or not you were instrumental in those copies getting to Mr. Mark Gayn. —
A. It appears to be a very heterogeneous collection of all sorts of material, in-
cluding what seems to be typewritten copies of comment by the Division of
Chinese Affairs concerning despatches forwarded from Chungking. It con-
tains also what would appear to be excerpts or perhaps the full text of copies
of Embassy despatches and in a few cases what seem to be copies of reports,
memoranda, which I wrote. However, none of these are exact copies, none of
them are in the form in which I originally prepared them. Also, it contains
various other material which I had no connection with whatsoever. There is,
for instance, a memorandum of a conversation between our Ambassador in
China and Chiang Kai-shek. There is a copy of a despatch from Kweilin. There
are notes concerning smuggling in the Chinese province of Fukien. There seems
to be a copy of an inter-OWI message and there seems to be a copy of a report
by Mr. Caldwell who was employed at the OWI. Finally, there is what seems to
be a photostat of an original despatch —
Mr. Achilles. May I examine that?
A. Attached to the original commenting memorandum prepared by the Division
of Chinese Affairs.
Mr. Achilles. What is it that indicates that that is a photostat of an original
despatch?
A. It has the file numbers on it, all the stamps, distribution stamps,
and distribution symbols come out very clearly. Many of these stamps, for in-
stance, would not have appeared on duplicate copies. They appear only on the
original or ozalid copies.
Mr. Achilles. Have you any idea how that original despatch got in Mr.
Gayn's possession?
A. I have no idea whatsoever, none whatsoever,
from State Department files? — A. No, sir; I was not. To answer your original
question, sir, I would say that — well, there is nothing here which I gave Mr. Gayn.
Q. Did you give Mr. Gayn anything? — A. No, sir; I do not believe I ever
showed liini any document.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. For the record, the Chairman notes that in the cover sheet of the FBI
attached to this document ii appears that the original of the item 2944 was
located in the State Department. It appears that it was received on 9-22-44 and
routed to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on the same day. This information
and other information which appears following that indicates that the photo-
stat which was found in the file is actually a photostat of the original docu-
ment found in the State Department files and loaned to the FBI by the State
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2455
Department for identification purposes merely. — A. To return to your original
question, sir, this material is apparently copies of State Department memo-
randa, Embassy and consulate despatches, and certain OWI papers. 1 never had
any of these papers in my possession, as far as I know, had never seen them.
Q. Excepting, of course, the reports which are prepared. — A. Yes, hut those
are enclosures to despatches. I did not give them to Mr. Gayn.
Q. I pass you now document B-84, which appears to be a photostat of a typed
original copy of a Service report dated September 2(*>, 1944. I asked you if you
have made that available to Mr. Gayn? — A. This is the same type of paper, sir.
It is a copy, a typewritten copy, of a Department of State — rather a Division
of Chinese Affairs memorandum and of an Embassy despatch which, in turn,
transmitted a report which I originally wrote. Actually this is identical with a
part of the papers which we just examined under the previous number, Docu-
ment No. B-83. It is a paper of which I never had a copy in my possession
and did not give it to Mr. Gayn. This is a copy — appears to be a copy of Chung-
king Embassy Despatch No. 2944, dated September 8, with a covering memo-
randum by the Division of Chinese Affairs, dated September 26, 1944.
Q. Is that by any chance identical with anything we have introduced? — A. It
is identical with the first part of the papers which were included under the last
document number.
Q. I mean at previous hearings. — A. Yes sir, it is apparently identical with
document B-21, which was one of the papers found, I understand, in Mr. Jaffe's
possession.
Q. I show you now B-85, which is a photostat of a typed original despatch
enclosing a Service report and ask if you will give us the same sort of information
about that paper? — A. I should have said in regard to the last document, B-84,
that it is identical with a part of document B-21, which was previously intro-
duced in these proceedings and which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.
This document B-85 appears to be identical with a portion of document B-22.
The material is apparently taken from the reports which I wrote. However, it
is not in the form in which I prepared my reports and I did not give these to
Mr. Gayn. I did not give them to Mr. Gayn in this or any other form.
Q. I pass you B-86, which appears to be a photostat of a typed original and
two pages of handwritten material. The typed material contains extracts, ap-
parently, of a Service report and I will ask if you will explain that document? —
A. This appears to be notes or excerpts from various sources. The first part, for
instance, is stated here to be from a report to the Secretary of State from the
Embassy in Chungking. The next part is obviously an excerpt from a translation
of a newspaper report which I transmitted at one time.
Q. Transmitted to whom? — A. I transmitted it in one of my memoranda which
I prepared.
Q. You mean transmitted to whom? — A. To the Army or the Embassy.
Q. Not to Gayn? — A. No, sir. I do not recognize the material and in any event
I did not give this to Mr. Gayn.
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting in the handwritten material? — A. No, I
do not.
Q. Was Mr. Gayn, to your knowledge, in 1945, engaged in any writing or
anything of that sort which would have necessitated this information' that you
have just seen in these last few documents? — A. Well, he does do magazine writing,
free-lance writing on the Far East, on China, and Japan. The material in this
particular paper seems to be mainly excerpts from speeches or statements by
Communist leaders giving Communist views on events in China. It is the type
of material which I assume a newspaper and magazine writer would be interested
in.
Q. As far as your knowledge is concerned at the time in 1945 when you sp.mt
a couple nights in Gayn's apartment did you know he was doing anything that
would require information of this sort? Did you then know it? — A. I knew then
he was a magazine writer specializing in the Far East.
Q. I mean the specific project. Did you know of any specific projects he was
e i ^aged on? — A. Well, he was engaged in writing an article on the morale effects
of the American bombing of Japan. That was published in Collier's about the
middle of June. He was assembling material for a projected series of articles on
< liina and Stilwell. I can't relate this particular material to any particular article
that I remember.
.Mr. Stevens. He did not show you any such material that he had in his
possession during the time that you stayed with him?
A. He d'd not. I had no idea that he had copies of Embassy or other classified
material. Embassy despatches and other classified material.
2456 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr. Achilles. Did Gayn ever ask you for any copies of your reports or other
material?
A. No, sir ; not that I recollect.
Q. No further questions on this. Can we now adjourn?
Mr. Achilles. There is one other matter I would like to ask a question or two
on. Have you ever known anyone by the name of Grace Granich?
A. I can't recall ever having known anyone by the name of Granich.
Mr. Achilles. Or Max Granich?
A. As I testified before, I had to inquire who that man was when I saw his
name mentioned in that article by Kamp.
Mr. Achilles. You had never heard that doctor in Yenan, Mahatem, speak
of a Mr. or Mrs. Granich?
A. No, Dr. Mahatem — well, he had an obsession, a reticence about his back-
ground and people he had known and how he got to China and so on. I don't
remember his ever discussing the Graniches.
Mr. Achilles. Did you ever bring or send any messages from him to Mr. or
Mrs. Granich?
A. I don't recall bringing any messages except for his own immediate family.
Q. No further questions. We will adjourn until further call of the chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. I note that in my introduction of items found in Mr. Service's office I did
not refer to B-76, which is a photostat of a typed original — I don't know whether
it is a Service report or not. Perhaps you can tell me. — A. I refer to document
B-60, which was discussed earlier and which was a piece of paper with some
handwritten notes. During this period of April and May 1945, soon after my
return from China, it was suggested to me by the Chief of the Division of Chinese
Affairs that it might be useful if I would prepare a rather comprehensive mem-
orandum concerning the situation in China and my opinions regarding policy
in that country, the policy we should adopt toward that country. In the ma-
terial that was found in my desk I think you will note that there are quite a
few fragmentary memoranda, fragmentary notes. They all deal with this
memorandum which I was in the process of writing in my spare time and which
I never actually did complete. However, this document B-76 is the most com-
plete draft which I finally ended up with. It is still only a partial text of the
memorandum that I had projected, but it may be of interest to the Board mem-
bers as reflecting my opinions as of May 1945.
Q. I also failed to refer to B-77, which is a photostat of a carbon copy of
Report No. 85, June 26, 1944, written by Mr. Service, and other papers. Per-
haps you will comment on that. — A. This is a translation of a book by Generalis-
simo "Chiang Kai-shek called "Chinese Economic Theory." This was a hook
which I think was written in 1944 and was used as a textbook in the party schools
in China. It was the Kuomintang Party schools in China. It is interesting as
i-eflecting the official economic thinking of Chiang Kai-shek and of at least an
important part of the Kuomintang Party. I had been instrumental in obtaining
a copy of the Chinese book and assisted in translating it. There was no official
Chinese translation into English. Attached to the translation is a summary of
the book .and a memorandum of comment on the probable actual authorship not
by Chiang Kai-shek himself, but by two ghost writers, and some comment on
the type of economic thinking represented.
Q. Was that prepared by you? — A. I worked on the translation and also pro-
vided some of the material and assisted in drafting the memorandum of com-
ment on the book. However, the major part of the comment and the summary
was done by Mr. Adler, who was the United States Treasury attache in China
with whom I was living at the time. The two of us collaborated, really, on tins
project which was an independent and voluntary one.
Q. Anything further?
Mr. Rhetts. No.
Q. May we adjourn until the call of the chairman.
(The Board adjourned at 12 : 25 p. m.)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John Stewakt Service
Date : Saturday. June 24, 1950, 10 : 20 a. m. to 12 : 50 p. m.
Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.
Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S, reporting.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2457
Members of Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur
G. Stevens ; Allen 15. Moreland. Legal officer.
Counsel for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts &
Ruckelshaus.
(The Hoard reconvened at 10: 20 a. m.)
The Chairman (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session.
(Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and
sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testilied further as follows:)
Questions by Chairman :
Q. Mr. Service, the Board, as you have been informed, has evidence before it
that you did make on May 8, 1945, certain statements to Mr. Jaffe at a meeting
which you had on that date and the Board would like to ask you a few questions
on that. We have not been able to secure a transcript of the exact statements
which you are supposed to have made, but in the course of the questions the
Board will give you its best knowledge of what these statements consisted of.
It is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that a plan had been made by General
Wedemeyer's staff after they got orders to make recommendations as to what
wo should do if the United States made a landing in territory held by the
Chinese Communists. Do you recall making such a statement? — A. Can you
tell me something more about the context'.'
Q. No. Apparently the discussion may have had something to do with mili-
tary planning of the United States so far as China was concerned. And the
first statement that I call your attention to is a statement that a plan had been
made, simply that a plan had been made by General Wedemeyer's staff. Per-
haps I can add the next question for what value it may have. — A. Please.
Q. It is stated that Mr. Jaffe questioned you as to whether or not this plan
indicated that we would cooperate with the Chinese Communists in that even-
tuality. And your answer was that this was the plan. — A. I certainly remember
that the whole subject was under consideration and study.
(}. You mean in Wedemeyer's headquarters? — A. Yes: in Chungking. And I
have a hazy recollection of one of the staff officers talking to me about the
subject. I assume that he was one of the officers working on a memorandum
or a plan. I do not remember that I ever saw the plan or saw a finished plan
or knew what the final decision was. I think that — I'm sure that the general
thinking in Chungking, as I believe in Washington and certainly my own think-
ing at the time was that the only plan, the only practical thing was that we
would cooperate with whatever forces we found organized and able to assist us.
I don't remember that any plan was ever couched in the terms of cooperating
with the Communists.
Q. N.>w. were you aware that some sort of a plan had been discussed in Gen-
eral Wedemeyer's headquarters? — A. I was aware that the subject had been
discussed.
Q. Was the fact that such a plan had been discussed in any way secret? —
A. I would not say it was because it was a subject that everybody had to be think-
ing about in those days.
*}. In other words A. I do not remember in terms of concrete or specific
plans. I remember in terms of discussion.
Q. If. then, you had told Mr. Jaffe that a plan had been discussed or had
been made up in General Wedemeyer's headquarters there was nothing, as I
understand your testimony, about such a fact that would have been secret? —
A. No, sir. I have no positive recollection. I have no positive recollection, sir,
of having made such a statement. But certainly the fact that the subject was
being discussed was something: that everybody could take for granted. Every-
body knew we bad to be considering that problem.
Q. Will you state whether or not the mere fact that we would probably co-
operate with whatever forces we found when we landed was a secret? — A. Well,
I don't believe that anyone knew the answer to that. Certainly I did not know
definitely what the answer was at that time.
Q. You mean, by the answer, what the actual plan was, what the actual deci-
sion was? — A. It would be a decision that would have to be made here in Wash-
imrton at the very highest level. The theater might have recommended one
course but it was a decision that would have been made here in Washington
at the top level.
Q. I'm trying to find out whether or not you had ever been instructed that the
recommendation of General Wedemeyer's staff was secret, that we should coop-
erate with whatever forces we found, or whether it as anything that you shouldn't
2458 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
have divulged? — A. That is one of the reasons why I think it is important for us
to know the full context of the thing, of the beginning of the conversation.
Q. Unfortunately we haven't that context.— A. I would say that I might well
have said — and again I'm not speaking from actual memory — that the thinking
of the headquarters in Chungking, as far as I know from the people I had been
working with, was that we should cooperate with whatever forces we found. That
also was my thinking, as expressed in several papers I wrote, in my memorandum,
and in Document 204, and I think in an earlier one. If I had made the positive
statement that that was the final decision I was indiscreet. But I did not know
what the final American Government decision was on that question.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. Can you recall ever having reviewed any such plan, or did you hear it dis-
cussed? Were you in a position in Chungking to be taken into counsel for a
review of military plans? — A. No, sir, I was not. My recollection is — and as I
say it is a very hazy one — that an officer in the headquarters who was assigned
to write a memorandum or a recommendation had talked to me at one time about
the matter while he was drafting it, while he was preparing it. That was in
much the same way as Mr. Gearey came and talked to me here in the Depart-
ment when he was assigned to draft a paper on what our policy should be in
Manchuria if we landed there. That was a subsequent date in May. I never
saw the final paper that Mr. Fearey drew up. To answer your question, I did
not see the war plans or final papers of the headquarters in Chungking.
Q. Can you recall whether — if you did have such a discussion with Mr. Jaffe —
it would have been with regard to general plans and thinking or whether it
would have been with respect to some specific plan that you may have had more
clearly in mind? — A. No. sir; I'm sorry I do not. The reason I was mentioning
the necessity of knowing the full background of the conversation is there was a
feeling among some groups in the United States that we were already by this
time thorough committed to support only the Kuomintang. American policy
had not committed itself, and I on certain occasions tried to explain to people
that we bad not, as that section of the press thought, committed ourselves en-
tirely to support one group. For instance, President Roosevelt, a few days be-
fore his death, had told a well-known writer something to this effect. The
President had been asked by this writer whether or not it was true that we had
committed ourselves completely to support the Kuomintang and President Roose-
velt replied— and I have heard this from the writer himself — -No; I'm dealing
now with both parties in China and I expect to go on dealing with both sides."
If Jaffe started an argument or a line of discussion along the line that we were
completely committed to military support of the Kuomintong, I might possibly
in the discussion have said, "Well, I don't think that is true at all. We are not
so committed. We are keeping ourselves in a more neutral position. We are
trying to win the war and I happen to know that the thinking in headquarters
in Chungking is that if and when we do land" — those were facts I know some-
thing about; I didn't know when we were going to land or where or whether we
would — "we will have to cooperate with whatever organized forces we find on the
spot."
Q. Your remarks just made rest on an analysis made 5 years after the fact,
or are they as yon recollect? — A. No, sir, I'm simply trying to reconstruct what
might have been the background. That is why I was saying if we knew the
whole conversation in exact detail we might be able to understand certain
isolated statements such as this.
Questions by the Chairman:
Q. Now. it is stated that the conversation went on as follows: That you told
Mr. .la lie that you had seen the plans which had been drawn up and that the
plans provided that when we were in Nationalist territory we would go on
cooperating with the Chinese Nationalists but that if the United States troops
landed in Chinese Communist territory without any question the Communists
would he the dominant force. Those are the exact words "the dominant force,"
whatever that may have meant. Does that in any way refresh your recollection
as to any actual conversation? I know that it is Very nearly in the words
that you have put, as to your reconstruction of what might have occurred. —
A. It doesn't refresh my memory of any actual conversations or statements of
that. In tact even that. I think, is only a partial resume' of what was probably
said. It would be quite obvious that if we landed in Communist territory
the Communists would he the dominant force. 1 may have been expending on
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2459
the general idea of the thinking of headquarters that if we Landed in Commu-
nist territory it would be the dominant force, therefore, we would be forced Cor
practical reasons to recognize and work with them for military purposes. '5. it
I don't remember seeing any particular plan setting that .out. I may ha\e been
explaining the rational behind the thinking of headquarters.
Q. To complete the subject, it is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that the
Chungking government had been putting pressure on trying to get the United
States to agree to take in Kuomintang officials whenever the United States troops
landed in China during the war but. as tar as you knew, such assurance had
not been given to the Nationalist Government.— A. Yes. Well, I do not think,
sir. that was any secret because the Kuomintang government itself made no
secret of its desire to have its officials go in with our forces whenever we landed
or wherever we went. And I simply state that "we have not made any decision
on that question, as far as I knew.*'
Q. Now, if you made the statements which I have outlined to you mi the
subject, can you tell me whether or not such information was common knowl-
edge among the newspapermen in China at that time? — A. Yes; I would say
the fact that the Kuomintang wanted us to take in its officials ana assist it .'n
sirring up its government was a commonly known fact, it was referred to and
stated by Chinese officials themsehes that they expected to reassert their author-
ity as we captured Chinese territory.
Q. Now. it is also said that in the course of tins discussion you cautioned Mr.
Jaffe that what you said about the military plans was very secret. Can you
recall saying that, or what it could have applied to? What there was about
such a discussion that was very secret? — A. No. sir; I can't remember. I would
question very much whether I used the word "plan" but I certainly would have
been — I was hypersensitive, very sensitive. I wouldn't say hypersensitive, but
1 was very sensitive about talking about things that were outside of my own
strict province. If I said to him that the thinking of headquarters at present,
or as far as I know, is that we should cooperate with whatever forces are on
the spot, I was, as I said a little while ago, indiscreet and it would be inappro-
priate for Mr. Jaffe to print or for me to allow him to print that information
which I had given him for background new\s. And I would certainly have
cautioned him against using in his publication such a statement by me that
the thinking of the Chungking headquarters was that we should cooperate with
whatever forces are on the ground. That information should come from some
source other than me.
Q. And that would be the meaning of saying that the information was secret?
In other words, it was given in secrecy? — A. Yes. In confidence, yes.
Q. I understand from your testimony today and previously that you were
not in possession of any document classified as secret which contained this in-
formation?— A. That is correct, I was not in possession of any such documents.
Q. Nor had you seen such a document? — A. As far as I can remember, sir,
I had not seen any. I may have, in this discussion which I have a vague
recollection of having with the staff officer in Chungking, seen the draft on which
he was working or something of that sort.
Q. But that was before it had received its classification? — A. That is correct, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. In your capacity as political adviser on General Wedemeyer's staff, to w7hat
extent was your advice sought in connection with military planning, on the
political aspect of the military planning? — A. I would like to object, Mr. AchiHes,
to the words "political adviser" because I never had that title officially. That
is a title that has grown up. I was a Foreign Service officer attached to General
Wedenieyer's staff. I can't recall any occasion, sir, that my advice was sought
in that connection.
Q. Wasn't that your function, though, to serve as political adviser? — A. Well,
no; because I cannot remember any occasion on which my advice wras sought
in connection with military planning. In fact there were very few occasions
when my advice specifically was sought. I was used quite often— particularly
under General Stilwell, of course I was working for General W demeyer for
a very short period, only a few weeks. I was actually in Chungking with
General Wedemeyer only for a few weeks. I was quite often used as what
you might call a consultant to agencies such as OSS which might have certain
projects in mind, certain plans for intelligence collection, and they might talk
to me about the problems they mig't meet, the feasibility of what they were
doing, what would be the probable relations between this war area commander
68970— 50— pt. 2 02
2460 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
and the Chungking Chinese military headquarters, whether or not they would
he able to work independently as they hoped to be able to do in such-and-such
an area without too rigid control by the Central Chinese Secret Police Organi-
zation and things like that. But on military planning in a real sense 1 was
never a participant.
Q. Your advice was not specifically sought on the political aspects of certain
military plans V— A. No, sir. I was used by General Wedemeyer for the drafting
of some correspondence and a few telegrams on semipolitical matters. We had
some problems in relation to the various French organizations that were trying
to work in Indochina. There was a Free French organization and there was
a French group in Indochina that claimed to be opposing the Japanese and
it was a question of American policy toward Indochina. I functioned on some
of those matters as a political adviser, the liaison between headquarters and
the Embassy.
I acted as an adviser on several occasions for General Stilwell but they were
matters on which my specialized knowledge of Clijna was useful. For instance,
if yon have read the memoranda which we have accumulated you will notice
a series of them concerning problems connected with the building of very large
air bases in the Chengtu. I was sent up there by General Stilwell's headquarters
because there were some riots, there was a good deal of anti-American feeling,
there were a lot of problems concerned witli the sudden influx of several thou-
sands. I remember over 10,000 Americans, and I was sent up there as political
officer to look over the situation and recommend what they might do.
The headquarters was also asked, for instance, by the Chinese to send mili-
tary observers to the Sinkiang Province because of a rumored border incident
between Sinkiang and Mongolia. And there is also a series of memoranda
which I wrote on that recommending that we do not send American military
observers, to avoid getting ourselves embroiled in that incident.
But the occasions on which I was adviser were very, very few and they were
these sort of things where I had particular specialized knowledge. I was never
a party to, nor ever a consultant, or never asked to advise on, strictly military
plans.
Q. You did not participate in any way in the drafting of military plans?—
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you consulted on the political aspects of this particular problem ; viz,
as to whom we should cooperate with when we landed, or whether we should take
in Kuomintang officials with our forces wherever we landed? — A. I do not re-
member that we — either I or the other Foreign Service officers — were specifically
consulted. As I think I have testified before, Mr. Ludden and I were in Chung-
king in February 1945 and we ourselves felt that there was danger in our be-
coming too limited in our choice of action; that our hands were being tied;
and we went on our own initiative to General Wedemeyer and talked to him
about the situation. And he said in general that he agreed with us and that he
would like to have us list some of the factors involved. Mr. Ludden and I then
drew up on one page here [indicating] the reasons why we thought the Ameri-
can military commander in the theater required freedom of action. We classi-
fied those reasons in a second group and these are
Q. Pardon me, is that document 204 V— A. No, 203. The second category ot
reasons is "to plan to supply and cooperate with whatever Chinese forces we met,
wherever and whenever we land on the mainland." Now, this was, as I say, a
list of the reasons which we submitted after discusison with General Wede-
mever. which we did on our own initiative.
Q. To what extent were the plans, say for landings in China, the responsi-
bility of headquarters in Chungking?— A. I have no knowledge, sir. I'm sorry,
I don't know. I have never known definitely whether we planned to land, where
or when. And I don't know whether the decision was one for Chungking
or one for Washington. 1 assume that it would be one for Washington. Cer-
tainly the landing would have to come from the Pacific and. therefore, it would
involve the Pacific theaters. It would not, I should imagine, be one for Chung-
king headquarters to make alone. It would involve in a way a union or a fusion
of General MacArthur's theater with the China theater, I suppose. I don't
know. „ , ,. . _. .
Q You personally bad knowledge that the question of landings in China was
under active consideration. I think that was general knowledge: was it not?—
A It was general assumption through public statements which had been made
by numerous people. That is, basic assumption of the whole war period and
of our presence in China.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2461
Q. You also had personal knowledge that the Kuomintang was recommending
that we take in their officials wherever we landed. That was also general
knowledge? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You just stated that you and Mr. Lndden had made these recommenda-
tions thai we should cooperate with whatever forces there were. — A. That is
correct.
Q. Have yon any further personal knowledge? — A. I said that we should be
free to cooperate.
Q. Had you any further personal knowledge as to the nature of the plans
which were being prepared in this respect? — A. I do not recall that I had any
specific knowledge; no, sir. Well, I have referred already to a vague recollection
of discussion with one or more staff officers.
Q. Do you recall any more specific information concerning the plans which
he may have conveyed to you? — A. No, sir.
Q. Whatever you may have told Jaffe on this subject was along the lines of
what you have just discussed? — A. I believe so. sir, but I have no definite specific
knowledge or recollection of the conversation.
Q. To the best of your recollection you had no further specific knowledge as
to the nature of these military plans? — A. That is the best of my recollection,
sir.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. On this problem of political adviser. I take it from your previous testi-
mony that you would probably classify yourself as a political observer and re-
porter with such advice as was sought, or such advice as you sought to give, or
very largely along those lines. If I recall your earlier testimony correctly, no
more than one or two of the reports that you wrote were specifically requested
of you by anyone; is that right? — A. That is correct. I would say there are two
or three short series of reports on specific local problems — that is what you
would call them.
Q. I have in mind such documents as your memorandum No. 40 aud the one
that you and Mr. Ludden prepared. Now. I take it that your memorandum
No. 4(1 was not one that was sought. — A. Absolutely not, sir; it was completely
voluntary, as most of my reporting was. and an expression of my own personal
views of a particular aspect of the situation.
Q. And the principal one that you could say was — at least where you were
asked to put your remarks on paper — was the memorandum referred to in your
numbering system as 203? — A. Yres, and 204. General Wedemeyer suggested
that we put our views in more complete form.
Q. Did you have any knowledge after those two documents were prepared
for General Wedemeyer whether he agreed with them or did not agree with
them or what use he intended to make of them? — A. No, sir; although in con-
versations with us he gave me the impression that, as military commander,
he in general agreed with our belief that his bands should not lie tied and that
for the sake of the prosecution of the war he should be free to use whatever
forces or take whatever actions he thought necessary for a more effective attack
on Japan.
Q. But the details of your reports, you have no idea whether he specifically
concurred with your statements and your summary of the situation? — A. No, sir;
I did not. May I bring in another example of the sort of thing that I did from
time to time. It's as what you might call a political adviser. Our document
No. 154 which is dispatch No. 2636, dated May 31, 1944, from the Embassy.
Chungking, to the Department of State.
Q. Mr. Service, what is the subject? — A. The subject is Complaint of French
Delegation Against American Intelligence Services in Connection With Alleged
Agreement Between the Chines,, and Indochinese [Vichy French] Authorities,
that has some enclosures of various correspondence between the Army head-
quarters and the Embassy, between the Embassy and the Free French repre-
sentative in Chungking, and a memorandum of a conversation between Colonel
1 »ickey. who was G-2 of the headquarters, and Mr. Chirac, who was the counselor
of the French delegation.
Now. I was instructed to accompany Colonel Dickey during that meeting and
to advise him in his conversations with the French representatives, I being
familiar with the American policy and having consulted with the Embassy, and so
on. I assisted from time to time in that way as an adviser but there are various
other ways, also, minor ways, in which as a diplomatic officer or as one who
had intimate background and knowledge of China. I was an adviser on particular
local problems. But I was never an adviser on high-level military planning.
2462 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Now, Mr. Service, I want to turn to another occasion. This has reference
to a meeting between you and Mr. Jaffe on May 29, 1945. On this occasion it is
stated that Mr. Jaffe informed you that Kate Mitchell was writing a book for
Which the publisher had suggested the title "China Without Confucius." It
is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that you yourself had written a report on the
setting up of the Confucian Society in China and that you asked Mr. Jaffe if he
had ever seen this report of yours. Do you remember such a conversation, Mr.
Service? — A. I remember such a conversation ; yes, sir.
Q. What report would that be? Is that one of your reports that we have
before this board? — A. No, sir; because it would have been a report, I assume,
written while I was in the Embassy attached directly to the Embassy. It would
have been a dispatch for the Ambassador's signature, of which — of course, as I
have testified before — I never retained any copies. I believe that that Confucian
Society was established in 1941 or early 1942. And we made no effort to have
the State Department assemble all of those early dispatches which I drafted
for the Ambassador's signature while I was in the Embassy.
Q. Why would you have assumed that Jaffe would have seen such a report?—
A. Perhaps I didn't hear your question.
Q. I said that, at the end of my question, you asked Mr. Jaffe if he ever saw
your report on the matter. — A. I'm sorry ; I didn't hear that.
Q. Why would you have asked him that question if, as a matter of fact, the
report was one which you yourself had never seen which was made by the
Ambassador? — A. Well, of course I had seen it since I drafted it. but I don't
remember asking Mr. Jaffe whether or not he had seen it. I don't under-
stand that statement.
Q. Did you have any basis for assuming that Jaffe had seen any of your reports
previous to the time of your meeting? — A. Yes, I had some basis to believe
that some types of material were being made available ; the information in some
types of reports were being made available to writers here. I mentioned earlier
the fact that it seemed to me that Mr. Gayn had certainly had a chance to read
my memorandum of June 20, since there was similarity between his article in
Collier's and some of the things that had been said in that report.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Service, did you at that time have any knowledge of the
fact that Mr. Jaffe bad in his possession United States Government documents?
A. No, sir; I did not. I'ni not sure whether I made myself clear. My feeling,
my assumption, was that a good deal of background information was being made
known to writers generally. I had no reason to assume or believe that Jaffe had
any copies of any documents.
Q. Or any more information than was being made generally available to other
writers? — A. That is correct; yes. A great deal of the writing on China by
magazine writers and other people in the United States had to be and was
obviously based on information which they could not obtain directly since they
were not in China, which I assume was made available to them in one form or
another as was the policy at that time.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q Hadn't Jaffe told you on at least one occasion that he had obtained a copy
of one of your reports and given it to Gayn? — A. I can't recall any such state-
ment at the moment. ( 'an you give me more information on it, sir?
Q. I believe it was the report which had been prepared in connection with
Mi-. Wallace's visit to China and Mr. Jaffe is stated to have told you that the re-
port had been passed around at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference ami
that he had obtained a copy of it and had given it to Gayn. Do you recall him
ever telling you that? — A. I think that may be true. I do have a hazy recollection
now of my surprise that this thing had beei passed around and I think you're
right, sir, that I did hear that it had been passed around at the IPR Conference
which I think was held down at White Sulphur Springs, or some place like that.
I'm not sure, but I had forgotten nil about that, but I think I did hear that this
report had been passed around.
The Chairman. To go on with this statement, it is stated that Mr. Jaffe told
you that he had not seen the report and that you told him that, because of your
Work in writing that report on the < Jonfucian Society, you had gotten an excellent
rating from the State Departmenl and that, as a matter of fact, in that work
you had made a collection of about .".00 slogans used by the society and that you
told Mr. Jaffe you would try to dig up the report for him?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2463
A. I think there is a very great condensation and telescoping here. This con-
cerns two entirely separate reports. The report on the Confucian Society, as I
recall it — and as I say I haven't seen it since it was dratted hack in l'.Ml or early
W4'2 — was quite a routine report from public sources. The Confucian Society was
inaugurated with great publicity and the patrons were H. H. Kung, who was a
lineal descendant of Confucius, and Chen Li-Fu, Minister of Education, and a
number of other important figures in the Government. And, as I remember, I
simply transmitted the published accounts and some of the published material
about the objectives and purposes of the organization and made some brief
comment.
Q. Was that a classified dispatch?— A. I don't recall.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. You said you didn't see the dispatch?— A. No; I drafted the dispatch, sir,
hut I had no copy of it.
Q. Would you have known whether or not it was classified? — A. Yes. In 11)41
and 1942 I was an officer in the Embassy, and was simply drafting it as the
political reporting officer. I would have to look up the matter, whether we wrote
one unclassified dispatch simply sending in the public material and then wrote
another dispatch commenting on it or whether we simply wrote one dispatch
with both public information and comment. In any case, as I remember the
comment very vaguely, it would not he very highly classified.
Mr. Stevens. This was in 1941 or 1942?
A. Yes ; I think so. Now, the other report, which is apparently referred to
here, was a dispatch which I wrote from Lanchow when I was an Embassy ob-
server up there in the summer of 1943. It would be probably June or July
1943. That is a dispatch which, as I say, consisted really of a compilation of
these propaganda slogans with some comment on them. The dispatch which I
wrote earlier on the Confucian Society was not one I received any commendation
on. The one I received the commendation on was the one on wall slogans.
This may be an unintelligible phrase.
Newspapers are scarce in China. Movies, radio, other media of propaganda
don't reach very many people so that one very common propaganda media is to
paint these very large slogans, these large characters, on walls of a building or
tlie wall along a street, or particularly facing a Chinese gateway there is always
a wall. The superstition is that evil spirits can only go in a straight line so
that opposite any important entrance there is a sort of spirit screen, so that you
have to go around the wall to go into the gate and these walls or screens are fa-
vorite places for painting a four-character slogan.
I had in my travels all through North China in 1942 and again in 1943 made
a practice of* jotting down these various slogans, of noting the relative fre-
quency of different slogans, or noting as far as I could the date on which they
were painted, because usually down below them there would be in small writing
the name of the organization which put it up and the date. So that I was able
to trace, I think with some accuracy, the trend of the propaganda line and to
note the various organizations which were active in painting the slogans and to
some extent the different lines adopted by the different propaganda organiza-
tions. As I say, this was a report which I sent in from Lanchow, which was
transmitted to the Department by the Embassy and on which I received the
rating of excellent. But it is an entirely different one from the one that this
material starts talking about.
Questions by the Chairman :
Q. Was it a classified report? — A. I do not remember, sir. It may have been
classified "confidential" or "restricted" because of my comments on the propa-
ganda lines indicated there.
Q. It is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that it might be sort of hard for you to get
this report because it was kept in a section where you were not assigned and
where you did not work and that Mr. Jaffe asked you, if you were successful in
obtaining the material, to mail it to him in New York or whether you would rather
wait until he came to Washington in 2 or 3 weeks and you told Mr. Jaffe, if you
could dig up a copy of it, it would he the Far Eastern Division copy and they
might not he willing to part with it. But you were sure you would he able to
run off a copy for him?— A. I must say that that is very different from my recol-
lection of the conversation. I rememher the conversation because I was quite
annoyed at Mr. Jaffe and I went into considerable detail to explain to him first
why I did not have any copy of my own, any personal copies of these dispatches.
2464 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
He thought that I would of course have a personal copy. And I explained in con-
siderable detail, as I recall, the difference between an Embassy dispatch which
was signed by the Ambassador and the type of memoranda which I had had in
my possession, as he knew and which I had allowed him to see some of. I also
went into considerable detail why I could not turn them over to him, why I
could not remove these from the files and turn them over to him.
My recollection is that I said that I would try to look the dispatch up if I
could find it. I pointed out, as I remember it, that that might be difficult because
the files in the China Division were quite chaotic and this was a very old dis-
patch. My recollection is that I told him I would try to look it up and give
him the dates of the events, the establishment of the Confucian Society, so that
he would have some guide in searching through published materials. It's quite
possible that I may also have said that if I found that it was not classified and
the Division of Chinese Affairs was willing that it might have been possible for
him to see it. But I don't recollect saying that at all.
My chief recollection of the conversation is that my explanation — I remember a
rather lengthy explanation as to the difference in character between the Embassy
dispatch and the papers I had shown him and the reason why I could not give
him copies of the Embassy dispatches. I certainly have no recollection of ever
offering to run off a copy for him. I may have said I would copy some of these
wall slogans. I told him some wall slogans from memory. I may have said that i
would try to copy off some of the more common wall slogans.
Q. Your recollection is in part confirmed by the final statement on this subject
that Mr. Jaffe said that it was funny that you did not keep a copy of the
report since you had written it and that you said that it was against regula-
tions to keep copies of your reports. — A. I remember considerable discussion
and quite a bit of annoyance on my part. This was the first time I think that
he ever asked me to obtain copies for him of dispatches.
Q. Now to turn to another subject on the discussion on the same occasion it
is stated that you and Mr. Jaffe talked about the "lowdown" on the Hurley
story and that Mr. Jaffe told you that Ambassador Gauss told Randall Gould
that Gauss resigned because Hurley broke his pledge to Britain by "monkeying"
with politics in China.
Mr. Rhetts. W'll you read that again, please?
Q. This is a statement that Jaffe is alleged to have told Mr. Service, that
Ambassador Gar^s had told one Randall Gould that Mr. Gauss had resigned
because Mr. Hurley broke his pledge to Britain by "monkeying" around with
politics in China and that Mr. Gauss and Mr. Gould never got along well and
discussed the possibility of Mr. Gauss giving Mr. Gould some wrong "dope"
and that General Stilwell was down in the Pacific and Mr. Jaffe asked you if
this were true or whether you could verify the information.
Now I give you all that as background for the statement that you're alleged
to have made, which was that it was heard confidentially but "you weren't
supposed to talk about it." Thereupon. Mr. Jaffe stated that Gauss had told
this fact to an OSS man and that the OSS man had told it to Gayn. Whereupon
it is alleged that you told Mr. Jaffe that, so far as you knew, the whereabouts
of General Stilwell was very confidential. Mr. Jaffe is alleged then to have
stated that whether or not General Stilwell was in the Paci*ic would be known
shortly, would be known on Saturday night, because he was due to speak at
some gathering and later to have a meeting with General MacArthur. It is
then alleged that you said, "That is how top secrets get out."
Now will you explain what you said on that occasion? Can you recollect
any such discussion and can you state what you said?
To review the several statements in the course of this conversation you are
supposed t<» have made, they are in substance : (1) that the fact that Stilwell
was down in the Pacific was heard confidentially but you weren't supposed to
talk about it: (2) that the whereabouts of General Stilwell was very con-
fidential : and (?,) that if it got out. as Jaffe had stated, "that is how top secrets
get out." Those are the statements you are alleged to have made. Perhaps
you might explain what information, if any. you had about the whereabouts
of Stilwell and what you may have said or can recollect having said on the
subject.
A. Well, I don't recall this conversation. I think I have already testified
that, since it is all a mystery to me. perhaps if we had the complete text —
but it seems to me that, if this is a correct and complet text. T was being very
discreet. I don't have any recollection of hearing of this alleged conversation
or conversations between Canss, Could as relayed to Gayn and as repeated to
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2465
Jaffe. Nor do I remember anything about this conversation, or bearing any-
thing about this conversation of the OSS men and Gayn. It seems to me I
avoided saying anything definitely about the whereabouts of General Stilwell
except that people were saving be is in the Pacific. But the whereabouts of
high officers during wartime is a secret.
Q. Did you. as a matter of tact, know where he was, Mr. Service?— A. I knew
that he was going out to the Pacific. I don't know when or where. I knew it
first from General Stilwell himself. I think that he was planning to go. I was
seeing his associates all the time. Now. this business of Saturday night con-
fuses me except that he was expected to speak to a meeting in New York and
the reference to that may simply have been that if he is unable to appear on
Sat uiday nighl why it would be obvious that he is away some place. .
Q. That was. of course, the remark that Jaffe was supposed to have said. —
A. But my statement of this, 'that is how top secrets get out," I suppose was
referring to all the various rumors and statements by OSS people and Randall
Gould and so on and SO on.
Q. Who was Randall Gould?— A. Randall Gould had been for many years
the editor of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, a newspaper published
in Shanghai by C. V. Starr. During the war he was in the United States. He
wrote a book on China. And then later he went to Chungking and set up the
Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury which came out
weekly for a while in Chungking. After the war he returned to Shanghai and
was finally, I think, forced to close down publication after the Communists
occupied Shanghai and imprisoned him in his offices and that caused a great
deal of trouble for him.
Mr. Achilles. Do you recall whether on that same occasion you again dis-
closed the possibility of American landings in China and the location of those
landings?
A. I have no recollection, sir. but it's quite possible that in a speculative way
there might have been some such discussion. I think by this time we were finding
probably in the middle of the Okinawa campaign that there was generel specu-
lation that any landing, if we made one. would be further north in China than
it might have been at an earlier stage of the war. If we held Okinawa it might
seem more logical to any armchair strategist to bit straight across in North China.
Mr. Stevens. Do you recall any?
A. No sir. I have no such recollection.
Q. I should complete my statement of this alleged conversation vou are sup-
posed to have had with Jaffe by saying it is stated that Mr. Jaffe asked you
whether you thought that the United States would land on the shores of China,
and that you told him. "I don't believe it has been decided. I can tell you in a
couple of weeks when Stilwell gets back I rather think we will." It is then
stated that Mr. Jaffe remarked that, if we did land in China, it would probably
be in Shanghai and that then we would accept aid from anybody. Communist
or non-Communist. — A. This is Mr. Jaffe?
Q. Yes : and you agreed with Mr. Jaffe that that was correct. — A. I don't
remember making any such statement and I don't see how I could have made a
statement like that, that "I can tell yon in a few weeks when General Stilwell
gets back." because that assumes in the first place that General Stilwell was
going to tell me what his plans were and General Stilwell never confided in me.
He confided in very few p°ople.
Mr. Stevens. Do you know whether General Stilwell was going to get back
in 2 or 3 weeks ?
A. No, sir: I don't recall that I did know it. As a matter of fact, he didn't
come back. He stayed out there. That statement is rather incomprehensible.
Mr. Achtt.t.f.s. That statement carries The implication that vou were offering
voluntary information as to the whereabouts of General Stilwell. which is
obviously a serious implication.
A. It's just incomprehensible to me. T don't have any such recollection of
such statements and I don't see how I could be in any position to promise, since
I never received any information on high military plans from General Stilwell
ever.
The Chairman. Well, yon said a minute ago that General Stilwell had told
you something: what was it?
A. Well. I saw General Stilwell some time in that spring after T came back.
And he said that he wanted to go out in the Pacific and get himself a job.
The Chairman. Yes. that is what you referred to.
2466 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
A. He wanted to get a fighting job. He didn't want to be sitting in a desk here
in Washington. But that is the sum total of what I remember that General Stil-
well told me.
Questions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. Had you discussed any military plans, anything of that nature, with
General Stilwell? — A. No, sir.
Q. At that time did you not know where General Stilwell was? — A. My recol-
lection is that all I knew was that he was going out in the Pacific. Of course
he was going to see General MacArthur, wherever General MacArthur was.
That could be assumed. I don't know that I had any specific knowledge as to
where he was at any particular time.
Q. So far as you know, all that General Stilwell was doing was looking for
a fighting job? — A. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Rhetts. I wonder if the Board can tell me what this purports to be. Does
this purport to be an account given by Mr. Jaffe? Does this purport to be a
recording of a conversation made by some mechanical device? Does it purport
to be the notes made by some person listening to the conversation? Is there
any way that the Board can enlighten us at all on that? My reason for asking
the Board this question is this : Of course Mr. Service was questioned earlier
in these proceedings on this same general subject matter. He has been ques-
tioned again in these vague terms within the past 2 days before the sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and it is obviously of the
greatest importance to ascertain precisely what source, what reportorial source,
(he Board has available to it. Because it seems to. me I think anyone who has
any dealings with these matters will recognize that an actual recording of a
conversation is one thing. Notes taken by a person listening with earphones
and a person who may or may not be familiar with the subject matter of the
discussion is another thing. And a summary prepared by another person, some-
one who had no knowledge of the matter is still a third and different thing.
The material which General Snow has been referring to here so obviously
suggests condensations, epitomizations, and the like, which makes it, it seems
to me, extremely important that we try to ascertain the exact source of the
material which the Board is using.
The Chairman. I'll say for the record that the Board lias only the reports
of the FBI on which to rely. We do not have the exact texts of these supposed
statements. The source, as far as the Board is free to reveal, is a confidential
source from the FBI. We have nothing further. It is a source which is unavail-
able for appearance before the Board. According to the public press in yester-
day's hearing the actual source of these statements is a recording. As to the
facts, the Board is unable to make a statement.
Mr. Rhetts. In that connection, if I might comment, I too am aware of the
report in the public press. On the other hand. I'm still not enlightened as
to whether it is an actual recording or whether it is notes purported to have
been made by someone who was listening or whether they are stenographic
transcripts or what.
The Chairman. The reports of the FBI do not advise the Board on that
subject.
Mr. Service. It seems to me that even if there is a recording we still have
the question of the completeness and clarity and the perfection of those record-
ings because in a conversation which I'm alleged to have had on May 19
The Chairman. May 29.
Mr. Service. May 29 ; yes, sir. It would appear that they have exactly reversed
the intent of what I seem to recall saying possibly by the omission of a few-
words or failing to catch a few words.
The Chairman. Well, the Board is unable to give you any further enlighten-
ment on the subject.
Mr. Achilles. To return to the specific statements that you are supposed to
have made to Mr. Jaffe, Mr. Service, that you did not believe it is decided
whether we would land on the shores of China but that you would be able to
tell him in a couple of weeks when General Stilwell got hack, would you have
told Mr. Jaffe such information had you known it, as to whether or not the
United States would in fact in future land on the shores of China?
A. It all depends. T mean — I'm trying to just speculate as to what was in
my own mind if I made such a statement, which I don't recall making.
Mr. Achilles. Would you please read the question again.
(Whereupon the reporter reread the previous question.)
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2467
A. No; I would not have told him if they were secret plans. I would not
bare told him any secret war plans. The reason I was trying to speculate what
was in the back of my mind was that 1 understood that the whole subject was
under discussion and that if there had been a large open build-up for a landing
such as, shall we say, on the Normandy Coast — and that was no secret about
the fact that we were going to land in Europe — I believe that what I was think-
ing was that after General Stilwell came back that it would probably become
obvious, because presumably he wanted to be in command of a preparation for
a large-scale operation, whether or not we were preparing to build up for an
operation on the mainland. That is the only basis I can think of that I would
have been able to tell anyone whether or not
Questions by Mr. Stevens:
Q. This is pure speculation? — A. This is pure speculation. I certainly would
not have told him any secret plan. I probably wouldn't have known any secret
plan. If I had known any I never would have told him.
Q. If you had known that we were going to land in China would you have
told him? — A. It all depends on the circumstances. That is, what I'm trying
to say, I would not have told him anything which was not well known. But
there was no secret that we were going to land on Sicily long before we did.
There was no secret that we were going to land in Italy. There was no secret
that we were going to land somewhere on the coast of France. That is the only
basis on which I can think that I would have any way of knowing or telling
anyone.
Quetions by Mr. Achilles :
Q. As I recall, those cases of where we were going to land was a matter of
vital secrecy. — A. Where, yes, but am I not purported to have said that I simply
would not be able to tell him whether we were going to land in China?
Q. That is correct. — A. And Jaft'e goes on to speculate that it woidd be in the
vicinity of Shanghai. I don't know where.
Q. Mr. Jaffe is purported to have said if we did land in China it would
probably be in Shanghai and that then we would accept aid from anybody,
Communist or non-Communist. And you are said to have agreed that that was
correct. It does not indicate which of Mr. Jaffe's statements you agreed was
correct. It could be either the landing in Shanghai or if we did land in Shanghai
we would accept aid from anybody there. — A. If I remember, I mentioned earlier
it was General Stilwell's hope — I think I used the word "dream" before — that
he would have the chance to be in command of a landing operation in China. It
was his private hope that he would be able to march back to Peiping, and so on.
And I may have assumed that after his return there would be public indication
of, as I say, a build-up for a large-scale landing. But that is just pure specula-
tion. I think that I ought to make that clear.
I think I ought to make it clear to the Board that I would never have known
any of the secret plans, never did know them, and never would have revealed
them to Mr. Jaffe or anyone else, that the only conceivable basis for this state-
ment was that possibly within a few weeks — since the progress of the war was
rapid at that time — that it would become obivous whether or not we were pr -
paring to mount a large-scale-offensive landing in China.
Mr. Stevens. Mr. Service, in your experience out there or anywhere with
respect to the war, was it ever common knowledge as to whether a build-up was
for one area in the Pacific or another? If I recall correctly, the assembly lines
were sending things out. We knew that material was going out to the west
coast, as far as the United States was concerned, but I don't think it was com-
mon knowledge in the United States as to where any material was going which
left the west coast. And that was something that was considered rather secret
here, as to whether we were going into any particular section of the Pacific. I
doubt very much, if my memory serves me correctly, that that was ever common
knowledge here, whether there was a build-tip in China or for some other place.
In your experience was it otherwise?
A. I have only been speculating here, sir, because I have no positive recol-
lection.
Questions by the Chaikmax :
Q. As a matter of fact, you were also speculating, weren't you, when you
referred to the common knowledge of the landing in Sicily? As a matter of
fact, that never was common knowledge. Sicily is a small place. If it had been
2468 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
common knowledge that we were going to land in Sicily the landing place would
have been pretty well known. — A. Well, I was speculating.
Q. You weren't here and didn't know whether it was or was not common
knowledge, did you?
A. My recollection of the chain of events at that time was that we knocked
out Pantelleris and did other actions, bombing preparations, and so on, which
pointed toward the occupation of Sicily before we went on to attempt an occupa-
tion in Italy. It was generally assumed, I imagine, that it would be dangerous
for us to attack Italy directly without first taking Sicily.
Questions by Mr. Stevens :
Q. I think if you look back, Mr. Service, none of this, as far as the United
States was concerned, was common knowledge at any time until after the matter
was an accomplished fact. I think that is true with regard to the build-up that
took effect in the United Kingdom with regard to North Africa, if I'm right.
All of it, there was a speculation in the United States, but there was never
any common knowledge as to whether it was likely to lie in a theater of war.
I'd just like for you to search back and see if in any of your visits to the United
States, of which there were not many, you could get anything which you would
have considered common knowledge of an act before that act occurred. Certainly
in my memory, being in Washington all during the war, I cannot recall any such
thing.
A. I'm not sure that I understand your question, Mr. Stevens.
Q. I'm not just sure that in your speculation you used the word "common
knowledge" advisedly, Mr. Service. — A. Common knowledge?
Q. Yes. — A. Common assumption, perhaps.
Q. It is necessary for the Board to get that clarified a bit. If you speculated
about Sicily and Normandy and others A. I should have limited it to Nor-
mandy. I suppose. I should have included the whole coast of France.
Q. Was there any common knowledge as to what the plans of General Mac-
Arthur and the people — Admiral Nimitz and others — where we were going to
strike next? — A. Well, we get into a problem of what point. Certainly I would
say that our maneuvers toward the Philippines indicated at a very early point
our intention to recapture the Philippines.
Mr. Achilles. On the occasion of one of your conversations with Jaffe, I
believe you discussed with him a report which you and a Mr. Adler worked on
jointly. Who was Mr. Adler?
A. Mr. Adler was the United States Treasury attache in Chungking from about
1942 through to the end of the war. I believe he remained Treasury attache
until 1946 or '47. I'm not sure just when he came back to the United States.
He was also the American member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.
Q. I believe you testified you lived with him.— A. I lived with him for a period
in Chungking, I believe for about a year. That was chiefly because living in
Army officer's quarters had been vei-y hampering to my work which involved a
great deal of contact with the Chinese. I could not entertain Chinese in the
Army mess. There was no sitting room or other place available where I could
meet people and talk with them. Mr. Adler had an apartment, had an extra
i-oom, which he offered to me, so I shared his apartment with him.
Q. Do yon have any particular impression as to his political views at that
time? — A. Well, it's very hard to describe the word "Liberal." I would say he
is a liberal. I had no indication or ever any reason to believe he was a Com-
munist or even close to a Communist.
Q. That follows now as well as then? — A. Yes, sir.
Questions by Mr. Achilles.
Q. You did know him, I assume, quite well, having lived with him for a year?—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the nature of your duties and his duties, did you and he have occasion
to collaborate in preparing reports on more than this one particular occasion?
Mr. Riietts. On what particular occasion are we referring to now, sir?
Q. This was a report prepared in connection with Mr. Wallace's visit to China,
which I believe Mr. Service stated he and Mr. Adler worked on together. — A. Mr.
Adler was a very active person and lived in the city away from the Embassy,
lie spent a great deal of his time with the Chinese and particularly with Chinese
people in financial and economic fields, bankers, government officials, in those
fields. And he developed an unusually broad circle of Chinese contacts along
those lines.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2409
I also developed an unusually broad circle of contacts, an entirely different one,
among entirely different ones, among entirely different groups, so that we had
very little overlapping. But between the two of us we — bow shall 1 say — we
covered a good deal of ground. So that we, living together, seeing each other
usually in the latter part of every evening, talked to each other, exchanged views,
news, and we did, I think you might say, work together continually. Certainly
t lie news which lie obtained from me entered in a way into his reports and the
information which I got from him was at times invaluable to me in broadening
my own knowledge and perspective of what was going on.
Mr. Adler was, as I say, in an independent position. He bad weekly or monthly
reports for the Treasury and occasionally if negotiations were going on he had
more frequent reporting in connection with those negotiations. Similarly I had
only a Limited number of required duties. Both of us spent a good deal of
rime picking up information, doing some voluntary reporting. A great deal of
his information went through conversations, and so on, to the Embassy. Mine
also, of course, went to the Embassy eventually.
But on our own initiative we did undertake what you might call several proj-
ects. One of them was this memorandum, which is our Document 157, which as
I have said was written shortly before Mr. Wallace's visit — Vice President Wal-
lace's visit. I did most of the initial drafting and then I would go over it with
him and he would suggest some changes. Perhaps he would work over a draft
and then I would rework it, and so on, so that both of us made some contributions.
Now. another independent voluntary enterprise that we undertook wTas the
translation and summarization and comment on the Generalissimo's book of the
Chinese economic theory. We introduced that into the proceedings here a few
days ago. I have forgotten the B number.
Q. Adler was at that time recognized, was he not, as probably the best informed
person on the Chinese economic situation? — A. I believe he certainly was, sir.
He was extremely well informed. And he was the only man we had in Chung-
king who was well informed on Chinese nuance and economics. He was invalu-
able to the Embassy and he assisted the Embassy a great deal. He was in the
closest, most intimate contact with the Chinese economic figures from H. H.
Kung on down.
Q. Turning to a different matter, some days ago I remember questioning you
concerning your discussion with Jaffe of April 20. 1945 ; as I recall you stated
that you had arrived at Mr. Jaffe's room in the Statler Hotel only shortly before
luncheon and that I advised you according to the FBI you were reported to have
gone to Mr. Jaffe's room at the Statler Hotel at about 9 : 30 o'clock that morning,
that you were unable to recollect having done so or having gone there earlier than
shortly before lunch. I wonder in the meantime if you bad a chance to recollect
anything further about that morning? Where you might have spent the morn-
ing?— A. I'm still unable to recollect, sir, having spent any long time in con-
versation with Mr. Jaffe on that morning. And, therefore, I'm still of the belief
that my hypothesis was correct that I may have taken these memoranda to his
hotel in the early forenoon, perhaps at the time 9: 30, which has been mentioned,
and that I left them with him. I left the hotel and returned there shortly before
lunch, expecting to have them returned to me. There is one recollection — it's a
vague recollection — which may relate to that day.
Q. What is that recollection? — A. That is that I believe at some time in my
early association with Mr. Jaffe this book of the generalissimo's on the Chinese
economic theory was mentioned and that he said that he had not seen it and that
I took to him, among the papers, memoranda and so on, a translation of the book
and this summary and comment and that Jaffe was interested and asked me if
he could make some use of the material. I told him that he could not, meaning
he could not use the summary and analysis which had been prepared in the
major part by Mr. Adler, which I had no authority to allow him to use.
Q. The point is of some interest because it is the only point, as I recall, at which
the statements you have made — both to the FBI in 1945 and to the board — differ
from information furnished by the FBI. But I take it that your best recollection
is still that you did not spend that morning in Mr. Jaffe's room at the Statler
Hotel? — A. That is correct. Might I suggest, sir, if in fact I did remain the
whole morning in conversation with Mr. Jaffe, which I have no recollection of
doing, there should be substantial evidence of the fact since Mr. Jaffe was under
such close surveillance. And if there is such evidence I would appreciate having
it made known to me.
Q. We have no such evidence.
2470 , STATE DEPARTMEXT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
The Chairman. I'd like to ask you, Mr. Service, if you care to give us a
comprehensive statement of your attitude with reference to communism as a
dogma with application to the United States. Are you a Communist or do you
believe in the Communist theory of government and social and economic order
or not? Or do you believe in what we call the capitalist system? I don't know
that you have given us anywhere in your statement a comprehensive statement
of your personal beliefs on that.
The board would like a short recess.
(Whereupon the board recessed at 12 noon and reconvened at 12 :05 p. m.)
Mr. Rhett. I'd like to make a preliminary statement. When Mr. Kennan
testified here on May 29, 1950, in the afternoon session, the board may recall
that at the conclusion of his testimony he submitted to the board the notes he had
made on the various reports. The board will also recall that while most of these
papers consisted of actual reports written by Mr. Service there were a few
memoranda included in this group which constituted memoranda made by other
agencies concerning interviews with Mr. Service. -
One of these reports, which is our Document Xo. 200, is a memorandum
dated Xovember 8, 1944, and entitled "Interview with John Service" and under
that "Japanese Communists." This memorandum is a memorandum of notes
of an interview held with Mr. Service evidently at the offices of the Research and
Analysis Branch of OSS. In the course of this memorandum or notes is stated
at the top of page 2 in connection with the discussion of the extent of contact
with the Japanese Communists have with the outside world — this is the Japanese
Communists who were then in Yenan — "Material cannot be sent through Russia,
although they undoubtedly have contact with a Russian station. Actually, they
can get no information out except by radio, although Service mentioned that
lie himself had helped in carrying information. Material going out of Yenan is
heavily censored by the Chinese."
Xow, amongst the notes which Mr. Kennan prepared on these documents we
have noted two references to this particular statement which I have just read
from Document 200. Mr. Kennan's notes on this appear on page 15 of his notes
which are attached to the transcript for the afternoon session. May 29, 1950. In
view of the implications of that statement, it seemed desirable for us to attempt to
clarify it.
The Chairman. What did Mr. Kennan say about it?
Mr. Rhetts. S'r. Kennan merely noted with respect to this Document No.
200. His notes are as follows :
"Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views on
Japanese Communists. Appears to be purely factual information. Service
states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese Communists, ap-
parently out of Yenan to Chungking for relay elsewhere. No elaboration."
Xow, it is in connection with this matter that I would like to interrogate Mr.
Fisher briefly and then Mr. Service again.
The Chairman. Go right ahead.
Thereupon Mr. Francis McCracken Fisher, being produced, sworn and ex-
amined as a witness for and in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as
follows :
Questions by Mr. Rhetts :
Q. Will you please state your full name for the record? — A. Francis McCracken
Fisher.
Q. And your address? — A. 2313 South June Street, Arlington.
Q. What is your present position, sir? — A. A student at the National War
College, detailed from the State Department.
Q. Were von in China during the period approximated of July to October
1944. Mr. Fisher?— A. Continuously.
Q. What was your position there at that time? — A. The head of the Office of
War Information activities throughout China. Might I add to that, I had been
told unofficially by General Stilwell soon after he arrived there that he wanted
me to be in charge or at least pass on all matters of psychological warfare
against the Japanese.
Q. So that you were particularly concerned with that range of matters in
relation to the Japs? — A. Certainly.
Q. During that period did you have occasion to visit Yenan? — A. I was asked
to do so by the commanding general. Might I add to that?
Q. Yes. — A. We had heard rumors that the Japanese and the Communists
themselves were having some considerable effect in securing the surrender of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2471
Japanese prisoners. This was rather unique in 1!M4 and it was felt apparently
worth while exploring the methods and means and so forth that they wen; using
in their psychological approach to the Japanese. Therefore, I was instructed
in my capacity that I just mentioned to go to Venan and contact those people
I could hud who were engaged in the psychological warfare against the Japanese,
to study their methods as fully as possible and report thereon.
Q. During what period were you in Yenan, sir? — A. Approximately 2 weeks,
from the latter part of August to early September. I can't give you the exact
dates.
Q. In 11144?— A. Yes. 1944.
Q. Ami did you know Mr. Service there, at that time? — A. I did.
Q. Did you have occasion to work with him in Yenan? — A. I took occasion
to, sir. May I explain that?
Q. Yes. — A. Very soon after I had talked to the various Chinese Communists,
the Army people in charge of psychological warfare, they put me on to Okano,
who was the head of the Japanese People*s Emancipation League and was mainly
the main spring or brain of the psychological-warfare effort. I had long interviews
with him. On numerous occasions I had long talks with him. At one point he
said that tomorrow he would he glad to tell me what the postwar Japanese
Communist program was. I felt that this was something outside my particular
range and should be of interest politically to the Government as a whole and
suggested to Mr. Service that he sit in on that interview. That is why. on the
occasion, I sought his help on a matter outside my range. But I thought it
would he of importance to the United States Government.
Q. Were there also Japanese located in Chungking who were also working in
the general area of attempting to convert the Japanese away from support of
the Japanese war efforts? — A. There were two groups in general. They were
under two Japanese. One was named Kaji Wataru and his wife. There was
another group working under a man named Ao Yama. I don't recall the rest
of his name. These two groups or cliques or factions had been in China for a
considerable period of time. They had been working, some of them, with the
Chinese Government and the Kuomintang even before the war. And they were in
touch with or had been contacted, had been sought by the OSS in particular dur-
ing the preceding months there in Chungking.
These two groups appeared to be somewhat ineffectual. Their activities seemed
to be mostly directed toward news sheets and pamphlets. I never knew just
what the circulation of them was. But some of them were in contact with the
very small number of Japanese prisoners captured by the Chinese and were
attempting to, under the direction of the Chinese Government, utilize these
prisoners in psychological warfare in that realm.
Q. That was also one of the activities in which Mr. Okano was engaged in
and around Yenan? — A. As far as I know, principally he was engaged in that, yes.
Q. Now. do you have any knowledge whether there was any communication
between Mr. Okano and his group in Yenen and the groups in Chungking, of which
you just spoke?— A. I noticed that the transcript stated that the Chinese severely
censored all material going out of Yenen — that is of course, as you know, the
Chinese Government, the Kuomintang secret police, and so forth established more
or less a blockade there and as a result of that there was very little communica-
tion as far as I knew between them. Occasionally some publication or some leaflet
would get across and there was vague knowledge on both sides, if you want to call
them sides, between the Japanese group in Chungking and the Japanese group
in Yenen. There was vague knowledge about what the other group was doing
and what it was interested in.
Q. Do you know whether you or the American Government officials had any
occasion or interest in attempting to permit some communication hetween Okano
and his group from Yenen with the other groups in Chungking? — A. I can't tes-
t f \ as to a specific instance hut 1 can testify as to background. The answer in
general is ••yes." that would he parallel to the general theory at that time, and
I want you to mark that time, early September 1!!44. in uniting all elements
available in fighting effectively against the Japanese. I think shortly after I
came hack from Yenen General Hurley went to Yenan with exactly, precisely the
same mission.
There was interest in seeing whether increased effectiveness could he ohtained
in psychological warfare effort by an increase in communication hetween these
two groups. I know that on one occasion at least — I can't testify as to the exact
time, hut my impression is that it was October or November of 11)44 — there came
through the regular communications channels some sort of communication, either
2472 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
a statement or a letter or something, from Okano which was made available to
Kaji and Aoyama in Chungking in the hopes there would be coalescence — not
coalescence but it would be increased effectiveness through cooperation.
Q. Now, as I understand it, Kaji and Aoyama were working for the American
forces? Or was it for the Chinese? — A. Cooperating. It's a little hard to describe
the exact part
Q. Perhaps I may make my question a little clearer. They were working in
cooperation with your group which was interested in promoting the psychological
warfare? — A. They were. When we would evolve a leaflet in Japanese to be
dropped we would naturally seek to get the best critique from the Japanese view-
point as was possible and we would ask them to criticize it, as we would the group
in Yenan.
And, may I add one more thing. I gathered there was perhaps a closer rela-
tionship on the part of the morale operations branch of the Office of Strategic
Services in Chungking with these two groups. I don't know how effective or
useful it was, but I know they sought to maintain contact with these two groups.
Q. When you referred a moment ago to your general recollection of some com-
munication coming through the regular official channels from Okano in Yenan
to the group in Chungking, would that have been through Army channels? —
A. All channels. I should describe the set-up as far as I know it, and that is
that the observer mission in Yenan transmitted documents and so forth, reports,
to headquarters, to Army headquarters in Chungking. It was an Army mission
there. We maintained an observer with it from time to time. But, as far as I
know, all communications coming from Yenan were screened at the input end.
The chief or his designated authority in Yenan would receive them at head-
quarters in Chungking — whether they were checked or not I don't know, I assume
they were all checked. We got them I believe, as I recall, from the G-2 office.
When some things were addressed to us they came through that channel and we
picked them up through G-2. The regular practice was that everything was
checked at both ends.
Q. During the period that you were either in Chungking or Yenan, did you
ever have any knowledge that any communications were being sent out by Okano
other than this limited communication with the Kaji group in Chungking that
you referred to? — A. Well, I should refer here to one general means of communi-
cation they had in a sense, and that was the Japanese People's Emancipation
League and Okano frequently published articles and reviews and things in the
Chieh Fang Jih Pao.
Mr. Service. It means the Liberation Daily.
A. That was the official Communist newspaper.
Q. Where? — A. In Yenan. And, as I recall, from time to time some of these
articles were broadcast. I would have assumed that some of them would have
been broadcast by the Eighth Route Army radio in their daily news through
the Communist newspapers through all the liberated areas. So I assume in
addition to this limited communication that we just referred to that there was
a certain amount of sort of semipublic broadcast of articles and information
and things from that source. I don't know if that adds anything. I don't know
of any other specific direct communication, nor do I have any knowledge or sus-
picion that there was any, what you might term, irregular communication.
The Chairman. Surreptitious communication?
A. Surreptitious. It was not subject to the complete approval or screening of
headquarters.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Fisher.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Rhetts. Will you take the stand, Mr. Service.
Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and
sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
Question by Mr. RHETTS :
Q. Can you shed any further light on this quotation from Document 200 which
I have read into the record? — A. Well. I think that I'm perhaps a victim in a
way of extreme condensate Q. This was an interview which undoubtedly lasted
for 2 or :'. hours, which has been condensed into .". pages. And I believe that what
1 said was something that we or the observer mission had allowed some com-
munication with these other Japanese groups. I'm sure that there was some
explanation and further on in the paper I mention Ao Yama and the other Japa-
nese who were cooperating with us on psychological warfare work in Chungking.
!\ly recollection is that fairly soon after the arrival of the observer mission in
Yenan — that would be in July.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2473
The Chairman. 1944?
A. Yes, li>44. There were a number of people in the group who were Japanese
specialists who came in contact with Okano and had to find out as part oi tueir
work what the Japanese were doing with the prisoners and Okano asked whether
or not it would be possible Cor him to send a letter to these other free .Japanese
groups in Chungking. I remember lus intent was to establish some sort of con-
sultation on the work they were doing, their objectives; I think perhaps to ex-
plore the possibility of whether or not they could more or less agree on their ob-
jectives.
We agreed — I say "we," I mean the observer group — to allow such a letter to
be sent. I remember the group I was living with — Colonel Barrett, the Com-
mander, I remember having a translation made and carefully studied by some of
our Japanese experts and we agreed to forward it through official channels over
the <; -2 in Chungking for transmission, if G-2 thought wise, to the Japanese
groups. That is the only occasion that I can remember of having any knowledge
or where I was in any way connected with the transmitting of messages for these
Japanese Communist leaders to anyone outside.
Q. As far as you recall, did you ever personally carry any communication of
any kind from < >kano or any of the Japanese Communists out of Yensen? — A. No,
sir. I have no recollection of every carrying any messages.
Q. So far as you know? — A. I was concernod only in consultation as to whether
or not the group would transmit, by official channels through G— 2, this letter.
Q. So it is your belief that this reference in the memo, this assertion that you
mentioned that you yourself bad helped carry information merely refers to the
fact that the observer mission i tlicially permitted Okano to transmit written
communication through official channels to Chungking for delivery to the other
Japanese groups there? — A. That is correct.
Q. And the inferences which Mr. Kennan may have drawn in his notes on tie
document are not proper inferences? — A. Let's say they go even beyond this.
They are not proper inferences. Even this [indicating] I think is incorrect.
Q. By "this" you mean the document, Document 200? — A. Yes.
The Chairman. Now could you answer the question asked before the recess,
the general question as to your respect for communism, as to theory? — A. It's
difficult to talk about a man's philosophy. That is something I'm not used to
doing. I'm not a deeply religious man in a conventional sense of the word.
But I think that I could sum it up by saying that it is my belief that life was
not created accidentally, that there is a divine cause, and that man was not
creeted accidentally but created as the ultimate and highest form of life.
I think that man's responsibility, or his destiny if you wish, is to seek to
achieve or live up to his highest potentialities, not only as individuals but as a
race. We have not succeeded in doing that. We are very far from doing it.
There have been certain individuals in history — Jesus Christ was one — who
have given us an insight into the qualities of mind and spirit for which man is
unique and which makes him the highest product of creation, which serve as
examples of what we should seek to achieve.
Now, this whole basic philosophy is built on the idea of, shall we say, the
dignity of man. Man cannot advance toward this goal of perfection without
the greatest freedom of expression, greatest freedom of experiment, greatest
freedom to improve and develop himself. That whole idea is absolutely contrary
to a fixed and rigid dogma.
I don't believe that there is any fixed dogma which is the ultimate truth. I'm
sure that communism is not because it is completely contrary to human nature
and would put us in a strait-jacket and instead of giving the fullest scope
for individual development it puts man in a strait-jacket and subordinates him
to a monolithic state or a completely monolithic totalitarian party.
The political expression, of course, of this kind of philosophy is democracy,
democracy of a very complete developed sort which must be centered about the
recognition of the dignity and rights of the individual.
The Chairman. You mean the basis of the philosophy which you are ex-
pounding?
A. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Not the basis of communism?
A. No. the philosophy which I'm expounding, which is the antithesis of my view
of communism. Related to my own view of the rights and dignity of men and
the political expression which I think is democracy, is my idea on economics,
because the kind of democracy which I believe in must be based on free enter-
prise. It must be based on the opportunity of the individual. I think that com-
2474 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
petition is necessary and is basic for this whole process of self improvement, of
trying to develop ourselves, that complete controls stifle, restrain our own efforts
at progress.
I think that one of the strengths of the American system is that Ave ourselves
are not tied to any rigid plan, or dogma — I use this word "dogma" over much
perhaps. What I'm saying is that I'm not a complete believer in unrestricted
capitalism, that my deep feeling about protection of the rights of the individual
necessitates some restrictions and control on capitalism. But we in the United
States have been able to achieve a balance between the protection of the rights
of the individual and the affording of the fullest opportunity for improvement
and advancement with competition and encouragement and free enterprise, all
of which I think are important.
I think it's obvious, from this clumsy effort to state what I believe, that I am
not a Communist, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Achilles. In my opinion, that is a very fine statement.
Mr. Service. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. The Board is adjourned.
The Board adjuorned at 12 : 50 p. m.
EXHIBITS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD-
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE
Exhibit No. 1
This exhibit not available.
This was a compilation of material collected for reference use of members
of the Loyalty Security Board which retained all copies. All important material
has been incorporated in the transcript.
Contents were :
Chronology of movements and events relating to John S. Service, 1941-49.
Quotations from material containing charges against Mr. Service.
The texts of a number of significant reports drafted by Mr. Service.
The transcript of testimony before the subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee (Hobbs committee) during its investigation of the Amer-
asia case (from Congressional Record, May 22, 1950).
p]xcerpts from the China white paper including annex 47 which was largely
made up of quotations from Mr. Service's reports.
Exhibit No. 2
Columbia University in the City of New Yokk
[New York 27, N. Y.]
EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE
433 West One Hundred and Seventieth Street
March 28, 1950.
Mr. John R. Peukifoy,
Assistant Secretary of state. United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Peui:ifoy: Allow me to offer myself as a character witness for Mr.
John S. Service in the event this is necessary in the forthcoming investigation.
Mr. Service and I have been closest friends since boyhood days in Shanghai, we
roomed together in college, and have kept in close touch with one another
ever since. I should count ii an honor to testify as to his absolute integrity
and loyalty to the United States, as well as pay tribute to his intellectual
honesty and idealism.
If there is any way in which I can assist in this matter of clearing up his
record in the public mind please call upon me. No such clearance is necessary
so far as the Department is concerned, I am sure.
Very truly yours,
C. Martin Wilbur,
Associat( Professor of Chinese History, Columbia University.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2475
Exhibit No. 3
Board of Economic War* abb,
Washington, D. C, January 2, 19Jf8.
Mr. Max ThornbeRG,
Petroleum Adviser, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Deab Mr. Thornberg: This is in reference to a report from Third Secretary
John S. Service, at Chungking, dated November 11, 1942, and entitled "The
Kansu Oil Wells." This report comprised several enclosures to Report No. 755
from Chungking, which bears the date November 24.
The Petroleum Division of this Branch has asked that I request you to transmit
our particular thanks and appreciation to Mr. Service. His despatch is ex-
ceedingly thorough and comprehensive, and is all the more commendable since
it was not written by an oil technician.
All phases of the subject covered by Mr. Service have been of marked interest
to us. We will be grateful if we are given any further information on this
subject which may become available from time to time.
With my very best regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Chari.es B. Raynor,
Chief, Technical Branch.
Exhibit No. 4
Chungking, August 16, 19^3.
John S. Service, Esquire,
Second Secretary of Embassy,
Care of General StiUcelVs Headquarters, Chungking.
Sir : Upon the termination of your detail to Lanchow and your detachment
from the Embassy to service on the staff of General Stilwell, the Embassy wishes
to express to you its appreciation of the political and other reports it has received
from you during your tour of duty at Lanchow.
Your reports were clearly and concisely written, they reflected ingenuity in
observation and in the gathering of information under difficult circumstances,
and industry and awareness of developments and trends of interest and of the
importance thereof. Your reports contained information of much interest and
value to the Embassy and the Embassy considers that your reports, and your
activities in connection with reporting, were of high quality and may in general
be characterized as excellent.
A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Department of State.
Very truly yours,
George Atcheson, Jr.
American Charge' d' Affaires a. i.
A true copy of the signed original.
Exhibit No. 5
Copy : ap. October 1, 1943.
No. 411.
The Honorable Clarence E. Gauss,
American Ambassador, Chungking.
Sir: The Department has noted with gratification the quality of the reporting
from Second Secretary Service while he was on detail at Lanchow. In particu-
lar, the reports submitted under cover of the Embassy's despatches no. 1485 of
August IS and no. 1493 of August 20 have impressed officers of the Department
with their value and timeliness, as has also the report which formed the subject
of the Embassy's commendatory despatch no. 1411 of July 31, 1943. The thorough
and objective manner in which Mr. Service covered "The Political Situation in
Kansu" in his despatch no. 9 (Embassy's no. 1485) has afforded officers of the
Department a very useful guide to an understanding of conditions in Kansu,
and his report on "Treatment of Foreigners in the Northwest," no. 21 (Embassy's
no. 1493), contains evidence not only of careful study of the subject but also
68970 — 50 — pt. 2 63
2476 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
of successful activity on the part of Mr. Service in ameliorating difficulties en-
countered by American citizens.
The Department requests that the Embassy bring this expression of apprecia-
tion of his work to the attention of Mr. Service.
Very truly yours,
&. Howland Shaw
(For the Seeretarv of State).
FE : JCV :ALM/ MS. FE.
9-28-43.
Exhibit No. 6
Copy for FP.
No. 431.
The Honorable Clvrence E. Gauss,
American Ambassador, Chungking.
Sir: In acknowledging the receipt of the Embassy's despatch no. 1410, dated
July 31, 1943. enclosing despatch no. 6, dated July 5, 1943, entitled : "Chinese
Propaganda as Shown by Wall Slogans in the Northwest" prepared by Mr. John
S. Service, American Foreign Service Officer on detail at Lanchow, it is a pleasure
to inform you that the Department has accorded to the latter despatch a rating
of Excellent, in view of the timeliness and value of the information contained
therein and the careful analysis it presents of the subject matter.
The contents of this instruction should be brought to the notice of Mr. Service
who should be commended for his initiative in preparing a report on this subject.
Very truly yours,
(For the Secretary of State).
DCR:GHK:AGH. FE. FP. 10/14/43.
Exhibit No. 7
Copy : ap.
June 21, 1944.
Unrestricted.
No. 698.
The Honorable Clarence E. Gauss,
American Ambassador, Chungking.
Sir:: In connection with current developments in Sinkiang having an impor-
tant bearing on Sino-Soviet relations, the Department has found of much interest
and value the report on the situation in Sinkiang submitted under cover of the
Embassy's despatch no. 2461 of April 21. 1944. by Second Secretary John S.
Service, on detail to General Stilwell's staff. This report has been given the
grade of "Excellent."
The timeliness and high standard of Mr. Service's reporting continues to be
a cause of satisfaction to the Department.
It is requested that you inform Mr. Service of this further commendation of
his work.
Very truly yours,
G. Howland Shaw
i Fui- the Secretary of state).
761.93/171.
CA : ASC : MHP.
6/13/44. FE.
Exhibit No. 8
Copy : ap.
January 13, 194.'..
No. 5.
The Honorable Patrick J. Hurley,
American, Ambassador, Chungking.
Sir: Officers in the Department have rend with interest and appreciation the
report entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guer-
rilla Bases," which was prepared by Second Secretary of Embassy John S. Service
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2477
and transmitted under cover <>f the Embassy's despatch do. 3022 of September
29, l'.Mt.
In view of the importance of the subject matter of tins report,- of the thoughtful
and comprehensive character of the study, and of the clear and logical manner
in which the information and views are presented, it is considered that the
report is of outstanding merit and usefulness to the Department. It has heen
given the grade Of ••Excellent."
Mr. Service, who is now in Washington, has heen informed of this commenda-
tion of his work.
Very truly yours,
(JGE)
(For the Secretary of State).
CA : ASC: MS.
1, 4/45.
Exhibit No. 9
Chungking, China, May 10, 19't5.
Subject : Letter of commendation.
To : The honorable the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Mr. John S. Service is highly commended for outstanding aid rendered Head-
quarters, United States Forces, China Theater, in advising the Commanding
General on political matters which have direct and important bearing on the
military situation in China. Mr. Service was influential in the establishment of
a Military Observer Group in Yenan, accompanying the initial group there him-
self. His thorough knowledge of Chinese customs and language enabled him to
develop and maintain cordial relations with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and other
Communist leaders. During his extended residence in l'enan he wrote a great
number of detailed reports on military, economic, and political conditions in
areas under Communist control, a field in which the American Government had
previously had almost no reliable information. He prepared valuable analyses
of the political situation as it affected the war potential of the Chinese Govern-
ment and by correlation that of the United States Forces in China.
In recognition of his outstanding performance of duty, the Commanding Gen-
eral, U. S. Forces, China Theater, expresses to Mr. Service the appreciation of
the United States Forces in China.
A. C. Wedemeyer,
Lieutenant General, V. S. A., Commanding.
Exhibit No. 10
Standard Form No. 64
Office Memorandum — United States Government
Date: June 16, 1947
To : FP— Mr. G. Ackerson, Jr. .
From : BC— Mr. E. T. Wailes.
Subject : John S. Service.
I quote the following excerpt from a personal letter received by Mr. Richards
from the Minister to New Zealand. Avra Warren :
"Service is doing a splendid job of work and is moving among people
in an eminently desirable way. While he has only made a few public
addresses so far, he presents himself in an entirely representative manner.
His remarks at the Memorial Day service held at the Anglo-Cathedral in
Wellington, with the Prime Minister present, were so well phrased and hail
such widespread support they were carried in the editorial space of the not
so friendly Wellington Evening Post."
We agree with Mr. Warren that John Service is doing an outstanding job
as First Secretary of the Legation at Wellington.
A. L. R.
BC: ALRichards: vg.
6S970— 50— pt. 2 64
T. W.
E. T. Wailes.
2478 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 11
Apkil 1, 1949.
Mr. Donald W. Smith,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State.
Dear Mb. Smith : On the eve of my departure from the States, I wish to
express my appreciation at having been given the valuable experience of serving
on a Selection Board, and to express my high regard for the performance and
ability and character of the other members of Selection Board "B" 1949. Dr.
Gordon A. Craig of Princeton University was an almost ideal public member,
bringing to his task a profound knowledge of international affairs and the
importance therein of a competent Foreign Service.
Foreign Service Officers Clarence C. Brooks, Parker T. Hart, and John S.
Service were also ideal. Brooks, with his long service experience and wide
acquaintance, his common sense and spirit of justice, was very helpful to the
Board in its deliberations.
Both Hart and Service worked almost double time in their determination to
insure that the Board would give a correct and just rating to the Foreign Service
officers available for promotion and in studying and drafting recommendations
which might be helpful to FP and the Board of Foreign Service for improving
the work of future Selection Boards.
These three men are splendid types of the American Foreign Service Officer.
Sincerely yours,
Donald R. Heath,
American Minister to Bulgaria.
Exhibit No. 12
Apkil 4, 1949.
John S. Sekvice, Esquire,
American Foreign Service Officer,
% Department of State. Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Service: I wish to thank you for the work which you completed as
a member of the 1949 Foreign Service Selection Board B.
In choosing the members of the Selection Boards, the Office of the Foreign
Service was fully aware that the arduous and exacting nature of the work that
would confront them, and its supreme importance, constituted a challenge to the
best that the Service could produce in the way of intelligence, fairmindedness,
and a realistic grasp of personnel problems. I am happy to say that yon met
this challenge with complete success.
The very existence of a career service such as ours is dependent upon the
confidence of its members in the absolute fairness and utter impartiality of the
manner in which promotions are made in it. You and your colleagues on the
I!i4!i Selection Boards have done much to enhance that confidence, and you have
earned the gratitude of the entire Foreign Service Officer corps.
Sincerely yours,
Christian M. Ravnal.
Director General of the Foreign Service.
OFS :FP :SHP»rowne :mgc.
Exhibit No. 13
Copy : ap.
Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of China,
April 18, 1950.
The Honorable, the Chairman of the Loyalty Security Board,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dim; S;i:: As an Americamborn Chinese, I have known for some thirty years
.Mr. and Mrs. Robert Roy Service, parents of the Hon. John Stewart Service, and
also him for over ten years in the United States and in China.
The late Mr. Robert R. Service was for probably two decades a secretary of the
International Committee of Y. M. C. A.'s (headquarters in New York) and served
i lost of that time as a Y. M. C. A. secretary in West China and Shanghai. He
had I raveled widely in all parts of China, beloved by thousands of Chinese of
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2479
all classes, Christian and Don. My family and I have been for many years
intimates of the Service family in Y. M. C. A.. Y. W. C. A., Church and Masonic
activities in China. In all these organizations, both father and son. the Services,
showed sympathetic understanding, and had a genius for friendship with the
Chinese people, especially with the underprivileged. These qualities character'
Hie whole Service family. I had come to know Robert and John Service quite
closely in community church and .Masonic lodges, and admire them for their
genuine humanitarian spirit, their devotion to the Protestant missionary enter-
prise in China and their Love of the Masonic Craft.
1 write this unsought testimonial, Sir. not just as a gesture of confidence in n
brother Mason, nor yet as a friend of Mr. John S. Service and his truly Christian
family, hut fundamentally as one who keenly appreciates his character to he
utterly alien to anything approaching Communist leanings, for I am firmly
convinced that his proud educational, cultural, family, and religious background
and professional career negate everything Communism stands for. I feel it is due
to Mr. Service, as well as to your Board, interested in ascertaining the facts
of that background, that I address you. for that background speaks louder than
words his loyalty to his country and the Protestant faith, of which all the
Services have been such outstanding exponents all their lives.
Aery respectfully,
Dr. H. C. Mei.
HCM : JMT.
Exhibit No. 14
March 1937
Frederick V. Field Owen Lattimore
Philip J. Jaffe Cyrus H. Peake
T. A. Bisson Rob it K. Reischauer
CITAo-ting Chi William T. Stone
Kenneth W. Colegrove Hester Lorn
March 191,0
Frederick V. Field Owen Lattimore
Philip J. Jaffe William W. Lockwood
T. A. Bisson Kate Mitchell
Lillian Peffer Cyrus H. Peake
Ch'Ao-ting Chi David H. Popper
Kenneth W. Colegrove William T. Stone
March 191,1
Frederick V. Field William W. Lockwood
Philip J. Jaffe Kate Mitchell
T. T. Bisson David H. Popper
Kenneth W. Colegrove William T. Stone
< >wen Lattimore
March 191,2
Frederick V. Field Kate Mitchell
T. A. Bisson G. Nye Steiger
Kenneth W. Colegrove Harold M. Vinacke
William W. Lockwood Benjamin H. Kizer
March 191,3
Frederick V. Field Kat Mitchell
Philip J. Jaffe G. Nye Steiger
T. A. Bisson Harold M. Vinacke
Kenneth W. Colegrove Benjamin H. Kizer
William W. Lockwood Harriet Moore
January 191,1,
Philip J. Jaffe K;;te Mitchell
2480 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Ex II I HIT 15
The Foreign Service of the United States of America
american embassy
102.91/6-349.
No. 218. Stockholm, June 3, 1949.
Unclassified.
Rec'd Jun. 13. Action Labor Enc. Info. FR. ITP. EUR. C.
Subject: Transmittal of Swedish test of 1949 agreement and English text of
1948 agreement with changes.
The honorable the Secretary of State, Washington.
Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department's A-102 dated April 16, 1949.
and A-144 dated May 27, 1949, requesting text of agreement reached between
Swedish Shipowners' Association and Swedish Seaman's Union, March 1949,
and to transmit the Swedish text of the 1949 agreement and the English text
of the 1948 agreement with marginal notations of all changes from the 1948
to the 1949 agreements.
This Embassy has had repeated assurances from the offices in Gothenburg
that the English text of the 1949 agreement would be in our hands shortly.
Copies will be forwarded in quantity as soon as possible.
Respectfully yours,
Hugh S. Cummixg, Jr.,
Counselor of Embassy,
(For the Ambassador).
Enclosures :
194S Agreement between Swedish Shipowners' and Seamen's Union
1949 Avtal Mellan Sveriges Redareforening och Svenska Sjofolksfbrbundet
OAPeterson : rep.
File No. 560.1.
DE.
Action copy. Return to DC/R files within 14 days, with a notation of action
taken.
AB.
Exhibit No. 16
Unclassified.
No. 13.
American Consulate General,
Tientsin, China, April 12, 1950.
Subject: Accounting Transactions of American Consulate General, Tientsin.
123 Wellborn, Alfred T.
17 Rec'd May 16. Action FE. Info. DCR. DS. DF. CS/P. CS. c.
The honorable the Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's despatch no. 11,
March 17, 1950 entitled "Final Accounting Transactions of American Consulate
General, Tientsin."
At the time despatch no. 11 was written it was believed that the last remain-
ing American member of the staff of this Consulate General would have left
Tientsin by the afternoon of March 17. However, two hours before my sched-
uled embarkation, the local authorities revoked my exit permit because of a
claim made on March 16 by the People's Government to certain furniture in the
United States Government premises here (see despatch no. 14, April 12, 1950).
The settlement of this issue took to April 8 and during that period certain addi-
tional transactions occurred.
As the duration of my enforced stay in Tientsin was indefinite and depended
entirely on the length of time necessary to come to terms with the local authori-
ties, the arrangement made with the British Consulate General, Tientsin, for
payment of last minute expenditures of this Consulate General was continued.
This arrangement was made inasmuch as the accounts of Disbursing Officer
■Gordon Tullock were closed March 13 preparatory to his departure which ac-
tually took place early on the morning of March 15. As I was to have left on
March 17, it was deemed preferable not to transfer to me the accounts for such
a short period.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2481
Bills paid in behalf of this Consulate General by the British Consulate General,
supported by vouchers and signed receipts, will he presented to the Department
for settlement through the British Foreign Office.
There has also been in this period ;i number of receipts of funds obtained from
the sale of United States Government property. A tabulation of these transac-
tions is as follows :
Exhibit No. 17
See transcript of proceeding for afternoon of May 27, 1050, commencing at
page 81.
Exhibit No. 18
Service
1. 5-14-412. Chungking.
Two memos.
The first is solely report to Con. Gen. of conversation.
■ Second is a similar report but with some interpretive comment, which is
factual and does not reveal bias.
Subject of both memos is the "Chinese Iudustrial Cooperatives."
2. 7-24-12. Chungking.
Despatch (called for) on propaganda and psychological warfare by
Chinese Gov't.
Generally factual and detailed. Received commendation from
Dep't Repeats some Communist criticism of Chinese Government
organs, which was probably accurate, as commies have generally
been perceptive and keen as critics of others, even when (and
especially whenj they were guilty of the same things, or worse.
3. 1-23-13.
Memo prepared in Dep't. A key document.
This is a thoughtful and well-written memo, pointing to the danger
of impending civil war in China, from both military and political
standpoints. While it relays, perhaps somewhat naively, certain
Communist suggestions for bettering the situation, it does not
recommend that these suggestions be accepted and followed up.
On the contrary, it recommends that U. S. officials be detailed to
the Communist-held area to provide the answers to a number of
questions concerning the Communists and conditions in the area
they hold. There was obviously no intent to influence the Gov-
ernment along pro-Communist lines, for the author complains
that such information as is available stemmed in part from
journalists "who appear to have a bias favorable to the Com-
munists." And he warns against any brief visits during which
our representatives "would be under the influence of official
guides."
4. 2-11-43.
Innerdepartmental memo drafted by S. and Smyth. Repeats briefly
warning of unfavorable course of events in China and points out that
"one possible course of action" might be sending U. S. representatives
to Communist areas. Warns that Chinese Gov't will probably not
sanction this, but will be resentful if it is done without its consent.
5. 8-6-13.
Despatch from Lanchow.
Called for report on Gold Market and Trading. Purely factual. No
political implications.
6. 8-6-43. Lanchow.
Reporting experiences of an American agricultural expert. Completely
nonpolitical. Points out exaggerated hopes for Chinese government
organs for U. S. aid and tendency to eidist that aid even when they
have no real need for it.
7. 8-16-43. Lanchow.
Reporting forced organization of professional people in Lanchow, for
purposes of extortion and political supervision. Unsparing of Party,
but factual. Essentially nonpolitical.
2482 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
S. 8-17-13. Lanehow.
On evidences of anti-Russian and anti-communist feeling in Chinese
officialdom. Seems to be purely factual. In describing the restric-
tions placed upon the local Soviet consul, Service was perhaps un-
aware that this sort of treatment had been accepted general practise
in the Soviet Union for at least a decade. Nevertheless, despatch
contains no statement condemning Chinese Gov't for this treatment.
9. S-17-43. Lanehow.
Service states that Soviet diplomatic representative has been very
friendly to himself and to Capt. Tolstoy "and his been willing to
discuss general problems with an oppenness and apparent frankness
rather unusual for our Russian colleagues". Otherwise, report con-
tains no independent comment by Service, and is restricted to a re-
counting of the views expressed by the Soviet representative.
10. 8-18-43. Lanehow.
Military notes. Purely factual. Describes deplorable state of Chinese
troops passing through city, and brutality with which they were
treated ; but description is impassive, and without independent com-
ment.
11. S-1S-43. Lanehow.
A report on political unrest and banditry in Kansu. Little relation
to communists. Report is detailed and factual.
12. 8-19-43.
Embassy at Chungking refers in a despatch to certain of Service's re-
ports. No comment on communists involved. Service speculates on
Chinese Government's plans with respect to communists. No bias
apparent.
13. 8-20-43. Lanehow.
On reception of U. S. broadcasts in Kansu. Factual and objective.
A long report on activities of local Chinese police with regard to for-
eigners : restrictions of movement, observation, curiosity, suspicion,
etc. Speaks of Chinese police using "Russian treatment of aliens
as a model."
115. 9-10-43. Stilwell mission.
Reporting statements made to Stilwell by Chinese (Nationalist) Gen-
eral, obviously sympathetic to communists. No independent com-
ment. Views expressed by General are somewhat similar to those
expressed by Service in item 3.
116. 9-23-43. Chungking.
Two interpretative memos by Service concerning Eleventh Plenary Ses-
sion of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
The memos subject the decisions of rhe gathering to a searching and
skeptical scrutiny, but the conclusions were borne out by subsequent
events.
(Note. — These memos should be compared with communist pub-
licity at the time).
117. 9-29-43. Chungking. Stilwell.
Describes the circumstances of the withdrawal of the communist rep-
resentative from a meeting of the People's Political Council, as repre-
sented by a communist source. Service adds no comment of his own.
lis. 10-27-43. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo asserting, and stating reasons why Chinese public opinion will
l e offended if Burma campaign is not soon inaugurated. No apparent
relation to communist problem.
119. 10 28- 13. Chungking. Stilwell.
Describes the bickering and bad blood between the Government and
the minority groups over the composition of the Committee for the
Establishment of Constitutional Government. Report is objective
and describes the Committee as "not a bad one: but states that "it
is a rather unfortunate omen that the committee is starting its
existence with a background of pettv and acrimonious politics."
120 11-13-43. Stilwell. (Military report).
Report on "willingness of Chinese Military leaders to become puppets."
An important memo, which should he compared with communist line
of tlie same period. Service rejects the communist thesis that the
Kuomintang was encouraging defection to the Japanese-occupied area
in order to improve their prospects for combatting the communists
after the war. Says this is the result rather than the design. Says
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2483
large-scale defections arc due primarily to Chiang's policy of placing
in front line war-lord forces which arc of doubtful loyalty to himself
and which, being mercenaries from the beginning, are naturally
amenable to Japanese promises of better pay and treatment.
121. 2-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Unimportant. Relaying of report that airport construction is causing
discontent in a certain district.
122. 2-3-44.
Memo from Kuomintang source about conspiracy against Chiang.
Questions Kuomintang tendency to blame communists.
123. 2-ir>-44. Chungking, stilwell.
Also about plot against Chiang. Adduces further proof that plot
existed, and that it was an inner-army affair.
124. 2-lo-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
A further report about the dissatisfaction caused by airport construc-
tion and Government's policies concerning compensation to land
owners and conscription of labor. Factual.
125. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Giving background on certain feelers for direct negotiations between
Government and communists. Factual. Reflects, like all of this
reporting, good contacts in the communist camp.
126. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting information released to correspondent by Government on
extent of Jap-controlled area. Points out that Government spokes-
man listed certain communist-controlled areas as entirely Jap-con-
trolled, evidently communist domination the more humiliating.
Service points to this as indication of bitterness now existing between
two factions.
127. 2-16-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting interview with Madame Sun-vat-sen. Factual.
128. 3-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Further report, detailed and objective, on Chinese unrest in Chengtu
arising out of construction of U. S. air bases. It is evident that
Chinese officials somewhere along the line are pocketing funds appro-
priated for compensation of conscripted labor, knowing that resulting
bitterness will attach largely to Americans ; but Service does not
charge this directly.
129 3-14-^14. Chungking. Stilwell.
Commentary on a report submitted by an OWI official from Kweilin.
Contains following significant passage:
"The wrar in China has stimulated political consciousness to the
point where loose separatism, which is the goal of the provincialists
and which will means a return to the chaos of the early years of
the Republic, is impossible. By present indications it does not seem
likely that the existing Kuomintang Government will collapse during
the war. But if the present conflict is followed, as does seem likely,
by civil war * * * out of this civil war * * * There can
be expected to emerge either a more progressive Kuomintang Gov-
ernment or a communist state, probably of the present modified
Chinese communist tvpe."
130. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Another interview with Madame Sun Yat-Sen. Purely factual. No in-
dependent comment.
131. 3-17-44. Chungking. Stillwell.
An excellent analysis of T. V. Soong's position — thoughtful and objec-
tive— acknowledged with special commendation by the Department.
132. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stillwell.
Commentory on another personal incident in the Chiang entourage.
Extremely moderate in tone, ending with the suggestion that "the
real importance of this story, and of the many similar ones regarding
the misdoings of the Soong-Kung family, is the readiness of the public
to believe them.
133. 3-14-44. Military.
Review of second edition of Chiang's book — '"China's Destiny." Points
out changes since first edition. Severely critical of book ("a bigoted.
narrow, strongly nationalistic effort at a special interpretation of
history") — says thai it reflects ••unchanged a bitter anti-communist
bias."
2484 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
134. 3-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on Chinese Territorial Claims in North Burma. Detailed, authori-
tative, analytical. "Chiang may have great ambition and vision.
But his statesmanship does not ordinarily go far beyond shrewd,
realistic, but often short-sighted bargaining."
135. 3-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on the rumored plan to reduce China's armies. Service is skep-
tical about this.
"China remains a country where life is valued very little, where cor-
ruption is deep-rooted and prevalent, where economics have been con-
sistently ignored or not understood, where power derives from military
strength and that strength is measured in numbers, where the interests
and welfare of the people have not (except perhaps in Communist North
China) been a concern of their rulers and where the basic, overriding
consideration is the struggle for power."
Discusses incident of bombing of Chinese forces in Sinkiang, obviously
by planes having something to do with the Soviet Union. Reflects a
certain naivete about Soviet Union in assumption that Soviet Kazakhs
might have taken initiative in Sinkiang and that Soviet Government,
might have been "willing to lend a little unofficial assistance."
137. 3-23-44. Military.
Reporting views of Chiang Kai-shek ; critical of Chang's attitude but
offers explanation for it. Concludes Chiang is responsible for situ-
ation in China and will continue in his present ways until the U. S.
formulates and applies a strong China policy. Analysis appears ob-
jective and unbiased. (Chiang mentions Amerasia.)
138. 3-22-44. Military.
More about bombing incident in. Sinkiang. Warns against U. S. in-
volvement, particularly if we want to run convoy through that area.
139. 4-5-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
More on bombing incident. Without particular interest.
140. 3-26-44. Military.
Transmitting report prepared by Englishman who had been residing
in communist area.
141. 4-1-44. Military.
Memorandum. Miscellaneous news items. Purely factual.
142. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Chungking Embassy despatch transmitting memo on situation in Sink-
iang. Specially commended by Department. Objective analysis of
Chinese Nationalist Govei-nment's motives in the Sinkiang incidents
and the success of the move. Service's recommendations include:
"We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia
are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a care-
ful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support
of the Chinese communists. But in determining our policy toward
Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initia-
tive must be kept firmly in our hands." . . . "Chiang unwittingly
may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by
internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form,
will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to
Russia. By doing so, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only
North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such or Korea
and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets."
143. 4-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Transmitting text of an interview with General Lung Yun. No com-
ments.
144. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo reporting views held by leaders of some of the minor parties of
China. Service's comments relate only to the relative importance of
these minor parties and are purely factual.
145. 5-18-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Service's critique of a Military Intelligence Dispatch. Objectively
points out fallacies in the MI dispatch. Outlines activities of Na-
tionalist Government in attempting to discredit the Communists in a
purely tactual manner. Makes three points: (1) that there is a
fundamental conflict between Communists and Japanese and puppets;
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2485
(2) Kuomintang is attempting to convince foreign opinion thai Com-
munists are in league with Japs and puppets; (3) thai Kuomintang
actually is in (-(intact with Japs and expects puppel support. Justi-
fies his points factually. (Rated Very Good in Department.)
146. 5-21 1-44. Chungking. St dwell.
Memo on plan to bring Chinese-American technicians to China. States
objections to plan factually. Totally nonpolitical.
147. 5-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo offering possible drawbacks to U. S. Army plan to pay benefits to
families of Chinese soldiers killed in Burma. Nonpolitical.
148. 5-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo recount ins rumors of domestic trouble in the Chiang Household.
Factual reporting.
140. 5-11-44. Military.
Transmitting a speech of Chou En-Lai ; summary without comment.
150. 5-12-44. Military.
Memo on effects of Japanese victories in Honan. States objectively
various interpretations which will be placed upon this in Chinese
circles.
151. ."-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Military.
Transmitting translation of statement of League of Democratic Parties.
Summary without comment.
152. ."►-25-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Recounting views of Lin Tsu-han. Chairman of Yenan Border Govern-
ment. Presented without comment.
153. 5-25-44. Military.
Transmitting information on the status of communist negotiations with
the Central Government as received from the Communists. Presented
without comment.
154. 5-31-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Factual account of an interview with Counselor of French Delegation
at Chungking. Reported without comment of political nature.
155. 6-0-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo of interview with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, presenting Marshal's
views without comment as to their validity. Purely factual.
156. 6-7-44. Military.
Presentation of the views of David An on Chinese Treatment of Koreans.
Reported without comment or interpretation.
157. 6-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Important memo, widely circulated with favorable comment in De-
partment. Strong denunciation of the weakness, corruption, and
venality of Kuomintang. Apparently written partly from exaspera-
tion at the Nationalist Government but criticism appears to be justi-
fied. Only political bias visible is that of American official trying to
turn China into an asset to the American war effort. Encourages
American contact with Communists as with other minor parties and
liberal elements to stimulate the Knomintang to a reform program.
No interest displayed in Communism as a movement in itself. Con-
tact with Communisr areas desirable from an intelligence standpoint
in the war effort. * * * "We should select men of known liberal
view to represent us in OWL cultural relations and other lines of
work in China."
158. 6-23-44. Military.
Memo of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and V. P. Wallace,
J. C. Vincent, Gen. Ferris, Owen Lattimore, and JSS. Factual
account.
159. 6-24-44. Military.
Reporting communist agreement to the sending of a U. S. "observers'
section" to Yenan. Objective report of communist views on the
matter, presented without bias or comment.
160. 7-6-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on communist map showing contraction of communist-held terri-
tory. Service cites contemporary Central Government map which
contradicts Communist claim. Illustrates distortions of Central
Government map and comments that communist map may not be
more than generally true and may not give whole picture. Objec-
tive, without political coloration.
2486 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
161. 7-11-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo transmitting a report from communist sources on communist
military operations against Japan during May 1944. Relayed without
evaluation although several Japanese news items are submitted in
connection with the report as some possible confirmation of com-
munist claims. No political implications.
162. 7-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo transmitting a personal letter from Chinese intellectual express-
ing disillusionment with present Chinese regime and hopes of con-
structive American aid. JSS feels letter reflects present state of
mind of large part of Chinese intellectuals and liberals. Objective
presentation, pointing out strength as well as weakness of viewnoint
163. 7-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Transmitting a statement of Chinese intellectuals "Appeal for Revolu-
tionary Democratic Rights." Covering memo indicates approval of
intellectuals' denunciation of Kuomialang suppression of freedom
of speech, thought, study, and expression.
164. S-26-44. Chungking. Stillwell. Yenan.
Memo of first impi t ssions of Yenan. Is highly favorable in comparison
with Kuomintang-held areas. '-There is a bit of smugness, self-
righteousness, and conscious fellowship" * * * but "most modern
place in China." "What is seen in Yenan is a well-integrated move-
ment, with a political and economic program which it is successfully
carrying out under competent leaders. * * * One cannot help
coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful and that
it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people
that it will not easily be killed." Service understandably favorably
impressed by comparison between Yenan and Kuomintang areas in
matter of material conditions, morale, and efficiency.
165. 8-26-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Memo of conversation with Mao Tse-Tung in Yenan in which Mao
sounded Service on the possibility of opening an American consulate
in Yenan. Factual reporting.
166. 9-1-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Transmitting reports of interviews with various Chinese communist
leaders. Factual.
167. 9-1-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Transmitting report of interview with Chief of Chinese General Staff.
Factual account of diametrical opposition of views between com-
munists and National Government.
168. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Important memo outlining Services interpretation of communist
motives. Inclines to think the best of communists. Offers arguments
in opposition t<> this attitude but explains why he does not feel the
opposing arguments are justifiable. Believes the CCP aims for
orderly prolonged progress to eventual socialism, not violent revolu-
tion, and in achieving that aim will not seek an early monopoly of
political power but considers first the long-term interests of China.
Service shows a certain naivete in his grasp of Marxist doctrine
and ignorance of some changes incorporated in that doctrine during
and after Lenin's time, e. g., that capitalist development is an
unavoidable stage of economic development. Service believes the
CCP will initiate (or had initiated) a type of NEP program which
will last indefinitely into the future — ignoring or ignorant of the
fate of NEP in the U. S. S. R. Appears to be an objective analysis of the
situation. (The conclusions appear to he what might be expected
from one judging on the basis of Chinese experience only, not with
reference to experience with communist seizures of power elsewhere, i
The Chungking Embassy takes issue with Service's views that the
CCP is not aiming for a monopoly of power in the near future.
169. 8-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo reporting on economic conditions in communist-controlled North
Shensi. Tone is favorable toward achievement hut information is
presented in factual manner without comment.
170. 9-19-44. Chungking Observer Section in Yenan.
Memo on Chieh Fang Jih Pao, communist newspaper in Yenan.
Submitted without comment save that the paper was well edited and
of high caliber. Unimportant.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOl U.I V INVESTIGATION 2487
171. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observer Section in yenan.
Memo summarizing lectures given by the Communist General, Chief of
Staff of 18th Croup, to officers of U. S. Army Observers Section re-
garding the situation behind the enemy lines in North China. Service
comments only on the fact that the communist army is a political
army as much .is it is military. Factual.
172. 9-21-44. Chunking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report designating communist-controlled areas of China. No political
comment.
173. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting report of a reception given the Observers Section. No
political comment. Unimportant.
174. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on communist charges against Gen. YTen Hsi-shan. Details
given factual without apparent bias.
175. 7-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Reporting on inauguration of daily news broadcasts from Yenan.
Purely factual.
176. 8-24-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting map of communist border area. No comments.
177. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Well conceived analysis of the strength of the communist movement
with the recomendation that American military aid be extended to
the Communist forces, to aid in the struggle against Japan. Service
expects the Knomintang will object to such aid and stated the U. S.
must soon formulate a policy to decide the question of this aid,
keeping in mind that "the nature, policies and objectives of the
CCP are of vital long-term concern to the U. S." ; the "CCP under
any circumstances must he counted a continuing and important
influence in China." Arguments in favor of extending aid are pre-
sented factually. The interview with Mao transmitted with this
dispatch indicates Service's views regarding the question of U. S.
relationship with the CCP parallel to a certain etxent those of Mao
himself. Service specifies his reasons.
178. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lecture by communist military leader on strength, distribu-
tion and arms of communist forces. Factual account.
179. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lectures by communist military leader on operations of 8th
Route Army. Factual account without comment other than to point
out the importance the commu-nists attach to political programs as
the hasis of their military strength and success.
180. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on possible usefulness of old communist bases in Southeast
China. Objective account of facts. Specifies in connection with
communist reasoning on matter that "it would be a mistake to assume
that the communist consideration of the problem is all on the high-
minded and unselfish plane." No political bias apparent.
181. 10-2—14. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo on personal impressions of communist leaders. Highly favorable
of the personal qualities of these men. (Strikingly like the impres-
sions of the old Bolsheviks which foreign observers acquired at the
time of the Russian Revolution). Service's favorable attitude obvi-
ously in part stems from the contrast with Knomintang leaders.
Apparently unaware of the potential dangerousness of the type of
character molded in the communist school, especially when the CCP
holds the reins of power. Objective in all.
182. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on the popular appeal of the communist party. Outlines tactics
employed by the communists which win popular support, i. e.
reduced rents, elimination of banditry, popular election of officials,
and converting the army from instrument of oppression to one of aid
to peasantry. Service views the accomplishments with favor tempered
with reserve. Can find no other explanation of popular backing of
the communists. (NB. Service apparently consider "democracy"
as synonymous with popular support, a definition which would apply
to Hitler's regime as well. On basis of this definition, Service's opin-
ion that the CCP is democratic is justifiable.)
2488 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
183. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Extremely well-balanced report oh the development of communist
political control in areas under their domination. (Rated Excellent
in Department.) Report is well-rounded, presents a factual picture
and appears to be very perceptive in divining the purpose of com-
munist actions in many fields. Explains both how the communist
program wins popular support and at the same time serves com-
munist interests. No political bias evident and no effort to condemn
•or praise. Factual reporting. (Should be noted that CA's com-
ments in Department on Service's reporting consistently put com-
munist in quotation marks, implying something distinct from the
Soviet brand. No evidence of this attitude has yet appeared in anv
of Service's work.)
184. 10-9-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Reports decision of CCP to change its name in foreign publicity to avoid
the stigma of "communism.'" Service interprets it as a desire "to
allay any foreign fears and to win foreign good-will." No political
comment otherwise.
185. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting communist views on treatment of Japan. No comment
made but appears to be evident that Service accepts sincerity of com-
munist spokesman and feels views expressed are honest aims of CCP.
186. 10H25^4. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Interview with CIC of communist military forces. Service states "I
am in general agreement with the views expressed by such com-
munist leaders as Gen. Chu. Every effort, however, has been made
to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to point out the prac-
tical difficulties in the way of direct cooperation and to suggest that
Japan may be defeated in other ways than as the communists insist,
a slow process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland."
Chu's views followed the usual pattern that cooperation with the
Kuomintang was impossible and U. S. strong role necessary in China.
187. 9-27-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report of interview with Hungarian national. No political content.
18S. 9-28-44. Yenan.
Memo on the orientation of the Chinese communists toward the USSR
and toward the U. S. Key document. Essentially, reasons that CCP
orientation is exclusively pro-China. Ties with the USSR are of
the past. Interests of the CCP are best served by cultivating ties
with the U. S. which can aid the industrialization of China. USSR
can't and China can't do it alone. Service states "I believe that the
Chinese Communists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity
on the basis of American support. This does not preclude their
turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to
survive American-supported Kuomintang attack." Service's account
appears to be an eminently fair statement of communist views as evi-
dent at that time — his conclusions, a reasoned choice between the
lesser of two evils. Reveals ignorance of some of the finer points
of communist doctrine, particularly in regard to the manner in which
Marxism is to be applied outside the USSR.
189. 10-1-44. Yenan.
Transmission of communist newspapers. No comments.
190. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo on communist success in eliminating banditry- Cites communist
explanation for this situation — economic improvement, mobilization
of enitre population in Ibe war effort and removal of feudal basis of
banditry — as only apparent explanation for its elimination. Objective
reporting.
191. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Reports of impresisons of American medical officer and several foreign
correspondents on popular support in communist areas. Presented
without comment.
192. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Transmission of memos on conditions in communist areas and on Com-
munist-Kuomintang relations. Service's observations are, that the
communists are fighting the Japanese, successfully because they have
the people behind them mobilized. Mobilization based on economic,
political and social revolution, gains of which the people will fight
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2489
to keep. Kuomintang will be unable to repress these mobilized people
or the communists as long as the Latter have popular support. Com-
munists will continue to be important part of China's future and unless
Kuomintang institutes extensive reforms (unlikely) Communists
will be dominant force in China in a few years. Service's observa-
tions have been borne out by subsequent events.
193. 10-10-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Important memo on need for realism in U. S. relations with Chiang.
Anti-Chiang, not pro-communist. Holds Kuomintang dependent on
U. S., U. S. not dependent on Kuomintang. AYe do not need it mili-
tarily, we do not need to fear its opposition or fall or its international
importance. Chiang does not represent pro-American or democratic
groups, we owe him no gratitude and be understands only force.
Need bard-boiled policy toward him to aid U. S. war effort. Only
reference made to communists is that "we cannot hope to solve China's
problems without consideration of the opposition forces, Communist,
Provincial, and liberal." Service's denunciation is strong but based
exclusively on the urgency of aiding the American war effort in the
Pacific. No indication of political bias towards any faction, only
against Kuomintang corruption and power politics. A tendency to
underplay usefulness of Kuomintang to the U. S. war effort and dis-
count any worth in the movement.
194. 10-10-44. Yenan.
Memo on communist interception of State Department radio bulletin.
No political comments.
195. 11-24-44. Yenan.
Memo on present communist attitude toward relations with Kuomintang.
Service displays great insight into tactics of communists in increas-
ing demands as the situation turns more in their favor. Reveals
acute observation and understanding of the power politics involved.
No personal comments of political nature appended.
196. 10-15-44. Yenan.
Memo regarding censorship of escape stories coming out of communist
territory. Unimportant.
197. 10-17-44. Yenan.
Memo transmitting the published policies and administrative program
of the CCP. No comments.
198. 10-18-44. Yenan.
Memo on communist propaganda use of statements of foreign corre-
spondents. Deplores the extravagant statements made by some
promising American aid to the communists, but comments on the
fact that many correspondents have been converted to a pro-com-
munist attitude. Unimportant.
199. 10-21-44. Yenan.
Transmitting communist newspapers. No comments.
•200. 11-8-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views
on Japanese communists. Appears to be purely factual information.
Service states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese
communists, apparently out of Yenan to Chungking for relay else-
where. No elaboration.
201. 11-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service on Washington consultation. Views on prob-
able developments in North China in the event of a U. S. landing.
States that communists will cooperate with allied troops as long as
allies do not interfere with their politics. Will not allow military
considerations to prejudice their political program. Service suggests-
however "that it would be well to put out a rather large number of
U. S. officers." since the communist area is decentralized. Chiefly
factual evaluations.
202. 11-8-44. Washington.
Interrogation of Service while on Washington consultation. Predomi-
nantly factual information. Service states "China's first need is:
economic development, and U. S. must do it. Russian help would
divide China, but U. S. will unite them.'' * * * "Chinese com-
munists are not radical at present. They are still Marxists, but are
against subjectivism. Marxism points to. ideal socialism." Little
political comment.
2490 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
203. 2-12-45. Chungking — for Wedemeyer.
Military only.
204. 2-14-45. Chungking — for Wedemeyer.
Memo on military weakness of our Far Eastern policy. States recom-
mendations to aid communists parallel Churchill's policy in Yugo-
slavia, aiding the faction which would assist most in the war effort.
Support of Chiang is only a means to an end but we tend to confuse
the means with the end. We must clarify issue to restore our primary
objective, defeat of Japan with smallest possible loss of life. Well-
constructed analysis of situation.
205. 2-14-45. Chungking.
Recount of the current status of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations.
Purely factual reporting.
206. 2-16-45. Chungking.
Views of Russian officials in China. No comments.
207. 2-17-45. Chungking.
Memo on Kuomintang hopes to make a deal with Russia. Service's
opinions are contradicted by later events but analysis is interesting.
Feels USSR will not deal with Kuomintang in view of its decided
objections to the regime, no likely quid pro quo exists and besides
Chinest Communists are stronger than Kuomintang. Unaware that
USSR would be willing to sacrifice interests of a local communist
party for Soviet interests.
208. 2-17^5. Chungking.
View of Sun Fo. No comments or analysis.
200. 2-19-45. Chungking.
Memo on Chinest feelers regarding Formosa. Purely factual.
210. 8-28-45. Chungking.
Criticism of proposal to declare Shanghai an open city. Military interest
primarily. Good analysis. No political application.
211. 2-28-45. Chungking.
Views of Captain (Joseph) Alsop. Diametrically opposed to Service's
opinions. Alsop argued on the line that U. S. long-range interests
were more important than the immediate ones of winning the war ;
that long-range interests involved allying China on our side as a
balance against Soviet influence — our greatest threat — and destruction
of the Chinese communists. Believed in necessity of getting involved
in the inevitable civil war which would follow from U. S. complete
backing of Kuomintang against communists.
212. 3-4-45. Chungking. Military.
Request to visit Yenan. No political coloration.
213. 3-21-45. Chungking.
Memo of communist attitude toward Central Government. Notes change
in CCP attitude toward U. S. cooperation in China and possibility
of cooperation with Kuomintang. Service notes this change dates
from Stilwell's departure. Communist expansions southward fol-
lowed belief that U. S. would support only Chiang. Notes communists
seem to be expecting large-scale Japanese activity in North China
and are gtting out of way of these Japanese efforts to consolidate
on mainland. Communist determination to control China proper
growing.
214. 3-13-45. Yenan.
Views of Mao Tse-tung. Factual reporting. Opinions similar to those
expressed in earlier papers.
215. 3-14-45. Yenan.
Memo on communist expectations of Soviet aid and participation in
the Pacific war at a late date. Probable course of military tactics
to be followed by communists. Notes that communists will strive
to gain control of Manchuria, that they have already infiltrated
the area, because of its industrial importance. (Feeling that CCP
did not expect USSR to strip Manchuria, as CCP intended to have
benefits of its industrial potential.) Factual analysis.
216. 3-16-45. Yenan.
Transmission of communist views regarding Sinkiang. Relayed with-
out comment.
217. 3-16-45. Yenan.
Communist views on Mongolia. Transmitted without comment.
STATE DEPAKTMKXT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2491
21S. 3-16 45. Yenan.
Policy of ilic Chinese communists toward the problem of aational minor-
ities. Service states that while communists claim their program is
based on Sun Y;it-Sen's. in actuality it is based directly on that of
the Russian communists (from whom Sun got most of his ideas).
Service feels thai some of these ideas I Stalin's ".Marxism and National
Question") may be unworkable in China because some of China's
minority nations exist close to other strong states and because China
is weaker than Russia was at time of 1917 revolution.
219. 3-17-45. yenan.
Communist plans for a relief and rehabilitation organization in com-
munist liberated areas. Nocomments. Purely factual.
220. 3-17-4.-.. Yenan.
Evidence to substantiate communist claims as to the extent of territory
under their control. American observers evidence. No political com-
ment. Purely tactual reporting.
221. 3-19-45. Yenan.
Comments on communist report of Kuomintang exile government organi-
zations in parts of China. Analysis of moves shows no political bias.
Factual reporting.
2J2. 3-20— to. Yenan.
Transmitting information regarding dealings of Chinese Central Gov-
ernment military official with the Japanese. No political coloration
evident.
223. 3-21-45. Yenan.
Memo on Chian Kai-shek's treatment of the Kwangsi Clique. Decidedly
critical of Chiang's activities. Service's interpretation not necessarily
accurate — CA disputes some points. Memo involves no mention of
our references to communist movement. Factual reporting.
224. 3-22-1.1. Yenan.
Significance of personnel appointments made by Chiang. Service inter-
prets these appointments are signs that Chiang is preparing for civil
war with the communists, rather than peaceful cooperation. Factual.
22.".. 3-23-4.".. Yenan.
Memo on contact between the Chinese communists and Moscow. Serv-
ice's interpretation is good. Gives known facts and distinguishes be-
tween governmental contacts and contact between communist parties.
Appears to be a realistic view of situation. Service feels communists
probably do not have relations with Soviet Government hut contact
between the Soviet CP and the Chinese is likely to exist.
226. 4-1-45. Y'enan.
Statement of communist policy to be adopted by the communist congress
as given by Mao and other leaders, offered without political observa-
tions other than to point out highlights.
2U7. 3-18-4.-.. Yenan.
Memo on establishment of unified labor organizations and women's
groups for the communis liberated areas. Factual account with com-
ment that this step constituted a direct challenge to the Central Gov-
ernment, almost bringing the future conflict into the open. No political
bias evident.
Exhibit No. 19
[Doc. 327]
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Incorporated
1 East 54th Street, New Yokk 22, N. Y.
Membership Card of
Mr. John S. Service,
American Consulate General
Calcutta, India
For year ending February 1951.
Amount $15.00.
Donald B. Straus, Treasurer.
Per Tillie S. Sladk.
Assistant Treasurer.
This card serves as your receipt
2492 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Exhibit No. 20
The State Department Espionage Case
(By Emmanuel S. Larsen)
WHO IS LARSEN?
Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen was catapulted into the international lime-
light early in June 1945, when as an official of the State Department he
was one of the six arrested by the FBI under the provisions of the Espion-
age Act. Born in 1897 in San Rafael, California, of Danish parentage,
Larsen was taken to China in 190(3 by his father who went there to teach
at the Imperial University in Chengtu. After a boyhood in China,
Larsen completed his college education in Copenhagen. Returning to
China he spent nearly twenty years in private and government service.
Back in the United States in 1935, he soon joined the Office of Naval
Intelligence in Washington as a civilian expert on Far Eastern affairs.
Behind the now-famous State Department Espionage Case, involving the arrest
of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the nation on June
7, 1945, is the story of a highly organized campaign to switch American policy in
the Far Fast from its long-tested course to the Soviet line. It is a story which
has never been told before in full. Many sensational though little-explained de-
velopments, such as the General Stilwell Affair, the resignation of Undersecretary
Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-
Soviet bloc in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced
with the Case of the Six, as the episode became known.
I have devoted many months to a plodding investigation of the case in which
I had become entangled, primarily to rehabilitate my reputation and to establish
my complete innocence. I have collaborated with < Jongressman George Dondero
of Michigan, who sponsored the creation of the House Committee which is about
to undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances of the disposition of the State
Department Espionage Case, and have offered my fullest cooperation to the chair-
man of that committee, Congressman Samuel Hobbs. In the course of my own
explorations, I have uncovered sufficient material to convince me that further
probing into the matter might assume proportions even more far-reaching than
those of the Pearl Harbor Investigation.
It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the Espionage Case which
the Congress has directed the Hobbs Committee to investigate. But from behind
that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon
Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it. That operation vitally affects our
main ramparts in the Pacific. In consequence of this operation General Marshall
was sent on a foredoomed mission to China designed to promote Soviet expansion
on our Asiatic frontier. It was a mission which could not but come to grief
and which may yet bring untold sorrow to the American people.
How did it happen that the United States began to turn in 1944 upon its loyal
ally, the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had for seven years fought Japan,
and to assume the sponsorship of the rebel Communist regime which collaborated
with the Japanese during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact?
How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist
Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of
China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce
Earl Browder and William Z Foster into key positions in the United States
government?
How did it transpire that our top-ranking military leader. General Marshall,
should have promoted an agreement in China under which American officers
would be training and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time
when they were ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over
were waging a war of nerves upon the United States?
Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under-
secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And
was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind
alley and retirement?
The answers to all of these questions came to me as I unraveled the main
threads of the tangled State Department Espionage Case. But many more ques-
tions still remain to be solved.
On June 7, 1945. while a tense nation was entering upon the climax of the war
with Japan, and exactly five weeks before the atomic bomb was dropped upon
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2493
Hiroshima, our country was shaken by an announcement From Washington: the
FBI had the previous night arrested on charges of violating the .Espionage Act
two State Department officials, one Naval Intelligence officer and three New York
journalists.
I was arrested in my home in Washington the evening of June *>, after a hard
day's work in the State Department where I was employed as a research expert
In Chinese affairs. When two FBI agents knocked at the door of our modesl
apartment as 1 sat down to dinner with my wife Thelnia and our little daughter
Linda. 1 could not believe it and thought it was some sort of a joke when they
informed me that I was under arrest.
The search of my home lasted late into the night, and it provided the saddest
hours of our lives. After a gruelling interrogation, I was brought, still in a
state of utter bewilderment, to the office of the United States Commissioner.
There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure
in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department, and to
Lieut. Andrew Roth, liaison officer between the Office of Naval Intelligence and
the State Department, whom I also knew as an adherent of pro-Soviet policies.
Both of them were arrested separately the same night in Washington.
In New* Y'ork that night of June 6 three other arrests were made simultaneously.
Philip Jacob Jaffe, publisher and editor of the obscure magazine Amerasia^
specializing in Far Eastern affairs, was picked up after a raid on his offices.
At the same time Kate Louise Mitchell, coeditor of Amerasia, a companion and
intimate collaborator of Jaffe's for years, was put under arrest. Another col-
league of Jaffe, the journalist Mark Julius Gayn, a contributor on the Far East
to Amerasia and leading national magazines, was also taken into custody in
New York.
The search in the offices of Amerasia yielded a trove of more than 100 files
containing, according to Congressman Dondero, top secret and highly confiden-
tial papers stolen from the State Department. War Department, Navy Depart-
ment. Office of Strategic Services. Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, and
the OWI at a time when we were at war with both Germany and Japan. Mr.
Dondero described some of these documents before the House of Representatives
on April 18th last as follows:
'"First. One document marked 'secret' and obviously originating in the Navy
Department dealt with the schedule and the targets for the bombing of Japan.
This particular document was known to be in the possession of Philip Jaffe dur-
ing the early spring of 1945 and before the program had been effected. That in-
formation in the hands of our enemies could have cost us many precious American
lives.
"Second. Another document, marked 'top secret' and likewise originating in
the Navy Department, dealt with the disposition of the Japanese fleet subsequent
to the major naval battle of October 1944 and gave the location and class of each
Japanese warship.
'•Third. Another document, stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph
Censorship, was a secret report on the Far East and so stamped as to leave no
doubt in anybody's mind that the mere possession of it by an unauthorized per-
son was a clear violation of the Espionage Act.
'•Fourth. Another document was stolen from the Office of Military Intelligence
and consisted of 2'2 pages containing information obtained from Japanese pris-
oners of war. When our military officials question prisoners of war, it is for
the purpose of getting secret military information of the enemy's plans.
"Fifth. Another stolen document, particularly illuminating, and of present
great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing
complete disposition of the units in the army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located,
how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and
shewing their military strength. It is easy to visualize the consequences of this
information in the hands of the Communist forces in China, then and now."
As disclosed by Congressman Dondero, one of the documents was "of such
exceptional military importance and so closely guarded in its limited transmis-
sion that it was delivered personally into the hands of the Chief of the Office of
Naval Intelligence." Many of the confidential papers here this imprint:
''This document contains information affecting the national defense of
the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act. 50, United States
Code 31-32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents
in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
In the offices of Amerasia. which boasted a total circulation of 1.700, the govern-
ment agents found a large photocopying department, the operation of which,
68970 — 50 — i»t. 2 65
2494 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
according to Congressman Dondero, could not possibly have been an essential
part of the business of such a limited publication. ''This department," stated
Mr. Dondero, "was working through the night, in the small hours of morning
and even on Sundays." Where these photostats went and how far they traveled
is one of the several pivotal mysteries awaiting solution in the whole case.
Probably not one informed American in 20,000 had ever heard of Amerasia.
P>ut those of us who had to do with research or policy-making in the field of our
international relations in Asia were well aware of the potent influence this
almost unknown publication exercised upon the conduct of American foreign
policy.
The magazine first came to my attention during my employment as an analyst
in Chinese affairs in the Office of Naval Intelligence, where I had served for
about nine years from October 1935* to September 1944. After having spent
nearly twenty-five years of my life in China, where my father was a university
instructor and where I grew up and mastered Chinese like a native, I returned
to the United States. Before entering the government service, I did post-gradu-
ate work at the University of Chicago and later at Columbia University on a
Rockefeller scholarship.
It was during the war, while working in the Office of Naval Intelligence as a
civilian, that circumstances led me unsuspectingly to my fateful meeting with
Philip Jaffe, the dominant figure in the Espionage Case.
One of the officers I had met in the Far Eastern branch of the Naval Intelli-
gence was a brilliant young man, Andrew Roth, who had been commissioned a
junior lieutenant after completing a special course in the Japanese language.
My friendship with Roth, who was a youth of 26, never became intimate. We
frequently lunched together. Occasionally we met in the evening for a pot-luck
dinner and a good argument.
Roth knew my special hobby, as did many of my associates and acquaintances.
Ever since 1923 I had been collecting path ntly f om every conceivable source
biographical data on Chinese personalities, military and political, and my file
of several thousand cards contained oft'-the-record material about the careers of
the chief figures in the great drama of modern China.
* * *
One day Roth came to my desk in the Navy Department around noon time and
asked me whether I had had my lunch. As I was free, I accepted his invitation
to join him for a snack. While we walked up Pennsylvania Avenue, Roth asked
me whether I knew Philip Jaffe, the publisher and editor of Amerasia. My an-
swer being in the negative, he remarked that Jaffe was a friend of his and that he
was interested in the biographies of Chinese leaders, so that the two of us should
have a lot in common.
Roth suggested that I get together with Jaffe who was in a position to trade
information with me about personalities. When asked how I could meet Jaffe,
he smilingly informed me that Jaffe was in Washington that day, that he, Roth,
was just then on his way to meet him for luncheon, and that he would be glad
to take me along and introduce me.
We walked over to the Statler Hotel and met Jaffe in the lobby. First we
had a cocktail in his room and then we had lunch in the restaurant. We dis-
cussed the conditions under which we could exchange information about Chinese
leaders. Jaffe said that he visited Washington about once a month and that he
would ask me on these visits for certain biographical material. If I didn't have
it ready on my cards, I would prepare it for him and he would pick it up on his
next trip. In return, he would supply me with information about the individuals
I was studying. I was quite happy to have this new source of information,
especially since I expected to get data on the Communist figures in China, a little-
known field.
Most of the China experts in the Office of Naval Intelligence were satisfied with
(he superficial and generally negligible official biographies, whereas what I
sought for my collection was the "dirt" about a man's career, the unpublished
facts about his past and the real reasons for his switching from one faction to
another. I had a hard time explaining to my superiors the importance of collect-
ing such data about China, which was governed not so much by ideologies as by
personalities.
It was not until after my arrest a year later, when I went over in my mind
again and again the various conversations I had had with Roth, that I began
to question the seeming coincidence of my meeting with Jaffe. I asked myself
why Roth, who had been so interested in bringing us together for the exchange
of information, never once inquired afterwards about my relations with Jaffe.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2495
Ii now occurred to me that Roth's avoidance of the subjecl was not quite normal.
And ever sine*' I have been pestered by the thought: "Had not that casual
meeting with Jaffe, which brought so much distress to me, been carefully pre-
arranged'.-"
After meeting Jaffe, I naturally began to follow Amerasia with increased
interest. Often I was surprised to discover how closely the situation in Asia as
presented in Jaffe's magazine corresponded to that given by our naval and mili-
tary attaches and by the State Department's field representatives in China.
In June 1!)44 Amerasia came out with a sharp attack on Undersecretary Grew,
who was opposed to the proposed bombing of Emperor Hirohito's palace and who
v\;as reputed to favor the retention of the monarchy after the defeat of Japan
as a stabilizing element in the Far East. This view of Mr. Grew's, which Gen-
eral MacArthur later put into effect, was a challenge to the pro-Soviet group in
the China Section, whose objective was internal revolution in Japan.
Never having been identified with any Communist organization or "front," I
did not suspect anything untoward in the attack upon Mr. Grew. I did notice,
however, that Roth had taken a deep interest in Jaffe's criticism of the Under-
secretary. Roth told me that he was working on a book in which he would
arraign Grew's policies.
I ascribe the auti-Grew campaign to the differences between the Grew
school in the State Department which favored a stable Japan as the keystone
of American postwar policy in the Pacific and the school which favored a strong
China as our best security in Asia.
When Jaffe came to Washington on his next trip, he invited me and my wife
to dinner at a Chinese restaurant. In the course of our conversation he told
me that he was worried by a report that Undersecretary Grew had been angered
by the attack in Amerasia. It was obvious that the report had come to him
from an inside source in the State Department.
At the same time Vice President Henry A. Wallace was dispatched on a mission
to China, the main purpose of which was to induce Chiang Kai-shek to form a
united front with the Communist insurgents. The mission followed upon the
outbreak of the so-called Kazak incident in the early part of 1944 in which Soviet
Russia was involved.
The American public was not allowed to know the facts reported by American
observers in China, namely, that Moscow bad come to the aid of the Chinese
Communists in the remote Sinkiang province by engineering an uprising there.
This was two years before the Iran Incident. It was done to divert Nationalist
troops from the Communist areas. Five full divisions were sent by Chiang
Kai-shek into Sinkiang. thus weakening the front against the Japanese and
opening the gates of the northwestern Shensi and Kansu provinces to the
Communists.
Even before Wallace returned from the Far East, Moscow which was not at
war with Japan, launched a propaganda drive against the recognized government
of < 'hina. On July 18, the mouthpiece of the Kremlin, War and the Working Class,
published a warning to Chungking to end its conflict with the Communist forces.
This was the opening gun in a smear campaign which soon was reflected in the
so-called liberal press in the United States. Our veteran ally Chiang Kai-shek
was denounced as a Fascist. Correspondents and commentators who had never
raised their voices against the dictatorship in Russia now echoed the Soviet-
inspired vituperation of the Kuomintang regime as a dangerous dictatorship.
The question as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war against Japan
was uppermost in Allied councils in those days. China's foreign minister, T. V.
Soong, told our Ambassador Gauss that he was convinced that Russia would
attack Japan when Germany was defeated, but would do so for the sole purpose
of sovietizing the Far East. Soong warned that America's headaches would
commence only then. It was a warning which Washington completely disregarded.
* * *
On Septemher 1, 1944. I was transferred from the Naval Intelligence to the
State Department, where I was attached to the planning and research unit
entrusted with the drafting of basic post-war policy toward China, Japan, Korea,
Siam, and other Far Eastern zones. I discovered to my amazement that the
State Department had no clear-cut general policy, but was run by cliques which
pursued their own preconceived aims and were often in violent conflict.
The pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose views were reflected by
Amerasia, and whose members were in touch with Jaffe and Roth, formed a
particularly compact clique. Secretary Ludden of the American Embassy in
2496 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Chungking was a leading figure in the group. So was John Davies, a native of
Chengtu, who acted as State Department attache with our military observers
in China.
He seemed to believe and report almost anything in the way of information
against the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, swallowing whole and relaying
nearly everything that the Communists gave him. Mr. Davies held the view
that the Chinese Communists were a breed apart from the Soviet elements and
had no intention of aligning themselves with Soviet Russia.
John Stewart Service, a junior colleague and friend of Mr. Davies, who was
stationed as a field representative in China and acted as political adviser to
General Stilwell, tried hard to convince Washington that the rebel Communists
were pursuing a policy of avoiding civil war. I remember that Ambassador
Gauss did not quite subscribe to this theory. I also recall that in an attempt
to discredit Ambassador Gauss's analysis of the Communist-Kuomintang conflict,.
Mr. John Carter Vincent, chief of the China Section, suggested that it was the
failure of the Kuomintang to back the reforms championed by the Communists
that was largely responsible for the difficulties in China.
Playing the part of a lone wolf, although one hundred percent in accord with
the pro-Soviet China Group, was John W. Emmerson. who served as political
adviser to Admiral Chester Nimitz in both Chinese and Japanese affairs,
I remember how our Consul in Kweilin had interviewed General Li Chi-shen
on the subject of the Democratic League which was represented in official dis-
patches as a liberal organization, and how he waxed hot in his report in an effort
to impress Washington with all the abuses heaped by General Li upon the
Chungking government. It appeared strange to me that a Unitde States official
should have been so receptive to violent criticism of the government to which he
was accredited. At no time did any of these field representatives report upon
the Communists who had helped create the Democratic League and who mani-
pulated it as a leftist ''front."
The encouragement extended to the Chinese Communists by many of our
officials there and by some of the writers whom they were inspiring was such
that the Reds in China declared they would sit back and wait for stronger
United States pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek. This pressure did not fail to be
forthcoming.
In the early fall of 1944 Donald M. Nelson and General Patrick Hurley were
dispatched to China as the President's special envoys to inform Chiang Kai-shek
of American disappointment over his failure to form a united front with the
Communists. The two envoys requested the Generalissimo to reorganize his
Cabinet and to place an American geenral in command of the Chinese armies.
It was understood that General Stilwell would be the American commander.
Chiang Kai-shek was at first inclined to make some compromise for the sake
of Allied unity but not at the expense of Chinese sovereignty. President Roose-
velt exerted his own direct pressure on the Generalissimo to back up his envoy's
demands.
Then came the Stilwell incident. John S. Service, Stilwell's political adviser,
accompanied a highly secret military commission to Communist headquarters
at Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, old "Vinegar" Joe demanded that
Chiang Kai-shek permit him to equip and arm some 300,000 Chinese Com-
munists and put them in the field alongside the Nationalist armies against the
Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek saw in this American proposal a Soviet plot to
build up the very rebel forces which had been waging civil war against liis
government. He requested the recall of General Stilwell.
The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been relieved
of his command, on October 30, 1!»44, John S. Service submitted his report No. 40
to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General Hurley in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that report was "a
general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent over there to
sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I was trying to
harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government."
During these and the ensuing months Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell made
numerous trips from New York to Washington. Mr. Jaffe would call me and
collect whatever biographical data on Chinese personalities I had, but I found
it increasingly strange that he would not reciprocate with the promised bio-
graphical information on the Communist figures that I needed.
* * *
The Espionage Case itself had its origin with tlie appearance in tin- December
1944 issue of Amerasia of an article containing unadulterated passages from
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2497
an extremely confidential report to the Office of Strategic Services. Two em-
ployees of the <>ss were struck by the passages which they had read in the origi-
nal and became curious as to how the information turned up in the columns of
Amerasia. A preliminary investigation conducted by OSS disclosed that vari-
ous other secret documents were in possession of Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and Mark
Gayn, all of Aincrn^iii.
The FBI then took charge <»f the affair. As established by Congressman Don-
dero, the government agents spent several months on the case. In the course
of their quest, it was found that John S. Service was in communication from
China with Mi-, .laffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages
to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before
They arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of Mr.
Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports, entitled "General-
issimo Chiang Kai-shek — Decline of his Prestige and Criticism of and Opposi-
tion to his Leadership."
In the course of the FBI investigation Amerasia was revealed as the center of
a constellation of Communist zealots and their satellite fellow-travellers. The
ramifications of Amerasia reached far beyond those of a modest academic pub-
lication. It appeared, for instance, that Owen Lattimore, consultant to OWI
and to the State Department on Far Eastern affairs, was formerly an editor
of Amerasia. Another former editor was Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a column-
ist for The Daily Worker and secretary of the American Council of the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, with which Kate Mitchell had been affiliated in various
capacities since 1933.
The publisher of Amerasia was a prosperous manufacturer of greeting cards
who had a rather unusual record for a well-to-do businessman. Mr. Philip
Jacob Jaffe. naturalized in 1923, had served as contributing editor of Labor De-
fender, monthly magazine of the International Labor Defense, a Communist or-
ganization, in 1033. From 1934 to 1936 he had been a member of the editorial
hoard of China Today, publication of the pro-Soviet American Friends of the
Chinese people, under his admitted alias of J. W. Phillips. Under that name
he presided in 1935 over a banquet at which Earl Browder was a speaker. He
had lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an avowed Communist
Party institution. In addition to several other pro-Soviet organizations, he was
a member of the Board of Directors of the National Council of American-Soviet
Friendship. The Nnr York Times described him on June 7, 1945 (subsequent
to his arrest) as "'an active supporter of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet move-
ments for a number of years."
What The New York Times did not know and what I could not possibly know,
but what was established during the investigation, according to the information
gathered by Congressman Dondero, was the following: that Jaffe is known to
have visited Earl Browder's apartment several times in the spring of 1915; that
he dined on more than one occasion at the Soviet consulate in New York ; that
when the Chinese Communist delegate, Tung Pi-Wu. while in the United States
in April 194.~> to attend the San Francisco Conference, visited New YTork, he
met Earl Browder one day in Jaffe's apartment: that Jaffe had been a liberal
contributor to pro-Soviet causes and funds; and that at one time Jaffe had in
his possession a message sent by Ambassador Hurley to his wife, advising her
not to rent their home in Chesapeake Bay for the summer, inasmuch as he ex-
pected to return to the United States before the end of the summer.
How this strictly personal message fell into Jaffe's hands was never ascertained.
But Congressional sources did establish the remarkable fact that Mr. Jaffe once
reserved two tables at a hotel banquet held to launch a pro-Communist China
front in the name of "The fifth floor, 35 East 12th Street," the national head-
quarters of the American Communist Party.
Kate L. Mitchell, co-editor of Amerasia, was a Buffalo heiress whose income
from a trust fund has been estimated to run as high as $15,000 a year. Born in
1908, a graduate of Bryn Mawr, widely traveled and a student of Asiatic prob-
lems. Miss Mitchell was so close to Jaffe that she had in her possession keys to all
the riles in the office of Amerasia. When John Stewart Service returned from
China. Miss Mitchell gave a party at which he was present. He had previously
attended a special press conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations
in which he supported the position of the Chinese Communists.
Lieutenant Andrew Roth, a rising Amerasia star and protege of Jaffe's is
a native New Yorker who had attended City College. Mr. Dondero disclosed
that Roth had been placed in his key post of liaison officer between Naval In-
telligence and the State Department "despite a totally unfavorable report result-
2498 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
ing from an investigation by the Office of Naval intelligence itself when he first
applied for his commission."
Mark J. Gayn, a native of Manchuria, whose articles in leading magazines
were based upon confidential documents supplied by Jaffe, was frequently con-
sulted by the latter after his Washington trips, particularly in Japanese affairs.
On at least one occasion. John S. Service was known to have visited Gayn in his
apartment. I have never met Gayn and was barely acquainted with Service.
* * *
Of many of these vital facts I was ignorant before my arrest. The political
background of Jaffe and Miss Mitchell and their confreres was completely foreign
to me. I knew Jaffe and his group as the editor of a magazine which had almost
semi-official standing among the left-wingers in the State Department. In spite
of the fact that I was gathering biographical material on Chinese leaders for
Mr. Jaffe, I did not do along with the Amerasia circle in questions of our policy
in the Far East.
In the spring of 1945, when it was generally believed that our next step in
the war would be an invasion of China, the problem of Manchuria came up
for discussion and analysis in the State Department. In the event of our seizure
of Manchuria, were we to hand it over eventually to any local Chinese faction,
even the Communists? Mr. Robert Feary, a well-meaning former official of our
Embassy in Japan, who drew his knowledge of China largely from the field dis-
patches of the pro-Soviet school, proposed that we turn over Manchuria to the
Chinese Communists if Chiang Kai-shek's troops were not there- to take it over
immediately.
This proposal struck me as outrageous, since President Roosevelt had promised
Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference that Manchuria would revert to his
nation, by which we unmistakably meant the properly constituted government
of China. I launched the initial protest against this and was able to bring about
the defeat of the plan.
Shortly after this meeting on Manchurian policy, I was warned by a young-
foreign service officer of Scandinavian extraction in a friendly way that I would
soon get into trouble if I opposed the anti-Kuomintang group in the China Section.
Soon afterwards I ran into Lieutenant Roth in the street, and he told me that
John Carter Vincent, head of the China Section, suspected me of being "too close
to the Chiang Kai-shek crowd." I resented the remark, since I had but purely
social relations with the Chinese Embassy in Washington. I wondered after-
wards whether Roth had used a fabricated story merely to test me.
Late in May. 1 was surprised to find Andrew Roth in my apartment when I
returned home mm the office. He was in an extremely nervous state. He told
me that he and his wife had intended to drop in upon us that evening, that she
had gone shopping, and that in the meanwhile he had received some upsetting
news which he was anxious to convey to her. It appeared that he had been
ordered to go to Honolulu and that he was making preparations to leave when
suddenly his orders were canceled. He evinced so much uneasiness and seemed
so reluctant to talk about the matter that I was somewhat baffled.
When his charming wife Renee arrived about an hour or so later, happy and
smiling, she was dumbfounded and put out by the bad news. I tried to comfort
her by saying that the Navy probably would have a better job for her husband,
but she brushed my remark aside in a peeved manner that indicated anxiety
and fear.
Is it possible that both Roth and bis wife were already aware then that they
were being shadowed and investigated, but said nothing about it to me? I
myself felt perfectly at ease, for I had not the faintest notion that I was standing
on the brink of disaster.
It was just about this time that Mark Gayn, who had made his plans the
previous year, prepared to go abroad as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago
Sun. He suddenly called upon George Taylor, in charge of the Far Eastern
Section at the OW1 in Washington, and asked him to authorise the decontrol of
some con idential gover.imenl documents which Gayn claimed to have used for
current ari icles.
Mr. Taylor issued a letter decont roling certain papers. This letter Mr. Gayn
presented at the New York office of the OWI, and is alleged to have persuaded
the person in charge of the files there to interpret Mr. Taylor's authorization
so broadly as to cover all the documents Gayn had in his possession.
My arrest in the evening of June (> came to me like a bolt from the blue. The
FBI agents found in my apartment three to four thousand cards of my collection
STATE DEPARTMENT! EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2499
of data mi Chinese personalities, and half a dozen folders of reports and memo-
randa dealing with political and geographic problems in Asia. Some of these were
confidential papers 1 had taken home in study. None of the documents was of a
military character which would affect national security. It was a common
practice in Washington among overworked governmenl employees to take home
con idential papers to work on.
When word of our arrests had spread through Washington, there was general
burning of official papers, taken home innocently or otherwise, all over the Capital.
The strange course which the Espionage Case took from the moment of our
arrests became evident to me that night, even when 1 was led into the office of
the United States Commissioner for arraignment. On June (i Andrew Roth was
still a uniformed lieutenant in the service of the United States Navy. That night,
as I beheld him a fellow-prisoner, I was surprised to find him wearing civilian
clothes. Upon inquiry I learned that literally overnight Lieutenant Roth had
been mustered out of the service. It was not until later that it had dawned
on me how grave it might have been for Roth to face charges under the Espionage
Act in wartime while still an officer in the Naval Intelligence.
When Kate Mitchell was arrested in New York that night she had in her pos-
session, according to Congressman Dondero, a highly confidential military docu-
ment entitled "Plan of Rattle Operations for Soldiers." It was a paper of such
importance that army officers were subject to courtmartial if they lost their
copies. Also in the possession of Miss Mitchell were found documents from the
OSS and the Office of Naval Intelligence. These were part of the huge files of
top secret material gathered by Jaffe.
Mark Gayn, who had made use at various time of Amerasia files, had more
than 200 secret documents in bis apartment at the time of his arrest. Mr. Gayn
was the only one of the Amerasia group to admit on the night of his arrest in a
signed statement that be had been found in possession of confidential gov-
ernment papers.
Mr. Jaffe, either before the arrest or upon his release on bail, is known to have
used the authorization to decontrol certain papers issued to Gayn by the OWI
in some inexplicable manner so as to claim exemption for all the documents
found in bis own possession.
* * *
On June 8, the day after the arrests, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, then Acting Secretary
of State, announced to the country that "a comprehensive security program is ro
be continued unrelentingly in order to stop completely the illegal and disloyal
conveyance of confidential and other secret information to unauthorized persons."
Philip Jaffe, speaking for himself and Miss Mitchell the following day, upon
their release on bail, countered with a statement to the press : "The Red-baiting
character of this case is scandalous and often libelous."
Mark Gayn raised the cry of the freedom' of the press, which certain so-
called liberal publications took up so as to eclipse in the public mind the charges
under the Espionage Act. Popular radio commentators echoed the cry.
Undersecretary Grew became a target for a campaign of vilification as chief
culprit in the case. The former Lieutenant Andrew Roth wrote a series of ar-
ticle in a New York evening paper and published a book in which he attacked
Grew as the father of a dangerous State Department policy in the Far East and
as the main prop of the throne in Japan which was represented as being in the
way of a "democratic" transformation in that country.
While public attention was largely focused upon extraneous issues, the Es-
pionage Case itself was following a special course behind the scenes. It ap-
peared that Kate Mitchell had an influential uncle in Ruffalo, a reputable at-
torney by the name of James M. Mitchell, former President of the New York
State Rar Association. Mr. Mitchell was a member of a very influential law
firm in Ruffalo, Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Rass & Letchworth. The New York
City correspondents of that law firm included the most redoubtable < 'olonel Joseph
M. Hartfield, extremely well-known and extremely influential in government
circles in Washington. Colonel Hartfield, who is regarded by some as one of the
most powerful political lawyers in the country, made at least four trips to Wash-
ington where he called on top officials of the Department of Justice in the matter.
At the same time Congressman Emanuel Celler, of New York, interested
himself in the defense of the New York figures involved in the case. To what
extent he exerted bis influence has never been determined. It was perhaps only
a coincidence that his law partner, Mr. Arthur* Sbeinberg. appeai-ed as Jaffe's
New York attorney when his case was called before the Criminal Division
No. 1 of the District Court of the District of Columbia.
2500 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
My own attorney was Arthur J. Hilland, whose first demand on me was that
I tell him the truth and nothing but the truth. As 1 had nothing to conceal, my
principal worry was my wife's difficulty in raising the $10,000 bail, for we were
people of most modest means.
The grand jury heard first the testimony of Service, Gayn, and Miss Mitchell.
At the end of June it was announced that new evidence would be .presented by
the Justice Department and additional persons would be charged with espionage.
The grand jury proceedings are, of course, secret. But it has been reported
to me that John Service had accused me of furnishing Jaffe with documents
found in his possession, which was a complete and vicious fabrication. Ac-
cording to Congressman Dondero, for some unaccountable reasons the govern-
ment attorneys presented to the grand jury only a part of the evidence in their
possession.
On August 10 came the sensational announcement that the grand jury had
dropped the indictments against Service, Gayn. and Miss Mitchell. The clearing
of these three was the signal for a renewed campaign against Under Secretary
Grew in the press. Within the State Department, it was generally known,
Dean Acheson headed the anti-Grew faction.
The evening of August 13, J. Raymond Walsh, research director of CIO-PAC,
outspoken Soviet partisan, made over the radio a strong plea for the defend-
ants in the Espionage Case. Of John Service he said: "His arrest brought some
exceedingly powerful people within the government to his defense. Again
one can easily infer that those who began this affair wished they hadn't. * * *"
A substantial fund for the defense of Mr. Service had been raised with the
help of Mortimer Graves, Secretary of The American Council of Learned So-
cieties. No one of the pro-Soviet group bothered about my defense.
On August 14, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson tendered his resig-
nation to Secretary Byrnes. For a moment it looked as if Mr. Grew had won
out. But that same day, August 14, the newly installed Secretary Byrnes ad-
dressed a letter to John Service, congratulating him on the "happy termina-
tion" of his ordeal and reinstating him to active duty "for important work in
connection with Far Eastern affairs." At the same time. Under Secretary Grew
wrote to Service a more formal letter expressing his pleasure at being returned
to duty and praising his enviable record.
* * *
It was about this time that Joseph E. Davies, of Mission to Moscow fame,
was alleged to have declared that Acheson made Grew's resignation from the
service a condition of his returning to the State Department.
Two days later Under Secretary Grew, after a lifetime in the diplomatic serv-
ice, resigned and President Truman announced that Dean Acheson would take
over the post of Under Secretary of State.
On September 20 the news that Jaffe had changed his plea from "not guilty" to
that of "guilty" of the unauthorized possession of Government documents and
was tincd $2v506 hit me like a bombshell. It appeared that by some strange coin-
cidence Jaffe's case had been called before Justice Proctor of the District Court
on a Saturday morning. Robert Hitchcock, of Buffalo, had presented the case
for the Department of Justice. The court asked for a brief statement of the
Government's case, which Mr. Hitchcock promised to do in "less than five
minutes."
The FBI has the authority to make arrests only upon the presentation of ade-
quate evidence, but it has nothing to do with the court's disposal of such evidence.
"I have heretofore charged and reiterate now," declared Congressman Dondero
on the floor of the House, "that the Court before whom these cases were brought
was not fully informed of the facts. A summary of the court proceedings had
been furnished to me, which shows no evidence or exhibit obtained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation presented to the court. Jaffe's counsel told the court
that Jaffe had no intention of harming the government, and United States At-
torney Hitchcock told the court there was no element of disloyalty in connection
witli the case."
My own situation was growing more deplorable and my financial circumstances
more straitened. I had been put "on leave-without-pay" status pending the out-
come of the case. I had no means to cover the expenses of my defense. For
weeks I had lain awake nights hoping for a speedy trial, expecting an acquittal.
I now resolved to go to New York to look up Mr. Jaffe. I telephoned the office
of Auk rax in and he somewhat reluctantly agreed to see me. I told him of my
financial plight and he agreed to defray the costs of my defense as well as to pay
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2501
the fine which might he imposed upon me. At this time, in October, the only
two of the Case of Six left on the calendar, were those of myself and of Andrew
Roth;
To run ahead of the story, my own case came up on November 2. Upon in-
sistent advice, I decided not to contest it as I had planned, ami pleaded nolo
contendere. The court imposed a tine of five hundred dollars, which was paid
by Mr. Jaffe's representative. He also paid all other expenses in my case, which
ran to an additional three thousand dollars. As for Andrew Roth, the indictment
against him was dismissed in February 1946 for insufficient evidence.
During my conference with Mr. Jaffe in October, he dropped a remark which
one could never forget.
'•Well, we've suffered a lot," he said, "but, anyhow, we got Grew out.-'
Ambassador Hurley was next to go. The road was clear for the pro-Soviet
( 'hina bloc to take over the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. The
polity which General Stilwell attempted to force down the throat of our ally
Chiang Kai-shek as a means of defeating Japan was entrusted to General Mar-
shall after Japan's defeat by America and after the rape of Manchuria by Soviet
forces. — Editor's Note.
Exhibit No. 21
[Prom the Washington Daily News, Monday, May 22, 1950]
Tydings Subcommittee on Amerasia Case — Amerasia Probe Prospects Dim —
Only Two Witnesses Heard in Month
(By Frederick Woltman, Scripps-Howard staff writer)
The Tydings Senate subcommittee, which on April 17 promised a new investi-
gation of the Amerasia case, more than one month later has done virtually noth-
ing about it.
Only two witnesses have been questioned, both in closed session. And the
subcommittee's legal staff has not yet got around to looking at the 1700 exhibits
which lay the groundwork of the case of the stolen Government documents.
One of the two witnesses was the spokesman for the Justice Department, which
is under fire for the way it handled the case. He is James M. Mclnerney, As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of the criminal division.
Belittled by Spokesman for Justice Department
The effect of his testimony, it was learned, was to belittle the Amerasia inci-
dent and play down the need for a thoro investigation.
Mr. Mclnerney told the senators May 4 there was little of importance in the
1700 records recovered by the FBI on June 6, 1945.
Contrary to the stand taken by the FBI and State Department at that time,
the Justice Department dismissed the contents of the stolen documents as mostly
"teacup gossip."
The other witness was Frank Bielaski, chief investigator of the Office of Stra-
tegic Services (OSS), who made the first wartime raid on Amerasia and dis-
covered a treasure trove of stolen State Department records. His testimony has
never been made public.
But yesterday, over NBC Television's "Meet the Press," Mr. Bielaski declared
that the Hiss-Chambers case was "chicken feed" compared with the Amerasia.
Feels There Was "Effort to Whitewash"
He said he felt "very definitely" there was "a concerted effort on the part of
someone to whitewash the Amerasia case."
"I do not think the case was ever properly or thoroly investigated," added
Mr. Bielaski.
Many important witnesses have never been called, he said, listing the names
of six. all ex-FBI agents. He himself was never interviewed by the Department
of Justice until last week, the former OSS official stated.
In the interview, Mr. Bielaski struck back at the Tydings subcommittee's only
other witness. Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney.
Mr. Mclnerney, he was told, testified that the Justice Department was handi-
capped because evidence had been "burglarized" and "obtained by theft from the
Amerasia office by OSS."
2502 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
"Argument Fallacious and * * * Poorly Chosen"
"That argument is entirely fallacious and, I think, poorly chosen by the As-
sistant Attorney General," said Mr. Bielaski.
"OSS was created by executive order and authorized to provide its own se-
curity. It was an espionage and counter-espionage agency. Our search, with-
out a warrant, was entirely reasonable in time of war. We were trying to
recover OSS property.
"If we had tried to get a search warrant, it would have ruined the whole
affair."
The FBI, he pointed out, had "13 volumes of exhibits" to bolster the Amerasia
prosecution.
"3,000 Documents Involved in Case"
"We calculated that a total of 3,000 documents were involved in the Amerasia
case in a three-months period," Mr. Bielaski said.- "In that time every State
Department document concerning the Far East passed thru the magazine."
Because of its secrecy requirements, he declined to reveal what he testified
at the Tydings subcommittee closed session. Asked if his former boss, William
J. Donovan, OSS chief, would be willing to testify if called, Mr. Bielaski replied :
"General Donovan is very willing and, I think, somewhat anxious to testify
as to the seriousness of the documents,"
So far as it is known, neither General Donovan nor any other witness has been
called by the Senate subcommittee.
Meanwhile, the Amerasia case has become one of the most-talked-of issues on
Caiptol Hill and in official Washington.
Among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress the feeling is widespread
that this is the time, for once and always, to clear up the Amerasia mystery.
They are depending on the assurance of a thoro inquiry made by Senator
Millard E. Tydings (Democrat. Maryland), chairman of the subcommittee.
Loyalty File Inspection Has Top Priority
Up to now, tho, the Amerasia case has been allowed to bog down in the sub-
committee's overall job of investigating charges of disloyalty in the State De-
partment.
The legal staff has given top priority to the examination of the 81 State De-
partment loyalty tiles. Until that's completed the Amerasia case will get little
attention.
The loyalty file inspection itself is in danger of bogging down. Because of
Sen. Tydings' restrictions, the Republican minority has concluded that the en-
tire inspection procedure is farcical. They may walk out on it any time.
So the immediate prospects of an Amerasia inquiry by the Tydings group are
not too bright.
Exhibit No. 22
See transcript of proceedings for afternoon of June 2. commencing at page 87.
Exhibit No. 23
[Doc. 100-3]
Excerpt From Congressional Re< ord — House, May 22, 1950
(Pages 7543-44)
Mr. BROOKS. That office at 225 Fifth Avenue. It was under surveillance for
a week or 10 days. The office, was operating every night until late at night.
There were lights in there. We could not gel in to take a look at it for that reason.
Then we made plans to enter the place under a subterfuge, not by force.
When the time came, we were let in, but we did deceive the people in the
buildings as to who we were, and what our purpose was. We entered the building
Sunday night, March 11, at about close to midnight. We were let into the office.
.Mr. ciikif, Of what year?
-TATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2503
Mr. Brooks. Nineteen hundred and forty-five. We were let into the office of
Amerasia magazine. 1 went myself because I did not believe in sending somebody
else to do something thai I would not do, We bad a party of five. I personally,
when we entered the office, devoted my time to looking through the office, the front
office, hoping to find this dummy I have described .
I did not find it. About all I found was a lot of information on circulation.
I looked over this information with some degree of care because I wanted to
know about how big an operation the Amerasia magazine was.
I found, at best, their circulation had been some 2,500 copies, and it had stead-
ily decreased. It was about 1.700. Dealer distribution had dropped from 500
jo 300. It was losing money, I could tell from correspondence, and looking at
the accounts.
It was perfectly obvious it was not a paying venture.
About the time I had come to the conclusion there was nothing in the front
uilice of interest to me — while I was in the front office, I had sent some of my
agents back through the rear part of ths office. It is quite a nice office, and very
well furnished. One of them came and said, "We think you better come back
here. We found some stuff you ought to see."
I started back. Before I went back to the rooms where they were, I observed
on the right side of the main corridor there was a room ; to be conservative, I
would say it is half as big as this. It was devoted, exclusively, to photo copy
work. They had a photo copy machine, and developer pans all around on the
shelves. The place was equipped to make photo copies, and make them in large
quantities.
I did not know what function that was for for a little magazine like Amerasia.
There it was.and I looked it over.
I went to the end of the corridor^ On the end over to the left was the room
of the associate editor who was Kate Mitchell.
On the right was a smaller office of Philip Jaffe, who was the editor. Just
before you came to those offices, on the right, was a large library twice as big
as this with volumes all over the place dealing, principally, with the Far East,
and many of them were works on communism and Communist movements, etc.
It was a library of several thousand volumes. I went into the office of Jaffe.
He had a desk about like this.
It was covered with originals and freshly made photo copies of documents, every
one of which was secret in its character. Some of them were directed, personally,
to the Secretary of State. Some of them were from military attaches in China
and other places, confidential. All of them were marked "Not to be shown
OWL" That was evidence of the confidential nature.
Some were from Naval Intelligence. There were a good many on his desk. It
would seem from the freshness of the copies that those photo copies had just
been made. They accounted for the fact that the office was working so late at
night.
Mr. Hancock. To whom were they addressed?
Mr. Brooks. The State Department documents were addressed to the Secre-
tary for his personal attention.
Mr. Springer. Were they all photostatic copies, or were there any originals?
Mr. Brooks. The originals were in there, and the photostatic copies. Every-
body was astounded at this stuff.
While we were looking it over, a man happened to look behind a door. Behind
the door he found a suitcase and two briefcases. The suitcase was a bellows-
type suitcase that was probably that thick [indicating].
Mr. Hancock. Two feet?
Mr. Brooks. About 18 inches. The briefcases were very heavy with docu-
ments. I had along an expert who opened all sorts of locks. He had opened all
the locks. He opened the suitcase, the briefcases. When he opened the suit-
case, it seemed to be a specially constructed affair with about 10 to 15 pockets
in it. It was a bellows-type suitcase spread out in this way. It was literally
loaded with secret documents of all sorts from all departments of the Govern-
ment.
Mr. Hancock. Originals?
Mr. Brooks. Yes. These were all originals. There were no copies in the suit-
case. There was one exception : in that suitcase I found an original, a typewrit-
ten original, and four copies of the particular document that I was after, that
was the Office of Strategic Service document on Siam.
In addition to that, I think there were five more secret documents on the
OfTice of Strategic Service which we had not missed, one of which was "top
secret," and extremely valuable and confidential.
2504 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
I took this stuff out and spread it around. It covered almost every depart-
ment in the Government with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. There were no documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
There were documents from the British Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, G-2,
State Department, Office of Censorship, Office of Strategic Service, and probably
others. There were so many of them, at that moment, I started to have a list
made. There were so many we could not list them. These documents had from
3 to 4 to 150 pages. There were 300 documents.
Mr. Chelf. Either confidential, secret, or top secret?
Mr. Brooks. Everyone of them bore the stamp that the possession of these
documents is a violation of the Espionage Act. It was stamped all over them.
About that time, one of my men who had gone into the library came in and
said he found something in the library.
He had an envelope which was not sealed. It was a large manila envelope.
In that envelope were, I should say, 15 or 20 documents. I could not tell whether
they came mimeographed or whether they were photo copied on this machine.
They were a little blurred. They were not photostats. They must have been
photo copies. In between these documents, every other one. we found six top-
secret documents of the Navy Department. I looked at these myself. I do not
recall all six of them. I ani sorry I did not make more notes about them, but
I remember distinctly two, probably the first two that I read. One of them was
entitled, and I do not know the exact words, but one was entitled, "The bombing
program for Japan." It was top secret. I read it. It showed how Japan was
to be bombed progressively in the industrial centers, and it named the cities.
The second one that I read gave the location of all the ships of the Japanese
fleet, subsequent to the battle of Leyte; I guess it was October 1944. It gave
the ships by name and where they were hiding.
I might say, off the record, at that time I did not know anything about the
atomic bomb. I had never heard of it. I have since been very curious trying
to wrack my memory whether there was anything in those other four top secret
documents. It would not have meant anything to me if it had. I had never
heard of the atomic bomb. I do not remember the other information. We did
not take the documents. We put them back where we got them.
We went back out into the other room. We look over this stuff. I came to
the conclusion, if I came down here to the Office of Strategic Service and told
them what I had seen, they just would not believe me. I. therefore, determined
to take 12 to 14 of the documents and bring them down and show them to them
as proof.
I picked out all of the Office of Strategic Service documents, including the five
copies of the one that I was after, and either seven or eight additional docu-
ments. I picked documents that had marks of sumo sort on them to indicate
through whose hands they had gone.
I put those in my pocket. I felt sure that there were so many there thai they
could not possibly miss those documents lor a week, anyhow. I put those in
my pocket. We left that place. We put everything back the way we found it.
We left there about 2 : 30 in the morning.
I took a plane and came to Washington. I had a meeting the first thing-
Monday morning with the security officer. I did not. myself, make a list of
those 12 or 14 documents. He did. He prepared a memorandum which is at
the present time on file with the Office of Strategic Services describing those
documents and the nature of them, what is in them.
There is a memo showing exactly what 1 brought down here as evidence for
my own office.
They were so startling that we lost sight of the first document we were search-
ing for. The others were so much more important.
Doc. 100-3
Before I could even deliver all of them, which I did one at a time because it
gave me a little pleasure to do it, they bad gotten in touch with General
Donovan. They had the chief of the secretariat down in the office when I delivered
all these papers to them, Donovan and I think the security officer. Mr. Van
Beuren went immediately over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to show them this
stuff.
If not then, then that night or the following morning. Mr. Van Beuren. the'
security officer, went to a meeting where this stuff was shown to the Secretary
of State.
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2505
I am telling you thai because thai was the disposition made, and because Mr.
Van Beuren, to whom I was adviser at the time, was perfectly willing to come
here ami tell you whal he knows about it and the character of the documents,
and what he did with them, and what they decided to do about the case.
[ made only one stipulation when I turned the stuff over to them, that was
that I and my men wore so apprehensive about this whole thing, that somebody
must do something about it. We did not want to sit by and see this thing go on.
We wanted action. We wanted it in a hurry. We thought something should
be done within a week. They promised action would be taken within a week.
It was only 0 days later that the Federal Bureau of Investigation moved in in
Now York.
Mr. Guinea, who was an inspector for the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
was sent up to take charge. He organized the various groups. He placed various
persons in the Amerasia magazine, offices and staff under surveillance. They
tapped the telephones. They entered the premises. I am sure they photostated
all of the documents that we saw there less only those which I delived down
here to my home office.
* ******
Mr. Bkooks. We felt the men who were in this place, that we had cut off or
found a principal channel of information from the Government files down here
into some hands which we suspected were Communist hands. We never know
where this stuff went after it got out of there. I think it was when the Peace
Conference was on in San Francisco that I entered a complaint with the Office
of Strategic Services. It seemed to me a terrible thing that certain persons
out there attending the conference had secret information from our State Depart-
ment and were informed on what our State Department planned to do and what
the State Department thought about. Nothing was done about that.
It was shortly after that that they did shut down on these people and arrested
six of them. I knew, also, that during this period, a second lot of stuff was
brought out from Washington ; that Jaffe came down, or someone came down.
My impression was that it was Jaffe. They got another suitcase full of it
and brought it back. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also photographed
all of that. In their exhibit, they must have all of the first lot and all of the
second lot. We were told the second lot was just as important as the first lot.
Exhibit No. 24
[From the New York Times, Tuesday, October 31, 1944]
Allies Heed 40,000 Nazis Toward Meuse ; 3 Japanese Cruisers Bombed at
Manila; Stilwell Recall Bares Rift With Chiang — Long Schism Seen —
Stilwell Break Stems From Chiang Refusal To Press War Fully — Peace
With Reds Barred — Generalissimo Regards Their Armies Fighting Japa-
nese as Threat To His Rule
The following account of the recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell is by
the Chungking correspondent of the New York Times, who has just re-
turned to this country. It was delayed and finally cleared by the War
Department censorship in Washington.
(By Brooks Atkinson)
Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, relieved of his command in China, Burma and India,
before leaving Chungking on Oct. 21 made a final swift tour of some of the mili-
tary bases in his command and then flew directly toward Washington in. his
silver-colored transport plane facetiously dubbed "Uncle Joe's Chariot."
For the last two months negotiations had been going on between President
Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalis-
simo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese
ground and air forces under the Generalissimo and to increase China's partici-
pation in the counter-offensive against Japan.
Although the Generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's
appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American
commander except General Stilwell.
2506 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
PRESSED FOR REFORM
His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At
a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang [National party]
Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal
ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental
reform.'
He declared that General Stilwell must go. that the control of American lend-
lease materials must he put in his hands and that, he would not be coerced by
Americans into he'ping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Com-
munists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back
to righting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor.
President Roosevelt agreed to the Generalissimo's demand for General Stil-
well's recall. Dividing the huge China-Burma-India war sector in two, the War
Department appointed Maj. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of
Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Commander of United States Army
Forces in China and Lieut. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan. General Stilwell's Chief of
Staff in Indian, as Commander of LTnite.l States Army Forces in Indian and
Burma.
After a career of more than twenty years largely devoted to military affairs in
China and two years and eight months as commander of the United States Army
Forces in China, Burma, and India and as Allied Chief of Staff to the General-
issimo, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell has now concluded a busy and constantly frus-
trated attempt to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat efficiency
of the Chinese forces.
Uncle Joe speaks Chinese. He knows moi-e about China than most foreigners:
He is more intimately acquainted with the needs and capacities of the Chinese
Army than the Generalissimo and Gen. Ho. Ying-chin, Minister of War and Chief
of Staff, because he has repeatedly been in the field with the troops.
He is commonly regarded as the ablest field commander in China since "Chinese"
Gordon. The second retreat with Stilwell s emed the final one. It was not from
the enemy but from an ally.
The decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications
for China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in
the Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to
discount China's part in a counter-offensive.
Inside China it represents the politicial triumph of a moribund anti-democratic
regime than is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in
driving the Japanese out of China. America is now committed to at least passively
to supporting a regime that has become increasingly unpopular and distrusted in
China, that maintains three secret police services and concentration camps for
political prisoners, that stifles free speech and resists democratic forces.
THE MAIN DIFFERENCE
The fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell
has been that the latter has been eager to fight the Japanese in China without
delay and the Generalissimo has hoped that he would not have to.
In no other way is it possible to understand the long series of obstructions
and delays that have made it impossible for General Stilwell to fulfill his orig-
inal mission of equipping and training the "unlimited manpower" resources of
the Chinese Army.
The Generalissimo has one positive virtue for which America is now indebted :
he has never made peace with the Japanese, although there have been times
when his .Ministers thought the future looked hopeless. But the technique of
preserving his ticklish balance of political power in China keeps him a passive
man.
Although he is the acknowledged leader of China, he has no record of personal
military achievement and his basic ideas for political leadership are those of
a war lord. lb1 conceives of armies as political forces.
In an enormous, loosely strung country populated chietlv by ignorant peasantry
he maintains his authority by preventing any group from becoming too powerful.
.\ few well equipped armies under a command not entirely loyal to him personally
might upset the military and political balance inside China and curtail his
authority.
The Chinese Communists, whom the generalissimo started trying to liquidate
in 1927, have good armies that are now fighting guerrilla warfare against the
SPATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2507
Japanese in northeast China. The generalissimo regards these armies as the
chief threat to his supremacy. For several years he has immobilized ::<><».<)<><) to
500,000 (no one knows just how many) Central Government troops to blockade
the Communists and keep them from expanding.
Distrusting the Communists, the generalissimo lias made no sincere attempt
to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war. The generalis-
simo's regime, based on the suppoii and subservience of General Ho, I>r. II. II.
Kung, Minister of Finance, and Dr. ('hen Li-l'u. Minister of Education, lias
remained fundamentally unchanged over a long period and has become bureau-
cratic, inefficient, and (-(irrupt.
Most of the armies are poorly fed and shockingly maltreated. In some parts
of the country the peasants regard the armies as bandits and thieves, in Honan
last Spring the peasants turned against the Chinese armies during the Japanese
offensive in revenge for the ruthlessness with which the armies collected rice
during the famine years.
Most of China's troubles now are the result of he? having been at war with
Japan for more than seven years and totally blockaded for two and one-half.
The reason nothing is done to alleviate the miseries is that the generalissimo
is determined to maintain his group id' aging reactionaries in power until the
war is over. when, it is commonly believed, he will resume his war against the
Chinese Communists without distraction.
Bewildered and alarmed by the rapidity with which China is now falling apart,
he feels secure only with associates who obey him implicitly. His rages become
more and more ungovernable and attack the symptoms rather than the causes
of China's troubles.
ACQI'TKSCENCK IX REGIME
Since the negotiations with General Hurley began the generalissimo's attitude
toward America has become more resentful and American criticisms of China
is hotly rebuked. Relieving General Stilwell and appointing a successor has the
effect of making us acquiesce in an unenlightened, cold-hearted autocratic politi-
cal regime.
Into this stagnant, baleful atmosphere General Stilwell came in February 1942,
animated by the single idea of fighting the Japanese immediately. Like most
foreigners who know the Chinese people, be loved them, for they are the glory
of China. From long experience Stilwell had great confidence in the capacities
of the Chinese soldiers, who even then were fighting on nothing.
In November, 1941, the Magruder Military Mission had already made an
agreement with the generalissimo to train and equip the Chinese Army on the
Theory that it would then become unnecessary to ship thousands of doughboys
to flight on Chinese soil. The war in China was initially handicapped by the
decision to tight Germany Brst and Japan second. General Stilwell was never
able to get 1 per cent of the American Army for use in his C-B-I theatre and
was never able to get all the equipment he has wanted, because it has always
been needed elsewhere.
On March :;. T.I4L'. less than a month after he had arrived in China. General
Stilwell was plunged into the calamitous Burma campaign without notice. He
had to return to Chungking to induce the generalissimo to come to the front
to vest him with sufficient authority to command the troops.
Even then the command was never secure or efficient. There were other
troubles. At a time when the troops needed transport, most of China's trucks
were hauling civilian loot out of Burma up the road into China, where goods
were worth huge sums of money.
When at last Stilwell ^iit out of Burma into India he did persuade the gen-
eralissimo to let him feed, train and equip the Chinese soldiers who finally
arrived. After training of a year and a half, those soldiers were the backbone
of the Chinese divisions who got Myitkyina back last August and are now pushing
toward Bhamo to free the Burma road. Inside China everything Stilwell has
tried to do has been obstructed and delayed.
The generalissimo and his staff like the United States Air Force, which they
get free and which asks for nothing except food and airfields, which we equip
with buildings and installations. But the Chinese Government hedges and
hesitates over anything involving the use of its armies. Foreigners can only
conclude that the Chinese Government wants to save its armies to secure its
political power after the war.
A nervous and driving field officer whose is impatient with administrative
details and political tangles. General S dwell is no diplomat. He goes straight
2508 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
to the point in his dealings with anybody. He is plain and salty. He is per-
sonally incapable of assuming a reverential mood toward the generalissimo and
he is impatient with incompetent meddling in military command. Although
General Stilwell is anything but arrogant, the generalissimo complained that
the American was trying to subjugate him.
But with the situation in China as it is, no diplomatic genius could have
overcome the generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle
with the Japanese. Amid the intrigue and corruption of China's political and
military administration, General Stilwell has been a lone man trying to follow
orders, improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, force open the Burma
Road and get China back into the war.
Now he has been forced out of China by the political system that has been
consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system that is undem-
ocratic in spirit as well as fact and is also unrepresentative of the Chinese
people, who are good allies.
Exhibit No. 25
[From the New York Times, Friday, March 23, 1945]
Chinese Reds Seen Hopeful of Unity — U. S. Political Aide Back From Area
Declares Communists Have Popular Support
Washington, March 22. — Raymond P. Ludden, foreign service officer attached
to Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer's staff as political adviser, returning from
an eight-month stay in the Communist territory in China, reported today that
these Communists are fighting the Japanese, that they have popular support
in their area, and that the people of the region all hope to obtain national unity
in China.
Mr. Ludden was one of two State Department officials to accompany a United
States Army observer section into the Communist areas last July to observe
and report on conditions there. The mission was primarily military — to obtain
military intelligence relating to such matters as order of battle, air fields, and
numerical strength, as well as such correlated matters as weather reports and
topography. They wore the Chinese Communist uniforms on the trip.
Traveling mostly by muleback and afoot, the party went over mountain trails
and forest tracks, crossing and recrossing the Japanese lines, always accom-
panied by a strong escort of Chinese guerrillas. The mission went by plane
from Chungking to Yenan and then by mule crossed the Yellow River into the
Communist area that forms part of the region supposed to be occupied by the
Japanese. The party traversed Shansi and spent a long period in Hopei, and from
there various sections of the party made side trips, one pushing as far as Peiping.
The return trip was more direct, but over more difficult country, and was made
almost 70 percent of the way afoot.
members of route army
Mr. Ludden said the officers and men who accompanied them all were of what
the Chinese in the region call the Eighth Route Army, the chief binding link for
the various separate administrative groups in the different sections where the
Communist bands are active. He said the Chinese considered part of their
forces as regulars and part as guerrillas, but that all were what we would call
guerrillas, both for their way of life in fastness retreats and their raids and
skirmishes with their enemies, the Japanese. One member of the party was
killed during one of these skirmishes, and at another time the group was obliged
to make a forced march of twenty-six hours without food or rest to escape being
intercepted by the Japanese.
Mr. Ludden did not wish to comment on the political situation, but said they
all hope for a unified China, and that he found a great admiration for the United
States among the soldiers and the people that be encountered in this area.
He said the program supported by the peasants was not particularly Com-
munist in character, but that it was indigenous to the peasantry of China. In
its simplest terms the program preached by all these local leaders was in terms
that everyone could understand:
"A full belly, a warm back, and nobody knocking them around."
In tins period of continuous skirmishing he said the feeling is among these
people that "the man who has no gun gets pushed around."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 2509
Exhibit No. 26
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
new york-washington, o. c.-chicago-san francisco-honolulu
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
ELdorado 5-1759
June 11, 1945.
The Honorable Joseph C. Grew,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Grew : My attention has been drawn to reports in the press
alleging that Mr. John S. Service, recently arrested in connection with the
release of unauthorized information, held a "press conference under the auspices
of the Institute of Pacific Relations" in our Washington office on his return from
China. For your information, I would like to state that this report is completely
inaccurate, as the Institute of Pacific Relations does not hold press conferences
of this character. Mr. Service was one of some seventeen people who had been
asked as guests of honor at small sherry parties given by the "Washington office
for the benefit of members of the American Council living in the Washington
area. It is customary on these occasions to ask the guest to talk in as frank a
manlier as he feels free to about matters of interest to members of the organiza-
tion, and most of those whom we have invited have complied.
In addition to Mr. Service, we have had such people as Sir Frederick Eggleston,
Mr. George Yeh, Mrs. Pandit, Ambassador Paul Naggiar, Senator Carlos Garcia,
the Honorable Walter Nash, Mr. Edmund Clubb, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, and
others.
Since both you and Dr. Hornbeck have attended these meetings from time to
time, I am sure that you, personally, realize that these press reports about Mr.
Service's participation in the press conference were inaccurate, but I did want
to set the record straight.
With cordial best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
(s) Raymond Dennett
Raymond Dennett, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 27
In reply refer to CA. June 18, 1945.
Mr. Raymond Dennett,
Secretary, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.
My Dear Mr. Dennett: I have received your letter of June 11, 1945, in which
you notify me that press reports alleging that Mr. John S. Service had held
a press conference under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in your
Washington office are completely inaccurate.
I wish to thank you for your courtesy in bringing the foregoing information
to my attention.
Sincerely yours,
(s) Joseph C. Grew,
Acting Secretary.
CA : EFDrumright : MS.
6-14-45.
X
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