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Full text of "State Department information program, Voice of America : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Res. 40, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Government Operations to employ temporary additional personnel and increasing the limit of expenditures"

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S. Res. 40 






FEBRUARY 16 AND 17, 1953 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




29708 WASHINGTON : 1953 



>i l^sy 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

Jg M  1958 - 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wiseonsiu, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
CLYDE R. HOEY. North Carolina 
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 
JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

ROY M. COHN, Chief Counsel 
Fbancis D. FLANAGAN, Qencral Counsel and Staff Director 



Appendix 75 

Index ._ I 

Testimony of — 

Carrigan, Charles B., Chief, Space Branch, State Department 62 

Compton, Dr. William, Administrator, United States International 

Information Administration Ig 

Creed, Donald R., Assistant Chief, Domestic Transmitter Division, 

Voice of America 40 

Freeman, Frederick, Acting Chief, Contract Administration Branch, 

Voice of America 47 

McKesson, Lewis J 1, 72 

Moran, James B 13 

Smith, Dr. Newburn, Chief, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory, 

United States Bureau of Standards 11 


Introduced Appears 
on page on page 

1. Memorandum from Gen. Frank E. Stoner, consultant, LTnited 

States International Information Administration, to Dr. 
Wilson Compton, Administrator, LTnited States Inter- 
national Information Administration, July 14, 1952 6 75 

2. (a) Copy of contract covering Ceylon project-- 14 (') 

(6) Parliamentary Debates of Cevlon House of Representa- 
tives, 1951 _ 17 0) 

3. McKinsey report, October 7, 1952 32 (») 

• May be found in the file? of the subcommittee. 





United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In\t:stigations 

OF THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed 
to January 30, 1953, in room 318 of the Senate Office Building,. 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy (Republican, Wisconsin), 
Everett M. Dirksen (Republican, Illinois), Charles E. Potter (Re- 
publican, Michigan), John L. McClellan (Democrat, Arkansas), 
Henry M. Jackson (Democrat, Washington), and Stuart Symington 
(Democrat, Missouri). 

Present also: Francis D. Flanagan, general counsel; Roy Cohn, 
chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, 
chief consultant; Henry Hawkins, investigator; and Ruth Young 
Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKesson, will you take the stand? 

Mr. McKesson, ycm, are reminded that 30U are still under oath. 
You were sworn previously. 

Will you give us your full name ? 


Mr. McKesson. Lewis J. McKesson. 

The Chairman. Spelled M-c-K-e-s-s-o-n ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. And you were with the Voice of America ? 

Mr. McIvEssoN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you come with the Voice? 

Mr. McKesson. In December 1949. 

The Chairman. December of 1949 ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you left the Voice when ? 

Mr. McKesson. November 1952. 

The Chairman. And you are now in private industry ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Wliat is your background so far as radio and 
electrical engineering is concerned ? 

Mr. McKesson. I have always been interested in radio from the 
time I was in high school. 1 graduated from the University of 
Minnesota in 1927, specializing in radio subjects. 


The Chaikmax. A little louder, Mr. McKesson. 

Mr. McKesson. I went with the Radio Corporation of America 
in 1927 and was with them for over 20 years. I then was ordered to 
active duty as a naval officer and did similar work in the United 
States Navy. 

The Chairman. And you were a graduate engineer from the Uni- 
versity of Minnesota ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Tlie University of Minnesota Electrical Engineer- 
ing School ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you have been in radio and electrical engineer- 
ing ever since ; is that right ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, am I correct in this : that there are two so- 
called anchor broadcasting stations which the Voice has been building 
in the United States, one known as Baker West, the other known as 
Baker East? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. And Baker West has been constructed where? 

Mr. McKesson. Near Port Angeles in the State of Washington. 

The Chairman. And Baker East has been located where ? 

Mr. McKesson. In North Carolina. 

The Chairman. Now, as an engineer, you made a study to deter- 
mine whether or not this was the best location from the standpoint 
of reaching the target area; is that correct? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And your conclusion was what ? 

Mr. McKesson. That both locations were not properly located. 

The Chairman. And if they were properly located, in your opinion 
how much money could you save, assuming that you wanted to get 
the same result from another location ? 

Mr. McKesson. Approximately $9 million for each station, or a 
total of $18 million. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is that you could 
save $18 million if you selected a proper site and still get the same re- 
sults in the target area ? 

Mr. McKesson. Tliat is right, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, I understand that the Bureau of Standards, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Radio Corporation of 
America have also made studies, and you have worked with them. Is 
that correct? 

Mr. McKesson. I have been familiar with their work, sir. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You understood now that they all agree with you 
that the locations that were selected were improper locations? 

Mr. McKesson. In general, yes. 

The Chairman. I understand you have some slides to demonstrate 
to the committee why you feel that these locations are improper and 
wasteful ? 

Mr. McKesson. They will illustrate 

The Chairman. Your point ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would someone turn off the lights ? 


You are now showing on the screen slide No. 1 ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And will you locate with your pencil the present 
location of Baker West and Baker East? 

Mr. McI\j:sson. Baker West is about in this location. I think you 
might focus that a little bit better, if you can. And Baker East is over 
in this location. 

The Chairman. And on that slide No. 1, there is a heavy red circle, 
circling the North Pole at a distance of a great number of miles. 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. It circles the geomagnetic North Pole; 
not the North Pole, which is up here. 

The Chairman. It circles the geogmagnetic North Pole. 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that band, that red band, shown on the map 
of the world, is about how many miles wide ? 

Mr. McIvESSON. Well, it varies in width. 

The Chairman. On the present map, roughly, the map you are 
showing us ? 

Mr. McKesson. Well, in the order of a thousand miles or more. 

The Chairman. And that represents a constant magnetic storm 
going on far above the earth. Right ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right; sir, yes. 

The Chairman. And does that interfere with radio transmission ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes ; it does. 

The Chairman. Does it take a great deal more power to transmit a 
radio signal when the transmitting station is located in that magnetic 
storm area ? ) 

Mr. McKesson. Yes ; it does. 

The Chairman. And that is known as the auroral absorption belt ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are Baker East and Baker West both presently 
located within the auroral absorption belt? 

Mr. McKesson. Well, may I say, sir: The path from both stations 
is largely within this belt for a disturbed radio condition. 

The Chairman. The target of Baker West is what ? 

Mr. McKesson. The target is Manila. For the western stations 
the target shown on this map is Manila, Philippine Islands. 

The Chairman. That is a relay station of the Voice ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is a relay station of the Voice. That is right. 

The Chairman. And the target area of Baker East ? 

Mr. McKesson. It is Munich, Germany, also a relay station. 

The Chairman. Also a relay station ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. Have you, by your studies and the 
studies conducted by the Bureau of Standards and MIT, and RCA, 
arrived at any conclusion as to whether or not that is a proper location 
for those two tremendously powerful transmitting stations? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir ; we have. 

The Chairman. And what is the conclusion arrived at by you? 

Mr. McKesson. The conclusion is that if the stations were moved 
to the more southerly locations, the signal from the same transmitters 


in the target areas and the relay stations would be of much greater 

The Chairman. Now, by a southern location, on the west coast, you 
mean southern California? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And in the east coast you mean southern Florida ? 

Mr. McKesson. Right, sir. 

The Chairman. Let us take Baker West for the time being. 

Would it take a less powerful station in southern California to 
achieve the same results in the target area ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir; yes. 

The Chairman. How much less powerful ? 

Mr. McKesson. My figures indicate that on an average about 10 
percent of the power would be required at this point, as will be required 
up here. 

The Chairman. By "this point," you refer to southern California ? 

Mr. McKesson. I refer to Point Conception, on the Pacific. 

The Chairman. What would the comparative costs of construction 
be, to obtain the same results to the target area ? 

Mr. McKesson. On the order of 10 to 1. 

The Chairman. Ten to one ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The estimated cost of Baker West in its present 
location is how many million dollars? 

Mr. McKesson. Approximately $9 million, I understand. 

The Chairman. Approximately $9 million? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you been informed that it is going to run 
above that by about a million and a half? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir ; I have so heard. 

The Chairman. And you could build a station in southern Cali- 
fornia which would achieve the same results for roughly how much ? 

Mr. McKesson. For approximately 10 percent of that, or about 
$900,000 or a million dollars. 

The Chairman. Is the same situation true on the east coast? 

Mr. McKesson. In my opinion, it is ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is the east-coast situation aggravated more, how- 
ever, by the fact that the present location is in a swampy area, much 
of the land flooded ? Or are you aware of that ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir ; 1 have so heard, that the cost of reclaim- 
ing that land so that buildings and antennas can be put on it would 
be excessive. 

The Chairjvian. In other words, the swampland must first be 
drained ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. And you are not in a position to give us the cost 
of that? 

Mr. McKesson. No. sir. 

The Chairman. You say you can save about $18 million by moving 
those broadcasting stations south ? 

Mr. McKesson. Right. 

The Chairman. That is the original cost. How about the cost of 
operation, the power required ? 


Mr. McKesson. The power required will be approximately the 
same ratios as stated before, or 10 percent. Land costs, personnel 
costs, and possibly some other costs, would not be that reduction. 

The Chairman. Let us take Baker West again. How much power 
would be required to operate the present facilities ; that is, the pro- 
posed facilities? 

Mr. McIvESSON. The transmitter output mainly consists of two 
1 -megawatt transmitters, which would require approximately 5 to 6 
megawatts of central station power. 

The Chairman. One megawatt is 1,000 kilowatts ; right ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. I have just been advised by the engineer here, Sena- 
tor Jackson. And that is 1,000,000 watts ; right ? 

Mr. McKesson. Right. 

The Chairman. And there are two transmitters, each requiring 
1,000 kilowatts? 

Mr. McKesson. Plus some smaller transmitters ; yes. 

The ChairmxVN. What was the size of the smaller transmitters? 

Mr. McKesson. They are two 200 kilowatts. 

The Chairman. One hundred kilowatts. Two of those? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. 

The Chairman. So it would be 2,000,200 Avatts ? 

Mr. McKesson. No ; 2,200,000 watts. 

The Chairman. So they are hundred kilowatts, the smaller ones? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Now, if j^ou move that down to southern Califor- 
nia, how many kilowatts would be required ? 

Mr. McKesson. In my opinion, approximately 10 percent of those 
values would perform the same job to the target area. 

The Chairman. Now, can you give us any estimate of the monthly 
or annual saving if you move it to the southern area? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir ; I cannot offhand. 

The Chairman. In other words, you do not have those figures? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. xVm I correct in this: That as far as you know, 
every engineer agrees with you now that the present locations are 
improper locations? 

Mr. McKesson. Right. 

The Chairman. At this point, I wovdd like to insert in the record 
the memorandum written bv General Stoner to Dr. Compton, dated 
July 14, 1952. 

Before inserting this, may I ask you this, Mr. McKesson. Am I 
correct that at the time the stations were originally located, there was 
some serious difference of opinion at that time as to where they should 
be located, but that by the 14th of July 1952, as far as you know, there 
was unanimity of opinion on the part of all engineers concerned that 
the broadcasting stations sliould not be located where they are pres- 
ently located? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. At this time I want to put in the record in its 
entirety a memorandum from General Stoner, who is present in the 
room, to Dr. Compton. 

Dr. Compton, may I liave your acciirate title in the record? 

29708— 53— pt. 1— — 2 


Dr. CoMPTON (Wilson S. Compton. Administrator, U. S. Interna- 
tional Information Administration). I am the Administrator of the 
International Infoi-mation Administration. 

The Chairman. And General Stoner ? 

General Stoner (Gen. Frank E. Stoner, consnltant, U. S. Interna- 
tional Information Administration). Consultant. 

The Chairman. Chief consnltant to Dr. Compton? 

General Stoner. Not the chief considtant, just consultant. 

The Chairman. We will put the entire document in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 1" and will 
be found in the appendix on p. 75.) 

The Chairman. I am going to ask counsel to read into the record 
the parts which he considers pertinent at this particular time. 

Mr. Schine (reading) : 

That a more southerly location would greatly improve the propagation of 
the transmitter, as it removes the path of the electro-magnetic waves from the 
absorption of the north auroral zone : 

That by remaining at the present site we are taking more than a calculated 
risk. * * * 

It would he necessary to make certain that we have a satisfactory site in 
southern California before decision is made to close out Baker West at 

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully 
to the Congress and to the press our reasons for so doing. Such exposure may 
result in congressional investigation and would not be conducive to our obtain- 
ing additional construction funds in the near future. 

If we remain at Seattle and install our megawatt at that point, we also must 
be prepared to be continuously under surveillance concerning our output 
efficiency. * * * 

I recommend that there be no change in the present site of the Baker West 
transmitter and that we reduce to an essential minimum all building and con- 
struction costs at the Seattle site. 

The Chairman. In connection with that, for the benefit of the Sen- 
ators who were not in New York during the hearings — Senator Jack- 
son was with me and Senator Symington ; and if I am wrong on this, 
Senator, I wish you would correct me — as I recall the testimony was 
that at the time this memorandum was written, roughly $200,000 had 
been expended on Baker West ; that the expenditures have continued ; 
that as of today some four-hundred-odd thousands have been expended 
by way of contractors' fees, some three-hundred-odd thousands for 
land, which I assume could be disposed of, of course, and that approxi- 
mately '6 millions have been expended for equipment; that the con- 
tractor was allowed 814 percent per month on the equipment which 
he had to purchase, which meant that at the end of the year the 
Government had paid for it in full; that he owned the equipment; 
that the legal adviser had advised that the contract with the con- 
tractor be terminated because 814 percent was completely out of line 
and that about 3I/2 percent would be more accurate ; and that this man 
had no background of experience in this type of contracting, that he 
was essentially a school contractor, and that the Government was 
setting him up, buying his equipment, and putting him in competition 
with other contractors. 

Now, in connection with that also, may I, in order to have the record 
clear, point out that this morning the staff talked to General Stoner? 
And in complete fairness to General Stoner, may I say that he has no 
power whatsoever to order anyone to do anything? He is a consult- 
ant ; can only advise. 


This morning, General Stoner informed the staff that construction 
was to be ordered discontinued on Baker West. 

I suggested to the staff that they point out to the general that 
Baker East was just as bad if not worse, because there you not only 
have the broadcasting equipment on pilings, and since that time ap- 
parently it has been decided to discontinue construction on both Baker 
East and Baker West. 

And may I say this, and I think Senator Jackson would want this 
in the record. I think that at the time Baker West was being located, 
there was some controversy as to where in Washington State it would 
be located. At that time, the then Congressman Jackson had no 
knowledge whatsoever of this transmission difficulty. He was not 
informed of that and was only interested in the question of which of the 
two different spots in Washington State it might be located. 

And I would like to compliment at this time, if I may, the Senator 
from Washington for the tremendous help he has given us in helping 
us dig out the facts in regard to Baker West. 

I think he is better informed perhaps than any other Senator on 
that situation out there. 

Senator Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask this question of Mr. McKesson, if I might, Mr. 

As I understand, at the time the two projects were located, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and RCA had recommended 
those sites. Is that correct? But you had disagreed ? 

Mr. McKesson, The Massachusetts Institute had recommended 
them. RCA had not, 

Senator Jackson. RCA had not recommended ? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. But MIT had recommended it in 1951 ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

Senator Jackson, And on the basis of that they went ahead ; that is, 
the Department did, with construction on Baker West? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Senator Jackson. And then in 1952, after the project was under 
way, the scientists changed their opinion on it — the scientists of MIT ? 

Mr. McKesson. I would say, sir, that MIT changed their opinion. 

Senator Jackson. Well, the people at MIT who had originally rec- 
ommended it, in 1951, changed their opinion a year later, in 1952, or 
thereabouts, in the summer of 1952 ?^ 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Now, this controversy, you recall, in the State of 
Washington, was between whether it ought to be located at Aberdeen 
or Port Angeles, Wash. Either site, according to your testimony, as 
it turns out now, or any place within the State of Washington, would 
be inadvisable? 

Mr. McKesson. That is correct. 

The Chairman. In any case, let it be noted that while Senator 
Jackson might have been interested in one of the two sites in Washing- 
ton State, he had nothing to do with having it located in Washington 
State rather than southern California. And I think it is very clear 
from the help he has given us that had he been informed of this situa- 
tion he would have been the most active in having it down in southern 


Senator Jackson. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this, Mr. McKesson. As well as 
the question of Avaste, what other significance do you find in this loca- 
tion of Baker East and Baker West^ 

Mr. McKesson. I would say, sir, that a station located at the current 
Baker West site, Avould greatly reduce the proposed effectiveness of 
the Voice of America to our relay stations and areas beyond the Iron 
Curtain, namely, China, Manchuria, and that area. 

The Chairman. Let us i)ut it this way : Let us assume we have a 
good Voice of America, a voice that is really the voice of America. 
Assume I do not want that to reach Communist territory. Would not 
the best way to sabotage that voice be to place your transmitters within 
that magnetic storm area, so that you would have this tremendous 

Mr. McKesson. I would agree with you a hundred percent, sir. 

The Chairman. The same applies to the east coast, also ( 

Mr. McKjesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And would it be easier for the enemy to jam — I do 
not know your technical terms here 

Mr. MclvEssoN. Jam the signal ? 

The Chairman. Jam the signal, with the location up in the auroral 
absorption belt, than farther south ? 

Mr. McKi:ssoN. Yes, sir; it would be much easier. Because a signal 
from this point, from Baker West, would be much w^eaker, and the 
power and number of jammers could be much smaller than if the 
station was at the optimum location. 

The Chairman. I assume that you agree wholeheartedly with the 
action which I understand Dr. Compton proposes to take, wdiich has 
not been taken yet, the action of suspending all construction of both 
Baker East and Baker West at tiiis time ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At the time of the original notation by General 
Stoner, the memorandum, I should say, to Dr. Compton, of July 14, 
1952, at which time I understand there Avas practical unanimity of 
opinion on the part of the engineers — at that time I understand there 
was only about $200,000 expended on Baker West, and since then 
another $3 million has been spent, committed, or spent. 

Can you think of any reason why this action Avhich is about to be 
taken today should not have been taken on Juy 14, 1952, with the 
consequent saving of millions of dollars? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And may I correct the record? Wlien I say the 
consequent savings of millions of dollars : I understand the millions 
represent the cost of generators, which can be used ; represent the cost 
of land which can be resold ; so that at this time it is rather difficult 
to know the actual waste. Is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir ; yes. 

The Chairman. Will you tell me why you resigned from the Voice 
of America ? 

Mr. McKesson. I resigned last November from the Voice of Amer- 
ica because I was very dissatisfied with the engineering being done in 
the Voice and found that I was imable to correct some of the bad 
points which I considered were going on. 


The Chairman. And I understand that in private industry yoii 
were making considerably more money than you made in the Voice? 
Mr. McKessox. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. So it was a rather heavy sacrifice for you to go with 

the Voice ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When you found that you could not accomplish 
what you set out to do, when you could not get a sensible construction 
program, you decided it was a waste of time and resigned? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : If Baker East and Baker West 
were to be located in the positions in which they are now located, 
would that save the Kussians a vast amount of money and effort insofar 
as jannning our radio signals is concerned? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. Now, there are many other projects which we 
cannot get into today. It is nearly 5 o'clock. 

Can you estimate the overall waste, solely in the construction pro- 
gram, which has occurred up to this date, with which you are familiar? 

Mr. McKesson. As to what I am familiar with, my estimate is on 
the order of $31 million. 

The Chairman. And that includes bases that we are building 
throughout the world ? 

Mr. McKesson. That includes other than Baker East and Baker 
West ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, has it ever been suggested by those who 
have worked with you in the Voice that this mislocation of stations, 
the waste in the construction program, has not been entirely as a 
result of incompetence, but that some of it may have been purposely 
planned that way ? Keep in mind we are not reflecting upon Dr. 
Compton or General Stoner at this time, but I am talking about the 
general conversation you heard by the Americans in the Voice. 

Mr. McKesson. That is a conclusion which I was forced to reach 
a number of times on a number of projects. 

The Chairman. In other words, you feel that mere incompetence 
could not explain away all this waste? 

Mr. McKesson. No", sir. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan? 

Let me complete the record, first, if I may. 

The chief engineer was a Mr. Herrick? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. And Mr. Herrick was your superior? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I think that we should at this time refer to the 
record of Mr. Herrick as gotten from the New York University. 

Mr. Herrick, according to his testimony, went to preengineering 
school for 1 year. We will read into the record his grades obtained 
at that time. And may I make it clear that I am not, at this time, 
trying to reflect upon Mr. Herrick. There are many fine individuals 
who would not make good engineers. I do not think I would make 
a good engineer myself. I do not think many of the Senators here 
would make good engineers. But to select a man who is not an engi- 
neer as chief engineer is where the error lies. 


Now, lie had 1 year of preengineering work. These are the grades 
gotten from New York University, from the registrar's office. Gen- 
eral chemistry, first term, failure ; second term, D. Chemistry, quali- 
tative analysis, first term, D; second term, D. Mathematics, ana- 
lytical geometry, failure; second term, and advanced algebra and 
calculus, failure. Mechanical drawing, first term C ; second term, 
descriptive geometry, D ; military science, first term B ; second term, 
B; English, first term, D; second term, D. Public speaking, first 
term, C ; second term, A. 

He passed in public speaking. 

I think it should be noted in the normal college, not only New York 
University but in the normal college, he would not have received 
sufficient credit points to continue the second year. 

Do you know of any reason, Mr. McKesson, why a man who was 
not a graduate engineer, who flunked out in his preengineering course, 
should be the chief engineer in selecting those sites, regardless of how 
fine a gentleman he may be otherwise ? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir ; I do not. 

The Chairman. Do you think that man was equipped for his job? 

Mr. McKesson. I did not think so, sir. 

The Chairman. I may say in fairness to Mr. Herrick that he did 
advise, according to his testimony, in June or July of 1952, that Baker 
West should be moved south to the location which you suggest. 

So Mr. Herrick was in agreement that Baker West and Baker East 
were improperly located? 

Mr. McKesson. Eight. 

The Chairman. Also, to have the record clear, we should point out 
that Mr. Herrick was demoted since the hearings commenced in New 
York and is no longer chief engineer. 

Senator McClellan ? 

Senator McClellan. How long were you with the Voice of Amer- 

Mr. McKesson. Approximately 3 years. 

Senator McClellan. Three years? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. I was very interested in your answers to 
Senator McCarthy's questions regarding this situation being the re- 
sult solely of incompetency. I had in mind to ask you before he inter- 
rogated you if, from your connections with the Voice of America 
and your training as an engineer and your experience and your as- 
sociations with those responsible for having made this decision, you 
did come to the conclusion that the location of these stations so as to, 
first, cost 10 times as much; second, make them less efficient in per- 
forming the services they were intended to render; and, third, make 
it easier for Russia to jam the signals, was by design and not as a 
result of incompetency ? Did you come to that conclusion ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir; I did. 

Senator McClellan. Now, can you give us the source of the re- 
sponsibility for that decision, or those decisions? If it was done in- 
tentionally and knowingly and by design, can you give us any intima- 
tion as to where the real responsibility lies ? 

Mr. McKesson. I do not believe I am qualified to answer this, sir. 
Everybody is entiled to some mistakes, but nobody is entitled to all 
mistakes. [Laughter.] 


Senator McClellan. And all mistakes were made in tliis? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman, Do you think if a man is merely stupid he cannot 
be consistently mistaken; that he has to make a right decision once 
in a while? 

Mr. McIvESsoN. That is right. 

The Chairjman. One other question. Did you, as a project engineer, 
Mr. McKesson, continuously oppose, either orally or in writing, the 
location of Baker East and Baker West in their present sites? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. For the same reasons that you have set forth today ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you aware of the fact — and you may not be the 
witness to testify here, and on this I am not sure ; we have a man from 
the Bureau of Standards here — are you aware of the fact that the 
Voice, instead of consulting the Bureau of Standards, which has been 
conducting propagation studies for some time and is expert on that, 
instead of consulting the Bureau of Standards, where they could have 
gotten this advice free and the studies free, contacted Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, has paid MIT approximately half a million 
dollars, even though while MIT is veiy well equipped to conduct cer- 
tain technical studies apparently they are newcomers in this propaga- 
tion of radio signals field? Or would you rather have me ask that 
question of the Bureau of Standards? 

Mr. McKesson. I was aware of that personally; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. May I ask Mr. Smith, from the Bureau of Stand- 
ards, a question? 


Dr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you give us your full name ? 

Dr. Smith. Newbern Smith. 

The Chairman. S-m-i-t-h? 

Dr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are reminded that you are under oath now. 
You were sworn the other day. 

Is it a fact that the Voice never contacted the Bureau of Standards 
when they were consideriuir the location of Baker East and Baker 

Dr. Smith. That is correct. We were never formally contacted. 

The Chairman. What is your title at the Bureau? 

Dr. Smith. Chief of the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory. 

The Chairman. And you have been conducting a study for this 
committee; have you? 

Dr. Smith. That is correct. 

The Chairman. To determine the wisdom and feasibility of shift- 
ing Baker West to a different location ? 

Dr. Smith. We have been conducting a study, sir, to determine the 
relative reliability of transmissions from the various points under 


The Chairman. And you have given us a preliminary report? 

Dr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that preliminary report backs up Mr. McKes- 
son 's testimony, does it ? 

Dr. Smith. Essentially. 

The Chairman. And if the Voice had asked you for that report 
when they were selecting a site for Baker West and Baker East, you 
could have given them the same service you are now giving this 
committee ? 

Dr. Smith. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. And am I correct in this: that your preliminary 
report indicates that it was a mistake from a propagation standpoint 
to locate Baker West in the Seattle area ? 

Dr. Smith. The indications from our preliminary survey are that 
from a propagation standpoint it was not a wise decision. 

The Chairman. It is 5 o'clock. 

Senator Jackson, did you have anything further? 

Senator Jackson. No; I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan, before you leave, I had these 
gentlemen come down here today, and I did not want to keep them 
sitting around. We started a liearing this morning, which is far from 
concluded, and that is upon the possible intimidation of witnesses. 
We have a very important matter here. Which would you prefer that 
we continue tomorrow morning? 

Senator Jackson, Why do we not finish this ? 

Senator McClei^lan. I would think so. 

The Chairman. We will meet in 357 at 10 : 30 in the morning. 

Can you be here, Mr. McKesson ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir ; I can be here. 

The Chairman. And if Dr. Stoner and Mr. Compton can be here, I 
would like to have you hear this testimony, because you may want to 
answer some of this before we get through. And Dr. Smith, from the 
Bureau of Standards, will be here, too. 

I would like to point out that if the Voice goes through with the 
proposed action, the action which they propose today, that is, following 
the advice to move those stations down to a better area, it will undoubt- 
edly mean an initial saving of about $18 million. 

I would like to compliment the staff of this committee and the other 
Senators for what appears to be, in the first week of your work, a 
saving of about $18 million. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 05 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Tues- 
day, February 17, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m.) 




United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 

or the Committee on Go\"ernment Operations, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Eesolution 40, agreed 
to January 30, 1953, in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Sena- 
tor Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding. 

Present: Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Senator 
Everett M, Dirksen, Republican, Illinois ; Senator John L. McClellan, 
Democrat, Arkansas; and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, 

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant 
counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Henry Hawkins, investiga- 
tor ; and Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. Mr. Moran, will you take the witness stand ? 

You are reminded that the oath which you took the other day is still 
in effect. 

Mr. Moran, you were with the Voice of America ? 


Mr. Moran, That is right. 
The Chairman. In what capacity ? 

Mr. Moran. I was director of the Honolulu relay base and chief 
radio engineer with the American Embassy in Ceylon. 

The Chairman. Will you speak a little louder, Mr. Moran? 

You were Director of the Honolulu relay base. 

Mr. Moran. And chief radio engineer in Ceylon. 

The Chairman. And your name is ? 

Mr. Moran. James M. Moran. 

The Chairman. Spelled M-o-r-a-n ? 

Mr. Moran. That is right. 

The Chairman. And when did you go with the Voice? 

Mr. Moran. I went with the Voice in July of 1949. 

The Chairman. When did you leave the Voice? 

Mr. Moran. In February oi 1953. 

The Chairman. February of this year ? 

Mr. Moran. February, the 2d. 

The Chairman. Less than 2 weeks ago ? 

Mr. Moran, That is right. 

The Chairman. Will you tell us why you left the Voice ? 


29708— 53— pt. 1—3 


Mr. MoRAN. I left the Voice on ficcoiint of misinana<:^ement and 
the way things are handled, especially as regards the transmitter 
projects and installations at foreign bases, and so forth. 

The Chairman. I am sorry. I had people talking to me from both 
sides. I did not hear what you said, 

Mr. MoRAN. I said I left the Voice of America on account of the 
mismanagement and the way things were handled in general. 

The Chairman. Will you give us the specific examples of misman- 
agement or waste ? 

jMr. MoRAN. Well, an example that I know most about was the 
installation in Ceylon. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. MoRAN. Here we are planning to spend approximately $1 mil- 
lion in a country which is shipping strategic materials, rubber, to 
communistic China. 

The Chairman. How long were you in Ceylon ? 

Mr. MoRAN. I was there 3 months. 

The Chairman. And you went there under the directions of the 
Voice ? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. When you got to Ceylon what did you find the 
condition to be ? 

Mr. MoRAN. I found that when I arrived there, in January of 1952, 
the Ceylonese had started shipping rubber to Red China in October of 
1951. So I was to, originally, function under the technical assistance 
point 4 program. When the Ceylonese began shipping rubber, of 
course, due to the Kem amendment of the Battle Act, this no longer 
could be done. Under the Kem amendment, as you know, any country 
sending strategic materials to a Communist nation is automatically 
barred from point 4 assistance. 

The Chairman. How much is the proposed cost of the project in 
Ceylon, if you know ? 

Mr. MoRAN. It is approximately a million dollars as it stands now. 

The Chairman. Do you know how much of that has been spent 
up to this date? 

Mr. MoRAN. I don't know exactly. I would say approximately a 
half million. 

The Chairman. Does the staff have a copy of the contract covering 
the Ceylon project? 

Mr. MoRAN. I have a copy of the agreement here. 

The Chairman. May I have that, Mr. Moran ? 

Til is copy will be marked as an exhibit and made part of the record. 

(The contract referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2a" and may 
be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. Or if you would prefer keeping this original 

Mr. MoRAN. I would like to keep that if I can. 

The Chairman. Then we will substitute a copy. 

I notice you have your own notations on it. 

Mr. MoRAN. Yes ; I have notes written on it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Moran, do I understand that this contract 
provides that when the construction is completed, all of the facilities 
will belong to the Ceylonese Government? 

Mr. Moran. That is right. They will be responsible for the opera- 
tion and maintenance during the term of the agreement. 


The Chaiemax. In other words, we lose ownership the day that the 
project is completed ? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right, sir. Title to such facilities is trans- 
ferred to the Government of Ceylon for 1 rupee. 

The Chairman. How much control do we have over the material 
broadcast over this Ceylonese station ? 

Mr. MoRAN. Under paragraph 10 of the agreement, we don't have 
much, if any, control. That paragraph gives them the power of cen- 
sorship, under which they can say that this program is prejudicial 
to Ceylon, or that program is prejudicial to Ceylon, and you have got 
to take it off the air. 

The Chairman. Perhaps I should read paragraph 10 into the 

"The Department" — that means the State Department? 

Mr. Moran. Right. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

The Department recognizes the right reserved by the Government of Ceylon to 
give approval to the schedule and to the contents of its broadcasts from Radio 

Do you interpret that to mean that this gives the Ceylonese Gov- 
ernment the power to censor any of our Voice broadcasts from Ceylon ? 

Mr. Moran. It certainly does, Senator. 

The Chairman. Now, how about the receiving facilities at Ceylon ? 
How do you receive the material that will be broadcast over Eadio 
Ceylon ? 

Mr. Moran. The receiving facilities are very unsatisfactory. I ar- 
rived there to find that out, not being aware of it before. 

The Chairman. Mr. Compton, if you care to sit up here where you 
can hear this testimony better, you are welcome to do so. 

Mr. Compton. This is all right. I can hear. 

The Chairman. Pardon the interruption. 

Mr. Moran. I arrived there to find out that they had a very ineffi- 
cient receiving location. The receiving location and facilities belonged 
to the Post and Telecommunications INIinistry of Ceylon, who had 
loaned it to Radio Ceylon. 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt you. 

General Stoner, you can either sit at that table, or if you can not 
hear there, sitting behind the witness, you can have a chair up here 
at the front table, w^hichever you care to. 

Again pardon the interruption. ^ 

Mr. Moran. Repeating what I said, the receiving facilities are very 
inefficient. As I say, they were loaned to Radio Ceylon by the Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunications. The antennas are not beamed on 
Tangier, which was to be our relay point. 

The Chairman. Speak a little louder, Mr. Moran. There is so much 
noise here. 

Mr. Moran. The receiving antennas are not beamed on Tangier, 
which was to be our relay pomt. They are beamed on London. One 
of the antennas was out of use, due to some road construction, so we 
only had two for what we call a diversity setup. The antennas were 
too close to each other to have nuich, if any, diversity effect. 

The Chairman. You are referring now to the receiving antennas? 

Mr. Moran. The receiving antennas, which were loaned to Radio 
Ceylon by the Post and Telecommunications Ministry. 


The Chairman. Unless you could properly receive, you have noth- 
ing to transmit ? 

Mr. MoRAN. Especially in that part of the world. Receiving would 
never be as good, proba'bly, as our other bases because of the great 
distances the relayed signal must travel. 

The Chairman. Now, you have told us that under this contract the 
Ceylon Government has the right to censor; also that you found 
them dealing freely with Communist China ? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right. 

The Chairman. From your stay in Ceylon, your contact with the 
Ceylonese Government, can you describe the political makeup of that 
Government ? 

Mr. Moran. As I understand it, the present government is the 
United Party. There are 101 seats in the House of Representatives, 
of which the United Party has 66. 

The Chairman. The United Party is the so called Conservative 
Party, is it? 

Mr. MoRAN. The Conservative Party. The anti-Communist Party, 
I think they call it, too. 

The Chairman. So that the anti-Communist Party at this time does 
have control of the Ceylonese Government by a margin of about 66 
to 35? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right. 

The Chairman. And how about the other 35 ? I understand they 
are not all Communists. 

Mr. Moran, No. Of the 35, some are what they call the Opposition 
Party of which some are Communists, some are Socialists, and various 
splinter groups of other factions, of which there are quite a few. 

The Chairman. Do you have the openly admitted Communist Party 
members numbered in the other 35 ? 

Mr. MoRAN. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. In other words, the Communist Party is a recog- 
nized party there ? 

Mr. MoRAN. Yes, sir. It is well known. 

The Chairman. You do not know how many of the 101 are mem- 
bers of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. MoRAN. No ; I don't. 

The Chairman. And how about the so-called executive branch of 
the Ceylonese Government? 

Mr. Moran. Well, I couldn't say as to that. 

The Chairman. You do not know about that? 

Mr. MoRAN. No ; I don't. 

The Chairman. Now, does the contract provide that in case it be- 
comes too difficult for us to broadcast from Ceylon, we may remove our 
equipment ? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right. According to the agreement we can 
remove our equipment. 

Senator Dirksen. Did the witness say we can, or cannot ? 

The Chairman. He said, "We can." 

Would it be feasible to remove it ? Would the cost be greater than 
the value of the equipment? 

Mr. MoRAN. In all probability, the cost would be so much to dis- 
mantle and move and ship it that probably it would not be moved 


at all. The Ceylonese Govermnent would get the transmitters for 
little or nothing. 

The Chairman. In regard to the subject of censorship, I am mark- 
ing at this time as "Exhibit No, 2b," the Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Representatives, 1951, in which the membership of the Ceylonese 
Parliament discuss the censorship power which they have over Radio 
Station Ceylon, in which the leader of the United Party, apparently 
a leader friendly to us, points out that they have the complete right 
of censoi-ship ; that they can make it so difficult for the United States 
when they see fit that we will have to withdraw, and for that reason 
the argument was that it was an excellent thing for Ceylon to have 
us proceed to construct bases in Ceylon, 

This will be marked as an exhibit, but will not be recopied into the 
record, Mr. reporter. It will be available to the Senators, 

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No, 2b and may be 
found in the files of the subcommittee,) 

Mr. MoRAN. There is one thing more, Senator, if I can bring it out, 
that complicates the situation more, in that Radio Ceylon is also a com- 
mercial station. Any advertiser objecting to any of the VOA pro- 
grams could also bring pressure on Radio Ceyoln to either get that 
program off or lose the commercial contract. 

The Chairman. I may say that is pointed out in the Parliamentary 
Debates also. 

How about Manila, the Philippines, as an alternative site to Ceylon, 
where you would not have the same difficulty, you would have in 
Ceylon ? 

Mr. Moran, In my opinion, Manila would be just as good. Since 
they would be under the protection of the American forces, they 
would not be as vulnerable as a country like Ceylon. 

The Chairman, Do you know why we located in Ceylon ? 

Mr, Moran, The idea, of course, was to cover India. That was, as 
I understand it, the primary purpose. Of course, I was in Honolulu, 
and the planning was worked out in New York without my knowledge. 
I was just asked to go to Ceylon and I went over. 

The Chairman. Do you know anything about the new proposed 
construction on Ceylon, in addition to the million-dollar project you 
talk about? 

Mr. Moran. There are plan in a future budget to install additional 
transmitters of higher power and also install a program center with 
studios, the idea being that it was proposed to originate directly from 

The Chairman. Do you know the estimated cost of that project? 

Mr. Moran. I would say about $10 million. 

The Chairman. I am not sure if you put into the record a history of 
your background so far as electrical or radio engineering is concerned. 

Mr. Moran. No ; I haven't. Not so far. 

The Chairman. In order to better evaluate your testimony, I think 
the Senators should have your complete background insofar as your 
experience in radio and electrical engineering is concerned, 

Mr, Moran, Well, I was 14 years in the technical phases of the 
commercial radio broadcasting industry ; I was in the service, a lieu- 
tenant commander in the Navy, for 4 years ; and I was connected with 
the Bureau of Aeronautics, where I handled administration of re- 
search and development for electronic warfare, handling the initiation 


of contracts, liaison between tlie other services, traveling to contractors 
to see if they were complying with Navy specifications; and then, after 
I left the service, I did the same work as a civilian in the Bureau 
of Aeronautics. I just changed my uniform, so to speak. I was there 
until July of 1949, until I went with the Voice of America. 

The Chairman. Now, assuming, for the time being, that the loca- 
tion in Ceylon is a proper location, assvmiing that that is the best 
location in that area, can you give us any examples of waste in the 
construction contracting? 

Mr. MoRAN. The example of waste I mentioned a while ago which 
was the inadequate receiving facilities. Apparently no thought was 
given to that. And now a new receiving site must be located. That 
must be installed and paid for before the present facilities will even 
be of much advantage. 

The Chairman. Do you know if the new budget calls for the con- 
struction of a receiving station? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is being planned, as I understand it — to install 
a new receiving station. I think plans are already under way. 
• The Chairman. But your position is that until the receiving sta- 
tion is constructed the broadcasting station will be of no use what- 
soever ? 

INIr. MoRAN. That is right. 

As far as picking up the relay points, like Tangier or Munich, they 
can play recordings in Ceylon, which, of course, would not be subject 
to the noise and the interference picked up in the relay. 

The Chairman. May I ask Mr. Smith, of the Bureau of Standards, 
whether your department has ever been called upon to make a study 
from the propagation standpoint, as to whether Ceylon is more desir- 
able than Manila, the Philippines, keeping in mind the target area 
that the Voice has in mind ? 


Dr. Smith. No, sir ; to my knowledge we have never been called upon 
for such a study. 

The Chairman. I wonder. It seems unusual the Voice has not 
asked you to do that. In view of the fact that it has not, I believe 
this committee will ask you to do that. 

I hate to load additional work upon you, but I think this is very im- 

May I ask Mr. Compton or Mr. Stoner : I wonder if you could tell 
me whether MIT or RCA or any other engineering outfit has been 
asked to make such a study ? 


Mr. CoMPTON. I think Mr. Ross, Senator McCarthy would be better „ 
able to answer that. Mr. Ross is of the staff of the Voice of America. f 
The Chairman. You do not know, yourself? 


Mr. CoMPTOisr. No ; I have no idea. 

The Chairman. Mr, Stoner, would, you know ? 

Mr. Stoner. I could not say, sir. We have our own central fre- 
quency staff in New York, and I think it was dependent on their 
judgment whether or not the outside assistance should be obtained. 

The Chairman. I see. 

May I ask, Mr, Stoner or Mr, Compton, either of you who care to 
answer this question : We found that about $600,000 was spent on ])ro- 
pagation studies by MIT. The evidence has been that wliile MIT is 
exceptionally well qualified to make studies in certain technical fields, 
this propagation study is rather new to them. 

It is very clear that the Bureau of Standards would have done this 
for the Voice for nothing, is apparently better equipped to do it than 
MIT. I am just very curious to know why the Voice never asked the 
Bureau of Standards to make a propagation study in connection with 
Baker East or Baker West or any of the other projects, why we spent 
that $600,000, 

Mr. Compton. If I may answer that, I would be curious, too. Senator. 

Mr, Ross (Julius Ross, Acting Assistant Chief, Engineering Divi- 
sin) . May I comment on that ? 

Mr, CoMPTON, I am not sure that they haven't, I would think it 
was commonsense that they should have. I noticed the statement 
made yesterday was that so far as the person making the statement 
knew, they had not been asked, but I think you should give us an 
opportunity to find out exactly what inquiry was made, if any. I 
don't know. 

The Chairman. Mr, Smith, here, is in charge of that project over 
in the Bureau of Standards. The inquiry would have come to him. 
He has testified under oath that no such inquiry was even made of the 
Bureau of Standards. 

I think it should be pointed out that Mr. Compton was not with the 
Voice at the time the original studies were made. Is that correct? 

Mr, Compton. That is correct; yes. 

The Chairman, I am not sure that we have the date that you came 
with the Voice in the record, 

Mr. Compton, Beg pardon? 

The Chairman, I am not sure we have the date that you came with 
the Voice in the record. 

Mr, Compton, The 20th of January 1952, 

The Chairman, The 20th of January 1952, And, General Stoner, 
you came with the Voice as a consultant on what date? 

Mr, Stoner, April the 11th, 1952. 

The Chairman, April 11, 1952, So both of you came with the 
Voice after the original locations were picked? 

Mr. Compton. That is correct. 

The Chairman, Can either of you tell me who picked Mr, Herrick 
as the chief engineer ? We have had the very unusual situation deve- 
lop here of finding that the chief engineer was not an engineer, that 
in fact he took 1 year of engineering and flunked his courses in en- 
gineering, and I would just wonder why he would be the chief engineer 
in charge of this tremendously sizable project, 

Mr, Compton. I presume, Mr. Kohler, who was with the Voice of 
America for 3 jestrs until last August ; and then he was succeeded by 


the present director, Mr. Morton. That could easily be found out, 
Mr. Chairman. I don't happen to know. 

The Chairman. I would like to know who did select Mr. Herrick 
and who gave him that job? I understand from the testimony here- 
tofore taken that he was originally at OWI and that he was then 
blanketed into the State Department with other OWI employees. 
And it would be rather interesting to find who gave this particular 
man the job as the chief engineer. And I am not attempting to re- 
flect upon him. Many fine men are put in jobs that just leave them a 
little over their head, and I know very little about the man, Herrick, 
except his engineering abilities. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I know that Mr. Kohler very stanchly and con- 
sistently sustained Mr. Herrick as competent in his job. Whether he 
selected him, I do not know. 

The Chairman. Mr. Compton, let me say this : that I realize that 
going into a project as vast as this Voice of America and as rapidly 
growing as the Voice of America has been growing, you may have 
found it tremendously difficult to get your finger on everything within 
the short period of time you have been there. 

Let me ask you this, though : Do you think it is wise to throw 
another five or ten million dollars into Ceylon, which is doing bus- 
iness with Red China, which has apparently a heavy Communist ele- 
ment in the Government, which has even power to censor our broad- 
casts both from the standpoint of content and from the standpoint 
of whether or not it interferes with the commercial program from 
Ceylon? Does that sound like a sensible idea, if you can find some 
other broadcasting point such as Manila in the Philippines? 

Mr. Compton. No, sir; we have no such intention of making any 
such investment. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the present plan ? 

Mr. Compton. The present plan is to operate what we have there, 
which is short wave, and to take no further action. 

The Chairman. When was that decision made ? 

Mr. Compton. Oh, within the last few months. 

The Chairman. But up until very recently you did have plans 

Mr. Compton. That is true. The original allocation — I have a 
document here which in due course I want to give to you, which indi- 
cated that the allocation for this project, which was called project 
Negate, is $6,372,627. 

The Chairman. Let us get beyond 1949. This is a project that 
cost roughly a million dollars. There is a contract covering that 

Mr. Compton. $535,000. 

The Chairman. Yes. Am I correct that that ran closer to a mil- 
lion finally, in the final cost ? 

Mr. Compton. The total obligation at the end of December was 

The Chairman. That is the total obligated. But do you know 
the total cost of that project when it is completed, what the total cost 
of that particular project will be ? 

Mr. Compton. I do not. 

The Chairman. You are of the opinion it will be less than a mil- 
lion dollars, in any event ? 


Mr. CoMPTON. That is my understanding, but I haven't the figure. 

The Chairman. You mentioned a figure of — what is the total proj- 
ect at Negate ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. $6,372,627 was the original allocation to that project. 

The Chairman. Now, in addition to this contract, which you say 
runs somewhere around $500,000, or which, according to Mr. Moran, 
will cost close to a million — in addition to this contract, will you 
describe the other broadcasting facilities which you are going to 
build in Ceylon, which would account for the other $9,400,000, or 
whatever it happens to be? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I do not know them in detail, Senator. I merely 
know that whatever collateral accessories are necessary to put on the 
air these shortwave transmitters are contemplated in the completion 
of the present stage, which, as of December 31, was represented by 
this figure I gave you, $470,582. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, may I ask : 

Mr. Compton, what do you charge into this? You charge super- 
visory cost, travel, subsistence from here, or is this bare equipment 
cost you are talking about ? 

Mr. Compton. My understanding is that it is the total cost. This 
is supposed to include all necessary travel incident to the construction. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, you say it is your understanding. Do you 

Mr. Compton. No, I do not know. 

Senator Dirksen. Very well. 

Mr. Compton. But I can find out. I think Mr. Ross would know, 
if you care to ask him. 

The Chairman. Forgetting about this project that you say costs 
$500,000, and Mr. Moran says costs close to a million, you tell us the 
total application was $10,400,000. What was the other nine or ten 
million dollars to be spent for ? 

Mr. Compton. For megawatt relay transmitter. 

The Chairman. And were you also going to set programing facili- 
ties, in other words, one of your main offices, in Ceylon? 

Mr. Compton. I have no knowledge about that. 

The Chairman. When did you abandon this nine or ten million 
dollar project? When was that abandoned? Or do you still plan 
on a $10,400,000 project in Ceylon? Wlien did you abandon it, and 

Mr. Compton. That is a part of tKe so-called total ring plan. 
This is merely a part of that. And We reached a conclusion some time 
ago as a result of the surveys largely initiated by General Stoner in 
the last several months, that the thing to do was to test the validity of 
the whole conception of the ring plan, the facilities that are now 
provided, and not ask for any further ones. 

The CHAiRiNrAN. By the ring plan, you mean the plan of having a 
a ring of broadcasting stations around the Communist-controlled coun- 
tries ? 

Mr. Compton. That is correct. Tliat was submitted, I believe, to 
the Congress in 1950, 1 think in the summer of 1950. 

The Chairman. Now, I am not trying to force you to answer some- 
thing that you cannot answer, Mr. Compton, but if you or General 
Stoner can tell me this, I would like to know when you abandoned all 

29708— 53— pt. 1 4 


construction beyond that covered in this contract. Do you follow 
me ? You said your total program was to spend $10,400,000 in Ceylon. 
We have a contract before us which you say calls for the expenditure 
of about half a million dollars. Mr. Moran says he thinks it was 
closer to a million dollars I believe. 

Now, forgetting for the time being which of you are correct in 
that, whether it is $500,000 or a million, when did you abandon the 
construction ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I am not aware that any construction was ever un- 
dertaken, Senator. 

The Chairman. Did I misunderstand you when I thought you said 
that the original plan called for the expenditure of $10,400,000 in 
Ceylon ? Did 1 understand you correctly in that ? 

Mr, CoMPTON. That is correct. 

The Cpiairman. All right. You no longer plan on spending $10,- 
400,000 in Ceylon? 

Mr. CoMPTON. We have never had the funds to spend in the first 
place, so it couldn't have been undertaken. 

The Chairman. Are you still asking for the funds ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. No, sir. 

The Chairman. When you planned the expenditure of $10,400,000 
at that time you were asking for the funds. Right ? 

Do I make myself clear, Mr. Compton ? 

Mr. Compton. Originally, I think the entire proposed construction 
of the ring plan, including the appropriations for it, was asked in 
1951. I think there was an estimate before both the House and the 
Senate for a total of close to a hundred million dollars. 

The Chairman. Mr. Compton, can you or your chief consultant — 
and you were the man in charge of this program — tell me whether 
you have abandoned the idea, the plans, of spending $10,400,000, in 
Ceylon, or whether you still want to spend that money there? And 
if you have abandoned that plan, I want to know when you abandoned 
it and why you did. 

Now, as head of the project, the topman over there, you should 
be able to give us some information over there. You see, we do not 

Mr. Compton. I am not the topman in tlie Voice of America, Sen- 
ator, and I am not the Voice of America planner. 

The Chairman. Mr. Compton, let us get your position straight. 
You are the head of the entire information program, are you not? 

Mr. Compton. Tliat is true. 

The Chairman. That means that the Voice of America is under 

Mr. Compton. The Voice of America is, of course, a constituent 
part of it. 

The Chairman. And it works under you ? 

Mr. Compton. That is true. 

The Chairman. You have jurisdiction over it? 

Mr. Compton. That is true. 

The Chairman. Well, what do you mean by topman. You say you 
are not the topman. That sounds top to me. 

Mr. Compton. Well, I mean to say I don't know the answers to all 
the plans that are in preparation, and I shouldn't answer a question 


of that sort without knowing. I merely say we are not asking for 
funds to carry out any project in Ceylon. We don't have to, in order 
to complete this small project, this relatively small project, whether 
it is a million or whether it is a half million, whatever that is. We 
do not have to ask for further funds. We have funds already ap- 
propriated that are ample to provide for that. 

Senator Dikksex. Mr. Compton, let me ask you: You appeared 
last year before the House and Senate Committee as Director of 
II A to present the justifications and to ask for funds for this informa- 
tion program under the jurisdiction of the State Department. You 
appeared, did you not? 

Mr. CoMPTON. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen, That includes books, informational libraries, 
motion pictures, and international broadcasting. 
- Mv. CoMPTON. That is right. 

Senator DipvKsex. So you are the top boss of IIA, and therefore you 
are the top boss of the so-called international broadcasting of the 
Voice of America ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, last year you asked for $36 million for new 
facilities, when you appeared before the House Appropriations Com- 
mittee. Is that correct? 

Mr. Compton. I think that is correct. I don't have the figures. 

Senator Dirksen. That would be roughly about April or May of last 
year, and you appeared before the Senate committee in June. Right? 

Mr. CoMPTON. In May, I believe. 

Senator Dirksen. Roughly about the same time. 

Mr. Compton. Yes. 

Senator Dirksen. So 3'ou presented your case for the $36 million 
in new facilities over there, and the House deleted the whole business. 
Is that right ? 

Mr. Compton. The House committee recommended $20 million, 

Senator Dirksen. Well, what happened on the floor of the House? 

Mr. Compton. On the floor of the House it was rejected entirely. 

Senator Dirksen. So finally you wound up with this broadcasting 
program with roughly $21 million in operating funds; is that rightl 
Roughly $24,000, $20 million, or whatever it was ? 

Mr. Compton. For the Voice of America ? 

Senator Dirksen. That is right. 

Mr. Compton. The appropriation did not break it down in Voice of 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. I am just speaking generally. But you 
asked for $36 million, and at the time you appeared before the Appro- 
priations Committee you must have had in mind a plan for installing, 
transmitting and receiving equipment somewhere in the world, to 
cost $36 million? 

Mr. Compton. That is true. 

Senator Dirksen. All right. Did that $36 million include the $10 
million contemplated for the island of Ceylon? 

Mr. Compton. I do not know the answer to that. I could find out. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, do you mean to say, in your request for 
equipment and transmission facilities, less than a year ago, you did 
not know whether it included $10 million for Ceylon or not? 


Mr. CoMPTON. I don't know whether it included that particular 
item. It may or may not have. I can easily get the information for 


Senator Dirksen. Well, you know, $10 million is like a bass drum 
or a grand piano. You do not lose that amount very easily. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I have never had that amount. 

Senator Dirksen. That is right. You had a plan as late as the time 
you appeared before the House and Senate committees of $36 million, 
for facilities. Then I suppose some of it was for Ceylon. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I can't tell you for certain. I can assure you of hav- 
ing that information. It is available. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, I am wondering about this plan, Mr. Chair- 
man, to install out there. Because that is only 9 months ago when they 
requested this of Congress. Now you are trying to find out when this 
thing was dropped. I would like to know when it was dropped, too, 
because it must have been a very live subject 9 months ago when they 
requested $36 million before the House deleted the whole amount for 
equipment and facilities. 

Mr. CoMPTON. Let me remind you. Senator : When I appeared be- 
fore the House committee in February, the ink was almost dry on 
my appointment as the Administrator of what j'ou call the HA. 

Senator Dirksen. But, Mr. Compton, from that time until you 
appeared before the Senate committee and was quizzed for, it seemed 
to me, hundreds of pages, by Senator McCarran, you must have de- 
veloped some familiarity with this instrument which we are dis- 

Mr. CoMPTON. I know that there was approximately $37 million 
requested; that the House committee rejected our request for two 
Baker plants, which would have cost approximately $10 million 
apiece, and reduced it approximately $20 million, or approximately 
$21 million of the requested thirty-six or thirty-seven million dollars. 

The House itself rejected the recommendation of the House com- 
mittee. The Senate did not raise the question. There was no hearing 
in the Senate on the matter of facilities, because the committee didn't 
choose to take it up, and there was no action on the floor. 

Senator Dirksen. But in the tabular breakdown, the matter was 
presented to the Senate. At least it appeared in the record of the 
hearings, did it not ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. That is right. It was in the budget. 

Senator Dirksen. Exactly so. 

Mr. CoMPTON. And the Senate got the budget the same as the House. 

The Chairman. Then, Doctor, will you do this for us? 

Will you check with your office and report to us when this additional 
$9 million project was abandoned, when you decided to no longer ask 
funds for it, when you decided it would be unwise? We also want 
to know why, what caused you to make that decision, whether you 
planned on building facilities somewhere else, whether you considered 
them unnecessary, or whether you were going to cut down the service 
in the area. Can you do that ? 

Mr. Compton. Yes. 

The Chairman. No. 2, in view of the fact that you are head of the 
entire information program, would it be very difficult for you to give 
us, No. 1, a table of organization of the various information pro- 


grains, including the Voice, and No. 2, a chart, showing the purpose 
and the function of eacli information program ? 

One of the things we intend to go into is the question of overlapping, 
duplication of facilities, and we have some difficulty finding anyone in 
the Department who has a very clear picture of just what each infor- 
mation program is designed to do, 

Mr. CoMi^ON. I would be glad to give that to you. 

The Chairman. I do not want to rush you, but just how soon could 
you have that prepared for us^ It would perhaps take some little 
time, I assume ? 

Mr, CoMPTON. We probably can give you a chart right away. 
We can give you an explanation right away. It may not be regarded 
by you as totally adequate for the purpose you have in mind. 

Senator Dikksen. Mr. Compton, when did you go before the Budget 
Bureau with respect to estimates for 1954 1 Probably September or 

Mr, CoMPTON. I think it must have been October. It may have been 

Senator Dirksen. Did you make a request for fiscal 1954 for funds 
for Ceylon 'i 

Mr, Compton. I can get you that information, exactly what was in it. 

Senator Dirksen. I am not concerned for the moment now about 
what finally came to Congress in the estimates for 1954. I am inter- 
ested in the request that you made to the Budget Bureau, through 
the budget officer of the State Department, some time in October, 
whether you requested funds to go ahead with this Ceylon project. 
Because we can determine later what the State Department action 
might have been or the Budget Bureau action. But would you not 
know whether you requested this money, in October, for the next 
fiscal year ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I don't have that record here. 

Senator Dirksen. Does it not occur to you, since it involves nearly 
$10 million 

Mr. CoMPTON. I don't think it was in. But I am not positive. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you appear before the Budget Bureau your- 
self ? 

jNIr. Compton. I did on oaie occasion for about an hour. I did not 
discuss any of these matters. 

Senator Dirksen. You have a budget officer in IIA ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

Senator Dirksen. You can find oat from him about this ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Oh, yes. The answer is easily available. I can get 
it on the telephone. 

The Chairman. Do you have any of your aides here with you, Mr. 
Compton ? 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Eoss. 

The Chairman. Would you tell Mr. Boss who to call ? 

I wonder if you would get on the telephone and get that informa- 
tion for Senator Dirksen? In fact, I think we should have your 
budget officer down here. 

Would that cause a hardship on your office if we called him down 
here ? 

Mr, Compton. No. You would like to have the estimates sub- 


Senator Dirksen. No ; we want the original request that you made 
through the budget officer of the State Department to the Director 
of the Budget for inchision of this money in the budget for 1954. 

Now, mind you, the State Department budget officer and the State 
Department authorities may have cut it out before it ever got to the 
Budget Bureau. The request, however, had to be initialed in II A. 
Was it in your original request for funds for 1954? 

Mr. CoMPTON. We can find that out. I do not happen to know. 

The Chairman. Also, this budget officer will be ahle to tell us what 
is currently available for each project, what has been appropriated, 
what is being asked for now? He will be able to give us that 
information ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. The budget officer, I am sure, can do that. 

The Chairman. Will you instruct your man to call him, the budget 
officer, and tell him to come down ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mr. Compton, you were about to describe the 
various information services under your jurisdiction. Would you 
rather wait and prepare a table on that ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I thought you had asked me for a chart and an ex- 
planation of the functions of each part of the Information Services. 

The Chairman. I thought you said you were prepared to give 
us that information now? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I meant any time. I don't have the chart here. 

The Chairman. I see. Well, can you describe in the record the 
various information programs over which you have jurisdiction, and 
then give us a chart later? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

The Chairman. And their functions and purposes? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Would you wish it right now ? 

The Chairman. Right now ; yes. 

Mr. Compton. The International Information Service organiza- 
tion includes, in addition to the Voice of America, which is known 
as the International Broadcasting Service, which is in New York and 
under the direction of Alfred H. Morton, the Deputy Administrator, 
the International Motion Picture Service, which is located here, under 
the direction of an Assistant Administrator, Mr. Edwards. 

The Chairman. Mr. Edwards? 

Mr. Compton. Edwards. 

The Chairman. What is his first name ? 

Mr. Compton. Herbert. 

The Chairman. Herbert Edwards? 

Mr. Compton. Yes, sir. The International Press Service under an 
Assistant Administrator, Mr. Charles P. Arnot, A-r-n-o-t. 

The Chairman. I did not get the name of the man heading IBS. 

Mr. Compton. Alfred H. Morton. 

The Chairman. Alfred Morton. 

What is Mr. Foy L. Kohler's position? 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Kohler has not been connected with the Voice 
of America since last August. 

The Chairman. Since last August. And what was the occasion of 
his removal? 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Morton was appointed to the position which he 


The Chairman. And where is Mr. Foy Kohler now ? Is he with the 
Voice ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I am not informed as to his present assignment. He 
is a Foreign Service officer. 

The Chairman. Did you ask him to resign for cause? Or why 
was he removed ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. His term, his normal term of departmental service 
as a Foreign Service officer would have ended this past summer, and 
we concluded not to ask him to remain any further. 

The Chairman. Is he still in the Foreign Service? 

Mr, CoMPTON. He is a Foreign Service officer, and I assume he is 
still in the Foreign Service. 

The Chairman. I do not know what you mean when you say his 
normal term in the Foreign Service would have expired this summer. 

Mr. CoMPTON. The Foreign Service, as I am informed — and I am 
not a member of the Foreign Service — has a pattern of assignments, 
rotating assignments, including what the Foreign Service regula- 
tions call departmental assignments. This is a departmental assign- 
ment. And that is normally for a 3-year period. It can be extended, 
on request, to 4 years. 

The Chairman. So as far as you know, he was not removed because 
of any inefficiency or incompetency or anything of that kind ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. No he was not removed for incompetence, Senator. 
It is perfectly plain, however, that his views with respect to the Voice 
of America and the views of the Administrator were not in accord. 

The Chairman. By "the views of the Administrator," you mean 
your own views? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I do. 

The Chairman. In other words, did you ask for his resignation or 
removal or transfer? 

Mr. CoMPTON. No, I merely refrained from asking that his term of 
departmental service be extended. 

Mr. Kohler had, Mr. Chairman, if I may say, a view which neither 
General Stoner nor I shared, and many of our advisers, that the 
answer to the radio program was to get more and more voices on the air 
in more and more languages. That is not, in my judgment, a satis- 
factory basis. The view was shared by the gentleman who was my 
predecessor, insofar as I had a predecessor. 

Senator McClellan. Who was your predecessor ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Thurman L. Bernard, who was what was called the 
General Manager of the International Information and Educational 
Exchange Service, which was the general designation, prior to the 
establishment of the International Information Administration. That 
is why I say, insofar as there was a predecessor, he at least occupied a 
position of general responsibility for the whole program. 

Mr. Bernard went on a worldwide inspection trip, in the first 6 
months of last year, and came back with a number of conclusions, in- 
cluding conclusions about the radio program. And his conclusion, 
if I may paraphrase a rather long report in a single sentence, was 
that we, meaning the whole Department, were still far short of find- 
ing the answer to the radio problem. 

Senator McClellan. Do you have a copy of that report? Did he 
make a report in writing? 

Mr. CoMPToN. Yes ; he made a report in writing. 


Senator McClellan. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have that 
submitted to the committee for its inspection. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I would be glad to make it available to you. 

The Chairman. By this afternoon at 2 o'clock? Can you obtain 
it by that time, or is it in New York ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. No, I think it is here. 

The Chairman. We will ask you to submit it at 2 o'clock this after- 

Senator McClellan. Doctor, may I ask you another question? 
You do not know where this man, Kohler, is now '. 

Mr. Compton. He is still in the Department. 

Senator McClellan. He is still in the service ? 

Mr. Compton. He is still in the service, still a Foreign Service 
officer, to the best of my knowledge. I think he is temporarily as- 
signed to some one of the regional bureaus. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you : Prior to the time you be- 
came Administrator, who was the top authority, and who had the 
final responsibility with regard to this program? Was it Kohler, or 
your predecessor ? 

Mr. Compton. The top authority was in the Secretary of State. 

Senator McClellan. All right. Next to him. Let us get the line 
of authority so that we can fincl out who is responsible for this. 

Mr. Compton. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affaii^s. 

Senator McClellan. Who ? 

Mr. Compton. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. 

Senator McClellan. Who was he? 

Mr. Compton. It was Mr. Edward Barrett. 

Senator McClellan. Mister who ? 

Mr. Compton. Edward Barrett. And then he was succeeded, a 
year ago, by Howland Sergeant. 

Senator McClellan. I am talking about the time these plans were 
made and these contracts entered into with Ceylon and other govern- 
ments. I want to find out who was responsible at that time. 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Barrett was the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Affairs for a period of 2 years, ending in January of last 
year. All of the contracts which were let within the previous 2-year 
period came within the period during which he was the responsible 

Senator McClellan. Next to him, then, in authority, would that 
have been your predecessor ? 

Mr. Compton. Yes, as far as the Voice of America was concerned. 

Senator McClellan. All right. Then, as far as the Voice of Amer- 
ica was concerned, the next in authority would be Kohler ; was it not ? 

Mr. Compton. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. Then we have the Secretary, the Under Secre- 
tary, the Administrator, and Kohler. Those are the four top people 
responsible for this program. Or Assistant Secretary instead of 
Under Secretary? 

Mr. Compton. Assistant Secretary. 

Senator McClellan. You gave us the name of your predecessor, I 
believe, Mr. Bernard? Is that correct? 

Mr. Compton. He was the General Manager, I said. 


Senator McClellan. Have they just changed the title since to 
Administrator ( 

JNIr. CoMPTON. No. The Information and Educational Exchange 
program, prior to a year ago, was administered in five different juris- 
dictions within the Deimrtment of State, in each of the regional bu- 
reaus. They had charge of certain portions ; that means the European 
Bureau, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America. I presume 
it sliould include tlie German Bureau, also. Perhaps you can say there 
were five geographic bureaus within the Department of State that 
had certain administrative and operating responsibilities. 

Senatoi- ] Well, Doctor, what I am trying to determine 
is: Where is the source of authority and responsibility, so that this 
committee can bring them here and get first-hand information from 
them as to why such a program as this was approved. That is what 
I want. Let us not have so much lost motion. I would like to see the 
connnittee get the responsible people down here. 

Mr. CoMFroN. Well, the question you asked me, Senator McClellan, 
was where this responsibility had been located at the time these con- 
tracts were let. 

Senator McClj-:llax. That is right. 

Mr. CoMPTOx. That is the question that I answered. The action 
taken a year ago by the Secretary of State in establishing the 
International Information Administration was to aggregate these 5 
or 6 separate authorities in 1 place, called the International Informa- 
tion Administration. And at that point the regional bureaus ceased 
to have any administrative operating responsibility. 

Senator McClellan. But on the basis of the information here de- 
veloped so far, it seems to me that there is a whole lot more incompe- 
tency and just plain stupidity involved in this whole affair, and I want 
to find out who the responsible heads are who had the final responsibil- 
ity, and determine whether they were that stupid, or if a great deal of 
this was apparently by design. Because I think this thing looks 
rotten on the face of it. 

Mr. CoMPTON. Well, I think you are talking to the right person to 
find out where you can get the information. 

Senator McClellan. All right. Just give us the full source of it 
so that we can get them down here. 

The Chairman. May I say also. Doctor, that we would be glad to 
have you suggest any witnesses that you would like to have this com- 
mittee call. The picture being presented by the witnesses so far, as 
indicated by Senator McClellan, and J agree with him wholeheartedly, 
gives us a very, very uncomplimentary picture of the operations of the 

Now, if you have other witnesses you would like to have called who 
will testify to the contrary or give us additional information, in other 
words, any witnesses who you think will be helpful in presenting a 
complete and clear picture of the entire information program, and if 
you will suggest their names, we will be glad to call them. You need 
not do that now. You can give us a list of those witnesses if you 
care to. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I can give you some of them right now, in response 
to your invitation of last evening. 

The Chairman. Very good. Do you want to do that right now? 

29708 — 53— pt. 1 ^5 


Mr. CoMPTON. Mr. Ross, as I indicated, here- 

The Chairman. Give us his full name, will you ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Ross. Julius Ross. 

The Chairman. And Mr. Ross's title is what? 

Mr. Ross. Acting Assistant Chief of the Engineering Division. 

The Chairman. Acting Assistant Chief of the Engineering Division. 

Mr. CoMPTON. He was Mr. McKesson's superior officer. 

The Chairman. Acting Assistant Chief of the Engineering Divi- 
sion of the Information Program, or of the Voice? 

Mr. Ross. International Broadcasting Service. 

The Chairman. I see. Known as the Voice of America. Right? 

Mr. Ross. Right. 

The Chairman. And your immediate superior was Mr. Herrick? 

Mr. Ross. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And who was the next witness you wanted to call, 
Mr. Compton? 

Mr. CoMPToN. Mr. Ring. 

The Chairman. And what is his title ? 

Mr. CoMiTON. Radio engineer-consultant. He is not employed by 
the Voice of America, and so far as I know never has been, but he has 
been one of the consultants. 

The Chairman. Mr. Ring has been a consultant? Do you know 
his first name ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Andrew, I think. 

The Chairman. And you will be able to tell the staff where to get 
in touch with him, will vbu ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. He is right here. 

The Chairman. He is right here. And he was a consultant for 
the Voice ? 

Mr. Compton. He has been a consultant in this program at various 
stages, I think, for quite some time. 

The Chairman. Wliat do the consultants get per day, incidentally? 

Mr. CoMPTON. General Stoner informs me they get service fees. 

The Chairman. I want to know the amount. 

Mr. Ross. ]\Iost of the activities 

The Chairman. Let me ask Mr. Compton. What do most of your 
consultants get per day ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. They get from $50 to $75. 

The Chairman. In other words, not less than $50 and not more 
than $75 ? 

Mr. Compton. We may have some less than $50. 

The Chairman. Do you have any over $75 ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I think we cannot pay, vmder the law, more than $75. 

The Chairman. Now, is there any other witness you have in mind 
you would like to have us call ? 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Carr. 

The Chairman. And who is he ? 

Mr. Compton. He is our radio engineer. 

The Chairman. Is he with the Voice ? 

Mr. Compton. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Is he a consultant also ? 

Mr. Compton. He at least was in this group that met in New York 
that I mentioned to you last evening, on last Wednesday, and he 
made the recommendation, a portion of which I read to you. 


The Chairman. Well, you asked us to call him. You must know 
something about him. Was he one of your consultants? 

Was he working for the Voice? 

Mr. CoMPTox. Off and on he has been. 

The CiiAiR3iAN. For how long? You have some reason to ask us 
to call him. I just wonder what his background is. 

Mr. CoMPTON. Well, he knows all about, or knows a great deal 
about the subject matter that Mr. McKesson brought before this 

The Chairman. You think he would be a valuable witness. All 
right. We will call him. 

And the next one ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Mr. Morris Pierce, who I understand was formerly 
employed by the Voice. He is now a broadcaster in Cleveland. 

The Chairjman. Mr. Compton, we will allow you to give the balance 
of the list to the staff, and the staff will be instructed to interview the 
witnesses, and we will lind out what they know about this project. 
You can give the balance of the list to the staff. 

Now, Mr. Compton, let me ask you this. Did you receive any com- 
plaints or information about waste in the program, or about kick- 
backs, or about incompetence ? 

Mr. CoMPTOx. I never heard any complaint about kickbacks. 

The Chairman. You have never investigated the subject of 
kickbacks i 

Mr. Compton. Beg pardon ? 

The Chairman. The Voice, itself, has never investigated the sub- 
ject of kickbacks ? 

Mr. Compton. Well, to say "never" is beyond my knowledge. I 
don't know. The Voice is 10 years old and I have been connected 
with it for a year. 

The Chairman. Under your administration ? 

Mr. Compton. Not that I know of. I never heard of any question 
of kickbacks. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the FBI was asked to inves- 
tigate the question of financial irregularities — let us call it that — 
within the Voice ? 

Mr. Compton, Well, I myself asked last July, I think it was, that 
a complete investigation, including anything, financial irregularity, 
loyalty, security, morals, anything that was objectionable, as a result 
of certain representations made to me last summer, be investigated. 

The Chairman. Do you, yourself, feel now that there has been con- 
siderable waste in the Voice's program ? 

Mr. Compton. Yes ; I do. 

The Chairman. I do not imagine you would be in a position to esti- 
mate the waste in dollars and cents ? 

Mr. Compton. No. I don't have, that competence. My business 
has been to try to find out where it was and to correct it. 

The Chairman. Keep in mind that when we talk about waste we 
refer not only to the dollars and cents wasted upon a particular proj- 
ect, but we refer to the wasted effort. The Voice is set up for a par- 
ticular purpose. If it does not accomplish that purpose, the waste is 
much more important than the dollars-and-cents loss. 

Mr. Compton. Well, I mentioned to you the report made to me by 
Mr. Bernard, or made to the Secretary by Mr. Bernard, and also to 


me, about 6 months ago, in which as a result of his own investigations, 
he concluded that we were far short of having found the answer, the 
proper answer, to the radio arm of the Information Service. 

The Chairman. At this time, I am going to ask Mr. David Schine, 
who is a consultant to the committee on the information program, to 
describe a report which he has here and to read into the record those 
parts of the report which he considers pertinent to the question I have 
just asked Mr. Compton. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask that the 
staff be directed to locate Mr. Kohler ; and let us find out if he is avail- 
able, and if not, how he can be made available to this committee. 

Mr. CoHN. We will do that right away. 

Mr. Schine. This was known as the McKinsey report, and was 
offered in 1952. 

The Chairman. Let us make it clear that it was the McKinsey 

Mr. Schine. It is the McKinsey report on the International Infor- 
mation Administration. And right at the beginning, the conclusion 
is as follows : 

These findings may be summarily stated : 

1. Procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, and services is charac- 
terized by : 

(a) Poor planning, ineffective preparation of specifications, and duplicating 
relationships with vendors and contractors. 

(6) Weali organization of the purchasing and contract administration 

(c) The lacli of adequate controls and executive review to insure efficient pro- 
curement performance. 

2. Construction of physical facilities has been characterized by : 

(a) Incomplete planning as to design, probable costs, and time required for 

(b) Costly and delaying amendment of design after contracts have been let. 

(c) Ineffective or inadequate supervision of exi>enditures and contractor per- 
formance on contracts in force. 

(d) Embarrassing inability to explain satisfactorily to congressional com- 
mittees the reasons for failure to complete facilities when scheduled and at 
estimated costs. 

3. Management of both IBS and NAO is marked by : 

(a) Failure to develop precise program goals and accepted yardsticks (e. g.. 
broadcast hours) to facilitate persuasive presentation of fiscal needs for admin- 
istrative and congressional review and persistent control by officials in charge. 

(&) Either a failure to analyze, or ineffective analysis of, critical organi- 
zational and day-to-day administrative problems (e. g., unsatisfactory perfox-m- 
ance of IRD-Radio Supply Depot) or failure to study carefully the actual space 
required for IBS operations. 

(o) Lack of explicitly stated policies and procedures to giiide personnel in 
performance of tasks requiring cooperative action of both agencies. 

4. Recruitment of staff" authorized for IBS has been delayed by: 
(a) Security provisions of Public Law 402. 

(&) IBS's own failure to forecast personnel needs accurately and to advise 
the recruiting unit. 

(c) Failure of NAO to recognize the uniqueness of IBS's need for foreign 
lanquage and engineering personnel and to devise aggressive, positive recruiting 

(d) Lack of a unified program and a single agency for handling both domestic 
and foreign personnel matters. 

5. Prevailing division of responsibility for providing administrative services, 
between the New York administrative office and other elements of IIA is not 
precisely defined, clearly understood, or accepted by key personnel in these ele- 
ments. Nor is this division of responsibility and the separate existence of NAO 
justified by either: 


(a) Variety and extent of administrative services it provides to organizational 
units of IIA or the Department of State other than IBS. 

(b) Economy with which administrative services are provided for these units, 

(c) Control it exercises over activities of these units. 

This is part of their conclusion. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I am quite familiar with that, Mr. Chairman, because 
that investigation was initiated at my request. 

The Chairman. In other words, you issued the order calling for 
this particular investigation, yourself? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I did. 

The Chairman. Would you care to tell us what steps you have 
taken ? The date of this is October 1952. Certain recommendations 
were made in this report, I assume, Mr. Compton ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

The Chairman. Have you taken any steps to put into effect the 
recommendations made? 

Mr. Compton. Yes. a good many steps. 

The Chairman. Would you care to describe what you have done to 
put into effect the recommendations made by this report? Also tell 
us what the report cost, will you? 

Mr. Compton. I don't recall what the cost of the report was. 

The Chairman. Can any of your aides tell us what the report cost? 

Mr. Compton. We can get it very easily. 

Would you check and find out what the report cost? 

The Chairman. Now, will you tell us. Doctor, what steps you 

Mr. Compton. Well, IBS was given general instructions to go after 
all these situations that were shown up. I think General Stoner can 
probably enlighten you in specific detail better than I can. One item 
was the warehouses. There was a duplication of warehouses. That is 
pointed out in this recital by the chief counsel. Those have been con- 
solidated and simplified, and I understand and have reason to believe 
that they have an efficient system now and that it has been in operation 
for some time. 

The relations between NAO and the so-called New York administra- 
tive office and the IBS, International Broadcasting Service, were, 
well, pathetic. There was no cooperation. At the present time, the 
New York administrative office has been transferred to the jurisdic- 
tion of the International Information Administration, whereas prior 
to that time, which was entirely outside this program 

The Chairman. In other words, prior to that time the New York 
office was operating pretty much as it pleased, with no control from 
your office? 

Mr. Compton. That is correct. And it led to a good deal of waste ; 
and I don't know that this is waste in any proper sense, but it cer- 
tainly was a gross inaccuracy in reporting the cost, for example, of the 
first mobile transmitter, this much publicized Courier, which is now 
broadcasting in the eastern Mediterranean. I submitted the informa- 
tion given to me by our office in New York, as an example, that the 
total cost of that was approximately $2 million, which was an accurate 
arithmetical statement so far as the New York office of the Voice of 
America had the information. I transmitted that to the Appropria- 
tions Committee of the House. That question was not brought up in 
the Senate. 


It later developed that that was in error to the extent of — well, the 
total final extent was more than $600,000. The answer to that was 
that that was due to tliis division of authority and res]3onsibility be- 
tween the Voice of America, on the one hand, and the New York ad- 
ministrative office, on the other. 

Now, incidentally, I reported that immediately. I gave a copy 
not only of this report but of the one that you had the chief counsel 
read here, promptly to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee 
of the House; and both Mr. Rooney, who was the chairman at that 
time, and Mr. Clevenger, who is now the chairman, and who was the 
ranking minority member at that time. 

I might say tliat, as an indicator — of course, I am not able to say 
with assurance how well this arrangement with the NAO, this com- 
bined arrangement, will work, but this I do know, as of very recent 
date; the Director, a Mr. Seymour, of the NAO, was transferred 
to take certain duties that heretofore had been handled by Mr. Her- 
rick, to whom you have referred. He advised the Budget Director 
that he was turning back from his allotment for the remainder of this 
year $120,000, which I assume represents at least an extent to which 
he has been able to institute economies in the operation of the New 
York administrative office. 

If you want more detail about that, I am sure Mr. Parker May 
can give you that further information. 

Now, on the matter of handling of contracts, those have been taken 
out of the hands of Mr. Herrick, and recently Mr. Seymour was the 
gentleman wlio had been serving as liead of NAO 

The Chairman. Why was the handling of contracts taken out of 
the hands of Mr. Herrick? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Because of their not being satisfactorily handled. 

The Chairman. In other words, you did not think Herrick was 
handling the contracts in the proper fashion. Is that right? Did 
it come to your attention that under Mr. Herrick and Mr. Kohler, 
Baker West employed a contractor who had no background of expe- 
rience in radio engineering, or construction of facilities of this type, 
whose apparent sole background was the construction of schoolhouses, 
and that he had no equipment on hand to do the type of work required 
by Baker West; that the contract provided that he could purchase 
equipment and he would be allowed 8I/2 percent per month on the 
equipment, so that at the end of 12 months the equipment would be 
fully paid for, and that he had purchased equipment more than 12 
months before he needed it so that the Government had l^ought and 
paid for his equipment and given it to him before he got to use it? 

Did it come to your attention that the legal officer advised that 
that contract with Mr. Watts, I believe his name was, should be imme- 
diately terminated, and that the legal officer cited the above grounds 
for the termination of the contract, but that the contract is still in 
effect with Mr. Watts? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I have not received any advice from the attorney 
to the effect that you state. 

The Chairman. You mean you have had no report on this matter 
I just cited? 

Mr. CoMPTON. I learned when I came back from an inspection 
trip in the middle of December — I learned about this SYo percent. I 


immediately inquired as to wliether, in the nature of our contract, 
it was possible for us to denounce that provision, which was obviously 
preposterous, and the advice given to me by our attorney, our legal 

The CHAiRMAisr. May I interrupt ? I do not think we should sub- 
ject the witness, Mr. Photographer, to having a photographer in front 
of him taking pictures. It is too disconcerting for the average wit- 
nes. I know you gentlemen have a job to do, and you have to come in 
and take pictures, and I would like to accommodate you, but the 
committee has decided No. 1, that tliere will be no flash pictures 
during a hearing and, No. 2, 1 do not think you should get in front of 
the witness. If you can take pictures from off on the side where you 
will not bother him and he has no objection, that is all right. 

Mr. CoMPTON. I have no more than average objection. I admit that 
having photographers flashing right in front of me doesn't help par- 

May I proceed with that, Mr. Chairman? The advice, which was 
informal at that stage, which was witliin the last few weeks, was 
that it was not possible to separate that item from the rest of the con- 
tract. Incidentally, if I am correctly informed, as I believe I am, that 
same applies in the contract for Baker East. 

The Chaiemax. Let me ask you this, Doctor. When you find that 
a contractor has been employed who has had no experience in this 
type of work, that he has no equipment, and you make a contract buy- 
ing his equipment for him, and by buying it for him I mean allowing 
him 81/2 percent, so that after 12 months the Voice has purchased the 
equipment and the contractor owns it, you thereby set up a new 
conti-act in competition with men who have had experience in that 
type of work. And would that not seem highly improper to you, 
inadvisable, expensive, and wasteful^ 

Mr. CoMPTON. That is one of the factors I had that prompted me 
to the conclusion that both these contracts ought to be suspended, 
as I indicated yesterday, but there is evidently no way within the law 
b}' which we could get rid of that preposterous purchase contract 
without denouncing the whole contract. 

The Chairmax. Now, one of the things that promptly interests me 
and I think all the members of this committee and the staff is : Why 
that unusual contract ? Was that made because someone was so in- 
competent that he did not realize what he was doing? Or was that 
type of contract made for a different reason? Have you checked into 
that ? Are you going to check into it ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Well, I have checked into it, Mr. Chairman, and 
I think I acted the same as under like circumstances you would. 
The contract itself with these contractors in both Baker West and 
Baker East does not include a recital of this 8l^ percent. It states 
that an agi^eement is reached, but the figure shall be an agreed sum, 
there shall be a determined percentage. That is in the contract. The 
determination of the 8I/2 percent itself was an action separately by 
the head of the New York administrative office, that I have just 
referred to. 

The Chairman. That was Mr. Foy D. Kohler ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. No, Mr. Meyers. Mr. Meyers was the head of the 
New York administrative office prior to Mr. Seymour. 


Now, there are so many names involved here, Senator, that it may- 


The Chairman. What is Meyers' first name ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Alva, I think. 

The Chairman. Alva Meyers, then, is the man who set the figure 
of 8M.' percent. Right? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

The Chairman. That was not set in the contract? 

Mr. Compton. That was not set in the contract, but the contractual 
provision empowered he Department to determine that percentage. 
Now, my further understanding is, and this is advice to me from coun- 
sel, from my legal adviser : In answer to my question, "How can we 
get rid of this preposterous provision ? Can we denounce that with- 
out just canceling the whole contract and taking the consequences?" — 
the answer to that was that Mr. Meyers did exceed his authority in 
.setting that figure, but that the contractor himself had the right, would 
have the right, to go to the Court of Claims, because it was a part, 
in good faith, of the contract arrangement that he had accepted, and 
in the opinion given to me, informally as I tell you, the contractor 
could collect from the Court of Claims. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is that while the 
contract to you appeared ridiculous, it was a valid contract, and you 
were without any power to break that contract ; that is was good in law ? 

Mr. Compton. Without breaking the contract. That is why I say 
that was part of the line of reasoning behind the conclusion to suspend 
both these contracts. 

Senator McClellan. The thing that I am interested in : I want to 
determine if the people who were responsible for having made such 
contracts are still in Government, and what positions they have now. 
I just feel that men that are that stupid should have no responsibility in 
the Federal Government. And if they are still in Government, still 
performing, we want to locate them and see if something can be done 
to get rid of them. That is the way I feel about it. 

Mr. Compton. Well, Senator, I don't happen to know about Mr. 
Meyers. This, of course, occurred while he was the head of the New 
York administrative office, which was then a part of the Department of 
State and was not a part of the International Information Adminis- 

Senator McClellan. I am not particularly concerned about iden- 
tifying with which branch or subdivision of this program they are in 
or were in. What I want to determine is, if they were responsible, 
first, for such contracts. And as has been testified to as to such admin- 
istration as obviously has gone on in this program in the past, I want 
to find out if they are still in Government, find out what their respon- 
sibilities are now, and see if they are commensurate with their capacity 
or their stupidity. 

Mr. Compton. If I were in your place, I would be of that opinion, 

The Chairman. Just a minute. In your place. Doctor, you have got 
to find that out. You must be interested in knowing where Mr. 
Meyers is now, what he is doing. He is still working your Department, 
1 understand. 

Mr. Comi>ton. Meyers? 


The Chairman. He has been transferred, but he still has the same 
salary, I understand. He is still in the information program. Is 
that right ? 

INIr. CoMPTON. I am told that he is. I didn't know that. 

The Chairman. Let me make it clear that I know when we bring 
these matters up you cannot possibly keep track of every individual in 
your Department, but I point out that it is your task to run these 
things down. I know you cannot run them all down in 1 day or 1 week. 

Mr. CoMPTON. But I know that the New York administrative office 
has been transferred to the authority of the International Informa- 
tion Administration, and Mr. Seymour took Mr. Meyers' place, and 
Mr. Seymour is now in charge of the construction contracts of the 
Voice of America. 

The Chairman. I thought Seymour took Herrick's place. 

Mr. CoMPTON. He did. Mr. Seymour, who succeeded Meyers, has 
taken over the handling of the construction contracts. 

The Chairman. Thank you. There are two other things. I would 
like to have you, before you come back this afternoon, find out where 
Mr. JNIeyers is, what he is now doing, whether he had any reduction 
in salary or any increase in salary since you started checking on these 

No. 2 : I would like to get the name of the Individual who sold the 
land in North Carolina to the Voice. We understand that there was 
swamp land covered with water sold to the Voice. We would like 
to know who sold it, how much per acre, and any commissions paid 
on it. 

Mr. CoMPTON. May I have a memorandum from someone on the staff 
as to all of these things that you like to have me provide ? They are 
all available, I am sure, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I would like that this afternoon. 

Mr. CoMPTON. And I should not like to trust my own memory that 
I can provide all these things you have asked me to provide. 

The Chairman. Well, you have two or three aides that have been 
jotting things down. 

As the Senator suggested, also any improvements to the land, any 
roadways built, necessary drainage. 

Mr. MoRAN. I would like to just take a minute, if I may, in con- 
nection with this million dollar figure, if you have time. It is just 
how I arrived at that. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. MoRAN. The three 35-kilowatt transmitters which are to be 
installed in Ceylon are $186,000 each, as I understand it, and there 
are three. That is $550,000, approximately. Then there was $500,000 
allocated for transmitting antennas, receiving equipment, amplifiers, 
power transformers, and auxiliary equipment. I think salaries come 
out of that, but I am not sure. So that makes a million or a little more. 

The Chairman. I see. So that, Mr. Compton, it appears that the 
figures would indicate that, taking just those two items, an amount 
of $1,058,000 was spent on the Ceylon project. 

We want your budget officer to go into that, and we will go into 
that this afternoon. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Moran, do you know whether the agreement 
that we entered into with the Ceylonese Government was similar to 

29708— 53— pt. 1 6 


agreements that we have entered into with other foreign countries? 
Can you enlighten us on that ? In other words, was this a standard 
agreement? Or would you knovt that? 

]\rr. INIoRAN. I am not familiar with the details of the agreements 
with other countries, but this was, as far as my information is con- 
cerned, a little different. We have a hybrid agreement with Radio 
Ceylon and the Voice of America, where we more or less have to coordi- 
nate with tliem, like in the matter of programs, everything that was 
done with them. In our other bases we have a more clean-cut opera- 
tion, where we are free to, more or less, broadcast whatever we want to. 

Senator Jackson. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if it might be helpful 
if we could get a comparative picture of the contracts with the other 
countries that would give us some idea of just what the situation is. 

The Chairman. I think it might be an excellent idea to get copies 
of the contracts covering all of the construction projects. 

Can you furnish that, Mr. Compton? 

Mr. Compton. I surely can. 

Could I offer at this point, Mr. Chairman, a document which I am 
sure you would like to have for the staff to examine ? It is the original 
allocations, the lawful authority, the current allocations, the cumula- 
tive obligations, and the unobligated balances, on all of the radio 
projects under all of the appropriations that have been made. 

The Chairman. We would be glad to accept that, and I thank you 
for it. I am going to ask you to refrain, now, until we get through 
with Mr. Moran, here. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. INIoran, may I ask, in the interest of clarifica- 
tion, first: Where were these receivers and transmitters located in 
Ceylon ? At Kandy or at Colombo ? 

Mr. MoEAN. They are at Colombo. Our transmitters are housed in 
buildings alongside the Radio Ceylon transmitting plant. 

Senator Dirksen. You used the term "relay." Do they beam the 
signal from here to an intermediate tower and then an to Ceylon? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. Then it picks up our signal on relay there at 
the receiver ? 

JNIr. MoRAN. That is right. It is a relay, with at least one relay 
point in between here and Ceylon. 

Senator Dirksen. And that was Tangier, you said? 

Mr. JSIoRAN. That is to be the main relay point. 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. And then, of course, your transmitter takes 
the material that comes from here to there and beams it out over the 
area that they want to serve? 

Mr. MoRAN. That is right, over India, southern India particularly. 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. Now, you said something about the effi- 
ciency of this receiving operation, before; that it was highly 

Mr. INIoRAN. It is highly inefficient. Especially when I first arrived 
there. Even the best equipment would probably not deliver the signal 
that we have at the other bases ; because it is a difficult location to get 
into, and the signals are not so good even with the best receivers. Now, 
we have, as I understand it, some new receivers in there which have 
improved the reception. 


Senator Dirksen. Let me ask yon another qnestion. '\yiiile you 
were there, was there an opportnnity to check up, in the island of 
Ceylon itself, for example,, on the number of receiving sets ? After 
allj sending out a signal, sending out a message, is a dud unless there 
are boxes that can receive it. 

Mr. JNIoRAN. Well, of course, the present transmitters are probably 
not heard in Ceylon at all. Being shortwave signals outside of 10 or 
15 miles from the transmitter, you probably don't hear them. 

Senator Dirksen. All right. Let us go to India. How many 
boxes are there in India ? Did you get a chance to survey that, or did 
they survey it ? 

Mr. MoRAN. I couldn't say as to that, whether they surveyed it or 
not. I know the great majority of the people there are very poor, and 
it is problematical as to how many effective receivers you have got. 
1 don't know what survey was gone into on that. 

Senator Dirkseist. Of course, the wife of the former Ambassador 
to Moscow in a book recently made a comment to the effect that there 
were very few receivers. jSiow, our Ambassador to Yugoslavia was 
on Information Please recently, and I think somebody asked him that 
question. He said there were very few receivers. We are dealing, 
after all, with the efficacy of an operation, an over-all operation, cost- 
ing $87 million. I think that is what Congress gave you last year. 
And $21 million for international broadcasting. And the question 
is, finally: Who do you get to? What does the United States of 
America get for the $21 million? That is what I want to loiow. 

Of course, you asked for $136 million last year for this over-all 
operation. I am speaking now of IIA. I think your total budget 
request was $136 million. 

Mr. CoMPTON. No, $170 million. 

Senator Dirksen. $170 million. That is right. And here are 
people who want to spend more and more money. The question is : 
What good do we do ? That is what I want to know. 

Mr. JNIoran. That has always been the question : As to how many 
people have receivers and actually listen. 

Senator Dirksen. Do you mind a leading question? What is your 
opinion about it ? You are an engineer, have some skill in this field. 
What have we gotten for our money ? 

Mr. jNIoran. Well, I don't believe we have gotten the results that 
we would like to have obtained. 

The Chair]vian. Have you anything further to add, Mr. Moran ? 

Mr. MoRAN. No ; I think that is all. 

The Chairman. I understand you left the Voice of your own ac- 
cord and left because of the incompetence and waste you found and 
the fact that you were not in a position to remedy it. Is that correct ? 

Mr. JMoran. That is correct. 

The Chairman. The McKinsey report will be marked as an ex- 
hibit and will not be copied into the record but just used as an exhibit. 

(The report referred to was marked "Committee Exhibit No. 3," and 
may be found in the files of the subcommittee. ) 

The Chairman. Then we will adjourn until 2 o'clock this after- 

(Wliereupon, at 12: 12 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of 
the same day.) 



The Chairman. Is Mr. Donald Creed here? "Will you step for- 
ward ? 

Right over here, Mr. Creed. 

Will you raise your right hand? In this matter now in hearing 
before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Creed. I do. 

Mr. CoHN. Give your full name, please. 


Mr. Creed. Donald R. Creed. 

Mr. CoHN. What is your occupation, Mr. Creed ? 

Mr. Creed. I am Assistant Chief of the Domestic Transmitter Divi- 
sion of the Voice of America. 

Mr. CoHN. You are currently with the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Creed. I have been there for 10 years. 

Mr. CoHN. You have been there for 10 years ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, what are your duties at the present time? 

Mr. Creed. The Domestic Transmitter Division is responsible for 
the operation of the licensees who transmit our programs from the 

The Chairman. I am sorry. I did not get that. 

Mr. Creed. Our division is responsible for the operation of the 
licensees who operate transmitters for us in the United States. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, we have had some reports about a certain sound 
truck that was built by the Voice of America. Do you know anything 
about that? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, we did have what they called the mobile unit, when 
they wanted to go out and make remote pickups. That is, say they 
wanted a sporting event of some type that they might want to go out 
and make a recording of. They would take this mobile unit out, be- 
cause they had it fixed up so that there was recording equipment in 
there, and also a small studio. 

Mr. Cohn. What kind of recording? Recording equipment, did 
you say ? 

Mr. Creed. A lathe, and also a Magnacorder; tape machines. 

Mr. Cohn. Wliat was the total cost of this mobile unit; do you 
know ? 

Mr. Creed. When it was completed, it ran approximately around 

Mr. Cohn. When was this mobile unit completed ? 

Mr. Creed. About 2 years ago. 

Mr. Cohn. And are you familiar with the first trip that they took 
this mobile unit out on ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, one of the first trips they took was up into Pennsyl- 
vania, to do a remote job. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know about that job ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, I was in the operations at the time they went on the 

Mr. Cohn. How did things go on that first trip ? 


Mr. Creed. Well, the engineer and the driver went out on the mobile 
unit, and the}- started up to Pennsylvania. They had a producer in 
another car with them, and tlie producer kept getting ahead of them 
with his car, because the mobile unit wouldn't stay up with him. It 
had a 105 horsepower motor in it to pull about a 20,000-pound load, 
and as they were driving along the steering wheel came loose, and all 
the bolts fell out of it, so they liad to stop the mobile unit and put in 
new bolts. 

Mr. CoHN. Did anything else eventful happen on that trip? 

Mr. Creed. Yes. They would go around a curve or a bend on the 
trip, and all the equipment was on one side, and the thing would 
almost tip over on them, and they had a little trouble keeping it right 
side up. 

]Mr. CoHN. How about the brakes? Did they work all right? 

^Lr. Creed. There was no hand brake. When they came down the 
hill, they had only a foot brake, no hand brake at all. 

Mr. CoiiN. How about the springs? 

Mr. Creed. They were very weak, and they wouldn't hold up the 

Mr. CoHN. Well, was the recording equipment all right ? 

Mr. Creed. It worked at times; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. At times? 

Mr. Creed. Yes. 

The Chairman. What was right with the equipment? 

Mr. Creed. It was a nice-looking job. It had Venetian blinds, and 
things on it. 

Senator Dirksen. Did you have a name for it? 

Mr. Creed. We called it the mobile unit. 

Senator Dirksex. You should have called it the budget, I guess, 
because it is a little on the unbalanced side. 

^Ir. CoHN. Is that about all that happened on that trip? 

Mr. Creed. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, after that trip, did they decide they had better do 
a little more work on the mobile unit ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes. They decided that they had better fix the motor 
up, or at least put a larger horsepower motor in the unit and strengthen 
the springs, and put a hand brake and some other things in it. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, do you know how much money this extra work 

Mr. Creed. Well, when they finally decided to do something about 
it, they took the truck up to upper New York and put a trailer on it, 
or rather a tractor, to take the place of — they cut a part of the body 
oflF and made a complete new job out of it. 

At the present time we have this big mobile unit with the trailer or 

Mr. CoHN. How much was the additional cost ; do you know ? 

Mr. Creed. When it was decided to modify the unit and add a 
tractor, this work was done by RCA at no cost to the Government 
other than $590 for paint and lettering after it was modified. There- 
fore, the total cost was $41,829.22. 

Mr. CoHN. Are you familiar with the equipment situation up in 
New York? 

Senator Dirksen. First, let me ask. How many times did you use 
this unit? You say you used it for remote broadcasting to pick up 
sports events that might be interesting? 


Mr, Creed. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. Can you name some of these events ? 

Mr. Creed. Well, there would be the one trip that they went up 
to Pennsylvania on to cover the music festival. They also went out to 
Detroit to cover a convention out there. Since we have had the mobile- 
unit back in New York for the last G months, it has been used twice, to 
my knowledge. It sits in the garage all the time. 

Senator Dirksen. How many times would you say it has been used 
since it has been completed and overhauled ? 

Mr. Creed. Twice, to my knowledge. 

Senator Dirksen. Twice 'i You have $40,000 invested in a remote 
control unit, and you have used it twice i 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir . 

Senator Dirksen. That is not maximum efficiency, by any means; 
is it? 

Mr. Creed. No, sir. No one wants to use it. No one wants to take 
it out. 

Senator Dirksen. You mean they are afraid it will tip over or 
something ? 

Mr. Creed. Well, not now. They were in those days. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, are you familiar with the situation concerning 
equipment which has been purchased for the new building up in 
New York ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CoHN. Tell us about that. 

Mr. Creed. I think that a great many overlooked the fact that we 
spent millions of dollars for transmitters overseas and in the United 
States, and actually the very meat of our programs and our operation 
is in New York, where we make the programs. All of our studios 
are located in New York. We have some 20 studios up there. We do 
all of our programing, all of our language programing, and yet we 
are working with equipment over 10 years old, some of it. 

The recording equipment is 10 years old. The consoles are in very 
bad shape. We were going to have a new building. I think money 
was to be appropriated for it. Equipment was bought for the new 
building, and it has been sitting down in a warehouse, and nothing 
has been done about bringing new equipment up to our place. I think 
we should have new equipment in there if we are to deliver a proper 
type of program to the world. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, you remember when additional facilities were in- 
stalled up at 1790 Broadway ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. And what happened after they moved into the place, 
with reference to the situation concerning current? 

Mr. Creed. Well, we are in about eight buildings up in New York 
at the present time, and they decided to take over some space at 1790 
Broadway. Quite a few of the units moved in, including the field 
unit, which is responsible for the remote jobs that we do. They moved 
all the equipment in, and found out that one floor was a. c, one floor 
was d. c, and so forth. They had to rip out all the wiring and change 
everything over to a. c. 

Mr. CoHN. They had to rip out all the wiring after it had been 
installed ? 


Mr. Creei). And change it over to a. c. 

Mr. CoHN. About how much did that cost ? 

Mr. Creed. I would think between $25,000 and $30,000. 

Mr. CoiiN. Do you know anything about the construction of tlie 
tape room ? 

Mr. Creed. Tlie tape room was started in around 1949. 

Mr. CoHN. How long did it take to build, to construct ? 

Mr. Creed. Well, over a period of almost a year and a half . 

Mr. CoHN. And there came a time when they finally did it; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, were the tape machines that they had used the 
latest models by the time they were finally installed ? 

Mr. Creed. Not by the time they had finished completing the tape 
room. No, they were obsolete by that time. 

Mr. CoHN. The tape machines were obsolete by the time they 
finished ? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. Let me ask about this equipnrient that was ware- 
housed. Is it still there — this recording equipment? 

Mr. Creed. I understand, Senator, they are now going to bring 
some equipment into the place and fix it all up. 

Senator Dirksen. You say they are going to ? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. It has not, then, actually been done ? 

Mr. Creed. Not as yet. 

Senator Dirksen. How long was this equipment in the warehouse? 

Mr. Creed. Within the past year. 

Senator Dirksen. For a whole year? 

Mr. Creed. About. 

Senator Dirksen. What is the depreciation on equipment of this 
kind when it is stored? 

Mr. Creed. Very much. Because there are very intricate lathes, 
recording lathes, that we have, and depreciation would be very big 
on it. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, with reference to this tape room, you say by the 
time they finally finished building it, the tape machines were obso- 
lete ; is that right ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, they were. 

Mr. CoHN. ^Yliat did they have to do to get the tape shows done ? 

]\Ir. Creed. We had to take a good many shows outside to get them 
done. The tape machines we have are not obsolete to the point where 
they can't be used, but my point is that it took so long to complete the 
tape room itself that the machines that we had were obsolete, and they 
could have done the job a lot faster. - 

Mr. CoHN. You say you had to take some tape jobs outside? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, we do a great many shows outside because we don't 
have sound effect tables or musical instruments and things of that 
type to do big shows. 

Mr. CoHN. Does that involve a substantial expense? 

Mr. Creed. Well, we bought two sound effect machines for some 
$4,500 apiece. 

Mr. CoHN. Have they been used ? 

Mr. Creed. No, they never have been used. 


Mr. CoHN. These jobs have been sent out? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

The Chairman. What was the price, $4,500 ? 

Mr. Creed. $4,500. 

Mr. CoHN. You say tliey had not been used at all ? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Tliey keep on sending the jobs outside? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, you were in Honolulu for a wliile; is that right? 

Mr. Creed. I was stationed direct at Honolulu. 

Senator Dirksen. Are there facilities and space to bring in shows 
from the outside to do this job in your own studios ? •/■■■■, 

Mr. Creed. Yes. We built two studios large enough t^ be able to do 
that type of M^ork. 

Senator Dirksen. So it could have been done there at a possible 
saving to the Government? 

Mr. Creed. It could have been ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, the last point I want to cover, Mr. Creed, is 
this: You told us you were station director at Honolulu. There came 
a time when you returned from Honolulu; is that right? 

Mr. Creed. I was in Honolulu from 194G to 1949. 

Mr. CoHN. When you returned, did you find out that plans were 
under way to eliminate you from the organization ? 

Mr. Creed. I had heard that there were plans, and I found a letter 
that stated such. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you actually see that letter? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoHN. Was that a letter from Mr. Harmon to Mr. George 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. And was the substance of that letter that they decided 
to place somebody else in your job and had to go about the process 
of getting rid of you in some way ? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. I am going to read you a paragraph coming from 
that letter, and I want to ask you whether or not this refreshes your 
recollection and whether or not it is an accurate reading from the 
letter : 

This brings up tlie question of Creed and how we can eliminate him. Based on 
strictly survey values, Creed has done an exceptional job. His operating costs 
have been reduced. The outage time for negligible overall operations is a rela- 
tively clear one. He is always coming up with money-saving devices, as the 
attached sheet shows. 

The Chairman. That sounds like grounds for discharging him. 
Mr. CoHN. Well, they were certainly trying to. 

His efficiency ratings have been good. The only possible solution we can 
see is to nbolisli the .1ob and rewrite a job description to cover the title of 
chief engineer. We probably have the basis for this, due to the second transmitter 
and the new receiving operation. 

Do you recall that ? 
Mr. Creed. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Well, even though this letter was written, the fact is 
that eventually you did hold on to your position; is that right? 


Mr. Creed. They eliminated me as station director and rewrote the 


Mr. CoHN. They did eliminate you and rewrote the position? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. And I took a one-grade drop in salary 
to come back to New York. 

Mr. CoHN. You took a one-grade drop in salary, and you came 
back to New York? 

Mr. Creed. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. And that was in spite of what is stated in this letter 
concerning the prospective eliminating, in which it stated you have 
been doing an exceptional job and had been coming up with one money- 
saving idea after another ? 

Mr. Creed. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen. Have you some idea why you were to be liqui- 

Mr. Creed. They wanted to put somebody else in my position there. 

The Chairman. I wonder if you could shed more light on that? 
This letter indicates that you were doing a good job, they had no fault 
to find with your job, that you were coming up with moneysaving ideas 
constantly. The average person reading this would wonder why you 
Avere to be eliminated. Can you shed any light on that ? 

Mr. Creed. Pardon? 

The Chairman. I say, can you shed any light on why you were to 
be eliminated, in view of the high recommendation given you in this 

Mr. Creed. Well, they didn't feel that I was capable of continuing 
with another transmitter in the place. We had a 100-kilowatt trans- 
mitter, and they felt that they should get someone else that would 
be more capable. 

Senator Jackson. What is your professional background ? 

Mr. Creed. I started with Columbia Broadcasting in 

Senator Jackson. No. What is your academic background, first? 

Mr. Creed. It is only through experience. 

Senator Jackson. Oh. Dicl you finish high school. 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir. I went 1 year to college. 

Senator Jackson. What did you take in college? 

Mr. Creed. Just general business. 

Senator Jackson. And then you picked up the 

Mr. Creed. I got into radio in 1937 as a sound engineer at Colum- 
bia Broadcasting. 

Senator Jackson. And you learned the broadcasting business and 
the technique through apprenticeship in the industry, and then fol- 
lowed on through to a point where you could operate these trans- 
mitters quite effectively ? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. I did not ask Mr. Moran : 

Did you have an engineering course in college ? 

Mr. MoRAN. Not a complete course. I had 2 years in Case School 
of Applied Science in Cleveland. 

Senator Jackson. You had 2 years at Case Institute ? 

Mr. Moran. Case Institute of Technology, I think they call it now. 

Senator Jackson. Yes. You had 2 years in engineering? 

Mr. Moran. Yes, an electrical engineering course. 


Senator Jackson. But that gave you a pretty complete course on 
the practical operation ? 

Mr. MoRAN. On the mathematics and physics, the basis. 

Senator Jackson. I did not mean to interrupt, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That is O. K. 

Senator Jackson. You had considerable experience in the opera- 
tion of these transmitters? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir ; I was there for 3 years. 

Senator Jackson. Did you feel that you were qualified to handle 
this additional transmitter ? Was it a hundred watts ? 

Mr. Creed. A hundred kilowatts. 

Senator Jackson. A hundred kilowatts. 

Mr. Creed. I was there when it was installed. 

Senator Jackson. I mean, you have no doubt about your ability 
to handle it? 

Mr. Creed. No, sir. As station director, I not only handled the 
technical side of it but also the administrative side as well. We had 
qualified engineers there. 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, if a man could handle 1 transmitter, Mr. 
Creed, is there any reason why he could not handle 2 ? 

Mr. Creed. No, sir. I would be handling them myself; it would 
be through the engineering stalf. 

The Chairman. I think the picture speaks for itself. I have no 
further questions. 

Senator Jackson. One last question. 

Your efficiency reports, or whatever you call them, have been good ? 

Mr. Creed. They have been "excellent,'' "good," and "very good" 
in Honolulu ; "excellent" every place but Honolulu. 

Senator Dirksen. Was that sort of preliminary to your removal? 

Mr. Creed. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. You felt that that was deliberate? 

Mr. Creed. In fact, I appealed it. I appealed the rating and was 
turned down. 

Senator Dirksen. But every other place it had been "excellent"? 

Mr. Creed, Or "very good" ; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, how was it when you first went out to 
Honolulu ? 

Mr, CitEED. It was "good." 

Senator Dirksen. They seemed to be out to get you as soon as you 
got to Honolulu ? 

Mr. Creed. I thought so. 

Senator Dirksen, That is all. 

The Chairman, Can you think of any reason why they wanted to 
get rid of you? 

Mr, Creed, Well, they didn't feel that I was technically able to 
handle the job; although I might cite an instance of another boy and 
myself who painted the interior of the transmitter out there. We 
saved $5,000, I got up on a ladder, got some old clothes, and when 
my superior came out to Honolulu to look at the place, and he looked 
at the paint job, he said, "You painted the wrong color." So that 
was^ the thanks I got for doing it. 

The Chairmax, You may step down. 

Mr. Freeman? Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Freeman? 


In this matter now in hearinji before tlie committee, do you solemnly 
swear to tell the truth, the wliole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you (lod? 

Mr. Freeman. I do. 

Mr. CoHN. Your full name, please, Mr. Freeman. 


Mr. Freeman. Frederick Freeman. 

rM. CoHN. Are you at this time with the Voice of America? 

Mr. Frfj<:man. Yes, sir. I am. 

Mr. CoHN. In what capacity ? 

Mr. Freeman. 1 am Aetin<r Chief of the Contract Administration 

Mr. CoHN. You are the Acting Chief of the Contract Administra- 
tion Branch of the Voice of America ? Is that right ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Freenu\n, have you encountered mismanagement 
at the A^oice of America ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, I have. 

Mr. CoHN. And as a result of this mismanagement, is it your opin- 
ion that hirge sums of the taxpayers" money have been wasted? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir, 

Mr. CoHN. How liigh Avould you say those figures go ? 

Mr. Freeman. The figures will run into millions. 

Mr. CoHN. Into millions ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. How long have you been with the Voice of America? 

Mr. Freeman. I have been with the Voice of America since the 
ISthof AugTistofl952. 

Mr. CoHN. Would you tell us very briefly your background prior 
to that time ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. Prior to that I do not have a college 
degree. I came out of high school in the poor days and went to WPA 
night schools and whatever I could get for nothing. 

With the Government, I joined the Signal Corps, Fort Monmouth, 
N. J., and worked on development of radar before the war. Follow- 
ing that, I was with the Bureau of Ships as a project engineer in 
electronic design. 

After that, I went in the Marine Corps and was in charge of radar 
countermeasures training with the Ninth Wing and the Second Wing. 
After that, in 1946, I joined the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Navy 
Department, as electronics engineer in charge of research and develop- 
ment ])rojects, until such time as I left there, last August, and joined 
the Voice of America. 

The Chairman. "\'Miat unit, incidentally, were you with in the 
Marine Corps ? 

Mr. Freeman. Sir? 

The Chairman. What unit were you with in the Marine Corps? 

Mr. Freeman. I was wdth the Ninth Wing and the Second Wing 
staff, sir. I went in in 1944, after having been in the South Pacific 
as a civilian. 


Mr. CoHN, Now, Mr. Freeman, would you describe very briefly for 
the committee your duties as Acting Chief of the Contract Admin- 
istration Branch of the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Freeman. As Acting Chief of the Contract Administration 
Branch, I have under me contract-service specialists whose job it is 
to be thoroughly familiar with all contracts that have been negotiated 
and to administer those contracts to see that particularly our cost- 
j)lus-fixed-fee contracts — to see that the Government is getting full 
value for money expended. Also it is one of my duties to assist in 
preparing information from which a contract is negotiated. 

As an engineer, I provide technical assistance and determination as 
to whether work is within or without the scope of the original contract. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Freeman, I wonder if you could tell us gen- 
erally what the nature of these contracts is. I presume transmitter 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. Well, examples are Baker East and Baker 

Senator Dirksen. In their entirety ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And everything that goes with it ? 

Mr. Freeman. And the administration of the contract ? 

Senator Dirksen. That is right. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, you haA^e mentioned Baker East and Baker West. 
Were you concerned at all with the administration of contracts con- 
nected with these projects at Baker East and Baker West? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir, I have been concerned with them. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, let us talk for a moment about Baker West. A'\'Tio 
is the general contractor for Baker West? 

Mr. Freeman. The general contractor is J. G. Watts Construc- 
tion Co. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you consider Mr. Watts of the Watts Construction 
Co. that was awarded the job the best available contractor for that 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir. Realizing that I am new in the Department, 
I must refer back to the files which were turned over to me for infor- 
mation which I am supplying now. 

Mr. CoHN. Surely. 

Mr. Freeman. The files which were handed over to me indicated 
that the Engineering Department in New York, IRD, did not consider 
Watts as a satisfactory contractor to handle this job, and furthermore 
I was told upon my arrival there, when I questioned the use of Mr. 
Watts, that he was considered the least eligible of about 14 bidders 

Mr. CoHN. In spite of that fact, in spite of the fact that Mr. Watts 
was considered the least eligible of the 14 bidders, he was awarded the 
contract; is that right? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. Wlio was responsible for that, Mr. Freeman ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, I tried to find out how the contract was 
awarded, and tried to get some background on Mr. Watts. And I 
found out, or at least I was told, that the Engineering Department 
in New York was not allowed to see the information on Mr. Watts 
at the time the contract was negotiated. 


Mr. CoHX. The Engineering Department was not allowed to see the 
information on him? 

Mr. Freeman, That is right, as to his financial background or the 
type of work that he had done previous. He submitted no brochure. 

The Chaikman. Let me interrupt there, if I may. You convinced 
yourself from examining the files that of 14 bidders he was the least 
competent contractor; is that right? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir; that is the way it appears in the record. 

The Chairman. Do you mean competent from the standpoint of 
experience ? 

Mr. Freeman. Experience, sir ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As far as his financial standing was concerned, 
you were not allowed to see that information at all ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you check with Mr. Al Meyers to find out why 
he would give this contract to Watts, in view of the fact that you 
determined he was the least competent of the 14 that handled it? 

Mr. Freeman. I have spoken to Mr. Meyers about it, and I was 
informed that it was decisions that were made prior to my arriving 
there. And, naturally, they negotiated the contract, and they felt that 
the Watts Construction Co. could do the job. 

The Chairman. And he would not let you see the information on 
his financial background? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And was this a negotiated contract, or a cost-plus ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, it was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. 

The Chairman. Does he get a fixed fee for his work and the cost 
of all materials plus a certain profit upon the materials on the sub- 
contractors; right? 

Mr. Freeman. The profit is the fee, sir. There is not supposed to 
be any profit in the cost. 

The Chairman. In other words, it is cost plus a fixed fee ; is that it? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. He gets the cost of the project plus a definite fixed 

Mr. Freeman. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, Mr. Freeman, these are negotiated con- 
tracts, then, are they not? You just pick somebody out of a list and 
negotiate a contract with him ? Or is it done on a bid basis ? 

Mr. Freeman. Each contractor is requested to bid as to what he 
estimates the cost would be, and the fixed price for which he would 
do the job, and his methods of attack on the problem. Primarily, the 
Engineering Department is concerned with the man's attack on the 
problems, to determine whether he is (Qualified or not. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask a question to clear that up. I 
think I understand a fixed fee. They submit a bid upon what they 
estimate the project will cost; that is, the material, the labor, and so 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. As to what they estimate the project will cost 
on the basis of the specifications submitted to them ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct. 


Senator McClellan. And then they submit an amount, a fixed 
amount, on the basis of that cost, that they are willing to do the 
supervisory work for; is that correct? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, that is the fixed fee. Instead 
of getting cost plus 5 percent or 10 percent, they state a definite 
amount, like $500,000 or $250,000, and they furnish all of the super- 
visory work for that fee ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Freeman. I would like to just clarify the word "supervisory," 
sir. The general management costs are involved, but not supervisory. 

Senator McClellan. Well, that is a better term. I accept that. 
But it is just like you pay a fee to get a particular job done. That is 
what it amounts to. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And that represents their profit ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. And not a percentage of the cost of materials 
or construction costs? 

Mr. Freeman. That represents their profit. 

Senator McClellan. Now, do you know how this particular project 
compared with the other bids on the basis of the fixed fee ? 

Mr. Freeman. There was not too much variance. 

Senator McClellan. I thought there were 14 bidders. 

Mr. Freeman. That is right. But as far as the money was con- 

Senator McClellan. That is, the fixed fee? 

Mr. Freeman. The fixed fee. And as far as the estimated costs of 
the job were concerned, the bidders were not too far apart. 

Senator Jackson. Wlio submitted the lowest proposal, for the fee ? 

Mr. Freeman. I am sorry, sir. I would have to look at my records 
to determine. 

Senator Jackson. I think that is quite important, to find out. 

Senator McClellan. But on the basis that they were all about the 
same there is not a great variance in the amount of the cost of the 
project and the amount bid for the fixed fee. Your position is that 
the least competent of the bidders was awarded the contract ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoLTN. That is not only your position, Mr. Freeman, but is 
that not reflected in the file ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Let me ask this, to show the significance of that. 
If you have a competent contractor, a man who is experienced in the 
work, let us assume he receives a fixed fee of $500,000. and he is com- 
petent to the point where he can do the job for $8 million. Put an 
incompetent man on it, and let us assume he does it a bit lower. He 
will do the work for a fixed fee, we will say, of $400,000. But he is 
not experienced in the work, and the final cost of the project would 
run $11 million or $12 million. The final result, the final selection 
of the contractor, should not depend upon the fixed-fee bid, but 
rather upon the competence taken into consideration with his fixed 
fee; right? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator JMcClellan. Now, one other point. In the event the cost 
with the incompetent contractor that you say was selected in this case 


greatly exceeds the amount estimated, is he not, under the contract, 
entitled to have a revision of the fixed fee ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir, he is. 

Senator McClellan. So, then, by making the project cost more, 
or as a result of his incompetency if it does cost more, his fixed fee 
is subject to revision and an increase, under the terms of the contract. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Let me ask a question. Let us say that he 
estimates the project will cost $9 million, which is roughly the figure 
on Baker West. Then assume that the project cost $11 million. His 
fee would be revised upward rather than downward. In other words, 
he is not penalized because the project costs more. His fee is in- 
creased because the job is bigger than he anticipated. Is that right? 

Mr. Freeman. Senator, you cannot put that in one sentence. There 
are certain factors that are involved. There are engineering dif- 
ficulties that become apparent as we go along. 

You must realize that you enter into a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
because you can't visualize the end product at the time you start. If 
you could, you would get a fixed price for the job. So that the con- 
tractor, on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, is actually an agent of the 
Government. The Government supervises his activities. The Gov- 
ernment supplies him with specifications. And the Government in- 
terprets those specifications. 

The Chairman. By the Government, in this case, you would be re- 
ferring to Mr. Herrick, I assume ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct. 

The Chairman. The Government has to be some individual doing 
the job ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct. 

The Chairman. So in this case the Government would be Mr. 
Herrick ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is right. 

The Chairman. Who has since been discharged because of incom- 
petence ; is that right ? 

Mr. Freeman. I don't know, sir, what has happened up there. 

The Chairman. Now, my question is this : If the cost of the project 
increases, the contractor getting a fixed fee would normally have his 
fee increased also ; is that right ? 

Mr. Freeman. If the scope is extended, and if there are delays in- 
volved which he can document, and other things beyond his control, 
yes, his fee will be readjusted by negotiation. 

The Chairman. Who determined whether his fee would be re- 
adjusted in this case? 

Mr. Freeman. The contracting officer is the one that must deter- 
mine that. 

The Chairman. Wlio was the contracting ofiicer ? 

Mr. Freeman. The contracting officer at the time of the initiation 
of the contract was Mr. Meyers. 

The Chairman, Mr. Al Meyers ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And who succeeded Al Meyers ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, Mr. Frank Seymour succeeded Al Meyers as 
contracting officer and has since been succeeded by Mr. Moseley. 


The Chairman. Mr. Moseley ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How about Alfred Morton? Where does Alfred 
Morton come into that picture ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, he is in charge of IBS operations in New York. 

The Chairman. He is not the contracting officer ? 

Mr. Freeman. He is not the contracting officer ; no, sir. 

The Chairman. And first Mr. Al Meyers, then Mr. Seymour, then 
Mr. Moseley, would have had the power to change the fixed fee from 
time to time if, in their discretion, they thought it should be changed? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. It is a negotiated matter. 

The Chairman. Does anyone supervise that? Does anyone have 
any power of veto over what they do ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, there must be supervision in Washington. 

The Chairman. Who had the power in Washington ? 

Mr. Freeman. I don't know, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, you do not know of anyone who 
exercised the veto power over what they did ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, I don't. 

Senator Jackson. Did the contractor guarantee any part of the 
cost? That is, was the contract broken down in the way that the 
contractor guaranteed that certain costs would not exceed a certain 
amount ? 

Mr. Freeman. The contractor submits an estimated budget as to 
what he feels the various major items will cost. He does not guaran- 
tee those costs. 

Senator Jackson. He is not bound by the estimate? 

Mr. Freeman. He is not bound by the estimate. 

Senator Jackson. And then his fee is adjusted upward if the addi- 
tional cost is due to new factors that are not contemplated in the 
original contract? 

Mr. Freeman. That is right, or a number of other circumstances. 

Senator Jackson. Now, where is the headquarters of the Watts Co. ? 

Mr. Freeman. It is in Portland, Oreg. 

Senator Jackson. Portland, Oreg. ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Freeman, do you know anything about the 
background of Mr. Watts? What kind of a contractor was he? A 
paving contractor, a sewerage contractor, or what ? 

Mr. Freeman. I have since found out that Mr. Watts has built some 
schoolhouses, has built some roads. He has done road-construction 
work. He is not a very old contractor in the business. I believe he 
entered the business at the end of the war. 

Senator Dirksen. Would it take some special qualifications to do 
this kind of a job, on the part of the contractor? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. As electronics engineer, I feel that the 
contractor associated with the prime contract on a radio station should 
be a man whose primary business is building radio stations. 

Senator Dirksen. So Mr. Watts had no record in the field of build- 
ing radio stations ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, that is very interesting, to say the least. 
I suppose, just to finish the thought, since this is an educational pro- 
gram and he built schoolhouses, that is what sort of identified him ? 



Mr. Freeman. Well, Senator, if I might go just one step further, 
one of the things that has worried me exceedingly concerning that 
job is that I feel that, well, perhaps a man does not have the original 
talent himself, if he hires sufficient talent it sort of offsets it. But he 
put a project manager on the job to run the job who worked for the 
Union Pacific Railroad in their construction department. He earned 
$6,000 a year with the Union Pacific Railroad, and he is presently 
earning $12,000 a year as project manager in charge of Baker West. 

Well, I thought now, there may be some mitigating circumstances 
here. We may get a construction superintendent who is well qualified 
in his field. But he hired a man by the name of Mr. McKenny, whose 
background is that he had 1 year of college and then he went to work 
as a shovel and dragline operator. I looked into his background and 
found that he had never put up a building in his life. Probably his 
last job was as a foreman of an operating engineer gang, and he 
probably is a good road-construction man. I don't mean to say 
anything that would tear the man down, as to his own field. But he 
was put in as assistant construction superintendent because he couldn't 
meet the qualifications of construction superintendent. Then Mr. 
Watts attempted to raise him to construction superintendent, and 
I wrote a letter pointing out that by the very job description that 
Mr. Watts himself wrote, Mr. McKenny would not qualify for it, and 
turned it down. Well, he in turn hired a building-construction man 
who was going to be assistant construction superintendent to take 
care of the building end of it, and again moved McKenny up, and 
that thing has just all been up in the air to where it stands right now. 

Senator McClellan. May I ask if the other bidders, the other of 
the 14 bidders, were experienced in building radio stations? Wliat 
I am trying to determine is whether you had any really competent 

Mr. Freeman. I might say that the other bidders involved, some 
of them, have had experience before, some of it gained with the Voice, 
but they were not primarily radio station construction people. 

The Chairman. Does this man. Watts, have the necessary equip- 
ment on hand for the construction of Baker West? 

Mr. Freeman. Watts had a limited amount of equipment which 
you would expect him to have in building a road. 

The Chairman. Did some of the other contractors have the neces- 
sary equipment? 

Mr. Freeman. Other contractors did have heavy equipment. 

The Chairman. Now, I understand from the testimony given this 
morning by one of the witnesses, I believe Dr. Compton himself, that 
the contract itself did not provide for the Government paying off the 
price of the equipment at the rate of BV2 percent per month. That 
was negotiated later, outside the contract, separate and apart from 
the contract. I understand that the Government paid for this equip- 
ment that Watts purchased at the rate of 814 percent per month; in 
other words, a hundred percent in 12 months. At that time Watts 
would own the equipment. Would you say that was a reasonable 
arrangement? Is that a normal arrangement? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir; that is an unusual arrangement. It was 
something that was taking place at about the time that I arrived in 
New York. And, as a matter of fact, the first item that I questioned 


was an Oldsmobile automobile which Watts was attempting to rent 
to the Government at 8i/^ percent and have the Government pay for 
all the gas, oil, and maintenance on it in addition to that. 

The ChaikMxVN. In other words, he was buying an Oldsmobile car. 
He was going to let the Government pay for that at the rate of 8^/2 
percent per month, so that at the end of the year, he would own the 
Oldsmobile and in the meantime they would pay all the maintenance 
and gas and oil on the car ? 

Mr, Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that was the first piece of equipment that sort 
of hit you in the eye ? 

Mr. Freeman. I discussed this with Mr. Meyers at the time, because 
the correspondence came to my desk. And Mr. Meyers told me that 
this was the best he could do with Watts ; that Watts was very arbi- 
trary on this matter and originally wanted 10 percent. And Mr. 
Meyers told me he had gotten it down to SV^ percent. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you a question there. Do I under- 
stand that he got a fixed fee that was specified in the contract, and 
then in addition to that, not specified in the written contract, it was 
orally agreed that the Government would buy all of his equipment and 
pay for it within a year, and then he was to own the equipment ? Is 
that correct? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, no, sir. In the contract it was stated that the 
Government would pay rental on equipment that was either Watts* 
own equipment which he put on the job, or the Government would pay 
rental on equipment which he had to get from another source. And 
there are in the construction field companies who rent big, heavy 
equipment and make a good business of it. Now, the figure was 
something that had to be negotiated with the contracting officer. On 
Baker West it was 8i^ percent. 

And that letter which authorized Sy2 percent and was signed by 
the contracting officer then became a part of the contract. 

On Baker East, the Association of General Contractors schedule 
was used. However, the schedule on hand was a 1949 edition. It has 
since been rewritten by tlie Association of General Contractors. And 
the contracting officer agreed to pay the Association of General Con- 
tractors rate plus 10 percent of that rate. In other words, a piece of 
equipment which was listed at 4 percent rental value, we would now 
pay 0.044 percent on that. And that seemed logical because of the 
fact that everything had gone up between 1949 and 1951. 

Senator McCellan. What I am trying to determine is : Did that 8I/2 
percent actually result in his buying equipment, so that the end of a 
year's time if 8% percent was advanced on all equipment that he 
owned, it would pay the cost of the equipment, the initial cost of the 
equipment, within a year's time? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir ; it would. 

Senator McClellan. And notwithstanding that the equipment may 
not have been used at all. And I understand some of it was not used. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct, sir. 

Senator McClellan. So he has profited, in addition to the fixed 
fee, by having the Government buy a lot of new equipment? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 


Senator McClellan. How much ? What do you estimate to be the 
value of it? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, we have been running about $25,000 a month 
rental costs at Baker West. By comparison, to give you something 
to compare it with. Baker East has never exceeded $12,500, where we 
are trying to drain a swamp. 

Senator ]\IcClellan. That is additional cost, too, is it not, the drain- 
ing of the swamp ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCleelan. That is not encountered at Baker West ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct. 

Senator Jackson. Wliat is the percentage charge at Baker East on 
the rental of equipment? You started to mention something about 
the Associated General Contractors schedule of rentals, and then 
there is something about 10 percent in addition to that. What is the 
percentage being charged by the contractor of Baker East on the 
equipment ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, it will depend upon the item involved. 

Senator Jackson. Can you give a percentage comparison with 
Baker West? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, the thing that I can do is that I can state this: 
that on Baker West, regardless of what the item is that is on the job, 
whether it is a chain saw, whether it is a Chevrolet truck, or whether 
it is a Lima crane, or whether it is batch mixing plant, we pay 8i/^ 

On Baker East, the Association of General Contractors Manual is 
used, whereby we will perhaps pay 31^ percent on a light truck, not a 
heavy truck, and the schedule will probably be 2.2 percent on a chain 

Senator Jackson. Depending on the life of the equipment? 

Mr. Freeman. That is right. 

Senator Jackson. It is an amortization figure ? 

IMr. Freeman. It is an amortization schedule that this manual has 
worked out. 

Senator Jackson. Well, you say roughly that it is half ? The actual 
gross is half, is it not? It is $12,000 a month at Baker East? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes ; it is. 

Senator Jackson. And $25,000 a month at Baker West? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes. 

Seantor Jackson. Is the equipment involved roughly the same, in 
gross value? 

Mr. Freeman. In gross value, we have been using heavier equip- 
ment and bigger equipment at Baker East. But in order to give the 
devil his due, the contractor down there has tried to use the cheapest 
method available to the Government. And because of the heavy rains 
in North Carolina during the winter, he has rented these big Le- 
Tourneau earth movers by the hour ; so that we only paid when we 
could work, and there were occasions when we could only work 2 
days a week. And, as a matter of fact, we were involved in a labor 
strike down there for 3 weeks, so that there was no rental paid on that 
heavy equipment during that time. 

Senator Jackson. At Baker East, the contractor is not furnishing 
the equipment ? He rents it from somebody else ? 


Mr. Freeman. The contractor has equipment, but he rents it to the 
Government, whether it is his, or whether he gets it from somewhere 
else. But in other words, Baker East is the Crowe-Loving venture 
down there. This heavy equipment belongs to the T. A. Loving Co., 
which is a part of the' partnership for that job. Now, they could 
just as well have tried to force the issue and rent that equipment by 
ithe month to us, but they gave us the lowest possible rate. 

Senator Jackson, That is all. 

Senator McClellan. Can you give us some estimate of the amount 
of waste that you regard as waste and unnecessary extravagance in- 
volved in this 81/4 percent that apparently goes to purchase equipment 
for Watts, over a period of a year, say the last year, or since the con- 
tract was made? Let us get some estimate or some value in the record 
here, something that we can identify as absolute waste under this 
contract, if you can do so. 

Mr. Freeman. Well, I would say that we have probably been ex- 
pending, I can safely say, $15,000 a month which was not required. 
Some of the basis for that. Senator, I would say is that he buys $11,000 
trucks out there, dump trucks. Now, in your business or mine you 
wouldn't buy that expensive truck if you had to pay for it yourself. 

Senator McClellan. Well, he expects to have that left over after 
the contract is finished, and paid for by the Government ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And that will actually be the result of it if this 
contract is carried out ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Now, then, how many months, at the rate of 
$15,000 per month, has this arrangement continued now ? 

Mr. Freeman. About 11 months. 

Senator McClellan. So what would be the loss up to now ? 

Mr. Freeman. It is about 10 months right now. 

Senator McClellan. $150,000, then, up to now, has been paid to 
him in excess of actual value received? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, Mr. Freeman, this is a kind of a funny 
business. I used to be a contractor myself. Wlien I went on a job, 
I usually appended some kind of a statement to show what kind of 
equipment I was going to use. Now, was there not some hint, when 
this thing was entered into, that he would have to have so many 
trucks, 5-ton trucks, 10-ton trucks, and Si^-ton, so many Erie shovels, 
so many heavy-duty Bucyrus, or whatever it was? Was there not 
something here ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir ; nothing at all was appended. 

Senator Dirksen. It was just all up in the air ? 

Mr. Freeman. Outside of the fact that IRD-New York was told 
that he had the equipment, that he could do the job. 

Senator Dirksen. Of course, you do not ask a contractor, if it is 
an open-end contract, to go ahead and pay for the truck and get a 
final payment on it at completion. But here you have an agreement 
to liquidate this equipment for him at 8I/2 percent per month. There 
ought to be something in the Government record to show what the 
understanding was. Otherwise the sky is the limit as to what he 
can buy. 


Mr. Freeman. Well, the prime error that was made in writing the 
contract, if the Government had to get into that kind of a position — 
there should have been a recapture clause in the contract. Mr. Watts 
was asked recently in New York, or it was pointed out to him, that 
these rates were absurd, and that he was winding up with brandnew 
equipment being paid for by the Government. And he was asked: 
"Since we are in this position, will you accept a recapture clause placed 
in the contract now and a recapture clause allowing the Government 
to take title of the equipment and pay for it, so that when we have 
paid 20 percent of the value of the equipment, we can buy it outright?" 

Mr. Watts said absolutely not. He would not accept a recapture 

The Chairman. Let me ask this, if I may, then. I understand. 
No. 1, that some of the equipment was purchased as long as 10 months 
before it was needed on the job, and that rental was paid during that 
10-month period. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, now, after rental had been paid for 12 
months, we will say on one of those $11,000 trucks, after the Govern- 
ment had paid the full $11,000, does the Voice continue, then, to pay 
the 8^/2 percent per month ? 

Mr, Freeman. Yes, sir ; under the present contract. 

The Chairman. And this project has been under way for how 
many months ? 

Mr. Freeman. For 10 months. 

The Chairman. And if it continues, how long would it take to 
complete the project? 

Mr. Freeman. The contractor's estimate — now, equipment will be 
retired in various stages as it is no longer required on the job. But 
his estimate now to get off the job is June of 1954. 

The Chairman. June of 1954. So that this is February, 1953. 
That would mean he would be paid over double the value of all of 
the equipment, but would still own the equipment ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This would, I assume, lead to the temptation of 
over-equipping, would it not, getting all the equipment he possibly 
could ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you found that on this job ? 

Mr. Freeman. We have found that there is more equipment on 
that job than there has been at Baker East ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you have any idea as to the amount of 
equipment which has been purchased by Watts? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir ; not without my files. 

The Chairman. In other words, you would not know whether it 
was $100,000, $200,000, or $300,000 ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir ; I can't give you a figure on that. 

Senator Jackson. What was the original scheduled date of com- 
pletion of the job? Work got under way when ? Last year? 

Mr. Freeman. Work got under way this past spring out there. 

Senator Jackson. Last April or May ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. And the schedule on the job was 15 months 
after Watts was given the site. That was the basic schedule. 


Senator Jackson. Fifteen months ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. What is the reason for the delay ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, it is pretty difficult to say. I think perhaps 
basically the delay involves — some of the delay is involved in the fact 
that we put the contractor on the job before the architectural engi- 
neering has been completed for the job. 

Senator Jackson. Well, did someone give him orders to go on the 
job? I am trying to find out who is who and what is what on this. 
I mean, who would direct him to go on the job ? 

Mr. Freeman. This predates me, and I am having to try to recall 
where the orders came from, but they came from the Voice, in other 

Senator Jackson. So that permission was given to go on the job 
at a certain date, and then he was supposed to finish that within 15 
months of his taking the site, or whatever you call it ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Now it is running for 2 years, a little over 2 
years ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes. 

Senator Jackson. This is what I am getting at : What is the reason 
for that delay? Is it the contractor? Or what is the reason for it? 
For the extension of time ; let us put it that way. 
^ Mr. Freeman. Well, the contractor has moved very slowly in get- 
ting the site cleared, getting the timber off the site, and I have had 
reports from my people on the west coast that they have had trouble 
in seeing some of he men moving out on the job. 

Senator McClellan. Well, is not their contract so written as to give 
incentive to that sort of working, instead of expediting the job? The 
longer it is delayed, the more rents he collects, the more profit he has. 
He gets his fixed fee anyhow. What is the incentive in the contract 
to get the work expedited ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, in a cost-plus-fixed-fee type of contract, it is 
up to the Government agency involved to have their inspectors and 
their engineers on the job to see that waste does not occur. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I understand. But there is no incentive 
to the contractor to expedite this job, is there? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. The longer it continues, the more rents he 
collects, the more profit he makes. He gets the fixed fee anyhow. Is 
that not an unusual arrangement? 

Mr. Freeman. No. As long as we are within the scope of the con- 
tract, and as long as he has the specifications and the drawings and 
everything that is due him, on time, he cannot get an additional fixed 

Senator McClellan. But he can get additional rents, according to 
your testimony? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes; he can. 

Senator McClellan. That is why I say: He gets the fixed fee 
anyhow. He does not get any more under the fixed fee, but he con- 
tinues to profit out of the rental arrangement. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. Of course, as far as the profit is concerned, 
I am of the opinion that when the General Accounting Office goes 


over this contract, there will be items disallowed. Because they will 
dig into it to see if there is profit in these other parts. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. You have been paying rental 
on the equipment now for how many months ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, of course, some of it is far back as 10 months. 
There have been additional equipments brought on the job at various 

The Chairman. We were informed yesterday that the work on the 
project is to be discontinued. Will the $25,000 per month rental 
on the equipment continue while the work is discontinued? Or do 
you know? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, there would be no reason to continue rental 


The Chairman. Do you know whether the rent will be paid during 
the time the contractor has been ordered to suspend operations? Do 
you know, or do you not know ? 

Mr. Freeman. Sir, this has happened since I left New York. 

The Chairman. All right. I am just asking. I will ask someone 
else if you do not know. 

Mr. Freeman. If it is the termination of the contract, he will be 
ordered to get everything off the job. If he is ordered to suspend 
his operation and perhaps start it up again, then the charges will 
continue on. 

The Chairman. All right. Let me ask Dr. Compton. 

Is this correct: that you have not terminated the contract with 
Watts? You have merely asked him to discontinue any further con- 
struction at this time ? Is that correct ? 

Mr, Compton. We suspended the contract. I believe, if it has 
the effect that Mr. Freeman indicates, we will of course terminate 
the contract. 

The Chairman. You have not answered my question. What have 
you ordered in this case? 

Mr. Compton. Suspension. 

The Chairman. Suspension of the operation ? 

Mr. Compton. Suspension of all construction. 

The Chairman. Of all construction. All right. Under the con- 
tract, do you consider the $25,000 a month payment for rental on the 
equipment ? 

Mr. Freeman. If it is a floating suspension 

The Chairman. I am asking Dr. Compton. 

Mr. Compton. I do not know the answer to that, either. 

The Chairman. Would it not be rather important to find that 

Mr. Compton. It would, indeed. 

The Chairman. Who can find it out for us ? 

Mr. Compton. We can telephone to New York. 

The Chairman. Is there not anyone here in the room, any one of 
your aides, who can tell us whether, after you suspend that opera- 
tion, you will be paying $25,000 a month rental ? 

Mr. Compton. It is all handled in New York. Mr. Freeman, if he 
were in New York, would probably be the one who would be asked. 

Mr. Freeman. I-would know if I were in New York. 

The Chairman. You are the legal officer in New York ? 

Mr. Freeman. I am the engineer. 


The Chairman. I am sorry. In view of Dr. Compton's statement 
that the contract has not been terminated, that operations and con- 
structions have been suspended, is it your opinion that the $25-,00O 
a month rentals will continue to be paid ? 

Mr. Freeman. If it is a floating suspension. But there are various 
types of suspensions. 

The Chairman. Well, now, Dr. Compton is here. He wrote the 
order. I assume he can tell you what type of suspension. 

What type of suspension is it, Doctor, so that the witness can 

answer? . 

Mr. Compton. Well, I did not intend any floating type ot suspen- 
sion. I meant to shut it down until we could get complete reexamina- 
tion, such as I mentioned yesterday afternoon. If, as a matter of fact, 
the nature of this contract, this 81/2 percent clause, which was one 
of the reasons, one of the specific reasons, why my judgment was that 
we had better shut it down — we want to get at that and eliminate 
that. If we have to take further action, we do that right away. 

The Chairman. You understand. Doctor, in asking you this ques- 
tion I am not criticizing you for that contract, which was made before 
you came into the picture. 

Mr. Compton. I understand. 

The Chairman. All I am trying to find out is what has happened 
since yesterday, when you ordered suspension of operations. If you 
can tell Mr. Freeman what you did yesterday, then I assume Mr. 
Freeman can tell us how much this is costing us per month. 

Have you a copy of the order you issued ? 

Mr. Compton. It was approved last night. Here is a copy. 

The Chairman. Would you hand that to Mr. Freeman, then, and 
see if Mr. Freeman can tell us? 

Mr. Compton. This was approved last night by the Under Secretary. 

The Chairman. Let us see, then, if Mr. Freeman can tell us whether 
we are still spending $25,000 a month on the equipment. 

Wliile Mr. Freeman is examining that: This was approved last 
night by the Under Secretary ? 

Mr. Compton. That is correct. 

The Chairman. His name? 

Mr. Compton. Mr. Lourie — to whom the memorandum was ad- 
dressed. I talked to him after the meeting at about 7 o'clock last 

The Chairman. Mr. Freeman, one of the Senators has pointed out 
that you may not have sufficient knowledge of the contract to answer 
this. If you think you cannot answer it, just tell us. 

Mr. Freeman. This is general. Senator, and I can't answer it. It 
would depend upon further interpretation as to the type of action 
that was taken. 

The Chairman. I assume you work closely with the legal officer 
in your work, do you not ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Could you take that up with the legal officer and 
get his opinion as to whether or not, under the contract, under that 
suspension order, we continue to pay the $25,000 a month or not? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, if I were to get this order, Senator, I would 
have to go back for interpretation to determine immediately as to 


whether the order meant to suspend the costs involved in the opera- 
tion or to hold the operation ready and maintain the payrolls and 
rentals ready to be reactivated. .,,.1.0-,, ^. 

Mr. CoMPTON. Well, it is intended to get rid of that 81/2 percent. 

That, I do know. . i ^i ^ -u-i 0.1. + 

Mr Freeman. Well, Mr. Watts stated quite clearly that while that 

contract was in force that 81/2 percent would have to hold. He would 

not renegotiate that. . , . , 1 -i 

The Chairman. We will gain nothing by discussing this back and 
forth across the table. We will ask you, if you will, to get m touch 
with the legal officer, get any interpretation that you consider neces- 
sary, and then see if you can tell us just what expenses will continue 
on under the contract. /, n i -, 

Senator McClellan. I would suggest also that if you find that those 
rentals would continue under this stop order, this suspension order, 
you ascertain from him and tell this committee what kind of an order 
is necessary to suspend the payment of rentals as well. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And also I would like to know from you and the 
legal department what will happen if the contract is terminated by 
Mr. Compton, what liabilities the Voice has under it, how much money 
Mr. Watts will receive, whether he will be able to keep all of the 
equipment which the Government apparently has already almost 
completely paid for, or if there is any chance of recapturing any of 
the loss we have had under it ; in other words, the complete picture if 
you can get that. And I know that is too big an order for you to 
give it to us today. 

Mr. Freeman. I can answer quite generally the question you have 
just placed. If we have a termination clause in the contract which 
allows the Government to terminate the contract at any time for 
reasons determined by the Government 

The Chairman. Mr. Freeman, let me interrupt you. You are 
speaking of a termination clause in the contract. I am not interested 
in any speculation now. I want you to examine the contract, go over 
it with the legal officer, and give us the answer without the "ifs." 

Let us go on to another point. I assume you have examined these 
various projects to determine roughly how much waste there has been 
on each project. Is that correct? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you like to run down, project by project, 
and give us your estimate of the waste in each particular Voice broad- 
casting project? I am speaking of the waste in the construction only. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. I would like to preface it by saying that 
these are my opinions in the matter.. 

Basically, at the two Baker plants, which are both in isolated areas, 
I would not have spent $750,000 at each project to put up a transmitter 
building, a building which will be a very fine building when it is 
finished. But I feel, personally, that we should use every dollar given 
to the Voice to get out a radio signal and minimize the cost of the 
associated items. 

The Chairman. In other words, you feel there is no need, for exam- 
ple, for a $750,000 building down in the swampland in Baker East? 


Mr. Freeman. That is right, where $150,000 would put up a satis- 
factory building to house the transmitters. 

The Chairman. Here is a question that has not been answered by 
any of the witnesses so far. Do you have any knowledge as to why 
the Voice selected swamp land, some of it covered with water, that 
had to be drained, inaccessible until a road was built into the area, for 
Baker East? Was not other land available? What is the general 
picture of that ? 

Mr. Freeman. I examined the record in New York, showing what 
the survey team did. There is not too much written there. And I 
asked questions around concerning it. And I sort of hate to bring it 
out here, but it was told to me, and this is strictly hearsay, that Senator 
Kilgore's relatives were involved in some of the land that was bought 
down there, and I don't know who or where. I am only repeating 
what was told to me when I joined the operation up there and asked 

The Chairman. I think we should restrict ourselves not to what 
has been heard so much as to what you, yourself, know. 

Mr. Freeman. Well, that is the reason I 

The Chairman. You, yourself, do not know that to be a fact at this 
time ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir ; I do not. 

The Chairman. We have asked Dr. Compton to give us the name 
of the man from whom the land was purchased. 

Can you give us his name at this time ? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. His name is Charles Carrigan. 

Senator Jackson. Did he sell it, or did he handle it ? 

Mr, CoMPTON. He handled it. 

The Chairman, Mi'. Compton, I want the name of the man from 
whom you purchased the Baker East land. 

Senator Jackson. Who sold it to the Government ? 

Mr, Compton, I don't know. Mr. Carrigan is the man who made 
the arrangement. 

The Chairman. I told you to get that and have it here at 2 o'clock. 
Can you not get the information ? 

Mr, CoMiTON. Mr, Carrigan is in the room. 

The Chairman, Mr. Carrigan, will you stand up? Will you be 
sworn, please ? In this matter now in hearing before the committee^ 
do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Carrigan, I do. 

The Chairman. I wonder if you would come up here, Mr. Carrigan. 
Would you spell your name for us, please? There are so many dif- 
ferent ways of spelling "Carrigan." 


Mr, Carrigan. C-a-r-r-i-g-a-n. 

The Chairman. And your first name ? 

Mr, Carrigan. Charles B. 

The Chairman. Charles B. Carrigan. The only information we 
want from you at this time, Mr. Carrigan, is the name of the indi- 
vidual from whom you purchased the land on which Baker East was 


Mr. Carrigan. There were about IG individuals involved. The 
largest owner was the K. Clyde Council estate. 

The Chairman. That is the estate of K. Clyde Council. How many 
acres ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Fourteen hundred acres. 
• The Chairman. All right. And the next one ? 

Mr. Carrigan. The International Paper Co., with about 550 acres. 

The Chairman. The National Paper Co. ? 

Mr. Carrigan. The International Paper Co. 

The Chairman. And how many acres ? 

Mr. Carrigan. 550 or 560 acres. There was a C. H. Settlemyer, 
about 110 acres. 

The Chairman. C. H. Settlemyer, 110 acres ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Yes. And I can't think of the initials, but there 
was a party by the name of Devane from Fayetteville. 

The Chairman. D-e-v-o-n ? 

Mr. Caiikigan. D-e-v-a-n-e. 

The Chairman. Devane, from Fayetteville. 

Mr. Carrigan. Yes. 

The Chairman. Fayetteville, N. C. ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Fayetteville, N. C. They had about 225 acres. 
And T. H. Maultsby, M-a-u-1-t-s-b-y. They had approximately 225. 

The Chairman. 225 acres. 

Mr. Carrigan. And the rest of them were small tracts owned by 
colored owners. Those are farms, small tobacco farms. 

The Chairman. What was the total acreage purchased? 

Mr. Carrigan. 2,817 acres, I believe. 

The Chairman. 2,817. Let us see. You have given us 1,960 acres. 
And you said the total was how much ? 

Mr. Carrigan. 2,800. 

The Chairman. You have a thousand acres to go ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Xo. The first tract was 1,400 acres. 

The Chairman. Pardon ? 

Mr. Carrigan. The first tract I gave you was 1,400 acres. 

The Chairman. Now, while neither Senator Kilgore nor anyone 
else is responsible for what his relatives do, I think we should clear 
up that point, in view of the fact that it was brought up. Are any 
of these individuals the ones you had in mind, Mr. Freeman? 

Mr. Freeman. I don't know a thing about it, sir. I am just repeat- 
ing what was told to me. 

The Chairman. I am not probing this subject, but in view of the 
fact that it was brought up : Are any of these individuals related 
to Senator Kilgore ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir, not to my knowledge. 

The Chairman. Then, as far as you know, Senator Kilgore does 
not figure in this picture ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir. 

The CH.VIRMAN. What is the total purchase price for all of the 

Mr. Carrigan. Approximately $229,000. 

The Chairman. How much did that figure per acre ? 

Mr. Carrigan. A little over $80 an acre. 

From that, you should deduct the timber on this one tract, of 
1,400 acres, in order to develop that particular acre where the tri.ns- 


mitter building is to be located. There is about a thousand acres of 
timber which we sold through a sealed bid for $36,500, or $36.50 an 
acre of timber. 

The Chairman. So the actual cost of the land after you sold the 
timber was about $195,000 ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Roughly in there somewhere. 

The Chairman. Did you pay different prices for different acreage? 

^Mr. Carrigan. On the large tracts, no. That is on the same basis, 
$75 an acre, and we disposed of the timber. Or on a $50 an acre basis, 
we would let them remove the timber. 

The Chairman. Now, we asked to have the names of all those from 
whom land was purchased submitted. Do I understand that you do 
not have the otlier names, the names of the other sellers ? 

Mr. Carrigan. I certainly could give them to you. I have them 
right on the property line map. 

The Chairman. Will you submit that to the staff either this after- 
noon or tomorrow morning, whenever you can ? 

Mr. Carrigan. I would have to go back to my office to get it if you 
wish it this afternoon. 

The Chairman. Mr. Carrigan, I think there is a question which we 
will ask all witnesses involved in these transactions from now on. I 
want to make it very clear to you and to the press that the mere asking 
of this question does not carry any implication with it. It is a ques- 
tion, however, that I think we should ask, and one that we ask not only 
of you but the other witnesses. That is this : Do you have any income 
outside of your salary with the Voice ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir. 

The Chairman. How long have you been with the Voice ? 

Mr. Carrigan. I am not with the Voice. I am with the Central 
Services Division. And I was loaned to the Voice program, particu- 
larly in connection with, this land acquisition. 

The Chairman. You have been in Government work over the past 
2 or 3 years ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Oh, yes, for 20 years. 

The Chairman. You have had no income aside from your Govern- 
ment salary over the past 3 years? 

Mr. Carrigan. Yes; I have. I made a thousand dollars in real 
estate commission from a friend of mine. 

The Chairman. A real estate commission? 

Mr. Carrigan. That is right. 

The Chairman. Did it have anything to do with land sold to the 
Government ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No ; I acquired this land for a friend of mine, who 
was a doctor. 

The Chairman. Did you receive anything of value from any of the 
contractors, any of the sellers of land, or anyone else doing business 
with the Voice or any other branch of Government over the past 3 
or 4 years ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Nothing of value? 

Mr. Carrigan. Nothing. 

The Chairman. Again let me say the asking of those questions 
should not carry any implication. We intend to ask those questions 


of every witness who appears. I think we must, because of the un- 
usual picture that is developiuo-, if we want to get that information. 

Senator Dirksex. Is this tlie goino- vahie of land that you recite 
here, Mr. Carrigan^ 

Mr. Carrioax. Yes. Timberland down there is very much in de- 
mand. It has a higli value. In fact, ])ulpwood is bringing the high- 
est prices in history down there. And this is in an area where there- 
are tree-growing farms, primarily for l)ulp production. 

Senator Dirksex. You are familiar with this whole tract? You 
have been over this whole tract? 

Mr. Carrigax. Oh, many times. 

Senator Dirksex. Is some of it under water? 

Mr. Carrigax'. I will tell you. In an area where you have flat 
ground, there is nowhere 

Senator Dirksex. AVell, look. Is it under water, or is it not? 

Mr. Carrkjax. No, sir. I heai'd it described as swamp land. It is 
not SAvamp land. In fact, in swam]) land you would not get the type 
of timber that could be sold for $;-)(),()()0. You won't get this type 
of timber to grow in swamp land. You will get hardwood. 

Senator Dirksex. Is the water table high in this land? 

Mr. Carrigax. No. They have a peculiar soil in North Carolina,, 
which I don't know. In fact, it is not my job to know about what i& 
underneath the ground. They have what is known as a Portsmouth 
and a Norfolk type soil in that area. The Norfolk soil is supposed 
to be veiT good load-bearing soil, and the Portsmouth is kind of a 
gumbo sort of a soil, which doesn't allow for good drainage. 

Senator Dirksex. Well, now, you say the water table is high in the 

Mr. Carrigax. Well, you are about a mile from the Cape Fear 
River, so the table would be high, but I don't know how high it is as 
to the top of the soil. 

Senator Dirksex. I can tell you whether a water table is higli by 
just stepping on it, and so could you, I imagine. 

Mr. Carrigax. Well, it is not a 

Senator Dirksex. The water table is high? . 

Mr. Carrigax. It is high. 

Senator Dirksex. Well, noAv, the reason for asking the question is 
this : If the water table is high, certainly if you were going to build 
any structures you would have to put piling down there, would you 
not ? 

Mr. Carrigax. Yes, they will have to put piling no matter if they 
had what they called the good type soil, the Norfolk soil. 

Senator Dirksex. Do you know what has been spent on draining 
this land, if anything, either subsurface drainage or 

Mr. Carrigax. I have an idea. I know that I have gone back and 
acquired otf-site drainage easements for them. 

Senator Dirksex. You could not exi)ect to use a helicopter to go 
to work in the morning, you know. So if it is swamp land, I would 
like to know. 

Mr. Carrigax. No; it isn't. In fact, it parallels and borders the 
Seaboard Airline Railroad. 

Senator Dirksex. Now, suppose you built a roadway down there. 
Would you have to pile it ? 


Mr. Carrigan. No. In fact, they used a borrow pit 

The Chairman. Did I understand that you did not have to drain 
some of the hind ? 

Mr. Carrigan. What is that ? 

The Chairman. Do I understand tliat you did not have to drain 
any of the land ? 

Mr. Carrigan. Oh, no. Tliere is a drainage problem there, because 
it is a flat area. And the only way that water, the drainage water, 
can get off there is by digging drainage ditches. 

The Chairman. So you dug drainage ditches ? 

Mr. Carrigan. That is right. 

The Chairman. And you had to do that before you could use the 
land. And you would have to do that anywhere in that particular 
part of North Carolina ? Now, do you know why that particular area 
was selected, an area which had to be drained ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No ; I don't think that was one of the considerations. 
In fact, you could not tell whether there was au}^ waste there. We 
.walked over a large portion of it. It was heavily treed, and there 
were several evidences of clamp spots. 

The Chairman. Those damp spots : How damp were they ? Were 
they under water? 

Mr. Carrigan. Well, you might have an area, say, as large as this 
room where the water had settled and stayed there. You might have 
6 inches of water. 

The Chairman. But no more than that ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No ; it wasn't any lake. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Freeman mentioned survey parties that went 
down there from the Voice. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Can you say something to the committee about 
what they found about this land? 

Mr. Freeman. The reports of the survey committee. Senator, did 
not indicate the presence of water. And it is very possible that they 
wouldn't have. Because the water table, during the dry season in the 
sunmier down there, was at —14 feet. The first week of rain that 
we got down there, the table went to —2 and stayed there. And 
the back part of the site, you had to go through with hipboots. 

Senator Dirksen. That is right. That is a way of saying that the 
water table is 2 feet under the land, and if you step in it you go down 
over your hips, maybe. 

Mr. Freeman. But if you went down in the dry season, you could 
^Yalk all through there. 

Senator Dirksen. Of course, the Voice is expected to work in the 
nondry season, too. is it not ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And also the dry season. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

You asked about the drainage. The estimate to drain the land is 
about a hundred thousand dollars. 

The Chairman. About a hundred thousaid dollars to drain it. 
How about the building of the roads? 

Mr. Freeman. The access road to get into the transmitter is esti- 
mated at a quarter of a million dollars. 


Senator Dirksen. How long is that road ? 

Mr. Freeman. Fifteen thousand feet. 

Senator Dirksen. That is just a little less than 3 miles. So that is 
-about $80,000 a mile? 

Mr. Free:man. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Is it surfaced? 

ISIr. Freeman. The road, as it presently stands, has had the sand 
brought into it from an outside borrow pit, but it would not be sur- 
faced until we have gone through a dry season. The road has ditches 
•cut on either side, and if Senator McCarthy did duty at Cherry Point, 
he knows what I am talking about. And then the sand is placed in 
there and allowed to settle, and the drainage takes the water out from 
underneath the road and carries it away ; so that you would not top 
the road, bluestone it, or top it, until such time as the road has had 
a chance to settle, and the construction equipment going over this road 
Avill help to pack it down. 

Senator Dirksen. "What will it cost to surface that road ? 

Mr. Freeman. The estimate I gave you of a quarter million is to 
•complete the road. 

Senator Dirkson. I see; surfacing it and all. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. May I ask who selected this site, who passed 
■on it for the Government ? 

Mr. Carrigan. The engineere in charge. 

Senator McClellan. Well, who are they ? 

]Mr. Carrigan. I think there was a Mr. Kaplan and another engi- 
neer. I don't recall his name — Mr. Holland. 

Senator McClellan. You did not have that responsibility ? 

Mr. Carrigan. No ; my responsibility was to acquire the property. 

Senator McClellan. After the selection of the site or general area 
ihad been made by someone else? 

Mr. Carrigan. That is right. 

Senator McClellan. Do you know whether any commission was 
paid on the part of the Government to anyone for securing these 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir. I acquired the land directly by direct 

Senator McClellan. There was no commission paid? 

Mr. Carrigan. No commission. 

Senator McClellan. Did any of them have to be condemned ? 

Mr. Carrigan. I took it all by condemnation, which constitutes a 
friendly condemnation action, primarily because there were minor in- 
terests and overlapping contested boundary lines among these colored 
•owners. And it is my opinion that that is the quickest 

Senator J^IcClellan. That is all right. You just made a blanket 
■condemnation and then negotiated settlements? 

Mr. Carrigan. No ; I negotiated the cost of the area prior to filing 
'the condemnation action. 

Senator McClellan. You had already agreed upon the price prior 
to filing condemnation ? 

Mr. Carrigan. I had obtained option agreements. 

The Chairman. Just one further question, just to have the record 
rstraight. I think I covered this before, but counsel has suggested 
.the form of a question which I think may be more all-inclusive. 


During the past few years, have you or any member of your family 
ever received anything- of value either directly or indirectly from any- 
one, or the close relatives or associates of anyone, who has done business 
with any branch of the Government? 

Mr. Carrigan. No, sir. 

The Chairman. The answer is "No."' You may step aside. 

Thank you A-ery much. 

Mr. Freeman, may I ask you, this question: That survey was con- 
ducted of the land on which Baker East was located. Did that show 
that a drainage project had to be constructed, or was that survey done 
in the dry season, with no indication that it had to be drained after 
the rains? 

Mr. Freeman. There was no indication in the survey report that I 

The Chairman. So that when the land was purchased, apparently 
those responsible for selecting the site kneAV nothing about this 
drainage problem after they had the line up ? 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir, unless they \Yent into it while they were down 

The Chairman. Does that seem rather unusual to you? Would it 
appear to you that the survey of a site would have taken into considera- 
tion the damp season and the dry season? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, it would appear reasonable. Senator, that a 
survey team would go into the weather conditions of an area, the 
amount of rainfall, and the various problems associated with it. 

The Chairman. What would you say the total waste would be 
because of the site having been in either a swamp or a semiswamp, 
call it what you may ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, a $100,000 drainage problem would not have 
been involved. The estimated cost of the road went up from about 
$30,000 to a quarter of a million dollars. Had you been able to just 
surface the soil that was there, you would not have had the problem 
of having to build the road on up. 

The Chairman. What would you say the total waste is insofar as 
Baker P^ast is concerned, if the project were to be completed? 

Mr. Freeman. The waste on Baker East ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Fri:eman. The w^aste on Baker East is attributable primarily to 
the site. And in addition to that, the construction of buildings beyond 
the scope of what would be required to house the facilities that we in- 
tend to place there. 

The Chairman. What would that total, roughly ? 

Mr. Freeman. It would total over a million dollars. 

The Chairman. That is the on-site waste. How about the waste 
that has resulted from placing it within the magnetic storm area, 
as against placing a station south beyond the magnetic storm area? 

Mr. Freeman. AVell, if we are placing a station where it would not 
be usable, we would be wasting $9 million involved in putting the 
station up, with the ability to recover some of that as the equipment 
could be recovered and used in other locations. 

The Chairman. In other words, everything that has been spent on 
Baker East is not wasted if we move now. I assume the land can 
be resold? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 


The Chairman. Do you have any idea as to the reasonable value of 
that land, per acre^ 

Mr. Freeman. No, sir; I do not have. 

The Chairman. And the transmitters, I assume, can be used some- 
place else? 

Mr. Freeman. The transmitters could be used elsewhere. 

The Chairman. And how about Baker West, the estimate of waste 
in that area ? And if you will, combine the figures resulting from the 
on-site waste and the figures on mislocation. 

Mr. Freeman. Well, the clearing on Baker West which originally 
was estimated in some of the writings I have seen was to cost about 
a hundred thousand dollars; in other words, to remove the timber 
and that sort of thing. 

The Chairman. Of course, you may find that in any site. 

Mr. Freeman. Well, it was originally e.stimated at a hundred thous- 
and dollars to do that job. It has run up to $280,000 so far to do 
that job. 

The Chairman. Are we also paying for the equipment to clear the 
land, the same 8^ percent per month? 

Mr. Freeman. The 8^ percent month is on the equipment that 
has been used, yes, sir, to clear the land. 

The Chairman. To clear the land also? 

Mr. Freeman. That is correct; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What would you say the total wfiste on Baker West 
would be? 

Mr. Freeman. The total waste on Baker West will run well over a 
million dollars on that site to complete it. It will run beyond that, 
because the contractor recently, in a meeting in Washington, estimated 
that the construction would run a million and a half beyond what he 
had originally estimated. They originally estimated 3.7 million. 

The Chairman. How about the waste as a result of mislocation? 
Or are you in a position to give us that ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, the same factor is involved there. The waste 
as a result of mislocation is the cost of the station if it were completed 
less what recovery could be made by using the transmitters at another 

The Chairman. I am not sure if you got my question. We have had 
testimony that a station producing the same results could be located 
farther south and get the same effective result out to the area where the 
storm area, call it what you will, at a very much lower figure, because 
much less powerful transmitters would be required. What is the 
■difference in cost? 

Mr. Freeman. Oh, I see what you are driving at now, sir. I am 

Well, we could reduce the power way down by moving to a location 
farther south and get the same effective result out to the area the 
signal is intended to be received. 

The Chairman. Would you be in a position to estimate the cost of 
broadcasting facilities farther south which would produce the same 
result as the proposed facilities up wdiere Baker West is now located ? 

Mr. Freeman. I would estimate that farther south, by using econ- 
omy in the program, we could get away with about 15 percent of what 
we are spending, and get the same signal strength out in the area. 


The Chairman. In other words, instead of $10 million, about a 
million and a half? 

Mr. Freeman. About a million and a half. 

Senator Dirksen. I thouo;ht Mr. Freeman said that the building 
at Baker West was estimated at $750,000. I suppose that is the main 
structure ? 

Mr. Freeman. That is the transmitting building; yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. The transmitting building? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, for $750,000 you can build a pretty good 
building, can you not? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. This is designed to be permanent ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. In other words, the implication from such a 
building nicely fitted would be that we are in the business of inter- 
national broadcasting from now on. Would that be a fair assumption ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. So there is an element of permanency about all 
this so far as the plans go ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, I have one other question. ^Hiat particu- 
lar considerations dictated the selection of this Carolina site? Any- 

Mr. Freeman. Well, sir; that is a propagation matter, which is 
outside of my field. I have seen material written on the subject, but 
I feel that I am not as qualified as perhaps other people to answer that 
question. But it should have been selected based on the propagation 
available at the frequencies that were wanted to be used. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, now, you have had considerable experience 
in the electronics field. 

Mr. Freeman, Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. To do this kind of a job, would you go down there 
and pick out 4,800 acres of the type picked out to build that kind of 
a station? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, sir, the thing that I would have to do : In other 
words, that is a specialized field. Before picking out a site, I would 
require propagation studies to be made. And, of course, the Bureau 
of Standards is the most logical source. They supplied the Navy 
with that when I was with the Navy. That was where we went for 
our information. And based on the recommendations of those people 
in their technical reports, then you would proceed to determine your 

Senator Dirksen. Now, your sheet shows that you have had some 
experience in the Navy. 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. And you say they go back to the Bureau of 
Standards ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. I want to ask the chairman : Was not the testi- 
mony that the Bureau of Standards was not consulted about this ? 

The Chairman. Yes ; the testimony was that the Bureau of Stand- 
ards was not consulted in this project, but that the Massachusetts 


Institute of Technology was hired, at a cost of, I think the figure was, 
either five or six hundred thousand dollars — it was $600,000. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Freeman. 

And we appreciate the fact that you had to get out of bed to come 
down here today. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. Freeman, The flu tried to get hold of me, but I think I got 
away from it. 

The Chairman. There were some other figures I wanted to get, 
but I think there are others just as familiar with the figures, so in view 
of your condition of semiflu, we will let you go. 

Mr. Freeman. I will get the other suspension data that you asked 
me to procure. 

The Chairman. Will you, please? 

Just a minute, Mr. Freeman. Counsel has one question to ask 
you, I believe. 

Mr. CoiiN. Would you come back for just one or two questions, 

By the Avay, with reference to the Watts contract down at Baker 
West, has IMr. Watts notified you whether or not he will complete the 
contract at the conti-act price ? 

Mr. Freeman. He has not notified us in New York, but he stated 
in a meeting in Washington that he estimates now that he would go 
a million and a half beyond what he originally submitted as a figure. 

Mr. CoHN. The next question is this : Did there ever come a time 
when you recommended at the Voice of America that the Watts 
contract be terminated forthwith ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir ; I recommended that the contract be tremi- 
nated, for a number of reasons, in a meeting in New York, in Mr. 
Herrick's office. 

Mr. CoiiN. Was Mr. Herrick there? 

Mr. Freeman. Mr. Herrick was there, Mr. Al Freeman, legal coun- 
sel in New York, was there, Mr. Frank Seymour was there, and Mr, 
Edward Carter. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, did Mr. Herrick agree that to suspend the termi- 
nation of the contract would be wise from a business standpoint? 

Mr. Freeman. Mr. Herrick agreed, by about 7 o'clock that evening, 
that it would be wise to terminate the contract, because of Mr. Watts' 
handling of the contract on the coast. 

Mr. Cohn. From a business standpoint? 

Mr. Freeman. From a business standpoint. 

Mr. CoiiN. Did he give any reason why the contract should not be 
terminated ? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, Mr. Herrick thought that it would not be a very 
wise move for us to make at the time, because of repercussions that may 
be involved in investigations and one thing and another. 

Mr. CoHN. When did this meeting take place ? 

Mr. Freeman. I would estimate it was about the middle of Novem^ 

The Chairman. Of 1952? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir, last year. 

Mr. CoHN. I just want to ask you this one last thing. 

Are you familiar with two projects known as John and Jade? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, I am. 


Mr. CoHK. They are two transmitter projects of the Voice; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Freeman. They are two transmitter projects. 

Mr, CoHN. And was there any waste encountered by you in con- 
nection with them ? 

Mr. Freeman. Well, as far as John and Jade were concerned, it 
was again a case of the contractor getting on the site before specifi- 
cations and architectural information was complete. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, was there any reason why that information should 
not have been complete before the contract was entered into? 

Mr. Freeman. Tlie information should always be complete, but it 
has not been normal to do it that way up there. 

Mr. CoHN, Now, if it had been done that way, the proper way, up 
there, how much money would have been saved ? 

Mr. Freeman. About a half a million dollars. 

Mr. CoHN. About a half a million dollars? 

Mr. Freeman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. I have nothing more, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chatkman. That is all. 

Thank you very much, Mr, Freeman. 

Mr. Freeman. Thank you. 

The Chairman. We would like to hear from Mr. McKesson again. 

You are reminded, Mr. McKesson, that you are still under oath. 


Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. P'reeman started giving us estimates of 
the waste in connection with the various projects, not only on-site 
waste but waste because of mislocation. I wonder if you would care 
to run down that list and give us your estimate of the waste on the 
various projects, starting with. No. 1, Baker West. I am not asking 
for an explanation at this time. I just want the figures, 

Mr. McKesson, If completed as planned, $9 million. 

The Chairman, $9 million. Baker East? 

Mr. McKesson. $9 million. 

The Chairman. How about John ? 

Mr. McKesson, Jade, sir? 

The Chairman, No ; John, 

Dr. Compt»n, in case I get into something here which is classified, 
I wish you would let me know. 

Mr. CoMPTON. It is all classified, but not the code names that you 
are using. 

The Chairman. The location is classified? 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. 

The Chairman. O. K. We will not go into the location of John. 
But how about the waste on John ? 

Mr. McKesson. On John, mv estimate is in the neighborhood of 
half a million to $600,000. 

The Chaikman. How about Jade ? 

Mr. McKesson. Approximately the same, sir. 

The Chairman, How about the curtain antenna ? 

Mr. McKesson. The curtain antenna is approximately $4 million. 


The Chaikman. And liow about tlie rhombic antenna ? First, will 
you explain what the curtain antenna is ? 

Mr. McKesson. The curtain antenna is an antenna intended to 
concentrate the beam of the sliort-wave transmitters, much like a 
searchlight concentrates the beam of a light. The curtain antenna 
is a special type which has been used for many years. Technically, 
it is an array of dipoles properly fed and phased to give a concen- 
tration of the radio beam. 

The CHAiRMAisr. That is what I thought you said. In other w^ords, 
you use the curtain antenna to focus the signal upon a particular 
target area ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. And you say there is a waste of about $4 million 
in connection with that ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How about the rhombic antenna? 

Mr. McKesson. The rhombic antenna program 

The Chairman. That is spelled r-h-o-m-b-i-c, right? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

For the particular type of thing for wdiich they were planned, in the 
first place, it is the wrong type, A curtain antenna can be built for 
60 percent of the cost of the rhombic antenna, which I believe costs 
about $900,000. That would be about the difference between $540,000 
and $900,000. 

The Chairman. In other words, about $360,000 waste, you would 
estimate, in connection with the rhombic antenna ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How about the Courier project? That is the 

Mr. McKesson. My estimate on that is that if properly handled 
that job could have been built for approximately $700,000 less. 

The Chairman. How about project Dog? Incidentally, is the lo- 
cation of that also classified. Dr. Com]3ton^ 

Mr. CoMPTON. Yes. They all are, sir. 

The Chairman. How about the waste on project Dog? 

Mr. McKesson. That job is still in the embryonic stage, as I 
understand it. 

Of course, things have happened since I left, some time ago. How- 
ever, my understanding is that if built as other projects are built, 
the waste would be approximately $1 to $2 million. 

The Chairman. How about Tangier? Do you know anything 
about that ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is a completed station, sir, and I believe 
the cost of that was ver^^ excessive, to the tune of possibly a half a 

The Chairman. How about Munich ? 

Mr. McKesson. That station, I believe, was handled much better, 
and the loss, or the excessive costs, are not high, although I do know 
from my associates on the Voice that there were some excessive 
expenditures, of $200,000 or so. 

Senator Dirksen. These are conservative estimates on vour part, 
Mr. McKesson ? 

Mv. McKesson. I believe so, and they are my opinion of the 


Senator Jackson. What is the nature of the waste that you have 
referred to on each of these stations ? The wrong equipment, or mis- 
jiianagement? Can you generalize? 

Mr. McKessOjST. Improper contracts would be one; improper de- 
sign of antennas would be another. 

Senator Jackson. Mostly putting in the wrong equipment? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir; in general I would have no quarrel with 
the equipment put in; the radio transmitters being the primary 
piece of equipment. 

Senator Jackson. I meant the wrong kind of radio-transmitting 

Mr. McKesson. No. The equipment is very satisfactory. 

Senator Jackson. Then the equipment is satisfactory, and the 
waste was due to excessive building costs? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir, building costs, improper design of an- 
tennas, improper location of stations, excessive delays resulting from 
greatly increased costs by contractors. 

Senator Jackson. The delay being due to a contractor going on 
the job before they were ready? 

Mr. McKesson. Thin^^s of that nature, yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. It looks like a calculated waste, does it not, Mr. 
McKesson ? Or miscalculated waste ? 

Mr. McKesson. I will agree in principle, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Do you have what is known as a work order 
Ihat puts these contractors on the job ? 

Mr. McKesson. What is that, sir? 

Senator McClellan. Is that the proper term for it? A work 
order is issued, that puts the contractors on the job prior to the time 
the specifications are ready? Is that the term you use? 

Mr. McKesson. Well, that term has not, in general, been used in 
the Voice. However, it is a common term for a Navy contract. 

Senator McClellan. It is a common term, is it not? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Wliat term is used in the Voice, to put these 
•contractors on there before the plans and specifications are ready ? 

Mr. McKesson. Well, the contract is signed, and the contractor im- 
mediately goes to work. 

Senator McClellan. There is no saving clause or protective clause 
in the contract, then. The contract is signed, the contract is put into 
effect, and the expense begins ; is that correct ? 

Mr. McKesson. I am not familiar with the details of contracts, sir. 
However, I do know in the case of one project, a large number of 
American personnel were sent overseas with nothing to do for a con- 
siderable period of time. 

Senator McClellan. Because there were no plans and specifications 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Just one further question. There was another 
proposed project called East, not Baker East, but East. The location 
of that is classified, I understand, also. Dr. Compton. 

Mr. Compton. It is. 

The Chairman. In any event, we can say it is in a friendly country; 

a very important project. Is it correct that that project was aban- 

•doned because of the excessive expenditures on these other projects? 


Mr. McKesson. I understand that is true; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, the money that would normally 
liave been spent for East has been already wasted in other projects, 
.and therefore East was abandoned, as far as you know ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

Tlie Chairman. And in your opinion, was East a very important 
•chain in the ring broadcasting system, if we are to continue the Voice 
of America? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I think we have nothing further, Mr. McKesson. 

We have an executive session at 4 o'clock, so, much as I hate to, I 
will have to ask you people to leave. 

The next open session will be tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, 
February 18, 1953.) 


Exhibit No. 1 

July 14, 1952. 

I — Dr. Compton. 
I— P. E. Stoner. 

Staff Study Bake31 West 

1. PROBLEM presented 

"Should the Administrator change the site of Baker West?" 

2. facts bearing on the case 

IBS initiated extensive research early in 1951, to determine the best areas 
on the east and west coasts of the United States for the location of the mega- 
watt high-frequency radio-broadcast transmitters. For this survey it employed 
the Research Laboratory of Electronics, MIT, with Dr. J. B. Wiesner in charge 
of the project. Dr. Wiesner's group evaluated all propagation data furnished by 
the Bureau oi Standards, the Army Signal Corps, and the Radio Corporation of 
America. It also considered such factors as the existing disposition of VGA plant 
facilities, research projects under way, and the role of these megawatt trans- 
mitters in the overall plan of operation for the present and future (ring) net- 
works. Dr. Wiesner advised the Department of State on May 31, 1951, and again 
on December 26, 1951, that the Seattle, Wash., area was the MIT group's first 
choice for the location of Baker West. Dr. Debetencourt, a member of the MIT 
group, gave indications on IMay 24, 1951, that the group would recommend, for 
first choice. Anchorage, Alaska, and southern California as second choice. This 
Is mentioned to show the indecision of the researchers, as a week later they 
recommended Seattle, Wash. 

The Watt Construction Co., of Seattle, Wash., was awarded the building con- 
tract in December of 1951. The delay between May 26, when the decision was 
known, and December 1951 was caused by relocating the site from Copalis, Wash., 
to Dungeness, Wash. 

At this date a major portion of the site (1,056 acres) has been purchased from 
the 13 owners, negotiations for the balance are well advanced, several buildings 
have been removed or destroyed and considerable clearing has been accomplished 
by a daily working crew of approximately 60 men. It is estimated that we have 
obligated $350,000 to date on this project. Renegotiation would entail a major 
loss of this amount and would delay completion of the project from 6 to 9 months. 

It is a well-established fact that the polar regions offer gi'eatly disturbed con- 
ditions which prohibit or hinder transmission. The polar regions may be con- 
sidered as regions in which these disturbed conditions are so frequent as to be 
normal conditions. During these magnetic storms, the particle bombardment is 
higher than normal, and conditions of high absorption may extend to much 
lower latitudes than during imdisturbed times. For this reason all commercial 
•operation attempts to have transmission paths as far away from this auroral 


absorption zone as is possible. This is accomplished by locating the transmitters 
as far south as possible. 

On high-frequency transmission paths which touch the auroral absorption 
fringe, transmissions, even with optimum use of frequencies, cannot be expected 
to allow 90 percent reliability even f<n' as long as a month, and may be less than 
50 percent reliable during some months. 

In consideration of this important absorption factor in a reappraisal of the 
Seattle site, practical tests were made during June 1952 by the MIT group in 
cooperation with the Army Signal Corps and the Federal Communications Com- 
mission. Field-strength measurements were made at Seattle, Tokyo, Manila,. 
Portland, Oreg., San Francisco, and Santa Ana, Calit. The propagational data 
obtained, while inconclusive, indicated that the southern site was superior. At 
a meeting in New York on July 2, 1952, Dr. Wiesner recommended that we move 
our megawatt transmitters to southern California. At this same meeting Dr 
Beverage, a national authority on antenna and radio propagation, stated he 
would have located the facilities initially in California but that he would not 
change the site at this late period. Mr. James O. Welden, the designer and 
builder of the megawatt transmitters, re<'omniended moving to a southern site 
in order to obtain maxinunn efficiency. 

Transmission paths from Seattle to the target areas are shorter than from 
southern California. Land in the Seattle site costs approximately $250 i^r 
acre. It is estimated that the most desirable land in southern California and 
the area from which transmission will pass the furthest away from the auroral 
absoii>tion zone will average from $500 to $1,500 an acre. The area referred to 
is the Point Conception area between Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo. 

In reference to television services in the Seattle area will he negligible. In 
most of the satisfactory sites in southern California interference will be a 
serious problem. If a southern California site is selected in the Bakersfield area,, 
this interference would lie greatly minimized. The area surrounding the Seattle 
site is not heavily populated. The small town of Dunseness has approximately 
1,0(X) ijeople. Tlie area is flat, the soil lias good conductivity, and offers an ex- 
cellent takeoff path for the target areas. Excellent railroad and highway fa- 
cilities connect the site with the port of Seattle. Also of great importance is 
the fact that this area has one of the lowest electrical power rates in the United 
States and sufficient quantities are available. 

The selection of the Seattle site envisaged the early implementation of the 
overall ring plan. One important phase of this plan was to- ol)tain reliable com- 
munication through the polar regions by use of high-power and high-gain anten- 
nas with the new method of scatter transmission (VHF). This proposed usage 
makes Seattle the best selection. However, it presupposes that Congress will 
provide the necessary funds for the comijletion of the additional transmitter 
plants on the west coast. 

On June 11 I telephoned Col. Fred P. Andrews, commanding officer of the 
Alaska Communication System, Army Signal Corps. Colonel Andrews has had 
approximately 14 years' experience with the effects of auroral absorption. The 
system he commands operates on a daily basis, circuits from Seattle to Tokyo, 
circuits from Seattle to points on the Aleutian tip. and circuits within Alaska. 
This system handles all the commercial business for the Territoi-y of Alaska. 
I have great confidence in Colonel Andrews' judgment. He stated to me over 
the telephone that the Seattle-Tokyo circuit, operating on the same frequency 
bands proposed for Baker West, is the most reliable circuit he has on the system. 
He stated for the month of Jime 1952 that this circuit was in operation 94 per- 
cent of the time and that for the past year the circuit was in service for 85 per- 
cent of the time. This circuit is a multiplex circniit handling ciphered traffic, 
which requires a high degree of stability. Colonel Andrews stated that the 
frequencies in use range from 7 to 19 megacycles, and that with frequencies 
lower than 7 megacycles much l)etter results than those recorded could be 
obtained. Colonel Andrews confirmed this information by telegram dated Jul.v 
14, 1952. This information coming from this unimpeachable source greatly 
favors Seattle. 

It would be necessary to make certain that we have a satisfactory site in 
southern California before decision is made to close out Baker West at Dmi- 

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully to 
the Congress and to the press our reasons for doing so. Such exposure may 
result in congressional investigation and would not be conducive to our obtaining 
additional construction funds in the near future. 


If we remain at Seattle and install our megawatt at that point, we also must 
be prepared to he continiiuusly under suneillance concerning our output effi- 


1. That a more southerly location would greatly improve the propagation of 
the transmitters, as it removes the path of the electromagnetic waves from the 
iibsurption action of the north auroral zone. 

2. That by remaining at the present site we are taking more than a calcu- 
lated risk. However, in view of the wide distribution of high-powered trans- 
mitters on the west coast, all of which will have high-gain, broad-band antennas 
<lirected on the various target areas, this flexibility brings the risk within rea- 
sonable bounds. 

3. The main mission of the Baker West transmitters is to feed John and Jade 
relays on a point-to-point basis. This service can l)e accomplished from Seattle. 
Direct hl-gh-frequency reception in att of the target areas is the questionable 


I recommend that there be no change in the present site of the Baker West 
transmitter and that we reduce to an essential minimum all building and con- 
struction costs at the Seattle site ; 

Further, that we expedite scatter transmission project, diverting funds from 
other projects if necessary. 



Arnot, Chfirles P 26 

Baker, West, stafe study 75 

Barrett, Edward 28 

Bernard, Thurman L 27, 28, 31 

Carr, Mr 30 

Carrlgan, Charles B., testimony of 62-68 

Coiupton, I>r. Wilson S 5-6, 8, 9, 12, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 72. 74 

Testimony of 18-40 

Council, K. Clyde 63 

Creed, Donald R. testimony of 40-47 

Devane, Mr 63 

Edwards, Herbert 26 

Freeman. Frederick 46, 59, 60, 62-63, 66, 72 

Testimony of 47-62, 68-72 

Harmon, Mr 44 

Herrick, George 9, 10, 19, 20, 30, 34, 37, 44, 51, 71 

Holland, :\Ir 67 

International Paper Co 63 

Kaplan, Mr 67 

Kilgore, Hon. Harley M 62, 63 

Kohler, Foy L 19, 20, 26, 27-28, 32, 34, 35 

Lourie, Mr 60 

Maultsby, T. H 63 

May, Parker 34 

McKenny, Mr 53 

McKesson, Lewis J 12. 30, 31 

Testimony of 1-11. 72-75 

Me.vers, Alva 35, 36, 37, 49, 51, 52, 54 

Moran, James M 21-22, 37, 38, 45 

Testimony of 13-18 

Morton, Alfred H 20, 26. 52 

Moseley, Mr 51, 52 

Pierce, Morris 31 

Ring. Andrew 30 

Ross, Julius 18, 19, 21, 25, 30 

Scliine, David ,32 

Sergeant, Howland 28 

Settlemyer, C. H 63 

Seymour. Mr 34, 35, 37, 52 

Smith, Dr. Newbern 19 

Testimony of 11-12, 18 

Stoner, Gen. Frank E 5-9, 12, 19, 21, 27, 30, 33 

Testimony of 18 

T. A. Loving Co .56 

Watts Construction Co 48, 49, 52 

Watts, J. G :_ 34, 48, 49, 52, 53. 54, 57, 59, 61, 71 










S. Res. 40 






FEBRUARY 18 AND 19, 1953 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 

29708 WASHINGTON : 1953 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN 1 - 1953 


JOSEPH R. McCarthy, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 






/Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 


Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
iFrancis D. Flanagan, General Counsel and Staff Director 



Appendix 144 

Index I 

Testimony ot — 

Ayers, Stuart, Assistant Chief, Latin American Division, Voice of 

America 79' 

Caldwell, John C . 117 

Connors, W. Bradley, Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans, 

United States International Information Administration 126 

Fast, Howard 98 

Wu, Dr. Kwant Tsing 114 


Introduced Appears 
on page on page 

4. Memorandum from Bradley Connors, Assistant Administrator 

for Policy and Plans, United States International Infornia- 

tion Administration, to Voice of America, February 3, 1953_. 97 144 

5. Confession of Chinese Communist, published by China Daily 

NeM's, Shanghai, September 3, 1950 116 145- 

6. Excerpt from hearings before the Internal Security Subcom- 

mittee, March 1952 116 0) 

7. Hearings, part 11, before the Internal Security Subcommittee, 

March 1952 118 (') 

> May be found in the files of the subcommittee. 





United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 

Invesitgations of the Committeb 

ON Government Operations, 

'Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, 
agreed to January 30, 1953, in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding. • 

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Everett M. Dirksen, 
Republican, Illinois ; Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; John 
L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, 
Washington ; Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant 
counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Henry Hawkins, investi- 
gator ; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Ayers, will you raise your right hand? In this matter now 
in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Ayers. I do. 


The Chairman. Your name is? 

Mr. Ayers. Stuart Ayers. 

The Chairman. That is spelled- 

Mr. Ayers. S-t-u-a-r-t A-y-e-r-s. 

The Chairman. You are presently working for the Voice? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How long have you been with the Voice of 
America ? 

Mr. Ayers. Since ISTovember 1950. 

The Chairman. What is your position at this time ? 

Mr, Ayers. Acting Assistant Chief, Latin American Division. 

The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, will you proceed ? 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Mr. Ayers, in your capacity as Chief of the Latin 
American Division of the Voice of America, while you have held that 
position, have you attempted to carry out the objectives of the Voice 
of America by conducting programs which would demonstrate the 
truth concerning our way of life, and would counter false Communist 
propaganda ? 



Mr. Aters. Yes, sir, we do that an average of 2 hours and 25 min- 
utes every night. 

Mr. CoHN. In these attempts of yours, since you have held your 
position, have you encountered any opposition ? 

Mr. Ayers. In our shortwave broadcast, I would say "No." In our 
platter programs, that is another matter. 

The Chairman. Your platter program ? 

Mr. Ayers. There are two ways of reaching the information area. 
One by shortwave, and the other by recordings, which are sent to tho 
field, there to be used on local radio stations. 

The Chairman. The recording program you call the platter 
program ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, with reference to the platter program, you say 
in response to my question as to whether you encountered interference 
in your anti-Communist program, that that was another matter. Is 
it in your testimony that you have encountered interference? 

Mr. Ayers. • Yes. In that programs we felt would be in the 
national interest were somehow not produced, and others we felt 
were rather fragile or not of anti-Communist content were produced 
to be sent to the field. 

Mr. CoHN. Let me ask you this. You say that it is divided into 
two parts, and the part which we are now discussing is that concern- 
ing the platters, the recordings which were made and sent out to Latin 
American countries to be placed on radio stations and broadcast to 
audiences we were seeking to reach there; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. I would like to talk about the year 1952. Was your 
division, the Latin American Division, supposed to have a certain 
budget, a certain allotment of money, in order to carry out the anti- 
Communist program with reference to these matters? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, there was to be a budget apportioned for us. 

Mr. CoHN. At the beginning of the year, did you seek to ascertain 
just how much money was going to be allotted to you for that purpose 
during the year ? 

Mr. Ayers. We did. 

Mr. CoHN. Were you able to do so ? 

Mr. Ayers. No, sir, we were not. 

Mr. CoHN. Who did you consult in an attempt to find out how 
much money you would have so you could plan out your recordings 
program ? 

Mr. Ayers. I personally did not consult anybody, because it was 
not my particular function at that moment, but the Chief of the 
Division, Stephen Baldanza, repeatedly asked that information from 
the Chief of the Overseas Services Branch, Robert Bauer, who had 
charge of apportioning that money for our approval. 

Mr. CoHN. Did Mr. Bauer furnish that information? 

Mr. Ayers. No, he did not. 

Mr. CoHN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Ayers. What is the Overseas 
Services Branch ? 

Mr. Ayers. It is now part of the Field Services Division. It was 
recently raised to a division status to include other operations, but 
the Overseas Services Branch is that part of the Voice which prepares 


productions in platter form for use in the field by the public-affairs 
officers attached to the embassies. 

Mr. CoHN. Is it in charge of making up the budget? 

Mr. Ayers. It is in charge of making a provisional budget which 
would then be approved by the various area divisions. 

Mr. CoHN, They plan out the budget, in other words ? 

Mr. Ayers. They plan the budget, yes. 

Mr. CoHN. And one of the divisions for which they plan the budget 
is your division, the Latin American Division ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. And your testimony is that at the beginning of the 
year you asked them just how much your budget would be so you 
<;ould make plans as to what programs you would map out in the 
anti-Communist program for the year; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. That is for the beginning of the fiscal year, last July 1. 

Mr. CoHN. And Mr. Bauer did not furnish that information? 

Mr. Ayers. No. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you or Mr. Baldanza, the chief of your division, 
make repeated requests to Mr. Bauer and his branch for the informa- 
tion as to how much money was being allocated to you ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, both Mr. Baldanza and our transcription director, 
Joseph Ries, who is the liaison with the Overseas Services Branch. 

Mr. CoHN. That is R-i-e-s? 

Mr. Ayers. R-i-e-s. Ries made repeated requests for that infor- 

Mr. CoHN. Did they get that information ? 

Mr. Ayers. No, they did not. 

Mr. CoHN. Did there come a time when anybody suggested to you 
and Mr. Baldanza that your division produce a program known as 
The Eye of the Eagle? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, that did occur, 

Mr. CoiiN. About when was that ? 

Mr. Ayers. I believe the first suggestion of it came around possibly 
March of 1952. Then it was merely in discussion form. The decision 
by Overseas Services to make the series would have been about June 
and July of 1952. 

Mr. CoHN. Wliere did the suggestion that this program. The Eye 
of the Eagle, be produced, originate ? 

Mr. Ayers. In Overseas Services Branch. 

Mr. CotiN. They initiated the suggestion ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Did the suggestion come to your attention? 

Mr. Ayers. It did, yes. 

Mr. CoHN. When it was made, what was the position taken by you 
and your division as to whether or^ not Voice money should be ex- 
ipended on this particular series of programs? 

Mr. Ayers. A suggestion of this sort goes through several different 
people of course, because it has to be evaluated and that includes the 
•chief of each language area. We have a Spanish area and a Brazilian 
area, as well as the transcription director who must give their approval 
of it. So the suggestion went to those three people. 

Mr. CoHN. Tell us what they said. 

Mr. Ayers. The Chief of the Spanish Service felt that the series 
was a juvenile adventure story ; as such would not attract the adult 


listeners we wished to reach. He did not want the series for his 
Spanish area. The Chief of the Brazilian Service felt the same, and 
was quite emphatic in saying that it would not do in Brazil. It would 
not be credible ; the devices to be used were flimsy and rather foolish, 
whereas it could easily be seen that it would be an exciting program 
from a purely entertainment point of view. 

Mr. CoHN. How about your division? 

Mr. Ayers. Those two languages come under our division. So the 
next voice would be, of course, Mr. Ries, representing the chief. 

Mr. CoHN. What was Mr. Ries' position ? 

Mr. Ayers. He saw no use for the series. He had been in the field 
himself as public-affairs officer for many years, and he could not see 
that it would do us any good. It would entertain, but it would not 
carry out any efforts for the national interest. 

Mr. CoHN. What efforts for the national interest were you and Mr. 
Eies seeking to carry out? 

Mr. Ayers. We wanted to put out programs by radio and platters 
that would name the enemy as the Communist Party or the individual 
Communists, and would support the foreign policy of the United 

Mr. CoHN. It was your position that this particular series would not 
accomplish those objectives ; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. That is how we felt. 

Mr. CoHN. And that was the unanimous conclusion of all those 
concerned on the language desk ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt. I understand that this program, 
the Eye of the Eagle, was not by any stretch of the imagination Com- 
munist propaganda, but rather a type of program that was juvenile 
and would make us look rather silly ; is that the idea ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, it was a juvenile program. Of course, they do have 
their place in radio, but I think a rather minor place when you are in 
the propaganda field with a very limited budget. If you want to reach 
children over a long period, it is splendid. But if you have little 
money to spend, there are other areas of population where your infor- 
mation would be more effective. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, when this position of all those concerned on the 
language desks was adopted, was it made known in any way to the 
Overseas Service Branch? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, it was, because they themselves questioned each 
of these individuals as to their reaction to the series. 

Mr. CoHN. Were they told that you were all against this series and 
favored instead something which would accomplish the objectives 
you have stated, naming the enemy and telling the truth concerning 
the propaganda of the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, we have for some time asked that other program 
series be produced, among them Animal Farm, which had been pre- 
pared by the Russian desk in a good fitting fashion, naming the enemy, 
and other programs. But they had been put aside, or we had no assur- 
ance that they would be produced. 

The Chairman. As far as you know, there was no anti-Communist 
material in this Eye of the Eagle program; is that correct? 

Mr. Ayres. Each of these three persons were assured that there 
would be anti-Communist material, and that it would carry weight. 


even though it was juvenile. As it turned out later, that was not the 
case. The terms used, such as "democracy" or "lovers of freedom" are 
the very terms the Communists use to support their own cause when 
they are attacking us. Our feeling was that this program would not 
name the enemy and that was our job. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, what was the position of Overseas Services 
Branch when told that all the language desks concerned were opposed 
to this particular program and favored in its stead an anti-Communist 
series ? 

Mr. Ayers. They told the chief of the Brazilian service that they 
would have to take the program anyway, because it had already been 
bought for the Spanish service. They told the chief of the Spanish 
service that the embassies had asked for it, and it was necessary to 
give them a program that would make it easy for them to persuade 
radio stations to take our heavier hitting recordings. So they might 
as well take it ; it was already contracted for. 

Mr. CoHN. Let me stop you at that point. Was the proper pro- 
cedure for them to contract for it before obtaining the approval of the 
language desks concerned as to whether or not the programs would 
be desirable ? 

Mr. Ayers. No. Therefore, they would have to have the approval 
of Mr. Ries, the transcription director. So Mr. Ries agreed finally 
that the program would be produced, subject to his approval of the 
first script, in which he would then know whether or not there was 
sufficient anti-Communist material to make the series worth while. 

Mr. CoHN. In other words, they were still assuring Mr. Ries that 
there would be some anti-Connnunist material inserted in these 
programs ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. And on that assurance, Mr. Ries gave his approval; is 
that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes ; subject to review of the first script. 

Mr. CoHN. Subject to review of the first script. Were there any 
other conditions which Mr. Ries attached ? Was he given any other 
assurance insofar as the rest of the budget was concerned ? 

Mr. Ayers. Mr. Ries insisted that only a small portion of our funds 
could go into this series, because of our previous requests for hard- 
hitting anti-Communist material. 

The CHAiRjxrAN". May I interrupt. I do not quite understand the 
setup. The Overseas Service Branch was ordering the programs for 
you ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Am I not correct in this, that the Overseas Services 
Branch is supposed to be subordinate to you and merely act as more 
or less a packaging and shipping department? 

Mr. Ayers. They were set up on the same level as we were, sir. 
Originally they had been a shipping department, wrapping up the 
platters, and the off-the-air recordings of our short-wave shows. 

The Chairman. Was not that its only function when that depart- 
ment was set up, to service your organization ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

The Chairman. In other words, the Overseas Services organization 
was supposed to do the work you ordered done, wrap up the platters 
and ship them to the right place ? 

29708 — 53 — pt. 2 2 


Mr. Ayers. Yes ; and they also were supposed to have requests from 
the embassies and submit those to us for approval and service the 
embassies as well as us. 

The Chairman. At what point in their proceeding does the Over- 
seas Services Branch become your boss and start to order the programs 
for you and tell you what you must take and what your budget is to 
be ? I do not quite get that picture. 

Mr. Ayers. At no point were they ever allowed to do that. As you 
mentioned, originally they were a shipping office, and nothing more. 
Then they were set up on the same level as we were, but to operate 
only on our approval. So there was no authority for either one or 
the other. They could not prepare a series unless we gave approval. 
But either they or ourselves could originate the program idea. 

Senator Symington. They were in effect a service agency for you ; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir; they were. 

Senator Symington. To whom did they report? 

Mr. Ayers. They reported to the Chief of the Program Division, 
who was Mr. Puhan. 

Senator Symington. How do you spell that? 

Mr. Ayers. P-u-h-a-n. 

Senator Symington. And to whom did you report? 

Mr. Ayers. I reported to my chief, Steplien Baldanza. 

Senator Symington. And to whom did he report ? 

Mr. Ayers. Mr. Puhan. 

Senator Symington. So Mr. Puhan was responsible for the serv- 
icing you received from the Overseas Service airency; is that right? 

Mr. Ayres. Yes; through his Deputy, the Chief of the Overseas 

The Chairman. That is spelled P-u-h-a-n? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 
• The Chairman. What is his first name ? 

Mr. Ayers. Alfred. 

The Chairman. I still do not quite have the picture, Mr. Ayers. 
This General Service Branch was supposed to do the packaging, 
shipping, and transmit requests to you, and ended up telling you that 
you had to take this program, The Eye of the Eagle. Whence did 
they get that authority ? 

Mr. Ayers. They never had the authority, sir. They were not to 
tell us that we had to do anything, but to ask our opinion and to act 
in conjunction with us. 

The Chairman. Then why did you listen to them? Wliy did you 
take this particular program if they did not have that authority ? 

Mr. Ayers. Because they promised us that this would be only a 
small part of our budget, and that as this would start production, the 
other programs would also be put into production which we had 
requested. They did have some correspondence from the embassies 
asking that there be a followup for another series of a similar nature 
that they had had before. 

, The Chairman. You say they told you this would only be a small 
part of your budget. What was the final result? Was this produc- 
tion, The Eye of the Eagle, only a small part of your budget? 

Mr. Ayers. No, it turned out to be almost our entire budget. 

The Chairman. Almost your entire budget? 


Mr. Atees. Yes. We had felt tlicat we would have a $188,000 budget 
for the fiscal year. That was later reduced and when we discovered 
what our total budget was, all but two or three thousand dollars had 
been spent for this one program. 

The Chairman. What is the cost of this one program, if you Imow ? 

Mr. Ayers. It is very difficult to say what the cost was because even 
today we have not heard how much money was spent for us in the 
first quarter of the fiscal year. All we know is that during the second 
quarter of the fiscal year about $30,000 was spent by Overseas for us, 
of which I would say $28,000 approxmiately was put into this one 

The Chairman. So that you had $28,000 in this juvenile program 
which you say contained no information in regard to the Communist 
Party, and you had only $2,000 left to carry on a program of education 
insofar as the Communist Party was concerned ? 

JVir. Ayers. I would like to add a little bit to that, if I might. The 
original scripts, as we received them from Overseas, had no anti- 
Communist propaganda, or so little anti-Communist propaganda as 
to be in our opinion worthless. However, we endeavored to write in 
the corrections for those scripts whenever we could see them, and 
they were produced with those corrections in, but not in all cases. At 
least when we saw the scripts they were. 

Mr. CoHN. You say the two conditions under which you agreed 
to accept this program, the series, The Eye of the Eagle, were, No. 1, 
the assurance that they would contain some anti-Communist state- 
ments, some anti-Communist information, or some information which 
would name the enemy, as you say, and No. 2, on the assurance that this 
would be only a relatively small part of your total budget for platters, 
so that you could use the great majority of that budget for the purpose 
for which the Voice exists, telling the truth about our way of life, and 
countering Communist propaganda ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Is it your testimony that neither of those promises 
were kept? 

Mr. Ayers. As regards the funds, no, they were not. As regards 
the anti-Communist propaganda, they were kept when we were able 
to write in the material. 

Mr. CoHN. Were they kept by the people who gave you the assurance 
that when the scripts came to you they would contain anti- Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Ayers. No. 

Mr. CoHN. By the Overseas Service Branch, neither of those two 
promises were kept. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. Ayers. That is a fair statement as regards the original scripts. 

Mr. CoHN. I am talking about before they got to you. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes ; that is right. 

Mr. CoHN. You have told us when the end of the year came you 
found out that virtually your entire budget had been used on this 
one worthless series, as you described it, and there was virtually 
nothing left for anti-Communist work; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. We discovered that in October at the beginning of 
the second quarter of the year. Our entire four-quarters budget 
had been put into this one series, with the exception of a little money 
for special anniversary shows. 


Mr. CoHN. And you had repeatedly asked during the year for some 
information as to how much money exactly you were being allotted 
and how much would be left over for the anti- Communist program; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. And they would never tell you how much? 

Mr. Ayers. That is right. 

Senator Symington. I would like to get this straight. You were 
operating under a budget as the head of the department, but you did 
not know what the budget was ; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. That is right. 

Senator Symington. Did you ask what it was ? 

Mr. Ayers. We asked what it was, but we were never told. 

Senator Symington. Did they ever say they would tell you ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, they were always about to tell us, but somehow 
did not make up their mind how much we would get. 

Senator Symington. Did you protest to Mr. Puhan that you did 
not know what the budget was ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, we did. 

Senator Symington. Wliat did he say to you about it? 

Mr. Ayers. He told us we were entitled to know and he directed 
Mr. Bauer to tell us what the budget would be. 

Senator Symington. But Mr. Bauer still never did until he used 
the budget up on the Eye of the Eagle ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ayers. That is correct. 

Senator Symington. Thank you. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, Mr. Ayers, insofar as the second assurance they 
gave you was concerned, namely, that there would be statements in 
the scripts naming the enemy and carrying out the anti- Communist 
program in which the Voice was engaged, you have told us that that 
assurance was not kept by the Overseas Service Branch; is that correct, 
before the scripts got to you ? 

Mr. Da vies. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, you told us that they were supposed to submit 
the first script to your Division to see whether or not it did contain 
this anti-Communist material. Did they ever submit that first script 
to you ? 

Mr. Ayers. No, they did not. One day Mr. Eies happened to 
be in their office about other matters, and he discovered a fifth script. 

Mr. CoHN. In other words, they had gone through the first four, and 
had not submitted them to your Division ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. They had gone ahead with production without submit- 
ting the first script for his approval, which approval, of course, would 
have started the entire series. 

Mr. CoHN. I assume it goes without saying that in the couree of 
operations up there, the proper procedure would be to submit the 
scripts to your Division before they were produced ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes ; that is essential. 

Mr. CoHN. And in this case, the first four were never submitted to 
your Division? 

Mr. Ayers. No. 

Mr. CoHN. The first one was not, and it was just by accident that Mr. 
Ries came across the first four ? 


Mr. Ayers. No. He came upon the fifth script and was told at that 
time that the fii-st 4 had ah'eady been approved by Overseas, had been 
translated, and had been produced on records, and were ready to send 
to the field, so there was nothing that could be done about corrections 
for the first 4. 

Mr. CoHN. Now; did he examine the first four at that point? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes; he examined the first 4, and No. 5, at that time. 

Mr. CoHN. Did he think they needed some corrections ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. They did not name the enemy. 

Mr. CoHN. They did not name the enemy ? 

Mr. Ayers. No. 

Mr. CoiiN. Were they worthless from the standpoint of anti-Com- 
munist information ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Was a complaint made to the Overseas Services Branch 
about this? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. Mr. Ries brought in script No. 5 and some of the 
others to me, and showed me corrections that he was making to name 
the enemy and to strengthen the script dramatically. He also wrote 
a memo to Overseas Services, asking that in the future the enemy be 
named and there be no doubt in anybody's mind that this was an anti- 
Communist series. 

Mr. CoHN. And did the Overseas Services Branch, in view of those 
complaints, agree not to go ahead with the first four shows? 

Mr. Ayers. No. They said the first four shows had already been 
made, money had been invested in them, so they would be sent out 
to the field, but the corrections he made in subsequent scripts would be 
put in as directed. 

jMr. CoiiN. Now, did Mr. Ries in your Division examine scripts 5 
through 25 for this series ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. In each case Mr. Ries wrote in the anti-Com- 
munist material that had not existed in the original scripts. 

Mr. CoHN. You mean in the case of the first 25 scripts, as they were 
prepared and submitted to your Division, not one of them contained 
satisfactory anti-Communist material ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. And in each and every one which you were given the 
opportunity to examine, corrections had to be made to get across the 
objectives of the Voice? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes ; and name the enemy. 

Mr. CoHN. Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, that is true. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, did there come a time when vou saw script No. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. And did script No. 26 name the enemy and contain anti- 
Communist material ? 

Mr. Ayers. No. There were two mentions of the word "Comin- 
form" in the script, but I didn't consider that naming the enemy, 
because especially in radio where the word goes rather quickly, 
Cominform would not mean anything to the listener. Communist 

Mr. CoHN. Did you make corrections in this script ? 


Mr. Ayers. Yes. I inserted seven mentions of the name "Com- 
munist" in the script. 

Mr. CoHN. Seven mentions; is that right? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you go to the Overseas Service Branch and insist 
that they embody those corrections you have made, naming the enemy, 
into the script ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. In fact, I even wrote them a memo saying that we 
would hereafter name the enemy in every script and not use the word 
"Cominform" when we could say "the Communist gangster" or other 
names we used to peg the names. 

Mr. CoHN. So the audiences would understand just what we were 
trying to get across. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Is it your testimony that you wrote a formal memo com- 
plaining about this to the Overseas Service Branch ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Was that memo dated October 14, 1952? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you state in that memo as written the script was 
absolutely worthless from a propaganda point of view, and did you 
continue, "We don't want to waste our money on pap when we can use 
it for bullets?" 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoHN. And you filed such a memo with the Overseas Service 
Branch ? 

Mr. Ayers. I did. 

Mr. CoHN. What position was taken by the Overseas Service Branch 
with reference to this memo you filed saying that money was being 
wasted on pap when it could be used for bullets, and that the scripts 
were worthless from a propaganda point of view ? 

Mr. Ayers. Their reaction was I would say slightly between an- 
noyance and rage. They did not care for the memo. 

Mr. CoHN. Did they ever ask you to withdraw the memo from 
the files? 

Mr. Ayers. They did ask me to withdraw the memo ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. What did they promise to do if you would withdraw 
the memo from the files ? 

Mr. Ayers. They promised to write in the corrections I had made, 
and that I would see that all future programs would carry the anti- 
Communist material. 

Mr. CoHN. In other words, they told you if you would agi-ee to 
withdraw this memo from the files, charging that the scripts were 
worthless, and that money was being wasted when it could be well spent 
in connection with the objectives of the Voice, if you withdrew that 
memo, they promised you that the corrections you had made in script 
No. 26 to name the enemy would be used in the program and future 
scripts would be submitted to you and your corrections would be 
accepted ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoiiN. Now, were the corrections you made in script No. 26 so 
that it would embody anti-Communist material ever accepted by the 
Overseas Services Branch? 


Mr. Ayers. No. When we finally received 

Mr. CoHN. Your answer is no ? 

Mr. Aters; No. 

Mr. CoHN. When did you discover that these corrections had not 
been made as promised ? 

Mr. Ayers. It was not until the end of December that the script 
was finally given to us in translation. 

Mr. CoHN. And did you read the script when it was given to you 
in translation ? 

Mr. Ayers. I did. 

Mr. CoHN. Had these seven mentions, naming the Communist 
enemy, been placed in the script as they had promised you ? 

Mr. Ayers. No, not one of them. 

Mr. CoHN. Not one of them ? 

Mr. Ayers. No, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. At that point 

Senator Potter. Mr. Counsel, if I may interrupt, over what period 
of time did this take place from the time that you received the first 
script until the 26th or 25th script came to your attention? Were 
they submitted once a week or once every 2 weeks or once every day ? 

Mr. Ayers. They come in as the author writes the scripts. There 
might be 2 a week or sometimes 5 would come in. Mr. Hies would 
then go over them as they came in. They began coming in, I believe, 
in July, so that by October we had had up to 26. 

Senator Potter. Were they being transmitted right along as Mr. 
Ries rewrote the script ? Were they then immediately transmitted ? 

Mr. Ayers. As they were corrected and approved in English, they 
would be put in Spanish, and Mr. Eies would then have the Spanish 
translation and approve that, or write in further corrections, and then 
they would be produced on recordings. That continued during all 
this time. 

Senator Potter. How long a period would you say it was from the 
time you received your first transcript until, say, the 25tli script? 

Mr. Ayers. It was approximately 3 months. 

Senator Potter. Now, the gentleman that you mentioned who is 
responsible, who is the authority for both your Division and Overseas 
Division, what is his name again ? 

Mr. Ayers. We have a transcription director whose name is Mr. 
Ries. He is responsible to the Chief of our Division. 

Senator Potter. The man who is in charge of both services, the 
Overseas Division reports to him, and yourself. 

Mr. AirERS. The program manager is Mr. Puhan. 

Senator Potter. Now, I assume that you have reported to him 
that you were not getting the type of script that you wanted from 
the Overseas Branch during this period of 3 months ; is that true ? 

Mr. Ayers. We reported to him on other difficulties we had with 
Overseas Branch, but not this in particular — not on the individual 

Senator Potter. Was he sympathetic to your recommendations? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, I think so. He said that he would be the referee 
of discussions that we had. He knew that we had difficulties with 
Overseas, and that they seemed to be usurping authority which he 
had placed on a discussion basis between us, and he asked for us to 


meet with Overseas and work the matter out, which we did. We 
tried to. But that was after this trouble had happened. 

Senator Potter. Apparently he exerted no force or pressure from 
his own position of authority to bring about the changes which you 
desired, at least during this 3-month period. 

Mr. Ayers. I felt that he tried to work things out by getting us to- 
gether and let us talk things out or thresh them out in his office. I 
think he was fair about it, because frequently in discussions of this 
sort, he may be a little officious. 

Senator Potter. He was the man that had the authority to bring 
about the change that you desired, and apparently that was not done. 
Now, either the head of the Overseas Branch was outwitting him or he 
was not firm enough or else he was not too dedicated to the recom- 
mendations you were making. Am I fair in that statement? 

Mr. Ayers. Mr. Puhan directed that Overseas not do any programs 
without our approval, and by that time our money had been all spent, 
so the direction was academic. 

Senator Potter, Did Overseas write their own script or did they 
contract for the script ? 

Mr. Ayers. They contract for a script. 

Senator Potter. Is not that a little unusual for the service branch 
to have the authority for writing the script, rather than your branch ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, we write all the programs for shortwave and for 
many of the platters, too, and in other language divisions the scripts 
are written within the language division. Overseas acts as sort of an 
administrative office, mostly duplicating the work that we do, and ad- 

Senator Potter. In this case they were actually determining policy, 
the type of script that you were transmitting. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. Unfortunately they were, and that is where our 
differences of opinion came in, because we felt that we were area 
experts and policy should be formed by us. 

Senator Poti^er. In other words, in this case the service agency 
was determining a policy when your agency and his own superior 
person in the Voice should be making that determination. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Senator Poti-er. They were exceeding their authority. 

Mr. Ayers. They were exceeding their authority, and Mr. Puhan 
told them they were. 

Senator PonER. Thank you. 

Senator Symington. If they were exceeding their authority in the 
opinion of INIr. Puhan, why did he not do something about it, if they 
were reporting to him ? 

Mr. Ayers. We brought the matter to Mr. Puhan's attention, and 
he callied a meeting of the Overseas and of us, and at that time Mr. 
Puhan directed them not to exceed their authority, not to produce pro- 
grams without our approval, so we felt that that condition might exist 
from that time on. 

Senator Symington. What I am trying to say, in spite of the fact 
that was his direction, they did not do anything about his direction, 
even though they work for him. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, but our money had all been spent before they did 
anything about it. 


 Senator Syimingtox. So the instructions were academic. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Senator Poiii:r. That is poor administration when you allow your 
money to be spent and your directives are not being followed. 

Mr. Ayres. If we had known what our budget was before then, we 
never would have allowed all the money to be spent on this one pro- 
gram. As a matter of fact, the day that we did find out what our 
budget was, we asked Overseas to stop production on the Eye of the 
Eagle, because we felt what little money was left should be used for 
other progi-ams. But they felt they could not do that, because it 
would mean canceling contracts. 

The Chairman. INIr. Ayers, you have recited what would appear 
to be the result of — what would you say — carelessness, stupidity, or 
worse. What is your evaluation of the matter ? 

Mr. Ayers. I think that stupidity plays a great part of it. I think 
a part of it is a desire to aggrandize the ])osition, make it more im- 
portant by taking authority over other people. We feel that we are 
all merely cogs in the wheel', trying to express foreign policy as we are 
directed. Occasions do arise, such as this, in which 1 section or 1 man 
wants to dominate the others for his own personal reasons. 

The Chairman. In your memorandum, you made the statement 
that instead of wasting our money on pap, it perhaps should be used 
for bullets. Could you give us an example of the type of pap that you 
refer to ? 

Mr. Ayers. I can tell you about the Eye of the Eagle. Here we 
have a scientist who has a helicopter that can go with the speed of a 
jet, and an atomic eye that can see through buildings and locate what- 
ever paper there may be on a desk in an inner office. It stretches the 
imagination quite a bit to feel that this would be believed as a device 
for an entertainment show. We have many juveniles on the radio here 
in the States— Superman, for example — that do the same story. It 
is Superman put on for overseas consumption. 

The Chairman. In other words, your entire budget was spent on a 
sort of Superman thriller? 

ISIr. Ayers. Yes ; a definitely juvenile program. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Ayres, we asked you this in executive 
session, and I know it is sometimes unpleasant to discuss 3'our co- 
workers, but will you tell us whether you think the individuals respon- 
sible for the type of material put out were loyal to America and want 
to give the truth about this country to the rest of the world, or what 
type of individuals do you feel they are? 

Mr. Ayres. I do not think they saw the truth about the country as 
we did in the Latin American Division. I do not believe that I can 
say that these people were subversives,^because I have no proof of that, 
but I do feel that there are many ways of gaging what you think is 
the truth about a country. There was at one time what they called 
the full and fair picture of the United States, in which they would 
quote articles attacking us, as well as those that sustained our point 
of view, and felt that that made credible output for our audience. 
We felt on the other hand that we were in the information business, 
which is propaganda; that we should sustain our national point of 
view and not express other points of view that might attack us. 
Between those two, there is an area of peihaps fuzzy thinking where 

29708— 53— pt. 2 ^3 


a man may feel that his point, his attitudes are the way to tell the 
story of the United States. I do not think that belongs in an infor- 
mation program, and I think that is what existed here. 

Senator Jackson. Might I ask a question at that point, Mr. 
Chairman ? 

Mr. Ayres, if you are talking to an intelligent audience, would we 
not be making greater and more effective headway if we tried to be 
objective about ourselves? In other words, the Russians constantly 
announce on their programs that tliey are not only the best people on 
earth, but they have discovered everything from the beginning of 
mankind and they have predated Marx-Leninist doctrine to be retro- 
active. I suppose if the Christian religion will serve their purpose, 
they will claim Christ in the name of Lenin and Marx. 

Now, their programs after a while became ridiculous, and I am 
wondering whether in fact there appears in some of our programs 
things that are critical of us, and at the same time laudatory of us, if 
that in itself necessarily, is bad propaganda? I do not like to use the 
word "propaganda," because it has a connotation of sometliing false. 
I mean in the eyes of the average citizen, when you say, "This is so 
much propaganda," I think there is a general impression that we are 
trying to put over a line. 

Did you get my question, Mr, Ayres ? 

Mr. Ayres. Yes, I think I did, and I will try to answer it in this way. 

First of all, about the word "propaganda," in our area, Latin Amer- 
ica, propaganda is the term used for advertising, so it does not have 
the possibly ugly connotation that we may feel it would have domes- 
tically, and I think possibly we feel that it does because we are rather 
self-effacing often, and we do not boast so much about our achieve- 
ments as sometimes we have been criticized for. 

Now, we can, of course, bring up criticism of ourselves. We feel in 
general the full stories are imported to our areas by the news wire 
services, and the editors there can choose what part of the story they 
want and how they want to play it. 

Senator Jackson. You mean the papers in South America? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. In fact, in all parts of the world, except behind the 
Iron Curtain. Everyone knows who listens to us that we are the Voice 
of America — in other words, the radio branch of the United States 
Government. The}^ also know that when they have a press release 
from our embassies, that it bears the official stamp, it comes from the 
embassies, and they expect it to reflect our national point of view. It 
is not surprising to them if it sustains our own national interest. 

Senator Jackson. I agree with you, but what I am getting at is this : 
The world knows that the Russians in giving out their propaganda 
give out a completely one-sided picture. I am wondering if we should 
not be a bit cautious in not following the same method that they use? 

Mr. Ayers. We are very cautious about that, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Do you see what I mean ? 

INIr. Ayers. Indeed I do. 

Senator Jackson. If we paint a completely rosy picture of every- 
thing perfect in America, it sounds a bit like something coming out of 
Moscow. I mean everything they send out is nothing but the best, 
and it is so preposterous that thinking people do not believe it. Sure, 
there are certain people that are credulous enougli to believe some of 
those things. 


Mr. Ayers. And furthermore, subsequent events prove that their 
contentions are not true. However, over the years of broadcasting 
news and information, we have always emphasized truth in output. 
We do not color stories. We do not change the facts. We give a true 


Senator Jacksox. I understand that, but let us get down to spe- 
cifics. Would it not be a good idea, for instance, to say that we have 
not eliminated the problem of discrimination in the United States, 
that we do have it, but that we are making a bold and determined effort 
to eliminate it, and that actually minorities are better treated in the 
United States than any other country ? 

Mr. Aters. We do tell that story. 

Senator Jackson. You do not say that it does not exist. 

Mr. Ayers. We do not. 

Senator Jackson. I think it good to be critical in that sense. I do 
not mean criticism that is obviously slanted the other way. But I am 
not so sure that information that is given all in one tone is necessarily 
effective information. 

Mr. Ayers. We do not try to hide our blemishes or faults. We have 
told the story of racial minorities in the States, and w^e have shown 
how progress has been made. 

Senator Jackson. And that is particularly effective in South 
America ? 

Mr. Ayers. It may be effective, and it may not. 

Senator Jackson. I recognize that a color problem exists in South 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Senator Jackson. I say there is a real color problem in South 

Mr. Ayers. But it varies from place to place. 

Senator Jackson. That is right. But I mean almost in every coun- 
try 3^ou have a definite color problem. The biggest country in South 
America is Brazil. I do not think we need to elaborate or say that 
there is not a color problem. 

Let me ask you another question. Do you feel that there is some 
sort of conspiracy in the Department to either make the news broad- 
casts or the information that is being disseminated slanted in such a 
way that it is ineffective, or that it does not do the job? Is that the 
general idea that exists in your mind ? 

Mr. Ayers. I can speak with authority only about the area in 
which I work. 

Senator Jackson. I meant vour Division. 

Mr. Ayers. No, there is no such conspiracy in our Division. We 
knx)w that our writers are loyal Americans and they do their best to 
tell the story as truthfully and as far in the national interest as they 

Senator Jackson. Are the people above them that pass on your 
material the Overseas Service? 

Mr. Ayers. There are various elements in the Voice. Fortunately, 
if the news that comes from our central news room might appear not 
to give the story as we have found it in the other wire services, we are 
allowed to use our own judgment in editing that news and in portray- 
ing it as we know the story has been. 


Senator Jackson. I am trying to pinpoint the people who are in- 
terfering with what you think — or if that is not the proper word, 
you state it in your own words — that are interfering with these pro- 
grams, that you feel are not being carried out. 

Mr. Ayers. There have been times when the source of our news has 
not been as we felt it should have been. It has not reported the story 
fully. There have been certain omissions. 

Senator Jackson. There is a difference between a conspiracy and 
ineptness and incompetence or failure to understand information 
objectives. I am just trying to find out whether you feel there is a 
premeditated and designed attempt. 

Mr. Ayers. I have felt that personally on the part of various peo])le. 
I do not know how well organized it has been within the Voice. But 
there have been instances where output has been misdirected. 

Senator Jackson. Will you submit those names to the committee? 
I do not think it probably ought to be done in open session. 

Mr. CoHN. I think the witness has submitted certain names to the 
committee, Senator. 

Senator Jackson. In executive session ? 

Mr. CoHN. Yes. 

The Chairman. This witness has submitted names of individuals 
who he does not consider good loyal Americans, at least not the type 
of loyal Americans that should be running the information progi-am, 
and we did not think those names should be submitted in the public 
session, until we had a chance to run a check on them and get further 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, without identifying persons 
coming w^ithin the category you have referred to, I do think the public 
record should show clearly who had the responsibility for this pro- 
gram, and who made the decisions that resulted in the waste of this 
money. We gave to the Secretary of State in a reorganization plan, 
I think in 1952, very broad powers to reorganize the Department, 
clearly defining lines of authority in conformity witli the Hoover 
Commission recommendation, so that when something developed such 
as this, someone could be held responsible. I should like for you to 
name your superiors in line of authority, and identify them, so that 
we can determine who was responsible, who made the final decisions, 
so that we can develop that, expose it, and then call those parties in 
here to account and see whether they can explain it. 

Mr. CoHN. That is with reference to the Overseas Service Branch, 
Senator McClellan. 

Mr. Ayers. The person in charge was Robert Bauer. 

The Chairman. I do not think you understood Senator McClel- 
lan's question. He wants the line of authority, starting with you 
yourself on up. 

Mr. Ayers. My chief is Stephen Baldanza, Chief of the Latin 
American Division. 

The Chairman. How do you spell it? 

Mr. Ayers. B-a-1-d-a-n-z-a. 

Senator McClellan. Did he make the decisions over you with 
respect to this situation that you have testified about, or did he agree 
with your position ? 


Mr. Ayers. Yes; he agi-eed with my position. He was greatly dis- 
turbed by the whole series, and did not want it from the start. 

Senator McClellan. So he is not responsible ; he agreed with you. 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. Let us go to the next position of authority. 

Mr. Ayers. Above Mr. Baldanza is Mr. Puhan, who was Chief of 
the Program Division at that time and is now program manager. 

Senator McClellan. He is now program manager? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. What was his position ? Did he support your 
view or did he support the position that was actually carried out in 
the program ? 

Mr. Ayers. Well, sir, we did not bring specific scripts to his atten- 
tion, because that was done on our level where we did the work of 
programing. So I doubt if he ever Imew very much about our argu- 
ments over the content of it. We carried that out ourselves, and tried 
to straighten the matter out. We went to him because we felt Overseas 
was usurping our authority. They had produced another series which 
we did not want. 

Senator McClellan. Did he agree with you or disagree with you? 

Mr. Ayers. He agreed with us. 

Senator McClellan. All right ; let us go to the next one. 

Mr. Ayers. He is the direct chief of Mr. Bauer of the Overseas 
Services Branch, and the decision would not have gone any further 
than Mr. Puhan. He made the directive at that time that Overseas 
Services should get together with us and should not produce anything 
without our approval. So he directed them to cooperate with us. 

Senator McClellan. Did they cooperate? 

Mr. Ayers. No ; they did not. 

Senator McClellan. Who is responsible for their not cooperating? 

Mr. Ayers. The chief of their division is responsible for that. 

Senator McClellan. Who is he? 

Mr. Ayers. Mr. Bauer. In that a chief is responsible for what hap- 
pens through his subordinates. 

Senator McClellan. Who is over Mr. Bauer? 

Mr. Ayers. We go back to Mr. Puhan again, who is his chief. Mr. 
Bauer is on a level with Mr. Baldanza. 

Senator McClellan. I am trying to place the responsibility. Who 
had the final responsibility, Puhan or Bauer? 

Mr. Ayers. Bauer had it under Puhan's directive to cooperate 
with us. 

Senator McClellan. He failed to cooperate? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Where is he now ? 

Mr. Ayers. He is still in New York as Chief of the Field Services 

Senator McClellan. Has he been promoted ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Have you been promoted? 

Mr. Ayers. My promotion is in an acting status. 

Senator McClellan. An acting status 

Mr. Ayers. It is subject to confirmation. 

Senator Jackson. Is that subject to committee action? 


. Senator McCleixan. I do not know. If this committee is going to 
use all this time and effort to investigate, I think somewhere down 
the line we should get some results and people who are responsible for 
the mismanagement of Government affairs and these programs ought 
to be called to account. 

The Chaikman. May I say, Mr. McClellan, that the committiee al- 
ready has gotten results insofar as Baker East and Baker West are 
concerned, and if the action which Dr. Compton suggested yesterday 
is followed through, it will save $18,000,000. That is not bad for 
the first week. 

Senator McClellan. No, I think we can do a little more now. That 
is what I am trying to do. What I am trying to determine is whether, 
in the case of your superiors in the course of the line of authority, 
there was any evidence to you of any conscientious purpose to provide 
or use scripts calculated to offset Communist propaganda, that was 
detrimental to the United States ? 

Mr. Ayers. May I ask by that do you mean did someone who was 
my superior support the scripts that were counter to our interest or 
refuse scripts that would have been in our interests ? 
• Senator McClellan. Both. 

Mr. Ayers. No, sir, I would say nobody above me did that. Our 
trouble was a unit or office on our own level. 

Senator McClellan. Did anybody above you undertake to correct 
that when you called it to his attention ? 

Mr. Ayers. When we called it to Mr. Puhan's attention he did direct 
that they cooperate with us. 

Senator McClellan. Was that direction carried out? 

Mr. Ayers. I personally do not tliink so, though I am sure that 
there are memos supporting cooperation. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt, please? The picture I have got- 
ten from you, and other witnesses, so far, Mr. Ayers, is that it is almost 
impossible to find where the authority lodges. You have complete 
administrative and budgetary confusion. Is that a correct 
description ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, it is, sir, because no final authority was given in 
the order setting up Overseas Services. They were told to cooperate 
with us, and to produce on our approval ; yet they could originate ma- 
terial, and they were in a position to assert authority not outlined for 

The Chairman. The final result in your desk was that you spent 
at the rate of 14 to 1, 14 for entertainment programs, juvenile pro- 
grams, to 1 for good material exposing the Communist movement, is 
that right ? 

Mr. Ayers. The one in this case was merely for anniversary pro- 
grams, that is to say, Washington's Birthday, Thanksgiving, and so 
forth, that are not what we would call hard-hitting anti-Communist 

The Chairman. The other day you gave us an estimate of $50,000 
spent on this entertainment program. 

Mr. Ayers. Fifty to sixty thousand dollars; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you compare the cost of one of these so- 
called Superman programs with the program which your Department 



could produce, a program which you thought would be of some 
benefit ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes, sir. There it cost Overseas approximately $1,100 
to do a program because they have no facilities for production, no 
writers or studios of their own. They go out and make contracts 
for it. Whereas it costs us in the neighborhood of $180 to perhaps 
$250 or $275 to produce the same half-hour progi'am, because we are 
set up to be producers. We have directors, we have writers, and we 
have people who have good voices. 

The Chairman. And you say it cost how much for the program 
they produce? 

Mr. Ayers. $1,100. 

The Chairman. So it is about 6 to 1 ? 

Mr. Ayers. Yes. 

The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Ayers to step down for the 
time being. We may want to call him later. 

Counsel, do you have documents which you wish to put in the 
record ? 

Mr. CoHN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. This is an exhibit received in evi- 
dence by the committee in executive session in New York under date 
of February 3, 1953, and it comes from the Department of State in 
Washington. It is entitled "Information Policy for Use of Mate- 
rials Produced by Controversial Persons." It is signed by Bradley 
Connors, Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans of the United 
States Department of State. This memorandum, Mr. Chairman, was 
received by the Voice of America as an instruction concerning the use 
of materials by certain controversial persons. In the course of the 
memorandum, the Voice of America and other parts of the United 
States Information Service and programs are given discretion to use 
the works of an author known as Howard Fast. 

The Chairman. Will you read that paragraph ? 

]Mr. CoHN. Yes. It says : 

Similarly, if — lil5:e Howard Fast — he is known as a Soviet-endorsed author, 
materials favorable to the United States in some of his works may thereby be 
given a special credibility among selected key audiences. 

Tlie memorandum then goes on to give 

The Chairman. The entire memorandum will be inserted in the 
lecord at this time. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4" and will 
be found in the -appendix on p. 144.) 

The Chairman. I should note for the record when this was called 
to ]Mr. Dulles' attention at the executive sessions which we had in 
New York, the new Secretary of State Dulles canceled this memo- 
randum and ordered that it not be followed. 

Is ISIr. Howard Fast in the room ? Mr. Fast, will you step forward ? 

Will you identify the gentleman with you ? 

Mr. Fast. My attorney, Mr. Benedict Wolf. 

The Chairman. Your lawyer, Mr. Benedict Wolf. 

Mr. Fast. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mr, Fast, you have already been sworn. You are 
merely reminded that the oath is still in effect. Counsel may proceed. 




Mr. CoHN. Are you Howard Fast, the author? 

Mr. Fast. I am. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Fast, are you now a member of the Communist 

Mr. Fast. I will refuse to answer that question, basmg my refusal 
to answer on the rights granted to me by the first amendment to the 
Constitution, and by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which 
guarantees my right against self-incrimination. . 

The Chairman. The witness is entitled to refuse if he feels that his 
answer might incriminate him 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Fast, have you ever been a member of the Commu- 
nist Party? 

Mr. Fast. I refuse to answer that question on the same ground I 
stated before. 

Mr. CoHN. Are you the author of certain books that have been 
published ? 

Mr. Fast. You will have to make your question more specific, I 
am afraid. 

Mr. CoHN. Have you ever written a book that has been published ? 

Mr. Fast. I have. 

Mr. CoHN. Is Citizen Tom Paine one of your works ? 

Mr. Fast. It is. 

Mr. CoHN. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you 
wrote Citizen Tom Paine? 

Mr. Fast. I refuse to answer that question for the same reasons I 
gave before. 

Mr. CoHN". Were you a member of the Communist Piarty at the 
time you wrote any of the books under your authorship which have 
been published? 

Mr. Fast. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason I 
gave before. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, when you appeared before the committee 
in New York you told us that the Army services had reprinted a 
sizable number of your books, and also the State Department, I believe 
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt worked in the reproduction of one. At that 
time we ordered you to present to the committee all of your accounts 
showing any moneys received from any grants of the Government, or 
any bureau that was semigovernment. Do you have those books with 
you today? 

Mr. Fast. I have with me all of the records on that subject which 
were in my possession. 

The Chairman. Can you tell us at this time how much money you 
have received directly or indirectly from any Government agency or 
any quasi-Government agency? 

Mr. Fast. I can tell you approximately, and I shall also have to 
correct my statement in New York City, which, as vou recall, was 

The Chairman. Will you speak a little louder, Mr. Fast? 

Mr. Fast. I shall have to correct my former statement which was 
a statement based on the recollection of what had taken place 10 
years before. 


The monej^ I received from the Government would be about the f ol- 
lowiuff amounts : Some three thousand and a few odd dollars, three 
thousand ten or twenty or thirty, a few dollars over $3,000, as wages 
from the Office of War Information. I have a record of $100 from 
the Office of War Information for the purchase of rights to publish 
Citizen Tom Paine in a number of languages. Do you want me to 
specify the languages ? 

The Chairman. T\^iat was the date of your employment with OWI ? 

]Mr. Fast. There, too, I shall have to revise my previous statement, 
which was based on a recollection of many years before. The date I 
now have is that I commenced employment on the 16th of December 
1942, or at least it says that is the date that my appointment to the 
Office of War Information became effective, and I was officially sep- 
arated in January of 1944. but I went off salary and off active work 
toward the end of 1943. The exact date when I ceased to receive sal- 
ary in 1943 I couldn't find, but I am sure that date exists in the records 
of "the Office of War Information. I don't have it in my records. 

The Chairman. You received a total of $3,000 from OWI ? 

Mv. Fast. In wages, a little over that. 

The Chairman. I do not quite follow that. You were on from 
December 16, 1942 to January 1944. That is a period of over 2 years. 
That would give you a salary of only about $1,500 a year. 

Mr. Fast. No, not a period of over 2 years. Senator. 

The Chairman. December 16, 1952, 1 beg your pardon. 

Mr. Fast. It is a little over 1 year. 

The Chairman. What other moneys did you receive from the Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Fast. I want to explain why I did not receive the full amount — 
you see, according to this document I was hired by the Office of War 
Information at the wages of $4,600 per annum, but I did not put in a 
full year of employment with them. I went off wages before I was 
officially separated. 

Senator Jackson. Why did you leave OWI ? 

Mr. Fast. Because the particular work I was doing there had been 

Senator Jackson. Did you quit ? 

Mr. Fast. I resigned. 

The Chairman. Did you know any other members of the Com- 
munist Party working in OWI at the time you were working in OWI ? 

Mr. Fast. I will refuse to answer that question for the same reason 
given before. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Chairman, may I ask at that point? 

The Chair:man. Certainly. In other words, you refuse to answer 
that question on the grounds of self-incrimination ? 

Mr. Fast. Correct. 

The Chaibman. You have a right to. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Fast, who was Director of OWI when you 
were employed, do you recall ? 

Mr. Fast. I really don't recall. You mean the top director? 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. 

Mr. Fast. The National Director 

Senator Dirksen. Was Mr. Davis the Director? 

Mr. Fast. I was going to say, Mr. Ehner Davis, but I wouldn't be 
absolutely certain. 

129708—53 — pt. 2 4 


Senator Jackson. Was Palmer White Deputy Director at that time. 

Mr. Fast. The name sounds familiar 

Senator Jackson. Or Acting Director at one time ? 

Mr. Fast. But I couldn't say now. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, do you know anyone in the Voice of 
America as of today who is a member of the Communist Party '? 

Mr. Fast. I refuse to answer that question, too, on the same grounds 
I stated before. 

The Chairman. The same grounds; again you mean the grounds 
that if you answered it might incriminate you ? 

Mr. Fast. Yes, the fifth amendment's guaranty against self-incrimi- 

The Chairman. Do you have any friends in the State Department 
as of today who are members of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Fast. I would refuse to answer that question, too, on the same 

The Chairman. The answer is on the groimds of self-incrimina- 
tion 'i 

Mr. Fast. Correct. 

The Chairman. I believe you told us that the Army services printed 
a sizable number of your books. Will you tell us now whether you 
were a member of the Communist Party at the time you wrote those 
books which the Army reprinted ^ 

Mr. Fast. I will refuse to answer that question on the same gi'ounds 
as stated before. 

The Chairman. On the grounds of self-incrimination ? 

Mr. Fast. Yes. 

The Chairman. I believe you told us also that the State Depart- 
ment translated your books into a sizable number of languages, and 
had them reprinted. Will you tell us now whether you were a member 
of the Communist Party at the time you wrote the books which the 
State Department finally translated and distributed? 

Mr. Fast. I am going to refuse to answer that question on the 
same grounds as before, iDut I want to correct again 

The Chairman. I think the record should show clearly each time, 
Mr. Fast, when you refuse 

Mr. Fast. On the grounds of the fifth amendment and my guaranty 
against self-incrimination. 

Here, if I may. Senator, I would like to correct my testimony in the 
New York session. I believe I stated that Citizen Tom Paine was con- 
tracted for by the State Department. If I did, if that was my testi- 
mony, it was incorrect, as this document shows that the contract was 
made by the Office of War Information, and not by the State Depart- 
ment. Your use of the term Army edition — I don't recall your exact 
usage for my other books 

The Chairman. I think you described it in New York as having 
been put out by Army Services. 

Mr. Fast. I will correct that. I believe the title was the "Edition 
for the Armed Services" — "Editions for the Armed Services." That 
was an organization set up by New York City publishers through the 
Council of Books in Wartime, and not a Government organization, but 
a private organization. 

The Chairman. Mr. Symington. 


Senator Symington. As I understand, you refuse to answer 
whether you are now a member of the Communist Party; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Fast. That is correct. 

Senator Symington. If you are a member of the Communist Party, 
sincerely, why are you not proud of it, instead of being ashamed of it ? 

(Witness consults his counsel.) 

Senator Symington. I did not ask your lawyer ; I asked you. 

Mr. Fast. I will refuse to answer you for the same grounds, basing 
my refusal on the fifth amendment and its right against self- 

The Chairman. You refuse to answer whether you are ashamed or 
proud of being a member of the Communist Party on the ground 
that if you answer it might incriminate you ? 

Mr. Fast. That is correct. 

Senator Potter. Were you a member of the Communist Party 
when you were employed by the Government in OWI ? 

Mr. Fast. I refuse to answer that question, basing myself on the 
fifth amendment and the guaranty on self-incrimination which it 
gives me. In refusing to answer this question — I am sorry, I don't 
know your name. Are you a Senator ? 

Senator Potter. Yes. I work for the Government. 

The Chairman. Senator Potter. 

Mr. Fast. I am sorry. In invoking the fifth amendment and its 
privileges to refuse to answer your question, I would just like to make 
these observations about the origin of this privilege and its incorpora- 
tion in the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. The committee will not receive a lecture from the 

Mr. Fast. I would appreciate the privilege. This is not in the 
foi'ni of a lecture, sir. I invoke the privilege 

The Chairman. We are not asking you for an explanation of the 
Constitution of the United States. We are granting you the right 
to refuse to answer any question which you think might incriminate 

Mr. Fast. Don't you think basing myself on the Constitution 
obligates me to say a word or two about the origins of this? I am a 
student of American history and have been for many years. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, you are ordered to answer the questions 
only. We are not going to take a lecture from a man who refuses to 
state whether he is a member of the Communist Party at this moment. 
We are not going to have a lecture from him on the Constitution of 
the United States. We do not think we need it. You will answer 
the question. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Fast, during tliat period of time in American 
history there were many other people working for the Government 
whose loyalty had to be above reproach, in a much more hazardous 
position that you served in, and whose loyalty today they are willing 
to demonstrate by saying that tliey are not dedicated to carrying out 

]Mr. Fast. Don't you think basing myself on the Constitution 
to our own foreign policy and our own way of life. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to 
ask. You mentioned that from the OWI you had received substan- 
tially $3,000 in fees and salary. Since your separation from the OWI 


have you received any money from the Federal Government in any 
way for any services or any writings ? 

Mr. Fast. Yes. 

Senator Mundt. Will you recapitulate that financial transaction? 

Mr. Fast. To the best of my recollection insofar as my records 
cover it, I received $100 from the Office of War Information, subse- 
quent to my separation, for the rights in Citizen Tom Paine, which 
I mentioned before, and I was also engaged in the spring of 1944 on 
a special project for the Signal Corps Photographic Center, the 
making of a film on the American Tradition. 

Senator Mundt. Would that be in AVashington, New York, or 
where ? 

Mr. Fast. In New York City'. While I worked on this project I 
received wages of $12.50 a day. To the best of my I'ecoUection — I do 
not have a record of the lengtli of my service — but to the best of my 
recollection it was between 4 and 6 Aveeks. 

Now, insofar as I can determine, tliis is the only money I have 
received from the Government since my separation from the Office 
of War Information. 

Senator Mundt. Have any books or publications on which you have 
royalty rights been used by the Government since 1944 in any way 
as far as you know ? 

Mr. Fast. As far as I know, I cannot recall any such use. 

Senator Mundt. You do not know whether they ever purchased any 
of your books for use in our information libraries overseas? 

Mr. Fast, I presume that they have since my books are widely 
read, but I have no specific information. 

The Chairman. You presume the Voice has purchased some of 
your books, but you do not know. 

Mr. Fast. No ; I didn't say that. When Congressman Mundt — Sen- 
ator Mundt, I am sorrv — said institutions I thought he meant libraries 
and things of that sort. I have no know^ledge of any purchase of 
my work by the Voice of America. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the International Informa- 
tion Administration has purchased any of your books? 

Mr. Fast. No, sir ; I do not. 

The CiiAiRiMAN. You do not know. It mifrht he a good idea if our 
staff would get a list of all books purchased by the information 

Senator Mundt, Mr, Fast, I would like to read a statement from 
this memorandum and ask you a question or two about it. The memo- 
randum is dated February ?>, and signed by Mr. W. Bradley Connors, 
of the State Department, and talks about controversial authors. Then 
he says, and I quote : 

If — like Howard Fast — he is known as a Soviet-enclorsed author, materials 
favorable to the United States in some of his works may thereby be given a 
special credibility among selected key audiences. 

Are you in fact known as a Soviet-endorsed author? 

Mr. Fast. I don't know what I am known as. 

Senator Mundt. Have any of your works been endorsed by Soviet 
critics or authorities ? 

Mr. Fast. You will have to spell out your question. I don't know 
what such endorsement means, or Avhat vou mean. 


Senator Mundt. Have they been commented upon favorably? 

Senator Jackson. Have they had favorable book reviews? 

Mr. Fast. B'y Soviet critics ? Indeed, yes. 

Senator Jackson. In the Literary Gazette? 

Mr. Fast. I don't know specifically. I know they have had favor- 
able book reviews in Russian articles. 

Senator Jackson. In Pravda and other Russian papers? 

Mr. Fast. I presume so. 

Senator Mundt. So you find no particular fault Avith that state- 
ment of Mr. Connors that 3'ou are known as a Soviet-endorsed author. 
You have no evidence to the contrary ? 

Mr. Fast. I don't understand what such a statement means. I was 
asked a question before about whether my books were reviewed favor- 
ably in the Soviet Union, and I answered that insofar as I Iniew they 
were, many of them were. 

Senator Mundt. You saj^ you do not understand what it means. 
If you have no objection to tlie statement, I have no desire to pursue 
the question any further. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Fast, are you sincere and conscientious 
in invoking the fifth amendment 

Mr. Fast. I am, sir. 

Senator McClellan. In refusing to answer these questions? 

Mr. Fast. I am, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Do you conscientiously feel that if you did 
answer truthfully that it would incriminate you? 

Mr. Fast. Yes, sir, and let me say that in feeling so and having 
this feeling, I can point again, and I must point, to the origin of the 
privilege among the Puritans in England in the I7th and 16tli 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I am not arguing with him. 
I am trying to ask you simple questions about your feelings and 
whether you are conscientious 

Mr. Fast. Sir, this is not a simple question. This is a question 
that goes to the depths of my conscience as an American. 

Senator McClellan. Here is one that is simple, if you want to 
argue about it. Do you believe in the overthrow of the United States 
Government by force and violence? 

Mr. Fast. That question I will have to refuse to answer basing 
myself upon the privilege granted to me by the fifth amendment. 

Senator McClellan. I grant you that privilege, but I reserve my 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, were you ever called to a conference in 
the White House? 

Mr. Fast. I didn't hear your question. 

The Chairman. Were you ever called to a conference in the White 
House ? 

Mr. Fast. I was not. 

Tlie Chairman. Were you ever in the White House ? 

Mr. Fast. I Avas. 

The Chairman. How many times? 

Mr. Fast. Once, I believe. I am trying to recollect whether I was 
there as a sightseer before that. As far as I can recollect, once. 

The Chairman. You are invited to the White House by whom? 

Mr. Fast. By President Roosevelt and his wife. 


The Chairman. Were you invited by both of them or by one ? 

Mr. Fast. The invitation I believe came from Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and his wife, insofar as I can recollect. 

The Chairman. Are yon sure of that ? 

Mr. Fast. This was many years ago. 

The Chairman. Are yon sure of that ? 

Mr. Fast. I say insofar as I can recollect. I do not have the invi- 
tation in front of me. 

The Chairman. The President himself did not attend that meeting, 
did he? 

Mr. Fast. It was not a meeting. It was a luncheon and the Presi- 
(ieilt was there. 

The Chairman. And Mrs. Roosevelt? 

Mr. Fast. Mrs.— — 

The Chairman. Was Mrs. Roosevelt present? 

Mr. Fast. Yes, Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt were present. 

The Chairman. A^'ere there any other Communists present at that 
luncheon ? 

Mr. Fast, I will refuse to answer that question for the same grounds 
I stated before, invoking my privilege against self-incrimination as 
guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 

The Chairman. You have a right to refuse to answer. Will you 
give us the names of the — first, roughly how many were at this 
luncheon ? 

Mr. Fast. In the first place I didn't count, and in the second place 
it was many years ago. 

Senator Jackson. What was the nature of the luncheon? What 
was it called for? 

Mr. Fast. I don't know that it had any nature. It was a luncheon 
reception for a number of people. 

The Chairman. Roughly how many ? 

Mr. Fast. I couldn't say. This was 9 years ago, and I simply 
couldn't say. 

The Chairman. A visit to the White House in the life of a man 
who refuses to answer whether he wants to overthrow our Government 
by force and violence 

Mr. Fast. I think that is uncalled for. 

The Chairman. Is not an everyday occurrence. Wait until I finish. 
I assume it was a rather important event in your life, and being rather 
important, you should have some idea as to roughly the number of 
people, whether it was 10 people, or 20 or 100 or 1,000. 

Mr. Fast. I have always been very dubious about the people who 
comment with such accuracy on witness stands on what took place 10 
or 15 years ago. I am not capable of such recollection. I have lived 
a full life, and events of 10 years ago are not very clear in my mind. 
I would not care, being under oath, to offer guesses any more than I 
have to. There were a number of people there. There were more 
than 10 people, I would say that. That is about as far as I would care 
to go. 

The Chairman. Would you say there were less than 20 or would 
you know ? 

Mr. Fast. I couldn't say that, but I want to add, Senator 

The Cir AIRMAN. In other words, you do not know whether there 
were more or less than 20 ? 


Mr. Fast. I wouldn't say there were less than 20. I want to say, if 
you have a right to make observations about my advocating the OA^er- 
throw of the Government by force and violence, and my refusal to 
answer questions, you should give me the right to comment on the 
privilege against self-incrimination. What I say goes out of these 
halls, and I believe the people have the right to understand and to know 
what this privilege means, what it meant historically. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, you can write a book on that, if you 
care to. 

Mr. Fast. Yes, and I think it would be profitable to read the books 
I have written. 

The CHAiR]\rAN. Thank you. 

Mr, Fast. Profitable in terms of knowing what our country means 
and what its heritage is. 

The Chairman, Thank you very much, Mr, Fast. Do I understand 
the total amount of money that you received either directly or in- 
directly from any Government agency or any quasi-Government agency 
amounted to less than $4,000, is that correct? 

Mr. Fast. I would say in the neighborhood of $4,000. 

The Chairman. You were ordered to go over 3'our books and give us 
the exact figure. Is there any reason why you cannot give us that 
figure right down to dollars and cents ? 

Mr, Fast, I can give it to you fairly exactly, but there are holes in 
my records. These holes can be easily filled in by Government records. 
Here are my records in dollars and cents. 

The Chairman. Just the total figure. I want the total figure. 

Mr. Fast, As far as the Office of War Information is concerned, and 
employment there, according to my records I commenced employment 
on December 16, 1942, at the salary of $4,600 per annum. I would 
believe that this would indicate an earning of about $150 in 1942. 

The Chairman. INIr. Fast, I merely want you to give me the total 
amount of money which you have received from any Government 
agency or any quasi-Government agency. At this time I am not 
asking for a breakdown. You may submit your records to the staff. 
They will break it down for us, 

]\Ir, Fast. You may have the records. 

The Chairman. Mr. Jackson, I think you had a question to ask 
after he answers my last question, 

Mr. Fast. I believe the total is under $4,000. 

The Chairman. Can you say for certain under oath that it is 
under $5,000, giving you some latitude? 

Mr. Fast. You see, I don't trust my memory too much any more 
after the last session. I am saying under oath I believe it is under 
$4,000. I think that is sufficient. I know these records exist and can 
be checked. 

The Chairman. It is not sufficient for this committee. We have 
heard these statements from many witnesses. Can vou say under 
oath it was less than $10,000 ? 

Mr, Fast. Yes, yes. 

The Chairman, Mr. Jackson, 

Senator Jackson, Mr, Fast, do you recall signing an oath at the 
time you were employed with the OWI to the effect that you were 
not a member of an organization that advocated the overthrow of the 
Government by force and violence, or words to that effect? 


Mr. Fast. I am going to refuse to answer that question, invoking 
the rights granted to me of self-incrimination under the fifth amend" 

Senator Jackson. I think 3^ou can state whetlier you actually signed 
an oath as required by law. That is a fact. That is not a question of 

Mr. Fast. I think the privilege holds in answer to that question. 
The Chairman. I believe, Senator Jackson, that the witness would 
have the privilege to refuse to state that he signed such an affidavit, 
because such an affidavit could be the basis for criminal prosecution. 
Senator Jackson. You are aware of the fact that Congress on July 
2, 1942, or rather the President, approved, I believe, a rider to an 
appropriation bill, now title V of the General Provisions of the Fed- 
eral Statute, section 501, making it mandatory for every Federal 
employee, and I believe Members of Congress as well — everyone who 
received Federal funds from the Federal Government — to sign an 
affidavit attesting to the fact that they are not a member of such organ- 
ization. Did you know that to be the law at that time? 

Mr. Fast. I can't possibly say what I knew 11 years ago. How 
could I ? 

Senator Jackson. Let me ask you this question: Did you know 
that Federal employees were required to sign an affidavit in connec- 
tion with their employment as Federal employees in order to receive 
their j^ay ? 

Mr. Fast. You mean did I know this 11 years ago? 
Senator Jackson. I mean in connection with your employment. 
Mr. Fast. I am under oath. How can I possibly say what I knew 
11 years ago? 

Senator Jackson. If you do not know, say so. I am just asking 
you. It is not difficult to answer. If you do not remember, you do 
not know. 

Mr. Fast. I certainly don't remember what I knew on this question 
11 years ago. 

Senator Jackson. Do you know it now ? 
Mr. Fast. I have just heard you repeat it. 
Senator Jackson. Until then you did not know it ? 
Mr. Fast. Will you clarify your question? Do you mean do I 
know now that in 1942 this was the case? Did I know before you 
asked this question ? 

Senator Jackson. I think the question is pretty clear. Is this tlie 
first time you have heard of this provision in tlie law that I just quoted 
to you ? 

Mr. Fast. I think I had heard something or other of such a 

Senator Jackson. Wlien did you first hear it ? 
Mr. Fast. I don't know. I don't recall. 

Senator Jackson. You do not recall. You did not go off tlie pay- 
roll of OWI because of this provision. As I understand it, you con- 
tinued to do work, but not on the payroll. I believe that was your 
testimony earlier. 

(Witness consults his counsel.) 

Mr. Fast. When I went off the payroll, I did not continue to work 
at OWI. 


Senator Jacksox. I had understood that yon worked for OWI 
between December of 1942 when your appointment papers went 
through and January, was it, of 1944? 

Mr. Fast. No. 

Senator Jacksox. That employment was periodical and you earned, 
roughly, approximately $3,000 during that time? 

Mr. Fast. No. The money I mentioned were wages paid for m 
steady run of emplovment. A point came where I felt that the job 
I was doing there was finished. At that point I went off the payroll, 
I was not yet officially separated. I was a part of the staff without 
wages, insofar as I recollect. 

Senator Jackson. As I understand it, you went to work in Decem- 
ber 1942. How long did you work continuously ? Can you remem- 
ber, roughly ? I am not asking you specifically. 

Mr. Fast. I don't have the records. 

Senator Jacksox. But you earned $3,000 worth ? 

Mr. Fast. I earned a little over $3,000. 

Senator Jackson. And you were hired at the rate of 

Mr. Fast. $4,600 per annum. 

Senator Jackson. I had understood you to say earlier that you 
worked from December of 1942 to January of 1944. 

Mr. Fast. No ; I am sorry you misunderstood. 

Senator Jackson. Making it just a little over a year. 

Mr. Fast. According to these wages that I have records of here, I 
must have worked about 8 months out of the 12. Apparently I went 
off' the payroll but continued to be associated with the organization. 

Senator Jackson. Why did you go off the payroll and continue to 
be associated with the organization ? Was it because of this affidavit? 

Mr. Fast. No ; I can only say what I recollect at the time, and my 
recollection is that this was not infrequent, that a person would go 
off pay and he would later go back on pay, and that these were two 
separate questions. The question of separation from the organization 
and the question of ceasing to receive wages were separate questions. 
Even though a person ceased to receive wages, he remained a part of 
the organization. 

Senator Jackson. But your recollection is that you went off because 
your work terminated ? 

Mr. Fast. That is my recollection. 

Senator Jackson. And it had nothing to do with the affidavit that I 
referred to which is required by law for all Federal employees to 
swear to ? 

Mr. Fast. That is my recollection. I am trying to testify honestly 
to a thing which I recollect very vaguely. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a couple of questions? 

The Chairman. Ma}^ I ask the Senators to cut their questioning as 
short as possible. We have another witness from New York that I 
would like to put on the stand. 

Senator Potter. INIr. Fast, how old were you at the time you were 
employed by OWI ? 

Mr. Fast. Twenty-eight, I believe. 

Senator Potter. What was your draft status? 

Mr. Fast. I lacked sight in one eye, to all effects and purposes. 

29708 — 53 — pt. 2— —5 


Senator Potter. Were you classified as 4-F ? 

Mr. Fast. No ; not then. I got a very low draft number, and to fill 
in the time between then and what I knew would be an early draft 
call, I went to work at the Office of War Information. 

Senator Potior. Did you have military service? Did you serve in 
the war? 

Mr. Fast. Previous to that ? 

Senator Potter. Did you serve in World War II ? 

Mr. Fast. No. I was rejected because of this eye condition, and 
subsequently I became a correspondent in the last year of the war. 

Senator Potter. You stated your classification was not 4r-F. 

Mr. Fast. It was 4-F. I said it was not 4— F at the time I went to 
work for OWI. 

The Chairman. What was it at the time you went to work for OWI ? 

Mr. Fast. I had not yet gone for my medical examination. 

Senator PorrER. Did you ever receive a deferment because of your 
work with OWI? 

Mr. Fast. No ; I did not. 

Senator Potter. Did you ask for a deferment ? 

Mr. Fast. I did not. 

The Chairman. What is the name of the doctor that examined you, 
if you know ? 

Mr. Fast. I have no notion. He was a regular draft-board doctor. 

Senator Potter. I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman. 
We are now in a war, and many men are being drafted. If it should 
become your duty, your obligation, to serve in our fight against com- 
munism in Korea, would you serve ? 

Mr. Fast. I have dedicated my entire life to the service of my 

Senator Potter. Would you serve ? 

Mr. Fast. I would like to say 

Senator Potter. That is a simple question. 

Mr. Fast. I would serve my country in any capacity which could 
benefit or advance my country's welfare. 

Senator Potter. Are you saying 

Mr. Fast. Why is it that you people never ask will I serve in the 
struggle for peace, to prevent war, to bring justice and freedom here? 

Senator Potter. Mr. Fast 

Mr. Fast. Of course, I will serve in any capacity that could benefit 
my country, that could aid my country. 

Senator Potter. The question was vei'v simple. Would you serve 
in the fight against conununism in Korea ? 

Mr. Fast. You are asking me would I serve if I was called? 

Senator Potter. Answer "yes" or "no." 

Mr. Fast. If I was called into the service of my country, the answer 
IS yes. 

Senator Potter. You have not answered the question. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fast, you are ordered to answer that question 
unless you want to claim the privilege. 

Mr. Fast. I would like the question to be clarified. What is the 
(juestion ? 

Senator Potter. If you were drafted to serve to fight the Com- 
munists in North Korea, would you do so ? 


Mr. Fast. If I were drafted into the service of my country, I would 
do so, I would accept the service of my country if I were drafted. 
That answer is plain . 

Senator Potter. To fight communism in Korea ? 

Mr. Fast, Why don't you ask me what you mean, would I accept —  — 

Senator Potter. Why are you so nervous when we say fighting 
Communists ? 

Mr. FavST, I am not nervous ; angry, but very calm. Don't tell me 
I am nervous. 

Senator Potter, If drafted, would you fight communism in Korea ? 

Mr, Fast, If you add the last part of that question, I shall have to 
refuse to answer and invoke my privilege against self-incrimination. 
If, however, you ask me whether I will accept service in my country's 
Army, I answer "Yes." 

Senator Potter. That is service in our country's Army and there 
are 130,000 casualties as a result of Communist bullets in Korea, and 
you refuse to answer whether you would serve in that capacity. 

Mr. Fast. That is a highly loaded statement, sir. 

Senator Potter, It was loaded for 130,000, too, I will tell you that, 
Mr, Fast, 

Senator McClellan, Mr, Fast, may I ask you one other question? 
Under oath, now, you state you are perfectly willing to serve your 
country. Are you willing to serve your country now by telling the 
truth and answering the questions that have been asked you regarding 
your membership in and affiliation with the Communist Party? Are 
you willing to serve your country by telling the American people and 
this committee the truth ? 

Mr. Fast. I must refuse to answer that question basing my refusal 
on the privilege granted to me in the fifth amendment, and in line 
with your words, sir, I wish you would allow me to spell out that 
privilege and what it means and why I am invoking it. 

Senator McClellan. All Americans 

Mr. Fast. No, I don't think everyone in this room knows this. Very 
few people know this. Wliy don't you give me a chance to state this ? 

Senator McClellan. Write a book. That seems to be what you 
want to do. 

Mr. Fast. I shall and I have. 

Senator McClellan. Write another, 

Mr. Fast. Indeed I shall. 

Senator Dirksen. Mr, Chairman, I would like to address one ques- 
tion to Mr, Fast and I would like to address it also to Mr, Wolf, because 
it is procedural, I am quite mindful that Mr. Wolf is not the witness. 
But would there be any difference in your answers if there existed on 
the statute books a statute that assured you of immunity against prose- 
cution for any answer that you might make? 

Mr. Wolf. If you are asking it as a question 

The Chairman, Mr, Wolf. 

Mr. Fast. He addressed the question to Mr. Wolf, 

The Chairman. I beg your pardon. 

Senator Dirksen. I did that, Mr. Chairman, because he is counsel 
for Mr. Fast and it is a procedural question. 

The Chairman. I would like to put him under oath if he answers it, 
I was talking to Senator McClellan and did not hear. The rule has 


been that the witness can consult with his lawyer at any time he cares 
to, and we would not hear the lawyer. 

Mr. Wolf. My opinion is, of course, that if there is no danger of any 
incrimination, a person cannot claim the privilege against self-incrim- 
ination. Or in fact, I would go a little further and say if there is no 
danger of prosecution for a crime. 

Senator Dirksen. Suppose the committee is pretty well agreed that 
there is a material question to which it needs an answer, and so that 
question is addressed to the witness. The witness may have rightly 
invoked the right he has under the fifth amendment. The committee 
might then be able to say under existing law we insist upon an answer, 
and you shall be assured immunity against prosecution if you do 
answer. Would the answer of the witness then be different than what 
it has been ? 

Mr. Wolf. In about 1856 there was an immunity statute with regard 
to congressional committees. Congress withdrew the iimnunity stat- 
ute, knowing that the privilege could be invoked, because what they 
found was happening was that witnesses would seek to appear before 
committees, testify to many things, and thus gain immunity. So in 
the balance of public opinion they decided it would be better to main- 
tain the privilege, rather than be able to compel testimony in certain 

Mr. Fast. Would you like me to answer that, too ? 

Senator Dirksen. Yes, I would. 

Mr. Fast. I would not like to be interrupted until my answer is 

Senator Dirksen. I would rather not have an involved answer, be- 
cause it does admit of answering yes or no. I will rephrase the ques- 
tion. If you were assured immunity against prosecution under an 
existing Federal statute in connection with any matter on which you 
might testify or any question that is addressed to you, would you 
answer then be different than it has been? 

The Chairman. You can answer that yes or no. 

Senator Dirksen. Tliat is refusal to answer. 
, Mr. Fast. I would like to answer it, but I cannot give a "Yes" or 
"No" answer. Life is not that simple. 

The Chairman. Are you saying you cannot answer "Yes" or "No"? 

Mr. Fast. I would like to answer 

The Chairman. Can you answer that "Yes" or "No" ? 

Mr. Fast. I cannot see that I can give an honest answer to that 
"Yes" or "No." 

Senator Dirksen. Is the question clear ? 

Mr. Fast. Yes, your question is clear, but your question is not a 
simple one. 

Senator Dirksen. You say you cannot answer it "Yes" or "No"? 

Mr. Fast. No, I would have to go into some of the circumstances 
surrounding your question- 

Tbe Chairman. If you cannot answer- 
Mr. Fast. The question and the framework- 

The Chairman. If you cannot answer it "Yes" or "No," then you 
will not answer. We are not going to use this committee as a trans- 
mission belt for the Communist Party. 


Senator Dirksen, I was going to say for the moment, at least, I 
would not be interested in a historical dissertation on the fifth amend- 

The Chairman. This witness has been eager all morning to give a 
lecture to the general public. He will not give it in this committee 
room. He will merely answer the questions. 

Senator Mundt. Do you recall who was the Director of the OWI 
at the time you joined up ? 

Mr. Fast. I think we started with that question and the answer was 
Elmer Davis. 

Senator Mundt. Will you tell us how you became associated with 
that agency ? Did you ask for the job ? 

Mr. Fast. I became associated through filling out an application 
for employment there. 

Senator Mundt. You sought the employment by filling out an 
application ? 

Mr. Fart. Yes, I went down to the oflBces of OWL As I testified 
in New York City, I believe I knew 1 or 2 people there. It is hard 
for me to recollect their names. 

Senator Mundt. Had you known Elmer Davis before that? 

Mr. Fast. No, I did not to the best of my recollection before that. 

Senator Mundt. Somebody further down ? 

Mr. Fast. Yes, and I filled in an application and was accepted. 

Senator Mundt. I would like to ask the same questions about your 
employment in the Signal Corps. That was in 1944, was it ? 

Mr. Fast. The officer at the head of the project came to me — ^lie 
knew me by reputation only — and asked whether I would not be- 
come a part of this project. 

Senator Mundt. Can you provide us with his name? 

The Chairman. I am not sure I got that answer. You said they 
knew you by reputation and based upon that they asked you to come 
in. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Fast. No, the question that Senator Mundt asked concerning 
the Senate — I am sorry, concerned the Signal Corps. How did I 
happen to come into that Signal Corps project. 

Senator Mundt. You said the officer knew you by reputation and 
asked you to do the job. 

Mr. Fast. Yes. 

Senator Mundt. Can you provide us with the officer's name ? 

Mr. Fast. I couldn't recall his name. 

Senator Mundt. What was his position ? 

Mr. Fast. He was a senior officer, either a captain or major. I 
don't think he was a colonel. 

Senator Mundt. At what post ? New York ? 

Mr. Fast. I couldn't say exactly after all this time. 

Senator Mundt. Did you work in New York? 

Mr. Fast. Yes; I did. 

Senator Mundt. Was he is charge of the work, or did he have 
anything to do with the work ? 

Mr. Fast. He was in charge of this particular project. 

Senator Mundt. We can find it from the records. 

Mr. Fast. Yes ; I am sure you can. 


Senator Mundt. Did you have to provide recommendations at that 
time for the Signal Corps, or did he just take you and you went to 
work ? 

Mr. Fast. I don't think so. I believe he came to me by reputation 
through i;eading what I had written. 

Senator Mundt. Were you doing what is called classified work or 
secret work ? 

Mr. Fast. No; it was not secret. The project was to lay out a film 
which would spell out the best and the most precious democratic tra- 
ditions of the United States of America, and his reading my books 
evidently led him to the conclusion that I was suited to this task. 

Senator Mundt. He felt that your particular interpretation was 
the kind he wanted to project, so he came to you. 

Mr. Fast. You are asking me what he felt. I don't know what he 
felt. I can only guess why he came to me and this would be my 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we have our inves- 
tigators to find out the name and identity of that particular officer. 

The Chairman. Very definitely so. 

The committee will adjourn until 10 : 30 tomorrow morning. 

Mr. Fast, you will remain under subpena, subject to call. In view 
of the difficulty the staff has experienced in contacting you, you are 
instructed that if you are wanted, that your lawyer will be contacted, 
and therefore you will contact your lawyer from day to day to find 
out whether you are due to return to the committee. 

We will adjourn until 10 : 30 tomorrow niorning. 

(Thereupon at 12 o'clock noon, the hearings were recessed, to re- 
convene Thursday, February 19, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m.) 




United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

OF THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 
40, agreed to January 30, 1953, in room 357 of the Senate Office 
Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senator Joseph R, McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator Charles 
E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator John L. McClellan, Demo- 
crat, Arkansas; and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Wash- 

Present also : Roy Colin, chief counsel ; Donald Surine, assistant 
counsel ; David Schine, chief consultant ; and Ruth Young Watt, chief 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

I may say a number of Senators have informed me that they will 
be late because of other committee work they are on this morning, but 
will be here later. 

Yesterday there was introduced into the record a memo dated Feb- 
ruary 3, 1953, which authorized the use of works by Howard Fast and 
other Soviet-approved writers in selected areas. For that reason the 
committee called Howard Fast, and, as the committee will recall, he 
refused to testify on three major points on the ground that if he 
told the truth, it might incriminate him. He refused to testify 
whether he was a member of the Communist Party at the time he wrote 
certain books that are being used by the Government. No. 2 he re- 
fused to testify as to whether or not he was a member of the Com- 
munist Party as of yesterday, when he appeared. No. 3, he refused 
to testify as to whether he believed in the destruction of this form of 
government by force and violence on the ground that if he told the 
truth it might incriminate him. And No. 4, he refused to testify in 
ant.wer to Senator Potter's (questions as to whether he would bear arms 
against the Communists in Korea, on the ground that if he answered 
that truthfully, it might incriminate him. 

Thereafter, the stalf checked further into the matter of directives 
concerning Howard Fast, and have informed me they discovered 
another memorandum that was issued, which named certain of Howard 
P'ast's books which could be used by the Voice. 

Will you describe, Mr. Schine, as to just what you found by con- 
tacting the New York office ? 



Mr. ScHiNE. This is a Department of State memorandum, March 
7, 1952, the purpose of which states : 

In view of the controversial nature of the writings of Howard Fast, this 
circular is issued to provide criteria governing the use of his books in United 
States information centers. 

Then it goes on to explain why they feel his books should be used, 
and list several of them which they recommended. 

The Chairman. Would you read the list into the record, Mr, 
Schine? These are works by Howard Fast, who appeared yesterday 
and refused to tell whether he was a member of the Communist Party 
on the ground that if he answered, he would be incriminated, is that 
correct ? It is the same Howard Fast? 

Mr, Schine. That is the same Howard Fast, 

The Chairman. Will you read the list of books? 

Mr, Schine. The Last Frontier, Haym Solomon, Goethals and the 
Panama Canal, The Unvanquished, Citizen Tom Paine, Freedom 
Road, Patrick Henry and the Frigates Keel, The American, My 
Glorious Brothers, 

The Chairman, I would like to have the staff call this to the atten- 
tion of the new Secretary of State or his assistant, and I assume he 
will order those books removed from the information program 

Do we have a representative of the State Department here this 
morning? If not, will the staff contact the proper person in the 
Voice and ask for a complete list of all books stocked in all of our 
libraries under the information program ? I think the record should 
show, incidentally, that yesterday the Secretary of State accepted the 
resignation of the Administrator of the International Information 
Program. In view of the fact that this rather unusual order was 
issued by Mr. Bradley Connors, Assistant Administrator for Policy 
and Plans, the committee thought it might be well to run that down 
a little further, and find out why this particular order was issued, 
and find out something about Mr. I3radley Connors. 

We asked Miss Nancy Lenkeith to come down from New York to 
testify this morning. In order to maintain the continuity of the 
testimony, we will ask you to wait until later and put on some testi- 
mony regarding Bradley Connors. In view of the fact that the 
testimony is of an uncomplimentary nature, Mr. Connors has been 
notified to be here, and he will be given a chance to answer testi- 
mony after it is given. 

Who is the first witness, counsel ? 

Mr. CoHN. Dr, Wu of the Library of Congress, Mr. Chairman, 

The Chairman. Will you step up here, Dr, Wu? Will you raise 
your right hand? 

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly 
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God? 

Mr, Wu, I do. 


Mr, Cohn. What is your name, please? 

Mr, Wu, Kwant Tsing Wu. 

Mr, CoHN, And Dr. Wu, are you with the Library of Congress? 

Mr. Wu, Yes, I am. 


Mr. CoiiN. Are you fully conversant with the Chinese language? 

Mr. Wu. I think so. 

The Chairman, May I interrupt. Is Mr. Bradley Connors here? 
Mr. Connors, if you care to, you may step up here and sit at the desk. 
If you can hear back there, then you may stay where you are. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Chairman, before questioning Dr. Wu, I have refer- 
ence to part 11 of the hearing on the Institute of Pacific Relations 
conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary 
Committee in March 1952. On page 3786 of those hearings, it is in- 
dicated that a document was under consideration. That document 
was a statement made by a Chinese named Li Peng. 

The Chairman. This is described as a confession, is it not? 

Mr. CoHN. Yes, it is described as a confession of a Chinese Com- 
munist who had been captured by the Nationalist Government, and 
it was published under the auspices of the Chinese Government on 
September 3, 1950, in the Central Daily News appearing in Shanghai. 

The Chairman. Was this Chinese Communist subsequently ex- 
ecuted ? 

Mr. Cohn. I believe he was, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You are referring now to a document which pur- 
ports to be the confession of a Chinese Communist, a confession which 
was introduced before the McCarran committee during the Institute 
hearings, is that correct? 

Mr. Cohn. That is correct. The document was received as exhibit 
No. 558 in evidence before the Senate Internal Security Subcom- 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from pages 3788 and 3789 of 
the official record of the Internal Security subcommittee hearing, 
a translation of a short portion of that document. 

The Chairman. Are you reading from the original document? 

Mr. Cohn. No, I am reading from a translation of the document. 
It reads as follows : 

At the time [talking about the time of delicate negotiations between the 
United States Government and the Communist and Nationalist Governments 
of China wherein the Soviet intelligence was attempting to obtain secret in- 
formation as to the progress of certain negotiations and the attitude of our 
country, speaking of that time, it is stated] 

The Chairman. I hope I do not have to tell the photographers that 
they will not take flash pictures while a witness is testifying. I know 
this man is not technically testifying, but he is on the witness stand. 
I do not want to appear unreasonable, but a number of witnesses 
have complained that this disconcerts them and makes it difficult for 
them to testify if they have flash bulbs flashing in their faces. So I 
wish you would watch that a little more closely. 

Mr. Cohn (reading) : 

At the time the person in charge of information and intelligence in the Amer- 
ican Embassy, the Director General of the United States Information Service, 
John K. Fairbank, and his successor [and names some other people] were all 
persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the Nationalist Government. 
Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating 
to the nations concerned. Wittingly or unwittingly, they leaked out diplomatic 
secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into 
the ears of the Soviet intelligence personnel. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, the name of the successor of John K. Fair- 
bank, who was accused along with Fairbank in this document of 


having wittingly or unwittingly leaked out diplomatic secrets into the 
ears of Soviet intelligence personnel was not placed in the record of 
the McCarran committee because that particular person was not the 
subject of investigation by the McCarran committee at that time, 
although Dr. Fairbank was. We have asked Dr. Wu to ascertam 
for us the name of the successor to Dr. Fairbank who was accused 
along with Dr. Fairbank in this confession of having gotten this 
information wittingly or unwittingly into the hands of the Soviet 
military intelligence. If I may, I will now ask Dr. Wu to give us 
that name. 

The Chairman. Let me get his full name first. 

Mr. Wu. KwantTsing. 

The Chairman. And the last name is Wu ? 

Mr.Wu. Wu,W-u. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. CoHN. Can you give us the name of the successor to Dr. Fair- 
bank who in this document is accused of wittingly or unwittingly 
leaking out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the 
embassies of third countries into the ears of the Soviet intelligence 
personnel ? 

Mr. Wu. In the original, which I translated, in the Central Daily 
News of September 3, 1950, at that time the American information 
officer of the United States Embassy was Fairbank. He was suc- 
ceeded by Bradley Connors. 

Mr. CoHN. I have no further questions of Dr. Wu. 

The Chairman. Dr. Wu, have you translated the entire confession ? 

Mr.Wu. No, I don't believe I translated that. 

The Chairman. Do we have the translation of the entire confession ? 

Mr. CoHN. No, we have a translation of those portions which were 

The Chairman. Will you translate the entire confession, Doctor, 
and supply that to the committee, and we will mark that as an exhibit, 
and make it part of the record, and the page of the IPE, hearings 
which you referred to will be marked as an exhibit, and also made 
a part of the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 5" and 
"Exhibit No. 6." Exhibit No. 5 will be found in the appendix on 
p. 145. Elxhibit No. 6 may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

Senator Jackson. Do I understand that Mr. Connors was named 
as a Communist in this confession? I am a little bit confused here. 
I understand that Dr. Fairbank was the public information officer at 
the American Embassy. 

Mr. CoHN. Senator Jackson, the situation in this confession is that 
the Chinese Communist is naming several persons who wittingly or 
unwittingly leaked diplomatic secrets which reached the ears of Soviet 
intelligence personnel, because these persons were fundamentally dis- 
satisfied with the Nationalist Government. 

The Chairman. In other words, he does not name Mr. Connors as 
a Communist in this document. 

Mr. CoHN. No, he states he was fundamentally dissatisfied with the 
Nationalist Government, and wittingly or unwittingly he was respon- 
sible for leaking out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted 
through the embassies of third countries. 


Senator Jackson. Does lie say to whom he released the information ? 

Mr. CoiiN. Pardon me ? 

Senator Jackson. Is there anything in his statement or confession 
which indicates the names of the persons to whom the information 
was given ? 

Mr. CoHN. No, they do not specify the names of all the persons to 
whom information was given or any of the persons. They say that 
the information went through the embassies of third countries into 
the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel. 

Senator Jackson. And it involves secret information. 

Mr. Cohn. Yes, it involved secret information; there is no doubt 
about that. 

The Chairman. May I suggest that when this entire confession has 
been translated a copy be given to each of the members of the commit- 
tee, so that we may go over that ? We may want to question you fur- 
ther on that, Doctor. How soon could you supply that ? I know it is 
a rather lengthy document. 

Mr. Wu. About 3 days, I guess. 

The Chairman. That will be all right. You may step down. 

The next witness is John C. Caldwell. Will you stand up and raise 
your right hand. 

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemn- 
ly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth^ 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I do. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, before this witness is heard, may 
I say that I was detained because I was talking to some of the people 
from the State Department, and they have some witnesses they would 
like to have testify 'and present their viewpoint on the engineering 
facilities and so forth, and I told them I was sure we would be happy 
to have them heard. 

The Chairman. Yes, I will be happy to hear any witnesses from 
the State Department or Voice of America. I certainly want to get 
the complete picture. It is certainly a complicated picture. 

Senator Mundt. I told them we were simply looking for the facts 
and trying to save the most money for the taxpayers, and get down 
to the real source of the information. 

The Chairman. Very well ; the staff is now interviewing the wit- 
nesses suggested b}^ the Voice and the additional witnesses suggested 
by the other officers in the State Department. 


Mr. Cohn. Give us your full name. 
Mr. Caldwell. John C. Caldwell. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Caldwell, were you ever associated with the United 
States Department of State? 
Mr. Caldwell. Yes, I was. 
Mr. Cohn. During what years were you with the Department of 

Mr. Caldwell. From 1945 to 1947, and from 1949 to 1950. 
Mr. Cohn. What position did you hold when you left the Depart- 
ment of State in 1950 ? 


Mr. Caldwell. I was Deputy Director of the United States In- 
formation Service in South Korea. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Caldwell, in 1945 and 1946, where were you sta- 

Mr. Caldwell. I was stationed in Washington and m China. 

Mr. CoHN. When you were stationed in Washington, what was your 

position? T 1 . 

Mr. Caldwell. I was Chief of the China Branch of the whole in- 
formation program. 

Mr. CoHN. Was there a State Department officer in China who oc- 
cupied a similar position ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes. You might say he was my counterpart, the 
Acting Director of USIS in China. 

Mr. CoiiN. Could you give us his name? 

Mr. CALD^VELL. His name was John K. Fairbank. 

Mr. OoHN. Mr. Chairman, should we have an identification of Mr. 
Fairbank at this time? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. CoiiN. I would like to read from page 629 of part 2 of the 
hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations conducted by the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee, the testimony of Prof. Louis Francis 
Budenz of Fordliam University. 

On page 629, Mr. Robert Morris asked Mr. Budenz the following 
question : 

Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, 
particularly in 1945. 

That is from page 629 of the Senate Internal .Security Committee 

Now, you say that in 1945 

The Chairman. May I interrupt. In view of the fact that 
Fairbank denied membership in the party, I believe his testimony 
loefore the McCarran committee should be marked as an exhibit, and 
be made part of the record. 

Mr. CoHN. This is in part 11. We will have it marked as an exhibit 
and made a part of the record in this case. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7" and may 
be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. I understood this witness' testimony was that he 
hired Mr. Connors under the direction of Mr. Fairbank. 

Mr. CoHN. We have not gotten to that. The testimony will be that 
the witness advised us that Professor Fairbank sought a promotion 
for Mr. Connors. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. CoHN. You say that Mr. Fairbank was your counterpart in 
China ; is that right ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Did there come a time when you heard the name or saw 
the name of Bradley Connors in writing from Professor Fairbank? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes. As a matter of fact, I first heard Mr. Connors' 
name when he was still with the OWL Beginning, I would say, early 
in 1946, Mr. Fairbank wrote the Department — and I believe possibly 
cabled also, but I cannot be certain of that — that Mr. Connors' work 


was SO outstanding that he highly recommended an increase in sahiry 
and in responsibilities. 

Mr. CoHN. That was Mr. Bradley Connors ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. The same man we have been discussing here today ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. By the way, do you see Mr. Connors in the room ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sitting to my right — my left. 

The Chairman. Have the record show this is the Bradley Connors 
who as of today is the Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans. 

Do I understand, Mr. Counsel, that his task actually was policy 
director insofar as the international information programs are 
concerned ? 

Mr. CoHN. That is our information. 

Now, after the time that Mr. Fairbank recommended this promo- 
tion for Connors, did you actually meet Connors'? 

Mr. Caldwell. I went to China and the Philippines on a survey 
trip in February and March of 1946, and I am certain that was the 
first time I met Mr. Connors in the city of Shanghai, where he held 
the position of Director of Operations of the United States Informa- 
tion Service. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you have occasion to review any of Mr. Connors' 
work at that time '? 

Mr. Caldwell. No, not much occasion to review the work; occa- 
sion to meet Mr. Connors, become acquainted with him, and talk with 

Mr. CoHN. Did you form any impression as to his capabilities? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes. Frankly I was rather surprised after the 
glowing recommendations we had received, because I did not feel that 
Mr. Connors had the educational qualifications or general background 
or interest or knowledge of objectives he should have in that important 

INIr. CoHN. Did you bring these facts to the attention of Mr. 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoHN. What did he tell you ? 

Mr. Caldwell. He told me it was a matter of my not knowing Mr. 
Connors long enough, and if I knew him long enough I would realize 
that he had very high qualifications and was obviously the man for 
the job. 

Mr. CoHN. Did there come a time when you did get to know Mr. 
Connors long enough ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Later ; yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you work closely with him ? 

Mr. Caldwell. For a period of approximately 9 months. 

Mr. CoHN. Where was that ? 

Mr. Caldw^ell. That was in Shanghai and Nanking, China, from 
September of 1946 until approximately the middle or the 1st of May 

Mr. CoHN. Did you have occasion to discuss China policy in your 
official capacity and privately with Mr. Connors? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, considerable occasion. More occasion to dis- 
cuss operations rather than policy. But policy was discussed at times. 


Mr. CoHN. Now, in the course of these discussions with Mr. Con- 
nors, was he ever critical of the Chinese Communist Government ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I do not believe I ever heard Mr. Connors critical 
of the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. CoHN. Was he ever critical of the Chinese Nationalists, th(; 
government of Chiang Kai-shek? 

INIr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, he was extremely critical, as were most of 
the members of the embassy at that time, sometimes rather viciously 
so ; also on a personal basis of the leaders of the Nationalist Govern- 
ment, and the things they did. 

Mv. CoiiN. Did he ever draw any comparison in your presence 
between the intelligence and forcefulness of the leaders of the Com- 
munist movement and the intelligence and forcefulness of the leaders 
of the Nationalist movement ? 

Mr. Caldwell. The only recollection I have is once Mr. Connors 
saying to me that the Chinese Communist leaders, particularly GeiL 
Chou En-lai, were men of such outstanding caliber and intelligence 
and so forth, and compared them a little unfavorably to their counter- 
parts on the Nationalist side. 

The Chairman. Identify Chou En-lai. 

Mr. Caldwell. He is at the present time the Foreign Minister of 
the Chinese Peoples Republic. 

Mr. CoHN. That is the Chinese Communist Government? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Did Mr. Connors ever express an attitude toward the 
policies of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Japanese oc- 
cupation forces? 

Mr. Caldwell. Almost always those that were critical of Chiang 
were critical of what MacArthur did, and that was the case of Mr. 

Mr. CoHN. Did there ever come a time when Mr. Connors ever told 
you anything about any secret reports he was submitting to any of 
his superiors in the State Department ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. Could I say something first that will make 
my answer more intelligible? 

Mr. CoHN. Certainly. 

Mr. Caldwell. I went out as Acting Director of the United States 
Information Service. Mr. Connors as Director of Operations was 
subordinate to me. Shortly after my arrival in China, Mr. Connors 
was put in a position where I was actually the subordinate. I was 
sent back to Shanghai. He stayed in Nanking, and he became more or 
less the chief censor of all of the operations of the United States Em- 
bassy, and he told me quite frankly that he made reports on individ- 
uals who he felt were not in line with what Mr. Butterworth felt 
should be done. He did not expand on what "in line" meant, but most 
of tliose he disliked happened to be persons who were rather pro- 

The Chairman. May I interrupt at this time ? Mr. Cohn, in read- 
ing the confession of the Chinese Communist, I understand that the 
McCarran committee retained all names except the name of Fairbank 
in whom they have interest, and you have added only one name, the 
name of Connors. 

Mr. Cohn. That is correct. 


The Chairman. Is there any reason why all of the men named by 
the Chinese Communist in his confession should not aj^pear in the 
record at this time? 

Mr. CoHN. I can see no such reasons. The names are John Fair- 
bank, Bradley Connors, and Ambassador Butterfield. 

The Chairman, Just three names? 

Mr. CoHN. Those are the three names referred to in this section, Mr. 

The Chairman. Any other names of any other State Department 
officials referred to in"^ any other section of the confession that you 
know ? 

Mr. Cohn. No, sir, but I would ask this, Mr. Chairman, if we could 
review the entire confession and see if there are additional names 
which should be inserted in the record. 

Was this the same Ambassador Butterfield 

Mr. Caldwfxl. It is Butter worth. His correct title was Minister 
Counselor of the Embassy. 

Mr, Cohn. And his name is Butterworth? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. And this is the one you referred to just now? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. Did he share Mr. Connors' views of antagonism toward 
the Nationalist Government and MacArthur policies ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, he did. I think probably he was more careful 
in expressing those views than Mr. Connors was. But he certainly 
shared them. 

The Chairman. Was there any doubt in your mind at the time you 
were in China that both Coniiors and Butterworth favored the Chinese 
Communists over the Nationalists? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, there was some doubt, because you have to have 
been there to understand the general hatred of Chiang on the part oi 
most of our Embassy people ; a very unreasoning hatred. It was not 
always, you might say, accompanied by praise of the Chinese Com- 
munists. In other words, it is very difficult to say that this individual 
was anti-Chiang but also pro-Communist. 

The Chairman. In other words, some of these men could dislike 
and be critical of the Chiang government without necessarily liking 
the Communists. 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. There were times I was critical of certain 
things that were done, and there were many others or some others like 
that, I am sure. 

The Chairman. How about these two individuals, Connors and 
Butterworth? How did they appear to feel toward the Chinese 

Mr. Caldwell. I honestly cannot say that I ever heard either of 
them praise the Chinese Communists. It was more the denunciation 
of the other side. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, did these secret reports that were submitted 
against people who were not in line with these views ever result in the 
dismissal of any persons from the Department of State? 

Mr. Caldwell. I believe it did. I believe also Mr. Connors' re- 
porting activities certainly resulted in the control of individuals. 
By that I mean placing them in positions where they could no longer 
do independent reporting of facts. They had to channel what they 


did through him. It was my understanding that many reports were 
changed, or at least covered by a dissenting report before they got to 

Mr. CoHN. Is it your testimony that as far as you know a^ of the 
secret reports were directed against people who were not in line with 
the anti-Nationalist views? 

Mr. Caldwell. I wouldn't say, sir, that all of them were against 
such persons, but I believe those most unpopular in the Embassy's 
staff were those unquestionably who were pro-Chiang and who were 

The Chairman. Mr. Caldwell, do I understand your testimony to 
be. No. 1, that John K. Fairbanks, who has been named a Communist 
under oath and has also been named in this Chinese confession, was 
a man who contacted you and favored a promotion for Mr. Bradley 
Connors, who is now directing the policy and information program ; 
that while you were in China you found that Bradley Connors and 
Butterworth, both of whom were named in this confession, were ac- 
tive in trying to bring into line anyone who was anti-Communist and 
pro-Chiang Kai-shek ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge that is the 
situation that existed. I might say that there was a rationalization 
of it. The idea was that everybody had to be completely controlled 
so that the Communists would not be offended by anything that was 
done. That seemed to be the basic idea behind the actions. 

The Chairman. Senator Mundt, any questions? 

Senator Mundt. Just one. Do you know of your own personal 
knowledge of any reports which were changed by Connors en route- 
to Washington? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, but unfortunately I cannot identify them. 
There were certain reports on the operations of the United States 
Information Service. There was one very important anti-Commu- 
nist report which I made which was not changed as such, but which 
Mr. Connors and Mr. Butterworth claimed, after it had been released 
to the press and caused consideraole consternation, that I had done it 
without authority, and was guilty of insubordination. It was, I 
believe, one of the first anti-Communist reports ever submitted from 

Senator Mundt. I think there is a difference between accompanying 
the report made by a field man with a dissenting report by one of your 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And actually changing the report itself. I was 
\vondering whether you knew of any reports that had been chano-ed 
from your own personal knowledge. '^ 

Mr. Caldweli.. I could not say under oath that I could pinpoint a 
report that had been actually changed. I am of the belief that re- 
ports were changed, but I cannot prove that. 

Senator Jackson. Did you leave the Department in 1950 did vou 
say? ' *^ ' 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Jackson. Did you resign, or what was 

Mr. Caldwell. That depends entirely on who you talk to in the 
Department of State, and what personnel papers you look at. 


Senator Jacksox. Can you tell the committee jnst what happened ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I was in Korea. I went out for the Army. I be- 
came Deputy Chief of the Army's information program. When the 
army of occupation ended, I was asked to be Deputy Director of the 
United States Information Service under the State Department. I 
did take that 

Senator Jackson. What year was that ? 

Mr. Caldwell. That was January 1, 1949, when I took over that 
job. I was in charge of all of our operations in South Korea. I 
supposedly had done a very good job, had excellent efficiency ratings, 
was praised b}' all concerned, until Mr. Connors became Public Affairs 
Officer for the Far East, 

Shortly after that I received a cable, the Embassy received a cable, 
rather peremptorily transferring me to Washington. I felt from the 
tone of the cable that there was trouble ahead of me. I did not wish 
to leave Korea. I asked the Ambassador if I might resign in Korea, 
and go into business. He asked me to stay on for a few months until 
a replacement could come. I actually resigned on the 21st of January, 
received papers to that effect, and later those papers were amended 
b^y the Department to show that I had resigned under pressure as a 
suspected Communist. 

Senator Jackson. You resigned according to the amendment to your 
resignation papers as a suspected Communist i 

Mr. Cald\vell. The wording was "security risk," and later I have 
been informed that the Department has informed persons, my pub- 
lisher, magazines interested in articles from me, that I had a long 
lecorcl myself of activities with pro-Communist peoples. That is the 
charge that has been held against me since I returned from Korea. 

The Chairman. That charge was not made at the time you resigned ? 

Mr. Caldwell. No, sir; no charge whatsoever was made when I 

Senator Jackson. Are you now or have you ever been a member 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I certainly have not. 

Senator Jackson, Have you ever belonged to any Communist- 
front organizations so listed by the Attorney General, or are you now 
a member? 

Mr. Caldwell. 1 am not. I think the only two clubs I ever belonged 
to were the Ornithological Club, because I am one of those queer bird 
watchers, and the Nashville China Club. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Caldwell, just a couple of other questions. 
Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. — I believe you testified 
that he is not a Communist? 

Mr. Caldwell, Who, sir? 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Connors. 

Mr. Caldwell. No, sir. In my own judgment I would never dream 
that Mr. Connors is a Communist. I have always thought of him as 
a very ruthless opportunist who played along with whoever could 
get him to the top the quickest. 

Senator Jackson. There has been considerable friction between you 
and Mr. Connors since your period in China? 

Mr. Caldwell. It is only fair to say that Mr. Connors and I have 
not gotten along very well. 


Senator Jackson. Do you have any reason to doubt his loyalty ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I never have had reasons to doubt his loyalty. I 
have had reason to doubt his judgment, but not his loyalty. 

Senator Jackson. You disagree with his judgment but not his 
loyalty ? 

Mr. Caldavell. That is my own opinion, sir, yes. 

The Chairman. You said that you thought Mr. Connors would play 
along with anybody who would get him to the top. When you were 
in China, the Avay to get to the top was to play along with those who 
opi^osed Chiang Kai-shek and favored Communists, what they called 
then the democratic regime in China. 

Mr. Caldwell. That is very true and to indicate how it worked, 
the anti-Communist report which I mentioned I had made, which I 
made on the re(|uest of the Department, was a report on Chinese Com- 
nuniist propaganda lines, methods, aims, particularly those directed 
against America. When that report was released to the United Press, 
and In-iefly carried in the papers — I might say it was an honest and 
factual report, I was just showing what I found out — I was repri- 

The Chairman. I do not want to go into that report at this time. 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. But I was reprimanded very severely for 
making the report. 

The Chairman. For making the anti-Communist report? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, I was. 

The Chairman. Then you would say as far as Mr. Connors is con- 
cerned, his playing along with Butterworth, his opposition to anti- 
Communists, his opposition to MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek, may 
have been merely the result of his desire to be promoted and get higher 
in the State Department, rather than any strong feeling on the 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir ; that would be my own opinion. That is 
what I felt during these last few years. 

The Chairman. And your experience was that those who stood up 
and took the opposite position from Mr. Connors, those who opposed 
communism in China, those who favored the recognized government 
of China, they were, as far as you know, gradually demoted or elimi- 
nated from the China area? 

Mr. Caldwell. They had a rather difficult time. 

The Chairman. Senator Potter. 

Senator Potter. Mr. Caldwell, did I understand your testimony 
that Mr. Connors told you that he was sending secret memoranda to 
Washington on personnel within the Information Service? 

Mr. Caldw^ell. No, sir, not to Washington. To the Embassy in 

Senator Potter. Who did he send it to? 

Mr. Caldwell. To Mr. Butterwortli. 

Senator Potter. Who was the head of the program at that time? 

Mr. Caldwell. He was not the Ambassador, but in effect he was 
really the Ambassador, because he controlled the progi^am. 

Senator Potter. And apparently also from your testimony, you 
either conformed sit tliat time to the anti-Chiang philosophy or else 
you had a pretty difficult time. 

Mr. Caldwell. You couldn't even be in the middle. As I said be- 
fore, I was certainly critical of certain things that were done in China, 

statb: department information program 125 

as nearly every person who has been there. I watched communism 
with interest until I realized without any question what it was. I 
was not completely on the Chiancj side. I was not against them. But 
even in that attitude, a person like myself had serious trouble. 

Senator Potter. At the time you were over there in the beginning, 
you and Mr. Connors had equal status, is that riglit ^ 

Mr. Caldwell. No, sir, I was superior to Mr. Connors. 

Senator Potter. Then how long a period did it take before he 
became your superior ? 

Mr. Caldw^ell. He never became superior in position or in salary, 
but in actuality he became my superior in about 3 or 4 weeks after 
1 arrived. 

Senator Potter. And it is your belief that the reason for this hap- 
pening is the fact that he had strong anti-Chiang views, or at least 
he had no anti-Communist views at that time? 

Mr. Caldwell. I think certainly that must be a part of it. I may 
be doing Mr. Connors an injustice, but that is the only way I can 
figure it. 

Senator Potter. And your views were well known as being 

Mr. Caldwell. I think they were. There were certain people who 
for reasons unknown to me always assumed I could be had as far as 
the Communists were concerned. I wouldn't say that I was com- 
pletely known as a complete anti-Communist. I was certainly not 
known as pro-Communist. Generally, I was known as somewhat pro- 
Chiang. I think that is the best way I could put it. 

Senator Potter. Do you have any idea who initiated the charges 
that you were pro-Communist through documents that went in your 

Mr. Caldwell. Xo, sir. I wouldn't want to say who I think did it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Caldwell, we have had so much testimony 
before this committee, and so much material gathered by the staff 
to show tampering with the files, removal of material from the files, 
we would like to have any information which you have which might 
help us to find out who inserted material in the .file. If your informa- 
tion is not of such a nature that you would care to make the names 
public at this time, I want you to give it to the staff in any event. 

Mr. Caldw^ell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Caldwell, you stated when you first went to 
China, you had a status which was superior to that of ISIr. Connors. 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. And subsequently it was changed, which in fact 
gave him more authority than you. Who was responsible for bring- 
ing about that change? Who made the decision? 

Mr. Caldw^ell. Mr. Butterworth, I believe, made that decision. 

Senator Mundt. The Ambassador ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. McClellan. 

Senator McClellan. No questions, Mr. Chairman. I just came in. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make this observa- 
tion, that if Mr. Caldwell has any information in his State Depart- 
ment file in which he is listed as a suspected Communist, which I 
believe he stated according to his testimony, that the Department 
people certainly ought to be up here to explain that matter. 


The Chairman. May I say, Senator Jackson, before we called this 
witness, we checked on" his background as well as we could, and found 
he had a long reputation of being anti-Communist, and while in China 
had a reputation of being pro-MacArthur and pro-Chiang Kai-shek. 
He wrote The Korean Story, which gives a fairly good picture of his 
attitude. We have heard the charge that a considerable period of 
time after he left the State Department someone did insert in his file 
material to indicate he was a pro-Communist. We do not know who 
it was. 

Senator Jackson. That is what I would like to find out; who was 
responsible ? 

The Chairman. We will try to do that. Mr. Caldwell, will you 
step down ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Bradley Connoi's. Mr. Connors, will you raise 
your right hand? In this matter now in hearing before the com- 
mittee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Connors. I do. 

The Chairman. May I say to the other Senators at this time, that 
the staff attempts to get a brief on each witness before they appear 
so all the Senators will have a complete picture. However, because 
of a limited staff, we do not always have a brief at the time the wit- 
ness testifies. 

Your name is Bradley Connors ? 


Mr. Connors. W. Bradley Connors. 

The Chairman. How long have you been with the State Depart- 
ment, Mr. Connors? 

Mr. Connors. Since July 1, 1946. 

The Chairman. Will you speak a little louder? 

Mr. Connors. July 1, 1946, 1 believe. 

The Chairman. Your title as of today is what? 

Mr. Connors. Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans, Inter- 
national Information Administration. 

The Chairman. You will have to speak a little louder. 

Senator Mundt. I cannot hear you. 

Mr. Connors. Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans, Inter- 
national Information Administration, Department of State. 

The Chairman. Actually are you what would be known as the top- 
man insofar as policy for the information program is concerned? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The answer is "Yes"? 

Mr. Connors. Yes. 

The Chairman. We had a memorandum introduced in the record 
the other day, one which was canceled by Mr. Dulles, when he learned 
of it, a memorandum having to do with the works of Howard Fast; 
and as you undoubtedly know, Mr, Fast appeared yesterday, and re- 
fused to testify whether he believed in the overthrow of this Govern- 
ment by force and violence, and he refused on the ground if he testi- 
fied it would incriminate him. 


In answer to Senator McClellan's question he said he honestly be- 
lieved if he told the truth in answering: that question, it would incrimi- 
nate him. 

Now, No. 1, did you sign this memorandum? 
Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is the memorandum dated February 3, 1953. 
We also have another memorandum dated March 7, 1952. This mem- 
orandum lists as acceptable for the information libraries throughout 
the world the following works by Howard Fast: Haym Salomon, 
Goethals and the Panama Canal, The Unvanquished, Citizen Tom 
Paine, Patrick Henry and the Frigate's Keel, The American, My Glo- 
rious Brothers. It lists as unacceptable : The Last Frontier, Freedom 
Road, Clarkton, The Children, and Departure. 

Did you have anything to do with the preparation of this memo- 
randum ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 
The Chairman. You did not? 
Mr. Connors. No. 

The Chairman. Were you head of the Department at the time this 
was issued, March 7, 1952 ? 
Mr. Connors. This was issued by the International Information 

Service Center and much 

The Chairman. Were you head of the Department ? 
Mr. Connors. I think I became policy director on March 25, 1952. 
The Chairman. Do you know who was policy director at the time 
this was issued approving a sizable number of the works of Howard 

Mr. Connors. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs was re- 
sponsible for policy at that time. 

The Chairman. Mr. Connors, hoAv much of an authority are you 
on the Communist movement ? 
Mr. Connors. I am not. 

The Chairman. You are not an authority. Have you ever read 
any of the works of Marx or Lenin, Engels ? 
Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Any of the works of Stalin ? 
Mi". Connors. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you ever studied a history of the Communist 
movement, their methods of operation ? 
Mr. Connors. I have never studied them. 

The Chairman. In other words, as far as you are concerned, your 
mind is pretty much a blank as far as the workings of the Communist 
Party is concerned ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, that is not true, because I depend on research 
and intelligence prepared by the Department on these things. They 
provide me with the propaganda lines and the actions that the Com- 
munist Party is planning. 

The Chairman. You said they provide you with the propaganda 
lines. In this directive issued February 3, 1953, you were setting down 
the propaganda line yourself, were you not, or was that upon the 
advice of someone else ? 
Mr. Connors. I did not write this directive. 
The Chairman. You signed it. 


Mr. Connors. I have signed it. It was prepared at the direction of 
Dr. Compton, following several recommendations. 

The Chairman. When you signed it, you obviously must have 
agreed with it. 

Mr. Connors. I had been informed that Dr. Compton had person- 
ally approved it, and had made certain editorial changes himself in it. 

The Chairman. Who informed you that Dr. Compton had ap- 
proved it? 

Mr. Connors. Allen Haden. 

The Chairman. A-1-l-e-n? 

Mr. Connors. Right. 

The Chairman. H-a-y-d-e-n? 

Mr. Connors. H-a-d-e-n. 

The Chairman. H-a-d-e-n. Did you agree with this document 
which you signed authorizing the use of the works of this Communist 
writer ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't think the directive authorized. 

The Chairman. Instead of saying Communist writer, this man 
who has a reputation of being a Communist writer. 

Mr. Connors. The directive does not authorize the use of Howard 
Fast's materials. 

The Chairman. Let me read the paragraph. 

The reputation abroad of an author — 

I am reading from the memorandum you signed — 

affects the actual utility of the material. If he is widely and favorably known 
abroad as a champion of democratic causes, his credibility and utility may be 
enhanced. Similarly if — like Howard Fast — he is known as a Soviet-endorsed 
author, materials favorable to the United States in some of his works may there- 
by be given a special credibility among selected key audiences. 

Would you not construe that as an authorization to use certain 
works of Howard Fast? 

Mr. Connors. That is not the operative section of the directive. 
The operative section is where the criteria are established which states 
that in the selection of materials as a general rule it should be possible 
to draw upon the great body of resources available, produced by 
persons whose ideological position is unquestioned. 

The Chairman. In other words, you say that this does not author- 
ize the use of the works of Howard Fast by the international infor- 
mation program? 

Mr. Connors. Only under very restrictive conditions. 

The Chairman. Who determines what those restrictive conditions 
are ? Are they set forth in this policy directive ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Do you approve of this 
memorandum of March 7, 1952, which authorizes the purchase and 
distribution throughout the world of seven of the works of this man 
who says, "I refuse to answer whether I would fight the Communists 
in Korea because if I told the truth it might incriminate me" ? A man 
who says "I refuse to answer whether I favor the overthrow of this 
Government by force and violence because if I told the truth it might 
incriminate me." Do you favor the purchase and distribution of 
these works throughout the world? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 


The Chairman. Seven of them. 

Mr. Connors. That directive would have been canceled by the new 

The Chairman. It would have been ? 

Mr. Connors. That is right. 

The Chairman. Has it ever been canceled? 

Mr. Connors. The new one got canceled. 

The Chairman. The new one got canceled. How about this old 

Mr. Connors. Now, there is at the moment 

The Chairman. How about this memorandum of March 7, 1952? 
Do you not think that should be canceled ? 

Mr. Connors. It has been canceled in effect by a memorandum that 
no materials by any controversial persons. Communist fellow travel- 
ers, et cetera, will be used under any circumstances by any IIA media. 

The Chairman. That was the order issued by Dulles after he learns 
of this memorandum that you issued. 

Mr. Connors. I don't know whether it was issued by Mr. Dulles. 
I was informed by Mr. McArdle. 

Senator Potter. What was the date of this memorandum which you 
just read? 

Mr. Connors. February 18. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask a question. It was not canceled 
upon your initiative or recommendation. It was after these hearings 
began and this exposure was in process; is that correct? 

Mr. Connors. The February 3d directive was canceled after the 
hearings started. 

Senator McClellan. I understand that this order of March 7, 
1952, so far as your administration is concerned, remained in effect 
until after these hearings started and this exposure began to develop. 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, that would have been amended and countered 
by this directive which was issued on January 30. 

The Chairman. January 30? 

Mr. Connors. It is dated January 30. It was issued on February 

Senator Mundt. February 3, 1953. 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Does this one of February 3 make any specific 
reference to the previous directive ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. How do you say it would be canceled by it? 
How would anyone know it was canceled until you referred to it 
specifically ? 

Mr. Connors. The various media divisions of the Information 
Administration are responsible for implementing the policy that is 
laid down in the policy directives and this was their directive, this 
March 7, 1952, circular. 

Senator McClellan. That is true. If you wanted to cancel it, 
why did you not say so in the directive of February 3? Why did 
you not say it was canceled or revoked, so there would be no mistake 
about it? 

The Chairman. Actually I may say — again I catch myself saying 
"Mr. Chairman," since you served as chairman so long — Mr. McClel- 


Ian, that it is obvious that the order dated February 3 does not 

Senator McClellan. He is saying it does. I want to point out 
if he actually meant to cancel it, why did he not say so ? 

Senator Mundt. Let us simplify it, Mr. Chairman, by having the 
M^tness read the language that cancels it. 

The Chairman. Read the language. 

Mr. Connors. There is nothing in the February 3 directive that 
refers to the March 7 directive. 

Senator Mundt. You said it canceled it. 

Mr. Connors. It sets up different criteria. 

Senator Mundt. You said it canceled it. If it cancels it, you read 
the language. 

]Mr. Connors. I can't read the language to say it cancels. 

Senator Mundt. In fact, it does not cancel it at all ; it supplements 
it and supports it and sets up some criteria for implementing the 
March 7 order. 

Mr. Connors. I think you are probably right, Mr. Mundt. 

Senator Mundt. Of course we are. 

Senator Jackson. Who is on this Advisory Commission on Infor- 
mation Exchange? 

Mr. Connors. The Chairman is Dr. J. L. Morrill, president of the 
University of Minnesota. 

The Chairman. How do you spell that ? 

Mr. Connors. M-o-r-r-i-1-1. The members are Mark Starr, edu- 
cational director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers 
Union ; Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University ; Martin 
R. P. McGuire, professor of Catholic University in Washington; 
Edwin F. Fred, president of the University of Wisconsin. 

The Chairman. Am I correct that they submitted a report semi- 
annually, and that you were responsible for the day-to-day operations 
as far as policy was concerned ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you one other question. You say that 
this order of March 7, which instructed the procurement of Fast's 
books, and distribution throughout the world, has been canceled. 
Wliat steps have you taken to have his books removed from the in- 
formation libraries throughout the world? 

Mr. Connors. I have not taken any steps. 

The Chairman. Do you not think it is about time? 

Mr. Connors. I have just sent this directive yesterday to the media, 
and I expect them to take the steps. 

The Chairman. To the what? 

Mr. Connors. To the information centers service, which is responsi- 
ble for the libraries. 

The Chairman. Do you not think that as well as ordering them 
not to procure more works from Communist writers, that you should 
say "Remove the books by Connnunist writers from the shelves of the 
information program libraries?" 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you take such action? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 


Senator Jackson. Something was referred to, I think, in the memo- 
randum about this Advisory Commission on Education, and I want 
to get this clear in my own mind. Did they have anything to do with 
this memorandum of February 3 ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Did they approve it? 

Mr. Connors. No, there are two 

Senator Jackson. Who approved it? 

Mr. Connors. It was approved personally by each of the Assistant 
Administrators of the Information Administration, by the Deputy 
Administrator for Field Programs, and I was told that it had Dr. 
Compton's personal approval, and included his personal editing of 
the language. Based on those facts, I issued it. 

Senator Jackson. This Commission, the names which you read a 
moment ago, did they have anything to do with it? Did they approve 

Mr. Connors. No, sir; but the Educational Commission recom- 
mended that the criterion for determining the availability of books 
for inclusion in the collections of USIS libraries abroad be based on 
content without regard to authorship. 

Senator Jackson. Without regard to authorship? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir ; that is the recommendation of the committee. 

Senator Jackson. Who made the recommendation? Give me the 
names of them. 

Mr. Connors. That step was taken in a motion unanimously adopt- 
ed in a meeting on December 4, 1952, of the United States Advisory 
Commission on Education. I believe all members of the Commission 
were present except Dr. Dodds. Whether he has concurred in this 
report which has been drafted since, I do not know. 

Senator Jackson. Will you state the exact language of what they 
agi'eed to at this December 4 meeting ? 

Mr. Connors, The minutes say : 

The Commission by motion unanimously adopted and endorsed this latter 
resolution and recommendations — that the criterion for determining the avail- 
ability of books for inclusion in the collections of USIS libraries abroad be based 
on content without regard to authorship. 

Senator Jackson. Does that mean by implication that they agreed 
to the inclusion of the Howard Fast books ? 

Mr. Connors. I could not answer for sure. 

Senator Jackson. Were Fast books discussed at this meeting ? 
Were you present? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir; I was not present. The Commission's 
recommendation was based on a recommendation from its own sub- 
committee called the Committee on Books Abroad, and that Commit- 
tee on Books Abroad was chairmaned by Dr. McGuire, of Catholic 
University, and included Charles P. Brett, president of McMillan & 
Co., Cass Canfield, chairman of the board, Harper & Bros., Robert L. 
Crowell, president, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Keyes D. Metcalf, di- 
rector of libraries for Harvard University, That committee recom- 

The Chairman. Mr. Connors, regardless of this list of names that 
you read off to us, you made the final decision, did you not, as policy 

(No response.) 


The Chairman. You had some boards to advise you as to what you 
should do, but you were the man who made the final decision; is that 
correct ? 

Mr, Connors. Well, based on 

The Chairman. Did you or did you not ? 

Mr. Connors. I made it based on the recommendation that Dr. 
Compton had approved. He is my superior. 

The Chairman. But you made the final decision as far as policy 
for the information program is concerned. 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. I would consider he made the decision, 
since he sent it to me with his approval. 

The Chairman. Who would issue the directive ? 

Mr. Connors. He is my superior. 

The Chairman. Who would issue the directive and sign it 5 

Mr. Connors. I issued it on his behalf. 

The Chairman. Did you always send every directive to Dr. 
Compton to get his approval ? 

Mr. Connors. Not always. 

The Chairman. In those cases where you did not send the directive 
to Dr. Compton, in those cases you were the final, ultimate, supreme 
court ? 

Mr. Connors. That is not true in the way the policy mechanism 
functions. Depending on the areas of policy .involved, the policy 
statements need the concurrence, the clearance of the various geo- 
graphic bureaus involved in the Department, and the public affairs 

The Chairman. You are policy director. 

Mr. Connors. That is right. 

The Chairman. And you say you do not determine policy ? 

Mr. Connors. I determine the policy but it is subject to review by 
certain elements of the Department of State before it can be issued. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : Just forgetting for the time 
being your name is Brad Connors and forget for the time being you 
are the policy director, would you say it is wise to have as policy di- 
rector a man who says, "I have never studied the wori<:s on any of 
the authorities of communism, I have never studied the Communist 
movement, I have never studied to determine how they work, how they 
infiltrate ?" Do you think it is wise to have a man with that complete 
lack of knowledge by his own admission directing the policy of a 
multimillion-dollar program that is designed to fight communism? 
Would it not be better to put a man with that lack of knowledge which 
you profess in some other department where he would fit and put a man 
in your job who knows something about the Communist movement? 
Wlio, for example, has studied the works of Lenin, Engels, Marx, 
and Stalin. Who knows the insidiousness of their workings. Is not 
that a reasonable conclusion? 

Mr. Connors. I have the assistance of fully trained and capable 
specialists. I bring a propaganda view to the policy which is im- 
portant, too. 

The Chairman. Would you say a fully trained and capable spe- 
cialist urged that we purchase seven of the works of a known Commu- 
nist writer and distribute them throughout the world? 

Mr. Connors. I did not issue that directive, and it was not prepared 
in my office. 

STATE dp:partment information program 133 

The Chairman. You issued a directive subsequently -svhich said you 
could use the works of this same author. In other words, No. 1, you 
have a directive dated March 7, 1952, a few days before you took over, 
which says buy the works of this Communist author. Then a year 
later you issue a directive sayinoj it is all right to use the works of 
this Communist author, naming him. "What trained specialist ad- 
vised you to do that ? 

Mr. CoxNORS. No one advised me, because I didn't draft this 
directive but from what I understand. Fast's name was used because 
there had been so much discussion about him, because of this March 7, 
1952, directive, and to call attention to the fact that under the new 
directive we were setting up restrictive criteria for use of any books 

Senator Mundt. At the time you issued this directive, did you or 
the people in the State Department know that Howard Fast had served 
a term in the Federal penitentiary for contempt of Congress, because 
he refused to disclose Communist records under his control at that 
time ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't think I had any personal knowledge, but I 
couldn't answer. 

Senator Mundt. Would it not be helpful to have somebody in the 
Department who knew something about who had been going to jail 
because they had concealed facts from Congress? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. That is the point the chairman was trying to make. 
May I say that this memorandum which was handed me by the staff, 
Mr. Connors, it says that in connection with the Commission's recom- 
mendation, you and Dr. Compton disagreed with the i-ecommendation ; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Connors. That is right. We felt that the Commission's rec- 
ommendation was too all-inclusive and too broad, and that we had to 
set up certain restrictive criteria. 

Senator Mundt. You simply disagreed with the details of the rec- 
ommendations and not its purpose or its objective. 

Mr. Connors. That is right. 

Senator Jackson. Was it a Commission's recommendation? If I 
understand the reading of the language that you submitted to the 
committee, any book, any author could be used. Was that recom- 
mendation ? 

Mr. Connors. That is right. The recommendation says specifically 
based on content without regard to authorship. 

Senator Jackson. That was the recommendation of the advisory 
committee ? 

Mr. Connors. That was the recommendation of the Advisory Com- 
mission, and the Advisory Commission's recommendation was based 
on the Committee of Books Abroad recommendation to it which said : 

The Committee is positive and unanimous in its decision to recommend to the 
United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange that authorship 
should not be a criterion for determining whether or not a book is available for 
USIS libraries abroad. 

In this connection the committee is unanimous in its recommendation 
that the content of the book, regardless of authorship, be the criterion 
which determines its availability for inclusion in USIS libraries. 


The Chairman. Mr. Connors, let me ask you this: Have you 
changed your mind ? Do you think now that we shoukl not distribute 
the works of known Communist autliors through the information pro- 
gram, or do you still think that some of their books should be used? 

Mr. Connors. I think that you have a use for some of them in trying 
to convince leftwingers and fellow travelers if you have something 
that has material that is favorable to the United States, is not opposed 
to any of our policies or principles. You might be able to use it to 
influence a leftwinger, a fellow traveler, and as a result of an effort in 
that way, then give him some other materials which would be 100- 
percent American. 

The Chairman. In other words, give him some Communist ma- 

Mr. Connors. That is a little bait. 

The Chairman. And some American material. Yesterday I under- 
stand you told the staff that you could not define the theory of com- 
munism, that you could not describe the practices of the Conmiunist 
Party ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Connors. Well, I think 

The Chairman. Is that essentially correct? 

Mr. Conncrs. That is what happened yesterday. 

The Chairman. If that is true, then how can you take a book writ- 
ten by a very clever Communist author, and determine whether it 
should be used or not, if you say you cannot define communism in 
theory or in practice ? 

Mr. Connors. The determination of the books is not my responsi- 

The Chairman. Do you not make the final decision? 

Mr. Connors. No. 

The Chairman. Wlio makes the final decision on the question of 
books ? 

Mr. Connors. The final decision on the question of books is made 
by the Assistant Administrator for the International Information 
denter Service. 

The Chairman. So your thought as of today is that as Director of 
Policy for the information program you should allow the use of 
Communist books and leave it up to someone else of discretion as to 
nhich Communist books should be used. 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, I do not agi'ee to that. 

The Chairman. All right. As of today do you think you should 
issue an order saying no Communist books should be used? 

Mr. Connors. There is such an order. 

Tlie Chairman. A minute ago you thought there was a valid use 
for books by Communist authors. Have you changed 

Mr. Connors. It does not. I issued an order which said — concern- 
ing use of materials by controversial persons — in order to avoid all 
misunderstanding, no materials by any controversial persons, Com- 
munists, fellow^ travelers, et cetera, will be used under any circum- 
stances by an II A media. 

The Chairman. You were ordered to issue that through Mr. Dulles' 
office, were you not ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't know whether that 

The Chairman. You were ordered to issue that memorandum ; is 
that correct? You did not initiate it? 


Mr. Connors. It was suggested that I should put out an order. I 
I'escinded the original. The original instructions to me was to rescind 
the February 3 order. 

The Chairman. Now, let me ask you this 

Mr. Connors. Then it was at the same time suggested that we 
should ban everything, so I drew up this instruction based on that. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. 

Mr. Connors. So I would say it was on direction of the Secretary, 
if the word came from him. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Unless I misunderstood 
you a few minutes ago, you said you thought that the works of some 
Communist writers could be used. 

Mr. Connors. They cannot be used. 

The Chairman. As of this moment, do you still think that the 
works of some Communist writers should be used in the information 
program, as of this moment ? 

Mr. Connors. Based on a standing directive that has been issued, 
they cannot be used. 

The Chairman. My question is, Do you think they should be used ? 
Do you think they have a place in our information program ? Forget 
about your directive for the time being. It is a simple question, Mr. 
Connors. The question is. Do you think we should use the works 
of Conmiunist authors in the fight against communism ? It is not a 
difficult question. 

Mr. Connors. We quote Stalin and Marx every once in a while for 
speech-propaganda purposes. I do not think we should have them 
in our libraries, ancl I don't think we should give the books out to 
people to read. 

The Chairman. So you think that was a mistake, a very serious 
mistake, when this order of March 7 was issued, saying purchase the 
works of a Communist writer, a Communist who served time in the 
Federal penitentiary. Do you say today that was a serious mistake, 
Mr. Connors ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Can you tell us now who is responsible for this 
particular order? 

Mr. Connors. I believe this order was issued by Mr. Dan Lacey. 

The Chairman. Where is he now ? 

Mr. Connors. He is now at the Library of Congress, but he was 
the Assistant Administrator for the Information Center Service. 

The Chairman. One further question, Mr. Connors. We have had 
testimony here that the two key broadcast stations to be located in the 
United States in the Voice program have been located within what 
is known as the Auroral absorption belt. In other words, the mag- 
netic storm area. Testimony has been that it takes a tremendous 
amount of power to penetrate that magnetic storm area, and get the 
radio signals to the target area ; in other words. Communist Russia 
or whatever it happens to be. The testimony has been that we could 
save approximately $9,000,000 in each of those stations if they are 
moved outside of that magnetic storm area. 

In line with that, the tAvo stations in question. Baker East and 
Baker West, have been canceled out. 

Let me ask you this : If I were in your Department, and I were a 
member of the Communist Party attempting to sabotage the Voice 


program, would it not be wise for me to try and locate the stations 
within that magnetic storm area so they would be subject to jamming 
by Communist Russia and so that we could not hit the target area 
with radio signals? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would that not be the logical thing, if I were a 
Communist, to do ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. May I ask this : Do you think that mislocation of 
those two stations was the result of stupidity or the result of a deliber- 
ate attempt to sabotage the Voice ? 

Mr. Connors. So far as I know the locations were picked based on 
surveys by competent radio engineers and a study by the Massachu- 
setts Institute of Technology. This is outside of my sphere of respon- 
sibility, and I do not have all the facts. 

The Chairman. Are you aware of tlie fact that over a year ago 
when only $200,000 had been spent on Baker West, all the engineers 
apparently agreed that Mr. Herrick then sent a memorandum to 
Mr. Compton saying : 

It is a mistake to locate Baker West where it is located ; it should be moved. 
However, if we move it, we run into congressional investigations ; we may lose 
our fund. Therefore, let us leave it in this area. 

Are you aware of that? 

Mr. Connors. I read what was developed at the hearing. 

The Chairman. I am sorry. I said Mr. Herrick. It was General 
Stoner who sent the memorandum. 

On another subject, how well do you know Edmund Oliver Clubb? 
I refer to the Edmund Oliver Clubb who is discharged as a security 
risk under the loyalty program. How well do you know him? 

Mr. Connors. I knew him to the extent that he was an associate 
in the Department of State. I first met him when he was assigned to 
a post in China and had normal business dealings with him. He 
was later in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and I saw him there 
on a daily business basis. 

The Chairman. Have you met and advised with him since he was 
discharged under the loyalty program ? 

Mr. Connors. He was not discharged under the loyalty program. 

The Chairman. Since he was allowed to resign after the Loyalty 
Review Board had recommended his discharge, then, have you met 
and advised with Edmund Oliver Clubb after he resigned, which 
resignation was after the Loyalty Review Board had recommended 
his discharge under the loyaky program? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. He came in to consult with me about some 
articles which he had submitted to the Department for clearance under 
the Department's rules. 

The Chairman. Did you discuss the Voice policy with him at that 
time ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not? How much time did you spend with 
him at that time? 

Mr. Connors. I would say no more than 5 or 10 minutes, and we 
discussed his articles. 


The Chairman. Have you seen him since that time ? 

Mr, Connors. I do not believe so. 

The Chairman. Did you advise him his articles could not be used, 
in view of his recent resignation by action of the Loyalty Board? 

Mr. Connors. No, I advised him that I didn't think his articles 
were very good, but I didn't have the decision ; he would have to take 
it up with the Publications Board. 

The Chairman. Did you make an appointment for him with the 
Publications Board ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't think so. 

The Chairman. Do you know? 

Mr. Connors. I doubt it, because he would just have to call some- 
one up. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether his articles w^ere used? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, I do not. 

The Chairman. How well have you known John Stewart Service? 

Mr. Connors. I have known him 

The Chairman. I refer to the Mr. Service who was also discharged 
under the loyalty program. 

Mr. Connors. I have known him, I think, since 1950. 

The Chairman. Socially? 

Mr. Connors. Socially. I first met him in the Department. 

The Chairman. Have you met and advised with Service since his 
discharge under the loyalty program? 

Mr. Connors. I have not met and advised with him. I have socially 
met with him, but I have not advised him on anything. I have been 
particularly careful not to discuss any business with him at any time. 

The Chairman. How often have you met with him since his dis- 
charge ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't know. I don't think I have seen him person- 
ally since September or October. 

The Chairman. Just one final question, Mr. Connors. Do you 
not think that it would be well for the new Secretary, if the Voice 
program is to be continued — and I think there is a good place for a 
good Voice program — to try and find a man to head up policy who is 
fully and thoroughly acquainted with the Communist Party line, 
with their policy, with their aims and objectives, and their method 
of operation ? Otherwise, you cannot conceivably have sensible policy 
directives. Otherwise, you will have a repetition of what we have had 
presented to us today. Keep in mind, this committee cannot spend 
all of its time running down the unusual and ridiculous directives 
issued by the Voice of America or the International Information 
Program. Can you answer that question ? 

Mr. Connors. I think that is a judgment for the Secretary to make. 
It would depend on the type of officers he wants in particular jobs. 

The Chairman. If you were the Secretary of State, and you were 
picking a policy director for the information program, an information 
program which is supposed to fight communism throughout the world, 
instead of getting a man like Bradley Connors, yourself, who says, 
"I know nothing about the Communist movement ; I have never read 
any of their works," would you not try to get an authority on the 
Comnmnist movement, someone who knows all about it, to head that 
very, very important project ? Would you not do that ? 


Mr. Connors. I think that is a problem, Mr. Chairman, because 
sometimes you fjet someone who knows the entire history, but he is not 
very capable on propaganda. 

The Chairman. Mr. McClellan, I think you had a question? 

Sena4^or McClellan. I thought I understood from this witness a 
few moments ago that prior to the issuance of the directive of Febru- 
ary 3, this man Fast had been discussed and his works had been dis- 
cussed, that Avere included in the directive of March 7, and they had 
become controversial, or some criticism had been made of the use of 
his works; is that true? 

Mr. Connors. No, I think what I had reference to there, sir, was 
the fact that the March T directive dealt with Mr. Fast, and therefore 
it was presumably deemed advisable to mention his name in this 

Senator McClellan. Since you did have your thoughts and interest 
focused on him at that time, if you wanted to cancel the previous 
directive, why did you not specifically say so? That is what I do 
not understand. In this directive you were considering him and made 
special reference to him, but you did not direct that his works be 
withdrawn or no longer used as was authorized, and directed by the 
directive of March 7. In other words, could you not write a plain, 
positive directive if that was your intention? 

Mr. Connors. I think so. 

Senator McClellan. You could have done so ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. You did not do it. 

Mr. Connors. No. 

Senator McClellan. One other question. You have mentioned 
that Dr. Compton, you understood, approved this directive of Febru- 
ary 3. Did you not take it up with him personally as your immediate 
superior ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, I did not, because I had been informed that 
his staff assistant had informed one of my senior staff directors that 
Dr. Compton had personally written his comments across certain parts 
of it. That if they were incorporated in the directive, it had his 
approval. • 

Senator McClellan. That may be the usual procedure, but it 
strikes me that on a directive of that importance you would want 
to confer with Dr. Compton about that personally and have him per- 
sonally tell you that he had ar:)proved it. You did not do that ? 

Mr. Connors. I did not. On the basis that since he had edited it 
himself, and it had been sent to me, that it now represented 

Senator McClellan. So for us to be able to determine whether he 
definitely approved it, we will have to inquire of Dr. Compton ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes. 

Senaator That is all. 

Senator Jackson. Did the March 7, 1952, directive have the approv- 
al of this Advisory Committee? 

Mr. Connors. I do not know. 

Senator Jackson. Was it ever called to their attention as being in 
full force and effect, if you can answer the question ? 

Mr. Connors. I just don't know. 

Senator Jackson. You do not know ? 

Mr. Connors. No. 


Senator Jackson. You heard Mr. Caldwell's testimony. I do not 
believe there has been any question asked about it. Do you have any 
comment on his testimony? 
(No response.) 

Senator Jackson. First let me ask you, Has there been some feeling 
between you and Mr. Caldwell? 

Mr. Connors. I think it arises from the fact that on his arrival in 
China in August 1946, I believe it was, we had no advance word that 
he was arriving in China until the day before he arrived, as I recall, 
and at the same time unbeknownst to me, General Marshall had re- 
quested my services in behalf of his mission. That resulted in my 
assignment to the Embassy, my having to go from Shanghai to Nan- 
king, and meant that the Shanghai office was left without anybody 
there, and it was decided that Mr. Caldw^ell would then have to go 
instead from Nanking to Shanghai. 

The Chaikman. Were you an adviser to Marshall on his mission to 

Mr. Connors. I served for a time. 

The Chairman. As his adviser ? 

Mr. Connors. On press. 

The Chairman. Were you his adviser ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes. 

The Chairman. How long did you serve as Marshall's adviser 
during his mission to China ? 

Mr. Connors. I think approximately during the month of August 
1946 until his departure on January 6 or 7 of 1947. 

Senator Jackson. What did you advise on? 

Mr. Connors. Press and public relations. 

Senator Jackson. Anything on policy? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir ; I also served General Wedemeyer in the same 
capacity in 1947 when he made his mission to China at the President's 

Senator Jackson. How long were you with General Wedemeyer? 

Mr. Connors. I think 4 to 5 weeks. 

Senator Jackson. Did you ever while you w^ere out in China talk 
sympathetically toward Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai, the Foreign 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, at no time did I favor the Communist regime. 

The Chairman. Do you know J ohn K. Fairbank ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know Fairbank urged a promotion for you 
to a more important job and a higher salary? 

Mr. Connors. I did not know it until it was mentioned here. I as- 
sume the records would show if he flid. 

Senator Potter. Did you ever write any of Marshall's speeches? 

Mr. Connors. I participated in polishing up things. 

The Chairman. Did you help write his reports? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Mundt. Did you prepare the press release he made at the 
end of his mission when he said, "A plague on both your houses"? 

Mr. Connors. I put it in final form. 

Senator Mundt. Was that your happy phrase? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 


Senator Mundt. Tell us something about this Allen Haden. If I 
understand your testimony correctly, neither Compton nor you draft- 
ed the directive of February 3, but it was drafted in the first instance 
by Allen Haden, who works in your office. 

Mr. Connors. That is right. 

Senator Mundt. He told you he submitted it to Compton and he 
made some delineations and on the basis of that report you put it in 
final form and signed it ; is that right ? 

Mr. Connors. To the best of my knowledge — and I looked at the 
memorandum for the first time this morning — my staff was instructed 
by Dr. Compton's staff assistant in a memorandum dated December 
29, 1952, to prepare such an instruction. 

This memorandum and directive to Mr. Haden, who was director 
for the regional staff within my office, they worked on the draft — they 
had several drafts apparently. They had a meeting on January 15, 
1953. The subject was discussed again at a meeting on January 28, 
of the program strategy committee at which Dr. Compton was pres- 
ent, but which I was unable to attend. 

On January 29, Mr. Haden was informed to proceed with the memo- 
randum and he was provided the handwritten changes which Dr. 
Compton had made. 

Senator Mundt. (presiding). How important a man in the shop 
is Allen Haden ? What is his salary ? 

Mr. Connors. He is a GS-15. 

Senator Mundt. What is his title ? 

Mr. Connors. Director of the Regional Planning and Policy Staff. 

Senator Mundt. GS-15 gets what salary ? 

Mr. Connors. $10,800 is the base, I believe. 

Senator Mundt. The chairman suggested that I ask you whether 
you could name the works of any other Communist or Communist 
sympathizer whose books were used in conformity of February 3. We 
have heard a lot of Howard Fast. Do you know of any others? 

Mr. Connors. So far as I know, no books were used or no materials 
were used based on the February 3 directive. I just don't have any 

Senator Mundt. How about the March 7, 1952, directive ? 

Mr. Connors. I would assume that since that directive was issued, 
and went to Overseas Information Center libraries that the libraries 
had those books. At the committee's request we are preparing a list 
of the books in all the libraries. 

Senator Mundt- Were you in the committee room this morning 
when the Chinese witness testified? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. You heard what he said ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Do you have any comments to make ? 

Mr. Connors. At that time I was serving as a press officer for 
General Marshall, I believe, and the man quoted was a correspondent 
for one of the newspapers, I believe the Government Central News 

Senator Jackson. Wliat was the Government Central News 
Agency ? 

Mr. Connors. Chinese Nationalist Government Central Newg 


Senator Mundt. Are you now or have you ever been a member of 
the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir ; at no time. 

Senator Mundt. Or any of the fellow-traveler organizations listed 
by the Attorney General ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Do you deny categorically the statements made ? 

Mr. Connors, Absolutely. 

Senator Jackson. Can you tell us anything about that confession ? 
I assume you have known about it. 

Mr. Connors. I have known about it to the extent that we had a 
report from the Embassy on the subject, and I had read the transla- 
tion. So far as I know, the man was 

Senator Jackson. Were you named as being a Communist in that 
■confession ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. "V^Tiat did it say about you, if you know? 

Mr. Connors. It accused me of passing on information through the 
Embassy that was inimical to our Embassy, which is completely 

Senator Jackson. None of the statements in the confession with 
reference to you were true ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

Senator Jackson. They are all untrue ? 

Mr. Connors. That is right. 

Senator Jackson. What about the statements made by Mr. Cald- 
well ? He questioned your judgment, I believe, and he did not ques- 
tion your loyalty. 

Mr. Connors. I could question his on the same basis, I think, on 
his judgment. 

The Chairman (presiding). So the record will be clear, there is 
considerable feeling not of the best nature between you and Mr. Cald- 
well. I think we should have that in the record so the Senators can 
better evaluate the testimony. In other words, you and Mr. Caldwell 
were not exactly what you call pals. 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. It is obvious. 

Senator Mundt. Before you secured your appointment with the 
Information Service, were you given a check by the FBI to your 
knowledge ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. No one can be employed 

The Chairman. Let me say, Senator, that a check by the FBI is 
meaningless as far as State Department personnel are concerned unless 
it is acted upon. One of the things developed over the past 3 years 
very thoroughly is that when the FBI goes out and does an excellent 
job, an outstanding job of investigating a man, no action is taken 
upon the investigation by the State Department evaluation officers. 
I do not say that is the case of Mr. Connors, but the statement of FBI 
investigation has been misunderstood so thoroughly that I think we 
should make it very, very clear that it is meaningless, regardless of 
how good a job the FBI does, unless the Security Division of the State 
Department acts upon it. 

Senator Mundt. You started to elaborate on the answer before the 
chairman interrupted you. 


Mr. Connors. I started to point out that Public Law 402 requires 
a full field investigation formally by tlie FBI. Congress amended the 
law in the last session. 

Senator Mundt. Do you know who it was that evaluated the FBI 
report in your connection? 

Mr. Connors, No, sir, I do not. 

Senator Mundt. . Who was Secretary of State at the time you were 
appointed ? 

Mr. Connors. The predecessor to General Marshall. 

Senator Mundt. Stettinius? 

Mr. Connors. Byrnes, I think. I think Byrnes was Secretary at 
the time. 

The Chairman. Do you not know who the Secretary of State was 
when you were hired ? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. I was overseas at the time and I believe it 
was Mr. Byrnes. 

Senator Mundt. Our information does not quite jibe with yours 
about this FBI investigation. Are you positive of your own know- 
ledge that you were given that field job? I know that is what the 
law says, because I wrote the law and put that in myself. Are you 
sure of your own loiowledge that you were given the field test? 

Mr. Connors. I have never seen the records or anything. I have 
been told. 

Senator Mundt. Your answer is simply based on the fact that it is 
in the law, and you assume that the law was enforced? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Wlio told you you were given a full field investi- 
gation? You said someone told you. Someone in the Department? 

Mr. Connors. No, I don't think anybody in the Department. I 
think I just assumed it. 

The Chairman. Did you know the Chinese whose confession we 
read this morning? 

Mr. Connors. He was a Chinese newspaperman. I knew him to 
the extent that he came to the Embassy. 

The Chairman. How well did you know him? 

Mr. Connors. To the extent that he called at the Embassy from time 
to time. 

The Chairman. You since learned that he was executed for being 
a Communist spy. 

Mr. Connors. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. Did you give him information when he came to 
the Embassy? 

Mr. Connors. Only such information as I gave to other newspaper 
reporters, and that was information that was authorized. 

The Chairman. You gave him information ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes. 

The Chairman. But you say it was information which you gave 
to any newspaperman? 

Mr. Connors. Correct. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony today is that you 
did not give this man any information that you would not give any 
other newspaperman ? 

Mr. Connors. Absolutely. 


The Chairman. For how long a period of time did you know him ? 

Mr. Connors. I have no idea, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you meet him socially ? 

Mr. Connors. I don't believe so. 

The Chairman. Do you know? 

Mr. Connors. I just don't know. 

The Chairman. Do you recall when you first met him? 

Mr. Connors. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I think that is all. Any questions by any other 
members of the committee, or any of the staff ? 

Senator Jackson. I was going to ask one question, Mr. Chairman. 

Are you a newspaper writer or what is your background ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir, I spent 5 years — — 

Senator Jackson. What is your academic background? 

Mr. Connors. I went to Newark Academy and Yale University for 
2 years. 

Senator Jackson. You went to Yale for 2 years ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. Then what did you do after you left Yale ? 

Mr. Connors. I did a little free lancing and worked for the Public 
Service Corp. of New Jersey. 

Senator Jackson. You worked for what ? 

Mr, Connors. Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, and then I went 
ito work on a New Jersey newspaper. 

Senator Jackson. What was the name of it? 

Mr. Connors. Newark Star Ledger. 

Senator Jackson. And then from there on to OWI? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jackson. And then on to the State Department. 

The Chairman. In conclusion, I understand we do have your assur- 
ance at this time that 3^ou will issue the proper order to remove from 
the information program libraries all works of Communist writers ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do we have your assurance of that ? Do you agree 
that action should be taken? We do not want to pressure you into 
taking any action that you think should not be taken. Do you agree 
that action should be taken ? 

Mr. Connors. Yes, sir. 

Senator Potter. You heard Mr. Caldwell's testimony when he 
stated that during the period of time that you both were in China, that 
you either conformed to the anti-Nationalist Government line or else 
it was pretty rough on you. Do you concur ? 

Mr. Connors. I do not concur with that statement by Mr. 

Senator Potter. In other words, ;four testimony is that this state- 
ment is not accurate ? 

Mr. Connors. It is not so. I was in full sympathy with the Nation- 
alist Government. I felt there were certain reforms that could be made, 
but I was unalterably opposed to the Communists. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Connors. 

We will recess until 10 : 30 tomorrow morning. And may I apolo- 
gize to you, Miss Lenkeith, for having called you down and kept you 
waiting, but we wanted to keep the continuity of the testimony. We 
will hear you at 10 : 30 tomorrow. 


(Tliereupon at 12 : 10 p. m., a recess was taken until Friday, Febru- 
ary 20, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m.) 


Exhibit No. 4 

[Outgoing airgram] 

Depabtment of State, 

February 3, 1953. 

Information Policy for Use of Materials Produced by Controversial Persons 

I. purpose 

The purpose of this instruction is to establish criteria to govern use in the 
IIA program of already existing books, writings, paintings, music, pictures, films, 
and other output, produced or created by persons who are subjects of public 


The question has often been raised within IIA and elsewhere of the relation of 
the political or ideological controversiality of the creators of material to the use 
of that material in IIA programs. Clearly, authors or other creators commis- 
sioned to prepare material for IIA use need to be selected with the utmost care to 
assure that their products will fully serve IIA purposes. But here the problem is 
rather whether existing creations by controversial persons can be useful in at- 
taining certain IIA objectives. Usefulness, therefore, is the basic consideration. 

The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, the body 
legally established to represent the public in advising the Department on its over- 
seas educational and cultural programs, unanimously adopted the following 
resolution after a prolonged study of this particular problem : "The content of 
the book, regardless of authorship, [should] be the criterion which determines 
its availability for inclusion in USIS libraries." The contrary view would argue 
that the Department should bar from use in its programs, without reference to 
the material itself, any product of an author or creator who is himself the sub- 
ject or likely to become the subject of domestic controversy. There is consider- 
able pressure to follow the latter course, though the problems involved in doing 
so have never been formally passed on by the Congress. 

The reputation abroad of an author affects the actual utility of the materiaL 
If he is widely and favorably known abroad as a champion of democratic causes, 
his credibility and utility may be enhanced. Similarly, if — like Howard Fast — he 
is known as a Soviet-endorsed author, materials favorable to the United States 
in some of his works may thereby be given a si)ecial credibility among selected key 

The withdrawal or obvious barring of a controversial author's work from a 
collection, exhibit, or the like where its absence or withdrawal will come to public 
attention abroad may have a seriously adverse effect on the credibility of IIA, 

The problem of determining who is and who is not a controversial or potentially 
controversial figure presents major difficulties. It follows therefore that in order 
to be sure that the product is useful in attaining IIA objectives careful scrutiny 
must be given to the product of any person whose political orientation has been 

The publications of organizations are normally issued for the specific purpose 
of advancing their organizational objectives. The publications of organizations 
on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations may hence be assumed; 
without further review to be subversive in intent. 


In the selection of materials, writiniis, art, photographs, films, etc., it should 
be possible, as a general rule, to draw upon the great body of resources available 
produced by persons whose ideological position is unquestioned. Admitting, 
however, that usefulness to IIA is the basic consideration governing inclusion of 
any materials in IIA collections, there are times when items produced by ideologi- 
cally questionable persons may be advisable. In view of the great resources avail- 
able to IIA, the latter action would necessarily be the exception rather thani 
the rule. 


The criteria governing that exceptional action are the following : 

1. Content of the product, not authorship, will be the primary criterion. This 
means that other factors are to be considered. 

2. Materials produced by a person whose ideologies and views are questionable 
or controversial will not be used unless : 

(a) The material supports iuiportantly (not incidentally) a specific IIA objec- 
tive ; and the converse, that is, none of the content is detrimental to the objectives 
of the United States Government. 

(6) The material is substantially better than other material available for the 
puipose, that is, support of a specific objective of IIA. 

(c) Failure to include the material would impair the general credibility of IIA. 

B. The effectiveness of the material, judged as promoting importantly a specific 
IIA objective, has been weighed against the possible harm resulting from the 
enhanced prestige the controversial producer may acquire by virtue of the in- 
clusion of his product in IIA operations. The balance must be clearly and 
strongly in favor of the effectiveness of the material. 


If in the application of the above criteria any doubts are entertained by the 
responsible officials in IIA or in missions overseas, the items concerning whichi 
there are such doubts will be submitted to a review board. 

The chief of mission is requested to name a review board of three members, 
of which the public affairs officer shall be one, to review all materials concerning 
which the public affairs officer may be in doubt, produced by ideologically ques- 
tionable persons. The review board may be on an ad hoc or standing basis as 
suits the convenience of the mission. 

Within IIA, a Standing Review Board is to be established, to meet, from time 
to time as may be required, to consist of three members to be appointed by the 
Administrator. All materials concerning which there is doubt within IIA may 
be referred to the Standing Review Board for decision. 

Should the review board at an oversea mission not be able to resolve doubts 
regarding the selection and use of items produced by ideologically questionable 
persons, such items may be submitted to the Standing Review Board of IIA under 
cover of an operations memorandum marked for the attention of IIA. 

For the Administrator : 

W. Bradley CJonnors, 
Assistant Administrator for Policy and Plans. 

Exhibit No. 5 

GEavEiEAL Discussion on Russian Intfxltgence Organs and the Tass Agenct 

IN China 

A confession by THE ESPIONAGE CHIEF, LI p'llNG 

(Translated from Central Daily News, Chung-yang jih-pao, September 3, 1950) 

At the time we are discussing, well-known Chinese Communists stated that 
their delegates stationed in Chungking had absolutely no connection with the 
Soviet Embassy there; but even if there were any occasional social intercourse 
between them it would be of a personal nature. In truth, the Soviet staff mem- 
bers, taking advantage of personal relations, made good use of Chinese Com- 
munists for their assistance in espionage work. The Chinese Communists whO' 
were close to Li Li-san and the so-called "International Communists were even 
more eager to carry out these duties. At that time, staff members Chou En-lai ; 
Kung P'eng, the former secretary of Chu Te; Ch'en Chia-k'ang, who represented 
the Chinese Communists in the International Youth Delegate Conference; 
Lu Ming, assistant city editor of the Hsin Hua Daily, and others, were all 
central figures employed by the Soviet Union. 

, Before and after the victory, during the political consultative conferences 
of the Government, the removal of the capital to Nanking and the peace con- 
ferences with the Chinese Communists, a group of persons who professed to- 
be democratic members of parties hitherto unheard of sprang up like bamboo 
shoots after the spring rain. Most of these people wished to build up their 


own personal political status in the midst of the conflict of interest between 
the United States and Russia, and the controversies between the National 
Government and the Chinese Communists. Whenever they found opportunities 
to get in contact with the Russians or the Chinese Communists, they willingly 
made themselves utilized. Such persons as Shen Yen-pin, Chang Hsi-man, 
Wang Yun-sheng, Huang Yen-p'ei, Lo Lung-chi, Chang Po-chiin, and others, 
all had relations with the Soviet Union while in Chungking and Nanking. 

Let us talk about the third method. Any diplomat of a country, in addition 
to representing his country and carrying out necessary diplomatic transactions 
with the country he is stationed in, has the duty to collect intelligence informa- 
tion for his own country. The Russian diplomats, because of the political 
system of their country, which has aggressive intentions, naturally would find 
themselves isolated when mingling in diplomatic circles in China. Among the 
40 and more diplomats in China, only Li Li K'o (a European name in Chinese 
form) who represented the politically changed Czechoslovakia had diplomatic 
relations with Russia. But the Soviet diplomats in China did not find them- 
selves isolated during their years in Chungking and Nanking. This was due to 
poor management by responsible Chinese diplomatic officials on one side, and to 
inconsistency and self-interest of other nations on the other ; so Russia did not 
let the opportunity pass by, but utilized the existing objective weakness. 

Ordinarily, our diplomatic relations with Russia are under the supervision of 
the Asia-Europe department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the basic 
national policy toward Russia was made by the highest authority, all the 
documents of correspondence and daily intercourse were handled by the Asia- 
Europe department. In addition to managing foreign affairs with Russia, the 
department also had the duty of dealing with the several near eastern countries, 
and, naturally, the foreign relations with these countries were not as important 
as those with Russia. For many years, the directorship of the Asia-Europe 
department had been held by graduates of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial College in 
Moscow, who were mostly former party members of the Kuomintang. They were 
sent to Moscow for training and observation and returned strongly anti-Com- 
munist. The staff members of the department in charge of documents were 
composed of people who liad either received their education in Harbin or were 
formerly under the employment of the Russians in the Chinese Eastern Railway 
Co., due to the scarcity of persons skilled in the Russian language. Most of these 
people had not received higher education. Members of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs often regarded top ofiicers of the Asia-Europe department as prejudiced, 
and the lower staff members as ignorant, so, as a result, the Asia-Europe de- 
partment could not carry out positive activities with Russia. 

There is another thing. The staff members of the protocol department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who undertake liaison diaties with diplomatic 
officials of other countries, were held and controlled by people closely related 
to the so-called diplomatic elite — Chinese diplomats who had been recalled 
from embassies or consulates in Europe and America. These people lacked 
enthusiasm for work. Besides fooling around and waiting to be dispatched 
abroad in order to enjoy life, most of them took the attitude that "less work 
is better than more work," and regarded matters concerning Russia even more 
as hard work to be avoided. Besides, staff members of both the Asia-Europe 
department and the protocol department differed so much in background and 
points of interest that they made fun of one another, and most of the time 
would not cooperate wholeheartedly. As a result, a near farce broke out when 
the (Chinese) landlord of the Russian Embassy residence at Ta Fang Lane in 
Nanking brought siiit against the Russian Ambassador in 1947. 

Because of poor management by officials of the department in charge, it 
goes without saying that it would be too much to expect these people to keep 
the Russian officials under close surveillance. Besides, we .should keep in mind 
the competition in diplomatic intelligence work. The accomplishment of either 
side depends on the degrees of efi'ort. One weak spot on our side will offer more 
opportunity to the opponents in their work. 

Since the end of the war, after the defeat of Japan in the fall of 1945, the 
nations active on the diplomatic stage in Chungking (later in Nanking) may 
be divided into six units and groups : 1. Tlie United States, which earnestly 
hoped to assist the Government in bringing about reorganization, peace, and 
reconstruction ; 2. The treacherous Soviet Union ; 3. The declining Great Britain, 
the most vigorously anti-Communist Canada, the self-governed Australia, etc., 
and the .small number of the anti-Communist north European countries ; 4. 
France, which could not even take care of herself, and which was riding on the 


fence ; 5. The South American countries, whicli followed the United States as 
their leadei* ; and 6. The near eastern Mohammedan nations ; Siam, and the 
riiree new nations : the Philippines, Burma, and India. 

Except for the Soviet Union all these countries were anti-Communist, but 
their degree of antagonism differed insofar as their interests in China were 
concerned. Among these nations the United States and Russia were obviously 
in direct conflict in their interests in China. The British hoped to take ad- 
vantage of the American-Russian conflict in order to maintain their already 
shaken interests in China on one hand, while working side by side with the 
United States in the United Nations and in formulating European policies on 
the other. France also had political difficulties and uncertainties internally ; 
her diplomatic policy toward China was to watch closely the development of 
Chinese Communist power merely hoping that it would not affect Indo- 
china. Others like the British dominion countries, the small number of the 
North Atlantic countries, the small countries in the Near East and South 
America, and the postwar new nations, are in general, indirectly concerned, 
and, therefore, took the attitude of watching the development of the Chinese 

When the United States Ambassador Hurley went to Yenan, China, in 1945, 
Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking and negotiated with the Government in 
order to solve their political differences. At the end of December, Marshall 
arrived in Chungking as the special American Ambassador. Early in the fol- 
lowing year (1946) the Government opened the Political Consultative Con- 
ference and issued a cease-fire order and reorganized the troops. Marshall went 
to Lushan six times and tried his best to bring about peace, but these peace 
negotiations dragged on for 2 years. During these 2 years our internal diplo- 
matic policies were all centered on the United States negotiations. Therefore, 
Soviet Russia's intelligence and that of other countries naturally were also 
centered on the same object. But the interests of the various nations were 
different and their emphasis and attention also were different. During these 
years the American Ambassadors were Hurley and J. Leighton Stuart. One 
was a straightforward soldier. [This refers to Hurley.] The other was a 
sympathetic educator [Stuart]. Both of them lacked the strict discipline of 
a diplomat in keeping confidential matters secret. At that time the American 
information officer of the United States Embassy was Fei Cheng-ch'ing (F. 
Faiy Ba-nk) [John Fairbank]. He was succeeded by K'ang Na-shih (Byadly 
Conneys) [Bradley Connors]. Later on this special assistant to Ambassador 
Stuart was Ambassador Pai Te-hua (Butternoill) [Butterfield] who had the 
respondsibility of formulating policies toward China. (He is now an Assistant 
Secretary of State as well as the head (chief) of the Far Eastern Section 
(Branch).) All these people were basically dissatisfied with the personnel of 
the Nationalist Government. They were prejudiced. 

Very often they forgot to keep secrets and they leaked out diplomatic secrets 
either intentionally or unintentionally. Then through the embassies of third 
nations, the leaked news reached the ears of our enemies. 

Since India gained its independence in 1947, it has been the ambition of Premier 
Nehru to make her the leading nation in the Far East, taking the place of Japan 
and China. In an endeavor to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia,. 
Nehru appointed his sister, Mrs. Pandit, whose international reputation was well 
known throughout India, as Ambassador to Soviet Russia. At the same time, 
after the coup d'etat of Pibul (Songgram). Thailand also wanted to maintain 
diplomatic relations and exchange diplomatic personnel with Soviet Russia. 
At that time such talks of diplomatic relations took place principally in Wash- 
ington. But the three countries concerned, Soviet Russia, India, and Thailand, 
all maintained diplomatic delegates in China. Moreover, Menon, the first Indian 
Ambassador to China, is a close friend of Nehru. It had long been decided to 
ti-ansfer Menon to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a deputy officer. 
Diplomatic delegates of Soviet Russia, India, and Thailand held secret talks in 
our National Capital. Some lower grade officers of the Soviet Embassy in China 
were transferred to Bangkok directly from China. It is understood that India 
and Thailand have always maintained very close relationships with China. To 
say nothing of the past historical relationship, leaders of both India and China 
had exchanged diplomatic visits during the period of the anti-Japanese war of 
resistance. For many years China and India have exchanged diplomatic dele- 
gates. Although Thailand is a small nation, overseas Chinese residing in that 
country occupy one-third of her total population. As there have always been 
difficulties requiring settlement, diplomatic relations have always been main- 


tained between the two countries. In short, as diplomatic delegates from both 
India and Thailand represent countries of diverse historical background and 
relationship, it was easier [sic] for them to get in touch with our Government 
officers and civilians. And our Government did not keep close watch over such 
personnel. For this reason Soviet Russia was able to exchange diplomatic 
information with India and Thailand in Nanking. As past events are reviewed, 
-it is not difficult to see that the unscrupulous recognition of the Chinese Com- 
munist regime by India and the vacillating attitude of Thailand is a result 
of this situation. 

In speaking of the fourth method employed by Soviet Russia in collecting 
information in China, it is nothing more than the systematizing and editing 
of fragmentary material scattered in the newspapers. This is one of the routine 
procedures followed in the embassies and consulates of all countries. For many 
years an information office has been organized in the embassies of Great 
Britain, the United States, France, India, etc. On the one hand, it has the 
responsibility to collect reference material for use use of its own counti-y. In 
like manner, China has maintained a similar service in foreign countries. But 
what should be pointed out particularly is that although the information service 
of the Soviet Embassy carries out identical duties its organization and nature 
show several special characteristics. First, the organization In connection with 
translation and the systematization of newspaper material is enormously 
larger than that of any other country. Secondly, the entire staff is composed 
of citzens of Soviet Russia. Thirdly, the scope of the collection of material is 
very broad. Fourthly, it works in close cooperation with the Tass Agency. 

Before discussing in detail the intelligence work in China by the Tass Agency, 
one of the Russian organs, let us mention by the way two Russian stores in 
Nanking seemingly not unconnected with the Russian Embassy. One, located 
on Ma Chia Chieh (Ma Family Street) in Nanking, was called Mme. Natleys 
Dress Maker; the other, situated in the vicinity of San P'ai-lo .(Three Arch- 
ways) was called Nestaiafe. The former was a high-class women's dress and 
wearing apparel store; the latter was a Russian-style restaurant and bakery 
shop. Both were owned by white Russians who had regained Soviet citizenship. 
Madame Natley was a middle-aged widow, who had resided in Harbin for many 
years, and had engaged in the women's dress business for a long time. She has 
a store in the Hotel des Wagon-Lits on Legation Street in Peiping. In the 
spring of 1948 she moved to Nanking, declaring that she had long ago obtained 
Chinese citizenship, and that she was engaged solely in doing business with 
women of the embassies and the American Advisory Committee. 

Madam Natleys was exceedingly wide and lavish in her social engagements 
and was frequently seen in the residence of ambassadors of foreign countries. 
She was especially intimate with the wife of the French Ambassador, Mei Li Ai 
(M. Jacques Meyrier), and the wife of the British naval attach^. Mo K'o T'an No 
(MacDonald). She personally sponsored international fashion shows twice in 
Najiking. Many families of the ambassadors and of the American military 
personnel attended the fashion shows with enthusiasm, but few knew that she 
was closely connected with some of the Russians. The proprietor of the Russian- 
style restaurant also participated in the Russian national holiday celebrations 
in the Russian Embassy, and was introduced as one of the few overseas Russians. 
The restaurant was also frequented by foreign diplomatic officials and the 
proprietor treated these customers with special courtesy. Some of the people 
who worked in the restaurant have recently come to Taiwan and joined in 
business with a Chinese merchant. It is possible that some information con- 
cerning the whereabouts and the activities of their former proprietor may be 
found by investigating them. At least we can point out that before the Govern- 
ment left Nanking, there were stores operated by the White Russians everywhere 
in Peiping, Tsingtao, Tientsin, etc. ; in the past few years thousands of White 
Russians regained Soviet citizenship, but at the same time many were refused 
citizenship. We can conjecture just what was the basis for acceptance and 

The information system of the T(ass Agency of Soviet Russia should be dis- 
cussed separately ; but in reality the Tass Agency and the Soviet Embassy are 
part and parcel of the same organization. It is understood that all the Soviet 
organizations in China can be grouped under four categories. First, the Soviet 
Embassy and its subsidiary consulate general in Shanghai, and the consulates 
in Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin, Tihua, etc. Second, the office of the Soviet 
military attache in China. Third, the commercial attache of the Soviet Embassy 
and his office in Canton. Fourth, the Tass Agency. In speaking of their organ- 


ization, these four types are directly responsible to Moscow ; but, in reality, 
they are one and inseparable. 

Although the Tass Agency has a close and inseparable connection with the 
information service of the Embassy, it is generally recognized as a news agency 
■of an international character. For this reason, correspondents of the Tass 
Agency possess additional facilities in carrying out their official and secret 

The development and the changes in the working procedures of the Tass Agency 
in China have been handicapped by obj^tive conditions in the development of 
the general situation in China. Long before the outbreak of the anti-Japanese 
war of resistance, Lo Kuo-fu (Rogov), who had been residing in the Far East 
for many years, was directing the affairs of the Shanghai branch office of the 
Tass Agency. He continued his stay in Shanghai even after the war broke out. 
When the Second World War broke out, a nonaggression pact was signed between 
Russia and Japan. Rogov continued to remain in Shanghai directing the infor- 
mation agencies of Soviet Russia. After the victory was won in the war of re- 
sistance, Rogov returned to Shanghai and was responsible for the head office 
of the Tass Agency in China. According to remarks made by an American cor- 
respondent who met Rogov, he is one of the few able men of Soviet Russia in 
the Far East. And, in fact, Rogov is one of the resiwnsible men in charge of 
Soviet information agencies in the Far East. The Tass Agency, taking advan- 
tage of the friendly Soviet-Chinese relations during the first stage of the war of 
resistance, gi'eatly expanded its i>ersonnel in China. At one time six cor- 
respondents were sent out to China. At the time when a desperate effort was 
being made in defending Wuchang and Hankow, the scope of the organization 
of the Tass Agency began to expand in Hankow. The Tass Agency was at that 
time issuing three publications: (1) Chinese draft of the daily news broadcast 
of the Tass Agency; (2) an English draft of identical content; (3) Classified 
News, published weekly. Besides, collections of speeches and monographs on 
special subjects were published in the form of small pamphlets. Work of this 
scope was maintained until the beginning of 1949, when the seat of government 
was removed to Canton. 

In an effort to maintain the continued publication of these materials, the Tass 
Agency trained many Chinese cadres who were willing to render loyal service 
to Soviet Russia. Such people had always been employed to do editing and 
translating work in different organizations of the Tass Agency. For the security 
and protection of these ])eople, they were accommodated in one place, leading a 
life completely isolated from the world. 

After the Government removed to Chungking, a special reception house was 
set up to facilitate the work of foreign correspondents. When the Government 
returned to Nanking, foreign correspondents set up their own reception houses, 
but the Tass Agency never joined them. The reason can be attributed to its 
huge organization, and to the secret nature of its work. 

In Chungking the Tass Agency maintained contacts with correspondents of 
other nations. Among them were Jou Erh Sun (G. Geolaon. now in France) and 
Kan Shih Pao (Serge Gunsbarg, now in Moscow) of the French News Agency; 
Mo Shat (Spencer Moosa, now in Taipeh, his wife being a White Russian who 
lives in Hong Kong) of the Associated Press; Ai Chin Sheng (Brooks Atkinson) 
(who later visited Russia), and Li Po Men (Henry Liberman, who has written a 
biography of Chou En-lai) of the New York Times: Wei Le (George Wealer) of 
the Chicago Daily News; Fu Erh Men (Harrison Forman, who wrote A Report 
From Red China and who attacked the [Chinese] Government very hard after 
his return to the United States) of the London Times, and others. In Nanking 
Mi Erh K'o Ssu (Harry Milks) and Lo Te Jui K'o (Cohn Roderick) of the Asso- 
ciated Press: La Ch'a (Jack Japire) of the French News Agency; Chang Kuo- 
hsin of the United Press, and others all -dealt regularly with the Tass Agency. 

Aside from dealings with various foreign correspondents in order to exchange 
information, the Tass Agency maintained still closer relationship with the New 
China Agency and the New China Daily News of the Chinese Communists. For 
example. Kung P'eng, Lu Ming, Chen Chia-kang. Wei Wen-chin (the English 
secretary of the Chinese Communist delegation), and others mentioned above, 
all helped them in establishing contacts in Chungking and Nanking. 

The Tass Agency sent six correspondents to China during the Wuhan and 
Chungking days. In the final stage of the war, they were transferred to Rus- 
sia one after another. And by the time of the return of the capital to Nanking, 
•only P'u Chin K'o (N. E. Protsenko) and Hsi Ni Nao K'o Fu (V. M. Sinelnikoff) 
still remained in China. After V-J Day, Protsenko stayed in Nanking and 


Shanghai briefly before returning to Moscow to be an editor in charge of news 
from China. When the Government evacuated to Canton, Sinelnikofif moved 
to Canton with the Soviet Embassy, and in October 1949 returned to Russia when 
the Soviet Embassy was withdrawn. He was the last correspondent in (Chinese) 
Government-controlled territory. After the continent was lost, the Tass Agency 
became the only foreign news agency that issued news release in the area under 
Chinese Communist occupation. It is believed that a large number of old 
correspondents (of this organization) almost certainly will return to China. 

From what has been said above, we can at least say in conclusion that Rus- 
sia has been engaging in intelligence work in China for many a year. At present, 
this kind of work has been pushed forward in the direction of Southeast Asia, 
possibly with Hong Kong and Shanghai as its center, to infiltrate gradually into 
Singapore, Bangkok, Manila, Batavia, and the whole south seas area. To save 
the last line of defense against the Communists in Southeast Asia and to win 
a few million of our overseas Chinese population in the south seas, it is necessary 
that we should give our close attention to it. 

Up to the present, the Asiatic countries that have diplomatic relations with 
Soviet Russia are the bogus re.gime of the Chinese Communists, India, and 
Thailand. As to Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, and 
French Indochina, etc., the Russians are yet unable to gain a foothold. The 
intelligence setup in these areas, if any, is mostly underground and can still 
be combated. If, in the future, the Communist influence extends eastward, 
not only Formosa will become even more isolated, but the whole of Southeast 
Asia also will be brought under the influence of Soviet Russia. 

Speaking of the continent of China as a whole, Soviet Russia must certainly 
be extending her influence at the present time by leaps and bounds. There- 
fore, our Government should stage a counteroffensive as early as possible in 
order to check further troubles in Ihe future. However, before a large-scale 
counteroffensive becomes a reality, it is of urgent necessity that the Govern- 
ment should strengthen its intelligence work on the continent at an early date. 

Translated by Liang Hsu, Joseph Wang, K. T. Wu, Edwin G. Beal, Division' 
of Orientalia, Library of Congress, February 24, 1953. 



Ayres, Stuart, testimony of 79-97 

Baldauza, Stephen SO, 81, 84, 94, 95 

Bauer, Robert 80, 81, 94, 95 

Real, Edwin G 150 

Brazilian Service 82, 83 

Brett, Charles P 131 

Budenz, Prof. Louis 118 

Butterfield, Ambassador 121 

Butterworth, Mr 120, 122, 124, 125 

Byrnes, James F 142 

Caldwell, John C 139, 141, 143 

Testimony of 117-126 

Cheng-ch'ing, Fei (F. Faiy Ba-nk) [John Fairbank] 147 

Compton, Dr. Wilson S 96, 128, 131, 132, 133, 138, 140 

Connors, Bradley 97, 

102, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 144, 147 

Testimony of 126-143 

Davis, Elmer 99, 111 

Dodds, Harold W 130 

Dulles, John Foster 97, 126, 129, 134 

Engels 127, 132 

En-lai, Gen. Chou 120, 139, 149 

Fairbank, John K 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 139, 147 

Fast, Howard 97, 126, 128, 130, 133, 138, 140, 144 

Testimony of 98-114 

Fred, Edwin F 130 

Haden, Allen 128, 140 

Herrick, Mr 136 

Hsi-man, Chang 146 

Hsi Ni Nao K'o Fu (V. M. SinelnikofE) 149 

Hsu, Liang 150 

Hurley, Mr 147 

Kai-shek, Chiang 120, 122, 124, 125, 126 

K'o, Li Li 146 

Kuohsin, Chang 149 

Lacey, Dan 135 

La Ch'a (Jack Japine) 149 

Le, Wei (George Wealer) 149 

Lenin 92, 127, 132 

Lenkeith, Miss Nancy 114, 143 

Li Peng 115 

Lo Kuo-fu (Rogov) 149 

Lo Te Jui K'o (Cohn Roderick) 149 

Lung-chi, Lo 14(3 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas . 120, 121, 124, 126 

Marshall, General 139, 140, 142, 147 

Marx, Karl 92, 127, 132, 135 

McArdle, Mr 129 

McGuire, Martin R. P 130, 131 

Mei Li Ai (M. Jacques Meyrier) 148 

Men, Fu Erh (Harrison Forman) 149 

Men, Li Po (Henry Liberman) 149 

Menon 147 

Mi Erh K'o Ssu (Harry Milks) 149 

Ming, Lu 145 



Mo K'o Tan No (MacDonald) 148 

Morrill, Dr. J. L 13a 

Morris, Eobert 118 

Na-shih, K'ang (Byadly Conneys) [Bradley Connors] 147 

Natley, Madame 148 

Nehru 147 

Pandit, Mrs 147 

Pao, Kan Shih (Serge Gunsbarg) _ 149 

Po-chun, Chang 146 

Puhan, Alfred 84, 86, 89, 90, 95, 96 

P'eng, Kiing 149 

P'n Chin K'o (N. E. Proteseuko) 149 

Ries, Joseph 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89 

Roosevelt, Mrs. Eleanor 98, 103 

Roosevelt, President Franklin D 103, 104 

Service, John Stewart 137 

Shat, Mo (Spencer Moosa) 149 

Sheng, Ai Chin (Brooks Atkinson) 149 

(Songgram) Pibul 147 

Stalin 127, 135 

Starr, Mark 130 

Stoner, General 136 

Stuart, J. Leighton 147 

Sun, Jou Erh (G. Geolaon) 149 

Te-hua, Pai (Butternoill) [Butterfield] 147 

Tse-tung, Mao 147 

Wang, Joseph 150 

Wedemeyer, General 139 

Wen-chin, Wei 149 

Wolf, Benedict 97, 109, 110 

Wu, Dr. Kwant Tsing 114, 115, 116, 117, 150 

Yeh-p'ei, Huang 146 

Yen-pin, Shen 146 

Yun-sheng, Wang 146- 



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