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Full text of "State Department information program, Voice of America : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Res. 40, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Government Operations to employ temporary additional personnel and increasing the limit of expenditures"

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S. Res. 40 



MARCH 3, 1953 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 

29708 WASHINGTON : 1953 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN18 1S53 


JOSEPH R. McCarthy, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 



Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL B. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 


Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
iFRANCis D. Flanagan, General Counsel and Staff Director 



Index I 

Testimony of— 

Ford, John W., Director, Office of Security, Department of State 389 

Harris, Reed, Deputy Administrator, United States International 

Information Administration 33 1 

Kimball, Arthur A., Assistant Administrator for Management, United 

States International Information Admiuistratioia 387 


Introduced Appears 
on page on page 

32. King Football, by Reed Harris 344 (*) 

33. Memorandum from Reed Harris to Mr. Henry G. Alsberg, 

November 12, 1937 387 (*) 

*May be found in the files of the subcommittee. 





United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

OF the Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to 
January 30, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 357 of the Senate Office 
Building, Senator Joseph H. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Joseph E,. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota ; Everett M. JDirksen, Re- 
publican, Illinois; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry 
M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; Stuart Symington, Democrat, 

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant 
counsel ; David Schine, chief consultant ; Herbert Hawkins, investi- 
gator ; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Reed Harris, will you raise your right hand ? 

Mr. Harris. I will, sir. 

The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing before the commit- 
tee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, tTie whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Harris. I do. 

The Chairman. Your name is Reed Harris? 


Mr. Harris. It is. 

The Chairman. Tell us what your position is, Mr. Harris. 

Mr. Harris. My position is Deputy Administrator of the Interna- 
tional Information Administration of the Department of State. 

The Chairman. And in the absence of Mr. Compton, you are Act- 
ing Administrator; is that correct? 

Mr. Harris. I believe I am Acting Administrator until some hour 
today when Dr. Robert Johnson will become the Administrator. 

The Chairman. And when Dr. Compton has been out of the coun- 
try or away from the office, you have been the Acting Administrator. 
Is that right? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 



The Chairman. I understand that you have a statement that you 
would like to read in defense of two individuals whom you had pre- 
viously defended. You may read that statement if you care to. 

Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will read this statement. 

Senator McClellan. Are copies of it available? 

Mr. Harris. I have a copy available for the stenographer, Mr. 
Chairman. I have not extra copies. I did send copies up last night. 
I don't know whether they are in the hands of the committee at this 

The Chairman. Where did you send the copies last night? 

Mr. Harris. Directly to you, sir. I don't know what room it was 
sent to. I believe 160. 

Senator McClellan. This will be a short statement? 

Mr. Harris. Yes. This is not a long statement. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Harris. Before proceeding with such questions as the commit- 
tee may have, I would like to make a statement which, because it will 
correct an injustice occasioned by certain testimony before your com- 
mittee last Saturday afternoon, is important both to the individuals 
concerned and to your committee. 

At the public hearings in New York last Saturday, Mr. James F. 
Thompson of the International Broadcasting Service testified that 
proposed transfers to the Voice of America of Mr. Theodore Kaghan 
and Mr. Edmund Schechter of the Public Affairs staff of HICOG, 
Germany, were canceled because they failed to pass security. While 
under existing Presidential and departmental directives and regula- 
tions such matters are not supposed to be discussed, I have been spe- 
cifically authorized by Mr. Jack Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State that in view of Mr. Thompson's incorrect 
testimony it is only fair to point out that both Messrs. Kaghan and 
Schechter have been investigated, as required by Public Law 402, and 
have full clearance as to loyalty and security. The fact that these 
individuals did have a clean bill of health should be given publicity 
equal to that of Mr. Thompson's erroneous charges. 

The Chairman. Your testimony is that Mr. Jack Tate authorized 
5'ou to state today that both Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Tate was Adrian Fisher's assistant, was he! 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And appointed by Dean Acheson to that job ? 

Mr. Harris. I would assume so. 

The Chairman. Do you know what Kaghan's real name is? Do 
you know that Kaghan is not going under his own name ? 

INIr. Harris. I have no such information, Mr. Chainnan. 

The Chairman. You have not seen the file yourself ? 

Mr. Harris. I have never seen any security file on these individuals. 

The Chairman. Do j^ou know whether that file shows that Mr. 
Kaghan signed Communist Party nominating petitions? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, 1 do not know. I have not seen the 
file. I could not testify in any way about the security file of these 


The Chairman. Mr. Harris, this committee has been trying to find 
the key to all of the gross mismanagement, the unusual things, that 
have been going on in the Voice. I know the majority of the staff 
and a number of the Senators feel that this could not be merely the 
result of incompetence or stupidity; that the mismanagement has 
been deliberate ; and we have been trying to get the key to that and 
find the individuals responsible. Of necessity, we must go into the 
past history of some of the men and try and bring their records down 
to date. We are going to go into your background a bit today. I want 
to make it clear that I don't think anyone in this committee thinks 
because a man may have made some serious mistakes 20 years ago 
he may not have fully reformed and may not be an outstanding 
American at this time. But we must start with the record and bring 
it down to date and find out whether there has been any change in heart. 

Now, you attended Columbia University in the early thirties; is 
that correct? 

Mr. Harris. I did, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Would you speak a little louder? 

Mr. Harris. I did, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. And were you expelled from Columbia! 

Mr. Harris. I was suspended from classes on April 1, 1932. I was 
later reinstated, and I resigned from the university. 

The Chairman. You resigned from the university. Did the Civil 
Liberties Union provide you with an attorney at that time? 

Mr. Harris. I had many offers of attorneys, and one of those was 
from the American Civil Liberties Union ; yes. 

The Chairman. The question is: Did the Civil Liberties Union 
supply you with an attorney ? 

Mr, Harris. They did supply me with an attorney. 

The Chairman. The answer is "Yes" ? 

Mr. Harris. The answer is "Yes." 

The Chairman. You know that the American Civil Liberties Union 
has been listed as a front of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, this was 1932. 

The Chairman. I know this was 1932. Do you know that they 
since have been listed as a front doing the work of the Communist 

Mr. Harris. I do not know that they have been listed so. I have 
heard that mentioned, or read that mentioned. 

The Chairman. Now, shortly after you were suspended, a Mr. 
Donald Henderson was removed as a professor at Columbia. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. Mr. Donald Henderson, who had 
played a considerable part in protests that were made at the time 
I was suspended, was suspended from the college faculty, and I was 
told that a major reason for his being so disciplined was that he had 
supported me in a freedom of the press and democratic freedom 

The Chairman. I see. And did you know that Mr. Henderson 
was a Communist at that time? 

Mr. Harris. I knew that he believed in some Marxist ideas, because 
I had heard him express them in classes. 

The Chairman. Did you know he was a Communist? 


Mr. Harris. I did not know that he had any connection with the 
Connnunist Party. 

The Chairman. Did you know he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Harris. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You wrote a book in 19;32. Is that correct? 

Mr, Harris. I wrote a book and a lot of us have written books 20 
or 25 years ago which we are not proud of any more and whicli we 
wish we had not written. But I think you will find that almost 
anybody who has made statements in public, who has written, has 
some books of that kind or magazine articles of that kind going- back 
several years that they are not particularly proud al)0ut. And as I 
testified in executive session 

The Chairman. At the time you wrote the book — pardon me. Go 

Mr. Harris. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. 

At the time I wa-ote the book, the atmos})here in the universities 
of the United States was greatly affected by the great depression 
then in existence. The attitudes of students, the attitudes of the 
general public, were considerably different than they are at this 
moment. And for one thing, there certainly was no awareness to the 
degree that there is today, of the way the Communist Party works, 
the way the international Communists do their business. 

The Chairman. What question are you answering now? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I am giving you background in con- 
nection with the book that you have referred to here. 

The Chairman. When I ask for the background you can give it. 

Mr. Harris. All right, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Or you may interrupt if you want to give the 
background before that. The question was: Did you write a book? 
The answer was "Yes"'? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, I wrote a book. 

The Chairman. At tlie time you wrote the book, did you know 
Donald Henderson was a Communist ? 

Mr. HzVRris. I knew he was a Marxist and not an announced Social- 
ist Party member. I therefore would have referred to liim as a Com- 
munist witli a lower case "c." But I had no knowledge that he had 
anything to do with the Comminiist Party. There is a difi'erence 
there, sir. 

The Chairman. As I recall, the other day you told us you did not 
know he was a Communist until 5 days after he had left school. One 
of the Senators called your attention to the fact that you referred 
to him as a Communist in the book. You then said you were referring 
to him as a Communist with a small "c." You did not quite make 
clear to us the difference between a Communist with a large "C"' and 
a Communist with a small "c." Is that still your testimony today, 
that you knew him as a Communist Avith a small "c" when he defended 
you, when you defended him, and it was only 5 years later that you 
found he was a Communist with a large "C," using your language? 
Is that your testimony today ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I did not know that this man had any 
connection whatsoever with the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. The other day you talked at great length about 
the difference between a Communist with a small "c" and one with a 


large "C." I would like to have you try and explain that, too, because 
I, frankly, did not understand you the other day. 

Mr. Harris. That is not surprising, in view of the situation today, 
when the word "Communist" has a very clear and understandable 
connotation. It simply means a Communist Party member, a person 
who follows the international Communist line, as dictated by Soviet 

If you will refer to dictionaries, yon will find that a Communist 
with a lower case "c" was any person who believed in Marxist philos- 
ophy in the broad sense, as the dictionaries were written in those days. 
I tried to make that distinction before the committee in the executive 
session, and I must admit that the testimony as I read it is not particu- 
larly clear. 

The Chairman. No ; it is not. 

Mr. Harris. But I still insist on my answer. 

The Chairman. Have you checked the book to find that actually 
you used "Communist" with a large "C" in the book ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will remember that I 
mentioned specifically that it was a large "C" as far as the book was 
concerned, and that I had mentioned that to the proofreaders at my 
publishing house, that I did not have a large "C" in my manuscript. 

The Chairman. Now, you very actively defended the right of Hen- 
derson to teach at Columbia at that time ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago. Senator Taft took the 
position that I took 21 years ago, that Communists and Socialists 
should be allowed to teach in the schools. It so happens that nowa- 
days I do not agree with Senator Taft as far as Communists teaching 
in the schools is concerned, because I think Communists are in effect 
a plainclothes auxiliary of the Red army, the Soviet Red army, and 
I don't want to see them in any of our schools teaching. 

The Chairman. In other words, you claim you have changed your 
mind very substantially since 1933 ? 

Mr. Harris. I declare that I have changed my mind. I am not 
merely claiming. I can prove it. 

The Chairman. At the time that you defended Henderson, and he 
defended you, you now know that he was an active Communist ? 

Mr. Harris. I now have information published in the press about 
5 years after I got out of Columbia that Henderson was top official 
of a union that was identified in the paper as a Communist union. 
That would appear to indicate that he was at least very, very close to 
the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. Do you know that all of the Communist-front 
organizations came wholeheartedly to your defense at the time you 
were being expelled ? 

Mr. Harris. I rather object to the^way you put that, Mr. Chair- 
man, because there were thousands of people who came to my defense. 
I can show you clippings from papers as far as Shanghai, China, who 
supported me, all parts, right, left, and middle, and people of all 
classes and all walks of life. They saw this as a disciplining of a 
student editor, in connection with editorials that appeared in a stu- 
dent newspaper. They also knew that I was a chairman of a board of 
several editors, that some of the things that I was criticized for were 

29708 — 53— pt. 5- 


not necessarily my own. But they also believed in the basic American 
idea of a free press, as we all do here. 

The Chairman. Now will you try and answer the question ? Is it 
correct that all of the Communist- front organizations that you knew 
at that time came wholeheartedly to your defense ? After you answer 
that, we will be glad to have you give us the names of any other organ- 
izations that defended you. 

First I want to know whether it is true that the Communist-led 
organizations came to your defense at that time. 

Mr. Harris. I do not know that, and I am not aware — I don't know 
of any Communist organizations, at that time; I just simply don't 
know them. 

The Chairman. In other words, you could not recognize a Commii 
nist at that time? 

Mr. Harris. I couldn't recognize an actual Communist Party con- 
trolled group. No ; I could not. 

The Chairman. Well, now, at that time you were associated with 
Mr. Henderson, Nathaniel Weyl. Is that right? 

Mr. Harris. I had no association with Nathaniel Weyl beyond 
the fact that I appeared on the platform with him for approximately 
3 minutes, in order to say, in Mr. Henderson's case, that I did not 
think he should be disciplined or removed from the faculty for the 
part he played in my situation at Columbia. That was a mistaken 
sense of loyalty, and that was the way that was made. I have never 
seen Mr. Henderson since. I am not anxious to see him, ever. 

The Chairman. Now, this meeting that you appeared at, and de- 
fended Henderson, was also addressed by Mr. Nathaniel Weyl. 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You have learned since then — you did not know 
it then — that Weyl was a member of the Communist Party at that 

Mr. Harris. You so stated in the executive session held last 

The Chairman. Have you learned it, aside from what we told 
you? Have you not read the newspaper accounts, interviews with 
Weyl, where Weyl tells about his activity in the Communist Party at 
the time he was at Columbia ? 

Mr. Harris. No, I don't think I have read that anywhere. 

The Chairman. At any event, you say at that time you did not 
recognize any of these associates of yours as Communists? 

Mr. Harris. Well, I certainly know that the most prominent of 
the speakers there was no Communist. He was Mr, Heywood Broun, 
who was a convert to the Catholic Church, who was a man who had 
nationwide reputation as a columnist and commentator and book re- 
viewer. I considered him a very able writer. And it seemed to me 
very good to be on the platform with Heywood Broun. I did not 
know of any Communist connections of these other people on the 
platform, and I say that I spoke for 3 minutes. 

The Chairman. You say that you know that Heywood Broun never 
was a Communist? 

Mr. Harris. I don't say I know that. I don't have that kind of 
information. If I said, "never," I don't know what he may have gone 


through at some time of his life. But certainly he was a prominent 
Socialist Party nominee. 'He had run for Congress at about that 
time. He was very well known for that. 

The Chairman. Well, I asked you whether you could recognize a 
Communist at that time, and you said one of the men who appeared 
on the platform certainly was not a Communist. You said Heywood 
Broun was that man. 

Mr. Harris. I said that because he was clearly identified as a 
member of the Socialist Party, which is in no way a supporter of the 
Communist Party line. 

The Chairman. Now we will get back to my question. Did you 
recognize any of the young men with whom you associated at that 
time as being Communists ? 

Mr. Harris. I recognized none of them as connected with the Soviet- 
dominated Communist Party. There were Marxists on the campus 
at that time, as there were on all campuses. Some of them identified 
themselves as Socialists with a capital "S." They belonged to the 
Socialist Party. The other Marxists, of varying shades, did not iden- 
tify themselves as belonging to some specific organization. And you 
would have had to be a mindreader to know which people were nec- 
essarily members of the Communist Party or exact followers. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Social Problems Club ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I have not had an opportunity to check 
any records to see whether in the month or so after I was disciplined 
by Columbia I signed up temporarily with the Social Problems Club. 
It is possible that I did. But I am not aware of having been a mem- 
ber, and I certainly was not a member for any large portion of the 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is you do not know 
whether you were or were not a member, but you were not a member 
for a large portion of the year ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You mean you do not know at this time whether 
you were a member of that club? 

Mr. Harris. No, I certainly don't. And I am quite sure that the 
people who are sitting at their receivers at home in the television 
audience, when they realize that you are asking me questions about 
things that happened 21 and 22 years ago, in college, which were per- 
fectly proper and legal and common at the time, which had no signifi- 
cance of the kind that is now being put upon them by this committee — • 
I say that I am sure that if they thought back and tried to remember 
every little thing they did, everything they said, every person they 
talked to, every organization and meeting they might have attended, 
I am sure they might have the same difficulty I have had. I think that 
should be made clear. 

The Chairman. Let us make it perfectly clear, then, that the Social 
Problems Club has been identified by its members as completely Com- 
munist controlled. I think you should remember whether you were 
a member of a Communist-controlled club. You say it is perfectly 
proper to belong ? 

Mr. Harris. I said it was 

Tlie Chairman. You have your right to decide whether it is proper 
to belong to a Communist-controlled club or not. 


Mr. Harris. Today it would not be, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. My question is: Do y6u know whether you be- 
longed to this Communist-controlled club ? 

Mr. Harris. I gave you a very straight and honest answer. 

The Chairman. Your answer is that you do not remember? 

Mr. Harris. I do not remember. I am aware that the Social Prob- 
lems Club was the spearhead in the protests that were held, the pro- 
test meetings, and a 1-day strike, held at Columbia, when I was dis- 

The Chairman. I am going to read you a passage and see if you 

recognize it. 

With his case as a point of departure, I made a further study of the situation 
at Columbia. My first discovery was that 2 young instructors, 1 a militant 
Socialist and the other a Communist, both graduates of Columbia, were slated 
for dismissal at the end of the year for being too radical. I further learned 
that appointments of instructors are made for 1 year only at Columbia, and 
that any man may be quietly dropped at the end of an academic year, without 
explanation — a system obviously designed to avoid unpleasant controversy over 
intolerance and regimentation of thought within an allegedly liberal university. 

Do you recognize that writing as yours ? 

Mr.* Harris. That sounds very nntcli like that book I wrote in 3 
weeks and have regretted ever since, Mr. Chairman. Yes, it does. 

The Chairman. Do we have an extra copy of the book? 

Mr. Harris. I will not contest, if that is quoted from my book, I 
am not contesting it. Tliat is certainly approximately what I said at 
that time, and as I said, I am sorry that I did say it. I took Senator 
Taft's position then. I don't agree with it now. 

The Chairman. I do not recall Senator Taft ever having any of 
the background that you have, sir. 

Mr. Harris. Mr, Chairman, I consider that a most unfair innuendo. 

The Chairman. Well, then, let us continue to read your own 

Mr. Harris. Twenty-one years ago, again. 

The Chairman. Yes, but we will try to bring you down to date if 
we can. You have got to start some place, somewhere. Some place 
there is a starting point. 

This is on page 151 of your book — 

First, let me ask: Who was that Communist you were referring 

Mr. Harris. Again I say that the word "Communist" should have 
a lower case "c" on it ; that I was referring to Mr. Donald Henderson 
in that respect ; that I had no way of knowing whether or not he had 
anything to do with the Communist Party. If I knew even half 
what I have learned in recent years about the Communist Party, I 
would have been far more suspicious. I would have had nothing to 
do with Donald Henderson. And you will note that I have had 
nothing to do with him since that meeting that you talk about, that 
protest meeting, over his dismissal. 

The Chairman. In other words, your answer is that the Communist 
referred to in this passage of your book was Donald Henderson? 

Mr. Harris. That was what I meant by that passage. 

The Chairman. That is the same Donald Henderson, a head of a 
union which was expelled from the CIO because it was Communist 
controlled ? 


Mr. Harris. Several years later ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Who is the Socialist, the "militant Socialist," you 
referred to '( 

Mr. Harris. I have tried to check back the records on that to see 
what that was, and I find difficulty in recalling. I think it was a son 
of Upton Sinclair. 

The Chairman. Do you know his name? 

^Ir. Harris. I am sorry. I do not remember his first name. 

The Chairman. And then you go on to applaud the fact that the 
fuss raised about your expulsion resulted in this Communist and this 
Socialist having their contracts renewed. At that time, I gather you 
felt you had scored a considerable victory by continuing the contract 
of this Conununist for a year. Or is that the correct analysis? 

Mr. Harris. I considered at that time, as Senator Taft does now^ 
that academic freedom should allow Communists and Socialists to be 
on faculties. 1 do not think so today. I have repeated that. I 
would not support that position in the case of a Communist at thisi 

The Chairman. Again, on page 147, in condemning the universities 
for denying academic freedom, freedom of expression of professors, 
you have this to say : 

There is, for instance, a professor at Princeton with whom I am intimately 
acquainted. For 3 years this middle-aged savant has been a Communist in 
personal conviction. In his teaching, in which he must make frequent mention 
of things political, he dares not suggest that the fundamental basis of American 
Government may be utterly wrong. From his lectures, even from his magazine 
articles, one might guess that he was a fairly regular old-school Democrat. This 
veneer of respectability was adopted l)ecause, one day in the spring of 1931. he 
told a class of freshmen that he was watching the Russian experiment with 
interest and that he believed that the new form of government was ideal at 
least in theory. One freshman wrote home to mama. IMama wrote to Princeton. 
And 2 weeks after this particular lecture was delivered, the head of my friend's 
department called him in and suggested that he keep his thoughts on subjects 
political to himself unless he desired to discontinue teaching. 

Now will you tell us who that professor was, and w^hether he is still 
teaching ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, if this were a simple fact-finding hear- 
ing, you would rely on the testimony I gave in executive session more 
than a week ago, a week ago Monday. But I will repeat the statement 
I made then. 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt you there. I hardly think we 
can rely on it, when we got a letter this morning that you want to cor- 
rect parts of that testimon3\ You will be given that privilege, but in 
view of the fact that you say you want to correct that testimony, we 
must reask you those questions under oath and find out what you want 
to correct. "We told you and told all witnesses whom we heard in 
executive session that they would have the right to examine their testi- 
mony and if they found any typographical or stenogi-aphic errors they 
could correct them. Now, I gather from your letter that your cor- 
rection is intended to go further than that. And I am inclined to 
think the counnittee will be extremely lenient and allow you to make 
siich corrections as you want to, perhaps even in substance, but in 
view of the fact tliat you say you want to make corrections we must 
rely on what you have to say after you have thought it over. 

Mr. Harris. If I liad only my own neck to think about, ^Ir. Chair- 
man, I would have devoted the last davs 


The Chairman. Just a minute. 

(Brief consultation among committee members.) 

The Chairman. O. K., sir. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, if I had only my own neck in mind 
here, I would have devoted the last 8 days, every hour of them, to 
going back into such records as I could dig up, calling people up to 
find the exact dates and places of things going back 21 years ago or 
17 years ago or 15 years ago. But you will realize, sir, that I have 
been holding down the top post in an organization of 8,000 people. 

The Chairman. I asked you a simple question : who the Communist 
at Princeton was. Do you know^ 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I will admit that I was talking about 
a broader issue at that point. 

The Chairman. Well, who is the Communist friend ? You say you 
were intimately acquainted with this Communist at Princeton. Then 
you go on to tell his difficulties. You relate them in detail. The 
question is: Do you know who that Communist was, or do you not? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, as I testified in executive session, I 
used what was called author's license. I had information on a Prince- 
ton professor that had been published in a publication. I can't re- 
member where the clipping came from, probably from some compila- 
tion of academic freedom cases. And I suggested in the book that 
this was a close friend of mine and this was not true. 

The Chairman. In other words, when you say you had an intimate 
friend at Princeton who was a Communist, when you related his dif- 
ficulties, you were not telling the truth, then ? 

Mr. Harris. I was not telling the truth in that respect in that book ; 
no, I was not. 

The Chairman. Then, is it your testimony today that you did not 
intimately know a Communist professor at Princeton at that time? 

Mr. Harris. That is my testimony today, as it was Monday, and 
will be hereafter at any time. 

The Chairman. Now let me read you from another page of your 
book, page 140. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, could we perhaps save a little time of 
the committee and everything else if I summarized some of the things 
that that book says that are not good ? 

For instance, there is criticism of the American Legion in there. 
There is an implication that post commanders are not always the 
finest men in the United States. 

The Chairman. Do you recall the passage? 

Mr. Harris. I can't recall it at this minute, exactly. 

The Chairman. Could I recall the passage to you ? 

Mr. Harris. I am bitterly unhappy about having made that state- 
ment, because I now know many men who hold posts in the American 
Legion who are among the finest men in this country. I have two 
close friends right now who are commanders of American Legion 
posts. It was a mistake to characterize the whole American Legion 
by the few little clippings that had been given to me at that time or 
that I had picked up from researchers at that time. That was a mis- 
take. It is part of the thing that I regret. It goes back 21 years, 
I repeat ; 21 years ago. 

I say that a man's mind can change a great deal in 21 years. I say 
that I have now been in the Government for a long time; that I have 


been investigated by six investigative agencies; that I have been 
cleared right and left. 

The Chairman. That is not true, sir. I have asked for your 
jBle, and in view of the fact that you said your file cleared you, I asked 
whether there was anything in the file which would indicate a clear- 
ance, and the answer has been "No." Mr. McLeod has taken over as 
security officer, and we hope that he will give us your file. So when 
you say you were cleared 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I resent very much that statement. 

The Chairman. Whether you resent it or not, I am relating the 
facts. I must relate the facts as they are. I talked to the Depart- 
ment this morning, and I asked whether there was anything in your 
file which would indicate that you were cleared, and the information 
was, "No, there was not," and I have asked for your file. You, the 
other day, after a bit of questioning, rather reluctantly consented 

Mr. Harris. Not reluctantly at all, sir. That is absolutely false. 
There was not a bit of reluctance in it. I even offered to let you look 
at that file. 

The Chairman. Let me get down to the question again. 

Mr. Harris. All right; but I think, when you are casting innuen- 
does and aspersions here without any support, it is not fair. I think 
you should let me tell what I have to say. I say that I was cleared 
by the Department of State 

The Chairman. Will counsel get the executive session testimony 
when we asked this witness whether his file should be reviewed? I 
think, in fairness to the witness, it should be read into the record. 
All the Senators were not there. 

As soon as we find that, we will read it into the record. 

I want to read another passage from your book, page 149. There 
you say that another member of the faculty — 

is like my Princeton friend, in that he, too, has had definite warnings by his 
departmental head. His two strongest convictions are that America should 
now be under Fascist control and that marriages should be cast out of our 
civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena. One day, in an 
informal talk with three sophomores, he stated and enlarged upon his two pet 
theories. Within a month he was notified that he must cease expression of 
his views or cease lecturing entirely. 

Now, is it correct that at that time you felt a professor should be 
entitled to lecture sophomores to the effect that "marriages should be 
cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenom- 
ena." Was that your thought at that time? 

Mr. Harris. It was my thought that anyone should be allowed to 
teach in a university who had not committed an actual crime and 
been convicted of the same. That is not my view now, as I have 
said several times. I think that teaching of a thing of that sort would 
be very unfortunate. 

I might add that I have been happily married since 1931 to the same 
wife ; that I do believe in the institution of marriage ; that I have three 
fine children at home ; that I think my conduct will stand examination 
by any impartial group ; that if this particular proceeding were held in 
a court of law, where it were possible to question the questions, as it 
were, where the legal counsel could be on both sides of the table and 
not merely on the prosecution side, I could satisfy anybody in these 
United States that I am a loyal American citizen. 


I resent the tone of this inquiry very much, Mr. Chairman. I resent 
it not only because it is my neck, my i^ublic neck, that you are, I think, 
very skillfully tryin<j to wrino;, but I say it because there are thou- 
sands of able and loyal employees in the Federal Government of the 
United States who have been properly cleared accordino; to the laws 
and the security practices of their agencies, as I was — unless the new 
regime says "No" — I was before. I am sure that any previous official 
would say so. I am sure that 1 have had two full field FBI investiga- 
tions. Can Mr. Colin say that? Has he had two full field investiga- 
tions, been examined all the Avay back to his births I have. And 
I have by Military Intelligence, by Naval Intelligence, by the Office for 
Emergency jSIanagement, and by the Civil Service Commission. 

The Chairman. Let us get down to the Naval Intelligence investiga- 
tion, since you brought it up. Is it correct that in 1942 Naval Intel- 
ligence investigated you when you applied for a commission, and that 
you were turned down after that investigation'^ That is correct; is 
it not? 

Mr. Harris. I am saying that they investigated me thoroughly. I 
am saying that they did turn me down, they said, for physical reasons. 
If they turned me down for security, I don't know that. 

The Chairman. Did they tell you they turned you down for physi- 
cal reasons? 

Mr. Harris. They did. I have a letter to that efi'ect. 

The Chairman. And would Security turn you down for ])hysical 
reasons ? 

Mr. Harris. Of course, Security would not turn me down for i^hysi- 
cal reasons, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Do you know now that you were turned down as a 
result of the security investigation ? 

jVIr. Harris. You were certainly implying that, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know that is the truth ^ 

Mr. Harris. I do not. 

The Chairman. May I ask that the counsel at this time check with 
the man on my staff who was in the Navy at that time, conducted the 
investigation, and we will have him testify as to the reasons for the 
turndown, so that there can be no doubt in your mind. As I say, seeing 
you brought that up, we will make that clear. 

Senator JNIcClellan. Mr. Chairman, is there a record that is avail- 
able ? I think that would be the best evidence. 

The Chairman. May I say. Senator McClellan; I have asked the 
State Department for the entire file on this individual. A new man 
has taken over as security officer, an outstanding man, Mr. McLeod. 
I assume that he will give us that file. We do not have it at this time. 

Senator McClellan. My only point is that if there is a record, an 
official record, that is the best evidence, and I would rather have that, 
])ersonally, than to have someone's connnent about it. If it is avail- 
able and it can be made available to us, I think that is the best evidence. 

The Chairman. If the file is not available, we will call the man who 
made the investigation. We can let him testify. I did not intend to 
bring this up, except that the witness said he was cleared by Naval 

Mr. Harris. I have not said I was cleared by Naval Intelligence. 
I said I was investigated very thoroughly. I certainly was cleared 
by the Civil Service Commission back as far as 1940. They read 


every page of the book you are now quoting from. They read every 
page of the Cohnnbia Spectator at the time I was there. They 
studied everything I had done up to 1940. They did it very thor- 
oughly, and they had a file this thick [indicating] when they inter- 
viewed me, and they were satisfied as to my loyalty, and so I was 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, we do not care who read what. This 
committee has found fantastic conditions in the Voice of . America, 
Two of the Senators have publicly expressed themselves that the 
conditions found there could not have been the result of stupidity but 
must have been the result of design. 
Mr. Harris. I am sure that is not true. 

The Chairman. You say we are after your neck. Before you came 
before this committee, I had never seen you before. 1 have the duty, 
as chairman of this committee, to try to bring before the committee all 

of this material 

Mr, Harris. All of it, sir ? 

The Chairman. Just a minute. We will give you all the time in 
the world to talk. You will not be cut off. But, while I am speaking, 
I will have to insist that you remain quiet. Is that all right? 

You wrote a book in 1932. I assume that expressed your feelings 
as of that date. You were editor of the Spectator. That is the 
Columbia newspa])er. I assume what you wrote then expressed your 
feelings as of that time, 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Now, if you still feel the way you felt then, you 
would be the most incompetent man conceivable for this job, and I 
am sure you would agree. If you have reformed, we are going to 
give you a chance to tell where along the line you changed your mind. 
You will have full opportunity to do that, even if we stay here all 
week. ^ 

I am going to ask you again. At the time you wrote this book, did 
you feel that professors should be given the right to teach sophomores 
that "marriages should be cast out of our civilization as antiquated 
and stupid religious phenomena"? Was that your feeling at that 
time ? 

Mr. Harris. My feeling Avas that professors should have the right 
to express their considered opinions on any subject, whatever they 

wei'e, sir. 

The CiiAiR]\rAN. Well, let me ask you this question again. 

Mr. Harris. That includes that quotation; any considered opinion 
they had, they would have a right to express to their students. That 
was my view then. 

Senator Symington. Mr. Harris. I do not think he is asking you 
whether you have got the right. I think he is asking you whether you 
agreed with what that professor said. 

Mr. Harris. Well, I certainly do not. I never have, Senator, I 
never have. 

The Chairman. That was not my question. My question was 
whether he felt then that it was an infringement upon academic free- 
dom — that is what he is talking about through this book — to deny a 
professor the right to teach sophomores that "marriages should be 

29708— 53— pt. .5 3 


cast out of oiir civilization as antiquated and stupid religious 

I understand your answer to be that at that time you felt professors 
should have that right. Is that right ? 

Mr. Harris. They should have the right to teach anything that 
came to their minds as proper to teach. 

The Chairman, I am going to make you answer this- 

Mr. Harris. My answer is "Yes," but you put an implication on it, 
and you feature this particular point in the book, which is quite out of 
context and does not give the proper impression of the book as a whole. 
The American public does not gain an honest impression of that book, 
bad as it is, from what you are quoting from it. 

The Chairman. We will mark the book as an exhibit in its en- 
tirety. I intend to read other passages from it. I thought you would 
have a copy of this book along with you, to make sure we were not 
taking it out of context. 

(The book referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 32," and will be 
found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

Senator ISIcClellan. Mr. Harris, as I understand you, at the time 
you wrote the book and expressed these views, they were truly your 
views at the time. You actually believed that a professor had a right 
to teach what you quoted here in the book. 

Mr. Harris. He had a right to teach anything, sir. Yes. That was 
what I had been taught. 

Senator MoClellan. Not only what you quoted in the book, but 
he had a right to teach any theory of life or philosophy of life or 
government or anything else he thought he believed in ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That was the position you took then? 

Mr. Harris. That is right, Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Do you still hold that view ? 

Mr. PIarris. I do not, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Wlien did you change? 

Mr. Harris. That was a molding process, as I learned more about 
life. I think it was clearly 

Senator IVIcClellan. All right. Can you give us any indication of 
at what time, at what period in your life, your views began to change 
on these subjects ? 

Mr. Harris. Recounting mental processes and trying to to probe 
those back in your mind is a very difficult thing to do. 

Senator McClellan. Well, you have some general idea. You say 
you have changed. Now, it is 21 years later. "\Vliat I am trying to de- 
termine : Was that change just recently, or immediately afterward ? 

Mr. Harris. It would certainly go back as far as 1935 or 1934. 
Something like that. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 1934 or 1935. Within 2 or 3 years 
after you wrote the book, your views changed on these subjects. Is 
that coi'rect ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. And you entertain diametrically opposite 
views now ? 

Mr. Harris. On the matter of Communists on college faculties, I 
certainly have diametrically opposed views now. Yes, I do. 


Senator McClellan. Just one other question. Do you think this 
book that you wrote then did considerable harm, that is publication 
might have had adverse influence on the public, by expression of the 
views contained in it ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, if you saw a flicker of a smile even in 
this serious proceeding when you asked that question, I will tell you 


Senator McCleli^an. I am not trying to get a smile. 

INIr. Harris. No. Forgive me. 

Senator McCleixax. I am trying to be helpful. If you want to 
present your case, I want to hear it. 

Mr. Harris. You are quite right, Senator. 

Senator ]\1cClellan. But I want to weigh it in the light of all of 
the testimony and all of the facts. 

Mr. Harris. I appreciate your question. The only reason I men- 
tioned the smile is simply that the sale of that book was so abysmally 
small, it was so unsuccessful, that the question of its influence — really, 
you can go back to the publisher. You can see it was one of the most 
unsuccessful books he ever put out. He is still sorry about it, just as 
I am. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I think that is a compliment to Amer- 
ican intelligence. 

I want to ask you one other question. Have you since considered 
writing another book that might be a good seller to repudiate the 
ideology and the views that you expressed in the book that we are 
discussing ? 

Mr. Harris. I would be glad to write such a book if I had the op- 
portunity, sir. I have been in the Federal service almost continuously 
since 1934, and there has been no opportunity to do much book writing 
in my jobs. 

Senator McClellan. I think there have been a great many books 
written by people in the Federal service. 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir ; I know. 

Senator McClellan. I think you have overlooked an opportunity, 
possibly, to correct those mistakes. 

Mr. Harris. If you can produce the publisher, sir, I will write 
the book, beginning tomorrow. 

Senator McClellan. I do not know whether anyone can produce a 
publisher or not for this kind of a book again. 

Mr. Harris. No, not this kind of a book. That was written in 
3 weeks. 

The Chairman. I am sorry. I would not take the responsibility of 
trying to get you a publisher. 

Mr. Harris, let me read to you another passage from the book. I 
want to ask you if this was your honest feeling at that time, and if so, 
. when you changed. 

You were again talking about academic freedom in connection, of 
course, as you say, with your Communist friend at Princeton and 
your Communist friend at Columbia. You say this : 

The colleges supported wholly by Protestant sects lead the way in creating 
the worst atmosphere of university fear in America. State colleges follow 
close behind. The Catholic institutions must be placed next. Last, but still 
intolerant, are the privately endowed colleges unattached to any religious 


The religious institutions can hardly be censured. Their intolerance is 
obvious in their very nature. 

Is that the way you honestly felt at that time? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, that was a summary of statistics, in 
fffect, simply, that showed at that time that these particular categories 
of universities seemed to discharge instructors or students for their 
beliefs, in that descending order of importance. That has nothing 
to do with my beliefs today. It was simply a summary of an existing 
situation then. 

The Chairman. You said that they were inclined to discharge 
students because of their beliefs. Do you know of any Protestant 
or Catholic college or university which discharged anyone because 
of his beliefs, except for Communist activities? 

Mr. Harris. Oh. certainly. 

The Chairman. When you talk ajbout beliefs, you are speaking 
about the type of Communist activities for Avhich Henderson was 
discharged, are you not? 

Mr. Harris. I am not talking about Communist activity at all. 
I am talking about expressions of strong beliefs in all sorts of direc- 
tions, beliefs that were not popular with the particular faculty or 

The Chairman. Do you know of a single student who was expelled 
for his beliefs during that period of time? 

Mr. Harris. As I said, I haven't had time to do a lot of research, 
but I could produce a lot of cases, sir. I remember the editor of the 
Daily Tarheel of the University of North Carolina was disciplined 
in that. For something that had nothing to do with communism or 
any other kind of "ism." And there have been others. As a matter 
of fact, I was not disciplined for connnunism. I hope that that is 

The Chairman. Let us see what you were disciplined for. 

Let me read one of the editorals, which you wrote, as editor of 

the Spectator 

Mr. Harris. Wouldn't it be more 

The Chairman. One that ap})arently served as a basis for your 
expulsion. Let me read it to you. 

The Stars and Stripes represent those things which every American holds 
dear, those things which his blood has been spilled to consecrate, namely, the 
American Legion, the Ku Klux Klan, Gastonia, Harlan County, and the Daughters 
and the Sons of the Amerit^an Revolution. * * * 

Mr. Harris. Twenty-one years ago that editorial was written by a 
member of my editorial board, and not by me. 

The Chairman. Who wrote it? 

Mr. Harris. I think, Mr. Chairman, if it is i)ermissible, I would 
prefer not to bring additional names into this hearing. 

The Chairman. It is not permissible. You must answer every 
question. You must answer, or refuse to answer on the grounds that 
it would incriminate you. 

Mr. Harris. I believe a Mr. D. D. Ross wrote it. 

The Chairman. Mr. D. D. Eoss. And where is Mr. Ross today? 

Mr. Harris. I think he is a repoi-ter at the present time. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether he is connected with the 
Government in anv manner? 


Mr. Harris. No, lie is not connected with the Government in any 
manner, unless he has joined in a recent week. 

The Chairman. Now, yon brought up the matter of the Legion in 
this editorial, and also in the book, and you raised the question your- 
self. I quote from page 122. This is not a direct quote, I may say, 
from you. You are quoting another student. 

I remember (him) as a sadistic butcher 

Is that a direct quote ? Counsel tells me this is a direct quote from 
you. I thought you were quoting another student at the time. Let 
us check it. 

Mr. Harris. That is a fictional section of the book, I might point 
out, a sort of passage from a short-story section. 

The Chairman. I think you were quoting someone else at this 
time. I know that the entire paragraph is within quotes. But, 
at any event, let me quote it to you. 

I remember (liim) as a sadistic butcher who is now probably the commander 
of some American Legion post. 

Did you honestly feel that way at that time? 

Mr. Harris. That was not my view, but it was reflected in certain 
press articles, unfair press articles, which were being run at that 
time, about the American Legion and its part in stopping various 
demonstrations of what api^eared to be legitimate unemployed people 
and things of that sort. Nowadays we would know that most of 
those demonstrations were led by the Communist Party, but people 
did not recognize that then. They did not see the pattern. 

The Chairman. May I say that some people did, apparently. Your 
testimony is that you did not recognize those demonstrations that 
you now say were Communist-led demonstrations as such, but the 
Legion did. 

Now, I would like to know when you arrived at a point where you 
could recognize Connnunists, where you could recognize Comnuinist 
groups. Being the top man in the Voice as of today, it is rather 
important that you be able to recognize Communists and Connnunist 

Mr. Harris. I began to be able to recognize their thoroughly dirty 
methods, their idea that the ends — the means, whatever they are, 
however dirty, however criminal — that the end justifies these means. 
I began to discover that just about the time that I was pushed out 
of Columbia, because I began to see these people who apparently 
were in some manner affiliated with Communist gi'oups, completely 
distorting the truih in all sorts of situations, lying about things that 
I knew about personally. And when I see people consistently lying 
in a political situation, I am highly s-uspicious of them. That is wdien 
the education started. That experience at Columbia was one of the 
greatest educational experiences one could have. I think I learned 
more in about 3 weeks of that thing than I learned in the other 3I/2 
years at Columbia about the political realities. 

The Chairman. You wrote the book after you had learned about 
those political realities, did you not? 

Mr. Harris. I said after I had begun to learn. I can't say that I 
knew it all then, but I learned 


The Chairman. You said that 3 weeks at Columbia was the best 
education you had, that you learned a lot about political realities. 
It was after that that you wrote this book? 

Mr. Harris. Quite right. But I hadn't learned all the tricks of 
the Communist Party at that time. It would take a long time to 
learn those things. 

The Chairman. By 1942 would you say that you could recognize a 
Communist ? 

Mr. Harris. I should think I could recognize anybody who is fol- 
lowing a clear-cut Communist line. I don't say that you can go down 
a street and look at a man and say he is a Communist, of course. I 
know that nobody can in this room or any other. 

The Chairman. I am referring to those men who are active in 
Communist work. We will take Don Henderson. By 1942, would 
you say you recognized him as an active member of the Communist 
conspiracy ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly recognized that he had been identified as 
such. I had not observed him personally from the time that I left 
Columbia in that protest meeting. 

The Chairman. You said you never saw him from the time you left 
Columbia up to the present date? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly never remember seeing his face anywhere. 

The Chairman. Can you tell us why in 1942, if you had not seen 
him for some 10 or 11 years — we will strike that. 

Mr. Harris. The implications of a thing of that sort left hanging 
in the air are that I had something to do with Donald Henderson in 

The Chairman. Well, now, if you want us to bring out Henderson's 
testimony, we will. I do not think, in fairness to you, we should. 
Henderson testified before this committee, and if you think it is fair 
to recite what he testified, I will. Do you think you should be present 
when he testifies? 

Mr. Harris. Certainly I think I should be present when he testifies. 
If I am given a clear-cut opportunity, under these conditions, to be 
where Donald Henderson is when he makes his testimony, I should 
prefer that. 

The Chairman. All right. Good. 

Let us go back to this book for one minute. On page 253, you say : 

Mediocrity has been the apparent goal of education, although such a situation 
ought never to have prevailed. Change the system, and thereby bring about 
progress toward new intellectual heights. 

Then you give your formula. You tell how you think the system 
should be changed. 

I am curious to know, No. 1, whether you honestly felt that way 
then, and when you changed your mind. 

You say this, on page 249. You say: "It is my plan" — in other 
words, this is a Harris plan. You say : 

The existing private institutions would be converted into public organizations 
and would be added to the present system of public educational facilities. 
This could be done, although with some difficulty, by the usual methods in use 
in our Government today, by negotiations, or by condemnation proceedings. 

In other words, as I read this, you say : 


Let US have no educational institutions run by any religious or- 
ganizations, by any private individuals. And you say : 

If they will not consent to have them converted to public institutions, then we 
will start condemnation proceedings. 

That is the Harris plan of that time to improve education. You say 
if we change the system we can bring about "progress toward new 
intellectual heights." 

Did you honestly feel that way at that time, and if so, have you 
changed your mind? And if so, if you changed, when did you 
change ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I was rather bitter at a large private 
institution of learning at that time. I think that any statements I 
made in that book, written in great haste, after that event, were 
affected considerably by my emotional feeling about private educa- 
tional institutions. And I did believe at that time that it would be 
a good idea for all colleges to be open to the general public, just as 
our public schools are, so that the broadest possible education could 
come to the broadest possible number of people; that I think that 
would lead to progress in education. I would doubt it very much, 
having studied the situation more in recent years. 

The Chairman. My question is : At that time, did you think 

Mr. Harris. I said "Yes, sir," in other words perhaps. 

The Chairman. This was submitted as the Harris plan, so I as- 
sume you gave it considerable thought. 

Mr. Harris. I wrote that book m 3 weeks, sir. 

The Chairman. The question is. At that time, did you feel that 
the Government should condemn and forcibly take over all colleges 
and schools that were not public schools and colleges ? 

Mr. Harris. No ; only I thought that there should be a law passed 
that they should become a part of the public educational system, and 
that if the thing was not done quickly and simply by normal negotia- 
tion it would require condemnation. Twenty-one years ago, in. a 
book written in 3 weeks, in an emotional state, after having been 
pushed around by a very large educational institution, I said those 
things. I don't believe them now. I regret having said them. And 
I find it hard to see that they have a great bearing on my proven 
conduct over the last several years when I have been a Federal 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, we intend to get into your proven con- 
duct over the past several years, also, you understand. Now, you 
have been in a position where you could have done a tremendous 
job with the Voice of America. You had unlimited funds. You 
were the Acting Director when Mr. Compton was away. We will 
want to go into in some detail what you have done and what you 
have failed to do. But the only way we can get a complete picture, 
we are trying to find the key to this fantastic picture in the Voice. 
You may not be the key. We do not know. But we must examine 
your backgi"ound. And certainly you start out with an unusual 

Now, when do you say that you became anti-Communist? Or do 
you say you always were anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Harris. I have always been opposed to the Communist Party, 
to the Soviet-controlled mechanisms, the way they have worked. 


The Chairman. Have you always been anti-Communist? Let us 
forget about this Soviet mechanism. 

Mr. Harris. Not as long as that word is defined as it was in those 
days. I have not rechecked the dictionary recently, but that referred 
to coUectivist philosophy, even as applied in convents and monasteries, 
and so on. I was not opposed to communism at that time, the broad 
theory; no. 

The Chairman. We are not talking about communism in monas- 
teries and convents. 

Mr. Harris. 1 know that, Mr. Chairman, but I have to keep the 
thing in context. 

The Chairman. We want to know what you understand communism 
to be. 

Mr. Harris. Eight today, you mean? 

The Chairman. Have you always been opposed to communism? 

Mr. Harris. The word as it is said today, I certainly have been 
opposed to; yes. 

The Chairman. Have you always been opposed to Marxism? If 
not, when did you become opposed ? 

Mr. Harris. I was not, in that college year. No; I wasn't, and 
probably not for a year after. 

The Chairman. You were not o])posed to Marxism in those days. 

Mr. Harris. Not to the broad principles of Marxism; no. 

The Chairman. And do you say the broad principles of Marxism 
are different from the broad ])rinciples of communism ? 

Mr. Harris. I am saying that Marxism was a very broad theoretical 
concept; that the practicalities of the communism of today are the 
international Soviet Communist line. 

The Chairman. I am trying to get your thought. You say you are 
opposed to communism as it is known today. As I understand Karl 
Marx and Lenin were the fathers of communism. To a great extent, 
their books are the bible of the present day Communists. Now, you 
indicate that you were at some time in favor of the teachings of Karl 
Marx, whom many of us consider the No. 1 Communist. But you 
say you were against communism as known today. Do you still 
believe in the teachings of Karl Marx ? 

Mr. Harris. I never did believe in all the teachings of Karl Marx. 
You asked me if I were opposed to all the teachings of Karl Marx at 
the time I was in college, and I said I was not. 

The Chairman. I asked you if you were opposed to communism. 

Mr. Harris. I have been opposed to the Communist Party and 
what it does, from the very first minute. 

The Chairman. Now, have you changed your thoughts about the 
teachings of Karl Marx since you were writing at Columbia '? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly have. 

The Chairman. And which of his teachings did you believe in then 
that you do not believe in now ? 

Mr. Harris, I believe in none of his teachings now. 

The Chairman. I see. All right. AVhich of his teachings did you 
believe in then? 

Mr. Harris. I believed that a civilization that gives each person 
what he needs, and takes from him according to his ability would be a 
very fine Christian society. I did not recognize what the practicalities 


of such a situation were. That has nothing to do with the Soviet 
communism of today. There is no more relation to it than the man in 
the moon. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, I hold in my band a document entitled 
"Alumni Home-Coming Dinner," dated Sunday, March 21 — what year 
is this, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. CoHN. 1937. 

The Chairman. 1937. That is 5 years after you wrote this book. 
The alumni referred to are apparently the alumni of the American 
Student Union. You are aware of the fact that the American Student 
Union has been named by the House Committee as a tool of the Com- 
munist Party; in other words, a fi'ont for and doing the work of the 
Communist Party ; that the function of this American Student Union 
was to take over and subvert the minds of the youth in college. You 
are aware of that, are you not? 

Mr. Harris. In recent years, I understand that it has been so identi- 
fied. I doubt very much whether it was so identified at that time. 

The Chairman. Are you aware of the fact that this is one of the 
organizations that has been identified as having been Communist con- 
trolled from the beginning? 

Mr. Harris. I do not know that. 

The Chairman. You do not know that? 

Mr. Harris. I do not. 

The Chairman. Well, now, in view of the fact that you were listed 
as a sponsor, in view of the fact that you were questioned about that, do 
you not think it might be well for you to check into the backgi-ound of 
that organization now, if you did not know then ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly think I should check into the background. 
And I will report what was said in the executive session, that I do not 
recollect having any part in a dinner or anything else for the American 
Student Union. 

I will return to the fact that I stated earlier, that a man does a great 
many things over a period of years, and does not remember everything. 
I think that the members of the TV audience, if they were requested 
right now to tell what they did 15 years ago — Perhaps somebody 
came around and said, "Would you give us $3 or $5 to have a little 
dinner of some students who want to get together and help the 
cause of youth?" You might easily have given that money, and 
thereafter your name may have been listed somewhere. 

I am not aware of having participated in any way in this thing, 
but you have held up a document which presumably is authentic. I 
deny ever having supported in any major sense the American Student 

Senator Mundt. Did you attend that alumni dinner? 

Mr. Harris. I don't think it would have been possible that I could 
have attended a dinner and not remember it. Senator. I don't think 
my memory is that poor. But I might have given some money or 
something of that sort for it and not remembered it. 

Senator Mundt. You did not answer the question. Did you attend 
that alumni dinner? 

Mr. Harris. I say to the best of my recollection, I didn't. 

Senator Mundt. To the best of your recollection, your testimony is, 
you did not attend ? 

29708 — 53— pt. 5 4 


Mr. Haeris. That is correct, Senator, absolutely. I would be very 
glad to have that checked back as far as you wish. 

The Chairman. Do you know why they used your name not merely 
as a member but as a sponsor? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, if they came around and collected some 
money, whether it was $3 or $5 or something of that sort, those people 
made a great specialty of coming around and giving you a sort of 
a garbled version of what they were going to do, and then they col- 
lected money and called you a sponsor. 

The Chairman. Were you ever on tlie editorial staff of any publica- 
tion known as a Communist-controlled publication ? 

Mr. Harris. I was never on the editorial staff, I was never on the 
regular editorial staff, of any publication of that kind. I know what 
you are talking about. I am perfectly willing to testify at full length. 
A single issue of a magazine called Direction was in effect brought out, 
at the suggestion of the Director of the Federal Writers Project of 
WPA to publish the creative writings of a number of people on the 
WPA Writers Project; a single issue, in no way connected with their 
regular series, and not edited by their regular board. 

The director of the project, who made these arrangements, as a 
courtesy to a number of his associates in the office of the Federal 
Writers Project, an official project of the Government of the United 
States in Washington, did list a group of the top executives of the 
Federal Writers Project, the American Guide Project, in the front 
of that single issue of that magazine. And I was so listed. It was 
an honoraiy editorial boraxl, not an actual editorial board, and it 
had no connection with the regular management of this magazine. 
And I am sure that can l)e established 15 ways. 

The Chairman. Is there no question in your mind but what that 
was a Communist-controlled magazine ? 

Mr. Harris. I had no knowledge of that. 

The Chairman. Do you know that now ? 

Mr. Harris. No; I don't know it now. I heard it so identified at 
the executive session on last Monday. 

The Chairman. Well, did you know the editor right well? 

Mr. Harris. I don't think I have ever known the editor. Who is 
listed as editor? 

The Chairman. Do you know the man who put you on the editorial 
board or listed you on the editorial board ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Henry Alsberg, the director of the project, listed 
me as a member of the honorary editorial board for this single special 
issue. He was not the editor of that publication. 

The Chairman. Was Alsberg a good friend of yours? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Alsberg w^as a very kind and good 

The Chairman, Was he a good friend of yours ? 

Mr. Harris. I would consider him not a very good friend, but he 
was a friendly person. He was very kind to all of his associates. We 
worked together in the same office. I was not a good fi'iend in the 
social sense. 

The Chairman. Did you consider him a Communist? 

Mr. Harris. No ; I certainly did not consider him a Communist. 

The Chairman. Did you consider him the type of communist with 
a small "c" that you said you thought Henderson was at the time you 
first met him ? 


Mr. Harris. I did not consider him a Communist in any sense of 
the term. 

The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, is it correct that Alsberg resigned 
while under a loj^alty investigation? 

Mr, CoHN. Yes ; while he was at OWI, I believe. 

The Chairman. No, how about Jerre Mangione? He was also 
listed on the editorial board with you? 

Mr. Harris. He was one of the editors, too. This is a semiofficial 
duty. We were listed on that board together. He was an employee 
of the American Guide Series like myself. 

The Chairman. Did you know he was a Communist at the time ? 

Mr. Harris. I had no such information. 

The Chairman. Have you learned since then that he belonged to the 
John Reed club ? 

Mr. Harris. I had not known it until the executive session last Mon- 
day, when you so stated, or I believe the counsel so stated; I don't 
remember which one. 

The Chairman. I believe you testified that you did not belong to 
the John Reed club yourself. 

Mr. Harris. I certainly did. 

The Chairman. You mean you certainly did testify ? 

Mr. Harris. I testified that I was never a member of that club. I 
don't know where the club is or what it was. 

The Chairman. Do you not know now that it is a Communist 
Pai'ty club ? 

Mr. Harris. I have heard a John Reed club identified. I don't 
know where or what. There may be several of them. 

The Chakman. Mr. Counsel, I think you wanted to read to the 
witness some of his editorials from the Spectator. If you have any 
questions along that line, you may proceed. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt only this much 

The Chairman. You may interrupt at any time. you care to and 
make any statement you care to, sir. 

Mr. Harris. I think that is a very generous offer. 

During the time you started this particular set of question, you 
made a statement that you were trying to get at the bottom of the 
troubles in the Voice of America, which I consider have been exceed- 
ingly exaggerated by witnesses here. But during that statement, you 
said that we, the command of this International Information Admin- 
istration, had had unlimited funds at our disposal. 

I should like to point out that we have had the most serious cuts 
in the amounts that we have requested to carry on the work ; that we 
have had to make adjustments constantly to stay within what to us 
has seemed to be a very small budget for a large cold-war effort. 

And may I add, too, sir, that much of this testimony which seems 
to indicate a mismanagement or inefficiency in the operation of the 
Voice can be refuted if the expert witnesses we have requested to be 
called are brought before this group. And may I give you one specific 
and very important example? 

The Chairman. May I interrupt you there? Any witness that you 
feel should be called — within limits, of course; we cannot call hun- 
dreds of witnesses — any of the important witnesses that you think 
should be called, in order to give us a complete, accurate picture of 


the workings of the Voice, will be called. I am going to ask you to do 
this, however. Some witnesses have been wiring the staffs of other 
Senators. I am not clairvoyant. Unless I receive word from you or 
from someone else that you want certain witnesses called, I cannot 
look into your mind, you see, and determine which should be called. 

Mr. Harris. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You can make a list. You can change that list 
from time to time. We want to get to the bottom of this. I personally 
think that the situation is fantastic beyond words. I cannot conceive 
of the things that have been going on in the Voice and going on in 
American institutions. I would be very happy if the testimony taken 
so far is proved to be wrong, and this has been well run. So we will 
call any witnesses you want to submit. 

Mr. Harris. May I state that the list of witnesses I am talking 
about was submitted to this committee by Dr. Compton approximately 
2 weeks ago. 

The Chairman. We have called about five or six of those witnesses 
up to this time. The others will be called in due course. 

How many of the Avitu esses submitted by Compton have been called ? 
Do you know, Counsel ? 

Mr. CoHN. Dr. Compton, General Stoner, Bradley Connors, Mr. 
Carrigan — I would say four or five, Mr. Chairman. We have com- 
municated with some others, who have stated they do not desire 
to be heard. 

The Chairman. In other words, some of those suggested by Comp- 
ton say they do not want to be heard ? 

Mr. Cohn. That is correct. 

The Chairman. I do not think the test is whether they want to be 
heard or not. If Compton wants to have some reluctant witnesses 
called, if he thinks they liave important testimony, I think they should 
be called, if we find they have some information. 

Mr. CoHN. Well, I have reference to those who felt they had no 
information whatever to contribute that would be at variance with 
information already furnished. Then, in the case of the bulk of the 
Avitnesses, they were members of this advisory board which was cited 
as having approved the directive authorizing the use of Howard 
Fast's works, in the International Information Progi'am, and you 
sent telegrams to each one of them, Mr. Chairman, and received 
telegrams and letters in reply expressing the position of each one of 
those, which are being assembled, for the purpose of having them 
entered in the record. 

The Chairman. In other words, we have either contacted by tele- 
phone or by wire everyone suggested by Dr. Com])ton? 

Mr. CoHN. I would say seven-eighths of the people, anyway, up to 
this time. 

The Chairman. Very good. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, will you forgive me? I had not com- 
]7leted this small statement I wish to make. 

There is one very important fact, I think, should get on the record 
before the television audience and everyone else. That is, early dur- 
ing these hearings, headlines came out which seemed to be based on 
testimony here which said that we had wasted $31 million on a trans- 
mitter construction program. We went back, and we checked our 


expenditure records, and we found that the absolute total spent on this 
transmitter construction program that was being described was $27 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt you there, Doctor — I mean, Mr. 
Harris. I notice that Dr. Compton made substantially the same state- 
ment in a national magazine a short time ago. In arriving at the 
fig;ure of $31 million, as I recall, the witnesses took into account the 
amount that was to have been expended on Baker East and Baker 
West. You may recall that the testimony was that the Voice, instead 
of going to the Bureau of Standards, where they could have gotten 
expert information free, hired the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology to make a study as to where the Baker East and Baker West 
should be located. Those Avere the two key transmitters. 

Our staff tells me that without exception all the competent engineers 
now" apparently agree that it is a tremendous mistake to put Baker 
East where it is located, and Baker West also, for the reason that they 
are located within the magnetic storm area, or the Auroral Absorption 
Belt. The testimony has been that while the cost for building Baker 
West would be about $11 million up in the Seattle area, if it were 
located out of that magnetic storm area and built farther south, it 
would be about a million and a half, meaning a saving of $9,500,000. 
The testimony has been that likewise, insofar as Baker East is con- 
cerned, if, instead of building it in a North Carolina swamp, it were 
built south, out of the magnetic stonn area, there woidd be a saving 
there of about $9 million. That is $18 million. Now, I know you 
can go over your bo<j]vS, and you will find that $18 million has not 
been spent, because the new Secretary of State took speedy, intelligent 
action when this was exjiosed, and called for a halt (m the construc- 
tion of these two programs. 

I may say in that connection, in view of the fact that you are dis- 
cussing the money situation, that we asked the Bureau of Standards 
for the same kind of I'eport which you could have gotten from them 
2 years ago, which was never gotten from them. The sworn testimony 
is that you never asked for a report from the Bureau of Standards. 
Here is their report : 

To deliver a satisfactory si.tiiial on at least 90 percent of the days at a given 
time of the day, a transmitter located at Seattle would require 50 times the 
power of a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. San Francisco and San 
Diego do not possess any appreciable advantage with respect to each other. 

In other words, the Bureau of Standards said that in addition to 
the original cost, the original saving of around $9 million or $9i4 
million on that Baker West project, there would also be a tremendous 
saving in power, because it would take 50 times as much power. 

Xow, I may say this is not the testimony of any member of this 
committee, not the testimony of aaiy disgruntled Federal employee. 
This is the top man of the Bureau of Standards wdio made this study ; 
and the Bureau of Standards is apparently recognized as the best 
qualified organization to make that study. 

Now you may proceed. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, the MIT group 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? I am not sure if I have told the 
committee that Mr. Jack Leahy has been designated by the State 
Department to sit in on all the hearings. He is with us today. I have 


told him that if the Senators have no objection he will have the right 
to examine any witness at any time he cares to, and, if the Senators 
have no objection, I have accorded him the right to sit in on any 
executive sessions. I have asked the staff to keep Mr. Leahy fully 
informed as to the progress of any investigation or any proposed in- 
vestigation, so that the State Department, our new team in the State 
Department, for whom I have tremendous respect — I think they are 
doing an excellent job — will be fully informed at all times. 

We want to welcome you here, Mr. Leahy. 

Mr. Leahy. Thank you. I might say I am here as an observer for 
the State Department. I do not want it understood that I am acting 
as counsel. 

The Chairman. We understand that you have no control over the 
committee. That should be clear. We do not get your consent before 
we do anything. We merely have you here so that you can know w4iat 
is going on. And you are in no way placing your stamp of approval 
or disapproval upon what we do. You are merely here to keep the 
State Department, the new team in the State Department, fully in- 
formed as to what the committee is doing, what witnesses will be 
called, and you are not responsible for any mistakes that the chairman 
or any member of the committee may make. 

Mr. Leahy. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciate the oppor- 
tunity and the friendly spirit of cooperation that has been shown, but 
I want it understood that I am not acting as counsel for any witness 
who appears here. 

The Chairman. I understand that. 

You were in the middle of a statement, I believe. 

Mr. Harris, I wish to make the statement that the MIT group to 
which you refer had on it a prominent member of the Bureau of 
Standards; that he did draw, according to the best information we 
have, upon all of the facilities of the Bureau of Standards when he 
made his recommendations. 

I say also that we have expert witnesses who apparently don't 
agree with your staff's contention that all the best engineers say that 
those are bad locations. 

The Chairman. Will you give us the names of those witnesses, so 
that we may call them? 

Mr. Harris. We have given those to you, sir. One is Colonel An- 
drews, who was in charge of the Alaska network for the Army, Army 
Signal Corps. 

The Chairman. Colonel Andrews? 

Mr. Harris. Colonel Andrews. 

The Chairman. You would like to have him called, would you? 

Mr. Harris. We would, and have requested it. Two weeks ago we 
requested it. 

The Chairman. Give us the names of the others. 

Mr. Harris. Another man would be Mr. Carr of the engineering 
finn of Weldon & Carr. 

The Chairman. Is it your understanding that they will testify that 
it would be better to locate Baker East and Baker West within the 
magnetic storm area ? Is that your understanding ? I have not found 
SI single engineer, and I have talked with many of them, who have even 
remotely suggested that. They all say it is a tremendous mistake, an 


obvious mistake, to locate the two key transmitters right in this mag- 
netic storm area. Now, is it your understanding that both Andrews 
and Carr will testify that they should be located there? If so, we 
want to get them down here immediately. 

Mr. Harris. I think that Mr. Weldon— that Mr. Carr and Colonel 
Andrews will certainly so testify with respect to the Baker East site. 
I do not know whether they would both so testify with regard to the 
Baker West site. Naturally, I can't predict the testimony of an 

The Chairman. For your benefit, then, maybe we can help you 
predict it. 

I beg your pardon. Did you mention Mr. Weldon ? 

Mr. Harris. I intended to mention only Mr. Carr at that time. 

The Chairmax. Do you want Mr. Weldon down? Your office sug- 
gested we call Weldon. 

Mr. Harris. If we so suggested, I think he should come. He is a 
highly competent engineer. 

The Chairman. Now, I have a memorandum from General Stoner 
to Dr. Compton referring to Baker West. In this memorandum, 
which either has been or will be made a part of the record today, he 
says that Weldon, who has been suggested by Compton as a witaiess, 
Mr. Weldon, the designer and builder of the megawatt transmitter, 
"has recommended moving to the southern site in order to obtain 
maximum efficiency." 

May I ask whether you are aware of this memorandum? Let me 
read some pertinent sections to you. I assume, as Acting Director, this 
has been called to your attention : 

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully 
to Congress and to the press our reasons for doing so. Such exposure may result 
in congressional investigations and would not be conducive to our obtaining addi- 
tional construction funds in the near future. If we remain at Seattle, and 
install our megawatt at that point, we also must be prepared to be continuously 
under surveillance concerning our output efficiency. 

Then he goes on to say : "I recommend that we stay at Seattle." 

At that time, a very small amount of money had been spent; since 
then, hundreds of thousands. My question is : Were you aware of that 

Mr. Harris. I was not aware of it until about 2 weeks ago, when it 
was brought up in connection with these hearings. That was a direct 
communication from General Stoner to Dr. Compton. He is a special 
consultant to the Administrator. 

The Chairman. Would you think this is a valid reason for refusing 
to change to a more desirable site ? He says : "If we change, we will 
have to explain to the press. We will have to explain to Congress. 
We might be investigated by Congress. We might not get funds." 
He says, "If we stay where we are we will have difficulty from now 
on, because of the output efficiency." He says for these political 
reasons, in effect, "I think we should not move." Do you think that 
indicates good business management, or not, and as Acting Director, 
do you approve of that ? 

Mr. Harris. That was only the recommendation of a consultant to 
the Administrator, 

The Chairman. The recommendation was followed, incidentally. 


Mr. Harris. The recommendation was followed. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Well, would you agree that that was an unjustified 
w\iste of money ? 

Mr. Harris. I would not ajiree that tlie location of Baker West in 
Washington was a waste of the taxpayers' money, and I think that 
Colonel Andrews, who has operated stations from that part of the 
world veiT effectively across the Pacific, in spite of the auroral ab- 
sor])tions zone, can indicate that the experience is remarkably good. 

The Chairman. You disagree, then, with the Bureau of Standards 
report ? 

Mr. Harris. I am not a teclmician. T can't agree or disagree with 
those reports. I am merely stating that I have as yet to see suffi- 
cient clear-cut evidence that that site should be abandoned. Right 
now, the Defense Department has informally a'^ked us whether we 
are going to abandon, so tliat they could )>ick it u]). There must be 
some value in that site, or they wouldn't be talking tliat way. 

The Chairman. Do you disagree with the suspension of Baker 
East and Baker West ? 

Mr. Harris. I think tlie suspension of Baker East was ])articular- 
ly unfortunate and will cost the (irovernment more money tlum if it 
had been allowed to proceed. Because I think that after solier re- 
flection and ca)'eful judgment and an examination of all the engineer- 
ing reports. Baker East will ])roliablv be constructed where planned. 
I do not know about Baker West. There is moi'e difference of opin- 
ion there. 

The Chairman. Do you think the suspension of Baker West was- 
wise, or unwise? 

Mr. Harris. I think it was a wise thing to do under the circum- 
stances then existing, yes. 

The Chairman. Well, now, the same circuni'^tances existed a year 
ago. Since then, you have spent several hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. If it was wise to suspend it when this committee started 
to take a look-see, would it not have been wise at the time General 
Stoner said to Dr. Compton, "It may be the thing to do, except that 
Congress may hear about it" ? 

Mr, Harris. I didn't know that General Stoner made that sort of 
a statement. 

The Chairman. Well, let us see. We do not want to misquote 
General Stoner. 

Mr. Harris. I think he said if we did move we would have to ex- 
plain it to the Congress, meaning particularly the House Appro- 
priations Committee, which objects very much to these changes in 
plans, naturally enough. 

The Chairman. Well, now, you say it is wise to suspend it now. 
At that time you had all the information you have now. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I do not feel we had all the informa- 
tion we have now. We have obtained some. 

The Chairman. It was available by calling the Bureau of Stand- 
ards and asking for it, was it not ? 

Mr. Harris. The MIT people had the same access. 

The Chairman. Wlio decided to pay MIT $600,000 for informa- 
tion which you could have gotten from the Bureau of Standards 


Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, that is a completely false implication. 

The Chairman. Who decided, then, to make this contract, which 
cost about $600,000 ? Put it that way. This contract with MIT. 

Mr. Harris. I think that the decision was a joint one of Mr. James 
Webb, the Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Edward Barrett, the 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at that time. 

The Chairman. Did you have anything to do with it? 

Mr. Harris. I had practically nothing to do with it. I had no con- 
trol, no part, in the process of developing or passing on that contract. 
And I might point out, sir, that that so-called Troy Project handled 
a great many items that are not in any way related to the location of 
transmitters. It went into electronics. It went into various methods 
that must be kept off the record and are highly classified, for carry- 
ing on the whole psychological warfare program. They did a great 
deal of work and covered a great deal of ground. And the implica- 
tion that they only did what you say we could have had done for 
nothing by the Bureau of Standards is simply not correct, Mr Chair- 

The Chairman. Well, now, as the Acting Director of the Inter- 
national Information Program, do you know how much was paid to 

Mr. Harris. I would have to look that up. I do not know. 

The Chairman. For this study ? Do you have any idea ? 

Mr. Harris. I don't at this moment know what payments were 

The Chairman. Well, in view of the fact that it runs into hundreds 
of thousands, do you not think you normally should know that? If 
you are the head of a plant run by private industry 

Mr. Harris. I was not head of the plant at that time, Mr. Chairman, 
when those expenditures were made. And, furthermore, there are a 
great many payments made under contracts that one cannot become 
familiar with, as to each one made. It is just not a possibility for any 

The Chairman. Well, in any event, is it correct to state that the 
Bureau of Standards was qualified to do this work, that the Bureau 
of Standards would not have charged you for doing the work ? 

Mr. Harris. I suppose, if they had been willing to do it, they would 
not have charged. But I do not know that they were willing to do it. 
There may have been a request made, and they may not have been 
willing to. I don't know that. 

The Chairman. The chief engineer has testified under oath that 
they never had been requested to do it ; that if they had been requested 
they would have been willing and able to do the work. 

Mr. Harris. They were certainly requested through the Troy-Proj- 
ect people. One Bureau of Standards man was on that project staff 
and certainly drew on everything that the Bureau of Standards could 
give him. 

The Chairman. It is 12 o'clock. I think we should take a recess. 

Senator Mitndt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a part of the 
record two of the conclusions that General Stoner stated in his recom- 
mendations to Dr. Compton. The first conclusion, No. 1, was that a 
more southerly location would greatly improve the propagation of 
the transmitters, as it removed the path of the electromagnetic waves 

29708— 53— pt. 5 ^5 


from the absorption action of the north auroral zone. The second 
conchision was that "by remaining at the present site, we are taking 
more than a calculated risk." 

Do you not think, with two conclusions like that before you or be- 
fore your group, it would have been wise to suspend operations until 
you could get more engineering data? 

Mr. Harris. I do think so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. It was not your decision to have this done? 

Mr. Harris. It was not my decision. 

Senator Mundt. It was Dr. Compton's decision, was it? 

Mr. Harris. It was Dr. Compton's decision. 

Senator Mundt. May I ask just one more question in that connec- 
tion? I would like to get the true facts about this engineering situa- 
tion. Up to now it looks pretty bad for Baker East and Baker West 
on the basis of the engineers who have testified. As against that, 
you have given us two engineers, one of whom is on record in the 
conclusion as supporting the position that Baker East and Baker 
West do not seem to be very optimum choices. Have you other engi- 
neers that you can recommend be heard by this committee, or just this 
one. Colonel? 

Mr. Harris. I believe we have a considerable list. Senator. They 
are not at my fingertips at this time. 

Senator Mundt. You are not prepared ? Are you prepared to sug- 
gest other engineers? 

Mr. Harris. We are prepared, but I cannot do it at this point. I 
am not prepared at this meeting. 

Senator Mundt. That is what I mean. 

Mr. Harris. No ; I am not, Senator. 

Senator Mundt. There was some criticism, I thought, on your part 
that we had not called engineers to present the point of view of the 
State Department. So, I wanted it in the record that, as of now, 
you are not prepared to suggest the names of those. We would like 
to find out. 

Mr. Harris. Senator, we suggested them 2 weeks ago. They were 
not called. We did not add to that list, because we assumed we were 
not going to have a chance to have them on here. It has been 2 
weeks, sir. I think it is fair to say that you could have the presump- 
tion that we were not going to have 

Senator Mundt. One is already on the record refusing the position 
you expected him to present. So, it was not very conducive to calling 
him. And we have suggested by writing, and we have suggested in 
personal consultation, and I have personally told the State Depart- 
naent's representative, Ben Crosby, who was with Dr. Compton as 
his aide, that we would be glad to liear these witnesses. I had a list 
from him that I thought was one which should be acceptable to present 
to the committee, but you do not now seem willing to present those 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Crosby, who is in the room, has 
now handed me a list of the witnesses, and I do have, therefore, an 
additional name at least. 

Senator Mundt. You have a list of five names ? 

Mr. Harris. I think I can give you such a list. I have given you 
the name of Lester H. Carr, the radio-engineering consultant of Wash- 


ington. I wisli to give you the name of Andrew Ring, of Washing- 
ton, a radio-engineering consultant, the name of Col. Fred Andrews, 
who is a retired Army officer and former chief of the Alaskan C om- 
munications System of the Signal Corps of the United States Army. 
I should like to have called Mr. R. Maurice Pierce, a consulting engi- 
need of New York. And I should like to have called a representative 
of MIT, preferably one agreeable to that organization, but a name 
which might be suitable would be Dr. Jerry Wiesner, W-i-e-s-n-e-r. 

Mr. CoHN. I might say that immediately following the submission 
of this list the staff contacted Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT. We talked 
to him, three of us on the line, for over 1 hour. Dr. Wiesner stated 
it was his conclusion that he still felt there was uncertainty ; that it 
was his conclusion that Baker West, from a standpoint of efficiency 
and reliability, should be moved south and away from Seattle, and 
that he would just as soon not come down and testify, as that would 
be his conclusion. If there is any change, and they want to have Dr. 
Wiesner communicate with us, or if they want us to talk to him again 
and see if there has been an}^ change of heart on his part, we would be 
certainly happy to have him. 

With reference to Mr. Ring, who was the next person we were to 
contact, I believe we were advised he was making a trip to the Pacific. 
Mr. Crosby indicates that is correct. And we would be advised when 
he returned and would be available. We would be glad to go over the 
list, even though we have just gotten this report from the Bureau of 
Standards, which would seem to settle the issue, and Mr. Harris him- 
self states that he thinks the decision to suspend Baker West was a 
wise one. 

If they think it is still profitable to go into it, after all those things, 
we would be willing to contact them and have them down here. 

Senator Mundt. We want to leave the invitation open, if you have 
some other engineers. Out of the 5, there are 2 who are not willing 
to support that. Kindly get the facts. 

Mr. Harris. We appreciate that. Senator. 

Senator Mundt. Even though we had the recommendation of Dr. 
Compton, I am not willing to accept that as Holy Writ. We want 
to get the best advice we can get, and if you can get some witnesses 
who are firm and will stand up and, when we contact them, support 
your position, rather than tell us over the telephone "Actually, we 
do not think they are in the right spots," we shall be glad to call them. 

Mr. Harris. Senator Mundt, I certainly agree with that. 

The Chairman. May I say I have just been notified by the staff that 
they also conferred with Mr. Ring, the fourth of the five men you 
suggested, and that he fully agrees that the southern location would 
have been better ; that the northern location is not satisfactory. 

So, it appears that 4 of your 5 witnesses will confirm substan- 
tially the testimony as it has been taken. I think you should check 
on that before you suggest the names of engineers and find out if they 
will add anything to this picture. If they are going to merely confirm 
what has been already established by other engineers, merely that 
you made a mistake by going up to Seattle, that it is better to move 
south, there is not much sense in wasting the money and the time of 
the committee. 

Mr. Crosby, I wish you would exercise a little more care. Do not 
ask us to contact a witness who is out in the Pacific, and then have 


someone come here and scream because we have not called him. You 
know where this man is. He is out in the Pacific and not available. 
So, do not give us names like that. . , • n .1 n 

Before you ask us to call other engineers, check with them and see 
if thev hkve other information available. My staff has talked to 
these engineers, 3 of the 5, and they find that they will confirm the 
testimony that has been given. . ^^ r^^  -u 

Mr. Crosby ( Ben Crosby, State Department) . Mr. Chairman, when 
the list was submitted, sir. Ring was in the country. And I did not 
know at the time the list was submitted that he was planning to leave 
the country. Those names were prepared and given to you by the 
competent technical engineering staff of the engineering program. 

The Chairman. We will not have any further hit-or-miss submis- 
sion of names about whom you know nothing, and then have a witness 
come up here and start to complain because those witnesses have not 
been called. We find that my staff has checked with those witnesses 
and has found that they agree with the Bureau of Standards. If that 1 
is the case, they will not be called. We will not waste the time of | 
the committee. 'The Bureau of Standards has submitted a report; not 
Dr. Compton, incidentally. 

So, in the future, when you ask us to call a witness, know something 
about him. Know whether he is available. 

Senator Symington? 

Senator Symington. Mr. Harris, I would like to ask you a couple 

of questions here. 

I cannot be here this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, on account ot Armed 
Services. They have a meeting this morning, and I want to go over 
to that meeting. 

In New York there was discussion of people in Europe who were 
working for the Voice, or for the Government, and were not cleared 
over here. One resigned, and so on. There were two of them, Mr. 
Schechter and Mr. Kaghan. And I asked Mr. Thompson if he knew 
whether or not for sure they had been cleared for security, and he 
said his opinion was that they had not been cleared for security. He 
felt in one case he had seen it and in the other case he had not. They 
came back here, and his testimony, I felt, made it appear as if you 
would like to have them back here, or there was something about it, 
and that they could not come back because of security. Now, would 
you care to comment on that? 

Mr. Harris. Senator Symington, in opening my testimony, I be- 
lieve, before you were here, sir, I testified that with the approval of 
Mr. Jack Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department, I was 
able to state that Mr. Schechter and Mr. Kaghan, the two names men- 
tioned, had indeed been cleared. I find no evidence in our files that 
we were trying to bring them back here. As far as I know, they are 
people who have been wanted in Germany, and they are being used in 
Germany, and they are cleared employees according to the standards of 
Public Law 402 as administered by the Department of State. 

Senator Symington. Well, would you get in touch with Mr. Thomp- 
son and clear up that part of the testimony ? 

Mr. Harris. I will be pleased to do that. 

Senator Symington. Now, my next question is that there has been 
a lot of talk about you at Columbia. What was your other education? 
Would you give us a rough picture of that ? 


Mr. Harris. Well, I think I could start with perhaps high school. 
I was a student at Cambridge High School in upper New York State, 
Cambridge, N. Y. I was an honor student there. I won the DAR 
prize for history' essay, and all that kind of thing. 

In the sunnner of id'27, I went to a CMTC camp. Citizens Military 
Training Camp. In the fall of ld'27, I entered Staunton Military 
Academy, down here in Virginia, which has an ROTC unit; and, 
incidentally, one of the best cadet officers there is the present Senator 
from Arizona, junior Senator, Senator Barry Goldwater. 

I graduated from Staunton in 1928. 

Senator SYMixcrrox. Senator Barry Goldwater? 

Mr. Harris. Senator Barry Goldwater. 

Senator Symixgtox. Did 3^ou know him there? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symixgtox^ Do you think he would be a character witness 
for you ? 

Mr. Harris. He could only testify as to my character at the time 
I was there. I have had practically no contact with him since. 

The Ciiairmax'. He just went to the same college you were at. In 
other words, the oidy contact was that he happened to be going to the 
same school. 

Mr. Harris. He was one of my company cadet officers and knew a 
good deal about my conduct in the academy. 

The CiiAiRMAX'. But he was no particular friend of yours. I notice 
you bring in the names of Bob Taft and Barry Goldwater. When 
you bring in their names I just wonder whether you know them, 
whether they are friends of yours. I understand you do not know 
(loldwater, that he is no special friend of 30urs. Have you seen him, 
over the last 10 or 15 years? 

Mr. Harris. I am not trying to claim that I am a close friend of 
either of these Senators. I have not said in any respect that Senator 
Taft is somebod}' that I know particularly. I quoted an opinion of 
his that has been expressed in the public prints, that Communists 
and Socialists should have the right to serve on college faculties if 
they wish. That is what T stated about Senator Taft. 

As far as Senatoi- Barry Goldwater is concerned, I mention him only 
because it helps to establish the character and type of school which 
I was attending at that time, and he certainly at least would be able 
to indicate whether I was a so-called subversive character when I was 
a cadet, with an honorable record, at ROTC, in Staunton Military 

The Ciiair:max. Did you write this book before, or after, you 
graduated ? 

Mr. Harris. After I graduated. 

The Chairmax^. You wrote it after you graduated? 

Mr. Harris. That is right. 

The Chairmax'. So that when vou were going to this })articular 
college you referred to, your feelings were expressed in this book, 
I assume ? 

Mr. Harris. Of course not : they were not. 

The CiiAiRMAX'. You said "of coui-se not''? 

Mr. Harris. That is what I said. Senator. 

The Chairmax-^. You said "of course not." 


Mr. Harris. They are not the same as expressed in the book. Is 
that the question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Harris. They were not the same when I was in high school. 
It was a process of what we were taught in college and the things that 
we heard about the depression. That led a great many of us to make 
statements of the kind I did in that book. 

The Chairman. You were talking about high school. You said 
you went to high school with Senator Goldwater. 

Mr. IlAiiRis. I went to Staunton INIilitary Academy, a preparatory 
school in Virginia. 

The Chairman. I thought you said you went to college with him. 

Mr. Harris. I did not, and I am not making any such statement. 

Senator Symington. Did you go to Staunton Military Academy in 

Mr. Harris. Yes, in 1927-28, except that during the summer I went 
to a military training camp. Fort Hancock, N. J., where my record can 
be checked also. 

Senator Symington. One more question : As I understand it, Mr. 
Harris, when you were an undergraduate, or just after you left Colum- 
bia, you wrote a book called King Football? 

Mr. Harris. I did. Senator. 

Senator Symington. And in that book you expressed a lot of things 
which you no longer believe in. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Symington. And Senator McClellan asked you when you 
changed your mind with respect to the things that you wrote in that 
book, and you said 1934—35. Is that correct? 

Mr. Harris. I did. 

The Chairman. I would like to say for the benefit of the Senator 
that it appears that Jack Tate, who is one of the appointees of my 
very dear friend Acheson, when he was called, said, "You can give 
clearance to Schechter and Kaghan." That is a violation of the Presi- 
dential orders. I may say I am not endorsing those orders that Tru- 
man has made, but they apparently are still in effect until the Attorney 
General's Office can make a study of them and have them properly 
changed. In view of the fact that Tate takes the liberty of telling us 
these two men have been cleared, I am going to subpena him, unless 
the committee objects, and put him under oath and have him testify 
as to what was in the files, upon what basis they were cleared. We will 
not take half the story by hearsay on clearance. We have the positive 
testimony on these two men, that they failed, they flunked, the securitv 

Mr. Harris. By one man, sir. 

The Chairman. We have the specific information on them ; that 
subsequently one of them was promoted and made head of the Radio 
Branch in HICOG ; that he is still there. And now you have a man 
who called you and says you can violate the order in order to give a 
clean bill of health. We will put Mr. Tate under oath, then, and make 
him give us the rest of the picture, if the Senators agree to that. He 
will not be allowed to use any Presidential order which he has already 
violated as a defense in refusing to answer. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, may I point out the original violation 
was by Mr. James Thompson, an employee of the Voice of America, 


who made those statements before this committee in New York on 

Senator McCLELLAisr. Let me ask you a question. Is it a violation of 
the order to say that a man has been cleared or has not been cleared? 

The Chairman. The President issued an order in September of last 
year, and it is interpreted to mean that the Congress is not entitled 
to any information whatsoever in regard to a security clearance ; that 
they are not entitled to information as to the status of the case, 
whether it has been cleared or has not been cleared. Mr. Humelsine 
has testified repeatedly before the committee. When that was ques- 
tioned before the Appropriations Committee, he came back and told us 
he had contacted his superior and he was not entitled to give that 

In view of the fact that Mr. Tate sees fit, without any authority, I 
understand, from Mr. Lourie or anyone else, to violate that order, he 
will be called to testify, and he will not be allowed to use that order as 
a grounds for refusing to answer questions, in view of the fact that he 
has already violated it. And if I have the approval of the com- 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a matter we 
could take up in executive session. 

The Chairman, I think it is something that should be taken up 
now. Senator McClellan, to some extent, in view of this statement 
here, which, on the face of it, appears to be incorrect because of the 
positive testimony we have had. I would be glad to take it up in 
executive session. 

You had some further questions in regard to the Spectator ? 

While counsel is checldng through the Spectator to read some of 
your editorial to you, let me read another passage from your book. 
1 think we will run for another 10 minutes, and then we will adjourn 
until 2 : 30. 

Mr, Harris, let me read another passage from your book. 

Soviet Russia, a young nation which, whatever else may be said about her, 
is searching the world over for the best technical methods and the best ideas, 
has recently begun stimulation of a program of competitive sports. Realizing 
that war spirit is developed by bodily contact games, and wishing sports for 
exercise rather than injury, Russia has barred football from her new athletic 
program, even though she has imported American baseball with enthusiasm. 
The ofheial who made the announcement concerning the exclusion of football 
said that Russia saw no reason for killing off a number of her best young men 
each season in the pursuit of a sport which appeals in the first place to the least 
desirable emotions. 

Do you lecognize that passage as coming from your book? 

Mr. Harris. I think that is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman, You may proceed. Counsel. 

Mr. Schine. This is an editorial entitled "Thanksgiving." 

Mr. Harris. Mav I know the date, sir ? 

Mr. Schine. The date is November 25, 1931. [Reading :] 

Although the newspapers of the Nation have been pretty well muzzled by 
their capitalist owners, no method has yet been devised to keep living beings 
from thinking. The unfortunate standees in the city soup lines are expei'iencing 
the fine manifestations of this great democracy. They are watching gangsters 
and corrupt politicians gulp joyously from the horn of plenty. Perhaps they 
will decide that even the horrors of those days of fighting which inaugurated 


the era of communism in Russia would be preferable to the present state of 
affairs. They have intelligence, and as for bravery, well, hunger will take 
care of that. 

The Chairman. What was the question ? 

Do you recognize that as your work i 

Mr. Harris. I looked it up the other day, and it is mine. It is a 
similar sentiment to a great many being expressed by all sorts of 
people in 1932. It has nothing to do with the kind of sentiment I 
have now. and it was 21 years ago. 

The Chairmax. Let us jump the gap of 20 years, then, and come 
down to date. 

Mr. Harris. All right. 

The Chairman. Do you generally approve of the operations of the 
Voice as conducted today ( I am not asking you whether you approve 
of every detail, no matter how well it is run. There are some things 
;y on could not approve. But you do generally approve the operations 
of the Voice as conducted today ? 

Mr. Harris. In general. I approve of the Voice as it is operated 

The Chairman. You do. 

Pardon me. Senator Mundt has a question. 

Senator Mundt. I am interested in the fact that yon have changed 
your point of view since 1932, and I can understand that perfectly. 
You said you changed it about 1934 to 1937 sometime. I am wonder- 
ing wdiether, in view of the fact that you were out in print with this 
rather strange array of connnentaries, and you were out in print with 
some of the editors in the Spectator, whether, wdien you changed your 
mind, you also made statements in the public print, that you might 
insert in the record, in Avhich you repudiated this book or the ideas 
you had in the book, or whether you perhaps repudiated some of the 
ideas expressed in the Spectator. Or did you clo good by stealth in 
this changeover, without making any jniblic changeover of any kind. 

Mr. Harris. Senator. I think I did good by doing loyal service to 
the United States Government. I did not write something that would 
repudiate the book or the editorials in the Spectator. It is a strange 
thing, but when anyone is a parent, even if it is a pretty ugly child, 
he is a little bit slow about going out in public and saying, "This is an 
ugly and dirty child." That is about the sentiment I had about that. 

This book had very little circulation, which can be proved. I was 
not proud of it. I would rather not have had at that time any 
attention called to it. If I had then ])ut out some book repudiating 
it s|)e<:'ifically, it would have been 

senator Mundt. I thought it would be very logical that in some 
public speech or statement or broadcast you might have referred to 
the fact that as a young "'liberaF' at Columbia University you came 
under certain influences which upset you emotionally, and you made 
some statements which you no longer believed in. I thought you 
might have said something which you could put in the record al)out 
the time and date and manner in which you changed from a jxjsition 
rather sympathetic, let us say, to socialism, to one which I hope is no 
longer sympathetic to that point of view. 

Mr. Harris. Senator, if I had been in the writing business at the 
time, or in a position where I had access to some kind of public forum 
as a standard thing, I am quite sure that I would have had such state- 


ments out. At this minute, I have not traced any actual pieces of 
paper that will prove this. 1 have made talks here and there that 
would indicate it. I think for instance that the board of directors of 
the National Self-Government Committee in New York, on which I 
have now been sitting for some several years, would remember my 
position on these things. I think that there are other people who 
would clearly understand my position and would have heard it ex- 
pressed often enough to be pretty clear about it. But, not being in a 
position where I made regular contributions to a column or any- 
thing — I was not writing anything or doing any speaking outside of 
the Government service — I found no opportunity to do anything 
very spectacular along that line. I think I can prove it by deeds, 
given time and given an opportunity to develop the material. 

I have explained to the chairman — and you will forgive me for 
being a little long winded at this time — that this past week, when, 
probably, for my own sake I should have been checking back on every 
record that I could, I have been carrying the full responsibility for 
an agency that has been in a rather demoralized condition, upset and 
worried, by investigations, changes of directives, and things of that 
sort, an understandable condition. I have wanted it to keep going 
properly, because I believe that it serves the people of the United 
States properly. And I think that the only patriotic and honest thing 
to do is to keep it going until the new chief can take over. For that 
reason, I have not done the kind of defense job that probably I should, 
in view of the fact that I seemed to feel, on the part of the staff at least, 
that this is nothing but prosecution. I don't hear any defense state- 
ments coming out of the staff. 

Senator Mundt. I do not think you have the justification for any 
such statement at all. We did not write the book or the editorials. 
We did not make the context. Our job is to investigate what we find. 

Senator Jackson. Will the gentleman yield for one question? I 
have to leave. 

Senator Mundt. Yes. 

Senator Jackson. I do not think it is any crime that you expressed 
very liberal views during the depths of the depression. 

The Chairman. Do you call this "liberal," Senator? 

Senator Jackson. Well, I will come to the point in a minute. 

Willkie did that when he was in college, as history bears out. And I 
think Willkie later became a big man in Wall Street and a highly 
respected American. I think what Senator Mundt and I are interested 
in is any contradictory evidence, anything that contradicts this book 
and your views as there expressed. ' That is the point that I am in- 
terested in. I believe — what is the name of the columnist that writes 
in one of the newspaper columns every day ?— Westbrook Pegler was a 
Socialist, was he not, at one time ? I believe that is correct. 

Senator Mundt. He probably will advise you as to the truth of it 
in his column. 

Senator Jackson. Well I do not think there is any crime in that. 
But I think what all of us are concerned about is the record subsequent 

to that. 

The Chairman. Also, one of the things I am very serious about is 
that this witness has said that he never had a loyalty hearing. With 
this book in existence, I cannot conceive of there not being a hear- 
ing: to determine whether he had changed. 


Let me put this in the form of a question. Would you agree with 
me that if you still held the ideas which you held when you wrote this 
book, yo.u would be entirely unfitted for your present job ? 

Mr. Harris. No, I wouldn't even agree to that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. In other words, you think if you still held the ideas 
you held when you wrote the book, you still would be fitted for this 
job you now hold as acting head of the Voice ? 

Mr. Harris. No, I wouldn't be fitted for this job, but I wouldn't 
be entirely unfitted. You used the word "entirely," and I think that is 
a very broad one. 

The Chairman. Well, let me ask you this: If you still held the 
views you held when you wrote this book, would you agree that you 
would be unfitted for your job ? 

Mr, Harris. I certainly would not appoint myself, if I had the 
choice, into that job, if I still held those views. That is correct. 

The Chairman. So that you feel that your appointment was only 
because you convinced your superiors that you had changed your 
mind ? 

Mr. Harris. Convinced a great many people, Mr. Chairman, be- 
ginning with the Civil Service Commission, in 1940, or early '41, when 
they investigated that very, very thoroughly, and got all the informa- 
tion and read the book and read the editorials and did clear me. 

Senator Jackson. Were you in any organizations at any time that 
were contrary to the Communist Party line? Let us take the period 
between August 1939, when the Germans entered into the pact with 
the Russians on neutrality, until June 21, 1941 — I think that is about 
the date, or thereabouts — when the Germans invaded Russia. Were 
you with any group ? I am trying to get some evidence here which, 
if you had it, would indicate a contrary position. 

Mr. Harris. I think I have that much evidence. I was a member 
of the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies. I be- 
lieve that that committee was entirely 

Senator Jackson. You were a member of the committee? 
^ Mr. Harris. I was a member. As I remember it, they sent invita- 
tions to contribute, which asked support moneywise, and by signing 
a little slip of paper. That was the William Allen White committee. 
1 am not sure of that title a hundred percent, but it was known as the 
William Allen White committee at that time. 

Senator Jackson. There was a committee headed by William Allen 
White, of Kansas, the editor of the Emporia Gazette. 

Mr. Harris. That is it, yes. 

Senator Jackson. You were a member of that committee? 

Mr. Harris. They had an overall top committee, but I wasn't a 
member of the top committee. I was one of the many people around 
the country who signed up. I made at least one talk for them. I 
made a talk, if I remember it right, at the Advertising Club of New 

Senator Jackson. You made a talk to the Advertising Club of 
New York? 

Mr. Harris. At the Advertising Club of New York. It wasn't to 
the whole club. I will try very hard to find out what that occasion 
was and what the group was, but I talked in favor 

Senator Jackson. Have you the record on that? 


Mr. Harris. I will try very, very hard to find siicli a record. 

Senator Jackson. I think the committee would like to have that. 
1 am not saying that at that time the people who were on the other 
side, were, of course, subversive, because you did have the America 
First Committee. But it will indicate very clearly, if that is the 
committee, what your position at that time was on foreign policy. 

Mr. Harris. Well, another indication would be, if I could establish 
it — I know I did it. I contributed to this organization called Bundles 
for Britain, which was helping out the British people in their fight. 

Senator Jackson, ^^^len was that ? During 1939-40, or in 1941 ? 

Mr. Harris. Along in there, about '40. I would have to look it 
up again. I suppose a man should have his whole history, all his 
A'iews, everj^thing he ever thought about or did, documented in some 
document. But hoAv can you predict 

Senator Mundt. That was not a very good one, because that was 
the time when Russia was one of our allies. I do not know when you 
joined that committee. 

Senator Jackson. If it was the Committee To Aid the Allies, headed 
by William Allen White, I am sure that was during the pact period. 

Mr. Harris. That was my impression. 

Senator Mundt. That was dissolved in 1941, so it would depend on 
when he joined. 

Senator Jackson. Yes. "^^Iiat I meant, Karl, was with reference 
to the period between August 1939, whenever the war broke out, and 
up to the time of the invasion of Russia, just during that period. I 
am not talking about subsequent to June 21, 1941. 

The Chairman. I understand your testimony to be, Mr. Harris, 
that you belonged to this Committee To Aid the Allies, or whatever 
you call it, after the invasion of Russia? Or before the invasion of 
Russia ? 

Mr. Harris. It would have been before the invasion of Russia. 

The Chairman. You say it would have been. Was it ? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, it was. 

The Chairman. Well, what do you have to show that ? 

Mr. Harris. I will have to see what I do have. I haven't anything 
here to produce at this minute. 

The Chairman. Do you know if you have it in your office? 

Mr. Harris. I don't have it in my office. I will have to look back 
and see if my very poorly organized personal files have any scrap 
of paper that will prove it, or if I can find somebody who was with 
me at that time, or something of that sort. 

The Chairman. Would you think you joined that committee while 
the Hitler-Stalin pact was in existence ? 

Mr. Harris. I would think there was no doubt about that. Because 
that was one of the most horrible, reprehensible things that has hap- 
pened in the history of mankind. 

The Chairman. We will take a recess until 3 this afternoon. 

I am going to ask the counsel to have Mr. Tate clown here at 2 
o'clock in executive session. 

Mr. Harris, how well do you know Mr. Tate ? 

Mr. Harris. I know him fairly well. I know him by his first 

The Chairman. Do you know him socially ? 


Mr. Harris. No, I don't think I have ever had any social contact 
with him of any kind. 

The Chairman. AVhen is tlie last time yon contacted him before 
today ? 

Mr. Harris. I talked to him on the phone when I asked this ques- 
tion about the security problem. His office was desi^iated by Mr. 
Lourie's office to fjive advice on these thino;s, and I called him. 

The Chairman. O. K. 

Thank yon. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 35 p. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m., 
this same day.) 

afternoon session 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, there was a witness in executive ses- 
sion, Mr. Tate. You were not present, of course, to hear him testify. 
The reason he was called in executive session was because we ordered 
him to produce certain files. We were to introduce those on the theory 
that if he had already violated a Presidential directive he could not 
use that as an excuse for not bringing the files. His testimony under 
oath conflicted directly with yours. 

I think if you want Mr. Tate recalled to testify in public session, in 
fairness to you, the Senate will recall him. Otherwise, you are being 
given a copy of his testimony. 

Would you prefer having him recalled to testify in public session? 

Mr. Harris. May I consider it? 

The Chairman. You certainly may. And also may I say this. I 
am not sure if we notified you. I think we did in executive session. 
Wherever any employer, or anyone, is under fire by other witnesses, 
if you have any questions that you want asked of that witness, yon 
can submit those questions to the chairman, and normally they will 
be asked. I think you have been informed also that at any time in 
these proceedings you care to, you may have counsel, and you will be 
entitled to consult with your counsel at any time during your testi- 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement with re- 
gard to this situation right now? 

The Chairman. Make it as short or as long as you care to. 

Mr. Harris. I will make it short, because I wish to look into this 
thing with Mr. Tate. 

But I find, on page 3 of the transcript you handed me, his state- 
ment that — 

r think you would be at liberty to state that fact, namely, that the people on 
my program have been cleared, but not to go into individual cases. 

I considered that an authorization. I do not consider that I have 
gone into individual cases. I think that in stating that two men on 
the program are cleared, I am merely stating the covering fact that 
all employees on our program now are cleared. They have to be by 
law, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Schechter and Mr. Kaghaii are in your Depart- 

Mr. Harris. They are under our direction, because they are in the 
Public Affairs Branch of HICOG, which is administered by the In- 
ternational Information Administration. 


The Chairman. Now will you tell us at this time : Did Mr. Tate 
ever tell you that those two men had been cleared ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Tate did not tell me that those two men had been 
cleared. That information came in the standard way from the se- 
curity area of the Department. 

The Chairman. Who told you they had been cleared? 

Mr. Harris. That information came from Mr. Ford, the head of 
SY, through our Assistant Administrator for Management, Mr. Ar- 
thur Kimball. 

The Chairman. Will the staff order Mr. Ford to appear today ? At 
4 o'clock today? 

Now, are you sure it is Mr. Ford, or not? We are going to call Mr. 
Ford down here. Did Ford tell you they had been cleared? 

Mr. Harris. Ford did not tell me. Ford told Mr. Arthur Kimball, 
and he told me. My normal channel to Mr. Ford is through Mr. 
Arthur Kimball. 

The Chairman. Ford told Kimball, and Kimball told you? 

Mr. Harris. That is a perfectly normal and proper procedure. 

The Chairman, When did Kimball tell you that these two people 
had been cleared? 

ISIr. Harris. The matter had not come to my attention in any direc- 
tion until this testimony of Mr. Thompson on Saturday. 

The Chairman. Now, your statement was made under oath to the 
question : 

Your testimony is that 'Sir. Jack Tate authorized you to state today that both 
Kaghau and Sfheciiter had been cleared. Is that correct? 

The answer : 
That is correct, sir. 

liberty, as it says here in the transcript, to state here the fact that all 
about the status of Schechter's or Kaghan's case ? 

Mr. Harris. Not as individuals, but he said tliat I would be at 
liberty, as it says here in the transcript, to state here the fact that all 
people on our program have been cleared. 

The Chairman. Did he ask you first whether they had been cleared? 

Mr. Harris. He asked me whether I had that information. I stated 
that I did have, from the security area. 

The Chairman. So, instead of Tate giving you the information, you 
gave Tate the information? 

Mr. Harris. I have never said that Mr. Tate gave me the infonna- 
tion. I have said that Mr. Tate was the authority for mentioning 
cases, for mentioning this matter before this committee. x\nd I still 
consider that there is a clear permission here to state that these two 
men, since they are among the peopre on duty in the Public Affairs 
program of HICOG, are cleared persons. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, do you have in your possession or in 
your Department now, a written memorandum from the Director of 
Operations of the Voice advising you that Schechter has not been 
cleared, and that he had requested a transfer to the Voice? 

Mr. Harris. I have never seen such a memo, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether such a memo exists? 

Mr. Harris. I do not, sir. 

The Chairman. When did Kimball tell you that Kaghan and 
Schechter had been cleared ? 


Mr. Harris. It was some time yesterday, after he had checked with 
Mr. Ford of SY. 

The Chairman. Where is Mr. Kimball ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Kimball is not present at this time. He is the 
Assistant Administrator for Management in our IIA. 

The Chairman. In New York ? 

Mr. Harris. No ; right here. 

The Chairman. Will the staff call Mr. Kimball? 

And you say that he told you that Mr. Ford told him ? 

Mr. Harris. That is the normal channel, the security area. 

The Chairman. Did he tell you that Mr. Ford told him that Schech- 
ter and Kaghan had been cleared ? 

Mr. Harris. That is as I recollect it, that Mr. Ford told him. 

The Chairman. Well, now, you talked to him a couple of days ago, 
and you come in here very indignantly to defend those two men. Do 
you not remember? 

Mr. Harris. These two men are on our program. 

The Chairman. Do you remember what he told you ? 

Mr. Harris. I do remember what he told me. 

The Chairman. Do you remember what Ford told him about Kag- 
han and Schechter having been cleared ? 

Mr. Harris. I do not remember his mentioning that Mr. Ford had 
stated it to him personally. He did state that Mr. Ford had run 
a check to make sure the information was clear, that he had obtained 
the information from the security area, and tha,t the men had been 
shown cleared. "Wliether he talked to Mr. Ford's assistant or to Mr. 
Ford personally, I don't see why I should know. The facts are there, 

The Chairman. You say now you do not know whether he talked 
to Mr. Ford personally or not? 

Mr. Harris. No, I don't know whether he talked to Ford personally 
or not. 

The Chairman. Did he tell you to whom he did talk ? 

Mr. Harris. He did not mention a name, except that he did mention 
that Mr. Ford had run a check. In other words, Mr. Ford had ordered 
a check of the records to ascertain the facts about these two employees 
mentioned in the Saturday testimony. 

We are under law, Mr. Chairman, Public Law 402, which requires 
that we have no one on our program who has not been cleared after 
a full FBI investigation. The fact that these two men are on duty 
is conclusive proof, if we are obeying the law, that these men are clear- 
ed, and that was exactly what I intended to imply and to state. I 
think I did haye that permission from Mr. Tate. I do not wish to 
put him in any false light, and I did not wish to imply that he gave 
me information on two specific cases. 

The Chairman. In other words, in what you said this forenoon, 
when you were answering the question put to you, you were not try- 
ing to imply that Tate had told you that Kaghan and Schechter had 
been cleared? 

Mr. Harris. I was trying to state, and I thought I did state, that 
Mr. Tate was the person who gave me authority to mention the fact 
that employees in this program were cleared. 

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Counsel. 


Senator Mundt, I have a question, Mr. Chairman. 

Have you personally seen the files of these two people in question? 

Mr. Harris. I have not, Senator Mundt. As a matter of fact, I 
have seen very few security files in my experience in the Department 
of State. That has not been in my line of duty. That is done by 
the Security Division or the personnel people. 

The Chairman. May I say that we are producing a witness in 
public session to show' that Schechter and Kaghan had flunl^ed the 
security clearance. 

Mr. CoHN. We have received that information, Mr. Chairman, and 
we have sent a telegram to three different persons whom we under- 
stand have official written information to that effect in the form of 
rejection slips, and asked them to be here tomorrow morning at 10 : 30. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether the counsel is say- 
ing that these gentlemen are not currently cleared? 

The Chairman. You can come and listen to the testimony, sir. 

Mr. Harris. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. Further, Mr. Chairman, we have asked witnesses to 
come down with reference to Mr. Harris' statement, that he finds no 
evidence in the files "that we were trying to bring them back here," 
meaning an attempt to bring them back from Germany to work in 
New York. 

That is what you said, is it not, Mr. Harris? 

Mr. Harris. "We found no evidence here in Washington of those 
things. In New York, we haven't had time to check. 

The Chairman. Just a minute. When you say you found no evi- 
dence in the files, are you now telling us you did examine the files? 

Mr. HarpvIS. I am saying we examined the files available to us 
right here in Washington, that a telephone check was made with 
New York, but we have not personally examined the New York files. 
There hasn't been time to. 

The Chairman. All right. Whom did you call in New York to 
ask them to check the New York files ? 

Mr. Harris. I did not make the call, sir. 

The Chairman. Who made the call ? 

Mr. Harris. I believe Mr. Kimball or one of his associates, per- 
haps the head of the persomiel area, made the check. 

The Chairman. When did they undertake that check ? 

Mr. Harris. Saturday and yesterday, probably most of it yes- 

The Chairman. On whose orders ? 

Mr. Harris. On Mr. Kimball's orders; a normal thing to do when 
any employee would be mentioned adversely in a public hearing. 

The ChxIirman. Then what did Kimball report to you ? 

Mr. Harris. He reported that there was no evidence in the files, 
according to the information received by him, that either Schechter 
or Kaghan had been requested by the Voice. 

The Chairman. Or that they had applied ? 

Mr. Harris. I don't know that he looked into the matter of whether 
they had ever applied, Mr. Chairman. It was a question of desire. 
I think that was the question this morning; that, as I understood it, 
it was a question of whether the Voice had requested them. 

The Chairman. The question before the committee is whether or 
not they had applied to come to the Voice in New York and thereby 


had to undergo a security check. Now, have you checked the files 
to see whether or not there Avas any application by them which would 
occasion a security check? 

You understand what we are talking about, Mr. Harris. 

Mr. Harris. Of course I do, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The witness in New York testified there was a se- 
curity check on those two men, because they were either about to 
be employed by the Voice or had applied for a job. You came in 
this morning, and you said, No. 1, they had clearance; and No. 2, 
there was nothing in the files to indicate that you were trying to get 
them back here. 

Mr, Harris. I will still stand by that. 

The Chairman. Now do you know whether there is anything in 
the files to show that they have applied '. 

Mr. Harris. I have assurance that they were not requested by the 
Voice. I do not know whether there is any application of any kind 
some time in the past. Some time in the past they may have applied. 
I don't knoAv. I don't think that was checked. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether anyone in the Voice liad 
asked for a security check under Public Law 402 ? 

Mr. Harris. That I believe was checked by Mr. Kimball. 

The Chairman. Did he tell you that was checked by him? 

Mr. Harris. Not in those terms, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Did he in any terms % 

Mr. Harris. He told me that those people — there had been no at- 
tempt to bring them to the Voice of America. He also told me that 
he had secured information from the security area that they were 
indeed cleared employees in their present assignment. Those are the 
only things I intended to state or imply. Any attempt to try to make 
it look as if I am saying sometliing else is just not correct, as I see it, 
Mr. Chairman. I am not trying to mislead this committee. I am 
giving this committee every bit of information it asks for, and I will 
continue to do so. 

Senator Mundt. Are these two men presently employed under your 

Mr. Harris. Senator, they ai'e employed in the Public Affairs 
Branch of HICOG, which is under the supervision of the International 
Information Administration; yes. 

Senator ^Iundt. Are all the people in HICOGr required to be 
checked under that provision of Public Law 402 ? 

Mr. Harris. No, Senator, they are not. It is those people who are 
engaged in public-affairs activities, that being the work of the Inter- 
national Information Administration, also called the United States 
Information Service, in accordance with the law of which you were 
coauthor, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Have you personally checked to see whether these 
two men in question were checked under that provision of the law, 
or did you just assume that they were, because they were working 
in that department ? 

IMr, Harris. I have not made a personal check, if by that you mean : 
Have I examined any security files ? 

Senator Mundt. Have you asked Mr. Kimball the question whether 
they were checked in conformity with that section of the law % 


Mr. Harris. The specific question Avas asked of Mr. Kimball, and 
the information in the statement this morning is based on that; the 
answer to that, "Yes, sir." 

Senator Mundt. You said they were checked under that provision ? 
Mr. Harris. That is my understanding, sir. 

The Chairman. KSenator ]Mundt, you asked about Schechter and 
Kaghan. Kaghan is the Acting Deputy Director for Public Affairs 
in HICOG. Schechter is the Cliief of the Radio Branch at HICOG. 
They are both in Bonn, Germany. 

Senator Mundt. I would like to pursue another angle, if I may. 
I was interested in your testimony this morning, Mr. Harris, when 
you said that as a young cadet at Staunton JNIilitary Academy, you 
did not then have the views which you later expressed in a book 


]Mr. Harris. King Football, sir. 

Senator Muxdt. King Football. Did I understand that testimony 
correctly ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Mundt. So that, apparently, something happened at the 
time you w^ere in Columbia University, which gave you the views wdiicli 
}ou later expressed in that book? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Mundt. And I am wondering whether, like some other 
witnesses that we have had before this committee, you could enlighten 
us as to what happened to give you those views. Did some professor 
try to mislead you in that direction^ Was there some influence on 
the campus? What was there that changed you in a period of a 
couple of years? 

Mr. Harris. This would be a period of 4 years. Senator, 
Senator ]Muni>t. All right. 

Mr. Harris. It is simply the process of a college education, under 
Avhich a man undergoes a number of changes in points of view. It 
Avas a college education in a time of depression, a time when there was 
great ferment in the world, and when many of the young instructors, 
particularly, that we listened to — there were ii number of them, but 
I can't identify 1, or 2, or 6 — did stir up our minds, and perhaps they 
did cause us to question some of the existing standards of the times. 
That was the si)irit of inquiry, the spirit of questioning. 

Senator Mundt. I asked you that question for two reasons. In 
the first place, in about tliat period I also was a student at Columbia 
University. I ran into exactly the kind of situation that you have 
described. And in interrogating Miss Elizabeth Bentley, who w^as 
a student at Columbia University at about that time, she mentioned 
specifically several instances in which influences there employed des- 
troyed her faitli in the American Constitution, the Holy Bible, the 
marriage institution. It was helpful to get that information. And 
I think if you want to be helpful there are two committees of the Con- 
gress that are studying that influence in university campuses that I 
think would find it very interesting that a high official in Government 
testifies that at Columbia University at that time certain professors, 
certain instructors, did destroy certain American convictions which 
he held at the time he went on the campus, so that at least for a short 
period of his life he started writing books and editorials which were 
rather derogatory of the whole American pattern. 


Now, if you could be a little more specific, I think it would be ex- 
tremely helpful. 

Mr. Harris. Senator, I will be as specific as I can. I don't want to 
be unfair to Columbia College. I think that it is a very fine institu- 
tion, and I think that the thing that was going on then was less a 
deliberate Red pattern than a business of questioning most of the 
standard situations, whatever existed at that time, the economic sys- 
tem, the social system, the ways of people, and so on. 

Now, one person I can remember, who gave me no impression of 
being in the least left wing, but who did undermine, by his approach, 
and sort of destroy, the old basis of thinking of many students ; that 
was a Mr. Casey in the sociological side. He was teaching sociology. 
I think it was his theory that it was a healthy thing to sort of wipe out 
all the things the students had learned by early conditioning, and let 
them start fresh with a new set of facts as presented in college. Now, 
if he was serving any Red pattern, I doubt whether it was a conscious 
one. It may have been. I can remember his influence more than that 
of anybody else, I should say, in that respect. 

There were others. There was a French professor, who is really 
the man I identified in the book King Football as having rather Fasc- 
ist ideas and strange ideas about marriage. 

There were one or two men, of course, who did show a Marxist at- 
titude, and the outstanding one of those would have been Donald 
Henderson, who has also been mentioned in the testimony. 

Now, there may have been others who taught in ways that would 
have had that effect, but not too many of them. I don't know that any 
of them were among my instructors. 

May I say I don't want to go on too far, Senator, but I want to 
answer your question as fully as you want me to. 

Senator Mundt. Yes, I think you have done that. The upshot is, 
at least, that the impact of the instruction that you received in part 
at Columbia University was responsible for your change of positions 
from the way in which you thought and believed at Staunton Military 
Academy and the Cambridge High School and the position which you 
later took, still as a young man. in the book. King Football, and some 
of your editorials in the Spectator. 

Mr. Harris. I think that is a perfectly fair statement. Senator. 

Senator Mundt. I believe Miss Elizabeth Bentley recorded that at 
about the same time she did come in contact Avith these Communist 
professors, who later took her and put her in a Communist cell in the 
Communist m<tvement. She was a little more aggressive than you, 
but perhaps she was more receptive to the indoctrination also. 

I do want to say this, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of Mr. 
Harris, coming as it does from a high Government official, is a pretty- 
strong indication that the Senate committee and the House committee 
which are presently investigating these Red influences is doing a 
constructive piece of work; because if they still continue, we have a 
demonstration here of how they can pretty well pollute the clear 
thinking of the young American of average parentage who goes to a 
university and finds himself confused at least in a temporary period 
of his life because of that kind of thing. 

Would you care to comment on that ? 


Mr. Harris. I am only sad that this would seem to be critical of a 
university for which I have such high regard, and in which I learned 
so many useful and helpful things. 

Senator Mundt. Although I guess your education was interrupted 
there, anything I can do with the alumni of that institution to be sure 
that new" generations of students do not find themselves indoctrinated 
by Communist agents. I feel will certainly elevate the reputation 
of a very fine institution. 

Mr. Harris. That is certainly a good and proper approach. 

The Chairman. I do not think tliat you have answered one of the 
Senator's questions, and that is : Do you think it is a good idea for a 
congressional committee to investigate the teachers in the schools? 

Mr. Harris. I didn't realize the Senator had asked me that question. 

The Chairinian. You are being asked it now% then. 

Mr. Harris. I think that if such an inquiry is carried on in a way 
that will not hurt the personal reputations in public of innocent people, 
if it is primarily done, I should say, in executive session, so that its 
clear-cut purpose is to detect genuine Communists and to eliminate 
them from the faculties, it is a useful and proper enterprise. 

The Chairman. You say that if it is done so that it does not hurt 
innocent people. We always hear the claim, of course, whenever you 
start to expose Communists, that we are hurting innocent people. 
Do you know of any innocent people that have been hurt by either the 
Jen'ner or the Yelde committees up to this time when they have been 
engaged in exposing Communists? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly read of a very unfortunate article about 
the wife of the publisher of the Washington Post. 

The Chairman. Now, will you answer my question ? The question 
is: Do you know of any teachers, any innocent teachers, who have 
been hurt by any of these two committees? 

May I say now: I have heard so much said about this statement 
about the wife of the publisher of the Washington Post. I understand 
Mr. Velde got two Meyers confused. I might say that if I were to pick 
up a paper, a letter, and find that a Mrs. INIeyer was coming to the 
defense of any Communist cause, without any further identification, 
I think that I might easily make the mistake of assuming it was the 
wife of the editor of the Daily Worker, the local Daily Worker. These 
people have defended every Communist cause, every Communist that 
has been accused, since I have been following this matter, so I think 
Mr. Velde's mistake, when he found a letter to Pravda or some place 
signed by Mrs. Meyer, in assuming it was this Mrs. Meyer, was a 
logical mistake. And when he found it was the wrong Mrs. Meyer, 
he corrected that. 

I am going to ask you again. You have been talking about how 
your mind was affected by the teachei's at Columbia, and in your book 
you talked about vour friends who were Communists and teachers. 
Do you think that up to tliis time the Velde or the Jenner committee 
have injured any innocent teachers? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I certainly would hesitate to say "no" 
at this time. I have not followed the testimony closely enough. But 
I think tliat the process of putting people in public hearings, many 
of whom have only slight charges made against them, and subjecting 
them to public degradation, when they may easilj^ be proved innocent 


at a later time, is not an American way to carry on the work, by Con- 

Senator MuNDT. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Let me first ask this question, if I may, Senator 

Name one of those individuals against whom very slight charges 
have been made, who has been degraded by a public session of either 
the Jenner or the Velde committee. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I can't do that at this time. 

The Chairman. You do not know of any at this time? 

Mr. Harris. I do not know of any at this time. I do think that the 
Mrs. Meyer incident was reprehensible. I cannot, as an American 
citizen, feel anything but sadness that you should so characterize 
what I consider to be one of the best papers in the United States, the 
Washington Post. 

The Chairman. I would assume you would. 

Mr. Harris. Yes, I am sure. 

Senator Mundt. This is a related question that I wanted to ask you, 
because you must find yourself, as an administrator, in the same posi- 
tion as the college president in regard to this. Do you consider it a 
fair or an unfair question for a committee of Congress to ask a col- 
lege instructor against whom it had received derogatory information 
in private session^ — to ask him in public session the question : Are you 
now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Harris. I should hope that he would be asked first in a private 
session. But if the proper safeguards are preserved, I suppose it 
might be possible to do it in such a way as not to hurt the man. It is 
perfectly proper to ask the man. The question of whether it is a 
public hearing or a private hearing disturbs me somewhat. Senator. 

Senator Mundt. Let me ask you this. Is it pro])er for a man who 
has been asked that question to refuse to answer, if he intends to serve 
the public in that type of a responsible position ^ 

Mr. Harris. No, I don't think that a man should refuse to answer. 
As you, I think, will remember, when I came before your executive 
session the other day, that kind of a question was ])ut to me, and I said 
that I had no desire to do any claiming of some sort of a constitutional 
right on a question of that kind, and I stated very firmly that I was not 
and never had been a member of the Communist Party. 

Senator Mundt. If one of these Conununist professors came to you 
and said, "Mr. Harris, I would like to get a job with the Voice of 
America," would you ask that question? And if he refused to answer 
on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate him. would you think 
he would be a good employee? 

Mr. Harris. He could not come in. He just automatically could 
not come in. That would cause him to have, I would say, a negative 
securitv record from the word "•'•o." 

Senator Mundt. Not necessarily. There are some people who are 
not Communists who refuse to answer that, and could perhaps still 
pass a security test. I am asking you whether you think that attitude 
is such that you would then consider him fit for employment in the 
Voice of America. 

Mr, Harris. Mr. Chairman, I perhaps made a very hasty statement 
there. It is obvious that some people turn to legal advisers, who, in 


their particular approach to things, feel that it is a good idea to put 
that kind of what they call safeguard around their client, A person 
conceivably could be misled into taking that position. But I should 
say that I would liaye to have very convincing proof, if a man had 
made that kind of denial at the current time, when I was trying 
to employ him. If he had taken a stand of that kind, I would feel 
that I couldn't bring him into our organization. It would just be 
taking chances with the cold-war apparatus of this Nation. 

Mr. CoHN. I wanted to take up this question, Mr. Harris, of accusa- 
tions against innocent people. You came in here this morning with 
a prepared statement in which you branded the testimony of Mr. 
flames F. Thompson, one of the top officials of IBS, the International 
Broadcasting System, the Voice of America in New York, as erroneous, 
incorrect, and actually untrue, is that not a fact? 

]Mr. Harris. In saying that these employees were not cleared, it was 
untrue; yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. And even more than that, you went on to say that as a 
matter of fact, you found no evidence in your files, and you are the 
Acting Administrator, that there was even an attempt to bring any 
of these ]:>eople from Germany over to New York, as Mr. Thompson 
liad testified. 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. That is quite a serious thing to say about somebody, 
is it not? 

Mr. Harris. It is quite serious to say about somebody, yes sir. 

Mr. CoHN. I imagine that you would feel quite keenly about it if 
you turn out to be completely wrong on both counts, is that not the 

Mr. Harris. I would, of course, feel very badly if I turned out to be 
completely wrong on both counts. 

Mr. CoHN. I would submit to you that you are, sir, and I want to 
ask )'OU this : Don't you know for a fact that 5 people, as testified to 
by Mr. Thompson, namely, Mr. Kaghan, Mr. Schechter, Mr. Charles 
Lewis, Mr. Shepard Stone, and ]Mr. Harold Wright were in fact re- 
quested by New York to be transferred from (jermany, from the 
State Department in Germany, to the Voice of America in New York ; 
that all 5 of those people filed Form 579 seeking employment in New 
York, and that a security investigation was instituted as to each 1 of 
those 5 ; and that only 1, Mi-. Harold Wright, survived that investiga- 
tion, and that he is now employed in New York. And Mr. Kaghan 
and Mr. Schechter remain in Germany. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Stone 
have resigned since the completion of the investigation. Do you now 
know my statement to be inaccurate ? 

Mr. Harris. I don't know your statement to be inaccurate. 

Mr. CoHN. What check have you made to find out whether or not 
Mr. Thompson was correct and was telling the truth before you came 
in here and said that the files indicate that there was not even any 
consideration of bringing these people from Germany to New York, 
and Mr. Thompson was telling an untruth when he said that? 

Mr. Harris. I have fully testified on that, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you talk to Mr, Thompson and ask him what the 
basis of his information was? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Thompson was not available. 


Mr. CoHN. Mr. Thompson's name is in the telephone book in New 
York, and he can be reached through the switchboard at the Voice of 
America 7 days a week. I asked him if he heard from you, and he 
said he did not. I asked him if he heard from anyone in your office, 
and he said he had not. 

May I ask you this : Did you communicate with Mr. Alfred Puhan, 
the Directors of Operations of the Voice, who has jurisdiction? 

Mr. Harris. The jurisdiction would be in the hands of the person- 
nel man in New York, and not in either of those gentlemen. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you communicate with Mr. Edward Macy, the 
personnel man ? 

The Chairman. Did you communicate with Mr. Thompson or Mr. 

Mr. Harris. I have not, and I have not communicated with any of 
these individuals. 

Mr. CoHN. You say jurisdiction is in the hands of the personnel 
man, Mr, Edward Macy ; and have you talked with Mr. Edward Macy, 
and did you talk to him before you came in here and made this 
statement ? 

Mr. Harris. I did not talk to Mr. Macy. 

Mr. CoHN. I would suggest to you, sir, if you had, Mr. Macy might 
have been able to tell you that all 4 of these people, or all 5 including 
Mr. Wright, who is with the Voice, did file Form 579, which were 
processed, to transfer from Germany to New York, and that as late as 
the last 6 weeks Mr. Macy, in behalf of the personnel office of your 
agency, sent a written slip to Mr. Puhan indicating that Mr. Schechter 
was not to be employed in New York and was turned down. 

Now, your testimony is that you did not consult with anybody in 
New York, the Director of Operations, Mr. Thompson, who made a 
sworn statement, a statement under oath, or Mr. Macy, the personnel 
man, before you came in here this morning and made this charge 
jagainst Mr. James Thompson? 

Mr. Harris. I say I checked through Mr. Arthur Kimball, my 
assistant administrator for management, which is the proper and regu- 
lar channel for doing that checking, and that he supplied the in- 
formation on which the statement was based, and did in fact write 
the statement; and that I have no reason not to trust the absolute 
integrity of Colonel Kimball. 

The Chairman. I did not hear the last part. 

Mr. Harris. I have no reason whatsoever not to trust the absolute 
integrity of Col. Arthur Kimball, who was the gentleman who fur- 
nished that information to me. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you advise the committee that these charges you 
made were made on the basis of hearsay ; that you had not personally 
spoken with Mr. Thompson or anyone in New York to ascertain 
whether or not there was a basis for what you told this committee 
under oath? 

Mr. Harris. I think there was a perfectly solid basis. 

The Chairman. If what you say is true — and I should make it 
clear at this time that we think it is completely untrue — if what you 
say is true, it would mean that Mr. Thompson was guilty of perjury. 
That is a very, very serious charge, especially to one who talks about 
the great care he takes in not smearing innocent people. You came 


before the committee this morning and every member of the commit- 
tee understood you to tell them that Kaghan and Schechter had been 
cleared and that Jack Tate had told you — I will read the question : 

Senator McClellan. Your testimony is Mr. Jack Tate autliorized you to state 
today that both Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared. Is that correct? 
Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

If we had not called Mr. Tate down here and put him under oath, 
the impression would have gone out that Mr. Tate, the assistant legal 
officer, had told you these two men were completely cleared. 

Now, at this time, Mr. Harris, I will read into the record a number 
of excerpts from your book, a book which would indicate to me that 
anyone who has the ideas expressed therein would be completely un- 
fitted for the job that you hold. You may have reformed or changed 
since then, and we hope to settle whether you have or not before we 
are through. I will read these into the record, and if you care to 
have a copy of the record, you can decide whether anything I read 
is unfairly taken out of context and if you want to add to it, you may 
do so. The entire book will be marked as an exhibit. 

Before we do that, may I ask, does counsel have any other questions 
lie would like to ask at this time ? I understand that he will be a wit- 
ness tomorrow morning. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr, Harris, what date did you give us as the date when 
3'ou say you completely broke with the ideas and ideology you ex- 
pressed in this book and in the editorials inspected ; what year ? 

Mr. Harris. These things are not done on a specific date, Mr. 

Mr. CoHisr. Give us your best estimate. I understand you cannot 
give it exactly. 

Mr. Harris. Substantially it was by 1934, most of that atmosphere 
had gone, those beliefs. Certainly before 1940 there would have been 
not the slightest vestige of any piece of the things that are in King 

Mr. CoHN. Would you say the vestiges continued until 1940? 

Mr. Harris. Probably on the subject of football, I think some of 
them would carry over that far. 

Mr. CoHN. How about on the subject of what we might call radical 
Tiews expressed on the question of things other than athletics ? 

Mr. Harris. Anything that I would call a radical view in there 
was out of the way by the fall of 1934. 

Mr. CoHN. I will now ask you whether or not, in the year 1938, 
jou had any connection with the League of American Writers — and 
before I ask that, Mr. Chairman, if I may, may I state for the record 
that the League of American Writers has been cited by the Attorney 
•General of the United States as a subversive and Communist organ- 
ization ; that Attorney General Biddle stated on September 24, 1942, 
and I quote : 

The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in 
1935. In 1939 it began openly to follow the Communist Party line as dictated 
by the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 

Then, of course, it has been cited, I believe, by the Committee on 
Un-American Activities and every other Government agency, and it 
has been officially cited by Attorney General Clark. 


I will now ask you whether or not in 1938 you had any connection 
with the League of American Writers ? 

Mr. Harris. As you well know from my testimony in executive ses- 
sion, I was a member of that oi-ganization for a matter of days in 
1938, and it had not been cited by any Government organization at 
that time as a Communist organization. There was no way that a 
person would necessarily know that it was a Communist organization. 

The Chairman. I do not believe the Communist Party has been 
cited yet. Is it your testimony that unless some other Government 
agency told you this was a group of Comnumists banding together, 
that you, the acting head of the information program, could not 
recognize it as a Communist front? Must someone tell you? 

Mr. Harris. Of course not, they must not tell me, but I am just 
pointing out that it was not publicly recognized as a Connnunist or- 
ganization at the time. 

I will further testify as I did in executive session. 

The CiiAiRMAN. Did you recognize it at the time as a Connnunist 
organization ? 

Mr. Harris. I had considerable reservations about it. I had doubt 
about some of the people whose names showed on their board, as I 
stated, I believe, in executive session. 

I also pointed^ out that the entrance into membership of the League 
of American Writers was in effect made for me by a person who 
thought that he was doing me a favor. 

The Chairman. Who was the man? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Jerre Mangione, as I previously testified. 

The Chairman. You know he is a Communist? 

Mr. Harris. I know that you so stated in executive session. 

The Chairman. Do you consider him one ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I have had no clear-cut evidence that 
Mr. Jerre Mangione is a Communist. 

The Chairman. Do you think he is a Communist? You are the 
man directing our information program, to fight communism. Do 
you consider Mangione a Communist? 

Mr. Harris. If you would allow me to examine his record, I would 
be pleased to give you my judgment. I have not seen Mr. Mangione 
for a good many years, and I don't know what his activities have 
been, and I am not dealing with him at this particular time. And it 
is, I think, quite unfair to expect me to characterize him as one thing 
or another at this point. 

The Chairman. When he did you this favor, putting you into this 
Communist-front organization, did you consider him a Communist 

Mr. Harris. I thought he was certainly being misled somewhat by 
them, in his great eagerness to corral people into this organizatioii. 

The Chairman. Did you think he was a Communist ? It is an easy 
question. Either you did or you did not think he was a Communist. 

Mr. Harris. I don't have any way of knowing that this man was 
a member of the Communist Party. I saw him being easy with a 
Communist organization. 

The Chairman. Well, now, can you tell us whether you thought he 
was or was not a Communist ? Or don't you have any 'idea ? 


Mr. Harris. I thought I testified a moment ago that I had no way 
of knowing whether he was a Communist or not. I said that he ap- 
peared to be easily led by Communists. 

The Chairman. Wliat Communists were leading him? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the then head of the 
League of American AVriters has been cited in a lot of public testimony 
as a probable Communist. 

The Chairman. Wliat is his name? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Donald Ogden Stewart. 

The Chairman. Was he a friend of yours ? 

Mr. Harris. I have never met the gentleman. 

The Chairman. You said he worked with Communist organiza- 
tions. AVhat Communist organizations did he work with? 

Mr. Harris. I don't know what organizations he worked with. I 
remember reading somewhere that he had been cited by, I believe, the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. But I certainly hate to 
get into recollections as slight as that. You have access to all of the 
indexes and the records and the lists, and I think it is hardly fair 
for me to hazard semiguesses on a thing as serious as this. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, I have one more question. We find 
your name listed as being on the editorial board of a Communist paper 
in 1937 or 1938, and you tell us that was done by a friend of yours 
who did you a favor without your knowledge ; and we find that you 
were listed as one of the members of the League of American Writers, 
an organization named as a Communist front, and you tell us that 
that was done by a friend of yours to do you a favor, Jerre Mangione, 
who seems to be well known as a Communist by everybody except 
yourself. We find that in 1937 you were the sponsor of another Com- 
munist front, the American Students Union, named by the Attorney 
General, and again you tell us you do not know ; that maybe someone 
might have collected money from you or you may have contributed, 
and you know nothing about it. 

I just wonder, if you were a head of the Security Division, if you 
found a man who had written such a book. King Football, belonging 
to these various Communist fronts, would you not think it was wise 
to call him up for a hearing and put him under oath and get the story 
from him ? You told us last week that you never had a loyalty heari ng. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I think that such a person should be 
very, very fully investigated by whatever means seemed to be appro- 
priate to the investigative agency doing the work. If that involved 
calling the person himself before a security officer, I think that that is 
perfectly proper and desirable. I believe the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation rarely does that type of thing, and I think most of the 
other investigative agencies seem to prefer to draw upon written 
sources, comments of informants, and so on, and not to question the 
individual at hand. 

May I say that I consider the juxtaposition of these things, one in 
1932 and one alleged in 1937, or two alleged in 1937, and one in 1938, 
as creating what is certainly a very false impression. I think given 
time, I could produce a juxtaposition of 5 or 6 events of the same 
period that would prove the opposite implication to be perfectly 


The reference to a so-called Communist publication, I resent a great 
deal, Mr. Chairman, because this was a single issue ; all it had of the 
regular format of the magazine Direction, if Red it was, it had this 
format, and it was entirely made up of material especially selected 
as a semiofficial part of the Federal Writers Project work. All of the 
articles in it came from such sources ; and the board listed, on which 
you say my name appears, on which my name does appear, was an 
honorary board and not an actual controlling board of any Red pub- 
lication. This was a single special issue put out as a semiofficial duty 
as part of the work of the American Guide Series Project, the Federal 
Writers Project. 

The Chairman. You may step down. 

Senator McClellan. One moment. 

Mr. Harris, the testimony before us regarding this book, which you 
admit, is very impressive. You say, as I understand you, that you have 
changed your views, and you no longer entertain those views ? 

Mr. Harris. I do say so, sir. 

Senator McClellan. I should like to ask you whether, since you 
wrote the book, you have written any articles for publication or that 
have been published, that refute the philosophy and the views you 
expressed in the book? 

Mr. Harris. I think that T c:in produce articles or statements that 
refute in general those things, and they are not specifically directed 
to the points in the book, Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Here is what I am concerned about. In the 
first place, I will ask you this : If it should be established that a per- 
son entertained the views and philosophies that you expressed in that 
book, would you consider that person suitable or fit to hold a position 
in the Voice of America which you now hold ? 

Mr. Harris. I would not. 

Senator McClellan. You would not employ such a person, would 

Mr. Harris. I would not, Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Now we find you in that position. 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. So I think that in view of these hearings and 
what has been developed, it behooves you, certainly insofar as you can, 
to present to this committee and to the public such affirmative evidence 
as will corroborate your statement that you have completely repudiated 
the views you then expressed ; and since you gave publication to those 
views and that philosophy that you then entertained, I think one of 
the most impressive ways you could do it, if you have done so, is to 
produce articles that you have written and had published since, which 
clearly indicate or prove or establish the fact that your views have 
changed and that you no longer entertain such a philosophy. 

Mr. Harris. Senator, I think that 

Senator McClellan. I would like personally to see you have that 
opportunity to present such documentary evidence to this committee,, 
if you are in a position to do so. 

Mr. Harris. Senator, I will do everything I can. 

The Chairman. We have asked the witness to do that in executive 
session, and we are still waiting for it. 


Senator McClellan. I wanted to ask him now, because I think 
tliat this is a serious thing, and I do not want the witness done any 
injustice. But I think, on the face of it, certainly we should have 
conclusive proof that he no longer entertains such views ; that he has 
done whatever he could by publishing articles or writings to repudiate 
what he published as his philosophy in 1932. He admits, he says, 
that he would not himself employ anyone for the position he now 
holds if he knew they entertained such views as he there expressed. 
I should like, if he has made such a record by writing articles and 
publishing views that completely contradict and repudiate those 
expressed in the book, for him to have the opportunity to present 
them to this committee and for the record. 

The Chairman. I am going to ask the witness to take his book 
King Football and mark the parts which he now repudiates, and the 
parts with which he still agrees. That will be a sizable job, and I 
know you cannot do it overnight. How much time would you want, 
Mr, Harris? 

Mr. Harris. I think, assuming no hearings are being held to exhaust 
this witness, I could probably do it in 2 days with considerable ease.. 

The Chairman. Today is Tuesday. 

Mr. Harris. I could produce that information. 

The Chairman. We will give you until next Monday. Will that 
be all right ? 

Mr. Harris. Yes. And may I say, in part answer to this question, 
I think that it must be made a fair situation, and it must be remem- 
bered that I have been a Government employee since November 11, 
1934, and that my work has not normally permitted me to write 
outside my Government work, and that I have not been on the staff 
of some regular publication where I would normally have writings. 
I think that my affirmative record with the agencies with which I 
have worked should have a bearing on the judgments of this com- 
mittee and the judgments of the American public. I think I can 
prove by the testimony of a large number of people, if that is neces- 
sary, that I have served loyally in the Government agencies in which 
I have served, and that I have cooperated at all times with the properly 
constituted investigative agencies, such as the FBI, volunteering 
information to them when it seemed to be of any use to them, and 
cooperating always in any investigation they have conducted, and 
insisting on the proper carrying out of security and loyalty rules, 
both in the sense of personnel and documentary security; and that 
this affirmative record was very clearly demonstrated early in 1938 
when I privately rather than publicly broke with the head of the 
Federal Writers Project over his habit of being too generous, too 
easy on members of obvious Communist-dominated unions in three of 
the major projects — New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. I am refer- 
ring to Mr. Henry G. Alsberg, a man of very great kindness and a 
man who would give the shirt off his back to his fellow man, but who 
in my opinion was far too easy on these tough, lying people. 

The Chairman. You said that you broke with Mr. Alsberg privately 
in 1938 because of his softness toward Communist causes. Do you 
know that Mr. Alsberg gave you as a reference for a job in 1942? 

Mr. Harris. I Iniow that the counsel so stated. I only know it 
from what the counsel stated, as far as any recollection of mine is 


The Chairman. Do you not think it is rather unusual if you had 
a break with this man because he was following the Communist line, 
and you told him that, that he would give you as a reference for a job 
4 years later? 

Mr. Harris. There are two or three things here — I did not say he 
was following the Communist line. I said he was ""too easy." 

The Chairman. Did you think he was following the Communist 

Mr. Harris. I think he was much too easy on Coimnunist-domi- 
nated unions who were controlling the units of the project in New 
York City, St. Louis, and Chicago. I even wrote him a memorandum 
to that efl'ect. I do have a copy of that memorandum. 

The Chairman. Is this a man whom you would recommend for a 
job in Government? 

Mr. Harris. Under present standards, I do not think so. 

The Chairman. Do you think the standards, to your way of think- 
ing, have changed? In other words, did you not require the degree 
of loyalty in IO08 that you do in 1952? Was it as high or a little 
higher ? 

Mr. Harris. As high a degree of loyalty, certainly, as loyal to the 
United States Government. 

The Chairman. Would you have recommended him for a job in 
1938 when you say you broke with him ? 

Mr. Harris. No ; I would not. 

The Chairman. Would you recommend him for a job in 1942? 

Mr. Harris. Not most types of jobs. 

The Chairman. Did you recommend him for a job in 1942? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly don't remember recommending him for a 
job in 1942. 

The Chairman. Pardon me? 

Mr. Harris. I don't remember recommending liim, if indeed I did. 

The Chairman. Did you recommend him for a job in OWI in 

Mr. Harris. I have just said that I do not recollect making any 
such recommendation. It is possible that Mr. Alsberg could have 
been used very effectively at that time out in the area of Turkey or 
something of that kind, because of his intimate knowledge of situations 
over there, because he would have no supervisory authority and would 
be working as a writer or editor, for which he was eminently qualified. 
The difficulties that I consider he had with words was caused by his 
supervision and the supervision assignment. I have never seen any 
sign and I have never had any evidence that he was a Communist, 

Senator McClellan. I wanted to state this: that my purpose in 
suggesting or making the suggestions about the articles was an effort 
to be helpful to you, and not to restrict the evidence you might submit 
solely to articles or things that you may have published since; but 
I think, and I say this to you frankly, that if you have done so, and 
if you have written and published articles since that clearly repudiate 
the views you expressed in that book, they would be very conclusive 
with me. If you have not, then of course we have got to go to other 
factors and other sources to determine about your sincerity now when 
you say that you no longer retain such views. 


Mr. Harris. May I enter in the record just before I step down a 
memorandum that' I addressed to Mr. Alsberg, a copy that I will 
certify to be mine, of November 12, 1937, in which I speak of opera- 
tions in New Yorlv, Chicago, and St. Louis, and say tliat the Com- 
munist domination of the projects — 

is scandalous and should be stopped somehow. In view of the law — 

tliat was the law at that time — 

the Communist feature is not what we should base action upon. We should 
insist that no political group has the right to run the project over the heads 
of the constituted officials. 

I said it that way, Mr. Chairman, because we were under clear-cut 
legal instructions. 

The Chairman. You will be back at 10 o'clock in the morning, Mr. 
Harris, and your memorandum will be received at this point. 

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33," and 
will be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Kimball? 

In this matter before the connnittee, do you solemnly swear that 
you will tell the truth, tlie whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God I 

Mr. KiMBAij.. I do. 


The Chairman. What is your job at the present time? 

JNIr. Kimball. Assistant Administrator for Management. 

The Chairman. Have you checked the files of Mr. Kaghan and 
Mr. Schechter to determine whether or not they were either cleared 
or rejected for a job with the Voice of America ? 

]Mr. Kimball. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I liave not checked 
the files. 

The Chairman. Have you seen tlie files ? 

Mr. Kimball. I have not seen the files ; no, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you gotten a report from anyone on the files? 

Mr. Kimball. I have gotten a report ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. From whom did you get the report ? 

Mr. Kimball. In both cases, I received the report from Mr. J. Albert 
Bush, Avho is the Chief of the Manpower Utilization Division part of 
my staff. 

The Chairman. Pardon me? 

Mr. Kimball. The man who is in. charge of personnel on my par- 
ticular staff, Mr. J. Albert Bush. 

The Chairman. That is J. Albert Bush? 

Mr. Kimball. B-u-s-h. 

The Chairman. Did he tell you that he had personally checked the 

Mr. Kimball. He told me that he had written evidence concerning 
the files; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you transmitted that written evidence — did 
you complete your answer? 


Mr. Kimball, Yes, sir ; I believe at that point. 

The Chairman. You transmitted the information you got from 
Bush to Mr. Harris, did you ? 

Mr. Kimball. I transmitted it orally, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you do that ? 

Mr. Kimball. I would say that it might have been at some earlier 
time, also, but I did so within the last week. 

The Chairman. Did you tell Mr. Harris that Mr. Kaghan and Mr. 
Schechter had been cleared by Security for jobs with the Voice? 

Mr. Kimball. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say — I may be mis- 
taken — but it is my understanding that, as to the nature of a conversa- 
tion which is based on security files, I am not permitted to answer 
that question under the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer that, in view of the fact 
that Mr. Harris has testified as to what you told him. The question 
is : Did you tell him that Mr. Bush said Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter 
had been cleared under Public Law 402 for a job with the Voice? 
You will be ordered to answer that. 

Mr. Kimball. If it is proper, I will be glad to answer it. 

The Chairman. In view of the fact that you may want to discuss 
this with your superior officers, we will give you time to go back and 
discuss that with them. In other words, we are not going to order 
you to answer it instantly. Your feeling is that under the present 
secrecy orders, you cannot tell us that! 

Mr. Kimball. That is my understanding, IVIr, Chairman. 

The Chairman. We will give you an opportunity to discuss that 
with the new team over in the Department, and you can tell them you 
have been ordered to answer that, and you will be asked to return 
tomorrow morning. 

I do not think we should order an answer instantly without hit- 
discussing it with his superiors. However, in view of the fact that 
Harris comes in and uses this conversation as a clearance, and the 
constant shifting — first it is Ford, and then it is Kimball, and then 
it is Tate — I believe we have got to get to the bottom of this. 

Senator McClellan. I think before you proceed, it is all right and 
I think it is quite proper to permit the witness to consult with his 
superiors before you order him to answer, but in the meantime I think 
you should call the subcommittee together for a conference and deter- 
mine procedure in executive session in the event his superiors refuse 
to permit him to testify. 

Here is the position the witness is placed in. He probably will be 
perfectly willing himself to answer the question and give the com- 
mittee the information it seeks, and at the same time he could not very 
well violate the order of his superiors. Since this order actually 
comes from the President of the United States, and if the order is 
wrong it was made by another President and not the present President 
of the United States, this President should have the opportunity to 
revoke it if he cares to do so. 

Mr. Kimball. I would appreciate the opportunity to consult. 

The Chairman. You will definitely have that opportunity. Will 
you return at 10: 30 tomorrow morning? 

Mr. Kimball. Yes. 


The Chairman. If your superior officer orders you not to answer 
this question, will you tell him that he is requested to appear with you ? 

Mr. Kimball. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We will take Mr. Ford very briefly, I believe. 

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Ford ? 

In this matter before the committee, do you solemnly swear that you 
will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 

Mr. Ford. I do. 


The Chairman. Mr. Ford, has anyone consulted you in the past 
few weeks or months in regard to a security clearance for Mr. Kaghan 
or Mr. Schechter ? 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, to my knowledge, the first time those cases 
ever came to my attention was about Sunday, when I read some testi- 
mony in the paper, at which time I prepared a memorandum for Mr. 

The Chairman. The time is short, and from past experience I 
know 5'ou are rather a long-winded witness. I have just a few very 
brief questions, and will you try to answer those : 

No. 1. Has anyone consulted you recently, in the past 2 weeks, in 
regard to whether Mr. Kaghan, Theodore Kaghan, and Mr. Schechter, 
who is now in HICOG, secured security clearance under Public Law 
402 for employment with the Voice ? 

Mr. Ford. Yes, sir, they have. There have been several discussions 
on it. 

The Chairman. Have you personally examined their security files 
to see if they had flunked that security test? 

Mr. Ford. Yes, sir ; I have, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, may I say the previous witness has refused 
to tell us whether they received clearance or not, under the Presidential 
directive, and he was ordered to answer that question but we gave 
him an opportunity to return to the Department and discuss the 
matter with his superiors. 

Do you take the position you can tell us whether those two men were 
cleared, or if you are barred from doing that under the secrecy order? 

Mr. Ford. I would give anything in the world if I could tell you. 
I would love to tell you, but it is my understanding that I am barred, 
sir, and I would like to ask that privilege. 

The Chairman. Wlio called upon you or who asked you about the 
specific clearance ? Was it Mr. Harris or Mr. Kimball ? Just give us 
their names. 

Mr. Ford. I am just trying to recall definitely, sir. 

I initiated the thing by a memorandum, and then after that I 
believe someone I had a conversation with — I am trying as hard as I 
can to recall the circumstances. There are so many cases, you know. 

Other than Mr. Tate, I believe I discussed it with him, but I could 
not possibly be positive with reference to Mr. Kimball. 

The Chairman. Wlien did you discuss it with Mr. Tate? 


Mr. Ford. I believe it was discussion, sir, of the memoTandum that 
I had written to Mr. Lourie, and I conkl not be positive about that. 
It was just a statement as to whether or not they had clearance. 

The Chairman. You discussed this with Mr. Tate, who is the 
assistant legal officer? 

Mr. Ford. No, it wasn't Mr. Tate. It was another man in his office. 
I am mistaken on that. Probably Mr. Bushon. 

The Chairman. And you sent Mr. Lourie a memorandum ? 

Mr. Ford. Giving the full details of each case. 

The Chairman. Who besides yourself had access to the security 
file of Kaghan and Schechter? 

Mr. Ford. Just the people in my own office, sir. 

The Chairman. How many people are in your office? 

Mr. Ford. In my own office 

The Chairman. How many people in your office have access to tluit 

Mr. Ford. I would say fi\e file clerks that work in the area where 
it is stored, and my deputy, and my special assistant, and myself; and 
Mr. Boykin, who "is above uie. The only other one I could think of 
would be Legal, occasionally, and vei-y seldom Ave have had occasion to 
send a hie over to them. 

The Chairman. Anyone in your office could see the files? 

Mr. Ford. Not anyone. 

The Chairman. Not any more? 

Mr. Ford. No. 

The Chairman. When did you change the rule ? 

Mr. Ford. I didn't change the rule, sir. 

The Chairman. We will start all over. I asked you if everyone 
in your office had access to the files, and you said not any more, and 
I assumed you meant that at one time they had access. 

Mr. Ford. No. I am trying to be fair with you, sir. You are 
speaking to a man that has eliminated 75 security risks from the 
Department of State in the past 21^ years, and I am just as anxious 
as you are to help out. 

The Chairman. I asked you if anyone in your office had access to 
the files, and I understood you to say "Not any more.'' 

Mr. Ford. I didn't intend to say that if I did, l)ut I don't recall 
what I said at that time. 

The Chairman. Then does everyone in vour office have access to 
the file? 

Mr. Ford. No. 

The Chairman. So if anyone got information on the clearance of 
these two men, they would have to get the information from either 

Mr. Ford. My deputy 

The Chairman. Of 1 of the 5 file clerks? 

Mr. Ford. The five file clerks would never actually have occasion 
to give a clearance, and they wouldn't know from an examination 
of the file whether a clearance was outstanding or just what the pro- 
cedure was. 

The Chairman. Those files contain FBI reports ? 

Mr. Ford. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are the man who does the evaluating? 

Mr. Ford. Not per se. We have a staff of officers in the Evaluations 
Branch who do that. 

STATE df:partment information program 391 

Tlie Chairman. Who are on that staff which does the evahiating? 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Thomas Hoffman is the Cliief of that Branch, sir. 

The Chairman. Thomas Hoffman? 

Mr. Ford. H-o-f-f-m-a-n. 

The Chairman. Who are the other members of that staff? 

Mr. Ford. It is pretty hirge, sir. I couldn't give you all of the 
names. Mr. David Tenney 

The Chairman. I understand that under Public Law 402, anyone 
who goes with the Voice of America needs clearance. 

Mr. FoRU. They had an FBI investigation; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And then a clearance by someone ? 

Mr. Ford, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The question is: Who gives the clearance, after 
the FBI has finished investigating? The FBI, of course, do not 

Mr. Ford. No. 

The Chairman. Someone must go over all of the files and say, 
"This man is all right," or "This man is not." A\lio does that? 

Mr. Ford. Well, this is some years ago when these people came in 
here, and at the present time it would be Mr. Hoffman, and he is the 
final person. During those dates, I don't know who. It depended 
upon the year that they entered on the rolls, sir, and I don't know 
who was there at the time they gave these clearances. 

The Chairman. You do not have that job yourself? 

Mr. Ford. Not per se. Any ditKcult case that would come up. 
where there are questions involved, I would be the one who would 
pass on them. For example, it might have been Mr. Nicholson. 
whom you remember, Mr. Chairman. It might have been Mr. Nich- 
olson, but I frankly don't know, sir. 

Senator McClellan. May I ask you one question. I understand 
from your testimony that you do have the information, and you could 
tell the committee, if you were permitted to, whether they were cleared 
or not cleared? 

Mr. Ford. I could, sir, very definitely. 

Senator McClellan. That is all. 

Mr. Ford. I would be glad to do it. 

The Chairman. I may say that you will be ordered to answer that 
question tomorrow, and you can discuss the matter with your superior 
ofticere and tell them that you are ordered to do it because the head 
of the information program has discussed the question of whether 
or not they have been cleared; and you can also inform them that 
we will subpena the documents upon which you base your clearance, 
and we will not merely take your word for that. 

Mr. Ford. Surely. 

The Chairman. As I told Mr. Khnball, if you are ordered not to 
give that information, we will want the superior officer who orders 
you not to give it to come with you tomorrow. 

Mr. Ford. Surely. 

The Chairman. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 15 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Wednes- 
day, March 4, 1953.) 



Acheson, Denn 332, 364 

Advertising Club of New York 368 

Alsberg, Henry G 352-353, 385^387 

America First Committee 369 

American Guide Series Project 352, 384 

American Legion 340, 347 

American Student Union 351, 383 

Andrews, Col. Fred 356-358, 360-361 

Barrett, Edward 359 

Bentley, Elizabeth 375-376 

Boykin, Mr 390 

Broun, Heywood 336, 337 

Bundles for Britain 86» 

Bureau of Standards 355, 358-359, 362 

Bush, J. Albert 387-388 

Bushon, Mr 390 

Carr, Lester H 356-357, 360 

Carrigan 354 

Casey, Mr 376 

Clark, Thomas 381 

Columbia Spectator 343, 346, 353, 365-366, 376 

Columbia University 333, 335, 336, 338, 345, 347, 348, 350, 362, 366, 375-376 

Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies 368-369 

Compton, Mr 331, 349, 354-355, 357, 359, 360-361-362 

Connors, Bradley 354 

Crosby. Ben 360-361, 362 

Daily Tarheel of the University of North Carolina 346 

Direction (publication) 352, 384 

Fast, Howard 354 

Federal Writers Project, WPA 352, 384-385 

Fisher, Adrian 332 

Ford, John W 371-372, 388, 389 

Testimony of -. 389-391 

Goldwater, Senator Barry 363 

Harris plan 348, 349 

Harris, Reed 388, 389 

Testimony of 331-387 

Henderson, Donald 333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 348, 352, 376 

Hoffman, Thomas 391 

Humelsine, Mr 365 

John Reed Club 35S 

Johnson, Dr. Robert 331 

Kaghan, Theodore 332, 362, 364, 370-373, 375, 379, 381, 387-390 

Kimball, Arthur A 371-375. 380, 387, 391 

Testimony of , 387-389 

King Football, by Reed Harris 364, 375-376, 381, 383, 385 

Introduced, Exhibit No. 32 344 

League of American Writers 381-383 

Leahy. Jack 355, 356 

Lenin .S50 

Lewis. Charles 379 

Lourie, Mr 365, 370, 389-390 

Maey. Edward 380 

Mangione, Jerre 353, 382-383 

Marx, Karl 350 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 355, 358-359 



McLeod. Mr 341-342 

Meyers. Mrs 377-378 

National Self-Government Committee, New York 367 

Nicholson, Mr 391 

OWI 353 

Pegler, Westbrook 367 

I'ierce, R. Maurice 361 

Puham, Alfred 380 

Ring, Andrew 361,362 

Ross, D. D 346 

Scheohter. Edmund 332, 362, 364, 370-373, 375, 379-380-381, 387-390 

Sinclair, Upton 339 

Social Problems Club 337, 338 

Spectator. ( .s'ee Columbia Spectator.) 

Staunton Military Academy 363, 375-376 

Stewart, Donald Ogden 383 

Stoner, General 354, 357, 358, 359 

Stone, Shepard 379 

Taft, Senator Robert A 335, 339, 363 

Tate, Jack 332, 362, 364, 365, 369-372, 381, 388, 389-390 

Tenney, David 391 

Thompson. .Tames F 332, 362, 364, 371, 379-380 

Webb, James 359 

Weldon, Mr 357 

Weldon & Carr 356 

Wevl, Nathaniel 336 

White, William Allen 368-369 

Wiesuer, Dr. Jerry 361 

William Allen White Committee 368 

Willkie, Wendell 367 

Wright, Harold 379-380 




BEFORE THB> , . , ._ 


' OF THE ' 





S. Res. 40 


MARCH 4, 1953 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 

29708 WASHINGTON : 1953 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN18 1S53 


JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN. Arkansas 



EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 


Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 

Pebmanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 


Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
Fbancis D. Flanagan, General Counsel and Staff Director 




Appendix 469' 

Index I 

Testimony of — 

Dooher, Gerald F. P., Acting Chief, Near East, South Asia, and 

African Division, Voice of America 397 

Francis, Robert J., Controller, Voice of America 413 

Glazer, Dr. Sidney, Chief. Hebrew Service, Voice of America 397 

Harris, Reed, Deputy Administrator, United States International 

Information Administration 394 

Johnstone, William C, Jr., Deputy Administrator, Field Progiams, 

United States International Information Administration 419 

Puhan, Alfred, Program Manager, Voice of America 394 

Sims, Albert G 419 

Thompson, James F., Facilities Manager, Voice of America 418 

SCHEDULE OF EXHIBITS introduced Appears 

on page on page 

34. Summary re Hebrew language broadcasts, December 10, 

1952 402 469 

35. Annual report from American Embassy at Tel Aviv to 

Hebrew Desk, Voice of America, January 9, 1953 449 (*) 

36. Report of scientific panel, December 17, 1952, submitted by 

Reed Harris 449 (*) 

37. Letter from United States Civil Service, Region 1, to Roy M. 

Cohn. chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations 463 (*) 

38. Statement by Col. Fred P. Andrews, February 17, 1953 467 (*) 


1. Letter from WiUiam C. Johnstone, Jr., Deputy Administrator for 
Field Programs, United States International Information Adminis- 
tration, to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman. Senate Perma- 
nent Subcommittee on Investigations 471 

*May be found In the flies of the subcommittee. 





United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

OF the Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ t). G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed 
to January 30, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m., in Room 357 of the Senate Office 
Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Karl E. Munclt, Republican, South Dakota ; John L. McClellan, Dem- 
ocrat, Arkansas; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and 
Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant 
counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investi- 
gator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; and John S. Leahy, Special 
Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Administration. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Do I correctly understand, Mr. Counsel, that the security officer is 
sending us a report on the files of the two individuals in question? 

Mr. Cohn. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That was to be delivered by Mr. Leahy ? 

Mr. Cohn. We understand Mr. Leahy will produce a report from 
the State Department containing a summary of those two cases. 

The Chairman. Ruth, will you call the security officer of the 
State Department? He was supposed to report over here at 10:30. 

In the meantime, Mr. Harris will take the stand again. 

Mr. Harris, yesterday we were going into your background. I 
believe you agreed with us that if your thinking was the same as it 
was when you wrote this book, you would be unfit to hold the job 
which you now hold. One of the problems before the committee is 
to bring your record down to date, to see if you have changed to the 
point that you would now be fit. 

There has been considerable evidence with regard to what happened 
when the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, when they started 
to persecute Jewish people because they were Jewish. There has 
been testimony from the head of the Hebrew desk, testimony from 
Mr. Dooher, who is head of the Near East, Asian, and African desks, 
to the effect that they felt what was done at that time under your 
orders was a great service to the Communist cause. And I would 
like to get into that with you at this time- 
Is it correct that along in December of last year, shortly after the 
Slansky trials, you ordered that the Hebrew language desk be closed ? 




Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, the answer to that is "Yes." And I 
consider that it was no service to the Communist cause, because we did 
not cut out anti-Communist broadcasts to Israel in any manner. We 
did not so order. We ordered just one thing. We ordered that the 
language, Hebrew, not be carried, as soon after that date as the orderly 
closing down would permit. And we based that on the sound manage- 
ment consideration that that was a very ineffective way of reaching 
the population in Israel. We were stepping up, at the same time, the 
con.ments about the anti-Semitic activity of the Soviets and their 
satellites, and that news was getting into Israel very, very effectively, 
through the American news services, through our own press serv- 
ices, through broadcasts in a number of other languages by the Voice. 
It was simply our impression, since our job is to do a world-wide fight 
against international communism, using what we consider to be rela- 
tively limited funds to the best advantage — we felt, in fairness to the 
taxpayers and in honesty, we had to cut down the Hebrew-language 
broadcasts, a step that had been recommended to us or had been agreed 
to by the International Broadcasting Service itself in earlier months. 

The Chairman. Now, there were 46 different language desks. Is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Harris. There were 46 different language desks; that is 

The Chairman. Can you enumerate those 46? 

Mr. Harris. I could not do that from memory, Mr. Chairman, and 
I do not have a document here that covers all of them. I could give 
you the names of those languages that were going into Israel at this 

The Chairman. No, the 46. How can you get that for 46? Do 
you have any man here who could give you that ? We are interested 
in why you picked out the Hebrew-language desk at the time you had 
this present propaganda weapon, why you let the other 45 desks 

Mr. Harris. I am sure Mr. Puhan could give that information. 

The Chairman. Mr. Puhan, are you in the audience ? 


Mr. Puhan. I am. 

The Chairman. Mr. Puhan, I assume you could hardly remember 
the 46, offhand? 

Mr. Puhan. I will try, sir, if you would like. 

The Chairman. Would you try and list the 46, if you will? 

Mr. Puhan, you are reminded that you were previously placed under 
oath, and the oath is still in effect. 

You may sit down. 

First, will you identify yourself? Wliat is your first name? 


Mr. PuHAN. My name is Alfred Pulian. 

The Chairman. P-u-h-a-n? 

Mr. PuHAN. P-u-h-a-n. 

The Chairman. And your job with the Voice? 

Mr. PuHAN. I am the program manager of the Voice of America in 
New York. 

The Chairiman. Now, can you try and list the 46 different lang- 
uages ? 


Mr. Ptjhan. I will try to the best of my ability, sir. 
English, to Western Europe ; French, to France- 

The Chairman. You need not give us the target area. Just the 

Mr. PuHAN. Portuguese, Spanish, German to Germany and Ger- 
man to Austria, Italian, Russian to the Soviet Union. 

The Chairman. Just the language. 

Mr. PuHAN. Ukrainian, Azerbaijani. 

The Chairman. I don't get that. 

Mr. PuHAN. A-z-e-r-b-a-i-j-a-n-i. 

The Chairman . Would you do that again ? 

Mr, PuHAN. A-z-e-r-b-a-i-j-a-n-i. 

The Chairman. And if I may interrupt you there, what is the target 
area for this particular language? 

Mr. Ptjhan. That is the south of the Soviet Union, the area of the 
Caspian and Black Seas, what is known as Soviet east and trans- 

The Chairman. O. K. Go ahead. 

Mr. PuHAN. Armenian. 

The Chairman. That is also of the Eussian dialects? 

Mr. PuHAN. Yes. Tatar, T-a-t-a-r. 

The Chairman. That is also a Eussian dialect ? 

Mr. PuHAN. Yes. Georgian. 

The Chairman. Georgian. That is another Eussian language? 

Mr. Puhan. Turkestani, T-u-r-k-e-s-t-a-n-i. 

The Chairman. That is principally to Turkey ? 

Mr. Puhan. No ; that is also to the Soviet east and trans-Caucasia, 

The Chairman. Do you have a number of people in the Soviet that 
speak Turkestani? 

Mr. Puhan. Yes. Polish, Czech, and Slovak, Eumanian, Hun- 
garian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbo-Croation, Slovene, Turkish, He- 
brew, Arabic, Iranian, or Persian, Hindi. 

The Charman. I don't get that. 

Mr. Puhan. Hindi, to India. Urdu, U-r-d-u, the official language 
of Pakistan ; Malayan ; Thai, T-h-a-i, to Thailand, Vietnamese. 

The Chairman. What was the one after Thai? 

Mr. Puhan. No. I am sorry. I say that is to Viet-Nam. Thai is 
the official language of Thailand, I believe. Indonesian, Mandarin, 
Cantonese, Amoy. 

The Chairman. Amoy? 

Mr. Puhan. Amoy. 

The Chairman. To what part of China is that beamed ? 

Mr. Puhan. The islands, Formosa, Southern China. Swatow. 


The Chairman. How do you spell that? 

Mr. PuHAN. S-w-a-t-o-w. Korean, Japanese. 

The Chairman. You are doing rather well. 

Mr. PuHAN. Thank you. 

The Chairman. That is 36. 

Mr. PuHAN. Spanish. 

The Chairman. I think we have that already. 

Mr. PuHAN. May I make a point here, Mr. Chairman? 

When they refer to 46 desks, it refers to 46 language services. For 
instance, Spanish to Spain is one service ; Spanish to Latin America 
is still another. There is a difference, actually, in the speech, some- 
what, one being the Castilian Spanish and the other the South Ameri- 
can Spanish. 

The Chairman. In other words, some of the Spanish is the kind 
that my staff would speak. I might say I was down in Mexico 2 
weeks ago, and after I had learned to speak Spanish, I discovered that 
the Spanish could not speak the language. 

Is that the kind of Spanish ? 

Mr. Puhan. Well, there is some difference. One is a purer form of 
Spanish, the Castilian in Spain. And then Portuguese to Brazil, and 
then again that is quite different from the Portuguese spoken in 

The Chairman. That is 38. Just, offhand, do you remember any 
others ? 

Mr. Puhan. No ; I think probably what happens is that we have 
three, I believe, separate English services, one going to Europe, one 
going to the Near East and Middle East, and one to the Far East. We 
have no English to Latin America. But I believe, and I am speaking 
here from memory, that what I have given you are the ones that I 
recall now, unless I have left out some important area of the world. 
I believe I have gone through Europe, the Near East, the Far East, 
and Latin America. 

The Chairman. The reason I asked you for these: In checking 
them over, I wonder why Hebrew was picked out of the 46 ? Take for 
example the desk dealing with Urdu going to Pakistan ? Do we know 
how many people in Pakistan have radio-receiving sets, as compared 
to the Hebrew people? 

Mr. Puhan. Mr. Chairman, we have such information. I do not 
have it with me, however. I could develop that for you, but I would 
have to check my office. 

The Chairman. Would you have any idea? 

Mr. Puhan. No. 

The Chairman. I assume the number of radio stations in Pakistan 
equipped to receive short-wave broadcasts is very low. Would you 
not think so ? 

Mr. Puhan. I just don't know. 

The Chairman. You may step down. 

Mr. Puhan. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Will Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher step forward? 

Dr. Glazer, you have been sworn ; and Mr. Dooher, you have been 
sworn. You are reminded your oath is still in effect. 

Dr. Glazer, what is your first name ? 



Dr. Glazer. Sidney. 

The Chairman. Sidney Glazer. That is spelled G-1-a-z-e-r. 

And Mr. Gerald Dooher. That is spelled ? 

Mr. Dooher. D-o-o-h-e-r. 

The Chairman. Dr. Glazer, you are head of the Hebrew desk. Is 
that correct, sir? 

Dr. Glazer. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And Mr. Dooher? 

Mr. Dooher. Acting Chief of the Near East, South Asian, and 
African desks. 

The Chairman. Now, we have had considerable testimony from 
witnesses and statements from another great number. So far the only 
man who has been found who tries to justify closing the Hebrew desk, 
among all of the other desks at the time when you were handed a 
counterpropaganda weapon, was Mr. Harris. I would like to get the 
comment of you gentlemen on that, if I may. 

Did you hear what the witness had to say this morning about clos- 
ing that desk ? 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. There is one point I would like to make on 
that. I consider it a very inaccurate implication that other languages 
are being broadcast to Israel. The only language being brought to 
Israel is the Hebrew language. There is an English language to the 
Near East, but, because of the language proportion in the area, that 
program is patterned mostly to the Moslem world. Other languages 
are heard in Israel, but not directed to the people of Israel ; for ex- 
ample, German. The German broadcasts are patterned for the people 
of Germany, and naturally will emphasize German news. Our Ger- 
man language broadcast to Australia naturally emphasizes Australian 
news. But the only language that is delivered every day for the peo- 
ple of Israel, that depends to a large extent on American Jews, for 
example, as interviewees, is the Hebrew language broadcast of the 
Voice of America. So I thought I had better correct that implication 
that there are other languages going to Israel. There are not. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Have you made a survey to 
determine the number of people in Israel who can understand only the 
Hebrew language? 

Mr. Dooher. Mr. Glazer, sir, has those figures. 

The Chairman. Doctor, could you give us a rough estimate of the 
number of people in Israel, No. 1, who can understand only the Israel 
language; No. 2, those who may be able to understand some other 
language also but can also understand the Hebrew language? 

Dr. Glazer. Yes. There is only one official statistic available on 
the subject. Unfortunately, it dates back to 1948. It is found in the 
Government of Israel Yearbook. It states that 54 percent of the 
population as of 1948 knew Hebrew as tlieir exclusive language. 

The Chairman. In other words, they did not understand any broad- 
cast except a Hebrew broadcast? 

29708— 53— pt. 6 2 


Dr. Glazer. That is right. In addition, 20 percent knew Hebrew 
as well an another language, Hebrew being their first and most effec- 
tive language. 

The Chairman. I assume that that figure would not be too accurate 
today, because there is a large influx of refugees into Israel. 

Dr. Glazer. The figure as such would be clouded today because no 
recent surveys have been taken. However, owing to the tremendous 
efforts made to teach the language to new immigrants, in order to 
hasten their absorption into the country, I would estimate that the 
figure is not only the same as that of 1948 but perhaps even higher, 
perhaps as close as 85 percent. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is that you esti- 
mate about 85 percent of the people of Israel could understand the 
Hebrew language? 

Dr. Glazer. Could understand the bulk of what we are trying to 
say, assuming they had the general intellectual background to grasp 
the ideas. 

Now, may I read one very short statement on this subject, bearing 
on the language? 

Since that has been an important point, I think it worth including 
in the record. This is from a magazine called Israel Life and Letters, 
published January-April 1952, wherein it was stated as follows : 

With the establishment of the state and the influx of a large immigration, 
Hebrew has become more widely used and more urgently necessary than before. 
It is the exclusive language of all national and local government authorities 
(except in Arab villages and towns) and serves as the one medium for an ex- 
tremely polyglot population, more heterogeneous than Jewish immigration into 
Palestine 20, 10, or even 5 years ago. 

Hebrew is Israel's chief cultural medium. Israel has a multitude of Hebrew 
newspapers and periodicals, Hebrew theaters, Hebrew schools, including higher 
institutions of learning and agricultural schools. It is the constant at the base, 
the unique spirit of the newspaper, the periodical, the theater, opera, the trade 
school, the university, the short story, the novel. * * * 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Dr. Glazer: Did you feel 
that when the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, as evidenced 
by the Slansky trial and subsequent events, you were then given a 
tremendous counterpropaganda weapon ? 

Dr. Glazer. I diet. 

The Chairman. Especially in view of the fact that the Communists 
have been preaching over and over and over that the rights of every 
minority group, are fully protected, that there is no racial or re- 
ligious discrimination under Communist domination. Did you feel 
that you had a tremendous propaganda weapon not merely to the 
Jewish people but to all minority groups who had been sold on this 
idea of racial and religious equality in Russia ? 

Dr. Glazer. I thought that it was a spectacular opportunity for 
the worldwide exploitation, and in particular for what you might 
call the specific minority group with which I was primarily con- 
cerned, that is, the people of Israel and the Jews elsewhere in the 
world. To them, of course, it applied very specifically at this given 

The Chairman. If the order of Mr. Harris to discontinue the 
Hebrew desk had been followed through, I understand that there 
would have been some lag between the time the order was issued and 
the time that you had been able to conform to it. Is that correct, that 


the order would have been actually put into effect almost coincident 
with the inauguration of the new President ? 

Dr. Glazer. Well, there were two dates actually. The first hard 
date would have come about 10 days after the Slansky trial. Owing 
to the protest put up by my superiors, the decision was delayed, and 
a new date, mid-January, I think January 15, was then set as the 
effective cutoff date. 

The Chairman. Is it correct that when this order was issued to 
discontinue the Hebrew language desk, Dr. Compton and Mr. Morton 
were both out of the country ; that you got in touch with them ; and 
that they ordered Mr. Harris' order countermanded ? 

Dr. Glazer. I did not, sir. It was done by my superiors, as I 
understand, by Mr. Puhan, in consultation with colleagues of the VOA 
staff. I was told this subsequently. 

The Chairman. Now, I understand Mr. Harris has given two rea- 
sons for the discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. One is budgetary, 
for budgetary reasons, to save the taxpayers' money. The other, not 
given today but given in executive session, was that the signal reach- 
ing the target area was weak. 

Did you send him a memorandum on that particular matter, or did 
Mr. Dooher ? 

Mr. DooHER. ]\Ir. Puhan sent him a memorandum, sir. 

The Chairman. And did that memorandum point out that neither 
of those arguments were valid ? 

Mr. Dooher. It did, sir. 

The Chairman. Tliat your contract obligations, the return of the 
people to their homes, who were under contract, would have consumed 
most of the saving that otherwise would have been accomplished? 

Mr. Dooher, I don't believe the budgetary matter was covered in 
the original memorandum, sir. I believe that was covered later on. 
However, I should like to point out that if I had been consulted on this 
matter, as Chief of the Near East, South Asian, and African desks, 
and if I had been ordered to make that $30,000 saving, I could have 
made that saving elsewhere, and I would have done it, because of the 
terribly crucial situation as regards the Soviet Union and Israel. I 
was not, however, consulted by the II A on that matter. 

The Chairman. Did you feel that if this order had been put into 
effect, we would have been performing a considerable service for the 
Communist cause? 

Mr. Dooher. I felt, sir, that the result of that order, if the Hebrew 
broadcasts had been ended, would have been an aid to the Communist 
cause. I think I called it a well struck blow for the Communist cause, 
in my Saturday testimony. 

The Chairman. In other words, you would call that a well struck 
blow for the Communist cause if your order had been put into effect? 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Going back to Mr. Harris, I understood you to say 
that we had been previously ordered to do this, or something to that 
effect, or it had been agreed upon. Did someone order you to take 
this action? 

Mr. Harris. I did not say, sir, I don't think, or I certainly didn't 
intend to say that we had ever been ordered to do it. I did say that 
it had been considered before and actually agreed to by the head- 
quarters of the Voice in New York on a previous date. 


The Chairman. By "the headquarters of the Voice," who do you 
mean ? 

Mr. Harris. I am talking about at that time. It would have been 
Mr. Kohler. 

The Chairman. Mr. Foy Kohler? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Foy Kohler, and Mr. Puhan. 

The Chairman. You say Mr. Puhan agreed with you to discontinue 
the Hebrew desk ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Puhan and Mr. Kohler submitted — ^I believe it was 
their own product — a list of particular services that they would feel 
should be cut if certain budgetary cuts had to take place. On that 
list, which I believe had 15 items on it, the Hebrew broadcast was one 
item. That whole order was considered, that whole list was con- 
sidered, at a meeting of the Program Allocations Board, which would 
have been in July 1952, and as a result of that meeting, after the 
results of the meeting were discussed with Dr. Compton, he sent a 
teletyped memorandum to the New York office of the Voice and in- 
cluded in that the statement that certain items — I must paraphrase; 
this is a classified document. But it merely said that IBS may safely 
undertake to put into effect 

The Chairman. A little louder, sir. 

Mr. Harris. IBS may safely undertake to put into effect Items 
1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the revised reductions recommended in 
Mr. Johnstone's memorandum to Mr. Harris of July 21. 

The Chairman. So that we may know what memorandum you are 
discussing, will you glance at this and tell me whether the paper I 
now hand you is the memorandum you refer to? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. I just want you to identify it as the memorandum. 

Mr. Harris. If I may compare these numbers, I can tell whether 
it is or not, I think. 

Yes, this would be. And may I read those items, or do you wish to 
do so? 

The Chairman. One, two, three, six, seven, and ten? Is that what 
you said ? 

Mr. Harris. One, two, three, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten. 

The Chairman. And you are referring now to an order from Dr. 
Compton ? 

Mr. Harris. That is an order from Dr. Compton to Mr. Kohler 
dated July 22. It is classified and can only be paraphrased in open 

The Chairman. Now, this memorandum lists the elimination of 
the Hebrew language service only next to reducing the Russian broad- 
cast. It is away down the list. No. 13 in priority. You now tell 
us that the order was to first follow recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 
9, and 10. None of those have to do with the Hebrew language desk. 
No. 1 is Russian, in the English language service, from 9 hours 
and 30 minutes to 5 hours and 45 minutes, eliminating 1 hour and 
15 minutes to Latin America, 1 hour and 15 minutes to Europe, 1 hour 
and 15 minutes to the Far East. That is No. 1 priority. 

No. 2 is reduction in the programing from Munich, from 10 hours 
to 1 hour and 45 minutes. And on down the line. It does not in- 
clude any elimination of the Hebrew desk, so that the order which you 


read to us Avould seem to agree with Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher that 
other action should be taken before you eliminated this Hebrew desk. 
And may I say also, from the date on this memorandum, that it ap- 
parently was prepared in July, and that was before the Communists 
became openly anti-Semitic, and even at that time you placed the 
elimination of the Hebrew service 13 down on the list by way of 

I am curious to know why you, or if not you someone else, agTeed 
that you should make elimination of the Hebrew language desk No. 1 
in priority at this particular time. 

Mr. Harris. I wish to preface my remark with one important 
thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that I have high respect for JNIr. 
Dooher and Dr. Glazer, here on my right. I think they are men who 
have great knowledge of that region of the world about which they 
are talking, and that they have great knowledge of radio as a medium. 

I must point out, however, that they do not normally have any 
relation to the overall program of even the international broadcast- 
ing service. 

The Chalrman. May I interrupt? One of the Senators has sug- 
gested an excellent question, and that is this : 

Mr. Puhan, will you stand up ? 

Did you agree at any time that the Hebrew desk should be dis- 
continued ? 

Mr. PuiTAN. In the early summer of 1952, when the International 
Broadcasting Service in New York, the Voice of America, was or- 
dered by the International Information Administration in Wash- 
ington to make certain reductions in progi'aming, I, under orders 
from my superior officer, prepared a list of 15 reductions which 
could be made at that time if they had to be made. I listed on this 
list, in 13th position, the Hebrew service, signifying that it meant 
that it was neither the most important nor the least important of the 
46 language services. I might add, however, that Mr. Kohler and 
I, and I believe Mr. Francis, the Comptroller, appeared in Washiiig- 
ton to argue against the reduction of these steps we were asked to list. 
We did agree, in the interest of equality and sacrifice, because of the 
fiscal reduction, to eliminate the English service as read by you, a 
portion of the English service, and a breakfast operation, because 
the breakfast operation did not hit the target area at a particularly 
useful time. We agreed to that. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? You said "eliminate the Eng- 
lish service." You mean reduce the English service? 

Mr. PuiiAN. Keduce. I am sorry. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: You may want to look at 
this document, which lists the 15 steps that could be taken. These 
are listed in the order of importance, and you give priority to the 
elimination of certain operations and put others down in the list. My 
question is : Does the position on the list have any significance ? 

Mr. Puhan. Yes, it does, sir. Because I stated in that particular 
memorandum that we started with the least significant in our opinion, 
the least significant service. 

The Chairman. So that before we get down to No. 14, for example, 
which has to do with the Russian broadcast, before you get down to 
14, you would feel that from 1 to 13 should be followed? 


Mr. PuHAN. That was my opinion. I felt that if I carried this list 
to the logical conclusion, the last service that I would have recom- 
mended for abandoning, or if the Voice of America were to be killed, 
of course, would be the Russian service. 

The Chairman. So you at no time ever agreed to the elimination 
of the Hebrew desk. Your only connection with this, I understand, 
was the preparation of this document, which we will mark "Exhibit 
No. 34," which places the elimination of the Hebrew desk down in 
13th position. Is that correct ? 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 34" and will 
be found in the appendix on p. 469.) 

Mr. PuHAN. That is correct. I think it is in 13th position. 

The Chairman. So that when Mr. Harris says that you agreed that 
the Hebrew desk should be eliminated, that is not correct ? 

Mr. PuHAN. Would you repeat your question, sir? 

The Chairman. I say : So when Mr. Harris says that you agreed 
that the Hebrew desk should be eliminated, that is not correct. 

Mr. Puhan. Well, when this was proposed, in December, I was, as 
reported here, the man who protested the order. 

The Chairiman. When the order came through, you were the man 
who protested. You were the man who contacted Dr. Compton and 
Mr. Morton and persuaded them to rescind the Acting Director's 
order ? 

Mr. Puhan. Mr. Francis and I were in charge of the Voice of 
America in New York at that time. My superior officer, Mr. Morton, 
was in Europe, and Dr. Compton was in Europe. I was under orders 
to eliminate the Hebrew service. I therefore, under orders, prepared 
to eliminate this service. But before doing so, I called my superior 
officer, Mr. Morton, in France, in Paris, and I told him of the order, 
and he asked me to stay the order until he would be back on Monday. 
I believe it was in the middle of the week, if I remember correctly. 
And he told me to hold off until he reported back. 

The Chairman. Counsel asks the question : What was your opinion 
of the attempt to close it down in December? 

I think that is very obvious from your previous answer, that you 
did everything to keep it from being closed down. 

Mr. Puhan. I believe I did, sir. Since I was under orders, I would 
have had to carry out the orders. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, will you tell us now who other than 
yourself decided upon the elimination of the Hebrew service at this 
particular time ? Were you under another's orders, or did you make 
this decision upon your own? 

Mr. Harris. I was under no orders whatsoever to close down the 
Hebrew desk. I sent the order. I think it was a proper order. 
I am prepared to defend it and bring out the facts on which I based 
my decision. 

The Chairman. Could I see that memorandum from which you 
were reading? 

Mr. Harris. I will say, sir, in submitting this to you, or showing 
this to you, that in that hasty gla^ice I gave to the paper you had, 
I apparently was wrong in the particular'one that I was referring to, 
because the. numbers are not jibing. You must have referred to Mr. 
Puhan's memorandum to us, Mr. Kohler's memorandum, rather than 
Dr. Johnstone's memorandum to me. 


Senator Symhstgton. Dr. Johnson? 

Mr. Haeris. Dr. Johnstone. Not the new Administrator, but the 
Deputy Administrator for Field Operations, sir. 

The Chairman. This gives you no authority to discontinue the 
Hebrew desk, does it? 

Mr. Harris, It was my understanding at that time that it did. 
It has nothing to do with the December situation, except as back- 

The Chairman. Well, will you point out to the committee just 
where in this order you lind any authority to discontinue the Hebrew 
desk? It specifically gives you authority to put into effect recom- 
mendation 1, which has to do with the English desk ; 2, which has to 
do with the program from Munich ; 3, which has to do with the elimina- 
tion of a breakfast program; 6 which has to do with the reduction 
of the French broadcast; 7, which has to do with the elimination of 
IBS programing from Washington; 8, which has to do with the re- 
duction of the Austrian language service, not elimination but reduc- 
tion : 9, which has to do with the reduction of Italian language service, 
and 10, which has to do with the reduction of the German language 

Now, if there is anything in here which gives you authority to 
discontinue the Hebrew desk, even at this early date, which was long 
before the Slanskj^ trials, long b.efore the Communists were becoming 
openly and publicly anti-Semitic — even then I would like to know if 
there is anything in there that gives you authority to discontinue the 
Hebrew desk. 

Mr. Harris. We were reading from a single item, and I have not 
had an opportunity adequately to compare the documents, but there 
are references here to item 4 and 5 also. 

The Chairman. We will give you this document also so that you 
may compare. I thought you were reading that as authority for 
discontinuing the Hebrew desk. 

Mr. Harris. I was reading this item, as having a, bearing on this 
discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. 

This is actually a summary of a meeting. This paper you are 
handing me is a summary of a meeting. This had to do with a meet- 
ing of Alfred Puhan and James Thompson, Edwin Macy, and others 
in New York City, and reference is made to a memorandum. I was 
assuming that the items listed in this summary of a conversation is 
the same as the thing talked about here but this is not the document 
that is referred to in my order. My order here — I call it my order ; 
I mean the order I am holding in my hand — was done by Dr. Compton. 
It refers specifically to Dr. Johnstone's memorandum to Mr. Harris 
on July 21, copy of which is being mailed to you tonight as it is stated 
in this thing. I would like permission to produce that memorandum, 
which Ido not have here at this minute. 

That memorandum included as one of the items on it, and I think 
you will find it is one of the items identified by number here, the 
reduction of the Hebrew service. 

Now, I say I take absolute responsibility for the decision made in 

The Chairman. Let us stop right there. Did you ever put into 
effect recommendations 1. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10? 


Mr. Harris. I think that all those recommendations were put into 
effect on a phased basis. 

The Chairman. On a phased basis? 

Mr. Harris. A phased basis, yes. That is, they didn't all go into 
effect at the same time, because the people in IBS discussed them 
f urtlier with us. 

The Chairman. Just a second and let us see if that is true. 

Mr. Puhan, may I ask you again : recommendation No. 1, reduction 
in English language service from 9 hours 30 minutes to 5 hours 40 
minutes. Eliminating 1 hour 15 minutes to Latin America, 1 hour 
15 minutes to Europe and 1 hour and 15 minutes to the Far East. Was 
that followed before Mr. Harris' order to discontinue the Hebrew 
desk ? 

Mr. Puhan. Yes ; it was, to the best of my recollection, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

No. 2, reduction in programing from Munich from 10 hours 30 
minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes. 

Mr. Puhan. This item as it is shown here, reduction in programing 
from Munich, from 10 hours and 30 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes, 
did not represent an actual reduction in programing. Munich was 
then doing 1 hour and 45 minutes, and the plans were at that time 
to go ahead, to raise it to 10 hours and 30 minutes. It was not carried 
out. The net effect of the order, as I remember it, was that we could 
not go ahead at that time to raise programing in Munich to the 
time that we had planned. 

The Chairman. So that in effect you did follow out recommendation 
No. 2. Is that correct ^ Except it was not a reduction. 

Mr. Puhan. Yes. There was no reduction in programing from 

The Chairman. There was no reduction, but we are only broadcast- 
ing 1 hour and 45 minutes now. 

Mr. Puhan. That is correct. 

The Chairman. No. 3, the elimination of this breakfast program. 

Mr. Puhan. That was done. It was eliminated. 

The Chairman. And No. 6, the reduction of the French language 
service from 1 hour to 30 minutes. 

Mr. Puhan. That was done. 

The Chairman. When was that done? 

Mr. Puhan. I think, sir, the date was September 7, but I am speak- 
ing from memory. 

The Chairman. I might say from the testimony we have had about 
the French desk so far, it could stand a further reduction or different 

No. 7, elimination of IBS programing from Washington? Was 
that done ? 

Mr. Puhan. No; that was not done. That is English operations. 

The Chairman. I see. And do you agree, Mr. Harris, that that was 
not done ? 

Mr. Harris. Yes; I agree that was not done. I say substantially 
these things were carried out. Some of them are still disputed by the 
IBS people. 

The Chairman. No. 7 was not done. 

How about No. 8, reduction of Austrian language service from the 
proposed 1 hour to 30 minutes? 


Mr. PuHAN. I believe, sir, that that was done. May I make one 
comment ? You will notice most of these steps were reduction in air 
time. They did not involve the elimination of an entire broadcasting 
service. If my memory serves me correctly, that was done. 

The Chairman. And No. 9 ? 

Mr. PuHAN. I believe so. 

The Chairman. And No. 10? 

Mr. PuHAN. Was reduced, but I don't believe to 1 hour ; I think to 
1 hour and 15 minutes, if I am not mistaken. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, No. 12 was listed before the elimination 
of the Hebrew desk ; the elimination of the Portuguese service. Has 
that been eliminated ? 

Mr. PuiiAN. No, sir ; it has not. 

The Chairman. It was your recommendation, the recommendation 
of your board, that that be eliminated before the Hebrew language 
desk be eliminated. Is that right? 

Mr. Puhan. I have it in 13th position on my paper, and Hebrew 
was in 14th position. You see, in both cases, sir, in the Portugese and 
Hebrew, it would have meant that we would not have been broad- 
casting in Portuguese to Portugal, and we would not have been broad- 
casting in Hebrew to Israel. 

The Chairman. My question is: Your recommendation was that 
you eliminate the Portuguese language desk before you eliminated 
the Hebrew language desk ? 

Mr. Puhan. Yes. 

The Chairman. Was that done f 

Mr. Puhan. No ; it was not done. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, you have heard Mr. Puhan's state- 
ment that he never agreed with you upon the elimination of the 
Hebrew desk. I understood you to say that he had so agreed. Both 
of you are under oath. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, he testified that he did not agi-ee to the 
December order. Wlien that question was asked a minute ago, he said 
that he did not agree to the December order. If I understood Mr. 
Puhan correctly, he did not say that he had not agreed that one of the 
steps to be taken, if we made budget cuts, back in July, should be the 
elimination of the Hebrew desk. Because that is on record. And I am 
sure he didn't intend to convey that impression. 

Tlie Chairman. Let's get this clear. I believe Mr. Puhan's testi- 
mony is that he put the elimination of the Hebrew language desk down 
in 14th position, that you raised that position and decided it should 
be done in December. 

Mr. Harris. I personally did not raise it to first position. 

The Chairman. Wlio did, then ? 

Mr. Harris. That was done by a number of people. It was done on 
the recommendation of competent regional experts, consulted by the 
Office of Field Operations of our area. 

The Chairman. Give us the names of those field experts. 

Mr. Harris. That information was collected for me by the Deputy 
Administrator for Field Operations, Dr. Johnstone, who in turn con- 
sulted his chief at that time of Near East Operations, who would 
have been — now, I don't have knowledge of which one was on duty 
that day — would have been Mr. Fisk or Mr. Clark. 

29708— 53— pt. 6 3 


The Chairman. Did yon ever discuss this with the head of the 
Hebrew language desk or with Mr. Dooher, who is head of the Near 
East, Asia, and African desks ? 

Mr. Harris. He is head of that for the Voice of America only, the 
radio arm, out of an information program which has five major arms. 

The Chairman. My question was: Did you ever discuss it with 
either of those men ? 

Mr. Harris. I did not. It would not be up to me to do so. 

The Chairman. And you say Dr. Johnstone discussed this with 
certain experts. 

Mr. Harris. He made the usual checks with the regional experts 
in the Department, including his own regional experts. 

The Chairman. And then he made certain recommendations to 

Mr. Harris. Recommendations to the Program Allocations Board, 
of whom I am a member. 

The Chairman. And who made the final decision ? 

Mr. Harris. The final decision in July was made by Dr. Compton. 

The Chairman. Who made the final decision? Now, you are 
talking about the decision in July, at the time it was put 14th on the 
list. You know what I am talking about? The question is: Who 
made the decision to take it out of that 14th position and cancel out 
the Hebrew desk at the time of the Slansky trials ? AVlio made that 
decision ? 

Mr. Harris. Now you have changed it again to December. Is that 
right, sir? 

I have said already that I am responsible for that order in De- 
cember, and I have said I have got good justification for it. I have 
said that the implication that it had any effect whatsoever on our 
fight against international communism is just not true. And I am 
prepared to defend tlie position we took before the taxpayers of the 
United States for whom we were working in order to save money 
and make sure that we had an effective fight worldwide against in- 
ternational communism. 

The Chairman. All right. Now, the PAB, the Program Alloca- 
tions Board, gave you this document. 

Mr. Harris. In July, sir. 

The Chairman. Putting the Hebrew desk in 14th place. Is that 
right, sir ? 

Mr. Harris. In July, sir. 

The Chairman. In July. Later, when the Communists became 
openly anti-Semitic, you say you were the man who decided to dis- 
continue the Hebrew desk. I would like to know why you did not 
eliminate the items recommended by the PAB before the elimination 
of the Hebrew desk. IVliy did you not follow their recommendation ? 

Mr. Harris. On analysis, that is a somewhat twisted thing. The 
position, No. 14 or 13, that you are talking about, was a recommenda- 
tion of the International Broadcasting Service. The Program Allo- 
cations Board never put that in 13th position at any time, in any of 
its discussions. It received a memorandum from the Voice of 
America people suggesting that Hebrew item No. 13 on that list in 
July. On examining it, with regional study in the Department, 
and overall consideration of the entire program worldwide, it was 


deterniiiied to move that into a different position on the list. And 
given an opportunity, I can show you the pertinent documents which 
moved it to a different position on the list, in July— Now, I am not 
talking about December. It was one of the items that Dr. Compton 
intended to be carried out during that time. 

The Chaikman. Do you recall that you testified in regards to this 
in executive session, and is it correct that you told us then that it 
was the decision of the PAB and not your decision to eliminate the 
Hebrew desk? 

Mr, Harris. If you are being technical about how the PAB works, 
it makes a recommendation to the Administrator, who actually makes 
the decision. What he does is simply sign the document that PAB 
lias prepared. PAB did prepare the order that was developed, which 
included Hebrew as one of the things to be eliminated, in July. It 
was signed by Dr. Compton. Therefore the decision, technically, is 
made by Dr." Compton. If I said that the PAB made it, I was in 
effect slurring over a step of procedure. 

The Chairman. Now, when you slurred over the step of procedure, 

you were telling the Senators that you did not make the decision 

Mr. Harris. I certainly would. 

The Chairman. To eliminate the Hebrew desk; that it was done 
by a Board. Is that your testimony now that that was incorrect, 
that the Board did not make tlie decision; that you, Reed Harris, 
made the decision ? 

You see, it is rather important that we know. When you tell us 
one thing one day, we would like to know whether your story is the 
same the next day. 

Mr. Harris. I object to the implication, sir. I have not, at any 
time, attempted to conceal any truth from this group. 

The Chairman. Did you tell us in executive session that it was 
not your decision but the decision of the PAB to eliminate the Hebrew 

Mr. Harris. I probably did use the word, since you say I did, on 
tlie matter of the Board making the decision. The Board wrote 
the decision, which was signed by Dr. Compton, so that technically, 
Dr. Compton was the decision maker at that time. Now, if you 
jump over to December, sir, Avhen I was in charge, I repeated that 
decision, and I issued the necessary order, and I will take full respon- 
sibility. And even disregarding the facts that have been in support 
of my position up to now, I am perfectly willing right now, here and 
now,'to justify that decision on Hebrew at that time, December 5. 

The Chairman. All right. Now, you say Dr. Compton signed the 
order. That is not correct, is it? Dr. Compton was in Europe. Dr. 
Compton countermanded your order. 

Mr. Harris. This is July, sir. I testified that Dr. Compton signed 
it in July. I testified I signed it in December. Now, why is that 
kind of a question being asked of me? 

Tlie Chairman. Well, because we are trying to get the truth from 
you, Mr. Harris. Now, do you say that the same kind of order was 
signed in December? 

Senator Symington. Would the chairman yield ? 
The Chairman. I would like to get this answer, if you will just 
give me 1 minute. 


Did Dr. Compton sign the type of order in July that you signed in 
December ? 

Mr. Harris. He signed an overall order that included the elimina- 
tion of the Hebrew language as one of the items. I signed a specific 
order to carry out a piece of that intention in December. But I am 
not trying to go back to Dr. Compton as far as taking responsibility. 

I am saying right here, Mr. Chairman : I am taking responsibility 
for that Hebrew decision, and I will defend it right here and now. 
1 have got the facts, and I will be glad to. 

The Chairman. Let us have it clear what Dr. Compton signed in 
July. He signed an order putting the elimination of the Hebrew 
language desk down to No. 13 in tlie list. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, he did not sign such an order. That 
is simply the material that was submitted to us by the International 
Broadcasting Service. 

The Chairman. Then what priority did Dr. Compton give for the 
elimination of the Hebrew language desk ? 

Mr. Harris. I shall have to look it up. I don't have that document 
here. It is probably well upon the list. I think it was item 3, 4, or 5, 
somewhere along in there. 

The Chairman. Do you know ? 

Mr, Harris. I think it was item 4, if I remember correctly, but I 
will have to look it up. 

The Chairman. Senator Symington, you have a question? 

Senator Symington. Yes ; I have a couple of questions. 

Mr. Harris, in July 1952, when they were considering cutting the 
budget, as I understand it, one of the places that they agreed to cut 
was the Hebrew broadcasting. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Symington. And you saj^ now that that was about No. 4 
on the list ? 

Mr. Harris, That is my recollection at this moment of the position 
on the priority list as agreed to by the Board. 

Senator Symington. Right. Now, the Board that discussed this 
matter : was that an advisory board to Dr. Compton or did Dr. Comp- 
ton have a decision with respect to that Board ? 

Mr, Harris. He sits as the Chairman of the Board, and therefore 
the Board, which is sort of advising him as he sits there, may go 
through the motions of really collaborating in his decision. But I 
think if you were being absolutely technical about it, the Board is 
advisory, and he is the decision maker. 

Senator Symington. In other words, as Chairman, he neverthe- 
less can make the decision by agreeing with the Board or overrulinsr 
the Board? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, sir. Yes, that can be done. 

Senator Symington. And what he did then, as I understand it, 
was that he accepted from this Board, which was in effect an ad- 
visory board, a recommendation that included the Hebrew desk 
elimination, as a possibility for cutting the budget. Is that correct? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Symington. And that was in July. Correct? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct. 


Senator Symington. In December, you decided on your own, based 
on recommendations that you say you obtained from the field, that 
it would be well to cut out the Hebrew desk ? Is that right ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Symington. Now, one other question. When you did that, 
did you not think about the fact that it might be misinterpreted be- 
cause of recent Slansky troubles and so forth ? Was that discussed 
by you with the people involved ? 

Mr. Harris. Senator, I must admit that specific point was not dis- 
cussed. But it seemed to me transparently obvious that if the Soviet 
Union and its satellites were attacking Semitic people everywhere, 
obviously all the people of Israel would become anti-Communist just 
like that. They would hardly need any more of our needling to gain 
that position. And there is plenty of evidence that they did so be- 
come. The local radio over there, their own radio, started to have 
anti-Communist material in the way they had never had it in the past. 
Some of their officials put out statements that were strictly and 
strongly anti-Communist, which they hadn't done before. I have here, 
for instance, a clipping from the New York Times, which was put 
out — this is January 20. And this simply illustrates the kind of 
thing that was going on, and is going on. 

"Government action against Communists and fellow travelers sup- 
porting the Soviet anti-Jewish campaign was threatened in the 
Parliament tonight by Foreign Minister Mosh Sherritt." And they 
go on to talk about 

Senator Symington. Could I interrupt you to ask one more ques- 
tion? You bring up now a new point, which I have frankly never 
heard before and have never seen before, and that is that you felt that 
canceling the Hebrew desk was justified in effect because the entire 
Semitic world had become anti-Communist due to the Slansky trial. 
Is that what you are saying ? 

Mr. Harris. I am saying that it went through my mind at the time. 
I was operating actually on clearances from the regional desk in the 
Department, and so on, I do not trust myself to have enough regional 
knowledge to make a decision of that kind. Senator. But since you 
asked whether it went through my head — it did go through my head, 
and I assumed that part. That seems just transparently obvious, and 
it has been borne out by events. 

Senator, will you forgive me if I go on just a little longer. 

At the same time we were stepping up worldwide exploitation of 
that theme — that anti-Semitism of the Soviet people was a threat to 
all the principles that we hold dear. And we were saying that to 
every country. We were saying it in all the languages. And we 
were saying it in languages that were reaching Israel. 

Furtliermore, the information about this anti-Semitic campaign was 
reaching Israel in a very full measure through the regular news serv- 
ices. They have regular, I believe, both AP and UP service in there. 
They have our own service, that is, the International Press Service of 
the IIA, and so on. 

The Chairman. Dr. Glazer wanted to comment, but first. Senator 
McClellan has a question. 

Senator McClellan. I just want to ask you one question. Did it 
occur to you that the fact that you were suspending this desk and this 


service might be indicative of the general attitude of the Voice of 
America and our Government that when some people, some minority, 
some race is attacked, as was being done by Russia then against the 
Hebrew people, it was the policy of our Government when that hap- 
pened to discontinue the Voice in the area where the people were most 
affected by such action ? In other words, it looked like we were run- 
ning from the issue. Instead of standing up and fighting against it, 
we close down the desk. What kind of an impression does that give 
to the world? 

Mr. Harris. If it were interpreted that way, it would be bad. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I am not saying that it was interpreted 
that way, but I can very well see that you could indulge that assump- 
tion just as well as the assumption that went through your mind, and 
that you indulged, that, oh, well, they are going to react unfavorably 
over there anyway. There is no use in continuing the service. I think 
there is just as much ground and logic in assuming that that is the 
very time when you should step it up and give the information to the 

Mr. Harris. Well, if the information would get to the world 
through this Hebrew broadcast, sir. But the information we have on 
the effectiveness of that program, that is, the number of listeners, and 
so forth 

Senator McClellan. I understand you then. You contend that 
the effectiveness of that broadcast was- such, or that particular service, 
that you did not feel it was justified to any longer continue the service ? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Irrespective of whether these atrocities had 
happened or not? 

Mr. Harris. I didn't feel that the use of the Hebrew language to 
Israel was effective. Because our reports showed otherwise. I will 
be able to produce those as we go on here. 

Senator McClellan. Well, may I ask you this : Do you think that 
the service would have been discontinued and that service closed ir- 
respective of these other events that transpired ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly do. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. And it was your intention to discontinue it 

Mr. Harris. It certainly was, as we show by the fact that we were 
considering it back in July. And there is earlier consideration given 
to that thing. 

Senator McClellan. That was a consideration back in July as to 
probable economies that might be effected? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir. That is the purpose of this. It is economy. 
We do not have as much money as we would need to operate every- 
thing that we have had in mind. 

Senator McClellan. Now, following these conditions that devel- 
oped in connection with the persecution of the Jews, what other desk 
did you discontinue at the same time you discontinued the HebreAv 
desk in order to effect some economy? 

Mr. Harris. The only other economy being made at that time in 
the Voice, ordered at the same period, was to make a change in the 
program booklet that they had, their program schedule they distribute 
all over the world. 

Senator McClellan. "NAliat do you mean by "their" ? 


Mr. Harris. I mean the Voice of America has a booklet, a program 
booklet that they are sending around the world. 

The only reason that this thing turned up in December, as it did, 
in spite of the nasty implications that have been cast around so freely, 
was that we did not feel, in a domestic sense, that it was wise to cut 
out the Hebrew desk during the period before our own national elec- 
tions, back there in July, August, September, and so forth, because 
both sides, both the Republicans and Democrats, in the election, might 
have misinterpreted either way. They might have said we were help- 
ing the election or harming the election on one side or the other, and 
we felt that we didn't want to get into that kind of domestic 

Senator McClellan. May I ask you this: These events that pre- 
ceded the closing of this desk, or the order to close it: w^ere they 
exploited and taken full advantage of in all of the other broadcasts 
and all the other services to all peoples of the world ? 

Mr. Harris. That is what our policy directives called for. I have 
not individually checked scripts, but I am quite confident that it was 
played very, very strongly. 

Senator McClellan. It does seem that it afforded a marvelous op- 
portunity and gave us something with which we could refute their 
contention that they were protectors of minorities and so forth. It 
certainly gave us an opportunity to do a great service. 

Mr. Harris. We have exploited it all over the world, sir, strongly, 
firmly, and we will continue to do so. We have not in any w^ay pre- 
tended to support this fiendish anti-Semitism of the Soviet Govern- 
ment, believe me. Any implication of that is just plain dirty pool. 

The Chairman. You have referred to your policy directives, Mr. 
Harris. You are ordered to produce No. 228, dated January 4, 1954, 
and 239, dated February 2, 1953. You are also ordered to produce 
the list that you said was signed by Dr. Compton, which placed the 
elimination of the Hebrew desk, I believe you said, third or fourth 
on that list. That will be produced at 1 : 30 this afternoon. And 
the staff will order Mr. Johnstone to be present at 1 : 30 this afternoon. 
And, so that there can be no question about this, your testimony now 
is that Mr. Johnstone advised you to discontinue the Hebrew desk at 
the time it was discontinued ? 

Mr. Harris. He w^as among the members who did. He gave the 
regional advice. We have a policy adviser on there, Mr. Bradley 

The Chairman. Now, we are not talking about July. We are talk- 
ing about December, when you ordered the Hebrew desk discontinued. 

Mr. Harris. I see. 

The Chairman. Did this man Johnstone advise you to take that 
action ? 

Mr. Harris. We took the usual checks 

The Chairman. Did Dr. Johnstone advise you to take that action? 
I understood you to say that he had. 

Mr. Harris. If you mean did he in some voluntary manner come 
forward and say "Please be sure they discontinue the Hebrew desk," 
that is not the case. 

The Chairman. That is not the case ? 


Mr. Harris. I will tell you exactly what did happen : simply that 
we had an understanding here that the Hebrew desk would be discon- 
tinued immediately after the domestic elections. 

The Chairman. All right. . ,^^ , . ^ 

Mr. Harris. We had that understanding m Washington. Dr. 
Compton had the understanding. Bradley Connors had the under- 
standing. Mr. Johnstone had the understanding. Mr. Gedalecia had 
the understanding— that that would be done immediately after the 
national elections. It was not done by the Voice. 

The Chairman. Wliat did the national elections have to do with 
discontinuance of the Hebrew desk? 

Mr. Harris. I have explained very carefully what it had to do. 
Simply as a Federal agency, of the Federal Government, we are not 
supposed to take steps that will encourage or discourage the fortunes 
of either of the national parties in a major election. And it was felt 
that if we discontinued Hebrew at that time some domestic organiza- 
tion with a desire to stir up some sort of fuss would use that event 
either pro or con for either of the parties. It was not clear how it 
might be used. But the subject of Semitism and anti-Semitism is 
also an explosive issue, as everyone in this room well knows, and we did 
hold off the implementation of an agreed position because of that. 
When December rolled around, we found that the Voice had not gone 
ahead with that pattern ; in our routine checks of what economies had 
been established they hadn't. We found the situation was getting 
worse. We had an additional cut in our budget in terms of being 
required to transfer additional money to the main part of the State 
Department for services. We therefore had to urge that these steps 
be implemented immediately. And that is what that order was. 

The Chairman. Let us get down to the time when the original 
decision was made then to discontinue the Hebrew desk; you say, 
"immediately after election." Did you ever tell the head of the 
Hebrew desk. Dr. Glazer, that he was to discontinue.the Hebrew desk 
as soon as the elections were over? 

Mr. Harris. I did not. I had no contact with Mr. Dooher or Dr. 

The Chairman. Do you know that anyone ever sent an order to 
them saying to discontinue? 

Mr. Harris. I do not. I do not know whether those gentlemen got 
a direct order or not. I know that the head of the Voice must have 
understood it. I can't understand that he didn't. 

The Chairman. All right. Tell us: Did you have conversation 
with Dr. Compton and did you and Compton agree that the Voice 
should be discontinued once the elections were over ? 

Mr. Harris. That was justified actually in this same PAB meeting, 
going back some time. 

The Chairman. And was a decision made at this PAB meeting 
that you would discontinue the Hebrew desk after the elections? 

Mr. Harris. In one of the PAB meetings, that decision was made ; 

The Chairman. That decision was made. 

Mr. Harris. That position was taken ; since we are saying that the 
PAB does not make the final decisions, it probably is incorrect to say 
they made the decision. 


The Chairman. You say the PAB met and they talked about the 
Hebrew-language desk, and they decided it should be discontinued 
after the elections were over? 

Mr. Harris. That is right. 

The Chairman. Do you know when that meeting was held? 

Mr. Harris. I am trying to determine that now, sir. I guess it 
would have been October 1952, October 21. 

The Chairman. October 21, 1952. Then you want this committee 
to understand that the Voice felt that the Hebrew desk should be dis- 
continued ; that for political reasons you continued to spend the money 
until after the election. Obviously, of course, the discontinuance of 
the Voice could not have adversely affected Eisenhower's vote. The 
only vote it could have adversely affected would have been Stevenson's. 
1 hate to think that the Voice was spending money which they felt 
sliould not be spent merely to affect an election in this country. I 
thought it was to fight communism in other countries. 

Mr. Harris. There is no question here of affecting one side or the 
other. The subject of anti-Semitism is open to misinterpretation on 
both sides of the House, and always has been. It was impossible to 
assess at all what that situation might be. And that subject was dis- 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Harris, you did not think the Voice voters 
would accuse Eisenhower of having discontinued the Hebrew desk, 
do you ? 

You knew if there was any accusation to be made against the men 
in i)ower. So that your testimony is that you continued that desk 
for fear you might adversely affect Stevenson's campaign. 

Mr. Harris. That is not my testimony, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, is there anyone here from the PAB ? 

Mr. Francis? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Francis sat in at least one of these meetings. 

The Chairman. Mr. Francis, I am going to ask you to come for- 
ward, if you will. 

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Francis ? 

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly 
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Francis. I do. 

The Chairman. What is your first name, Mr. Francis? 


Mr. Francis. Robert J. Francis. 

The Chairman. Robert J. Francis. And your position is what 
on the Voice? 

Mr. Francis. I am the Controller. 

The Chairman. You are Controller of the Voice, and you are a 
member of PAB. Right? 

Mr. Francis. I am not a member of the PAB. 

The Chairman. You are not a member. Did you sit in on meet- 
ings with the PAB ? 

Mr. Francis. I have sat in on 3 or 4 meetings of the PAB. 

29708— 53— pt. 6- 


The Chairman. Can you tell us whether or not the PAB made 
this decision to discontinue the Hebrew desk after the elections? 

Mr. Francis. To the best of my recollection, there was a discus- 
sion at a PAB meeting in July, which I attended with Alfred Puhan 
and Foy Kohler. At that time, the recommendation had been made 
by Dr. Johnstone's office to change the priority of the Hebrew service 
from the listing we had given it, No. 13, I believe, or No. 14, up to 
position No. 3. 

We objected to that recommendation in the meeting, took a very 
strong position on it. Mr. Kohler led that discussion on behalf of 
the Voice. He was not a member of the PAB either. We were simply 
invited to discuss it with the PAB. 

The Chairman. You said that he led the discussion on behalf of 
the Voice. Did he object to moving this from position No. 13 to po- 
sition No. 3, or did he agree it should be moved ? 

Mr. Francis. He objected, very strongly. 

Thereafter, we were given a memorandum. I believe it was trans- 
mitted on July 22, if my memory serves me, and I have checked my 
files on this. A memorandum came by teletype to the Voice of Amer- 
ica. And the wording of it we considered to be quite important. 
The wording went something like this : "The Voice may safely take 
certain stej)s." We did not consider that an order. One of those 
steps recommended was the elimination of the Hebrew service. 

The Chairman. Where was that on the list? Was that No. 3? 

Mr. Francis. I believe it was No. 3 at that time. The list had then 
changed. Our priorities had been rearranged by the PAB. 

The Chairman. This order, of course, was before the Communists 
became openly anti-Semitic? 

Mr. Francis. That is correct. 

At that time, we did not accept that as an instruction, and Mr. Koh- 
ler went to see Dr. Compton. I do not know what he said there, 
but when he returned to New York, he told us that the decision had 
been killed, that the Hebrew service was not to be discontinued, and 
that no order had been issued. 

Subsequently, we prepared another appeal, giving our suggestions 
as to what could be done. We presented that to Dr. Compton. Mr. 
Kohler sent it to him. 

Then there was another meeting of the PAB in August, I believe 
August 15, and certain discussions took place. All I know is what 
resulted from it. In the meeting in August, a decision definitely was 
made not to suspend the Hebrew service. 

The Chairman. That was a meeting of the PAB ? 

Mr. Francis. That is correct. The discussion was, I believe, that 
this is an item that we had protested, and so on, and they felt it should 
receive further study. 

The Chairman. And as far as you know, the PAB never made any 
decision to discontinue the Hebrew language desk after the elections ? 

Mr. Francis. That I can't say, sir. I do not know. 

The Chairman. Do you recall that in these discussions of the PAB, 
there was any mention of the effect of your operations upon the elec- 
tions? In other words, was that part of the governing force, the 
effect of any action you might take upon the elections ? 

Mr. Francis. If there was such a discussion, sir, it did not play an 
important part in the discussion at all. 


The Chairman. Let me ask you this : Would you consider it entirely 
improper to guide the actions of the Voice on the basis of how it might 
affect an election in this country ? 

Mr. Francis. Absolutely. It would be incorrect to do that. And 
we have never, in the Voice of America — the position all of us have 
is that we are completely impartial with respect to politics. We 
must be. 

The Chairman. Then you feel it would be an improper use of the 
taxpayers' money to guide your activities by the effect that it might 
have on any election m this country ? 

Mr. Francis. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Dr. Glazer was about to make a comment about 
half an hour ago when I stopped him for one of the Senators, on the 
statement by Mr. Harris that when you had this counterpropaganda 
weapon it was umiecessary for the Voice to use it, that the people of 
Israel would hear it anyway. You raised your hand at that time, 

Dr. Glazer. Yes; I was quite delighted by Senator McClellan's 
comment. Senator McClellan anticipated the very point I was going 
to make in answer to the argument that just at this time, when Israel 
was already amply supplied with news and comment, we could safely 
disregard it. I thought, as the Senator evidently did too, that it 
would have exactly the opposite effect. It seems to me that if we were 
the citizens of a small country, surrounded by essentially unfriendly 
nations, and then a major power located not too far away committed 
an act that we thought threatened our very existence, wouldn't it be our 
first impulse to try to fijid out what our great f riencl, the one wdio had 
helped us so much, who was the enemy of our enemy — wouldn't we like 
to find out what he was thinking about and how he was reacting to 
that event ? Would we then feel pleased and flattered to know that 
presumabl}^ at this moment, for the sake of the saving of a few dollars, 
this friend decided he no longer desired to communicate with us every 
day by radio, had been so encouraged as to think that we were "in the 
pocket" and could safely be taken for granted ? Or was it more likely 
that we would be distressed and discouraged into feeling neutralist, 
with the beginning of a-plague-on-your-house thought creeping into 
our minds ? 

More than that, it seems to me this development would have been 
inimical to our interests, in that it would have encouraged the almost 
completely crushed Communists and leftwingers in Israel, crushed 
by the Prague trial, and the like. They had to lay low. And just at 
this time, we would encourage them to rise up and say : "See, we told 
you. America doesn't care for you at all." And thereby give a new 
impetus toward trying to find an accommodation with the Soviet 
Union. After all, we mustn't forget that the Soviet Union supported 
the idea of partition and the State of Israel for purely cynical rea- 
sons, in anticipation of favors to be derived, and when it became 
clear to them that these favors were not to be had, they abandoned this 
State completely. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, I just wondered if this im- 
pression might not have been gained from the discontinuance of the 
service, that America was in effect abandoning Israel to whatever 
fate might befall it. 


Dr. Glazer. It certainly would. 

Senator McClellan. I am askino; for information, I am not trying 
to be critical of what was done. I am trying to ascertain what the 
truth is and what the possible effects might have been. 

Dr. Glazer. I am positive that this might have had precisely 
that effect. It seemed to us also that the other great objective of our 
broadcasts was completely overlooked, namely, an attempt to lead to 
an achievement of peace between Israel and the Arab neighbors. How 
by any stretch of the imagination could we hope to advance this cause 
by suddenly deciding that we were no longer going to talk to one of 
the two sides involved; what would the other side have thought at 
this moment ? 

Senator McClellan. What was the reaction that you got from 
over there when this reaction went out? Or what request or what 
suggestions did you get from Israel with respect to how you should 
handle this or take advantage of this weapon that had been given to 

Dr. Glazer. Well, I 

Senator McClellan. I do not know that there was anything, but I 
just wonder what you sensed the reaction was over there? 

Dr. Glazer. Well, the spectacular nature of the opportunity given 
to us was seen independently by our mission overseas, when, for the 
first time since we inaugurated our broadcasts, they sent us a specific 
directive on a purely counterpropaganda theme. We had gotten many 
from them before, but this was the first on propaganda. 

May I just read a line here ? 

Senator McClellan. That I understand is from your own repre- 
sentatives over there, the representatives of the Voice of America? 

Dr. Glazer. No, no. From the American Embassy. From the 
American Embassy in Tel-Aviv. And I will just give the idea of it, 
because it is a classified document. 

The Embassy felt very strongly that radio should go all out in an 
effort to exploit this opportunity, and they listed a few specific sug- 
gestions, which we carried out within 24 hours. 

Senator Jackson. You mean in Hebrew ? 

Dr. Glazer. In Hebrew. They specifically referred to Hebrew. 

Senator McClellan. Now, did j^ou get any suggestions or any 
reaction, from the people of the State of Israel ? 

Dr. Glazer. Yes, we did. 

Senator McClellan. I mean people not associated with you, not 
interested in the program, or not representatives from our Govern- 
ment. I am trying to get what the reaction was. 

Dr. Glazer. Exactly. Within a few weeks we got a considerable 
number of letters that indicated that this news and our handling of it 
had achieved a considerable impact. I read portions of those letters 
into the record Saturday, and I shall refrain from doing it again 

Senator McClellan. I think Dr. Harris should be given a chance 
now to comment on that. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan, some of the Senators are going 
down to a luncheon with the Democrats, some of the Democrats, I 
understand also, and they have asked that we adjourn now and re- 
convene at 2 : 30. So we will do that. 


In the meantime, a question arose last night as to the clearance of 
the two individuals that Dr. Harris said had been cleai;^ed. I got in 
touch with the new Security and Personnel Officer in the State Depart- 
ment, Mr. McLeod, in whom I have the utmost confidence, and asked 
him if they could check the files and let us know whether those two in- 
dividuals have been cleared or not. 

We have received a memorandum from him, in which he states that 
it is difficult to be helpful to the committee at this time because much 
of the material in the files is outside of Washington ; that he would 
want to i-eview all of the files before he gave us any definite answer. 
He says that from what he has, it appears that there is a question of 
the suitability of one of the individuals. On the other one, he wants to 
make no comment until he can get the files from New York. He has 
indicated that he would be glad to go into the matter in detail with the 
•committee in executive session when he has a chance to study the files. 
And he ends by saying that he wants to cooperate to the fullest possible 
extent with this committee. 

I am satisfied he does. I think it would be impossible for him to 
give us the information we want until he has seen all of the files. When 
that is done. I will make airangements to have a meeting of the com- 
mittee and Mr. McLeod, if that is agreeable. 

Senator McClellax. What did we do with the witnesses that were 
on the stand yesterday pnd Me ordered to come back this morning? 

The Chairman. Well, in view of the fact that even Mr. McLeod 
cannot determine whether there was clearance or not, says that the files 
show there was a question of the suitability in one, and the other lie 
does not want to make any comment on, I am afraid his subordinates 
Avould not be in a position to give us more information than he can. 

I would like to have the security officer have the opportunity to have 
a complete review of the files. The witnesses who were ordered back, 
if the}' are in the room, are notified that they are considered under 
subpena to be called at such time as they are notified to be present by 
the staff. • 

Senator INIcClellan. In other words, the whole question or issue of 
the clearance of the two parties is being deferred until tlie new security 
officer has an opportunity to determine from the records what action 
has been taken, and will report to this committee ? 

The Chairmax. Yes; and he savs from the files thev have in Wash- 

• • • . • •■ *■' 

ington, it is impossible to give us a complete answer. 

You gentlemen will return at 2 : 30 this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., a recess was taken until 2: 30 p. m., 
this same da3\) 


(The hearings resumed at 2 : 30 p.m.) 

The CiiAiRMAx. The committee will come to order. 

I believe we should hear Mr. Thompson. He was accused yesterday 
b}' one of the witnesses as having given us false information, a rather 
serious charge and accusation that he gave false information under 
oath. I may say that from the staff's investigation they feel that Mr. 
Thompson was extremely accurate in his information, and he will be 
permitted to go on the stand and deny the charge made against him 

Mr. Thompson, would you take the stand ? You have been sworn 



Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Thompson, yesterday Reed Harris accused 
you of having unfairly stated that either Mr. Schechter or Mr. Kaghan 
had received security clearance. He made the further statement that 
there had been no attempt to bring either one of them over to the Voice. 

In view of the fact that you were accused of having given false 
information under oath, which is a very serious accusation, we felt 
that you should be entitled to answer that. 

I may say that my staff tells me that they are firmly convinced 
from their investigation that you gave them the accurate information 
and what you said was completely true, but that you might want to 
add somethinor to it. 

First, do you know for a fact that the International Information 
Program did attempt to arrange to have both Mr. Kaghan and Mr. 
Schechter come with the New York Voice ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

The Chairman. How do you know ? 

Mr. Thompson. Because I placed Mr. Kaghan's name in process in 
the spring of 1949 myself, and in late 1951 I placed Mr. Schechter's 
name in process. I did it myself. 

The Chairman. So that you personally put their names in. Did 
you know that they filed a form 57 as an application? 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Schechter filed a form 57. Mr, Kaghan did 
not. His name came to me — I don't at the moment know how his name 
came to me — ^but as a man qualified in the news field and at that time 
we had many operations in the newsroom and we were looking for 
people with his experience, so he was put in. As a matter of fact, when 
I was in Germany in October 1951, he asked me how his application 
was coming. 

The Chairman. So that any statement that the files failed to show 
that both Kaghan and Schechter were prospective employees of the 
Voice would be a false statement ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Thompson. I would say, sir, if the files are complete they will 
show it. 

The Chairman. May I say that we have asked the new security offi- 
cer, Mr. McLeod, to go through the files and give us the information 
on whether or not Schechter and Kaghan received clearance under 
Public Law 402. Mr. McLeod, the security officer, has informed us 
that the files in Washington are in such shape that it is impossible for 
him to give us a definite answer. He said that he will have to get the 
files from other places, New York, et cetera. He does state, "It appears 
that the question of suitability was raised with respect to one of the 
individuals." This is from the files in Washington, without getting 
the New York files. He has told us he will come before the com- 
mittee when he has gone through the files. Do you care to give at 
this time any information in addition to what you gave us in New 
York with regard to the question of security ? 

Mr. Thompson. No, sir; I do not. 

The Chairman. In other words, you are satisfied to let Mr. McLeod's 
study of the file completely uphold you ? 

Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. 


The Chairjnian. Mr. Piilian, you have in your possession, I under- 
stand, the rejection slip on Schechter, but you feel in view of the fact 
that Mr. jVIcLeod is studying this matter, and in view of the various 
secrecy orders, that you would rather not produce that at this time? 

Mr. PuHAN. Senator, I have the utmost confidence in Mr. McLeod's 

The Chairman. In that case you will not be asked to produce that 
rejection slip today. 

Mr. PuHAN. Thank you. 

The Chairman. I wish you would make sure that there is a copy 
of it in the files so that when Mr. McLeod studies the files, the rejection 
slip will be in there. 

Mr. PuHAN. I will turn my file over to Mr. McLeod. 

The Chairman. I do not believe we will need either of you gentle- 
men any further. If you care to, the staff will be glad to arrange 
plane transportation back to New York. I understand you want to go 
back this afternoon. 

Mr. Thompson. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan, I have just been handed a letter 
from Reed Harris, which I have not had a chance to read. I will read 
it out loud now : 

In rechecking background information here, following the hearing this morn- 
ing, I find that I inadvertently used the name of Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr., 
Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, as a person who was present and 
advising me in early December, whereas the Acting Deputy for Field Programs 
at that time was Mr. Albert G. Sims. We normally think in terms of assignments 
rather than individuals, and the Deputy Administrator for Field Programs or 
the Acting Deputy Administrator for Field Programs always takes part in the 
work of the Program Allocations Board. Mr. Sims happened to be acting at the 
time that some of these matters were being considered. I will desire permission 
to change the transcript when it is available to cover the point made here. 

During this afternoon's session Dr. Johnstone will be available but will be 
accompanied by Mr. Sims in order that Mr. Sims may be questioned if the com- 
mittee so desires. 

Sincerely yours, 

Reed Harris, Deputy Administrator. 

Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Sims. Both of you gentlemen raise your 
right hands. In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do 
you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I do. 

Mr. Sims. I do. 


The Chairman. Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is spelled Johnstone and not Johnson. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sims, what is your first name ? 

Mr. Sims. Albert G. 

The Chairman. What is your present position. Dr. Johnstone? 

Mr. Johnstone. Deputy Administrator for Field Progi'ams, Inter- 
national Information Administration. 

The Chairman. And that covers not only the Voice but the other 
information programs ? 


Mr. Johnstone. It covers the operation of the USIS or United 
States Information Services overseas; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I do not believe that we have a record of all of the 
descriptions of the various functions of the IIA. Perhaps we should 
do that at this time. 

No. 1 is the Voice, which, of course, you oversee. Will you give us 
the other operations? 

Mr. Johnstone. Mr. Chairman, could I say that I have no direct 
authority over the Voice in New York ? My position is with respect 
to the programs that are in operation in the 88 countries, I think it is, 

The Chairman. Do you have anything to do with the library ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir, only in respect as they are operated over- 
seas. We have media divisions, as you know. If you wish, I can give 
you a brief description of those or simply give the names of the media 

The Chairman. This forenoon, Mr. Harris indicated, I believe, that 
you were the man that advised discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. 
In this letter he indicates that he made a mistake in the name. That 
actually you were not holding that job at the time, that Mr. Sims 
advised him. Is that the intent of your letter, Mr. Harris ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, in July Dr. Johnstone was here. In 
December Mr. Sims was performing his duties. 

The Chairman. The reason we called Dr. Johnstone up here today 
is because you said he was the man that advised you on the discon- 
tinuance of the Hebrew desk. Is it your statement now that it w^s 
Mr. Sims and not Dr. Johnstone ? 

Mr. Harris. It is my statement that in July Dr. Johnstone and 
his division advised us on that point, and in December Mr. Sims, 
carrying on the normal duties, continued that advice, or reiterated 
that advice. 

The Chairman. In other words, when the order was issued in 
December, it was on the advice of Mr. Sims: is that correct? 

Mr. Harris. He was one of the people that checked it or his organ- 
ization did through him. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sims, did you advise discontinuance of the 
Hebrew desk in December? 

Mr. Sims. Yes; I did so. I would like to make plain, if I may, 
the basis upon which this advice was given. As Dr. Johnstone has 
explained, our Office of Field Programs is not responsible for the 
Voice or for any of its broadcasts, but being represented on the PAB, 
our advice is consulted because the PAB wants to know how our pub- 
lic-affairs officer in Israel and the program in Israel considers recep- 
tion and impact of the Voice in Israel. From that point of view I 
gave this advice. 

The Chairman. Will you just give us the function of the PAB? 
By that you mean the Program Allocation Board ? 

Mr. Sims. Yes ; that is correct. The Program Allocation Board is 
a group set up to advise the Administrator on budget and program 
matters. Most typical of the kinds of questions it handles is how 
much of our resources should go to this media division, all of which 
are asserting strong claims against limited funds. 

The Chairman. In other words, you decide how much money should 
go to the Voice as against libraries ? 


Mr. Sims. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Will you give us the names of all of the divisions 
over which the PAB has jurisdiction? 

Mr. Sims. PAB has no jurisdiction in that sense, sir. It advises the 
Administrator who makes the decisions himself. 

The Chairman. All its functions is with regard to advice, then. 
Do you understand me ? 

Mr. Sims. I am sorry, sir. I don't think I do. 

The Chairman. I understood you to say tliat the PAB advises on 
how much budget should be divided up within the international in- 
formation program. I want the names of the various branches to 
which funds are allocated. For example, you have the Voice of 
America. You have a press section. Give us a list. 

Mr. Sims. There are the five media divisions. 

The Chairman. Give us the names. 

Mr. Sims. The radio or Voice of America or International Broad- 
casting Service, as it is properly known. The Information Center 

The Chairman. Will you describe that last one? 

Mr. Sims. That is the media service which administers the book 
program and supports the Information Centers overseas. 

The Chairman. The third? 

Mr. Sims. International Motion Pictures Service. Do you want me 
to describe that briefly? 

The Chairman. It is not necessary. The next one. 

Mr. Sims. The International Educational Exchange Service, which 
administers the exchange program. 

The Chairman. What type of exchange program ? 

Mr. Sims. These are exchange-of-persons programs. The Ful- 
bright program is included among them. 

The International Press Service is another of the media services. 
In addition to those five services, there is a separate part of the budget 
which goes for overseas missions or the operations of our staffs carry- 
ing on public-affairs responsibilities overseas. This is a sixth major 
element in our budget among our budget claimants. 

Tlie Chairman, What is the title of that again ? 

Mr. Sims, Our overseas missions. They are the public-affairs or- 
ganizations attached to each diplomatic mission in the countries in 
which we operate. 

The Chairman. That is what you call a publicity or public-relations 
officer attached 

Mr. Sims. They are the means through which our program gets 
articulated except for the Voice program. 

The four media services in Washington support these overseas mis- 
sions and feed them materials and program assistance. 

The Chairman. Do you know roughly how much in the way of 
counterpart funds the II A uses per year, or say over the last year? 
In other words, in addition to the money appropriated to you, how 
nuich counterpart money have you used during the past year? 

Mr. Sims. I would not be qualified to say offhand. 

The Chairman. Are you not on the board that decides how the 
funds should be allocated or advises how they should be allocated? 

29708— 53— pt. 6 5 


AVoiild you not be interested in knowing how much counterpart money 
was available ? 

Mr. Sims. Yes, sir. Our functions, however, were primarily with 
respect to the allocation of our dollar resources, the moneys appro- 
priated by the Congress for our use. 

The Chairman. But if you want to intelligently do that, is it not 
necessary that you know how much counterpart money is available? 
Do you follow me, Mr. Sims ? If you are sitting on a board and your 
task is to decide how such money should go to the Voice, how much to 
the overseas missions, how much to the international exchange pro- 
gram, before you can intelligently perform that task would it not be 
necessary for you to know how much by way of counterpart funds 
were available to you? 

Mr. Sims. Our primary use of counterpart funds, I believe, is in the 
Fulbright program. The International Exchange Service programs 
its Fulbright program annually and claims the necessary amount of 
counterpart to run the program. There is no adjudication function in 
that respect as between media services. 

The Chairman. The Voice uses counterpart funds ; does it not ? 

Mr. Sims. I am not aware of the extent to which it does, if at all. 

The diAiRjiAN. You do not know ? 

Mr. Sims. No, sir. 

The Chairman. My. Harris, can you tell us whether the Voice 
utilizes counterpart funds? 

Mr. Harris. I could not without checking with our budget officer. 
It is not a normal thing for the Voice to do unless it uses it in some 
form of construction money. 

The Chairman. You mean at this time you do not know whether it 
uses counterpart funds? 

Mr. Harris. That is correct ; I do not know. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the International Motion- 
Picture Section uses counterpart funds? 

Mr. Harris, The International Motion-Picture Service does not 
normally use those funds. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether they have been using thein ? 

Mr. Harris. They do not use them. There is an MSA information 
program closely tied to us which uses counterpart funds extensively. 
We work together very closely. We could give you a detailed report 
on that by consulting MSA, but it would take some time to prepare. 

The Chairman. Do you have any type of supervision over MSA 
information program? 

Mr. Harris. I do not have any direct supervision over MSA opera- 

The Chairman. Do you have any indirect? 

Mr. Harris. I should say we have an indirect influence on them, 
because in Europe the MSA program, like the United States Informa- 
tion Service, which is our side of the house, has combined direction. 
Each public-affairs officer in the mission supervises both programs. 

The Chairman. Does the International Press Service use any of 
the counterpart funds ? 

Mr. Harris. They do not use such funds either, unless you consider 
the fact that our press people can work with ]MSA and thereby make 
indirect use of counterpart funds. Our press people do not have coun- 


terpart funds made available to them and they cannot use such funds 

The Chairman. Do you know how much in dollars you have used 
from the counterpart funds in the past year, that is, the IIA? 

Mr. Harris. Is it all right if I take the stand ? 

The CHAiR3iA]sr. Would you rather come up here ? 

Mr. Harris. Yes; I would, sir. 

The Chairman, Certainly. 

Mr. Harris. The question had to do with the use by the press service, 

The Chairman. No ; the entire international information program. 

Mr. Harris. I would have to check the budget officer to give you 
exact figures. You will recognize, sir, for instance 

The Chairman. I do not want an exact figure. Just give me some 
rough idea of how much of these funds you have utilized over the past 
year. As Acting Director you must have some faint idea, I assume. 

Mr. Harris. If all types of foreign funds available to us are in- 
cluded in the total, whether they can technically be called counterpart 
in all cases, I would have to discover by going back and checking the 
records, but over and above our $87 million of appropriated dollars, 
we have about $13 million more available to us principally for the 
Fulbright program and related exchange programs, the Finnish pro- 
gram. Mr. Sims points out that the India program takes the form of 
dollars, but is money that is available to us above the standard appro- 
priation as now administered. 

I therefore included it in the total. "We can give you detailed 
breakdowns on this thing any way you want them. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is that in addi- 
tion to the money appropriated by the Congress for the past fiscal year 
you had available roughly $13 million in foreign funds, but whether 
they can be technically called counterpart funds or not you are not 
prepared to say ? 

Mr. Harris. I am not. The German program, which we have just 
recently taken over, had some $20 million available from sources of 
this kind. 

The Chairman. Let me get back to ]\Ir. Johnstone. 

Mr. Johnstone, did you advise in July that the Hebrew-language 
desk should be discontinued ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I advised that on the basis of our field reports, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you advise that it should be continued until 
after election because a discontinuance might have some effect upon 
the elections? 

Mr. Johnstone. I participated in the discussion at the PAB at 
which we raised the question of the public relations involved in this, 
both domestic and foreign, sir. 

The Chairman. The question was, Did you advise that the desk 
should be continued until the election and then discontinued because 
you feared that a discontinuance prior to the elections might have 
some effect upon our elections in the United States ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I did not so specifically advise. I raised the ques- 

The Chairman. Was that agreed to by the PAB ? 
Mr. Johnstone. The first action of the board was taken on a whole 
series of budgetary reductions, one of which was the elimination of 


the Hebrew broadcasts. There was a recommendation and it was my 

The Chairman. I am going to ask you to answer this question. The 
question is, Did the Board agree that the Hebrew desk should be dis- 
continued, but that it should be continued until after the elections 
because you felt that a discontinuance before the national elections in 
this country might have an adverse effect upon some candidates? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was that decision made? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir ; not in those terms. 

The Chairman. You are sure that it was not ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Not to my recollection, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, it is your testimony that the PAB 
made no decision to continue until the elections? That there was no 
discussion upon the effect of a discontinuance prior to the election ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Excuse me, sir ; there was discussion. Your ques- 
tion, I take it, refers to the decision. The recommendation of the 
PAB I do not recollect was made in the terms as you stated them, sir. 

The Chairman. What terms was it made in? Mr. Harris has testi- 
fied this forenoon that it was decided to continue the program until 
the day after the elections, and then discontinue it. He gave us a rea- 
son, the fact that the PAB felt that if the Hebrew language desk 
were discontinued before the elections, it might have an adverse effect 
upon some candidate. 

My question is, Is that true ? You were a member of the board. Or 
is that untrue? 

Mr. Johnstone. Sir, I was not on the board. I was with Dr. Comp- 
ton in Europe from the end of October until December. Therefore I 
did not participate in the discussions during that period. Therefore, 
I can only testify prior to the end of October, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you present when anyone urged that the 
Hebrew desk should be continued until elections and then dis- 
continued ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I do not recollect any such statement as that being 
made, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sims, you have been a member of the Board 
also ? 

Mr. Sims. I am an alternate member, Senator, when Mr. Johnstone 
is out. 

The Chairman. Were you present when Mr. Harris testified this 
forenoon ? 

Mr. Sims. No, sir, I was not. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : Were you ever present when 
anyone urged this particular desk be continued until election day, 
and then discontinued, giving as a reason that a discontinuance prior 
to the election might have an adverse effect upon some candidate ? 

Mr. Sims. I do not recollect that. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : Would you consider it highly 
improper for the Board to have decided to continue a desk until 
the day after election on the ground that a discontinuance before that 
might have an adverse effect upon some candidate in an election in 
the United States. Would you consider that a highly improper use of 
funds ? 


Mr. Sims. I think this was part of the consideration that the ad- 
ministrator himself had to take. This was not part of the considera- 
tion for which we in the field programs office had a responsibility. In 
other words, we were being asked : Does this program from the field 
point of view, from the point of view of our staff in Israel, have 
validity. Our answer was "No," and in terms of the budget urgencies 
that confronted us, our point of view was that this should be discon- 
tinued as soon as possible. 

The Chairman. Will you listen to my questions? 

Mr. Sims. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The testimony this forenoon by Mr. Harris was 
to the effect that they had decided to continue the Hebrew desk until 
the day after election. That the reason that they felt that was that 
if they discontinued the Hebrew desk before the election, it might 
have an adverse effect upon some candidate in the United States 

My question to you is, would you consider that a highly improper 
use of the Voice funds, or do you think that is proper ? 

(No response.) 

The Chairman. Are you having some difficulty answering that? 

Mr. Sims. I have, because it is not my responsioility to make that 
kind of decision. If you want a personal judgment of mine, I would 
say that was the kind of decision that the administrator could well 
have taken properly, and that would not necessarily have been a mis- 
use of the Voice funds. 

The Chairman. In other words, your testimony is that even though 
the administrator felt the program being beamed to Israel in the 
Hebrew language was of no benefit and should be discontinued, you 
say it would have been proper for him to have continued nevertheless 
to spend money because of the effect of a discontinuance on an elec- 
tion in the United States ? . 

Mr. Sims. I can conceive that would have been so, although that 
was not my responsibility to make that decision and I did not investi- 
gate all of the factors that would have been pertinent in coming to 
that conclusion. 

The Chairman. You think that would have been a proper use of the 
funds ? 

Mr. Sims. It could have been ; I am not prepared to say that it was. 

The Chairman. You nodded your head, Mr. Johnstone. I assume 
you agree? 

Mr. Johnstone. We are constantly aware, Senator, that any action 
or use of funds in this program must not reflect any attempt to be 
partisan as far as the United States is concerned. I can conceive that 
some action of this sort might have an adverse effect or might have 
had some public relations effect in teTms of the United States elections. 
I think that should have been considered. Like Mr. Sims, that was 
not a consideration with which I was concerned, and therefore I did 
not go into all the factors which might have gone into such a deter- 

The Chairman. You think as well as fighting communism you 
should take into consideration the effect that your actions might have 
upon elections in this country ? 

Mr. Johnstone. May I answer that fully, Senator? 


The Chairman. I may say this is a fantastic concept. You feel that 
running the Voice, when you have been appropriated money by the 
Congress to fight communism, that you feel that you must take into 
consideration the effect that your spending may have upon national 
elections ? 

Mr. Johnstone. May I answer that fully. Senator ? 

The Chairman. I cannot conceive Mr. Sims answering that. And 
I cannot see Mr. Harris having made the decision based on that. 

Mr. Johnstone. May I answer that? 

The Chairman. You certainly may. 

Mr. Johnstone. A discontinuance of the Hebrew broadcast could 
have laid us open overseas to a charge of anti-Semitism. I don't think 
we should have laid ourselves open to that kind of charge either over- 
seas or domestically. 

The Chairman. Could the charge be any different the day before 
election from the day after election ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir, I do^ not think so. I may not have under- 
stood your question correctly, sir. As far as the action of the Voice 
of America or any other part of this program being determined by 
the question of the effect on the United States elections, that should 
not be a consideration, in my opinion. That is, we should take the 
consideration on the purposes of the program and what we are trying 
to do with it. 

The Chairman. You are William C. Johnstone, J-o-h-n-s-t-o-n-e? 

Mr. Johnstone. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. You know something about the McCarran commit- 
tee, I assume ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. May I ask a question right there, Mr. Chair- 
man ? Along the line of the questioning, if I may interrupt, Mr. 
Chairman, you pointed out that to discontinue the Voice or to discon- 
tinue the Hebrew desk during the time of the presidential campaign 
might subject you to criticism of anti-Semitism; is that correct? 

Mr. Johnstone. That is what I tried to convey, I think. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Did you give any consideration to that when 
the order was issued to discontinue that immediately after Russia had 
demonstrated her anti-Semitism ? Did you give consideration to that 
action in discontinuing it at that time, that that might be the reactioji 
over in Israel ? 

Mr. Johnstone. As I have testified, I was not here at the time the 
final decision was made in December, but prior to that time — I will 
answer your question, sir — that we did consider the public-relations 
effect in Israel. 

Senator McClellan. That had not occurred in Russia at that time ? 

Mr. Johnstone. We were aware of it. 

Senator McClellan. Understand, I am not trying to be too critical. 
But it does occur to me that immediately after the Russian actions 
that gave to us an opportunity to show our friendship for Israel and 
Hebrew people, to then immediately discontinue the desk that was 
serving Israel would indicate to me that we were probably laying our- 
selves liable to the criticism that you say you thought should have 
been avoided during the presidential campaign. 

Mr. Johnstone. May I answer that, sir? 

Senator McClellan. Yes. 


Mr. Johnstone. The wliole United States Information Service in 
Israel consists of a lot of activities in addition to the Hebrew-language 
broadcast. The persons in Israel whom we talked to, and who know 
the kind of material we are putting out, and who know the kind of 
things we are saying through this Information Service, advised us 
that the Voice of America in Hebrew was not listened to to any large 
extent, and consequently was considered, and is so considered by our 
Ambassador there, as a marginal activity. 

Senator McClellan. I cannot quite understand why we would say 
it would not be listened to in the Hebrew language when apparently 
from the best evidence before the committee about 85 percent of the 
people do understand the Hebrew language, whereas not that large 
a percent understands any other language. 

Mr. Johnstone. I was basing my recommendation on what we have 
received from our officers in Tel Aviv as to the listening habits of the 
population of Israel. A great many apparently listened to the 
English-language broadcast and to our other broadcasts, as well as 
read the newspapers and get the material which we are distributing 
in the form of pamphlets and press material, and the evidence that 
we were basing our recommendation on was that the number of listen- 
ers to the Hebrew-language broadcast was relatively small, and there- 
fore that Avas a less efFective means of reaching the people of Israel 
than some of the other means which we were using, and have continued 
to use. 

Senator McClellan. I was just trying to follow your reasoning for 
not wanting to discontinue it during a presidential campaign over 
here, and for being willing to discontinue it immediately after the 
Eussian demonstrations and their antagonism toward the Hebrew 

Mr. Johnstone. As I said, I was not present at the time that the 
decision was made for discontinuance in December. 

The Chairman. Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher, will you come forward? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, may I ask something at this point? 

The Chairman. Just a minute. We will give you all the time in 
the world. 

Senator Mundt. I would like to ask whichever one of you gentle- 
men it was, to repeat what you said this morning about the advice 
you received from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, because if I 
understood you correctly, it is in conflict with what Mr. Johnstone 
just said. Maybe I did not understand you correctly. 

Mr. Glazer. Sometime late in November 1952 we got the first mes- 
sage from our Embassy in Israel giving us a directive, 3^ou might call 
it, or advice on how to capitalize on this tremendous opportunitj^ pre- 
sented to us. I underline the word I'first," because we had gotten a 
number of messages from them before on various other aspects of the 
program. But they, as we, quite independently saw in this a superb 
opportunity to drive home the force of all the things that we had been 
trying to say against the Communists and to do it in a way they 
considered to be most effective. 

Senator Mundt. I am trying to figure out what way did they con- 
sider most effective? Did the}^ consider that broadcasts over the 
Voice in the Hebrew language or just discussing the anti-Semitism? 


Mr. Glazer. No ; in regard to the Voice they specified the Hebrew 
language. They made a number of suggestions that only point to that. 
I can give you the exact text of that message. 

Senator Mundt. Did that come from our American Ambassador? 

Mr. Glazer. Yes, sir; over the signature of our Ambassador to 

Senator Mundt. From whom did you get your information? 

Mr. eToiixsTONE. Ambassador Monet Davis replied in 1952 to a 
telegram estimating the effectiveness of all the various media which 
we were using in Israel. At the end of this telegram — - 

The Chairman. Just a minute, first. If you are going to read clas- 
sified wires, you may do it, but if so I want it understood if you read 
any classified document, I shall demand all the other related classified 
documents. We are not going to let you come down here and pick a 
part of the classified document and say, "I cannot give you the rest 
because of a Presidential order." If you read a part of a classified 
document, and refuse to bring down all other related documents, I 
will recommend contempt action on that ground. Do you follow me ? 

Mr. JoHxsTONE. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I am not going to ask you to violate any Presiden- 
tial order, let me repeat that, until the new President has a chance to 
go over those orders, and decide how he wants them changed. But if 
you violate any of those orders by reading sections of classified docu- 
ments, then the Presidential order will be no defense in a contempt 
proceeding against 3^ou. 

Senator Mundt. Is that a classified document that you are working 
on there? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We have had too much of that already. Witnesses 
have come here and taken out of context a section of a classified docu- 
ment, and when we order the entire document produced, the defense 
is we cannot do that under the Presidential directive. We are all 
through with that from now on. I think the Senators will agree with 

Senator McClellan. I make this observation, that if classified docu- 
ments are denied to the committee, their contents of course should be 
used in every instance. I do not agree, frankly, with the order denying 

The Chairman. I do not, either. 

Senator McClellan. I mean to this extent. Certain information 
should not be made available to the public. But there is certain infor- 
mation in classified documents I feel the Congress is entitled to have in 
weighing certain issues that come before it. 

The Chairman. I may say I have taken no issue with the new admin- 
istration on these orders because I know the tremendous burden of 
taking over the administration. I know that they cannot overnight 
undo everything that has been done over 20 years. I assume that these 
orders are under study. But I will not have any witness reading part 
of a classified directive, and then refusing the entire directive on the 
ground it is classified. 

I may say, and repeat for emphasis, if that is done, if a witness reads 
part of a classified document and refuses to submit all the related docu- 
ments, I will move strongly for contempt action against the witness. 


Senator McClellan. Let me ask this question of tlie chairman. If 
the witness has the information that is contained in the classified docu- 
ment that supports his position, is he prevented from expressing or 
giving the committee the information he has simply because it is 
contained in a classified document ? 

The Chairman. I think he should not be, Mr. McClellan, but that 
is the interpretation of the present order. 

Senator McClellan. If so, you get in this situation. You may ask 
the witness a question which he can answer definitely and conclusively 
so far as his point of view is by reference to a classified document. If 
you do not let him refer to it or give the information the document con- 
tains, then he is not in position to answer the question. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan, I have never favored the Tru- 
man secrecy orders. 

Senator McClellan. I may agree with you on that. 

The Chairman. I have never favored them. I have not interpreted 
as the Department has that the witness can give no information from a 
classified document. I assume that the new administration is presently 
looking over those orders. The position that I am taking in notifying 
the witnesses — I hope the committee will go along with me — is this: 
That no witness can come up here and read selected portions of a clas- 
sified document and then refuse to submit the entire document and all 
I'elated documents on the ground he is violating a Presidential order. 
I just think that is completely improper, and ties the hands of the com- 
mittee, and I personally will do everything I can to prevent that from 
being done. 

Let me make it very clear that I am not placing any stamp of ap- 
]>roval on those secrecy orders, except I say if they are going to be fol- 
lowed to prove one point, then the entire material must be available. 

Senator McClellan. I am not necessarily disagreeing with the 
chairman on that point of view, but I am pointing out if you ask the 
witness why did he do this, and why did he do that, and his answer is 
in a classified document, the information contained in a classified 
document that was considered in arriving at the decision to take a 
certain action, then it is manifestly unfair to the witness, because he 
cannot give his answer without reference to those documents. 

The Chairman. That is one of the reasons that I assume that those 
ridiculous secrecy orders will be amended by the new team in power. 
I am not responsible for the drafting of those orders. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, let us get back to where we were 
this morning, and let me inquire first of Dr. Glazer whether he was 
reading from a classified document this morning, and repeating from 
a classified document this afternoon when you were quoting what came 
to you from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv. 

Mr. Glazer. I read a paraphrased version of a classified document. 

Senator Mundt. I wonder if we could not get an equally para- 
phrased version of whether the American Embassy was advising one 
of our officials one way and another one another way? There is a 
direct conflict in evidence. 

The Chairman. May I say that I think the three Senators here are 
fairly good security risks. May I see the docmiient you are reading 
from ? 

Mr. Johnstone. This is a summary of the document, sir. 

29708 — 53— pt. 6 6 


The Chairman. It is your summary of the document? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you have the document there ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No ; I don't have the document here, sir, but that 
has been furnished to one congressional committee, and we have ar- 
rangements I understand with your committee. Senator, for the fur- 
nishing of certain classified documents to your committee. 

Senator Mundt. It seems we are getting in an awful bad fix. When 
we ask the question, one man says he is going to paraphrase a classi- 
fied document, and another witness says, "I want to paraphrase some- 
thing that refutes it." Personally I have very little confidence in any- 
one's paraphrasing. Since we have accepted this morning one para- 
phrased version, we should find out if this is the same Ambassador 
and if he is making two different statements, and if we can find out 
anything that will make his statements consistent. 

The Chairman. I understand, Mr. Glazer, that you have the en- 
tire document with you, the document wdiich you read and para- 
phrased. I think if the witness can give us a summary of the docu- 
ment, the document should be available to the committee so the com- 
mittee can tell whether that gives an accurate summary. 

Mr. Johnstone. I would be very glad to. I do not have the docu- 
ment with me to which I referred. 

Senator Mundt. Pardon ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I do not have the dispatch to w^iich I referred, sir. 

The Chairman. I do not think we should accept a summary of a 
document without being able to see the document, especially in view 
of the very conflicting and changing testimony we have had here. Just 
to properly identify you, Dr. Johnstone, you are the same William 
C. Johnstone who was officially listed by the report of the McCarran 
committee as a result of hearings held June 25 to July 20 on page 100 
as part of a pro-Communist group, entitled group P? Are you the 
same William C. Johnstone? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have never seen that, but I was never a member 
of a pro-Communist group. 

The Chairman. Let me read this and see if we have the same man : 

At least .59 of the iiulividnals listed were identified by one or more witnesses 
testifying under oatti before tlie subcommittee, or by documentary evidence on 
record before the subcommittee, as having been affiliated with one or more Com- 
munist-controlled organizations * * * ^ud these, with one exception, have 
not been included in Mr. Holland's list of anti-Communists. 

Then they give a list of names, including yours, William Johnstone, 
and add to the fact that William Holland, who was listed as one of 
the pro-Communists, has stated that he feels you were not a pro- 
Communist. He feels you are anti-Communist. Are you the same 
man, or would you know ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I presume that refers to me. I am certainly not 
a pro-Communist. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether you are the man officially 
listed by the McCarran committee as in group P, pro-Communist? 

Mr. Johnstone. I assume that is. 

The Chairman. You think they did this without any basis? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think that they did it without any basis 
in fact ? 


Mr. Johnstone. I don't know of any basis in fact that they would 
do that. 

Senator McClellan. Were you given an opportunity to appear 
before that committee and refute any testimony that was presented? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir ; I was not. I did not know that such testi- 
mony had been presented. 

Senator McClellan. This is the first you knew about it? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir; because I have not read that report, sir. 
I read a summary of it. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the board of Indusco 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir; I was never a member of the board of 

The Chairman. You were not ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. , 

The Chairman (reading) : 

Mr. Johnstone was not only a member of the board of Indusco which has been 
cited in the hearings as a Communist-controlled organization, but he was also 
the man who, on January 20, 1944, arranged the luncheon meeting at the 
Cosmos Club for the Tass correspondent, Vladmir Rogov, who was identified 
as an agent of Soviet military intelligence. 

When they say you were a member of the board of Indusco, this is 
a false statement ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I was a member of what was called an advisory 
board, and I resigned from it as soon as I felt Indusco became a 
Communist front. 

The Chairman. How long were you a member of the board ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I would have to check the dates, but my memory 
is that I resigned late in 1944 or early 1945. 

The Chairman. Up until that time you did not feel it was a Com- 
munist-controlled organization ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I did not feel it was. I did not have any direct 
information. As a matter of fact, I did not serve in any active capac- 
ity on that advisory group. It was not the board of directors. 

The Chairman. Wliat action did you take insofar as resigning? 

Mr. Johnstone. I resigned because I said I felt that the purposes 
of that organization had been subverted. 

The Chairman. Did you write a letter ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you have a copy of that letter ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think I do, sir. I would have to check my files. 

The Chairman. Did you arrange this luncheon for the Tass cor- 
respondent whom the McCarran committee said was identified as an 
agent in the Soviet Intelligence ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes ; I did so at the request of E. C. Carter, and 
I attended the luncheon because I wanted to find out whether a Tass 
correspondent would admit he was a Soviet agent. 

The Chairman. Did you ask him if he was an agent? 

Mr. Johnstone. My best recollection is I asked him and he said 
"No." My interest was to see what his line was. 

The Chairman. You said you arranged the lunch because Mr. 
Carter requested it and No. 2, because you wanted to find out if he 
would admit he was a Soviet agent. 

Mr. Johnstone. I always felt that Tass correspondents were agents, 
and I wanted to see what he would say. I never met one before. 


The Chairman. His name was Vladimir Rogov; is that correct? 

Mr. Johnstone. My recollection is something like that, sir. I do 
not have the name. 

The Chairman. Who else was at that meeting that you arranged ? 

Mr, Johnstone. My recollection is that it was arranged by Mr. 
Carter and Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent were 
at the luncheon, and I was asked by Mr. Carter because I was a member 
of the Cosmos Club, and they wanted to have a place to have the 
luncheon. I agreed to go because I was interested to see what a Tass 
correspondent would say and what line he was peddling. 

The Chairman. The report says you arranged the luncheon. 

Mr. Johnstone. I merely used my membership in the Cosmos Club 
to collect the money from the others and sign the check. 

The Chairman. Did j^ou make arrangements with the Cosmos Club 
for the luncheon? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir; it was held in the public dining room in 
the club. 

The Chairman. Who were present ? Was Owen Lattimore present ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. John Carter Vincent? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. E. C. Carter? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there any others present ? 

Mr. Johnstone. That was all, and myself. 

The Chairman. How many hours did the luncheon last ? 

Mr. Johnstone. It is my recollection that the luncheon was about 
an hour and a half, and I had another engagement and left. We left 
the luncheon table, and I don't know how long the rest talked to Mr. 
Rogov, because I had to leave. 

The Chairman. In other words, you say you left at the end of an 
hour and a half? 

Mr. Johnstone. That is my best recollection, sir. It was about 
that. I remember that I had another engagement and couldn't stay. 

The Chairman. In other words, that was more than a luncheon. 
It was a conference ; is that right ? 

Mr. Johnstone. That is what it apparently turned out to be. As 
I have just said, my interest was to see what a Tass correspondent, 
what kind of line he would peddle and ask him the specific question 
if he was an agent of military intelligence. 

The Chairman. Did you not actually spend 2i/^ hours with this 
man and with Lattimore and Vincent ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Sir, I am just giving you my best recollection. It 
may have been longer than an hour anct a half. I do recollect I had 
another engagement. My recollection on the time may not be clear. 

Senator Mundt. What did the Tass man say when you asked 

Mr. Johnstone. My best recollection is that he laughed and said, 
"Of course not, I am just a newspaper correspondent." My best recol- 
lection is that I said, "That does not seem the way you operate." 

The Chairman. Do you know Rose Yardumian ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir; I know she was a Communist. 

The Chairman. Do you know she was a Communist ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I so reported to the FBI. 


The Chairman. Was she a close friend of yours ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chaieman. I might say the reason I mention the figure of 2% 
hours, it has to do with exhibit No. 26 produced before the McCarran 
committee. I shall read it. It was written to Edward C. Carter. 

Dear Mr. Carter : I received you letter of January 17 with copies of the tele- 
grams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning 
and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would under- 
stand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with 
Rogov. He mentioned the Rogov articles in War and the Working Class and that 
Rogov's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. He said 
that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogov to Hornbeck's office, they would not 
refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our 
State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch 
with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck. 

Mr. Curria has arranged to see Rogov at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymon- 
ville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed 
to get in touch with our oifice then. 

Rogov visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk 
with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5 :30. 

Is that correct? Did you and Rose Yardumian and Rogov have a 
conference in the office or a little talk, as she says ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

The Chairjvian. You do not ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No ; I don't. 

The Chairman. Do you recall how often you saw Rose Yardumian? 

Mr. Johnstone. She was the secretary in the IPR office here in 
Washingtoif. I was at work at that time conducting a series of study 
groups with representatives of Nationalist China and various other 
foreign officials and other people trying to study the effects of the 
war. I saw her quite frequently because she did typing and that sort 
of material. It was that luncheon that is one of the reasons that I left 
the IPR. 

The Chairman. When did you leave the IPR ? 

Mr. Johnstone. 1945. 

The Chairjvian. And the question was, roughly, how often did you 
see Rose Yardiunian? 

Mr. Johnstone. Quite frequently, sir, because she was the secretary 
and arranging the meeting which I was responsible for calling. 

The Chairman. You knew she was a Communist at that time? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir; I did not know she was a Commmiist at 
that time, but I began to suspect it the longer I associated with her 
and the more I suspected it. Later I gave the information to the FBI. 

The Chairman. Wlien did you learn she was a Communist? 

Mr. Johnstone. I never learned through any direct means she was 
a Communist. She simply talked like one and acted like one. I have 
no knowledge of her actually being a Communist Party member. I 
reported my impressions. 

The Chairman. Actually you gave the FBI no information about 
her until after she had been publicly labeled as a Communist, did you ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I am not sure of dates on that. Senator McCarthy. 

The Chairman. Try to think hard, will j'ou ? You see if you can 
recall if you ever gave them any information about Rose Yardumian 
before it was well known she was a Communist. 


Mr. Johnstone. I gave information on her as I recall, I think, the 
fall of 1945. And I was told that she was being accused of being 
a Communist at that time. 

The Chairman. Do you know this, that you never did give the 
FBI any information to the effect that she was a Communist until 
it was general knowledge that she was a Communist? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think that is probably correct. 

The Chairman. So you were performing no service when it is 
already known she was a Communist. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes. 

Senator Mundt. Did you go to the FBI voluntarily with this 
information, or did they come to you with interrogation ? 

Mr. Johnstone. They came to me with interrogations. 

Senator Mundt. Were you a member of this Amerasia group we 
heard so much about in the McCarran committee ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

Senator Mundt. Did you contribute any articles to them ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I contributed two articles, and I think it was in 
1940 or 1941, and that was done after I talked with Mr. Charles Moser 
at the Department of Commerce, and various other people. It was 
on the question of our war shipments to Japan. That was done in a 
sense as a kind of a test whether they would publish a thing like that. 
I was fully aware of Amerasia and what it stood for, and informed 
my students when I was at the university what kind of magazine it was. 

The Chairman. One line of the magazine was that the Chinese 
Communists were agrarian reformers. Did you say that? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have checked my writings and I called them 
Communist with a capital "C." I have never called them agrarian 

The Chairman. Are you sure of that, now ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have recently checked all of my books, and I do 
not find that, sir. I never regarded them, certainly. " 

The Chairman. Did you check their writings in 1943? Did you 
not write a pamphlet in' 1943 in which you called that line, that they 
were agrarian reformers ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I don't know what pamphlet you might be refer- 
ring to. Senator, but I don't recall that. I would be glad to check it. 

The Chairman. You say you did not refer to them as agrarian 

Mr. Johnstone. I reread one of my pamphlets the other evening 
and I recollect, I can check it, but I recollect that I had a sentence 
that these were sometimes called agrarian reformers. I called them 

The Chairman. You say you wrote a pamphlet saying that they 
were sometimes called agrarian reformers ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think that was the sentence. I would have to 
check them. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question 
on an altogether unrelated subject because I have a call from my office. 

Will you make an effort to get the entire document from which 
you were about to paraphrase an answer, and you get your entire 
document so the committee can have the two documents^ so we can 
find out what Telaviv actually did say to the State Department? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 


The Chairman. Let me read this letter which I started to read, on 
which I based my questions with respect to Kogov. 

Rogov visited our office yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk 
with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 
5 : 30. Rogov said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting ; 
that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact 
that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute 
of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. Bill and Anne 
Johnstone — 

That is your wife ? 

Mr. Johnstone. It must be. That is not her correct name. 

The Chairman. Is that her first name? 

Mr. Johnstone. Anne. 

The Chairman. A-n-n-e? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together 
at their home this evening — the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few 
others — but time is very short and many of these people have already made 
plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. How- 
ever, Rogov is coming in to our office at 2 o'clock today ; Bill is planning to take 
him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John 
Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements 
to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places. 

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him as I know that there 
are many people here who would have enjoyed hearing him. 
Sincerely yours, 

Rose Yardumian. 

P. S. — I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted the 

P. P. S. — Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2% hours 
talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent. 

Does that refresh your recollection so that you can say you had at 
least a two and a half hour conference ? 

Mr. Johnstone. It may be tjue. I don't believe I went back to 
the office. I had another engagement. I said an hour and a half, but 
it could have been two and a half hours. I wouldn't want to say an 
hour and a half under oath. I know that I went there. 

The Chairman. May I quote from your article, Mr. Johnstone, 
dated August 1943, published by the Foreign Policy Association, 
entitled "The Chainging Far East" by William C. Johnstone. 

Chinese Commimists were also Nationalists and their main objectives were 
agrarian reform and an economic democracy that they practiced as well as 

Does that refresh your recollection that you now know you did refer 
to them as agrarian reformers ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Sir, I said Chinese Communists 

The Chairman. Would you care to see it ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I would, yes. 

The Chairman. Before reading that, may I ask you, Do we both 
agree that that was the Communist line in 1943, that they were agrarian 
reformers interested in agrarian reform and practicing democracy? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes; that was the Communist line and I didn't 
agree with it. 

The Chairman. You did not agree with it ? 


Mr. Johnstone. I cannot. 

The Chairman. In 1943, you did not? 

Mr. Johnstone. In 1943 or any time. 

The Chairman. May I say, Mr. Johnstone, I do not intend to inti- 
mate because you may have agreed that you were purposefully carry- 
ing the Communist line. 

Mr. Johnstone. I understand. 

The Chairman. I think a sizable number of good Americans were 
thoroughly deceived at times by Communists. I think many of them 
were deceived by the motives of the Chinese Communists. I am just 
trying to get at your thinking at that time. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. May I say. Senator, the sentence reads : 

Chinese Communists were also Nationalists and their main objectives were 
agi'arian reform nnrl an economic democracy that they practiced as well as 

I did not call them agrarian reformers, but their objectives were 
agrarian reform. I assume that the rest of that sentence could be 

The Chairman. If you say their objectives were agrarian reform, 
would not that be calling them agrarian reformers ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Well, they did try to institute agrarian reform, but 
I called them Communists, Senator. In my other writings you can find 
I called them Communists. 

The Chairman. I do not want to spend any additional time on this, 
but let me read this : 

Chinese Communist were also Nationalists and their main objectives were agrar- 
ian reform and an economic democracy that they practiced as well as preached. 

Did you believe that was true in 1943? 

Mr. Johnstone. I believe that was partially true, yes, sir, in the 
areas that they were in. That does not, however, mean that I agreed 
that that was what should happen or agreed with them. 

The Chairman. You have incidentally been in charge of the ex- 
change-of -persons program ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I was from 1948 to 1952, sir. 

The Chairman. The only other article I find in this book is by 
Lawrence K. Rosinger. Do you consider Rosinger a Communist ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have no knowledge that he is a member of the 
Communist Party. I did not agree with his views and so stated, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know that he appeared before the Mc- 
Carran committee and refused on the grounds of self-incrimination to 
answer whether or not lie was a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I do, sir. 

The Chairman. Does that give you any idea 

Mr. Johnstone. I would assume that he was, sir, from that. 

The Chairman. Do you think it might be significant that this book 
contain only your writing which did follow the Communist line — I am 
not saying you were a Communist. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Your book which followed the Communist line and 
also the article by Rosinger, the man who refused to say whether he 
was a Communist or not. Do you think that has any significance? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think it has some significance. I thought so 
after the book was published. I think you will see some other state- 
ments in the pamphlet which are fairly clear, too. 


Tlie Chairman. Do you notice the suggested reading in this book ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes. Those readings were done by the Foreign 
Policy Association. 

The Chairman. Would you care to look at the authors suggested as 
suggested reading and tell us how many Communists you recognize 
among that list of authors ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Mr. T. A. Bisson, I know, has been called by the 
McCarran committee. I have testified I disagree with Mr. Bisson. I 
have no personal knowledge that he was a Communist, but I do know 
I disagreed with his line. 

The Chairman. I may say for your information that he has been 
named several times before congressional committees as an espionage 
agent as well as a Communist. 

Mr. Johnstone. I know that information from press reports. 

The Chairman. Just pick out the ones that you would consider to be 
Communists now, not those that were necessarily Communists then, 
and tell us which and any you thought were Communists then also ? 

Mr. Johnstone. E. Herbert Norman, Mr. Rosinger, Mr, Edgar 
Snow, have all been before various committees. 

The Chairman. Were you not a bit disturbed to find this article 
of yours put out in a book wliich contained an article by Kosinger, and 
recommended the writings of known Communists as recommended 
reading ? 

Mr, Johnstone. I did not have information at that time, Senator ; 
that has since been revealed by all those people. I would certainly 
be disturbed now. I must say I was not as disturbed then because I 
did not have information about their leanings. I knew I disagreed 
with them on practically every point. 

The Chairman. I will certainly agree with you that many people 
who are well-known Communists now may not have been considered 
such at that time. The FBI has been quoted as referring to Amerasia 
as a tool for Soviet espionage in a Washington paper, the Washington 
Daily News. Would you agree that is the correct description of 
Amerasia ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I would say yes, it was very close to it if it wasn't 
actually. That is based on the reports that I have seen and the Mc- 
Carran investigation. 

The Chairman, Your testimony is that while you contributed cer- 
tain articles to that magazine, you did not contribute any after you 
suspected this was a Communist organization ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know when you first contributed articles to 
Amerasia and when you last contributed articles? 

Mr, Johnstone, There were tw^o articles — I would have to check 
my files — on the shipment of war materials to Japan, which I wrote. 
As I recall, it was a series of two articles, one in 1940, and I believe 
the other in 1941, I think I have copies of those articles. 

The Chairman. Wlio did you contact in Amerasia? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think I have correspondence on that, sir. My 
recollection is very dim as to who received the articles. 

The (chairman. Did you know Phil Jaffe ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I have met him, I think, not more than 2f or 3 
times, and that very briefly. 


The Chairman. Do you know Mark Gayn ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I think I have met him twice. 

The Chairman. Did you talk to him about your articles? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir; I did not talk to anybody in the Amerasia 
staff about these articles. 

The Chairman. Did you merely send the articles to them for publi- 
cation ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. No one had recommended that you send the 
articles ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you get paid for the articles ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to check that 
to be sure, but I don't believe so. 

The Cpiairman. I am not sure if I follow you. Is that a normal 
practice on your part, to write articles and send them to a magazine 
gratuitously and not receive any pay ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Senator, at this time I was most concerned with 
the possibility of Japanese aggression. I was studying, I was writing 
about it, and I felt that certain facts ought to be made public and it 
was a practice among college professors who are not paid very large 
sums for their articles, particularly a technical article, to send articles 
to magazines without asking for compensation. 

The Chairman. Do you know that Amerasia was purchased by the 
State Department and distributed to its officials? 

Mr. Johnstone. I was not in the State Department at the time. I 
didn't know that for a fact at that time. I have only been in the State 
Department since 1946. 

The Chairman. I was not suggesting you were responsible for the 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know that to be a fact now ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes ; I have seen that stated. 

The Chairman. Do you know Andrew Roth ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you know him very well ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir ; fairly well. 

The Chairman. Did you consider him a Communist? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you first learn he was a Communist? 

Mr. Johnstone. I did not know him to the best of my recollection— 
I can check my statement — until about the end of 1944, or tlie early 
part of 1945, wlien he was around the IPR offices here in Washington. 
He was at that time working on a book on Ja]:>an. 

The Chairman. Were you questioned by the FBI in connection with 
the Amerasia case ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I was questioned by tlie FBI on individuals and 
I assume it was in connection with the Amerasia case, sir. That is, 
the FBI did not say specifically it was that case. 

Tlie Chairman. Andrew Roth was one of those accused of having 
obtained classified documents and turning them over to Amerasia. 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you ever live with Roth ? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 


The Chairman. Did yoii ever stay with him? 

Mr. Johnstone. No, sir. 

The Chairman. How many times, roughly, would you say you were 
at his home and he at yours ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I was never at his home, and I don't remember that 
he was ever at mine. 

The Chairman. You say you knew him very well socially ? 

]Mr. Johnstone. Not very well, sir. I knew him in the sense that 
he used to come around to the IPR offices quite often. Also when I 
was in the American Embassy in New Delhi he came there and at that 
time I wrote a memorandum to the Ambassador saying who he was 
and his background and warned the Ambassador we should not give 

The Chairman. The committee has described the IPR, I believe the 
quotation is correct, as a cover shop for Soviet espionage. That may 
not be the exact description. Would you agree with that description 
of the IPR ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I would have to say from my own knowledge that 
it was certainly infiltrated by Communists, that it was used as a front. 
A lot of that information has since come out in the McCarran subcom- 
mittee. I began to feel that the organization was being subverted, that 
the organization was not what it appeared to be, and what its objec- 
tives said it was, and that was one of the reasons I disassociated myself 
from the IPR in 1945. 

The Chairman. How well did you know Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Johnstone. I met him I thinly first in the late thirties and 
since my professional interest at that time as a professor of far- 
eastern politics took me to a number of conferences, meetings, and 
so forth, I saw him at various conferences and meetings up to 1940 
or 1941. I was at two IPR conferences where he was present. 

The Chairman. Did you ever submit any of your writings to him 
and he ever submit any to you ? 

Mr. Johnstone. He never submitted any to me and I never sub- 
mitted any to him. 

The Chairman. Getting back to this question of the Hebrew desk, 
your testimony is that you did advise that the Hebrew desk be dis- 
continued ? 

Mr. Johnstone. Yes, sir; we did advise that, reflecting in my 
job the opinion of the public affairs officer in Israel, who had returned 
in July 1952, and who knew the situation in Israel, that it was a 
marginal operation since the people of Israel could get information 
from a great many sources in addition to the Hebrew-language broad- 

What we were trying to do was to .reduce our budget in accordance 
with the amount of money we had. There was a whole series of 
recommendations on which we were acting, this being one of them, 

The Chairman. In other words, getting into some of your so-called 
classified information, the thing that concerns me is how Dr. Glazer 
could get a recommendation from the Embassy in Israel, Tel Aviv, 
saying this is an excellent operation, give us more of it, and you could 
get a recommendation saying that it is marginal. Is this correct, 
Mr. Johnstone, that you were advised it was marginal because the 
signals were weak, that is, the radio signals ? 


Mr. Johnstone. That was part of the reason. That was one reason 
in July-August. That was before the Courier went into operation. 

The Chairman. That may explain the difference between the ad- 
vice given to you and Dr. Glazer, because I understand Courier went 
into operation later in the year, and the word was that you were 
getting a good strong signal into Israel. 

Mr. Johnstone. That is right, sir. I was in Salonika in November 
and saw the reports on both the Courier operation and the Salonika 
relay. We were getting a good signal in through Hebrew, German, 
and English, and the various languages beamed to that area. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : You advised in July that the 
desk be closed and part of the basis for your recommendation was the 
weak signal which was getting into the area. Would your recom- 
mendation have been the same in December, at which time you were 
getting a good strong signal as a result of the Courier ship being 
located in that area ? 

Mr. Johnstone. On the basis of reports we got from Tel Aviv in 
November, the same recommendation went in from my office through 
Mr. Sims in December. It was based on these considerations, if I may 
state them, sir. It was based on the considerations, first of all, that 
the listening audience as far as could be determined on the spot, was 
very, very small. There was a large listening audience for the English- 
language broadcast. The Embassy's recommendation was that of the 
various ways in which we had to tell our story and to tell the story 
of what the Russians were doing and to get out anti-Communist ma- 
terial to the people of Israel, this particular method of the Hebrew- 
language broadcast was least effective of the ways we had to get our 
story across. 

The Chairman. Dr. Glazer, you were head of the Hebrew desk; 
do you care to comment on that ? May I say that we ]3erliaps would 
not take as much time on this one particular desk if it were not for a 
number of reasons : No. 1, we have this book written by Mr. Harris 
and Mr. Harris admits that if he were to feel the way today as when 
he wrote the book, he would be unfit to hold his job. It follows the 
Communist line. He says he does not believe it any more. It refers 
to the right of Communists to teach in colleges. It refers to the right 
to teach that marriage is outmoded and should be thrown into the 
ashcan because of outmoded religious phenomenon, suggests that all 
schools be made public schools, tliat where the private interests object, 
that the schools be condemned. So you find it following the line 
quite strictly. 

As I say, Mr. Harris admits if he still felt the same way he would 
be incompetent to hold his job. We find such a fantastic picture in 
the Voice that we know there is some one some place responsible for 
it. I for one, and I know other members of the committee agree 
with me that this cannot be the result merely of stupidity. It is by 
design. We are trying to find out who is responsible. I feel that if 
I were trying to aid the Communist cause, and some of the witnesses 
have made this statement, one of the excellent ways to aid the cause 
would be to cut off the Hebrew desk at the time they were handed this 
excellent counterpropaganda weapon, that is, when the Communists 
became anti-Semitic. 

For that reason it is very important to us to try to find the reason- 
ing behind this. We find that neither the head of the Hebrew desk, 


nor the head of the Near East Division, were ever consulted. We 
have had testimony to the effect that this was continued until the 
elections because otherwise it might have an adverse effect on some 
candidate in this country. For that reason we are keeping you here 
longer, Dr. Glazer, than we would normally on this subject. 

Would 3^ou comment on that, and then Mr. Harris will comment on 
the subject. 

Mr. 'Glazer. I would like to say that as late as December 5, 1952, 
Washington maintained that the reason for suspending broadcasts 
was "proved ineffectiveness of our signal." I would like at this 
moment to read another cable from the field. 

Senator Mundt. No more cables unless you read them all. 

Mr. Glazer. This is unclassified, and I don't believe it was referred 
to here, and was the reason for my great puzzlement, using ineffectual- 
ness on the one hand or the fact that the signal was not audible on 
the other as justification for the suspension. This cable, unclassified, 
dated November 17, states : 

VOA coverage presidential elections excellent. Signal strength satisfactory, 
reception very good, press, official and private comment over Israel indicate 
heavy listenership Hebrew and English broadcast. Detailed operation memo- 
randum follows. 

Senator Mundt. Signed by whom? 

Mr, Glazer. Signed by Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell was counsel of 
the Embassy who had arrived in Israel, I think a month or so prior 
to the election. He was a brand new man, and frankly I was a little 
bit puzzled to find a comment about the Voice of America over his 
signature. All material dealing with the Voice normally would come 
over the signature of the public-affairs officer or one of his subordinates. 

Two days later we got the detailed account of our election coverage, 
also an unclassified document. I would like, if I may, to quote 2 or 
3 paragraphs from it, indicating very significantly the impact we 
were making in terms of propaganda value, not to mention the fact 
that we were actually heard. 

Press coverage. Mr. Nathan Gurdns, correspondent of Agence France Presse 
and of Haboker, a leading local daily, stated that USIS coverage was a splendid 
example cf American efticiency. He had particular praise for the Voice of 
America, stating that VOA made it unnecessary for any reporter to move from 
his radio. Mr. Gurdus' sentiments were reflected by representatives of virtually 
all significant local newspapers. 

The Chairman. Wliat would you say about Mr. Johnstone's state- 
ment that there are other ways of better reaching the people of Israel ? 

Mr. Glazer. I do not agree with it. I would like to say, however, 
that my disagreement is on technical ground. It is my personal opinion 
that one medium is not a substitute for another under special circum- 
stances. They are not transferrable.and sometimes the discontinuance 
of one media, particularly one that requires a highly trained staff, 
radio, is f rought with the greatest danger that cannot be compensated 
even with the intensification of another medium. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : Has there been a fairly strong 
Communist Party in Israel ? 

Mr. Glazer. It has been strong out of proportion to its numbers. 
In terms of the formal representation in the country's parliament 
where, as you know, the party is still legal, it has had no more than 
eight members at its high point. It now has five. However, in coop- 


eration with an extreme leftist party, it has managed to exert a very 
considerable influence, not so much in promoting pro-Communist sen- 
timent as such, but to equally dangerous neutral sentiments, and I 
think it was that that was to us one of the greatest tasks to which 
we had to address ourselves, and would, it seemed to me, have been 
promoted by an evidence of American dissent implicit in the suspen- 
sion of Voice broadcasts. 

The Chairman. Am I correct in this, that the Communists were 
using to fairly good advantage the fact that they had favored the 
creation of the Israel state and also propagandizing the people of 
Israel to the effect that there was no discrimination because of race 
or color under Communist control ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Glazer. That is correct. 

The Chairman. They M'ere making fairly good headway in that^ 

Mr. Glazer. Very much so. 

The Chairman. I assume there is no question but what their open 
anti-Semitism would have been extremely effective as a weapon of 
counterpropaganda to show that they were not telling the truth when 
they were saying there was no racial or religious discrimination. 

Dr. Glazer. Quite. 

The Chairman. Can you see any reason at all when you were handed 
that effective counterpropaganda weapon you desk should be closed ? 
Can you think of a single reason ? 

Dr. Glazer. I can't think of any reason, but I can think of about 
a dozen reasons why we should have given additional time. 

The Chairman. I am not sure whether you covered this or not this 
morning, but, as I recall, you or Mr. Dooher stated in New York that 
you felt that the closing of the desk would have been a tremendous 
service to the Communist cause. 

Mr. DooiiER. I stated that, sir. Could I comment a little further? 

The Chairman. Yes ; you may. 

Mr. Dooher. This morning there were remarks made about dirty 
pool and nasty implications. 

The CHAIR3IAN. I did not get that. 

Mr. Dooher. This morning there were statements made by Mr. 
Harris about nasty implications or dirty pool. I did not make any 
implications. I made a statement of fact. I consider that this clos- 
ing of the Hebrew desk was part of a pattern. For reasons of high 
policy I cannot go at this moment into the pattern step by step. I 
cannot develop it. I hope to be able to do so later, possibly next week 
or 2 weeks from now. However, I can read from an interview which 
\vas given by Dr. Compton to a national magazine this week. I have 
the highest respect for Dr. Compton and do not think that these are 
his ideas. I think that these ideas are the result of advice he has 

In the interview the question was asked : "What changes, if any, do 
you think should be made in the operation of the voice?" Answer — 
and this is a partial answer — I will not take it out of context. I have 
the entire article here for anyone. The first paragraph of the an- 
swer is: 

It should be concentrated on the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It is not 
only the best Init the only means of reaching them. The "Voice broadcasts to the 
free countries — those that can be reached by other means wiiich are generally 
more effective — should be reduced to a standby basis or eliminated. 


I would like to leave for a while this statement : "those that can be 
reached hj other means which are generally more effective." That 
is a point which I would like to develop after this policy consideration 
is over. I would like to comment upon the statement with this inter- 
polation out. "The Voice broadcasts to free countries should be 
reduced to a standby basis or eliminated." 

That means that this recommendation by Dr. Compton means that 
we sliould continue the struggle behind the Iron Curtain and the area 
where the battle was lost. We should retreat from the field in those 
areas where the battle should be won by psychological warfare. This 
is a recommendation that we decrease our psychological warfare poten 
tial in those areas where it is important to increase it. 

That is my statement, sir. 

Tiie Chairman. Thank you. 

Anything further, Doctor? In other words, I gather you feel 
strongly, Mr. Dooher, if the Voice is properly run, it can be of tremen- 
dous benefit. 

Mr. DooHER, Sir, I can prove it. 

The Chairman. And you feel that Communist Eussia is engaging 
in an all-out propaganda war, and that we should engage in a comiter- 
propaganda war ourselves. 

Mr. DooHER. I do, and I would personally like to develop the rea- 
sons why Dr. Compton made these recommendations, where he got the 
advice, who concurred in this advice, or was it simply an idea he got 
after he resigned. I do not believe that, sir. 

The Chairman. You said that the attempted cancellation of the 
Hebrew desk follows the pattern. 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. I cannot develop the step of the pattern, 
but I can develop the conclusion which is stated in public print. 

The Chairman. And your conclusion is that there is a deliberate 
pattern of attempting to keep the Voice from being an effective anti- 
Communist weapon. 

]Mr. DooHER. A deliberate pattern to destroy or nullify the Voice 
as a broadcast to the free world. I do not know whether the pattern 
will go further and eventually destroy the Voice broadcast to the 
nonfree world. But as far as I can develop it, it can be developed 
here very clearly, I believe. 

The Chairman. Do you think the various unusual aspects of the 
Voice we have discovered are the result of stupidity or design ? 

Mr. Dooher. As I testified in New York, sir, I do not believe it 
could be stupidity, because stupidity does not fall into a design. 

The Chairman, In other words, if a man is stupid, he normally 
does not follow a consistent pattern. 

Mr. Dooher. That is right. 

The Chairman. He may make a mistake that is right once in a 

Mr. Dooher. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

Mr. Dooher. No, sir. I felt I had to make this statement in view 
of the fact that these remarks had been made this morning, which I 
believe reflected not upon my implications of last week, but my state- 
ment of last week. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, I assume you have a statement. 


Mr. Harris. I certainly have, Mr. Chairman. You have given the 
witnesses who are supporting your thesis the utmost freedom. This 
morning at the end of the session they were testifying on this same 
line, and the senior minority member, Senator McClellan, said he 
assumed that Mr. Harris would have something to say, and the hear- 
ing was ended like that. When it opened this afternoon I did not 
have an opportunity to present my position on it. 

The Chairman. You^ill be on here a few more days yet. Do you 
prefer having a chance to speak earlier in the day and the other wit- 
ness later? I would like to accommodate you. It is 4 o'clock now. 
Do you think we are unfair to you if you did not speak at 12 but at 4? 
We will put you on at 12 tomorrow. 

Mr. Harris. It has nothing to do with the particular part of the 
day. It has to do with the juxtaposition of the charges. They are 
put on the record, and they go on for 2 or 3 hours, and, if I am lucky, 
I get a chance to say something in rebuttal thereto. I do not feel 
that is basically fair. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, let us have it clear right now, that you 
will have unlimited time to say whatever you want to. This committee 
is interested in arriving at the facts. You agree that your background 
is such that unless you have reformed, you would not be competent 
to hold your job. I am interested in jfinding some evidence of reform. 
I have not seen it yet. So for that reason you will be given unlimited 
time to give the committee any proof that you have to show you do 
not feel the same or stronger than when you wrote that book. You 
can have any time of the day you want. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, you repeatedly use words like "incom- 
petent"' or "unqualified" when you say that I admit that I would not 
be the person to take this job if I still had the views in that book. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you one question. If I misquoted you, 
do you feel today that if you held the ideas you had when you wrote 
that book, that you would be either competent or qualified to hold the 
job you now hold? 

Mr. Harris. If I held all the views in that book today, I would not 
be qualified on security grounds to hold this position. The question 
of my competence as an editor or writer and that sort of thing would 
not be involved in any manner, sir. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Harris. I would like to point out to this committee, my job, 
the job of Dr. Compton, the job of the top people here, is to promote 
the maximum effectiveness of our whole worldwide campaign against 
international communism, using all media as economically as possible. 
Let us get this situation in perspective. 

The chairman said this morning that I am the only man who de- 
fended the decision to stop ineffective Hebrew broadcasts as an econ- 
omy measure. That has already been shown to be a little strong. And 
the chairman has implied also that I was aiding international com- 
munism by making such a decision. Yet the persons that he has pro- 
duced who keep saying that it is part of a pattern, that there was no 
reason whatsoever to cut off Hebrew, and so on, are gentlemen of the 
Voice of America, perfectly competent gentlemen, as I said this morn- 
ing. I have respect for Mr. Dooher and Mr. Glazer for their knowledge 
of the areas of the world they serve and their media, but they have a 


vested interest in the thing. That is their baby. It is close to their 
heart. I can't imagine that Dr. Glazer, no matter how much scholarly 
competence he has, would concur in a recommendation to abolish his 
unit. Of course he would not. He feels that is important. He is 
fighting for it. 

Mr. Dooher is fighting for his area of the Voice. It is a proper 
thing to do. But to imply that it is some part of a pattern supporting 
international communism, I say, is just absolutely incorrect. It is un- 
fair to the people of the top command of IIA, and it should never 
have gone on the public record. If anybody had that kind of sus- 
picion rather than to hurt the Voice all over the world by this open 
struggle in public with lots of people being attacked and called 
names, I think it should have been discussed in private until it was 
developed to the point where the facts were pretty clear. I do not 
think that there is any evidence that that has happened. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt ? Your thought is that this should 
not be in public session. It should be in secret session. 

Mr. Harris. It is my thought that this feeling Mr. Dooher has been 
led to say he has, and Dr. Glazer has been led to say, that there is some 
pattern of favoring international communism here, that would be a 
serious matter. That would involve, I think, treason. It would in- 
volve the type of thing that should be handled in a very careful, cau- 
tious way of this kind of an extremely delicate subject which can be 
damaging to our war effort all over the world, and we have evidence 
that it has been, I am leaving out the question of reputation. 

The Chairman. May I say while we welcome your views, the com- 
mittee feels that the country is entitled to this information and it 
should not be in secret session. We shall continue to hold public ses- 
sions, but thank you for the advice anyway. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, to that remark I would like to make 
this comment, that my motivation in making that statement has to 
do with the national security of the United States, and a desire to 
see this cold war prosecuted as effectively as possible. We are fighting 
international communism all over the world, not just in one country. 
We don't like to see papers overseas, the Communist radio and so 
forth, able to laugh at the Voice of America, which they have been 
doing in the last few days. That cuts deep for all of us, not just for 
the gentlemen up in New York, believe me. 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt. In other words, you feel by 
exposing the facts they can laugh at the Voice for making a mistake. 
I think that is the attitude that should be corrected in such a position 
as yours. You think it is the district attorney that catches the crook 
Avho is to blame or the committee that exposes wrongdoing and waste is 
to blame. That is our job. It is not a pleasant job. As I explained 
to you the other day, I do not think a single member of this commit- 
tee ever met you or saw you or knew anything about you until we got 
evidence concerning you. Then we took much of it in executive session, 
and because some of your friends seemed to feel it would be unfair to 
develop all the adverse evidence before you had a chance to testify, we 
decided to give you the substance of what was received in executive 
session and let you testify first. We are not going to hold these ses- 
sions secret. We feel that the American people who are paying for 
this program are entitled to know whether it is a Voice of America, 


or whether, in the words of one of the witnesses the other day, it is the 
voice of international communism. 

May I say that I do think some of the Voice desks have been doing 
an excellent job of connterpropao-anda. I think in certain echelons 
we find some very good people. But we do intend to continue this in 
public session and let the people know what is going on. And if the 
people laugh at any of the Voice operations, I think it is the job of 
the new heads to make sure they remove the cause of the laughing 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the public is entitled 
to know the facts about the Voice of America, and about the Interna- 
tional Information Administration. I do not feel that the very one- 
sided presentations that have been made in these hearings can be called 
a factual presentation. I do not think that the methods used would 
stand up in any court of law of the United States, as I have said before. 

But we will go on to the matter of Hebrew. It has not been sus- 
pended at the minute, as you know. 

The ChairMxVN. Before going into that 

Mr. Harris. Dr. Compton — — 

The Chairman. Just a minute. You said this would not stand 
up in a court of law. You have been informed you can have a lawyer. 
You have been informed that while in a court of law you could not 
consult with your lawyer while testifying, you will be given that 
privilege here. You can have your lawyer sitting beside you to advise 
you at any time. You have been told you can submit any questions 
you care to ask any witness. You have been told to submit the names 
of any witnesses you want to call, and they will be called. You can- 
not defend your position, Mr. Harris, by screaming at this committee. 
You must present the facts. 

Mr. Harris. The facts will be presented. 

The Chairman. Good. Could we get down to some of the facts 
which show that you have changed since you wrote this book, that 
you now are anti-Communist? I would like to get down to those 

Mr. Harris. That particular question is not the one we are discussing 
right now. We are discussing the Hebrew language to Israel. I think 
it is proper to go with that. 

The Chairman. That is only one part of the picture. 

Mr. Harris. I say each time you hold up that book and wave it and 
make comments about it, 3^011 make it sound just a little worse; 75 
percent of that book, sir, at the very minimum, is on commercialism 
in college football. A large part of the rest is perfectly good today or 
any other day. But there are some statements of opinion in there that 
I have repudiated as I told you many times, and those are not good 
statements. I said I was ashamed of them, that they go back 21 years, 
and you should not bring it up. Now I would like to go on with this 
Hebrew business. 

I say that Hebrew is not suspended at this moment, and you have 
pointed out that that was because of a decision by Dr. Compton. I 
will point out, however, that Dr. Compton as late as February 5 was 
still considering dropj^ing Hebrew and not on my advice, and not in 
any way connected with anything I was doing,' You will find the 
letter addressed to Senator Wiley available to you, which includes 
this statement : 


If these activities (referring to IIA media services other than radio) give 
sufficient coverage to Israel at less cost, discontinuance of broadcasting in the 
Hebrew language would be a prudent step to take. 

Now, Dr. Compton has had a number of talks with Representatives 
Taber and Clevenger, the gentlemen who deal with our appropria- 
tions in the House. They have constantly stated they felt the Voice 
was not as good as it should be and they have urged economies. There- 
fore, Dr. Compton has been very vigorous in his efforts to make sure 
we were not in any case wasting money through "Voice programs. 

The Chairjian. I want to tell the two witnesses that you may stay 
if you care to, but you are no longer under orders of the committee^ 

Now, with respect to the document, if you want to submit the resume 
of the document, we will want to see the document. That does not 
mean we will make it a part of the record. We want to compare your 
resume with the document. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, in one sense every cut we make in the 
"Voice of America, or any other medias of the IIA, could be called a 
blow in favor of communism. But those cuts are necessary because 
we get reduced amounts of money. They are not necessary because of 
some strange plan in the minds of people in our organization. "We can 
prove where the cuts have come from, what they were caused by, believe 

Let us again talk about Hebrews. Our office of field programs 
recommended the elimination of Hebrew broadcasts to Israel as a 
marginal activity. "VVe do have a document that shows that the A-in- 
bassador stated that it was a marginal activity. Our evaluation 
staff, on the basis of studies made by the Chief and Mr. Goldberg, rec- 
ommended suspension in December. Mr. Goldberg discovered that 
we had been getting fewer letters from Israel since Hebrew broad- 
casting began than we got before when there were other languages 
only getting into Israel from the Voice of America. 

The Chairman. Can you supply that information? 

Mr. Harris. I can supply detailed tabulations. 

The Chairman. No; the document. You say Mr. Goldberg and 
the Chief recommended discontinuance in December. 

Mr. Harris. They have not done it by document. I have the basic 
study on which the recommendations were made, and I would like 
to read some of it because it is very pertinent here. "We have a tabula- 
tion of audience mail which is an important measure of the effective- 
ness of our programs. It is one of the things we draw on for our in- 

In December 1952. this crucial month we have been talking about, 
there were exactly 16 letters from Israel in the regular "Voice recep- 
tion, and with respect to the Turkish program, 1,577. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? This is in conflict with testi- 
mony heretofore received. 

Mr. Harris. I do not think, Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. I have to interrupt you, Mr. Harris. 

Mr. Harris savs we have only 16 letters from Israel in December. I 
believe you testified on that. Dr. Glazer. 

Dr. Glazer. "We gave testimony of figures for a longer period of 

The Chairman. Yours do not merely cover the month of December? 


Dr. Glazer. No; that covered since the inception of the broadcasts. 

The Chairman, I think you referred to the tremendous increase 
since the anti-Semitic purges in Russia? 

Dr. Glazer. Yes, sir. I said we had a terrific increase of listeners. 
I did not say mc had a terrific increase in the number of letters. 

The Chairman. I am sorry. 

Dr. Glazer. I would like to mention at this time that I agree with 
the figure of 16 just quoted for the month of December. However, 
for the same month the country of Egypt, with a population 18 times 
the size of Israel, also had the figure of 16 letters for the month. I 
bring this up to show that audience mail is only a factor in evaluation. 

The Chairman. I am going to ask' you to refrain at this moment. 
I thought you had some other figures. Proceed, Mr. Harris. 

Mr. Harris. Thank you. 

The Chairman. When ISIr. Hari'is gets through, I Avant to hear 
from you. Dr. Glazer. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, since Dr. Glazer has mentioned Egypt, 
I would point out that there is no separate special program that goes 
to Egypt equivalent to the Hebrew. The Arabic, which also serves 
Egypt, goes to a number of countries through the Near East, and the 
letters that came in on all Arabic programs for all Arabic broad- 
casts in December numbered 300 letters. I will submit this. I will 
be glad to give it to the committee. This is a perfectly provable 

The Chairman. I might say for that to have some value, you should 
have the comparative population figures from which that mail comes. 
You say there are 16 from Israel and 309 from the entire Arabic world. 
What is the comparison ? 

Mr. Harris. I can't give you that now. But let us have some other 
comparisons right now. The Israel letters, as I say, were 16 in De- 
cember. From Turkey we had 1,577 ; from Greece, we had 1,301 ; from 
Iran we had 712. Now, 16 from Israel does not suggest that the 
Hebrew language program was getting to some tremendous number 
of people. Furthermore, I have here an annual report of the re- 
stricted classification, and therefore it can be turned over to the com- 
mittee without question. It is not security information but I will 
quote from it and I will turn the whole document over to you. This 
is dated January 9. It comes from our Embassy over there, and it 
says : 

The VOA Hebrew broadcasts to Israel still fail to evoke any great listener 
interest. As the Embassy sees the situation, a regular continuing press cam- 
paign is the only remaining hope to create a raison d'etre for the VOA Hebrew 

The Chairman. Is that January 1953 ? 
Mr. Harris. That is January 9, 1953. 

Funds for such a project would, of necessity, come from VOA allocations and 
would constitute a minuscule portion of the total sum spent on programs. 

They are talking about a press campaign that would be necessary 
to build up listenership. That is another type of information. 

I repeat that our letters show that this is one of the least effective 
services, and we have fewer letters. 

I want to repeat my statement. When the Voice of America was 
broadcasting to Israel only in languages other than Hebrew, we 


■^vould get more letters. The letters went down when we started the 
Hebrew broadcasts, which certainly does not suggest a great increase 
in listenership as a result of putting on Hebrew broadcasts. 

Now, another thing. Dr. Glazer in his testimony in New York 
said that there had been a number of surveys made and they had 
several types of information available proving the effectiveness of 
Hebrew, and he referred for one thing to the work of a scientific panel 
that had been convened and had been asked how the Voice of America 
could best program in Hebrew or in other languages in Israel, and 
here is a quote from that, and I will also furnish that full document. 
It says: 

Language choice — English preferred ; Hebrew second. 

Many respondents had listened to foreign broadcasts in more than one language. 
Englisii led with 32 mentions, followed by Hebrew with 1.5, German with 10, 
Russian with 7, and French with 6. 

My job is to be a manager of public funds so they are used to the 
maximum effect in the battle against worldwide communism, and not 
merely to meet a very special need in a single coimtry, if need there be. 
We do not feel that need exists. If we did, we would have ruled 

The Chairman. Are you through with that document that you are 
reading from? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir, I am. 

The Chairman. I assume you want these marked as exhibits, Mr. 

Mr. Harris. I would like to have them marked as exhibits. I would 
appreciate it very much. 

( The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 35 and 36" 
and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

Mr. Harris. Dr. Glazer, as I say, naturally fighting for the life of 
his desk on the Voice of America, although he would certainly be used 
in our anti-Communist unit up there with the knowledge he has, has 
quoted from a number of things here, and he was just reading, a 
minute ago from a report from the Embassy in which they lumped 
English and Hebrew, and the impression might have been given that 
lie was talking only about Hebrew. 

The Chairman." May I interrupt? May I see the document you 
read from last? 

Mr. Harris. The one I read from last is there among those exhibits. 

The Chairman. You are reading a report from the Embassy ? 

Mr. Harris. That is in my hands. I want to make another refer- 
ence to it. Do you wish to look at it and hand it back ? 

The Chairman. May I have it a second so I can follow your testi- 
mony ? That is committee's exhibit No. 35. 

Mr. Harris. Yes. 

Now, I would like to ask, if I could, through this committee or 
directlv to this committee, what would the American taxpayei-s say 
if they knew we were using between $80,000 and $100,000 a year, and 
that is the yearly cost of the Hebrew desk, on a service reaching so 
few people that only 16 write to us in a crucial month like December? 
And that is all mail" from Israel. I say that the Israelis need nothing 
from us to be persuaded to be anti-Soviet. I am sure that you would 
know that one of the Soviet consulates there was bombed by the people 


of Israel. I am sure you know they cut off diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Government. I find it very hard to see 

Senator Mundt. Were those decisions made before or after the 
decision was made to abandon. the Hebrew desk? 

Mr. Harris. They were made recently but the reason is to show that 
the Israeli people were getting thoroughly anti-Communist. I don't 
believe the small Communist Party there has a Chinaman's chance. 
I think they are probably well boxed in and locked out of the way. 
I am practically certain of that, because no country is going to put up 
with this vicious anti-Semitic campaign. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, from the testimony we previously had 
we understand that this Hebrew service is more than merely with 
respect to Israel. That covers other areas of the world. I do not 
follow your reasoning to the eifect that when you have a tremendous 
counterpropaganda weapon, such as you have here, that there is no 
need to use it because the people will know about it anyway. If that 
were true, the only time you would use the Voice is when you had 
to manufacture counterpropaganda. 

Mr. Harris. I don't follow your reasoning on that. I don't agree 
with that. 

The Chairmax. You say we can discontinue the Hebrew broad- 
casts because the Jewish people tlirougliout tlie world — not using your 
language, but trying to get your idea — will of necessity be anti-Com- 
munist now that the Communists are so publicly anti-Semitic. In 
other words, when you were handed a tremendous propaganda weapon, 
we do not need to use it over the Voice because the people of the world 
will know about it. Is that not the reasoning? 

Mr. Harris. No; not in the way you said it; because we are using 
that wea]Don, and very hard, all over the world in every language. 
But we did propose to take out the least of the effective languages he- 
cause it was not serving the purpose. We have less money than we 
need to do all the things we would like to do. That applies to the 
Voice as well as the rest of the organization. 

The Chairman. You say the least effective of the languages. You 
say that the man who is head of the Hebrew desk is saying tliat because 
he is fighting for his job. I do not believe that is true. He seems to 
me to be a very sincere American. It seems to me that he is fighting for 
America. He says that his survey shows that 60 percent of the people 
can understand Hebrew. From the number of letters received from 
Israel, I do not know whether the people who cannot speak or write 
English would be inclined to write us if they did not know where or 
how to write. One of the recommendations made was that you cancel 
the Portuguese desk before you canceled the Hebrew desk. If it is a 
question of how many letters are important, can you tell us how many 
letters you got from Portugal? 

Mr. Harris. I can't at this minute. I will be glad to check it. 

The Chairman. If this matter of letters is important, we should 
check with the other desks which you kept on instead of canceling 
the Hebrew desk. 

Dr. Glazer, you had a comment to make on this. Will you make it 
briefly? I want to give Mr. Harris plenty of time. 

Dr. Glazer. I would like to comment specifically on the point he 
mentioned with regard to using audience mail as a criterion of effec- 


tiveness. First, I would like to say that there is only one device known 
to us that will give us such a criterion, and that is a scientific survey, 
using established, tested procedures that were very largely developed 
in this country and applied overseas. Such an organization, by the 
way, does exist in Israel. We are very much interested in having them 
do the survey until we found out that it would have cost $10,000. We 
couldn't afford it ; so we never did contract for this survey. 

I submit that anything other than that, a fair sampling using scien- 
tific methods, does not indicate in any way, except the most tentative 
fashion, the degree of effectiveness or the success in carrying over our 
message. We recognize that mail does have significance, particularly 
in very large quantities and with reference to certain external factors. 
However, we cannot assume from the absence of mail that the contrary 
is the case, because in the very nature of things only a tiny fraction 
of the people write. Until you can assess the habits of a population 
of a country, the circumstances under which they are struggling, I 
submit you can't tell from the absence or presence of letters what that 
really means. 

You take a country like Israel, where it costs something like 30 
cents to write a letter, where you have to wait in line half an hour or 
more in order to buy a stamp ; that might discourage them from writ- 
ing. That does not mean that you will be willing to go through all 
the hazards of posting a letter to a foreign nation. 

The Chairman. Let me ask both of you gentlemen this : Mr. Harris, 
as I understood, said the Hebrew broadcast was the least effective. In 
support, of that, you gave us exhibit No. 4, which compares the mail 
received from Israel, Turkey, Greece, and Iran. I understand there 
are 46 different language desks. When you say the Hebrew desk is the 
least effective, have you compared the mail from the other 45 desks, or 
do you mean merely the least effective of the 4 you gave here ? 

Mr. Harris. I mean least effective of the number of programs car- 
ried by the Voice. 

The Chairman. Did you base that on the letters you receive ? 

Mr. Harris. On a great many things. The reports from the Em- 
bassy, the comments of the public-affairs officer who served there for 2 
years and is in touch with the Embassy all the time, Mr. Leonard 
Ware, a member of Mr. Johnstone's staff. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you, when you give us the number of 
letters received, do you take into consideration the factors mentioned 
by Dr. Glazer — namely, a cost of 30 cents to send a letter and that 
people might have to stand in line to get a stamp for a half-hour or 
more — and, therefore, they may not be free in their letterwriting ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly do, because the same situation obtains in 
Turkey and several other Arabic areas^ and Iran. 

The Chairman. What does it cost to send a letter in Turkey? 

Mr. Harris. I can't give you the exact figure, and I don't think Dr. 
Glazer could give you the same exact figure for Israel. 

The Chairman. Why do you say it is the same situation in Turkey? 

Mr. Harris. Because I have heard people say that it is not cheap to 
get mail out of those Near East countries. It is not limited to Israel. 
The cost of transportation is involved. 

The Chairman. You can submit any exhibits you care to; but, if 
you are going to submit an exhibit such as this, and on the basis of 


that — that the Israel desk is the least effective — it will not have much 
meaning unless you submit the same figures on all 46 desks. 

Mr. Harris. That can be done. But I did not state on the basis of 
this alone, as I have repeatedly said. I didn't state it on the basis of 
this alone. I stated it on the basis of information which we have 
developed here to some extent, and more of which is available. I think 
that the case rests on far more than this audience mail. I bring this 
up because Dr. Glazer made a considerable point this morning, or 
rather in New York, about the audience mail. Your transcript, as a 
matter of fact, said that he said "600,000 letters," and I am sure he 
did not. I think they took the statement "600" and misinterpreted it 
in the stenotype transcript. But even that 600 which he used, at least 
the people who listened with me and watched the television perform- 
ance, suggested that that meant that they got 600 letters in a recent 
period. Actually, that was all the letters they received since the thing 

Dr. Glazer. There are 881. 

Mr. Harris. Excuse me. I didn't try to add this up ; 881 is stili «, 
low figure. 

Mr. Chairman, forgive me; I have only respect for Mr. Glazer, but 
you have encouraged him to say whatever he wants to say at great 
freedom. You have not permitted interruptions of any kind by me 
while he was talking, and I should hope that you would not permit 
interruptions by Dr. Glazer while I am talking, simply in the interest 
of getting a coherent story. 

Now, Dr. Glazer has talked about the seriousness of cutting off 
Hebrew, and he implied, at least, that there would be very little, if 
any, radio getting in there by the Voice of xVmerica if Hebrew were 
cut off. That is certainly not true on the basis of the scientific evi- 
dence. For one thing, the beams that go into the Near East and cover 
Israel include the following languages: English, Arabic, Greek, as 
well as Hebrew, Persian, and Turkish. Those programs reach the 
area both in shortwave and in mediumwave. 

Additionally, it may be assumed that all languages relayed by the 
"Courier" on its present omnidirectional antennae can be heard in the 
Near East, which do not beam into a particular area. These lan- 
guages include, in addition to the ones I mentioned, Armenian, Azer- 
baijan, Georgian, Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian, Albanian, Rumanian, 
Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian. 

Lest anybody say that I am talking about languages that they don't 
speak in Israel, I am sure Dr. Glazer would admit that most of these 
languages have at least a small splinter representation in Israel. 

There are languages, in addition to these, that are broadcast from 
Munich in shortwave which can be heard by good receivers in that area 
of Israel. These include French, German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, 
Albanian, Slovene, Serbo-Croat, Hungarian, and Russian. 

We have even heard of reception by a few people of Urdu and Hindi 
because they have come up from Ceylon. Every one of those languages 
is carrying this story about the Soviet anti-Semitism. It is carrying 
the same hard-fighting anti-international-Communist message. The 
idea that somehow we favor international communism by reducing 

The Chairman. Are you stressing Soviet anti-Semitism in the 
broadcasts to Arabia ? 


Mr. Harris. We are playing it down in that area because the situa- 
tion with the Arabic-speakino; peoples is obviously that they do not 
care for Jewish people, and it should not be played up. We have men- 
tioned it, but it is not the same degree that we would mention it on 
other programs, certainly. There are a gi-eat many other things 
going on. 

The Chairman. Let me see if I follow you. You mentioned the 
fact that you have the Arabic broadcasts beamed at Israel, also, and 
therefore, for that reason you could cut off the Hebrew broadcasts, 
I would imagine that the content of your Arabic broadcasts would be 
entirely different from that in Hebrew ; is that right? 

Mr. Harris. That is lifting one single language out of a whole list 
that I read. I said English, too; didn't I? English is preferred by 
the listeners in Israel, preferred by scientific surveys that I submitted 
to you. I mentioned Greek, I mentioned Persian, I mentioned Turk- 
ish. I mentioned a number of languages that get in there from the 
Voice of America transmitters at various points. 

I don't want to appear to duck your question, but I don't see why 
the single language, Arabic, is lifted out of the context and raised as a 
question. Naturally, the Arabic content is not as strong on the theme 
of anti-Semitism. 

The Chairman. In fact, in beaming a Voice program to the Arabic 
world, I would assume you would spend practically no time at all on 
the anti-Semitism of the Soviet Union ; would you ? 

Mr. Harris. I don't know what the exact amount of content is at 
this minute. I have not had a report for the last few days. 

The Chairman. One of the important things we are interested in is 
to have the friendship of the Arabic world and the friendship of 

Mr. Harris. It certainly is. 

The Chairman. There has been considerable speculation that Com- 
munist Eussia may have started this anti-Semitic program to gain the 
favor of the Arabic world. 

Mr. Harris. I have read that, sir. 

The Chairman. Therefore, as Director of the Voice, you should 
be very deeply interested in knowing exactly what you are beaming 
to the 400 million Moslem people. 

Mr. Harris. I would. I am not Director of the Voice. 

The Chairman. Do you not know ? I am not trying to cross-exam- 
ine you, but here you have a tremendous job 

Mr. Harris. Yes, I have a very important job. 

The Chairman. And I would imagine that one of the all-important 
thitigs you have in mind is how can we gain the friendship of the 
Arabic world, the roughly 400 million people. We know the Com- 
munists are going all-out to try to gain their friendship. The ques- 
tion is, Do you not take the time to examine the scripts to find out 
what we are beaming to them? Naturally, in Israel we will play 
up the anti-Semitism of international communism. Naturally, we 
will play that up anyplace where Russia has been successful in her 
propaganda effort to create the impression that there is racial and 
religious freedom in Russia. I wonder why you, as Acting Director, 
do not know what you beam to the Arabic world since this anti- 
Semitic program started in Russia ? 


Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I think that is the kind of question 
if it were examined fairly, people would consider to be strange on the 
face of it. 

The Chairman. AVill you try to answer it, even if it is strange? 

Mr. Harris. Of course I will answer it. I am not attempting not 
to answer it. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, it is very hard to sit here and have a 
person try very hard to show a lack of understanding on a single item 
of a single jDart of a great big program of this kind. You know, sir, 
that I sit here in Washington in an office that is responsible for five 
major media, that we have 87 countries, we have 8,000 employees, we 
have all kinds of things going out to various parts of the world, and 
you ask me, do I know about the exact content of a few Arabic scripts 
right now. Of course I don't know the exact content. I know the 
general directives. 

The Chairman. I am not asking you about the exact content of a 
few Arabic scripts. You are in charge, while Dr. Compton is away, 
of this battle of words. I w^ant to know whether you can tell us 
generally what type of program you are beaming to the Arabic world. 
Are you advertising the anti-Semitism of the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Harris. I have said we are not. 

The Chairman. I am asking you if you can tell us that. 

Mr. Harris. I have testified to that and said that we are not playing 
it up in a strong way. We are mentioning it. 

The Chairman. Are you mentioning it ? 

Mr. Harris. It has been mentioned. 

The Chairman. What is the policy ? 

Mr. Harris. I cannot give you policy directives because I am not 
permitted to do so. That would give our cold-war strategy away and 
this public hearing should not have it laid before it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, you are ordered to state whether you 
have a policy of beaming information about Russia's anti-Semitism 
to the Arabic world or not. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I will consult my superiors and be glad 
to give you the answer to that. Earlier today you asked me to produce 
two guidances which are of the same nature in general which you are 
asking me about now. I specifically consulted Mr. Donald Lourie. 
I had a telephone call from him. He specifically stated that I was not 
at liberty to produce these classified directives which have to do with 
our strategy in the cold war, because if we did get them out in the open 
we would be hurting the national security and hurting our cold-war 
effort. I will make the same request regarding this, but I think -the 
answer will be that that information should not be given to this com- 
mittee in this way. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, you will be ordered to tell us whether 
or not you are beaming information about Russia's anti-Semitism to 
the Arabic world. If so, we wdll want to know why, and this com- 
mittee will have to make recommendations to the Appropriations 
Committee. We must know wdiat you are trying to do and what you 
are accomplishing, and that will be the order of the chairman at this 

Mr. Harris. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 


The Chairmax. If anyone else feels that that information is infor- 
mation to which the committee is not entitled, we will want him to give 
the reasons for it, and if the reasons seem sound we will honor them. 

Mr. Harris. All right, Mr. Chairman, that is the way it will be 
handled. Now, while we are talking about this Hebrew problem, Dr. 
Glazer used figures referring to the number of people who speak 
Hebrew in Israel. We have had a quick examination made of the 
information available to us and the gentleman who has compiled some 
information for me simply said that Dr. Glazer's figures and mine are 
both estimates. There is a question that the only reliable information, 
as I think Dr. Glazer says, is information that goes back to 1948. That 
is a long time. There were 700,000 people or so, living in Israel at 
that time, and of this number half, or 350,000, spoke Hebrew as a 
mother tongue, and about 150,000 as a second language. Since 1948, 
the Jewish population has more than doubled, owing to immigration, 
of course. It hardly seems likely that a greater percentage of the new- 
comers speak Hebrew than of the old settlers. 

Let us forget for a moment that this teaching program that they 
now have probably is aimed at schoolchildren, and that as a new 
country Israel is also a young country. It was estimated in 1951 that 
more than 40 percent of the population was under 15 years of age and 
hardly a potential audience for foreign political broadcasts. What, 
that means is that the people who would listen seriously to our pro- 
grams, Hebrew, English, or something, are the people who would be 
beyond 20, and in all probability beyond 25. We can't very well 
justify the expenditure of very limited funds to reach a small audience, 
and one already so firmly established in the anti-Communist camp. 
For instance, let us speak about the language — Russian — that we use. 
That goes to 160 million people. A comparison, I think, suggests that 
we are reaching a very, very small audience at a rather large cost with 

I say that if I had not made a recommendation that Hebrew be cut 
out I would be derelict in my duty as a public official. I have been 
constantly admonished by Dr. Compton, and when I have been before 
committees in Congress, even before the committee on which you did 
sit last year, the Senate Appropriations Committee, that there is no 
question but what they want greater economy. They want proof that 
they are getting effective use out of every dollar we spend. We have 
been trying to achieve that, but when we do it, we get assailed here 
with fantastic charges of following the Communist line. Would you 
charge the Appropriations Committees with following the Commu- 
nist line because they cut our appropriations ? 

The Chairman. We have had evidence, Mr. Harris, before this 
committee that you are proceeding with a program that has involved 
the waste of $9,500,000 in one project in the west. Now you make 
a plea for economy to the effect that you can save $10,000 or $15,000 
on this program. It does not greatly impress us when we find you 
are wasting millions in one phase of the operations and then plead- 
ing that you are trying to practice economy and cutting out the desk 
at a particular time when you are handed the propaganda. That 
desk was in existence for quite some time. 

I would also like to have you explain sometime your reasoning 
whv that was continued, that which was a waste of money, until 


election, and cut out after the election. I am curious to know why 
the International Information Program heads felt that they should 
spend money on what you call a wasteful program so as to affect 
our election in this country. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I have never stated that we made any 
decision that was based on our wishing to affect the election. We 
are under strict orders that we take no action. Federal agencies 
that would favor either side in a political controversy 

The Chairman. Did I misunderstand you this morning when I 
thought I heard you say that you decided to continue the Hebrew 
desk until after the election ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly did. 

The Chairman. Because you were afraid if you discontinued it 
before the election you might adversely affect one or the other of 
the candidates ? 

Mr. Harris. I said that to raise the issue of anti-Semitism would, 
among other things, affect one or the other of the candidates. That 
it would also put words into the campaign that could be used to great 
damage. Xlie arousing of the issue of anti-Semitism on a broad scale 
in a national election is a very dangerous thing, both domestically 
and overseas. It gives people an opportunity to make pro- and anti- 
Semitic statements that are violent, that cause the people overseas 
who want to use them, to use them to our detriment. It gives them 
wonderful ammunition. We were very much aware that any sugges- 
tion at that time of cutting out the Hebrew desk might have that 
kind of effect. Let me point out something else. 

The CHAiR]vrAN. Let us stick to that for the time being. 

Mr. Harris. This is the same point. I wisli to continue with the 
same point, if I may. 

The Chairman. You may. Proceed. 

Mr. Harris. I am sure we are aware in this room tliat anti-Semitism 
was used in the campaign against President Eisenhower in the pre- 
convention period when he was seeking the Republican nomination, 
and like many others we saw the scurrilous hate sheets which were 
making anti-Semitic attacks on General Eisenhower at that time. 
Attempts to inject this type of race hatred into the campaign failed 
because of the good sense of the American people, but they might not 
have failed if we got this subject out where everybody was talking 
Semitism and anti-Semitism in the campaign. 

The Chairman. Is it your testimony, then, that if the Truman 
administration w^ould have discontinued the Hebrew desk, you were 
afraid that this might be used against General Eisenhower? I do' 
not quite follow that. 

Mr. Harris. I am saying- that injecting the issue of anti-Semitism 
into a large public discussion, wliich is Avhat the campaign is 

The Chairman. Is it your thought that cutting off the Hebrew desk 
would indicate anti-Semitism? 

Mr. Harris. It was my impression that there might be people in 
the period of heightened excitement of a campaign who might claim 
that. They might be anti-Semitic themselves and pull that infor- 
mation out and make something of it. During a campaign, the idea of 
pro- or anti-Semitism can become absolutely explosive, as everyone 
in this room knows. 


The Chairman. In other words, it is clear then that you did con- 
tinue what you thought was a wasteful practice because the issue might 
be used in the election ? 

Mr. Harris. The issue might be used in the discussions around the 
election to our disadvantage, both overseas and domestically. 

The Chairman. You think that is a proper use of the funds ? 

Mr. Harris. AVhere national security is involved, where it involves 
both parties ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to just one 
point, and that is that during the month before we began broadcasts 
in Hebrew, which was March 1951, we got more mail from Israel than 
we got during any month of 1952. And during the 7 months ending 
with December 1952, our mail from Israel always contained far more 
letters in the English language than in Hebrew, suggesting that 
English is used with freedom and is the popular language in Israel. 

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that the fact that you 
had more letters in English indicated to you that the English broad- 
casts were more popular? 

Mr. Harris. I say that is one of the factors that suggests that Eng- 
lish is used there. I have produced, as the testimony will show, a sci- 
entific study showing that a panel technique used out there — one of 
the scientific techniques that Dr. Glazer refers to — resulted in a find- 
ing that English was preferred to Hebrew as a language for listeners 
to the VOA. I have submitted that for the record, as you know. I am 
not saying that getting letters in English necessarily proves that all 
the people who write them prefer to listen in English. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? You said you submitted that for 
the record ? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir ; I did. 

The Chairman. Is that the one entitled "Israeli Listener Panel"? 

Mr. Harris. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Harris. Earlier, when you spoke of Dr. Glazer, I mentioned 
I had respect for him, that he was an able man, but I said he was 
naturally fighting for the life of his desk, and you said you thought 
to the contrary, that he was fighting for the good of America. There 
was nothing in my statement that would suggest that he was not trying 
to fight for the good of the United States, just as I am. We are in the 
same business. We believe in fighting the cold war against interna- 
tional communism and in favor of the principles of this Nation. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, there is a big difference when you say 
a man is fighting for his own job and for that reason his testimony 
should not he given much weight. It is a rather serious accusation. 
I had never met Dr. Glazer until I Saw him in New York. I may say 
I have been favorably impressed by him and Mr. Dooher, and I have 
been impressed with the record they have had in the Voice for many 
years. I have checked their records. The only thing Mr. Dooher said 
that made him worry about himself is the fact that he rose so rapidly 
in the State Department. 

Mr. Harris. I think the fact that Mr. Dooher rose is proof that 
there is no conspiracy to hold people back in the HA. This question 
of saying that Dr. Glazer was motivated to some extent by his natural 


instincts to fight for his own desk is simply a statement of psycho- 
logical fact. No matter how far you try to disassociate yourself, you 
naturally have a desire to fight for your own desk. That is no reflec- 
tion, that is a tribute. The considerations that motivate us are neces- 
sarily broader by the nature of our jobs. We have to think about 
five media and the entire world. Dr. Glazer does not. He, therefore, 
sees such a thing as this in a far narrower context. He cannot help 
but be in that position. That is no reflection on him whatsoever. 
That is merely to show that his area of interest is necessarily some- 
what limited in respect to this program. I would like to point out 
further that in the nature of things a great many of the persons who 
serve on particular parts of our media, that is, on a single desk of the 
Voice, on a single desk of our press service, on a single selection group 
of our information-center service, on our motion-picture program, and 
so on, are not given the overall highly classified directives of certain 
kinds, and some of the highly classified information that we must 
draw on when we are making decisions in headquarters. 

I contend that the entire high command of IIA, and I include 
myself in that, has been motivated entirely by patriotic, loyal, Amer- 
ican motives, that we have at no time supported any international 
Communist line, directly or indirectly, in this work. 

The Chairman. You say as far as you know everyone 

Mr. Harris. In the top command. 

The Chairman. In the top command? 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir ; that is what I said. 

The Chairman. How about the second and third echelons ? 

Mr. Harris. I should say that everybody that I know anything 
about, that I ever met, that I have worked with in the International 
Information Administration, is strongly anti-Communist and is 
working together as a fine team to carry out our cold- war objectives all 
over the world. 

The Chairman. In other words, you are quite thoroughly satisfied 
with both the personnel and the performance of the IIA? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I feel the performance is very high 
under the conditions given. I think the performance of the Voice 
is excellent, and the rest of our media perforin excellently. I do not 
believe in your contention that anything has been proved before this 
committee suggesting these great amounts of waste that you talk 
about. I think before the end of these hearings, or at least before 
the ultimate public judgments have been made, that there has not 
been this waste will be proven. 

The Chairman. Were you responsible for the hiring of the chief 
engineer, Mr. Herrick? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Herrick was in the organization long before I ever 
got into it. 

The Chairman. I am not reflecting on his loyalty or security or 
anything of the kind, but do you think he was the type of individual 
who should have held that job as chief engineer? 

Mr. Harris. I think he is one of the most able development engi- 
neers in the country, and part of his duties were development of new 
techniques and apparatus to deal with this problem. He turned out 
to be somewhat less effective as a supervisor, and therefore we had 
to break down the work in additional parts so the supervision would 


be in other hands and Mr. Herrick, who has had a citation and honor 
award in the Department of State for his ontstanding work as a devel- 
opment enigiieer, should continue exclusively on that type of business. 
It is true that we sometimes have to make people double in brass, and 
one side of that doubling might not be as effective as the other. 

The Chairman. You think he was found unsatisfactory in super- 
vising construction work^ 

Mr. Harris. He was less effective as a construction supervisor than 
as an engineer. 

The Chairman. Did you find him unsatisfactory ? 

Mr. Harris. I have made no finding on those accounts at all. 

The Chairman. Do you not, as acting director, have something to 
say about people you put in or take out of key jobs ? 

*Mr. Harris. Yes, when I am Acting Director that is the case. 

The Chairman. Did you approve the removal of Mr. Herrick as 
chief engineer ? 

Mr. Harris. I had nothing to do with it. 

The Chairman. Do you approve of it now ? 

Mr. Harris. I think it was a good idea to move him entirely into 
development w^ork where he can do his best work and put a person who 
is a specialist in construction in that job. I think it was a wise thing 
to do, just as we always do in the case of specialists. 

The Chairman. As acting head of IIA, did you ever check into 
the background of your chief engineer? 

Mr. Harris. I had no occasion to do that but I knew his perform- 
ance, and I knew what other professional engineers say about him, 
and it was all very, very fine. 

The Chairivian. You say you knew his performance. You said 
he selected the site Baker West, which you think should be suspended. 
1 am curious. The committee heard Mr, Herrick in New York. He 
seemed to be a very nice sociable individual. We checked his school 
record and found that he had gotten D's or flunked everything in his 
preengineering work, except public speaking. We found that he had 
never taken any actual engineering work in college. This is not being 
said as a criticism of Mr. Herrick. Many people would flunk engi- 
neering, as other people might flunk other studies. 

But I wonder why you, as Acting Director, or whoever happened 
to be Director, would not check into the background of an engineer, 
especially when he is supervising this very, very costly program. I 
may say he was removed the day after we went to New York and took 
evidence in public session showing — I say showing, all the engineers 
who have testified so far have agreed that it would have been a great 
waste of money with respect to the original construction as you 
constructed Baker West — and according to the Bureau of Standards 
it would have taken 50 times as mucli power to get the same signal 
to the target area about 90 percent of the day. You say you were 
satisfied with his performance. I wonder what he would have to do 
to make you dissatisfied with his performance. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, if I had information presented to me 
in the exact form you did, and nothing else, I probably would have 
felt very badly about Mr. Herrick. Mr. Herrick had excellent prac- 
tical engineering experience. A great many engineers who have 
worked with us, consultants, and so on, so far speak highly of him. 
Mr. Carr, for instance ; Mr. Ring, for instance. 


The Chairman. Have there been complaints made to you that the 
antenna has been extremely wasteful and the wrong type selected? 
Have you received complaints to that effect ? 

Mr. Harris. I have heard two or three engineers advance opinions 
that one type of antenna is preferable to the other. But the consensus 
of opinion, which we must draw on, the best opinion we can get, says 
that the curtain antenna, which has been under criticism, give us a 
far more powerful directional signal than any other type available 
at this time. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, when you found this great quastion 
about whether a serious mistake had been made in the location of 
Baker West and Baker East, do you not think that normally it would 
have been your duty to check into the background of your chief 
engineer, check his schooling, find out what he had done as an engineer, 
to see if he was qualified, or were you too busy, or why did you not 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, it was in no way my province to do 
that. General Stoner made the checks of the location of Baker East 
and Baker West after new engineering evidence suggested that there 
may have been a question about the location of Baker West. No one 
iri our organization has ever conceded that there was a reason for sus- 
pending Baker East, except the public controversy aroused by this 
committee. Baker East we will probably wish to continue. On the 
best scientific evidence we have, it ought to continue. 

The Chairman. Let us take Baker West. Do you agree that to 
continue that would result in a waste of $9 million ? 

Mr. Harris. I do not. 

The Chairman. What would j^ou set the waste at ? 

Mr. Harris. I am not sure there would be any waste. I knoV there 
is a difference of opinion among scientific people about whether the 
location is the best location under the circumstances. 

The Chairman. You say there is a difference of opinion. Do you 
know that the Bureau of Standards has issued a report saying that 
the original site was undesirable and that a. site farther south, either 
San Francisco or San Diego, would mean that you could get by with 
one-fiftieth as much power in certain parts 90 percent of the day? 
Do you disagree with the Bureau of Standards on that? 

Mr. Harris. I am not competent to go into details on this thing. I 
know we have had the statements of various engineers that they do 
not subscribe with the original recommendations made to us, which 
were supposed to have included the information from the Bureau of 
Standards at that time. 

The Chairman. You have repeated that over several times. 

Mr. Harris. I have, sir. 

The Chairman. We have the head of the Bureau of Standards 
under oath before the committee, and he said that you have never 
requested any information from them. 

Mx. Harris. We said we did not. MIT did it for us, I don't know 
liow that particular kind of evasion got into the record. 

The Chairman. That kind of what? 

Mr. Harris. Wliat I would say would be an evasion. 

The Chairman. I did not hear you. That particular kind of what 
got into the record ? 


Mr. ILvRRis. I would say that was an evasion because the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology requested that information for 
us. We did not request it. The man who so testified is testifying 
quite truthfully that we did not request information from the Bureau 
of Standards. But when MIT requested the information for us, I 
hardly see that that indicates that we didn't have the mformation, 
or that we haven't used the Bureau of Standards information. 

The Chairman. You paid MIT, and you say MIT got the informa- 
tion from the Bureau of Standards. 

Mr. Harris. I say one of many kinds of information that they 
had was information from the Bureau of Standards. 

The Chairman. Do you question the fact that the Bureau of Stand- 
ards is better equipped to conduct the study than the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology ? While the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology is excellently qualified for many studies, this was rather un- 
usual. This was a type of work the Bureau of Standards was equipped 
to do. 

I am curious as to why you hired the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology to get the information from the Bureau of Standards. 
It seems rather roundabout. 

Mr. Harris. The Bureau of Standards was but one of many areas 
and people who were consulted by the people on this survey. They 
were not limited to the Bureau. We certainly do agree that the 
Central Propagation Laboratory of the Bureau of Standards is very 
well equipped. They did not have a report of that nature available 
at the time we were doing this work, from what the MIT people tell us. 

The Chairman. We are talking about the propagation of a signal. 

Mr. Harris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The Bureau of Standards is fully equipped to 
conduct such a study. 

Mr. Harris. It is. 

The Chairman. The Bureau of Standards did conduct such a 
study for this committee. 

Mr. Harris. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. They have testified under oath that you have never 
asked them to conduct this propagation study. 

Mr. Harris. We did not, sir. 

The Chairman. The testimony is that you hired MIT to do it. 

Mr. Harris. A number of things, including that, sir. 

The Chairman. Why did you not have this work done for free by 
the Bureau of Standards ? 

Mr. Harris. There was no charge made by the MIT for informa- 
tion obtained by them from the Bureau of Standards. 

The Chairman. Was there any charge by the Massachusetts Insti- 
tute of Technology for this popagation study ? 

Mr. Harris. They made far more than a propagation study. They 
went into all factors. 

The Chairman. You know what I am asking you. 

Mr. Harris. I know. They made a large charge for the total 
project. But they did not charge for any- information they got 

The Chairman. Did they charge you for this propagation study? 
Do you know what I mean by propagation study? 

Mr. Harris. Yes ; I understand what a propagation study is. 


The Chairman. You know you had to have that study conducted 
before you could intelligently decide to locate those two key broad- 
casting stations. 

Mr. Harris. That is right. ' 

The Chairman. And the propagation study made by the Bureau 
of Standards indicates your selection of Baker West was wrong. My 
question was this : Did you pay MIT for this propagation study, and, 
if so, how much ? 

Mr. Harris. The propagation study I could not give you a figure on 
unless we got a breakdown. The project of which it was a part, which 
would cover something like 50 items, cost a good deal. It cost between 
$500,000 and $600,000, 1 believe. 

The Chairman. Could you tell us why you did not have the Bureau 
of Standards conduct this all-important propagation study ? 

Mr. Harris. I do not know why the Voice did not do that. I think 
the feeling was that they needed more information than the Bureau 
of Standards could furnish. We may have found by informal inquiry 
that they were not ready to do it at that time. I don't know. 

The Chairman. In any event, some $3 or $4 million has been 
spent on Baker West, which has now been discontinued, and as far as 
you know the Bureau of Standards said it never should have been 
located where- you have located it. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, you have made such a statement, and I 
certainly have no reason to question it, but I would like to point out 
here that I have a statement prepared by Col. Fred P. Andrews of the 
United States Signal Corps, retired, who has had experience in mak- 
ing use of radio communications from the State of Washington be- 
tween Seattle and Tokyo, and I would like to have permission to read 
that and also submit it for the record. 

The Chairman. Do you consider Colonel Andrews as a qualified 

engineer ? 

Mr. Harris. I consider that he knows about the practical expe- 
rience. It is not a question of theoretical engineering. It is a ques- 
tion of actual experience in operating radio circuits, which he did 

The Chairman. Do you feel he is a qualified engineer? 

Mr. Harris. I know nothing about whether he is a qualified engi- 
neer or not, I know he is a colonel of the United States Signal 
Corps. I know that he was in charge of the Alaska Communications 
System, which included radio-telegraph circuits, and Voice circuits 
beyond Seattle to Tokyo. 

The Chairivian. Did you try to appoint him as Chief Engineer of 

Mr. Harris. General Stoner savs he believes he might be one of 
the good candidates. 

The Chairman. You suggested that he be appointed chief engineer; 
did you not? 

Mr. Harris. I had nothing to do with it unless I signed a recom- 
mendation that General Stoner developed. 

The Chairman. You did sign a recommendation that he be ap- 
pointed chief engineer; did you not? 

Mr. Harris. I would have to check my files to see whether I signed 
a recommendation that Colonel Andrews become chief engineer. 


The Chairman. You do not know at this time whether you recom- 
mended him as chief engineer ? 

Mr. Harris. I know he was recommended to me by General Stoner 
as a person who would be qualified. I don't know whether we actually 
went through and asked for his services or not. 

The Chairman. I will introduce the document which you were go- 
ing to introduce on this expert, a letter dated March 3, 1953, special 
delivery from the United States Civil Service, region 1, addressed to 
Mr. Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel, Senate Investi^tion Subcommittee, 
Eoom 160, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Cohn : At the telephoned request of Miss Lawrence, we are send- 
ing you by special delivery a photostat of the application of Mr. Fred Page An- 
drews who, you will note, received an ineligible rating under "Announcement 
No. 2-S (52)" for the position of engineer. 

The ineligible rating was based on the fact that Mr. Andrews failed to show 
the required qualifying experience. 
Sincerely yours, 

James E. Rosseix, Regional Director. 

{ The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 37" and may 
be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. Now, let us hear about this expert. 

Mr. Harris. I should say as far as his experience from the point 
of view of the Civil Service Commission is concerned, that is pretty 
well disposed of. I have the statement that he has 14 years of ex- 
perience on the Alaskan Communications System, in the capacity of 
commanding officer for 9 years and 5 years as officer in charge of 
engineering. I should hate to think that the Signal Corps of the 
United States Army would agree with that appraisal by the Civil 
Service Commission. 

The Chairman. When you were offering him to us as the authority 
that the Bureau of Standards was wrong, did you know that he had 
been declared ineligible for the position of engineer, not the chief 
engineer ? 

Mr. Harris. I had heard nothing of that kind until you read that 

The Chairman. Until this time you did not know that he was de- 
clared ineligible ? 

Mr. Harris. I certainly did not know it. I will point out once 
more that we have clear-cut evidence that he successfully operated 
the Alaskan Communications System for the United States Army 
Signal Corps. I don't know what goes into the judgment some- 
times of the Civil Service Commission. Sometimes they make me 
wonder. But I can say that certainly a man who successfully oper- 
ated a communications system as big as that should be considered a 
person who knows what he did and what happened. He is not mak- 
ing this statement on the basis of some general engineering compe- 
tence. He is making it on the basis of actual experience. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, before you recommended this man 
Andrews for the job of chief engineer, did you check his background 
to see if he had ever gone to an engineering college, if he had ever 
graduated, if he had flunked as the other chief engineer had ? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, our method of selecting personnel — — 

The Chairman. Did you or did you not ? 


Mr. Harris. I had it clone by my personnel division, which is the- 
proper way to do it, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. What did you find that his educational background 

Mr. Harris. I do not have the report. I have not had it reported 
to me. 

The Chairman. You have not? 

Mr. Harris. 1 1 has not been reported. 

The Chairman. You did not get a report, and as of today you do 
not know whether you recommended him as chief engineer or not? 

Mr. Harris. The thing you are calling a recommendation may have 
consisted of a routine request that our personnel office make a check 
as to his availability for the position. That does not constitute ac- 
tually a recommendation, if such a document exists. It indicates that 
we have heard that this man has the qualifications, but we want the 
normal checking done. That means that both the civil-service type 
of checking of his background and the security checking must be 
made on our program before any man can work for it, including a full 
FBI field investigation. That is all that means. That work shall be 
undertaken by our personnel and security people. 

The Chairman. Did not your recommendation mean that he would 
have had the job of chief engineer unless the Civil Service Commis- 
sion had turned him down ? 

Mr. Harris. Unless civil service or security had turned him down 
he certainly would have had the job. 

The Chairman. In other words, you think we should leave it up to 
the Civil Service Commission to determine whether your chief engi- 
neer is competent or not. It is not up to you. 

Mr. Harris. As a matter of fact, we are by law required to have 
civil service do this part of the job. After we get the details from 
civil service, then we can make the choice as between people. He 
would not have gone on duty if the report had come back that he was 
not qualified, or something of that kind. I think the Civil Service 
Commission with its exoellent ways of investigating and checking 
records certainly should be able to give us as much information as 
anybody can. 

The Chairman. Did you check to see if Mr. Herrick, who had 
flunked engineering, had passed the civil-senace test? 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I don't see why that is really relevant 
because I came into this program in August 1950, when Mr. Herrick 
had long been on the Voice. I had no reason to go back and recheck 
the records of each of the officials with whom I was working. They 
were performing in a way that appeared competent, was reported 
to be competent, and we carried them. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, you knew that Mr. Herrick had been 
demoted and that he was no longer cliief engineer. You knew that 
this project on the west coast that cost millions of dollars had been 
discontinued. I assume you read the record and knew that he had 
1 year of preengineering and had flunked. 

Did not that sort of put you on your guard and make you say to 
yourself, "Harris, before we get a new chief engineer, let us be sure 
we get a good man." 


Mr. Harris. I should certainly say so. And when the former Chief 
of Army Communications, General Stoner, comes in and says that a 
man is a person who is qualified, we certainly send his name in and find 
out what the details are through the normal channels. I think that is 
a proper and sensible thing to do. Certainly you wouldn't contest that 
the man who was Chief of the Army Communications Service during 
the war, and was a high-ranking general in the Signal Corps, would 
be lacking in any judgment on what kind of people made good chief 

The CHAiRMAisr. You refer to General Stoner's judgment. You 
tnow that General Stoner wrote a memorandum to Dr. Compton point- 
ing out that Baker West was located in the wrong location and to con- 
tinue operations there was more than a calculated risk. He said, "If 
we move it, we will get in trouble and will have to explain to the 
press and Congress may investigate us. Therefore, let us continue on 
with this and compound the error." Would you say you are willing 
to rely on his judgment? 

Mr. Harris. I don't think that is an accurate paraphrase of the 

The Chairman. Then we will read it to you. First the conclusions : 

(1) That a more soutberly location would greatly improve the propagation 
of the transmitter as it removes the path of the electromagnetic waves from the 
absorption action of the north auroral zone. 

(2) That by remaining at the present site we are taking more than a calculated 

I may say at that time, according to the testimony, there had been 
spent only about $200,000 in the project. Here is the advice of the 
man upon whom you rely. 

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully 
to the Congress and to the press our reasons for doing so. Snch exposure may 
result in congressional investigation and would not be conducive to our ob- 
taining additional construction funds in the near future. If we remain at Seattle 
and install our megowatt at that point we also must be prepared to be continuously 
under surveillance concerning our output in efficiency. 

Now, the final recommendation: "* 

I recommend that there be no change in the present site of Baker West. 

Since then, as you know, several million dollars have been spent. 
Some of it can be reclaimed, of course, because it is equipment which 
■can be used some place else. 

I understand your testimony is that you are relying upon this man 
to select a chief engineer for you. 

Mr. Harris. Dr. Compton tliought highly of him. I think highly of 
him. He made this memorandum to Dr. Compton at the time and I 
did not see it until it came up in this investigation. But we had every 
reason to trust the judgment of General Stoner on all counts I knew. 

The Chairman. Do you trust his judgment now after hearing this 
memorandum read? 

Mr. Harris. I would not think well of the sequence suggested there. 
I don't understand that particular approach to a thing. It does. not 
seem to be very well thought through. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Harris. But I had no knowledge of that memorandum, I 
might say, at the time there was talk about the possibility of a new 


chief engineer. Dr. Compton did suggest that General Stoner find 
an appropriate person and start finding out through the normal per- 
sonnel mechanism whether he would be available and the proper 
person to go on the job. There is probably no doubt that a routine 
memorandum went in to have that check made. I still feel, Mr. Chair- 
man, that a colonel who has served for a year and a half in charge of 
the Alaskan communications system radio-telegraph circuits between 
Seattle and Tokyo, and had additional experience in that system for 
a whole 9 years, can certainly state accurately what his experience 
was there, regardless of whatever General Stoner said in the mem- 
orandum, or whatever the Civil Service Commission said about 
Colonel Andrews. 

This statement about what actually happened under this command 
would certainly seem to stand up. There has been no question here 
of the veracity of Colonel Andrews, and I don't think we could ever 
wish to question it. I don't think you would. 

The Chairman. Mr. Harris, you need more than truth to be a good 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I say that this gentleman is making a 
statement on the basis of his experience, his experience in a particular 
situation, namely, operating radio facilities out of the State of Wash- 
ington area toward the Far East. And that therefore his experience 
has relevance and that it makes very good sense to have in the record 
a statement by such a person in order to help bring balance into the 
consideration of whether or not the Baker West location had some 
reason for being. 

The Chairman. Were you aware of the fact that Colonel Andrews 
had recommended the present location of Baker West? 

(No response.) 

The Chairman. I say when you tried to appoint him as chief engi- 
neer, were you aware of the fact that he had agreed that Baker West 
should be located where it is located ? 

Mr. Harris. I have no information on that, but I should assume 
that General Stoner, knowing him and working with him and his ex- 
perience in the Alaskan Communications System, would have gone to 
him when he was making his check. That is a supposition only. 

The Chairman. The question that occurs to me is this, that if Gen- 
eral Stoner knew, as he did know from his memorandum, that Mr. Her- 
rick and Colonel Andrews both agreed that Baker West should be 
located where it was located, and decided that was a serious mistake, 
in view of the fact that he made that one mistake, don't you think he 
should have checked further into his background ? The memorandum 
on page 3 shows that Col. Fred P. Andrews was one of those who 
recommended Baker West to be put in this bad location. 

Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I have testified before and you have 
demonstrated by showing a letter from the Civil Service Commission 
that we did indeed check very deeply into him, and the fact is that the 
Civil Service Commission would have looked at it very thoroughly. 
We would get all the information necessaiy. I can't undertake per- 
sonally all of these personnel checks, of course. You know that, and 
you wouldn't expect me to. We do have mechanism for doing it, and 
the mechanism went to work, as it should. I still return to my state- 
ment, sir, that Colonel Andrews, having had practical experience in 


operating circuits between Seattle and Tokyo — in other words, out 
of the State of Washington not far from the site of Baker West as 
it was chosen — that his experience there has some bearing on deciding 
what will really happen in a radio circuit. 

It is one of the strange things about radio that very often the theo- 
retical engineers turn out to be wrong and that the practical men 
find ways to go around a particular theoretical problem that the engi- 
neers have raised. That is one of the reasons that Mr. Herrick has 
been very successful. He has not gotten this detailed engineering 
training, and he is a person who thinks in practical terms. 

The Chairman. Did you want that statement to be made an exhibit ? 

Mr. Harris, Yes. 

The Chairman. That will be accepted as committee exhibit No. 38. 

(The document referred to was marked "Committee Exhibit No. 
38" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. We will adjourn until 10 : 30 tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 30 p. m., the committee was recessed to recon- 
vene at 10 : 30 a. m., Thursday, March 5, 1953.) 


Exhibit No. 34 

Summary of a Meeting 

Present : Alfred Puhan, Chairman, James F. Thompson, Gerald Dooher, Howard 

Hotchner, John Taliaferro, Edward W. Macy, and Idris Rossell 
Subject : Hebrew Language Broadcasts 
Time and place : Room 1631, 3 : 00 P. M., December 10, 1952 

Mr. Puhan stated that he had called this group together to apprise them of 
the order received from Mr. Reed Harris to discontinue the VOA Hebrew broad- 
casts. He read the memorandum dated December 5 received in New York on 
December 9 as follows : 

"Confirming my conversation with Sidney Sulkin and in accordance with 
discussions held in the PAB with regard to the effectiveness of Hebrew language 
broadcasts, you are requested to suspend such broadcasts as soon as possible. 
The Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs has been consulted and agrees 
with this decision, as does IFI/N. 

"I am aware of the public relations problems which could result. However, 
the proven weakness of the signal we can get into Israel with existing trans- 
mitters makes the Jewish program.^ so markedly ineffective that we cannot 
justify continuation in the face of the $600,000 cut in the IBS budget." 

Mr. Puhan then stated that for the record he wished to trace the course of 
events which had led up to this order. It was recalled that in April during Mr. 
Puhan's absence on a trip a request had come from Washington to perform 
certain "arithmetical exercises" which would reduce programming of the VOA. 
Certain recommendations were proposed by Washington, but they were reviewed 
and amended by IBS. At that time the question of Hebrew had not arisen. 

In July specific instructions were received from Washington to the effect that 
programming would have to be cut and we were requested to come up with 
programming cuts. In the middle of July a paper was prepared by IBS spelling 
out in detail programming reductions which could be made in the order of 
minimum damage to IBS objectives. If carried to its logical conclusion the 
last item for an orderly reduction of VOA programming would have been the 
discontinuance of Russian language programs. IBS at that time was prepared 
to undertake steps #1 and #2 of the suggested steps. The steps are as follows: 

1) Reduction in English Language Service from 9 hours 30 minutes to 5 hours 
45 minutes, eliminiating : 

1 hour 15 minutes to Latin America 
1 hour 15 minutes to Europe 
1 hour 15 minutes to Far East 

2) Reduction in programming from Munich from 10 hours 30 minutes to 1 
hour 45 minutes. 

3) Elimination of "Breakfast" programming to Europe and Middle East, 
except for 11 : 15 — 11 : 45 P. M. Russian transmission to be carried on point-to- 
point facilities (eliminating 4 hours of daily broadcasting). 

4) Reduction of Spanish broadcasting to Latin America from 2 hours twenty- 
five minutes to 1 hour twenty-five minutes. 

5) Reduction of Mandarin from 3 hours to 2 hours. 

6) Reduction of French Language Service from 1 hour to 30 minutes. 

7) Elimination of IBS programming operations from Washington. 

8) Reduction of Austrian Language Service from proposed 1 hour (current 45 
minutes) to 30 minutes. 

9) Reduction of Italian Language Service from 1 hour twenty-five minutes to 
35 minutes (5 minute daily RAI relay to be retained) . 

469 • 


10) Reduction in German Language Service from 1 hour 45 minutes to 1 hour. 

11) Reduction in Spanish Language Service to Spain from 45 minutes to 30 

12) Elimination of Portugese Language Service to Portugal. 

13) Elimination of Hebrew Language Service to Israel. 

14) Elimination of "Breakfast" programming to Far East except for 11:15- 
11 : 45 P. M. Russian transmission as listed in Item #2 (eliminating 3 hours 15 
minutes of daily broadcasting). 

15) Elimination of all remaining programming operations of Inter-American 
Branch: (1 hour twenty-five minutes in Spanish and 45 minutes Brazilian). 

It was noted that the elimination of the Hebrew Language Service was No, #13 
in this list. 

An excerpt from a memorandum from Mr. Kohler to Dr. Compton of July 24 
was read : 

". . . Actually, as you will recall from our appeal presentation of July 17 in your 
office, IBS asked for a limitation of VOA programming reductions to the first 
two items of some fourteen steps required if we were given no budget relief, these 
two steps being the ones mentioned above. IBS made it clear at that meeting 
that it was reluctant to agi-ee to any reduction of its program, but that in the 
interest of equality of sacrifice, it was prepared to take hese two steps, thereby 
reducing VOA programming by 15 percent. . . ." 

In another memorandum of August 11 Mr. Kohler wrote to Mr. Reed Harris 
as follows : 

". . . These additional 5 steps would cover the remaining deficit. Note that 
the Hebrew Language Service has not been eliminated. IBS recommends against 
this step, not for programming reasons, but rather as a matter of public 
relations. . . ." 

In PAB Action Paper No. 1, dated August 15, 19.52, which was cleared with 
Messrs. Reed Harris, A. G. Sims, Ben Gedalecia, W. Bradley Connors, Arthur A. 
Kimball, and which was signed and approved by Dr. Compton, the following 
point was made : 

'•. . . Portuguese and Hebrew language service will be continued until final evalu- 
ation of data from missions, etc. ; the discontinuation of either service or both, 
or any other change in IBS programs or operations subsequently developing, will 
be accompanied by adjustments in the IBS allocation. . . ." 

No further word on the Hebrew Language broadcasts was heard until Decem- 
ber 2, 1952, when Mr. Micocci wrote to Mr. Puhan with copies to Messrs. Sulkin, 
Hamilton, Sims, Carolan, Gedalecia, as follows : 

"You will recall PAB's decision to suspend Hebrew broadcasts by VOA soon after 
November 4. This is a reminder of that decision and a request to proceed with 
the suspension 

"With the thought that some new factors might have entered the picture, I 
have made a partial check here of the people concerned with Israel (NEA, IFI, 
etc.) I have found no change even though it is now assumed that with tjhe 
Courier in operation the strength of the signal is not an issue. If you wish j'ou 
may make a recheck of your own. But in view of the time that has elapsed 
since November 4, I suggest that you do it quickly — if you do it. 

"I understand that Mr. Gedalecia can and is willing to help with some public- 
relations aspects of the discontinuance. I am sure you will keep him informed 
of the timing on your program action so that he can do his part at the proper 

Mr. Puhan pointed out that IBS had been unaware of the PAB decision to 
suspend Hebrew programs soon after November 4 until the December 2 memoran- 
dum had been receiv^d. 

On December 4 Mr. Sulkin sent a teletype to IBS, an excerpt of which follows : 

". . . Hebrew: Harris will send memorandum instructing suspension of 
Hebrew Language broadcasts as soon as possible. He states that this was clearly 
a PAB decision and that nothing new has happened to change that decision. The 
cable from Tel Aviv regarding Prague trials does not alter decision particularly 
in the light of current budget situation . . ." 

On the same day, December 4, Messrs. Puhan and Francis sent a memorandum 
on the Budget, to Reed Harris which contained the following excerpts on the 
Hebrew broadcasts : 

". . . IBS has been ordered to suspend Hebrew broadcasts leaving the 
decision to take such action to IBS. (See wording of Miccocci memorandum to 
Puhan dated December 2.) Allowance was made for IBS to make a recheck of 


our own. The question is whether IBS has taken into account the following 
factors : 

"A) . Tel Aviv has just asked us to use VOA full blast on the recent Czech Anti- 
Semitism purges : 

"B). While anti-Semitism flourishes behind the curtain and where a tremen- 
dously important political issue has been handed the Hebrew desk, is this the time 
to suspend Hebrew broadcasts? 

"C). With the Israeli-Arabic issue about to come up in the U. N. and both sides 
jockeying for support of us, will the abandonment of Hebrew at this time not be 
falsely interpreted? 

"Please reply urgently." 

On December 5, Mr. Sulkin sent another teletype to IBS on the budget with 
the following pertaining to the Hebrew programs : 

"* * * I asked Harris to look at the Puhan teletype, particularly the section 
on the Hebrew broadcast since it raised certain cautions which should be kept In 
mind by HA." 

The December 5 memorandum which was read at the beginning of the meet- 
ing was the final word to date on this subject. Mr. Puhan pointed out that IBS 
was now under an order and that he had asked the people present at the meeting 
to sit down and discuss ways and means to carry out this order. Mr. Puhan 
asked that Mr. Taliaferro determine the precise figure for the savings which 
would be made in cutting out the Hebrew programs, taking into account civil 
service rules and regulations, the payment of leave, the return of contract 
employees to Israel, any savings in facilities, etc. He also asked Mr. Hotchner 
to obtain a report on reception of Hebrew programs in Israel, since there is a 
distinct contradition as to the reception of the program in Israel. The date for 
the cutting out of the Hebrew programs was set as January 15. There was con- 
siderable discussion as to the serious effects of cutting out this program, not 
only from a domestic public relations point of view, but from the international 
political viewpoint. There was also considerable discussion on the mechanics of 
carrying out the personnel reduction in force. 

It was decided that another memorandum would be prepared by Mr. Puhan 
to be sent from IBS to Mr. Harris stating that the necessary steps were being 
taken, but that IBS felt it must go on record again with its objections to this 
step. At the same time it was agreed to place a call to Mr. Morton, recommend- 
ing that the final order not be issued to the staff of the Hebrew unit until Mr. 
Morton's return to the office on Monday. Mr. Dooher was requested not to 
transmit this information to the Hebrew desk until specifically ordered to. 

Supplemental Data No. 1 

Department of State, 
United States International Information Administeation, 

Washington, March 9, 1953. 
The Honorable Joseph R. McCarthy, 

United States Senate. 
Mt Dear Senator McCarthy: In reviewing the transcript of my testimony 
before your committee on Wednesday, March 4, 1953, I find I made two factual 
mistakes which I should like to correct : 

1. In response to your questions, I stated (p. 11583) that Mr. E. C. Carter was 
at tlie luncheon for Mr. Rogov. Miss Rose Yardumian's letter to Mr. Carter, 
which you read into the record, does not include Mr. Carter's name as in attend- 
ance at the luncheon, and does not include that of Mr. Carl F. Remer. I do not 
recall Mr. Remer's attendance, but accept the above statement as fact that the 
persons at the luncheon for Mr. Rogov were Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mr. Carl F. 
Remer, Mr. John Carter Vincent, and myself. 

2. In response to your question as to when I left the IPR (p. 11586), I stated 
"1945" and again I stated (p. 11601) "and that was one of the reasons I dis- 
sociated myself from the IPR in 1945." My recollection is clear that I did, in 
fact, cease active participation in IPR activities in 1945. On checking my 
records, I find that I was elected to the board of trustees of the American Council 
IPR in 1946. I am certain, however, that on receiving notice of this action, I 
resigned, but I have not been able to find the correspondence in my files. In 
1948, I was again elected to the board of trustees and I again tendered my resig- 
nation, which was accepted by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, chairman of the board 
of trustees. 


3. In my testimony (pp. 11580-11581) I stated that it was my recollection 
that I resigned from the advisory board of Indusco late in 1944 or early in 1945. 
I find, on checliing my files, that actually I resigned sometime in 1946, at which 
time I requested that my name be removed from the list of the advisory board. 
I would appreciate it if the committee would include this letter in the record, 
or take such other steps as it deems proper in order that the record may refiect 
the corrections contained herein. 
Sincerely yours, 

WnxiAM O. Johnstone, Jr., 
Deputy Administrator for Field Programs. 



Andrews, Col. Fred Page 462, 463, 466 

Bisson, T. A 437 

Blakeslee 485 

Carolan, Mr 470 

Carr, Mr 459 

Carter, Edward C 431, 432, 433, 471 

Clark, Mr 405 

Clevenger, Hon. Cliff 447 

Cohn, Roy M 463 

Compton, Dr 400, 402, 403, 406, 407, 

408, 411, 412, 414, 424, 442, 443, 444, 446, 447, 454, 455, 465, 466, 470 

Connors, W. Bradley 412, 470 

Curria, Mr 433 

Currie, Mr , 433 

Davis, Monet 428 

Dooher, Gerald F. P 393, 396, 401, 406, 412, 427, 444, 445, 457, 469, 471 

Testimony of 397, 399, 442-443 

Eisenhower, Dwight 413, (428), 456 

Faymonville, Colonel 433 

Fisk, Mr 405 

Francis, Robert J 401, 402, 470 

Testimony of 413-415 

Gayn, Mark 438 

Gedalecia, Ben 412, 470 

Glazer, Dr. Sidney 396, 401, 409, 412, 430, 439, 440, 444, 445, 449, 455, 457, 458 

Testimony of 397-399, 415-416, 427-429, 441-442, 447-448, 450-452 

Goldberg, Mr 447 

Gurdus, Nathan 441 

Hamilton, Mr 470 

Harris, Reed 393, 398, 415, 

416, 417, 418, 419, 424, 425, 440, 441, 442, 443, 469, 470, 471 

Testimony of 394, 399-413, 420, 422-423, 427, 444-467 

Herrick, Mr 458, 459, 464, 466 

Hiss, Alger 433 

Holland, William 430 

Hornbeck 433,435 

Hotchner, Howard 469, 471 

Jaffe, Phil__'_ 437 

Johnstone, Anne 435 

Johnstone, William C, Jr 400, 402, 403, 405, 406, 411, 412, 414, 441, 451, 472 

Testimony of 419-420, 423-440 

Kaghan, Mr 418 

Kimball, Arthur A 470 

Kohler, Foy 400, 401, 402, 414, 470 

Lattimore, Owen 1 432, 435, 439, 471 

Lawrence, Miss 463 

Leahy, John S 393 

Lourie, Donold 454 

McCarran committee 426, 430, 431, 433, 434, 436, 437, 439 

McLeod, Mr 417, 418, 419 

Macy, Edward W 469 

Macy, Edwin 403 

Micocci, Mr 470 

Morton, Mr 402, 471 

Moser, Charles 434 

Norman, E. Herbert 437 



Puhan, Alfred 399, 400, 403, 469, 470, 471 

Testimony of 394r-396, 401-402, 404^05, 414, 419 

Remer, Carl F 435, 471 

Ring, Mr 459 

Rogov, Vladmir 431, 432, 433, 435, 471 

Rosinger, Mr 436, 437 

Rossell, Idris 469 

Rossell, James E 463 

Roth, Andrew 438 

Russell, Mr 441 

Sc'hechter, Mr 418 

Sheritt, Mosh 409 

Sims, Albert G 426, 440, 470 

Testimony of 419-422, 424-425 

Slansky trials 393, 406 

Snow, Edgar 437 

Stevenson, Adlai 413 

Stoner, General 460, 462, 463, 465, 466 

Sulkin, Sidney 469, 470, 471 

Taber, Hon. John 447 

Taliaferro, John 469, 471 

Thompson, James F 403, 417, 469 

Testimony of 418-419 

Todd, Larry 433 

Truman, Harry 456 

Vincent, John Carter 432,435,471 

Ware, Leonard 451 

Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman 471 

Wiley, Hon. Alexander 446 

Yardumian, Rose 432, 433, 434, 435, 471 



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