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Full text of "State Department information program, Voice of America : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Res. 40, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Government Operations to employ temporary additional personnel and increasing the limit of expenditures"

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Given By 





j,,„,^,BBFORE THE ,i^,,.„^ 






S. Res. 40 


MARCH 13, 16, AND 19, 1953 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 

2S708 WASHINGTON : 1953 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN18 1S53 


JOSEPH R. McCarthy, Wisconsin, Chairman. 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 



Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. McCarthy, Wisconsin, CJiairmati 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 


Rot M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
Francis D. Flanagan, General Counsel and Staff Director 




Appendix 769 

Index I 

Testimony of — 

Dooher, Gerald F. P., Acting Cliief, Near East, South Asia, and Afri- 
can Division, Voice of America 745 

Ghosh, Dr. Stanley S., Chief, Hindi Service, Near East, South Asia, 

and African Division, Voice of America 741 

Hlavatv, Julius H., chairman, department of mathematics, Bronx 

High School of Science, New York, N. Y 702 

McKesson, Lewis J 684 

Richmond, Alfred C, rear admiral. United States Coast Guard 697 

Veldhuis, A. C, chief engineer, Wind Turbine Co 719 


Introduced Appears 
on page on page 

59. Letter from Senator Styles Bridges to Senate Permanent Sub- 

committee on Investigations, February 23, 1953 684 769 

60. Memorandum from Fov D. Kohler, Director of Voice of 

America, to Reed Harris, May 19, 1952 695 770 

61. 1952 primarv election enrollments 706 * 

62. Capy of script entitled "This Is America," May 9, 1952 708 * 


fi Appears 

on pagfl 
1. Memorandum from Lewis J. McKesson to George Q. Herrick, Sep- 
tember 8, 1950 773 

*May be found in the files of the subcommittee. 




FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

•OF THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed 
to January 30, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin ; 
Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota ; Everett Dirksen, Republi- 
can, Illinois: John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; and Stuart 
Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Also present : Senator Stj^les Bridges, Republican, New Hampshire. 

Present also : Roy Cohn, chief counsel ; G. David Schine, chief con- 
sultant ; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk ; and John Leahy, State De- 
partment, Deputy Assistant to the Under Secretary, 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Yesterday we ordered certain records produced- here at 10 : 30 this 
morning by some of the lAA people. I understand this situation 
was called to Dr. Johnson's attention; that is, the situation as far 
as Baker West is concerned, and that he had ordered a complete and 
thorough and immediate check upon it. I have been informed that 
the papers which the committee has requested will be necessary if 
Dr. Johnson is to get a complete picture of the setup himself. We 
have been asked to defer that request for the papers until Dr. John- 
son has a chance to see them himself. I think that request should 
be honored. I have taken the liberty of informing Dr. Johnson's 
office that we will be glad to wait until he has had a chance to examine 
all the documents himself, if that is agreeable to the rest of the com- 

This morning we are going into a matter referred to us by Senator 
Bridges, chairman of the Appropriations Committee. We have asked 
Senator Bridges to be present. We have informed him he will have 
the complete right to ask any of the witnesses any of the questions and 
take any part in the proceedings he cares to. I have done that subject 
to the approval of the committee. I assume there is no objection to 
that. So, Senator, we welcome you as an ex officio member of the 
committee today. 

Senator Bridges. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. I might say the matter referred to us was the 
question of the so-called Vagabond project or Courier projects 1 
ship acting as a transmitter, which has been completed, and 2 pro- 



posed, which I believe $4 million has been requested in the present 

Before we get into that subject, we have a witness here who w^as re- 
quested to appear yesterday morning, and who notified us he could not 
be here because he said the notice was too short. He is here this morn- 
ing, so, Senator Bridges, we will put this witness on first. He has 
nothing to do with the Vagabond project, incidentally. 

Mr. Hlavaty. 

Mr. CoHN. He is accompanied by counsel. 

The Chairman. Will you hold up your right hand. 

In the matter in hearing before the committee, do you swear that 
you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I do. 


Mr. CoHN. May we have your name for the record ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am Dr. Julius H. Hlavaty. 

Mr. CoHN. Dr. Hlavaty, what is your position at the present time? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am chairman of the department of mathematics at 
the Bronx High School of Science, New York City. 

Mr. CoHN. How long a period of time have you held that position? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Fifteen years. 

Mr. CoHN. Dr. Hlavaty, is it correct that on May 29, 1952, you par- 
ticipated in a broadcast on schools to Czechoslovakia over the Voice 
of America facilities ? 

Mr. HlxVVAty. I don't recall the precise, date, but that is probably 
right. I was on a program for the Voice of America last spring. 

The Chairman. Will counsel identify himself? 

Mr. Shapiro. Kalph Shapiro, 9 East 40th Street, New York City. 

The Chairman. I assume counsel has informed the witness of his 
I'ights insofar as his counsel is concerned, but I think we should make 
that a matter of record. 

Mr. Hlavaty, you are entitled to consult with your counsel at any 
time you care to, and advise with him. If at any time you want to 
retire for a private conference with your counsel, we will give you 
that right. We do not allow counsel to take part in the proceedings, 
however, except to advise you whenever you want to talk to him. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Thank you. 

Mr. CoHN. Dr. Hlavaty, we have it that you are chairman of the 
mathematics department at the Bronx High School of Science, and 
the fact that you participated in this broadcast on schools over the 
Voice of America to Czechoslovakia last year. 

My next question is. Are you now or have you ever been a member 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Are you asking me that question as a teacher in the 
New York City school system or with reference to the Voice of 

The Chairman. We are asking you the question. Are you now or 
have you ever been a member of the Communist Party ? We are ask- 
ing you the question. 


Mr. Hlavaty. I am not a member of the Communist Party nor was 
I a member of the Communist Party when I participated in the Voice 
of America broadcast. 

Mr. CoHN. The question was, Have you ever been- a member of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I feel that that question is an improper question. It 
seems to me to have no bearing on the question you are investigating 
now of my participation in the Voice of America broadcast. 

The Chairman. Mr. HLavaty, we are interested in that answer for 
a number of reasons. No. 1, we like to know whether members of 
the Communist Party have been used by the Voice of America. No. 
2, we want to know what check has been made by them to see whether 
a man has been a member or not. I think that is a very, very im- 
portant question. The Voice, you see, is allegedly fighting Com- 
munists. We do not think they can fight communism too effectively 
by using Communists. I do not think that Communists are too dedi- 
cated to a fight against communism. I think you will agree with that. 
The question is. Have you been a member of the Communist Party? 
You are ordered to answer that, unless you think your answer will 
incriminate you. If you feel your answer will incriminate you, you 
have a right to refuse to answer. That is the only ground that this 
committee will honor. You will not be allowed to refuse on any 
other ground. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I think I have answered the question that I was 
not a member of the Communist Party when I was asked to make 
this broadcast, and I am not now. I do feel that it is improper for 
you to question, me as to what my youthful beliefs may or may not 
have been. 

The Chairman. If you do not want us to go into your youth, how 
old are you now ? 

Mv. Hlavaty. I am 46. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party a 
year ago ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Tliat was when I made the broadcast. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party a 
year ago ? 

J\lr. Hlavaty. I was not ; no, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party 2 
years ago ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party 3 
years ago ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I was not a member of the Communist Party for a 
number of years. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party 3 
years ago ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I was not. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party 4 
years ago? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I was not. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party 5 
years ago? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 


Mr. Hlavaty, I -would, like to say that as of 1949 I was not a 
member of the Communist Party, and because I feel that investiga- 
tions into my beliefs or possible associations before that are improper 
in the general rights a citizen has, and also the question violates the 
provisions of the fifth amendment, I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party in 

Mr. Hlavaty. I already answered the question. 

The Chairman. The question is. Were you a member of the Com- 
munist Party in 1948? We will have to impose upon you to answer 

Mr. Hlavaty. I decline to answer on the ground I have already 
given you. 

The Chairman. The only grounds that we will honor here are the 
grounds that your answer might incriminate you. I will ask you a 
question. Do you honestly feel that if you were to tell us whether you 
were a member of the Communist Party in 1948 that would incrimi- 
nate you ? We must have an answer to that question before we can 
determine whether you can claim the right or not. 

Mr. Hlavaty. May I consult counsel ? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

(Witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. I may say to the other Senators, one of the reasons 
why this witness was called is not because he has been such an im- 
portant cog in the Voice machinery, but we have found that they have 
adopted a rule to the effect that if a man only does four specific jobs 
per month — is that it. Counsel ? 

Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That he needs no security check of any kind. We 
found that men who were turned down by Security for a full-time job 
with the Voice have been hired on a piecemeal basis, and they do 3 
or 4 jobs a month, even though they have been rejected. We are 
calling this witness whom we incidentally know has a Communist 
background and the information we have is that he was never even 
asked by the Voice about his background, but hired to do this broad- 
cast on the American school system. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, when was that rule adopted, be- 
cause it is a direct violation of Public Law 402, which specifically in 
section 105 prevents that. I would like to know when that rule was 
adopted, and by whom, because somebody in the State Department, 
in so doing, is also in contempt of Congi-ess. 

The Chairman. It is a violation of Public Law 402 which was 
drafted by the able Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Mundt. I think 
there is no question about it that the rule was adopted for the purpose 
of voiding the effect of the law which you drafted. 

Senator Mundt. I think we shoulcl find out who deliberately vio- 
lated that law, because there were no "ifs" and "buts" that you could 
use a Communist for 4 hours a week or a month. It was specific, total, 
and complete. It was reinforced by many letters by our committee 
at that time. Somebody in the Department of State then or now 
certainly was in direct contempt of Congress, and in violation of the 

The Chairman. May I ask counsel how deeply have you gone into 
this matter? Have we determined who the originator of this order 


Mr. CoHN. That has not been finally determined, Mr. Chairman. 
There has been a good deal of confusion. 

The Chairman. A good deal of shifting of responsibility. 

Mr. CoHN. Yes. The clear fact is, though, that this practice has 
been engaged in. 

The Chairman. That rule is still in effect ; is that right? 

Mr. CoHN. Apparently the rule is still in effect. 

Senator Mundt. I would suggest that counsel advise the new Secre- 
tary of State that it is a direct violation of the law of Congress, and 
ask for its immediate rescission. 

The Chairman. I think that is an excellent idea. 

Senator Mundt. There is not much use having a Congress, Mr. 
Chairman, if you are going to pass laws and have some department 
downtown thumb their nose at the law and the Congress. 

The Chairman. That is right. May I say that all the indications 
we have so far is that our new head of the IIA is apparently very 
sincere about doing a good job with the information program. 

Senator Mundt. I think that is perfectly right. It probably has 
never been called to his attention. Some underling under Dean Ache- 
son's Department of State deliberately violated the law. We ought to 
find out about it and correct it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hlavaty, the question was, do you honestly 
feel if you were to tell us whether you were a Communist in 1948 
that your answer might incriminate you ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I think it is perfectly possible. I don't know what 
"incrimination" means, and I don't know what person might say 
that I was a member of the Commuist Party in any given year, and 
I don't know whether my word would be taken against his word. It 
is for that reason that I invoke this constitutional protection, which 
I understand is devised to protect the innocent, not the guilty. 

The Chairman. The purpose of the law is to provide that no man 
need convict himself, regardless of how guilty he is. That is the pur- 
pose of the law. The purpose of the law is not for the purpose of 
protecting the innocent. It came down from the old English law. 
I think it is a good idea not to force a man to convict himself of any 
crime, even though he is guilty. 

The question is, Do you honestly feel that if you tell us whether 
or not you were a member of the Communist Party in 1948, that that 
might tend to incriminate you ? If not, you will be forced to answer 
this question. 

Mr. Hlavaty. My answer to that question in effect nullifies the 
invocation of tliis right that I have, and that the Constitution gives me. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hlavaty, this committee must determine when 
a witness is entitled to invoke this right. Before we can determine 
whether you are entitled to this right, we must know wjiether you 
honestly feel that if you answer, your answer would tend to incrimi- 
nate you. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I must decline to answer that question on the same 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer that question. You 
understand me ? I am ordering you now to answer not whether you 
were a member of the Community Party. I am ordering you to 
answer whether you feel if you answered that question, that the answer 


might tend to incriminate you. We will not hear from counsel. You 
may consult your client. 

Mr. Shapiro. May I make a statement ? 

The Chairman. You may not make any statement. You may talk 
to your client, and he may make any statement he cares to. You 
may consult with him freely. 

Mr. Shapiro. All right. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Shapiro. I wonder if we may have the question posed again 
so we will be certain. 

The Chairman. Let me repeat the question. Mr. Hlavaty, first 
I asked you whether you were a member of the Communist Party in 
1948, and you declined to answer that question. My question to you 
now is. Do you feel that if you answer the question and tell us whether 
you are a member of the Communist Party in 1948 or not, that that 
answer might tend to incriminate you. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Senator, that is a very complicated double question, 
and I really do not understand it. 

The Chairman. We will start over again, if you think that is too 
complicated. You are entitled to refuse to answer any question you 
honestly feel that your answer might tend to incriminate you. Other- 
wise, you are not entitled to refuse to answer. You understand that, 
do you not ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. That I do. 

The Chairman. In other words, if you feel that the answer will in 
no way incriminate you, then you are not entitled to refuse to answer. 
So my question to you is this : Do you honestly feel that if you were 
to tell us now whether you were a Communist in 1948, that that answer 
might tend to incriminate you ? If you do not understand that ques- 
tion, we will try and rephrase it for you. 

Mr. Hlavaty. It has been suggested to me that I say that my invoca- 
tion of the fifth amendment was made in good faith. Your question 
reminds me, if I may — this is no time for puzzles — a double problem 
where two parts of a question cancel each other out, and I don't 
understand it. Perhaps you have heard the puzzle on how you can 
find out which of two chairs is an electric chair. One of them is an 
electric chair. The other one is good. And there is a man standing by, 
and you are entitled to ask him one question, and he will answer the 
question "yes" or "no." The only thing you don't know is whether 
he is a liar or whether he tells the truth. What is the question you 
ask him to find out which is the electric chair ? Your question reminds 
me of what the correct answer to that puzzle is. I will give you the 
answer to the question if you are interested. 

The Chairman. I am interested in the question that I asked you and 
not your ejectric-chair puzzle. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I made my original claim in good faith. Senator. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer the question. If you do 
not answer it, I will take up with the committee the question of what 
should be done about it. 

(Witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Hlavaty. On the question. Senator, when you ask me in the 
first place whether I was a member of the Communist Party in 1948, 1 
decline to answer on constitutional grounds. When I invoked that, 


I made the statement in good faith feeling that there was a possibility 
that I might incriminate myself by answering the question. Does 
that answer your question ? 

The Chairiman. It may, but I think we will require you to give us 
a straight answer. Understand, Mr. Hlavaty, if we were to ask you 
what day of the week this is or where you live or questions like that, 
and if you were to say "I refuse to answer on constitutional grounds," 
we could not honor that, unless you first told us that you honestly felt 
that your answer might incriminate you. My question now is, and I 
think you may have answered it partially. Do you honestly feel that if 
you were to tell the committee the truth about whether you were 
a member of the Communist Party in 1948, that answer would tend 
to incriminate you ? You are ordered to answer that question. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I honestly do. 

The Chairman. Then you are entitled to the privilege. 

Mr. Mundt? 

Senator Mundt. If I understand your testimony correctly, and I 
want to review it because it seems to me you have gotten yourself in a 
pretty serious position, you were asked the question, I believe — and I 
came in a little late — Are you now a member of the Communist Party, 
to which you said "No" ; is that right ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. That is right. 

Senator Mxtndt. You were asked the question. Were you a member 
of the Communist Party at the time you gave a certain broadcast for 
the State Department, and I believe you said "No"; is that correct? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mundt. I think you should know, then, because you have 
not been before this committee before, and as far as I can observe by 
looking at him, this is the first time your counsel has been before the 
committee, we have had quite a rash of fifth-amendment Americans 
before our committee, I might add, so we are kind of accustomed to 
working with people who invoke the fifth amendment, but, you see, you 
did not invoke it when you were asked if you are a Communist. You 
did not invoke it when you said, "No; you did not belong to the Com- 
munist Party when you gave the broadcast," So what you have done 
in fact knowingly or unknowingly is to proclaim to the world that you 
used to be a member of the Communist Party because you waited until 
that particular question to invoke this fifth-amendment right which 
you had. It is your business, not mine. I do not know where you work, 
or who you are employed by or what you do, but, in fact, you have 
proclaimed yourself to any thinking American, as a result of your tes- 
timony, that not only did you used to belong to the Communist Party, 
but you apparently want to conceal that fact that you have never dis- 
avowed the Comniunist Party, and consequently you invoke the fifth 
amendment to protect yourself. You have that right, and I want you 
to know what you have done, certainly as far as anybody who is less 
than an addlebrained American must understand. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Senator INIundt, I think those are inferences you have 
drawn which are not necessarily true. 

Senator Mundt. Whether true or not, you made the implications — 
I did not — that nobody could fail to understand. Just positively no- 
body. We might just as well face up to the fact that what you have 
done is tantamount to admitting that not only did you formerly belong 


to the Communist Party but you refuse to admit it ; you refuse to dis- 
avow it; you conceal it because your involvement apparently was so 
deep that you are afraid that it ^\i\\ incriminate you. Maybe you were 
in the espionage apparatus. Maybe you were involved really deep. 
I do not know. You have the power, authority, and constitutional 
background, but you cannot stand in front of an intelligent American 
audience, either visual or hearing, and answer two-thirds of the ques- 
tions, and on the third one invoke your constitutional immunity with- 
out by implication indirectly making a tremendous confession. 

Mr. Hlavatt. I have made no confession. I don't feel I have to dis- 
cuss what I may have believed 10, 20, or 25 years ago, when I was a 
boy, on a number of matters. I don't know how acts or words of 
mine — certainly I am not aware or conscious of any ill I did. 

Senator Mundt. At your age, you were far from a boy in 1948. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Senator McCarthy, you said something about the 
broadcast that I think is not completely correct. I was asked to make 
the broadcast by one of the people 

The Chairman. We intend to go into that. First, Senator Syming- 
ton has some questions to ask you. 

Senator Symington. If you were a member of the Communist 
Party, you must know what year you joined, and you nmst have 
thought it was right to join, and if you left the Communist Party, you 
must have known when you left it, and you must have felt it was right 
to leave it. So why do you leave this thing hanging in the air? Why 
do you not say when you joined the party, if you joined the party, 
and when you got out of the party, if you got out of the party, and 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't see what any of these questions really have 
to do with the problem that you asked me in the first place. The 
question you asked me about my participation on the Voice of Amer- 
ica program 

Senator McClellan. You take the position, then, that the Gov- 
ernment and the people of the United States, and the Voice of Amer- 
ica, should not be concerned about the views and philosophy of those 
who broadcast on the Voice of America. Is that your position ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. If it is not your position and you feel that 
the Congress and the officials of the Voice of America should have 
some interest in it, then do you not think it quite proper and neces- 
sary that they know the background and philosophy of those whom 
they employ to carry on their service ? 

(Witness consults with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. You should be able to answer that question without 
consulting your lawyer. You may consult if you care to. 

Mr. Hlavaty. In the first place, I was not employed on this broad- 
cast. It was a volunteer effort. I was asked to do what I thought 
was a service to get a message to the people across the Iron Curtain 
with some possible risk to relatives that I still have there. 

Senator McClellan. I do not know what the broadcast contained. 
I do not have the script before me, and I have not seen it. The point 
I make is that I am not criticizing you for accepting an invitation to 
make a broadcast, if you were invited. The point I am making here 
is that I think the American people and the Congress, who appro- 


priate this money to carry on this service, certainly have a right to 
know the kind of people that are being used to broadcast, what their 
philosophies are, what their views are, and 5^ou leave us in the posi- 
tion here of having to ascertain from your own statements that in all 
probability at one time you were a Communist. There are many who 
drop out of the party who do not change either their views or their 
philosophy, and you leave us in that situation. If you do not want 
to clear it up, that is all right, but I insist that the people and the 
Congress have a right to know who is being used, what their philoso- 
phies are, and what the effect of their broadcast and expression of 
their philosophy might involve. 

Mr. Hlavaty. But would a part of that be knowing what they did 
10 or 15 or 20 years ago? At the time of the broadcast, I made the 
broadcast in full faith as a loyal American citizen, doing a service that 
I was asked to do. I was not paid for it. It was time out that I had to 
take. As I say, there was a possible risk to my relations in Czecho- 
slovakia. Now should I have had different ideas in 1930 or 1935, dif- 
ferent from those that I had in 1952, I don't think that affects what 
I may have said in 1952. 

Senator McClellan. You may not think it affects it, but I think 
the American people and the Congress are interested in knowing who 
is employed or who is used on the Voice of America to speak for 
America. I do not think the Congress or the American people want 
people speaking on the Voice of America at taxpayers' expense who 
are not loyal Americans and believe in our system of government. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am all of that. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. That is what I am trying to find out. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am a loyal American citizen. 

Senator McClellan. That is your view and your statement, and 
it may be true. But in order for us to determine in view of the situ- 
ation you have left us here before this committee, I think it would 
be necessary for you to give the committee the information it seeks. 
You have a perfect right to invoke the fifth amendment to the Con- 
stitution if you want to do so. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan, we have other matters we 
would like to go into with this witness, but we have invited Senator 
Bridges here this morning to hear the matter of Vagabond /, //, or 
///, or commonly known as the Courier projects. Senator Bridges 
tells me he will not be able to be with us this afternoon. I will ask 
this witness to step down, but remain here, because we want to dis- 
cuss other matters witli you, if that is agreeable to the committee. 

Senator Mundt. We will let the witness go forever if he will answer 
that question. 

Mr. Hlavaty. There are many things about the broadcast you did 
not ask me. 

The Chairman. You may step down. We will give you an op- 
portunity later on. 

Who is your first witness on the Courier project? 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. McKesson. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKesson. You have been sworn? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are reminded your oath still is in effect. 

At this point we will insert in the record the letter of Senator 
Bridges, dated February 23, 1953, in which he outlines some of the 


problems involved, and his request that this committee study this 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59" and will be 
found in the appendix on p. 769.) 


The Chairman. Mr. Colin. 

Mr. CoHN, Mr. McKesson, I think you have told us previously 
that you had been for some time with the Voice of America in the 
engineering department; is that correct? 

Mr. AIcKesson. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Are you familiar with the project known as the Vaga- 
bond project? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, so that Senator Bridges may know 
some of the background of this man — it is in the record, I know — 
would you take a minute or two to briefly go over his experience and 
background as a radio engineer ? 

Mr. Cohn. For the benefit of Senator Bridges, would you give us 
very briefly your experience as an engineer and your background? 

Mr. McKesson. I graduated from the University of Minnesota in 
1927, as an electrical engineer. I have been active in radio ever 
since. I have been over 20 years with the RCA. 

Mr. Cohn. You were with RCA for over 20 years? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. I was in the Navy doing similar 
types of work. Since then I have been with several private com- 
panies, including about 3 years with the Voice of America. I left 
there last October. 

Mr. Cohn. What rank did you hold in the Navy ? 

Mr. McKesson. Commander. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. McKesson, when you were with the Voice of Amer- 
ica, you were in the engineering department, is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Were you ever assigned to this Vagahond project? 

Mr. McKesson. At the initial onset of the thinking that such a 
project might be useful in connection with broadcasting to the world, 
I was asked to investigate the possibilities of such a project. 

Mr. Cohn. Would you tell us very briefly just what this project was 
to be? 

Mr. McKesson. Because of the difficulties in obtaining land-base 
sites close to the target areas, it was felt that a ship might become 
useful upon which high-power radio equipment could be mounted. 
There had been some history along these lines with other ships so 
that it was not entirely a new project. 

In the middle of 1950, I did some preliminary planning. I came 
down to the Navy Department to discuss the possibility of such a job 
with a number of naval officers, ship conversion people, and so forth, 
and it looked like a good deal. 

Mr. Cohn. I might ask you, you say you were assigned to it as a 
project engineer at the beginning? 

Mr. McKesson. I am not sure of the words "project engineer" being 
used. I investigated the situation. 


Mr. CoHN. Did you continue to have familiarity with the project 
as it progressed? 

Mr. McKesson. No, sir. After coming to the Navy Department and 
summarizing the results of this work in a memorandum, I was ordered 
to other duties. 

Mr. CoHN. And after 3^ou were ordered to other duties, you never- 
theless were familiar with what was going on in connection with this 
project, is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. To a limited extent. 

Mr. CoHN. And you conferred with the engineers who were working 
on it? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CoHN. And you are familiar with the amounts of money gen- 
erally which were expended on it ? 

]\Ir. McKesson. In general ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. As a result of your experience on this project, do you 
feel that there was waste of Government funds in connection with its 
construction ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes; I do. 

Mr. CoHN. You say you originally went to the Navy ; is that right ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. After your consultations with the Navy, did you and 
they reach any conclusion as to what type of ship would be best suited 
for use in this project? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes; we did. At that time it seemed desirable to 
use the maximum possible power that we could for a number of rea- 
sons. One is that a ship will not have the same antenna facilities 
available that a shore base will, so that the power should be maximum. 
At that time we had the possibility of using megawatt transmitters, 
which were at that time being constructed. My work was entirely 
on the basis of putting a megawatt, that is a 1,000-kilowatt trans- 
mitter, on the ship. 

Mr. CoHN. Was there any type ship which was available and would 
have been suitable for that ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. There was one class of tanker, I forget which 
class, which looked suitable. Also, we knew there were quite a num- 
ber of naval ships, called CVE, that is the escort or baby carrier type, 
which also looked very ideally suited for the job. 

]\Ir. CoHN. Am I correct in stating that you submitted a memoran- 
dum to Mr. Herrick, to Mr. George Herrick, who was then chief engi- 
neer of the Voice of America, dated September 8, 1950, embodying 
a recommendation that a CVE ship be used ? 

Mr. McKesson. CVE be considered as one of the best possibilities ; 


Mr. CoHN. And you made various other recommendations so that 
maximum power could be achieved in this project, is that correct? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Were those recommendations followed? Was a CVE 
ship used ? 

Mr. McKesson. No. A small cargo ship was eventually used. 

Mr. CoHN. Instead of using a CVE, a small cargo ship was used? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoiiN. Was it possible to use this megawatt transmitter on this 
small cargo ship ? 


Mr. McKesson. No ; there was not physically enough room. 

Mr. CoHN. Whose decision was it to use the fcmall cargo ship? 

Mr. McKesson. I assume it was George Herrick's. 

The Chairman. In otlier words, your testimony is that there were 
ships available in mothballs that would have been suitable and you 
recommended such ships, and instead of taking a satisfactory ship, a 
small cargo ship was selected? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. As far' as you know, Mr. Herrick and his department 
made the decision that the CVE would not be used, and used the small 
cargo ship ? 

Mr. McKesson. With a small transmitter as well; 150-kilowatt 
transmitter, instead of a 1,000-kilowatt transmitter. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKesson, what repairs were necessary because 
of the selection of a small ship, instead of the satisfactory vessel? 
What alterations? 

Mr. McKesson. One thing, a small ship of that type had to be, as I 
understand it, strengthened considerably to take the weight of the 
auxiliary diesel engines required. A flight deck had to be built to 
handle the equipment. 

The Chairman, No, 1, you had to strengthen the hull of the sliip 
so as to take the diesel engines. 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Do you know the approximate cost of that work? 

Mr, McKesson, I am not too familiar with the breakdown of those 
costs, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. But there were ships available in mothballs which 
would have required no strengthening of the hull ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. We determined that with the Navy Depart- 
ment, the hangar deck had sufficient strength, that is the load per 
square foot was sufficient to take the transmitter, all elements of the 
transmitter, and the diesel engines. 

The Chairman. And after selecting the smaller cargo ship, they 
built a flight deck on it? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You say there were ships in mothballs with flight 
decks ali'eady built on them? 

Mr, McKesson. Yes, that is right. 

The Chairman. Can you think ofi'hand of any reason why they 
would select a ship that needed all this repairing or altering when 
satisfactory ships were available at that time? 

Mr. McKesson. Sir, some of the reasons given were legitimate to a 
certain extent. One was that a smaller ship could go into harbors 
where a larger ship could not go. The smaller ship did not require 
the same crew that the larger ship would. Those are the two main 
reasons. . 

The Chairman. Wliat v/as the cost of the alteration, if you know? 

Mr, McKesson. The total cost, I have been informed, was of the 
order of $2,600,000 for Vagabond. That is the equipment, alterations, 
and entire cost. 

The Chairman. $2,600,000. 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Are you speaking now of the total cost or of the 
unnecessary expenditure ? 


Mr. McKesson. That is the total cost. 

The Chairman. How iiiiicli of that cost could have been eliminated 
if the correct ship had been selected in the first place, the type of ship 
that you as the engineer had recommended? 

Mr. McKesson. I would estimate that at least a million dollars of 
that could have been eliminated. 

The Chairman. How about this question of the balloon antenna? 
If you had a larger ship, could you have had an antenna without the 
balloon ? 

Mr. McKesson. That was an engineering problem which had we 
gone ahead with the larger ship, we would have investigated thorough- 
ly. At that time, it was possible to erect antenna towers on the 
larger ship to l)e used either in place of or in conjunction with a 
balloon antenna. The planning had not gotten far enough to finally 
make a decision on that point. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this question : As the time the 
plans were being made, did the engineers who were doing the plan- 
ning know what wavelengths would be available for this Courier 

Mr. McKesson. Not specifically, no; only the broadcast medium 
wavelength band was to be used. 

The Chairman. Was that an important element or not? 

Mr. McKesson. In general the balloon type of antenna is quite 
flexible, and it can be used on any frequency. That is one of the 
big advantages of that type of installation as compared to shore based 
installation where you are somewhat limited after you build your 
antenna on what frequency you can use. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire there? Is not that 
pretty good justification for using the balloon type antenna for a ship 
which is going to move from country to country and continent to 
continent where you have to change the wavelength to meet the local 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, that is a very good justification. 

The Chairman. In other words, you feel that tlie use of a balloon 
antenna is not a mistake if you have the proper ship and you know 
how to handle the balloon. 

Mr. McKesson. I feel at the time there were a number of questions 
which have been since largely answered. At the present time the 
balloon antenna does have a useful location. In some parts of the 
world the possibility of using the balloon are greatly reduced, and in 
other parts the balloon can be used almost every day of the year. 

The Chairman. Do I get your testimony at this point to be that 
the construction of the Courier ship and the use of a balloon antenna 
in and of itself may be a desirable part of the Voice project, but the 
question here is what waste was occasioned because of bad engineer- 
ing or bad planning? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. That resolved itself to that ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, will you continue? 

Mr. CoHN. I want to go into this first, Mr. McKesson. Instead of 
having the Navy plan this out, is it a fact that the Voice of America 
then w^ent to a private engineering firm known as the Rhoades Co.? 

29708— 53— pt. 9 2 


Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you feel the Navy should have been in on that rather 
than the Rhoades Co.? 

Mr. McKesson. I felt the Navy was the best qualified people to 
do such work, because I was familiar with another conversion, to a 
certain extent, the purpose of which is classified, but it was very simi- 
lar to the work which had to be done on the Navy ship. 

Mr. CoHN. Would there have been any cost to the Voice of America 
if the Navy had done this? 

Mr. McKesson. I believe that would have been handled on a strictly 
cost basis by transfer of Government funds from one agency to 

Mr. CoHN. And there would not have been the necessity of paying 
to a private contractor as much as was actually paid, is that correct 5 

Mr. McKesson. There would not have been a profit and cost-plus 
figures involved. 

Mr. CoHN. There would have been no profit or cost-plus figures 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you know what kind of a company this Rhoades 
Co. was? Was this their specialty? 

Mr. McKesson. I know before the war they were specializing in 
smaller yacht type of design, sailing vessels and so forth. I do 
believe they had experience in larger vessels during the war. 

Mr. Cohn. In any event, this Rhoades Co. was used, is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Is it correct that the Rhoades Co. made certain recom- 
mendations and a certain budget was provided? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. In constructing this ship, did the Voice engineering 
department stay within that budget? 

Mr. McKesson. As I understand it the first estimates made by the 
Bethlehem Steel and Todd Shipbuilding were considerably in excess 
of what the anticipated cost was to have been. 

Mr. CoHN. What do you estimate the total waste to have been on 
this project? I am going to ask you to break it down then. 

Mr. McKesson. You mean on the Courier type of vessel ? 

Mr. CoHN. Yes. 

Mr. McKesson. I estimated that it could have been done for six or 
seven hundred thousand dollars less than it actually was done. 

Mr. CoHN. Would you tell us why ? 

Mr. McKesson. There were numerous delays. There was redesign 
a number of times, all of which cost money. With better engineering, 
electronically, especially, I think some of the changes that had to be 
made later could have been avoided initially. Maybe a few other 
items of that nature. 

Mr. CoiiN. Let me ask you this : After the Courier went into opera- 
tion and continued in operation, do you know whether or not it Avas 
operating at maximum power ? 

Mr. McKesson. You mean where she is operating now ? 

Mr. CoiiN. Yes. 

Mr. McKesson. No. I understand that because of interference 
with a SAvedish chain of stations they are required to operate at 
greatly reduced power when the Swedish stations are on the air, which 


of course is the maximum listener time from 6 p. m. to 2 a. m., or 
something like that. 

Mr. CoHivr. At the maximum listener time, they are forced to oper- 
ate as you put it, at greatly reduced power. Can you tell us the differ- 
ence in power between the daytime hours and the nighttime hours 
when they have their maximum listening audience ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. I understand they operate at 40 kilowatts 
instead of 150 kilowatts. 

Mr. CoHN. That is certainly a very substantial difference, is it not? 
Mr. McKesson. Yes. There is another important point which 
ought to be brought out, that for some months during the winter they 
have not been able to fly the balloon at which time they had to operate 
on the ship's antenna. That is quite a small antenna, and I do not 
have the exact figures, but being quite familiar with Navy antennas on 
shipboard, I do not believe they can put more than 30 kilowatts into 
that antenna. 

Mr. CoiiN. That is when the balloon is not going ? 
Mr. McKesson. That is right. There is one other point. That 
antenna is very much more less efficient than the balloon antenna, by 
about 15 percent. So the total power radiated is approximately 15 
percent of 30 kilowatts, instead of 30 percent of 150 kilowatts under 
those conditions. 

Mr. CoHN. Those certainly are conditions which should be remed- 
ied before, I assume, further funds are appropriated. Would that be 
your feeling ? 

Mr. McKesson. They shoidd be investigated to see if there is not a 
better solution to the problem. 

Mr. CoHN. Have any of these balloons blown away? 
Mr. McKesson. I have heard that three of them have, I believe. 
Mr. CoHN. How much does it cost to buy one of these balloons com- 

Mr. McKesson. I believe it is in the neighborhood of $20,000. How- 
ever, I also understand the Coast Guard was able to obtain balloons at 
no cost from surplus material. 

]Mr. CoHN. Have you also heard that they have purchased a num- 
ber of them at the sum of $18,000 apiece ? 
Mr. McKesson. That may be correct, yes. 

The Chairman. Let me see if I get this picture. You say the bal- 
loons that blew away were war surplus and did not cost them any- 
thing, but they have'had to replace them and the cost of the replace- 
ments has been $18,000 each ? , n t 
Mr. McKesson. To wliat extent they have used the new balloons, i 

don't know. 

The Chairman. Do you know how many new balloons they pur- 

chased ? 

The Chairman. Why would you have five balloons ? You only use 
one balloon to hold up the antenna ; do you not ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. It is a question of spare parts, you 

might say. . , „ n . /? i • 

Senator Bridges. They were getting ready for a fleet of ships ; were 

they not? 

Mr McKesson. I could not answer that. 

The Chairman. I am a bit confused by these five balloons they 
bought. Would you say that for this one Courier project they would 
need five balloons ? 


Mr. McKesson. If tliey did not have the war surplus balloons, that 
mi<>;ht be a little on the high side, but I do not think you can object to^ 
it too seriously on a ship going to certain locations of the world. In 
fact, during some of the initial considerations of this, there was talk 
of sending it to the Korean area where you might expect a few 
balloons to be shot down in addition to blowing away. 

Mr. CoHN. I think this point is important. You have told us about 
the reduced power at which the Courier has to operate due to this 
frequent trouble on the one band, and due to the fact that when they 
cannot get the balloon up, I assume due to weather conditions they 
have to operate on the antenna on the ship, which means very greatly 
leduced power. 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Was there any advance planning? Did they stop to 
figure out before they did this just where the ship was 'going, and 
make arrangements for maximum power? 

Mr. McKesson. No ; my knowledge of that was that it was a very 
confused situation right up almost to the day or two before she left 
for her trip. Nobody knew where she was going. 

Mr. CoHN. If they used a CVE ship, is it true that they would have 
achieved 12 times the power that is possible under these conditions? 
Mr. McKesson. Yes ; that is right. 
Mr. CoHX. Approximately 12 times the power? 
Mr. McKesson. With directive antennas of balloons, and a 1-mega- 
w^att transmitter. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you feel that the receiving equipment now in use by 
the Courier is adequate? 

Mr. McKesson. No ; I do not. The reason for that is that they are 
still, as I understand it, using the receiving equipment aboard the 
ship, and with the high power they are using on the medium wave 
and the shortwave transmitters, the interference to the present receiv- 
ing facilities greatly limits their ability to get good program material. 
The Chairman. In other words, you cannot have the receiving 
equipment and the broadcasting equipment in close proximity? 
Mr. McKesson. It is difficut to operate under those conditions. ^ 
Tlie Chmrman. So it would be necessary when you have a Courier 
ship to have the receiving facilities land-based or based on other 
ships some distance away? 

Mr. McKesson. That would be very desirable. 
The Chairman. What distance would you set, approximately? 
Mr. McKesson. Five miles is desirable, if you can get it. A little 
greater is better yet in most cases. 

The Chairman. Do you know what planning was rnade to have 
proper receiving facilities when the broadcasting facilities were con- 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. I recommended certain material which was 
put aboard the ship for shore-based receiving facilities, but I do not 
believe that has ever been put in use since the Courier started opera- 
tions in the Mediterranean. 

The Chairman. As far as the receiving equipment is concerned,, 
that is simply a larce powerful radio receiving set? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, but it is not physically large. It could be put 
up in a farmhouse. It would not involve necessarily building ex-^ 
pensive buildings. 


The Chairman. There is nothing expensive about the receiving 

Mr. McKesson. It is expensive as compared to the receiver you have 
at home, but by comparison with the total project, it is very small. 

The Chairman. Roughly what would good receiving equipment 

Mr. McKesson. The equipment itself would run between 20 and 25 
thousand dollars for one good receiver, and we would have to add the 
antenna and installation cost on that, another 5 to 10 thousand dollars 

The Chairman. Wlien you are talking abovit receiving equipment, 
you are referring to the equipment which could be used to receive the 
material from the New York desk, or some place else? 

Mr. McIvesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Wliich would be broadcast over your broadcasting 

Mr. McKesson. That would be connected to the ship with UHF or 
VHF radio circuits, or the possibilit}'' of telephone lines might be 
presented in some cases. 

The Chairman. I have a bit of confusion on my figures here. You 
testified either today or the other day, and I have your testimony of 
both days — I have it all in mind so I do not know which day you testi- 
fied to the particular part — but your testimony, as I recall, was that if 
the proper ship had been selected, the Courier project could have been 
constructed at a total cost of around $600,000, or thereabouts. In 
other words, if you selected a ship that did not need to have an addi- 
tional flight deck, one with a hull strong enough so you did not have to 
rebuild the hull, the total cost would run about five or six hundred 
thousand dollars. 

Mr. McKesson. No, I think that five or six hinidred thousand 
dollars is the amount that I said the present Courier was overexpended* 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Assume that the Congress 
decides that we want to authorize additional Courier projects — inci- 
dentally, this one was never authorized by the Congress — you know 
something about the ships that are in mothballs at the present time 
and are available, what Would you say a reasonable cost per Courier 
would be, selecting the proper kind of ship, the ship with the type of 
hull that would not need rebuilding? 

Mr. McKesson. I would recommend that the power would be maxi- 
mum which at this time would be 1,000 kilowatts. If a CVE carrier 
in operating condition — and I believe there are quite a number of them 
who have had very little service since the war, I believe there are a 
number of those. The ship modifications I do not believe should run 
over, well, 3 years ago, $1 million. It would be up 20 percent or more 
than that possibly now, so $1,200,000 or so, plus the cost of equipment 
which would run approximately $900,000 for the transmitter. Six or 
seven hundred thousand dollars for the diesel engines, plus incidental 
equipment, which would be another two or three hundred thousand 

The Chairman. You say the total cost if you have one of the most 
•powerful transmitters, 1,000 kilowatts; is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. It would run roughly $2 million ? 


Mr. McKesson. I was just g:oing to add up those figures. 

The Chairman. Will you do that? 

Mr. McKesson. I said $900,000 for the transmitter, $1 million for 
the ship modification, $700,000 for the diesel power, $200,000 for 
incidental receiving equipment and so forth. That is $2.8 million, if 
my addition is correct. 

The Chairman. How would that compare with the Courier ship now 
in operation insofar as power and range is concerned ? 

Mr. McKesson. If the directive antenna was used — and, inciden- 
tally, that same directive feature can be used to protect a transmitter 
which is operating on the same frequency — if that was used, the 
energy toward the target would be 12 times what the present Courier 
can deliver. 

The Chairman. Wliat were your total figures again? 

Mr. McKesson. $2,800,000. 

The Chairman. You say the present Courier cost about $2,600,000; 
is that right? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

The Chairman. You say there was a waste of six or seven hundred 
thousand dollars, or roughly that, in connection with the present 
Courier; would you say thai a new Courier ship, if efficiently con- 
structed and the right ship selected, would cost $2,800,000 ? I assume 
the additional cost is because of the transmitting facilities which are 12 
times as powerful. 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. I would say this is a poor way to do 

The Chairman. The reason I wanted your figures, Mr. McKesson, 
is because there has been a request of the Congress that we apj)ropriate 
$3,714,000 to begin operations on another CouHer project. 

Mr. McKesson. I don't know what is involved in that figure, so I 
would not be prepared to say exactly whether it is correct. It seems 


The Chairman. I know you cannot plan a project here at the witness 
table. Also you have been going over this in some detail, but your 
testimony is that we could get the most ])owerful transmitter on the 
proper type of ship with a total overall cost not exceeding $2,800,000, 

Mr. McKesson. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. I assume, too, that some substantial sums of money were 
saved as a result of the fact that the Coast Guard did get into this 
situation and take it over ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. We will be able to develop that from Admiral Richmond 
later. As I understand your testimony, particularly with reference 
to what we should know before money is a]i]n'opriated for other ships 
along these lines, the first situation is a CVE ship was available or 
could have been used, and you could have had 12 times the power. 
Would that have meant that the operating costs would have been 12 
times as high ? 

Mr. McKesson. No, obviously not. The estimate at the time indi- 
cated the operating cost of that type of ship would be around, as I 
remember the figures I had, $773,000 a year. 

Mr. Cohn. What is the ratio ? 


Mr. JVIcKesson. By the time you add the radio part to that, it might 
be approximately twice what the present Courier costs the Coast Guard 
to operate. 

Mr. CoiiN. So for twice the operating cost, we would have achieved 
12 times the power, by the use of a CVE and a megawatt transmitter. 

Mr. jNIcKesson. I would like to say that the CVE part of this never 
got to the point where the Navy was formally requested to state whether 
one was available or not. 

Mr. CoiiN. That request Avas never made to the Navy. 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. If it had been and the CVE was available, it would have 
meant 12 times the power at only twice the operating cost ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. You told us the receiving equipment here is wholly in- 
adequate, and I assume that is something which would have to be cor- 
rected ; is that right ? 

Mr. McKesson. It is corrected on the present Courier^ but they have 
not chosen to put it into use. 

Mr. CoHN. They have not put into use the proper receiving equip- 
ment ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. Cohen. No. 3 is that you have told us it operates by using 150 
kilowatts' during the daytime but when they can reach the maximum 
listening audience, it goes down to 40 kilowatts, and, as a matter of 
fact, when the balloons cannot work due to the weather, it goes down 
to 30 or even less ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right, to 15 percent of 30. 

Mr. CoHN. 15 percent of 30, which is certainly a very substantial 

Mr. McKesson. As compared to the 150 kilowatts. 

Mr. CoHN. I assume your recommendation would be that before a 
lot of money is appropriated, and they make plans' for a new one, they 
should know where they are going to send it, and w^iat they have in 
mind, and make sure the frequencies are available, and the power 
situation is taken care of, so that at the important hours it does not go 
down to almost nothing. 

Mr. McKesson, I would say where that 15 percent of 30 kilo- 
watts comes. For engineers, they might think that is a little strange, 
but a six-tenths wavelength antenna, which the balloon is, will have 
a field strength of approximately 265 millivolts per meter, at 1 mile 
per kilowatt. I do not have the exact figures of the ship antenna, 
its effective height or resistance but I think the value will be 100 
millivolts per meter. If you work that out mathematically you find 
it is 15 percent. Actually it is 14.4 percent. 

Mr. CoHN. Furthermore, I think you made the point if the services 
of the Navy had been used, rather than a private contractor, the Gov- 
ernment would not have had to pay a profit and go into a cost-plus 
arrangement such as it did in this' case ; is that right '? 

Mr. McKesson. That is true, if the Navy had done the work. How- 
ever, the Navy also occasionally uses private contractors. 

Mr. CoiiN. Would the Navy have been available? Were they ever 
asked to do this? 


Mr. McKesson. Preliminary investigation at that time indicated 
that the Navy would be interested in it. Officers at my level who I 
talked to indicated that they thought it would be possible. It did 
not go to the Chief of Staff. 

Mr. CoHN. A request was not made to higher authority to see if the 
Navy could do this work or not? 

Mr. McKesson. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, let me ask you this : The Coast Guard, of course, 
mans this Courier. Now, did they call on the Coast Guard at the 
outset to see what the Coast Guard could contribute and what recom- 
mendations the Coast Guard could make toward saving money? 

Mr. McKesson. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. CoiiN. As far as you know, the Coast Guard didn't come in until 
some time later ; is that right ? 

Mr. McKesson. After the ship was pretty well designed and par- 
tially constructed. 

Mr. CoHN. This, of course, is one item that you have named for us. 
Now, were there any other items handled by the Voice Engineering 
Department that you regarded as not having been handled properly, 
such as this one ? 

Mr. McKesson. Well, I have a list of a number of other items here, 
which are quite technical and would require days to go into details. 
However, I would like to just mention what they are. 

Mr. CoiiN. Could you do that, very briefly? And then we could 
■decide which ones we want to go into in further detail later. 

Mr. McKesson. Coherent transmissions. 

Proper use of phase modulation. 

Optimum use of the twilight curtain for getting signals into Russia 
and satellite countries. 

Improper use of Rhombic antennas on certain areas and stations, 
primarily those in the United States and Okinawa and the Philippine 

Improper design of curtain antennas, which, of course, has been 
partly covered and will be covered additionally. 

General Sarnoff suggested some years ago the possibility of, as he 
called them, $2 receivers as a means of getting additional listeners 
behind the Iron Curtain. That was investigated by several people 
privately, but the voice sabotaged it. 

Mr. CoHN. Didn't they ever follow that up? 

Mr. McKesson. To my knowledge, they followed it up, but as to 
the receivers that resulted, one type of receiver was very expensive 
and the other type of receiver used transistors, which I imagine would 
cost several hundred dollars, which are not in the throwaway class. 
I don't think our Treasury is that big. 

The present megawatt stations, some of which are under construc- 
tion, are using low antennas, which result in the same situation that 
Mr. Gillett spoke about yesterday, where the loss in listeners in the 
fading range is very high. 

They have not investigated and used to the best advantage single- 
side band transmissions both to targets and relays. When it is used 
to target directly, you use a modified signalside band, so that an ordi- 
nary receiver can receive it with a considerable gain. 

Another point of interest to propagation people is that along the 
geomagnetic, equator, which is near the Philippine station, the propa- 


gation in the east and west direction of vertical polarization is greatly 
absorbed. This is in exactly the direction they expect this station 
to operate, and in my belief additional tests should be made and con- 
sideration given to people such as the Bureau of Standards that know 
the answers to some of these questions as to what the field may be. 
It may be too low to give any program service to that area at all. 

The VOA uses clippers at all radio stations, which result in very poor 
quality, and in my opinion do not gain what they are supposed to. 
"We have a recording of these clippers in operation, and if the com- 
mittee would like to go into those at some time, we have made tenta- 
tive arrangements to place them on a speaker here. 

Eandomizing of frequencies, locations, and langiiages has not been 

Transmission into enemy skipzone areas has not been used. 

I believe considerable gain can be had by operating on Russian 

There have been excessive delays in construction, resulting in re- 
strictions on the expanded program of the Voice. 

However, there is one point I want to make clear here : That I be- 
lieve Mr. Weldon, who has designed the megawatt transmitters, both 
the shortwave and the longwave, has done an exceptionally good job, 
and I believe all engineers in the industry will back me up in saying 
that he has done a wonderful job under extreme difficulty. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, Mr. McKesson, about the last thing I have to ask 
you is this : 

First, if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the record I will call to your 
attention a memorandum directed to Mr. Reed Harris, dated May 19, 
1952, which has been supplied to the committee, and which might shed 
some light on some of the conditions which have been described. It 
was submitted by the Voice in New York to Mr. Reed Harris. It 
is entitled "Contract Administration for VOA Facilities Project." 
It states, in part : 

On the score of site audit, from a fiscal and administrative point of view, the 
Department is wide open (except to the extent that our engineers have per- 
formed some of these functions despite their lack of training or of responsibility 
and authority). 

The memorandum goes on to say at a later point- 

The Chairman. Who is that memorandum from? 

Mr. CoHN. The memorandum is under the name of the then Di- 
rector of the Voice, Mr. Kohler, and it was addressed to Reed Harris, 
and was dated May 19, 1952. 

It goes on and it states, on page 5 of the memorandum : 

We are not able to tell where we stand financially on our various construc- 
tion projects, and must rely on the contractor to provide information as to ex- 
penditures. This has proved wholly^ inadequate, even for our needs, and, of 
course, is downright dangerous to the Government's financial interests. 

Now, may I ask that this memorandum, Mr. Chairman, be made a 
part of the record ? 

The Chairman . It will be. 

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60" and 
will be found in the appendix on p. 770.) 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. McKesson, my last question is this, in somewhat of 
a summary form. You have told us about these 16 items. You and 
others have testified about this Baker West, this $10 million project, 


which, it turns out now, in the opinion of the Bureau of Standards 
and everybody else, was clearly mislocated. And as to the Bureau 
of Standards, of course, they were never asked for a report, but a 
private consultant was paid $600,000 for this and other projects. But 
that opinion, a unanimous opinion, was submitted to the IIA in July 
of 1952, and they did nothing about it until this committee began its 
investigation. You have named some 16 other projects in which you 
state the Engineering Department was derelict in its duties. We have 
this memorandum. We had the testimony of Mr. Pratt, adviser to 
President Eisenhower, concerning the incompetence of the Engineer- 
ing Department. 

Now, do you think that all of these items, which involve I think 
almost every major engineering project the Voice has had, has in 
your opinion fallen into a pattern while you were with the Voice 
Engineering Department and observing all of these things? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes; I do; and in the projects I was concerned 
with, I tried to correct it. I believe I did correct some of it. But it 
became an impossible thing for some of us to do what we considered 
a proper job. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Assume you were the chief 
engineer, or assume you were in Mr. Reed Harris' ])osition, or that of 
whoever was the final authority at that time, the man responsible for 
the engineering. I am not speaking now of the material broadcast. 
But assume you were in charge of all the construction, deciding what 
type of antenna, what type of transmitters, would be built. If you 
wanted to thoroughly discredit the operation, if you wanted to thor- 
oughly sabotage it, would you not have done almost exactly what 
has been done? 

Mr. McKesson. I think it was very much along those lines, and I 
think you are correct. If I was a saboteur, I would do things like 

The Chairman. Exactly what has been done ? 

Mr. McKesson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Senator Bridges or Senator McClellan? 

Senator Bridges. In your judgment, there has been waste in this 
project. No. 1; there was not proper investigation, 2; and in your 
judgment, before Congress authorizes further funds for anything 
of this kind, you think there should be rather a complete investiga- 
tion into this subject by the Voice, with a report to the Congress, and 
that they should have competent engineers to do it, rather than some of 
the people they have had ? 

Mr. McKesson. That is my opinion; yes, sir, very much so. 

The Chairman. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. CoHN. No. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. McKesson. 

Incidentally, I understand that you and other engineers have 
drafted what you think would be a feasible plan if the Voice is to be 
continued. We will be interested in that plan. In the meantime, I 
would suggest that it might be well to submit it to Dr. Johnson. 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir. I will try to do that. 

The Chairman. Just glancing over the plan casually, it seems to 
have apparently a lot of merit, although the committee cannot put 
itself in the position of drafting a plan for the Voice. I think you 


should submit that to Dr. Johnson, and I would like to get his re- 
actions to it. 

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir; I will. 

The Chairman. Who is your next witness ? 

Mr. CoHN. Admiral Richmond. 

The Chairman. Admiral, will you take the stand? You may bring 
anyone with you that you care to. 

Admiral Richmond. I need no one, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand ? In this matter 
now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the 
truth, the M'hole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Admiral Richmond. I do. 

Mr. CoHN. Would you give us your full name, please? 


Admiral Richmond. Alfred C. Richmond, rear admiral, United 
States Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant. 

Mr. CoHN. You are the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard ; 
is that right ? 

Admiral Richmond. That is correct. 

Mr, CoHN. Admiral, are you thoroughly familiar with the project 
known as Vagabond Day, or the Courier? 

Admiral Richmond. I was in on the original consultation with rep- 
resentatives of the State Department, and followed it with interest, 
but, of course, after the outfitting was started, my knowledge of that 
is based on the records that we have at Coast Guard Headquarters. 

Mr. CoHN. And you have consulted those records at the request of 
the committee; is that right? 

Admiral Richmond. I have consulted those records. 

Mr. CoiiN. Now, Admiral, is it a fact that the Coast Guard was not 
called in on this originally when the plans were first being made? 

Admiral Richmond. From the testimony given here this morning, 
that is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you feel that had they been called in originally at 
the time the plani»; Avere about to be formulated, and consulted about 
the whole thing, in view of the fact that they were eventually to man 
the thing, a more economical job could have been done ? 

Admiral Richmond. I believe certainly we could have given a great 
deal of advice in things that later involved changes, and undoubtedly 
economies would have been effected ; yes. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : In view of the fact that the 
Coast Guard would ultimately he manning that ship, would it not be 
the normal thing to have you called in at the time the project was 
initiated ? Would that not be the normal procedure? 

Admiral Richmond. I would say "Yes, sir," but if I may I would 
like to explain to the committee exactly how the Coast Guard got into 
manning of the Vagabond. 

Senator Bridges. Mr. Chairman, before the witness does that, may I 
say that because I have another meeting that I have got to preside at, 
I will ask the committee to excuse me, please. I want to thank you 


for going into this matter, and I have four members of the staff of 
the Appropriations Committee here now working on this thing as 
observers, and we appreciate the wholehearted cooperation of your 
committee and your able counsel, who has been investigating this sub- 
ject. I hope as a result of it we are going to first show the completto 
disregard of funds which the Voice used in going into this subject, 
and the waste resulting, and also the necessity for having better plan- 
ning, and, third, a complete revision of the engineering staff on a more 
competent basis. I think that your investigation will probably show 
that, and if it does that we will have at least a basis to proceed on. 

The Chairman. I may say, Senator Bridges, that we have been 
taking a tremendous amount of testimony so far, and every competent 
engineer who has been before us, I believe, has agreed that the entire 
setup falls into a pattern. And not merely this Vagabond project; I 
think that is one of the least wasteful, though it is very wasteful. 
But on all of the projects you have the same pattern, a pattern that 
would appear to be a deliberate attempt to discredit, to sabotage, any 
attempt to have an effective operating Voice of America. And I 
heartily agree with Senator Bridges when he says your engineering 
setup over there needs a complete and thorough revision. It is hard 
for us at this time to know where to place the blame, as to why incom- 
petent engineers were hired, whether it was deliberately done. We 
have been trying to find the key to this entire situation. We know 
it is extremely bad. And I may say to the chairman of the Appro- 
priations Committee, whenever you have any other project that you 
want checked into, we have a good, competent staff to do it. 

Senator Bridges. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Admiral Richmond. On January 22, 1951, three representatives of 
the Voice of America — Mr. Herrick was the senior one — visited the 
Coast Guard headquarters. I am not sure of the names of the other 
two. I think it was a Mr. Kaplan and possibly a Mr. Walker. They 
outlined this plan for a mobile station. They indicated that the type 
of ship had been selected. 

Mr. CoHN. They told you the type ship had already been selected; 
is that right ? 

Admiral Richmond. They indicated they had selected the type and 
were sure they could get it from the Maritime Cormnission. 

Mr. CoHN. There was no mention to you of the possibility of using 
a CVE or anything like that? 

Admiral Richmond. It is only within the last day or so that I even 
knew a CVE was ever contemplated. The general outlines of the 
project were discussed, and what they asked was that the Coast Guard 
undertake the manning of the ship, or if we would be willing to con- 
sider the undertaking. I represented the Coast Guard at that confer- 
ence and told them that, although we were not seeking the job, in line 
with our statutory responsibility of cooperation with other Govern- 
ment agencies, we would consider the matter, under three conditions : 
( 1 ) that there would be a formal request from the Secretary of State 
to the Secretary of the Treasury for Coast Guard cooperation; (2) 
that in the event it was decided that the Coast Guard should man the 
ship, at the time the Coast Guard undertook the manning of the ship, 
not the conversion but the manning of it — we had nothing to do with 
the conversion — there should be an advance of fmids at the beginning 


of the year, of which we would keep a strict accounting, but they would 
have to pay in advance for the manning; and (3) that before the man- 
ning was done, there would be a firm agreement between the State De- 
partment and the Coast Guard, as to areas of responsibility. Because 
you gentlemen can well understand that in a combined operation of 
this thing you can get into many differences of opinion. 

Following that, on the 9th of February, a request was received by 
the Secretary of the Treasury — I might say a letter was received 
dated the 9th of February — from the Under Secretary of State, di- 
rected to the Under Secretar}'^ of the Treasury for Coast Guard co- 
operation, setting forth the general outline of the plan that had been 
discussed earlier. 

The matter was considered at Coast Guard Headquarters, and at 
February 20 the then Acting Secretary of the Treasury answered and 
said that the general terms of the plan were acceptable, and the 
Coast Guard would undertake to cooperate in this project and name 
a designated Coast Guard representative to meet with the Voice of 
America people. 

Such a meeting was held early in March, and on the 9th of April, 
the prospective commanding officer was ordered to New York to go 
to the Hoboken plant of the Bethlehem shipyard along with the 
engineer or prospective engineer officer and a machinist. At the same 
time, we set up a staging schedule for the balance of the personnel for 
the vessel. 

Do you want me to follow through the whole history of this, sir? 

Mr. CoHN. No ; I don't think that is necessary. Maybe we can do 
it this way, but I didn't want to go into it with you. Through the 
Coast Guard agreement you were to take over the Courier. Are you 
familiar with the fact that Commander Wev has made an estimate 
as to the amount of monev'^ that was saved by the Coast Guard eliminat- 
ing from the modification costs that had been planned by this Rhodes 
Co., this private contractor, various items ? 

Admiral Richmond. I am familiar with Commander, now Captain, 
Wev's letter. 

Mr. CoHN. I am sorry. Captain Wev. 

The Chairman. Do not start demoting these naval officers. 

Admiral Richmond. No, he was a commander at the time. Captain 
Wev's letter — in which he indicated certain changes that had come 
about after the ship arrived at the yard but before work was started 
based on recommendations 

Mr. CoHN. Made by the Coast Guard? 

Admiral Richmond. Made by ourselves, and an agreement that I 
would say involved the manning of the broadcasting room itself. 
Originally, the plan was that we were to deliver power to the board, 
and that was our only responsibility. 

Mr. CoHN. About how mucli money was saved by these modifica- 

Admiral Richmond. At that time he indicated that he figured the 
estimated savings would be $1,200,000. 

The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, I understand from the witnesses that 
have been interviewed that originally it was planned to have an 
extremely plush job, and that the Coast Guard cut down on that 
and cut out the trimmings and saved considerable money on that 
score. Would you care to go into that ? 


Mr, CoHN. Is that a fact, Admiral ? In other words, various modi- 
fications were suggested by the Coast Guard, which would put com- 
plete emphasis on this from a utilitarian point of view and eliminate 
anything which was more elaborate than necessary ? 

Admiral Richmond. There were two main alterations, if I may 
enlarge upon them. 

First, the original plans — and they were very rough plans — of the 
conversion of this vessel, the Coastal Messenger, had contemplated 
moving the deckhouse from aft amidshii)s and placing the balloon 
platform aft. Furthermore, there was contemplated, as I indicated 
a moment ago, the carrying of the broadcasting staff. That crew 
would have required a breaking down or cutting up of the space. A 
military service, as you know, operates for its men on the basis of 
dormitories. I have pictures which I can show the committee of 
crew's quarters, for example. 

Mr. CoHN. What type of thing were you able to eliminate? 

Admiral Richmond. Staterooms, a lounge, and particularly the 
change for the stateroom for the broadcasting personnel, civilian 
broadcasting personnel. 

Mr. CoHN. You were able to eliminate the lounge and the state- 
room ? 

Admiral Richmond. As an example, originally they had planned 
to have from 15 to 20 State Department people on there. At the 
present time, there are only three. Because the work that was being 
done by them is now being done by Coast Guard enlisted personnel. 

The "major change, and I don't know that the Coast Guard alone 
can take credit for this, was that the original plans involved changing 
the after deckhouse forward and ])utting the balloon platform aft. 
As a result of these changes, the original structure of the ship, as far as 
the deckhouse was concerned, was left intact, and the balloon deck 
was put amidships. In other words, there was just a superstructure 
deck built over the amidship section. That, of course, saved two 
things. It saved the elimination of a deckhouse and the rebuilding 
forward. It also eliminated the running of lengthy or relatively 
lengthy high-powered transmission through the ship, because the 
balloon deck is now over the transmitting room. 

Mr. CoHN. And Captain Wev has estimated that all of these 
various items, the elimination of the lounge, the radio situation, the 
staterooms, all these things, amounted to a saving of approximately 

Admiral Richmond. At that time. That was the estimate. 

Mr. Cohn. Let me come to this, if I may. Admiral. Are you aware 
that the Voice of America engineering department insisted on the in- 
stallation of vapor-phase cooling for the diesel generators? 

Admiral Richmond. I am, and have read the record on it ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Did the Coast Guard regard this as necessary, or un- 
necessary ? 

Admiral Richmond. At the time, the Coast Guard was against 
the installation of vapor-phase cooling on the diesel generators for the 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know how much this installation cost? 

Admiral Richmond. I do not. 

Mr. Cohn. We have gotten an estimate of approximately a hundred 
thousand dollars. Do you know whether that is accurate? 


Admiral Richmond. I don't think that is the estimate for the in- 
stallation. I have heard that by insisting on that it cost a hundred 
thousand dollars additional. Personally, I don't believe it. 

Mr. CoHN. What was your estimate ? 

Admiral Richmond. I would say probably, over conventional diesel 
generators, $15,000. 

Mr. CoHN. About that, you say. And you say you objected to this. 
Is that right ? 

Admiral Richmond. We recommended against the installation of 
the vapor-phase cooling on the diesel generator system. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you recommend it because in your experience you 
had found it would not be the most effective thing ? 

Admiral Richmond. I wouldn't say most effective. We had util- 
ized it on one occasion and had trouble with it. It has had veiy 
little marine experience, and we felt that it was inadvisable to put 
aboard a ship that would be staged in some outlying area something 
that hadn't been tested, fully tested. 

Mr. CoHN. I see. And by the way, would you see if it would be 
possible to ascertain the exact figure? Maybe we shouldn't ask you 
about that. We might be able to get that from the engineering 

Admiral Richmond. As to the cost of installation ? 

Mr. CoHN. Right. 

Admiral Richmond. Yes. Because we didn't know what the cost 

Mr. CoHN. Am I correct in assuming that you are still, with respect 
to future projects of this kind, opposed to that decision ? 

Admiral Richmond, I would say at this stage we would be against 
vapor-phase cooling. 

Mr. CoHN. By the way, I think we ought to go into that for just 
a second, too. Is it a fact that when you had to go about the task 
of acquiring materials for use in the Courier, instead of going out 
and purchasing them, you went around and acquired various surplus 
property and requisition supplies from the Maritime Service in the 
Navy and effected a saving of about $200,000, which would have had 
to be spent if they were purchased on the commercial market ? 

Admiral Richmond. Naturally in outfitting the ship we attempted 
to do it in the most economical way possible, and availed ourselves 
of every possible source. The answer to that is, "Yes; we went to 
the Maritime Commission." A specific item was the balloons already 
mentioned this morning. Captain Wev arranged for the transfer 
of 5 balloons at an estimated cost of $18,000 for stocking. 

Mr. Cohn. Right. Now, my last question would be this, Admiral 
Richmond. You have heard some discussion here this morning about 
a request for an appropriation for some additional ships, along these 
lines. Is it your opinion that if the planning is handled in a proper 
manner and if the right people are called in at the very beginning 
and all these items Ave have gone over are given careful consideration 
and planned out by competent engineers in consultation with the 
Coast Guard or whoever would man them, the ships would not have 
to cost as much as this project has cost, and that savings might be 
effected ? 


Admiral Richmond. I think that is a reasonable assumption, based 
en the grounds that any delayed project is going to certainly cost you 

Mr. CoiiN. I have nothing more of Admiral Richmond, except to 
thank him for coming up here, and effecting these economies which 
we have heard about. 

The Chairman. Do you think we should thank the admiral for 
saving $1,200,000? You are going to make him unpopular with the 
II A if he saves that much money ; that is, the old management of the 
IIA, I should say. 

Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Admiral Richmond. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Veldhuis, I just want to apologize to you. 
You have evidence of tremendous importance to this investigation. 
We thought we would get to you this morning. 

I am sorry we did not get to you this forenoon. 

I wonder if we could impose on you to be available at such time as 
you would be called. I assume that will be next week. We want to 
give you sufficient time to develop fully the evidence which you have. 
1 think it is of very great importance. 

In view of the fact that you have a lawyer, Mr. Hlavaty, I assume 
your trip down here is costing you something. I do not believe we 
should have you come back again. I assume you would prefer to 
have your testimony completed today. Right ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So we will adjourn until 2 : 30 this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. 
this same day.) 


The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Would you 
give me the spelling of your name again, sir ? 


Mr. Hlavaty. H-1-a-v-a-t-y. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hlavaty, have you done any work for the 
Government of any kind other than the broadcast for the Voice of 
Ajnerica ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Not in recent years. During the war, I was called 
on to help construct examinations in mathematics. 

The Chairman. During the war ? What department ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I think it was the Army. I could look that up. 

The Chairman. You worked for the Army during the war. How 
many years, and what salary did you draw? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't recall. It was during the 3 or 4 war years. 
1 was occasionally asked to make an examination or to check on an- 
other examination, and they reimbursed me at an hourly rate equiva- 
lent to the pay I was receiving as a chairman in the New York City 
school system. 


The Chairman. Did you correct examination papers at that time, 
or did you draft them ? Just what were your duties ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I made up questions, and I helped draft examinations. 

The Chairman. Did you correct any of the papers ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I did not. 

The Chairman. In other words, you did not have the task of pass- 
ing on the grades or the eligibility of anyone at that time ? 

lilr. Hlavaty. Certainly not. 

The Chairman. And were you a member of the Communist Party 
at that time ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I answered tlie question this morning. I decline to 
answer that question. 

The Chairman. On the grounds that that answer might incriminate 
you ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Y es, sir. 

k5enator Dirksen. Mr. Hlavaty, I assume you are of Czech origin, 
are you not? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir; I am. 

Senator Dirksen. Were you born in Czechoslovakia? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I was. It was Austria-Hungary at the time I was 
born there. 

Senator Dirksen. At what age did you come to the United States? 

Mr. Hlavaty. At the age of 14, 

Senator Dirksen. I assume, of course, you suffer some distress of 
spirit over what has happened to the freedom of the Czech people, do 
you not? 

Mr. Hlavaty'. I do. 

Senator Dirksen. And you would like to see that freedom restored? 

Mr. Hlavaty. It was for that reason that I took part in that broad- 
cast that I was asked to participate in. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, I want to take a moment to develop a little 
background with reference to your refusal to answer the chairman's 
question this morning. And for the moment, certainly, I do not 
quarrel with your answer, but I would rather put the thing on another 

I assmne you have been following somewhat the activities of this 
connnittee and what it lias been seeking to do. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. I thought at the present time it was the 
question of the Voice of America. And I have not been asked about 
that yet. That is why I would like to develop what that program 
was and how I got into the program. 

Senator Dirksen. AVell, I just wanted to summarize for you some- 
what in this fashion. We are concerned, obviously, about a free 
America, and we are concerned about those instrumentalities for which 
the Congress appropriates and creates, to carry American sentiment 
and American viewpoint and American interpretations abroad, on the 
theory that it certainly will strengthen the free world, and it will be 
in the interest of the perpetuity of the freedom of our own country. 

Now, if, for any reason, whether based on assumption or allegation, 
there is at least a reasonable suspicion that everything is not all 
right, it becomes then the responsibility of some agencj^, whether it 
be this or any other committee, to make an investigation. 

29708 — 53— pt. 9 -3 


We go on the theory that perhaps at the outset these may be assump- 
tions, they may be allegations, they may be well founded, or they may 
be ill founded. Only adducing the truth will determine that finally. 

Now, in that general exploration, of course, there are two lines to 
follow. One is what facilities, physical facilities, you use, in the form 
of transmitters and so forth. Were they properly located? Were 
they efficiently constructed? And was it done on a sound basis? Or 
was there perhaps an attitude that would give rise to the belief that 
everything was not all right, and that one might describe it as a bit of 
polite and very subtle sabotage ? That is one line that you investigate. 

Now, the second line that you examine is the material that is broad- 
cast. And that involves first, of course, the people that do it, and 
secondly, the substance of the material that is used. _ Because if it 
does not express America, and if it does not go to an objective, such as 
seeking to roll back communistic sentiment and to substitute therefor 
what we think is the true sentiment, the free sentiment, that we hope 
somehow to impress upon the hearts and minds of people, then we 
ought to look and see what is wrong. So take first of all  

Mr. Hlavaty. If I may interrupt for a moment 

Senator Dirksen. Just let me finish the thesis, and then I will ask 
a question. 

Now, in investigating, of course, the type of material, that will 
include the scripts, how they are done, what sentiments are expressed, 
whether there is a misinterpretation of what we believe is the Ameri- 
can viewpoint, quite aside from what the purveyor of the idea may 
think. And then, secondly, of course, there are the people. Now, if 
I, for one, were going to subvert a program of that kind, I think 
just as a natural consequence I would start first of all with people, 
and get those that I think will express an opposite viewpoint, or at 
least who can very subtly give a turn to a phrase or to a word so that 
it does not express America at all, as a matter of fact. 

That gets back, then, to the question that was asked you this morn- 
ing. The chairman asked you whether or not in a given year you had 
been a member of the Communist Party. You declined to answer 
because of the immunity that is granted under the fifth amendment. 
I will not quarrel about it now. It could be entirely on good ground, 
and I would always rationalize it, I think, on behalf of the witness 
if it were a close question. 

But I would say this to j^ou, having listened this morning to your 
testimony as far as you got. It would seem to me that you, a born 
Czech and a naturalized American, would be so interested in this 
thing called freedom that on patriotic grounds you might serve your 
country, you might serve your city, by stating very freely, instead 
of taking refuge in constitutional immunity, whether or not you had 
been a member of that party in any given year. I put it on that 
ground. And I think there is something of a patriotic duty, quite 
aside from the legal immunity that is involved, to answer the question. 
But I do not think I, for one, would compel you to, if you insisted 
on finding refuge in the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Hlavaty. May I speak to that? The reason I am here today is 
I think traceable back to the fact that when I graduated from high 
school I won a medal on cooperation in government. And when I was 
asked by the Voice of America representative to speak, I didn't seek 


the opportunity to speak on the program, but when I was asked to 
speak I said "Yes," after I found out wliat they wanted on the pro- 
gram. They wrote the script. I submitted the contents to my im- 
mediate superior at the school, because it was a description of the 
school in which I teach, which is a very special school ; in fact, I would 
lilce to say the best high school in the world. And I was proud to say 
all those things. But I did not write any part of it. 

I do want to say something about the second point that you make^ 
Senator, because I feel that very deeply. I think I am acting as a' 
loyal American citizen when I invoke constitutional guaranties. Be- 
cause I disagree with Senator Mundt when he said this morning that 
citing the fiftli amendment is a confession of guilt. I don't think it is. 
I think it is a guaranty which particularly in difficult times it is im- 
portant for Americans to cite. It puts the burden of proof on the 
accuser, not on the defender. And I don't know who, what person, 
for any motive whatsoever, might charge me with something which is 
not so or which is not true. And that is why I invoke that. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, frankly, granting everything you say, the 
weakness in the case that you make lies simply in the fact that, first, 
you are not being charged with anything. This is not a judicial pro- 
ceeding at all. This is just an investigatory proceeding seeking to 
develop the facts with respect to an activity of the Federal Govern- 
ment that we seek to make as efficient as we can in the interest of our 
country. Now, that is the first thing. 

But secondly, out of all your testimony this morning, I could not 
help but feel — and I never asked a single question this morning; I 
just listened — I could not help but feel, sir, that you gave to my mind 
and I think to the mind of every listener who may have been in this 
room that you were a member of the party in some year. You made 
exceptions to given years. You said, "In that year I was not." "In 
that year I was not." "In another year I was not." Then, when we 
came to still another year, you said, "I decline to answer." 

Now, how could one go away without the impression that in a given 
year not too far back you were a member of the party, and that it 
came within that time when this program was first started, in 1947? 

Now, if we are trying to make this the Voice of America — it is a 
good name ; the Voice of America, American opinion, American sen- 
timent — I think you would serve your country if you very freely 
said, "In that year I was." Because you are not being charged with 
a crime. If I am familiar with the laws of the land, it is no crime 
to be a member of the Communist Party. But at least it does give 
to us some information I think we need as to who was selected to 
broadcast these sentiments to all the wide world and what the back- 
ground is. 

Mr. Hlavaty. In all the questions, there hasn't been one question 
yet about the contents of the pro^rram. What I actually said, though 
it wasn't anything that I wrote, I agreed with most of it. I suppose 
you have a text of it. I brought a text with me. Unfortunately, it is 
in Slovak, but if you would like to hear what is in it, I could give you 
a running translation of what I did say. And by no stretch of the 
imagination could it be considered as anything which might sub- 

The Chairman. Mr. Hlavaty, have you taken any interest in poli- 
tics in New York ? 


Mr. Hlavaty. Off and on ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are aware of the fact, I assume, that the 
Liberal Party broke away from the American Labor Party ; that tlie 
Liberal Party was the anti-Communist element of the American Labor 
Party ; that the American Labor Party has been cited twice as com- 
pletely Communist controlled. Are you aware of that ? 

Mr. Hlavatt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman, You are aware of that ? 

Mr. Hlavatt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How long have you been aware of that? You 
knew that last year; did you not? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I knew that such statements were made ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You knew they were cited as Communist 

Mr. Shapiro. Wliat do you mean by "cited as Communist con- 

The Chairman. Mr. Attorney, I told you you may take no part in 
the proceedings. You may talk to your client if you care to. 

Mr. Shapiro. Well 

The Chairman. Understand this: You may talk to your client. 
He may talk to you whenever he wants to. If you want a private 
conversation with your attorney, we will give you a private room for 
that. The attorney will take no part in these proceedings. If you 
think he does not understand *a question, you may talk to him when- 
ever you want to. 

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.) 

The Chairman. We will mark these as exhibit 61. 

(1952 election primarily enrollments were marked "Exhibit 61" and 
will be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. We want to welcome Congressman Van Pelt here. 

Representative Van Pelt. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Will you hand this to the witness, Ruth? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I understood you to say about that that there is an 
opinion held by many people that the American Labor Party is or 
was Communist-dominated. Is that what you meant? 

The Chairman. The question is: Do you know that it has been 

Mr. Hlavaty. Is that a technical word that I don't understand. Is 
that a technical word ? 

The Chairman. It was named officially by the Un-American Activ- 
ities Committee, and I believe it was named by the California Un- 
American Activities Committee, as Communist-controlled. Your 
answer to that was "Yes." Now, if you want to change your answer, 
you may change it. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Well, I have no idea what is in that book. 

The Chairman. You know it has the reputation of being Commu- 
nist-controlled? You have known all along that this had the reputa- 
tion of being Communist-controlled? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes. Yes. 

The Chairman. Will you identify those two documents which were 
handed you ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. This is the primary enrollment for the year 1952, 
and it shows that I enrolled in the American Labor Party. 

The Chairman. And the other one? 


Mr. Hlavatt. This other one is not me. And I am very much dis- 
turbed by it. 

The Chairman. Whose is that ? 

Mr. Hlavatt. This is an enrolhnent bhmk signed by my wife. 

The Chairman. For 1952? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

The Chair3ian. Mr. Hlavaty, have you attended meetings of the 
Communist Party or Communist cells ? 

You may advise your client at an}^ time you care to, Mr. Attorney. 

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.) 

Mr. Hlavaty. I must decline to answer that question on the grounds 
of the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. On the grounds that your answer might incrimi- 
nate you. How many years have you taught school ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Twenty- four years. 

The Chairman. Twenty-four years. And your job as of today is 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am the chairman of the department of mathematics 
at the Bronx High School. 

The Chairman. How many students are at that school ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. 2,400. 

The Chairman. Have you ever attended any Communist Party 
meetings or any cell meetings which were attended by any of your 

Mr. Hlavaty. I must decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. On the grounds that the answer might incriminate 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you ever attempted to reciTiit any of your 
students into the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I am afraid I must • decline to answer all such 

The Chairman. You can decline to answer that. You have a right 
to. If, as you say, you honestly think if you told us the truth, it would 
incriminate you, you have the right to decline to answer. 

Mr. Hlavaty. That isn't the way I would say it, Senator. 

The Chairman. That is the only ground upon which you have the 
right. Otherwise we will not grant you that right. You are only 
entitled to the right to refuse to answer before this committee if you 
honestly think that if you told this committee the truth it would incrim- 
inate you. You are not entitled to decline on the ground that perjury 
might incriminate you. You understand that. It is only if you 
honestly feel that a truthful answer would incriminate you. 

Do you understand the question? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And your answer is that you decline to answer on 
the ground that your answer might incriminate you ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. On the ground of the fifth amendment ; yes, sir. 

Senator, you still haven't asked me what I was called down here 
for and brought away from my work for. I made a broadcast, a 
patriotic and unpaid act, and you haven't asked me anything about it. 

The Chairman. We know you read a broadcast over the air, Mr. 
Hlavaty, that was prepared by someone else. We have that. It will 
be made part of the record. 


(The broaclccast material referred to was marked "Exhibit 62" and 
may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. We are now going into your background. 

IMr. Hlavaty. But this 

The Chairman. One of the reasons why you are here, Mr. Hlavaty, 
is to demonstrate the lack of wisdom in the present rule adopted by 
the Information Administration. It is a rule which is in direct con- 
flict with Public Law 402, which was drafted and introduced by Sen- 
ator Mundt. That law provides that anyone who works for the in- 
formation program in any capacity must pass a loyalty test. We find, 
as I have explained to you this morning, that where people flunk that 
loyalty test, then, instead of being hired on a full-time basis, they are 
hired on a piecemeal basis. 

I would like to ask you this question. Has anyone at the Voice 
ever asked you whether you were a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you be willing at this time to give us the 
names of those people v/ho attended Communist meetings or cell meet- 
ings with you ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I must decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. On the ground that that might incriminate you? 

Mr. Hlavaty. On the grounds of the fifth amendment; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You regard the Communist movement as an in- 
ternational conspiracy, do you? 

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.) 

Mr. Hlavaty. It is a matter of opinion. I agree with that state- 
ment, however. 

The Chairman. Your answer was what? What is your answer to 
that, sir ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. What was the last question ? 

The Chairman. The question was : Do you consider the Communist 
Party not a political party but rather an international conspiracy? 

Mr. Hlavaty. It is a matter of opinion, but I agree with that 

The Chairman. You agree with that ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That being the situation, as an American, you 
having been naturalized and having had all the benefits of an Ameri- 
can citizen, if you agree that communism is an international con- 
spiracy against this country, do you not think you have a duty to 
sit down and tell us all about your connection with the Communist 
Party, the people with whom you have been associated? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I think I have a duty to answer all the questions on 
your present inquiry on the Voice of America, and I would answer 
those questions fully and truthfully, as fully and as truthfully as I 
possibly can. 

The Chairman. We have asked you whether you have attended 
Communist cell meetings. We have asked you whether you tried to 
recruit students into the Communist movement. 

Mr. Hlavaty. But all those questions have nothing to do with the 
Voice of America or what I said there or how I came to say what I 

The Chairman. I cannot force you to give the names of the people 
who were with you in the movement. I was just suggesting that if 


you claim to be a loyal American, if you concede that communism is 
a conspiracy against this country, you do owe a heavy duty. But I 
cannot force you to do that. 

You had a question. When you made this broadcast, did you start 
out by announcing your name? 

Mr. Hlavatt. The broadcast was started by a general introduction 
by the person who was interviewing me. 

The Chairman-. Did you identify yourself? Were you identified? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I was identified when I was asked, and that is on 
page 3  

The Chairman. The question is : Were you identified ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir ; I was. 

The Chairman. Thank you. I do not think I have any further 
questions of this witness. 

Senator McClellan. I think in fairness to the witness, Mr. Chair- 
man, he should be given an opportunity to submit for the record the 
script of the broadcast that he has referred to, and that he also should 
be prepared to tell the committee how he happened to make the broad- 
cast, for the record. 

The Chairman. The script is part of the record. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I may say there that it seems to me that my name 
tomorrow is going to be spread over all the newspapers in the country, 
and what I said here, which would be the strongest defense that I 
would have, will not be in there. I appreciate that you want to intro- 
duce it into the record. I would like to explain how I came to make 
this speech. 

Senator McClellan. I am just asking you so that you can explain. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes. 

The Chairman. May I say for Senator McClellan's benefit, as I 
have said before : The broadcast was not prepared by this gentleman. 
There has been no claim, as far as I understand, that it contains any 
Communist propaganda. 

Is that correct, Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. Cohn. None whatsoever. 

Mr. Hlavaty. May I explain how I came to make the talk? 

Senator McClellan. I think in view of the fact that the witness 
has been questioned about his associations and his affiliation, with 
nothing else before the committee other than that, the assumption 
might be that in this broadcast there was something that favored 
communism or indicated maybe he was following the party line or 

Just in fairness to you, I think that should be at least filed with 
the committee as a part of its record, and I think you should be per- 
mitted to tell how you happened to make the broadcast. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Thank you very much. 

Senator McClellan. You understand, I am not taking a position 
of agreeing with you in all the positions you have taken, other than 
that you have the right to take them under the Constitution. I am 
not at all condoning some of your attitudes. But, as a matter of fair- 
ness, I think this should be in the record. 

The Chairman. Mr. McClellan, the witness has been notified that 
he has the right to make any statement he cares to make. He can do 


Mr. Hlavaty. First I would like to explain how I came to make 

this broadcast. 

Last year, I was invited to speak to one of our classes in world 
literature on Czech and Slovak literature. I did so. It happens that 
one of the students in our school is the daughter of someone in cliaroe 
of the Czechoslovak Division of the Voice of America in New York, 
and this girl carried the news back that the chairman of the mathe- 
matics department read some Slovak poetry and discussed Czech and 
Slovak literature, and the mother came to see me and spoke to me and 
to my principal and asked me whether I would be willing to take 
part in an interview. 

The Chairman. What was this person's name? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Mrs. Winn. 

The Chairman. Mrs. what? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Mrs. Winn. W-i-n-n, I believe. 

The Chairman. Do you know her first name ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't, no. 

The Chairman. Does she work for the Voice ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. She came to me from there. I don't know what po- 
sition she occupies there. And she said they had a series of programs 
called This Is America, factual accounts illustrating facets of Amer- 
ican life, and she thought that a program which would explain one 
particular educational provision that the New York City school system 
was making would be a very interesting program. Our school, as 
some of you may know, is a special school for gifted children, and 
since this involved the school, I felt I ought to go to my principal and 
say I had been invited to make this talk and, "Should I take part in 
it?" He saw no objection to it, and this script was submitted. 

First, there is a long introduction about the school, and then there 
is a series of questions addressed to me. It is in the Slovak language. 
And I answered the questions. It explains how we admit students 
into the Bronx High School of Science, what kind of curriculum we 
offer, what extracurricular activities, what enrichments there are, and 
some of the great things that our graduates have done. 

The Chairman. Would you care to tell us who prepared the 
script ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't know who did. I was asked then to come 
down on my own. I wasn't paid for this in any way. I came down, 
and we read the script over. And the actual full reading of it I be- 
lieve was recorded, and the broadcast was made several days later. 

There was a very interesting consequence after that. Several days 
later, I received a telephone call from them that they had received a 
letter. It developed a childhood friend of mine heard this broadcast 
in a displaced persons' camp in western Germany, and he wrote to 
me. He recognized me. And he identified himself. 

Now, that is what the broadcast contained. 

I would be very glad to read any parts of it if you would be inter- 
ested, and I certainly would appreciate having it made a part of the 

Senator Dirksen. Mr. Hlavaty, let me ask at that point: You 
answered the question of the chairman to the effect that in this inter- 
view preceding the broadcast you made manifest to all the listeners 
who you were. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 


Senator Dirksen". Your first name, and your last name? 

Mr. Hlavaty, No ; as I look at it, I Avas simplj' — the introduction 
said that this person interviewed the principal, and the principal "told 
me that the chairman of the mathematics department is Dr. Hlavaty, 
who comes from Czechoslovakia, so I went to see Dr. Hlavaty and 
begged him to tell us something about the school. Listen to what he 
told us." And then the interview begins. 

Senator Dirksex. Do you keep up some contact with people back 
in Czechoslovakia ? B}^ letter ancl otherwise ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

Senator Dirksen. Are jow pretty well known back there ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Well, I came to this country 32 years ago, and I 
have relations there. I don't know that I have any kind of repu- 
tation there. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, here is the thought that occurs to me, quite 
aside from whatever sentiments may have been expressed in that 
script. If, for instance, I were the interviewer, and I should suddenly 
start one of these international broadcasts by saying, "You are now 
about to hear from Mr. Earl Browder" — Mr. Browder might read 
the Ten Commandments, yet behind the Iron Curtain people would 
know certainly who it is, would they not ? 

Mr. Hi^vATY. They would not laiow me that way. 

Senator Dirkseist. Well, I am speaking about INIr. Browder. They 
would know that Mr. Browder was broadcasting, then. Tliey would 
know who he is. They might be very cynically curious about it, but 
on the other hand, they might say, "Well, evidently we are making 
progress in America, because now Mr. Browder is being used and 
his talents employed for this purpose." But now you come on. Now, 
I would not for the world say that you were a member of the Com- 
munist Party. I would not follow up any such allegation, no matter 
what impression you may have given from what you expressed this 
morning. But would it not be reasonable to assume that back in 
Czechoslovakia when your name was announced and you did maintain 
those. contacts, if you had been a member of the party in America, 
there would be some who would say, "Well" 

]\Ir. Hlavaty. May I speculate as to what the reaction might have 
been on the part of the people who were there? 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. 

Mr. Hlavaty. They would know that in 1921, as a very poor boy 
of 14, 1 went to America, and I received such opportunities inAmerica 
that I was able to reach so distinguished a position as chainnan of 
mathematics of the best high school in the world. I think that would 
be a very good kind of propaganda for America. 

Senator Dirksen. But what would the invading hosts say over 
there to their leaders who have. subverted the freedom of Czechoslo- 
vakia, if you had been a member, and, by the peculiarities of those 
apparatuses that seem to work, they would identify you at once ? Then 
what ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I have no idea. 

Senator Dirksen. It would discount everything that was said in 
the script. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I have no idea, really. Senator. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, one other thing I would like to ask about 
is this : You mentioned a moment ago that your name will doubtless 


appear on the front page. That might be a warranted assumption. 
And it is one of the reasons why I try to be cautious not to injure any- 
body. But on the other hand, look at the other side of this respon- 
sibility. You have neighbors and you have friends in New York. 
Doubtless they knew that you had been invited. Maybe you told 
them. Maybe they found out in another way that you were going 
to do a broadcast on invitation by the Voice of America. 

Now, you said that you had been identified with the American Labor 
Party in New York. Some neighbors, some friends or associates, 
who are Americans and taxpaying Americans and have to support 
this sort of thing might say, "Well, how strange. Here is the head 
of the mathematics department in a very prominent high school with 
more than 2,000 students, whose background we know, and he is invited 
to participate and lend his voice over the air waves for a broadcast 
to a foreign land." 

Mr. Hlavaty. But, Senator, you see how unfair you are in this ? 

Senator Dirksen. I am trying, my dear sir, to be very fair, and if 
there is anything in what I say that is unfair, I will take it all back, 
every bit of it. 

Mr. Hlavaty. You say something about my background. I am 
distressed today about what is happening to me. I have a reputation 
from New York to California as a teacher of mathematics. Three 
weeks from today I am supposed to teach a model lesson at a national 
conference of mathematics teachers. 

In my own community I am shown as a selfless giver of himself to 
every community activity. That is how I am known. Not by the 
fact that maybe some time I registered in the American Labor Party. 
That is something that most people probably don't even know. And 
I think if anything, that is what should be weighed against this. 
What is happening here today means, if not actually, potentially, the 
end of a career which I with all modesty can say was a distinguished 
career in education. In education, mind you. In New York City 
T rose to every single distinction that a teacher of mathematics could 
gain, not by my opinions but because I am a teacher and because I 
am a teacher of mathematics. 

The Chairman. Do you think that Communist teachers should be 
employed to teach in the high schools ? 

Mr, Hlavaty. I have had occasion to pass on the qualifications of 

The Chairman. Do you think that Communist teachers should be 
employed to teach in the high schools ? 

Mr. Hlavatf. Let me finish. Senator. I haven't had a chance to 
say very much in my own defense. I really haven't. 

The Chairman. Let me say, Mr. Hlavaty, you are getting a lot 
more opportunity than you normally would get. The House Un- 
American Activities Committee used to have a rule which I think was 
an excellent rule. That was that when a man came up and said, "I 
refuse to tell you whether I am a member of the Communist Party, 
because if I told you the truth, it would incriminate me," he was 
ordered to step down. He was not heard from after that. We are 
giving you unlimited time to be heard. And I am not sure this is the 
correct rule. I think I might favor the rule the House committee had 
while Senator Mundt was on that committee. We may yet adopt that 
rule. I do not know. That is on the theory that when a man says, 


"I can't tell you the truth about my connection with an international 
conspiracy, because if I told you the truth, I might go to jail," I am 
not sure we should hear him any further. But we are permitting you 
to do that, and then we are allowing you to continue. 

The question was: Do you think that Communist teachers should 
be employed to teach in the high schools ? 

Mr. Hlavatt. I think a teacher should be judged by what he says 
on the job. I agree with Senator Taft, who says that when you put a 
teacher in a job you should watch him, and if he does a job, that is it, 
whatever his opinions may be. If he is guilty of any conspiracy or of 
any crime, it certainly should be provable. I wouldn't ask a man what 
his opinions were to decide whether he is a good carpenter. 

The Chairman. Do you think that he should be allowed to teach 
if he tries to recruit his students outside of class hours into the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Absolutely not. 

The Chairman. You think he should not. Do you think he should 
be allowed to teach if he takes part in Communist activities outside 
of the classroom ? 

]\Ir. Hlavatt. Absolutely not. 

The Chairman. If he was a Communist, he would be taking part 
in Communist activities outside of the classrooms, would he not ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't know. 

The Chairman. You mean you do not know whether a Communist 
would be a Communist outside of the classroom ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. There again, I don't know what you mean by Com- 
munist activities. If he is engaged in anything treasonable or wrong, 
then he should be removed from the job, no matter how competent he 
is. But if he is competent on the job, and has private activities and 
opinions I think 

The Chairman. Do you think it is wrong to belong to the Com- 
munist Party at this time, in view of your statement that it is an 
international conspiracy ? Do you think that is wrong ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I don't know. If it were wrong, it should be written 
into a law. 

The Chairman. In other words, you feel that unless something is 
written into a law it is not wrong? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Well, I didn't make that general statement. 

The Chairman. You do not think that, now. 

Go ahead, Senator. 

Senator Dirksen. I want to examine for a moment this observation 
that has been made on several occasions when witnesses have gone back 
to quoting Senator Taft. You say that as long as you show high 
efficiency and competence in a given field there should be no inquiry 
about anything else ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. May I say what I mean about that? I mean not 
just whether I can teach the Pythagorean theorem perfectly. But if a 
teacher does a good all-around job, he is a good influence on the child- 
ren, he teaches his subject matter, he rears and develops good loyal 
Americans, I would say that such a person, whatever his opinions 
outside the classroom are, is entitled to stay on the job. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, before I pursue it further, let me ask: Is 
tliis high school in which you teach a tax-supported school? 

Mr. Hlavaty. It is a public school. 


Senator Dirksen. A public school. So the citizens through their 
taxes support this school ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir; 

Senator Dirksen. Now, it would occur to me in all honesty, Mr. 
Hlavaty, that you might never have uttered a subversive word of 
any kind in the classroom, and you may have been able to lead young- 
sters through the mazes of Euclid better than probably anybody who 
ever taught the fourth dimension or quadratics; but if the youngsters 
said, "There must be something to this Communist business, because 
here is our very capable teacher, and he has some truck wnth it, and 
he is identified with it," you would not have to say a word, if at once 
the symbolism of the thing, that has its greatest influence upon young 
and formative minds, took hold. And I think I can draw somewhat 
on my own impressions when I was in grade school and high school. I 
thought the sun rose and set on the teacher. But you say that is your 
business. Yet, this is a tax-supported school. I think I disagree 
with you. No matter what your competence may be in the field of 
mathematics, I think there is a subtle influence that goes out from 
your conduct and your identity with organizations. If they seem 
to subvert the basic principles of America, it has a decided effect upon 
the youngsters. And I do not think you can take the easy answer and 
say that so long as you show that proficiency there should be no ex- 
ploration of anything else. 

Mr. Hlavaty. On the question of influencing children, I think 
I am an expert on that. For 25 years I have been at the business. 

Senator Dirksen. I have no doubt of it. 

Mr. Hlavaty. And you influence children in two ways. Anybody 
who is a teacher knows that to teach anything you have to explain 
clearly and drill and go over and go over. A hint won't do it. You 
can't teach the addition of fractions that way. You can't teach par- 
allel line theorems that way. You have to go over them. 

The second influence on children is what kind of person the teacher 
is, whether he is a person who in all his activities has an integrity 
about him and has an honesty about him. Now, if there is a person 
who has those qualities, that is what I mean by all-around competence; 
I don't mean just pure technical efficiency in teaching any particular 
thing. If those two things are there, I think that person should be a 
teacher. Now, if it can be demonstrated that people with red hair 
don't have one or another of those characteristics, throw them out on 
the ground that they have red hair. But you would have to establish 
that first, wouldn't you ? 

Senator Dirksen. I can give you a far better illustration, I think. 
Because I remember the dean of a dental college who used to chew 
tobacco around the clock. And you would be surprised at the num- 
ber of students on the campus who thought that was good because 
the dean did it. 

Mr. Halavaty. Some of my students fold their handkerchiefs the 
way I do and during the proper seasons carry flowers in their button- 
holes because I do, and I always felt that was a sign that I was in- 
fluencing them. But I don't think I ever taught anybody to chew 

Senator Symington. Could I ask you a question ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 


Senator Symington. Do you believe it is wrong to teach belief in 
God in a school ? 

Mr. Hlavatt. It depends on what the school is. I think in this 
countr}^ we have a separation of church and state. I think it is proper 
in religious schools to teach belief in God. 

Senator Symington. You said that you were a good American. 
Is that right? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes, sir. 

Senator Symington. Do you believe in God ? 

I am only trying to help you. I do not understand your concept. 
Let me rephrase it to you this way. If you did believe in God, would 
you like your children taught by a Commmiist? 

Mr. Hlavaty. This is another confusing question. May I ask my 
attorney ? 

Senator Symington. I do not want you to answer if you do not want 
to. I w^ould like to say you are the most confused witness we have 
ever had. I do not want you to ask your counsel on that. I withdraw 
the question. 

Senator Mundt. Just one question along that same line. You have 
stated that you think tlie Connnunist Party is an international con- 
spiracy, I believe. Since you agree with the committee that the Com- 
munist Party is an international conspiracy, I wish you would explain 
how you can reconcile your statement that you think a teacher who 
fits your concept of competence should be permitted to teach even 
though he be a member of the Communist Party. Because if he be a 
member of tiie Communist Party he is contributing to an international 
conspiracy which seeks to destroy all such schools as that in which you 

]Mr. Hi^vvaty. Well, I think — I don't know too much about this, but 
woiddn't you have to establish in the individual person's case that he 
subscribes to the things which we usually associate with communism? 
I mean, we don't just identify a person by tlie group that he may 
choose to belong to and automatically judge him on that basis. 

Senator Mundt. That was not the question. We asked you a ques- 
tion about a man who was a meml>er of the Communist Party, and you 
said you thought a member of the Communist Party should be per-- 
mitted to teach provided he had the general all-around competence 
and did nothing in the schoolroom or with the children that led them 
in the direction of communism. My point is that if you belong to the 
Communist Party you are ipso facto contributing to an international 
conspiracy which seeks to overthrow our way of life, which is now 
providing the arms and ammunition and the lives in Korea to kill off 
some of the kids you taught in your school. I just do not follow you 
at all. You think that that type of teacher, regardless of his com- 
petence, is fit to teach in a tax-supported school ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. No ; as I say, if the individual person who is a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party can be shown to subscribe to those prin- 
ciples which make communism an international conspiracy, then by 
all means he should not be allowed to teach. 

Senator Mundt. I do not care what he subscribes to. If he belongs 
to the party and pays his dues, that helps the conspiracy. I do not 
care if he is a wooden Indian in front of a cigar store ; if he walks by 
and gives the dues collector a dollar every quarter, he is contributing 
to the overthrow of our way of life. * 


Senator McCi^llan. You keep referring to the fact that it should 
be established that he is a member of the Communist Party, or, "if 
it could be established." You can appreciate the difficulty any com- 
mittee or any board of school supervisors or any other official tribunal 
would have in establishing those facts if all of those who have knowl- 
edge of them took the same position that you take today, can you not ? 
You are not being helpful. You may be protecting yourself, but you 
are not being helpful to this committee, or to anyone else who would 
like to establish those facts as you say they should be established before 
any judgment is rendered. 

Mr. Hlavaty, Of course, there we come to a question of what the 
committee is investigating. 

Senator McClelx-an. It is investigating the thing that it is asking 
you about, obviously. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I thought it was the Voice of America. 

Senator McClellan. Well, it is the Voice of America and how it 
is conducted and who is running it and who is being used to carry 
out this program and what they believe in and what their philosophy 
is. That is the only way we can investigate the Voice of America 
and come to any sound judgment about it. 

Senator Symington. You said that a man that was a good carpen- 

Mr. Hlavaty. May I answer your question for the record ? I do 
believe in God. But it seemed to me a wrong kind of question. 

Senator Symington. That is why you wanted to ask your counsel? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Whether it was a proper kind of question. 

Senator Symington. The reason I asked the question is that I 
wanted to understand you. If a man is a good carpenter, you say, 
it makes no difference what he believes beyond the fact that he is a 
good carpenter. 

Mr. Hlavaty. I once read an essay by Macaulay in which he dis- 
cusses whether Jews should have civil rights. I don't know whether you 
have read that essay. He says a man's orthodoxy of belief may decide 
whether he should be archbishop of Canterbury, but should not decide 
whether he ought to be allowed to cobble shoes. 

Senator Symington. Well, in other words, if you are a good mathe- 
matician working on the development of children's minds, it would 
make no difference whether you were a Communist too, as far as the 
teaching was concerned. Is that right? 

Mr. Hlavaty. I can't see how particular beliefs, religious beliefs 
or political beliefs, could affect your teaching of mathematics. 

Mr. CoHN. By the way, did you attack communism at all in that 

Mr. Hlavaty. This was not political. 

Mr. CoHN. No ; there was nothing one way or the other on the sub- 
ject of communism, was there? 

Mr. Hlavaty. No. 

Mr. CoHN. So, certainly you were not coming out against com- 
munism or anything like that. You were merely talking about the 
school system and what goes on. At that time you were a registered 
member of the American Labor Party, which you have told us today 
you knew was Communist controlled. Do you not think that is 
pretty material to this ? 


Mr. Hlavaty. Mr. Cohn, I didn't say I knew that. And secondly, 
I have not attended a meeting of the American Labor Party in, oh, 
maybe 7 or 8 years. I didn't register at every election. Sometimes 
I did. Sometimes I did not. 

Mr. CoHN. Sir, you proclaimed to the world in a public registration 
for the year 1952 that you were joining up with the American Labor 
Party, a party that has been cited as a Communist front, which you 
have told us here you knew. 

Mr. Hlavaty. But I had no feeling that I was — it might have 
been — — 

Mr. Cohn. This isn't '48, or 10 years ago. This is the year in which 
you made this broadcast. 

Now, I want to ask you this. 

I am sorry. Did you want to comment on that? 

Mr. Hlavaty. "Wlien I registered with a listed party, I knew that 
many people considered it a left-wing organiaztion. To me it 
wasn't a matter of particular consequence when I registered. Really 
it wasn't. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hlavaty, you just got through telling Senator 
Dirksen that your students thought so much of you that they would 
fold their handkerchiefs the way you folded yours and they would 
wear flowers the way you did. Do you not think that when they 
learned that you were supporting an organization, were a member 
of an organization, that was publicly proclaimed as a front for and 
doing the Avork of the Communist Party 

Mr. Hlavaty. There isn't a student in the school who knew how I 

The Chairman. Let me finish. Do you not think they might imitate 
you, then, too? 

Mr. Hlavaty. If they knew it. But I thought that was a private 
affair of mine how I registered. My students didn't know that. 
And I certainly didn't tell them how I registered. 

Senator Dirksen. But, Mr. Hlavaty, the pollbooks are subject to 
inspection by anyone who wants to go and look at them. 

Mr. Hlavaty. But my students wouldn't go and look at them to find 
out how I registered. 

Senator Dirksen. Are there no people interested in public affairs 
around where you live that take an opportunity to look at the poll- 
books and the publications of the names ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. It may well be. 

Senator Dirksen. Oh, it would be, I think. It would be. 

Mr. Hlavaty. Now, I live in a suburb of New York City, and it 
isn't at all likely that any student of mine would know how I 

The Chairman. Just to show you the extent to which your activities 
are public knowledge, I understand the staff got your name, dis- 
covered you had worked for the Voice, because some people in the 
Czech community objected strenuously to the Voice attempting to 
dignify you by calling you over there to read this script. They 
called the committee's attention to the fact that you belonged to this 
organization officially listed as a Communist front, and that is why 
we checked into your background further. That is why we asked you 
whether you were an active Communist in 1948. That is why, after 


checking into your background, we asked you whether you tried to 
recruit students into the Communist Party. 

So I can assure you there is no secret in your community as to 
Hlavaty's activities outside of the classroom. I think this all has a 
direct bearing upon Senator Dirksen's comments in regard to the iiT- 
fiuence which a Communist teacher may exert upon his students, even 
though he never raises his voice in favor of the Communist conspiracy 
in the classroom. 

Are there any further questions, Mr. Cohn ? 

Mr. CoHN. No further questions. 

The Chairman. If you have anything further to state, you may go 

You wanted this script made a part of the record. I think it has 
been received already. 

Mr. CoHN". We have gone into that. It contains nothing, one way 
or the other. This is in Slovak. I think we can obtain a translation 
of it in English and have them both attached to the record. 

The Chairman. I would say the English translation might be more 

I think there is one question we may have missed asking you. Do 
you know any Communist teachers in the New York school system ? 

Mr. Hlavaty. Well, certainly I don't know 

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.) 

Mr. Hlavaty. I would say that it is a question that goes back to 
what I said this morning, that I decline to answer 

The Chairman. On the ground your answer might incriminate 

Mr. Hlavaty. Yes. 

The Chairman. You have that right. 

You may step down. 

The committee will adjourn until the next call. 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken to the call of the 



MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 

THE Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to Senate Resolu- 
tion No. 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, in room 318, Senate Office 
Building, Senator Josei^li R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, AVisconsin; 
Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; John L. McClellan, 
Democrat, Arkansas; and Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri. 

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; 6. David Schine, chief 
consultant; and Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; and John Leahy, 
State Department, Deputy Assistant to the Under Secretary. 

Senator Mundt (presiding). The committee will come to order. 

Who is your first witness? 

Mr. Schine. Mr. Veldhuis. 

Senator Mundt. Mr. Veldhuis, will you come forward, please. Do 
you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

Mr. Veldhuis. So help me God. 

Senator Mundt. Will you, first of all, give your name and back- 
ground for the record, so that w^e will know to whom we are having 
the privilege of listening this morning? 



Mr. Veldhuis. My name is Albert C. Veldliuis, V-e-1-d-h-u-i-s. I 
am chief engineer for the Wind Turbine Co. I have been connected 
with the Wind Turbine Co. for about 6 years or somewhat in excess 
of 6 years. I have been connected with the radio communications 
business for well in excess of 20 years and have, for the last 10 to 15 
years, specialized in antenna work in low frequency and high and 
ultrahigh frequencies. 

Senator Mundt. Will you give us just a word about the Durban 

Mr. Veldhuis. W-i-n-d T-u-r-b-i-n-e. 

Senator Mundt. The Wind Turbine Co. Will you give us a little 
bit about what kind of company that it is, what it does ? 

29708— 53— pt. 9 4 719 


Mr. Veldhuis. The Wind Turbine Co. is a company that was origi- 
nally set up to develop and produce wind power plants, which we are 
still doing today ; parallel to that, has developed the line of broad- 
casting towers, antenna towers, and antennas of all sorts and de- 
scriptions. We do quite a bit of work in that field. We do the designs, 
the development, the construction, and the erection of such antennas 
in the field if the customer so desires. 

Senator Mundt. O. K. 

This distinguished-looking gentleman on my left is Senator 
Symington, of Missouri, and I am Senator Mundt of South Dakota, 
and the only reason you are looking at just two members of the com- 
mittee this morning instead of the full committee quota is that, 
simultaneous with these hearings, hearings are being held over in 
the House caucus room on the President's new reorganization plan, 
and the rest of our colleagues are there. 

Mr. Cohn, you may proceed with the witness. 

Mr. Cohn. Dr. Veldhuis, you told us you are the chief engineer of 
this Wind Turbine Co. Is it a fact that the Wind Turbine Co. is the 
company which holds the contract for the construction of antenna 
work for the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. And when were you awarded this contract by the Voice 
of America ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That was at the end of August 1950. 

Mr. Cohn. The end of August 1950. 

Now, exactly what type of work were you engaged to do, by the 
State Department, for the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We were engaged to construct and fabricate the 
antennas and erect those antennas in accordance with plans and 
specifications that were supplied to us. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, are you a contractor in what is known as the cur- 
tain antenna program of the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I would think so ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Would you tell us just what this curtain antenna pro- 
gram is? 

First of all I might ask you you : What is its total estimated cost ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The total cost for the contract is around $1,700,000. 
It is slightly in excess of $1,700,000. 

Mr. Cohn. What is the total cost of the project, the curtain antenna 

Mr. Veldhuis. I do not knoAv. 

Mr. Cohn. An estimate has been furnished to us of approximately 
$5 million. Does that sound right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is quite possible. In this antenna program 
there is involved the design of those antennas. There is also in- 
volved the towers to support the antennas that we are fabricating. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, how many antennas are being built? 

Mr. Veldhuis. A total of 40 antennas. 

Mr. Cohn. Forty antennas. For how many transmitting stations? 

Mr. Veldhuis. For six transmitting stations. 

Mr. Cohn. For six; is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not the entire program calls 
for 10 towers to supply 10 transmitting stations? 


Mr. Veldhuis. I believe that is true also. That is this way : that 
1 location has 2 curtains, each containing 4 antennas. Other locations 
have 1 curtain, each containing the same 4 antennas. 

Mr. CoHN. What do you mean by a curtain? I know it is called 
the curtain-antenna program. What does that word "curtain" sig- 

Mr. Veldhuis. This particular type of antenna consists of dipoles 
that are suspended in front of a reflecting screen and that screen is 
vertical and therefore resembles somewhat and is supported somewhat 
the way a normal curtain is suspended. For that reason — mainly for 
that reason — we speak of curtain antennas, although a technically more 
correct name would be broadside antennas. 

Mr. CoHN. I see. Now, is the estimate we have received that the 
total cost of each of these antennas is approximately half a million 
dollars accurate, to your knowledge? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I don't know that. I can see how that price would 
run up that high ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Let me ask you this : Wlio is the main contractor in this 
work ? Is that the company of Francisco & Jacobus ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Those are the architect engineers. 

Mr. CoHN. They are the architect engineers ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, the company of Welden & Carr is also in this pic- 
ture. How do they fit in ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The only thing I know about that is that the firm of 
Welden & Carr has made a model investigation which presumably led 
to the present design of those antennas that we are talking about. 

Mr. CoHN. By the way, have you ever heard of anything like these 
curtain antennas before this? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Mr. CoHN. They have been used on other occasions; is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Very many ; yes. 

Senator Mundt. Is that the customary type of antenna used by 
commercial broadcasting firms in the United States ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I would say it is 1 of the 2 main types of antennas. 

Senator Mundt. Used by commercial concerns? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Senator Mundt. It is a satisfactory type, is it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Very much so. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, Dr. Veldhuis, to go back to the beginning, as I 
understand it, Francisco & Jacobus were the architect engineers and, 
we have been advised, were what is known as the consulting engineers 
on the project. You say you were awarded your contract by the State 
Department in August of 1950. Is that correct? 

Mr, Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, did you receive the contract as a result of competi- 
tive bidding? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Let me explain the circumstances surrounding that 
bid. On August 18, 1950, we heard, through a business friend of ours, 
that the State Department was about to award a contract — a sizable 
conti'act — for the construction and erection of those antennas. As a 
result of that, the same day the Wind Turbine Co. got in contact with 
the State Department and the architect engineers, and found out that 
the contract was to be awarded the next Monday, which I believe 


was August 21. We had been able to get the State Department and 
the architect engineers to delay the awarding of that contract for, I 
believe, a week. We also have been able to obtain the plans and 
specifications and we made up a bid accordingly. 

Mr. CoHN. And you were awarded the contract ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. And as a result we were awarded the contract. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you not Ivuow that you were the lowest bidder ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I know we were the low^est bidder. 

Mr. CoHN. You were the lowest bidder. Do you know, whereas you 
were the lowest bidder and were awarded this contract on the basis 
of competitive bidding, the main contract which was awarded to Fran- 
cisco and Jacobus, was not awarded as a result of competitive bidding ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I beg your pardon ? Would you repeat ? 

Mr. CoHN. You received your contract because you were the low- 
est bidder. Do you know^ that in the case of the letting of the contract 
to Francisco and Jacobus, there was no competitive bidding? That 
there was merely a negotiated contract; they were not the lowest 
bidder ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Francisco and Jacobus ? 

Mr. CoHN. Yes. 

Mr. Veldhuis. I would assume that there was no competitive bid. 
I don't know. But I presume that. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, your contract is on a lump-sum basis; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. In other words, you are given one lump sum by the Gov- 
ernment, and it is up to you to do the job within that ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. So, the Government knows in advance how much the 
job is going to cost them ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know that the contract given to Francisco and 
Jacobus was not on a lump-sum basis but was a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is what I understand from rumors, that it is a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Nobody every told me so specifically, 
and certainly not Francisco and Jacobus. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know how much above the contract price and 
the original estimate they have already gone ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I have no idea. 

Mr. Cohn. By the way, before you were awarded this contract, had 
you done any work in connection with erection of towers and antennas 
for the Government of Pakistan ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Would you tell us what that was, very briefly ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We have, as a subcontractor to one of the largest 
companies in the United States, been awarded a contract for the 
design and construction of an international broadcasting antenna sys- 
tem for the Government of Pakistan. 

Mr. Cohn. And did you successfully complete that project? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We like to think that it was very successful. 

Mr. Cohn. Dr. Veldhuis, after you were awarded this contract by 
the Voice of America, by the State Department, in connection with 
this curtain antenna program, did you make a study of the program. 


based on your background in this field and the many other similar 
projects you had carried out? Did you look over the plans and 
specifications ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We looked over the plans and specifications ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, after you had looked over the plans and specifica- 
tions, did you reach any conclusion as to whether or not the plans and 
specifications called for this program being carried into effect in the 
most efficient and economical way possible? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. I asked myself that question. 

Mr. CoHN. What was the answer ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The answer to me was that there had to be very good 
reasons, of which I was not aware, to justify the design as it is. Of 
course, I couldn't know, and I don't know, what the reasons were. It 
was certainly not what I would call a normal design. 

Mr. CoHN. And was the cost, the estimated cost, of this design 
much greater than you felt was necessary ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I certainly think so ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Even though you were the contractor who actually got 
the contract here, did you actually go to the engineering department 
of the Voice and suggest to them that this whole program might be 
revised and accomplished in a much more economical way by a change 
in design and a change in plans and specifications? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not in that sense. 

As soon as I saw the plans and specifications, it became apparent 
that this antenna was intended to be a broad-band antenna. I could 
not see any reason that would lead me to believe that this antenna 
would turn out to be a broad-band antenna, notwithstanding the fact 
that quite a bit of material and arrangement had been designed into it. 

When I inquired about that, I was informed that all that was taken 
care of; that a model measurement had been made and that, at least 
in the opinion of the State Department and presumably the architect- 
engineers, this antenna, after it had been built, would be a broad-band 

Wlien I expressed that I just didn't know that, and that I would 
be very much interested to see those results of those model measure- 
ments — for two reasons I wanted to see them : First of all, if there 
Avas something in there that I didn't know of, of course I would be 
interested; and, secondly, if I could point out that the results of that 
measurement would be iincertain, would not give the guaranty to the 
broad-band antenna, I felt it my duty, if I knew that, to so tell the 
State Department and the architect-engineers. But I have never been 
able to obtain that technical background on those antennas. 

Mr. CoHN. You mean to say that you, the contractor, or one of the 
contractors in the situation, "have been unable to obtain that infor- 
mation ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator Mundt. Whom did you ask, and who declined it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I asked specifically, I believe, at the second meeting 
at the State Department. I asked Mr. Herrick, and Mr. Herrick 
said : "Yes, of course, you will have to have those things. I believe I 
have one here." He didn't have one of the copies at his desk. And he, 
on that occasion, I believe, told one of his engineers to see to it that 
we would get a copy. 


At the next meeting, when I wasn't present, I was given to under- 
stand the architect-engineers objected and flatly refused to give us 
a copy of the model measurement. 

Senator Mundt. In other words, Mr. Herrick said you should have 
them, that it was essential to your work, and then, when you sought 
to get them, the architect-engineers declined to let you see them. That 
was who ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Francisco and Jacobus. 

Mr. CoHN. After studying what information was available, do you 
feel if you had come into this in the beginning, before the plans and 
specifications were drawn, and had been consulted on it, you could 
have made suggestions which would have resulted in the saving of 
considerable money to the taxpayers in the planning of this program? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I believe so ; yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Approximately how much money do you feel would 
have been saved if this thing had been done as economically and 
efficiently as possible, approximately? 

Mr. Veldhuis. You must make a distinction there between two 
possible ways. One way is in a given design, in a given plan. 

Mr. CoHN. You mean there would be two ways. In other words, 
if they had cast aside the plans and started over and used new plans, 
you feel that an amount of money could have been saved that way, 
and you also feel that even taking the plans as they were, that type 
of thing, a good deal of monej^ could have been saved on that? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. How much money could have been saved on the first 
basis, if they had recast the plan and had done what you regard as 
a more economical and efficient job from the very beginning? What 
would your estimate on that be ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Maybe I can best answer that by giving you a com- 
parison of prices for, for instance, the Pakistan system. 

I am somewhat hesitant on that, because, as I expressed before, this 
was some subcontract to one of the big companies here in the United 
States, and I am, of course, not at liberty to publicly give all the prices 

Mr. Cohn. Well, what I would like you to do is just give us your 
best estimate, an approximation as to how much money could have 
been saved if these plans for the curtain-antenna program had been 
redone in what you would regard as a more economical and efficient 
way from the very beginning . 

Mr. Veldhuis. On our portion of the antenna program, that is, the 
antennas proper and the transmission lines, that is, excluding the 
towers, I think a possible saving of in excess of 40 percent would 
have easily been achieved. 

Mr. Cohn. In other words, you are the man who got the contract 
for this job, and in spite of that fact you say that you have looked 
it over, and if the thing were done properly and economically and 
efficiently, approximately 40 percent could have been saved on the 
particular part of the contract which your company is carrying out? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is for a different design. 

Mr. Cohn. If they had used a different design? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator Mundt. How much would that have amounted to in 


Mr. Veldhuis. Well, the present contract is slightly in excess of 
$1,700,000. So there is an approximate saving of $800,000. 

Mr, CoiiN. And that, of course, is only on your phase of the program. 
Is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Would there have been other savings on other phases 
of the program ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. I think so ; although at that time it could not 
be corrected any more. A more economical design results in a lighter 
antenna, an antenna that exerts lesser loads on the supporting struc- 
tures. And, therefore, the supporting structures would be designed 
lighter and therefore more economically. 

Senator Symington. When did you bid on this contract ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That was toward the end of August 1950. 

Senator Symington. How did you know that the work was being let ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We heard that through a business friend. 

Senator Symington. And there was no publication of bids ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not to us ; not to our knowledge, no. 

Senator Symington. Had you ever done any business before for 
the Government? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes, we did and do a great amount of business. 

Senator Symington. For the State Department? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Also for the State Department. 

Senator Symington. What did you do for the State Department? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We sold them our standard rhombic towers and 
rhombic antennas, for one thing. 

Senator Symington. Would that type of antenna have been suitable 
for this job? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That depends. Our standard design of rhombic 
has a power limit of approximately between 50 and 80 kilowatts. 

The present design, as I understand it, of those broadside antennas, 
has a power of 200 kilowatts in mind. We have never been told so 
specifically, but that is what I understand. 

Senator Symington. When you made your fii-st bid, did you bid on 
a fixed-fee basis, or on a straight-price basis? 

Mr. Veldhuis. We have given two bids. We gave one bid which 
is a fixed price for the material, the fabrication, and the erection. 

The other bid was a fixed price for the material and the fabrication 
and a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis for the erection. 

Senator Symington. Was that the same as the bid that you gave 
to the State Department ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Those bids we gave to the State Department. 

Senator Symington. In the past to the State. 

When you made your other bids, is that the way you did it? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I'beg your pardon, I thought you 

Senator Symington. Say '^oice of America" when you mean that, 
and we can segregate the two. 

Mr. Veldhuis. All the other bids were on a fixed price. 

Senator Symington. All the other bids to State. And this was on 
a fixed price and cost plus fixed fee ; is that right ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. On this one we gave the State Department an al- 
ternate, on the broadside. One was for a fixed price for material, fabri- 
cation, and erection. The other bid was a fixed price for material and 
fabrication, and a cost-plus basis for the erection. 


Senator Symington. That is for the Voice of America. 

Mr. Veldhuis. For the Voice of America. 

Senator Symington. One other question. As I understand it, steel 
is where you would have saved the most money. Is that right ? In 
design ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Steel is where we would save a lot of money. 
Whether it would be the most money, I don't know. 

Senator Symington. How much steel would you have saved, rough- 
ly, in tons per antenna, if your concept of the design had been used 
based on your past work as against this new design ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is very difficult to state, Senator, for this rea- 
son : The present design utilizes self-supporting towers. The towers 
that we manufacture are nearly always guyed towers. The guyed 
tower uses considerably less steel than a self-supporting tower does. 
There are limitations on a guyed tower. Those limitations are mainly 
in the manufacturing facilities. It is doubtful whether, on the pres- 
ent antennas, it would be possible to design the antenna in such a way 
that the economical guyed towers can be used. If the guyed tower 
cannot be used, then the saving that is obtainable in a self-supporting 
tower may not be too great. It may be a saving just in the tonnage. 
And the fabrication of such a tower is not too awfully expensive, so 
I believe that you can estimate, or could at that time estimate, a price 
of approximately 57 cents per pound. And I would guess — and this is 
just a guess — that on the towers something like 20 tons per tower could 
have been saved. 

Senator Symington. Now, just one more thought. Who made the 
specifications up ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Francisco and Jacobus, to my knowledge. 

Senator Symington. Had they had experience in this field before ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Symington. Had you had experience in this field before? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes; a great deal. 

Senator Symington. Did you suggest that you could make the an- 
tennas for less money if they would let you submit a design? 

Mr. Veldhuis. They would not ; no. 

Senator Sy]\iington. Wait a minute. I said : Did you suggest that 
you could make the antennas for less money if you submitted the de- 
sign ; your company ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. At that time, when we got the bid, we understood 
that the towers were already purchased. The order for the towers 
had already gone out. 

Senator Symington. I see. So it had gone too far to use your 
design ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It had gone very far. Yes, indeed. 

Senator Symington. One other question. What basis was the fixed 
fee figured on ? What was the estimate ? How did you arrive at a 
fixed fee, in that part of the contract which was a fixed fee? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I actually don't know the proper percentage. I 
have very little to do with that. Nevertheless, the fixed-fee contract 
was not awarded to us. The State Department took it on a fixed-price 

Senator Symington. Thank you. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you ever have any discussions with any of the people 
in the engineering department in which you indicated that if you 


had come in at the beginning and if the plans had been competently 
drawn, the thing could have been done for 50 percent less? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. In other words, you called to the attention of the engi- 
neering department that if the thing had been done right, from the 
start, and this other design had been used, it might have been possible, 
on your particular part of the job, to save 50 percent, or approximately 
50 percent? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That was intimated in the discussions, yes. 
Whether we at that time pronounced it that specifically, I doubt that. 
However, people in this field of business ought to know what projects 
have been executed in the whole world, for that matter. They ought 
to know what prevalent designs there are, what the prices are. We 
have submitted quotations for other designs, for other applications. 
A direct comparison there is possible. 

Mr. CoHN. In any event, you were told at that point it was too late. 
The plans and specifications had been drawn, they had ordered the 
towers, and it was impossible to redo the designs. Is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you feel that there was any excuse for the failure to 
find this out at the time the plans and specifications were drawn ? Is 
this something unusual, or is it something that, if they had gone to 
the right people and made the right inquiry, they should have known 
about ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The only excuse that I can think of is that at that 
time this project was restricted, and I understand that there are dif- 
ficulties in obtaining open bids on restricted projects. 

Mr. CoHN. This was a pretty basic thing, though, wasn't it ? I 
mean, here was a $5 million job, and if it was possible to do it in a 
way that would save 50 percent of it on your part of it and I assume 
similar savings on other parts of it 

Mr. Veldhuis. I would think it was before I jumped into a project 
like that ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. I would certainly think so. I might ask you this. 
Time might have been a factor here. Suppose they were in a hurry 
to get this job done. Which would have been the quicker way of 
doing it, the way they actually did it or the way that would have 
been 50 percent cheaper? Or is there no difference? 

Mr. Veldhuis. There is considerable difference in the ease of 
handling this material in the field. There was considerable difference 
in the ease of obtaining certain types of material. 

Mr. CoHN. Which would have been quicker? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The other way. 

Mr. CoHN. The cheaper way ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Not only would it have been 50 percent cheaper, but it 
could have been done in a short period of time? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I think so. 

Mr. CoHN. And I assume it goes without saying that the sooner 
these antennas got into use, and all that, the sooner we would be able 
to have a wider listening audience for the Voice program. 

Mr. Veldhuis. That might be. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, let me ask you this. When this whole situation 
came up, as you have told us, they said it was too late to do anything 


about it. Now, going ahead with these curtain antennas, these broad- 
band antennas, as they called them, could any money have been saved 
on the basis of their present way of doing the job ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Mr, CoHN. You say it could have? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Mr. CoHN. Even taking the way they had it planned out, you say 
money still could have been saved ? 

Mr, Veldhuis, Oh, yes. 

Mr, CoHisr. Approximately how much? What percent? 

Mr, Veldhuis. I think something like 20 percent could have been 

Mr. Cohn. Did you call that to their attention ? 

Mr. Veldhuis, Yes. There was one phase of this project where we 
felt very strongly ; that is, on the type of guy material. The guy mate- 
rial specified in the specifications is unusual, and it is difficult to ob- 
tain. Furthermore, it is more expensive and, in my opinion, less 
desirable than other material is that is usually used there. And we 
worked out a quotation for a price reduction using, instead of guy 
rope, guy strand, and the saving in material only amounted to $o5,000, 
thirty-five-thousand-and-some dollars. We submitted that as a quota- 
tion. That proposal was rejected. 

Mr, CoHN. They rejected that proposal? 

Mr, Veldhuis. They rejected it, 

Mr, CoHN. Do you know why they insisted on spending more 
money ? 

Mr, Veldhuis. I haven't the faintest idea. 

Mr, CoHN. I mean, here is the situation of where the actual people 
who have been awarded the contract — you come in and suggest money- 
saving proposals; and you say they were rejected? 

Mr, Veldhuis. They were rejected. 

Senator Mundt. Do you know on whose recommendation they were 
rejected ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No ; I don't know. Eight in the beginning, it was 
one of the things that immediately caught our eye, the type of mate- 
rial specified for the guys, and we have mentioned it. We have 
strongly expressed ourselves on this matter, and we didn't get any- 

Senator Mundt. To whom did you strongly express yourself? 

]SIr. Veldhuis. To the architect-engineers, during a meeting, in the 
beginning. Also it has been discussed with engineers in the Depart- 

Senator Mundt. Did you take it up with the chief engineer, Mr. 
Herrick ? 

Mr. Veldhuis, We took it up with Mr. Herrick, too. And, as a 
result, Mr, Herrick wrote a letter instructing the architect-engineers 
to thoroughly investigate this matter and make a choice whether they 
would stick to the original specification or follow our recommendation. 
And I believe that in a couple of very minor cases, we have been al- 
lowed to use guy strand instead of guy rope, but in the majority of 
the material we were instructed to maintain guy rope. 

Senator Mundt. Most of the commercial installations use guy 
strand ; do they ? 


]Mr. Veldhuis. They use guy strand. That is right. So much of 
(hat material is used that all the manufacturers can tell you that this 
has become an over-the-counter item that they can't make any money 
on it. The competition on guy strand is terrific. Everybody makes it 
and makes it satisfactorily. 

Senator Mundt. Can you think of any superior characteristics that 
guy rope might have that guy strand does not have ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Guy rope does have characteristics, some character- 
istics, that are superior to guy strand. It is much more flexible. In an 
application where flexibility is of no importance, that advantage of 
guy rope just does not enter into the picture. A decided advantage of 
guy strand is that the galvanizing is more uniform and heavier than 
on the thin wires of guy rope. Also, if thin wires of guy rope lose by 
corrosion, lose a thin layer of the cross section, that influence is a larger 
percentage of the cross section than if you lost the same layer on the 
relatively thick wires of guy strand. So the long-range strength of 
guy strand is better than of guy rope. 

Senator Mundt. It is more durable and lasts longer ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It is more durable. And you only use guy rope 
when you have to use it on account of its flexibility, which is superi'^" 
to guy strand. 

Senator Mundt. All right. In the instant case, was flexibility a 
factor ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not at all. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, I want to talk for a minute about the shackles 
connected with these antenna towers. We have been informed, and 
is it a fact, that they have had some serious trouble with the shackles 
at the stations in Wayne and Bethany, Ohio, within the past few 
weeks ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Very serious. 

Mr. Corn. Is it a fact that the shackles have actually been 
breaking ? 

Mr Veldhuis. They have. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, those shackles were supplied, I assume, pursuant 
to specifications originally drawn up by the International Informa- 
tion Administration, Engineering Department; is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Wlien you say "originally," I must object there. 
The shackles are supplied in accordance with specifications. Those 
specifications supersede the original specifications. 

The reason that it was necessary to have another specification is 
that shackles, in accordance with the original specification, were not 
readily obtainable. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, these shackles were supplied, and you say there 
have been instances of serious breakage in these shackles within the 
past few weeks. Is that correct ? ^ 

Mr. Veldhuis. That first started approximately 8 months ago. 

Mr. Cohn. Within the last few days. 

Mr. Veldhuis. No ; 8 months ago. 

Mr. Cohn. When was the last break ? 

Mr. Valdhuis. Last Friday. 

Mr. Cohn. Last Friday; is that correct? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is right. 


Mr. CoHN. Let me ask you this : Is it true that it appears that the 
reason for the breakage of these shackles is a result of corrosion in 
the atmosphere at these particular sites ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I am perfectly familiar with that. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt ? 

I wonder if counsel or Senator Mundt could give me a brief resume 
of the testimony thus far ? 

Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. CoHN. I think you just told us this breakage you believe was 
due to corrosion. Now, is it correct, then, that if there is breakage in 
the shackles due to corrosion, and they merely replace it with the same 
type shackles, you are going to get breakage all over again? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I believe so. 

Mr. CoHN. What are they doing? Are they replacing it with the 
same type so that there will be breakage all over again, or are they 
going out and getting the right type or doing something to counter- 
act the effects of the corrosion ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I have no knowledge that they are doing anything 
else. We have been instructed to replace them with the same 

Mr. Cohn. And I assume it is reasonable to anticipate there might 
be breakage again. Is that right? 

Mr. Veldhuis. In my mind, there is not a shadow of doubt. 

Mr. Cohn. There is not a shadow of a doubt that there will be 
breakage all over again? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. How is it possible to explain stupidity such as that? 

Mr. Veldhuis. There are things I cannot explain. 

Mr. Cohn. You say you can't see any explanation for that. 

Have you protested this to the Engineering Department there ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes, I have. As a matter of fact, I don't believe that 
there is too much argument on this point. There was for a while espe- 
cially in the beginning, when the first breakage occurred. And that 
included myself. I thought : "Well, there is a certain amount of unsat- 
isfactory material that go into shipments, and we have to replace 
that as fast as possible under our guaranty." We have a guaranty 
for a year. Once the shackles, the broken shackles, were removed from 
the curtain, and we had the metallurgist investigate this, it immedi- 
ately became clear that the unanimous opinion is that the breakage is 
due to the atmosphere surrounding the shackles, which, in the trade, 
is called season cracking. 

Mr. Cohn. But you say as far as you know they are just goinjr right 
ahead and replacing it with the same thing, so it will just keep right on 
breaking ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoiTN. And you say this has been called to their attention, and 
they are still doing it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. As a matter of fact, at one site, as to the shackles 
that broke originally and that were replaced approximately July 1952, 
some of those shackles broke again. 

Mr. Cohn. You mean it has actually happened? The shackles 
broke, they replaced them, and the shackles they replaced them with 
also broke ? 


Mr. Veldhuis. Yes ; and if one shackle breaks, the antenna is prac- 
tically out of operation. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you know how long they intend to keep on replacing 
this with the same type of thing that keeps on breaking? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The expert opinion of the metallurgists that we 
have consulted, and publications in the metallurgists' trade, is that this 
breakage can occur anywhere between 2 months and 2 years after 

Mr. CoHN. I see. You would certainly regard this as a very serious 
situation then? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Very serious. 

Mr. CoHN. What is the cost involved in this shackle program ? 

]Mr. Veldhuis. The cost of the shackles themselves runs around 79 
cents each. The cost to replace a shackle in the curtain depends on 
the number of shackles. It runs anywhere between $50 each and 
$100 each. 

Mr. CoHN. This small item. About how many are used in con- 
nection w^ith one antenna ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Per curtain, there are used somewhere in excess of 
480 shackles of this type. 

Mr. CoHN. I see. Now, you have painted a picture here. Dr. Veld- 
huis, at the beginning, they were spending 50 percent too much. It 
was shoAvn that they could save under their current plans. They didn't 
do that. They have shackles breaking, destroying the possibility of 
the antenna operating, and they keep replacing it with material that 
keeps breaking all over again. 

What explanation do you think there is for a situation such as this ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Actually, I don't have an explanation. If I had 
an explanation, I would have yelled about it long ago. 

I have, on several occasions, been driven practically to despair, be- 
cause I just don't understand this situation. I can't cope with this 
situation. I don't know what is behind it. 

Senator Muxdt. It must be either the architect-engineers or the 
engineering counsel that the Voice of America has on its own staff. 
It has to be one of those two sources, does it not ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Well, it is certainly true that the architect-engineers 
on all occasions have sometimes expressed and always sliown resent- 
ment at any observation, suggestion, advice, that we made. 

Senator Mundt. I think you testified earlier that the architect-engi- 
neers are not really specialists in this field of radio transmission ; that 
their experience goes into some other type of con'^truction ; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. To my knowledge, they never did anvthing in this 

Senator Mundt. In other words',4his was an experiment with them, 
something new for them to do ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I think so. 

Senator Mundt. They do not do the same kind of service for NBC 
or CBS or ABS, or any of the big radio concerns? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not even remotely connected. 

Senator Mundt. And your concern has had experience, as I under- 
stand, with some of the large radio people in this country? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. 


Senator Mundt. Who selects the architect-engineers ? Do they get 
their position on the basis of competitive bids, or on a cost-plus-nxed- 
fee basis? Or are they just chosen and employed on a contract? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I don't know. 

Senator Mundt. How is it done in the trade ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Usually, when you have something in mind that you 
want, you go around in the trade. We sometimes employ people to 
be our architect-engineers. Sometimes we are consulting engineei'S. 
Sometimes we employ engineers. When you have something in mind, 
you go around and find out who is best suited, who has the best facili- 
ties for that particular project that you have in mind. 

The secrecy that surrounded this project is best illustrated by the 
fact that we first knew about it 3 days before the contract for the con- 
struction was to be awarded. That was the fii-st we knew it. And 
we believe that we are very much "with both legs" in this industry, 
and that we know what goes on. 

Senator Mundt. Would a more normal procedure have been to ad- 
vertise for bids and put announcements in the trade journals that a 
certain contract was going to be let, so that the people who are special- 
ists in the field would all know about it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Normally it Vv'ould. In this particular case, the fact 
that this project was restricted may have prevented that. I don't 

Senator Mundt. Restricted as to location, or as to design, or in 
what way was it restricted ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The wliole project was restricted. 

Senator Mundt. It was pretty well known throughout the country 
that the Voice was building a series of transmitters. That part was 
not restricted. That passed through Congress. 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not at that time. 

Senator Mundt. It was not known at that time ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It was not known to us, anyway. 

Senator Mundt. What is the customary procedure after architect- 
engineers are employed ? Does the employer of those engineers dele- 
gate to them all authority and all power, or can the man or the firm 
or the Government who employed the architect-engineers still veto 
their decisions and change them? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I can only speak for myself, and I know that when 
I make a design, I am eager to talk to anybody who can possibly have 
criticism on my designs. And I discuss my designs with those people 
in detail. 

Senator Mundt. Well, now, let us take the instant case. The State 
Department employed some architect-engineers. They employed 
some designs which appear to be faulty. They certainly were ex- 
travagant and wasteful. You called to the attention of the engineers 
in the Voice that these designs were wasteful, that they were extrava- 
gant, that perhaps they were faulty. 

In that type of case, does the State Department, if it so desires, does 
the Voice of America, if it so desires, have the power, after it had 
made a contract with the architect-engineers to request them to make 
the changes? Or do they delegate all their authority and all their 
administrative capacity in the contract to the architect-engineers? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It would appear as if in this case the State Depart- 
ment did not have any power to effect changes in either the program 


or the specifications. As a matter of fact, it has been expressed on 
occasions by engineers in the Department that they coukl not do any- ' 
thing at all with which the architect-engineers did not agree. 

Senator Mundt. That is the point I am trying to bring out. Is 
that the customary way it is handled in the trade? If NBC employs 
some architect-engineers, do they delegate to them complete authority 
then to go ahead even though it appears that a mistake had been 
made? It would seem to me that normally the employer of architect- 
engineers would reserve unto himself the right and the power to insist 
on changes which are indicated as necessary. 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. I believe that is true. The letters of contract 
and agreement — all these will fix a large amount of responsibility on 
the architect-engineer, or the designer, but in all my experience, it has 
always been the fact that such a designer or architect-engineer is only 
too happy to have his own mistakes corrected, and is only too happy 
to receive constructive criticism, especially where there is hardly any 
field at all where anybody can be an expert in all the phases of such a 
project, and certainly not in a big project of this nature. 

Senator Mundt. Exactly. 

Senator McClellan of Arkansas has a question. 

Senator McClellan. I did not hear the earlier part of your testi- 
mony. As I understand it, you have a contract for the construction of 
certain facilities? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. Including the supply of material ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. And that is a cost-plus ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No ; that is a fixed-price contract. 

Senator McClellan. It is a fixed-price contract ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. Does that include a number of installations ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is on six locations. 

Senator McClellan. On six different locations? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan, The contract you have is for similar services 
on the six locations? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. Is your contract completed? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The contract proper is completed, yes. 

Senator McClellan. The contract proper is completed ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. You mean by that it is only a matter of col- 
lecting the balance that is owed you? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It is a matter of collecting the balance. It is also 
a matter of, on one site, some argument that exists at this moment to 
straighten that out. 

Senator McClellan. Well, it is a matter of judgment and final 
settlement ; and so far as your construction work is concerned, it has 
been completed? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. Did you make a profit on the contract? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No, sir, we didn't. 

Senator McClellan. You made no profit? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No, sir. 


Senator McClellan. Then can it be said that you are disgruntled 
about it because of some experience you had, and that that gives rise 
to your testimony of criticism ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I think that that could be said. I don't agree with 
it, but I don't doubt that people will say that, yes. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, I am trying to determine for 
the record, so that we might weigh your testimony properly, just 
what motivates you now to come in and give this testimony, that is 
most critical of the project and the way it was handled and the 
architectural and engineering design of it, and so forth. Have you 
volunteered to give this information ? 

Mr. Veijdhuis. No, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Or were you first approached by the com- 
mittee staff or someone else to inquire about it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is right. 

The Chairman. I do not understand. You said "That is right." 
Senator McClellan asked: "Did you volunteer, or were you ap- 
proached by the committee staff?" I do not understand the answer. 

Mr. Veldhuis. We were approached. 

Senator McClellan. I understood him to say he was approached. 

My only purpose in these questions: You can appreciate that as 
a result of everything this committee does, whether the results of its 
efforts are good or bad, the committee is criticized, and also these 
who testify critically of the program are criticized from some sources. 
And I am trying to make the record straight so that we might eval- 
uate your testimony in the light of all the attending circumstances. 

As I understand you, when you first were given an opportunity to 
bid, or about the time of your bid, you pointed out to the authorities 
in the VGA — or IIA is it? Well, they represented in this instance the 
Voice of America, did they not ? 

The Chairman. I do not know, Mr. McClellan, whether it was the 
Voice engineers. 

Senator McClellan. The State Department authority. It is all 
under the State Department ? 

The Chairman. May I say. Senator, the reason I made that com- 
ment : We find that in most of the contracting, the responsibility for 
what is ultimately clone apparently rests in IIA rather than in the 
Voice officials. It is rather difficult to place tlie responsibility. 

Senator McClellan. I understand. 

Anyway, you pointed out to the Government authorities, whoever 
they were, in charge of the construction program, that the designs 
of the antennas, and so forth, were all wrong, that this would make 
them far more expensive, and that they would not provide any addi- 
tional service over and above the much cheaper and much more 
practical construction; did you? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes; we did. 

Senator McClellan. You said, I believe, that had they changed 
those plans and designs for the type that you considered appropriate 
and adequate, a saving of some 50 percent in cost could have been 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 


Senator McClellan. Did you call their attention to that prior to 
the time that your contract was firmed up ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. It was more specific than that, Senator. One of the 
means that we had at our disposal to convince the State Department 
that it might be worth their while to allow us to bid was to submit 
and discuss with the State Department the drawings and the plans 
and the specifications that at that time were completed for the Pakistan 
system. So they were fully aware of what we proposed as an alternate. 

Senator McClellan. You have used here the percentage of 50 per- 
cent that you say could have been saved. Did you specifically use 
those figures, or call their attention to that great saving that could be 
achieved by a change in the design ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Whether it was expressed as 50 percent, I don't 
know. I do know that several of the individuals in the Department 
knew exactly the price that we charged that other company for the 
Pakistan system; yes. 

Senator McClellan. Now, you also further testified that under 
their own design, and with the type that you finally constructed 
under the contract that you had with them, a saving of 20 percent 
in the cost could have been achieved. 

Mr. Veldhuis. The saving of 20 percent is an estimate that I give 
now. At the time, as I testified before, we had one particular phase 
of material on which we felt very strongly, and we made a quotation 
on that particular piece of material; guy strand against guy rope. 
"We made a quotation which would effect a saving of $35,000. That 
was not accepted. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, you made specific suggestions 
to them in the course of the construction, pointing out where savings 
(ould be made? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Senator McClellan. And that is what you are talking about when 
you say 20 percent could have been saved ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is right. 

Senator McClellan. Now, as to these modifications that you sug- 
gested during the period of construction which would have resulted 
in a total of 20-percent savings, were they changes which would 
have in any way affected adversely the services to be performed by 
these facilities ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No ; those savings would in no way affect the basic 
design as given to us. They are all details and parts, certain specified 
parts, and materials, and would in no way affect the basic design. 

Senator McClellan. Would they have in any way affected or 
shortened the life of the service of the stations or of the facility ? 

Mr. VELDHxns. This particular guy strand that I am talking about 
would in effect have lengthened the life. However, the life expectancy 
of an antenna of this nature, the expectancy of usefulness of an 
antenna of this nature, usually is much less than the life expectancy of 
the components that make up such an antenna. 

Senator McClellan. When you pointed out how these savings 
could be effected, by modifying the construction or particular designs 
of parts, as you went along, on construction, what reaction, or what 
answer, was given you, as to why they were unwilling to have modified 
the plan ? 

29708— ^53— pt. » 5 


Mr. Veldiiuis. As I said before, every siio^gestion was met by a feel- 
ing of resentment on the part of the architect-engineers. This is not 
only my own experience, but several people in onr organization have 
the same opinion, are of exactly the same opinion. 

Senator McClellan. Can yon account for that resentment or lack 
of interest or willingness to consider these suggestions in the interest 
of economy ? Have you any explanation for it from what you believed 
and your contacts with them and what they may have said or how they 
may have acted about it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I have a personal opinion, yes, Senator. The reason 
for it, I believe, is that the architect-engineers felt that they are on 
thin ice, they are not too certain of themselves, and therefore they 
are resentful of every suggestion that is made. There again, if you 
know what you are talking about, and you propose something, and 
somebody else who knows better than you draws your attention to 
an omission or to something that you do wrong, you say, "That is fine. 
Thank you very much. We are very grateful that you did make that 
suggestion," even if somebody makes a suggestion and you don't 
agree with him, then still you say, "I am very grateful that yoa made 
that suggestion, but I am not going to follow it in this case," that is my 
experience in engineering circles, that that is the normal procedure. 

Senator McClellax. Well, did that polite conversation or attitude 
become manifest in the instance where you called their attention 
to this? 

Mr. Veldhuis. No, sir. They always were resentful of everything 
that we had to say on this. 

Senator McCleelan. Could it be possible or probable that the 
reason for not making these changes in materials and certain designs 
was because of some peculiar or personal interest that some of them 
had in that particular type of equipment, that caused them to insist 
on holding tenaciously to the plans they had ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I can't answer that, Senator, because to my knowl- 
edge they have no interest and they have no background in this kind 
of work. 

Senator McClellan. I am trying to see what could be their motive. 
What would prompt them to just arbitrarily refuse to consider sug- 
gestions that might be helj^ful and might produce economies and 

May I ask you this : Do you think they simply did not know any 
different? Is it because of incompetency — we will put it that way — 
that they declined to consider these suggestions? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Yes ; personally, I think so. 

Senator McClellan. You think it was just incompetence? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I think so. 

Senator McClellan. And they didn't want to admit that they had 
made a mistake. 

Mr. Veldhuis. I personally had the very strong feeling all the 
time — I still have it — that the architect-engineers, because of their 
oAvn feeling, could not allow even the slightest criticism or change, 
because they did not want their design to be anything but perfect. 
They don't even know that nothing can be perfect. They didn't even 
know that. So they wanted at least the record that what they do is 
perfect, that no changes, no improvements, are even possible. That 
is my personal opinion, as vague as it is. 


Senator McClellan. In other words, it seemed to you they felt if 
they made a change in the course of construction, it would be an 
admission on their part that they had made mistakes, and they did 
not want to subject themselves to that criticism ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Exactly. 

Senator McClellan. And therefore they just arbitrarily insisted 
upon proceeding notwithstanding the suggestion to them that they 
w^ere spending considerably more than was necessary to get the same 
results ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. May I ask you : "Would other competent con- 
tractors or people in your field, you think, being acquainted with all 
of the facts, substantiate the testimony you have given here with 
respect to this waste and extravagance ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I didn't get that. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Well, you could only give an opinion, I as- 
sume ; but would other competent contractors in this particular field,, 
do you think, have the same view, and would they rather confirm what 
you have testified to here about savings that could have been made in 
the construction of this project ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. I can go much further than that. 

In this field, quite a few of the people that don't know the full 
background of this project are under the impression that the Wind 
Turbine Co. is responsible for the designs. 

Senator McClellan. What company ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. The Wind Turbine. 

Senator McClellan. That is your company ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That my company is responsible for the designs. 
And many of our clients have said to me personally : "How could you ? 
You ought to know better," and then I had to explain to them that I 
didn't do it; that those were the designs given to us. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you: Were you not reluctant to 
enter into a contract for the construction of a project of this character, 
when you knew in the beginning that it involved such tremendous 
waste ? In other words, why would you be willing to have your com- 
pany identified in the capacity it was with such an enterprise as this? 

Mr. Veldhuis. That is an unfortunate circumstance. As I pointed 
out before, on the 18th of August 1950, we heard, through a business 
friend of ours, that this contract was to be awarded. That same day, 
our company was in New York inquiring about it and heard then that 
the contract was to be awarded on the 21st. The 18th was on a Friday^ 
The 21st was the next Monday. We were, after asking, for it, allowed 
delay in the opening date for the bids and we were allowed delay to 
make up our bid. That had to be done very fast. 

Senator McClellan. Within a week, I think you testified. 

Mr. Veldhuis. About a week. And such a short time does not leave 
open much time to contemplate the design itself, to judge the design on 
its merits or its shortcomings. 

Senator McClellan. Are you trying to indicate now that you did 
not discover all of these factors until after you had made a contract? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Not all of them. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. You had observed some of them. 

Mr. Veldhuis. Some of them, yes. 


Senator McClellan. Was it much worse after you had made the 
contract than you thought it was or might have been before you entered 
into the contract? 

Mr. Veldiiuis. INIy opinion on that change: There again, it is the 
normal procedure that so often you get a design that you are asked to 
bid on, and there are phases of that design where you know better than 
the one who made up the specifications. And always it has been my 
experience that, when you discuss such differences, always the custom- 
er is appreciative of your elforts; that sometimes there are reasons 
that you didn't know for a certain setup, and then at least they have 
tlie courtesy to explain to you why that is, just in an effort to come to 
the best design possible. 

Senator ]\icCLELLAN. Let me ask you one further question. In ret- 
rospect, would you again enter into such a contract with the knowl- 
edge you now have of this? Would you permit your coni]mny to 
beconie involved in it under the same circumstances, and anticipating 
the same results that have been achieved in this? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I don't know what the position of my company 
would be. I can only speak for myself. I hope never in my life to go 
through an ex]ierience like this again. 

Senator McCleelan. You say you made no profit. 

Was that because of your mistaken judgment in the amount of your 
bid? Or for other reasons? 

Mr. Veldhuis. I don't know that exactly. I am an engineer, and 
on the financial side of it, although I am somewhat connected with it,. 
I don't know all the intricacies of that. 

Senator McClell.^n. I thought that might be pertinent to this 
inquiry, in view of the fact that you are so critical of what actually 
occurred and what has been done; that you might feel that notwith- 
standing your judgment in the beginning, you could contract for it on 
the basis you did, and at a profit, but that things happened subse- 
quently, by reason of these difficulties you encountered that affected 
the profit result. I do not know whether that is true or not. 

Mr. Veldhuis. Some factors did, yes. There are some factors 
where that definitely is the case. I would say very few. But there is 
no reason to gripe about that. 

Senator McClellan. Would it be fair to say that you are simply 
unhappy about this whole thing because you didn't make a profit ? Or 
would you assert under oath that it is because of the incompetency and 
waste, and those factors that entered into it, that you are unhappy 
about it ? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Well, we had correspondence before. There is cor- 
respondence with the State Department that points out some of the 
things that I have been talking about. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, this is not an afterthought 
on your part since you found that you made no profit? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, no. 

Senator McClellan. As I understand you, in the course of the 
whole construction program you were pointing these things out? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Oh, yes. 

Senator McClellan, From the beginning of the contract on through 
to completion of the job? 

Mr. Veldhuis. Definitely. 


Senator McClellan. I believe that is all, Mr. Cliairman. 

The Chairman. I want to thank you very niiich, sir, for coming 

Subject to the approval of the other Senators, we will have no 
public hearing until Thursday morning at 10 : 30. In the meantime, 
we have a number of witnesses I would like to bring in in executive 
session, and I will contact your office, John, and yours, Karl, and we 
can arrange to have them here. I think we might have one of some 
importance this afternoon. 

Senator McClellan. I may say this : I am very much interested in 
all this testimony that may be presented that indicates incompetency, 
lack of efficient personnel, or if it goes further and shows a willful 
disregard for the public interest, for economy, and so forth, because 
I think, personally, this service that we are undertaking to provide 
by these facilities is vital, of great importance, and I think it is of 
great concern not only to the Congress but, I should think, to the State 
Department to ascertain if this thing has gotten off on the wrong track 
or is being undertaken by incompetents or people who are indifferent 
to the public interest. If that is the case, I think corrections should 
be made without further delay. 

Mr. Veldhuis. I have no personal knowledge of that. 

Senator McClellan. That is why we are all trying to find this out. 
We can appreciate that in a program of this size some deficiencies will 
necessarily occur, in view of the speed and the urgency of it. But 
that does not justify just wholesale incompetence or lack of interest 
and purpose to protect the Government in this program. 

So I am interested in testimony that gives us an accurate picture of 
what the situation is. 

Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. You may step down, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 11: 55 a. m., a recess was taken to the call of the 
sChair. ) 




United States Senate, 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 


Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met, (pursuant to S. Res. 40, agreed to January 
30, 1953) in room 318, Senate Office Building, at 10 : 30 a. m., Senator 
Joseph K. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican. Wisconsin; 
Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator John 
L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas. 

Present also : Roy Cohn, chief counsel ; G. David Schine, chief con- 
sultant ; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Mundt. (presiding). Counsel will call the first witness, 

Mr. Cohn. Dr. Ghosh. 

Senator Mundt. Dr. Ghosh, do you solemnly swear that the testi- 
mony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I do. 

Senator Mundt. You may be seated. 

Mr. Cohn. May I get the spelling of your name, please? 


Dr. Ghosh. The name is Stanley Ghosh, G-h-o-s-h. 

Mr. Cohn. G-h-o-s-h? 

Mr. Ghosh. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Before you start to question the witness, I would 
like to tell the other Senators that a matter of, I think, extreme im- 
portance has come up, which will necessitate hearing the security 
officer, Mr. McLeod, in executive session. So we will ask Mr. Leahy 
to contact Mr. McLeod and tell him we would very much appreciate 
it if he would be here at two o'clock this afternoon. 

Mr. Leahy. Very well. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Dr. Ghosh, are you with the Department of State 
at the present time? 

Dr. Ghosh. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Cohn. What position do you hold ? 



Dr. Ghosh. I am the Chief of the Hindi Service of the Near East, 
South Asia, and African Division of the International Broadcast- 
ing Service. 

Mr. CoHN. You are the Chief of the Hindi Service of the Inter- 
national Broadcasting Service of the Voice of America. Is that 
correct ? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. AVhere were you educated? 

Dr. Ghosh. I had my B." A. honors and M. A. froui the University 
of Calcutta, and a Ph. D. from the University of Indiana. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, at the time you w^ere studying in India and living 
in India, did you acquire a reputation as an anti-Communist? 

Dr. Ghosh. I certainly did. 

Mr. CoHN. And after you came to this country and took your doc- 
tor's degree at the University of Indiana, did you teach at the Uni- 
versity of Indiana thereafter ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I was on the faculty, yes; as an assistant to the chief 

Mr. CoHN. Did you thereafter take a position in the United States 
Government ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I went to Washington, where I was with the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization as a South Asia specialist. 

Mr. Cohn. And did there come a time when you went with the 
Department of State ? 

Dr. Ghosh. Well, there was a brief period when I was teaching 
South Asian world politics at the American University Graduate 

Mr. CoHN. At the American University Graduate School? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. And did you then go with the State Department ? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. And you now hold the position, you have told us, of 
Chief of the Hindi Service of the Voice of America. 

Let me ask you this. Dr. Ghosli. While with the Hindi Service 
and as its chief, what has been your aim as far as broadcasts of the 
Voice of America are concerned ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I think that could be sunmiarized in a few points. 
First of all, the basic objective has been to lielp the implementation 
of the American foreign policy and to build good will between the 
United States and India; No. 2, to counter Communist propaganda 
efmanating from within and outside of India; No. ?>, to project the 
true picture of America to the people of India, so that it miglit help 
to dispel the wrong impressions which the people liave about this 

Mr. Cohn. I see. Now, addressing ourselves particularly to No. 2, 
you say you found it to be of importance to counter Conununist 
propaganda; is that right? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you find that one of the effective ways of doing 
that was by broadcasting over the Voice of America anti -Communist 
statements made by leaders within India itself ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I felt that was very important. 


Mr. CoHN. Dr. Ghosh, did there ever come a time when there was 
attempted interference with your program in broadcasting to India 
anti-Communist statements bj^ Indian leaders? 

Dr. Ghosh. Well, there was no interference from Indian leaders, 
but we certainly got guidance from the Embassy last summer, the 
summer of 1952, wliich asked us to stay away from broadcasting or 
putting undue em])hasis on anti-Conmiunist statements made by In- 
dians and then broadcast them back to India. 

Mr. CoHN. And from whom did this guidance emanate? 

Dr. Ghosh. It came on a teletype, and as far as I can remember, 
it was from the Ambassador in India, Mr. Bowles. 

Mr. CoHN. Is that Cliester Bowles? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. CoHKT. "What was your view of the soundness of this guidance? 

Dr. Ghosh. I thought'it was a very unsound and unwise guidance. 

Mr. CoHX. Let me ask you this:* At the time that Ambassador 
Bowles asked you to stojj sending over anti-Connnunist statements by 
Indian leaders, was the Soviet Union ceasing in its campaign of attack- 
ing the United States or using anti-American statements? 

Dr. Ghosh. As far as I know, they were carrying on their usual 
attacks in the time-honored fasliion, and I think the tempo was very 
high. And I can cite one example right here in my files : that just 
]irior to that the Comnnmist newspaper, the Blitz, published in Bom- 
bay, attacked myself and the whole staif in a lead article, and I have 
a photostatic copy of it here. 

Mr. Cohn. That was a Communist newspaper? Is that right? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt ? 

Dr. Ghosh. Surely. 

The Chairman. Did Bowles give any reason for this directive tell- 
ing you not to broadcast the anti-Communist statements of Indian 
leaders ? 

Dr. Ghosh. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Dr. 'Ghosh, in other words, the situation was- this: 
The Soviet Union was blasting away with its campaign against the 
United States. You people were attempting to counter it by telling 
the truth, and an important weapon in that was showing leaders within 
India itself were attacking the Communist movement and making 
anti-Communist statements. 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. As a matter of fact, your counterpropaganda effort was 
so effective that you had been the subject of attacks by a Communist 
newspaper in India ? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. And in the face of that, a guidance comes in from Am- 
bassador Bowles telling you to stop making anti-Communist state- 
ments ? 

Dr. Ghosh. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. And you have made your position^clear on that. 

Dr. (thosh. I might add that I refused to follow that guidance, for 
the simple reason that no reason was forthcoming from the Embassy 
or anybody else. Me reaction to it was immediate. I got a lengthy 
tape recording by a leading Indian literateur who was in Paris at- 
tending a cultural freedom congress, and I recall, as far as I remember,; 


that soon after I got the guidance, I got this tape, and it certainly 
was a very strong anti-Communist statement. I broadcast it, and I 
had no qualms about it. 

Mr. CoHN. And you did that in spite of the guidance which you 
had received? 

Dr. (iiiosH. Because in my judgment it was all right. 

Mr. CoHN. Yes. And you felt that the position taken in the guid- 
ance was unsound, particularly in the face of the Soviet campaign, 
and, as you saj', no reason was given for this directive'^ 

Dr. (jhosii. That is right. 

Senator Mundt. Did the cablegram or communication from Chester 
Bowles indicate that the Government of India, of Nehru, was opposed 
to the type of programs which we were broadcasting in the Voice of 
America, and that he was relaying to you the attitude of the Govern- 
ment of India, or did it simply seem to be the attitude of Chester 
Bowles that he was relaying to you ? 

Dr. Ghosh. No reason was given, Senator. The only thing I got 
from my superior officer at that time was a little message, a brief 
message, which came on the teletype, asking us to refrain from using, 
or not to emphasize, rather, the anti-Communist, strong anti-Com- 
munist, statements made by Indians. No reason was forthcoming. 

Senator Mundt. No reason was given? 

Dr. Ghosh. And as of today, I don't know what the reason is. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, let me ask you this: At any time during your 
service as Chief of the Hindi Service, have you received any message 
from Ambassador Bowles or anyone in the Embassy, asking you to 
send in anti-Communist material, or encouraging you in your cam- 

Dr. Ghosh. No. As a matter of fact, the correspondence between 
the Embassy and the VOA, New York, has been altogether too scanty, 
and it has been almost a whole year, I think, since we got even a 
single line out of them. 

Mr. CoHN. And have you ever received any encouragement in your 

Dr. Ghosh. No ; we have never gotten any encouragement. On the 
contrary, we have come to feel that we were most unwelcome. 

Senator Mundt. I understood from the testimony of earlier wit- 
nesses, and from my study of the manner in which the Voice is sup- 
posed to operate, that part of the procedure, part of the formula, is 
for the Embassy to send frequent suggestions and directives to New 
York or to Washington, indicating the type of program which should 
come in and the reaction of the citizens to the programs. In other 
words, our Embassy people are sort of supposed to serve as eyes and 
ears picking up the reactions, are they not ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I have seen nothing of the kind. At least, it was not 
drawn to my attention. 

Senator Mundt. So that you had to sort of shoot in the dark. 

Dr. Ghosh. Not necessarily; I will say that. Because we claim to 
be specialists, and we keep our ears to the ground in India. We have 
more than one channel to know what is going on. We can read be- 
tween the lines in reading newspapers, and we have other forms of 
communication, and we judge for ourselves, and also in consultation 
with superior officers both here and in Washington, as well as through 
the policy adviser. 


Senator Mundt. But as far as picking up the flesh-and-blood re- 
action of the people in India, the Voice has a very small staff in a 
very large country over there. Is that not right? 

Dr. Ghosh. I don't believe there is anybody there. 

Senator Mundt. So that then the Embassy is not fulfilling its func- 
tion, which is part of its job, to report by cable, checking on your pro- 
gram of this morning at 10 o'clock, cabling back at noon today, that 
the reaction was thus and so, believing that if you would carpenter 
the program in this direction, the reaction would be better, and so 
on. We have been led to believe that is part of the procedure by 
which the Voice operates. It certainly is part of the procedure by 
which the Voice should operate. I think I understand your testimony, 
then, that that would com])el you to shoot in the dark, because you did 
not get those immediate reactions from the Embassy people there. 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. CoHisr. Now, Dr. Ghosh, in addition to this one teletype, did 
there ever come a time when you received additional word that that 
teletype asking you to refrain or tone down these anti-Communist 
statements reflected the personal view of Ambassador Bowles? 

Dr. Ghosh. I think that was mentioned by my superior officer at 
a later date. 

Mr, Coirx. Who do you refer to as your superior officer? 

Dr. Ghosh. Mr. Dooher. 

Mr. Coiix. That is Mr, Gerald Dooher, who is the Acting Chief of 
the Near East, Asia, and African Division of the Voice of America ; 
is that right? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

Mr. CoHX. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. Dooher is here, and I 
wonder if we could have him come up at this time? He is already 
under oath. 

The Chairman. Mr. Dooher, do you want to move that chair up 
and place it beside the witness? 

Have the record show that Mr. Dooher has previously been sworn. 

You are still under oath, Mr. Dooher. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Dooher, you have heard the testimony of Dr. Ghosh ; 
is that correct ? 


Mr. Dooher. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you yourself have any personal knowledge concern- 
ing this incident Dr. Ghosh has related to us, namely, the fact that 
Ambassador Bowles asked the Voice to desist as far as the sending 
of anti-Communist statements of Indian leaders was concerned? 

Mr. Dooher. I was informed that when Ambassador Bowles was 
back in Washington — I believe the date was June 16— there were 
several conversations in the International Information Administra- 
tion regarding the Voice of America, and that at that time he had 
confirmed that guidance; that he had urged that the Voice refrain 
from using the anti-Communist statements by Indian leaders oi> hig, 


broadcasts. I believe the words were "not to place undue emphasis 
on these broadcasts." 

Mr. CoHN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Dooher, Did you ever see this 
confirmed in writing? 

Mr. DooHER. I saw a memorandum of conversation in which the 
statement was confirmed. 

Mr. CoHN. Was that a memorandum of conversation actually held 
with Ambassador Bowles himself? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Do you recall the date? Have you checked on the date 
of that memorandum ? 

Mr. Dooher. The nineteenth of June, I believe it was. 

Mr. CoHN. Was that June 19, 1952? 

Mr. Dooher. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Mr. Dooher, as Acting Chief of the Near East, Asian, 
and African Division, what was your view as to the soundness of 
this position taken by Ambassador Bowles ? 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? Mr. Dooher, we have dif- 
ficulty hearing you. Will you try and speak into the microphone? 

Mr. Dooher. Surely. 

Mr. CoHN. Did you feel there was any justification for this position 
taken ? 

Mr. Dooher. I felt there was no justification for the position taken. 
I have felt that not only in this case but in other cases where we have 
been asked to tone down the anti-Communist content of our broadcasts. 
But here I felt Dr. Ghosh was perfectly competent to tell what his 
listeners would want to hear, and how far to go, and particularly in 
using their people to present anti-Communist propaganda against 
the Soviets. 

Senator Mundt. May I inquire if you were ever asked to tone down 
the anti-Communist content of your broadcasts in general, or was 
that with respect specifically to the Indian broadcasts? 

Mr. Dooher. I think this was the only reference here, this particular 
statement. But elsewhere it was suggested to me many times to tone- 
down the content of our broadcasts. 

Mr. CoHN. From an anti-Communist standpoint ? 

Mr. Dooher. From an anti-Connnunist standpoint. That is cor- 

Mr. CoHN. Before we leave this Indian thing, I just wanted to 
ask you this: Did you ever receive any encouragement at any time 
from Ambassador Bowles or anyone in the Embassy in India to use 
anti-Communist statements of any kind ? 

Mr. Dooher. No, as Dr. Ghosh said, it was a most discouraging 
state of affairs. We felt that we were not wanted on the air to India. 
In fact, we had a good deal of evidence that it was the desire of the 
Embassy to cut out our broadcast, to transfer the funds to operations 
locally in Delhi. 

The Chairman. Can you think of any legitimate reason why the 
Ambassador would want you to refrain from using the statements of 
Indian leaders? 

Mr. Dooher. Not, to my mind, legitimate, sir. I felt it was an 
extremely effective form of propaganda. 

The Chairman. How about your physical setup in India? What 
coverage do you have? 


Mr. DooHER. Well, that, sir, is a question I would like to defer for 
a couple of minutes. We have been informed month after month, day- 
after day, up to last week, by the Embassy that our signal does not 
reach India. Nevertheless, within the 28 days of February, we re- 
ceived 1,000 letter from Indian leaders. It seems to me the Indians 
are hearing us, but probably those people in the Embassy supposed to 
hear us are not listening. 

For a while, we were receiving audience mail reports from India, 
1 letter a month, 2 letters a month, 3 letters a month ; until Dr. Ghosh 
became very suspicious. So we took our own post-office box in Delhi. 
Immediately after taking our own post-office box, we made announce- 
ments, only on the Hindi program, that the listeners should write to 
us and indicate if they are listening. Within 28 days, approximfitely^ 
1,000 letters were received; which is an extraordinary number from 
a country where literacy is not high. 

The Chairman. I do not understand the sudden increase in mail. 
You say when the letters were sent to the Embassy, you were getting 
only 1 or 2 letters a month. When you had your own post-office 
box you got about a thousand letters a rfionth. How would you ex- 
plain that? 

Mr. DooHER. It appeared to us, therefore, that the Embassy was 
not forwarding the letters. And I don't know on what they were bas- 
ing their decision that the Voice was not reaching India. For exam- 
ple, they also told us that the signal was not being heard. I believe 
that as late as last week we received a letter from the information 
officer stating that inasmuch as the signal was practically inaudible, 
they were not going to publish our programs in the Embassy publi- 
cations. But another division of the Embassy sent us tapes of the 
signal, which are quite clear, and show that a signal almost as good as 
that of BBC is reaching India. 

The Chairman. What coverage does BBC, the British Broadcast- 
ing Co., have in India ? 

Mr. DooHER. According to the Embassy reports, it is the strong- 
est signal outside of All-India Kadio. However, the audience response 
to BBC is approximately one-eighth of the audience response to the 
Voice of America. I would say that in spite of our Embassy reports, 
the VOA Hindi broadcast has more listeners than BBC. 

The Chairman. Does BBC broadcast on shortwave also? 

Mr. DooHER. BBC broadcasts on shortwave, and we use their wave- 
length. BBC leases its wavelength to our Hindi Service. The same 
wavelength, the same signal. 

The Chairman. How about the local radio stations in India ? Do 
they broadcast in shortwave, or longwave ? 

Mr. DooiiER. All-India Radio broadcasts on medium and short- 
wave to its own people. There is a very fine station in Ceylon. The 
Ceylonese Government broadcasts on shortwave also. 

The Chairman. Do you use the same facilities for broadcasting, 
the same broadcasting station, as the British Broadcasting Co.? 

Mr. Dooher. To get to India, we do. We lease one of their broad- 
casting transmitters to get the signal to Delhi and to other parts of 

The Chairman. Where is that broadcasting station located, and 
how powerful is it? 

Mr. Dooher. That I don't know, sir. 

29708— 53— pt. 9 6 


Senator Mundt. You say you lease one of their stations. By that 
you mean what ? 

Mr. DooHER. BBC stations. 

Senator Mundt. Do you use any Indian stations in your program ? 

Mr. DooHER. The Indian Government does not permit any VOA 

Senator Mundt. I was trying to think of some reason for that 
strange and curious cablegram from iVmbassador Bowles, and I 
thought if you were leasing Indian Government stations, there per- 
haps would be something in their code which would prevent local 
politicians or local agitators from being quoted on their stations. 
But you say you did not use Indian stations at all. 

• Mr. DooiiER. No, sir, not even for prepared package programs. I 
understand now that All-India Radio will not even use our records. 

Senator Mundt. We had testimony in connection with the South 
American broadcasts that one reason they toned down the anti-Com- 
munist content was because the South American owners of those sta- 
tions insisted upon it. But, that would not obtain, then, in India? 

Mr. DooHER. No, sir, it would not obtain in most of the Middle East. 
I have advocated all along that we should not use local broadcasting 
services to relay, because they immediately become the censors of our 
broadcasts. I do not think it is a wise thing to do. I would advocate 
a better signal, short wave or medium wave, from our own facilities , 
than the facilities of a sovereign nation, which can therefore control 
the content. 

Senator Mundt. I am curious about another statement you made. I 
wanted to recapitulate and see if I have it right. 

You said you were rather discouraged, because you received only 1, 
2, or 3 letters a month from India, and that now you had received, as 
I understood it, a thousand letters during the past 30 days. Has some- 
thing happened? Have you stepped up your signal? Have you in- 
creased the power? Have you changed the nature of the program? 
What has brought about this big change from 2 or 3 letters a month 
to approximately a thousand letters a month ? 

Mr. DoOHER. I think, sir, that Dr. Ghosh will confirm this. The 
only real change made was changing the post-office box. 

Isn't that so. Dr. Ghosh? 

Dr. Ghosh. May I add a word here ? 

It was our impression that the Embassy assumed that over here in 
New York we do not understand the Hindi language, although we are 
supposed to be broadcasting in Hindi. So they painstakingly trans- 
lated every single letter in Hindi to English, and then, after 6 months, 
they forwarded the mail to us. And those of us who have any ex- 
perience in radio know that if you get fan mail after 6 months it is 
not going to build up much confidence in the broadcasts. And it is not 
that we haven't told the Embassy that we do understand the Hindi 
language, but it seemed to have no effect whatsoever. And the only 
reason why we are getting all this mail now, as far as I can determine, 
is the fact that they have finally got to the point that they do not 
translate the letters. 

Senator Mundt. I see. They held the letters up for 6 months in the 
process of translation, and so forth ? 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right, sir. I would add this : This was one other 
factor involved in the sudden increase in the mail. We tried to coin- 


cide opening of the post-office box with a give-away program. We 
offered a map of the United States, in view of the fact that naost of the 
people had expressed their desire to know more about the history and 
geography of the country. We offered a map of the United States 
and also, later on, a pamphlet about the educational system of this 

Senator Mundt. I am very glad to hear you say that, because for 
over 3 years I personally have been suggesting to the various people- 
in the State Department that one way in which they could increase 
their mail — I think it is very important that we get mail — is to take 
a leaf out of the booklet of American broadcasters, and send them 
something like that, the biography of an American President or some- 
thing like that as an inducement. I am glad to find that at one place in 
the world they have finally come to that. 

Dr. Ghosh. I might add it took me almost a whole year to convince 
the people in the Voice to let me do it. 

Senator Mundt. You are a better salesman than I am. I worked 
on them for 2 years and did not get anywhere. So I am delighted to 
hear you say that. 

The Chairman. Mr. Dooher, you seem to have a very disturbing 
pattern, I gather; in Korea, for example, the Voice authorized and 
sponsored broadcasts attacking Syngman Ehee, when he was in a lif e- 
and-death struggle with the Communists, protested all of the attacks 
that you could possibly make on him, gathered them from all the news- 
papers in the world, rebroadcast them in Korea. In India, you have 
the order that you cannot attack the Communists. 

Do you have any way of accounting for the unusual pattern? It 
becomes clearer and clearer, it seems, as we get more testimony. 

Mr. DooHER. I have had several other cases within my jurisdiction 
during the past 2i/^ years also. It seems to me a terrible softness, which 
comes only from a lack of dedication to the cold war struggle. That 
is the only explanation I have for that. There is no dedication on the 
part of those who are supposed to be master-minding our psychological 

The Chairman. May I suggest to counsel, not on this point that we 
are here discussing this morning, but as a general proposition, that I 
think we should have one of the engineers make a complete study of 
the broadcasting facilities, and give the committee a map of the areas 
that we are actually hitting with an audible signal. I have been going 
over the maps the Voice submitted to the Appropriations Committee, 
which would indicate that we had complete coverage of all the desired 
target areas. I find that the testimony taken here has been in direct 
conflict with the picture shown in these maps. I think we should be 
able to get either one or several engineers to give us a complete and 
accurate picture, so that we will know just what target areas we are 

Senator Mundt, On that point, how much of India do you hit with 
our signal? 

Mr. DooHER. I believe Dr. Ghosh could handle that. He has studied 
the audience very carefully. 

Dr. Ghosh. The BBC signal emanating from London reaches al- 
most the entire country. The Ceylon relay is aimed prima- 
rily to northern India, because that is the territory where the Hindi 
language is spoken. There is evidence to prove that tlie signal 


reaches more than three-fourths of the country, and in a very satis- 
factory form. 

The Chairman. We have had testimony that the Ceylonese Govern- 
ment has received the right to censor our broadcasts emanating from 
Ceylon. Would you have any comment on that? 

Dr. Ghosh. Yes, I think the transmitter of radio Ceylon being 
located on sovereign territory, they have the basic right to do that. 
15ut I think so far they haven't exercised that right to censor, although 
they have a right to do that, I suppose. 

Senator Mundt. I think that would be perfectly understandable. 
When we were trying to make a contract with Radio Luxembourg, they 
received that same right. And it seemed to me it is proper that they 
should, since most of the radio stations over there are owned by the 
Government, and consequently they have an interest and a con- 
cern about what kind of broadcasting is being done, even if it is leased. 

The Chairman. I think in that connection it should be pointed out 
that the testimony heretofore taken has been that the United States 
has undertaken to build the facilities in Ceylon. When they are com- 
pleted, they will be owned by the Ceylonese Government. The testi- 
mony has been that of the 108, I believe, members of parliament in 
Ceylon, 65 belong to the so-called right-wing party; the balance are 
composed of some Communists and Socialists and other individuals; 
so that the Ceylonese Government, at present is controlled by what 
you would call a Republican Party, John? Or a Southern Demo- 
cratic Party? 

So that as of today, with the Conservatives in power in Ceylon, you 
perhaps would not have too much difficulty insofar as censoring is 

Dr. Ghosh. That is right. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this question: The engineers have 
testified that you could hit the target area in India just as well from 
a station located in Manila, rather than Ceylon. I note that the new 
budget calls for funds for additional construction in Ceylon. Would 
it not seem wise that, if it is true, if the engineers are correct that 
Manila would be just as desirable an area, we should build in Manila, 
where we would not have this problem of censorship ? 

Dr. Ghosh. I should say so. Because there is always this constant 
danger that, Ceylon having a parliamentary form of government, 
there may be an upset of the present regime at any time, and if the 
ruling power, the government, takes an antiwestern or anti-American 
attitude, it is quite possible they might impose restrictions which will 
eventually affect our broadcasts as relayed from Ceylon. And, in that 
case, I should think that if the transmitters are located in a more 
friendly territory, w^e certainly would profit by it. 

The Chairman. I might say in that connection also that the testi- 
mony has been that Ceylon is trading very heavily with Red China, 
especially insofar as rubber is concerned, and they would be sub- 
ject to influence, I assume, from that angle. So I gather your 
advice would be that we should certainly seriously consider construc- 
ing the broadcasting facilities in Manila rather than in Ceylon ? 

Dr. Ghosh. Well, if the signal, according to the engineers' point of 
view, can reach India satisfactorily, then in that case I would cer- 
tainly support that contention. At the same time I will say this: 
That we should continue to relay our programs from BBC London, 


because that signal is really getting through satisfactorily without 
any intermediate relay base. 

The Chairman. In other words, we broadcast to India from 
London ? 

Dr. Ghosh. "We broadcast from out here in this country. I think 
the station is Cincinnati, Ohio, and from there it is picked up at 
London, and then relayed from London to India. There are two 
other points from where our broadcasts are relayed. That is Munich 
in Germany and Tangier in North Africa. 

I might add here that among the languages which are used by the 
Voice of America, this is one of the languages which has a global audi- 
ence — the Tangier relay, at least the back end of the beam, reaches 
South America, and is clear as a bell, and we have today one of the 
largest audiences in that territory. 

Also the Tangier relay reaches East Africa very satisfactorily, and 
I am told the area contains potentially about 200,000 listeners. 

The Chairman. Mr. Dooher, I wonder if you could answer this 
question. We have had testimony before the Appropriations Com- 
mittee to the effect that Argentina refused us the use of her broad- 
casting facilities because of our attacks upon the present Argentine 
Government. Do you know whether we are beaming programs into 
Argentina now, and whether we have been continuing attacks upon 
the Argentine Government, or what type of programs we are beaming 
in, or is that outside of your field ? 

Mr. Dooher. I do know, sir, that we are strongly heard in Argen- 
tina. I know our audience mail from Argentina is tremendous and has 
been increasing a good deal in the last year. We have a large audience 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan? 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Dooher, you have testified before the 
committee before ? 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And as I recall some of your testimony, you 
have referred to what you term a pattern. 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. A pattern of softness, a lack of dedication 
toward the basic purpose and objectives of this program. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dooher. That is correct. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. That, of course, is just a matter of opinion, 
yet it comes from one who has been in the best position to observe 
and to know what the facts are. 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. There is a point I think I have mentioned 
before, that during my career I spent 10 months in Communist- 
controlled government. " I can't mention the place for security reasons 
at the moment. However, there I learned what Communists do, how 
they do it, how they go about it. I know what they don't like to 
hear, and what they don't like to hear is just what we are giving them. 
And when elements try to make it difficult for us to put across that 
line, I then look around to see if there is a pattern, and I have found 
it in at least a half a dozen cases during my 2 years with the Voice 
of America. 


Senator McClellan. Now, just for the record, you mention a half 
a dozen places. Will you identify those places so that we can get this 
more concrete rather than in general terms ? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. My own feeling is that with the facilities we 
have there is a certain element, on the possibility of results that we 
could achieve by the proper utilization of these facilities. And what 
I am trying to determine is whether, as a result of that pattern, to 
what extent we have failed to utilize our facilities and opportunities 
to the extent of attaining their maximum benefit and usefulness. You 
keep referring to this pattern, and I am confident you feel convinced 
tliat it exists and has been operating, and I would like for you to 
specifically identify the things now that cause you to come to this 
conclusion that there has been a definite pattern established and fol- 
lowed, or attempted to be established and followed. And then I 
should like for you to tell us to what extent this pattern has influenced 
the results and effectiveness of this program, and to what extent it 
would have influenced and affected this program had you, in your 
position, followed that pattern. 

I want you to give us just as clear a picture of it as you can, 
because my own thought is, as far as we have gone in this, that the 
real core of failure or deficiency or incompetency rests pretty high 
up. And it has been a lack of a definite, positive, affirmative fighting 

Mr. DooHER. Absolutely, sir. I agree with that. 

Senator McClellan. I want you to comment thoroughly for the 
record now, and let us know exactly how you feel about it, and why 
you feel that way, and cite specific, concrete things, upon which you 
have arrived at this conclusion. 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. I think the chairman can tell you there is 
one country, one program, I cannot talk about specifically for se- 
curity reasons, but beyond that I will tell you. 

Mr. CoHN, I would suggest this, Mr. Dooher, in answering Sena- 
tor McClellan fully : We have been requested by General Smith not 
to refer to this country by name, but I think if you can refer to it as 
country X or something along those lines, you could give Senator 
McClellan a full picture. 

Mr, Dooher. Yes, I will call that country X in this case. 

First of nil, we have had fairly full testimony on the attempted cut- 
ting of the Hebrew broadcasts, which did not take place because of the 
fight which we put up. That, to my mind, if it had gone through 
would have given the Soviet propagandists worldwide another Rosen- 
berg case, another case whereby they could say "the Americans are 
the anti-Semites and not us." But I will skip that, because I think 
I have already covered that fully. 

Senator McClellan. All right. That is ISTo. 1. 

Mr. Dooher. No. 1 is the Hebrew situation. 

The second is the Hindi Service, a definite deliberate effort to elimi- 
nate the Hindi Service, which, to my knowledge and to the knowledge 
of Dr. Ghosh and our other experts in the area, was the only effective 
counterpropaganda medium of the United States Government of the 
International Information Administration. We were broadcasting 
strong counterpropaganda which was effective. We were being 
listened to. We had a clear signal. We were getting audience re- 


sponse. And yet, time after time, our public-affairs people in India 
insisted that we stop spending money on broadcasts, turn it over to 
the Public Affairs Office in Delhi, and let them spiend it. 

Senator McClellan. Now, you think because you were getting re- 
sults, because it was being effective, these programs that you were 
putting out, that prompted this request or effort to have your pro- 
gram and your work stopped, and transfer the whole service to some 
other source ? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. I wouldn't have said that if it weren't for the 
specific instructions, specific guidance, which we received, that Dr. 
Ghosh has told about, that they did ask us to tone down the content of 
our program. I think the two things tied in together indicate a lack 
of desire on the part of the Information people in India that we con- 
tinue this sort of broadcasting. 

Senator Mundt. Now, when you talk about public affairs officers, 
you are talking about IIA officials in India. Right? 

Mr. DooHER. The USIS, United States Information Service, which 
is IIA. 

Senator Mundt. Which is now IIA ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is the group that reports to Dr. Johnstone. 

Senator Mundt. So what we have, in fact, is one part of the IIA 
operation based in India working in an opposite direction from 
another part of the IIA operation operating from New York? 

Mr. DoOHER. Unquestionabl}^ sir, to the point where I believe mis- 
information was given to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Rela- 
tions that went to Delhi to investigate the effectiveness of the Voice. 
Misinformation was given in a report, which is unclassified, which I 
have in front of me. I can comment on that further, sir, after I get 
through with my points. 

Senator McClellan. All right. You have made two now, the 

Mr. DooHER. And the Hindi, the Indian. 

Senator McClellan. All right, 

Mr. DooHER. At another time, when I was in charge of organizing 
broadcasts to the hundred million minority peoples of the Soviet 
Union, I had a most difficult time to get a strong policy guidance out 
of Washington. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt ? Just for Senator Purtell's bene- 
fit, this is Mr. Dooher, who is testifying. And Mr. Dooher is head of 
the Near East, South Asian, and African desk. Is that right ? 

Mr. Dooher. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. And Dr. Ghosh is head of the Indian desk, and 
they have had some testimony so far about the former Governor of 
your State, who is the Ambassador to India. 

Senator Purtell. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Not of your party. 

You could not get policy guidance with reference to your programs 
for Russia ? 

Mr. Dooher. I got policy guidance. That is what I wanted to 
testify on. It was not the sort of policy guidance I wanted. Here is 
what the guidance said, in part. It said I was to do nothing in my 
broadcasts that would outrage the sentiments of Soviet nationalism, 
Soviet or Russian nationalism. In other words, we were to do nothing 
that would offend the sensibilities of people who said there was a 


Soviet nation, whereas I refuse to recognize that there is a Soviet 
people. I recognize the Russian people and the various other peoples 
of the Soviet Union. But this was a specific directive preventing us 

Senator McClellan. In other words, did that mean that you could 
not attack communism, and communism as a government in Russia? 

Mr, DooHER. It meant, sir, that we should not attack the idea which 
Stalin created that all the people of the Soviet Union were one and in- 
divisible in suppoi't of him ; in other words, that there was this great 
Soviet nation — which really does not exist. You have the Russian 
people, the Ukrainian people, the Byelorussian people, the Caucasians, 
and the central Asians. 

Senator Mundt. In other words, you were not permitted to inject 
into your broadcasts anything which would appeal to the nationalism 
of the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, and people of that kind ? 

Mr. DooHER. We were permitted, after I fought it out, because we 
got that guidance modified. 

Senator Mundt. But in accordance with that directive, you were 
not so permitted ? 

Mr. DooiiER. That is right. It went further, however. It pro- 
hibited us from using certain portions of the Soviet Constitution 
against the Soviets themselves. In other words, those portions of 
the Soviet Constitution which appealed to the nationalism of these 
minorities were prohibited to us. In other words, we couldn't be the 
devil using scripture for his own purpose in this case. So it was 
given the softening impact, the effort to make it more difficult to leally 
fight a fight in the cold war. That is the third case. 

Senator INIundt. Before we leave the third case, did this directive, 
in the third case, come from our public-affairs officials, of which we 
haye very few if any in Russia, or did they come from the Washington 

Mr. DooHER. It came from Washington. 

Senator Mundt. "V\niich division in Washington issued it? 

Mr. DooHER. As usual, is came to me through channels, so I can't 
identify who the originator was. I dislike naming names, for a very 
specific reason, that in State Department documents, a man signs a 
document, and it doesn't mean that he is the man who is responsible for 
that. It goes through channels. For instance, I am quite sure this 
came to me from Mr. Kretzmann in New York, our Policy Director. 
However, I am also quite sure that Mr. Kretzmann had nothing to do 
with writing this document. In other words, it came to me through 
the channel. 

Senator Mundt. I completely appreciate that fact. That is why I 
did not ask for a name. I asked you from what division of the IIA. 

Mr. DooHER. It certainly came from IP. It must have. The pol- 
icy office of IIA. It must have come from them. 

Senator Mundt. "\^nio is the head of the policy office down there? 

Mr. DooHER. At the present time, I think Mr. W. Bradley Connors. 

Senator McCleLlan. All right. Let us get No. 4. 

Senator Mundt, Was he the head at the particular time when you 
got this directive ? Or do you say at the present time? 

Mr. DooHER. I believe so, sir, but I am not certain. I am not quite 
sure at that point. He might have been in charge of Far Eastern 
policy affairs at that time, I remember there was a period of transi- 


tion. He was first in charge of Far Eastern policy, and then he 
became director of all policy. 

The fourth point is a very significant one. This was done in the 
interest of economy. Economy is a wonderful cloak with which you 
can cover any sort of action you like, and you usually get approval. 
Because economy is a very nice thing. 

I will mention four broadcasts — but there is another ; for security 
reasons I can't mention it — which were cut in broadcast time last 
September. Now, all of these broadcasts were to critical areas or 
Iron Curtain areas. 

Senator McClellan. You say there were four of those ? 

Mr. DooHER. There were five broadcasts which I know were cut 
in time. The fifth I again will call country X. One of them was our 
Turkish broadcast. 

Now, our Turkish broadcast is one of the most effective in the world, 
not just in the Voice of America but in the world. For example, 
during the period of July, August, and September of 1952, audience 
response to the BBC Turkish program was 80 letters. During the 
same period the Voice of America Turkish program received 8,600 
letters, a fantastically effective program. Immediately thereafter, the 
broadcast was cut from an hour to 45 minutes. And I understand it is 
on the list of broadcasts which are contemplated being cut under the 
so-called Jolmstone plan. 

Senator McCi.ellan. You mean being cut out? 

Mr. DooHER. Being reduced to a standby level. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, because it is effective and has 
been determined to be very effective, we applied the economy to that 
particular program? 

Mr. DoonER. Economy is probably the only excuse, sir, that could 
be used with an effective broadcast like that. However, it is even worse. 
Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian broadcasts to the Iron Curtain 
areas were cut for the same reason at the same time. 

Senator McClellan. I see. 

Mr. DoOHER. The people in the Voice couldn't help it. They were 
told, "Make these program cuts. Now you choose what you have to 
cut." What they did : The Voice people decided to cut off the morning 
programs, so that they could save an 8-hour period of transmitting 
time. That saves a lot of money. If you have to save money, you 
have to cut. Now, I will leave it to the judgment of other people as 
to whether other cuts might have been made without cutting these very 
effective and important broadcasts. 

Senator McClellan. Well, I can appreciate that there may be times 
when certain economies have to be resorted to, to stay within the 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Did you feel that these particular economies, 
however, were required or instigated for that reason ? 

Mr. Dooher. Well, sir, when I was certain of the fact that in the 
field, in one post in particular, which, again, I cannot mention, there 
were 130 people working for the United States Government, putting 
out exactly zero anti-Communist propaganda, I thought that maybe 
in posts like that, the cuts could be made. In other words, I do know 
of places which are devoted to cultural and the so-called positive 
propaganda solely, which admittedly do no anti-Communist propa- 
ganda whatsoever. Those were not cut at the same time. 


Senator McClellan. In other words, those were simply a matter of 
entertainment, educational program, and so forth, and no real, posi- 
tive anti-Communist propaganda was being used. When it got down 
to economy, you eliminated those that were really making the fight? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And favored those that were not aggressive ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Not aggressive in the real battle against com- 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct, sir. 

Senator McClellan. And that was observed by you and can be 
established by the record, I assume ? 

Mr. DooHER. Oh, definitely, sir. No question. The record is avail- 
able. As a matter of fact, in this particular post, which again is 
country X, Inhere is a report available. I do not have a copy of it 
myself. However, I have seen a copy of it several times. It states 
that in the war against Soviet imperialism, the USIS in this country 
has been able to accomplish absolutely nothing, because it does not 
use anti-Communist propaganda. 

Mr. CoHN. To develop that for Senator McClellan a minute, I think 
that is extremely important. That is this country X we have been 
talking about. Is that right ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, you have the material from our information pro- 
gram getting in there in several ways. First of all, you have the Voice 
of America, and you have told us they tried to cut down the Voice of 
America going to that country. Is that right? 

Mr. DooHER. They did cut it down by 33^3 percent. 

Mr. CoHN. By one-third. 

Mr. DooHER. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. And in the Voice of America you know for a fact that 
the broadcasts had an aggressively anti-Communist content; is that 
right ? 

Mr. DooHER. I know it was extremely effective, and we have testi- 
mony from our Ambassador to that country to that effect. 

Mr. CoHN. All right. Now, the Voice of America supplies effective 
anti-Communist statements going into country X. If the Voice 
of America were cut down as it has been, or eliminated, the only thing 
we would have left to get across the truth about our way of life to the 
people in that country and to counter Communist propaganda would 
be through the other parts of the State Department information pro- 
gram. Is that right ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. And those other parts are consolidated under what is 
known as the USIS, the United States Information Service. Is 

that so ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. That includes press and publications, motion pictures, 
things along those lines? 

Mr. DooHER. Right. . . 

Mr. CoHN. And those are pretty much under the public affairs 
officers who are in that embassy. Is that right? 

Mr. DooHER. Definitely ; yes. 


Mr. CoHN. And these public affairs officers are responsible to Wash- 
ington ? 

Mr. DooHER. They are responsible to Dr. Johnstone, who is in 
charge of IFI, the International Field Organization. 

Mr. CoHN. In other words, this Dr. William Johnstone, Jr., one of 
the top officials of the International Information Administration in 
Washington, has under him some 8,000 of these public affairs officers 
who man the embassies throughout the world and are in charge of the 
United States Information Service in these various posts throughout 
the world. Is that so ? 

Mr. DooHER. In 88 United States offices overseas. 

Mr. CoHN. So, in other words, if you cut out the Voice of America 
or reduce it, the only thing we have left to depend on in countering 
Communist propaganda and getting across the truth is the United 
States Information Service as administered by these public affairs 
officers ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct. 

Mr. CoHN. Now, is it your testimony that in this country, country X, 
where they cut down the Voice of America broadcasts, the Voice of 
America officers, through the USIS, were not getting across anti- 
Communist statements ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is my testimony. 

Mr. CoHX. And did you refer to some specific written report you 
have seen ? 

Mr. DooHER. I have seen one specific written report and have had 
many verbal reports from officials returning from that country. 

Mr. CoHN. And what was the effect of that written report ? 

Mr. DooHER. The effect was that the USIS was unable to distribute 
any anti-Communist propaganda whatsoever in that country. 

Mr. CoiiN. That they were doing absolutely nothing. 

Mr. DooHER. They were doing nothing. 

Mr. CoHN. Did that report say what the Russians were doing while 
we were doing nothing ? 

Mr. DooHER. That report said the Russians were very effective, 
through their libraries and through their Communist Party in that 
country — that they were doing very effective work. 

Mr. CoHN. Did any of these PAO's or people connected with them 
in this country X try to get you people in the Voice of America to 
tone down the anti-Communist content of your broadcasts? 

Mr. DooHER. They did, to the point where they said that our broad- 
casts were — the quotation was — "warmongering." 

Mr. CoHN. They also told you that your broadcasts with an anti- 
Communist content were wannongering and should not go to 
country X ? 

Mr. DoOHER. That is right. 

Mr. CoHN. This came from the' PAO's in that country? 

 Mr. DooHER. I would like to point out, though, that the so-called 
warmongering broadcasts specified two scripts which were broadcast 
to 46 other areas by the Voice of America. In other words, this was 
not a specific thing'written for this country. This was a house script, 
as we call it. It was only declared warmongering by the PAO in 
this particular country. 


Mr. CoHN. So the PAO in this particular country said that these 
broadcasts, which I understand reflected the policy of the United 
States Government — is that right ? 

Mr. DooiiER. They were approved policywise. 

Mr. CoiiN. "Were warmongerino- on our part. And they tried to 
get you to tone down the ^nti- Communist content. 

Mr. DooHER. That is right. 

Senator McClellan. Is not "warmongering" the same term that 
Communists would have likely applied to these programs? 

Mr. DooHER. That is a very interesting question, sir, because at 
the same time the Soviet radio was broadcasting to country X attack- 
ing the Voice of America broadcasts and requesting that they be cut. 
The Soviet radio asked the same thing. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, we were complying with the 
Soviet request, were we, in making this reduction ? 

Mr. DooHER. Certainly the action came at approximately the same 

Senator McClellan. So they were related at least with reference 
to time ? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct. 

Senator McClellan. And also with reference to the term used to 
express the objections? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes. We were called warmongers. We were called 
the blood drinkers of Wall Street, by the Moscow radio station at 
that particular time. 

Senator Mundt. Let me ask whether you have any evidence from 
country X that the Ambassador or Minister to that country asso- 
ciated himself with the PAO officer in feeling that these were war- 
mongering broadcasts, or whether he, on the other hand, felt they 
were worthwhile and effective? 

Mr. DooHER. Well, sir, first of all, I was told he associated himself, 
with that, but I didn't believe it. I waited until he came back for 
consultation. When he came in for consultation, I had a conference 
with him, and we worked out a memorandum of conversation tosether, 
which I think later on we can put into the testimony, in which it 
was stated that what we were doing was exactly what he wanted us to 

In fact, he wanted us to step up the content, to make it even more 
pointed. So we were doing exactly what our diplomatic chief wanted 
us to do. 

Senator Mundt. In other words, the PAO were not honestly rep- 
resenting the view of the Ambassador ? 

Mr. DooHER. That seemed obvious. 

Senator Mundt. They were telling you one thing, to stop these anti- 
Communist broadcasts, that they were warmongering and all that, 
and when you went to see the Ambassador personally, he said that 
was not true at all, that the broadcasts were fine, that he wanted 
more of them, and he wanted them effective and anti-Communist? 

Mr. DooTTER. That is right. 

Senator Mundt. Did you advise the Ambassador of what the PAO's 
had been telling you and he refused to associate himself with their 
statements ? 

Mr. DooHER. In fact, he specifically told me that the broadcasts 
should not be cut but should be stepped up. 


Senator INIundt. To the best of your knowledge, are these PAO 
officers still functioning in that same capacity in country X? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Can you give us No. 5 now ? You have given 4. 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. I gave 5. 

Senator McClellan. Country X you regarded as No. 5? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes ; the Turkish broadcasts were No. 4. The Hindi, 
the Hebrew, and the Soviet minorities guidance. 

Senator McClellan. Country X makes the fifth ? 

Mr. DooHER. Makes the fifth ; yes. And then I had reference to the 
Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian broadcasts which were cut also, as 
additional evidence. It is actually eight languages that were cut. 
However, I would like to develop the matter further, because it was a 
softening through 4 different methods, or 3 different methods, anyhow. 

The first was through the efforts to have us tone down our anti- 
Communist broadcasts. That was method 1. 

Senator McClell^vn. Softening through four methods. All right. 

Mr. DooHER. Tone down the content of our broadcasts. I have 
given three examples of that. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. DooHER. The second was to reduce the air time of the effective 
anti-Communist broadcasts. There are five examples of that. 

Senator McClellan. Reduce the air time of what, did you say? 

Mr. DooHER. Of the effective anti-Communist broadcasts. Tliere 
are five examples of that. 

Senator JMcClellan. All right. 

Mr. DooHER. The third method was efforts to eliminate, completely, 
effective broadcasts. The Hebrew and the Hindi are two examples 

Senator McClellan. There are two examples of that? 

Air. DooiiEK. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. Dooher. The fourth method was what I think I am going to 
call the Dr. Johnstone plan, since he is the one who originated it, in a 
document, the HA Newsletter, which, in effect, would turn the control 
of all the media over to the public affairs officers in the field. In other 
words, the public-affairs officer in country X, who didn't believe in 
anti-Communist broadcasts, would be the boss and could tell me in 
New York tliat I couldn't broadcast anti-Communist propaganda, 
under this 88 country plan, the so-called 88 Voices of America plan. If 
Ave had a good public-affairs officer — and we have many good public- 
affairs officers, I must s-ay — in my area I know of 4 or 5 who are 
extremely cooperative. If they are good we will have good broadcasts, 
but if they are bad, then the broadcasts also will be milky-white and 
not effective whatsoever. 

Senator McClellan. Now, Mr. Dooher, you have testified in some 
detail with reference to these factors upon which you came to the con- 
clusion that a definite pattern was being followed. Will you tell us 
now, taking into account the facilities you have and the money you 
had to spend and the program that you felt was in keeping with the 
intent and spirit of gaining our objectives, to what extent these policies 
and these actions that you have referred to affected or influenced the 
effectiveness of this program ? 


Mr. DooHER. Well, sir, in two of my countries, again nameless for 
obvious reasons, they cut the actual time in which Ave could do effective 
propaganda. That was the effect. Everything else, I have been suc- 
cessful in fighting off, I think. 

Senator McClellan. Well, assuming they had all been success- 
ful, what I am trying to determine is : What would have been the effect 
of our Voice of America work and the work that is set out for it and 
the program that it is intended to carry out ? What would have been 
the effect, had all these influences been successful in being brought to 
bear, as related to what could have been accomplished with the same 
money, the same facilities, and a definite, positive program, as you 
wanted to carry out, and what would have resulted had all these 
factors been sustained, I will say, and put into effect? 

Mr. DooHER. If these had been all put into effect, we would have a 
program, a propaganda program, over the Voice, that would have 
been so ineffective that I personally would have resigned. I Avouldn't 
have carried on a program of that kind. It would have wasted the tax- 
payers' money. There would have been no reason whatsoever for 
broadcasting to these areas if all of these factors had been carried to 
their logical conclusion. 

On the other hand, if we had full support in what we were trying 
to do, we could have — and did where I really put up a fight — accom- 
plished the goals outlined for us by Government policy. In other 
words, in country X and another country, in three countries, I 
think we could prove documentarily that our broadcasts were effective 
in changing the minds of the people who ran those countries. I think 
we can very definitely prove that. I know in 1 country of my 15 
countries when a parliamentary deputy attacked the Voice of America 
for a statement it did not make, the foreign minister of this country, 
got up and defended the Voice of America. Now, that, to me, is effec- 
tive. And this is a so-called neutralist country. 

Senator McClellan. Now, they were not nble to have adopted or 
carried out a number of these patterns or soft attitudes, attempts to 
try to reduce the effectiveness of the program. They were not success- 
ful in attempting to carry that on ; is that correct? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Now, had they been successful, can we reason- 
ably assume that they would have taken further means to have made 
more ineffective and less forceful the entire program? 

Mr. DooHER. Well, sir, they were not successful, but they still recom- 
mended further means to try to reduce the effectiveness. When they 
couldn't force us to take out the anti-Communist material, when we 
fought against the reduction in air time, when we fought against the 
elimination of programs, they came up Avith this master plan, which 
I think was the final recommendation by Dr. Compton, which again, 
I sav I do not blame him for. He was taking advice from his experts, 
the higher echelon I spoke about before, the people in IIA in Wash- 
ington. And his final recommendation was that all broadcasts to the 
free world be put on either a standby basis or eliminated. In other 
words, "this is a phychological war, but we will stand by." The Soviet 
won't stand by. 

I have here a document, which, again, is unclassified. I can rf ad 
from it. 


The Soviet Union today is broadcasting 695 hours a week to these areas where 
we would stand by. 

To country X, for example 

Senator McClellan. When you say "stand by," do you mean 
suspend the program in this country ? 

Mr. DooHER. I don't think that was meant. I think it was meant we 
would stay on the air for 15 minutes, just so we would have a little 
team available in case they decided to expand again. But they a'so 
intended to eliminate many broadcasts. 

The recommendation was to put on a standby broadcast or to elimi- 
nate all broadcasts to the free world. The Soviet Union isn't stand- 
ing by or eliminating. It is increasing. I have one of these books, 
showing that every year there are more and more Soviet broadcasts. 
You take, for example, country X, where I broadcast 7 hours a week. 
The Soviets broadcast 45 hours a week. It is a very ticklish situation 
there. Rather than be standing by in this country, we should be 
increasing the intensity of our efforts. 

You take India, Pakistan, and the South Asia area, where Dr. 
Ghosh broadcasts 3i/^ hours, and our Urdu service. They are broad- 
casting 7 hours and 30 minutes a week. 

In other words, we are a pretty small voice in this psychological 
war. I think we are doing a fine job. I think we are actually counter- 
ing Soviet propaganda. But not if we have to stand by. And that 
was a recommendation which was made public, I believe, immediately 
after Dr. Compton's resignation. That, I believe, was part and parcel 
of the so-called Johnstone plan. 

The effort has been for some time to decrease the Voice, the radio 
Voice. And yet to my mind it is the only one we can really count on 
to put over American policy. Because we are the only ones who 
are not in the target countries. We are here in New York and Wash- 

If the Secretary of State says we must take a very firm line, we 
must be anti-Communist, say, in country Z-— well, the USIS people in 
country Z can do nothing, because they are on the sovereign territory 
of a foreign country. But we in New York can broadcast exactly what 
the Secretary wants. It is the medium which Washington controls. 
It is the medium which Congress controls, which the Secretary of 
State controls, and which the American people control. The other 
media are, to put it one way, censored, because they are on the sov- 
ereign territory of another state. 

Senator McClellan. Now, if we are to take your testimony at full 
value, it occurs to me that the real job to be done down here is to 
develop the facts as related by you, assuming those are accurate and 
can be substantiated by the report. The real job is to expose this 
condition by the work of this committee, and bring it to the atten- 
tion of the new administration of the State Department, to the end 
that they can pursue this further and actually point up the responsi- 
bility wthin the State Department and within the Voice and the IIA, 
and then remove those who have been responsible for this policy and 
these patterns that you speak of, and replace them with people who 
are competent and who are dedicated to this task. 

Now, if we can perform any service here, I think that should be the 
objective of this committee. And I am very anxious to have placed 
on the record these things that can be substantiated so that a correct 


and a full reevaluation can be had of thig entire program and of the 
policy that has been pursued in order that it might be corrected, and 
we can get this Voice of America again on the right track, so that we 
can get effective results. 

Now, one other question: Every time we undertake to do some- 
thing here, the critics are always saying, "Oh, well, it is a group of 
disgruntled former employees." Now, you are not a former employee. 

Mr. DooHER. No, sir. I am an employee. 

Senator McClellan. You still have your position? 

Mr. DooiiER. I have my position. 

Senator McClelean. And you are making this fight in response to 
the committee's invitation or request for your presence? 

Mr. DooiTER. This is the third time I have appeared, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You are making this fight in the service of 
the Voice of America in the hope that you may get these conditions 
corrected ? 

Mr. DooiiER. Yes, sir. I didn't start the fight before this com- 
mittee. In May 1952, I wrote a memorandum to my superior officer 
and asked for a meeting to discuss just this thing, which I said was, 
in that memorandum, a negation of the congi-essional intent in grant- 
ing us funds. 

In January of this year, I wrote to my contacts in Washington, the 
people I have to write to, pointing out four of these cases, which I 
said showed a very disturbing trend. So I did not simply wait for this 
committee to be formed to put u]> this fight on this same issue, that 
there is a pattern. I began this about a year ago. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, you tried to bring this to 
the attention of those responsible, in the hope that they might share 
your views about it, recognize the situation, and take the appropriate 
action to change this trend? 

Mr. DooHER. I did. And before I came before the committee, I 
wrote to my superiors, told them what I was going to say, in short. 

Senator McClellan. Sir? 

Mr. DooHER. In other words, I informed my superiors of exactly 
what I intended to say. This was not done under the table. I spe- 
cifically went on record saying, "Now, this is what I intend to testify 

So this thing has been quite a fight, for over a year now. I came 
back from overseas service in September of 1950, quite wide-eyed. 
I didn't believe these things were going on, until they began to affect 
the actual programs under my supervision. 

And then, when I finally detected the program, which was a year 
ago, I went on record and said, "This is a pattern." 

Senator McClellan. So you certainly cannot be placed in the 
category of a disgruntled former employee? 

Mr. DooHER. That is right, sir. 

Senator McClellan. You are in the service. I assume you feel 
like you want to dedicate yourself to this task and make it most 
effective, and therefore you are trying to be constructive. You were 
before you came before the committee. You were trying to be con- 
structive within the organization, by calling attention to these things 
and undertaking to arouse those in superior authority to this situation 
and get them to take appropriate action to correct it? 

Mr. DooHER. That is correct, sir. 


Senator Mundt. Mr. Dooher, your testimony has been very disturb- 
ine:, but very helpful, and well documented, I might add. 

It seems to me the demonstrative type of evidence which can be 
checked. You have not given us a lot of generalities, a lot of ethereal 
cases, but you have given us some specific cases, 

I would like you to address yourself, if you will, to this question: 
What, in your opinion, can this commitee do or can the new team 
in the State Department do to correct this rather unsavory pattern of 
activity that you have discussed? In some instances, it was because 
the ambassador of a certain country lacks a realistic approach, let us 
say, to the problem confronting them. 

In country X, it is the fact, apparently, that we have some Public 
Affairs officers who either maliciously or ignorantly have been giving 
some very, very detrimental advice to this country. In other instances, 
it is because the policy group here in Washington have sent you direc- 
tives which are unworkable, if this is really to be a fight against com- 

So, while we have a pattern, it apparently is not a pattern which 
has been planned by any one specific individual. 

Mr. DooHER. Not a conspiracy, sir ; no. 

Senator Mundt. It is a pattern that evolves out of the fact that 
here, there, and elsewhere we have people who, for one reason or 
another, do not recognize the Communist international conspiracy 
for what it is and have no realization of what we should do with our 
funds and our Voice and our USIS to counteract it. 

So I wish you would address yourself to the question of wiiere we go 
from here now, what the new team, what the new director, Dr. John- 
son, who has assured this committee and has assured this Senator 
personally, that he has the same attitude that you have, that this is a 
fight against communism, that we are either going to win the cold war 
or have to fight a hot one, and that we have no business throwing the 
tax])ayers' money aroinid if we have not got a pattern or a blueprint. 

And I wish in whatever you have to say for the record, you would 
now say, as counsel to this committee or to the new team in the State 
Department, what can be done so that we can achieve the optimum 
results we want out of this program. 

Mr. DooHER. Sir, I believe Dr. Jolinson has certainly started on the 
right foot as far as we are concerned. I know^ he has had talks with 
Mr. Puhan, the chief of our program operations, whom I think you 
know. He ha s addressed the thing properly. He has gone about care- 
fully consulting with everybody. His own new team are talking with 
the people in the Voice, and I think they are very carefully trying to 
find out what is wrong and how to correct those wrongs, and I think 
the committee has done a remarkable service in bringing to light some 
of these facts that, frankly, w^ere very difficult to get through channels 
to the people in Washington who could take action. 

Channels, you know, are absolutely essential in Government work, 
but channels sometimes have the very bad habit of getting clogged. 
That is what I found with many of my complaints. They went 
through channels but I didn't know where the channel ended. Cer- 
tainly we didn't get action at the end of the channel. 

So I think that what is being done is what should be done. I think 
that bringing these things to light, these constructive points, these con- 
structive things, shows that the Voice and certainly other media, too, 

29708 — 53— pt. 9 7 


can do a fine job if they are properly organized, properly led, if they 
have the dedication that is so essential to winning this cold war. 
Without the dedication, I think neither the Voice, the movies, nor 
anything, can work. 

Senator Mundt. It is largely a problem of personnel and person- 

Mr. DooHER. Absolutely. Personnel are most important. 

Senator Mundt. One other thing. I would not want you to leave 
the record with the impression, unless you do it intentionally, which 
I do not think you do, although I recognize you are a radioman, and 
a shoemaker sticks to his last, but I would not like to have you leave 
the impression that these 88 offices set up in USIS, which function 
in terms of a great many services, including pamphlets, printed mate- 
rial, bulletins of information, scientific and technical aid to the coun- 
tries involved, motion pictures, public addresses — I would not like 
3-on to leave the impression that necessarily those cannot be used to 
fight communism. In certain countries, yes, where the Communists 
are in control. In certain countries, yes, where they are so close to 
the periphery of the curtain where it might be considered almost a 
revolutionary act for the local country to permit it. But in other 
countries, such as Western Europe and Central Europe and parts of 
Asia, at least it is my opinion that they can become an equal of radio 
and perhaps a more effective weapon than radio. 

Mr. DooHER. Yes, sir. I can give one example of where the public- 
affairs office is doing a splendid job, in Turkey, an absolutely splendid 
job. We are a team working with the public-affairs officer in An- 
kara and Istanbul. We are one unit working together. 

Sanator Mundt. I am delighted to hear you say that, because I have 
visted the public-affairs office in Turkey, both in Istanbul and Ankara, 
and certainly I agree 100 percent with you. And since on occasion 
we have had the names of people tossed into this record who have been 
unhappily involved, I wish you would name this public-affairs officer 
who is doing a good job. 

Mr. DooHER. The man who has really worked with us, Mr. Joyce, 
who now is the regional planning officer in Istanbul, has done a superb 

The Chairman. Mr. Dooher, one or two questions. 

We have had a great difference of opinion among the experts, the 
so-called experts, as to the type of broadcast most desirable, if the 
Voice is continued, in the friendly countries. 

Senator Mundt. What do you mean "if" ? "Wlien" it is continued. 
Or as it is continued. 

The Chairman. I will let the question be amended in that fashion. 

Senator Mundt. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Some have urged that in the friendly countries we 
should have nothing but the hard-news broadcasts and analysis of the 
news, in other words, following pretty much the British Broadcasting 
Co.'s line ; and that only in the Communist countries should we beam 
the so-called anti-Communist propaganda. 

Others have suggested that the anti-Communist material be beamed 
to all countries, friendly and enemy, or I should say, friendly and 

Would you care to comment on that ? 


I have in mind the comment that Dr. Compton made when he left 
the IIA, to the effect that he thought in unfriendly countries we should 
not attempt to put out the so-called strong anti-Communist propa- 
ganda. And whether I agree with that or not, I think there is con- 
siderable merit to the suggestion. 

Mr. DooHEB. Well, sir, that is what I Avould call the "standby" 
attitude. We mustn't forget that the enemy is putting out his strong 
anti-American and anti-free-world line. I have found that even to 
the so-called neutralist countries, good factual anti-Communist com- 
mentaries are most effective. 

To give you an example: When the Soviets turned anti-Semite, 
people told us that we shouldn't broadcast anything to the Arab world, 
because we would only make the situation worse. Well, we have 
some pretty good area people in our Arabic services. We put one of 
our men to writing commentaries. He wrote commentaries to the 
effect that this anti-Semitism of the Soviets might tomorrow be anti- 
Moslemism, very effectively. It was picked up in General Naguib's 
own personal newspaper in Cairo and printed in the Egyptian press. 
That is effectiveness when the head of a state's own paper picks it up 
and uses it. And I would hate to see us lose the opportunity of doing 
that, even in the so-called neutralist areas. 

In country X there is no question about the effect of our anti-Com- 
munist propaganda. The press is using it all the time, monitoring 
and picking up our broadcasts. Wliat they like are the commentaries. 

BBC has an excellent news service. If I could comment here on 
what I call the myth of BBC, I would like to, because we are always 
being told we should be like the BBC because that is the best broad- 
casting service in the world. 

Maybe I am a little proud of VGA, maybe too proud of it, but the 
fact is that the audience response insofar as my area is concerned, 
runs from 4 to 1 to 100 to 1 in our favor. That is the only way you 
can measure it. If the people write to you, they are interested. If 
you get 1,600 letters a month from a so-called neutralist country, that 
is important. Because, first of all, these countries in some cases are 
illiterate to the extent of maybe 90 or 95 percent. And a thousand 
letters from one of those countries might be like 20,000 letters from a 
European country. And don't forget that the few cents they have to 
spend on stamps over there is a big cut out of their paychecK. 

Senator Muxdt. How are we set up? Are we set up so that when 
we get 1,600 letters from a country they are not answered, or are they 
always answered? 

Mr. DooHER. They are always answered. 

Dr. Ghosh is making sure now that his letters are always answered, 
for example. 

The Chaieman. Before you get into that, let me get your position 
absolutely clear on the record. Your thought is, and I gather you 
feel very strongly about it, that if we are to have a Voice, we should 
expose communism for what it is, regardless of whether we are expos- 
ing it in a friendly country or in an enemy country? 

Mr. DooHER. Yes. 

The Chairman. And that we should not revert merely to a broad- 
cast of hard news and analysis ? 

Mr. DooHER. No. I think that that can be done by other media. 

The Chairman. I gather you feel rather strongly about that ? 


Mr. DooHER. I feel very strongly about that. I feel even in coun- 
tries where there is supposed to be great sophistication, such as France,, 
there we should be exposing communism just as strongly as we are 
in country X or Turkey or in the Soviet Union. 

The CiiAiKMAN. I would like to have your comment on this situa- 
tion, Mr. Dooher. 

We have gone into it to some slight extent before. 

The evidence before this committee and the Appropriations Com- 
mittee has been that the Voice has been rather vigorously attacking 
the present Government of Argentina. Let us assume for the time 
being that you may not favor the present regime in Argentina. I say 
assume that for the purpose of your answer. 

Do you agree that the function of the Voice is to attack governments 
throughout the world which we do not heartily approve of? Or is 
the function of the Voice to attack international communism ? 

Mr. Dooher, Well, I, myself, have never attacked the government 
of any area toward which I was broadcasting except behind the Iron 

I think you should have one big goal. You should not scatter your 
shot. I think you should have one target, keep your eye on that 
target, keep pounding aM^ay at that target. 

The Chairman. One of the very competent engineers that testified 
the other day was asked the question, if he were a member of the 
Communist Party, if he had been under ordei^ from Moscow, would 
he have followed the same pattern of sabotage of the physical setup? 
I am not speaking of the broadcast now, but of the physical setup; 
locating stations in the wrong place, building the wrong type of an- 
tenna, the same type of pattern that has been followed. 

His answer is : "Yes," he would. 

I know you are not an engineer. But let us shift to what you call 
a pattern insofar as the material broadcast is concerned. Let me ask 
you this. If you were a member of the Communist Party, if you were 
under orders from Moscow, woidd you have performed, do you think, 
the same function the Voice performed in Korea, namely, w^hen Rhee- 
was in a life-and-death struggle with the Communists, and an election 
was coming up, and the Communists were trying to unseat him, con- 
stant attacks upon Rhee over the Voice ? 

Repeating my question: If you were a member of the Communist 
Party, is that the type of pattern you would have followed? 

Mr. Dooher. Yes, sir; I believe you could make a comparison with 
Soviet broadcasts at the same time and see that they followed the 
same line. We have this example in India, where the thing com- 
plained about is that our broadcasts are not very welcome over there. 
Here is a violent attack by Blitz, the leading Communist paper in 

The Chairman. In other words, the Communist paper in India; 
objected to your broadcasting the statement of Indian leaders? 

Mr. Dooher. They objected to our existence. And, by the way, 
they have named and blacklisted Dr. Ghosh and his entire staff. In 
other words, these men who came to serve America are on the Com- 
munist blacklist. This is it. 

The Chairman. I may be getting outside of your realm now, Mr. 


Do we have any comparison between the money being spent by 
Communist-controlled countries for tlieir voice, if we can call it that, 
their propaganda efforts, as compared to the amount of money we are 
spending ? 

Mr. DooHER. No comparison of money, sir, but, again, we have a 
•comparison of the number of hours of broadcast, to which you must 
add the thousand transmitting stations the Soviets are using to jam 
•our broadcasts. And that is a very important factor. It is just as 
expensive to jam, I believe, as it is to broadcast. 

The Chairman. I do not imagine they were trying to jam those 
broadcasts into Korea, were they f 

Mr. DooHER. I doubt it very much. As a matter of fact, it is inter- 
esting to note that they have started jamming Dr. Ghosh's broadcast to 
India. They are picking up the signal from Tangier to Ceylon and 
jamming it in between. 

The Chairman. Some measure of the effectiveness of your program 
in the eyes of the Soviet would be the effort they expend on trying to 
jam. Is that right? 

Mr. DooHER. That is right. 

Now, on the Hindi and Hebrew programs, we have an effort to jam 
since we started. 

The Chairman. Perhaps we should ask Dr. Johnson for this. 

If you could give us some estimate of the comparative attempt to 
jam the various programs throughout the world, it would be some key 
as to how they are regarded by the Soviet. 

Do you think you could do that ? 

Mr. DooHER. I think there is such a thing as a jamming map which 
shows the centers of jamming. I recall that about a year and a half 
ago, when we began broadcasting in the Caucasian languages — I was 
in charge of those at the time — the center of jamming moved from the 
Leningrad-Moscow area down to the Caucasus; the main reason being, 
I think, that we were broadcasting in Georgian, Stalin's own language, 
and he didn't want anybody in Georgia to hear about his past life, 
I assume. But that was an actual fact. 

The maps prepared before and ait«r show that the center of jam- 
ming has moved. I think you probably could, from our facilities 
people in New York, get a jamming map. 

The Chairman. Do you have any further comments, any further 
advice, that you would like to give in regard to the future of the Voice ? 
We would be glad to hear it. 

Mr. Dooher. No, sir. As one who has not been associated with the 
Voice for too long — after all, I am a Foreign Service staff officei^ — it is 
not really a situation in which I was trying to protect my baby, but 
I have seen as one who has come in from the field that the Voice is a 
terribly effective weapon that can.'t be matched overseas, because you 
'don't have the facilities overseas. 

And I believe it should be cleaned up and strengthened, and there 
is no question that the Voice of America has its faults. I think the 
committee has brought this out, and everyone will admit it. But the 
imoprtant part is that where it doesn't have those faults it has proven 
to be an extremely effective instrument of countering Communist 
propaganda, and I think we should strengthen those parts and give 


them full support and make clear what they are supposed to do. I 
mean, now that we know that we are supposed to be countering Com- 
munist propaganda, we can move ahead, now that we won't have this 
softening eifort, this constant softening effort. 

The Chairman. I want to thank you very much. 

Senator Purtell, any questions ? 

We will recess the public hearings now until next Tuesday morning 
at 10 : 30. 

We will have public hearings every morning then and executive 
sessions every afternoon. 

There will be an executive session this afternoon at 2 o'clock. 

There will be an executive session Monday at 10 : 30. 

And I may say that the sessions next week will not concern them- 
selves primarily with the Voice but will concern themselves more with 
other elements of the information program, although there is a certain 
amount of dovetailing, and some of the testimony will concern the 

And thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 10 p. m., the hearing was recessed until Tuesday, 
March 24, 1953, at 10 : 30 a. m.) 


Exhibit No. 59 

United States Senate, 
Committee on Appropriations, 

February 23, 1953. 
Re Voice of America — Shipborne Transmitters 

Senator Joseph R. McCartht, 

Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, 
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Senator McCarthy : I have followed with interest accounts of the 
hearing you are now conducting into the Voice of America operations. In that 
connection I should like to provide you with some information which has come 
into my possession from the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Mutual 
Security. I had originally intended to direct this committee to conduct inquiries 
into the matter but I feel that since you are already conducting such an inquiry 
it would be appropriate for me to furnish this information to you and request 
that you furnish me the results of your investigations into the subject. 

The Voice of America now has in operation one ship equipped with electronics 
equipment for the purpose of beaming broadcasts into the Iron Curtain coun- 
tries ; approximately 90 men are required for the routine functioning of this 
ship; the ship is called Vagabond A. Similar equipment is now being installed 
In a second ship called Vagabond B. In the budget estimates for fiscal year 
1954 the State Department is requesting $3,714,000 to begin operation on a third 
such ship to be called Vagabond C. 

Vagabond A, the only such ship now in operation, is anchored at the island of 
Rhodes. This ship has 2 short-wave transmitters of 35 milliwatt-hour and one 
150-kiIowatt medium-wave transmitter. It broadcasts through antennas sup- 
ported in the air by a helium-filled balloon. I have been advised by a technician 
whose ability I have reason to believe is adequate that it is not possible with 
the present development of electronics to utilize the full power of the transmitting 
device with antennas such as this. In addition to this technical difficulty there 
is the obvious weakness of depending on such a device, namely, that the continuity 
of broadcasting cannot be maintained since the balloon is subject to the vagaries 
of stormy weather and high wind. 

In fact, I was advised that recently one of the balloons broke loose from the 
moorings and was lost ; I am advised also that the cost of a helium-filled balloon 
is approximately $15,000. 

I understand that the ship as it functions at the present time utilizes antennas 
located on the Island of Rhodes itself. Competent technicians in the field have 
said that it would be of definite advantage to have a mobile transmitter presuming 
the technical difficulties which would prevent effective service could be overcome, 
since it is more diflicult to jam signals coming from unknown and varied direc- 
tions. However, these advantages are conditioned upon overcoming such tech- 
nical difficulties. It seems that the primary difficulty is in the receiving 
antennas ; in order to have consistent reception it is necessary to have more 
than one antenna so that a signal fading on one antenna could be picked up on 
another. This could be accomplished on land but not on the ship at the present 
stage of electronics development. 

It appears, then, that if the receiving antennas must be located on land and 
if the transmitting antenna is far more effective if located on land then it would 
be much less expensive to have the whole operation based on a permanent site 
on land. 

The difficulty of transmitting a program without effective land-based antennas 
with the knowledge available in the scientific field now could be overcome by 
( 1 ) having a live broadcast from the ship ; this does not seem feasible since it 



would be more difficult, if not impossible, to carry the staff required for such an 
ojjeration on shipboard; (2) the practice of flying recordings to the ship from 
the nearest land operation ; this also seems impractical. 

As of a recent date the Voice of America broadcast from the Vapnbond A 
5 hours and 45 minutes per day. Of this 1% hours was a simultaneous relay of 
broadcasts received either from New York or from one of the relay stations 
abroad. Thirty minutes of the time was spent transmitting transcriptions and 
SVo hours was spent broadcasting "repeats." These "repeats" were programs 
previously received on their equipment and recorded on tape for rebroadcast by 
Vagabond A at a later time. 

While I do not have complete facts available and it is for that reason I am 
transmitting this information to you, it would appear that until the technical 
difficulties in connection with broadcasting from a ship are overcome that we 
do not actually have mobility in Vagabond A and it seems reasonable, therefore, 
that the Voice of America might perfect their original equipment before attempt- 
ing other experiments. 

In addition to these technical difficulties it has been alleged that it is contrary 
to provisions of international law to broadcast from the high seas for public 
consumption such as the Voice of America program envisages. 

With the information I have available it appears that we are being asked to 
appropriate almost $4 million for the construction of another "mobile" trans- 
mitter that is not mobile and I personally feel that no such appropriation should 
be approved by the Appropriations Committee until it can be adequately demon- 
strated that such a device will actually function. I further believe that the Voice 
of America should be required to furnish complete data on the cost of construct- 
ing and operating these exi)erimental units. 

AVith every good wish, I am, 

Sttles Bridges. 

Exhibit No. 60 

May 19, 1952. 
I — Mr. Reed Harris 
IBS— Foy D. Kohler 
Contract Administration for VOA Facilities Projects 

This is in reply to your memorandum of April 11, 1952, concerning the technical 
and auditing personnel at our construction project sites, with which I wholly 

I regret that the reply which I am obliged to make to your inquiry is not a 
happy one. This is another matter which founders on the divided responsi- 
bilities of IBS and NAO, my views on which have been well known but unheeded 
since August 24, 1950. On the whole, I feel fairly secure as respects engineering 
supervision of projects, with IBS staff engineers on the spot from the beginning 
of operations on all major projects : Jean Seymour on Vagabond and now as- 
signed to Baker East : Jesse Holland assigned to Baker West ; Charles Brannen 
on John, and Charles Smith on Jade, both under the direction of George Chapman 
in Manila ; Carl Finley and John Hall on Cast ; James Alley on Negate ; Victor 
Farrell for Curtain Antennae ; and William Brady standing by in London to take 
over Dog. In addition, the consultant firm of Francisco & Jacobus is controlling 
construction of the Curtain Antennae with an architectual engineer at each site ; 
and the firm "IT. S. Consultants", reporting to Chapman, is under contract to 
inspect and certify compliance with drawings at John and Jade. This has given 
us at least mininuuu technical coverage of every project and full all-around 
coverage of most. In a few locations our engineers are perhaps not ideally suited, 
however, on problems of site preparation and building construction, and should 
be supplemented in these fields. 

On the score of site audit from a fiscal and administrative point of view, the 
Department is wide open (except to the extent that our engineers have per- 
formed some of these functions, despite their lack of training or of responsibility 
and authority). To date only one accountant has been sent to any of the projects 
by NAO, namely, Otto Strohmenger, who was assigned on March 21, 1952, to 
Manila, from which point he is apparently expected to handle both John and 
Jade. Another accountant, Joseph Sanders, has been stationed in a rear echelon 
office in San Francisco since July 19.51. 

As we see the administration of CPFF contracts, it is essential that the fol- 
lowing types of personnel be provided : 


1. Project engineer 

Technical supervision of physical construction and electronic installation re- 
quires the services 6f at least one resident project engineer, together with such 
assistant project engineers as the size, scope, and complexity of the project makes 
necessary. His primary responsibility is to insure compliance with the terms of 
the contract insofar as technical construction and adherence to plans and speci- 
fications is concerned. 

2. Project accountants 

One or more project accountants are required at the site of construction with 
responsibility for a continuing audit of all claims before they are forwarded for 
payment. The duties include determination that claims documents are in proper 
form, that the work represented by them fall within the scope of the contract, 
and that all claims are authentic. He is responsible for protecting the Govern- 
ment's fiscal interest in the project, and should also maintain budgetary control 
and provide accounting reports needed in the management of the operation. 

3. Time checkers 

An essential element of any CPFF contracts includes a continuing site review 
of i)ersonal services claimed by the contractor. This involves determining that 
payroll charges are made only for individuals who are actually on the job, that the 
rates of pay provided are appropriate for the work the individuals are perform- 
ing, that overtime is properly approved and performed, that individuals are not 
included on the payroll who should be carried as overhead cost rather than 
project cost, and that the actual cash payments made are in accordance with the 
charges shown on the payroll itself. This type of activity is a continuing process 
throughout the life of the contract at the site of the actual construction. It can 
only be accomplished by a continuing inspection operation, involving a virtual 
patrol of the project, and physical presence at the paymaster's office on payday. 

4. Material checkers 

One or more material checkers (whose functions on smaller projects can be 
combined with those of time checkers) are required to assure the proper safe- 
guarding and disposition of equipment, supplies, and material delivered to the 
site. The material checker verifies through receiving reports the delivery of 
material for which billings are made by the contractor to the Government, super- 
vises the contractor's storage of material so as to avoid loss through theft or 
deterioration, and arranges for the proper disposal of surplus and excess material 
to the Government's advantage in accordance with established regulations. 

The functions described above obviously can be performed only at the project 
site. When tlie question was originally raised as to how we would administer 
our contracts back in 1950 and the early part of 1951, it was decided that NAO 
would assume these responsibilities, with the exception of the assignment of the 
project engineers which remained a responsibility of IBS. While I do not believe 
the specific functions were spelled out in as great detail as I have done above, 
there was no question as to the resjponsibility for these activities since items 2, 
3, and 4 pertain directly to the audit responsibility, and since NAO clearly was 
assigned the duties falling within these categories, as evidenced by the following : 

1. Memorandum from Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., to George Herrick dated February 
14, 1951 : 

"Reference is made to your memorandum of January 20, 1951, under the above 
subject (audit and administration of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts). Provisions 
are being made by the NAO within our staffing pattern to render the audit and 
administration of cost-plus-fixed-fee-contracts service." 

2. Excerpt from a memorandum from Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., to Mr. William 
Wright dated April 24, 1951 : 

"* * * DF and NAO are in agreement that, since NAO will be responsible for 
the administration of the contract, NAO should have primary operating audit 
responsibility and DF sliould function in its usual technical consultative and 
supervisory relationship to NAO * * *." 

3. Reports from the Embassy at Manila and other reports from our engineers 
have repeatedly called attention to the difficulties being encountered by the 
failure to supply needed auditing staff. 

4. On January 16, 1952, Mr. Herrick sent me the following memorandum con- 
cerning this problem. I think it important to quote this memorandum in its 
entirety : 

"I regret to inform you that the present auditing capabilities of NAO and OIB 
are not satisfactory for the successful completion of the construction program. 


"At the present time, I cannot properly service the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts 
and, therefore, am not cognizant of expenditures during the prosecution of the 

"I call to your attention that the Grove, Shepard, Wilson, & Kruge contract 
has been in existence since January 29, 1951, and as of this date we still do not 
have an auditor in the field representing NAO to pass on these vouchers. 

"The same condition applies to the various other construction pi'ojects under 
vpay, such as the curtain programs, Vac/ahond, etc. 

"We are placed in the highly improper position, in order to expedite matters, of 
primarily auditing these vouchers by members of our oven staff, who should not 
legally nor morally be involved in such activities since this is the sole function 
of the A area. 

"I also call to your attention that one of the most important tools of proper 
management and construction, which is continuous audit as differentiated from 
postaudit, is absolutely nonexistent. Continuous aiulit is necessary to maintain 
budget control of the contractors so that the end object of marriage of the project 
and the budget upon completion is successful. 

"As a result of these administrative conditions which face me and the respon- 
sibility which the Department and Congress has placed upon me, I hud my posi- 
tion intolerable. 

"This situation must be resolved as rapidly as possible, and until this situation 
is resolved I can only say I will do my best to carry out these projects within 
the confines established, but under the circumstances I cannot accept full and 
total responsibility for noncompliance." 

5. The following is the reply made by Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., on January 21 : 
"Reference is made to Mr. Herricli's memorandum of January 16, 1952, to Mr. 

Kohler regarding the subject indicated above. 

"Although we have been unsuccessful in assigning an auditor to the base of 
the operations of the Grove, Shephard, Wilson & Kruge contract, vouchers cover- 
ing the Manila operation have been audited and paid through our authorized 
representative in San P"'rancisco. Even that situation is expected to improve 
within the next week, for we are planning to send Mr. Sanders from San Fran- 
cisco to Manila and Mr. Baker from DF in Washington to relieve Mr. Sanders 
in San Francisco. Vouchers covering the Vagabond project are being audited 
and paid through the fiscal branch of NAO and the payments are currently 

"A study is being made as to the propriety and necessity of having an auditor 
on the premises of the Bethlehem Steel Co. full time to closely obsem^e thi? 
Vagabond operation. A decision in this regard will be reached immediately. 

"Our difficulty has been in obtaining FBI clearance for applicants and getting 
them on the job before some of the defense agencies pick them up on their pay- 
rolls. At the present time there is a great demand for the type of personnel who 
qualify for positions such as we must procure if our audit and accounting program 
is to be successful. We not only rely on our own Personnel Brancli to recruit 
for these positions, but we have also enlisted the aid of FP in Washington. A 
number of applicants are now under investigation and we hope we will soon have 
sufficient personnel to adequately fill vacancies which we expect to arise in the 
near future. 

"I am sorry that unfavorable conditions as suggested in Mr. Herrick's memo- 
randum have been unavoidable and I assure you that recruitment has been of 
most vital concern to us since the beginning of the construction program, and 
will continually be a matter of prime importance as the program proceeds." 
(Underscoring supplied.) 

6. In January 19.52, the New York administrative ofBce issued a manual on 
administrative audit procedures for cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. While this 
manual is a very helpful document, it does not fully cover the required types of 
procedures for handling these contracts, and it is somewhat untimely in terms 
of the fact that construction has been proceeding for a considerable period of 

As a result of the failure to supply the needed staff at the project sites, we 
have ben severely handicapped in several ways. Apart from the burden placed 
on the engineers to certify as to receipt of materials and other billings for service 
rendered which he is obviou.sly not equipped to do by training or experience, it 
has interfered with the real purpose for which his assignment to the project is 
made. In addition, we are placed in the untenable position of not auditing and 
controlling our operations in the proper manner. We are not able to tell where 
we stand financially on our various construction projects, and must rely on the 



^contractor to provide information as to expenditures. This has proved wholly 
inadequate even for our needs and, of course, is downright dangerous to the 
Government's financial interests. 

This entire problem was reviewed in some detail on May 13 when Mr. Kimball 
visited us in New York. As a result of his visit, it has been decided to assign 
Alva Meyers and Robert Francis the job of developing as soon as possible recom- 
mendations for remedial action. The assignment has been broadened to include 
the whole problem of contract administration, including procurement matters. 
I expect that their report will be available within the week and that we will 
then be in a position to make a decision on what is to be done. I think it is fair 
to assume that we will immediately require a number of auditors and other per- 
sonnel to be asigned to the project sites. In this connection, we will require 
everyone's help in locating qualified and cleared personnel and in expediting their 
transfers to the field. 

I repeat that I am unhappy to have to give you this report. I am sure that 
there are extenuating circumstances on the side of NAO, including recruiting 
diflBculties. I personally regard the system as the basic fault and have long 
hoped that this could be rationalized before an inevitable crisis arose, involving 
personalities. But the facts remain that necessary functions have not been 
i)erformed; that the resultant situation is serious (including the question of 
costs of Vagabond, John, and Jade) ; and that we must all cooperate in finding a 
prompt and workable solution. 

I have discussed this matter in general terms with Dr. Compton and request 
that this memo be brought to his attention. 

cc : IMA — Mr. Kimball 
IBS/L— Mr. Micocci 
IBS— Mr. G. Herrick 
IBS — Mr. J. Thompson 
IBS— Mr. R. Francis 
NAO — Mr. Meyers 

Note. — Copy circulated to rest of EB 


September 8, 1950. 
To : George Q. Herrick. 
From : Lewis J. McKesson. 
Subject : Trip report. United States Navy, August 6, 1950, re Megowatt shipboard 

Re : Mr. Seymour's memo August 18, 1950. 

The subject matter was discussed at length with the following officers in Cap- 
tain Beltz's and Captain Engulund's offices on August 6, 1950 : 
Capt. W. H. Beltz, code 800, electronics. 
Capt. W. Pryor, code 801, electronics. 
Capt. Engulund, code 460, ship conversions. 
Comdr. Andrews, code 950B, electronics. 
I furnished a brief description of the transmitter, giving cubic contents, weight, 
power requirements, etc. Various type ships which might be suitable for the 
conversion were considered and the following data was obtained : 

Tankers. — The type T2 are now all in active service in either maritime or 
Navy use. During the war two ships were converted to fresh-water distilling 
ships and these now are in the naval reserve fleet. The electrical data of these 
ships with electric drive are : 







T2-SE-A1 -- 



3/62/ cycles.- 

2 X 400 KW-440VAC. 

T2-ST-A1 (Navy AV) Distilling ships 

3/62/ cycles 

2 X 400 KW-440VAC. 


3/50 cycles .- 

Some nonelectric ships of the T2-A and T3 class are inactive in the naval 
reserve fleet. 


No Liberty ships (G2 hulls) have electric drive, although a large number of 
these are available through either the Navy or Maritme Commission. 

The general opinion of the officers was that there vpould be little difference 
in cost or time in converting the various types of ships to operate the megawatt 
transmitter. The size and space requirements of diesel units and large trans- 
formers did not seem to cause any concern to Captain Engulund. 

The Navy has a conversion (nonradio) in a Liberty ship where the power 
required and equipment are comparable to our job. The only cost estimate 
of conversion I could get was somewhere between $3 million and $6 million 
(includes electronics). 

Cost of operation for a Liberty ship was obtained from Commander Andrews 
as follows : 

Per day 

Operating supplies (consumable) $103 

Port charges (auxiliary, fuel, and power) 127 

Fuel 583 

Lubricating oil 12 

Maintenance and repair, including annual overhaul, spare parts, etc 347 

Miscellaneous services (pilots, etc.) 55 

Total 1,227 

Personnel, 60 civilians : 834 

Subsistence 90 

Total average operating of Liberty ship : 

Per da.y 2, 151 

Per year 766, 865 

To the above add the following radio expenses : 

Director 1 

Chief engineer 1 

Supervisors 3^ 

Senior engineers 14 

Junior engineers 12 

Captive balloonist 1 

Administrative officer 1 

Medical corpsman 1 

Secretary 1 

Total 35 

Salaries $169,820 

Allowances 124,358 

Subsistence 19,162 

$313, 34a 

Tube costs 48, 261 

Transmitter maintenance costs (balloonist cost, etc.) 16,100 

Miscellaneous ti-ansportation of radio personnel on leave, sick- 
ness, etc 10, 000 

Total operating cost 1, 154, 566 

Mr. Harmon's estimate of the operation of a shore-based megowatt transmitter 
including two 35-kilowatt shortwave transmitters is $946,937. 

The above ship estimate is based on the assumption that the daily cost will be 
approximately the same whether under way or stationary. Stationary operation 
is based on 24-hour operation. 

The possibility of using an escort carrier (CVB Tfotser class) was investigated. 
Essentially no conversion costs would be involved and all equipment could be 
Installed on the hangar deck. Deck mounting appears practical for all units 
Including three 1,240-kilowatt diesel units. Some of these ships have electric 
drive, but do have steam capacity to drive turbo-generators. Mr. Walker i» 
investigating this in lieu of diesel units. All OVE carriers are in reserve status 
so that it might not be difficult to divert one or more. 

The antenna problem had been referred to H. R. L. whose preliminary verbal 
reports were quite negative. However, Mr. Seymour's and my preliminary data 
looks quite practical and this will be worked up as soon as possible. 


Captains Beltz and Englund suggested that if this work is to be carried further, 
it will be necessary for them to have a directive from the Cliief of Naval Opera- 
tions. They suggested that an initial "study directive" be initiated and then 
a number of men would be assigned to work on details upon which firm recom- 
mendations could be made. 

cc : Messrs. Charles Pease 
Julius Ross 
William Harmon 
Jean Seymour (Munich). 



Alley, , James 770 

American Boardcasting Co 731 

Andrews, Ck)mmander 773, 774 

Baker, Mr 772 

Beltz, Capt. W. H 773,775 

Bethlehem Steel Co 688,699,772: 

Bowles, Ambassador Chester 743, 744, 745, 746, 753 

Brady, William 770^ 

Brannen, Charles 770 

British Broadcasting Co 747, 748, 749, 750, 755, 764 

Browder, Earl 711 

Chapman, George 770' 

Compton, Dr. Wilson S 760,761 

Connors, W. Bradley 754 

Dooher, Gerald F. P. 

Testimony of 745-768 

Elsenhower, Dwight 696 

Engulund, .jCaptain 778, 774, 775 

Farrell, Victor 770 

Ferrick, George Q 77^ 

Finley, Carl 770- 

Francis, Robert 773 

Francisco & Jacobus Co 721, 722, 724, 726, 770^ 

Ghosh, Dr. Stanley S 752, 753, 761, 765, 766, 767 

Testimony of 741-751 

Gillett, Mr 694 

Grove, Shepard, Wilson, & Kruge contract 772 

Hall, John 770 

Harmon, Mr 774 

Harmon, William 775 

Harris, Reed 695, 696, 770 

Herrlck, George 685, 686, 698, 723, 724 728, 771, 772, 773 

Hlavaty, Dr. Julius H. 

Testimony of 676-683, 702-718 

Hlavaty, Mrs. Julius H 707 

Holland, Jesse 770 

Johnson, Dr 675, 696, 697, 763, 767 

Johnstone, Dr. William, Jr 753, 755, 757, 759, 761 

Joyce, Mr . 764 

Kaplan, Mr 698 

Kimball, Mr 773 

Kohler, Foy D 695, 770, 772 

Kretzmann, Mr 754 

L., H. R 774 

Leahy, John 675, 741 

Macaulay .  716 

McKesson, Lewis J 773 

Testimony of 684-697 

McLeod, Mr 741 

Myers, Alva, Jr 771, 772, 773 

Micocci, Mr 773 

Nagiiib, General 765 

National Broadcasting Co . 731, 733 

Pease, Charles 775 

Pratt, Mr 696 

Pryor, Capt. W 773 



Puhan, Mr 763 

Rhee, Syngmaun 749, 766 

Rhoades Co 687, 688, 699 

Richmond, Read Adm. Alfred C 692 

Testimony of 697-702 

Ross, Julius 775 

Sanders, Joseph 770, 772 

Sarnoff, General 694 

Seymour, Mr 773, 774 

Seymour, Jean 770, 775 

Shapiro, Ralph 676, 680, 702, 706, 707, 708 

Smith, Charles 770 

Stalin. Joseph V 767 

Strohmenger, Otto 770 

Taft, Senator Robert A 713 

Thompson, Mr. J 773 

Todd Shipbuilding Co 688 

Veldhuis, A. C 702 

Testimony of 719-739 

Walker, Mr 698, 774 

Welden & Carr(firm) 721 

Wev, Captain 699, 700, 701 

Wind Turbine Co 719, 720, 721, 726, 737 

Winn, Mrs 710 

Wright, WiUiam 771 




3 9999 05445 3459 

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