The state in peace and war

,

THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

fUBUSHEL) BY

JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS, GLASGOW

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MCMXIX

THE STATE IN PEACE
AND WAR

BY

JOHN WATSON, LL.D., Lrrr.D., D.D.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN QUEEN S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, CANADA

GLASGOW
JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS

PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY

GLASGOW : PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY ROBERT MACLEMOSE AND CO. LTD.

DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF

EDWARD CAIRD

LATE MASTER OK BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

PREFACE

IN the following pages an attempt has been made to follow
the evolution of political ideas from the origin of the City-
State to the rise of the modern Nation-State, and to give
a concise statement of what seems to me to be the true
principle of the latter. I have attempted to guard this
principle from misconception, and specially to indicate
the intimate relation of the State to the various
subordinate organisations which it includes and which
are essential to its perfection, as well as its relation
to foreign states and to the world at large. To this
has been added a short statement of the regulations
of civilised warfare, a reference to the character of the
British Empire, and a consideration of the proposals for
a League of Nations. I have in the main avoided all
reference to the present war, contenting myself with
indicating the opposing conceptions of England and Ger-
many. It may appear that I have gone a long way round,
but perhaps this is a case in which " the longest way
round is the shortest way home."

The development of political theory from the funda-
mental idea of Plato and Aristotle that the State exists
for the production of the best life, through the long and
troubled period of the Roman Empire and the Middle
Ages, is a continuous development, in which one element
after another obtains prominence, until we reach the period
of the modern Nation-State, in which the ideas of check

viii PREFACE

and balance, of a law of nature, of absolute sovereignty,
of contract and utility, form stepping stones to the clear
and simple conception of the State as existing for the
establishment of the external conditions under which the
highest human life may be carried on.

Corresponding generally to the order of treatment in
this volume, a List of References to books and articles
that I have found more or less valuable will be found at
the end of the volume. On the whole I owe most to Green's
Principles of Political Obligation, Mr. Bosanquet's Philo-
sophical Theory of the State and other writings, Edward
Caird's Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers
and his Critical Philosophy of Kant, and D. G. Ritchie's
Natural Rights. In the historical section I have derived
much advantage from Professor Dunning 's History of
Political Theories, supplemented by Professor Coker's
Readings in Political Philosophy.

Perhaps I should add that the text of this work was
prepared for publication before the conclusion of the
Armistice.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, CANADA,
March, 1919.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER FIRST
THE CITY-STATE

PAGE

PERICLES' FUNERAL ORATION - r

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY - 3

THE SOPHISTS - . - 4

SOCRATES - - 5

THE CYNICS 6

THE CYRENAICS - 7

PLATO :

The Apology - 8

The Crito - ..... 9

The Protagoras 10

The Meno - X2

The Euthydemus - 13

The Gorgias .... I4

The Republic- - - . Z6

CRITICAL ESTIMATE 28

CHAPTER SECOND

THE CITY-STATE— Continued

ARISTOTLE :

Relation to Plato - 33

Natural Conditions of the State - - - - 33

The Family and the State 35

Slavery 38

Property 39

Criticism of Plato's Communism - - 40-

Citizenship - . . .

Education -----..__

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE CITY-STATE - - - - 46-

ix

x CONTENTS

CHAPTER THIRD

THE WORLD-STATE, THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND
THE MIDDLE AGES

PAGE

THE STOICS AND EPICUREANS 53

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 57 '

Polybius ... 57

Cicero 59

THE ROMAN EMPIRE - 61 '

Ulpian - 62

The Institutes of Justinian - - 63

The Christian Fathers - - - 63 ,

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE - - - 64

Political Theories of the Ninth Century - 65 "^

FEUDALISM AND SCHOLASTICISM - - 66 -"^

Social Contract Theories 68 ^

The State and the Communes 69

St. Bernard - - - 70

John of Salisbury - 70

Thomas Aquinas - - - 71

Jurists of the Fourteenth Century - 72

Dante's De Monarchia - - - 73

Marsiglio of Padua 76

Decay of Feudalism and Rise of the Towns 79

Wycliffe and Huss 80

CHAPTER FOURTH

THEORIES OF THE STATE FROM MACHIAVELLI

TO GROTIUS
THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION :

Machiavelli : II Principe and Discorsi - 81

Luther : Liberty of a Christian Man - 88

Bodin : De Republica - 88

Grotius : De lure Belli ac Pads ... - 89

CHAPTER FIFTH

THE NATION-STATE : HOBBES, SPINOZA AND LOCKE

HOBBES : Leviathan • - - - - 91 '

SPINOZA : Tractatus Politicus and Tractatus Theologico-

Politicus - - - 92

LOCKE : Treatise of Civil Government - - 102 "

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER SIXTH

THE NATION- ST ATE— Continued : ROUSSEAU, KANT
AND HEGEL

HAGE

ROUSSEAU : Contrat Social - - - 104

KANT: Die Rechtslehre 112

HEGEL : Die Philosophic des Rechts - - - - 127

CHAPTER SEVENTH

THE NATION-STATE— Continued : BENTHAM, JAMES AND
JOHN STUART MILL AND HERBERT SPENCER

BENTHAM - - 147

JAMES MILL - 150

JOHN STUART MILL - 151

HERBERT SPENCER - 159

CHAPTER EIGHTH

THE NATION- ST ATE— Continued : NIETZSCHE,
HAECKEL AND TREITSCHKE

HEGEL AND TREITSCHKE 164

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL UNITY IN GERMANY 168

HAECKEL' s MATERIALISM - - 1 70

NIETZSCHE AND BERNHARDI - 171

TREITSCHKE'S Politik - 172

CHAPTER NINTH
ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN STATE

THE LAW OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION ILLUSTRATED FROM

ATHENS AND ROME ... - - 184

SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION - 186

DEFECTS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 194'

RELATION OF THE STATE TO SUBORDINATE ORGANISATIONS 197'

THE STATE AND THE FAMILY - 198

THE STATE AND THE TRADE UNION - 199

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH - - 199

THE STATE AND THE COMMUNITY 202

THE STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT - - 208,

INDIVIDUALISM AND IDEALISM - 212

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - 216

THE MORALITY OF THE STATE - - - • - 217

xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER TENTH
SYSTEM OF RIGHTS

PAGE

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS - ... 222 -

WALLAS' VIEW OF POLITICS - - 224

THE RIGHT TO LIFE - ... ... 230 ""

THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 231 ^

RIGHTS OF CONTRACT 232 -

THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION - - 232-^

RIGHT TO EQUALITY - 233

THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY - 234

SOCIALISM 235

KANT'S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT - - 242""

DURKHEIM'S THEORY -------- 243

CHAPTER ELEVENTH
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PEACE AND WAR

THE STATE AS AN ORGAN OF HUMANITY - - - 247

WAR NOT INEVITABLE 249^

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS ON WAR - 250 -

KANT'S Essay on Perpetual Peace - - 252 •

TREATIES, CONFERENCES AND CONGRESSES - 253

THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 256 -

AMERICAN " LEAGUE OF PEACE " AND BRITISH " LEAGUE

OF NATIONS --------- 257—

TRUE PATRIOTISM ____-__- 260

MR. A. C. BRADLEY'S DIFFICULTIES IN REGARD TO FEDERATION 263
SIR JOHN MACDONNELL'S STATEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS

OF FEDERATION 264^

THEORY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER DISCREDITED - - 266 "

VISCOUNT GREY ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ... 268 "

BOYCOTT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE LEAGUE ... 2jo

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND ITS MISSION - - - 270

GREEK WRITERS ON WAR - 277^

RULES IN REGARD TO COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS - 279

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND EDUCATION - 285-

THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

CHAPTER FIRST

THE CITY-STATE: THE SOPHISTS,
SOCRATES AND PLATO

IN the funeral oration preserved for us, in substance at
least, by Thucydides, Pericles claims for the City-State two
main excellences : it is pervaded by a single mind, and
it allows free play to the capacities of the individual.
Speaking of the Athenians who fell in the first year of the
war between Athens and Sparta he says : 1 " Before I
praise the dead I should like to point out by what prin-
ciples of action we rose to power, and under what institu-
tions and through what manner of life our empire became
great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not un-
suited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly
of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them.
" Our form of Government does not enter into rivalry
with the institutions of others. We do not copy our
neighbours, but we are an example to them. It is true
that we are called a democracy, for the administration
is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But
while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their
private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recog-
nised ; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished,

1 Jowett's Thucydides, ii. 35 ff.
W.S. A

2 THE STATErJN PEACE AND WAR

he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of
privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty
a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the
obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in
our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not
suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour
if he does what he likes ; we do not put on sour looks at
him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While
we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a
spirit of reverence pervades our public acts ; we are pre-
vented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for
the laws, having an especial regard to those which are
ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to
those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor
of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.

" We are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our
tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manli-
ness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation,
but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty
with us is no disgrace ; the true disgrace is doing nothing
to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the
State because he takes care of his own household ; and
even those of us who are engaged in business have a very
fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes
no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a
useless character ; and if few of us are originators, we are
all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to
action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that
knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to
action. ... To sum up : I say that Athens is the school of
Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person
seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most
varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace."

The problem of uniting public authority with individual

THE CITY-STATE 3

freedom, which Pericles claims that Athens had solved,
is the problem with which Plato and Aristotle are con-
cerned. The State must enable its citizens, they thought,
to realise the true, the beautiful and the good, and to do
so without derogating from the freedom and independ-
ence of the individual.

When Greek thought emerged from the stage of custom
and tradition it first fixed its attention upon the external
world, seeking to explain the life and movement of the All.
In its search for a single principle it came upon the idea
that underlying all change is an unchanging substrate,
and this principle it sought to apply in explanation of the
life of man as well as the life of nature. The Pythago-
reans reduced the physical elements to numbers, and this
principle they applied in explanation of the world of man's
conduct. Justice they declared to be a square number,
the State being just when it displays an equality of parts.
To act justly is to take from him who has more than his
share and give to him who has less. In Heraclitus, again,
we have an application of the law of the world to the law
of the State. It is, however, only when we turn to Athens
of the fifth century that we find any definite political theory.
Nature was conceived as a teleological scheme, and thus
the transition was made from physics to politics. No
longer was the same law supposed to apply both to
physical nature and to man, and when man was com-
pared to nature it was expressly by way of analogy, not
of identity. As there is order in the great cosmos, so, it
was argued, there must be onjer in that smaller cosmos,
the State. With the SOPHISTS, however, we find ourselves
in a new atmosphere. It is not the State but the indi-
vidual upon whom they fix their attention. " Nature " is
now expressly opposed to " convention." How did this
change come about ?

4 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

The old idea of the immemorial origin of customary
laws was undermined by the process of history. Colon-
isation, by its formation of new states with new laws, and
reflection on the variety of customs in different tribes
and peoples, seemed to make it doubtful if there was any
absolute law in regard to human affairs. The Persian
wars gave an impulse to freedom of thought by increasing
both national and individual self-consciousness, a self-
consciousness which first appears in the philosophy of
Protagoras and of Gorgias. Protagoras transferred his
gaze from external nature to man, and declared that
" man is the measure of all things," while Gorgias claimed
that as a knowledge of nature is impossible, we ought
to concentrate our attention on human affairs. It is man,
subsequent Sophists went on to say, who in his own
interest establishes the State and human institutions
generally. This point being reached, it was inevitable
that it should be inferred that laws and institutions exist,
not by nature, but only by convention. This meant
that customary moral ideas are not divine ordinances,
as an earlier age had held, but on the contrary are dis-
tinctly opposed to the ideal code of morality. The source
of law, it was held by the Sophists, is really the desire
for the pleasure and satisfaction of the individual.
" Justice is the interest of the stronger."

The political theory which this individualism produced
was that of a social contract. The State, it was thought,
arose when men saw that it was to their individual interest
to surrender their purely selfish interests in order the better
to secure them. They believed that by combining with
one another and giving up their immediate satisfactions
they would in the end gain more for themselves. There-
fore they formed a contract, giving up their freedom in
return for the protection and preservation of their lives.

THE SOPHISTS 5

Another and more extreme form of the theory held that
the State was an expedient by which the weaker got the
better of the stronger. This, it was said, inverts the true
order of things, in which the strong by virtue of their
strength have the greatest right to the best.

This theory of all being conventional was applied also
in the sphere of religion. The first gods worshipped, said
Prodicus, were personifications of the forces of nature,
and according to Critias they were inventions of men for
the better security of social life. The Sophist Alcidamas
declared that by nature no man was a slave, and that all
distinctions of high and low were purely conventional.
Even the institutions of the family and private property
were attacked, and the communism afterwards suggested
by Plato, which gave to women the same work and the
same privileges as to men, seems to have been already
anticipated. Not all Sophists, however, took such ex-
treme views. Prodicus was a preacher of ethics, and
Protagoras, as Plato tells us, believed that, while men
gathered themselves together in cities for self-preservation,
yet law and order were of divine regulation.

A truer theory emerged with SOCRATES, who sought to
substitute self-knowledge for the self-assertion of the
Sophists. He taught men to discipline themselves instead
of following their natural impulses, and therefore he in-
sisted upon the necessity of a definite knowledge of the
nature of moral rules. For this reason he demanded that
men should not only act morally but should have a clear
conception of why they so acted. Hence his demand for
definitions. That which a man has clearly defined to
himself becomes a definite principle of action. In this
sense he declared that " virtue is knowledge." He made
no attempt to impose new rules of conduct upon men ;
on the contrary he claimed that we have only to make

6 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

explicit the rules by which men are accustomed to act
to see that morality is universally binding upon men.
When this is done it will be found that all moral rules
subserve a single end, the end of happiness or well-being.
It was with the object of making men conscious of their
ignorance, and so leading them to see the necessity of clear
definitions, that he practised the art of interrogation.
Every man who worked at a trade knew precisely why he
did certain things, and yet people go on contentedly,
he said, in ignorance of the true meaning of life. So-
crates therefore sought to arouse men from this fatal
state of inertia, and to make of moral or political affairs
a " profession " in the noblest sense of the word. He
therefore inculcated the necessity of an art of life. Who
would trust a pilot who could not distinguish the Pole-
star from Venus, who was ignorant of the currents, and
did not know how his ship would answer the helm ? And
yet men are content to remain in ignorance of the ship
of State. To remedy this state of things Socrates laboured
incessantly, and ultimately lost his life in pursuit of what
Plato calls his " mission."

Applying his principle that " virtue is knowledge,"
Socrates advocated an aristocracy of intelligence. He
had no love for a sovereign assembly in which men sat
who had never given a thought to the meaning of politics.
There was therefore a certain amount of truth in the charge
that he was not a friend of the Athenian democracy. That
he was a corrupter of the minds of the youth was a charge
entirely unjust — except in the sense that a fundamental
criticism of traditional ideas is always disturbing — for
his conception of the ruler was of one who acted only in
the best interests of the people.

The CYNICS, while claiming to be followers of Socrates,
really misinterpreted his doctrine that virtue is know-

SOCRATES 7

ledge. The wise man, they said, is sufficient for himself.
They revolted against the whole of society, affirming that
one man is as good as another, and one country as good
as another. " Why should I be proud of belonging to
Attic soil with worms and snails ? " If, they argued,
Virtue is knowledge, external things, so far from being a
help, are only hindrances to the proper life of man. The
only citizenship the Cynic acknowledged was the citizen-
ship of the world ; which was no citizenship. Thus he
destroyed the whole conception of the City-State, and the
world was unprepared for any wider form of society. His
ideal of life was that of the animals, who have no cities,
laws or artificial institutions. Diogenes, indeed, held that
there must be law, but it must be in a World-State in
which all are equal.

The CYRENAICS, who alsq claimed to be the true dis-
ciples of Socrates, were, like the Cynics, individualists.
Virtue is indeed knowledge, but knowledge shows us that
what man seeks is pleasure. The State was therefore
regarded as a superfluity. Law they regarded as a mere
convention ; things are right or wrong by convention,
not by nature. They admitted, however, that a man
might find pleasure in seeking the good of his friend or of
his country. Thus Individualistic Hedonism, as always,
passed into Utilitarianism. The Cyrenaics, however,
added that general welfare was the welfare of the world,
not that of the City-State. This simply emptied the idea
of all content, leaving the individual alone with his desires.
No doubt the ultimate ideal is the good of all, but it must
be secured by the good of the State in the first instance.
In point of fact the Cyrenaics were partly the expression
of the decay of the City-State, and partly helped to bring
it about.

The true follower of Socrates was PLATO, who develops

8 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

supplements and corrects the one-sidedness of his master.
Starting from the thesis that " virtue is knowledge,"
he illustrates its application in his earlier dialogues, and
then finding it too narrow he expands it until it embraces
all forms of being and all life and action.
, The Apology, though it deals primarily with the life and
id£ath of Socrates, is indirectly a discussion of the problem
'^-^-ilow far the individual is under obligation to obey the law
•j of the State. This problem had already been presented
' in the Antigone of Sophocles, in which the heroine is repre-
sented as refusing to obey the command of Creon to leave
her brother unburied, on the ground that there are " un-
written laws of heaven " which have precedence over the
decrees of an earthly ruler. Socrates, suspected of being
the head of an aristocratic coterie, was accused of cor-
rupting the minds of the youth and disbelieving in the
gods of his country. The problem raised by these charges
is one of perennial interest, being substantially the same
as that with which Luther was confronted in a later age.
To cast doubt upon the customary ideas on which the laws
of the State are based must introduce unrest and uneasi-
ness into the mind of the average man, accustomed as he
is to regard the ordinary customs and laws of society as
revelations from heaven. On the other hand, in the mind
of the intellectual, moral, or religious reformer there exists
an ideal which goes beyond anything embodied in actual
law, and he who is true to the light within him is impelled
to express himself whatever be the consequences. The
work of Socrates was mainly and directly that of the intel-
lectual reformer who insists upon questioning accepted
ideas and forcing men to ask what were the principles
upon which they were accustomed to act. When there-
fore he was confronted with the alternative, Death or
Silence, his answer was the answer of Antigone and

PLATO 9

Luther : " This is the command of God. Acquit me or
condemn me, I shall never alter my ways," or, in Luther's
phrase, " Ich kann nicht anders." This then is Plato's
answer to the question how far the State may rightly
demand implicit obedience to its express commands.
No State may rightly prevent the development of the
individual by force, and if a man is conscious of pos-
sessing in himself at least the germ of higher truth, he must
obey the " inner light " whatever be the consequences.
There is, however, another side of the question. In the
Crito Socrates is represented as tempted to escape from the
prison in which he lies awaiting death. Will he again
disobey the law and so save his life, or will he submit to
what he must regard as an unjust sentence ? This is not
the same problem as before. There the question was
whether it is permissible to act contrary to a higher law,
and so violate one's conscience ; here the alternative is
disobedience of the law for a personal end. Socrates
does not for a moment hesitate ; he will do nothing to
weaken or destroy the sanctity of the State, so long as
no question of obedience to a higher law is at stake. No
individual may oppose his own inclinations to the will
of the State even when he believes that what it commands
is unjust. We must remember, says Plato, that the
individual is the child of society, and, while it is right to
affirm oneself in obedience to a higher law, it can never
be right to turn against our " maker " for personal reasons.
Moreover, not only does the individual owe obedience to
the State out of gratitude for the training he has received
from it, but he has entered into an implicit covenant to
obey its laws. When a man has reached the years of dis-
cretion he is at liberty to emigrate to another state, but if
he elects to remain in his own, he gives a tacit consent to
submit to its authority. Plato does not mean that society

io THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

is based upon a contract of individuals, for in that case
the contract might be dissolved ; what he means is that
in anyxwell organised State the recognition of the indivi-
dual's rights involves an obligation on his part to submit
to its ordinances. The burden of these two dialogues
t then is : Disobey the law when a higher impersonal
\ law would otherwise be violated ; obey the law where
* only one's own individual interest will be adversely
affected.

The justification for the attitude of Socrates towards
the customary laws of his country lay in his contention
that morality depends upon customary ideas being raised
into clear self-consciousness, while this again involves
the assertion that morality is a thing that can be taught.
To prove this latter proposition is the main object of
Plato's Protagoras. In this dialogue it is suggested that
the Socratic thesis, " Virtue is knowledge," may be defended
on the ground that the good is the same thing as the
pleasant. This is the doctrine afterwards known as
Psychological Hedonism. Whatever be the special object
in which men believe their good to consist, the real and
ultimate object, it may be said, is pleasure, the imme-
diate object being valued purely for the pleasure it is
expected to bring with it. The distinction between the
virtuous and the vicious man is therefore resolved into
knowledge or ignorance of the objects which are fitted to
bring pleasure. In order that we may act virtuously
the essential thing is to construct a calculus of pleasures,
by means of which we shall be saved from following the
chance suggestions of the moment. As no one would de-
liberately choose a less in preference to a greater pleasure,
the man in possession of such a calculus will, it is argued,
inevitably act virtuously, that is, will act in accordance
with what will bring the greatest pleasure in life as a whole.

PLATO ii

In this very dialogue, however, Plato puts a very dif-
ferent view before us, which he expresses through the mouth
of the Sophist Protagoras. This view contends for the
substantial soundness of ordinary morality, as based on
the common sense of men. Protagoras sets forth his
conception of life in an apologue, in which man is repre-
sented as in his original state the most helpless of all the
animals. In the state of nature men, even when endowed
with the arts of life, are represented by him as involved
in a continual struggle for existence, and as in danger of
being destroyed by the lower animals. But Zeus sent
forth Hermes to them bearing reverence and justice (aiSw
and diKr]) to be the ordering principles of cities and the
bonds of friendship and conciliation. Thus civiJ society
is really a gift from heaven, not something which depends
upon the special talent or energy of favoured individuals.
For " cities," says Protagoras, " cannot subsist if a few
only share in the virtues, as a few only have capacity for
a special art." It is for this reason that all the citizens
are competent to speak on questions affecting the common
weal. In this region all the citizens are teachers of all.
Morality is developed by the ordinary social training of
the family and the school, and by the rewards and punish-
ments which society bestows or inflicts upon its members.
No scientific process of reflection such as Socrates de-
manded is required, but there naturally grows up a
common feeling of what is right and what is wrong by the
action of many minds upon one another. Why does the
State inflict punishment upon evil doers if not to deter
the criminal and others from wrong doing ? This clearly
implies that virtue can be taught.

Plato cannot be said to endorse either of these views
without reservation. He has begun to see that custom-
ary morality is something more than ignorance, and does

12 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

not depend upon philosophic discussion, though such
discussion may be required to bring its content clearly
before the mind and free it from inconsistency. On the
other hand he was not prepared to admit that the demand
for a reasoned knowledge of the principles on which
morality is based was altogether false. The doctrine
to which he was feeling his way was that in the uncritical
judgments of common opinion we have the first form
of that consciousness of the good which it is the business
of philosophy to analyse and develop. Thus between
ignorance and knowledge, as he has begun to see, there is
a third term — afterwards distinguished as " opinion "
($6j~a) — partaking of the nature of both, but identical with
neither. For perfect virtue, indeed, scientific know-
ledge is indispensable ; virtue is one, and its oneness can
only be discerned by systematic reflection ; but it is none
the less true that without " opinion " there would be
nothing from which this systematic knowledge could be
developed.

This doctrine is stated in the Meno, a dialogue which on
linguistic and other grounds we may confidently assign
to the same period as the Protagoras. Knowledge, it is
said, may be called rather remembering than learning
anew. In a previous state of existence, as Plato mythi-
cally puts it, the soul was in possession of truth, which has
been temporarily lost by the shock of birth. Knowledge
is therefore recovering what in an obscure way it already
possesses. Thus the transition from the unreflective
to the reflective consciousness, from opinion to knowledge
proper, consists in the recognition of what was present
in an intuitive form. This transition, however, is not a
mere restatement of truth already present in the unre-
flective consciousness, but a grasp of the particular pro-
position as part of a connected system of ideas. Thus

PLATO 13

we can understand how an act may rightly be regarded as
just or temperate or courageous, though the individual
who makes the judgment may be quite unable to define
justice, temperance or courage. In our ordinary moral
judgments there is really, though not explicitly, a union of
the universal principle and the particular instance ; and
what reflection does is not to introduce a new principle,
but only to lift the principle involved in the particular
judgment into the light of clear and explicit conscious-
ness, and thus to show why it had been regarded as good.
If it is asked why we should not be satisfied with our
ordinary moral judgments, Plato answers that, so long as
the principle which guides our action and justifies it is
not clearly grasped, there is always a danger that we may
fall into confusion and pronounce to be good that which
is not really good. This is the weakness of all purely
instinctive action, which is apt to fail us just at the critical
moment. Only a reasoned knowledge, illuminated by a
principle clearly grasped, will meet all the demands of life,
and only such knowledge can be communicated to others.
It is for want of this reasoned knowledge that good states-
men cannot transmit their gifts to their sons. They have
never themselves gone beyond the stage of " right
opinion," and right opinion, like divination in the sphere
of religion, cannot be communicated from one to another.
If virtue in its perfect form can only be reached by
a complete and scientific education, the true statesman
must be one who in the government of the State has a
clear knowledge of the principles of statesmanship.
This is the substance of the Euthydemus. The great
object of the statesman who possesses the true know-
ledge of statesmanship is to communicate the knowledge
he himself possesses to the citizens. All other results
— wealth, freedom, tranquillity, — are in themselves neither

14 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

good nor bad ; political science ought to make men wise
and good. Only those who have a real knowledge of the
art of politics have a right to be heard. Wisdom must
govern, and wisdom is not to be found in every unedu-
cated workman who imagines that his crude opinions
are of as much value as those of the highly educated states-
man. There must therefore be a special class who have
charge of affairs of State. The notion of Protagoras that
every citizen is equal to every other in political insight
cannot be entertained. It is true that even the ordinary
citizen has or may have " right opinions " on political
matters, but equally he may not ; and we cannot commit
the State to the chance direction of those who are just
as likely to be wrong as right. Thus Plato once for all
commits himself to the doctrine afterwards elaborated
in the Republic, that only the enlightened or philosophic
statesman has a right to be heard in regard to matters of
State.

In another dialogue, the Gorgias, Plato goes on to recon-
struct ethics on the basis of the general principle already
enunciated, the principle that a knowledge of the essence
of moral ideas is the only guarantee of the wise government
of the State. The distinction between opinion and know-
ledge he illustrates by showing how rhetoric, even when
it advocates what is false, comes to have its persuasive
power over the uneducated mind. Its influence rests upon
a confusion between that which seems and that which is.
No man ever really wills evil, though he may think he does ;
for nothing is ever done by a human being except sub
ratione boni — under the notion that it is good. In per-
forming particular acts men are really in search of the
good, and the immediate objects of their desire are valued
only as a means to this end. The true statesman will
therefore seek to keep the desires in proper subordination

PLATO 15

to the whole, and when he finds the soul in a diseased
state he will be ready to chastise and mortify it until the
desire which is in excess has been reduced to Jits proper
proportions. It is in truth a greater evil to do than to
suffer injustice, and if any one has acted unjustly he ought
to desire to be punished for it. He who escapes from
punishment will persist in his evil course, contrary to his
own real will, while he who suffers punishment for wrong
doing may be liberated from the evil, and thus attain to
what he really wills. In seeking to determine how to act,
we must start from the whole or the Good, and it is by
reference to this standard that actions are to be judged,
not by their tendency to give satisfaction to a particular
desire. Just as a living being is not a mere sum of parts,
but a genuine whole, in which each organ implies all the
others, so the good of man does not consist in a number of
particular satisfactions, but in the satisfaction of his whole
nature. The Good is not a mere hypothesis ; it is no
creation of the moralist ; for every man in making a
moral judgment tacitly presupposes it. Only the Sophist
or Materialist imagines that the immediate object repre-
sents the true and ultimate object of the will, and upon
this false assumption bases the false inference that moral
judgments are merely conventional ; the genuine moralist,
starting from the ordinary moral judgments of men and
freeing them from confusion and inconsistency, is enabled
to get back to the organising principle from which all
right judgments proceed. Hence the politician who
thinks only of gaining the applause of the citizens by
gratifying their immediate desires is violating the true
objects of statesmanship, which is to develop the intelli-
gence and the moral nature. Just as there is an art of
the body, which aims at health, so there is an art of the
soul, the object of which is to produce virtue. And this

16 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

latter art, the art of politics, like medicine, has two branches :
one which regulates the growth and healthy action of the
soul, and the other which heals its diseases. Sophistry
gives false principles to regulate the soul, and rhetoric
merely makes a pretence of curing injustice by " making
the worse appear the better reason." The Politician who
seeks merely to aggrandise the state, filling the city with
harbours and docks and walls and supplying it with fat
revenues, forgets the true end of statesmanship, and
leaves no room for justice and temperance. To be a true
statesman a man must be trained in the art of politics.
He must have a right moral purpose, and also a full know-
ledge of the political art ; he must be at once unselfish
and a specialist. Politics is an art, and like other arts it
demands unselfish love of work and trained knowledge.

Plato is not disposed to regard the Athenian State with
the too partial eyes of Pericles. What is required is that
the conduct of the citizens should be determined, not by
instinctive judgments, which may or may not be right,
but by principles that have been explicitly grasped
and put in practice. This is the great want, he thinks,
of the politician, who may have a natural gift for govern-
ment but is unable to explain to others the principles by
which he acts. Practical tact may lead him right, but it
cannot be transmitted from one to another. There is
needed also, he argues in the Republic, a thoroughly
systematic method of education, by which the true states-
man may be formed and enabled to act on the minds of
the citizens without any force but reason. For reason
is not something peculiar to this or that mind, but the
great principle of unification. The whole community
will have a common will if men are but agreed in the prin-
ciples from which they act. The object of the State is
to produce the best kind of citizen, and this cannot be

PLATO 17

done without enlightenment on the part of the rulers as
well as recognition on the side of the citizens. Wisdom
is not to be found in every uneducated workman who
imagines that his ill-digested opinions are equal in value to
those of the trained and educated statesman. Politics
is a science as well as an art, and therefore a special class
of citizen must have charge of affairs of state.

Plato's view, then, is not that every State is of neces-
sity fitted to secure the highest good of the citizen. A
State may be so bad that it will only confirm the confusion
between the real and the apparent good. But, while this is
so, it is Plato's firm conviction that apart from society the
best life is impossible. It is in and through the organism
of the State that man can be taught to distinguish
between the real and the apparent will. The statesman
has therefore the fundamental nature of man to work
upon, and it is his special task to legislate so that the
never-dying will for the good shall be promoted and the
immediate desire for particular ends curbed and purified.
Thus the State is no arbitrary product of the unenlightened
individual, but is essential to the revelation of the true
will of man. To Plato therefore the question, What is a
good man ? immediately merges in the deeper question,
What is a good State ? Thus moral philosophy is insepar-
able from political philosophy. It is the object of genuine
political philosophy to instruct the citizen in the good life,
and the study and practice of statesmanship is indispen-
sable to the creation of the best form of society. The
statesman must know what is the true good, or his legis-
lation will only confirm men in their devotion to their
immediate ends. We must therefore have a thorough
system of education by which the true nature of the good
is grasped and distinguished from lower ends. False
views of the function of the State are the cause of its cor-

i8 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ruption, and therefore we must examine and refute the
doctrine of the Sophists that organised society is purely
conventional. The State does not exist, as they taught,
for the self-satisfaction of the rulers, but for the develop-
ment in the citizen of an unselfish interest in the common
weal. In truth the good of the individual can only be
secured by providing for the good of the whole. The
laws of morality are not conventional, but are the ex-
pression of the true nature of the human soul. The State
is a communion of souls united by reason for the pur-
suit of a moral end, and all its provisions should be framed
with a view to that end. But this idea of the State is far
from being realised in existing forms of society ; on the
contrary, these are infected with an individualism that
gives only too much support to the false views of the
Sophists ; indeed, were it not for " that great Sophist
the public," they would have very little influence. To
restore the broken unity of the State by developing the
true will of the citizens is the aim of Plato, and this aim,
he thought, can only be secured by taking the power out
of the hands of the ignorant mob and of the self-seeking
politicians who exploit the State for their own ends. A
democracy which encourages the predominance of the
ignorant and of the selfish demagogue seems to Plato
inconsistent with the true end of society. Since govern-
ment must be carried on by men trained to the work,
not by an ignorant rabble, every man should be limited
to the task for which by nature and training he is best
itted. Plato has no superstition as to the absolute good
:>f independence ; he is prepared to exercise any amount
interference with the individual, provided that it is
necessary to the emergence of his deeper will and his truer
self. His view is just as hostile to an oligarchy which
employs the office of the State for its own selfish ends as

PLATO 19

to a democracy which rests upon the selfishness of the
mob. The State must not be split up into two hostile
camps, the rich and the poor, the oppressors and the
oppressed. Plato is quite prepared to strike at the root
of avarice by abolishing wealth, and to destroy the self-
ishness of the Family by an abolition of the institution.
Nor will he allow of any absolute division between man and
woman, a division which to his mind loses the services of
one half of the community from traditional prejudices.
Though he begins with a consideration of the State,
Plato really presupposes the threefold division of the soul
into appetite, spirit and reason as his foundation of the
division of the State into three classes. In its lowest
form society is an expression of the appetitive part of the
soul. It is an organisation for the satisfaction of certain ^
physical wants. The necessity for such an organisation ''
lies in the fact that no man is by himself self-sufficient
(avrapK*)?) , while yet he is able to contribute something
that is required by others. The result is an inevitable
division of employments, involving a combination for the
reciprocal exchange of the several articles produced by
each. The principle of reciprocal service is thus the
foundation of the State. Not that this principle is to be
regarded as a purely economic one, for Plato conceives the
whole of society as resting upon the proper division of
labour and the assignment of a special function to each man
in accordance with his natural endowment. This principle
we find illustrated in the economic aspect of society. By
specialisation of employments a greater number of com-
modities is produced, and these of better quality than
could be obtained by every man dissipating his energies
in the production of various different kinds of goods.
Nature has itself indicated this principle, for no two men
have exactly the same natural qualities. Thus indus-

20 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

trial society grows and differentiates itself. We find
pastoral, agricultural and mechanical industries practised
by distinct classes of producers, and economic society
is enlarged by the growth of foreign trade and commerce.
Society, however, as so constituted, provides only for the
satisfaction of the elementary wants, and is in itself little
better than a " city of pigs," since it is wanting in those
refinements and higher purposes without which civilised
man would not consider life worth living.

So far the only part of the soul which has come into
play is that of appetite. Spirit emerges in the more deve-
loped form of the State. With the growth of luxury and
refinement, along with the accessories of the fine arts and
poetry and the art of medicine, it is found that the land
is not sufficient for the support of the population, and thus
arises war. The element of spirit now comes into play,
leading to the military organisation of society, the function
of which is to protect it against aggression and to main-
tain internal order. For a State must be strong, if it is
to preserve the conditions under which the higher life
is developed. Shall we then have in our State a special
class devoted to war, just as in the economic sphere we have
found the true principle to be the specialisation of em-
ployments ? The answer cannot be doubtful. There
must be a military class to safeguard the State from attack,
and the members of this class must be selected on the
same principle of natural capacity as that which deter-
mines the allocation of employments in the organisation
of economic society. The men fitted by nature to serve
as guardians are those who are marked by the posses-
sion of spirit, the fighting element in human nature. But
they must also possess an element of an opposite character,
the element of wisdom — the " philosophic " element
Plato calls it — which binds men together in unity. Like

PLATO 21

a good watch-dog, which is mild and gentle to friends but
fierce to strangers, the guardians must love their fellow-
citizens and be implacable only to the enemies of their
country ; and such love, as based upon knowledge, is one
of the forms in which reason manifests itself.

Reason, however, is most perfectly shown in the ruler.
In the military class it is only seen in the instinctive form,
while in the ruler it becomes self-conscious ; for the wise
government of the State implies the exercise of reason
in the form of love of country. The true rulers will be
those who find their highest good in disinterested service.
The real bond of the State is therefore reason. It is reason
that binds men together by teaching them to understand
one another. The rulers, like the guardians, must be
a distinct class. Reason including love is found in any-
thing like a pronounced form only in a few, and these must
be subjected to the severest tests before they are set to
govern others. They are to be selected from the most
promising of the military class. They must have the
philosophic temper, and be trained to recognise justice,
beauty and temperance, so that they may fashion the
citizens under their care after the image of those virtues.
The ruler who is also a " philosopher," a lover of wisdom,
must be able to see the dependence of all other ideas on
the idea of ideas, the idea of the Good. Thus he will
contemplate all human action as subordinate to this
supreme principle. The State can only be perfect when
it is guided by men who are possessed of this compre-
hensive view of human life.

The community, then, must be a unit, and at the same
time there must be specialisation of function and proper dis-
tinctions of class. What then are the virtues required in a
complete State ? They are usually said to be wisdom,
courage, temperance or self-control, and justice. Now

22 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

wisdom is an enlightened way of dealing with the internal
and external relations of the whole community. The capa-
city to deal with them in this way is found only in a very
few men, and these we must make the rulers. Wisdom
is therefore the special virtue of the rulers, who alone
know what is best for the whole community The typical
form again of the virtue of courage is manifested on the
field of battle, but Plato so widens the conception of it
as to make it include everything that we should call moral
courage, that is, the power of remaining steadfast in what
one believes to be right in the presence of anything from
«~ which we naturally shrink. To secure the existence in
the State of those who can be trusted under all circum-
stances to display this virtue, we must choose those who
have the right natural disposition and give them a care-
ful education. It is for this reason that we insisted so
strongly on the necessity of selecting our military men
and training them by means of gymnastic and the arts
to play their part worthily. For courage is not the blind
or irrational quality of the animal or the slave, but the
enlightened courage of the trained citizen, the power to
do what is right in spite of the strongest solicitations of
fear or desire. As to the third virtue, self-control, we
have seen that the State consists of rulers and ruled, and
that it is necessary for the citizens to regard this as the
proper form of the community. Self-control mpy therefore
be regarded as a harmony between the different elements
in the State, such a harmony as results when the best rule
and the others obey, all uniting in this arrangement as
that which secures the best results.

There still remains another virtue, the virtue of justice,
and Socrates in the Republic is made to express great
perplexity as to what it can possibly be. Wisdom is
characteristic of the rulers, courage of the soldiers, self-

PLATO 23

control of the working-class, but what is justice ? Rulers,
soldiers and workmen are the only classes in the State,
and each has its proper virtue ; what then can justice be ?
We have been looking for it afar off, when all the time it
was " tumbling out at our feet." What was the general
principle on which our State was to be organised ? Was
it not that each man should devote himself to that one
function in the State for which he was by nature best
fitted ? This we found to be the foundation of economic
efficiency, and it turned out later to be the principle by
which a special task was assigned to the different classes
in the community. May we not then conclude that justice
is this principle of the distribution of functions ? It is
not a special virtue like temperance or courage or wisdom,
but consists in the exercise of each of these virtues by the
class of which it is the characteristic quality. When the
rulers are wise, the soldiers courageous and the workmen
self-controlled, then the State as a whole is just. Justice
in short consists in each man fulfilling the special duties
of his station.

In order to secure justice in the State Plato has two
suggestions to make. There must be a common system
of education and a system of Communism. The former is
necessary in order to do away with that conceit and
ignorance which Plato found to be prevalent in Athens and
to prepare men for the discharge of their special function.
The latter he regards as essential if the temptations to
inordinate selfishness are to be removed. The education
of the young should consist of art and literature on the
one hand, and gymnastic on the other ; while the educa-
tion of the ruler is to be scientific and philosophic. The
ultimate object of the earlier training is to turn the inner
eye towards the good, while it is the object of the later
to bring the mind into direct contact with it. In order to

24 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

discover men who are fitted to rule, we must find out
whether those who have been under* training are ready
to give up their private interests for the public weal and are
fitted to bear the burden of responsibility. They must
be free from intellectual indolence and from the false
influence of pain and pleasure, and no others can be
allowed to rule. Those who have stood the test well to
the end should, when they have been matured by long
experience, be made rulers, while the younger members of
the service will act as auxiliaries. From the age of twenty
to thirty those who have proved their superior ability
during the earlier education and have shown a special
aptitude for science will be practised in war and all the
other duties required by the State. From thirty to thirty-
five a training will be given in philosophy to those who have
excelled in the study of science. For the next fifteen years
these will hold all commands in war and deal with other
matters not reserved for age, and in general their lives will
be spent in the acquisition of political experience. Those
again who have stood all the tests will at the age of fifty
spend part of their life in the service of the State, but will
also be allowed to devote the rest of the time to the con-
templation of the Good. Thus in Plato's eyes the final
goal of life is the life philosophic, which he regards as the
highest. The ruler who has reached this highest point
will still serve the State, not because he has a desire to
gain honour, but as a duty to be borne for the good of his
fellows in requital of the training that he has received.
Thus all faction will be excluded, for there will be no
struggle for office and none of the fierce conflicts that
accompany it.

Our conclusion so far is that human society should be
organised on the principle that each may contribute his
best to the whole and receive from the whole what he most

PLATO 25

wants. There must be an entire absence of self-seeking
and of all attempts to find satisfaction in the lower instead
of the higher elements of human nature. All inducements
to follow the immediate desires must be removed, and
full advantage must be taken of the powers latent in all
members of the community. Are we then taking full
advantage of those powers when we educate only one sex
in art and gymnastic, in science and philosophy ? Is
there such a difference between men and women that
only the former are fitted to be soldiers and rulers ?
There is of course a sexual difference, but is it such as to
imply that women must be excluded from the protective
and deliberative functions ? Certainly it is not so if we
follow our old analogy of the watch-dog, for here sex makes
no difference of function ; and if there is no good reason
for drawing a distinction in the case of human beings,
women should be trained in the same way and employed
in the same social service as men. The whole question
is whether this will minister to the higher good of the
community. It may, however, be denied that the interest
of society demands so radical a change, on the ground
that it is inconsistent with that specialisation of function
which has been made the very foundation and justifica-
tion of the State. The objection has no real force, for
the difference of function between the sexes does not prove
that there is a difference in relation to the functions to be
discharged in society. No doubt men as a whole are
superior to women, but there is no special endowment
of the one sex as compared with the other, and as to ex-
pediency, there can be no doubt that both women and men
should be as good as possible, and therefore both should
have the same kind of education.

But can we allow the family as at present constituted
to continue in our ideal State ? The answer can only

26 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

be given by considering that the State should not exceed
a certain number of citizens, and that the principle of
society is to secure a common spirit by eliminating the
temptations to selfishness. The former object Plato
hopes to secure by an elaborate system in which the pro-
duction and rearing of children will be brought under
State control and determined on scientific principles,
and the latter by a regulated system of common life.

Excellent as is the State which has been sketched, is
it practicable ? It must be at once admitted that the
ideal cannot be literally realised. Justice is the perfect
pattern of what a State should be, but we can never find
it realised in any actual community. But can it be even
approximately realised ? It can, answers Plato, but only
on condition that most of those who now possess political
power should be deprived of it, and that all power should
be given only to genuine philosophers — by which he means
something very different from those who call themselves
philosophers ; he means in fact men of genius in the
fullest sense of the term. Only such men have a clear
perception of the principle upon which the State should be
based, and they must have the peculiar knowledge that
comes from wide experience. Both are needed, but of
the two the more important is a firm grasp of principles,
without which experience is of little account. The philo-
sopher as conceived by Plato has all the qualities which
go to make up a perfect character. The love of truth,
which is in him fundamental, involves the passion to
learn and to be at one with the permanent nature of things,
or to possess wisdom ; it leads to self-control, because
it is an absorbing passion, which expels all lower desires ;
it gives courage, for he who has the vision of all time and
all existence will not fear death ; and he will be just,

having no fear, greed or personal passion to deflect him
I

PLATO 27

from the straight path of justice ; and finally the philo-
sophic nature is quick to learn and retentive of what has
been learned, and so it will readily adapt itself to the
form and pressure of things. We may say in fact that it
is the philosophic nature which makes a man truly man.
To such a man surely the government of the State may
safely be committed.

But if the philosophic nature is that which is best fitted
to rule, how is it that those who devote themselves to
philosophy are such useless and unpractical persons,
while the majority of them are either eccentric or are
rascally knaves ? The fact is undeniable, but the ex-
planation must be sought in the divorce of speculation
from practice. The philosopher is useless because the
helm of State has been seized by the demagogue, who
persuades the well-meaning but somewhat stupid people
that politics is an art that cannot be taught. A much
more serious cause of the ruin of the State is the demora-
lisation of those who have a natural gift for philosophy. <
The great source of the corruption of souls naturally fitted
for the highest things is the noxious surroundings in which
they are placed. It is the strong man and not the weak
who suffers most. " That great Sophist the public "
does all it can to corrupt an originally noble mind. How
can we be surprised that the low views of life which con-
front the philosophic soul everywhere — in the assembly,
the law-courts, the theatre, the army — should deflect
it from its true path ? When the truth is presented, the
leaders of society are at once up in arms, and do all in their
power to corrupt the strong man and to use him for their
own base ends. The consequence is that philosophy is
deserted by those who in a proper environment would
have been its best representatives. Yet as philosophy
still retains the splendour of a great name, small petty

28 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

souls claim to be its representatives. They are like a
little bald tinker who has come into a little money and
takes advantage of the poverty and loneliness of his
master's daughter to marry her. In the midst of this
evil world what can a true philosopher do ? He can only
go on doing his own work and saying nothing, like a man
in a storm who takes shelter behind a wall from the driv-
ing wind of sleet and hail. Thus he suffers a kind of defeat,
which can only be remedied by a total reconstruction of
society. Nor is such reconstruction impossible. Men are
so hostile to philosophy because they are ignorant of
its true nature, confusing it with the jargon that passes
for it. The true philosopher is one who dwells in a king-
dom of peace, a world of unchangeable law, which is the
real nature of the world. If this perfect law could only
mould the characters of men in its likeness, we should have
the actual embodiment of the ideal in an existing State.
But the production of a philosopher of this type must
necessarily be a hard and difficult task, one which can
only be accomplished by a severe and long protracted
system of education such as has been indicated above.

We have now obtained a general view of the Platonic
State and of the functions and virtues of the classes into
which it is divided. What at once strikes us in the sketch
is the absence in Plato's account of justice of all reference
to rights. And in point of fact there are no individual
rights in the case of the two higher classes. Only in this
way, Plato thinks, can they be trusted to seek only the
good of the State. The element of desire must be allowed
to have no share in their actions. Thus Communism is
no accident in Plato's theory, but inevitably follows from
his conception of the opposition of reason and desire,
and the necessity of the higher classes being governed

PLATO 29

only by reason. If they were to have their energies frit-
tered away in the pursuit of wealth, how could they be
expected to give their unstinted energy to the good of
the whole ?

The Communism of Plato, unlike modern Socialism,
has nothing to do with the economic condition of society.
The ruling classes have no property, but live on the neces-
saries supplied to them by the labouring class. Modern
communism, on the other hand, aims to destroy the un-
checked competition of individuals in the economic sphere.
Plato does away with the competition for power between
one selfish unit and another, seeking as he does to free the
rulers from all distractions, so that they may give all
their time and energy to the State ; and it is for this reason
that he advocates a communism of wives as well as of
property. The family seems to him inconsistent with
that concentration of energy on the public weal, which
is his ideal of society. Each separate home appears to
him to be a centre of exclusiveness. He first emanci-
pates woman from the drudgery of household cares, set-
ting her energies free for the work of the State. Thus
she stands beside man ready to share in the fulness of his
life. The fundamental defect in this conception of the
family is not in its aim, which is high and noble, but in
the false view of marriage upon which it is based. The
physical basis of the family relation is not its deepest
purport. To regard it merely as a device for the pro-
duction and rearing of children is to overlook what Plato
himself has pointed out in another connection, namely,
that the physical basis is entirely transcended in the higher
aspects of the family relation. Upon it is based the finest
form of friendship, and it must be remembered that the
training which children receive in the family cannot be
replaced by the colder method of State regulation.

30 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

The communistic theory of Plato rests upon the unten-
able assumption that the evils of society can be cured
by an alteration of external conditions. As Aristotle
points out, you cannot get rid of social diseases except
by a change of mind. It is the truth that sets men free,
not a mere change in external organisation. This is the
spirit in which Aristotle would vindicate property as the
basis of a moral life, and justify the family as an essential
preparation for the wider life of the community. The
Kigher self must be based upon an initial consciousness
of individual personality, and Plato's attempt to convert
the individual into a pure organ of the whole is doomed
to failure because it takes away that intense consciousness
of personality which is the condition of the higher life.
He who has no self cannot be unselfish. The good of the
whole can only be secured by means of subordinate organ-
isations. It is true that men must learn to rise above
the separate individuality of the single life, but this
advance can only be made by means of the moralisation
which is afforded by the family, and by trade and com-
merce as implying individual rights of property. And
it might be added that just because Plato does not allow
for the moralisation obtained by organs subordinate to
the State, he is unable to free himself from the narrow
limits of the Greek City-State. He would limit the popu-
lation on the ground that beyond a certain number a
State is unable to develop the intense patriotism which
he has in view as its ideal. This attempt at artificial
limitation is no longer necessary when the State widens
into the nation, much less when we keep before our minds
the wider unity of a world policy. It may also be pointed
out that Plato's whole conception presupposes a funda-
mental distinction between the working class and the
governing class which can only result in degrading both.

PLATO 31

The workers are shut out from the training given by active
participation in the government, and the rulers lose the
valuable insight acquired by participating in active life.
The State must be not only organic, but every member
in it must take an active share in all its concerns, unless
we are to have a conflict of classes and a consequent weak-
ening of the body politic.

While we cannot accept the ideal State of the Republic
literally, we must not undervalue the aims which Plato
has set forth with such force and clearness. The State
ought to be the embodiment of the best mind of the whole
community, and this mind must work through its various
institutions. It is necessary if this ideal is to be realised
that the citizen should have no individual interests which
conflict with the good of the whole. It was for this reason
that Plato sought to make selfishness impossible by re-
moving its occasions, and though he erred in regard to
the means by which he endeavoured to secure this end,
the end itself remains the ideal of society. Plato forgets,
or does not realise, that the State cannot be stereotyped
for all time, but must necessarily grow with the growth
of men's insight. The citizen must be certain that any
change proposed is really an advance, and this is only
possible in a community where the whole people parti-
cipate in the government and learn by experience what
lines of action do not lead to its complete organisation.

While the speculations of Plato bring out very clearly
his conception of the community as a combination of
citizens by which the best life may be realised, the re-
striction of the State to the City and a want of faith in
the free movement of the human spirit led to an abstract
view of social life. On the one hand Plato does not think
of the State as serving a special task in the development
of humanity, and on the other hand he lacks confidence

32 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

in the possible political wisdom of the working class, and
in the unselfishness of the upper classes. These two
defects are in fact correlative, for it is because he thinks
of the members of his State as Greeks with special gifts
and virtues that he has so little faith in the individual
citizen. When a thinker starts from the conception of
a special race, and not from that of humanity, he natur-
ally denies that reason is a universal possession. Hence
Plato, while in his conception of woman's sphere and capa-
bilities he was far in advance of his age, has no proper
appreciation of the latent powers of men, and therefore
no real faith in their freedom and independence. The
State as he conceives it is lacking in the differentiation
of life and character which is essential to its perfection
and to the full development of man. His communism
is really incidental to his limited conception of society.
In this respect Aristotle saw much deeper than Plato,
finding in private property and the family the essential
conditions of the best life ; though even he could not shake
off the prejudice that a good State must, like Athens, be
limited in territory and sufficient to itself.

CHAPTER SECOND
THE CITY-STATE— Continued : ARISTOTLE

WHILE Plato has given us the sketch of a City-State in
which nothing but the pure or real will of the citizen is
embodied, and while, in order to free it from imperfection,
he is prepared to sacrifice the free play of individuality,
Aristotle believes that the real will of the people may be
realised without detriment to the independence of the indi-
vidual. Neither the one nor the other has any conception
of a State wider than that of the City, although when
Aristotle wrote his Politics the City-State was drawing to
a close.

Like Plato, Aristotle assumes that the State must not
exceed the limits of the Greek City-State, while the citi-
zens must be of the general type of the Hellenes. The
real function of organised society is not outward success
of any kind, and certainly not the amassing of wealth,
but the production of citizens of the highest intellectual
and moral culture, to whom all other citizens must be
subordinate. As the end of society is to secure the realisa-
tion of the best life, Aristotle is led to regard the main body
of the people as instruments for the production of the
highest results in the person of a few privileged citizens.
One of the conditions for the fulfilment of this object he
believes to be found in the physical features of Greece.
Greece, as Homer says, speaking of Ithaca, is " a rugged
country, but a good breeder of men." Composed of chains
w.s. 33 o

34 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of mountains interrupted by deep depressions, it seems
destined by nature to be split up into small independent
commonwealths. It was naturally a maritime country,
with its coastline of bays and peninsulas and its lines of
islands stretching towards the East. The internal re-
sources of Attica fitted it for commercial and industrial
pursuits. No large population could be maintained by
its comparatively poor soil, but it was well adapted for the
culture of the olive, the vine and the fig. As Mr. Bosan-
quet points out,1 it " had an inexhaustible store of the
choicest marble, a supply of clay adapted for pottery, a
sea well stocked with fish, a flora which gave the choicest
honey, and above all silver mines, from which a consider-
able revenue was drawn, and owing to which the Attic
silver coinage had a general currency like that of English
gold, and Athens could always pay for her imports in
specie if commodities suitable for export were not forth-
coming." These natural features were taken full advan-
tage of by Athenian statesmen, who saw that the future
of the country lay in industry, commerce and letters.
Themistocles persuaded the people to apply the revenue
from the silver mines to the building of ships, by which
the maritime supremacy of Athens was assured. For
the defence of the harbour a fleet was needed, and the three
natural harbours of Piraeus were constructed.

Aristotle is quite alive to the importance of these gifts
of nature, as well as to the necessity of having a popula-
tion of the right kind to make them available. Nature,
as he saw, ceases to be mere nature when it is translated
into a world by man's mind. The State, says Aristotle,
conies under the influence of necessity, for it must have a
territory and a supply of external things, as well as a
population of the right kind. Of even greater importance

1 International Ideals^ p. 256.

ARISTOTLE 35

than material conditions are the citizens themselves.
If these possess the proper physical and spiritual quali-
ties, they are able to turn to account the material con-
ditions in the perfecting of society. Nature itself often
aids in this work, making a cunning use of necessity.
Necessity demands that means should be provided for the
maintenance of life, but nature may employ this fact in
order to secure the higher end of a good life, provided
only that the citizens are endowed with the qualities that
enable them to make full use of their natural advantages.
Man, working on the material supplied to him by nature,
is able to mould it in accordance with reason. It is true
that the " matter " is not always in harmony with the
" form " ; but here man may intervene and help nature
to realise its end. In a good State we may therefore expect
to find the formation of men into a community for the ful-
filment of their latent and ideal nature. The State is
natural both in its origin and in its end. It has its origin
in the household and in the village, and its end in the real-
isation of the best life. For this purpose there must be
a natural order and proportion, and therefore Aristotle
will not accept as final certain forms of communal life.
In distributing its favours the State must assign wealth
and political power, not to every citizen in the same degree,
but only to those who are best fitted to use them wisely.
It is for this reason that he divides society into two
sections : the one, and that the largest, having to do only
with the production of the necessities of life ; the other,
and the smaller, with the true life of the State.

In developing his own view Aristotle has before his mind
the conception of the community expressed by Plato.
This conception he accepts in so far as it maintains that
the State exists for the production of the best life and
the highest type of citizen ; but he refuses to accept the

36 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

regulations by which Plato seeks to secure these ends. At
the very beginning of the Politics he examines the Pla-
tonic doctrine of paternal government, maintaining that
it rests upon a confusion between the State and the
Household. In the Politicus Plato maintains that just
as it is the function of the father as head of the family
to rule over his children and slaves, so it is the function
of the head of the State to rule over the citizens, prescrib-
ing for them their duties without any initiative on their
part. The State, Aristotle argues, cannot thus be identi-
fied with the Family. It is not correct to say that the
authority of the father over his children and the slaves
of his household is the same in kind with that exercised
by the ruler over his subjects. The ruler must express
the common will of the citizens, and therefore the consent
of the citizens is implied as a necessary factor. The State,
it is true, originates in the household, but the household
is only related to it as the seed to the full-grown plant.
The relation of husband and wife arises from an impulse
common to man with the plant and the animal, while the
relation of master and slave is based upon the necessity
of providing for the subsistence of the family. The house-
hold is " natural," resting as it does on the reproductive
instinct and on the impulse to self-preservation. More-
over, the relation of master and slave is also " natural "
in the sense that the master by his superior intelligence
is the ruler, while the slave by his physical strength is
fitted to carry out the will of the master in the production
of the means of subsistence. The relation of husband and
wife is different from that of master and slave, for the
function of the woman is to bear and rear children, while
that of the slave is to supply the wants of each day. It
is a mark of barbarism either to class women with slaves,
or to enslave a free-born Greek.

ARISTOTLE 37

The household naturally expands into the village com-
munity by the association of several households. It is
based upon a common descent, and supplies wants that go
beyond the necessities of the day. The most natural
form of the village community is that of a colony from
the original family ; and as the family was ruled by the
father, the form of government, when the village community
expanded into the City-State, is naturally that of a mon-
archy. Like the family and the village community the
State first arises from the necessity of providing for every-
day wants ; but having arisen, it continues to exist for the
development of the higher life. The State, in even a higher
sense than the household or the village community, is
" natural." It is higher than these, because it alone is
self-sufficient. Man is by his essential nature ordained for
civil society, and he who is without a country, either
through natural causes or through misfortune, is either
above or below humanity. Unlike the gregarious animals,
man has the gift of articulate speech, and is able to discern
the distinction of good and evil, right and wrong. On
this consciousness of good and evil, justice and injustice,
the State is based. Thus, though Aristotle traces back the
origin of society to impulses common to man with the
animals, he recognises that the presence of conscious-
ness in man makes him essentially different in nature.
The State is no external device for the realisation of some
immediate good, but is absolutely necessary to the com-
plete exercise of man's powers. It is thus evident that
in nature it is logically " prior " not only to the individual
but to the family and the clan. What is only implicit
in the family and the clan is in the State explicitly rea-
lised. Just as in a living being no single organ exists
except in its inseparable relation to the whole body, so
the State is presupposed in the individual, for the indi-

38 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

vidual cannot supply all his wants, physical, mental and
spiritual, when he is separated from his fellow-men. How
necessary the ordered life of the community is may be
seen from the depths of degradation from which it saves
the individual man. In his completeness man is the best
of all animals, but just because of this when he is separated
from society he is the worst. Justice is essentially a virtue
of society and exists only in an organised community.
It is therefore a gross mistake to say that the State is
purely conventional, as the Sophists affirmed, or is un-
essential to the best life, as was declared by the Cynics.
Were not the State the expression of man's true nature,
no contract could give it authority. We must not think
of it as limiting the rights which men possessed in their
separate existence ; it is the State that creates and justi-
fies rights. It owes its existence to the love of society
and the perception of right and wrong implanted by nature
in man ; to the impulse of self-perpetuation ; to the
need of protection from enemies ; and above all to the
demand for the satisfaction of the higher needs.

As the Family exists within the organism of the State,
and indeed is the simplest constituent of it, Aristotle
begins by pointing out the different relations it involves.
Accepting the Greek form of the household, he says it
has three constituents or relations : the relation of master
and slave, that of husband and wife, and that of father and
child. With Plato he regards the institution of slavery
as not only necessary but as essential to the higher life.
There are, he claims, natural masters and natural slaves,
and he goes on to argue that slavery is best for the moral
efficiency both of the slave and of the master. As a matter
of fact Attic slaves were very well treated and were pro-
tected by society from ill usage. Many of them did the
same work and received the same pay as freemen. Aris-

ARISTOTLE 39

totle, however, would limit slavery to those who were
unfit for any but the roughest work, such as digging and
lifting, pulling and pushing and carrying. As instru-
ments of the family they are regarded by him simply as
property. Their function is to perform services, not to
produce commodities, as is indicated by the definition of
a slave as " a piece of property of an animated kind engaged
in rendering services." The master, he holds, is to the
slave as soul to body. Aristotle's doctrine rests on the
assumption that there are men whose sole use is in their
bodily strength. He admits, however, that nature has
not always distinguished the master from the slave, and
it is perhaps for this reason that he provides for their
possible emancipation. While maintaining that there is
a natural slavery, Aristotle rejects the slavery that is
based upon victory in war, and he is absolutely opposed
to the enslavement of Hellenes.

As the slave is a member of the household and also an
object of property, the transition from slavery to the con-
sideration of property is easy and natural. Property is
external to the good life, being only a condition and not a
part of it. Wealth is merely a means to the attainment
of this life, and is therefore defined as " a store of things
which are necessary for life in the association of city or
household." As the instrument of the moral life it must
be limited in amount, for otherwise it would only serve
as a hindrance. There are two ways of acquiring wealth :
firstly, by cultivating the earth, and secondly, by ex-
ploiting one's fellows, either by selling commodities at a
large profit or by lending money at heavy interest. These
are contrasted as respectively the natural and the con-
ventional method of acquiring wealth. Nature, which
does nothing without a purpose, provides plants and ani-
mals for the support of human life, just as it provides the

40 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

milk in the mother's breast at the beginning of the child's
life. The art of profit-making, on the other hand, is an
unnatural mode of acquisition, since it takes advantage
of men's necessities to extract profit from them. Every
commodity has a double use : it may be employed for im-
mediate consumption, or it may be used for the purpose of
exchange. The use of commodities for the purpose of
exchange is indeed necessary and natural within its pro-
per limits, serving to correct the inequality which results
from one man having too much of one thing and another
man too little ; but when one person gets more than a
sufficiency, giving less than he receives, equality disap-
pears and injustice enters. The unnatural exploitation
of other men takes the place of the natural exploitation
of the soil. The transition arises through the medium of
money. The primitive exchange of the village consisted
in a simple system of barter, but if a man desires to deal
with a foreigner, he may not be willing to pay the cost
of importing a heavy article, and instead will prefer to use
silver or gold, which are of great value in proportion to
their bulk. Thus money comes into use as the medium
of exchange. Now it is the existence of money that in
Aristotle's view facilitates the rise of the dealer or middle-
man, who grows wealthy at the expense of others, ab-
stracting from them part of the substance which they have
acquired for themselves in a legitimate way. Forgetting
the true end of life, the dealer desires unlimited wealth.
Classing usury under the head of profit-making of the
illegitimate kind, Aristotle condemns it even more decidedly
than commerce. It is a means by which men make profit
out of the necessities of their fellows and make barren
metal breed an issue.

The main end of the State is not, however, the satis-
faction of the lower wants, but the institution of means

ARISTOTLE 41

for the development of the best life. The State being a
" community," it is obvious that all the citizens must
have something in common ; at the very least they must
all live on the same territory. But can we accept the sug-
gestion of Plato that community should be stretched so
far as to include a community of wives and children and
property ? In this way he expected to do away with
dissension and selfishness. In the Republic, indeed, he
seems to confine his communistic scheme to the upper
classes, but in the Laws he declares that the best form of
the State as a whole is that in which all things are held
in common, private and individual interests being alto-
gether banished from life, so that all men will express
praise or blame and feel joy or sorrow on the same occasions.
Aristotle defends the institution of the family and
private property. Plato, he argues, has a wrong idea of
the true unity of the State, not seeing that differentiation
is as necessary to its perfection as identity. It is for
this reason that he assimilates the State to the Family,
which is to overlook their specific difference. Nor is it
a confederacy, which is an aggregation of similars. The
greater the number of persons who compose an alliance,
the stronger it is, whereas a State, when it exceeds a cer-
tain number, loses its compactness and the kind of unity
which its idea demands. That which constitutes the true
form of society is dissimilarity in its members, and a reci-
procity of service and functions. There must be rulers,
who afford a wise and intelligent guidance to the subjects,
in return for which they are entitled to receive respect
and to exact a willing obedience to their commands. There
must be reciprocity even among free and equal citizens,
for all cannot rule at once, and the only possible alterna-
tives are either a permanent ruling body or an alternation
or rotation of functions. In the State there must also be

42 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

a variety in the various offices assigned to the governing
body. By the abolition of private property the zeal and
energy of ownership will be lost, for men throw most energy
into that which concerns them individually. And the
same objection applies to the communism of the family.
The dissipation of feeling over thousands of so-called sons
and daughters can only result in watering down the
natural sentiment of parenthood till it has practically
disappeared. Nor will Plato's scheme do away with the
causes of dissension ; on the contrary, it will have exactly
the opposite result ; for of the two qualities which chiefly
inspire regard and affection and prevent violence and
outrage, namely, that a thing is one's own and that it is
an object of love, neither can exist in such a community
as Plato has imagined.

Communism of property, similarly, has a specious appear-
ance of benevolence, seeming to get rid of such evils as
law-suits about disputed property and breach of con-
tracts, as well as convictions for perjury and the like.
But the real cause of these evils is not, as Plato assumes,
the existence of individual property, but the prevalence
of moral corruption, and moral corruption is not to be got
rid of by changing the external conditions. Plato's con-
ception of the State thus rests on a false notion of unity.
Moreover, his argument that women should share the
same occupation as men is based upon the analogy of the
lower animals, an analogy which fails at the crucial point,
for the lower animals have no domestic life.

While defending the family against Plato, Aristotle
proposes certain modifications of it. The recognised duty
of perpetuating the family, and thus obtaining a kind
of vicarious immortality, often gave rise in Greece to
over-population and pauperism ; and therefore the first
problem with reference to the household is to adjust its

ARISTOTLE 43

rate of increase to the interests of the community. The
duty of the wife was recognised to be that of caring for the
children and managing the household. The Greek husband
was little at home, spending his time in war or in the con-
sideration of political matters or in the exercise of his
vocation. The main defect of the Greek household Aris-
totle ascribes to the inadequate preparation of the father
for the superintendence of his sons' education. The
family is at once a group of friends, and a school of train-
ing for common ends ; and therefore it is of great import-
ance to see that it is fitted for this task. Aristotle would
regulate the age of marriage, the period for the birth of
children and the number of children. The education of
the sons should, in his estimation, be committed to the
State after the sons have reached the age of seven. The
household should have a definite area of land assigned to
it as a means of subsistence, for a due supply of goods is
a necessary condition of virtuous action. The ideal dis-
tribution of wealth is neither too much nor too little, but
that which is sufficient for the highest life. The distribution
of landed property must be supplemented by the limitation
of population, as well as by an enlightened system of edu-
cation, which will develop in the citizen a hatred of
injustice. Slavery must be carefully organised, and the life
of women properly regulated by law. We must avoid the
mistake of Sparta in aiming only at the production of
military virtue, for war is only a means to peace.

What then is the best form of society, and wherein
does citizenship consist ? Looking at the State as a com-
pound, the component parts of which are the individual
citizens, we may define a citizen as one who participates
in those offices which are held for an indeterminate time.
No doubt this definition applies only to a democracy,
but Aristotle holds that " the size of the State makes any

44 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

other form of State impossible." The deliberative and
judicial functions being the essential functions, Aristotle
naturally regards those who discharge them as the only
true citizens. Citizenship is therefore for him the exer-
cise of sovereignty, not the right to share in the election
of the sovereign. The distinction is due to the small
size of the Greek State, which naturally led to a system
of primary government, and we must remember that
what Aristotle calls a democracy is not a democracy
in the modern sense of the term. To participate in
both deliberative and judicial functions requires at
once ability and leisure, and these gifts are not to
be found, he holds, in mechanics and labourers, who
are therefore excluded from citizenship. A State may
be denned as " a body of men sharing in judicial and
deliberative offices and sufficient in number for a self-
sufficient existence." A State so constituted will not
extend the right of citizenship to its colonies. Its iden-
tity depends upon the form of the constitution, for the
constitution determines who shall hold office, and develops
a corresponding type of citizen. The Spartan military
type, for example, is the natural product of the Spartan
constitution. We may therefore now define the State
as " a compound of citizens sharing in deliberative and
judicial offices, and united by a constitution which deter-
mines their place in the compound and supplies the motive
for all their action." The functions of the State are the
provision of food, the practice of the arts, the defence by
arms, the acquisition of wealth, the worship of the gods,
and the determination and enforcement of what is right
and expedient for the whole community. The end of the
State is higher than the means, so that those engaged in
the lower occupations cannot be the equals of the others.
War needs the spirit and vigour of youth, government

I.

ARISTOTLE 45

the experience and reflection of age. Therefore it seems
natural that the same men should be soldiers in youth
and rulers in age. As by this arrangement the soldiers
will finally be rulers, following the plan of nature, the last
stages will be devoted to the service of the gods, and the
rulers will become the priests of the community.

The education proposed by Aristotle is fitted in his
estimation to produce the best type of citizen. The object
of youthful education is to develop a high type of char-
acter, and hence stress is laid upon those influences that
are fitted to mould the will insensibly, such as music and
literature. Art is for Aristotle the means of reaching the
moral sense. There are three stages in the development
of the soul : that of natural disposition, that of habitual
temperament, and that of rational self-determination.
As to the first, the legislator, if he is to attain the best
results, must have as his material a Greek population,
and marriage must be regulated with a view to the improve-
ment of the offspring. Habitual temperament, again,
is especially amenable to the influence of education. In
youth feeling and sentiment are predominant ; the mind
is then quick and responsive to both good and evil, and
habits may be formed which under proper treatment
will develop into methods of rational self-direction. The
young should therefore be early trained in habits of cour-
age, temperance and other virtues. At a later time an
appeal should be made to the reason, and instruction
given in mathematics, logic and philosophy. Thus the
goal of education may be said to be the development of
rational freedom. As reason is both theoretical and
practical, education must develop the mind by the con-
templation of truth, culminating in the contemplation of the
divine nature. Education must be conducted by the State,
and as the end is one, so the education should be one.

46 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Now that we have obtained a general notion of Aris-
totle's theory of the State, it will be well to form some
estimate of its value, and to see why the subsequent history
of man led beyond it. What is characteristic of the City-
State of the Greeks, and especially of Athens, is its marked
individuality. The Greek made two demands upon
himself : firstly, that he should govern himself, and
secondly, that he should govern himself under obedience
to law. These two demands explain the struggle for
self-government and the inextinguishable opposition to
the permanent rule of a tyrant, or of an oligarchy. The
problem of politics is to bind men together in a free and
orderly community, ; ust as philosophy endeavours to dis-
cover the fundamental principles by which man's experi-
ence may be welded into a whole. It was therefore natural
that the same people who originated philosophy should
also be the first to solve the problem of the State. The
transition from the earlier to the later form of philosophy
occurred through the influence of the Sophists and Socrates,
and upon the methods and principles suggested by Socrates
was based the ethical and political philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle. The summing up of the essence of the State was
made by Plato and Aristotle just at the time when the
characteristic political life of Greece was drawing to a close.
This, indeed, is in accordance with the general character
of philosophy ; for, as Hegel says, " the owl of Minerva
does not begin its flight till the shades of evening have
begun to fall."

We cannot expect that the Republic of Plato or the
Politics of Aristotle will give such a treatment of political
philosophy as can be employed literally by a modern State
in solution of its own peculiar difficulties. The State of
which these thinkers spoke is one that was destined to dis-
appear with the wider experience of humanity, and after

ARISTOTLE 47

an interval to be replaced by the modern Nation-State.
The speculations of Aristotle were based upon the experi-
ence of political life which he as a Greek enjoyed, and the
interpretation of it that he gave was inevitably coloured
by the presuppositions of the Greek mind. All that he
could do was to attempt a rehabilitation of the City-State,
by reference to its ideal as he conceived it. The interpre-
tation of the State by Aristotle thus throws the clearest
light upon the forces at work in it. The fundamental
idea of Greek political philosophy was that the development
of man's intellectual, artistic and moral nature is only
possible by the concentrated activity of various minds all
working towards a common end. There must be unity
of aim and unity of life. This idea is expressed by Aristotle
in the form that the State is " natural," that is, it is based
upon the necessary wants of men and naturally develops
in fulfilment of those wants. What is virtually the same
idea is expressed by saying that the State is " prior " to
the individual and the family, meaning that the individual
cannot possibly realise his true self otherwise than in
society, or, as Aristotle puts it, that man is formed for the
life of the City-State. Every man in the community, it
is implied, whether he be statesman, soldier or workman,
has a certain distinctive type of mind which fits him for
the discharge of a special task, and it is through the har-
monious operation of the different members of society in
subordination to the "common good that the highest life
is capable of being realised.

While there is an undoubted contrast between the ancient
and the modern State in regard to the constitution of
society, we must not suppose that there was nothing in
the thought of ancient times which in any way anticipates
modern ideas. In the very age of Plato and Aristotle,
we find the prevalence of ideas that have been made the

48 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

foundation of modern theories of the State. Thus it was
supposed by the Sophists that man's nature was to be
discovered, not in the maturity of his development but in
his first or original state — a conception similar to the claim
for natural rights expressed by Hobbes and others. The
Sophist further held that law and political unity were the
product of an arbitrary convention, and the Cynics main-
tained that man should be free from the trammels of any
single State. In marked contrast to these individualistic
views Plato and Aristotle assume that the City-State is
the necessary condition of the highest life. No doubt the
segregation of the hewers of wood and drawers of water is
necessary, but this separation is to their mind indicated
by the fundamental distinction of the true ruler and the
born subject, and the highest results cannot otherwise be
obtained. But, starting from these presuppositions, they
go on to demand that the citizen should not consider that
he is any chartered libertine, free to do whatever seems
good in his own eyes. There must indeed be freedom to
live the higher life without interference from either neigh-
bour or State ; such freedom, however, does not mean
licence, but the subordination of all personal motives and
conduct to the laws of the community. In such subordi-
nation there is no real loss of freedom, but on the contrary
the realisation of the common will, which is on the whole
the rational will. With whatever modifications the ideas
of Plato and Aristotle must be accepted, there can be no
doubt that Greece set the example to the world of a polity
in which the freedom of the individual was shown to be
compatible with the authority of society. The good of man
cannot be secured by giving free play to the selfish desires
of the individual. " Men," says Aristotle, " should not
think that liberty consists in refusing to submit to the
constitution." True liberty is found in obedience to the

ARISTOTLE 49

laws. " Many practices, indeed, which appear to be
democratic are really the ruin of a democracy." In
order to realise true liberty there must be a personal
authority in government, while the magistrate must be
the embodiment of an impersonal factor, expressing in
his regulations that public opinion and customary law
which reason demands. Hence Aristotle demands the
proportional equality of every citizen against every other ;
for " when men are equal they are contented." Speaking
of the expulsion of Tyrants from Athens, Herodotus
had said : " It is plain enough from this instance that
equality is an excellent thing; since even the Athenians,
who, while they were under the rule of tyrants, were not
a whit more valiant than their neighbours, no sooner shook
off the yoke than they became decidedly the first of all "
(v. 78). To the people as a whole, as Aristotle says, must
be ascribed the office of final judgment on official conduct,
since the opinion of the whole people is preferable to that
of any expert. And if the will of the people is to be em-
bodied in the laws of the State, there must be an opportunity
for them to rise to the highest level of moral and intellectual
excellence.

It is then in accordance with the political ideas of the
Greek that each State should be independent of all foreign
domination, and that each individual should be free to
live the highest life without vexatious interference from
others. No State, as Pericles said, can suffer dictation
from another State ; it must be free to develop itself in
its own way ; and the members of each State must be free
from dictation by their fellow-citizens. The Athenians,
as Aeschylus makes his chorus in The Persians say, " call
no man their master." Each man, it was felt, has a right
to mind his own business, and the only possibility of pre-
serving this right is by each having a share in public affairs,
w.s, p

50 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Even if the result is less successful than government from
above, the free man prefers government at his own hands.
As a matter of fact, however, tyranny and oligarchy were
rejected because they were found to be incompetent and
selfish forms of government.

The idea of liberty also implied more than the absence
of foreign domination and of interference of one citizen
with another. Liberty is not to be justified by the mere
absence of interference, but because it is the condition of
the higher life. The liberty of Athens resulted in the pro-
duction of artists, poets and philosophers in the marvel-
lously short period in which she had real political liberty.
No other people has produced in so short a time such great
achievements in architecture, sculpture, drama and philo-
sophy. Here, indeed, as Matthew Arnold says, " is the
great spectacle of the culture of a people. It is not an
aristocracy leavening with its own high spirit the multitude
which it wields, but leaving it the unformed multitude
still ; it is not a democracy, acute and energetic, but taste-
less, narrow-minded and ignoble ; it is the lowest and middle
classes in the highest development of their humanity that
these classes have yet revealed. It was the many who
relished these arts, who were not satisfied with less than
these monuments."

Much as we have to learn from this Athenian conception
of liberty, we have also much to reject. Athens preserved
its liberty for only some fifty years, and preserved it at
the expense of a violation of the fundamental rights of
humanity. It was a civilisation based upon slavery and
contemptuously rejecting the claims of women to share
in the government of the State. And Athens, which
demanded freedom and independence for herself, forgot
her ideal in dealing with other States. In any case the
attempt of Plato and Aristotle to preserve the City-State

ARISTOTLE 51

was foredoomed to failure. With the advent of Alexander
the Great, the independence of the City-State came to an
end, and the political philosophy of the great Greek time
almost ceased to be understood. No political theory
indeed was based on the character of the Macedonian
Empire, but the fact of its existence had so enlarged men's
vision beyond the narrow bounds of the city that it prepared
the way for a new conception of society, a conception which
was expressed in the language of the Stoics as the " city
of the world." The individual, finding no outlet for his
activities in public life, had to fall back upon himself,
seeking for a satisfaction that he could not obtain out-
wardly in the self-centred spheres of morality and religion.
This was the point of view of Stoicism and Epicureanism.

While the great Greek thinkers have not drawn a dis-
tinction between Society and the State, being obsessed by
the idea that the whole regulation of life is the work of the
legislator, it is worth while remarking that in Aristotle
we have the indication of such a distinction in the way in
which he connects the economic relations of the com-
munity with the family. It was, however, only after the
decay of the City-State that the organisation of subordinate
groups was at all clearly perceived. The appropriation
of all political functions by the Roman Empire naturally
shut out the individual from any direct political relations,
and this forced him back upon himself and led to the growth
of various corporations in which some substitute for his
vanished political power was felt to be necessary. The
modern State, in accordance with the general principle
that below the supreme organisation of the State proper
there are other forms of organisation in which the general
will is partially expressed, displays a degree of specialisa-
tion that the ancient City-State did not allow. Not only
has the distinction between Church and State come to

52 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

be recognised, but there are vast numbers of subordinate
associations which are essential to the perfection of the
whole. It is not that the wider organisation of the State
has decayed, but that means have been devised of ex-
pressing the common will in various corporations which
were excluded by the relatively simple character of the
City-State.

CHAPTER THIRD

THE WORLD-STATE, THE ROMAN EMPIRE
AND THE MIDDLE AGES

THE establishment of the Macedonian Empire resulted in
the loss of Civic freedom, and the individual, finding no
outlet for his activities in external life, had to fall back
upon himself. The representatives of this new point of
view were the Stoics and Epicureans. These schools do
not show that high power of philosophical speculation
which distinguishes Plato and Aristotle, but they indicate
an advance in the central idea of their systems, the idea
of self-conscious personality. It is true that they are more
one-sided than their great idealistic predecessors, but their
one-sidedness was a necessary stage towards a deeper
reconciliation of the reason and the passions than had been
attained by Plato and Aristotle. They make that division
between private and public life which strongly contrasts
with their identification in the great days of the City-
State. There was therefore needed some new rule for the
individual by which he could rationalise his life. In the
destruction of the national religion the philosophies of
the Stoics and Epicureans took upon themselves the task
of consoling and advising the individual how to live in an
alien world. He must not seek for happiness in the active
life of the State, but he may find peace in his own soul.

What is characteristic of the philosophy of the Stoics is
the principle that there is something beneath all the differ-

53

54 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ences of men, whether individual or national, that unites
them with one another simply as men. Their watchword
was the watchword of humanity : Homo sum, humani nihit
a me alienum pulo. While he keeps aloof from society,
the Stoic regards himself as belonging to the great State
of the World, comprising gods and men. This aspiration
after a world-community did not become an actuality, but
it tended to break down the barriers between one man and
another, one nation and another. No doubt this breadth
of sympathy did not lead to active efforts for the good of
humanity, but at least it softened the bitterness of national
and personal prejudices. Though the Stoic was indifferent
to the law of the State, he did not regard himself as absolved
from all law, but on the contrary as subject to the law of
the universe, the law of reason, of which the whole universe
is a manifestation. Living in this faith he cultivated an
attitude of wide impartiality and of complete indifference
to changes of fortune. It was the firm grasp of the central
principle that the world is rational, and therefore identical
with what is deepest in man, that gave to Stoicism its
enormous influence over the mind of the ancient world.
It is reason that binds man's whole existence into one and
subordinates all his other powers to itself. The impulse
of a rational being is to satisfy self in its universal nature.
Hence man must be as little affected by his own fate as
by the fate of others. It is the same self that thinks and
wills, perceives and desires. No doubt man may be led
into intellectual error or moral guilt by the passions, but
this is due to his not being faithful to his true self. The
first aims of nature are health, wealth and honour, and the
like ; but reason as it awakens within us makes us think
not of these, but of life as a whole, and now we seek to realise
the law of reason. Duty must be done, in other words,
as Kant afterwards maintained, for duty's sake alone.

THE WORLD-STATE 55

We must act in harmony with the rational nature of the
universe, and in doing so we shall come to harmony with
our own true self. At the same time the Stoics were unable
to reconcile this belief in the rationality of the world with
their belief in the actual world of their experience. Marcus
Aurelius was just as sure of the perfection of the universe,
as he was dismayed by the disintegrating forces working
in the imperial system. All that he could do was to stand
and die at his post in spite of the evil forces around him.

The ideal of the Stoics that men are of kindred nature
is a permanent contribution to the progress of the world.
It is true that we are still far from a practical realisation
of the " parliament of man, the federation of the world,"
but at least the conscious antagonism of nation against
nation is something for which we feel that we must apologize.
Nevertheless the conception of a World-State as held by
the Stoics is too vague and powerless to serve as a per-
manent ideal of 'mankind. We can only have a true
World-State when we have developed to their utmost the
possibilities of each Nation-State, just as we cannot have
a true Nation-State without the institution of the family
and of private property, with the various industrial and
commercial relations which they imply, and without that
free play of individuality which gives rise to decentralised
forms of association. A World-State based upon the com-
bination of variously differentiated Nation-States is a
possible ideal ; a World-State which abolishes all the
differences of race and nationality and individuality is an
empty ideal. The fundamental mistake of the Stoics is
seen in their doctrine that the highest good of man is in
no way dependent upon the interests of the social life.
This drives the individual back upon himself, and makes
him indifferent to the ties of kindred and friendship, family
and nation. The Stoics were weak where Plato and

56 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Aristotle were strong, namely, in not seeing that the
consciousness of self as a spiritual being cannot be separated
from the consciousness of self as a member of society. To
fall back upon an abstract self without positive relations
to others is to overlook the profound truth of Aristotle's
saying that man is a " social and political being." It is
true that the manifold relations of the individual life have
only a relative value, and that no single interest must be
allowed to absorb the whole self ; but to say that man is
greater than any individual interest is not to say that he
is complete in himself apart from all individual interests.
It is not true that man should be indifferent to all special
interests because he must not allow himself to be com-
pletely immersed in any one. It is not true that the good
of man can be realised in a merely internal state of the
soul which excludes the family, the State and the various
social relations into which men enter with each other. The
progress of man consists, in one of its aspects, just in.
the multiplication of forms of association subordinate to the
State, and thus in the more perfect unification of the State
itself. The ideal State cannot be antagonistic to the actual
State ; it can only be realised by the gradual expansion
of actual States, an expansion which implies at the same
time the internal development of each particular State.
When the internal organisation has reached a fair degree
of perfection, and has been purged of its narrow vision
and its concentration on its own selfish interests, the way
has been prepared for a wider form of organisation.
Whether the ideal of an actual World-State is realisable,
and if so how, we shall have to consider later ; at present
it is enough to say that even in the form of the consciousness
of each State as working for the good of humanity as a
whole, it is a valuable ideal, and for it we have largely to
thank the Stoics. It was much that in the decay of the

THE WORLD-STATE 57

City-State the Stoics insisted that after all the City-State
was not in harmony with the ideal State. This at least
made men seek for improvements in the actual forms of
society, and it prepared the way for the positive universal
conception of Christianity, which looks beyond the divisions
of men and of nations to an underlying unity of nature.
The old bonds of society were burst, and a deeper view of
humanity was the condition of a new form of society. The
recognition by the Stoics that all men have the same funda-
mental nature was an idea that inspired the Roman lawyers
to convert a narrow legal system fitted only for Rome into
a system of universal legislation that has formed the
starting-point for the jurisprudence of all civilised peoples.
It also prepared the way for a universal religion. Thus
Stoicism really helped to effect the transition from the
ancient City-State to the modern Nation-State, and to
suggest the ideal of a World-State which shall realise itself
by means of the complete organisation of the various
Nation-States.

The Roman people proved themselves to have an ex-
ceptional military genius and a remarkable sense of legal
and constitutional expediency, but they never displayed
any great power of speculation on political sub j ects . Before
an analysis of its government was attempted, Rome was
already the strongest power in the world, having succeeded
in establishing domination over the whole circle of Medi-
terranean States. The first thinker who attempted such
an analysis was Polybius, a Greek, who was held in Italy
as a hostage for sixteen years, and who in this way obtained
an intimate acquaintance with the Roman constitution.
In his history of the Roman Republic, he seeks to set forth
the principles of government under which its eminence
had been achieved. This work had an important influence

58 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

on later political theory. Polybius claims that in the
Roman constitution there are three organs which embody
respectively the principles of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy. The consuls represent the monarchic aspect
of the constitution, the Senate is essentially aristocratic,
and the popular assemblies are clearly democratic. The
consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome,
and are supreme masters of administration, all other
magistrates except the tribunes being subordinate to them.
In the preparation for war and in the conduct of a campaign
they have all but absolute power ; they have the right to
inflict punishment on all who are under their command
while on active service ; and they have authority to spend
as much of the public money as they choose. On the other
hand the Senate controls the supplies for the armies of the
consul, determines whether or not he shall retain command
at the expiration of his term of office, and decrees or with-
holds the triumph which is the utmost goal of his ambition ;
while the comitia may hold him responsible for his conduct
and may always have control over the question of peace
and war. The Senate has immense power, but it is obliged
in public affairs to respect the wish of the people, and it
cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against
the Republic that are punishable with death unless the
people first ratify its decrees. Even in matters directly
affecting the Senators the people have the sole power of
passing or rejecting a law. But most important of all is
the fact that if the tribunes impose their veto the Senate
are not only unable to pass the decree but cannot even
hold a meeting. Now the tribunes are bound to carry out
the decree of the people, and therefore the Senate stand in
awe of the multitude, whose feelings it cannot afford to
ignore. Finally, the assemblies are subject to a restraint
in their activities, firstly because contracts are given out

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 59

by the censors for the repair or construction of public
buildings throughout Italy ; there is also a collection of
revenues from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines and
lands, in short everything that comes under the control
of the Roman government — and in all these the people
at large are engaged. Secondly, every citizen is likely to
come sooner or later as a soldier under the absolute power
of the consul, and hence there is an indisposition to reckless
opposition to the authority of the senate and consuls, for
fear of reprisals.

This analysis of the Roman system is interesting as the
first formal exposition of the principle of check and balance
in constitutional organisation, the favourite idea of the
eighteenth century. Polybius favours a mixed constitu-
tion in which there are three distinct organs, each embody-
ing a definite principle and acting through self-interest as
restraints upon the others. Thus, while Plato and Aristotle
sought to combine in one system the principles peculiar
to the various simple forms of constitution, Polybius seeks
to secure the same end by the reciprocal antagonism of
the different organs.

There is a certain irony in the construction of this
supposedly perfect Roman constitution from the fact that
it was hardly formulated by Polybius when the agitation
of the Gracchi led to its destruction. The only writer who
tried to prop up the constitution, which was obviously
falling in pieces, was Cicero, who in his De Republica and
De Legibus sought to induce the Romans to recur to the
older methods of government. His attempt was fore-
doomed to failure, but it had an influence upon imperial
lawyers and early Christian writers. Cicero assumes the
essential idea of the State to be the Commonwealth. " The
State," he says, " is the whole body of the people. The
people is not, however, any group of men brought together

60 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

but a multitude united by a common sense of right and by
a community of interest." The primary cause of union
is not, as Polybius imagined, the consciousness that
isolation means weakness, but rather the fundamental
social instinct of man. It is this instinct, Cicero holds,
that leads to the institution of government in order that the
unity may be preserved. Each of the three primary forms
of government — namely, monarchy, aristocracy and demo-
cracy— has certain advantages, but each contains within
itself the germ of corruption, which produces a cycle of
revolutions. Like Polybius, he concludes that we must
have a combination of all three forms, embodying the best
features of each, and avoiding their defects. On this
principle Cicero seeks to show that the Republican system
is a perfect example of the ideal mixed form of constitution.
The reason for the abolition of monarchy was that the king
degenerated into a tyrant ; the patrician aristocracy was
forced to yield to the restraint of the plebeians because it
was overbearing in its monopoly of power ; and the troubles
of public life since the days of the Gracchi he regarded as
due to an exaggeration of democratic influences.

In the De Legibus Cicero seeks to determine the relation
between right (jus) and law (lex). His argument is
that the former is in all cases dependent upon and sub-
ordinate to the latter. The universe, as the Stoics said,
is a manifestation of the divine reason, which in man
becomes self-conscious, and the ultimate principles of
right and justice are in harmony with the laws by which
the divine government operates. These principles are
capable of being apprehended by all men in virtue of
their rational nature, for " no one is so like to himself as
all are like to all." Now, " to whomsoever reason is
given by nature, so also is right reason ; hence also law,
which is right reason in commanding and forbidding ; and

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 61

if law, also right ; and as reason is given to all, so right is
also given to all." The origin of natural rights, the jus
naturale, is therefore to be sought in the law of nature, the
lex naturalis. Nor is it true that human rights are based
upon self-interest, or that the diversity of institutions
and laws implies diversity in right and justice. It is
only by courtesy that local and temporary enactments are
called law (lex), for those enactments which are contrary
to the dictates of reason have no binding force. This
conception of a law of nature as the source of all obligation
came to have great influence on political speculation
fifteen centuries later.

The Roman Republic gave place to the Empire, and the
overmastering might of the latter destroyed all independent
political life in the subject peoples, completing the work
that the Macedonian conquest had begun. There was
indeed a great development of municipal law and admini-
stration,— a thing by no means unimportant in the
political history of man — but anything like independent
nationality had disappeared. Even under emperors like
Augustus the evils of a despotic government were inevitable,
and from Commodus to Constantine there was an almost
unbroken succession of rulers distinguished for little but
unbridled licence and incapacity. In any case the political
development of a people under a military despotism is
impossible. It is true that under the Roman Empire a
specious appearance of republican institutions was pre-
served, but these were merely a thin disguise behind which
a hard military despotism barely concealed itself. The
emperor had gathered into his own hands all the offices
that in the days of the Republic had been distributed
among the various magistrates. Popular or represen-
tative government there was none, and the Senate was

\

62 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

merely the subservient tool of the emperor's will. As
pontifex maximus he was the supreme arbiter of sacred
law ; he was defended by the irresistible might of the
legions, of which he was absolute master ; his wealth,
derived from the richest and most important provinces,
was enormous ; and his decrees and rescripts had the full
force of law.

Under these conditions it is not to be expected that
there should be anything like a free discussion of the
foundation of society and the State. At the end of
the second century Ulpian lays down the principle that the
emperor's will is law, though only because he has been
endowed with this power by the will of the people, and he
is himself bound by the law from which all his authority
proceeds. But this limitation had very little real influence,
since the power once conferred could not be withdrawn or
diminished, and the power itself was practically unlimited.
The marked distinction drawn by Ulpian between the jus
naturae and the jus gentium had a great influence on subse-
quent thought. He agrees with the Roman jurists of the
second century that while the regulations of society never
reach the stage of perfect justice, they at least tend to apply
to actual conditions principles of absolute obligation. The
Stoic conception of a law of nature was employed in deter-
mination of the principles applicable to all men, with the
result that we find Ulpian declaring that " so far as pertains
to natural rights, all men are equal " ; that by " nature
all men are born free " ; and that " slavery is an institu-
tion contrary to nature." But these suggestions had no
immediate influence upon Roman jurisprudence, since
alongside of them it was held that it is the will of the
prince which makes law ; quidquid principi placuit
legis habet vigor em. Still, though the theory of natural
rights had no direct effect, the opposition of positive law

THE ROMAN EMPIRE 63

and natural rights was bound in course of time to exert a
beneficial influence by suggesting that the former was not
in harmony with what is ideally right ; and after many
days this contrast forced men's minds, especially when
supplemented by the Christian conception of the identical
nature of all men in the sight of God, to face the question
whether that which in positive law is incompatible with
the law of nature was not in disharmony with the true
principles of legislation.

The lawyers who compiled the Institutes of Justinian
follow Ulpian in distinguishing the jus gentium from the
jus naturae, and indeed they differ very little from him in
their general conceptions. The law of nature, they hold,
is divine and immutable, forming the ideal standard of
right conduct, and from it the jus gentium is distinguished
mainly because there are institutions which, though they
are common to various nations, are not " natural " in
the full sense of the word. These jurists also held that
all authority ultimately comes from the people.

The political theory of the Christian Fathers from the
second to the seventh centuries is in essence identical with
that of the Roman lawyers of the same period. They start
with the idea of natural law as the law of man's reason —
a conception first clearly expressed by St. Paul — and thus
conceive of human nature as something transcending all
distinctions of rank and station, and even of nationality.
Slavery is regarded by them as the result of the Fall of
Man, which has made the conventional institutions of society
necessary. It is at once a punishment and a remedy for
sin. The Fathers were no more prepared to condemn
slavery as unlawful than the jurists or philosophers, but
its implicit contradiction with the essential principles of
Christianity worked along with the influence of Stoical
lawyers to ameliorate the condition of the slave and

64 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ultimately to bring slavery to an end. The normal type
of Christian thought is that which is expressed by St.
Augustine, when he declares that man is by his very nature
impelled to enter into social relations. In the state of
nature prior to the Fall men freely obeyed the wise,
and were so generous and humane that no one was allowed
to want. The general theory of government of the Fathers
is that the Ruler is the representative of God on earth,
and as such is entitled to the obedience of his subjects,
the only difference of opinion being as to whether he
must be obeyed under all circumstances. The direct
reference of the power of the Ruler to God as its source
is the point in which the Fathers differ from the legal
writers, who traced all authority back to the people ;
and the history of mediaeval political theory is largely a
history of the contrast of these two doctrines. Justice, it
was held by the Fathers, is not created by the civil power,
for beyond it is the ecclesiastical, which is not so much
within the State as it is a principle of authority parallel
to and independent of it.

Lord Bryce has shown conclusively that the Roman
Empire did not cease with the extinction of the Western
Empire in 476, but continued to exist, or at least was
believed to exist, for the next thousand years. The imperial
titles and imperial traditions remained unbroken down
to the days of the Frank conquest, when Charlemagne
assumed the title of Roman Emperor. This was the first
time that a man of avowed Barbarian blood had ventured
to claim the imperial rank, and to reign not only as King
but as Caesar over the whole of his dominions. The power
of Charlemagne was thus extended over large provinces
that had been wrested from the Roman Empire, and over
vast regions which the elder Caesars had never possessed.

THE ROMAN EMPIRE 65

With the exception of England, Charles was either the
immediate sovereign or the suzerain lord of all Western
Christendom. With the claim to supremacy as Emperor,
there was combined the Germanic ideas of freedom and
law. A law became valid only when it received the sanction
of the monarch, but by custom the counsel and consent
of the assembled nobles, both ecclesiastical and secular,
was required. The approval of the people, on the other
hand, was usually dispensed with, except in matters that
concerned the organisation of Church or State, or the
rights of the people themselves. Though nominally he
was only the head of the State, Charles enforced among
the clergy the recognised Christian discipline, while the
hierarchy exercised a marked influence upon political
institutions.

The political theorists of the ninth century seek to
harmonise their own Germanic conceptions with the teach-
ings of the Fathers. The Ruler was held to receive his power
from God, and rebellion against his authority was severely
condemned. The King, however, is under obligation to
carry out the law, consisting of traditional tribal law, the
legislation of the Roman Empire, which obtained in many
districts, and the laws that the King or Emperor might
issue with the consent of some or all of his subjects.
There seems no reason to think that even Charlemagne
claimed to be the sole legislator in his own right, and as the
century advances we find an ever more decided assertion
of the limited and conditional character of the royal
authority, probably as a result of the civil wars, by which
the power of the Ruler was lessened. Hereditary succes-
sion was the custom, but it had to be confirmed by some
national recognition or election. The deposition of Louis
the Pious in 833 shows that the King held his throne on
condition of discharging his obligations to the general
w.s. E

66 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

satisfaction of his subjects. There was great difficulty
in determining the respective spheres of Church and State.
It was held to be the duty of the King to superintend the
conduct of the clergy, even in purely religious concerns ;
he presided at the Synods ; and he had considerable
power in the appointment of ecclesiastics to office.
On the other hand, the spiritual authorities imposed the
severest penalties for violation of the law of the Church,
and the Pope and the Bishops exercised great authority
in the deposition of King or Emperor.

Feudalism, though it was not the most important element
in the structure of mediaeval society, was a new element
in civilisation. Beginning in the tenth century, it reached
its final form in the latter years of the thirteenth
century. Feudalism, as is well known, is a system of
personal relations, of land tenure, military organisation,
judicial order and political order. The great systems of
national organisation were really independent of it. In
Germany, what triumphed was not feudalism but terri-
torialism. It is to a large extent true that mediaeval
life was dominated by a chivalrous devotion and loyalty,
but there was between the lord and his vassal a relation
of contract involving mutual obligations. The main ele-
ments in the relation were Comitatus, Commendatio and
Beneficium. By the first a band of followers devoted
themselves to a leader ; the second was the process by
which a hitherto independent person became the dependent
of some powerful chief in return for the protection afforded
him ; while the third was a system of land tenure on the
basis of military service.

In this period the law was primarily custom, and two
tests were applied to determine whether a custom was
legal ; the custom must be general, and it must be con-

THE MIDDLE AGES 67

firmed by a judgment of the Court. If the lord can show
that the vassal has failed to discharge his obligations,
the vassal will forfeit his fief ; if the lord can be proved
to have broken his faith, the court will free the vassal
from his obligations, so that he will be entitled to hold
his fief without service for his lifetime. No vassal
can be deprived of his benefice without regular proof,
and the case must be tried by a Court composed of the
peers of the vassal or by the Court of the Emperor.
Only the laws promulgated by the King after delibera-
tion with the Council of his great men and approved by
the custom of those concerned has the force of law. Thus
feudalism was a limitation of autocratic authority. It
was, in fact, after the dissolution of the Carolingian
Empire that Feudalism arose. The invasions of the North-
men and the Magyars led to the destruction of a strong
central authority, and men had to turn for protection
to the nearest power. The result was that the relation to
the central authority was weakened. While in Germany
the process of national consolidation was overpowered by the
territorial principle, in England and France, and ultimately
in other European States, national liberty triumphed.
As early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries the principle
of a direct relation between all free men and the King
began to be established. In doing homage to a lord,
the supreme authority of the King is reserved, so that
the vassal must follow the King even against his lord.
The normal view was that the authority of the King
was derived from God. Such an authority, it was held,
is needed to suppress wrong and to maintain righteousness.
The functions of the Ruler are to maintain justice, to
suppress vice and crime, and to maintain the Catholic
faith. These principles were recognised alike by Im-
perialists and by Papalists. The general view of the

68 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

former was that once elected the King cannot be deposed.
The normal view, however, was that where there is no
justice there is no King, but only a Tyrant. John of
Salisbury held that the Tyrant has no rights against
the people, and may be justly slain. The principle of
hereditary succession was recognised, but never without
the recognition or election of the great men of the community
as a whole. The idea of a strictly hereditary right of
monarchy is not a mediaeval idea. In France and England
some form of election was always a regular part of the
constitutional process of succession to the throne. In
the Empire the succession was always elective. The
principle that the legislative action of the Ruler was limited
by the counsel and consent of the great men was expressly
asserted by so great an Emperor as Barbarossa. Manegold
attacks the tradition that a Ruler has an absolute divine
right ; if the King violates the agreement under which
he was elected, the people, he held, may justly be regarded
as freed from their allegiance.

There was in the mediaeval period a gradual growth of
the idea that the origin of the State is to be found in a
contract of subjection made between the People and the
Ruler. The individual was therefore held to be the
source of all political legislation. There were, however,
it was maintained, natural rights which were unaffected
by the contract and could not be impaired by the State,
a principle expressed in the maxim, salus puUica suprema
lex. The idea of sovereignty was transferred from the
Ruler to an Assembly of the people, though it was held
to be limited by natural law. The notion gradually grew
that the State is the one single Power which stands above
the individual. This theory at once came into conflict
with the claim of the Church to have equal or even
superior power, but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

THE MIDDLE AGES 69

the way was prepared for the absorption of the Church
in the State.

The ancient idea of the State as the highest form of
community, when once it was accepted by the mediaeval
theorist, raised the difficulty as to which of the existing
communities is supreme. The lawyers declared that the
Empire is the one true State, but they went on in defiance
of consistency to apply the conception of the State to
much smaller communities. The philosophical theory,
on the other hand, started with the assumption that there
cannot be more than one State, while below the State are
mere communes. Gradually the term State was applied
only to a community which does not recognise any
external superior. The idea of a World-State had faded
into an insubstantial shadow, and all smaller groups
were brought under the head of corporations or communes.
This did not deprive the latter of a certain independent
life of their own and the possession of rights as subject to
the demands of public law. Neveitheless the tendency
was to exalt the sovereignty of the State as the only
representative of the common interests and the common
life of the community. No room was left for feudal or
patrimonial powers. All subordinate power was to be
delegated by the sovereign power, the State. The privileges
enjoyed by the corporations were regarded as bestowed
upon them by the State, which in the interest of the public
might revoke them. Thus mediaeval thought prepared
the weapons for that combat between the Sovereign State
and the Sovereign Individual which fills the subsequent
centuries. As time went on the ideas of Natural Right
and Freedom more and more lost their meaning, and it
required the type of experience furnished by the modern
Nation-State before the original meaning could be restored
and widened by the enlarged experience of centuries.

70 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Political speculation after the growth of Nation-States
begins again, feeling its way towards an explanation of a
self-governing society by means of the inadequate ideas
of contract, force, representation in a legal " person," and
kindred notions.

In the twelfth century there were two writers who
exercised a certain influence on political theory. These
were St. Bernard and John of Salisbury. St. Bernard pro-
tests strongly in his work On Reflection (De Consider atione,
Libri V) addressed to Pope Eugenius III. against the
interference of the Church in administrative and non-
spiritual affairs. It was not in harmony with his lofty office
that so much of the time and energy of the Pope should
be occupied with such worldly matters as the extension
of the Church's territorial possessions. "What," he
exclaims, " is more slavish and unworthy, especially
in the chief pontiff, than to sweat every day and almost
every hour over such things ! " It may be said that such
interference is demanded in the interests of the Church.
" And indeed," says Bernard, " law resounds every day
through the palace ; but it is the law of the Justinian,
not the law of the Lord." The proper work of the Church
is to absolve from sin, not to divide estates. " Why
do you rush into another's field ? Why do you set your
sickle to another's crop ? " The Pope should limit
himself to his pastoral duties, leaving to the State the
function of maintaining and protecting the Church. This
is also the view of John of Salisbury. "The prince,"
he says, " is indeed the servant of the priesthood, and
performs the part of the sacred duties which seems unworthy
of the hand of priesthood. For while every duty of the
divine laws is religious and holy, nevertheless that of
punishing crimes is inferior and seems in away to represent
that of the executioner ! "

THOMAS AQUINAS 71

The twelfth century was the period of the special intel-
lectual activity of the Scholastics, by whom philosophy
was employed solely in support of the accepted doctrines
of the Church. The Aristotelian logic was the chief source
of the rigid syllogistic method that is so common in their
writings. The dogmas of the Church being regarded as
infallible, the main activity of thought was concentrated
on the attempt to reduce them to syllogistic form, and to
support them by references to Scripture and to the Fathers
of the Church.

The greatest of the Scholastics was Thomas Aquinas,
who employs all his dialectical skill in the attempt to
show that the Church has both temporal and spiritual
power, and must be represented by the Pope. Authority
and reason he regards as independent sources of knowledge.
By the former are revealed the mysteries of the Trinity,
the incarnation and the creation of the world, which
human reason could never have discovered of itself,
though it is capable of establishing the existence of
God and providence from the nature of the world. Man
being a social being, as Aristotle said, even had there been
no Fall he would still have found it necessary to unite in
the order of the State ; and the State by its very nature
demands that there should be a Ruler, whose function
it is to secure the interests of all the citizens, and who is
distinguished above others by his ability and knowledge.
The laws of the State are special ordinances based upon
the law of nature, which embodies the distinction between
good and evil. Law does not cover the whole life of man,
but only commands those things that are essential to the
common weal. The commands of the ruler must be
obeyed except when they are contrary to the will of God,
or when they exceed their proper sphere. Divine law
has been revealed in order that man should learn how he

72 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

may obtain eternal happiness, and this law is under the
jurisdiction of the Church, the representative of which
is the Pope, who is the supreme authority in all matters of
faith. If the Church were not so represented, there would
be no unity of faith. Christians must obey their earthly
rulers, because such obedience is essential to the order
and stability of society. Even if the prince rejects the
Christian faith, his subjects are not absolved from obedience,
since divine law does not destroy human law. The Church,
however, may find it necessary to release the subjects
of an apostate prince from their allegiance, -since he may
by his authority destroy the faith. Excommunication
is thus a legitimate weapon in the hands of the Church.
As to other apostates, Thomas held that they must be
prevented from obstructing the faith, though they cannot
be compelled to embrace Christianity. Intercourse with
unbelievers may in certain cases be permitted, since it
is possible that by such intercourse they may be converted
to the true faith. The heretic is not to be condemned
except after a " first and second admonition," as Scripture
enjoins, but should he prove stubborn and unyielding
in his heresy, he may be excommunicated and handed
over to the earthly court to be put to death.

Hardly had St. Thomas passed away when the old
controversy of the ecclesiastical and secular powers was
resumed. This controversy was brought to a head by
the quarrel between Pope Boniface and King Philip the
Fair. The claim put forward in behalf of the Pope
was that his power extended to temporal as well as spiritual
concerns, and that the King was subject to him in both
respects. The ultimate ownership of all property, it was
further held, is in the Church, and therefore those beyond
the fold of the Church have no just title to it. At a later
time Augustinus Triumphus went even further and

DANTE 73

maintained that as Vicar of God the Pope can at his
discretion deprive private citizens and even kings of their
property. Meantime the papal prestige was declining,
and we are not surprised to find its pretensions attacked
in the most vigorous way. The jurists of the fourteenth
century, by arguments drawn both from the canon and
the civil law, and by appeals to the writings of Aristotle,
helped to consolidate the national monarchies, which
were gradually extending their jurisdiction at the expense
of the Church. The growth and prominence of the French
monarchy under the strong hand of Philip the Fair threw
doubt on the mediaeval doctrine of the universal dominion
of the Emperor, which, as 'a matter of fact, had become
mere fiction. The King, it was held, " holds and possesses
his kingdom immediately from God alone " and his right
is a divine right. The Pope, as Peter Dubois argues,
should not intermeddle in political affairs, but should
confine himself to his proper task of saving souls.

While John of Paris and Peter Dubois wrote in sup-
port of the sovereignty of the French king, Dante came
forward in defence of the Imperial interest. His De
Monarchia is in substance a plea for that secular world-
empire which after the days of the Hohenstauffen ceased
to correspond to facts. Still his treatise is a clear and
impressive statement of the imperial idea. The highest
good of man, it seemed almost self-evident to him, can
only be secured by the subjection of all mankind to
the rule of a single monarch, " a Prince who is over
all men in time, or in those things which are measured
by time." The spiritual interests on the other hand must
be the concern of the Pope, the divinely appointed head
of the Church. This view Dante regards as having the
support of Aristotle, " il maestro di color que sanno."

74 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

For does not " the philosopher " say in his Politics that
" where a number of things are arranged to attain an end,
it is fitting that one of them should regulate or govern the
others, and that the others should submit." Of course this
is a perversion of Aristotle's argument, which was put for-
ward to show that the Greek should be the master of the
Barbarian, and is as far as possible from giving countenance
to the idea of a world -ruler, which, as we know, was entirely
foreign to Aristotle's whole conception of the State. More
germane to the subject is Dante's argument that peace
and tranquillity can only be secured by submission
to a single supreme authority. It is true, he says, that
the family, the village, the city, and the nation are all
under authority, but so long as we have no wider principle
of authority wars and conflicts can never cease. There
must then be one supreme arbiter of all men to settle
disputes, namely, an emperor. Only in him can we expect
to have an authority who by his position is raised above
all merely personal desires, and actuated solely by the desire
to see perfect justice administered to all men. Moreover,
it is only in a universal empire that we can expect the
freedom of men to be preserved. " Democracies, oligarchies
and tyrannies drive mankind into slavery, as any one
who goes about in them soon learns." Dante does not
mean that all legislative power should be in the hands
of the emperor, but only that " cities, nations and kingdoms
should be governed by a rule common to them all, with
a view to their peace." And the emperor must be Roman,
for Rome is the divinely appointed ruler of the world.
The justice of the claim is shown from the fact that,
neglecting her own interests, Rome has always since
the days of the " divine Augustus " sought to promote
universal peace and liberty. Her government might
well be called, in the words of Cicero, " not so much an

DANTE 75

empire as a protectorate of the whole world." It is the
will of God which has enabled Rome to extend her sway
so widely. With this divinely appointed agent of God
a faithless Church has dared to interfere. "It is those
who profess to be zealous for the faith of Christ," he in-
dignantly exclaims, " who have chiefly ' raged together '
and ' imagined a vain thing ' against the Roman Empire ;
men who have no compassion on the poor of Christ, whom
they not only defraud as to the revenues of the Church,
but the very patrimonies of the Church are daily seized
upon ; and the Church is made poor ; while, making a
show of justice, they yet refuse to allow the minister of
justice, i.e. the emperor, to fulfil his office." Their plea
that the empire receives its authority from the Church
is false ; both alike are the ministers of God. Their
talk about the " Donation " of Constantine is baseless
and self-contradictory ; for it is not only contrary to the
very idea of the Church to receive temporal power from
anyone, but even if it were true, the successors of Con-
stantine might logically and fairly give up to the Church
the entire power of the empire. In truth Empire and
Church have each its own independent jurisdiction,
corresponding to the double nature of man as living in
this world and as an heir of eternity. Yet we must not
deny that in certain matters the Roman Prince is subject
to the Roman Pontiff. For that happiness which is subject
to mortality in a sense is ordered with a view to the happi-
ness which shall not taste of death. " Let therefore Caesar
be reverent to Peter, as the first born son should be reverent
to his father, that he may be illuminated with the light
of his father's grace, and so may be stronger to lighten
the world over which he has been placed by Him alone
who is the Ruler of all things, spiritual as well as temporal."
The Empire in short should be the protector of the Church,

76 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

and should with all humility receive the teaching of the
Church in spiritual things. Thus there will be peace and
harmony between them, and they will unite in securing the
happiness, temporal and eternal, of the whole human race.

Dante has been wrongly called " a Reformer before
the Reformation," a title which might be much more
justly applied to Marsiglio of Padua, whose Defensor Pads
anticipates a line of thought that had to wait until the
sixteenth century for general expression, and which even
forecasted the political ideas of Revolution in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. The occasion for the
composition of this remarkable treatise was the dispute
between Lewis of Bavaria and Pope John XXII. By
his victory over Frederic of Austria, Lewis obtained the
crown of Germany, and he immediately showed that he
intended to assert his rights as Emperor of Italy. Ostensibly
a dispute in regard to the opposition of the secular and
the sacred power, the real question at issue was whether
France or Germany or Italy should gain the upper hand.
The dispute was complicated by the action of the Pope,
who condemned the attitude of the Franciscans in retaining
the use of property while claiming to devote themselves
to a life of poverty. For his action the Pope was vigorously
attacked by a group of ecclesiastics, of whom the most
prominent was Marsiglio, a member of the secular clergy,
who also followed the practice of medicine and was for
a short time Rector of the University of Paris.

The ultimate purpose of the State, as Aristotle pointed
out is, says Marsiglio, not merely life but good life.
We may therefore start from the principle that all men,
if they are not bereft of reason or otherwise perverted,
naturally strive for a complete and satisfying life. In
order to attain this object a civil community is necessary.

MARSIGLIO 77

The passions of men deflect them from this end ; they
are liable to suffering and destruction from the powers
of nature, and therefore they stand in need of arts of
diverse sorts to ward off these evils. It is necessary for
men to combine with one another in order to acquire
what is useful and escape what is injurious. Government
is therefore a necessity of social existence. If men are
not regulated by the rules of justice, division and strife
will finally lead to the dissolution of the community. These
rules are the method by which rational government is
secured. Since it is the function of government to
restrain dangerous transgressors and all who seek to
harass the community from within or without, the State
must be able to bring force to bear against all who threaten
its existence and its ultimate purpose. It exists, in short,
in order to provide the means of good life and to transmit
the things that are necessary to that life from generation
to generation ; it must be sufficient in itself for this end ;
and there must be different ranks or offices, each con-
tributing something which man needs for the sufficiency
of his life. Now, law in the strict sense is not merely
the knowledge of what is just and expedient, but a precept
expressed in the form of a command binding upon all the
citizens. Who then is the maker or originator of law ?
Marsiglio answers in unequivocal terms that the source of
political obligation is to be found only in the people as a
whole. " According to truth and the opinion of Aristotle,"
he says, " the legislator, that is, the effective and peculiar
creator of law, is the people, or a majority of them, acting
through election, or more directly through vote in a
general assembly of the citizens, commanding that some-
thing be done or refrained from in the field of social human
action, under pain of some temporal punishment." The

1 Defensor Pacts, bk. i. ch. 12.

78 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

citizens may commit the duty of making law to some one
or few, but the latter do not constitute the legislator in
the strict sense of the term, but act only for the period
covered by the authorisation of the primary legislator. It
is for the people to decide what ceremonies, if any, are
needed for a valid election. It is the people who directly
or indirectly modify, interpret, or suspend laws according
to the exigencies of time, place or other circumstance. By
the same authority laws must be promulgated after their
enactment. A citizen Marsiglio defines, after Aristotle,
as " one who participates in the political community
with either deliberative or judicial authority, according
to his station." It is then to the whole body of the
citizens that the power to make laws belongs. General
utility is more apt to be found in laws so constituted
than from the action of a single person or a few, who are
tempted to seek their own rather than the common good.
If the law is made by one or by a few, the result will be
a despotism over the others, and the rest of the citizens
will endure the law with impatience and seek to evade
it ; while a law made by themselves they will obey,
since it has proceeded from their own will. No man
knowingly does injury or injustice to himself. The citizens
must therefore as a whole have the power of electing,
correcting, and if need be, deposing the government. And
it seems to be a fair inference that a ruler who is elected
without succession is greatly to be preferred to rulers
who are hereditary

The doctrine of popular sovereignty is applied by
Marsiglio to the Church. By the Church is properly meant,
not simply the priesthood, but the whole body of believers.
The ultimate authority in religious matters is therefore
the assembly of all Christians or of their delegates, who
should be chosen from every important province or com-

MARSIGLIO 79

munity of the earth in proportion to the number and
character of its inhabitants. The laity as well as the clergy
must be represented in this general council, which has the
power to excommunicate, to regulate the ceremonial of
worship, and to fill the offices of Church government.
The sole function of the Church is to promote the faith
that leads to salvation in the future life, and it must not
seek to promote this object by compulsion. The power
to enforce its opinions lies with the supreme legislator,
who alone has the right to inflict even the ecclesiastical
penalties of interdict and excommunication. Not only
have the hierarchy no authority in temporal matters,
but even in spiritual things the priest has no power to
forgive sin or to remit the penalty to the sinner ; that is
a matter for God alone, the function of the priest being
merely to certify the divine act. The Pope has no more
jurisdiction than any other bishop, though in dignity he may
be properly regarded as pre-eminent.

From the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the
fifteenth century the national as distinct from the imperial
idea more and more took possession of men's minds. There
was also a decided decline of the political power of the
feudal aristocracy, and before the close of the fifteenth
century it had been practically destroyed. Another
important element was the increased political significance
of the towns, which by their experience of commerce and
industry were able to oppose their own ideal of life to that
of the Church. In England, France and Spain the burghers
aided the crown in overthrowing the nobility, while in
Germany they became practically independent, and in
Italy they assumed the character of the City-States of
antiquity. Meantime the existence in the Church of a
Pope and anti-pope each hurling anathemas at the other

8o THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

destroyed the idea of the unity of the Church, and the
necessity of the monarchical form of its government.
The schism in the Church led to the Council of Constance,
in 1414-1418, and the substitution in large measure of
conciliar for papal authority. Though the papacy finally
succeeded in destroying the Council, its real power was
greatly diminished.

The movements associated with the names of Wycliffe
and Huss were national and anti-papal in spirit. The theory
of authority developed by Wycliffe has a certain interest in
the history of political thought. The authority of God,
which is direct and immediate, is the highest of all. Lower
and subject to this supreme authority are two kinds of lord-
ship, the natural and the civil, the former shared in by all
Christians, the latter arising from the sin of man. The
relation of the divine to civil lordship is figured after the
manner of the relation of the feudal lord to his vassal.
Aristocracy Wycliffe regards as the true form of govern-
ment, while monarchy is only required because of the fall
of man from a state of innocence. Slavery he regards,
after the manner of St. Augustine, as a human institution
resulting from sin, while the elect, being equal in freedom
and nobility, look upon servitude as a matter of indifference.
A grant of perpetual civil property can justly be made
neither by man nor God. Hence he concluded that the tem-
poralities of ecclesiastical corporations might be taken away
in case of misuse. The priest, as he agrees with Marsiglio
and Ockam in holding, has authority only in so far as he
conforms to the law of Christ ; so that no bull or other
document of the Pope has in itself any validity. In general
Huss was in harmony with Wycliffe on all essential points,
being the spokesman of a reaction against the claim to
clerical omnipotence.

CHAPTER FOURTH

MACHIAVELLI TO GROTIUS

AT the opening of the sixteenth century a monarchic
reaction had taken the place of the movement for limited
government in Church and State, while the Roman see
under Leo X. had been materially strengthened. This
fact was thoroughly appreciated by Machiavelli, who
was also conscious that there was a tendency in the time
towards the expression of nationality as well as monarchy.
The old idea of an empire co-extensive with Christian
Europe had faded away, and it seemed to him that the
only way to restore prosperity to Italy, split up as it was
into five separate states, was by some Italian prince of
commanding intellect and strong will making himself
master and obtaining the support of the people in arms
against the dominion of a foreign power.

Machiavelli approaches the problem of political philo-
sophy from the point of view of a practical statesman.
His object is to determine the conditions under which a
strong, united and efficient authority can be established.
The question of the best form of government, important
as he regarded it, was with him strictly secondary. He
saw small despotic states oppressed by petty tyrants, and
republics worn out by faction and mutual hatred. His
own preference was for a republic or a limited monarchy,
but he was prepared to accept even a despotism provided
it was the only or the best way of defending the existence
w.s, §i F

82 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of the State. The one indispensable quality in a ruler,
whether it be the people, a king or a tyrant, is strength of
will and clearness of insight. The main lesson he drew
from his study of contemporary facts was that the ruin
and distraction of Italy sprung from weakness. The ruler
is not to be judged from any fictitious " law of nature,"
but only by asking whether he fulfils adequately the
true function of a ruler. -Utility and morality is the
standard by which he is to be praised or blamed. This
is especially manifest in the Prince, but it is also true of
the Discourses. In the former work he analyses the
political system of the strong monarch, in the latter that
of the strong republic ; but in both cases what he is
interested in is the method of maintaining the power
of the State rather than any abstract question as to its
foundation.

Nowhere has Machiavelli a good word to say for any
destroyer of a free government, and it is for this reason
that he counsels his countrymen to take the Roman
commonwealth as their model. " In a republic," he says,
" nothing should be left to extraordinary modes of govern-
ment ; because though such a mode may do good for the
moment, still the example does harm, seeing that a prac-
tice of breaking the laws for good ends lends a colour to
breaches of law for ends that are bad." He has therefore
no sympathy with the revolutionary dictator. No doubt
occasions may arise when reform cannot be secured by
ordinary means, and then recourse must be had to violence
and arms. In these circumstances some man must make
himself supreme, but when he does so by violence he is
probably a bad man, for a good man will not climb to
power by such means. Nor will a man who has become
supreme in this way be likely to use his ill-gotten power
for good ends. This is the eternal dilemma of a State

MACHIAVELLI 83

in convulsion. Nevertheless Machiavelli, like Aristotle,
suggests a means for preserving tyranny. The tyrant
must encourage his people to pursue their vocations
and give them security that they will not lose their
profit ; he must delight them with feasts and spectacles ;
he must in every way exalt his city. Popular government,
in which Machiavelli was a firm believer, can only exist
when a State has been well instituted and is not yet
corrupt. Otherwise a tyrant is needed as a " strong
medicine " who in virtue of his strength shall redress
what is wrong. Machiavelli believed in a mixed govern-
ment which gave scope to prince, nobles and people ;
but it is the prince who bulks most largely in his eyes
in the stress of the time.

The ideal of a limited City-State, in which the culture
of art and philosophy was the main object, was one with
which Machiavelli had strong sympathy, but he regarded
it as too far removed from attainability to be worthy of
serious consideration. No doubt a perfectly balanced
State would be the true political existence. " But all
human affairs are in motion and it is impossible to stand
still ; they must progress or decline ; and where reason
does not lead, necessity often drives." A State which
is organised merely with a view to existence is likely to
be forced into the policy of expansion, and thus be brought
more quickly to ruin. Its failure in successful expansion
explains why Machiavelli formed a low estimate of the
Greek State and showed particular interest in Rome.
The Greek States were lacking, he thought, in political
wisdom because they were incapable of successful expan-
sion, while Rome achieved empire, and thus showed the
perfection of her ideal.

What marks most decisively Machiavelli's break^with
the Middle Ages is his attitude toward morality and

84 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

religion. He hardly refers to the law of nature, which
was both in ancient and mediaeval philosophy conceived
to be the source of political science ; and the law of God
as manifested through direct revelation was regarded
by him as having nothing to do with the science of politics.
He therefore deliberately and consciously separates the
science of politics from the science of ethics. He does
not deny the excellence of the moral virtues, but he refuses
to regard them as fundamental conditions of political
virtues. The sole object of the strong man in politics
is success in the establishment and extension of govern-
mental power. In both The Prince and the Discourses
Machiavelli discusses the employment of violence, cruelty,
bad faith and other vices with only qualified disapproval,
and he speaks of the employment of virtue and religion
with as little evidence of moral appreciation. He main-
tains that while it is most praiseworthy for a prince to
be good, nevertheless he must be ready to sacrifice
even his conscience, if that is required in the interests of
the State. The ruler who is discreet will naturally avoid
the infamy of those vices which endanger the State, but
for the sake of maintaining political power he may legiti-
mately practise deceit and hypocrisy. " The Prince
must appear all sincerity, all uprightness, all humanity,
all religion " ; but his mind must be so disciplined that
when it is necessary to save the State, he will act
regardless of these. " Let the prince then look to the
maintenance of the state ; the means will always be deemed
honourable and will receive general approbation." The
same method is applied to Republics. " I believe,"
says Machiavelli, " that when there is fear for the life of
the state, both monarchs and republics to preserve it
will break faith and display ingratitude." The ruler's
sole business is to save the State. A perfectly good man

MACHIAVELLI 85

living in a world where so many people are bad, would
be no match for it. There are two ways of carrying on
the fight against vice — one by laws, the other by force ;
but as the first is not always adequate, resort may at times
be had to the second. A wise man neither can nor ought
to keep his word, when his word would injure either himself
or the State, or when the reason that made him give his
promise has passed away. He should never allow his
reputation for mercy to interfere with the severity which
it is necessary to practise in certain cases. It would be
well if he could be both loved and feared ; but if cir-
cumstances force him to make a choice between them,
it is better to be feared than loved. The whole question
under all circumstances is what is best for the State. Where
the safety of a country is at stake, no heed should be paid
to justice or injustice, to pity or severity, to glory or shame ;
but that course should be followed which is likely to preserve
existence and freedom.

Machiavelli is by no means a thoroughgoing advocate
of a monarchical form of government. When there is any-
thing like economic equality the only possible form of
government he believes to be a republic. The people as a
whole are wiser than the princes, and are not more ungrate-
ful. Though they are often mistaken in regard to great
principles, they are usually right in regard to particular
measures. As for prudence and stability, he says, " I say
that a people is more prudent, more stable and of better
judgment than a prince. Never let a prince complain
of the faults of the people under his rule, for they are due
either to his own negligence or else to his own example,
and if you consider a people given to robbery and outrages
against law, you will generally find that they only copy
their masters. Above all, and in any case, the ruler,
whether hereditary or an usurper, can have no safety

86 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

unless he founds himself on popular favour and good will.
Better far than any number of fortresses is not to be hated
by your people. '

The only sound policy for an hereditary monarch,
and much more for a newly established prince, is to show
respect to the established institutions and customs of the
land. The Prince must have a good army, and he should
seek to inspire fear in his subjects. At the same time
he must cultivate a reputation for high purposes and
lofty character, and he must liberally encourage the useful
arts. Machiavelli consistently maintains the distinction
between the fundamental law of the State and ordinary
legislation. Law naturally reflects any change in custom,
while the constitution itself remains unchanged. Rigidity
in the constitution will ultimately lead to the ruin of the
State unless it is modified to suit new conditions. It is
wise, however, to respect the ancient forms, even if a
fundamental change is made in substance ; and this is
easily done, because the people are not hard to please so
long as appearances are respected. Some officer of State
must be provided who on occasion may exercise absolute
power in great emergencies. This is especially necessary
in a popular form of government on account of the
slowness of the administration. The struggles of parties
Machiavelli regards, not as evils, but as a condition of
greatness ; they give occasion for testing the ability of
the leading citizens, and call into existence the institutions
and laws which prove the mainstay of the government
in later days.

Machiavelli is no doubt right in maintaining that there
is a distinction between public and private morality,
and that a patriotic statesman may do many things which
in a private individual would call for severe reprobation.

MACHIAVELLI 87

But it is one thing to say that a nation, responsible for
the whole life and "prosperity of the subjects, cannot be
judged in the same way as we judge an individual in his
comparatively limited sphere of action, and another thing
to say that it is absolved from all moral law and may
employ fraud, deceit, treachery and violence under all
circumstances and as a regular principle of action. Nor
can a statesman be exonerated if he employs as a settled
policy such methods to secure the aggrandisement of his
own people, and even apart from any real danger to the
existence of the nation. We have to consider among other
things the inevitable effect of this unscrupulous mode of
action upon the whole spiritual life of the nation that
he represents, not to speak of its influence upon the subjects
of other nations. In any case the attempt to justify
action that at the most can only be condoned by dread of
national extinction, and to make it a fixed principle of
State action, is contrary to the higher interests of the State
which practises it, not to say anything of the continual
temptation to find reasons for holding the country to be
in peril whenever there is a temptation to embark upon
an unscrupulous policy. It cannot be admitted that
statesmanship consists in the endeavour to secure special
advantages for one's own people at the expense of other
peoples — as if the real interest of one nation were neces-
sarily in antagonism to the interests of all other nations.
More and more we are coming to see that the highest
form of statesmanship, and indeed the only rational form,
is that which regards the various nations as fellow-workers
in the common cause of humanity. No doubt we are
still far from realising this ideal, but the first step towards
it is to get rid of the notion that nations must be regarded
as necessarily hostile, the only law in their case being the
"law of the beasts."

88 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

As Machiavelli is the spokesman of the Renaissance,
so Luther represents the political philosophy of the Refor-
mation. The influence of the latter was once for all to
substitute in men's minds the authority of the State
for the authority of the Church. The prince became
no longer a feudal monarch, but ruled by his own indepen-
dent power, while the authority of the emperor practically
disappeared. Luther never allowed the right of the people
to rebel against the authority of the prince, and therefore
he pronounced against the revolt of the peasants in 1525.
The distinction between sacred and secular he denied,
and he maintained the necessity of inequalities of rank.
Although his influence was on the whole in favour of
nationalism, it was not the German people, but the terri-
torial prince who reaped the benefit. The prince in his
view is responsible only to God, not to the people. To
him it seemed evident that the only power which could
secure to the individual his rights and his liberty was a
prince with absolute authority ; for only so, he thought,
could the lay power be liberated from clerical control.
The actual result was to give the prince authority over the
religion of his subjects and to make religion dependent
upon the will of statesmen. The imperial authority
was destroyed, but at the same time all checks on princely
tyranny were removed by the transference of the doctrine
of non-resistance from the imperial to the princely and
from the ecclesiastical to the lay power.

The problem of Machiavelli was how to preserve a State
whose very existence was threatened. Jean Bodin on
the other hand really attempts to put forward a theory
of the State, and he gives a precise definition of what he
understands by political sovereignty. Sovereignty is a
power supreme over citizens and subjects, itself not bound

JEAN BODIN 89

by the laws. This power must not be temporary but
perpetual. Whatever authority is given to magistrates
or private individuals is different in its nature from the
power of the sovereign. Supreme and perpetual power
may be bestowed by the people upon an individual, they
having abrogated their authority, just as one may surrender
to another the ownership and possession of his property ;
and in this case an individual may have sovereignty, pro-
vided always the transfer is free from conditions. The
monarch is in this case above law, though he is not above
duty and moral responsibility. " If we define sovereignty
as a power legibus omnibus soluta, no prince can be found
to have sovereign rights ; for all are bound by divine
law and the law of nature, and also by the common law
of nations which embodies principles distinct from these."
A prince may abrogate, modify, or replace a law made by
himself and without the consent of his subjects ; but he
cannot abrogate or modify laws concerning the supreme
power, since these are attached to the very sovereignty
with which he is clothed. Even if a prince has sworn
to obey the laws of his fathers, he is not bound by his oath
unless it has been made to his subjects as a condition of
reigning. The first and principal function of sovereignty
is to give laws to the citizens, nor is the prince bound
to obtain the consent of any assembly or senate. He
may indeed call together assemblies or senates, but the
final decision rests solely with himself. Custom has
no force against the authority of the prince, for it has
compulsory force only so long as it is endorsed by the prince,
and when it is so endorsed it has the force of law.

The most important contribution of Grotius to political
science was his formulation of a scheme of international
rights and duties. Such a scheme was eminently called

go THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

for from the need to find some substitute for the influence
of Christianity which had served to bind peoples together,
but which was now of no avail when one nation was
Catholic and the other Protestant. The place thus
left vacant was filled by the revived idea of a law of nature
prescribing the rights and duties of divided and warring
peoples. In his doctrine of sovereignty Grotius cannot
be said to have made any advance upon Bodin ; and his
assimilation of sovereign power to a private right has tended
to obscure its true nature. The theory that society is based
upon an original contract, which was employed to defend
the absolute power of the monarch, equally lent itself to
the support of the sovereignty of the people ; for a contract
by its nature implies the observance of its terms by both
parties, and ceases to be binding when its terms are violated
by either party. As it happened, the course of events led
to the application of the idea of contract on the Continent
in support of an absolute monarchy, while in England it
was turned to account in justification of revolution.

CHAPTER FIFTH

THE NATION-STATE: HOBBES, SPINOZA
AND LOCKE

THE Sophists, as we have seen, sought to base the State
upon a " contract neither to do nor to suffer wrong."
This idea of an opposition between the individual and the
State, involving the conception of the individual as having
natural rights apart from society which he voluntarily
suspends in order to obtain a greater personal good, is
the common assumption of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau,
an assumption which is received from them by Bentham
and Austin. Hobbes maintains that in the state of nature
each man fights for his own hand, and it is to escape
from the internecine state of war thus engendered that a
contract or pact is made by which individuals hand over
their power to some individual or individuals, who hence-
forth act with the combined power of all the individuals.
The contract is indissoluble, and the government has an
indefeasible right to direct the actions of all members
of the society over which it is sovereign. It is true that
the only sovereign in the proper sense must owe his power
to the consent of the people, but it is tacitly assumed by
Hobbes that the sovereignty once established cannot
be annulled. If indeed the subjects are strong enough
to resist the claim to sovereignty, the right disappears. It
follows that the only source of an obligation is the power
to enforce obedience. For the right of the sovereign is

91

92 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

established only by natural right, which means that its
basis is, like that of the individual in a state of nature,
his power to uphold it.

Sovereign power may be acquired, as when men submit
to a conqueror under fear of death. Such a sovereign
is not properly a sovereign in Hobbes' sense of the term,
because his power is not due to any covenant. The only
sovereign in the proper sense is one who owes his power
to the consent of the people. But Hobbes tacitly assumes
that a sovereign who has obtained his sovereignty by
acquisition may act as if he were a sovereign by institu-
tion. The only right which a sovereign can claim lies
in his superior power, and if the subject can resist it the
right disappears. A successful resistance would show
that the sovereign power had ceased to exist. Hobbes
can only show that the subjects have a right to rebel
by distinguishing the Power of a Sovereign from his Right.
The sovereignty established can only have a Natural
Right, and that means mere Power. If it means anything
else, it must mean that there are natural rights of men
other than mere power, which are vindicated by the
subversion of the latter. But if there are such rights,
there must be equally a possibility of collision between
the sovereign power and these rights which would justify
a resistance to it.

In harmony with the ancient idea Spinoza holds that
the State is the great means by which man is freed from
the " wretched and almost brutish existence " which is
spent by those " who live in a state of barbarism without
a political order of life." It is true that the State cannot
determine the whole life of man ; there are spheres and
interests which lie beyond it ; nevertheless there is
much which only the State can do, and it is one of the most

SPINOZA 93

important means of human happiness. From what source
then does society derive its powers or rights ? The answer
of Spinoza is that man has a natural right which is
co-extensive with his power over things. This power is by
no means unlimited, because each individual being is only
a part of a whole order or system which is constituted
by the essential nature of the universe or God. The good
of man is that which will contribute to his greatest welfare
or happiness. Men certainly often err in regard to the
means by which their good may be obtained, but this is
due solely to an error of judgment. He who has a clear
conception of that wherein his true happiness consists
cannot help seeking and willing it. A bad action is one
which is the expression of an inadequate idea, and its
badness consists entirely in this inadequacy. Hence
the only way to make a man better is to give him reasons
for changing his opinion. The society which by its laws
encourages industry, enterprise, honesty and thrift
supplies to its citizens adequate reasons for regarding
these qualities as for their good. The thief may be con-
verted into an honest tradesman if he can be convinced
that the skill which he displays in depriving another of
his money can be employed to his own greater advantage
in another way. To be angry or indignant with the evil-
doer is not only useless, but it does not remove the causes
which led to his evil-doing. The proper method is to
institute better conditions of social existence, more suitable
conditions of labour, and a better form of family life.
The end of the State is, then, to make men free, that is,
to induce them to live according to reason, and it can only
do so by prescribing and enforcing certain courses of
conduct. The individual must obey the law or submit
to the penalties imposed by the State. If every man
followed reason, he would cease to speak of being under

94 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

obligation to obey the law, and would speak only of liberty
and happiness and the love of his fellows, which is identical
with the love of God. A law is not properly a command,
but a rule of conduct which a man prescribes to himself or
to any other with a view to a certain end. But as the true
end of life is recognised only by a very few, legislators
have promised rewards to those who obey the law and
threatened punishment to those who violate it. It is
for this reason that a law has come to be regarded as a
command. Man is not naturally moral or social, but
must fight his way towards sociability, and the State is
the chief moral agency in this contest. In the state of
nature men are one another's enemies. But this is only
the first state of man. Every one desires to live in security
and without fear ; and this end cannot possibly be attained
so long as enmity, hatred, anger and guile rule in place of
reason.

Spinoza rejects the view of Hobbes that in a state of
nature there is " war of all against all." Men naturally
associate with one another, finding the help of others
necessary for defence and for the satisfaction of the natural
wants. Without mutual help they would spend their
lives in the utmost wretchedness, whereas a settled order
confers positive advantages upon the individual. Hence
even in the state of nature that man is the most powerful
and most a law to himself who is most guided by reason.
If all men were so guided, they would utterly detest fraud
and guile, and would sacredly observe every promise,
thus displaying that loyalty which is the best defence of all.
However far we go back in history, we never find a point
where men are not endowed with the faculty of reason, a
faculty which is not made by the State, but which, on the
contrary, calls the State into existence. The civil order is
the conscious and deliberate creation of men's thought,

SPINOZA 95

and has been instituted because they recognise that each
would gain more than he lost by having settled laws, cus-
toms, modes of conduct, and forms of rule binding upon all.
The State is therefore a social compact of a peculiar kind ;
for it does not derive its character from any other compact,
but is the condition of them all. It does not necessarily
imply free consent, but may be based upon force and
conquest, and in its terms it is absolute and indissoluble.
Nor does it depend upon any verbal or written agreement,
but springs from the essential nature of man. Whatever
in the judgment of the ruler is in the commom interest,
that it is right for him to do. The contract ought undoubt-
edly to be violated if this is demanded by common safety,
though the right to judge whether it should be broken
belongs to no private citizen, but only to him in whose
hands the supreme power is placed. On all other occasions
the State is bound to observe the terms of the contract,
for the same reason as a man in the state of nature, if he
would not be his own enemy, must not commit suicide.
So far is it from being the case that government is an
alien force, it is the best friend that man has in the world.
There is no antagonism between the individual's interest
and the interests of the community. Reason teaches us
that we should seek the things that make for peace, and
peace cannot be secured unless the common laws of the State
are preserved inviolate. " The status civilis has its natural
source in the desire to be free from some common fear,
and to remove the common causes of unhappiness. Hence
its chief end is just that which each man who was guided
by reason would try, but try in vain, to reach in the state
of nature. Thus even if the man who makes reason his
guide has sometimes, in obeying the commands of the
State, to do what he knows to be contrary to reason, this
loss is far more than made up to him by the benefits which

96 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

the status civilis itself confers upon him. And surely it
is a law of reason that a man should always choose the lesser
of two evils. Our conclusion accordingly is that no one
acts in any way contrary to the prescript of his own reason
when he does that which the law of the State requires
should be done." x

The end of the State, then, is not to restrain men by
fear, and subject them to a foreign yoke, but to "deliver
each man from fear, so that he may be able to live with
the utmost possible security ; that is to say, that he may
maintain in the best way his own natural right to exist
and to act, without doing harm either to himself or to
his neighbours." 2 Hence the power and the right
which in a state of nature each man possesses cannot
belong to him in the civil community. If he remains out-
side of the civil order, he must submit to the consequences,
and hence we may say that the civil order is natural
to everyone and is maintained by the thought and will
of each individual within it. By it a man is protected
against his own lower self, not less than against the en-
croachments of others. The law is an expression of reason,
and therefore of man's higher self ; hence neither religion
nor his own unguided judgment can be a substitute for it.
The State is indeed a necessity, but it is a necessity of
thought.

What does the individual give up in order to enjoy the
advantages of the civil order ? In the highest sense he
does not give up anything, but in a lower sense he gives
up the power and the right to do whatever is in his own
judgment for his advantage, and he agrees to be ruled in
his conduct by what the State judges to be the best for

1 Tractatus Politicus, iii. 6 ; Duff's Ethical and Political Philosophy of
Spinoza, p. 267.

2 Theol. Pol ch, 20 j Duff, p. 267.

SPINOZA 97

all and therefore best for him. In other words, he resigns
his own natural right in favour of a ruling power which
employs the natural right of the whole community. A
man has no property, for example, which he can call
absolutely his own, and which may not be interfered with
by the State. All property belongs to the community,
and if we distinguish between private and public pro-
perty, it is only because in the one case the property is
entrusted to the private citizen for use, while in the other
case it is administered by a public official.

Hobbes regards the State as synonymous with the Ruler,
while Spinoza more properly distinguishes the one from
the other. The ideal State is in his estimation that in
which the Ruler's power is absolute ; but what this means
is for him that only the Ruler who acts in the interest
of the public good can be absolute in the control of his
subjects. Spinoza indeed is the determined opponent
of an absolute monarchy, which he regards as the most
dangerous and precarious of all kinds of rule. He carries
through his social theory the principle with which he starts,
that no one has more right than he has power and insight.
Though the people may have made a covenant with the
Ruler, and though the Ruler may have the blessings
of the Church, yet if he does not fulfil his proper function
and maintain the interests of the whole community,
he inevitably loses his authority. This principle Spinoza
regards as the only safeguard against absolutism such as
that advocated by Hobbes. The right to rule and the
claim to obedience lapses with a violation of the conditions
essential to the ordered civil life. " The existence of a
State," he says, " depends upon certain conditions. If
these conditions are maintained, so also are the reverence
and fear of the subjects towards the State ; while if these
conditions are destroyed, so also are the reverence and
w.s. G

98 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

the fear of the subjects ; and when reverence and fear
are lost, so likewise is the State. The State is therefore
bound, if it would be a law and an end to itself, to main-
tain the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise it ceases
to be a State. For it is as impossible for the man or men
who have their chief place in the community to flaunt
their drunkenness and profligacy in public, to play the fool,
openly, to violate and contemn the laws made by them-
selves, and at the same time to maintain their sacred
majesty, as it is impossible at once to be and not to be.
Or again, if they slaughter and plunder their subjects,
ravage virgins and so on, they inevitably change the fear
of their subjects into indignation. That is to say, they
turn the status civilis (whose end is peace) into a state
of hostility." *

Spinoza denies that we can apply directly to the State
the principles which are applicable to individuals. Being
the supreme authority, the State, if it is untrue to itself,
will act in disharmony with the interests of the citizens.
To observe a treaty which is found not to be in the interest
of the citizens, is to act contrary to the very idea of the
State. So long as separate states are supreme each in its
own sphere, there must be a condition of mutual hostility,
which cannot be overcome until some organised force
stronger than any one of them is established. There may
indeed be a federation of States, which can do much to
diminish war ; and the greater the number of the States
that enter into the confederation, the less likely is war
to take place. Nevertheless each State must see to the
interests of its own citizens, and cannot without folly
make any agreement that would interfere with this
object.

There is also another side to the autocracy of the State.

1 Tract. Pol iv. 4 ; Duff, p. 289.

SPINOZA 99

It must be independent of any right or power vested in
its citizens as private individuals. The citizens have no
rights except those which have been bestowed upon them
by the State. Hence any individual, corporation, trade, or
Church, which secures for itself rights or powers without
the authority of the State, simply proves the weakness
and inefficiency of the State. If it is to preserve its
independence, the State must be supreme, and therefore it
cannot transfer its rights to any other body or individual.

Spinoza's theory of the State marks a distinct advance
upon that of Hobbes, especially in its conception of the
source of rights. The notion that men have rights apart
from society is the foundation on which Hobbes' theory of
the Social Contract is built. Men are assumed to have rights
before the existence of society, and only surrender them
in order the better to secure their own individual interests.
Thus rights are divorced from duties, and it is supposed
that the only rights that they possess after the formation
of society are those granted to them by positive enactment,
except certain primitive rights which survive under the
new conditions. In truth, as Spinoza sees, there can be
no right which does not flow from the consciousness of a
common interest on the part of members of a society,
since a right implies recognition by the common will.

But, suggestive as it is, Spinoza's doctrine does not seem
to be consistent with itself. He holds that men band
themselves together because they believe that in this way
they will best realise the effort to perpetuate their own
existence. He does not recognise any other motives in
the civil state than those which are operative in the state
of nature.

In his theory of the State he carries out unflinchingly
the fundamental principle of his ethical philosophy, that
man's highest good is the result of that conatus sese con-

ioo THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

servandi which is found in all forms of being. Anything
like self-sacrifice or even self-blame he rejects. Asceticism
is for him nothing but a torva et tristis super stitio. The
true end of all action is to secure the greatest self-satis-
faction or individual happiness, and in this attitude of pure
affirmation Spinoza finds the secret not only of the State
but of the highest form of blessedness. From passion,
the motive operative in man in his first mind, liberation
is to be obtained by an enlightened self-interest that
leads to identification with the common weal. It is entirely
a question of the greater enlightenment which comes
from the wider view of reason. When we bring our own
life into connection with the life of society as a whole,
we see the irrationality of the narrow life of passion, and
therefore we seek our own good in the common good.

The defect in this account of the transition from the
state of nature to the social state is that it gives no justifica-
tion for the latter. If we once admit that in the so-called
state of nature man is already in possession of rights,
there can be no difference in principle between the status
naturalis and the status civilis. In truth in the former there
can be no rights, but only powers, or if there are, it must
be because there is ascribed to man in the state of nature
the very same essential nature as that which is supposed
to come into existence only in the civil state. Thus
Spinoza's view really leads to the dilemma : If in the
state of nature there are rights, society is already formed ;
if there are only powers, these will not develop into
rights.

Spinoza's transition from passion to reason is in effect
a means of concealing the defect in his conception of society.
Passion has in it an element of defect, being an inadequate
idea, and this inadequacy arises from its finitude. Remove
the limitation due to this cause and it will become adequate.

SPINOZA

Personal ambition is morally wrong, but when it is brought
into relation to the idea of the whole, it becomes moral.
Now, this way of looking at the matter disguises the fact
that Spinoza has here really made a transition which is
qualitative. Selfish ambition differs from unselfish, not
merely because it is inadequate, but because it is wrong.
Thus the difference is infinite. True, it is so far moral
as to imply a false notion of what the highest good of the
individual demands ; but this false notion covers a dis-
tinction in kind. Spinoza, fixing upon the fact that it
involves an impulse towards self-realisation, and so far
agrees with disinterested ambition, the ambition which
leads a man to identify his own good with the good of the
community, affirms that the former is in essence identical
with the latter. But it is only identical in being a real
but blind effort after the good. Thus it is as much a
violation of true self-realisation as it is an effort after it.
The transition from selfish to disinterested ambition
can only be made by the negation of the defective element
in the former, and this negation is just as essential as
the affirmation. All moral action therefore involves
a negative as well as a positive element, and it is neglect
of the negative element that leads Spinoza to think of
morality as pure self-affirmation ; and, it may be added,
it is the same neglect that leads him to endorse the
idea that the State is a Contract, that is, an agreement
of separate wills each seeking its own personal good.
The fundamental mistake in his political philosophy as
in his general philosophy is to conceive the bare individual
as having a nature apart from society, whereas there can
be no distinctively moral action except in so far as the
individual discharges a function in society which enables
him to minister to the well-being of the whole community.
Spinoza was debarred from taking this view by his denial

io2 THE Sf ME IN PEACE AND WAR

of all final causes. Holding that man like other beings
is determined solely by material and efficient causes,
he can properly speak neither of rights nor of duties,
both of which imply relation to an end, namely, the good
of society as a whole. This does not prevent him from
tacitly assuming that human affairs are directed to an end,
as when he says that men seek to secure a higher form
of civil society. He thinks that a clear understanding
of the world will lead to an advance from a lower to a
higher form of society ; and in so doing he tacitly assumes
that man is determined by the idea of social perfection,
and not simply by the impulse to secure his own well-being.

With less speculative power than Spinoza, Locke comes
nearer in virtue of his strong common sense to a true
political theory. He differs from Hobbes in conceiving
the original contract as merely an agreement to form a
civil society, which must have a government, but not
necessarily the same government. The people always
retain the right of resuming the powers delegated to the
legislative and the executive. Thus Locke virtually
vindicates the right of revolution. The legislative power
is supreme over all other organisations, but in the last
resort it is subject to the will of the community. Thus a
government that passes bad or fails to pass good laws
may be removed and another put in its place. The liberties
of the people cannot be allowed to pass out of its own
hands. Where the executive is vested in a constitutional
monarch, inferior magistrates derive from him their powers,
but obedience is due to him only so long as he acts according
to the law. When he fails to represent the commonwealth
and acts by his own will, he degrades himself, and is
" but a single private person without power, and without
will that has any right to obedience ; the members owing

LOCKE 103

no obedience but to the public will of the society." l Locke
therefore distinguishes three senses in which we may speak
of the supreme power : (i) The sovereign power ascribed
to the constitutional monarch, (2) the supreme law-making
body, (3) the whole mass of public opinion and the whole
force of the people. Good government is determined
by the relation between the legislative and the general
will, which is the ultimate political sovereign, and which
is expressed through representative institutions, petitions,
public meetings, a free press, and various other means.
If these are interfered with or refused, the public will may
assert itself by armed rebellions, *or, if that is not possible,
by secret conspiracies. International law is not a limita-
tion of the absolute sovereignty of the nation, being self-
imposed. No doubt the recognition of the nation as one
of a community of nations, with moral claims upon it,
which are backed by the irregular penalties of war, imposes
a moral check upon its unlimited independence, but only
as the recognition of the will of the ultimate political
sovereign imposes a moral check on the legal sovereign.

1 Locke's Treatise of Civil Government ^ bk. ii. ch. 13.

CHAPTER SIXTH

THE NATION-STATE (continued) : ROUSSEAU,
KANT AND HEGEL

IN the eighteenth century the transition was made from
these abstract conceptions to a more concrete grasp of the
nature of the State in the Control Social of Rousseau.
As was only natural in a pioneer, the new wine of political
theory is put into the old bottles of the juristic tradition,
with the result that Rousseau's fundamental idea is apt to
be misapprehended or overlooked. When he tells us that
" man is born free and everywhere is in chains," x we
naturally think that he is making a claim for the unsophis-
ticated man and preferring an indictment against civilised
society as a restriction of human freedom. This is by
no means his meaning, though it must be confessed that
he gives countenance to this false interpretation by his
confused idea of the state of nature. His view is clearly
indicated in his criticism of Grotius. Government,
according to Grotius, is based upon force, not upon the
true consent of the governed. But this, argues Rousseau,
makes right depend upon the power that chances to be
strongest, and with the weakening of the power the right
is also weakened. Grotius asks why, if an individual
man may alienate his liberty, a people may not give
up their liberty into the keeping of a king. To which
Rousseau answers that no man can rightly alienate his

1 Contrat Social, i. I.
104

ROUSSEAU 105

freedom, and even if he could alienate himself, he could
not alienate his children ; so that in each succeeding
generation the people must have the right to accept or
reject the government. To renounce one's liberty is to
renounce what makes one a man, and to destroy the morality
of action. Grotius says that a people may give itself a
king ; but he does not observe that a nation must first
exist before it can give itself a king.1

Having thus cleared away Grotius' inadequate solution,
Rousseau restates the problem in this form : "To find
a form of association which shall defend and protect,
with the entire common force, the person and the goods
of each associate, and by which, uniting himself to all,
he may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as
free as before."2 There is a certain defect in this mode
of statement ; for obviously if man is originally free, some
of his freedom must be lost when he submits to society ;
and if on the other hand man in society has increased
power, he must be more free than he was before. This
defect is connected with the individualistic terms in which
Rousseau states his doctrine of the common will. He
never entirely clears his mind of the fallacy that man
is free apart from society, whereas the real gist of his
argument is that it is only in society that man is free
at all.

The essence of the Social Contract is reducible to the
formula : " Each of us puts into the common stock his
person and his entire powers under the supreme direction
of the general will." 3 No doubt " each individual may
as a man have a particular will contrary to or unlike the
general will which he has as a citizen." Thus, " in order
that the social pact may not be a vain formula, it tacitly
includes the covenant . . . that whoever shall refuse
M. 4,ii. 5. 2i- 6. 3i. 6.

io6 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by
the whole body, which means nothing less than that he
will be forced to be free." l For, if the social person is a
reality, force employed against the physical individual
may be the condition of freedom. " The transition from
the state of nature to the civil state produces in man
a very remarkable change by replacing in his conduct
instinct by justice, and giving to his actions the morality
which they lacked before. It is then alone that, the voice of
duty succeeding to physical impulse, and right to appetite,
man, who till then had only considered himself, sees himself
compelled to act on another principle, and to consult
his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although
he deprives himself in this state of several advantages
which he holds from nature, he gains much greater ones
in their place : his faculties exercise and develop themselves,
his ideas expand, his sentiments are ennobled, his whole
soul is exalted in such a degree, that, if the abuses of his
new condition did not often degrade him below that from
which he has emerged, it would be his duty to bless without
ceasing the happy instant which tore him from it for ever,
and, from a stupid and narrow animal, made him an
intelligent being and human." We must therefore
" distinguish natural liberty, which has no bounds but
the powers of the individual, from the civil liberty which
is limited by the general will." And we may " add to the
gains of the civil state 'the moral freedom which alone
makes a man master of himself ; for the impulsion of
appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law which we
have prescribed to ourselves is liberty." 2

For Rousseau, then, the civil state is an embodiment
of moral liberty. It is not a mere renunciation, but the
attainment of freedom. By freedom Rousseau means

M. 7. 2i. 8 ; Bosanquet's Phil. Theory of the State, pp. 97-98.

ROUSSEAU 107

the recognition of a law and a will with which one's every-
day self may be at odds, but which is one's truer and
fuller self. Positive freedom being the exercise of the
higher self or general will, Sovereignty will consist in
its exercise. The general will is not the mere sum of
individual wills — though Rousseau speaks at times as if
it were — but the will of all in so far as the common good
is its object ; and law is its expression, but only in so far
as it is what it ought to be. Sovereignty must therefore
be distinguished from Power, for Power can be trans-
mitted, but not Sovereignty. The exercise of the general
will can never be alienated, for that would mean that
it is not an expression of the consensus of all the wills of
the community. Sovereignty is thus at once inalienable
and indivisible. It consists solely in the act of legislation,
and implies that the people as a whole come to a decision
with reference to the whole people. Laws can only be
made by the general will, and are the register of the real
will of the individual. Still, while the general will is always
right, it does not follow that the resolutions of the people
are always right ; for, though men always desire their
own good, they do not always discern wherein their good
consists.1

Government, which is never the same as the Sovereign,
does not legislate, but carries out the legislation of the
Sovereign. As the magistrates, with the execution of the
laws and with the maintenance of liberty, both civil and
political, may be the whole people or a small number,
or a single person, a State may be either a Democracy,
an Aristocracy or a Monarchy. The difference in these
forms of government does not lie in the quarter where
the Sovereignty resides — for it must always reside in
the whole body of the people — but in that in which

Mi. 2, 3.

io8 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

the government resides. The government is the public
force by which the general will is brought to bear on the
citizens or against other States. Rousseau is of opinion
that the best form of government is a Democracy, though
he points out that the will of all does not necessarily
coincide with the general will. In the other two forms,
indeed, the force of government is greater than in a Demo-
cracy ; but where there is any Sovereign Will at all, the
government must express it.

Since the Sovereignty is inalienable, there can be no
contract between the Sovereign and the government.
" There is but one Contract in the State, namely, that of
the original association ; and this excludes every other.
No other contract can be imagined which would not be
a violation of the first." l Even when government is vested
in a hereditary body, monarchic or aristocratic, this is
merely a provisional arrangement, made and liable to be
reversed by the Sovereign, whose officers the governors
are. In order that the sovereignty should not fall into
abeyance, it must be exercised, and it can only be exer-
cised in assemblies of the whole people. Such assemblies
are entitled to revise and repeal all previously enacted
laws. The English people, according to Rousseau, is only
free while an election to parliament is going on.

It is obviously the confusion between the general will
and the will of all — which yet Rousseau himself clearly
distinguishes — that leads him to say that the general
will can only be exercised in an assembly of the whole
people. If, as he says, the general will may be very
different from the will of all, it is obviously not funda-
mental that the general will should be expressed by the
whole assembled community ; what is fundamental is
that it should be expressed. Rousseau admits that the

1 iii. 1 6.

ROUSSEAU 109

general will may be overpowered by particular interests,
and find no expression in the votes of the popular assembly.
Apparently, however, the possible lack of enlightenment
does not prevent its decisions from being in the interest
of the general good ; which is an obvious confusion between
the absoluteness of the general will and the relativeness
of its actual expression.

The main defect in Rousseau's theory of the State
arises from his assumption that the general will can only
be exercised in a full assembly of the whole people ; a
condition which is impossible in any large State. Such
a view is obviously the result of a confusion between the
general will and the will of all. It is not fundamental
to his doctrine that the whole people should determine
each law in their assembly, but only that, whatever the
method of ascertaining it, the general will should be
expressed. What is best for the good of the whole is by
no means manifest to every citizen in his ordinary mind ;
his real will must be revealed to him, and for this purpose
a representative form of government may be shown to
be more successful than any form of plebiscite. On
Rousseau's view no large State is possible. It is quite
conceivable that the people may have no clear conception
of what the public good demands, and may really be
determined in their judgments by a consideration of their
private good. No doubt a man does not lose his desire
to make the best of himself however he may be deflected
in his judgment by his private interest. What is permanent
in Rousseau's doctrine is that man is always aiming at
what he believes to be his good. If this ineradicable
impulse of an intelligent being disappeared, there would
be no general will, and the whole foundation of political
society would cease to exist. If every man had an intelli-
gent apprehension of his own real good, he would in all

no THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

cases seek the common good, and in that case the will
of all would be identical with the general will ; but even
so, the justification would not lie in the fact that a vote
of all was given, but in the coincidence of the judgment
of all with reason . An agreement of all if each is determined
by the consequences to himself as a private individual
is merely what Rousseau would call a sum of particular
wills. The fact, for example, that the German people
are unanimous in believing that world-conquest is the
mission of Germany does not prove that their will coin-
cides with the interests of humanity. We cannot assume
that the agreement of all is the same as the good of all.
Even if the aim were actually achieved, would it compensate
for the destruction of the freedom of other nationalities ?
Should we not lose the incalculable benefits which accrue
from the individuality of nations each concentrated on
a special task ? If so, obviously the agreement of all
citizens is not the realisation of the true will of even a
single nation, not to speak of the community of nations.
The basis of the general will is not the consent of the
citizens, even when they are unanimous — a condition
which in practice never occurs — but the rationality of their
action. If the citizens of two nations take opposite views,
and even go to war in support of them, it does not follow
that both are right. Yet on the ground of mere agreement
the view of the one is just as strong as the view of the other.
There is no way of reconciling a flat contradiction.

It is true that the will of the whole of the citizens should
be the basis of State action ; but the reason is not that
absolute agreement is the only condition under which
the general will can be realised, but that the political
education of the whole people is essential to the best
citizenship. This is the ground on which we may legiti-
mately condemn all absolutist governments. Even grant-

ROUSSEAU in

ing that the acts of an absolute ruler are on the whole
for the good of his people, absolutism offends against
the fundamental character of every citizen as essentially
a rational and social being. What is simply imposed
from above, even with the best intention, and however
good it may be in itself, is not will but force, and a free
being cannot agree to be forced to act. In a represen-
tative government there is more likelihood, granting that
the representatives are elected by the whole people —
for otherwise sectional interests are sure to sway their
judgments — that the social will shall be realised than in
a primary assembly ; for not only are all interests repre-
sented, but the special study demanded for wise legislation
is more likely to be found in the body of representatives
than in the uninstructed will of the whole body of the
citizens. The complex organisation of a modern Nation -
State makes it a means of discovering and realising the
common will better than any collection of the momentary
wills of individuals. By reducing the machinery for the
expression of the common will to the isolated and unassisted
judgment of the whole body of citizens, Rousseau is really
ensuring the very reverse of what he professes to aim at.
We must also remember that the work of the legislator
is a continuous process. The growing experience of the
people through the various organs of their social life, and
the continually new insight thus gained, make legislation
a process of self-criticism and self-correction. The habits
and institutions of a community may be regarded as the
interpretation of the private wills which compose it. Thus
the real will of a community is not to be identified either
with the private will or with the sum of private wills,
except in so far as it expresses what both are really aiming
at. Of course the interpretation of the real will is never
final, but each advance is a step towards a better inter-

H2 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

pretation of it, just as science is continually passing from
one discovery to another, though it never reaches absolute
completeness.

The principle which Rousseau brought to light, though
he expressed it with a certain ambiguity — the principle
that the end of the State is to realise the general will — is
made by Kant the basis of his theory of jurisprudence.
Morality demands that every human being should be
regarded as an end in himself, while the problem of juris-
prudence is to secure that each should exercise his freedom
in a way that is consistent with the exercise of the freedom
of all the others. Hence the free subject must impose upon
himself the limit which he is called upon to respect ; if
he claims a right against others, he must recognise that
others have the same right against himself. Collisions
of one person with another can be avoided only by each
acting in accordance with rules that can be universalised.
Acts which are inconsistent with the principle, that what
one claims for himself he must recognise in the case of
others, are contrary to freedom, and may therefore be
restrained. Thus there is a compulsion which is in harmony
with freedom. " When a certain use of freedom is a
hindrance to freedom according to universal laws, the
compulsion which is opposed to it, as the hindering of a
hindrance to freedom, itself agrees with freedom accord-
ing to universal laws, i.e. is right." *

In jurisprudence we have nothing to do with the motive
from which an act is done. Hence my right extends
only so far as it is possible to compel others to respect it.
A legal right being entirely external, it cannot appeal to
the consciousness of moral obligation, but must be based
on external compulsion. A creditor, for example, cannot

lvii. 28; Caird's Kant, ii. 321.

ROUSSEAU 113

lead the debtor to feel that payment of his debt is demanded
by reason : all that he can do is to bring compulsion to
bear upon him on the ground that the payment of one's
debt is consistent with the freedom of everyone, and there-
fore with his own freedom. Right and the title to compul-
sion therefore mean the same thing.

There is only one original or innate right, the right of
freedom, and upon this right every acquired right is based.
Freedom, or independence of the compulsory will of another,
belongs to every man in virtue of his humanity. Such
freedom carries with it equality, for a man cannot be bound
by others to more than that by which he may bind them.
How, then, does freedom realise itself in the outward
world ? We must start from the principle that the only
limit to the freedom of another consists in the right
to freedom of oneself. Rights do not belong to things
but only to persons. Again, rights are always in one
person as against others. Lastly, the relation of persons
is reciprocal. Rights cannot be on one side and duties
on another, — a principle which is violated by slavery. In
the actual state of nature no rights are respected, because
right implies reciprocal compulsion, which can be enforced
only by a power which acts in the name of all. Since
the rational subject is inviolable, this inviolability attaches
to the objects into which he puts his will. Thus liberty
gives rise to property. " What is mine is that with
which I am so bound up that if any other person should
make use of it without my consent, he would do me an
injury." l Thus interference with the external things
that belong to me is inconsistent with the freedom which
is my birthright. The connection of objects with my per-
sonality is not dependent upon actual physical possession,
but is an " intelligible " possession. My personal will

1vii. 43; Caird, ii. 325,

H4 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

is manifested in the external object, and only in this
way can all persons be excluded from the object. The
external world is to be conceived as a common possession
of the race, but this ideal community of possession can
be realised only by the exclusive appropriation of indi-
viduals. Prior occupation may be regarded as establishing
an exclusive right against all who come after. The jus
in rem is thus the right of persons in things, and is necessary
to prevent the wills of persons from coming into collision.
Personal rights, on the other hand, are rights of one person
to an object at first possessed by another, or to some service
which the other can perform for us. A contract is
implied, in which a transfer is made from one to another.
The right so established is against a particular person.
Where a service is in question, it must be definitely limited
in extent and character ; otherwise it would amount to
slavery. Lastly, jus realiter personate is the right over a
person as if he were a thing. In marriage each acquires
a right over the person of another, so that personality
is restored. This excludes polygamy. In the relation of
parent and child the independence of persons is also annulled.
In order that there may be security that individuals
will enjoy their rights, there must be a political power.
I must be assured that if I respect the property of another,
he will equally refrain from violating my property. No
special legal act is required to guarantee this reciprocal
legal obligation, because the universality of that obliga-
tion is admitted. A compulsory power can only be
exercised consistently with freedom by a " collectively
universal will armed with absolute power," in other words
in the civil state. The violence involved in the enforce-
ment of rights is necessary to counteract the potential
violence arising from a state of anarchy. The State is
thus constituted by an original contract, the terms of

ROUSSEAU 115

which are that all members of the people give up their
freedom in order to take it back again as members of a
commonwealth. By this contract a man does not sacrifice
any part of his freedom, since the contract is an expression
of his own will. The State, then, at once frees the individual
from himself and protects him against enslavement by
others. It uses its power to " hinder the hindrance of
freedom," and it must not attempt more.

If we call the State a Contract, we must add that it is
a Contract that men are bound to make, and which, once
made, can never be broken. " The origin of the Supreme
Power is for the people in a practical point of view in-
scrutable, i.e. the subject ought not to raise subtle questions
as to its origin, or treat its right to his obedience as a jus
contr over sum which he is free to question. For, as the
people, in order to have a rightful authority to judge
the Supreme Power in the State, must be viewed as already
united under a universal legislative will, it can and ought
not to judge otherwise than as its Supreme governor
wills. To ask whether originally it was an actual contract
which led to its subordination under that Supreme Power,
or whether violence came first and law only followed, is,
for a people which already stands under civil law to asl
an aimless question ; and yet it is one that one day
be fraught with danger to the State. For, if the subject
who has found historical proof that the latter of these
hypotheses is the truth, were to proceed on the ground of
his discovery to resist the established authority, he would,
according to its laws, and that means with perfect justice,
be destroyed or expelled as an outlaw. Now, a law which
is holy and inviolable, so that practically even to question
it, or for a moment to suspend its execution, is already
a crime, is usually represented as one which has come,
not from man, but from some higher immaculate law

n6 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

giver. And this is the force of the dictum that ' all
the powers that be are ordained of God/ — a dictum
which is not meant to express the historical basis of the
civil constitution, but an idea which is a practical principle
of reason, that we ought to obey the existing legislative
power be its origin what it may." l Individuals may not
rightly rebel against the State.

Kant holds that the true form of the State is a Republic,
\and it is the duty of the sovereign power to bring the
relations of the State into harmony with this ideal. In
*the ideal State the supreme legislative power should be
exercised by the representatives of the people. The
subject is then under a law which he himself enacts. It
would seem from this that only the wills of all can con-
stitute that universal will to which all must submit. The
» people must not themselves share in the legislative power,
but only elect deputies to do so. But though the auto-
cratic and aristocratic forms of government are defective,
it is still possible that the spirit of a representative
system should be maintained, the spirit which was at
least expressed by Frederick the Great, when he said,
" I am merely the highest servant of the State."

Kant is aware that there has been no actual contract
to form a State. " The Social Contract," he tells us, is

a mere Idea of Reason, which, however, has its indubit-
able practical reality in that it binds every legislator to
enact no laws but such as might have arisen from the
united will of a whole people, and in that it regards
every subject, in so far as he claims to be a citizen, as if
he had given his personal assent to such a will. For this
is the criterion of the justice of a law of the State. If any
law is of such a character that a whole people could not
, possibly give its assent to it, — as, e.g. the law that a certain

1 vii. 136; Caird, ii. 334.

ROUSSEAU 117

class of subjects should have supreme authority in the
State secured to them by inheritance — then it is not a
just law. If, however, it is even possible that a whole
people should agree to the law, it is a duty to regard it
as just, even though at the moment the people be in such
a position or temper that if they were asked they would
probably not yield their assent."

Free speech is the inviolable right of the citizens, and
the sovereign is bound to enact every law that is needed
for the maintenance of justice, and no law which is not
so needed. The citizen has the right to seek happiness
in his own way, and it is despotism if the ruler attempt
to make his subjects happy according to his own judgment.
All other constitutions find their ultimate justification in
the fact that they prepare the way for a Republic. " The
lower forms of the State are only the letter of the original
legislation, and therefore they may remain so long as,
through old and long custom, they are held to be necessary
to the machinery of the constitution. But the spirit
of the original Contract contains the obligation of the
constitutive power to adapt its manner of governing to
the idea of the State ; or, if this cannot be done once
for all, to make gradual and continual changes, till in effect
the government is in harmony with the one rightful
constitution, to wit, a Republic ; and until all empiric
forms which served only to secure the subjection of the
people give place to the rational form which alone makes
freedom the principle and the condition of all compulsion.
In this way the letter will finally be accommodated to
the spirit." 2

Rousseau, as we have seen, shows the result of the
initial assumption that the individual has a universal

1 vi. 329 ; Caird, ii. 339. 2 vii. 158 ; Caird, ii. 341.

n8 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

nature as an individual in his view that the consent of
the whole people must be given to the Contract by which
the State is supposed to be founded. It is true that he
distinguishes the general will from the will of all, but he
never gets rid of the initial assumption that society is
constituted by an arbitrary act. It is because of this
untenable position that he regards the consent of the whole
people as necessary to valid legislation. Kant accepts
this view, declaring that " only the agreeing and united
will of all, in so far as each determines the same for all
and all for each, can be legislative." l This would seem
to imply that the Contract must be repeated from genera-
tion to generation ; or if not, that the original Contract
must endure for all time, — a conclusion which would
deprive subsequent generations of all possibility of assent
or dissent. We can only escape from this difficulty by
denying the assumption of a Contract altogether, or
interpreting it as a phrase expressing the fact that man's
obligation to respect the law of the State is based upon
his social nature, the recognition of which constitutes
the justification for submission to it. If social life is
essential to the realisation of man's true nature, it is
irrational to leave the constitution of society to the assent
of the individual will.

In violation, however, of the idea of a Contract, Kant
maintains that it is right to force men to enter into society
and to respect its laws. The general will is thus the
law of reason to which the individual ought to conform.
The social power may punish any refusal to obey the laws
of the State, because these are an expression of that
universal reason which constitutes the essential nature of
every rational being. What this really implies is that
man is essentially social. It is only through society

*vi. 132.

KANT 119

that man can realise himself.^ The obedience of the lower
to the higher nature of man is at the same time necessarily
his submission to a social law. Only in society have
men any rights, and rights are justified because they
are the necessary conditions of the moral life. Morality
is not the willing of the individual nafure, but the willing
of the social nature. If we separate morality from society,
and suppose it to be a law by which the individual is an
end to himself, it is not possible to go beyond the abstract
rule to do one's duty for its own sake, and such a rule
gives no guarantee of any specific duty whatever. Morality
is essentially social, and the institutions of the State can
be justified only as essential to the development of this
social morality. It is true that the State cannot directly
enforce morality, for the duties of men in society imply
the willing of the social moral law ; but the State can
supply the external conditions under which morality can
be achieved, and indeed this is its sole function.

The original error of making the State merely the result
of Contract is further shown in Kant's attempt to assimilate
the family and the State to a voluntary association. In
his view of the jus realiter personate he speaks of the
right to treat another as a thing. This is a violation
of his own principle, that a being with a will cannot be
treated as a thing which has no will. He tries to get out
of the difficulty by saying that as a husband has a right
over the wife, so the wife has a right over the husband.
In this way he disguises the transition to the idea of
the social whole as the expression of man's true nature.
The husband and wife do not give up their will on the basis
of any contract for particular ends, as in the case of
ordinary contracts, but recognise the essentially comple-
mentary nature of one another as necessary to the higher
life of each. It is not a question of any bargain by which

120 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

each gains a particular advantage by mutual concessions,
but a method of realising the essential nature of each.
This implies that in the family the individual, without
ceasing to be free or to surrender his true will, realises a
higher form of unity than is possible if each sought only
to realise his separate personality. Here the individual
is a means to the realisation of a social end ; he is not an
end in his separate individuality. This is very apparent
in the case of parents and children, where each is recipro-
cally, apart from any expressed will, means and end to
the other.

Similarly, in the State the individualistic separation of
persons as ends in themselves, leading to the idea of a social
contract, is transcended. On the social contract theory
the will of all is the basis of the general will. But in truth
the relation is not one of contract, but one of inseparable
relation apart from any contract. It may be expressed
by saying that it is the relation of a community of rational
beings not externally bound together but organically
connected. Unless it is recognised that man is an end
to himself only in so far as he is a social being, we must
fall back upon the idea that the basis of the State is force.

Man becomes conscious of himself only in and through
his consciousness of other selves. He can only oppose
himself to the other selves in so far as he is conscious
of his unity with them. The conception of a person
as a law and end to himself is not ultimate, though
it has a relative justification. It is convenient to treat
individuals as having rights that are mutually exclusive,
but ultimately the right presupposes .the common weal,
and can be defended on no other ground. To say that
individual rights must be enforced by the State in order
to liberate man from the tyranny of his immediate impulses,
is only to substitute one form of wrong for another. There

KANT 121

is no real compulsion in enforcing rights, because these ,-
are the expression of what a rational social nature demands. '
Law, then, is the condition of the moral life, and though
it is not a direct means of securing morality it promotes
morality indirectly by taking care that no one shall interfere
with the exercise of another's freedom. It has indeed
to do only with external acts, not with the motive from
which acts are done. If I interfere with the property
of another, the State will punish me, whatever be my
motive. Provided I respect the property of another,
the State does not ask whether I do so because I have
before my eyes the fear of prison, or because I regard
the act as contrary to duty ; all that law can deal with
is my outward act. Morality, on the other hand, de-
mands that I shall act from regard for the moral law,
which tells me that respect for another's property is
a duty binding upon me as a moral agent. But it is not
possible to separate the ground of moral obligation from
the sphere of individual rights. For individual rights
can be justified only by reference to the social good. No
doubt each individual is conscious of himself as exclusive
of other selves. On this ground it has been argued that
society is composed of a number of exclusive selves, and
that there is no such thing as a truly social self-conscious-
ness. And of course there is no social consciousness separate
and distinct from the self-consciousness of individuals.
To say so, would be to hypostatise the abstraction of
society, and to fall into the fallacy of mediaeval realism.
But it does not follow that the common self-consciousness
is not present in individuals as an idea. Just as there
Js no animal in general, or man in general, while yet there
is a universal character or type of animal or man, without
which the individual animal or man is inconceivable,
so the principle of society is present in individuals, and

122 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

without it they would not be themselves or rational. If
we suppose individuals completely isolated from their
fellow-men, obviously they would never distinguish be-
tween themselves and others, and therefore would not
think of themselves as in any way related to others.
But to be conscious of oneself as different from others
is to be conscious of a unity which makes possible the
consciousness of the difference of oneself from others.
Individuals who have nothing in common can have no
relation whatever to one another. Identity is necessary to
difference. Thus the self-consciousness of the individual
overrides the distinction of oneself from other selves*
The individual must be able to transcend his consciousness
of himself so far as to conceive himself as possessed of
the same fundamental nature as other self-conscious
beings. It is in virtue of this power that he distinguishes
himself from others, while yet he recognises that the
distinction is not absolute. This fundamental character of
a self-conscious being constitutes the social consciousness.
True, society has no self-consciousness of its own which
can be separated from the self-consciousness of individuals ;
but society is present in each individual in the form of a
comprehension of his identity with all others as well
as his distinction from them. The consciousness of one's
own states is not a possible object apart from the con-
sciousness of others. It is true that we could have no
knowledge of the self-consciousness of others were we not
ourselves self-conscious. But we do not infer the existence
of their inner selves from our perception of their bodily
activities ; we interpret both the perception of their body
and of their soul in the same way ; the only difference
is that it is by a more complex process of interpretation
that we become aware of their inner life than that involved
in the interpretation of their bodily acts. We may by

KANT 123

an act of abstraction separate a sensation from the con-
sciousness of an object ; but it is only when we conceive
of the sensation as indicating an object, and so contrast
ourselves as subject with the object that we become con-
scious of self at all. In self-consciousness we thus go
back upon the presupposition both of the subject and of
the object, and it is only by having the consciousness of
an object that we become conscious of self. Thus it is
in the return from the consciousness of other selves
as objects that we become conscious of ourselves. A
social community of life is therefore presupposed in our
first consciousness of ourselves as individuals. No doubt
this first consciousness of self appears to be rather the
consciousness of the opposition of ourselves to others ;
but, as has been said above, this opposition is relative
to the consciousness of the fundamental identity in nature
of oneself with the self of others. Not unnaturally we are
apt to think of ourselves as limited by other beings against
whom we affirm our independence, not seeing that we can
only gain real independence by a recognition of the just
claim of others to be a self like ourselves.

Now Hobbes, misreading the real relation of the self
to other selves, adopts the view that by nature man
is absolutely unsociable, being occupied solely in the
endeavour to satisfy his immediate impulses. From
this point of view law and morality are merely expedients
for expressing the egoism of individuals. There is an
unlimited desire for gain and glory, which in a finite world
can only lead to a bellum omnium in omnes. In the first
return of the self from the objective world the self affirms
its independence and refuses to recognise any claims of
other selves. The immediate self of desire claims complete
satisfaction for itself, not seeing that only in unison with
others can the self receive satisfaction.

124 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Kant on the other hand denies that the individual
is related to other individuals in an absolutely negative
way. A man voluntarily limits himself, recognising the
just claim of others, and therefore he only demands that
others should recognise that they also must limit themselves
in a corresponding degree. Thus on his view a reciprocal
self-limitation preserves the independence and secures the
freedom of each. In his inner life each is self-determined,
while in his outer life he limits himself relatively to others,
on condition that they shall similarly limit themselves.
There is no possible collision in the inner life, where each
is alone with himself, but in the outer life conflict is
inevitable, and can only be allayed by the establishment
of a Power armed with force to protect individuals from
each other.

The defect in this point of view is that it postulates
a fundamental discrepancy between different self-conscious
beings. Self-consciousness is supposed to be not a unifying
but a separative faculty, and therefore it is by a voluntary
surrender of it that order can be introduced into the world.
In truth the State is not the result of any self-surrender
of an original opposition, but the recognition that such
an opposition is one-sided and abstract. The State is
neither a despotism, forcing individuals to submit to its
| commands, nor is it an arbitrary agreement of individuals
to protect their personal rights by making concessions to
others ; it is the recognition and realisation of the essentially
indivisible nature of the consciousness of self and the con-
sciousness of other selves. The general will of which it is an
expression is the essential nature of the wills of individuals.
In other words, the recognition of rights is a lower form
of the principle of social morality. Society exists for the
purpose of realising the moral life, and by this test it must
be judged. It can never directly attain its end, because

KANT 125

it acts only in the world of external deeds ; but it can
establish the conditions under which the higher life of
morality may be attained. Morality cannot be identified j
with the laws of the State, as if there were no higher law. I
That was the defect of ancient patriotism, which made
no distinction between the duty of man as man and the
duty of man as citizen. Nevertheless the laws and customs
of society are the foundation on which the higher law of
morality rests. Starting from this fundamental level
man returns upon himself and gains a higher point of view.
The laws of society are based upon reason and derive
their authority from reason ; but reason cannot be satisfied
with this first expression of itself, and thus there arises
the consciousness of a spiritual law transcending the law
of the State, and based upon the idea of humanity.

There can be no absolute separation of jurisprudence and
morality. We distinguish the sphere of the one from the
sphere of the other, but both presuppose the unity of a
single principle. In the sphere of so-called private rights,
both rights and duties are the result of the reciprocal
limitation of persons, who within these limits live an inde-
pendent life. But in the sphere of the family and the State
the individual is the organ of a social principle which is
expressly recognised to be above the individual will, not
because it is contrary to that will in its essence, but
because it is the fuller expression of it. The magistrate's
right is to administer the law, and it is his duty to do so ;
the citizen's duty is to serve the State, while it is the
function of the State to protect his rights against all
aggression, as the necessary condition of his higher life.
So far as the State fails in this task, the individual has the
right to protest against its action, and to employ all consti-
tutional means for raising it to a higher level. The citizen
is entitled to oppose the acts of its representatives, if these

126 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

are contrary to the idea of the State, just as he is entitled
to put forth his best efforts to make it conform more closely
to its idea. But until we have reached a higher form of
sociality, the supreme court of appeal is the State, all
other forms of organisation being subject to its authority.
This in no way interferes with the legitimate operations of
subordinate groups, so far as these do not contradict the
basis of the State ; but it is not compatible with dis-
loyalty to the sovereign power itself, which expresses the
general will of the community. Every subordinate form of
organisation implies a general will, only differing in degree
from the general will of which the State is the embodiment,
and it may fairly be argued that the formation of such
groups is a condition of the increased perfection of the
community. But, while such specification is quite in
harmony with the nature of things, we must not forget
that it must not be antagonistic to the unity of which the
State is the guardian and the expression. Subordinate
organisms may very well come into collision, and it is the
function of the State to reconcile them with one another ;
and just as the State is the supreme arbiter between various
groups within itself, so it is supreme in relation to other
States. A State must be autonomous or self-governed,
otherwise it ceases, to the extent at least in which it is
interfered with, to be a State. This does not mean that it
may not agree to suggestions from a foreign State, but it
does mean that it cannot be forced to accept these sugges-
tions by pressure from without. Nor does freedom or
autonomy mean that a State must think only of its own
selfish interest, i.e. an interest incompatible with the
good of other States. There is nothing in autonomy to
interfere with the widest possible conception of what is
best for mankind as a whole, unless we assume that what
is best for mankind is necessarily antagonistic to the good

HEGEL 127

of a particular State ; but the recognition of this wider
good must be freely made by each State, not forced upon
it at the cannon's mouth. An absolutist State claiming
to have a right that transcends all other States is a contra-
dictory idea. Not only is such an idea incompatible
with the community of States, each of which, to be a
State, must be autonomous, but it is inconsistent with its
own good. The State does not and cannot determine
the whole spiritual life of its own people, not to speak of
other peoples ; its function is to secure to the community
those rights without which the best life cannot be lived.
All obstacles to the promotion of this best life it is its duty
to remove, but it is not the business of the State to tell
the citizens all the ways in which they may best promote
this best life. The free participation of the individual in
the work of the State is essential to the security of his rights.
The State cannot prescribe all a man's duties, because to
do so is to prevent him from completely realising himself.
Thus in two ways the State may be said to be limited ;
it cannot treat other States as subordinate, and it cannot
determine the whole life of the citizens. Nevertheless,
within its own sphere each State is supreme, both over
its own citizens and in relation to other States. How far
the State can be said to be subject to the ordinary rules
of morality binding upon the individual must be considered
later.

In his history of philosophy Hegel has a passage which
is significant of his distinction from Kant and Fichte.
" Kant," he says, " began to found right on freedom, and
Fichte too in his Natural Right made freedom his principle ;
but it is, as in Rousseau, the freedom of the particular
individual. This is a great beginning ; but in order to
get to particular results they were obliged to accept pre-

128 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

suppositions. The universal for them is not the spirit,
the substance of the whole, but the external mechanical
negative power against individuals. . . . The Individuals
remain always hard and negative against one another ;
the prison-house, the bonds, become ever more oppressive,
instead of the State being apprehended as the realisation
of freedom.' x

Hegel as well as Kant starts from Rousseau's conception
of moral freedom as the peculiar and distinctive quality
of man. The defect, to Hegel's mind, of Kant's conception
of freedom is due to his opposition of morality and indi-
vidual rights, leading to a purely subjective view of the
former and a negative and abstract view of the latter.
When morality is conceived as the mere willing of duty
for duty's sake, it becomes logically incapable of being
realised outwardly, and can never get beyond the perfectly
empty and general law to do one's duty. This fundamental
defect arises, Hegel argues, from the separation of reason
from desire. For, when the natural impulses are regarded
as the negation of reason, it is not possible to spiritualise
them, and thus the will is emptied of all content. Similarly,
Kant's isolation of the individual, who is declared to be
an end in himself, results in the conception of rights as
attaching to individuals in their separation from one
another, and leads to the conception of the State as an
j external power, the function of which is to keep individuals
from interfering with the rights of one another. Thus,
on the one hand, freedom is conceived as purely subjective,
residing, as it is held to do, in the inner world of intention
and conscience, where it can find no outlet without sur-
rendering its autonomy ; while on the other hand rights
can only be defended as imposed externally by the State

1 Gesch. d. Phil, iii. 576, quoted in Bosanquet's Phil. Theory of the State^
p. 247.

HEGEL 129

as a means by which the isolated individual is maintained
in his isolation and independence of others. Moral rules
are absolutely universal and admit of no possible exception,
and rights are equally incapable of violation. Hegel
seeks to do away with this opposition of morality and law,
endeavouring to show that true freedom involves the out-
ward realisation of what is inwardly demanded by reason.
The condition under which this realisation takes place is
by means of society and the State. Inner freedom becomes
real only by being realised outwardly in a series of mani-
festations ; in law, in the rules of morality, and in the
whole system of institutions and influences that make
for righteousness. This is the system of Social Ethics *
(Sittlichkeit) , in which the inwardness of morality and the
mere externality of law are reconciled. The State is not
conceived any longer as a mere device by which separate
individuals are kept from interfering with each other's
rights, but as the highest expression of the reasonable
will, the will which aims at the general good of the whole.
It does not rest upon any Contract, but is the embodiment
of the free self. This does not mean that there is nothing
higher than the State, but it does mean that there is
no organised community to which the State is subject.
Morality, religion, and philosophy go beyond the organism
of the State, but within its embrace it holds the family,
the civic community and all the institutions by which
man in society realises his highest interest. Thus, in
Hegel's view, the State is the unity of all the other social
functions, and it has as its special task to harmonise these
with one another. This it is entitled to do, because it
simply expresses in law what is the burden of the senti-
ments and ideas working in the mind of the citizen. True,
the State may pass laws that are not recognised by every
citizen as reasonable, but this is no objection to its legisla-
w.s. i

130 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

tion so long as these laws really express the essence of the
general mind. If it is objected that this view makes the
State infallible, Hegel answers that he is not claiming
infallibility for any existing State, a claim which is contra-
dicted by the fact that the State is continually developing
from lower to higher ; what he is asserting is that the
State as a whole is the custodian of the conditions under
which a given people manifests its ideal ends. " Every
State," says Hegel,1 " even if your principles lead you
to pronounce it bad, even if you detect this or that defici-
ency in it, always has (especially if it belongs to the more
developed States of our time) the essential moments of its
existence in it. But because it is easier to discover defects
than to grasp the affirmative, people easily fall into the
error of allowing particular aspects to lead them to forget
the inner organisation of the State. The State is no work
of art ; it stands in the world, that is, in the sphere of
caprice, accident, and error ; evil behaviour is liable to
mar it in many respects. But the ugliest human being, a
criminal, a sick man, or a cripple, is all the same a living
human being ; the affirmative, his life, persists in spite of
the defect, and this affirmative is what we are concerned
with here." Every State, in short, will display the three
spheres of Right or Law, of Morality, and of Social Observ-
ance, and defects in these do not take from it the character
of a State. If it is objected that this is to identify the
State with the Community, Hegel would answer that any
other view falls into the error of identifying it with the
Government. The State, it is true, does not determine
by legislation how men are to act in all cases ; its function
is to maintain the conditions under which society must be
carried on. A modern State will not allow, for example,
polygamy or slavery, it will not allow intercourse with

lPhil. d, RcchtS) p. 313 ; Bosanquet, p. 250.

HEGEL 131

foreigners under conditions which threaten its own exist-
ence ; but it does not prescribe the rule of conduct of the
citizens as moral beings except in so far as it rules out
certain actions as hostile to the common weal. Being
thus the custodian of the conditions under which all the
institutions of society are carried on, and adjusting their
relations to one another, these must, Hegel would say,
be regarded as forming an integral part of the State or
Nation. Of course a distinction may be made between
the Community and the State, such as is made by Pro-
fessor Maclver in his interesting work The Community,
but this seems to me largely a matter of terminology.
No doubt the citizens of a given State may form a union
with those of other States, but they cannot do so unless
their own State allows it. This point we shall have to
deal with more thoroughly afterwards ; at present it is
enough to say that the_State, as conceived by Hegel, in
its wMest^gjis^_Jndudes_j!Jl other social groups. This
is an application to the modern State of the idea involved
in the ancient City-State. The fundamental distinction
is that the modern State works through the actual con-
sciousness and rational will of the citizen, not through
custom and usage.

The first form in which the will is realised outwardly
is in relation to property, where things, which have no
will of their own, become organs of life by the will of the
persons being expressed in them. This is by no means a
full realisation of the free will, but is based upon the idea
of abstract personality. Hence each person is inviolate
to all other persons. The only conditional rule is of a
negative character ; it is prohibition not to entrench upon
the personality of another, and therefore not to interfere
with the object in which his will is expressed. All rights
are therefore personal, as depending upon the conception

I32 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of man as man, not, as in the Roman law, upon special
privileges. Property cannot be defended on the ground
that it is necessary to the satisfaction of the individual's
needs, but only on the ground that it is the first form in
which the subject realises himself outwardly. Thus in
property the personality of a man is by no means com-
pletely realised, but property is the essential condition of
the higher realisation of personality. Hence a commun-
istic view of property is contrary to freedom. And as
body and soul are inseparable, slavery is a violation of a
man's right as a person. While property is essential to
the realisation of personality, it does not follow that all
persons should have the same amount of property ; the
amount must depend on the intelligence and industry of
the individual.

As property is exclusive possession, I may exchange
it for an equivalent, and thus arises Contract, which is an
agreement of persons about an external thing. As the
will here exercised is arbitrary, it is not yet the general
or universal will, but only the " common will." Disputes
may take place irr regard to the person to whom a given
piece of property belongs, and thus arises the civil suit,
the object of which is to determine the justice of the several
claims as compared with each other. Fraud, on the other
hand, is the intentional violation of a right while pretence
is made to respect it, and Crime again is the negation of
all right as expressed in this particular instance. The
wrong cannot be atoned for by a particular will, but must
be abolished by a disinterested authority that inflicts
punishment for the wrong.

Rights of property cannot be regarded as absolute,
and therefore as sacred under all conditions ; for rights
are ultimately justifiable only as a means of realising the
general good of the whole. We have to view property

HEGEL 133

in relation to the living spirit, not in its bare letter. Law
must be regarded as part of a living system, which ulti-
mately rests upon the will to maintain a certain type of
life. The order of law and property is found to break
down at a certain point. The conscience of the individual
claims to be higher than that which is embodied in law,
and insists upon its right to oppose what it cannot accept.
Here we have the conflict of the inner self with the outer
world — a conflict which is shown historically in Stoicism
and in some forms of Christianity, more especially of
Protestant Christianity. This abstraction of the good
will is expressed by Kant in the doctrine that " Nothing
can be conceived which can be called good without quali-
fication but a good will." Hegel's objection to this doctrine
is in essence, that will conceived in this abstraction cannot
be connected with any definite course of action whatever,
and is apt to lead to the sophistry of " pure intention,"
by which any course of conduct may be plausibly justified.
But, one-sided as this conception of the good will is, it
gets its apparent force from the fact that an intelligent
being can acquiesce only in what enters into the object
of his will. The subjective will has its own claims ; but
it is to misread them to interpret that will as absolute
in its pure subjectivity. What it really points to is the
union of the subjective and the objective will, and this
union is found in what Hegel designates as the Ethical
System (Sittlichkeit) . Will is realised in objective institu-
tions and operates by the free assent of the individual to
them.

Social Ethics, then, is the union of the subjective and the
objective. It corrects the one-sidedness of both, transcend-
ing the outwardness of law and the inwardness of conscience
by bringing the will of the individual into harmony with
the general rational will. In practice this results in the

134 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

acceptance of the moral usages in which the individual
realises his freedom. This social morality is expressed
in the spirit of a nation. Man recognises that his personal
good is to be found in the good of the whole, and thus he
freely and spontaneously wills that good. Thus the idea
of freedom is developed into an actual world, which is at
the same time the embodiment of his intelligence and will.
It is an actual world, because it is expressed in the bodily
habits and external actions of a people. The rules and
traditions of a nation are as objective as " sun, moon,
mountains, rivers, and all objects of nature." Man lives
by them without, as a rule, any direct consciousness of
them. They form what may be called the body of the
moral world. Nevertheless these laws of living are the
expression of man's rational and self-conscious nature.
They form a system and are not a mere abstract idea of
a good which is not specified. For this reason the
individual finds himself realised in the performance of
the special duties belonging to his place in the whole.
By fulfilling the duties of his station he contributes to
the common good. No doubt he does not realise all that
is implied in his relation to the whole, but he is ready to
sacrifice his particular desires for the whole. The ethical
system is thus the soul of the moral world. Social action
is not " virtue," in the ancient sense, as something due
to exceptional gifts of nature or fortune ; rather it consists
in the discharge of the duties of one's station, of which
no man may boast. Boasting is excluded, because a man
does not boast of realising what his own nature demands
that he should realise.

The system of social ethics is expressed in three forms,
each of which implies a different mood or disposition,
namely, the Family, the Civic Community, and the State in
the narrower sense of the term, i.e. the Political Organism.

HEGEL 135

In the organism of society the Family is nearest to the
natural world. Resting upon a natural basis, it receives
a spiritual meaning, which shows itself in the unanimity
of love and trust of its members. Mind appears in the form
of feeling. The natural distinction of sex is at the same
time a difference of intellectual and moral type. This
combination of two personalities in one person is essential
to the good of the whole. Thus the Family is an essential
form of society, to supersede which would destroy the
concreteness of the social life. It differs from the State
proper, where the bond is not so much feeling as clear
intelligence, law and system. Hence Hegel, like Aristotle,
rejects theories, such as that advocated in Plato's Republic,
which assimilate the State to the Family. The Family s
does not rest upon mere feeling, nor is it a mere contract ;
it exists for the training of children to fit them for public <
duty, and its public aspect is properly recognised by a
public declaration of an acceptance of the responsibility, I
which is an essential part of marriage. The equal relation
of the heads of the household is implied in their equal
responsibility, and therefore only the monogamous family |
can properly fulfil its function as the preparatory organ '
in the social whole. When a man or woman arrives at
maturity, a new form of life begins ; he or she enters a world
of conflicting interests, where a living has to be made
or property administered. Thus arises what Hegel calls
the Civic Community (Burgerliche Gesellschaft) . This is
the system of limited aims and self interest, where a man
has to find his work and do it.

The Civic Community actually is a combination of indi- <
viduals each of whom is seeking to attain his own ends.jl/
Thus it differs from the Family, in which a common
purpose prevails ; and from the State, which is an embodi-
ment of the general will. This free play of the individual

136 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

is characteristic of the modern as distinguished from the
ancient State. It is found by the individual that he can
only secure his own good by respecting the well-being
and rights of others. In the Civic Community scope is
given for the exercise of various talents and for differences
of birth and fortune. The individual has the right to
develop himself on all sides, but he is subject to the power
of the whole. When free rein is given to the selfish desires
of the individual, it leads to the destruction of society ;
while on the other hand the absorption of the individual
in .the State, as suggested in Plato's Republic, does not
lead to the best form of the State. To exclude private
property and the family as well as all choice in the matter
of a profession, as Plato would do, destroys the strength
and flexibility of the community. The civic community
is not simply a means of satisfying the natural wants :
it is a process by which man gains a mastery over nature,
putting his own stamp upon the natural object. The
struggle of man with nature is at the same time the struggle
with his immediate desires. A man must attach himself
to a definite kind of service, and this is a great training
in civilisation. The process is severe, but it is indispens-
able if we are to have true freedom. It turns out that
the insecurity which seems to be implied in dependence
on the vast system of wants is not really insecurity,
but results in the highest stability. Spiritual wants in
society become predominant, so that man makes his own
necessity.

Labour is the means by which particular wants are
provided for, demanding as it does quickness of apprehen-
sion and the cultivation of the intelligence. By occupying
oneself with some particular form of activity special skill
in the performance of a particular task is developed. At
the same time the reciprocal relations of men are multiplied,

HEGEL 137

and machinery is constructed which takes the place of
human labour. In seeking to satisfy himself man contri-
butes to the satisfaction of others, and this leads to the
production of wealth. The share of each in the general
wealth is left to individuals, but the differentiation of
the civic community demands the distinction of classes.
There is first of all the substantial class, which obtains
wealth from the natural product of the soil. Though
the pursuit of agriculture still retains the general char-
acteristics of the patriarchal life, in our day it has
largely become an industrial process. The industrial
class is occupied in the formation of natural products
by means of the labour of manual workers or of skilled
workmen. The feeling for freedom and order is felt most
strongly by this industrial class and arises in cities. A
third class is concerned with the general interests of society,
and must have either private means or be supported by the
State. Natural qualities, birth and circumstances deter-
mine the class to which a man belongs. In this respect
the modern world is distinguished from the ancient. By
recognising the rights of the individual the modern State
stimulates thought and tends to ensure that men will be
promoted by merit.

The citizen is not really detached, as he is apt to think
he is, but is sustained by the general life of the State.
The civic community is not separate, but can exist onlyi
within the State proper. It represents human nature)
in a special and comparatively narrow aspect. In the
first place, it involves the administration of justice. The
system of law of a modern State regulates in a fairly reason-
able way the rights and relations of persons. By being
expressed as law right assumes the form of universality.
It is a mistake to say that customs are superior to laws,
for laws by being written down and collected become

138 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

explicitly present to consciousness. The collisions which
arise in the application of laws to special cases prevent
the development of law from becoming merely mechanical,
since they stimulate thought and lead to a revision of
existing laws.

,\ Out of the interests of the civic community arise State
[regulation and Trade Societies. The ordinary principle
of industrial society is that of supply and demand, but as
this in some cases leads to accidental hindrances to the
best life, the State has the right to step in and protect the
general good against such accidents. The Trade Society
approximates to the unity of the State, since it seeks to
determine what is required in the interest not of the
individual, but of the class. As a member of his class
or estate the citizen comes to conceive of his particular
interest as bound up with the interest of his fellows. He
also learns to honour the member of his Trade Society
or Corporation who fulfils his task in a workmanlike way,
and he is insured against misfortune and receives the
training required for his special task.

In the State proper or PoliticaLConstitution the Family
v/jand the Civic Community find their completion and security.

(Here the ethical idea is no longer implied but is explicitly
realised. It is only when the State is identified with the
Civic Community that its sole function is held to consist
in providing for the security and protection of property
and of personal freedom. In truth the individual cannot
realise his true nature except in the State. It is there-
fore an error to regard the State as based upon the common
will as directed to the greatest personal good of the citizens.
It rests upon the objective or rational will, not upon the
/ personal will, or upon external necessity, such as the need
for defence against enemies, or the production of wealth.
The State cannot be justified by its strength. The only

HEGEL 139

true Might is Right, that which is ethical and just. Its
foundation is the power of reason realising itself as will.

Every State is by its essential nature individual and|
independent of all other States. The Modern State, by
allowing the greatest freedom to the idiosyncrasies of indi-
viduals consistent with its own unity, has tremendous
strength and depth. In one respect it bears the aspect
of an external necessity, prescribing the laws regulating
the Family and the Civic Community ; but its power lies
in the unity of its final aim with the interest of individuals,
who have duties towards it just so far as they have rights.
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights. The
individual must find his personal satisfaction in the dis-
charge of his duty, and from this relation there grows up
a right by which his special interest becomes part of the
common good.

There must be Institutions by which the union of the)
personal will with the common good is realised. Sub-'
jectively this is the politicaljtemper, and objectively the I
Constitution^ the State. The political temper is not the
mere disposition to make special sacrifices for the good
of the whole, but the disposition to make the common
good the motive of everyday action, out of which springs
the willingness to sacrifice even life itself for the good of
the State. What holds the State together is not force, but
the deep-seated feeling of order in the mind of the citizen.

The Political State involves the Legislative Function,!
the Government and the Princely Function. In a Consti-j
tutional Monarchy there is realised the union of what in
ancient times was distinguished as Monarchy, Aristocracy
and Democracy. The essential thing is that the principle
of free subjectivity should be recognised. It is not possible
to make a Constitution, because it must originate freely
from the character of the people. Every nation has the

140 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Constitution which suits it. Napoleon offered the Spaniards
a better Constitution than their earlier one, but it was
rejected, because the people were not ready for it.

The State is an organism in which there is only one life,
and therefore the classes, powers and corporations within
it must be subject to the State, in accordance with the
principle that its end is the realisation of the common good.
Moreover, the particular offices and agencies of the State
are the mouthpieces of the whole. The individuals who
control these agencies must have a natural capacity for
their particular office and be specially trained. The unity
produced by the subordination of the various agencies,
all working with a single eye to the common good, is the
basis of the sovereignty of the State. This Sovereignty
is not Force, but Rational Will. What gives countenance
to the idea that Sovereignty is Force is the fact that the
State adjusts the relations of private life, of the family,
and of the economic world. It may intervene to remove
obstacles in the path of the common good, though it is
characteristic of the modern State as distinguished from
the ancient that it allows the family feeling and the
individual interest to have the freest play compatible with
the common good. Essentially, however, the State is the
indwelling principle which is working in these in a less
explicit form, being the embodiment of the real will of the
people. The division of functions is necessary to the
rational organisation of the whole. Sovereignty does
/not reside in any one element, but in the harmonious
'working of each factor of the Constitution. In times of
i peace the particular spheres are not interfered with ; but
in periods of distress, whether from internal or external
causes, the Sovereignty inherent in the idea of the State
must interfere even at the sacrifice of that perfect freedom
of action which at other times is allowed.

HEGEL 141

Hegel maintains that the personality^fjUi£j5tate must!
be embodied in a single_person, the Monarch. The whole!
essence of the State must be, so to speak, brought to a
focus. The Monarch expresses the "I will " which is
necessary to the actualisation of the intelligent mind
of the community. A hereditary Monarch tends to raise Y
the State above faction. We cannot properly oppose
the Sovereignty of the people to the Sovereignty of the
Monarch. Apart from the Monarch, who expresses the
articulation of the whole, we have only a formless mass,
which is not a State, and has none of the marks that dis-
tinguish the organism of the State — namely, Sovereignty,
Government, Law-courts, Magistrates, Classes, etc. What
the State has to express is not any mere agreement of
particular wills, but the reasonable will of the whole people.
When it is said that the Monarch by his "I will " brings
this reasonable will into actuality, it is not meant that he
may do what he pleases ; he must consult his advisers,
and when the Constitution is established he has often
nothing to do but to sign his name. " He puts the dot
on the ' i ' ". But this apparently formal act is really
essential to free individuality.

There must be an Executive to carry out the decisions
of the Monarch and to apply existing laws and regulations.
The Executive includes the Judiciary and the Police.
The private interests of the civic community are subject
to corporations or societies, trades and professions, in which
the members have confidence ; but their authority rests
upon and is subordinate to the higher interest of the State,
and must be ratified by the State. Thus the spirit of the
Corporation is universalised.

The principle of the division of labour is implied in
the appointment of Boards, which are distinguished as
superior and inferior. The members of these Boards are

142 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

appointed for their fitness, so that any citizen may be
elected to serve on them. They must have no private
ends to serve, but must find their good in the discharge
of their public duties. The security of the State against
the misuse of power on the part of Bureaus lies in their
responsibility for their acts and in the check supplied by
the Corporations, which supplement control from above.

The legislative, power deals with the laws as such, and
with internal affairs. The foundation of its power is the
Constitution, as developed by the progress of civilisation.
In the legislative power as a whole there are two elements,
the Monarchical and the Governmental. To the former
belongs the ultimate decision, to the latter definite know-
ledge and oversight of the whole. When it is argued
that the people best understand what is for their good,
it must be replied that the people often does not know
what its real will is. This knowledge is the fruit of insight
and education. The highest State officials have a deeper
j/land more comprehensive insight into the needs of the
'State than the people at large. Between the Government
and the people stand the classes, which exercise a media-
torial function. In despotic States, where nothing stands
between the Prince and the People, the People act merely
as a disturbing element, whereas by the intermediation
of the estates they obtain their interests in a legal and
orderly way. Representation is of bodies or interests
rather than of masses of individuals, and the Corporations
or Trade Societies have an important place in the com-
munity because of their contact with the various depart -

ents of the executive government.

Publicity of discussion in the assembly of the classes of
estates is the great means of instruction in the general
interests of the State. It is in this way that what is
called " Public Opinion " arises. We may be sure that

T:

HEGEL 143

public opinion will ultimately endorse any reasonable
view. It is not true that everyone knows what is for
the good of the State, and has only to go down to the
House and utter it. By public discussion, " where one
shrewd idea destroys another," private views are brought
into harmony with the principle of the common good
The value of a given opinion cannot be judged by the
degree of passion with which it is held, but only by the
insight which divines what the public really desires, that
is, what is its real will. It is this power of divination
that gives a man great political eminence. At the same
time, by the right of public expression the impulse of self-
assertion is satisfied, and there is all the more likelihood
of acquiescence in what is done when a man feels that
he has contributed something to the settlement of the
question.

The State is a self-sufficient organic unity. As such
each State is exclusive of other States. It is therefore
the duty of the members of a State to assist in maintain-
ing the substantial individuality, the independence and
Sovereignty of the State, by the willing sacrifice of their
life and property, not to speak of their private opinions.
Herein lies the ethical element of war, which must not be
regarded as an absolute evil due to the passions of the
ruling powers or of the people. A perpetual peace would 1 ./
lead to the internal corruption of the people. As a matter *
of fact successful wars have prevented internal unrest j
and have strengthened the power of the State. Those j
nations which have refused to submit to the Sovereignty
of the State have been subjugated by other nations, due
to their inability to establish within themselves a central
power. Their freedom^dies from fear^ofjdying. Kant
proposes an alliance of Princes to settle disputes of States,
and. the abortive Holy Alliance was very much an institution

144 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

( of this kind. Even if there should be formed a family of
1 1 States, the result would be to create the opposition of other
v / States not included in the family, and thus to lead to fresh
I disputes and wars.

So far as the State is in danger of losing its independence,
it is the duty of the citizen to come to its defence ; and to
make this defence effective there must be a special class
devoted to the conduct of war and distinguished by their
courage. The necessity of the military class is due to the
same necessity as that which gives rise to the family,
industrial society, the political class, and the business
class. True courage in the modern State consists in
readiness to sacrifice oneself in the service of the State
and to submit to what is necessary in an organised army.
Mere courage is not enough without this supreme motive.
The value of courage lies in its subservience to the absolute
end, the sovereignty of the State. Here we have the
most complete union of opposites : a self-sacrifice which
is true freedom ; perfect self-control and submission to
mechanical order ; the absence of personal aims, along
with the most intense devotion ; the most hostile action
against individuals, together with indifference or kindly
feeling towards them as private persons. The mere risk-
ing of one's life has no ethical value ; its value lies entirely
in the cause for which life is risked.

It falls within the province of the Princely power to
command the armed force of the State, to enter into rela-
tions with foreign powers through ambassadors, and to
declare peace or war. A State is so involved with several
other States that the declaration of peace or war can only
be properly undertaken by the Head of the State.

As States are not private persons, but independent
totalities, their relation to one another is different from the
morality binding upon private individuals. In the case

HEGEL 145

of private individuals, there is a Court to settle their dis-
putes impartially and to determine what is right. No
doubt the relations between States should be intrinsically
just, but there is no Power distinct from the several States
which can decide what is intrinsically just. Thus justice
as between States must always remain an ideal, and any
stipulations they make with one another can only be
provisional. One State should not interfere with the
internal affairs of another, but the individuality of a State
implies its recognition by the others, just as the individual
apart from his relation to others is not an actual person.

Between different States Contracts may be made, which,
however, are much less complex and varied than those
entered into between individuals in the civic community.
The obligations of States towards one another rest upon
Treaties which should be kept inviolate. But as there
is no will higher than the sovereignty of each State, a
Treaty may be altered in consequence of a change of
circumstances. When therefore States cannot agree upon
some disputed point, the conflict must finally be decided
by war. The complicated relations of the citizens of
different States to one another naturally lead to the con-
viction that a Treaty has been violated, all the more that
a State may hold its honour to be involved in any one
of the relations. Besides, the particular injury may be
regarded as indicating a threatened danger, and, especially
if there has been a long peace, there is a tendency to
suspect the ultimate intentions of the other State. The
object of a Treaty always is to secure the well-being of
the State with its particular interests.

The fact that States mutually recognise one another

implies that there is a bond between them even in war,

when force and contingency rule. International Law

implies the possibility of peace, war being understood to

vv.s. K

146 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

be only temporary. Hence ambassadors are respected,
and it is understood that war is not made against the
internal institutions of the foreign State or against peaceful
families and private citizens. Modern wars are therefore
carried on humanely, and without personal hatred. The
nations of Europe form a family of nations by the general
principles of their legislation, their ethical customs and
their culture. Thus among them international behaviour
is ameliorated.

CHAPTER SEVENTH

THE NATION-STATE (continued) : BENTHAM, JAMES
AND J. S. MILL AND HERBERT SPENCER

IN contrast to the Universalism of Hegel stands the
Individualism of BENTHAM and his followers, the two
Mills and Herbert Spencer. When Bentham began to
write, the Natural Rights of Man, of which so much is said
in the American and French Declarations of Rights, had
in England ceased to exercise on men's minds their potent
spell. He has no more faith m_anxjndefeasible right of
man than Burke, the spokesman of Conservatism. Man,
Bentham declares, has no natural rights whatever : he has
only inclinations, desires and expectations. " Rights
properly so called," he affirms, " are the creatures of Law
properly so called ; real laws give birth to real rights."
We shall best appreciate the strength and the weakness
of Bentham by regarding him as a man whose main interest
lay in fading effective means for the improvement of
society. It is with this object in view, and not from any
purely speculative interest that he makes an elaborate
classification of the various pleasures which serve as
motives to action ; and his continual insistence on the
principle that " every one is to count for one and no more
than one " proceeds from the same generous impulse. He
is the uncompromising critic of all ascetic and altruistic
doctrines, maintaining that ultimately the only motive
to conduct is regard for one's own personal interest. We

148 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

must distinguish between the motive to an act and the
intention with which it is done. " A motive," he says,
" is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain,
operating in a certain manner." Moreover, " Pleasure
is in itself a good, nay, even setting aside freedom from
pain, the only good ; pain is in itself an evil, and indeed
without exception the only evil. And this is alike true
of every sort of pain and of every sort of pleasure. It
follows that there is no such thing as any sort of motive
that is in itself a bad one." The value of an act consists
entirely in its tendency to produce pleasure or to avert pain.
The only thing that can be called either good or bad is not
the motive from which a man acts but his disposition ;
but then again the disposition is good or bad according as
it tends to produce or to result in pleasure or pain. Good-
ness and badness thus depend entirely on the disposition
of the agent as determined by the view taken of his act
combined with the view of its consequence. " On the
occasion of every act he exercises every human being is
led to pursue that course of conduct which, according to
his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will
be in the highest degree contributory to his own happi-
ness." Bentham distinguishes between " private ethics "
and the " art of legislation," endeavouring to determine
the limits of each. " Ethics at large may be denned as
the art of directing men's actions to the production of the
greatest possible quantity of happiness." Private ethics is
the art of self-government, legislation the art of directing
the actions of other agents so as to produce a maximum
of pleasure on the whole. The quality which a man
manifests in discharging -his duty to himself is that of
prudence ; to forbear from diminishing the happiness of
one's neighbour is probity ; to add something to his happi-
ness is beneficence. If it is asked why I should obey the

BENTHAM 149

dictates of probity and beneficence, Bentham's answer
is, that while the qnlyjnterests which a man at all times
and upon all occasions is sure to find adequate motives
for consulting are his own, yet there are no occasions in
which a man has not some motives for consulting the happi-
ness of other men. In the first place, he has, on all
occasions, the purely social motive of sympathy or benevol-
ence ; in the next place, he has, on most occasions, the
semi-social motives of love or amity and love of reputation.
The motive of sympathy will act upon him with more or
less effect according to a variety of circumstances, princi-
pally according to the strength of his intellectual powers,
the firmness and steadiness of his mind, the quantity of
his moral sensibilities, and the characters of the people he
has to deal with. As private ethics and legislation have
the same end in view, namely, the happiness of every
member of the community, to a certain extent they go
hand in hand. How then do they differ ? They differ
in so far as the acts with which they are concerned are
not perfectly and throughout the same. " There is no
case in which a private man ought not to direct his own
conduct to the production of his own happiness, and of
that of his fellow creatures ; but there are cases in which
the legislature ought not to attempt to direct the conduct
of several other members of the community. Every act
which promises to be beneficial upon the whole to the
community (himself included) each individual ought to
perform of himself, but it is not every such act that the
legislature ought to compel him to perform."

It may be asked how we are to prove that the pursuit
of happiness of the greatest number will result in the
greatest happiness of all. No doubt if we assume that all
men are equal, the identification of the " greatest number "
with " all " will directly follow ; but this line of thought

150 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

was not open to Bentham, for the supposition of the
equality of men he regarded as one of the most pernicious
and anarchic fallacies. Why then should we regard the
majority or the " greatest number " of Bentham as if they
could be taken to represent the whole community ? De
Toqueville concluded from his survey of the United States
that the fundamental principle of democracy is equality.
This view Bentham decidedly rejects. The public good,
he maintains, demands that society should provide sub-
sistence and abundance, as well as equality and security ;
but it is his view that when the pursuit of equality comes
into collision with security, " it will not do to hesitate for
a moment. Equality must yield." The truth is that
Bentham practically dismisses equality, and, for purposes
of legislation, treats fellow-citizens as equals. Thus he
employs the formula merely as a working rule for legisla-
tion. He does indeed argue that to increase a man's
means is to increase his happiness ; but at the same time
he admits that this increase is by no means in proportion
to the increase in wealth. Nor can it be said that the
bestowal of political rights must of necessity lead to the
greater well-being of the individual or the community,
irrespectively of that intelligence and public spirit which
alone make these privileges valuable and just.

Like Bentham, JAMES MILL'S interest was not so much
intellectual as practical, and indeed his psychological
investigations were primarily conducted with this definite
social end in view. Bentham was satisfied with a crude
form of psychological hedonism, which he identified with
egoism, and he made a very imperfect reconciliation of
egoism and altrusim. The aim of James Mill was by the
employment of the principle of Association to show that
there is nothing in the principle of Utility, the principle

JAMES MILL 151

that the true aim of the individual is the " greatest happiness
of the greatest number " — to preclude the possibility of
altruistic or disinterested conduct. This he seeks to do by
distinguishing " inseparable " from other forms of associa-
tion. The former, he holds, may convert what at first
is merely a means into an end that is sought for its own
sake. He is also original in interpreting the result of the
association of various mental elements after the analogy
of a fusion of chemical elements. In this way he believes
that it is easy to show that the intuitional or " moral
sense " view of conscience is untenable, the truth being
that moral judgments are at bottom based upon the prin-
ciple of Utility. Like Bentham, of whom he was a devoted
follower, James Mill sought to apply the principle of Utility
in many departments of philanthropy and politics. He
may be regarded as the intellectual father of the English
Reform Bill of 1832. He was not, however, an advocate
of the immediate adoption of universal suffrage, but sought
only to secure the emancipation of the middle classes.
His view was that the extension of the suffrage to the
working classes must be gradually prepared for by the
spread of enlightenment and education. Like Bentham
he thought the most important thing was that men should
have an enlightened sense of their own interests ; which
means that the principle of Utility is beyond the region
of doubt. His advance on Bentham consists mainly in
his attempt to place the principle common to both upon
a more definite and stable basis.

In his Ethics JOHN STUART MILL displays the same
combination of wide outlook and narrow theory as in other
parts of his philosophy. To the last he maintains in words
the hedonistic and utilitarian doctrine which had come
down to him from Bentham and James Mill. In his

152 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Utilitarianism he tells us that the foundation of all moral
action is the desire for pleasure and freedom from pain,
and that " all desirable things are desirable either for the
pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the pro-
motion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." x The
pleasure, or happiness, however which is the end of life is
" not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest
happiness altogether." 2 Moral feeling induces us to strive
for the promotion of happiness even when the happiness
is not our own. It may be objected that, even granting
that men do as a matter of fact always seek for happiness,
it does not follow that they are right in doing so. To this
objection Mill answers : " The sole evidence it is possible
to produce that anything is desirable is that people
actually desire it. ... No reason can be given why the
general happiness is desirable, except that each person,
so far as he believes it to be obtainable, desires his own
happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only
all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is
possible to require, that happiness is good ; that each
person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general
happiness, therefore, a good to be the aggregate of all
persons." 8 If it is further objected that this proof fails
to show that happiness is the only object actually desired
by men, Mill answers that virtue, although it is not natur-
ally and originally part of the end, has become so in those
who love it disinterestedly.4

In accordance with his general theory Mill seeks to
show that the moral feeling is not innate, but is a highly
complex product of various elements, the chief of which
are sympathy, fear, religious feeling of various kinds,
experiences of the effects of action, self-esteem, and a

1 Utilitarianism, p. 10. 2 Ibid. p. 16.

*Ibid. pp. 52-53. *Ibid. p. 55.

JOHN STUART MILL 153

desire for public approbation. In this complex character
we have an explanation of the extraordinary force and
tenacity of the feeling. The association of the different
elements of which it is composed is so strong as to amount
to indissolubility. It is for this reason that it has been
supposed to be " innate " ; for that which appears to act
instinctively is not unnaturally supposed to be a primitive
" intuition." If any of those elements may be called at
least relatively " innate," that element is sympathy.
It is, however, of more importance to observe that associa-
tion in the common life accustoms men to work with one
another and to unite their forces in order to obtain a common
end. The higher the development reached in social life
and the more the barriers between different classes are
broken down, the more does this solidarity increase ; and
when it is persistently fostered by education and the
ordering of institutions, and encouraged by the force of
public opinion, this feeling may give rise to what may well
be called a form of religion. Mill, therefore, in contrast
to Bentham, believes that there are perfectly disinterested
feelings. "It is better," as Plato says, " to surfer wrong
than to do wrong. The step marked by the Gorgias is
one of the greatest in moral culture — the cultivation of
a disinterested performance of duty for its own sake."
" Man," he says, " is never recognised by Bentham as a
being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end ;
of desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own
character to this standard of excellence, without hope of
good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward
consciousness. Even in the more limited form of con-
science this great fact escapes him." It is not surprising
that one who thus registers his dissent from one of the
cardinal features in the doctrine of his master should insist

1 Dissertations, i. 359 ; James Seth's English Philosophers, 253.

154 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

upon the importance of interpreting Utility " in the highest
sense, as grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being." l In his Utilitarianism Mill expresses
his faith in the progress of humanity in words that display
a quiet and sustained hopefulness. " No one," he says,
" whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can
doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world
are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs
continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow
limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be
completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, com-
bined with the good sense and providence of individuals.
Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be
definitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and
moral education, and proper control of noxious influences ;
while the progress of science holds out a promise for the
future of still more direct conquests over this detestable
foe. And every advance in that direction relieves us from
some, not only of the chances which cut short our own
lives, but, what concerns us still more, which deprive us
of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. As for
vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments con-
nected with worldly circumstances, these are principally
the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated
desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions. All
the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a
great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable
by human care and effort ; and though their removal is
grievously slow — though a long succession of generations
will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed,
and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge
were not wanting, it might easily be made — yet every mind
sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, how-

1 Liberty, Intro. ; Seth, p. 254.

JOHN STUART MILL 155

ever small and inconspicuous, in the endeavour, will draw
a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would
not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence consent
to be without."

Mill was by no means an advocate of the form of individ-
ualism which regards all State interference as an inter-
ference with the liberty of the subject ; on the contrary,
he looks upon legislation in regard to colonisation, hours
of labour, endowment of research, and similar matters,
as quite consistent with an enlightened individualism.
Nevertheless he is quite clear that there are certain
indefinite limits within which the State should confine
itself. He has no implicit faith in the wisdom of majorities,
and therefore he defends an organised opposition under all
forms of government, and supports the scheme of Hare
for the representation of minorities. He also insists upon
the supreme importance of respecting the principle that
the individual must not be interfered with except in so far
as such interference is necessary to prevent his behaviour
from injuring others. The interference in such cases may
take the form of physical force or the force of customary
opinion. There must be the greatest possible freedom in
the expression of opinions as well as of actions. For,
he argues, the only way in which truth is reached is by free
discussion of all possible alternatives. Actions, no doubt,
cannot be accorded so much liberty as opinions, but he
maintains that the condition of individual happiness,
as well as of individual and social progress, is that a man's
action should proceed from his own character, and not
simply follow custom and tradition. Mill, therefore,
holds by his individualism, at least so far as to maintain
that society must rest upon private property, private
capital, inheritance, contract, and competition. He

1 Utililarianisniy p. 21.

156 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

therefore rejects all social legislation which would abolish
private capital, maintaining that such a revolution could
only end in disappointment and disillusion. Competition
he regards as essential to progress. Those who charge
upon competition the evils of existing society " forget,"
he says, " that wherever competition is not, monopoly is,
and that monopoly in all its forms is the taxation of the
industrious for the support of indolence, if not of plunder."
Rejecting the socialistic remedy for the evils of society,
Mill strongly advocated voluntary co-operation. The
working classes, he holds, may in course of time command
the necessary capital and can be trusted to encourage
enterprise provided, and only provided, they have been
sufficiently educated. By education he means much more
than the teaching of the three R's, or a superficial acquaint-
ance with history, science and political economy, or even
the direct instruction in political and social duties. His
conception is rather of the large and liberal character
which Plato has set forth in his Republic, or at least it is
the Platonic idea as adapted to the exigencies of modern
life. A man is educated, in Mill's sense, not simply by his
rudimentary education at school, but by that higher form
of education which he experiences from the practice of
his particular trade or profession. The education of the
citizen cannot be decided by merely endowing him with the
franchise, but only when the whole training of society
fits him for the gift of self-government. It is only by the
actual use of this gift that he can be made fit to receive
it. No doubt a certain risk is run when the general
principle of democracy is put in practice ; and indeed there
is no more important problem for the believer in demo-
cracy than to find out means for guarding against such
risks. Thus Mill is no mere advocate of laissez faire,
but only of an enriched and positive individualism. He

JOHN STUART MILL 157

is the opponent of all distinctions of group, class or caste.
It is not enough that society should be diverse and free,
but each member of it must be vigorous, enlightened
and disinterested. It is for this reason mainly that Mill
insists so strongly upon the right of free discussion ; indeed,
he carried it so far as almost to convert it into a supersti-
tion. He shows a similar extravagance of faith in social
experiments. It is not true, he declares, that the health
of society can be measured by " the amount of eccentricity
to be found within it." Mill has so great an antipathy
to social interference that he seems at times to regard
the mere refusal to bend to social authority as in itself a
virtue. At the same time his general idea is undoubtedly
right, namely, that much which is best in human nature
lies beyond the province both of social and of legal
sanction.

In his Utilitarianism Mill gives an analysis of the senti-
ment of justice which will be found, when carefully analysed,
to presuppose the principle that human perfection is the
hidden spring of all social progress. Why is it, as Mill
himself says, that as time goes on there is a gradual widen-
ing of sympathy which points beyond the individual and
even beyond the nation, so as ultimately to include all
men, if not that man learns by the teaching of experience
and by hard-won conquests over his own narrowness and
prejudices that nothing short of complete unity with a
good which is not here nor there but everywhere, can
bring him permanent satisfaction ? Justice, as the means
of securing to every man what is necessary to his full
development, is something very different from the mere
impulse of retaliation, based upon the animal instinct
of resentment, to which Mill would trace it back. The
extension of sympathy to all men is more than a mere
extension, because a recognition of the claims of every

158 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

man to fair and equitable treatment can ultimately be
justified only on the principle that the true end of life
consists in the union of all men in a common cause.
Justice cannot be defended, as Mill would defend it, by any
attempt, however specious, to reduce it to a mere calculus
of pleasures. Such an attempt owes its apparent success
to a confusion between the term ." pleasure " and human
perfection. Justice is therefore not something which is
complete once for all, but something which is ever in
process of realisation, though it can never be completely
realised.

Mill's view is that all " restraint qua restraint is an
evil." This idea is based upon the principle that liberty
consists in " being left to oneself." This can hardly mean
that a man is to be left to act in accordance with the
promptings of unregulated desire or selfish inclination,
for if so there would be no justification for any public action
whatever. Mill really means that freedom of individual
action is essential to the highest life ; and if it is once
clearly grasped that there is no justifiable freedom to follow
unsocial desires, a so-called interference of society with
the liberty of the individual must be regarded as an
essential condition of true freedom. Men have not fought
and died merely for the liberty to be let alone, but to
escape from arbitrary, illegal, unwise restraint ; and this
implies the recognition of the importance of good laws to
secure the external conditions of a good life. The absence
of restraint is but a means to the free development of the
best life, and where a higher good is to be obtained by
interference with the individual it is thereby justified
Mill is so desirous of leaving the individual to follow his
own ends that he seems to regard diversity and eccentricity
as in themselves desirable. But, as Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen says, " Originality consists in thinking for your-

JOHN STUART MILL 159

self, not in thinking unlike other people." If thinking
for oneself leads to thinking unlike other people it can be
justified only on the ground that it is better thinking. It
is not true that in a civilised State there is less interference
with the individual ; what is true is that the ordered
life of civilisation provides the conditions under which
much greater diversity of individual life is possible. The
savage life is one of simple and undifferentiated action in
which every one is bound down by the tyranny of custom.
It is often the case that law protects the individual
against the tyranny of custom. The State protects the
family, the professions and trades, and the religious life,
against the unjust interference of customary opinion or
the tyrannous power of corporations. Mill admits that
" in England the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that
of law lighter, than in most other countries of Europe."
By taking education out of the hands of ecclesiastical
bodies the State is really making individual liberty possible.
A compulsory system of education is interference with
parents in favour of the children. Mill says that " the
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number is self-protection." But the indi-
vidual of whom Mill is thinking is the product of an
advanced civilisation. In truth we cannot, except by a
vicious abstraction, separate the individual from the
various relations to others which are essential to his life.

In HERBERT SPENCER we have a thinker who carries
out individualism in a more consistent, if less suggestive
way, than John Stuart Mill. He is largely influenced by
the analogy of society to a living organism. The applica-
tion of this analogy rests upon the principle of the struggle
for life and the survival of the fittest. Here human society

i6o THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

is compared to a whole animal species, or to the totality
of animal species in so far as they are in competition with
one another. On the other hand, Spencer also compares
f society to an individual organism, the- members of which
correspond to cells, or rather to " physiological units."
He holds, however, that there is one important distinction
between a society and an organism ; for, whereas conscious-
ness exists in the organism in connection with a central
organ, in society there is no special organ of consciousness.
Moreover, while in the former the parts exist for the sake
of the whole, in the latter the whole exists for the sake
of the parts. From this fact he infers that the central
organism — in other words, the government — can never
be more than a necessary means, instead of being, as in
the individual, the supreme arbiter. The teaching of
experience, he contends, is that all external interference
with the individual results in loss of the power of
practical adaptation to the realities of nature. Nor are
artificially created authorities ever so vigorous and effective
the spontaneous activity of individuals.
Spencer assumes that there is such an opposition between
••' the individual and the State that what is gained by the
State is lost by the individual, and what is gained by the
individual is gained at the expense of the State. This
doctrine implies that State action in no sense is the action
of the individual. In reality what gives force and what
justifies State action is that it is an expression of the real
will of the individual. Under no other condition can a
free being feel any obligation to obey the laws of the State.
No doubt there are cases in which the real will of the
individual is not embodied in some governmental measure ;
but the reason is not that the State is opposed to the will
of the individual, but that it does not express his real will.
Hence we find individuals opposing some action of the

HERBERT SPENCER 161

government, and seeking to have a law rescinded. Such
an action is justifiable if the government has done some-
thing which is in opposition to the common good. We
have to remember that governmental action is always an
essay in what is for the common weal, and that as no
government is infallible, there may be an opposition be-
tween its acts and the real good of the community. But
this in no way shows that the will of the individual is of
necessity opposed to the action of the State ; all that it
shows is that the real will of the individual has been mis-
understood. The State is not an aggregate of individuals ;
it has no existence except as it expresses the will of indi-
viduals, and that will, while it is, speaking generally,
expressed through the government, may on occasion be
contrary to the will of the individuals. There is no contra-
diction in a government at one time abolishing the Corn
Laws and at another time passing Factory Acts. The
same principle underlies both kinds of action. By the same
principle we may rightly protest against arbitrary and un-
constitutional acts at one time, and at another time
pass laws which interfere with the supposed right of an
ecclesiastical organisation to prescribe what men shall
believe in religious matters. The whole question is
whether the action is or is not in harmony with the
common weal, which is the same thing as the real will of
the community.

Spencer's conception of the State as an organism com-
parable to a living being seems to suggest a higher doc-
trine of the State than the opposition of the State and the
individual ; for it is of the very essence of a living being
to be a whole in which no part has any independent exist-
ence, and it is also characteristic of a living being, at least
of the higher type, to have a central organ by which the
subordinate organs are regulated and adjusted to one
w.s. L

162 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

another. It is therefore strange that Spencer should,
after comparing the State to an organism, go on to say that
individuals must be likened to " bodies dispersed through
an indifferentiated jelly." The reason, I suppose, is that
otherwise the analogy would lead us to suppose that the
government corresponds to the brain ; and then where
is there a good ground in the analogy for minimising the
action of the State ? "As there is no social sensorium,"
says Spencer, " it results that the welfare of the aggregate,
considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be '
sought for. The society exists for the benefits of its
members, not the members for the benefit of the society."
This is the old fallacy that the State is opposed to the
individuals composing it. When we see that the State
is the individuals, being the expression of their true will,
there is no longer any reason for denying to it what by
analogy may be called a " sensorium." It is in fact a
self-conscious organism. Of course there are not two
things, the State and the citizens ; the State is the mind
and will of the citizens, and if we remove either the citizens
or their mind and will we have nothing at all, and of course
no " sensorium." Though the State is more than an
organism, it is not less ; and we lose all the suggest iveness
of the comparison if we do not recognise that, just as the
parts of a living being are nothing apart from the whole,
so the individual members of the State have no existence
except in the whole, any more than there could be a whole
without them.

In support of the doctrine of Natural Rights, Spencer
says that " before definite government arises, conduct
is regulated by customs." Granting this very obvious fact,
does it follow that rights are independent of society and
belong to the individual ? What it shows is only that
in early society rights were recognised by the community,

HERBERT SPENCER 163

though not explicitly embodied in laws. Primitive law,
as Sir Henry Maine has shown, is a declaration of custom,
not a command ; but a custom recognised by the com-
munity is the early form of State action. Thus the develop-
ment of custom into State law is really a proof that laws
are the expression of the mind, not of the individual who
is seeking his own personal interest, but, on the contrary,
of the general mind which rises above merely personal
interests and legislates for the good of the whole. " Pro-
perty," Spencer says, " was well recognised before law
existed." Certainly ; but the recognition of property,
though not formulated by law, was the expression of the
general will, not of the selfish interests of the individuals.
Property Spencer thinks of as belonging by indefeasible
right to the individual, the function of the State being
to protect him from interference on the part of others.
But property was not among primitive peoples individual :
it belonged to the family, the village, or the tribe ; and
property in the modern sense was a decided interference
with this corporate property. The foundation of rights is
the establishment of the external conditions essential to
the realisation of the best life, and thus society creates
rights with their corresponding duties. This is virtually
admitted by Spencer when he tells us that " the conception
of natural rights originates in a recognition of the truth,
that if life is justifiable, there must be a justification for
the performance of acts essential to its preservation, and
therefore a justification for those liberties and claims
which make such acts possible."

Spencer's conception of sovereignty seems to be that of
Hobbes and Austin, who place it iiTsbme definite person
or persons, though he differs from them in denying that it
is unlimited. But, in the first place, sovereignty does not
lie in any definite person or persons but in the community

164 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

as a whole. Government is but the organ by which the
general mind is expressed, and its authority is drawn from
its relation to the general mind. And in the second place,
the sovereignty must be unlimited, because otherwise
there fs no central authority to which appeal may be made
in the last resort. Political obedience is not rendered to
the will of any given person or persons, but is an expression
of the general will as realised in and through the whole
complex of customs, institutions and beliefs that together
constitute the social and political organism.

CHAPTER EIGHTH

THE NATION-STATE (continued) : NIETZSCHE,
HAECKEL AND TREITSCHKE

THE importance attached by Hegel to the sovereignty of
the State may be partly explained by the peculiar history
of Germany. Unlike Goethe, Hegel was an ardent patriot,
though before the reforms of Stein, Scharnhorst and
Hardenberg he had nothing but contempt for Prussia,
which, he said, had secured her own tranquillity by a
degrading subservience to Napoleon. He did not despair,
however, of the ultimate unity of Germany, and at a later
time spoke of the " World-soul " as having " put the
greatest genius into military victory, only to show how
little after all mere victory counts for." At this time in
a letter to Zellman he bids him look beyond the immediate
failure to its causes and see in them the promise of recovery.
" The French nation," he writes, " by the bath of its revolu-
tion has been freed from many institutions which the
spirit of man has left behind like its baby shoes, and which
therefore weighed upon it, as they still weigh upon others,
as lifeless fetters. . . . Hence their preponderance over the
cloudy and undeveloped spirit of the Germans, who, how-
ever, if they are once forced to cast off their inertia will
rouse themselves to action, and preserving in the contact
with outward things the intensity of their inner life,
will perchance surpass their teachers." l This prophecy

1 Hegel, xvi. p. 628.
165

166 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

received confirmation after the reforms of Stein and
Hardenberg. Hegel rejoiced that the German nation had
redeemed itself from the worst of tyrannies and regained
its nationality, " that foundation of all higher life." The
youthful enthusiasm kindled in him by the French Revolu-
tion has been changed into a conception of the State as an
organic unity, which at the same time secures to the in-
dividual his rights. On the one hand, it must be based on
a community of race and language, and it must rest upon
relations that are beyond the caprice of individuals ; on
the other hand, it must also be a civil community in which
individuals are secured in their private rights of person and
property, and permitted to pursue their particular aims
and to develop their special abilities in competition and
co-operation with one another. Hegel believes, as we
have seen, that the best form of government must have at
its head a constitutional monarch ; and whatever may
be said of his view, there is good ground for believing
that it was necessary under the actual conditions of the
time. While his ideal implies a more democratic form of
government than the Prussian system, he assigned to govern-
ment a more direct initiative than was to be found in the
English system. In the paper in which these views are
expressed Hegel declares that Germany "is no longer a
State, but, as a French writer has said, a constituted
anarchy." Under the Holy Roman Empire the general
power of the State had been destroyed. He calls for a
renewal of authority under one monarch and one govern-
ment. " The greatness of modern States makes it possible
to realise the ancient idea of the personal participation of
every freeman in the general government. Both for
execution and deliberation, the power of the State must
gather to a centre. But if this centre is maintained by
the reverence of the people, and consecrated in its unchange-

HEGEL 167

ableness in the person of a monarch, determined by the
natural law of birth, the Government may, without fear
or jealousy, leave the subordinate systems and corpora-
tions to determine in their own way most of the relations
which arise in society, and every rank, city, commune,
etc., to enjoy the freedom of doing that which lies within
its own sphere." Thus his idea is that of an organism in
which life is continually streaming from the centre to the
extremities, and back from the extremities to the centre.
This is in essence the doctrine expounded in his Philosophic
des Rechts. Hegel, though he has been accused of being
the mouthpiece of the reaction, shows in this work that he
provided for many of those popular institutions which a
reactionary government refused to grant.

Hegel has been accused of being the exponent of Prussian
military tradition, and the present ruthless conduct of the
war has been traced back to his doctrine of the State.
The strong words in which he denounces the gospel of
force, as advocated by von Haller, sufficiently prove that
the charge is not based on fact. Hegel, indeed, believes
in the absoluteness of the State in the sense that it is the
ultimate authority in relation to its own citizens as well
as in negotiations with foreign powers, but he just as
decidedly declares that will, not force, is that which binds
together the distinct elements. Nor does he hold that a
State exists for the purpose of conquest. War, according
to Clause wit z, " is the continuation of politics." This is
entirely contrary to the philosophy of Hegel, for whom the
continuation of politics is art, science, religion, for which
the State provides the essential external conditions. It
is true that he has very little to say about international
relations ; but the reasons are surely patent without our
having recourse to the view that the State is beyond all
law of right and may do whatever is in its own selfish

168 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

interest. What was of first importance in Hegel's day was
the creation of a national feeling, as Fichte also saw, and
Hegel was attempting to analyse an actual State, as he
tells us, not to construct an ideal State. In any case he
would certainty not have admitted the atrocious doctrine
that a State is above all morality and may do whatever it
pleases irrespective of the claims of other States. Above
and beyond the State there is the spirit of the world,
which is also the divine spirit. The State is for him the
custodian of the moral world, and within and beyond it
is the Kingdom of God. As he said in his first public
utterance as University Professor in Heidelberg : " Now
that the German nation has redeemed itself by the sword
from the worst of tyrannies, and regained its national
unity — the foundation of a higher life — we may hope
that besides the Kingdom of this world, on which all
thoughts and efforts have been hitherto concentrated,
the Kingdom of God may also be thought of; in other
words, that, besides political and worldly interests, science
and philosophy, the free interests of intelligence, may
also rise to newness of life." It is strange that some
who trace all our present evils back to Hegel do not see
that one who held the inviolability of the State could not
be at the same time an advocate of world-dominion, and
that it is not possible that the exponent of the free will,
which is also the moral will, should be the fons et origo of
the immoral doctrine that the State has no limits but its
own selfish interests. The philosophy which has but-
tressed up this irrational doctrine is really due to a reaction
against the idealist philosophy, and it may be proper to
say a few words in regard to the historical causes which
have led to the present German deification of Force as the

^— — i _ • -._ __„_£•-! T -_ i i iii^""^ • mm M JBH IUT— -^-^•^•^

essence of the modern State.
The political unity of Germany was secured compara-

STEIN AND HARDENBERG 169

lively late, partly because of the strong individuality, not
to say the selfishness, of the two hundred States into which
it was divided. At the end of the eighteenth century
the economic condition of the country was of the poorest.
Systems of common cultivation and of partial villeinage
prevailed, and industrial development could hardly be
expected from a people split up into so many separate
states and almost hermetically sealed against one another,
not only by tariff barriers but by differences in measures
and money, in customs and laws. From 1850 to 1860,
however, the foundations of Germany as an industrial
State were laid, although its rate of economic progress was
retarded by the rivalry of other countries, especially in
iron, steel and other mineral industries. A new order of
things was initiated by Stein and Hardenberg and several
other statesmen, and it is significant that none of these
reformers were Prussians. Stein was aided in awakening
Germany to self-consciousness by Fichte's Addresses to the
German People ; but the mass of the people were kept out
of even moderate rights for many years by the pedantic
Frederick William the Third and his pedantic advisers ;
so that in Germany, almost alone of the great European
powers, the democratic and national movements towards
unity and liberty were stifled in their birth. It was under
the strong hand of Bismarck that Germany entered upon
a new career, the final result of which was its unification
and the contemporary organisation of the Prussian army
by Roon, while the military strategy of von Moltke resulted
in the triumph of Prussia, first over Austria and later over
France. The effect of these wars on the German people
was to stimulate their consciousness of unity, and, under
Bismarck's guidance, to develop the rich mineral resources
of the country. One untoward result of this increased
self-consciousness and this material expansion was the

170 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

rise of a materialistic philosophy in writers like Moleschott
and Biichner. " No one," said Ranke sadly, " thinks of
anything but commerce and money." In confirmation
of this materialistic tendency Darwin's doctrine of the
struggle for existence was interpreted, or rather mis-
interpreted, as a proof that the law of life and history is
that the strongest must win in the long run. " The theory
of selection teaches," says HAECKEL, " that in human life,
as in animal life, everywhere and at all times, only a small
and chosen minority can exist and flourish, while the
enormous majority starve and miserably perish more or
less prematurely. . . . The cruel and merciless struggle
for existence which rages throughout all living nature,
and in the course of nature must rage, this unceasing and
inexorable competition of all living creatures is an incon-
testable fact ; only a picked minority of the fittest is in
a position to resist it successfully, while the great majority
of the competitors must necessarily perish miserably.
We may profoundly lament this tragical state of things,
but we can neither controvert nor alter it. ' Many are
called but few are chosen.' This principle of selection
is nothing less than democratic ; on the contrary, it is
aristocratic in the strictest sense of the word." Again,
applying the principle in the interpretation of human
life, Haeckel says : " The supreme mistake of Christian
ethics, and one which runs directly counter to the Golden
Rule, is its exaggeration of love of one's neighbour at the
expense of self-love. Christianity attacks and despises
egoism on principle. Yet that natural impulse is abso-
lutely indispensable in view of self-preservation ; indeed,
one may say that even altruism, its apparent opposite, is
only an enlightened egoism. Nothing great or elevated
has ever taken place without egoism, and without the
passion that urges us to great sacrifices. It is only the

NIETZSCHE 171

excesses of the impulse that are injurious. One of the
Christian precepts that were impressed upon us in early
youth as of great importance, and that are glorified in
millions of sermons is : ' Love your enemies, bless them
that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray
for them that despitefully use you and persecute you.' It
is a very ideal precept, but as useless in practice as it is
unnatural. So it is with the counsel : ' If any man will
take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also/ Trans-
lated into terms of modern life, that means : ' When
some unscrupulous scoundrel has defrauded thee of half
thy goods, let him have the other half also.' Or again,
in the modern politics : ' When the pious English take
from you simple Germans one after another of your new and j
valuable colonies in Africa, let them have all the rest of your /
colonies also — 01 best of all give them Germany itself.' "J

The aggressive and ambitious spirit which since 1870
has characterised the German people has been intensified
by the writings of NIETZSCHE. In his later years, it is
true, he spoke of nationalism with contempt, advocating
a united Europe, and calling for men of rigid austerity and
self-discipline ; but his worship of power has been eagerly
caught up by the new Germany which came to self-
consciousness after 1870. Its mission, it is believed,
is to " carry heroism into knowledge and to wage war for
the sake of ideas." It is therefore only natural that
General von BERNHARDI should endorse the saying that
" without war inferior or demoralised races would only
too easily swamp the healthy and vital ones, and a general
decadence would be the result. War is one of the essential/
factors in morality."

These are the ideas that TREITSCHKE instilled into the
mind of young Germany year after year until they have
now become all but universal there. Of his ardent patriot-

x)

172 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ism there is no manner of doubt, but it can hardly be called
the patriotism of a well-balanced mind. He adopts the
doctrine of Bismarck that " even one's good name must
be sacrificed to the Fatherland." In his Lectures on
Politics his contrast to Hegel was shown with startling
clearness. The State according to Hegel is based upon
Will, " its binding cord being not force but the deep-
seated feeling of order which is possessed by all." In
criticising von Haller, the Tieitschke of his day, he says :
"It is not the power of the right that Haller means, but
the power of the vulture which tears in pieces the innocent
lamb." 1 This opposition of Will and Force is obliterated
in the writings of Treitschke, and it is from a confusion
between them that his theory gets its plausibility.

The burden of Treitschke's Politik is that the State is
Power : it is, we are told, infinitely superior to the individual,
its object being to realise an ideal beyond and above that
of personal happiness. No doubt man is more than a
merely political being, for he has the right to think freely
about all matters pertaining to the sphere of religion ;
but in matters pertaining to secular things he is absolutely
under the control of the State. Even the Church must
obey the laws which the State sees fit to make, including
a certain measure of religious unity, since " without com-
munity of religion the consciousness of national unity
is impossible." It is a great mistake to suppose that the
principle of humanity can be made the basis of political
action. There is no natural equality among men, and
indeed the essential inequality of men is the foundation
of all political reasoning. The State is a Person, not an
Organism. As a Person it attains to realisation by friendly
intercourse and by conflict with other States. The con-
ception of a World-State is a thoroughly false ideal. " In
the eternal conflict of separate states lies the beauty of

1 Philosophic des Rcchts, p. 245.

TREITSCHKE 173

history." Hence " the State is the public power for
defensive and offensive purposes, and a state which is not
able to form and maintain itself deserves to perish." The
maintenance of military power is therefore an absolutely
essential duty, and the State that cannot protect its subjects
will not generate in them a true patriotism and national
pride. War, when it is waged for some national interest,
is essentially wholesome and elevating ; it is, as Clausewitz
says, the necessary instrument of the State — in Treitschke's
phraseology " Political science par excellence." "It is
only in war that a people becomes in very deed a people.
By it new states are erected and disputes settled between
independent states ; it is a sovereign specific against
national disunion, and a school of the manly virtues. The
protection of its citizens by force of arms is the foremost
duty of a nation. Therefore wars must continue to the end
of history. Even among civilised nations it is the only
form of law-suit by which the separate and irreconcilable
claims of each may be determined. Is it not a perverted
form of morality which would eradicate the heroic spirit
from 'the human race ? Even if wars were to become
infrequent, it would still be wise to maintain a citizen
army as a school of character. Apart from this the main-
tenance of a military class is dictated by the instinct of
self-preservation. The State is power, and it is reasonable
and normal that a great nation should by its physical
force embody and perfect this power in a well-organised
army. Of all political institutions a really national and
well-organised army is the only one which brings citizens
together as citizens." It is Treitschke's belief that there
is no danger that a nation in which every able-bodied
citizen is a soldier will ever disturb the peace of another
nation by wanton conquest.
Treitschke makes it clear that when he declares the

174 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

State to be Power, the State he is thinking of is Prussia.
Power is a means to culture, and culture he practically
assumes to be a monopoly of Germany. The German
nation must be sovereign, which means that it has virtu-
ally no international obligations. " The State," he says,
" is the highest thing in the eternal society of man ; above
it there is nothing at all in the history of the world. . . . To
care for its power is the highest moral duty of the State.
Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most
abominable and despicable ; it is the sin against the Holy
Spirit of politics." This doctrine is naturally a menace to
International Law and a constant threat of aggressive war.
Treitschke will have nothing to do with the " Liberal "
theory, which " regards the State as a fine fellow, who is
to be washed and combed and sent to school, and to be
thankful and just, and God knows what beside." His
own theory is that International Law must be between
Great States of about equal size, because " history shows
the continuous growth of great States out of decadent
small States." Small States are apt to be soft and senti-
mental, and are in continual fear of aggression. " Few
people realise how ridiculous it is of Belgium to feel itself
the home of International Law. A State in an abnormal
position must have an abnormal view of International
Law. Belgium is neutral ; it is emasculated ; it cannot
produce a healthy International Law." England on the
other hand is a nation which violates all the principles of
International Law in her maritime transactions, and in
order to produce an equilibrium, the other great powers
must have a navy of equal strength. When the sovereignty
of the State is threatened, " it is ridiculous to advise a State
which is in competition with other States to start by
taking the catechism in its hands." A State may there-
fore disown a Treaty if there is necessity -for it. "A

TREITSCHKE 175

State cannot bind its will for the future over against another
State." When circumstances change, the Treaty ipso
facto also changes, and a State itself is the only judge on
this point. Evidently on this theory International Law
and Treaties are " scraps of paper." As Treitschke puts
it, " if a State is not in a position to maintain its neutrality,
it is empty words to talk of neutrality." Alas, poor
Belgium ! A small State, as one German writer argues,
must be dependent on the culture of the great State, and
will gain in real vitality by incorporation in its more power-
ful neighbour. In short , as Treitschke expressly says,
" Might is at once the supreme Right, and the dispute
as_tp what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war."
It is not surprising therefore that he should in his pamphlet,
Was fordetn wir von Frankreich ? insist upon the annexa-
tion of Alsace-Lorraine. These conquered provinces must,
in Kant's words, be " forced to be free." " We Germans
know better what is good for Alsace and Lorraine than the
unhappy people themselves, who through their French
associations have lived in ignorance of the new Germany.
We will give them back their own identity against their
will. We have in the enormous changes of these times
too often seen in glad astonishment the immortal working
of the forces of history to be able to believe in the uncon-
ditional value of a Referendum in this matter. We invoke
the men of the past against the present." Treitschke
admits that there is something not altogether lovely about
the " civilising " methods of Prussia ; but, he argues,
Prussia, united to the rest of Germany under the new
Empire, will become humanised and will in turn humanise
the new subject peoples. Unfortunately the forty years
that have elapsed since he uttered this prophecy have
shown that instead of a Germanised Prussia what has
come to be is a Prussianised Germany.

176 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

There is no absolute law, according to Treitschke, to
which a State is subject, for laws are made by a sovereign
power which is able to enforce them. There is therefore
no such thing as International Law. States may make
Treaties, but these last only so long as the contracting
parties see fit to observe them The only law which applies
to States is the law of their own interest. Treaties which
have outlived their usefulness may be discarded and new
Treaties corresponding to the new conditions take their
place. The establishment of an International Court of
Arbitration is incompatible with the nature of the State,
which at the most can only submit to such a Court in
questions of secondary importance. International Treaties
may become more frequent, but to the end of time the right
of arms will endure.

As a great institution for the education of the human
race the State must come under the moral law. A sincere
and honest policy builds up a national reputation which
is a power in itself. For Bismarck candour was a most
effective weapon, for when he spoke out his intention
frankly the inferior diplomat always imagined that he
intended just the opposite. The State must be moral,
but its highest moral duty is to maintain its power. The
individual may properly sacrifice himself for the sake of
the community of which he is a member, but it is not the
duty of the State to sacrifice itself. That one State should
sacrifice itself in the interest of another would not only
be immoral but contrary to that principle of self-preserva-
tion which is its highest duty. We must distinguish
between public and private morals. Of all political sins
that of weakness is the most despicable. Generosity
and gratitude can only be virtues in politics if they do not
militate against the great object of politics, which is the
preservation of the power of the State. A State which

TREITSCHKE 177

finds itself in contact with a barbarous or unscrupulous
people may justifiably come down to its level. Brutality
may be met with brutality, fraud with fraud.

Colonies are valuable because they enable the mother-
state to save her surplus population from being dissipated
among other nations. The need of such a State as
Germany for colonies is "a necessity which knows no
law." This indeed is not Treitschke's own express state-
ment, but it is one held by his disciples to be fairly deducible
from his doctrine.

International Law is a set of rules framed by the enlight-
ened self-interest of nations. Treitschke denies that
minor or neutral States can claim any share in drafting
these rules. As a result of reasoned calculation as well
as from a mutual sense of their own advantage States will
exhibit an increasing respect for justice, but as there is
no higher power placed above them, the existence of
International Law is always precarious. The idea of a
balance of power contains a germ of truth. An organised
political system presupposes that no one State shall be so
powerful as to be able to do just as it pleases without danger
to itself. It is the fault of England alone that the pro-
visions of International Law which relate to maritime
warfare still sanction the practice of privileged piracy. It is
certain that war will never be expelled from the world by
International Courts of Arbitration. How could Germany,
for example, allow the question of Alsace-Lorraine to be
decided by a Court of Arbitration ?

Since^ the State is Power, that . State which unites all
power in a single hand and asserts its own independence
corresponds most nearly to the ideal. A Democracy is
inferior to a Monarchy and an Aristocracy, being based on
the false principle that men are by nature equal. The
notion of ruling implies the existence of a class that is
\v.s. M

178 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ruled ; but if all are to rule, where is this class to be found ?
Liberty rests upon reasonable laws, which the individual
can obey with the approbation of his conscience. It is a
false conception of liberty to ask for it not in the State but
from the State. Political liberty depends much less
upon the right to vote than upon a serious and conscien-
tious participation in administrative work. A hereditary
Monarchy is therefore the ideal form of constitution. As
a ruler by hereditary right the Monarch ought to be irre-
sponsible for the exercise of his powers. In a Monarch
the will of the State is an expression of the will of one man
who by virtue of the historic right of a certain family
wears the crown, and with whom the ultimate decision
must rest. The Monarch is morally supported by the
aristocracy, because he represents the hereditary principle
and at the same time he normally becomes the protector
of the people. The existence of a monarch is also justified
because it puts the highest position of authority out of
the reach of adventurers, and because no one is jealous
of the Monarch's supremacy. No doubt the success of a
Monarchy implies that there is public confidence in the
dynasty and in the monarchical form of government.
A Democracy founded on the dogma of equality veers and
shifts with the whims of -the majority. It can only survive
when it can dispense with a large standing army, with an
efficient civil service, and with a centralised government.

When Treitschke tells us that the State is " infinitely
superior to the individual," he makes a statement which
is ambiguous and misleading. For him it practically
means that the individual is bound to submit to the laws
of the State under all circumstances. This is connected
with his view that the best form of government is govern-
ment from above, and that the mere possession of the fran-

TREITSCHKE 179

chise is of quite secondary importance. Hence the import-
ance he attaches to an aristocratic form of government.
The opposition of the State and the individual is essentially
false. There are not two ends : one the good of the State,
and the other the good of the individual. The State exists
for the purpose of securing the best life of the individual
and derives its authority from the free consent of the citizens.
In no other way can the law of the State be justified.
It is true that the individual does not always realise wherein
his good consists, but neither does the government. All
the institutions of society are organisations by means of
which the best life of the individual is discovered and
embodied in the law of the State. Thus the State is
gradually brought into harmony with the good of the
citizens. The individual cannot reasonably be asked
to submit to any laws except those which are the embodi-
ment of the common good of all individuals. Moreover,
the laws of the State are not a complete expression of the
life of individuals. Confined as it is to the external regula-
tion of the conditions of the best life, the State cannot
directly in justice interfere with art or religion, with
science or philosophy, as developed by the free play of
social forces, but can only secure that the individual shall
have freedom to live his own life without undue interfer-
ence. Thus within the State there are organisations for
the development of the higher life, and beyond the State
there are also associations for the promotion of the same
objects.

The State, Treitschke tells us further, exists in order
to realise " an ideal beyond and above that of individual
happiness." No doubt ; but this ideal is the ideal of the
individual who really realises wherein his highest good
consists. Morality does not consist in the pursuit of
happiness, if this means in securing the greatest possible

i8o THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

sum of pleasure. We cannot legitimately oppose the
good of the individual to the good of the whole ; the two
coincide. What gives point to Treitschke's remark is that
the individual may seek his good in the pursuit of selfish
ends : ends which are incompatible with the good of the
whole. And this is true ; but what it shows is that the
individual contradicts his own true nature. His own
good and the good of the whole coincide. Man's real
will, as Plato said, is the common good ; which does not
mean that every individual must live the same life as
every other, but that whatever life he lives, it must in some
way promote the good of the whole.

We are told that the foundation of all political reason-
ing is the perception of the essential inequality of men.
Hence the conception of the State is prior to that of
Humanity. What gives apparent force to this view is
that each nation has a special task, which it is called upon
to perform. But this truth is perverted when it is held
that the task of a particular State may be so important
that it overmasters that of any other State, and that it
may therefore justly compel others to accept its guidance,
if that can only be secured by force. The importance of
the mission of any State cannot justify it in attempting
to enforce its particular form of civilisation upon other
civilised states : firstly, because no State can exhaust
the possibilities of human nature ; and secondly, because
civilisation cannot be imposed by force. Each nation
has its distinctive type of culture, and the distinction is
essential to the complete life of mankind. As Mr. Davis
well says : " When we say that every nation has its own
type of moral excellence we do not mean that it has virtues
which no other nation possesses, or that it approves of
conduct which every nation reprobates. We only mean
that some of the common virtues of humanity are more

TREITSCHKE 181

highly prized in one nation than in another ; that certain
types of human activities are more useful in this place than
in that. The scientific mind is more highly prized in
Germany than it is in England ; this does not mean that
the Englishman regards the scientist as useless or per-
nicious. The French value courtesy more highly than we
do ; but still we regard courtesy as a good quality." l

But even granting that one nation possesses all the
highest qualities — a preposterous supposition — it would
still be true that it has no right to impose its culture on
other nations by force. What cannot be done should not be
done. Civilisation is necessarily a slow and gradual process,
because it implies the response of those upon whom it is
attempted to be imposed. Unless they respond, all that
is secured is an external conformity, which is very different
from a real assimilation of the new spirit, and is sure to
be accompanied by hypocrisy and other evils. Treitschke
never seems to understand that the good of the State in-
volves the free consent and endorsement of the laws, and
that unless this is secured the true good of the State cannot
be attained. Provided you have subservient citizens,
he seems to think, all is secured that is desirable. But all
is not secured. It is by the free exercise of rational will,
experimenting in various forms of social organisation,
that the good of the State is secured. Eliminate the whole
process of experimentation thus involved, and the State
is itself bound to suffer.

Punishment, according to Treitschke, is simply ordained
in order to preserve the external form of society. This
is a thoroughly inadequate theory. External order is not
an end in itself ; it is valuable only as an indication of a
moral order, and moral order is impossible without the
moralisation of the individual. By punishment the

1 The Political Thought of Trcitsckke, p. 125.

182 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

individual comes to be aware of the higher mind of the
community, which he has violated ; otherwise it would
simply be the desire of the stronger to prevent the opposi-
tion of the weaker. The State exists for the promotion
of the best life, and this end can only be secured by the
enforcement of penalties upon individuals who violate
the sanctities of the best life. The justification of punish-
ment is that it shows to all the citizens wherein the con-
ditions of the good life can be attained, and it brings home
to the criminal the respect in which he has violated those
conditions. It promotes the external order of the State
certainly, but that order is justifiable only because it is
essential to the best life.

War Treitschke regards as a sovereign specific against
national disunion. This is a specious argument. It is
true that a people comes in time of war to realise its soli-
darity, but that is not a reason for engaging in war. The
true cure for disunion is in the removal of its cause. If
a State is internally wholesome there is no need for war
to awaken the consciousness of its solidarity. In times of
peace the citizen is not aware of his consciousness of the
common good, but war does not create this consciousness ;
it only makes explicit a consciousness which is already
there. Moreover, so far as war necessarily distracts atten-
tion from the internal defects of the State, it is a malign
influence. The internal disease is only concealed, and is
bound to break forth again in times of peace. Nothing
will cure internal disease but internal reformation. To
argue that only war convinces a people that they are really
one is a palpable fallacy. Every act of obedience to
established law is a confession of unity. It is true that
war develops certain forms of virtue, but it is absurd to
say that it is the only school of the manlier virtues. Manli-
ness is not limited to courage in war, but is more highly

TREITSCHKE 183

developed in battling against the evils of society. In
overcoming the forces of external nature, in abolishing
the ravages of disease, in the development of art, science
and philosophy, the manly virtues are more worthily
cultivated than in the practice of war, with all its attendant
evils. To argue that a citizen army must be maintained
in order to cultivate character only means that Treitschke
does not properly appreciate the discipline of peaceful
pursuits, and shuts his eyes to the evil sentiments inevit-
ably generated by war, as well as to the enormous economic
losses which it brings in its train.

Treitschke rightly enough says that Treaties are subject
to revision with a change of circumstances ; but he does
not tell us whether a State may, without giving due notice,
violate a Treaty for what it considers military necessity.
His whole argument, however, implies that a State must
determine for itself where and when and how it will break
the terms of a Treaty. He tells us that the supreme duty
of a State is to maintain its power, and he would there-
fore accept the doctrine of Machiavelli that a State may
violate all the ordinary rules of private morality when its
existence is at stake. When its existence is at stake must
be determined by itself. Obviously this view can only
lead to the unlimited right of a State to do whatever it
regards as necessary to preserve its existence. Generosity
and gratitude on this view are political virtues only if
they do not militate against the power of the State ; which
practically means that they have no place whatever in
statecraft.

CHAPTER NINTH
ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN STATE

OUR survey of the development of political theory, which
is now completed, has made it abundantly evident that the
community, beginning in a simple and undifferentiated
form of life, has, by various and sometimes devious routes,
advanced to a condition in which life is at once much
more diversified and much better organised. In primitive
society the individual man was kept within very narrow
and rigid limits, and the community as a whole was there-
fore of a type which hardly admitted of any complexity
in its organisation. The individual members were allowed
little free play for any special idiosyncrasies of character
or talent. The good of the whole demanded the sacrifice
of independence in the parts. Confined within narrow
territorial limits, the individual was expected, and was
prepared, to sacrifice his own personal inclinations for the
good of his clan or tribe ; and devotion to his own small
community was accompanied by antagonism to all others.
This gives to ancient society a false appearance of solidarity
as compared with the more developed forms of modern
life. The relative simplicity of the primitive community,
as compared with the modern State, suggests the general
principle that the development of society has been from
simplicity to complexity of life and organisation.

The Athenian State was almost as perfect as such a form
of society could be. It had, however, two fundamental

184

THE ATHENIAN STATE 185

defects, which were bound to effect its destruction in the
fulness of time. In the first place, the great results which
it was able to accomplish in a marvellously short time
were made possible because it was a slave-owning State ;
indeed it would be more accurate to call Athens a slave-
owning aristocracy than a democracy in the modern sense
of the word. It is true that in no other city of Greece
were the slaves so comfortable or lived so varied a life,
and in none were they so exclusively drawn from foreign
and half-civilised peoples ; but the fundamental crime
against humanity undermined the life of the citizens
and ultimately proved its undoing. And there was a
second defect in the Athenian constitution, connected with
the manner in which its surplus wealth was obtained.
Partly, no doubt, it was drawn from the ordinary revenue,
but the greater part was obtained from taxes levied upon
subject cities. This, indeed, was in contradiction of the
Athenian idea that a State should be self-sufficient, since
it sacrificed the self-sufficiency of other communities for
the benefit of one. Athens, in fact, could not herself
provide for her daily wants, much less without external
assistance could she develop the noble life for which she
was praised by Pericles. Thus the self-sufficiency of the
City-State had proved to be an unrealisable ideal.

The same tendency to pass beyond the limits of the City-
State was displayed by Rome. During the period of the
oligarchy a system of law was required to regulate trans-
actions between Romans and foreigners and between
foreigners themselves, and the Twelve Tables were too
peculiar to supply a proper basis for decisions. Disputes
between Romans and foreigners were decided by the
praetors according to the practices and customs of those
concerned. Thus arose the jus gentium, as distinguished
from the jus civile or native law of Rome. The result was

186 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

the formation of a body of law of wider application than
the native law. In truth, Rome by its development had
ceased to be a true City-State, and the establishment
of an Empire became a necessity. The result of its ex-
pansion was thus to carry it beyond its original narrow
confines, and indirectly to make a cleft between the central
organisation and the various communities under its sway.
While all the political power was in the hands of the
Emperor, a certain amount of self-government was allowed
to the communes ; and this fact is by no means insignifi-
cant, since it introduced a distinction between society and
the State, which was destined to result in greater con-
creteness in the life of the community. The City-State
combined in itself almost all the needs of civilised life :
religion, politics, music, painting and part of education ;
and therefore its maintenance was a necessity of any
civilised life whatever. The subsequent history of man-
kind led to the differentiation of the political organ from
the artistic, educational, industrial and religious. The
Stoical philosophy, with its conception of the fundamental
identity in nature of all men, and the corollary of Stoical
lawyers that there is a " natural law " which is applicable
to all men, gave rise to a system of jurisprudence of wide
and universal scope, which has had enormous influence
upon modern peoples.

Before proceeding to a consideration of .the true form
of the modern State it will be well to refer shortly to the
successive steps by which political theory has advanced.
Aristotle, who firmly grasped the whole essence of the
ancient City-State, points out that it exists for the develop-
ment of the best life through the co-operation of the various
classes of society all working towards a common end.
This conception of society as the necessary condition of
the realisation of what man in his essential nature truly

ARISTOTLE 187

is, stands in marked contrast to the individualistic doctrine
of the Sophists, for whom the State was but a device by
which men are enabled to secure advantages for them-
selves that they could not otherwise obtain. Thus, at the
very dawn of political speculation we find individualism
affirmed in contrast to an organic conception of society,
and the same contrast meets us at the beginning of modern
political speculation with Hobbes. The limit of self-
sufficiency, which seemed to Aristotle a fundamental
condition of a powerful and successful community, is
conceived by him as well as by Plato to be the City-State,
a community pursuing its own independent life and so
ministering to the highest good of its own citizens, includ-
ing those literary, scientific, artistic and philosophical
products which Athens in its best days was able to produce.
The weakness of this form of society arose from its funda-
mental assumption that not the good of mankind as a
whole, but only the good of the Greek citizen, was the end
and purpose of political organisation, and therefore that
slavery and the subjection of the working class was a justi-
fiable method of securing the best life, while other com-
munities were as a matter of fact used simply as a means
for the attainment of this end. It was therefore a marked
advance upon this conception when the Stoics and
Epicureans insisted upon the spiritual value of man as
man, the one advocating a cosmopolitan view of humanity,
and the other making a plea for the higher value of friend-
ship as compared with the colder bond of citizenship.
The strength of these schools thus lay in the new con-
ception of self-conscious personality as the essence of
humanity, their weakness in not providing in their systems
for those virtues, rights and duties which can only be
secured in a properly organised community. Men were
taught to cultivate indifference to their own fate, and this

i88 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

carried with it the corollary that they should be equally
indifferent to the fate of others ; with the result that no
effort was made to realise in practice their dream of a
good as wide as humanity. Nevertheless, the conception
of something higher than the narrow life of the City-State
was never entirely lost, even when it was temporarily
obscured, and this conception began to be practically
realised when Christianity made its advent in the world,
proclaiming that all men are children of one divine Father.
The subsequent history of mankind may be said to consist
in the endeavour to realise this ideal, not merely in the
lives of individuals, but in a form of society modelled
after the " pattern in the mount."

The influence of the Stoical philosophy is seen in the
importance attached by Cicero to the conception of a
" law of nature " as supplying the standard by which the
institutions and laws of society may be estimated, a con-
ception which served as an ideal for the reconstruction
of society fifteen centuries later. With the vast exten-
sion of the Roman Empire all ideas of independent national
life were lost, but in its place there came a great develop-
ment of municipal law and administration, preparing the
way for a more concrete conception of the State than was
possible to the more limited vision of Plato and Aristotle.
Ulpian and the Roman jurists caught up the idea of a
" law of nature," pointing out its incompatibility with the
institution of slavery ; and the Christian Fathers, though
they were not prepared to advocate the abolition of slavery,
at least helped to ameliorate the condition of the slave.
With the conversion of Constantine the Church became
closely allied to the State, and in the subsequent period,
when the Roman Empire began to crumble under the
fierce attacks of the Barbarians, the Church was all the
more powerful that the power of its rival, the Empire,

CHURCH AND STATE 189

had become weak and ineffectual. The Empire, however
was not dead, but lived on for a thousand years after the
extinction of the Western Empire. The alliance of Church
and State was renewed under Charlemagne, and the tradi-
tional tribal law of the Franks was amalgamated with
Roman law. The Feudal Monarchy, based as it was upon
the idea of a contract between the king and his vassals,
prepared the way for the reintroduction of the doctrine
that the State owes its origin to a pact between the people
and the sovereign. Imperfect as this conception is
theoretically, it proved to be a valuable device for the
defence of liberty and nationality.

The great question of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries was whether the Church or the Empire, both
admittedly of divine appointment and having jurisdiction
over all Christendom, was to be regarded as supreme
over the other. Frederick II., the champion of the claims
of the Empire to supremacy, seems to have not only
claimed supremacy for the Empire, but an authority
which extended to spiritual as well as temporal concerns.
His untimely death left the question unsettled, and a
number of writers carried on the controversy, the most
important being Thomas Aquinas, as representing the
papal claims, and Dante, who pleads for the separate and
independent jurisdiction of Emperor and Pope, the one
supreme in all temporal matters, the other in things spiri-
tual. Rising above this dispute between the Church and the
Emperor, Marsiglio of Padua prefigures the modern theory
that the creator of law is the whole people, who have the
power not only to elect but to depose the governing power ;
and a similar conception he applies to the Church, affirm-
ing that the supreme authority in spiritual matters is not
the priesthood but the whole body of believers.

From the middle of the fourteenth century to the end

igo THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of the fifteenth there was a gradual decay of the imperial
idea and a decline in the power of the feudal monarchy,
with a simultaneous growth of nationalism and a strong
opposition to the overweening claims of the Church. This
is the explanation of the movements associated with the
names of Wycliffe and Huss. It is, however, with Machia-
velli that the modern study of politics really begins. It
is true that he deals not so much with the fundamental
principles of politics, as with the special problem how a
statesman who is convinced that his country is in danger
of destruction should act ; but his dispassionate method
raised the problem of government above the conflict of
Church and State, and his principles made for the independ-
ence and unity of the nation, even if that could only be
achieved by means of a military despotism. If Machia-
velli represents the point of view of the Renaissance,
Luther as the main spokesman of the Reformation endorses
that complete denial of all civil authority to the Church
which was characteristic of the Reformation, and it is for
this reason that he exalts the authority of the prince to a
pitch which prepares the way for subsequent attempts
to defend the " divine right of kings." Luther's doctrine
is that the prince is responsible to God alone, not to the
people ; a doctrine which, in spite of his real interest in
the liberty of the individual, could not but give counten-
ance to an absolutism in which all civil liberty was
destroyed. Bodin, on the other hand, while seeking to
preserve the sovereignty of the prince, endeavours to shield
the citizen from the arbitrary encroachment upon his
personal liberty by his affirmation that, while the sove-
reign is supreme over citizens and is not bound by the
laws, yet this does not mean that he may cast aside all
duty and moral responsibility.

Grotius makes the first attempt to formulate the prin-

GROTIUS 191

ciples of International Law, required to replace the decayed
jurisdiction of the Church. Thus the whole medieval
point of view, with its opposition of Church and State,
clergy and laity, secular and sacred, has at length given way
to a doctrine of national and international relations ; and
henceforth political theory is concerned solely with the
foundation of the State, the source of sovereignty and rights,
and the relations between the several independent states.

Hobbes, making use of the old Sophistic idea that
society is based upon contract; derives the sovereign's
authority from the consent of the subjects, whose agent
he is ; yet he maintains that the subjects cannot change
the form of government, nor can the sovereign, who has
made no covenant, forfeit his power. Any attempt to
subvert the power of the ruler, Hobbes argues, is equiva-
lent to a return to the state of nature, in which pure force
ruled. But what if there should be a successful rebellion ?
Since the right of the sovereign rests upon mere power,
and power disappears if the opposition to it is successful,
it would seem to follow that only an abortive revolution
can be condemned. This contradiction is quite explicit
in Spinoza, because he expressly says that natural right
is the same thing as natural power, a power which can
never be abandoned. Hence he cannot explain how,
without rising above nature, any right whatever can be
established. The basis of rights consists in the idea of an
end higher than the merely natural, and this again implies
the idea of final cause, which Spinoza expressly rejects.
Locke, on the other hand, holds that in the state of nature
men have a consciousness of the law of nature, though they
do not always obey it. The function of the legislature,
as he conceives it, is to formulate this law, to administer
it by known authorised judges, and to enforce the decisions
arrived at. This, he thinks, will prevent each man from

192 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

giving his private interpretation of what the law of
nature demands. And as " the legislative being is only a
fiduciary power to act for certain ends there remains still
in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislature." In this way Locke would defend the revolu-
tion of 1688. The theory of a social contract gets its
best expression, however, from Rousseau, who holds that
every individual gives up his rights, not, as Hobbes held,
to a sovereign person or persons, but to society as a whole.
Thus sovereignty really resides in all the members of
society, who are subjects only as owing obedience to the
laws of the State. Rousseau, however, obscures the issue
by identifying the will of all with the general will — a
confusion based upon the false assumption that the general
will can be found only by a plebiscite of the citizens. The
subsequent development of political theory, therefore,
consisted in removing this ambiguity and maintaining that
the source of all law and right lies in the common will,
however ascertained. This was the substance of Kant's
theory of rights, which, however, was still partly infected
by the false notion that rights rest upon the individual
will as such. Kant is therefore forced to find the basis
of the State in the aggregate of wills combining to " force
the individual to be free," that is, to act in accordance
with universal laws, not from personal desires. Hegel
removes the last vestige of the false theory that the State
is based upon contract, making its foundation to rest
upon the true principle of the common will, as distinguished
from the mere sum of individual wills. The State must
indeed be powerful, but only because it is its function to
maintain the external conditions essential to the best
life. Thus Hegel really restores the fruitful conception of
Aristotle, that the function of organised society is to
secure the highest good of the citizen,

MODERN SOCIETY 193

In contrast to this organic conception of the State
stands the individualistic theory of Behtham and his
followers. The whole fiction of a social contract is con-
temptuously rejected by Bentham, just as it is set aside
by Hegel, but what is lacking in the former is just the
element which in the latter replaces this age-long fiction,
namely, a recognition of the common will as the source
of rights and the true foundation of sovereignty. In
John Stuart Mill the doctrine is modified by elements
which really imply that the basis of rights lies in the
principle of the common will and the common good. In
Spencer the pure individualism, which in Mill had been
replaced by a less consistent but more suggestive theory,
is advocated in all its nakedness. He will have no inter-
ference with what he assumes to be the absolute rights of
the individual, and his doctrine, if logically developed,
would lead to the conclusion that the State has no function
whatever. At the most it can only be regarded as a kind
of joint-stock company, in which the disputes of individuals
must be settled by mutual compromise.

IiL.Treitschke, Bernhardi and other German writers
we have the theory of the absoluteness of the State revived
in its crudest form. The State exists simply for the good
of its own citizens, as distinguished from the citizens of
other States. Its foundation is might, not right — " the
good old law, the simple plan, trTat he should take who
has the power, and he should keep who can." Hence the
glorification of war as the nursery of the manly virtues,
and the contempt for weak States which cannot defend
themselves. This is a palpable distortion of the doctrine
of Hegel, that the State rests upon Will, not upon
Force.

The very complexity of modern society makes it hard
to find a formula which expresses its nature with accuracy
w.s. N

194 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

and completeness. In Cicero, as we have seen, much
importance is attached to the idea of a law of nature,
an idea which he derived from Stoical writers. As inter-
preted by him it has the meaning of an ideal of social
action which may be employed as a standard by which
actual rules of life are to be judged. The law of nature
is, he holds, higher than any positive laws of society.
But when we ask what is its content, it is difficult to get a
precise answer. The nearest approach to such an answer
is to say that it is the embodiment of a law which is appli-
cable to man as man, not to the member of a particular
class or nation. But if we abstract from all that is
characteristic of a class or nation, we seem to be left with an
indefinite residuum, which gives us no practical guidance.
The institution of slavery is incompatible with the law of
nature, while it is in harmony with the law of nations.
But this does not lead to its abolition, since it is not clear
that the law of nature will positively determine what is
to be done with the slave. Thus the Stoic could maintain
the identity of all men as men and yet reconcile himself
to slavery. Obviously the defect of such a conception
as the law of nature is its utter abstractness, which does
not enable us to deduce from it any positive rules. It
points beyond the inequalities of society, but it is useless
as a guide to 'the actual constitution of society and the
State. The community is something concrete, which
cannot be determined by the merely abstract conception
of humanity. The idea of humanity must ever remain
as an ideal, but to give it form and body we must seek to
realise the ideal in determinate ways, and this implies a
definite organisation of society, with national differences
and differences of vocation among its members.

The conception of the State as a social contract, but a
social contract into which men are bound to enter, is

A SOCIAL CONTRACT 195

equally unsatisfactory in its own way. Starting from the
idea of the community as simply an aggregate of individuals,
it goes on to account for the fact of society by affirming
the existence of a contract, actual or implied, as its founda-
tion. This gives no justification for the existence of the
State, since it makes society an arbitrary combination of
individual wills. There is nothing to compel individuals to
enter into the contract, and therefore nothing to explain
why it should be made. To reduce the contract to a mere
expedient for attaining a larger amount of happiness,
does not explain why any man should be under obligation
to assent to the contract, if he thinks he would obtain
more satisfaction by purely individual initiative. And if
all men should take this view, as according to the theory
they might, what becomes of society and the State ?
We must therefore go deeper than any contract if we are
to account for the real foundation of the community.
Carried out consistently the theory can only explain the
compulsion placed by society upon the individual by
saying that the good of the greatest number is more im-
portant than the private interest of any individual. But
this obviously identifies the State with the power of the
majority to have its own conception of good forcibly
realised. It may be said that the individual may be
" forced to be free," as Kant affirms ; but this is really
an evasion of the difficulty ; for the individual is not
" free " if he dissents from the contract, but on the contrary
he is simply forced to submit to the greater force brought
to bear upon him, We must therefore revise this whole
conception of the foundation of society. It is not any
number of separate individuals, choosing to make a pact
with one another, that justifies the existence of the State.
The real justification is to be found in the social nature
of man. which is a fact whether it is recognised or not.

196 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Freedom consists in the actual realisation of this social
nature. No contract is needed, but only a recognition
of the actual character of human life. The whole complex
organisation of society gets its justification from its fitness
to realise man's essential nature, and different political
constitutions must be judged by this standard. It is for
this reason that an absolutist form of government must
be condemned. It is not that it may not be, so far as it
goes, a means of realising man's nature, but that it fails
in one essential point, namely, in not allowing the indi-
vidual to have a share in the determination of his own
life. And the same objection must be brought against
any attempt to destroy the subordinate forms of organ-
isation by which human life is realised. Their destruction
means that everything is determined from above. Thus
the progress of humanity is inevitably arrested, because
it is by the free but regulated action of these organisations,
in subordination to the central authority, that the common
will is expressed. For the same reason all rigid distinc-
tions of class or rank are condemned, since these prevent
the " open career " without which the individual remains
only partially developed. Thus society and the State
are concrete organisations in which the universal life freely
pulsates, and that form of the community is best which
best enables the totality of the citizens to realise all that
is in them.

But while this is so, it cannot be admitted that any
form of organisation, whether it be a Trade Union, a Club,
a Joint Stock Company, or a Church, can claim to be
absolutely independent. To say so, is to open up the way
to anarchy. For the sake of efficiency each organisation
must be allowed to manage its own affairs, but none may
claim a right to act in defiance of the good of the com-
munity as a whole. The principle of an enlightened State

THE STATE SUPREME ±97

is to grant freedom of action to all legitimate forms of
organisation within its boundaries, but it cannot surrender
its ultimate power of harmonising differences without
ceasing to be a State. There are things with which it
cannot interfere, but only because to do so is to violate
its own nature. It cannot, or at least should not, interfere
with the independent action of corporate bodies, except
in so far as their action Destroys or weakens the rights of
individuals ; it cannot violate the rights of the individual
conscience, or prescribe religious beliefs, — though it may
prevent an ecclesiastical body from attempting to impose
its creed by force — because its function is to provide the
external conditions of the free life, not to attempt the
impossible feat of making its citizens religious or moral.
Religion and morality are matters of the private conscience,
which it is unable to touch, and which it is fatal for it to
attempt to touch. But within its own sphere it is supreme.
The State must and does play a part in the adjustment of
conflicts of authority or ownership of property, and in the
exercise of this legitimate function it may have occasion
to interfere, not with the private beliefs of its citizens —
except as these may be translated into action that is
inimical to the good of the whole, — but with the extra-
legal operations of some ecclesiastical body, or with the
tyrannous action of a corporation or fellowship. In virtue
of its function as the central regulative body the State
has a right to see that the internal organisation of either
church or civil association shall not be inconsistent with
the organisation of society at large. To hold otherwise
is to condone the capricious action of a Church or Corpora-
tion, and to subvert the end and purpose for which political
institutions exist.

It seems important that we should have a clear idea of
what we mean by Sovereignty. Two powers are of inde-

198 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

pendent or co-ordinate authority when neither can in any
way interfere with the other. On the other hand, one
power is supreme over the other when in any respect it can
dictate what the other must do or refrain from doing.
In order to obtain supremacy it is not necessary that a
power should interfere in all the operations of another
body : all that is necessary is that within a certain sphere
it should have authority to dictate or prevent the action
of the other. We must therefore distinguish between
Absolute Supremacy and Relative Supremacy. The
former is incompatible with any independent activity
on the part of any other body ; the latter is only incom-
patible with activity of a certain kind. These two things
seem to have been confused in much of the recent attacks
upon the supremacy of the State. Relative supremacy
is not affected by the fact that one power is subject in
some respects to the other. A body may have supreme
power within its own domain and yet be subject to the
other power beyond that domain. Thus a Church, a
Family, a Trade Union, may be beyond interference by
the State so far as it has a certain sphere of operations
assigned to it with which the State may not legitimately
interfere. To affirm that the State may be absolutely
supreme means that the other Power is in no sense inde-
pendent ; in other words, that all action proceeds from the
State. But this is a view which, so far as I know, no
modern English or American writer maintains. Each of
the bodies mentioned has its own jurisdiction, and for the
State to interfere within that sphere would be to assert
absolute sovereignty, and to take away from the other
power all its authority

Take, for example, the Family. Here the authority of
the Heads of the Family in regard to the family life is not
subject to the State. The conduct of children is at the

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 199

command of the parents to whom they owe obedience.
But the authority of the Family is not absolute. To begin
with, it rests in a civilised country on monogamy, and the
claim to override this provision on the part of any family
will be resisted by a civilised State. Moreover, the State
may enforce the principle that the younger members of
the family must submit to the education demanded by
the State on the ground that it is essential to the good of
the whole community. Again, the State regulates the
provisions for property. Thus the State has a Relative
Supremacy in relation to the family, but not an Absolute
Supremacy.

Similarly, a Trade Union has an independent jurisdic-
tion in regard to its members, who must submit to the rules
of the association. On the other hand, the Trade Union
has not Absolute Supremacy even over its members, much
less has it power to compel all workmen to belong to the
association. The Trade Union in the exercise of its
authority cannot override the laws of the State as regards
property or the right to life and independence of its citizens.
Obviously, therefore, the Trade Union has not absolute
supremacy, but only supremacy in subordination to the
regulations of the State.

What now shall we say of the relation between the
State and the Church ? Have we here an exception ?
Is any Church supreme in the sense that it is absolutely
independent of all State Control ? In other words, are
Church and State two bodies of absolutely co-ordinate
authority ? Surely the mere statement of the problem
is enough to suggest the answer. The question is not
whether a Church has authority within its own sphere,
which no one denies, but whether it has absolute supremacy
in the same way as one State is independent of another.
A want of clearness on this point seems to me to vitiate

200 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

much of the reasoning of Mr. Laski in his interesting
discussion of the problem of Sovereignty.

Mr. Laski says that " just as the mediaeval State had
to fight for relief from ecclesiastical trammels, so does
its modern exclusiveness throw the burden of a kindred
struggle upon its erstwhile rival." l The suggestion
here seems to be that the Church is now fighting against
the claim of the State to destroy its independence, and to
assert its own claim to co-ordinate authority with the
State. But the State does not seek to destroy the authority
of the Church within its own domain, but only to regulate
its action in the interest of the community. So far as a
Church is an association for the furtherance of the religious
life, and keeps to this its proper task, the State cannot
rightly interfere with it. It cannot interfere, because its
weapons are not spiritual but secular. But it does not
follow that a Church may make a rightful claim to unlimited
authority. The weapons that a Church may use being
spiritual, it exceeds its sphere if it brings pressure to bear
upon its members of an external kind, and the State cannot
allow such pressure to be exercised. Moreover, the State
must regulate the rights of ecclesiastical property. The
authority claimed by the State is not Absolute but Relative
Sovereignty, whereas Mr. Laski seems to represent the
problem as one in regard to the Absolute Sovereignty of
the State, which threatens to destroy the Relative Sove-
reignty of the Church. This at once introduces an initial
confusion, of which, unless I am mistaken, he never gets
rid. He says that " the Church ... is compelled to seek
the protection of its liberties lest it become no more than
the religious department of an otherwise secular organisa-
tion." That is, the Church has to fight against the claim
of the State to dictate its whole action. But the State

1 7^he Problem of Sovereignty > p. 270,

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 201

is not Sovereign in this sense : it does not, or at least
should not, interfere with the internal organisation of the
Church, unless the action of the Church interferes with
its own proper sphere. Then indeed it will interfere, and
rightly so. To say that the Church may have an authority
which is denied to the State, and may act in opposition to
the laws of the State, is not even to assert its equality of
authority with the State, but to make a claim for its
Absolute Sovereignty ; for if a Church may override the
regulations of the State in one respect why not in all r*
And then what becomes of the authority of the State ?
It is simply swallowed up in the authority of the Church.
Our conclusion, then, is, that while Church and State
are each supreme within its own sphere, there is this differ-
ence between them, that the latter, while it will not interfere
with the proper action of the former, yet will not allow of
any encroachment upon the rights of its citizens, and
therefore it may be called upon to exert its authority
when the Church exceeds its proper limits. The Church,
on the other hand, as an organisation for the maintenance
of the religious life of its members, has necessarily a more
limited sphere than the State. How far it may expel from
its membership those who are held to be faithless to its
doctrines, it is not necessary to consider ; but a Church
cannot be allowed to employ the arm of the State to compel
its refractory members to alter their ways. The State is
the custodian of rights, and will brook no interference with
its authority so far as these are concerned. Thus, what-
ever the special relation of a Church to the State may be,
it has no rights contrary to those that are embodied in
recognised custom and within law. In two ways, there-
fore, the State is sovereign : firstly, in that its authority
extends to all the citizens without exception ; and secondly,
because it is the supreme authority for the settlement of

202 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

all disputes between the Church and other organisations
or individuals.

The conception of the State which I have tried to indicate
is, then, that the sovereign power is not to be identified
with the government, but rests upon the will of the people
as a whole, or rather upon their rational will, which is
not always the same thing as what the majority may
suppose it to be. To this view certain objections have
been made, which it will be well to consider. It is asked
why the State should be assumed to have a superiority
over all other institutions. A citizen may belong to a
Church which includes in its members citizens of other
States than his ; or he may belong to a company of scholars
much more closely in contact than the citizens of any
State : or he may belong to a non-nationalist company or
a labour union. Hence, it is argued, the Community is
much wider than the State. Nor is there any reason for
regarding the latter as more valuable than other institu-
tions. In truth no institution is sovereign. The relation,
for example, between Church and State is not one of
subordination, but of co-ordination. No doubt the State
provides the opportunity for the enjoyment of those goods
which the other institutions supply ; it is the highest
institution for a political purpose, but not the only institu-
tion even for that purpose. Subordinate to it are municipal
councils, provincial, government and other organisations.
Over these it is sovereign, but not over non-political
organisations. The purposes of law and government are
to secure to citizens order and liberty, but there are many
things with which it cannot interfere, such as art or science
or religion, although, no doubt, none of these could exist
without order or liberty.

Now, if I have made at all clear the conception of the
State on which the idealist doctrine rests, it must be mani-

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 203

fest that the main contention here set forth is one which is
endorsed and has been repeatedly stated by the exponents
of idealism. The general will is not expressed in any one
institution, but in all the institutions, voluntary or in-
voluntary, which form the very complex web of modern
society. We may, if we please, call other institutions the
Community, not the State, but things are not made different
by attaching to them different names. The main point
for which we contend is not that the political organisation
is absolutely supreme over other forms of organisation, but
that it is the final means by which the other institutions
are brought into harmony with one another, and prevented
from interfering with the rights which it is the especial
business of the State as a political organisation to provide.
The political organisation is not supreme in the sense of
including all other institutions ; on the contrary, it is its
function to see that these are allowed perfect freedom to
manage their own affairs, — always provided they do not
clash with one another, and do not destroy the liberty of
the individual. It is admitted that one institution may be
subordinate to another, and this admission seems to imply
that ultimately the institutions so subordinate are not of
co-ordinate authority with one another. It cannot be
fairly contended that the Church is absolutely independent
of the State in the sense that it can interfere with the
rights of citizens, — rights which are guaranteed, not by
the Church but by the State. Nor can it be justly main-
tained that the Church is not subordinate to the State in
relation to its property. The control of property is essenti-
ally a matter for State action. It is perfectly true, as has
been already indicated, that the State cannot interfere
with the religion of the citizen, or at least ought not to
interfere with it, but the reason lies in the character of
State action, which is limited to the external conditions

204 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of the good life. It is also true that the central authority
cannot determine the character of artistic products or
dictate the conclusions of the man of science — though it
may turn his attention to the application of science to
industrial pursuits — but it does take care that the artist
or the man of science shall not trespass on the rights of
their fellow-citizens. Will it be said that the United States
was not justified in abolishing polygamy, on the ground
that it was contrary to the conditions essential to civilised
life ? Will it be argued that should a Church arrogate
the right to punish anyone who does not accept its creed,
a stop may not be put to this arrogant and unjust pro-
cedure ? It is hard, therefore, to see how the new theory
of the community is in essence different from the old.
Nor is the relation of the State to municipal councils and
provincial governments at all inconsistent with the claim
to sovereignty. For Parliament is not to be confused with
the State. The State is the totality of institutions by which
the common weal is secured, and it is a matter of no import-
ance, so far as the question of sovereignty is concerned,
whether the government is carried on by one central
organisation or distributed among several ; in either case
the sovereignty does not lie in either, but in the common
will. As Sir Frederick Pollock says : " The minimisers
of the State's function appear not to distinguish sufficiently
the action of the State in general from its centralising
action. There are many things which the State cannot
do in the way of central government, or not effectually,
but which can be very well done by the action of local
governing bodies. But this is a question between the
direct and the delegated activity of the State, not between
State action and individual enterprise." Nevertheless
the final decision rests with the organ which represents
the summing up of the general will. The central govern-

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 205

ment, representing the final will of the citizens, so far as
it is made explicit, is the final authority for determining
the functions of the decentralised bodies, though the
complete will of the citizens expresses itself through all the
organisations of society. The adjustment of the proper
relations between the central government and local or
provincial governing bodies is a matter of practical
experience. It is of importance that the central govern-
ment should not be overburdened with detail, but on the
other hand many good measures may be inoperative from
the remissness of local bodies.

It will be understood from what has been said that
there is no intention of undervaluing the importance of
subordinate institutions. As Mr. Bosanquet has clearly
pointed out, it is by means of these subordinate forms of
social life that the experimental and inventive element is
prepared for embodiment in legislation, the work of the
central government being mainly to endorse the results
of social co-operation. Nevertheless, as he rightly holds,
all society is under the final control of the State, which
includes the whole field of social co-operation, its special
task being to adjust and reconcile the institutions which
it contains in a self-consistent system. Why this view
should be accused of some terrible crime in identifying in
this sense the State with the whole group of organisations
by which the whole life of a people is carried on it is difficult
to understand, unless a claim is made for absolute non-inter-
ference with them. Such a claim, however, does not seem
to be made, and it must be by confusing the legitimate con-
trol by the State of other forms of association, in which the
general will is partially realised, with an absolute control
which not only adjusts their relations to one another and
to the rights of individuals, but absolutely determines
their actions, that the idealistic doctrine can for a moment

2o6 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

be supposed to be inconsistent with the importance attached
to these subordinate forms of organisation. As Mr. A. C.
Bradley points out, " The citizens are not a mere collec-
tion or aggregate but form an organised whole, performing
a multitude of different functions which should, and more
or less do, so complement and play into one another that
they make a common life and produce a common good." 1
At the present day there is an enormous number of associa-
tions of every kind : political, economic, religious, educa-
tional, scientific, artistic, literary, recreative ; and these
are in their combination distinctive of the modern as
distinguished from the ancient State, and add to the
intensity and complexity of modern life. The State as
sovereign does not seek to suppress these, but on the
contrary welcomes them as means of fuller life. Only
if the members of any of these associations act in a way
that is prejudicial to the common good does the State,
if it is wise, attempt to interfere with them ; but the fact
that it may interfere shows that it is the ultimate court of
appeal for its own citizens. That the members of the
association number in their ranks men of other nationalities
will be permitted, provided the foreign element is not
injurious to the conditions that have been established
for the common good of the citizens ; nor will it object to
the international character of an association unless the
constitution of the association is incompatible with its
own autonomy. Thus over its own citizens the State
has complete control. It seems to me to be entirely mis-
leading to contrast the limited area of a State with the wider
area of a Community ; for the action of a State extends
in principle beyond its own area. Each of the different
nationalities represented in a Labour Union, for example,
is subject to the control of its own State, and it is as

1 " International Morality," in The International Crisis, p. 48.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 207

little to the purpose to say that the association is supra-
national as to speak as if the internal organisations differ-
ent from the political were outside the sphere and influence
of the State. Normally no State will interfere with the
actions of the citizens of another State, but it will interfere
with those of its own citizens, or in their behalf, who are
temporarily living abroad, unless they have abandoned
their allegiance to itself. Of course a nation is the custodian
of the interests of those living within the boundary of its
own territory, but its action is not limited to its own
territory ; it makes laws or passes resolutions which
involve relations to other nations ; but this does not inter-
fere with its right to see that its citizens do not transgress
the laws of their own country. It thus seems to me that
the control exercised by the State is just as wide as that of
the Community. The citizen who belongs to an inter-
national association does not thereby escape from its super-
vision and control, so far as the State has any right to
exercise supervision and control over him.

It cannot, then, be admitted that the State is sovereign
in the sense that it has an unlimited power of regulating
the life of its citizens. Hegel, indeed, allots to the power
of the State, as acting through its officials, an amount of
power over the individual which would be intolerable to
an Englishman or an American or a Canadian. But this
cannot be said to arise from his identification of the State
with society — an identification which he does not make —
but from his belief that it is essential to the realisation of
the good will. Hegel argues that the trained official is
better able to judge what is for the public good than the
unenlightened citizen. This may be admitted without any
admission of the corollary that society must be entirely
regulated from above. It is only in the sense that the
final adjustment of other institutions is necessary, on the

208 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ground that there must be some ultimate court of appeal,
that the State is said to include all the institutions of
society. But this does not allow to it an absolute right to
determine the action of the subordinate institutions.
Freedom of life to citizens to form what associations they
please, and to construct rules for their own guidance, is
implied in the whole conception of the State as the organ-
isation by which the best life is realised. It is by the
free action of various subordinate forms of association that
progress is made possible in the community, and the
function of the State is not to dictate to those institutions
their action or to impede its exercise, but to aid them in
every way compatible with their harmony with one another
and with itself. For this reason the various institutions
of society must be under State supervision. It is obvious
that on this view no claim is made to defend an absolutism
which would regulate every department of life. On the
contrary a Socialist would certainly say that the theory
outlined errs in not allowing sufficient regulative power
to society.

It is of great importance to recognise that the State
cannot be identified with the Government, which is merely
the organ through which the harmony of the various
organisations included in the State is effected. " The
State," as Mr. Bosanquet says, " includes the whole hier-
archy of institutions by which life is determined, from the
family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and
the University. It is the structure which gives life and
meaning to the political whole." This seems to me to dis-
pose of the criticism of Mr. G. D. H. Cole, who correctly
points out that Rousseau objected to every form of par-
ticular association, whereas the characteristic of modern
associations is speciality of function.1 But Mr. Cole

1 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. xv. p. 144.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 209

means to exclude these associations from the State, whereas
the idealistic view is that they are required for the complete
expression of the general will. Such an opposition would
seem to imply that by the State is to be understood only
the governmental machine, and therefore a contrast is
drawn between the State as one association, with which
other and non-governmental associations are contrasted.
But, if by the State we understand all the associations by
which the general will is expressed, such an opposition is
obviously inadmissible, since it would identify a part of
the whole system of associations, namely, the Government,
with the whole. It is true that the political organisation
of a people must be distinguished from the State as a
whole, the special function of the former being to reconcile
conflicts of subordinate associations with one another or
with itself. Such an organ is required, unless we are
prepared to say that the conflict must remain unreconciled.
Nor is there anything in this conception to prevent the
appointment of special commissions to help in the adjust-
ment of differences between the subordinate associations ;
though ultimately they must be subject to the political
organisation, if other means are found inadequate. It
is therefore no real objection to this view to say that " the
very existence of particular associations is a sufficient
proof that the State cannot fully express the associative
will of man." This is undoubtedly true, if we identify
the State with the governmental machine, but obviously
inept on a theory which regards these associations as an
integral part of itself. " All social machinery," says Mr.
Cole, " alike in its agreements and in its conflicts, is a
partial and more or less successful expression of the general
will which every community possesses." This may be
at once admitted, but it does not affect the doctrine which
has just been stated, that it is the general good which is
w.s. o

210 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

the ultimate object of allegiance. This, of course, means
that the Government is responsible to the people by whom
it is elected, and in this sense the individual is not called
upon to serve the State " with a loyalty surpassing and
different in kind from other loyalties." But the individual
is bound to conform to the general will. No doubt it is
not always easy to discover wherein this general will
consists. But the whole history of man is the process
by which the discovery is made, and it may be assumed
that while the process does not result in absolute comprehen-
sion, it is in a well-organised State at least in the line of
development towards it. If it is denied that there is any
organ for the final expression of the general will, we
place all associations on the same level ; which leads to
the conception of the various forms of organised life as
related simply as a loose confederation, with no means of
adjusting conflicts between them.

When we look beyond the internal affairs of a particular
State we find, says Mr. Cole, that there are relations of
individuals and of groups which extend beyond the bound-
aries of a single State, " Religion, industry, the arts,
morality — all furnish instances of inter-State grouping,
and all give rise to obligations which may conflict with
loyalty to a State." l This view seems to depend for its
plausibility on the identification of the State with the
Government, and on the assumption that the former is
limited to what concerns only a particular area. The
State, however, we contend, is not the Government, but
the whole system of organisations by which the general
will is realised ; and it is a false view which conceives of
it as confined within a given area, merely because in the
normal exercise of its function it legislates for a people
so confined. An enlightened State, as we have said, will

^Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, xvi. p. 313.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 211

not attempt to coerce men in matters of religion, nor will
it set limits to the free production of art by any assumed
moral criterion, and in dealing with questions of trade
and commerce it will have to consider the economic con-
ditions of its people — though I believe it is an entire
misunderstanding of the interests of its people to assume
that questions of trade and commerce can be satisfactorily
dealt with on the principle that a State must be self-suffi-
cient. But while all this is true, it does not follow that
there is no place for the effective control of religious institu-
tions, of industry and of art. There is a definite sphere
in which the State is supreme, and neither an ecclesiastical
body, nor a trade union, nor an association of artists can
contravene the conditions essential to the best life of the
citizens. Within their own sphere these associations
will not be interfered with by an enlightened State, but,
on the other hand, they cannot be allowed to threaten its
own existence. The State has the right to determine the
conditions under which trade and commerce are carried
on, so far as that is necessary in the interests of the whole
body of its people. An enlightened State will not pass
laws which assume that the economic good of its citizens
is incompatible with the economic good of the citizens
of other countries ; but the reason is that such legislation
is not in the interest of its own citizens any more than
of those of foreign peoples. If, on the other hand, the
Government is convinced of the opposite principle, believ-
ing that that which is good for its own citizens will inflict
harm on the citizens of other States, there is no remedy
for it but the enlightenment of the people, which may
lead to more rational action. Meantime, no nation can
be prevented from passing restrictive enactments which
damage both itself and other nations. That is only part
of the process by which an advance is made from less to

212 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

more reasonable modes of action, and has nothing to do
with the question of the limitation or non-limitation of
State authority. The question in regard to art is of a
similar nature. If a State, rightly or wrongly, regards
a certain form of artistic production as contrary to the
moral interests of its people, it is justified in placing restric-
tions upon it on that ground. This is a region, no doubt,
in which there is great liability to error, but that does not
prove that the supremacy of the State should therefore
be limited : what it shows is that it should be enlightened.
Individualism, as we have seen, assumes that man is
always seeking his own personal good. This is true enough
if it is interpreted to mean that man is ever striving to
attain to the perfection of his nature ; but it is not true
if it is supposed that he is not aiming at objective ends,
but only at the pleasure which is incidental to those ends.
If man's good could be abstracted from the character of
the objects pursued, and ascertained simply by asking
what amount of pleasure can be obtained, it might reason-
ably be argued that as each individual has his own idea of
what he wants, any external interference with what he
desires will frustrate this object. Hence the Individualist
naturally objects to State interference, on the ground that
it prevents him from pursuing the ends which, as he
believes, will secure the greatest amount of pleasure or
happiness for himself and at the same time for others.
It is true that Individualists are sometimes better than
their theory. Mill, as we have seen, holds that a man may
sacrifice what he regards as his personal good in deference
to an ideal. . But this is a virtual denial of the hedonistic
creed as it was logically developed by Bentham. On the
principle of Individualism it cannot be shown that my
egoistic desires, if I believe them to be such as will secure
my greatest good, are not as justifiable as my so-called

INDIVIDUALISM AND IDEALISM 213

altruistic desires ; for no immediate desire can be really ^
altruistic, as Bentham recognised. If it is once admitted
that only by following the common good can I really
obtain the highest satisfaction, it is obvious that I am,
on hedonistic principles, only showing my good sense in
seeking to obtain in that way the greatest happiness of
which I am capable. But this does not make my course
one whit better morally than if I followed my egoistc
desires in preference to the altruistic. Thus morality in
the sense of what is universally binding disappears. The
individual, it is held, must be free to follow his desires,
whether they lead to egoism or altruism. For this reason
he must not be coerced in any way : the logical conclusion
from which would seem to be that there should be no
interference whatever with the individual.

Idealism starts from the opposite principle, namely,
that the good of the individual is identical with the good
of the community. It is held to be man's nature that he
cannot find permanent satisfaction except in identifying
his personal good with the good of the community. This
does not mean that he will not have to sacrifice his pleasure
in certain cases in view of its disharmony with the true
end of his existence. But though he thus gives up his
immediate desires, he will, as Mill admits, find satisfaction
of a higher kind. That being so, in his best mind he has
no objection to State interference which is not in harmony
with his private and particular desires, but is in harmony
with his own explicit or implicit ideal of himself. The
laws of the State may well be identical with his own real
will ; and if they are not, they are condemned as not
realising their end. This at once explains the habit of
obeying without question the ordinary laws of the State,
and also the opposition to those laws, actual or proposed,
which are not in harmony with man's ideal of himself.

214 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

.The State in its performance of those acts which agree with
his own deeper will is therefore acting as if he of himself
directly passed the laws. It makes no difference to their
obligatory force that they are not directly made by himself,
but only through his representatives, provided only that
they are in accordance with his conscious or unconscious
will. The laws of a nation are therefore on the whole the
expression of those objects which are of vital interest to
human life, and all the institutions of society are of this
nature. Those institutions are, like individual habits,
the embodiment of the conclusions reached by society
at a given time in regard to the conditions requisite for
the fulfilment of the ultimate purpose of organised life,
namely, the good, not of this or that individual, but of all
the citizens. Written laws are the definite formulation of
a people's conception of what is for the good of all. The
size of a modern State prevents everyone from personally
giving his assent to proposed laws, but even if it were
possible to get the opinion directly of everyone, that would
not establish them as obligatory on the individual. Noth-
ing makes a law obligatory, but its harmony with the
real will of the community, and the dissent or assent of
individuals does not either prove or disprove its reason-
ableness.

There is no opposition between the good of the citizen
and the good of humanity ; on the contrary, it is by pro-
viding the external conditions under which a people may
realise the higher life that the cause of humanity is best
furthered. For each nation has its own special task,
arising from differences in climate, economic, religious,
artistic and scientific relations. These, as they vary in
different nations, make it necessary that each State should
legislate in its own way in behalf of the interests of its
people ; but it is a mistake to suppose that these are

IDEALISM 215

incompatible with the interests of other nations. The
organism of humanity no more demands sameness in
nations than in the institutions of a single nation ; individu-
ality in nations is essential to the full development of
mankind. Since man is ever striving after the highest
moral good, or the realisation of his essential nature under
special conditions, it is the object of the State to provide
for the free development of the individuals under its super-
intendence. In this sense the State has a moral purpose.
Aiming at the highest good of the individual, it cannot
allow itself to be dissuaded from interfering with the
actions of individuals on the ground that men have a right
to do what is essential, or seems to be essential, to their
personal happiness. The personal, as distinguished from
the common good, is not a legitimate end of action. Man,
as Aristotle said, is a social and political being, and the
limits to public action are determined by reference to
the common good, which cannot be secured by unlimited
interference. The State cannot directly promote morality,
because morality is a matter of will and motive, and though
it can secure outward conformity to law, it cannot pene-
trate to the inner self. But, subject to this restriction —
a restriction which is essentially moral, because any attempt
to promote morality directly will only diminish or pre-
vent it— any regulation may be passed which is in the
interest of the community. Thus the State is a moral
agent, though not directly so. It has been said, following
Kant, that its object is to " hinder hindrances." And
no doubt this may be taken as on the whole its function ;
but it seems better to conceive of that function as rather
to promote by all legitimate means the physical, mental
and moral well-being of its citizens. On this principle
egislation for the prevention of disease is entirely in har-
mony with its aim. Similarly, it may be held that it has

2i6 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

a right to pass laws, such as Factory Acts, which promote
the physical well-being of the individual, not to speak of
the effort to provide such conditions of existence as will
make it possible that all citizens shall have the opportunity
of living a decent human life. It is part of its task to
see that the children do not grow up in an ignorance that
makes it impossible for them to discharge later the duties
of a good citizen. Thus freedom as secured by the State
is at once a positive endeavour to promote the good life
and a definite and systematic attempt to secure that end.
Nothing can be good which is not a means to the pro-
motion of the fullest life of every individual in the com-
munity, and whatever promotes that life is by its very
nature good.

There can be no State in the proper sense of the term
that is liable to dictation from another State. A State
must be autonomous and self-governed, otherwise it
ceases, to the extent in which it is interfered with, to be a
State. This does not mean that it may not agree to sug-
gestions from a foreign State, but it does mean that it must
freely accept those conditions and not be forced to accept
them by external pressure. Nor again does freedom or
autonomy mean that a State must think only of its own
selfish interests, or even seek to inflict harm upon a neigh-
bouring State. There is nothing in autonomy to interfere
with the widest possible conception of what is best for
mankind as a whole, unless we assume that what is best
for mankind is necessarily antagonistic to the good of a
particular State. It may well be that the good of a State
is identical with the good of mankind as properly con-
ceived. If there is to be such an action of States as will
at the same time promote the good of mankind, it must
be because there is a rational will which is the expression
of the best mind of the community. If there is no such

MORALITY OF THE STATE 217

will, then there is neither a single State nor any possibility
of the harmony of different States one with another. It
is obvious enough that the morality of the State is not
identical with the morality of private life. Private life
involves the " kindly charities of husband, son and brother,"
and all those acts which are implied in a Christian civilisa-
tion ; whereas the function of the State in reference to its
own citizens is to make such acts possible by its regulations,
not to enforce them. On the other hand, there are acts
which a State cannot do without violating its duty to
humanity. It cannot, because its morality is different
from that of private morality, throw all scruple to the
winds, and practice any amount of fraud, cruelty or violence
which its agents think to be necessary. " The State as
such," says Mr. Bosanquet, " can have no ends but public
ends ; and in practice it has none but what its organs
conceive to be public ends. If an agent, even under the
order of his executive superior, commits a breach of
morality, bcna fide in order to what he conceives to be a
public end desired by the State, he and his superiors are
certainly blamable, but the immorality can hardly be laid
at the door of the public will. ... To speak of the question
as if it concerned the conduct of statesmen and their
agents, instead of the violation of a State as such, seems
to introduce confusion, We are discussing the parallel
between public and private acts, and we are asked to
begin by treating the public acts as private." x

The difficulty in accepting this view of the matter is
that by a curious process it seems to take all the responsi-
bility frbm the State and to impose it upon its agents.
It is true that an agent may be ordered by his superior
to do an act against which his conscience revolts : say,
to massacre innocent civilians, including women and

1 Phil. Theory of the State, p. 322.

218 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

children ; and if I understand Mr. Bosanquet rightly, he
would claim that the State is not in any way responsible.
And no doubt there is a question how far a soldier may
violate his conscience at the command of a superior. That
is a question of the casuistry of conscience, which it is not
necessary to discuss. But, suppose the superior is acting
under the authority and the express command of the
government, are we to say that the government is not
responsible, and that " the immorality can hardly be laid
at the door of the public will " ? Who then is responsible ?
Apparently not the " public will," that is, the State. But
surely, though it may fairly be held that we must assign
responsibility to the subordinates of the government, we
must at the same time place responsibility on the heads of
the government, of whom the subordinates are but the
tools. Now, admittedly the action of the government
receives all authority from the will of the people. This
is in accordance with Mr. Bosanquet 's theory of the State,
and it is difficult to see how otherwise any authority can
be assigned to it at all. If it is answered that the govern-
ment has not received authority from the " public will "
for an outrage of this kind, and therefore is not in any
way blamable, we seem to be asked to admit both that the
government acts as an agent of the people, and that it may
act on its own responsibility. This destroys all possi-
bility of having the " public will " implemented, and seems
to lead to the conclusion that an action may be contrary
to the general will and yet not be done on the responsibility
of its mouthpiece. Now, it is true enough that a govern-
ment may act in contradiction of the " public will," but in
that case it is surely responsible for its action to the people.
So long therefore as the people do not register their dissent
from the kind of action referred to, they must be held
responsible for it. No doubt actions of this sort are not

AN ORGANISED SOCIETY 219

in harmony with the " true will " of the nation, but we
cannot identify the true will with the will as actually
existing at any given time. Thus we get the conclusion
that there is a breach of the true will of the people, but not
of the actual will. The nation is absolved on the ground
that it cannot be expected to endorse the ideal. Grant-
ing this obvious fact, the nation must be judged by its
actual and not by its ideal will. And as its actual will
must be regarded as expressed by the government, or not
expressed at all, it seems manifest that the public will is
responsible for the kind of action referred to. When,
therefore, Mr. Bosanquet says that the question concerns
the volition of the State as such, it seems to me that he
must either regard such actions as due to the State or as
not blameworthy at all. Will he say that the murder
of innocent civilians is in harmony with the idea of the
State ? If not, it is hard to see how he can exonerate the
" public will " without admitting that such acts are quite
within its legitimate sphere. If indeed the acts are done
in contradiction of the public will, then no doubt the
responsibility must be placed elsewhere ; but if they are
the acts of the government, which is an accredited agent
of the people and expresses its actual will, it must be held
that the really responsible agents are the people and not
the immediate agents. It is not to the purpose to say that
we must distinguish between the private acts of subordinate
agents and the public acts of the State ; for this does not
show that the State is free from all moral obligation ; it
only shows that its acts differ from those of a private
individual.

The State, then, must be held to be an organised society
of men, and cannot be regarded as justified by its distinc-
tion from the individual citizen in practising breach of
faith, fraud, violence of all kinds, and atrocious cruelty

220 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

to innocent civilians. Even in war there is a code of
morality which a nation is bound to obey. A nation at
war must not make a regular truce, and then massacre
a confiding enemy. It is contrary to the usage of civilised
nations to use poison, to butcher non-combatants in cold
blood, to torture prisoners, and so forth. There is a very
high standard of public morality which is recognised and
accepted by civilised peoples, and the nation which violates
these accepted conditions of war is not only untrue to its
express pledges, but is acting contrary to the dictates,
not of private, but of public morality. It has bound
itself not to kill, destroy or deceive except so far as it
admits that the enemy is equally justified in doing the same
kind of things in retaliation. Nor is it to be overlooked
that a combatant not only cannot in fairness act otherwise
than he admits the right of the enemy to act, but every
breach of the recognised code of International Law is an
incalculable lessening of the humane conduct which the
human race has worked out by a long and slow process.
And apart from the agreements recognised as applying
to a state of war, we have to remember that the normal
relation of nations is not war but peace. No doubt a man's
duty to a stranger is not precisely of the same kind as his
duty to an intimate friend or a relative, but it does not
follow that he has no duties at all to the citizens of other
nations. It is his duty to defend his own country, and
he is not called upon to defend a foreign country ; never-
theless, he has duties to the residents of other countries,
which spring from his relations to them as members of the
human race. If he is dealing with men of another race
he is not absolved, nor is the State absolved, from fair and
honourable conduct ; and if he is dealing with races inferior
in civilisation, he cannot be allowed on any defensible
system of morality to treat them as having no rights and

AN ORGANISED SOCIETY 221

no sensibilities. They have rights, though not the same
rights as himself, and his obligations correspond to them.
To use them as mere instruments for his own gain or
pleasure is entirely immoral. The only defence of his
rule over them is that he belongs to a higher stage of civilisa-
tion, and it is his duty to rule them entirely with the end
in view of gradually making it possible for them to lift
themselves to a higher plane. The true policy for a State
and for humanity as a whole is to act so as to merit the
reputation for good faith, justice and peaceableness ; and,
while admitting that it may be called upon to make war
in defence of its own existence, to carry on war at least in a
way that does not fall beneath the recognised code of Inter-
national Law, as first formulated by Grotius and elaborated
during the last three centuries by jurists and statesmen.

CHAPTER TENTH
SYSTEM OF RIGHTS

IN order to realise the good will a system of Rights is
necessary. As the ultimate object of society is the develop-
ment of the best life, each individual must recognise the
rights of his neighbour to as free development as that
which he claims for himself. The justification of this
claim is not any fictitious " right of nature," but the just
claim that without freedom to live his own life under recog-
nised external conditions, he is not capable of contributing
his share to the common good. A man has rights which
are recognised by society, but they are not made right by
legislation, as Bentham held, but are recognised because
they are essential to the development of the common
good. The possession of rights and their recognition by
society are not two different things, but the same thing ;
for, as the individual claims rights in virtue of his being
an organ of the common good, so the State recognises his
rights on the ground that they are required for the realisa-
tion of the highest good of all. The State, we may say,
is under obligation to secure to the individual his rights,
and any State which fails to do so ceases to fulfil its essential
function. We must therefore distinguish between actual
States and States as they ought to be. In a State which
is fulfilling its proper function rights are recognised and
embodied in its laws and constitution, but the rights are
not made by this recognition ; the recognition is made

222

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 223

because rights belong to man as a moral agent whose will
is realised through them. We may, if we please, call
rights " natural," so long as we do not suppose them
to belong to man in his isolation. It is the common
moral consciousness which justifies them, not any legal
enactment.

From the nature of the case rights must be enforced.
What, then, is the Power by which they are enforced ? It
cannot be based upon mere Force, but only upon the
rational ground that it supplies the conditions under which
the good will may be realised. The sovereign authority
is not the personal will of any individual or any class,
but the common or rational will — that will which the
individual in his best mind recognises. Therefore the
common consciousness not only creates rights, but creates
the sovereignty which is essential to their maintenance.
Ultimately it is the general will which is sovereign. This
simple principle has been obscured by the confusion between
the nominal, the legal and the ultimate political sovereign.
The first is the constitutional sovereign, who in England
is the King, in France the French Republic, in the United
States the Federal Government. The second is the supreme
law-making body, in Great Britain the Parliament. The
last is the general will, operating through persons, but more
powerful than they, and the ultimate source of authority.
The authority of the legal sovereign is derived from the
ultimate political sovereign, which expresses itself by means
of representative institutions and in other ways. Ultimately,
therefore, it is the general will which is sovereign, and it is
the duty of the legal sovereign to discover what this general
will is. The people, on the other hand, can only be called
sovereign in fact when they will that which subserves the
true end of all political action. The general or rational will
thus creates rights, creates the system of rules by which

224 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

they are maintained, and creates the sovereign whose
function it is to enunciate and enforce the law, and to
sustain the harmonious operation of the institutions in
which rights are embodied.

It may be objected that the people cannot be the ulti-
mate sovereign because the rational will is not explicitly
present in the citizen. To this objection we may answer,
with Green, that a consciousness of this will is really im-
plied in the ordinary behaviour of the humblest citizen
who does not belong to one of the dangerous classes. There
are certain moral obligations which he recognises as bind-
ing upon him, and as the authority of the sovereign power
arises from the fact that it subserves the end of securing
the fulfilment of the common will, this recognition of
his moral obligations' by the individual is virtually an
endorsation of the duty of obedience to law. How far
existing law is imperfect involves other questions, but
whatever the special form of the State may be, it is a
State just in so far as it actually realises the rational will.
Meantime it is important to insist that it can rightfully
bring force to bear upon the individual only because it
represents the will of the community.

It may be said, however, that to speak of the State as
the product of reason and will is to overlook the fact that
man does not always act from the consciousness of the good
to society to be attained by his action. Great part of his
life consists in the expression of his immediate impulses
and instincts, and it is therefore, it may be urged, a distor-
tion of facts to ascribe the growth of society to definite
thought and volition. There is a whole side of man's nature
in which he is acted upon by suggestion, associations of
ideas and habits. Men are not definitely seeking the
common good, nor even their own personal good. Man
is much more complex than this truncated account of

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 225

his action would have us believe. " Politics," says Mr.
Graham Wallas in his Human Nature in Politics, " is only
in a slight degree the product of conscious reason ; it is
largely a matter of subconscious processes, of habit and
instinct, suggestion and imitation." He therefore resolves
much of human action into sensation and impulse . ' ' Man , "
he says, " like other animals lives in an unending stream
of sense impressions." We fix our attention on what in
this stream of impressions calls up by association some-
thing similar, and this suggests a whole set of impressions.
Names have a great weight with the majority of men.
This is the explanation of the success of the politician,
who plays on the susceptibilities of the ordinary citizen
by party means, party colours, and party placards. " The
empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of
opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious
non-rational inference." Good may, indeed, result from
this suggestiveness of names ; there may come a time
when the name of Humanity will become charged with
emotion, and " an idea of the whole existence of our
species may take the place of the present limited idea of
' Country ' and ' Party.' " No longer will the electorate
be hypnotised by all sorts of " suggestion," by means of
which they are led to further the interest of a party or
an organisation.

The contrast which Mr. Wallas draws between sense and
impulse on the one hand, and thought and reason on the
other, is one which will not bear careful examination.
There is no such antagonism between sense and thought
as he assumes. A pure sensation or a mere impulse is not
to be found except by an illegitimate process of abstraction.
When a man perceives an object he is already beyond the
stage of mere feeling ; he has advanced to the stage when
the feeling is interpreted as pointing to an actual thing,
w.s, P

226 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Thus we cannot identify sensible perception with bare
sensation. It is not true that man " lives in an unending
stream of sense impressions " ; what he " lives in " is a
world of more or less clearly denned objects. Were it
true that his life is simply a succession of sense impressions,
his world would never grow more and more complex, for
the simple reason that there would be no " world " for
him whatever. The very simplest form of conscious
life is that in which an object is opposed to himself the
subject, and such a contrast takes him beyond the " stream
of sense impressions." From the first simple contrast of an
object hardly characterised at all, to the most complex
world of science, religion, and philosophy, man has left
behind the stage of undifferentiated feeling which Mr.
Wallas assumes. It is by the perpetual comparison of
conscious objects with one another that he builds up his
world. Nor is habit a mere association of feelings with
one another : it is the crystallisation of experiences of
objects. One sensation never " suggests " another ; what
is suggested is the similar qualities or relations of objects.
There is no greater fiction of abstraction than the idea of
one sensation as calling up a number of others. Similarly,
the nominalistic theory to which Mr. W'allas commits
himself is one the superficiality and falsity of which has
frequently been exposed. As there are absolutely no
undifferentiated feelings following one another in an end-
less chain, so a name is not a label put upon any series of
feelings. A name is the sign of the permanent features
of an object, as grasped by thought. In the world as known
to us there are no isolated things any more than there are
isolated feelings. A conception is no abstraction of the
common attributes of a number of separate things, but
indicates the mind's grasp of the principle by which things
are bound together in a cosmos, The name "country"

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 227

is a symbol of the spirit which a people expresses in its
whole manner of life. Thus we cannot separate percep-
tion from thought any more than we can isolate feelings.
Thought consists in grasping the principles embodied in
perception, separated from which it has no real content.
The law of gravitation is not an abstraction formed by the
simple comparison of a number of isolated things ; it is
the real principle manifested in things, without which they
could not be at all. When, therefore, it is said that the
history of man is an expression of a rational process, it is
not meant that institutions in all cases are the deliberate
result of any abstract process in which they are placed
before the mind and the means for their fulfilment sought
for. Political institutions exist before there is an explicit
and reflective consciousness of their nature. Now, if it is
true that the whole life of man is a comprehension of the
real world and of himself, he cannot get rid of the unseen
guidance of reason without ceasing to be a man. How
otherwise than by supposing that reason is something more
than direct ratiocination does it come about that the
institutions of society do realise human purposes and dis-
play a rational system ? How otherwise can we account
for the progress which has been made in the forms of
association by which human life is raised to an ever higher
potency ? Nay, how otherwise could Mr. Wallas' ideal
of a time when the name " humanity " may come to mean
" the whole existence of our species " be realised ? It is
because reason has been present in the different modes of
the conscious life that by a slow process of trial and error
society has been raised to its present eminence, and it will
only be by a continuation of the same process that itv will
evolve into higher forms. Take away rational compre-
hension from the life of man and you leave only a mass of
prejudices and habits which have no connection and no

228 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

meaning. It is true that much of the action of the ordinary
citizen is the result of habit and of imitation ; but even
these are the habit and imitation of a being always striving
after the reasonable. A man cannot explain all his actions
and show them to be rational ; most men are only able to
see what they regard as their obvious duty ; but in their
acceptance of the habitual life of their people they are
guided by the consciousness of what they believe to be,
and what in the main is right. Thus it may fairly be
contended that reason is the ruling principle even when it
does not rise into clear consciousness or can be defended on
explicitly rational grounds. It is true that the ordinary
man may be, and often is, misled by the catchwords of
party ; but surely we may say that what misleads him
is " light from heaven." For him " country " means
much, and if he is apt to mistake what is for the good of his
country by identifying it with the good of his party, this
does not show that at bottom he does not act from reason,
but only that he mistakes what is partially reasonable,
or even pernicious, for really rational action. His real
will, as Plato says, is to do what is reasonable, and what-
ever the sins of politicians may be, on the whole they are
guided by the ideal of the common good. There is a
continual advance towards this ideal. The habitual
action of a people, as Lord Haldane has shown in his im-
pressive address on Higher Nationality, may be regarded
as registering the progress already made, even when the
conscience of the ordinary citizen may not have reached
the same level ; the decisions of judges are largely influenced
by the wider consciousness working in the nation ; and
the advance to a higher idea of life is brilliantly indicated by
the heroism and unselfishness which come to light in such
a crisis as the present war. We may therefore take comfort
from the reflection that nothing will permanently satisfy

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 229

man but that which is in the line of evolution towards a
good that is disinterested, reasonable, and humane.

If it is true that law proceeds from the will of the whole
people, it may be asked whether the people as a whole or
an individual may not refuse to obey a law that is, or
seems to be, contrary to the common good. May not a
law be resisted which has been passed by one party in the
State, perhaps by a party elected on a different issue ?
Is it not reasonable to resist the enforcement of a law
which seems incompatible with the general good ? The
conscience of the individual may be higher than the law
of the State. Before the abolition of slavery the injustice
of the slave laws was virtually recognised by the social
conscience, and as a result those laws could not be properly
enforced. This instance seems to afford us a principle by
which we may distinguish the true will of a people from the
law as it actually exists, and it may properly be argued that
this does not apply in cases where the community has not
reached the point of virtual denial of an existing law.
It is only when the new rule cannot be shown to be the
inevitable outcome of existing laws or customs that the
proposed law may be fairly resisted.

It is the State which creates and maintains rights, since
it is the embodiment of the common will of the community.
We may define a right as the claim of an individual upon
others which is recognised by the State, whereas a moral
right is the claim of an individual upon others with which
the State does not attempt to deal. The justification of all
rights is their tendency to further the good of the whole
community. This is practically admitted even by an indi-
vidualist like Sidgwick when he declares that a man may
be " called upon to make sacrifices of his happiness for the
good or welfare of his country." Still, the good of a com-
munity is identical with the good of its members, for apart

230 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

from a community of some sort there is for the individual
no rational end. The community itself is continually
changing, and every extension of the range of persons
effects a change in our moral judgments. The appeal to
natural rights is only safe when it is interpreted as an
appeal to what is socially beneficial, account being taken
of what is not only immediately convenient to the existing
members of a particular community, but of the welfare of
the community in relation to the whole of mankind.

Is there an indefeasible right to life ? Apart from the
possession of a will which enables the individual to work
for the common good, there is no such right. As every man
has the capacity of acting with a view to the common
good, the right to life is bound up with his position in the
State ; but as a man is also capable of being a member of
any State, he possesses the right to free life as a human
being. This conception has only gradually been reached.
In primitive times no right to life was recognised as be-
longing to the member of another tribe ; then, as various
tribes united into a community of tribes, the same right
was extended to all the members of the community. Even
when this extension of the right was recognised as belonging
to the citizen, it was denied to the slave, who was at the
mercy of his master ; and it was only by the growth of the
Roman system of equity, by the influence of the Stoical
doctrine of a law of nature embracing all men, and from
the gradual realisation of the incompatibility with slavery
of the idea of Christianity that all men are equal in the
sight of God, that ultimately all men were recognised to
have the same right to life. As the right is justifiable
only as the condition of the free development of the indi-
vidual in the service of society, it seems to follow that
society should by its legislation secure that every one is in
a condition to develop his capacity for public service.

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 23!

It is commonly assumed that in a time of war the right
to life and free activity are suspended, no matter what
may be the occasion of the war. The only case in which
war can be held to set aside temporarily the claim to life
and freedom is when it is necessary to save the nation
from destruction, or to fulfil its obligation to other States.
It is the function of the State to establish and defend the
conditions under which the best life is possible. Manifestly,
therefore, nothing short of the threatened extinction of
the State, or a violation of the national honour implied
in the observance of its Treaty obligations, can justify
the temporary abolition of the right of all men to life as a
necessary condition of their contribution to the common
good. Most wars have arisen, not because the existence
or honour of the nation was at stake, but from dynastic
ambition or national vanity, and such wars cannot be
justified, nor do they allow of the plea to be urged that
the right to life must give way when the very conditions
of life are assailed. No State can be justified in ignoring
the rights of man, however a particular nation, under
present conditions, may be forced to go to war to defend
itself from annihilation or to fulfil its obligations to other
nations. War is always wrong, though it is not always
clear on whom the blame must be laid. As States more
and more realise their obligations to humanity, and legislate,
not in the interest, or rather supposed interest, of their own
people, the more certainly will the possibility of war be
abolished and the abrogation of man's right to life be
rendered improbable.

Has the individual a right to liberty ? We must make it
clear what we mean by liberty. There can be no right
simply to be allowed to do anything that one would like
to do, irrespective of what it is we purpose doing. Liberty
is good or bad according as the things which can be done

232 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

are good or bad. The proper sense of liberty, therefore, is
that every well-regulated society ought to secure to all
its members, as far as possible, the opportunity of develop-
ing their natural gifts and powers so far as they can do so
without detriment to one another or to the well-being of
the community as a whole. It is not always recognised
how much real positive liberty depends upon the existence
of elaborate social arrangements, and especially upon a
strong and enlightened government. Liberty is the essence
of opportunity, for self-development is the creation of law,
and not something which could exist apart from the action
of the State. Freedom of thought, in the positive sense
of the development of intellectual capacity, implies the
existence of a good system of education, a high average of
intellectual culture, in at least some class of the community,
and the possibility of a satisfactory career for the citizens
at large.

It is obvious that an absolute right of freedom of contract
cannot be permitted in a well-regulated State. Such a
right would mean that even a contract to commit crimes
or to rebel against itself should be enforced. If, therefore,
certain contracts may be refused, it is implied that it is one
of the functions of the State to prevent or prohibit certain
kinds of contract by refusing to allow legal remedies for
their violation.

Is it permissible to use force against an existing govern-
ment ? The destruction attendant upon all interference
with the actual conditions of life makes it necessary to
consider whether, granting the justice of the indictment,
there is a reasonable chance of not merely overthrowing
the existing government or constitution, but of substi-
tuting something better in its stead. There is certainly
no right of rebellion unless the conscience of the rebels is
really better than that which is embodied in the existing

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 233

State. This principle applies to all opposition to proposed
measures. It can only be after all constitutional means
have been tried and have failed, or because the government
make it impossible to have recourse to them, that rebellion
can be justified at all ; and even then we must always ask
whether the evils from which we are suffering are so great
as to entitle us to risk disorder and bloodshed.

Justice demands that there should be equality before
the law. Such equality is a necessary result of the con-
ception of every one as a person. Equality in political
rights, on the other hand, cannot be determined in this
abstract way. The main reason for the extension of politi-
cal rights to all persons of sound mind who have reached
a certain age is that the exercise of political rights has
an incalculable educational value and is essential to the
realisation of the common good. For this reason there
seems no just ground for the exclusion of women from the
suffrage ; besides that, the special knowledge of the condi-
tions under which their sex lives must form an important
element in determining many social questions. The aim of
all social and political regulations is always to secure the
greatest good of the community, and it can hardly be
doubted that an extension of the suffrage to all adults
would work towards this end. But the mere extension
of the suffrage is not enough, so long as inequalities in
social condition prevent or make too difficult the develop-
ment of all the latent capacities of the citizens. There
must therefore be equality in the sense of equal opportunity.
It can hardly be said that the child of vicious parents has
an equal opportunity with the child who has grown up
in a respectable household, though no doubt a compulsory
system of education tends to mitigate this evil. The right
of the child to be educated must be placed upon the same
basis as the right to life and liberty. Parents cannot be

234 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

allowed to exploit their children to the extent of prevent-
ing the realisation of their latent capacities. The well-
being of the community can only be secured by the State
taking over the function of which it deprives the family,
and performing that function in a better way.

Property, which is based on the abstract idea of person-
ality, is essential to the free realisation of the higher life,
being the external instrument for the realisation of that
life. The actual distribution of property must depend
upon the general social arrangements of the community.
It may, however, be said generally that no arrangements
which make it virtually impossible for a large section of
the community to own property can be defended. Admit-
ting the existence of private property, we cannot fairly
object to the accumulation of property in the form of
capital, which is used for the production of commodities.
Inequality of property is in harmony with the common
good, and in any case it is hard to see how it can be pre-
vented in any community which allows freedom of com-
petition. The idea of the older Socialists that men should
be assigned advantages according to their capacities
would be fatal to the development of the higher literary,
scientific and philosophical' pursuits. At the same time
the legislation should be conducted with a view to providing
for the possible acquirement of property by everyone ;
for without property, as Hegel says, a man cannot be a
complete man. Hence the State has the right to interfere
with anything that prevents a large number of the citizens
from acquiring property. It may, indeed, be doubted if
the present system of landed property in England does
justice to the working class. Land is unlike capital in
this respect, that it cannot be possessed by one person
without others being deprived of it, whereas capital benefits
both its possessor and those who labour under its super-

SOCIALISM 235

intendence. The system of landed property which has
led to a class of landless men requires some readjustment,
and the State ought therefore to exercise some control over
rights of property in land.

In contrast to any proposal to limit the rights of contract,
the Socialist has but one answer to make : it is vain, he
says, to attempt to secure the good of the citizen by any
half-hearted regulation of the conditions under which the
capitalist State operates. The fault does not lie in defective
arrangements, but in the institution of capital and capital-
istic labour, and no real advance can be made until the axe
is laid to the root of the tree. As the Fabian puts it,
" Whatever State control may have meant fifty years ago,
it never meant hostility to private property as such. Now,
for us, and for as far ahead as we can see, it means this and
little else." * The advent of Socialism or State-control
is held to be inevitable. " Step by step the political power
and political organisation of a country have been used for
individual ends, until to-day the largest employer of labour
is one of the ministers of the Crown (the Postmaster-
General), and almost every conceivable trade is, some-
where or other, carried on by parish, municipality, or the
National Government itself, without the intervention of
any middleman or capitalist. . . . Besides our national
relations, and the army, navy, police, and the courts of
justice, the community now carries on for itself, in some
part or other of these Islands, the post-office, telegraphs,
carriage of small commodities, coinage, surveys, the regula-
tion of the currency and note issue, the provisions of weights
and measures, the making, sweeping, lighting, and repair-
ing of streets, roads, and bridges, life insurance, the grant
of annuities, shipbuilding, stockbroking, banking, farming,

1 Fabian Essays^ p. 208.

236 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

and money-lending. It provides for thousands of us
from birth to burial — midwifery, nursery, education,
board and lodging, vaccination, medical attendance,
medicine, public worship, amusements, and interment.
It furnishes and maintains its own museums, parks, art-
galleries, libraries, concert-halls . . . markets, slaughter-
houses, fire-engines, lighthouses, pilots, ferries, surf-boats,
public baths, wash-houses . . . cow meadows, etc. Besides
its direct supersession of private enterprise, the State now
registers, inspects, and controls nearly all the industrial
functions which it has not yet absorbed." 1

It does not follow, however, that because State control
has been extended, we must endorse the Socialist contention
that society inevitably tends towards the complete absorp-
tion by the State of all the means of production. No
doubt there has been a great expansion of national and
municipal ownership, but it is overlooked that, however
great this expansion may be, it presupposes the existence
of private capital and the perpetual experimentation
which is essential to the success of public industry. Take
away this basis and the whole proposed system of State-
directed industry is essentially changed. Under the
present conditions there is a perpetual interchange of
influence between the functions of the city and State on
the one side and individual enterprise on the other side.
The control of certain forms of production, in so far as it
succeeds in saving, gives back to the nation an increased
amount of capital that is used productively. It is there-
fore an assumption that cannot be justified that the complete
control of all forms of industry may safely be committed
to public regulation. Any new departure in this direction
must be carefully scrutinised and adopted tentatively
until it has shown itself by experience to be successful.

* Fabian Essays, pp. 47-48.

SOCIALISM 237

We have therefore to examine the proposal of Socialism
to abolish all private capital on its own merits, abandoning
the facile but hazardous role of prophecy.

The earlier form of Socialism, as represented by Fourier
and his school, maintained that the present competitive
system does not produce as much wealth as common
ownership of capital would do, and wastes what is produced
by its false method of distribution. The followers of
Saint Simon again argued that the so-called right of private
property is simply the asserted right to receive an income
that has not been earned. The capitalist and the land-
owner take advantage of their monopoly to force the
workers to yield to them a large share of the product of
their labour. " If the exploitation of man by man no
longer bears the brutal aspect which characterised it in
antiquity, it is none the less real. The workman is not,
like the slave, the direct property of his master ; the terms
on which he works are fixed by contract ; but is this trans-
action a free one on the part of the workman ? It is not,
since he is obliged to accept on pain of death, reduced as
he is to look for each day's food to the pay of the day
before." l This anomalous state of things must be done
away, and the only way to effect this end, it is said, is for
the State to become the owner of all the means of pro-
duction, while the individual will enjoy a life-interest in
the share allotted to him. The assignment of a special
task will be determined by State officials, who will train
the young in the occupations for which their natural
capacities best fit them, and provide the equipment re-
quired for their special career.

According to Marx the final explanation of all social
changes and political revolutions must be sought in
economic conditions, a view which obviously gives a very

1 Quoted in Skelton's Socialism, p. 71,

238 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

partial and distorted conception of the course of history.
The reduction of all conflict to the struggle between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat is based upon a theory of
life too simple to account for the facts. More recent
Socialists have proposed one of three methods of securing
the best results by the State organisation of all production.
One proposal is to give to the State the whole charge of all
departments of industry under the superintendence of
political heads ; another is to separate the political from
the industrial State, and to appoint expert commissions
to take charge of industrial production ; while a third
would commit production to the autonomous adminis-
tration of trade unions, under their own selected chiefs.
The objection to the first method is that it would inevitably
lead to the most terrible contests of factions and give enor-
mous opportunities for illicit profits. The second plan, the
one put forward by the English Fabians, could only result
in the substitution of an irresponsible bureaucracy for the
present system of free competition under moderate State
regulation. The third proposal, which is to elect higher
officials in each industry by the workers directly concerned,
would give an opportunity for the rise of sectional interests,
and would certainly lead to irreconcilable disputes between
the different organisations, with no supreme power to adjust
the claims of each.

The general proposal of Socialism of the modern type is
to do away with the present form of industrial competition,
substituting for it some form of unified control. The
various Socialistic organisations in Europe and America
all look forward to the collective ownership and operation
of the means of production and exchange, and the allot-
ment of reward by authority. How this ideal is to be
realised is not made very clear. Perhaps we cannot do
better than give the outline of the necessary collectivist

SOCIALISM 239

ideal as formulated by Schaeffle, an opponent of the theory,
but so impartial that Socialists have admitted his sub-
stantial correctness.

The mass of invested capital at the present day, it is
said, arises from the returns on capital, and is saved out
of the profits of employees. The accumulation of great
fortunes is made possible because the wage-earner receives
less than the full value of the produce of his labour, so that
the surplus falls to the share of the capitalist. The work-
man is forced to take the wages he can get by the intense
competition of his fellow-workmen, the fluctuating con-
dition of social production, the disturbing effect of machin-
ery, changes in technical manufacture, foreign competition,
and many other circumstances. To do away with this
unjust condition of things there must be a public organ-
isation of labour and public distribution of the national
income. The whole national income should be equitably
distributed, with the exception of the part reserved by the
public overseers as capital and for the maintenance of
unproductive public institutions. As large incomes will
disappear, the consumption of private luxuries will be
enormously lessened, while there will be an increase in
public institutions designed for cultivation and the amuse-
ment of the people. Socialism does not abolish private
property, but only private property in the means of pro-
duction, that is, capital. It does not do away with the
right of inheritance, though no doubt there would be only
modest properties to bequeath. Nor is it of necessity
hostile to the family or the Church, though such hostility
may be, and indeed has been, expressed by individual
Socialists.

It is pointed out by Schaeffle that Socialism as thus
described is really a form of Individualism, since the
control of all production is advocated for the express

240 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

purpose of giving each individual his proportionate share
in the national income. Nor can it be said that it values
man as man, for its conception of humanity is that of an
aggregate, not that of an organic unity. In truth the whole
ideal is false, for it is not possible to determine the exact
value of each man's labour. How are we to decide, for
example, how much is due to the creative skill displayed
by the great captains of industry ? Nor can the value of
labour be determined by the amount of time expended.
Hence Socialism cannot fulfil its claim of distributing
equitably the products of labour. And if, setting aside the
ideal of distribution according to the value of the product,
the attempt were made to apportion men's share according
to their needs, the result would be that in a short time
every individual would discover that he was in a great
state of need and destitution, while an equal division
could only result in indolence and idleness.

Socialists have themselves admitted the difficulty of
distributing reward according to the value of the product,
and in a kind of desperation have been forced to fall back
on the old solution of equal sharing. " The impossibility,"
says one of the Fabians, " of estimating the separate value
of each man's labour with any really valid result, the friction
which would be provoked, the inevitable discontent, favour-
itism and jobbery that would prevail, — all these things
will drive the Communal Council into the right path, the
equal remuneration of all workers." The proposal is at
once impracticable and unjust. It could only result in
lessening production and leading, as has been said above,
to indolence and slackened effort.

Is it true that under the Socialist scheme the product
would be increased ? The contention is that the huge
share of wealth now annually appropriated by the capitalist
would be available for distribution among the workers.

SOCIALISM 241

Now, the income of the capitalist is largely reinvested in
production, and it is admitted by Kautsky that only
greater productivity could lead to improvement in the
condition of the workman. This increased production,
it is said by Kautsky and Bebel, would result from con-
centrating work on the largest and most perfect industrial
plants and throwing the rest out of service. This tendency
indeed is at present at work, and might be accelerated ;
but it does not follow that it could be profitably applied
to all forms of industry ; and in any case individual
initiative would be cramped and social progress retarded.

In contrast to the Administrative Socialism of the
Fabian School a recent group of thinkers advocate what is
called " Guild Socialism." Distrusting the direct action
of government, they would reduce its powers as much as
possible, maintaining that central control implies a bureau-
cracy and a defective electoral machinery. No doubt,
it is admitted, the State is the final owner of the means of
production, but the control of the use of means should be
given to each guild of workers. Both rent and profits
should be under the management of the guild, which would
have the right to determine wages, hours of labour and
prices of products. While each guild would thus control
the use of the means of production within its own sphere,
a place would still be left for the action of the State, which
would no longer interfere with the means of production,
but would deal with all that concerns the higher interests
— fine arts, education, international relations, justice,
public conduct — leaving technical education, however, to
the care of the guilds. Thus we would have two sections
of society, the first dealing with all that concerns the
national income, the second with purely political concerns.
The State would be the owner of all the means of production,
while the guilds would regulate the use of those means,

W.S. Q

242 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

paying to the State an annual rent for their charter. From
this source the State would derive its finances, not by the
present cumbrous and unjust methods. Disputes between
guilds would be adjusted, not by the State, but by a con-
ference of guilds.

The proposal to have two separate democracies is obvi-
ously impracticable. The State is to deal with international
relations, which turn to a great extent upon the conditions
under which the economic products of different countries
are carried on. It is no solution to say that when disputes
between guilds take place, as they inevitably would, or
between the conference of guilds and Parliament, these
will adjust themselves. This is to hand over the fate of
the nation to chance. There must be some responsible
body to decide disputes, and there is no other body but
that which represents the citizens as a whole. The theory
of Guild Socialism is thus an illogical and impracticable
compromise between State Socialism and Syndicalism.

Punishment, to pass to another point, according to
Kant must be inflicted without any regard to the happiness
of the individual or of society and solely with a view to
the maintenance of justice. It is, he argues, neither
preventive nor educational, but simply retributive. The
criminal affirms the law of his desires, and society uses
violence in order to cause the irrational act to recoil upon
himself. There is in truth, we may reply, no real discrep-
ancy between these three conceptions of punishment.
As the object of punishment is to maintain the social
unity against the caprice of individuals, punishment is
preventive in the sense that by tending to awaken the
conscience of the community, it suggests an ideal which is
in contrast to the selfish inclinations of individuals. It
is also educative, in tending to arouse the consciousness

PUNISHMENT 243

that crime is worthy of punishment. And it is a vindica-
tion of justice, because justice is shown to be the means
by which the best life is made possible for men. Punish-
ment is not preventive because it hinders the commission
of particular crimes, but because it brings to light the
principle which condemns all crime. It is not educational
in the sense that it makes men afraid of the penalty
connected with the commission of a criminal act, but in
the sense that it makes them fear the guilt inseparable
from crime. And punishment vindicates justice as a
necessary condition of the realisation of the true self.
Punishment is therefore a moral agent, not because it acts
directly on the will — no external agency can so act — but
because it makes the individual realise that the truly
reasonable motive for avoiding crime is the nature of man
as essentially social.

M. Durkheim has put forward a theory of punishment
which is derived from the principle that society and the
State rest upon the division of labour. With all its sugges-
tiveness this doctrine can hardly be regarded as adequate.
It is only by a metaphorical extension of the meaning of
the term that he plausibly accounts for the rights of society
on this basis. No doubt it is true that the division of
labour does increase as society develops ; but it cannot
be admitted that all the complex forces of social life are
merely instances of such division. The specialisation of
functions which M. Durkheim rightly finds in modern
society cannot be reduced to merely economic conditions.
There is an enormous increase in the specialisation of the
industrial and agricultural conditions of life, but this
increase is not to be explained simply as due to the pressure
of external circumstances. These conditions are the simpler
elements of social life ; and what determines their import-
ance is the change in outlook of society as it develops.

244 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

The conditions under which the life of man is carried on
differ for different societies, and change as a society realises
that there are ever new conditions by which man is enabled
to realise himself. Economic conditions have to be con-
sidered, but they do not explain all that is meant by
patriotism and the love of humanity. A defensive war
is not simply for the sake of preserving the favourable
conditions of trade and commerce — though these are an
element in the calculation — but to defend one's ideal of
the best life ; and it would be hard to show that war is
limited to the defence of these conditions only ; in reality
it is justified only when the very complex conditions of the
life believed to be reasonable are at stake ; and it is this
that gives the sentiment of nationality its tremendous force
and energy. Wars must necessarily discompose all the
ordinary conditions of trade and commerce, and can be
defended only on the ground that these are less than the
higher interests of life, endangered by this or that ambitious
nation which regards the evils of war as of less consequence
than the ultimate gains expected to accrue from it. Even
a conquering State would not enter upon a war of conquest
were it not that national honour is believed to be promoted
by success. No doubt this success includes better economic
conditions ; but these are only part of the whole conception
which determines a nation to risk defeat on the chance
or the belief in the rectification by its means of the evil
economic and other effects of the war itself. Man does
not live by bread alone, but by ideals of justice, humanity
and generosity, without which he feels that he will lose
his own soul. A people in its highest mind will disregard
its own selfish interest in view of a higher end. There is
such a thing as a national spirit which refuses to consider
economic gain when a great object is at stake. It is the
expression of the General Will, which we have seen to be the

PUNISHMENT 245

spirit of a people. Economic considerations, then, are
but a part, and by no means the most important part,
of the nation's will. As Mr. F. H. Bradley says : " The
moral organism is not an animal organism. In the latter
the member is not aware of itself as such, while in the former
it knows itself, and therefore knows the whole in itself.
The narrow external function of a man is not the whole man.
He has a life which we cannot see with our eyes, and there
is no duty so mean that it is not the realisation of this,
and knowable as such. What counts is not the visible
outer work so much as the spirit in which it is done. The
breadth of my life is not measured by the multitude of my
pursuits, nor the space I take up among other men ; but
by the fulness of the whole life which I know as mine.
It is true that less now depends on each of us as this or
that man ; it is not true that our individuality is there-
fore lessened, that therefore we have less in us."

According to the theory of M. Durkheim an act is a crime
when it offends the strong and collective sentiments of
society. This makes crime consist entirely in the senti-
ments with which it is regarded. The act is a crime because
it offends ; it does not offend because it is a crime. If a
man assaults me in the street and I knock him down, to
use Mr. Bosanquet's illustration, there is no force in asking
whether I do so in order to cure him of his insolence, or
to punish him for having struck me, or to prevent him
from hitting me again. The actual fact is that I react
against him instinctively because I am offended. And no
doubt there is behind my action some positive sentiment
or conviction. But this cannot be regarded as a complete
account of the nature of punishment. We have still to
ask what justification there is for the existence of the
sentiment which exists against crime. A thing is not
made right by the fact that it is held to be right by a given

246 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

number of persons who form the members of an actual
society. M. Durkheim himself admits that many things
were tabooed at an early stage of human history which
are now regarded as perfectly innocent. But if the only
defence of law is that it is an embodiment of the collective
consciousness, all cases in which that consciousness speaks
decidedly will be justified ; or if not, there will be no
justification for any system of repressive punishment.
A thing is not made right because it is in consonance with
public sentiment. No doubt law is the expression of the
public will, but not because a number of members of society
endorse it. What justifies punishment is its harmony
with the ultimate end, which is the development of the
best life in a single society, and ultimately in humanity
as a whole. It is this latent reference to an ideal good
life which justifies the common sentiment in favour of
punishment. Man is always more or less consciously
guided by this principle, and law is a progressive realisation
of this ideal of the best life. This enables us to give a
relative justification to the sentiment of early society,
which endorsed and punished many things that we should
neither endorse nor punish. The development is in the
greater and clearer appreciation of what is required by the
ideal of the best life. A crime, then, is not simply some-
thing which offends our sentiments. — though it of course
does so offend — it rests upon a distinction between a
right and a wrong act. When a law is formulated, it is
implied that something is expressed as obligatory which
is worth maintaining, and that this is recognised by the
common consciousness ; but it is a hysteron proteron to
say that it is a crime merely because it is so regarded, not
because there is anything in its intrinsic nature which
accounts for the strength and permanence of the reaction
against it.

CHAPTER ELEVENTH

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PEACE
AND WAR

So far we have been considering the State in relation to
its own citizens, and the relations of these to one another,
whether as individuals or as members of subordinate groups.
We have now to ask what is the true relation of States
to one another. The conception of the State as an institu-
tion which has the right to do whatever is conceived to be
necessary for the preservation of its own existence, the
conception which underlies such theories as those of
Treitschke, is one that we cannot accept. It leads to the
absolutist doctrine associated with the name of Machiavelli,
who tells us that a prudent ruler " neither can nor ought to
keep faith when to do so would be to his own disadvantage,
and when the motives for which he made his promise are
no longer existent." Machiavelli indeed advances this
principle of the absence of all principle only when the
very existence of the State is at stake. " When the salva-
tion of our country is at stake," he says, " all questions of
justice and injustice, of mercy and cruelty, of honour and
dishonour, must be set aside ; every other consideration
must be subordinated to the one of saving her life and
preserving her honour." When " the salvation of one's
country is at stake " must of course be determined by the
ruling powers, and will always serve as a plausible reason
for the violation of morality and the sanction of fraud,

247

248 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

cruelty and violence. In contrast to this doctrine we must
hold that the violation of all the recognised principles of
morality, including the practice of fraud, cruelty and viol-
ence, is in fundamental disharmony with the idea of the
State as an institution whose purpose is to maintain the
conditions of the best life for its own citizens. It is assumed
that this end can only be attained at the expense of other
nations, an assumption which is contrary to the truth.
It is true that the first duty of a State is to its own citizens,
but it is mere confusion of thought which assumes that this
duty is incompatible with the observance of humane rules
of action in its dealings with other States. The action
of one State is naturally different from that of another,
because its climatic, economic and social conditions are
different. Each nation has its own problems, which it
must solve in its own way, but it cannot solve them by
assuming that it is necessarily in antagonism to other
nations. As a matter of fact, States have always been in
amicable contact, and it is through this contact that each
has been able to make an advance in culture and refine-
ment, and in the application of scientific discovery to the
improvement of the external conditions of life. The good
of one State cannot be separated from the good of another.
We must therefore start from the idea of the interdepend-
ence of States, in contrast to the Machiavellian view,
apparently endorsed by the present rulers of Germany,
that one State is necessarily related to another as an enemy.
So long as this fallacy rules men's minds wars are inevitable.
The interdependence of States is a fact, and to this fact our
theory should adjust itself. The real aim of State organ-
isation being to secure the best conditions of life for its
citizens in harmony with and limited by the universal
principles of morality, we may say that the true relation
of States to one another is co-operation, not antagonism.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 249

Thus one nation may learn from others, appropriating what
is in harmony with its own life, and in this way gradually
working out a more and more perfect form of organised
life. This contact with other nations will not destroy
the independent life of each, but will result in a progressive
differentiation in social institutions which will work to-
wards the better development of humanity.

While each State must therefore conceive of itself as one
of the organs by which humanity is making some approach
to the best life, no State can surrender its autonomy without
ceasing to be a State. What is required is that the rulers
should have in view the good of humanity, not that they
should allow the conflicting claims of individuals or
associations to act in entire independence of State control.
For the independence of the State is essential to the good
of humanity. The separate action of each State is required,
since each has what may be called its special mission, and
the better each fulfils its own mission the better it will be
for the good of humanity. It is the false notion that the
interests of one State are necessarily in antagonism to the
interests of the others that leads to wars, and to the ambi-
tion of foreign conquest as an end in itself. The increase
of armaments in one State cannot but lead to a correspond-
ing increase in the others. The main source of war lies
in the defective organisation of a community, which inevit-
ably gives rise to policies of expansion, and the true cure
for this state of things is better internal organisation.
The free development of the community is prevented by
restrictive laws limited to a certain class, since the privi-
leged class naturally seeks to prevent the extension of rights
by external expansion, while the suffering class attracts
the sympathy of the citizens of other States. Remove
these anomalies, and the normal co-operation of States
will be allowed free play. Thus it is not the supremacy

250 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

of the State which gives rise to conflicts, but a false idea of
what is required in the interest of its citizens.

War then is due to imperfect socialisation. It does not
follow, however, that it is never justifiable. A State must
preserve its autonomy or cease to be a State, thus surrender-
ing its right to defend the liberties of its people. It has
been held by a certain small number of the writers on
national and international affairs that, unnecessary and
futile as it is, war can never be abolished, while there are
others who maintain that it can be abolished by a refusal
to engage in it. Representatives of the former view hold
that, horrible and evil as it is, war is inevitable, or that
it should not be abolished because it develops the manly
qualities of a nation and springs inevitably from the clash
of interests between different nationalities. Now, to main-
tain that war is essential to the preservation of the higher
qualities of a people simply means that those who hold
the doctrine have not grasped the real significance of a
State, Not to speak of the wanton destruction of man's
labours war brings in its train enormous evils. In a state
of war, as Hobbes says, " there is no place for industry,
because the fruit thereof is uncertain ; and consequently no
culture of the earth ; no navigation nor use of the commod-
ities that may be imported by sea ; no commodious build-
ings ; no instruments of moving and removing such things as
require much force ; no knowledge of the face of the earth ;
no account of time ; no society ; and which is worst of all,
continual fear and danger of violent death ; and the life of
a man. solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." The
defence of war is that it may be necessary to defend one's
country against hostile invasion, to uphold the national
honour, and to preserve all the conditions which are essential
to a reasonable human life.

A glance at the history of man in Christian times gives

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 251

us ground for believing that there has been a steady advance
towards the diminution if not the abolition of war. The
aim of Rome was to extend her sway over the whole world,
and in pursuit of this ideal the Empire in effect reduced
all rights to the one right of imperial citizenship. The
result of this policy was to prevent war within the bound-
aries of the Empire. The earlier Fathers of the Church
were opposed to war, partly no doubt on account of the
pagan rites connected with taking the military oath, but
also because of its conflict with the reign of peace. Augus-
tine, however, regarded military service as consistent with
the duties of a Christian, and at a later time with the rise
of the Mohammecfan power there was a change of attitude,
resulting in the religious wars of the Crusades. For cen-
turies no power was more aggressive than that of the Church.
At the time of the Reformation Erasmus expressed his
abhorrence of war in striking terms. " If there be any-
thing in the affairs of mortals," he said, " which it becomes
us deliberately to attack, which we ought indeed to shun
by every possible means, to avert and to abolish, it is
certainly war, than which there is nothing more wicked,
more mischievous or more widely destructive in its effects,
nothing harder to be rid of, or more horrible and, in a word,
more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian." l

With the development of the modern State out of the
ruins of the old feudal system private war came to an end
and peace was regarded as the normal condition of society.
The Reformation laid the foundation of International
Law by leading to the recognition of the independence
of nations and indeed making such law a necessity. Hence
we find Grotius laying down the conditions of a code of
universal law. He was the first to interpret the jus gentium

1 Quoted by Miss Campbell Smith in her translation of Kant's Perpetual
Peace, pp. 18-19.

252 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

as not a collection of rules common to various peoples,
but as the law between nations. " The proposition," says
Sir Henry Maine, " that independent communities, how-
ever different in size and power, are all equal in the view oft
the law of nations, has largely contributed to the happiness
of mankind." States must recognise one another as mem-
bers of a society of States. There must therefore be laws
binding nations even in war.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century William
Penn suggested an international tribunal in the interests;
of peace, and by the Abbe St. Pierre the problem of per-
\petual peace was introduced into political literature. It
I is, however, only with Kant that we have a complete and
/ j reasoned statement of the conditions under which a per-
* ; petual peace may in course of time be secured.

As to international relations, Kant holds that there are I
certain preliminary articles which if adopted would pre- :
pare the way for a lasting peace. The first of these^is that
\no treaty of j^ej^jiiaUJjejria^^
lof causes of quarrel which might furnish material for

^ — . T-. ,_ ,•*; . •-- — •- '"* *- -""^ "**< _ ---

another war. Anything else wouloTSe a mere truce and
not a true peace. A second condition is that no State,
\ great or small, shall be acquired by another through inherit -
jancc, exchange, purchase, or donation. A State is a society
of human beings, not a patrimony. Not less important is
it that standing armies^ should jbe gradually abolished,
since they lead "To a perpetual rivalry of other States,
which have no guarantee of security so long as they exist,
and their expense leads to wars of aggression, undertaken
in order to get rid of the burden of debt incurred in keeping
them up. Another essential condition of peace is that
no State shall countenance such means of injuring the
enemy as must make mutual confidence impossible when
peace is restored. Treachery, espionage and other dis-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 253

lonourable stratagems tend to lead to wars of extermina-
ion. These articles, however, are but preparatory. The_/
:qndijioii-o£ lasting peace_ requires, firstly, that the civil
constitution of. each- State sho.ukLbe_re£ublican, that is,

ugnjpfln thp. fregflnm a.rid^r[na.lity^of the citizens.. There \
s no guarantee of perpetual peace until the power of; 1
declaring war is in the hands of the people. The law of
nations must thus be based upon a federation of free nations.
No doubt even this will not make a complete end of war,
but with it we must be satisfied until the world is pre-
pared for a World-Republic. A League of Nations is all
that we can at present have, and in such a League there must

a provision for securing the rights of each citizen of the
contracting States as a " citizen of the world," that is, the
right to visit and trade freely with countries other than
his own.

In two ways an attempt has been made within the last
lundred years to substitute international agreement in
prevention of international disputes, namely, by Treaties
and by Conferences and Congresses. The weakness of
Treaties is that it is difficult to obtain guarantees that the
terms of the Treaty will be carried out, and not easy to
devise an effective method for varying and modifying the
provisions. Mill proposed a time limit, and this method
tias been on the whole successful in the case of commercial
Treaties ; but where large political and administrative
relations are involved, it has its disadvantages. The
Treaty entered into at Chaumont in 1814 by the four
great powers — Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria —
was to last for twenty years, but it came to nothing. At
the first conference in September, 1818, it was proposed
to guarantee the maintenance of the governments then
established in Europe, but Great Britain refused to pledge
herself to suppress all efforts that threatened the established

254 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

order, and no advance was made towards the organisation
of a Government for Europe. " The idea of a solidary
alliance," said Castlereagh," by which each State shall
be bound to support the state of succession, government
and possession within all other States from violence and
attack . . . must be understood as morally implying the
previous establishment of such a system of general govern- '
ment as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations
an internal system of peace and justice. Till a mode of
constructing such a system shall be devised the consequence
is inadmissible as nothing would be more immoral or
prejudicial to the character of governments generally
than the idea that their force was collectively to be prosti-
tuted to the support of established power without any
consideration of the extent to which it was abused." This
has been the policy of Great Britain in similar cases ; she
has always protested against intervention in the internal
affairs of independent nations.

The body of rules and usages which now prevail among
civilised nations had no existence before the end of the
Middle Ages. There was no International Law in our
sense of the term, but only partial custom. The Church
was not able to prevent Christian rulers from making war
upon each other, and even the Pope was himself, as a tem-
poral Prince, often a belligerent. Grotius finds the basis
of International Law in the law of nature, the precepts of
revealed religion, and custom ; and within half a century
his treatise was received as authoritative. He has no-
thing to say about the duties or rights of neutral States
as against belligerents, but with this exception he has laid
the foundation of International Law. To the objection
that he could not create law since he was not a legislator,
Sir Henry Maine properly replies that " the founders of
International Law, though they did not create a sanction,

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255

created a law-abiding sentiment. They diffused among
sovereigns, and the literate classes in communities, a
strong repugnance to the neglect or breach of certain
rules regulating the relations and actions of States. They
did this not by threatening punishments, but by the
alternative and older method, long known in Europe and
Asia, of creating a strong approval of a certain body
of rules."

There are three sources of International Law : the author-
ity of writers, the recognition and declaration in Treaties
and other diplomatic acts, and the embodiment of general
opinion in the usage of nations. The first authority gets
credence according to the reputation of the writer, as
correctly representing the views of civilised governments.
Authority based upon Treaties must be accepted with
caution, since an agreement between two or more powers
may not be regarded as of universal application even by
themselves, much less as binding upon those who have
been no party to the Treaty. It is otherwise when the
Treaty is the result of a Congress or Conference of a number
of the greater States for the determination of matters of
permanent interest. And naturally the agreement of a
number of these powers has very great weight even
among States whose consent has not been given. The
United States in the War with Spain, though it had refused
to accept the Declaration of Paris of 1856, decided to
adhere to the rules there laid down, and these were observed
by both belligerents. But the most important of Inter-
national rules is that afforded by actual usage, which
indicates that the law is based upon deliberate consent.
Moreover, those rules .which are generally accepted by
independent States may fairly be regarded as convenient
and just. No doubt there is always a body of opinion in
advance of the popular conscience, which will have at

256 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

least the effect of keeping usage up to the mark of average
opinion, if not beyond it.

There are controversies between nations in regard to
boundaries and territorial rights, in regard to alleged
breaches of non-performance of active obligations arising
out of the interpretation of treaties, claims of its subjects
for compensation, and contests for supremacy or predomi-
nant influence. The last are the most dangerous of all,
for the powers concerned are usually less willing to invite
or tolerate interference in proportion as their cause is
weak.

There are two methods of international arbitration :
either the matter in dispute may be referred to a judge or
judges of their own choice, or the States concerned may
prefer to use the machinery provided by a general inter-
national agreement of more general scope. The important
arbitrations of Great Britain have all been conducted on
the first method.

The most important advance in making permanent
provisions for international arbitration was made by the
Peace Conference at the Hague. The original proposal
to consider the possible reduction of armaments was not
found practicable. So far the only Power which has made
any definite overture in this direction is Great Britain.
Sir Frederick Pollock is of opinion that, " as time goes on,
it will be less and less reputable among civilised States
to talk of going to war without having exhausted the
resources of the Hague Convention ; and the necessity
of any formal national declaration in that behalf may be
avoided altogether if the tribunal acquires by custom, as
one hopes it will, a stronger authority than any express
form of words would confer." Whatever advance may be
made by the widening of national feeling beyond the
confines of a particular State — and it is to be hoped that

FEDERATION OF STATES 257

this civilising process will go on increasing — in the mean-
time we must sympathise with those who have made
proposals for the settlement of disputes between national
groups of varying size and power, in such a way as to
preserve the peace between them. It is on this basis that
the American " League to Enforce Peace " rests. The
programme of the League is as follows :

" First : All judicial questions arising between the
signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject
to the limitations of Treaties, be submitted to a judicial
tribunal for hearing and judging both upon the merits and
upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

" Second : All other questions arising between the
signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be sub-
mitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration,
and recommendation.

" Third : The signatory Powers shall jointly use forth-
with both their economic and military forces against any
one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of
hostility against another of the signatories before any
question arising shall be submitted, as provided in the
foregoing."

According to these proposals the task of settling disputes
is still to be left to diplomacy. The suggested council of
conciliation is in effect a device for bringing collective
diplomacy to bear on questions of dispute. According to
the Third Article the signatories must submit their cases
to the council of conciliation, but there is no obligation
other than moral upon them to accept the decisions arrived
at. Moreover, it is implied that any State has the right to
secede from the Union. Thus the League would not
constitute a true Federal Union, but would at most be a
somewhat more elaborately organised Concert or Alliance
of Sovereign Powers.

w.s. R

258 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

According to the " League of Nations Society " there
is an obligation on the signatory powers not only to submit
all justiciable disputes to the Hague Court of Arbitration
or some other judicial tribunal, but also to accept its
decisions as final and to carry into effect these decisions.
Apparently the obligation to submit justiciable disputes
to arbitration is to be enforced, and the collective power of
the League is to be brought to bear to enforce the decisions
of the Arbitral Tribunal. But enforcement of the recom-
mendations of the council of conciliation does not seem to
be contemplated. It is the view of Sir Frederick Pollock
that there must be an International Executive and a
standing International Police. These, he says, are essential
" if a League to enforce Peace is to be in a position to
exercise timely and effective force at need and to nip
offences in the bud."

It has been asked why the process of " nipping offences
in the bud " should be less dangerous now than it was a
hundred years ago under the provisions of the Holy Alli-
ance. May it not be answered with some degree of force
that things have somewhat changed since Alexander
First put forward his scheme of peace ? For one thing
Wellington and Castlereagh had no faith in the scheme,
and indeed distrusted all schemes for the peace of the
world. The Czar's plan naturally failed when Europe
came to be guided by statesmen like Bismarck, Metternich
and Cavour, who had no belief in the obligation of a State
to observe the principles of morality, while idealism such
as that of the Czar seemed to them but the dreams of
an unpractical mystic, — a " loud-sounding nothing," as
Metternich called it. But a change has come over men's
minds since those days. Statesmen like Mr. Asquith and
Viscount • Grey agree with President Wilson that some
form of a League of Nations is feasible and urgently called

FEDERATION OF STATES 259

for, and therefore an appeal to the past by no means settles
the question. One may rather hope that the words with
which Mr. Alison Philips ends his Handbook of Modern
Europe may not be merely idle phrases. The nations of
Europe, he says, may " in spite of countless jealousies and
misunderstandings, grow in time to realise their unity in
all that constitutes a nation ; in their common origin, their
common traditions, their common interests." " There
are plenty of difficulties in the way of an International
League, but it seems no less obvious that they are of a
kind that can be overcome if there is a general will to over-
come them ; and if there is not such a general will, there
cannot be any league at all." That such a will is slowly
growing may be confidently affirmed, and there is good
hope that after the present war has come to an end, and
the futility of it all is burned into men's hearts and
minds, they will be ready to listen to proposals of the kind
referred to.

Meantime we must not underestimate the difficulties
of a Federation of States. We are told that the great
obstacle to such a Federation arises from the intense self-
consciousness which superinduces antagonism to other
nations, an antagonism inevitably arising from separate
traditions, customs and habits of life, and by jealously
guarded economic interests. The first step towards an
International Authority, Mr. Bertrand Russell tells us, is
that people should get rid of their narrow loyalty to their
own nation and think, not of their own selfish national
interest, but of abstract justice and the good of humanity.
This doctrine obviously implies, it is said, that there must
be an effective supremacy over the will of all the national
groups or other groups within the world league. The
stability and permanence of the Federation demands
that the interests of the constituent groups should be

260 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

subordinated in all matters affecting the common weal
to those of the whole.

Now, it is certainly true that the proposed Federation or
League would lead to a very decided transformation of
that form of loyalty to one's country which is embalmed
in the phrase, " my country right or wrong " ; but it is
fair to ask whether this form of patriotism is worthy of a
reasonable being. Every Treaty into which a nation
enters is in a sense an abandonment of its independence,
but it will not be contended that for that reason no Treaty
ought to be made by a self-respecting nation. The very
foundation of a Treaty is the belief that it will secure the
higher good of the nations who enter into it, a belief which
in most cases at least is fully justified. Why then should
it be assumed that a Federation of Nations involves any
abandonment of the autonomy of the contracting powers ?
It may be said that the proposed League differs from a
Treaty in one important respect, that it is meant to be
permanent, whereas a Treaty is for a limited time and for
a limited purpose. But the proposals of the associations
who advance the scheme of a League of Nations do not
involve the abandonment of the autonomy of the several
nations who enter into it. Each nation still retains full
control of its internal affairs — except, of course, so long as
agreements of an economic nature for the mutual benefit
of its own citizens as well as the benefit of the citizens of
other nations are in force — and, as the main object of the
League is to prevent the devastating effects of war, the result
must be a fuller control of these affairs. That such a
Federation would result in economic progress there can be
no possible doubt, for one of the most pernicious econpmic
fallacies is the idea that the gain of one nation is necessarily
the loss of another. One of the advantages of a Federation
of Nations would be an elevation of the idea of the true

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 261

purpose of a nation. No longer would the mutual jealousy
and distrust of one people lead to friction and sometimes
to indefensible wars. Each nation, seeking as its main
object the development of the common good, would
approach every question, not in the attitude of one seeking
to gain greater advantage for itself, but with the object
of determining what was the greatest good of itself and
others. That this greater good must be antagonistic to
the welfare of each nation is based upon an unreasoning
prejudice and a false economic theory. We do not assume
that the individual member of any State can only secure
his own good at the expense of his neighbour ; why, then,
should it be taken for granted that a nation stands to
another in the position of the hypothetical " state of
nature " ? Each nation has its own special task, but this
task is perfectly compatible with the exercise of even-
handed justice to other nations. It thus seems to me that
the proposed Federation has nothing to fear either from
those who would counsel us to get rid of all feelings of
loyalty to a single nation and think only of humanity,
nor from those who oppose it on the ground that it wrould
destroy that loyalty which is the spring of all progress.
The feeling of loyalty must be sublimated into a form of
patriotism which combines the most intense love of country
with the desire to do justice to other nations. There are
tasks enough for men to do without wasting their emotions
on evil feelings against the citizens of a foreign nation, and
really vigorous life is not to be expected from those whose
devotion to humanity makes them indifferent to the
immediate problems of their own country. The union of
love of country with devotion to the cause of humanity
is the true ideal, and neither a selfish patriotism nor a vague
humanitarianism that leads to nothing but neglect of the
duty that lies nearest.

262 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Apart from war there is sufficient work for every State to
do in developing the conditions which lead to the best life.
As Green says : 1 " Those who from time to time talk of
the need of a great war to bring unselfish impulses into
play give us reason to suspect that they are too selfish
themselves to recognise the unselfish activity that is going
on all around them. Till all the methods have been ex-
hausted by which nature can be brought into the service
of man, till society is so organised that everyone's capacities
have free scope for their development, there is no need to
resort to war for a field in which patriotism may display
itself. . . . Just so far as States are thoroughly formed,
the diversion of patriotism into the military channel
tends to come to an end. Patriotism, in that military
sense in which it is distinguished from public spirit, is not
the temper of the citizen dealing with fellow citizens, or
with men who are themselves citizens of their several
States, but that of the follower of the feudal chief, or the
member of a privileged class conscious of power, resting
ultimately on force, over an inferior population, or of
a nation holding empire over other nations." It is there-
fore in the interest of this noble ideal of patriotism that a
League of Nations is proposed for the prevention of war.
No war can arise without wrong, intentional or uninten-
tional, on the part of one or other of the combatants, or
both, and the remedy is not to be found in the surrender
of a nation's rights to self-government, but in cleansing
its own household, and so concentrating attention upon
justice. Properly understood the mission of one nation
cannot be incompatible with the mission of another.
Germany is not wrong in claiming that it is her duty to
spread her civilisation abroad ; the mistake is in supposing
that civilisation can be imposed by force, and that other

1 Principles of Political Obligation, s. 172 ; Works > ii. p. 482.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 263

nations have nothing to contribute to the progress of
humanity. " A healthy State," as Mr. Bosanquet says,
" is not militant." States are normally co-operative, not
antagonistic, and a League of Nations must be based upon
this fundamental truth.

Mr. A. C. Bradley has suggested certain possible dangers
in the proposal to form a Federation of Nations. One
difficulty would be, he thinks, that if all the States had
equal voices, there would be a preponderance of the influ-
ence of the smaller States, to which the greater States
could not be expected to submit ; while, on the other hand,
if not, the disputes would be practically determined by the
greater States, to the disadvantage of the smaller. It
may perhaps be answered that some arrangement, such as
that which prevails in the United States, might be made by
which this danger would be avoided. The sovereign
equality of each of these States is preserved by their equal
representation in the Senate, the balance being redressed
by the fact that both the Supreme Executive Authority,
the President, and the members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, are elected by the people. No doubt there
would be a difficulty in adapting this system to the
Federation proposed, but some such method of checks and
balance might surely be devised.

Another difficulty mentioned by Mr. Bradley is that
when a decree unfavourable to a powerful State was felt
to touch deeply its honour or interests, there would be a
danger of its trying to elude the requirements laid on it,
and an equal danger that other States would shut their
eyes to this attempt rather than enforce the decree at the
cost of all the evils of war. This objection is properly
enough based upon the imperfection which attaches to
the State as to all human organisations, but it does not
seem to be a fundamental objection to the proposed scheme.

264 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

We must hope that the just claims of each State will not
be overlooked by the League, and that mutual goodwill
would in general lead to the avoidance of this danger,
which after all is not incompatible with the main principle
of the League.

Certain general suggestions are made by Sir John
Macdonnell 1 which are worthy of careful consideration
by anyone who seriously believes that wars may by proper
regulations be avoided. The first and most obvious
condition is that enormous armies must cease to exist.
So long as peace is a preparation for war, each nation will
be compelled to prepare for the next war. If one State
is in possession of an army or a fleet dangerous to others,
they must maintain a proportionate force. There must
therefore be effective measures for disarmament, including
the abolition or control of establishments for the production
of war material. No doubt there will be great difficulty
in determining the basis on which disarmament is to be
carried out, but a good scheme is not beyond the powers
of those who will look at the matter from a high and
enlightened point of view. We must trust to the gradual
growth of ideals of disinterestedness in affairs of State,
such as are now fairly prevalent in the relations of citizens
to one another. There are signs of the development of
such ideals. They form the central idea of such documents
as President Wilson's addresses, and of the memorandum
descriptive of the Labour Conference. These give evidence
of an advance to new ideals, of a break with narrow aggres-
sive nationalism, and of aspirations for something above
it. It may indeed be doubted whether Mr. Dawson's
suggestion of an Inter-State Parliament is practicable.
He suggests " that the legislative assembly might be pro-
vided by superseding the periodical ad hoc congresses of

1 Contemporary Review for May, 1918.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 265

the European and other States, called for special purposes,
by a standing Congress, for all purposes. Such a Congress
.of States as the Parliament of the Nation should meet at
regular intervals. The Congress of States would be com-
posed of the Parliaments of all the nations represented,,
elected by their members upon a proportional representative
principle, with a view to giving a voice to important
minorities." If this is a doubtful proposal, much more
doubtful is the proposal to institute a world-parliament,
a proposal which hardly seems compatible with a multitude
of inferior national bodies. May there not, however, be
some international body to deal with the growing interests
of nations ? A Conference such as that which met at the
Hague in 1899 anc^ I9°7 would not serve the purpose. It
could do no more than conclude Treaties which might
not be ratified. Sir John Macdonnell suggests as a begin-
ning in international organisation, that each legislature
should have a Foreign Affairs Committee free to enter
into relations with other similar committees, cognisant of
all negotiations, and claiming the right to be heard upon
them, and to obtain full information. If a League of
Nations is established, it is plain that there must be some
body which represents the common interests of its members,
and it must discuss matters openly. It is almost univers-
ally admitted that there should be a court to determine
disputes of a legal nature between nations. This body
should be composed of jurists, and also of conciliators, the
latter men of wide reputation, to whom States could with
confidence commit the settlement of issues of the first
importance. If something of the nature of an international
legislature and judiciary is feasible, there should be no
difficulty in providing an international Executive. That
there are already the rudiments of such an Executive
has been shown by Mr. Woolf and others, and these

266 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

international institutions will doubtless grow as occasion
requires.

These practical suggestions are worthy of the serious
consideration of all who are interested in the prevention of
war and in the promotion of peace on earth and goodwill
to men. But no amount of machinery will be of much
avail without the growth in the peoples of different nation-
alities of a new conception of loyalty, a wider outlook
and a real desire to promote the good of mankind. This
spirit, I feel sure, is not to be generated by any vague and
misleading talk about the Community as wider than the
State, or any belittling of the State's supremacy. A suc-
cessful League must be a League of Nations, fulfilling and
not superseding the principle of a people's self-govern-
ment. The notion of what is called a Balance of Power
has proved its inefficiency in preserving the conditions of
good life among the nations. As Mr. Asquith has said :
" Such a state of international relationship without any
solid foundation, ethical or political, was bound to stimulate
naval and military activity. No one felt secure." Unless
we are able to substitute a League of Nations for the dis-
credited principle of a Balance of Power, there is little hope
of a permanent method of securing peace. So long as each
nation regards its own interests as incompatible with the
good of humanity, there must be a continual danger of
the Balance being upset by some one or more ambitious
powers. If there is a clear conviction of the essentially
anarchic character of the whole system, there is some hope
of a remedy. No doubt it will be difficult to diffuse this
idea so as to make it a guiding principle of action, but unless
there is a gradual infiltration of the idea it is vain to look
for an end of war. There must be, as President Wilson
has said, a "destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 267

the peace of the world ; or if it cannot be presently destroyed,
at the least its reduction to virtual impotence." Hence,
as he argues, we must have " the establishment of an
organisation of peace which shall make it certain that the
combined power of free nations will check every invasion
of right and serve to make peace and justice the more
secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which
all must submit and by which every international readjust-
ment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the people
directly concerned shall be sanctioned." In a word, what
is sought is " the reign of law, based upon the consent of
the governed and sustained by the organised opinion of
mankind." As he has explained, there must be no
" entangling alliances."

Now if we are to put an end to such alliances it is obvious
that in the League must be included all the great Powers
of the world ; otherwise the principle of a Balance of
Power will not have been got rid of. If the Central Powers
of Europe are left out, we must look for a continual attempt
to upset the League by drawing to their side all the dis-
satisfied Powers, an attempt by no means certain of failure ;
and thus we should have all the old conditions back again.
Assuming a favourable issue of this war, there seems to be
good hope that Germany would be willing to enter the
League. During his tenure of office Chancellor Bethman-
Hollweg expressed himself as favourable to the project ;
it would certainly be supported by the Socialists, the
Radicals and the Catholic " centre," and, as Mr. Brails-
ford says, " an impoverished Germany would welcome
relief from the burden of armaments." Germany might
no doubt object that the League is based upon the one-
sided principle of the naval supremacy of Great Britain.
The answer to this seems to be that there might be some
force in the objection before the formation of the League,

268 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

but that this difficulty disappears with the inclusion in
it of the United States. If in case of dispute Britain refused
to go before the Council of Conciliation, or refused to accept
its decision, it is inconceivable that she should be backed up
by the United States. The supposition, in fact, is utterly
improbable, firstly, because England has never shown an
indisposition to submit her case to fair arbitration ; and
secondly, because she would naturally defer to the strongly
expressed opinion of the United States, and would be very
unlikely to endanger her long peace with so friendly a power.
The absolute necessity of including Germany among the
Powers subscribing to the League is convincingly stated
by Viscount Grey, who points out that a satisfactory
League of Nations must rest upon moral ideas. Two
conditions are essential, if such a League is to be effective.
In the first place, " the idea must be adopted with earnest-
ness and conviction by the executive heads of states. It
must become an essential part of their practical policy,
one of their chief reasons for being or continuing to be
responsible for the policy of their states. They must
not adopt it only to render such service to the persons
whom it is convenient to please or ungracious to displease.
They must lead, and not follow. They must compel, if
necessary, and not be compelled." This condition is
actually fulfilled as regards the executive head of the
United States, and will be accepted by the Entente Govern-
ments, while Austria has shown a disposition to accept the
proposal. The difficulty will lie with Germany, so long at
least as it is ruled by a military caste. Until the German
people renounce their belief in force, there can be no League
of Nations in the sense intended by President Wilson.
" A League such as he desires must include Germany and
should include no nation that is not thoroughly convinced
of the advantage and necessity of such a League, and is,

LEAGUE OF NATIONS 269

!( therefore, not prepared to make the efforts, and, if need be,
lithe sacrifices necessary to maintain it." The second con-
j'dition is that the German Government, and not merely
the States that are willing to favour it, must understand
I] that some limitations upon the national action of each are
implied. Force must be brought to bear upon States that
refuse to settle their disputes by arbitration. " The
obligation is that if any nation will not observe this limita-
tion upon its national action ; if it breaks the agreement
which is the basis of the League, rejects all peaceful methods
of settlement and resorts to force, the other nations must
one and all use their combined force against it. The econ-
omic pressure would in itself be very powerful, and the
action of some of the smaller States composing the League
would perhaps not go beyond economic pressure, but those
States that have power must be ready to use all the force —
economic, military or naval — that they possess." Viscount
Grey is hopeful that the other Entente nations will respond
to President Wilson's ideal, but he is not so certain of
Germany. " The only conclusion is that the United States
and the Allies cannot save the world from militarism unless
Germany learns the lesson thoroughly and completely, and
they will not save the world, or even themselves, by a
complete victory over Germany until they too have learned
and can apply the lesson that militarism has become the
deadly enemy of mankind."

If we are to have a world at peace we must be prepared
to make what concessions are necessary to realise it. A
Commonwealth of Free Nations, in Lord Milner's phrase,
is the alternative to the Prussian ideal of a single Empire
with all other peoples its subservient tools. Unless this
is secured we shall have to face a vast increase of even
more deadly and costly armaments than have been
weighing us down in the present war.

270 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

A satisfactory League of Nations is impossible if the
threat of a boycott of the Central Powers should be carried
into effect. Such a proposal amounts to a determination
to perpetuate the old feud upon which the theory of the
Balance of Power rested, and would therefore be in dis-
harmony with the declared intention of the League.
Neither revenge for the barbarous manner in which Germany
has conducted the war, nor an eye to the commercial
interests of England, even if that could be admitted, will
justify us in proposing a League of Peace on the one hand,
and seeking to destroy the legitimate trade and commerce
of Germany on the other. This idea once taken up by the
German people would ruin any hope of a successful result.
To propose a trade war after peace is to confirm the
partisans of Germany in their contention that the policy
of England has always been dictated by her commercial
interests. Thus the real motive with which we entered the
war will be misunderstood or distorted, and the vision of
a League of Peace will be wrecked. The military dominion
and the racial pride of Germany will be confirmed, and the
better elements will be discouraged and powerless. It
is no defence to say that the boycott is only temporary.
Even granting that this were true, it would not meet the
difficulty that we are making it certain that Germany will
have nothing to do with a League of Peace which is to ruin,
and intended to ruin, her trade. No better method could
be devised for perpetuating militarism. Germany, ex-
cluded from a League with which she cannot be expected
to sympathise, will certainly as soon as she is able renew
her armaments, rebuild her ships, and prepare for the next
war.

Whether the theory of a League of Nations can be brought
into practical operation or not, there is no doubt that in

THE BRITISH EMPIRE 271

the British Empire we have a form of political relationship
which has proved to be a decided success. It may be said
to be the only thoroughly successful experiment in inter-
national government that the world has ever seen. The
|j Roman Empire was a form of polity in which the peoples
| subject to it were indeed allowed considerable freedom of
local government, but they were not permitted to have any
share in the larger concerns of the State ; and while they
were as a rule contented and successful in their daily life,
the bond which connected them with the central govern-
ment was mainly in the form of taxation for the empire,
which dictated a policy over which they had no control.
The foreign cities under the sway of Rome became municipal
towns of the empire and were governed by a Roman magis-
trate, though a certain amount of local self-government
was allowed. The central figure in the system of govern-
ment was the emperor, who had absolute control of all
the fighting forces, and possessed the power of declaring
peace and war. Although theoretically he could be de-
posed by the people acting through the Senate, as a matter
of fact he could only be deposed by the army. Being
invested with the " powers of the tribunes," he could veto
any measure he chose, and in this way he was practically
autocratic. Naturally therefore his wishes were found out
beforehand, and a subservient Senate acted accordingly.
The emperor also was invariably appointed Pontifex
Maximus, and thus he became the guardian of the religious
interests of the people. Nominally all the citizens shared
in the government of the State, but as a matter of fact the
power of the emperor was absolute and unrestricted. The
people neither elected nor legislated, and even the Senate,
which was nominally credited with making laws, was only
allowed to pass those resolutions which were agreeable to
the Emperor. The Romans did not attempt to govern the

272 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

subject provinces on any rigid and uniform plan, but were
satisfied if the Roman rule was duly recognised, and the
taxes paid. When a province was conquered, its territory
became technically the property of Rome, and part of it
was so kept, including the mines of gold, silver, lead, iron
and salt, or quarries of marble, granite and gravel. Some
portion of it might be assigned to veteran soldiers as colon-
ists. These retained their rights as citizens, and as the
native population came in from the surrounding district
they also easily acquired similar privileges. The remainder
of the territory was usually given back to the original
inhabitants, on condition that they paid rent for it in money
or in kind. The land tax, together with the personal tax,
was the chief source of the revenues of Rome, though a
great part of it was spent in the administration of the
provinces.

In marked contrast to this government from above
stands the British Empire, so far at least as the self-govern-
ing colonies are concerned. The form of government is
founded on principles which appeal to the highest political
ideals. No doubt there is still a nominal degree of central-
isation, but the tendency is to recognise the status of the
Dominions as equal nations within the Empire. As General
Smuts says : " To a very large extent we are a group of
nations spread over the whole world, speaking different
languages, belonging to different races, with entirely
different economic circumstances, and I think that to run
even the common concerns of that group of nations by means
of a central Parliament and a central Executive would be
absolutely to court disaster." On this last point there may
be a difference of opinion, but there can be none in regard
to the remarkable success achieved by the Empire in com-
bining the freedom of the separate organs with the unity
of the whole. Here then we have a type of Confederation,

THE BRITISH EMPIRE 273

based upon common sentiment and common ideals, which
has proved its sanity by its successful operation. There
is within the Empire the greatest possible freedom of
initiative, and in proportion as this freedom has been
developed the loyalty to Great Britain has increased and-
intensified, as the action of Canada, Australia and New
Zealand in the present war has amply demonstrated.
The self-governing colonies lead their own individual life,
absolutely undisturbed by the dictation of the mother
country, and even make their own fiscal arrangements
in a way that they believe to be for their own good. This
k'roup of groups has thus shown by a brilliant example what
may be effected when the outlook is that of free men,
attached by the bond of common descent and common or
at least similar institutions, and all performing their part
in furthering the success of the whole. We have in this
modern State an almost perfect example of that unity in
diversity which we have already seen to be necessary in a
single nation. The common will is the hidden spring of
this community of nations, a will which is manifested in
each and yet is necessary to the harmony of the whole.
Here we have the real general will present in its degree in
every one of the co-operating groups. Here sovereignty
in the true sense is realised ; for sovereignty, as we have
seen, is not limited to any person or body of persons, but
consists in the practical operation of the system of institu-
tions as a whole. The great experiment of the British
Empire also shows that the State may take any form which
is consistent with its central principle of democratic self-
government. The important thing is that there should exist
a genuine intention to make the institutions express the
best will of the people. For it is through a complex system
of institutions that freedom finds expression. These may
be more or less independent, and the example of the
w.s. s

274 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Judiciary shows that for certain functions a very high
degree of independence is desirable. But while making
all due allowance for the independence of all the organisms
by which the general will is realised, we must still maintain
that that will demands some form of central government as
the outward expression of the mind and will of the people.
It is no light task which Imperial England is called upon
to face — nothing less than that of developing the industrial,
moral and political ideals of some four or five million souls
of every race and religion, and at every stage of civilisation .
It may be laid down as a fundamental principle that the
only justification for the rule of a superior over an inferior
people is that the former should regard as its special task
the elevation of the latter to its own level. Unless the
civilised people acts from this principle, its rule can only
be regarded as an unjustifiable tyranny. As Lord Morley
has said : "A superior race is bound to observe the highest
current morality of the time in its dealings with the subject
races." It must be admitted that the first contact of the
civilised trader with the savage races has often led to the
most deplorable results ; the natives have been robbed,
corrupted by opium, murdered in cold blood, and sold as
slaves. It is this fact, combined with the fanaticism and
barbarism of the native race, which has usually forced the
civilised power to assume the guardianship of the lower
race. In the case of a people who have themselves made
some advance in civilisation, but have not been able to
maintain a civilised government when they came in con-
tact with the modern world, there arises a problem essenti-
ally of the same character. The most obvious instance
is that of India. In the middle of the eighteenth century
India was fast approaching a state of anarchy, and it be-
came evident that if the people were to be protected from
their oppressors, native and foreign, the control of the

THE BRITISH EMPIRE 275

country must be undertaken by a strong and sympathetic
government. It was with great reluctance that English
statesmen came to this conclusion, a conclusion which could
not be avoided in the interests of humanity and justice.
The rule of a foreign and subject people is a difficult and
delicate task. The better elements in the older civilisation
must be recognised and fostered. To destroy a people's
faith in their traditional customs and laws can only lead to
the overthrow of all moral rules and the introduction of
moral anarchy. A whole foreign civilisation cannot be
externally imposed upon a people. The foreign govern-
ment must act so as to create a feeling of loyalty to itself
in the minds of the subjects, while these must learn to
look to it for security of person and property, for freedom
of thought and speech, and for the defence of their special
form of worship. There is no justification for the rule of
a foreign government which does not seek to promote
civilisation, liberty and progress in the subject people, and
does not take the necessary steps to fit them for self-
government.

The first task to which Britain set herself in India was to
maintain peace, order and justice, so that the farmer might
reap what he had sown, and the trader follow his occupation
under proper restraints. Then it was seen that the Indian
people must be taught the learning and methods of the
West. Material civilisation has been placed upon a solid
footing, and schools and colleges established everywhere.
It is indeed open to question whether the industrial develop-
ment of India might not have been more wisely managed,
but at least there has been no lack of goodwill on the part
of the government. The growing demand for a greater
amount of self-government must be regarded as a healthy
sign, especially when it is combined with a recognition of
the advantages of British rule, Whether the people are

276 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

ready for self-government or not is a difficult question ;
but it may be pointed out that the dominance of the real
will of a people is not ensured simply by introducing the
machinery of democracy. It is impossible to have a true
representative system where the great bulk of the people
are totally illiterate. The question is one to be settled by
careful and experimental statesmanship. In India the
religious antagonism of Mohammedan and Hindu, the
segregation of women in the harem, and the barriers of
caste, prevent that frank communication with one another, ;
and that strong sense of national unity, which are essential
in a self-governing people. That these barriers are gradu-
ally breaking down there are not wanting significant signs,
but until there is clear evidence that at least a fair measure
of progress has been made in this direction, it would be
hazardous to commit their fate to themselves. We must
remember that the government has the responsibility of
guiding a dependency, not merely in its own interest, but
in the interest of mankind, and that its rule can be just
only by its success in gradually raising the people to the
level at which they can govern themselves.

There is a passage in Green's Principles of Political
Obligation which, though not written with direct reference
to the rule of an inferior people, may be interpreted as the
view he would in all probability have taken had he dealt
with the question. " That active interest in the service
of the State," says Green, "which makes patriotism in the
best sense, can hardly arise while the individual's relation
to the State is that of a passive recipient of protection in
the exercise of his rights of person and property. While
this is the case, he will give the State no thanks for the pro-
tection, which he will come to take as a matter of course,
and will only be conscious of it when it descends upon
him with some unusual demand for service or payment,

LAWS OF WAR 27?

and then he will be conscious of it in the way of resentment.
If he is to have a higher feeling of political duty, he must
take part in the work of the State. He must have a share,
direct or indirect, by himself acting as a member, or by
voting for the members of supreme or provincial assemblies
in making and maintaining the laws which he obeys." *

So long as the conditions which give rise to wars continue
to exist, regulations intended to lessen its barbarity are of
great importance. In the ancient City-State war was in
many ways ruthless enough, but there were certain recog-
nised sanctities the violation of which was regarded as
impious.2 One of these was the necessity of attending to
a proper burial of those vanquished in battle, a striking
instance of which is shown in the trial and condemnation
to death of the admirals who after the victory of Arginusae
failed to rescue the seamen from the twenty-five ships sunk
in the fight, or to recover the bodies of the dead. Sacred
buildings were respected, and intense feeling was aroused
by the destruction of Greek temples by the Persians.
Heralds were inviolable, and the lives of women and children
were spared.

In Greek writers of the great age we find the expression
of a humane feeling which anticipates the sympathy and
compassion naturally associated with Christian civilisation.
" The Troades of Euripides," says Professor Gilbert Murray,
" is perhaps in European literature the first expression of a
spirit of pity for mankind exalted into a moving principle ;
a principle which has made the most precious and perhaps
the most destructive, elements of innumerable rebellions,
revolutions, and martyrdoms, and of at least two great
religions."

^ Principles of Political Obligation, s. 122, Works, ii. p. 436.
2 See an article by Mr. H. R. James in the Edin. Rev. for January,
1918.

278 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Plato hardly reached the level of " Euripides the human,"
but he like Aristotle denounces the enslavement of Hellenes
and the devastation of Hellenic territory, on the ground of
their common ties of blood and friendship. He has no
sympathy with the doctrine that war is not only inevitable
but a great school of the manly virtues. " War," he says,
" whether external or civil is not the best, and the need of
either is to be deprecated ; but peace with one another and
good will are the best ; nor is the victory of the State
over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a
necessity ; a man might as well say that a body is in the
best state when sick and purged with medicine, forgetting
that there is a state of the body which needs no purge.
And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether
he aims at the happiness of the individual or the State,
who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare, nor will
he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake
of war, and not war for the sake of peace." l

" War/' says Aristotle, " has its end in peace. The
object of military training should be not to enslave persons
who do not deserve slavery, but firstly, to secure ourselves
against becoming the slaves of others ; secondly, to seek
imperial power, not with a view to a universal despotic
authority, but for the benefit of the subjects whom we rule ;
and thirdly, to exercise despotic power over those who are
deserving to be slaves. That the legislator should rather
make it his object so to order his legislation upon military
and other matters as to promote leisure and peace is a
theory borne out by the facts of history." 2 It is not
worthy of a statesman to devise the means of rule and
mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or against
their own will.

There is also a striking passage in Polybius in regard

lLawst i. 628. 2 Politics, bk. iv. ch. xiv.

THE HAGUE CONVENTION 279

to the ruthless devastation of a neighbour's territory.
" 1 never," he says, " sympathise with those who indulge
in their anger against the men of their own blood to the
length of not only depriving them of their year's harvest
when at war with them, but even of cutting down trees and
destroying their buildings, and of leaving them no oppor-
tunity of repentance. Such proceedings seem to me rank
folly. For while they imagine they are dismaying the
enemy by the devastation of their territory, and the de-
privation of their future as well as of their present means
of getting the necessaries of life, they are all the while
exasperating the men, and converting an isolated ebullition
of anger into a lasting hatred."

The most important principle in the modern theory of
war is the distinction between combatants and non-com-
batants. Jurists regard such written laws as those passed
by the Hague Convention as binding, whereas military
authorities are disposed to attach chief importance to the
practice followed by armies in the field. The Prussian
General Staff speak of the agreements of the Hague Con-
vention as "in fundamental contradiction with the nature
and object of war," and even in regard to those " usages "
which they admit, they hold that they are subject to the
exigencies of " necessity." Their view is that of Clause-
witz, who says : " Laws are self-imposed restrictions,
almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed
' usages of war.' Now philanthropists ma}' easily imagine
that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming
an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is
the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible
this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated,
for in such dangerous things as war the errors which pro-
ceed from the spirit of benevolence are the worst. ... To
introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of

280 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

moderation would be an absurdity. . . . War is an act
of violence which in its application has no bounds." Or,
as the German War Book puts it, there are certain
severities which are " very frequently the only true
humanity." This is practically an abandonment of laws
of war altogether.

The Hague Conventions presuppose that belligerents
will observe the principles of the law of nations, as resulting
from the usages established among civilised peoples, the
laws of humanity, and the exigencies of the public con-
science. As to these unwritten rules, the English represen-
tative urged that regulations should be made as explicit
as possible, while the spokesman of Germany urged that
they should be made as indefinite as possible.

The combatant, according to the Hague Conventions,
is entitled to " quarter " if he throws down his arms, while
this privilege cannot be accorded to the non-combatant
if he acts as a combatant. The regular army and the
auxiliary forces are admittedly belligefents, and these
include Territorials, Militia, Reservists and a Civil Guard.
Even the Prussian War Book admits that " smaller and less
powerful States " are authorised to employ the whole
population in defence of their Fatherland, and the Hague
regulations provide that " the population of a territory
not yet occupied who on the approach of the enemy spon-
taneously take up arms in order to resist the invaders,
without having had time to organise themselves, shall be
'regarded as belligerents provided they carry their arms
openly and respect the laws and customs of war." This
regulation, however, is disputed in the Prussian War Book,
which insists that there must be a regular organisation by
the people, however sudden the invasion.

The Hague Regulations for Land Warfare declare that
the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the

THE HAGUE CONVENTION 281

enemy is not unlimited. The object of war is to overcome
the enemy, but there are certain rules which have been
dictated by the necessity of maintaining discipline, by
humanity, and by regard for the public opinion of the civil-
ised world. When an army invades an enemy's territory
it is customary for the commander to issue a proclamation,
announcing that so long as private citizens remain neutral,
and make no hostile attempt against the troops, they will
be spared as far as possible the horrors of war, and will
not be molested in their person or property. It is the
recognised duty of the commander of hostile forces to pro-
tect the civilian population, and to purchase the provisions
required for his troops.

Certain rules are laid down in the Hague Regulations for
the conduct of sieges. Bombardment of any kind, includ-
ing dropping of shells from balloons and airships, is for-
bidden if the town, village or dwelling or building is un-
defended, but no Great European Power except Great
Britain has ratified the Declaration. Care is to be taken
not to injure the buildings devoted to religion, art, science,
and charity, historic monuments, and hospitals, provided
they are not used for military purposes. The pillage of a
town or place even when taken by assault is prohibited.

The Proclamation issued by General von Kummer at
Metz on October 3Oth, 1870, gives an example of the
powers of an occupant of foreign territory :

" If I encounter disobedience or resistance, I shall act
with all severity and according to the laws of war. Who-
ever shall place in danger the German troops, or shall
cause prejudice by perfidy, will be brought before a council
of war ; whoever shall act as a spy to the French troops
or shall lodge or give them assistance ; whoever shows
the road to French troops voluntarily ; whoever shall
kill or wound the German troops or the persons belonging

282 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

to their suite ; whoever shall destroy the canals, railways
or telegraph wires ; whoever shall render the roads im-
practicable ; whoever shall burn provisions or munitions
of war ; and lastly, whoever shall take up arms against
the German troops, will be punished with death. It is
also declared that (i) all houses from which or from out of
which any one commits acts of hostilities towards the
German troops will be used as barracks ; (2) not more
than ten persons shall be allowed to assemble in the streets
or public houses ; (3) the inhabitants must deliver up
all arms by 4 o'clock on Monday, October 31, at the Palais,
rue de la Princesse ; (4) all windows are to be lighted up
during the night in case of alarm."

Martial law was described by the Duke of Wellington
as " neither more nor less than the will of the General who
commands an army." It implies the suspension of ordin-
ary law and the substitution of military rule and force.
The services of the inhabitants of occupied territory may
be requisitioned, if they do not involve their taking part in
military occupations against their own country. Germany,
Austria, Japan and Russia have all compelled men under
threat of death to give information of military value ;
but it is held by Dr. Higgins that this practice is " contrary
to the whole spirit of the modern development of the laws
of war," and "should disappear from all the military
manuals of civilised States."

There are three articles in the Hague Regulations which
either prohibit pillage or forbid the confiscation of private
property. But guns, ammunition, and all kinds of war
material are always taken from the inhabitants, and heavy
penalties are inflicted for the concealment of arms. Horses,
motor-cars, carriages, and pleasure steamers, and so forth,
may be seized, and a receipt given as a proof of the claim
to compensation. Public buildings devoted to religion,

THE HAGUE CONVENTION 283

education, art, science and the like, are to be treated as
private property. Royal palaces are therefore to be exempt
from confiscation or injury, as well as picture galleries,
public libraries, museums and their contents.

By the Geneva Convention of 1906 for the first time
International recognition was given to the work of the Red
Cross Societies, provided they are under due control.
" But," says Dr. Higgins, " both in naval and land warfare
the private citizen is still subject to great dangers and
losses. Forced labour may be requisitioned, private
property of every description may be commandeered for
the use of the invading army, foodstuffs of all sorts com-
pulsorily purchased, and several of the most powerful
of the military States still insist on retaining the right —
one of the most objectionable of the usages of war — of
forcing non-combatant individuals to act as guides to the
army of invasion."

From the nature of the case sea-warfare differs from land
warfare. In the Hague Conventions immunities are
accorded to hospital ships, corresponding to those granted
to medical corps on land. There is, however, one unfortun-
ate provision, which Dr. Baty properly describes as a
"shocking article."1 A neutral not under belligerent
control may be compelled to give back to the enemy any
" wounded sick or shipwrecked " who may be on board.
Great Britain, indeed, understands this article as applying
solely to rescue " during or after a naval engagement " ;
but this leaves it doubtful what is to be done if a ship
is wrecked long after a naval engagement. Cases have
occurred when the provisions of this article were disregarded.
Lord John Russell refused to give up to the Federals the
sailors rescued when the Alabama was sunk, and similarly
the British, French and Italian commanders retained the

1 War ; its Conduct and Legal Results, p. 213.

284 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

Russian soldiers they had rescued when the Russian
squadron was destroyed.

There is an article in the Hague Convention prohibiting
the bombardment of towns and buildings which are not
" defended." Apparently the presence of a warship does
not bring a town under the head of a " defended " place,
because there is a special provision giving permission to
fire on a ship of war in a harbour. On the other hand, a
town defended by contact-mines seems to come under
the head of a " defended " place. The use of automatic
anchored mines which do not become harmless on breaking
loose is prohibited. It was proposed to prohibit mine-
fields altogether, except at the coast, but the view of
Germany prevailed, and mines may be laid on the high
seas ; nor can neutrals complain of their existence, though
in the present war they might properly form a League to
clear the seas of all mines, British or German.

The institution of what are called " military areas "
is quite recent. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5
war correspondents who chartered a vessel fitted with wire-
less telegraphy were warned that if they ventured within
the area of Russian operations, they would be treated as
spies. The Institute of International Law in 1906 declared
that the transmission of wireless messages within the sphere
of action of military operations was a transgression of the
rights of neutrals, and the British Admiralty has spoken
of the North Sea as " a military area " ; which probably
means only that the presence of neutrals in this area will
be regarded as highly suspicious, and will render them
more than usually liable to charges of contraband trading
or of un-neutral service.

Blockade is an extension of siege, and is based on the
principle that a neutral cannot be allowed to nullify the
effects of siege by throwing in provisions or other commodi-

PURPOSE OF THE STATE 285

ties to a beleaguered place. The object is to cut off export
trade and the import of raw materials. The usual penalty
for such acts is confiscation of ship and cargo. No permis-
sion can be given to vessels of a particular nation, or carry-
ing a particular kind of cargo, since this would naturally
give rise to the idea that the blockade was suspended.

The State, as we have endeavoured to show, exists for
the purpose of providing the external conditions under which
all the citizens may have an opportunity of developing the
best that is in them, and the success with which this aim is
achieved is a test of the perfection of a community. It
is the expression of the common will, which must not be
identified with the will of the majority, or even with the
will of all ; nor is it maintained simply by the regulations
of government, but by all the organisations through which
the will of society is expressed. This destroys the force
of the contention that other forms of organisation are
independent and co-ordinate in authority. The ultimate
authority is the State, which adjusts the relations of the sub-
ordinate groups, and secures that the rights of all members
of the community shall be provided for. There is nothing
in this conception to prevent the community from aiming
at the good of humanity. If this is not admitted, we have
a theory of the State such as has unfortunately dictated
the policy of the dominant power in Germany. That
policy is based upon the false principle that militarism
is essential to the spread of German civilisation, and
German civilisation to the civilisation of the world. The
influence of this idea is shown not merely in the economic
principles of Germany, but even in the efforts of the govern-
ing powers to regulate the whole system of education in the
selfish interest of one nation, and to despise all that we
mean by a liberal education. The object of education on

286 THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR

this view is to generate intensely loyal citizens whose ideas
are in line with those of the ruling powers. " Wir sollen,"
said the Kaiser on one occasion, " junge nationale
Deutsche erziehen und nicht junge Griechen und Roemer "
— as if the object of classical education was to convert
the modern youth into a Greek or Roman, not to familiarise
him with the fountain-heads of modern civilisation. To
this object the whole of the elementary education of Ger-
many is subordinated. Fortunately this very inadequate
conception of education is not universally held, and indeed
the higher education of Germany, much to the disgust of
the Pan-Germanists, is still largely influenced by the truer
ideas of an earlier time. This gives us some ground for
hope that, Germany having been defeated in this war, the
country will awaken to the idea that a policy of force and
intrigue is sure to defeat itself in the long run. We cannot
disguise from ourselves, however, that a very great change
of mind must take place before there is much hope that a
League of Nations which includes the Central Powers can
be formed. As we have argued, this comprehensive scheme
is essential to the success of the League. If the Central
Powers are excluded, and forced back upon themselves, we
must look for a continuance of the present discredited idea
of a Balance of Power in a new form. There will be a high
probability of renewed war, intensified by the building of
armaments more destructive than ever, the maintenance
of powerful armies and fleets, and a diversion of the energies
of the nations to the task of preserving their independence.
One important task of a League of Nations would be to
provide for the fair treatment and the gradual development
of backward communities. No object can be more worthy
of consideration by statesmen, and there seems no good
reason why those communities should not be brought under
the supervision of the League. If some such arrangement

PURPOSE OF THE STATE 287

is not made, we shall have a continuance of the system of
exploitation with its enormous evils, and the danger that
an ambitious and unscrupulous power should employ
natives in its battles. This is one of the dangers that
perpetually confront us in South Africa. Even from the
point of view of their own interest it therefore seems
necessary to provide against such a contingency by an
agreement of civilised nations. From every point of
view it is the duty of Christian men to further by all means
in their power a conception of the duty of civilised nations
to unite for the promotion of the good of humanity, aban-
doning once for all the notion that only their own selfish
interest is the object of statesmanship.

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INDEX.

Alcidimas, 5.

Aristotle, Politics, 3, 169.

Criticism of Plato's Commun-
ism, 32, 40-42.

Natural conditions of the State,

33-
Matter and form of the State,

34-35-
Nature, Necessity and

Human Agency, 35.
Relations of the Family and

the State, 35-36.
Origin of the State, 37.
Defence of slavery, 28-39.
Property and wealth, 39-40.
Conception of Democracy, 43-

45-

Theory of Education, 45.
Critical estimate of, 46-51.
Distinction of Society and

the State, 51-52.
Asquith, The Balance of Power,

266.

Balance of Power, 266-268, 270.
Baty, Maritime War, 283.
Bebel, Capitalism, 241.
Bentham, Political theory of,

147, 193, 212.
Bernard, St., Political theory

of, 70.
Bernhardi, Relation of, to

Treitschke, 171.

Bodin, Political theory of, 88-89.
Bosanquet, Morality of the

State, 205, 208, 217, 263.

Boycott of Germany unwise, 270.

Bradley, A. C., The League of
Nations, 263-264.

Bradley, F. H., The Moral
Organism, 245.

Brailsford, The burden of arma-
ments, 267.

British Empire, Character of
the, 270-276.

Biichner, Political theory of,
170.

Christianity, Influence of, 188.

Cicero. Political theory of, 59-
61, 188.

City-State, i, 184-188.

Clausewitz, Theory of War,

173. 279-

Cole, G. D. H., Political theory
of, 208-212.

Cynics, The Philosophy of, 6.

Cyrenaics, The Philosophy of, 7.

Dante, the De Monarchia, 73-76,
189.

Dawson, An Inter- State Parlia-
ment, 264.

Education :

Plato's theory of, 23.
Aristotle's theory of, 45.
German conception of, 285-
286.

Erasmus, Condemnation of War,

251-
Fathers, The Christian, Political

theory of, 63-64.
Relation to war, 250-251, 254.

293

294

INDEX

Feudalism, 66-68, 189.

Fichte, Addresses to the German
People, 169.

Germany, Development of poli-
tical unity of, 168.

Gorgias, 4.

Greece, Physical features of, 33.

Green, T. H., Citizenship, 224.
Political obligation, 276.

Grey, Viscount, on League of
Nations, 268-269.

Grotius, Theory of International
Law, 89-90, 190, 251, 254.

Haeckel, Materialism of, 170-
171.

Haldane, Lord, Higher Nation-
ality, 228.

Hegel, Political philosophy of,

127-146, 165-168.
Relation to Rousseau, 128.
Kant, 128, 192.
Clausewitz, 167.
Treitschke, 172.

Heraclitus, 3.

Higgins, The Laws of War, 282-
283.

Hobbes, Political theory of,

91-92, 123, 191.
Condemnation of war, 250.
Critical estimate of, 123.

Huss, Political theory of, 80,
190.

James, H.- R., War in classical
times, 277 n.

Jurists, Roman, the " law of
nature," 188.

Justinian's Institutes, 63.

Kant, Principles of Juris-
prudence, 112-117.
Critical estimate of^ 117-127,

192, 195, 215.
Hegel's relation to. 127.
Theory of Punishment of,

242-243.
International Relations, 252-

253.
Kautsky, Capitalism, 241.

Laski, Problem of Sovereignty,

200-201.

Law, Resistance to, 232-233.
League of Nations, 253-270.
Locke, Political theory of, 102-

103, 191-192.
Luther, Influence on political

theory, 88, 190.
Machiavelli, Political theory of,

81-86.
Critical estimate of, 86-87,

247-248.

Maine, Sir Henry, on Inter-
national Law, 254.
Marsiglio, Defensor Pads, 76-79,

189.
Middle Ages, Theory of Society,

65-70.

Independent corporations, 69.
Church versus Empire, 68,

81.
Mill, James, Political theory of,

150.

Mill, John Stuart, Political
theory of, 151-159, 193,
212, 213.

Moleschott, Materialism of, 170.
Morley, Lord, Duty of an Empire,

274.
Murray, Gilbert, on Euripides,

277.

Macdonnell, Sir John, Pro-
posals for League of Nations,
264-266.
Nation- State, Complexity of,

193-194.
not based upon Contract,

194-197.
Sovereignty of, 179, 191, 197-

208.

Relation to the Family, 198.
the Trade Union, 198.
the Church, 199-205.
the community, 202-212.
Individualistic theory of, 212-

213.
Morality in, 214-216.

INDEX

295

Penn, Proposal for International

Tribunal, 252.

Pericles, Funeral Oration, 1-2.
Philips, Alison, on International

League, 259.
Plato, Problem of, 2-3.
The Apology, 8-9.
The Crito, 9-10.
The Protagoras, 10-12.
The Meno, 12-13.
The Euthydemus, 13-14.
The Gorgias, 14-16.
Estimate of Athens, 16.
Problem of the Republic, 16-

19-
" Parts " of the soul and

classes of society, 19-21.
Virtues of citizens, 21-23.
Education, 23-24.
Position of women, 24-25.
Communism; 25-26, 40-42.
Philosopher- Kings, 26-27.
Why philosophy is despised,

27-28.
Critical estimate of, 28-32,

46-52, 184-185.
Political theory, Development of,

57-64, 65 ff., 186-193.
Pollock, Sir F., Relation of the
State to subordinate organ-
isations, 204.
Hague Convention, 256.
League to enforce Peace, 258.
Polybius, Analysis of Roman

Republic, 57-59.
Prodicus, 5.
Protagoras, 4.
Punishment, Kant's theory of,

242-243.
Durckheim's theory of, 243-

246.
Rights, System of, 222 ff .

Right to life, 211-212, 230-

231-

to liberty, 231-232.
to equality, 214-215, 233-
234

Right to property, 234-235.

of contract, 232, 235.

to punish, 242-246.
Roman Republic, Character of,

57-61, 185.

Empire, character of, 61-62,
271-272.

and the State, 186.
Rousseau, Contrat Social, 104-

108, 192.
Critical estimate of, 109-

112.
Russell, Bertrand, Loyalty, 259-

261.

Scholasticism, Character of, 71.
Smuts, General, The British

Empire, 272.
Social Contract theory, Defects

of, 194-196.
Socialism, Earlier form of, 237-

238.
» Fabian, 235.

Guild, 241-242.
Socrates, Political theory of,

5-6.
Sophists, Political theory of,

4-5, 186.
Spencer, Herbert, Political

theory of, 145-148, 159.
Critical estimate of, 160-164,

193-
Spinoza, Political theory of,

92-99.

Critical estimate of, 99-102.
Stoics, The Philosophy of, 53-

55

Critical estimate of, 55-57.
Themistocles, Statesmanship of.

34-
Thomas Aquinas, Political theory

of, 63-64, 71-72.
Treitschke, Political theory of,

171-178, 247.

Critical estimate of, 178-183.
Ulpian, Distinction of jus

naturae from jus gentium,

62-63.

296

INDEX

Wallas, Graham, "Human Nature j War, Plato's view of, 278.

in Politics," 224-229.
War, Causes of, 247-250.
History of, 250-251.
Christian Fathers' view of , 25 1 .
Erasmus' view of, 251.
Green's view of, 262-263.

Aristotle's view of, 278.
Polybius' view of, 278.
Regulations for conduct of,

257-261, 279-285.
Wilson, President, Organisation

of Peace, 266-267.

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