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Full text of "Statement of information : hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, second session, pursuant to H. Res. 803, a resolution authorizing and directing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. May-June 1974"

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STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 803 

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE 

ON THE JUDICIARY TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER SUFFICIENT 

GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO 

EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO IMPEACH 

RICHARD M. NIXON 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



Book III— Part 2 

EVENTS FOLLOWING 



THE WATERGATE BREAK-IN 

June 20, 1972— March 22, 19Y3 



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MAY-JUNE 1974 



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U.S. government PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1974 



For sale by the Superintc ident of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OlTice 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $11.50 per set 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 



PETER W. RODINO, JB. 



HAROLD D. DONOHUE, Massachusetts 
JACK BROOKS, Texas 
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin 
DON EDWARDS, California 
WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, Missouri 
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan 
JOSHUA EILBERG, Pennsylvania 
JEROME R. WALDIE, California 
WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama 
JAMES R. MANN, South Carolina 
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland 
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio 
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California 
ROBERT F. DRINAN, Massachusetts 
CHARLES B. RANGEL, New Yorli 
BARBARA JORDAN, Texas 
RAY THORNTON, Arkansas 
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN. New York 
WAYNE OWENS, Utah 
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, Iowa 



New Jersey, Chairman 

EDWARD HUTCHINSON, Michigan 
ROBERT McCLORY, Illinois 
HENRY P. SMITH III, New York 
CHARLES W. SANDMAN, Jr., New Jersey 
TOM RAILSBACK, Illinois 
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, California 
DAVID W. DENNIS, Indiana 
HAMILTON FISH, JR., New York 
WILEY MAYNE, Iowa 
LAWRENCE J. HOGAN. Maryland 
M. CALDWELL BUTLER, Virginia 
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine 
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Wisconsin 
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California 
JOSEPH J. MARAZITI, New Jersey 
DELBERT L. LATTA, Ohio 



John Doar, Special Counsel 
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Special Counsel to the Minority 
Joseph A. Woods, Jr.. Senior Aseociate Special Counsel 

Richard Gates, Senior Associate Special Counsel 

Bernard W. Nussbaim, Senior Associate Special Counsel 

ROBERT D. Sack, Senior Associate Special Counsel 

Robert A. Shelton, Associate Special Counsel 

Samdel Garrison III, Deputy Minority Counsel 



Fred H. Altshdler, Counsel 
THO.MAS Bell, Counsel 
W. Paul Bishop, Counsel 
Robert L. Brown, Counsel 
Michael M. Conway, Counsel 
RuFus Cormier, Special Assistant 
E. Lee Dale, Counsel 
John B. Davidson, Counsel 
Evan A. Davis. Counsel 
Constantine J. Gekas, Counsel 
Richard H. Gill. Counsel 
Dagmar Hamilton. Counsel 
David Hanes, Special Assistant 
John E. Kennahan, Counsel 
Terry R. Kirkpatrick, Counsel 
John R. Labovitz, Counsel 
Lal'rance Lccchino, Counsel 
R. L. S.mith McKeithen, Counsel 



Alan Maker, Counsel 
Robert P. Murphy, Counsel 
James B. F. Oliphant, Counsel 
Richard H. Porter, Counsel 
George Raybors. Counsel 
James Reim, Counsel 
Hillary D. Rodham. Counsel 
Stephen A. Sharp. Counsel 
JARED Sta.mell, Counsel 
RoscOE B. Starek III, Counsel 
Gary W. Sotton, Counsel 
Edward S. Szukelewicz, Counsel 
Robert J. Trainor, Counsel 
J. Stephen Walker, Counsel 
Ben a. Wallis, Jr., Counsel 
William Weld, Counsel 
William A. White, Counsel 



(H) 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Statement of Information - Part 2 689 

Statement of Information and 

Supporting Evidentiary Material - Part 2 721 



NOTE: Book III is published in two parts. Part 1 contains the entire 
statement of information and supporting evidentiary rmterial for 
paragraphs 1-47. Part 2 contains copies of paragraphs 48-75, and 
the supporting evidentiary material for those paragraphs. 



(Ill) 



STATEMENT OF INFORMATION 



EVENTS FOLLOWING 

THE WATERGATE BREAK- IN 

Jime 20, 1972 - March 22, 1973 

Part 2 



(689) 



48. On February 28, 1973 Senate hearings commenced on the nomination 
of L. Patrick Gray to be Director of the FBI. Gray testified that he had 
shown interview reports and other data from FBI Watergate files to John 
Dean who had told him that the President specifically charged him with 
looking into any involvement on the part of White House staff members. 
Gray offered to open those files to any Senator on either the Senate 
Select Committee or Senate Judiciary Committee who wanted to see them. 



Page 

48.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, SJC, Gray 

Nomination Hearings, February 28, 1973, 

1, 42-43, 45-46 724 



(691) 



49. On March 1, 1973 the President met three times with John 
Dean in the Oval Office — from 9:18 to 9:46 a.m., from 10:36 to 10:44 
a.m. and from 1:06 to 1:14 p.m. The President decided that the White 
House would explain publicly that Dean sat in on FBI interviews because 
he was conducting an investigation for the President. 



Page 

49.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 1, 1973 

(received from White House) 730 

49.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 1, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

1794-95 737 

49.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 993-94 740 



(692) 



50. On March 2, 1973 President Nixon explained at a press confer- 
ence that John Dean had access to FBI interviews in July and August 
1972 because he had conducted an investigation at the direction of the 
President. The President stated that Dean's investigation showed that 
no one on the White House staff in July and August at the time Dean 
conducted his investigation had knowledge of or was involved in the 
Watergate matter. The President promised to cooperate with the 
Senate Select Committee if it conducted its investigation in an 
even-handed way. The President stated that because of executive 
privilege, no President could ever agree to allow the Counsel to the 
President to testify before a congressional committee. The President 
said that if the Congress requested information from a member of the 
White House staff, arrangements would be made to provide that 
information. 



Page 

50.1 President Nixon news conference, March 2, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 214, 219-20 744 



(693) 



51. As Gray's confirmation hearings continued during the first 
week in March 1973, public reports circulated that John Dean would be 
called to testify. Dean has testified that on March 4 or 5, 1973 
he reported to Ehrlichman that it would be difficult to win a court 
test of executive privilege involving Dean as Counsel to the President 
because Dean had met with the President so infrequently. 



Page 

51.1 President Nixon news conference, March 2, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 214, 219-20 748 

51.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 994 751 



(694) 



52. On March 6, 1973 the President met with John Dean in the 
Oval Office between 11:49 a.m. and 12:00 noon. According to information 
supplied to the Senate Select Committee by White House Special Counsel 
Buzhardt, the President decided that executive privilege guidelines 
would cover former as well as present White House personnel. Dean has 
testified that the President told him to report directly to the President 
and not to involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman with Watergate-related matters. 
On March 7, 1973 the President met with Dean in the Oval Office from 
8:53 to 9:16 a.m. and, according to information supplied by Buzhardt, 
there was a discussion of executive privilege guidelines; Dean told the 
President that the White House was clear; and the President inquired as 
to how Gray was doing. Dean has testified that the President instructed 
him to tell Attorney General Kleindienst to cut off Gray from turning 
over any further Watergate reports to the Senate Judiciary Committee . 



Page 

52.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 6-7, 1973 (received from 

White House) 754 

52.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 6-7, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 761 

52.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 994-95 764 



(695) 



53. On or about March 7, 1973 L. Patrick Gray and John Ehrlichman 
had a telephone conversation. Gray told Ehrlichman that he was being 
pushed awfully hard in certain areas and was not giving an inch, and 
that Ehrlichman knew those areas. Gray also told Ehrlichman to tell 
Dean to be very careful about what he said and to be absolutely certain 
that he knew in his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the 
FBI, and not to make any distinction between the recipients of the 
materials. 



Page 

53.1 Transcript of tape recorded telephone conver- 
sation between John Ehrlichman and L. Patrick 
Gray, March 7 or 8, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 102, 

7 SSC 2950-51 768 

53.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2785-86 770 

53.3 L. Patrick Cray testimony, 9 SSC 3469-70, 3537-39 772 



See Book II, Paragraph 37 and Book II, Paragraph 
45 for evidence regarding Dean's transmittal of 
material from Hunt's safe to FBI agents and Acting 
FBI Director Gray. 



(696) 



54. After the call from Gray, Ehrlichman called Dean. Ehrllchman 
told Dean that Gray wanted to be sure that Dean would stay very firm 
and steady on his story that Dean had delivered every document to the 
FBI and that Dean not start making nice distinctions between agents and 
directors. Ehrlichman also told Dean that he thought they ought to let 
Gray hang there and "twist slowly, slowly in the wind." Dean agreed and 
said, "I was in with the boss this morning and that is exactly where he 
was coming out." 



Page 



54.1 Transcript of tape recorded telephone conver- 
sation between John Ehrlichman and John Dean, 
March 7 or 8, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 102, 7 SSC 

2950-51 778 

54.2 John Ehrlichman testimony,- 7 SSC 2786-88 780 



(697) 



55. On March 8, 1973 Dean met with the President in the Oval 
Office from 9:51 to 9:54 a.m. Dean has testified that the President 
asked if something had been done to stop Gray from turning over FBI 
materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Dean replied that he 
believed the matter had been taken care of by Attorney General Klein- 
dienst. On March 10 the President and Dean spoke by telephone from 
9:20 to 9:44 a.m. Dean has testified that the President called to 
tell him that the executive privilege statement should be got out 
immediately, and that this should be done before Dean was called before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings 
so that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege 
was in response to the action by the Senate committee. 



Page 



55.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 8 and 10, 

1973 (received from White House) 784 

55.2 John Dean testimony, 3SSC995 791 

55.3 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 8, 1973 (received 
from SSC) and accompanying Fred Thompson affidavit , 

4 SSC 1494-95 792 



(698) 



56. On March 12, 1973 the President issued a statement on exec- 
utive privilege. The statement set forth in part: 

A member or former member of the President's personal 
staff normally shall follow the well-established pre- 
cedent and decline a request for a formal appearance 
before a committee of the Congress, At the same time, 
it will continue to be my policy to provide all nec- 
essary and relevant information through informal 
contacts between my present staff and committees of 
the Congress in ways which preserve intact the Con- 
stitutional separation of the branches. 



Page 



56.1 President Nixon statement, March 12, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 253-54 796 



(699) 



57. On March 13, 1973 the Senate Judiciary Committee voted in 
executive session to ask John Dean to testify in the Gray confirmation 
hearings concerning his contacts with the FBI during the investigation 
of the Watergate break-In. 



Page 

57.1 Washington Post , March 14, 1973, Al , A12 800 

57.2 John Dean testimony , 3 SSC 995 802 



(700) 



58. On March 13, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 

12:42 to 2:00 p.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects 

discussed in the course of the March' 13, 1973 meeting: 

TRANSCRIPT PAGE 

Advisability of public disclosure 16-19, 65-69 

Possible public testimony of Sloan, Kalrabach, Stans 

and Mitchell 46-49 

The pre-June 1972 role of Gordon Strachan in 

Watergate and Strachan 's statements to investigators 58-59 

The pre-June role of Jeb Magruder in Watergate. . . . 59-60 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman and Gordon Liddy's 

intelligence program at CRP 61-63 



Page 



58.1 Tape recording of meeting between the 

President and John Dean, March 13, 1973, 

12:42-2:00 p.m., and House Judiciary 

Committee transcript thereof 804 



(701) 

35-905 (Pt, 2) O - 74 - 2 



59. On March 14, 1973 Dean wrote to Senator James 0. Eastland, 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and, citing the doctrine 
of executive privilege, formally refused to testify in the Senate 
confirmation hearing on the nomination of Gray to be Director of the 
FBI. On the same day the President met with Dean and White House 
Special Counsel Richard Moore in his Executive Office Building Office 
from 9:43 to 10:50 a.m. and from 12:47 to 1:30 p.m. They discussed 
a press conference scheduled for the next day and making Dean a test 
case in the courts on executive privilege. 



Page 

59.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 14, 1973 

(received from White House) 882 

59.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 14, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 889 

59.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 995-96 892 

59.4 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1973 894 

59.5 Washington Post , March 15, 1973, Al, A8 895 



(702) 



60. On March 15, 1973 the President held a press conference. 
He stated he would adhere to his decision not to allow Dean to testify 
before the Congress even if it meant defeat of Gray's nomination as 
Director of the FBI, because there was "a double privilege, the lawyer- 
client relationship, as well as the Presidential privilege." He also 
stated that he would not be willing to have Dean sit down informally 
and let Senators question him, but Dean would provide all pertinent 
information. 



Page 

60.1 President Nixon news conference, March 15, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 271-73 898 



(703) 



61. On or about March 16, 1973 E. Howard Hunt met with Paul 
O'Brien, an attorney for CRP . Hunt informed O'Brien that commitments 
had not been met, that he had done "seamy things" for the White House, 
and that unless he received $130,000 he might review his options. On 
March 16, 1973 Hunt also met with Colson's lawyer, David Shapiro. 
According to Colson, Hunt requested of Shapiro that Colson act as 
Hunt's liaison with the White House, but was told that that was impossible. 



Page 

61.1 Paul O'Brien testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 24, 1974, 27-30 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 902 

61.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
July 17, 1973, 87-95 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 906 

61.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 29, 1974, 63-71 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 915 

61.4 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for 
delivery to SSC, September 1973, 37-38 (received 

from SSC) 924 



(704) 



62. On March 17, 1973 the President met with John Dean in the 
Oval Office from 1:25 to 2:10 p.m. (On April 11, 1974 the Committee 
on the Judiciary subpoenaed the President to produce the tape 
recording of the March 17 meeting. The President has refused to pro- 
duce that tape but has furnished an edited partial transcript of the 
meeting. After having listened to the tape recording of the March 17, 
1973 meeting, the President on June 4, 1973 discussed with Press 
Secretary Ron Ziegler his recollections of that March 17 meeting. A 
tape recording of the June 4 discussion has been furnished to the 
Committee. The evidence regarding the content of the March 17 meeting 
presently possessed by the Committee also includes a summary of the 
March 17 meeting furnished, in June 1973, to SSC Minority Counsel Fred 
Thompson by White House Special Counsel Buzhardt and the SSC testimony 
of John Dean.) 

In his discussion with Ziegler on June 4, 1973 the President 
told Ziegler the following regarding the March 17 meeting: Up to 
March 17, 1973 the President had no discussion with Dean on the basic 
conception of Watergate, but on the 17th there began a discussion of 
the substance of Watergate. Dean told the President that Dean had 
been over this like a blanket. Dean said that Magruder was good, but 
that if he sees himself sinking he'll drag everything with him. He 
said no one in the White House had prior knowledge of Watergate, except 
possibly Strachan. There was a discussion of whether Haldeman or 
Strachan had pushed on Watergate and whether anyone in the White House 



(705) 



was involved. The President said that Magruder put the heat on, 
and Sloan starts pissing on Haldeman. The President said that "we've 
got to cut that off. We can't have that go to Haldeman." The 
President said that looking to the future there were problems and 
that Magruder could bring it right to Haldeman, and that could 
bring it to the White House, to the President. The President said 
that "We've got to cut that back. That ought to be cut out." There 
was also a discussion of the Ellsberg break-in. 

The edited partial transcript of the March 17 meeting 
supplied by the White House contains only a passage of conversation 
relating to Segretti and a portion of the conversation relating to 
the Ellsberg break- in. It contains no discussion of matters relating 
to Watergate. 



Page 

62.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 17, 1973 (received from 

White House) 929 

62.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 17, 19 73 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 936 

62.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 996-97 939 

62-4 White House edited transcript of meeting 
between President Nixon and John Dean, 
March 17, 1973 941 



(706) 



63. On March 19, 1973 Paul O'Brien met with John Dean in the 
EOB and conveyed a message from E. Howard Hunt that if money for living 
and for attorneys' fees were not forthcoming. Hunt might have to recon- 
sider his options and might have some very seamy things to say about 
Ehrlichman. 



Page 

63.1 Paul O'Brien testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 24, 1974, 30 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) , 946 

63.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 13-14 (received from Water- 
gate Grand Jury) 947 

63.3 U.S. Secret Service White House Appointment 
Record for Paul O'Brien, March 19^, 1973, 

5:20 p.m. (received from Watergate Grand Jury) 949 



(707) 



64. On March 20, 1973 John Ehrllchman met with John Dean at 
the White House. They discussed Howard Hunt's request for money, the 
possibility that Hunt would reveal activities of the Plumbers' opera- 
tions if the money were not forthcoming, and plans for Dean to discuss 
the matter with John Mitchell. According to Dean, Dean discussed the 
matter with Mitchell by telephone later that evening, but Mitchell did 
not indicate whether Hunt would be paid. On the afternoon of March 20, 
1973 Ehrlichman had a telephone conversation with Egil Krogh and told 
him Hunt was asking for a large amount of money. They discussed the 
possibility that Hunt might publicly reveal the Plumbers' operations. 
Krogh has testified that Ehrlichman stated that Hunt might blow the lid 
off and that Mitchell was responsible for the care and feeding of 
Howard Hunt. 



Page 

64.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
September 13, 1973, 2-6 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 952 

64.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, Feb- 
ruary 14, 1974, 14-16 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 957 

64.3 Egil Krogh testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, Jan- 
uary 29, 1974, 5-7 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 960 

64.4 John Ehrlichman log, March 20, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 963 



(708) 



65. On March 20, 1973 Dean had a conversation with Richard Moore, 
Special Counsel to the President. Dean told Moore that Hunt was demand- 
ing a large sum of money before his sentencing on March 23, and that 
if this payment were not inade, Hunt was threatening to say things that 
would be very serious for the White House. After this conversation. 
Dean and Moore met with the President from 1:42 to 2:31 p.m. According 
to information furnished to the Senate Select Committee by Special Counsel 
Buzhardt, the President and Moore agreed that a statement should be re- 
leased immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. According to 
Moore, following this meeting he told Dean that Dean should tell the 
President what he knew. According to Dean, Dean told Moore that Dean 
did not think, the President understood all of the facts involved in the 
Watergate and particularly the implication of those facts and that Dean 
felt he had to lay those facts and implications out for the President. 

Pag:; 

65.1 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1944-45 966 

65.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 997 968 

65.3 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 20, 1973 

(received from White House) 969 

65.4 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 20, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 976 



(709) 



66. On March 20, 1973 John Dean had an evening telephone conversation 
with the President during which he arranged a meeting with the President 
for the next morning. According to the edited transcript of this con- 
versation made public by the White House, Dean requested a meeting with 
the President to go over soft spots and potential problem areas. Dean 
said that his prior conversation with the President had been "sort of 
bits and pieces" and that he wanted to paint the whole picture for the 
President. The President agreed to such a meeting, and the President 
also instructed Dean to try to write a general statement like one that 
would state categorically that based on Dean's investigation Haldeman, 
Colson and others were not involved in the Watergate matter. 



Page 

66.1 White House edited transcript of tape recorded 
telephone conversation between President Nixon 
and John Dean , March 20 , 1973 980 



(710) 



67. On March 21, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 10:12 

to 11:55 a.m. H.R. Haldeman joined the meeting at approximately 11:15 

a.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in 

the course of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting: 

Transcript 
Page 

Possible involvement of Haldeman, 

Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Colson, 

Strachan and Porter in Watergate 

matter 5-28 

Clemency and Watergate defen- 
dants 61-62 

Whether money should be paid 

to E. Howard Hunt 40-42, 105-06 



Page 

67.1 Tape recording of meeting between the President 
and John Dean, joined later by H.R. Haldeman, 
March 21, 1973, 10:12 - 11:55 a.m., and House 
Judiciary Committee transcript thereof 990 



(711) 



68. On March 21, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. H.R. Haldeman spoke by telephone 
to John Mitchell, who was in New York City. In addition to reflecting 
the 12:30 p.m. call, Haldeman' s telephone log for that day also shows 
a conversation with John Mitchell's office at 4:06 p.m. with a marginal 
notation "car - 9:30 a.m. (word illegible) Nat'l — Amer 520." Haldeman 
has testified that he does not recall asking Mitchell on March 21 whether 
Mitchell was going to take care of Hunt's demand for money. 



Page 

68.1 H.R. Haldeman telephone log, March 21, 1973 
(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1118 

68.2 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 30, 1974, 4-16 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1120 

68.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 16 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1133 



(712) 



69. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 Dean met with Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that the participants 
at the meeting speculated about John Mitchell's role in the Watergate 
affair, and wondered whether Mitchell's not coming forward was the cause 
of the beating everyone was taking on the subject of Watergate. Dean 
and Haldeman have testified that in the late afternoon of March 21, just 
before their second meeting with the President on that day. Dean told 
Haldeman that perhaps the solution to the whole thing was to draw the 
wagons around the White House. According to Haldeman, Dean also said 
that they should let all the chips fall where they may, because that 
would not hurt anybody at the White House since no one there had a 
problem. 



Page 

69.1 John Ehrlichman log, March 21, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1136 

69.2 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 21, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1137 

69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2741-43, 

2756 1138 

69.4 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 14, 1974, 17 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1142 

69.5 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000, 1092 1143 

69.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899 ...1145 



(713) 



70. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 from 5:20 to 6:01 p.m. the 

President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. The following is an 

index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 

1973 afternoon meeting: 

Transcript Page 

Possibility of testimony before 

a new Grand Jury or before an 

independent panel established 

to investigate facts 1-^. 21-22 

Possibility of pardon or 

clemency for Hunt 5-6 

What was being done about 

Hunt's demand 6-7 

Existence of persons with 

knowledge 7-8 

Written report by Dean on which 

President at some later time 

could be shown to have relied 12-19, 23, 30-32 

Ellsberg search and seizure may 

be sufficient for mistrial 20 

Possibility of Magruder, Chapin, 

Dean and Haldeman going to jail 25-28 

Possibility of Mitchell stepping 

forward and making some kind of 

disclosure 35 



Page 

70.1 Tape recording of conversation among the 
President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean, March 21, 1973, 5:20 - 6:01 
p.m., and House Judiciary Committee tran- 
script thereof 1148 



(714) 



71. On the evening of March 21, 1973 Fred LaRue caused approxi- 
mately $75,000 in cash to be delivered to William Bittman, attorney for 
E. Howard Hunt. Earlier that day LaRue had called Mitchell when Dean 
refused to authorize the payment to Hunt, and Mitchell had approved 
the payment to Hunt . 



Page 

71.1 Fred LaRue testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 13, 1974, 2-lOA (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1188 

71.2 Manyon Millican testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 13, 1974, 2-7 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1198 

71.3 Sherman Unger testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 19, 1974, 3-14 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1204 

71.4 Sherman Unger Grand Jury Exhibits SU-1 
through SU-7, February 19, 1974 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1216 

71.5 William Bittman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, August 3, 1973, 189-91, 194-96 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1226 

71.6 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, July 17, 1973, 95, 111-12 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1232 

71.7 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 16 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 1235 

71.8 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1630-31 1236 



(715) 



72. On April 17, 1973 the President issued the following 
public statement: 



On Mar h 21, as a result of serious charges 
which came to my attention, some of which were 
publicly reported, I began intensive new 
inquiries into this Vhole matter. 



In his address to the nation of April 30, 1973 the 
President stated that in March 1973 he received new information 
regarding the :' ivolvement of members of the White House staff in 
the Watergate affair, and that: 



As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed 
the responsibility for coordinating intensive new 
inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered 
those conducting the investigations to get all the 
facts and to report them directly to me, right here 
in this office. 



Page 

72.1 President Nixon remarks, April 17, 

1973, 9 Presidential Documents 387 1240 

72.2 Preside 't Nixon address to the nation, 
April 30, 1973, 9 Presidential 

Documents 433-34 1241 



(716) 



73 . On the evening of March 21, 1973 the President dictated his 
recollections of the events that had occurred on that day. 



Page 

73.1 Dictabelt recording of the President's 
recollections of March 21, 1973, and 
House Judiciary Connnittee transcript 
thereof 1244 



(717) 

35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 3 



74. On the morning of March 22, 1973 at 11:00 a.m. H.R. Haldeman, 
John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell and John Dean met in Haldeman 's office. 
Hlademan, Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that at this time Mitchell 
indicated that E. Howard Hunt was not a "problem any longer." Mitchell 
has denied making such a statement. At this meeting, according to 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Mitchell stated that the Administration's 
rigid executive privilege policy was untenable, both from a legal and 
from a political standpoint, because it appeared to the public to be a 
cover-up on the part of the President. Haldeman testified that most of 
the discussion at the meeting concerned approaches to dealing with the 
situation, rather than a review of the facts. 



Page 

74.1 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 22, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1-253 

74.2 John Ehrlichman log, March 22, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1254 

74.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 14, 1974, 17-18 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1255 

74.4 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 30, 1974, 36-38 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1257 

74.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate 
Grand Jury, September 13, 1973, 67-73 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1260 

74.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899 1267 

74.7 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2745, 2853 1268 

74.8 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000-01 1270 



(718) 



74.9 John Dean testimony, SSC Executive 

Session, June 16, 1973, 129-31 ^272 

74.10 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1663 1275 



(719) 



75. On or about March 22, 1973 John Ehrllchman met with Egil Krogh 
at the White House. Ehrlichman assured Krogh that Howard Hunt was 
stable or more stable, that his reconmendation was just to hang tough, 
and that Hunt was not going to disclose all. 



Page 

75.1 Egil Krogh testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 29, 1974, 10-11 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 1278 

75.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2550-51 1280 



(720) 



STATB1ENT OF INFORMATION 
AND 
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 



EVENTS FOLLOWING 

THE WATERGATE BREAK- IN 

June 20, 1972 - Nfarch 22, 1973 

Part 2 



(721) 



.* 



48. On February 28, 1973 Senate hearings commenced on the nomination 
of L. Patrick Gray to be Director of the FBI. Gray testified that he had 
shown interview reports and other data from FBI Watergate files to John 
Dean who had told him that the President specifically charged him with 
looking into any involvement on the part of White House staff members. 
Gray offered to open those files to any Senator on either the Senate 
Select Committee or Senate Judiciary Committee who wanted to see them. 



Page 

48.1 L. Patrick Gray testimony, SJC, Gray 

Nomination Hearings, February 28, 1973, 

1, 42-43, 45-46 724 



(723) 



48.1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 28, 1972, SJC, 
■ ' GRAY NOMINATION HEARINGS, 1, 42-42, 45-46 



NOMINATION OF LOUIS PATRICK GRAY III 



r 



WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 



staf 

I Pat 

liny 



U.S. Sex.vte, 
Committee ox- the Judiciary, 

Washington, D.C. 
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room 1202, 
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present: Senators Eastland, McClellan, Ervin, Hart, Kennedy, 
Bayh, Byrd of West Virginia, Tunney, Hruska, Fong, Scott, Thur- 
mond, Cook and Gumey. 

Also present: John H. Holloman, chief counsel, and Francis C 
Rosenberger, Peter Stcekett, and Thomas D. Hart, professional 
staff members. 

The Chairman. These hearings are on the nomination of L. 
Patrick Gray III, to be Dii-ector of the Federal Bureau of 
yestigation. >. 
enator Ribicoff. 



STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM RIBICOIT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

CONNECTICUT 

Senator Ribicoff. Mr. Chiiirman, we, in Connecticut, are proud 
of Pat Gray, and so am I. We, in Connecticut, respect Pat Gray, and 
so do I. 

^■Ir. Chairman, I have kno\vn Pat Graj'' for many years. I have 
always found him to be a man of outstanding ability^ character, and 
integrity. Every- job that Pat Gray has performed he has performed 
with excellence. There is no question in my mind that Pat Gray is a 
dedicated pubUc servent who will perform any task assigned to him 
in a nonpartisan manner. I respect the FBI, and the entire Nation 
respects the FBI. The FBI is one of the great law enforcement institu- 
tions in America. All of us know that when youngstei-s come to \'isit 
Wiishington, one of the first places they want to see is the FBI. 

There is no question in my mind that as Director of the FBI, Mr 
Gray will perform his tasks on a completely non[)artisan basis. In all 
the years I have knoum Pat Gray he has never questioned the civil 
rights of indivitluals and the protection of constitutitnal guarantees. 
IsXy feeling is that only the criminal has much to feax from Patrick 
Gray, and that tlie law-abiding citizen has notliing to fear fiotn Pat 
Gray. He \\'iil be a defender of our rights, a defender of the Consti- 
tution, and law enforcement in this Nation vaW be stronger with Pat 
Gray as Director of the FBI. lie has un^ unqualitied support. 

(1) 



(724) 



s 

n 

I r 



48ol L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 28, 1973, SJC, 
GRAY NOMINATION HEARINGS, 1, 42-43, 45-46 

42 

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, that is correct, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. And your investigation of tlie history of the practice 
satisfied you that tiiis information was gathered for the benefit of 
those FBI employees who may have a reason to contact these Con- 
gressmen for the FBI in the dealings between Congress and the FBI. 

Mr. Gr.\y. Yes, sir. Right here at the national level men like 
Inspector Dave Bowers, who conduct this kind of relationship -with 
the Confess, who reaUy — really it is a congressional ser^-ices unit 
and that is what I have changed it to in the reorganization. Those men 
are doing that now and are in what we call today the congressional 
services unit. 

Senator Ervin. As I understand from your letter and other public 
statements made by you, this practice has been discontinued and the 
FBI relies upon such things as the "Congressional Quarterly" and 
other public information for any information of this character? 

Mr. Gr.\y. Right. I shut it down over the recommendations of the 
people In the Bureau that it be continued and I said absolutely not, it 
will not be continued. It is too readily subject to mismterpretatioa 
and we don't need it. 

Senator ERVTNf. As you know, the Senate has imposed upon me- 
and other members of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities a very solemn and serious responsibihty in con- 
nection with the so-called Watergate affair and various ramifications 
connected witlt it. I woidd have been happy if I could have asked 
you some of these questions I am now going to ask you after that 
committee has discharged those responsibihties. However, in view of 
the fact that your nomination has been submitted now, I am compelled 
in the nature of things to ask you these questions. 

Mr. Grat. Senator Ervin, I understand that. I would hope, of 
course, we would not get into the Watergate substantively, but I can 
readily see that the members of this committee have got to be assured 
that I went at this with the FBI's standard procedure, with its accus- 
tomed vigor, and I will do my very best to respond to any of your 
questions. I have absolutely nothing to hold back in connection 
with that and if we are going to take two bites of that apple why so 
be it, let's get on with it. 

Senator Ervin. I have received by telephone the assurance of 
the Attorney Gene'-al that he and the Department of Justice Avill 
cooperate with the committee in the effort of the conunittee to investi- 
gate these matters. I take it from your statement a moment ago that 
you are also prepared to cooperate with the committee. 

Mr. Gray. Absolutely, sir. Our raw data, our memoranda, what- 
ever |this committee wants, whatever the Ervin Select Committee 
wants, is available to the members. 

Senator Ervin. I am frank to state that I am just a little bit 
troubled by the limitation that you announced, that only members of 
the committee, that is only Senators, shall be allowed to inspect these 
raw files, because I have got 10,000 other jobs besides tliat of investi- 
gating Watergate and I think that is true of all the other members of 
the committee. 

Mr. Gray-. I understand that, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. The Senate resolution authorizing and requiring 
this investigation specifies that the only people who can have access 



(725) 



fi] 



48.1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 28, 197 Z, SJC, 
GRAY NOMINATION HEARINGS, 1, 42-43, 45-46 

43 

to these files would be either tlie members of the committee or ths 
chief coimsel to the committee or the coimsel for the minority or other 
members of the staff of the committee who might be designated by 
the chairman nnd the ranking minority member of the committee. 
Mr. Gray. You are talking about your Ervin Select Committee? 
Senator ErvIiV. Yes. 

Mr. Gr.\y. I have no riuarrel with that. We vril! comply with the 
resolution of the Senate. But I am talking about the procedure now, 
because Senators here who are members of this committee ob\-iously 
are going to want to know how Gray liandled the Watergate before 
they are going to confirm this bloke for my position and I am prepared 
to tell you. 

Senator Ervin. In other words, I would think that the minority 
ranking member, who is now elected vice chairman of tlie committee, 
Senator Baker of Tennessee, would not want anybody but the most 
reputable person to look at the files but we would like to have a 
member of the staff selected by both of us to do this work instead of 
doing it in person. 

Mr. Gray. Senator, as far as your committee is concerned, we in 
the FBI will abide by the joint resolution. I hare some people I have 
to take some orders from, too. On the one hand, there were some who 
criticized Mr. Hoover for being a feudal baron and now maybe it 
seems I sense a little criticism of me because I am taking orders, but 
I am trying to, comply. I am sajing to this committee that my posi- 
tion has been from the beginning that we have nothing to hide and 
I am going to state it on the pubUc record because I have stated it 
on the private record. 

Senator Ervix. Yes, that is the reason that I am concerned that 
Senatore not be the only ones who ^vill have to do this work and so 

I understand 

Mr. Gray. I meant. Senator Er^-in, for this committee I am wilhng 
to send over the materials and I am uiHing to send over two agents 
and a Senator can sit down ^^"ith them and question them any way 
they want. 

Senator Ervin. And I might state that as far as I am concerned 
and as far as I can contrcl the matter, it is not the purpose of the 
committee to take and put any raw files or anything of that character 
in evidence. We just don't want to have to put the ta.xpayers to the 
e.xpense of setting up a little FBI of our own to conduct investigations 
which have been made by the FBI. We want to learn from the FBI 
files \\ho are witnesses possessing some knovvledge which is worthwhile 
for the com^mittpe to hear. 

^[r. Gray. Right, and we have analyses and all other kinds of 
books and summaries and we \\ill provide that to the Ervin Com- 
fiittee. We liave no problem on that. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. J. P]dgar Hoover ne\'er had a more anient 
admirer in the United States than myself, and there is nobody in 
the United States who has respected through.out the yeaj-s the work 
of the FBI mure than I have respecteil it. As a practic'mg attorney 
and as a judge I had manv rtuitacts with the FBI agents. 1 have been 
impressed by the highest standard of coiuluct and tl-.e high chm-actcr 
which they posse.ss. 

Mr. GitAV. Thardv you, Senator Ervin. 



(726) 



r 



?. 1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 28^ 197Z, SJC, 
GRAY NOMINATION HEARINGS, 1, 42-43^ 45-46 

45 

tell you. To give you that information T am sioing: to have to take time 
to tell you how we progressed on this investigation. 

Senator Ervi.v. Well, that wouldn't be a likely procedure to be per- 
mitted bv the FBI, would it? 

Mr. Gray. Of course not. We certainly would not. 

Senator Ervin. So you, at the present time, can neither afBrm nor 
deny that statement; 

Mr. Gr.w. No, I don't because I can't; I can't say with any degree 
of certainty testifying under oath that he was or was not. 

Senator Ervin. I take it that you give the committee your assurance 
that if any such event happened, that is if any copy of the FBI inter- 
\new was given to Mr. Segretti it was not given by you or ^vith your 
knowledge or consent; 

Mr. Gray. It was not done with my knowledge or consent, that is 
true. But I can go into it fuither if you want me to explain how it 
possibly could. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, I would like to have that. 

Mr. Gray. When we started out this investigation, it was the most 
closelv held investigation that we have conducted in the FBI because 
of the fact that we did not know who might become involved. Dis- 
semination of information on this was very limited, a^ my explicit 
order, and with the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United 
States. 

Now there was that contact between the case agents and the 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys that traditionally occurs in an investigation. 
There was contact also with the assistant attorney general of the crimi- 
nal division, and in accordance with then standard FBI operating 
procedures, on June 19 there was delivered to me a summary report of 
what had transpired to date, facts and circumstances, in Watergate. 
Coupled with that was a letterhead memorandum, as I recall it, and 
I will introduce those documents for the record here, a letterhead 
memorandum transmitting this information to the Attorney General, 
and a letter prepared addressed to H.R. Haldeman. I said no, and I 
stopped it right then and there. That was in accordance with then 
standard FBI operating procedure. The material just came up, and I 
said no. 

Now, as time went on we finally began delivering the investigative 
reports to the assistant attorney general of the crinunal division and 
we have a listing of the dates on which we did that and I %vill 
submit that for the record. Then, I think it was the middle of July, 
about the 19th, I was asked by the WTiite House, by John Dean, to 
provide them with a letterhead memorandum because he wanted to 
have what we hatl to date because the President specifically charged 
him with looking into any involvement on the part of White House 
staff members. 

I asked my legal counsel to prepare a memorandum regarding 
whether or not we hatl a duty to send any material to the U hite 
Hou-^e. The answer came back: On our own initiative, no; in response 
to a directixe from an iudi\i(!ual acting for the Presiilent of the 
United States, that is another matter and we do. 

So I had pi'oparcd, caused to be prepared, a letterhead memoran- 
dum, dated July 21, and we will submit that for the record, auel that 
was submitted to tlu- Attoriie\- General. I ha\e e\'ei'\' reason to believe 



(727) 



L 



48.1 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 28, 1973, SJC, 
GRAY NOMINATION HEARINGS, 1, 42-43, 45-46 

4G 

that that went over to Mr. Doan at the White Hoime. I have no 
reason to question that it should or should not, berause I work for 
the President of the United States and I think the President of the 
United States is entitled to ask the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation: "What information do you have that implicates 
individuals who are members of m\ stall?" And I submitted it. 

Later on, Mr. Dean asked to review the int'Tview reports of the 
Fed.eral Bureau of Investisratiou, and I submitted those to him. So you 
see the possibility here, Senator, and I think what is being driven at 
in this, the allegation is really directed toward Mr. Dean having one of 
these inter\"iew reports and showing it to Mr. Segretti down in Miami. 
I can tell you this, that when this newspaper report hit I called John 
Dean and I asked him if he had done this, and he said: "1 did not. 
I didn't even have those documents with me." 

Senator Ervin. Now, am I correct in inferring that it had been 
the practice to supply information collected by the FBI, either in the 
formi of summaries or in the form of copies of interviews, to officials 
of the Department of Justice or the ilistrict attorneys: 

Mr. Gray. Our regular procedure, Senator Ervin, of course, is to 
work very closely with the assistant U.S. attorneys and with U.S. 
attorneys, and then at FBI headquarters levels to work with the 
Assistant Attorney General having cognizance of the case, and the 
answer to your question is "Yes; we keep them informed." In this case 
we were even tight with information there. 

Senator ErVix. Let me see if I understand another thing you said. 
Some infonnation or a summary of some information collected by 
the FBI in regard to some aspect of the Watergate m^atter, accom- 
panied by a proposed letter, was to be sent to Mr. Haldeman? 

Mr. Gr.\y. Yes, sir; that happened on June 19, and I will submit 
those documents for the record. I will show them exactly as they 
came up to me, and I said "No." 

(Mr. Gray subsequently submitted the. following documents:) 

Ju.NE 19, 1972. 
To: The .\ttornev General from Acting Director, FBI. 

Re James Walter McCord, Jr., and others, burglary of Democratic Party National 
Headquiiricrs, Washington, D.C. 

Enclosed is a memorandum containing the resuU.s of investigation of the 
burglary of the Democratic Party National Headquarters, Watergate Apart- 
ments, Washington, D.C, on June 17, 1972. 

A copy of the memorandum has also been furnished to Honorable H. R. Halde- 
man, Assistant to the President. Investigation concerning this matter is continu- 
ing and reports of investigation will l)e furnished to the Criminal Di\ ision aa 
soon as they are received. 

U.S. Dep.vrtme.nt of JusTicf;, 

FkDKR.VL BcRi:.\U of iNVF-STtOAXtON, 

\ya>.hinglon, D.C, June 19, 1973. 
Hon. H. R. Haldt.m A.s, 
Aifsiatant to Ihe Prt.^ident, 
The While House, 
Wanhiivjlon, DC. 

D}:\H Mh. Hvi.dkman: Enclosed is a mem(^randnm containing the resuUs of 
investigation of the burglary of the Democratic Partv National Headquarters, 
Watergate .Vpartnicnts, Washington, D.C, on June 17. 1972. 

.\ Copy of the ineniorandum has al<o been forward'.-d to the Attorney General 
and investigation by the FBI is continuing. 
SinciTclv vours, 

L. PvTlUCK tlR^Y, Til, 

Ac:in(] Director. 



(728) 



49. On March 1, 1973 the President met three times with John 
Dean in the Oval Office — from 9:18 to 9:46 a.m., from 10:36 to 10:44 
a.m. and from 1:06 to 1:14 p.m. The President decided that the White 
House would explain publicly that Dean sat in on FBI interviews because 
he was conducting an investigation for the President. 



Page 

49.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 1, 1973 

(received from White House) 730 

49.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 1, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accon^janying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

1794-95 737 

49.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 993-94 740 



(729) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1, 1973 



101530 

MEETINGS AND TELEPrlONE CONVERSATIONS B£T\yEEN 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN W. DEAN, III 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns. 



May 1, 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John V/. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



12:45 




11 


12:49 




09 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




•12 


12:49 




.12 



The President met to sign personal legal documents with: 
The First Lady 
John J. RatcMord 
Mr. Butte rfield 
Mr. Haldeman 
Mr. Ehrlichmian 
John W. Dean, HI 
John H. Alexander 
Richard S. Ritzcl 



No other contact during August 1972 



nni 



(730) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1, 1973 



September 15, 1972 jxij a^-^ 

PM The President met with: 



3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 



(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 



No other contact during September 1972 



October 9. 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Nev/house Broadcasting 
and Herb Klein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting. 



November 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr. ■John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of '76" with 

Rose Mary Woods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during Novennber 
and December 1972. 



m 



(731) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1, 1972 

101530 

January 21, 1973 

AM 11:05 12:04 President and First Lady hosted Worship Service. 

John Dean attended. 



February 27, 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in Ov'al Office. 

February 28, 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office. 



March 1, 1973 

AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean, III, 

in the Oval Office. 
(At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
}0:36 10:44 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. too the call.) 
-^Mr. Kissinger was present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 



March 6, 1973 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7, 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 8. 1973 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 






(732) 



49,1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1, 197 Z 



March 10, 1973 



lOi^jao 



AM 9:20 9:44 



President talked long distance with 'iAr . Dean. 

President initiated the call from Cainp David 
to Mr. Dean who was in V/ashington, D. C. 



March 13, 1973 
PM 12:42 2:00 



President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43- 12:55) 



March 14, 1973 



AM 8:36 

8:55 
9:43 



PM 



8:59 
10:50 



President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President. 
President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office. 
Also present were: 

Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 

Ronald L. Ziegler 

Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 



12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Deari. 
12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 

President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 
President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean 
initiated the call. ) 



4:25 
4:34 



4:26 
4:36 



larch 15, 1973 

\y PM 3:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



m 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 4 



(733) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1, 1973 

March l6, 1973 iQi-j3<J 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met v/ith Mr, Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ziegler was present from. 10:58-11:10. 

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr. Dean, (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



March 17. 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the 0\-al Office, 

March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested that Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join hirn in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President m.et with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 

March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tall<:ed v/ith Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call, ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call, ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr, Dean and Mr. Moore. 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



3- 



(734) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 1^ 1973 

March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Halderr.an was also present for at least 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:01 President met withMr. Dean in the President' s 

EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman -1 ("\ A ^ '^0 
Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) 1-* •^'-'^ 
jy^Gen. Sc owcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 
Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 
Mr. Haldem.an (2:01-3:40) 
Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 



PM 12:44 1:02 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in ■Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp Dav-id, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM .9:17 10:12 President met v/ith Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

^March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 
t' staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 

the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 

(735) 



49. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 3, 1973 

April 16, 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 President met with Mr. Dean in Oval Office. 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

lUlb30 

April 22. 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean from Key Biscayne. 



'^r 



(736) 



49.2 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT^ 
MARCH 1, 1973 

3, \\.-:\\o]^.\\'ov,Vl <jl-" .stjiiS'i'AXc;.-: of O'^ax's ca'M.s 
AXO V :-:!-/i iXdS WITH 'iiil-; p;i.-:sr;;-;xT 




Se;.i,:,r.box- 15, 1972 
F.;h.-i.ai-y 28, L973 



\:Ar.h 1, 1973 



L 



2vlarch 6 , 1973 



March 7. 1973 



Doa;i i-..;portcd on. IRS invostigatioA of r,.-.ri-y O ' Pj ;^" •n. 
Deaa roporled on Watergate indictivvj.-its. 

Discussed oxocalivc privilege, minority counsel 
for V/atcrgato Con.rnitteo. Dean suggested White 
House aides si.'j.nit answers to interrogatories. 

President inquired of Watergat-^ , D.:-p.a said .lO Vv'nite 
HoLise iavolverncnt, Stans was victiiii (jf ci rcani ■>!.",. ■ices, 
Colson was lig'ntning rod because of liis reputaiion. 
Disciissed wiretappings which had V.eon brought up 
in the d-ay hearings. Sullivan, Deputy Director, 
was fria-.d oi Dean and Dean suggested they n-.ake 
sure that wiretaps of prior years (other A.dministra- 
tions) be made known. 

Preparation for press conference -- go over <iuestif-n. 
and answer book. Was decided t'le question v.ould 
cO:~.~ie up as to AJ-^y Doan was sittiiig in on FBI inter- 
views and that ;"-.e reason was lie was connncting an 
in\'e stigation for the President. Presid^.-nt asked 
Dean to write a report. Dea.n was al^o c.-i'.ical of 
Gray. 

(March 2 press conference) 

Discussed executive privilege guidelines, decided 
to cover for.ner White House personnel as well as 

pr^-sent. 

Again discussion executive privilege guidelines. 
Dean again told the President the W'hite House was 
clear. The President inquired as to how Pat Gray 
was doing. Dear. i.\ -'oriv.ed iiim S . B , 'iVil "ip ;r. > r,~.d 
droToed out of tlie civil case. 



Scu/^c E . SSC >/q n.j 7V 



)a 



49.2 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT. SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794^95 

1704 
Exhibit No. 70A 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SE-ECT COMVJTTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTr/ITIES. ET. AL.- 

Plaintiffs 



RICHARD M, NIXO?v 

INDrviDUALLY AXD AS PRESIDENT OE THE UNITED STATES 

THE VmTE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Defendant 



Civil 

Action 

No. 



AFFIDA\1~ OF FRED D. THOMPSON 

Fred D. Thompson, being swo?n, deposes and says: 

1, Early in J\ine, 1973, the White House transmitted 

to the Select Comxnittee a rr-.emorandum (which is attached to this 
affidavit) listing certain oral cornmunications, both face-to-face and 
telephonic, 'betweea President Richard M. Nixon and John Wesley Dean m. 
This memorandum, inter alia f includes the "exact times and durations of 
these commonicatioas, and, in the case of face-to-face corT-jTiunication.s, 
the other participants, if any, in those conversations. 



(738) 



49.2 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4SSC 1734r-95 

1795 



2- Shortly therc-aftcr, I received a t<::e,-,:-.one cill 

from J. rred Buzhardt. Special Ccunsel to the President. Duri.-.y 
this telephor.e call. Mr. Buzhardt related to me his understandi.ns 
as to t:-.e substance of certain portions of the enumerated conversations 
between the President and Mr. Dean. 

3. During my diicussioc with Mr. Buzhardt. I 

made cetaUed notes on the inror.-r-.ation that he gave me. Upon 
conclusion o: the conversation, I pro.-nptly prepared a "Memorandum 
of Substance o: Dean's Calls and V.-eting with the President." a 
copy of xTiich is attached to this a-:davit. It is my belief that this 
ir.emorazcu.-. accurately rerlects the information imparted to me by- 
Mr. 3czh^.rct. 




Subscribed and ST,orn to. bercr 



ice, this 



aM 



ds.- of _j^^O'.«,ij/ 'if.7Z 




[ ^ Co~i3s:cn r 



ry r-aalic. D.C. 



nr 



-j^. loTf 



(739) 



49,3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 2S, 1973, Z SSC 99S-94 

993 

involved in an obstruction of justice. He would not accept ray analj'sis 
and did not want me to get into it in any detail other than what I had 
just related. He reassured me not to worry, tliat I had no legal prob- 
lems. I raised this on another occasion with the President, when Dick 

Mdi)!!' was piX'^ent. 

^"^^^^^^"^^""^ SIeETIXG of iL\BCH 1 



The first meeting on this date and the afternoon meeting which 
occurred on March 1, related to preparing the President for his forth- 
coming press conference. The President asked me a number of ques- 
tions about the Gray nomination hearings and facts that had come 
out during these hearings. In particular. I can recall him stating that 
there should be no problem with the fact that I had received the FBI 
reports. He said that I was conducting an investigation for him and 
■that it would be perfectly proper for the counsel to the President to 
have looked at these reports. I did not tell the President that I had 
not conducted an investigation for him because I assumed he was well 
aware of this fact and that the so-called Dean investigation was a 
public relations matter, and that frequently the President made refer- 
ence in press conferences to things that never had, in fact occurred. 

I was also aware that often in answering Watergate questions, that 
he had made reference to my report and I did not feel that I could 
tell the President that he could not use ni}- name. There had been con- 
siderable adverse publicitj- stemming from the Gray hearings and the 
fact that Gray was turning over FBI information to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which caused the President to tell me at this 
morning meeting that Gray must be '"pulled up short." He told me 
that he had talked with the Attorney General to tell him to read the 
chaiitcr in his book "Six Crises." dealing witii the //?.«'? case icgarding 
the lack of cooperation which Truman and the FBI had given to his 
investigation. He also told me the FBI Watergate materials should 
not be turned over by Gray. I informed him that I had had a meeting 
several days prior with Mr. Sullivan who had been at the FBI for 
many years and Sullivan had alluded to the fact that the FBI had been 
used for political purposes by past acbninist rations. I cited a few 
examples that Mr. Sullivan had given me. The President told me to 
get this information from Sullivan. The President told me that he 
was reading a. book at that time called "The 13 Mistakes of Kennedv." 
and he told me that I should read the chapter regarding Kennedy's 
use of the FBI. He also told me that I should gather any material I 
could .frather regaT-ding the uses and abuses of the FBI bv past admin- 
istrations so that we could show that we had not abused the FBI for 
political purposes. 

The President told me that he was convinced that he had been wire- 
tapped in 1908 and the fact that DeLoach had not been forthcoming 
indicated to the President that DeLoach was ])robably lying. He told 
me tliat I should call Don Kendall, DeLoach "s employer, and tell him 
that DcTiOach had better start tellinsr the truth because '"the bovs are 
coming out of the woodwork."" He said this plov may smoke DeLoach 
out. I might respond that I never did call Mr. Kendall. He also asked 
me who else might know about the bugging of his 19BS campaign and 
I sugofpsted that Mr. Tolson, Hoover's former assistant, might have 
some knowledge of it. He told me that he probably ought to call Mr. 



(740) 



49.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25^ 1973^ 2 SSC 993-94 

994 

Tolson and wish him happy birthday or good health and possibly get 
some information from him when he was talking to him. The dis- 
cussion then turned back to the Hiss case and I reminded the Presi- 
dent of the strong statement he had made in 1950 regarding Truman's 
refusal to provide his committee witli information, and that speech 
might be raised at his press conference. He asked me to go get a copy 
of that speech. 'I returned to his office shortly with a copy of the speech, 
and he asked me to discuss with him how it could be differentiated 
from the present situation. 

During the March 1 afternoon meeting the President also asked 
me some questions about executive privilege and the timing on the 
release of the executive privilege statement which he had cTiscussed 
in his press conference on January 31. I told him that the statement, 
as far as I was concerned, was ready for release and merely would 
require the signoff of a handful of other people. I told him I thought 
it poiild be out within a week. 



It was during the days after this series of March 1 meetings with 
the President that the name Dean began coming increasingly to the 
forefront in the Gray confirmation hearings, and the rumblings were 
"that there was going to be a situation where Dean could be called 
to the committee to testify and a number of Senators were anxious to 
use me as a vehicle to test executive privilege. On March 4 or 5, I 
had a conversation with Ehrlichman in which I might add occurred 
in the hall of the West Building, in which I told him that I thought 
it would be very difficult to maintain a court test of executive privilege 
over me, when in fact I had only met with the President infrequently 
and had had very few conversations with him that would be protected. 
It was following this conversation with Ehrlichman that I began 
meeting and talking with the President, at his request, with ever 
increasmg frequency. The Presidential meeting'of March 6. 

Senator Ervix [presiding]. A vote has been called on a 10-minute 
basis. I expect the committee had better go and come back. "We will 
finish this statement this afternoon. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervin. The committee will resume. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you can proceed. Senator TVeicker is here 
making a quorum, as required by our rules. 

]Mr. De.\n. Thank you. 

Meetixg of !March 6 

This meeting was brief and a general discussion of the status of 
the Gray hearings and the President reminded me again that I should 
report directly to him and not involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
with Watergate-related matters. 

Meeting of !March 7 

The President was very unhappy with Gray's performance before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In my meeting with him on this date 
he made a reforence to the fact tliat Grav's coniinont rogardinir niv sit- 
ting in on the investigations by tlie FBI was absurd. lie feTt it was 
perfectly proper that I was present at those intoiviows and said tliat 
Gray's attitude that he "jolly well"' went forward because he had no 



(741) 



50. On March 2, 1973 President Nixon explained at a press confer- 
ence that John Dean had access to FBI interviews in July and August 
1972 because he had conducted an investigation at the direction of the 
President. The President stated that Dean's investigation showed that 
no one on the White House staff in July and August at the time Dean 
conducted his investigation had knowledge of or was involved in the 
Watergate matter. The President promised to cooperate with the 
Senate Select Committee if it conducted its investigation in an 
even-handed way. The President stated that because of executive 
privilege, no President could ever agree to allow the Counsel to the 
President to testify before a congressional committee. The President 
said that if the Congress requested information from a member of the 
White House staff, arrangements would be made to provide that 
information. 



Page 

50.1 President Nixon news conference, March 2, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 214, 219-20 744 



(743) 



SO.l PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE^ MARCH 2, 19? S, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 



PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 



faith and to believe in it, and to practice a life of diffi- 
culties and fiardsfiips and pioneering and to build for the 
future. 

If we had the choice, if people would say to us, "Look, 
you can only have one friend in this world. Choose," I 
have no doubt whom we would have chosen. Throughout 
the years, in these very recent years, you know very well 
what you and your people mean to Israel. 

I have personally ver% many things to be thankful for 
in my long life. I include even the difficulties that I had 
to face, because I can honestly say at least one thing: I 
never ran away from a difficult situation. I have more 
courage to face our young men and women at home. 

We discussed at the table the heroes, the heroes of the 
wives and parents of your prisoners of war, the joy that 
we feel, all of us in the world, that they are coming back 
to their families. The difficulty to sit around at home for 
me with a group of these young wives — not very many, 
thank God, only 13 men in Egypt and in Syria — but I 
look at these young women, with their little children, and 
their husbands torn away from them, brave, courageous, 
or when I have to face widows, orphans, mothers, and 
fathers who have lost their dear ones — in moments of 
that kind, I have been able to be stronger in my ability 
to face these real heroes of all nations, because, Mr. Presi- 
dent, you have made it possible for us to know we are 
not alone. 

And again, I have been privileged — I don't know 
why — that in the last few years I should be the messenger 
to bring this great message to my people, young and old, 
and say to my people, "We are not alone; we have a 
friend." This people, through the man who carries the 
greatest burden and highest office, through its President, 
made it possible for us to know in the dangerous position 
that we still are, that we are not alone. 

For this, Mr. President, for all that you have done, for 
your understanding of what we are striving for, for your 
not doubting that what we really want is an honest and 
real and true and lasting peace with our neighbors, that 
the greatest dream that we are dreaming is to cooperate 
with our neighbors, to cross the borders not with tanks but 
with tractors, to help, together with our neighbors, to build 
the area that has known so much bloodshed and so much 
war and so much destruction, to build together with our 
neighbors an area where people, men and women and 
little children, will be happy and will live and will find 
all this worthwhile. 

When that great day comes — I said the other night to 
a group of friends, wc have a song about peace, what 
will happen when peace comes, and the song has a re- 
frain: This is not a fantasy, this is not a dream, this is 
true; if it won"t happen today, then tomonow; if not 
tomorrow, then the next day, hut this is not a fantasy and 
not a dream. 



Mr. President, when that great day comes, and I am 
convinced that it will come, we will always remember that 
in days of sorrow and difficulty and danger, we were not 
alone, we had a friend. 

Ladies and gentlemen, to the President. 

note: The President spoke at 10:01 p.m. in the State Dining Room 
at the White House. 



I THE PRESIDENT'S 

I NEWS CONFERENCE OF 

I MAR CH 2, 1973 

The President. I have one announcement for those who 
are members of the traveling press. 

Meeting With PREsroENT Thieu 

We have now set the date for the San Ciemente meet- 
ing with President Thieu, and it will be April 2 and 3. 
Those of you who desire to go should make your plans, if 
you could, to leave on the Friday before, because I am 
going to California to attend a dinner on that occasion for 
John Ford on Saturday night, the 31st, and then the meet- 
ings wiU start the following Tuesday and vcill be concluded 
that week. 

I will take any other questions you have. 

Questions 
cease-fires in laos and q^mbodta 

Q. Mr. President, there has been considerable specula- 
tion and interpretation after the Laos cease-fire pact to the 
effect that the Communists gained more out of this than 
they did out of the Geneva Accords, and also a situa- 
tion in Cambodia that no one seems to be able to inter- 
pret. Originally you hinged your peace settlement on 
all of Indochina. 

What is your expectation in these areas, and how much 
confidence do you have that stability will be maintained? 

The President. Mr. Sheldon, first, with regard to 
Laos, the agreement there was made by the Royal Laotian 
Government, and it is an agreement which we, of course, 
supported and we accept. 1 have noted that various ele- 
ments within Laos have questioned the decision by 
Souvanna Phouma to make the agreement that he did. 
But the key to that agreement, and what will make the 
cease-fire work Ls an unequivocal provision in the agree- 
ment that wc made and that is for the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Laos. We expect that to be .idhcrcd 
to, and when that is adhered to. we belie\c that the 



Volume 9 Numbai 



(744) 



50. 1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 2, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 

PRESIDENTIAl DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON. 1973 



as ;'. But whM mattered was tlial in the end, the averaije 
worked out so that \vc almost achieved our goal of 3 per- 
cent. We got lo 3.4. 

Now what we are concerned about is to see that in 
the negotiations in the year 1973 those negotiations are 
undertaken with enough flexibility — some will go a little 
higher, some will go a little lower — but with enough flexi- 
bility so that we don't have a wage-price push which would 
destroy the goal that everybody unanimously agrees we 
should try to achie\e of 2.5 at the end of the year at the 
retail level. I am sure that confuses you. 

THE AMERICAN DOLLAR 

Q. Mr. President, what kind of trouble is the American 
dollar in in Europe, in your judgment? 

The President. Well, the American dollar, I think, 
is being attacked by international speculators. I know that 
when I use that term my sophisticates in the Treasury De- 
partment shudder because they believe these great forces 
are not determined by speculation and the rest. But as 
I look at the American economy, as I look at the American 
rate of inflation, I would say that the dollar is a good 
bet in the world markets today. 

The United States has the lowest rate of inflation of 
any major industrial country. The United States has cer- 
tainly the strongest economy of the major industrial coim- 
tries. The United States also has a program, which we 
believe is going to work, for continuing to control inflation. 
We have a very tight budget, or I should say a responsible 
budget. Let me point out, it is not a budget which is cut ; 
it is a budget, however, which does not go up as much 
as some would want it to go, and therefore, one that will 
continue to cool the inflationary fires. ^\nd, of course, 
under these circumstances, we believe that the dollar is 
a sound currency and that this international attack upon 
it by people who make great sums of money by speculat- 
ing — one time they make a run on the mark and the 
next time it is on the yen, and now it is on the dollar — 
we will survive it. 

Let me say there will not be another devaluation. I 
would say, second, we are going to continue our program 
of fiscal responsibility so that the dollar will be sound 
at home and, we trust as well, abroad. And we also are 
going to continue our efforts to get the other major coun- 
tries to participate more with us in the goal that we believe 
we should all achieve, which we set out at the time of the 
.Smithsonian and the other agreements, and that is of 
getting an international monetary system which is flexible 
enough to take care of these, what I believe are, temporary 
attacks on one currency or another. 

Q. Can we do anything to bring these speculators under 
control? 

The President. We cannot, because I would say for 
the most part they are operating in the international area, 
.ind all that we can do is to keep our dollar ;i.s sound as we 



( an at hnme, to keep our economy as sound as we can, to 
he as rc^prlll^iblc ;ls wc can so that the run on the dollar 
docs not mean a u':akn("ss of the .American economy or of 
the dollar, in fact, that we spend here at home. 

RENT CONTROLS 

Q. Mr. President, are you possibly giving any thought 
to reviving the Rent Control Board? 

The President. No, we are not. Rent controls have an 
enormous public appeal, particularly when you see some 
of the gouging that goes on in individual cases. The diffi- 
culty with rent control, however — and any of you who 
have visited Paris or some of the other major cities which 
have had rent control almost since World War II and see 
what has happened to rents, particularly of new dwellings, 
know what I am talking about — the difficulty with rent 
control, if you put a rent control ceiling on that is not 
economically viable so that the builders and those who will 
rent apartments and so forth cannot and will not rriake 
their investment, all that happens is that you get a shortage 
of housing, the pressures go up, and also you find that the 
landlords don't keep up the places. 

No, I do not think that rent controls is the right answer. 
I think the answer to the problem of rents is prtxluction of 
housing which will deal with it. 



the WATERGATE CASE 



Q. Mr. President, now that the Watergate case is over, 
the trial is over, could you give us your view on the verdict 
and what implications you see in the verdict on public 
confidence in the political system? 

The President. No, it would not be proper for me 
to comment on the case when it not only is not over, but 
particularly when it is also on appeal. 

I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case 
what I have said previously, that the investigation con- 
ducted by Mr. Dean, the White House Counsel, in which, 
incidentally, he had access to the FBI records on this par- 
ticular matter because I directed him to conduct this 
investigation, indicates that no one on the White House 
Staff, at the time he conducted the investigation — that 
was last July and .\ugust — was involved or had knowl- 
edge of the Watergate matter. And, as far as the balance 
of the case is concerned, it is now under investigation by 
a Congressional committee and that conimittee should 
go forward, conduct its investigation in an e\en-handed 
way, going into charges made against both r.nndidates, 
both political parties. .-\nd if it docs, as Senator Ervin has 
indicated it will, we will, of course cooperate with the 
committee just as we cooperated with the grand jury. 



congressional hearings AND executive privilece 

Q. Mr. President, yesterday at the Gray hearings. 
Senator Tunney suggested he might ask the committee to 
.isk for John Dean to appear before that hearing to talk 



Volum* 9 — Nombvr 9 



(745) 



320 



SO. 1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 2, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973 



about the Watergate case and the FBI-White House 
relationship. Would you object to that? 

The President. Of course. 

Q- Wh y? 

^^H^T'rfsident. Well, because it is executive privi- 
lege. I mean you can't — I, of course — no President could 
ever agree to allow the Counsel to the President to go 
down and testify before a committee. 

On the other hand, as far as any committee of the Con- 
gress is concerned, where information is requested that 
a member of the White House Staff may have, we will 
make arrangements to provide that information, but 
members of the White House Staff, in that position at 
least, cannot be brought before a Congressional commit- 
tee in a formal hearing for testimony. I stand on the same 
Dositionthere that every President has stood on. 



Reporter. Thank you, Mr. President. 

Q. Mr. President, on that particular point, if the Coun- 
sel was involved 

The President. He always gets two. (Laughter) 

Q. — if the Counsel was involved in an illegal or im- 
proper act and the prima facie case came to light, then 
would you change the rules relative to the White House 
Counsel? 

The President. I do not expect that to happen, and 
if it should happen I would have to answer that question 
at that point. 

Let me say, too, that I know that, since you are on your 
feet, Clark [Mollenhoff], that you had asked about the 
Executive Privilege statement, and we will have that 
available toward the end of next week or the first of the 
following week, for sure, because obviously, the Ervin 
Committee is interested in that statement, and that will 
answer, I think, some of the questions with regard to how 
information can be obtained from a member of the White 
House Staff, but consistent with executive privilege. 

Reporter. Thank you again. 

NOTE : President Nixon's thirtieth news conference was held at 1 1 :08 
a.m. on Friday, March 2, 1973, in the Briefing Room at the White 
House. 



"Heart-of-the-Year" Award 
to the President 

Exchange of Remarks Between the President and Dr. 
Paul N. Yu, President of the American Heart 
Association, at the Presentation Ceremony. 
March 2, 1973 

Dr. Yu. Mr. President, each year the .Vmcrican Heart 
.Association has been privileged to honor a distinguished 
Amcriran with the "Hcart-of-thc-Ye.ir" Award. For the 
past 4 years, Mr. President, you have graciously consented 



to present the award in our name. This year we would 
like very much to have you keep it. 

Mr. President, we are really extremely pleased and 
proud to present the 1973 "Heart-of-the-Year" Award 
to you in recognition of your consistent support and en- 
couragement of the voluntary action in the health field. 
Your support has helped make it possible for us to expand 
the role of the volunteer and of our voluntary health 
agency to fight the number one health problem — heart 
and blood diseases. 

As you know, the goal of the American Heart Associ- 
ation is to conquer heart and blood vessel diseases through 
the support of cardiovascular research, education, and 
commingled services. We are very confident that with the 
sustained guidance, support, and encouragement we %vill 
achieve our goals. 

So, Mr. President, please accept this award as a small 
token of our great appreciation. 

The citation reads: "1973 Heart-of-the-Year Award. 
Presented by the American Heart Association to President 
Richard M. Nixon for his consistent support and encour- 
agement of voluntary programs combatting the nation's 
most serious health problem — heart and blood vessel 
diseases." 

Thank you very much. 

The President. Thank you very much. Dr. Yu. 

In accepting this award. Doctor, I want to accept it on 
behalf of those of you who deserve it, and that is the 
volunteers both here in the District of Columbia and all 
over this Nation. 

I noted in my talking papers that I was to mention 
the fact that I should accept it because, and make note 
of the fact that this Administration has committed ap- 
proximately $100 million to research in the field of heart 
disease. 

But I cannot take the credit for that. The taxpayers of 
America, all of the American people, have made it possible 
to do research and go for\vard. 

That is the governmental side, but what is done on the 
voluntary side, which you represent here today, is equally 
important. This is the seed money, and then the volimteers 
will go far beyond that in finding, certainly, a solution to 
this problem. 

Just let me say one thing personally. As you presented 
this here in this Oval Office of the President, I think about 
the two Presidents — the three Presidents — who preceded 
me in this office. President Eisenhower, of course, had a 
heart attack in 1955, and eventually that was the cause 
of death; and that President Johnson had a heart attack 
while he was in the Senate, and that that was the cause 
of death. 

I think back over my public life of going to \i=it Presi- 
dent Eisenhower in Denver right after his heart attack, 
which is something that I will never forget, and also 
going to visit Picsident Johnson when he w;xs in Bcthesda 
Hospit.il. I am not suggesting by that that Pic.sidents are 



Volume 9 — Numbsr 9 



(746) 



51. As Gray's confirmation hearings continued during the first 
week in March 1973, public reports circulated that John Dean would be 
called to testify. Dean has testified that on March 4 or 5, 1973 
he reported to Ehrlichman that it would be difficult to win a court 
test of executive privilege involving Dean as Counsel to the President 
because Dean had met with the President so infrequently. 



Page 

51.1 President Nixon news conference, March 2, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 214, 219-20 748 

51.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 994 751 



(747) 



Sl.l PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 2, 1972, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 

PBESIDENTIAl DOCUMENTS RICHABO NIXON. 1973 



f.\itli and to believe in it, and to practice a life of diffi- 
culties and hardships and pioneerinj; and to build for the 
future. 

If we had the choice, if people would say to us, "Look, 
you can only have one friend in this world. Choose," I 
have no doubt whom we would have chosen. Throughout 
the years, in these very recent years, you know very well 
what you and your people mean to Israel. 

I have personally very many things to be thankful for 
in my long life. I include even the difficulties that I had 
to face, because I can honestly say at least one thing: I 
never ran away from a difficult situation. I have more 
courage to face our young men and women at home. 

We discussed at the table the heroes, the heroes of the 
wives and parents of your prisoners of war, the joy that 
we feel, all of us in the world, that they are coming back 
to their families. The difficulty to sit around at home for 
me with a group of these young wives — not very many, 
thank God, only 13 men in Egypt and in Syria — but I 
look at these young women, v»4th their little children, and 
their husbands torn away from them, brave, courageous, 
or when I have to face widows, orphans, mothers, and 
fathers who have lost their dear ones — in moments of 
that kind, I have been able to be stronger in my ability 
to face these real heroes of all nations, because, Mr. Presi- 
dent, you have made it possible for us to know we are 
not alone. 

And again, I have been privileged — I don't know 
why — that in the last few years I should be the messenger 
to bring this great message to my people, young and old, 
and say to my people, "We are not alone; we have a 
friend." This people, through the man who carries the 
greatest burden and highest office, through its President, 
made it possible for us to know in the dangerous position 
that we still are, that we are not alone. 

For this, Mr. President, for all that you have done, for 
your understanding of what we are striving for, for your 
not doubting that what we really want is an honest and 
real and true and lasting peace with our neighbors, that 
the greatest dream that we are dreaming is to cooperate 
with our neighbors, to cross the borders not with tanks but 
with tractors, to help, together with our neighbors, to build 
the area that has known so much bloodshed and so much 
war and so much destruction, to build together with our 
neighbors an area where people, men and women and 
little children, will be happy and will live and will find 
all this worthwhile. 

When that great day comes — I said the other night to 
a group of friends, we have a song about peace, what 
will happen when peace comes, and the song has a re- 
frain: This is not a fantiusy, this is not a dream, this is 
true; if it won't happen today, then tomorrow; if not 
tomorrow, then the ne.\t day, but this is not a fantasy and 
not a dream. 



Mr. President, when that ■n'cat day comes, and I am 
convinced that it will come, we will always remember that 
in days of sorrow and difficulty and danger, we were not 
alone, we had a friend. 

Ladies and gentlemen, to the President. 

note: The President spoke at 10:01 p.m. in the State Dining Room 
at the White House. 



THE PRESIDENT'S 
NEWS CONFERENCE OF 
MARCH 2, 1973 

The President. I have one announcement for those who 
are members of the traveling press. 

Meeting With President Thieu 

We have now set the date for the San Clemente meet- 
ing with President Thieu, and it will be April 2 and 3. 
Those of you who desire to go should make your plans, if 
you could, to leave on the Friday before, because I am 
going to California to attend a diimer on that occasion for 
John Ford on Saturday night, the 3 1st, and then the meet- 
ings wrill start the following Tuesday and will be concluded 
that week. 

I will take any other questions you have. 

Questions 

cease-fires in LAOS AND t:AMBODIA 

Q. Mr. President, there has been considerable specula- 
tion and interpretation after the Laos cease-fire pact to the 
effect that the Communists gained mere out of this than 
they did out of the Geneva Accords, and also a situa- 
tion in Cambodia that no one seems to be able to inter- 
pret. Originally you hinged your peace setdement on 
all of Indochina. . 

What is your expectation in these areas, and how much 
confidence do you have that stability will be maintained? 

The PREsroE.NT. Mr. Sheldon, first, with regard to 
Laos, the agreement there was made by the Royal Laotian 
Government, and it is an agreement which we, of course, 
supported and we accept. I have noted that various ele- 
ments within Laos have questioned the decision by 
Souvanna Phouma to malce the agreement that he did. 
But the key to that agreement, and what will make the 
cease-fire work is an unequivocal provision in the agree- 
ment that we made and that is for the withdra%val of all 
foreign forces from Laos. We expect that to be adhered 
to, and when that is adhered to. we believe that the 



Volum. 9 — Number 9 



(748) 



51.1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 2, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 

PSESIDENTlAl DOCUMENTS RICHAXO NIXON, 1 773 



.IS :!, But what riiiUtcrcd was thai in thr rnd. the avcra'^i- 
wnrkod out so that we almost achieved our goal of 3 pcr- 
lOIU. Wc jrot to 3.4. 

Now what wc are concerned about is to .see that in 
the negotiations in the year lj73 those negotiations are 
undertaken with enough flexiliility — some will go a little 
higher, some will go a little lower — hut with enough fle.xi- 
bility so that we don't have a wage-price push which would 
destroy the goai that everybody unanimously agrees we 
should try to achieve of 2.5 at the end of the year at the 
retail level. I am sure that co.ifuses you. 

THE AMERICAN tXDLLAR 

Q. Mr. President, what kind of trouble is the American 
dollar in in Europe, in your judgment? 

The President. Well, the American dollar, I think, 
is being attacked by international speculators. I know that 
when I use that term my sophisticates in the Treasury De- 
partment shudder because they believe these great forces 
are not determined by speculation and the rest. But as 
I look at the American economy, as I look at the American 
rate of inflation, I would say that the dollar is a good 
bet in the world markets today. 

The United States has the lowest rate of inflation of 
any major industrial country. The United States has cer- 
tainly the strongest economy of the major industrial coim- 
tries. The United States also has a program, which we 
believe is going to work, for continuing to control inflation. 
We have a very tight budget, or I should say a responsible 
budget. Let me point out, it is not a budget which is cut; 
it is a budget, however, which does not go up as much 
as some would want it to go, and therefore, one that will 
continue to cool the inflationary fires. And, of course, 
under these circumstances, we believe that the dollar is 
a sound currency and that this international attack upon 
it by people who make great sums of money by speculat- 
ing — one time they make a run on the mark and the 
ne.xt time it is on the yen, and now it is on the dollar — 
we will survive it. 

Let me say there will not be another devaluation. I 
would say, second, we are going to continue our program 
of fiscal responsibility so that the dollar will be sound 
at home and, we trust as well, abroad. And we also are 
going to continue our efforts to get the other major coun- 
tries to participate more with us in the goal that we believe 
we should all achieve, which we set out at the time of the 
Smithsonian and the other agreements, and that is of 
getting an international monetary system which is flexible 
enough to take care of these, what I believe are, temporary 
attacks on one currency or another. 

Q. Can we do anything to bring these speculators under 
control? 

The President. We cannot, because I would say for 
the mo.st part thev are operating in the international area, 
and all that we can do is to keep our dollar as sound as we 



li'.n at home, to keep our eciinomy as sound ;ls we can, to 
be ;ls rcsponsiljle ;ls we can so that the run on the dollar 
docs not mean a weakness of the .American economy or of 
the dollar, in fact, that we spend here at home. 

RENT CONTROLS 

Q. Mr. President, are you possibly giving any thought 
to reviving the Rent Control Board? 

The President. No, we are not. Rent controls have an 
enormous public appeal, particularly when you see some 
of the gouging that goes on in individual cases. The diffi- 
culty with rent control, however — and any of you who 
have visited Paris or some of the other major cities which 
have had rent control almost since World War II and see 
what has happened to rents, particularly of new dwellings, 
know what I am talking about — the difficulty with rent 
control, if you put a rent control ceiling on that is not 
economically viable so that the builders and those who will 
rent apartments and so forth cannot and will not rhake 
their investment, all that happens is that you get a shortage 
of housing, the pressures go up, and also you find that the 
landlords don't keep up the places. 

No, I do not think that rent controls is the right answer. 
I think the answer to the problem of rents is production of 
housing which will deal with it. 

the WATERGATE CASE 

Q. Mr. President, now that the Watergate case is over, 
the trial is over, could you give us your view on the verdict 
and what implications you see in the verdict on public 
confidence in the political system? 

The President. No, it would not be proper for me 
to comment on the case when it not only is not over, but 
particularly when it is also on appeal. 

I will simply say with regard to the Watergate case 
what I have said previously, that the invesdgation con- 
ducted by Mr. Dean, the White House Counsel, in which, 
incidentally, he had access to the FBI records on this par- 
ticular matter because I directed him to conduct this 
invesdgation, indicates that no one on the White House 
Staff, at the time he conducted the investigation — that 
was last July and August— was involved or had knowl- 
edge of the Watergate matter. And, as far as the balance 
of the case is concerned, it is now under investigation by 
a Congressional committee and that committee should 
go forward, conduct its investigation in an e\ en-handed 
way, going into charges made against both candidates, 
both political parties, .(^nd if it does, as Senator Ervin has 
indicated it will, we will, of course cooperate with the 
committee just as we cooperated with the grand jury. 



congressional hearings AND EXECUTTVE PRn,-ILECE 

Q. Mr. President, yesterday at the Gray hearings. 
Senator Tunney suggested he might ask the committee to 
ask for John Dean to appear before that hearing to talk 



Volume 9 — Numb«f 9 



(749) 



35-905 (PI. 2) O - 



51.1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 2, 1972, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 214, 219-20 

PRESIDENTIAl DOCUMENTS: RICHASO NIXON, 1973 



ib.iut ihe \N atcrgate rase and thi- FBI-\S'hitc House 
rcKuioMilup. W'tnild you object to that? 
I'hk 1'res;idf.nt. Of course. 
■ Q. Whv? 
I'liF. Pri'.sidf.nt. Well, because it is exccuti\e privi- 
lege. I ni^an you can't — I, of course — no President could 
e\er agree to allow the Counsel to the President to go 
down and testify before a connmittee. 

On the other hand, as far as any committee of the Con- 
gress is concerned, where information is requested that 
a member of the White Hou.se Staff may have, we will 
make arrangements to provide that information, but 
members of the White House Staff, in tfiat position at 
least, cannot be brought before a Congressional commit- 
tee in a formal hearing for testimony. I stand on the same 
position there that every President has stood on. 

Reporter. Thank you, Mr. President. 

Q. Mr. President, on that particular point, if the Coun- 
sel was involved 

The President. He always gets two. (Laughter) 

Q. — if the Counsel was involved in an illegal or im- 
proper act and the prima facie case came to light, then 
would you change the rules relative to the White House 
Counsel? 

The President. I do not expect that to happen, and 
if it should happen I would have to answer that question 
at that point. 

Let me say, too, that I know that, since you are on your 
feet, Clark [Mollenhoff], that you had asked about the 
Executive Privilege statement, and we will have that 
available toward the end of next week or the first of the 
following week, for sure, because obviously, the Ervin 
Committee is interested in that statement, and that will 
answer, I think, some of the'questions with regard to how 
information can be obtained from a member of the White 
House Staff, but consistent with executive privilege. 

Reporter. Thank you again. 

-NOTE: President Nixon's thirtieth news conference was held at 11 :08 
a.m. on Friday, March 2, 1973, in the Briefing Room at the White 
House. 



"Heart-of-the-Year" Award 
to the President 

Exchange of Remarks Between the President and Dr. 
Paul N. Yu, President of the American Heart 
Association, at the Presentation Ceremony. 
March 2. 1973 

Dr. Yu. Mr. President, each year the .American Heart 
.Association has been privileged to honor a distinguished 
■Americm with the "Heart-of-the-Year" .Award. For the 
j);i.t 4 years, Mr. President, you have graciously consented 



In priscnt the j.ward in our name. This vear we would 
like very much to have you keep it. 

Mr. President, we are really extremely pleased and 
proud to present the 197.3 "Heart-of-the-Ycar " Award 
to you in recognition of your consLstcnt suppyjrt and en- 
couragement of the voluntary action in the health field. 
Your support has helped make it possible for us to expand 
the role of the volunteer and of our voluntary health 
agency to fight the number one health problem— heart 
and blood diseases. 

.As you know, the goal of the American Heart .A.ssoci- 
ation is to conquer heart and blood vessel diseases through 
the support of cardiovascular research, education, and 
commingled services. We are very confident that with the 
sustained guidance, support, and encouragement we will 
achieve our goals. 

So, Mr. President, please accept this award as a small 
token of our great appreciation. 

The citation reads: "1973 Heart-of-the-Year Award. 
Presented by the American Heart Association to President 
Richard M. Nixon for his consistent support and encour- 
agement of voluntary programs combatting the nation's 
most serious health problem — heart and blood vessel 
diseases." 

Thank you very much. 

The President. Thank you very much, Dr. Yu. 

In accepting this award. Doctor, I want to accept it on 
behalf of those of you who deser\'e it, and that is the 
volunteers both here in the District of Columbia and all 
over this Nation. 

I noted in my talking papers that I was to mention 
the fact that I should accept it because, and make note 
of the fact that this Administration has committed ap)- 
proximately $100 million to research in the field of heart 
disease. 

But I cannot take the credit for that. The taxpayers of 
America, all of the American people, have made it possible 
to do research and go forward. 

That is the governmental side, but what is done on the 
voluntary side, which you represent here today, is equally 
important. This is the seed money, and then the volunteers 
will go far beyond that in finding, certainly, a solution to 
this problem. 

Just let me say one thing p>ersonally. .As you presented 
this here in this Oval Office of the President, I think about 
the two Presidents — the three Presidents — who preceded 
me in this office. President Eisenhower, of course, had a 
heart attack in 1955, and eventually that was the cause 
of death; and that President Johnson had a heart attack 
while he was in the Senate, and that that was the cause 
of death. 

I think back over my public life of going to visit Presi- 
dent Eisenhower in Denver right after his heart attack, 
which is something that I will never forget, and also 
going to visit President Johnson when he was in Berhesda 
Hnspital. I am not suggesting by that that Pre.sidents are 



Votumo 9 — Number 9 



(750) 



r 

I ti 



U 



51.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY^ JUNE 25^ 197 Z, 3 SSC 994 

994 

Tolson and wish him happy birthda\' or good health and possibly get 
some information from him wlien he was tallcing to him. Tiie dis- 
cussion tlien turned liark to the Hiss case and I reminded tiie Presi- 
dent of tlie strong statement he had made in 1950 regarding Truman's 
refusal to provide his committee witli information, and that speech 
might be raised at his press conference. lie asked me to go get a copj 
of that speech. 1 returned to his office shortly with a copy of the speech, 
and he asked me to discuss with him how it could be differentiated 
from the present situation. 

During the March 1 afternoon meeting the President also asked 
me some questions about executive privilege and the timing on tiie 
release of the executive privilege statement wliich he had discussed 
in his press conference on January 31. I told him that the statement, 
as far as I was concerned, was ready for release and merely would 
require the signoflP of a handful of other people. I told him I thought 
"t could be out within a week. 

It was during the days after this series of March 1 meetings with 
the President that the name Dean began coming increasingly to the 
forefront in the Gray confirmation hearings, and the rumblings were 
that there was going to be a situation where Dean could be called 
to the conamittee to testify and a number of Senators were anxious to 
use me as a vehicle to test executive privilege. On Marcli -4 or .5, I 
had a conversation with Ehrlichman in which I might add occurred 
in the hall of the West Building, in which I told him that I thought 
it would be very difficult to maintain a court test of executive privilege 
over me, when in fact I had onlv met with the President infrequentlj- 
and had had very few convei-sations with him that would be protected. 
It was following this conversation with Ehrlichman that I began 
meeting and talking with the President, at his request, witli ever 
increasmg frequency. The Presidential meeting of March 6. 

Senator Ek\tx [presiding]. A vote has been called on a 10-riiiiuite 
basis. I expect the committee had better go and come back. AVe will 
finish this statement this afternoon. 

[Recess.] 

ot^iiator Er\7X. The committee will resume. 

]\Ir. Dash. Mr. Dean, you can proceed. Senator "Weicker is here 
making a quorum, as required by our rules. 

]Mr. De.\x. Thank you. 

Meetixg of Makch 6 

This meeting was brief and a general discussion of the status of 
the Grav hearings and the President reminded me again that I should 
report directly to him and not involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
with "Watergate-related matters. 

Meettxg of ^I.\rch 7 

The President was very \inhappy with Gray's i-erforinaiico liefore 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In my meeting with him on this date 
he made a referciice to the fact that Grav's comment regarding my sit- 
ting in on the investigations by tiie FBI was absurd. lie felt it was 
perfectly projH'r that I was present at those interviews and said that 
Grav's attitude tliat he "jolly well" went forward becau-^e lie had no 



(751) 



52. On March 6, 1973 the President met with John Dean in the 
Oval Office between 11:49 a.m. and 12:00 noon. According to information 
supplied to the Senate Select Committee by White House Special Counsel 
Buzhardt, the President decided that executive privilege guidelines 
would cover former as well as present White House personnel. Dean has 
testified that the President told him to report directly to the President 
and not to involve Halderaan and Ehrlichman with Watergate-related matters. 
On March 7, 1973 the President met with Dean in the Oval Office from 
8:53 to 9:16 a.m. and, according to information supplied by Buzhardt, 
there was a discussion of executive privilege guidelines; Dean told the 
President that the White House was clear; and the President inquired as 
to how Gray was doing. Dean has testified that the President instructed 
him to tell Attorney General Kleindienst to cut off Gray from turning 
over any further Watergate reports to the Senate Judiciary Committee . 



Page 

52.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 5-7, 1973 (received from 

White House) 754 

52.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 6-7, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95. 761 

52.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 994-95 764 



(753) 



52.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 6-7, 1973 

101530 

MEETINGS AND TELEPrlQNE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN \V . DEAN, III 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns. 



May 1. 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries V/"eek. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



12:45 




11 


12:49 




09 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




.12 



The President met to sign personal legal documents with: 
The First Lady 
John J. RatcMord 
Mr. Butte .field 
Mr. Haldeman 
Mr. Ehrlichman 

John W. Dean, III ' ' 

John H. Alexander 
Richard S, Ritzel 



No other contact during August 1972 



■i1 : 



(754) 



52.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARCH 6-7, 1973 

September 15, 1972 X Q, 1 • ; , •; 

PM The President met with: 

3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 



No other contact during September 1972 



October 9, 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Newhouse Broadcasting 
and Herb Klein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting. 



November 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr. -John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of '76" with 

Rose Mary Woods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact betv/een the President and John W. Dean, III, during November 
and December 1972. 






(755) 



52. 1 MEETINGS AW CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN, MARC H 6-7, 1973 

^ — ~ 101530 

January 21, 1973 

AM 11:05 12:04 President and First Lady hosted Worship Service. 

John Dean attended. 



February 27. 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in Oval Office. 

February 28. 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office. 

March 1, 1973 

AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John V/". Dean, III, 
y/ in the Oval Office. 

y{At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
}0:36 10:44 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. too the call. 
r^Mr. Kissinger was present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 



March 6, 1973 . 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7, 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



March 8. 1973 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met v.'ith Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



(756) 



52.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE ' PRESIDENT AND 



JOHN DEAN, MARCH 6-7^ 197 Z 



March 10, 1973 



101530 




AM 9:20 9:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

President initiated the call from Canip David 
to Mr. Dean who was in V/ashington, D.C. 



March 13, 1973 

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office, 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-12:55) 



March 14, 1973 

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President. 
9:43 10:50 President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office. 

Also present ■were: 

Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 

Ronald L. Ziegler 

Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean. 

12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 
4:25 4:26 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean 

initiated the call. ) 



arch 15, 1973 

PM 3:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



5 SI 

1: 



^i 



(757) 



52.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 
JOHN DEAN^ MARCH 6-7, 1973 

March l6, 1973 iOi-JoJ 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ziegler was present from 10:58-11:10. 

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



March 17, 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested tlia t Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join hiiTi in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 

March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tallied with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore. 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



mi 



(758) 



(,/ 



March 21, 1973^" ~~^ — 

AM 10:12 xi:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Haldeman was also present for at lea.st 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:0i President met withMr. Dean in the President's 

EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr, Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman -I n 1 ^- 'id 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) 1*-^ -^'-^^^ 
ly^Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 
Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 
Mr. Haldem.an (2:01-3:40) 
Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked' long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in 'Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp Da\dd, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 

staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 
the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing.) 




(759) 



52. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND 

JOHN DEAN, MARCH 6-7, 1973 

April 16. 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 President met with Mr. Dean in. Oval Office. 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked v/ith Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

10ib30 

April 22, 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean frorn Key Biscayne. 



f 



l^p 



(760) 



52.2 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN ^S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, 
MARCH 6-7, 1973 

3. M/.V.ORANDUM Ol-^ SL'ii.STAXCls Oi-^ Or;AX'S CAfJ-S "Cj 

AXD Vi-:K'riX(-;s wi l'h Tii^: i-':ii-:.si;);-:\''L' *^ 



'3o^'i>j,i".bor l5, 1972 Dean iTiported on IRS investigation of F.-.-i-ry OT*. .' n. 

Dean rr^portod on Watergate in.nictiT:';ats . 

l-'oo v"i;a i-y ?,7, lv/3 Disci'.s.scd execuiive privilege, minoi'ity counsel 

for V/atcrgate Committee. Dean suggested Y/liite 
House aides submit answex^s to interrogatories. 

F.;"-. ruary 28, 1973 President inquired of Wate rgat.\ D..-a,i --airi .-.o V/'-Ite 

House involvement, Stans was vicliiii oi circ-irn s!..~ .ices, 
Colson was lightning rod because of iiis reputation. 
Discussed wiretappings wluch had been brought up 
in the G.ay hearings. Sullivan, Deputy Director, 
was friiv.d of Dean and Dean suggested they make 
sure that wiretaps of prior years (other Administra- 
tions) be made known. 

%'-..-rii 1, 1973 Preparation for press conference -- .;o over cuest;"' n 

and answer book. \Va:3 decided the r ■■.e.^lloa would 
co.~.-<e up as to ■.\hy Doari was sitting in on i'3I inter ■ 
views and that :"ie reason was he was coriCV'Tcting an 
i:"i\"e stigation for the President. Prefid^-nt asked 
Dean to \.>,-ri:e a rop.jrt. Dean v.-as alio c /'.'. ical of 
Gray. 



(March 2 press conference) 



March 6, 1973 Discussed executive privilege guidelines, decided 

to cover for.-.ier ^^'^hite House personnel as well as 
present. 

March 7, 1973 Again discussion executive privilege guidelines. 

Dean again told the President the White House was 
clear. The President inquired as to hov^- Pat Gray 

was doing. Deari ir. 'ormed hijn E.3. '.'•'-.■.■,' n-. s '.-■-■.d 
_^___ droo;Ded out of r.\e civil case. 



C7A1 ^ 



^^'■^-^^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^LAmmi^^ 



1704 
Exhibit No. toa 

IN THE UMTED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMVJTTEE ON PREalDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTrVITIES, ET. AL.' 

Plaintiffs 



RICHARD M. NIXO^^ 

INDrviDUALLY AND AS PRESZDENT OT THE UNITED STATES 

THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON. D. C. 

Defendant 



Civil 

Action 

No. 



AFFIDA\1T or FRED D. THOMPSON 

Fred D. Thompsoa, being swofa, deposes and says: 

1, Early is. June, 1973, the White House trazisimtted 

to the Select Corrj-aittee a rr.emoraadam (which is attached to this 
affidavit) listing certain oral corrjnunications, lioth face-to-face and 
telephonic, ■between President Richard M. Nixon and John Wesley Dean m. 
This memorandum, inter alia , include* the exact times and durations of 
these commurdcatioas, and, in the case of face-to-face conrmnunication.s, 
the other participants, if any, in those conversations. 



(762) 



52.2 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT^ SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794^95 

1795 



2. Shortly therc-afic r, I received a. telephone cill 
frorri. J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President. Dvirir.jj 
this telephone call, Mr. Eushardt related to me his understandi.-.g 

as to the substance of certain portions- of the enumerated conversatio 
between the President and Mr. Dean. 

3. During my discussioa with Mr. Buzhardt. I 
made detailed notes on the information that he gave me. Upon 
conclusion of the conversation, I promptly prepared a "Memorandum 
of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meeting with the President," a 
copy of vhich is attached to this affidavit. It is my belief that this 
ir.e3nora:::curr» accurately reflects the informatioa imparted to me by- 
Mr. Buzhi-rct. 



1<?U^ 




iZX. 



tr red D. ihompsor. 
I 



f 



Subscribed ar.d sr/orn to. bcTcre 







(763) 



52.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, Z SSC 994-95 

994 

Tolson and wish him happy birthday or good health and possibly get 
some information from him when he was talking to him. The dis- 
cussion tliwi turned back to the Hi.ss case and I reminded the Presi- 
dent of the strong- statement he had made in 1950 regarding Truman's 
refusal to provide lus committee with information, and that speech 
might be raised at his press conference. lie asked me to go get a copy 
of that speech. 1 returned to his office shortly with a copy of the speech, 
and he asked me to discuss with him how it could be differentiated 
from the present situation. 

During the March 1 afternoon meeting the President also asked 
me some questions about executive privilege and the timing on the 
release of the executive privilege statement which he had discussed, 
in his press conference on January 31. I told him that the statement, 
as far as I was concerned, was ready for release and merely would 
require the signoff of a handful of other people. I told him I thought 
it could be out within a week. 

It was during the days after this series of March 1 meetings with 
the President that the name Dean began coming increasingly to the 
forefront in the Gray confirmation hearings, and the rumblings were 
that there was going to be a situation where Dean could be called 
to the committee to testify and a number of Senators were anxious to 
use me as a vehicle to test executive privilege. On March 4 or 5, I 
had a conversation with Ehrlichman in which I might add occurred 
in the hall of the "West Building, in which I told him that I thought 
it would be very difficult to maintain a court test of executive privilege 
over me, when in fact I had only met with the President infrequently 
and had had very few conversations with him that would be protected. 
It was following this conversation with Ehrlichman that I began 
meeting and talking with the President, at his request, with ever 
increasmg frequency. The Presidential meeting of i\Iarch 6. 

Senator Er\ix [presiding]. A \ote has been called on a 10-minute 
basis. I expect the committee had better go and come back. We will 
finish this statement this afternoon. 

[Recess.] 

Senator Ervtx. The committee will resume. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Dean, you can proceed. Senator "Weicker is here 
making a quorum, as required by our rules. 

IMr. Dean. Thank yon. 

^»» jMeetixg of ]\Lvrch 6 

This meeting was brief and a general discussion of the status of 
the Gray hearings and the President reminded me again that I should 
report i^irectly to him and not involve Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
with Watergate-related matters. 

Meeting of ^Iaisch 7 

The President was very unhappy with Gray's performance before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In my meeting with him on this date 
he made a reference to the fact that Grav's comment regarding my sit- 
ting in on the investigations by the FBI was absurd. He felt it was 
perfectly proper that I was present at tliose inter\iews and said tliat 
Gray's attitude that he "jolly well" went forward because lie had no 



(764) 




52.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 3 SSC 994-96 

995 

altei-uaHve was absurd. I also disoussod with tlic Prcsidonr the taot 
that ZiL'gler was considering endorsing tlic ACLU letter to the .Tiidi- 
ciary Committee regarding the turning over of FBI materials. Tlie 
President thought that tliat was a good idea. At the end of tlic meeting 
the President instmcted me to tell the Attorney General to cut otf 
Gray from turning over any further Watergate reports to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. He said this just had to cease. 

ilEETiXG OF March 8 

I had a very brief meeting with the President on this date during 
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray from turn- 
ing over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told him 
I tnought that the matter had been taken care of by the Attorney 
General. 

Phoxe Coxatrs-vtiox of March 10 * 

The phone conversation of March 10. The President called me to tell 
me that he felt we should get the executive privilege statement out 
immediately; that this should be done before I was called before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings so 
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege was 
in response to the action by the Senate committee. 

Meeting of jVL\rch 13 

This was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up 
by a, discussion about the Gray hearings and the fact that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection 
with Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential 
of litigating the matter of executive privilege and thereby preventing 
anybody from going before any Senate committee until that matter was 
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularlv when 
I mentioned to him that it might be possible that he could also claim 
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest potential case on 
executive privilege would probably rest on the counsel to the President. 
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He 
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to go before 
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean, 
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the convei-sation, 
we got into a discussion of AVatergate mattei-s specifically. I told the 
President about the fact that there were money demands" being made 
by the seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencing of these 
individuals was not far otf. It was during this conversation that Halde- 
man came into the office. After this brief interruption bv Haldeman's 
coming in. but while he was still there. I told the President about the 
fact that there was no money to pay these individuals to meet their 
demands. He asked me how much it would cost. I told him that I could 
only make an estimate that it might be as high as $1 million or 
more. He told me that that was no problem, and lie also looked over at 
Haldeman and repeated the same statement. He then asked me who 
was demanding this money and I told him it was principallv coming 
from Hunt tlu-ough his attorney. The President then i-eferred to the 
fact that Hunt had been ))romised Executive clen\encv. He said that he 



(765) 



35-905 (Ft. 2) O - 74 - 6 



53. On or about March 7, 1973 L. Patrick Gray and John Ehrllchman 
had a telephone conversation. Gray told Ehrlichman that he was being 
pushed awfully hard in certain areas and was not giving an inch, and 
that Ehrlichman knew those areas. Gray also told Ehrlichman to tell 
Dean to be very careful about what he said and to be absolutely certain 
that he knew in his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the 
FBI, and not to make any distinction between the recipients of the 
materials. 



Page 

53.1 Transcript of tape recorded telephone conver- 
sation between John Ehrlichman and L. Patrick 
Gray, March 7 or 8, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 102, 

7 SSC 2950-51 768 

53.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2785-86 770 

53.3 L. Patrick Cray testimony, 9 SSC 3469-70, 3537-39 772 



See Book II, Paragraph 37 and Book II, Paragraph 
45 for evidence regarding Dean's transmittal of 
material from Hunt's safe to FBI agents and Acting 
FBI Director Gray. 



(767) 



33.1 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/GRAY CONVERSATION, MARCH 7 OR 8, 1973, 
SSC EXHIBIT NO. 102, 7 SSC 2950-51 



2950 



Exhibit No. 102 



Conversation with Pat <Jray, March 7 or 8, 1973 
E. Ebrllchman 
G. Gray 

E. Been testifying today? 

G. Yeah, I'm having a ball. Let me just tell you an unuaual development that 
happened today I think you'll be interested In and it's not a disaster or any- 
thing, it's just a total surprise I think to everybody including me and all 
the committee members. Over the weekend I had prepared a rather forceful 
statement saying that this function of the committee was . . the function of 
this committee was to look into my qualifications and to examine my pro- 
cedural conduct of the Watergate not to get into substance that this had 
'been assigned to the Brvin select subcommittee and they would erect the 
proper safeguards to protect those who were innocent and were just stand- 
bys in this whole matter here of this criminal offense and il talked about 
constitutional due process and the right to privacy and all that kind of stuff. 
What the hell should turn up this morning to the chairman of the committee 
and each member of the committee and then a copy was delivered to me in 
the hall as we were walking into the hearing room but a three page letter 
from the 'ACLU practically saying the same damn thing. So what has hai>- 
I>ened is that we got a state of consternation up there right now vrith the 
AOIjU and the FBI in the same bed. And I don't know what the heU they're 
going to do on that. I wanted you to know that that development occurred 
and I also got another letter today along the same lines from a professor 
who's pretty highly respected and I talked with Jim Eastland. We're going 
to throw that letter into the hopper tomorrow, too. I'll read that — that's 
one of the first things I'll do tomorrow morning. 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is that I'm l>etng pushed awfnlly 
hard in certain areas and I'm not giving an inch and you know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
Imows In his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any distinction between . . . bat that he delivered everything 
he had to the FBI. 

B. Right 

G. 'And that he delivered it to those agents . . . this is alwolutely imperative. 

E. All right. 

G. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm hitting hard and I'm 
jnst taking them on the attack. 

E. OK 

G. il wanted you to know that. 

B. Good. Keep up the good work, my boy. Let me Icnow if I can help. 

6. All right. He can help by doing that. 

E. Good, I'll do it. 



Conversation with John Dean same day immediately following 

B. Ebrllchman 

D. Dean 

D. Hello. 

E. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

D. Which is? 

E. Patrick J. Gray 
D. Oh, really? 



(768) 



53.1 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/GRAY CONVERSATION, MARCH 7 OR 8, 1973, 
SSC EXHIBIT NO. 102, 7 SSC 2950-51 



2951 

B. And he say« to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very very firm and 
steady on his story that he delivered every document to the FBI and that 
he doesn't start making nice distinctions between agents and directors 

D. He's a little worried, is he? 

E. Well, he jnst doesn't want there to be any question. He says he's hanging 
very firm and tough and there's a lot of probin' around. 

D. Yeah, he's reaUy hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript It just 
makes me gag. 

E. Heally? 

D. Oh, it's awful, John. 

E. Why did he call me? To cover his tracks? 

D. Yeah, sure. I laid this on him yesterday. 

E. Oh, I see. OK. 

D. I laid it on him to, you know, to fuse the issue so I don't have any idea what 
he said up there today. 

E. I see. It was a funny phone call. Said he was going in to object to the juris- 
diction of the group to get into the substance and that their own jurisdiction 
was to . . . was procedural efforts and his competence and he says the AOLU 
put a letter In to the same effect 

D. Yeah. Wally picked up an interesting one on the grapevine today that planned 
strategy now is to proceed In this one as they did In the KleindiensL 

E. Down to the point of calling you? 

D. Down to the point of calling me and 

E. Let him hang there? 

Well I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly slowly 
In the wind. 

D. That's right I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly where 
he was coming out He said I'm not sure that Gray's smart enough fco rtm 
the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

E. Well, OK, you're on top of it. Good. 



(769) 



53.2 JOHN EERLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2785-86 

2785 

Senator Weickjer. Let me repeat Mr. Helms' testimony or his inter- 
view rather, his interview with this committee. Helms had no idea 
what they were talking about with respect to Mexico and when he 
asked he was told: "Never mind what it's all about" but they wanted 
Walters to go to Pat Gray right then and there? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The President's instructions were not to me, they 
were to Mr. Haldeman and he is going to be your best "witness as to 
those instructions but my understanding of those instructions second- 
hand is that the President said that he wanted General Walters and 
Pat Gray to work this out between them. And that was confirmed to 
me by the President at a later time but I didn't know it at the time of 
this meeting. 

Senator Weicbler. And then we also have Greneral Walters' memo- 
randum which I have read to you in ■which he indicates concern over 
the Watergate investigation in a political sense and you disagreed 
with that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I am — the memorandum that 3'ou read to me 
was dated the 28th of 

Senator Weicker. Have you got that memorandum ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. June 28 Tvhich was considerably 

Senator Weicker. Five days afterward ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes; and, as a matter of fact after the CIA 
finally determined that it had no involvement or exposure on the 27th 
and orally informed the Bureau to that effect. It was then and only 
then that General Walters sat down and reconstructed these meetings. 

Senator Weicker. So, in effect, your testimony stands in conflict 
with the versions of that meeting told by, as I have read them to you, 
of both General Walters and Director Helms ? 

IjjEggLiciiMAN. Yes, sir. 



« 



enator Weicker. One last series of questions, Mr. Chairman, and 
then I will move along here. I would like to, if we could, get to the 
taped telephone conversations, the conversations which you taped. 

Do you have both those before you ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Which are those, Senator? 

Senator Weicker. These would be to — I find it strange in the United 
States to say which are those as if this was normal practice. These are 
the conversations with Pat Gray on March 7 or 8, and the folloAving 
conversation with John Dean, whatever that happens to be. 

I wonder if at this time we might not, Mr. Chairman, have these 
entered as exhibits. 

Senator Ervin. What do you want entered as exhibits? I didn't 
quite get what you wanted entered as exhibits. 

Senator Weicker. The two, the transcriptions of the two taped tele- 
phone conversations, the first between Mr. Ehrlichman and Pat Gray, 
the second one between Mr. Ehrlichman and John Dean. 

Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Ehrlichman identify the one that he was 
a party to ? 

Senator Weicker. He was a party to both, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. The two papers will be marked as exhibits and 
admitted as such. I am sorry, I thought maybe you were referring to 
tlic General Walters matter, the memorandum which you read pre- 
viously. We will also enter that with tlie appropriate exhibit number. 



(770) 



53,2 JOHN EHELICHMAN TESTIMONY^ JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2785-86 

2786 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 101, 102 and 
103.*] 

Mr. Wilson. Is there a pending question, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator "Weicker. I want to be sure Mr. Ehrlichman has a chance 
to look over the material. 

'Mr. Ehrlichman. That is fine. 

Senator Weicker. All right, let's get first to the conversation be- 
tween yourself and Pat Gray. The first portion of it, let me try to 
synopsize that, Gray makes some preliminary — unless you want the 
whole thing read. If you want the whole thing read we can do that. 
"Would that be better to handle it that way so there won't be any 
unfair 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Why don't you just ask whatever you have on 
your mind. Senator, and see if I can answer. 

Senator Weicker. Well, Gray, Pat Gray made some preliminary 
remarks concerning the position at the judiciary, these are phone con- 
versations of March 7 or 8, 19T3j when Pat Gray is before the 
Judiciary Committee. Subject of his confirmation, Gray made some 
preliminary remarks concerning his position, that the Judiciary Com- 
mittee could only question his procedural conduct of the investigation, 
not the substance since the Ervin committee would do that. He also 
pointed out the very same day that ACLU submitted a letter to the 
committee stating the same position. 

Gray then went on to say, and then I am going into the exact quote, 
and this is Gray to Ehrlichman: 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is that I'm being pushed awfully 
hard in certain areas and I'm not giving an inch and you know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
knows in his own mind that he delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any distinction between — 

And then something goes on that is inaudible — 

but that he delivered everything he had to the FBI. 

Now what did you assume this to mean, what is he talking aJbout 
here when he says, "And you know those areas I think you have got 
to tell John Wesley"? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume he was talking about his method of 
the delivery of the contents of Hunt's safe, the fact that some went to 
the Washington field office and some went to the Director directly. 

Senator Weicker: 

Ehrlichman. Right. 

Gray. And that he delivered it to those agents ♦ ♦ » this is absolutely . 
imperative. 

Ehrlichman. All right. 

Gray. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm hitting hard and 
I'm just talcing them on the attack. 

Ehrlichman. OK. 

Gray. I wanted you to know that. 

Ehrlichman. Good. Keep up the good work, my boy. Let me know if I can help. 

Gr^vy. All right. He can help by doing that. 

Ehrlichman. Good, I'll do it. 

You then immediately called Mr. Dean; is that correct? 
Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. 

•See pp. 2iMS-2»52. 



(771) 



53,3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIWNY , AUGUST Z, 6, 197Z, 9 SSC 2469-70, 3537-39 

3469 

sen's presence to inform Mr. Petersen that he had turned two files from 
Hunt's safe, havinof nothin;r to do with Watergate, over to me. Mr. 
Petei-sen told me that lie informed Dean to take it up with me and 
asked me if Dean had done so. I told Mr. Petersen, truthfidly, that . 
Dean had not. I certainly did not acknowledge to Mr. Petersen that 
Mr. Dean had turned over any such files to me but I do not recall Mr. 
Petersen asking me that question on this occasion. 

I must acknowledge the possibility, however, that Mr. Petersen may 
have asked me if Dean had turned over such files to me. If he did ask, 
I am certain that I would have denied receipt of such files l>ecause of 
the instructions I received from Messrs. Ehrlichman and Dean on 
June 28. the infonnation I had been given about thei.^ national security 
implications and the injunction that they '"should never see the light 
of day." 

I recall calling John Dean shortly thereafter and asking him 
whether he had told Henry Petersen about the two files. He told me 
that he had. I then asked "him, in effect, if he told Jklr. Petersen the 
whole story, namely, that the files were given to me in John Ehrlich- 
man's presence with the assurance that they had nothing to do with 
Watergate, were sensitive and classified with national security over- 
tones, should not be part of the FBI files, were political dynamite and 
clearly should not see the light of day. He said he had not told Mr. 
Petersen all of this. I told Mr. Dean that, if, as I had bsen assured, 
these files were of the v^haracter he described and had nothing to do 
with Watergate he ought not to be discussing them at all but that, if 
he did, he should at least tell Mr. Petersen the full story of their sig- 
nificance and the instructions to me. 

Within a few days after this call, perhaps the next day, I called John 
Ehrlichman. This is the conversation which, unknown to me, John 
Ehrlichman tape-recorded. I believe this committee has a transcript 
of that tape. I believe this call to be a call reflected in my logs as made 
on March 6, 1973, at Q-Mi p.m. I come to this conclusion in substantial 
part because at the outset of the conversation the transcript reports 
me as informing Ehrlichman that during my confirmation hearings 
"this morning," membere of the Judiciary Committee received copies 
of a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union objecting to my 
otfer that niembei-s of the Judiciary Committee could examine the 
entire FBI Watergate file. The transcript of my confirmation hearings 
reveals that such a letter was received by the committee on the morning 
of March 6. 

The transcript of this conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman also 
reveals that I state to Mr. Ehrlichman that: 'T am being pushed 
awfully hard in certain areas and I am not giring an inch and you 
know those areas." The assumption appears to have i^een made by 
Mr. Ehrlichman and by various membei's of this committee in their 
questioning of Mr. Ehrlichman tliat the "certain areas'' in which I was 
being ])ushcd was the leceipt l^y the FBI of the contents of Hunt's safe. 
In fact the subject of the contents of Hunt's safe did not arise in my 
confirmation liearings until the next day, March 7. 

I was being puslied, however, with respect to my turning over FBI 
repoi-ts to Mr. Dean and it was clear to me that my relationship with 
Mr. Dean v.as coming under increasing criticism by members of the 
Judiciary Committee. There is no doubt that I was concerned that the 



r 



(772) 



53.3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST Z, 6, 1973, 9 SSC 3469-70, 3537-39 

3470 

committee would, as it subsequently did, inquire into the ciiviimstanccs 
of the tumovei- to the FBI of the contents of Hnnt's safe. Because of 
the instructions I had received from Messi's. Dean and Ehrlicliman 
when the two files were given to me and my absolute conviction that 
these files, tinged with jwlitical and national secunty implications, 
had nothing whatsoever to do with Watergate, I had no intention of 
volunteering to the committee my receipt and destniction of these files 
and did not do so. I would not and did not make any false statements 
iHider oath but I acknowledge that I purposely did not volunteer this 
infonnation to the committee. 

I justi-ied my reticence not only because I then believed in the recti- 
tude of the administration whose nominee I was and in the integrity 
of rhe men who gave me the files and instructions, but because my "brieif 
look at the file of State Department cables had confirmed for me 
what I thought were overwhelming considerations of national security. 
I had Jio way of knowing then, of course, that the cables were fab- 
ricated nor. I might add. did I know then what I have since learned — 
that I was being left, in Mr. Ehrlichman's elegant phrase, to "hang 
there and twist slowly in the wind.*' 

It was in this conte.Yt, and knowing that Mr. Dean had already told 
Air. Petersen about the files, that J had mv convei-sation with :Mr. 
Ehrlichman on [March 6. There is no doubt that the messa<re I intended 
to give to Mr. Ehrlichman was that he should tell Mr. Dean that he 
should not disclose the delivery to me of those two files. 

At about 10 :;]0 p.m. on the evening of Apiil 1.5, 1973, I received a 
call from Mr. Elulichman. His remarks were very shoit. terse, and to 
the point. He simply told me that Dean had been talkinc to the prose- 
cutors for some time and "we think you ought to know about it." It 
was obvious from his tone and the manner in which he spoke that no 
questions were invited and none were asked. I merely said thanks as he 
was hanging up the phone. I may have said. "Good evening, John" or 
''Hello, John'' when I picked up" the phone and it is my finn recollec- 
tpon that he started talking right away and made no response. 

At shortly after 11 p.m.' Ehrlichman called me again. This time his 
remarks were just as short, tei-se, and to the i)oint. He said. "Dean has 
been talking about the files he gave you and von better clieck your hole 
card." 

I said, ''John, those papeis were destroyed long ago." 

Again it was plain and obvious from his tone and the manner in 
which he spoke that no questions were invited and none were asked. 

Both of these calls were of e.xtremely short duration, less than 15 
seconds each. His manner was fast talkiiig and he seemed tense, 

I know that Mr. Ehrlichman has testified that in these convei'sations 
I told him I would deny recei\ini!r the files and asked him to support 
me in that denial, I have ab.solutely no recollection of such an exchange 
and believe that both convei-sations were substantially as I have 
desciibed them, I realize that the conveisations may have been 
recorded without my knowledge. 

On :\ronday, -Vpril IG. mrn, at V) -M a.m.. A.^sistant Attorney Gen- 
eral Petei-sen came to see me. He .^aid that ^^l■. Dean told tIu>"i)rose- 
cutoi-s he ha<l turned over two of Hunt's files to me. I denied that I had 
received tliom. Mr. IVtei-sen went on to sav that Mr. Dean had said 
these two files had nothing to do with "Watergate. He also said that 



L 



(773) 



r 



53.3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 6, 1973, 9 SSC 3469-70, 3537-39 

3537 

cliargc of tlic Criminal Division. The Attorney General could have 
called nie at any time and said I want this oi- t want that from you. 
He didn't. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Senator Euvi.v. During the Judiciary hearing on your nomination, 
you contacted Jolin Ehrlichman daily, didn't you, by telephone? 

Mr. Git^\T. Sir? 

Senator Ervt.v. During the time the Senate Judiciary Committee 
was passing on your nomination to be Director of tlie FBI, you had 
daily conversations by telephone -with John P^hrlichman. 

-\Ir. Gic\Y. Mr. Chairman, I don't laiow whether they were daily or 
not but whatever my logs show in that regard that 

Senator Ermx. You have a copy of the tape of Mr. Ehrlichman of 
March 7 or 8, 1973? 

Mr. GiLVY. I have Tuesday, March 6, 1973, Mr. Ehrlichman called 
me at G :34 p.m. that evening. 

Senator P]k\ix. Now, j'ou were very much concerned that it might 
come out in the Judiciary Committee hearings that the contents of 
Hunt's safe were delivered, a part of them were delivered at one time 
to agents of the FBI other than yourself and that these two envelopes 
were dclievcred to you yourself at another time? 

Mr. Gray. I do not laiow that I was concerned. The message — if you 
arc referring to that telephone call, the message that I was giving him 
then in that March 6 telephone call did not have to do with the contents 
of 

Senator Ervix. I am asking about the ne.xt one. In other words, it 
says "another thing" — now, this is you talking to Ehrlichman — '•an- 
other thing I want to talk to )-ou about is that I am being pushed 
awfully hard in certain areas and I am not giving an inch and you 
know those areas and I think you have got to tell John Wesley" — a 
good Methodist name — "John Dean to stand awfully tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain 
that he knows his own mind, that he delivered everything he had to 
tlie FBI and do not make any distinction between, but that he de- 
livered everything he had to the FBI." 

Now, that was in effect askins John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean in 
case he testified before the Judiciary Committee that he must sny that 
eveivthing was delivered to the FBI at one time. 

:\Ir. Gray-. Senator Ervin. what I was telling Mr. Ehrlichman there 
was told to him on the evening of ^farch 6 because 

Senator Ei;\ix. Yes. 

Mr. Gray. It is not March 7 or 8 because that is tlie day on which we 
received a letter fiom the ACLF and what I was — I can pin it down 
with that because the laniruage of mine is right there with reference 
to the letter that was deliveiod on that day and tliat call was in the 
c\ening of March fi. 

Senator Ervtx. "Well 

Mr. Gray. In the areas. Mr. Chairman — ^Mr. Chairman, if I may. 
the areas T was being pushed awfully hard in were rhe fact that I had 
irivon to "Mr. Dcnn reports of FBI interviews and had permitted Mr. 
Dean to sit in <iii FBI iuterxiows. 

Senator Ervix. "Well, the interpretation T place on this is that you 
were asking John Ehrlichman to tell John "Wesley Dean to be careful 



(774) 



5S,3 L. PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3,6, 1973, 9 SSC 3469-70, 2537-39 

3538 

wliat lie said and to say that all of these thinfjs that came out, all the 
contents of Hunt's safe were delivered to FBI ajrents at one time 
instead of some of them beinp delivered to the agents and the other 
heing delivered to the Acting Director? 

Mr. Ghay. That is correct, and, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the 
message I gave to Mr. Ehrlichman was to tell John Dean to shut up 
but was not certainly a message to tell him that if asked under oath 
that he could not testify because I had previously spoken to John Dean 
on this very subject and had asked him if he had told Henr}' Petei-sen 
e\erything about those very same files that he had told me. 

Senator Ervin. Well, John Ehrlichman said, '-right,"' in reply to 
your statement? 

]Mr. Gr-vt. I do not know what that means, sir. 

Senator Ekvix. Well, you asked him to tell John Dean to say that 
all of the contents of the safe were delivered to the FBI at one time 
instead of part of them being delivered to the agents and others being 
delivered to you. 

Mr. GR-\r. I was telling John Ehrlichman to tell John Dean to shut 
up unless he told the real facts about it, no question about that. 

Senator Ervtx. And at the top of the next page it states "and he" — 
that is Dean — "delivered it to those agents. This is absolutely 
imperative." 

Mr. Gr.\y. That is correct. I told him that to distinguish between 
' the Watergate evidence and the non-Watergate evidence as the}- told 
me. 

Senator Ervtx. And Ehrlichman savs, "All rieht.'' And this buir- 
ging that John Ehrlichman did shows that he called Dean and he told 
Dean that you had called him and tliat you had said to him, Eiirlich- 
man. to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very firm and steady 
on his story that he delivered everv document to the FBI and that he 
does not start making nice distinctions between agents and directors? 

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator ER\ax. And then Ehrlichman asked Dean, why did you call 
me. that is, why did you call him — "to cover his tracks?" And Dean 
sav-s. "yeah, sui'e. I laid this on him yesterday." 

"Ehrlichman. Oh, I see. OK." 

Now, as a matter of fact, is not the interpretation of that transaction 
that you called Ehrlichman and asked him to see that Dean said, when- 
ever he talked, that all of the contents of Hunt's safe had been delivered 
to the FBI at one time, to the agents rather than part to the agents 
and pait to the Director? 

Mr. Gray. I think you have got to put that in the proper context, 
Mi-. Chairman. T had just had a call the day before from John Dean 
i-egarding tliis in wliirh T went into it chanter and vei-se with him 
jbecanse he had told Henry Petei-sen of the delivery of these two files 
■to me and I had asked John Dean if you. John, have told Henry every- 
■thing you told me about tliose files, that they were non-Watersrate 
^•vidence. non-Watergato-related. should clearly not l:)e permitted to 
see the light of day, were political dynamite. So this has got to be put 
in that proper context but there is no question about it that in that 
telephone call I was saving to John Elii'lichnian to tell Jolin Dean 
to shut up because he was making nice distinctions the>e that those 
two did not nial<e with me at all. Mv a>siiinptioii was that thov had 



(775) 



53. S L, PATRICK GRAY TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 6, 1972, 9 SSC 3469-70, 3537-39 

■do69 

delivered all of the Watergate evidence that was in Jlr. Hunt's files 
to the A^jreiicy. 

Senator Ervix. It seems to me this is a very simple proposition. Is 
this not it in its sense, that you asked Jolm Ehrlichnian to see that 
Dean refrain from telling the truth about this and tell on the contrarj- 
that all of them were delivered to the FBI at one time and John 
Elirlichman agreed to do that and to call Dean and repeat your request 
to Mm? 

Mr. Gr.\.t. Certainly, that was not my understanding of the call. 
They cannot tell me one thing, Mr. Chairman, you know, and then tell 
another thing. I certainly told— I do not make any bones about it. I 
told John Elirlichman to tell John Dean to shut up. 

Senator Er\7X. Yes. 

Mr. Gr-xt. But just the day before 

Senator Ervix. Mr. Gray 

Mr. Gray. I told- 



L 



Senator Ennx. Is it not the interpretation to be placed on this that 
you were asking P'Jirlichman to tell John Dean not to tell the truth 
about how some of them got to you and some of them to the agents of 
the FBI? 

Mr. Gray. No, sir, because 

Senator ERVi>f. Well, I do not believe I will question further. Just 
let the record show that the two tapes from John Ehrlichman — well, 
the recording, I believe, instead of bugging, two recordings of John 
Ehrlichman of his conversations be put in the record at this point 
unless somebody else interprets it. 

Now, this was thought to be a sort of ordinary burglary at first and 
then it came out that one of the burglars was the chief security officer 
of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. Then in a short time 
it was discovered that a White House consultant who then had an 
office in the "White House -was implicated, and that the chief counsel 
of the Stans' committee, Finance Committee To Re-Elect the Presi- 
dent, was also implicated, did it not? 

Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator Ervtx. So it came out while the burglary might have been 
ordinary, the burglars -were extraordinary [laughter]. And a short 
time after that you found the FBI investigations got a lead indicating 
that some political money was possibly involved in the form of four 
^lexican checks and the Dahlberg check, a total of $114,000. 

Mr. Gr.vy. That is correct, sir. We found those early in the investi- 
gation in the Republic National Bank. 

Senator Ervix. And after you started working on that you pot a 
phone call from John Ehrlichman informing you that John Dean 
was interested in the TVHute House in connection with the FBI and 
the CIA. 

Mr. Gray. I do not — Mr. Chairman. I am not sure whether you are 
referring to the first telephone convei-sation 

Senator Ei;nx. Ye.^. 

Mr. Gray. I had with — from .Mr. Ehrlichman on June -21. 

Senator EnvTX. T do not know whether it was the fiist one but the 
time he called you up and told you that Jolin Doan was representing 
tlie. White IIouso in tliis investigation. 



(776) 



54. After the call from Gray, Ehrlichman called Dean. Ehrlichman 
told Dean that Gray wanted to be sure that Dean would stay very firm 
and steady on his story that Dean had delivered every document to the 
FBI and that Dean not start making nice distinctions between agents and 
directors. Ehrlichman also told Dean that he thought they ought to let 
Gray hang there and "twist slowly, slowly in the wind." Dean agreed and 
said, "I was in with the boss this morning and that is exactly where he 
was coming out." 



Page 



54.1 Transcript of tape recorded telephone conver- 
sation between John Ehrlichman and John Dean, 
March 7 or 8, 1973, SSC Exhibit No. 102, 7 SSC 

2950-51 778 

54.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2786-88 780 



(777) 



54.1 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/DEAN CONVERSATION, MARCH 7 OR 8, 197 S, 



SSC EXHIBIT NO. 102, 7 SSC 2950-51 



2950 

Exhibit No. 102 

Conversation with Pat Gray, March 7 or 8, 1973 
E. Ehrllchman 
G. Gray 

E. Been testifying today? 

G. Yeah, I'm having a balL Let me just tell you an unnjoal development that 
happened today I think you'll be interested in and it's not a disaster or any- 
thing, it's just a total surprise I think to everybody inclnding me and all 
the committee members. Over the weekend I had prepared a rather forceful 
statement saying that this function of the committee was . . the function of 
this committee was to look Into my qualifications and to examine my pro- 
cedural conduct of the Watergate not to get into substance that this had 
been assigned to the EJrvin select subcommittee and they would erect the 
proper safeguards to protect those who were innocent and were just stand- 
bys in this whole matter here of this criminal offense and i talked about 
constitutional due process and the right to privacy and all that kind of stuff. 
What the hell should ttim up this morning to the chairman of the committee 
and each member of the committee anu then a copy was delivered to me in 
the hall as we were walking into the hearing room but a three page letter 
from the ACLU practically saying the same damn thing. So what has hai>- 
pened is that we got a state of consternation up there right now with the 
AOI/TJ and the FBI in the same bed. And I don't know what the heU they're 
going to do on that I wanted you to know that that development occurred 
and I also got another letter today along the same lines from a professor 
who's pretty highly respected and I talked with Jim EJastland^ We're going 
to throw that letter into the hopper tomorrow, too. Ill read that — that's 
one of the first things I'll do tomorrow morning. 

Another thing I want to talk to yon about is that I'm being pushed awfnlly- 
bard in certain areas and I'm not ^ving an inch and yon know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tl^t In the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
knows in his own mind that be delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any dlsttnctioa betwe«i . . . bnt that he delivered everything 
he had to the FBI. 

E. Right 

G. And that he delivered it to those agents . . . this is absolutely, imperative. 

E. All right. 

G. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm bitting hard and I'm 
just taking them on the atta<^ 

E. OK 

G. I wanted you to know that. 

B. Good. Keep xtp the good work, my boy. Let me know if I can help. 

G. All right. He can help by doing that. 

E. Good, 111 do it. 



Conversation with John Dean same day immediately following 

E. Ehrlichman 

D. Dean 

D. Hello. 

E. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

D. Which Is? 

E. Patrick J. Gray 
D. Oh, really? 



(778) 



54.1 TRANSCRIPT OF EHRLICHMAN/DEAN CONVERSATION, MARCH 7 OR 8, 197 S, 
SSC EXHIBIT NO, 102, 7 SSC 2950-51 

2951 

E. And he says to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very very firm and 
steady ■on his story that he delivered every document to the FBI and that 
he doesn't start making nice distinctions between agents and directors. 

D. He's a little worried, is he? 

E. Well, he just doesn't want there to be any question. He says he's hanging 
Tery firm and tongb and there's a lot of probin' around. 

D. Yeah, he's really hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript. It joat 
makes m« gag. 

E. BeaUy? 

D. Oh, it's awful, John. 

E. Why did he call me ? To cover his tracks ? 

D. Xeah, sure. I laid this on him yesterday. 

E. Oh, I see. OK. 

D. I laid it on him to, you know, to fuse the issue so I don't have any idea what 
he said up there today. 

E. I see. It was a funny phone call. Said he was going in to object to the juris- 
diction of the group to get into the substance and that their own jurisdiction 
■was to . . . was procedural efiforts and his competence and he says the ACLU 
put a letter In to the same effect. 

D. Yeah. Wally picked up an interesting one on the grapevine today that planned 
strategy now is to proceed in this one as they did in the Kleindienst, 

E. Down to the point of calling you ? 

D. Down to the point of calling me and 

E. Let him hang there? 

Well I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist sloiwly slowly 
in the wind. 

D. That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly where 
he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray's smart enough to run 
the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

E. Well, OK, yoii're <hi top of it. Good. 



(779) 



54.2 JOHN EHRLICnmN TESTIMONY, JULY 27^ 197 Z, 7 SSC 2786-88 

2786 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 101, 102, and 
103.*] 

Mr. WrLSOK. Is there a pending question, jNIr. Chairman? 

Senator Weicker. I want to be sure Mr. Ehrlichman has a chance 
to look over the material. 

^ir. Ehrlichjian. That is fine. 

Senator Weicker. All right, let's get first to the conversation be- 
tween yourself and Pat Gray. The first portion of it, let me try to 
synopsize that, Gray makes some preliminary — imless you want the 
whole thing read. If you want the whole thing read we can do that. 
AV'ould that be better to handle it that way so there won't be any 
unfair 

Mr. Ehrlici jian. "Why don't you just ask whatever you have on 
your mind. Senator, and see if I can answer. 

Senator Weicker. Well, Gray, Pat Gray made some preliminary 
remarks concerning the position at the judiciary, these are phone con- 
versations of March 7 or 8, 1973, when Pat Gray is before the 
Judiciarj- Committee. Subject of his confirmation, Gray made some 
preliminary remarks concerning his position, that the Judiciary Com- 
mittee could only question his procedural conduct of the investigation, 
not the substance since the Er\-in committee would do that. He also 
pointed out the very same day that ACLU submitted a letter to the 
committee stating the same position. 

Gray then went on to say, and then I am going into the exact quote, 
and this is Gray to Ehrlichman: 

Another thing I want to talk to you about is that I'm being poshed awfully 
hard in certain areas and I'm not giving an inch and you know those areas 
and I think you've got to tell John Wesley to stand awful tight in the saddle 
and be very careful about what he says and to be absolutely certain that he 
knows in his own mind that ho delivered everything he had to the FBI and 
don't make any distinction between — 

And then something goes on that is inaudible — 

but that he delivered everything he had to ttie FBI. 

Now what did you assume this to mean, what is he talking about 
here when he says, "And you know those areas I think you have got 
to tellJohn Wesley"? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I assume he was talking about his method of 
the delivery of the contents of Hunt's safe, the fact that some went to 
the Washington field office and some went to the Director directly. 

Senator Weicker: 

Ehruchman. Right. 

Grat. And that he delivered it to t^'ose agents * • • this is absolutely 
imperative. 

Ehruchman. All right. 

Gr-^y. You know I've got a couple of areas up there that I'm hitting hard and 
I'm just taking them on the attack. 

Ehrlichman. OK. 

Gray. I wautiHl you to know that. 

EnBLicHM.i.v. Good. Keep up the gootl work, my boy. Let me know if I can help. 

Gr.\y. Alt right. He can help by doing that. 

BHRticHMAN-. Good, I'll do it. 



n 



You tlien immediately called Mr. Dean; is that correct? 
Mr. EHRLiciiaiAx. Yes, sir. 



Sec pp. 2WS-2052. 



(780) 



54.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2786-88 

2787 

Senator Weickzr. I would like to go ahead and read, if we could, 
this conversation. 

Dean. Hello. 

BHELICHMA^f. Hi. Just had a call from your favorite witness. 

Dean. Which is? 

Ehbuchman. Patrick J. Gray. 

Dean. Oh, really? 

Ehelichmain. And he says to make sure that old John W. Dean stays very, 
very firm and steady on his story that he delivered every document to the FBI 
and thS't he doesn't start making nice distinctions between agents and directors. 

Dean. He's a little worried, is he? 

Ehblichman. Well, he just doesn't want there to be any question. He says he's 
hanging very firm and tough and there's a lot of probing around. 

Dean. Teah, he's really hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript. It just 
makes me gag. 

Ehklichman. Really? 

Dean. Oh, it's awful, John. 

Ehblichman. Why did he call me? To cover his tracks? 

Dean. Teah, sure. I laid this on him yesterday. 

Ehruchman. Oh, I see. OK. 

Dean. I laid it on him to, you know to fuse the issue so I don't have any Idea 
what he said up there today. 

Ehblichman. I see. It was a funny phone call. Said he was going in to object 
to the jurisdiction of the group to get into the substance and that their only 
jurisdiction was to — 

again inaudible there — 

was procedural efforts and his competence and he says the AOL/U put a letter in 
to the same effect. 

Dean. Teah. Wally picked up an interesting one on the grapevine today that 
planned strategy now is to proceed in this one as they did in the Kleindienst. 

EHRLICHMAN. Down to the point of calling yon? 

Dean. Down to the point of calling me and 

EHRLICHMAN. Let him hang there? 

Well, I think we ought to let him hang there. Let him twist slowly, slowly in 
the wind. 

Dean. That's right. I was in with the boss this morning and that's exactly 
where he was coming out. He said I'm not sure that Gray is smart enough to run 
the Bureau the way he's handling himself. 

EHRLICHMAN. Well, OK, you're on top of it. Good. 

Now, Mr. Ehrlichman, that portion of the transcript, "Yes, sure, 
I laid this on him yesterday," and you said "Oh, I see. OK." What is 
being referred to there? 

Mr. EnnLiCHM.AX. I do not know. I do not know and never did 
know, I do not know what Mr. Dean had talked to him the previous 
day about. I was looking as you were reading, to see if I could see what 
had been transpiring in that particular week in those hearings, and it 
seems to me that the issue was primarily 

Senator WEirKER. Dean sat in on the interviews that the FBI con- 
ducted during the Watergate investigation and the question of whether 
Dean would come to the Judiciary Committee and testif}-. 

>[r. EniiLirint.vN. I think that this was one of a series of telephone 
calls that Mr. Gray made to me and Mr. Dean at the close of his testi- 
fving every day to give us his view of how things had gone for the 
day, sometimes rather optimistic, but in direct response to your ques- 
tion, I do not know to what that does refer, that is to say," what ilr. 
Dean talked to him about the previous day. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, that, would then go into the same 
aioa of ''I laid it on him, too. vou know, to fuse the issue."' Again vour 



(781) 



35-905 (PI. 2) O - 



54.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2786-1 

2788 



L 



response would be similar there — yoii do not understand what he was 
talkin<r about? 

Mr. EunLictiMAX. Well, that is correct; unless it refere back to this 
question of who the documents were delivered to. If it refers to some 
other subject, I do not know. 

Senator Wek-ker. Let me ask you a question. Yesterday you testified 
to two separate events. One was April 15 where Mr. Petersen and 
Attorney General Kleindienst informed the President, and I think 
3'ou said yourself also, of the fact that the record, the Hunt records, 
had been burned by Pat Gray and that pi-ecipitated the phone con- 
versation. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, sir. They had a conversation 

Senator Weicker. If I can finish that, that precipitates the phone 
conversation to Gray in the evening? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No. At the time of that telephone call in the 
evening, neither the President nor I knew or had any reason to believe 
that Mr. Gray had destroyed the docnments. 

Senator Weicker. Well, I think it might be — let me get back to 
that question, I will get back to that question in just a minute. 

You also — let me drop back in time — at the beginning of April, you 
■went out and you had a talk witli Judge Byrne relative to the FBI 
directorship. Now, it is clear from this taped telephone convereation 
that you do not think very much of jNIr. Gray unless for some reason 
or another swinging around in the breeze is a new term of endearment 
that I do not know anj-thing about, and obviously, from what John 
Dean says, the President does not think very nuich of Pat Gray. He 
says that "I am not sure Gray is smart enough to run the Bureau the 
Avay he is handling himself," and obviously. Dean, Dean says, "He 
makes me gag." So John Dean does not thing very much of Pat Gray. 
What in heavens' name is Pat Gray doing up there at these confirma- 
tion liearings as the nominee of the administration ? 

Mr. Ehrlichjiax. Well, Senator, I think you will remember those 
confirmation hearings and the revelations of the manner in wliich Mr. 
Gray responded during the hearings, and I think it is fair to say that 
there was pretty general disenchantment in the manner in which he 
handled himself during that time. Wliat I was looking at while you 
were reading was the various events that took place starting back 
around the first of the month in those hearings, and climaxing on the 
23d of March with Mr. Gray saying that John Dean probably lied to 
the FBI, and then later privately recanting that charge to \[t. Dean 
and admitting that it was an overstatement, and so on. At this point 
in time there was general disenchantment of Mr. Gray's conduct in the 
process of confii-mation. there is not a!iy question about it. 

Senator Weicker. But. do you mean to tell me if there is this degree 
of disenchantment that you are going to keep this man on as the 
nominee and then later on as Acting Director, in fact, until April 27, 
when, in fact, it is Pat Gray tliat ste[)s down, is that correct i There 
nuist be some reason, tliero must Ik" sonie reason. 

Mr. EHT{r,icFT:MAX. Well, I think the situation was evaluated as being 
perhaps doubtful and painful as it existed but j'jerhaps more painful 
to withdraw the problem, aiui so there was a weighing of the alterna- 
tive evils, and it was felt on balance that at some time along in there 



(782) 



55. On March 8, 1973 Dean met with the President in the Oval 
Office from 9:51 to 9:54 a.m. Dean has testified that the President 
asked if something had been done to stop Gray from turning over FBI 
materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Dean replied that he 
believed the matter had been taken care of by Attorney General Klein- 
dienst. On March 10 the President and Dean spoke by telephone from 
9:20 to 9:44 a.m. Dean has testified that the President called to 
tell him that the executive privilege statement should be got out 
immediately, and that this should be done before Dean was called before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings 
so that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege 
was in response to the action by the Senate committee. 



Page 



55.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 8 and 10, 

1973 (received from White House) 784 

55.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 995 791 

55.3 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 8, 1973 (received 
from SSC) and accompanying Fred Thompson affidavit , 

4 SSC 1494-95 792 



(783) 



55,1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10 ^ 197 Z 



101530 

MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN V,^ DEAN, III 



No contact between the President and John W, Dean, III, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 inconne tax returns. 



May 1, 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



The President met to sign personal legal documents with: 



12:45 




11 


The First Lady 


12:49 




09 


John J. Ratchford 


12:49 




11 


Mr. Butte rfield 


12:49 




11 


Mr. Haldeman 


12:49 




12 


Mr. Ehrlichman 


12:49 




12 


John W. Dean, UI 


12:49 




12 


John H. Alexander 


12:49 




12 


Richard S. Ritzel 



No other contact during August 1972 



WH" 



(784) 



55.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 1973 

Scptc^mbcv 15, 1972 rnVr-'C'- 

PM The President met with: 

3:15 6:17 Ivlr. Jfaldemar. 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 

No other contact during September 1972 



October 9. 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met v/ith Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Newhouse Broadcasting- 
and Kerb JQein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting. 



November 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr. -John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President m.et aboard "Spirit of !76" with 

Rose Mary AVoods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during November 
and December 1972. 



^A- 



(785) 



55. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 1972 



101530 



January 21, 1973 



AM 11:05 12:04 President and First Lady hosted Worship Service. 

John Dean attended. 



February 27, 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in Oval Office, 



February 28, 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office, 



March 1, 1973 

AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean, III, 

in the Oval Office. 
'(At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
J0:36 10:44 President met with Mr, Dean in the Oval Office. too the call.) 
jy^yir, Kissinger was present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 




March 6, 1973 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7, 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



March 8. 1973 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met v/ith Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 






55.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 1973 




March 10. 1973 



101530 



AM 9:20 9:44 President talked long distance v/ith Mr. Dean. 

President initiated the call from Camp David 
to Mr. Dean who was in V/asliington, D. C. 



March 13, 1973 

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-12:55) 



March 14, 1973 

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President. 
9:43 10:50 President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office, 

Also present were: 

Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 

Ronald L. Ziegler 

Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean. 

12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 
4:25 4:26 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean 

initiated the call. ) 




arch 15, 1973 

PM 3:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



(787) 



:i 



55. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 1972 



iMarch 16, 1973 lui-JOJ 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr, Ziegler was present from. 10:58-11:10. 

PAl 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



March 17, 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested tliat Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join him in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr, Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 

March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tallied with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore. 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean, (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



(788) 



55. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 1973 



March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President rr.et with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Halcleman was also present for at least 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:01 President met withMr. Dean in the President's 

EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman ifAl'-'in 

Mr, Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) l'-* -^'-^^^ 
ly^Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 
Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 
Mr. Haldeman (2:01-3:40) 
Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in "Washington, D. C.) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp Davdd, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 
*-■ staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Roonn which 

the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 



WH 



55.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT 
AND JOHN DEAN, MARCH 8 AND 10, 197 Z 

April 16, 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 President met with Mr. Dean in Oval Office. 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

KJibao 

April 22, 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean from Key Biscayne. 



(790) 




I- 



55.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 2S, 1973, 3 SSC 995 

995 

.•iltornarlve was absnv.l. T al.so disoiissod with tlir I'lTsidoat tlio fact 
that Zi(\i,diT was consiilfi-in^^- oiul(irsiu;r tlic ACLT" Icttoi- to the Jiicli- 
ciary Coiiiniittef rei^ardini; tlio turaino- ovfr of FBI materials. The 
Pivsulcut thought that that was a irood idea. At tlu- end of the meetinir 
the President instnicted me to tell the Attornev Geueial to cut o5 
Gray from turning o\-er any further Watergate reports to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. He said tiiis just had to cease. 

^Ieetixg of March 8 

I had a very brief meeting with the President ou this date during 
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray from lurn- 
ing over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told hun 
I thought that the matter had been taken, care of by the Attorney 
General. 

PhON-E CoX^TRS.iTIOX OF ]VLiRCII 10 

The phone conversation of March 10. The President called me to tell 
nie that he felt we should get the e.xecutive privilege statement out 
immediately; that this should be done before I was called before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings so 
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privile"-e°was 
in response to the action by the Senate committee. " 

Meeting of March 13 

This was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up 
by a discussioft about the Gray hearings and the fact that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection 
with Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential 
of htigating the matter of executive privilege and thereby preventing 
anybody from gomg before any Senate committee until tluit matter was 
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularly when 
I mentioned to him that it might be possible tiiat he could also claim 
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest potential case on 
executive pnvilege would probably rest on the counsel to the President. 
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He 
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to co before 
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean, 
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the convei-sation, 
we got into a discussion of Watergate matters specifically. I told the 
President about the fact that there were money demands beintr made 
by the seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencin<r o'f these 
individuals was not far off. It was during this conveisation that Halde- 
man came into the ofHce. After this brief interruption by Haldeman's 
coming in. but whde he was still there. I told tiie Pi-osident about the 
fact that there was no money to pay these individuals to meet their 
demands. He asked me how much it would cost. I told him that I could 
only make an estimate that it might be as high as i=;i million or 
more. He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at 
Haldeman and repeated the same statement. He then asked me who 
was demanding tins money and I told liim it was principally comino- 
from Hunt through his attorney. The President then referred to the 
tact that Hunt had been ))iomised Executix e clemency. He said that he 



(791) 



SS.3 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT 



MARCH 8j_ 1973 



■ :-. ■■■;. Lv/3 



•. ■; :o. !'r/3 



Prc:;.i''.ij 111. ir,CMii-i:ri .-.s to v/ri'>:ri'-; r C'i.o.^jiri 
'r.f;li.:a .'■Ji:,' r>.-i-'^i . Oi-an :;aid no. 



x^ 



{M:-i,c]\ IZ; I ;>! •:<] slat'-'inoiit oti ■■.•x.:i:'.ilivo ^)rivi'.;go, 
a;)o!i.ji to pio:ior.t a;id foniier liLRrfors Vi'x'c .vilL pro- 
vid.; i.v'o iT,\?.Lioa. ) 



M:-.-.-h 13, 1973 



Prcpara.ioii lo..' ^■/os.-; conrciOacc. V/ont over q'j:as- 
tioas a.ud an:,-wers. l-'resi'iLint ir.quired as to Kon 
Rietz. D>iati 3aid no illey?.lity involved. President 
F..skcd if Colson or Ilaldemaa know Soj^reiti. Pronidont 
asked if Viitchcll and Colson kr.^w oi \''p.i,:,:^PL\.e, 
I3oan said t!;^' ro was nothing specific on Colson; 'a-.t 
'ne <-.ida't know -I'-ont Mitchell but tliat Strachan ■:ouid 
be i,-.volvod. P/osident states again "-'aat Dean should 
conipilo a \vi-it;,.Mi x-eport about the maLter. Dean 
said Si.'ica was a iian;;;ing Judge, the President said 
he liked h.r. ,-i^ii-ig ji'^' ■. They discussed fund raising 
before April 7. Ooan said l:\at everything that had -j.JGn 
done was legal. 



V^..-<-h 14, 1973 



.s . -i :' C a 17, 



i-^ress conierenci 



was r.i 



■ cussed 



ouo.?:;ions and 



ar.owers. Discussed ijNOc-'.'.ive privilege. Decided 
they ;vcedcd a Sapren^ie Court tost. Deci'-.ed th=t 
ihc President should discuss his 19r3 position. 
Tliat afternoon t:ie President sii';gested Dean should 
po.'j .".ih-y nppoa.' bi-fc^^re the press ar.d discussed wr.ether 
C'-.apin .,'.;ould r.'.:-.ko a stateni.ont about Segretti. The 
Gray ".,0.-. ri.igs :-..i(i th.e use of FBI files were also 
discussed. 



;s coaierence. 



i nai ai: 



.oon 



Pre side. it held ; 

discussed tr.at cay's press conference and decid-'.f 

use of "separation of powers" instead of executiv* 



privilege terminology. 



March 



1973 



The President reiterated his position on use of raw 
i'BI :.;les. Suggested Dean's written report be 

acoo^.'.p-.aied by affidavits. Dean suggested unti.i-.ely 
rc'jase of writ:en report might prejudice rigiits of 
i.i.iocer.t p.:^ople. i^iscvisied pos.-ibiliiy o: gettip.j 



-2- 



.^ 



V 



(792) 



55.3 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO, 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 



1794 
Exhibit No. 70A 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SE1.ECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES. ET. AL.- 

Plaintiffs 



RICHARD M. NTXO>U 

INDIVLDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE ITNiXED STATES; 

THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Defendant 



Civil 

Action 

No. 



AFFIDAVIT OF FRED D. THOMPSON 

Fred D. Thonnpson, being sworn, deposes and says: 

1, Early in June, 1973, the White House traas nutted 

to the Select Conimittea a memorandum (which is attached to this 
affidavit) listing certain oral communications, both {ace-to-face and 
telephonic, between President Richard \1. Nixon and John Wesley Deaa m. 
This memorandum, inter alta , includes the exact times and durations of 
these communications, and, in the case of face-to-face communications, 
the other participants, if any, in those conversations. 



(793) 



55.3 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT^ SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 

1795 



2. Shortly thereafter, I received a t'-lej^hone ':.'i.*i 
from. J. Tred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the Presicer.c. Durir.jj 
this telephone call, Mr. Buzhardt related to me his understanding 

as to tne substance of certain portions of the enumerated conversations 
between the President and Mr. Dea.n. 

3. During my discussion with Mr. Buzhardt, I 
made detailed notes on the information that he gave me. Upon 
conclusion of the conversation, I pronrvptly prepared a. "Memorandum 
of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meeting with the President," a. 
copy of ^'h;ch is attached to this affidavit. It is my belief that this 
ir.eaioraTicurrA accurately reflects the Lnformatioa imparted to me by- 
Mr. Buiharct. 




Subscribed and S7;orn to. befor-e 




:3.ry ?-ajj.ic. B.C. 



I ^ C3"i;; 



,^ 



-xcires. 






(794) 



56. On March 12, 1973 the President Issued a statement on exec- 
utive privilege. The statement set forth in part: 

A member or former member of the President's personal 
staff normally shall follow the well-established pre- 
cedent and decline a request for a formal appearance 
before a committee of the Congress. At the same time, 
it will continue to be my policy to provide all nec- 
essary and relevant information through informal 
contacts between my present staff and committees of 
the Congress in ways which preserve intact the Con- 
stitutional separation of the branches. 



Page 



56.1 President Nixon statement, March 12, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 253-54 796 



(795) 



56.1 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEmNT, MARCH 12, 1972, 
9 Pm:SIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 25S-54 



P^tSiai.srWl. DOCU.McNrv SICHiia MIXON, I973 



r MO ■ I\/^-l '07'' 

Pr-.laniaf.ov. 419.1. Mcrch 12, 1973 

Sy th:: President cj ihe United States o,' America 
a Proclamation 

In 110 facet of our national life Ls the- American genius 
for independence, innovation and self-improvement better 
disnlayod than in the small business community. 

Tlis instinct to create, sustain and expand an inde- 
pendent enterprise is as old as America herself — an im- 
pure that brought the earliest setders to our shores and 
moii\ated generation after generation of our cidzens in 
their onward, upward march. Nowhere is it more clearly 
evident today than among our Nation's 8 million small 
businesses. 

In the past year alone, more than 70 thousand new 
companies were started. Nineteen out of ever)' twenty 
firms are considered small business, and they provide ap- 
proximately 35 million jobs, and contribute more than 
$420 billion to the gross nadonal product. 

They also provide a ladder of opportunity to hard 
working, ambitious Americans of all races and creeds — 
the chance to harness individual initiative and ability to 
the mighty potentials of the free enterprise system. As 
long as .America remains true to her heritage, the small 
businessman will continue as a mainstay of our economy 
and our society. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Ndcox, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby designate the week 
beginning May 13, 1973, as Small Business AVeek. I ask 
all Americans to share with me during this week a 
deep pride m the many accomplishments of our Nation's 
small businessmen and women, and in the invaluable con- 
tribution they have made to our free way of life. 

In \VrrNESs Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 12th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred seventy-three, and of the Independence of the 
United States of Am.erica the one hundred ninety- 
seventh. 

Richard Nixon 

[Filed with the Ofnce of the Federal Register, 2:57 p.m., 
March 12, 1973] 



Executive Privilege 



Slatnnent by the President. March 12, 1973 

l>.i!;;v; my pre-vS conference of Janunrj 3\, 1073, 1 
s'.itrti in.ii I would is>uc a statement outlining my views on 
f^ ■ '■•'.'.<■ privilcLjc. 



The doctrine of e;-;':cut;vc pri.vilege is well fsc-iCjiished. 
It \».''-S first invoked by President Washington, and it has 
been rccogni/.ed and utilized by our Presidents for al.most 
2O0 years since that time. The doctrine is rooted in the 
Ccnjtitution, which vests "the Executive Power" solely in 
the President, and it Ls designed to protect communicadons 
vrithun the executive branch in a variety of circumstances 
in tim.e of both war and peace. Without such protection, 
our m.ilitarv security, our relations with other countries, 
our law enforcement procedures, and many other aspects 
of the national Intertst could be significandy damaged and 
the decisionmaking process of the executive branch codd 
be impaired. 

The general policy of this Administration regarding the 
use of e.xecutive prinlege during the next 4 ) ears uill be 
the same as the one we have followed during t'ne past 4 
years and v.hich I outlined in my press conference : Execu- 
ti\e privilege will not be used as a shield to prevent em- 
barrassing information from being made available but 
will be exercised only in those particular instances in which 
disclosure would harm the public interest. 

I first enunciated this policy in a memorandum of 
March 24, 1969, which I sent to Cabinet officers and 
heads of agencies. The memorandum read in part: 

'"The policy of this Administration is to comply to the 
fullest extent possible with Congressional requests for 
information. While the Executive branch has the re- 
sponsibihty of withholding certain information the dis- 
closure of \vhich would be incompatible with the public 
interest, this Administration wiH invoke this authority 
only in the most compelling circumstances and after a 
rigorous inquiry into the actual need for its exercise. 
For those reasons Executive privilege will not be used 
without specific Presidential approval." 

In recent weeks, questions have been raised about the 
availability of officials in the executive branch to present 
testimony before committees of the Congress. .'\s my 1969 
memorandum dealt primarily with guidelines for provid- 
ing information to the Congress and did not focus speciS- 
cally on appearances by officers of the executive branch 
and members of the President's personal staff, it would be 
useful to outline my policies concerning the latter question. 

During the first 4 years of my Presidency, hundreds of 
Administration officiak spent thousands of hours freely 
testifying before committees of the Congress. Secretary of 
Defense Laird, for instance, made 85 separate appearances 
before Congressional co.Timittecs, engaging in over 327 
hou.-s of testimony. By contrast, there were only three oc- 
casions during the first term of my Administration when 
executive privilege ^^■;ls in\ okcd ap.\"svhs:rc in the executive 
branch in response- to a Congressional request for informa- 
tion. These facts spe.ik not of a closed Administntioa but 
of one that is pledged to openness and i> proud to stand 
on iy record. 



(796) 



56. 1 PRESIDENT NIXON STATEMENT, MABCH 12, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL WCVmNTS 252-54 

PSE515fNriAU DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 17r3 



p-cqupsts for Con,n"e.^Monal apn":iranrcs I'v mombcrs if 
ihr PrcMdeni's pcr!>onal stjfT present a diftcrtnt .--ituiition 
;:nd raise different considerations. Such requests hive been 
relatively infrequent through the years, and in past admin- 
istrations they liave been routinely declined. I have fol- 
lowed that same tradition in my Administration, and I in- 
tend to continue it during the remainder of my term. 

Under the doctrine of separation of pov\ers, the manner 
in which the President personally exercises his assigned 
executive powers is not subject to que.stioning by another 
branch of Government. If the President is not subject to 
such questioning, it is equally appropriate that members of 
his staff not be so questioned, for their roles are in effect 
an extension of the Presidency. 

This tradition rests on more than Constitutional doc- 
trine: It is also a practical necessity. To insure the effec- 
tive discharge of the executive responsibility, a President 
must be able to place absolute confidence in the advice and 
assistance ofTered by the members of his staff. And in the 
performance of their duties for the President, those staff 
members must not be inhibited by the possibility that their 
advice and assistance will ever become a matter of public 
debate, either during their tenure in Government or at a 
later date. Otherwise, the candor with which advice is 
rendered and the quality of such assistance will inevitably 
be compromised and' weakened. What is at stake, there- 
fore, is not simply a question of confidentiality but the 
integrity of the decisionmaking process at the \ ery highest 
levels of our Government. 

The considerations I have just outlined have been and 
must be recognized in other fields, in and out of govern- 
ment. A law clerk, for instance, b not subject to inter- 
rogation about the factors or discussions that preceded a 
decision of the judge. 

For these reasons, just as I shall not invoke executive 
privilege lightly, I shall also look to the Congress to con- 
tinue this proper tradition in asking for executive branch 
testimony only from the officers properly constituted to 
provide the information sought, and only when the elicit- 
ing of such testimony will serve a genuine legislative 
purpose. 

As I stated in my press conference on January 3 1 , the 
question of whether circumstances warrant the exercise 
of executive privilege should be determined on a case-by- 
case basis. In making such decisions, I shall rely on the 
following guidelines: 

1. In the case of a department or agency, every official 
shall comply with a reasonable request for an appearance 
before the Congress, pro\nded that the performance of 
the duties of his office will not be seriously impaired 
thereby. If the official believes that a Congressional request 
for a particular document or for testimony on a particular 
point raises a substantial question as to the need for in- 
voking executive privilege, he shall comply with the pro- 
cedures set forth in my mcmo.'-andum of March 24, 1959. 



Tlu:s, c:ccriitive privilege will not bi: invoked ii.itil th^ 
compelling need for its exercise has li'-f-n clearly demon- 
strated ^nd the request has been approved first by the 
Attorney General and then by the President. 

2. A Cabinet officer or any other Government official 
who also holds a petition as a member of the president's 
personal staff shall comply with any reasonable request 
to testify in his non-White House capacity, provided that 
the performance of his duties will not be seriously impaired 
thereby. If the official believes that the request raises a sub- 
stantial question as to the need for invoking executive 
privilege, he shall comply vdlh the procedures set forth 
in my memorandum of March 24, 1969. i 

3. A member or former member of the President's per- 
sonal staff normally shall follow the well-established prec- 
edent and decline a request for a formal appearance be- 
fore a committee of the Congress. At the same time, it 
will continue to be my policy to provide aU necessary and 
relevant information through informal contacts between 
my present staff and committees of the Congress in ways 
which preserve intact the Constitutional separation of the 
branches. — — 

note: The text of the memorandun] to which the staterr.ent refers 
was also made available by the White House Press Office, as follows; 

Marefi 2+, 1969 

Memorandum for the He.«)s of Executive Departments and 
Agencies 

Subject: Estabushixo a PaocEDURE to Govern CoMrUAMCE 
With Congressiox.\i. Dema.nds for Infohmation 

The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest 
extent possible with Congressional requests for information. \Vhile 
the Executive branch has the responsibility of withholding certain 
information the disclosure of which would be incompatible with 
the public interest, this Administration will invoke this authority 
only in the most compelling tnrcumstances and after a rigorous 
inquiry into the actual need for its exercise. For those reasons Execu- 
tive privilege will not be used without specific Presidential approval. 
The following procedural steps will govern the invocation of Execu- 
tive privilege: 

1. If the head of an Executive department or agency (hereafter 
referred to as "department head") believes that compliance with 
a request for information from a Congressional agency addressed 
to his department or agency raises a substantial question as to the 
need for invoking Executive privilege, he should consult the .\ttor- 
ney General through the OSce of Legal Counsel of the Department 
of Justice. 

2. If the department head and the Attorney General agree, in 
accordance with the policy set forth above, that Executive privilege 
shall not be invoked in the circumstances, the infomiation shall be 
released to the inquiring Congressional agency. 

3. If the department head and the .Attorney General agree that 
the circumstances justify the invocation of E.vecutive privilege, or 
if cither of them believes that the issue should be submitted to the 
President, the matter shall be transmitted to the Counsel to the 
President, ^ho will advise the department head of the President's 
decision. 

4. In the event of a Presidential decision to invoke Executive 
privilege, the department head should advise the Congressional 
agency that the cliim of Excrulivr privilege is being made with the 
specific approval of the President. 

r>. Fending a final detrnniration of the nutter, the depart.-nenl 
head should request the Cor.qresiional .igenry to hold its demnnd 
for ihc information in abeyance unt.T such determination can be 



Volume 9 Numb.f 1 1 



(797) 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - -74 - 1 



57. On March 13, 1973 the Senate Judiciary Committee voted in 
executive session to ask John Dean to testify in the Gray confirmation 
hearings concerning his contacts with the FBI during the investigation 
of the Watergate break-in. 



Page 

57.1 Washington Post . March 14, 1973, Al, A12 800 

57.2 John Dean testimony , 3 SSC 995 802 



(799) 



57.1 WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 14, 197 S, Al , Ali 



G 



ray MeaFisig 



By Carl P.eni'itein 
and Bob Wuoclward 

^^ W;ishlnclon PO't S:.'ll Will, is 

I The Senate Judiciary Com- 

I mittcc voted vinaitiiniuisly yr^- 
terday to invite J'n-sulent .\i\ 
on's White House eiiun-el, 
Jolin \\e>ley IJean 111. to tes- 
tify al eojifirnialion lieaiines 
on the niinnnalinn ol 1.. W\'.- 

I riek Cia) 111 lu he iierniani'M', 

Idir celor ol the FI!I. 

The vote follnweil the eo:- 
lapsed llepublivan ellocts to 
altaeli limits io tin- invilalinn 
and it set tlio siauo lor a sho'A 
down between the eoinniitlee 
and rre<^ick'nl .\i\on. \\ ho ha t 
already said he wotdd reUis ■ 
to allow Dean to appear. 

LrIc yesterday, the While 
House reiterated Mi'. Nivon's 
stated position that "no I're'i 
dent cotild e\er aciree to allou 
the counsel to the President 
to go down and testify before 
a committee ' 

The two i)rineipal leaders of 
the mo\emeni to rail Dean. 
Senate Ma.iority Whip Kobert 
C. B.vrd (D'WWa.) and Sen. 
John V. Tunncy iDCalif.), 
said after the vote liiot ihev 
believe they can force ;he 
White House to withdraw 
Gray's nomination if Dean re- 
fuses to teslif.v. 

A central issue that has de- 
veloped in Gray's coiuirnia- 
tion hearinJs has been the 
FBI's handling of the \\"ater- 
gate inveslieation and. parrie- 
ularly, tlic propriety of CIray's 






r'' 









.loiiN w. i)r..\x III 

. . his lesliniony soiuht 



I.. r.ATUU iv (;l;^^ iii 

. . his niiihin.iliiin iK'li.iti-il 



Cra.v 



ined 

Dean ■ ■ 

j Sen, K J V. .i r 

(DMass.i. aKo 
'liu' JuiiU'Uuy 1. 



ile.ilin 
tl 



M, Ken 
nienibc 



a'.iree.nK-nt to turn uvei' mU'- 

le.;aii.e reports to IJean. .Menv 

bets of tlio Judiciary C<uninil 

tec want to di termine if Dc-ai 

hn-,ijar.l ihL iiil'i..r;n,iii(jn h^ !..■ 

eeived Iroin the KBl. 
•If the Wliite House wanls 

Palriek Gra.v they will ha\e 

Jniin Dean come and teslily." 
'Sen. n.wd said \esterday, add 

[in.;; 'IC he does not appear.' nedv added: ■( iluni; it 
■the Senate nu:;ht not aet until; he much uMre difiiiidi 
[after tlie Senate has conduct-! .\lr. Grav to W cnnfir 
'et' i|s o«n iiivesiiuation of tlie wiiiioui .Mr. Dean appeaii 
;Water.^ate ease" and c.Nani-' Their reuiarks refle 

il ft it :V ;'! ft 



with 



inee. 

|alier the niei'liirj: "In 
'of toda.\'s stron.'. hipar 
: act ion, 1 hope the Presi 
will see the uisdom" of 
•|inittina Dean to te.-li.ly. 



ledy 
r of 

view 
li -an 
dent 
per- 
Ken- 
nulll 
liir 
■med 
ii'-t." 
eied 



.:GRAY, Fiom.M 

Senate Jlajority Leader 
Mike Mansfield, who had pre- 
viously announced his support | 
of the Gray nomination, was 
asked yesterday if he believes 
action should be postponed 
until after a special Senate 
committee completed its inves- 
tigation of the \Vateri;ate ease 
and related allegations of po- 
litical spying and sahotacte "1 
would think so," replied Mans- 
field, "but that's a ciuesiion 
for the Judiciary Committee 
to decide." The Ma.iority 
Leader added that he believesj 
Dean should appear before lhe| 
committee. I 

Meanwhile, the powerful 
chairman of the Committee, 
Sen, James O. Kastland ID- 
Miss.), reiterated his belief 
that Gray will be confirmed 



regardless of whether Dean 
testifies. 

Democrats on the Jueiciary 

Committee have cpiestioned 

whether Gray has generally 

been too political during his 

tenure as acting FBI director^ 

and have suggested that hei 

bowed to' White House pres-j 

sures in conducting the Water- 1 

gate inquiry. ] 

They repeatedly have ques-! 

tioned Gray about his fre-| 

quent contact with Dean, who' 

had ieconmiende<l that one of . 

the men subsequently eon-| 

victcd in the Watergate con-' 

spiracy. G. Gordon Lidd.v, bcl 

hired as roun.sel of the Cora-i 

mittee for the Kc-olcction of 

■ the President. '. 

I Dean conducted an investi- 

I gallon of the Waicrgale case' 

j for President Xi.xon tliat ah-, 

Isolvi-d current members ol the' 

I adminislration from any in- 

volvenU'iit in l!ie bii .'.ling of i 

Demo(r.itie headqua. ivrs. The 

Wliiie House has satu it was 



necessary that Dean receive 
FBI information in eondui.iin 
his inquiry and has denied 
that Dean leaked any of the 
FBI's reports to the Commit- 
tee for tlie Kcelection of the 
President or elsewhere. 

Yesterday's unanimous vote 
to ask that Dean appear be- 
fore the Judiciary Committee 
was taken during an executive 
session in which Democrats 
were re|)ortedly in no mood to 
compromise. 

.\ecording to sources pre: 
cm at tlio meeting. Keiniblican 
members contended tlial the 
in\itation to Dean shuuld in- 
clude an agreement that he be 
(piestioned only about hi; 
dealings witli Ch-.-iy and the 
use of FBI data. 

However, in the midst of 
the discussion Sen. John Mc- 
Clellan lD-.\rk,), who is con- 
sideieil a key swing vote in 
the commiitce. announced 
|h;il he favored an uiiresirict 
ed invitaiioii and the He|)iib 
lieniiN' .■ii".;umrnl -.eas aban 



what Democratic sources said 
is their current sirate'-;y in 
dealing with the Gray nomi- 
nation: To give Mr. Mvon the 
dnice of either scadiir^ Dean 
\ulunlarily {ji- face the possi- 
bility of Gray's nomination 
being shelved until a select 
Senate invesiieaiio': cunnnil- 
tee submits ils mial ii-;i;.rl 
on the W3ler;;aU- i a^e nest 
February. II Ihey i an pn-i- 
pone action until ilu-ii. tiu'-c 
sources said. Iliey bclie\e the 
Pri'sideni « ill u i i h d r a w 
(U:\y\ noioiM.il mil 

There a;e'-';i:'rd to bt.. a 
L-iiiv. ing teeliir.; ammv.; S"n.'i- 
lors of both p.iri'i,-. yrsi, iday 
iliat Gray's iioiiiir.:oiMn is in 
si'iiitUs jeop:o(l.\ ri,!i -- lJe.''n 
te-lifies. 

line Keiui'iilican -"iL.tfn ore- 
'.liiled last nr.:hi ih .; Demo- 
I lats have suffitieni vmcs in 
llie Judiriaiy fomniitiie to 

'block CIra.'.'s p.i;nii..iiion if 
Dean doesn't tesi'ly airl said: 
■Il looks like the b;ii:.,'in is l'o- 
ing up on this one. U l.ioksj 
M:e more opposilino is l.iiilrl. 
ing agaii'.-t fir;iy" ih.ni deu'l- 
o[)ei.i ill last .\eai'.> i.alii'.^ ovi-r 
the conlirmalion ol .\;i.,rtiey 

' Cieneral lliehatd (\ Klein- 
rlienst. 

Gray has been acting di''ee- 

■tor of tlie FBI since .Ma\ :>, 

See cr.W. M:. Col. 1 

./oJiji Denti ''s co..s.'fcre'i 
i (I s''.7r;) nxf/ coie.e'i'.'c.';/ Urj 
: i:l Si riiit nii!f. !'i:ge Al'2. 

doned, the sources said. 
Democrats command a 9-7 ma- 
jjority of the committee, but 
votes seldom follow strict 
party lines in its deliberations. 
Significanth, the sources 
reported that Sen. Charles 
McC. Mathias fR-Md.) did not 
join otlier GOP members of 
the committee in urging that' 

conditions be attaclicd to the 
Dean invitalion. and remained 
;ilent during the discussion. I 
Democrats opposing the Gray 
nomination are hopeful of, 
winning Mathias' support in 
a showdown confirmation vote 
if Dean does not testify, 

Follownig the voice vote to 
invite Dean to testily, Sen 
Philip Hart (D:\Iich.) success- 
fully moved to invite three 
other witnesses whose names 
have figured in the Gray con- 
firmation Ilea ■iie-'s Judith Ho 
back, the foriuer assist.mt to 
the trea-'i'i'i- of tlie Commit- 
tee for the Keeleclion of thi- 



(800) 



57.1 WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 14, 1973, Al, A12 



President; Thomas Lumbard/' 
a Wasliinston lawyer who says 
he worked with Dean and Lid- 
dy on a Nixon campaign proj- 
ect; and Tliomas Bishop, for- 
mer deputy director of thej 

.FBI. 

The vote to call Bi^hopj 
pa.sscd H to 1; Mrs. Holiacki 
was unanimously requested tol 

i appear and Lumhard's invita-i 
tion cleared on an 8-7 vote. 
with Mathias voting with the] 
Democrats and Kastland withi 
the Republican.^, McClellan 



had by then left the meeting. 
Of the three, only Lumbard 
accepted the invitotion, and 
his testimony was scheduled 
for 2 p.m. today. Lumijard, a 
former assistant U S. attorney 
here, has said that Dean and 
Watergate conspirator Liddy 
worked closely together on 
campaign finance matters. 

Bishop recently retired 
from the FBI after reportedly 
disagreeing with Gray'.s man 
agement. Gray has said Bishop 
'was involved in sending a 
teletype message — over Gray's 
name— to FBI field offices 
asking for information that 
would aid the White Hou.se 
in President Nixon's campaign. 
Gray has maintained he did 
not know about the message 
until after it was sent and I 
would not have approved it. | 
Mrs. Hoback, who declined! 
her invitation yesterday after-t 
noon, has signed an afl'idavnl 
saying that within 48 hours of' 
a supposedly confidential FBi 
interview, she was questioned 
about the interview by offi- 
cials of President Ni.xon's re- 
election committee. 



Senators have said llieyl of Dean. Cftmmon Cause, a cit-' 
particularly want to question! ii'crs' lobbying organization,' 
l^ean about wlielher he told; hns sued to force disclosure of : 
the Nixon campaign organiza-j ''"^ n.Tnics of Nixon campaign I 
tion about Mrs. Hoback's i„.l ':°""''''"l"rs who g.ive prior to 
terview. Thev also w.niit to' ■,'""' """■ "''''" ""^ '"'"'I 
discuss another allccd breach i''''^'^""" '"'^'"-^ ''''^ '■°°'^ ^f" 



^of the confidentiality of FBI 
ifiles, this one dealing with 

Donald H. Segretti. 
I Segretti, an alleged poiiti- 
|cal sabotetir woriung on b?- 
ilialf of the Nixon re-election 

effort, reportedly was shown 
|:opies of liis own FBI reports 
;by Nixon campaign aides dur 



feel. 

! .-Mlorneys for Common' 
Cause maintain tliat the old; 
law also required full d;scl<>-i 
sure. As a result of the siiit,| 
the Ki.xon committee prcvi- 
otisly agreed to di;;closc the 
names of some donors who 
contributed about So million 
piior to April 7. There is at 



rnnvl'^V '''■'^"'"i^^'" .-^^J'onaljicast another ?5 million in un- 
Convention in Miami Beach, disclosed contributions. 
I lie ulnte House has denied t, ., 

suggestions th.nt Dean sho^ved ^^''^ ''^ °"\'''" ''"'°"' 5^'''- 
•hem to Segretti. poenaed are Mxon campaign 

, , ; aides Jeb Stuart iMagrudor, 

111 another matter relating, jtobcrt C. Odlc Jr., DeVan L, 
to Dean, Common Cause ob-; .shumway, .Murray M Cho- 
ta.ned a subpoena .\esteidayj liner. High W. Sloan Jr. and 
for Dean and six presidential! H.nrry S. Fleming. The subpoe- 
campaign aides in an attempt :, ins call for '•aHlettors cone- 
to get inlnrmation about the' spondence, documents re- 
collection of funds by the; cords, memoranda, and other 
[residents reelection commit-, vvritings" that relate t^virtu- 
'•^''- i ally every aspect of the Prcsi- 

The White House is ex-, dents (nmpai.-n finance oper- 
pected to resist the subpoenaiaiion. 



(801) 



57. 2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973^ 3 SSC 99S 

995 

alternative was absurd. I also discussed with the President the fact 
that Ziegler was considering endorsing the ACLU letter to the Judi- 
ciary Committee regarding the turning over of FBI materials. The 
President thought that that was a good idea. At the end of the meetine 
the President mstructed me to tell the Attorney General to cut oft 
Gray from turning over any further Watergate reports to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. He said this just had to cease. 

iJJEETixG OF March 8 

I had a very brief meeting with the President on this date ijuring 
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray fron\turn- 
in^ over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told him 
I thought that the matter had been taken care of by the Attorney 
General. 

Phot: Cox\"ersatiox of March 10 

The phone conversation of ^larch 10. The President called me to tell 
me that he felt we should get the executive privilege statement out 
immediately; that this should be done before I was called before the 
Senate Judiciaiy Committee in connection with the Graj' hearings so 
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege was 
in response to the action by the Senate committee. ^ . . 

' Meeting of March 13 



Tliis was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up 
by a discussion about the Gray hearings and the fact that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection 
witli Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential 
of litigating the matter of executive privilege and thereb}- preventing 
anybody from going before any Senate committee until that matter was 
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularly when 
I mentioned to him that it might be possible that he could also claim 
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest jiotential case on 
executive privilege would probably rest on the counsel to the Pi'esident. 
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He 
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to go before 
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean, 
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the convei-sation, 
we got into a discussion of Watergate mattei-s specifically. I told the 
President about the fact tliat there were money demands being made 
by tlie seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencing of these 
individuals was not far otl'. It was during this conversation tliat Halde- 
man came into the office. After this brief interruption bv Ilaldeman's 
coming in, but while he was still tliere. I told t'ne President about the 
fact that tliere was no money to pay these individuals to meet their 
demands. He asked me how much it would cost. I told him that I could 
only make an estimate that it might be as high as 81 million or 
more. lie told me that tliat was no problem, and he also looked over at 
Haldeman and repeated the same statement. He then asked me who 
was demanding this money and I told him it was principally coming 
from Hunt through his attorney. The Presidcut then referred to the 
fact that Hunt had been promised Executive clemencv. He said that he 



(802) 



58. On March 13, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 

12:42 to 2:00 p.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects 

discussed in the course of the March' 13, 1973 meeting: 

TRANSCRIPT PAGE 

Advisability of public disclosure 16-19, 65-69 

Possible public testimony of Sloan, Kalmbach, Stans 

and Mitchell 46-49 

The pre-June 1972 role of Gordon Strachan in 

Watergate and Strachan 's statements to investigators 58-59 

The pre-June role of Jeb Magruder in Watergate. . . . 59-60 

John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman and Gordon Liddy's 

intelligence program at CRP '. 61-63 



Page 



58.1 Tape recording of meeting between the 

President and John Dean, March 13, 1973, 

12:42-2:00 p.m., and House Judiciary 

Committee transcript thereof 804 



(803) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 12, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF 

FOR THE 

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 

OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG 

THE PRESIDENT, JOHN DEAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN 

ON 
MARCH 13, 1973, FROM 12:42 TO 2:00 P.M. 



(804) 



58.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IS, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF A 
RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, 
JOHN DEAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN ON MARCH 13, 1973, 
FROM 12:A2 TO 2:00 P.M. 



HALDEMAN: Say, did you raise the question with the President on, 
on, uh, Colson as a consultant? 



DEAN: 



No, I didn't. 



HALDEMAN: Was that somebody [unintelligible]? 



DEAN: 



It was — the thought was — 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



well [unintelligible] it's a consultant without doing 
any consulting — Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: 



He wanted it [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



He wants it for continued protection on, uh 



HALDEMAN: 



Solely for the purposes of, of executive privilege 
protection. So that — 



DEAN: 



One of those things that's kept down in the personnel 
office, and nothing's done on it. 



(805) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 
PRESIDENT: What happens to Chapin? 

DEIAN: Well, Chapin doesn't have quite the same problems 
appearing that Colson will. 

HALDEMAN: Yeah but — you have the same, you, you have the same 
problems as Chapin appearing versus Colson. 

PRESIDENT: Well, can't — That would be such an obvious fraud to 

have both of them as consultants, that that won't work. 
I think he's right. Uh, you'd have to leave Chapin — 

HALDEMAN: Well, you can't make Chapin a consultant, I — we've 
already said he's not, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



Yeah. 

'cause we wanted the separation. The question is, if 
he — are, are you then, going to let — As of now, the 
way they have interpreted executive privilege, is that 
you are not going to let Chapin testify. 



PRESIDENT: Anybody. 



HALDEMAN: 



because it applies to executive privilege but 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 



HALDEMAN; by the former people in relation to matters while they 
were here. 

-2- 

(806) 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



And the problem area is that Chuck — 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



That same thing would apply to Colson. 

Well, yes, if Chuck were truly going to be doing nothing 
from the, this day on. 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



That's right. He's concerned about what he's doing. 
Colson 's concerned about what he's doing from now on, and 
he would apply the consulting thing to what, to if he 
were called regarding actions taken now 

That's right. 



HALDEMAN: that relate to Watergate actions. 

DEAN: Probably 'cause^ because [unintelligible] he will be out 

stirring up, you know, uh, counter-news attacks and 
things of this nature and — 

PRESIDENT: Jesus Christ. Is he supposed to do that and be consulting 
with the President on it? 



DEAN: 



No, no. But he's consulting, uh, it's a, you know, wide 
open consultantship. It doesn't mean he consults with you. 



HALDEMAN: Your idea was just to put this in the drawer, in case 
I unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Put it in the drawer, and then — 



-3- 



(807) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



Not decide it. 



HALDEMAN: Uh, it would be a consultant without pay. 

DEAN: I'd even tell Chuck that, uh, that, well, just tell 

Chuck something, 

HALDEMAN: Better not tell Chuck. Chuck's [unintelligible] 

DEAN: is, there is something in the drawer. And just say we — 

PRESIDENT: There is no reason to tell Chuck is there? Why — I 
would, I would tell him that, uh, for — he's not to 
say anything, frankly. 

HALDEMAN: The point would be to date it back last Saturday, so 
it, it's continuous. 



DEAN: 



Continuous . 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



That, that is his consultant fee stopped, for the present 
time, but he's still available for purposes of consulting 
on various problems and the like. 

Right. 



PRESIDENT: Unpaid consultant? 



DEAN: 



Yes. 



[Laughter] 



HALDEMAN: 



We have some of those. 



PRESIDENT: 



Good ones. 



-4- 



(808) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH U, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



HALDEMAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Well, uh — What are the latest developments Bob should 
get something on? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. Uh 



PRESIDENT: Before going into that uh, uh, I was wondering on that, on that, 
[unintelligible] jackassery about some kid who was in- 
filtrating peace groups, which of course is perfectly 
proper. Christ, I hope they were. I would hope, I would 
expect we were heavily infiltrated that way, too. 



DEAN: 



The only, the only problem there, Mr. President, is that — 



PRESIDENT: 



Did he get paid? 



DEAN: 



Uh, he was paid, uh -- 



PRESIDENT: 



By check? 



DEAN: 



Uh, he was paid by personal check of another person over 
there who, in turn, was taking it out of expense money. 
Uh, when the ultimate source of the money — as best, as 
quickly as we've been able to trace it — was pre- April 7th 
money. Uh, there, there could be some potential embarrass- 
ment for Ken Reitz, uh, along the way. 



PRESIDENT; 



Oh. Working for him. 



-5- 



(809) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 23, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

DEAN: So he is — But I, I, I think it's a confined situation. 

Obviously it's something that's going to come up with the 
Ervin hearings, but, uh, it's not, not another new 
Liddy-Hunt, uh, operation. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, it's such a shit-ass way to think. 



DEAN: 



Oh, it is. 



PRESIDENT: 



For Christ sake. 



DEAN: 



It is. 



PRESIDENT: I mean, uh, what, what happened to the kid? Did he just, 
uh, decide to be a hero? 



DEAN: 



That's right. He apparently chatted about it around 
school, and the word got out, and he got confronted with 
it and he knew he'd chatted about it, so there he was. 
It's, uh, absurd; it really is. He didn't do anything 

illegal. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: [Uninfilligible]. Apparently you haven't been able to do 
anything on my 



DEAN: 



But I have, sir — 



PRESIDENT: project of take the offensive 



DEAN; 



No, to the contrary. 



-6- 



(810) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 197 Z MEETING, 2-76 



PRESIDENT: 



based on Sullivan. 



DEAN: 



No, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Did you kick a few butts around? 



DEAN: 



Uh, I have all of the information that we have finished — 
that we've collected. There is some there, and, uh, I've 
turned it over to Baroody. Baroody is having a speech 
drafted for Barry Goldwater. And there's enough material 
there to make a rather sensational speech just by: "Why 
in the hell isn't somebody looking into what happened to 
President Nixon when, during his campaign — look at 
these events. How do you explain these? Where are the 
answers to these questions?" Uh, there's enough of a 
thread, I've — 



PRESIDENT: 



Double standard. 



DEAN: 



Yeah, and I've, I've pulled all the information — 



PRESIDENT: Also, the Senator then should also present it to the, 
uh, to the Ervin Committee and demand that that be in- 
cluded. 



DEAN: 



A letter — 



PRESIDENT: 



He is a Senator, 



-7- 



(811) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 2973 MEETING^ 2-76 



DEAN: 



What I'm working on now 



PRESIDENT: 



a Senator — 



DEAN: 



is a letter to Senator Ervin saying, "This has come to 
my attention, and why shouldn't, uh, why shouldn't this 
be a part of the inquiry?" And he can spring out of '64 
and then quickly to '72. And, and we've got a pretty good 
speech, uh, Baroody tells me, if we can get out our 
material. 



PRESIDENT: 



Good. 



DEAN: 



So it's in the mill. 



HALDEMAN: 



Good. [Unintelligible] friends have you got [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right, 
Thank God. 



HANDEMAN: Why has there never been [unintelligible] come up and did 
it before? 

PRESIDENT: Just wasn't enough stuff. Tney couldn't get anybody to pay 

any attention. For example, the investigations were supposed 
to have been taken for the thirty-four million-odd contri- 
buted to McGovern in small — Oh Christ, there's a lot of 
hanky-panky in there, and the records used on it are just 
too bad to find out anything. 



-8- 



(812) 



58 . 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1S73 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: That's one of the problems that he has — 



PRESIDENT: That's the problem, and can that be an issue? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That will be an issue. That we have — There is a crew 

working that, also. 

Do you need any IRS [unintelligible] stuff? 



DEAN: 



Uh — Not at the — 



WAITER: 



DEAN: 



Would you care for some coffee? 

No, thank you, I'm fine. Uh, there is no need at this hour 
for anything from IRS, and we have a couple of sources over 
there that I can go to. I don't have to fool around with 
Johnnie Walters or anybody, we can get right in and get 
what we need. 



PRESIDENT: Talk to Elliot Gompers. 

DEAN: I've, I've been preparing the, uh, the answers for the briefing 

book and I just raised this with Ron, uh. It's my estimation, 
for what it's worth, that probably this week will draw more 
Watergate questions than any other week you're likely to see, 
uh, given the Gray hearings, the new revelations about — 
they're not new, but they're now substantiated — abnur 
Kalmbach and Chapin that have been in the press. 

-9- 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 9 



(813) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



To the effect of what? They — 



DEAN: 



That Chap in directed Kalmbach to pay Segretti, the 
alleged saboteur, somewhere between thirty-five and 
forty thousand dollars. Uh, there is an awful lot of 
that out in the press now. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



There is also the question of Dean appearing, not 
appearing — Dean's role. There was more stories in the 
Post this morning that are absolutely inaccurate, uh, 
about my turning information over to the Re-election 
Committee for uh, uh — some woman over there, Mrs. Hoback, 
signed an affidavit, gave it to Birch Bayh, said that 
I was, uh, brought into Mardian's, Bob Mardian's office 
within forty-eight hours after a private interview I had 
with the Bureau, and confronted with it. How did they 
know that? Well, it came from internal sources over there, 
is how they knew it. 



PRESIDENT: 



From what? 



DEAN: 



Internal sources — this girl had told others that she 
was doing this, and they just told, uh, just quickly 
filled her to the top when she was out on her own. 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] 



-10- 



(814) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



She did. Said we had two or three of those. 



PRESIDENT: Why did she do that? Was she mad? 

DEAN: She's a registered Democrat. 

PRESIDENT: Why did we take her in? 

DEAN: I'll — To this day, I do not understand what she was 

doing. And she was — 

PRESIDENT: Who was she working for? 



DEAN: 



She worked in Stans' operation. 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] that was a bright move. 

DEAN: It wasn't a good move. He had — in fact, that was one 

of our problems, was the, uh, the little pocket of women 
that worked for Maury Stans. No doubt about it, that was 
things would have sailed a lot smoother without that pack. 
Not that they had anything that was devastating. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Yeah. Well, now, with regard to the questions, and so 
forth, sure, uh, it would be my opinion, though, not to, 
not to dodge it just because there are going to be 
questions. 

Well, it's going to be — You're probably going to get more 



-11- 



(815) 



PRESIDENT: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 

questions this week. And the tough questions. And some 
of them don't have easy answers. For example, did Haldeman 
know that, uh, there was a Don Segretti out there? That 
question is, is likely. 

Did he? I don't know. 



DEAN: 



He had, he had knowledge that there was somebody in the 
field doing prankster-type activities. 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh huh. 



DEAN: 



Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



So I don't know that. [Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



So at this — I mean that's the other thing 



PRESIDENT: Yes, but what about, what about my taking, uh, basically, 

just trying to have to fight this thing at one time. I can 
fight it later, but it's not going to get any better. I 
don't think that the way to get into this, did he know or 
not, I think the thing to say "This is a matter being con- 
sidered by a committee and I'm not going to comment upon 
it while it's being — I don't want to get into the business 
of taking each charge that comes up in the Committee and com- 
menting on it. It is being considered by, and it's being 
investigated. I'm not going to comment on it." 



-12- 



(816) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

DEAN: Well, that's, that's exactly the way I drafted these. I 
have kept them general answers. 

PRESIDENT: And I just cut them off. No. If I start getting, I think, 
John, if I start breaking down — it's like on the Court 
thing — the Watergate stuff, I'm not going to comment on 
it. I know all of these questions. "I am not going to 
comment on that. That's a matter for the Committee to 
determine." Then, I'll repeat the fact that I, as far as 
the Watergate matter is concerned, there was no knowledge 
there, I am not going to comment on anything else. Let 
the Committee find out. What would you say? You don't 
agree? 



DEAN: 



Well, uh, the bottom line, on, on a draft that — before 
I came over for [laughs] lunch — was, well, if you have 
nothing to hide, Mr. President, here at the White House, 
why aren't you willing to spread on the record everything 
you know about it? Why doesn't the Dean Report be made 
public? Why doesn't everyone come out? Why does Ziegler 
stand out there and bob and weave, and no-comment? That's, 
that's the bottom line. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, all right. What do you say to that? 



DEAN: 



Well 



-13- 



(817) 



58.1 TEANSCHIPT OF MARCH U, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 

PRESIDENT: You — we are furnishing information. We will do something. 

DEAN: I think we — well, of course, we have — 

PRESIDENT: V7e have cooperated. 

DEAN: We have cooperated with the FBI in the investigation of the 

Watergate. 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

DEAN: We will cooperate with the investigation of, a proper in- 

vestigation by the Senate. 

PRESIDENT: Right. We will make statements. 

DEAN: And, indeed, we have nothing to hide. 

PRESIDENT: We have furnished information; we have nothing to hide. So 
we have [unintelligible] have to handle it. 

DEAN: Uh huh. 

PRESIDENT: What else can we do, really. I mean, we can't — you 
see, I can't be in the position of basically hunkering 
down because we got a lot of tough questions on Watergate, 
and not go out 



DEAN: 



True. 



-14- 



(818) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1972 MEETING^ 1-76 

PRESIDENT: and, and talk on other issues because they're going to be, 
they're embarrassing. It's not going to get better. 
It's going to get worse. Do you agree? 

DEAN: That's — I would agree. I think it's cyclic somewhat. I 
think after the Gray thing takes one course one way or the 
other, there'll be a dead period of news on Watergate until 
the Ervin hearings start again. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: Uh, this has obviously sparked the news again. 

PRESIDENT: Well, let me just, just run over the questions again. Now, 
isn't it best, "What about Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Segretti, and 
so forth." "That's a matter which is being considered by a 
Senate committee; I'm not going to comment on it." That's 
true, isn't it? 

DEAN: That's correct. That's specifically 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 

DEAN: spelled out in their resolution that they will — 

PRESIDENT: I am not going to comment on that one [unintelligible] being 
considered by a committee. [Unintelligible] as I have 
already indicated. Uh, I am just not going to comment on 
it. You already indicated my views on the Watergate thing. 



-15- 



(819) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

DEAN: Did Mr. Chapln's departure have something to do with his 
involvement with Segretti? 

PBESIDENT: No. The answer's "No." And, uh, "But what about, uh, 

what about Mr. Dean?" My position is the same: "We are 
going to be — We were — We've been cooperative. We 
cooperated with the Justice Department, with the FBI — 
completely — in trying to, in furnishing information that 
was relevant in this matter. We will cooperate with the 
Committee under the rules that I have laid out in my st — 
my statement on executive privilege." Period. Now what 
else? Let's see. 

DEAN: Well, then, you'll get a barrage of questions probably on, 
will you supply, will Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and 
Mr. Dean go up to the Committee and testify? 

PRESIDENT: No. Absolutely not. 



DEAN: 



Mr. Colson. 



PRESIDENT: No. No. 

DEAN: I think that's — 

PRESIDENT: No. Absolutely not. I — No. It isn't a question of, 
the question is not — under what, uh, or somebody, or 
Ziegler, or somebody had said that, uh, that we, we in 
our executive privilege statement it was interpreted as 

-16- 



(820) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 12, 1972 MEETING^, 1-76 

being that we would not furnish information. Oh, well. 
We said we will furnish information, but we're not going 
to publicly testify. That's the position. But, will 
Dean, and all the rest, will they furnish, you'll furnish 
information, won't you? 



DEAN: 



Yes. Indeed I will. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. Sure. 



DEAN: 



Well, I think possibly by the time — 



PRESIDENT: See, that's what I do. My feeling, John, is that I better 
hit it now, frankly, as tough as it is, and, uh, rather 
than just let it build up to where we, we're afraid of 
these questions and everybody and so forth, and let 
Ziegler get out there and bob and weave around. I know 
the easier thing is just to bug out, but I'd rather hit 
it now. 



DEAN: 



You're right. I was afraid for the sake of debate, 'cause 
I was having reservations. And, uh. 



PRESIDENT: 



I think so. 



DEAN: 



uh, it is a, it, it's a bullet-biter and you just got to 
do it, and, because they're not going to go away, the 
questions. Now the other thing that we talked about in 



-17- 



(821) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

the past, and I, I still have the same problem, is to 
have sort of a "Well, here it all is" approach. Uh, if 
we do that — 

PRESIDENT: And let it all hang out. 



DEAN: 



And let it all hang out, uh. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN; 



uh, let's say with the Segretti situation — 



PRESIDENT: I guess, I guess if we were going to do that, we have 
passed that point. 

DEAN: We have passed that point plus the fact, they're not going 

to believe the truth. That's the incredible thing. 

PRESIDENT: They won't believe the truth, they don't even believe 
when they convicted seven people. 

DEAN: That's right. They will continually try to say that there 
is [unintelligible] 

PRESIDENT: They'll say, "Haldeman did it." And then they'll say I 
did it. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



-18- 



(822) 



58. 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13 J 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

PRESIDENT: I don't think they'll get to that point. They might 
question his political savvy, but not mine. Not on a 
matter like that. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 



[Laughs]. No. Well, the thing on Sullivan which I have. 

Sullivan, uh, who as I told you, and, have been prompting 

him and I said, "Bill, I would like, for my own use, to 

have a list of some of the horribles that you're aware 

of." Well, he hasn't responded back to me, but he sent me 

a note yesterday saying that, "John, I am willing at any 

time to testify to what I know if you want me to." What 

he has, as we already know, has got a certain degree of, uh 

— it's a, it's a dynamite situation what he's got already — 

the '68 bugging, the surveillance that Goldwater [unintelligible] 

It's not — we [unintelligible] on the '68 bugging, that it was 
ordered, but he doesn't know whether it was carried out. 

That's right. Uh ~ 

But at least he will say that — 

Yes. 

Tell them, for example, I mean I — 

I would think — 

That kind of thing. 

Well, I've never talked to Bill about this so it must be — 



-19- 



(823) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 

I've never really gone into detail, because he's always been 
very up close about it, but he is now getting to the point if, if 
we wanted him to do this, someone — and I don't think the 
White House should do it — should sit down with him and really 
take him over cross-examination of what he does know and, and 
how strong it is, what he can, can substantiate. 

PRESIDENT: John, who the hell could do it if you don't? 



DEAN: 



Well, that's, that's probably — there's no one. That's the, 
uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



That's the problem. 



DEAN: 



That's the problem. Now, the other thing is, if we were going 
to use a tactic like this: Let's say in the Gray hearings 



PRESIDENT : 



[Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



where everything is cast that, that we're, we're, that we're 
the political people and they're not — that Hoover was above 
reproach, which is just not accurate. 



PRESIDENT: 



Bull shit. Bull shit. 



DEAN: 



Total bull shit. The, uh, the person who could, would destroy 
Hoover's image is going to be this man. Bill Sullivan. Uh, 
that's what's at stake there. Also, it's going to tarnish 
quite severely, uh — 



-20- 



(824) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH U, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



Some of the FBI. 



DEM: 



some of the FBI. And a former President. 



PRESIDENT: Fine. 



DEAN: 



Uh, he's going to lay it out, and he, it's just all hell is 
going to break loose once he does it. It's going to change 
the atmosphere of the Gray hearings. It's going to change 
the whole atmosphere of the Watergate hearings. 



PRESIDENT: 



Not much. 



DEAN: 



Now the risk — 



PRESIDENT: How will it change, John? 



DEAN: 



How will it change? Because it'll put them in context that, 
that, uh, a government institute was used in the past for 
the most flagrant political purposes. 



PRESIDENT: 



How does that help us? 



DEAN: 



How does it help us? 



PRESIDENT: 



I'm being, I'm just being — 



DEAN: 



Yeah, I, I appreciate what you are doing. 



PRESIDENT: 



Red herring. Is that what you mean? 



-21- 



(825) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

DEAN: Yes. It's a, it's a red herring. It's what the public 
already believes. It's just that people would just, I 
would say react, that, oh Christ, more of that stuff. 
Uh, they're all, you know, they're all bad down there. 
Because it's a one way street right now — 

PRESIDENT: lUnintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Pardon. 



PRESIDENT: Do you think the press would use it? They may not play it. 



DEAN: 



It'd be difficult not to. Uh, it'd be difficult not to. 



PRESIDENT: Why is it that Sullivan 'd be willing to do this? 



DEAN: 



I think the, the quid pro quo with Sullivan is that he wants 
someday back in the Bureau very badly. 



PRESIDENT: That's easy. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Do you think after he did this to the Bureau that they'd 
want him back? "They," if there is a "they." 



DEAN: 



Uh, probably not. But I think that, uh, he could also 
possibly do — What, what Bill Sullivan's desire in life 



-22- 



(826) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING:, 1-76 

is, is to set up a national, or domestic national security 
intelligence system, a plan, a program. He says we're 
deficient. Uh, we've never been ef — ^ efficient, since Hoover 
lost his guts several years ago. If you recall, he and 
Tom Huston worked on it. Uh, Tom Huston had your instruction 
to go out and do it. Then the whole thing just crumbled. 

PRESIDENT: Do you think Hoover would have cooperated? 

DEAN: That's all Sullivan really wants. Even if we just put 
him off studying it for a couple of years, we could put 
him out in the CIA or some place else where he felt — 

PRESIDENT: Put him there; we'll do it. 

DEAN: I think that's what the answer is. I've never really — 

PRESIDENT: No problem with Sullivan. We'll put him — I mean, 

he's a valuable man. Uh, now, would the FBI then turn 
on him, piss on him? 



DEAN: 



There would be some effort at that. That's right, they 
would say he's disgruntled. He was canned by Hoover. He 
is angry, he's coming back. But that would kind of, I 
would think a lot of that would be lost in the, uh, in 
the shuffle of what he is laying out. I don't know if 
he's given me his best yet. I don't know if he's got more 



-23- 



(827) 



58.1 TMNSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

ammunition than [unintelligible] he has already told me. 
Those were just a couple off-the-cuff remarks. 

PRESIDENT: And that's why you said that ~ Why do you think he is 
now telling you this? Why is he doing this now? 

DEAN: Well, the way it came out is, when I, when the Time 

Magazine article broke on the fact that it charged that 
the White House had directed that newsmen and White 
House staff people be, uh, subject to some sort of 
surveillance for national security reasons, I called, 
in tracking down what had happened, I called Sullivan 
and I said, "Bill, you'd better come over and talk 
to me about that and tell me what you know." I was 
calling him to really determine if he was a leak. That's one 
of the reasons. I was curious to know where this might 
have come from because he was the operative man at the 
Bureau at the time. He's the one who did it. Uh, he would 
not, you know, he came over and he was shocked and, uh, 
distraught, and, and the like [unintelligible] his own, 
uh, uh, his own [unintelligible] [laughs] frankly, uh, 
and then, and after going through his explanation of all 
what had happened, he started volunteering this other 



-2A- 



(828) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MAECH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

thing. He said, "John, what, this is the only thing I 
can think of during this Administration that has any taint 
of political use but it doesn't really bother me 'cause 
it was a national security purpose. These people worked — 
there was sensitive material that was getting out, was 
getting out to reporters." 



PRESIDENT : 



[Unintelligible] what we ordered? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Of course, [unintelligible] the stuff was involved in the 
God damned Vietnam War . 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT; 



That's what it was. 



NOTE: 



At this point, a portion of the discussion has been 
deleted. 



DEAN: 



But he said, "John, what does bother me is that you all 
have been portrayed as politically using — " 



PRESIDENT: 



And we never did. 



DEAN: 



And we never have. He said the Eisenhower Administration 
didn't either. The only 



-25- 



(829) 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 10 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT; 



Never. 



DEAN; 



times that he can recall that there has been a real 
political use has been during Democratic tenure. I said, 
"For example. Bill, what are you talking about?" Then 
he told me this example of, of, uh , the Walter Jenkins 
affair, when DeLoach 



PRESIDENT; 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



and, and Fortas, and — 



PRESIDENT 
and DEAN: 



[Unintelligible] 



PRESIDENT: The Kennedys, the Kennedys used it, let me say, politically 
on that steel thing. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



That was not, that was not a national security, was it? 



DEAN: 



No. Now I asked, uh , I asked somebody about that and they 
told me that what happened there is that, uh — they were 
being defensive of Kennedy, and so that the person who would 
defend Kennedy necessarily — was saying that Kennedy had 
given Hoover orders and Hoover, being typical in his 
response, tried to get it yesterday as far as the answer 



-26- 



(830) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 197 Z MEETim, 1-76 

for the President. And that's why he sent people out in 
the middle of the night and the blame really fell on 
Hoover. And, and this might be lunintelligible] over 
there though , who knows . 



PRESIDENT: 



lunintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Well, that's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



It's still wrong. 



DEAN: 



That's right. Sure. 



PRESIDENT: Good God. Can you imagine if somebody — steel company that 
had raised hell about, uh, or an automobile company, about, 
something, silly thing, Ruckelshaus does, and we send FBI 
agents out to arrest? Jesus Christ, now. Does he know 
about the bugging of Martin Luther King? 



DEAN: 



Yep. 



PRESIDENT: 



I wonder if he'd tell that, that would be good. 



DEAN: 



I think he would tell everything he knows. 



PRESIDENT: 



You do? 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. That's why I'm saying he is, he is, he is a 
trem — he's a bomb. Uh, now the fact is — 



-27- 



(831) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 



PRESIDENT : 



You really have to keep telling — 



DEAN: 



Well, if that's, that's the, the real problem is, how 
it's structured, how can it be done. Uh , he sent me this 
note and I called up and I said, "Bill, I appreciate 
getting that note very much." I said, "It takes a lot 
of guts to send a note like that to me." And he said — I 
said, "It's kind of a pleasure to see a man stand up, 
blowing a little smoke up him and the like." Uh , he said, 
"Well, John, I mean it. I am perfectly willing to do 
anything you want. If you want me to go up and testify, 
I will." I said, "Well, how much, you have just given me 
some tidbits that you, in our conversation and I would 
really like to again repeat: Can you put together what 
you do know; just for your own use right now, just put it 
together on a pad, go through all your recollections; and then 
also tell me how you can substantiate it, and, what kind 
of cross-examination you might be subject to on it if you 
did testify." So he is doing that. Now, the question 
I've, I've had is, how in the world can we program some- 
thing like this? The, wa — I, I just have a feeling that it 
would be bad for one Bill Sullivan to quietly appear up on, 
uh, on some Senator's doorstep, and say, "I've got some 
information you ought to have." "VJell, where did you get 



-28- 



(832) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

it? Where — why are you up here?" "The White House 
sent me." That would be bad. The other thing is, maybe 
this information could be brought to the attention of the 
White House, and the White House could say to the, uh, to, 
uh, Eastland, "I think you ought to call an executive 
session and hear his testimony. This is quite troublesome, 
the information that has been presented to us. It's so 
troublesome, we can't hold it here and hope to, uh, and 
rest comfortable." 

PRESIDENT: Why, why on the other hand doesn't he just present it to Eastland? 
I mean, uh — Why executive session? That doesn't serve — 



DEAN: 



Well it would, one, because you're trying — The first 
approach would be not to destroy the Bureau, not to tarnish 
the name. It's going to leak out of there, though, quite 
obviously. If it doesn't, we'd make sure it did. Uh — [coughs] 
If, if, uh, Sullivan went up to Eastland cold and just said, 
or Hruska, I would think they would say, "Go on back down 
to the Department of Justice where you work, and let's not 
start all this." 



PRESIDENT: Suppose another thing, Patrick Gray says to either Eastland 
or to, or to Hruska or anybody on that Committee — Who is 
the tiger on the Committee on our side, on the Committee, the 
Judiciary Committee? 



-29- 



(833) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



Cook's — 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Gumey, Gurney has been good. Gumey was good during the 
ITT hearings, and he — he'll study, he'll get prepared. 
Uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



But, would he go after the Bureau? [Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



They're not going after the Bureau. What they are doing 
is, they're taking the testimony of somebody who is going 
after the Bureau. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. I know that. I'm just thinking of the — 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



They all look down the road and see what would be the 
result of what they are doing is, won't they? I would 
think so. I mean, I'm just trying, how — Would they go 
after Johnson? Let's look at the distant future. Uh, look 
at the — How bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the 
FBI so terribly discredited? [Unintelligible] 

[Unintelligible] I've, I've, kicked this around with Dick 
Moore, these, these broader questions, and, I think it 
would be damaging to the FBI, uh, but maybe it's time to 



-30- 



(834) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



shake the FBI and rebuild it. 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



I'm not so sure the FBI is everything it's cracked up to 
be. I, I'm convinced the FBI isn't everything the public 
thinks it is. 



PRESIDENT; 



No. 



DEAN: 



I know quite well it isn't. 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] if you could get, uh , Jerry Wilson in 
there rather than a political appointee. What is your 
feeling at the moment about Gray? Can he hang in? 
Should he? I don't know. 



DEAN: 



Uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: Awfully close. 

DEAN: 1 — they're going to vote this — They have an executive 

session this afternoon to invite me to testify. 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



Uh, there's no question, they're going to invite me. Uh, 
I would say, based on how I handle the: (1) the formal 
letter that comes out of the Committee asking for informa- 
tion, and I programmed that they do get specific, just 



-31- 



(835) 



58.1 TMNSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

what in the hell do they want to know that I've got, and 
lay it out in the letter that's sent down here asking me 
to appear so I can be responsive, fully — 



PRESIDENT: Respond to the letter. 



DEAN: 



Respond to the letter in full. I think I have, I feel I 
have nothing to hide, as far as, uh, the issue they've 
raised , 



PRESIDENT: Would you respond under oath? 

DEAN: I think I would be willing to, yes. 

PRESIDENT: That's what I'd say because that's what I am preparing in 
the press thing. I'll say you'll respond under oath in a 
letter. You will not appear in a formal session. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



That's, that's our present position. 

What if they say, what if they say, "Would he be willing 
to be questioned under oath?" 

That's not what the question is. Yes, I'd be willing to 
be questioned under oath, but we're not going up. 



PRESIDENT: No, no. But here? 



DEAN: 



Oh. I think that would be a hell of a bad precedent. 



-32- 



(836) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

PRESIDENT: Okay. I just wanted to be sure we don't cross that bridge. 
I agree. You — but you would respond to written inter- 
rogatories. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's it. Okay. 



DEAN: 



Now, uh, after, after that, if we've been responsive, their 
argument for holding up Gray's confirmation based on me is, 
should be gone. Sure, they're going to say it raises more 
questions than it answers, but if we're — but that can go 
on forever. We've taken the central points they want 
answers to, given them the responses, that puts something in 
Eastland's hand that can say, "All right, it's time, it's 
time to vote." And Eastland says he's got the votes to 
get Gray through. Now, but what happens on the Senate 
Floor is something else, 'cause Byrd is opposing Gray. 
Byrd's got good control of that Southern bloc. 



PRESIDENT: 



Not totally. 



DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: Byrd is running for leader of the whole Senate. A lot of 
them may desert him on this. 



DEAN: 



But Mansfield, on the other hand, of course, has come out 



-33- 



(837) 



58.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

and said that he favors, initially he supported Gray's, uh, 
confirmation. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



My feeling is that they would like [unintelligible], I think 

that they'd like to have a, an excuse not to do it. Maybe 

they'll use, not you, but all this crap about hearings 
[unintelligible] 

Well if they say, if they say they have to hold up Gray's 
confirmation until the Watergate hearings are completed — 

Oh — That's great. , 

That's the vehicle — 



PRESIDENT: The best of both worlds for us, John, 

DEAN: That's right. 

PRESIDENT: because Gray, in my opinion, should not be the head of the 
FBI. Not because of any character or other flaws or 
thoughtless flaws, but because he is going to be too much 
like Kleindienst. After going through the hell of the 
hearing, he will not be a good Director, as far as we're 
concerned. 



DEAN: 



I think that's probably true. He'll be a, he'll be a very 
suspect Director. Not that I don't think Pat won't do 
what we want. I, I read him a little differently than 



-34- 



(838) 



58. 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



Dick in that regard. Like he's still keeping close touch 
with me. He's calling me. He's given me his private 
line. We talk at night, just how do you want me to handle 
this, so and so forth. So he still plays, playing in 
tight, and still being involved. But I think he — 

But he couldn't do it. 



DEAN: 



But he can't do it. He's under, he's going to be under 
such surveillance by his own people — watch every move 
he's making — uh, that'll be the difficult thing for Pat. 
Not that Pat wouldn't want to still play ball, but he may 
not be able to. 



PRESIDENT: 



I agree. That's what I meant. 



DEAN: 



Pat has already gotten himself, himself, in a situation 
where he's got this Mark Felt as his number two man. 
These other people are surrounding him. If you put a guy 
like Jerry Wilson in there he could just, you know, wipe 
this, and say, "Gentlemen, I'm putting my own team in, and 
I'm going to bring people in I've met around the country 
who are good office directors; Sacks out of Chicago," 
wherever, and just put his own team t6gether for the, for 
the Headquarter 's Office. 



PRESIDENT: 



So where do you come out? 



-35- 

(839) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT; 



DEAN: 



Gray's already been locked into, to major personnel 
decisions. I wouldn't be surprised to see [unintelligible] 
occur if they say that they cannot go forward with Gray's 
hearings because of the Watergate. 

Where would that be done, John, at what point in the Com- 
mittee or on the Floor or both? 

It could happen. It would certainly be voted on first in 
the, uh, uh, in the Committee, in the Judiciary Committee. 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 

DEAN: The question is, then, whether, uh, it'll be put on the 
calendar by the leadership. I assume that that's — 

PRESIDENT: The leadership might determine that we will not put it on 
the calendar until after the Watergate hearings. 

DEAN: That's right. 

PRESIDENT: Then we could then. Gray could then come in and say 
I will not wait that long. 

DEAN: And they'll — when they — you're — "This, you're, 

this is damaging to the leadership of the FBI, and I will 
have to withdraw based on this." What would be nice for 
all would be to get Gray voted out of the Committee 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



-36- 

(840) 



58.1 WANSCPIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



with a, with a positive vote, uh , enough to get him out 
of Comn.lttee, and then lock him at limbo there. 

What is Moore's judgment about Sullivan? Does he know? 

Yeah, he's, uh, uh, he says It's a piece of dynamite. He 
says it depends and we both agree, that it, it — the 
way it would be done would be a secret, whether it was 
done. Whether — this isn't the sort of thing we could 
just leap out and do. Have to be very carefully thought 
through. Have to be — have to decide in advance should 
the White House not be involved or should we be Involved? 
If we're going to play with it, we are going to probably 
have to say that we were involved and structure it in a way 
that there is nothing improper with our involvement. 



PRESIDENT: The difficulty with the White House being involved is 

that if we are involved in pissing on Johnson, [unintel- 
ligible] that concerns me. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: That's why it really ought to be, I mean — If he could 
just — 



DEAN: 



I suppose the answer is saying, to, to have him — to 
say to him — 



-37- 



(841) 



58.1 TRANSCEIPT OF MARCH 23, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



You've got, you know, this is something — "What you've, you've 
intimated a few things to me, uh. The proper place to take 
that information is to the Senate Judiciary Committee or to 
the Attorney General, possibly." And then have 
Dick take it to the Committee. Or is that too close to the 
President, still? 



PRESIDENT: First hand, if he takes it to the Committee, it's better 

if the Committee's conducting a hearing. [Unintelligible] 
Wait a minute, he works for the Attorney General, doesn't 
he. 



DEAN: 



That's right. If he takes it to Kleindienst, Kleindienst 
is going to say, "Bill, just don't do it because you are 
going to take DeLoach's name down with it, and DeLoach is 
a friend of ours." 



PRESIDENT: 



Bull shit. 



DEAN: 



Something I have always questioned. 



PRESIDENT: Nobody is a friend of ours. Let's face it. Don't worry 
about that sort of thing. 



DEAN: 



Well, it's something I will, uh, I think I ought to 
[unintelligible] kick around with Dick Moore, 'cause — 



-38- 



(842) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



But first of all, I've got to, uh, just have to be 
thought through every inch of the way. It came here 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



late yesterday afternoon. 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



It was not — Bob said, uh, when I talked to him, he 
said he was quite excited about it, as Ehrlichman said, 
gave a very favorable "Uh huh." Uh , and I said, "Well, 
I'm not going to rush anything on this. It's — We've 
a little bomb here that we might want to drop at one" 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



"point down the road." 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, yeah. 



DEAN: 



Maybe, maybe the forum to do it is something totally out 
of the Committee context between the Gray confirmation 
hearings and the Watergate hearings. Maybe let him go 
over to U. S. News, or, who knows what it would be, but 
we ought to consider every option, now that we've got it, 
and see if — 



-39- 
(843) 



PRESIDENT: Rather than doing it in a hearing, doing it in the press. 
Then that will force the hearing to call him. That's 
another way you can do on this. Have him be selected to 



DEAN: 



Give an interview. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



to give an interview. I would do it in tJ^_ S . News . Do it in 
[unintelligible] wire service guy or something. A 
respected damn reporter. Why not go to a jackass like 
Mollenhoff? No, he's too close to us. 

Well, that's interesting. Now, Mollenhoff is, is close 
but by God, you can't program Mollenhoff to do anything. 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



DEAN: And if, uh — 

PRESIDENT: No. And also, we are in a position on Mollenhoff, who's 
been fighting us some, that maybe, maybe Mollenhoff would 
be a pretty good prospect for this thing because it's the 
kind of a story he loves, he digs on some. You couldn't 
tell him, however, uh [unintelligible] story part. Or 
Sullivan just goes to talk to him, says, "Well, now, hell, 
you're a hell of a, hell of a guy, and, uh, I just 
wani. to tell you a few things." 



-40- 



(844) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 



DEAN: 



Or, can you call Clark and say — can I call Clark and 
say, "Listen, Clark, a guy has brought me a piece of 
dynamite I don't even want in the White House?" 



PRESIDENT: 



He will write that, though, won't he? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. Because that'd look like that's a set-up deal. 
Well, Clark Mollenhoff is the first guy to uncover 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



[unintelligible] anything, and he will say no way. 



PRESIDENT: 



But he's willing to do it. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's very important, at least. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: Broadens the scope. Getting to the bottom of the whole 
thing, don't you feel that that's the need here is to 
broaden the scope of the damned thing, instead of — 



DEAN: 



The focus is right on us. That's the problem. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. Nothing on the Democrats, and nothing. 



DEAN: 



Nothing. 



PRESIDENT: 



nothing on what the previous three Administrations did. 



-41- 



35-905 (PI. 2) O- 74 - 11 



(845) 



58.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 
DEAN: Nothing. It's making, 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: well, it, it — of course it's still a Washington 

story. You go out of this city 

PRESIDENT: I know. 

DEAN: and you can't find anybody that even knows what's happening. 

Although it's increased in the network coverage. That NBC 
thing last night, which is just a travesty as far as — 
the very thing Ron was talking about, about shabby journa- 
lism. They took the worst edited clips they could, out of 
context, to respond to things they would say on the lead 
and they would have a little clip of Ron saying, "Well, 
I deny that." And he was denying something totally other 
than what they were talking about in their charge. It 
was incredible. Someone is going through and putting that 
all together right now, and, Ron ought to be able to have 
a field day back with that one on NBC. It was just ver — , 
it was very, very dishonest television reporting of a 
sequence of events. It was out of sequence. 

PRESIDENT: Well, you see, John ~ Yeah. I know the situation. 

Ervin gets up there and, you know, gassing around, he was 
huffing and puffing about his being a great Constitutional 
lawyer and all. I guess it just makes us wonder about our first 
decision, doesn't it, [unintelligible] about sending 
Gray up. Probably a mistake, but then, we didn't anticipate — 

-42- 



(846) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH U, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 



DEAN: 



Well ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Or you think not. Who knows? 

Who knows? That's right. Uh, if you didn't send him up, 
why didn't you send him up. Because he was — 

Right. I know. That's what they — 

That's true. 

That's what they — You send somebody else up 

to take them on, not a big clown. You know what I mean? 

Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: I won't even announce any [unintelligible]. I think the 
problem is, the reason that the Senate was not [unintel- 
ligible] being reasonable was because [unintelligible] 
a lot of this stuff hanging out there [unintelligible] Ervin 
Committee. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, we, you know, one, one thing is that I, the 
saturation level of the American people on this story is 
[laughs] depressing. Pretty close — in fact [laughs] 
the saturation level in this city is getting pretty high 
now. They can't take too much more of this stuff. 

Think not? 



-43- 



(847) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



Nothing, nothing really new is coming out. 



PRESIDENT: Some kid, they said — I don't think that anybody, in- 
cidentally, will care about somebody infiltrating the 
peace movement that was demonstrating against the President, 
particularly on the war in Vietnam. Do you think so? 



DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: Anyway, I don't care about that. What happened to this 
Texas guy that took his money back? Was he — 



DEAN: 



All hell broke loose for him after. This was Allen. 



PRESIDENT: 



No, no. Allen — yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Allen, not Duncan, there were two 



Nothing to do [unintelligible] , 



DEAN: 



[Unintelligible]. All hell broke loose for Allen for this 
reason: He, uh, uh — The money apparently originally 
came out of a subsidiary of one of Allen's corporations 
down in Mexico. It went to a lawyer in Mexico who put 
it down as a fee billed to the subsidiary. Then the, then 
the lawyer, the Mexican lawyer, sent it back into the 
States, and it came back up here. But, the weakness of 



-44- 



(848) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

it is, is, uh , the Mexican lawyer: (1) didn't have a 
legitimate fee; (2) it could be corporate contribution. 
So Allen wanted, and Allen had personally put a note up 
with the corporation to cover it. But Allen is meanwhile 
having problems with his wife, and a divorce is pending, 
and tax problems. So he — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



[Unintelligible], The only problem I saw there was where you 
put it off — lay it off — [unintelligible] the fact that 
it was being used for Watergate. 

That's — I don't know why that went in the letter. I, 

uh — it wasn't used for the Watergate. That's the, that's 

the interesting thing. 



PRESIDENX: 



It wasn't? 



DEAN: 



No. It was not. What happened is these Mexican checks 
came in. They were given to Gordon Liddy, who said, 
"What do we — why don't you get these cashed?" Gordon 
Liddy, in turn, took them down to this fellow. Barker, 
in Florida, and said, "Would you cash these Mexican checks." 
Uh, and so that's how they went through Barker's bank 
account back in here. They could have been just as easily 
cashed at the Riggs Bank. There was nothing wrong [laughs] 
with the checks. Why all that rigamarole? It's just like 



-45- 



(849) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



a lot of other things that happened over there. God knows 
why it was all done. It was totally unnecessary, and it 
was money that was not directly involved in the Watergate. 
It wasn't a, a wash operation to, to get money back in to 
Liddy, and the like. 

Who is going to be the worst witness up there? 



DEAN: 



Sloan. 



PRESIDENT : 



Unfortunate, 



DEAN: 



Without a doubt. He's — 



PRESIDENT: 



He's scared? 



DEAN: 



He's scared. He's weak. He has a, uh, a compulsion to, 

uh, cleanse his soul by confession. Now, we're, he's 

going, we're giving him a lot of stroking, uh, telling 

him you're doing a beautiful job. The funny thing is, 

this fellow goes down to the Court House here before 

Sirica, testifies [laughs] as honestly as he can testify, 

and Sirica looks around and calls him a liar. [Laughs] He's 

a sad — Sloan can't win. So Kalmbach has been dealing 

with Sloan. Sloan [unintelligible] as a child. Kalmbach 

has done a lot of that. The person that will have the greatest 

problem with — as a result of Sloan's testimony is Kalmbach 



-46- 



(850) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

and Stans. So they're working closely with him to make 
sure that he settles down. 

PRESIDENT: Kalmbach will be a good witness. 

DEAN: Oh yes. 

PRESIDENT: Knowing what Kalmbach has been through. 

DEAN: Kalmbach has borne up very well. In fact, I decided he 

may be — 

■ « 
PRESIDENT: Kalmbach, Kalmbach, of course, this is somewhat 

embarrassing, he is, they say, lav^yer for the President. 

Well, hell, I don't need a lawyer. He handles that, that 

property out there. 

DEAN: He's sensitive on that point. He, uh, over — he saw a 
briefing, uh, saw a transcript of a, of a briefing where 
Ron was saying, "Well, he's really not, that's not the 
right nomenclature, this 'personal attorney'." Herb said, 
"Well, gee whiz. I don't know if Ron knows what all I 
do." And I said, "Herb, well, don't worry about it." 

PRESIDENT: Well, what I meant is that this — I don't care about that, 
but I meant, it's just the fact that it's played that way, 
as if he's in, that I am, he's in talking to me all the 
time. I don't ask him [unintelligible] 



-47- 



(851) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 2973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



I know that. 



PRESIDENT: I don't talk to him about anything. I mean, I don't know, 
I see Herb once a year when he brings the income tax 
returns . 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN; 



PRESIDENT : 



DEAN: 



That's right. 

I'm sure that he, he handles that San Clemente property and 
all the rest, but he's, he isn't a lawyer in the sense that 
most people have a lawyer. 

No, no. Although he didn't even handle the estate plan, 
he's done some, you know, dove-tailing on it, like — 

Well, but anyway, we don't want to back off of him. 

No. Anyway he's solid. He's solid. 

He will, uh, how does he tell a story when he gets, 
[unintelligible]? He's got a pretty hard row to hoe, he 
and Stans have. 

He'll be good. He's going over every — Herb is the kind 
of guy who will check, not once, not twice, on his story, 
not three times, but probably fifty to a hundred times. 
Literally. He will go over it. He will know it. There 
won't be a hole in it. He'll have thought it — he, he'll 
do his own Q. and A. He'll be — have people cross-examine 
him from ten ways . 

-48- 



(852) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1972 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



Good. 



DEAN: 



He will be ready, as John Mitchell will be ready, as 
Maury Stans will be ready. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, 



DEAN: 



Uh, it's, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Mitchell is now studying, is he? 



DEAN: 



He is studying. Sloan will be the worst witness. I think 
Magruder will be a good witness. This fellow, Bart Porter, 
will be a good witness. They've already been through it, 
they've been through Grand Jury. They have been through 
trial. Uh, they did well. [Coughs] And then, of course, 
people around here 



PRESIDENT: 



I [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



won't be witnesses. 



PRESIDENT: They won't be witnesses. 

DEAN: Won't be witnesses. 

PRESIDENT: Hell, no. They will make statements. That's ~ That'll be 
the line which I think we've got to get across to Ziegler, 
in all of his briefings where he is constantly saying we 



-49- 



(853) 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

will furnish information. That is not the question. It 
is how it's to be furnished, and we will not furnish it 
in a formal session. That would be to break down the 
privilege. Period. Do you agree with that? 

I agree. I agree. I have always thought that's the bottom 
line, and I think that's the good thing about what's 
happening in the Gray hearings right now. If we, they 
send a letter down with specific questions, I send back 
written interrogatories, sworn. You know as a, as a 
lawyer, that, uh, you can handle written interrog — , inter- 
rogatories, where cross-examination is another ball game. 



PRESIDENT: 



I know. 



DEAN: 



They can — you can make a person look like they're in- 
accurate even if they're, even if they are trying to tell 
the truth. 



PRESIDENT: "Well now, really, you sh — , you can't mean that." You know, 
uh, I know — All their face-making and all that crap. I 
know; [unintelligible]. Written interrogatories you can — 

DEAN: Can be artfully, accurately answered and give the full 

information. 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] that there will be total and full [unintelligible], 



-50- 



(854) 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 2973 MEETING, 1-76 

Well, what about the sentencing. When the hell is 
he going to sentence? 

We thought he was going to sentence last Friday. Uh, 

I know; you've said that. 

no one knows what in the world Sirica is doing. It's 
getting to be a long time now. It frankly is. 

[Unintelligible] 

And no one really has a good estimation of how he will 
sentence. There's some feeling that he will sentence 
Liddy the heaviest. Liddy's already in jailj he's in 
Danbury. He wants, he wanted to start serving so he can 
get good time going. Uh , but Hunt, he'll probably be 
very fair with. 



PRESIDENT: 



Why'! 



DEAN: 



Pardon? 



PRESIDENT: Why? Why Hunt? 

DEAN: He likes Hunt. He liked Hunt. He thought Hunt was being 

open with him and candid, and Hunt gave a statement in 
open court that he didn't know of any higher-ups involved 
and, and, uh , Hunt didn't put him through the rigors of 



-51- 



(855) 



58,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

trial, and Hunt was a beaten man, the loss of his wife, 
uh , was ill, they tried to move and have a, him severed 
from the trial. And Hunt didn't cause a lot of problems. 
Bittman was cooperative, uh. Whereas Liddy played the, played 
the heavy in the trial. His lawyer raised all the objections 
and the like, and embarrassed, uh, the judge for some 
in-chambers things he'd said, and — 



PRESIDENT: 



But Liddy 's going to appeal the sentence? 



DEAN: 



Liddy is going to appeal the decision juh, the trial. He 
will appeal, appeal that. 



PRESIDENT: 



He will appeal the trial? 



DEAN: 



Trial — And there's — 



PRESIDENT: He was convicted. 



DEAN: 



There is an outside chance that this man has gone, this 
judge has gone so far in his zeal to be a special 
prosecutor — 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, some of those statements from the bench — 



DEAN; 



Incredible statements. 



PRESIDENT: To me, to me, incredible. 



-52- 



(856) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING^, 1-76 



DEAN: 



Commenting on witnesses' testimony before the jury, was 
just incredible. Incredible. So he may have, there may 
be a mistrial. I don't — There may be reversible 
error, even. I don't know. 



PRESIDENT: 



What about the Cubans? 



DEAN: 



The Cubans will probably be thought of as hired hands, and 
nowhere near the sentences of Liddy, I would think. Uh, 
not all of them. Barker, uh, the lead Cuban, may get more 
than the others. It's hard to say. I, you know, I just 
don't have any idea. Sirica's a strange man. He is known 
as a hanging judge. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



That's the kind that I want. 



DEAN: 



That's right. [Laughs] 



PRESIDENT: 



I understand. 



DEAN: 



That's right. He's tough. He, he is tough. Now, the other 
thing, Sirica — there was some indication that Sirica 
might be putting together a panel. They have this system 
down there now, based on this informal agreement, where 
a judge, a sentencing judge, convenes a panel of his own 
to take advice from. If Sirica were being shrewd, he just 
might get himself a panel and take their recommendations. 



-53- 



(857) 



58.2 TRANSCRIFT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

PRESIDENT: When will the Ervin thing be hitting the fan most, 
I mean [unintelligible] 

DEAN: Well, I would say that, uh, uh, the best indications 

we have now is public hearings will probably start about 
the first of May. Now, they will, you know, there'll be 
a big, probably, bang of interest, initially. We have 
no idea how they will proceed yet. We do have sources to 
find that out, other than Baker. Incidentally, Kleindienst 
was, was, had called Ervin again, returned the call. Ervin 
is going to see him this week, uh, with Baker. That's — 

PRESIDENT: Public hearings the first of May. Well, that'll be a big 
show. The public hearings, I wouldn't think, though, I 
know from ex — •, experience that, my guess is that, uh, I think 
they could get through about three weeks of those and then 
I think it begins to peter out somewhat. Do you agree? 

DEAN: No, I — 

PRESIDENT: ITT went longer, but that was a different thing, and it 
seemed more important. 

DEAN: When I told Bob, oh, several months ago, I hope they don't 
think [unintelligible]. He said the way they could have 



-54- 



(858) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IS^ 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

those hearings and do a masterful job on us, is to hold 
one hearing a week on Thursdays, Thursday mornings, 

they cov — , they cover it live. That way, you'd get 
live coverage that day; you'd get the networks that 
night; the national magazines that week; the — get the 
weekend wrap-ups. You could stretch this thing out for 
nearly — 

PRESIDENT: We should insist — Our members of the Committee at least 
should insist, "Let's get it over with, and go through 
five day sessions, and so forth." 



DEAN: 



Yeah. Well, they, you know, they, they're not that, I 
don't think they are that 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



DEAN: 



perceptive to, to figure that- 



PRESIDENT: Well, so be it. This is a, I mean, I noticed in the news 

summary Buchanan was viewing with alarm the [unintelligible] 
the great crisis in the confidence of the Presidency, 
and so forth. [Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Well, the best way — 



PRESIDENT: 



How much? 



-55- 



(859) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MABCB IZ, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



Pardon? 



PRESIDENT: How much of a crisis? I mean. It'll be, it'll be in a 
newspaper [unintelligible] but the point is that every- 
thing is a crisis. I mean, Christ, we've had — screw 
around with this thing for a while [unintelligible] it'll be 
mainly a crisis among the upper intellectual types, the ass 
holes, you know, the 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: soft heads, soft — our own, too — Republicans, Democrats 
and the rest. Average people won't think, it is much of a 
crisis unless it affects them. But it'll go on and on 
and on. 



DEAN: 



Well, I think It'll — I, I, you know, I think after the 
Ervin hearings, they are going to find so much — there will 
be some new revelations. Uh, I don't think that> uh, the 
thing will get out of hand. I have no reason to believe 
it will. 



PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, there'll be the revelations in, in Watergate. 
They, they [unintelligible]? That's the point. 



DEAN: 



Well, they want to, they want to find out who — 



PRESIDENT: 



Who — is there a higher up? 



-56- 



(860) 



■ 58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING:, ^-76 

DEAN: Is there a higher up? 

PRESIDENT: They're really, let's face it, after, I think they are 
really after, uh, Haldeman. 

DEAN: Haldeman and Mitchell. 

PRESIDENT: Mitchell — I mean, Colson is not a big enough name for 

them. He really isn't. You know, he is a thorn in their 

side, but Colson 's name bothers them none. So they get 
Colson. They're after Haldeman and after Mitchell. Don't 
you think so? 

DEAN: That's right. Or I bet they'd take Ehrlichman if they 

could drag him in but they've been unable to drag him 
' in in any way . 

PRESIDEin?: Ultimately, uh, Haldeman, uh, Haldeman 's problem is 
Chap in, isn't it? 

DEAN: Bob's problem is, is circumstantial. 

PRESIDENT: What I meant is, looking at the circumstantial, I 

don't know that [unintelligible]. On top of that. Bob had 
nothing — didn't know any of those people, like the Hunts and 
all that bunch. Colson did. But, uh. Bob, Bob aid know Chapin. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Now, what — Now however the hell much Chapin knew I'll 



-57- 
(861) 



35-905 (PI. 21 O - 74 - 12 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



be God damned, I don't know. 



DEAN: 



Well, Chapin didn't know anything about the Watergate, 
and — 



PRESIDENT: You don't think so? 



DEAN: 



No. Absolutely not. 



PRESIDENT: 



Did Strachan? 



DEAN: 



Yes. 



PRESIDENT: He knew? 



DEAN: 



Yes. 



PRESIDENT: About the Watergate? 



DEAN: 



Yes. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Well, then. Bob knew. He probably told Bob, then. He 
may not have. He may not have. 

He was, he was judicious in what he, in what he relayed, 
and, uh, but Strachan is as tough as nails. I — 

What '11 he say? Just go in and say he didn't know? 

He'll go in and stonewall it and say, "I don't know any- 
thing about what you are talking about." He has already 
done it twice, as you know, in interviews. 



-58- 



(862) 



58.1 TEANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I guess he should, shouldn't he, in the interests 
of — Why? I suppose we can't call that justice, can 
we? We can't call it [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Well, it, it — 



PRESIDENT: The point is, how do you justify that? 

DEAN: It's a, it's a personal loyalty with him. He doesn't 

want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He 
didn't have to be asked. It just is something that he 
found is the way he wanted to handle the situation. 



PRESIDENT: 



But he knew? He knew about Watergate? Strachan did? 



DEAN: Uh huh. 

PRESIDENT: I'H be damned. Well, that's the problem in Bob's case, 
isn't it. It's not Chapin then, but Strachan. 'Cause 
Strachan worked for him. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. They would have one hell of a time proving 
that Strachan had knowledge of it, though. 



PRESIDENT : 



Who knew better? Magruder? 



DEAN: 



Well, Magruder and Liddy. 



PRESIDENT: Ahh — I see. The other weak link for Bob is Magruder, 
too. He having hired him and so forth. 



-59- 
(863) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MABCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



That's applies to Mitchell, too. 



PRESIDENT: Mitchell — Magruder. Now, where do you see Colson coming 
into it? Do you think he knew, knew quite a bit, I can't 
I can't — yet he could know a great deal about a lot of 
other things and not a hell of a lot about this, but I 
don't know. 



DEAN: 



Well, I've never — 



PRESIDENT: He sure as hell knows Hunt. That we know. And was very 
close to him. 



DEAN: 



Chuck has told me that he had no knowledge, uh, specific 
knowledge, of the Watergate incident before it occurred. 
Uh, there have been tidbits, that I have raised with Chuck, 
I have not played any games with him, I said, "Chuck, I 
have indications — " 



PRESIDENT: 



Don't play games. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



I don't 



I — 



DEAN: 



You've got to be — the lawyer has got to know everything. 

That's right. And I said, "Chuck, people have said that you 
were involved in this, involved in that, involved in this." 
And he said, "I — that's not true," and so on and so 
forth. Uh, I don't, I think that Chuck had knowledge that 
something was going on over there. A lot of people around 

-60- 



(864) 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING^, 1-76 

here had knowledge that something was going on over there. 
They didn't have any knowledge of the details of the 
specifics of, of the whole thing. 

You know, that must, must be an indication, though, of 
the fact that, that they had God damn poor pickings. 
Because naturally anybody, either Chuck or Bob, uh, was 
always reporting to me about what was going on. If they 
ever got any information they would certainly have told 
me that we got some information, but they never had a 
God damn [laughs] thing to report. What was the matter? 
Did they never get anything out of the damn thing? 

No. I don't think they ever got anything. 



PRESIDENT: 



It was a dry hole, huh? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



Jesus Christ. 



DEAN: Well, they were just really getting started. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah. But, uh. Bob one time said something about 

the fact we got some information about this or that or the 
other, but, I, I think it was about the Convention, what 
they were planning, I said [unintelligible]. So I assume 
that must have been MacGregor, I mean not MacGregor, but 
Segretti. 

-61- 



(865) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: Bob must have known about Segretti. 



DEAN: 



Well, I — Segretti really wasn't involved In the intelli- 
gence-gathering to speak of at all. 



PRESIDENT: Oh, he wasn't? 



DEAN: 



No, he wasn't, he was out just, he was out — 



PRESIDENT: 



Who the hell was gathering intelligence? 



DEAN; 



That was Liddy and his, his outfit. 



PRESIDENT: 



I see. Apart from Watergate? 



DEAN: 



That's, well, that's right. That was part of their whole 
Watergate was part of intelligence-gathering, and this 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Well, that's a perfectly legitimate thing. I guess that's what it was 



What happened is they — 



PRESIDENT: What a stupid thing. Pointless. That was the stupid thing. 

DEAN: That was incredible. That's right. That's right. 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] to think that Mitchell and Bob would allow, 
would have allowed this kind of operation to be in the 
Committee. 



-62- 



(866) 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



58.1 TMNSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 197Z MEETING, 1-76 

I don't think he knew it was there. 

You kidding? 

I don't ~ 

You don't think Mitchell knew about this thing? 

Oh, no, no, no. Don't mis — I don't think he knew that 
people — I think he knew that Liddy was out intelligence- 
gathering. 

Well? 

I don't think he knew that Liddy would use a fellow like 
McCord, for God's sake, who worked for the Connnittee. I 
can't believe that. Uh, you know, that — 

Hunt? Did Mitchell know Hunt? 

I don't think Mitchell knew about Hunt either. 

So Mitchell's thing is [unintelligible] said, "Gee, 
and I hired this fellow and 1 told him to gather intelli- 
gence, but I — " Maybe [unintelligible]. 

That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Magruder says the same thing? 



-63- 



(867) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13^ 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

DEAN: Magruder says that — as he did in the trial — he said, 

it was, uh, — Well, of course, my name has been dragged 
in as the guy who sent Liddy over there," which is an 
interesting thing. That's a — 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



That's right. They said, well what happened is — 
Magruder asked for a lawyer — he wanted to hire my 
deputy over there for General Counsel and I said, "No 
way. I can't give him up." 



PRESIDENT: 



Was Liddy your deputy? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



No, Liddy never worked for me. Uh, there was this 
fellow Fred Fielding who works for me. And I said, 
"I can't give him up." He said, Magruder said, "Will 
you find me a lawyer?" I said, "I will be happy to 
look around." I checked around the White House, Krogh 
said, "Liddy might be the man to do it, to go over 
there — he would be a hell of a good lawyer. Uh, 
he has written some wonderful legal opinions over here 
for me. 

Right, 



DEAN: 



and I think he is a good lawyer . " 



-64- 



(868) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



So I relayed that to Magruder. 



PRESIDENT: How the hell does Liddy stand up so well? 



DEAN: 



He's a strange man, Mr. President. 



PRESIDENT: Strange or strong, or both? 



DEAN: 



Strange and strong. 



PRESIDENT: Good. 



DEAN: 



Uh, he — his loyalty, I think, is just beyond the pale. 
He's just — nothing. 



PRESIDENT: 



He hates the other side too. 



DEAN: 



Oh, absolutely. He's strong. He really is. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, what about the hang-out thing? 



[Unknown person enters, receives instructions from the 
President to take something to Haldeman, and leaves 
the room. ] 

PRESIDENT: Uh, is it too late to, to, frankly, go the hang-out 
road? Yes, it is. 



DEAN: 



I think it is. I think — Here's the — The hang-out 
road — 



-65- 



(869) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN; 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



The hang-out road's going to have to be rejected. I, 
some, I understand it was rejected. 

It was kicked around. Bob and I and, and, and — 

I know Ehrlichman always felt that it should be hang-out. 
lUnintelligible] 

Well, I think I convinced him why that he wouldn't want to 
hang-out either. There is a certain domino situation here. 
If some things start going, a lot of other things are going 
to start going, and there are going to be a lot of problems 
if everything starts falling. So there are dangers, Mr. 
President. I'd be less than candid if I didn't tell you the 
— there are. There's a reason for us not — not everyone 
going up and testifying. 

I see. Oh no, no, no, no, no. I didn't mean go up and 
have them testifying. I meant — 

Well I mean just, they're just starting to hang-out and say 
here's our, here's our story — 

I mean putting the story out to PR buddies somewhere . 
Here's the story, the true story about Watergate. 
[Unintelligible] 

They would never believe it . 



-66- 



(870) 



58.1 TRANSCFIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: That's the point. 



DEAN: 



The point is — the two things they are working on on 
Watergate — 



PRESIDENT: Who is "they"? The press? 



DEAN: 



The press. 



PRESIDENT: The Democrats? 



DEAN: 



the Democrats, the intellectuals — 



PRESIDENT: 



The Packwoods? 



DEAN: 



Right. Right. "They' would never buy it, uh , as far as 
(1) White House involvement in the Watergate which I think 
there is just none, uh, for that incident that occurred over 
in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. People 
just, here, would — did not know that that was going to be 
done. I think there are some people who saw the fruits 
of it, but that's another story. I am talking about the 
criminal conspiracy to, to go in there. The other thing 
is that, uh, the Segretti thing. You hang that out, uh, 
they wouldn't believe that. They wouldn't believe that, 
that, uh, Chapin acted on his own to put his old friend, 
friend Dick Segretti in to be a Dick Tuck on somebody 



-67- 



(871) 



58.1 TEANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 mETING, 1-76 



PRESIDENT: 



else's campaign. They would, they would have to paint 
it into something more sinister, something move involved, 
a part of a general plan. 

Shit, it's not sinister. None of it is. 



DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: 



Segretti's stuff isn't been a bit sinister. 



DEAN: 



It's quite humorous, as a matter of fact, 



PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, it's just a bunch of crap. It's just 
is a [unintelligible]. We never knew. Never objected to - 
You don't object to such damn things, oh, anjrway. On, and 
on and on. No, I tell you this, the last gasp of the, of 
the, you know, of the, our partisan opponents. They've 
just got to have something to squeal about. 



DEAN; 



The only thing they have to squeal on- 



PRESIDENT: Squeal about that, that, and perhaps inflation, but 

that will end. Oh, yeah, they're going to squeal and 
then they're [unintelligible]. They're having a hell 
of time, you know. 



-68- 



(872) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

They got the hell kicked out of them in the election. 

[Unintelligible]- They are, they're, they're goine to 
Watergate around in this town, not so much our opponents, 
but basically it's the media, uh, I mean, it's the 
Establishment. The Establishment is dying, and so they've 
got to show that after some rather significant successes 
we've had in foreign policy and in the election, they've got 
to show, "Well, it just is wrong because this is — be- 
cause of this." In other words, they're trying to use 
this to smear the whole thing. 



DEAN: 



Well, that's why I, in fact, I keep coming back with 
this fellow, Sullivan, who could. 



PRESIDENT; 



— who could — 



DEAN: 



could change the picture. 



PRESIDENT: 



How would it change it though? 



DEAN: 



Well it ~ 



PRESIDENT; 



By saying you're another? Is that what it is? 



DEAN: 



That's, yeah. But here's another, and it happens to be 
Democrats. Your, uh — I, you know, I just, I just wish 



PRESIDENT: If you get Kennedy in it, too, I'd be a little more 
pleased. 



-69- 



(873) 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 19? Z MEETING, 1-76 

Well, now, let me tell you something that's — lurks 
at the bottom of this whole thing. 



PRESIDENT : 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



If, in going after Segretti, I — Segretti, right — 
they go after KaLmbach's bank records, you'll recall 
that sometime back — maybe you, you perhaps didn't 
know about this, it's very possible — that right after 
Chappaquiddick somebody was put up there to start ob- 
serving. Within six hours. 



PRESIDENT: 



Did we? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



I didn't know that. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN; 



That man watched that — he was there for every second 
of Chappaquiddick, uh, for a year, and almost two years 
he worked for, uh, he worked for Jack Caulfield, who was 
originally on John — 

Oh, I heard of Caulfield, yeah. 

He worked for Caulfield originally and then he worked for, 
when Caulfield worked for John, and then when I came over 
here I inherited Caulfield and this guy was still on this 



-70- 



(874) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH IZ, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 



same thing. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah., 



DEAN: 



Well, if they get to those bank records between, uh, it 
starts on July of '69 through June of '71, and they say, 
"What are these about? Who is this fellow that's up in 
New York that you paid?" There comes Chappaquiddick 
with a vengeance. This guy is a, is a twenty year detec- 
tive on the, uh. New York State, uh. New York City Police 
Department. 



PRESIDENT; 



In other words, we — 



DEAN: 



He is ready to disprove and to show that, everything 
from — 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] consider that wrong, do we? 



DEAN: 



Well, if they get to it, uh, it's going to come out and 

the whole thing is going to turn around on that one. 

I mean, if Kennedy knew the bear trap he was walking into 



PRESIDENT: 



How do we know — uh, why, why don't we get it out anjrway? 



DEAN: 



Well, we sort of saved it. [Laughs] 



PRESIDENT: 



Does he have any record? Is it any good? 



DEAN: 



Uh, he is probably the most knowledgeable man in the country. 



-71- 



(875) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 19? Z MEETING, 1-76 

He can't, you know, there are certain things he runs up 
against walls when they closed the, when they closed the 
records down, things he can't get, but he can ask all 
of the questions and get some, many of the answers. As 
a, as a twenty year detective, but we don't want to sur- 
face him right now. But if things ever surfaced, uh, this is 
what they'll get. 

PRESIDENT: Novr, how will Kalmbach explain that he'd hired this 
[unintelligible] Chappaquiddick? Did he — out of 
what type of funds? 



DEAN: 



We'd have — he had, he had money left over from, uh, 
pre-convention — 



PRESIDENT: 



Are they going to investigate those funds too? 



DEAN: 



They are funds that were quite legal. There's nothing 
illegal with those funds . 



PRESIDENT: 



How can they, how can they investigate them? 



DEAN: 



They can't. 



PRESIDENT: 



Huh? 



DEAN: 



They — The only — The — What they would — happens — what, what 
would occur, you see, is they would stumble into this in 
going back to, say '71, on Kalmbach 's bank records. They've 



-72- 



(876) 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH U, 197 Z MEETING, 1-76 

already asked for a lot of his bank records in connec- 
tion with Segretti, as to how he paid Segretti. 

Are. they going to go back as far as Chappaquiddlck? 

Well, yeah, but this, this fellow worked into '71 on 
this. He was up there. He talked to everybody in 
that town. He, you know, he, he's the one who caused 
a lot of embarrassment for Kennedy already by saying — 
he went up there as a newspaperman. "So why aren't 
you checking this? Why aren't you looking there?" And 
pointing the press's attention to things. Gosh, the 
guy did a masterful job. I have never been, had the 
full report. 



PRESIDENT; 



DEAN: 



Coming back to the Sullivan thing, you'd better now go 
ahead and talk to him. You will now talk to Moore, 
again to Moore and, uh, then what? 

Uh , I'll see if V7e have something that's viable. And 
if it's ~ 



PRESIDENT; 



In other words — Have you talked to Sullivan again? 



DEAN; 



Oh, yes. Yes, I plan on it. 



PRESIDENT: 



Why the hell don't you get him in and talk to him? [Unintelligible] 



DEAN; 



Well, he's — I asked him last night and he said, "John 



-73- 



35-905 (PI. 21 O - 74 - 13 



(877) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13, 1973 MEETING, 1-76 

give me a day or so to get my, all my recollections 
together," 

PRESIDENT: Right. 

DEAN: and that was yesterday. So I thought I would call him 

this evening and say, uh, "Bill, I'd just like to know — " 

PRESIDENT: You see, the fact that you've talked to him will become 
known. So maybe, maybe the best thing is to say "I am 

not concerned here," and you say that he, he's to turn 
this over, and you say we will not handle it. Then make, 
then anyway, it gets to the Committee, aren't they going 
to say, "The White House turns over information on the 
FBI?" That's the — I don't know how the Christ to get 
it down there. 



DEAN: 



Well, that's what I think I can kick around with Dick 
Moore. He and I do very well just bouncing these things 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



back and forth and coming up with something that we don't have 
to be embarrassed about it. 



PRESIDENT: 



I think a newsman, a newsman, a hell of a break for a newspaper. 



DEAN: Oh yeah. 

PRESIDENT: A hell of a story. Uh, maybe the Star would just run a hell of 
a story, I mean a real bust or the FBI. Then, and then, and 

-74- 



(878) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 23, 1973 MEETING^ 1-76 

then the Committee member, the man you, you, for 

example, on this basis could call Gurney, and say, 

"Now look. We're on to something very hot here. I can just 

tell you, I'm not going to tell you anything more. Go 

after it, forget you ever had this call." Then he goes. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: 



It seems to me that that's a very effective way to get it out. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. Another thing is, I don't think Sullivan would 
give up the White House. Sullivan — as I said could, there's 
one liability in Sullivan here, is that's his knowledge 
of the earlier things that occurred, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



That we did? 



DEAN: 



That we did. 



PRESIDENT: Well, now you should tell them. Oh, you mean he wouldn't, 
he'd say, he'd say, "I did no politicfal work at all. My, 
my work in the [unintelligible] Nixon Administration was, was 
solely in the national security." 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



And that is totally true. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



Okay. Well, good luck. 



-75- 



(879) 



58.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 13. 1973 MEETING. 1-76 

DEAN: All right, sir. 
PRESIDENT: It's never dull, is it? 
DEAN : Never . 



-76- 

(880) 



59. On March 14, 1973 Dean wrote to Senator James 0. Eastland, 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and, citing the doctrine 
of executive privilege, formally refused to testify in the Senate 
confirmation hearing on the nomination of Gray to be Director of the 
FBI. On the same day the President met with Dean and White House 
Special Counsel Richard Moore in his Executive Office Building Office 
from 9:43 to 10:50 a.m. and from 12:47 to 1:30 p.m. They discussed 
a press conference scheduled for the next day and making Dean a test 
case in the courts on executive privilege. 



Page 

59.1 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 14, 1973 

(received from White House) 882 

59.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 14, 1973 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 889 

59.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 995-96 892 

59.4 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1973 894 

59.5 Washington Post , March 15, 1973, Al, A8 895 



(881) 



59.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 14^1973 



101530 

MEETINGS AND TEI-.EPHONE CONVERSATIONS BET'.yEEM 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN W. DEAN, III 



No contact between the President and John \V. Dean, III, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns. 



May 1, 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John V/. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



12:45 




11 


12:49 




09 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 



The President met to sign personal legal documents with: 
The First Lady 
John J. Ratchford 
Mr. Butte rfield 
Mr. Haldeman 
Mr. Ehrlichman 
John W. Dean, in 
John H. Alexander 
Richard S. Ritzel 



No other contact during August 1972 



(882) 



59.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 14, 197 Z 



September 15, 1972 lQ^\ ^ ' 



PM The President met with: 

3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 

No other contact during September 1972 



October 9, 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Nev/house Broadcasting 
and Herb Klein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the nneeting. 



Novernber 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr, -John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of !76" with 

Rose Mary Woods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact betv/een the President and John W. Dean, III, during November 
and December 1972, 



# 



(883) 



59.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 14, 197 Z 

101530 

January 21, 1973 

AM 11:05 12:04 President and First Lady hosted V/or ship Service . 

John Dean attended. 



February 27. 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in 0->.'al Office, 



February 28. 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office. 




March 1, 1973 

(. 
AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John W. Dean, III, 

in the Oval Office. 
'(At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
J0:36 10:44 President met v/ith Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. too the call. 
•^Mr. Kissinger was present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 



March 6, 1973 . 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7. 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



March 8. 1973 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



(884) 



55.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 14, 1973 




March 10, 1973 



1(31^j30 



AM 9:Z0 9:44 President talked long distance v/ith Mr. Dean. 

President initiated the call from Camp David 
to Mr. Dean who was in Washington, D. C. 



March 13, 1973 

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-12:55) 



March 14, 1973 

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President. 
9:43 10:50 President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office. 

Also present were: 

, Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 
Ronald L. Ziegler 
Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean. 

12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 
4:25 4:26 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean 

initiated the call. ) 



iCiar 



ch 15, 1973 

PM 3:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



(885) 



59.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 14, 1973 



March 16, 1973 lOi'JOJ 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ziegler was present from 10:58-11:10. 

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



March 17, 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the 0\-al Office. 

March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested that Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join hirn in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 

March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tallied with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore, 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



m 



(886) 



59. 1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 14j_ 1973 



March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. HaldeiTp.an was also present for at least 
part of the time. 



PM 5:20 6:01 



President met withMr. Dean in the President's 
EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr, Ziegler (departed fet 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman -i f A A ^-"'iT^ 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01)1'-'-^'-^^^ 
ly^Cen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 



March 22, 1973 
PM 1:57 



3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 

Mr. Haldem.an (2:01-3:40) 

Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President iuitia.ted the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in 'Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Deam. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp Da\dd, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 






.March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 

staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 
the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 



(887) 



59.2 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 14, 197 Z 



April 16, 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 Pre sident met with Mr. Dean in Oval Office, 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



_____ 101b30 

April 22, 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 Pre sident phoned Mr. Dean from. Key Biscayne. 



(888) 



59.2 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT 



h S, I'j/T, 



\'.--..-.-h 10, ]•),'?, 



MARCH 14^1973 



V cc:-\'\v al i ; .c 111 I'c. ; r.s to wrj'-T;:r.ii r C,':\r,.-jia h.-.d 
hcl-Diu: .')>•' r>:L'i.i . Ourtn saiti no. 



P^ 



(MaL-cii 1?.: I:i^-,lJod sla'comciit ";>ri OKOci-J.ivo ^jrivilfx^'i, 
."X'^jplios to pics^nt and f"jvu-.cr slarfors V/'jt v.ill pro- 
vido ia;o rr. iAiion. ) 



^^•..■oh 13, 19/3 



) . 



V'.-.-rh 14, 1973 



L 



.rch 15, 19 ''3 



.Varch 16, 197 3 



Prep.rvi-avion for ^•.-oss coiiriironce. V/fjnt over r-^^^oz- 
tions arid an.iwois. President iiiquii-ed as to Ken 
Rietz. Dean s?iid no illegality involved. President 
asked if Colson or Haldeinan know Se'jrei.ti. President 
asked if Mitchell and Colson kr..^-.v r)£ V.';=.Ler^aLe. 
}3oan u?.id tl^e re was nothing specific on f^olson; •.i-.-.t 
he ditin't k.iow .'bout Mitchell but that Strach.an could 
be ir.vol\.:-d. Pro side nt states again that Dean should 
compile a writoji report about the mai-ter. Dean 
said Sirica, was a :ian;;ing judge, the President said 
he liked V.an^ii-.g j'lo' ■• i'hey discussed fund raising 
before April 7. Dean said that everything that had hjca 
done was legal. 

Press conferer.ce was discussed -- questions arid 
ar.swers. Discussed exocv.uive privilege. Decided 
Ihoy r.'ieccd a Suprenie Court tost. Decided that 
i'le P/;sident ^>hould discuss his 19 rS position. 
Tliat afternoon ti-.e President si.i.'jgested Dea.n should 
po.v:;ih".y .\ppear b./fore the pre jS and discvissed vs'h.other 
Chapin s';ould ;.-.:.ke a stateni.jnt about Segretti. The 
Gray h.iari.igs --..Td the use of F3I files were also 

QlSCUSSeG. 

President held press conference. Thar afternoon 
discussed tr.at cay's press conference and decic<":d on 
use of "separation of powers" instead of executive 
privilege terininology. 

The President reiterated his position on use of raw 
FBI lules. Suggested Dean's written report be 

acco-..~.p..:-.ied by affidavits. Do::i su;:;gested unri.r.ely 
rc'jaso of written report lo.iglit prL-'jui-.ice righ.rs of 
i.ir.ocei-.t p.jople. Discussed possi'^iliiy of j-t'tflr.^ 



V 



C-> 



(889) 



59.2 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 7 Ok, 4 SSC 1794-95 

1794 
F:\muiT Xo. TOA 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMVaTTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, ET. AL." 

Plaintiffs 



RICHARD M. NIXO>U 

iNDrVTDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE UXITED STATES 

THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Defendant 



Civil 

Action 

No. 



AFFIDA\~T OF FRED D. THOMPSON 

Fred D. Thompson, being sworn, deposes and says: 

1. Early in June, 1973, the White House transmitted 

to the Select Committee a memorandum (which is attached to this 
affidavit) listing certain oral communications, both face-to-face and 
telephonic, between President Richb-^d M, Nixon and John Wesley Dean m. 
This memorandum, inter alia , includes the exact times and durations oE 
these communications, and, in the case of face-to-face communications, 
the other participants, if any, in those conversations. 



(890) 



59. Z FRED TROMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 

1795 

2. Shortly thereafter, I received a. telephone f;aU 

from J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Cou-nsel to the Presider.t. D'.irir.j; ' 

this telephone call, Mr. Buzhardt related to me his understanding 
as to the substance of certain portions of the enumerated conversations 
between the President and Mr. Dean. 

3. During my discussion with Mr. Buzhardt, I 
made detailed notes on the information that he gave me. Upon 
conclusion of the conversation, I promptly prepared a "Memorandum 
of Substance o: Dean's Calls and Meeting with the President." a 
copy of vTvich is attached to this affidavit. It is my belief that this 
ir.e3iora-cum accurately- reflects the information imparted to me by 




iZX. 



L<?U^ 



iir red D. Thompson 



I 



,u 



Subscribed s.r.i. ST/orn to, bcrore 
n:e, this_^^ d=.v of _^4t0'.«=iy lt;73 




yj^^CccCe^/ 



yi'. 






(891) 



59.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, Z 5SC 995-96 

995 

alternative was absurd. I also discussed witli the President the fact 
that Ziegh-r was considering endorsing the ACLU letter to the -Tudi- 
ciary Committee regarding" the turning over of FBI materials. The 
President thonght that that was a good idea. At the end of the meeting 
the President instructed me to tell the Attorney General to cut oft" 
Gray from turning over any further Watergate reports to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. He said this just had to cease. 

Meetixg of March 8 

I had a very brief meeting with the President on this date during 
which he asked me if something had been done to stop Gray from turn- 
ing over FBI materials to the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told him 
I thought that the matter had been taken care of by the Attorney 
General. 

Phoxe Cox\xrsatiox ok March 10 

The phone conversation of ilarch 10. The President called me to tell 
me that he felt we should get the executi\e privilege statement out 
immediately; that this should be done before I was called before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the Gray hearings so 
that it would not appear that the statement on executive privilege was 
in response to the action by the Senate committee. 



Meetixg of March 13 



This was a rather lengthy meeting, the bulk of which was taken up 
by a discussion about the Crray hearings and the fact that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had voted to invite me to appear in connection 
with Gray's nomination. It was at this time we discussed the potential 
of litigating the matter of executive privilege and thereby preventing 
anybody from going before any Senate committee until that matter was 
resolved. The President liked the idea very much, particularly when 
I mentioned to him that it might be possible that he could also claim 
attorney/client privilege on me so that the strongest potential case on 
executive privilege would probably rest on the counsel to the President. 
I told him that obviously, this area would have to be researched. He 
told me that he did not want Haldeman and Ehrlichman to go before 
the Ervin hearings and that if we were litigating the matter on Dean, 
that no one would have to appear. Toward the end of the convei-sation, 
we got into a discussion of "Watergate mattei-s specifically. I told the 
President about the fact that there were money demands being made 
by the seven convicted defendants, and that the sentencing of these 
individuals was not far otf. It was during this conversation that Halde- 
man came into the office. After this brief interruption by Ilaldeman's 
coming in, but while he was still there, I told the President about the 
fact that there was no money to pay these individuals to meet their 
demands. He asked me how nrtich it would cost. I told him that I could 
only make an estimate that it might be as high as $1 million or 
more. He told me that that was no problem, and he also looked over at 
Haldeman and repeated the same statement. He then asked me who 
was demanding this money and I told him it was principally coming 
from Hunt through his attorney. The President then referred to the 
fact that Hunt had been j)romised Executive clemency. He said that he 



(892) 



59. Z JOHN DEM TESTIMONY ^ JUNE 25, 1973, S SSC 995-96 

996 

liad discussed this niiitter with EJirliohman and contrary to instruc- 
tions tliat Ehrlicliinan had given Colson not to talk to the. President 
about it, that Colson had also discussed it with him later. He, expressed 
some annoyance at tlie fact that Colson had also discussed this matter 
with him. 

The convsi-sation then turned back to a question from the President 
regarding the money that was being paid to the defendants. He asked 
me how this was done. I told him I didn't know much about it other 
than the fact that the money was laundered so it could not be tr-aced 
and then there were secret deliveries. I told him I was learning about 
things I had never known before, but the next time I would certainly 
be more knowledgeable. This comment got a laugh out of Haldeman. 
The meetmg ended on this note and there was no further discussion 
of the matter and it was left hanging just as T have described it. 

Meetings of AIakch 14 

The meetings which occurred on this day principally involved pre- 
panng the President for a forthcoming press conference. I recall talk- 
ing about executive privilege and making Dean a test case in the courts 
on executive privilege. The President said that he Avould like very 
much to do this and if the opportunity came up in the press conference, 
he would probably so respond. I also recall that during the meetings 
which occurred on this day, that the President was going to try to 
find an answer that would get Ziegler off the. hook of tlie frequent 
questions asked him regarding the Watergate. He said that he was 
going to say that he would take no further questions on the Watergate 
until the completion of the Ervin hearings and that Ziegler in Turn 
could repeat the same statement and avoid future interrogation bv the 
press on the su bject. 

■ Meeting or M.vrc'h 15 



It was late in the afternoon after the President's press conference 
that he asked Dick Moore and I to come over to visit with him. He was 
in a very relaxed mood and entered into a general discussion about the 
press conference. The President was amazed and distressed that the 
press had paid so little attention to the fact that he had made an 
historic announcement about Ambassador Bruce opening up the liaison 
ofhce in Peking. He said he was amazed when the first question follow- 
ing that announcement was regarding whether or not Dean would 
appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the 
Gray hearings. The conversation then rambled into a discussion of 
the //v.i'.v case, and I\Ir. Moore discussed his memory of the Pi-esident's 
handling of the case. 

Meeting of M.akch 16 ' 

This meeting was a discussion with Ziegler on how to follow up on a 
number of matters that had arisen in the press conference of tlie 
preceding day. 

Meeting of March 17 

This was St. Patrick's Day and the President was in a very good 
mood and \ery relaxed and we engaged in a rambling convoisa"tion 
with only some brief reference to the Gray hearinirs and the problems 
that were then confronting the White House regai-ding the Pre.sident's 



(893) 

35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 14 



59.4 RICHARD MOORE TESTIMONY, JULY 13, 1973, 5 SSC 1973 

1973 



Mr. Tiiojrrsox. Let me ask you about the meetings that you and 
Mr. Dean had with the President, and I will start with March 14. 

Mr. i\rooRi';. Yes. 

Mr. Thompsox. Would you tell us what you discussed at that meet- 
'u\<Xi the purpose of tiie niectiug-; what was discussed and what was 
resolved, if anything ? 

Mr. Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. As of this year ? 

Jlr. MooRE. The purpose of the meeting was to go over with the 
President the possible questions that might be asked in the next day's, 
the next morning's press conference on the general subject of executive 
privilege and these hearings, the Gray hearings were still also going 
on, and in that sense the Watergate. Now, Dean and I — the way that 
worked was Mr. Buchanan, who usually coordinates the President's 
briefing book, had sent \is a list of at least 20 questions that could be 
asked, more were handed, and for 2 or 3 days before that we divided 
them up, we suggested answers or gave background answers so that 
the President could consider them, and they were then edited by Mr. 
Buchanan and put in the briefing book. 

The President now wished to discuss those answers with us. 

Mr. Thompson. Had the President made a statement on executive 
privilege by that time? 

Mr. MooRE. Yes; he had made that on March 12 and this meeting 
took place on Marcli 14 and it was a very hot issue at that moment 

"Ir. Thomfson. What about March 15 ? 

Mr. Moore. JNlarch 15 was a very pleasant and relaxed meeting at 
the end of the day in the Oval Office where the President kind of 
wanted to chat about the press conference. 

Mr. Tuojrpso.N. The press conference had been earlier that day? 

j\Ir. Moore. Earlier that day and he wanted to know how we thought 
it went, and Mr. Dean correctly testified that the President said, "You 
know, the very first thing that I said, I made an announcement that 
I thought was quite historic, first representative to the People's Re- 
public of China, and I was nominating a most important man as our 
first representative, David E. K. Bruce. I made the announcement 
and what do you think the first question was? Dean's testimony at the 
hearings and it shows where their minds are." And then we talked a 
little bit about the press conference and then he got into this discussion 
where he had been thinking more and more where we had been using 
the wrong, the more narrow phrase that what was involved here was 
the separation of powers and the President's responsibilities to pre- 
serve that separation, and I think I told you how he went through, 
how wo invite each other, that Congressmen will come here by invi- 
tation, that we go there but neither of us can command the other, and 
that is the way it has to be and we went into that. 

And then he got talking about how lie wanted us to be outgoing and 
he recalled the days when he was a Congressman, when he could not 
get a re[)ort, an FBI report, not raw files but an FBI report, in the 
Hiss matter, and he said, "But we are going to tell this committee, 
give them anything that they want in terms of information. Now we 
may do it," he said. "That is where you fellows come in," he said, "It 



(894) 



59.5 WASHINGTON POST, MARCH IS, 1973, Al^ A8 



He 
iliiimied 



ariiig 



eaii 



x\i(le to IVixon 
Instead Offers 
Wjillcii Reply 

Sy Carl Bern';tein 
and Bob Woodward 

^^^^aihinglon Post Staff Writers 

Citing the doctrine of ex- 
ecutive privilege, presiden- 
tial counsel John W. Dean 
III yesterday formally re- 
fused an invitation to 
testify in the Senate confir- 
matioa hearing on the 
I nomination of L. Patrick 
I Gray III to be director of 

luie nu. 

Dean's refusal put the 
White House on a collision 
course with Democratic mem- 
bers of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee who have vowed to 
block Gray's nomination un- 
less Dean testifies about mat- 
ters pertaining to the Water- 
gateirase. 

Both Republican and Demo- 
cratic sources on the commit- 
tee said privately yesterday 
that Dean's refusal had placed 
Gray's nomination in serious 
jeopardy and predicted nn ex- 
tremely close vole on report-' 
ing the nomination to the Sen- 
ate floor. Leaders of the move 
to call Dean as a witness said 
they believe they can block 
the nomination in committee. 

Dean's refusal to tesiify had 
the immediate effect of inten- 
sifying Deinucialic opposition 
on the committee and shifting 
the focus of the Gray confir- 
mation hea!in^.;s away irom 
the nominee and closer to tlie 
issues of executive privilege 
anrl the White House role in 
the FRl's Watergate iinestiga- 
tinn. 



Executive privilege — the 
doctrine that Presidents have 
B right to confidential advice 
svhieli reed not he (li.''close.i 
to Congress— is not -.vriitcn 
Into ]aw and tliereiorc is sub- 
ject to many interprctalions. 
Democrals on the .Tudici.iiv 
Committee contend that tliej 
concept is being applied too 
broadly in Dean's crse becnii-ol 
they want to ask hir.i about iiisl 
communications with Gray _| 
not tlie President. | 

A central issue that has 
developed in Grny's confir- 
mation hearings has been the 
propriety cf his a reemcnt !o 
turn over investigative reporls| 
in the Watergate case to Ue.-.i;. 
Members of the Jiidiciaryl 
Committee want to dctcrmin"! 
If Dean misused tlie infoiini 
ation he received from the 
FBI. I 

Senate iMajority Whip Hub- 1 
rrt C. Byrd iD-W.Va.). one of; 
the leaders of the move to call I 
Dean, took the Senate floor to • 
denounce the White House fur 
claiming executive privilege 
"in such a questionable area." 

"Mr. Dean's testimony be- 
fore the Judiciary Committee 
is vital to any considered, col- 
lective commitlce judgment 
on the proper conduct of the 
FBI investigation of the 



Sec GK.\Y, AS, Col. 1 



GPv.W. Friiri Al i 

Watergate break-in and Mr.] 
Crray's litness to be direcior of 
the bureau," Byrd said. Ilei 
added: I 

"Without the testimony of Mr.] 
Dean relating to these and many 
C't'ier unresolved qiie.-tioiis. thcj 
/udiciary Committee has be-: 
trre it a record that i.^ iiitoni- 
"1' te. . . . The Senate ought lo 
I'p'use to give its consent to 
til':' nomination.'' 

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-liul.), 
who during the confirmation 
he:ii'inss has praised Gray's per- 
sonal integrity while qiieslioii- 
in.if whclher he allowed ilie! 
V'liite House to interfere willil 
".e FDl's W.itergolc piube, .s.iid 
he now thinks the ti;nimill.'o 
-''oiild reject the noniin.ili.iii. 
i;a\h observed: "1 iliink II, e 
Pie>ident h:i. done a ;;ie.ii dis- 
si rvi.c Id Mr. fir^iy hy letusiiig 
to alow Mr. Dean to ap.Je.u. ' 

The (lue^li.'n ol l)e:iii'> ap- 
pearance bci ,ic the loniniittcci 



h.is heccme central to the (iray 
nomiiuilinn brc.iuse of what 
Son .li.bii V. 'I'linney (O-C.ihf.) 
I'.is caikd Dean's "oinnipros- 
er.cc" in the FBI's in\eslig.ition 
of llie Watergate c.ise. Gray 
Ic'lificd that his frcciucnt con- 
lads "ilh Dean were based on 
"a ppvMimption of regularity" 
ir Ine While House. 

.\s While llou.se counsel, 
r;e;iii received regular re- 
poris of FBI interviews in the 
inve-:ti;;.-ilinn. s:il in nn all 
inti-rviows with White House 
stsff niombors and. after a 
oiiewcel; del.iy. turned over 
to the FBI the personal ef- 



fcel.<; of one of the Watergate 
cuuspiralors. former White 
Hii.i-.e coiisultanl F. Howard 
Hiiiu Jr. 

Before conducting a White 

lluu^p investigation of the 

bulging for President .Vixon.i 

Dc.i.'i hiid recomniended that 

another of the Watergalc con- 

spir;\to!-s — former White 

I House aide G. Gordon Lidd 

—be hired as counsel for the 

j Committee for the Re-election 

I of the I'jesidcnl. 

Dean's refusal to testify was 

coniained in a two-paragraph 

(letter to Judiciary Committee 

Chairman James O. Eastland 

(D-Miss.). .T supporter of the 

CIray nominalion. Dean did of- 

jfer to reply in writing to the 

committee's questions, which 

|Kasllr,ntl described as "better 

'than getting nothing." 

However, other members of 
the 9 to-7 Democratic majority 
on the committee were under- 
' stood to be unanimous in re- 
jecting Dean's offer, and Re- 
publican Charles ,\Ic. .Mathias 
(R-.'Mil.) was also expected to 
reject it. 

.Sen. John L. I\ICIcllan (D- 
.-\rk.i. who with Mathias holds 
the crucial swing votes on the 
coniimiiee. said Dean's offer 
to supply written answers "is 
jusl iKH sufficcnt for the com- 
mittee's need to interrogate 
wilncses." 

MiCIellan said that he has 

noi niaile up hii muul whellier 

111 voie lor or aiMin^l the noni- 

jiii::liiin i.f Guy. v.ho has been 

|;."ting (liiiiioi of iiic FBI since 

! Mi'V .■;. i:)72. 



(895) 



59.5 WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 15, 2972, Al, A8 



A spokesman for Huyh Scott 
(R-Pa). the Senate .Minority 
Leader, said tliai, "If tlie ma- 



■ A spokesman for Mathiasl That special investigating! nominee again on the witness] 
said the Maryland senator too I committee, headed by Sen. [stand. 

has not decided how lie will fi-lsam J. Ervin (D-N.C), is not' It was alsn announced that] 
nally vote on tlie nomination, [scheduled to make its final re-jcall Dean as a witness in; 

port until next February. iGray's confirmation hearings, 
Leaders of the movement to; have argued that unless Dean! 

testifies Grsy's qualifications Thomas Lumbard, a former as-! 
jority wants to pursue the|cannot be evaluated until the sistant U.S. attorney here who' 
matter in good faith-rather ■E,,.in committee has made its ^as scheduled to appear before! 
than making waves — they final i-enorl '^ v u >. i 

should accept this otter, i ,f those Democrats cannot i'^^ <^°'^'"'"^'' yesterday, had, 

"Under the restrictions of'^yjn jho ei^ln votes neces.sary ''^^'^''"^^ to testify. ; 

executive privilege, Mr- jto block the Grav nomination i Lumbard, who provided 
Dean's offer is a pretty goocJ outright, they are expected to. volunteer legal advice last 
deal for the committee," he ja,tempt to hold it in abeyance year to the White Housp nn 
added. "Mr. Gray's nomina-i^jntjl after the Ervin commit- ^^''' '° ,. ^'^^ "°"'' °" 
lion as a pie.sidential ap-jtee has completed its work.l""^''^'?" finances, has said 
pointee is before the Judiciary gdcpesg j^ ijiis, meml)ers of'that Dean and Watergate bug- 
Committee, not the Watergate j 1,0th parties have said, would ging conspirator G. Gordon, 
case. The Select Committee(p,.obablv force the President kiddy worked closely together 

L"nairto1m-esirC"l'hUcali'\;"''''.'T '\^T^f^^'- in the months before 'the 
senate to in\cstigale political Meanwhile. Eastland an-I, , . ^ • ,- • 

espionage is the place to e.x-'nounced the hearings on Gray's: ^'■^^''"'" ^^ °^"'°"^^"= ■^^''^"■ 

amine the Watergate case — [nomination will resume atl^^ National headquarters on 

not the Judiciary Committee." 1 10:30 a.m. Tuesday with the! June 17, 1972. 



(896) 



60. On March 15, 1973 the President held a press conference. 
He stated he would adhere to his decision not to allow Dean to testify 
before the Congress even if it meant defeat of Gray's nomination as 
Director of the FBI, because there was "a double privilege, the lawyer- 
client relationship, as well as the Presidential privilege." He also 
stated that he would not be willing to have Dean sit down informally 
and let Senators question him, but Dean would provide all pertinent 
information. 



Page 

60.1 President Nixon news conference, March 15, 1973, 

9 Presidential Documents 271-73 898 



(897) 



60.1 PRESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 15, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 271-72 

PSeSIDtNTIAl DOCUMENTS; RICHASO NIXON, 1973 j^, 

;:i lichalf of fu.^ic(• rhiklren, so triat Ihry i:riy .;i;joy tb;.- hiinilrct! si;vcnty-three, and ot tht: Independence of the 

souiul development that comes from a full and happy United States of America the one hundred ninet\-seven''h 
family life. Richard .\ixon 

In Witnf.ss Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 



tn:s 



,,, , rxf u • 1. c r 1 ■ '"'''" """ ""^ Ohics of the Federal R-g.jtcr, 3:04 p.m. 

14th day ot March, in the year or our Lord nmetcen March 14 19731 



THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF 
MARCH 15, 1973 



United States Llmson Office in Peking 

The President. Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement with 
regard to our Liaison Office in Peking. 

The office will open approximately on May 1, and Ambassador 
David Bruce will be the Chief of the Liaison Office. In the office will be 
approximately a total complement of 20 (30), of whom 10 will be at 
what we call the expert level; the others, of course, for the support level. 

The two top assistants, top deputies to Ambassador Bruce — how- 
ever, we should note, I call him Ambassador, but his title will be Chief 
of the Liaison Office — will be Mr. Jenkins from the State Department, 
who, as you know, is one of our top experts on Chinese-American rela- 
tions in State; and Mr. Holdridge from the NSC [National Security 
Council], who is the top man in the NSC advising in this area there. 

We selected these two men because Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge 
not only are experts in Chinese — they are bilingual, incidentally, in both 
Chinese and American; they speak well; in fact I remember both assisted 
in translations when I have been there — but in addition to that, they are 
men who have from the beginning been participating in the new initiative 
between the People's Republic and the United States. They have accom- 
panied me on my trip, and they have accompanied Dr. Kissinger on 
his trips. 

A word about why Ambassador Bruce was selected. We called him 
out of retirement because I thought it was verj' important to appoint a 
man of great stature to this position. The Chinese accepted that view 
themselves, and we expect soon to hear from them as to the appointment 
of the man they will have as his opposite number here in Wa.shington. 
Another reason that I selected Ambassador Bruce was because of his 
great experience. AM of you know that he has been Ambassador to Britain 
and Ambassador to Germany, Ambassador to France, and also headed 
our delegation in Paris in the Vietnam talks in 1971 and '72, in the early 
part of '72. 

A third reason, perhaps, has even greater significance. Many of you 
in this room were on the trip to China, and sometimes I suppose the feel- 
ing must ha\e devclnped, "Well, this is a one-shot deal." I never con- 
sidered it that, and all of you who reported on it did not consider it that. 
It was the beginning, we trust, of a longer journey, a journey in which 
wc will have our differences, but one it; which the most populous nation 
in ttic world and the United States of .America can work t(\:;cthrr where 
u.t.ji interests coincide for the cniisc of pf.-icc .nnd better rel.itions in the 
PariTic ami in the woikl. 



(898) 



GO. 1 PPESIDSJ'JT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH IS, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 271-73 

r,~:;;i3'NriM document';- Rii.n'-'<'j riixoM, I9.'3 

Ii ;.; iT-c'-'-'O'v f'lr't ;■!'■; I'-. tlv'-T'i'-r. a !i:p:ivt;van itpfrrrpri--^-; in the 
liishcst sense of \hc. wi-ii'. 

Mr. Bruce, as you know, wiiilc lie hai not Ije.eri cngai^ed in partisan 
(jolitics, as such, is a Democrat. He lias served four Pre.sidctits with equal 
disiinctioii, Democratic Presidents as well as Repahlicans. And v.c bi:!ic\e 
tluit appointii'n him as head of the deicgation indicates our intention that 
this initiative will contiiuie in the future, whether the Presidency is occu- 
pied by a Democrat or a Republican. Of course, I am not making any 
predictions as to what will happen ^\■hen I leave. 

But that is the end of my announcement. We will now go to your 
questions. Mr. Risher. 



Questions 



TE5T::.roNY oy white house counsel before 

CONGRESSIONAL COMMrTTEE 

Q. Mr. President, do you plan to stick by your deci- 
sion not to allow Mr. Dean to tesnfy before the Congress,' 
even if it means the defeat of Mr. Gray's nomination? 

The President. I have noted some speculation to the 
effect that the Senate might hold Mr. Gray as hostage to a 
decision on Mr. Dean. I cannot believe that such respon- 
sible Members of the United States Senate would do that, 
because as far as I am concerned, my decision has been 
made. 

I answered that question rather abruptly, you recall, the 
last time it v/as asked by one of the ladies of the press 
here. I did not mean to be abrupt, I simply meant to be 
firm, 

Mr. Dean is Counsel to the White House. He is also 
one who was counsel to a tiumber of people on the White 
House Staff. He has, in effect, what I would call a double 
privilege, the lawyer-client relationship, as well as the 
Presidential p.dvilcge. 

.A.nd in terms of privilege, I think we could put it an- 
other way. I consider it my conititutional responsibility 
to defend the principle of separation of powers. I recog- 
nize that many Members of the Congress disagree with my 
interpretation of that responsibility. 

But while we are talking on that subject — and I will go 
on at some length here because it may anticip.ite some of 
your other questions — I am very proud of the fact that in 
this .-\dministration we have been more forihco.ming in 
temis of the relationship between the executive, the White 
Hou'^e, and the Congress, than any administration in my 
mtmor)'. We have not drawn a curtain down and said 
that ihiTc could be no information furnished by members 



of the White House Staff because of their special rela- 
tionship to the President. 

All we have said is that it must be under certain cir- 
cumstances, certain guidelines, that do not infringe upon 
or impair the separation of powers that are so essential to 
thesurvival of our system. 

In that connection, I might say that I had mentioned 
previously that I was once on the other side of the fence, 
but what I am doing here in this case is cooperating with 
the Congress in a way that I asked the then President, Mr. 
Truman, to cooj^erate with a committee of the Congress 
25 years ago and in which he refused. 

I don't say that critically of him now — he had his rea- 
sons, I have mine. But what we asked for in Lhe hearings 
on the Hiss case — and ail of you who covered it, like Bill 
Theis and others, will remember — what we asked for was 
not that the head of the FBI or anybody from the \Vhite 
House Staff testify. There was very widespread informa- 
tion that there was a report of an investigadon that had 
been made in the Administradon about the Hiss case. We 
asked for that report. \S'e asked for the FBI information 
with regard to that report. 

And Mr. Truman, the day we started our investigation, 
issued an executive order in which he ordered everybody 
in the executive department to refuse to cooperate with 
t'lie committee under any circumstances.' The FBI refused 
all information. We got no report from the Department 
of Justice. And we had to go forward and break the case 
ourselves. 

\Ve did. .'\nd, to the credit of the Administradon, after 
we broke the case, they proceeded to conduct the prosecu- 
tion and the FBI went into it. 

I would like to say, incidont.iUy, that I talked to Mr. 
Hoover at that time. It was with rcluct.''.ncc that he did 
not turn over that infomiadon — reluctance, because he 



■Sr- 



t.f thi. 



'Src PubHc Papers of Ihf Pres^d'-.-.ti, Itirr; S. Tnrmin. 1943 



(899) 



PFESIDENT NIXON NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH IS, 197 Z, 

9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 271-73 

ii;it tlic infciimation, Ific invcsligatioii tlu:y li.-ul con 
(l,,...-fl, \v.L< \yr; p::rri;n:nl to ■.•-'.lat l\v: ( f.inr.st.t'.-,- w.-' 
(toiii;.; 



fi-lt li 



60.1 



You will nolo lli.it lhci<; li;tvc hcen reports of infiltra- 



VJct:.; 



to Sc; 



Vic'n.i'.n of 



t!ic aiiiounts that were a'j 



upon 



Now, I llioiii^lu that decision was wroni;. And so when 
this Adininisti.'.tioii has conic in, I have aKvays insisted 
that wc should cooperate with Members of the Congiess 
and with tlie committees of the Con^-^ress. And that is 
why wc have fuinislied information. But, however, I am 
not yoing to have the Counsel to the President of the 
United States testify in a formal session for the Congress. 
}l..)w;-vcr, IMr. Deaa will furn.isii iiitorrnatioa when any 
of ii is rc:quc;Stcd, provided it is pertin.;nt to the unestis.-i- 
tlon. 

Q. Mr. President, would you then be willing to ha\e 
Mr. Dean sit down informally and let some of the Senators 
question him, as they have with Dr. Kissinger? 

The pRESiDtNT. No, that is quite a different thing. 
In fact. Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Ehrlichman, as you know, not 
only informally meet with Members of the Congress on 
matters of substance, the same is true with members of 
the press. As you know, Dr. Kissinger meets with you 
ladies and gentlemen of the press and answers questions 
on matters of substance. 

In thLs case, where we have the relationship that we 
have with Mr. Dean and the President of the United 
States— his Counsel — that would not be a proper way to 
handle it. He will, ho%vever— the important thing is, he 
will furnish all pertinent information. He will be com- 
pletely forthcoming — something that other Administra- 
tions have totally refused to do until we got here. And I 
am \ery proud of the fact that we are forthcoming, and I 
would respectfully suggest that Members of the Congress 
might look at that record as they decide to test it. 



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN VIETNAM 

Q. Mr. President, can you say, sir, how concerned you 
are about the reports of cease-fire violations in Vietnam? 

The President. Well, I am concerned about the 
cease-fire violations. As you ladies and gentlemen will re- 
call, I have consistendy pointed out in meeting with you, 
that we would expect violations because of the nature of 
the war, the guerrilla nature, and that even in Korea, in 
which we do not have a guerrilla war, we still have vio- 
lations. They recede every year, but we still have them 
long — 15, 20 years — after the war is over. 

In the cJise of these violations, we are concerned about 
them on two scores. One, because they occur, but two, 
wc are concerned because of another violation that could 
lead to, we think, rather serious consequences — we do not 
believe it will; we hope that it will not — and that is the 
reports that you ladies and gendemen have been receiv- 
ing from your colleagues in Vietnam with regard to 
infiltration. 



ec|i!ipinciit exceeding 
in thescttl'-ment. 

Now, some cquipr.ieiit can come in —in other v.orcLs, 
reph'.cement equipment, but no new equipment, nothing 
which steps up the capacity of the North Vietnamese or 
the Victcong to wage war in the South. No ne\v equip- 
ment is allowed under the agreement. 

Now, as far as that concern is concerned, particularly 
on the i.Tfiltratioii — that is the ni.-;re important point, 
i.icber than t!;e re.-i.^e-.ri;c violations which -.ve think, over 
a period of time, will be reduced — but in terms of the 
infiltration, I am not going to say publicly what we have 
said. 

I will only suggest this: that we have informed the 
North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration 
and of what we believe it to be, a violaUon of the cease- 
fire, the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern 
has also lieen expressed to other interested parties. And 
I would only suggest that based on my actions over the 
past 4 years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly 
disregard such expressions of concern, when they are 
made, with regard to a violation. That is all I will say 
about it. 

Q. ^^r. President, in connection with this matter, there 
is a report also that not just equipment, but a new infusion 
of North Vietnamese combat personnel have been intro- 
duced into South Vietnam, which is apait from just 
equipment. Can you confirm this? Is this partly what you 
are talking about? 

The President. Mr. Theis, the reports that we get 
with regard to infiltration, as you know, are always either 
too little or too late or too much. And I am not going to 
confirm that one, except to say that we have noted the 
report having been made. We, however, are primarily 
concerned about the equipment, because as far as the 
personnel are concerned, they could be simply replace- 
ment personnel. 
Q. Mr. President. 

The President. Go ahead, you are up in front. 
Q. Sir, why have we not gone through the ICCS 
[International Commission of Control and Supenasion] 
to complain about this infiltration? 

The President. The ICCS is being used. As you 
kno%v, there are some problems there. The Canadians 
have expressed considerable concern about the fact that 
they don't want to be on a commission which b not being 
effectively used, and we will continue through the ICCS 
and any other bod> that we can effectively appeal to, 
to attempt to got action there. I can only answer in 
thai way at thi> point. 



VoUmt 9 — N-jr-bT 1 1 



(900) 



61. On or about March 16, 1973 E, Howard Hunt met with Paul 
O'Brien, an attorney for CRP . Hunt informed O'Brien that coiranitments 
had not been met, that he had done "seamy things" for the White House, 
and that unless he received $130,000 he might review his options. On 
March 16, 1973 Hunt also met with Colson's lawyer, David Shapiro. 
According to Colson, Hunt requested of Shapiro that Colson act as 
Hunt's liaison with the White House, but was told that that was Impossible. 



Page 

61.1 Paul O'Brien testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 2A, 1974, 27-30 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 902 

61.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
July 17, 1973, 87-95 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 906 

61.3 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 29, 1974, 63-71 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 915 

61.4 Charles Colson draft statement prepared for 
delivery to SSC, September 1973, 37-38 (received 

from SSC) 924 



(901) 



61. 1 PAUL O'BRIEN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 24, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 27-30 

LJ V 27 

Q In Bubstar.ce did he say that he v.'asn't going to 
2 assuine responsibilty for it or did not regard himself as havinrr 
_ responsibility? 

A Yg3, he did. 

Q VJhat did he say about having talked v.'ith Mr. Moore 
that gave you the impression that Mr. Moore had brought up 
the subject with Kr. Mitchell? 

A I v;as under the impression that Hr. Koore could 
have even possibly been in Kr. Mitchell's office when I called 
him, although I'n not certain, but he indicated specifically 
tiiat I^« Moore had been there and that he had talked with hin 
and that this subject had been brought up and he had made his 
position clear to Mr. Moore. 

Q Now on or about llarch 16th, 1973, did you have a 
meeting with Mr. Runt? 

A I did. 

Q Can you tell the Grand Jury how that came about? 

A I received a telephone call from Mr. Bittman who 
indicated that his client was extremely upset, that he had 
received word that he was going to be sentenced on the 23rd 
of March, if that's a Friday, and that he was attempting to 
put his affairs in order and to take care of such matters as 
have to be taken care of regarding his children and his so- 
called connitments had not been met and that it was imperative 
that I come to his office and discuss the matter with Mr. Hunt 



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61.1 PAUL O'BRIEN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 24, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 27-30 

uv 

1 vb.o uas at that time there. 

2 Q Did you go o'v'er to I'lr, Eittman ' s office? 

3 A Reluctantly, yes. 

4 Did you thereafter neet alone V7ith Mr. Hunt? 

5 A I did. 
g lio\,- did it happen that you met with Mr. Kunt alone? 
7 A I went to Mr. Bittman's office and Mr. Bittinan was 
g on the telephon at the time. I suggested that Mr. Eittman 
g acconpany me. Ke was busy and said, "Go talk to him. He's 

going to tell you the same thing I've told you." 

I do not recall whether it was at the end of the 
hall that Hr. Bittnan was on, but it was either in Mr. Kittler^s 
office — he was out of the office that day — or in a small 
conference room, but it v/as in another room that I met with 
Hr , Kunt . 

BY MR. BEN-VEIJISTE: 
Q Khat did Kr. Kunt tell you? 

A >!r. Hunt vent over essentially the sarae ground; that 
his concnitnents hadn't been met, that he was going to be sen- 
tenced. Ke seened particularly disturbed and agitated, 

I told him that I didn't have anything to do with 
his cormitments, that I vas Borry but I didn't think that t 
could help hin. 

Tie had no intention of letting iT\e out on that basis. 
I?e v.-ont on and stated that he had $60,000 in legal fees out- 

(903) 



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61.1 PAUL O'BRIEN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 24, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 27-30 



I 

2D 

1 standing, and he nado a demand for S130,000. It is my 

2 recollection that it was rrixty and seventy thousand total. 

3 During the course of the conversation he indicated 
that he liad done — the word he used was "seeny" things — 

5 for the V.l.ite House. He instructed rae to pass this inforTr.atior 
on to Mr. Dean and ho indicated that these things didn't happer 
— if these things didn't happen he would have to revievv his 
g options. 

In addition, during the course of the conversation 
I indicated to hin again, as I said, that I was powerless in. 
this situation, that I thought he had best contact his friend 
Mr. Colson or someone else who could assist hin. 

Q Vrtiat was his reaction to that? 

A There was sone indication that he had been in con- 
tact with Mr. Colson and he really didn't give a damn about rny 
suggestion. He was just telling me what to do at that stage, 

Q V7as there any other inference frora his statenent 
that he would have to reviev/ his options, made in conjunction 
v-;ith his statement about having done seeny things, which led 
you other than to th.o conclusion that he was threatening to 
publicly make some sort of statement unless his demands wore 
met? 

A I've got to be frank and tell you at the tirr.e that 
the peripheral aspects of his conversations, such as the seemy 
ctixug-o and "reviev; l.is option", didn't hit me with that 



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61.1 PAUL O'BRIEN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 24, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 27-ZO 



1 particular impact. I had never had anyone make a personal 

2 demand on ms for over a hundred tliousand dollars. I nean it 
v.-asn't just that somebody approached me a dime for a cup of 

4 coffee. 

5 Frankly it sort of cent ne right up tlie wall. i 
g just wanted out of tj'.ere. 

7 Q Did Mr. Hunt indicate that you ought to convey this 
g message to f-ir. Dean? 
A He did. 

10 Q -'OW after you left the office vhat did you do? 

11 A I stopped back past Vir . Bittraan's office and I 

12 reiterated the essense of the conversation, 
Q Wliat did hrr. Bittinan say? 
A He said, "1 indicated to you that Mr. Hunt was 



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j5 I extremely agitated and upset and he was going to do this." 



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[That v.-as about it. t then departed. 

Did you then repeat v.-hat Mr. Hunt had told you to 
Kr. Dean? 

A I did. 

Q Khen was that? 

A As far as I recall, immediately following the meet- 
ing, 

BY MR. FRW-IPTON: 

Q Nov- J-'r. O'Brien, ycu mentioned before a meetina 

whicli you had on about N'ovember 2Gth or 29tli v.-ith Mr. Eittman 



DV 

(905) 



61.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY. JULY 17. 1973. WATERGATE GRAND JURY. 87-95 

Q\ ^^ 

:tKer or ncc I war, sufficiently re- 
covered from the chock of my wife's death to stand trial I 
think had been resolved by that time. 

Q All right. Did you ever say to anyone, that uight 
have been picked up by Mr. O'Brien, that you thought a good way 
to handle this or, in substance, the v;ay to handle this -- you 
had a psychiatrist, by the way, who was ;?illing to testify that 
you were unable to stand trial. Isn't that a fact? 

A No, sir. 

Q You did not have such a psychiatrist? 

A No, sir. 

Q You didn't have a psychiatrist? 

A No, sir, I did not. 

Q Okay. 

A I was examined by a Government psychiatrist. 

Q Only a Government psychiatrist? 

A Only a Government psychiatrist. 
l"^!! I Okay. Now, then, you did have a conversation with 



r 



I'*'; 'Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Paul O'Brien, about the middle of March, 1973 
did you not? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Where did this conversation take place? 

A It took place in the law offices of Hogan and Harts orx. 

24 1! Q That's the firm Mr. Blttman is a member of? 

;! 

■.>5 i A Yes, sir. 

(906) 



61.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY^ JULY 17, 1973^ WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 

V • 88 



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■" 'vJiic v;as present at that conversation ^/Lth yoa and 
Nr. O'Brien? 

P. Only the two of us . 

Q During this conversation did you say, in essence, to 
Mr. O'Brien, first, you apologized for putting hiin\in the middle, 
and then explained that you only had a certain number of days 
in v)hich to get your affairs in order and that, again, commit- 
ments had been made but had not been kept? Did you say those 
words, in substance? 

A In substance, yes, sir, 

Q In substance, to Mr. O'Brien? 

A Yes, sir, 

Q And did you say you'd done a number of "seamy" things 
for the White House? 

A I may very well have, yes, sir. 

Q Well, to the best of your recollection, did you? 

A Yes, sir, 1^ the context that I wanted hira and his 
principals to — to remind him and his principals that Watergate 
i was not the only activity that 1 had engaged in for them. 

Q And you used the word to describe the nature of those 
activities, such as "seamy"? 

A Yes, sir, 

Q And you told him to deliver that message, that you had 
done a number of "seamy" things for the White House, and that 



25 I! if something didn't happen -- referring to your commitment, the 



(907) 



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61.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1^72. WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 , 

;j9 



ccirjTiltments -- y:.! i.'OLild have to vc-rLc: the 3ltt.--n';t;iv.~:; . Did 
you raake statcmonta, in substance, to that effoci;, Co Mr. 
O'Brien? 

A Can we break that down in two parts, sir? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A Would you go into the first half of that? I would 
like to respond directly to that in one context. 

Q Well, why don't you just go ahead and tell us how 
you put it. Tell us the conversation you had with Mr. O'Brien 
in the offices of Hogan and Hartson in the middle of March, 
1973. 

A I did not tell Mr. O'Brien to deliver any messages. 
That is one part I want to answer specifically. 

Q Well, did you think Mr. O'Brien — why were you tellling 
him this, then? 

A Because I knew that he was a middleman of sorts. 

Q You knew he would deliver messages, didn't you? 

A Pardon me? 
Ill ij Q You knew he would deliver the message? 

A I didn't know that he would deliver the message, no, 
sir. 

Q Were you saying this just to stop with Mr. O'Brien, 
Mr. Hunt? 

A I was hoping that, eventually, it would reach some 



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81.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 

90 

'7 

Q 0!:r.y. :'o what^yt5u're saying; is yoa didn't :.ry, li: 
so many words, I want you to deliver a tnecGage? 

A Precisely. He deprecated his role to me very mucli. 
He said he only saw people occasionally; that he was just a 
middle man; he had no influence; he was glad to meet with me, 
on that basis, so long as I understood, this sort of thing. 

Q All right. Nov?, I certainly don't want, at any time 
during the course of this interview -- and I've told you this 
before, haven't I, Mr. Hunt? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Anything but the truth from you, right? Nothing but 

the truth, at all? 

A Yes, sir, 

Q And I don't want to put any words in your mouth at 
all. You understand that? 

A And 1 don't want Mr. O'Brien to put words into my 
mouth. 

Q And I don't want Mr. O'Brien to put words in your 
mouth. Now, would you prefer to go through what you told Mr. 
O'Brien in the middle of March, 1973? 

A To the best of my recollection, yes, sir. 

Q Yes, sir. 

A Yes. sir. I had asked specifically for the meeting 

24 II with Mr. O'Brien because I was within a few days of sentencing. 

ii 

.)j, I I was in a very depressed physical and, certainly, mental 



(909) 

35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 15 



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61.2 g. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 197 S, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 

9L 
cn..iltion. My v;i£e had beei. klll::^! Li\ Decer^'ber; I was coi;:ing 
ui. for Esntencini^ very shortly; ir.y financial position was 
extremely uncertain; I had no idea of what kind of sentence 
Judge Sirica might meet out. 

Q Now, what I'm interested in is what you said to Mr. 

O'Brien. I do understand that position. 

A I covered all these natters with him. 

Q Then what I read to you, the substance of that con- 

versation with the exception, then, that you didn't say, "I 
want you to deliver a message." 

A So far, yes, sir. 

Q Now, with the word "seamy" things for the White House, 
did you mention any name there? 

A I never knew who he was dealing with. 

Q No. In respect to the "seamy" thing, did you mention 
any name? 

A I may have said Dean. I may have concluded that he 
was dealing with John Dean. 

Q You did the "seamy" things for Dean? 

A No, sir. 

Q All right. Did you mention anyone's name for whcrr. 
you had done these "seamy" things in the White House? 

A I read press accounts that I said Ehrlichman. I did 
not say Ehrlichman. 

Q Forget the press accounts. What do you recollect: 



(910) 



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61.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973^ WATERGATE GRAND JURY^ 87^-95 

you said? 

A I have no recollection that I put a name on it. I 
said, "I have done a number of seamy things for the White 
House." The context ^ being that they should take these into 
consideration as added reason for their obligations to me to 
help me out of ny present plight, which has frightened me to 
death. 

Q You have no present recollection of having mentionec 
>-r. Ehrlichman's name In the course of that? 

A No, sir, I do not. 

Q Very well. Now, we understand that what you've beer 
testifying to here today is not something from press reports, 
right? 

A Correct. 

Q What you testified here today is the truth, as well 
as you know. Not what you've heard from any press reports? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And no one in here has tried to get you to say any- 



l!l i! 

20 

21 , Q Did he say to you — did Mr. O'Brien respond to you 



l!i ll thing about press reports, you understand that? 

ii 

A Perfectly. 



22 jl about why you didn' t contact some of your friends rather than 

2'. ' noing through him? 

24 i| A He was rather specific about it. 
Q What did he say? 



(911) 



61.2 g. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 

DV 

A 1:2 r..i-l, a;_,ain -- he assumed a 2c;If-deprecatory role 

and sf^^.ted thai ho 'v'as a man of little or no influence. He 
war. a ir.essage c-rrier. A middle man, if you will. 

He said, "Chuck Colson Is your friend- VJhy don't you 
write him a mexaorandum?" 

Q What did you say with respect to that? You've alread^ 
had one conversation with Mr. Colson. You told him about the 
"ready". What did you say? What did you say in response to 
that? 

A I believe — first of all, I believed that Mr. O'Brien 
was a man who was involved with Mr. Mitchell. 

Q Now, what did you say to him? 

A So, against that background — 

Q Yes? 

A — I believed Mr. O'Brien to be a Mitchell man rather 
than a Colson man. I felt that what he wanted was something 
on the record that could involve Mr. Colson. And so I don't 
believe I gave him a direct response. 

To the best of my recollection, I gave him something 
that I could — I said, "On the other hand. Chuck hasn't been 
involved so far. I don't see any reason to involve him now." 

Q All right. Now, did this conversation with Mr. O'Brien 
occur about the middle of March, about a week prior to your 
scheduled sentencing? Is that the best of your recollection? 

A Approximately, yes, sir. 



(912) 



ei 2 E mWARD HUNT TESTTMONY. JULY 17 , 1972. WATERGATE GRAND JUHY^ 87-95 
. — '■ ' ' V't 

Q And you said thct your coriiii.itrcents had not been i.:st 
and you mentioned that you'd done a nuziber of "searriy" thir.v^s 
for the White House; and if the conxuittnents v/eren ' t met, you 
might have to review the alternatives. Correct? 

A I would put it a different way, sir, to the best of 
my recollection. That I said that the cornmitments had not 
been kept and, accordingly, if I were suddenly to become a 
very poor man, that I would no longer have options available 
to me which were currently available. 

Q And did you mention "searcj'" things you had done for 
the VThite House? 

A I had done that previously. 

Q But in the same conversation? 

A Yes. I had done seamy things for the White House, 
yes, period. 

Q And that if the commitments weren't met, and you 
jwould become a poor man, you raight have to review the alter- 
natives? 

A And see what other steps could be taken on my behalf. 

Q Now, a few days thereafter, you received a package, 
21 ijdidn't you? 

A Yes. 

2:; Ij Q How much was in that package? 

■24 \ A $75,000. 

.2«, I Q That was the last package you've received to date? 



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61.2 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 197 Z, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 87-95 

95 
Yfc3, sir. I also, at tV-.at time in the conversation 
j witli nr. O'Krien, told him specifically V7hat my legal fees had 
amounted to, at that time. 

Q You said, as a matter of fact, you counted up to 

about $70,000 living expenses and $60,000 legal fees, something 
like that? 

A Whatever it was. 

Q Does that sound about right? 

A I would guess 50 or 60. 

Q And a few days after this conversation with Mr. O'Eri^euj 
you received a package of cash amounting to $75,000? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Okay. Now, Mr. Frampton is going to question you 
about some deliveries of money, okay? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And then you'll be excused for the time being. I'm 
going to meet our good friend, Mr. Glanzer, so would you all 
excuse me, and then I'll see you all back at 2:00 this after- 
noon. Thank you very much for your patience, members of the 
Grand Jury; and, Mr. Hunt, I'll talk to you later. Okay? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Excuse me. One thing before I go, if I may. I'll 

show you v;hat has been marked for identification as Grand Jury ; 

I 
Exhibit Eini-2, 7/17/73, and I'll ask you if you recognize that? 

A I recognize it. 



(914) 



61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONXj, JANUARY 23, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURX^ 63-r71 



22 

I 

13 
14 

'.5 



DV 



'■^^ BY MRS. VOLKER: 



Q Now, the reason that you requested the meeting with 

Mr. O'Brien was to relay to him, number one, a demand for a 
sum of money in excess of $100,000 and, secondly, to tell 
him that otherwise you were going to reveal the seamy things 



NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINED THE ABOVE DELETION WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. 



(915) 



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61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63-^71 

64 
that yoa had done for Mr. Ehrlichman, is that not correct? 

A Well, I've gone over this a good many times. I 
know repetition is the name of the game. I thought that, 
with inprisonment approaching, it was highly essential that 
if any of these commitments were going to be kept, that they 
be kept then and there. 

And I mentioned to Mr. O'Brien, en passant, that 
other things had been done at the White House in the past 
and ray feeling was that if anybody was going to be the reci- 
pient of VJl-iite House largesse, if you will, it should be 
those who put their necks on the line for those people before. 
But I don't think that any quid pro quo is explicitly in thert 
I don't know what Kr. O'Brien's perception of the meeting was. 

Q You've already told Vx , Colson, in November, that 
you were protecting the people who were involved in the Water- 
gate break-in, and now you're telling Kr. O'Brien that there 
are people involved in other seamy things besides the Water- 
gate break- in, and you're asking for money and you're saying, 
"I'll have to review my alternatives if I don't get that 
money." And that can't mean anything except that youire 
going to reveal that unless they meet your deajadds for money. 

A Well, it's a manner of speaking, too. I revievj 
my alternatives, I review my options. ^'That were my options? 
They were very damned slim. 

BY ^^l. BEN-VENISTE: 



ov 



(916) 



61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY , JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63-71 



15 

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I 



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Q That's precisely the point. Is it not, Kr. Hun;:? 
You r option was either to continue to keep quiet or to talk 
And what you're saying is, wasn't it, that in the event that 
^ they weren't prepared to meet your demands, you'd had enough 

5 and you were about ready to talk? 

6 A I knew all along that I was going to have to talk 

7 end, in fact, I began to talk within a very few days there- 

8 after. Everyone knew that. 

9 Q That's not the point, Hr. Hunt. That's not the 

10 question. If everybody knew that, what was the point in 

11 mentioning that? Then you have no option. 

12 That*E totally inconsistent with the concept of 

13 option, if you were to suggest, now, that you had no option 

14 A Well, that's a great White House phrase — options 
this, options that. It's a parlance I picked up. I was bein* 
as vague — 

Q It meant, did it not, that you were going to see 
whether or not you were going to talk? Does it have any 
other interpretation than that? 

20 A I don't know how it was interpreted. 

21 Q Well, does it have any other interpretation? 

22 A Well, the interpretation, again, I placed on it 
was that I had been involved in "seamy things" for the ^^Tiite 
House of which Mr. O'Brien rr.ight not be aware, and r:y impli- 
cation was that I, having done this kind of work for thezi 

DV 

•— ' ^ (917) 



2 



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61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JANUAJ^Y 23, 1974. WATERGAT E GRAND JURY, 63-71 

I 

■66 , 

I 

' before, felt that they had, in effect, a double obligatiorr 

to me, 

3 Q That's the first half of it. But the second half 
^ of it is you will review your options if your demands aren't 

5 met. And what does that mean? 

6 A Well, it sort of means what a parent says to a 

7 child. "If you don't bring home the car at 11:00 o'clock to- 
night, I'll have to give further consideration to our re- 

9 lationship." 

10 I mean, in other -words, what does that mean really? 

11 It's just a form of speech, I think. 
Q You were- speaking to Mr. Shapiro as a parent does 

13 a child? 

14 A I would like to have. I didn't, though. 
Q And, Indeed, you were speaking to Mr. Shapiro in 

16 a manner that gravely indicates concern. You were in dead 

17 earnest. 
A Are we talking of Mv. O'Brien or Mr. Shapiro now? 
Q I'm sorry. Mr. O'Brien, yes. And you're saying 

that you would have to review your options. You were saying, 
as a father might say to a child, "You can't have the car 
anymore. I'm going to do what you don't like me to do. I'm 
going to punish you," Isn't that so? 

^ A It's very hard for me to reconstruct my frame of 

25 n-ind then. 



(918) 



61.3 E. HOWARD BUNT TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63-71 

D\J I 

67 : 



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Q In fact, the only thing you could punish with thezi 
was to tell the story -- to tell about the seamy things. 

A Well, these people were well on top of the case, 
then. Thiey knew it was just a matter of ten days or two 
weeks before this was going to come before the Grand Jury. 

Q The point is, Kr. Hunt, we're dealing with a con- 
versation, at this time, and we're asking you, under oath 
before this Grand Jury, if you can provide any other explana- 
tion other than what the plain words mean that you would 
review your options. 

A Well, I know that at one point I was contemplating 
suicide. 

Q Mr. Hunt, that is not in your mind at the time. 
You were not threatening or stating to Mr. O'Brien, at this 
time, were you, that if these monies were not paid that you 
would commit suicide? 

A No. 

Q You don't mean to seriously suggest that? 

A No, I don't. But you're asking me now to project 
for you what was in my mind. This is one of the things that 
was in my mind. 

Q That had been in your mind earlier but, at this 

tinie, you were saying to Mr. O'Brien, "Look, in addition to 

what I know about Watergate and the chain of cornrr,and, I've 

done a lot of things for Mr. Ehrlicliroan. 

(919) 



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61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63^71 , 

.68 I 
To this extent, this is new information that you're 
conveying to Mr. O'Srien that, to your knowledge, he didn't 
know about before, and you were saying this in the context 
of making demands for an extraordinary amount of money but, 
in the face of your going away to jail and losing whatever 
bargaining position you had at that time, you clearly under- 
stood that that was the situation. That unless you got these 
corrmitments acted on, at that time, that your chances were 
substantially diminishing in being able to argue your own 
case from jail later on. Isn't that right? 

A What do ntdu mean? Arguing my case in jail? 

Q In respect to getting your commitments. In respect 
to getting your money. 

A Oh. 

Q That was clearly foremost in your mind? 

A Right . 

Q And in the same connection, you're telling him, now 
that you will review your options in the event that he's not 
responsive to your immediate demands. 

A He told me that he was impotent; that he was becom- 
ing very ineffective; that he was really not the one that I 
should be talking to, and so forth. 

Q Well, of course, you told him to pass on this de- 
mand to Mr. Dean and tell Mr. Dean what it was. 

A I don't think I knew that Mr. Dean was his principa 

DV 

(920) 



61,3 E, HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63-71 

69 

^ at that tiiTie. I said "to whenever. " I don't believe Mr. 
^ O'Brien identified Mr. Dean. I could be wrong about that. 

Q So it's quite possible that if Kr. O'Brien recol- 
lects that you said, "Pass it on to Mr. Dean," that Mr. 
O'Brien could be accurate in his recollection? 

A I beg your pardon, sir? 

Q That if Mr. O'Brien recollects you said, "Pass it 
on to Dean," that you wouldn't quarrel with that particularly 

A I wouldn't quarrel particularly with it. I would 
say that, at that juncture, I had no knowledge that John 
Dean was active in this thing, es he turned out to be. 

I presumed, all along, that O'Brien's principal was 
John Mitchell. 

Q And you were expecting it to be passed on to John 
Mitchell rather than Mr. Dean? 

A To the best of my current recollection, yes. 

Q But Mr, Ehrlichman was at the Irtiite House, where Kr, 
Dean was, and Mr. Mitchell was up in New York on Wall Street, 
at the time. 

A I didn't know where Mr. Mitchell was. 

Q Well, you knew where he wasn't. 

A Did I? 

Q Didn't you know he was no longer Attorney Genera? 

A I didn't know that he wasn't livincr down at the 



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^7 .^ ff. gOm?g Ht/iVr TESTIMONY. JANUMX 29. 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63^71 

70 I 

Q Well, you knew he wasn't in the \Aite House? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, going back to the initial question, Mr. Kunt, 

is there any other interpretation one could place other than 

the plain meaning when you said you would review your options 

other than the fact that unless they met your demands you 

would tell about the seamy things? 

A I would like to consult with counsel on that point. 

THE F0RE2<AN: Go ahead. 

THE WITT^^SS: With your permission. 

(Whereupon, the witness left the Granc; 
Jury Room.) 

(Whereupon, the witness returned to 
the Grand Jury Room.) 



BY MRS. VCLNERi 
Q Mr. Hunt, have you had time talk to your attorney? 
A I have. 

Q Are you now prepared to answer the question? 
A I am. 

Q Would you answer the question, then? 
A Could 1 trouble you to restate the question? 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 
Q The question was one which has been restated several 
times, but, again, is there any other interpretation other 
than the clear meaning of the words that you would reviev: 
25 11 your options for alternatives other than that you would tell 

DV 

(922) 



61.3 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 63-71 



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71 
about these so-called seamy* things unless they met your 
demands? 

A No. 

l>iR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you. 
BY MRS. VOLNER: 

Q And what seamy things did you have in mind at the 
time, Mr. Hunt? 

A I was thinking about the Fielding episode — things 
like that — that were not integral with the Watergate itself 

Q And what other things besides the Fielding break-in 

A Oh, I think most of the items that have come out 
subsequently. 

Q Can you tell the Grand. Jury, please? 

A Well, we're casting back, now, to just about a year 
ago. At that time, the Ellsberg thing was uppermost in my 
mind and I think, if I had actually gone ahead and done any- 
thing, I would have made a list of those dirty tricks and 
things as these things have come up. 

Q There were numerous items that would have been on 
your list? 

A That's correct, yes. 

Q And I'm asking you what those things were. 

A Oh, my. The Segretti involvement, I suppose. Tne 
Vietnam cables. Principally, the whole Fielding-Ellsberg 

(923) 



61. 4 _ CHARLES COLSON DRAFT STATSmNT TO SSC, SEPTEMBER 1973^ 1, 37-38 



Ooen\n 


5. Sta 


te 


pent 


of 


Clu 


rl 


23 


u. 


C 


0l3 


on. 


Before 


Sela 


ct 


Corr. 


.-nit 




on 




cesi 


Ci 


ent 


ial 


Campai';/, 


.1 Act 


!L\'' 


L t i e 


y , 


Jr^it 


sd 


s 


:acc 


s 


Se 


aate 



I appreciate the opportunity to present this opening 
statement to your Comnittes. I shall first attenpt to the best 
of my reccllectioa to recount my knowledge of the events 
surrounding the Watergate Affair. 

I will also attempt, if 1 may, to give this Corrjnittee 

some insight into the mood and atmosphere which existed in 
the White House during the Nixon vears. I have followed vnur 
proceedings to date; it is clear that you are seeking to deter- 
mine not only v;hat in fact happened, but why and how these 
things could have happened. 

AS TO THE FACTS: 

1 first heard that there had been a burglary at the 
Democratic ITational CcT_-;iictee bcadqun rters on the radio. It 
v.-c-ic Saturday, June 17, 197?, I lIiomY'^.c it v;as no more th^n an 
ordinarv uur'-^la-v -•- one more addition to the R. C. crime 



(924) 



61.4 CHARLES COLSON DRAFT STATEMENT TO SSC, SEPTEMBER^ 2973, 1, 37-38 

37. 

allegations attempting to link ma to the Watergate. During 
that conversation Dean told me he •^■.'anted to see me imniediately 
upon my return. On March 8, two days before I left the 
TJhite House Staff to return to the practice of law, I met 
with Dean in his office. He was, at that point, working 
on the President's statement on executive privilege which 
we discussed at some length. During the meeting he astced 
me if I v7ould see Bittman or Hunt at some point just to be 
sure, as he put it. Hunt knew I was still his friend and 
cared about him. 



At this point I had become very cautious, particularly 
because of the concerns Mr. Shapiro had expressed to me. 
1 made no response to I-Ir . Dean's request but discussed it 
immediately x-zith Mr. Shapiro, who instructed me not to see 
Mr. Hunt under any circumstances. Rather, he, Shapiro, 
asked me to arrange through Mr. Bittman for him to see Hunt. 
I did so. Mr. Shapiro met with Mr. Hunt on Friday, March 16, 
and reported to me on Monday, March 19. He told me in 
substance that while Mr. Hunt had confirmed that I had no 
knowledge or involvement in Watergate, Hunt wanted me to 
act as liaison between himself and the Vfnite House. Mr. 
Shapiro said he told Mr. Hunt that that w-as impossible, that 
Mr. Hunt would have to find some other wav of makins: 
his position knovm to the Vftiite House and that I would be 



(925) 

35-905 (Pi. 2) O - 74 - 16 



61.4 CHARLES COLSON DRAFT STATEMENT TO SSC, SKPTLl'IBER 1973^ 1, 37^8 

38. 

instructed to have no contact either with Hunt or with 
the White House concerning Hunt. Follox'/ing his report, 
Mr. Shapiro told me in the strongest possible language 
to have no further discussions V7ith anyone in the VJhite 
House regarding Howard Hunt. 



In the same conversation, Mr. Shapiro told me that, 
in his viev7, the situation was getting serious. He said, 
"For God's sake, the President has to get the facts. 
I'Jh.o knows what's going on in that place. The fox may be 
guarding the chickens". I reminded Mr. Shapiro that I 
had discussed my suspicions about John Mitchell on 
February 14, but the President said that Mitchell had 
sworn he was innocent. I said it was impossible to know 
what advice the President was getting and from whom and 
I suspected the President would not know whom to believe. 
I further said that if I should now start warning the 
President about others ■^^n.thout hard evidence, he might 
erroneously think that I was myself involved and was only 
trying to shift the blame to others. 

Mr. Shapiro then said, "In that case, there is 
only one thing you can do for the President. You have 
to get him outside counsel, somebody impartial, v7hom he 



(926) 



62. On March 17, 1973 the President met with John Dean in the 
Oval Office from 1:25 to 2:10 p.m. (On April 11, 1974 the Committee 
on the Judiciary subpoenaed the President to produce the tape 
recording of the March 17 meeting. The President has refused to pro- 
duce that tape but has furnished an edited partial transcript of the 
meeting. After having listened to the tape recording of the March 17, 
1973 meeting, the President on June 4, 1973 discussed with Press 
Secretary Ron Ziegler his recollections of that March 17 meeting. A 
tape recording of the June 4 discussion has been furnished to the 
Committee. The evidence regarding the content of the March 17 meeting 
presently possessed by the Committee also includes a summary of the 
March 17 meeting furnished, in June 1973, to SSC Minority Counsel Fred 
Thompson by White House Special Counsel Buzhardt and the SSC testimony 
of John Dean.) 

In his discussion with Ziegler on June 4, 1973 the President 
told Ziegler the following regarding the March 17 meeting: Up to 
March 17, 1973 the President had no discussion with Dean on the basic 
conception of Watergate, but on the 17th there began a discussion of 
the substance of Watergate. Dean told the President that Dean had 
been over this like a blanket. Dean said that Magruder was good, but 
that if he sees himself sinking he'll drag everything with him. He 
said no one in the White House had prior knowledge of Watergate, except 
possibly Strachan. There was a discussion of whether Haldeman or 
Strachan had pushed on Watergate and whether anyone in the White House 



(927) 



was involved. The President said that Magruder put the heat on, 
and Sloan starts pissing on Haldeman. The President said that "we've 
got to cut that off. We can't have that go to Haldeman." The 
President said that looking to the future there were problems and 
that Magruder could bring it right to Haldeman, and that could 
bring it to the Wliite House, to the President. The President said 
that "We've got to cut that back. That ought to be cut out." There 
was also a discussion of the Ellsberg break-in. 

The edited partial transcript of the March 17 meeting 
supplied by the White House contains only a passage of conversation 
relating to Segretti and a portion of the conversation relating to 
the Ellsberg break-in. It contains no discussion of matters relating 
to Watergate. 



Page 

62.1 Meetings and conversations between the President 
and John Dean, March 17, 1973 (received from 

White House) 929 

62.2 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 17, 19 73 
(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 
Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 936 

62.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 996-97 939 

62.4 Wliite House edited transcript of meeting 
between President Nixon and John Dean, 

March 17, 1973 941 



(928) 



62.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 17, 197 Z 



# 



101530 

MEETINGS AT^ID TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETV/EEN 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN W . DEAN, III 



No contact between tlie President and John W. Dean, III, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns. 



May 1, 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



The President met to sign personal legal documents with: 



12:45 




11 


The First Lady 


12:49 




09 


John J. RatcMord 


12:49 




11 


Mr. Butterfield 


12:49 




11 


Mr. Haldeman 


12:49 




12 


Mr. Ehrlichman 


12:49 




12 


John W. Dean, KI 


12:49 




12 


John H. Alexander 


12:49 




12 


Richard S. Ritzel 



No other contact during August 1972 



rr 



(929) 



62,1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 17^ 1973 



m 

Septembfir 15, 1972 



i O 1 



PM The President met with: 

3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 

No other contact during September 197Z 



October 9, 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Nev/house Broadcasting 
and Herb 'Clein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting. 



November 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr. -John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of '76" with 

Rose Mary Woods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact between the President and Jolin W. Dean, 111, during November 
and December 1972. 



m 

(930) 



62.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 17, 1973 



^** 101530 

January 21, 1973 

AM 11:05 1Z:04 President and first Larly hosted Worship Service. 

John Dean attended. 



February 27, 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in CK'al Office. 

February 28, 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office. 

March 1, 1973 

AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John \V. Dean, III, 
/ in the Oval Office. 

[/(At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
J0:36 10:44 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. too the call. 
I^Mr, Kissinger vs^as present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 

March 6, 1973 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7, 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 8. 1973 • - 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 



■J':.i (931) 



62,1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 17, 1973 , . . . .— 



# 




March 10, 1973 lOi-J^'-' 

AM 9:20 9:44 President talked long distance v/ith Mr. Dean. 

President initiated the call from Camp David 
to Mr. Dean v/ho was in Washington, D. C. 



March 13, 1973 

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-12:55) 



March 14, 1973 

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President, 
9:43 10:50 President met with Air. Dean in the P's EOB Office. 

Also present were: 

Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 

Ronald L. Ziegler 

Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean. 

12:47 1:30 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 
4:25 4:26 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. (Mr. Dean 

initiated the call. ) 



arch 15. 1973 

PM 3:36 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



(932) 



62.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 17^ 1973 



March 16, 1973 iOi-JO' 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ziegler was present from 10:58-11:10. 

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

March 17, 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the 0\-al Office. 



March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested tha.t Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join hini in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 



March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tallxed with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr, Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore. 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean, (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



^^IjV 



(933) 



# 



62.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 17, 1973 _ 



March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Deem in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Haldcman v/a.s also present for at least 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:01 President met withMr. Dean in the President's 

EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr. Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 

Mr. Haldeman 1 f"\ 1 ^-"' 'lf\ 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) 1*^ "-'-^^ 
2/Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 
Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 
Mr. Haldem.an (2:01-3:40) 
Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in "Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Canap Da\'id, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President' s 

EOB Office. 

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 
u' staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Roonn which 

the President a.ttended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 

"fin m) 



# 



62.1 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 17, 1973 . 



April 16, 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 President met with Mr. Dean in Oval Office. 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:25 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

ioib:iO 

April 22, 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean from Key Biscayne. 



(935) 



62.2 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, 
MARCH 17, 1972 .^ 

D -1 .' \ t D i r. L e; .- \'i -. :■: H a I -! e n-. n. n and 

F.Avlichmftri.- The Pre; side nt S'ivj^csCecI D.'-an should 

possibly oo CO Canip D?.v-ld 'o write }jis report. 



March 17, 19 73 



L 



Presirlont had niade a noto oii a press survey containin,^ 
an article "aireying V/Viito House in'/olverr.ent for follow- 
up {Deaa possibly has copy of this). Dean again sug- 
gested thay b^-ir.g oui: 1968 bugging and Presid.jut 
said Kleirii'iien.st had advised against it. Several 
nai'aes were discussed as possibly subject to attack: 
Colson, Kalden-.an, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and JDean 
himself. The Presideat asked De.-.n point-blarik -if 
he knew about the planned break -in in advnnce. Dean 
said no, th.ere th.cre was no a.ctual V/hite I-fouse invol- 
vement regardless of appearances except possibly 
Strachan. Doan told President Magruder pushed 
Liiddy hard but that Maldeman was not involved. 
The President v.-antod Ifaldeman, Earlichrnan and 
Dean to talk to the Comraitteo and Dean resisted. 
Dean told th.e President of the EUsberg break-in but 
that it had iiolhi;-.g to do with Watergate. 

(March 19: Ervin had been on Face tlie Nation and 
accused Dean of hieing behind executive ori'/ilege.) 



Nlarch 19, 1973 



It was decided Dean would send a letter or sworn 
statement to the J 
certain cuestions. 



statement to the Judiciary Comrrattee answering 



March 20. 1973 



(Republican Ic^ad.'^r sViip had been in tii^at day. ) 
D»-.an discussed Mitchell's problems witii the j^rand 
jury, Vosco and the Gurney press conference. 
The President and Moore agreed that the w',-,ole 
investigation should be made public and that a state- 
ment should be released ii-nniediately after the sen- 
tencing of the defendants. Dean suggested that oach 
member of-the-F rvin-Comn-.ittee be challenged to 
invite an FBI investigation of his own Senate campaign. 
The President called Dean that night and D.-an .-.'.id 
that there v.as "p.ot a scintilla of ev'ir''-ncc" to ir.'U- 
cate White House involvement an'! D';-. n su':.-7.:.'-tod 
he give.th-: President a more in-depth briefing on 
what had : .istyired. 



-<^ 



■3- 



^ 



.-^> 



(936) 



62.2 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 



1704 - - - 

Exhibit No. TOA 

IX THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT or COi,UM3IA 



SENATE SE;,ECT COMVJTTEE ON PRESIDENTIAI- 
CAMPAIGN ACTr/ITIES, ET. AL.' 

PlaLaiifi* 



RICHARD M. NIXO?v 

iNDrvXDUAi^LY A^TO AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Defeadaat 



Civa 

Action 

No. 



APriDA"" O? FRED D. THOV.PSON 

Fred D. Thompsoa, being iwora, depose* and says: 

1. Eirly ia June, 1973, th* White House trxasmitted 

to the Sslect Corr.i7uttee a ir^emorandum (whica is attached to this 
affidavit) Ustiag certaia oral co— jnur.icatioas, Isoth tace-to-face and 
telephooic, 'betwaeQ Presideat Richard M. Nixoa aad Joha Wesley Dean HL 
This memorandum, later alta ~ jacludes theiexact times aad duratioas ot 
these communicatioas, and, in the case of face-to-face cammunications, 
the other participaats. if any, in those conversations. 



(937) 



62.2 FEED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO . 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95^ 

1705 



. . 2. Shortly th-rri.-artc r, I received a telK,-.-onK- ci-ll 

frorr. J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Cc^insel to th^ Pr<?sici..r.t. D-arir.^ 
this te'.ephor.a call, >/r. Suzhardt r=Uted to rr.e hi* u-nd^rstandt.-.- 
as to the substance of certain portions- of the enumerated conversations 
between the President and Mr. D-an. 

3. During my discussion with. Mr. Buzhardt. I 

mada cetaUed notes on th. information that he gav. me. Upon 
concluaioa of the conversation, I pro.-nptly prepared a "Memorandum 
of Substance o: Dean's CaUs a.-id Meeting with the Preaident. " a 
copy of vhici is attach.d to this aiildavit. It i> my belief that this 
memora^crm accurately rer.ecti th. information imparted to m. by 




Subscribed £.r.i ST/om to. before 




V- r-i — 



C3::ris5ic- Expires 



^^^^lo;^ 



v r 



/ 



(938) 



62.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 3 SSC 996-97 



996 

liad discussed tliis matter with Ehrlichmau and contrarj' to insti-uc- 
tions that Ehrlichman liad given Colson not to talk to the President 
about it, that Colson had also discussed it with him later. He expressed 
some annoyance at the fact that Colson had also discussed this matter 
with him. 

The conversation then turned back to a question from the President 
regarding the money that was being paid to the defendanto. He asked 
me how this was done. I told him I didn't know much about it other 
than the fact that the money was laundered so it could not be traced 
and then there were secret deliveries. I told him I was learning about 
things I had never known before, but the next time I would certainly 
be more knowledgeable. This comment got a laugh out of Haldeman. 
The meeting ended on this note and there was no further discussion 
of the matter and it was left hanging just as I have described it. 

Meetings of March 14 

The meetings which occurred on this day principally involved pre- 
paring the President for a forthcoming press conference. I recall talk- 
mg about executive privilege and making Dean a test case in the courts 
on executive privilege. The President said that he would like very 
much to do this and if the opportunity came up in the press conference, 
he would probably so respond. I also recall that dunng the meetings 
which occurred on this day, that the President was going to try to 
find an answer that would get Ziegler off the hook of the frequent 
questions asked him regarding the Watergate. He said that he was 
going to say that he would take no further questions on the "Watergate 
until the completion of the Ervin hearings and that Ziegler in turn 
could repeat the same statement and avoid future interrogation by the 
press on the subject. 

Meetint. of March 15 c 

I. ...^ idte in the afternoon after the President's press conference 
that he asked Dick Moore and I to come over to visit with him. He was 
in a very relaxed mood and entered into a general discussion about the 
press conference. The President was amazed and distressed that the 
press had paid so little attention to the fact that he had made an 
historic announcement about Ambassador Bruce opening up the liaison 
office in Peking. He said he was amazed when the first (juestion follow- 
ing that announcement was regarding whether or not Dean would 
appeal- before the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the 
Gray hearings. The conversation then rambled into a discussion of 
the Hiss case, and Mr. Moore discussed his memory of the President's 
handling of the case. 

Meeting of March 1(> 

This meeting was a discussion with Ziegler on how to follow up on a 
numbei- of matters that had arisen in the press conference of the 
preceding day. 

Meeting of March 17 

This was St. Patrick's Day and the Prcsideiit was in a voiy "rood 
mood and mm v relaxed and we etiiratri'd in a ratnblinir conversation 
with only some biiof rofeionco to the Gray hearings and tho problems 
that were then confronting the White House resrardinjr the President's 



(939) 



62.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 3 SSC 996-97 



997 

statements on executive privilepre and his willingness to go to court on 
the matter. He opined that he did not think that the Senate would be 
dumb enough to go for the bait he had given thciu but he was hopeful 
that they might. 

Meeting of March 19 

As I best recall this meeting, it was a rather rambling discussion 
regarding media problems in connection -vrith the Gray hearings. As 
the discussion proceeded, I suggested that Mr. iloore might like to 
engage in this conversation -with us. There was some discussion of 
Senator Ervin's appearance the preceding Simday on "Face the Na- 
tion," and whether or not it would be appropriate for mc to respond to 
some of the points that were being made regarding my requested ap- 
pearance before the Senate Judiciary Conunittee. I told the President 
that I would work with Dick Moore in preparing a draft response. 

Meetixgs of March 20 

The President had called me earlier that morning to tell me that I 
should work up a draft letter of response as a result of the discussions 
that we had had the preceding evening with Moore. I told him I was 
drafting a letter and he told me as soon as I had the letter pi-epared 
that I should arrange to meet with him. Sliortly after lunch. I took over 
a draft copy of the letter which T had developed with Mr. Moore and 
I have submitted a copy of that draft letter to the committee. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit Xo. 34-30.*] 

Mr. Deax. The President read the draft and we discussed it. There 
was no resolution of the problem. He told me to talk with Ziegler. I 
told him that if T did this as a swoin statement, that I was going to 
obviously redraft it very carefully before I signed any affidavit on the 
letter. 

It was during the afternoon of ]March 20 that I talked again with 
Dick Moore about the entire covenip. I told ]\Ioore that there were 
new and more threatening demands for support money. I told him 
that Hunt had sent a message to me — through Paul O'Brien — that he 
wanted $72,000 for living expenses and $50,000 for attorney's fees and 
if he did not receive it that week, he would reconsider his options and 
have a lot to sav about the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman 
while at the White House. I told Moore that I had about reached the 
end of the line, and was now in a position to deal with the President 
to end the co\erup. I did not discuss with Moore the fact that I had 
discussed monev and clemency with the President earlier, but T told 
him that I really didn't think the President undei-stood all of the facts 
involved in the Watergate and particularly the implications of those 
facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding itself 
and I felt that I had to lay the facts out for the Pi-esident as well as 
the implication of those facts. ]Moore encouraged mc to do so. 

Phoxe Cox\"ersatiox of ^Iakch 20 

"When the President called and we had a rather rambling discussion. 
I told him at the conclusion of the couvoi-sation that evening that I 
wanted to talk with him as soon as ])ossibIe alwut the Waterg-ate matter 



•.See p. 1252. 



(940) 



62.4 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 17, 1973 MEETING^ 1-4 
OVAL OFFICE -- MARCH 17, 1973 -- PRESIDENT/DEAN 

1:Z5 to 2:10 P. M. 

(Material relating to breakin at Dr. Fielding's office in California) 

P Now on the Segretti thing, I think you've just got to -- 

Chapin,all of them have just got to take the heat. 
Look, you've got to admit the facts, John, and -- 

D That's right. 

P And that's our -- and that's that. And Kalmbach 

paid him. And (unintelligible) a lot of people. I 
just think on Segretti, no matter how bad it is. It 
isn't nearly as bad as people think it was. Espionage, 
sabotage? 

D The intent, when Segretti was hired, was nothing evil 

nothing vicious, nothing bad, nothing. Not espionage, 
not sabotage. It was pranksterism that got out of 
hand and we know that. And I think we can lay 
our story out there. I have no problenn with the 
Segretti thing. It's just not that serious. The other 
potential problem is Ehrlichman's and this is -- 

P In connection with Hunt? 

D In connection with Hunt and Liddy both. 

P They worked for him? 

D They -- these fellows had to be some idiots as we've 

learncfl after the fact. They went out and went into 

(941) 

35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - n 



62.4 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 17, 1973 MEETING, 1-4 

-2- 

D Dr, Ellsberg's doctor's office and they had, they were 

geared up with all this CIA equipment -- cameras and 
the like. Well they turned the stuff back in to the CIA 
some point in time and left film in the camera. CIA 
has not put this together, and they don't know what 
it all means right now. But it wouldn't take a very 
sharp investigator very long because you've got pictures 
in the CIA files that they had to turn over to (unintelligible). 

P What in the world -- what in the name of God was 

Ehrlichman having something (unintelligible) in the 
Ellsberg (unintelligible)? 

D They were trying to -- this was a part of an operation 

that --in i.onnection with the Pentagon papers. They 
were -- the whole thing -- they wanted to get Ellsberg's 
psychiatric records for some reason. I don't know. 

P This is the first I ever heard of this. I, I (unintelligible) 

care about Ellsberg was not our problem. 

D That's right. 

P (Expletive deleted) 

D Well, anyway, (unintelligible) it was under an Ehrlichman 

structure, maybe John didn't ever know. I've never asked 
him if he knew. I didn't want to know. 



(942) 



62.4 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 17, 1973 MEETING, 1-4 

-3- 

P I can't see that t^ettinr; into, into this hearint^. 

D Well, look. No. Here's the way it can come up. 

P Yeah. 

D In the CIA's files which they -- which the Committee is 

asking for -- the material they turned over to the 
Department of Justice. 

P Yeah. 

D There are all the materials relating to Hunt. In there 

are these pictures which the CIA developed and they've 
got Gordon Liddy standing proud as punch outside this 
doctor's office with his name on it. And (unintelligible) 
this material it's not going to take very long for an 
investigatoi to go back and say, well, why would this -- 
somebody be at the doctor's office and they'd find out 
"that there was a breakin at the doctor's office and then 
you'd find Liddy on the staff and then you'd start working 
it back. I don't think they'll ever reach that point. 

P (Unintelligible?) 

D This was way, this was -- 

P It's irrelevant. 

D It's irrelevant. Right. 

P That's the point. That's where -- that's where -- 

where Ervin's rules of relevancy (unintelligible I. 

(943) 



62.4 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 17, 197 S MEETING, 1-4 

-4- 
P Now what the hell has this got to do with it? 

D It has nothing as a lot of these things that they should 

stunible along into is irrelevant. 



(944) 



63. On March 19, 1973 Paul O'Brien met with John Dean in the 
EGB and conveyed a message from E. Howard Hunt that if money for living 
and for attorneys' fees were not forthcoming. Hunt might have to recon- 
sider his options and might have some very seamy things to say about 
Ehrlichman. 



Page 

63.1 Paul O'Brien testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 24, 1974, 30 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 946 

63.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 13-14 (received from Water- 
gate Grand Jury) 947 

63.3 U.S. Secret Service White House Appointment 
Record for Paul O'Brien, March 19^, 1973, 

5:20 p.m. (received from Watergate Grand Jury) 949 



(945) 



63.1 PAUL O'BRIEN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 24, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JUBY, 30 



J 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



30 
particular iir.nact. I had never had anyone make a personal 
denand on ne for over a hundred thousand dollars. I nean it 
v.-arn't just that somebody approached mo a dine for a cup of 
coffee. 

Frankly it sort of sent ne right up the wall. I 
just vanted out of tJiere. 

Q Did t-ir . Hunt indicate that you ought to convey this 

inessage to t-'j: . Dean? 

A He did. 

Q Now after you left the office what did you do? 

A I stopped back past tir. Bittman's office and I 
reiterated the essense of the conversation, 

Q Wliat did ^lr. Bittnan say? 

A He said, "1 indicated to you that Mr. Hunt was 
extremely agitated and upset and he was going to do tiiis." 
That v .-as about it. I then departed. 

Q Did you then repeat v;hat Mr. Hunt had told you to 
Kr. Dean? 

A I did. 

Q When was that? 

A As far as I recall, icnnediately following the neet- 
ing. 



Tnat v.- 

r 



BY KR. TRWrPTON: 
Q Nov Mr. O'Brien, you ncntioned before a neeting 

v/iiich ycu had on about K'overfjcr 20th or 29th v/ith Mr. Dittrr.an 

(946) 



63.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 13-14 1^3 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Itstenir.^: to tapes, to differentiate botvecn the i.-.-.-f.'.n „; 
but that statements that you attribute to one ir.eetin;j very 
well may hn.ve occurred in another meeting, or have bean re- 
peated In Bubstance at the various meetings. Is that, eg a 
general matter, correct? 

A That is correct. I vjas — when I prepared my 
Senate testimony, I was aware of things that occurred that I 
couldn't put in any particular meeting and, sometimes, I 
omitted them for that reason thinking they would come up in 
cross examination at the Senate hearings, v;hich they didn't. 

Q Mr. Dean, did there come a time around the latter 
part of 1 larch when you learned that Howard Hunt was threaten- 
ing to reveal certain matters if his demands for payment of 
substantial amounts of money were not met? 

A Yes, I did learn such a fact, 

Q From whom did you learn this information? 

A From Mr. Paul O'Brien. 

Q In substance, what did Mr, Paul O'Brien tell you? 

A Mr. O'Brien reported that he had had a meeting with 
Mr. Hunt and Mr. Hunt had told him, at the meeting, a nuniber 
of thin;;s. One particularly of which was that he should take 
a message to John Dean. 
! 1 said, "Why Dean?" And he said, "I raised the. 

same question with Mr. Hunt and his response was, 'Well, you 
just ta'-.L this to Dean,'" which O'Brien was doing. He tolc 



dv 



(947) 



i: 
63.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 13-14 14 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

2- 



nu that Hunt ccid that Goace.ici.ri -.vas eminent and he l.r.d to 
i.^aUc his arrangementG and he hcci just a fev? days to do it In; 
that he wanted to have sone, you knovj, hard evidence that he 
was being supported in terras of nioney for his living fees 
and money for his attorney fees, and if this money did not 

Ehe would have to reconsider his option and might have 
very seamy things to say about Mr. Ehrlichman. 

Q Now, prior to the 21ct of March, did you have a 

conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman about what you had learned 
froni Mr. O'Brien? 

A Yes. After Mr. O'Brien brought this to ray atten- 

tion, I brought it to Mr. Ehrlichman' s attention. 

Q Well, what was the conversation, in substance, whict 

you had with Mr. Ehrlichman? 

A Mr. Ehrlichman appeared to want to give the impres- 

sion that he wasn't particularly concerned about the — 

Q I take it you related the substance of what Mr. 

O'Brien told you to Mr. Ehrlichman? 

A Yes, I did. And he wanted to give the impression 

he wasn't particularly concerned about it, but he asked me if 
I'd talked to John Mitchell about it. I said, no, I had noz. 
He said, "Well, I think you better talk to Mr. Mitchell about 
this." And that was the conversatiori. 

Q Thereafter, did you have a conversation v;ith hr. 

Mitchell? 



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(948) 



63.3 SECRET SERVICE APPOINTMENT RECORD^ MARCH 19, 1976 



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(949) 



64. On March 20, 1973 John Ehrlichman met with John Dean at 
the White House, They discussed Howard Hunt's request for money, the 
possibility that Hunt would reveal activities of the Plumbers' opera- 
tions if the money were not forthcoming, and plans for Dean to discuss 
the matter with John Mitchell. According to Dean, Dean discussed the 
matter with Mitchell by telephone later that evening, but Mitchell did 
not indicate whether Hunt would be paid. On the afternoon of March 20, 
1973 Ehrlichman had a telephone conversation with Egil Krogh and told 
him Hunt was asking for a large amount of money. They discussed the 
possibility that Hunt might publicly reveal the Plumbers '. operations. 
Krogh has testified that Ehrlichman stated that Hunt might blow the lid 
off and that Mitchell was responsible for the care and feeding of 
Howard Hunt . 



Page 

64.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
September 13, 1973, 2-6 (received from Watergate 
Grand Jury) 952 

64.2 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, Feb- 
ruary 14, 1974, 14-16 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 957 

64.3 Egil Krogh testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, Jan- 
uary 29, 1974, 5-7 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 960 

64.4 John Ehrlichman log, March 20, 1973 (received 

from SSC) 963 



(951) 



64.1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURxj 2-6 
I 

! 2 

Y.'L llI li'I 11 1 II Li ii 
whereupon, 

JC'-I'I EHKLICffii^n 

was called as a vjitnesc and, liavin.^, been firjt Caly s-v-rorn by 

the Foreman of the Grand Jury, was e;-arained and testified as 

follows: 

I 

Q Mr. Ehrlicb^an, I'm goiuo to skij; over some areas | 
I want to come back to in time, and ask you some things that 
occurred near the end of your employment. 
I I want to ask you if, on or around March the 20th, 

I 1973, you had a conversation with Mr. Dean in which he related 
to you a certain message that he had allegedly received, eithe^ 
directly or indirectly, from Mr. Hunt? 
A Yes. 

Q Would you tell us what he related to you? 
A As I recall, he said that he had either a call or 
a conversation with an attorney in behalf of Hunt. Ke said 
that, in effect, unless Hunt were paid a substantial amount 
of money, that he would disclose activities in which he had 
been engaged in during the time he was at the White House. 
Q I'm sorry, I missed the last part of your answer. 
A I say he said he would disclose the activities in 
o.} 11 which he had been engaged daring the time he wac at the White 
.,5 IJ House, and the message which Dean got apparently related those 



DV 



(952) 



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gj.l J-QOT EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, WATERGATE GRAN D JURY, 2-6 

I , ! 

" I 

I 

to ;ir. Kro^-.h, but Der.n also rel-'.tcd thtrri r.s nffcctrin^ -r.o. i 

I 
Q Did he say that the message he passed on to you ;;r-:?rT.j 

I 
Hunt would have a lot of things to say about what he'd done ! 

I 

-- a lot of things to say about the searay things that he h'd ^ 

i 

done while he was at the IJhite House? i 

A Yes. Or words to that effect. ' 

Q Words to that effect. Ifno was present during this ' 
conversation v.'lth Dean? You were present, Dean present, '-'as 
anyone else present? 

A I don't believe so. 

Q What did you say in response to this, if anything? 

A Well, for one thing, I said it looked to me like 
blaclcmail, I asked him -- 1 also said it looked to me like 
he was talking about the Plumbers' operation, but I asked him 
if he understood, from whoever he talked to -- and I believe 
it was Bittman that he told me he had talked to — whether 
this fellow had indicated that this was to be a particular 
event that he was threatening about or if this was the whole 
Special Unit operation that he was talking about, or just 
what Dean understood it to relate to. 

Q What did Dean say in response to that? 

A Well, he said he didn't know. 

Q Did you give Dean any instructions with respect to 
this? 

A I asked him — 



ov 

(953) 



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64,1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY^ 2-6 

il 4 

I; 

C^ ::t-.all :.-.; scrilce z^:.': for ]..:::: a Qcrjent frouj thd 
record. And he£o'-3 I p,ct ro that, ;-i:i: yoa if you reraeEber 
any specific sura of money bein,^ ncintioned? 

-'> I remember -- yes, I reipcnber that a specific S'a-.'. 
of money was named — mentioned. Actually, two suras of tnonsy 
were mentioned and I can't tell you precisely what they v;ere, 
but it was soaething over $100,000, in total. 

Q Right. Do you rernerabcr vjhat the purpose of this 
money — what Hunt said this money would be used for? The 
purpose of giving him the money? 

A I don't think that that was -- well, it may have 
been told me. I don't recall it, though. 

Q Now, go on with what, if anything, yoa asked Dean 
or instructed Dean to do, after this conversation? 

A Hell, first, there was more conversation. 

Q Tell us all the conversation. 

A And T asked Dean for his estimate of the reality 
of this, whether or not this was a real problem for us or not, 
because I was thinking in terms of Hunt making a disclosure 
to the prosecutors of the Special Unit operations. 

And we discussed whether that was the intent of 
this or — because he said that Hunt was coming up for sentenc 
ing. I think that was at the time that Hunt was coming up for 
sentencing. So I was curious as to whether this was in sort 
of a judicial process framework or whether he was talkin- 



dv 



(954) 



64,1 JOHN EHBLICmm TESTIMONY ^ SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-6 

i! 5 i 

1: ! 

1,. at-'OUt goin;;; public -Jith thio. ■. 

I [ 

2 I Dean said that he felt that it '.;as not -. thr^iat to 1 

! I 

3 I go to the press or to the public with this as much ac it \:a3 I 
I i 

■i to go to the prosecutors. 

And the other question that I asked, which led to 
my requesting, was whether he thought this was really Hunt 
or whether he thought this was the attorney trying to get 

S money for attorney's fees; and he said that he didn't kncr.;, 

9 he didn't have a feel for that. 

10 And this had apparently not occurred to him and so 

U I said, "I think you ought to talk to Colson." 

12 Q Talk to Colson? 

13 A And see if he can give you any feel or his estiraate 

14 of whether that is the case or not but, at the same time, we 

15 discussed the possibility of problems in the exposure of the 
](i Special Unit operations to the prosecutors and he said he 

17 felt that since Petersen had information about the Special 

18 Unit for a long time, that did not pose any particular prob- 
1!) lem in terms of any notoriaty or any newspaper stories or 

:'0 things of that kind. 

21 I So it was kind of a back and forth and, frankly, I 

•j_. I was shaken by this because Dean put it in terms that this was 

2.1 !! a threat aimed at me on a personal basis. 

04 1' So I also asked him whether, in his opinion, I had 

.jj ! any legal liability in the eyes of a prosecutor on account of 



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(955) 



8 

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11 

12 
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14 
15 
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18 
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64,1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER IS, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-6 
I 

i • M 

J . • 

^1; ti-..- rlu..,;;cr5 ' G- r^xtiv'jp. iiad, j.;artLculcirLy , the Ellsbcr-j brcjal:-| 

'^ in ljuciri'„:j.s . 

■' Go than Man the nature of that conversation. 

•• I Q Other than vrhat you have related, did you give Mr. 
Dean any instructions? 

A I ccn't recall any. 

Q Specifically, did you tell hita — did you ask hira 
if he'd discussed this matter with Mitchell, the matter 
being the subject of this conversation? 

A No. I think he said he was going to discuss it 
with Mitchell. I didn't ask hira to discuss it with Mitchell. 

Q That was my next question. Did you ask, request 
or instruct Dean to take this matter to Mitchell or to dis- 
cuss the matter with Mitchell? 

A No. I think that was a given. I think he indicated 
that that was what he had done or was going to do. 

Q Okay. But you made no request along that line? 

believe not. 
Q Now, Mr. Ehrlichman, turning to March 21, 1973, were 
you present in any conversations that Mr. Dean had with the: 
21 j President? 

A I don't believe so. Now, let's sec. Was that th:^ ! 

1 
I 

2:1 day -- I beg your pardon. 

■;n \\ Q Two meetings and you were present at; one of tner.-. 



LQ OP 



■r. 11 



A Yes, I believe I was there at the afternoon meeting,. 

DV 

(956) 



64.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY. FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 14-16 

DV 



I 



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IS 



iu 



ine that llu.it czid that Bcntencins wac etaincnt and he had to 
mnUe his orrnngctncnts and he had just a fcvj dpys to do It In; 
that he wanted to have sooce, you know, hard evidence that he 
was being supported in terms of money for his living £eea 
and tnoney for his attorney fees, and if this money did not 
come he would have to reconsider his option and might have 
some very seamy things to say about Mr. Ehrllchman. 

Q Now, prior to the 21st of March, did you have a 
conversation with Mr. Ehrlichtnan about what you had learned 
from Mr. O'BrienT 
I A Yes. After Mr. O'Brien brought this to my atten- 
tJ.OQ, I brought It to Mr. Ehrlichaan's attention. 

Q Well, what was the conversation, in substance, whici' 
you had with Mr. Ehrlichoan? 

A Mr. Ehrllchman appeared to want to give the inpres 
*^| sioa that he wasn't particularly concerned about the -- 
^^1 Q I take it you related the substance of what Mr 
18 n O'Brien told you to Mr. Ehrltcisnan? 

A Yes, I did. And be wanted to give the Impression 
^fl he wasn't particularly concerned about it, but he asked me if 



19 



21 
22 



I'd talked to John Mitchell about it. I said, no, I had not. 
He said, "Well, I think you better talk to Mr. Mitchell about 
this." And that was the conversation, 
pi Q Thereafter, did you have a conversation with Mr. 
Mitchell? 



25 



iLUJutiH ««n nrian 

U223 Dc«y Covrt 
■toumfton, MaqUnd 207S5 
(301) S4M436 



as-ctOS fPt. 2> O - 74 - 18 



(957) 



S4.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY^ FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 14-16 ^^ 

A Yes, I did. UV 






And, ta BubsCance, vhat was that conversation? I 



3? take It Mr. Mitchell was not in Washington at the tine? 
4} A No, he was not. I had to call him In New York and, 
5r as I recall it, it was late in the evening and he had left 
el his office. 1 reached him at home and had a guarded converrc- 
7 1 tlon with him because I had been told by Mr* LaRue — as a 
8 1 natter of fact, I think he was the one who first told me to 
9$ be very careful In calling Mr. Mitchell' a hotel or apartment 
jol because Mrs. Mitchell might well want to listen In on the 
III t«Lcphone 
12 1 Q And what do you recall the substance of that conversf*^ 

13 tion being? 

14 A I recall that It was a guarded conversation and that 

15 I I related to Mr. Mitchell what Mr. Ehrllcbaaa had asked mc to 

16 relate, to him. 

17 j Q And what was Hr. Mitchell's response. If any? 
IS A Well, 1 don't recall ~ I recall one thing we talked 

19 about was whether Mr, Pappaa ~ but I didn't use the naste 

20 Pappas, as I recall -~ was coming into town, as a potential 

21 eource of money. 

22 I referred to Mr. Pappas as "a Greek bearing gifts,' 

23 and most of the conversation was in a guarded manner like this. 

24 And Mr. Mitchell indicated to me he believed Mr. Pappas was 

25 going to be in town shortly — soaathins to that effect. 



nJ2A3tT« KSl VTXVH 
11225 t>««e» Cov-rt 
i;«.uini-<!n. MirrUnd 20795 
(301) ««-4«i 



(958) 



fid.P. JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 14-16 



I 

2 
3 

4 
5 
6 

7 
S 
» 

u 
n 

13 



I ; 

Q 

LaRue? 
A 

Q 
A 



16 

Q Now, did nr, MltchcslL, at that time. Indicate to 
one way or another, whether Mr. Hunt would be paid? 
A No, he did not. 

Thereafter, did you have a conversation with Mr. 



Yes. I did. 

And what was the substance of that conversation? 
Mr. LaRue wanted to know what I was going to do. 
abouC the problea that had raised, and 1 told hia, nothing; 
tfaac 1 was out of that business. 

Be then asksd me what I thought he should do axad 
X told hia I thought he ought to talk to Mitchell abouC IC 
Q Kou, after the laeeting on the 21st with the Presl- 
1^1 dent sod, for a portion, Mr. Haldenan, did you Isara fros> 
^B anvonc whether Mr. Mitchell had been contacted with respect 
'^R to coming dc%m to Washington and oeetlng with you and Mr. 
'"^y Ealdeoao ocd the President and Mr. Ehrllchnian? 



IS 

IS 

.» 

21 
22 
23 
24 
22 



Bjznrni waimxi 

11Z25 D»«n Coirr. 
KtuJnron, MaryUod 2D7S5 
(301) MM436 



A Yes. I did. 

Q And when did you learn ttiatT 

A Soaetime on the 2lEt, I learned it froct Mr. Halde- 
man. Originally, it had been hoped that Mr. Mitchell could 
come down isnediately but, for some reason, he couldn* t com& 
down until the next norulng. So a meeting was scheduled for 
the next oomlng. 

Q Now, later on in the day, on the 21st, you had a 



(959) 



64.3 EGIL KROGH TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY. 5-7 5 

1 Q That nicar.G t'a:.'u ttie rresident ' 3 crWizorij a„ ^-2il 

2 as Hr. Dean? 

3 A That's right. That was the second part of your 

4 question, I assumed that. 

5 Q And, further, he indicated to you that he did not 

6 believe that Mr. Hunt's threatr could be met at that time? 

7 A That's correct. I should also say tliat Hr. Dean, 

8 in that meeting, was extremely unhai.'j.y — seemed to be very, 

9 very aggitated. He told me that he had been under excrutiatiig 

10 pressure for months; that his wife was very concerned about 

11 him because he couldn't sleep at night; and that he felC 

12 terrible. And I should also add that Mr. Dean and I had been 

13 very close friends when he was the Associate Deputy Attorney 

14 General for Legislation in the Department of Justice. 

15 And, also, I had been partly responsible — I would 

16 say probably primarily responsible — for recruiting him to 

17 the White House staff. We had talked on a number of occasions 

18 Q Now, when Mr. Dean said, in substance, that the 

19 President did not know what was going on, did you interpret r- 

20 did that statement lend itself to an interpretation that the 

21 President did not understand what the significance was of 

22 what was going on? 

23 A Yes. It would lend itself to that interpretatior.. 

24 i Q Now, following your meeting with Mr. Dean, did you 

25 I have a telephone conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman on the 



r 

• nave i 



(960) 



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64.3 EGIL KROGH' TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 5-7 g 

20t:h of March a::: veil? ■ 

A Yes, I did. I retarned to the Department of Trar.3- 
portation. I'm not sure of the precise time. It must have 
been about 4:30, 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, and Mr. Ehrlich 
man had been trying to call me, I understood, at the time 
that I had been with Mr. Dean . in the Old Executive Office 
Building- 
He told me, when we made contact on the telephone, 
that Mr. Hunt had been asking for a great deal of money. I 
don't remember if he precisely stated a figure on the tele- 
phone. 

Q Did you indicate to Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Dean 
had filled you in on the details? 

A I don't believe I did tell him that. 

Q And what else did Mr. Ehrlichman say? 

A I told him — I asked him what condition Mr. Hunt 
was in and he said he did not know; that John Mitchell was 
responsible for the care and feeding of Howard Hunt. 

Q I'm not sure that the reporter got that — the pune- 
tuattonn there. Did he say, in substance, that Mr. Ehrllchmar 
told you that Mr. Ehrlichman did not know personally about 
Mr. Hunt's situation but that Mr. Ehrlichman knew that Mr. 
Mitchell was responsible for the care and feeding of Mr. Hunt? 

A That's correct. That is the gist of it, yes, sir. 

Q I'm sorry. I was distracted for a moment when you 
began your narrricion of this conversatioa. f"^\ / 

(961) 



64.3 EGIL KBOGH TESTIMONY. JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 5-7 7 

1 Did you say that Tir. Ehclic- ;-.?.r. told you that Mr. 

2 Hunt v;as asking for a great dca.1 of -Doey and that he might, 

3 in effect, blow the lid off? 

4 A That's right. That is correct, yes. 

5 Q And did he indicate that — did you say that, if 

6 the money was not paid, according to Mr. Ehrlichman, that Mr. 

7 Hunt would, in essence, tell all he knew? 
Ig A In essence, that's correct. 



9 Q And what occurred after this part of the conversa- 

10 tion? 

11 A I asked for a meeting with Mr. Ehrlicbman to dis- 

12 cuss this situation. He agreed, and Itxiet with him the next 

13 afternoon in his office, March 2Ist, in the West Wing of the 

14 White House, second floor. 

15 Q Now, were you watting for him for some time in his 

16 outer office? 

17 A I waited there, I think, probably for an hour and 

18 a half. I'm not sure exactly what time the meeting had been 

19 set for — 2:00, 3:00, 4:00, somewhere in there. But, in any 

20 event, I had to wait quite a while before I was able to get 

21 in, or he came in and we were able to go in his office to- 

22 gether. 

23 Q And did you know where Mr. Ehrlichman had been prioi 

24 to his meeting with you? 

25 A I didn' t know for certain. I assumed that he had 



dv 



(962) 



64.4 JOHN EBRLICHMAN LOG, MARCH 20, 1973 
FRIDAY, MARCH io, 1973 



rst 



8;i5_ _HR H o£f ic5 ''-^^ ^ 

9:00 Cop.grasoman Rhodes, DiSona 

10:00 Everett Srlick (ABC), Cane Gowan 

11:00 jack sutharlaad (Us Nev/3 and V/orld Report) 

11:30 Ron ]S,[cGready 

12:00 Buehl Beranbson (Senatorial campaign ccmmLttee) 

12:30 VvTEiCA tape for Jack Scott 

'1:00 Lunch, with Jim Lehrer - Sans Souci 

2:30 Secretary Weinberger 

3:00-4:_45 president 

5:15-6:4 5 Pres ident, Kerman Kahn 

To Camp David (svitK Joby and Bob) 

MONDAY, JVAARCH 19, 1973 

8 : 1_ 5 HRH office 

11:30 .Frank Gannon 

12:00 Bob Tim_m (Chairman, CAB) 

2:00 Jules Witcover (WH staff story) 

3:00 Nat Owings, David Childs, Len Garment (Bicentennial 

Gardens) 
5:30 President ■ - 



y TVZSDAY, ^D^RCH 20, 1973 



7:30 KRC meeting 

8:30 Republican Leadership - Cabinet Roora 

11:30 President 

1:0D Lunch in Mess with Bill Simon, Bradford Cook 

\~3 : 30 John Dean 

4:00 president, Bush 

7:00 Birthda.y dinner at Trader Vic's - Jody and Bob, Kullins 



(963) 



65. On March 20, 1973 Dean had a conversation with Richard Moore, 
Special Counsel to the President. Dean told Moore that Hunt was demand- 
ing a large sum of money before his sentencing on March 23, and that 
if this payment were not made. Hunt was threatening to say things that 
would be very serious for the White House. After this conversation. 
Dean and Moore met with the President from 1:42 to 2:31 p.m. According 
to information furnished to the Senate Select Committee by Special Counsel 
Buzhardt, the President and Moore agreed that a statement should be re- 
leased immediately after the sentencing of the defendants. According to 
Moore, following this meeting he told Dean that Dean should tell the 
President what he knew. According to Dean, Dean told Moore that Dean 
did not think the President understood all of the facts involved in the 
Watergate and particularly the implication of those facts and that Dean 
felt he had to lay those facts and implications out for the President. 

Page 

65.1 Richard Moore testimony, 5 SSC 1944-45 966 

65.2 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 997 968 

65.3 Meetings and conversations between the 
President and John Dean, March 20, 1973 

(received from White House) 969 

65.4 Memorandum of substance of Dean's calls and 
meetings with the President, March 20, 1973 

(received from SSC) and accompanying Fred 

Thompson affidavit, SSC Exhibit No. 70A, 

4 SSC 1794-95 976 



(965) 



r 



65.1 RICHARD MOORE TESTIMONY, JULY 12, 197 Z, 5 SSC 1944-45 



1944 

On March 19, 1 was called to meet with the President jind Mr. Dean 
in the President's Executive Office Building office. The President 
reiterated his desire to get out a general statement in advance of the 
hearings. He asked us to be tliinking about ways that tliis could be 
done. This would include or could include issuing a full statement 
or "TVliite Paper" ; he was also interested in our thouglits about ways 
to present our story to the Senate in terms of possible depositions, 
affidavits, or possible conferences or meetings wiiich would give the 
Senate all the information it wished but which would not cut across 
the separation of powers. He asked Dean and me to consider ways to 
do this. 

Xow, late on March 19, 1973, or possibly on March 20 — ^before we 
met later that day with the President — Mr. Dean told me that Howard 
Hunt was demanding that a large sum of money be given to him before 
his sentencing on March 23, and that he wanted the money by Wednes- 
day, the 21st. If the payment were not made, Dean said, Hunt had 
tlireatened to say things that would be very serious for the White 
House. I replied that this was pure blackmail, and that Dean should 
turn it off and have nothing to do with it. T could not imagine, I said, 
that anything that Hunt could say would be as bad as entering into 
a blackmail arrangement. I don't recall Mr. Dean's exact Tvords, but 
he expressed agreement. 

This revelation was the culmination of several other guarded com- 
ments Mr. Dean had made to me in the immediately preceding days. 
He had said that he had been present at two meetings attended by 
Messrs. Mitchell, Magnider, and Liddy before the bugging arrests, 
during which Liddy had proposed wild schemes that had been turned 
down — specifically espionasre, electronics surveillance, and even kid- 
napping. He said that the Watergate location had not been mentioned, 
and that he had "turned off the wild schemes." I believed then and be- 
lieve today that Mr. Dean had no advance knowledge of the Watergate 
bugging and break-in. In addition, he said that if he ever had to testify 
before the grand jury, his testimony would conflict with Mr. Ma- 
gruder's, and that he had heard that if ilagnider faced a perjury 
charge he would take others with him. 

IMr. Dean had also mentioned to me in these davs in March that 
earlier activities of Messrs. Hunt and Liddy— not directly related to 
Watergate — could be seriously embarrassing to the administration if 
they ever came to ILwht. He had also implied to me that he knew of 
payments being made to the defendants for litigation expenses, and 
Hunt's explicit blackmail demand raised serious questions in my mind 
as to the nurpose of these payments. 

This brings me to the afternoon of March 20, when ^fr. Dean and I 
met with the President in the Oval Office. The meeting lasted about 
half an hour. The President again stated his hope that we could put 
out a full statement in advance of the hearincrs. and again he expressed 
his desire that we be forthcoming, as he put it. He made .some compari- 
.-ons as to our attitude and the attitude of previous administrations, 
and he wanted us to make sure that we were the most forthcomins: of 
all. 

As I sat through the meetinsr of March 20 with the President and 
y\v. Doan in the Oval Office, I came to the conclusion in mv own mind 
that tl'e President could not be aware of the thinrrs that Dean was 
worried about or had been hinting at to me, let alone Howard Hunt's 



(966) 



u 



65.1 RICHAED MOORE TESTIMONY, JULY 12, 1973, 5 SSC 1944-45 

1945 

blackmail demand. Indeed, as the President talked about getting the 
whole stoiy out— as he had done repeatedly in the recent meetings — 
it seemed crystal clear to nie that he knew of nothing that was incon- 
sistent with the previously stated conclusion that the White House was 
uninvolved in the Watergate affair, before or after the event. 

As we closed the door of the Oval Office and turned into the hall, 
I decided to raise the issue directly with Mr. Dean. I said that I had 
the feeling that the President had no knowledge of the things that 
were wonying Dean. I asked Dean whether he had ever told the Presi- 
dent about them. Dean replied that he had not, and I asked whether 
anyone else had. Dean said he didn't tliink so. I said, and I use quota- 
tion marks to indicate the substance, and I tliink these are almost my 
precise words — I said, "Then the President isn't being served, he is 
reaching a point where he is going to have to make critical decisions 
and he simply has to know ail the facts. I thuik you should go in and 
tell him what you know, you will feel better, it will be right for him, 
and it will be good for the country."' 

I do not lecall whether Dean told me he woidd take action or not, 
but I certainly had the impression that he was receptive. In any 
event, the question was resolved that very evening when I received 
a call at home sometime after dinner and it was Mr. Dean, who said 
that the President had just phoned him and that he had decided that 
this was the moment to speak up. He said that he told the President 
that things had been going on that the President should know about 
and it was important that Dean see him alone and tell him. Dean said 
that the President readily agreed and told Dean to come in the follow- 
ing morning. I congratulated ilr. Dean and wished him well. 

The next day, March 21, Mr. Dean told me that he had indeed 
met with the President at 10 o'clock and had talked with him for 2 
hours and had in his words, "Let it all out.'' I said, "Did you tell 
him about the Howard Hunt business?" Dean replied that he had told 
the President eveiything. I asked him if the President had been sur- 
prised and he said yes. I say he said yes in terms of liis response; 
whether yes is the exact words, but it was an affirmative statement. 

Following this critical meeting on March 21, I had several subse- 
quent meetings and telephone conversations with Mr. Dean alone, as 
well as several meetings witii the President which Mr. Dean did not 
attend. I do not dispute Mr. Dean's account of the meetings between 
us as to any substantive point, and I have no direct knowledge of what 
transpired in Mr. Dean's subsequent meetings Avith the President. But 
nothing said in my meetings or conversations with ilr. Dean or my 
meetings with the President suggests in any way that befoi-e March 
21 the President had known— or that Mr. Dean believed he had 
known — of ai'v involvement of AMiite House persoiuiel in the bugging 
or the coverup. Indeed, Mr. Dean's own account that he and I agreed 
on tile importance of pei-suadingthe President to make a prompt dis- 
closure of all that the President had just leai-ned is hardh' com- 
patible with a belief on Mi'. Dean's part that the President himself 
had known the critical facts all along. In one of my talks with the 
President, the President said he liad kept askinghimself whether there 
had been any sign or clue which shoukl have led him to discover the 
true facts earlier. I told him that I wished that I had been more 
skeptical and inquisitive so that I could have served the Presidency 
better. 



(967) 



65.2 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 2 SSC 997 



997 

statements on executive privilege and his wiUmgne-ss to go to court on 
the matter. He opined that he did not think that the Senate would be 
dumb enough to go for the bait he had given thom but he was hopeful 
that they might. 

Meetixg of iL\ROH 19 

As I best recall this meeting, it was a rather rambling discussion 
regarding media problems in connection with the Gray hearings. As 
the discussion proceeded, I suggested that ilr. !Moore might like to 
engage in this conversation with us. There was some discussion of 
Senator Ervin's appearance the preceding Sunday on "Face the Na- 
tion,'" and whether or not it would be appropriate for me to respond to 
some of the points that were being made regarding my requested ap- 
pearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee. I told the President 
that I would work with Dick jNIoore in preparing a draft response. 



r 

I sh^ 



Meetixgs of !XLvrch 20 



The President had called me earlier that morning to tell me that I 
should work up a draft letter of response as a result of the discussions 
that we had had the preceding evening with Moore. I told him I was 
drafting a letter and he told me as soon as I had the letter prepared 
that I should arrange to meet with him. Shortly after luncli, I took over 
a draft copy of the letter which I had developed with ^Tr. ifoore and 
I have submitted a copy of that draft letter to the committee. 

[The dociiment referred to was marked exhibit No. 34-39.*] 

ilr. Df.ax. The President read the draft and we discussed it. Tliere 
was no resolution of the problem. He told me to talk with Ziegler. I 
told him that if T did this as a sworn statement, that I was going to 
obviously redraft it very carefully before I signed any affidavit on the 
letter. 

It was during the afternoon of ]March 20 that I talked again with 
Dick ^loore about the entire coverup. J told iloore that there were 
new and more threatening demands for support monev. I told him 
that Hunt had sent a message to me — through Paul O'Brien — that he 
wanted §72.000 for living expenses and $.")0,000 for attorney's fees and 
if he did not reooive it that week, he would reconsider liis options and 
have a lot to sav about the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman 
while at the "Wliite House. I told ^loore that I had about reached the 
end of the line, and was now in a position to deal with the President 
to end the co\erup. I did not discuss witli ifoore the fac: tliat I had 
discussed money and clemency witli the President earlitM-. but T told 
him that T reallv didn't think the President undei-stood all of the facts 
involved in the Watergate and particularly the implic.irion.^ of those 
facts. I told him that the matter was continually compounding itself 
and I felt tliat T had to lay the facts out for the President as Veil as 
the implicatioti of those facts. "Moore enoouragcd me to do so. 

PiioxK Cox\T.Rs,vrrox of ^Iarch 20 

TYIien the President called and we had a rather rambling discussion. 
I told him at the conclusion of the conversation that evening that I 
wanted to talk with him as soon as jiossihle al>out the "\Yatei-g:ito matter 

•Spp p. 1202. 



(968) 




65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 



101530 

MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BST'.rEEM 
THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN \V. DEAN, III 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, UI, during January, 
February, and March 1972 



April 13, 1972 

PM 4:31 4:34 President met with Frank DeMarco, Jr. , and 

John Dean to sign 1971 income tax returns. 



May 1, 1972 

PM 3:02 3:07 President had photo opportunity in Rose Garden for 

National Secretaries Week. Mr. Dean attended 



No contact between the President and John W. Dean, III, during June and 
July 1972. 



August 14, 1972 



PM 



12:45 




11 


12:49 




09 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




11 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 


12:49 




12 



The President nnet to sign personal legal documents with: 
The First Lady 
John J. Ratchford 
Mr. Butte rfield 
Mr. Haldeman 
Mr. Ehrlichman 
John W. Dean, Ul 
John H. Alexander 
Richard S. Ritzel 



No other contact during August 1972 



\!^J^. 



65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 



September 15, 1972 1 Q, 7 -"'1:^ 

PM The President met with: 

3:15 6:17 Mr. Haldeman 

5:27 6:17 Mr. Dean 

(The President talked with Mr. MacGregor by- 
phone from 5:36 to 5:38) 

No other contact during September 1972 



October 9, 1972 

PM 3:10 3:34 The President met with Samuel Newhouse, President 

of Newhouse Newspapers and Newhouse Broadcasting 
and Herb Klein. 
3:23 3:34 John Dean joined the meeting. 



November 8, 1972 



The President attended a senior staff meeting in the 
Roosevelt Room. Mr. -John Dean was in 
attendance. 



November 12, 1972 

8:40 8:44 The President met aboard "Spirit of '76" with 

Rose Mary \Voods and Mr. and Mrs. John Dean 



No contact betv/een the President and John W. Dean, III, during November 
and December 1972. 



M 



(970) 



65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 

January 21, 1973 

AM 11:05 12:04 President and First Lady hosted W'ors'hip Service. 

John Dean attended. 



February 27, 1973 

PM 3:55 4:20 President met with John Dean alone in Oval Office. 

February 28, 1973 

AM 9:12 10:23 President met with John Dean in Oval Office. 

March 1, 1973 

AM 9:18 9:46 President met with his Counsel, John \V. Dean, III, 
/ in the Oval Office. 

|/ (At 9:36 the President rec'd a call from AG Kleindienst. Dean 
J0:36 10:44 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. too the call. 
j-^ls/lr. Kissinger was present from 10:30 - 10:37. ) 
PM 1:06 1:14 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office 

March 6, 1973 

AM 11:49 12:00 President met with Mr, Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 7, 1973 

AM 8:53 9:16 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

March 8, 1973 

AM 9:51 9:54 President met v.-ith Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 






(971) 



65. S MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 



March 10, 1973 



101530 



AM 9:20 9:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

President initiated the call from Cainp David 
to Mr. Dean who was in V/'ashington, D.C. 



March 13, 1973 

PM 12:42 2:00 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

(Mr. Haldeman was present from 12:43-1Z:55) 




March 14, 1973 

AM 8:36 President telephoned Mr. Dean. The call was not 

completed. 
8:55 8:59 Mr. Dean returned the call and talked with the President. 
9:43 10:50 President met with Mr. Dean in the P's EOB Office. 

Also present were: 

Mr. Kissinger (departed at 9:50) 

Ronald L. Ziegler 

Richard A. Moore (9:55-10:50) 

PM 12:27 12:28 President telephoned Mr. Dean. 

President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean. 
President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 
4:34 4:36 President talked with Mr. Dean. {Mr. Dean 

initiated the call. ) 



arch 15, 1973 

PM 3:3o 6:24 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore 

in the Oval Office. 



12:27 


12:28 


12:47 


1:30 


4:25 


4:26 



'. a - J 



(972) 



65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 



MARCH 20, 197 Z 



March 16, 1973 lOi'JO' 

AM 10:34 11:06 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. Ziegler was present from 10:58-11:10. 

PM 8:14 8:23 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 



March 17. 1973 

PM 1:25 2:10 President met with Mr. Dean in the 0\-al Office. 

March 19, 1973 

PM 4:59 President requested tlia t Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean 

join him in his EOB Office. 

5:03 5:41 President met with Mr. Moore and Mr. Dean in 

his EOB Office. 



March 20, 1973 

AM 10:46 10:47 President tallied with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

PM 12:59 1:00 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call, ) 

1:42 2:31 President met with Mr. Dean and Mr. Moore. 

7:29 7:43 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 




'^ 



(973) 

35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 19 



65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 

March 21, 1973 

AM 10:12 11:55 President met with Mr. Dean in the Oval Office. 

Mr. HaldeiT.an was also present for at least 
part of the time. 

PM 5:20 6:01 President met withMr. Dean in the President's 

EOB office. Also present were: 

Mr, Ziegler (departed at 5:25) 
Mr. Haldeman 1 fA 1 ^ 'iO 

Mr. Ehrlichman (5:25-6:01) J-'-' -i-'"^^^ 
ly^Gen. Scowcroft (5:27-6:05) 

March 22, 1973 

PM 1:57 3:43 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. Also present were: 
Mr. Ehrlichman (2:00-3:40) 
Mr. Haldeman (2:01-3:40) 
Mr. Mitchell (2:01-3:43) 



March 23, 1973 

PM 12:44 1:02 President talked' long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean wlio was in 'Washington, D. C. ) 

3:28 3:44 President talked long distance with Mr. Dean. 

(The President initiated the call from Florida 
to Mr. Dean who was in Camp Daxdd, Md. ) 



No contact during the period April 1-14 



April 15, 1973 

PM 9:17 10:12 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

March 22: Deleted -- (Mr. Dean was scheduled to attend the President's 
t-' staff briefing in the EOB Briefing Room which 

the President attended from 8:44-9:03. Attendance 
was not confirmed on this briefing. ) 

(974) 



65.3 MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN, 
MARCH 20, 1973 



April Id, 1973 

AM 10:00 10:40 President met v/ith Mr. Dean in Oval Office. 

PM 4:07 4:35 President met with Mr. Dean in the President's 

EOB Office. 

4:04 4:05 President talked v/ith Mr. Dean. (The President 
initiated the call. ) 



April 17, 1973 

AM 9:19 9:2 5 President talked with Mr. Dean. (The President 

initiated the call. ) 

10ib30 

April 22, 1973 

AM 8:24 8:39 President phoned Mr. Dean from Key Biscayne. 



(975) 



65.4 MEMORANDUM OF JOHN DEAN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, 
MARCH 20, 1973 



March 17, 1973 



\'cti-ch 19, 1973 



Mfvrch 20. 1973 





Da.','-, Ij ir.L-j.-vi-j-..- I-Ial -leman and 

Earlich-.-nan.- The ProBideht suggcsTcd Doan should 

possibly go to Canip David to write ))is ronort. 

President had made a note on a press survey contaiainp 
an article -alFeging V/aitc House involvement for follow- 
up {Dean pos_sibly has copy of this). Dean again sug- 
gested they bj-ing out 1968 bugging and Presid.int 
said Kleindienst had advised against it. Several 
names were discussed as possibly subject to attack: 
Colson, Hauioman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and jican 
himself. The President asked Do.-..n point-blank -if 
he knev/ about the planned broak-in in adwince. Dean 
said no, there there was no actual White House invol- 
vement regardless of appearances except possibly 
Strachan. Dean told I'resident Magruder pushed 
Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved. 
The President v.antod Haldeman, Ehrlichman and 
Dean to talk to the Cornn\iLtec and Dean resisted. 
Dean told the President of the Ellsberg broak-in bat 
that it had nothing to do with Waterg-ite. 

(March 19: Er--/in had been on Face t'le Nation and 
accused Dean of hiding behind executive privilege.) 

It was decided Dean would send a letter or sworn 
statement to che Judiciary Co ran-, it tee :.nswering 
certain cuestions. - 



(I?, 



pu ji.ican ^.■^adersViip h.^d been it\ tli^ai day. ) 



Dean t.iscui-sod J.'.iicheli' s problems with the jjrand 
jury, Vesco and the Gurney press conference. 
The President and Moore agreed tliat the u'hole 
investigation should be made public and that a state- 
ment should be released ii-r.n-iediately after the sen- 
tencing of the defenoanis. Dean suggested that each 
n-.ember of-the Ervin-Cornm-ittee be challenged to 
invite an FBI in\05tigation of his o^vn Senate campaign. 
The President caVied Dean that night r^nd P. -an .o-.id 
that there was "not a scintilla o: ij\-ir".--.ico" to '.u'li- 
cate V.'hjte House involvement arid D :\a suit;.:;. ted 
he give.tlv J-'resident a more in-depth brieiinf; 'm 
what had ; .ispired. 



,/^'- 



-3- 



<j' 



(976) 



65.4 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT, SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A, 4 SSC 1794-95 

1704 

Exhibit No. TOA 



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SEI^ECT COM.VJTTEE ON PRE5ID=.NTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTr/ITIn-S, ET. AL.' 



Plaintiffs 



RICHARD Nt. NTXO>w 



RICHAKLJ M. .Ni-i^ v.-s, _.„„ t;TA.TES 

£5rVIDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT OF Tr-.^ UNiX^D STATES 



THE VmTE HOUSE 
■WASHINGTON, D. C. 



Defendant 



CivU 

Action 

No. 



AFFIDA\-T or FRED D. T HOMPSON 

Fred D. Thompson, being s«rora. deposes and says: 

1. Early in June. 1973. the White House transmitted 

to the Select Corr^ttee a rr.emorandarr. (which is attached to this 
affidavit) listing certain oral corr^unications. ^oth face-to-face and _ 

and John Wesley Dean IH. 



telephonic, "between President Richard M, Nixon 

■r.>Z. alia - includes'the -exact times and durations of 
This memorandum, inter alia , inciuae» 

these commurac-! 

the other participants, if any, in those conversations. 



actions, and, in the case oC face-to-face communications. 



(977) 



65.4 FRED THOMPSON AFFIDAVIT^ SSC EXHIBIT NO. 70A^ 4 SSC 1794-95 



1795 



; - ■ 2. Shortly thereafter, I received a. telephone lill 

from J. Fred Buzhardt, Special Counsel to the President. Dvirir.j; 
this telephone call, Mr. Buzhardt related to me his understanding 
as to tr»e substance of certain portions- of the enumerated conversations 
between the President and Mr. Dean. 

3. During my discussion with Mr. Buzhardt, I 

made detailed notes on the information that he gave me. Upon 
conclusion of the conversation, I promptly prepared a "Memorandum 
of Substance of Dean's Calls and Meeting with the President," a 
copy of vTiich is attached to this a::'idavit. It is my belief that this 
ir.einorarcum accurately reflects the informatioa Imparted to me by- 
Mr. Scsbaret. 




Subscribed ar.d ST/orn to. berore 
n:e, this=£^d^T of _^^<"'.6tej/i_r.75 



U: 




=^^Y — 



(978) 



66. On March 20, 1973 John Dean had an evening telephone conversation 
with the President during which he arranged a meeting with the President 
for the next morning. According to the edited transcript of this con- 
versation made public by the White House, Dean requested a meeting with 
the President to go over soft spots and potential problem areas. Dean 
said that his prior conversation with the President had been "sort of 
bits and pieces" and that he wanted to paint the whole picture for the 
President. The President agreed to such a meeting, and the President 
also instructed Dean to try to write a general statement like one that 
would state categorically that based on Dean's investigation Haldeman, 
Colson and others were not involved in the Watergate matter. 



Page 

66.1 White House edited transcript of tape recorded 
telephone conversation between President Nixon 
and John Dean, March 20, 1973 980 



(979) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 1-8 

IGl 



I MARC 
I THE 



MARCH 20, 1973, (7:29-7:43 PM) - TELEPHONE CONVERSATION - 
THE PRESIUENT/DEAN 



P John Dean, please. 

Opr Yes, Mr. President. 

P Hello. 

D Yes, Sir. 

P You are having rather long days these days, aren't 
you? I guess we all have. 

D I think they will continue to be longer. 

(Material unrelated to Presidential actions deleted) 

D The other witness they have now subpoenaed - there are 
two other witnesses - there is a Hoback girl from 
the Re-E lection Committee - she was interrogated 
by Committee staff and counsel as a result of her 
confidential interviews with the FBI. 

P Hmph. 

D Alleging that that had been leaked by me to them emd 
then, of course, that was not true. 

P That's not true. 

D And the other fellow they are calling is a fellow 

by the name of Thomas Lombard who is trying to establish 
a link between Dean on that one. Lombard did volun- 
teer work for me in my office and did volunteer 
work for Liddy and at one time he saw Liddy in my 
office- Big deal. It was purely campaign, you know. 

(980) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 1-8 

1S2 

P Well, is that what Lombard will testify to, or 

will he testify to - 
D Well he has written a very lengthy letter to the 

Committee declining to testify originally and saying 

this is all I would have to say and it is probably 

not relevant. I know nothing of Dean and Liddy's 

connection. 
P Right. 

D Other than the fact that they — 
P That's not bad then - maybe he will make a pretty 

good witness. 
D He might. He might. 
P What about the Hcback girl? 
D The Hoback girl should be broken down. She should 

come out in tears as a result of the fact that she 

is virtually lying about one thing and our people 

will be on the -- 
P You mean — do our people know what to ask her? 
D Yes they do. Yes they do. 

P Uh,huh. Why is she doing it? Do we know? 
D She - ah — 
P Disgruntled? Somebody - 
D Disgruntled. She has been fairly disgruntled all 

along. She is a Democrat that worked over there in 



(981) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 1-8 

1G3 

-3- 

D Finance Committee. She professes a personal loyalty 

to Maury Stans but that is aJbout the extent of it, 

any, of her loyalty. 
P Yeah- 
D I never have figured out how she got in there. 

(Material unrelated to Presidential action deleted) 
P They didn't bite the bullet with regard to subpoenaing 

you? 
D No. I don't think there is any chance they are 

going to do that. 
P That's rather interesting isn't it? Something 

ought to be made of that. 



Unless they get — they are taking more evidence on 
me. Obviously with these other two witnesses, not 
that I think anything will come out of this. It will 
just be- more — I had a conversation with John 
Ehrlichman this afternoon before he came down to 
visit you. I think that one thing that we have to 
continue to do, and particularly right now, is to 
examine the broadest, broadest implications of this 
whole thing, and, you know, maybe about 30 minutes 
of just my recitation to you of facts so that you 
operate from the same facts that everybody else has. 
Right. 

(982) 



66 1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 C ONVERSATION, 1-8 

-4- 



D I don't think — We have never really done that. 

It has been sort of bits and pieces. Just paint the 

whole picture for you, the soft spots, the potential 

problem areas 
P Uh,huh. 
D cind the like so that when you make judgments you 

will have all that information. 
P Would you like to do that — when? 
D I would think, if its not inconvenient for you, sir, 

I would like to sort of draw all my thoughts together 

and have a — just make some notes to myself so 

I didn't — 
P Could you do it tomorrow? 
D Yes, Sir. Yes, Sir. 
P Uh,huh. Well, then we could probably do it, say, 

around ten o-' clock. 
D That would be fine, sir. 
P Do you just want to do it alone? Want einybody else 

there? 
D I think just — 

P It is better witn nobody else there, isn't it? 
D Absolutely. 

P Anybody else they are all partisan interest virtually. 
D That's right. 



(983) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 2-8 

1G5 

-5- 

P Right. Fine. The other thing I was going to say 
just is this — just for your own thinking — I 
still want to see, though I guess you and Dick 
are still working on your letter and all that sort 
of thing? 

C We are and we are coming to — the more we work on 
it the more questions we see — 

P That you don't want to answer, huh? 

D that bring problems by answering. 

P And so you are coming up, then, with the idea of 
just a stonewall then? Is that — 

D That's right. 

P Is that what you come down with? 

D Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are always 
willing to cooperate, but no one is asking us for 
anything. 

P And they never will, huh? There is no way that you 
could make even a general statement that I could put 
out? You understand what I — 

D. I think we could. 

P See, for example, I was even thinking if you could 
even talk to Cabinet, the leaders, you know, just 
orally and say, "I have looked into this, and this 
is that," so that people get sort of a feeling that — 



(984) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 1-8 

1G6 

-6- 

P your own people have got to be reassured. 

D Uh,huh. 

P Could you do that? 

D Well, I think I can but I don't think you would 

want to make that decision until we have about a — 

P No, I want to know. I want to know where all the 
bodies are first. 

D And then, once you decide after that, we can 
program it anyway you want to do it. 

P Yeah. Because I think, for example, you could do 

it orally, even if you don't want to make the written 
statement. You could do it orally before the Cabinet, 
the leaders and the rest. Lay it all out. You see, 
I would not be present. You just lay it all out and 
I just — See what I mean? 

D Uh,huh. 

P Now that is one thing. The other thing is that I 

do think there is something to be said for not maybe 
this complete cinswer to this fellow, but maybe just 
a statement to me. My versions are these: bing, bing, 
bing. That is a possibility. 

D Uh, huh. 

P What I mean is we need something to answer somebody, 
answer things, you know they say, "What are you 
basing this on", I can say, "Well, my counsel has 

(985) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSATION, 1-8 

-7- 1S7 

P advised me that" — Is that possible or not, or are — 

D Well, you know there is that — and there is always 

the FBI report which we have probably not relied upon 
enough. There is not one scintilla of evidence. 

P I know. But I mean, can't you say that? Or do you 
want to put it out? 

D Ah, it could be said, and it is something we haven't 
really emphasized. Pat Gray is the only person who 
has said it and it has really never gotten picked up. 

P How would you do it then? What I meant, isn't that 

something that you could say? Do you want to publish 
the FBI report? 

D Oh, no, because at our own strictures we are trying 
to place an up - right — 

P But you could say, "I have this and this is that." 
Fine. See what I am getting at is that, if apart 
from a statement to the Committee or anything else, 
if you could just make a statement to me that we 
can use. You know, for internal purposes and to 
answer questions, etc. 

D As we did when you, back in August, made the state- 

ment that — 

P That's right. 

D And all the things — 



(986) 



66.1 WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 20, 1973 CONVERSA TION, 1-8 

1G8 

-8- 

P You've got to have something where it doesn't 

appear that I am doing this in, you know, just in 
a — saying to hell with the Congress and to hell 
with the people, we are not going to tell you any- 
thing because of Executive Privilege. That, they 
don't understand. But if you say, "No, we are 
willing to cooperate," cind you've made a complete 
statement, but make it very incomplete. See, that 
is what I mean. I don't want a, too much in chapter 
cind verse as you did in your letter, I just weint 
just a general — 

D An all around statement. 

P That's right. Try just something general. Like 

"I have checked into this matter; I can categorically, 
based on my investigation, the following: Haldeman 
is not involved in this, that and the other thing. 
Mr. Colsori did not do this; Mr. so and so did not 
do this. Mr. Blamk did not do this." Right down 
the line, taking the most glaring things. If there 
are any further questions, please let me know. See? 



D Uh, huh. I think we ccui do that. 

P That is one possibility, and then you could say 

that such things -- and then use the FBI report to 
the Cabinet and to the leaders. It might just be 



(987) 



67. On March 21, 1973 the President met with John Dean from 10:12 

to 11:55 a.m. H.R. Haldeman joined the meeting at approximately 11:15 

a.m. The following is an index to certain of the subjects discussed in 

the course of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting: 

Transcript 
Page 

Possible involvement of Haldeman, 

Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, Colson, 

Strachan and Porter in Watergate 

matter 5-28 

Clemency and Watergate defen- 
dants 61-62 

Whether money should be paid 

to E. Howard Hunt 40-42, 105-06 



Page 

67.1 Tape recording of meeting between the President 
and John Dean, joined later by H.R. Haldeman, 
March 21, 1973, 10:12 - 11:55 a.m., and House 
Judiciary Committee transcript thereof 990 



(989) 



35-905 <Pl. 2) O - 14 - 20 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 



1-126 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF 

FOR THE 

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 

OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG 

THE PRESIDENT, JOHN DEAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN 

ON MARCH 21, 1973 FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 



(990) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF A 
RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, 
JOHN DEAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN ON MARCH 21, 1973 
FROM 10:12 TO 11:55 A.M. 



PRESIDENT: 



John, sit down, sit down. 



DEAN: 



Good morning. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, what is the Dean summary of the day about? 



DEAN: 



John caught me on the way out and asked me about why Gray 
was holding back on information, if that was under instruc- 
tions from us. And it, uh, it was and it wasn't. Uh, it 
was instructions proposed by the Attorney General, consis- 
tent with your press conference statement that no further 
raw data was to be turned over to the 



PRESIDENT : 



Full coimnittee 



DEAN: 



full committee. 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



And that was the extent of it. And Gray, himself, is the 
one who reached the conclusion that no more information 
be turned over; he'd turned over enough. Uh, so this is 
again Pat Gray making decisions on his own as to how to 
handle his hearings. He has been totally unwilling all 



(991) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-55 A M 
1-126 ' ' '' 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



along to take any guidance, any instruction. We don't know 
what he is going to do. He is not going to talk about it. 
He won't review it, uh, and I don't think 

Right. 

he does it to harm you in any way, sir. 

He's just quite stubborn and, he's quite stubborn; also he 
isn't very smart. You know he and I — 

He is bullheaded. 



PRESIDENT: 



He is smart in his own way, but. 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: but he's got that typical, "Well, by God this is rieht 
and they're not going to do it." 

DEAN: That's why he thinks he'll be confirmed, because he thinks he's 

being, he's being his own man. He's being forthright, honest. 
He's feels he has turned over too much and so it's a conscious 
decision that he is harming the Bureau by doing this and so 
he is not going to — 

PRESIDENT: [Sighs] I hope to God that we get off [unintelligible] though 

today that, this is because the White House told him to do this 
or that or the other thing. And also, I told Ehrlichman, I 
don't see why our little boys can't make something out of the 
fact that God dam it this is the, this is the, the only 

-2- 

(992) 



67.1 TRANSCRIFT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

responsible decision you could possibly make. The FBI cannot 
turn over raw files. Has anybody made that point? I have tried. 



DEAN: 



Sam Ervin has made that point himself. 



PRESIDENT: 



Did he? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh, in fact, in reading the transcript of Gray's hearings, Ervin 
tried to hold Gray back from doing what he was doing at the time 
he did it. Uh, I thought it was very unwise. I don't think 
that anyone is criticizing 

Well, let's say. 



DEAN: your position on it. 

PRESIDENT: let's make the point, let's make the point that the raw files 
cannot be turned over. Well, I think that point should 
be made. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



That , that — 

We are standing for the rights of innocent individuals. The 
American Civil Liberty Union is against it. We're against it. 
lUnintelligible] the tradition, and it will continue to be the 
tradition that all files are — I'd like to turn them all over 
to somebody. I'd like to get a chance for Spiro to put it out. 
[Unintelligible] and let them see what is in one. 

How damaging — 



-3- 

(993) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: Any further word on, on Sullivan? Is he still — 

DEAN: Yeah, he's, he's going to be over to see me today, this 
morning, hopefully, sometime. Uh — 

PRESIDENT: As soon as you get that, I'll be available to talk to you 
this afternoon. 

DEAN: All right, sir. 

PRESIDENT: I will be busy until about one o'clock; after that we can 

contact. Anytime you are through I would like to see whatever 
[unintelligible] he has. We've got something but I'd like to 
just see what it is. 

DEAN: Uh, the reason I thought we ought to talk this morning is 

because in , in our conversations , uh , uh , I have , I have the 
impression that you don't know everything I know, 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

DEAN: and it makes it very difficult for you to make judgments that, 

uh, that only you can make 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

DEAN: on some of these things and I thought that — 

PRESIDENT: You've got, in other words, I've got to know why you feel that, 
uh, that something 



-4- 

(994) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21^ 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



Well, let me , 



PRESIDENT: 



that, that we shouldn't unravel something. 



DEAN: 



let me give you my overall first. 



PRESIDENT: In other words, your, your judgment as to where it stands, 
and where we go now. 



DEAN: 



I think, I think that, uh, there's no doubt about the 
seriousness of the problem we're, we've got. We have a 
cancer — within — close to the Presidency, that's growing. 
It's growing daily. It's compounding, it grows geometrically 
now, because it compoimds itself. Uh, that'll be clear as 
I explain, you know, some of the details, uh, of why it is, 
and it basically is because (1) we're being blackmailed; 
(2) uh, people are going to start perjuring themself very 
quickly that have not had to perjure themselves to protect 
other people and the like. And that is just — And there 
is no assurance — 



PRESIDENT: 



That it won't bust. 



DEAN: 



That that won't bust. 



PRESIDENT: 



True. 



DEAN: 



So let me give you the sort of basic facts, talking first 



-5- 



(995) 



07. 1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



about the Watergate; and then about Segretti; and then about 
some of the peripheral items that, uh, have come up. First 
of all, on, on the Watergate: how did it all start, where 
did it start? It started with an instruction to me from 
Bob Haldeman to see if we couldn't set up a perfectly legi- 
timate campaign intelligence operation over at the Re- 
election Committee. 



PRESIDENT: 



Hm. 



DEAN: 



Not being in this business , I turned to somebody who had been 
in this business. Jack Caulfield, who is, I don't know if you 
remember Jack or not. He was your original bodyguard before 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



they had 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



candidate, candidate 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



protection, an old New York City policeman. 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. I know, I know him. 



DEAN: 



Uh, Jack had worked for John and then was transferred to 
my office. I said, "Jack come up with a plan that, you 
know, is a normal infiltration, I mean, you know, buying 



-6- 



(996) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



information from secretaries and all that sort of thing." He 
did, he put together a plan. It was kicked around, and, uh, 
I went to Ehrlichman with it. I went to Mitchell with it, and 
the consensus was that Caulfield wasn't the man to do this. 
Uh, in retrospect, that might have been a bad call, 'cause he 
is an incredibly cautious person and, and wouldn't have put 
the situation where it is today. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



All right, after rejecting that, they said, "We still need 
something," so I was told to look around for somebody that 
could go over to 1701 and do this. That's when I came up with 
Gordon Liddy, who — They needed a lawyer. Gordon had an 
intelligence background from his FBI service. I was aware of 
the fact that he had done some extremely sensitive things for 
the White House while he'd been at the White House, and he had 
apparently done them well. Uh, going out into Ellsberg's 
doctor's office 



PRESIDENT: 



Oh, yeah. 



DEAN: 



and things like this. He'd worked with leaks. He'd, you 
know, tracked these things down. Uh , and [coughs] so the 
report that I got from Krogh was that he was a hell of a 
good man and, and not only that, a good lawyer, uh, and 
could set up a proper operation. So we talked to Liddy. 



-7- 



(997) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 — 



Liddy was interested in doing it. Took, uh, Liddy over 
to meet Mitchell. Mitchell thought highly of him because, 
apparently, Mitchell was partially involved in his ev — ^ 
coming to the White House to work for, for Krogh. Uh, 
Liddy had been at Treasury before that. Then Liddy was 
told to put together his plan, you know, how he would run 
an intelligence operation. And this was after he was hired 
over there at the, uh, the Committee. Magruder called me 
in January and said, "I'd like to have you come over and 
see Liddy's plan." 



PRESIDENT: January of '72? 



DEAN: 



January of '72. Like, "You come over to Mitchell's office 
and sit in on a meeting where Liddy is going to lay his plan 
out." I said, "Well, I don't really know as I am the man, 
but if you want me there I will be happy to." [Clears 
throat] So I came over and Liddy laid out a million dollar 
plan that was the most incredible thing I have ever laid 
my eyes on: all in codes, and involved black bag operations, 
kidnapping, providing prostitutes, uh, to weaken the opposi- 
tion, bugging, uh, mugging teams. It was just an incredible 
thing. [Clears throat] 



-8- 



(998) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT : 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT; 



But, uh. 

And — 

that was, that was not, uh. 

No. 

discussed at the 

No. 

[Unintelligible] 

No, not at all. And, 

{Unintelligible] 

uh, Mitchell, Mitchell just virtually sat there puffing and 

laughing. I could tell 'cause after he — after Liddy left 

the office I said, "That's the most incredible thing I have 

ever seen." He said, "I agree." And so then he was told 

to go back to the drawing boards and come up with something 

realistic. So there was a second meeting. Uh, they asked me 

to come over to that. I came into the tail end of the 

meeting. I wasn't there for the first part. I don't know 

how long the meeting lasted. Uh, at this point, they were 

discussing again bugging, kidnapping and the like. And at 

this point I said, right in front of everybody, very clearly, 

I said, "These are not the sort of things (1) that are ever 

to be discussed in the office of the Attorney General of the 

United States" — where he still was — "and I am personally 

incensed." I was trying to get Mitchell off the hook, uh, 

'cause — 
I know. 

He's a, he's a nice person, doesn't like to say no under 

— when people he's going to have to work with. 

That's right. 

-9- 

(999) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



So, I let, I let it be known. I said "You all pack that 

stuff up and get it the hell out of here 'cause we just, you 

just can't talk this way in this office and you shouldn't, 

you should re-examine your whole thinking." Came back — 



PRESIDENT: 



Who else was present? Besides you — 



DEAN: 



It was Magruder, Magruder, 



PRESIDENT: 



Magruder. 



DEAN: 



uh, Mitchell, Liddy and myself. I came back right after 
the meeting and told Bob, I said, "Bob, we've got a growing 
disaster on our hands if they're thinking this way," and I 
said, "The Wliite House has got to stay out of this and I, 
frankly, am not going to be involved in it." He said, "I 
agree John." And, I thought, at that point, the thing 
was turned off. That's the last I heard of it, when I thought 
it was turned off, because it was an absurd proposal. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Liddy — I did have dealings with him afterwards. We never 
talked about it. Now that would be hard to believe for 
some people, but, uh , we never did. Just the fact of the 
matter. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, you were talking about other things. 



-10- 



(1000) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN; 



Other things. We had so many other things. 



PRESIDENT: 



He had some legal problems at one time. 



DEAN: 



Now [coughs] — 



PRESIDENT: But you were his advisor, and I, I understand how you could 
have some , uh , what cam — what are they campaign laws — I 
knew that was you, you have — Haldeman told me you, that you 
were heading all of that up for us. Go ahead. 



DEAN: 



Now. [Clears throat] So, Liddy went back after that and 
was over, over at, uh, 1701, the Committee, and I, this is 
where I come into having put the pieces together after the 
fact as to what I can put together what happened. Liddy sat 
over there and tried to come up with another plan, that he 
could sell. (1) They were talking, saying to him he was 
asking for too much money, and I don't think they 
were discounting the illegal points at this, after 
you know, Jeb is not a lawyer. He didn't know whether this 
was the way the game was played or not, and what it was 
all about. They came up with, apparently, another plan, uh, 
but they couldn't get it approved by anybody over there. So 
Liddy and Hunt apparently came to see Chuck Colson, and 
Chuck Colson picked up the telephone and called Magruder 
and said, "You all either fish or cut bait. Uh, this is 



-11- 



(1001) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - U-SS A M 
1-126 ' '"* 



absurd to have these guys over there and not using them, 
and if you're not going to use them, I may use them." 
Things of this nature. 



PRESIDENT: 



When was this? 



DEAN; 



This was apparently in February of '72. 



PRESIDENT: 



That could be — Colson know what they were talking about? 



DEAN: 



I can only assume, because of his close relationship with 



PRESIDENT: 



Hunt. 



DEAN: 



Hunt, he had a damn good idea of what they were talking about, 
a damn good idea. He would probably deny it, deny it today 
and probably get away with denying it. But I, uh, I still — 



PRESIDENT: 



Unless Hunt — 



DEAN: 



Unless Hunt, uh, blows on him — 



PRESIDENT: 



But then Hunt isn't enough. It takes two doesn't it? 



DEAN: 



Probably. Probably. But Liddy was there also and if, if 
Liddy were to blow — 



PRESIDENT: Then you've got a problem — I was saying as to the criminal 
liability in the 



-12- 



(1002) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

DEAN: Yeah. 

PRESIDENT: White House. Okay. 

DEAN: I will go back over that, and tell 

PRESIDENT: Was that Colson? 

DEAN: you where I think the, the soft spots are. 

PRESIDENT: Colson — that, that, that Colson, uh , you think was the, uh, 
was the person who 

DEAN: I think he, 

PRESIDENT: pushed? 

DEAN: I think he helped to get the push, get the thing off the 

dime. Now something else occurred, though — 

PRESIDENT: Did Colson — had he talked to anybody here? 

DEAN: No. I think this was an independent — 

PRESIDENT: Did he talk to Haldeman? 

DEAN: No, I don't think so. Now, but here's the other the thing 
where the next thing comes in the chain. I think that Bob 
was assuming that they had something that was proper over 
there, some intelligence gathering operation that Liddy was 
operating. And through Strachan, uh, who was his tickler, 
uh, he started pushing them 

PRESIDENT: [Sighs] Yeah. 

DEAN: to get something, to get some 



-13- 
(1003) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-55 A M 
1-126 ' '' 



information and they took that as a signal — Magruder 
took that as a signal — to probably go to Mitchell and 
say, "They are pushing us like crazy for this from the 
White House." And so Mitchell probably puffed on his pipe 
and said, "Go ahead," and never really re — reflected on what 
it was all about. So, they had some plan that obviously had, 
I gather, different targets they were going to go after. 
They were going to infiltrate, and bug, and do all this 
sort of thing to a lot of these targets. This is knowledge 
I have after the fact. [Coughs] And, apparently, they, uh, 
they, they had. they had after, they had initially broken 
in and bugged the Democratic National Committee, they were 
getting information. The information was coming over here 
to Strachan. Some of it was given to Haldeman, uh, there is 
no doubt about it. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Did he know what it was coming from? 



DEAI^: 



I don't really know if he would. 



PRESIDENT: 



Not necessarily. 



DEAN: 



Not necessarily. That's not necessarily. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Strachan knew what it was from. 



DEAN: 



Strachan knew what it was from. No doubt about it, and 



-14- 



(1004) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 



whether Strachan — I have never come to press these people 
on these points because it. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



it hurts them to, to give up that next inch, so I had to 
piece things together. All right, so Strachan was aware 
of receiving information, reporting to Bob. At one point 
Bob even gave instructions to change their capabilities 
from Muskie to McGovem, and had passed this back through 
Strachan to Magruder and, and apparently to Liddy. And 
Liddy was starting to make arrangements to go in and bug 
the, uh, uh, McGovern operation. They had done prelim — 

They had never bugged Muskie, though, did they? 

No, they hadn't, but they had a, they had, uh, they'd 

[Unintelligible] 

infiltrated it by a, a, they had 

A secretary. 

a secretary and a chauffeur. Nothing illegal about that. 

[Unintelligible] 

Now, so the information was coming over here and then, uh, 
I finally, after the next point in time where I became 
aware of anything was on June 17th, when I got the word 
that there had been this break-in at the Democratic 
National Conmittee and somebody from the Committee had been 



-15- 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 21 



(1005) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT : 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN; 



caught, uh, from our Committee had been caught in the 
DNC. And I said, "Oh, my God, that, I can only." You 
know, if, instantly putting the pieces together — 
I Coughs ] 

You knew what it was. 

I knew what it was. So I called Liddy, uh, on that Monday 
morning, and I said, "Gordon," I said, "first, I want to 
know if anybody in the White House was involved in this." 
And he said. "No, they weren't." I said, "Well, I want to 
know how in God's name this happened." And he said, "Well, 
I was pushed without mercy by Magruder to get in there, 
get more information, that the information, it was not 
satisfactory. Magruder said, 'The White House is not 
happy with what we're getting.'" 

The White House? 

The White House. Yeah. Uh 

Who do you think was pushing him? 

Well, I think it was probably Strachan thinking that Bob 
wanted things, and, because, because I have seen that happen 
on other occasions where things have been said to be of 



-16- 



(1006) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



very prime Importance when they really weren't. 



PRESIDENT: 



Why [unintelligible] I wonder? I am just trying to think as 
to why then. We'd just finished the Moscow trip. I mean. 



we were — 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 

The Democrats had just nominated McG — McGovem. I mean, for 
Christ's sakes, I mean, what the hell were we ~ I mean I can 
see doing it earlier but I mean, now let me say, I can see 
the pressure, but I don't see why all the pressure would have 
been around then. 

I don't know, other than the fact that, uh, they might have 
been looking for information about 

The convention. 



DEAN: 



the conventions. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, that's right. 

Because, I understand, also, after the fact, that there 
was a plan to bug Larry O'Brien's suite down in Florida. 

Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Uh, so, uh, Liddy told me that, uh , you know, this is what 
had happened and, and this is why it had happened. 



-17- 
(1007) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-55 A M 
1-126 ■ *■' 

PRESIDENT: Liddy told you he was planning — where 'd he learn there 
was such a plan — from whom? 

DEAN: Beg your pardon? 

PRESIDENT: Where did he learn of the plans to bug Larry O'Brien's 
suite? 



DEAN: 



From Magruder, after the, long after the fact. 



PRESIDENT: Oh, Magruder, he knows. 

DEAN: Yeah. Magruder is totally knowledgeable on the whole 
thing. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: All right, now, we've gone through the trial. We've — 

I don't know if Mitchell has perjured himself in the Grand 
Jury or not. I've never — 

PRESIDENT: Who? 

DEAN: Mitchell. I don't know how much knowledge he actually had. 

I know that Magruder has perjured himself in the Grand 
Jury. I know that Porter has perjured himself, uh, in the 
Grand Jury. 

PRESIDENT: Porter [unintelligible] 



-18- 
(1008) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



He is one of Magruder's deputies. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Uh, that they set up this scenario which they ran by me. 
They said, "How about this?" I said, "I don't know. I, 
you know, if, if this is what you are going to hang on, 
fine." Uh, that they — 



PRESIDENT: What did they say before the Grand Jury? 



DEAN: 



They said, they said, as they said before the trial and 
the Grand Jury, that, that, uh, Liddy had come over as, as 
a Counsel 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



and we knew he had these capacities tc. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



You know, 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



to do legitimate intelligence. We had no idea what he was 
doing . 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



He was given an authorization of $250,000 



PRESIDENT : Right . 



-19- 



(1009) 



67.1 TRAWSCRIFT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



to collect information, because our surrogates were out 
on the road. They had no protection. We had information 
that there were going to be demonstrations against them, 
that, uh, uh, we had to have a plan to get information as 
to what liabilities they were going to be confronted with 



PRESIDENT: 



Right . 



DEAN: 



and Liddy was charged with doing this. We had no knowledge 
that he was going to bug the DNC. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, the point is, that's not true. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



Magruder did know that — 



DEAN: 



Magruder specifically instructed him to go back in the DNC. 



PRESIDENT: 



He did? 



DEAN: 



Yes. 



PRESIDENT: 



You know that? Yeah. I see. Okay. 



DEAN: 



Uh, I honestly believe that no one over here knew that. 
I know, uh, as God is my maker, I had no knowledge that 
they were going to do this. 



PRESIDENT: 



Bob didn't either [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Uh, but — 



-20- 



(1010) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: They know you're not the Issue. Bob, Bob, now — he wouldn't 
know. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Bob — I don't believe specifically knew they were going in there. 



I don't think so. 



DEAN: 



I don't think he did. I think he knew there was a capacity to 
do this but he wouldn't, wasn't giving it specific direction. 



PRESIDENT: Strachan, did he know? 



DEAN: 



I think Strachan did know. 



PRESIDENT: 



They were going back into the DNC? Hunt never [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



All right, so — uh, those people are in trouble as a result 
of the Grand Jury and the trial. Mitchell, of course, was 
never called during the trial. Now — 



PRESIDENT: Mitchell has given a sworn statement? 



DEAN: 



Yes, sir. 



PRESIDENT: To the Bureau? 



DEAN: 



To the Grand Jury — 



PRESIDENT: 



Did he go before the Grand Jury? 



DEAN: 



He had, we had a, an arrangement whereby he went down to, 
with several of the, because it was, you know, the heat of 



-21- 
(1011) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



this thing and the implications on the election, we made 
an arrangement where they could quietly go into the Depart- 
ment of Justice and have one of the assistant U. S. Attorneys 
come over and take their testimony and then read it before 
the Grand Jury. Uh, 

PRESIDENT: That was [unintelligible] 

DEAN: although I — That's right, Mitchell was actually called 

before the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury would not settle for 
less. The jurors wanted him. 



PRESIDENT: 



And he went. 



DEAN: 



And he went. 



PRESIDENT : 



Good. 



DEAN: 



Uh, I don't know what he said. Uh, I have never seen a 
transcript of the Grand Jury. Now, [sighs] what, what has 
happened post-June 17? Well, it was, I was under pretty 
clear instructions [laughs] not to really to investigate 
this, that this was something that just could have been 
disastrous on the election if it had — all hell had broken 
loose , and I worked on a theory of containment 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



-22- 



(1012) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 22:55 A.M., 
1-126 . 



DEAN: 



to try to hold it right where it was. 



PRESIDENT: 



Right . 



DEAN: 



There is no doubt I, I, uh, that, uh, I was totally aware 
what the Bureau was doing at all times. I was totally 
aware of what the Grand Jury was doing. 



PRESIDENT: 



You mean 



DEAN: 



I knew what witnesses were going to be called. I knew what 
they were going to be asked, and I had to. There just — 



PRESIDENT: 



Why did Petersen play the, play the game so straight with 
us? 



DEAN: 



Because Petersen is a soldier. He played — He kept me 
informed. He told me when we had problems, where we had 
problems and the like. Uh, he believes in, in, in you. He 
believes in this Administration. This Administration has 
made him. Uh, I don't think he's done anything improper, 
but he did make sure the investigation was narrowed down to 
the very, very 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



fine 



-23- 



(1013) 



67,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: Right. 

DEAN: criminal things, which was a break for us. There is no 

doubt about it. 

PRESIDENT: He honestly feels that he did an adequate job? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



He, uh, they ran that investigation out to the fullest 
extent they could follow a lead [coughs] and that was it. 

But the point is, where I suppose he could be criticized 
for not doing an adequate job: Why didn't he call Haldeman? 
Why didn't he get a statement from Colson? Oh, they did 
get Colson. 

That's right. But see, the thing is, is based on their FBI 
interviews, there was no reason to follow up. There were no 
leads there. Colson said, "I have no knowledge of this" 
to the FBI. Uh, Strachan said, "I have no knowledge of — " 
you know, they didn't ask Strachan any Watergate questions. 
They asked him about Segretti. Uh , they said, "What's 
your connection with Liddy?" and he just said, "Well, I, 
you know, I just, met him over there," and they never really 
pressed him. They didn't, you know, they — Look, Strachan 
appeared, uh, as a result of some coaching, he could be 
the dumbest paper pusher in the bowels of the, the White 
House. 



-24- 



(1014) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



All right. Now post-June 17th: These guys innnediately — 
It is very, very [laughs] interesting. Liddy, for example, 
the Friday before — uh, on I guess it was the, uh, on the 
15th , uh, 16th, uh, of, uh, June — had been in Henry 
Petersen's office with another member of my staff on 
campaign compliance [laughs] problems, uh, joking. After 
the incident, he went, he.ran, uh, Kleindienst down at 
Burning Tree Country Club and told [laughs] him that 
"you've got to get my men out of jail," which was kind of 
a — Kleindienst said, "Now, you get the hell out of here, 
kid, uh. Whatever you've got to say, just say to somebody 
else. Don't bother me," and — But this has never come up. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



"l.T„ « 



Uh, Liddy said, said that, you know, if they all got counsel 
instantly and said that, you know, "We'll, we'll ride this 
thing out." All right, then they started making demands. 
We've got to have attorneys' fees. Uh, we don't have any 
money ourselves, and if — you are asking us to take this 
through the election." All right, so arrangements were 
made through Mitchell, uh, initiating it, in discussions 
that — I was present — that these guys had to be taken 



-25- 



(1015) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



care of. Their attorneys' fees had to be done. Kalmbach 
was brought in. Uh, Kalmbach raised some cash. Uh, 
they were obv — , uh, you know, 

PRESIDENT: They put that under the cover of a Cuban Committee or 
[unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Yeah, they, they had a Cuban Committee and they had — some 
of it was given to Hunt's lawyer, who in turn passed it out. 
This, you know, when Hunt's wife was flying to Chicago with 
ten thousand, she was actually, I understand after the fact 
now, was going to pass that money to, uh, one of the Cubans 
— to meet him in Chicago and pass it to somebody there. 

[Unintelligible]. Maybe — Well, whether it's maybe too 
late to do anything about it, but I would certainly keep 
that, [laughs] that cover for whatever it's worth- 

I'll — 



PRESIDENT: Keep the Committee. 

DEAN: Af — , after, well, that, that, that's 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 

DEAN: the most troublesome post-thing, uh, because (1) Bob is involved 

in that; John is Involved in that; I am involved in that; Mitchell 
is involved in that. And that's an obstruction of justice. 



-26- 
(1016) 



67.1 TMNSCRIFT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



In other words the fact that, uh, that you're, you're, you're 
taking care of witnesses. 



DEAN: 



That's right. Uh, 



PRESIDENT: 



How was Bob involved? 



DEAN: 



well, th — , they ran out of money over there. Bob had three 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars in a safe over here that 
was really set aside for polling purposes. Uh, and there 
was no other source of money, so they came over here and 
said , "You all have got to give us some money." 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



I had to go to Bob and say, "Bob, you know, you've got to 
have some — they need some money over there." He said 
"What for?" And so I had to tell him what it was for 
'cause he wasn't about to just send money over there willy- 
nilly. And, uh, John was involved in those discussions, 
and we decided, you know, that, you know, that there was no 
price too high to pay to let this thing blow up in front of 
the election. 



PRESIDENT: 



I think you should handle that one pretty fast. 



DEAN: 



Oh, I think 



PRESIDENT: 



That issue, I mean. 



-27- 
(1017) 



e7.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 2973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



I think we can 



PRESIDENT; 



So that the three-fifty went back to him. All it did was — 



DEAN: 



That's right, I think we can too. 



PRESIDENT: 



Who else [unintelligible]? 



DEAN: 



But, now, here, here's what's happening right now. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



What sort of brings matters to the — This is the one that's 
going to be a continual blackmail operation by Hunt and 
Liddy and the 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Cubans, No doubt about it. And McCord, 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



who is, who is another one involved, McCord has asked for 
nothing, Uh, McCord did ask to meet with somebody, and it 
was Jack Caulfield, who is his old friend who'd gotten him 
hired over there. And, when, when, when Caulfield had him 
hired, he was a perfectly legitimate security man. And he 
wanted to know, well, you know, [coughs] he wanted to talk about 
commutation, and things like that. And as you know Colson 



-28- 
(1018) 



67.1 TEANSCEIFT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



has talked to, indirectly to Hunt about commutation. 
[Clears throat] All these things are bad, in, in, in 
that they are problems, they are promises, they are commit- 
ments. They are the very sort of thing that the Senate is 
going to be looking most for. I don't think they can find 
them, frankly. 



PRESIDENT: 



Pretty hard. 



DEAN: 



Pretty hard. Damn hard. It's all cash. Uh* 



PRESIDENT: Well, I mean, pretty hard as far as the witnesses are 
concerned. 



DEAN: 



That's right. Now. The blackmail is continuing. Hunt called 
one of the lawyers from the Re-election Committee on last 
Friday to meet with him on — over the weekend. The guy came 
in to me, to see me to get a message directly from Hunt to 
me, for the first time. 



PRESIDENT: 



Is Hunt out on bail? 



DEAN: 



Pardon? 



PRESIDENT: 



Is Hunt on bail? 



DEAN: 



Hunt is on bail. Correct. Uh, Hunt now is demanding another 
seventy- two thousand dollars for his own personal expenses; 



-29- 
(1019) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



another fifty thousand dollars to pay his attorneys' fees; 
a hundred and twenty some thousand dollars. Wants it, 
wanted it by the close of business yesterday. 'Cause he 
says, "I am going to be sentenced on Friday, and I've got 
to be able to get my financial affairs in order." I told 
this fellow O'Brien, "You came — all right, you 
came to the wrong man, fellow. I'm not involved in the money. 
Uh, I don't know a thing about it, can't help you." Said, 
"You better scramble around elsewhere." Now, O'Brien is, 
O'Brien is, is a ball player. He's been, he's carried 
tremendous water for us . Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



He isn't Hunt's lawyer, is he? 



DEAN: 



No he is, he is our lawyer at the Re-election Committee. 



PRESIDENT: 



I see. Good. 



DEAN: 



So he's safe. There's no problem there. But it raises the 
whole question of Hunt now has made a direct threat against 
Ehrlichman, as a result of this. This is his blackmail. 
He says, "I will bring John Ehrlichman down to his knees and 
put him in jail. Uh, I have done enough seamy things for he 
and Krogh, uh, that they'll never survive it." 



PRESIDENT: 



What's that, on Ellsberg? 



-30- 



(1020) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



Ellsberg, and apparently some other things. I don't know 
the full extent of it. Uh -- 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



I don't know about anything else. 

I don't know either, and I [laughs] almost hate to learn 
some of these 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



things. So that's, that's that situation. Now, where are 
the soft points? How many people know about this? Well, 
uh, well, let me go one step further in this, this 
whole thing. The Cubans that were used in the Watergate 
were also the same Cubans that Hunt and Liddy used for this 
California Ellsberg thing, for the break-in out there. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



So they are, they are aware of that. How high their 
knowledge is, is something else. Hunt and Liddy, of course, 
are totally aware of, of, of it, and the fact that, uh, it 
was right out of the White House. 

I don't know what the hell we did that for. 



DEAN: 



I don't either. 



-31- 



•1<;-Qn', fPt 21 O - 74 - 22 



(1021) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Wliat in the name of God did that — 



DEAN: 



Mr. President, there have been a couple of things around 
here that I have gotten wind of. Uh, there was at one 
time a desire to do a second-story job on the Brookings 
Institute where they had the Pentagon Papers. Now I flew to 
California because I was told that John had instructed it 
and he said, "I really hadn't. It is a misimpression, that 
for Christ's sake, turn it off." And I did. I came back 
and turned it off. Because, you know the, when you, you 
know, if the risk is minimal and the, and the gain is 
fantastic, it's something else. But with a low risk and, 
uh, no gain, uh , gee, it's just, uh, it's rot worth it. But — 
who knows about this all now? All right, you've got 
[clears throat] the Cubans' lawer, a man by the name of Rothblatt, 
who is a no good, publicity seeking, son-of-a-bitch, to be 
very frank about it. Ke has had to be turned down and tuned 
off. He was canned by his own people 'cause they didn't 
trust him. They were trying to run a different route than 
he wanted to run. He didn't want them to plead guilty. 
He wants to represent them before the Senate. So F, Lee 
Bailey, who was the partner of one of the, one of the men 
representing McCord, uh, got in and, and cooled Rothblatt 
down. So F. Lee, Lee Bailey's E^ot knowledge. Uh, 



-32- 
(1022) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197S MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



Hunt's lawyer, a man by the name of Bittman, who's an 
excellent criminal lawyer from the Democratic era of 
Bobby Kennedy, he's got knowledge. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Do you think, do you think, that he's got some? How much? 

Well, everybody — not only, all the, all the direct know- 
ledge that Hunt and Liddy have, as well as all the hearsay 
they have. 

I [unintelligible] 

Uh, you've got the two lawyers over at the Re-election 
Committee who did an investigation to find out the facts. 
Slowly, they got the whole picture. They are, I, they're solid, 

but they're — 

But they know. 

But they know. Uh, you've got, then, an awful lot of — all 
the principals involved know. Uh, Hunt — Some people's 
wives know. 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh, there's no doubt about that. Mrs. Hunt was the sawiest 
woman in the world. She had the whole picture together. 

Did she? 



-33- 



(1023) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1972 mETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: Yeah, It, uh — Apparently, she was the pillar of 

strength in that family before the death, and, uh — 

PRESIDENT: Great sadness. The basis, as a matter of fact [clears 
throat] there was some discussion over there with 
somebody about, uh. Hunt's problems after his wife died 
and I said, of course, commutation could be considered 
on the basis of his wife, and that is the only discussion 
I ever had in that light. 

DEAN: Right. Uh, so that, that's it. That's the, the extent 

of the knowledge. Now, where, where are the soft 
spots on this? Well, first of all, there's the, there's 
the problem of the continued blackmail 

PRESIDENT: Right. 

DEAN: which will not only go on now, it'll go on when these 

people are in prison, and it will compound the obstruc- 
tion of justice situation. It'll cost money. It's dangerous. 
Nobody, nothing — people around here are not pros at this 
sort of thing. This is the sort of thing Mafia people can 
do: washing money, getting clean money, and things like 



-34- 



(1024) 



67.1 TMNSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 



that, uh — we're — Me just don't know about those things, 
because we're not used to, you know — we are not criminals 
and not used to dealing in that business. It's, uh, it's, 
uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



It's a tough thing to know how to do. 



PRESIDENT: 



Maybe we can't even do that. 



DEAN: 



That's right. It's a real problem as to whether we could 
even do it. Plus there's 3* real problem in raising money. Uh, 
Mitchell has been working on raising some money. Uh, feeling 
he's got, you know, he's got one, he's one of the ones with 
the most to lose. Uh, but there's no denying the fact that 
the White House, and, uh, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean are 
involved in some of the early money decisions. 



PRESIDENT: 



How much money do you need? 



DEAN: 



I would say these people are going to cost, uh, a million 
dollars over the next, uh, two years. 



PRESIDENT: 



We could get that. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



-35- 



(1025) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



You, on the money, if you need the money, I mean, uh, you 
could get the money. Let's say — 

Well, I think that we're going — 

What I meant is, you could, you could get a million dollars. 
And you could get it in cash. I, I know where it could be 
gotten. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh huh . 

I mean it's not easy, but it could be done. But, uh, the 
question is who the hell would handle it? 



DEAN: 



That's right. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Any ideas on that? 

Well, I would think that would be something that Mitchell 
ought to be charged with. 

I would think so too. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



And get some, get some pros to help him. 

Let me say, there shouldn't be a lot of people running around 
getting money. We should set up a little — 

Well, he's got one person doing it who I am not sure is — 



-36- 



(1026) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Who is that? 



DEAN: 



He's got Fred LaRue, uh, doing it. Now Fred started out 
going out trying to 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



DEAN: 



solicit money from all kinds of people. Now, I learned 
about that, and I said. 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



DEAN: 



"My God," 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



DEAN: 



'It's just awful. Don't do it." 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Uh, people are going to ask what the money is for. He's 
working — He's apparently talked to Tom Pappas. 



PRESIDENT: 



I know ■ 



DEAN: 



And Pappas has, uh, agreed to come up with a sizeable amount, 
I gather, from, from 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, 



-37- 



(1027) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



Mitchell. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. Well, what do you need, then? You need, uh, you 
don't need a million right away, but you need a million. 
Is that right? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: You need a million in cash, don't you? If you want to put 
that through, would you put that through, uh — this is 
thinking out loud here for a moment — would you put that 
through the Cuban Committee? 



DEAN: 



Urn, no. 



PRESIDENT: Or would you just do this through a ~ [Unintelligible] that 
it's going to be, uh, well, it's cash money, and so forth. 
How, if that ever comes out, are you going to handle it? Is 
the Cuban Committee an obstruction of justice, if they want 
to help? 



DEAN: 



Well, they've got a pr — , they've got priests, and they -- 



PRESIDENT: Would you like to put, I mean, would that, would that give 
a little bit of a cover, for example? 



DEAN: 



That would give some for the Cubans and possibly Hunt. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



-38- 



(1028) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



Uh, then you've got Llddy, and McCord is not, not accepting 
any money. So, he's, he is not a bought man right now. 



PRESIDENT: 



Okay. 



DEAN: 



All right. Let, let me, uh, 



PRESIDENT: 



Go ahead. 



DEAN: 



continue a little bit here now. The, uh, I, when I say this 
is a, a growing cancer, uh, I say it for reasons like this. 
Bud Krogh, in his testimony before the Grand Jury, was forced 
to perjure himself. Uh, he is haunted by it. Uh, Bud 
said, "I haven't had a pleasant day on the job." 



PRESIDENT: 



Huh? Said what? 



DEAN: 



He said, "I have not had a pleasant day on my job." Uh, 
he talked, apparently, he said to me, "I told my wife all 
about this," he said. "The, uh, the curtain may ring down 
one of these days, and, uh, I may have to face the music, 
which I'm perfectly willing to do." Uh— 



PRESIDENT: 



What did he perjure himself on, John? 



DEAN: 



His, did, uh, did he know the Cubans? He did. Uh 



PRESIDENT: 



He said he didn't? 



-39- 
(1029) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



That's right. They didn't press him hard, or that he — 

He might be able to — I am just trying to think. Perjury 
is an awful hard rap to prove. He could say that I — 
Well, go ahead. 

[Coughs] Well, so that's, that's the first, that's one 
perjury. Now, Mitchell and, and, uh, Magruder are potential 
perjuries. There is alv;ays the possibility of any one of 
these individuals blowing. Hunt. Liddy. Liddy is in jail 
right now; he's serving his — trying to get good time 
right now. I think Liddy is probably, in his, in his own 
bizarre way, the strongest of all of them. Uh, so there's, 
there is that possibility. 



PRESIDENT: Well, your, your major, your major guy to keep under control 
is Hunt . 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



I think. Because he knows 



DEAN: 



He knows so much. 



PRESIDENT: 



about a lot of other things. 



DEAN : 



He knows so much. Right. Uh, he could sink Chuck Colson. 
Apparently, apparently he is quite distressed with Colson. 



-40- 



(1030) 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



He thinks Colson has abandoned him. Uh, Colson was to 
meet with him when he was out there, after, now he had 
left the White House. He met with him through his lawyer. 
Hunt raised the question; he wanted money. Colson' s 
lawyer told him that Colson wasn't doing anything with 
money, and Hunt took offense with that immediately, that, 
uh, uh, that Colson had abandoned him. Uh — 

Don't you, just looking at the immediate problem, don't 
you have to have — handle Hunt's financial situation 



I, I think that's. 



damn soon? 



that is, uh, I talked to Mitchell about that last night, 



Mitchell. 



DEAN: and, and, uh, I told — 

PRESIDENT: Might as well. May have the rule you've got to keep the 
cap on the bottle that much, 

DEAN: That's right; that's right. 
PRESIDENT: in order to have any options. 
DEAN: That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



Either that or let it all blow right now. 



-41- 



(1031) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 



DEAN: 



Well that, you know, that's the, that's the question. Uh 



PRESIDENT: 



Now, go ahead. The others. You've got Hunt; 



DEAN: 



All right, now we've got — 



PRESIDENT: you've got Krogh, and you've got — 



DEAN: 



Now we've got Kalnbach. [Coughs] 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, that's a tough one. 



DEAN: 



Kalmbach received 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 

DEAN: at the close of the, of the, uh, '68 campaign, in January 

of '69, he got a million seven dollars, uh, a million 
seven hundred thousand dollars to be custodian for. That 
came down from New York. It was placed in safe deposit 
boxes here. Uh, some other people were on the boxes, and 
ultimately, the money was taken out to California. All 
right, there is knowledge of the fact that he did start with 
a million seven. Several people know this. Now since '69, 
he's spent a good deal of this money and, and, uh, accounting 
for it is going to be very difficult for Herb. For example, 
he's spent — oh — close to five hundred thousand dollars 
on private polling. Now that just opens up a whole new 



-42- 



(1032) 



67.1 TRANSCFIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

thing. It's not illegal, but, uh, it's more of the same 
sort of thing. 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 



I don't think that poses a hell of a problem, does it? 
No, I don't think so. Uh — 
Practically everybody does polling. 

That's right, uh, it's not, there's nothing criminal about 
it. It was private polled. It was. 

Nothing — 

uh, proper money. 

The law didn't, the law didn't [unintelligible] [coughs] 
polled all through the years. 

That's right. Uh, he sent four hundred thousand dollars, 
as he's described it to me, somewhere in the South for 
another candidate. I assume this was four hundred, uh, 
that went 

Wallace. 

to Wallace. Right. Uh, he has maintained, uh, a, a 
man who I only know by the name of "Tony," who is the 
fellow who did the, the Chappaquidick study and 

I heard about that. 

other, other odd jobs like that. Nothing illegal, 



-43- 



(1033) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: uh, but closer. Uh, I don't know of anything that Herb 

has done that is illegal, other than the fact that he doesn't 
want to blow the whistle on a lot of people, and may find 
himself in a perjury situation. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Well, if he, uh, he — could because he will 
be asked about that money? 

He will. What '11 happen is, when they call him up there — 
and he of course has no immunity, uh, they'll say, "How 
did you happen — how did you pay Mr. Segretti?" "Well, 
I had cash on hand." "Well, how much cash did you have on 
hand?" 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Right . 

Uh, where does he go from there? "Where did you get the 
cash?" 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 

A full series of questions. His bank records indicate he 
had cash on hand, because some of these were set up in 
trustee accounts. 



PRESIDENT: 



How 



would you handle him, then, John. For example, would 



-44- 



(1034) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M.. 
1-126 



you just have him put the whole thing out? 



DEAN: 



I Draws breath] 



PRESIDENT: I don't think so. I mean I don't mind the five hundred 

thousand dollars and I don't mind the four hundred thousand 
dollars 



DEAN: 



No , that , 



PRESIDENT: for activities [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



that, that, uh, that doesn't bother me either. There's 
— as I say. Herb's problems are 

There's a surplus — 



DEAN: 



politically embarrassing, but not as — not criminal. 



PRESIDENT: Well, they're embarrassing, sure — he, he just handled 
matters that were between the campaigns, before anything 
was done. There were surveys, et cetera, et cetera, 
et cetera, et cetera. There is no need to account for that. 
No law requires him to account for that. 

DEAN: Right. Uh, now — 

PRESIDENT: The source of the money, there's no illegality in 
having a surplus, is there, in cash after — ? 

DEAN: No, the money — It has always been argued by Stans 



-45- 

(1035) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M. 
1-126 



— came from pre-convention 



PRESIDENT: 



Pre-conventlon . 



DEAN: 



for the — and pre-primary for the, for the, uh. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



'68 race. 
That's right. 



DEAN: 



It was just set aside. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



Uh, that, that all can be explained. I think that the — 



PRESIDENT: 



All right. How do your other vulnerabilities go together? 



DEAN: 



The other vulnerabilities: We've got a, uh, runaway 
Grand Jury up in the Southern District. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. I heard. 



DEAN: 



They're after Mitchell and Stans on some sort of bribe 
or influence peddling 



PRESIDENT: 



On Vesco. 



DEAN: 



with Vesco. 



-46- 



(1036) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M.. 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Uh, they're also going to try to drag Ehrlichman into 
that. Apparently, Ehrlichman had some meetings with 
Vesco, also. Uh, Don Nixon, Jr., came in to see John 
a couple of times, uh, about the problem. 



PRESIDENT: 



Not about the complaint. 



DEAN: 



That, there's, uh — the fact of the matter is — 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligihle] about a job. 



DEAN: 



That's right. And, and, and, uh, I 



PRESIDENT: 



We're, is it — Ehrllchnan's totally to blame on that. 



DEAN: 



Yeah, well, I think the Wliite House — 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



No one has done anything for — 



PRESIDENT: 



Vesco. 'latter of — net for the prosecutor. 



DEAN: 



No. [Coughs] The, uh 



PRESIDENT: 



Would Ehrlichman, incidentally, have to appear there? 



DEAN: 



Before that Grand Jury? Yes. He could very well. 



-A7- 



(1037) 



35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 23 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A M 
1-126 ' 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh, we couldn't presume immunity there? 

Not really. Uh, criminal charge — 

Criminal charge — Yeah, well [unintelligible] charge 
[unintelligible]. Go ahead. 



DEAN: 



Right. That's a little different, [Clears throat] I 
think that would be dynamite to defend, uh. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



against that. 

Also, he, he distinguishes it. He says, "It's a 

criminal charge; I'll be glad to go up," Use the Flanigan 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Right, 
analogy . 



DEAN: 



Right, uh, [clears throat] well that's, that's pretty much 
the overall picture, and probably the most troublesome 
thing — well the Segretti thing. Let's get down to that. 
I think, Bob has indicated to me he told you a lot of, of 
it, that he. Indeed, did authorize it. He didn't authorize 
anything like ultimately evolved. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



-48- 



(1038) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M. 
1-126 ' 

DEAN: He was aware of it. He was aware that Chapin and Strachan 

were looking for somebody. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Again, this is one that, uh, it is potential that Dwight 
Cha — , Chapin could have a felony charge against him in 
this, because he's — 

Felony? 

Felony, because he has to, he has to disprove a negative. 
The negative is that he didn't control and direct Segretti. 

Would the felony be in perjury again? Or — 

Uh, no, the felony this in this instance being a potential 
use of the, one of the civil rights statutes, for anybody 
who interferes with a candidate for, uh, national office — 
no, in — , interferes with their campaign in any way. 

Why isn't that a civil rights statute used to pick up 
any of these clowns that were demonstrating against us, 
then? 



DEAN: 



Well, I have, I've, I've argued that they use that for that 
very purpose. Uh 



-49- 



(1039) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Really? 



DEAN: 



Yes, I have. And, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



We were, those were, uh, that was interfering with the 
campaign. 



DEAN: 



That's exactly right. Exactly right. But they — 



PRESIDENT: 



Segretti — But I think, uh, I'm not as concerned about 
that because it's so bad the way it's been put out 
on the PR side, then I think it will eventually end up 
on the PR side very confused. And it'll look bad 
when that's attributed, but I don't, I can't see the 
criminal thing, buT; I may be wrong. 



DEAN: 



Well here, what really, what really bothers me is that 
this, this growing situation. As I say, it is growing 
because of the, the continued need to provide support for 
the 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



Watergate people who are going to 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



hold us up for everything they've got. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



-50- 
(1040) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



and the need for some people to perjure themselves as 
they go dovm the road here. Uh, if this thing ever 
blows, and we're in a cover-up situation, I think it'd 
be extremely damaging to you, uh, and, uh, the, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



Uh 



PRESIDENT: 



The whole concept of Administration justice 



DEAN: 



That's right, uh 



PRESIDENT: 



We cannot have — 



DEAN: 



That's what really troubles me. For example, what 
happens if it starts breaking, and they do find a criminal 
case against a Haldeman, a Dean, a Mitchell, an Ehrlichman? 
Uh, that is — 



PRESIDENT: 



Well if it really comes down to that, we cannot, maybe 
We'd have to shed It in order to contain it again. 



DEAN: 



[Clears throat] That's right. I'm coming down to 
the, what I really think is that, that. Bob and John 
and John Mitchell and I should sit down and spend a 
day, or however long, to figure out (1) how this can 
be carved away from you, so it does not damage you 
or the Presidency. 'Cause it just can't. And 



-51- 



(1041) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11 -SS A M 

1-126 n.ii.. 



it's not something, it, you're not involved in it and 
it's something you shouldn't — 



PRESIDENT: 



That is true. 



DEAN: 



I know, sir, it is. Well I can just tell from our conver- 
sations that, you know, these are things that you have 
no knowledge of. 



PRESIDENT: 



The absurdity of the whole damned thing. 



DEAN: 



But it 



PRESIDENT: 



bugging and so on. Well, let me say I am keenly aware of 
the fact that, uh, Colson, et al., and so forth, were doing 
their best to get information and so forth and so on. But 
they all knew very well they were supposed to comply with 
the law. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 
No question. 



DEAN: 



Uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



[Unintelligible] you think — you feel that really 
the man, the trigger man was Colson on this then? 



DEAN: 



Well, no, he was one of s — , he was just in the chain. He 



-52- 



(1042) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 

1-126 

was, he helped push the thing. 



PRESIDENT: Called [unintelligible] and said, "We've got a, we've 

got a good plan.' I don't kno\<r what the Christ he would 
be doing. Oh, I'll bet vou. I know why. That was at the 
time of ITT. He was trying to get something going 
there because ITT, they were bugging us. I mean they were 



DEAN: 



Right . 



PRESIDENT: 



giving us hell. 



DEAN: 



Well, I know, I know he used, uh. 



PRESIDENT: 



Hunt to go out there': 



DEAN: 



Hunt. 



PRESIDENT: 



I knew about that. 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: 



I did know about it. Uh, I knew that there ^'as, there was 
something going on there. 



DEAN: 



Right . 



PRESIDENT: 



but I didn't know it x-ias Hunt. 



DEAN: 



Right. Uh, that's what re — , what really troubles me is, 
you know, (1) will this thing not break some day and 



-53- 
(1043) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197 Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: the whole thing — domino situation, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: you know, they just, I think if it starts crumbling, 

fingers will be pointing. And, 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

DEAN : uh , 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

DEAN: Bob will be accused of things he has never heard of 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: and then he'll have to disprove it, and it'll just get 

nasty and it'll be a 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: real, uh, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: real bad situation. And the person who will be hurt 

by it most will be you and 

PRESIDENT: Of course. 

DEAN: the Presidency, and I just don't think — 

PRESIDENT: First, because I am expected to know this, and I am 

supposed to, supposed to check these things. And so forth 



-54- 



(1044) 



DEAN: 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M 
1-126 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: and so on. But let's, let's, let's come back. Go further. 
Sure. Yes indeed. But what are your feelings, yourself, 
John? You know pretty well what they all say. liJhat are 
your feelings about the options? 



DEAN: 



I am not confident that, uh, we can ride through this. 
I think there are t — ^ I think there are soft spots. 



PRESIDENT: 



You used to feel comfortable. 



DEAN: 



Well, I feel, I felt, I felt comfortable for this reason, 
I've noticed of recent — since the publicity has increased 
on, on this thing again, with the Gray hearings, that 
everybody is now starting to watch out for their own behind. 
Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



Everyone's pulling in. They're getting their own counsel. 
More counsel are getting 



PRESIDENT: 



Right, 



DEAN: 



involved. 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



Uh, you know, "How do I protect my ass?" 



-55- 



(1045) 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 . 



Well, they're scared. 

They're scared and that's just, you know, that's bad. 
We were able to hold it for a long time. 

Yeah, I know. 



DEM: 



Uh, another thing is, you know, my facility now to deal 
with the multitude of people I have been dealing with 
has been hampered because of Gray's blowing me up into 
the front page. 



PRESIDENT: 



Your cover is broken. 



DEAN: That's right and it's with, it was — 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] cover. All right. Now. So on. So, so 

what you really come down to is, what in the hell, in the 
hell will you do? Let's, let us suppose that you and 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman and Mitchell say, uh, "We can't 
hold this." What, what then are you going to say? Are 
you going to put out a complete disclosure? Isn't that 
the best plan? 

DEAN: Well, one way to do it is to — 

PRESIDENT: That'd be my view on it. 



-56- 



(1046) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



One way to do it is for you to in — , tell the Attorney 
General that you finally, you know, really, this is the 
first time you are getting all the pieces together. Uh 



PRESIDENT: 



Ask for another grand jury? 



DEAN: 



Ask for another grand jury. The way it should be done 
though, is a way that — for example, I think that we 
could avoid, uh, criminal liability for countless people 
and the ones that did get it, it could be minimal. 



PRESIDENT: 



How? 



DEAN: 



Well, I think by just thinking it all through first as to 
how, you know, some people could be granted immunity, uh - 



PRESIDENT: 



Like Magruder? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. To come forward. Uh , but some people are going 
to have to go to jail. That's the long and short of it, 
also. 



PRESIDENT: 



Who? Let's talk about that. 



DEAN: 



All right. Uh, I think I could, for one. 



PRESIDENT: 



You go to jail? 



-57- 



(1047) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1972 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



Oh, hell no. I can't see how you can. But I — no. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, because — 

I can't see how, that — Let me say I can't see how a 
legal case could be made against you, J — , uh, John. 



DEAN: 



It'd be, it'd be tough but, you know, uh. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



I can see people pointing fingers, you know, to get it out 
of their own, put me in the impossible position, disproving 
too many negatives. 

Oh, no. Uh, let me say I — not because you 're here — But 
just looking at it from a cold legal standpoint: you are 
a lawyer, you were a counsel — you were doing what you 
were doing as a counsel, and you were not, uh. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



[Clears throat] 

doing anything like that. You mean — ^■Jhat would you go to 
jail on, [unintelligible]? 

The obstruct — , the obstruction of justice. 



PRESIDENT: 



The obstruction of justice? 



-58- 



(1048) 



67. J TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's the only one that bothers me. 

Well, I don't know. I think that one. I think that, 
I feel, could be cut off at the pass. Maybe the 
obstruction of justice — 

It could be a — you know how — one of the — that's, 
that's why — [sighs] 

Sometimes it's well to give them 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



[Sighs] 

something, and then they don't want the bigger fish 
then. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. I think that, uh, I think that with 
proper coordination with the Department of Justice, 
Henry Petersen is the only man I know bright enough and 
knowledgeable enough in the criminal laws and the process 
that could really tell us how this could be put together 
so it did the maximum to carve it away with a minimum 
damage to individuals involved, 

Petersen doesn't know 



DEAN: 



That's what I think. 



PRESIDENT: 



the whole storv? 



DEAN: 



No, I know he doesn't now. I know he doesn't now. I am 
talking about somebody who I have over the years grown to 

-59- 

(1049) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21^ 1973 MEETING .FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



have enough faith in. [Clears throat] It's possible 
that he'd have to, he'd have to, uh --. put him in a very 
difficult situation as the Head of the Criminal Division 
of the United States Department of Justice, and the oath 
of office — 



PRESIDENT: 



Tell me — Talking about your obstruction of justice 
role, I don't see it. I can't see it. You're — 



DEAN: 



Well, I've been a con — , I have been a conduit for infor- 
mation on, on taking care of people out there who are 
guilty of crimes. 



PRESIDENT: 



Oh, you mean like the uh , oh— the blackmail. 



DEAN: 



The blackmail. Right, 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, I wonder if that part of it can't be — I wonder 
if that doesn't — let me put it frankly: I wonder if 
that doesn't have to be continued? 



DEAN: 



[Clears throat] 



PRESIDENT: 



Let me put it this way: ^^^t us suppose that you get, 
you, you get the million bucks, and you get the proper 
way to handle it, and you could hold that side. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



-60- 



(1050) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



It would seem to me that would be worthwhile. 



DEAN: 



[Clears throat] 



PRESIDENT: 



Now we have 



DEAN: 



Well, that's, yeah that's — 



PRESIDENT: 



one problen: you've got a problen here. You have the 
problem of Hunt and, uh, his, uh, his clemency. 



DEAN: 



That's right. And you're going to have the clemency 
problem for the others. They all would expect to be out 
and that may put you in a position that's just 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 



DEAN: 



untenable at some point. You know, the Watergate Hearings 
just over. Hunt now demanding clemency or he is going to 
blew. And politically, it'd be impossible for, you 
know, you to do it. You know, after everybody — 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



I am not sure that you will ever be able to deliver on 
the clemency. It may be just too hot. 



-61- 



(1051) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



You can't do It till after the '74 electinr"?, 
that's for sure. But even tJ'en 

[Clears throat] 

your point is that even then you couldn't do it. 

That's right. It may further involve you in a way you 
shouldn't be involved in this. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



No it's wrong; that's for sure. 

Well, whatever — you know I — there 've been some bad 
judgments made. There 've been some necessary judgments 
made. Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



Before the election. 



DEAN: 



Before the election and, in a way, the necessary ones, you 
know, before the election. There — you know, we've, this 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, 



DEAN: 



— to me there was no way 



PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 



Yeah. 

that, uh — 

Yeah. 

But to burden this second Administration 



-62- 



(1052) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - V.:55 A.M., 
1-126 ■ 



PRESIDENT: 



We're all in on it. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



was something that — It's something that is not going to go 
away. 

No it isn't. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



It is not going to go away, sir. 

Not going to go away, it is — the idea that, uh, that, uh, 
well, that, uh, that people are going to get tired of it and 
all that sort of thing — 

Anything will spark it back into life. It's got to be, 
uh, it's got to be — 

Well, it's too much to the partisan interest of others 
to spark it back into life. 

And it seems to me the only way that — 

Who else, though? Let's, let's leave you and — I don't, 
I don't, I don't think on the, on, uh, on the obstruction 
of justice thing — I think that one we can handle. I, 
I don't know why I feel that way, but I — 

Well, it is possible that I — 

I, I think you may be overplaying, but who else, uh, 
who else, who else do you think has, uh — 



-63- 



(1053) 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 24 



DEAN: 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MRCH 21. 197 Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



Potential criminal liability? 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



I think Ehrlichman does. I think that, uh, — I think 



PRESIDENT: 



Wliy Ehrlichman? What'd he do? 



DEAN: 



Because this conspiracy to burglarize the, uh, uh, 
Ellsberg office. 



PRESIDENT: 



You mean — that, that is, provided Hunt breaks. 



DEAN: 



Well, uh, the, the funny — let me say something 
interesting about that. Within the files — 



PRESIDENT: 



Oh, I saw that. The picture. 



DEAN: 



Yeah, the picture. That, see, that's not all that 
buried. And, while we can, we've got — I think we've got 
it buried, there is no telling when it's going to pop 
up. Uh, the Cubans, uh, could start this whole thing. Uh, 
when the Ervin Committee starts running down why this 
mysterious telephone was here at the liHiite House, uh, listed 
in the name of a secretary — one of these, some of these 
secretaries have a little idea about this, and they can be 
broken down just 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



-64- 



(1054) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 ____^ 



DEAN: 



so fast. That's another thing I missed, missed in the 
cycle — in the circle. Uh, Liddy's secretary, for example, 
is knowledgeable. Magruder's secretary is knowledgeable. 



PRESIDENT: 



Sure. 



DEAN: 



Uh ~ 



PRESIDENT: 



So Ehrlichman on the, uh 



DEAN: 



But what I am coming to you today with is: I don't have 
a plan of how to solve it right now, but I think it's at 
the juncture that we should begin to think in terms of, 
of how to cut the losses; how to minimize the further 
growth of this thing, rather than further compound it by, 
you know, ultimately paying these guys forever. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



I think we've got to look 



PRESIDENT: But at the moment, don't you agree that you'd better get 
the Hunt thing? I mean, that's worth it, at the moment. 



DEAN: 



That, that's worth buying time on, right, 



-65- 



(1055) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



And that's buying time on, I agree. 



DEAN: 



Uh, the, the Grand Jury is going to reconvene next week 
after Sirica sentences. Uh, bat that's why I think that, 
you know, that — John and Bob have met with me. They've 
never met with Mitchell on this. We've never had a real 
down and out with everybody that, uh, has the most to 
lose. And the most — and it is the most danger for you 
to have them have criminal liability. I think Bob has a 
potential criminal liability, frankly. I think — in 
other words, a lot of these people could be indicted. 
They might never. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah . 



DEAN: 



Lght never, uh, be convicted; but just the thought of 



PRESIDENT: 



Suppose 



DEAN: 



indictments 



PRESIDENT: 



Suppose that they are indicted in this. Suppose — 



DEAN: 



I think that would be devastating. 



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PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Suppose the worst — that Bob is Indicted and Ehrlichman 
is indicted. And I must say, maybe we just better then 
try to tough it through. You get my point. 

That's right. That — 

If, if, if, for example, our.uh, our — say, well, let's 
cut our losses and you say we're going to go down the 
road, see if we can cut our losses, and no more black- 
mail and all the rest, and the thing blows and they 
indict Bob and the rest. Jesus, you'd never recover from 
that , John . 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 

It's better to fight it out instead. You see, that's the 
other thing, the other thing. It's better just to fight 
it out, and not let people testify, so forth and so on. 
Now, on the other hand, we realize that we have these 
weaknesses — that, uh, we, we've got this weakness in 
terms of — blackmail. 



DEAN: 



It's — what — if we, you know, there, there are two routes, 
you know: One is to figure out how to cut the losses and, and, 
and minimize the, the human impact and get you up and out 



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and away from it, in any way, uh, in, in a way that 

would never come back to haunt you. Uh , that is one, 

one general alternative. The other is to go down the 

road, just hunker down, fight it at every corner, every 

turn, uh, don't let people testify, cover it up 
is what we're really talking about. Just keep 

it buried, and just hope that we can do it, hope that we 

make good decisions at the right time, and keep our heads 

cool, uh, we make the right moves, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



And just take the heat. 



DEAN: And just take the heat. 

PRESIDENT: Now, with the second line of attack. You discussed this 
though I do want you to still consider my scheme of 
having — , you brief the Cabinet, just in very general 
terms, and the leaders — very general terms — and maybe 
some, some very general statement with regard to my 
investigation. Answer questions, and to, and to basically 
on the question of what they told you, not what you know. 



DEAN: 



Right. 



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PRESIDENT: 



Haldeman is not involved. Ehrlichman — 



DEAN: 



Oh, I can — you know — if, if we go that route, sir, 
I can, I can give a show that, you know, there's, uh, 
we can sell, you know, just about like we were selling 
Wheaties on our position. There's no — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEM: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



The problem that you have are these, uh, mine fields down 
the road. I think the most difficult problem is the, are 
the, are the, are the guys that are going to jail. I 
think you're right about that. I agree. Now. And also 
the fact that we're not going to be able to give them 
clemency. 

That's right. How long will they take — How long will 
they sit there? I don't know. We don't know what they 
will be sentenced to. There's always a chance — 

Thirty years, isn't it? Maximum? 

It could be. You know, they haven't announced yet, but 
it, uh — 

Isn't that what the potential is? 

Uh, it's even higher than that. It's about fifty years, 
with all the — 



PRESIDENT: 



So ridiculous. 



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DEAN: 



Oh. Well, you know, what's so incredible is, the, 
these fellows who, who sh — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



People break, and enter, and so forth, and get two years. 

Well, the other thing — 

No, no weapons. No results. What the hell are they 
talking about? 

The, the individuals who are charged with shooting John 
Stennis are on the street. They were given, you know, 
uh, one was put out on his personal recognizance rather 
than bond. They've got these fellows all stuck with 
hundred thousand dollar bonds. The same judge — Sirica 
let one guy, who, who's [laughs] charged with shooting 
a United States Senator, out on the street. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Sirica did? 

Yeah. It's just, it's phenomenal. 

What is the matter with him? I thought he was a hard- 
liner judge. 

He's a, he is just a, a peculiar animal, and, uh, he set, 
set the bond for one of the others — I don't have all 



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the facts, but he set the bond for one of the others — 
somewhere around fifty or sixty thousand dollars. But 
still, that guy is in, but — didn't make bond — but, 
you know, sixty thousand dollars as opposed to a hundred 
thousand dollars for these guys is phenomenal. 

PRESIDENT: When could you have this meeting with these fellows, as 
I think that time is of the essence, in my opinion. 



DEAN: 



[Clears throat] 



PRESIDENT: 



Could you do it this afternoon? 



DEAN: 



Well, Mitchell isn't here, and — 



PRESIDENT: 



Tomorrow? 



DEAN; 



It might be, might be worth it to have him come down. 
And, now, I think that Bob and John did not want to 
talk to, to John about this, John Mitchell. And I don't 
believe they've had any conversations with him about it. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, let me get Haldeman in here now. 



DEAN: 



Bob and I have talked about just what we're talkine about 
this morning. I told htm I thought that you should have 
the facts, and he agrees. 'Cause we've got some tough 
calls down the road if we — 



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PRESIDENT: Let me say, though that Hunt [unintelligible] hard 

line, and that a convicted felon is going to go out and 
squeal about this [unintelligible] decision [unintelligible] 
turns on that. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, we can always, you know, on the other side, we 
can always charge them with blackmailing us, and it's, 
you know, this is absurd stuff they're saying, and — 

That's right. You see, even the way you put it out here, of 
course if it all came out, it may never, it may not 
never, never get there. 



[Haldeman enters the room.] 

PRESIDENT: I was talking to John about this, uh, this whole situa- 

tion, and I think we, uh , so that we can get away from 
the bits and pieces that have broken out. He is right 
in having — in, in, uh, recommending that, that, uh, that 
there be a meeting at the very first possible time. 
Ehrlichman, and now Ehrlichman's gone on to California but, 
uh, is today, uh — is tomorrow Thursday? 

HALDEMAN: Uh, he — John doesn't go until Friday. 



DEAN; 



Friday — 



PRESIDENT: Well, in any event, could we do it Thursday? This meeting? 
This meeting — you can't do it today, can you? 



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DEAN: 



I don't think so. I was suggesting a meeting with 
Mitchell — 



PRESIDENT: Mitchell, Ehrlichman, yourself and Bob, that's all. 
Now, Mitchell has to be there because, uh, uh, he is 
seriously involved and, uh, we're trying to keep, uh, 
we've got to see how we, uh, how we handle it from 
here on. We are in the process of having to determine 
which way to go and, uh, John has thought it through 
as well as he can. I do, I don't want Moore there on this 
occasion. 



DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: You haven't told Moore all of this, have you? 



DEAN: 



Moore's got, uh, by being with me, has more bits and 
pieces. I've had to give him 



PRESIDENT: Right. 



DEAN: 



because he is making 



PRESIDENT: Right. 



DEAN: 



judgments that, uh — 



PRESIDENT: Well, the point is, once you get down to the PR, once 

you decide what you're going to do, then we can let him 

-73- 



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know, and so forth and so on. But it is the kind of 
thing — I think what really has to happen is for you 
to sit down with those three and for you to tell them 
exactly what you told me. 



DEAN; 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: It may take him about thirty-five or forty-five minutes. 
In other words he knows, John, uh, uh , knows about 
everything and also what all the, uh , what all the 
potential criminal liabilities are, you know, whether 
it's uh — what's it like that thing — what about, uh , 
obstruction — 

DEAN: Obstruction of justice. Right. 

PRESIDENT: So forth and so on. And, uh , the, uh — I think, 
I think that's — Then we've got to, uh, see what 
the line is. Whether the line is one of, uh , continuing 
to, uh, run a, try to run a total stonewall, and take 
the heat from that, uh, having in mind the fact that, uh, 
there are vulnerable points there; the vulnerable 
points being, that, well, the first vulnerable points 
would be obvious: Iti other words, it would be if, 
uh, uh, one of the,uh, defendants, particularly Hunt, 
of course, who is the most vulnerable in my opinion, 
might, uh, blow the whistle, and he, he — and his price 
is pretty high, but at least, uh, we should, we should 

-74- 



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buy the time on that, uh, as I, as I pointed out to John. 

Apparently — Who, who is dealing with Hunt at the moment 

now that Colson's [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Well, uh, Mitchell's lawyer and, uh. 



PRESIDENT: Colson's lawyer [unintelligible] 

DEAN: Colson's lawyer, both. 

PRESIDENT: familiar with him. Hunt has at least got to know 
before he is sentenced, that he's — 



HALDEMAN: Who's Colson's lawyer? [Characterization deleted] in his 
law firm? 

DEAN: Shapiro. Right. Who lied to the, you know, who just -- 

The other day he came up and — 

HALDEMAN: Colson's told him everything, hasn't he? 

DEAN: Yup, I gather he has. Uh, the other thing that bothered 

me about that is that he's, uh, a chatter. He came up to 

Fred Fielding, of my office, at Colson's going away party. 

I didn't go over there. It was over at the Blair House the 

other night. And he said to, uh, Fred, he said, "Well, 

Chuck has had some mighty serious words with, uh, his, his 

friend Howard and had some mighty serious messages back." 

Now, you know, what's a lawyer — how does he know what 

Fielding knows? 'Cause Fielding knows virtually nothing. 
[Laughs] 
PRESIDENT: Well, anyway. 

HALDEMAN: That's, that's where your dangers lie, is in all these stupid 



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PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



human errors developing. 
That's very — 
That's — that ~ 

Well, the point is Bob, let's face it, the secretaries know; 
the assistants know. There's a lot of the, many of the damn 
principals may be hard as a rock, but you never know when 
they're going to crack. But, so, we'll see, we'll see. First 
you've got the Hunt problem. That ought to be handled. 

Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



HALDEMAN: 



Uh, incidentally, I do not think Colson should sit in this 
meeting. Do you agree? 

No. I would agree. 

Okay. Uh, how then — Who does sit and talk to Colson? 
Because somebody has to, shouldn't we talk to — ? 

Chuck, uh — 

— talks too much. 

[Sighs] I, I, you know, I like Chuck, [laughs] but, uh, 

I don't want Chuck to know anything that I'm doing, frankly. 

[Laughs] 

All right. 

I think that's right. I, I think you want to be careful 



-76- 



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not to give Chuck any more knowledge than he's already got. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT : 



Sure. Well — 



DEAN: 



I wouldn't want Chuck to even know of the meeting, frankly. 



PRESIDENT: Fortunately, fortunately, with Chuck it is very — 1,1 
talk to him about many, many political things, but I 
never talk about this sort of thing 'cause he's, uh, he's 
very harmful. I mean I don't think — he must be damn 
sure I don't know anything. And I don't. In fact, I'm 
rather surprised at what you told me today. From what 
you said, I gathered the impression, and of course your, 
your, your analysis does not for sure, uh, indicate that 
Chuck knew that it was a bugging operation for certain. 



DEAN: 



That's correct. I don't have — 



PRESIDENT: 



On the other hand, on the other hand that. 



DEAN: 



Chuck, Chuck denies that — 



PRESIDENT: On the other hand, the other side of that is that Hunt 

had conversations with Chuck, and it may be that Hunt told 
Chuck that it was bugging, and so forth and so on. 



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DEAN: Uh huh. 
PRESIDENT: Is that correct? 

DEAN: Uh huh. They were very close. They, they talked too much, 

uh, about too many things. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: They were intimate on this sort of — [coughs] 

HALDEMAN: Well then Chuck ~ 

PRESIDENT: There's another thing you can't — 

HALDEMAN: Chuch has a problem. Chuck loves, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: he loves what he does. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: He likes to talk about it. 

PRESIDENT; He also is a name dropper. Chuck might have gone around and 

talked to Hunt and said, "Well, I was talking to the President, 
and the President feels we ought to get information about this, 
or that or the other thing," and so forth, and so on. 

DEAN: Well, Liddy is the same way, and — 

PRESIDENT: I have talked to, I have talked to — this and that and the 
other thing. I, I have never talked to anybody, but I have 

talked to Chuck and John and the rest and I am sure that Chuck may 
have. Chuck might have even talked to Hunt along those lines. 

HALDEMAN: I would — Well, anything could happen. I would doubt that. 



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DEAN: 



I would doubt that too. 



HALDEMAN: I don't think he would. Uh , Chuck is a name dropper in 
one sense, but not in that sense. 

PRESIDENT: Well, then do you think — 



HALDEMAN: 



I think he very carefully keeps the President out of things 



PRESIDENT: Right. 

HALDEMAN: except when he's doing it, when he's very intentionally 

bringing the President in for, for the President's purposes. 

PRESIDENT: He had the impression though, apparently, that he, he was the, 
as it turns out, really is the trigger man. Uh, may of 

damn well have been the trigger man where he just called up 
and said, "Now look here Jeb , go ahead and get that informa- 
tion." And [unintelligible] got to be a decision on it at 
that time. This is February. 



DEAN: 



Yes, sir, I figure it was somewhere 



PRESIDENT: It must be the — I — it must have been after — 

DEAN: This was the call to Magruder from Colscn saying, "Fish or 

cut bait." Hunt and Liddy were in his office. 

HALDEMAN: In Colson's office? 

DEAN: In Colson's office. And he called Magruder and said, "Let's 



-79- 
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35-905 (Pt, 2) O - 74 - 25 



67.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 2973 MEETING FROM 20:22 - 21:55 A.M., 
1-126 

fish or cut bait on this operation. Let's get it 
going." 

HALDEMAN: Oh, really? 

DEAN: Yeah. This is — Magruder tells me this. 

HALDEMAN: Of course. That — 

PRESIDENT: Well on the other hand — 

HALDEMAN: Now wait, Magruder testified [unintelligible] 

[Several voices] : [Unintelligible] 

DEAN: Chuck, Chuck also told me that, uh. Hunt and Liddy were in 

his office and he made a call. 

HALDEMAN: Oh, okay. 

DEAN: So it did, it was corroborated [laughs] by the, the 

principal. 

HALDEMAN: Hunt and Liddy haven't told you that, though? 

DEAN : No . 

HALDEMAN: You haven't talked to Hunt and Liddy? 

DEAN: I talked to Liddy once, right after the incident. 

PRESIDENT: That's right, but not ~ all right. The point is, the 

point is this, that, uh, it's now time, though, to, uh , that 
Mitchell has got to sit down, and know where the hell all this 



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DEAN: 



thing stands, too. You see, John is concerned, as you 
know. Bob, about, uh, Ehrlichman, which, uh , worries me 
a great deal because it's a, uh, it — and it, and this is 
why the Hunt problem is so serious, uh , because, uh , it 
had nothing to do with the campaign. 

Right , it, uh — 



PRESIDENT: Properly, it has to do with the Ellsberg thing. I don't 
know what the hell, uh — 

HALDEMAN: But why — 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Why — I don't know. 



HALDEMAN ; 



What I was going to say is — 



PRESIDENT: What is the answer on that? How do you keep that out? I 
don't know. Well, we can't keep it out if Hunt — if — 
You see the point is, it is irrelevant. Once it has gotten 
to this point — 



DEAN: 



You might, you might put it on a national security ground, 
basis, which it really, it was. 



HALDEMAN : 



It absolutely was. 



DEAN: 



And just say that, uh. 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



that this is not, you know, this was — 



PRESIDENT: 



Not paid with CIA funds. 



DEAN: 



Uh — 



PRESIDENT: No, seriously. National security. We had to get 
information for national security grounds. 



DEAN: 



Well, then the question is, why didn't the CIA do it 
or why didn't the FBI do it? 



PRESIDENT: Because they were — We had to do it, we had to do it on 
a confidential basis. 



HALDEMAN; 



Because we were checking them. 



PRESIDENT: 



Neither could be trusted. 



HALDEMAN: 



Well, I think 



PRESIDENT: 



That's the way I view it. 



HALDEMAN: that has never been proven. There was reason to question 
their 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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HALDEMAN : 



posxtion; 



PRESIDENT: You see really, with the Bundy thing and everything 
coming out, the whole thing was national security. 

DEAN: I think we can probably get, get by on that. 

PRESIDENT: I think on that one, I think you'd simply say this was a 
national security investigation that was conducted. And 
the same with the drug field, with Krogh. Krogh could say I — 
if Krogh were to — if [unintelligible] feels that he 
[unintelligible], it was a national security matter. That's why 

DEAN: That's the way Bud rests easy, because he's, he's, he's 

convinced that he was doing it — he said there was treason 
about the country, 

PRESIDENT: Uh huh. 



DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



and it could have threatened the way the war was handled. 



Yeah. 



DEAN: Uh, and by God — 

HALDEMAN: Bud, Bud said this? 

DEAN: Yes. 

PRESIDENT: Well, Bud could say that and say this, it does involve — 

It was a national security — and I was not in a position to 
divulge it. Well, anyway, let's don't go beyond that. We're 



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forget — but I do think now we, uh , I mean, there 
is, there is a time, now, when you don't want to talk to 
Mitchell. He doesn't want to talk, and the rest. But 
John is right. There must be a, must be a four way talk 
here of the particular ones that we can trust here. Uh, 
we've got to get a decision on it. It's not something 
that — you see you got two ways, basically. There are 
really only two ways you could go. You either decide the 
whole God damned thing is so full of problems with poten- 
tial criminal liability which is what concerns me. I 
don't give a damn about the publicity. We could, we could 
rock that through, if we had to let the whole thing hang 
out. It would be a lousy story for a month. But I can take 
it. But the point is, I don't want any criminal liability. 
That's the thing that I am concerned about for members of 
the White House staff, and I would trust for members of 
the Committee. And that means Magruder. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Let's face it: he's the one that's, uh — I think Magruder 
is the major guy over there. 



DEAN: 



I think he's got the most serious problem. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



-84- 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-56 A M 
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HALDEMAN: Well, then we talked about yesterday, you've got a, you 
got a question where your cut off point is. There is a 
possibility of cutting it at Liddy, where you are now. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: 



But to accomplish that requires 



PRESIDENT: Requires what? 



HALDEMAN: 



Requires continued perjury by Magruder. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. And it requires total 



DEAN: 



— commitment — 



PRESIDENT: control, got total, got total control over all of the 
defendants, which — in other words [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



The basic position — 



HALDEMAN: 



They don't know anything beyond Liddy. 



DEAN: 



Uh, no. Other than the fact, other than the fact that 
Liddy, they have hearsay, uh — 



HALDEMAN: But we don't know about Hunt. Maybe Hunt has it tied in 
to Colson. We don't know that, though, really. 



-85- 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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DEAN: 



No. 



PRESIDENT: I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more. 



DEAN: 



Yeah , I do too . And , now what McCord — 



HALDEMAN: You think he does? I am afraid you're right, but, uh, 
we don ' t know that . 

PRESIDENT: I don't think — [laughs] I think we bettwe assume it. 
I think Colson — 



DEAN: 



And he's playing hard ball, and he wouldn't play hard — 



HALDEMAN: 



Is he? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. He wouldn't play hard ball unless he were pretty 
confident that he could cause an awful lot of grief. 



HALDEMAN: 



Really? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: He is playing hard boiled ball with regard to Ehrlichman, 
for example, and that sort of thing. He knows what he's 
got. 



HALDEMAN: 



What's he planning on, money? 



DEAN: 



Yeah, money and 



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(1076) 



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HALDEMAN: 



Really? 



DEAN: 



Oh , yeah . He ' s uh — 



PRESIDENT: It's a hundred and twenty thousand dollars. It's about 
what, about how much, which is easy. I mean, it's not 
easy to deliver, but it is easy to get. Uh, now, uh [nine 
seconds of silence]. If that, if what, if that, if that is the 
case, if it's just that way, then the thing to do is, if, if, 
the thing all, uh, cracks out — if, if for, if, for example, 
you say look we're not, we're not going to continue to try 
to — let's state it frankly, cut our losses — that's just 
one way you could go — on the assumption that we're, we, 
by continuing to cut our losses, we're not going to win. 
That in the end, we are going to be bled to death, and it's 
all going to come out an5rway, and then you get the worst of 
both worlds. We are going to lose, and people are going 
to — 



HALDEMAN: 



And look [unintelligible] 



PRESIDENT: And we're going to look like we covered up. So that we 

can't do. Now. The other, the other, uh, the other line, 
however, uh, if you, if you take that line, that we're not 
going to continue to cut our losses, that means then we have 



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to look square in the eye as to what the hell those losses 
are, and see which people can — so we can avoid criminal 
liability. Right? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: And that means, we got to, we've got to keep it off of you, 
uh, which I, which I [unintelligible] obstruction of 
justice thing. We've got to keep it off Ehrlichman. We've 
got to keep it, naturally, off of Bob, off Chapin, if pos- 
sible, and Strachan. Right? 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: 



And Mitchell. Right? 



DEAN: 



Uh huh . 



PRESIDENT: 



Now, 



HALDEMAN: And Magruder, if you can. But that's the one you pretty 
much have to give up . 

PRESIDENT: But, but Magruder, Magruder, uh, uh, John's, Dean's point 
is that if' 'Magruder goes down, he'll pull everybody with 
him. 



HALDEMAN: 



That's my view. 



PRE,SIDENT: 



Is it? 



HALDEMAN: Yup. I think Jeb, I don't think he wants to. And I think 

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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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he even would try not to, but I don't think he is able 
not to. 



DEAN: 



I don't think he is strong enough, when it really — 



HALDEMAN: 



Well, not that", not that — 



PRESIDENT: Well, another way, another way to do it then. Bob, is to — 

and John realizes this — is to, uh, continue to try to cut our 
losses. Now we have to look at that course of action. First, 
it is going to require approximately a million dollars to take 
care of the jackasses that are in jail. That could be, that 
could be arranged. 



HALDEMAN or 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 

That could be arranged. But you realize that after we are 
gone, I mean, assuming these [unintelligible] are gone, they're 
going to crack, you know what I mean? And that'll be a un- 
seemly story. Eventually, all the people aren't going to care 
that much. 



DEAN: 



That's right. It's — 



PRESIDENT: 



People aren't going to care. 



DEAN: 



So much history will pass between then and now. 



PRESIDENT: In other words, what we're talking about is no question. But 

the second thing is, we're not going to be able to deliver on, on 

any kind of a, of a clemency thing. You know Colson has gone 

around on this clemency thing with Hunt and the rest. 

-89- 

(1079) 



DEAN: 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



Hunt, Hunt is now talking in terms of being out by 
Christmas. 



HALDEMAN: This year? 

DEAN: This year. Uh, he was told by O'Brien, who is my conveyor 

of doom back and forth. 



HALDEMAN: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



uh, that, uh, hell, he'd be lucky if he were out a year from 
now, after the Ervin hearings were, uh, you know, over. He 
said, "How in the Lord's name could you be commuted that 
quickly?" He said, "Well, that's my commitment from Colson." 

By Christmas of this year? 



DEAN: 



Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: See that, that really, that's very believable 'cause 
Colson, 

PRESIDENT: Do you think Colson could have told him — 

HALDEMAN: Corson is an, is an — that's, that's your fatal flaw, really, 
in Chuck, is he is an operator in expediency, and he will 
pay at the time and where he is 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



whatever he has to, to accomplish what he's there to do. 



Right, 



-90- 
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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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HALDEMAN: And that's — I, I would believe that he has made that 
commitment if Hunt says he has. I would believe he is 
capable of saying that. 

PRESIDENT: The only thing you could do with him would be to 

parole him for a period of time because of his family 
situation. But you couldn't provide clemency. 



DEAN: 



No, I — Uh, Kleindienst has now got control of the parole 
board, and he said that now we can, we can pull paroles off 
now where we couldn't before. So — 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, parole — 



HALDEMAN: Yeah, but Kleindienst always tells you that, and then never 
delivers . 

PRESIDENT: Parole, parole. 

DEAN: Well, I mean — 

PRESIDENT: Let's, let's talk candidly about that. Parole [unintelligible] 
in human terms, and so forth, is something that I think in 
Hunt's case, you could do Hunt, but you couldn't do the 
others. You understand? 



DEAN: 



Well, so much depends upon how Sirica sentences. He can 
sor — , sentence, sentence in a way that, uh, makes parole 
even impossible. 



-91- 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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PRESIDENT: 



Oh, he can? 



DEAN: 



Sure. He can do all kinds of permanent sentences. 



PRESIDENT: 



On this kind of thing? 



DEAN: Yeah. He can be a, just a son-of-a-bitch, uh, as far 
as the whole thing. 

HALDEMAN: Of course, can't you appeal on a, on an unjust sentence as 
well as on an unjust conviction? 



DEAN: 



You've got sixty days to ask the judge to review it. There 
is no appellate review of sentences. 



HALDEMAN: 



There isn't? 



DEAN: 



Not that I — 



PRESIDENT: 



The judge can review it, yeah. 



HALDEMAN: 



Only the sentencing judge can review 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: 



his own sentence? 



PRESIDENT: Coming back, though, to this. So you got that — the, uh, 
hanging over. Now. If, uh — you, you see, if you let it 
hang there, the point is you could let all or only part — 
The point is, your feeling is that we just can't continue to. 



-92- 
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67.1 TEANSCHIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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to pay the blackmail of these guys? 



DEAN: 



I think that's our greatest jeopardy. 



HALDEMAN : Yeah . 



PRESIDENT: 



Now, let me tell you, it's 



DEAN: 



'Cause that is — 



PRESIDENT: no problem, we could, we could get the money. There is 
no problem in that. We can't provide the clemency. The 
money can be provided. Mitchell could provide the way to 
deliver it. That could be done. See what I mean? 



HALDEMAN: 



But, Mitchell says he can't, doesn't he? 



DEAN: 



Mitchell says that, uh — Well, Mitch — , that's, it's, you 
know, there has been an interesting thing, uh, phenomena 
all the way along on this, is that there have been a lot 
of people having to pull oars and not everybody pulls them 
all the same time, the same way, because there develop 
self-interests. 



HALDEMAN: What John is saying is that everybody smiles at Dean and 
says, "Well, you better get something done about it." 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT : 



[Unintelligible] 



HALDEMAN: And Mitch — , Mitchell is leaving Dean hanging out on a — None 

-93- 
(1083) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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of us, well, maybe we're doing the same thing to you. 



DEM: 



That's right. 



HALDEMAN: But I — let me say that, that I don't see how there's 

any way that you can have the I'fhite House, or anybody pre- 
sently in the I'Thite House, involved in trying to gin out 
this money. 

DEAN: We are already deeply enough in that. That's the problem. 

Bob. 

■e 

PRESIDENT: I thought you said you could handle the money? 



DEAN: 



Well, in fact, that, uh, when — 



PRESIDENT: Kalmbach? 



DEAA^: 



Well, Kalmbach, uh, was a — 



HALDEMAN: He's not the one. 

DEAN: No, but when they ran out of that money, as you know, they 
came after the three-fifty that was over here. 

PRESIDENT: And they used that, right? 

DEAN: And I had to explain what it was [laughs] for, uh, before 
I could get the money. 

PRESIDENT: Well, you said ~ 



-94- 



(1084) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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DEAN: 



Now, they — now, that — they — 



HALDEMAN: That was put, that was, that was — in the first place, 
that was put back to LaRue 



DEAN: 



That's right, 



HALDEMAN: where it belonged. It wasn't all returned in a lump sum. 
It was put back in pieces. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



And then LaRue used it for this other purpose? 



DEAN: 



That's right, 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, I think they can get that. 



HALDEMAN: 



And the balance was all returned to LaRue. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



HALDEMAN: The problem is we don't have any receipt for that, do we. 
We have no way of proving that. 

PRESIDENT: I [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



And I think, I think that was because, you know, of self- 
interest over there. Mitchell would — 



HALDEMAN: 



Mitchell told LaRue not to take it at all. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



-95- 
(1085) 



35-905 (PI, 2) O - 74 - 26 



e?.! TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A M 
1-126 ' '' 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: This is what you told me. 



That's right. And then you don't give them a receipt. 



PRESIDENT: Well, then, but what happened? LaRue took it, and then 
what? 



DEAN: 



Well, it was sent back to him because we just couldn't con- 
tinue piecemeal giving, you loiow, I ask it — Everytime I 
asked for it I had to tell Bob I needed some, or something 
like that. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: and he had to get Gordon Strachan to go up to his safe and take 
it out and take it over to LaRue. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



This was just a forever operation. 



PRESIDENT: Then what — Why didn't they take it all to him? 



DEAN: 



I think it's sent over with him. 



HALDEMAN: Well, we had been trying to get a way to get that money back 
out of here anyway. 

PRESIDENT: Sure, 

IIAJjDEMAN: And what this was supposed to be was loans. This was 



-96- 
(1086) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 20:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



HALDEMAN: immediate cash needs that was going to be re — , replenished. 
And Mitchell was arguing "You can't take the three-fifty 
back till it's all replenished." Isn't that right? 



DEAN: 



That's right. Well, uh, you know, we 



HALDEMAN: And then they never replenished it, so we just gave it all 
back anyway. 

PRESIDENT: I have a feeling we could handle this one. Well — 

DEAN: Well, first of all, they'd have a hell of a time proving 

it. Uh, that's one thing. Uh — 

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah — I just have a feeling on it. But let's now 

come back to the money, a million dollars, and so forth and 
so on. Let me say that I think you could get that in 
cash, and I know money is hard, but, there are ways. That 
could be [unintelligible]. But the point is, uh, what would 
you do on that — Let's, let's look at the hard facts. 



DEAN: 



I mean, that's been very interesting. That has been, thus 
far, the most difficult problem. 



PRESIDENT: Why? 



DEAN: They have been — That's why these fellows have been on or 



-97- 



(1087) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

off the reservation all the way along. 

PRESIDENT: So the hard place is this. Your, your feeling at the pre- 
sent time is the hell with the million dollars. In other 
words, you say to these fellows, "I am sorry, it is all off," 
and let them talk. Right? 



DEAN: 



Well — 



PRESIDENT: 



That, that's the way to do it, isn't it? 



DEAN: 



That — 



PRESIDENT: 



If you want to do it clean, [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



Then what — 



PRESIDENT: 



come out . 



HALDEMAN: See, then when you do it, it's a way you can live with. Be- 
cause the problem with the blackmail, and that's the thing we 
kept raising with you when you said there's a money problem, 
when we need twenty thousand or a hundred thousand or some- 
thing, was yeah, that's what you need today. But what do 
you need tomorrow and next year and five years from now? 



PRESIDENT: 



How long? 



DEAN: 



Well, that was just to get us through November seventh thouph. 



-98- 



(1088) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



I recognize that's what we had to give 



Right . 



HALDEMAN: to November seventh. There's no question. 



DEAN: 



Except they could have sold — these fellows could have 
sold out to the Democrats for a fantastic amount. 



PRESIDENT: 



HALDEMAN: 



Yeah, these fellows — But of course you know, these 
fellows though, as far as that plan was concerned. 

But what is there? 



PRESIDENT: As far as what happened up to this time, our cover there is 

just going to be the Cuban Committee did this for them up through 
the election. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT; 



DEAN: 



Well, yeah. We can put that together. That isn't, of 
course, quite the way it happened, but, uh — 

I know, but it's the way it's going to have to happen. 

It's going to have to happen. [Laughs] 

That's right. Finally, though, so you let it go. So what 
happens is then they go out and, uh, and they'll start 
blowing the whistle on everybody else. Isn't that what 
it really gets down to? 

Uh huh. 



-99- 



(1089) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING PROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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PRESIDENT: 



So that, that would be the, the clean way. Right? 



DEAN: 



Uh — 



PRESIDENT: Is that really you're — you, you really go so far as to 
reccmmend that? 



DEAN: 



That — No, I wouldn't. I don't think, I don't think 
necessarily that's the cleanest way. One of the — I think 
that's what we all need to discuss: is there some way that 
we can get our story before a grand jury, and, so that they 
can have, have really investigated the White House on this, 
I mean, and I must, I must be perfectly honest, I haven't 
really thought through that alternative. We've been, you 
know, been so busy 



PRESIDENT: 



John , 



DEAN: 



on the other containment situation. 



PRESIDENT: John Ehrlichman, of course, has raised the point of another 
grand jury. I just don't know how you're going to do it. 
On what basis. I, I could call for it, but I — 

DEAN: That would be, I would think, uh — 

PRESIDENT: The President takes the leadership, and says "Now, in view 

of all this, uh, stripped land and so forth, I understand this, 



-100- 



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67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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but I, I think I want another grand jury proceeding and, 
and we'll have the White House appear before them." Is 
that right John? 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: That's the point, you see. That would make the difference. 
I want everybody in the White House called. And that, that 
gives you the, a reason not to have to go up before the 
[unintelligible] Committee. It puts it in a, in an 
executive session, in a sense. 

HALDEMAN: Right. 

PRESIDENT: Right. 



DEAN: 



Uh, well — 



HALDEMAN: 



And there 'd be some rules of evidence, aren't there? 



DEAN: 



There are rules of evidence. 



PRESIDENT: Both evidence and you have lawyers. 

HALDEMAN: So you are in a hell of a lot better position than you 
are up there. 



DEAN: 



No, you can't have a lawyer before a grand jury. 



PRESIDENT: Oh, no. That's right. 



DEAN: 



You can't have a lawyer before a grand jury. 



-101- 



(1091) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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HALDEMAN: O.K., but you, but you, you do have rules of evidence. 
You can refuse to, to talk. 



DEAN: 



You can take the Fifth Amendment, 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. That's right. 



HALDEMAN: 



You can say you forgot, too, can't you? 



DEAN: 



Sure, 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



But you can't — you're — very high risk in perjury 
situation. 



PRESIDENT: 



That's right. Just be damned sure you say I don't 



HALDEMAN: 



Yeah — 



PRESIDENT: remember; I can't recall, I can't give any honest, 

an answer to that that I can recall. But that's it. 



HALDEMAN: 



You have the same perjury thing on the Hill, don't you? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Oh hell, yes. 



HALDEMAN: And, and they'll be doing things on [unintelligible] 



-102- 



(1092) 



67. 1 TRAI^SCEIPT OF MAECH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

PRESIDENT: My point is, though — 



HALDEMAN : 



which is a hell of a lot worse to deal with. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: The grand jury thing has its,uh, uh, uh — view of this 

they might, uh. Suppose we have a grand jury proceeding. 
Would that, would that, what would that do to the Ervin 
thing? Would it go right ahead anyway? 



DEAN: 



Probably. 



HALDEMAN : 



If you do it in executive — 



PRESIDENT: But then on that score, though, we have — let me just, 
uh, run by that, that — You do that on a grand jury we 
could then have a much better cause in terms of saying, "Look, 
this is a grand jury, i" which, uh, the prosecutor — " 
How about a special prosecutor? We could use Petersen, or 
use another one. You see he is probably suspect. Would you 
call 



DEAN: 



No — 



PRESIDENT: in another prosecutor? 



DEAN: 



I'd like to have Petersen on our side, advising us [laughs] 
frankly. 



-103- 



(1093) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETim FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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PRESIDENT: Frankly. Well, Petersen Is honest. Is anybody about 

to be question him, are they? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



No, no, but he'll get a barrage when, uh, these Watergate 
hearings start. 

Yes, but he can go up and say that he's, he's been told 
to go further in the Grand Jury and go in to this and 
that and the other thing. Call everybody in the White 
House. I want them to come, I want the, uh, uh,to go 
to the Grand Jury. 

This may result — This may happen even without our calling 
for it when, uh, when these, uh — 



PRESIDENT: Vesco? 

DEAN: No. Well, that's one possibility. But also when these 

people go back before the Grand Jury here, they are going 

to pull all these criminal defendants back in before the 

Grand Jury and immunize them. 

& 
PRESIDENT: And immunize them: Why? Who? Are you going to — On what? 

DEAN: Uh, the U. S. Attorney's Office will. 

PRESIDENT: To do what? 

DEAN: To talk about anything further they want to talk about. 



-104- 



(1094) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. What do they gain out of it? 



DEAN: 



Nothing. 



PRESIDENT: 



To hell with them. 



DEAN: 



They, they're going to stonewall it, uh, as it now stands. 
Except for Hunt. That's why, that's the leverage in 
his threat. 



HALDEMAN: 



This is Hunt's opportunity. 



DEAN: This is Hunt's opportunity. 



PRESIDENT: That's why, that's why. 



HALDEMAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



God, if he can lay this — 

that's why your, for your immediate thing you've got no 
choice with Hunt but the hundred and twenty or whatever 
it is. Right? 

That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Would you agree that that's a buy time thing, you 
better damn well get that done, but fast? 



■nT7/^»T. 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 



T thin^. he ought to be given some signal, anvT'Tay, to, to 

Yes. 

Yeah — You know. 

Well for Christ's salces get it in a, in a way 
that, uh — Who's going to talk to him? Colson? 

-105- 

(1095) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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He's the one who's supposed to know him. 



DEAN: 



Well, Colson doesn't have any money though. That's 
the thing. That's been our, one of the real problems. 
They have, uh, been unable to raise any money. A million 
dollars in cash, or, or the like, has been just a very 
difficult problem as we've discussed before. Apparently, 
Mitchell has talked to Pappas, and I called him last — 
John asked me to call him last night after our discussion 
and after you'd met with John to see where that was. And 
I, I said, "Have you talked to, to Pappas?" He was at home, 
and Martha picked up the phone so it was all in code. "Did 
you talk to the Greek?" And he said, uh , "Yes, I have." 
And I said, "Is the Greek bearing gifts?" He said, "Well, 
I want to call you tomorrow on that." 



PRESIDENT: Well, look, uh , what is it that you need on that, uh , when, 
uh, uh? Now, look [unintelligible] I am, uh, unfamiliar 
with the money situation. 



DEAN: 



Well that, you know, it, it sounds easy to do, apparently, 
until, uh, everyone is out there doing it and that's where 
our breakdown has, has come every time. 



PRESIDENT: Well, if you had it, where would you, how would you get it to 
somebody? 



-106- 



(1096) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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DEAN: Well, I, uh, I gather LaRue just leaves it in mail boxes 

and things like that, and tells Hunt to go pick 

it up. Someone phones Hunt and tells him to pick it up. 

As I say, we're a bunch of amateurs in that business. 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



That was the thing that we thought Mitchell ought to be 
able to know how to find somebody who could do all that 
sort of thing, because none of us know how to. 

That's right. You got to wash money and all that sort, 
you know, if you get a hundred thousand out of a bank, and 
it all comes in serialized bills, and — 



PRESIDENT: oh I understand. 

DEAN: And that means you have to go to Vegas with it or a book- 

maker in New York City, and I've learned all these things 

after the fact, it's — [laughs] Great shape for the next time 
around . 

[Laughter] 



HALDEMAN: 



Jesus. 



PRESIDENT: Well, the main point, now, is the people who will need the 
money [unintelligible]. Well of course, you've got the 
surplus from the campaign. That we have to account for. 
But if there's any other money hanging around — 



-107- 



(1097) 



67.1 TEANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21^ 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



HALDEMAN: Well, but what about all the, what about the money we 
moved back out of the — here? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Apparently, there's some there. That might be what 
they can use. Uh, I don't know how much is left. 

Kalmbach must have some, doesn't he? 

Kalmbach doesn't have a cent. 



PRESIDENT: 



He doesn't? 



DEAN: 



See the new law — 



HALDEMAN: No, see that three-fifty that we moved out was all 

we saved. Because they were afraid to, because of this — 
that's what I mean; that's the trouble: We are so God damned 
square that [laughs] we'd get caught. I mean — 

PRESIDENT: Well, could I suggest that this though: uh, now, let me, 
let me, let me go back around — [unintelligible] . They 
will then, uh — 



HALDEMAN: 



Be careful — 



PRESIDENT: The, uh, the Grand Jury thing has a feeL Question is uh, — It, 
it at least says that we are cooperating 



-108- 



(1098) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
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DEAN: 



Well ~ 



PRESIDENT: with the Grand Jury. 

DEAN: Once we, once we start down any route that involves 
the criminal justice system. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



you, you've got to have full appreciation of there 
is really no control over that. 



PRESIDENT: No, sir. 



DEAN: Uh, while we did, uh — we had a, an amazing job of 



PRESIDENT: Yeah, I know. 



DEAN: 



keeping the thing on the track before 



PRESIDENT: Straight. 

DEAN: while the FBI was out there, all that — and that was , uh, 

only because 

PRESIDENT: Right. 

DEAN: I had a [unintelligible] of where they were going. 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible]. Right. Right. But you haven't got 

that now because everybody else is going to have a lawyer. 
Let's take the new Grand 



-109- 
(1099) 



67.1 TRANSCRTPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



Jury. Uh, the new Grand Jury would call Magruder again, 
wouldn't it? 



DEAN: 



But, based on what information it would? For example, 
what happens if Dean goes in and gives a story, you know, 
that here is the way it all came about. It was supposed 
to be a legitimate operation and it obviously got off the 
track. I heard of these horribles, told Haldeman that we 
shouldn't be involved in it. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. Right. 

DEAN: Then Magruder's going to have to be called in and questioned 

about all those meetings again, and the like. And it be- 
gins to — again he'll begin to change his story as to 
what he told the Grand Jury the last time. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well 



DEAN: That way, he's in a perjury situation. 

HALDEMAN: Except, that's the best leverage you've got on Jeb — 
is that he's got to keep his story straight or he's in 
real t: ouble. 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



That's right. 



Unless they get smart and give him immunity. If they 



-110- 



(1100) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

immunize Jeb , then you have an interesting problem. 



PRESIDENT: He wouldn't want — 



DEAN: 



Well, I think we have. 



HALDEMAN: 



[Unintelligible] immunity. 



DEAN: 



we have control, we have control over who gets immunized. 



HALDEMAN : 



Do we? 



DEAN: 



Yeah, I think they wouldn't do that without our — 



PRESIDENT: But you see, the Grand Jury proceeding [unintelligible] 

sort of thing, you can go down that road and then — if — 
if they had — I'm just thinking of now how the President 

looks. We would be cooperating. We would be cooperating 
through a Grand Jury. Everybody would be behind us. That's 
the proper way to do this. It should be done through a 

grand jury, not up there in the kleig lights of the Com- 
mittee, or — 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: Nobody's questioning if it's a grand jury, and so forth. 
So, and then we would insist on executive privilege 
before the Committee, flat out say, "No we won't do that. 
We're not going to do it. Matter before a grand jury," and 



-111- 



(1101) 



35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 27 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

that's that. You see — 



HALDEMAN: All right, then you go to the next step. Would we then - 
the Grand Ju — , the Grand Jury meet in executive session? 



DEAN: 



Yes, sir, they're 



PRESIDENT: 



Always — 



DEAN: 



secret sessions, they're secret 



HALDEMAN : 



Secret session — 



PRESIDENT: 



Secret — 



HALDEMAN: All right, then would we agree to release our statement, 
our Grand Jury transcripts? 



DEAN: 



That's not, that's not for our — We don't have the 
authority to do that. That's up to the Court and the 
Court, thus far, has not released the ones from the last 
Grand Jury. 



PRESIDENT: 



They usually are not. 



DEAN: 



It would be highly unusual for a grand jury to come out ■ 
What would happen is — 



HALDEMAN: 



But a lot of the stuff from the Grand Jury came out. 



-112- 



(1102) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

PRESIDENT: Leaks. Well — 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



It came out of the U. S. Attorney's Office, 

Yeah. 

more than the, the Grand Jury. We don't know. Some of 
the Grand Jurors may have leaked 

Right, right. 

it, but they were — 

Bob, it's not so bad. It's, that's just not the bad — 
or the worst place. But — 

Well, what I was, I was going the other way there. I was going to 
it might be to our interest to get it out. 

Well, we, we could easily do that. Leak out certain stuff. 
We could pretty much control that. We've got much more 
control there. Now, the other possibility is not to go 
to the Grand Jury. Then you've got three things. (1) You 
just say, "The hell with it, we can't raise the money, 
sorry Hunt, you can say what you want." And so Hunt blows 
the whistle. Right? 

Right. 

All right, if that happens, then that raises some possi- 
bilities of other criminal — because he is likely to say 
a hell of a lot of things and he's certain to get Magruder 

on it. 

-113- 

(1103) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 METING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

DEAN: It'll get Magruder. It'll start the whole FBI investi- 

gation going again. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. So, uh, what else — it'll get Magruder; 

it could possibly get Colson. He's in that danger. 



DEAN: 



That's right. Could get, uh — 



PRESIDENT: Could get Mitchell. Maybe. No. 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



Hunt can't get Mitchell. 

I don't think Hunt can get Mitchell. Hunt's got a 
lot of hearsay. 

Ehrlichman? He could on the other thing — except Ehrlich- 
man [unintelligible] 

Krogh, Krogh could go down in smoke. Uh — 

Because Krogh, uh — Where could anybody — But on the 
other hand, Krogh just says he, uh, uh, Krogh says this 
is a national security matter. Is that what he says? 
Yeah, he said that. 

Yeah, but that won't sell, ultimately, in a criminal 
situation. It may be mitigating on sentences but it won't, 
uh, in the main matter — 



-114- 



(1104) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M. 
1-126 



HALDEMAN: 



Well, then that — 



PRESIDENT: That's right. Try to look around the track. We have no 
choice on Hunt but to try to keep him — 

DEAN: Right now, we have no choice. 

PRESIDENT: But, but my point is, do you ever have any choice on 
Hunt? That's the point. 

DEAN: [Sighs] 

PRESIDENT: No matter what we do here now, John, 

DEAN: Well, if we — 

PRESIDENT: Hunt eventually, if he isn't going to get commuted 
and so forth, he's going to blow the whistle. 



DEAN: 



What I have been trying to conceive of is how we could lay 
out everything we know [sighs] in a way that, you know, we've 
told the Grand Jury or somebody else, so that if a Hunt 
blows. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



so what's new? You know, it's already been told to a grand 
jury, and they found no criminal liability, and they investi- 
gated it in full. We're sorry fellow — 



-115- 



(1105) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197 Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-55 A M 
1-126 ' ' " 



DEAN: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: That's right. 



Uh, We don't, it doesn't — 



PRESIDENT: Including Ehrlichman's use of Hunt on the other deal? 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: You'd throw that out? 



DEAN: 



Uh, well. Hunt will go to jail for that too — he's got 
to understand that. 



PRESIDENT: That's the point too. I don't think that -- I wouldn't 
throw that out. I think I would limit it to — I don't 
think you need to go into every God damned thing Hunt has 
done. 



DEAN: 



No, 



PRESIDENT: He's done some things in the national security area. Yes. 
True. 

HALDEMAN: We've already said that. Anyway, I mean, we've laid the 
groundwork for that. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: But here is the point, John: So you go that — Let's go 
to the other extreme, the other, the other angle is to 
decide, oh, well, if you open up the Grand Jury, first, it 



-116- 

(1106) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11-55 A M 
1-126 ' '' 



won't do any good; it won't be believed. And then 
you'll have two things going: The Grand Jury and you 
have the other thing. At least the Grand Jury appeals 
to me from the standpoint, it's the President makes the 
move. "Since all these charges have been bandied about, 
and so forth, the best thing to do is to — I have ordered, 
or I have asked the Grand Jury to look into any further 
charges. All charges have been raised." That's the place 
to do it, and not before a committee of the Congress. Right? 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: Then, however, we may say, Mitchell, et al., God, we 

can't risk that, I mean, uh, all sorts of shit '11 break 
loose there. Then that leaves you to your third thing. 
The third thing is just to continue to — 



DEAN: 



Hunker down and fight it. 



PRESIDENT: All right. If you hunker dowa and fight it, fight it and 

what happens? 
DEAN: Your — 

PRESIDENT: Your view is that that is, is not really a viable option. 



DEAN: 



It's a very — it's a high risk. A very high risk. 



PRESIDENT: A high risk, because your view is that what will happen 
out of that is that it's going to come out. Somebody's 
Hunt — something's going to break loose — 

-117- 
(1107) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197 Z MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:56 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



Something is going to break and 



PRESIDENT: When it breaks it'll look like the President 



DEAN: 



— IS covering up 



PRESIDENT: is, has covered up a huge uh, uh, this — Right? 



DEAN: 



That's correct. 



HALDEMAN: 



But you can't contain the charge. 



PRESIDENT: That's not ~ 



DEAN: 



I just don't 



PRESIDENT: You're, you're. 



DEAN: 



I don't think it's — 



PRESIDENT : 



you now have, uh , moved away from the hunker down. 



DEAN: 



Well, I've moved to the point that we've certainly got 
to make a, a harder look at the other alternative, which 
we haven't before. 



PRESIDENT: 



The other alternatives, 



DEAN: The other alternatives. Right. 

PRESIDENT: Three other choices, wouldn't you say? As a matter 

of fact, your m — ^middle ground of Grand Jury. And then 
there's finally the other ground of — No, I suppose there's 
a middle ground, 



-118- 



(1108) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



And I would — 



PRESIDENT: or the middle ground of a s — , of a public statement, 
but without a grand jury. 

DEAN: What we need also, sir — 

PRESIDENT: And also — 

HALDEMAN: But John's view is if we make the public statement 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: that we talked — I raised that this morning, the, the 
thing we talked about last night 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: If each of us 
PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: make moves, 
PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: he says that will immediately lead to a grand jury. 

PRESIDENT: Fine — all right, fine. 

HALDEMAN: As soon as we make that statement, they'll have to 
call a grand jury, 

PRESIDENT: Then maybe we make the public statement before the 
Grand Jury, in order to — 

HALDEMAN: So it looks like we are trying to do it over. 

^^^' All right, say, all right, say here are public statements, 

and we want , we want , uh , 

-119- 



(1109) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



full Grand Jury investigation 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



by the U. S. Attorney's Office. 



PRESIDENT: Curious to see whether this statement's, then, 

that's right. That I, but — And that we've said that 
the reason that we had delayed this is until after the 
sentencing. You see, the point is, the reason that 
time is of the essence, we can't play around with this, 
is that they're going to sentence on Friday. We're going 
to have to move the God damned thing pretty fast. See 
what I mean? 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: So we've got to act, we really haven't time to [unin- 
telligible] 



DEAN: 



The other, the other thing is that the Attorney General 
could call Sirica, and say that, "The government has some 
major developments that it's considering. Would you hold 
sentencing for two weeks?" If we set ourself on a course 
of action. . 



PRESIDENT: 



Yep, yep. 



-120- 



(1110) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



Say, that "The sentencing may be in the wrong perspective 
right now. I don't know for certain, but I just think 
there are some things that, uh, I am not at liberty to 
discuss with you, that I want to ask that the, the Court 
withhold two weeks sentencing." 

So then the story is out: "Sirica Delays Sentencing 
Watergate — For — " 

I think, I think that could be handled in a way between 
Sirica and Kleindienst that it would not get out. 



HALDEMAN OR 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



PRESIDENT: No. 

DEAN: Sirica tells me, I mean Kleindienst apparently does have 

good rapport with Sirica. He's never talked to him since 
this case has developed, 

Why not? 
but,uh — 

That's helpful. Kleindienst could say that he's, uh, he's 
working on something and would like, like, like to have a 
week. I wouldn't take two weeks. I would take a week. 

I'll tell you the person that I would, you know, I feel that, 
uh, we, we could use his counsel on this, because he under- 
stands the criminal process better than anybody over here does, 

PRESIDENT: Petersen? 

DEAN: is Petersen. It, it's awkward for Petersen. He's the head of 



DEAN; 



-121- 



(1111) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



the Criminal Division. But to discuss some of these 
things with him, we may well want to remove him from the 
head of the Criminal Division and say, that, uh, " Rela — , 
related to this case, you will have no relation." Uh, and 
give him on some special assignment over here where he 
can sit down and say, "Yes, this is an, this is an ob- 
struction, but it couldn't be proved," or so on and so 
forth. We almost need him out of there to take his counsel. 
That would, uh , I, I don't think he'd want that, but, uh, 
he is the most knowledgeable — 



PRESIDENT; 



How could you get him out? 



DEAN: 



I think an appeal directly to Henry, uh, that, uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



Why doesn't the President — could, could the President 
call him in as Special Counsel to the White — to the, to 
the White House for the purpose of conducting an investiga- 
tion, represent — uh, you see, in other words — 
rather than having Dean in on it , 

I have thought of that. I have thought of that. 

have him as Special Counsel to represent to the Grand 
Jury and the rest. 

That is one possibility. 
Yeah. 



-122- 



(1112) 



67.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



HALDEMAN: 



On the basis that Dean has now become a principal, rather 



PRESIDENT: That's right. 



HALDEMAN: 



than a Special Counsel, 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: That's right. 



DEAN: 



Uh huh. 



PRESIDENT: And that he's a — 



DEAN: 



And I, and I could reconunend that to you. 



PRESIDENT: He could recommend it, you could recommend it, and 

' Petersen would come over and be the, \ih — And I'd say, 
"Now — " 



HALDEMAN: 



Petersen's planning to leave, anyway. 



PRESIDENT: 



And I'd say, "Now, 



DEAN: 



Is he? 



PRESIDENT: "l want you to get — we want you to (1) — " 

We'd say to Petersen, "We want you to get to the bottom of 
the God damned thing. Call another Grand Jury or anything 
else," Correct? Well, now you've got to follow up to see 



-123- 
(1113) 



67 A TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197S MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



whether Kleindienst can get Sirica to put off — Right? 

If that is, if we — Second, you've got to get 

Mitchell down here. And you and Ehrlichman and Mitchell 

and let's — and — by tomorrow. 

Why don't we do that tonight? 

I don't think you can get him that soon, can you? 

John? 

It would be helpful if you could. 



HALDEMM: 
PRESIDENT: 
HALDEMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 

DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 



HALDEMAN : 
PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 

PRESIDENT: 
DEAN: 
PRESIDENT: 



I think, it would be. 

You need — 

Get him to come down this afternoon. 

It would be very helpful to, to get it going. And, uh, 

uh, you know, and uh, and, uh, and then, uh ~ Actually, uh, I'm 
perfectly willing to meet with the group, or I don't 
know vrtiether — 

Do you think you want to? 

Maybe have Dean report to me at the end, as to what are, as to 

what conclusions, et cetera, what you want to do. I think I 

should stay away from the Mitchell side of it at this point. 

Un huh. 

Do you agree? 

Uh huh. 

And , uh — 



-124- 



(1114) 



67.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 

DEAN: And I think, unless we see, you know, some sort of a 
reluctant dragon there — 

9- 

HALDE1>IAN: You might try to meet with the rest of us, I, I'm, I'm 
not sure you'd want to meet with John in a group of us. 
Okay, let me see if I can get it done. 

PRESIDENT: All right. Fine. And, uh, my point is that, uh, we can, 
uh, — you may well come — I think it is good, frankly, 
to consider these various options. And then, once you, 
once you decide on the plan — John — and you had the right 
plan, let me say, I have no doubts about the right plan 
before the election. And you handled it just right. You 
contained it. Now after the election we've got to have 
another plan, because we can't have, for four years, we 
can't have this thing — you're going to be eaten away. 
We can't do it. 

DEAN: Well, there's been a change in the mood — 

HALDEMAN: John's point is exactly right, that the erosion here now is 
going to you, and that is the thing that we've got to turn 
off, at whatever the cost. We've got to figure out where to 
turn it off at the lowest cost we can, but at whatever cost 
it takes. 



DEAN; 



That's what, that's what we have to do. 



-125- 



(1115) 



67,1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 10:12 - 11:55 A.M., 
1-126 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here, apart 
from anything, you know, people saying that, uh, well, 
the Watergate isn't a major concern. It isn't. But it 
would, but it will be. It's bound to be. 



DEAN: 



We cannot let you be tarnished by that situation. 



PRESIDENT: Well, I [unintelligible] also because I — Although Ron 
Zlegler has to go out — They blame the [unintelligible] 
the White House [unintelligible] 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: We don't, uh, uh, I say that the White House can't do it. 
Right? 



HALDEMAN: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



Yes, sir. 



-126- 
(1116) 



68. On March 21, 1973 at 12:30 p.m. H.R. Haldeman spoke by telephone 
to John Mitchell, who was in New York City. In addition to reflecting 
the 12:30 p.m. call, Haldeman's telephone log for that day also shows 
a conversation with John Mitchell's office at 4:06 p.m. with a marginal 
notation "car - 9:30 a.m. (word illegible) Nat'l — Amer 520." Haldeman 
has testified that he does not recall asking Mitchell on March 21 whether 
Mitchell was going to take care of Hunt's demand for money. 



Page 

68.1 H.R. Haldeman telephone log, March 21, 1973 
(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1118 

68.2 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 30, 1974, 4-16 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1120 

68.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 16 (received from Watergate 

Grand Jury) 1133 



(1117) 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 28 



C8.1 H.R. HALDEMAN TELEPHONE LOG. MRCH 21, 1973 



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(1118) 




'A. o/ ^ 



6 8.1 H.R. HALDE M AN TFLEPHONE LOG, MARCH 21, 1973 
THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 



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U.S. GOVEaHMEMT PRirmNC 0rfXI;l97»— 0-37^347 



(1119) 



68.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 ^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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18 

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20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A I understand. 

Q Do you understand that while the Grand Jury rules do 
not permit you to have an attorney present in this room, you 
may be excused to consult with an attorney outside of this 
room at any time upon request to the Foreraam of the Grsmd Jury. 
. h I understand. 

Q For the record, you are represented today by counsel 
in the presence of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Strickler who are 
outside, is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q So that anything you do say should be said freely 
and voluntarily. Do you understand that? 

A Yes. 

Q And you understand further , as in the past, the 
fact that you have been advised that you are a potential 
target of this Gremd Jury's investigation which means that 
you may well be considered as a defendant for purposes of 
indictment by this Grand Jury. 

A I understand. 

Q Now understanding all of those facts and rights whicf. 
you possess, are you prepared to testify this morning? 

A I am. 

Q Mr. Haldeman, may I direct your attention to the 

day of March, 1973 and ask whether you recall meeting on 
that day with the President and John Dean who was at that time 



p 

I 21st c 



DV 

(1120) 



counsel to the President? -^ 

A Yes, I do. 

Q And you recall entering a meeting which was then in 
progress? 

A That's correct, yes. 

Q Now following that meeting did there come a time 
when you had a conversation with John Mitchell who was then in 
New York City on the telephone? 

A Yes, I am svire there did. Let's see — March 21s t? 
Yes. 

Q Ccin you give us the best of your recollection of the 
time of the telephone conversation and the sxibstance of it? 

A I don't have — I should qualify niy previous answer. 
I am sure that there was a telephone conversation because one 
of the results or one of the outcomes of the March 21st meet- 
ing with Mr. Dean and the President was a request by the 
President that Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr- Mitchell and I 
meet that day or the following day to discuss some of these 
questions and then to report back to the President. 

I feel sure that I called Mr. Mitchell to request his 
coming down for such a meeting. 

Q What do you recall of the conversation between your- 
self and Mr. Mitchell? 

A That's about all I recall. I «im really assuming 
that there was such a call. I think I called him. It is 



DV 

(1121) 



68.2 n.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 



1 

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5 

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6 

possible that sorneone else called hira.' My general recollection 
now would be that I had called him and said that the President 
wanted us to meet and asked him to come down. 

Q Is it not the case that you discussed with more 
particularity t he problems about which the President suggested 
you. meet In yoxir conversation with Mr. Mitchell? 

A Not that I recall, no. 

Q Is it your testimony that you do not recall saying 
to Mr. Mitchell in substance that the President requested that 
you meet as to how to deal with Mr. Hunt's demand for suljstan- 
tial cash payments? 

A Yes. I have no recollection of that being discussed, 

Q It is your testimony that — is it your testimony 
that in the telephone conversation with Mr. Mitchell you did 
not allude in any way to the subject matter aJbout which you 
would be meeting the following day? 

A My recollection is that the subject matter about 
which we would be meeting was the general subject of how to 
deal with the overall — what has now become called the 
Watergate situation, as it stood at that time. 

I don't recall the point that you raised as being 
the specific subject for the meeting. 

Q I'm sorry but your answer is not responsive to my 
question, most respectfully. I asked whether you did not 
recall alluding to the subject matter in your telephone 



DV 

(1122) 



68.2 H.R. EALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4^1 



6 



7 



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-16 
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conversation with Mr. Mitchell. 

A I don't recall alluding to the subject matter. My 
recollection would be that if I discussed the subject matter 
it would be in the context that I have just described. The 
purpose of the meeting was, as I recall it, to review the 
Watergate situation. 

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. Haldeman, that in your tele- 
phone conversation with Mr. Mitchell you stated to him in 
substance, or you asked him in substance, whether he was going 
to take care of Mr. Hunt's problem? 

A I don't recall any such discussion, no. 

Q When you say you do not recall any such discussion, 
that would be something you would recall, would it not, if you 
had such a discussion? 

A I w ould think so but I don't see that as having beei 
the major point of discussion either at the time of the phone 
call to set up the meeting or at the meeting which took place 
on the 22nd. 

Q You're talking now again about Mr. Hunt's specific 
request, is that coirrect? 

A Yes. 

Q When were you first advised that Hunt was making 
such a rec[uest or demand? 

A To the best of my recollection, the first I knew of 
that was when it was raised in the March 21st meeting when it 

DV 



(1123) 



68.2 



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was reported to the President In ray presence. 

It la my belief that it had been discussed prior to 
n^ coming in to that meeting and then was reraised as a point 
of information when I came in. 

Q Did you not have a conversation with John Ehrlichman 
prior to the meeting zibout which you are making reference con- 
cerning Mr. Hunt's most recent demamd for funds? 

A 1 have a general recollection of a very brief dis- 
cussion of that topic with Mr. Ehrlichmjm. I don't think it 
was before the meeting with Mr. Dean and the President that 
morning. 

I ^un not sure when that — I think it was discussed 
or rai sed i n the course of the conversation, but my recollec- 
tion now is the first 1 heard of that was in the meeting in 
the President's office. 

Q You say you recall some conversation with Mr. 
Ehrlichman and you think it was after Mr. Dean raised it in 
your presence with the President or discussed it with the 
President in your presence. 

I ask you whether, more specifically, you did not 
have a conversation on the 20th of March, thte day before the 
meeting between Mr. Dean and the President to vdiich you have 
alluded, with Mr. Ehrlichman at which time the discussion 
about Mr. Hunt's most recent demand was discussed. 

A That is not my recollection at this time. It is 

DV 



(1124) 



68.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUABY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 



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awfully hard to put these tninga into time position. My 
feeling now is the first I heard of that was in the March 
21st morning meeting in the President's office. I can't dis- 
count the possibility of the other. 

I am trying to give you my best recollection. 

Q You think you may well have had a discussion with 
Mr. Ehrlichman on the 20th about Mr. Hunt? 

A I don't recall any such. That's really all I can 
say. I have no recollection of such a discussion preceeding 
the other. 

1 have a recollection of that point coming up in 
conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman at some time. My feeling is 
that that was after the 21st. 

Q Well, what do you recall about the substance of it 
coming up with Mr. Ehrlichman which would be something which 
might put it in a better chronological frame. 

A This account is only a very general recollection. 
Let's see if I can reconstruct this. What 1 would recall in 
a general sense is that there was some reference to the fact 
or to the report that Hunt had made some kind of a threat that 
he was going to reveal the seemy things he had done for 
Ehrlichman, or something to that effect, and that was discussed 
as a point of information. 

Mr. Ehrlichmam expressed the view that that was a 
matter of no concern to him because there was nothing, as far 

DV 



(1125) 



68.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 10 



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as he was concerned, that fit that kind of a description that 
he would have any concern about Mr. Hunt revealing. 

In other words, his view was — £ind this is the 
general sense — I'm not trying toput words into it because 
I can't — it was that there was no basis for a Hunt threat 
in that respect. 

Q That's what Mr. Ehrlichman told you at the time of 
your conversation? 

A That's my recollection. 

Q As part of the threat, didn't Mr. Ehrlichman tell 
you that Mr. H^lnt wasasking for a lot of money and that the 
threat to reveal these things about Mr. EhrllchmEui smd others 
was contingent on his demand not being met? 

A It is not my recollection that Mr. Ehrlichmam told 
me that. It is my recollection that I had heard that, the 
substance of the threat, prior to the conversation or the 
raising of this point in conversation with Ehrlichman. 

Q Well, if we break that down there should be something 
which should trigger your recollection as to whether you heard 
about a threat from Mr. Ehrlichman for the first time or you 
heard it from Mr. Dean, and when you discussed it with Mr. 
Ehrlichman, whether Mr. Ehrlichman told you that the threat 
was a flat or unconditional threat to reveal things, or whether 
it was conditioned on a circumstance not being met; that is 
the payment of money to Mr. Hunt. 



DV 



(1126) 



.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 ^^ 



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A Okay, As I thought I had said, my belief is that 
I was told or that 1 heeird of the threat in the teinns that 
Mr. Hunt had said he had to receive — I think it was a hiondred 
and twenty thouszmd dollars, or something like that — or he 
would reveal the seanry things that he had done for Ehrlichman. 
That sort of phraseology is how I recall it. 

In other words, it was a threat that he had to be 
given this amount of money or he would do the other thing. 
But ity recollection ia that where I heard that was from John 
Dean and in the President' s office, not from John Ehrlichman. 

Q That wasn't the only thing that Mr. Dean had indica- 
ted that Mr. Hunt would talk about. Is it? 

A That's the only thing 1 recall. 

Q Isn't it a fact that the Hunt threat was in the con- 
text not only of telling these seeuny things £j30ut Ehrlichman, 
but that he would tell what he knew aJaout Watergate, it's 
break-In emd its aftermath. 

A No, that's not how I remember It at all. 

Q It's not? 

A No, sir. 

Q Your recollection of being so advised by Mr. Dean 
was that Hunt would only tell about Ehrlichman? 

A There may have been another name. It may have been 
Ehrlichman and someone, but my recollection very specifically 
in that regard Is that the threat related to what was describee 



DV 



(1127) 



eS.2 H.ff- HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 



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as the seamy things he had done for Ehrlichman. It may have 
been for Ehrlichman and someone else, but it was not, as 1 
would reconstruct it now — my impression is not that it was 
a threat to disclose anything other than the apparent projects 
that he claimed he had done for Ehrlichman. 

Q Wasn't the fear expressed that in terras of Hunt 
"blowing"? 

A It may have been, and if it was, my recollection 
again would be that it was in that context. 

Q Now what was Mr. Mitchell's response to you on the 
telephone, to your invitation? 

A Again, it would have to be basically speculation. I 
think that I transmitted to him the request to attend the 
meeting, and h e said that he would be down the first thing in 
the morning and a meeting was therefore set up. 

Q And later on is it not a fact that Mr. Mitchell's 
travel plans were confirmed and you were apprised of his time 
of arrival? 

A That's probsibly true, yes. 

Q Do you recall that? 

A No, I don't now but I imagine that would be the case 
I don't know whether it was later on or he confirmed it at the 
time. I'm not sure of that. 

Q Now Mr. Haldeman, you recall — do you recall pro- 
viding to the United States Attorney's Office, and specif icallii 



DV 

(1128) 



,2 H.H. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 



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to Mr. Sllbert, copies of the various telephone logs of yours? 

A Yes. 

Q Where are the originals of those logs? 

A I don't know. I'm not sure. We may have turned 
over the originals. They may be in my attorneys' possession. 
They may still be in the White House files. 

Q Would you like to confer with counsel with respect 
to the emswer to that question? 

A Fine. 

(Whereupon, the witness left 
the Grand Jury room to confei 
with counsel.) 

(Whereupon, the witness re- 
entered the Grand Jury room.) 

BY MR- BEN-VENISTE: 

Q Mr. Haldeman, have you had the opportunity to consul! 
x^ith counsel? 

A I have. 

Q Are you able to answer the question with respect to 
your logs? 

A It is my counsel's belief that they were provided 
with several Xerox copies of those logs, but they do not have, 
and did not have the originals at any time. 

On the basis of that, I can only assume, and this 
would be ray beet belief, that the originals are still in the 
White House files. Prior to my leaving the White House, and 

DV 

(1129) 



68.2 H 



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R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARI 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 14 

for the purpose of turning over copies to the D. S. Attorney's 
Office, copies were made of those logs. A Xerox copy was held 
in my attorney's file and copies were turned over to the U. S. 
Attorney's Office. 

Q So that you requested that the White Rouse Xerox 
various of your documents which were in the presidential files: 

A There was a specific request for these logs apparent- 
ly, and the copies were made and they were turned over. That 
is my understemding , 

Q Were you provided a copy of whatever was tujrned over 
to the U. S. Attorney's Office? 

A Yea. My recollection is that these were not in the 

White House files at the time. They were held by my secretary 

in my office. 

MR. BEN-VENISTE: May we mark this as Exhibit HRH-1 

of this date? 

(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibit 
HRH-1 was marked for identi- 
fication.) 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q I'll show this to you, Mr. Haldeman, and ask if this 
does not appear to be one of the logs turned over to you — 
turned over by you to the U. S. Attorney's Office. 

A It appears to be, yes. 

Q Now if you will notice, this is a telephone raemoran- 

dtim log dated March 21, 1973, Wednesday, H. R. Haldeman, and 



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(1130) 



68.2 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY^ JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY^ 4-16 



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It begins at 2>50 p.m. 

A Right. 

Q With the first entry. 

A Right. 

Q Do you know vhera the first page of that log is, as 
I will advise you that it has never been turned over to the 
Government. 

A Is this identified as the second page? Yes, it is — 
page 2. No, I have no idea. 

Q Have you ever seen page 1? 

A I have not made any attempt to review these logs so 
I probably haven't. As I have indicated in earlier appearance4, 
this log was not kept by me. It was kept by my secretary. I 
am not familiar. I didn't even know it existed, as a matter 
of fact, until the request was made and we got it. 

Q Have you ever seen page 17 

A Not that I recall. I have no reason to believe that 
I have. Let me volxinteer that if there is a page 1, and I 
would like to ask that we ask my attorneys, and we can do it 
right now if you \rant to, to check, they do have — Mr. Strickle 
said they have a copy in their file. They can sezurch that and 
see if there i s a page 1 for that date which is quite possiblt 
that it is just left out. 

THE FOREMAN: Would you please do so? 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 



dv 



(1131) 



68.2 H.R. 



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HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 4-16 

(Whereupon, the witness left 
the Gr£ind Jury room to confei 
with counsel.) 

(Whereupon, the witness re- 
entered the Grand Jui^ room.) 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q Mr. Haldemam, have you checked the copy that you have 
or that your attorneys have of the March 21 telephone logs? 

A I have not. I have talked with Mr. Strickler and 
he is calling his office. It is in the file in his office emd 
he is calling to have it checked right now. As soon as he 
has an answer he will notify the Marshal. 

Q Do yon have any knowledge as to any deliberate with- 
holding of this docximent? 

A No. 

Q Either by your attorneys or by anyone at the White 
House? 

A Np, I don't. It was our intent euid thought that 
we had turned over the complete file, both the telephone logs 
and the date and appointment files. 

Q Now with respect to the tape recording of the con- 
versation about which you have testified between the President 
and Mr. De^m, and then later yourself, on the 21st of Mjirch, 
1973, did you ever make a duplicate of this tape or of any 
portion of the tape? 

A No. My answer is no, but I w^lnt to be sure I 



dv 



(1132) 



68.3 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 16 



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Q Kow, did l!r. Mitchell, at that tine, indicate to 

you, one way or another, whether Mr. Hunt would be paid? 
No, he did not. 
Thereafter, did you have a conversation with Mr. 



A 

Q 

LaRue? 
A 

Q 
A 



Yes, I did. 

And what was the substance of that conversation? 
Mr. LaRue wanted to know what I was going to do 
about the problem that had raised, and 1 told him, nothing; 
that I was out of that business. 

He then asked me what I thought he should do and 
I told him I thought he ought to talk to Mitchell about it. 

Q Now, after the meeting on the 21st with the Presi- 
dent and, for a portion, Mr. Haldeman, did you learn from 
anyone whether Mr. Mitchell had been contacted with respect 
to coming down to Washington and meeting with you and Mr. 
Haldeman and the President and Mr. Ehrlichman? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And when did you learn that? 

A Sometime on the 21st, I learned it from Mr. Halde- 
man. Originally, it had been hoped that Mr. Mitchell could 
come down immediately but, for some reason, he couldn't come 
down until the next morning. So a meeting was scheduled for 
the next morning. 

Q Now, later on in the day, on the 21st, you had a 



DV 

(1133) 



69. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 Dean met with Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that the participants 
at the meeting speculated about John Mitchell's role in the Watergate 
affair, and wondered whether Mitchell's not coming forward was the cause 
of the beating everyone was taking on the subject of Watergate. Dean 
and Haldeman have testified that in the late afternoon of March 21, just 
before their second meeting with the President on that day. Dean told 
Haldeman that perhaps the solution to the whole thing was to draw the 
wagons around the White House. According to Haldeman, Dean also said 
that they should let all the chips fall where they may, because that 
would not hurt anybody at the White House since no one there had a 
problem. 



Page 

69.1 John Ehrlichman log, March 21, 1973 

(received from SSC) , 1136 

69.2 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 21, 1973 

(received from SSC) 1137 

69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2741-43, 

2756 1138 

69.4 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 14, 1974, 17 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1142 

69.5 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000, 1092 1143 

69.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899 ...1145 



(1135) 



E 



69.1 JOHN EHRLICHMAN LOG, MRCH 21, 1973 
WEDNITSDAY, MARCH 21. '97^ ~ 

^■A'd HRH oifLcB 

9 : 00 _Pr e s'lci i nt 

11:00 Albert Hall, A.ssisfcant Sacretar/ of Deisrij a, Iriialliver.c^ 

11:45 Cic al; vv-est bassmant 

12:00 Cor-gressmaa Jack Kamp 

1:00 Lunch, in ^-le 5 3 v/ith Cola 

2 :45 Hav-ir! Young 

3:00 Bernard Hi^snbrand (MACO), Jim. Falk 

i/" 3 : 4 3-6 KRK^o h n D e an 

6 : 00 Bud K rogh 

7:00 Metropolitan Club - Gene Bradley dinner 

TH URSDAY, ^/LARCH 22, 1973 

8:30 Sub -Cabinet briefing - 450 EOB 

11:00 HRH office - Dean, Mit c_bLell 

11:45 Car at west basement 

12:40 Sec. Shultz' plane arrival {Mrs. E on plane) - Andre%v3 

3:15 Secretary Shultz 

3:45 President, Sbultz 



y 



FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1973 

11:45^ Pre sident 

1:00 Depart west basemeiit 

1:30 Depart Andrews, Jecstar 4200 

(Mr, ajid Mrs, E, Hvllins, Zieglers, Gladden) 
3:00 Arrive Offutt AF3, Omaha (engine trouble) 

5:30 Depart Offutt 

7:00° Arrive San Francisco 

Stay Clift Hotel 

MONDAY, IN/LARCH 26, 1973 



9:00 Depart San Francisco 

(Shrlic.hmana (3), Hullins, Gladden) 
1:50 Arrive Kansas City (Forbes) 

2:20 Depart Kansas City 

5:40 Arrive Dulles, ??.g; 



(1136) 



69.2 H.R. HALDEMAN CALENDAR, MARCH 21, 1973 



PFednes^ayy March 21 

80 



i«7J Ann 19/] 

S s* T w t f % 

I 2 1 t i t~7 

' « 10 II 12 II It 

15 T6 17 la 19 20 21 

22 2] 2*. 2J 2» V 23 
29 10 







IMS 



IGt30 



I0.« 



II.3D 



^^:^4 ^Il^. 



^- ^\ 



'-yH^-^i 



X/Mx 



I 










-— UXTT 

i-g^ J/.Jxj7i7T 



IM^ikL^r^-^^*^^ 



IZI5 



12^ V'f/- 6.tc/ - 



T 



V ' 







6.00 

615 



T-S-- 



V >ly 



E-g 

7:00 

715 



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(1137) 



69. S JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY^ JULY 27, 1973^ 7 SSC 2741-43, 2756 

2741 

So, basically, he thought that was where oue drew the line, and he 
wanted Dean to focus very hard on that. I don't think, on the 27th, 
that the President was advised of any implication in this matter of 
either Mr Haldeman or me, and in point of fact he continued to be 
conhdent through the 30th, 1 know, and as matter of fact, on through 
April 16, because he had a report from Mr. Petersen, the Assistant 
Attorney Genei-al, and the Attorney General to the eliect that neither 
Mr. Haldeman nor I were cruninally involved in this matter in any 
respect, bo, and that was on the occasion of their meeting on that Sun- 
day which would have been the 15th, wouldn't it ? 

So, I don't think, particularly February 27, but continuing down 
through the next 3 -weeks, that he had any real concern about that. 

Senator Gukney. Well, you mentioned meetings with Dean so I 
guess It IS a good time to go to those. 



r 



Lets go U> this meeting between you and Mr. Haldeman and Mr 
Dean. foUowmg the March 21 meeting of Dean with the President. 
Ihat is when the roof sort of started to cave in, and I am curious to 
know what transpired m that meeting between the three of you after 
the meeting between Dean and the President, when presumably accord- 
mg to Deans testimony, substantiated by Moore in what Dean told 
Moore Dean told the President everything he knew about Watergate. 

^en there was a meeting, as I understand it, between the three of you. 

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. ihere was a meeting at 3 :45 p.m. on the 21st. 

Senator Gurnet. Yes. 

Mr. Ehrlichman And then that meeting moved to the President's 
omce after about an hour. 

Senator Gurnet. Now, could you describe to us what happened in 
your oflice— It was m your office, wasn't it, the first meeting « 

Mr. Ehruchman. I am not sure. I don't recall offhand. 

Senator Gurnet. I have in the log here 3 :45 to 6 p.m.. Dean, Halde- 
man, that IS the only thmg it says. It doesn't say where, although there 
IS another note that day of a meeting. It says Haldeman's office, so I 
would assume perhaps this 3 :45 p.m. meeting was in your office 

Mr. Ehruchman. I don't know. My notes don't show. 

Senator Gurnet. It is a minor point. 

Mr. Ehruchman. In any event it was either in Mr. Haldeman's 
office or mine. I am sure. 

The conversation 

Senator Gurnet. Who called the meeting? Do you remember? 

Mr. Ehruchman. No, sir I do not. I do not. The convereation, as I 
recall It largely involved the question of testimonial availability of 
White House staff p^ple. It was this continuing question that was 
ongoing. Mr. Dean did not report in my hearing what he had told the 
r^resiaent tnat aay. 

wifrtftrSSS ^' °'''' °^^"''^"«i ^'^^thing about his meeting 

Mr Ehruchman. No, sir, not that I can recaU at all. We were 

largely, at both that meeting and continuing in the meeting which took 

place m the President's office afterward, we were taken up with the 

?,^!^V^" f ^T ^,^^^ **"? ^^ ^"'^' ^''- 1' ^i<^^ to get White House 
people to testify fully, under what circumstances, whether they should 



(1138) 



69.3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27^ 2973, 7 SSC 2741-43^ 2756 

2742 

be made fully available to this committee, waiving all privilege or 
whether they should be made available fully to the grand jury and not 
to this committee at all, whether the attorney -client piiviicge still 
existed as to Dean, and he talked to us quite a bit about the law of 
attorney-client privilege as I recall on that occasion, and so it was that 
setting. 

Now, JVIr. Dean and I got into a diiference of opinion at that time 
about the question of immunity, and how that should be handled. 
As I recall, right around this time, I think 

Senator Gtjrnzt. Now what do you mean about immunity? 

ifr. Ehrlichman. Well, his theory was that the President should 
negotiate blanket immunity for the White House staff with the Attor- 
ney General so that the entire White House staff, lock, stock, and 
barrel, could testify freely before the grand jury as to any and all 
facts and clear the air and everybody would be immune from prose- 
cution. That just didn't make any sense to me from either a practical 
standpoint or a public appearance standpoint, and we got into a 
difference of opinion on that. That was again — pardon me, Senator. 

Senator Gurnt.t. Well now, why did he say that? 

Mr. Ehrlichman-. Well, he was looking for formula, he had come 
up with a concept that there ought to be some kind of a commission, 
an independent commission that would be set up. 

Senator Gukntit. But when somebody talks about immunity, obvi- 
ously they are afraid of e.jiding up in the pokey. Did he say, "Now 
we are all going to jail so he had better get some immunity here." 

Mr. Ehklichman. No, he said he was concerned that people would 
not talk freely. Now, ilr. Dean is an immunity expert. !Mr. Dean told 
us early in the game that he was the author of the statute which the 
Congress eventually adopted granting immunity to people in certain 
criminal situations so that they would testify against higher-ups or 
coconspirators or whatnot, and so he gave us quite an accounting of 
the difference between use immimity and transactional immunity and 
the various technicalities of this and he expl.xined that immunity was 
sort of the lubricant that was needed in this thing to get people to 
come forward and to fully tell their stories. 

Senator Gttrnt.y. If eveiybody is innocent of everything and stop 
with Liddy, why would people worry about immunity? 

Mr. EiiRLiCHsrAN'. Well, I don't think at that stage that there was 
any necessai-y assumption on our part that everybody was innocent 
of everything. I think this was implicit in the conversation that there 
were liabilities. We were thinking in terms of ilr. Magruder, we were 
thinking in terms of people at the committee, but ^Ir. Dean was also 
implying to us that people in the White House woidd not come for- 
ward and testify freely without immunity. 

This was a line that picked up, I guess, about this time and then 
was rcphiyefl over and over in his conversations with Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator GnnxEY. Did he mention to you in this discussion who 
would need immunity in the "WHiite House? 

Mr. EitRLictiM-VN-. No ; ho did not. 

Senator Gurxet. No names were mentioned at all ? 

ilr. EiiRLirtiMAN. Xo, sir; not tliat I can recall. 



(1139) 



L 



69.3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 2?^ 197Z, 7 SSC 2741-43, 2756 

2743 

Senator Gurnet. Who did you think might, because you had some 
discussion on this? 

Mr. Ehruchman. I don't think that I thought who might at that 
point. Bear in mind I had been totally out of touch with this situation 
for some period of time. My reaction to his proposal was to simply 
say to him that that was out of the question, that we simply could not 
expect anybody to grant immunity either on a blanket basis or on an 
individual basis to anybody in the White House. I said that rather 
early in the conversation and that may have inhibited any specifics 
that Mr. Dean otherwise might have been willing to come forward 
with. 

Senator Gurnet. What was Mr. Haldeman's reaction? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. He didn't express a reaction that I can recall to 
that. He was concerned, as I recall, with the general subject of execu- 
tive privilege because he had been hearing from Mr. Mitchell strongly 
about executive privilege and he conveyed to us Mr. Mitchell's strong 
feeling that the executive privilege position that the administration 
was taking was untenable. 

Senator Gurnet. And he didn't say anything about this conversa- 
tion he had had, this long conversation earlier in the day with the 
President of the United States ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. No, sir; he did not. 

(Senator Gurnet. Did you know at that time about who may have 
been knowledgeable about the break-in. You know at some point in 
time he told you that some people knew about it? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Oh, no. 

Senator Gurnet. This was later? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. That developed as a result of phone calls that 
Bob Haldeman was getting while we were in San Clemente following — 
we left, I left 

Senator Gurnet. I dont want to get bogged down on that. 

Mr. Ehruchman. Yes, I left about 5 or 6 days later for California. 
While we were out there, we began realizing there was a strong con- 
flict between Dean and Mitchell on this whole question of people going 
to the grand jury or the committee and so on, and could not get a feel 
of it because I didn't know what was behind it and I began trying to 
find out what was behind it, and then I talked to Mr. O'Brien and that 
is the first that I knew about these four meetings back in November 
and December, January, and February where these plans "were laid. 
Then I began inquiring through Mr. Moore and others as to what 
Mr. Mitchell might have testified to that was worrying him, and why 
he didn't think Dean ought to go near the U.S. attorney or the grand 
jury and what his concerns were. 

Senator Gurnet. Is it fair to say that up to this March 21 date 
you had no knowledge of what Dean's activities were in connection 
with Watergate, and now I am talking about possible illegal activi- 
ties, other than the Kalmbach business, and this talk you had on 
Executive clemency? Is that a fair thing to say? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I did not know what he had to do with the 
Kalmbach business except in the recruiting of Mr. Kalmbach. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, I am only talking about what has trans- 
pired here this week. 



(1140) 



69.3 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 27, 1973, 7 SSC 2741-4Z, 2756 

2756 

Almost surely if John Mitchell is indicted, Kleindienst will resign," 
and he said, "I think Joe Snetid ought to be Acting Attorney General." 

Then he said, "The U.S. attorney has assured me that I am not a 
target, and neither is any other White House person." 

Senator GtmNET. Were these notes made at the time of the meeting? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. Yes, sir, as we talked. 

Senator Gtjrxet. Did he tell you about all his involvement with 
Kalmbach. raising of money, and these methods of paying it that 
Ulasewicz told us about ? 

Mr. Ehrlichm.\x. No, sir. That I hadn't heard until this testimony 
here. 

Senator Gubxet. Or the contacts he was having with LaRue at this 
particular time? 

^Ir. Ehrlichm.\x. No. You will recall he testified about five dif- 
ferent ways, about looks of anguish, disbelief, scorn, whatnot, on my 
f^ace at the time he said I was indictable. In point of fact at the time 
he Laid I was not indictable but that the Kalmbach thing might be 
a problem for me as being misunderstood, I said, "Well, I just don't 
see how it could, John," and then we discussed just that, the assump- 
tions which I had made that there was nothing improper about it, 
and so on. 

Senator Gurnet. At one of these meetings, and I can't remember 
which one, it was now because there were several in this time frame, 
but Dean testified, as I recall, that there was a discussion between 
you and him, and I think Haldeman, on the fact that the best way 
to settle Watergate wo\ild have Mitchell come forward, I guess that — 
March 21 counsel tells me. Do you recall anything on that, whether 
there was a discussion or agreement between you, that that was the 
best thing to do? 

Mr. Ehrlichman, There never -was such an agreement. 

Senator Gurxey. Was there a discussion? 

jMr. Ehrlichman. Yes. During that meeting and during subsequent 
meetings between Mr. Haldeman and me and meetings between Halde- 
man, Dean and me on the two occasions, I think we had them subse- 
quent to that, there was a lot of speculation about John Mitchell and 
his place in all of this, and of course he was not saying anything to 
anybody at that point in time, and none of us really had a feel for 



ri 



L 




all shared at various times that question in our minds as to whether 
the Ideating everybody was taking on the subject of Watergate was 
because he was not coming forward. Now that was one of the reasons 
that the President asked me to meet with Mr. jMitchell on the after- 
noon of Saturday, April 14, to say to him for the President that if 
Mr. Mitchell thought his silence was somehow serving the Presidency 
that was a misapprehension, that the President didn't want him to sit 
silent if he knew something unless Mr. Mitchell felt from his own 
personal point that wa.s an exercise of his own rights, in which case 
tliat was up to him. And T dclivei-ed tliat messaire to him at that time 
but that was a continuing question all the wav throu<rh this period of 
time. 



(1141) 



69.4 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 1? 



5 

6 

7 

S 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

IS 



19 

20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



-17 



meetLns with Mr. Haloc^an and Mr. EhrllcK-nrn, did yau r;ot? 

A Yes, 1 did. 

Q During the course of that meeting, wgs there any 
ilscuEslon about whaC your preference might be as to Mr. 
Kitchen's future actions? 

A Yes, there wag. The nature of that conversation 
vas that It was felt that Mr. Mitchell should be the one to 
step fofjard and stand responsible for the entire Wctergate 
natter and that, if he did, the problems that had occurred 
after June 17th would dissipate themselves and there would 
be a satisfaction with somebody that was standing accountable 
for the matter. 

In other words, a big enough fleh would have been 
caught that the problem would have been resolved. 

Q In other words, that would have taken public opinion 
away from what night have occurred after the break- in. In 
ccr.nection with the so-called cover-up? 

A That is correct. 

Q Now, on the 22nd of March, in the morning, did you 



attend a meeting with Mr, Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. 
Mitchell? 

A Yes, I did attend such a meeting. 

Q Where did that take place? 

A In Mr. Haldeman' 8 office. 

Q Do you recall any reference being made to Mr. Hunt's 



DV 



(1142) 



f— ^ 



69.6 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 2S, 26, 1973, Z SSC 1000, 1092 

1000 

the President suggested that we have a meeting with Mitchell, Halde- 
man, and Ehrlichman to discuss how to deal with this situation. Wliat 
emerged from that discussion after Haldeman came into the office was 
that John Mitchell should account for himself for the pre- June 17 
activities and the President did not seem concerned about the activities 
■which had occurred after June 17. 

After I departed the President's office I subsequently went to a meet- 
ing with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss the matter further. The 
sum and substance of that discussion was that the way to handle this 
now was for Mitchell to step forward and if ilitchfll were to step 
forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those in- 
volved in the White House in the coverup. 

Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called Mitchell and asked him 
to come down the next day for a meeting with the President on the 
Watergate matter. 

In tlie late afternoon of March 21, Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
and I had a second meeting with the President. Before entering this 
meeting- I had a brief discussion in the President's outer office of the 
E.xecutive Office Building suite with Haldeman in which I told him 
that we had two options: 

One is that this thing goes all the way and deals with both the pre- 
activities and the postactivities, or the second alternative: if the 
coverup was to proceed we would have to draw the wagons in a circle 
around the White House and that the White House protect itself. 
I told Haldeman that it had been the "White House's assistance to the 
reelection committee that had gotten us into much of this problem and 
now the only hope would be to protect ourselves from further 
involvement. 

The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me 
because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the '\^Tiite House 
was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and I were sitting at a small table in front of the Presi- 
dent in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time 
said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman. Ehrlich- 
man. and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of iustice and that 
was the reason I disagreed with all that was being discussed at that 
point in time. 

I could tell that both Haldeman. and particularly Ehrlichman, were 
very imhappy with my comments. I had let them verv clearlv know 
that I was not going to participate in the matter anv further and that 
I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling 
the truth. 

I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible to per- 
petuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the 
President out in front. 



^[eetixg of ^ilAHcn 2-2 

The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after Ixmch 
witli tlie President with Ehrlichman, Haldeman. Mitcliell, and myself. 
Mr. Mitchell came to Washington that morning foi- a meeting in 
Haldeman's office in which Ehrlichman, ^Mitchell, Haldeman, and 



(1143) 



r 



I 



69.5 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY^ JUNE 25, 26, 197Z, 2 SSC 1000, 1092 

1092 

Senator jMoxtoya. "WTio devised the shelter of executive privilege 
as part of the coverup ? 

Air. Deax. Well, the — I wouldn't say there was a conscious decision 
at any point in time to use executive privilege as a part of the coverup. 
It was always in existence with regard to \\liite House staff because 
no one, the President's policy was he didn't want the staff coming up. 
It began to take a very severe focus during the — first of all, during the 
Patman hearings that if push had gotten to shove in those hearings 
that privilege would have been declared on Timmons and myself. 

Senatoi Moxtota. You mean to tell me that you and Mr. Haldeman 
and Mr. Ehrlichman didn't discuss the use of executive privilege? 

ifr. Deax. Yes, sir ; I was getting to that. 

Senator Moxtota. As a coverup ? 

Mr. Deax. That was the first time it had occurred when there was 
some discussion of it that was with regard to the Patman hearings in 
late September or early October. That was the only congressional 
problem that arose. It was during the Gray hearings when my name 
moved to the information front that we began discussing using or 
litigating with Dean the issue of executive privilege, possibly being 
the strongest, and these were the discussions I had with the President 
whereas if we were litigating the matter with Mr. Dean there would 
be no other witnesses from the White House who would have to appear 
because he would have the perfect reason that this mattec. is under 
litigation. 

Senator Ervix\ We will take a 5 minute recess to vote. 

[Recess.] 

Senator ER^^^^ The committee will resume. 

Senator Moxtota. Mr. Dean, I only have three or four questions to 
ask of you. I want to clear this matter up with respect to ilr. Mitchell. 
On pages 225 and 226 of your statement, you mention that there was 
a move afoot at the TVhite House to try to get ilr. Mitchell to accept 
the blame for the entire affair. Now, can you tell me who the prime 
mover of this attempt was at the White House ? 

Mr. De.\x. It is very difficult for me to say who the prime mover 
was. At the time this first was discussed, it was after I had reported 
to the President on the 21st what I thought were the implications of 
this entire matter and subsequently, I had a meeting with Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman and then another meeting with the President. It was 
early discussion — I recall one particular incident that occurred out- 
side of the President's Office before he went into a meeting in -which T 
said that there are two options. One is everything pre and post is going 
to have to be laid out or, second, the White House is going to have 
to surround itself with wagons and start protecting itself. It was in 
subsequent discussions with the President when it was evolving that 
I was argiiing that both pre and post had to be disclosed, but there 
was evol\ in<j Hie thought at that point in time that if we merelv deal 
with the pre situation, that the post might go away. I did not believe 
lliat and .t was really when tiie Pivsideiitial partv came back from 
California that early discussions of this concept had evolved into a firm 
policy. 

So I also mentioned that there was a meetmg on tlie 2-2d where 
Mr. Mitchell came down. I assumed at that time that Mr. Ehrlichman 
and Mr. Haldeman were going to do soinetluug to try to bring Mr. 



(1144) 



r 



L 



69.6 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 30, 197 Z, 7 SSC 2899 

2899 

Senator Baker. "Would you supply us with copies or the orii^inal so 
that we could have copies? 

Mr. Haldemax. I believe 

Senator Baker. I understand — has a copy been supplied to the com- 
mittee? 

Mr. Dash. It is being reproduced now. 

Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ervix. You may proceed with your original statement. 

Mr. Haldeman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and I met with the President later that 
afternoon of the 21st. That meeting dealt with the questions of the 
grand jury, the Senate committee, and executive privilege in connec- 
tion with gathering the facts and getting them out, I think there was 
some discussion of Ehrlichman's theory that everybody should go to 
the grand jury ; and Dean's reaction that that would be fine as long 
as we had immunity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall, very strongly shot 
down that thought from Dean saying it did not make any sense at all. 
Dean has testified that he argued that the way to get the truth out 
would be to send everybody to the grand jury with immunity. That, in 
itself, is rather indicative of the different attitudes. Mr. Ehrlichman 
was arguing for going to the grand jury without immunity in order 
to get the truth out. iVIr. Dean was arguing for going to the grand 
jury with immunity to get the truth out. 

I recall an incident after that afternoon meeting that Mr. Dean also 
recalls, but he says it took place before and he sees it a little bit dif- 
ferently. I remember that Dean and Ehrlichman and I were standing 
on the top of the steps of the EOB, the Executive Office Building, out- 
side the President's office. Dean said, sort of thoughtfully, that maybe 
the solution to this whole thing was to draw the wagons around the 
White House and let all the chips fall where they may, because that 
would not hurt anyone in the Wliite Hous(!, nobody here had a prob- 
lem — but his question was : "VVliat would that do in the way of creating 
problems for Mitchell and Magruder? The significance of that com- 
ment was that it still seemed to be clear in Dean's mind that the prob- 
lem did not lie in the White House. 

The next step was the meeting of Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Dean, and 
myself the next day with the President. 

The four of us met first in the morning in my office and had some 
discussion of Dean's report to the President, although not in any de- 
tail. Most of the discussion was regarding approaches to dealing with 
the situation rather than a review of the facts of the situation. 

Mitchell turned the discussion to the problem of executive privilege, 
and he argued very strongly that the positiou the President had taken 
and was maintaining regarding execufciv-e priviler appeared to the 
public to be a coveaip on the part of the Pro ^ .nC and that it was 
bad politics, bad public relations, and a bad idea. Dean at that meeting 
again argued his idea of everybody going to the grand jury with im- 
munity in order to get the facts out. 

That was the day the news report, was received regarding Pat Gray 
accusing Dean of having been a liar in som? report he had given to the 
FBI. That interrupted the meeting and there was some discussion 
about it. 



(1145) 



70. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 from 5:20 to 6:01 p.m. the 

President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. The following is an 

index to certain of the subjects discussed in the course of the March 21, 

1973 afternoon meeting: 

Transcript Page 

Possibility of testimony before 

a new Grand Jury or before an 

independent panel established ,. 

to investigate facts 1-A, 21-22 

Possibility of pardon or 

clemency for Hunt 5-6 

What was being done about 

Hunt's demand 6-7 

Existence of persons with 

knov/ledge 7-8 

Written report by Dean on which 

President at some later time 

could be shown to have relied 12-19, 23, 30-32 

Ellsberg search and seizure may 

be sufficient for mistrial 20 

Possibility of Magruder, Chapin, 

Dean and Haldeman going to jail 25-28 

Possibility of Mitchell stepping 

forward and making some kind of 

disclosure 35 



Page 

70.1 Tape recording of conversation among the 
President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman 
and John Dean, March 21, 1973, 5:20 - 6:01 
p.m., and House Judiciary Committee tran- 
script thereof 1148 



(1147) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M. 1-38 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF 

FOR THE 

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 

OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG 

THE PRESIDENT, JOHN DEAN, JOHN EHRLICHMAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN 

ON 
MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 5:20 TO 6;01 P.M. 



(1148) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.:, 1-Z8 

TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF A 
RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, 
JOHN DEAN, JOHN EHRLICHMAN AND H. R. HALDEMAN 
ON MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 5:20 TO 6;01 P.M. 



PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] to this morning. 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, you go round and round and you come up with all 
questions and no answers. Backed up where you were at 
when you started. 

PRESIDENT: That's where we were this morning. Well, uh, anything 
additional to rush here? 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I, I just don't think that the immunity thing 
will wash. 



PRESIDENT: 



And the Grand Jury. 



EHRLICHMAN: It may, if you come to — 

HALDEMAN: Well, the immunity [unintelligible] problems. 

EHRLICHMAN: Well under this procedure of John's, uh, John's grand 

jury package was, uh, was, uh, uh , to give immunity, you 
know, to various witnesses who go before the Grand Jury. 
I, I think we have to figure that that is out of the 
picture. I just don't think that it, that it can be 
carried off. 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 30 



(1149) 



70,1 TMnSCRIVT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

HALDEMAN: Well, either the Grand Jury or you can try by setting up 
a special panel, 'cause you — 

DEAN: The special panel could investigate and report back on 

the whole thing. Have them [unintelligible] immunize 

witnesses so that all the information can be obtained, 
and , uh — 

PRESIDENT: Maybe the appointment of a Presidential panel? 

DEAN: I would think it would be too — well that would take 
special legislation to get immunity powers, whereas 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

DEAN: the Department of Justice right now possesses the, the 
ability to grant immunity. 

PRESIDENT: Well, let's take the Grand Jury without immunity, what 
about that? 



DEAN: 



Well — 



PRESIDENT: That was your idea of getting out of it. 

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. Well, I think that, uh, uh, is still a possibility. 
It leads to some very drastic results. Counsel over here 
reads the statutes, and, uh, there are awful opportunities 
for indictment, and, uh — So, uh. 



-2- 



(1150) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.^ 1-38 
DEAN: Yeah, 

EHRLICHMAN: you end up with people in and out of the White House 
indicted for various, for various offenses. [Unin- 
telligible] overlaid. 



HALDEMAN : 



[Unintelligible] still plenty of these guys [unintelligible] 



EHRLICHMAN: That's right. Now the other, now the other route — 

PRESIDENT: That is, if we're not, not mentioning that, uh — 

EHRLICHMAN: I wouldn't, uh, I wouldn't spend too much time with 

that. I, I give up there. Uh, the other route would 
be two papers, or possibly three, and these papers would 
say, "Mr. President, you asked me about this thing. 
Here's my, here's my review of the facts." And, uh, 
I think we disagree as to whether or not that's a 
viable option or not. I, I think you could get out 
a fairly credible document that would stand up, and 
that will have the effect of trimming the scope, and 
would have the effect of maybe becoming the battle- 
ground on a reduced scope, which I think is important. 
But, uh, the big danger in the Ervin hearings, as I 
see it, is that they will, they will run out, uh, leads 
into areas that, that it would be better not to have to 
get into. But, uh, if, uh, Baker, you know, under his 
direction — Uh, and if you could put out a basic 



-3- 
(1151) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

document that would, uh , define a limited set of issues, 
uh, even if you, you don't try to concentrate on target, 
you just might have something, some — but obviously, 
you haven't any way of imposing a lot of s — 

PRESIDENT: But, does, uh, does anybody, uh, really think, really 
think that really we should do nothing? That's the 
other, I mean, that's, that's the option, period. 
If, uh — keep fighting it out on this ground if it 
takes all summer. 



HALDEMAN : 



Which it will. 



PRESIDENT: That's the other thing, whether we're going to, say. to 
contain the thing. 

EHRLICHM^\N: Well, we've talked about that. We talked about, uh, 

possible opportunities in the Senate, that, that may turn 
up that we don't foresee now. In other words, that you 
go in and start playing for the odds. Keep trying to 
put out fires here and there. The problem of the Hunt 
thing and, and,uh, possibly McCord and some of these 
other people breaking is there's no, uh, there is, 
there's no, uh, sign off on that ever. It just goes 
on and on and on . 



-4- 



(1152) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 2973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.. 1-28 
PRESIDENT: That's right. Well if that's the case then, uh, what 
is your view as to what we should do now about Hunt, 
and so forth? 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, my, my view is that, that, uh. Hunt's interests 
lie in getting a pardon if he can. That ought to be, 
somehow or another, one of the options that he is most 
particularly concerned about. Uh , his, his indirect 
contacts with John don't contemplate that at all. Well, 
maybe they, maybe they contemplate it, but they say 
there's going [unintelligible] 



PRESIDENT: 



I know. 



HALDEMAN: That's right. 



EHRLICHMAN: They think that that's already understood. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



EHRLICHMAN : Uh 



PRESIDENT: I mean he's got to get that by Christmas time. 



DEAN: 



That's right. But, uh 



EHRLICHMAN: And if he doesn't, obviously, uh, he's got to figure it 
gets crosswise. 

PRESIDENT: If that blows. 



EHRLICHMAN: If that blows and, and that's, it seems to me, that the, 
uh — although at lea — It obviously is understood, that 

-5- 
(1153) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

he has really gone over the ground with his attorney 
that's in there. 



PRESIDENT: However, can he, by talking, uh, get pardoned? Get, 
get clemency from the court? 



DEAN: 



That's one of the options he's obviously looking at now. 
He comes in and tells this judge before sentencing, "Your 
Honor" — and the judge is likely to call him in before 
sentencing — and says, "Your Honor, I am willing to tell 
all. Uh, I don't want to go to jail. I have pleaded 
guilty to an offense. I'll take that plea. I don't 
want to go to jail. I'll cooperate with you and the 
government in any way possible. I'll tell you every- 
thing I know." I think the judge probably, uh , uh, would 
look upon that very favorably, it would pay somebody to 
tell him. 



EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



So then, now — so the point we have to, the bridge you 
have to cut, uh, cross there is, uh, which you've got 
to cross, I understand, quite soon, is whether, uh, we, 
uh, what you do about, uh, his present demand. Now, what, 
what, uh, what [unintelligible] about that? 

Well, apparently Mitchell and, and, uh, uh, 



-6- 



(1154) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 2973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-28 
UNIDENTIFIED: LaRue . 

DEAN: LaRue are now aware of it, so they know what he is 
feeling. 

PRESIDENT: True. [Unintelligible] do something. 

DEAN: I, I have, I have not talked with either. I think 
they are in a position to do something, though. 

PRESIDENT: It's a long road, isn't it? I mean, the way you look 

back on that, as John has pointed out here is that that's 
a, that's a, that's a long road. 



HALDEMAN : 



It sure is. 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



For all of us, for all of us. I mean, what the hell 
you going to do? That's why you're, that's why you, 
you're sort of wrestling with the idea of moving in 
another direction. 

That's right. Uh, 'cause it's not only that group, but 
within this circle of people who have tidbits of knowledge, 
there are a lot of weak individuals and any one of those could 
cause it to blow: the secretary to Gordon Liddy, uh. 



PRESIDENT: Sloan. 



DEAN: 



the secretary to, uh, to Jeb Magruder, 



(1155) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
PRESIDENT: Sloan. 



DEAN: 



Chuck Colson's secretary, [unintelligible] before the 
Senate Committee. And it's not, it's not only one 
forum. There's the civil suit filed by O'Brien which, 
uh, for some reason we can't get settled. They are 
holding on to it. They are going to have rather intense 
civil discovery. They may well work hand in glove with 
that Senate Committee. They're going to go out and take 
depositions and start leaking things and there'll be in- 
consistencies. Leak what's in the transcript of one and 
see who breaks out in the other. There are all kinds of 
things they've got going right now that, uh, would mean, 
uh, [unintelligible] hold this thing together. And the 
other thing I must say I've noticed is there is a, 
there's an attitude that has grown amongst all the 
people that have been involved in this thing to protect 
their own behinds. And they're going to start going and 
hiring counsel. 



HALDEMAN; 



Yeah. They've started to do that. 



DEAN: 



Oh yeah. Uh, Dwight, for example, now wants a lawyer; 
uh, uh, Kalmbach has hired himself a lawyer; Colson has 
retained a lawyer; and now that we've [unintelligible] 
enough to know that self-protection is setting in. 



-8- 



(1156) 



70 



2 TRANSCEIPT OF MAFCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 



PRESIDENT: Well, let's not trust them. 



DEAN: 



Surely. 



PRESIDENT: Maybe we face the situation, but we can't do a 

damned thing about the participants who are going 
to get it eventually, [unintelligible] why not now? 



DEAN: 



Well, that 



PRESIDENT: That's, that's what you're sort of resigned to do. 



DEAN: 



Well, my thought is that if it's going to come it should 
come in a way that would not harm you and, uh, the indi- 
viduals bear a part of it. 



PRESIDENT: Well, we don't want to harm the people either. That's 
my concern. Well — survives them. Well, we can't, 
we can't harm the, uh, these young people I mean I'm 
damned concerned about all these people that were all 
working in 



DEAN: 



For my part — 



PRESIDENT: whatever they considered to be the best interests of the 
country, and so forth. I've never, I haven't any 
question as to — 



HALDEMAN: 



That's right, we don't have any question here of some guy 



-9- 



(1157) 



[Several 
Voices. J 



70.1 TBANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
stashing money is his pocket. 

[Unintelligible] 



PRESIDENT: 



HALDEMAN: 



PRESIDENT ; 



DEAN: 



[Unintelligible] it isn't something, it isn't it isn't 
something like Hiss, for example, God damned treason. 
SoiTiething [unintelligible] 

Or like Sherman Adams, doing it for his own comfort, 
or uh, Albert Fall, doing it for his own enrichment. 

Yeah. That's right. That's the point. That's why I say 
I'm, I'm going to take a lot of the heat. [Coughs] Well, 
we have to realize that, uh , the attrition is going to be 
rather considerable. That, that's your point, isn't it? 

I think it, it's hard to prevent. Now, that's why 
I raise the point of, of this immunity concept again. 
That would take a lot of heat. Obviously, the immunity 
might — But it also [unintelligible] you find cannot be 
structured, that you're con — , you're concerned about, 
there's something lurking here that has been brought to your 
attention of recent. Uh, now is the time to get the facts. 
People have been protecting themselves. Dean couldn't get 
all the information. People wouldn't give it to him. Uh, 
there are indications now that there are other things, and 
you'd like to get all this information and lay it before the 



-10- 



(1158) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.^ 1-38 

public, but it's not going to come out if people are going 
to go take the Fifth Amendment before a grand jury. It'll 
never be proved. I — 

PRESIDENT: And it isn't going to come out of a connittee. 

DEAN: It's not going to come out of a committee, either. Uh , 
for those reasons — 

PRESIDENT: Not in a fair way, that's the point. 

DEAN: True. That's right. Now — Or it may never come out. 
They may — They will probably never get it out either, 
regardless of how clever they are. But now's the time to 
pull it up, all out [unintelligible] 

EHRLICHMAN: Plus, they're not going to have the key witnesses. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



UNIDENTIFIED: That's right. 



DEAN: 



So therefore, you select a panel of, say the Deputy Attor- 
ney General, the head of the Criminal Division, the head 
of the Civil Division, something like that. You call over 
everybody in the White House, and tell them that we want, 
"I have been instructed by the President, ws-' re' to put 
together exactly what happened. You won't be prosecuted 
for it because, uh, that's not the point now. The point 
is to get out all this information." And then you will 

-11- 



(1159) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
make a decision, based on what you learn, whether people 

can remain in the government or not. And if it's bad, uh, 

they'll be removed, they'll be forced to resign. If it's 

something that, uh, is palatable, they'll go on with 

their job. 

HALDEMAN: The hue and cry would be that "This is, this is a super 
cover-up. Before they were just trying to cover up the 
the information. Now they realize they've got guilty 
people, so they, they've immunized them so that they can't 
be prosecuted." 



DEAN: 



I'm not just sure how many people would come out guilty. 



EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, well [unintelligible]. The perception is the 
important thing. 



PRESIDENT; 



Yeah, but the point is, were we talking — 



DEAN; 



All right, is that, is that better? Or is it better to 
have, you know, just, just keep going and have the thing 
build up and all of a sudden collapse? And, and people 
get indicted, and people, uh, get tarnished. 



PRESIDENT : 



After we've stonewalled it? 



DEAN: After we've stonewalled it, and after the President's 
been accused of covering up that way. 



-12- 
(1160) 



70.2 TRANSCEIPT OF MARCH 22, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 



PRESIDENT: That's the point. 



EHRLICHMAN: Or is there another way? 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah, like 



EHRLICHMAN: Like the, the Dean statements, where the President then 
makes a full disclosure of everything which he then has. 
And is in a position if it does collapse at a later time 
to say, "Jesus, I had the FBI, and the Grand Jury, and I had 
my own counsel. I turned over every rock I could find. And 
I rested my confidence in these people in good faith and 
it's obvious now — " 

PRESIDENT: The middle ground taken would be — I mean, I've been around, 
we've been around on that one quite a bit, the middle ground 
would be that, uh, I mean, uh, naturally you, you having 
to live through it, have to be a bit sensitive about the 
way we're going to, we're --- but I ■ — That doesn't concern 
me. I mean it doesn't concern me, and I don't — I think 
as far as the public is concerned, it won't do much. Uh, 
if you as the White House Counsel, John, uh, on direction 
— uh, I ask for a, a written report, which I think, uh , 
that — which is very general, understand. Understand, 
[laughs] I don't want to get all that God damned specific. 
I'm thinking now in far more general terms, having in mind 
the fact that the problem with a specific report is that, 



-13- 



(1161) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

uh, this proves this one and that one that one, and you 
just prove something that you didn't do at all. But 
if you make it rather general in terms of my — your 
investigation indicates that this man did not do it, 
this man did not do it, this man did do that. You are 
going to have to say that, John, you know, like the, uh, 
Segretti-Chapin — 



DEAN: 



Urn huh. 



PRESIDENT: That has to be said. And, uh, and, so forth. And that 
under the circumstances, that, uh, grinds the man. 

EHRLICHMAN: Could he do this? To give some weight to that, could you 
attach as an appendix a list of the FBI reports to which 
you had access: interview with Kalmbach, interview with 
Segretti, interview with Chapin, and Magruder, and whoever, 
Dean, the whole business. So that the President at some 
later time is in a position to say, "I relied." 



DEAN: 



Not on Dean alone but on corroborated evidence [unin- 
telligible] 



EHRLICHMAN: That's right. It also helps with the Gray situation be- 
cause it shows the use made of the FBI reports by you. 
He's reporting to the President. He can say in there, 
"I have not disclosed the contents of these to anybody 
else." 



-14- 



(1162) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197Z MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 2-38 
PRESIDENT: "Yes, I was, had access to reports for the purpose of 

carrying out your Instructions to find out whether — " Be- 
cause that is true. I've had — You're the man I have asked 
"Well, now, who the hell has been involved here." You re- 
ported it before, found that there was no reflection on 
anybody [unintelligible] at this point. Uh, but, uh — 

UNIDENTIFIED: [Unintelligible] 

EHRLICHMAN: I think that the President's in a stronger position later, 
and the Presidency is in a stronger position later if he 
can be shown to have justifiably relied on you at this 
point in time. 

DEAN: Well, there's the argument now that Dean's credibility is 
in question, uh, as a result of the Gray hearings. Maybe 
I shouldn't do it. Maybe someone who has — 

EHRLICHMAN: This will rehabilitate you, though. Your credibility — 

PRESIDENT: No, as a matter of fact, John, I don't think your credi- 
bility is in much jeopardy. Sure, you're under attack, 
but they want you up there to testify. I don't think it's 
the credibility. They want you to testify. I, uh, I would 
not be too sensitive about that. I think that you would, 
you'd make a hell of a good impression, really. 



EHRLICHMAN : 



Beyond that, you can, you can help your, your participation 



-15- 



(1163) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21^ 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:02 P.M., 1-38 

in the interviews by saying, uh, that, in addition to 
having seen the, uh, FBI synopses, you were present at 
the time of the interview of a number 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



EHRLICHMAN: of these witnesses, and 

PRESIDENT: That's right. 

EHRLICHMAN: you yourself conducted interviews of others — 

PRESIDENT: "I conducted interviews of the following people. I 

didn't, didn't, didn't," uh — I'm Just trying to think 
about it. Huh? 

HALDEMAN: Turn all that into a puzzle. 

EHRLICHMAN: Absolutely. 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

EHRLICHMAN: You were doing this in furtherance 

PRESIDENT: Right. 

EHRLICHMAN: of your role — 

PRESIDENT: That's right. And also, that you, that there's been such 

a, a lot of crap put out about, uh, what you have done that. 



-16- 



(1164) 



70.1 TRANSCBIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

uh, without referring to the fact, without being a bit 
defensive about it, uh, that, you know, that you, you in- 
tended to do the letter. The letter — which would not 
be a letter to Eastland. I think that at this point it 
would be a letter from Dean to me. And you'd say that, 
"Now that the," — and you would base it on the fact, 
"Now that the hearings, now that the Watergate is, is 
done, I can now give a report about any progress of — " 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, that's what you should say. In other words, he gives 
the report because you asked him for it, regardless of the 
timeliness. 



DEAN: 



Yeah, the only problem with that 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: is that if Hunt and — not Hunt but, excuse me, Liddy and 
McCord are still out on appeal, they may not be sentenced 
on Friday — 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



DEAN: 



-- they still haven't come out the way 



EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. Well, all right. Then I would not get into that. 
I think you could say that, you could say, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



-17- 



(1165) 



35-905 (PI. 2) O - 74 - 31 



70.1 TMNSCRIFT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
EHRLICHMAN: uh, "1 have a report. I don't mind showing it to Ervin. 
I wouldn't want ±t published because some fellow's trial 
— The case is still around." 

PRESIDENT: Right. Well, let me say, the problem with that is, uh, 

I don't believe that helps on our cause. In light of the 
fact that — well, uh, let me just — I am not sure, maybe 
I am wrong — the fact that the President says, "I've shown 
Ervin the report.'' VJe've got to remember that we have, we have 
nobody there. I think something has to [unintellip,ible] where, 

EHRLICHMAN: Fine. [Unintelligible] 

PRESIDENT: where we can put out something to the public. 

HALDEMAN: If you're worried about the timeliness, and trying to 
hang it to the — on the sentencing, we don't really 
have to do that. We're going to say we just ignore the 
trial, 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: and say you have been — and we've been, the, this — we 
want it established anyway Dean has given you a report. 
We, we basically said it's an oral report. You can put 
the thing that Dean has kept you posted from time to time 
with periodic oral reports as, uh, on this thing, as, as it^ 
uh, uh, it becomes available 



-18- 



(1166) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
DEAN: Right. 

HALDEMAN: and so forth. You have asked him 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

HALDEMAN: now, uh, to summarize those. 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



HALDEMAN i 



uh, into, uh , 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



HALDEMAN; 



an overall summary. 



PRESIDENT: Overall summary, and I am making the report available 
to the Ervin Committee. Very public. 



[Several 
Voices. ] 



[Unintelligible] 



PRESIDENT: And, and, and I again offer the Ervin Committee, I offer 
the Ervin Committee, uh, I'd say, "Dear Senator Ervin," 
I'd say, "Here, here is the report, it is before your 
hearings. I want you to have it, complete access, and, as 
I have said previously, that any, any questions that are 
not answered here, any member of the White House staff, 
they will be directed to answer any, uh. 



HALDEMAN: 



informal 



-19- 



(1167) 



70.1 TMNSCRIPT OF MARCH 21^ 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



HALDEMAN : 



Good. 



PRESIDENT: on that basis." Well, we've run that by before, John. 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, we've said it's formal and informal 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

EHRLICHMAN: in the statement and that's uh , 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

EHRLICHMAN: [unintelligible] 

PRESIDENT: Yeah. 

EHRLICHMAN: But let's suppose you did the damn — I mean, you did 
it as to the burglary, and you did it as to — 

PRESIDENT: Segretti. 

EHRLICHMAN: and you make some passing reference to money, correct? 
And then you send her up there. Uh , then let's suppose 
Hunt blows at some time. Our position on that is that, 
uh , "Hunt was an investigator. He was sent out to 
do an investigation on Ellsberg. Uh , when we discovered 
what he was up to, we stopped him." [Coughs] Now, I 
suppose that lets Ellsberg out, that's an illegal search 



20 



(1168) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

and search and seizure that may be sufficient at least 
for a mistrial, if not for a — 

PRESIDENT: Isn't it damn near through yet? 

EHRLICHMAN: Pardon? 



PRESIDENT: 



Isn't that case about finished? 



EHRLICHMAN: Oh, it'll go on a while yet. Uh 



HALDEMAN: 



Can he get a mistrial after a conviction? 



EHRLICHMAN: Yeah, sure. Uh, well, let's, let's suppose that 
occurred. Uh , that was a national security situ- 
ation. Uh, Hunt exercised bad judgment, and I think 
it's arguable that he should never have been permitted 
to go to the Committee after that episode, having, 
having, uh, reflected on his judgment that way. But, 
uh, beyond that, the question is, did we, did we 
authorize it, did we condone it. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



EHRLICHMAN: 



did we 



PRESIDENT: Yeah. 



-21- 



(1169) 



70.1 TEMSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 
EHRLICHMAN: support it? And that kind of thing. 

PRESIDENT: And that's that part of it. Getting back to the, uh, 
getting back to this, John, uh, you still sort of tilt 
to the panel idea yourself? 



DEAN: 



EHRLICHMAN : 



Well, I'm still, I see in, in this conversation the 
things that we've, you know, thought of before, 
we've talked about before. But they do not ulti- 
mately solve what I see as the grave problem of 
a cancer growing around the Presidency, and that 
the cancer is going to continue to grow. This is 
just another thing that gives a problem. It does 
not clean the problem out. 

Well, but doesn't it give, doesn't it permit the 
President to clean it out at such time as it does 
come up? By saying, "Indeed, I relied on it. 
And now this, this later thing turns up, and I 
don't condone that. And if I'd known about that 
before, obviously, I wouldn't have done it. And 
I'm going to move on it now." 



-22- 



(1170) 



70.1 TMNSCRIPr OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.^ 1-38 

PRESIDENT: Your point, John, is the, the — You really think 
you've got to clean the cancer out now, right? 



DEAN: 



Yes sir. 



PRESIDENT: And, uh, how would you do that? You come 
back again for another round. You see no 
other, you see no other way that, uh, you, 
you, you — without the, without setting a, 
without breaking down on executive privilege, of 
course . 



DEAN: 



I see that, yeah, yeah, there are a couple of ways 
to do it. 



PRESIDENT: You certainly don't want to do it at the Senate, 
though, do you? 



DEAN: 



No sir. 



PRESIDENT: All right. 



DEAN: 



I think that would be an added trap. 



PRESIDENT: That's the, that's the worst thing. All right. 



-23- 



(1171) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197 Z MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:02 P.M., 2-38 
DEAN: Uh — 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



We've got to do it. 

We've got to do it. You have to do it, to get the 
credit for it. Uh, that, that gets you above it. Uh, 
as I see it, that means people getting hurt, and I 
hope we can find the answer to that problem. 

EHRLICHMAN: All right, suppose we did this? Supposing you rendered 
a report to the President on everything you know about 
this. And the President then fires some people. Step 
one. Step two, sends the report over to the Justice 
Department, then says, "I've been diligently at work on 
this. My counsel's been diligently at work. Here are 
his findings ." 

PRESIDENT: Where would you stop it? With, uh, Magruder over in 
Commerce? 

EHRLICHMAN: Christ, I don't know where it stops. You know, uh — 



UNIDENTIFIED: [Unintelligible] Ziegler? 



EHRLICHMAN: Christ, that's — 



HALDEMAN: 



It's probably going to be with Magruder 



PRESIDENT; 



No. 



HALDEMAN; 



[unintelligible] send it over to Justice. 



-24- 



(1172) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.^ 1-38 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, if you send the report over, it just says Magruder 
did this and this. 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, yeah, but — 



EHRLICHMAN: Well, that's what he's, that's what he is talking about. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



PRESIDENT: 



And then Magruder, though, is a, is a fellow that's a 



EHRLICHMAN: a free agent, at this point. 



PRESIDENT: 



EHRLICHMAN: 



is a free agent, according to John, who'd say, uh 
he'd pull others down with him. 

Sure . 



DEAN: 



Well, now, what you, what you do — 



HALDEMAN: You don't know that he would, but you sure as hell have 
got to assume he would. 

EHRLICHMAN: Why, of course. 



DEAN; 



I think what you could do is you could drop numbers, 
with names on them, in a hat, you can draw them out to 
see who gets hurt and who doesn't. [Laughs] Well, that's 
about as fair as you could be. 



EHRLICHMAN: 



The minute you — 



PRESIDENT: 



Strachan. Do the same to him with it. 



25 - 



(1173) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21. 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.. 1-38 
DEAN: Strachan? 

PRESIDENT: Maybe. Not so much. 

UNIDENTIFIED: Maybe Jeb . 



DEAN: 



[Unintelligible] I think he has a problem. 



PRESIDENT: Uh, the problem of knowledge of it. 

HALDEMAN: He has a problem of knowledge. Magruder has a problem 
of action. 

PRESIDENT: Action and perjury. 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, Strachan found the money. That's the problem. 



DEAN: 



No. 



HALDEMAN: 



Not really. 



DEAN: The thing that we'd like, you know, to happen, if 

possible, to do this, is — Hunt has now sent a black- 
mail request directly to the White House. 

PRESIDENT: Who did he send it to? You? 



DEAN; 



Yeah. 



PRESIDENT: Or to me? 



DEAN: 



To your counsel. 



26 - 



(1174) 



70. 1 TEA^SCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh huh. 



HALDEMAN : 



That's the interesting kind of thing, there's something 
there that maybe we blow it all up that way, and there 
go all the — and everything starts going in a whole 
new direction. 



DEAN: 



That would hurt but he's, he's coimnitting an offense. 
Right there. That is blackmail. 



HALDEMAN: Yeah, John, but where does that take you? That takes you 
to your support of other people who are not fully 
aware of the [unintelligible] anyway. 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



HALDEMAN : 



But we didn't know about that. 



UNINDENTIFIED: That's a fact. We're above that. 



DEAN: 



But, then, again, you have to get the problem of people, 
what they're going to say — [whistles]. 



EHRLICHMAN: Well, if you go your route, you can't draw the line 
someplace — 



DEAN: 



No, no. 



EHRLICHMAN : 



You can't then say, you know, we're going to, we're going 



-27- 



(1175) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

to reserve that, we've got to let it all — 

PRESIDENT: You see, if you go your route of the ca — , of getting, 
cutting, cutting the cancer out, the question is would 
you cut it out now is, uh , is, is, is, uh — - Take a Hunt. 



DEAN: 



Well 



PRESIDENT: 



You [unintelligible] — knock the hell out of him, don't 



you.' 



DEAN: 



That's right. 



HALDEMAN: 



Well, if you take your route and it goes slightly 
[unintelligible] you have a certainty, almost, of 
Magruder going to jail. Chap in going to jail, you 
going to jail, 



PRESIDENT: 



No. 



HALDEMAN: 



probably me going to jail, 



PRESIDENT: 



Uh, again, I question the last two, 



HALDEMAN: 



Certainly Chapin. Certainly Strachan. No, not really. 



DEAN: 



Not necessarily, uh 



UNIDENTIFIED: Not Chapin. 



HALDEMAN: 



Chapin and Strachan are clean. Well, so is Strachan. 



-28- 



(1176) 



70.1 TRANS CRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M 2-38 

EHRLICHMAN: I think Strachan is hooked on, on this money. 

PRESIDENT: What money was that? 

EHRLICHMAN: He is an accessory in a, in a undeclared campaign 
fund. 

HALDEMAN: That's no — That, that's — The only guy responsible 
for that is the treasurer. 

EHRLICHMAN: I know. 



HALDEMAN : 



Sure. 



EHRLICHMAN: 



But not under the law. 



PRESIDENT: 



EHRLICHMAN: 



DEAN: 



Well that was un--, undeclared for awhile, I think it 
was '70, '68. 

Yeah. But then it got back into the coffers and, uh, 
was used in this campaign. 

Let's say, let's say the President sent me to the Grand 
Jury to make a report. Who would be, who would, who 
could I actually do anything to, or cause any problems 
for? As a practical matter, first-hand knowledge, uh, 
almost no one. All I could do is to give them a focus 
plus leads. 



-29- 



(1177) 



70.2 TRANSCRIPT OF MAPC H 21. 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:02 P.M., 1-38 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. Right. 



HALDEMAN: 



Then they start following the leads. 



DEAN: 



That's right, and where they ultimately come down or 
— Well, there, there again, is, is, is the — We don't 
have anybody to talk to somebody who understands the 
process [unintelligible]. I was talking outside with 
Bob about Henry Petersen. Uh, we just have to have 
somebody talk to somebody that, that, can really break 
in and can say, "Henry, what does this mean in the 
criminal justice system? What kind of a case could 
be made on this? Uh, what kind of offenses would 
evolve out of that?" [Unintelligible] got a pretty 
good idea of most of the statutes that are involved, 
but there uh, there is so much behind the statutes. 



PRESIDENT: Do you want to bring him in? Talk to him? Well, if 
you do that, you will suit the Attorney General. 



DEAN: 



Well, you're putting in, you're putting in his 
knowledge — 



PRESIDENT: 



I see. 



DEAN: 



Uh, we'll have to play with that, 



-30- 



(1178) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.. 3 -.?;? 
HALDEMAN: If you do it hypothetically — 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Right. 

You've got, you've got this brother-in-law who has this 
problem in school. [Laughs] 

Yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



HALDEMAN: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



HALDEMAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



He told this wild scenario that I'd like you — 

Yeah. 

[Unintelligible]. My friend is writing a play, and 
unl<?ss he. uh — 



Uh, 
the 



but, it bothers me to do anything further now, in 
situation, when Hunt's our real hang-up. 



Well, now, do you think a statement orompts him? 

I 

! 

Yesl sir, I do. It doesn't solve it. It's just one more 
stef. 

i 
The payment to Hunt does too. 

The payment to Hunt does, yeah. 

Maybe that's what -- That's why I say. you know, somebody 
to assess the criminal liability. Maybe we are mis- 
assessing it. 



-31- 



(1179) 



70.1 TRA^SCEIPT OF MARCH 21, 2973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I really don't know, will Petersen — ? 
Would you confide in him? 



HALDEMAN: 



EHRLICHMAN: 



I think I would. 

How else? You could start down that road. You could 
say, "Henry, I want to, I want to talk to you about, 
uh, questions that arise in the course of my investiga- 
tion, but I have to swear you to secrecy." If he'll 
take it on that basis. 



DEAN: 



EHRLICHMAN: 



PRESIDENT : 



DEAN: 



There's the answer, of course, 'The President has told me 
never to say — I, uh , I want to know if you can talk to me 
off the record. ' [Unintelligible] 

You immediately eliminate one of your options. You 
can, well, you can eliminate the option of the President 
being able to take the position he knew nothing about 
it. 

Uh, so you, uh, you see then that, uh, you don't see 
the, uh, you don't see the statement thing, uh, uh, helping 
insofar as the, the — be of any way -•• the, uh — help- 
ing insofar as — 'cause if — you, you must — you 
think that over some more. 

Yes, sir. The idea is the temporary answer. 



-32- 



(1180) 



70.1 TMNSCRIFT OF MARCH 21, 197S MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:02 P.M., 1-38 

PRESIDENT; I agree with that. But the point is to, uh, but you 
see, here's the, the way I would see the statement 
that we could say we get out: Our — Everything we 
would intend to say or, or we could get out a general 
statement as I have already indicated, would get out 
a, with regard to the fact that we spent looking 
into the God damn thing, it's really — I mean, I've 
said it, we, we just can't, you, you know, withdraw, 
so let's forget a withdrawal at this point. Well, and 
secondly, again, the offer for White House people to 
cooperate so that we're not covering up, okay. And 
that still leaves it, however, in the hands of the 
Conunittee. I agree. A statement, at least, would, 
it's true, temporary, but it, uh , would indicate 
the President has looked into the matter, has had his 
counsel report to him and this is the result of that, 
uh, now let the Committee do their damnedest. We 
will cooperate. And the Committee will say, "No." 
And so we'll just stand right there. 



DEAN: 



Well, what will really [sighs], I think what will, will 
prompt a new problem will be Sirica giving a speech 
from the bench on Friday when he sentences. 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



-33- 



(1181) 



35-905 (Pt. 2) O - 74 - 32 



70.1 TEANSCBIPT OF MARCH 21, 1972 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 



DEAN: 



I think he will charge that he cannot believe the trial 
was conducted by the government presenting a limited 
case. That he is not convinced the case represents 
the full situation. 



HALDEMAN: 



In other words, uh 



DEAN: 



I know if that's the case it'll have a dramatic impact 
on the day of 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



sentencing with Sirica from the bench, 



That's right. 



DEAN: 



because he'll charge that there are higher-ups involved 
in this. He may take some dramatic action like, uh, you 
know, appoint a special prosecutor. Who knows? 



PRESIDENT: 



Can he do that? 



DEAN: 



Sure. I think he could. 



PRESIDENT: He could appoint a special prosecutor, for what? 
For — 



DEAN: 



To reopen the investigation. He is the presiding 
Judge. 



-34- 



(1182) 



70.1 TFANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M.^ 1-38 

HALDEMAN: He could go, he could convene a grand jury. Or he said 
he could. 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, the government is going to do that. Uh — 

The government's going to do that for what? 

Right after sentencing, the week, after sentencing they're 
going to take all the people who've been sentenced back 
before the Grand Jury — 

These same ones? 



DEAN: 



PRESIDENT: 



EHRLICHMAN: 



These same ones. And see if they want, now want to talk. 

Sirica may — put, you know, give them provisional 
sentences. And say if they are helpful to the govern- 
ment, back before the Grand Jury, he'll reconsider the 
sentences, [unintelligible] people horrendous sentences. 

Suppose — Horrendous sentences I think we can anticipate. 
But, but, suppose he does that? Then where, where does 
that leave us then, John? Where does that leave us? 
You just say — 

Well, I don't think that's a surprise to the defendants. 
I think their counsel must have prepared them for that. 



-35- 



(1183) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

PRESIDENT: I'm — right. I wonder, however, however, in terms of 

what about our, what about our position? In other words, 
we're damned by the courts before Ervin ever could get 
there. 

EHRLICHMAN: The, the only thing that we can say is for Ziegler to 
say, "Look, we've investigated backwards and forwards 
in the White House, and we're satisfied on the basis 
of the report we have that nobody in the White House 
has been involved in a burglary, nobody had notice of 
it, knowledge of it, participated in the planning, or 
^ aided or abetted it in any way." 



PRESIDENT: 



Well, that's what you could sa^^ 



EHRLICHMAN ; 



And it happens to be true, 



PRESIDENT: 



Yeah. 



EHRLICHMAN: as for that transaction. 



PRESIDENT: 



[Laughs] Sure. As for that transact 



ion. 



EHRLICHMAN: Right. 

PRESIDENT: Well, John, you, uh, you, uh, you must feel that's, uh, 
is enough. 



DEAN: 



No [unintelligible] 



-36- 



(1184) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 1973 MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

EHRLICHMAN: Now, let's, let's try another, let's try another con- 
commitant to that. Supposing Mitchell were to step out 
on that same day and were to say, "I've been doing 
some investigation at 1701 and I find so and so, and 
so and so." 

PRESIDENT: [Unintelligible] 

UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, sir. 

EHRLICHMAN: And I don't know what he would say, but maybe he'd 

want to make some kind of a disclosure. And then what? 

PRESIDENT: What the hell is he going to disclose that isn't going 
to blow something? Yeah. Well [unintelligible] 

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I'm going to have to — I [unintelligible] have to 
resolve it. 

PRESIDENT: I don't have any time. I'm sorry. I'm going to have to 
leave. What is there — What have you got here [unin- 
telligible]. Well, uh, you meet what time tomorrow? 



HALDEMAN: 



I am not sure. In the morning. 



DEAN: 



Morning . 



HALDEMAN: 



[Unintelligible] we will brood this out. 



-37- 



(1185) 



70.1 TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 21, 197 Z MEETING FROM 5:20 - 6:01 P.M., 1-38 

PRESIDENT: Fine. Well, sure. You come here [unintelligible]. 
We're going around. That's the way you have to do. 
Right. 



-38- 



(1186) 



71. On the evening of March 21, 1973 Fred LaRue caused approxi- 
mately $75,000 in cash to be delivered to William Bittman, attorney for 
E. Howard Hunt. Earlier that day LaRue had called Mitchell when Dean 
refused to authorize the payment to Hunt , and Mitchell had approved 
the payment to Hunt . 



Page 

71.1 Fred LaRue testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 13, 1974, 2-lOA (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1188 

71.2 Manyon Millican testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 13, 1974, 2-7 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1198 

71.3 Sherman Unger testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 19, 1974, 3-14 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1204 

71.4 Sherman Unger Grand Jury Exhibits SU-1 
through SU-7, February 19, 1974 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1216 

71.5 William Bittman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, August 3, 1973, 189-91, 194-96 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1226 

71.6 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, July 17, 1973, 95, 111-12 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1232 

71.7 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
February 14, 1974, 16 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 1235 

71.8 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1630-31 1236 



(1187) 



71.1 FRED LaRVE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-1 OA 2 



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PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon , 

FRED C. LARDE 
waa called as a witness, and, having first been duly sworn by 
the Foreman of the Grand Jury, was examined and testified as 
follows : 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q Would you state your full narae fortthe record, 
please? 

A Fred Chaney LaRue. 

Q Mr. LaRue, you are reappearing before this Grand 
Jury to answer questions which it believes relevant to its 
investigation . 

Mr. LaRue, do you recall an occasion in March of 
1973 when you participated in the delivery of approximately 
$75,000 in cash to a Mr. Willisun Bittman for the benefit of 
E. Howard H\int7 

A I do. 

Q Now if we could work backweurds from the delivery, do 
you recall how that delivery was effectuated? Who actually 
delivered the- money fco Mrr Bittman? 

A The money was delivered by Mr. Manyon Millican, 

Q Had Mr. Millican delivered money to Mr. Bittman at 
youx- request before that occasion? 

Ji Yes , that ' 3 true . 



11973 wl 



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(1188) 



71.1 FRED LaBUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-lOA 



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Q What waa Mr. MillicarT^ job at the time? 

A He was working for — I'm sorry. At that particular 
time I don't know if I could - i don't know his job status. 
At one time he was working for the Committee to Re-elect the 
President. When he went off the payroll over there I just 
don't know. 

Q Noiy on the evening that Mr. Millican deliver^dlthe 
money, can you recall what occurred prior to the time that 
you asked him to make this delivery? 

A Yes. I got a call from Mr. Dean, John Dean — 

Q 1 mean the evening itself, just prior to that. I 
think that we'll work backwards from there if that's helpful. 

A I had invited Mr. Millican over to my apartment for 
dinner. There were two other people present, my secretary. 
Miss Fredericks, and Sherman Unger. 
We had dinner and ~ 

Q Who is Mr. Dnger? 

A Mr. Dnger is a friend of mine. At one time he was 
with the Committee to Re-elect the President. 
Q Where is Mr. Unger from? 
A Cincinnati^ _QhioL. 

Q Do you recall whether Mr. Unger was in just for the 
day as far as what he told you? 

A That is my recollection, yes. 

Q And you had invited him for dinner in advance? 



DV 



(1189) 



71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY. 2-1 OA A 
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A That Is correct, yes. Not in advance of that day. 
He called me that day when he czima to town, and I invited him 
to dinner. 



Q Now you had dinner with Mr. Millic2in, Miss Fredarickt 
emd Mr. Dngar. Do you recall iiny thing unusual which occurred 
that night which makes it stand out in your mind? 

A Yes, one occurrence. I had just moved into a new 
apartment. I had built a fire in the fireplace and the forced 
aLx circulating fan exhaust — - the smoke wenlicout and filled 
the apaurtment with smoke. 

Q So that that particular dinner party strmds out in 
your mtt^d, for that reason? 

A Yes, it does. That's right. 

Q After dinner do you recall the circvimstances of your 
asking Mr. Millican to make another delivery to Mr. Bittmzm? 

A Yes. I called Mr. Millican into the bedroom and I 
asked him' if he would mind delivering a package to Mr. Bittman 
for me that night. 

Q What did that package consist of? 

A $75,000 in cash, hxmdred dollar bills. 

Q How was it wrapped? 

A My best recollection would be it was in just a 
memilla envelope, no markings on the envelop>e. 

Q I take it Mr. Millican consented? 

A Pardon? 



DV 



(1190) 



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71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY IZ, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2^10A 
Q I take it Mr. Millican consented? 



A Yes. 

Q After Mr. Mlllicem left did you telephone Mr. 
Bittman? 

A That's the best of my recollection. I did telephone 
Mr. Bittman and tell him that there was a package that would 
be delivered to him that night. 

Q And it was your understanding that the package would 
be left in the mailbox? 

A That is correct. 

Q And there would be no personal contact between Mr. 
Millican and Mr. Bittman? 

A That is correct. That was the procedure that was 
followed on the other two deliveries. 

Q Now how did you identify yourself to Mr. Bittman on 
the telephone when you called? 

A In all conversations with Mr. Bittman I identified 
myself as Mr. Baker. 

Q Was this the second telephone conversation you had 
had with Mr. Bittman that day? 

A Again, to the best of my recollection I called Mr. 
Bittman earlier that day to ascertain whether he would be home 
that night, yes. 

Q And you identified yourself again as Mr. Baker, I 



take it? 



DV 



(1191) 



71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-lOA 

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A That's correct. 

Q You told Mr. Bittman that you vould like to make a 

delivery to his home that evening? 

A That is correct. 

Q And you aoked whether he would be available for that 
purpose? 

A Correct . 

Q You were obviously somewhat anxious about the possi- 
bility that the envelope might sit in the mailfiox for any 
period of time? 

A Correct. I called him when Mr. Millican left. I 
called him ajid told him that the delivery would be made within 
next thirty minutes or so. 

Q Had you ever delivered anything else to Mr. Bittman 
aside from money that you can recall? 

A Not that I can recall, no. 

Q So every time, as far as yoa know, that Mr. Bittmem 
received a telephone call where the caller identified himself 
as Baker he received cash in the delivery that ensued rather 
than any other documents or anything else? 

A Certainly from any conversations he actually had 
from me, that would be the case. 

Q And you made up the name Bciker yourself, I take it? 

A That is correct. 

Q New with respect to that telephone call to Mr. 



I called 
I the n€ 



DV 

(1192) 



71.1 FRED LaRVE TESTIMONY. FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE G RAND JURY, 2-lOA 

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Bittman in the afternoon, do you recall whether that was a 
telephone call in Mr. Bittman 's office? 

A That would certainly be my recollection so certainly 
ray assumption that the call would have been made through his 
office, yes. 

Q If it were not to his office, if he had left already 
it would have been to his home, I take it? 

A That would be true. 

Q So you would place that at sometime in the latter 
part of the afternoon or the early evening? 

A The first call? 

Q Yes. 

A I would place it in the afternoon. 

Q Now prior to mciking that call, I take it you had had 
discussions with other people concerning whether to make this 
delivery. 

A That is correct. 

Q That day had you spoken to Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell? 

A That is correct. 

Q Now starting with Mr. Dean, c£m you tell us what Mr. 
Dezm told you in substance? 

A My best recollection of that phone call is that Mr. 
Dean called me. He stated that he had had a request for a 
delivery of money to Mr. Bittman for Mr. Hunt's attorneys fees 
and for Mr. Hunt's expenses, living expenses. 



p. 

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(1193) 



71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974. WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-1 OA 



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Q Okay. 

A He indicated to me that he was passing this informa- 
tion on to me for whatever purpose I wamted to make of it, 
that he was not going to have any furtherinvolvement, contact, 
in the delivery of monies to the so-called Watergate defendant:, 
and that I would have to exercise my own judgment to decide 
what to do about this request. 

I told Mr, Dean that unless I was authorized by 
someone that I would not mak& this delivery, at which point 
he suggested that I call Mr. Mitchell. 

Q Did Mr. Dean in that conversation indicate that ther^ 
was a sense of urgency about this? 

A Yes. 1 recall that he indicated there was a sense 
of urgency. To the best of my recollection he mentioned some- 
thing to the effect that Mr. Hunt was due to be sentenced, I 
think within the next two or three days, and he did imply a 
sense of urgency zJDOut it, yes. 

Q I take it Mr. Deem identified an amount of money in 
the course of that conversation that Mr. Hunt was asking for? 

A That is correct. My recollection is that there was 
$75,000 required for attorneys fees, and $60,000 required for 
his living expenses. 

Q Now I talce it you had a conversation with Mr. 
Mitchell following that with Mr. Dean. 

A That is correct. 



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(1194) 



71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY ^ , FEBRUARY 12^ 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-rlOA 

9 

1 Q Can you recall to the best of your recollection the 

2 substance of that conversation? 

3 A As it relates to the delivery of this money, I can, 

4 yes. I told Mr. flitchell of my conversation with John Dean, 

5 dLndicating that Dean was not going to be involved any further 
g in the authorization and distribution of money. 

J I told Mr. Mtchell that we had had a request for 

$75,000 for Mr. Hunt. He asked me what it was for. I told 



8 



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and he said that under the circumstances, he said, "I think 
you ought to pay it", which I proceeded to do. 

Q Is it a fact then that you didn't mention to Mr. 
Mitchell the request for $60,000V — 

A This is my best recollection — 

Q Mr. LaRue, let me finish the question. $60,000 
for maintenance. 

A To the best of my recollection this is true. I 
think this was a decision I made myself. It was certainly 
a rather large sura of money involved, quite frankly approach- 
ing the amount of money which I had on hand at that time. 

The only amount of money I recall discussing with 
Mr. I'litchell was the $75,000 which was delivered. 

Q Was there anything in the conversation you had with 
Mr. Mitchell by which Mr. Mitchell indicated that he had or 
had not heard of this request earlier than the time of your 



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71 I FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUABY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-lOA 

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conversation? 

A Nothing that would indicate to me one way or the 
other. 

C Now in fixing the date of these events, do you 
recall that the date following this delivery of money you 
learned that Mr. Mitchell was in Washington? 

A r don't specifically recall Mr. Mitchell being in 
Washington on that particular day. I do recall him being in 
Washington a couple of times in this time frame, but as far 
as the specific date, I can't recall. 

Q Now independently do you have any recollection of 
the precise date of the request to Mr. Millican to deliver 
the funds? 

A The precise date of the request? 
Q Yes. 

A The date would be on the day he delivered it. It 
would have been that specific day. 

Q I mean cem you recall of your own recollection, or 
through any of your own notes, what day this was? We know it 
was in late March from your recollecting the events, but 
specifically can you recall the precise day? 

A I can't specifically recall the precise day. No, 
sir. 

Q All you can be sure of is that it was the evening 
of the dinner party with Mr. Unger? 

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71.1 FRED LaRUE TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 2-lOA 

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A That is coi^rect. 

Q At which you had the problem with your fireplace? 

A That is righti 

THE FOREMAN: Mr. LaRue , could you in any way estab- 
lish that? I think you testified that this was the day that 
Mr. Dnger arrived in Washington. 

THE WITNESS: ^fy personal opinion is that Mr. Unger 
is acn. attorney and keeps probably a lot better records than I 
do, travel vouchers 2Lnd so forth. I would imagine he could 
determine that date. 

THE FOREMAN: So you could provide that for us then? 
THE WITNESS: I could? 
THE FOREMAN: Through Mr. Dnger? 

THE WITNESS: I think Mr. Dnger could provide that, 
don't have any access. 

BY MR. BEN-»VEN1STE : 
Q Now you had asked Mr. Millicsm to provide the same 
service for you on two prior occasions. 
A That is correct. 

Q And on those occasions did you telephone Mr. Bittman 
identifying yourself as^ Mr. Bciker? 
A Yes. 

Q Can you tell us the circumstances of the first time 
that you used Mr. Baker as an alias? 

A Yes. This would be back in I think October of 1972 

DV 



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(1197) 



35-905 fpt. 2) O - 74 - 33 



71.2 MANYON MILLICAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
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^Thereupon , 

MRNYOM MILLICAN 
was called as a witness, emd, having first been duly sworn by 
the Forenan of the Grzind Jury, was exaninod and testified as 
follows: 

BY MR. FRAMPTOTJ: 

Q Sir, will you state your full name and spell your 
last naiae for the Reporter, please? 

A Kemyoa Millican, M-a-n-y-o-n M-i-1-l-i-c-a-n. 

Kr. Millican, where is your heme? 

A Well, my official donicile is Biminghan, Alabama. 
That's where I pay taxes, but I live in Slaters Fork, West 
Virginia. 

Q How are you enployed right ncJw? 

A I euQ director of marketing of a snow shoe company 
in Slaters Fork, West Virginia. 

Q Mr. Millican, beginning in about July of 1972 did 
you hold a position with the Committee to Re-elect the 
President? 

A Yes, Z did. 

Q What was that? 

A I was national director of canvass control, and 
accountability. 

Q Did you remain in that position through the electiori. 



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(1198) 



71.2 MANYON MILLICAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY U, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
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thn 1972 oloccioii? 

A Yss, I did. 

Q I take it that you aro a lonc.-tine business and socia 
frioncl of ;-'r. Fred LaRu-2 ' s , is that correct? 

A Yes . 

Q Mr. Millican, in late I'arch, the latter part of 
March of 1973, did you attend a dinner party at Mr. LaRua's 
home at which a nurober of other people were present including 
Miss Laura Fredriclts and Mr. Sherman Unger? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there anything about that particular dinner 
party, anything that happened during that evening, that clearly)' 
stands out in your nind vrith respect to anything strange that 
happened? 

A Well, in retrospect, yes, but not at that time. 

Q Was there sonething about a fireplace that you 
recall? 

A Yes. The fireplace didn't vrark and it almost wiped 
out the apartment and us, too. Smoke cane out. Yes, I do 
remember that. 

Q Now late during that evening as the party v?as break- 
ing up, did you have a conversation v;ith Mr. LaRus in which 
he asked you to deliver an envelope to the home of Mr. .iilliaia 
Bittman? 

A Yes. 



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(1199) 



71.2 MANYON MILLICAU TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 13, 1974. WATERGATE GRAW JURY , 

2-7 4 

Q Did he then give you hhis envelope? 

x^ Yes . 

Q What did it look like? 

A Ten by twelve, perhaps, or an eleven by twelve type 
of ir.anilla envelope, a routine looking type of envelope. It 
was sealed where the flan is. 

Q Do you recall whether there was any name written on 
it or other marking on the outside? 

A No, there was none. 

Q There was none? 

A No. I didn't look for any and I didn't see any. 

Q Did you deliver the envelope that evening? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Can you describe hov7 you delivered it? 

A The precise directions and that sort of thing? 

Q X\'ell, just in substance ^-hat you did v;ith the envel- 
ope. 

A I don't know the street now, but I guess it was out 
in the Potomac area. 

Q That's Potomac, MarylcUid? 

A I guess it is. I'm not that familiar v/ith. the 
Mar^'land side. I dro'/e by the house and lowered the window 
of my car, an electric v/indow on the lefthand side, and put th^ 
package in the mailbox. 

Q Had you previously on two other occasions delivered 



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71,2 MANYON MILLICAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY IS, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
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cnvalopes or packages to Mr. Bittnan's mailbox? 

A Yes. 

Q V7hen, v;a3 the first time that that occurred? 

A My recall now is -.jovs'?. than it vas when I talked 
v;ith the FBI, but T think it was probably in "Rbruary. 

Q In FEbruary? 

A Probably. 

Q To the best of your recollection was the second 
delivery in about late February' or early March? 

A Yes, probably in that time frame. 

Q Did you on the occasion of the first delivery have 
some problems about finding the house of Vj: . Bittman and makinr 
certain that that was the right mailbox? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Can you describe briefly what happened at that 
tine? 

A '-^gII, as I recall it, I v/as infomed that Mr. 
Bittnan's name would be on the mailbox. I had the specific 
address number of the mailbox. 

Mr, Bittman' s nar'Ae was not on the mailbox. As 1 
recall, I drove dcvm the road to a telephone booth to make 
sure that this vras Mjt. Bittman' s mailbox, matching it up with 
the number of the mailbox. 

That's ho^ I knew it v/as Mr. Bittman that I was 
ildlivering it to. 



ov 

(1201) 



71.2 MANXON MILLICAN TESTIMONY^ FEBRUARY 13, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 

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Q Now qoing back to your third and final delivery 

in the latter part of March, Mr. ''illican, appro-.-cintately v/hat 
tine did you leave the package in '-'r. Bittn'ian's mailbox to the 
best of your recollection? 

A V?ell, as you said earlier, the party was not breakin--r 

up. I was leaving. I th.ink the other quests stayed and 1 
think that I was just leaving. 1 think that it was about 
tenish. 

Q About 10:00 p. in.? 

A Or 10:15 — somev.'here in that neighborhood. 

Q vrnen you left Mr. LaRue's house? 

A Yes. 

Q Mr. Millican, did Mr. LaRue tell you at any time 
during the period in which you delivered these three envelopes 
what was in them or why he was asking you to make these deliv- 
eries? 

A No . 

Q Were the first tv?o occasions on which you nade 
deliveries to hici also occasions which were late evening 
occasions following dinner parties or dinners when you v»ere 
together with "'"r. LaKue? 

A Yes. I v/ent to his home, his apartrr.ent, frequently 
and it V7as not an occasion of ne going just specifically to 
do something for hiri^. I have kno\-;m him since 1961, and Miss 
Fredericks, his secretary, equally as long. In fact, she used 



DV 



(1202) 



71.Z MANYON MILLICAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY IS, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 



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to bfi my secrataiT' a fc;v/ yaars ago. V/s are very close friend: 

IIP,. FPJ>-MPTO>T: Fine. Thank you. May thcs v.'itna33 

be excuscri, Mj:. Forenan? 

THE FOKErU^N: You'ra excused, Mr. I'dllicein. 

(Whereupon, the v^itness v/as 
excused. ) 



DV 



(1203) 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 3 

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P S 5 !^ J5 ?. -2 ^. ?- 2 s 
W'hereupon,. 

SIIEDM.AO'I 1^. UNGKR 
was called as a witness and, having been first duly oworn by 
the Foreman of the Grand Jury, was examined and testified as 
follovs: 

BY MR. FRAMPTON: 
st Sir, could you state your full name for the Court 
Reporter? 

A Sherman Edward Unger. 
Q And how do you spell your last name? 
A U-n-g-e-r. 

Q Mr. Unger, what is your address •»- heme address? 
A 2918 Observatory Road, Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Q And how are you employed? 
A I'm a lawyer, 

Q Now, Mr. Unger, are you acquainted with Mr. Fred 
LaRue? 

A Yes. 

Q And how long have you known Mr. LaRue, approximately^ 
MRS, VOLNER: Could you speak up. The Grand Jury 
can' t hear you. 

THE WITNESS: Since the summer of 1964. 
BY MR. ERAMTTON: 
Q Now, Mr. Unger, directing your av.cention Co 

DV 

(1204) 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, ^ 

3-14 

1 approximately lata March of 1971^*^-1^ you leave Clnclanati 

2 and go on a trip for a rumiber of; days v;htch Included stc.j in 

3 Phlladalphia, New York a.n<\ TT.n«^hlr.gton, D. C.7 
* A Yea, 

^ Q And during that trip, did. you have occasion when 

6 you vere in Washington, D. C. . to attend a dinner party at 

' the apartment of Mr. LaRue? 

« A Yes. 

9 Q Now, do you recall if other people were present on 

10 that occasion? 

u . v«. ^^ 

i2 Q At Mr. LaRue' 8 apartment? 
'3 A Yes. 

W Q Was a Mr. Manyon Mtlllktn present that evenlna? 
^ A Yea, though I had no Independent recaU. of tliat un- 

^ til it was suggested to me and -then I remembered It. 
"^ Q But you do— with your recollection rafrsshed, you 

i^ do recall that Manyon Mlllikln was there? 
15 A That !s correct. 

20 Q AndMr, I^Rue was there, I take it? 

21 A That ' 8 correct . 

^22 Q And was Miss I^ura Fredericks also prasent : 
23 A Yes, she was. 

•^ Q And do you recall that anything particular happened 

"^ that evening which makes the evening stick In your mind? 



(1205) 



71,3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 5 

3^14 



A I do. After my memory wars— te^eshed again, cnis 

was the first time I'd been to LaRue's apartment — his new 
apartment — and he was using hia fireplace and it started 
backing up and smokengcarted coming down into the room. He 
was very embarrassed. 

Q Now, Mr. Unger, during this trip to Washington, how 
long did you stay in Washington, D. C? 

A Oh, probably less than 24 hours, I guess. I got 
here around 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock on the Zlst and left about 
11:30 the next morning. 

Q When you say the next morning, that would be on 
March 22nd? 

A That's correct. 

Q And so the evening on which you went to dinner at 
Mr. LaRue's house and the fireplace backed up and so on was 
the evening of March 21st, 1973, was it? 

A That is correct. 

Q Now, Mr. Unger, do you keep a diary or appointment 
book in which you record both appointments or notes about 
activities coming up and also substantially contemporaneous 
appointments or meetings that you've had? 

A Yes. 

Q And have you turned over several pages of that diary 
to us, beginning on Sunday the 18th of March and ending on 
Friday the 23rd of March, 1973? 



Ov 



(1206) 



71.3 SHEmAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JVRY, 

Zr-14 



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A Yas, I liave. 

MR. FRAMPTON: All rrlsht. For. the raQQ^d. •-.<:'.!,1 

raark as Gove -mnent ExhlbU J^U-l oH this dato three pages, 

diary pages, for March, 1973, beginning on Sunday .'a 13th 

of March aad ending on Friday the 23rd of March. 

(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibit No. 
SU-1 was marked for IdenttficAtion.) 

. BY MR. FRAMPTON: 

Q Now, showing you these three pages, one day on each 
side, is that the original copy of your diary? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q Now, Mr. Unger, on the page for the 19th of March — 
I ^-Jhich is a Monday -- there's a notation :hat says, "All day 
SMS we-eting. SU elected to BD." Could you explain wb-' that 
means? 

A Yes. I was in King of Prussia, Pennsylv.-r.a, ^-.'A I 
attended a stockholders' meeting and was elected to tha Qoard 
of Directors of Sheridan Medical Services, a na-.ljrul >xtware 
company. 

Q And did you travel, on .the Monday evening, Co New 
York City? 

A That is correct. 

Q And there is an entry, is thera not, on the boutcm 
of the page for March 19th, saying Metro to NYC? 

A Yes. 



.1 . / 



(1207) 



^^ 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

~ ■ ■ . ■ _ __ 7 

Q And your diary for March 20th, Tuesday, that heading 
is circled and the words are written "See next page," and, on 
the next page, the date that was originally printed in the 
diary, March 21, Wednesday, is crossed out and, instead, you 
have written in there — or there is written in there — 
March 20, Tuesday. Is that your handwriting? 

A That is correct. 

Q And, similarly, for the 22nd, you have crossed that 
out and written 21, Wednesday. la that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, does the writing which you have put on these 
papers, after crossing out the original printing, represent 
the actual day for which the other entries were made in your 
diary? 

In other words, are the appointments which you have 
written down here, on the page which is now marked in your 
handwriting "March 20," are those appointments and activities 
which 3rou actually had on March 20th? 

A The appointments and activities reflect the dateic^ 
as changed at the top of the page. 

Q As changed. And, as changed, your diary indicates, 
at the top of the page for March 20, "NYC, Carlisle." Does 
that indicate that you stayed at the Carlisle Hotel in New 
York on the evening of the 19th, morning of the 20th? 

A That is correct. 

(1208) 



71,Z SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

3^14 8 



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Q And did you remain In New^York City that evening? 

U'y 

A Yea, I did. ^ 

Q And on March 2Ist, during the day, did you come to 
Washington, D. C. , from New York? 

A Yea, I did. 

Q Now, yovir diary indicates, on the evening of March 
21, "Dinner at LaRue's." That, I take It, indicates the 
evening you had dinner at Mr. LaRue's house? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, in your diary for March 23, you have a line 
drawn across the middle of the page, and on the top of the 
line in parenthesia there are the words, "Thursday, fly Cln." 
and below the line there is some other writing. 

Would you explain the significance of this page and 
the significance of the line which la drawn through the middle 
of it? 

A Well, I think earlier In the week I skipped Tuesday 
and atarted recording Tuesday on the page designated Wednes- 
day, and followed through Thursday and didn't catch it xintll 
I got to Friday. 

When I atarted recording Friday, I realized that 
I'd already had aome note-taking up there, and I went back 
through and corrected the dates, at that time, I drew a line 
through the March 23rd page, showing that under the line was 
Friday, above the line was Thursday. 



(1209) 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 

3^14 ' 9 

Q So on the page marked Frtday, March 23, above the 
line In your diary are actlvltlea — Indicated activities — 
which you did on Thursday, March 22. Is that correct? 

A That indicates actlvltlea I did on Thursday, March 
22nd, and the compulation of monies that I spent during the 
week on that trip. 

Q And then on March 22 -- that la Thursday — you 
flew back to Cincinnati from Washington, D. C? Is that 
correct? 

A That Is correct. 



<>(. 



(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibits Nos. 
SU-2, SU-3, SU-4 and SU-5 was marked 
for Identification.) 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q Mr. linger. In coming to Washington on the 2l8t, do 
you recall where you came from? 

A New York. 

Q And do you recall what day you left New York? 

A That day. 

Q The 2l8t Itself? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, I show jrou what has been marked Exhibit SU-4 
for Identification and ask you If that Is your airline ticket 
Indicating that you traveled from New York to Washington on 
the 21st of March? 

A Yes, It Is. It has my signature. It has my American 



(1210) 



71.2 SHEEMAN UNGER TESTIMONY:, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

3-14 Y-Q 



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Express card number on It. 

Q And you were able to locate' ttiat, at our request? 

A That Is correct. 

Q And that Indicates that you flew on American Airlinejs 
Is that correct? 

A That is correct, and I think it's flight 395 that 
departed at 3:30 p.m. 

Q Now, I show you SU-2 for identification and ask you 
whether that is your airline ticket indicating that you left 
Washington for Cincinnati on the 22nd of March, 1973, at 
approximately 11:10 a. a.? -^^ t 

A It is my ticket, yes. It so indicates. 

Q And it shows that you flew on American Airlines, as 
well, on flight 475, I think? 

A That is correct. 

Q And do you recall that these were, indeed, the dates 
that you did travel and there was no change in jraur ticketing? 

A That is correct. 

Q You've also produced a document which we have marked 
as SU-3, which appears to be a flight which you took from 
Cincinnati leaving on 19 March — 

A No. I believe it's leaving on 18 March. 

Q 18 March, yes. I misread that. You're correct 
And you identify that as your ticket leaving Cincinnati? 

A Yes. Sunday night. 



(1211) 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY ti 

S-14 ' ^^ 

Q Now, I show you what has been marked SU-5 for 
Identification and ask whether that appears to be your ledger 
card for your stay at the Carlisle Hotel in New York, which 
would indicate that on March 2l8t you were at the Carlisle 
and stayed one day. 

A No, I don't believe it would indicate that. It 
would indicate that on March 2l8t I checked out, I was there 
two days, and that's the total of the bill when I checked out. 

Q And the bottom line, which indicates March 21, '73, 
and the dollar amount and the total amount as to your account 
at the Carlisle is reflected there? 

A That is correct. 

Q And March 21 indicates the day that you left the 
Carlisle? 

A That is correct. 

Q And that is your recollection in addition to these 
documents, I take it? 

A That is correct. 

Q Now, finally, when you stayed in Washington you 
stayed at the Metropolitan Club, did you not? 

A That's correct. 

(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibit No. 
SU-6 was marked for identification.) 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q I show you SU-6, which is a chit from the Metropolitin, 



(1212) 



71 3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

3-14 . — 12 



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Club, indicating that you stayed In Room No. 300 on March 21, 
1973, and It's dated March 21, 1973, and it's a $20.00 charge 
for that room, and there's a member signature line on SU-6. 
Is that your signature, Mr. Unger? 

A No, it's not. It must have been signed for me at 
the desk. 

Q Do you recall this form as a regular procedure of 
checking into the hotel, that such a form would be prepared, 
indicating the room and the date you staj^d there? 

A The form would be prepared on the charges for the 
room. The rooms are different prices and it's a chit a member 
can send for if he questions his monthly voucher, but I 
usually don't send for it. I didn't, in that case, because 
I knew I stayed there. 

Q Do you recognize your signature on this document? 

A This is my signature. 

MR. BEN-VENISTE: We'll matk that SU-7. /I^ 

(Whereupon, Grand Jury Exhibit No. 
SU-7 was marked for identification.) 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q This is also a chit from the Metropolitan Club and 
this is a bar bill at the club time stamped March 21, 1973. 
Is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q And you identify this as your signature at the top 



(1213) 



71.3 SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, -- 

3rd4 *-^ 

vhece It says "member's signature"? 

A That is correct. 

Q And I assume the regular procedure is that, after 
you have some drinks at the bar, someone brings a chit or a 
tab for you to sign, and that's the way you would sign it? 

A That is correct. It comes with the drinks. 

Q And it is dated? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, can you recall, Mr. linger, when the next time 
you saw Mr. LaRue was after the 2l8t of March? y* 

A I'm sure it was in Florida sometime. ^^i^^ 

Q Can you approximate how long thereafter? 

A Months. It would have been months afterwards. 

Q Certainly more than one month? 

A Yes. 

Q And how about the time prior to March 21st when you 
saw Mr. LaRue? 

A I would have seen hia, I believe, between the In- 
augural and March 21st in Washington. 

Q Can you recall the closest time you might have seen 
him to March 2l8t? Was It more than a couple of weeks, do you 
think? 

A It would be sometime after January 21sts say within 
that sixty day period I think I might have seen him, but I 
have no recall. I would have to go back to my diary. 



(1214) 



71. Z SHERMAN UNGER TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 19, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

3-14 14 



Q Was it more than several days? More than a week^ 
say, prior to the time you had dinner? 
A Oh, yes, yes. 
Q Possibly more than two weeks? 

A Yes. Probably, I would guess, a month at least 
before, but I think I was here once between the Inaugural and 
this time and I probably would have seen him< 

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I have no further questions at 
this time. Do any members of the Grand Jury have questions? 
THE FORaWN: I have no questions. 

MR. BEN-VENISTE: If that's the case, then, I would 
ask that Mr. Unger be excused. 

THE F0RE>IAN: Thank you, Mr. Unger, you're excused. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.) 



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L 



(1215) 



71.4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-1 - SU-7, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 



f^ 



73 77th day - 288 dayi (oilov) 



Purrm 



Second Sundoy ol lenl 



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(1216) 



71.4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-1 - SU-7 , WATERGATE GRAND JURY 



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MARCH 



19 



MONDAY 



1973 78lh day-287doys(ollov 



Shushan Purim 



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(1217) 



71.4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-1 - SU-7, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 




?73 79th day - 286 day? follow 



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(1218) 



71.4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-1 - SU-7 , WATERGATE GRAND JURY 



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(1219) 



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(1220) 



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MARCH 23 




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(1221) 



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(1222) 



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71.4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-1 - SU-7, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 

MR.SHERMAN UNGER 
291« OBSERVATORY ROAD 
1NC|NATTI,0HI0 45208 



Sa 



.s 



ON AVENUE AT 76TH STREET 
NEW YORK 
RHINELAMDCR 4-I800 
IHT'L TELEX S20992 



MtMO 



. February 



A - LIMOUSINE 
B - BAGGAGE 
C - CIGARETTES 
D - DRUGS 



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DATE 



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HAft-Z-73 
KAR 13:73 
KAn21-73 



EXPLANATION 



F»'ARO cio: 




fVard 

fVAoO 

fVahd 



€^3 



CHARGES 



^ZUB 




* 87J7 

*124.3 



CREDITS 



BAL DUE 



12X75 



* 313.93 

* MOUO 

* 525.M9 



Please accept this note as a friendly reminder 
of the overdue balance on your account. 

Or, if you have made a very recent payment 
— Many thanks. 

THE CARLYLE 



G - BARBER SHOP 
H — BEAUTY PARLOR 
N - NEWSPAPERS 



Last Balance is 
Amount Due UNLESS > 
OTHERWISE INDICATED 



PLEASE MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO THE ORDER OF THE CARLYLE. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 



(1224:) 



71,4 SHERMAN UNGER EXHIBITS, SU-l - SU-7, WATERGATE GRAND JURY 



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71.5 WILLIAM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST S, 1972, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, . ] 89 



189-91^ 194^96 



85 -^ li A I did receive an envelope during th:it period of tine, 

i; 

~ W and I am not sure whether it was in December or not. I just 

j' 
"'* W don't know. 

ii 

■* !j Let me tell you why I have difficulty with it. I 

Ji 

5 ! was out of town from December 22nd until lata January 2nd. 

i 

; Mr. Hunt was also out of tov/n sometime after his V7ife was 

killed, v/hen he went to Florida v;ith his faraily. 

I think it somewhat unlikely that I did receive an 

envelope for him during that period of time, but I could have. 

I did receive envelopes for him. 

Q Between October 13th and to date — 

A Not including the one on October 13th? 

Q Not including the one on October 13th, how rr.any 
envelopes have you received in a fashion similar to the fashion 
you received the one on October 13th for yourself or for Kr. 
Hunt from this Mr. Rivers or Mr. Baker? 

A None of them were for myself. 

Q Well, how many for Mr. Hunt then? 

A You say in the same fashion? 

Q Either to your office or your home. 

A I believe there were four. There might have been 
three, but I believe there were four. 

Q Can you describe how those were delivered, and 
,, I I approximately v;hen those were delivered? 

A I can't give you the dates except for the last one. 



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'7.5 WILLIAM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 2973, WATERGATE GRAW JURY 
189-91, 194r-96 



86 



190 



I would receive a telephone call either at ray office or at 
^ !l my home, and a man who identified himself as Mr. Baker on 



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the phone . 

Let's say for example, it was at my home. I usually 
work' late and don't get home until eight, nine, or ten o'clock 
at night. 

I would get a call in the evening: "Mr. Bittman, 
this is Mr. Baker. Will you be home at 11:30 tonight?" I 
would say, "Yes, I v/ill." 

He would say, "Will you deliver an envelope to I-lr. 
Hunt?", and I would say, "Yes, I will." He would say, "We'll 
leave it in your mailbox", and I would say, "Fine." 

I vrould then go out to the mailbox at approximately 
11:30 or whatever time it was. I would get the envelope^ 
bring it into my home. 

The next morning I would call Mr. Hunt and tell r-Lr. 
Hunt about the telephone call. He would come to my home at 
about 7:30 in the morning. I would give him the envelope, u.n- 
opened. He would take it to his home, and that would be it. 

That same modus operandi took place in all the 
instances with respect to the envelopes that I received at 
my home. They were all delivered to Mr. Hunt unopened. 

Q To the best of your recollection this occurred three 
or four times during thatperiod — let's say December to 



April 1st, December of '72 to April of '73. 



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71,5 WILLIAM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURX, 
189-r-91, 194r^6 



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A That's my recollection. 

Q I believe you told us that to the best of your 
recollection there were two of these deliveries in late 
January or early February, 1973, and a final delivery sot?.stiT.e 
about March 21, 1973. 

A I am not certain at all vjhen these envelopes came 
in except for the last one, because I think it V7as v^ithin tv;o 
or three days before he was sentenced. 

The other envelopes that I gave to Mr. Hunt really 
would have no significance to me whatsoever, so I have no idea 
when that took place . ! 

Q But other than the final envelope which you received 
on or about March 21, it is your recollection that there vjere 
two or three others and they v/ere received in late January or 
early February? Is that correct? 

A I would say possibly one in December. I just don't 
know. The others would have been January or February. Yes,. 
sir. 

Q When did Mr. Hunt make payments of legal fees to 
your firm, on what dates? i 

A Well, the legal fees that Mr. Hunt paid to rae in 
January and in April came directly from the proceeds of his 
deceased wife's insurance policies. 

Q The dates and the amounts? 

A The dates \,'oro , as I said before.. Jr.n-K-. "y 7.?-, T 



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71.5 WILLIM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 394 
189^91, 194r-96 ^ 

1 ji ticKet, a transfer. VJe did assist him in that sense. I 

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2 ]\ didn't do it personally, but someone in our firm did. 



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Other than that, we had nothing else to do with it. 
BY MR. FRAI'IPTON: 

CQ Going back to the envelopes which v/ere delivered to 
for Mr. Hunt, it is your testimony, is it, that when the 
individual, Mr. Baker, called up to arrange to make these 
deliveries to you, that he told you that these envelopes were 
for Mr. Hunt? 

A Absolutely. 

Q Did the envelopes, when they arrived, have anything 
written on them, on the outside of them? 

A I don't think anything was written on them. 

Q They were just plain blank envelopes? 

A They were blank envelopes and they were left in 
my office. 

Q Did Mr. Hunt subsequently tell you what was in the 
envelopes? 

A He did. 

Q What did he tell you? 

A In connection with his Grand Jury proceedings, he 
told me that there was cash in the envelopes. 

Q Did he tell you how much cash was in each of the 
different envelopes that he received? 

A Eventually in his testimony before the Senate and 



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71.6 WILLIAM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST Z, 197 Z, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 



189-91j_ 194^96 



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the Grand Jury, I learned that. 

Q What did you tell you were the amounts? 

A He told me that in the first envelope there was 
$15,000, $12,000 of which he sent to these friends, the Cuban 
Americans, $3,000 of which he kept for living expenses. 

He said that the next delivery of $50,000 could 
have come in either one or two packages or envelopes. He's 
not sure, totalling $50,000, and the last delivery of $75,000. 

That is vi7hat I learned from Mr. Hunt in connection 
with his testimony before the Grand Jury and before the 
Senate committee. 

Q Since you had already received tv;o cash payments 
yourself which had been opened by you or in front of you in 
July and October, 197 2, weren't you well aware that these 
envelopes in fact contained cash? 

A I was not well aware. 

Q When you passed thera to Mr. Hunt? 

A I wasnot well aware. 

Q You were not well aware of that? 

A I was not. Mr. Baker never told me there was any 
cash in those envelopes. 

BY MR. BEN-VENISTE: 

Q Did you suspect that there was? 

A I would say particularly with the last payment be- 
cause of the timing of it, shortly before he went to jail. 



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71.5 WILLIAM BITTMAN TESTIMONY, AUGUST 3, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
189-91, 194-96 



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But I had no specific knowledge that there was cash in those 
envelopes. 

Q Short of opening them, the entire history of your 
dealings with people who identified themselves as Rivers and 
Baker indicated to you, did it not, that the probability was 
that there would be cash in those envelopes? 

A Well, I never thought about it in those terms. My 
recollection is, Mr. Ben-Veniste, that those first two payment: 
came from Rivers. Baker was a new entity. 

I now know from Mr. LaRue's testimony that he claims 
that he's the one who called me in October. 

Q Well, Mr. LaRue has testified here. My question is 
simply whether at the time you thought it probable that they 
contained cash. 

A I can't say I thought it probable. If I thought it 
probable , I would have made no notation at my home and I 
would be able to tick off, chapter and verse, the dates of the 
receipts and every word that Mr. Baker told me had I thought 
there was anything unusual about it. 

Q Did you inquire of Mr. Baker or anyone else as to 
why you were receiving these envelopes? 

A I did not, and I wish I had. 

Q Did there come a time when you had a conversation 
with Mr. McCord — I have just one or two more questions and 
then we'll be finished. Some of the Grand Jurors have to 



(1231) 



71.6 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 

95, 111~J2. g^ 



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A Yes, sir. I ali;o, at that tLrae in the conversation 

•with Kr. O'Brien, told hiia specifically v?hat my legal fees had 
amounted to, at that time. 

Q You said, as a matter of fact, you counted up to 

about $70,000 living expenses and $60,000 legal fees, something; 
like that? 

A Whatever it was. 

Q Does that sound about right? 

A I would guess 50 or 60» 

Q And a few days after this conversation vith Mr. O'Brien 
I you received a package of cash amounting to $75,000? 
I A Yes, sir. 

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71.6 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 
95, lllrl2 

^ . r-^ic'vages, did you receive another delivery of cash? 



A 



; A I did. I received a final delivery of cash. 

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Q After that $50,000, you received only one more de- 

livery, is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And that was for $75,000? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And can you remember the approximate date of that 
delivery? 

A 1 would place it as on or about the 20th of March. 

Q On or about the 20th of March? 

A Of this year. 

Q Of 1973, is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And that followed by a period of about a weeic or so, 
did it, after your private conversation with Mr. O'Brien about 
which you previously testified today? 

A Yes, sir, it did. 

Q And what did you do with that $75,000? 

A I had the checks issued in the amount of $60,000 to 
Mr. Bittman and I placed the rest of the money — made it 
available to the household for the household expenditures. 

Q How did you receive that $75,0CQ. 



A Under the same circumstances, the same delivery inethqd. 

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71.6 E. HOWARD HUNT TESTIMONY, JULY 17, 1973, WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 112 
95, 111-12 

call from Mr. Bittman indicating he had an envelope at his 

house — we only live about a mile apart. I drove over, I 

believe, in the morning to pick it up before he left for the 

office; received the envelope unopened from him; drove back to 

my home; opened the envelope; counted the money. 

Q Did you receive any other cash deliveries or cash 

or packages of cash in addition to those that you have told th 

I 

Grand Jury about, during the period December 8th to, let's sayj 

April 15, 1973? ' 

A I was incarcerated on March 23rd. 

MR. FRAMPTON. Fine. I'm finished. Those are all 

the questions. Thank you, Mr. Hunt. Could you step outside 

for just a moment, please, and I'll ask the Grand Jurors if 

they have any questions. 

(Whereupon, the witness left the Grand 
Jury Room.) 

(Whereupon, the witness returned to the 
Grand Jury Room.) j 

i 

MR. FRAMPTON: Mr. Hunt, you understand that you're ■ 
still under oath? { 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

MR, FRAMPTON: Mr. Foreman, are there some question: 
that either you or other members of the Grand Jury would lik. 
to ask Mr. Hunt? 

THE FOREMAN: Mr. Hunt, you indicated, during your 
testimony, that you had some involvement or some DarticiDatio: 



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7^ y jOljf^ PEAN TESTIMONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974. WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 16 16 



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Q Now, did llr. Mitchell, at tint time, indicate to 

you, one way or another, whether Mr. Hunt vjould be paid? 

A No, he did not. 

Q Thereafter, did you have a. conversation x^ith Hr. 
LaRue? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And what was the substcnca of that conversation? 

A Mr. LaRue xjanted to know what I was going to do 
about the problem that had raised, and I told him, nothing; 
that I was out of that business. 

He then asked me what I thought he should do and 
I told him I thought he ought to talk to Mitchell about it. 

Q Now, after the meeting on the 21st with the Presi- 
dent and, for a portion, Mr. Haldenmn, did you learn from 
anyone whether Mr. Mitchell had been contacted with respect 
to coming down to Washington and meeting with you and Mr. 
Haldeman and the President and Mr. Ehrlichroan? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And when did you learn that? 

A Sometime on the 21st, I learned it from Mr. Halde- 
man. Originally, it had been hoped that Mr. Mitchell could 
come down immediately but, for some reason, he couldn't come 
do-vvn xintil the next morning. So a meeting was scheduled for 
the next morninj;. 



75 '' ■ 

!i Q Now, later on in the day, on the 21st, you had 



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(1235) 



71.8 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY, JULY 10, 1973, 4 SSC 1630-31 

1630 

Mr. MrrcHzci,. Yes, sir. 

J[r. Dash. Xow, whea did you leave your posicioa as the director 
of the camoaign? 

Mr. MiTCitELL. On the ist of July 1072. 

Mr. Dash. And when you left, you Tvere aware, were you not, that 
Mr. Mai^ruder was staying on as deputy director of the campaign. 

Mr. iliTCHELL. Yes, he stayed on as ilr. iMacGregor's deputy. 

Mr. Dask. And were you not aware.when you. were leaving that; ilr. 
Magruder at lease faced some serious problem of being indicted oa the 
break-in. of the Democratic National Committee headquarters as of 
July 1 ■? 

Mr. ilncHELL. As of July 1 ? I think that was a potential, yes. 

ilr. Dash. Now, 3-0U did meet with the President on June 30, 1972, 
just befora you left. As I understand, you had lunch with, the Presi- 
dent. 

Mr. ilrrcEEii. That is correct, sir, 

Mr. Dash. Did you think it your duty to tell the President at that 
lunch before you left that the man who was playing such a key role in 
his campaign, jilagruder, had such a problem that he might be indicted 
for the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters? 

Mr. JMiTCHELL. ilr. Dash, I think you and I have gone over to the 
point where we have established that the "White House horror stories 
had come out in connection with the problem at that particular time 
and there wasn't the question of lifting of the tent slightly in order 
to get with respect to one indi\idual or another; it was a keeping the lid 
on and no information volunteered. 

Mr. Dash. Even if the lid had been kept on the so-called TVliite House 
horrors, wouldn't it be very embarrassing to the President of the 
United States in- his effort to be reelected if his deputy campaign di- 
rector was indicted in the break-in of the Democratic National Com- 
jnlttee headquarters? 

Mr. MiTcnELL. I don't think as far as the "Watergate was concerned, 
there was a hell of a lot of dift'erence between the deputy cam.paign 
director and the counsel for the finance committee and the security 
officer. Quite frankly, as far as the Watergate was concerned, that was 
already a public issue. It was the parties that were involved. 
"^ ilr. Dash. There came a time, did there not, Mr. 2ilitchell, that the 
pressures for money by the defendants or by Mr. Hunt increased ' 

"Would you tell us what you know about that ? 

]\rr. MrrcHELL. Well. I am not sure, Mr. Diuh. that I can tell you very 
much about them other than the fact that somewhere along in the tall. 
^Ir. Hunt had a telephone con\ersation with ^[r. Colson, which, I 
think, covered the subject matter and then later on. as I recall, ^Ur. 
Dean has cot in the record a letrer from Mr. Hunt to^[r. Colson. w'nich 
I think is qi;ite sugcrescive of th.e fact tnat he was hein2' abandoned. 

Tiien I Ilea id later on. in ^fa!c!i of this vear, rherp were oral com- 
munications from e'rh>^r Hunt or iiis nrtnrnev relarinT tn ronue^cs for 
leiral fees and .=0 fortli. which were rnn-.municated rn the "Wliite House. 

Mr. Da.sff. How did von hear ah.iur ciie ^[;•,^ch reqi't^st' 

Mr. ^[rTCHFr,r.. Tl;e March roqiu'St ^ I tiiink I prohnMv h^ard about 
it throivh ^^r. r.a. Ru-^. if mv m^Muor^- servps me riirhr. 

Mr. D\s?f. Dii vou i;n.o\\- hov.- nuicli r'!oney was actually b-^ing re- 
qiiested at that time ? 



(1236) 




71.8 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY, JULY 10, 197 Z, 4 SSC 1620-31 

1631 

Mr. ^tiTCJiEi.L. I can't really tell vou about the mon^rs across tliis 
period of time.Jt ieems to me chat the March request iiad'son;^ amount 
in the area of S75.000 which Mr. LaRue described to me. that was beini^ 
requested by counsel for their le^al fees in connection with the rep^ 
resentation of Mr. Hunt. 

Mr. Dash. Did ^fr. LaRue ask vou what vour opinion wasorwhether 
he should pay that amount of money to Mr. Hunt or his counsel ? 

Mr. MrrcHEtx. Mr. LaRue, to the best of my recollection, put it in 
this context : I have got this request, I have talked to John Dean over 
at the White House, they are not in the money business any more, 
whax would you do if you were in my shoes and knowinp: that he made 
prior payments? I said, if I were you. I would continue and I would 
make the payment. 

_ Mr. Dash. And in that adnce to Mr. LaRue, I take it, was the con- 
sideration that unless that payment was made. ilr. HuntTnisrht in fact 
uncover the so-c;\lled ^Yhite House horror stories. 

Mr. jVIiTCHELr,. Mr. Dash, I don't know how you can move from the 
fact that Mr. LaRue told me that it was for le,£ral fees to the point 
where we are uncovering the "IVhite House horror stories. It may be 
there. I don't know. 

Mr. Dash. Didn't that enter your mind, the pressure from Mr. Hunt, 
the fact that you indicated there were requests and former pressures 

for money, to the 

}lr. iliTCHEXL. I don't think, Mr. Dash, that in March of 197-3, those 
things were entering my mind, because I think as you are well awara 
from other testimony, I had refused to even consider raisin? money for 
these purposes a long time before that. 

Mr. Dash. But you are aware that there was a sum of money avail- 
able for that at the White House, were you not ? 

Mr. MiTCHEix. I was aware that there had been one at one time, but 
I didn't know how far Liddy had ffotren into that particular fund. 
Mr. Dash. Since the 33.50,000 had come over from the Committee 

for the Re-Election of the President to the Wliite House 

Mr. MrxcfTELt. That is the only hind I was aware of, yes. 
Mr. Dash. "\Miy, Mr. Mitchell^ did vou refuse around t.hat time to 
raise any money for the payment or these fees? 

Mr. ]\riTcnELL. Well, not only around that time, but all other times. 
I have never raised a.ay money for anything and I was not about to 
start for tliat particular purpose. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever make anv sue2:e5tions that the m.oney that 
should be"used for that purpose was" the"S3.3O.00O? 
_ Mr. MrrcTiFr.L. No, to the best of my recollection. I Iiad a conversa- 
tion with Mr. LuRue. I am sure ac his" instance, not mine, in which he 
pointed out that the funds, whatever source thev were, that lie had ^or 
the^support of and the payment of lawvers' fees of these indiv-iduafs'. 
had run out, did I Ktiow whether th.ere'was anv other money? And I 
suggested that maybe you oneht to cal! over ro the ^Yliite House and see 
if the ?.1.".0.0*')0 that had b'>en sicrinn-over there since April was avail- 
able for the purpose. I understand that he did so. 

Mr. Dash. Do vou recall attendin:^ a meetinir in Jajiuarv wirh Mr 
Kalmbach and .Mr. Deau in which vo;; asked Mr. Kalmbaol: to h-ip 
raise money for th.-se legal fees and support of families I Tiiat c>-ci;rrcd 
in Januaiv 1^(7."',. 



(1237) 

35-905 (Pt, 2) O - 74 - 35 



72. On April 17, 1973 the President issued the following 
public statement: 



On March 21, as a result of serious charges 
which came to my attention, some of which were 
publicly reported, I began intensive new 
inquiries into this tehole matter. 



In his address to the nation of April 30, 1973 the 
President stated that in March 1973 he received new information 
regarding the involvement of members of the White House staff in 
the Watergate affair, and that: 



As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed 
the responsibility for coordinating intensive new 
inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered 
those conducting the investigations to get all the 
facts and to report them directly to me, right here 
in this office. 



Page 

72.1 President Nixon remarks, April 17, 

1973, 9 Presidential Documents 387 1240 

72.2 President Nixon address to the nation, 
April 30, 1973, 9 Presidential 

Documents 433-34 1241 



(1239) 



72.1 PRESIDENT NIXON REMARKS, AI'RIL 17. 
9 PRESWENTIAL DOCUMENTS 387 



1973, 



PRE5IDENTIAI DOCUMSNIS: RICHARD NIXON, J973 



,"'■ .; ■.^.rr. ttiii'r.T- 0^;-'-jr .'6, /97o 

Mrs. Jouett Shouse, of Washington, D.C., business and civic 
leader, Washington, D.C. 

John T. Connor, of Ntorristown, N.J,, pifsident and chief execu- 
tive ofncer, .Mlied Chemical Corp., New York, N.V. ; and former 
Secretary of Commerce. 

Fur a term expiring Oclober 26, 1074 

Mitchell I. Kafvrski, of Bloomfield Hills, Mich., chairman of the 
bonrd, president, and treasurer, Aactron, Inc., Madison Heights, 
Mich. 

Willie L. Leftwich, of Washington, DC, attorney, Hudson and 
Leftvvich, Washington, D.C. 

The President also announced the designation of Mr. 
Qucsada to serve as Chairman and Mr. Bruckmann to 
serie as Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Pennsylvania .Avenue Development Corporation. 

In addition to the eight members appointed by the 
President the Board of Directors also consists of the fol- 
lowing: Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secre- 
tary of Transportation, Administrator of General Services, 
Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and the Chair- 
man of the District of Columbia Council. The eight mem- 
bers appointed by the President will serve terms of 6 years 
once the initial staggered terms have expired. 

The Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation 
was established by the Pennsylvania Avenue Development 
Act of 1 972 { Public Law 92-578 ) to provide for the prep- 
aration and carr^'in^' out of a development plan for the 
area between the White House and the Capitol. 



The Watergate Investigation 

The President's Remarks Amtouncmg Developments and 
Procedures To Be Followed in Connection ivitk the 
Investigation. April 17, 1973 

Ladies and gentlemen: 

I have two announcements to make. Because of their 
technical nature, I shall read both of the announcements 
to the members of the press corps. 

The first announcement relates to the appearance of 
White House people before the Senate Select Committee, 
better known as the Ervin Committee. 

For se\'cral weeks. Senator Ervin and Senator Baker 
and their counsel have been in contact with White House 
representatives John Ehrlichman and Leonard Garment. 
They have been talking about ground rules which would 
preserve the separation of powers without suppressing the 
facts. 

I believe now an agreement has been reached which 
is satisLtcto^y to both sides. The committee ground rules 



as adop'ed, (ota'Jy preserve the doctrins of s.^paracion of 
powers. They provide that the appearance by a witness 
may, in the first instance, be in executive session, if 
appropriate. 

Second, executive privilege is expressly reserved and 
may be asserted during the course of the questioning as 
to any question. 

Now, much has been made of the issue as to whether 
the proceedings could be televised. To me, this has never 
been a central issue, especially if the separation of powers 
problem is otherwise solved, as I now think it Ls. 

All members of the White House Staff will appear vol- 
untarily when requested by the committee. They will tes- 
tify under oath, and they will answer fully all proper 
questions. 

I should point out that this arrangement Ls one that 
covers this hearing only in whicli wrongdoing has been 
charged. This kind of arrangement, of course, would not 
apply to other hearings. Each of them will be cor^idered 
on its merits. 

My second announcement concerns the Watergate case 
^irectly. 

On March 2 1 , as a result of serious charges which came 
to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, 
I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter. 
"""Last Sunday afternoon, the Attorney General, Assistant 
Attorney General Peterson, and I met at length in the 
EOB to review the facts which had come to me in my 
investigation and also to review the progress of the Depart- 
ment of Justice investigation. 

I can report today that there have been major develop- 
ments in the case concerning which it \vould be improper 
to be more specific now, except to say that real progress 
has been made in finding the truth. 

If any person in the executive branch or in the Govern- 
ment is indicted by the grand jury, my policy will be to im- 
mediately suspend him. If he is convicted, he mM, of 
course, be automatically discharged. 

I h.ive expressed to the appropriate authorities my view 
that no individual holding, in the past or at present, a 
position of major importance in the Administration should 
be given immunity from prosecution. 

The judicial process is moving ahead as it should, and 
I shall aid it in all appropriate ways and have so infonr.ed 
the appropriate authorities. 

As I have said before and I have said throughout this 
entire matter, all Government employees and especially 
White House Staff employees are e.\pected fully to co- 
operate in this matter. I condemn any attempts to cover 
up in this case, no matter who is involved. 

Th;u!k you. 

note: The President spo'is at +:42 p.m. in the Briefinst Room ll 
the White House. 



Volom* 9— Number 16 



(1240) 



72. 2 PRESIDEPIT I] IXON ADDRESS. APRIL 30, 1973, 
9 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 433-34 

PSesiDSNriAl OOCUMcNIS: RICHARD NIXON, 19/3 413 

xiii evidence ^vith the appropnale authorities, and I gccd psople ot ability that I am confident a traasition of 

should spend the time necessary in relation thereto. my responsibilities can be affected without Ic^s of progress. 

One of the toughest problems we have in this life is in I will do all I can to assist in accomplishing the transition. 
seeing the difference between the apparent and the real. Yours sincerely, 

and in ba.>ing our actions only on that which is real. We John D. EnRLtCHMAN, 

all must do that more than we do. I have confidence in the Aaislanl lo the President. 



ultimate prevalence of tnith; f intend to do what I can to 
speed truth's discovcrv' 



(The P.TMdent, the While Houie, Washington, D.C.) 

.note; Forastatemen 
s^e the preceding ite 

tion. Tliere are on the Domestic Council staff so many se- :he f^llowing item 



rr^, , ■* f Ti ■ , T I • .note; For a statement by the President announcing the resiffnalioni. 

Therefore, Mr. President, I submit to you my resigna- ^^ ^.^ preceding item. For the Presidenfs addres* to the Nation, 



THE WATERGATE INVESTIGATION 

The President's Address to the Nation. April 30, 1973 



Good evening: 

I want to talk to you tonight from my heart on a subject of deep 
concern to every American. 

In recent months, members of my Administration and officials of 
the Committee for the Re-election of the President — including some of 
my closest friends and most trusted aides — have been charged wth 
involvement in what has come to be knowTi as the Watergate affair. Tliese 
include charges of illegal activity during and preceding the 1972 Presi- 
dential election and charges that responsible officials participated in 
efforts to cover up that illegal activity. 

The inevitable result of these charges has been to raise serious 
questions about the integrity of the White fiouse itself. Tonight I wish 
to address those questions. 

Last June 17, while I was in Florida trying to get a few days rest 
after my visit to Moscow, I first learned from news reports of the Water- 
gate break-in. I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action, and I was 
shocked to learn that employees of the Re-election Committee were 
apparently among those guilty. I immediately ordered an investigation 
by appropriate Government authorities. On September 15, as you will 
recall, indictments were brought against seven defendants in the case. 

As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those con- 
ducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that 
members of my Administration were in any way involved. I received 
repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these continuing 
reassurances, because I believed the reports I was getting,.because I had 
faith in the persons from whom I was getting them, I discounted the 
stories in the press that appeared to implicate members of my Adminis- 
tration or other officials of the campaign committee. 

Until March of this year, I remained con\ inced that the denials were 
tme and that the charges of involvement by members of the White House 
Staff were false. The comments I made durinu this period, and the com- 
monts made by my Pres>s Secretary in my behalf, were based or. the infor- 
mation provided to us at the time wf made those ccntneiits. However, 



Volum. 9 — Nj/-b-r 13 



(1241) 



7Z.2 PRESIDEtlT NIXCII A3DRESS, APRIL 30, 1973, 
9 PFESIDENTIAL DOCVMEIITS 433-34 

PRcSlDENIIAL DOCUMENTS: SICHARO NIXON, 1973 

uf.v: inforxnation then cam,; to me which persuaded, me that there -.vas a 
real possibility that some of these charges wer<; true, and suggesting further 
that there had been an effort to conceal the facts both from the public, 
from you, and from me. 

As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility 
for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally 
ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to 
port them directly to me, right here in this office. 

I again ordered that all persons in the Government or at the Re- 
election Committee should cooperate fully with the FBI, the prosecutors, 
and the grand jury. I also ordered that anyone who refused to cooperate 
in telling the truth would be a.sked to resign from government service. 
And, with ground rules adopted that would preserve the basic consti- 
tutional separation of powers between the Congress and the Presidency, 
I directed that members of the White House Staff should appear and 
testify voluntmily under oath before the Senate committee which was 
investigating Watergate. 

I was determined that we should get to the bottom of the matter, and 
that the truth should be fully brought out — no matter who was involved. 

At the same time, I was determined not to take precipitate action, 
and to avoid, if at all possible, any action that would appear to reflect on 
innocent people. I wanted to be fair. But I knew that in the final analj-sis, 
the integrity of this office — public faith in the integrity of this office — 
would have to take priority over all personal considerations. 

Today, in one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency, I 
accepted the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White 
House — Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman — two of the finest public 
servants it has been my privilege to know. 

I want to stress that in accepting these resignations, I mean to leave 
no implication whatever of personal wrongdoing on their part, and I leave 
no implication tonight of implication on the part of others who have been 
charged in this matter. But in matters as sensitive as guarding the integrity 
of our democratic process, it is essential not only that rigorous legal and 
ethical standards be obser\'ed, but also that the public, you, have total 
confidence that they are both being observed and enforced by those in 
authority and particularly by the President of the United States. They 
agreed with me that this move was necessary in order to restore that 
confidence. 

Because Attorney General Kleindienst — though a distinguished pub- 
lic servant, my personal friend for 20 years, with no personal involvement 
whatever in this matter — has been a close personal and professional asso- 
ciate of some of those who are involved in this case, he and I both felt 
that it was also necessary to name a new Attorney General. 

The Counsel to the President, John Dean, has also resigned. 

As the new Attorney General, I have today nained Elliot Richardson, 
a man of unimpeachable integrity and rigorously high principle. I have 
directed him to do ever7thing necessaiy to ensure that the Department 
of Justice has the confidence and the trust of every law abiding person 
in this country. 

1 liave given him absolute authority to make all decisions bearing 
upon the prosecution of the Watergate case and related matters. I have 



Vol>;m. « NuiT 



(1242) 



73 . On the evening of March 2J, 1973 the President dictated his 
recollections of the events that had occurred on that day. 



Page 

73.1 Dictabelt recording of the President's 
recollections of March 21, 1973, and 
House Judiciary Committee transcript 
thereof 1244 



(1243) 



7S.1 TRANSCRIPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 1973, 1-5 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF 

FOR THE 

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 

OF THE PRESIDENT'S CASETTE RECORDING 

OF HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 1973 



(1244) 



7Z.1 TRANSCRIPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 197Z , 1-5 



TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY 
STAFF FOR THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S CASETTE RECORDING OF HIS RECOLLEC- 
TIONS OF MARCH 21, 1973. 



PRESIDENT: 

As far as the day was concerned it was relatively uneventful except 
for the, uh, talk with Dean. Dean, really in effect let it all hang out 
when he said there was a cancerous growth around the President that 
simply was going to continue to grow and that we had probably to cut it 
out now rather than let it grow and destroy us later. He obviously is 
very depressed and doesn't really see anything — other course of action 
open, but to, uh, move to let the, uh, the facts out. Paragraph. 

As I examined him it, uh, seems that he feels even he would be 
guilty of some, uh, criminal pra — , uh, liability, due to the fact that 
he, uh, participated in the actions which, uh, resulted in taking care 
of the defendants, while they were, uh, under trial. Uh, as he pointed 
out, uh, what is causing him concern is that every one of the various 
participants is now getting his own counsel and that this is going to 
cause considerable problems, because it will be each man for himself, 
and, uh, one will not be afraid to rat on the other. As a matter of 
fact, uh, Haldeman backed him up in this respect, when, uh, he mentioned 
the fact that, uh, even Magruder would, uh, bring Haldeman down if he, 
would, uh, if he felt that he himself was to go down. Haldeman said he 
agreed. Uh, the Haldeman selection on Magruder is still a very hard one 
for me to figure out. He was, he's made very few mistakes, but this is 



(1245) 



73.1 TMNSCRIPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 1973 , IS 

one case where Rose was right. He picked a rather weak man, who had 
all the appearance of character, but who really lacks it when the, uh, 
chips are down. It seemed to me in my talk with Dean that the idea of 
a Grand Jury had, uh, much to, uh, be said for it. Yet after he, 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman had met they came back and said they'd been 
around the track and felt that that would be a mistake. Ehrlichman 
did not feel, for example, that a Grand Jury or some sort of a special 
panel which Dean thought could be set up, uh, would be able to grant 
immunity. Uh, the Grand Jury appealed to me because, uh, it seemed to 
me this would be much better to have the White House, uh, people appear 
before a Grand Jury with some rules of evidence than to, uh, be forced, 
uh, eventually to appear before a Committee of the Congress, where there 
would be none. Of course, the other option is for them not to appear at 
all, but this puts the buck right back on the President, as Dean pointed 
out, and leaves, uh, not only the aura of cover-up but also the, uh, 
very great danger that somebody like H — Hunt is going to blow. Paragraph. 

Hunt seems to be a real problem according to, uh. Dean. What really 
concerned him was that somebody approached him. Hunt's lawyer, at some 
party and said that Hunt needed a hundred and — thousand dollars or so 
to pay his lawyer and handle other things or he was going to have some 
things to say that would be very detrimental to Colson and Ehrlichman, et 
al. This is, uh. Dean recognizes as pure blackmail. Of course. Hunt's 
in a pretty bad position on this because it would expose him to another 



-2- 



(1246) 



7Z.1 TRAmCRIPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 1972, 1-5 

charge, but I suppose that what he might be figure is that if he, uh, 
turns state's evidence he could, uh, go free himself. Paragraph. 

I feel for all of the people involved here, because they were all, 
as I pointed out to them in the meeting in the EOB this afternoon, 
involved for the very best of motives. Uh, 1 don't think that, uh, 
certainly Haldeman or Ehrlichman had any idea about bugging, I, I and 
of course know Dean didn't. He in fact pointed out that when, uh, Liddy 
had first presented this scheme it was so wild that Mitchell sat puffing 
his pipe rather chuck — or rather, uh, chuckling all the while, that 
Dean had then pointed out, uh, later to Ehrlichman that, uh, to, uh, 
Mitchell that they had to get off of this kick right away. Uh, then 
came the, uh, real cruncher: Apparently what had happened is that Colson, 
with Liddy and Hunt in his office, called Magruder and told him in 
February to get off his ass and start doing something about, uh, setting 
up some kind of an operation. Uh, this involvement by Colson, of course, 
is, uh, uh, was perhaps the very best intention and it may be that he is 
telling the literal truth, when he says he doesn't know what they were 
going to do in terms of bugging, etcetera. Yet, uh, Colson was always 
pushing terribly hard for action, and in this instance, uh, pushed so hard 
that, uh, Liddy et al, following their natural inclinations, uh, went, 
uh, the extra step which got them into serious trouble. Period. Paragraph. 

I learned for the first time that, uh, Ehrlichman apparently had 
sent Hunt and his crew out to check into Ellsberg, uh, to see something 



(1247) 



7Z.1 TRAfJSCRIPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 2973 . 1-5 

about his, uh, check something about his, uh, uh, psychiatric problem 
with his doctor, or something like that. That seemed to me to be a very 
curious junket for, uh, Ehrlichman to be involved in. Ehrlichman says 
that, uh, he was three or four steps away from it, but apparently Krogh 
has a problem here because Krogh did answer one question to the effect 
that he did not know the Cubans, which, of course, puts him in a straight 
position of perjury. This of course would be a terrible tragedy because 
Krogh, uh, was involved in national security work at the time, had nothing 
whatever to do with Watergate and the whole Ellsberg business, uh, was 
something was undertaken solely for the purpose of, uh, attempting to get 
information which would be helpful in, uh, working up some of the Govern- 
ment's case, uh, on the, uh. Pentagon papers. It seems that Strachan has 
been a real, uh, courageous fellow through all this. He apparently 
certainly had knowledge of the informa — of the matter, and, uh, according 
to uh, uh, uh. Dean, uh, Strachan apparently transferred the $300,000 or so 
that Haldeman had 1 — that was left to Haldeman after the 1969 campaign — 
'68 campaign — had transferred it back to the Committee. Uh, I don't think 
that this is the problem that Dean seems to think it is, but of course 
he's — has to warn against every loose end that might come out, particularly 
in view of some of the things that have come out up to this point. They 
are going to meet with Mitchell in the morning, and I, uh, hope that Mitchell 
will really put his mind to this thing and perhaps out of it all can come 
so — some sort of a course of action we can follow. Uh, it seems to me 



(1248) 



7ZA TRAHSCRrPT OF DICTABELT RECORDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RECOLLECTIONS OF MARCH 21, 1972, 1-5 

just to hunker down without making any kind of a statement is really, 
uh, too dangerous as far as the President — [57 second silence] I 
got over to the house quite late — 



(1249) 



74. On the morning of March 22, 1973 at 11:00 a.m. H.R. Haldeman, 
John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell and John Dean met in Haldeman 's office. 
Hlademan, Ehrlichman and Dean have testified that at this time Mitchell 
indicated that E. Howard Hunt was not a "problem any longer." Mitchell 
has denied making such a statement. At this meeting, according to 
Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Mitchell stated that the Administration's 
rigid executive privilege policy was untenable, both from a legal and 
from a political standpoint, because it appeared to the public to be a 
cover-up on the part of the President. Haldeman testified that most of 
the discussion at the meeting concerned approaches to dealing with the 
situation, rather than a review of the facts. 



Page 

74.1 H.R. Haldeman calendar, March 22, 1973 

(received from SSC) >i253 

74.2 John Ehrlichman log, March 22, 1973 

(received from SSC) J.254 

74.3 John Dean testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, February 14, 1974, 17-18 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) 1255 

74.4 H.R. Haldeman testimony, Watergate Grand 
Jury, January 30, 1974, 36-38 (received 

from Watergate Grand Jury) J.257 

74.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, Watergate 
Grand Jury, September 13, 1973, 67-73 

(received from Watergate Grand Jury) 1260 

74.6 H.R. Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2899 1267 

74.7 John Ehrlichman testimony, 7 SSC 2745, 2853 1268 

74.8 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 1000-01 1270 



(1251) 



74.9 Johr, Dean testimony, SSC Executive 

Session, June 16, 1973, 129-31 1272 

74.10 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1663... 1275 



(1252) 



74.1 H.R. HALDEIMN CALENDAR. hlARCH 22, 1973 

'' ' ' — r — ' — ' 



1773 MA5CH 1973 

S M T w T F S 

1 2 3 

« J « 7 S 9 10 

II II 1} It IS 16 17 

18 19 30 21 J2 33 34 

'j?^» 37 3S :» 30 31 • 



Thursday^ March 22 



81 



-^A.M. ,c_ cOL-l^^-t^Lx-' 



:00 



At- 



130 



' < j It. 7' — s — « -J — 



/^y -y ^^ 






d;iAi^^^^^^yf^4^ 



LIS 



2:00 



7^ 



->->' ^ ^ 



^^Xi^^i 



ZI5 



230 



Z45 



■ J I ^%,. .1 ■ . I. .- -^111. ... I I . ■ — ^ . ■■*...*■■■ , 



3:00 







>- .W .- .f: 



433 



ij'j X 



t' I 



rr 



N^ 



^ .^ : cr 



X-^^ u U 






\y ' ^ 



4-15 



^ 



500 






(/•■''wC--n. 



5i5 






. - - 1-"-" • t> 



V •< J 



■<3 — = — '\y 



m 



S 



iiejuiu 



7:53 



7.45 



800 



8!5 



8:3 



815 






35-?05 (Pi. 2) O - 74 - 36 



(1253) 



74.2 JOHN EHRLICEMAN LOG, MARCH 22, 1973 



WEJNZSDAY. \[ARCH2L, 197 



u ; 



HRH ofi 



''•^'^ PresLaanc 

ll:0"ir Albert H2.II, A-Ssistant Sacracar/ of B<sf sr.d a^ Ir.i2lli.;f enc 

11:45 Car at west basemant 

1Z:00 Congressman. Jack Ksmp 

1:00 Lunch in Mess with. Cole 

2 :45 Qajdji- Young 

3:00 Bernard Hillenbrand (NACO), Jim Falk 

i^ 3:45-6 HRH^ohn Dean 

6:0 Bud Krogh 

7:00 Metropolitan Club - Gene Bradley dinner 

THURSDAY, NLARCH 22, 1973 

?<■ ■ 
8:30 Sub-Cabinet briefing - 450 EOB 

"liOO HRH office - Dean, Mitc kell 

11:45 Car at west basement 

12:40 Sec. Shultz' plane arrival (Mrs. E on plane) - Andrews 

3:15 Secretary Shultz 

3:45 President, Shultz 



y 



FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1973 

1 1 :45____ President 

1:00 Depart west basement 

1:30 Depart Andrews, Jetstar 4200 

(Mr. and Mrs. E, Hvllins, Zieglers, Gladden) 
3:00 Arrive Offutt AF5, Omaha (engine trouble) 

5:30 Depart Offutt 

7:00 Arrive San Francisco 

Stay Clift Hotel 

MONDAY, A/LARCH 26, 1973 

9:00 Depart San Francisco 

(Ehrlichmans (3), Hullins, Gladden) 
1:50 Arrive Kansas City (Forbes) 

2:20 Depart Kansas City 

5:-i:0 Arrive Dv.lies, P?.ge A^lrways 



(1254) 



74.Z JOHN DEAN TESTBmJY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAND 
JURY, 17-18 



17 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

U 

12 

13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

18 



19 
20 
21 

22 
23 
24 
25 



ncetlng \!ith Kr. Halde.-.an end Mr. nhrltch-Mn, flid yon not? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Daring the course of that ceettny, was there any 
discussion about what your preference eight be as to Mr. 
Mitchell's future actions? 

A Yes, there v.'as. The nature of that conversation 
was that It was felt that Mr. Mitchell should be the one to 
step for'.;ard and stand responsible for the entire Watergate 
matter and that, If he did, the problems that had occurred 
after June 17th would dissipate thenselves and there would 
be a satisfaction with sornebody that wae standing accountable 
for the matter. 

In other words, a big enough fish v;ould have been 
caught that the probleia would have been resolved. 

Q In other words, that would have taken public oplnioni 
away from what might have occurred after the break-In, in 
connection with the so-called cover-up? 

A That is correct. 

Q 



Now, on the 22nd of March, in the morning, did you 
attend a meeting with Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. 
Mitchell? 

A Yes, I did attend such a meeting. 

Q Where did that take place? 

A In Mr. Haldeman' s office. 

Q Do you recall any reference being made to >'.r. Hunt's 



DV 



(1255) 



74.3 JOmi DEAN TESTmONY, FEBRUARY 14, 1974, WATERGATE GRAIID 
JURY. 17-18 



'le 



1 

2 

3 

< 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 



17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



tJcna:icl3 cc nny ;.oint ta tluit meeting? 

A Yea. 1 do recall very well the ctrcicjscanccs . Ic 

was just as the neetlng was otnrtlng. The pr.rtlclpants — 
the four of ub -- v;erc seated In the four chairs In front of 
llr. Haldeman'c fireplace end Mr. Mitchell was directly across 
frora Mr. Ehrlichaan and I was directly across frcn Kr. Halde- 
man. 

As wc were sitting down, Mr. Ehrlich=:an had, in sortj 
of an ofTnand — not particular focusing anyone's attention 
on it — nanner, but something that everyone could clearly 
hear, to Mr. Mitchell or just openly to the air, that he 
I wondered about Mr. Hunt's problca and ho;* that was — 6or:e- 

thing to that effect — and Mr. Mitchell responded, ii=sedintaly, 
that he didn't think that Mr. Hunt was a problen anyaore. 

Q Was the natter dropped at that point? 

A That was all that was said. 

Q Now, was there any discussion vlth Mr. Mitchell 

about Mr. Mitchell coaing forth in the oanner which you had 
discussed the previous afternoon? 

A Ko. There was not. In fact, I had expected to 

witness a rather spectacular show that norning, when they 
presented this to Mr. Mitchell, and there was not so ir.uch as 
a word mentioned to Mr. Mitchell that he should account for 
himself. 

Q Was some reference made later on during the course 






(1256) 



74.4 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JANUARY 20, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 36-38 



36 



A Let me rtd.se one other point that is not specif IcalXr 
I guass in responoa to that, but very definitely I would 
aeavnoB now relates to it which is that in the meeting with 
John Mitchell, John Dean, John Ehrlichman, and nyaelf, in my 
office on March 22n(], which was the day following this, and 
which wa8 when John Mitchell came down for the meeting with 
the President, we met separately before the meeting with the 
President. 

Z do recall, and I think Z have testified to aji 
interchange, as I recall It, between John Dean and John Mitche 
where the question was asked in some way, "What about the Hunt 
problem?", and Dean saying, "What's the situation with H»int7", 
or "What's happened on Hunt's problem", or something, and Mr. 
Mitchell saying something to the effect of , "That's no 
problem", or, "That's t^Ucen care of", or "That's okay", or 
something like that. 

There was in no way, that I recall, any reference 
to a payment having been made or not been made, or any specific 
definition that that was what the Hunt problem was, 

Looking back at It now, Z assume that it vas. Z 
can't confirm that it was. 

Q Does that not refresh your recolleotlon about your 
conversation with Mr. Mltcl^ell the previous day on the. tele- 
phone in which you invited Mr. Mitchell to Washington, and 
more specifically, does it not refresh your recollection as to 



DV 



(1257) 



74.4 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTmONY, JANUARY 30, 1974, WATERGATE 
GRAND JURY, 36-38 



3 37 



I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2S 



whether you naked Mr. Mitchell whether he was going to do 
something about Mr. Bunt's problem? 

A It doea not. I don't recall dlBCusslng that. 

Q Did you not learn that In substemce on March 22nd, 
that Mr. Hunt'e demandhad been In essenco acceded to? 

A I wouldn't Bay bo, no. The only thing 1b I In 
effect overheard a conversation between Mr. Dean and Hr. 
Mitchell, as 1 just recounted. 

Q You were all present, meeting together, were you 
not? 

A Yes, but in this meeting, as most of these meetings 
are, people are in and out. There are side discussions. 
People are on the phone during the meeting, and that sort of 
thing. 

This was a bilaterial conversation between Hr. Dean 
and Mr. Mitchell. 

Q Hell, It was fundamental to your meeting on the 22nd 
as to what would be done with Mr. Hunt, or what position the 
White House would take with respect to Mr. Hunt. 

A Mo, that's not my recollac^on of the March 22nd. 
It is not my recollection that that was fundtunental or even 
consecfuentlal. The points of those discussions on the 22nd 
were on a much broader stab^Act vrttich was dealing with the 
prime question of White House, and so on, 

We have the tape of that meeting, Hr. Haldeaan, with 



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74.4 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIflONY, JANUABYSO, 1974, FATEEGATE 
GRAND JURY, S6-33 



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the President, but my question, if you listen to it carefully, 
sir, dealt with the purpose of the meeting, ond if it was not 
fundamental that Mr. Hunt's problem or the question of how to 
deal with Mr. Hxint was not fundaniantal to yoiir havinq the 
toeeting, and most respectfully, if it was stated at the outse^ 
of the meeting, which you have testified it was, that Mr. 
Hunt's problem was no longer a problem for the White Bouse in 
essence, then you could move on to other things, could you 
not? 

A Ito, Let mo correct tin appiurent mlsinprassion there. 
I don't believe it was stated at the outset. I believe it was 
BOmothing that came up peripherally during the course of the 
meeting. I don't thihk it was a part of the meeting-discussion 
as such. 

My recollection is that this was a side discussion 
inatdental to the Heating between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean 
at a point where maybe someone else had walked in or out of 
the room, or something like that, or there was a phone call, 
and they were conversing incidentally to the course of th«> 
_.genercLl discussion. 

Q Mr. HJLldeinenr', isn't it a fact that in the coafde of 
the meeting on the 21st with the President, the question of 
whether or not to accede to Mr. Bunt's most recent demand was 
a subject of discussion? 

A In the Dean meeting with the President? 



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74.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, 
h'PTERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 



67 



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tiow you haJ that inforLiation. for t.a dciyc. '.:■/ q-jc:; 
tion now ia in your neeting with Mr. Mitchell — Jtr. f'itchcll 
Hr. Ilalxlen.an and ilr. Dean on I-larch 22 — did yoa ask. .".r, 
Mitchell whether Hunt's money proble.-=3 had been solved? 

A I did not. 

Q Okay. Did you get into ajiy discussion of the infor 

nation of the threat or the corouaication riade fron Mr, Hunt 
through sonebody, and finally Dejin to you? 

A I think I haard such a discussion, but I'ra not sure 

It was a very brief passage between Decin and Kitchel-l where 
Dean asked Mitchell, as I recall, in very indirect terms, or 
in a vary indirect way, i-f that la&tter had been t-^lipn care of 

;'Jhen I say indirect, I don't tlvink the word "nunt" 
was used. I don't think the word "blacfcaaii" vzis used. But 
in looking back on it, X assuiae that that is the meaning of 
the remark. 

Q What T»as said, the jaanner or the words said, that 

caused you then and causes you now to relate that to Hunt's 
threat? 

A Well, that was on my nind at the tixie obviously. 

Dean had said ho was going to talk to Mitchell in cxir convert 
satlon on tiia 20th, so when Dean said, "Is that taken ^ are of 
or "Is that mattervtaken care of?", or "Are you working on 
that?", or soEsething of that Idnd, I .assccaed that that's what 
he was talking about. 



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14 



74.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTmONY. SEPTE{4BER 13. 1973, 
WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 Cf> 

I (lion't as:-, zirA it warrr'.'t cx.pliii.-.--^ , b-c if ir. 
fact there was any corxicnt at that necting on th::e subject, 
that was the only connent that I heard that co;ilil have relatec 
to that. 



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Q Tell the ladies and gentier'.en of the Grand Jury this, 

J 

Mr. Ehrlichraan, Jind if you don't thiiik this is a fair guestioa, 
then let me withdraw it. ■ [ 

On riarch the 20 th, you had been told of vhat vou ' 

i 

admit shook you, of a threat by Hunt to disclose cei-tain ! 
things if he didn't get paid what I would call a substantial 
sum of aoney. 

You beard, apparently frcca what, you're teXXlng ne, 
that Oean said in the course of this that he was going to 
talk Hitcbell about this, right? 

A Kight. 

Q You laiew that Mitchell had proopted fundraising 

before by virtue of the Kalmbach contact. Two days later, you 
hear Dean sialce or have socoe colloguy with Mr. Mitchell which 
J.ed you to believa that they were dlsoosslng that matter. 

Did it occur to you to say, "look nen, now we can 
be gettiog into a violation of law here if we do something 
like this." 

Do you consider that a fair question? Do you want 
to share with the Jury your thoughts on that? 

A It's a fair question. X had had that kind of a 



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74. S JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIIfONY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1973, 

WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 " j 

conversation with Dean already in -..-hich I had said to hi.- \ 

tluit r felt that thia was blacJccail that could not be couatcn-; 

t 
anced, euid we ought to just let the chips fall where they j 

! 

might. ! 

t 
Q Did you have this conversation at the tine E>ean re- 

ported this to you or some other tl:?.e? 
A No. 

Q What other time did you have it? 



It had to be after. It was after I talked to 



i 



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Krogh, and I think after 1 talked to both Krogh and Young be- 
caused I wanted to tajte a look at our hold card. It had been 
a long time since 1 had ever thought about the subject:. 

Q What was the hold card? 

A Kell, the question of the Plonbers operation, and 
the antecedents of it, and how nuch could be exposed In natlonj- 
al security laatters that Hunt had f aaillaxlty with. 

You see Hunt went out of ny line of vision at eose 
point in 1971, and I was not sure how much Hunt night have 
known about soma of the things .that particnlarly Young had 
laeen involved with, and if he did go public on a thing of thi 
kind, just how much exposure there could be in teras of daaag«i 
frora the national security standpoint, particularly. 

I was 2l1so interested in rrv own exposure. So I 

talked to both Krogh and Young to find out what Hunt knew, or | 

I 
might think he knew, and how much they bad shared with him on t 



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7^.5 JOTil/ EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY_. SEPTEMBER IZ, 1973, 
WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 '" 

sonic; of tJi'jso tiiinca that '.'t; v._r>_; t;tiH concerned. ai>oufc. 

So I qot aaauriinc^-.-. fro.i then that right after this i 

f 

Ellnberg business, that he ro xonycr had been uaed in aixv o£ ; 

these other things, paxticulirly Ycung, but that also ilrogh , 
had been involved In Later, and that reaasnred ne consideraiily 
on th^t siibjcct. j 

I felt after talliing to both Krogh and Young that ; 

t 

I personally didn't have emy problera, and so it was either on ; 

; 

the phone or in person, I'n not sure which, that I did indicate 
to Dean that I thought we ought to just let her go. t 

Q Well, when you heard this corament, this conversatioa 



between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Deam on March' 22, did it occur 

to you to breaJc in there and say, "V7ait a-ninute"? 

A It really didn't, emd as I say, it was not> a convex-; 

I 

nation in vhich I was. It was soaething that I sort of over- [ 
beard. 

Q You were not in the chain of conversation? 

I 
A It was preliminary to our meeting, as I recall, when! 

I 
r 
the two of then first carae in contact. But I heard t-h-ig testi- 
mony and I was trying to think back as to what in fact took | 

! 
place there. 1 asked Ealdeman about it, and **at ^^«: recollec— 

i 
tion of it was, and I've been trying — j 

Q What was his recollection? 

A Much the same as mine, that the conversatioa was 

between Dean and Mitchell. He identified it as being related 



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74.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, [ 
WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 ] 71 

to the OLibJcct, and I an influenced in part by tiia'-i. j 

» 
Q nave you talked to t\r. Haldencm .about this subjec::" j 

Mr. Ilaldoraon was aware of this, right? 

A I'n cure he was. 

Q Did you tell hL-n about it? 

I 
I 

A I don't ]cnow whether I told hirx i03out it or somebody 

i 

else did. I 

I 

Q Do you know whether anybody told hira in your pres— ; 

f 
sence if you didn't tell hin about It? I gather what you're .- 

• 

saying is that you nay have told Ealdeiaan euid yoa nay not 
have. 

A I don't think I told hia, but I think we talJced 
about it. 

Q All right. So then prior to March 22, Mr. Haldemaui 
vaa aware because of his conversation with yoa of the threat 
being loade? 

A He was aware of it. Whether I talJced to him prior 
to that tine or not, I don't know becaase I have only recently 



discussed with bis this allegation that yoa read off there. 

Q miat did be say prior to March 22 that caused you 
to know that he was aware of the threat? 

A He has told ne since. I %rould have the impression 
now that he was aware of it imd that this remark was signifi— 
ceuit to hin in the light of what ervidently was his prior 
awareness. 



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74.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEmSR 13, 1973. 

WATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67-73 



72 



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Q }!c- l.ij told yoa :;inca that ho lieard Deam i^nd 

Kltchcll have thir; nido converaation? 
A P.ic;ht. 

Q 7^d that he was awaxe at the tine that It concert'--'' ' 

— or he thought at tha tine, or aasuried at the tine that it 

I 
concerned the threat by Hunt? I 

A Yes, but it didn't cone quite that way. I asked hi.-n 

Whether- he recollected a conversation between Dean asid ir.e at '■ 



that meeting such as Dean testified to, and he said, "IJo, 
that conversation was between Deem, and Kitchell." 



Q Did he say anything else that would cause you to 

asEuaa that he was aware of the subject matter and Icaew what 
they were talking about? 

A No, but I assumed from that that be inust. have been. 

I don't think that the conversatloa between Dean and Mitchell 
was sufficiently in detail that soioebody who wasn't aware of I 
the circunstances would have read that into it. That's what 
I'm trying to say. 

Q Which ha did? 

A Which evidently he, did by what he has recently told 

Bse. 

O All right. Let me ask you this question. You did 
not, I gather, ask Mitchell whether Hunt's rsoney problems had 
been solved, and Mitchell did not respond ro you that he did 
not think it was a problem any further? 



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74.5 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1973, 
VATERGATE GRAND JURY, 67 -7 Z 



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Tliat's correct- ! 

I 
Q But according to your tcatir-.or.y, sosiething ll};e th.-.-.: 

[ 
was Gaid between Kitchell and DccLn? i 

'i 
A I thioV. it was less definite than tliat, lens detail- 

ed than that. 

Q You dida't think it was a problen any further-, or 

something like that? 

A I'm not sure that he said that. He did nore them 

just grunt af f inoatively, but it wasn't nuch more than grunt 
affirmatively. It was not an elaborate sentence as you have 
read off there. 

Be gave soma Iclnd of an af flrsiativs, put.-of£ kind 
of a response. 

Q Did yoa ]atow at this tis*, or did yoa learn a fev 

days later, that a package of raoney, approxlnatBly $75,000 
in caBh, was delivered to Hunt? 
A Ro. 

On or aroxmd Karch 20 and 21, 1972? 
A Ko. 

Q Khen did you firs^ hear of that? 
A At the Ervin Coismittae hearings. 

A JUKORt 1973- 

KR. NEAl.: I'm sorry, 1973. I beg your pardon. The 
Doney was delivered in '73. i 

THZ yJlTtXZSSi X bad assused and continoad to assuiae 



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74.6 H.R. HALDEMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 30, 197 Z, 7 SSC 2899 

2899 

Senator Baker. Would you supply us with copies or the original so 
that we could have copies? 

Mr. Haldem.vn. I believe 

Senator Baker. I understand — has a copy been supplied to the com- 
mittee? 

Mr. Dash. It is being reproduced now. 
Senator Baker. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ervtx. You may proceed with your original statement. 
Mr. Haldeman. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and I met with the President later that 
afternoon of the 21st. That meeting dealt with the questions of the 
grand jury, the Senate committee, and executive privilege in connec- 
tion with gathering the facts and getting them out I think there was 
some discussion of Ehrlichman's theory that everybody should go to 
the grand jury ; and Dean's reaction that that would be fine as long 
as we had immunity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall, very strongly shot 
down that thought from Dean saying it did not make any sense at all. 
Dean has testified that he argued that the way to get the truth out 
would be to send everybody to the grand jury with immimity. That, in 
Itself, is rather indicative of the different attitudes. Mr. Ehrlichman 
was arguing for going to the grand jury without immunity in order 
to get the truth out. Mr. Dean was arguing for going to the grand 
jury with immunity to get the truth out. 

I recall an incident after that afternoon meeting that Mr. Dean also 
recalls, but he says it took place before and he sees it a little bit dif- 
ferently. I remember that Dean and Ehrlichman and I were standing 
on the top of the steps of the EOB, the Executive Office Building, out- 
side the President's office. Dean said, sort of thoughtfully, that maybe 
the solution to this whole thing was to draw the wagons around the 
White House and let all the chips fall where they may, because that 
would not hurt anyone in the White House, nobody here had a prob- 
lem — but his question was : What would that do in the way of creating 
problems for Mitchell and Magruder? The significance of that com- 
ment was that it still seemed to be clear in Dean's mind that the prob- 
^ lem did not lie in the White House. 

The next step was the meeting of Mitchell, Ehrlichman, Dean, and 
myself the next day with the President. 

The four of us met first in the morning in my office and had some 
discussion of Dean's report to the President, although not in any de- 
tail. Most of the discussion was regarding approaches to dealing with 
the situation rather than a review of the facts of the situation. 

Mitchell turned the discussion to the problem of executive privilege, 
and he argued very strongly that the position the President had taken 
and was maintaining regarding executive privilege appeared to the 
public to be a coverup on the part of the President and that it was 
bad politics, bad public relations, and a bad idea. Dean at that meeting 
again argued his idea of everybody going to the grand jurv with im" 
numity in order to get the facts out. 

That was the day the news report was received regarding Pat Gray 
accusing Dean of having been a liar in some report he had given to the 
FBI. That interrupted the meeting and there was some discussion 
about it. 



(1267) 




74.7 JOHN EHRLICmMN TESTIMONY, JULY 27 , 30, 1973, 
7 SSC 2745, 2853 

274o 

Mr. Ehkuchman. I do not tliink he knew about it either. I inter- 
viewed Stracha-n at great length and my notes are here and I asked 
him, because 1 was tiding to hnd out about Mr. Halderaan, frankly. 
I said, "Tell me eveiy tiling you know about how Ilaldeman might be 
tied into this thing," and he gave me four or five instances of some 
contact that Mr. Haldeman might have had with the Watergate busi- 
ness. There was not a scintilla of a mention of shredding documents 
anywhere in that. 

Senator Gurney. What you are saying is we may get different testi- 
mony from the next witness. 

Mr. Ehruchman. Well, and I am saying, too, that as we sat in this 
March 21 meeting, I do not think Mr. Haldeman or I had any contem- 
plation that there was going to be a suggestion of our implication. 

Senator Gukney. Well, now, what did the President say to this 
difference of opinion between you and Dean on immunity ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. He said that he would like to have us have a 
meeting with John Mitchell, and sit down and talk with him not only 
about that, about the basic question of •whether staff should appear here 
or at the grand jury or both, but also recasting the administration's 
approach to the question of executive privilege because he knew Mr. 
JMitchell had very strong views on that. 

Senator Gurney. Did the meeting end on that note ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Yes, sir. 

'Senator Gurney. All right. The next day you did have such a meet- 
ing, did you not ? 

Mr. Ehruchman. Yes, we did. 

Senator Gurney. With the three of you and Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Right, and then that meeting likewise went over 
to the President's office in the aft,ernoon. 

Senator Gurney. Will you describe those two meetings ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. I was only in a part of the first meeting held in 
Mr. Haldeman's office, that was the day Secretary Shultz came back 
from the monetary conferences and we were in the midst of a reexam- 
ination of phase III, the economic program, and I was sent to the 
airport to meet Secretary Shultz, ride back with him in a helicopter 
and bring him up to date on what the President wanted to meet with 
him about, and arrange for a time that afternoon when the Secretary 
could come over and we could have a further meeting and get into 
the work that had been in progress during his absence. 

The Under Secretary — I guess it is cafled Deputy Secretary — of the 
Treasury, Mr. Simon, likewise rode back and we had that session. 

So I joined, I rejoiued, excuse me, the Dean-Mitchell-Haldeman 
meeting, not too long before it went over to the President's office. 

Senator Gurney. What transpired while you were there ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. Sir? 

Senator Gurney. What transpired while you were there? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. While I was there there was largely a discussion 
of executive privilege, and Mr. Mitchell's views that the Kleindienst 
testimony or — I do not remember whether he testified, but anyway, 
the administration position had been too restrictive, and that it was 
untenable both, he thought, from a legal standpoint and also from a 
political standpoint. 



(1268) 



74.7 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY. JULY 27 , 30. 1973, 
7 SSC 2745, 2853 



2853 

ilr. Ehrlichjiax. Well. In any event, the finsvrer to your question 
is that I just really draw a blank on that. It doesn't relate to anj-thin^ 
I can recall. " " 

Mr. WiLsox. May we have it now ? 

jNIr. Dash. Yes. I have a copy, if somebody would take it for you 
to peruse. 

Senator Ervin. If it will refresh your recollection and, if so, I would 
like you to respond. 

Mr. WrLSON. May we keep that ? 

Mr. Dash. It is my only copy but I will make a Xerox copy for you. 

ilr. Ehrlichmax. Counsel, I don't recall ever either seeing this 

transcript or 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Wilson, would you like a copy of that? 
Mr. Wilson. Please. 

Mr. Dash. Yon can return it and we will see that you do get a copy. 
You stated a little earlier prior to my showing" you that document 
that Mr. Hunt was making a demand — either I get so much money or 
I will tell this or that. What conceivably could Mr. Hunt have told? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. The way John Dean explained it to me, the threat 
was in terms of he would tell seamy things about what he did at the 
White House for Mr. Krogh and me. Now, I took that to refer to the 
California break-in which is the only thing I could think of that 
would— that he ever did at the "White House for me of any kind for 
that matter. And I asked Mr. Dean if he knew what this -was about 
_ and he said he assumed that that is what it was about. 

Mr. Dash. Now, do you recall a meeting with Mr. Dean and with 
Mr. Mitchell. I think, probably on March 22. Did vou ask Mr. Mitchell 
whether or not Hunt's demand had been taken care'of ? 

Mr. EiiRLicHitAX. I heard that testified in point of fact, my recollec- 
tion of that is that that convei'sation was between ifr. Dean and Mr. 
Mitchell and it was Mr. Dean saying just, is that matter taken care of, 
without reference to Hunt or anybody, and Mr. Mitchell sort of grunt- 
_ing and saying maybe, or I guess so, or something very vague. 

^fr. Dash. Did you learn about that time that in" fact Mr. Hunt's 
demand had been taken care of? 

Mr. Ehrmchmax. No. In fact it wasn't until the testimony here 
that T was aware of that. 

ifr. Dash. And did you have any knowledge or awareness of ilr. 

Fred LaRue's role 

Air. Ehrlichmax. No. 

yiv. Dash [continuing]. In malring those payments? 
Did you by the way tell the President about the blackmail demand ? 
Mr. EHRLiCHifAX. By the time I discussed it with him. he already 
knew of it. 

Mr. Dash. Now. it appears from certainly the White House loirs we 
have received, that after the La Costa meeting, some time after Feb- 
niaiT 10. Mr. Dean's meetings with the President increased really sig- 
nificantly beranse he had very few meetings prior to that time and then 
they were quite frequent. Could you explain to your knowledge, if you 
ha ve any, why that occurred ? 

Mr. EHRi>icH:NrAx. Yes, sir, I think lean. 



(1269) 

35-905 tPt. 2) O - 74 - 37 



74.8 JOHN DEAN TESTmONY, JUNE 25, 1973, 3 SSC 1000-01 

lOOO 

the President suggested that we have a meeting \vith Mitchell, ELilde- 
man, and Ehrlichman to discuss liow to deal with this -iltuatiou. W'liat 
emerged from that discussion after Haldemau came into the office was 
that John Mitchell should account for iiimself for tlie pre-June 17 
activities and the President did not seem concerned about the activities 
which had occurred after Jime 17. 

After I departed the President's office I subsequently went to a meet- 
ing with Ilaldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss the matter further. The 
sum and substance of that discussion was that the way to handle this 
now was for Mitchell to step forward and if ilitcliell were to step 
forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those in- 
volved in the White House in the coverup. 

Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called ^Mitchell and asked him 
to come down the next day for a meeting with the President on the 
Watergate matter. 

In the late afternoon of March 21, Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
and I had a second meeting with the President. Before entering this 
meeting I had a brief discussion in the President's outer office of the 
E.xecntive Office Building suite with Haldeman in. which I told him 
that we had two options: 

One is that this thing goes all the way and deals with both the pre- 
activilies and tiie postactivities, or the second alternative; if the 
coverup was to proceed we would have to draw the wagons in a circle 
around the White House and that the White House protect itself. 
I told Haldeman that it had been the White House's assistance to the 
reelection committee that had gotten us into much of this problem and 
now the only hope would be to protect ourselves from further 
involvement. 

The meeting with the President that afternoon with Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and myself was a tremendous disappointment to me 
because it was quite clear that the coverup as far as the White House 
was concerned was going to continue. I recall that while Haldeman, 
Elirlichman, and I were sitting at a small table in front of the Presi- 
dent in his Executive Office Building office that I for the first time 
said in front of the President that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlich- 
man. and Dean were all indictable for obstruction of lustice and that 
was the reason I disagreed with all that was being discussed at that 
point in time. 

I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman. were 
very imhappy with my comments. I had let them verv clearlv know 
that I was not going to participate in the matter anv further and that 
I thought it was time that everybody start thinking about telling 
the truth. 

I again repeated to them I did not think it was possible tn per- 
petuate the coverup and the important thing now was to get the 
President out in front. 



Meetixg of Mabch 22 

The arrangements had been made to have a meeting after lunch 
witli tlie President with Ehrlicliman, Ilaldeman. Mitchell, and myself. 
y\r. ^ritcliell came to Wasliinirfon that niorninfr for a meeting in 
Haldemnn's office in which Elirlichman. iMitchell. Haldeman. and 



(1270) 



74.8 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY^ JUNE 25, 1973, 2 SSC 1000-01 

1001 

myself were present. 1 recall that one of the first things that Ehrlich- 
man asked of ^litchell was whether Hunt's money problem had been 
taken care of. ilitchell said tliat he didnt think it was a problem any 
further. There then followed a general discussion of the status of 
the Senate hearings, and the discussion never got down to specifics. 
It had been my inrpression that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were 
going to try to get iMitchell to come forward and explain his involve- 
ment in the matter. This did not occur. Mitchell said that he thought 
everything was going along very well with the exception of the posture 
of the President on executive privilege. He said that he felt that the 
President was going to have to back down somewhat or it would appear 
. he was preventing information from coming out of the Wliite House. 
I recall that Ehrlichman left the meeting before it had terminated 
because he was going to meet Secretary Shultz. who was coming in 
from out of the country. I was also called out of the meeting about 
noontime when a message was sent to me by Zieglcr that it was impor- 
tant he see me immediately. This had to do with the statement that 
was running on the wires that Gray had said that I had probably lied 
and Ziegler wanted to know how to handle it. Accordingly, I departed 
the meeting and went into a meeting with Ziegler and Moore to dis- 
cuss Gray's comment. I returned to Haldeman's office where ilitchell 
and Haldeman and I had lunch. 

During lunch, there was some continued conversation about the "en- 
eral problems. Mr. Mitchell raised the fact that F. Lee Bailey, who 
had been very helpful in dealing with McCord, had a problem that he 
would like to bring up. He said that Mr. Bailey had a client who had 
an enormous amount of gold in his possession and would like to make 
an arrangement with the Government whereby the gold could be turned 
over to the Government without the individual being prosecuted for 
holding the gold. Mitchell was addressing his request^for assistance to 
Haldeman but Haldeman was nonresponsive and the matter was 
dropped. 

I again departed Mr. Haldeman's office to have further dealin<»s 
with Moore and Ziegler and Haldeman told me that there would be°a 
meeting m the President's EOB office about 1 :30 and that I should 
come directly from Zieglers office when I got mv problem worked out 
regarding Gray's statement. I arrived about l":30 in the President's 
Office but the President was not ready to hold the meetins yet. 

The meeting with the President, Ehrlichman, Haldeman", Mitchell, 
and nie was again a general discussion of the Senate Watergate hear- 
ings situation and, did not accomplish anything. Rather it Tvas a fur- 
ther indication that there would be no effort to stop the covenip from 
continuing. I recall that Mitchell told the President that he felt that 
the only problem that he now had was the fact that he was taking a 
public beating on his posture on executive privileire : that the statement 
on executive privilege was too broad and that probably something 
should be done to change his posture on the matter. 

Mitchell was not suggesting that members of the White House so 
to the Hill to testify, rather that some more cooperative position be 
developed to avoid tlie adverse pulilicirv. It was at tins time that the 
President said that Kleindienst was supposed to be workinir those 
things out with Senator Baker and he apparently had not l^een doinir 
so. The President said that Timmons had told liim that a member of 



(1271) 



74.9 JOHN DEAN TESTmONY, JUNE 16, 1973,- SSC EXECUTIVE 
SESSION, 129-32 

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House Judiciary Committee staff 



Mr. Dean. No. 

Mr. Shaffer. The answer is no. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you ever express to anyone that if you 
went before the Grand Jury that you would want immunity? 

Mr. Dean. No. In fact, when we get down into that — 

Mr. Shaffer. That's a pretty broad question. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, that's exactly how I want to put it. 

Mr. Shaffer. I advise him not to answer that question 
on the grounds that it invades his own attorney-client privilege. 

Mr. Dean. I thought the reference was to the White House. 

Mr. Thompson. It was, actually. 

Mr. Dean. And the answer to that is, I did not. 

Mr. Thompson. I'll say, excluding the President, 
excluding any attorney-client privilege. 

Mr. Dean. I even discussed that with the President and told 
him I was not seeking immunity. 

Mr. McCandless. That's a conversation, there. 

Mr. Thompson. Then, I believe, on the 22nd you had a 



meeting with Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Haldeman. 

Mr. Shaffer. If you could speak up. 

Mr. Dean. That was a meeting — 

Mr. Dash. And with the President. 

Mr. Thompson. First of all, with these people. 

Mr. Dean. In the morning meeting there was a general 
discussion of the whole problem at that point in time. There 



129 



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74.9 JOHN DEAN TESTIMONY, JUNE 16, 197 Z, SSC EXECUTIVE 
SE SSION, 12 9-31^ 

Indistinct document retyped by 
House Judiciary Committee staff 

was an effort evolving to get Mitchell to come forward in hopes 
that he would take the heat for the — situation, and thereby 
avoid the problems of the Grand Jury, and others getting into 
the post-situation. 

Mr. Thompson. Who was that, in effect? 

Mr. Dean. This was discussed with Ehrlichman and 
Haldeman. 

Mr. Thompson. What was Mitchell's response to that? 

Mr. Dean. Well, I never confronted him with it, they 
didn't. 

Mr, Thompson. This was something that they were hoping, 
but never really presented it to him? 

Mr. Dean. That's right. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you actually get into the discussion 
as to culpability of knowledge before June the 17th? 

Mr. Dean. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Could you be a little bit more specific 
as to who said what at that meeting? 

Mr. Dean. Well, it was a very rambling meeting. I recall 
that at one time during the meeting Ehrlichman left to go to 
a meeting with Secretary Schultz who was coming in town, and 
the meeting continued with Haldeman and myself. 

I at one point left the meeting when the wire services 
carried the story that Pat Gray said that I probably lied. 
It was a very rambling meeting about just the problems in 



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(1273) 



74.9 JOHN DEAN TESTmONY, JUNE 16, 1973, SSC EXECUTIVE 

SESSION, 129-31 

131 

Indistinct document retyped by 

House Judiciary Committee staff 

general, and nothing specific. There was discussion about, 
you know, would the doctrine of White House privilege prevent 
the White House staff from appearing. There was a great interest 
developing, particularly on Mitchell's part, that I not testify 
in any form, at any time. 

Mr. Thompson. Why? 

Mr. Dean. Well because I had made it very clear to every- 
body that I was going to tell the truth. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Mitchell ever express the idea that 
the President's claim of executive privilege would be a bad 
idea, it would be just as bad as taking the Fifth Amendment, 
in the public eye? 

Mr. Dean. Yes, sir. He felt at that point in time that 
the beating that the President was publicly taking was because 
of his stance of executive privilege, and that something should 
be done to change the tenor of that; that some middle ground 
should be reached with interrogatories, or something other 
than flat-out refusal to send people to the Hill. 

Mr. Thompson. Did Ehrlichman ever express the idea, 
either in this meeting, or any other meeting that one should 
come clean, and whoever had to be sacrificed should be sacrif iccdc?'; 
Put his cards on the table, this sort of thing. 

Mr. Dean. He did. It was raised to me, not by Ehrlichman 
directly, but by Haldeman, and the first time I heard about it 
was shortly after the election, when Haldeman told me about it. 



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74.10 JOHN MITCHELL TESTIMONY, JULY 10, 1973, 4 SSC 1663 

1663 



ci 

n 



I re 



answers relating to ifr. Magrnder's testimony where I know damn 
well that he has transposed events and got them mixed into other 
circumstances. 

Senator TALirADOE. Mr. Dean has testified before this committee 
that there was a meeting on >[arch 22. 1973. where you met with him, 
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. and you said that there was no 
more money problems for Mr. Hunt. Did this meeting take place? 

Mr. ^MrrcHELL. The meeting had taken place. Senator. I covered this 
earlier this morning, and it is to this effect, the meeting took place 
prior to a meeting with the President. It was on March 22, those par- 
ticipating were Haldeman. Ehrlichman, Dean, and myself. Dean's 
testimony is to the effect that Ehrlichman asked me if Hunt had been 
paid or if his problems had been l^aken care of, and I am reported by 
Dean to have answered, yes, something. To the contrary, I deny that it 
ever existed as far as I am concerned, because I would not know whether 
Hunt's problems have been taken care of or not. 

Senator Talmadge. Then, you are telling this committee Mr. Dean 
was in error when he made this statement ? 

Mr. MrrcHELL. This may be another one of these cases where on 

Senator Tal3iadge. Intentions were good and his facts were wrong? 
Mr. MrrcHELL. Well, he probably got the parties mixed up. I do not 
recall ever having talked to John Ehrlichman about payment of money 
anybody in connection with the Watergate case. 
Senator Talmadge. I believe you stated you later met with the 
President that day ? 
Mr. MrrcHELL. Yes, sir, we did. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Dean said — he testified — you talked with the 
President about dealing with the Ervin committee at that point, is 
that correct? 

Rlr. Mitchell. Excuse me, this is a side joke that we have, he is 
afraid I am going to pronoimce the chairman's name wrong as I have 
from time to time. 

The word "dealing" is a pretty broad term. Actually, the subject 
matters were a number that did have to do with the committee and it 
was also, of course, the basis, the subject matters were the basis for 
discussion that took place previously that morning among Haldeman. 
Ehrlichman. Dean, and myself in the meeting that we just got out of. 
The real problem that was discussed at that particular time was 
the problem the President was having in connection with executive 
privilege and that was the real focal point of it and, of course, that 
was right in the middle of the Gray hearings where the concentration 
was on the executive privilege matter. 

The other aspects of it were as to who was to be the liaison in con- 
nection with the "UTiite House working with this committee up here, 
and I believe that Mr. Dean is correct in his testimonv that during 
that meeting the President called Mr. Kleindienst to ask him if he 
had met with the chairman and the vice chairman of the committee 
on the subject matter to start discussing these matters of executive 
privilege and the other relationships in that area. 

Senator Talmawje. Did you convince the President at that time 
that he ought to wai\'e executive privilege? 
Mr. Mitchell. I urged it. 



(1275) 



75. On or about March 22, 1973 John Ehrllchman met with Egil Krogh 
at the White House. Ehrlichman assured Krogh that Howard Hunt was 
stable or more stable, that his recommendation was just to hang tough, 
and that Hunt was not going to disclose all. 



Page 

75.1 Egil Krogh testimony, Watergate Grand Jury, 
January 29, 1974, 10-11 (received from 

Watergate Grand Jury) 1278 

75.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2550-51 1280 



(1277) 



75.1 EGIL KROGH TESTmOIH . JANUARY 29, 1974, WATERGATE 
~ GRAND JURY, 10-11 

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but I was not told this specifically as to who would be in- 
volved in those meetings. 

Q So what you're saying is that you would not do any- 
thing with respect to going over to the Justice Department or 
to the Prosecutors until at least Mr. Mitchell arrived in 
Washington and it was learned how this Hunt demand would be 
handled or how it had been handled? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, did there come a time thereafter when you spoke 
to Mr. Ehrlichman again? 

A Yes, sir. After that discussion with him on Wednes- 
day, the 21st, I went home. I stayed away from the Department 
of Transportation all day on Thursday the 22nd. 

Q At that time, you were Under Secretary of the De- 
partment of Transportation? 

A I was Under Secretary of the Department of Trans- 
portation, and I called in and said that I was not feeling 
well, which was true, and was literally awaiting the outcome 
of those meetings on Thursday. 



Q And did you then have a telephone conversation with 
Mr. Ehrlichman on the 22nd? 

A Yes, sir, I did. It was in the late afternoon some- 
time. I received a call from him and he indicated to me that 
Mr. Hunt was, apparently, stable or more stable and that his 
recommendation would be just to hang tough -- that's the 



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(1278) 



75.2 EGIL KROGH TESTIMONY, JANUARY 29, 1974, W/'TEBGATE H 
GBAND JURY, 10-11 ^^ 

;.rccisc wo;c.;; that he used in that telephone conversation. 

r.i.' Mr. Ehrlichman indicf.te to you that he had 
learned frc:. llr. Mitchell, in substance, that Kr. Hunt v;as 
not going to blow? 

A That is correct. I'm not sure exactly what the 
vjords V7ere that he used, but the clear impression I derived 
was that Kr. Hunt was stable and that he was not going to 
disclose all, and I believe the opport'onity would have been 
the next day at his sentencing hearing in the U. S. Court- 
house. 

Q Now, did you, thereafter, have a telephone conversa- 
tion with Mr. Dean? 

A Yes, sir, I did. I'm not sure whether he initiated 
it or I did, but, in any event, as I had had an independent 
conversation with Mr. Dean earlier in the week, I wanted to 
find out from him what he felt would be the appropriate thing 
to do. 

It was a short conversation. He told me, "Bud, now 
is not the time to do anything rash." Which I interpreted to 
mean, do nothing, and I didn't. 

Q And that was also in the conizeict of Mr. Hunt not 
going to blow the lid off, at least on any eminentrprediction 

Ctime? 
A I assume that is so. 

MR. BEN-'i/ENISTE: I have no further questions at 

(1279) 



75.2 JOHN EHRLICHMAN TESTIMONY^ JULY 24^ 1973, 6 SSC 2550-51 

2550 

Mr. Dash. Would it? 

Mr. EiiRLiciiM-vx. Tliat would be my a.ssumption, yes. 

Mr. D.vsn. Would it not be in preparation for the drafting of such 
a memo to get your specific approval in writing? 

INIr. ETiRLicHirAX. No, that is not ordinarily the way we did busi- 
ness. Tiie only time I would be asked for so.mething like this is if they 
had trouble getting in to see me, that they wanted to set up an agenda 
so that when we did get together, we hit a number of topics, and so on. 

jMr. Dash. Now, do you recall that on March 27, Mr. Young had 
a meeting with you at a time when he was leaving the White House? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. We had a meeting around that time. 

Mr. Dash. March 27, 1973. And do you recall that you asked him 
to pull together a number of the papers that the special investigative 
unit had kept, and that he did? Do you recall that? 

Mr. Ehrlichjiax. I think I asked him to put all of them together, 
yes. 

Mr. Dash. He brought them to you in a bag ? 

Mr. Ehrlichman. In a bag? No, I do not — I think my request to 
him was that since he was leaving, all of the special unit's documenta- 
tion should be gathered in one ptace so that it could be transferred to 
the President's file. 

Mr. Dash. But you reviewed them before they were transferred? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, there were drawers of them. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall receiving a number of papers from Mr. 
Young and then returning them minus this memorandum and an- 
other, which I will ask you about ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No. The receipt of documents, as I recall, was in 
Krogh's — this document has been in my files and I saw it there the 
other day. 

Mr. Dash. I will just put the question to you so you can answer it. 
Do you know if Mr. Young raised the question concerning the memo- 
randum and that you said it was too sensitive a memorandum and that 
you had retained it? 

Mr. Ehrlichjiax. No. No. First, I know I have had in my files, 
actually unknown to me, this and a number of other documents relat- 
ing to the Ellsberg matter. I do not know for how long, and I do not 
know from what source. I do know that at the time that Mr. Young 
was leaving, we asked that he pull together everything, and I believe 
Jietymed all of his documents over to Todd Holland in my office. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall telling Mr. Young, in that meeting on the 



27th, that you suspected that Hunt may be going public in California 
on this operation, and that Mr. Young was cleeply concerned that this 
may be possible ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. No, the — well, what I told him was not on the 
27th. As I recall, it was earlier than that. I had an appointment with 
Mr. Young shortly after Mr. Dean came in to say that the White House 
was being blackmailed by Hunt. And I reviewed with both Krogh 
and Young — because this was all quite dim in my recollection — what 
it was that Mr. Hunt might say. what the national security aspects of 
this were again, and went over the whole ground with them in tiie light 
of the blackmail attempt. Now, that nuist have been on the 20th or the 
21st or not later than the 22d of ifarch. 



(1280) 



75.2 JOHN EHELICHMAN TESTIMONY, JULY 24, 1973, 6 SSC 2550-51 

2551 

ill-. Dash. Well, do you recall telling Mr. Young that Mr. Krogh 
was going to be taking the responsibility for that and that ]Mr. Young 
reminded you tluit maybe Mr. Hunt or some others made some copies 
of tliJs memorandum^ .Viid that you indicated that, well, if that was 
so, the position to take would be that it would be a luitional security 
matter ai\(lyoa \\ould button up ? 

Mr. EiiuncHJEAx. Xo. Tiie convoi-satiou, basically, ^vas for me to 
inquire of Mr. Young to get as mucii information as I could about 
what it was that 3Ir. Hunt was, in effect, threatening to say. And he 
went into this in considerable detail with nie at that time — that is to 



sav. the (reiieral subject matter. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you also indicate to him that the President 
knew about this and had fully authorized it or had felt that it was a 
perfectly legal matter at that time ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. If — I may have. 1 well may have, because in that 
period of time, 20, 21, 22 March, somewhere in there, I did have a 
convei"sation with the President about this. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, did you also receive a memorandum sug- 
gesting that there would be a congressional investigation about the 
Ellsberg affair? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I have had a memorandum in my file from Mr. 
Colson on that subject. I do not know if that is the one to which you 
refer. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever receive one from Mr. Young? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. About a congressional investigation? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, suggesting that IMr. Mardian and others might 
be involved in this. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I may have, but that goes way, way back in time. 
I have not seen anything like that. 

Mr. Dash. Dated August 26, 1972. 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. I well may have. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall having received this memorandum? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax. It has my initial on it. I do not have a present 
recollection of the document. 

Mr. Dash. Do you also not« that there is an attached memorandum 
on the same date for Mr. Colson from you, Mr. Ehrlichman, subject, 
"Hunt/Liddy special project." 

And I quote : 

On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and Liddy would 
be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you 
by next Wednesday a game plan on how and when you believe the materials 
should be used. 

Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Ehrlichmax-. Yes, I have seen that recently on going back into 
the files. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I just have one last question. There are others, Mr. 
Ehrlichman, that I would like to get into, but I have taken sufficient 
time and I will have a chance to question you later. But you also indi- 
cated this morning when I put the question to you whether you were 
concerned whether or not the so-called enti-y, whether you call it the 
Ellsberg break-in in this particular case, it was a break-in, the Ellsberg 
breaknin, would become known publicly, whether that would be em- 



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