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Full text of "Status of POW/MIA negotiations with North Korea : hearing before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, hearing held June 20, 1996"

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[H.N.S.C. No. 104-47] 


Y4.SE2/1 A: 995-96/47 

status of POU/niA Negotiatiois uith. . . 







JUNE 20, 1996 





For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-054289-8 

[H.N.S.C. No. 104-47] 


Y 4.SE2/1 A: 995-96/47 

status of PDU/niA Negotiations uith... 








JUNE 20, 1996 



(.■ "^on 


37-S84 WASHINGTON : 1997 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-054289-8 


ROBERT K. DORNAN, California, Chairman 

RON LEWIS, Kentucky G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi 

J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma IKE SKELTON, Missouri 



TODD TIAHRT, Kansas MIKE WARD, Kentucky 


DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

John D. Chapla, Professional Staff Member 

Michael R. HiggINS, Professional Staff Member 

Donna L. Hoffmeier, Professional Staff Member 

Diane W. Bowman, Staff Assistant 





Doman, Hon. Robert K., a Representative from California, Chairman, Mili- 
tary Personnel Subcommittee 1 

Fox, Hon. Jon, a Representative from Pennsylvania 11 

Gejdenson, Hon. Sam, a Representative from Connecticut 53 

Pickett, Hon. Owen, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Minority Mem- 
ber, Military Personnel Subcommittee 7 

Prepared statement 8 


Brown, David G., Director, Korean Affairs, Department of State: 

Statement 40 

Prepared statement 43 

Cole, Paul, Researcher and Former DOD Archivist in Russia and East Eu- 

Statement 191 

Prepared statement 204 

Dumas, Bob, Brother of Korean War POW Army Private Roger Dumas: 

Statement 156 

F*repared statement 167 

Dunton, Pat, President Korean/Cold War Family Association: 

Statement 83 

Prepared statement 149 

Lee, Insung O., DPMO Analyst; accompanied by John McCreaiy, Chief Ko- 
rean Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Norm Kass, Russian Divi- 
sion DPMO: 
Statement 74 

Liotta, Alan, Deputy Director, Defense POW/MIA Office: 

Statement 34 

Mandra, Irene, Sister of Korean War POW USMC Sgt. Philip Mandra: 

Statement 182 

Toon, Malcolm, Co-Chairman, United States-Russia Joint Conunission on 
Statement 17 


Defense Intelligence Agency Report 59 

Executive Summary to the Comprehensive Report of the United States Side 

of the United States-Russia Jomt Commission on POW/MIA's 18 

Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing 89 




House of Representatives, 
Committee on National Security, 
Military Personnel Subcommittee, 
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 20, 1996. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:40 p.m., in room 
2212, Raybum House Office Building, Hon. Robert K Doman 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 


Mr. Dornan. Ladies and gentlemen, the Subcommittee on Mili- 
tary Personnel of the National Security Committee will come to 

My apologies for a one-half hour late start here, but a cluster of 
some votes came up at the last minute and then I had a meeting 
with the Speaker on this very issue and foUowthrough for 149 days 
from now. No matter how the Presidential election goes, the Repub- 
licans do hope to hold on to a majority in the House and if the lead- 
ership stays the same, Mr. Gingrich is amenable to some sort of 
task force with some sort of funding for foUowthrough, particularly 
when I showed him an article by a hero of his and mine, five-star 
general and two-term beloved President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
saying that he agreed with an analysis to write off as dead, several 
hundred Americans that we knew to be alive, left behind in Korea. 
It was a total shock for me. Nobody is an angel. 

President Eisenhower, in another reflection back on his wonder- 
ful life, was so angered at having walked through the Nazi con- 
centration camps and thinking about his own proud Grerman herit- 
age that he denied bare subsistence to some German prisoner-of- 
war camps where hundreds of German POWs died. There is a Ca- 
nadian documentary, well-researched, overstated, as some things 
are, but it turned out to be quite true for a while that although 
there was no torture or abuse, food conditions and sanitary condi- 
tions were so bad in some of these huge holding camps of German 
prisoners, at which one of my colleagues was a 19-year-old com- 
mander, the now-retiring No. 2 man on the Appropriations Com- 
mittee, John Myers of Indiana. He told me it was pretty bad at his 
camp, but not that bad. So like all of us, we make some mistakes 
in life. 

I would like to read my opening statement and an opening state- 
ment from Mr. Pickett and a guest Congressman from Pennsylva- 
nia, Mr. John Fox, and he would like to make a statement and 


then we will proceed to take testimony from our distinguished 

The historic hearing on American prisoners of war who were 
never released from the Korean war is taking place as the United 
States Government has begun negotiations with North Korea on 
accounting for our missing heroes. The last hearing in the House 
on this issue until this very moment — in the House; there were 2 
hours in the Senate, I understand — ^but in this House, the last time 
was 1957, nearly 40 years ago, under the chairmanship of a won- 
derful man, a good friend of mine, Chairman Clem Zabloski from 
Wisconsin, who went on to chair the Foreign Affairs Committee 
when I was a member of that distinguished committee. 

The result was a proclamation by the House for the return of 
"450 American POW*s still imprisoned by the Communists." During 
this postwar period. President Ike Eisenhower made numerous 
public statements regarding American prisoners who were known 
to be in captivity. For example, on Memorial Day 1955, I had just 
been commissioned a second lieutenant and I had just married. I 
was on my way to gunnery, full of respect for him and bursting 
with pride to be a young Air Force jet pilot. 

President Eisenhower stated, "We have had long, serious discus- 
sions with the Chinese Communists, trying to make them disclose 
where our prisoners are being held. We have gotten back a few" — 
four F-86 pilots were to return that very next month, who were all 
shot down in Manchuria. One of them was a commander of mine. 
Heller, Parks, Cameron, Fisher. 

A few months later, by a slip of the tongue at a cocktail party 
in Geneva to Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United 
Nations, an entire B-29 crew, Anderson's crew, was returned 
through Hong Kong, 11 of the 13. Two were held back because they 
were the enlisted radar technicians on the airplane who could give 
lie to the charge that the B-29 was shot down in China when, in 
fact, it was shot down over North Korea. So their expertise as the 
two radar navigators cost them their lives, to die alone in some rot- 
ting Chinese camp facility, but at least we got back 11 of the 13 
out of Jack Anderson's crew, and I have spoken to some of them. 

I spoke to one sergeant who was a schoolteacher in Cleveland 
and he told me he was held in a camp where he would pry apart 
the boards on his window. His roommate was Thomas Downey, 
who was a CIA man captured in China and held for almost 20 
years, and Downey was his roommate for a while. He said he could 
pry the boards open and see in a compound, a quadrangle, Cauca- 
sian prisoners all his age or younger walking in a quadrangle, and 
he said he could almost tell from their demeanor the Americans 
from the British and some of the other nationalities. He said the 
Americans were, he said, I do not know to explain it, looser, more 
good humored, trying to accept their fate. That was never offered 
in testimony in Congress, either side of the Hill, until this moment, 
I assume. 

In fact, based on statements by returned American prisoners, 
international intelligence reports, interviews, and statements by 
high-ranking former Communist officials and defectors over a 40- 
year period, there were at least four separate categories of pris- 

oners of war that were not defectors who were exploited, held back 
by the Soviets, Chinese, North Koreans. 

First, highly trained aviators — ^what I did a few years later — 
transonic fighter pilots, the F-86 Saber jet, with a 7-, 8-, and in 
some periods 13-to-l kill ratio, victory ratio, over Soviet pilots that 
we now know were running the air operation in North Korea, just 
as they were advisors, as were the Chinese, in the Vietnam air op- 
eration with an evil human being named Robert McNamara giving 
sanctuary to all the MiG bases while our young second lieutenants 
were shot down on their first, second, third missions with MiG's 
coming out of the sun who were allowed to take off within view of 
our fighter pilots and could have destroyed their bases, sort of a re- 
play of Korea, only worse. Highly trained aviators, technicians 
whose skills were coveted by our Communist enemies. 

The second group included soldiers who were used for — ^brace 
yourselves — ghastly medical and psychological experiments. This is 
the ugliness of Harbin, unit 731, held secret by our Government for 
decades, one of another heroes of mine, General MacArthur, huge 
mistake. No war crimes trials for Japanese that equaled in the in- 
tensity of their evil Dr. Mengele, the devil of death at Auschwitz, 
who used to be called the angel of death. 

People who would cut the arms and the legs off healthy Chinese, 
Russians, and now we find out by the excellent research of Gavin 
Dawes, Americans, Australians, and British and New Zealand pris- 
oners in Manchuria, Harbin, unit 731, stories right out of a book 
titled once, "The Theory and Practice of Hell." That was applied to 
Nazi horrors. It went on under Japanese warlords. Where did the 
doctors that ran these ghastly war crimes camps end up? The head 
of medical schools in Japan. Only God and their conscience would 
drive some of them to suicide in later years. Now we find out that 
the Czechs built a hospital in North Korea for these same 
unfathomable evil experiments. 

The third category, including men held back as bargaining chips 
for future negotiations, a Communist pattern in every conflict since 
Lenin taught us that l3dng was not lying if the end was, in his con- 
cept, just. And for manual slave labor in that third category. 

And finally, those whom enemy intelligence agencies hoped to 
train as sleeper agents or trainers in English and American cul- 
ture, trainers of sleeper agents and then infiltrated back into the 
United States. If the Communists would put men in Italy through 
the Catholic training for 10, 12 years to become a priest and they 
would suffer all of that as atheists, they would certainly run sleep- 
ers who had a military background. 

At least 19 human intelligence documents, including at least half 
a dozen interviews with North Korean defectors, just some of them 
over the past few months, led to a report by InSung Lee. I have 
to assume Mr. Lee is under a lot of pressure the last week. He is 
a Korean American, an analyst at the Defense Department, and he 
issued a background paper to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
that came to this conclusion, "that there are two groups of Ameri- 
cans in North Korea, a small group of defectors," now established 
factually by name and city, "and a larger group of 10 to 15 possible 

I have read all of the documents that I could get my hands on 
and find that, unlike the recent statements by DPMO official Alan 
Liotta, who is with us today, that many are not thirdhand accounts 
but firsthand or strong secondhand accounts that are fairly consist- 
ent in their descriptions, and to use the case of the Romanians, 
where people who have not seen one another since 1979 could iden- 
tify one another by name and then track this person and find out 
that they are American citizens living in the same neighborhood 
and did not know it. 

Today, I am providing the unclassified documents from this se- 
ries and I am asking at this time for the Department of Defense 
to declassify, given the time factors here, all of the documents. 

We know that there are at least four American defectors in 
North Korea. They have appeared in a feature film. I hope to see 
that film in the next few days, "Nameless Heroes," I think is the 
name. The Pentagon knew about these men for many years but did 
not publicly admit it until the South Korean press broke the story 
last year. Then there were denials and admissions and finally ad- 

If the sources of recent intelligence reports honestly identify 
these men, serious professional investigators like InSung Lee have 
to seriously consider these same sources' accounts of other Ameri- 
cans, 60 to 70 years old, who are called prisoners of war from the 
war of liberation against the South. 

Is survival possible? A year ago Christmas, in my office, I re- 
ceived, as a visit, Lt. Cho Chang-ho, who was captured in 1951, a 
lieutenant then, during the Korean war and was later declared 
killed in action, body not recovered. He escaped from North Korea, 
after multiple attempts, was branded a hard case. His wife turned 
against him, his two daughters. He took years of preparation to es- 

He only remembered that his daughter was a high school teach- 
er. By the time he made contact through covert sources, it lucked 
out she was in a phone book. She was not a high school teacher 
but a graduated and retired college professor and she paid the 
money to the Chinese for the boat trip after he had to cross the 
Yalu River and almost died and was unconscious, in a coma when 
he was repatriated and woke up in a hospital 3 days later. He 
came to my office with his whole family and American-Koreans in 
his family who he had not seen in four decades. 

He escaped from North Korea in 1994. He had been held 43 
years as a slave laborer in coal mines in the harsh mountain cli- 
mate — ^no Grerman treatment for officers here like some of the sta- 
lag camps that we could make comedies of. Although in the remote 
areas he was held in he did not see Americans — he said he had 
never had a hint of an American — ^he claims there were thousands 
of other South Koreans, our allies, prisoners held in North Korea 
after the war. He said 40 to 50 at the beginning. He believes 
10,000 stiU Uve. 

In his opinion, there are others like himself who would desire to 
escape. When we ask why Americans have not escaped, here is a 
man, the right body structure, the facial features, the language, 
and bom on that peninsula and it took him 43 years to get out. 
How in the name of God could an American escape? And if you 


read the two escape overnight attempts in Vietnam, you under- 
stand that it is pretty close to impossible. This is no great escape 
like the 76 that escaped from Grermany and Goering and he paid 
for this with his suicide and death sentence, had 50 British and 
American heroes executed for doing what is in our code of conduct, 
attempting to escape. 

He exemplifies the reason why we can never rule out the possi- 
bility of survival of any prisoner who was last known alive. 

Included in my testimony, I am submitting a written statement 
by a Czechoslovakian major general, Jan Sejna, who currently is 
employed by the United States Department of Defense, and I will 
track him and make sure he is not punished for this. I spent 2 
hours with him 2 days ago. In 1968, he was the highest-ranking 
Soviet bloc intelligence officer to ever defect to the United States. 
He told me of the horror stories, and that is what they are, of 
American prisoners of war captured in Korea and then in Vietnam 
who were moved to third countries for technical information exploi- 
tation or these ghastly medical experiments. 

He briefed me on his horribly inadequate CIA briefing, how Kis- 
singer fired him within days of Nixon taking over, how they did not 
want to hear anything about POWs, how they did not want to hear 
anything about this Czech-built hospital, that, by the way, years 
later, after he had been attacked and discredited, turns out to 
exist. It is real. I would call that a smoking gun. And how they did 
not want to know about him, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs 
in Czechoslovakia and the strategic plan to prepare for a third 
world war. They were not interested in any of that. 

They finally gave him $50,000 of our taxpayers' money and 
picked out where he would live and sent him to Lake George to run 
a golf course and he was broke within months and finally became 
a carpenter and worked his way back and has finally been used as 
a valuable intelligence source the last decade by the DIA. 

Thus far, the negotiations with North Korea have focused pri- 
marily on the repatriation of remains and digging up airplane 
crash sites, all of them 46 to 43 years old. Here we go again, the 
hunt for bone fragments and to hell with stories about live Ameri- 
cans. I believe that the first priority should be to find out the truth 
of Americans who were left behind. The figure given at 8th Army 
Headquarters in Vietnam to every CODEL I have taken there over 
the last 20 years, 389. I thought that was a pretty sacred figure 
out of the Eisenhower years and it turns out that that was one of 
these manipulated, pared down, squished down figures, and the 
389 was lowball. It was much higher. 

The second priority should be visits to the military museums and 
archives by honest professional researchers. I went over to the Sen- 
ate Cloakroom and got a quick and dirty briefing from one of my 
heroes over there. Bob Smith, and he told me how he went to 
Korea, the first American Senator in Korea, maybe ever. I do not 
know how many Senators had Chosin, a Japanese-occupied area, 
on their visit list for CODEL's in the 1930's and 1920's. But he said 
he was not properly briefed on any of this by our State Department 
when he went over there. This is Senator Bob Smith. 

This should be run by honest professional researchers to prepare 
Congressmen and Senators willing to go over to these dangerous 

places, and they are dangerous. I flew four flights on the airplane 
that killed Ron Brown, about 3y2 weeks, before he did, with the 
same pilot, Ashley Davis, and the same crew attendant, who was 
wonderful, Shelly Kelly, now dead. It is dangerous on these 
CODEL's, particularly when I fly on a Russian Antonov 12 with 
one of the engines missing all the way from Ulan Bater in Outer 
Mongolia, or from Beijing up there on a rotten airplane where I 
smelled vodka on the breaths of the crew. Some of these CODEL's 
are not trips to Hawaii, folks. 

We should be able to excavate cemeteries outside of former pris- 
on camps, but not when the Czechs built a crematorium as part of 
the hospital so that any poor Grod-forsaken person who lives this 
miserable existence as a guinea pig before God takes them and 
they are burned into ashes, again Auschwitz-style, crematoria. We 
are not going to find any remains from some of this. But some of 
the former prison camps' cemeteries, we may find people. 

Certainly, there are battlefields. I talked to a marine just a few 
years older than I am who said he could go back to Chosin and 
identify the area where they put 200 of his friends in a mass grave, 
he says, in a heartbeat, if it was winter and if there was snowcover 
on the ground. He said, "I have it burned in my brain. The location 
is like a pirate's treasure map. I made a mental note. I stared at 
that for an hour so I could find that location." 

Crash-site excavations, while providing dramatic photos for re- 
porters who take the danger of going to these areas, are little more 
than expensive boondoggles for the Communists, and we now have 
a GAO investigation, thanks to Senator Smith and myself, about 
$4 million unaccounted for in Vietnam. The beat goes on. 

The first priority should always be to resolve questions regarding 
men possibly alive. In addition, we must use all the means pos- 
sible, including creative independent research, honest outside bro- 
kers. This has worked at the Defense Department. This has worked 
with outside contractors. That is why I have asked people who 
wrote a RAND study to come today. 

In addition, we must use information from the former Soviet bloc 
and China. China, again, a prideful Chinese wall slammed in front 
of us, Soviet bloc windows opening and closing all the time, people 
dying off who were forthcoming. I am going to recommend to this 
panel, as I did to the last one, that they look at the BBC interview 
and tell me if these Soviet former fighter pilots, retired, again, my 
age or older, chest full of medals, if they do not appear to be telling 
the truth when they talk about getting shot down and taking a bul- 
let from an F-86 Saber, carrying open their arm, compound frac- 
ture, and I ejected, but, of course, they are ejecting over their terri- 
tory. North Korea or Manchuria, so they get patched up and go 
home. Our men, F-86 pilots who would lose an aerial duel, God 
knows what the fate was for some 40 to 50 of them. 

We simply have to resolve the fate of those American heroes who 
are last known to be alive in communist custody. I still think well 
of General MacArthur and President — ^both five-star generals — Ei- 
senhower, but if they could come back today, I am convinced, as a 
student of those two men, that they would say we were wrong and 
try and right those wrongs. Let us do it right. 

Mr. Pickett, please, any opening remarks, sir. 


Mr. Pickett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I simply want to welcome our two panels of witnesses here today 
and I look forward to hearing their testimony on this very sensitive 
subject. I do have a statement which I will simply submit for the 
record in order to catch up a little bit on our time here and give 
us an opportunity to hear more from our witnesses, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickett follows:] 




June 20, 1996 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our 
witnesses. I also want to extend a warm welcome to those family 
members and friends of Korean War POW-MIAs who are 
attending this hearing. 

This nation's ability to fully account for the more than 8,000 
US servicemen who did not return following the Korean War has 
been stonewalled by a period of more than 40 years of intensely 
bitter hostility, rivalry, and even war between the United States, 
North Korea, and China, and an extended Cold War with the 
former Soviet Union. 

The evidence that US Korean War POWs were held in North 
Korea, China and the former Soviet Union is irrefutable. That 
these same nations have the ability to do more than they have to 
date in accounting for US personnel also goes without question. 

That some American POWs may still remain in North Korea is the 
subject of periodic credible reports. 

For these reasons, the recent apparent willingness of the 
North Koreans to allow US investigators into that country must be 
seen as a positive development and I look forward to hearing more 
about it from both our Department of Defense and Department of 
State witnesses. 

I am also concerned, however, that we do not underestimate 
the apparent willingness of the North Koreans to give little or 
nothing , while trying to get a lot. For example, since 1990, North 
Korea has returned the alleged remains of 207 US personnel. To 
date, only four of these remains have been officially identified as 
American. Nevertheless, in January of this year. North Korea 
broke off POW-MIA negotiations when the US refused to pay as 
much as $4 million to compensate North Korea for so-called 
expenses incurred in the recovery of remains. Moreover, not until 
the US agreed in May to pay North Korea $2 million for expenses 
incurred in the return of remains in the early 1990s did North 


Korea agree to permit US field investigations. Why the US agreed 
to pay this money remains unclear. Perhaps our witnesses can 
clarify the matter. 

FinaUy, I look forward to hearing from our panel of POW- 
MIA family members and supporters. They can help us put in to 
perspective the other testimony we will hear. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 


Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett. 

Before I ask our witnesses to take the oath, I am going to recog- 
nize Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania, and then I have a document dated 
April 27, 1992, signed by Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., who was 
then the Director of DIA. I will read this document. It should set 
the tone, and then we will swear in our first panel. 

Mr. Fox. 


Mr. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your outstanding leadership in 
ensuring that our men and women who are listed as missing in ac- 
tion or prisoner of war are not forgotten. I share your deep commit- 
ment and that of Congressman Pickett to resolve the fate of each 
and every one of our brave troops and I appreciate your holding 
this hearing to highlight Korean war issues which must be ad- 
dressed, particularly in view of recent reports of live sightings in 
North Korea. For more than 45 years, families of Korean POW/ 
MIA's and those killed in action still worry about the fate of their 
loved ones. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the dedication of my 
constituent, a Charlotte Busch Mitnick — recognize yourself, 
please — to the cause of POWs and MIA's. On June 13, 1952, Char- 
lotte's brother, Maj. Samuel N. Busch, was among a crew of 12 men 
who, alone, unarmed and unafraid, flew a sensitive reconnaissance 
mission over the Sea of Japan. They were shot down by two Soviet 
MiG— 15 jet fighters. For over 40 years, family members believed 
what they were told by our Grovemment, that their relatives had 
perished in an air accident. In 1992, President Yeltsin admitted 
that the plane had been shot down and that some airmen had been 
taken prisoner and may still be alive. Their fate is still unknown. 

We need to end the paper chase so that loved ones will learn the 
whereabouts of their relatives who died, who are missing from the 
Korean war, so that their hearts and minds can be put at ease. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit the 
compelling statement of my constituent, Charlotte Busch Mitnick, 
which expresses far better than I ever could the feelings of the fam- 
ilies of our POWs and MIA's. I would ask to submit for the record. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Thank you, Mr. Fox. Please, that will be done. 

Mr. Fox. Thank you. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Fox and Ms. Mitnick follow:] 




JUNE 20, 1996 










My faatlly's paper chase started in the 50s with my father. 
I know little more now than he did back then. 

It isn't easy to find the words to express what has been in 
the hearts and minds of my family and the families of 
thousands of POW's and MIA's of the Korean and Cold Wars. 
For more than 45 years we have worried about our loved ones, 
wondered if they were alive, if they were well, or if they 
were ever coming home. Time after time we have asked the 
government to help us with our search for the truth, and all 
that we have ever received were lies, half-truths and 
misinformation. All that we have ever wanted, was to know 
the fate of our loved oi^es. 

In August of 1944 one of my brothers, at age 21, was killed 
on the battlefield in France; he is now buried in Beverly 
National Cemetery in New Jersey . Upon hearing of his death 
my family was devastated, but there was no uncertainty about 
his fate. He was dead, and we mourned him, and that is the 
normal response. How can you mourn a POW/MIA? You can't. 
You don't. What you do is pray, unite with others, you 
question, you become assertive, aggressive, and obnoxious. 
You push your Senator, your Congressman, and investigative 
reporters. And then when we, the family members start making 
progress in our search for an accounting there is always 
someone or something that stands in the way trying to prevent 
us from getting that accounting. For example. Senator John 
McCain or the Members of the Old Boys Club at DPMO. Neither 
one represents the wishes of any families I know. 

Why is the government afraid to tell the world what happened 
in the 50's, 60's and 76's? Why, after all this time, is the 
information on our POW's and MIA's from the Korean and Cold 
Wars still classified 7 

General Wohl stated in a letter to Mrs. Patricia Dickinson, 

"concerning your question about documents remaining 
classified from the Korean and Cold War eras, any 
intelligence and operational reports that indicate 
Intelligent sources and matters that remain sensitive today 
will continue to have that kind of information protected." 

The questions I put forth to you again regarding the above 
are: What could be so sensitive after 45 years? Why 

are the Korean/Cold War families being sent on such a paper 

chase? Why are the families being given the run-around? 

What is our government trying to hide? They say "Nothing." 

It doesn't appear that way. And last but not least. 

Why do we have to make laws to make people in government do 

what is honorable and the morally correct? For what ever the 

reason, it seems we must, and that is what we are fighting 

for here today t 

There is ao much we the families need to know so our hearts 


and minds can be put at ease after all this time. We need to 
have an accounting of our loved ones' lives, so that we, and 
they can rest in peace. 

Thank you, for your continued support of our cause. 

Charlotte Busch Mitnik 

731 Kllldeer Lane 
Huntingdon Valley, PA 
(215) 947-8153 (home) 
(215) 576-1788 (work) 
(215) 887-8015 (fax) 


Sister of: 

Major Samuel N. Busch, 

Shot down over the Sea of Japan 

June 13, 1952 

S/Sgt. Horria H. Busch 

KIA France August 1944 


Mr. DORNAN. Just one memo before we start. I will be reading 
this, except for the first paragraph, for the first time myself. Gen- 
eral Clapper, 27 April. There is a slight redaction ahead of the first 

The enclosed intelligence report sximmarizes the results of a DIA investigation 
into possible drug experimentation on United States prisoners of war dvuing the Ko- 
rean war carried out by Soviet and Czechoslovakian personnel. The purpose of this 
program was to develop comprehensive interrogation techniques involving medical, 
psychological, and drug-induced behavior modification. Information uncovered by 
DIA indicates that up to several dozen unwilling participants in this program may 
have been executed upon its conclusion in North Korea. 

If we ever nail this down, can you see this article in Reader's Di- 
gest? Americans reading this on some transcontinental or trans- 
atlantic or Pacific flight? 

Slight redaction, second paragraph, just one word, it looks like: 

The source was well placed in that he personally saw progress reports on the 
work in North Korea that were forwarded to top leadership in the Czech Central 
Committee and the ministry of defense. This remains a very sensitive source who 
has provided reliable information to the U.S. intelligence community for many 
years. The source is most reluctant to have his identity become known or be tied 
to the information he has provided. It should be noted that the source did submit 
to polygraph examination, during which no deception was indicated. This report is 
classified both to protect the source's identity and to ensure proper secvirity is main- 
tained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative activity. 

Number three, it looks like a three letter, a redaction. "I have 
furnished the attached report to the Secretary and Deputy Sec- 
retary of Defense for their information." This would have been Che- 
ney in 1992, Dick Cheney. "Normally, intelligence reports concern- 
ing American prisoners of war are distributed within the Govern- 
ment to the military departments, the intelligence agencies, the 
Department of State, temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/ 
MIA Affairs," which was to go out at the end of 1992, "the House 
POW/MIA Task Force," which has gone out of existence because I 
took the portfolio where it should be, in the Military Personnel 
Subcommittee. It should never have left here 25 years ago. 

"However, as the attached intelligence report could seriously im- 
pact ongoing foreign policy activities of the United States Grovem- 
ment, I await instructions on any further dissemination of this sub- 
ject report." I just want to make sure that does not go down a big 
dark hole of Calcutta somewhere. 

The first panel, I will introduce them and then swear them in. 
Malcolm Toon, former distinguished Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Cochairman of the United States-Russia Joint Commission 
on POW/MIA's, upon which two of our former POWs in this House 
of Representatives served. Second will be Alan Liotta, Deputy Di- 
rector, Defense POW/MIA Office. Number three, from the Depart- 
ment of State, David G. Brown, Director of Korean Affairs. 

Gentlemen, if you would please rise. This is done at the request 
of the families and I concur. Please raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated. 

Ambassador Toon, if you will please proceed with your state- 
ment, it will be put in its record in its entirety if you want to sum- 
marize. It is your call. Please proceed. 



Mr. Toon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be with you 
again, I hope. 

I would like to thank the committee for inviting me here today 
to discuss the work of the United States-Russian Joint Commission 
on POWs and MIA's. I believe the Commission's work over the 
past 4 years demonstrates a number of accomplishments as well as 
the serious obstacles we have encountered in trying to determine 
what the former Soviet Union may know about missing American 

I would like to begin my remarks on a positive note, highlighting 
some of the major achievements recorded since March 1992, when 
I was appointed to be the Commission's U.S. Cochairman. 

Through a great deal of persistence and resourcefulness, we have 
established an enduring structure for pursuing a comprehensive 
interview and archival research program throughout the former So- 
viet Union. The Commission's day-by-day research and investiga- 
tive efforts are handled through our staff personnel in Moscow. 
Their relentless search for the facts has taken them across much 
of Russia and its neighboring states and has produced hundreds of 
documents and scores of interviews that form the core of our inves- 
tigative program. 

I should say parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that when I took on 
this job over 4 years ago, I thought it was for 6 months. I am head- 
ing into my 5th year and I am facing my 80th birthday on the 
Fourth of July. I think it is about time for me to quit. 

Mr. DORNAN. Happy Fourth of July. Happy birthday. 

Mr. Toon. The work of these dedicated people in Moscow be- 
comes the basis for the agenda items discussed when my fellow 
Commissioners and I travel to Moscow to attend regular plenary 
sessions, of which 12 have been held to date. Discussion with Rus- 
sian counterparts, which gives us a chance freely to express our 
views and concerns, takes place in four working groups represent- 
ing the Commission's focal points: The Korean War Working 
Group, chaired by Congressman Sam Johnson; the Vietnam War 
Working Group, headed by Congressman Pete Peterson; the Cold 
War Working Group under Mr. Dennis Clift of the Joint Military 
Intelligence College; and the World War II Working Group, whose 
work is guided by Michael McReynolds of the National Archives. 

Losses of former Soviet personnel during the war in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere have also been pursued by the Commission. 

The working groups have compiled their findings in a com- 
prehensive report. An executive summary of that report has just 
been presented to the President. In that study, the American peo- 
ple will receive a full report of the many initiatives that our Com- 
mission has undertaken, the results achieved, the obstacles encoun- 
tered, and the avenues of further inquiry that look most promising. 
The summary of our report will be released this afternoon through 
the Defense Department's Public Affairs Office and through the 
Commission's congressional membership. I am pleased to leave a 
copy of that summary, Mr. Chairman, with you today. 

[The following information was submitted for the record:] 







17 JUNE 1996 



The U.S. -Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs ("the Commission") was 
established on 26 March 1992 under the aegis of the Presidents of the United States and 
Russia. Ambassador Malcolm Toon was appointed by President George Bush, and re- 
confirmed by President William J. Clinton, to serve as the American Co-chairman. 
General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin and 
served as the Russian Co-chairman until iiis dcatli on 6 December 1995. In January 
1996 General-Major Vladimir Zolotarev was appointed by President Yeltsin to succeed 
General Volkogonov. 

The nine commissioners who comprise the U.S. side of the Commission 
include two members of the United States Senate: John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and 
Robert Smith (R-New Hampshire); two members of the U.S. House of Representatives: 
Sam Johnson (R-Texas) and Pete Peterson (D-Florida); two senior executives from the 
Department of Defense: A. Denis Clift (President, Joint Military Intelligence College) 
and James Wold (Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs); two senior 
executives from the Department of Sute: Kent Wiedemann (Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) and John Herbst (Principal Deputy Coordinator, 
Russia and the Caucasus), and a senior executive from the U.S. National Archives: 
Michael McReynolds. The executive secretary of the U.S. side of the Commission is 
Norman Kass of the Defense POW/MIA Office. The Russian side of the Commission 
includes officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, 
the Russian State Archives, the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, and the Russian Presidential Commission on POWs, Internees and Missing in 
Action. Colonel Sergei Osipov of the President's Office serves as the executive 
secretary of the Russian side of the Commission. In addition, the Commission has 
benefited from the service of numerous archivists, military historians, analysts, linguists 
and professional military personnel from both the American and Russian sides. 


The Commission's inaugural meeting was held in Moscow in March 1992. In the 
ensuing four years the Commission has met in plenary session an additional eleven times - nine 
in Moscow and two in Washington. In addition to the plenary sessions, two other high-level 
meetings between U.S. and Russian commissioners have been held in Washington. Between 
plenary sessions, working-group-level technical talks have supported the work of the 
Commission. Commission members have traveled throughout Russia, as well as to the newly 
independent states of Armeiua, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and to Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. In each country the Commission has sought assistance in obtaining information 
about U.S. POW/MIAs. Meetings witli high-ranking government officials have been 
conducted, and appeals to local citizens for information have been issued through the print and 
broadcast media. 

During meetings of the Commission in the United States, POW/MIA family 
members have been afforded a unique opportunity to present their concerns and 
questions directly to General Volkogonov and other Russian members of the 
Commission. In conjunction with two technical-level meetings held in Washitxgton, 
Russian members of the Commission have visited the Defense POW/MIA Office, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory, the 
National Archives and Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Russian members of the 
Commission and Russian forensic specialists have also visited the U.S. Army Central 
Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, where they were briefed by U.S. specialists on the 
most up-to-date scientific techniques and methods for identifying human remains. 

The work of the U.S. side of the Commission was initially supported by Task 
Force Russia, an organization created by the Secretary of the Army at the request of the 
Secretary of Defense and responsible for research, analysis and investigation into issues 
identified by the Commission. In July 1993, the mission, functions and many of the 
personnel of Task Force Russia were incorporated into the Office of the Secreury of 


Defense in the newly cieated Defense POW/MIA Office. The Commission continues to 
receive research, analytical and investigative support from the Joint Conunission 
Support Directorate oT the Defense POW/MIA Office. 

Information of value to the woiic of the Conunission is gained primarily 
through access to archival records and through interviews of veterans, government 
officials and other knowledgeable Russian and American citizens. Archival research 
and interviews are conducted in the former Soviet Union and in the United States. 

The Commission has received more diao 12,000 pages of Russian documents, 
many of which were once hi^y classified. Initially the documents are screened by 
U.S. analysts to determine their pertinence and significance to the work of the -^- ' 
Conunission. Those determined to be pertioent are translated into English for further 
analysis. To date, more than 4.000 pages have been translated into English and 
analyzed in detail. Copies of the origin^ documents, screening reports and translations 
are forwarded to the Library of Congress and to the National Archives. Documents 
directly related to the fate of specific unaccounted-for American servicemen are also 
forwarded through the appropriate service casualty office to family members.- 

Through the research efforts of the Russian side, the Commission has gained 
access to impoitant archival informatioiL At this stage in its work the Conunission 
believes that more archival information remains. Archival searches continue in both 
countries. The Russian side is currently considering requests by the U.S. side for 
specific documents and for additional Russian archival searches of Presidential, Ministry 
of Defense, Ministry of Internal AfiEairs. Foreign Intelligence, Security Service and 
Border Guards archives. 

Hundreds of interviews with Russian and American veterans, current and 
former government officials and other individuals have been conducted to further the 
work of the Conomission. Initially, interviews in Russia were conducted jointly by 


Russian and American staff members. As the scope of tlie interview program expanded, 
the U.S. side was granted permission to travel throughout Russia to conduct interviews. 
In the newly independent sutes of the former Soviet Union, interviews have been 
conducted with the consent and support of the host governments. To date, important 
witnesses to and participants in the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War 
have been interviewed. Information gained in the interviews is analyzed and collated 
with information from archival sources and from other interviews to form the basis for 
broad-based analysis and to suggest leads for further investigation. 

In pursuit of information on unaccounted-for Americans, the U.S. side's 
representatives in Moscow have visited psychiatric hospitals, prisons and prison camps. 
Card files and other relevant hospital and prison records have been reviewed for -*- ' 
evidence of unaccounted-for Americans. The Commission continues its efforts to 
identify and visit psychiatric hospitals and prison facilities. 

To facilitate its work, the Commission established permanent working groups 
on World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War and the war in Vietnam. The work of 
the Commission and its four working groups was summarized in an interim 'report 
signed on 25 May 1995 by Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov. The report, 
prepared jointly in English and Russian, was presented to President Clinton and 
President Yeltsin. Since that time the Commission has continued its work. The 12th 
Plenary session was held in Moscow from 28-30 August 1995. Following the death of 
the Commission's Russian Co-chairman, General Volkogonov, the plenary session 
scheduled for December 1995 was postponed. In February 1996 technical-level talks, at 
which the new Russian Co-chairman was introduced, were held in Moscow. 
Tluoughout this transitional period research, analysis and investigation have continued 
in Russia and the United States. 

In its work the Commission has focused on three primary objectives. The first 
objective has been to determine whether any American POW/MIAs are still being held 


in the former Soviet Union against dieir will. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Select 

Committee on POW/MlA Affairs on 11 November 1992, General Volkogonov 

presented a statement from Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin which stated, in 

part: "As a result of the work done, one may conclude that today there are no 

American citizens held against their will on dK territory of Russia. " In a written 

statement to the Committee, General Volkogonov fiitther said that: 

"No U.S. citizens are curreody being drtainrd within the territory of the 
former USSR. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival 
documents, interviews with witnesses, azkd on-site inspections of possible 
American housing sites." 

Representatives of the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service and of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs have provided similar statenoents. The archival research and 
interviews conducted by the Conunission to date have produced no information which - 
disputes General Volkogonov's statement. The Commission has investigated numerous 
reports of live Americans in tiie former Soviet Union and will continue to pursue any 
new information which arises coocemiiig possible live American POWs or MIAs. 

The second objective of the Commission has been to determine the fate of 
unaccounted-for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were located on the territory 
of the Soviet Union or about whom the Russian government may have information. The 
Commission records uneven progress towards this objective as discussed below by each 
working group. One of the Commission's most significant accomplishments in this 
regard has been the repatriation of the remains of U.S. Air Force Captain John 
Dunham, lost in a shoot-down incident in the Soviet Far East in I9S2. 

The Commission's third objective has been to clarify facts pertaining to Soviet 
personnel missing from the war in Afghanistan and from Cold War-era loss incidents. 
Issues related to this objective have been included in the work of the Cold War Working 
Group and are summarized below in that working group's summary. The work of the 
Conmiission has also included resolving the fates of missing Soviet military personnel 
and "displaced persons" from World War II. Highlights from the Commission's work 


towards this objective are set forth under the World War II Working Group section 



The World War II Working Group (WWII WG) has conducted extensive 
research into the measures undertaken by both the Soviets and Americans in 1944 and 
194S to plan for, document and account for prisoners of war liberated by each side;- - 
The efforts of the working group have been based almost entirely on historical records 
which have been found in Russian and American archives. Thousands of pages of 
documents have been exchanged by the two sides of the working group. 

The principal focus of the U.S. side of the working group has been to research 
and analyze the wartime experience of American prisoners of war liberated from 
German POW camps by the Soviet Red Army. In its comprehensive report, the U.S. 
side of the WWII WG provides a detailed analysis of the historical record regarding the 
numbers of U.S. POWs freed from the German camps in the Soviet zone of occupied 

Research completed thus far by the WWII WG confirms that over 28.000 U.S. 
prisoners of war were repatriated under extremely chaotic and stressful circumstances 
from Soviet occupied territory during the final months of World War II. Information 
collected to date by the working group indicates that American servicemen were not 
held against their will as a matter of Soviet policy. However, as General Volkogonov 
noted on several occasions, at the end of World War n the repatriation of some 
American servicemen with Slavic, Baltic or Jewish names was delayed because of their 


ctlinic origin. The. U.S. side has received no documencary information to support 
General Volkogonov's statements. 

The prime issue of concern to the Russian side of the worlcing group has been 
to account more fully for more than 450,000 Soviet citizens who were located in 
displaced persons camps in the American and British zones of occupation at the end of 
World War II. The U.S. side provided more than 5,500 pages of archival documents 
which shed light on the fates of more than 300,000 former Soviet POWs and displaced 
persons. The Commission's efforts to clarify tlie "displaced persons" question were 
lauded at celebrations in Moscow commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the end of 
World War U in Europe. 

There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the U.S. side of the WWII 
WG and the Commission. They deal primarily with details on tlie fates of individual 
American servicemen. Requests for additional information from the Russian side have 
been made. Research to clarify details related to the fates of these servicemen continues 
in U.S. archives. 


The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) has engaged in a concerted effort 
to clarify the fates of American servicemen missing from the Korean War. In the 
course of their work, Russian and American researchers have interviewed more than 
one hundred people and have obtained several hundred pages of documentation from 
Russian and American archives. In addition, investigators have visited numerous 
camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals in the former Soviet Union in pursuit of 
investigative leads. 


Based on a thorough and ongoing comparison of U.S. and Soviet records, the 
KWWG has developed specific information on the circumstances surrounding the loss of 
23 American servicemen. In these 23 cases the American servicemen are listed as 
missing in action. Based on the work of the KWWG, a significant amount of 
infonnation now exists that indicates that these men perished. The KWWG has also 
developed information on the fates of anotlier 54 missing-in-action servicemen. The 
working group believes that continued and coordinated inquiries into the holdings of the 
Russian Ministry of Defeiise archives will yield fiirther clarification regarding the fate 
of individual American POW/MIAs. 

The primary focus of the work of the KWWG has been its efforts to determine 

the facts concerning Soviet involvement with and the transfer of U.S. POWs from the 

Korean Theater of Operations to the Soviet Union. In the Interim Report of May 199S. 

the KWWG stated. 

"The Commission has received information concerning statements of former 
Soviet officers asserting that' there were cases of transferring American POWs 
to places of confinement on the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as 
cases of interrogation of American POWs who were transferred to Soviet 
territory for this purpose." 

In the last year the Conunission has heard additional statements from former Soviet 
servicemen and otiiers who assert that American servicemen were transferred to the 
Soviet Union. The KWWG attaches great importance to continued efforts to research 
the issue of the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. It will continue to 
interview Russian, formerly Soviet, and American veterans and other citizens in pursuit 
of the facts surrounding this issue. 

Central to the continued efforts of the KWWG is further access to Russian 
archives, particularly those of the Russian Ministry of Defense. At technical talks held 
in February 1996 in Moscow, the Russian side pledged to provide a large number of 
potentially relevant documents to the U.S. side. The U.S. side continues to wait for 
these doctunents. 



The work of the Cold War Working Group (CWWG) has focused on ten 
specific incidents of U.S. aircraft lost from 1950-1965. These incidents were selected 
in light of the feet that they occurred on or near the territory of the former Soviet Union 
and resulted in nussing American servicemen. The working group has developed an 
extensive body of knowledge on certain of these incidents. In its work the CWWG has 
also addressed the Russian side's requests for information on its servicemen missing 
from the conflict in Afghanistan and from incidents which occuned during the Cold 
Wax era. 

As a result of the work conducted to date the CWWG has acquired more than 
80 primary Soviet source documents which contain some 200 pages of information of 
the highest authority relating to the U-.S- aircraft loss incidents. Scores of interviews 
with Soviet pilots who participated in the shootdowns as well as with other participants, 
witnesses and knowledgeable individuals, have been conducted. The combination of 
primary-source documentation and witness testimony related to the loss of a USAF RB- 
29 on 7 October 1952 led to the location, recovery and repatriation of tlie remains of 
Captain John Robertson Dunham, USAF. 

The Commission has undertaken field trips across the former Soviet Union. 
The Commission conducted a field investigation of the 2 September 1958 loss of a 
C-130 near Yerevan in the then-Soviet Republic of Armenia. Commission 
representatives visited the crash site in August 1993. interviewed witnesses and 
coordinated a detailed investigation by forensic anthropologists from the U.S. Army. 
Field investigations continue. 

Based on the synthesis of information obtained from U.S. and Russian archives 
and from interviews conducted with American and Russian veterans and others, the 


CWWG has developed a detailed account of the circumstances of loss in several cases. 
In other cases, the details are less clear. The CWWG cites, in this regard, three 
examples where further clarification is sought. In the 29 July 1953 loss of a U.S. RB- 
50. shot down by Soviet fighters near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, the co-pilot of 
the plane survived the crash and was subsequently rescued by the U.S. Navy. 
Circumstantial evidence has been obtained that additional crew members may have 
survived. In another case, information has been received that surviving crew members 
from a plane shot down on 4 July 1952 were interrogated in detail about a crew member 
missing from an RB-29 shot down by the Soviets near Vladivostok on 13 June 1952. In 
a third case, the CWWG has information that the remains of a U.S. crew member from 
a plane shot down in the Barents Sea on 1 July 1960, were recovered by the Soviets. 
To date, the location of these remains has not been ascertained. Work continues to' 
clarify the details of these and other questions related to each of the Cold War loss 

At this time the CWWG considers increased access to Russian archives of 
primary importance to furthering the goals of the Commission. The U.S. side has 
repeatedly pressed for access to Russian Border Guards archives in the belief that the 
Border Guards units would have played a role or, at least, been fully aware of the 
circumstances surrounding each of the incidents. The U.S. side has identified relevant 
documents in the Russian Central Naval archives and has asked the Russian side to 
provide them for review by the Commission. The request remains open. Work on each 
of the Cold War incidents continues. 


The Vietnam War Working Group (VWWG) of the Commission has examined 
issues regarding the loss of U.S. servicemen in Soutlieast Asia. The Russian side has 
provided the U.S. side 270 pages of material in 76 documents, including 64 pages of 


previously classified information from Soviet military intelligence holdings on the air 
war in Vietnam. Interviews on events in Vietnam during the war years have been 
conducted with more tlian 100 witnesses. Many of these interviews have been with 
intelligence officers, senior military technicians, present and former high-ranking 
government officials. Efforts to discover additional documentation and to locate and 
interview additional witnesses continue. 

As in other areas of the Commission's work, the Vietnam War Working Group 
believes it is essential to seek furtlier information from Russian archives regarding the 
issue of American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. In its continuing examination of 
the issue, the VWWG believes that additional interviews with officers of the former 
Committee for State Security (KGB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Main 
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of tlie General Staff are a high priority. 

The issues before the VWWG have included the transfer of U.S. POWs to the 
Soviet Union; Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, either through 
direct or indirect contact; information from Soviet archives concerning Vietnamese 
policy toward U.S. POWs, and information known to Soviet veterans and othfef 
personnel concerning loss incidents involving U.S. personnel during the Vietnam War. 
In this context, one of the primary lines of inquiry guiding the work of the VWWG has 
been the question of whether American POWs were transported from Southeast Asia to 
the former Soviet Union. At this stage in its investigation, the working group has found 
no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from 
Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. However, the working group continues to 
investigate other information which suggests that such transfers may have taken place. 
The issue continues to be one of highest priority in the Commission's research and 

The VWWG has reviewed two important documents from the Russian GRU 
(military intelligence). While not vouching for the accuracy of tl« documents' contents, 


the Russian Co-chainnan of the Commission has stated that they are valid transcripts of 
wartime reports by North Vietnamese officials on the number of American POWs 
captured and held in North Vietnam during the war. In the first document, dated 1971, 
a North Vietnamese official stated that 735 American POWs were being held. In the 
second document, dated 1972, another North Vietnamese official state that 1205 
American POWs were being held by the North Vietnamese. Both documents have been 
dismissed as fabrications by the Government of Vietnam. 

The numbers 1205 and 735 are higher than the 591 U.S. servicemen who were 
returned in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming. There is debate within the U.S. 
side of the Commission as to whether the numbers cited in these reports are plausible.' 
The U.S. Government has concluded that there is probably more information in - • 
Vietnamese party and miliury archives that could shed light on these documents, and 
both the U.S. and Russian sides agree that ultimate clariQcation of these documents 
should come from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, in 
the interim, the VWWG is continuing to seek additional information from Russian 
sources to assist with its investigation into these documents, to Include access to the 
Soviet-Vietnamese translators who initially acquired and evaluated these reports, as well 
as access to relevant archival reports. 

The Vietnam War Working Group has also received important leads which 
may clarify the degree of Soviet involvement with interrogations of American POWs. 
The VWWG is continuing to seek archival access to determine whether interrogation 
records might exist in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the 
GRU. The Commission is also continuing to seek interviews with Russian Vietnam 
War veterans and Russian personnel who may have relevant recollections. The U.S. 
side of the Commission has underscored to the Russian side the importance of 

' A coordinated, interagency Inietligence analysis released by lite Department of Defense on 24 January 1994 
casts doubt on the accuracy o/llie numbers in the Russian documents. Anotlier analysis, by U.S. Senator Bob 
Smith released on 21 July 1993, lends credibility to the documents. 


determining whether any Vietnamese or Russian interrogation records might contain 
information on unaccounted for U.S. personnel. The efforts of the VWWG continue. 


In its work to date the Commission has made steady progress towards its objectives. In 
May 1995, an interim report on the work of the Commission was presented to the Presidents 
of the United States and Russia. This comprehensive report is designed to present to the 
President of the United States the Commission's findings to date and to inform the Secretary of 
Defense and Secretary of State of the need for follow-up action by each of the Aimed Services 
and other appropriate agencies of the federal government. We have managed to resolve 
certain of the issues which have been before us. However, we believe that a considerable 
amount of work remains to be done. We recommend that the United States Government 
reaffirm its commitment to building and sustaining a vigorous interview and archival search 
program in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to pursue additional 
information on the fates of American POW/MIAs. This, coupled with a well-targeted use of 
the media for publicizing the Commission's program and objectives, has proven to be the only 
effective means for achieving progress. For by keeping the issue of American POW/MIAs in 
the public eye, both in the U.S. and in Russia, we assure that those with information that 
might help resolve our unanswered questions are aware of the U.S. Government's efforts on 
behalf of our unaccounted-for servicemen. 


United States-Russia Joint Commission on 
Prisoners of War/Missing in Action 

Malcolm Toon, Chainnan 

U.S. Side 

John E. Herbst 

A. Denis Clift ' 

Sam Johnson 

R. Michael McReynolds 

Robert C. Smith 

Qy Kent M. Wiedemann 
Noimaii Kass, Executive Secretaiy 


James W. Wold 


Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Toon. To date, the U.S. membership of the Commission has 
visited every one of the 15 states formerly comprising the U.S.S.R., 
with the single exception of Tajikistan. I have met with the top 
government officials in each of these countries £ind have made nu- 
merous media appeals asking anyone with information about our 
missing servicemen to contact us as a gesture of humanitarian con- 
cern. Thanks to similar appeals in the past, we have been able to 
assure that at least one American pilot whose fate was once un- 
known now rests in peace at Arlington Cemetery. 

We have looked hard at the question of transfers of United 
States servicemen into the former Soviet Union. As a result of my 
intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union's modus operandi, I have 
long believed that particularly during the Korean war, the former 
U.S.S.R. would not have missed a chance to get its hands on our 
POWs and to exploit them for its own political and military objec- 
tives. This view is shared by prominent officials on the Russian 
side and is supported by a number of leads that the Commission 
has uncovered, including testimony by a former Soviet sergeant 
claiming to have seen four United States servicemen being treated 
in a military hospital north of Vladivostok in 1951. 

In each instance where we have obtained such information, we 
have sought to examine it thoroughly so that we could report the 
facts to the American people. Unfortunately, despite extensive ef- 
forts, we are not yet at a point where we can provide a definitive 
statement about specific United States servicemen who were 
caught up in a Soviet program to transfer United States POWs 
onto Soviet territory. Continuing our investigation into the transfer 
issue has been and will continue to be a top priority for the Com- 
mission in the weeks and months ahead. 

In this context, I would like to point out that as my personal 
view, but it is shared by most of my fellow Commissioners, I would 
like to point out that our Joint Commission with the Russians 
must expand its scope to include direct discussions with the gov- 
ernments of the People's Republic of China and North Korea. This 
is essential if we are to get out all the facts about Americans miss- 
ing from the Korean war. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Ambassador. 

I always envied those whose birthday was the Fourth of July, 
you. Senator George Murphy, George M. Cohan, and my mother is 
long in heaven so she cannot get angry when I say this, but she 
never should have copped out that I was conceived on the Fourth 
of July, hence, 269 days later, an April 3 birthday. So it is a good 
day for a person who has served his country as long as you have. 
Thank you for your statement. 

Mr. Liotta, excuse me for trying to attach you to that handsome 
movie star, Ray Liotta. 

Mr. Liotta. We do come from the same part of New Jersey. 

Mr. DORNAN. Do you really? Is he your cousin? 

Mr. Liotta. No, no relation. 

Mr. DoRNAN. You are luckier. You got the red hair. 

Mr. Liotta. That is right. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Please go ahead, Mr. Liotta. 



Mr. LlOTTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

UnHke Ambassador Toon, this is my first ever Congressional tes- 
timony. I am proud that my baptism centers on such an important 
and critical issue as our efforts to account for our missing men 
from the Korean war. 

In about 20 days, a team of 10 American Department of Defense 
remains recovery experts will deploy into North Korea on the first 
ever joint United States-North Korean recovery operation. This un- 
precedented event is the result of long years of frustrating but ulti- 
mately successful negotiations with North Korea on the POW-MIA 

The issue of accounting for our missing servicemen in the Korean 
war is one that we take seriously. It is an issue for which progress 
has long been overdue. Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, 
the United States Grovernment has sought to bring home thousands 
of American servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the Ko- 
rean conflict. Despite continuous frustrations in dealing with the 
North Korean and the Chinese governments, we never gave up 
hope that we would one day make serious progress on this impor- 
tant humanitarian issue. Over the last 6 months, a series of direct 
talks with the North Koreans finally achieved a breakthrough that 
the United States Government, veterans of the Korean war, and 
the families of our missing have long been waiting for. 

Prior to these direct contacts, we had conducted talks on the 
POW/MIA issue through the United Nations Command to its coun- 
terpart, the North Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. These 
talks achieved some progress, including the signing of an agree- 
ment in 1993 to regularize the remains repatriation process. This 
agreement facilitated the subsequent return of over 200 remains 
between 1990 and 1994. However, as a result of the North Koreans' 
recovery techniques, we have successfully identified only six of 
these remains. It was for this reason that we were convinced that 
joint recovery operations were the only way to proceed if we were 
to have any hope of recovering significant numbers of identifiable 

Despite former North Korean leader Kim Il-song's statement to 
former President Jimmy Carter in 1994 that joint recovery oper- 
ations were possible, the Korean People's Army refused over the 
next 18 months to discuss the issue with the United States. During 
this time, the United Nations Command continued to negotiate 
with the North Koreans, pressing them to agree to joint recovery 
operations, but to no avail. At the end of last year after careful 
interagency deliberation, we decided to try direct contacts with the 
Korean People's Army to see if this new venue would achieve the 
desired results. 

Our first direct talks took place in Hawaii in January of this 
year at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. 
During these talks, we had three principal objectives: resolve the 
outstanding issues involving previous repatriations, get the DPRK 
to commit to joint recovery operations, and demonstrate to them 
the capabilities of the laboratory to further their understanding of 


why we were unable to identify more than six of the 208 remains 
they had returned to us. 

Although the talks at CILHI failed to achieve any agreements, 
we did succeed in broadening the North Koreans' understanding of 
the need for joint recovery operations. In late March, the North Ko- 
reans signaled that they wished to meet again and we subse- 
quently agreed to hold another round of talks in New York in May 
of this year. At that time, we resolved the past issues associated 
with the repatriated remains and agreed to a subsequent working- 
level meeting in the first half of June 1996 to begin planning joint 
recovery operations aimed at implementing these operations. 

I have just returned from 8 days of these working-level talks in 
North Korea and am pleased to report that our first joint recovery 
operation will begin on July 10 at a crash site in Unsan County 
in the northwestern part of North Korea. This first operation is 
scheduled to last no more than 20 days. During our working-level 
talks, we also had the opportunity to briefly visit this site. A second 
joint recovery operation is set for September of this year. This site 
is in Nampo City, just southwest of Pyongyang. 

I would like to note that although these working-level talks were 
arduous, we did agree on a myriad of technical details necessary 
to achieve this long-awaited breakthrough. 

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Liotta, just one point. I am following your com- 
ments and you skipped over that Congressman Richardson was 
with you. He had hoped to visit with us either on the panel or as 
a witness today. He may yet come over. 

Mr. Liotta. It was during his Congressional delegation visit to 
North Korea over Memorial Day weekend in which I was asked to 
accompany him because of the remains-related issue talks which he 
would be having. 

Mr. DORNAN. I asked him on the House floor yesterday, was 
there any discussion of live American prisoners. He said no, and we 
will get to this later in questioning. I asked Mr. Richardson, were 
you briefed at all on this? Were you briefed on any of these memos 
that are coming forward, and he said no. He is very experienced, 
had a great successful mission in the Middle East to get out those 
two McDonnell Douglas people. 

We all have top secret clearances. I am on the Intelligence Com- 
mittee. You have to team this thing. We have to work the way Am- 
bassador Toon works with Mr. Peterson and Sam Johnson, the 7- 
year prisoner, Pete Peterson, almost a 6-year prisoner. It is not 
your fault. I do not even know if you got the briefing. We will find 
out in a minute. Please proceed. 

Mr. Liotta. Thank you. Despite our significant progress on the 
remains aspect of this issue, we are not content to accept progress 
on this aspect of the issue alone. A key concern remains unresolved 
reports of live Americans living in North Korea. Over the years, the 
United States Government has received reports, mostly hearsay, of 
live Americans in North Korea. Some of these reports allege the 
Americans are Korean POWs. Other reports describe them as de- 
fectors. Most of the reports have been linked to the appearance of 
these Americans in a North Korean propaganda film, "Nameless 
Heroes", or their role as language instructors in a military training 


We do know that there are currently four American servicemen 
who deserted their imits in the 1960's, subsequently defected to 
North Korea, and are still living there. Two later defectors were re- 
ported to have died. Because of their close similarities with individ- 
uals in the propaganda film and because some of the reports indi- 
cate the alleged POWs appeared in the films and served as lan- 
guage instructors, we suspect these individuals are the basis for at 
least some of these reports. However, because we cannot absolutely 
rule out the possibility that these Americans account for all of the 
reports, we continue to investigate these reports to the utmost of 
our ability. 

With specific mention to the four defectors, the State Department 
has undertaken requests to seek consular access to these individ- 
uals in an attempt to talk to them and to see if there is interest 
in their returning home or at least meeting with their families. 

In addition, the Defense POW/MIA Office has begun the 
daunting task of producing a more accurate listing of the Korean 
war unaccounted for. This involves reviewing and reconciling the 
official Korean war casualty list with the American Battle Monu- 
ments Commission's list of unaccounted for remains and the 
Central Identification Laboratory's Korean w£ir forensic data base. 
Already, we have uncovered thousands of errors and inconsist- 
encies, but there remains much more to accomplish before we have 
the desired goal of the most accurate listing ever. We hope to com- 
plete our first draft of this project in August of this year. 

In addition to this, we are continuing our efforts to locate, re- 
view, declassify, and centralize Korean war documents from both 
Department of Defense and National Archives sources. This effort 
is intended to provide more accurate information to the families as 
well as make the information more accessible to the public, in com- 
pliance with recent congressional legislation. 

We are also looking into expanding our contacts with the Chinese 
government on the Korean war POW/MIA issue. Already, the Chi- 
nese are accepting specific case inquiries and we are currently pre- 
paring five additional such cases, which we hope to expand this ef- 
fort into some joint archival research efforts with the Chinese. 

Finally, with the approval of the use of DNA as a forensic tool 
in the identification of remains, families can now provide reference 
samples through their service casualty office. Mitochondrial DNA 
testing requires a reference sample from the individual's maternal 
line, such as the mother, brother, sister, mother's sister or brother, 
et cetera. The service casualty office will determine who the most 
eligible next of kin is and arrange for a kit with detailed instruc- 
tions to be sent to that person for a blood sample to be taken. 

The Korean war is often referred to as the forgotten war. As I 
have demonstrated to you today, hopefully, that is not the case. 
Our current commitment to account for our servicemen from this 
conflict is stronger and more robust than at any time since the 
signing of the armistice. President Clinton reaffirmed this commit- 
ment in his dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in 
Washington in 1994. Secretary of Defense Perry recently signed a 
DOD policy statement establishing the Korean war accounting ef- 
fort as a DOD priority, with directions to the individual services to 
devote the commensurate resources to the effort. 


For my part, I can assure you that the Defense POW/MIA Office 
intends to carry on its mission of accounting for our Korean war 
missing. We are determined not to let the daunting challenges fac- 
ing us deter our efforts to succeed, and as American military ex- 
perts deploy into North Korea next month to begin the first joint 
recovery operations, they do so in a concerted effort to remember 
and respect the brave servicemen for whom they are searching and 
working to bring home after so many years. Thank you, Mr. Chair- 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Liotta. 

How many in the room are family members of Korean missing 
in action? Quite a few. Do you know if any are waiting in the hall? 
Do we still have a line of about seven or eight people out there? 
I tried to get the bigger room because I knew so many of you do 
not have military assist travel and paid your own way here. There 
is nobody? Good, because what I was going to suggest was any 
staffers who were interested, and I appreciate them being here, 
they can come up and line the wall up here and make sure we have 
every family member inside the room. 

Thank you for joining us, Ms. Harman. I was going to make an 
observation, so you got in under the wire before we hear from our 
third panelist. 

My wife, who thought she was going to lose me in Vietnam as 
a correspondent, because she knew as a reserve fighter pilot, I was 
stealing and begging every combat mission I could get on, and I did 
get 14, and I would have had a lot of explaining to do if I had been 
shot down in what I called a Saigon Sam-suit with civilian identi- 
fication. I do not think they would have bought, "Just a reporter. 
I will walk back." They would have said, "CIA. You dead." 

My wife sat there in the hearing room for the whole hearing yes- 
terday on Vietnam and then talked for hours afterward, saw our 
best friend in the Air Force, the wife of a known POW in Laos for 
at least 5 or 6 years, the famous, sad, infamous David Herdlijka 
case. She and Carol renewed friendships. Carol started to cry and 
Sally said, Mr. Pickett was wonderful in his questioning when you 
left the room. Where was everybody else? Why is there no congres- 
sional interest in this? 

J.C. Watts came for a while. Ben Oilman read a tough but heart- 
felt statement. He is the full chairman of International Relations, 
so he had to get back to other committee hearings and he apolo- 
gized to me three times today already for not coming back. Ike 
Skelton, who is always sensitive to these issues, came. Steve Buyer 
was there for a couple of minutes. 

There is something about this issue where good people, thought- 
ful people, compassionate people say, well, that is it. Let us move 
on. I have had combat officers who watched the wing man go down 
say, "Hey, I took my chances. It could have happened to me." I say, 
where is your empathy? If it happened to you, you have brothers 
and sisters and mother and aunt and your dad and they all die, 
and then your kids are 40 and 50 years of age and they start to 
go through that search in midlife and want to know what happened 
to my dad. Why would you not be out in the front here? I do not 
understand the lack of interest. 


Then when I find these stories of bureaucrats coming clean now, 
or Russian combat pilots coming clean. When I try to blend these 
together, which has been your job. Ambassador, I do not under- 
stand why we are letting something slip through our fingers here. 

Ms. Harman, at the beginning, I mentioned that one of my he- 
roes, Ike Eisenhower, said something that gave me a chill that I 
got hold of last night. This came out in the newspapers, November 
9, 1992, shortly after Clinton's victory. All eyes were on Arkansas, 
and it just disappeared. I never even saw it. Nobody even sent it 
to me. Family members assumed that we are riding this and I 
would be ahead of them. 

Listen to this article. It is very short. The United States Govern- 
ment wrote off American POWs during the Korean war and knew 
that many United States servicemen were shipped to the Soviet 
Union, a national security aide to President Eisenhower said yes- 
terday. In fact, retired Army Col. Philip Corso — have any of you 
seen the BBC documentary where he is right on camera? Ambas- 
sador, you have seen it, and many of the family members. They 
showed it at the Alliance yesterday across the river to the families. 

He said he recommended to President Eisenhower the policy in 
which the administration falsely declared soldiers dead when they 
were known to have been captured alive. 'The fate of our prisoners 
fell through the cracks. It was not an accident. It was policy, 
confessing that live Americans in enemy hands after the war," 
Colonel Corso, 77, said in a news conference. I never heard of a 
news conference. The retired intelligence officer previewed testi- 
mony he expected to give today, November 9, 1992, to the Senate 
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. I asked Senator Bob Smith 
last night. He said Kerry walked out. McCain walked out. Every- 
body walked out. One Senator took the testimony from Philip 

He said, "With its end-of-the-year deadline looming, the Senate 
panel having concentrated its efforts on POW's from the Vietnam 
war has turned its attention to more than 8,000 servicemen unac- 
counted for" — that is four times Vietnam — "from the Korean war." 
As chief of special projects during that war. Colonel Corso was or- 
dered to keep track of American prisoners in North Korea and re- 
port his findings to Eisenhower. "I kept getting reports that some 
of our men were being shipped to Manchuria and then into the So- 
viet Union." I am told that all of this is still in the NSA archives. 
It is there. Somebody has to go through the laborious search. 

But during the truce talks at Panmunjom, North Korea — we ar- 
gued about the table shape for 2 years, or the height of the stools — 
"The American delegation asked North Korea and the Chinese offi- 
cials about the men only once, and unofficially at that," said Colo- 
nel Corso. 

Fighting ended in July 1953. After the postwar exchange of pris- 
oners, Pentagon officials were flabbergasted to discover that hun- 
dreds of U.S. soldiers known to have been taken prisoner were not 
returned. "I definitely know of two trainloads of American pris- 
oners, about 1,000 men" — ^Ambassador, you know what this does to 
the family members, I am sure you do — "taken to China and then 
switched to Russian trains and shipped into Siberia. None of those 
boys ever came back." Colonel Corso said the prisoners were dead 


men because they were unlikely to survive and the Soviets would 
always deny holding them. 

He added that the communists used personal data from the 
POWs to create false identities for their spies, and I remember 
that year, as an airman basic, reading a story in 1953 — I looked 
it up recently — on a camp in the Soviet Union patterned after a 
middle-American village with a soda shop, 1950's music, and they 
would learn to speak in the American idiom to move and act and 
think and talk like Americans before they were infiltrated into the 
cold war, and that is where they would have used this. 

The last paragraph, to conceal the fate of the prisoners from the 
public — this is the confession of a 77-year-old officer — Colonel Corso 
said that he suggested in 1955 that Eisenhower declare the men 
dead. President Eisenhower said to me, "I think you are right. I ac- 
cept your recommendation," the retired colonel said. The American 
people were not made aware of this matter until this month. Eisen- 
hower, class of 1915 — I always wanted to go to West Point; that is 
why I am wearing my West Point tie — duty, honor, country. There 
is nothing honorable about that blight in an otherwise excellent 

Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes? 

Ms. Harman. Would you yield to me just for a moment? 

Mr. DORNAN. Please. 

Ms. Harman. I appreciate your moving words. I would just like 
to say how important I think it is that you are holding these hear- 
ings and to say for myself, and I am sure it is true for so many 
others on this subcommittee, that there are conflicting hearing 

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. 

Ms. Harman. I just left one on proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
which I know you are intensely interested in, too, and it is very 
hard to be everywhere. I hope many of the families know that we 
were in session until 11:30 last night 

Mr. DORNAN. Midnight, actually. 

Ms. Harman. Midnight, and this place seems to be working all 
the time. It is not an excuse, but so many of us have conflicting 

I would just like to add this. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you 
represented parts of my congressional district in California, and on 
Pacific Street in Venice, CA, there is a haunting mural that says, 
"Do not forget our POW/MIA's." 

Mr. DoRNAN. I have seen it. 

Ms. Harman. And there is a list of names. T just want to tell the 
families that I do not forget and that I take these issues very seri- 
ously and that I join with you and our other subcommittee mem- 
bers in trying to find answers everywhere in the world where we 
have been at war and where there are people unaccounted for. As 
a mother of two sons and two daughters, I think one of my worst 
nightmares would be having my children serve our country and 
never knowing what became of them. 

Mr. Dornan. Mrs. Harman, thank you for bringing that up be- 
cause you sound like me last night, around 1 in the morning, ex- 
plaining to my wife again, and she has been a 20-year congres- 


sional wife, the divided duties around here, and I am glad you 
brought that up because I want to tell all the family members in 
the room that Ms. Harman speaks for most members. 

I should have added that I have had people coming up to me for 
the last several months thanking me for these hearings, apologiz- 
ing for not coming, asking me how they are going. There is an in- 
tense interest in this. It is not like it is completely forgotten. I 
think what I meant to convey was the frustration of, what can you 
do about it? I mean, half the House is younger — ^almost, not quite — 
they were all toddlers or not bom, hsdf the House, when the Chi- 
nese came across and entered this conflict in Korea in November, 
and then the boys obviously were not going to be home for Christ- 
mas. Some of them maybe are still there through 45 Christmases. 

So I appreciate you bringing that up, because I do not want the 
families to think there is not great concern about this. The truth 
is, I told Curt Weldon at the hearing that you just came from that 
what he was doing, what you have just been working on, is the 
most important thing we can do in Congress today, because one 
American city or one European city or Haifa disappearing to a nu- 
clear device is more people than every tragedy and every war in 
the history of the United States, every killed in action, wounded, 
or missing all put together, just one city. I was trying to get the 
big room. I said, no, you keep the big room. I am trying to clean 
up the past. You are trying to save a horrible tragedy in the future. 

I did not mean to set you up, Mr. Brown, for any more pressure 
than you feel, but to Jane and anybody who has just joined us, this 
is the Director of Korean Affairs at the Department of State with 
an extensive background. I have not had a chance to go over your 
biography but I have had a briefing on how extensive your knowl- 
edge is. Please proceed, Mr. Brown. 


Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to have this oppor- 
tunity presented by the initiative you have taken to hold these 
hearings, which I do think are extremely important. I must say I 
have a certain sympathy for the comments you have made about 
the apparent lack of interest or the difficulty of generating interest 
in this subject because even some members of my own family have 
asked, why in the world is a State Department official getting in- 
volved in questions of remains and MIA issues left over from the 
Korean war? I have to, I am sure, explain it in the same way that 
you do, that we have a complete commitment to all of those people 
who have been sent overseas to serve their country. 

Mr. DORNAN. You have been to the Korean Memorial. 

Mr. Brown. I have, sir. 

Mr. DoRNAN. That answers everything. 

Mr. Brown. It is a beautiful 

Mr. Dornan. Haunting. 

Mr. Brown. Yes. The return of remains of United States service- 
men and an accounting for those still missing have been important 
issues for the United States since the end of the Korean war. We 
have been in active contact with the Democratic People's Republic 


of Korea [DPRK] on the remains issue since 1985 through a variety 
of channels. 

I would like very much to acknowledge that a number of Con- 
gressmen have played important roles over the last decade, includ- 
ing Congressman Sonny Montgomery, Senator Bob Smith 

Mr. DORNAN. Who thanked me this morning for having these 
hearings, deeply, told me to press on, and that he will join me 
later. He has a conflict. 

Mr. Brown. If you look at the record, you will see his early in- 
volvement in this issue. I would also mention Senator Frank Mur- 
kowski. Mr. Chairman, your own comments in hearings last No- 
vember helped underline through the DPRK the importance of this 
issue, and as has been mentioned, most recently. Congressman Bill 
Richardson visited Pyongyang and his principal purpose was to 
convey his sense of the importance of this issue of the return of re- 

Over the last several months, the State Department has worked 
very closely with DOD on the remains issue. We have served as a 
channel of communication with the DPRK. We have dispatched 
personnel to assist DPMO negotiators in the negotiations you have 
heard about, and we have tried to provide the political advice we 
can provide on the overall context in which their work is being con- 
ducted with North Korea. 

What is that political context? The United States-Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea agreed framework of October 1994 made 
clear to North Korea that the implementation of the nuclear agree- 
ment and progress on other issues of concern to the United States 
would be needed in order for North Korea's relations with the Unit- 
ed States to improve. In addition to the nuclear issue, we have 
made clear to the North Koreans repeatedly our concerns about a 
number of issues, including missile proliferation that you just men- 
tioned, the DPRK's support for terrorism, the importance of North- 
South dialog, the reduction of the conventional military threat in 
the Korean peninsula, and, prominently, the return of the remains 
of American servicemen who died in North Korea. We have 
stressed repeatedly the importance of resolving the important hu- 
manitarian issue that this committee is addressing. 

Our South Korean allies have fully understood our efforts to deal 
with North Korea on the remains issue, recognizing the importance 
of this humanitarian issue to us. I would like to express our appre- 
ciation for the understanding and support which the Republic of 
Korea has shown for this work. 

Under DPMO's skillful and patient leadership, our consistent ap- 
proaches to the North Koreans have produced some significant and 
welcome progress. As Mr. Liotta has indicated in his testimony, de- 
tailed negotiations with North Korea over the past 5 months pro- 
duced agreement last week in Pyongyang to conduct the first joint 
recovery operations in North Korea next month. 

These negotiations have taken place against the backdrop of 40 
years of post-Korean war hostility between the United States and 
North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the 
world. The Korean People's Army, that is the organization with 
which DPMO reached agreement last week and with which DPMO 
will be working together to conduct these joint recovery operations, 


has been one of the most impenetrable elements of this North Ko- 
rean society. In this context, I think our agreement to conduct joint 
recovery operations involving United States military personnel in 
North Korea, working cooperatively with the North Korean Army, 
is truly a major accomplishment. 

Apart from the return of remains, there is the related and impor- 
tant question of whether there are American POWs or MIA's still 
alive in North Korea. We in the State Department fully support 
DOD's efforts to check every and all reports alleging that there 
may still be Americans held against their will in North Korea. 
While there have been reports of live American POWs, thus far, 
the United States Government has been unable to substantiate 
that any Americans are being held in North Korea against their 

The agreement to conduct joint recovery operations bodes well for 
our ability to make progress on the repatriation of remains and to 
resolve the fate of American soldiers still listed as missing in the 
Korean war. That is the end of my testimony, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:] 


House Committee on National Security 
Sub-committee on Military Personnel 

June 20, 1996 

Testimony of David G. Brown 

Director, Office of Korean Affairs 

Department of State 

Mr. Chairman, 

It is my pleasure to represent the State Department 
before this committee. 

The return of the remains of US servicemen and an 
accounting for those missing have been important issues for 
the US since the end of the Korean War. We have been in 
active contact with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) on the remains issue since 1985. A number of channels 
have been used to achieve progress on this issue, including 
the Military Armistice Commission, meetings between US and 
DPRK Embassies in Beijing, our New York channel via the DPRK 
UN Mission, and direct negotiations, most recently between US 
delegations led by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and 
North Korean delegations led by the Foreign Ministry and 
including representatives of the Korean People' s Army (KPA) . 

A number of Congressmen have also played important roles 
over the last decade, including Congressman Sonny Montgomery 


- 2 - 

and Senators Bob Smith and Frank Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, 
your own comments in hearings last November helped underline 
the importance of this issue. Most recently. Congressman 
Bill Richardson visited Pyongyang to convey the importance of 
North Korean cooperation on the return of remains. 

State and DOD have cooperated in various ways to 
accomplish the US goal of bringing fallen Americans home 
through the institution of joint recovery operations. Over 
the last several months, the State Department has assisted 
DOD by serving as a channel of communications with the North, 
by despatching personnel to assist DPMO' s negotiators and by 
providing advice on the political context within which the 
remains negotiations have taken place. 

What is the political context for these activities? The 

US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October, 1994 made clear to North 

Korea that the implementation of the nuclear agreement and 

progress on other issues of concern to the United States 

would be needed in order for North Korea's relations with the 

US to improve. In addition to the nuclear issue, we have 

made clear to the North Koreans our concerns about a number 

of other issues. These include: missile proliferation, DPRK 

support for terrorism, North-South dialogue, the reduction of 

conventiortal military threats, and -- prominently -- the 

return of the remains of American servicemen who died in 

North Korea during the Korean War. 


- 3 

We have made clear to the North Koreans that more normal 
relations will only be possible if we are able to make 
progress on these issues of concern to the US. We have 
stressed the importance of resolving the important 
humanitarian issue of repatriating remains. 

Our South Korean allies have fully understood our efforts 
to deal with North Korea on the remains issue, recognizing 
the importance of this humanitarian issue to the US. We 
appreciate the understanding and support they have shown. 

Under DPMO' s skillful leadership, our consistent 
approaches to the North Koreans have produced some 
significant and welcome progress. As Mr. Liotta has 
indicated in his testimony, detailed negotiations with North 
Korea over the past five months produced agreement last week 
in Pyongyang to conduct the first joint recovery operations 
in North Korea beginning next month. DPRK agreement to joint 
recovery operations is a major step forward. 

These negotiations have taken place against the backdrop 
of forty years of post-Korean War hostility between the US 
and North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the most closed 
society in the world. The Korean Peoples Army, the 
organization with which DPMO reached agreement last week and 
with which DPMO will be working to conduct the joint recovery 


operations, has been one of the most impenetrable elements in 
North Korea. In this context, our agreement to conduct joint 
recovery operations with the KPA in North Korea is truly a 
major accomplishment. /uid one on which we must build with 
continued firmness and patience. 

Apart from the return of remains there is the related and 
important question of whether thel^e are Americans POWs or 
MIAs Still alive in North Korea. The State Department fully 
supports DOD's efforts to check all reports alleging that 
there may be Americans held against their will in North 
Korea. While there have been reports of live American POWs, 
thus far, the USG has been unable to substantiate that any 
Americans are being held in North Korea against their will. 

The agreement to conduct joint recovery operations 
reflects the success we have had in persuading North Korea of 
the importance of these humanitarian issues and in building a 
basis for constructive work with North Korea. This bodes 
well for our ability to make progress on the repatriation of 
remains and to resolve the fate of the American soldiers 
still listed as missing in action from the Korean War. We 
will continue to encourage North Korean cooperation, making 
clear that concrete accomplishments are needed in this and 
other areas in order for our bilateral relations to improve. 

Thank you. 


Mr. DORNAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. 

I will ask my colleagues to indulge me, because I have set a pat- 
tern in this committee of letting all members go first and go last, 
but if you would not mind, Mr. Pickett, I have been doing so much 
midnight reading on this that I would like to ask a few questions 

Mr. Pickett. Please go ahead. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Ambassador, what is your assessment, and I know 
this is tough, Mr. Ambassador, because it is a personal question 
and it is the kind of thing that the press feeds off and tends to 
want to, by isolation, exaggerate it, embellish it, or make it some 
sort of definitive statement based on hard-core knowledge, but I 
think the famiUes are entitled to ask you this, since you put 4 hard 
years into this. And Ms. Harman, Ambassador Toon just proudly 
stated that over the Fourth of July holiday, on that very date, he 
turns 80, and he thought this was a 6-month assignment. He called 
off what he was beginning to think was a good, well-earned retire- 

Here is the question. What is your assessment personally about 
the transfer of American POWs during the Korean war? Let me 
use your own words back at you, because yesterday I used it sev- 
eral times and used the word obsession, that Soviets who had their 
pilots running the air war, their best fighter pilots over there, you 
saw the photographs in the documentary of them in Chinese neu- 
tral clothing with no insignia in Beijing on the way to Mukhden 
and Manchuria and then down to Korean bases when they had 
enough real estate to operate out of there. You have seen these offi- 
cers, with the general officer rank eventually and a chest full of 

They would lust, I said yesterday, they would be obsessed at get- 
ting an F-86 Saber and as many pilots as they could, and in the 
BBC documentary, you see extensive — I saw this in the archives a 
month ago. I said I thought they gave phony germ warfare confes- 
sions and used bad grammar as they did in Vietnam, "I are an aer- 
ial war pirate of the blackest most evil kind," et cetera. Instead, 
here are complicated drawings of all the K-series air bases, K-13, 
K-16 where the ammunition depot was, if they had ever had the 
wherewithal to bomb us, the kind of thing the Germans would have 
lusted for, for RAF bases during conflict. 

And then formations of how to tactically form up and fight and 
engage and break up into elements and dog fight. I could not be- 
lieve they got this out of our pilots. Now, what was released to us 
by the Russians was always by returned pilots, much to their em- 
barrassment, never anybody that was not accounted for — ^very clev- 

Back to the question. What is your gut feeling, Mr. Ambassador, 
about whether or not they acted upon where we agreed they had 
this lust to get at our pilots, whipping them so badly in air combat? 

Mr. Toon. I think, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I knew the So- 
viet Grovemment pretty well, having worked with it for almost 8 
years, 2 years as Ambassador, and I am convinced, knowing the So- 
viet GrOvemment, that they would have used every effort to get 
their hands on qualified American POWs. 


Beyond that, I think we ought to recognize that the Soviet Union 
was really running that war in Korea. The Koreans were doing ex- 
actly what the Soviets wanted them to do, unlike the relationship 
between Moscow and Hanoi. One of the interesting things that we 
discovered over the past 4 years is the relationship between Mos- 
cow and Hanoi was probably worse than the relationship between 
Washington and Hanoi, despite the fact that we were at war. But 
that was not the case between Pyongyang and Moscow. Moscow 
was running the whole show. 

Mr. DORNAN. Is it correct that Stalin had a Chinese pseudonym, 
Sung See [ph.] that he would sign documents with? That was in 
that documentary, and they showed the documents. 

Mr. Toon. I have seen that allegation. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, that he would have this Chinese name that he 
would sign documents with and that he was reluctant to unleash 
Kim and Kim Il-song made the case and he said, when they said, 
look, the Koreans are collapsing. MacArthur will have the whole 
peninsula by Christmas. They are on the Yalu and a couple of 
points. We have to go in. It was a date I have never known, Octo- 
ber 19 that he signed using this Chinese name, go ahead. Go at 
them. Then he was embarrassed when the whole United Nation 
stayed in and the war went up to a higher level. 

Mr. Toon. Mr. Chairman, throughout my private conversations 
with General Volkogonov, my former opposite number, now de- 
ceased, and in my many meetings with Russian officials, I have ex- 
pressed my deep suspicion that this happened. We have not found 
any archival evidence that this is the case. 

I did try to meet with a former member of the Politburo when 
I was Ambassador there by the name of Mr. Punamajov. He is the 
only living member of the former Politburo when I was Ambas- 
sador. I asked to meet with him in order to find out the answer 
to this question, because I am convinced that if any American 
POWs came to the Soviet Union, the first person to know about 
it would be the top man, who was Brezhnev at the time — ^who was 
Stalin at the time. 

But the answer came back, yes, he would meet with me, and two 
weeks later, the answer came back that he was ill and he could not 
meet with me. So I submitted my questions to him in writing and 
the answer came back was that he had no knowledge at all that 
would be useful to me. 

So we have run into an absolute blank brick wall on this whole 
issue. That is why I think it is important for us to talk to the 
North Koreans as members of the Commission and to the Chinese 
and find out just what the story is about this. I have read the 
Corso testimony before and we have quoted this time and time 
again to our Russian opposite numbers, but they cannot find any 
archival information that would back this up. 

Mr. DORNAN. Can we find archival information on our side on 
Philip Corso? I cannot believe — he admitted to me he was partially 
unprepared. I cannot believe that one Senator, Bob Smith of New 
Hampshire, who is the junior member and felt much abused on 
that committee — whether it is true or not, he felt abused by some 
other Republicans joining forces with a predetermined agenda, bat- 
tering him around, that is the way he felt, and exhausting him, he 


told me. He was just at his wit's end. And he sits there alone with 

If Corso is trying to get something off his conscience, I am all for 
truth serum if he will do it. He is a free man. I am all for 
polygraphing and I am all for getting his assistance to find archival 
evidence on what he bases it on, because you are a Russian expert, 
but I sat at a table with Henry Hyde at one side opposite Yeugeny 
Primakov in Lubyonka, or a satellite of Lubyonka, and I said, try- 
ing to break the ice a little bit, I said, look, why do you not tell 
me if you have any agents in the CIA right now and we will get 
rid of them this will really establish a friendship. 

Aldrich Ames was highly active at that moment and for the next 
year. And he gets this knowing look on his face and he says, like 
a little kid, "You tell me where yours are and I will tell you where 
mine are." We walked out and Henry Hyde said to me, 'This guy 
is a tough customer." He is now the foreign minister. This is a man 
who would pick up a phone and say, 'Tou are sick," or "You are 
not going to get your check in retirement, my ex-Politburo friend. 
You are sick." 

And he calls the Archives and says — they never destroy any- 
thing, thank God. It is like Nixon not following Buckley's advice to 
destroy the tapes that he owned until they became public knowl- 
edge and it was too late. He calls the Archives and says, "Seal that 
section off. Do not show Ambassador Toon anything," and you shut 
your mouth. That is the stone wall we are running into. 

That is why I asked for your own gut feeling and I guess I will 
have to just go with your analysis that they would literally die or 
get people killed or die themselves to get this information because 
they are preparing for World War III and they do not want our 
planes to shoot them down at the rate of 7, 8, or 13 to 1. So that 
is where we are stuck, and it is a stone wall and that is why in 
my opening remarks I said, windows opening, windows closing and 
why, and probably Mr. Liotta will feel the brunt of my questioning 
on this, why we cannot make definitive statements about conclu- 
sive and credible and not credible and this in an analytical paper, 
but we will get to that later. 

Another question, Mr. Ambassador. You already answered this 
one. It is on the Russian Archives. But how about in the Russian 
Archives did we find anything on Chinese knowledge? Congress- 
man Sam Johnson, who has enjoyed serving on this with you, told 
me, "The key is China. The key is China, China on everj^hing, 
China on Vietnam, China on Korea, China on the Soviet coopera- 
tion. They went by train through China. Everything is China." 
What do you think about the Russians? Did they ever say to you, 
"Go to China. It is in their archives." 

Mr. Toon. Many times. 

Mr. DORNAN. Many times. That is 

Mr. Toon. These are the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the 
North Koreans have the answer to these questions that you put to 

Mr. DoRNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Toon. Frankly, I think at some point, as I said in my re- 
marks, we should sit down with the Chinese and the North Kore- 
ans and discuss this problem very frankly with them. But, as you 


know, I am no longer a member of the government. I am a private 
citizen trjdng to enjoy life down in North Carolina and I simply 
await the time when my colleagues in the State Department say, 
it is appropriate for you now to approach the Chinese. And when 
they do that, then I will be glad, together with Congressman Sam 
Johnson, who is head of the working group on Korea, to talk with 
the Chinese about this and try to find out what they know. 

Mr. DORNAN. Fortunately, in that culture, your fourscore of wis- 
dom in years has some credibility, unlike some other countries that 
say, well, his time is gone. But the Chinese do respect that. 

You have answered question four, your assessment of Chinese 
knowledge based on what you uncovered in Russia. You say you 
are entering your fifth year. This is a key question and it is one, 
if it is carried in the press or if the Russian Embassy has a person 
in the audience, is the Russian cooperation increasing or decreas- 
ing at present? 

Mr. Toon. Let me be perfectly frank with you in answering that 
question. The cooperation we have had from the Russian side ia 
much better than I ever thought we would get, but it falls short 
of what we need in order to answer the basic questions that we 
have on our POWs and MIA's. I am convinced on the Korean POW 
problem that there are files in the Presidential Archives that would 
prove this point, but we have not been able to get our hands on 
any files. 

Now I can understand this. If, for example, Washington, the ex- 
ecutive branch, should order the CIA and the FBI to open up all 
their files to the former enemy, do you think there would be wild 
enthusiasm about doing this? 

Mr. DORNAN. Good point. 

Mr. Toon. There is not wide enthusiasm among certain circles, 
the circles represented by Mr. Primakov, whom I know very well. 
I must say, I am not wildly enthusiastic about him being foreign 
minister, but that is a personal view. 

Mr. DoRNAN. I have been over to the Soviet Union 10 times, 
never to Russia, since the union collapsed, just circumstance and 
other things to do. But when you were there, and I went through 
there many times, there was an electricity in the air. You know 
how you had a morale problem with some of your troops. They 
would get there, the excitement of the Soviet Union, and then that 
grayness would close in, particularly in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989. 
They would say, 'This is the most depressing place," after 2 or 3 
months. All my skills, you begin to weigh, and one of them was 
married so he had his wife there who was an active duty foreign 
service officer and they said, "An3rthing, any place in the world 
would be better than this," because it was that tension right before 
the collapse. 

After that mood change, I am sure you have seen some of these 
documentaries, and here is an example I want to give you and the 
family members about people's desire to talk at some point in their 
life, like the Soviet generals in uniform before camera and Colonel 

I saw a film on the — what is the Russian word for memory? 

Mr. Toon. Pamyat. 


Mr. DORNAN. I think that was the name of the film, and they 
showed where apartment complexes had been built on mass graves. 
Now, I consider myself more than a student on the Holocaust, hav- 
ing visited 19 concentration camps, several more than once, from 
Babyar to Salasviels to the Yusanovach in Yugoslavia, and many 
trips to Auschwitz. I am looking at this like a Holocaust of hun- 
dreds of thousands of people, mass graves, and they are showing 
how they deliberately under Stalin and later built apartment build- 
ings right on the grave. 

And then here comes a man who wants to talk, a plain-looking 
Russian, looked for all the world sort of like Solzhenitsyn without 
the beard and he says, "I remember my worst day, I killed 300 peo- 
ple in the woods." He said, "My arm was so tired at the end of the 
day, I could hardly hold it up, shooting them in the back of the 
head over and over," describing how the people could be brow-beat- 
en into being submissive. It reminded me of Yusanovach, of a cor- 
rupt, hate-filled ex-Catholic priest who started a bet with 2 other 
guards, who could kill the most people in one night, and the other 
2 guards quit at 200 and he killed 300 using a sledgehammer, and 
there was the sledgehammer in the museum case and it has been 
destroyed by Franco Tujman, who does not want any part of that 
bad memory of Croatia. 

So I look at these, that one is an archival thing in Yusanovach 
in what is now Croatia, and the other is a man I am looking at 
on film talking about he killed 300 human beings in one night until 
his arm would not come up anymore, and you could tell it was 
painful for him to say it, how he kept it secret for a while, but now 
he wants to get it off his conscience. 

There are people who will talk, who are willing to talk, but the 
leadership says, shut up, this pride thing. The current foreign serv- 
ice or the KGB, do not talk, do not talk, do not talk, and that is 
why it is so delicate to get through these openings and try and go 
with — ^that is why I said earlier private independent resources, 
skilled researchers, not an eager young bureaucrat who says, "Well, 
it is not a mindset to debunk. I am tough. I want conclusive evi- 
dence and that is it." 

I have no more questions to you other than do you think, on a 
hopeful note, that the Yeltsin government, if it gets through the 
runoff, might be more forthcoming, the window might open up a lit- 
tle bit more? 

Mr. Toon. The problem, basically, is this, Mr. Chairman. The 
people that I dealt with are still around in important places and 
it those people who block access to the information that we need. 
I am talking about the Primakovs, people like that. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right, and the people who would talk are on a pen- 
sion and it is a lousy pension and it is diminishing in value. They 
want some peace, but they also want to get it off their conscience. 

What we will do is we will continue with the Ambassador and 
then we will go down to the other two. 

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Gejdenson of Connecticut. 

Mr. Pickett. Mr. Ambassador, you have indicated that timing 
might be the key to real success in being able to answer a lot of 
questions about the missing as a result of the Korean war, that you 
just cannot walk in and take action and conclude what you have 


undertaken. The timing and being able to talk with the right peo- 
ple and having the right environment in which to pursue this is 
very important to success. I think you have indicated that. 

My question relates to the organization of the Commission that 
has been set up to investigate this issue and goes to the question 
of whether you feel that there are adequate resources behind what 
you are undertaking to do, whether there is an adequate long- 
range plan to stay the course, to get to the point where the envi- 
ronment will be "right" to get to the bottom of this issue. How do 
you feel about that? 

Mr. Toon. I think you never are satisfied with the degree of co- 
operation you get from the Government, but I think, in fairness, I 
should point out that we have managed to get the sort of transpor- 
tation that I think we need to carry out the job. I made it very 
clear when I took on this job almost 5 years ago that under no con- 
ditions was I was going to fly Aeroflot and I had to have a reliable 
aircraft. So what I 

Mr. DORNAN. You have experienced the vodka breath that I 
have? They pass it up and down the cabin for free. I thought it was 

Mr. Toon. I flew Aeroflot a lot in the old days. 

Mr. DORNAN. I bet you did. So did I. 

Mr. Toon. I had had my fill of that sort of thing. But in any case, 
I made clear that under no conditions will I fly Aeroflot. I had to 
have my own aircraft, and we have had that all the way through. 

Under the Bush administration, we flew directly from Andrews 
Air Force Base and the plane stayed with us throughout our, usu- 
ally a week or 10-day, visit. Under the Clinton administration — I 
probably should not say this — ^but apparently, in order to save 
money, we fly commercially now to Frankfurt. Then we pick up the 
plane that was carr5dng Ron Brown. Now we have another plane 
that usually takes us. But in any case, I do have that sort of co- 

As far as finances are concerned, I think now in the Pentagon 
we have the sort of support that we should have had many years 
ago. So that, I think, has been adequately taken care of. 

Personnel problems from time to time are a little bit difficult, but 
I think that we have reached the point now where there is a gen- 
eral recognition across the whole Government that this is an im- 
portant issue. 

Mr. Pickett. Thank you. That was the main thing I wanted to 
get on the record. 

Mr. DORNAN. Ms. Harman, and then Mr. Gejdenson. 

Ms. Harman. I only have this question. I have listened carefully 
and it is a very frustrating and sad circumstance in which we find 
ourselves. As the chairman pointed out, many families who are sit- 
ting in this room, I wonder what any of these witnesses has to say 
to these families about the future for them. Should they remain 
hopeful? Do you think that in some finite period of time there will 
be more information? I realize it is unknown what will happen 
with the Russian election and then if the Yeltsin administration 
will be cooperative, but do you have anything to address to these 


Mr. Toon. Let me just say a word about this. I have made clear 
from the very beginning of this exercise that there was to be noth- 
ing classified. Now, there was a practical reason for this. I am sit- 
ting down in North Carolina and I have no way of maintaining 
classified files, and that has been followed all the way through. 
That means that any information that we have gotten from the 
Russian side or from the other republics — I visited 14 of them, as 
I told you — has been made available to the families because it is 
unclassified. So as far as I am concerned, everything that I know, 
they know. 

Ms. Harman. Anyone else? Mr. Brown? Mr. Liotta? 

Mr. Liotta. In terms of 

Ms. Harman. Anything at all. You have been addressing your 
comments to this panel, as you should. I am asking you as a panel 
member to address any comments you might have to the families 
that are sitting behind you. 

Mr. Liotta. I would hope that the family members do maintain 
the hopes and expectations and the demands that they put upon 
their Government and which we are trying to move forward with. 
One of the things which my office has done is we have begun an 
outreach program, where we are going out across the country, 
sending teams of people from our office to meet with family mem- 
bers in their home districts as opposed to having them have to 
travel to Washington, DC, answer their questions about their indi- 
vidual cases, update them and give them briefings on what is cur- 
rently happening within our office, within the State Department, 
with the United States-Russia Joint Commission, and other ave- 
nues to give them the sense of where our progress lies, where our 
frustrations lie, and what we are trying to do to overcome that in 
an effort to keep them fully apprised of where we are going, where 
we hope to be, and what is left to be done. 

Ms. Harman. Thank you. Mr. Brown, any comment? 

Mr. Brown. Just to add to that the hope that they would have 
and understand that their Grovemment is working on their behalf, 
that we take their concerns seriously, that we are trying to do ev- 
erything we can to track down the information to support DOD's 
efforts. This is a difficult problem and we will do our best. 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Grejdenson is here for the second panel. Bob Dumas is the 
brother of a Korean WEir POW Army private and will be on that 
second panel. He is from your district. 


Mr. Gejdenson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to com- 
mend you for holding these hearings and just say for one moment 
that I know how difficult a situation this is. My parents survived 
Hitler and Stalin in Europe, and as a young child, there were con- 
stantly stories of brothers and sisters and cousins who may or may 
not have survived the Holocaust or survived Stalin. 

I think for those of us in (Jovemment, we have two responsibil- 
ities here. One is to make sure that any American military person- 
nel who risk their lives for the security of this country and the en- 


tire planet, that they deserve an unending effort to determine their 
situation, whatever that might be. 

We also owe to the families a responsibility to make sure that 
those who would profit from exploiting their feelings are not given 
any advantage, and I know from working with Bob how determined 
he is, and I know that all of us here understand that in some ways, 
these family members have paid a greater price than those who 
have certainty about the loss of relatives. 

As a child, I remember people used to come around and tell you, 
for $10,000, we could find a cousin or an uncle hidden away in Si- 
beria somewhere. In virtually every instance, the money dis- 
appeared and no information was gathered. 

So that is why I think it is particularly critical that the Govern- 
ment of this country, elected by its citizens, lead this effort to make 
sure that every honest effort is made and that people's emotions 
are not simply toyed with. 

I will not be able to stay because I have a 3 o'clock meeting that 
I must tend to, but I want to commend Bob for all he has done and 
commend you and the committee for its efforts today. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DORNAN. Before you go, a quick story because it is $10,000. 
The worst story I ever heard in Vietnam — I know the Ambassador 
may not have heard this because it is a Vietnamese true story. 
Mrs. McDonald, I met her at the league family meetings. Her 
young son, a Navy pilot, was one of the tougher cases, a good shoot 
or radio contact on the ground. She ran into a stone wall trying to 
get at some briefings. It was during this "seal everything up" pe- 
riod and things were leaking out slowly. 

She gets a call, "Come to Mexico City." This is a mom now in her 
70's. She goes to Mexico City and some evil creep says, here is a 
picture of your son, half of it. Give me $10,000 and I will go get 
you the other half She comes up with $10,000 and never hears 
from him again and now she is dead. 

If that does not tell you the horror of this case and the 
scavengerous people that will hang around the fringes, and the 
$10,000 triggered that. I will give you a report on the Dumas fam- 
ily. Thank you. 

Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Ambassador, where was the one pilot? You said 
it was satisfying to at least get one case solved. Did you find his 
remains somewhere in Russia? 

Mr. Toon. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. One of those 14 trips? 

Mr. Toon. No. What happened was that — see, on every visit that 
I have made, in every city that I have visited, I have gone on Rus- 
sian television or the television stations of the 14 republics and 
made an appeal. 

Mr. DORNAN. And you speak in Russian. 

Mr. Toon. If the local people do not mind that. 

Mr. Dornan. Right. 

Mr. Toon. There is a feeling of reluctance to use the Russian lan- 
guage in some of the new republics. But if they do not mind it, 
then I speak in Russian. I usually start off with a few words of 
Russian in any case. 


But in any case, I appeal to the people to come forward with any 
information they may have about any American POW/MIA's and 
point out to them that, unlike in the past when they would have 
been punished for doing this sort of thing, they would be com- 
mended by the local government. And I can assure my audience, 
on the basis of my conversations that day with the President, the 
foreign ministers, and so forth, that this was the case. 

In response to one of these appeals, a former member of a crew 
of a trawler off the Vladivostok coast came forward with a ring and 
offered to sell it to me. I pointed out to my opposite number, you 
just remind this young man — ^young man, he was about 75 — that 
he is holding stolen property. It was Dunham's ring, Dunham's 
Naval Academy ring. So he came forward with the ring and gave 
it to me finally and we sent it to the family. 

Then we quizzed him very thoroughly about what happened and 
he told us that the body of Dunham was pulled out of the 

Mr. DORNAN. Spell that Dunham. 

Mr. Toon. D-u-n-h-a-m, Captain Dunham. He was pulled out of 
the water off the Pacific Coast and he knows exactly where it was 
buried. So we made a joint team of American experts and Russian 
experts and went out there and dug up a lot of territory before we 
finally found Dunham's body. 

Mr. DORNAN. Was Captain Dunham an air pilot or off a ship? 

Mr. Toon. He was an air pilot. 

Mr. DORNAN. I get the full story. That alone is a dramatic story, 
a ring. A Medal of Honor winner. Lance Sigent — the chow hall is 
named after him at the Air Force Academy — his ring turned up in 
Thailand years after he had disappeared and then died in captivity. 
Other members saw his sad shape from a beating for 30 days. But 
his ring turned up. That kind of an old story, of course, to the fam- 
ily members, it chokes them up and they think, I would be satisfied 
for a ring. 

One final thing. Had you ever heard of this Clapper report, that 
is Greneral Clapper when he was head of the DIA, on this experi- 
mentation and execution, probably? 

Mr. Toon. Yes. 

Mr. Dornan. There are things I guess we still have to keep clas- 
sified so as not to have more people pick up the phone and tell re- 
tired people, shut your mouth or you will lose your dough, or seal- 
ing off archives, but that is why you have to work with us — and 
this is more to the other two gentlemen — so that Mr. Gejdenson, 
properly representing his family in Connecticut — we all have top 
secret clearances. I do not want this friction back and forth. 

I want the bureaucrats, and I say that with the best sense, the 
investigators, let us say, to understand that we are the first line 
of contact. It is like the Willy and Joe cartoons in World War II. 
Write your Congressman if you do not like it here, and people do, 
and sometimes we can help. 

Let me change the order here, Mr. Liotta. Because this is your 
baptismal appearance before Congress, I will let you be the anchor 

Mr. Brown. I will mess up your plans, Mr. Chairman, by saying 
it is my first time. 


Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Ambassador, did you read the RAND report? 
I have met Paul Cole, who is going to be on the next panel, and 
he has my confidence. I saw him also in this BBC documentary. I 
am not a bad investigator, after doing 6 years of interrogating peo- 
ple in front of a camera and winning emmys for it. I am pretty 
good at getting information out of people, getting them to say 
things they did not plan on when they came on my TV show. 

But I like Paul Cole's report. I know what a great archivist he 

Mr. Toon. I know Cole very well. I have had a number of ses- 
sions with him. I think he is pretty well informed. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Good. All right, Mr. Brown. Has the State Depart- 
ment, in fact, contacted the North Korean Government to gain ac- 
cess — we will take the easy one first — to the four defectors who you 
agree are alive and there and we have their names and home- 

Mr. Brown. We are in the process of doing that. We have indi- 
cated to them that this is an issue we want to raise and we plan 
to do so. 

Mr. DORNAN. And one intends to come home or would like to 
come home? 

Mr. Brown. We have indications that one of them may want to, 
but until, of course, we have some way of arranging access to that 
person, we are not in a position to confirm that. 

Mr. DoRNAN. If they were civilian defectors, under the Vietnam 
period, Jimmy Carter gave them amnesty. These are military de- 
serters and that is on the books, so they would have to go through 
a court martial if they come home. 

Mr. Brown. I am not an expert in that aspect of it. Congress- 

Mr. Dornan. All right. 

Mr. Toon. May I make a personal observation here? 

Mr. Dornan. Yes, please. 

Mr. Toon. I do not quite understand why we seek an appoint- 
ment with these defectors in order to find out whether they wanted 
to come home or not. My own feeling is that we ought to ask them 
for any information they may have and just leave them there. 

Mr. Dornan. That is the only reason. I agree. I agree. Of course, 
if a guy was willing to take his medicine, go through a court mar- 
tial, just to get to come home, that he would prefer an American 
jail for a while to the depressive and near starvation status that 
you are the expert on, Mr. Brown, I would say, OK, that is fair if 
you give us information. But then they enter the category of this 
whole ugly industry that victimized the aforementioned mom, Mrs. 
McDonald, where they would say, "I will make up stuff and get to 
come home." 

This is why I went to Ronald Reagan in November 1984 and 
said, truth serum Bobby Garwood. Get his permission. I said, I am 
inclined — there is a James Bond streak in my generation — kidnap 
him and stick the truth serum in him, for God's sake, if we find 
out about live American prisoners. They are going to court martial 

If these defectors would be willing to say, "Yes, I will take truth 
serum" — and I have seen it work on test pilots who could not re- 


member a bailout and when they give them the truth serum, on 
video. I have seen Fish Salmon, the famous Lockheed pilot, read 
off the instruments that a human would not even remember, that 
it heightened his memory under truth serum as he is spinning in 
an F-104 into the ground, about to eject, a violent ejection. 

Give them the truth serum and if it pans out, then they come 
home and face the court martial. But they owe it to their country 
if they have ever seen another American or if one of the language 
translators is there under POW status. That is where I may have 
some disagreement with Mr. Liotta, that some of these reports are 
more than hearsay, it is firsthand, and it indicates 60- to 70-year- 
old, or depending on the sighting date, of late 50's or early 60's, 2 
or 3 years older than I am, in a guarded status. 

Was a request made, Mr. Brown, to the North Korean Grovem- 
ment? You say you have made that formal request? 

Mr. Brown. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. You are negotiating. Do you think that they, if they 
do give us access to these people, do you think they would be in- 
clined to threaten or brief these people, you must not talk about 
any other Caucasian you have ever come in contact with? 

Mr. Brown. I think we would have to assume the worst 

Mr. DORNAN. Assume the worst. 

Mr. Brown [continuing]. In that sort of circumstance, and would 
have to be seeking access, if we can get it, to them in the normal 
kind of circumstances where people would be able to speak freely. 

Mr. Dornan. How long ago was the request made? 

Mr. Brown. We indicated this week 

Mr. Dornan. This week? 

Mr. Brown. You have to understand, Mr. Congressman, that 

Mr. Dornan. Let me ask a cynical question. Not in preparation 
for this testimony? 

Mr. Brown. No. 

Mr. Dornan. No. 

Mr. Brown. You have to understand that this is a difficult 

Mr. Dornan. You heard the groans. 

Mr. Brown [continuing]. Country to deal with, in which you have 
to make progress in a step-by-step fashion and you have to be care- 
ful about the implications of what you do in one area for what hap- 
pens in another area. So we try and exercise good judgment in the 
way we go about 

]VIr. Dornan. You want to see a Congressman between a rock 
and a hard place? I understand that. You do not want what Am- 
bassador Toon called doors slammed in your face and then you are 
down the dark hole again for 5 years. But convincing family mem- 
bers not to groan when nobody does anything for 15 years and then 
you have something fruitful and you say, "All right, let us try and 
keep this door open. I will put my foot in the door." Then they say 
this week — it has to be a steady constant pressure and a trust rees- 

Look, these family members may not be able to forgive President 
Eisenhower the way I have indicated I am willing to take his whole 
life into context here when their sons were written off and a hero 
President who drove Hitler to suicide, from lieutenant colonel sta- 
tus to a five-star general, and we wrapped it up in Europe in 3 


years and less than 5 months, if you take April 30 instead of a 
week later when the war ended in Europe. 

This is a tough thing. They have to feel constant pressure and 
then they will be able to trust you that, wait, let us wait a month, 
even 2 months, 3 months, because we do not want these people to 
bring that damn door down in front of our face. 

Had you read the Clapper memo? 

Mr. Brown. I have not. 

Mr, DORNAN. Please read this. Have you seen the documentary 
on BBC, as the Ambassador has? 

Mr. Brown. I have not. 

Mr. DORNAN. We will get you a copy. I am going to make it avail- 
able to all the Congressmen. It may not be perfect, I mean, it may 
be 90 percent on target, but I will bet it is not much off 90, and 
right now I am looking at it as kind of 100 percent. 

[The following information was submitted for the record:] 



\Smimgton. O.C. 20>'»0 

_ . 2 7 APR mL 

S/NF-04 66/POW-MIA 



Defense Intelligence Agency Report S/NF-0418 
Information Memorandum .____^., ... 


^^ The enclosed intelligence report summarizes the 
^f a DIA investigation into possible drug experimentation 
on U.S. Prisoners of War during the Korean War carried out^ by 
Soviet and CzechoslovaJciaji personnel. The purpose of this 
program was to develop compjcehensive interrogation techniques 
involving medical, psychological and drug-induced behav-ior 
modification. Information uncovered by DIA indicates that up to 
"several dozen" unwilling participants in this program may have 
been executed upon its conclusion in North Korea. 

2. ^mP The source was well placed in that he personally saw 
progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded 
to top leadership in the Czech Central Committee and Ministry of 
Defense. He remains a very sensitive source who has provided _ 
reliable informatio'n to the" U.S. ihtelligehcecbmmuni'EY for many 
years . The source is most reluctamt to have his identity become 
Icnown or to be tied to the information he provided. It should be 
noted that the source did submit to polygraph examination- during 
which no deception was indicated. This report is classified both 
to protect the source ' s identity and to ensure proper security is 
maintained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative 
activity. " • " 

3 . 00 X have furnished the attached report to the Secretary ; 
and dlputy Secretary of Defense for their information. Normal-ly, 
intelligence reports concerning American prisoners of war are 
distributed within the Government to the Military departments, 
the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the temporary 
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, the House POW/MIA 

\ i 





I'oi-cc, etc. Ilouciior, as the atcached intelligence report 
Id seriously impact/ongoing foreign policy activities of the 
niCed States Government, I await instructions on any further 
dissemination of the subject report. 

1 enclosurer^ 
DIA meroorandiin / 
0468/POW-MIA (S/NF) 


PDASD, Mr. Ford 



GC: Mr. Allard 

Lieutenanl General, USAF 



1. PURPOSE : (U) To provide_ information for a proposed 
diplomatic demarche to the ,'Czechoslovakian] Government . 


a. fflflift During an Escape and Evasion research project in 
September XSk90, Air Force Intelligence (AF/INU) . debriefed a 
United States Governaent (USG) source on Soviet Prisoner of War 
(POW) interrogation techniques. He alleged that some of the POW 
handling techniques were based on research conducted during the 
Korean war. This research comprised medical, psychological, and 
drug-induced behavior modification experiments performed on 
American POWs. Source also stated that a number of American POWs 
were executed at the conclusion of the tests. Subsequent to the 
completion of Operation Desert Storm, DIA's Special Offi<^ for 
Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (DIA/POW-MIA) was informed 
of the investigative lead and conducted an initial interview with ! 
the source. 

b. ^^^^1 DIA/POW-MIA conducted an intensive and" extensive 
review of open source literature and archived intelligence ; 
materials.. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)' was tasked to j 
search archived intelligence reports as well as current sources j 
and defectors. Department of Defense (DoD) elements were 
similiarly tasked. The investigative and analytical effort | 
culminated with a report of investigation received from the 
Czechoslovcikian Intelligence Service in March 1992. "Vhile the 
information developed does not corroborate the specific "" i 
operation, it does confirm corollary elements of the source's ; 
report such as the existence and location of field elements and j 
of CzechoslovaJcian and Soviet institutions in North Korea. In ' 
addition, developed information confirmed the correct names, ! 
placement, and access of several individuals identified by the i 
source. Also, it should be noted as background that the -source ; 
has provided reliable information to the DSG for over 20 years. 
Upon compl-etion of the investigative effort the source was 
polygraphed on the essential elements of the reported information 
with "no deception indicated." 

c. ^^^^1^ Source ' s Report: During the Korean war a Soviet 
and Czech drug testing program utilized American and other United i 
Nations POWs as laboratory specimens. The program was initiated 
by the then Soviet Union's Main Medical Administration of the 
Ministry of Defense and conducted jointly with medical personnel ( 
from the Czechoslovakian Military Health Administration and '■ 

"" • ' CLASS IFrED- BTf:- POW7MIA 



Korean doctors. Testijig was done in a Czech built hospital in 
North Korea. Analysis" was conducted in Prague by the Central 
Military Hospital and the Air Force Research Institute. 

(1) The drug experimentation program '-s primary ,^___ 
objective was to develop methods of modifying "human behavior and 
destroying psychological resistance. The program studied tiie 
effects of various drugs and environmental conditions on American 
soldiers arnj pilots. A secondary objective of the' program was to 
train Czechoslovakian and Soviet doctors under waartime 

(2) At the conclusion of the testing program a number | 
of American POWs were executed. The individuals were executed to j 
preclude public exposure of the information. This action was 
discussed by Department Eight (Administrative Organs Depeurtment 

of the Czech Government) and the So viet Main Health ^ . 

Administration amd Administrative Organs Department. Th^ source j 

has indicated that these and other Soviet organizations were' ) 

participants in the testing program. ^. j 

d. (10^ POW-MIA investigation emd analysis has confirmed 

that the CzechoslovaOcian Government did have a lao'ge hospital ' ', 

facility, staffed by Czech medical personnel, operating in North ', 

Korea during the wair. In addition, special POW interrogation i 

facilities were maintained in North Korea and Mukden, China ! 
(Mukden was the location for Japan's biological warfare testing 

program during WW li) . Caucasians believed to have been Soviets i 

or East Europeans were described by returned. U.S. PPils. as _ ._, ; 
directing interrogation operations at both facilities. Intense 

interrogations and environmental control techniques were also ■ 

practiced at both facilities. The activities at these two known ; 

special interrogation facilities cannot be directly linked to ' 

research at the Czech hospital based on currently availctble I 

information. ! 

e- ('4flP) At the request of DIA, the CIA has queried the 
Czechoslovakijui Intelligence Services (CIS) on this matter. The 
CIS has confirmed the existence of the Air Force Health Research 
Institute, the Central Military Hospital in Prague, and the 
identities of physicians identified by the OSG's source. The 
physicians served in the Central Military Hospital and in the 
Czech hospital in North Korea. Czech sources deny that their 
personnel conducted any activities other than medically treating 
North Korean civilians. I 


a. (^VV) All available intelligence and open sources have • 
been exploited to- collect information on the Soviet-Czech drug ' 
experimentation program. More detailed information on the 



rograra-related activities, personalities, and organizations of 
'the former Czechoslovakian Government is listed in the enclosure 
uelow. ,To resolve the question of American unaccounted for from 
Che Korean War, additional information must be obtained from the 
current Czechoslovakian Government and the Commopwealth of 
Independent States. At a minimum, this would include arctTIval 
records access to validate knovm information and develop ."., 
additional leads for follow-up. The ultimate goal would be the 
development^of information concerning unaccounted-for Americans 
possibly involved in the program sufficient to determine and 
document their fate. 


Mr. DORNAN. Here is a tough question that the families asked 
my staffer to be sure I asked today. You knew about these defec- 
tors in 1988. I am putting all the weight of the State Department 
on you, Republican Presidents, Democrat Presidents. If we knew 
about it in 1988, what happened in over 8 years here? 

Mr. Brown. In fact, I think we have known about the defectors 
since they defected. They defected — ^the four that we believe are 
still alive, and I say we believe — in the 1960's, so we have known 
about it for a long time. We have not had an ability, really, to do 
serious work on this kind of thing until much more recently. 

Mr. DORNAN. My friend, Steve Solarz, my liberal Democrat 
friend, and he is a friend, he went over there, cost a Southern 
Democrat his seat, Billy Ray Evans of Georgia. They got all the 
way up to the border area. They went into Pyongyang. It seems 
like we lost an opening there. 

President Carter's opening that I read in my statement, was that 
not 1994? 

Mr. Brown. That was 1994. 

Mr. DORNAN. President Carter has this charm factor because he 
has been into so many dangerous stops, saved hundreds of lives in 
Haiti, in my estimation, personally saved hundreds of civilians 
from d5dng and a handful of handsome young men and women in 
the 82d Airborne. So he has a mystique about him. They will open 
up to him. He is like a good priest. He will get that confession 
going. We have to get on a different track. 

Mr. Brown. As Mr. Liotta said, when President Carter went 
there, he did raise this issue and it was part of the process that 
has led to the success that we have had. 

Mr. Dornan. All right. Mr. Liotta, you get the toughest questions 
because you are a redhead, so I show you no mercy. 

Mr. Liotta. That sounds fair. 

Mr. Dornan. OK. At your Pentagon briefing Monday — remem- 
ber, you have a second panel following you — ^you said, nobody is 
able to confirm these reports, that it was nothing more than an an- 
alytical exercise representing the views of one person. You said 
that the 19 intelligence reports, and I have seen most of them now, 
were little more than third-hand accounts. 

In other words, the press was trying to create a fight between 
you and me by calling me right after your press conference and 
saying, boy, all of this information seems to have been trashed over 
there, and they gave me some of your direct quotes and I think you 
will notice that I said I will wait, please, until the hearing and I 
get to meet Mr. Liotta for the first time. 

You said that your office has not been able to confirm anything. 
Could you give us some steps that you actually took to confirm 
these reports after they had been acquired, and to bring my col- 
leagues up to speed, a Romanian comes in this country as an immi- 
grant and he says, "I will give you some information on Americans 
in Korea because you caught me here illegally, if you will let me 
stay." That sounds Uke all of the vicious reporting — false report- 
ing — in Bangkok, in Cambodia, and Indochina. So they said no and 
he is kicked out. 

So a good researcher says, "Hey, look at this I have found. Let 
us see if we can find this guy in Romania." He goes to the Immi- 


gration and Naturalization Service. [INS]. We have everything 
computerized now. Within hours, they find out he is back in the 
United States legally and it has been so many years, he is an 
American citizen. So they call the guy again, debrief him, poly- 
graphs, and they say, "Can you give us the bus driver's name 
where you saw 10 Caucasians in a field, locking onto a pair of blue 
eyes as they track one another?" I have read the debriefing. 

And he says, "I do not know the bus driver's name. She was 
North Korean. I know some other Romanians on the bus." Dam 
good. Hearsay so far, or one person's word. They track down an- 
other Romanian and he is in the United States. He is an American 
and lives in the same neighborhood and the guy did not know it 
and he confirms the 1979 report. 

I call that a smoking gun. I call that corroboration. I call that 
one hell of a 1979 story. So give us some specifics on how you came 
to the conclusion that it is an analj^ical exercise and just the view 
of one person. 

Mr. LlOTTA. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 
your comments and your willingness to wait to hear from me before 
we could make any final determination. I would hope that you 
would be able to read my entire transcript of my press conference 
and not the 30-second sound bites which get often played out in the 

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Because if you do, you will see that in my press con- 
ference, I did not disown that report that my analyst wrote and I 
did not debunk or refute the report that that analyst wrote. What 
I tried to do in that press conference in response to questions was 
put the report in its proper context, to give an understanding to 
some people in the room of why the report was drafted and what 
the report was attempting to convey, and the information that an 
analyst, doing his job as an analyst, is trying to put forward. There 
is some information, there is some reporting that we need to follow 
up on, that we need to pursue that reporting and get to the bottom 
of it. 

The fact is, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the 
reason that report, that we had some reporting recently, is because 
of the initiative of this ofiice, of my office. We had had, up until 
about 1985, only a handful of reporting involving live sightings of 
Americans in North Korea, far fewer than the many hundreds of 
reporting we have had in Southeast Asia, as you are well aware. 

Mr. DORNAN. True. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Last year, we established, as we geared our office up 
to begin to tackle the question of the Korean war accounting, we 
established an analytic team, and one of the things that that ana- 
lytic team did was begin to look into the question of the possibility 
of live Americans in North Korea. As they should do, they sent out 
requirements and taskings of the various intelligence community 
resources who could possibly provide information. They began to 
hunt, to look for information and reporting that could provide us 
leads and to work with information that we did have to try and cor- 
roborate that information. 

I will talk in detail, if you would like, to the Oprica sighting, 
which is the one that you are referring to. 


But in the course of that, the recent reporting that we have seen 
is all the result of the work of my office. The reporting which is 
coming out now is because we are asking the question. We are 
going forward and saying, where is the information? Provide us the 
information so that we can come forward and begin our search. We 
can look and we have specific and detailed places to go to look, tar- 
geted questions to ask so that we can get answers, not speculation, 
not hyperbole, but truth. That is what we are after. 

Case in point, Mr. Oprica's reporting. We did have the report 
from Mr. Oprica of the bus ride that he took while he was working 
in North Korea as a Romanian engineer, and in his report, he gave 
us several facts that included the fact that they were on a bus and 
that they were driving on a countryside road and that they saw 
some laborers out in the field, that the laborers looked 

Mr. DORNAN. Driving to a museum of all the gifts from world 
leaders to Kim Il-song, and the museum is strangely 3 hours north 
of Pyongyang, and one of the lines in the report, Mr. Oprica's own 
feeling about locking eyes, as other people on the bus did, with 
these Caucasians who were a whole foot taller than everybody else 
and stood there expressionless and their eyes tracked them as the 
bus went by until the bus went around a comer, was he said it oc- 
curred to him later that these were other trophies, living trophies 
of Kim Il-song from the great war of liberation. 

Now that is just a man saying that was my own thoughts, and 
that they all talked about it. When they asked the bus driver, she 
refused to talk about it. From then on, they had the same guides 
for other weekend tours — it could be boring in North Korea — but 
never again did they ever see that bus driver again. 

So in other words, if you have a Sherlock Holmes bent, a Hercule 
Poirot feeling about anything, you can tell when somebody is lying 
and when they are giving you the whole full feeling of what they 
felt about that event. So it was not just that thing. 

Then he said that he thought they were lost, but then again, it 
was a pretty direct route, that they just went straight from that 
spot, about 2 hours and 15 minutes out of Pyongyang, 45 minutes 
more to the museum, and he began to think, they deliberately took 
us by there. That is when they talked to one another and said, 
what were these, Uving trophies of Kim Il-song? Is this a farm ex- 
tension of the museum, where they have captured Americans as 
slave laborers? That is why I put credibility in Oprica's report. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Interestingly enough, during my trip to North Korea 
last week, they also took me to that museum and traveled the 
same road that they went along in that very regard. Let me explain 
to you one of the dfificulties that we have. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Have you read the second Romanian's report? I 
have not. 

Mr. LiOTTA. Yes, sir, and that is what I am going to highlight 
for you right now. One of the things that Mr. Oprica did for us was 
give us the names of other Romanians who were on that bus, and 
so we went and talked — ^and he said, talk to them. They can tell 
you what we saw. That is exactly what we need to do. That is the 
kind of corroboration that we are after, not just one report, not just 
one eyewitness report. 

Mr. DORNAN. Are you going afber the other Romanians? 


Mr. LlOTTA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent. _^^ 

Mr. LiOTTA. We have interviewed two of the Romanians who 
were on that bus and they have given us two additional names, 
and we are in the process of tracking down those two additional 
people that were on the bus. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Are they all saying substantially the same thing 17 
years after the fact? 

Mr, LlOTTA. No, they are not, and that is what I would like to 
demonstrate for you. Mr. Oprica said that he saw about 50 farm 
laborers. One of the other persons, Mr. Tomescu, that he gave us 
the name of and the person we interviewed, said he saw between 
20 and 30 farm laborers. 

Mr. Oprica said there were no guards on these farm laborers. Mr. 
Tomescu said there were, at least present in the fields. 

Mr. Oprica said they were Caucasians, appeared to be Cauca- 
sians. Mr. Tomescu said the people appeared white. 

Mr. Oprica said they were 3 hours north of — I am not saying it 
is a difference. I am just telling you 

Mr. DORNAN. No, no, that is good. I am tracking you so far. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Mr. Oprica said they were 3 hours north of 
Pyongyang when they came across this site. Mr. Tomescu says that 
they were in Nampo, which is southwest of Pyongyang, about an 
hour and a half southwest of Pyongyang, not on the way to the mu- 

Mr. Oprica said that he locked eyes and that the eyes were light 
or possibly blue-gray. Mr. Tomescu said the bus was driving at 
about 40 kilometers an hour and that the laborers were 400 to 500 
yards away, not a distance that you could see the color of their 

Mr. Oprica said they were all dressed in the same t5rpe of uni- 
form. Mr. Tomescu said they were all dressed differently. 

These are the kinds of questions which we are faced with. These 
are the kinds of questions which we have to resolve in order to de- 
termine. We have two eyewitnesses on the same bus on the same 
event giving radically different accounts. It is not surprising 

Mr. DORNAN. One second. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN. Now I am pitting my 63 years against yours and 
I will weigh in Mr. Brown and I will bet he will be on my side. 
Those are not radically different accounts. 


Mr. DORNAN. I do not mean to put you on the spot, Alan, but 
white and Caucasian is the same. You know we could run an ex- 
periment, and I have somebody senior to me, that you could put a 
bunch of people on a bus, and I have fighter pilot's eyes. One guy 
locks on a far target. Thirty to 50 is identical. You could have peo- 
ple on that bus say 10, 20, 100, 50, 60, they are all in the ballpark. 
One guy locks on the far people in the field while Mr. Oprica locks 
on this guy's eyes who stands up closer to the road. The other guy 
might not have even seen him. Forty miles an hour, I can pick up 
some things not only at 85 in a car. 

I flew an F-16 last weekend at 63 years of age and my pilot, 
David Doman, 20 years my junior, did not get a single bogey all 


afternoon before I did. I felt pretty cocky at the end of that flight. 
He said, *Tou have still got it, Congressman," and I will bet you 
Duke Cunningham, his eyes go 25 miles further than mine. 

This is not radical. It is different — different. I am just arguing 
with your adjective. It is not radically different. It is all in the ball- 
park. The main thing is, they are all corroborating bus, white Cau- 
casians. For example, the trip. They took a bus trip every weekend. 
Seventeen years later, two people both could pass a polygraph test. 
Are you sure it was on the museum trip? I thought it was on the 
trip southwest to Nampo. That is all in the ballpark, do you not 
think, Mr. Brown? I am trjdng to recruit you here. 

Mr. Brown. I think I will 

Mr. DORNAN. I will not put the Ambassador on the spot. 

Mr. Brown. I think what you have to do here is what Alan 
Liotta's office is doing. He is trying to get in touch with 

Mr. DORNAN. But I will tell you what is going to happen. If you 
find 10 Romanians, you are going to get 10 slightly different sto- 
ries, or in some aspects, badly different, different weekend, dif- 
ferent trip, but the overall story is going to keep getting confirmed. 
Those Romanians on that bus saw Caucasians. 

For example, if Mr. Oprica said he saw no armed guards, the guy 
who says he saw armed guards adds credence to this story. He may 
have been locked on the people close to him going — he even says 
in his report, "What are Caucasians doing out here in the middle 
of — why would they volunteer to do creepy labor in a boring little 
town like this," while somebody is looking afar and seeing guards. 
The guards make the first story even more important, not less im- 
portant. And the different clothing? You can get 10 different de- 
scriptions on — ^because that is not the clothing Romanians wear. 

This is just — ^tomorrow, I was supposed to go see a marine dying 
of AIDS who got a bad blood transfusion after he was shot in El 
Salvador. He died at 11 a.m. this morning. I have tomorrow morn- 
ing, all morning long, free. I am going to call you at your shed. I 
would like to get the transcript of your press conference. I am glad 
I did not get baited by the news media to create bad blood between 
us, but I want to talk to you about this further investigation, and 
unfortunately, it is a 1979 story. 

I was a Congressman in 1979. I was chairman of the POW Task 
Force. I would have been all over this story if we had had it in 
1979, and here it is, 17 years later. When we get the other panel, 
I will get you the transcript, so I hope you can hang around for the 
other panel. 

Let me ask my colleagues if they have any questions, and I just 
have a couple more for you. 

Mr. Pickett. I do not have anything further, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DORNAN. Ms. Harman? 

Ms. Harman. I am sad to excuse myself, but I am glad this in 
quiry is continuing. 

Mr. Dornan. I will give you a follow-up on the House floor. 

Can I come back to this thing, conclusive proof or conclusive evi- 
dence. We had a problem yesterday with the panel on Vietnam on 
what is circumstantial evidence, and this is causing friction be- 
tween the DPMO office and Mr. Smith's office and my office. It has 
even gotten into Al Hunt's column today, one of Mr. Smith's staff- 


ers and my staffers, in the Wall Street Journal column today. He 
is called ubiquitous, that he is everywhere. I will tell you, he had 
three Purple Hearts before his 19th birthday. That is not too bad. 
He has written some great oral histories on Vietnam, including 
"Leading the Way," where he interviewed Schwartzkopf and Colin 
Powell and the just-deceased Greneral Warner, the black officer, 
four-star who just died. 

So Al knows what he is doing. And he also, just to give you a 
little personal knowledge on my side — Mr. Chapla knows this; I do 
not know if Mr. Pickett did — he had a unit overrun and squads left 
behind. He goes to his officers — officers, but I did both — he says, 
"We have to go back for those men." The lieutenant says, "Do what 
you want. I am not going back in there." So this young 18-year-old 
sergeant organized, or maybe he was a corporal then, and went 
back in and rescued his platoon. That is not forgetting. That is not 
leaving wounded on the battlefield. And he brought them out. 


Mr. DORNAN. And so he gets the Bronze Star and his lieutenant 
probably got a Bronze Star for being in the area, right? Or it was 
a captain. Maybe the captain got a Bronze Star, because by the 
time you left, they were passing them out like popcorn. Lately, peo- 
ple are dying over the honor of just little tiny dollar devices on 

Let me ask you about this museum. My staffer has the name of 
the museum written down. Here is where my intelligence back- 
ground comes in. I was an intelligence officer and a fighter pilot. 
I do not want to say the name of the museum or the country for 
fear if there is a foreign service officer of a foreign embassy in here, 
they will say, "Do not ever let anybody go to that museum in our 
country, because guys have gone to the museum in Hanoi, which 
they are cocky about, and we have found hard evidence and re- 
solved some cases in the museum." 

When I went to the museum with David Hrdlicka in 1979 — ex- 
cuse me, I have Dave on the mind — with David Drier, there is an 
American flag all battle damaged and burned in a case and I said, 
this bugs me. Cover me. Cover me. And I reached around through 
the back of the museum case and furled Old Glory until you could 
not even tell it was an American flag. I just did not want to see 
an American flag in a case in a Communist museum in Hanoi. And 
we found names and LD. cards of persons and brought them back. 

But I know a lawyer, a liberal lawyer of principle, who was help- 
ing guys defect in Saigon on conscientious defector status, and 
when he went to Hanoi, his Americanism came up because they 
thought he was on their side. Oh, you are from New York. And he 
saw all these American names in the museum and he took down 
all these names and brought them back to Saigon and they had 
new respect for this conscientious objector lawyer working on spec 
in Saigon because he gave our guys about 50 names of pilots shot 
down that they never knew happened. I had dinner with him in 
Saigon during the war and heard that story. 

So there are lots of ways you can get stuff at a museum. So I 
am going to ask you in private later about a museum in another 
country, so let me ask you generically, are we using these assets. 


like museums, to go in there on a trip like yours with Congressman 
Richardson and say, "Take us to your war museum." 

Mr. LlOTTA. We did not during Congressman Richardson's visit, 
but during the delegation which I led last week, I insisted that 
they take me and my delegation to this war museum. They were 
reluctant. They did not want to take us to it. They were afraid that 
we would be offended in the very way that you have described so 
eloquently. By midweek, I said that I would not carry on with the 
negotiations unless they took us to the war museum. 

Mr. DORNAN. Good. 

Mr. LlOTTA. They agreed. They took us to the war museum and 
we spent half a day going through the war museum. We went 
through more rooms than any other American that has been to 
that war museum has been to, and Senator Smith was the first to 
get into that war museum and visited a great many rooms and 
gave us a report on and some pictures from his trip to that mu- 
seum. So we have known about it and we were able to get some 
information from it. 

While we were in that museum and making the tour, we took nu- 
merous photographs of things which they had on display there, 
which included U.S. military I.D. cards, blood chits from the war. 
One point that I made sure to raise to them was at one point we 
were in an anti-aircraft command post to show us what their bri- 
gades looked like and they had a book in Korean. I asked what the 
book was and was told that it was a shoot-down record. 

So I pointed to the shoot-down record and I said, this is the kind 
of archival information that we must have access to because it is 
taking this kind of archival information. It has the unit and where 
they shot it down and was anyone captured, what happened to the 
plane, did they get to the crash site, did they investigate it, find 
any bodies there, find any live soldiers or airmen? 

This is the kind of archival information that we have to have ac- 
cess to, and that when we combine this archival information with 
the archival information that we have in our holdings right now, 
then we can come to a true understanding and we would get direct 
evidence that allows us to understand the fate of many of our unac- 
counted for. 

They understood that and they said that they thought that we 
would be able to, indeed, move toward archival progress and that 
we would be able to work together, and that is on our agenda to 
pursue it. They know it is an objective of ours. They know it is very 
important to us and they know that we are going to continue to 
push and prod and demand access to that information so that we 
can work with it. 

Mr. DORNAN. The museum I was thinking of was a different mu- 
seum, but I would have asked you about that one because Senator 
Smith told me to. But there is another museum that I will talk 
with you in private about tomorrow and it may even be more fruit- 
ful because it is much bigger, a bigger museum. 

Mr. LlOTTA. I would like to talk to you about that. 

Mr. DORNAN. Are you aware that the Senate Select Committee, 
before it went out of business, said that a Task Force China should 
be formed similar to Ambassador Toon's Commission with Russia? 

Mr. LlOTTA. Yes. 


Mr. DORNAN. Have you started to implement anything like that? 

Mr. LlOTTA. We have not. 

Mr. DoRNAN. We had better move on it. Again, we may run into 
a wall, given what happens with the most favored nation vote with 
China, and that will be taken as a much bigger insult, if they do 
not get it or it is taken away, than we even can conceive of here. 

Mr. LiOTTA. Irrespective, Mr. Chairman, of bilateral issues be- 
tween us, I would be very interested in working with you and also 
discussing, would a commission be the best way to get Chinese co- 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. LlOTTA. I think some China scholars would tell us that it 
would not be the best way to get cooperation. 

Mr. DORNAN. What has your office, the Defense Missing Persons 
Office, done to question Vietnam on their relationship with North 
Koreans during the Vietnam war? I just found out during the week 
that North Korea came down to Vietnam — this never occurred to 
me. I do not know, because I visited in the field around Cam Rahn 
Bay with the White Horse and the Tiger Korean divisions, ROK di- 
visions. Republic of Korea, so the Communists went to their allies, 
their axis, and they said, we need your help on how to deal with 
these two Korean divisions, upping the tension there. 

But has anybody asked, has anybody queried them on their rela- 
tionship with North Koreans in interrogating prisoners in Vietnam 
or sending prisoners to Korea? Remember, Cubans came to Hanoi 
into our prison system and savagely tortured to death Major Earl 
Cobiel in front of other prisoners, and we found out who one of 
those people was and he ends up in New York as a brigadier gen- 
eral with the Cuban Embassy at the United Nations. When I was 
a freshman Congressman, I said, arrest this killer, and nobody had 
the stomach to do it in the Carter administration. So he went back 
to Cuba and he is probably a three-star general now. 

Read the book "P.O.W." He beat an American to death, smashing 
his head against the concrete, screaming, "You g-d-m liar. You 
faker," he called them. That was his name, the faker, because he 
would hit him across the face with a whip and he would not even 
blink because his mind had been destroyed. Actually, he was taken 
off and died alone. We got his remains back. He has been buried 
in American soil. 

Has anybody thought of following this line of questioning? Did 
American prisoners come up here from Vietnam? Could we have ac- 
cess to your intelligence officers that went down to Vietnam from 
Korea? Has anybody started to put together a profile on that? 

Mr. LlOTTA. I do not know the answer to the question but I will 
get you an answer to that question. 

Mr. DoRNAN. OK, because if the Cubans were there, believe me, 
fellow Asians were there, especially since the Chinese were run- 
ning the antiaircraft program, had 300,000 people involved. Ambas- 
sador Toon is correct. Soviets ran the Korean war but they funded 
95 percent of the Vietnam war but without the same control, but 
the funding made them an important player. 

I have a final question for you and I will turn to my colleagues. 
In negotiations with the North Vietnamese in the Clinton adminis- 


tration, when did you first raise the need to discuss any of these 
specific Hve sighting reports from 1968 up to the present with the 
North Koreans? Have you done that on a trip over there or just in 
writing or what? 

Mr. LlOTTA. Three times, Congressman. 

Mr. DORNAN. Over there? 

Mr. LlOTTA. No, first raised in an off-line conversation in New 
York City during the New York talks. We asked two questions. We 
asked about the defectors and what the status of these defectors 
were and whether we could get access to the defectors. 

Mr. DoRNAN. That was before Mr. Brown. 
, Mr. LlOTTA. That is right. And that is why I said this was off- 
line. It was not an official representation and was not part of the 
official talks. 

During the trip with Congressman Richardson, I asked in a car 
ride with a foreign ministry official, I reminded them that General 
Wold had raised the question in New York about the defectors and 
also about the possibility of Americans being detained still, Amer- 
ican servicemen still being detained against their will. We had 
asked for an answer from them. Did they have an answer that I 
could bring back to General Wold? 

I was told they did not have an answer ready yet. I reminded 
them that I would be hopefully coming to have the next round of 
talks, the technical talks with them, in about 10 days, and that I 
would hope they would have an answer ready at that time. 

During my delegation, we had a dinner with Ambassador Kim 
Jung Hong, who was the head of their delegation. They met with 
General Wold. At that time, he delivered an answer to General 
Wold's questions which basically said, the so-called Americans in 
the propaganda film "Nameless Heroes" were not Americans, they 
were not the defectors, and that ever3d:hing that — ^they have no 
Americans being detained against their will and that they have no 
other information about it, and then they proceeded to harangue us 
about their POWs which we have not given back, allegedly. 

The bottom line here is 

Mr. DoRNAN. This is a repeat of Vietnam. It is tragic. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Yes, sir, and the bottom line was, this was the same 
response that Senator Smith and Congressman Montgomery and 
other distinguished officials who have been able to travel and have 
asked these questions directly to the North Koreans have received. 
They received the same answer. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Make me this promise, because I may try to go over 
there in August, depending on how my own political race is going, 
because there is not much reward in tracking old issues like this 
in a hot election year, but I may put duty ahead of survival an3rway 
and go over there. 

If other Congressmen get over there or Senators ahead of me or 
I do not get over, please promise me, and you also, Mr. Brown, that 
you will make it part of the briefing of any elected official from this 
country, which they pay great attention to, that they understand 
that the ongoing investigations are the hottest ones and then give 
them the top secret part of it. Do not blow this track we are on, 
but we want you to have this knowledge in case you get a little mo- 
saic piece that we can put into the puzzle. 


Mr. Pickett. 

Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe I have gotten the information from this panel with your 
questions and mine that I believe we can get today. I thank you 
very much, and I want to thank you gentleman and wish you well 
in your undertaking. 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. 

One final cleanup here. On March 9, 1988, you can see it is re- 
dacted in the body of the testimony, and there is the full list and 
it is the full intelligence distribution list. In response to your re- 
quest, about four lines redacted, three separate reports of such 
sightings, which are attached. The first report dated April 80 indi- 
cates that, redacted, sighted two Americans in August 1986, re- 
dacted, on the outskirts of Pyongyang. Ten military pilots captured 
in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea — captured in North 
Vietnam were brought to North Korea. This is 1988. 

The second report, also dated April 80 — that was the very month 
I was chairman, the only Republican chairman of anything on Cap- 
itol Hill. Steve Solarz paid me the decency of making me, because 
of my corporate institutional knowledge, he made me chairman of 
the POW Task Force. In the third report dated March 1988— this 
is 8 years later now — indicated sighting as many as 11 Caucasians, 
probably American prisoners from the Korean war in the fall of 
1979 at a collective farm north of Pyongyang. That may have been 
a repeat in March 1988 of the Romanian report. It sounds like 

When I get hold of any of these documents, I like to send them 
back to you and say, we got it, we are working it, we are doing this 
or that. You can see, Ambassador Toon, if they do let you go, this 
is going to go on and on because of this situation of some of these 
countries, like Korea, coming out of the dark ages furtively. Are 
they out? Are they not out? It is anybody's guess what is going to 
happen in China, given the fact that, unlike the Russians, these 
people have a capitalistic ability to create things. 

In my district, in Disneyland, everything from a $1 refrigerator 
magnet to a $3,500 bisque scene from Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs is all made in China. All Russia seemed to be good at was 
space and military and the overlap was almost total. So we are 
going to see a hell of a century here with the Chinese. 

I thank the panel very much. It was not as bad as you thought. 
I do want to keep this relationship going, but I am a Sherlock 
Holmes type and I am also an optimist and that is a bad combina- 
tion. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Toon. Thank you. 

Mr. LlOTTA. Thank you. 

Mr. Brown. Thank you. 

Mr. DORNAN. If the analysts would please come forward. Would 
family members hold off for just a second? I wanted the analysts 
to come up first: Norm Kass, InSung O. Lee, and John McCreary. 
I am going to start to pick up the pace here, mainly my pace. I just 
want the families to hear the panelists before we hear from you. 
We owe you that. 


Mr. McCreary is on board. Mr. Kass is on board. Mr. Lee, if you 
would take your seat, we are off and running here. If you gentle- 
men would rise, please. Raise your right hsmd, please. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated. 

So as not to delay the suspense anymore, I am going to start 
with the DPMO analyst, Mr. InSung O. Lee. Since, Mr. Lee, your 
report moved across the wire services, I would like to ask you if 
you have any statement or anything that you would like to make, 
and then I have four questions for you. 


Mr. Lee. Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, my name is 
InSung O. Lee, an analyst assigned to the Office of Assistant Sec- 
retary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Defense Prisoner 
of War and Missing in Action Office. By Mr. Chairman's invitation, 
I appear before this committee. 

I am somewhat confused as to whether to thank Congressman 
Doman or not for this invitation, for I would rather spend more 
time conducting research and investigation. Nevertheless, I appre- 
ciate the opportunity to share my analytical views of the prisoners 
of war and missing in action from the Korean war, and Mr. Chair- 
man, thank you for your invitation. 

Mr. Chairman, before I begin with my contribution to this hear- 
ing, I would like to convey to the public, especially the Korean war 
veterans and those KOA's, MIA's, and unaccounted-for personnel 
from the Korean war. Of course, if they have ability to hear me, 
I would like to express my appreciation for their sacrifices, allowing 
me to live in this democratic society. I consider all Korean war vet- 
erans, and especially those who have died or are missing from the 
tragic war, my heroes, as I was a little child when the war broke 

Mr. DoRNAN. Like my colleague, Jay Kim, a little child looking 
at these soldiers from all these countries there to fight and die for 
your freedom. He tells me about that quite often. 

Mr. Lee. Mr. Chairman, I am not a policy officer for DPMO and 
my answers will be directed to the analjrtical areas. As a research 
analyst and a team chief in the Korea Division, I am responsible 
for directing and analyzing all sources, both classified and unclassi- 
fied information, and make recommendations and advise the policy 
officers and my DPMO leadership. 

With that comment, I am ready to answer any of the questions 
which you may have. 

Mr. DORNAN. Let me just ask a few questions first of Mr. Lee, 
before the others testify. Well, no, let me get it all on the record 

Mr. Norm Kass is the Russian Division at the same office. De- 
fense Missing Persons Office. Do you have a statement of any kind, 
Mr. Kass? 

Mr. Kass. No, sir; I am here to respond to your questions. 


Mr. DORNAN. Good. I have a few questions for you, and I am sure 
Mr. Pickett might have, as well. 

Mr. McCreary, you are the Korean analyst at the Defense Intel- 
ligence Agency and you have been an expert in this field for many 
years, I understand. How long? 

Mr. McCreary. Twenty-two years, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN. Twenty-two years. Would you prefer also just to re- 
spond to questions? 

Mr. McCreary. I am delighted to be here. I compliment you on 
your hearings and I am at your service. 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McCreary. To the extent of my considering that this is an 
open session. 

Mr. DORNAN. That is right, and if there is anjrthing that we can- 
not discuss in open, remember that I have the standard Congress- 
man's top secret clearance. I can call the CIA to my office at any 
time personally, or with other members, and get a briefing on any- 
where in the world. It is almost 95 percent there. But having 
served 8 years on the Intelligence Committee — which means ap- 
pointed by my minority leader. Bob Michel, and then reappointed 
by the Speaker, Newt Gingrich — I have a little bit more access. I 
read the NID as much as I can, the National Intelligence Daily, to 
see if it is keeping up with CNN and the New York Times. 

Could you please, Mr. Lee, describe the circumstances that led 
you to prepare this document? For example, how long did you work 
on it? 

Mr. Lee. As far as working on the document, I had to collect all 
the information that I have heard from all sources and I have been 
working on it for about IV2 years now. The document itself was 
drafted in about 3, 4, or 5 days of intense analyzation, something 
that needs to be brought before the leadership of the DPMO as well 
as I look that the public had a need to know about, the recent find- 

Mr. DoRNAN. I agree. What did you do with it once it was finally 
prepared? To whom did you provide it? 

Mr. Lee. Since I am not the Division Chief, it normally goes 
through a Division Chief. And so therefore, when I drafted it I 
showed that to my Division Chief, and he agreed that we are to 
send this out to our leadership. 

Mr. DORNAN. I want to ask you a personal question. I think I 
know the answer, but I just want to hear it. As someone of Korean 
heritage who knows that 33,651 Americans died, another 10,000 in 
flying safety accidents in a combat theater and lost at sea and so 
forth, auto or jeep accidents, and whose own country suffered mul- 
tiple times that KIA rate and as the aforesaid, 50,000 mission, do 
you agree with Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho that possibly 50,000 pris- 
oners were held back and that there might be 10,000 alive of Ko- 
rean, South Korean, ROK forces? 

Mr. Lee. I am not sure about the figure itself. By this testimony, 
by the interrogation of 

Mr. DoRNAN. Were you in on his interrogation or did you read 

Mr. Lee. I was not there physically, but one of our colleagues 
from another agency was there who is also Korean American. So, 


therefore, he may have thought this gentleman was a Korean indi- 
vidual, but that was not the case. He was American. And he was 
there when the interrogation took place. 

As far as figures are concerned, it is very strongly believable that 
the South Koreans who were captured are still in North Korea. On 
one of my trips to Russia, I had talked to one of the former North 
Korean general officers and he also stated that South Korean pris- 
oners of war were taken to other places in the Soviet Union and 
used as labor camp laborers. 

Mr. DORNAN. A human coin of the realm to pay back debt, pay 
back war debt. This happened with many Vietnamese as more 
bonded servants going to East European countries and working for 
peanuts to try and send money home, and that happened in the pe- 
riod from the Saigon collapse in 1975 to the wall coming out. For 
14 years, there were a lot of sad stories of Vietnamese trying to 
work off a debt — North Vietnamese trying to work off a war debt. 

But that is a fascinating story in itself, because Korea is an al- 
lied country and here the same pattern that may have happened 
to a small number of American pilots or other American techni- 
cians is compounded by a factor of 10, 20, 100, 1,000, with our al- 
lied persons. It shows you what happens when you do not win a 
war and you sign a cease fire and then a 2-year phony negotiation 
and then a sort of armistice with Pyongyang. 

Here is the big question. You stand by, of course, all the conclu- 
sions that you made in that memo dated March 26, 1996? You do? 

Mr. Lee. That is affirmative. 

Mr. DoRNAN. I want to ask the family members coming up about 
that, and I want to tell you that we are pretty proud of you in my 
office because we think your analysis was straightforward and 
based on more than circumstantial evidence. You had corroborative 
reports in there. So I hope that there is an attention, but rather 
a team feeling at the office. Do you believe, based on your analysis, 
that I choose to call expert analysis — this is the gut feeling thing 
I sort of asked Ambassador Toon — do you believe that not only is 
your statement accurate, but you now are convinced personally 
that there is a small number of live Americans in North Korea who 
are not in the defector category, or do you feel comfortable separat- 
ing them from the defector category? 

Mr. Lee. Definitely, there is more than one group of Americans 
there, from 

Mr. DORNAN. See, that alone is a powerful statement. Definitely 
more than one group. 

Mr. Lee. From my analysis. The reason being that this reporting 
was about the Oprica case, the first sighting that — pretty confident 
that they have seen Caucasians there. It was revealed to our Grov- 
ernment in 1988. There is no question about what they saw, in my 
mind. We are not discounting that Romanians who have seen those 
Caucasians out in the field. 

It is difficult to prove that the Caucasians are, in fact, POWs, 
from my analysis. And from what I understand, Mr. Oprica and 
Mr. Tomescu made conclusions based on a certain degree on some 
rumors that were prevalent in North Korea during that period. Ko- 
reans were saying that there were POWs held back from the Ko- 
rean war. 


Now, for the first time, and the recent reports, a North Korean 
defector was able to distinguish United States defectors from other 
groups of foreigners for the first time. In all the previous reports, 
there was really no differentiation there. There was another defec- 
tor who had personally seen and spoken to an American. That per- 
son may have been a defector — a U.S. defector — but at the same 
time, that may have been a POW. 

In the Oprica sighting it can be argued that the group of Cauca- 
sians may have been part of a friendship harvest outing. There is 
someone who contends that might happen. So we were looking at 
all different avenues of either, discount or confirm this sighting. 
Again, this idea cannot be discarded, but there is very little merit 
for the following. 

Now, this incident took place on Sunday. Like m£iny countries, 
even North Koreans allow their workforce to take a break 1 day 
out of the week. If in fact they were planning to have any diplo- 
matic corps or foreigners for public relations purposes, they want 
to take them out to the fields; certainly I do not think it would be 
a Sunday. And also that the Koreans have set aside Friday after- 
noons, where office workers are drafted to go out to the fields and 
do some labor. 

Mr. DORNAN. Office workers are drafted? The word "drafted" can 
be replaced with "dragooned," "shanghaied," "ordered" to go out 
and work in the field. 

Mr. Lee. I would say they were ordered to. 

Mr. DORNAN. Ordered? 

Mr. Lee. It is like standard operating procedures for military, 
the training schedule. Every Friday afternoon, their place of duty 
is out in the field. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Mr. Lee, did you hear my exchange with Mr. 
Liotta? By the way, I took note at the end that there was pride of 
supervisor status and pride of authorship, that he was taking pride 
in your work. You see, that was not what I had picked up from the 
press conference, and I do want to look at the full transcript of it. 
But he quite plainly said, "Hey, this is my office developing all this 
stuff. This is good work." So I was happy to hear him say that. 

But did you notice that as mean as I got with anybody — and I 
thought it was pretty tame, myself — was when I said, hold on, 
those are not radically different accounts. He is not a trained ana- 
lyst, at least not to my knowledge: is he? He is not a trained ana- 
lyst; you are. You are. You are: the three of you are trained inves- 
tigators. Would you call those different sightings that he was relat- 
ing — I do not want to start an interoffice conflict, but does an3rthing 
strike you as radically different? 

Mr. Lee. One thing I could say for sure is that the people they 
have observed were Caucasians. 

Mr. DoRNAN. That is a common denominator. So when you get 
into a numbers game, is not 10 or 20 or 80 all in the same ballpark 
in a field? It is like guessing beans in a jar. The range of guesses 
are phenomenal, what people think when they see a large group in 
the field, particularly if your view is fixated, as I said, on just a 
few people. And if you have eye contact and you do not break that 
eye contact, everything else is peripheral vision. And a lot of people 
are not trained to use their peripheral vision at all; they just have 


tunnel vision. So I hope that we see more pride of supervisor status 
about what you are doing. 

Let me ask Mr. McCreary a question. Mr. McCreary, I assume 
I read a lot of your work product in the National Intelligence Di- 
gest Daily, the daily. 

Mr. McCreary. That would be an assumption. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes; that is not a fair question. 

Mr. McCreary. I do not write for that and I prefer not to get 
into that. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right, but you have been a Korean area analyst for 
how long? 

Mr. McCreary. For a number of — several decades. 

Mr. DoRNAN. I am sorry. I asked you that before. Do you feel, 
as an analyst, that at the end of the Korean war — July 27, 1953: 
I am waiting to go to pilot training, Eisenhower kept his promise; 
as a President-elect, he kept a campaign promise and was off to 
Korea in 1952 so the war has come to an end — do you believe that 
there was the regular Communist pattern at the end of that war 
of holding back prisoners? In every conflict — ^White Russian con- 
flict, 1919, in every conflict — ^the Communists hold back prisoners. 
Do you believe they held back prisoners? South Vietnam and Amer- 
icans and maybe some of the other nations involved: Turks, 
Greeks, British, Canadians, whatever? 

Mr. McCreary. What I believe is less important than what the 
evidence shows and 

Mr. DORNAN. That is what I meant, is what the evidence shows. 

Mr. McCreary [continuing]. And there is evidence that shows 
that that is true, that is right, including the work that Mr. Lee did. 

Mr. DORNAN. Have you read his report? 

Mr. McCreary. I have read his background paper, yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. March 26, and you accept that as a pretty good 
piece of work? 

Mr. McCreary. I took Mr. Oprica's deposition for the Senate Se- 
lect Committee. I went to North Korea and verified personally the 
physical plant and the things that he described. I was with Senator 
Smith on his trip. 

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent. 

Mr. McCreary. So I have no question. He is the only American 
I have ever met who has a badge, a medal given by Kim Il-song, 
as a matter of fact. So I personally have verified, at least to the 
extent that I can, the extent that a trip to Pyongyang can, his per- 
sonal — ^the observations he made. He said there was a thing here; 
I saw it. He said there was a thing there; I saw it. He said there 
was a museum in Yohongsong; there is one. 

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Oprica has a medal personally pinned on by 
Kim Il-song? 

Mr. McCreary. That is correct. 

Mr. Dornan. There is a piece of evidence we had not come 

Mr. McCreary. It is just a testimony to his bona fide. He was 
not Ijdng about being in North Korea. 

Mr. Dornan. So a person like that, you would not feel you had 
to give him sodium pentothal. He is a good witness. 


Mr. McCreary. Tomescu was with him. We knew about Tomescu 
in 1992. We tried to get there. We ran out of time and money and 
we could not find him. We knew about the other witness. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. McCreary. The Senate Select Committee did. We just sim- 
ply did — it was a bridge too far. 

Mr. DORNAN. So you went through the museum with Senator 

Mr. McCreary. Yes. I went farther than Senator Smith. I broke 
away from the group. 

Mr. DORNAN. And you would probably concur with my analysis 
of my friend, that this man's heart and soul is wrapped up in seek- 
ing the truth on this issue, Senator Smith? 

Mr. McCreary. No question about that. 

Mr. DORNAN. No question about that, I agree with you, Mr. 
McCreary. And you stand ready to go back on another trip if this 
window begins to creak open a little bit more? 

Mr. McCreary. I would go with you if you go. 

Mr. DORNAN. That is what I was leading up to. 


Mr. DORNAN. What about — I resisted asking this question before. 
Mr. Santoli, now that he is in the Wall Street Journal, his cover 
is blown. He wants me to ask about the museum in China. I al- 
ways like to assume there is a Chinese foreign service officer who 
is very aggressive and very loyal in the room, but there are war 
museums in China. I went to the Anthropological Museum where 
our North China Marines took away the actual skull of Peking 
man — we said it differently in those days — ^but they had the plaster 
of paris that we left them. I went to look at all the anthropological 
exhibits, and like Mexico in their anthropological museums, know- 
ing these translations — their museums are not like ours with triple 
translations — ^but their museum is a little dusty but in pretty good 
shape. They must have one hell of a war museum somewhere 
around Beijing. Have you ever heard of one around Beijing, Mr. 

Mr. Lee. Not in Beijing, but the Ondong has a museum and in 
it we have found that there were dog tags of U.S. pilots who were 
shot down. 

Mr. DORNAN. You have heard it? Now that would be hearsay. 
That is hearsay. 

Mr. Lee. No, sir; it is not hearsay. We have copies of dog tags 
that were sent. There were rubbings sent. We have been able to 
analyze and determine in one case, an ML\. case that we have 

Mr. DORNAN. Have you seen the BBC documentary? 

Mr. Lee. No, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN. Have you seen it, Mr. McCreary? 

Mr. McCreary. No, sir. 

Mr. DoRNAN. You know more than this documentary, so I would 
really like your opinion on this. In the documentary is my good 
friend, Bud Meheron, 21 victories in Europe, our first double ace, 
our first triple ace, our first quadruple ace, shot down in May with 
the other person who had 20 kills. Ken Johnson, and they both es- 
caped and evaded. They sent him to the Japanese theater and he 


shot down one, and then he went to Korea and shot down five. You 
will not find him on the ace list because he let his wing man take 
credit for number five. He figured he would have more chances. 
The wing man got back and they looked at his gunnery film and 
his guns jammed. That was Bud Meheron's victory. So he is an ace 
in Korea. 

They captured him. He is in the film. There have been hints in 
my office that he might have been the F-86 pilot taken to Moscow 
to brief at a science and technology museum. I cannot believe that. 
I mean, he is such a close friend. I took him to the 50th anniver- 
sary of the Battle of Britain with his wife, Joan, and we became 
very close, and I see him several times a year and he always has 
lunch with me when he comes here. I will talk to him again. I will 
ask him if he would take sodium pentothal, and I bet he would, as- 
suming that he is not recalling something. 

But I guess we are setting up a screening at the DPMO office. 
Have you seen it, Mr. Kass? 

Mr. Kass. No, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN. You have to see this film, because these are live 
interviews with general officers spilling all about getting their 
arms compound fractured from Saber jet 50-caliber machine guns. 
But I will show that film to you and we will talk about visiting 
some of these other war museums and hopefully they will not clean 
up the rooms and hide the material from us and we can get some 
progress here. 

Mr. Kass, what initiatives are being taken to find sources of in- 
formation independently? Mr. Toon is on the record under oath 
sajdng he thinks the world of one of my panelists, Paul Cole, who 
is also interviewed live and in color in this BBC documentary. I 
was very happy to hear that, because Mr. Cole has my confidence 
and I think there is great value in an independent analysis. 

My first experience with this was under George Bush, the B 
team at the CIA. Remember setting up a blue ribbon team to say, 
wait a minute, our analysis here is breaking down and we are all 
honorable, patriotic Americans. Let us split into teams here, and 
the B team came in with a totally different analysis of what turned 
into a book, "A Clear and Present Danger," the Soviet lurch toward 
just crushing their economy so that everything would go into war 

What is your opinion of independent analysis helping something 
like the Missing Persons Office? 

Mr. Kass. I would say it is not only desirable, it is essential. 

Mr. DORNAN. Essential? 

Mr. Kass. Yes, indeed, and I would also say that if you examine 
the 4-plus years that this Commission has been in operation, what 
you would find over in DOD and DPMO is that we have had 
through the life of the program parallel efibrts to those of the Com- 
mission, because I think one of the enduring premises we make is 
the fact that you can learn only up to a certain amount through 
the Commission for a number of reasons. 

There are many difficulties that we encounter, both in terms of 
reaching people and in terms of getting access to archives, and the 
only way to address the effort, if it is going to be a serious research 
effort, is to explore alternative methods and alternative support re- 


search that would allow us to develop leads which then could be 
used to go back to the Commission and pursue them. 

Mr. DORNAN. Did you follow what I meant when I said a Sher- 
lock Holmes attitude? 

Mr. Kass. I think I understand the idea, yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. But there are people who are bom cynics — impos- 
sible, could not happen, too many years, baloney, he is lying, it is 
a dead lead, going nowhere, do not do it, do not do it. You remem- 
ber when IBM was famous for one little arrogant thing on your 
desk that says "Think'7 I would like to put up a sign in the DPMO 
office that says, "No mindset to debunk." That is a little too much 
in your face 


It is too much in your face, but the opposite of that would be, 
in a positive way, "A mindset to uncover the impossible," the Gor- 
dian knot, whether it is mythological allegorical, or what. Alexan- 
der the Great says, pretty big knot. He pulls out his sword and cuts 
it in half. There goes your Gordian knot. Onward to Persia. 

There has to be a positive mindset, and that is why I like inves- 
tigators who say, you know what, this looked impossible but it led 
me to follow this lead, and then I went to that lead and then I 
went to that lead. We go to court all the time with circumstantial 
evidence and get convictions. Buliose has a book out that I just 
sent for, Vincent Buliose, who said he has sent people to the death 
chamber, or had them rot for life, on circumstantial evidence one- 
fiftieth of what O.J. Simpson beat the rap on. And then I hear peo- 
ple say, oh, it is circumstantial evidence, it is hearsay, it is this or 

We had an indictment yesterday — no, an unindicted co-conspira- 
tor yesterday — ^his picture is on the front page, Bruce Lindsay — ^to 
get at hearsay evidence. 

I just have one more question for you and Mr. Pickett and then 
we will go vote and we will come back to the final panel. I want 
to follow up on what I asked Malcolm Toon. What is your opinion 
of the status of Russian cooperation, increasing or decreasing? 

Mr. Kass. Decreasing. 

Mr. DORNAN. Pardon? 

Mr. Kass. Decreasing. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Decreasing, window closing. Thank you. 

Do you believe that the GRU military intelligence and the KGB 
under the eye of the foreign minister who ran it, Yeugeny 
Primakov, has been fully cooperative with the Commission's ef- 

Mr. Kass. No, I do not. 

Mr. DORNAN. Do you believe there is still pertinent archival in- 
formation being withheld on Korea or Vietnam in Russian ar- 

Mr. Kass. Not that I think, I know. 

Mr. DoRNAN. You know 

Mr. Kass. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. And yet they say to a distinguished 
diplomat with four decades of living, go to China, go to Korea, go 


to Vietnam and find out there. All of that is diversionary and dis- 

Mr. Kass. I think it is an effort to deflect attention from what 
they know and what they are ready to share. 

Mr. DORNAN. And just stall and buy time. 

Do you believe that American prisoners, and I guess you can pick 
up on Mr. McCreary's answer, so I will put it in the way he an- 
swered it. Is there hard evidence to you that American prisoners 
were taken to Russia during Korea? 

Mr. Kass. There is certainly evidence. I would consider it signifi- 
cant evidence. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Not hard, OK. Significant. 

Mr. Kass. Really, it is a quibbling over the adjective, but I think 
there is compelling — I would consider it strong evidence to suggest 
that, yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. And Vietnam, any evidence that people from Viet- 
nam went to Russia? 

Mr. Kass. There is evidence of that, as well. 

Mr. DoRNAN. As compelling, or about the same? 

Mr. Kass. I cannot discuss the details of that with you. 

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent. You can with me off camera. 

How about Russia after World War II? 

Mr. Kass. With regard to the transfer of Americans onto Soviet 
soil or the presence of Americans on Soviet soil, we already know 
existed following World War II. We found that out through the 
Commission and other sources, as well. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. This is hard to reflect in a written record, 
but could I ask the family members, do you have confidence in 
these three men? Is there anybody who does not have confidence 
in these three men? 


Mr. DoRNAN. Are we building confidence? We have a long way 
to go. Right, separate them. 

Here is the problem, Mr. Pickett and I have five votes, roUcall 
votes. They will be 5-minute votes. Mr. Pickett, do you have any 
questions of our analysts? 

Mr. Pickett. No, Mr. Chairman. I think probably we are going 
to have to leave very shortly to go over and vote. 

Mr. DORNAN. There is no sense going over right now when we 
have 15 minutes. We will set up the panel, swear them in, and 
start it. I hope you can come back with me. Then we will go over 
and catch the tail end of the 15-minute vote. Then we are going 
to have four 5-minute votes with about 2 or 3 minutes in between. 

I am not apologizing to the families because I think it was good 
for you to hear the top level as long as we questioned them, then 
the analysts, and I have access to these people all the time and I 
have confidence in all three of these people. That is why it is much 
shorter than the other one, because I am not so sure at the top. 
I felt a little better after today, but still, I have more questions. 
Their answers created more questions, but I do not have anything 
else for you three gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Kass, thank you, Mr. 
Lee, thank you, Mr. McCreary. 


If very quickly you could change places with Pat Dunton, with 
Bob Dumas, with researcher Paul Cole, and with Irene Mandra. As 
fast as you can get up to the table, I will swear you people in. 

Captain McDaniel, you honor us with your presence. 

Ms. Mandra, hello again. Is Mr. Dumas here? Please take the 
second seat. I flew with a Robert K. Dumas in F-lOO's. Hello again, 
Mr. Cole, and Pat Dunton. If you would all please stand and raise 
your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated. 

I am going to ask you, since your entire written statement, if you 
have one, will go in the record, so that we can kind of getting this 
going, because second bells will go off in a minute and then we will 
stay about 4 minutes and then we will be gone probably the better 
part of a half-hour, and then it should be open-ended. I, for one, 
like this clustering of votes because we are not running over burn- 
ing up all this electric train time from this building, and that way, 
we should have another long hour of testimony. 

Again, I want to publicly state that Mr. Owen Pickett of Virginia 
has been an absolute champion to sit at my side because this, he 
knows, is a keen area of interest of mine and he has gone way be- 
yond just being a good vice chairman. He has picked up a tremen- 
dous interest himself, because he is the Congressman for one of the 
biggest military conglomerates, mostly Navy, in the country, and 
much respected in the whole Newport/Newport News/Hampton/ 
southeastern Virginia area. 

So we wiU just go left to right here. Ms. Dunton, I have met you 
in my office for the first time recently. We have 9 minutes on the 
vote. We will take about 4 of it right now. Please proceed with any 
opening statement. 


Ms. Dunton. I would like to tell the committee that I have been 
working on this since I was 21 years old in 1969. 

Mr. DoRNAN. You were how old when your dad was shot down? 

Ms. Dunton. Three years old. 

Mr. Dornan. Three years old. 

Ms. Dunton. He was shot down April 12, 1951. When I was 21, 
I decided it was time that I found out what happened to my father 
since the Government had not seen fit to try to discover what had 
happened to him or informed my family of what had happened to 
him. I am saying that to dispel the myth that this is new, that we 
are Johnny-come-lateiys. The families have always been doing this. 
There are many of us out there that have been trying to contact 
the Government or people in the Government who would get the 
answers for us. We were consistently put off. 

I went to the National Personnel Records Center in 1969 and 
asked them for information. Their excuse now is that, well, we had 
a fire in 1974 so we do not have anything to give you. In 1969, they 
said they had no record of my father ever serving in Korea, much 
less having any information on him. That is a little bit of my back- 


Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask you one question. In 1965 — may I ask 
you to do the arithmetic? In 1965, how old were you? In 1964, 
when Alvarez was shot down in the Tonkin Gulf incident, how old 
were you on August 5, 1974? 

Ms. DuNTON. Seventeen, sixteen. 

Mr. DoRNAN. During the entire next decade, from 16 to 26, did 
you have this feeling of here we go again? 

Ms. DuNTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. DORNAN. With missing 

Ms. DuNTON. I tried to contact the National League of Families 
in 1974 when I first found out about it, and I wanted to get in 
touch with those families and say, "Please do not do what we did 
in Korea. Do not do what our parents did and what the wives did 
from Korea, because they listened to the Grovemment who told us, 
'We will get you the information.' They were promising you, *We 
will get the information to you.' " 

Mr. DORNAN. All right. We will come back and finish your state- 
ment. And Mr. Cole, please let me rearrange the order: I am going 
to go to the relatives first — to Mr. Dumas, and then to Ms. Mandra, 
and then we will come back to you. 

Let me just tell Mr. Pickett here that Mr. Cole did this long, ex- 
tensive report for the RAND Corp. He is in this documentary that 
I am going to send to you. He has been — I hate this word "trashed," 
it is overused — ^but he has been critiqued severely, sort of discred- 
ited. And that is the nonsense that has to stop. Everybody should 
accept everybody else in good conscience, and the cynics ought to 
occasionally back off and let the optimists have their day to see if 
there is anything to be, to use the word from some of your families, 
anything to be ferreted out in the area of intelligence. 

We will take a recess for voting and be right back. 


Mr. DORNAN. The subcommittee comes back into order. Thank 
you for your forbearance. I am supposed to do a speech on the 
House floor. I am going to cancel it for you folks so this will be 
open-ended. I can always do what we call a special order. That is 
what general officers put out: general orders and special orders. I 
never knew if the House adopted that military term or not, maybe 
when George Washington was presiding over the Continental Con- 
gress, he started issuing general orders and special orders. But we 
will proceed here. 

I will tell you something that is peculiar that just hit me. I come 
back and whatever minor level attention there is when I have bu- 
reaucrats in front of me — and you will notice that, for all my tough 
image around this place, I do not conduct a hearing like some Hol- 
Ijrwood movie. "I think the witness is lying." "I think the witness 
is stonewalling me." "I will wait here until hell freezes over until 
I get an answer." The toughest I ever get is I repeat what I said 
to Mr. Liotta. Wait a minute. I question your adjective, radically 
different testimony on the bus sightings of the Romanians. 

But I suddenly realized as I sat down, there is no tension here. 
I have a panel before me that is going to answer every question to 
the best of their ability: no equivocating, no shaving, no double 
entendres, no nuances, just straightforward search for the truth. 


We go back to you, Ms. Dunton, to pick up where you left off, 
if you wanted to say anjrthing else in an opening statement. 

Ms. Dunton. I have quite a long opening statement. Would you 
mind if I go ahead and read it, because I think it does have some 

Mr. DORNAN. Look, you have worked hard on it. The family 
members learn so much from sharing other people's experiences. 
You kicked into this in your maturity just as Vietnam is taking off. 
You concurred with my feeling that you said, here we go again and 
you watched the agony of all these missing in actions shoot down 
with one horrible extension. Because I lived through them both, 
one, as a young enlisted man who joined in October 1952. 

You may not have been at the hearing yesterday when I said the 
lead Army psychiatrist of the team that debriefed every single re- 
turning prisoner from North Korean camps came by to talk to us, 
to give us something to do as young precadets. I had just turned 
20. I picked up a fascination with this. I picked up a fascination 
with escape and evasion stories. I read about the first F-80 pilot 
to evade from North Korea to South Korea with both his ankles se- 
verely broken on handmade crutches and his ankles fused with his 
feet at an angle like this so he walked the whole distance on his 
toes. I read that. He then had to have his ankles rebroken and 
reset and then went back to flying. I read that in 1952, before I 

I have always had a keen interest in escape and evasion, and 
then I end up being a pilot myself, eject twice — once in the moun- 
tains rescued by a helicopter in Arizona, once in the ocean in the 
Guard, rescued again by a Navy helicopter. I am always thinking, 
the stress I was under, nobody was shooting at me. Many trips to 
Vietnam, thinking there when my imagination would leave the mo- 
ment of trjdng to film something with a Bolax camera, that if I get 
shot down, I am in deep trouble because I am a civilian. How do 
I explain my presence in Indochina? 

Then as a Congressman, in my 20-year span, 18 years in office, 
a 2-year gap. I want to learn from you folks but I want you to 
share one another's story. So read your statement and we will all 
track your experience, and then you two folks can do the same. 

And one question, because you were not there yesterday. I sug- 
gested to Delores Apaca and to Joann Shirley — ^that is her last 
name — that we form in the families a coalition. Keep your individ- 
ual identities — there is strength in the numbers of different 
groups — on letter signing, making statements of different groups. 
But we have to have a coalition of the League, the Alliance, and 
the Korean war family groups. Is there more than one Korean war 
family group? 

Ms. DuNTON. Not that I know of 

Mr. DoRNAN. Little local groups maybe came together years ago. 
You three people have to have a coalition working group to get to 
Mr. Santoli and his counterpart. Stand up and identify yourself, 
Dino, and pronounce your last name with all of its Italian flourish. 

Mr. Carluccio. Dino Carluccio. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Dino Carluccio and Al Santoli; these are my sol- 
diers. He just reported to Senator Bob Smith, the only man who 
conducted a short 2-hour hearing on Korea in almost half a cen- 


tury, 45 years or so. And then you will have a coalition so we can 
stay on track and this will not be broken. 

If we lose the leadership in the House — the Republicans — I have 
utmost confidence in this gentleman from Virginia that he will 
have a series of hearings on this and keep it going. Mr. Clinton 
cannot break any more promises on this; I did not learn until yes- 
terday that he has never come to a League meeting, an Alliance 
meeting, or sent a high-ranking representative — just analysts and 
briefers. I guess Greneral Wold is the top of that food chain. 

So we will try and keep this continuity going so we do not get 
another dry spell of 5 or 10 years where nothing happens. And we 
will ride Korea and pray to God that they just keep opening up. 
Who knows, we can get another miracle like the Berlin Wall com- 
ing down. 

So take as long as you want, Ms. Dunton. 

Ms. Dunton. Thank you. I think we got to the part where I was 
21 years old in 1969 when I started trying to find the information 
on my father. I contacted Senators, Congressmen, the Air Force 
Specialty Office, VA offices, governmental and private agencies, all 
with the same "no information" response. 

When the Air Force Casualty Office told me they had burned the 
records of the Korean war missing because they did not have the 
space to keep them, I realized I would have to do the research my- 
self. Part of my research involved on-line computer communication. 
This is where I met my first other Korean war MIA daughter. A 
close bond developed rapidly between us, and as we learned how 
similar our experiences were in attempting to gain information 
about the loss of our fathers, soon we were sharing experiences 
with other families. 

We were all in the same situation. Either we got no information 
at all or the text trail led to still-classified documents, and those 
documents are mostly still classified to this day. Unable to get 
declassifications or results individually, we realized a collective ap- 
proach would have more strength. The Korean/Cold War Family 
Association of the Missing was formed and incorporated in Texas 
in 1993. This is how long it has taken the families to get together 

In the 1950's, there was a family association called the Fighting 
Homefront and they wrote letters, they went to Congress. I know 
my grandmother was physically removed from the Senate building 
because she said she was going to sit there until she talked to her 

Mr. DORNAN. What year was that? 

Ms. Dunton. 1954. 

As the president of the association, I am before you today to 
state clearly and for the record what our association believes can 
be done to account for the Korean war missing. Presently, the De- 
fense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office [DPMO], under the 
authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of De- 
fense, International Security Affairs, is tasked to serve as the De- 
partment of Defense focal point for all POW/MIA matters. 

We are aware that a few family members have received assist- 
ance from this office. We are also aware that there are committed 
individuals who have worked in this office in the past and that a 


few are there now. However, those few personnel who are assigned 
to work on the issue of more than 8,000 Korean war unaccounted 
for must attempt to function within a bureaucratic and poUtical of- 
fice which, according to the Inspector General's report, still has not 
clearly defined its goals and objectives on this issue. 

One officer at DPMO recently defined his job as paper shuffiing. 
Because a lot of times we do not know what these people do, we 
asked him, what is your job? What do you do? He says, "I shuffle 

Mr. DORNAN. At what location were you when you were told 

Ms. DUNTON. I was at DPMO, talking to DPMO personnel. 

Mr. DORNAN. In Crystal City? 

Ms. DuNTON. Where were we? 

Mr. DORNAN. Through that door with all the keyed locks on it? 

Ms. DuNTON. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. And he said, my job is a paper shuffler? 

Ms. DuNTON. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. What level? He was not an analyst like the three 
men we had here. 

Ms. DuNTON. You did not have him testify today. 

Mr. DORNAN. But his title is analyst? 

Ms. DuNTON. No. It was — no. He was not an analyst. 

Mr. DORNAN. A field officer? The kind they are going to send out 
in briefings across the country? 

Ms. DUNTON. Exactly. 

Mr. DORNAN. Building up toward 

Ms. DuNTON. One of the ones that talk to the families. 

Mr. DORNAN. How many of you in the room today were at part 
of the hearings yesterday? Some of you were. You heard the analy- 
sis of Bill Bell, who has given years of his life to this including two- 
plus in Hanoi, that he feels this is their way to finally shut down 
or discourage annual meetings. So that is the level that will be 

And this is what I have meant for years as a Congressman, for 
two decades: Do not put bureaucrats there who are in a dead end 
career. That is why I could never understand an otherwise nice 
man, Paul Mather, having a job for 15 years, stalled out at Lieu- 
tenant Colonel in Bangkok. Or Chuck Trowbridge, who I thought 
I could trust over the years, who spent about 20 years in a slot ac- 
complishing nothing and debunking. No mindset to debunk, con- 
stant debunking. 

Go ahead. 

Ms. DuNTON. Another high-ranking official within the United 
States-Russian Task Force for years has called for the family mem- 
bers to beg for more personnel and more money. At the same time 
his office spends thousands of dollars paying for limousines, expen- 
sive hotels, picnics, and tours for Russian members of the Joint 

When the families have asked for research on the Korean war, 
they have consistently told us, we do not have the analysts to do 
it, we do not have the money to get the analysts to do it, you all 
need to go back to the Hill and get us some more money. It is con- 
stant, what we hear from them as far as 


Mr. DORNAN. Somebody has told you, go to the Hill — to the Con- 
gress of the United States — and get us more money? 

Ms. DUNTON. Yes. We did it once already. 

Mr. DoRNAN. That was the million that 

Ms. DuNTON. Jeannie and I 

Mr. DoRNAN [continuing]. That my friend, Murtha. 

Ms. DuNTON. We went on the Hill, just like we did 5 weeks ago 
and said, DPMO does not have the funds to do this. They do not 
have the funds to do the Korean war research. We want the re- 
search done. We need to get funds to do this specifically. It was 
done in the 1995 authorization act and it was $1 million. 

Mr. DORNAN. Be advised, if you want to get tough, that they had 
the money to send a male and a female analyst. And I am not mak- 
ing any assumptions that it was party time because I understand 
they are a mismatched set, but we all get surprises. But a male 
and a female who are supposed to be qualified senior administra- 
tors went out to Monterey, CA, not a stick in the eye, to an admin- 
istrative school for a month last year and the year before and a 
week refresher last week. So remember that. If you need their 
names, I will get you their names. 

Gro ahead. 

Ms. DuNTON. At great taxpayer expense, DPMO has produced 
few tangible results for Korean war missing. You heard them 
today: they claim one, and that was actually a cold war shoot- 
down, I believe. 

Now, at a critical time in our history when it appears joint recov- 
ery teams might be allowed into North Korea, we must have our 
house in order before we move forward with the North Koreans. 
DPMO has had the time, the personnel, and plenty of money to be 
prepared, yet they are not. They are not prepared to do this. They 
do not have the list ready. They do not know who is missing where, 
much less who is missing. 

It is time to try a more productive and efficient approach. Our 
association believes the Congress of the United States can do a 
service to Korean war missing, their families, and the American 
taxpaying public by defunding DPMO for Korean war accounting. 
We propose that Congress use only half what DPMO states they 
spend on Korean war accounting — approximately $4.5 million an- 
nually — and fund an independent private entity capable of produc- 
ing results for Korean war missing and their families. 

At this time, I submit a copy— I have one here — of our proposal. 
I think. Congressman Doman, you already have one, and I will get 
copies for everyone. We ask that this be included in the record. 

[The information of the Korean/Cold War Family Association fol- 



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m 3K f O 

^^^N. OF ^^^ 
















Table of Contents 

A. Proposal 

B. Appendix A, Inspector General White Paper Report 

C. Appendix B, Federal Research Division Final Report 

D. Appendix C, K/C FAM Policy Dimensions 

E. Appendix D, Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA 
Korean War 


April. 1996 

Summary : Private Sector Research Entity (PSRE) Proposal 

The United States Congress has enacted into law through the 
1991, 1992, 1995, and 1996 Defense Authorization Acts a clear 
mandate that the United States government shall continue to 
invest igate and strive to resolve the more than 8,500 cases of 
Americans listed as MIA from the Korean and Cold Wars. Annually the 
Department of Defense spends mil lions of tax payer dollars 
attempt ing to account for these missing men. Year after year, 
administration after administration there is little or no tangible 
resul t . 

The end of the Cold War and the proposed multi-faceted Peace 
Treaty negotiations with North and South Korea, China, Russia, and 
the United States should provide a unique and long overdue 
opportunity to resolve the fates of missing Americans. The 

Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing strongly requests 
the United States Congress to support the creation of a private 
sector POW/MIA initiative research entity (PSRE) to ensure 
resolution of the fates of missing American servicemen at this 
historic and opportune time. 




1) End of the Cold War creates opportunities to account for the 


2) Governmental entities have failed to exploit this potential 


1) Fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs from the Korean War 

and the Cold War 

2) Serve the interests of the POW/MIAs and their families 

Privatize Research 

1 ) Specifically tasked and well funded government entities have 

made ineffectual attempts at progress 

2) The private sector offers professional expertise and 

objectivity from political considerations 

Mission Statement 

Research in order to resolve 

Sources and Products 

1) Research United States archives utilizing experts with 

security clearances 

2) Research foreign archives without political restraint 

3) Provide information to the families and government 


1) Meet or exceed accepted professional standards 

2) Invest igat ion on case by case basis 

Funding Requirements 

1) Combination of private and public source financing, 

foundat ion grants, private gifts and matching funds 

2) Budget request less than one tenth that of DOD expenditures 


Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA RESEARCH AGENDA 


The end of the Cold War brought a great deal of opportunity to answer the 
question of what fate befell servicemen who did not return from the Korean War 
or from the Cold War. Many believed, with a great deal of justification, that 
archival records held by communist nations would be the most important sources 
of new information. 

In the early 1990' s, two governmental bodies were created to take adveintage of 
this unprecedented and historic opportunity. There is a consensus that at leas t 
DPm/USRJC and probably the entire Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTFFA) 
process has inadequately explored the potential now available. The cost to 
taxpayers for this failure is measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 

The time has come to create and adequately fund a Private Sector POW/MIA 
initiative Research Entity (PSRE). In order to do so, the first step must be a 
comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the governmental effort to resolve 
Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases. The purpose of this evaluation is not to 
become bogged down in a rehash of what went wrong; rather, in order to establish 
the need for a new approach one needs to show that those who had the chance, the 
money and the responsibility have not performed satisfactorily. (Appendix A) 
Thus, the failed governmental approach should end, or at least step aside. It 
is time for others to be given a chance which cannot happen without adequate 


The objective of the private sector POW/MIA research entity (PSRE) would be to 
provide a fullest possible accounting for the POW/MIA 's and answers to the family 
members. This will be achieved by the creation of a research entity that will 
meet rigorous professional and academic standards found in military history and 
archive sciences. Unlike existing governmental structures, PSRE does not believe 
families need counseling or advocates; rather, families deserve answers. 

Rather than conducting research that serves the political purposes of 
governmental bodies, PSRE will put the accounting for the POW/MIA' s first. PSRE 
will define in clear terms what services and information family members can 
expect and will also create an open organization whose activities are held 
accountable by the consumers it is designed to serve. Thus, PSRE's mission 
statement and accountability will be centered on the interests of the POW/MIA's 
and their families. 

This research agenda is intended to be used as a planning document that will both 
justify the creation of a private sector research entity and lay the foundation 
for a campaign to raise funds from public and private sector sources. 


Privatize Research 

In a formal finding in 1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of Defense was 
not capable and would not have the capability to do the type of research required 
to resolve Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA issues. Evidence accumulated since 
1^2 demonstrates that the two governmental structures - The Defense POW/MIA 
Office (DPMO) and the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC) - 
responsible for resolving Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases have bad little 
success. Many have concluded that their efforts on Korean War cases have been 
a failure. 

The USRJC, which has existed longer than the Korean War lasted, has not resolved 
a single Korean War POW/MIA case using information derived by DPMO or the 
Commission. The meager progress that has been made was the result of the efforts 
of others, including work by family members and independent researchers. 

Over the past two years, family members have forwarded to Congress an ever 
increasing volume of complaints and expressions of frustrations concerning DIWO's 
conduct and lack of results. Neither JTFFA nor DPMO has suffered from a lack of 
funds. Using DPMO's own figures, its operation costs the teixpayer $60 million 
per year. Thus, since 1992 this failed effort has cost the taxpayer over $300 
million. DPMO states its financial resources are 40% directly allocable to the 
Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases; $120 million, with no resolved cases to 
show for it. The time has come to move on. 

The Defense Department has had its well-funded chance. The time for a private 
sector research alternative has come. The government can keep DPMO and the USRJC 
if it must, but the PSRE must be given the opportunity to serve the needs of the 
Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs and their families. Up to now, family members 
have had to fund private sector research efforts out of their own pocket. Thus, 
in an example of double taxation, a citizens group has to pay taxes to support 
an ineffectual government program while simultaneously financing a private effort 
designed to achieve the same end and with better results. 

The DoD's observation that DoD has neither the talent nor the resources to do 
adequate research on Korean War or Cold War POW/MIA cases has been proven to be 
true. The private sector should take over and provide low cost, efficient 

By creating PSRE, the families will form an organization that can better serve 
them and conduct research in a more systematic fashion. In order to make the 
case for a private sector entity, however, PSRE must demonstrate that it knows 
what to do and how to do it. 

Mission Stateaent: Resolve Cases 

The Department of Defense treats the POW/MIA resolution effort as a Graves 
Registration Service problem. The DoD defines "to resolve" as the recovery and 
identification of remains. In contrast, PSRE will provide the most comprehensive 
and detailed description of the circumstances of loss and ultimate fate that can 
be obtained. 


The definition of "to resolve" forms the very core of the PSRE. PSRE's 
definition of "to resolve" has two levels: 

1) Use archival research to locate the individual POW/MIA whether alive or as 
positively identified repatriated remains. 

2) Obtain information concerning the circumstances of loss from US records, 
interviews and debrief ings of US servicemen and from foreign sources. This 
information will be provided on a timely basis to family members and also placed 
in casualty records according to Section 1506 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. 

PSRE recognizes that it will not be possible to account for every Korean War and 
Cold War POW/MIA case. With that goal in mind, however, PSRE will work to 
determine to the greatest degree of detail possible the fate of individual Korean 
War and Cold War POW/MIA cases and forward this information to the families. 
PSRE will perform these tasks with compassion, discretion and dignity. 

Sources and Products 

PSRE will search for information that derives from records and from direct 
testimony of eyewitnesses. The result of this effort will be an important 
addition to the record of American Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs. 

PSRE has no ambition to duplicate the functions of the individual casualty 
affairs branches of the independent Services. In addition, PSRE will not seek 
custody of individual casualty records or otherwise attempt to become a record 
repository. PSRE will be a research organization whose products will be 
distributed first to families, then to governmental organizations whose mission 
is to store and retain documentation. 

PSRE, like other existing government contractors, will utilize qualified 
professionals who hold security clearances in order to access classified 
materials in the United States. Relevant record repositories are scattered from 
Hawaii to Washington, DC. Using established business practices, PSRE will obtain 
access to these repositories in order to conduct research that falls within both 
US law and any subsequent statement of work contained in PSRE's contracts. The 
Department of Defense is on record with the determination that DoD has neither 
the expertise nor the resources to carry out archival research. 

PSRE will also organize archive research efforts in foreign holdings. There are 
many precedents whereby private contractors conduct proprietary research abroad 
with the approval and endorsement of the US government. There are also many 
examples that show how independent researchers, by disengaging their work from 
politics to the greatest degree possible, are able to achieve results that 
governmental bodies cannot. 

PSRE will use the efficiency and expertise of the private sector and leverage its 
relationship with governmental sponsors to devise the most effective and 
professional archive research effort possible. PSRE will adapt its methodology 
and approach to the local circumstances where foreign archive holdings are 



PSRE will conduct interviews with US and foreign veterans whose testimony can 
complement known facts concerning a particular case. As shown repeatedly over 
the past four years, direct testimony of eyewitnesses contributes considerably 
to the effort to derive a more complete picture of the circumstances of loss and 
ultimate fate of Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs. 

Of particular interest will be to locate, analyze, and disseminate the 
debrief ings of repatriated Korean War POWs. The records for repatriated US Army, 
Navy and Marine POWs have been located in the National Archives and Records 
Administration. A priority will be to locate the debriefings of repatriated US 
Air Force POWs. These records, which have been missing for twenty years, have 
been located by private sector researchers. PSRE will seek, within the context 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, to incorporate 
the relevant contents of the US Air Force POW debriefings into the casualty files 
of Korean War MIA cases. 

In sum, PSRE will focus oa untapped sources of information and will provide this 
information first to the families and then to appropriate offices in the US 
government that are custodians of casualty data. 


The methodology for services provided by PSRE will meet or exceed accepted 
professional standards and will conform to established practices in the event 
PSRE becomes a government contractor . 

PSRE will prepare its investigation on a case by case basis giving priority to 
those cases that either have not been adequately documented or can be completed 
or even resolved through meticulous research. 

PSRE will not subait lists to foreign researchers first. PSRE will focus 
research efforts as evidence accumulates. 

Funding Requireaents 

PSRE will seek a combination of private and public source financing, foundation 
grants, private gifts and matching funds. Contracts from the US government, 
particularly OSD, will be necessary for two reasons. First, private sources will 
not be able to provide adequate funding. Second, in order to work with certain 
types of casualty records and in order to have full access to all archives, PSRE 
researchers must have an official relationship with an OSD sponsor. 

Total amount of funding required depends on the level of ambition. PSRE would 
seek a fraction of the contract money previously spent by the Defense POW/MIA 
Office. In 1994, for example, DPMO paid $840,000 to photocopy for and ship to 
DPMO records that were already in the public domain. (Appendix B) This type of 
public sector excess will not be a part of PSRE's operations. 


The job will be expensive, but if one takes DPMO's expenditure of $30,000 per 
Korean War POW/MIA case as a guideline, then PSRE should be expected, by DPMO 
standards, to spend in excess of $200 million. PSRE will budget for each Korean 
War and Cold War POW/MIA case less than one tenth of what the DPMO has spent. 
A $11.25 million operating budget over five years should be adequate to address 
the Korean War cases and the Cold War cases as well. Additional funds will be 
sought if needs are identified. 

In light of the fact that OSD funding is an Executive Branch function, contract 
support from an OSD sponsor will reflect the policy of the current 
Administration. Likewise, if the current administration does not support private 
sector research, it will be difficult in the extreme to obtain contract support 
from OSD or any other branch of the government. 

The extent to which the Legislative Branch can compel the Executive Branch to 
support PSRE's work depends, in large measure, on the composition of PSRE's 
Congressional support. 





[■«! M o c i)- 

' 1i 

■•"■■ Tl" 






\fw^^ - .■^♦?vW*jyv>'^*f' Y.^t.. ..jj 









Program Evaluation Directorate (PED) White Papers are intended to provide a more 
informal vehicle for communicating advice and constructive suggestions to our clients. 
Enclosed is a White Paper we prepared to help your office define its missions and tasks, 
establish a planning process, and structure the organization. As briefed to you previously, 
our initial work found that improvements in these areas were needed. 

The White Paper provides suggestions for improving practices in your office based 
on legislative requircmeiits, information from other studies we have conducted, or our 
review and interpretation of the appropriate managemem literature. We also provide some 
illustrative examples of goals and structures for your office drawn from our on site work. 
However, we fiirnly believe thai only the members of the organization can properly decide 
their own goals and scnictures. We can only provide the appropriate information itnd tools. 

As is the usual practice with the Program Evaluation Directorate projects, our 
findings and recommendations are advisory in nature and do not require any specific 
management response. However, we hope this report will be of value to you and we 
would appreciate your feedback on the report. Please direct your comments to me or to 
Mr. David House, at (703) 60*-8783. 

John C. Speedy/m^ 
Assistant Inspector General 
Program Evaluation 




— ^ 


The Secietaiy of Defense established the Defense PiisoDer of War/Missing in Action 
Ofike (DPMO) in JuW 1993 to provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in 
action (POW/MIA) amirs widiin the Department of Defense. Creation of the office brought 
together four disparate DoD ofSces that had been working in the POW/MIA arena for varying 
amounts of tune. 

In Augost 1994, the Director, DPMO. on his own initiative, requested an evahiation of his 
office by the Dqnily Assistant In^>ector General for Program Evaluation (PED). We focused 
our initial work on assessing the processes that provide definition, direction, and structure for 
tiie organization. We found that well developed processes in these areas were not yet in place. 
Specsically, we found that: 

■ basic missions and tasks were not well defined or communicated widiin tlie 

■ no strategic plaming process was in place; and 

■ the organi^tional structure was turbulent, poorly defined, and not consistent with 
current policy guidance regarding organizational teyering. 

After documenting these observations and providing a briefing to the Director in December 
1994, we redirected our work to provide constructive suggestions on defining mission and 
tasks, establishing a plaiming process, and structuring the organization at the DPMO. The 
results of that work are preseioted in this White Paper and summarized in die paragraphs that 

Defining Misstons and Tasics 

In defining its missians and tasks, the DPMO faces challenges posed by ^ broad nature of 
its cbaiter, die difEeient institutiQnal backgrounds of the office's cangKnems, and the 
divergent nature of its internal aiid external clients. Overcoming these obstacles first requires 
recognition of ibs c(Hiflicting' p e isp e uiy es tibat clients and conq)onents bring to bear on the 
opeiatioiis of dK agency. We suggest patting together a specific statement of tibe 
organization's purpose and translating it into some genend goals as a way to produce 
awareness of where groups differ on attacking a common problem. This pnxxss can also 
co mri b m e'to conmnmicaticHi and help foster commitmem to Vat goals that are ultimately 
established. Only die members of an o rganiza tion can validly formulate its goals, and the 
process shOukMncoipoiate a wide Tange of iiqnt knd discussion. However, we do provide 
some i*lustrative general goals for DPMO to facilitate our discussion. We recommend 
finalizing the draft instructions on Missions and Functions as a good vehicle for documenting 
the results of this effort. 

PED Wuu Paper on Ae DPMO 



Strategic FlaDnlng 

Canying out tbe missions and tasks established by the DPMO means setting up a good 
pla^^g proce^. This involves translating the established pmposes into more specific 
objectives or imliat ives. Fonnulating ttiese specific objectives sboold take into account Uie 
nttM Ml and extemal mvironment and attempt to identify stm^As and weaknesses of the 
oiganizatiao. Ibe {socess should also account for the resources needed to reach the objectives 
and detenmne wiqts to measure prog re ss towards achieving objectives. We point out the 
strategic iriannjng guidelines set fotdi in die Government rafonnanoe and Results Act and 
urge die DPMO to adopt this model. We suggest diat plaiming efforts should start small and 
need not wait until full developed strat^tc plans are in place. We also recommend that the 
otganizatioD adopt pafotmance measures that are simple to qiply and linked to. the budget 
process. . 

OrganizatioDal Stmctures 

In OUT discnswm of organization structure, we recommend diat die DPMO refiam from 
toy ad hoc sUuuuual changes until it makes a moie systematic assessment of its mganizational 
needs. We anatyzed diree general alternative ways to divide die wodc and die aggigtwn ^nt of 
responsibilities and aud ior i t y in die DPMO: 

■ Attenndvel: Ibe Cuirem Structure Widi Well Defined Mission and Tasks. 

■ Ahem ativ e 2: A matrix-Qrpe structure using task forces for ^ledfied activities. 

■ A l l euiativ e3: A structure that allocates a significant partjon of die work load and 

reqionsibility structure by geogrqphk; region. 

Criteria we present for analyzing su u cl ur es include clear lines of audiority and 
r eq>on si biliiy, decentralization where possible, and congruence with die strat^y of die 
organization. In focmulatiEig die alternatives, we assume that aU current functioiis will remain 
w&in die DPMO. The descr^ition of Mch alternative incfaides any a&Muiiptioii & made 
i-K'MM'.iiiii^ ^ ^nxk processes at die DPMO. We believe the alternatives pr ese n ted are viable 
a lte iua tiv es for coositoatioa, in whole ot fai part, but only diose taxt £BDiiiliar wiUi the 
oiganizatioo can validatB oar assonqitioDS. . : Aoootdingly, we make no specific 

'T1?1WIP*'''*"'*'*'* "" ***^ twiKfiir^ mnf anpriiirinfi^ far tii^ .OPMO -- 

Condnding Remarfcs 

In coiKduding, we recognize the difficulty in settir^g aside time for sndi process building. 
However, in oar cqi eiie uce , widnut die strong kadeiriiip tint such actions require, dw 
otganizatioii wiDoontinne to eApeuenoe difficulty in Justify mg its resource leqiurements and 
conqdetiog die f^figii"'* misnon. 

FED Wiite Paper on Ou DPUO 








Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense 

Defuse IntdUgence 
Aeoicy Spedal 




In July 1993, officials in the Office of the Secietary of 
Defrase nx)v«l to finalize &e intetnal directive and siq^pOTting 
documents Oat set up a new Dqw u tuient of Defense (DoD) field 
activity-the DFMO. One phrase in tbe new ofiBce's ctaarto: sets 
fMth its mission: *. ..provide centralized management of pr i son er 
of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) afftirs within the 
Dq wu lme m of Defense. '*■ 

According to one participant in tbe establishment of tbe 
DPMO, the timing for its creation was driven by an invitation 
issued to femilies of POWs and MIAs to meet with officials in 
Washio^lton to discuss their concerns. While this aq>lanation 
would not be inconsistent with tbe role played by outside forces 
in the \aSboty of die POW/MIA issue, the DoD documents setting 
up the agency do not address the political considerati<His involved 
in the decision. Tbe rationale for the new field agency, as set 
foiti) in the decision nmnorandom to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, was that providing centralized management of 
POW/MLA afndrs within tbe DoD would enhance the 
"efficiency, effectiveness, and re^wnsiveiKss of the 
DquLchnent's efforts in diese matters. '^ 

The Deputy Secretary's aj^woval of tbe proposed directive 
brought together four disparate DoD offices that had been 
working in the POW/MIA arena for varying amounts of time. 

The first of tbe four ofBces, die Office of tbe Dqnity 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MLA), was esta b lished in 
1991 within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Its job was 
to develop U.S. and DoD policies on POW/MIA issues. Widi 
die creation of die DPMO, die Dqiuty Assistant Secretary of 
Defense who beaded die office was now also in charge of the 
new DoD field activity. He continued to report to tbe Assistant 
Seaetaiy of Defnise (IntematioDal Security Affairs), Clffiqe of 
flie UDder Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

The' second ofBce, tbe Defense Intelligence Agency Special 
Office for POW/MIAs. was set up during tbe Vietnam Conflict 
to collect information on American servicemen classified as either 
POWs or MIAs. The office, wtakh was intended to siqipoxt 
operational commanders, continued functioning at varying levels 
of activi^ after die fall of South Vietoam. 

Tbe third office, tbe Central Documentation Office, was set 
up by the Secretary of Defense m late 1991 to review and 
declassify materials pertaining to American POWs and MIAs lost 

FED WhUt Papv on theDWO 



in Southeast Asia. Before the consoUdatioii, die office reported 
to the Assistant Secivtaiy of Defense (CcHmnand. Control, 
Conuniinications and Intelligence). 

Task Force Russia The fomdi office, Tad: Force Russia, was set iq) in eariy 

1992 under die control of die Dqmtment of die Anny. The 
Task Force was given the mission of siqipcnting the United 
States-Russian Joint Commission on POW/NQAs (beieafter 
lefeiied to as tiie Joint Commissioi^. The Joint Commission was 
inimarily intended to resolve the fote of U.S. Korean War and 
Cold War POW/MlAs. In addition, it lepoits on any infbnnation 
CQDcenmg \^etnam War and WoM War n POWs and MIAs. 
The Joint Coimnission includes Members of Congress, senior 
Dqnrtment of State and DoD p er s o nn e l , and a rqaesen t a tive 
from die U.S. Archives. Much of de Task Force's work 
consists of reseaidi in Russian archives and interviews of Russian 
citizens that provide the data used by the Joint Commission in 
detennining the £ue of U.S. service meihbers. 

ONE OFFICE'S Widi the creation of die DPMO. Task F(«ce Russia no longa 

REiSERVATKWS fell under die andiority of die Department of die Army. Whm 

ABOUT asked to co mm e nt on this prospect. Task Force Russia staff 

CWiSOUDAnON cautioned dieir superiois diat die friaceoKnt under DPMO 

"carries widi it a very real probability that [the task force's] 

suoocssful operating piou ed ui es win not survive subordination to 

the new organizatioiL''^ WUle the Army kadershqi evenhially 

cancuned widi die conscriidation proposal, they did mform 

officials in the Office 0[ die Secr^ary of Defense of specific 

concerns about die impact of die action on the successful 

operation of die Task Force. Dealing widi dwse concerns was 

not die only challenge feped by die kadersh^i of the new 




One challoige for die DPMO was canying cut its stated 
responsibility to "[SJove as die DoD focal point for POW/MIA 
matten." "rhis lespcMBsibili^ had to be earned out even diough 
odier DoD offices diat deid widi POW/MIA matters answer to 
different administtative chams of cammand than die DPMO 
office. Key organizations, outside the Office of the Secretary of 
Defeoae. diat deal widi POW/MIA tnoes include: 

■ The Military Service Casualty and Moituaiy AfDurs 

■ The U.S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory in 

PED Wuu Paptr on the DPMO 






■ The U.S. Pacific Conunand's Joint Task Force Full 
Accounting which conducts POW/MIA research and field 
investigations in Southeast Asia; and 

■ The Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and 
£scq)e Agency, which develops policy and procedures 
that may influence the actions of fiinire POWs. 

Odier outside entities with whom the DPMO must work to 
cany out the responsibilities in its charter include the Defense 
Intdligence Aeent^, Congress, POW/MIA faioilies, and veterans 

Anodier challenge was that the DPMO began operations 
without the full staffing level envisioned for the new 
organization. The administrative documents accompanying the 
DPMO Charter aotborized 51 personnel ^ces for the DPMO in 
addition to the 71 spaces transferred from the C^iice of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency offices 
that combmed to form the new organization. However, 
establishment of the office preceded wit^mt filling these spaces. 
In addition, while 27 military personnel occupied temporary 
p osition s in the Task Force Russia when the DPMO started-up m 
July 1993, the antborization for these spaces terminated in 
December 1993. In sum, as of August 1994, the DPMO had 
personnel filling only 66 of 122 authorized positions.' 

Because the increased perstHmel authorized for the DPMO 
were not mitially available, die detailing of DoD personnel to the 
ofiQce was pennitted, according to the administrative documents 
supporting the charter. However, the office was expccXeA to take 
actkm in order to recruit and hire the needed personnel. 
Administrative siqrport for these persoimel actions, under the 
tenns of the charter, u provided by the Director, Washington 
Headgoarters Services," 

As the DPMO moved to establish itself as the focos for 
POW/MIA affiurs while simultaneously obtaining the p e r s on nel 
authorized for the office, it did so in die context of increased 
attention on POW/MIA afEairs. President Bush's efforts to 
nnmalize relations' widi Vietnam in 1991 coincided with 
increased attentioh \n Congress on POW/MIA matters. By 
1994, two sqnrate Congressiraial investigations had ^^■miir^' 
POW/MIA matters. Also, the end of the Cold War opoied iq> 
the possibili^ of obtaining information on Korean aixi Woild 
War n POW/MIAs fitxn the former Soviet Union. This event 
led to the creation of £unily groiq>s for Korean POW/MIAs to 
join die already active fainily groups related to the Vietnam 

PED Whiu Pcgfer on the DPiSO 







This was die context, then, for our examination of the 
processes in place at die DPMO. Overall, we saw te need to 
.build die basic elements necessary for providing clearer 
definition, direction, and stiuctiire in the oiganizaticm. Our 
sgcdSc obsovations are detailed in die fidlowing paiagrqibs. 

We found tbat tbe DFMO's basic miagwwig and tasks are not 
well defined or conunimicated widnn die mganization. While 
dus deficit is lecogmzed by senior k«deisliq> at die DPMO,' die 
procedmes for gwiwraiir^ die needed definitions, intetoal 
directives and guidelines are not in {dace. To some, die lade of 
procedures may be perceived as b uieai K a a tir . oveta;^ that have 
occurred in die face of uigent oper ati on a l requirements. 
Howeva, in our e]q)erieiioe, action to carrect diis situation is 
required so diat die DPMO can focus its limiied resources on 
wlot is essential and reduce any duplkatioD of eCTort 

De&iing missions and tasks is also a prerequisite for 
identifying die skills and petsonnd die organization must obtain 
fat die j^ it needs to do. Uns clear definition of p er s o nn el 
requirements is ewftnlial as tbe agency attmnKa to justify its 
current personnel levels during projected downsizing in tbe DoD. 

Faced widi tbe short-teim requironents of establishing a new 
organization, tbe DPMO Ifadrnhip had not established a 
strategic planning process. As a result, die DPMO is not availing 
itself of a useful tool for providing overall direction to personnel 
and for adjusting to.changing reqnnements and resource levels. 

In examining 'tbe oiganizatioial structure, we found a great 
degree of tuibulenbe. Widiin a six month period, we were 
provided with six different wganizational charts reflecting a 
different otganizatioiial structure and petsouuel nmimug levels. 
We did not find evidence that these cbanges were based on a 
systematic assessment of how best to (nganize die UiPMO to meet 
its misaon. In addition, tbe current structure at the DPMO does 
nM reflect National and Defeose FOfonnance Review guidance 

HBgairiiT^ rtiwniilinit^ nrg«iiiT«rin«inl taygfs As a ICSUlt of diete 

conditions, organizational effioency is redooed and die matching 
of penoouel widi aullmlzed rpositioDS is not assured. 
Establishmg a process diat..will let tbe oigauiati on stabilize its 
structure is ftfrntiiil for foouing tie efifocts of the directorates to 
meet die DPMO's mission." 





'DoD Directive S 1 10. 10. D^aae Prisoner Of War/Missing In Aaitm OUpce (PPUO), July 16. 199S. 

^baernew with DoD Official condnct e d by PED Soff, Noveod>er 3, 1994. 

SWbile we do not necenvUy oidone the aodior't views, a historical renew of the public role in the POW/MIA 
isioe can be fooad m H. Brace FranUin, J£M or M>ritondbiii(m iimerica, RotsenUnivenity Press, New 
Bnmswidc, New Jersey, 1993. The stated ratiooale for wliWfcdriin; the DPMO is firom Manorandumfor th, 
Deputy Seerttary of D^dat from,. DirtOor, A dmuUsoati an and Maie^tmatt, Sidij«a: PropestdDoD 
Dindtve, "D^nst Prisoner <if War/Mssbtg in Aedm Offiee9>PUO). ' July 15, 1993. 

*Memorand>m For Dirtaor, Task Pone Rassia, From Dq/uy Director Aitd Spedtd Assistaa to tiie Dirtaor, 
Subjea: Seorgatdzation Of POW/MIA Affairt. April 29. 1993. 

^Stated Reqxmsilnlity from DoD Directive SI 10.10, Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing In Action Office (DPMO), 
July 16. 1995. Seutou E.. paiagmih d. Outside eulitiu noted in patagra(A i. same lefeieme. 

^InfoaiBtion on petsoonel authorizations, transfos, and **«"'"t pasonnd basaExeaaive Sanmary /Cover Bri^. 
Memonmdtonfor Hie Depiay Secretary ofD^ensefrom. , JXrector, Adminisrration and Management, 
Subjea: Proposed DoD Direetine, 'Defense Prisoner of War/Mi^ng in AOtonOgicefDPMO),' My \5, 
1993. page 2. For iTtitiii ■<^iffi"i**ti*iw» fonctioos. die persoond tmsfcned froin die nine OSD positions 
are a separate groop. 

^Ad u i iiiisu a ij ve soppoit for DPMO a d dressed in DoD Directive 5110.10, D^iense Prisoner Of War/Missing In 
Action Office (DPMO). July 16. 1995, Section H. pancn^ 3. 

<k)noaiigie8sioDal investigaiicos see TV /tqwn on {AfSetecrCMimiaee on roif/aCU 'J, Seoanv Mm Kerry, 
Oi^niBD, Janoaty 1993, and /4n£niinination(;^U.5. Policy Toward POW/MIAs. Prepared by die Minority 
Staff of die U.S. Senate Conmittee on Foreign Relations. Senator Jesse Hdms, Rankiag Meodwr, May 

'For example, the Deputy Director, DPMO, espr e ss ed need for a clearer missiaa statrjiwit and better idea 
where dK otgf^sHoa is heading. Interview with die Deputy Kiector, DPMO. cnndurtrd by PED Staff, 
November 1. 1994. 

'''On deiayering and span of cooirol see Vice President A] Gore's, Report of the National Peifbrmance Review. 
Sqxember 7. 1993, pp. 70-72. The Defense Performance Review was estsbUshed by Secretary of Defense 
.JOK 1.1993. 

PED White Ptper on the DmO 


For the sake of brevity, the models proposed by the Inspector 
General s office have been omitted. 

The following are excerpted from the text: 


step;.- DEFmntG mission and tasks 

LEGI SLAT IVE Budier impetus for defining missitMis and tads is contained 

FRAME WORK indie Govenimeot Perfmmance and Resolts Act of 1993. In this 

ESTABLISHED IN Act, Congress established a l^islative fr amewoik for defining 

1993 missions. Tbe law requires that each agency establish 

comprefaeasive mission statements. Tbe Act tiso calls for 

stiat^ic plans from all Executive Dqwtments by 1997. These 

must ctntain general goals and objectives for major fonctions, a 

descrqition of how these gods and obfei^ives will be 

■cconfriished, and identiScafion of factors omside Oe agency's 

cootrcd diat could a£kct its ability to adiieve die goak and 


The mission stttemeats, as called for in the Act, Aould 
exiriain why the organization exists and give a clear picture where 
it is going. While the DPMO is not spedfically directed to do 
so. developing a mission statement and odier ekments cons is t ent 
widi tbe Government Performance and Results Act recpiirements 
is a prudent way to be consistent with Department-wide planning 








Our e*p ei i e iiu e with conducting odier organizatkHial reviews, 
us to conclude that proMenu with clarifying focus and 
purpose are not unusual. What accounts for diis condition? 

Some management literature suggests diat ^lecial 
diaractBristics of tbe public sector complicatB things. In this 
view, objectives of poUic agencies tend to be inultq>le. 
conflicting, and vague. PiBq>le want difiicRat things with varying 
d^rees of intensity and vague objectives can aconnmodate 
disagreement CUeots of pub^ sector agencies also tend to be 
nnl^ile and faeterogeneoos in dieir iu t n e sls . A speail point has 
been made diat policy offices with dieir hard to d^ne outputs are 
a paiticulaily difficult area to establidi qiecific purposes and 

These general factors help ej^lain die tptiaGc obstacles faced 
by the DPMO as it tries to establish a weD-defined purpose. The 
missioo in tbe diarter is overly broad, die conqmnents of die 
office have different in s titutiona l backgrounds, and die internal \J/ 
and external clients of the office are widely divergeot. These 
points are detailed bekrw. 

The mission statement of the office in its entiiety is as 
follows: "The DPMO provides centralized management of 
[POW/MIA] affairs widiin die Department of Defense." The 
ciiaitBr does not furdier eUborate on what 'central management" 
consists of. It does not, for example, note a role for die office in 
the review of resources for other activities diat p er fo r m in the 
POW/MIA arena. It does not differentiate between the role die 
ofike has in present day operadonal matters versus past issues. 


FED White PqferoHifie DPMO 







D lJi'MtR ING 


Extenud Clients 

Internal CUents 

Tbe cbaiter does not provide detailed descriptions of what 
'centtally managing POW-MIA affairs' means in such areas as 
intelligence collection. These are 'details' diat tbe office needs 
to work out as it opoationalizies its mission statement 

This situation is not unique. Other Defense D^artment 
offices are f«:ed with implementing broad mission statements that 
are subject to differing inteipietatioiL For exan^le, the Office of 
tbe Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Opoations and Low 
Intensity Conflict) was set iq> in 1^6 and given the task of 
'overall s(q)ervision (including oversight of policy and resources) 
of special operations activities....' In inplemniting tiiis broad 
mission, i utetpr tt ati on problems have arisen and in 1993, the 
office still saw a need to 'ask die Secretary of Defense to issue 
inq)lementing instructioiis to clarify the relationshq) and 
r espe cti ve reqwnsibilitig between [t be office] and tbe [Special 
Operations Command].*^ In odier FED work, we have pointed 
out how ambiguities in tbe DoD directives have resulted in 
differing interpretations between the office m charge of the 
Defense Infimnaticp Program, the Military Departments, and tbe 
Defense Agencies. 

Anodier obstacle is the differing institutional backgrounds of 
the organoational elements within the DPMO. The creation of 
DPMO brou^ togedier individuals widi recent backgrounds in 
policy offices, intelligeiKe organizations, public afiain, and 
spedH task forces. Even tlwse with similar organizational 
backpouixls had expedtnces with different regions of the world 
(e.g., Russia and Sondieast Asia) and different wars (e.g., 
Vietnam and Korea). 

Anodier obstacle to mganiTing around a common purpose is 
the difiiereiit clients saved by die office. We use this term to 
indicate tbox who avail diemselves of the information, services, 
or pi Dgr am s geu e m t ed by die DPMO. 

First, significant outside clients exist in the form of various 
bmily groiqis. In tbe 1970's Soudieast Asia families formed into 
the National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
Misang in Soodieast Asia, genenlty abbreviated as the National 
League of Families. This groiq> has initiated visits to Hanoi and 
die Icadasbip has been gttooed secori^ clearances so as to 
particqwte in higMevel meetings on POW-MIA matters.^ Widi 
tbe opening iq> of tbe fanner Soviet Union, family groups have 
also been establidied for Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs. 

Tbe DPMO also has sig ni fic an t iidemal clients. First, tbey 
are to be tbe advisor to the Secretary of Defense on POW/MIA 
matters acting dnou^ the a p p ro pr ia te policy offices. Second, 
they must generate internal DoD policy in die area for die 
Military Dqwrtments and the Condntant Commands. Third, 
tbey must generate intelligence requirements for agencies across 
tbe GovennnenL 


no Vhiu Paper on Oie DPMO 






60AL Provide obfective and mef/ advice to DoDleadeiship on 
poBcy inattefs Bnd MeSgence lequlnnHMits. 

QOAL Ensure the MIest possible cooixBnation across all elgm&its 
In DoDinmlvBd In POWfMIA affairs. 

GOAL Be My responsive to fftose outside DoDwUi an inbresl 

QOAL B^tertly manage and maintain In f on nati onresouraes on 
POWIMIA matters. 





As impoitant as tbe sabstaoce of die goals is the process for 
fonnulatmg dmn. Ideally, tbe pnx^ess shook! obtain input from 
a wide range of sources, both inside aixl outside ^ organization. 
In this way, tbe pnx:ess itself can c unuibute to communication 
and he^ foster commitment to tbe objectives diat are ultimately 
establisbed. We note that tbe involvement of others, particularly 
.Apse outside the DoD, has to be appr o pri ate to die circumstances 
md may not mean direct participation. 

During our research at die DPMO, we were shown a draft 
administrative instruction that attenqKed to define tbe 
r eqxm s ibilities of tbe different c omp one n ts of tbe oCBce. This 
document was incon^lete and had temained inconqilete for over 
a year. While some mi^ view this as a bux e auuat ic formality, 
tbe development and finalization of an instruction on missions 
and fianctians is a good vehicle for defining missians and tasks at 
die agency. Once diese are defmed, die next stop is detaiUng tbe 
specific dungs diat need to be done and die methods diat need to 
be employed for accomplishing the stated mission and general 
goals. This involves Tnfftit^ii<i™"*'yh'C a planning process. Tbe 
next section deals with this area. 


FED Wdte Paper <m die DPUO 




: ^ 



Advice on ]plaiiiiiDg is easy to give but sonntimes hard to 
take. We all know tbzt we need to 'consider die big picture,* 
"describe how our goeds will be actueved," and "pot fim things 
first* However, it's hard to stop w<mying about day-to-day 
brush fires wlien it's your yard dat's binning. Even political 
app o in t e e s , who wofold tippcaz to have the authority needed for 
taking time out to do strategic planmng, report that time 
pressures beyond their omtrol nakc this difficult. 

However, ovracomii^ dwse difficulties is worth the effort. 
Mapping out how to a:Jueve the purposes set for the organization 
helps focus attention on the right dtings. The process often 
includes longer-term needs that may be neglected in the face of 
pressing emergencies. 


As noted pievioasly, we found diat the DPMO had not J/ 
instituted a strat^ic plaiming process, either in line with die 
Govemmrat Petfbcmance aixl Results Act of some other model. 
In addition, die task had not been assigned within the 
organizaticm. The Plans and P(dicy Directorate, where one might 
eiqiect to find this fimctioii, was not involved in intei^ 
organizatioiial planning. Tlie Deputy Director acknowledged that 
die DI^O 'oevo- really looks forward more dian about dnee . 
mondis,* and be recf^gnized die need to formulate a 'clear view* /^ 
of ixiKre die organization is beading.^ 

The following paoffapbs, while not intended as a treatise on 
standard qiproacbes to planning, proinde some suggestions on 
correcting ttis situatiraL 

START WHERE YOU In general, a good pkamiog process translates die established 

ARE missim and goalsinto nxne qiecific objectives or initiatives. 

Formulatiiv dbese tpctiBc objecdves should take into account die 
xtfieiijni and e x t eoaa l mvironment ind attenqit to identify 
streogdB and weaknesses of die organization. The process 
should also accoont for ttae l e t o ut ce s needed to reach the 
objectives and determine ways to measure progress towards 
achieving objectives. This is a big order when the organizatioa 
has several misskm, a complicated and fast-moving 
eovironmeot, and few existing performance measures, as is the 
case widi die DPMO. 

PEDWdU Paper OH thtDPUO '^ 






Having (fiscussed suggestions on how to define mission and 
tasks at tbe DPMO and how to estahlish planmng systems, we 
now tuTD to ways to develop and analyze alternative structures for 
iSat organization. By stnictnring, we mean the division of work 
and the assignment of responsibilities and aatboiity in tbe 



Of coarse, stnictora] changes alone are no panacea for solving 
an organization's problems. We agree widi tliose who assert that 
cultural factors^ values, and, last but ix>t least, leadership, are 
also inqxHtant.^ However, we assume that structural issues 
provide a foundation for addressing &ese areas. 

Because of this assunqition, we are concerned about the 
unstable and Ql-deflned structure we found at DPMO. To correct 
this situation, we r eco mm end that the DPMO leftain from any ad 
hoc changes until it nukes a more systematic assessment of its 
organizational needs. Tliis section provides some suggestions and 
Dlustrations on how to carry out diis recommendation. 

We begin with gmeral principles on structuring and then 
apply them to diree alternative structures for tbe DPMO. In 
fonmilating the alternatives, we assume tiiat all current functions 
wiU remain within die DPMO. Tbe description of each 
alternative includes aiiy ass ump tions made concerning tbe work 
pr oce ss es at the DPMO. We bdieve tbe alternatives presented 
axe viable alternatives for considenticm, in whole or in part, but 
Qidy tlKne more £uniliar with the organization can validate our 



While tbeie is no clear ctmsensus on tbe issue, our review of 
tbe management literature and the principles stated in tbe Vice 
President's National Performance Review lead us to formulate 
tbe following criteria for »«««^»«ing alternative organizational 



Criteria 1- Clear Lines 

Structures should support the clearest posable definition of 
authority and re^>onsibUtiy consistent with achieving the mission 
of the organization. 

FED WOie Paper on the DPMO 








The directoraies shown in Figure 3 are conqx>sed of between 
one and tfatee di^sions. The largest directorate. Research and 
AiBtysis, generally contains die st& who fonneily coiiq>osed the 
Defense IdelUgeiKe Agency's fecial Office. Task Force Russia 
staff madce iq> the bulk of, the Joint Commission Sofipoit 
Directorate;' The Refereooe md Docomaits Directorate is staffed 
by flxise "«1k> fmnofy, manned the Central Doctnneobaion 
Office. Memben 'of the staff^i^iffednal batted mOfBce of the 
Seoetaiy of Defease positions are concentrated in the Plans and 
Policy Directorate. Stxff elements at the DPMO inchide a Chief 
of Staff, General Comisdl,-a Special Assistant, a Family 
Adyocaie,j«n Ettcntiiv iSeqretiriat, and an Executive Secretary 
for the Jomt.CommissknL . 


Clear Lines. The greatest posnbili^ for an;d>iguous, lines., of 
authority are widi elements in the organizational structure with 
similar fimctions, namely, a staff: oBice for Family Advocate and 
a tfp antfg one for Extetnal AfiEurs; and in die odier case, a 
Directorate for Joint Conmission Sii^pott and a sqiatate 
Executive Seoretary for U.S./Russia Joint C(nunission. An 
iitfemal study done in the Summer of 1994 and memorandum 
prepared by staff rotating out of the DPMO pointed towards the 
cooidination difficulties posed by the ambiguous stnicture for 


FED Wiiu Paper on the DPMO 


A j:> jp ^ la d i .?c JB 


Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 

Summary: Final Report on Korea/Cold War Archives Research, Library 
of Congress Federal Research Division under the direction of 
Department of Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) 

Archives accessed readily available to the general public: 36,523 

Archives accessed not readily available to general public: 2,000 


(still classified) 

Case specific information forwarded to permanent casualty file: 

Information forwarded to family members: Unknown 

TOTAL COST $840,212.84 

COST PER PAGE $21 .81 
(for photo- 
copying/del ivery ) 




TO : Dr. AngeloCoUun. Chief DATE: AptU 11, 1996 

Reseudi mJ Analysis Division 
Defenae POW/MIA Office I 

FROM : Louis R. Mbnimer. OasX 2l p> v> 

Pedeni Rneardi Divisioi^^ 

RE : Final Report on Kona/Cold Wtr Archives Reseatui 

Punuam to our Nfemoraadum of ApeemBitt (MOA) for FY 1993, I am rqKVtiag 
the results of work p er f ormod by staff meinben of the Ubtaiy of Congress Federal Research 
Division (FRD) in searching for and recovering documents ptrtaiiiinfi lo unaccoonted for 
ffliiitaty persoimel fiDom die Korean Conflict and the Cold War- All archival research was 
performed in the WuhiiictOD. D.C. tm, lod both oncIassifiBd and dsssified records 
repositories were researched. FRD submitted quarterly reports on the progress of the 
research and ttiese rqwrta summarized the activities performed during that quarter. 1 will 
not reiterate the detailed diacussioa of each of those rqwrts here. , 

Acconttng to the terms of our MOA, FRD archive researchers were not tasked to 
declassify or redact documents. Staff membefs identified those documents that pertained 
only to the comdhioa, locatioo, and treatment of unaccounted-for penoanel from the Korean 
Conflict and Cold War era. HID staff members photocopied those documenu aixl 
transferred them to DPMO custody. At no time did FRD take possetskm of any classified 

documents. FRD transfiBncd all retrieved and photocopied documents to DPMO. 


FRD archival researchen used official DqMitment of Defense personnel liste 
(iochiding die BattlefieM Monuments Commission list of Korean War missing and Summary 
of Cold War Losses) and identified a toul of 38.523 pages of documencs related to the 
locati<m. condition, and treatment of unaccounted for persoimel from die two conflicts. 
These documents consist of casualty reporu, debriefingt, and official reonds from archives 
of die US Armed Forces, Dqiartment of State. US National Ardiives. and other federal 
agencies. Personnel from die Defense POW/MIA OfTun uwk possession of the recovered , 
documents either fnnn FRD staff members who made deliveries of unclassified materials ot. 
if classified material, direcdy from die records repository officials. A summary of archival 
reseaxch activities at the rqiositories visited follows. 


US N«tfawd Archhcf 
Waaiiiiigton, D.C. and SnlUaBd and College FUrk, MD 

Staff members begin dieir wodc at the downtown facility in uoclasiified military 
records. Uiing tbe guides created by archives documents analysts, staff dioroughly examined 
16 difremt record groiqx. Mr. WUbeit Mahoney, Military Refoenoe Branch, Textual 
Reftience Division, served as point of contact. In addition to the military records, staff 
nmnbers visited the Natio&al Archives II in College Park, MD to investigate record groups 
diat bad been moved to that location. Records in tbe Sam Klaus files; were not available to 
FRD researchers because they were in transit and not open during the period of ibo MOA. 
Time did not permit FRD iti^f to return to the College Park archive in Sq>tembeT 199S to 
view dtese flies. 

Archives researchers visited both the Notional Archives Records Administratian and 
Federal Records Center in Suitland, MD where they examined military records and 
documents, classified and unclassified. Researchers relied on tbe expert knowledge of Mr. 
Rkhird Boylan and Mr. Midiael Waesche, curators of the pertinent collections. Messrs. 
Boylan and Waesche were very fac^ful to FRD staff members. Bottii gentlemen guided 
researchers through the collectioas, identifying record groups of potential value to this 
pro|ect, inchiding messages and documents produced and received bytfae US embassies in 
Seoul and T(Ayo during &e Korean War that contained some leferen^ to prlsoners-of-war' 
and casoaltiM. 

A total of 13,039 pages of documents were lepnxlaced at the US National Archives 
fjdA)*^*^ located in downtown Washington, D.C, College Park, MD^ and Soitland, MD. In 
Sqitember 1992, FBD researchers located some 33 documents requested by DPMO's 
analysis branch. This figure represents approximately 7S percent of dte requests for 
clarificitioii. FRD staff were denied access to one record gnnxp that ibad been recently 
moved to College Park/ Archives II, but FRD supplied DPMO with the appropriate point-of- 
cootact at the facility for future foUow-tq). 

US Nary Operation Archives 
WadiingtaB Navy Yard 

The documents housed in the US Navy Opention Archives are extremely fragile and 
FRD researchers were not permitted to handle and photocopy them. FRD, in coivunction 
with the Riotoduplication Service of the Library of Congress (which installed the microfilm' 
camera and supplied the technician) made arrangements with Mr. Bernard Cavalcante and 
Ms, Kathy Lloyd at (be Opention Archives to microfilm the documents. An FRD staff 
member was granted pennisaion to disassemble the document bindinc|B and assist the 
microfilm technician to tpttd the filming process. All Naval Aviation and Marine Aviation 
ftles were screened (including unit histories and shq? logs; war diaries and activity reports) 
and filmed. DPMO has no microfilm reader and, therefore, paper copies of the fibned 
documents were produced. The tviginal microfilm was given to the Navy Arddves in return 
for the use of their facility and in the interest of long-term preservation of die material. A ' 


total of 4^99 pagw of docnmeoti wei« trunnitted to DPMO. 

Marine Corps Historkal Center 
Wathington Nary Yard 

War diaries and opeaskm logs for Marine Aviation uniu. (^rational diaries on 
aviation and ground units, and docoxnent folders m peacetime casualties were screened. 
Histories for all Marine Corps units active in ttie Fleet Marine Force Command down to 
battalions and service su(q>ort compsoies were examined on the advice of Mr. Fred ' 

Onboske. archivist. In all. 490 pages of documents were produced for DPMO. FRD 
researchers were unaUe to locate USMC witness statements on te deaths of cotnbat soldiers 
and prisonon-of-war. 

138 Anay Center for MDitary Hlstin7 < 

Waskincton, D.C. 

Reaearchers exanmed tbe cootenu of two file cabinets contaioing Korean War, World 
War n, and Vietnim reports, inchiding Korean War docomeots on Alnerican personnel listed 
as "missing-in-actioD." Many of dte reports found in the cabinets had been reproduced for 
DPMO from copies at tbe National Aichives. However, btodc 1.968ipages of documents 
were unique and useful. Ms. Hannah Zeidlik, Chief of the Archives iBranch, served as 
expert consultant. 

US Department of State ' 

Washington, D.C. and Ncwington, VA 

Archive researchers met with Ms. Jeamn Hassan and Mr. Cra^l McKeeg. 
i q>iese mat ives of the External Resesrdi and Intelligence and Research Divisions, 
respectivety to learn how ttie State Depottmeflt files sre organized, die nature of the 
infoimatian repo t ted m messages, telegrams, and special investigatioiis. These q)ecialists 
obtained the State Depaitmcffl's concerns about politically sensitive (tocuments and their 
right to deny tbe release of all, or parts of fbese documents to DPMQ. Once the documents, 
all categorized as classified, were screened and tagged for die atteiaiqn of State Dq>artment 
officials, tfie «w^wwn*ii ttwnselves had to be listed for raquest-for-release procedures aiKl 
then reviewed by the Declaialfirstion Branch. 

The Sam Klaus files were never available to FRD researchers and have not been 
reviewed for documents diat may contain informitioa on the condition, location, and 
treatment of mutccounted-for personnel. The files were closed in preparation for transfer ta 
Archives II (College Park. MD) shortly after work began at the downtown National Ardiives 
location and time dUd not permit researchers to examine die files before termination of the 

Researehen axamiiiBd die so-caUed Central. Log. and Post Files, containing materials 


on casualties, negotiatiooa with the North Koreans regarding unaccounted-for ndlitaiy 
personnel, reports oo Cold War shootdowns, and State Departmeot diploniatic activity 
worldwide: those documents produced by the Korean Desk Officer (iiicluding the embassy 
files and publicatioos on the country) and all available files on the Korean War and Cold 
War at the downtown Washington facility. The National Archives is the custodian for most' 
Central File documents produced in the 19508 and 1960s. All of these documents are 
inchided in Record Croup 59 which was moved to Archives II in College Park. These 
records were examined by FRD researchers in September 1995. 

PRD staff then travelled to Newington, VA to a lecondaiy storage facility to examine 
the Field Office Files. These files contain memoranda, and other doouments fliat were 
produced in-country. FRD staff members identified 3.056 pages of documents and these 
materials were transferred from External Request Research Drvisioc to the Declassification 
Division. The FRD point-of-contact was Rosa Pace; the case officer for declassification 
(account number 9500784) was Christine Peoace (202) 647-7125. The Department of Sute 
has instructions to notify DPMO when the documents are ready for transfer. 

US Army InveGtigative Records Center 
Ft. Meade, MD 

The primary focus of research from late in the third and during all of the fourth 
quarters of FY 1995 was the Army Investigative Records Center. Eight FRD researchers 
worked two shifts at the Center in order to complete the review of files. The Center houses 
the 3,000 files of Army persounel who were held as prisoners during the Korean War. 
These files contain ddsriefing reports from returnees, witness statements regarding 
eyewitness accounts of American persoimsl "last seen," and questionnaires concerning the 
capture, treatment, axxi escape attempts that were answered as follow-up to these witness 
statements. The reports provide valuable eyewimess statements that include names, cause of 
death, place of burial, and other relevant observations. The investigation of the documents 
was rather slow because of the poor condition of the material: papers literally broke apart in 
the hasds of researchers. 

Over a period of four months, researchers identified and photocopied 10,325 pages of 
documents, 8.325 unclassified and 2,000 classified reports. Archive researchers worked 
under the guidance of Mr. Henry Persons, custodiao of the files. FRD staff members were i 
instnictBd by DPMO officiBls not to photocopy the questionnaires (the so-called Phase 1-4 
surveys of returnees) because the material contains personal data that would be virtually 
ImpossiUe to redaa for privacy information. An estimated 10.000 p^es of casualty 
information could not be reproduced. The presence of privacy information in these survey- 
questionnaires was the detennimng factor in the decision not to photocopy. PRD staff found 
classified documents other than survey material in only 427 remmee folders. The Army 
Investigative Records Center was the last documents repository visited by FRD staff 


David Osborne served as project manager, oveneeiog the cooodination of staff 
aisignmeats, research sites, liaison with archivists regarding permission to access files, and 
witb DPMO officials. The following FRD staff performed fidl-time aidiival research during 
the course of the MOA: 

David Osborne, Project manager 

Rodney P. Katz, team leader 

Jennifer B. Whatl^ 

Thomas D. Hall 

Michelle D. Wright 

Laura McLeanaa 

Carol A. Corrigan i 

Samuel Stueland 

Olena Z. Thome 

Other staff memben worked on tbt project oo an as-oeeded baJsis.' 

Two micicfilmiog tectmiciani were loaned to FRD by the Libary of Coagress 
Pbotoduplication Service. Ms. Patricia Byam assisted with the i^iotooopy efforts at the 
National Archives and Ms. Cbetyl Nutter operated the microfilm camera to produce ' 

microfilm at the US Navy Operation Archives, Washington Navy Yard. 

^The large volume of archive material at the Army Investigative Records Center, Ft. ' 
Meade, MD required additional staff members to work in two shifts in order to complete the 
task by the end of Ae fiscal year. i 



FY 1995 expenditures are aa follows: 

Direct Labor Cost 


Overhead Costs 




Administrative Costs' 


Photodup equipmeat 


Copy sccount 


Mictonim/Copy Flow (attached) 




Research Ftudings 

The greatest disappointment to the researdiers was the inability to locate all pertinent 
US Air Force documents. After numerous telephone communications with personnel (at 
Boiling AFB; Ft. Belvoir; SAF/AAIQ, the Peoiagon; St. Louis. MO; Maxwell AFB; Kelly 
AFB; Randolph AFB) researchers could iKit locale the Air Force returnee debriefings. A 
similar condition seems to exist with regard to the US Navy debriefings. Several archivists 
suggested that the documents QO longer exist. 

Staff researchers were given some research information from members of the 
Korean/Cold War Families of the American Missing. This information consisted of letters 
from the archivist at the Eisenhower Library indicating that some pertinent material might be 
found there. Time and funding did not permit FRD staff to travel to remote locations and it 
would be useful for analysts at DPMO to contact those presidential library archivists to 
determine whether related documents exist in those archives if they ha,ve not already done so. 

Archive researchers at FRO were endnisiastic and committed to fmding every piece of 
documentation relating to the conditions of die MOA. They were dedicated to the task and 
determined to help DPMO and family members find evidence of unaccounted-for militaTy 

'Administrative costs include FRD administrative, marketing, snd accounting sxipport 



Policy Dimensions of Korean War MI As 

BY: Pat Wilson Dunton, President 

Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing 

Day: 214-428-2855 
Evening: 214-471-0246 

For Immediate Release 

Friday, March 29, 1996 


This article addresses several critical issues that were not covered in "The Other MIAs: 
Americans Seek Relatives Lost in Korea," (WP, March 26, 1996). In this article, the 
author reviews the five research tasks required to resolve Korean War MIA cases, calls for 
the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (DPMO) ofiBce to be disbanded, and offers 
some suggestions on how the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea could 
be coordinated in a way that would more effectively achieve an accounting for Korean 
War MIAs and address the needs of their &milies. 


Policy Dimensions of Korean War MIAs 

"The Other MIAs: Americans Seek Relatives Lost in Korea," (WP, March 26, 
1996), focuses on important personal and humanitarian dimensions of the Korean War 
MIA problem. Analytical and policy issues that are not discussed in that article deserve 
equal attention because at the end of the day, Korean War MIA cases will be resolved 
through methodical research. 

The Korean War MIA is not just a Cold War curiosity for historians to 
contemplate. The policy implications for the Clinton Administration are profound. The 
Post correctly notes that the MIA issue "complicates relations with North Korea." The 
same can be said for US-Russia relations. This explains why the State Department would 
like to see the Korean War missing in action (MIA) issue disappear and why the Defense 
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO) is content to make no progress on 
finding out what happened to American servicemen who were taken to the USSR during 
the Korean War. 

The overall DoD MIA resolution effort, Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTFFA), 
has an annual budget of $65 million. Of this, DPMO receives $12 million per year. Thus, 
since 1992 DoD has spent at least $260 million, over one quarter of a billion dollars, on 
MIA resolution efforts. By DPMO's estimate, $4.8 million of its annual budget ($12 
million total since 1992) has been devoted to Korean War cases. It is feir to ask, "What 
has been achieved v«th all this money?' 


One way to begin to answer this question is to look at the analytical issues. 
Resolution of Korean War MIA cases falls into the following five broad categories that 
must be addressed with distinctly different sources and methods: 

• Establish an accurate list of Korean War MI As and complete circumstances of loss 
fi-om US records; 

• Conduct an Outreach program for femily members of Korean War MIAs for the 
purpose of DNA collection; 

• Identify remains of the imidentified buried on US territory and those obtained fi-om the 
North Koreans using DNA technology; 

• Recover remains in North Korea by joint US/NK recovery efforts; and 

• Determine the fete of men who were last known alive in North Korean, Chinese, or 
Soviet custody. 

These five analytical tasks, if properly done, can provide femilies what they need to 
know about individual servicemen lost during the Korean War. A review of DoD's 
performance in general, and of DPMO in particular, reveals that since 1992 a massive 
amount of money has produced few tangible results for the femilies of Korean War MIAs. 

First, the formulation of an accurate list of Korean War MIAs (Persons Missing - 
Korea, PMKOR) was not begun by DPMO imtil October 1 995, and to date, has not been 
completed. The November 1995 DPMO newsletter stated, "// is important to understand 
that the product will not and cannot meet the same standards of information as PMSEA 


(Persons Missing - Southeast Asia) and its related files. " After only one month's work , 
DPMO determined not to inclixde critical Korean War MIA case information in its 
"definitive" Korean War data base of MIAs. Contrary to DPMO's position, many 
research professionals agree that much important case information is most asstiredly 
available, but requires a methodical research plan for its recovery. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense in charge of DPMO, James Wold states in the Post article that he 
agrees with Korean War MIA families that accoimting efforts for their loved ones should 
be equalized with government efforts at recovering the missing from Southeast Asia, yet 
DPMO, by their own admission, continues to use different standards for Korean War MIA 
accounting efforts. 

Second, in 1954 each &mily of a missing serviceman received notification from 
DoD that any additional information concerning the recoverability of their &mily member 
would be sent to them immediately. Not only was this not done, individual MIA case files, 
including names and addresses of next of kin were inadvertently destroyed or "retired" to 
places unknown necessitating a costly process of relocating the femilies. The "Outreach" 
program for Southeast Asia MIA femily members provides excellent information about the 
DNA identification process and enables femilies to submit DNA samples. No such 
program exists for Korean War MIA femily members, yet DPMO continues to accept 
remains from North Korea, many of which very likely cannot be positively identified by 
any other method. 

Third, in 1953 approximately 850 American remains that could not be identified 
were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery in Honolulu, Hawaii. With contemporary DNA 


techniques, there is a good chance that many of these men could be identified. The 
nationality of these men has never been in doubt, and since they represent over 10 percent 
of the servicemen whose cases have not been resolved, this is an excellent place to start. 
DPMO has not, however, taken any steps to identify the bodies buried at the Punchbowl. 

The North Korean government turned over to US authorities dozens of remains 
long before DPMO existed. CILHI, the DoD laboratory responsible for analyzing these 
remains, concluded in 1993 that the individuals represented by the bones were too old, too 
short, and had not been buried long enough to be those of Americans. In spite of this 
finding, DPMO asserts the remains "may be those of Americans." If that is true, then the 
only option is DNA testing. Yet DPMO has done nothing to prepare for DNA tests. 
Neither the delivery of remains nor the identification of them is a DPMO function. 

Fourth, the remains of thousands of servicemen who died in combat, in POW 
camps, or were murdered after c^ture, were left on the Korean peninsula. For the 
fiunilies of these men, the issues are what were the actual circumstances of death and 
whether remains still exist. The only way to be sure is to have access to North Korea for 
this humanitarian purpose. DPMO has &iled to negotizite access to known North Korean 
archival records which would reveal the fete of missing servicemea DPMO has even 
felled to negotiate access to known grave sites while at the same time US tax dollars are 
going to be used to build a light water reactor at Shin-po in North Korea. DPMO does 
not even have a liaison with KEDO, the international organization in charge of building 
the reactors! 


The construction of the Shin-po reactors should be linked to North Korea's 
willingness to permit American forensic anthropologists to search the site for the remains 
of American servicemen lost during the Korean War. Before the site where the lightwater 
reactor will be buih is bulldozed. Congress should require a search for American remains 
that might be buried at the site. The alternative would be to permit bulldozers operated by 
an American civil engineering firm, paid for by American tax dollars to obliterate the 
remains of American servicemen that DPMO is "searching for" at great expense. 

Fifth, US records do not have enough data to inform families what happened to 
men who were last seen alive in enemy custody. DPMO has not initiated any effort to 
establish archival research efforts with North Korea or China concerning these men. 
However, those men who were transported to the USSR or died in Soviet custody can be 
accounted for with Soviet records now in the custody of the Russian government. Yet the 
DoD/DPMO body responsible for this research, the US-Russian Joint Commission on 
POW/MIAs (USRJC) (which has existed for longer than the Korean War lasted), has 
failed to resolve a single case of an American serviceman last known to be alive in Soviet 
custody. DPMO and the USRJC have no results to show but will not state that the POW 
transfer did not occur. This sophistry is simply a recipe for continued fiinding for DPMO. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of DPMO, James Wold, said he 
"agrees" that Korean War femilies deserve the "same thing" as the femilies of those lost in 
Southeast Asia. Since the annual budget for Southeast Asian work is about $60 million 
compared to $4.8 million for Korean War cases. Wold's position would require the budget 
for Korean War cases to be increased by over two thousand percent per year for four 


years. He has never made such a request and it would be unwise to trust DPMO with any 
more money if he did. 

For the many millions spent, DoD in general and DPMO specifically have not 
produced any results for the Korean War MIAs or their femilies. The Korean/Cold War 
Family Association of the Missing opposes continued funding for DPMO. How much 
more money and how many more opportunities need to be wasted before Congress shares 
the Family Association's conclusion that DPMO is not capable of the type of analysis 
required to deal with Korean War cases? The evidence is overwhelming—DPMO has 
Med utterly and should be zeroed out as soon as possible. 

The effort to accoimt for the more than 8,000 missing servicemen and to provide 
answers to their ^imilies must continue, but it must be pursued methodically by research 
professionals. In the view of the Korean/Cold War Family Association, DPMO should no 
longer have the responsibility for Korean War MIA accounting efforts. Privatize this 
effort in the same way DoD pays private industry to develop technology for the services. 

To date, the Clinton administration has chosen not to include accounting for Korean 
War MIAs in any substantive manner in their negotiations with the North Koreans. 
Perhaps availability of accurate Korean War MIA case development would empower the 
Clinton administration to make accounting for Korean War MIAs a meaningful part of any 
future tiegoti^ions with the North Koreans. 



A^li>^nci jL >c E 


An Examination of 
U. S. Policy 
Toward POW/MIAs 

By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations Republican Staff 

Thursday, May 23, 1991 



Unlike the result in World War II, Allied forces did not achieve a military victory in Korea. 
Tne Korean War ended at the negotiating table between Communist North Korean representatives 
and United Nations representatives. 

With regard to POW repatriation, the North Koreans initially demanded an "all-for-all" 
prisoner exchange. The United States was reluctant to agree to this formula based on its World War 
II experience with the Yalta agreement and mandatory repatriation, knowing that thousands of 
those forced to return to the Soviet Union were either shot or interned in slave labor camps, where 
most of them died. After two long years of negotiatioi^s, the North Koreans agreed to the principle 
of voluntary or "non-forcible repatriation." This agreement stated that each side would release only 
those prisoners who wished to return to their respective countries. 

Operation BIG SWITCH was the name given to the largest and final exchange of prisoners 
between the North Koreans and the U.N. forces, which occurred over a one-month period from 
August 5, 1953 to September 6, 1953.' Chinese and North Korean POWs were returned to North 
Korea, and U.S. and other U.N. troops were returned to South Korea. Approximately 14,200 
Communist Chinese POWs elected not to return to the Peoples Republic of China; while 21 
.American POWs elected to stay with the Communist forces, and likely went to China. These 21 
Americans are defectors and obviously are not considered as unrepatriated U.S. POWs. 

However, U.S. government documents state that the U.S. government knew that nearly one 
thousand U.S. POWs-and an undetermined nimiber of some 8,000 U.S. MIAs-were still held 
captive after operation BIG SWITCH and were not repatriated at the end of the Korean War. 
These U.S. POWs were never repatriated. 

Three days after the start of operation BIG SWITCH, the New York Times reported that 

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, retired commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, estimated 
tonight that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.- 

' Korean War Almanac. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry, Facts on File, pp. 33,62. 
= "8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," The New York Times, August 8, 1953. 

4 .] 




A report by the U J^. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea, five days 
into operation BIG SWITCH, stated: 

"Figures show that the total number of MIAs, plus known captives, less those to be US 
repatriated, leaves a balance of 8,000 onacooonted for.* [emphasis added]^ 

The report mentions numerous reports of U.N. POWs who were transferred to 
Manchuria, China, and the USSR since the beginning of hostilities in Korea." Specifically, the 
report stated 

many POWs transferred have been tecfanidans and factoiyvrorkeis. Oth^ POWs transferred had a 
knowledge of Cantonese and are reportedly used for propaganda purposes.^ 

The nimiber of known U.S. POWS not repatriated from the Korean War was cited by Hugh 
M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Amty in January, 1954, in a memorandimi he wrote four 
months after the conclusion of operation BIG SWITCH. Section 3, Part B reads: 


1. There are approziniately 954 Uiuted States persoimel falling in this group. What the 
Department of the Army and other interested agencies is doing about their recovery falls into two 
parts. Hrst, the direct efforts of the UNC YASkaiy Armistice Commission to obtain an accurate 
accounting, and second, efforts by G2 of the Army, both overt and covert, to locate, identify, and 
recover these individuals. G2 is making an intensive eflbrt through its information collection system 
world-wide, to obtain information on these people and has a plan for clandestine action to obtain the 
recovery of one or more to establish the case positively that prisoners are still being held by the 
Conununists. No results have been obtained yet in this eferL The direa efforts of the UNC [United 
Nations Conunand] are being held in abeyance pending further study of the problem by the State 

2. A further complicating Uaoi in the situation is that to continue to cany this personnel 
in a missing status is costing over one million dollars annually. It may become necessary at some future 
date to drop them from our records as "missing andpresumed <iea<^ "^emphasis added] 

^Report, U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea, (CCRAK). CCRAK SPECIFIC REQUEST 

Number 66-53. 

' The United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China and, as a result, the U.S. did not deal directly 

with the Chinese throughout the negotiations. 

5 (CCRAK) Report, REQUEST Number 66-53. 

' Memorandum, SECRET, TO: Secretary of the Army, Subject: The Tvrenty-One Non-Repatriates and the Unaccounted- 

For Americans Believed to be Still Held Illegally by the Communists, From: Assistant Secretary Milton," January 16, 


4 -2 



In fact, the Defense Department did in fact "drop them" from DOD records as "missing and 
presumed dead," as were the non-repatriated U.S. PO Ws from the American Expeditionary Force 
in World War I and World War II. In a memorandum to Milton from Major General Robert Yoimg, 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 of the U.S. Army, Young updates Assistant Secretary Milton on 
the progress on dropping the U.S. POWs from DOD records: 

2. Under the provisions of Public Law 490 (77th Congress), the E>epanment of the Anny, after careful 
review of each case and interrogation of returning prisoners of war, has placed 618 soldiers, known 
to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following 

313 - Finding of Death - Administratively determined, under the provisions of Public Law 

490, by Department of the Army. 

275 - Repon of Death - reponed on good authority byretuming prisoners. 

21- Dishonorable Discharge. 

4 - Under investigation, prognosis undecided. Missing in Action for over one year. 
2- Returned to Military Control.' 

The ntunber had already been dropped from 954 to 618 through a series of presumed 
findings of death for the "unaccoimted-for Americans believed to be still held illegsjiy by the 
Communists." Presumed findings of death were also used to whittle down the number of U.S. 
soldiers listed as MIA. 

According to the "Interim Report of U.S. Casualties," prepared by the OfBce of the 
Secretary of Defense, as of December 31, 1953 (Operation BIG SWITCH ended September 6, 
1953), the total number of U.S. soldiers who had been listed as Missing in Action from the Korean 
War was 13,325. Still listed as MIA in January 1, 1954 were 2,953, and the figtire for died, or 
presumed dead, was 5,140. 5,131 MLAs had been repatriated and 101 were listed as "Current 


On Jime 17, 1955, ahnost two years after the end of operation BIG SWITCH, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, issued an internal report titled, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of 
War." The report admitted that. 

' Memorandum, SECRET, "To: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subjea: United States 
Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Roben N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-1." April 29, 1954. 

' See "Interim Report of U.S. Battle Casualties," as of December 31, 1953 (Source: Progress Reports and Statistics, 
OSD, as of January 25, 1954). 

4 .3 



After the ofBdal repatriation efforts were completed, the U.N. Command found that it still 
had slightly less than 1000 U.S. PWs [not MIAs] "unaccounted for" by the Communists.' 

Although frank and forthright, this report-written by staff of the Office of Special 
Operations —provides a glimpse into the thinking of those involved in the Korean POW issue. 
Sections of the report follow: 

At the time of the official repatriation, some of our repatriates stated that they had been 
informed by the Communists that they (the Communists) were holding 'some' U.S. flyers as "political 
'prisoners' rather than as prisoners of war and that2h««/)ec>p2eM>ouiid/im« to te V^gor^ae(2/br' 2/^^ 
political or diplomatic channels. Due to the fact that we did not recognize the red regime in China, 
no political negotiations were instituted, although [the] State Pq>anmeat] did have some esqiloratoiy 
discussions with the British in an attempt to get at the problem. Ilie situation was relative^ dormant 
when, in late November 1954, the Pek^g radio announced that 13 of these 'political prisoners' had 
been sentenced for 'spying.' This announcement caused a public uproar and a demand from U.S. 
citizens, Congressional leaders and organizations for action to efifect their release. *° [emphasis added] 

The eleven U.S. "political prisoners," were not the only U.S. servicemen the Chinese 
held after the Korean War. The New York Times, reported 

Communist China is holding prisoner other United States Air Force personnel besides the 
eleven who were recently sentenced on spying charges following their capture during the Korean 
War. This information was brought out of China by Squadron Leader Andrew R. MacKenzie, a 
Canadian flier who was released today by the Chinese at the Hong Kong border. He reached freedom 
here two years to the day afto^ he was shot down and fell into Chinese hands in North Korea....Held 
back from the Korean war prisoner eacchange, he was released by the Peiping [sic] regime following 
a period of negotiations through diplomatic channels.... '^A^g Comdr. Donald Skene, his brother-in- 
law who was sent here from Canada to meet him, said guardedly at a press conference later that an 
undisclosed number of United States airmen had been in the same camp with Squadron Leader 
MacKenzie.... Wing Commander Skene said none of the Americans in the camp was on the list of 
eleven whose sentencing was announced by the Oiinese November 23[, 19S4]." 


Despite some political inconvenience to the Department of Defense, the government felt 
that the issue £ind controversy had been controlled. The conclusion of the report, "Recovery of 
Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," stated: 

• Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, titied 

"Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, OfBce of 

the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Repon No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955. 


" "Freed Flier Says Peiping Is Holding More U.S. Airmen, Canadian Now in Hong Kong Brings News of Americans 

Other Than 11 Jailed," The New York Times, December 6, 1054. 

4 .4 



Such as they are, our current efforts in the political field, plus the 'stand-by' alternatives 
developed by the military, represent the full range of possible additional efforts to recover personnel 
now in custody of foreign powers. On one hand, we are bound at present by the President's 'peaceful 
means' decree. The military courses of action apparently cannot be taken unilaterally, and we are 
possessed of some rather 'reluctant' allies in this respect The problem becomes a philosophical one. 
If we are 'at war,' cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must 
learn to live with this type of thing. Ifwe are in forfiftyyearsof peripheral 'firefights'we may be forced 
to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political course of action something like General Eiskine 
outlined which would (1) instill in the soldier a much more effective 'dont get captured' attitude, and 
(2) we should also push to get the military commander more discretionary authority to retaliate, fast 
and hard against these Communist tactics." 

Reports of the fate of these Americans continued to come to the attention of the United 
States government. One such report, a Foreign Service Dispatch (cable) by Air Pouch dated March 
23, 1954, sent from the U.S. diplomatic post in Hong Kong to the State Department in Washington, 
sheds some light on the fate of hundreds of U.S. POWs captured during the Korean War. The 
report reads: 

American POWs reponed en route to Siberia 

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American 
prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border 
of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 193 1 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant 
and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air 
Liaison OfBcer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probably 
true and the evaluation of the source as unknown reliability. The full ten of the initial Air Liaison 
Office repon follows: 

Fust repon dated March 16, 19S4, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington, G2. 

This office has interviewed refiigee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war 
in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 195Z Observations were made at 
Manchouli (Lupin), 49 degrees 50'-117 degrees 36' Manchuria Road Map, AMSL 201 First Edition, 
on USSR-Mancburian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into 
trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were 
under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia nliich indicated POWs were 
Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among 
PO W shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. 
Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is 
willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available Hong Kong for questioning 
for the next four days.' 

Upon receipt of this information, USAF, Washington, requested elaboration of the following points: 

^ Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoneis of War, Study Group m. 
'Recovery of Unrepatriated Piisoneis of War,* a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, OtBoe of 
the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Repon No. CPOWy3 D-1, June 8, 1955. 

4 .5 



1. Description of nnifonns or dothing vrom by POWs induding omaments. 
Z Physical condition of POWs. 

3. Nationality of gnards. 

4. Specific dates of observations. 

5. Destination in Sibeiia. 

6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian dotbing accompanying movement of POWs. 

7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned. 

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below. 

■FROM USAIRLO SON LACKEY. CITE C 4. REUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven 

(l)POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy inasmuch as weather considered 
early spring. Source identified from pictures service jadcet, field, M1943. No belongings 
escept canteen. No omaments observed. 

(2)Condition appeared good, no wounded an ambulatoiy. 

(3)Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On 
Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate bisecting 
platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian traiimien wore dark 
blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train 
uniform but he knows the trainmen are military wearing regular train uniforms. 

(4)Interrogation with aid of more fluoit interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in 
railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside d^ of Manchouli about 
three months later with POW train headed towards station wbeic he observed POW 
transfer. Souroewas impressed withseoond observation becauseoflargenmnberofNegroes 
among POWs. Source states job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouh every time 
subsequent POW shipments passed through ManchouH Source says these shipments were 
reported often and occurred ^rtien United Nation forces in Korea were on the offensive. 


(6)Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who manned train. 

(7)Three POWs observed in station restaurant appeared to be 30 or 35. Source identified 
Air Force non-commissioned ofBcer sleeve insignia of Staff Sergeant rank, stated that 
several inches above insignia there was a propeller but says that all three did not have 
propeller. Three POWs accompanied by Chinese guard. POWs appeared thin but in good 
health and spirits, were being given what source described as good food. POWs were talking 
in English but did not oonveise with guard. Further information as to number of POWs 
observed source states that first observation filled a seven passenger car train and second 
observation about the same. Source continues to emphasize the mmiber of Negro troops, 
wtiicb evidently impressed him because he had seen so few Negroes before. 

...Comment Reporting Officer Source is very careful not to eoiggerate information and is positive 
of identification of American POWs. In view of information contained in Charity Interrogation 
Repon No. 619 dated 5 F^ruary 54, Reporting Officer gives above information rating of F-2. Source 
departing Hong Kong today by ship. Future address on file this office.' 

In this coimection the Department's attention is called to Charity Interrogation Report No. 

— 4 -6 



619, forwarded to the Depanment under cover of a letter dated March 1, 1954, to Mr. A. Sabin Chase, 
DRF. Section 6 of this report states, 'On another occasion source saw several coaches full of 
Europeans who were taken to USSR. They were not Rtissians. Source passed the coaches several 
times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him.*" 


The report from Hong Kong was specifically discussed in Major General Voting's ^ril 29, 
1954 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hugh Milton, IL Young, responding to 
Milton's request to "consolidate infonnation on prisoners of war which may remain in Communist 
hands," states in his memorandum written six months after the last U^. POW returned from North 
Korea, that the above quoted intelligence report 

corroborates previous indications UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean 
hostilities....repons have now come [to the] attention [of the] U.S. Government which support earlier 
indications that American prisoners of war from Korea had been transported into Soviet Union and 
are now in Soviet custody. Request fullest possible information these POWs and their repatriation 
earliest possible time.'' 

One CIA intelligence report, which had an information date as of October 1950 - February 
195 1, confirmed that himdreds of Negro troops were held by the North Koreans. The CIA report 

1. One Republic of Korea soldier who was captured by the Communists on 29 October 1950 
was sent to a war prison camp at Pyoktong (125-26, 40-36) in North Pyonman. This camp in early 
November had about 1,000 American war prisoners, ofwhom about 700 were negroes, approximate^ 
1400 ROK prisoners, and about 300 civilian employees of the United Nations forces.^ 

A different three page CIA intelligence report, on Prisoner of War Camps in North Korea 
and China, with information dated January-May, 1952, descnbed the Chinese Communist system 
of camps for U.N. POWs. 

War Prisoner Administrative OfBce and Car »r n«««ifif3irinn 

1. In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative OfBce (Chan Fu Kuan Li Ch'u) (2069A)199/4619/ 
3810/5710) in P'yongyang, under Colonel No-man-chl-fu (6179/7024A 148/1 133), an intelligence 

" Cable. Foreign Service Dispatch "From: AMCONGEN, Hong Kong, To: The Department of Sute, Washington, 

by Air Pouch, signed Julian F. Harrington, American Consul General, oc Tupei, Moscow. London, Paris, No. 1716,* 

March 23, 1954. 

" Memorandum, SECRET, *To: Hugh Mflton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States 

Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Aanstant Cltief of Staff, 

G-1,* April 29, 1954. 

" Repon, CIA, No. SO 6582, Country: Korea/China; Date of Info: Oaober 1950 - Frt>niary 1951. 

4 .7 



officer attached to the general headqnanets of the Soviet Far Eastern Militarjr District, oontroUed 
prisoner of war camps in Mandraiia and North Korea. The office, foimerfy in Mokden, employed 30 
peisons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/ 
2480) were deputy rJiainnoi of the office. 

2. The office had developed three types of piisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps,' 
detaining penons \i4io eaddbited piD-Commimist leanings were characterized by consideiate treatment 
of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Commimist rallies and meetings. The largest 
peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Cbnngcfaim. Peace camps were also at 
K'aiyuan Ksicn (124-05, 42-36) and Pendil (123-43. 41-20). 

3. Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained antJ-Commnnist prisoners possessing 
certain technicid skills. Fm phaCTe at these camps was on re-indoctrination of the prisoners. 

4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Kdrea, detained prisoners ^om the 
' rn mrriiiiiift w will (■rrhangf- Pi i um ^ i.t in pfoce and r^iwm camps wM not be exchanged, [emphasis 


5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individiial prisoners to the War 
Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prison ers wer e being transferred to peace camps. ROK 
[Republic of Korea] offioos were being shot; ROK snstj soldios were being rondoctrinated and 
assimilated into the North Korean army. 

„.13. On 6 January four htmdred United States prisoners, indudiiig three himdred negroes, were 
being detained in two bufldings at Nsiao Nan Knan Chaih, at the southeast comer <rf the intasection, 
in MukdeiL One building, used as the police headquarten in Nsiso Nan Knan during the Japanese 
occupation, was a two-story concrete structnre, 30 meteis long and 20 meters wide. The other 
building, one story high aiKl constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both 
buildings had tfle roob. AU piisonen held heie, widi the catcqnion of three second tKotoiants, were 
enlisted persoimeL The prisoners, dressed in Chiiyyc Commimist army umforms, with a red arm 
band on the left arm, were not required to woA Tno hours of indoctrination were conducted daity 
by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisonen were permitted to play basketball in 
the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoneis to escape caused the withdrawal of permission 
forwhiteprisonerstowalkalonethrong^streetsinthevidnityofthecamp. Two Chinese Communist 
soldieis guarded groups of viiite prisoners «4ien such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, 
CO uld move outside the oompoimd area freety and individiialty. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were 
served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 meiL One platoon of Oiinese Conmiunist soldiers 
guarded the compound." 


In an attempt to resolve the unrepatriated U.S. POW problem from the Korean war by 
diplomacy, the United States ofBcially commimicated with the Soviet government on May 5, 1954. 
The official U.S. diplomatic note to the Soviet Union stated: 

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign 
Afbiirs of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to request the Ministiys 
assistance in the following matter. 

" Report, CIA, "Subject: Prisoners-of-War Camps in North Korea and China,' No. SO 91634. July 17, 1952. 
4 -8 



The United States government has recently received reports whicb support earlier indicati o ns 
that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States Government 
desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these 
American persoimel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time." 

On May 12, 1954, the Soviet Union replied: 

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America, received by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on May 5, 1954, the Ministry 
has the honor to state the following: 

The United States assertion contained in the indicated note that American prisoners of war 
who participated in military actions in Korea have allegedly been transferred to the Soviet Union and 
at the present time are being kept under Soviet guard is devoid of any foundation whatsoever and is 
clearly &r-fetched, since there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.'' 

The Soviet response predicates denial of access to the men on its refusal to characterize the 
U.S. personnel as "prisoners of war." In fact, the Soviets made it a practice to refuse to acknowledge 
the U.S. citizenship of the U.S. soldiers; as a result-from the Soviet's standpoint- the Soviet denial 
is accurate. 

Nor was this lesson - that the Soviets do not acknowledge the citizenship of UJS. POWs - 
ever learned. According to a April 15, 1991 press advisory issued by the United States Department 
of State, the United States once again requested that the Soviets "provide us with any additional 
information on any other U.S. citizens who may have been detained as a result of World War II, the 
Korean conflict or the Vietnam War,"" a request that repeated the mistake of asking for 
information only about U.S. citizens that the State Department made 37 years earlier. 

The State Department also made a point of including in its recent press advisory the 
government's usual statement that "in the interest of following every credible lead in providing 
families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones.'* Furthermore, 
according to the press advisory, the State Department specifically asked the Soviets only about "two 
U.S. planes shot down in the early 1950s,"" and did not ask the Soviets any specific questiono about 
any non-repatriated POWs from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. It seems 
apparent that if the Department of State had expeaed to get solid information from the Soviet 
government, then the State Department would have sent a much more comprehensive and 
appropriately phrased request 

" See diplomatic note. 

" U.S. Slate Department press release 249, May 13, 1954. 

" See United States Department of State press advisory. Office of the Assistant Seoetary/Spokesman, "USSR: 

Allegations of U.S. POWs in the USSR," April 15, 1991. 


^' ibid. 

4 .9 



The sincerity of the State Department's declared intention to follow "every credible lead in 
providing families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones" is, therefore, 
suspect. One U.S. government docimient dated January 21, 1980, a memorandum from Michael 
Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, reveals 
the cynical view and attitude of at least one U.S. government official with regard to the non- 
repatriation issue, 

a letter from you is important to indicate that you take recent refugee reports of sighting of live 
Americans 'seriously.' This is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game, and you 
should not be the whistleblower. The idea is to say that the President [Carter] is determined to pursue 
any lead concerning possible live MIAs.^ 


The executive branch's disinformation tactics against concerned mothers and Others 
extended to Congressmen and Senators. One case is fotmd in a December 21, 1953 letter sent to 
the Secretaiy of State from Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson with regard to a constituent 
letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas, who wrote Senator Johnson about a U.S. News and 
World Report article titled "Where are 944 Missing GI's?" 

The first reaction of the Secretaiy of State's office was to call Johnson and dispose of the 
matter by phone. However, as a written reply was requested, Thruston B. Morton, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, was tasked to reply. The evolution of the text of 
Morton's letter to Johnson-which took four rewrites to complete-definitively illustrates the 
ambivalence with which the United States government has approached the non-repatriation issue. 
The four drafts still exist today, and they illustrate how the State Department artfully sought to 
mislead the futtire U.S. President, and the most powerful leader in Congress at the time. 

The first draft of the State Department's response contained the following tea: 

On Septemba 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives 
on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 
Americans, about whom there was evidence that they bad at one time or another been in Communist 
custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by 
prisoners, prisoners of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio 
broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of 
these personnel 

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to 
them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they suted that many of the men 
on the list had never been captured at all, while others had alreaity been repatriated." 

° Memorandum, National Security Council, To: Zbigniew Brzezinski, From: Midiael Oksenberg,* January 21, 1980l 
" Letter, first draft To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thruston 
B. Morton," file number SEV 611.61241A2-2153. 

4 - 10 



This entire section was crossed out by Morton, but a persistent foreign service officer sent 
Morton back the second draft, with the section quoted above unchanged, as well as a new sentence 
at the end of the inttoductory paragraph which read: 

He [Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas] can be assured that efforts are being made to obtain 
the release of all our men in Communist custody and may be interested in having the following 
infonnation about this maner." 

The second draft also contained a new page which followed the paragraphs used in the first 
draft. The second page of the second draft read: 

General Clark, in a letter of September 24 [19S4], two and a half weeks after Operation BIG 
SWITCH ended] to the Communist side, stated that he considered their reply wholly unacceptable, 
and pointed out that by signing the armistice agreement the Communists had undertaken a solemn 
obligation to repatriate directly or to hand over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission all of the captured persons held by them at the time the armistice was signed. He pointed 
out that this obligation was binding upon them and applied to all United Nations Command persons 
regardless of where captured or held in custody. I am enclosing a copy of General Clarke letter of 
September 24 which you may wish to send to your constituent 

On November 21, the United Nations Command provided the Conmiunist side with a 
revision of its original list of unaccounted for Allied peisoimel which it had presented to the 
Communists on September 9. The revised list contained a total of 3,400 names, and the figure for 
United States prisoners of war unaccounted for was increased by eight to a total of 952. 

On November 21, the United Nations Command protested in the Military Armistice 
Conmiission to the Communists that they had still failed to give a satisfaaory reply concerning the 
list of unaccounted for United Nations Command personnel, and pointed out that additional 
evidence provided by three Korean prisoners of war who recently defeaed to the United Nations side 
corroborated the United Nations Command statements that the Communists were withholding 
prisoners of war. The United Nations Command demanded that the Communists *hand over to the 
custody of the Custodian Forces of India aU those prisoners that your side still retains.' 

Ambassador Arthur Dean has also referred to this problem in the course of his negotiations 
with the Communists at Panmunjom. 

Your constituent may be assured that it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain 
the return of all personnel in Communist custody and the United Nations Command will make every 
effort to accomplish the objective.^ 

Assistant Secretary Morton rejected aU the proposed changes in the second draft by 
crossing them out. The third draft of the letter to Johnson was so disagreeable to Morton 
that he typed out two sentences and attached it to the draft and crossed out all other 
sentences that related to the State Departments reply. As a result, the final letter read: 

" Letter, second draft To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of Sute for Congressional Relations, 

Thruston B. Monon," file number SEV 611.61241A2-2153. 


4 .11 ■ 



My dear Senator Johnson: 

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with 
which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the 
December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article 
'Where are 944 Missing GVsV on page 27 of this publication. 

I am enclosing copies of a statement recounting the efforts being made to secure the return 
of American prisoners of war who migfa still be in Communist custody which I believe will be of 
assistance to you in replying to your constituent. As the statement points out, it continues to be our 
determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and we will do 
everything possible to accomplish this objective, [emphasis added] 

Wi\b regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States 
citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities 
recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are 
imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with 
the cooperation of other agencies of the Government 

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently 
made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer R Cox 
and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning [German] prisoner-of-war as being in 
Soviet custody. The Department wiU investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating 
that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments. 

Sincerely Yours, 

For the Secretary of State, 

Thruston B. Morton" 

It is noteworthy that Morton's letter contained no specific or accurate information, as 
contrasted with the three rejected drafts which had such information. The rhetoric of the State 
Department could not go beyond the word "might" to describe the possibility of U.S. soldiers being 
held by Commimist forces. On the one hand, the State Department was taking credit for having 
released two Americans from the Soviet gulag and for investigating "every report indicating that 
American citizens are held in the custody of foreign govenunents," but on the other it was dismissing 
any real possibihty that there could be more POWs in Communist prisons. Meanwhile, the State 
Department knew that the North Koreans had not returned nearly 1,000 U.S. POWs, as well as an 
imdetermined number of the 8,000 MIAs who were actually captured alive and imprisoned by the 
North Koreans. 

" Letter, final To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thruston B. 
Morton', file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153, January 20, 1954. 

4 . 22 




The People's Republic of China, as noted earlier, released a Canadian Squadron Leader 
thirteen months after the last U.N. POW was repatriated by the Communist forces three months 
after Operation BIG SWITCH. In 1973, Chinese Communists repatriated two American POWs 
who had been captured during the Korean War, along with a pilot, Philip Smith, who was shot down 
over the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietoam war. During interogation sessions in Smith's seven 
years of solitary confinement in a PRC jail, these two U.S. POWs from the Korean War were 
paraded before him. Smith said the Chinese told him: 

they wouldn't release me, and would hold me like they'd done to these other gays ontfl I recanted." 

Most Americans would find it incomprehensible that the Chinese would hold U.S. POWs 
from the Korean War, and release them two decades later, yet, to the Qiinese Communists, this 
policy had some rationale. 

At the conclusion of Operation BIG SWITCH, the United States Government left U.S. 
POWs, held against their will, in custody of the North Koreans, the mainland Chinese, and the 
USSR. Whether any of these men are still alive is -tragically-unclear. 

The fate of the more than 8,000 men listed as MIA who were administratively foimd to be 
"presumed dead" is a mystery. No rebuttal was ever made to General Van Fleet, who stated in the 
fall of 1953 his behef that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in 
Korea were alive." "A large percentage" translates into thousands of U.S. soldiers who were never 
repatriated by the Communist forces after the Korean war. 

Seven years after operation BIG SWITCH, one Foreign Service Dispatch to the State 
Department in Washington contained the names of two U.S. Korean POWs working in a Soviet 
phosphorus mine.® The cable, "sanitized" by the United States government, originally contained 
the names of the two U.S. POWs. However, but the names were blacked out in the sanitized version. 
According to the United States govenmient, the names were blacked out to protect the abandoned 
POWs' "privacy." It is absurd that the U.S. govenunent, having abandoned soldiers to a life of slave 
labor and forced captivity, is attempting to protect the same abandoned soldiers' "privacy."" 
Perhaps this example best illustrates the U.S. approach to repatriating our abandoned POWs. 

" "ExPOWs Recall Psychological Tenor, Coerdon," The Free Press Enterprise, Jannaiy 22, 1991. 

" '8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says." The New York Times, August 8, 1953. 

® Cable, 'From: the American Embassy in Brussels, To: the State Department in Washington,* September 8, 1960. 

" 'Men Who Never Returned,' Editorial, The Washington Times, March 13, 1991. 

_ 4 . 13 


Ms. DUNTON. Briefly, I will address parts of the proposal. The ob- 
jective of a private sector research entity is to provide the fullest 
possible accounting for the POW/MIAs and the answers to the fam- 
ily members. That is it, two goals. 

The families define an accounting for the missing in four parts: 
The discovery of live American missing service personnel. That is 
the main part, our biggest goal, of course. Two, the recovery of re- 
mains. Three, the identification of remains. And four, provide the 
information to the families. Let us know what happened. 

The key to achieving these goals is well planned, methodical re- 
search in the United States and in foreign archives. As the Air 
Force Casualty Office so aptly phrased it, the data base on the 
missing from the Korean war is grossly incomplete. That is what 
they said. 

In order to discover if any American missing service personnel 
are still alive, case files need to be built. Leads need to be followed. 
The files have to be analyzed to develop new leads. Waiting for in- 
formation to fall out of the blue is not research. Research is aggres- 
sively planned, it is methodical, it is pro-active research, work, con- 
stantly in the record. 

Mr. DORNAN. Please, a footnote for your morale. I have had re- 
cently, in the last week or so, analysts in my office who have al- 
most used those very words. They have been volunteering their 
concept of what an analyst is — looking for opportunities to go in 
the field, picking up a phone book, and tracing one lead to the next 
instead of creating dead ends by debunking something and saying, 
"Well, this is worthless. It is probably just hearsay or lying." 

They go after it. And it has been done so little and it has borne 
so much fruit already — and I am talking about Korea, not only 
Vietnam — that now we see what could have been done with a prop- 
er attitude at the top over the years. It does not mean there were 
not people there with that attitude, like Lt. Gen. Eugene Tye, who 
coined the phrase "a mindset to debunk." 

The reason I do not mind jumping on Trowbridge's case is he 
leaves in a few — he is already on termination leave. He leaves with 
a gigantic Federal pension very soon, and I look back with horror 
at how I treated him in a friendly way for 25 years. You know how 
to play a Congressman, I guess, or when I was just a concerned cit- 
izen: Act like you are as aggressive as he is, and you are as opti- 
mistic as he is, and you are out there looking for leads, boy, and 
you are going to nail this thing down. 

This is the way communists in Korea and Vietnam and Russia — 
which we will hear from Mr. Cole — treat us when we walk out of 
the room, American negotiators. We leave the room — this is the 
arms control talks, and I do not know what their cultural body lan- 
guage is, but it would be like this: "Are these Americans easy to 
roll or what, comrade?" 

I heard this from our best negotiator, and I have to get this 
three-star general's name who spoke fluent French and Spanish 
and was our lead negotiator or the head of the administrative team 
in Geneva. They just have this attitude that we are stupid and eas- 
ily pushed around and easily lied to. 

So they have contempt for us, overlaid in China's case by a cer- 
tain cultural contempt that Henry Kissinger sums up in one story. 


He said to Cho En-Lai, 'Tou really think that we are not as intel- 
ligent." Cho says, "Well, you are not bad for a Westerner." That 
was his attitude to Dr. Henry Kissinger. So it really is true that 
they just think we are pitiful, and we get it from our own people 
that make us think that, that they are pitiful, and then we get the 
feeling they are laughing at us behind our backs when we leave the 
room — our American people are — and then they go back to shuf- 
fling paper. 

Go ahead, please. 

Ms. DUNTON. It may sound extraordinarily simple to build case 
files. It would seem only common sense to have our facts in hand 
before pursuing information from North Korea, Russia, or China. 
But true case files for the Korean war missing have never been ac- 
cumulated by any department of the Federal Government, and 
DPMO seems to be overwhelmed by the task. It is an archival chal- 
lenge, but not an impossible one for professionals in the field. 

We ran into this when the Task Force Russia was first tasked 
to go over and look for the missing that Yeltsin had pronounced 
that they should have some information on. Task Force Russia 
could not find information to ask the Russians about; they did not 
know enough about the Korean war missing. The families supplied 
them the information about who was lost, where they went down, 
what kind of plane, the background of the missing people, because 
there were no case files for them to work with. And those were the 
families that knew about Task Force Russia at the time; that was 
not, by any stretch of the imagination, all of them. 

Existing records are scattered across the United States in var- 
ious facilities, the majority of which have never been declassified. 
Intelligence collected at the time and over the next decade by the 
CIA, NSA, DIA, DOD, and others was never analyzed and matched 
with the appropriate missing service person. This indicates to me 
that the Department of Defense never had a true intent to recover 
those left behind. 

Still, many of the families have built case files themselves in 
spite of the Grovemment's obfuscation. We have followed leads and 
analyzed what information we could gather in order to develop new 
leads, but we are limited by access to documents which are still 
classified and the funds it takes to do it. The assistance we have 
gotten did not come from DOD; they have impeded our process. We 
have received valuable assistance and been provided concrete re- 
sults from private researchers, scholars, and archivists. 

The recovery of remains not only requires research efforts but ob- 
viously access to the territory of loss. Since the end of the cold war, 
everyone knows we have been working on negotiations with North 
Korea to get access there. It is undeniably critical to use qualified 
personnel in the recovery operations and to minimize acceptance of 
curated remains in order to maximize identification probabilities. 

But we cannot move ahead with politically motivated recovery 
plans based on flawed methodology. If we use politically motivated 
methodologies to do something that should be a scientific or an ar- 
chival method of approaching — I am not making sense here, but 
you just cannot politically do a scientific project. And recovery of 
remains should be a scientific-type project, not, "Okay, we will let 
you go here or we will let you go there." It needs to be set up with 


a long-range plan and we determine — the scientists determine, the 
archaeologists determine — what the best possibilities are for recov- 
ery of remains. 

The identification of remains for the majority of the cases will re- 
quire the use of the most modem technology available, 
mitochondrial DNA. In order to use this technology, reference sam- 
ples must be collected from the family. Some of the families that 
know about this process have already sent in some reference sam- 
ples to AFDIL, but the majority of the families do not know about 
this. The majority of the families have never been contacted about 
these possibilities. There are also 866 unidentified remains that 
were interred in the Punch Bowl in Hawaii and the families need 
these identified. It is already on our territory. Why cannot we get 
these remains identified for those families and for those parents? 

The families want the live men located and all the information 
that can be had as to what happened to the missing. It has become 
painfully apparent that the Department of Defense is not the entity 
that is going to accomplish this task. We are denied access to docu- 
ments, access to eyewitness testimony, access to live sighting re- 

I was told just last summer that DPMO had no live sighting re- 
ports on Korean war missing, absolutely none. They were taking 
me on a tour of the Vietnam section of the files and they said, "And 
these are our live sighting reports section." I said, "Where is it for 
Korea?" "We do not have any for Korea. This is no live sighting re- 
ports for Korea." I have documents that say there are. I knew that 
was not true, but this is their department saying this to me. 

DOD is serving political purposes of governmental bodies and 
lacks the proactive intent and motivation to put the accounting for 
the POW/MIA first. It has to come first. In a formal finding in 
1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of Defense was not 
capable and would not have the capability to do the type of re- 
search required to resolve Korean war and cold war cases on POW/ 
MIA issues, and we agree completely. We need an open organiza- 
tion whose activities are held accountable by the consumers it is 
designed to serve. 

In closing, I wish to refute a statement that has been used by 
the Department of Defense and many of its agencies since I can re- 
member, and that is, "We do not want to give the families false 
hope" by giving them interim information or giving them just a lit- 
tle bit and letting them go off on their own. For over 40 years, the 
real false hope the families have had is that the Government and 
the Department of Defense will keep the promises made to these 
missing men and their families. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dunton follows:] 


Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing 

128 Beaver Run 

Coppell, Texas 75019-4849 

Statement to Congress 
June 20, 1996 

Pat Wilson Dunton 
President/Founding Director 

On April 12, 1951, near the northwestern border of North 
Korea, the B-29 bomber my father, Capt . James S. Wilson, Jr., was 
navigating, was shot down by Russian MiGs. There were eleven 
American service personnel on board. Reports vary as to the number 
of parachutes seen coming from the crippled plane . One report 
sites 5 parachutes while another reports only one. All of the men 
were subsequently listed as "unofficial PWs" , In August of 1953, 
during Operation Big Switch, two of these crew members were 
repatriated. By December of 1953, the other nine were declared 
dead. My family, as were the other families, was told by the 
Department of Defense that we would be contacted immediately should 
any information be forthcoming. 

I was 3 years old when my father's plane was shot down. In 
1969, I was 21 and my family still knew nothing as to when he died, 
where he died, how he died, or even if he died at all. I decided 
it was time I found out. Over the next 20 years, I contacted my 
Senators, Congressmen, casualty office, VA offices, government and 
private agencies: all with the same "No Information" response. 
Early on, before the fire at the National Personnel Records Center 
in St. Louis, they said they had no record of my father ever 
serving in Korea. When the Air Force casualty office told me they 
had burned the records of the Korean War missing because they did 
not have space to keep them, I realized I would have to do the 
research myself. 

Part of my research involved on-line computer communication. 
This is where I met my first other Korean War MIA daughter. A 
close bond developed rapidly between us as we learned how similar 
our experiences were in attempting to gain information about the 
loss of our fathers. Soon we were sharing experiences with other 
families. We were all in the same situation; either we got no 
information at all or the text trail led to still classified 
documents. Unable to get declassification or results individually, 
we realized a collective approach might have more strength. The 
Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing was then formed 
and incorporated in Texas. 

As president of the Association, I am before you today to 
state clearly and for the record, what our Association believes can 
be done to account for Korean War missing. Presently the Defense 
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO) , under the 
authority, direction, amd control of the Assistant Secretary of 


Defense (International Security Affairs) , is tasked to serve as the 
Department of Defense "focal point" for all POW/MIA matters. We 
are aware that a few family members have received assistance from 
this office. We are also aware that there are committed 
individuals who have worked in this office In the past, and some 
who are there today. However, those few personnel who are assigned 
to work on the issue of the more than 8,000 Korean War unaccounted 
for must attempt to function within a bureaucratic and political 
office which according to an inspector general's report still has 
not clearly defined its goals and objectives on this issue. One 
officer at DPMO recently defined his job as "shuffling papers." 
Another high ranking official with the US/Russian Task Force for 
years has called family members to beg for more personnel and more 
money, at the same time his office spends thousands of dollars 
paying for limos, expensive hotels, picnics and tours for Russian 
members of the Joint Commission. 

At great tax payer expense DPMO has produced few tangible 
results for Korean War missing. Now at a critical time in our 
history, when it appears joint recovery teams might be allowed into 
North Korea, we must have our "house in order" before we move 
forward with the North Korezms. DPMO has had time, personnel, and 
plenty of money to be prepared, all to no avail. It is time to try 
a more productive and efficient approach. Our Association believes 
the Congress of the United States can do a service to Korean War 
missing, their families, and the American tax paying public by 
defunding DPMO for Koream War accounting. We propose that Congress 
use only half what DPMO states they spend on Korean War accounting, 
approximately $4.5 million omnually and fund am independent, 
private entity capable of producing results for Korean War missing 
and their families. At this time I submit a copy of our 
privatization proposal to the committee and ask that it be included 
in the public record of these hearings. Briefly, I will address 
parts of the proposal . 

The objective of a private sector Korean War POW/MIA research 
entity (PSRE) is to provide a fullest possible accounting for the 
POW/MIAs and answers to the family members. 

The family members define Accoxinting for the Missing in four 
parts : 

1. Discovery of live American Missing Service Personnel 

2 . Recovery of remains 

3 . Identification of remains 

4 . Provide the families with all the information 

"Let us know what happened" 

The key to achieving these goals well planned, methodical 
RESEARCH, in the United States and in foreign archives. As the Air 
Force Casualty Office so aptly phrased it "the data base. . . .on the 
missing from the Koreoui War... is grossly incomplete." 

In order to Discover if any American Missing Service Personnel 
are still alive, case files would have to be built, leads would 
have to be followed, and the files would have to be analyzed to 
develop new leads. Waiting for information to "fall out of the 


blue" is not research. Research is aggressively planned, 
methodical, proactive WORK. 

It may sound extraordinarily simple to build case files. It 
would seem only common sense to have our facts in hand before 
pursuing information from North Korea, Russia or China, but true 
case files for the Korean War missing have never been accumulated 
by any department of the federal government . DPMO seems to be 
overwhelmed by the task. It is an archival challenge but not an 
impossible one for professionals in the field. Existing records 
are scattered across the U.S. in various facilities, the majority 
of which have never been declassified. Intelligence collected at 
the time and over the next decades by the CIA, NSA, DIA, DoD and 
others was never analyzed and matched with the appropriate missing 
service person. This indicates to the families the Department of 
Defense never had a true intent to recover those left behind. 
Still, many of the families have built case files themselves in 
spite of our government's obfuscation. We have followed leads and 
analyzed what information we could gather in order to develop new 
leads, but we are limited by access to documents which are still 
classified and the funds required to find them. The assistance we 
have gotten came not from DoD, they impeded our progress. We have 
received invaluable assistance and been provided concrete results 
from private researchers, scholars and archivists. 

The recovery of remains not only requires research efforts but 
obviously access to the territory of loss . Under the heading of 
Search and Rescue Attempts, too many of the case status cards of 
the '50's say "none, territory held by hostel forces". Since the 
end of the cold war, we are beginning to get access to these 
territories. With this access, it is undeniably critical to use 
qualified personnel in recovery operations and minimize acceptance 
of curated remains in order to maximize identification 
probabilities . It is imperative to use our own archival records 
and repatriated POW eyewitness accounts to prioritize our recovery 
efforts . 

The identification of remains requires, for the majority of 
cases, the use of the most modem technology available; 
mitochondrial DNA. In order to use this technology, a reference 
sample must be collected from the maternal relatives of the missing 
person. Families knowledgeable of the process have already 
deposited reference samples with AFDIL but the majority of families 
would have to be located and informed in order to build a true data 
base. Approximately 866 unidentified remains are interred at the 
Punch Bowl in Hawaii, half of which were recovered by our own 
Graves Registration Service during and shortly after the war. 
The families want these remains identified first. 

The families want the live men located and all the information 
as to what happened to the missing. It has become painfully 
apparent that the Department of Defense is not the entity that will 
accomplish this task. We are denied access to documents, access to 
eye witness testimony, access to live sighting reports, and access 
to foreign intelligence and witness reports. DoD serves political 


purposes of governmental bodies and lacks the proactive intent and 
motivation to put the accounting for the POW/MIA first. in a 
formal finding in 1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of 
Defense was not capable and would not -have the capability to do the 
type of research required to resolve Korean War and Cold War 
POW/MIA issues. WE AGREE WHOLE HEARTEDLY. We need an open 
organization whose activities are held accountable by the consumers 
it is designed to serve. 

In closing I wish to refute a statement used by the Department of 
Defense and its many agencies in reference to giving information to 
the families: "We don't want to give the families 'false hope'." 
For over 40 years, the real 'false hope' the families have had is 
that the government and the Department of Defense would keep the 
promises made to these missing men and their families. 


Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. 

One of several questions, then we will go to Mr. Dumas. Carol 
Hrdlicka is in the room. They have got to appreciate this. When I 
think about Vietnam and Korea, I just reflected on 1954. Is your 
grandmother in heaven? Still alive. She has not gone to heaven. 
Here is your grandmother demonstrating in the Senate in 1954. 
David Hrdlicka and I are in pilot training. He is shot down in 
1965. So you are 11 years apart there, your grandmother's dem- 

But Hrdlicka is 1975, 1985, 1995— it is 31 years ago. So 
Herdlijka and Wilson are closer than you would think, talking 
about two wars that we just so quickly started going through this 
pathetic dance again. 

So when you say to me, and Carol Hrdlicka, who has gone 
through so much redacted material and false material in her hus- 
band's file, trying to get rid of another case using his — not even his 
general area of his shoot-down — ^to have somebody tell you, "Well, 
we cannot release these documents to you," it is infuriating to a Vi- 
etnamese-era family who say, "Good Gk)d, we are talking about 
something 30 years ago. Who are you keeping this secret from ex- 
cept me, and you have already given them all the top secret infor- 
mation, asking them to divulge information." So you are only keep- 
ing it from those who have a loved one's interest here. 

To add another 11 years to it or excuse me. Your dad's shoot- 
down was 1952, right? 

Ms. DUNTON. Fifty-one. 

Mr. DORNAN. Fifty-one, so you add another 14 years to it. Who 
told you that they cannot release something classified to you? 
Where did they say, "No, this is classified. We cannot give it to 

Ms. DuNTON. They have classified — ^which time? I am stunned. 
Which area? Every place we have been. The National Archives has 
classified documents. The Air Force — what is the name of that 
place — Montgomery, AL, the Air Force Historical Society, rooms 
full of classified documents. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Do you remember when we talked about the Air 
Force material? 

Let me ask Dino Carluccio a question. Did you guys ever get ac- 
cess to any of the Air Force classified material? 

Mr. Carluccio. The law that we wrote requires all this stuff to 
be declassified by this past January, so they are in violation of the 

Mr. DoRNAN. Everybody is already in violation of the law. 

Ms. DuNTON. Yes. Yes. 


Mr. DoRNAN. Let me ask Mr. Cole a question out of sequence. 
Have you done some archival research in Great Britain? 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Do they not have a statute of limitation on all of 
their secret information? For example, I remember in Time maga- 
zine a few years ago it was divulged, British war plans for a war 
with the United States. It was not 1820, following up the War of 
1812 to 1814. It was the 1920's. They were anticipating a possibil- 
ity, if we got in a war with the United States, here is what we 


would do and how many battleships did we have to their emerging 
naval strength again, the naval treaty signed here in Washington 
in 1922. So we all had a good laugh, because we had fought World 
War II together and they had been at our side in Korea and then 

^^ry^^l^^"^' *^®^^ ^^^P^ ^^® ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ trading with the enemy. 

Do they not have something like 25 or 30 years where they say, 
OK, time limitation. No sensitivity is involved. Take it 

Mr. Cole. No. 

Mr. DORNAN. They do not? 

Mr. Cole. No. 

Mr. DORNAN. They will lock things up forever, too*? 

Mr. Cole. The British have the Official Secrets Act. I find that 
in my experience— I was just jotting down here how many foreign 
countries I have either done archive research or organized research 
projects and it is about seven or eight. The British are the most 

Mr. DoRNAN. The most restrictive? 

Mr. Cole. Yes, the most secretive. 

Mr. DORNAN. Who is the least? Are we the least secretive? 

Mr. Cole. By far and away, the most open, and it is in large 
measure through the Freedom of Information Act, which is unique, 
and It is also to the kind of legislation you are just discussing be- 
cause It gives private researchers the tools to pry information out 
of the archives. 

For example, and I do not want to get into too much detail here 
but there was a change in the Freedom of Information Act, and I 
cannot put a date on it right now. It was like 2 or 3 years ago 
somethmg like that. Prior to that, if I went to the archives and 
said, I would like to have this document declassified, the presump- 
tion was against me. I had to prove that I needed this document 
for some legitimate purpose. 

It has now been turned around. This is because of legislation. 
The presumption is, it should be declassified and it is up to the 
originating agency to state why it should not be. So this has made 
things much easier for researchers. 

So no matter how bad things are here, believe me, it is far worse 
everywhere else, in my experience. 

Mr. DoRNAN. But when all the Presidents from this period are 
dead, Nixon, Truman, Roosevelt, Ike, I do not understand what 
possible rationale, except that we still have a hostile relationship 
with North Korea and we still have U-2's flying in the area, which 
has been in the open press. We still have serious intelligence gath- 
ering because of their lurch toward nuclear capability. We are put- 
ting money in there for light reactors to try and get them to be a 
decent nation. 

I still do not understand why with particular combat intelligence 
there is any— can you think, Mr. Cole, of a rationale for holding 
back any combat stories or afteraction reports from 1950, 1951 
1952, and 1953? 

Mr. Cole. I do not have to think of them. They exist. I have an 
opinion on these things. 
Mr. DoRNAN. Please. 

Mr. Cole. By and large, you will find two methodological prob- 
lems. I can think of two concrete examples. One is looking for the 


debriefs of Air Force POWs from Korea. No one has found those. 
There are Hke 16 fragments of the several hundred floating around. 
One of the potential problems that I would have if I went to the 
archives is that this would be considered information of a personal 
nature and I would be denied access. Whether or not this informa- 
tion was actually personal is another matter. I would have to ap- 
peal it. It would take years to dig it out. 

Actually, I can think of three things. The second thing is it is 
rather routine to be denied access to material on the grounds of 
sources and methods, and you cannot look at the material to make 
a determination. So even if you have this blanket declassification 
decree signed by the President, then there are still exemptions to 
it, sources and methods. 

The third thing is that, as you know from your own experience, 
it is not a simple thing to get a document declassified unless it has 
already been reviewed. They call it available for research, is what 
the National Archives call it. 

Mr. DORNAN. What do they call it? 

Mr. Cole. They call it available for research. 

Mr. DORNAN. Available for research. 

Mr. Cole. Documents are still classified, but you just put a de- 
classification strip on the photocopy machine and that is how you 
declassify it. 

Now, documents that are not available for research but are 
stored at the archives, if I want to get access to them, then it is 
the originating agency that has to review these. So if it is — take 
the example of the Air Force POW debriefs. Assume, for the mo- 
ment, that we actually do find them and that the office that pre- 
pared them no longer exists. Then you have to find somebody in 
the Air Force structure who has now taken over a role of a defunct 
office and get them to review those documents to see if they are 
available for research. Usually, the answer you get back when you 
file such a request is, take a number, particularly with the CIA. 

The CIA is my favorite example, and I have a zillion stories 
about them. If you filed a FOIA request with the CIA, they are 
very efficient in sending you the answers and so forth to your let- 
ters, but it usually says that you are number 437, or 1,200, in your 

Ms. DUNTON. Twelve-hundred-and-sixty-five. I have 1,265. 

Mr. Cole. The record for me — I keep track of these things just 
out of, I guess, morbid curiosity — is nearly 4 years and 6 months 
I waited for a document to be declassified. It was an NSC docu- 
ment. So there is no sense of urgency. And also, I have no recourse 
to the methodology that would allow these documents to be re- 
viewed more quicMy. 

But I have to note, full stop, these procedures exist in the United 
States. We can do these things here. But they do not exist else- 

Mr. DoRNAN. But in the butcher shop, if you take a number, or 
Starbucks coffee, somebody is going down the numbers. How do we 
know that somebody is assiduously going down a list of 1,266 peo- 
ple and saying, well, he does not exist an3rmore. He graduated and 
changed, went into medicine. He is not writing this thesis paper. 
She does not need this. She passed away. Who is going down the 


list that you suddenly get a call 5 years later that says, "By the 
way, you are 1,266. Your number just came up." 

Mr. Cole. Two things. Well, you do not get a call, you just get 
the documents in the mail, for example. 

Ms. DuNTON. Or a denial. 

Mr. Cole. Or a denial. You wait 5 years and you get a denial. 

But there are two things that I should point out here. One is, if 
you look at the structure of the State Department where they do 
the declassification reviews, within the State Department, that of- 
fice is called the elephant's graveyard. It is really understaffed. If 
you look at the computers they use, just to put the logo of the State 
Department on a document when they are reviewing it, their com- 
puters are so slow that they press the function and go get a cup 
of coffee. 

The second thing is, I received one time in my experience with 
the FOIA system a letter from the CIA— this is after a couple of 
years— saying, "Do you still want these documents? If we do not 
hear from you in 30 days, we are going to flush your request from 
the system." 

But once again, full stop. In my experience with the FOIA, it is 
a very effective system but it is very, very slow, just because of the 
magnitude of requests, I suppose. But there are ways you could ad- 
dress that, in my personal opinion, but they would require some 

Mr. DORNAN. But occasionally you see books written and stories 
written, so somebody does get through the FOIA process and gets 
a story written. 

Mr. Cole. A lot of times, historical material is, as it is called, 
available for research, boxes and boxes of material that you have 

Mr. DoRNAN. This is a learning process for me, so let me press 
on in kindness to everybody. Mr. Dumas? 


Mr. Dumas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Is this your younger or older brother, Bob? 

Mr. Dumas. This is my younger brother. I had five brothers on 
the front line at one time. 

Mr. DORNAN. In Korea? 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, in Korea, myself and four other brothers. You 
are only supposed to have two. 

Mr. DORNAN. Any sisters who were nurses? 

Mr. Dumas. No. I have one sister, but she was not in the service. 
This is my 46th year. I started in 1950. I served two tours of duty 
in Korea. 

Mr. DORNAN. Two tours? 

Mr. Dumas. Two tours. 

Mr. DoRNAN. What number brother are you of the five in age? 

Mr. Dumas. Number two. 

Mr. DORNAN. Number two. What was your older brother doing? 

Mr. Dumas. My older brother was in Korea in the 3rd Division. 

Mr. DORNAN. And which is the brother who is missing? 


Mr. Dumas. That is Roger. He was in the 24th Division, Com- 
pany C. 

Mr. DORNAN. Overrun in 

Mr. Dumas. Overrun by the Chinese. 

Mr. DORNAN. In November? 

Mr. Dumas. November 4, 1950. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Go ahead with your statement. 

Mr. Dumas. I think the statement I gave to the committee is in 
front of you. 

Mr. DORNAN. I have it right in front of me here. 

Mr. Dumas. I will try to condense 46 years in a few minutes, 
which is hard for me to do. Anyway, in 1953, when the conflict 
ended, he was still living. He was ready to be released and he was 
getting on a truck to go home and a guard took him off with a bay- 
onet and marched him up a hill. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Other soldiers witnessed this? 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. There is one in California right now, Bobby 
Caruth in Redding, CA. 

Mr. DORNAN. This is why Al Santoli wanted me to have you on 
the panel. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. He lives in Redding, CA, Bobby Caruth. He just 
had a stroke about 3 months ago. He is doing well. 

Mr. DoRNAN. How old are you, Mr. Dumas? 

Mr. Dumas. I am 66. 

Mr. DORNAN. Are any of your other three brothers alive? Let us 

Mr. Dumas. No, they are all dead but one, one more. 

So anyway, he did not get released in 1953, and Colonel Foster 
was right when he said there were many, many American POW's 
that were not released on that day in August 1953 and again in 
September 1953. But he was seen alive again in 1956 and 1957 by 
an ex-POW from Seattle, WA, by the name of Walter Enbom, who 
the Government said was never a prisoner of war at all, but he was 
in camp number five with my brother from 1950 to 1953. 

He was released in 1953 and reentered the Air Force in 1956 and 
got another tour of duty in Korea. They sent him back to Korea in- 
stead of sending him to Europe. They sent him to Korea. On a pa- 
trol one night on the DMZ line, the 38th Parallel, he was captured 
with six other men in a patrol. Unbeknownst to the North Koreans, 
they forgot about him 3 years earlier and took him back to 
Pyongyang and he was put in a cellblock which was made out of 
stone. The whole building was made out of stone. While he was 
there, he saw my brother and 25 other American POW's. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Pause right there. Camp five. Al Santoli has shown 
me some pictures of these huge camps along the — was camp five 
up near the Yalu? 

Mr. Dumas. That is on the Yalu river. 

Mr. DoRNAN. And it is rolling hills 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. You have a hill on the right-hand side that 
comes down into an inlet. 

Mr. DoRNAN. So now his experience is totally different. He is in 
a block-type prison in Pyongyang. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. He is taken right to Pyongyang, the capital. 


Mr. DORNAN. Let me just jump ahead. He has always been dis- 
credited. The Government has always said 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, they have always discredited him. I was in Fed- 
eral Court in 1982 to change my brother's status from missing pre- 
sumed dead to prisoner of war and at that time this was brought 
into Federal Court. But the U.S. attorney for the Government said 
that this man was not a POW. 

Mr. DORNAN. In 1956? 

Mr. Dumas. No, in 1982, 1982. 

Mr. DORNAN. No, no. I mean, did they say he was a prisoner in 
1950 to 1953 but he was never recaptured? 

Mr. Dumas. He was in the Air Force from 1956 to 1957 but they 
said he was never recaptured. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. Right. But they acknowledged he was a pris- 
oner with your brother the first go-around? 

Mr. Dumas. No, they will not acknowledge he was a prisoner 
even in 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953, but I have his release list from 
the State of Washington, in alphabetical order. He is on a release 
list from 1953 as a prisoner of war from the State of Washington. 
I have all the States. 

Mr. DORNAN. Did he ever polygraph? 

Mr. Dumas. No, no. He gave me a sworn statement, notarized, 
though, from the State of Washington. I also have him testifying 
at the VA in Seattle, WA, for a friend of his that was also in the 
camp with my brother and he gave a statement to the Government. 
He testified that he was bayoneted by a Chinese guy in the but- 
tocks and the VA in Washington took his testimony as a POW, a 
prisoner of war, so I have a DD-214 form that does not say he was 
a prisoner. It just says he was in from 1956 to 1957 and he was 
released on a general discharge. That is the way they did things 
back in those days, give them a general discharge. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. But anyway, he is still in Seattle, WA. He called me 
about 7 years ago and told me he could not talk to me anymore, 
that he works for the Commerce Department, which is a Federal 
job, and that they were putting pressure on him and he could not 
talk to me no more. That was the last time I spoke with him. That 
was in 1956 and 1957. 

Mr. DORNAN. When he said he was captured on this patrol — ^you 
see, this story is so compelling. The cynical side of this optimist 
says, it cannot be true. This is a Walter Mitty story, that this pris- 
oner is now fantasizing and trying to get back into the swim of 
things and he is picking out a prisoner from the prior imprison- 
ment, your brother, and he is spinning an outrageous tale. 

I had a friend during that period who, we teased him at a drive- 
in. He lifted up his shirt — he was a few years older than I — and 
says, here is where I was wounded in Korea, and it was a recent 
appendix operation and he had never left basic training. He was 
kicked out. So some people will, tragically, fantasize about things. 

If he was captured in a patrol and he was Air Force, Air Force 
bases are usually back from the DMZ or the armistice line. Other 
people were captured with him and then they were all released at 
some point? 


Mr. Dumas. Yes, just like 1968. Eleven months after your cap- 
ture, after the war, you are released by the North Koreans. Do not 
forget. Chairman Dornan, since 1953 to 1996, we have had 1,100 
men captured on the 38th Parallel. 

Mr. Dornan. That is right, and all released 

Mr. Dumas. And all released except a few, one or two back and 

Mr. Dornan. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. A lot of people do not know this in this country, but 
at that time, from 

Mr. Dornan. Like the recent helicopter pilot, the Kiowa pilot. 

Mr. Dumas. Right. From 1953 into the 1960s, there was no fence 
along the 38th Parallel, and if you happened to walk into North 
Korean territory, you were captured, and if they walked into South 
Korean territory, they were captured. This went back and forth for 
many years until they put that demarcation line fence up later on 
in years. 

Mr. Dornan. How many people were captured with him the sec- 
ond time when he was Air Force? 

Mr. Dumas. Six, besides him. 

Mr. Dornan. And all six were released? 

Mr. Dumas. All seven, with him. 

Mr. Dornan. Seven. 

Mr. Dumas. It was seven with him. 

Mr. Dornan. Have you contacted any of the others? 

Mr. Dumas. The only one I got was him. Major Kelly, the Penta- 
gon said they were looking for a Major Kelly for years and they 
never could find him. There was a Sergeant Hill that was also in 
that patrol from Massachusetts. The Government would not give 
me their address, would not give me nothing on these people. We 
could not get nothing from them. Everything was classified. 

Mr. Dornan. C-SPAN cameras grind at certain hearings around 
here and people will look at them. There are junkies that look at 
everjrthing. It is their taxpayer money being spent in most cases. 
But a lot of things can go on and be boring and people will just 
tune out. I do not think that this type of a story is an3rthing short 
of fascinating to most Americans, and if there were a C-SPAN 
camera grinding away and it was on C-SPAN I or II, somebody 
would look and say, my God, I was one of those six guys. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, that is what I mean. 

Mr. Dornan. Seven guys. 

Mr. Dumas. They showed up. 

Mr. Dornan. And I am going to corroborate this. It is hard to 
get these stories out. It is not grist for the mills of People magazine 
and things like that, because that is all the glitterati and the young 
set. It is too bad you had to fight this struggle alone. 

Continue with the story. So up to the point of 1982, you tried to 
sue the Government. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. Before I get to that, he had given a statement, 
a sworn statement. He had it notarized in Seattle, WA. On the 
statement, he names 15 ex-POW's that were in the camp with him 
the first time he was a prisoner of war, when the Government said 
he was not a POW. He names 15 prisoners that were with him in 
the camp. 


Mr. DORNAN. See, if we had a proper list of the 8,000, we could 
take those names, computer check him, and in today's state of the 

Mr. Dumas. I got the list. 

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. It spits out the answer in seconds. 

Mr. Dumas. I got the list. 

Mr. DoRNAN. You did? 

Mr. Dumas. I got the list of 8,000, 8,200. 

Mr. DoRNAN. So do they 

Mr. Dumas. And they are all on the list. 

Mr. DoRNAN. And they are all on the list? 

Mr. Dumas. Every one of them is on the list. All the guys he 
named in that statement is on that list. Sonny Preston — Sonny 
Preston knew my brother. He is on that list. 

Mr. DORNAN. These are all people I saw alive. 

Mr. Dumas. All the people that he was in the camp with, the 
prison camp. All these people. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. Now if you want to jump ahead a little bit to 

Mr. Dornan. No, let me go back one second. Did anybody specu- 
late why your brother was taken off at bayonet point? 

Mr. Dumas. The only one who speculated was Bobby Caruth 
from Redding, CA, that was with him. 

Mr. Dornan. What would he say he thought they did it for? 

Mr. Dumas. What was that again? 

Mr. Dornan. Why did he think they singled out your brother? 

Mr. Dumas. All he said to him, "Where are you going?" and he 
put his hands in the air and says, "I do not know." That was the 
last time he talked to him. That was in August of 1953. 

Mr. Dornan. Let me tell the family members what Mr. Cole sug- 
gested I do. Al Santoli and I a few weeks ago went up to the Na- 
tional Archives branch one and only, the National Archives where 
our Constitution and Declaration of Independence is, right over 
here across from the National Museum of Art, and we went up to 
Maryland, and it is a fantastic facility. Mr. Cole gave us a sample 
of films to ask for to get — I could not spend the hours of laborious 
hard work that he did researching. He wanted us to get a flavor. 
The researchers up there, partly because of your introduction, were 
most friendly and accommodating, as a matter of fact, into helping 
all of you family members. 

We go up at Hollywood state-of-the-art moviolas — I used to do 
this for a while. I lasted all of 3 days, it was so horrible with white 
gloves, taking down the edge numbers on editing film. I flashed on 
that. We started looking through stuff and we are looking at film 
exactly in the period your brother was captured and you are in 
combat with your other brothers. We see this film, that I can see 
it vividly. There was even a slight older tint to the film, but very 
clear, very good film, and they have three copies of each, one 
stashed away, one kept here. I mean, we are a rich country. By 
God, we could solve this because we do do things right in an archi- 
val sense. It is getting access to it. 

They are in Pyongyang. There is no bomb damage. The people 
are not even hostile. They are more curious. We are both making 


the same observations without even telHng one another. And as I 
have suffered with Vietnam photographs like the HrdHcka picture, 
it is so obviously Hrdlicka it is ridiculous, but it is grainy, it is in 
the rain. The guy has a poncho on. He has a bayonet at his back. 
But here are moving pictures, so I hit the pause button and I say, 
"Al, here is what we suffer with in Vietnam. Eight families will 
identify this person's face that is blocked by the guy's head in front 
of him." 

But we are not dealing with stills. I hit the button. We are deal- 
ing with motion pictures. He is coming at me and he is turning and 
I could identify this guy 100 times over, particularly if you gave me 
a list of my unit, jogged my memory on the names. That is Bill, 
that is Fred, that is Mike, that is Skip, and bingo, you go through 

So I am looking at this and then we start to hear prisoner testi- 
mony before the war is over, and I am starting to flash back on 
prisoner exchanges, because, after all, the war came to a screeching 
halt. MacArthur is fired in April. I just turned 18 that month. I am 
anxious to go in, an adventuresome-type young man. My dad got 
three wound chevrons and gassed in World War I. My brothers, 
older, younger, the same way. I love brother stories. "Beau Geste" 
was our favorite movie, three brothers. 

So I look at this film and I say, this guy is in 1951, a felt thing 
on a table. He is in Japan somewhere, a typical young high school 
dropout or a not well-educated guy, but very forthcoming, and he 
tells the story of a lieutenant singled out, like your brother, taken 
to the top of a hill, and they told him, "America is that way. Run. 
Run for it," and they start laughing. He has his hands up and he 
says, "No." They said, "Run." "No." So they shoot him eight times 
on the spot and kill him and dump him in a grave that they just 
had him dig. 

He said, "We went up on the hill the next day and they had not 
even covered his body. We buried other guys who died in the 
camp." And he gave this lieutenant's name. This is all in the ar- 
chives that Mr. Cole has been through, extensive, and I said, Al, 
this is one depressing operation. I have the flavor here. I know 
what is available here. And then Al says, and what about the Air 
Force records? What about this? What about that? 

So you do not need a reason why they would single out somebody 
like your brother with a bayonet. This is the tragedy of POWs. It 
brings out sadism in the guards. It brings out this god-like power 
of arbitrariness. You see it in the movie "Schindler's List". He looks 
at the little boy, puts his fingers on the window and says, 'Tou 
want merciful? You can do anything you want." He picks up his 
rifle and goes right down and shoots the top of the little boy's head 
off out in the yard when the little boy thought he was home free. 

Mr. Dumas. For no reason at all. 

Mr, DORNAN. No reason at all, just because he is in that god-like 
role. So you tell a story like this and while you are telling it, I am 
flashing on these young guys being debriefed in Japan and where 
all of these debriefings are. So I said to Al, and I am going to ask 
Mr. Cole this in a minute, I said, I wonder if after the war was 
over, using a modicum of imagination, we said, let us assemble all 
the sergeants and senior corporals of the 24th Infantry Division, 


coin assist, pay their way to come to wherever their home base is, 
and go into an auditorium and run all these films. 

I remember having gang officer calls in the auditorium with a 
World War II building at George Air Force Base and seeing the 
first film available on the F-105 Thunderchief and everybody flying 
F-lOO's is going, "Whoa, it keeps getting better. I want to fly this 
monster." We had Israeli officers come and tell us of their air bat- 
tles and everything. This would have been the same period, 1955, 
1956. I am flashing on something I actually did. Call in the whole 
unit. We are going to have a mass gang showing of all of these 
films. Here are all the rosters of the order of battle 6 years ago and 
we want to identify every person here, who is home and who is not. 

I said, Al, do you think they did that? No, probably not. Life 
marches on. This is the failure of this country to bring its wounded, 
and a prisoner is always psychologically wounded, back from the 
battlefield, and that is why Vietnam sticks in my craw because I 
tracked it all during the war as a journalist and a reserve officer 
with friends in captivity and half did not come back. Saying in Ha- 
waii, you are going to do it right this time, right? We have comput- 
ers. We have a data base and everything, and they did everything 
just as screwed up as in Korea. 

Mr. Dumas. Exactly what you are talking about are these photo- 
graphs, exactly what you are saying. 
Mr. DORNAN. Are these the ones I already saw, Al? 
Mr. Dumas. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Yes, I saw them. Yes. 

Mr. Dumas. These men never came out, and we have four identi- 
fications right now on this picture. It is my brother in the right- 
hand corner, Mr. Weldon East, who the Ciovemment said was 
never a prisoner of war, that he did not send a letter to Senator 
Kerrey, but the FBI in Arkansas had his handwriting analyzed. It 

is the same handwriting that they received in 1992 from him 

Mr. Dornan. So now he gets the POW medal. 
Mr. Dumas. No, he gets nothing. They will not recognize it. 
Mr. Dornan. They are still denying it? 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. They are not going to tell him he is a POW. 
Weldon East is the fellow that sent a letter from North Korea that 
says, I am sick. I was bom in Spardra, AR. I am still a prisoner 
in North Korea and I want to come home. This is 1992. John 
Kerrey had that letter in his possession for a month and a half be- 
fore he turned it over to the family in Arkansas. When he turned 
it over to the family in Arkansas, the FBI in Washington said it 
was a hoax. 
Mr. Dornan. Did you track this case, Dino? 
Mr. Carluccio. I have some recollection on it. 
Mr. Dumas. I am only saying what the family told me what they 
did with the FBI in Arkansas. His sister, who lives in Arkansas 
with her husband, received a letter from him in 1950 before he 
went overseas. They analyzed his handwriting, the FBI in Arkan- 
sas, with the letter that he sent and it is the same handwriting. 
But the Grovemment said he was never a prisoner — or he was a 
prisoner of war. He was captured in 1951. But this was not from 
him, this was a hoax. 


Mr. DORNAN. In the Defense Missing Persons Office, is anybody 
going back over the Korean photographs, imagery, Mr, Cole, any- 
body trying to do what we never did in the first place, a thorough 
photographic scan of every face? At NPIC down here in the old 
Navy Yard, they have technologies and skills they did not have 
after Korea. 

Mr. Cole. First off, I do not know what DPMO does. I am not 
employed by them and they do not share their methodology or in- 
sights with me. 

I do know what happened to the materials that I have uncovered, 
and I can give you two examples. In one of the archive research 
projects that I undertook for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
in Ukraine, we found a whole bunch of Korea war photographs. It 
turns out that the Tass photographers that were running around 
North Korea were actually working for the KGB, which is no sur- 
prise. These photographs were found in the KGB archives in Kiev. 

I also found a bunch of photographs from Vietnam, as well, and 
these photographs were of American POWs, and also some rather 
graphic and gruesome photographs of dead Americans that were 
photographed by the Tass photographers. 

I turned those over to DPMO, and then a fellow by the name of 
Larry Gioladan wanted to get some photographs of POWs to use 
for his book, "Last Seen Alive," and one of the photographs that I 
uncovered in Kiev is on the cover of his book. Larry, who is now 
a foreign correspondent somewhere, so he told me this directly — he 
is in Sarajevo. 

Mr. DORNAN. Sarajevo? 

Mr. Cole. He told me when he asked for these photographs from 
DPMO, he got them and he said to them, "Where did you get 
these?" He knew they were from me because I showed him the pho- 
tocopies that I kept. And their answer was, "We do not know. We 
do not know where we got these." 

So I think, in my personal opinion, I do not think anything was 
done with those photographs. I think one photograph from Viet- 
nam, they said some cryptic comment to me, like, "This was useful 
in the resolution of a Vietnam case." 

Mr. DoRNAN. Pat? 

Ms. DUNTON. I know what happened to those photographs. I was 
at a camp two reunion in San Aiitonio, TX. DPMO was there. They 
had the photographs. They presented it to these ex-POWs and one 
photograph was identified. I was standing right there when the 
man identified it. As it turns out, that is the photograph that is 
on the cover of the book you just said. The man is still alive. He 
lives in South Texas. I told Larry Gioladan that and Gioladan said, 
"No, they told me none of these people were identified," and I was 
standing right there when DPMO had this particular picture iden- 
tified, long before they gave it to Larry Gioladan. 

Mr. Cole. The second part of my answer involves — now, this is 
still photographs we discussed — ^the motion pictures. For a rea- 
son — I do a lot of different projects and I do historical research for 
a number of organizations. It is kind of my business. I had reason 
to revisit the Korea war collection, and in the process of going 
through some documents from the Korea war crimes section of a 
judge advocate general in Korea, they are preparing war crimes 


trial files in case we ever got our hands on these people who mur- 
dered our servicemen once they were captured — this is in textual 
records now, documents — I found two reels of film. 

That is not supposed to happen. There is a whole section at the 
Archives, the Motion Picture Branch. This set the archivist into 
sort of a dither because the textual people did not know what to 
do with the reel of film, and it was the original. You had not gone 
there. There has to be a so-called reference copy. You are not sup- 
posed to look at the original. 

Before we figured out that this was the so-called archive copy, we 
looked at one, and it was a film of an atrocity site, just a slow com- 
bat camera footage of panning down this terrible scene. Well, there 
are two reels of this. That told me two things. 

DPMO has said, they have told your office in writing and they 
have told me that they looked through those textual records and 
have analyzed them. They say they have photocopied every piece 
of paper that is in that archive group, RGr-153. Whoever did it 
overlooked two reels of film, and this is very unusual. 

Mr. DORNAN. It seems highly unlikely. 

Mr. Cole. So whoever did it — now, they cannot turn around and 
say, oh, yes, we saw that, because it is archive copies. They could 
not have seen it. So whoever does this research for them — I used 
to be a university professor, so I feel comfortable grading people — 
I would write at the top of this, "Come see me in my office." 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Cole. Then in the Motion Picture Archives at College Park, 
I have found some of the films that you saw, and what you are re- 
ferring to, where it shows these POWs, is actually captured enemy 

Mr. DORNAN. That is right. 

Mr. Cole. We do not know who made the film, if it was Russians 
or Chinese or Koreans. We just know we captured it. We do not 
know the providence of those films. It is just impossible to deter- 
mine right now, in other words, where they came from, if they were 
just kept by the Air Force or if they were kept by the Army or 
whatever. They have been sitting somewhere for a very long time. 
In my estimation, since they were captured enemy films, they were 
treated as an intelligence product and they probably just sat in a 
vault somewhere. 

The second thing about the Motion Picture Archives in this con- 
text is the so-called 293 files, which are the basic documents for 
unrepatriated servicemen, all MIA's and POWs. It has an IBM 
card — many of the family members have seen this — stapled in the 
back of the casualty jacket. There are 17 reels of film that show 
the Kukura facility in Japan in 1952 in operation that shows the 
bodies coming in the doors 

Mr. DoRNAN. We saw that. 

Mr. Cole. It shows every step of the process, showing the files, 
showing the guys doing the skeletal charts, showing — and also with 
the identities of the individuals that they are working on. 

There are two reels of film that are only in the archive version. 
I requested to have reference copies made. That tells me, as a re- 
searcher — ^you know, all researchers are very curious at what other 


researchers are doing, but you have to be sort of clever in finding 

Mr. DORNAN. Including the DPMO calling down there and say- 
ing, what did Congressman Dornan look at? What did he want to 
see? What is Al Santoli looking at? I do not want to play these 
games. Call me and ask me what I looked at. 

Mr. Cole. Exactly. That is, excuse me, sleazy. 

Mr. Dornan. Yes. 

Mr. Cole. You do not go snooping around another researcher's 
stuff unless you come up and ask them directly. You do not go ask 
the Archivist, what is that guy doing? 

My point here is that there are actually 19 reels of film, 2 that 
exist in the pristine archive version. I had requested those to be 
made into reference copies. That tells me that nobody has looked 
at them. Either they had not looked at it before, or if they had, 
they were so incompetent that they did not ask for the last two 
reels of film. 

Once again, full stop, what does this tell you about the people 
who are looking into the Korean war evidence that exists in the ar- 
chives? They go through boxes of documents and ignore films. They 
do not even look at films. And I have my own views on this, and 
I am sorry to monopolize it, but it raises profound questions about 
the competence of the people who are allegedly doing research. 

Mr. Dornan. Pat's term comes back to mind. "I shove papers 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. Dornan. That is not someone driven toward an objective the 
way you would be as a researcher. 

Let me come back to you. It was very valuable to have you come 
into the flow at that point. 

Mr. Cole. I am sorry I was so long. 

Mr. Dornan. Do you have anjrthing else to say, Bob, and then 
I will go to Ms. Mandra. 

Mr. Dumas. No, the only thing before Irene's speech is this. 
These photographs were given to the Defense Department over a 
year ago and they blew these up to the size that we have here, and 
the Defense Department told me that these were very important 
because they never saw anything like this. These are men that 
never were released. Now, we are not talking about 150 men here. 
We are talking maybe 3,000 or 4,000. 

Mr. Dornan. Now wait a minute. They told you nobody in that 
picture has ever been released? 

Mr. Dumas. According to what I was told by the guy that 
brought it out, the fellow that brought it out in 1953. He gave it 
to the AP in 1978. The Associated Press in Washington gave it to 
me, and he said he snuck it out in the shoe, in the bottom of a 
shoe, the film, because the AP photographer had died in the camp 
and he took the film, put it in his shoe, and when he was released 
in 1953 took it with him. But he did not have it developed until 
1978, when he read about me in an AP story. Then he developed 
the film, and he did it through photographs, and he gave them to 
AP in Washington. He told them that these men were never re- 
leased. None of these men came out. 

Mr. Dornan. Circa 1978, he said that? 


Mr. Dumas. Yes, and then I gave these to the Defense Depart- 

Mr. DORNAN. Last year? 

Mr. Dumas. A little over a year ago. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. And I said to Marty Wisda, I believe he is Colonel 
Wisda, I said, "Colonel Wisda, it looks Uke these men have never 
been released." He said, "Well, I will have them analyzed at the 
Pentagon. We will blow them up and I will give them back to you." 
I did not give him the originals but just a copy. 

Mr. DORNAN. And he blew them up and gave them back to you. 

Mr. Dumas. He gave them back to me. 

Mr. DORNAN. Do you know this colonel's name, Al? 

Mr. Santoli. Colonel Wisda. 

Mr. Dumas. Colonel Wisda, and he said that he was going to 
send this picture to every VFW, American Legion, and DAV post 
in the United States so they could identify some of these men. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Has that been done? 

Mr. Dumas. Never been done, no. They never did that. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Can we get a letter with Senator Smith and me 
and ask why this was not done? 

Mr. Dumas. They never did it. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Of course, that is an excellent idea. That is imagi- 

Mr. Dumas. Senator, all the veterans' posts or the ex-POWs that 
belong to these posts could identify some of the men in this photo- 

Mr. DORNAN. My American Legion post in Pacific Palisades, the 
Ronald Reagan post, would put that — ^it ought to be bigger than 
that, to tell you the truth, it is that clear — ^would put it up on a 
bulletin board that would sit there for 2 or 3 years. They would 
never take it down. They might frame it and make it part of the 

Mr. Dumas. I will leave it with Al tonight, both of these photo- 

Mr. DORNAN. We will track that. Sometimes you do not get any- 
thing done around here because people say, oh, it will die in the 
House. It will die in the Senate. They thought they had tamped 
down Senator Bob Smith until I pop up over here, and we find out 
that when we send letters together, neither has to threaten to sub- 
poena. It comes. There is something about, oh, God, if they are co- 
ordinated on this, we might as well give it to them. So we will fol- 
low that up. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dumas follows:] 


JUNE 20, 1996 


My brother CPI Roger Armand Dumas COC 1 9th Infantry Regiment 
24th Division was captured by Chinese Forces Northeast of Anju North 
Korea on November 4, 1950. 

At the end of the conflict in September 1953, he was not repatriated 
with the sick and wounded. 

He was seen alive in August waiting to board a truck to be released to 
Freedom Village. Mr. Bobby Caruth of Redding California was with him 
when a Chinese guard took CPI Dumas away without any explanation. 

Mr. Caruth had given a statement after his release. He has given me a 
statement on a cassette tape which is available to the Committee. 



In 1956 he was seen alive in a Pyongyang Prison by a former Korean 
Prisoner of War, Mr. Walter Enbom of Seattle Washington, was in camp 
number 5 with CPI Dumas in 1951. 

He was released in 1953, he re-entered the Service in 1955 and was 
sent back to South Korea for a Tour of Duty. He was recaptured by a 
North Korea Border Patrol along with six other men. They were taken to 
Pyongyang where he met CPI Dumas and twenty-five other Americans 
who were not released in 1953. 

Eleven months later they were released and reported what they knew. 
They were told they were captured after the armistice and that is why they 
were released. 


The same thing happened to the Pueblo crew in 1968. They were also 
held for eleven months then released. Many crew members said they had 
heard of Americans still in North Korea from 1953. 

Mr. Enboms statement is attached. Several other POW's knew CPI 
Dumas in Camp Number 5. Mr. Lloyd Pate of Grovetown, Georgia, Mr. 
George W. Rogers, of Terlton, Oklahoma. Mr. Rogers also drew maps for 
our Intelligence of Camp Number 5, which are available, their statements 
are on file in Hartford Federal Court. 

In 1979, the Associated Press in Washington D.C. sent me Two original 
photos of Camp Number 5 and Prisoners waiting to be released, but these 
men were not repatriated, CPI Dumas and several other Prisoners have 
been identified in this photo. 



An Ex-POW smuggled the film in the bottom of his Chinese slipper. The 
film was given to him in Camp Number 5 by an Associated Press 
Journalist, who gave it to him before he passed away. The Ex-POW is a 
Mr. Achee of Florida (no Address). 

These photos have never been Published. Two years ago I gave them 
to Col. Marty Wisda of the POW/MIA Office, he said at the time he was 
going to send a copy to all Veteran Organizations to see if the rest of the 
POW's could be identified. I have heard nothing since. These two large 
photo are available to the Committee also. 



In 1982, I was the Prevailing Party in a Federal Law Suit for the change 
of CPI Dumas from Missing to Prisoner of War. In 1980 the Military Board 
of Review had refused to let me present evidence in CPI Dumas' case. 
Previously, in 1981, I had met with Senator Thurmond the Judiciary 
Chairman. He arranged a meeting at the White House for me with Admiral 
Bud Nance on December 23rd, we met for over two hours, where we 
discussed my brother and all the other men who were not repatriated in 

Admiral Nance National Security Advisor to President Reagan agreed we 
left men behind, but did not know any more than that. I advised him that I 
was going to institute a Federal Law Suit to change CPI Dumas' status to 
Prisoner of War from MIA to POW. 

The meeting ended with no promises but that he would continue to 
keep me informed through Sen. Thurmond Office, which Sen. Thurmond 
did. We had a very good relationship, the Senator and I. He was always 
available to any one who wanted to look at his records on the Prisoner 
issue in Korea. 

In February of 1982. I instituted my suit in Federal District Court in 
Hartford, Connecticut. My case went to trial in July of 1982. The 
presiding Judge was Judge Emmett T. Claire. 

I presented witnesses who knew CPI Dumas in Camp Number 5, North 
Korea, Mr. Lloyd Pate of Grovetown, Georgia gave a full description of 
how he met CPI Dumas. 

Mr. George W. Rogers of Terlton, Oklahoma, also testified he knew CPI 
Dumas in Camp Number 5, Mr. Rogers also knew Walter Enbom in Camp 
Number 5 along with Mr. Cecil Preston of Seattle, Washington who also 
knew Mr. Enbom. They had a reunion in Seattle, Washington at the Ex- 
POWCIubin 1979. 



In 1985, I won my case and was the Prevailing Party. The Army 
Secretary, John Marsh changed CPI Dumas' status to POW presumed dead. 
Previously in July of 1 982 Judge Claire ordered the Government Attorney 
to brng Into Court 389 data sheets that were available, of POW's not 
returned In 1953 including CPI Dumas' name and data sheet. 

The Attorney argued that the Defense Department knew nothing about 
389 Data Sheets on POW's. The Judge then said if they were not in his 
Court Room in two (2) weeks he would hold him in contempt. 

Two weeks later the Attorney arrived with the Data Sheets. He gave 
me 189 Army Data Sheets including CPI Dumas and others, and he kept 
200 Air Force Data Sheets which are in his office in New Haven, 

Judge Claire gave me only the Army Data Sheets. Several years after 
the Court Case, I received a phone call from the Government Attorney 
telling me the change of status of CPI Dumas was not put in his military 

I then proceeded to institute another suit in the District Court of 
Connecticut in 1992. But because the present Attorney General was 
involved in the first case, I decided to put the case in the Federal District 
Court in the District of Columbia. 

Last year Judge Harold Green dismissed the case because the 
Government Attorneys told him that they were the Prevailing Party in the 
first case. This was not true. 

I was the Prevailing Party. I am the only person in history to get a 
status change in Federal Court, no one has ever done this. My brother CPI 
Dumas is still POW, Presumed Dead. 

How can one be a Prisoner of War and no one saw him die. How can 
this government then still presume him dead? My Court Case is available in 
the US District Court of Connecticut, and also in the Congressional 


In 1986, I Robert Dumas, had a conversation with Col. Henry Land, the 
head of the POW/MIA Office at the Pentagon. Our conversation was 
recorded on cassette. In our conversation I said that the State Department 
told me that when we bring our troops home form South Korea then we 
will get our Prisoners back. Col. Land said that is correct, that is a public 
statement by the North Korean Government. 

Also, he said when the North Koreans get to a position and they want 
to release the Prisoners and the remains that are up there, they will do so 
when it is to their advantage. I said isn't it to their advantage to release 
them. He said you don't have to convince me, you have to convince the 
North Koreans. This tape is available for the committee. 



In 1987, I was approached by the Rev. Jesse Jackson and asked if I 
ould set up a meeting with Ambassador Pak Gil Yon, The North Korean 
bserver to the United Nations. I called the Ambassador who I have known 
or several years, he agreed to meet Rev. Jackson at the Hyatt Regency 
lotel in New York. The meeting took place at 1 :00 p.m. I introduced Rev. 
lackson to the Ambassador, several other persons were in the room with 
IS, Mr. Chong, 1st Sect, to Ambassador Pak, Rev. Arhne of Chicago, a 
(ainbow Coalition Member, Peter Jango Ha a South Korean businessman 
rom New York and Jesse Jr, Secret Servicemen and myself. 

Rev. Jackson opened the meeting with the most important question 
ver asked of the North Korean Government. Mr. Ambassador, if your 
:ountry still have Americans alive form the Korean War it would be good 
or both of our nations to release them. I will come to Pyongyang with a 
Delegation around Christmas time to discuss this. 

Ambassador said yes Rev. it would be good for both of our Countries, 
^ev. Arhne will put the Delegation together. Rev. Jackson called the State 
Department and told them of his plans, I don't know who he spoke with 
)ut I was afraid someone would stop our trip. 

Rev. Jackson said to me, I can go anywhere in the world I want, I said 
/es anywhere but North Korea. Jackson wrote a letter that I hand 
delivered to Ambassador Pak the following morning. 

At 10:30 a.m. that morning I received a call from Rev. Arhne of 
hicago informing me that the State Department put travel restrictions on 
North Korean Delegates to New York. North Korea got mad and put 
restrictions on our trip. 

Rev. Jackson has not spoken to me since 1987. I have tried to contact 
him without success. Rev. Arhne called me last year and said he was sorry 
about the trip but he still knows of live Americans in North Korea. Rev. 
Jackson's letter is attached. 



On December 10, 1987, The Hartford Courant Newspaper had a story 
about the meeting. The following day there was another story of a 
Romanian Engineer who lived in Bloomfield, Connecticut. His name is 
Serban Oprica. He defected from the Communist in the middle eighties. 
He saw the story and called the person who wrote it. He said when he 
lived in Romania, he and twenty other Romanian Engineers were sent to 
North Korea in 1979 to build a TV Station. 

One Sunday a bus took them sight seeing. The driver was new and he 
took a wrong road four hours North of Pyongyang. This was October 1979 
on a Sunday afternoon. 

The bus came upon a Collective Farm by mistake, Mr. Oprica and the 
other men saw 50 Caucasians working in a Cabbage Field. The closest to 
the bus looked to be in his early fifties with blue eyes. Mr. Oprica asked 
who these people were, are they Europeans, he was told by an Engineer 
who had been in Korea for several years that these are American Prisoners 
from the Korean War. There are no European workers on Collective Farms 

When Mr. Oprica got to his apartment he informed his lovely wife, Tina, 
"Guess who I saw today, I saw American Prisoners from the Korean War 
working on Collective Farms." 

Mr. Oprica informed Congressman John Rowland of Connecticut, about 
this, he wrote to the Defense Department shortly after Jackson's meeting. 
The Defense said he was mistaken, they came to see him at his home. He 
stands by his story of what he saw and what he told his wife. He was not 
even an American Citizen at the time he wrote to the Defense Department. 
He is very disappointed with Washington. He is a top Engineer with the 
State of Connecticut and now resides in West Hartford. 

In 1992 Mr. Oprica testified with me before Senator Kerrys Committee 
on what he saw. Nothing was ever, ever said again about our testimony. 
An official from Washington came to see him last year and he told him 
again what he saw and the exact location where he saw them. He has not 
heard from them since. His statement is attached. 

PAGE 10 

Nothing was ever done by Senator Kerry, Chairman of the POW 
Committee to keep hearings open, especially after so many individuals 
testified about live Prisoners in North Korea. I feel very sorry for Mr. 
Oprica and his family. 


PAGE 1 1 
In July of 1993, I met with Ambassador Pak Gil Yon in New York. He 
said he was sorry the Delegation was not able to come to Pyongyang, He 
asked about Rev. Jackson, I said I have not talked to him since December 
9, 1987. No more was said about our trip. Ambassador Pak Gil Yon asked 
if I had a picture of my brother, I always carry one wherever I go. He took 
the picture of CPI Dumas in uniform two months before his capture and 
sent it back to Pyongyang. I have not seen that photo since. Recently, I 
was told the photo is safe and will be returned to me someday. Picture 


PAGE 12 
In 1994, I had a conversation with another Ambassador I have known 
for several years. Ambassador Ho Jong. In this conversation, which is on 
tape, he said we will tell whereabouts of all persons in my country. The 
Ambassador never used the word POW only persons. This will be done if 
the United States will sign a Peace Treaty with his Country. This tape is 
available for the Committee. 

PAGE 13 

In 1992, I received a CIA Document that was sent by an unknown 
individual from Washington D.C. It said, to change Roger Dumas' status to 
Prisoner would cause a precedent for other cases, also, a letter I received 
while in Federal District Court in Connecticut said not to tell the public 
about this, as it would cause a precedent for other cases. Last year I 
received the same letter as I did when I was in Court. Both Documents are 

PAGE 14 

Congressman Dornan, you and your Committee, after almost 43 years, 
>w have the opportunity to settle this long overdue issue. Please hold 
ore hearings, and discussions with the North Korean Government, to 
turn these poor devils after all these years. I am very disturbed that we 
e giving North Korea Humanitarian Aide. Food and Oil and have not asked 
)Out our men still being held somewhere in North Korea and not allowed 
I leave. 

If it is going to take a Peace Treaty between our two Nations, so be it. 
that is the only way to bring them home. Do It. Regardless of what 
outh Korea says. 89 thousand Americans missing from World War Two, 
ietnam, and Korea and none are accounted for. 

We are the only nation in the World who does not negotiate for their 
risoners of War. This is a disgrace to our Nation. Thank you for accepting 
ly testimony and statement. 

Robert R. Dumas, Sr. 

Brother of CPI Roger A Dumas 

Korean (POW) Not Returned 


Mr. DORNAN. Irene, your statement, please. 


Ms. Mandra. Congressman Dornan, members of the committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of my brother, 
Sergeant Philip V. Mandra, and for all of the POW's and MIA's 
from Korea and the cold war. 

In 1953, at the end of the Korean war, my family and I were told 
that my brother was dead. We were told that no American soldiers 
were left behind in Korea. I believed our Government. We mourned 
and went on with our lives. Congressman Dornan, we were lied to. 
Our boys were left behind alive. They were shipped to China, the 
Soviet Union, and North Korea. 

I am from a generation that believed our government to be of the 
people, for the people. I was wrong. What I have learned has 
shocked and surprised me. I found out on my own that marine 
search teams reached my brother's location within 15 to 20 min- 
utes of the explosion. Search teams found nothing. There were no 
bodies. Where did five marines go within 15 to 20 minutes? Our 
boys were dragged off by the Chinese. I learned that Phil was hit 
with a concussion grenade, not gunfire. His wounds were surviv- 

Inquiries of my Government yielded little to no information. In- 
formation on Korea was still classified in 1988, some 35 years after 
the Korean war. There was nothing being done to account for the 
389 known prisoners left behind. 

What I had to contend with and what has upset me the most is 
the apathy I have seen within my own Government. In 1992, all 
this was changed and I had hope and faith again when the Govern- 
ment started Task Force Russia. This organization was short-lived 
before the Department of Defense took over under Ross and a cloak 
of secrecy prevailed. 

Information surfaced about my brother in 1993 when a Russian 
colonel identified Phil's picture from an album of the missing. This 
colonel unequivocally 

Mr. Dornan. Pardon me just one second. This is the general that 
I saw on film in the BBC documentary. 

Ms. Mandra. Yes, Colonel Molinin. 

Mr. Dornan. Totally believable. 

Ms. Mandra. Yes. He stated that he saw an American soldier in 
a Magadan prison in the 1960's. The Russian side of the commis- 
sion did not believe this colonel, but Ambassador Toon and the task 
force said the colonel was very credible. 

The information I received on that interview with the Russian 
colonel was redacted. When I protested, I was told by my Govern- 
ment that all of the names were blackened to protect the Russians* 
privacy. How dare the United States Government — my Govern- 
ment — protect the rights of privacy of Russian citizens. What about 
my rights? What about my brother Phil's rights? 

This is only one of the problems I have had with the handling 
of the MIA affairs and DPMO. My problem is not with the people 
at DPMO, it is the agency itself. The unwritten policies of the orga- 
nization are dictated by lifetime bureaucrats. Most people working 


n DPMO are decent, honorable people. They are hindered by anti- 
[uated laws and by people in authority who are protecting wrong 
iecisions that were made years before DPMO's control, afraid that 
ur Gk)vemment may be embarrassed by its previous actions. 

After the privacy incident, I flew at my own expense to Moscow 
ind met with the Russian side of the commission. I immediately 
eceived all of the documentation that I could not get from my own 

Mr. DORNAN. By the way, where did they film you for that docu- 
nentary, here in the United States? 

Ms. Mandra. Yes. That was done during the Korean dedication 
n July, this past July. 

! Mr. DORNAN. I was at that, but I left when someone else arrived, 
i little higher office than I. 

Ms. Mandra. I was promised that a team would go to Magadan 
Ind would investigate the prison and would speak to the surround- 
ng communities. I had to wait 18 months before a team was sent. 

Piis was 18 months added to my brother's death sentence, 18 
onths he did not have to give. 
] If I may just stop for a minute. Congressman Dornan, the only 
reason they went was because I approached Ambassador Toon at 
a cocktail party and I said to him, "Ambassador, you promised 
lie " 

Mr. Dornan. Here or in Moscow? 

Ms. Mandra. No, here in Washington. 'Tou promised me that 
/ou would send a team to Magadan, and," I said, "you have never 
researched what has happened with my brother." At that moment, 
tie called men over and said, "We have not been to Magadan yet?" 
\nd they said, "No, Ambassador." He said, "Get a team going," 18 
months after Colonel Molinin came forward and said, "I saw Philip 
Mandra in that prison." 

I would like the members of the State Department, the Depart- 

Mr. Dornan. Excuse me one second, Irene. I do not want to for- 
get this. Yesterday, some of the Korean families told me about 
these briefings, instructions you got before you met with the Rus- 
sians at the party here. Now I am told they had tours, limousines, 
and I would not resent all that if we were stroking them with cour- 
tesy, politeness, and a taste of America to get some productive con- 
versation out of them later. But when we hit a wall, then all of 
that is wasted money. While the relatives are flying around on 
their own money, their tax dollars are paying for these guys. 

I do not know if Carol Hrdlicka was in the room. It reminded me 
of the briefings the military gave Carol Hansen or gave Mrs. Hol- 
land when I was out of the room. My wife was telling me what Mr. 
Owen Pickett had gotten out of her, that, oh, do not do this or you 
will get your guy killed. This is top secret. You will get your man 
killed. And check with us in 30 years. Maybe he will still be alive 
because you did not get him killed. 

Did you get one of those briefings about, do not be rude to the 
Russians. Treat them nice, now. We want to get something. 

Ms. Mandra. The first time we were meeting with the Russians, 
they did meet with the family members and did say that we should 


speak to them politely and we should not be angry with them. In 
this way, we could have some kind of dialogue and communication 

Mr. DORNAN. And then 18 months goes by. 

Ms. Mandra. But the funny thing is that you brought that up. 
I was the one that protested because I asked, I think his name is 
Colonel Olinka, is it, the man from Korea? 

Mr. Cole. Orlov. 

Ms. Mandra. Orlov, and 

Mr. DORNAN. Could you spell it? 

Ms. Mandra. I do not know. 

Mr. Cole. Colonel Alexander Orlov, 0-r-l-o-v. 

Ms. Mandra. And I brought up my brother's case at the plenary 
and he said, "Go see the Chinese." That is all I needed, after I 
spent money for a ticket and food and a hotel, and I had it. I went 
home and I picked up the phone and I did not stop calling everyone 
I could call and I wrote a whole column and I sent it to every veter- 
ans' paper that I can, that we pay for these Russians to come here, 
we entertain them, and then they turn around and they tell us to 
go see the Chinese. This is just an outrage. 

Right after that, I understand that the Russians were not invited 
back here, and I was very happy about it. But they are not going 
to give us information. Why should we ask them to come here? I 
do not have to waste 

Mr. DORNAN. Irene, just take a second. John Chapla is my chief 
of staff and he is an Army lieutenant colonel. This is a getaway 
Thursday. You can pretty much set your own pace. You can come 
in early tomorrow. If any family member thinks the pace is too 
slow here, just raise your hand and we will pick up the pace. But 
I am absorbing this. It is open-ended here. My chief of staff just 
said, do you want to do a special order tonight? I said, no. He did 
not know I had already told you that this is more important to me. 
I can do a special order on this later. 

I do not know if some of you heard, but I said Dino Carluccio and 
Al Santoli are in today's Wall Street Journal, a column by Al Hunt 
saying that the ubiquitous but — it is a negative column, but 

Mr. Santoll Basically, we said that we are involved in some 
kind of a circus, some kind of a sideshow, milking the families, 

Mr. Dornan. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Santoll That is a John McCain, John Kerrey. That article 
was a hunt. 

Mr. Dornan. Now here is why I wanted kind of a second time- 
out here, is this is going to be an awfully good record, the hearings 
yesterday and today, toward what end? Printed in one of these 
Government brown books that I used to look at in the Korean war 
that had the same cover as the field manual for a Springfield 1903 
rifle or a Colt 45? All the recommendations at the tail end of your 
Senate written report, and I mentioned the minority report, and 
then I realized, I did not carefully read the minority report because 
I had access to Senator Bob Smith and would talk to him. 

What is frustrating me now as I listen to this story is it is sort 
of what I expected, the way we treated the Russians. I asked to get 
on that task force and our minority leader said, no, I am putting 
Sam Johnson on. I said, well, I certainly step aside for a 7-year 


POW. Sam is frustrated to the point of saying, what is the purpose 
tiere. Obviously, Malcolm Toon at age 80 on the Fourth of July 
would like to step aside for somebody. 

I am open for suggestions later on what you would like us to do 
an some course of action. If I go on the House floor and say that 
[ have confidence in the analysts — somebody mentioned they want 
to talk to me off the record about one of the analysts that I at this 
point have confidence in, but I am not going to play a game with 
Mr. Toon's replacement. It will be interesting to see, as people are 
getting indicted more and more over the next few months, who is 
going to be left to be appointed to anything. 

But I want to work with these people and I want the games to 
start playing. Mr. Cole used a tough word, sleazy. It is annoying 
to me to have people call over there and say, "What did Mr. Dor- 
nan want to see? Do not let him know something more than we do. 
If he gets ahead of us, he will embarrass us." It is not going to be 
paper pushing anymore. 

I do not know if you heard my opening to the Vietnam section 
yesterday, but I said if anybody does not believe that we left pris- 
oners alive in Korea, save Vietnam for later, quit. Have the de- 
cency to walk away from this thing because you are an obstruction- 
ist. It is now an incontrovertible fact, way beyond circumstantial 

Then let me ask this from the whole audience. Did anybody here 
learn today about President Eisenhower's words? 

Ms. Mandra. Oh, no. We have known that. 

Mr. DORNAN. See, you have all known that. 

Ms. Mandra. We all know this. We have been in this for 

Mr. DORNAN. Some of the articles Al was bringing me from a 
magazine I used to subscribe to, Argassi, I read all of these things 
religiously and then I did not totally forget them. I just filed them 
away. And when he brings me Argassi the other day, I said, I re- 
member reading this article right before I joined the Air Force, 
thinking, well, this is why I am joining the Air Force. This is not 
going to happen again. We will get these guys out. We will shoot 
our way in and get them out. 

And now, all these things you have had in drawers and bureaus 
and filed in red, here we are reliving all of this again with this dif- 
ference. We have money. We have an office. We have some people 
pushing papers around, other people who are dedicated. We can get 
an emergency million, Murtha's million, you call it, out of an ex- 
marine, a good guy. 

Mr. Santoli. They said that pejoratively, like laughing about it. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Who said it pejoratively? 

Mr. Santoli. Ask Paul. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Make a note of Murtha's million and we will come 
to that. 

Mr. Santoli. And what happened to it. 

Mr. DORNAN. Finish your story, Ms. Mandra. I just want you to 
know that I am sitting here figuring, what do we do with this testi- 
mony, because when you say, "I am the one who took exception to 
that," that is great, but where are we now and when did you take 
exception to it, month and year. 


Ms^ Mandra. I am just trying to think. At that plenary, because 
the Russians did not come back in January. Volkogonov passed 
away, I beheve it was December of 1995. I have been flying back 
and forth so often. Congressman Dornan, it is a little hard to re- 

Mr. Dornan. When did you go to Moscow? 

Ms. Mandra. I went to Moscow in December of 1993 

Mr. Dornan. Who went with you? 

Ms. Mandra. Just me and my older brother. 

Mr. Dornan. How old is your older brother? 

Ms. Mandra. My older brother is 71, a World War II veteran 
Navy. ' 

Mr. Dornan. This may not seem important, but it is to me. Who 
met you at the airport? 

Ms. Mandra. Colonel Parr met me at the airport 

Mr. Dornan. Air Force attache, Moscow? 

Ms. Mandra. He was the head of the task force on the commis- 
sion side in Moscow, only because I requested it. I wrote a letter 
to the Department of Defense and I said, I am not familiar with 
the language. I do not know my way around. 

I was partially disabled because I was suffering from knee sur- 
gery, so I was walking with a cane. I said, please have someone 
come and pick us up so this way we can get to the hotel safely, and 
Colonel Parr picked us up. 

Mr. Dornan. And then what hotel did they put you up at? 

Ms. Mandra. We put ourselves up. It cost us $10,000 in 2 weeks 
my brother and I. 

Mr. Dornan. You know, of course, you just triggered the $10,000 
figure again in my mind that Mrs. McDonald gave to some 
sleazeball in Mexico City. The House is going out. Ten thousand 
dollars the total trip cost you. 

Ms. Mandra. Yes. 

Mr. Dornan. What hotel did you stay at? 

Ms. Mandra. Hotel Aerostar, I think it was called. 

Mr. Dornan. Who are the highest embassy people that tried to 
help you there and that you saw? 

Ms. Mandra. On the Russian side? 

Mr. Dornan. No, on our side. 

Ms. Mandra. On our side, I saw the Ambassador. 

Mr. Dornan. Who was the Ambassador then? 

Ms. Mandra. I am just trying to think. It is going back to 1993 

Mr. Dornan. Who is after Jack Matlock? 

Ms. Mandra. Pickering. 

Mr. Dornan. Pickering is still there. 

Ms. Mandra. Pickering, I saw. 

Mr. Dornan. He is a good man. I saw him in El Salvador many 

Ms. Mandra. I ran ads in newspapers. I tried to get a plane to 
go to Ekaterinburg, which is where the gulags are. 

Mr. Dornan. Where the Czar was killed, where Francis Gary 
Powers was shot down, when it was called Sverdlosk. 

Ms. Mandra. Colonel Parr talked me out of it, because 

Mr. Dornan. Who talked you out of it? 

Ms. Mandra. Colonel Parr. 


Mr. DORNAN. Why? 

Ms. Mandra. Because he said that we would have to have an in- 
terpreter and a car waiting for us. He did not guarantee that I 
:ould get a car or an interpreter. He said, "What are you going to 
do if you land there and you do not have the means to travel 
around? You would need someone who knows the location." He ac- 
tually, you know, put a little fear into us. We were afraid at that 
point. We had so much to do in the 2 weeks 

Mr. DORNAN. Why would he not volunteer to go with you, if that 
is why he is there? 

Ms. Mandra. They did not. They did not. 

Mr. DoRNAN. That is Yeltsin's hometown, as a matter of fact. 

Ms. Mandra. Congressman, it was so — we had to hire an inter- 
preter. We had to hire a car in order to go anyplace. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Stop right there. Has any other family member in 
the room had this type of an experience? 

Ms. Mandra. No. The only other person I know that went to 
Moscow was Jane Reynolds Howard, but she had a Russian friend 
there that traveled with her so they knew the location and they 
knew the language, so it was much easier for her. We had to hire 
people in order to move around and get anjrplace. 

Mr. DoRNAN. What hotel here was this Russian plenary session 
at, the Ritz Carlton? 

Ms. Mandra. We went to the Pentagon, did we not? When we 
met the Russians and they held the plenary, I thought it was at 
the — because we met them twice. 

Mr. DORNAN. You see, the shift of dollars from one of those ple- 
nary sessions to a fund in Moscow to be used for relatives who are 
coming with the hard evidence that you had, we are talking pen- 
nies here in comparison to sending two people for a month to Mon- 
terey to learn how to be a good administrator. What are we hiring 
people for that are not trained to be administrators when there are 
people volunteering to come back on active duty with their heart 
and brain totally into this issue? It is just astounding. 

Please finish your statement, Irene. 

Ms. Mandra. I spoke to General Volkogonov, not only 
Volkogonov, but Colonel Malinin 

Mr. Dornan. In Moscow. 

Ms. Mandra [continuing]. Took a train from his town all the 
way — he lived outside of St. Petersburg — down to Moscow to meet 
me, and I showed him other pictures of Phil. I wanted to make 
sure. He picked out two pictures of my brother 

Mr. Dornan. Did you say your hotel is called the Red Arrow? 

Ms. Mandra. Aerostar, I believe we stayed at. 

Mr. Dornan. The midnight train from Leningrad is called the 

Ms. Mandra. He picked out this picture and this picture. 

Mr. Dornan. At your hotel in Moscow? 

Ms. Mandra. And he said to me that he made no mistake be- 
cause he recognized — he saw him twice, once in 1963 and once in 
1966. He said when he saw him the second time, he thought that 
he — ^the first time, he said, he did not look that bad but he said 
you could see how he aged being years in prison. And he said he 
made no mistake. He saw the Roman nose, the thin face, because, 


he said, this man looked up at him and knew that he was looking 
down at him. 

This man, he said, was all by himself, circling a courtyard. He 
was allowed to come out of his cell just a few minutes 

Mr. DORNAN. What was the general's job and rank when he saw 
your brother? 

Ms. Mandra. The colonel? 

Mr. DoRNAN. The colonel, I mean. 

Ms. Mandra. He was supposed to be with the, I thought the 
MVD, and he was a colonel 

Mr. DoRNAN. Right. 

Ms. Mandra. Yes, and he said that he and his wife, his first 
wife, started to find out about all the atrocities that were going on 
at that time and he said he never forgot this boy all these years 
because it bothered him. He asked the commandant of the prison. 
Who is he?" And the commandant said, "Oh, he was just sent to 
me from the camps. He is an American spy." In Moscow, in Russia, 
you are an American spy no matter what you do. 

My brother was a sergeant, the head of a fire team. He was no 
spy. Why they called him a spy, I do not know. But you have to 
remember, knowing my brother, he was a 21-year-old kid, a strict 
Catholic. He was an altar boy as a child. He would never accept 
communism ideology, and if they tried to push that down his 
throat, or you could have your freedom if you either spied for us 
or joined the Russian Army, my brother would not go for any of 
this, so I think 

Mr. DORNAN. Your brother does not have the technical back- 
ground as somebody they would have lusted to keep. 

Ms. Mandra. No. 

Mr. Dornan. However, suppose he was taken for the medical ex- 
periments and he was somebody they never got around to. They 
shut down the thing. Somebody had normal human guilt kick in 
and then they said, well, what do we do with this last survivor? 
Well, send him over to that camp, and he shows up, a nondistin- 
guished prisoner, as far as any technical background is concerned. 
And let us say the general was forcing his memory and he was 
being kind to you and he was seeing things that his subconscious 
wanted him to see. He still saw somebody. 

Ms. Mandra. That is what I kept telling them. 

Mr. Dornan. Even if it was not your brother. 
^^ Ms. Mandra. Even if the Department of Defense says to me, 
"This is not Philip Mandra," but it was an American boy in that 
courtyard who was segregated and who was being called an Amer- 
ican spy and it behooves my Government to find out not only who 
that boy was, but there were three other boys that were hanging 
out a window yelling, "I am an American. I am an American." 
Mr. Dornan. To the colonel? 

Ms. Mandra. To the colonel. Now, he could not get close enough, 
because they were way up, to identify the boys that were yelling 
at him, but all this testimony came out in 1993 when we spoke to 
Colonel Malinin. This is why I had to make the trip. I wanted to 
speak with this man, and at that time, they said he was— in fact, 
that is part of my speech. 
Mr. Dornan. This is December 1993 when you were there? 


Ms. Mandra. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. Please read that. 

Ms. Mandra. I have here, I would like the members of the State 
Department, the Department of Defense, and this committee and 
the White House to put themselves into the shoes of our boys, our 
prisoners of the Korean war. Please, let us get motivated to change 
present protocol before our POWs are starved or tortured or suffer 
even one more moment in prison or captured. 

Communication with DPMO is better than previously, but it 
must improve. DPMO's office organizational skills are lacking. 
Faxes are still being misplaced. Mail is not being answered in a 
timely fashion. Information given by family members is not re- 
viewed unless requested several times. Trust has been lost. How 
can the old task force have a turnaround period of less than a day 
but under DPMO there is no turnaround, there is no responsive- 

Congressman, how do we as Americans continue to give China 
most favored nation status for trade purposes, yet accept and, in 
essence, reward China for her refusal to answer questions on the 
Korean war? The Chinese were in charge of the POW camps. How 
do we justify billions of dollars to Russia when the Russian side of 
the commission actually goes out to intimidate and harass any 
Russian individual who attempts to bear witness to the capture 
and captivity of our boys? The Russians' cooperation is minimal. 

We spend billions of dollars in aid for illegal aliens, foreign aid, 
humanitarian efforts, yet all the while we are denying our task 
force essential personnel. We currently have two investigators in 
the field in Russia. We originally had six. Visualize the mass we 
call Russia. Now, how do we expect two men to canvas one of the 
largest countries with no other support group? 

The White House gave $2,500 per Russian soldier to aid and as- 
sist them to build their own housing under the Russian Officer Re- 
settlement Program. Why not restructure those moneys to give 
back the life of our U.S. soldiers? Let us follow leads promptly, re- 
turn phone calls in a timely fashion, respond to legitimate faxes, 
help us to obtain documents, hire more analysts, and hire respon- 
sive personnel, not bureaucrats. Think about hiring an outside cor- 
poration like the RAND Corp., if need be, to do analytical work. We 
have done it before. 

Stop the denial process. Begin the responsive process. Colonel 
Stuart Harrington and Ralph Peters from the original task force 
made a video containing various proofs, testimonials, and other 
data. Included in this video was the testimony by a Chinese colonel 
that he himself turned Americans over to the Russians. At a later 
date, Peter Tsouras, an analysts from the original task force, wrote 
a 77-page booklet on the investigation, findings, and proof which 
led to the same conclusions, that American servicemen indeed were 
sent to the gulags. Ed Ross tried to classify 

Mr. DoRNAN. Excuse me 1 second, Irene. Do you have that 77- 
page booklet? 

Ms. Mandra. Yes. In fact 

Mr. DORNAN. Do the other family members? 

Ms. Mandra. We sent it over to Al Santoli. 

Mr. DORNAN. OK. He has it. 


Ms. DUNTON. I do not have it with me today, but I have it. 

Ms. Mandra. I have it, too. 

Mr. DORNAN. At this point, to tell you the truth, I am being over- 
whelmed by this, because I have so many duties here, but Mr. 
Santoli is coming in weekends with his Vietnamese-American wife. 
He has interns volunteering to help him. He is burning the mid- 
night oil here. We are getting so much material that — ^you know, 
all Westerners use this expression, the tip of an iceberg, and even 
the story that Ambassador Toon told about Dunham, how his body 
washed up on the shore from the plane shot down, from a ring. It 
is the tip of an iceberg. 

Ambassador Toon indicated that he was making all these state- 
ments as he traveled around on a Government taxpayer airplane, 
which I perfectly understand his asking for, given the poor state 
of Aeroflot in that country, but I just fmd out from Dino, going over 
to vote, that Senator Smith was the one who said, put an ad in Red 
Star newspaper, and it was the Russian responding to the Red Star 
newspaper ad. Now, if Ambassador Toon knew that, he forgot it, 
and that is what caused the man to come forward, and maybe the 
rest of the story is accurate, asked for some money or something, 
and then he says, 'That is stolen property," and got the story out 
and brought this one set of remains home. 

Since it is only one, it is very easy to do the arithmetic. How 
much have we spent on all of this? That is the price to get that 
one funeral somewhere in the United States on this officer 

Ms. Mandra. The testimony by the Chinese colonel that he, him- 
self, turned Americans over to the Russians. At a later date, Peter 
Tsouras, an analyst from the original task force, wrote a 77-page 
booklet on the investigation, findings, and proof, which led to the 
same conclusions, that American servicemen, indeed, were sent to 
the gulags. Ed Ross tried to classify this 77-page report but family 
members already had copies, so they could not. 

Let us stop the madness. Let us stop the coverup. Let us fix the 
problem. We currently have another Russian citizen who claims 
that he personally was in a hospital — he was hospitalized with my 
brother. Because of his statement, we must interview seven Rus- 
sian individuals. At present, we are still waiting for the Russians 
to cooperate. Let us not forget the patriotism of the Korean war 
veterans who were called upon to fight one of the bloodiest wars 
this Nation had to face, as well as the pilots and their crew from 
the cold war, who were the epitome of courage and bravery. 

I know the Department of Defense has a difficult job, a tough job. 
I do not expect miracles, but it was done before by the original task 
force, so it could be done again. My brother and every POW has 
rights. Let this committee enforce their rights. I know that we can- 
not give the prisoners of war back their lives, but they have a right 
to live in a world without bars and shackles and chains, to come 
home and see their country once more and to be with their fami- 
lies. They have a God-given right to freedom. Let us find them. 
Congressman, let us honor our dead but let us bring back the liv- 
ing. Thank you. 



Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Irene. 

Mr. Paul Cole, your statement and then we will go to questions. 


Mr. Cole. I will keep this brief. I am here to talk about how one 
does Korean war POW/MIA research. In my view, the t3rpe of re- 
search that would establish the criteria established by the Korea/ 
Cold War Family Association of the Missing is a relatively straight- 
forward task. My purpose is to describe how these cases can be re- 
searched in United States and foreign archives. 

Since the BBC program has been mentioned a number of times, 
I feel compelled to say two things. I brought a copy of it, which I 
would be happy to submit for the record. I do not know if 

Mr. DoRNAN. No, no, I will take a look at it. 

Mr. Santoli. We can show it to the DPMO analysts, if they have 
not seen it. 

Mr. Cole. Which they have had, by the way. When they said 
today they had not seen it, I was flabbergasted. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Wait. Most people said they had not seen this docu- 
mentary yesterday. Refresh my memory, Mr. Santoli or Mr. 
Chapla. Going left to right, did not — yes, none of them, starting 
with Mr. Gray all the way down the line, nobody had seen it. Colo- 
nel Curt Young in the back had not seen it. We said we would get 
him a copy. And today. Ambassador Toon said he saw it, which 
surprised me. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. I did not produce this film. I participated in it, 
and that is one of the things I want to say for the record, is I am 
now working for the BBC on another program as a result of this, 
so I am still working with them. But copies of this were provided 
to DPMO and I know that people there have seen it, because a lot 
of the material DPMO traded information with the 

Mr. DORNAN. Have you ever read the book — I have not — called, 
"Kiss the Boys Goodbye"? 

Ms. Mandra. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Was a documentary made out of that video? 

Mr. Santoll No. "We Can Keep You Forever" was the documen- 

Mr. DORNAN. "We Can Keep You Forever", which is an actual 
line that many POW's who have survived told me they used on 
them. "We can keep you forever, so you had better do what we" — 
that is what they basically said to Colonel Bud McHuron. "The war 
is ending. They do not even know we have you. They do not know 
you are alive. We can keep you forever," and that is part of the way 
they broke him. 

Mr. Cole. I am also submitting materials for the record that I 
have to stress were in the public domain prior to my appearance 
today. I obtained a lot of archive material from the Soviet Union 
that, in contrast to what Ambassador Toon said today, that there 
is no classified material, DPMO has received materials from the 
Russian side of the joint commission and classified them in this 
country. I obtained the same, in some cases, more complete copies 
of the same archive materials from Russia and I have them in my 
bag right here and I provided those to DPMO to show them the 


contrast between what the Russians were giving them and 

Mr. DORNAN. Who do you think looked at it? 

Mr. Cole. I was told by — I will not use his name here — a source 
I trust at DPMO, since I used to be a consultant to them. He said 
that nobody looked at them. 

Mr. DORNAN. Wow. 

Mr. Cole. Congressman, there is something that is missing here. 
The ground rules that Ambassador Toon agreed to when the Unit- 
ed States-Russian Joint Commission was established, and I was a 
so-called technical consultant. I was in Moscow in March 1992 
when this commission began. Remember, I had a research team 
that had been at work for 3 months in the archives when this com- 
mission was created, so I knew the scene. 

Ambassador Toon agreed to two ground rules. The first one was 
that there would be no independent research used by the commis- 
sion. The second ground rule was, the United States could not take 
the initiative to interview anyone in Russia without first informing 
the Russian side of the joint commission. 

So this meant, as I found out, and I will give you an example 
in my statement here, of archive material that was obtained by 
independent sources in Moscow that pertained directly to American 
row's in Korea submitted to DOD, to DPMO, and in mziny cases, 
was never used because it violated so-called, as Mr. Norm Kass put 
it to me once upon a time, it violated the spirit of the commission. 

Let me just blow through this statement. 

Mr. DORNAN. He has been over to Moscow. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. It violated the spirit of the commission. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. I can give you so many examples like this from 
my own first-hand experience. I can give you an example — let me 
go through this and then 

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. Cole. I sort of gave some thought to this and it sort of works 
if I read it. 

Mr. DoRNAN. All right. 

Mr. Cole. Since 1991, I have organized and have been the prin- 
cipal investigator for three separate research projects lasting 2V2 
years relating to Korean war POW/MIA issues. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense retained me for these projects, in part, be- 
cause of a DOD finding in 1991 that the Office of the Secretary of j 
Defense did not have adequate expertise or resources to conduct ar- 
chive research in United States or foreign archives. A short sum- 
mary of my work for DOD is attached to my formal statement. 

These projects began in 1991. 

Mr. DORNAN. Was Dick Cheney aware of this, or below, maybe? 

Mr. Cole. You are getting ahead of me again. I went to Russia 
with an introduction from Secretairy Cheney in his own hand- 

Mr. DoRNAN. All right. Go ahead. 

Mr. Cole. The motivation for the first project was the anticipa- 
tion that the United States and North Korea would engage in bilat- 
eral negotiations. Thus, POW/MIA issues had to be addressed. I 
was also asked to prepare a remains joint recovery strategy, which 


is why I have some opinions about the one that they have planned 

The general purpose of these OSD-sponsored projects was to de- 
termine the fates of World War II, cold war, and Korean war POW/ 
MIA's through archive research. Included in these projects was the 
task to determine if any POWs or MIA's from any conflict had 
been transported to but not repatriated from the Sino-Soviet bloc. 

Following the award of the first OSD contract in 1991, I initiated 
an archive research project in the United States, in the Soviet 
Union, and a smaller effort in Sweden. The joint archive project, 
which preceded by 3 months the creation of the United States-Rus- 
sian Joint Commission, was approved by the Soviet Minister of De- 
fense, Marshal Shaposhnikov, and by Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney. In 1992, the first project, which focused on Soviet military 
archives, was so successful it was extended by OSD for an entire 
year. My three-volume report, "POW/MIA Issues," deriving from 
these projects was published by RAND in 1994. 

I have also organized and managed archive research related to 
Korean war issues in the Federal Republic of Germany, including 
archives of the former Grerman Democratic Republic, their military 
archives, and their secret police or Stasi files, and also KGB ar- 
chives in four former republics of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Lith- 
uania, Latvia, and Estonia. My seven-volume report deriving from 
research in the KGB and Stasi archives was submitted to DPMO 
in 1994. I brought some examples of it. 

The content of all these studies was studied, reviewed, edited, 
and approved for release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and DPMO. 

Results are possible, but from time to time, we need to remind 
ourselves what we are doing. It is easy to lose track of what is im- 
portant when servicemen are reduced to objects, such as BNR's, 
and the families become so-called PNKO's. We are not looking for 
things; we are looking for people. The purpose of Korean war POW/ 
MIA research is to help people find information about other people. 
If that is the task, then results are possible. 

But in order to be effective, research should be organized only 
after a family expresses what they want to know about a POW/ 
MIA case. Prior to that, one can only guess what a family wants 
to know. Since families are entitled to answers that match their 
level of interest, I think that is a logical place to start. Family in- 
terest ranges from none at all to the belief that a missing man is 
still alive and everything in between. 

The circumstances of loss framed by these two polarities are not 
evenly distributed. More men remain unrecovered from POW camp 
cemeteries, that is about 2,100, than were transported to the 
USSR. In my view, that is about 35. More men murdered after cap- 
ture remain unrecovered, that is about 950, than were unrecovered 
from marked, isolated burial sites, about 575. And more men re- 
main unrecovered from temporary military cemeteries, about 500, 
than might have died in aircraft crashes, about 400. So the cir- 
cumstances of individual loss vary greatly. 

Thus, the utility of different archive holdings varies according to 
the circumstances of loss. The type of information the family re- 
quires varies, as well. Each case is a custom job, you could say, but 


similar cases can be addressed with similar methodological tech- 
niques and similar sources. 

At the end of the day, Korean war POW/MIA cases will be re- 
solved by research, not by poUtics, but access to the archives is a 
political act in any country. 

A brief word about the utility of U.S. records. The historical 
record of Korean war POW/MIA information is extensive and the 
level of detail is precise. Parenthetically, I strongly disagree with 
DPMO when they allege that the record is flawed. 

Mr. DORNAN. That the record is what? 

Mr. Cole. Flawed. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. Cole. The quantity and quality of existing information in 
U.S. archives alone is adequate to answer questions relating to per- 
haps 95 percent of the remaining POW/MIA cases. 

In my experience, most families want to know what happened. 
Recovery of remains or expectations that anyone is alive are found 
less frequently. For the families who would be satisfied to know the 
circumstances of loss, information and details contained in U.S. ar- 
chives are usually more than sufficient to satisfy their inquiries. 

For example, of the approximately 5,000 POW/MIA's who died 
but were not recovered from marked graves, crash sites, and battle- 
fields above the 38th Parallel, U.S. archives can provide detailed 
information on the circumstances of death for over 4,500. The cir- 
cumstances of death for over 4,100 men lost above the 38th Par- 
allel were witnessed by repatriated American POWs and over 400 
more were thought to have perished in air crashes. The other 550 
cases either have no geographic coordinates — loss at sea, that sort 
of thing — or no repatriated eyewitnesses could provide information. 

In addition, using modem techniques derived since 1954, there 
is a good chance that a majority of the 866 Americans buried as 
unidentified in the Punch Bowl Cemetery in Honolulu could be 
identified. We could, in other words, recover the remains of up to 
866 American servicemen without any assistance from China, 
North Korea, or the Soviet Union. We could do this using U.S. ar- 
chives, U.S. scientific methods, and we do not even have to leave 
the United States. 

Mr. DORNAN. Wow. 

Mr. Cole. In my view, information derived from U.S. archives 
would satisfy many, perhaps the majority, of families. Since the cir- 
cumstances of loss for over 4,500 can be derived from U.S. sources, 
I think it is a good place to start. 

A brief word about the utility of Soviet records. Soviet military 
records in Russian custody have been proven to contain informa- 
tion concerning unrepatriated and unrecovered American POWs 
and MIA's. I attached something that I c£dl my "Moscow Report" 
to my formal statement, where you can see how this archive infor- 
mation can be related to specific individual cases. 

Records of the Soviet KGB, on the other hand, have turned up 
a great deal of information on imprisoned Americans who held dual 
citizenship, but thus far have not revealed any information on Ko- 
rean war POW/MIA's. I should stress, however, that KGB records 
in Russian custody have yet to be examined. The only KGB records 
I have seen, I have obtained from Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and 


Estonia. I have been in the KGB archives looking through the 
boxes myself, but not in Russia. 

In 1991, the late Greneral Dimitri Volkogonov promised that up 
to three American researchers would be given access to Soviet mili- 
tary archives. No governmental research group has ever placed 
American researchers in Soviet military archives. When 
Volkogonov made this promise, which was never kept, my research 
team was already at work on Soviet military records under the 
terms of the Shaposhnikov-Cheney agreement. Our group success- 
fully located a number of valuable records, but eventually, access 
was denied to these archives by Russian authorities. 

I should add, in contrast to what Ambassador Toon said today, 
he referred to my archive research team as "disruptive and out of 

Mr. DORNAN. You must have been surprised to hear today how 
highly he thought of you. 

Mr. Cole. Yes, that is a good way to put it. 

Mr. DORNAN. Disruptive and out of control. 

Mr. Cole. Yes, and this also was part of the problem, that it was 
an independent research effort that had to be shut down, as he put 
it. On the April 9, 1992, meeting of the U.S. side, the commis- 
sioners, the minutes of that meeting are very clear. Toon com- 
plained to RAND, where I was working at the time, that this effort 
was ruining their commission. 

Mr. DoRNAN. And this is Bataan Death March Day 1992 and 
George Bush is President. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. And Toon is complaining. Toon was appointed by 
George Bush to this. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. And he is complaining that very day, in what 
words again, about RAND? He complained to RAND? 

Mr. Cole. That the indei>endent archive research that was under 
my supervision in Moscow was "disruptive and out of control." This 
came from a complaint that he received from Volkogonov, because 
what I did, if I can be immodest for a second, I went to Moscow 
and tried to find the best archivist in Russia and I put him to 
work. When the commission was put to work, they had the B team. 

Mr. DORNAN. You had the A team. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. Guess who did not like it. 

Mr. DoRNAN. The B team. But Volkogonov is the one who com- 
plained to Toon? 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. So he was not all this splendid person that he pre- 
tended to be until he died. 

Mr. Cole. No. 

Mr. DORNAN. Well, he is Communist, but I thought he was a 
guilt-ridden communist. 

Mr. Cole. No. But the point is that Soviet military archives 

Mr. DORNAN. Then the loss of him meeting his maker in Decem- 
ber of last year is not as terrible as I thought, then. 

Mr. Cole. Since we are on the subject, just let me tell you a side- 
bar story to Volkogonov. There were a few things that I was forced 
to cut out of my RAND rejjort. Some, you disagree with, it is edi- 


torial stuff and some people just do not get it and you think you 
are such a great writer and they just do not understand, but you 
go along with it. 

But one to this day that sticks in my craw is I had the docu- 
ments on how Volkogonov was selling archive material to Korean 
journalists under the name of the newspaper. I knew the record 
groups. To my satisfaction, this was a clear thing and the position 
of Task Force Russia was, the only issue is what hand does he take 
the money with. That is what I was told. Well, I had to cut this 
out of my report. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Cole. You will see that I sort of hint at it in this very dark 
and vague way, which you can sort of figure it out. But that is the 
kind of environment. 

Then they had a deal with a British publisher to sell microfilm 
copies of these archives. Why should they give them to the Ameri- 
cans for free, for goodness sake? 

I am almost finished here. The point is, the utility of Soviet mili- 
tary archives in Russian custody, they contain information that 
tells the story of how American servicemen died in Soviet custody, 
how Soviet officers witnessed the deaths of Americans or located 
and in some cases photographed the remains of Americans. The 
daily operational reports of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, which they 
had a combat regiment at Endol, are particularly valuable. The 
American side of the United States-Russian Joint Commission has 
requested these documents repeatedly but my team was the only 
source of them. 

Full stop, my team obtained — I have not brought them today — 
another folder full of these daily operational summaries, which I of- 
fered to Norm Kass and he would not take them because he said 
the commission did not accept documents from independent re- 
searchers. So they have been sitting for 2 years. 

Mr. DORNAN. But then you heard Mr. Kass say today that he 
thinks outside sources are essential. Was that not the word he 

Mr. Cole. We will have to revisit that, obviously. But Soviet 
military records contain information about Americans found dead 
in crash sites, photographs - of Americans found dead by Soviet 
search teams, and unrepatriated Americans who were interrogated 
by Soviet intelligence. Also, the identify of unrepatriated Ameri- 
cans shot down by Soviet aircraft and the identity of crashed Unit- 
ed States Air Force aircraft located by Soviet service teams can be 
derived from these materials. I attached my "Moscow report," as I 
call it, as an illustration. I also include a couple of these daily oper- 
ational summaries. 

This report demonstrates the utility of Soviet military records 
and how this information can be related to individual American 
POW/MIA cases. Soviet veterans are also a valuable source of in- 
formation concerning American POW/MIA's. 

Finally, the utility of other archives. In my view, in contrast to 
what we heard early today, and I know there are a number of peo- 
ple in this room who would disagree with me, and I am aware of 
this, I think there is little to be gained from other archives. At the 


very least, we should concentrate our efforts on archives whose 
utility has been proven. 

The archives of the People's Republic of China have not been 
proven to have information related to POW/MIA's. I did an inves- 
tigation a few years ago, trying to find out through academic circles 
how we could crack the code on Chinese military archives that 
might have some utility for this and the answer was, not in a mil- 
lion years. 

No one has yet to prove that the North Koreans made 

Mr. DORNAN. One second, Dr. Cole. Meaning there might be 
something there, but we are never going to get to it. 

Mr. Cole. It would be an enormous effort. This is a recipe for 
making a lot of trips to Beijing and having banquets and toasts 
and all this kind of stuff, and your archives and our archives and 
that sort of thing. I have never liked that approach. At the end of 
the day, you sit down with a box of documents, you have some seri- 
ous butt time, and you turn the pages. That is how you make 
progress in archive research, and you have to negotiate it on the 
worker bee level. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Cole. It is only the worker bees who are going to be able 
to do it. 

And the North Koreans, to describe them as vassals during the 
Korean war is probably to give them a bit of credit. They lifled 
things and they built roads and they carried stuff. I do not think 
they ever put pen to paper about the Americans that they were 
murdering after they captured. Why would they 

Mr. DORNAN. This is the Chinese you are talking about? 

Mr. Cole. The North Koreans. 

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, the North Koreans, right. 

Mr. Cole. So until we see that this North Korean museum that 
we are talking about 

Mr. DORNAN. What about the camera crews that took the excel- 
lent film footage that you directed me to in the archives? 

Mr. Cole. I bet you it was Russians. That is just an intuitive 
feeling. North Koreans are not making films of people they capture. 
This is Tass stuff. This is KGB. This is GRU. And a lot of this ma- 
terial was probably captured when we overran the Soviet Embassy. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right, because it is not identified precisely where 
it came from. 

Mr. Cole. No, and we will never know, probably. But the North 
Koreans, in addition to everything else, they were dirt poor. Are 
they going to spend money on a movie camera? Even the propa- 
ganda films of Kim Il-song had a Russian, and all that sort of thing 
that I have found in the archives thus far have a clear Russian 

Mr. DoRNAN. Actually, I looked up the other night, we took 
Pyongyang around October 20-21, 1950. 

Mr. Cole. Yes, 1950. 

Mr. DoRNAN. So that was pretty quick turnaround from Inchon 
on September 15. A month and a few days later, bing, we had 
Pyongyang and we are on our way north. So yes, that could have 
come out of the Soviet 


Mr. Cole. The military intelligence had organized — I have the 
documents at home, I did not bring those with me today — ^there 
was an organized effort to collect all of the Soviet material that we 
could lay our hands on in Pyongyang, the assumption being that 
soldiers would not pay much attention to it, so they had to organize 
special units to recognize the material and that sort of thing. 

Mr. DORNAN. One thought on other archives. The infamous 
march down the street in Hanoi of pilots they had captured up to 
that point, which were not that many, although dozens, July 6, 
1966. In the still photographs that were released by Hanoi of the 
pilots walking down the street in twos, handcuffed together, you 
see in the background many Caucasian faces, including one that I 
thought I could identify as an Indian, Delhi, cameraman, Bul- 
garians, who knows what, East Germans. There are many camera- 
men with 16-mm cameras filming this march until the crowd got 
out of control and started to seriously hurt some of them and then 
they all ran for the soccer stadium and slammed the doors and did 
not have their rally. They had overinflamed the crowd. 

Where is all that film from all these East European countries 
rallying to the cause of Hanoi early in the Vietnam air war? It is 
somewhere to turn up, and certainly there must be some Russian 
film of that. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. I can give one brief insight to that. I did not work 
on Vietnam. It was not defined as an archive project by the Depart- 
ment of Defense when I got into the picture. We did do a search 
of the motion picture archives, of the Soviet military archives just 
outside of Moscow, and our researchers reported to us that most of 
it had been gone through and there were entire boxes missing. So 
someone sanitized it. 

Mr. DORNAN. And that is one thing they would want to sanitize, 
is Vietnam footage. 

Mr. Cole. Yes, and Korea stuff, too. This was, once again, part 
of the Commission's methodology. They told the Russians they 
wanted to look at the motion picture archives, gave them time to 
go there, sanitize it, and then they came. 

Mr. DORNAN. This is something I meant to ask Ambassador 
Toon. He would have considered it hostile. That is why he said he 
hoped it did not go too badly today. But he is leaving. He kind of 
captured me when he said he would be 80 July 4. But this is what 
has to stop, not only saying that independent work is anything 
other than the way Norm Kass characterized it, essenti£d, but to 
stop this telegraphing our punches, spooking them is the right 
word, and causing them to pick up a phone, as our CIA would do 
here if somebody was coming over and saying, "You know some- 
thing, they are going to get into this Howard Hunt stuff of the CIA, 
the rogue elephant crap. Do not let them see that stuff. Seal it off. 
Get that out of there," and there goes a lost opportunity. 

Mr. Cole. I can give you a concrete example of how this works, 
in addition to the fact that it is not just my observation. The Sen- 
ate Select Committee had testimony about how the Russian side of 
the joint commission would get the witnesses and intimidate them 
and all this sort of stuff. One of my consultants had a very shad- 
owy figure come up to him and he said, 'Tou are working too close- 


ly with the Americans. It would be easy to push you in front of a 
car." And he looked at him and he said, "Try it." 

Mr. DORNAN. You mean one of your Russian associates, your A 
team of archivists? 

Mr. Cole. Yes. He knew who it was. He was a local figure. 

A fellow who was in Moscow with Task Force Russia — I am going 
to have to be careful here, because he told me — ^this was one of 
these things where he was not really supposed to be doing what he 
was doing — he did not like this rule about tipping the Russians off 
to what we wanted to do. He was a Russian speaker. He said, 
every time they went to a prison camp, he said he could tell that 
the card files, the prisoner files had been gone through. Now, you 
know that from going into the archives. If someone — even with 
your in-box, if someone jumbles the papers, you can tell it. But this 
happened time-and-time again. 

The first time I met Ambassador Toon was before we went to 
Moscow in March of 1992 when I said, "Do not tell them the names 
of who you are looking for. It is a bad idea. Just tell them you want 
to find Americans and see what you get." Well, that showed my na- 
ivete and he understood the Russian mind. So they gave him a list 
of names. This is who we are looking for. And the Russians asked, 
please, give us all the names. 

Well, the person responsible for going to the prison camps told 
me that he was ordered to tell them in advance that he was going, 
he said, but what they did not say, what his orders did not forbid 
was he had a list of people that we knew had been in the gulag 
but came out, repatriated gulag prisoners. 

He says, on the list of the people that he was ordered to look for, 
he never found one. But on his private list of people he knew had 
been there, he found 85 percent. 

Mr. DORNAN. Sanitized. 

Mr. Cole. Oh, of course. You know that old Russian phrase that 
goes, "It never happened, and besides, it was a long time ago"? 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Cole. That is at work here. But my point is that even under 
the conditions we are talking about, we know where the records 
are. We know what they contain. It is a question of how well we 
want to, I do not want to say exploit the archives, how well we use 

Let me finish with one example. 

Mr. DORNAN. Then I am going to ask you the question I inter- 
rupted Irene with. Where do we go from here? Where do you think, 
in your opinion, we should go? 

Mr. Cole. Just let me give you one example about this independ- 
ent research stuff. In 1993, and I will not use names here, but it 
is documented well if you want to know the details, my research 
team in Moscow uncovered documents relating to an American 
pilot who was being interrogated and transported by Soviets in 
Korea. In this report from the Soviets, it gives the date of the 
man's death. It just says, "Died during transport. We could not 
complete the interrogation." 

I sent these documents to DPMO in 1993. The next of kin got 
the documents in 1993, as well. The United States-Russian Joint 
Commission never accepted those documents as evidence. What 


they did accept from the Russians and is in the record is two par- 
tial documents that were cut, pasted together so clumsily you could 
almost see the paper crossing, and presented as a single document. 
But because it came from the Russians, that was OK. They could 
accept that. The full text of the documents that my group had un- 
covered were never accepted by the DPMO or the Commission as 

Mr. DORNAN. Explain to me, they do not accept it. What does 
that mean? 

Mr. Cole. The answer I got was, I said, well, how do you make 
this determination, and the answer I got back was, "Some things 
we take and some things we do not." Only at the insistence of a 
family member were these complete documents ever put in the cas- 
ualty file, and to this day, they have never been officially put into 
the casualty file. When a family member asked DPMO, why is it 
taking over 2 years, the answer was, "It was a bureaucratic over- 
sight." That is a direct quote. 

We can all sit around and tell horror stories about DPMO and 
all that kind of stuff. You can travel the world over and never find 
a monument built to a commission. In my view, just as a private 
citizen and so forth, I do not think the (government has any busi- 
ness being in the research business. Doing this sort of analysis, 
yes, but research, no. The Department of Defense realized that in 
1991. They said, we do not do archive work, and over the past 5 
years, they have proven that they do not do archive work. They 
knew that very well. 


Mr. Cole. So the long and the short of this is, look, this is not — 
take this in the right way — this is not brain surgery. Archive re- 
search is a matter of finding boxes and going through the docu- 
ments, finding the evidence. But if we focus aU the efforts on we 
are going to go to an F-80 crash site in North Korea and dig it up, 
why? I have in my documents here, I can tell you who died there. 
I can tell you down to a space about as big as this area here where 
that plane crashed. But on the other hand, I can tell you the names 
of almost 3,000 U.S. servicemen who are left in marked graves by 
the Graves Registration Service. 

So the approach just does not make any sense to me. This is not 
a research strategy. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Let me ask you this. I meant to ask this of Ambas- 
sador Toon. I will submit it to him in writing, but then again, it 
is speculative. Is it possible, given that they are allied at one time 
formerly, allied Asian Communist nations, that North Koreans 
would walk across the street — I asked something similsir to this — 
to the Ambassador from the People's Republic of Vietnam to North 
Korea and say, "Tell us how you deal with the Americans in crash 
sites. How do you get the money out of them? What is the potential 
for money and how do you do this?" 

Mr. Cole. I do not have to even make a hypothetical answer to 
that, or I would never try to guess what Ambassador Toon would 
say. I was hired to answer that question in 1991. Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford said 

Mr. DORNAN. A good man. 


Mr. Cole. Oh, I had a great time working with him. I really en- 
joyed it. But that is a parenthetical. 

He said, make a comparison between the way that the Vietnam- 
ese are exploiting the remains issue and the North Koreans. He 
says, take a look at it and come back and tell me if there are any 
similarities. So I looked into it and I got into an area that I do not 
claim any expertise on whatsoever, forensic anthropology. But I 
looked and held, physically held in my hands, quite a few of the 
remains that we obtained and identified from Vietnam and I saw 
the records that the Vietnamese turned over with them. 

They show classic signs of French education, forensic anthropol- 
ogy. The notes are in French. The notation system is right out of 
the textbooks. These are educated people who are dealing with 
these remains. In one case, they are numbered. In one case, I saw 
a set of remains that had been hanging in some guy's doctors office 
for a while. 

Mr. DORNAN. No, it was in a medical museum 

Mr. Cole. A medical museum. 

Mr. DORNAN. A medical school in Vinh. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DoRNAN. They could see the little holes drilled in all the pi- 
lot's bones. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. Do you know the sidebar story to that? 

Mr. Cole. No. 

Mr. DORNAN. They told the family this. They bit the bullet and 
said, **Your son's bones hung in a medical school for x-number of 
years, all wired together, and was used in this class as American 
remains," and the family grieves over that. The father gnashes his 
teeth. He passes on and then they come back to the family and say, 
"Excuse me, we were wrong. It was not your son," and then they 
have to go tell the other family that it was your son. I mean, that 
is the kind of screw-up that went on in the early years. 

Mr. Cole. There is one example after the other of that sort of 

The point that I am trying to make here is that the Vietnamese 
who dealt with these remains showed a certain level of anthropo- 
logical sophistication derivative from France. It was not their own. 
You could say that they learned how to deal with remains from the 

Then we go to Korea. Five years ago, you look at the condition 
of the remains, and I document this in my RAND report. It is the 
first place, by the way, that any photographs have ever been pub- 
lished. It is an oddball thing, that 

Mr. DORNAN. From Korea. 

Mr. Cole. Korea. The Department of Defense will not allow 
these bones to be photographed, they say for privacy reasons, but 
I can go out to the National Archives and see film by name of Ko- 
rean war KIA's being embalmed. 

Mr. DoRNAN, That are identifiable. I saw those. 

Mr. Cole. Yes. I can do that, but I cannot publicize these re- 
mains that the North Koreans appear to be obtaining from ancestor 
worship yards. 


The point here is, the North Koreans showed absolutely no train- 
ing, no sophistication, no nothing. I spent a lot of time with the last 
East German Ambassador to Pyongyang trying to understand his 
experience in Pyongyang and what was going on here. He just 
looked at me and with this — kind of laughed and said, "Dr. Cole, 
if you want bones, they will give you bones." He says, "That is the 
way they look at it." 

So I cannot stress strongly enough that there was absolutely no 
similarity between the Vietnamese exploitation of these remains 
and the North Korean 5 years ago. 

I do know, and no one ever told me this was classified — maybe 
it is — ^but I was told the North Vietnamese charged a site visit, to 
go visit a crash site, the price tag was $450,000. 

Mr. DORNAN. North Vietnam or North Korea? 

Mr. Cole. North Vietnam. 

Mr. DoRNAN. North Vietnam? 

Mr. Cole. North Vietnam. Well, Vietnam. 

Mr. DORNAN. They charged $450,000? 

Mr. Cole. Yes, just to go visit the site. Up until a couple years 
ago, remains obtained from Korea, there was never any question of 
compensation or anything. In my own view, the fact that the 
DPMO announced that they are going to go visit a crash site, we 
have taught the North Koreans how to exploit us. 

Mr. DORNAN. That is the answer to my question. 

Mr. Cole. Five years ago, they were clueless. We have told them 
how to do it. We paid them almost $1 million for remains that have 
no scientific relationship to Americans. Their own scientists at 
CILHI, and I commissioned a study from the two heads, the two 
forensic anthropologists 

Mr. DORNAN. But as I was corrected by one of the colonels in uni- 
form yesterday, "Oh, no, we do all this in Hanoi now. It does not 
happen in Hawaii. They do not get the free trip to Hawaii any 

Mr. Cole. It may be. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Cole. But the point I am trying to get across here is, once 
again, facts are stubborn things and research is research. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Then we do not get skulls. 

Mr. Cole. From North Korea? 

Mr. DORNAN. From Vietnam. There are no more skulls from Viet- 
nam. It is all chips now. 

Mr. Cole. No. North Korea, the only thing we get are big bones. 
There is never any screening. It is so consistent. I had an anthro- 
pologist look at these North Korean bones and he said, "You know 
what this looks like? This looks like stuff that was collected from 
Indian reservations in the 1930s by WPA." He says, "It is the same 
thing." If you just send people out to look for bones, they see a 
skull and go, hey, look, pick it up. It breaks the mandible off. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Cole. Eighty-five percent of the remains we get back from 
North Korea have the face smashed out. That is where you can tell 
race. The remains are older — and I tried to explain this to some- 
body at DPMO once. Statistics can be useful, particularly if you do 
a distribution of one population, you look at the standard devi- 


ations, and if you go back and take another sample, random sample 
from that population, it should have the same distribution. 

I took where the North Koreans said they found these remains 
and looked up who was lost there, which Americans died in that 
area. We can document that. I put together the distribution by 
height and by age and then made the same distribution by height 
and age of the remains that the North Koreans say they found 
there. The average age of the American lost in these areas was 22 
years. The average age of what the North Koreans turned over was 
almost 30 years old. The average height — ^you know, Americans 
tend to be taller than Asians on average — was about 5 feet 10 
inches. The average height of these remains from North Korea was 
down around 5'6", 5'7" inches. 

So I said, look, you are paying them $1 million for these bones 
that they got out of ancestor worship jars. 

Mr. DORNAN. So they are Korean bones and that is why there are 
no skulls. 

Mr. Cole. No; we get skulls from Korea. We get lots of skulls, 
but the faces are smashed out. The mandibles are missing. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Right, though you can separate an African heritage 
by the back of the skull and by the thickness of the skull, but an 
Asian, it is by the facial area? 

Mr. Cole. It is the Mongolian features. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:] 



To: Mr. Norman D. Kass, DPMO 

From: E>r. Paul M. Cole, Vice President for Government Programs, Defense Forecasts, Inc. 
Subject: This memorandum transmits and lists the Soviet era archives obtained by DFI. 
Date: March 17, 1994 


This section summarizes the origins of the archive research effort which produced the 
Soviet era documents attached to this interim report to the Department of Defense Prisoner- 
of-War Missing-in-Action Office (DPMO). 

In 1991, Dr. Paul M. Cole, now Vice President for Government Programs at Defense 
Forecasts, Inc. (DFI) in Washington, DC, was introduced in a letter written by Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney to Soviet audiorities as the principal researcher on a Department of 
Defense study of archival records relating to the loss of U.S. service members who were 
unrepatriated prisoners-of-war (POW) or missing-in-action (MIA) during the Korean War. 
(Attachment 1.) With this introduction in hand. Dr. Cole established in Moscow with the 
cooperation of a range of Soviet officials one of the first post-Cold War research projects 
focusing on the archives of the Soviet era. 

In March 1992, Secretary Cheney wrote to the Commander-in-Chief of the QS Armed 
Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov to thank him for his assistance in 
establishing Dr. Cdle's research effort in Soviet era archives. (Attachment 2.) Secretary 


Cheney wrote the following: 

In December 1991, an important step was made toward the resolution of an 
issue that has complicated our bilateral relations for over 40 years. With your 
assistance, a number of your subordinates have created a procedure to examine 
POW/MIA issues in the foimer Soviet archives. 

Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote in a March 1992 letter to Secretary Cheney (Attachment 3.), 

I share your concern over the fate of your fellow countrymen who disappeared 
or perished in World War n, over the course of the Korean War, the war in 
Viemam and the Cold War. 

In connection to your request, v/otk is being carried out in the archives of the military 
in records related to this problem. 

As a result of the archival research which began under the auspices of the American Secretary 

of Defense and the Soviet Minister of Defense (who later became the Commander-in-Chief of 

the CIS Armed Forces) and was continued at DFI in Washington, EXT, significant findings 

relating to the fate of American POW-MIAs from the Korean War have been made in Soviet 

era archives. 

The purpose of this project's archive research in Moscow was, in Secretary (Theney's 

words, to obtain "access to records that can help account for missing Americans." This 

objective was achieved successfully. Research, which was sustained for over two years, 

produced significant findings which respond directly to the original purpose of this project 

(By agreement with DPMO, DFI's research into Soviet era archives located in Russia ended 

on March 31, 1994.) The information in the Soviet era documents provided in this report 

clearly links, without doubt or ambiguity, Soviet authorities with American POW/MlAs in the 

Korean War. Further, there is ample evidence that Soviet era archives contain information 

that can contribute to the resolution of the fates of American POW/MIAs from the Korean 



Formal Submission of Documents 

This interim report, associated with DFI's DoD-sponsored project "POW-MIA 
Research in Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Berlin," is a formal submission to the 
DoD/DPMO of the documents, a total of 207 pages, obtained as a result of DFI's research 
effort in Soviet era archives. Included in this collection are letters written by Russian citizens 
who reported first-hand knowledge of American citizens allegedly sighted in the Soviet Gulag 
system. Some of the documents included in this report were previously provided to DPMO 
on a background basis. The documents submitted in this report supercede those previously 

The Soviet era documents as they appear in this interim report constitute DFI's formal 
submission of these documents to DPMO. DFI obtained these Soviet era documents under 
the terms of the Cheney-Shaposhnikov agreement 

These documents arc not to be released before March 31, 1994. 

Assessment and Conclusions 

Since 1991, the U.S. government has had access to Soviet era archives through four 
principal sources. 

• In December 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was given archive material 
related to POW/MIA issues by Soviet authorities. This was, ^parendy. a cme time 
document transfer. 


In late March 1992, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs was 
established The archive research associated with this Commission is on-going. 

• From time to time, private researchers working in Moscow obtain documents related to 
POW/MIA issues. 

At the request of the Department of Defense, in December 1991 the author of this 
study created an archive research team in Moscow. This research effort continued 
until March 31. 1994. 

The content of the records obtained by Secretary Baker, some of the material acquired by 

private researchers and an unknown portion of the documents produced by the Joint 

Commission have been made available to the public either in full or in summaries. With the 

exception of President Boris Yeltsin's remarkable letter to the U.S. Senate in June 1992 

regarding POW/MIA affairs, the Russian government has taken public positions on 

POW/MIA issues based on the documents obtained by the Russian side of the Joint 


The Russian government's position may derive fmrn the documentation which Joint 
Commission researchers located in Soviet era archives. (President Yeltsin's June 1992 letter 
on POW/MIAs, in contrast, was not supported by any primary source evidence from Soviet 
era archives.) Since the Joint Commission was established as a high-level govemment-to- 
govemment effort, it follows that Commission researchers in Moscow would focus their 
research effort on high-level Soviet era documentation. 

This type of Soviet documentation may not contain the evidence American authorities 
need in order to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues. At a high level, U.S. government 
documents often contain little operational information. One could reasonably conclude that 
similar events occurred in the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1950s. 


Another factor may explain why the DFI documents contain details that are not found 

in material obtained by Secretary Baker or located by Joint Commission researchers. In the 
United States, the Department of State is the government agency that most closely follows the 
National Archive rules with respect to marking documents for archival purposes. The three 
copies of documents prepared for top political leadership (President, Vice President, Secretary 
of State) are usually clean when submitted to the principal decisionmakers, e.g., the 
documents routinely have no distribution lists or routing instructions. Markings for archival 
purposes are added to this type of State Department document only after these documents 
have been read by the designees. If Soviet archivists followed similar steps, this would 
explain the absence of routing sheets and distribution lists on any high-level Soviet era 
documents provided to Secretary Baker and the Joint Commission. 

The archive research that produced the records attached to this report focused on 
operational files at a relatively low level within the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus one finds on 
these documents the regisd-ation marks and classification markings, routing slips and 
distribution lists intact. (Some of these marks have been redacted much in the same way 
documents from the U.S. National Archives arc sanitized for public release.) If the Joint 
Commission's researchers focused on searching high-level records, this could explain why 
detailed information contained in the records obtained by DFI through its research team in 
Moscow contain information that, in some cases, contradicts the position taken by the Russian 

This background may explain why the documents submitted with this report contradict 
the position taken by the Russian government that, among other things, Soviet forces in Korea 


had no direct or systematic contact with American POW/MIAS. DFI's document collection 
shows, in contrast, that Soviet forces in Korea: 

• Organized and maintained direct, systematic contact with American POW/MIAs from 
the earliest days of the war. 

Interrogated American POW/MIAS directly using Soviet personnel and indirectly 
through the use of North Korean and Chinese personnel. 

• Deployed search teams whose mission was to locate the wreckage of American aircaft 
in order to transport instruments and other materiel to Soviet aerospace design and 
research bureaus in the USSR. 

• Transported American POW/MIAs in the custody of Soviet forces, though in these 
documents the destinations are not named. 

• Reported the results of interrogations of Americans and other data relating to 
American POW/MIAs to the highest levels of the Soviet government, including the 

There is much more information in these documents, but it will take more time to complete 

the analysis of them. 

Some of the atuched documents have been reduced in size in order to present them in 

a standard 8.S x 11 format Documents that show lines missing or lost characters at the end 

of lines were received in this form from Moscow. DFI received no originals, but only 

photocopies Soviet era documents. 


Documents Attached To This Report 

Attachment 1. 

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Dr. Paul M. Cole, December 
10, 1991. 1 page. 

Attachment 2. 

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Commander-in-Chief of the 
CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, March 12, 1992. 
1 page. 

Attachment 3. 

Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of 
Aviation Ye. 1. Shaposhnikov to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, March 18, 
1992. 1 page. 

Attachment 4. 

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shalin, January 13, 1951. 2 pages. 

Attachment 5. 

Telegram from.Razuvaev to Vasilievskii and Shtemenko, January 21, 1951. 1 

Attachment 6. 

Telegram from R^auvafev to Shtemenko, December 16, 1951. 1 page. 
Attachment 7. 

Telegram from Postnikov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 1 page. 
Attachment 8. 

Telegram from Lobov to Kigarev and Krasovski, April 26, 1952. 2 pages. 

Attachment 9. 

Telegram from Lobov to Vasilievski, Zhigarev and Krasovski, May 7, 1952. 6 



Attachment 10. 

Telegram fix>m Bodrov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 2 pages. 
Attachment 11. 

Telegram firom Krasovski to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page. 

Attachment 12. 

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Batitskii from Belov, December 17, 
1950. 2 pages. 

Attachment 13. 

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 31, 1950. 4 

Attachment 14. 

Telegram from Krasovkskii to Zhigarev, November 11, 1950. 1 page. 

Attachment 15. 

Telegram from Merzhelikin to Schtemenko and Batitskii, November 26, 1950. 
3 pages. 

Attachment 16. 

Telegram from Belov and Mironov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 30, 
1950. 11 pages. 

Attachment 17. 

Fragments of interrogation records of American POWs and one Australian 
POW found in Soviet era archives. 

a. Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 1 page. 

b. Roland W. Parks, USAF. 2 pages. 

c. Charles McDonough, USAF. 2 pages. 

d. Frank Denstech, USAF. 2 pages. 

e. Edward G. Izbiky, USAF. 2 pages. 

f. Michael E. DeArmond, USAF. 2 pages. 

g. Donald W. Pinkstone, RAAF. 2 pages. 



Attachment 18. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 32 pages. 
Attachment 19. 

Partial interrogation protocol of Joseph F. Green, USAF. 6 pages. 
Attachment 20. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles W. Maultsby, USAF. 8 pages. 
Attachment 21. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Thomas L. Eyres, USAF. 5 pages. 

Attachment 22. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles E. Stahl, USAF. 46 pages 
including two maps. 

Attachment 23. 

Interrogation protocol cover page. 1 page. 
Attachment 24. 

Letter of transmittal, June 27, 1952. 1 page. 
Attachment 25. 

Telegram from Schtykov to Vyshinskiy, August 28, 1950. 8 pages. 

Attachment 26. 

Telegram fi-om Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, September 7, 1950. 1 cover page plus 
3 pages of text. 

Attachment 27. 

Telegram from Slyusarev to Bulganin and Zhigarev, December 21, 1954. 16 

Attachment 28. 



A collection of leaers sent to Borovoy. 24 pages. 

Attachment 29. 

Telegram from Kasovskii to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page. 



1 DEC 1991 

Dr. Paul Cole 

Rand Corporation 

Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 

Dear Dr. Cole: 

I am pleased to note that at the request of the 
Depsrtnent the RW-JD Corpcrat io.i has undertaken a study of 
archival records relating to the loss of 'J . S . Service .members 
rr.isslng-in-action (MIA) duri.ig the Korean Conflict. 

This letter should serve to introduce you as the 
principal researcher on this U.S. governrnent sponsored 
re2e^rc^ project/ which I consider to be of the Jt.'nost 
i~'^c rt.''.r. .~s . Thcuoh "cu sre ~?t ?. oo"?rr''"F''^t f^molcvee.. vour 
work with RAND on this study is of great interest to us, and 
we sincerely hope that you will receive all assistance 
necessary in carrying out your research. 

VJe will be especially appreciative of assistance by 
foreign governments which give you access to records that can 
help account for missing Americans. 





10 fleKadpfl 199 I r. 

JloKTopy nojiy Kayjiy 

?eKji. KopnopeM'jjeH 

CaHTa MoHHKa, CA 90407-2138 

JIonoroM jiOKTop Kayji! 

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1 2 MAR 1992 

Marshal of Aviation Ye. 1. Shaposhnikov 

Commander in Chief of the C.I.S. Armed Forces 

Ministerstvo Oborony K-160 



Dear Marshal Shaposhnikov: 

In December 1991, an important step was made toward the 
resolution of an Issue that has complicated our bilateral 
relations for over 40 years. With your assistance, a number 
of your subordinates have created a procedure to examine 
POW/MIA issues in the former Soviet archives. 

I would like to extend my thanks to Lt . General Leonid 
G. Ivashov for the cooperation he has extended to the RAND 
Corporation, under contract fro;n the Department of Defense, 
to carry out this important archival research. General 
Ivashov has offered the services of Colonel I. I. Kotliarov 
as well. 

Major General Anatoli Kharkov, Director of the Institute 
for Military History, has offered the resources and expertise 
of his staff. This is a welcome contribution to this effort. 

Finally, I would like to commend Colonel Valery Frontov, 
an officer on the General Staff, for the assistance he gave 
to the RAND research team during their visit to Moscow. I 
have been told that his work was essential. 

Wit>i these excellent people committed to the resolution 
of the POW/MIA issue, we should be able to make quick 
progress in our efforts. As Under Secretary Wolfowitz and 
you discussed, during his recent trip to Moscow, this is an 
issue of great importance to the U.S. government, and to all 
Americans. It is essential that we resolve all outstanding 
questions in this area. Your support will be indispensable 
as we work t,oward final resolution of this issue. 





.iOCV33, " ^^" M3pT£ IGS2 

yB3>:<aGi-mjil rocno;i:iH ^iHHHCto! 

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"xgjigaHo!; 3c::>:ri". 

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.oc~c:::;Hy .-"'[D/zy :s::h. 

r ._i3;-.:.— i 0.-. , /A.o. 


Moscow, March 18, 1992 

Dear Mr. Minister: 

I share your concern over the establishment of the fate of your fellow countrymen, who 
disappeared/perished (could be either) in World War II, over the course of the Korean War, the 
war in Vietnam and during the Cold War. 

In connection to your request, work is being carried out in the archives of the military 
depanment on the study of documents related to this problem. 

I hope for a positive outcome to this noble and humanitarian task. Upon the receipt of 
results, I will immediately contact you. 

E. Shaposhnikov 
Marshal of Aviation 






VOLUME 1: Moscow Research 

By: Dr. Paul M. Cole 
DFI International, 
Washington, DC 

October 27, 1994 
Revised February 1995 

1 Dupont Circle. NW 

iflh Floor 

Washington, DC 20036 • 1 109 

02 -785 -9041 

^AX 202 • 785 • 9034 

The views opinions, and findings conuined in this report are those of the author(s) and should not 

be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the US Government or any of its 

agencies, unless so designated by other official documentation. 


DFI International — Moscow Report 

Table of Contents 

Summary 3 

Background 3 

Puqjose 3 

Documents of Particular Interest 3 

Significant Findings • 1 

Photographs '5 

Why Findings May Differ 16 

Data Reference Point 17 

A. Soviet Air Force Records Associated With POW/MIAs 18 

A.l. Soviet-era Archive Data Relating to POW/MIAs by Name 18 

A.I.I. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown 1 9 
A. 1.2. "Colonel Shink" • 19 

A. 1.3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney 19 

A.1.4 2"''Lt."Flenk" 21 

A.1.5 ILt. JohnEllis 22 

A. 1 .6. Maj. "Andrew Robert Makken" (Canadian) 23 

A.1.7. Col. John Arnold 24 

A. 1 .8 Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller 25 

A. 1 .9 Captain Harold Edward Fischer 26 
A.1.10. "MacDonnal" 27 
A.l.ll."PaulNiss" 27 

B. 64th lAK and Other Soviet Archive Data Associated With POW/MIAs 28 

B. 1 . Pilot of F-86 Shot Down September 2,1951 29 
B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1951 29 
B.3. Interrogation of a Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951 30 
B.4. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952 31 
B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 1 1, 1952 31 
B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1, 1952 32 
B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4, 1952 33 
B.8. 1 F-86 shot down July 4, 1952 34 
B.9. Pilot of F-86 No. 15/24001, July 20, 1952 34 
B. 10. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952 34 
B.I 1. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952 35 
B.12. F-86 Pilot Shot Down, April 12, 1953 36 
B.13. F-84 Shot Down April 12, 1953 37 
B.14. -24. Interrogation of 1 1 B-29 Crew Members 37 
B.25-26. USAF BNR Cases from the July 4, 1952 B-29 Shoot Down 38 
B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin 38 

C. Soviet-era Archive Data on FOW/MIA Who May Have Died In Soviet Custody 

C.l Charles E. McDonough 
C.2 Captain Albert G. Tenney 


DFI International — Moscow Report 

D. Information Obtained from Soviet Veterans Associated With POW/MIAs 41 
D. 1 . Captain William D. Crone 41 
D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough 41 
D.3. Major George A. Davis 43 
D.4. Lt. Austin W. Beetle 44 
D.5. "Van Paul" 44 

E. Uncorrelated Information From Soviet Archives 44 

F. Change of C^'ualty Status Recommendations 46 

F. 1 . Albert Gilbert Tenney 48 

F.2. Deltis Fincher 49 

F.3. William Crone 49 

F.4. 1 Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis 49 

F.5. ILt. Henry D.Weese 49 

F.6. Airman 1 Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr. 49 

F.7. Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast 50 

F.8. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright 50 

F.9. ILt. Vance R.Frick 50 

F.IO. Five members of B-29 crew shot down September 13, 1952. 50 

F. 1 1 . 1 Lt, James Washington Wills Jr. 50 

F.12. ILt. Lennard Owan Deluna 50 

F.I3. ILt. Robert F. Niemann 51 

F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough 51 

F.15. Col. John R. Lovell 55 

F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis 55 

F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin 55 

F.I8. Lt. Laurence C. Layton 55 

F.I 9. ILt. Austin Beetle 56 

G. Unreported USAF Losses In Chinese Territory 56 

G.I. Deceptive USAF Reporting on Location of Losses 57 

H. Additional Research Required 64 

Appendix A. 64 lAK operational summaries in Russian and English. 66 

Appendix B. Documents obtained by DFI. 67 

Appendix C. Photographs 70 


DFI International ~ Moscow Report 



An overview of the entire project is included in the Executive Summary. Volume 1 
covers DFI International's archive research in Moscow. 

From October 1993 until March 31, 1994, DFI International sustained a modest 
archive research effort in Moscow. This parallel research, which was commissioned by 
DPMO to complement its support of the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs 
(USRJC), was also motivated by the lack of cooperation from Russian authorities. 

In accordance with DPMO's guidance, DFI's research was suspended on March 31, 
1 994 and all documents accumulated (ca. 200 pages) were turned over by DFI to DPMO 
on March 17, April 7, and June 18, 1994. 

In order to ensure the provenance of the data presented in this report, information 
deriving from Soviet-era archives (documents) is presented in a section separate from that 
based on information deriving from interviews with Soviet Air Force veterans who served 
during the Korean War. 

In accordance with the Eigreement between DFI and DPMO made at the final project 
briefing on October 18, 1994, duplicate copies of records which have already been given 
to DPMO are not included with this report. Archive materials which have been submitted 
to DPMO are considered to be part of this final report nonetheless. At the final project 
briefing on October 18, 1994, DPMO expressed no interest in obtaining additional 
archive material (interrogation records, Soviet military operational records, exploitation 
of POWs for propaganda purposes, etc.) from Soviet-era archives in Russia. 

Photographs which were obtained in Moscow from the Tass archives are included at 
Appendix C. These photographs were provided in the original to DPMO on April 1, 


The purpose of the archive research in Russia was to continue to locate previously 
classified files and other records in order to determine whether information concerning 
American citizens in general and American POW/MIAs in particular is stored in Soviet 
era archives located in Russia. 

Documents of Particular Interest 

The results of DFI's research in Moscow were positive in a number of areas. The 
Moscow research produced Soviet era documentation of great interest to DPMO and the 

• DFI obtained documents which the Russian side of the USRJC claims do not exist 
in Soviet-era archives. 


DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

• DFI obtained complete copies of documents which had been heavily and 
inexplicably redacted by the Russian side of the USRJC. 

• DFI's research in Moscow demonstrated without question that the Russian side of 
the USRJC was either withholding documents or incapable or unwilling to locate 
in Soviet era archives. 

The DFI document collection includes records of particular interest to the American side 
of the USRJC. 

Documents located by DFI's archive research team in Moscow are considered by 
DPMO and Joint Commission sources to be among the most significant obtained to date. 
Among the many documents obtained by DFI from Soviet-era archives, two documents 
and one record group attracted particular attention: 

• The so-called "262" document which is the final unit history of the Soviet 64 Air 
Corps' activities during the Korean War' ; 

• Two complete documents from the Soviet archives were obtained which pertain 
directly to Soviet reporting concerning the death of a USAF pilot (current casualty 
status MIA) during the Korean War; and 

• Approximately one hundred pages of handwritten daily logs of the Soviet 64 
Fighter Corps detailing combat operations in Korea. 

Some of DFI's documents were presented the Russian side or referred to at the Tenth 
Plenum Session of the USRJC. 

The DFI team in Moscow obtained daily operational summaries of the Soviet 64 
Fighter Aviation Corps (lAK). Daily Operational Summary reports for the Headquarters 
of the 64'*' lAK in Andung, China, which were obtained by DFI cover the 24 hour periods 
shown in Table 1 . 

This document, which was used as Talking Point #1 at the Tenth Plenum, is also referred to by the 
American side of the USRJC as Telegram No. 307717/Sh, December 21, 1954. See Tenth Plenum, p. 53 
and p. 82. The Russian side of the USRJC provided a version of this document to the American side. 


DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Table 1 

1951 1952 1953 

Soviet 64"* lAK Operational Summaries 

October 26 

January 7 

July 8 

January 13 

December 1 5 

January 8 

July 20 

January 23 

December 16 

May 3 

August 1 



August 22 

April 12 

June 11 

September 13 

June 21 

October 18 

July 4 

December 6 

The operational summaries were of particular interest to the American side of the 
USRJC. The 64* LAK operational summaries obtained by DFI were all given to DPMO, 
some as early as April 1994. Nearly three months after DFI delivered the 64 lAK 
records to DPMO, the American side of the USRJC twice asked the Russian side to 
provide daily operational records of the Soviet 64* lAK. During the Ninth Plenum of the 
USRJC, June 1-3, 1994, Commission Member Dr. Trudy Peterson asked the Russian side 
for "a copy of the daily reports of the 64th" Air Corps.^ Mr. Steven Pifer, Principal 
Deputy for Ambassador-at-Large for NIS also asked the Russian side, "We request copies 
of all the daily logs of the 64*- Fighter Aviation Corps.'" 

The American view, that there are valuable data points in the daily operational 
summaries, was not shared by the Russian side of the USRJC. Col. Alexander S. Orlov 
claims to have examined files which he describes as, "basically the day-to-day activities 
of the 64'". That is all."* Orlov, who offered no details or any other information 
concerning the content of these records, asserted these records are interesting, "but not for 
getting names."' This report shows that Orlov's claim is not accurate. 

Col. Viktor V. Mukhin also attempted to downplay the significance of the operational 
64*- lAK records, saying. 

Regarding these daily journals, the combat journals as they're called, they are summaries of activities 
that occurred, like historical documents. I don't think that there will be much of interest in them. 

The daily operational summaries of the Soviet 64 lAK are, in contrast to the views of 
Mukhin and Orlov, a rich source of information which can be used to resolve the fates of 
American USAF jjersonnel or to recommend a change of casualty status. A sample from 
this group of records for the twenty-four hour period ending at midnight, December 1 6, 
1 95 1 , follows in Russian and English translation. 

Ninth Plenum, p. 41. 

Ninth Plenum, closing session, p. 2. 

Ninth Plenum, p. 17. 
' Eighth Plenum, p. KW- 10. 
*NinthPlenum, p. 41. 

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[TFR 263-1) 
[This document handwritten in its entirety.) 
[Pages 2 and 3 of 4 are missing.) 

No. 1227/k 280 

Top Secret 
To Moscow, Comrade S.M. Shepenko 
Comrade P . F . Zhigarev 
Copy to Peking, Comrade S.A. Krasovkij 

Operational summary No. 0382. 64th lAK HQ, Antung. 
Dated 16 Dec 51 2400. Map scale 500,000-1, 1941. 


1. On 16 Dec 51, corps' air assets on airfield stand-by 
intercepted enemy aircraft during the day, providing air cover 
for targets in the Antung -Tcibin- An ju area. 

82 combat sorties were flown totalling 68 hours and 53 
minutes. Of these, the 303rd IAD conducted 46 sorties totalling 
37 hours 45 minutes and the 324th IAD conducted 36 sorties 
totalling 31 hours 8 minutes. 

Corps staff conducted one sortie and engaged enemy fighters 
once. There were no enemy or friendly losses. A total of 449 
shells were expended: 58 N-37's and 152 NS-23's by the 303rd 
IAD; 69 N-37's and 170 NS-23's by the 324th IAD. 


ITFR 263-2] 
4. 283 

Of the 324th IAD's 54 MIG-15's, 11 are not combat ready (1 
is undergoing preventative mainteneuice ; 5 require replacement 
engines; 2 need engine repairs; and 3 are under repair) . There 
are 79 fliers - 54 are combat ready, (of these, 4 are at HQ; 6 
are unpaired) 19 are ill, euid 6 are on R&R. There are 38 combat 
ready aircraft. 


1. Enemy aircraft did enter the Antung AAA zone of fire, 
thus the 92nd AAAO did not fire. 

2. On the night of 15-16 Dec Sl. at 1925, one B-29 conducted 
reconnaissance on the Tod)in and Napsi airfields at an altitude of 
6300m. At 1215 on 16 Dec 51, 2 F-86's flew across the AAA zone of 
fire at an altitude of 2000m. Units of the 87th AAAD fired on 
all of the enemy aircraft. 66 88inm and 202 37mm shells were 
expended. There were no enemy or friendly losses. 

3 . Fighting strength and the locations of the AAA units are 
unchanged . 

Interrogation of two Americaua prisoners of war, F-86 pilots 
shot down by Corpg' pilota in dogfights on 24 Oct 51, has 
revealed that the enemy has two pilots for each F-86 aircraft. 
This apparently is done to increase the number of personnel 
receiving battle experience and to decrease the workload of each 

[signature 'Rolf Suslin"] (R. Suslin) 
17 Dec 51 [signature "Yataev"] 


DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Significant Findings 

According to DPMO, most of the 200-plus pages of Soviet-era archive material 
submitted by DFI to DPMO had not been fully analyzed or assessed by DPMO as of 
October 1994. In light of this, DFI reviewed the minutes of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
USRJC Plenum Sessions in order to assess the degree to which data contained in archival 
material obtained in Moscow compare to positions taken by the Russian side of the 
USRJC. In order to be comprehensive, documents obtained during the current project, 
plus other documents obtained previously from Soviet-era archives and submitted to 
DPMO, are discussed or referred to in this report. 

Among the significant findings deriving from the comparison between Soviet era 
documents and the record of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Plenum Sessions are the 

1 . Soviet records obtained by DFI contain information which is apparently sufficient 
for a change of casualty recommendation for approximately 29 Korean War 
POW/MIA cases. 

2. Soviet Air Force records contradict the summary of Korean War shoot downs 
summarized, allegedly from primary source material, and presented as fact by the 
Russian side of the USRJC.' 

3. The Russian side of the USRJC claims to be unable to locate information in 64* 
lAK files concerning any USAF personnel on the USAF list of 187 MIA/POWs 
from the Korean War (AFM 200-25)' DFI's research in 64"^ lAK files located 
information by name concerning at least one USAF MIA from the 200-25 list and 
could link one other name from the 200-25 list to Soviet records. 

4. Col. Aleksandr Orlov claims that Soviet forces involved in interrogating 
American POW/MlAs in Korea, when reporting results of the interrogation of 
American POWs in Korea, "we never listed source. We would just go ahead and 
say, according to testimony provided by prisoners of war, the following 
information was acquired.'" The records of the 64"" lAK demonstrate that 
Orlov's claim is incorrect. 

5. Many Soviet records, including the 64'*' lAK operational summaries, refer by 
name to American POW/MIAs and to specific USAF aircraft registration 
numbers. The fates of individuals may be determined from these primary source 

'SeeTFR 180. 

' At the Ninth Plenum of the USRJC, Col. Orlov stated, "We have looked at all the files regarding 64th 
Fighter Aviation Corps." Col. Mukhin, when asked by Congressman Johnson, "Nothing on the 187 
names?" replied, "No nothing." Ninth Plenum, p. 17. 
Ninth Plenum, p. 37. 


DFI International — Moscow Report 

6. Though Soviet reporting refers by name and date to many interrogations of 
American POWs, records of these interrogations have not been provided by the 
Russian side of the USRJC. 

7. Some of the interrogation records of American POW/MIAs during the Korean 
War obtained by DFI v/ae not provided by the Russian side of the USRJC to the 
American side. The existence of these records contradicts statements such as 
those by Cols. Mukhin and Orlov who explain the discrepancy between the large 
number of USAF POWs who passed through a Soviet interrogation point (262) 
and the small number of interrogation records provided (ca. 56). Mukhin and 
Orlov claim sidditional interrogation records do not exist because they were never 
forwarded to headquarters. This is not true. 

8. Col. Orlov claims that the Russian side could only locate interrogation records 
from 1952-1953 because this is when the interrogation process became more 
"formalized."'" Yet the eleven page Soviet interrogation of USAF Capt. 
Lawrence Bach, whose F-86 was shot down in December 1950, has been in the 
public domain for over two years. This interrogation record, which was circulated 
to the entire Soviet Politbureau, including Stalin, resulted from an interrogation 
conducted "by a representative of Comrade Mironov." A four-page December 30 
Soviet interrogation summary of fiirther interrogations of Bach was sent to 
Moscow on December 31, 1950. Orlov is aware of the Bach interrogation, since 
it is included in a RAND report Orlov referred to more than one half dozen times 
at the Tenth Plenum." 

9. At the Ninth Plenum, Col. Mukhin claimed, "I don't believe that our military 
command structure allowed the MGB access to the [USAF] pilots in China, or in 
Korea. ... On the basis of documents, we have nothing at all regarding this 
issue. '"^ At the Tenth Plenum, Mukhin dropped all references to the lack of 
MGB activity on Chinese territory. Documents obtained by DFI and the USRJC 
show that the Soviet command structure not only permitted MGB access to USAF 
POW/MIAs, but in some cases requested MGB participation in interrogations in 
China. This may explain the difference between Mukhin' s beliefs expressed at 
the Ninth and Tenth Plenum sessions. 

10. Col. Vyacheslav P. Mazurov stated that as a result of an order signed by Stalin in 
1 949 which harmed Soviet intelligence operations, "the proposal from the 
intelligence leadership to set up operations targeting American POWs in Korea 
did not receive any support from our political circles. . . . Both the Koreans and 
Chinese refiised to allow the Soviet intelligence service to conduct these types of 
activities on the territory of Korea."" The Soviet intelligence organizations did 
so anyway. As previously documented, Soviet intelligence organs made efforts to 

'"Ninth Plenum, p. 36. 

" The first page from Bach's interrogation record, which clearly shows the December 1950 date, 
appears in POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1 (RAND, MR-351/1 USDP, 1992), p. 168. 
'^NinthPlenum, p. 35. 
" Tenth Plenum, p. 26. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

recruit agents among prisoners held in POW camps in North Korea. Soviet MVD 
specialists were summoned by the Soviet armed forces to interrogate American 
POWs in China. 

11. Col. Mazurov asserted in reference to a RAND report, that George Blake said, "he 
knows of incidents where the KGB worked with POWs." Blake never said such a 
thing and this statement does not appear in any report, including the one referred 
to by Mazurov. 

12. Col. Mazurov asserts that the individuals on the 510 list "have no connection with 
the foreign intelligence service. We did not deal with these people.'"^ In fact, the 
KGB dealt with many of the people on the 510 as a cover for talking with Blake. 

13. Col. Mazurov claims that the names on the so-called 510 list were produced by 
"more than one search group from my service," and that the list is complete. Yet 
the 510 list, allegedly derived from KGB files, does not contain the name of 
George Blake, though Blake's office clerk and the name of every other civilian 
captured with Blake is included. Mazurov should be asked why the only person 
known by name to have had direct contact with the KGB—indeed, Blake was 
recruited by the KGB while in a POW camp—is missing from the 510." 

14. Mr. K.S. Nikishkin claims "there are no documents in the Navy files" concerning 
the shoot down of the USAF RB-50 on July 29, 1953." A July 1953 telegram 
from Admiral N. Kuznetsov, counter-signed by Rear-Admiral Yakovlev, Director 
of Operations of the Navy General Staff, was sent to the Navy Commander-in- 
Chief and to the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade 
N.A. Bulganin. Another telegram was sent by Admiral Kuznetsov to USSR 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade V. M. Molotov on July 29, 1953. Another 
telegram was sent from Admiral Kuznetsov to Marshal Bulganin on July 29. All 
of these telegrams concerned the shoot down of the RB-50 on July 29, 1953.'' 

15. Col. Sergei Osipov asserted, in reference to the July 29, 1953 shoot down of a 
USAF RB-50, "among those documents which have been discovered to date there 
is no documentary evidence that there were any survivors in the case."" In fact, 
at least three reports from N. Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Soviet Navy, to Marshal 
A. Bulganin, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union and V. M. Molotov, USSR 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, describe in great detail the downing of the RB-50. 
On July 29, 1953, Admiral Kuznetsov reported to Minister Molotov, "The US 
SB-29 plane flew out to the area of the proposed fall of the B-50 plane, and at 

Tenth Plenum, p. 29. 

" Mazurov said that Blake was "the well-known British agent," when in fact Blake was a Soviet agent. 
Tenth Plenum, p. 27. 

"Ninth Plenum, p. 18. 

' The telegrams cited here, which were all transferred to DPMO in the original Russian and English 
translation in 1993, are not duplicated in this report. According to Soviet intercepts of US Pacific Fleet 
communications, a US SB-29 search plane "reported to base about locating B-50 wreck, a rescue boat and 
seven men floating near the boat." 

" Tenth Plenum, p. 119. 


DFI International - Moscow Report 

20:29 hours reported to base about locating the B-50 wreckage, a rescue boat and 
seven men floating near the boat" 

16. Col. Orlov continues to assert that Soviet forces were forbidden to have direct 
contact with American POWs during the Korean War." Col. Orlov should be 
asked to explain why the Soviet officer, a Buryat Mongol named Kolya 
Monkuyev who impersonated a Chinese, systematically interrogated American 
POWs. Col. Orlov should be asked how his version of the ban on direct contact 
squares with the testimony of Col. Valentin S. Golobov who said, "According to 
Air Force traditions, the pilot who was shot down meets the pilot who shot him 
down."^" How does this systematic, direct contact fit into the alleged "no contact" 

1 7. Col. Orlov claims there was no contact between "foreigners and any of our 
people." Orlov cites the experience at Poltava during World War II as evidence of 
this policy.^' Col. Orlov should be asked to explain why the Soviet security 
services maintained surveillance of over 700 American servicemen at Poltava, 
with special attention given to Americans with Russian, Jewish, or otherwise 
"suspicious" surnames.^ 

1 8. Col. Orlov said, "The Rand report cites General Lobov's remark that 70 
investigative groups had been created. Lobov didn't say investigative groups, but 
search groups."" Orlov's observation is incorrect on two counts. First, how 
would Orlov know what the now-deceased general said in an interview where 
Orlov was not present? Second, the report in question does not cite a "remark," 
rather, it cites a telegram that the commander of the 64* Air Corps, General 
Lobov, sent to Moscow in 1952." In this telegram, Lobov referred to "search- 
group expeditions. . . On the average, 70 Soviet servicemen participate daily in 
our search groups."" 

1 9. The Russian side of the USRJC suggested it would be useful to find a veteran who 
participated in the Soviet search teams in Korea. DFI located and interviewed a 
veteran who was a member of such a search group during the Korean War. 

20. Lt. Col. Sergei 1. Chuvashin stated that Corps-level operational summaries which 
were forwarded to the Command directorate stated, "as a rule, these reports 
covered 10-day and 1 -month periods."^' In contrast to this claim, both Corps and 

Tenth Plenum, passim and p. 35. 

^° Tenth Plenum, p. 62. 

^' Tenth Plenum, p. 44. 

'' The KGB surveillance list of over 700 American servicemen is included in DFI's report on Ukraine. 

" Tenth Plenum, p. 55. 

^* Decoded Telegram Number 501817/sh (Top Secret), Lobov to Comrades A. M. Vasilevskij, P. F. 
Kigarev, and S. A. Kxasovskij, May 7, 1952. This telegram is fully cited and the correct terminology used 
in the document referred to by Orlov. 

" The American side of die USRJC has also referred incorrectly to "70 search groups," rather than 70 
servicemen. Ninth Plenum, p. 29. 

'"Tenth Plenum, p. 70. 



DFl International - Moscow Report 

Division-level reporting occurred on a daily basis. Chuvashin further stated that 
these reports would therefore refer only to "aircraft types." In fact, the daily 
reports contain registration numbers of US aircraft and the names of USAF 

21 . Col. Orlov claims that US records are confused concerning Albert G. Tenney's 
rank." This is not true. Tenney was a First Lieutenant when he was shot down 
on May 3, 1952. Tenney, whose casualty status has been MIA since May 3, 1952, 
was promoted to Captain, per Special Order 62, on April 1, 1953. Thus Tenney is 
referred to as First Lieutenant in contemporary casualty reports and as a Captain 
in current POW/MIA lists, such as the CILHI data base. What Orlov cannot 
explain is why Tenney, who was a First Lieutenant when the Soviet report on 
Tenney was written, is referred to as Captain in the Soviet records dated May 3, 
1952. In other words, Soviet records refer to First Lieutenant Tenney as Captain 
Tenney one year before Tenney was promoted to Captain}* 

22. Col. Orlov claims, "There is not a single document signed by Razuvaev that 
concerns POWs. that have [sic] been found in the military archives."" Two 
documents obtained by DFI, signed by Razuvaev, refer directly to Major General 
William Dean, the highest-ranking American POW captured during the Korean 
War.'° Razuvaev not only signed these documents, he sent one of them to the 
entire Politburo, including Stalin. 

23. Col. Orlov asserts that "Amirov, who said that he saw a rail car with prisoners in 
Alma-Ata, repudiated his testimony, saying that he was misunderstood."^' Major 
Valerie Amirov neither said this nor ever retracted such a comment. 


DFLs research team searched Tass records for photographs relating to POW/MIAs. 
On April 21, 1994, DFI forwarded to DPMO the original of 23 photographs obtained 
fi-om Tass photo archives. These photographs clearly show American POW/MIAs from 
the Korean and Vietnam Wars. (Photos of POW/MIAs were also obtained by the 
Ukraine research team. See Volume 2 of this report.) 

The provenance of these photographs, which was once in doubt, is now clearly 
established to be Russian. Two photographs located in the Tass archives appeared in Life 
magazine on May 1 1, 1953 in a story entitled, "Secret Photos from the Red Korea of 
1950-Some GIs Not On Exchange List." One of the Life photographs was clear taken 
seconds after one of the photos located in the Tass archives. The Life editors reported. 

To Life last week came a group of photographs which, for the first time, break into the oldest and most 
biner mystery of the Korean War. Checked, clearly authentic, but taken under circumstances so 

Tenth Plenum, p. 79. 
'TFR 76-37. 
'Tenth Plenum, p. 85. 
'TFR 148-3 and TFR 148-8. 
'TenthPlenum, p. 91. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

strange and perilous that tiieir source cannot be revealed even yet, the pictures have been hidden for 
nearly three years. They show what befell the first American soldiers taken captive by the Reds in the 
first full, black month of the war. What has happened to them since in the Red retreats and prison 
camps is not known. . . . 

The pictures were taken near and in Seoul on July 18, 21, and 22 of 1950, two weeks after the first 
Americans went into battle. They carry no identification of individuals, but the Americans shown 
must have come fh>m the 24th Infantry Division, first and until July 20 the only US unit committed in 
Korea. Probably they are from the 19th or 34th Regiments. 

Copies of these photographs are attached to the end of this report in Appendix C. 

Why Findings May Differ 

An important question is why DFI's findings differ so greatly from those of the 
USRJC. The answer appears to lie in the difference between archival research conducted 
by official and private researchers. The content of the records obtained by Secretary 
Baker, some of the material acquired by private researchers and an unknown portion of 
the documents produced by the Joint Commission have been made available to the public 
either in fiiU or in summaries. With the exception of President Boris Yeltsin's 
remarkable letter to the U.S. Senate in June 1992 regarding POW/MIA affairs, the 
Russian government has taken public positions on POW/MIA issues based on the 
documents obtained by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. 

The position of the Russian side of the USRJC may derive from the documentation 
which Joint Commission researchers located in Soviet era archives. (President Yeltsin's 
June 1992 letter on POW/MIAs, in contrast, was not supported by any primary source 
evidence from Soviet era archives.) Since the Joint Commission was established as a 
high-level govemment-to-govemment effort, it follows that Commission researchers in 
Moscow would focus their research effort on high-level Soviet era documentation. 

This type of Soviet documentation may not contain the evidence American authorities 
need in order to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues. At a high level, U.S. government 
documents often contain little operational information. One could reasonably conclude 
that similar events occurred in the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1950s. 

Another factor may explain why the DFI documents contain details that are not found 
in material obtained by Secretary Baker or located by Joint Commission researchers. In 
the United States, the Department of State is the government agency that most closely 
follows the National Archive rules with respect to marking documents for archival 
purposes. The three copies of documents prepared for top political leadership (President, 
Vice President, Secretary of State) are usually clean when submitted to the principal 
decisionmakers, e.g., the documents routinely have no distribution lists or routing 
instructions. Markings for archival purposes are added to this type of State Department 
document only after these documents have been read by the designees. If Soviet 
archivists followed similar steps, this would explain the absence of routing sheets and 
distribution lists on any high-level Soviet era documents provided to Secretary Baker and 
the Joint Commission. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

The archive research that produced the records attached to this report focused on 
operational files at a relatively low level within the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus one finds 
on these documents the registration marks and classification markings, routing slips and 
distribution lists intact. (Some of these marks have been redacted much in the same way 
documents from the U.S. National Archives are sanitized for public release.) If the Joint 
Commission's researchers focused on searching high-level records, this could explain 
why detailed information contained in the records obtained by DFI through its research 
team in Moscow contain information that, in some cases, contradicts the position taken 
by the Russian leadership. Perhaps the structure of the USRJC, which is a Presidential 
commission, is too formal for the type of archival research required. 

This background may explain why the documents submitted with this report 
contradict the position taken by the Russian side of the USRJC that, among other things, 
Soviet forces in Korea in general and Soviet intelligence services in particular had no 
direct or systematic contact with American POW/MIAs. 

Data Reference Point 

Whenever possible, CILHI data are used in this report, particularly for current 
casualty status. Thus the rank of an individual MIA when lost usually differs from the 
rank in current CILHI records due to the fact MIAs were often promoted in abstentia. 



DFl International — Moscow Report 

A. Soviet Air Force Records Associated With POW/MIAs 

Soviet archives contain information which is related directly, in some cases by name, 
to American POW/MIA cases from the Korean War. In other cases, information from 
Soviet sources ()ertaining to USAF aircraft losses may be related to specific individuals 
by correlating the Soviet information with USAP records. Two facts which derive from 
the analysis of Soviet Air Force records deserve particular attention: 

First, some USAF casualty records (293 files) contain information concerning the 
location of crash sites which was not reported completely or, in some cases, accurately by 
eyewitnesses. The purpose of the incomplete reporting was, according to Korean War 
veterans, to conceal the fact that USAF pilots made unauthorized combat flights into the 
territory of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Evidence concerning the presence of 
USAF combat and reconnaissance aircraft in PRC airspace presented in this report 
derives, in part, from Soviet and American veterans of the Korean War. Documentation 
from primary source Soviet Air Force records is included in this analysis." 

Second, there is a one hour time difference in Soviet and American reporting. When 
reading American records, subtract one hour to match Soviet records. When reading 
Soviet records, add one hour to match American records." 

A.l. Soviet-era Archive Data Relating to POW/MIAs by Name 

The daily operational summaries and telegrams from the Korean combat theater to 
Moscow prepared by the Soviet 64* Fighter Corp include references to American 
POW/MIAs by name. This section examines the Soviet information in order to determine 
whether Soviet reporting is accurate. If Soviet reporting which refers to American 
POW/MIAs by name is accurate, then this suggests that other Soviet records which are 
not as explicit contain accurate information as well. 

The names found in the Soviet records, shown as they appear in the original text, are 
the following: 

A. 1 . 1 . Sergeant Herbert D. Brown 

A. 1.2. "Colonel Shink" 

A. 1 .3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney 

A. 1.4. 2"^^. "Flenk" 

A. 1.5. ILt. John Ellis 

Telegram No. 481/k from Suslin in Andung, China to Comrades S. M. Shtenenko and P. F. Zhigarev 
in Moscow and Comrade S. A. Krasovskij in Beijing (Top Secret), April 9, 1952. "The enemy air force, in 
separate pairs and groups of four F-86s, systematically violates the border of the People's Republic of 
China and tries to attack our pismes reaching the area of the airfields. According to preliminary data, five 
F-86s were shot down over Chinese territory by units of the corps. Of those, two F-86s were found in the 
region ten kilometers north-northeast of Chandyan'khehkou. The pilots perished, one F-86 made a landing 
south of the island of Sin-to and sank, the remains are being searched for." 

The time difference is most likely explained by the fact USAF operations in Korea were recorded in 
Tokyo, Japan time (Zulu plus nine hours) while the Soviet times were recorded in Mukden, China time 
(Zulu plus eight, or one hour behind Tokyo time). 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

A. 1.6. Maj. "Andrew Robert Makken" 

A. 1.7. Col. John Arnold 

A.1 .8. Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller 

A. 1.9. Captain Harold Edward Fischer 

A. 1 . 1 0."MacDonnal" 


A.1.1. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown 

A September 23, 1951 telegram from Arkov to Zakharov^ details an interrogation of 
Sergeant Herbert D. Brown, 307* Bomber Wing, who was taken prisoner in the region of 

According to DPMO's Korean War specialist. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown's status is 

Conclusion: The telegram, though brief, is further indication of the Soviet system for 
extracting intelligence from American POWs in Korea. 

A.1.2. "Colonel Shink" 

In Operational Summary No. 00132 of the Headquarters of the 64* lAK in Andung 
for the 24 hour period ending May 11,1 952, the Soviet command reported to Moscow 
that infonnation had been obtained from the diary of Capt. Albert Tenney, an F-86 pilot 
shot down and killed on May 3, 1952. General Lobov reported that Tenney "wrote in his 
log that Colonel Shink was shot down on 1 May. On that day the enemy was engaged by 
the 821'' I AP." 

Neither DPMO nor CILHI was able to match the case of "Colonel Shink" with an 
American POW/MIA. "Shink" may be a reference to a USAF pilot named Shinz or 
Shanks who, after being shot down in MiG alley on May 1, spent thirty days on the island 
of Sojoson-man until he was rescued and returned to US military control." 

Conclusion: The Russian side of the Joint Commission should provide the American 
side with Tenney's diary in order to determine the original English language spelling of 

A.\3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney 

The handwritten daily Operational Summary of the Soviet 64 Fighter Corps for the 
24 hour period ending at 2400, May 3, 1952, which was signed by General Lobov and 
sent to Shtemenko and Zhigarev in Moscow, contains direct evidence concerning Captain 
Albert Tenney. The information in the Soviet document is consistent with the USAF data 
concerning the time of the incident, but does not support the USAF version of the crash 
location. According to the records of the 256* FAR of the 64* Air Corps, 

Deciphered Telegram No. 502763/sh. 

Roland Parks recalled the name and the incident in a conversation on October 18, 1994 widi Paul M. 
Cole. He pointed out that the incident is included in Clay Blair's book. Beyond Courage. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

Captain Abitkovskij's group, the 821" FAR of the 190* FAD, had the mission to cover the 
airfields at Andung and Myaogou. The first squadron led by Major Vakhrushev (from Lieutenant 
Colonel Olenich's group) encountered four F-86s at 1629 in the area of Singisyu at an altitude of 
8,000 meters. The enemy did not engage in battle and departed toward the south. Our fighter group 
began to pursue the enemy. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Olenich transmitted by radio that he was 
fighting 8 F-86s in the area of the airfield. Major Vakhrushev stopped pursuing the enemy and went to 
the area where Lieutenant Colonel Olenich was engaged in battle. 

Senior Lieutenant Mazikin saw 2 F-86s ahead of him, which were pursuing one MiG-lS at 1638 
at the approach to the Myaogou airfield. Senior Lieutenant Mazikin attacked the enemy and shot 
down one F-86. 

The body of a pilot was found in the remains of one of the F-86s shot down in the area of the 
Myaogou airfield. From documents, it has been established that the pilot is Captain Gilbert Tenney, 
who belonged to the 5 1 " Fighter Air Group. 

The information obtained by DFI from Soviet archives concerning Captain Tenney was 
confirmed by Joint Commission documentation, viz., TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38, 
obtained by the American side of the Joint Commission from its Russian counterpart on 
December 21, 1992." TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38 state that Tenney, shot down while 
attacking the Myaogou air base, was found dead after the crash of his F-86E. Soviet 
records are unclear as to the precise location of the crash of Tenney' s F-86E. 

According to the USAF casualty file. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney (A0803490 \6^ 
Fighter Intercept Squadron 5 T' Fighter Intercept Group) was a member of a two plane 
flight of F-86 aircraft which departed Suwon Air Base, South Korea, on the afternoon of 
May 3, 1952, to perform a combat fighter sweep mission." While making a high-speed 
descent over North Korea, the flight was attacked by enemy aircraft. During the 
engagement that followed, Captain Tenney's aircraft (F-86E, No. 50-652) was seen by 
the flight leader. Captain William R. "Nuts" Nowadnick (USMC), to dive away from an 
enemy MiG and execute evasive maneuvers, according to element leader Nowadnick, at a 
low altitude. Captain Tenney was informed of his low altitude and instructed to pull up. 
Immediately thereafter, according to the "complete and accurate" details of the crash as 
reported by wingman Nowadnick, Tenney leveled the wings of his F-86 which then 
struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high-speed glide approximately three miles 
offshore near the mouth of the Yalu River. 

The USAF estimated the time of the crash to be 1 730 hours. Enemy aircraft forced 
the leader to leave the area and prior to his departure he did not see Captain Tenney 

According to Nowadnick, this reference "must be of me and Tenney. We were the only ones to 
launch as a pair. The others launched in fours." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 28, 1994. 

"TFR 76-37/8, signed by Lt. Col. Tashchan, Chief of Intelligence Unit P/P 54892, is an inventory of 
the personal effects removed from Tenney's body. The document is entitled, Op. No. 2, Documents from 
the F-86 flier Captain Gilbert Tenney shot down on 3 May 1952 in the area of Myagou Airfield (flier died). 
The effects included identification cards, a photograph, and a 62 page diary. Captain Nowadnick stated, "I 
can't imagine anyone would take all of that stuff with him. I just can't believe it. There's no reason to 
believe anyone would do something like that. This is weird." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 

'* Tenney, who was not a regular 51st squadron pilot, was apparently flying in order to maintain his 
certification or to accumulate enough flight time to earn combat pay. 



DFl International ~ Moscow Report 

abandon the F-86 or the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft 
returned to the scene of the crash landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in 
the vicinity, but no traces of Captain Tenney or his aircraft were found." In 1953, the 
Secretary of the Air Force approved a recommendation from the director of USAF 
personnel that, in light of the fact that Tenney's plane had not been seen to disintegrate or 
sink, a possibility existed that favorable conditions prevailed whereby Captain Tenney 
survived and was rescued by North Korean surface craft seen in the area. USAF casualty 
affairs concluded on April 23, 1953 that Captain Tenney "will be continued in a missing 
in action status following the expiration of 12 months' absence." Tenney's casualty 
status has not changed since this determination was made. 

Conclusion: There is a substantial discrepancy between Soviet and USAF records as 
to the location of the crash of Captain Tenney's aircraft. The Russian side of the USRJC 
has also presented inconsistent accounts of the Tenney shoot down. Captain Tenney's 
casualty record, including contemporary and subsequent statements by Captain William 
R. Nowadnick does not support the fact that Captain Tenney was lost on Chinese 
territory.*" Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should account for their own report that 
Captain Tenney died "at Myaogou airfield" following, according to the Russian side of 
the USRJC, "transit through an interrogation point."*' The Russian side of the USRJC has 
therefore suggested there is direct evidence proving that Tenney survived the crash of his 
F-86, was found alive by Soviet forces, transported alive to an interrogation point, then 
onward to the Chinese mainland where Tenney, according to Russian sources, allegedly 
died. As noted, however, the Russian side has contradicted itself on this Ccise thus it is 
impossible to reconcile the Termey incident without additional information. [See ftirther 
discussion of this case at C.2 and F.I.] 

A.1.4 2"" Lt. "Flenk" 

In Operational Summary No. 00173 from the 64* lAK Headquarters in Andung, the 
Soviet command reported on June 21, 1952, "At 1555 hours, Senior Lt. Chistyanov's 
group engaged four F-86's in the Singisyu region at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 meters. . . 
The enemy did not actively engage in battle and dove away toward the sea when under 
attack from our fighters. Two pilots fired upon the enemy. Senior Lt. Shishov shot down 

At the Ninth Plenary and Working Group session of the USRJC, Pavel Antonovich Koval'sicii 
testified, "I was assigned as an engineer-designer with the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). 
At the end of 195 1 , or in the beginning of 1952, an F-86 Sabre, that was in good shape, arrived at TsAGI. 
It looked almost brand new. . . . We were given the mission of providing detailed drawings of the F-86, so 
that a similar aircraft could be reconstructed. We were puzzled by the fact that the aircraft was intact, and 
only the presence of sand in the wheel wells and fuselage, were we able to deduce that the aircraft had 
landed on the beach. ... It must have been a wheels-up forced landing. There was no damage to the 
fuselage and there was no evident battle damage to the aircraft." 

Captain William R. Nowadnick said, "My statement then was true and accurate. If I were to go into 
China, 1 would not have gone there with a pilot whose capabilities I didn't know. Tenney went into the 
water. That is a fact. I made a couple of circles after the plane hit. Teruiey was still in the cockpit. The 
canopy was still on." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 1994. 

A List of United Stales Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircrafi 
Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through and Interrogation Point. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

oneF-86. The pilot of the downed plane, 2Lt. Flenk of the 4 Air Group, was taken 
prisoner by our Korean comrades." 

Information from the casualty records division of the Army Central Identification 
Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) states, "ILt. Vance R. Frick . . . sighted four MiGs on a 
westerly heading, 36,000 feet altitude, six miles southeast of Uiju. The friendly flight 
attempted to close on the enemies in a right climbing turn which lowered their airspeed as 
the MiGs led them into the sun. As the friendlies were in this maneuver two MiGs 
attacked them from the four o'clock position high, causing the friendlies to break to the 
right. During this turn, Lt. Frick called, 'This is Green 2. They are shooting at me, get 
them off.' Lt. [William E.] Marsh had looked just prior to this and saw Lt. Frick in his 
four o'clock position and two MiGs were passing right in front of Lt. Marsh's plane, so 
he dove in a roll into the MiGs. As the MiGs passed under the flight and leveled off, Lt. 
Marsh found himself on the tail of one of the MiGs. Lt. Marsh tried to close on the MiG 
in a climb and fired a short burst observing hits on the left wing and smoke from the left 
side. Lt. Marsh was not given credit for a damage as he had no witness and gun camera 
film was not satisfactory for an assessment. No further transmission was heard from Lt. 
Frick. Lt. Marsh observed an F-86 spinning down three miles south of Uiju, trailing 
white smoke. Lt. Frick is listed as Missing in Action." 

The USAF Casualty Office reported to DPMO that F-86 pilot ILt. Vance R. Frick, 
shot down and captured on June 21, 1952, was repatriated on September 6, 1953.*^ 

A 1 8-page interrogation protocol for "Vance R. Frick," shot down on June 21,1 952, 
was obtained by DPMO from Russian sources. 

Conclusion: U.S. and Soviet records describe the shoot down of ILt. Vance Frick. 
No explanation has been found to reconcile the contradiction between the CILHI and 
USAF Casualty Office versions of ILt. Frick's current casualty status. 

A.1.5 ILt. John Ellis 

According to Operational Summary No. 00202 from the 64"' Headquarters, Andung 
from July 20, 1952, between 1604-1620 hours the 415'" lAP, flying at 8,000 - 10,000 
meters over the Sinuiju and Sakusyu area in two squadrons and one single pair, engaged a 
total of 20 F-86's in separate groups of two, four and eight. Eight pilots fired on the 
enemy. According to the pilots and gun camera data, Sr. Lt. Lepikov shot down one F- 
86. A search party was sent out to look for the downed aircraft. 

Later in Operational Summary No. 00202, the Soviet command reported that the pilot 
of one of the F-86's shot down that day, "ILt. John Ellis of the 336"' Air Squadron, 4* 
Air Group, was taken prisoner." 

USAF casualty records state that ILt. John G. Ellis Jr., 336* Fighter-Interceptor 
Squadron, 4 Fighter-Interceptor Group, flew on July 20, 1952 with a group of four F- 

The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union, (Unclassified report labeled "Working 
Papers" subsequent to its submission to the Russian side of the USRJC), (Department of Defense: Joint 
Commission Support Branch, Research and Analysis Division, DPMO, August 2S, 1993), p. 68. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

86's led by Major John Kozey Jr. Major Kozey sighted two MiG's six miles south of the 
Sui Ho Dam at 24,000 feet. Four more MiG's were sighted above these two at 
approximately 33,000 feet. Major Kozey closed on the right wing of the enemy aircraft 
but was forced to break off the attack when several MiG's began to fire on his flight. 
Major Kozey claimed one MiG-15 damaged. 

ILt. John G. Ellis Jr., was flying No. 4 man in Major Kozey 's flight who was lost 
during this engagement. During this engagement, Lt. Ellis called to say he was "O.K." 
and was at 7 o'clock behind the No. 3 man. Major Lewis Green. Major Green checked 
Ellis's position, stated that Ellis had lagged behind somewhat, but had flown a variable 
position during the entire flight. As Major Kozey began to fire on the MiG, Major Green 
checked to the rear and called "Clear" to Major Kozey. At this time Major Green asked 
1 Lt. Ellis his position. Two such calls were made but no answer received. ILt. Ellis, 
according to USAF casualty data, was not seen or heard fi-om until the end of the war. 

Conclusion: The Soviet and U.S. records describe the same engagement. ILt. Ellis 
was captured by Soviet forces (as in the case of Major MacKenzie discussed at A. 1 .6.), 
with the assistance of Soviet forces, or at least the capture of Lt. Ellis was made known 
the S2ime day as it occurred to Soviet forces. ILt. Ellis's casualty status, according to 
USAF data, is POW/RMC. 

A.1.6. Maj. "Andrew Robert Makken" (Canadian) 

In Operational Summary No. 00341 from the Headquarters of the 64 lAK in Andung 
to Moscow on December 6, 1952, an addendum to Operational Report No. 00340 for 
December 5, 1952 is included. The addendum reads, "On 5 December, our fighters shot 
down the leader of a group of four from the 51st Air Group made up of Canadian VVS 
trainees. The commander of the squadron. Major Andrew Robert Makken, parachuted 
and landed in the area of Supkhuni near the 5 1 ^ anti-aircraft battery. Prior to the 
approach by our personnel, Maj. Mjikken opened fire with a pistol. He surrendered after 
we retaliated. He was turned over to the Chinese authorities." 

A Canadian F-86 pilot. Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, 39^^ Fighter- 
Interceptor Squadron, 51^' Fighter-Interceptor Group, was shot down on December 5, 
1952. MacKenzie, the most publicized Canadian POW of the Korean War, was held as a 
political prisoner in China until 1955. MacKenzie's casualty record states, "Lost while 
on combat mission over NK. Sq. leader MACKENZIE was last seen at XE 4767 (6135- 
III)," near Uiju, North Korea. MacKenzie claimed, upon repatriation, that he had been 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

shot down by an F-86.'" A board of inquiry examined MacKenzie's claim after the 
Korean War, but the results of this inquiry are not known." 

Conclusion: 1) The Soviet version and UN version are consistent with the capture of 
Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, a Canadian F-86 pilot who lives in Canada 
today. 2) The MacKenzie case confirms the direct participation of Soviet forces in the 
pursuit and capture of UNC air crews. MacKenzie's casualty status is POW/repatriated. 

A.1.7. Col. John Arnold 

Operational Summary No. 0013 from the Headquarters of the 64''' lAK to Moscow 
from January 13, 1953, reported. 

At 2150 hours, one SSS"" lAP MiG-15, piloted by Senior Lt. Khablev, was vectored to an enemy 
bomber by the RTS. Near Taegwon, the Corps Command Post's RTS 'periscopes' vectored him, from 
the rear, to the enemy aircraft which was at 6,500 meters and heading toward Uiju. At 2210, the 
enemy aircraft was again spotted by search lights at 7,000 meters. Having closed to 600 meters on the 
0/4-1/4 quarter, he fired one long burst, causing the enemv p lane to burst into flames. After turning 
left, he got back on the burning plane's tail and opened fire a second time at 300-500 meters on the 
0/4-1/4 with three long bursts and expended all of his ammunition. The RB-29. covered in flames, 
sharply descended earthward, and crashed in Chinese territory near Ulumbej (30 km north of Andung). 
... Of the 14 crew members, 1 1 were taken prisoner by Chinese comrades and three were dead. 
Amongst the prisoners was Col. Arnold who identified himself as the commander of the 581" Air 
Wing of the H"" Air Army based in the Philippines. The RB-29 was from the 91" Strategic 
Intelligence Squadron. 

The USAF version of events notes the aircraft, RB-29 (No. 44-62217), departed 
Yakota AB, Honshu, Japan at 1720, January 12, 1953 on a "Classified Psychological 
Warfare Leaflet Mission to North Korea." The flight plan was intended to bring the 
aircraft out of North Korea near Cholsan south of Sinuiju on the northwest coasfline. 
USAF records state the RB-29 transmitted a "May Day" call at 23 16 hours on January 12 
and disappeared from friendly radar scopes at XE6050^', on North Korean territory. 

Conclusion: The Soviet and USAF descriptions are of the same incident. The last 
recorded radio transmission from the RB-29 differs from the time of the last attack by the 
Soviet MiG by six minutes. The discrepancy lies in whether the RB-29 was in Chinese 

*^ Col. Fischer, who was in a Chinese prison with MacKenzie, stated, "Andy told me of his last 
mission. They had made an attack on some aircraft and were pulling away when he was hit. His aircraft 
began an uncontrollable roll since evidently his hydraulic controls had been damaged. There was only one 
thing he could do and that was to bail out. He pulled the handles on the ejection seat and as he separated 
from the seat and pulled the rip cord, an F-86 went by him. He was convinced that an F-86 had shot him 
down and although he tried to view this objectively, he was nevertheless a little bitter about the incident, 
which he had every right to be." Fischer fax to Paul M. Cole, July 1 1, 1994. 

^ The Director of Air Intelligence for the USAF reported on February 29, 1952, "Two sightings were 
made during the month which indicate that the enemy has put an F-86 aircraft into operation in Korea." 
FEAF Air Intelligence Summary, February 29, 1952, (Secret), SS-U-87. The Russian side of the USRJC 
confirmed in June 1994 that a copy of the F-86 was constructed in the Soviet Union based on an intact F- 
86 captured in late 1951 or early 1952. 
Underscored in original. 

*' USAF casualty data reports that Arnold's RB-29 was lost over map sheet no. 6134-1, in other words 
on North Korean territory well south of the Yalu River. 



UH International — Moscow Report 

airspace when it crashed. The USAF report on the downing of the RB-29 is consistent 
with the established pattern of deception in USAF records concerning flight activities 
over Chinese territory. In addition, crew members of the RB-29 who recalled being 
moved from North Korea to China said the transport occurred while the American 
prisoners were covered in order to block their vision.*' Thus the Soviet description of 
where the RB-29 crashed would be more consistent with the subsequent Chinese action.'" 
Col. Arnold's casualty status is POW/repatriated. [See related case at D.5.] 

A. 1.8 Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller 

Operational Summary No. 0023 from the Headquarters of the 64 lAK for January 
23, 1953, notes. 

At 1 130, in the Sinuiju/Danu area, the SSS"" lAP (20 MiG-15s led by LTC Alimov) engaged 24 F- 
86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. Six pilots fired during the battle, the results of which are still 
unknown. Two squadrons of the 913 lAP (16 MiGs led by LTC Razorenov) in the 
Danu/Andung/Sinuiju area engaged 12 F-86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. Three pilots fired on the 
enemy. According to the pilots, Sr. Lt. Karpov shot down one F-86. Sr. Lt. Karpov did not return 
from the mission. He ejected and is currently in the vicinity of Ben'sikhu. 

On 23 January 1953 while in aerial combat near Kuan'dyal* with his unit, the 913"' lAP, Sr. Lt. 
Korlov shot down on F-86. The pilot ejected and was taken prisoner by Chinese comrades. He is 
wounded and is currently in a hospital in Andung. The downed pilot, Lt. Col. Edwin Heller, a USAF 
ace, is the commander of the 16 Squadron, 51" Air Group. 

Col. Harold Fischer, who shot down the MiG-15 that shot down Heller, said after 
reviewing the Soviet version of events, "This tracks. It makes sense. I shot down the 
MiG that got Ed. I didn't know what happened to Ed. He just disappeared."" 

USAF casualty data state, "Lt. Heller was last seen at XE3252 (6134-4), at about 
40,000 feet." Col. Heller was quoted indirectly by DPMO investigators as stating he "did 
not know if he was shot down over Chinese or North Korean territory" because he 
"became disoriented during the conduct of air-to-air combat." Heller disputes DPMO's 
summary of his remarks." 

Two crew members. Brown and Kiba, have made this observation. See Wallace L. Brown, The 
Endless Hours: My Two and a Half Years As A Prisoner of the Chinese Communists (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1961), pp. 30-33. See also Steve Kiba's comments in Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA 
Issues: Volume 1, The Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-351/1-USDP, 1992), p. 203. 

TTie survivors of the RB-29 crash were held as political prisoners in China until 1955. 

Kuandian is approximately 60 kilometers north of the Yalu River in China. 

Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 8, 1994. 

Fellow F-86 ace Col. Harold Fischer noted in reference to Heller's claim of "disorientation," "It's 
just not so. Ed flew way up into China routinely, usually for reconnaissance. He only recently told me just 
how far he was really up there. You get disoriented in clouds. You don't get disoriented that far into 
China during combat." Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 7, 1994. Col. Heller stated in response 
to the DPMO summary of his remarks, "A commanding officer of a fighter unit who doesn't know north 
from south, even without a compass, is a son of a bitch." Fax from Col. Fischer to Paul M. Cole, citing "a 
direct quote [Ed] said I could pass on to you." July 11, 1994. Col. Heller said, "That's a bunch of baloney. 
I don't remember telling anyone I was disoriented. I was north of the river, I just didn't know how far." 
Telephone conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 12, 1994. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

Conclusion: The U.S. and Soviet versions describe the same incident, though there is 
no explanation for the discrepancy in the name of the Soviet pilot given credit for 
shooting down Heller's F-86. The U.S. version of this shoot down is consistent with the 
pattern of deceptive reports meant to conceal the fact of USAF operations in Chinese 
airspace. Heller's casualty status is POW/repatriated. [See map at G. 1 .] 

A.1.9 Captain Harold Edward Fischer 

Operational Summary No. 0097 from the Soviet 64'*' Air Corps in Andung submitted 
by General Lobov to Moscow for the 24 hour period ending April 7, 1953 noted, 

At 1610, six MiG-15s of the 224"' FAR (led by Senior Lieutenant Anisimov) battled with four F- 
86s in the area of Kizjo at an altitude of 13,000 meters. At 1640 upon approach to Danu airfield, 
Senior Lieutenant Berelidze's pair attacked one F-86 which was pursuing Senior Lieutenant 
Ugryumov at an altitude of 1,000-1,500 meters. Senior Lieutenant Berelidze shot down one F-86 from 
a distance of 400 meters at a Vi quartering angle. The pilot: Captain Harold Edward Fischer, service 
number A02204126, Flight Commander, 39^ Air Squadron, 5l" Wing, was taken prisoner. 

Captain Fischer was flight leader of "Python" flight on a Yalu River fighter sweep on 
April 7, 1953. The USAF casualty file notes, "The coordinates and location [of the crash] 
are unknown since the wingman was uncertain of his location at the time he last saw 
Captain Fischer." Further, the USAF casualty file refers to the location of the dogfight as 
"the area." The location of the combat and the coordinates for the crash of Captain 
Fischer's F-86 (No. 52-2871A), which occurred at 1735 hours, were not reported 
accurately in the USAF casualty report of this incident. 

Captain Fischer, a highly publicized political prisoner of the Chinese, was released in 
May 1955 after two years of solitary confinement. The casualty status of Captain 
Fischer, whose subsequent captivity in the People's Republic of China lasted until 1955, 
is POW/repatriated. 

Conclusion: Soviet records track with the USAF account for this case and are more 
complete with respect to the location of the crash of Fischer's aircraft. The reason for the 
absence of a geographic description of this incident in USAF records is that USAF pilots 
were not authorized to cross the Yalu River on a routine basis. According to USAF F-86 
veterans of the Korean War, such as Senator John Glenn, the USAF suppressed or 
destroyed evidence which showed American aircraft in Chinese airspace." In reality, 
"the area" where Captain Fischer attacked the Soviet MiGs and where his own F-86 
crashed was Chinese territory. Captain Fischer was not, however, shot down. He was 
forced to eject after his F-86 engine ingested debris from a MiG-15 that broke up in front 
of Fischer's aircraft. Captain Fischer successfully ejected and was captured by Chinese 

" Co. Fischer remarked in 1994, "The rule was, don't cross the Chinese border. During debriefing 
after a mission, pilots would just give North Korean coordinates for kills and our own crashes that 
happened in China. It was a question of CYA. For convenience, a place south of Andung over the river 
was chosen for the sight where we shot down MiGs which were really shot down in China. I think that 
little town had more MiGs fall on it than any other place on earth." Discussion with Paul M. Cole, June 27, 



UH Iniemaiional ~ Moscow Report 

militiamen who drove him past the crash site. Fischer's casualty status is 


According to Operational Summary No. 102 of the Soviet 64''' Fighter Aviation Corps 
for April 12, 1953, between 0755-0800, six MiG-15s (led by Captain Doroshenko), flying 
at 13000 meters in the Siodzio region, engaged four F-86s. One pilot fired. According to 
the pilot's report and interpretation of the gun camera footage. Captain Doroshenko shot 
down one F-86. According to radio intercepts, an ace from the 51" Air Group, "Mak 
Donnel," was shot down. The pilot ejected. 

ILt. Joseph McConnell Jr., who shot down his eighth MiG on April 12, 1953, was 
shot down on the same day. After successfully ejecting from his aircraft, McConnell was 
plucked from the Yellow Sea by a 3"* Air Rescue Group H-I9 helicopter. By April 24, 
1953, the newly-promoted Captain McConnell had ten kills. 

Conclusion: Soviet records concerning "MacDonnal" refer to the downing of 
McConnell. McConnell was rescued by UN forces. McConnell, who returned alive from 
Korea, was subsequently killed in a test flight. 


On May 30, 1953, Major General Borisenko reported to the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Forces of the Soviet Army on "the operations of the U.S. Air Force in Korea for the 
period May-December 1952."" Borisenko's cable derives from the interrogation of 
USAF POWs in Korea. Included in Borisenko's cable is the sentence, "Especially 
experienced instructors at the flight schools treat the students poorly — according to pilot 
Paul Niss." 

Of particular interest, however, are the names of the Soviet officers who, according to 
Borisenko, "took part in compiling the report." The Soviet officers named in Borisenko's 
cable are the following: 

• Colonel Petrachev 

• Lt. Colonel Komarov 

• Colonel Voronets 

• Lt. Colonel (Medical service) Drozhevkin 

• Colonel Noltev (perhaps Poltev) 

• Engineer Major Tikhonov 

According to Soviet records obtained by DPMO, 2Lt. Niss, a F-51 pilot, was shot down 
on May 31, 1952.*^ The Soviet records note that 2Lt. Niss's personal documents were 
taken from him. 

Cable from Major General Borisenko to the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, 
Operations Directorate (Secret), No. 03817, May 30, 1953. 



DM international — Moscow Report 

Conclusion: DFI was able to match the name "Paul Niss" with an American 
POW/MIA named 2Lt. Paul R. Kniss (AO 1909070), who was shot down on May 31, 
1952. 2Lt. Kniss's casualty status is POW/RMC. 

B. 64th lAK and Other Soviet Archive Data Associated With POW/MIAs 

Soviet 64''' Air Corps records contain information on aircraft shoot down incidents 
which do not mention American POW/MIAs by name. Using USAF casualty files, a 
correlation made be made with American POW/MIAs for the following cases included in 
Soviet records: 

B. 1 . Pilot of F-86 shot down, September 2, 1 95 1 

B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1 95 1 

B.3. Interrogation of Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951 

B.4. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952 

B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 11, 1952 

B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1 , 1 952 

B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4, 1 952 

B.8. F-86 shot down July 4, 1952 

B.9. Pilot of F-86 No. 15/24001, July 20, 1952 

B.IO. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952 

B.l 1. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952 

B.12. Pilot of F-86 shot down, April 12, 1953 

B.l 3. F-84 shot down, April 12, 1953 

Other Soviet-era archive documents mention by name the following USAF POW/MIAs, 
all of whom where shot down in the same B-29 incident on July 4, 1952: 

B. 1 4. 1 Lt. Joseph E. Moreland 
B.l 5. 2Lt. Francis A. Strieby 
B.16. ILt. Kenneths. Brazil 
B.17. AlC Edwin D. Combs 
B.l 8. AlC William E.Koski 
B.l 9. SSgt. Charles V. Johansen 
B.20. AlC Kenneth H.Bass 
B.21. A2C Donald L. Hand 
B.22. SSgt. Bernard F. Rivers 
B.23. AlC Eugene E. Evers 
B.24. Captain Theodore R. Harris 
B.25. SSgt. Richard L. Albright 
B.26. SSgt. Clifford H. Mast 

In addition, Soviet-era archive material demonstrates that the Commanding Officer of the 
34th Infantry Regiment was captured alive and was not a KIA(BNR) case as shown in US 
records. The conunander was: 

B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin 



UFl International ~ Moscow Report 

B.l. Pilot of F-86 Shot Down September 2, 1951 

Operational Summary No. 0277 of the Headquarters, 64 Fighter Corps for 
September 2, 1951, reports that six F-86 aircraft were shot down on that day. Two MiG- 
15s were lost. The summary states, "The 17 Fighter Regiment (word missing) in the 
region of Syukusen at 1035 hours 10 F-86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. As a result of 
the attack conducted against the enemy fighters by the regiment. Major Pulov shot one 
down from the rear below the angle of approach 0/4 at a range of 450 meters. One F-86 
according to crew observations (possible "bailed out") in the air. 

The 18* Fighter Regiment encountered separate pairs and groups of four of enemy fighters at 1043 
hours in the region of Khanusen at an altitude of 7000-9000 meters, which were attacked by one air 
squadron by order of the leader. At that time new groups of enemy fighters began appearing from 
behind the clouds in groups of 2-4-6- F-86s, which, using their altitude advantage, attacked our 
fighters. Altogether as many as 30 enemy F-86 aircraft took part in the air battle. Our fighters waged 
battle in threes and pairs. The battle lasted 15 minutes. Two F-86s were shot down. Shooting down 
one enemy plane apiece were: Lt. Colonel Smorchkov, Senior Lt. Shchukin and Major Os'kin; Senior 
Lt. Kapitonov and Captain Gerasimenko put two F-86s out of action. The planes were shot down from 
the rear hemisphere below the angle of approach 04-2/4 from a range of 300-700 meters. Senior Lt. 
Akatov and Senior Lt. Kolpikov didn't return from the mission, presumably shot down in combat. 

According to USAF casualty data, on September 2, 1951 shortly before 1255 hours, 
Lt. Laurence C. Layton's F-86A (No. 49-1258A) was damaged in a dogfight with enemy 
MiGs in the vicinity of YD 0375 (Anju/Sinanju area). After radioing that he was heading 
toward the coast, Lt. Layton's successful bailout at 1255 hours was observed by another 
F-86 pilot." The position was reported to be near the mouth of the Chong Chong River, 
approximately six miles from the coast. Though DPMO's summary indicates that Lt. 
Layton is believed to have been rescued by "persons aboard a large power boat operated 
by the enemy," an eyewitness to Lt. Layton's contact with the water. Major Winton W. 
Marshall, stated on October 15, 1951, "1 did not see Lt. La>ton bail out nor his 
parachute." Major Marshall added that as Lt. Layton was advised to bail out, "My MiG- 
15 was hit at this time and spun and crashed into the ground." 

Conclusion: With the exception of the discrepancy in the time of day, the Soviet and 
American records appear to describe the shoot down of Lt. Layton. Since the Soviet 
summary indicates that "search efforts" for the down aircraft were "being conducted" for 
an F-86 pilot who Soviet sources reported had bailed out, the Russian side of the Joint 
Commission should be asked to provide the results of these search efforts in order to 
contribute to the resolution of Lt. Layton's case. Lt. Layton's casualty status is MIA. 

B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1951 

Operational Summary No. 0382 from the Soviet 64''* lAK in Andung to Moscow for 
December 16, 1951, states, "Interrogations of two American prisoners of war, F-86 pilots 
shot down in dogfights on 24 October 1951, has revealed that the enemy has two pilots 

ILt. Layton's parachute landing at YD 0169 at 1255 hours was observed by Captain Ralph D. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

for each F-86 aircraft. This apparently is done to increase the number of personnel 
receiving battle experience and to decrease the workload of each flyer." 

According to USAF casualty records, ILt. Bradley B. Irish (AO 191 1424), F-86 pilot, 
was shot down in the vicinity of Sinanju, North Korea on October 24, 1951. 

According to USAF casualty records, Lt. Fred T. Wicks (AO 1910294) departed 
Kimpo air base on October 24, 195 1 . In the vicinity of Sinanju, the flight was attacked 
by four enemy fighters. Wicks' s aircraft was hit by ground fire. "A garbled radio 
message was received ft-om Lt. Wicks which indicated his intention to abandon the 
aircraft. Continuous observation of the F-86 was not maintained during its descent from 
an altitude of 15,000 feet, however, the plane was sighted just as it crashed to the ground 
and exploded." Although the aircraft was observed to explode on impact, the 
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, determined that ILt. Wicks was an 
"unconfirmed prisoner of war." 

Conclusion: Both Wicks and Irish were repatriated in September 1953. The Russian 
side of the USRJC should be asked for the interrogation records of Lt. Irish and Lt. Wicks 
which are referred to in Soviet reporting. 

B.3. Interrogation of a Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951 

Operational Summary No. 0381 from the Soviet 64'*' lAK in Andung to Moscow for 
December 15, 1951, states, "The flier of a downed enemy 'Meteor' aircraft was taken 
prisoner on 1 December. This flier indicated that the group of 12 'Meteors' had been 
tasked to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the Tajsen airfield. The mission was not 
carried out because the 'Meteors' were intercepted by MiG-15 aircraft and the 'Meteor' 
flight leader was shot down."" 

According to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) records, on December 1 , 1951, 
F/Sgt. Ernest E. Armit (A22221), pilot of the Meteor aircraft number A77-949, was lost 
during a combat flight in the area south of Pyongyang and north of Kimpo airfield 
between Chienampo and Singye. F/Sgt. Armit was reported to be MIA. On the same 
mission, RAAF Meteor pilots Sgt. Bruce L. Thomson (A32427) flying No. A77-29 and 
Sgt. Vance Drummond (A33624) flying No. A77-251 were also shot down. Thomson 
cind Vance, who were repatriated in Big Switch, were "unable to thrown any light on the 
fate of F/Sgt. Armit during their de-briefings following release."" 

Conclusion: 1) It is not clear whether Soviet records refer to Armit's incident. 2) 
F/Sgt. Armit's current casualty status is "missing presumed dead." 3) Soviet records 
should be examined to determine which Australian Meteor pilot was interrogated. 

Four sentences were struck out in Operational Summary No. 0381, "The prisoner did not know the 
number of planes that were shot down. According to information from the Korean Command, the 
wreckage of three 'Meteor' was found. The pilots of those aircraft perished. The aircraft of the prisoner 
had also crashed." 

" Letter from Donald W. Pinkstone to Paul M. Cole, August 4, 1994. Pinkstone quotes ofTicial 
Australian military sources in this letter. 



DFl International ~ Moscow Report 

B.4. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952 

Operational summary No. 42/K from January 7, 1952 states, "At 0849, the 196th lAP 
engaged up to 40 F-86 aircraft at an altitude of 1 0,000 m in the Bukhen area. The 
engagement lasted 15-16 minutes, ranged in altitude from 7,000 - 10,000 m and moved 
toward Anju. Ten Flyers fired on the enemy aircraft. Four F-86s were shot down. 
Colonel Pepelyaev, Lt. Colonel Mitusov, Captain Zaplavnij and Sr. Lt. Rud'ko each shot 
down an enemy aircraft 

A 48-page Soviet interrogation protocol (plus one photograph) of Charles Eugene 
Stahl, an F-86E pilot shot down on January 7, 1952, was obtained. The Soviet 
interrogation record includes a drawing of an F-86 with serial number 51-651 and a 
photograph of ILt. Stahl. The interrogation record shows Stahl's take-off time to have 
been 09:00 (08:00 US time). 

According to USAF casualty records, on January 7, 1952, ILt. Charles E. Stahl (AO 
191 1688), F-86 pilot, was lost over Namsi-dong during air-to-air combat. On April 27, 
1952, ILt. Stahl's name w£is included in an enemy broadcast from North Korea and again 
in an article published in Pravda on November 18,1 952. 

Conclusion: The Soviet report corresponds to the shoot down and interrogation of 
Charles Eugene Stahl. ILt. Stahl's casualty status, originally MIA, was changed to RMC 
when Stahl was repatriated in September 1953. 

B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 11, 1952 

Operational Summary No. 00163 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64*- lAK in 
Andung reports, "During the night of 1 1 June, a search team found the debris of one B-29 
and 8 corpses to the west of Kakusan region. Furthermore, Korean and Chinese 
comrades reported seeing 1 B-29 fall into the sea and explode in an area 20 km southeast 
of Simni-do Island." 

According to USAF casualty records, a B-29 (No. 44-61967A) was last seen on June 
10, 1952 at 1341 hours near the bombs away position (39°4r N.-125°04' E.). Last 
positive radio transmission made on VHF at control point 38°15' N.-124°5r E. There 
were no distress signals or further transmissions of any sort. No further sightings of the 
aircraft were made when overdue at 03 1 5 hours (local time) June 1 1 , 1952, a search of 
the area was instituted with negative results. Among the crew of this B-29, ILt. Wilbur 
Eugene Lewis (AO 772859) was reported MIA on June 11, 1952 and has been carried in 
this casualty status ever since. Lewis, who in civilian life was an aircraft supervisor in a 
plane subassembly plant, is the only member of the missing B-29 crew listed in Air Force 
Manual 200-25 Missing in Action: Korea. 

According to USAF casualty records, a B-29 (No. 44-62183) was reported to be 
caught in enemy searchlights, struck by rockets and destroyed in a mid-air explosion on 
the night of June 10, 1952. Eyewitnesses reported seeing the stricken aircraft fall to earth 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

in three sections. According to USAF records, only one of the 13 member crew, Anton 
Brom Jr. (AO 701420), survived to be repatriated." 

Conclusion: The Soviet records do not indicate whether the B-29 found as reported 
in Summary No. 00163 was shot down on June 1 1 or earlier. If the report concerns a B- 
29 found as a result of a search team sent out before June 1 1, then it may coincide with 
one of the two cases found in American sources. The Russian side of the Joint 
Commission should be asked to provide the June 11, 1952 report of the Soviet search 
team concerning the B-29 and the disposition of the bodies found. If the Soviet report 
describes the crash of No. 44-6 1967 A, then an additional 12 cases should be reviewed for 
possible change in casualty status from MIA to KIA(BNR). 

B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1, 1952 

In Operational Summary No. 00214 from the 64'*' lAK at Andung for August 1, 1952, 
the Soviet command reported to Moscow, "One of the downed F-86's fell 7 kilometers 
southeast of Sakchu. The side number is USAF 12767", the fuselage was marked with 
nine stars (each marking equates to one victory). The aircraft was destroyed, the pilot 
perished and his identity cannot be established." 

According to a DPMO summary of USAF casualty data. Major Felix Asia Jr., who 
was engaged in aerial combat on August 1, 1952 near Sinuiju, became separated from his 
wingman.'" He twice radioed for information as to whether visual contact could be 
established with his aircraft.*' The messages did not indicate that he was experiencing 
any difficulty at the time, although it appears that he failed to receive replies from the 
other pilot, who repeatedly advised that he did not have visual contact and was leaving 
the area. Subsequently, a report was received from a member of another flight in the area 
who witnessed and enemy fighter attack on Major Asia's F-86 and that his plane had lost 
the left wing. The aircraft was last seen spinning downward from an altitude of 23,000 
feel at a point 1 5 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea at 0927 hours. A subsequent 
aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot. 

Asia was not an ace. The only USAF ace with nine confirmed kills as of August 1, 
1952 was 2Lt. James F. Low who had nine by June 15, 1952. Low was in the 335th 
FlS/4th FIW. Asia was in the 336th FIS/4th FIW. According to USAF casualty data, 
Asia was shot down in an F-86 with the serial number 51-2767. 

Conclusion: The day, geographic data and aircraft serial number in the U.S. and 
Soviet accounts match the incident which resulted in the loss of Major Felix Asia. Since 
Major Asia's status is KIA(BNR), and since it is apparent from Soviet records that Asia's 

The other crew members were: Capt. Louis R. Gorrell, ILt. Harold R. Holmes, ILt. Robert B. 
Baumer, ILt. David Mandel, ILt. Robert E. Hudson, ILt. John H. Adams, S/Sgt. William A. Canning, 
A/lc Edgar F. Harrington, A/lc Elbert J. Reid Jr., A/lc Robert L. Ross, A/2c Thomas J. Pettit, A/2c Paul 
K. Kellstrom. All are listed as MIA by CILHI. 

"The number also may read "USNF 1226720." 
'"USAF casualty data states Asia's aircraft serial number as "51-2767." 
Asia, whose code name was Red One, asked twice, "Red Two, do you have me?" In each case the 
reply was "Negative." 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

body was recovered by Soviet forces, the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be 
asked for information concerning the disposition of Major Asia's remains. 

B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4, 1952 

According to Operational Summary No. 00186, from the Headquarters of the 64'-'' 
lAK at Andung, on July 4, 1952, elements of the 351" lAP encountered a USAF B-29 
while on a combat sortie. At 2246 hours, Major Karelin observed one B-29 in the 
searchlight beams near Khakusen at an altitude of 7200 meters and attacked it. Orienting 
on the flaming aircraft, the pilot conducted three more attacks and shot down the B-29. 
The bomber started to break up midair and fell two kilometers west of Khakusen. Four 
engines and the burnt fuselage were found at the crash site. According to Operational 
Summary No. 00186, "eight crew members of the B-29 were taken prisoner by our 
Chinese comrades. The shoot down of the aircraft by Major Karelin was seen from the 
KP lAK." 

According to USAF casualty data, RB-29 (No. 44-61727) departed Yakota Air Base, 
Japan, at 1858 hours on July 3, 1952 for a night reconnaissance mission. Statements of 
repatriated crew members reveal that the RB-29 reached the Sinanju area at 
approximately 2330 hours and encountered sporadic ground fire directed from the bridge 
complex area. Shortly thereafter it was attacked by MiG-15 aircraft and severely 
damaged. At approximately 2343 hours, while at an ahitude of 19,000 feet, the crew 
abandoned the aircraft which crashed some 20 miles southwest of Sinanju. Repatriate 
statements further reveal that Lt. Francis A. Strieby, the copilot, was the last crew 
member to observe Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast. Lt. Strieby states that he attempted to push 
Mast, the nose gunner, out the nose hatch. Mast resisted and took a swing at the copilot 
who left him standing beside the aircraft commander's seat. The copilot then started 
across the hatch toward the radio operator's position and encountered fire coming through 
the forward bulkhead door. This was the last he remembered prior to regaining 
consciousness in his parachute at £m altitude of 1 ,000 feet. ^ 

Although some crew members believe Mast was captured and either killed or taken to 
Manchuria, they could give no evidence to support their belief Of the 13 man crew, one 
was killed before bail-out, 1 1 were captured and repatriated and Mast remains MIA." 
S/Sgt. Richard L. Albright (18365010), another MIA case from this incident, is described 
in a Soviet cable to Moscow, along with Mast, as killed in the crash of the RB-29. 

DPMO obtained from Russian sources the 6-page interrogation of Kenneth S. Brazil, 
crew member of the RB-29 shot down on July 4, 1952. This is apparently one of the 
eight captured Americans referred to in the Soviet operational summary. 

Conclusion: The Soviet and American accounts concern the same aircraft incident. 
[See F.7 and F.8.] 

Telegram No. 503826/III, November 26, 1952 (Top Secret). 


DFI International — Moscow Report 

B.8. 1 F-86 shot down July 4, 1952 

According to Operational Summary No. 00186 from the headquarters of the 64''' Air 
Corps in Andung for July 4, 1952, two USAF F-86s were shot down by Soviet MiG-15s. 
One F-86 was reported shot down at 1 127 hours, at an altitude of 1500-2000 meters, 20 
kilometers south of Sakusyu by Senior Lt. Krutsckykh. The other F-86 was reported shot 
down at 11 45 hours, near Chisyu-Bikhen by Senior Lt. Mishin. 

USAF casualty records indicate that ILt. Austin Beetle (AO 840696), pilot of an r-86 
(No. 50-683), was lost in Jiir-to-air combat on July 4, 1952, at approximately 1257 hours. 
ILt. Beetle drown almost immediately after ejecting over Chodo Island. He could not be 
recovered with grappling hooks used by UN rescue forces even though they were no 
more than 300 yards away when ILt. Beetle hit the water. 

Conclusion: The Soviet account for the 1 145 shoot down appears to be consistent 
with the loss of ILt. Beetle. ILt. Beetle's status in CILHI data is MIA. [See F.19.] 

B.9. Pilot of F-86 No. 15/24001, July 20, 1952 

According to Operational Summary No. 00202 of the 64''' lAK Headquarters in 
Andung. on July 20. 1952 between 1612-1620 hours, Maj. Zebelin's group (256"" lAP), 
flying at an altitude of 7,000 - 13,000 meters over the Uiju/Bikhen region, engaged a total 
of 24 F-86s in separate groups of four. Maj. Zabelin shot down one F-86E, No. 
15/24001, which crashed 12 kilometers southeast of Sinanju. The pilot of the F-86E was 
killed and the aircraft completely destroyed. 

Conclusion: CILHI could not identify an F-86 with the registration number 
15/24001. ILt. John G. Ellis Jr., for example, who was shot down on July 20, 1952, flew 
F-86 No. 492828. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to clarify this case. 

B. 1 0. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952 

Operational Summary No. 00235 of the Soviet 64"' Air Corps reports that for the 24 
hour period ending August 22, 1952, 

From pilot reports and photo-control data, 1 F-86 was shot down and 1 F-86 was damaged. From 
radio-intercept data, 2-F-86s were shot down and 1 F-86 was damaged. Flights of the SIS* FAR 
completed their assigned mission in the area of Kajsen, Ansyu and Dzyunsen. Captain Frolov's flight 
encountered and engaged six F-86s in banle at 0950 in the area of [Khamisam?] at an altitude of 
1 1,500 meters (37,350 feet]. Captain Chemavin's flight covered the attack of Captain Frolov's flight. 
Two pilots shot at the enemy aircraft. Senior Lieutenant [Ignatov?] shot down one F-86 from a 
distance of 500-600 meters at a % quartering attack angle. The enemy aircraft crashed in the area of 
Kajsen; the [aircraft] remains were found; the pilot perished." 

Soviet Korean War veterans Col. Georgi Plotnikov and Col. General Valentin Sozinov remarked in a 
March 1992 interview, "The name of Major Delt came up in my conversation with General Lobov. I don't 
know what his position is. Be he also ejected and was captured, and then escorted somewhere. I think he 
was on the People's Republic of China territory." The reference to "Major Delts" has been associated with 
Deltis Fincher by DPMO analysts. Paul M. Cole, interview with Plotnikov and Sozinov, March 30, 1992, 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

According to the USAF casualty report, F-86E (No. 51-2866) pilot Major Deltis H. 
Fincher (AO 43 1410) departed Suwon Air Base, Korea for the Chong Chong River on 
August 22, 1952 to conduct a fighter sweep mission. Major Fincher was flying lead 
position in a flight of four F-86 aircraft. The flight entered the destination at 38,000 feet. 
Number 4 man called two MiGs at 10 o'clock position that were approaching 90° from 
the left of the flight. Number 1 and 2 men did not observe the MiGs immediately, and 
number 3 man told them to delay while he checked the MiGs' intentions. As the MiGs 
reached the 7 o'clock position, still on a 90° heading, MiG leader turned sharply in 
toward Major Fincher and his wingman. Major Saunders, number 3 man, called to Major 
Fincher to break to the left, which he did. MiG leader fired on Major Fincher, but Major 
Saunders did not observe strikes on Major Fincher's aircraft. Major Saunders called to 
Major Fincher and told him that he would try to take MiG number 2 and keep him out of 
action. Major Saunders moved into position and fired upon the MiG, but the MiG 
continued to pursue flight leader. 

At this time flight leader called, "Is he still on me?" Major Saunders replied that his 
element was still pursuing MiG number 2. That was the last radio transmission received 
from Major Fincher. During the break number 2 man blacked out and did not observe 
any of the above mentioned action. When he regained consciousness he did not observe 
Major Fincher's aircraft in the area. Wingman called him several times, but Major 
Fincher did not acknowledge these calls. Major Fincher was last sighted at map grid 
coordinate 6333-11 at 1049 hours. Major Fincher's casualty status continues to be MIA. 

Conclusion: The positive association between the U.S. and Soviet data on the day, 
time, geographic location, and circumstances of this incident lead to the conclusion that 
the Soviet records describe the shoot down of Major Fincher. Fincher's current casualty 
status is MIA. [See F.2.] 

B.l 1. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952 

Operational Summary No. 00257 for the 64'*' lAK in Andung for September 13, 1952, 
reported, "From 2235 till 0106, the 87*- anti-aircraft artillery division fired on 35 B-29's 
at altitudes ranging from 6800 meters to 7500 meters. Two B-29's were shot down and 
two B-29's were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 bodies were found. The 
search continues."" 

According to USAF records, on September 13, 1952 a B-29 (No. 44-86343) was 
"flying over to target when it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen to blow up in the air. 
No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue search for seven days with 
negative results. No chance for survival." CILHI records indicate that one of the 12 
member crew, A/lc Fred Parker Jr., was repatriated in August 1953. Ten members of the 
crew are carried as BNR in the Battle Monuments list." One of the crew members, ILt. 

Underscored in original. 
"The ten are the following; ILt. William K. Phillis (MIA), ILt. Henry B. Kelley (MIA), ILt. Fred D. 
Bloesch (MIA), Capt. James A. Lowe (MIA), ILt. Spiro J. Peters (MIA), M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown (MIA), 
A/lc James O. Trosclair (MIA), A/lc Jimmie R. Hobday (MIA), A/lc James W. Kelly (MIA), and A/lc 
James R. Lebaron (MIA). 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

Ted G. Royer, appears neither on the Battle Monuments BNR list nor on the USAF 
Korean War RMC list. 

Conclusion: The Soviet records apparently describe the loss of USAP B-29 No. 44- 
86343. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to account for disposition of the 
five bodies which are described in the Soviet document. [See F.10.1 -F.10.10.] 

B.12. F-86 Pilot Shot Down, April 12, 1953 

According to Operational Summary No. 102 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64"^ 
lAK for April 12, 1953, five USAF F-86s were shot down by Soviet forces. The reports 
and times of day are the following: 

• At 1 055, six MiG-1 5s from the 224'*' lAP (led by Captain Doroshenko), flying in 
the Siodzio region at 13500 meters altitude, engaged eight F-86 aircraft. One 
pilot. Captain Doroshenko, fired and hit one F-86. 

• At 1055, six MiG-1 5s from the 224*'' lAP (led by Senior Lt. Anisimov), flying at 
12500 meters altitude in the Dehehguan-dong region, engaged six F-86 aircraft. 
One pilot fired. Captain Lazarev shot down one F-86 at a distance of 600 meters, 
on the starboard beam. 

• At 1 105, a flight from the 535- lAP (led by Major Isakov) flying at 1 1000 meters 
altitude in the Kidzio region, engaged a pair of F-86s. One pilot fired. Captain 
Utkin shot down one F-86 from a distance of 350 meters, on the starboard beam. 

• At 1 1 1 5 hours, a pilot from the 224 lAP, Senior Lt. Berepidze, while on 
approach to the Andung airfield at 9000 meters altitude, attacked a pair of F-86s. 
He opened fire on the wingman, but no results were observed. 

According to Air Force records, Lt. Robert Frank Niemann (22287A), pilot of F- 
86E/6 (No. 522891), was "bounced" by MiG aircraft while flying as number four, 
wingman to the element leader, at approximately 40,000 feet, 20 miles south of the Suiho 
Reservoir, on April 12, 1953. Lt. Niemann, who took off at 1115 hours, was reported to 
be MIA at 1225 hours the same day. Lt. Niemarm was seen in a right turn with a MiG 
closing on his aircraft approximately 30 miles southwest of the Suiho Reservoir. Lt. 
Niemann's aircraft was last seen seven miles south of Sakchu. 

Lt. Niemann was captured by enemy forces and subjected to interrogation. Niemann's 
name appears on the list compiled by the Russian side of the Joint Commission entitled, 
A List of United States A ir Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti- 
Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an 
Interrogation Point. Niemann made an impression on Soviet intelligence officers 
because he refused to answer questions." Soviet forces recorded a list of personal effects 
taken from Niemann. 

Soviet Korean War veteraui Victor Bushuyev recalled, "The interrogations were easy. The only case 
was that of Niemann who refused to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal 
reason why he refused. He was in from hospital. He said it was a violation of international law." Paul M. 
Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1, The Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND MR-351/1-USDP, 1993), 
p. 142. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Conclusion: The time of the attack (12:15 in USAF time) on the F-86 by Berepidze 
and the fact the attack was made on the USAF wingman, and the time Niemann was 
reported to be MIA (12:25) indicate that Soviet records describe the shoot down of ILt. 
Niemann. In contrast to the last sighting of Niemann's aircraft by USAF witnesses, 
Soviet records indicate that Lt. Niemann crashed in China near the Andung airfield.*' 
Niemann's casualty status is MIA. [See F. 13 and map at G.I.] 

B.13. F-84 Shot Down April 12, 1953 

Operational Summary No. 1 02 from the 64'*^ Soviet lAK in Andung to Moscow for 
April 12, 1953 states, "at 1604, 8 MiG-15s from the 913'*' lAP (led by Captain Semenov), 
flying in the Bikhen region at 500m altitude, engaged 4 F-84s. 1 pilot. Captain Semenov, 
fired and shot down 1 F-84 at a distance of 800m on the target's rear aspect." 

According to USAF records, F-84 (No. 51-4854) pilot ILt. James Washington Wills, 
Jr. (20408 AF), went into a shallow bomb run on April 12, 1953. After approximately 
two seconds of the explosion of the bomb released by Wills, a second explosion was 
observed approximately 2000 feet ahead of the bomb burst. A search of the area revealed 
burning wreckage of what appeared to be a crashed airplane. No parachute or sign of life 
was observed. 

According to USAF records, F-84 (No. 51-1 1 lOA) pilot ILt. Lennard Owan Deluna 
(AO 2223617) was also shot down on April 12, 1953 at 19:51 hours during a night 
interdiction mission. 

Conclusion: Of the two F-84s reported to be shot down by Soviet forces on this day, 
U.S. and Soviet records are not consistent with the loss of ILt. Lennard Owan Deluna, 
whose current casualty status is MIA. Soviet records appear to be consistent with the loss 
of 1 Lt. James W. Wills Jr. Wills who is carried as BNR in the Battle Monuments list and 
MIA in ClLHl records. There was no report by wingmen flying with Wills, however, of 
enemy aircraft activity. [See F.l 1 and F.12.] 

B.14. - 24. Interrogation of 11 B-29 Crew Members 

The B-29 case which appears in the 64 Soviet lAK daily operational summary (see 
B.8. above) was the subject of a 14-page telegram from General Slyusarev to Comrades 
Malinin and Batitski.*' Slyusarev reported that eleven of the members of the B-29 crew 
shot down on July 24, 1952 had been interrogated by Soviet and Chinese forces. The 
Americans were interrogated, according to the telegram, were the following: 

B.14. ILt. Joseph E. Moreland 
B.15. 2Lt. Francis A. Strieby 
B.16. ILt. Kenneth S. Brazil 
B.17. AlC Edwin D. Combs 

Niemann's element leader, ILt. Donald W. Stewart Jr., who said the flight turned "left" before 
crossing the Yalu River, reported, "I estimated my position when I last saw Lt. Niemann as being 30 miles 
southwest of the Suiho Reservoir." Statement made April 14, 1953. 
*' Deciphered Telegram Msg. No. 503826/sh, November 26, 1952. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

B.18. AlC William E.Koski 

B.19. SSgt. Charles V. Johansen 

B.20. AlC Kenneth H.Bass 

B.21. A2C Donald L. Hand 

B.22. SSgt. Bernard F. Rivers 

B.23. AlC Eugene E. Evers 

B.24. Captain Theodore R. Harris 

All of these servicemen were returned to US military control after the Armistice. 

Of particular interest in this telegram is the line, "Representatives from the MGB 
USSR and China have arrived from Peking to conduct fiirther prisoner interrogations, in 
order to gain more precise information. . . The interrogation will be continued in 
Pekton."*' Thus it is clear that the Soviet military permitted intelligence services to have 
access to American POWs and in this case invited them to participate. In addition, it is 
clear that Soviet intelligence organizations conducted these interrogations on North 
Korean territory. 

Conclusion: The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to provide the MGB 
records of the interrogation of this crew. 

B.25-26. USAF B^fR Cases from the July 4, 1952 B-29 Shoot Down 

In telegram No. 503826/sh discussed in B. 14-24, Slyusarev reported that two 
members of the B-29 crew died: 

B.25. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright 
B.26. SSgt. Clifford H. Mast 

Conclusion: Both of these are MI A cases. The Russian side of the USRJC should be 
asked to provide information concerning the disposition of the remains of Albright and 
Mast. If the remains were buried at the crash site an effort could be made today to 
recover them. [See F.7 and F.8.] 

B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin 

Enciphered telegram No. 406466/sh, which was sent to Deputy Chief of the Soviet 
General Staff Zakharov and copied to the entire Politburo, including Stalin, by Shytkov 
on July 24, 1950, raises an important issue. Shytkov reports that the commanding officer 
of the US 34th Infantry Regiment was captured. The four commanders of the 34th 
between June and July 1950 were the following: 

Col. Jay B. Loveless, June 25 - July 7. Relieved of command and sent to Japan. 

Col. Robert R. Martin, July 7 - July 8. Reported to have been killed in action. 

Lt. Col. Robert L. Wadlington, July 8 - July 18. Temporary commander who was not 

This appears to be a reference to the POW came at Pyoktong. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Col. Charles E. Beauchamp, July 18-onward. Departed Korea ca. April 1951. 

Conclusion: The only commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment who is not 
accounted for is Robert R. Martin, whose current casualty status is MIA. [See F.17.] 

C. Soviet-era Archive Data on POW/MiA Who May Have Died In Soviet 

Soviet archive records include information concerning the death of at least one and 
perhaps two American servicemen who may have died in Soviet custody during the 
Korean War: 

C.l. Captain Charles E. McDonough 
C.2. Captain Albert G. Tenney 

C.l Charles E. McDonough 

According to USAF records, including the testimony of repatriated POW Captain 
Hamilton B. Shawe, the last American known to have seen Captain McDonough alive, 
McDonough's RB-45C (No. 48 015) departed Yakota Air Base, Japan, on December 4, 
1950 for a combat reconnaissance mission over North Korea.™ The Department of the 
Air Force described the route of the RB-45 as "Sinuiju eastward to Hoeryong along the 
North Korean border." McDonough told Shawe the RB-45 was "jumped by five MiGs" 
over the Yalu River. 

On the first pass, his aircraft was partially crippled and he was unable to jettison his bomb bay tank 
which gave the MiGs an opportunity to make a second pass. On the second pass, two of his engines 
were shot out, and he went into a spin at about 35,000 feet. At about 1,000 feet, he finally managed to 
get the canopy off and bail. Major McDonough was the only one to escape from the aircraft. He 
landed in the burning wreckage of the aircraft and had his hands and face burned and lost his flying 
boots. He then evaded for three to four days, wandering around in the snow without any shoes which 
of course cause severe frostbite. 

USAF records state with certainty that McDonough's RB-45 was shot down over North 
Korea. McDonough's 293 file states that the location of the shoot down was grid 
coordinate 6034-11. McDonough's Case Status Card states that McDonough "parchuted 
into crash near Sinuiju." 

In a Soviet interrogation of McDonough previously obtained by DPMO, McDonough 
said the attack occurred "after lunch, about 2:00. ... They shot us down near the Chusan 
[phonetic] at about 30,000 feet [9,000 meters]. One jet plane shot us down. The plane 
caught fire and all three crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don't know where 
the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed." 

The crew of the RB-45 included, in addition to McDonough, Colonel John R. Lovell, 924A; Captain 
Jules E. Young, AO800628; and co-pilot and ILieutenant James J. Picucci, AO928027. In a Soviet 
interrogation of McDonough previously obtained by DPMO, McDonough told the Soviets on December 
18, 1950, "The type of [aircraft] I fly on is the RB-45. It has a crew of three." There were four Americans 
on this RG-45 when it was shot down. 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

In the first of two Soviet cables obtained by DFI," dated December 17, 1950, 
information concerning this RB-45 was sent from Belov to Shtemenko and Batitski. 
Belov reported. 

An aircraft shot down on December 4, 1950 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of 
Andung. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely. The crew 
bailed out on parachutes. The pilot, Charles McDonough, was taken prisoner. 

Further, Belov reported that under interrogation McDonough said the RB-45 had been 
shot down at 30,000 feet [9000 meters]. McDonough is reported to have said the 
navigator landed and ran off. The radio operator disappeared but McDonough did not 
know where. There was no mention of the fourth man. Colonel John R. Lovell. 

The following day, December 18, 1950, Krasovskii reported to Batiskii concerning 

1 am informing you, the pilot from the downed B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was 
not finished. I am sending you the material that I have on hand. 

Col. Orlov stated with no reference to primary source data, "On 4 December 1950 a B-45 
was shot down in East Andimg."" McDonough' s Soviet interrogation record refers to 
the shoot down location as near the Cusan (Chosin?) reservoir. 

Conclusion: A clear discrepancy exists between Soviet and American records as to 
the location of the November 4, 1950 crash of RB-45 No. 8015. There is substantial 
reason to suspect that McDonough crashed in China and no doubt was interrogated by 
Soviet forces. This raises doubts whether McDonough was evading after capture or was 
in Soviet or Chinese custody for some or all of the time between the shoot down on the 
fourth and McDonough's appearance in Sinuiju on the fourteenth. McDonough appears 
to have died in Soviet custody or at least with a Soviet witness during transport to an 
undetermined location where, according to Soviet reporting, the unfinished interrogation 
was apparently scheduled to continue. [See D.2, F. 14, and map at G. 1 .] 

C.2Captain Albert G. Tenney 

Russian sources have given three "official" versions of the fate of Captain Termey: 1) 
Tenney died at Myaogou airfield; 2) Teimey died in the vicinity of Myaogou airfield; and 
3) Soviet records contain no information concerning the fate of Captain Tenney. 

Conclusion: Until the Russian side of the USRJC is able to resolve the contradictions 
in its own reporting, the possibility that Tenney was alive in Soviet custody carmot be 
excluded. [See F. 1 .] 

" Both cables have been submitted in their entirety to DPMO previously by DFI. CDR Kurt HoflfVnan 
said that neither document was accepted as a formal submission to the USRJC, thus there are no TFR 

" Eighth Plenum, p. KW-2. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

D. Information Obtained from Soviet Veterans Associated With 

Information obtained from Soviet Air Force veterans may be associated by name with 
the following Korean War POW/MIA cases: 

D. 1 . Captain William D. Crone 

D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough 

D.3. Maj. George A. Davis 

D.4. Austin W. Beetle 

D.5. "Van Paul" 

D.l. Captain William D. Crone 

According to DPMO's August 1993 study, The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs 
to the Soviet Union, Captain Crone was participating in a four aircraft c<?mbat mission in 
the Sinuiju area of North Korea on June 18, 195 1 . Approximately 30 kilometers 
southeast of Sinuiju, the formation was attacked by eight enemy aircraft at 25,000 feet. 
Captain Crone was last seen in a 360 degree tight right turn. Circumstances of his loss 
could not be ascertained and an aerial search revealed no clues as to his fate. USAF 
casualty data pinpoint the time of the crash of Crone's aircraft at 1 1 :30 hours. 

Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel Askold Germon reported in May 1994 that he was 
able "to determine, with a reasonable degree of reliability, the fate of William D. Crone." 
Working through a network of Soviet veterans and the Moscow Aviation Institute, 
Germon learned that on June 18, 1951 at 0946 local time in Korea, an American F-86 was 
rammed, or more likely was simply involved in a collision, during an air engagement 
with Soviet fighters. Both aircraft crashed as a result of the incident. The Soviet airman 
was able to parachute to safety, but the American was killed. '' According to Germon, in 
all probability this American pilot was Captain Crone. Germon also noted that this 
incident was reported in the June 21, 1951 edition of Izvestiya. Other Soviet veterans 
have previously reported seeing Crone's identification card. 

Conclusion: A discrepancy exists in USAF and Soviet records as to the time of the 
crash of William Crone's F-86. USAF records are uncertain as to the circumstances of 
loss, thus the estimate of the time of the crash may not be accurate. [See F.3.] 

D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough 

In addition to the information obtained from Soviet archive sources, Soviet Air Force 
veterans provided the following information on the shoot down of McDonough's RB-45 
on December 4, 1950. 

Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel Askold Germon reported in April 1994 that a 
Captain Vidinskij was the pilot of one of four MiGs which attacked an USAF RB-45 at 
1 1 :35 hours on December 4, 1950. According to Germon's conversation with unnamed 

Germon reported in July 1994 that Crone "collided with a Soviet MiG piloted by Major Subbotin of 
the 176th Guards Aviation Regiment. The search group found Crone's photograph and other documents." 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

individuals writing a book on the Korean War, one member of the RB-45's crew was 
seen leaving the stricken aircraft at 2,000 meters. According to this source, the RB-45 
crashed 15 to 20 kilometers (9 to 12 miles) north of Ti-Sin (phonetic). 

Col. Germon reported on May 27, 1994 additional information on the RB-45 case. 
According to Germon's sources, pilot A. F. Andrianov, who now lives in Moscow, 
received credit for shooting down the RB-45. The RB-45 was on a course from Mukden 
to Andung when it was intercepted. Participants in the engagement reported that they 
saw one American crew member parachute from the aircraft. According to Germon's 
conversation with the Soviet participants, the other members of the RB-45 crew were 
killed in the crash of the RB-45. According to Soviet documents, the wreckage of the 
RB-45 was collected by Soviet forces for shipment to the USSR. 

In October 1994, DFI's research team met with Alexander Fyodorovich Andrianov, 
who described the circumstances concerning the shoot down of the RB-45 on December 
4, 1950. When it was detected, the RB-45 was flying "very fast" at an altitude of 10,000 
meters (33,000 feet). A flight of four MiGs (a sveno), including Andrianov and Alexey 
Kumosov, were scrambled to intercept.^'' After approximately 80 to 100 kilometers, it 
seemed they would not be able to catch up with the faster American aircraft which had 
not yet reacted to the pursuing MiGs. When the MiGs were finally detected, the "RB-45 
made a turn south to run for Japan." The RB-45 was on a southeast course over China. 
The turn slowed down the RB-45 enough for the MiGs to come within fuing range, 
approximately 15 kilometers north of Andung. 

Each of the four MiGs opened fire and the RB-45 was hit by all of them." The RB- 
45 caught fire and went into a tight spin. Andrianov tracked the aircraft down to 13,000 
feet where he saw one parachute deploy. He circled around the parachute, contemplating 
opening fire on the crewman, but did not. During this time the RB-45 crashed, so 
Andrianov did not have visual contact with it the entire way down. Thought Andrianov 
heard that the entire crew on board was killed, he cannot categorically exclude the 
possibility that other parachutes appeared. Andrianov was by this time low on fiiel and 
returned to Andung. 

A deputy regimental political officer named Fironov interrogated the captured RB-45 1 
pilot, Charles McDonough. Fironov noted that McDonough was heavily bandaged, in 
part because his mouth had been ripped apparently by the wind during the bail out. 
Fironov said McDonough was both "arrogant and courageous." After being interrogated 
by Russians in Andung, McDonough was turned over to the North Koreans who 
transported him across the Yalu River to Sinuiju. Fironov said the North Koreans hung a 
sign around McDonough's neck stating he was a US war criminal, put him on display in a 

The flight leader, according to Andrianov, was a pilot named Polopanov. 

The four pilots could not determine who should receive credit for the kill, thus they drew cards for it. 
Whoever drew the Jack of Clubs would win. Andrianov won and thus received credit. Soviet pilots also 
received bonuses for shoot downs - 3,000 rubles for an RB-45, 2,000 for a B-29, and 1,000 rubles for a 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

public square, and permitted a mob to beat McDonough to death. Andrianov could not 
recall any information concerning the disposition of the pilot's remains. 

Conclusion: Soviet Air Force veterans confirm that only one member of the RB-45 
crew was observed to parachute from the stricken aircraft. The veterans have offered no 
evidence of other survivors. The location of the crash of the RB-45, according to Soviet 
veterans, was China rather than North Korea as shown in USAF records. [See D.2, F. 14, 
and map at G.I.] 

D.3. Major George A. Davis 

According to Col. Germon, Davis was shot down and killed shortly after he had shot 
down two Soviet MiGs. "At the sight of the crash," Germon added, "besides documents 
the search team found his pistol. It is quite possible that he was shot down by Mikhail A. 
Averin." Lt. Gen. Georgii Lobov, commander of the 64"' air corps, noted in his memoirs, 
"Our pilots shot down. . . Maj. George A. Davis, the top American ace of the war at the 
time (killed)." 

According to the Battle Monuments list of Korean War BNR cases. According to 
CILHI records, Lt. Col. George A. Davis Jr. (13035 A) was shot down on February 10, 
1952. According to F-86 Sabre, Major George A. Davis, who was expected to become 
the Korean War's "ace of aces ... the leading ace of the war," attacked a MiG formation 
at 32,000 feet (9,753m) near the Yalu, where he recorded his 13th and 14th MiG kills. 
During this engagement Davis was shot down by a MiG. '' F-86 Sabre states that Davis 
was killed on February 10, 1952. during a mission near Uiju, south of the Yalu River, 
though there is no direct evidence pointing toward the fact of Davis's death. 

USAF records indicate that Major Davis's wingman "followed him straight down and 
observed [Davis] pull up from dive and head southeast with wheels down and smoke 
coming from aircraft" after Davis was struck by MiG cannon fire near XE 3530. At XE 
8070 Davis was observed to start "a large spiral to left and aircraft was seen to crash and 
bum at XE 83 15." The wingman "due to watching for enemy aircraft did not observe 
whether [Davis] bailed out or not. There was snow on the ground making it difficult to 
locate a parachute." 

Conclusion: Soviet data is consistent with USAF records on Lt. Col. George A. 
Davis. According to CILHI data, Lt. Col. George A. Davis Jr., whose crash date is 
February 10, 1952 and crash site reported to be at Anju, near the mouth of the Chong 
Chong River well south of Uiju, (coordinates 6233-IV or XE830150), is a Korean War 
MIA. According to USAF data, "due to the fact that the entire descent of Major Davis's 
aircraft was not observed and because of the difficulty of seeing a parachute against a 
background of snow that Major Davis should be continued in MIA status." [See F.16.] 

Robert F. Dorr, (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International Publishers, 1993), p. 129. Maj. Davis, 
promoted posthumously to Lt. Col., was the only F-86 pilot to be awarded the Medal of Honor during the 
Korean War. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

D.4. Lt. Austin W. Beetle 

Soviet Air Force veterans reported to DFI in July 1994 that Beetle "apparently was a 
Black man and his plane was shot down. His plane had both Korean War and World War 
II stars on the cabin." 

According to USAF records, Lt. Beetle and his element leader. Captain Clifford D. 
JoUey, were engaged in an intense dogfight with several MiGs on July 4, 1952 near 
Sinuiju. Beetle (AO 840696, F-86 No. 50-683) was taking fire from a MiG which Jolley 
"slid in behind . . . and fired a short burst which ripped the right horizontal stabilizer off 
The MiG immediately snapped over and spun in." A few minutes later. Beetle reported 
that he "was hit bad. He was over the Yalu River mouth at 25,000 feet." Both Jolley and 
Beetle, extremely low on fuel, steered toward Chodo Island. Jolley and Beetle both 
ejected. Jolley was plucked from the water by a South Korean rescue ship, taken to 
Chodo, then transported by helicopter to K-16 Air Base. Jolley reported that Beetle 
"bailed out over Chodo Island and landed at SC 5668. An Air rescue SA-16 was 300 
yards from Yellow Two when he hit the water and 100 yards from him when he went 
under. [Beetle] was dragged under almost immediately upon contact with the water, 
apparently by his parachute. Crew members of the rescue aircraft used a grapple with no 

Conclusion: The information from the Soviet Air Force vetercins matches that of Lt. 
Beetle. According to CILHI data. Beetle's casualty status is MIA. Beetle, who was bom 
in 1916 and thus was old enough to have been in World War II, was a Caucasian. [See 

D.5. "Van Paul" 

Col. Germon reported in July 1994 that of the "15 or 16 men in the crew" of the RB- 
29 shot down in January 1953, "12 bailed out and the rest died. The name of one of the 
crew members killed was Vzin Paul. The pilot who shot down this airplane now lives in 

On January 13, 1953, USAF RB-29 (No. 44-62217) departed Yakota Air Base Japan 
for a "mission-classified" psychological fanfare leaflet drop. The RB-29 was shot down 
by enemy MiGs. One of the crew members, ILt. Paul E. Van Voorhis (AO 2091867), is 
currently an Korean War MIA case. (For additional information on this RB-29 incident, 
see the discussion of Col. John Arnold above.) 

Conclusion: Germon's information is consistent with the circumstances of loss for 
Paul Van Voorhis, whose current casualty status is MIA. [See related case at A. 1.7, F.4, 
and map at G.I.] 

E. Uncorrelated Information From Soviet Archives 

The following information from Soviet military archives concerning American 
aircraft shot down during the Korean War could not be correlated with data from U.S. 
archives. DFI International had neither the resources nor the access to relevant archive 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

holdings in order to compare the following shoot downs to U.S. records. (All shoot 
downs were by aircraft unless noted as AAA.) 

E.l. 1 B-29, October 23, 1951, shot down by the 1777* AA Regiment. 

E.2. 1 F-86, October 26, 1 95 1 , 1000 hrs @ 8000 meters, near Dzyunsen 

E.3. 3 F-80's, October 26, 1951, 1059 hrs @ 5000 meters, near Dzyunsen 

E.4. 1 F-80, October 26, 1951, 1455 @ 2-3000 meters, south of Anju 

E.5. lF-86, December 15, 1951, 1025 hrs @ 9-1 1000 meters 

E.6. 1 F-86, December 15, 1951, 1031 hrs @ 10.5-11000 meters, south of Anju 

E.7. 1 F-86, December 15, 1951, 1028 hrs @ 1 1.5-12000 meters, south of Anju 

E.8. 2F-86's, January 7, 1952 

E.9. 2 F-86's, January 7, 1952, 0849 hrs @ 7-10000 meters, near Bukhen-Anju 

E. 1 0. 1 F-86, January 8, 1 952, 0933 hrs @ 1 0000 meters, NE of Bikhen/Andung 

E.l 1. 1 F-86, January 8, 1952, 1418 hrs @ 9-1 1500 meters, near Anju-Taesen 

E.l 2. 1 B-26,May3, 1952 

E.13. 1 F-86, May 3, 1952, 1722 hrs near Tajsen 

E. 1 4. 1 F-86, May 1 0, 1 952, 0732 hrs by AAA 1 km south of Sensen 

E.l 5. 1 F-51, May 10, 1952, 1 km SE of Kokunendon 

E. 1 6. 1 B-29, June 11,1 952, 2 1 45 hrs @ 6500 meters near Sensen 

E. 1 7. 1 B-29, June 11,1 952, 2200 hrs @ 7800 meters 1 5-20 km east of Sensen 

E.l 8. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2225 hrs @ 7000 meters 20 km SE of Semni-do 

E.l 9. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2145-2230 hrs, fell into the sea 

E.20. 1 F-86, June 1 1, 1952, 1824 hrs, near Bikhen-Ryugampo region 

E.2 1 . 1 B-29, June 1 6, 1 952, fell into the sea 

E.22. 1 B-29, July 4, 1952, 2210 hrs @7500 meters, 75 km west of 

E.23. 1 B-29, July 4, 1952, 2246 hrs @ 7200 meters near Khakusen 

E.24. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1 127 hrs @ 1500-2000 meters, 20 km south of Sakusyu 

E.25. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1 125 hrs @ 1500-2000 meters, 20-25 km south of 

E.26. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1121 hrs, near Dehehguandong, destroyed in mid-air 

E.27. 1 F-86, July 4, 1952, 1 145 hrs, near Chisuy-Bikhen 

E.28. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952, 1604-1620 hrs @ 8-10000 meters, near Sinuiju 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

E.29. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952, 1612-1620 hrs @ 7-13000 meters, near Uiju-Bikhen 

E.30. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952 

E.31. 4 F-86's, August 1,1952 

E.32. 1 F-86, August 22, 1952 

E.33. 1 B-29, September 13, 1952, 231 1 hrs, 10 km SE of Sakusyu 

E.34. 1 or 2 B-29's, September 13, 1952, 2235-0106 hrs @ 6800-7500 meters, 5 

E.35. 3 F-86's, October 18, 1952, 0941 hrs @ 12000 meters, 30 km west of 

E.36. 3 F-86's, January 13, 1953, one of which exploded in mid-air 

E.37. 1 B-29, January 13, 1953, 2125 hrs @ 7000 meters, crash near Simni-do 

E.38. 1 F-86, January 23, 1953, 1 121-1 123 hrs @ 400 meters, near 

E.39. 2 F-86, April 7, 1953, 0940-0945 hrs, 20 km NE of Sensen 

E.40. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0807 hrs @ 1 1000 meters, near Siodzio 

E.41. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0754 hrs @ 13000 meters, near Siodzio 

E.42. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0753-0800 hrs @ 13000 near Siodzio 

E.43. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1055 @ 13500 meters, near Deheguandong 

E.44. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1 1 15 on approach to Andung airfield 

E.45. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1 105 @ 1 1000 meters, near Kidzio 

F. Change of Casualty Status Recommendations 

The first attempt to use Soviet AAA records in order to provide data on which the 
casualty basis of U.S. Korean War MIAs could be changed occurred in 1993." A 
subsequent effort, which according to a Joint Commission member was also "the first 
time that we have been able to use both Russian and US records to resolve missing in 
action cases" using Soviet AAA battery records, was completed by June 1994.'' This 
section is an effort to use, for the first time, the daily operational summaries of the Soviet 
64 Fighter Corps' air combat operations either to resolve the fate of American 
POW/MIA cases or to recommend a change of casualty status. 

A report from Soviet AAA battery number 45 10, November 23, 195 1, was published in POW/MIA 
Issues: Volume I. The Korean War, pps. 1 19-120. The USAF personnel, carried as MIA in American 
records, who were reported dead in this report are the following: ILt. Jack A. Fisher (AO 2087035), Maj. 
Gordon K. Kahl (AO 0437317), and ILt. John Roumiguiere (AO 2221990). The Soviet records are 
consistent with USAF Field Search Case 753. 

" Minutes of the Korean War Working Group. Ninth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs. 1-2 
June 1994, p. 27. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

The source of information on which this section is based, i.e. the records of the Soviet 
64"* Fighter Corps' air combat operations, has not been made available elsewhere. It is 
worth recalling what USRJC member Col. Mukhin said about the operational summaries, 
"Regarding these daily journals, the combat journals as they're called, they are 
summaries of activities that occurred, like a historical document. I don't think that there 
will be much interest in them."" In contrast to Col. Mukhin's view, as shown in this 
report the operational summaries contain a vast Eimount of relevant data which provided 
the basis for the following recommendations for a change of casualty status. 

The following POW/MIA cases are described in sufficient detail to warrant an 
examination of the data for the purpose of making an official change of casualty status. 

F. 1 . Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney 
F.2. Major Deltis Fincher 
F.3. Captain William D. Crone 
F.4. ILt. Paul E. Van Voorhis 
F.5. ILt. Henry D.Weese 
F.6. Airman 1/c Alvin D. Hart, Jr. 
F.7. S/Sgt. Clifford H. Mast 
F.8. S/Sgt Richard L. Albright 
F.9. ILt. Vance R.Frick 
F.IO. B-29Crew 

F.10.1 ILt. William K.Phillis 
F.10.2. ILt. Henry B.Kelley 
F.10.3. ILt. Fred D.Bloesch 
F.10.4. Capt. James A. Lowe 
F.10.5. ILt. Spiro J. Peters 
F. 1 0.6. M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown 
F.10.7. A/lc James O. Trosclair 
F.10.8. A/lc Jimmie R. Hobday 
F.10.9. A/lc James W.Kelly 
F.IO. 10. A/lc James R. Lebaron 
F. 1 1 . 1 Lt. James Washington Wills, 
F. 1 2. 1 Lt. Leimard Owan Deluna 
F.I 3. ILt. Robert F. Niemann 




Reconcile CILHI & USAF data. 


































Ninth Plenum report, p. 4 1 . 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough FROM: KIA(BNR) TO: POW(BNR) 

F.15. Col. John R. Lovell 

F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis 

F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin 

F.18. Lt. Laurence C. Layton 

F.19. ILt. Austin Beetle 






F. 1 . Albert Gilbert Tenney 

The report of Tenney's loss was initially thought to have been deliberately distorted 
by his flight leader in order to conceal the fact that the USAF, in this case at least eight F- 
86s, was operating in Chinese airspace against standing orders." This hypothesis could 
not be proven. Current information is consistent with the original description of the 
circumstances of Tenney's loss. Captain Tenney's lead that day, Captain William R. 
"Nuts" Nowadnick, stated on July 19, 1994, "I'll guarantee you the aircraft hit the water 
and Tenney was in it."" Tenney's MIA status was based on the observation that his 
aircraft was not observed to sink, the impact on the water was not necessarily fatal, and 
there were North Korean surface vessels in the vicinity which could have captured 
Termey. In addition, Lt. Col. Nowadnick (Ret.) said, "Tenney's plane had no battle 
damage. 37 millimeter cannon shells leave a pretty good mark. There wasn't a mark on 
the aircraft. I was no more than 25 feet away during the entire descent, maybe four 
minutes, before Termey struck the water at something like Mach .9." 

Since Soviet records contain direct evidence concerning Termey's death "in the 
vicinity of Myaogou field," the prospect for a recovery and identification of these remains 
is greatly enhanced. 

Based on the analysis of the information obtained by DFI concerning Captain Albert 
Gilbert Tenney, DFI recommends the following: 

• That Air Force casualty affairs change Captain Tenney's casualty status fi-om J 
MIA to POW(BNR) until the Russian side of the USRJC is able to demonstrate | 
the circumstances of Tenney's death; 

• That the Russian side of the Joint Commission be given the task to determine how 
Soviet forces disposed of Captain Termey's body, including the burial location, 

F-86 ace Col. Harold Fischer said, "Pilots routinely did this during debriefings. There was no order 
from above. You just did this to avoid problems or even possibly being dismissed from the Air Force." 
Discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 27, 1994. 

Conversation with Paul M. Cole. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

• A request be made to the government of the PRC, the country where the grave is 
presumably located, for permission to recover the remains.'^ 

F.2. Deltis Fincher 

Recommendation: There is not a significant discrepancy between the circumstances 
of loss for Deltis Fincher as described in USAF and Soviet records. Soviet records, 
however, state with certainty that Fincher' s F-86 was found and Fincher perished in the 
crash. There are adequate grounds on which to question the authenticity of the Soviet 
records of this incident, thus the casualty status of Major Dehis Fincher be changed from 
MIA to POW(BNR). The Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked for 
information as to the disposition of Major Fincher in light of Lobov's statement that 
Fincher had been captured and transported to an undetermined location. 

F.3. William Crone 

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to question the 
validity of the conclusion derived fi^om Soviet Air Force veterans and the Moscow 
Aviation Institute, the casualty status of Captain William D. Crone should be changed 
from MIA to believed to be KIA(BNR). 

F.4. ILt. Paul E. Van Voorhis 

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the 
veracity of the Soviet archive documents which state the precise number of bodies found 
in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953 and the veracity of the 
reporting from Soviet Air Force veterans who provided information that "Van Paul" was 
one of those killed in this crash, the casualty status of ILt. Paul E. Van Voorhis should be 
changed from MIA to KIA(BNR). 

F.5. ILt. Henry D. Weese 

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the 
veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the 
USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953, the casualty status of ILt. Henry D. Weese 
should be changed from MIA to KJA(BNR) 

F.6. Airman ICIass Alvin D. Hart, Jr. 

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the 
veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the creish of the 
USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953, the casualty status of Airman 1 Class 
Alvin D. Hart, Jr. should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR) 

A complete set of Tenney's dental records, on which a positive identification may be based, exist 
and are available. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

F.7. Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast 

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the 
veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the 
USAF RB-29 shot down on July 4, 1952, the casualty status of Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast 
(AF 194 17343) should be changed from POW(BNR) to KIA(BNR). 

F.8. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright 

Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet 
reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down 
on July 4, 1952, the casualty status of Ssgt. Richard L. Albright (AF 183650 10) should be 
changed from MIA to KIA(BNR). 

F.9. ILt. Vance R. Frick 

Recommendation: Reconcile CILHI and USAF Casualty Office data. 

F.IO. Five members of B-29 crew shot down September 13, 1952. 

Recommendation: Five of the following are confirmed dead in Soviet records. The 
original USAF report noted there was "no chance for survival" for the crew, though one 
crew member did survive. At a minimum the casualty status of five, and in view of the 
records perhaps all ten, of the following should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR). 

F.10.1 ILt. William K.Phillis 

F.10.2. ILt. Henry B.Kelley 

F.10.3. ILt. Fred D.Bloesch 

F.10.4. Capt. James A. Lowe 

F.10.5. ILt. Spire J. Peters 

F. 1 0.6. M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown 

F. 1 0.7. A/1 c James O. Trosclair 

F.10.8. A/lcJimmie R.Hobday 

F.10.9. A/lc James W.Kelly 
F.10.10. A/lc James R. Lebaron. 

F.l 1. ILt. James Washington Wills Jr. 

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for disputing the veracity of USAF and 
Soviet records pertaining to this case, 1 Lt. Wills should be reclassified from MIA to 

F.12. ILt. Lennard Owan Deluna 

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for disputing the veracity of USAF and 
Soviet records pertaining to this case, ILt. Deluna should be reclassified from MIA to 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

F.13. ILt. Robert F. Niemann 

Soviet records suggest and Soviet veterans confirm, that Niemann was alive, for an 
unknown period of time, after he was shot down over China. Soviet veterans confirm 
Niemann was alive long enough for Soviet forces to record the fact that Niemann refiised 
to answer questions during interrogation." Niemann's personal effects were collected by 
Soviet forces" and Niemann's name was included on a list prepared by the Russian side 
of the USRJC, List of US Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti- 
Aircraft Artillery during Combat Operations in Korea and Transited Through an 
Interrogation Point." Three Soviet and Russians sources—Soviet document, veterans, 
and the Russian side of the USRJC-independently point toward the fact that Niemarm 
survived the crash of his F-86 and was interrogated by Soviet forces. 

Recommendation: Regardless of the actual location of the shoot down of ILt. 
Niemann, since the evidence strongly suggests that he was alive in enemy hands and 
since Soviet veterans of the Korean War have direct knowledge of Niemann alive in 
captivity, Niemann's casualty status should be changed from MIA to POW(BNR). The 
Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked to provide fiirther information on 
the Niemann case, particularly concerning the direct evidence of an interrogation record. 
Failing that, the Russian side should be asked to support its position by providing 
information on the location of Niemann at the time of death and the disposition of 
remains. [See map at G. 1 .] 

F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough 

The McDonough case, indeed the fate of each crew member of the RB-45, is both 
unresolved and littered with contradictory evidence. '* 

There are at least two "authoritative" locations for the RB-45 crash site: 

1) Near the Yalu River (CILHI data, map grid 6332-IV, Col. Orlov from March 2, 
1994); and 

2) Near Andung, China (Soviet records and Col. Orlov's reports). 
There are three conflicting versions of when McDonough was last seen alive: 

1 ) "Died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site," according to "A. Orlov.'"' 

POW/MIA Issues: Volume I, The Korean War, p. 142. Tlie Soviet officer responsible for preparing 
interrogation records said, "The interrogations were easy. The only case was that of Neimann who refused 
to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal reason why he refused. He was in 
some hospital. He said it was a violation of some international laws. Of course they wanted to interrogate 
him, but then I never saw any materials of his interrogations." 
",TFR 76-34 

USAF analysis of the Korean War POW experience and Soviet records point toward the North 
Korean city of Sinuiju as the place referred to as "the interrogation point." 

*On what evidence, for example, did Belov base his conclusion that the crew of the RB-45 "bailed 
out on parachutes?" Is it solely from McDonough's interrogation, or are there other reports? 

TFR217-1, entitled "Last names of American fliers mentioned in documents of the 64th lAK 
[Fighter Aviation Corps], citing TsAMO, f.5, op 918795, d. 120, 559, 574. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

2) "Died en route," according to Soviet reporting to Moscow on December 1 8, 

3) "On the night of December 16, 1950 we were both taken from the cell... Major 
McDonough was placed on an ox cart, and I was told by the interpreter that he 
was being taken to a hospital for medical attention. Since that night I have never 
seen or heard anything of Major McDonough, and I feel reasonably certain that he 
passed away or was killed," according to Captain Shawe. 

There are four conflicting versions of whose custody McDonough was in when he died. 

1 . Repatriated POW Shawe reported McDonough was taken away on a ox cart by an 
unspecified captor. 

2. Col. Orlov has said repeatedly that McDonough was in Chinese custody and all 
information in Soviet records was provided by Chinese forces. 

3. Soviet records indicate that McDonough was in Soviet custody at least part of the 
time between the shoot down (December 4) and the day he was last seen alive 
(December 16 or 17). 

4. Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was in North Korean custody 
with a Soviet political officer as an escort when he died. 

To support its version of events, the Russian side of the Joint Commission presented two 
documents concerning the McDonough case, a handwritten note and one document which 
"had been cut from complete documents and taped together on a single sheet of paper."" 
The Russian interpretation of the documents is either less than competent or deliberately 

Col. Orlov passed to the American side a handwritten note concerning McDonough 
which the American side considered to be disingenuous. Orlov wrote that McDonough 
"died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site" giving the false impression that 
McDonough died on the same day as the crash." DPMO noted, "It is likely that Orlov 
was trying, in his note, to present the information in a more positive light than did the 
original documents." 

The Russian version of why two documents had been cut apart and pasted into one 
does not withstand carefiil scrutiny. Orlov asserted that the portions of the two 
documents redacted by the Russians "is a report that contains other things. We gave all 
that pertains to POWs."^ This statement was not entirely true. 

TFR-242-2. DFI previously obtained and sent to DPMO complete copies of both documents. The 
Russia^ cut-and-paste job was a significant distortion of the content and format of the original documents. 
The Russian side summarized and redacted these documents to conceal, among other things, the fact 
McDonough lived for at least two weeks following the crash of his aircraft. Col. Alexander Orlov 
provided the American side of the USRJC a handwritten document (TFR-217-1), a summary allegedly 
derived from documents of the 64th lAK, which inaccurately and deceptively states that McDonough "died 
during evacuation from the aircraft crash site." 

'' TFR-217-1. 

'^ Eighth Plenum, p. KW-9. 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

• The cut-and-paste version of the two documents prepared by the Russian side 
deleted the date of the second document (December 18)." 

• Orlov's note gives the misleading impression that McDonough died while being 
"evacuated" from the crash site when in fact McDonough died nearly two weeks 
after the crash. In that time McDonough had been interrogated by Russian forces, 
transported from China to North Korea, and apparently died while being 
transported to an unknown destination by the North Koreans with a Soviet 
political officer escort. 

Col. Orlov insists the "Chinese did the interrogation" and shared the information with 
Soviet forces. The facts suggest, in contrast, that there was direct Soviet involvement 
with McDonough. 

• Soviet reporting states clearly that McDonough was interrogated by "Kuznetsov" 
and the interrogation of McDonough was attested to by Major Kozlov, Senior 
Intelligence officer of Unit 54892. 

• Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was interrogated by deputy 
regimental political officer Fironov. 

• Orlov's claim that the Chinese but not the Soviets interrogated McDonough is 
supposedly supported by the fact that Krasovski signed the second telegram. 
Orlov asserts that in his role as chief military advisor to the Chinese, Krjisovski 
would have been informed about the McDonough interrogation. This does not 
withstand scrutiny. 

• The cut and paste document provided by Orlov does not show the name of the 
Soviet officer who signed the report concerning McDonough' s interrogation. In 
fact, the report to Moscow on the content of the interrogation was signed by 
Belov, the commander of the 64th lAK. Krasovski, the liaison to China, did not 
report on the interrogation, Belov did. The interrogation and report of it were all 
conducted by Soviet forces and transmitted within Soviet channels. There is no 
evidence of Chinese involvement in any of this material. 

• As the commander of the 64th lAK, Belov had no liaison functions with the 
Chinese. Belov is reporting information derived from Soviet efforts. This is why 
the interrogation of McDonough was conducted by Unit 54892 and attested to by 
Major Kozlov. Orlov deleted Belov's name in an attempt to conceal this fact.'^ 

" TFR-242-2. 

'^ Subsequent DFI research uncovered Soviet documents which show the channels of communication 
used by Soviet forces to send interrogation records to Moscow. Documents were included in the Soviet 
diplomatic courier pouch to Beijing and forwarded from there to Moscow. Thus the evidence shows 
Krasovskii's message concerning McDonough's alleged death was based on reporting obtained from 
Soviet forces, not Chinese. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

In response to Congressman Sam Johnson's direct question concerning the McDonough 
case, "This was early in the war. Did you have units there then?" Orlov responded only, 
"It crashed in Andung."*" 

Four issues must be resolved before McDonough' s casualty status is changed to 
KIA(BNR). 1) The possibility cannot be excluded, for example, that "died en route" is a 
Soviet euphemism.** 2) If "died en route" is not a euphemism, however, and if it is true 
that Captain McDonough indeed died on December 18, 1950 in Soviet custody en route, 
then the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be given the task to account for the 
disposition, including the burial location, of Captain McDonough's remains." 3) If Col. 
Orlov' s statement is correct, that McDonough died while being evacuated from the RB- 
45 crash site, on what basis is this conclusion drawn? How does Orlov reconcile this 
version to the report from Krasovkii to Batitskii, "the pilot... died en route"? 4) If the 
Soviet forces buried or witoessed the disposition of Captain McDonough's body in North 
Korea, as Soviet veterans report, then the location of the last known area where 
McDonough was seen alive by Soviet forces should be obtained from the Russian side of 
the USRJC. 

In addition, US records suggest McDonough may not be a BNR case. In 1955, 
according to the opinion of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations General G. B. Erskine, "There is reason to believe Major McDonough's body 
is included among those which have been recovered by our Graves Registration units..." 
Erskine considered the McDonough case to be one "with serious domestic public 
relations implications."^ Further research is required into this report by General Erskine. 

Recommendation: According to family members, McDonough's casualty status was 
changed from MIA to KIA on the basis of repatriate testimony in 1954. McDonough is 
still carried by CILHI as MIA. In the absence of independent confirmation of the fact of 
death or additional evidence which corroborates the alleged fact of death in the Soviet 
archive documents, the grounds are insufficient to maintain a KJA(BNR) casualty status 
for Captain Charles McDonough. In light of information from Soviet archives which 
clearly shows direct Soviet involvement in the interrogation and transport of 
McDonough, facts the Russian side of the USRJC have attempted to blur or conceal, 
Captain McDonough's casualty status be changed from KIA(BNR) (or MIA if CILHI's 
data are accurate) to POW/B>fR. The burden of proof in this case and the responsibility 

'' Eighth Plenum, p. KW-2-3. 

There is a precedent for this type of euphemistic Soviet-ese. After World War II, the Chief of 
NKVD Camp No. 188 was instructed by the Chief of the NKVD USSR Directorate for POWs and 
Internees, "In your wire reports about prisoner movements the word 'died' from now on should be 
substituted with the word 'loaded.'" Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume 2, World War II and the 
Early Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, MR-351/2-USDP, 1993), p. 24. 

If, as reported in Soviet documents, the RB-4S crashed in China, it remains to be explained how 
McDonough made it to Sinuiju, North Korea where he was last seen alive. 

Letter from General G. B. Erskine (Secret) to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs, October 1, 1955. 61 1.95a24/10-155. The "domestic public relations implications" 
referred to may have been the fact that McDonough's RB-45 was shot down in Chinese airspace while 
conducting strategic bombing reconnaissance for the Strategic Air Command. [See map at G.I .] 



DFI Intemation2il ~ Moscow Report 

to account for the remains of McDonough lie with the Russian side of the USRJC. [See 
map at G.I.] 

r.l5. Col. John IL Lovell 

Recommendation: According to the next of kin of Colonel John R. Lovell, a 
passenger on McDonough's RB-45, Lovell "was declared Killed in Action in 1954." 
There is no evidence showing the basis on which Lovell's casualty status was changed 
from MIA to KJA. Further interviews with the participants in the shoot down and 
collection of the wreckage of the RB-45 should be made. Pending the outcome of these 
interviews, and given the degree of contradiction in Soviet records and the lack of direct 
evidence of death, Lovell's casualty status should be changed from KIA(BNR) to 
MIA(BNR). [See related case at C. 1 , D.2, F. 1 4, and map at G. 1 .] 

F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis 

Recommendation: Thus far there is no direct evidence from the archives of the 64 
lAK which confirms information from Corps Commander Georgii Lobov, for example, 
that Davis was killed in the crcish of his F-86. The authoritative source F-86 Sabre does 
not provide evidence which supports the fact of death either. USAF records show that 
there is a possibility that Davis managed to eject in time to save himself It is clear that 
Soviet search teams located the crash site and recovered personal effects from Davis. 
Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should have access to archive material which will 
demonstrate whether Davis was captured alive or w£is found dead. In light of the fact 
that Davis, if captured, would have been of great interest to Soviet intelligence military 
specialists, George Davis's casualty status should be changed from MIA to POW(BNR). 

F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin 

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for doubting the credibility of Shytkov's 
report that Col. Martin was captured in July 1950, Robert R. Martin's casualty status 
should be changed from KIA(BNR) to POW(BNR). [See B.27.] 

F.18. Lt. Laurence C. Layton 

Recommendation: In light of the evidence in Soviet documents that Soviet forces 
were searching for Lt. Layton, and in light of the fact that Layton was known to be alive 
and well on the ground following his bailout, the possibility cannot be excluded that Lt. 
Layton was captured alive by Soviet, Chinese, or Korean forces. The recommendation to 
change Lt. Layton's casualty status from MIA to POW(BNR) is consistent with Air Force 
Manual 200-25. [SeeB.l.] 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

F.19. ILt. Austin Beetle 

Recommendation: The circumstances of loss for Lt. Beetle are clearly consistent with 
a KJA(BNR) casualty status, Beetle's records should be changed from MIA to 
KIA(BNR). [SeeD.4.] 

G. Unreported USAF Losses In Chinese Territory 

American F-86 pilots had a variety of incentives to violate Chinese airspace and to 
conceal, to the extent possible, the true nature of this activity. Two reasons suffice for the 
purpose of this report. First, USAF rules of engagement banned combat sorties across the 
Yalu River into China except in the case of "hot pursuit." Dolphin Overton III, the first 
USAF F-86 pilot to be caught after making an unauthorized sortie over the Yalu, was 
grounded, sent home and threatened with a general court martial in order to compel him 
to resign from the Air Force. The only jet ace in Marine Corps history, Lt. Col. John 
Bolt, wrote, "If you went north of the river, it was at the risk of your professional career if 
you got caught."" As Fischer noted above, in order to avoid Overton's fate, F-86 pilots 
simply selected a location or a village south of the Yalu if one needed to report where a 
MiG or an F-86 has been shot down. This was, according to Fischer, "strictly CYA." 

Second, F-86 pilots such as Air Force Ace Harold Fischer note today that one was 
compelled to cross the Yalu in search of Soviet MiGs simply because "that's where they 
were. According to Lt. Col. Bolt, "The Chinese were yelling and screaming about the 
'pirates' that were coming over there, but that's where the action was." Bolt described 
how the desire to fight MiGs overwhelmed even the most disciplined defenders of USAF 
policy. Summarizing direct first-person interviews with many F-86 veterans of the 
Korean War, F-86 Sabre reported, "throughout the war. Sabre pilots crossed the 
forbidden Yalu to engage MiGs on their own turf, ignoring rules, politics, and direct 
orders telling them to stay out of Chinese airspace. At the 51st FIW, Gabreski, Jones, 
Mahurin, Major William Whisner, and others adopted a hot-pursuit policy, flying what 
they called Maple Special incursions into China when circumstance gave them a shot at a 
fleeing MiG pilot. These border crossings were kept secret from most other pilots.'"* 

These cross-border missions were an invitation to trouble. Lt. Bill Ginther came back from a mission 
with revealing gun camera film. He had attacked a MiG over Manchuria and, trying to escape, the 
MiG pilot had dived to earth, pulling out just in time to pass along the runway at the crowded Antung 
airfield. Ginther began firing at the MiG while flying so low that the gun camera film, as Mahurin 
described it, showed 'row after row of MiGs lined up on either side of the runway,' so that 'it appeared 
that the F-86 was flying even below the tops of the MiG tails. While enemy technicians stood on the 
MiGs watching, Ginther shot down his MiG, got out of the place, coaxed his Sabre home— and burned 
his film. 

Capt. Ivan C. Kincheloe, for example, recorded one of his MiG kills in the vicinity of 
Mukden, about 60 miles (97km) north of the Yalu. 

""Time Flies: The Oral History of Lt. Col. John F. Bolt, USMC (Ret.)," Foundation, Fall 1993, p. 99. 
^ F-86 Sabre, p. 130. 
^ F-86 Sabre, p. 130. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Thus it is understandable that the majority of USAF losses over Chinese territory are 
not reported or reflected as such in US casualty records. US records are a unreliable 
source and offer little insight into these losses. In cases where USAF reconnaissance 
aircraft entered Chinese airspace on classified missions approved by the relevant USAF 
and FEAF authorities, documentation which accurately describes the true nature of 
operations of this type would have been generated by SAC and FEAF during the Korean 
War. In the case of unauthorized combat operations in China, however, the only extant 
USAF records associated with these missions do not accurately describe these missions. 

G.l. Deceptive USAF Reporting on Location of Losses 

As shown in Section A of this volume, USAF personnel who had direct knowledge 
of unauthorized combat incursions into Chinese airspace during the Korean War left an 
incomplete record concerning the location of the loss of US aircraft in cases where the 
aircraft was lost on Chinese territory. In some of these cases, Soviet Air Force records 
are a useful source of information as to the true location of crash sites. 

The following four maps show the contrast between crash locations in USAF records 
and the location of the Arnold (January 13, 1953), Heller (January 23, 1953), and 
McDonough (December 4, 1950), and Niemann (April 12, 1953) incidents as recorded in 
Soviet records or reported by Soviet Air Force veterans. These four incidents were 
selected to illustrate that the same discrepancy occurs in F-86 repat, F-86 BNR, B-29, and 
RB-45 cases. 






DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

USAF records are particularly misleading, for whatever reason, in the case of 2Lt. 
Roland W. Parks (23197A, Field Search Case 590), an F-86E (No. 51-2801) pilot who 
crashed on September 4, 1952. Major R. E. Grote, Adjutant of the 51st Fighter 
Interceptor Wing, summarized the "complete and accurate details of disappearance" of 
2Lt. Parks in the following way: 

On 4 September 1952, Lt. Parks was flying Bear two (2) in a flight of four (4) F-86 type aircraft. On a 
sweep over the Yalu River flight came in contact with some enemy MiG-15 type aircraft. Lt. Parks 
radioed that he had lost his leader and was confused about his position. Lt. Erikson made contact with 
him and advised him to take a southerly heading. Lt. Parks radioed that his remote compass and radio 
compass were inoperative. Lt. Erikson advised Lt. Parks to put the sun at three o'clock. Lt. Parks 
after some difficulty managed to get his position. He then called and said he was running short of fuel 
and would have to bail out. He described the peninsula he was over and then said thai he had 
/lamed out and was bailing out. Lt. Parks was last sighted at coordinates XE 4040. (emphasis added) 

The USAF map enclosed in Parks' casualty file clear indicates XE 4040 as the "aircraft 
last seen " location. The summary of the circimistances of Parks' crash clearly indicate 
his radio transmissions were being monitored by ground controllers. ILt. Erikson's 
statement of September 4, 1952 clearly states, "I told him [Parks] to describe the terrain 
that he was flying over. He described the peninsula he was over and I drew a picture of it 
on my map as he described it to me. Putting in towns, air bases and other important land 

On September 6, however, Captain Byron S. Worthen, the 51st Wing Intelligence 
Officer, wrote in his statement concerning the Parks incident: 

At the debriefing of 1 Lt. Lester A. Erikson, it was determined that Lt. Parks flew over water and cloud 
cover for a considerable distance before sighting what he described as an island surrounded by many 
dikes and patched water areas. He then stated it was not an island, but he determined that he was over 
a peninsula. He then stated that he was over a very large seaport city with a circular square in the 
center of that city. He described seeing several undamaged airfields loaded with MiG-15s before 
approaching the city. In view of this description plus the fact that his radio signal was becoming 
stronger, it would indicate that Lt. Parks had followed Lt. Erikson's instructions, and had placed the 
sun off his right wing thus assuming a southerly heading. The terrain he described above would 
indicate this and that he had bailed out over or near the City of Dairen, Kwantung Peninsula, of 
Manchuria. The description of the city fits the case perfectly. This officer feels assured that he bailed 
out over said city and that his aircraft landed to the south of Dairen itself 

Parks told Soviet interrogators that he flew over an airfield (probably "Dalnii"), sighted 
Soviet planes and radioed, "I'm probably in Port Arthur area." 

Despite all of this information about the true location of the crash of Parks' F-86, 
USAF records indicate XE 4040 as the "aircraft last seen" location and Parks' casualty 
report lists the crash site as 6134-III. The official "complete and accurate details" in the 
USAF summary also omitted Parks' transmission which named Chinese territory by 

The Parks case is a paradigm of how USAF pilots were reluctant to report that a 
fellow pilot had been lost in China, even when the evidence was abundant and 
compelling. The Parks case also illustrates how US archives sometimes contain 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

information which answers or at least rounds out the official, but incomplete, version of 

USAF recormaissance aircraft shot down over China during the Korean War were, in 
some cases, conducting missions authorized by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) rather 
than missions in direct support of the Far East Air Force (FEAF). This is illustrated by 
the conflict between SAC and FEAF over the control of recormaissance assets such as the 
RB-45."* The downing of the RB-45 on December 4, 1950, for example, coincided with 
one of the most intense periods of the Korean War. The Chinese People's Volunteers 
invaded North Korea on November 25, 1 950. In response, the NSC was called into 
emergency session at least three times a week as the President, Secretary of Defense and 
the rest of the foreign policymaking circle tried to anticipate the American reaction to a 
variety of Chinese actions. On November 30, President Truman implied at a press 
conference that "the atomic bomb might be used against the Chinese and that the decision 
to use it would be up to the commander in the field.""" In addition, Truman was advised 
by Senator Vandenberg and others that in the event of Chinese air strikes on US forces in 
Korea, the Chinese should be "made to pay." Plarming was undertaken to prepare strike 
options for the President. Three days after the RB-45 was shot down. President Truman 
said that if UNC troops were bombed, "every airfield in sight" would be hit in 
retaliation.'"^ Without a doubt, therefore, the USAF and the top national command 
authorities required intelligence on potential Chinese targets which could only be 
collected by overflights of Manchuria by reconnaissance aircraft such as the RB-45. 

The primary source evidence which illustrates the SAC-FEAF conflict has not been adequately 
researched. In addition, this discussion exceeds the scope of the issue at hand. Illustrativeof U.S. archive 
material which supports the fact that USAF aircraft from the FEAF were operating over China under orders 
from SAC are the following documents: Memorandum for Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, Collins and 
Admiral Sherman (Top Secret) Subject: Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea- 
Aerial Reconnaissance, January 27, 1951. Letter from Col. Winton R. Close, Headquarters Strategic Air 
Command (XRAY) General Headquarters Far East Command, Office of the Chief of Staff (Top Secret) 
To: Major General T.S. Power, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, June 6, 1951. Close wrote, "Since 
the JCS has given General Ridgway authority to reconnoiter Manchuria and China at his own discretion, 
the possibility of securing such reconnaissance now is a possibility." Letter from Col. Wintron R. Close, 
Headquarters Strategic Air Command (XRAY) General Headquarters Far East Command, Office of the 
Chief of Staff (Top Secret) To: Major General T. S. Power, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, June 
29, 1951. Close wrote, "At this point I have been unable to get FEAF to set the requirement before 
CINCFE. FEAF claims that they must justify the selection of our reconnaissance targets to General 
Ridgway in order to secure his approval and that, at present, insufficient justification exists. In accordance 
with your instructions, I cannot put SAC in a position of justifying its requirements to FEAF or of allowing 
FEAF to feel that they are in a position to approve or disapprove our intended operations." 

Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 329. 

Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II: The Test of War, 
1950-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), p. 89. 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

Even senior officers were not inunune to the temptation to cross the Yalu against 
standing orders. Squadron Commander George I. Ruddell was Bolt's commander in the 
4* Fighter-Interceptor Group in Korea."" Bolt recalled, 

Ruddell wasn't getting any MiGs because they weren't coming south of the river. He'd been 
threatening everybody that he'd kill 'em, cut their heads off; decapitate 'em, if they went north of the 
river. But he weakened one night. He'd had a few drinks, and he called me into this little cubbyhole 
where he had his quarters. During the discussion, tears came to his eyes — running down his cheeks — 
as he was saying how he wanted to be a good Air Force officer, and he loved the Air Force, and if they 
told him to do something he'd do it. But getting those MiGs meant more to him than is career and life 
itself And since he had been beating up on his own flight about not going across the river, he'd be 
embarrassed to ask any of them to go across the river with him. He didn't know whether they would 
want to fly anyway — two or three members of Dog Flight didn't like to do it. (They would have been 
in big trouble if they'd been identified as going up there. I don't know if the ones they picked up later 
on, who were shot down north of the river, were ever disciplined when the war was over. But at this 
time the threat was believed and hanging very heavily over you.) 

So Ruddell said, 'Would you give me some of your flight? I want to go across the river; I gotta have 
some action.' I was going across every flight, anyway, and it was useful to have guys who didn't go 


across in your flight. 

Bolt's reason for weinting some of the flight to stay south of the river was so radar 
controllers could be fooled into thinking they had the image of all of the F-86s. Those 
crossing the river would swdtch to a training frequency to eliminate the possibility of 
controllers overhearing, then after an exchange of code words ("Sioux," answered by 
"Falls," or "Twin," answered by "City"), the leader would "strangle his IFF — his 
squawk" and the F-86s would sail across into Chinese airspace looking for MiGs. Bolt's 
gun c£imera film clearly shows Bolt destroying MiG-15s in Chinese airspace. 

H. Additional Research Required 

Additional research is clearly required if DPMO intends to resolve BNR cases 
resulting from USAF losses over and on Chinese (PRC) territory during the Korean War. 
As shown in this report, without supplemental data from Soviet sources, USAF records, 
particularly Field Search Cases, are an inadequate source of information as to the true 
location of some USAF losses. A data base deriving from a systematic search of USAF 
records is necessary, therefor, in order to establish a foundation for further research into 
Soviet and, potentially, new research into Chinese records. Current legislation (Section 
1033, S. 2182, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, "Contact With 
China on PO W/MI A Issues") specifies that the Secretary of Defense "establish contact 
with the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China regarding unresolved 
issues relating to American POW/MIAs from the Korean conflict." The Chinese MoD 
may not be, however, the appropriate Chinese entity for such a research effort. Indeed, 
efforts to conduct such a project wdth the Chinese MoD may result in a diminished 

"On May 18, 1953, Lt. Col. George I. Ruddell, commander of the 39th FIS/51st FIW and pilot of an 
F-86F called MiG Mad Mavis (51-12940), destroyed his fifth MiG to become the 31st jet ace of the war." 
F-86Sabre,p. 137. 

"Time Flies...," p. 99. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

possibility to obtain information from Chinese sources related to US losses on Chinese 

As experience with Soviet archives demonstrates, before contact with Chinese 
officials is made, a coordinated, thorough search of sources other than USAF records is 
necessary. To approach the Chinese prematurely may result in errors, loss of credibility, 
and a serious delay in the pace of research. Soviet Air Force records should be thorough 
examined prior to any request for assistance from the Chinese. The results of such as 
examination, as shown in this report, will narrow significantly the number of cases to be 
resolved and produce accurate geographic data on crash locations and the potential 
location of bodies buried on Chinese territory. 

From what is known at this point, the following three steps should yield significant 
results in the effort to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues: 

1 . Complete a comprehensive review of USAF records. 

2. Locate crash sites on Chinese territory using Soviet Air Force records. 

3. Search for remains in China using data deriving from a comparison of USAF and 
Soviet records. 



DFI International - Moscow Report 

Appendix A. 64"* lAK operational summaries in Russian and English. 

Previously submitted to DPMO. 



DFI International — Moscow Report 

Appendix B. Documents obtained by DFI. 

Note: Documents 1-3 have been submitted to DPMO several times. Documents 4-29 
were submitted to DPMO in their entirety on March 17, 1994. 

Document 1 . 

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Dr. Paul M. Cole, December 10, 
1991. 1 page. 

Document 2. 

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Commander-in-Chief of the CIS 
Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. 1. Shaposhnikov, March 12, 1992. 1 page. 

Document 3. 

Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. 
I. Shaposhnikov to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, March 18, 1992. 1 page. 

Document 4. 

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shalin, January 13, 1951. 2 pages. 
Document 5. 

Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilievskii and Shtemenko, January 21, 1951 . 1 page. 
Document 6. 

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shtemenko, December 16, 1951. 1 page. 
Document 7. 

Telegram from Postnikov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 1 page. 
Document 8. 

Telegram from Lobov to Kigarev and Krasovski, April 26, 1952. 2 pages. 
Document 9. 

Telegram from Lobov to Vasilievski, Zhigarev and Krasovski, May 7, 1952. 6 pages. 
Document 10. 

Telegram from Bodrov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 2 pages. 
Document 1 1 . 

Telegram from Krasovski to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page. 

Document 12. 

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Batitskii from Belov, December 17, 1950. 
2 pages. 

Document 13. 



DFI International - Moscow Report ' 

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 31, 1950. 4 pages. 
Document 14. 

Telegram from Krasovkskii to Zhigarev, November 11, 1950. 1 page. 

Document 15. 

Telegram from Merzhelikin to Schtemenko and Batitskii, November 26, 1950. 3 

Document 16. 

Telegram from Belov and Mironov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 30, 1950. 
1 1 pages. 

Document 17. 

Fragments of interrogation records of American POWs and one Australian POW 
found in Soviet era archives. 

a. Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 1 page. 

b. Roland W. Parks, USAF. 2 pages. 

c. Charles McDonough, USAF. 2 pages. 

d. Frank Denstech, USAF. 2 pages. 

e. Edward G. Izbiky, USAF. 2 pages. 

f Michael E. DeArmond, USAF. 2 pages, 

g. Donald W. Pinkstone, RAAF. 2 pages. 

Document 18. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 32 pages. 
Document 19. 

Partial interrogation protocol of Joseph F. Green, USAF. 6 pages. 
Document 20. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles W. Maultsby, USAF. 8 pages. 
Document 21. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Thomas L. Eyres, USAF. 5 pages. 

Document 22. 

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles E. Stahl, USAF. 46 pages including two 

Document 23. 

Interrogation protocol cover page. 1 page. 
Document 24. 

Letter of transmittal, June 27, 1952. 1 page. 



DFI International ~ Moscow Report 

Document 25. 

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, August 28, 1950. 8 pages. 

Document 26. 

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, September 7, 1950. 1 cover page plus 3 pages 
of text. 

Document 27. 

Telegram from Slyusarev to Bulganin and Zhigarev, December 21, 1954. 16 pages. 
Document 28. 

A collection of letters sent to Borovoy. 24 pages. 
Document 29. 

Telegram from Krasovskii to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page. 



DFl International - Moscow Report 

Appendix C. Photographs 

23 photogr^hs obtained from Tass archives in Moscow. Originals were submitted 
to DPMO on April 1,1994. 


Mr. DORNAN. We are reaching the end of the day. Let me ask ev- 
erybody on the panel this and everybody in the room this. We are 
going down the same path, it is obvious. We are going to spend mil- 
Hons of dollars, ironically, that comes from the U.S. taxpayers* 
treasury because of people like me and Bob Smith and a handful 
of Congressmen driven by concern kept alive by people like you and 
the Vietnamese families in the league and the alliance. We have 
created the funding and then we do not have any oversight, we do 
not track it, and we have now established a bone-hunting office 
that debunks and mocks the live sighting reports and accepts ani- 
mals bones and almost treats the families and the Congress with 
this attitude of, well, they are easily satisfied if you give them the 
right dialog. 

Yes, Bob. 

Mr. Dumas. Congressman, this is camp number 5 right here. 

Mr. DORNAN. Along the river. I saw that last night. 

Mr. Dumas. There are two burial sites here with 1,500 bodies 
here and 1,500 bodies here. This comes from the POWs in the 
country that told me they buried over 1,500 right here and across 
the Yalu River. On this side, you have about 1,000 right here in 
this burial site, and you have about 1,200 right here in another 
burial site. So we are talking 3,000 or more bodies. Why are they 
looking for a plane crash site? 

Mr. DORNAN. Here is what we need, then, and I am going to have 
to sit down and think this through with my staff. I have to go over 
to the Senate. I am going to see if I can get Senator Kempthome 
of Idaho, who has just taken over my chairmanship on the other 
side from Dan Coats, v.'ho has moved to another chairmanship — 
their chairmanship is very dissimilar to ours in their committee 
and subcommittee titles — and see if we can work out congressional 
law that tells them, here is what we meant for you to do and here 
is what we want you to do and we want the cost accounting figures. 
Unless we get control of the purse strings, you have no control over 
what they are doing. 

What I would say, for example, is, and this is just talking off the 
top of my head, shut down all the search at airplane sites right 
now. It is too expensive. You are copping the Vietnam model. It is 
a ripoff. They are going to tear our face off and the GAO audit is 
now out there to try and find out with six very good people what 
happened to $4 million. 

Here is what I suggest. We have a photograph of a major camp, 
camp 5. We can get testimony from people. We can do what you 
do at the back of Air Force magazine and Navy magazine and all 
the magazines. Sea Power. They run ads looking for all the people 
of the 380th bomb group for a reunion, to go to Tampa, FL, and 
all drink, and there is nothing wrong with that, to think about 
World War II and saving democracy. 

How about running ads in these magazines, we need everybody 
who was in camp 5 who did come home to help us identify where 
the graveyards are. Here is — and if they write, you send them an 
overlay map of the whole area with these experts that can now 
take a computer and go into it three-dimensionally and turn the 
whole thing, like these mapping systems that I fly on a simulator 
that comes right across the California coast and there is Palos 


Verdes to the n-th micromillimeter, and I am going, my Grod, what 
a great way to train fighter pilots going into the target. 

And we say, here is camp 5 from 6 different views. Will you 
please identify from your memory where the graveyards were, 
where you carried out bodies, where you buried friends, and then 
we will not get radically different opinions, as Mr. Liotta said. You 
will get some differences. 

You blend them all together and then we say to the North Kore- 
ans, we only have one project right now, one and one only, and it 
is on the Yalu and it is camp 5 and we know where the graveyards 
are. You send us there or we are not going anywhere. There will 
not be any millions of dollars. There will be no bone searches. We 
know where our bones are. We do not need you to help us or tell 
us. We are not going to interfere with anybody's lifestyle along the 
Yalu. Let us go there. 

Mr. Cole. Congressman, let me make two quick points. The loca- 
tion of the graveyards from POW camps are well established. There 
is even overflight 

Mr. DORNAN. Is that not where we should start? 

Mr. Cole. In my view, not the POW camps. I think we ought to 
start with the temporary cemeteries that were established by the 
Graves Registration Service that 

Mr. DORNAN. Our own cemeteries? 

Mr. Cole. Our own. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Of course. 

Mr. Cole. The second thing 

Mr. DoRNAN. No; wait a minute. Remember, a graveyard at a 
prisoner of war camp is sort of our cemetery. We did the digging 
under gunpoint. We buried our men. We had little short ceremonies 
if they allowed us. And we know if we would do a serious — see, this 
is not an archival search. It is a live person search, like an oral 
history thing that Mr. Santoli did, where it is so inexpensive com- 
pared to all of these expensive crash site searches that have been 
scrubbed over by them 1 million times, particularly when it was a 
new airplane in theater, like an A-6 or the F-4 Phantom. The So- 
viets swarmed over those crash sites, for Grod's sake. 

Mr. Cole. Sir, that is the point that just slipped my mind. Before 
we allow DPMO to do these so-called recoveries from the F-80 and 
the B-29, we have to get an assessment from the Russians if their 
search teams, what they did there, because their search teams 
hauled away equipment. They photographed the wreckage sites. 
They even, from time to time, buried the bodies. Ask them. Ask 
Toon if they have asked the Russians if they went over these sites. 

Mr. DORNAN. We will put that in. 

Mr. Cole. I bet you it has not even crossed their mind. But the 
advantage of going to the 

Mr. DORNAN. Our temporary graveyards. 

Mr. Cole. Our so-called temporary cemeteries, is that you have 
by row and plot number, and I can give you the names of these 
people. You know the identification of who is supposed to be in this 
particular grave. 

If you go to a POW camp cemetery, there are two problems. The 
first one was that there was no real proper burials there. They are 
very shallow graves and it is on a flood plain. The Yalu River 


floods tremendously. It is like the Mississippi. Every now and then, 
it just goes berserk. So I would have a higher confidence in starting 
with proper graves that were identified and marked by the U.S. 
Graves Registration Service. 

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, Bob. 

Mr. Dumas. Let me say one thing. I have done this for 46 years. 
He is right in what he is saying partially, not all the way. The 867 
bodies that are in the Punch Bowl are unidentified. Why? They 
were turned over in 1954 when they were in good shape, those bod- 
ies by the North Koreans. Those bodies come fi'om camp number 
5, those 867 bodies, because Colonel Webb says, "Maybe we ought 
to exhume these bodies and find out what they are and who they 

Mr. DoRNAN. What colonel said that? 

Mr. Dumas. Colonel Webb, who is in the 

Mr. DoRNAN. Oh, Jimmy Webb— Johnny Webb. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, Webb; at a briefing. It was at a briefing at the 
Pentagon — no, over here in Arlington. He said, "Maybe we ought 
to exhume some of these bodies and find out." 

Let me tell you something. If you remember the leprosy colo- 
nies — I said this before and he called me a nut. They have been 
calling me a nut for 46 years because I said we had live prisoners 
in North Korea, and there are live prisoners in North Korea. But 
as far as the remains go, you have to understand, that leprosy back 
in the 1950's and 1940's was a no-no, not only in North Korea, 
China, and the Asian countries, but it was a no-no in this country, 
because we had two leper colonies in this country, one in Kentucky 
and I think the other was in Mississippi, I am not sure, two leper 
colonies. The ex-POW's 

Mr. DORNAN. Molokai was closed down in Hawaii. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, but the leper colonies that the POWs — like you 
said before, let us get these ex-POWs that came back and question 
them about the leper colonies, about the prison camps, where the 
bodies are buried. But I was told by an ex-POW that said, when 
you contacted leprosy, and leprosy comes from starvation, tuber- 

Mr. DORNAN. Dirty soil. 

Mr. Dumas. Right, that is what caused it, and our men did not 
have any medical treatment at all in those prison camps to speak 
of. So when they contacted leprosy, the Chinese were not stupid 
and the North Koreans. They knew they had leprosy, so they did 
not want to touch them. They did not want to get near them, be- 
cause they figured the disease would spread throughout all North 
Korea, China, across the Yalu into China. 

So what they did was they were releasing them to the U.N., un- 
beknownst to anyone in this country. They were released to the 
U.N. every time they came down with leprosy. They put them in 
Okinawa, in the leper colony in Okinawa, and on Okinawa when 
they died years later, or when they died, they shipped them to the 
Punch Bowl and they buried them in that Punch Bowl. 

Mr. DORNAN. Stop right there. Have you ever heard this story, 
Dr. Cole, about leprosy? 

Mr. Cole. No. I also have 


Mr. DORNAN. Have any of the other family members ever heard 
Mr. Dumas. Talk to the ex-POWs. 
Mr. DORNAN. Have you heard it? 

Mr. Dumas. I am just saying what I was told by the ex-POW's, 
and I have contacted over 300, 400 POW's in the Korean war that 
had dealings with this in the prison camps. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Again, I am an optimist but my cynical side says, 
no, this sounds too conspiratorial. I resist conspiracies. But then 
there is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. There are other scan- 
dals like this. There are the nuclear experiments that we are pay- 
ing thousands of people. You have the brainwashing experimen- 
tation that we are now pa5ang lots of money from. It could be pos- 
sible that somebody could come back to Okinawa with leprosy. 

Mr. Dumas. Congressman, if the men died on the battlefield, 
right, it is possible they died on the battlefield with their dog tags 
still around their neck. 
Mr. DoRNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. So they could identify these men. 
Mr. Dornan. And the Korean families would like some of these 
bodies exhumed? 

Mr. Dumas. I asked them to exhume the bodies and they will not 
do it. 
Mr. Dornan. Who will not do it? 
Mr. Dumas. Colonel Webb said, "Maybe we ought to exhume 

these," so I brought it up again 

Mr. Dornan. Colonel Webb says maybe. 
Mr. Dumas. Maybe. 

Mr. Dornan. All we have to do is draw up a congressional thing, 
put it in the defense authorization £ind tell Colonel Webb, who I 
like a great deal, know personally, many, many visits with him, tell 
him, go dig up a comer of this grave and take out 20 or 30 and 
see if — now we have this DNA. Maybe there is some way we can 
identify some. 

Mr. Dumas. The only reason they were unidentified, from what 

I understand, is that they could not tell the families in this country 

that they died in a prison camp, those men died in a prison camp. 

Mr. Dornan. I will tell you something. I never heard of 850-some 

people buried 

Mr. Dumas. Colonel Webb is the one that corrected me. 
Mr. Dornan. When did you first find out that? 
Ms. Dunton. My brother went out to the Punch Bowl and some- 
one said, "Oh, by the way, this is where the unknowns from Korea 
are buried and this is where the names of the missing are written 
on the wall." That was 1985. 

Mr. Dornan. Have you heard this, John? John has never heard 
it. Let me tell you something. In Vietnam, because CILHI vvas 
doing such a good job, we had trouble finding an unknown soldier 
from Vietnam. We got it down — I was there in Hawaii when this 
project was going on. They got it down finally to a small portion 
of bone from a crash site in Laos and they said, there is no way 
we are going to identify that. 

It was kind of pushed, like, my gosh, are we so expert now in 
helicopter dust-off rescues and everything that we are not going to 


come up with one missing in action soldier when we had tens of 
thousands in World War II, many thousands in World War II, and 
I never heard of this in Korea, so obviously they had no problem 
getting an unknown soldier from Korea. They just took one of the 
Punch Bowl sets of partial remains. 

But in Vietnam, we have nobody, so they finally found, and I 
have been afraid to ask, how big a chip is it that sits in Arlington 
at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier from the Southeast Asian con- 
flict, so I am not going to forget that about the Punch Bowl. I was 
there Pearl Harbor week with my wife. We just decided to go there. 
The CODEL was not going out. 

Mr. Cole. Congressman, I have to say one thing about the Punch 
Bowl and the unknowns there. First off, I have never heard the 
leprosy story. But about 450 remains that were unidentified are 
from the very first part of the war. The first Graves Registration 
Officer in Korea was a volunteer. He was a laundry officer. 
Mr. DORNAN. And did not know how to identify people. 
Mr. Cole. No. It was terrible conditions and all that sort of 
thing. After General Walker was killed, then his body was brought 
back and there was a hue and cry that we should repatriate the 
remains. They got pretty good at it, at moving the bodies from the 
battlefield very quickly. So the identification rate went way up. So 
you have about 450 from the early part of the war and you have 
almost an equal number, well, 400-and-something, that were part 
of so-called Operation Glory. Of the about 1,200 sets of remains 
that came back in 1954, they could not identify 400. 
Mr. DoRNAN. So they went through two-thirds, 800. 
Mr. Cole. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. And remember, we are pushed down to the Pusan 
pocket. Then Inchon comes in. Then we go all the way back, and 
fighting back, we probably left these temporary grave sites all the 
way up to the Yalu. Then we get pushed down to the ragged 38th 
Parallel line and so now we can go back to all these in South Ko- 
rean control, all of the temporary ones there, and that is what 
probably started coming back, but we never got to our temporary 
grave sites north of the current armistice line. 
Mr. Cole. Exactly. 

Mr. Dumas. You asked me a question before about the Federal 
court case I had in 1982 and I won that case. 
Mr. DORNAN. I did not know that. 

Mr. Dumas. I am the only man in history to ever win a Federal 
court case to get a status change in this country. No one has ever 
done that. 

Mr. DoRNAN. So you declared your brother a POW and then 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, they made him a POW and presumed him dead 
again, so I said to the judge, "If he is a prisoner of war and no one 
saw him die, how can you presume the man dead?" And he said 
to the U.S. attorney, "How can you do that?" So he said, "I will 
have to go back and ask the Government." So he comes back 2 
weeks later and he says, "Well, there is a classification on these 
men to the year 2006. I cannot give you any more information than 


But do you want to know the reason why no one has ever been 
classified as a prisoner of war in this country until I went to Fed- 
eral court? 

Mr. DORNAN. Why? 

Mr. Dumas. I spent 6 years in Federal court and I did not even 
have to go to Federal Court because they were carrying all these 
men as prisoners anjrway all those years. Now listen to this. There 
is a document I got in Federal court and this is what it says. This 
is a memorandum, a U.S. memorandum, because Richard 
Childers — remember him. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Yes. 

Mr. Dumas. He looked at this and said it was a smoking gun, 
and this is what it said. While I was in court, this is from the Of- 
fice of the Secretary of the Army. This is William Clark, the Chair- 
man of the Military Board of Review, that your missing person's 
bill, and John Hall's missing person bill is going to have to deal 
with this, because this is William Clark signed on the bottom, his 
initials. Chairman of the Military Board of Review, and this is 
what it says. 

"I have received your memo of November 17, 1982, concerning 
the case of Private Roger Dumas, which is presently being pursued 
by his brother, Robert Dumas, and a Mr. Frank Valutti, a law stu- 
dent. We honor agreement that every effort to keep this matter out 
of the public eye should be made. It is clear from your memo that 
you wish no additional information be provided to the Justice De- 
partment. There is also an understanding from my conversation 
with Maj. John Burton" — Maj. John Burton is the litigation officer 
in my case — ^"that the Army will not turn over the documents that 
Dumas is seeking under a court order. Because of the nature of 
this case and the undesirable precedent that might occur, your 
course of action seems appropriate." 

This was presented to the judge and the Army said it was a 
hoax, but when I came out of court in 1986, this is in my file in 
Federal court. This is a routing slip from the Military Board of Re- 
view with all the Military Board of Review names on it, all the peo- 
ple that were on that Military Board of Review in 1982, and this 
is what it said. 

Do you remember Jim Buckley, Senator Buckley from New York? 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. A good Republican Senator 

Mr. DORNAN. I know him personally. 

Mr. Dumas [continuing]. Who was a judge in Washington for 
many years. 

Mr. DoRNAN. The court of appeals. 

Mr. Dumas. This was written to him, but it never got to his office 
because they stopped it, and this was in my file in Federal court 
and this is what it said. "To change Roger Dumas' status to pris- 
oner of war will cause a precedent for all the cases." In other 
words, if they changed him to prisoner of war before I won the case 
in Federal Court, the Military Board of Review, it would open a can 
of worms for every other case in this country, including World War 
I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf— not the Persian 
Gulf because that did not happen at that time. 


Mr. DORNAN. We will write to 8th Army Headquarters and ask 
if your brother's name is on that list of 389 that they still 

Mr. Dumas. He is on that list. 

Mr. DORNAN. Is he? 

Mr. Dumas. I have the data sheets. 

Mr. DORNAN. Is your brother's name on that? 

Ms. Mandra. No. 

Mr. Dumas. I have the data sheets, and I just want to say one 
more thing and then I want to go because I had a major operation 
about 6 weeks ago and it has taken a lot from me. But here is a 
picture of Jesse Jackson. Everybody knows who Jesse Jackson is. 
He ran for President in 1987. At that time, he called me and asked 
me if I could set up a meeting with the Ambassador of North 
Korea, Pak Gil Yan. This is Pak Gil Yan right here. I said, "What 
for?" He said, "Because I want to deal with your brother's case. I 
want to find out if there are any live Americans in North Korea." 

So I set up the meeting at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in New York 
City on December 9, 1987. In that room was Jesse Jackson, Jesse 
Jackson, Jr., myself 

Mr. DoRNAN. Now a Congressman. He is now a Congressman, 
Jesse, Jr. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, Congressman Jesse, Jr. This is Mr. Chang, who 
is back in North Korea, who was the aide to Pak Gil Yang, the Am- 
bassador. This is Jackson, myself, and a businessman from South 
Korea by the name of Peter Chang Boha, but he had an office in 
New York. When we sat down to start the meeting, I had a tape 
recorder. I taped everybody in this country for 35 years. I have 500 
tapes. White House tapes. Pentagon tapes. I have tapes of the 
North Koreans. I have 600 calls that the North Koreans taped. 
They do not even know it, so I do not care if they do know it. 

So what happened this day was that Jackson said to the Ambas- 
sador, who is back in Korea now — he just left about a month ago — 
"Mr. Ambassador, if you have live Americans in your country and 
if you will release them to me, I will come and get them on Decem- 
ber 24, 1987. It will be good for both our countries." And the Am- 
bassador said, 'Tes, Mr. Jackson, it would be good for both coun- 

So after a little news conference downstairs in the hotel with 
South Korean newsmen, no American newsmen, just South Korean 
newsmen, he grabbed me by the arm and said, "Get upstairs. I 
want to talk to you." So we get back upstairs, we sat down, and 
he turned to me and he said, "My God, he had live Americans from 
the Korean War. He just told me." He said, "We are going to have 
to do something. We are going to have to go get these men." I said, 
"Okay, but do not tell the State Department. If you tell the State 
Department, the trip is off." This is December 9, 1987. 

You can say what you want, but he gets on the phone, and I do 
not know who he talked to at the State Department, but when he 
got off the phone he said, "We are leaving on December 24." So he 
wrote a letter that was hand-delivered by me the following morn- 
ing. I delivered the letter the following morning. I have the letter 
right here, two pages. I think I gave you a copy. You have it in 
your office. 


So when he got off the phone, I said, "The trip is off," and he 
got mad at me. He said, "Nobody can tell me where to go. I can 
go anywhere in the world." 

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. 

Mr. Dumas. You can go anywhere in the world but North Korea. 
Nobody goes to North Korea. No one in this country will ever go 
to North Korea. 

Mr. DoRNAN. The passports in those days with Albania and 

Mr. Dumas. Right. So what happened was I got a phone call 

Mr. DoRNAN. China was out by then. 

Mr. Dumas. I got a phone call at 10 in the morning from Chi- 
cago, from his right-hand man Reverend Ahn, who is a minister, 
and he said the trip was off. They put sanctions on North Korea's 
travel to this country, the State Department, and North Korea put 
travel restrictions on our going to Pyongyang. That was December 

This man in the middle, Jackson, has never opened his mouth 
since that time, and he has been talked to by many reporters try- 
ing to get him to tell what that meeting was about that day. I 
know, because I was in the room. 

Mr. DoRNAN. What does he say? 

Mr. Dumas. He will not talk to anyone about it. 

Mr. DoRNAN. I will write to Jesse Jackson. I bump into him occa- 
sionally. I have been to his house for dinner. We have a good ac- 
quaintanceship under maybe opposites attract. But obviously, that 
Ambassador told him, and we will close on this. 

What I have been told for the last 40 years, and I have been told 
this in 8th Army Headquarters in Korea. When I took a CODEL 
of five or six Congressmen, head of the Rules Committee, Gerry 
Solomon, chairman of International Relations Ben Oilman, the now 
much demeaned former Congressman Billy Hendon of North Caro- 
lina, David Dreier of California, number two on Rules, we all went 
over there on Valentine's Day 1986 to Hanoi, and we went through 
Korea on the way back. I said, let us see if they still use the 389 

So I prepped everybody, pretended I was dumb and said to the 
division commander, no, the three-star commander of Korea, I said, 
"Are we still talking about live Americans left behind in Korea?" 
"Yes, sir, Congressmzin." "What is the number?" 'Three-eighty- 
nine." The current Grovernor of Connecticut 

Mr. Dumas. John Rowland. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Rowland said, "Doman, very good. How many 
years ago was that?" I said, "10 years. It is still 389." 

Now, here is what we are told. They all go, "What? What? What? 
We are coming back from Vietnam. Why did we not do something 
about Korea? That is a bigger number than Vietnam. Nobody says 
we left behind anybody in Vietnam definitively." Here is what the 
general officer tells me. Luck's predecessor, although I would have 
to go back and look up his name. 

He said, "Congressman, the North Koreans umpteen times over 
the last" — it is 11 years ago — "three decades have said to us, 'Do 
you want your live prisoners back?' Tes, we do.' Then talk to us 
bilaterally.'" There is the punch line. Our response through our 


State Department for all these years has been, no. It was a U.N. 
effort, our first police action. It was a joint effort. You, North 
Korea, were in the United Nation then. You will talk to the U.N. 
We will not deal with you unilaterally. 

And the North Koreans would say, not an Ambassador to a Rev- 
erend Jesse Jackson would say in New York, then go to hell. We 
want you, the world's superpower, to deal with us unilaterally. We 
want to talk to you, and if you do, then we will talk about your 
live prisoners. Otherwise, go to blazes. We are not dealing with the 
U.N. We do not recognize them. It was a criminal effort. All the 
countries in the world ganged up on us and we do not recognize 
the U.N. That is what I have been told for 40 years. 

Mr. Dumas. Right, but you have to remember Solarz. Remember 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. He went to North Korea twice, 1980 and 1982. 

Mr. DORNAN. I did not know he went 

Mr. Dumas. He went twice, because 

Mr. DoRNAN. Oh, he went in 1992 after he had lost the election. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, and he went in 1980. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. In 1980, he spent 12 days and he met with Kim II 
Sung for 3 days. Believe me when I tell you this. I have a 12-year 
dialog with the North Korean Government. 

Mr. DORNAN. Right. 

Mr. Dumas. And this is what he told me, Pak Gil Yan. He said, 
"Solarz was in our country for 12 days and for 12 days I tried to 
get him to talk about the prisoner issue in my country." This is 
Pak Gil Yan. Ask Mr. Chong. Ask Mr. Lee. They will tell you. Do 
you know what he says? This is what Solarz said. He said, "I am 
not here to talk about American prisoners of war. I am here to talk 
about reunifying families in South Korea and North Korea." 

So when he came back in 1980, they invited him to the mission 
in New York where I used to go, where I still go, and when he was 
at the mission here, they brought it up again. He says, "I told you, 
I am not interested in American POWs. I am only interested in re- 
unification of families of South and North Korea." 

And the second time he went, in 1992, they brought it up again 
with him in North Korea and he still refused to talk about Amer- 
ican POWs. And I made a speech in New York City, in Manhattan, 
right in front of all the workers, about 5,000 people at 12 noon and 
I mentioned Solarz, that he went to North Korea and was told 
about the Americans and he did not want to talk about it, and boy, 
they booed him. Five thousand people were booing him in Manhat- 
tan, N.Y. This is true. This is God's honest truth. 

Mr. DoRNAN. This is incredible. 

Mr. Dumas. It is not incredible. Congressman. When Mr. Solarz 
held hearings on this right here in this room 

Mr. DORNAN. Lester Wolf from New York, who was chairman of 
the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee of then-called Foreign Affairs 
was defeated in 1980 by John LeBoutlier, who took up such an in- 
terest in this that it destroyed his freshman term and he never got 
reelected again. It got Billy Hendon defeated. He came back in 


1984 and I got to know him, and then he got defeated again in 

But that is when Steve Solarz became chairman of Asian and Pa- 
cific Affairs in January of 1981 and rode it beautifully, used it to 
travel more than any other Congressman in history except me, and 
I am 30 countries ahead of him, and then he was defeated in the 
Democratic primary in, what, 1992? 

Mr. Dumas. Ninety-two. 

Mr. DORNAN. In 1992, and if it were not for the bounced check 
scandal, he would today be the Ambassador to India, and he must 
be very hurt that that never worked out. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes. 

Mr. DORNAN. Everybody would lovingly talk about him. He was 
going to be the next Secretary of State under the next Democratic 
President, which would have been Clinton that very year. But So- 
larz is losing a primary. Clinton is pulling off a 43-percent victory. 

I will track that down. I will ask Steve personally. We get along. 
But the main thing is, I smell that the North Koreans like direct, 
straight contact. 

Mr. Dumas. Contact, straight contact. 

Mr. DORNAN. And that, they will get out of me. Mr. McCreary, 
is he still here? If he will come with me as the Korean expert to 
Korea, I will go to Korea and then go down to Vietnam. 

Mr. Dumas. One more thing too. Congressman. Jackson told a 
South Korean newsman that afternoon — that morning — that after- 
noon, I am sorry, at 2, that there were no live Americans according 
to Pak Gil Yan. That is what the told the South Koreans. But up- 
stairs, he had told a different story upstairs. I think maybe he 
wanted to keep it quiet until he went to North Korea and brought 
someone home. 

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. The Ambassador would have told him, if you 
want to come over and do this, you have to deny it right now. 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, right. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Look, folks. Pat, you wanted to say something? 

Ms. Mandra. One thing. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Does anybody in the audience want to say any- 
thing? John, do you want to ask questions? Mr. Santoli, do you 
have any questions? Does anybody have anything else to say? We 
have gone real long. I want you to understand, I am not giving 
anybody short shrift. There is no juice out of these hearings for me 
politically. Personally, it is very frustrating because I get this feel- 
ing, is this never going to end. 

Yes, sir, and then, Pat, you end it. I will repeat this gentleman. 
What is your name, sir? 

Mr. Hall. Roger Hall. I am a researcher of the Vietnam era. 

Mr. DoRNAN. Oh, I know you, Roger, sure. Roger Hall, a re- 
searcher, said that at some point during this joint commission, the 
Russians said we are not holding anybody against their will, which 
Tok, the foreign minister or deputy foreign minister, used over and 
over to me in 1979 in Hanoi and again in 1985 in Hanoi. 

Pat, where do we go from here? Did you have a final thought? 

Ms. Mandra. Two things. One, the remains out at CILHI can be 
identified but it is going to take mitochondrial DNA matching to 


do it. In order to do that, they have to contact the families. They 
do not know where the famihes are. None of the service 

Mr. DORNAN. How many sets of remains do they have? 

Ms. Mandra. They have 866. 

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, you mean at the Punch Bowl? 

Ms. Mandra. Yes, at CILHI. I get this information from CILHI 
directly, that they would need 

Mr. DORNAN, I am sorry. You are right. 

Ms. Mandra. They have records 

Mr. DORNAN. You are right. You cannot get DNA. Lucy goes all 
the way back 2 million years, but it has to be a matriarchal line. 

Ms. Mandra. You asked where we should go from here. We need 
the Korean war out of DPMO. They are not doing the job. They are 
not going to do the job. We need it privately researched, funded, 
whatever it takes, but I really do not believe DPMO is going to be 
able to ever do that job. 

Mr. Dornan. The next 138 days, when you wake up in the morn- 
ing, will go by quickly. It may be a new day if Mr. Clinton is de- 
feated. I will talk with Speaker Gingrich about an earmark de- 
signed allocation of money. I have all the right friends on Appro- 
priations, Bill Young, a terrific guy, Jack Murtha, used to have Bill 
Young's chairmanship of Defense, to get some money and say, this 
is to be spent on outside contracted researchers and archivists. 

I just learned something very simply from Dr. Cole that has 
never occurred to me. I interchange these terms. A researcher is 
not an analyst. You can have great intelligence analysts but re- 
searchers Eire equivalent to the people in the field, like an air 
attache in the Embassy in Moscow is the researcher. He is going 
out in the field. He is looking at stuff. He is covertly taking mental 
pictures or photographic pictures and he sends it back to DIA at 
Boiling and they analyze it. So now that is clear in my head. 

We need outside contracted researchers for this one simply rea- 
son only that has finally penetrated my brain, that is not that 
dense — I like to think I am very clever — and that is simply, if you 
have a contracted person, you give him a contract. He has a goal. 
He has a starting point. He has a set budget. He has a conclusion 
point. He gives you work product. That is the exact opposite of 
somebody assigned who is "pushing papers around" and patting 
people on the head and then saying, "Boy, I will be glad when this 
job is over for me and I move on." 

Yes, sir? This has got to be the final. The gavel is in my hand. 

Ms. Mandra. Congressman? 

Mr. Dornan. No, I am sorry, Irene. Let me ask him, and then 

Voice. Representative Dornan, what is going to be done to move 
our Government to get the live POWs back from Korea? 

Ms. Mandra. And Russia. 

Voice. And Russia. Do you not think something should be done 
to push them, to pressure them? 

Mr. Dornan. You are probably one of those who groaned when 
Mr. Santoli said, ask him, Mr. Brown, when did you make this re- 
quest, and he said, "This week." The whole room groaned. Then I 
said, let me ask a cynical question, softening my attack. I said, "It 
would not be because of this hearing, would it?" "Oh, no, no, no." 


But there is the circumstantial evidence that the timing is very un- 

So we will keep on them. That is where we need your help. This 
is Al's principal duty on my staff. John has a lot of other things 
to worry about, like what to pay the younger nephews and grand- 
children on active duty from these military families. But as long as 
I have Al with me, I will stay on track. Give me your input. 

If I go to Korea, and I can see it formulating in my mind, I have 
to go there, I will say, I want to go to the language school. Give 
me a break. I have a very aggressive personality but a big smiling 
face. Let me go to the language school. Let me see how you do it. 
Let me talk to these defectors. I am not going to yell at them after 
all of these years. After all, they bought themselves 30 wonderful 
years in North Korea. I will say, let me talk to them and fmd the 
one who wants to come home and say, look, do you want to face 
court martial? We have laws on the books. You know that. How 
badly do you want to get out of here? 

But you heard what Ambassador Toon said. I did not argue with 
him, but I was rejecting it. Did you hear what he said? "Gro to them 
and say, you bastard, you are never coming home. We do not want 
you back, but we want you to be cooperative now and tell us every- 
thing you can." I almost laughed out loud, but I just said, OK, he 
will be 80 on the Fourth of July. Goodbye. 

So I want to go to these guys and say, "I will help you get home. 
I am a Catholic. You want to go to confession? I will forgive you. 
I am ordered by Jesus to forgive you. But give me something here. 
You take truth serum here. You polygraph here and then we will 
come home and I will testify at your court martial that you have 
already been given one hell of a sentence." 

We are letting child molesters and serial killers come up for pa- 
role. Polly K^lass' murderer gave the double finger to the courtroom 
yesterday, and Rush Limbaugh says we are more upset over that — 
some liberals are, that he flipped them a double bird — than they 
were that he killed and tortured this little girl and had her in the 
car maybe when the cops pulled him over. 

So we will get something out of this. You just keep calling in the 
plays from the sidelines and I will go to Korea and maybe you can 
all vote to say who is the best one to go. I am looking for a new 
Ann Griffith with new ideas on the Korean side to go over there 
and not be coopted by a Federal bureaucracy. 

Mr. Dumas. One more thing, too, is you have to remember that 
there is a toll-free number now to the Capitol. You are going to be 
bothered by everybody. 

Mr. DORNAN. That is right. 

Mr. Dumas. There is a toll-free number, anybody who wants it. 

Mr. DORNAN. That clicks you into 224-3121, which is the 

Mr. Dumas. Yes, something like that, but it is a toll-free number. 

Mr. DORNAN. He is a workaholic and we will get something done. 

Irene, you get the last word. What is it? 

Ms. Mandra. Thank you. Congressman, I just wanted you to 
know that the flyer that I made up I had done in Russian, and I 
am trying to send it over there with a little reward with his pic- 
ture, my phone number and what have you, and DPMO approached 
the Russians and asked for addresses of asylums, because given 


our men, their age and the hard life that they have lived, anyone 
who is alive, they take them now and throw them in asylums when 
they cannot work any longer. I approached them and I wanted the 
addresses of asylums so I could send my brother's picture and the 
Russians turned me down. Now, if they had nothing to hide, could 
they not give me the address? 

Mr. DORNAN. Irene, I may be one of the world's greatest travelers 
and I love to travel sdone, I love new experiences, and I love to just 
wing it. I would have gone to Ekaterinburg with you. I have been 
on the subways in Moscow as long ago as 1972 and 1966 and I 
have had a guy put his arm inside my arm, he did not speak a 
word of English, a young man, and eventually through sign lan- 
guage he says, "You want to come and hear my Nat King Cole 
records?" This is the summer of 1972. I am on my way to Vietnam, 
flew combat missions with the VNF Air Force and I said, let us go. 

I go to his house. I thought, oh, my Grod, this is worse than pov- 
erty housing in any barrio, ghetto, or white trash area in America. 
The light switch had so much dirt on it from hands over 20, 30, 
40 years that it was an eighth of an inch thick. I had never seen 
such living conditions, orange crates. And he was a young Russian 
who had fallen in love with America just in his head and had this 
record collection. And he was not a Jewish refusenik that I met 
with in later years, just a Russian. 

We would have found somebody like that. We would have found 
a cab driver. You give him a few rubles and say, "Take me to where 
they dug up the forest, where they dug up the Czar's bones. Take 
me there. And after you soften them up and they think you are just 
a history buff," you say, "Take me" — what is the name of the pris- 

Ms. Mandra. No, I asked for addresses of asylums outside of St. 
Petersburg and Moscow and the Department of Defense ap- 
proached the Russians and 

Mr. DoRNAN. Oh, you mean you were going in the blind to try 
to find the asylum? 

Ms. Mandra. No. I am trying to mail flyers to these places with 
pictures of my brother, so I feel that if he is an inmate there, that 
one of the doctors or the nurses or someone would contact me, be- 
cause I had "Reward, $5,000 for this man's location," and the Rus- 
sians will not give addresses to the Department of Defense. This 
is what the Department of Defense 

Mr. DoRNAN. Here is what I am afraid of. I am afraid if I get 
reelected, I keep this chairmanship, and I ask to come before me 
the pilot of Malcolm Toon's Gulf Stream, that an Air Force pilot 
would tell me, "I was on every trip. I tagged along. It was all a 
bunch of BS and vodka and caviar and schmoozing and nobody 
went for the kill to say, take us to a grave and produce here." And 
all of this money has been spent. He says he is into his fifth year, 
and we have one buried American, Dunham, from an ad in Red 
Star that I find out was Senator Bob Smith's idea. That is not 
much product for 5 years of work. 

That message that my chief of staff brought me was saying, 
'Tour wife wants to see you." What she wants to know is, what 
happened at the hearings today because she had plenty of crying 
from yesterday's hearing and woke up this morning going, "Why 


are you alone on this, like a lot of other projects?" But I am not 
alone. I have him, I have you, I have Senator Bob Smith, who is 
a great guy. 

The subcommittee adjourns. 

[Whereupon, at 8:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 



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