RELIGION IN LITERATURE AND LIFE
THE STOIC CREED
Printed by
MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED
FOR
T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH
LONDON ! SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED
NEW YORK : CHARLES SCRIBNER*S SONS
RELIGION IN LITERATURE AND LIFE
THE STOIC CREED
BY
WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
AUTHOR OF "THE LOGIC OF DF.FINITION"
"THEISM AS GROUNDED IN HUMAN NATURE" "CHRISTIAN ETHICS"
ETC. ETC.
EDINBURGH : T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET
1.907
"Our individual natures are all parts of universal
nature. Wherefore, the chief good is to live in
accordance with nature, which is the same thing as
in accordance with one's own nature and with the
universal nature."
CHRYSIPPUS (in Diogenes Laertius).
" Be like the headland, on which the billows dash
themselves continually; but it stands fast, till about
its base the boiling breakers are lulled to rest."
MARCUS AURELIUS.
PREFACE
THESE chapters are a contribution towards the exposition
and just appreciation of Stoicism which, whatever its
defects, was a system of lofty principles, illustrated in
the lives of many noble men. The subject has perennial
fascination ; and there are not wanting signs that it
appeals with special attractiveness to cultured minds at
the present day. It has both speculative and practical
value ; its analysis of human nature and its theory of
knowledge, no less than its ethical teaching, giving
insight into the problems of the universe and the right
mode of guiding life. As an important stage in the
march of philosophical thought, and as a luminous
chapter in the history of natural theology, it solicits
our attention, and will repay our study.
Ample quotations are designedly made from the Stoic
writers themselves and from ancient Greek and Latin
expositions. Responsibility for the translation of most
of the passages must be accepted by myself. One
exception, however, has to be made. The passages
vi PREFACE
from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius are reproduced
from the fine rendering of Dr. Kendall in his Marcus
Aurelius To Himself.
Hearty acknowledgments are made of the friendly
services of Mr. R. S. Rait, Fellow, Tutor, and Dean
of New College, Oxford, in going over the work in
proof.
WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON.
THE UNIVERSITY, ABERDEEN,
March 1907.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION A. MOULDING INFLUENCES,
AND LEADERS OF THE SCHOOL
CHAPTER I
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE
PAGE
The post-Socratic philosophies attach themselves to Socrates i
Not least the Stoic philosophy . . . . .2
Points for consideration ...... 2
II
Psychology, as dating from Socrates . . . .2
Nature of pre-Socratic thought ..... 2
The Ionic or Physical philosophers .... 2
Result of beginning with a material dpx^ . . .3
Parmenides, the Eleatic ..... 3
Empedocles, and his doctrine of the Senses . . .3
Democritus, the Atomist ..... 3
Anaxagoras, and Nous ...... 4
III
Socrates, and the study of mind . ... 5
Our debt to him for a Method . . . . .6
What his Cross-questioning meant . . . . . 6
Its unsettling tendency ...... 7
What doctrines we get from Socrates . ... 8
Ethical doctrines . . . . . 9
Religious doctrines God and Immortality . . .10
How he stimulated to philosophy . . . .10
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV
The relation of Socrates to the Sophists . .11
The Sophists as rhetoricians . . . . .11
As philosophical educationists . . . . .12
Their philosophical standpoint . . . . 13
Their connexion with politics . . . . 13
Their art based in psychology . . . . 15
Their view of the nature of Thought . . . 15
The Protagorean dictum : " Man the Measure " . . 16
How met by Socrates . . . . . . 17
His standard or criterion of Truth . . . .18
V
Personal character of Socrates . . . . .18
Plato, in Phcedo . . . . . . 19
Xenophon, in Memorabilia . . . . 19
CHAPTER II
THE STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS
I
Zeno of Citium, the founder . . . .20
Practical object in founding a new school . . .21
This explanatory of certain of the positions . . .21
Nationality and character of Zeno . . . .21
His debt to the various Greek schools . . . 23
c Stoics as Controversialists . . . .24
Their polemic with Epicurus . . . . .24
Opposition to the Epicurean Cosmogony . . .25
Opposition to the Epicurean Ethics (hedonistic) . . 25
Polemic with Pyrrho and the Sceptics . . . .26
eaning of "the Stoic philosophy " .... jz6
How it grew under the various masters . . . _g6_
Modern researches . . . . . .27
Place of Cleanthes . . . . . -27
State of extant writings of the Stoics . . . .28
The Dissertations and Encheiridion of Epictetus . . 29
Seneca's philosophical writings . . . .29
Cicero's De Officiis . . . . . -3
Marcus Aurelius's Meditations . . . . -3
of system, and the consequence . . . 31
Teaching as tested by practice . . . . 32
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
Farrar's Seekers after God ... -34
Table, embodying names and dates . -34
The Older, the Middle, and the Later Stoa . . 35
SECTION B. STOIC SCIENCE AND
SPECULATION
CHAPTER III
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY
I
The Vision of Philosophy to Boethius . . . 36
II
FROM TT TO B
Stoic definition . . . . . . 38
Its full import . . . . . . -39
LEADING CHARACTERISTICS
The unifying science . . . . . .40
The knowledge of things by their causes . . .40
Presupposes the unities of the other sciences . . .40
No opposition between philosophy and physical science . 40
No opposition between philosophy and mental science . 41
THE CONSTITUENT SCIENCES
The place of psychology . . . . 41
Threefold and sixfold grouping of the sciences . . 42
Stoicism essentially and supremely psychological . . 42
This exemplified . . . . . . .43
-The Stoic Logic ....... 44
Why placed first . . . . . . -44
Three parts of . . . . . . -45
Rhetoric ........ 45
The Stoics did not excel here, and why . . .46
Formal Logic . . . . . . -47
Chrysippus . . . . . . -47
Epistemology . . . . . . -47
The Stoic Physics . . . . . .48
Wide view of cosmogony and theology . . .48
The Stoic Ethics,. . . . . . .48
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
The crown of the sciences . . . . -49
A synonym for " philosophy " . . . -49
Included ethics, politics, and natural theology . . 50
Practical rules for the guidance of life . . . -5
III
-Characterization of Stoic philosophy . . . 51
IV
Demands on personal character . . . . 52
Simplicity of aim and sincerity of conviction . . .52
Consistency and nobility of life . . . . . 53
Wide sympathies . . . . . -53
High idea of vocation . . . . . -54
Personal habits and outward appearance
V
Stages in the development of Stoicism . . . -56
As determined by Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus . . 57
Advance by Presidents of Middle Stoa . . . 57
Pansetius and Posidonius . . . . 5$
Eclecticism of Roman period . . . . 58
Subordination of everything to Ethics . . . -59
Pantheism tending to Theism . . . . -59
Cosmopolitanism operative . . . . .60
The philosopher as preacher . . . . .61
CHAPTER IV
LOGIC : THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
I
The Stoics and Rhetoric . . . . .62
II
Enthusiasm of earlier Stoics for Formal Logic . . 63
Chrysippus . . . . . . .63
Logic as a safeguard against error . . . .64
Ao'yos evdiaQeros and Xdyos -rrpo^opiKos . . . 65
III
Logic as Epistemology . . . . . .66
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
i. EXPOSITION PAGE
Mind a tabula rasa . . . . . .66
Action of impressions on it . . . .66
QavTaffiai KaTa\r)irTiK*.l . . . . .67
Activity of the mind . . . . . .68
Ilpo\ri\l/eLs or xoival evvouti . . . . .69
These not "innate ideas " . . . . .69
How men may err . . . . . -7
Stoic Epistemology struck at root of Scepticism . 71
2. ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE
Sense origin of Knowledge . . . . 7 2
Stoid^ analysis of " object " inadequate . . 73
Two social factors to be reckoned with . . 73
"Apprehending representations " . 74
Meanings of " apprehending " . . . . -75
Meaning of ''representation" . . . . -75
Objections to tertium quid in perception . . -75
Objections to materialism . . . . 7^
The Stoic Criterion of Truth . . . 76
How to be regarded . . . . . -77
Expressed in modern phraseology . . . 7^
Ethical application . . . . . 7$
" Pre-conceptions " or " Common notions " . . -79
Not incompatible with sense origin of Knowledge . . 81
" General consent " as the test of a pre-conception . . 81
3. SUMMARY
The Stoic Epistemology so far successful . . .82
Foreshadowing Descartes and Spinoza . . .82
Absolute nescience suicidal . . . . -83
CHAPTER V
PHYSICS : NATURE, GOD, SOUL
I
Meaning of Physics in Stoicism . . .84
The problem of the Universe . . . . 85
Eleatic solution . . . . . . -85
Solution by Heracleitus . . . . . .86
Heracleitean contributions to the philosophy of the subject . 86
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS
II
PAGE
The Stoics' debt to Heracleitus . -87
Their primitive substance . ... 87
Their cosmogony described
" Seminal reason" ...
The world how evolved .... .88
The heavenly bodies .... .89
Man, as consubstantial with the divine . . .89
His reason (\6yos, rb i)ye/jiovi.K6v) . . .89
The Anima Mundi . . . . . .90
The doctrine of " Cycles " : Conflagration and Regeneration 91
Universal Law, Destiny, and Providence . . 92
III
Points of interest for moderns in this Cosmic theory . . 92
The World perfect ... -93
The Deity material .... -93
Materiality of the Soul .... -94
How Cleanthes proves it . . . . -95
Eschatology ..... -95
Difficulties about the reabsorption of the soul . . .96
The duration of the soul ... .96
Absorption in relation to earthly life . . . .96
Recollection and previous states of existence . . 97
Seneca and Immortality . . . . -97
IV
The Stoic Cosmology not fully satisfactory . . -99
Views of the relation of supreme Mind and Matter . 99
(1) Each eternal and independent . . . -99
(2) Each eternal, but one dependent on the other . . 100
(3) One alone eternal and independent and the other created 101
(4) One sole existence, eternal and self-contained . .102
Each of these views considered . . . -103
The Stoic view . . . . . . .103
Disparity between physics and ethics of Stoics . -103
Conception of evil . .103
Slavery . . . . . . . .104
Progress and recurrent cycles . . . . .104
Other physical speculations deferred . . . .104
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER VI
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST
I
PAGE
Resemblance between Stoicism and Epicureanism . -105
Sources of our knowledge of Epicureanism . . 105
Lucretius's De Rerum NaturA . . . . .106
Is Lucretius a reliable authority? .... 106
His characteristics . . . . . .107
Epicurean " summaries " (/ctf/ucu 5ocu) .... 107
Strict adherence to the master's teaching . . . 108
Personal devotion to the master .... 108
Outward tokens of ...... 108
II
Atomic Theory explanatory of the World . . . 109
Atoms in motion and the void ..... 109
Nature of the atoms ...... 109
How they move : their power of declination . . .no
Concourse of atoms, fortuitous . . . . .no
No interference of the gods with nature . . .in
Apparent design, how explained . . . .112
Importance of Atomic Theory for moderns . . 113
III
Atoms as explanatory of Life and Mind . .114
The soul or mind material . . . . . 1 14
Whence constructed . . . . . .114
Its difference from grosser matter . . . .114
Distinction between animus or mens and anima . 115
Sensation nature of . . . . . 115
Visual perception explained . . . .116
Sensation as criterion of truth . . . . J1 7
Absolute scepticism suicidal . . . . 117
May the senses be refuted ? . . . . 117
How can doctrine of Atoms be tested by Sensation . 117
Explanation of pleasure and pain . . . .118
/Will, and its freedom . . . . . .118
IV
Epicurus's debt to Democritus . . . . .119
Points of difference between the two . . . ,119
xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS
PACK
^'Interest of Democritus scientific, that of Epicurus religious . 120
i. Epicurean special teaching . . . . .120
i. Criticism of Democritus's velocity of atoms . . .120
Democritus denied free will . . . . .121
Structure of the soul to Democritus and to Epicurus . .121
V
^Contrast of Epicurean cosmogony to Stoic . . .121
v/ Fortuitous clash of atoms versus teleology . . .122
Materialism unable to account for Life and Consciousness . 123
Surmounted in Epicureanism by tacit assumption . .124
Epicurean Criterion of Truth . . . . . 1 24
Epicurean doctrine of free will . . . . 125
SECTION C MORALITY AND RELIGION
CHAPTER VII
PREDECESSORS OF THE STOICS IN ETHICS
I
Plato little effective with Stoics, and why . . .126
Certain Platonic doctrines taken over . . . .127
Aristotle little effective also in Ethics, and why . .129
Voluntarism versus intellectualism . . . -130
II
The Cynic influence . . . . . .130
Zeno and Crates . . . . . . .130
Antisthenes in Symposium of Xenophon . . 131
Cynic's Ideal Sage . . . . . 131
Dangers of self-sufficiency . . . . .132
Not escaped by the Cynics . . . . .132
The doctrine at its best . . . . . -133
The Stoics indebted to it . . . . .134
Life in accordance with nature the Cynic view . 134
Savages and the lower animals, the types . . 134
The Stoic contrast, with results . . . 135
Cynics and the Allegorical method . . . .136
Followed by the Stoics . . . . . -136
How the Stoics differed from the Cynics . . 137
Summary by Sir A. Grant . , , f 137
TABLE OF CONTENTS xv
I"
Heracleitus, as influencing Stoic ethics . . . 138
His doctrine of the Logos . . . . 138
Its ethical bearings . . . . . J 39
Stoicism and Matthew Arnold . . . . . 139
CHAPTER VIII
ETHICS: EXPOSITION
I
Man a compound being, according to Stoics . . .140
Marcus Aurelius's view ...... 140
Body, in relation to soul ..... 141
Inconsistent Stoic positions ..... 142
Man as reason (rb ijyefjioviKov) . . . . .142
Nature of the soul, according to later Stoicism . . 142
" Living agreeably to nature" what? . . .142
In the view of Cleanthes ..... 142
As expressed by Epictetus ..... 143
In the view of Chrysippus . . . . .143
The views complementary of each other . . 144
II
Wherein happiness consists ..... 144
Control, even eradicate, the desires .... 145
Life worth living, according to the Stoic . . . 146
Chrysippus and Epictetus ..... 146
Where difficulty lies . . . . . . 147
PLEASURE, APATHY, DESIRE
Nothing external can really affect us . . . . 147
Pleasure and pain in the Stoics' view .... 147
Aurelius and Cleanthes ...... 148
Passionlessness or Apathy (cbrcifleia) .... 149
Characteristics of the Wise Man .... 149
Suicide when allowable . . . . I 5 I
Doctrine of " the open door " ... . IS 1
VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS
Relation between the two . . . . i$ 2
Virtue defined , , , , , . .152
xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Its inwardness . . . . . . 153
Kinds of Duty "the suitable" and "the right " . . 154
Virtue indivisible and insusceptible of degrees . 154
So with vice : all sins are equal . . . 155
Only two classes of men " the wise " and "the foolish " . 156
Human nature depraved . . . . -156
Length of days does not add to happiness . . . 157
Compare with teaching of Spinoza . . . .158
Virtue its own reward . . . . . 159
Vice its own punishment . . . . .159
Virtue's worth independent of our appreciation of it . . 159
EPICUREAN HEDONISM
Pleasure as summum bonum abhorrent to Stoics . .160
The term pleasure ambiguous ..... 160
Two meanings even of agreeable sensation . . . 160
The virtuous happy under pain ..... 161
Virtue not valued for the pleasure it brings . . .161
Stoic psychology of pleasure ..... 161
Hedonism incompatible with altruism and sympathy . . 162
If pleasure the chief good, wisdom nugatory . . . 162
ENTHUSIASM OF HUMANITY
Individual's good bound up with that of community . . 162
^Relation between self-interest and altruism . . -163
What is the community ? ..... 164
Humanity an organism . . . . . -165
Condemnation of Slavery . . . . .165
Consequences of Cosmopolitanism on earlier teaching . 166
Forgiveness of injuries . . . . . .166
Function of punishment . ..... 167
No one willingly injures another .... 167
The Stoic neither bigot nor hermit .... 167
His regard for social duties . . . . .168
MORAL PROGRESS
Virtue may be taught . . . . . .170
Progress in the moral life . . . . .170
Stoics divided as to whether virtue may be lost . .170
Parallel in Christian theology . . , , , 171
TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii
PREFERENCE AND AVOIDANCE
PAGE
Doctrine of "indifferent things " revised . . . 171
Some thing's to be " preferred " to others . . .172
Some thing's to be " avoided " ..... 172
Effect on character determines . . . . .172
This the sphere of duty as the fitting- (KadrjKou) . 173
A concession to everyday morality . . . 173
CHAPTER IX
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS
I
" Living- agreeably to nature " how interpreted . 174
Influence of doctrine on modern ethical systems . . 176
II
The Stoic doctrine of Will . . . . .176
To be taken in connexion with psychology of desire . . 177
III
Virtue as happiness . . . . . .178
Protest against moral materialism . . . 179
IV
Value of Stoic Cosmopolitanism .... 180
Morality essentially social ..... i8c*
Contrast with Epicureanism ..... 180
Influence on St. Paul and Christianity .... 180
Carried by Aurelius into Legislation .... 181
V
The dignity of man ...... 182
Self-respect . . . . . . .182
Kindness to the lower animals . . . . .183
Connexion between ethics and religion . . . 183
Even human laws echo the divine .... 184
Influence of Stoicism on Roman Jurisprudence . . 184
VI
Regenerative power of a virtuous life .... 184
Moral heroes, of the past ..... 184
b
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Epictetus's account of Diogenes, the Cynic . . .185
Moral heroes, of the present ..... 185
Teaching morality by example . . . . .185
VII
Stoics' helpfulness to others ..... 186
Classification of duties . . . . . .186
The Cardinal Virtues . . . . . .187
Germ of the modern threefold grouping- . . .187
CHAPTER X
ETHICS: DEFECTS
I
The Ideal Sage too unsympathetic . . . .188
Does not sufficiently recognize the emotions . . .189
The power of an ideal . . . . . .190
Under what circumstances the Stoic ideal effective . .190
When ineffective . . . . . . .191
Comparison of Stoicism with Christianity . . .191
In the conception of self-sufficiency .... 191
With regard to the kindlier feelings . . . .192
Advance in Stoic teaching here . . . . .192
The Stoical Ideal, in part non-human . . . .192
Perception of this led to changes in the system . . 193
Relative virtue . . . . . . .193
Degrees in virtue and in vice . . . . 194
Brotherhood of mankind . . . . 194
Moral progress ....... 194
II
Involuntary injury . . . . . 195
This doctrine not supported by experience . . 195
Ground of the dictum ...... 195
Ignores the fact of malevolent affections . . . 196
The offender to be won, not by reason, but by love . .196
The doctrine regards sin as a mere defect . . . 197
III
The doctrine of adiaphora too unbending . . .198
The Stoic view of the body . . . . .198
TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
PAGE
Alien to man and a hindrance ..... 199
Correct view . . . . . ... 199
Slovenly neglect of the body condemned by Stoics . . 200
The reasons given by Epictetus .... 200
Death as a "thing indifferent " .... 201
Suicide allowed ....... 202
Shows an inadequate notion of both God and man . . 202
Counselled infanticide . . . . . . 203
IV
The Stoics unjust to Epicurean Hedonism . . . 203 >
Wrong view of Pleasure and Pain .... 203
Laid stress on the lower pleasures .... 204
Epicurus's view of pleasure ..... 204
Epicurus's doctrine of desire ..... 205
Hedonism and noble aspirations .... 206
CHAPTER XI
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION
Metaphysics of ethics . ... 208
Can there be ethics without metaphysics ? . . 208
I
THE WORLD ONE AND PERFECT
This the view sub specie tzternitatis . . . .210
No such thing as evil or as sin . . . . .210
PROVIDENCE : OPTIMISM
The course of the world ideologically determined . .211
Providence both universal and special . . . .211
Stoical optimism the result . . . . .212
Nevertheless, the Stoic sometimes pessimistic . .212
Cheerful acquiescence in the World-Order . . . 213
Significance for the present day . . . .213
IS GOD PERSONAL OR IMPERSONAL?
Discrepancy between Stoic Physics and Ethics here . .214
Epictetus almost monotheist . . . . .214
Aurelius pantheistic . . . . . .215
Difficulty in determining . . . . -215
Deity both all-pervasive essence and Moral . . .216
xx TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
PAGE
Cleanthes's proof from the Primitive Fire . . .217
(1) Inductive proofs . . . . . .217
Argument from man's constitution . . . .217
Stress laid on man's moral nature . . . .218
Argument from history or Consensus gentium . . .218
The Teleological argument . . . . .218
Moral government of the world . . . .219
(2) Deductive proofs ...... 219
Truth, in propositions regarding the future . . .219
Argument from notion of the world as a universe . .219
Argument from God's foreknowledge .... 220
Argument from Divination ..... 220
AGAINST AGNOSTICISM
God knowable ....... 220
A modified agnosticism ...... 221
THE DEITY LIMITED BY FATE
Seneca and Cleanthes ...... 222
The doctrine partially ignored ..... 222
MYTHOLOGY AND DIVINATION
Did not discard "the gods " . . . . . 223
Supported Divination by examples .... 223
II
Observations ....... 223
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Discrepancy between Stoic teaching and Conscience . 223
Denial of sin is merely dogmatic assertion . . . 223
Job's difficulty how solved by Stoics .... 224
Evil is good in disguise, and is for the best . . . 224
Suffering is disciplinary ...... 225
Seneca, De Providentid ...... 225
Epictetus. ....... 226
Suffering vicarious, and is of nature of atonement . . 226
Stoic held evil and sin to be necessary on law of Relativity . 226
This an overstraining of the law .... 227
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi
THE DOCTRINE OF FATE
PAGE
Numbing, when strictly expressed .... 228
May be so interpreted as to bring out a great truth . . 228
Seneca . . . . . . . . 229
Cleanthes ....... 229
Stoic acquiescence lacks hope for future . . . 229
DIVINATION
Probably, a philosophical acknowledgment of supernatural . 230
Distinction between kinds of Divination . . . 231
Technical or artificial divination .... 231
Its value to be tested by inductive procedure . . . 231
Natural divination ...... 232
Personal character of agent important here . . . 232
On the lines of Prophecy ..... 232
Justification of proof of God's existence from divination . 233
PRAYER
Acknowledgment of the supernatural .... 233
The purpose of Prayer ...... 234
Aurelius on Prayer ...... 234
Cleanthes's Hymn to Zeus ..... 235
CHAPTER XII
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM
The Stoic philosophy instinct with life .... 237
Its value as science and speculation .... 237
Its ethical and religious value ..... 238
Stoicism to be studied as an aid to right living . . 238
Stoicism has been opposed to Christian Theology . . 239
Marcus Aurelius given as our model here . . . 239
Kenan's attitude ....... 239
Leslie Stephen ....... 240
Why Aurelius is thus chosen ..... 240
Characteristics of his Meditations .... 240
Matthew Arnold's estimate ..... 242
Aurelius not anti-supernaturalist .... 242
Much less is Epictetus or Seneca .... 242
xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS
II
PAGB
Renan lays the stress on the wrong point . . . 243
V Points to be emphasized in Stoicism .... 243
Its recognition of the world as a system . . . 244
Its sympathy with Nature and her processes . . . 244
Appreciation of the beauty in natural scenery wanting . 245
Its experiential nature ...... 245
Its insistence on character ..... 246
Its reverent and devout spirit ..... 246
Its view of the World as a manifestation of Divine Order,
and Social Order binding as having Divine sanction . 247
Faith in the future of the individual alone wanting . . 248
The high estimate of human nature .... 249
Its acquiescence in the World-Order and Social service . 250
Carlyle on Blessedness . . . . . 250
Epictetus and service of the Divine . . . -251
III
These points have perennial value .... 252
r Practical utility of writings of Epictetus, Aurelius, and Seneca 252
Farrar ........ 252
J- S. Mill 253
Wisdom justified of all her children .... 253
Christian view of Divine revelation .... 253
Debt of Christian civilization to Stoicism . . . 254
APPENDIX
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM
These defined ....... 255
How Stoical ethics is " pragmatical " .... 256
Nature of Pragmatism ...... 256
Truth determined by the active side of man's nature . . 256
Voluntarism versus Intellectualism .... 256
Axioms originally postulates ..... 257
Appeal to experience and consequences . . . 257
The stress laid on the practical need of human nature . 257
Opposed to a priorism and Absolutism . . . 258
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii
II
PAGE
Has the merit of appealing to Experience and the whole of
human nature ...... 260
Deals with concrete experience, and not abstract thought . 261
Rejects Absolutism of the bloodless type . . . 262
III
Over-emphasizes action on the will .... 262
Plan or purpose implies an intellectual factor . . . 263
Intellect sometimes ignored, sometimes disparaged . . 263
Weak metaphysically ...... 264
If human wants are everything, metaphysics as a rational
human want must count for something . . . 265
Metaphysics compatible with science of Nature and Induction 265
Use of an ideal ....... 265
THE STOIC CREED
SECTION A. MOULDING INFLUENCES,
AND LEADERS OF THE SCHOOL
CHAPTER I
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE
"First Socrates,
Who, firmly good in a corrupted state,
Against the rage of tyrants single stood,
Invincible ! calm Reason's holy law,
That voice of God within th' attentive mind,
Obeying, fearless, or in life or death :
Great moral teacher ! wisest of mankind ! "
THOMSON.
I
ALL the Greek philosophies that have permanently
influenced the world attach themselves ultimately to
Socrates not least that of the Stoics, 1 whose founder
was first drawn to philosophy by the Memorabilia of
Xenophon (see Diogenes Laertius, vii. 3), and which
reproduced as its fundamental features the leading
1 The name " Stoic " comes from Stoa Poecile or Painted Porch
at Athens, in which Zeno, the founder, lectured.
I
2 THE STOIC CREED
characteristics of Socrates, namely, his ethical spirit,
his religious reverence, his psychological standpoint,
his regard for experience and concrete fact, and his
distinctively practical cast of mind. There are differ-
ences, of course, and very marked ones too seen most
in the speculative tendencies of the Stoics and their
interest in the science of nature ; but the inspiration
is undoubted. And so the subject of Stoicism is best
introduced by some consideration of Socrates and the
Socratic impulse.
This consideration may very well, for the purpose
in hand, concern itself with the four points of (i) the
relation of Socrates to the pre-Socratic philosophers,
(2) his distinctive position, (3) his relation to the
Sophists, and (4) his personal character.
II
The study of mind may, in a general sense and with
necessary qualifications, chiefly with the qualification
that Socrates was in part anticipated by the Sophists,
be said to date from Socrates (B.C. 469 to 399).
Previously to his time, no doubt, there was much
speculation and eager questioning of a philosophical
kind among the Greeks, but for the most part it
centred in external nature or the material universe
its structure and constitution, the phenomena of change
or flux exhibited by it, its being or reality ; and man
himself was interpreted from the side of the universe,
as a part of nature. The Ionic or Physical philoso-
phers (Thales, Anaximander, etc.) occupied themselves
with the examination and investigation of the world,
and regarded it as the end and aim of philosophy to
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 3
achieve a cosmogony or physical explanation of the
cosmos. In this way, they were all naturally materialists,
and took simply a mechanical view of things. Their
great quest was for the material a.pxn or first principle
of existence the primitive stuff or matter out of which
the world was formed ; Thales (B.C. 640 to 550) finding
it in water, Anaximenes in air, Heracleitus in fire.
But if the first principle of things was material, so too
must be all that is dependent on it : so too must be
the human soul, which was variously conceived as fire,
air, breath. Mental facts and processes, accordingly,
consciousness itself, sensation, intellection, volition,
were interpreted materially. Parmenides, the Eleatic,
laid down the doctrine that like acting upon like is
the cause of sensation. This doctrine Empedocles
(born about 500 B.C.) accepted, and, combining it with
his own special teaching that man, like the universe,
consists of the four elements fire, air, earth, water,
proceeded to explain thereby sense-perception in all
its forms. Effluvia or emanations (cbroppoiai) from the
different external bodies enter man through pores
(iropot), and, like being recognized by like (fire by fire,
water by water, etc.), give rise to what we know
respectively as the sensations of sight, hearing, taste,
smell. All is explained by material effluxes and pores,
and the recognition of like by like (17 yvwo-is TOV 6/u.otov
TU> o/xoi'u)). This dominance of materialism is specially
obvious in the Atomic philosophy, represented by
Democritus (born about 460 B.C.), the doctrines of
which we shall see, later on, in their full development,
when we come to the psychology of Epicurus. Even
Anaxagoras (born about 500 B.C.), who was probably
4 THE STOIC CREED
the first of the Greek philosophers to attain to the
conception of mind or vovs as the explanatory term
of existence, did not put this conception to any very
effective use. Striking, indeed, was his utterance,
"All things were together; then mind came and set
them in order (iravra xP'ni JLaTa ? v OJJLOV' etra vovs f\0w
avra Ste/cdcr^o-e)," * but its efficiency depended on the
application of it ; and, unfortunately, Anaxagoras put
it forth only in a tentative way, as a shy, philosophical
suggestion of design in the universe, rather than as
a firmly-grasped all-explanatory principle. Aristotle
tells us (Met. i. 4) that " Anaxagoras uses his Intelli-
gence simply as a device to create the world where-
withal ; or when he is hard pressed to say why it must
be necessarily as it is, then again he drags it in : in all
other cases he would credit anything and everything
rather than Intelligence with being the cause of pheno-
mena." And it is the bitter complaint of Socrates in
the Phcedo, in a passage that may very well have been
autobiographical, that when he (Socrates) went to the
writings of Anaxagoras to be instructed in his teleo-
logical principles, he was put off with a discourse on
the secondary and physical causes of things, indeed,
on "the conditions" of things instead of "the causes,"
and gives as a concrete example his own present case
of calmly sitting awaiting his fate in prison in place of
making his escape, as his friends counselled him to do.
"I might compare him," he says, "to a person who
began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause
of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endea-
voured to explain the causes of my several actions in
1 See Diogenes Laertius, ii. 6.
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 5
detail, went on to show that I sit here because my
body is made up of bones and muscles ; and the bones,
as he would say, are hard, and have joints which divide
them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the
bones, which have also a covering 1 or environment of
flesh and skin which contains them ; and as the bones
are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation
of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this
is why I am sitting here in a curved posture that is
what he would say ; and he would have a similar ex-
planation of my talking to you, which he would attri-
bute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would
assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, for-
getting to mention the true cause, which is, that the
Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and ac-
cordingly I have thought it better and more right to
remain here and undergo my sentence. . . . There is
surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in
all this." 1
Ill
It was the characteristic of Socrates that he turned
men's thoughts from the study of matter and mechanical
causes to self-reflection or the study of mind : as Cicero
puts it rhetorically, in the Tusculan Disputations (v. 4),
"Socrates was the first to call down philosophy from
heaven, and to place it in cities, and to introduce it into
the houses of men, compelling men to examine into
life and morals, and good and evil." This he regarded
as a divine vocation, as a work imposed upon him by
the Deity, in discharging which he made prominent the
position that self-knowledge, "know thyself" (yv&Oi
1 Jowett's trans.
THE STOIC CREED
, is man's first duty and chief concern. This
meant, on its negative side, that attention must be with-
drawn from physics and physical speculations from
natural science and cosmology ; and, on its positive
side, that it must be concentrated on the mind "the
proper study of mankind is man." But this is, in part
at least, psychology. Not, however, that Socrates, like
Aristotle, worked out a psychology, or did much
towards the scientific exposition of the province and
functions of mind generally. His interest lay mainly
in Ethics and Politics, not in mental science ; and what
we owe to him is, (i) the impulse to the determinate
and exact consideration of ethical and social phenomena,
and (2) the clear presentation and systematic applica-
tion of the true method of psychological investiga-
tion, namely, the inductive method comparison and
generalization leading to clear concepts and precise
definitions. In this second particular, he is the father
of the Logic of Consistency, and, in especial, of that
province of Logic known to moderns as Definition
and Classification. It was in direct contact, however,
with living minds, not by the dogmatic enunciation of
abstract formulae, that he exercised his art ; and how
he proceeded was thus :
Through dexterity and skill in Dialectic, by persistent
oral cross-questioning of his fellow-citizens in the
market-place, in the workshops, in the schools, under
pretence of his own ignorance (et/awveta), thereby
bringing ideas to the birth (fj /xaievTi/o? rex^), he
elicited and enforced two things, (a) men's in-
1 In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (iii. 9), he puts this from the
obverse side, " Be not ignorant of thyself " (^77 ayvfet ffeavr6i>).
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 7
veterate ignorance, or conceit of knowledge that they
did not possess ; and (b) the true way of one's attaining
knowledge, namely, by becoming explicitly conscious of
one's ignorance and of the cause of it (that is, confused
ideas), and so by directing one's effort to get rid of
confused ideas and to acquire clear ones. 1 In all this,
he never questioned the existence of truth or the pos-
sibility of man's attaining it ; but he saw that it had
to be strenuously pursued and carefully articulated.
Consequently, he made it his business to subject pre-
vailing notions, generally accepted opinions, as held in
concrete instances, in all departments of human interest,
to a strict criticism and review. It was not enough
to him that they should rest upon " use and wont " or
long-established custom : they must stand the test of
reason, or else be rejected. This meant, of course, a
revolt against tradition and against the lazy servile
acceptance of truth on mere authority. In which
attitude, there was unquestionably something unsettling,
even although his ultimate object was, like that of
Descartes, later on, 2 through doubt and searching to
attain Certainty to establish both truth and morality
on a sure foundation (see Diogenes Laertius, i. v. 7) ;
and, on the face of it, there seemed to be the same
dangerous tendency that characterized the scepticism
of the Sophists. Hence, we do not wonder that
Socrates should have been represented, as by Aristo-
phanes in the Clouds, as a Sophist ; nor is it matter for
surprise that he should ultimately have been condemned
to death on the charges of atheism and impiety and
1 See, e.g., Apologia and Thecetetus.
2 See his Discourse on Method and Meditations.
8 THE STOIC CREED
corrupting the youth. 1 Not religious, any more than
social or other, belief was safe, if it rested merely on
popular prejudice or on unreasoned (much more,
irrational) adherence to antiquated usage ; and well
might elderly people, thus shaken rudely out of their
lethargy, look askance at a teacher who habituated his
hearers, especially young men, to demand a reason for
every proffered truth and every cherished conviction.
Free thinking like this was certainly disconcerting.
Nevertheless, in the Socratic procedure there was,
beyond dispute, supreme psychological insight and just
appreciation of the power of human reason ; and here
we find the beginnings of psychology as a science and
of rational metaphysics, even though Socrates himself
may not have explicitly said so. In point of positive
doctrine, we get little from Socrates, even in his
favourite sphere of Ethics no enumeration of funda-
mentals, no elaborated system. He had no archi-
tectonic, such as we find in Plato or in Aristotle or
in any of the modern epoch-making thinkers Spinoza,
Kant, Hegel. No doubt, we have the difficulty of
ascertaining precisely what it was that the historical
Socrates really taught. The Socrates of Plato and the
Socrates of Xenophon are not identical. 2 Yet we can
distinctly see that his teaching centred in a prominent
ethical dictum, based in psychology, namely, that no
man sins willingly, or, as he also expresses it, that vice
1 See Plato, Apologia, etc. ; also, Xenophon, Memorabilia, i.
2 See Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools (Eng-. tr.),
p. 181 ff. ; also, Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (Eng. tr.), vol. ii. ;
and Benn, The Greek Philosophers, vol. i. chap. iii.
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 9
is ignorance and virtue knowledge. 1 Again, we can
scarcely be wrong in ascribing to him the emphatic
assertion of the supreme importance for character of
the virtue of abstemiousness or self-control. His own
life was one in which this virtue played a prominent
part ; 2 and his laudation of moderation in Xenophon, 3
and his insistence on the necessity of reducing the
number of our desires and wants, and of strictly sub-
ordinating the lower pleasures of our nature to the
higher, if we would not be slaves, showed that he made
this the foundation of morality. We can see, further,
that it was the tendency of Socrates to ground virtue
on utility, to estimate it by its consequences : that
alone is good which is good for someone or which
serves some end "a dung-basket that serves its
purpose is more beautiful than an unserviceable shield
of gold." 4 In this respect, he anticipated the modern
pragmatist (Professor James, for instance, or Mr. F. C.
S. Schiller), who maintains that truth, in order to be
true, must have practical results, must work yea more,
in the wider doctrine of " humanism," it consists in
consequences, more especially if those be good. 5
Then, lastly, we can hardly question that the historical
Socrates reasoned on Theistic lines, basing his con-
ception of God and God's providence on teleology or
the marks of design manifest in the universe ; 6 and
that his views on the Soul are accurately represented,
1 See the Protagoras of Plato.
2 See Xenophon, Memorabilia, i. 2.
f 3 See Memorabilia, i. 5, 6 ; also ii. i .
4 See Xenophon, Memorabilia, iv. 6.
5 See Appendix.
6 See Xenophon, Memorabilia, i. 4 ; iv. 3.
io THE STOIC CREED
in all essentials, by Plato in the Apologia and the
Phcedo. The real Socrates was characterized by
religious reverence and personal piety (Xenophon and
Plato alike e.g.^ in Euthyphro being witnesses), and
his teleology is strict and definite so much so that it
commended itself as a model to natural theologians in
Christendom for many centuries. Nor are his views
on Immortality less striking (Xenophon and Plato,
again, being at one here) ; although it is not often
observed that the ultimate conclusion that Socrates
reaches is a guarded one. Of the immortality of the
soul, he affirms, he is personally convinced, but he
does not profess that he can prove it by irrefragable
argument absolute demonstration is impossible in the
matter. "It came to me," he says, "apart from de-
monstration, with a sort of natural likelihood and
fitness." That is all ; but it is much.
Apart, however, from positive doctrine, Socrates was
practically the founder of mental and moral science, and
the great stimulator to philosophic thought because of
his firm grasp of the inductive method applied to mental
and moral subjects and carried systematically out in his
peculiar dialectic of cross-examination, and because of
the variety and many-sidedness of his ideas, leading
to great developments in the hands of his pupils.
Although gruff and even repulsive in his outward
person, he had the extraordinary magnetic power of
attracting and stimulating thinking men of all tempera-
ments, and of sowing seeds that should germinate and
grow in many different soils. That he should have laid
hold on the heart and the imagination of Plato, and
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE n
become the hero and the sage of the Platonic Dialogues,
is itself sufficiently remarkable. Remarkable is it also
that he should have so captivated Xenophon as to
impel him, like another Boswell, to write a treatise
of recollections of the master's conversations, and this,
too, with a view to defend him against the accusations
that had brought about his condemnation and death, a
treatise charged with the reverence and affection of the
whole-hearted admirer and devoted disciple. But it is
no less remarkable that he should have thrown out so
many fruitful and suggestive thoughts as to be virtually
the founder of all the leading post-Socratic schools
Platonic, Peripatetic, Cynic, Cyrenaic, Megaric, Stoic,
Epicurean alike. All derived their impulse, directly or
indirectly, from him ; and each claimed for its own
tenets a basis in the Socratic teaching.
IV
But the position of Socrates cannot be fully under-
stood unless we take it in connexion with the Sophists.
The Sophists were pre-eminently educationists, active
teachers of the liberal arts, but more particularly of the
arts that bear upon the business and duties of life.
They were, therefore, necessarily rhetoricians and
logicians (in so far, at any rate, as logic has to do with
disputation), and theoretical politicians as well. They
claimed in special to teach the art of discussion and
address, so as to guide public opinion and to train
young aspirants for political honours, fitting them for
civic life, and enabling them to be a power in the senate
or in the law-courts. " If Hippocrates comes to me,"
says Protagoras, in the Platonic dialogue of that name,
12 THE STOIC CREED
"he will learn . . . prudence in affairs private as well
as public ; he will learn to order his own house in the
best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for
the best in the affairs of the State. Do I understand
you, I said ; and is your meaning that you teach the
art of politics, and that you promise to make men good
citizens? That, Socrates, is exactly the profession
which I make." In this respect they may be desig-
nated professors of intellectual fencing, with a dis-
tinct and definite practical end in view. But they were
philosophers also ; and, although they had no fixed
philosophical system of their own, although they
founded no school, philosophical principles lay at the
root of their dialectical procedure, for there can be no
true education, there can be no true rhetoric (even if
we understand rhetoric simply as oratory, forensic or
political), that does not implicate psychology. It was
in his treatise on Rhetoric, not in his Psychology, that
Aristotle gave his completest analysis of the Emotions ;
and modern writers on Rhetoric have equally laid
psychology under contribution witness, for example,
Campbell in his Philosophy of Rhetoric and Bain in his
Rhetoric and Composition.
What, then, was peculiar to the Sophists as philo-
sophical educationists was this. In philosophy, they
made the first great start towards amended thinking
under the leading of Protagoras by departing from the
old physical speculation and directing man's attention
specially to man himself. In doing so, they raised
some of the perennial problems of thought and will
(such as, the nature and power of reason, the value of
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 13
sense-perception, the basis of morality, the dependence
of virtue on education), giving explicit utterance to them
and offering a solution of them from the standpoint of
individual consciousness and of practical experience ;
and although their philosophy was in many ways un-
satisfactory and inadequate, it was a distinct advance
in the march of human thinking. No doubt, the dis-
putation by which it was operated was of a peculiar
kind it was what is known as Eristic or wrangling, or
the art of " popular and approximate debate " ; but that
is not to be condemned without discrimination, even
though, in the hands of degenerate teachers (say, dur-
ing the latter part of Plato's life and in the days of
Aristotle), it became what we nowadays know by the
disparaging name of sophistry of cavilling, of captious
criticism and quibbling, of arguing for the sake of
victory, or attempting against all comers to " make the
worse appear the better reason." For that simply
means that it shared the fate of many other good things,
which have been brought into disrepute by being un-
worthily handled, and cannot reasonably be held
responsible for men's abuse of it.
On the side of politics, on the other hand, the effort
of the professional Sophists about the time of Socrates
was to get men to think and act in an independent
fashion, to feel dissatisfied with inherited custom and
mere authority, and to subject common opinion and
popular belief to a thorough sifting. For this purpose,
they did, in the spirit of free inquiry, treat of such
things as government and positive institutions and law,
and they handled the political virtues (justice and the
like), not forgetting, however, the training of the in-
14 THE STOIC CREED
dividual in character. And if here again degeneracy
set in, and the rhetor made a base use of his oppor-
tunities, disregarding high principle and contracting a
mercenary spirit, prizing his art only in the light of
how much money it could bring him, we must not
condemn the ideal because the real fell so far short of
it. The day for passing a wholesale condemnation
on the Sophists is gone thanks mainly to Hegel in
Germany and to Grote in England, and Gomperz has
nobly followed up the lead at the present day. 1
The situation was as follows : Given an age far back,
long before the invention of printing (such as we con-
ceive printing) and the influence of the Press an age,
therefore, when spoken address was all-powerful ; given
a highly intellectual, an eagerly inquisitive, a naturally
disputational, an eminently artistic, and a politically
enthusiastic people, democratic in their leanings ; and
given the desire of the patriotic and the ambitious to be
able to sway this people, and the circumstance that it
was only by ability to sway them that high place and
influence could be achieved in the State ; given, further,
the keenness of the ancient Greek for culture and for
the artistic expression of it in speech, and there we
have, in brief form, the circumstances that determined
the nature and marked off the limits of the sophistic
art.
Yet, it must be emphasized the basis of the sophistic
1 See Grote, History of Greece, vol. viii. ; Zeller, Presocratic
Philosophy (Eng. tr.), vol. ii. ; Schwegler, History of Philosophy,
especially Dr. Hutchison Stirling's Essay in the Annotations of his
English translation ; Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (Eng. tr.), vol. i.
bk. iii. chap. 5.
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 15
art 'was psychology, a distinct view of human thought
and human volition, implying a knowledge of men's
passions, interests, and motives, and a familiarity with
the various springs of human action. Even the phi-
lological researches of the Sophists, in which they
excelled, point in this direction. More still, the Sophists
had their own view of the nature of thought. They
held that Reason was a powerful instrument for criticism
and destruction, but was not competent to reach
absolute truth. It is limited in its extent, and deals
necessarily with the impressions of sense, which are
different to different individuals and relative to the
percipient ; so that knowledge, in the strict sense of the
term, is impossible, and there is no greater justification
for the opinion that one may hold than there is for its
opposite ; or, to put it in express sophistic phraseology,
an assertion and its contradictory are equally defensible.
But if there is no such thing as absolute truth, neither
is there any such thing as absolute morality. Here as
there, all may be questioned, and belief may be im-
pugned. The logical result, therefore, is universal
scepticism scepticism in cognition and in morals alike.
Gorgias of Leontini (date about B.C. 483 to 375) put
it bluntly, on the intellectual side, when he said :
' * Nothing is ; if anything is, it cannot be known ; if it
be known, it cannot be communicated." Thus being,
cognition, and articulate speech fell at a stroke, each
and all came under the ban of nescience. But the
formula of sophistic negation that most deeply affected
subsequent thought, and is prominent in the history of
philosophy, is that of Protagoras (born about 490 B.C.).
" Man," said he, "is the measure of all things
16 THE STOIC CREED
XPWOLTW /xe'rpov avOpu-rrov eu/at) ; of things that are, that
they are ; of things that are not, that they are not."
Now, this sophistic view of the relativity of human
knowledge and of human morality, this Protagorean
doctrine of homo mensura (jue'rpov av0pa>7ros), individual-
istically interpreted, 1 was met by Socrates met, not
after the manner of the modern critic of philosophical
positions, but according to his own dialectic, in the
critical clash of intellect personally confronting intellect ;
and the contrary doctrine, though not in so many words,
was championed by him, namely, that human reason,
though limited in its range, can give us truth, and that
morality has a stable basis in reason and is universally
valid. In this way, while agreeing with the Sophists in
upholding the rights of the individual to think and to
act, he separated from them wholly in his appreciation
of the dignity of the individual and his ability to effect
great things as participating in universal reason.
If "man is the measure of all things," then the
logical conclusion seemed to be that truth is merely
1 It has been argued (e.g., by Gomperz) that this individualistic
interpretation is not the correct one ; for, however it may have
been in the days (say) of Aristotle or even at the end of Plato's
life, neither Protagoras nor the Sophists of Socrates's time did inter-
pret it individualistically. In this there probably is some truth ; but
the point is that the Sophists did actually degenerate, on the line
of this interpretation, and that both Plato and Aristotle (the one in
the Thecetetus and the other in the Metaphysics] did interpret the
Protagorean formula individualistically, which seems to show that
relativity to the individual was at any rate implicit in the formula.
It is never well to forget that Plato and Aristotle were themselves
Greeks and lived near to the Socratic moment, .and so were able
to appreciate movements of their time and to gauge tendencies
in a way that is scarcely open to modern non-Hellenic thinkers.
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 17
relative, and things are as they appear to each to be :
there is no universally valid knowledge. That con-
clusion was drawn by Plato and by Aristotle alike. 1
Whence it follows logically, also, that Ethics has no
unimpeachable groundwork, but varies with the in-
dividual and the age, according to circumstances, and
expediency or self-interest becomes the supreme virtue :
that is right or wrong to each man as it seems to each
to be. That Protagoras himself drew these conclusions
is very far from obvious ; but they were implicit in the
ordinary rendering of his formula. Here the historic
Socrates, in his principles and method, stood forth as
the defender of Reason. In discussion, he demanded
as the criterion of truth clear concepts, and enforced
the dictum that, given clear concepts, consistent and
coherent thinking becomes possible, and high-principled
and coherent action too; and this just means uncon-
ditional knowledge and absolute or objective moral law.
He did not, any more than Protagoras, desert the
subjective standpoint the standpoint of the conscious
self or ego : he had simply a more just idea of what
the self or ego meant. He fully admitted that error
is possible, and that the senses may deceive us and
convention mislead ; but, at the same time, he insisted
that Reason has in itself the power of detecting and
correcting error, and so of reaching certainty. Sub-
jective conviction, he practically maintained, rests on
objective grounds what is true for me is true for
you and for other intelligent beings (intelligence itself
secures that, for intelligence is not a mere individual
or private possession, but is shared by others and
1 See Plato, Theeetetus ; and Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. x. 6.
2
i8 THE STOIC CREED
designates our common nature, thereby giving " truth
for all ") ; and absolute nescience or universal scepticism
is suicidal even in proclaiming that truth is unattain-
able, the sceptic assumes the truth of reason, its trust-
worthiness as destructive of itself, which is absurd. 1
Thus Socrates virtually enunciated the principle that
lies at the root of epistemology, and may claim to have
placed metaphysics on a stable foundation.
That, then, was what gave Socrates his position and
marked him off from the Sophists (strictly so called),
separating him from them in spirit and in aim alike,
as also in the conclusions reached, and what gives
him his distinctive importance in the history of human
thought. His influence on the Stoic teaching, more
especially on its ethical side, will be apparent as we
proceed. Meanwhile, as the personal character of
Socrates counts for much, owing not only to the nobility
of his death but also to the energy and nobility of his
life, this chapter may fitly end with a passage from
Xenophon's Memorabilia, characterizing the Socrates
whom he knew so well. For if it be so that the
Memorabilia was the book that first drew Zeno to the
study of philosophy, the picture of Socrates that we
there find may very well be credited with having
aroused, to some extent at least, his regard for the
master, and may serve to suggest to us how the Stoics
1 For modern presentations of the doctrine of the relativity of
knowledge, see Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature), Hamilton
(Metaphysics and Discussions), J. S. Mill (An Examination of
Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy], Herbert Spencer (First
Principles).
THE SOCRATIC IMPULSE 19
should have come to venerate Socrates and to accept
him as one of their Ideal sages. If Plato, at one in
his estimate of Socrates with Xenophon, could conclude
the Phcedo with the sentence, ''Such was the end,
Echecrates, of our friend ; concerning whom I may
truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I
have known, he was the wisest and justest and best,"
Xenophon could conclude his Memorabilia thus :
"To me personally he was what I have already
endeavoured to describe : so pious and devoutly
religious that he would take no step apart from the
will of heaven ; so just and upright that he never did
even a trifling injury to any living soul ; so self-con-
trolled, so temperate, that he never at any time chose
the sweeter in place of the better ; so sensible, and
wise, and prudent, that in distinguishing the better
from the worse he never erred ; nor had he need of
any helper, but for the knowledge of these matters,
his judgment was at once infallible and self-sufficing.
Capable of reasonably setting forth and defining moral
questions, he was also able to test others, and where
they erred, to cross-examine and convict them, and so
to impel and guide them in the path of virtue and
noble manhood (eV dper^v /cat KaXoK<xya0iai/). With these
characteristics, he seemed to be the very impersonation
of human perfection and happiness. Such is our
estimate. If the verdict fail to satisfy, I would ask
those who disagree with it to place the character of
any other side by side with this delineation, and then
pass sentence " (Mem. iv. 8, trs. by H. G. Dakyns).
Perfection embodied in an individual such did
Socrates appear to his immediate disciples to be ; and
that explains how he should have become the object
of special regard and devotion even to the Stoics,
whose test of greatness was life and character, not
mere power of abstract speculation.
CHAPTER II
THE STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS
"Those budge doctors of the Stoic fur." MILTON.
I
ASSUMING, then, that the Stoic philosophy shared in
the Socratic impulse, and, consequently, has thus far
its general character determined, it next becomes
necessary to consider the determining factors of its
special form. 1 This will best be done if we take a
brief preliminary survey of the circumstances under
which it arose and the situation it was designed to
meet, as well as of the difficulties that beset us in our
interpretation of it.
Although destined to be a philosophy wielding a deep
and widespread influence in Athens and by and by in
Rome, and thence outward throughout the civilized
world, it had neither Athenian nor Roman for its
founder, but Zeno, a native of Citium, in Cyprus, in
whose veins is said to have run Phoenician blood. 2
Nevertheless, its teaching was originally formulated at
1 More will be said, later on, regarding- the Cynic influence and
the contrast of the Epicurean Physics and Ethics.
2 The strength of the case for the Semitic origin of Stoicism
may be seen by a reference to Sir Alexander Grant's The Ethics
of Aristotle, vol. i., Essay vi., and to Bishop Lightfoot's Epistle to
the Philippians, Diss. ii., "St. Paul and Seneca."
20
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 21
Athens, was addressed to Greeks, was cast in Hellenic
moulds and nurtured under Hellenic patronage. When
first it saw the light, at the end of the fourth century
B.C., it came to a declining people a people past the
heyday of their political freedom, with their intellectual
interest in truth narrowed, and the disintegrating touch
of social corruption and moral turpitude visibly laid
upon them. The greatness of the days of Pericles was
gone, and the distance between the age of Plato and
the age of Zeno was enormous. It may be illustrated
by the character of the comic plays that found favour.
"The comedy of Aristophanes has for its scene the
main resorts of the public political life of its time. It is a
caricature of public men and public measures. Athens,
with its foreign relations and its domestic politics, is
the topic which reappears in a hundred shapes, and
drags into its compass even the inmates of the women's
chamber and the character and ideas of the public
thinkers. In the new comedy of Menander and
Philemon, public life is unknown. It is the family
and the social aspects of life which are the perpetual
theme. Instead of generals and statesmen, demagogues
and revolutionaries, the new comedy presents a re-
curring story of young men's love affairs, and old men's
economies, of swaggering captains and wily valets-de-
chambre, hangers-on at rich men's tables, and young
women working mischief by their charms. The whole
comedy turns on one aspect of domestic life it is
full of embroiling engagements between lovers, and
brings the cook and the dinner-table prominently on
the stage." 1
To stem the tide of deterioration, and, if possible,
to produce in men a healthy robust moral nature,
which would be able to resist the temptations to
degeneracy that on every hand presented themselves,
1 W. Wallace, Epicureanism , p. 10.
22 THE STOIC CREED
and which would yield inward and abiding peace in the
midst of the exceptional difficulties and trials that were
inseparable from the exigencies of the times, was one
great object that Stoicism served, and for the accom-
plishment of which it was consciously called into
existence. This so far explains some of its distinctive
positions particularly, its doctrines of Providence and
the true nature and source of human happiness. It
explains also, in part, how Ethics became to it the
supreme and all - important science ; speculation,
physical and metaphysical, being subordinated thereto.
Ariston of Chios even went the length of saying that
"dialectical arguments are like cobwebs, which,
although they seem to weave something artistic, are
useless " (Diog. Laert. vi. 2). That might stand as a
motto for Bacon and for Locke.
But the personal character, natural temperament,
and intellectual training of its great founders had also
their marked influence.
We can clearly discern, throughout the whole term
of the existence of Stoicism as a separate philosophical
school, traces of the austerity and simplicity of life that
characterized the Semitic Zeno ; of the deep religious
spirit, anchored on physical speculation, that dis-
tinguished Cleanthes ; of the hard logical reasoning
and subtle dialectic that was conspicuous in the self-
confident and redoubtable Chrysippus. Moreover, the
period of years, whether twenty or ten (the number is
disputed), spent by Zeno, in preparation for his work
of teaching, in the various Greek schools Cynic,
Megaric, Academic, Peripatetic was not without its
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 23
effect in shaping 1 the form that Stoicism took. Even
though ultimately opposed to one and all of these
schools, Zeno learned and assimilated something from
each, and reproduced it in his teaching. Although
repelled by the slovenly and sometimes offensive habits
and not less by the intellectual narrowness of the
Cynics, he, nevertheless, caught their spirit of a high
ethical ideal and a contempt for mere pleasure, and
based his own ethical system on the conception of the
Ideal wise man. Hence, Diogenes the Cynic could be
accepted by the Stoics as a pattern sage (along with
Socrates and Hercules and a few others) ; but it was
Diogenes without the htb. 1 From the Megarics, and
more especially from Stilpo, whose pupil he was, he
would at least acquire an interest in Logic, and would
be sharpened by them in the practice of Eristic, for
which they were famous. He would learn from Stilpo,
further, the doctrine of Passionlessness or aTrdOeia,
which that great Megaric shared with the Cynic school.
By the Academics he would be introduced, among other
things, to certain Platonic ethical notions, and to the
teaching of Heracleitus a teaching which, as we
know, he highly prized, accepting it as the groundwork
of his own physical theorizing. He would learn from
the Aristotelians formal logic and metaphysics, no less
than natural science. Indeed, so fully did the various
Greek schools affect Zeno, that even in his own day
he was roundly accused of being a plagiarist or a mere
eclectic, devoid of originality. 2 But this may simply
have meant that he had an open and receptive mind,
1 The Cynic influence is further considered in Chapter VII.
2 See Diogenes Laertius, vii. 20.
24 THE STOIC CREED
and that he was less under the sway of the spirit of
sect than many of his contemporaries. It is no easy
matter, in any age, for a partisan to see that a thinker's
first duty is to be sympathetic towards other thinkers,
and ready to believe that there is truth even in systems
from which he himself dissents. If Zeno was com-
paratively tolerant, that surely was a virtue, not a vice.
When he listened to and learned from the different
teachers of the diverse tenets, he only showed that he
had in him the genuine spirit of the earnest seeker after
truth ; and when he broke off from this teacher and
from that at particular points, and essayed to occupy
an independent position, he simply acted on the proper
philosophic maxim, "Dear to me is Plato, but dearer
still is Truth (amicus Plato, magis arnica veritas)."
Nevertheless, the founders of Stoicism were perhaps
by nature, at all events from the pressure of circum-
stances eager controversialists ; and controversialists
were all their successors. It was the fate of the school
to be constantly engaged in philosophical warfare.
One ground of polemic lay with Epicurus and the
Epicureans on the physical explanation of the nature
and constitution of the universe. Zeno possibly, and
Cleanthes certainly, entered the lists here ; but Chry-
sippus was the combatant that stood forth pre-eminent.
To those protagonists it seemed impossible that the
world should have arisen, as the Epicureans maintained
it did, by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. That doc-
trine appeared to give an erroneous idea of Providence,
and left the world an inexplicable riddle. Therefore,
it had to be strenuously resisted. " Either an ordered ...
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 25
universe," urged Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, iv. 27),
"or else a welter of confusion. Assuredly then a
world-order. Or think you that order subsisting
within yourself is compatible with disorder in the All ? "
" Recall to mind the alternative (iv. 3) either a fore-
seeing providence, or blind atoms and all the abound-
ing proofs that the world is as it were a city." In like
manner, Balbus, in Cicero's De Natura Deorum (ii. 37),
maintains that it is as easy to believe that, by throwing
a large quantity of the letters of the alphabet at random
on the ground, there would emerge, legible and clear,
the Annals of Ennius, as to believe that the world, so
obviously showing marks of wisdom and design, could
have been produced by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. 1
To the Epicurean Ethics a no less strenuous oppo-
sition had to be made. If " pleasure" were man's
highest good, then, it seemed, egoism and selfishness
ruled, virtue was stripped of its absolute value, and
morality had no sure foundation. " In the constitution
of the reasoning being I perceive no virtue in mutiny
against justice ; in mutiny against pleasure I see self-
control " (Aurel. viii. 39). Hence the Stoical treat-
ment of the emotions and desires. Complete repression
of these was the counsel, if peace were to be secured :
" Banish joys, banish fear, put hope also to flight, and
let not grief be present " (Boethius, De Consol. Phil.
Lib. i. metrum 7). No one carried on this antagonism
to Hedonistic Ethics more persistently than Epictetus. 2
1 The Epicurean Cosmogony will be considered in Chapter VI.
2 See, for example, Dissertations, i. 23 and ii. 5. The arguments
against Epicurean Hedonism will be adduced in Chapters VIII.
and X.
26 THE STOIC CREED
In the same way, a merciless war had to be waged,
over the Theory of Knowledge, with Pyrrho and other
sceptics. If there were no such thing as Truth, or if
Truth were not attainable by man, if man's wisest
motto were nihil scire ("to know nothing"), then
human reason was rendered impotent and human action
paralyzed. In this connexion, a prominent place must
be assigned to Chrysippus.
These oppositions were inveterate and permanent ;
and they explain much of what might not at first sight
be obvious in the Stoic philosophy.
But " the Stoic philosophy " is a wide word ; and we
must not forget that it covers teaching that grew and
developed from the fourth century B.C. to, at any rate,
the second century A.D., and that, while the home ot
its first activity was Greece, the city of its later develop-
ment was Rome. We must remember, moreover, that
the materials for our knowledge of the first period of it
are very meagre only fragments of the voluminous
writings of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (for they
all wrote voluminously 1 ) have come down to us, and
the Stoicism with which we are most familiar is that
of the second or Roman period associated specially
with the names of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus
Aurelius ; i.e., the Stoicism which has been modified
by the lapse of time, by change of country (from Greece
to Italy, from Athens to Rome), and by assimilation of
elements from other and competing philosophies. No
1 See, for instance, the list of writings given by Diogenes
Laertius in his Lives, Doctrines, and Sayings of Eminent Philo-
sophers.
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 27
doubt, through the labours of recent scholars particu-
larly Zeller, Stein, Hirzel, von Arnim we are able,
to a not inconsiderable extent, to reproduce the leading
teaching of the earliest Stoics, and to apportion to each
his distinctive doctrines, and thereby to trace advance
in the first or Greek period. Yet not without a certain
danger. It is proverbially difficult to prove a negative ;
and if we were left solely to deep-sea dredging for our
evidence, we should inevitably infer that no human
body was ever buried in the sea, for human bones have
not been dredged from the depths of the ocean. It
needs great care and discrimination before we can, with
any plausibility even, demonstrate from mere fragments
of the writings of an author that this or that doctrine
was not held by him. But with care and discrimina-
tion much may be done ; and, at any rate, we can now,
more specifically, appraise the works of Cleanthes and
appreciate his originality. So long as "the Hymn to
Zeus " was the solitary specimen of his productions
known to students, or taken notice of by them, his
place could only be that of a religiously-minded man,
bent on giving a theological interpretation of the
universe, and breathing a pious submission to the
world-order which it was refreshing to feel and to come
in contact with. But now that his fragments and the
references to him and criticisms of him in Greek and in
Latin writers have been fully brought together, 1 he is
seen to stand forth a most important figure in Stoicism,
stamping his personality on the physical speculations
of the school (just as Chrysippus stamped his personality
on its logic) ; and by his Materialism carried through-
1 See, e.g.) Pearson's Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes.
28 THE STOIC CREED
out all the spheres of philosophical inquiry he gives
a remarkable unity to the system. But, for all this,
our knowledge of early Stoicism is fragmentary, and,
for the most part, at second hand, 1 and the Stoicism in
which we are most at home is that of the Roman period
matured developed Stoicism, old yet fresh and
vigorous, and destined to leave a permanent mark on
the civilized world.
The respective contributions of the first three great
Stoics have been succinctly expressed by Mr. Pearson
(The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 48) thus:
"To Zeno belong the establishment of the logical
criterion, the adaptation of Heraclitean physics, and
the introduction of all the leading ethical tenets.
Cleanthes revolutionised the study of physics by the
theory of tension and the development of pantheism,
and by applying his materialistic views to logic and
ethics brought into strong light the mutual inter-
dependence of the three branches. The task of Chry-
sippus was to preserve rather than to originate, to
reconcile inconsistencies, to remove superfluous out-
growths, and to maintain an unbroken line of defence
against his adversaries."
A further difficulty confronts us in the fact that the
Stoic writings possessed by us are not methodical ex-
positions of the system, but either notes of lectures
delivered on promiscuous subjects, or treatises on
separate portions of the Stoic doctrine, or jottings of
random thoughts (resembling Pascal's Pensees or Cole-
1 Our chief authority is Diogenes Laertius, who lived probably
in the second century after Christ.
.CALL
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 29
ridge's Aids to Reflection) made for private use and as
helps to personal conduct one might almost say, to
personal piety and devotion.
To the first class belong the Dissertations or Discourses
of Epictetus (originally eight books, now only four),
which were simply Arrian's memoranda of his master's
prelections unpruned, unassorted, and unsifted, 1 a
mixture of the gold and the dross, yet charged with
human interest and enlivened by anecdote and humour ;
and even Arrian's selections of the master's dicta,
known as the Encheiridion or Handbook, while it
removes the dross, does not present a homogeneous
system, or give more than glimpses which the reader
must develop for himself. It is, moreover, rather
lopsided, presenting in excess the more unbending
side of Stoicism and subordinating too much the
" amiable" virtues.
Seneca's prose writings exemplify the second class.
They are either books on isolated Stoical themes (" On
Anger," "On Benefits," "On the Blessed Life," etc.),
or casual expositions contained in Letters (one hundred
and twenty-four in number, addressed to Lucilius)
letters, no doubt, that are practically lectures of the
moral philosopher, hortatory, edifying, full of sage
counsel clothed in graceful language, with a tendency
to prolixity, and a proneness on the part of the moralist
to become the moralizer (to be classed, as to style and
spirit, along with the philosophical group of Addison's
papers in The Spectator, or with Dugald Stewart's
moral philosophy lectures), but not systematic treatises,
1 According to modern notions, Arrian would not be regarded
as a good editor.
30 THE STOIC CREED
unfolding in a continuous coherent fashion the various
branches of Stoical investigation. Indeed, Seneca was
distinctly averse to system-building. He had neither
the inclination nor the ability for methodical speculation ;
and, even in Ethics, he is more of the preacher than of
the philosopher. He ever and anon seems to long for
the wisdom of the ancients, which was concerned
merely with precepts about what to do and what to
avoid, when men, being less learned, were far better
morally; and it is a real pain to him that "plain and
open virtue should now be turned into an obscure and
ingenious science, and that men should be taught to
dispute and not to live " (Epistles, 95). Moreover, the
conditions under which he wrote were unfavourable to
system. He had to address himself to specific points
as opportunity required, and he meant his counsel for
edification he was always ready to "improve the
occasion." The nearest, perhaps, that we come to a
systematic Stoic treatise is in Cicero's De Officiis
("On Duties"); two books of which are avowedly
reproductions of Panaetius's teaching clearly tinged,
however, with the shrewd common sense of the Roman
statesman and politician himself.
The third class is represented by Marcus Aurelius's
Meditations (TO. cts eauroi/), a supremely precious volume,
as giving us the artless picture of a great Emperor
drawn by himself, yet a picture, in all probability, never
intended for public gaze, precious as revealing to us
the upright nature of an amiable, pure, magnanimous
soul, full of high thoughts and generous sentiments,
and inspiring us by its whole-hearted resignation to
destiny, but not in any way a rounded whole or an
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 31
articulated dissertation. In a word, we have here
simply the guileless earnest presentation of a limited
number of great ethical notions in the shape of self-
musings, and the stimulating example of a lovable man
in the highest social rank, the idolized "philosopher-
pontiff," moulding his life consistently on his own
principle ''Whatever any one else does or says, my
duty is to be good ; just as gold or emerald or purple
for ever says, Whatever any one else does or says, my
duty is to be an emerald and keep my proper hue "
(Med. vii. 15).
This lack of system all along the line is unfortunate
and tantalizing, all the more so as it was in great
measure intentional. One can quite well understand
the position of Epictetus, who was a teacher by pro-
fession and a man with a mission, and who naturally
conceived it to be his duty to lecture rather than to
write, and, in lecturing, to stir his hearers by ardent
words uttered straight from the heart in conversational
style, rather than to perplex and possibly to repel them
by sterile logomachies and mere intellectual conceits.
Arrian's characterization of him insists on his intensity
and his infectious enthusiasm. 1 But the position of
others, not thus situated, is more difficult to understand.
Marcus Aurelius, however, near the opening of his
Meditations (i. 7), lets us into the secret. When
acknowledging his debt to the Stoic Rusticus, who
was the first to arouse in him the desire to live rightly,
he expresses his gratitude that he was kept back by him
from "sophistic ambitions and essays on philosophy,
discourses provocative to virtue, or fancy portraitures
1 See Arrian's dedicatory letter to Lucius Gellius.
32 THE STOIC CREED
of the sage or the philanthropist," while he " learned
to eschew rhetoric and poetry and fine language." This
is significant. As it was the aim of the Stoics to form
men, and not merely to train reasoners or to produce
orators, that determined their mode of procedure. To
them, character was the great thing ; and so it seemed
better to stimulate the heart to morality and to attend
to conduct than to pose as learned pedants, or even
to delight the intellect with legitimate logic and
speculation.
Hence, the later Stoics have done themselves an
injustice. When what we have to judge them by is
simply a collection of partially disjointed reflections,
frequently reiterated, and of practical moral counsels
wise, searching, and direct, yet not systematized, it
cannot but be that they should often appear to us
inconsistent, and that we should sometimes find it
extremely difficult to see how different utterances of
the same man are to be reconciled.
Lastly, we have the difficulty of teaching as tested
by practice.
We shall do the Stoics a grievous wrong if we be
not on our guard against allowing our knowledge of the
aberrations of individual Stoics, or traditional stories
regarding them, or, perhaps, unworthy and false charges
of opponents against them, to prejudice us in our
estimate of the intrinsic value of the system. If, on
the one hand, there were Stoics who drew antinomian
conclusions from Stoical premises, especially from the
''apathy" of the wise man and the doctrine of things
""indifferent," and lived accordingly (just as there were
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 33
early Christians who defended antinomianism by St.
Paul's doctrine of God's free grace), there were, on the
other hand, Stoics (and many of them) who lived noble
lives ; and, in particular, we have Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius, who are brilliant examples to all ages of
practice conforming to precept. Earlier, we have
Zeno, the founder, of whom it is recorded by Diogenes
Laertius (vii. 9), that the assembly decreed him a
golden crown and a tomb in the Ceramicus at the
public expense, on the ground that "he had spent
many years in the city in the pursuit of philosophy, and
was in all respects a good man, and had exhorted the
young men who sought his intercourse to the practice
of virtue and temperance, setting up his own life to all
as a model in the things that are best, being in con-
formity with the doctrines on which he discoursed."
So that noble lives there were among the Stoics, of
which any creed might be proud ; and, for the rest, we
may ask, What philosophy, or what religion, can stand
the rigorous test of absolutely consistent lives on the
part of all its adherents ? It is principles that we must
gauge principles in their legitimate, and not merely in
their actual, effect in practice ; and on an unprejudiced
examination of these principles and their legitimate
outcome, must our estimate be formed.
II
There is no need here to offer biographies of " those
budge doctors of the Stoic fur." That has been done
with sufficient fulness by Zeller and others ; and, in
particular, the three great Roman Stoics Seneca,
Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius have been limned in
3
34 THE STOIC CREED
his wonted picturesque manner by Dean Farrar in his
Seekers after God. But a table, embodying the leading-
names, with dates, may here be appended. It will
show at a glance the Presidents of the Greek School,
as well as the masters of the Latin period.
TABLE
I. GREEK PERIOD
Presidents of the School
{Zeno (who founded the school about 308
Cleanthes (born 331 B.C. ; died 232 B.C.).
Chrysippus (282-209 B.C.).
Zeno of Tarsus (about 206 B.C.).
Diogenes of Seleucia (about 150 B.C.).
Antipater of Tarsus (about 144 B.C.).
'Panaetius of Rhodes (about 180-111 B.C.
a friend of Scipio Africanus the younger,
and greatly instrumental in introducing
Transitional^ Stoicism into Rome).
Posidonius of Apamea in Syria (born about
135 B.C. teacher of Cicero, when he
visited Rhodes).
II. ROMAN PERIOD
L. Annaeus Seneca (3-65 A.D.).
Epictetus (left Rome in 94 A.D. on
the expulsion of the philosophers by
Domitian for Nicopolis in Epirus,
where he taught and died).
M. Aurelius Antoninus (born 121 A.D. ;
Emperor, 161-180 A.D.).
Chrysippus is usually designated "the second founder of the
School," according to the saying, " Had there been no Chrysippus,
there would have been no Stoa." But the independent work of
Cleanthes seems to entitle him also to the name of founder.
STOIC MASTERS AND THEIR WRITINGS 35
According 1 to the usual division, the first three names
constitute the Older Stoa ; the other names of the
Greek period designate the Middle Stoa ; and the Later
Stoa is covered by the names of the Roman period \
How far this grouping seems to mark advance in
teaching, or to exhibit the development of doctrine in
the school, will be shown at the close of next chapter.
SECTION B. STOIC SCIENCE AND
SPECULATION
CHAPTER III
I
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY
" To every impression apply, if possible, the tests of objective
character, of subjective effect, and of logical relation
. " AuRELlUS.
" He who neglects education walks lame to the end of his life,
and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below."
PLATO.
" Philosophise servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas."
SENECA.
I
WHEN Philosophy, in the early part of the sixth century
of the Christian era, disclosed herself in vision to
Boethius, as he lay in the prison of Ticinum waiting
his tragic end, she appeared as a Woman of a very
reverent countenance, with glowing eyes, penetrating
with a power beyond that of human eyes, of vivid
complexion and inexhaustible strength, although so full
of years that she could not be deemed to belong to the
present age. Her stature was difficult to define. For,
at one time, she would confine herself within the
common human measure ; at another time, she seemed
to raise her head so high as to penetrate the heavens,
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 37
and be lost to the gaze of the beholder. Her garments,
woven by her own hands, were wrought of the slenderest
threads, with exquisite art and of imperishable material.
Yet withal the mist of antiquity and even of neglect had
overspread them. On the lower edge was inscribed
the letter -n- ; and, on the upper, the letter 0. And
between these two letters there was a series of others,
by which you could ascend, as by the steps of a ladder,
from the lower to the higher. The vesture itself, how-
ever, had been torn by violent hands, and fragments of
it borne away. In her right hand she carried books ;
and, in her left hand, a sceptre. 1
Now, all this was allegorical, and was intended to
indicate, as in a picture, the nature and pretensions of
Philosophy, as conceived by one who may not unfairly
be designated the last of the Stoics, if also " the last of
the Romans."
The majestic Lady, with reverent countenance and
glowing eyes and exhaustless vigour and lively com-
plexion, typifies Philosophy, and emphasizes its perennial
interest and worth. The exquisite apparel, woven of
indestructible material, points to the value, durability,
and excellence of philosophic thought. The changing
figure of Philosophy now human, now divine in-
dicates the twofold subject-matter, things of earth
and things of heaven. The lower letter TT represents
Philosophy in its practical and more mundane aspect ;
while is the region of theory of theology and
speculation. And the way from the one to the other
is unbroken ; the ascent is made by a continuous grada-
tion. Alas ! that men should have rent the garment,
1 See De Consolatione Philosophies, Lib. i. Prosa i and 3.
38 THE STOIC CREED
and carried off the fragments ; prizing the parts more
highly than the whole. Philosophical sects, like all
others, have much to answer for. Yet, take Philosophy
in its entirety, and what, according to Boethius, have
we ? We have an instructress and a consoler : light
and comfort come from thence the deepest intellectual
insight and sovereign regulative power. We have both
the "books" and the "sceptre": on the one side,
illumination of the mind ; on the other side, guidance
of the will. Philosophy, when rightly interpreted,
is of studies supreme ; for unity is given to human
nature and harmony to life, when principles and
practice meet.
II
What then, let us ask more particularly, is Philo-
sophy ?
From TT to 6
The Stoics defined it in a single phrase as " striving
after wisdom," and wisdom they defined as " knowledge
of things divine and human," so that these things de-
termine the scope of philosophy. 1 To modern thinkers,
this definition may seem inadequate and even naive.
But there is more in it, especially when taken in con-
nexion with the Stoics' application of it, than at first
sight appears. There is this, at least, in it : first,
that no speculation is philosophy that does not run up
into consideration of the divine or all-comprehending
principle of existence ; and, secondly, that no philo-
sophic speculation on things divine can rightly claim to
be legitimate that does not start from, and guide itself
1 See, e.g., Epictetus, Diss. \. 14 ; Seneca, Ep. 88.
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 39
by, a knowledge of things human. The ascent from -n-
to is continuous, unbroken. Two errors, therefore,
are here excluded errors into which students of the
mind have frequently fallen, and which are still pitfalls :
first, the error of supposing that psychology or study
of psychical states alone is philosophy ; secondly, the
reverse error of ignoring psychology and dealing with
metaphysics as though it had for us a wholly inde-
pendent footing were entirely unrelated to, and inde-
pendent of, the facts and principles of human nature.
Philosophy, in order to be correctly understood, must
neither be separated from an experiential basis nor be
identified with the bare scientific investigation of
experience.
In another sense, also, study of the divine, as well as
of the human, is necessary namely, when we come to
deal with the practical applications of philosophy. The
two classes of interest, theoretical and practical, are so
intimately connected as to be interdependent ; and any
neglect of the one necessarily tells adversely on the
other. The Stoics were very insistent on this point ;
and earnest ethical teachers ever since have been
equally emphatic. Take a single example from Marcus
Aurelius. In the third book of his Meditations (iii.
13) occur these sentences: " As surgeons keep their
instruments and knives at hand for sudden calls upon
their skill, keep you your principles ever ready to test
things divine and human, in every act however trifling
remembering the mutual bond between the two. No
human act can be right without co-reference to the
divine, and conversely."
Philosophy, then, has for its subject-matter things
40 THE STOIC CREED
human and divine : it must rise from TT to 0, and
determine the principle of union between the two. That
is the first step in the definition.
Leading Characteristics
But now, if there is a principle of union to be deter-
mined, that means : (i) That philosophy is the unifying
science : it is the effort of the mind to reach the rational
interpretation of the universe, by viewing the parts in
the light of the whole and grasping the underlying
principle. Consequently, it must deal with the deepest
problems of human life those connected with God or
the Absolute ; with Self, the Ego, or the Soul ; and
with the World or Nature. (2) Hence, it rises beyond
the mere study of isolated occurrences or existences in
their fragmentary aspects and the formulating of their
laws, in other words, beyond the mere scientific study
of them, and seeks to determine their reason or their
why i as Aristotle puts it (Met. v. i), " Philosophy is
the knowledge of things by their causes." (3) Never-
theless, it presupposes that knowledge of existences
in their laws and modes of existence has first been
obtained. The secondary unities of knowledge must
be established before the great all - comprehending
unity can be reached.
Whence it follows that there is no real opposition
between philosophy and science, not even between
philosophy and the physical sciences. For, though
the procedure of physical science is analytic, it is not
that alone. All analysis leads up to synthesis ; and
every one of the physical sciences aims at unifying its
material. Indeed, the material itself, when brought
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 41
under science (scientict) that is, when it is really
known, is a subject for philosophy ; and the deeper
conceptions of science (such as "force," "space") are
seen to have full meaning only in a philosophical setting.
But if so, then philosophy differs from physical science
mainly in the circumstance that it lays bare the in-
tellectual presuppositions of such science, and is,
therefore, more general.
But if there is no opposition between philosophy and
physical science, much less is there opposition between
philosophy and mental science. On the contrary, the
mental sciences are philosophy's handmaids ; and
philosophy, from one point of view, may quite correctly
be conceived as a genus, having the mental disciplines
under it as species, for a knowledge of the that and the
how is inseparable from a knowledge of the wherefore
and the why.
The Constituent Sciences
Let us then, next, view the various mental disciplines
and sciences as branches of philosophy as the parts
of the three - barbed arrow with which Hercules
wounded 'Here and vanquished Hades that is, being
interpreted, dispelled ignorance and penetrated into
things secret.
In an inquiry of this kind, modern philosophers
naturally look first to psychology, and ask, What, in
any proffered scheme of the sciences, is the place
assigned to psychology, and why ? But this was not
how the Stoics proceeded at least, not explicitly.
With them there is no definite and specific treatment of
psychology. Their classification of the sciences (one
42 THE STOIC CREED
that, in all likelihood, originated with them) was simply
threefold namely, into Logic, Physics, and Ethics. In
explication of this grouping, they "compared philo-
sophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and
sinews, physics to the fleshy parts, and ethics to the
soul ; or, again, to an egg, logic being the shell, and
ethics the white, and physics the yolk ; or to an all-
productive field, logic being the surrounding fence,
ethics the fruit, and physics the soil or the trees ; or to
a city well fortified and governed by reason " (Diogenes
Laertius, vii. 33). From this threefold grouping, psy-
chology is apparently excluded. And even when, as with
Cleanthes, we duplicate each science and extend the
division to six members namely, Logic and Rhetoric,
Physics and Theology, Ethics and Politics, we seem to
be no nearer effecting an independent place for psy-
chology than we were before. Yet there can be no
question that the Stoics were supremely psychological.
Their whole philosophy, indeed, may be said to repose
on psychology, for the study of humart nature, on its
individual and on its social side, is for them paramount
and fundamental, and even physical speculation and
metaphysical inquiries have their basis in man's mental
constitution, and repose on his conscious experience.
Hence the Stoics (more especially, those of the earlier
times) were conspicuous among the philosophers of
antiquity in insisting on a philosophical vocabulary
(which was very much the same thing as a psychological
vocabulary) on the discrimination of synonyms and
the precise and scientific use of mental terms ; thereby
anticipating the demands of the present day. Indeed, so
strict were they in their requirements here, that Cicero,
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 43
unable duly to appreciate the need for exact terminology
(which is only another way of expressing the need for
exact thinking), criticizes them for introducing and
coining new terms, or for giving new meanings to old
terms, and designates Zeno ignobilis verborum opifex
(" a vile coiner of words "). But, clearly, the Stoics were
right. There can be no true mental science without an
abundance of properly defined and accurately applied
terms ; and though we may allow that a newly-coined
word ought not to be barbarously formed (an admission
that contains a rebuke to many modern men of science,
as much as to any of the ancient Stoics), we must insist
that the attempt to introduce technical exactness into
philosophical speech bespoke a psychological interest
on the part of the Stoics that is remarkable, and that
augured well for their future.
Then, further, psychological insight and psychological
analysis run through all the Stoical sciences. | Their
Logic, when it comes to Theory of Knowledge or
Epistemology, is markedly psychological.) Pyschologi-
cal, again, is their Physics, in so far as the universe is
conceived as a macrocosm, with man as its counterpart
microcosm, and in so far as the substance of the
universe is regarded as identical with that of man's
soul. Psychological, too, and supremely so, is their
Ethics. Here, they essayed a psychological analysis
and classification of the Emotions ; from thp standpoint
of psychology, they handled moral science, emphasiz-
ng the mind's assent (o-vy/cara0e<ng) as the basis of
responsibility and laying the essence of morality in its
inwardness in the agent's motive and intention ; and
both their doctrine of human Happiness and their
44 THE STOIC CREED
doctrine of Habit are eminently psychological. They
had, also, a distinct psychology of Pleasure ; maintain-
ing that pleasure indicates, not the fulness and vigour,
but the decline of vital energy, the point where the
climax has been reached, and where descent and decay
begin, while, in the interests of virtue, they confined
pleasure to the lower psychical energies, chiefly the
sensuous, and refused to allow it any application to
the higher energies of the soul at all. Psychological,
furthermore, is the basis of Religion with them, and
their main argument for the existence of God that
which grounds it in human nature. So that, para-
doxical though it may appear, the Stoics must be
pronounced to be in the first instance psychologists,
even though thej have no separate place for psychology
in their scheme of the sciences. 1
This being understood, let us proceed to the first of
the Stoical sciences namely, Logic. It is rightly called
the first, because Zeno himself so regarded it : his
arrangement, rising in the order of importance, was
Logic, Physics, Ethics. 2 But it is first also, because
the Stoics, with rare insight, looked upon it as the
1 Hence, a work of Stein's on the Stoics is entitled Die Psycho-
logic der Stoa.
3 This order, however, was not always followed, for, as Diogenes
Laertius tells us (vii. 33), some Stoics maintain that " no part is to
be preferred to another, but they are all mingled together and so
are handled indiscriminately (rty Trapddocriv JUUKTTJV eTroiovv) ; while
others place logic first, and physics second, and ethics third, as
Zeno in his treatise On Reason, and Chrysippus and Archedemus
and Endromus. For Diogenes of Ptolemais begins with ethics,
but Apollodorus puts ethics second, and Panaetius and Posidonius
begin with physics."
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 45
necessary introduction or propaedeutic to philosophy.
" For this reason," says Epictetus (Diss. i. 17), "I
think the logical arts are placed first, just as in the
measuring- of corn we place first the examination of the
measure. But if we do not first determine what is a
modius, nor first determine what is a balance, how shall
we still be able to measure or to weigh anything? In
this case, then, if we have not learned thoroughly and
investigated accurately the criterion of all other things,
and that through which they are understood, shall we
be able to accurately investigate and thoroughly under-
stand anything else ? ... It is enough that Logic has
the power of distinguishing and examining other things,
and, as one may say, of measuring and weighing them."
Now, Logic, in the view of the Stoics, consisted of
three parts not, however, of co-ordinate value. As
they did, in all probability, themselves coin the name
11 logic," they had quite a right to give it whatever
meaning they chose ; and they used it to designate a
wide area. Not only did it cover to them what has
been regarded by many as alone Logic, namely, " the
science and art of reasoning" or of "thought," but it
included also Rhetoric (or the art of style) and Episte-
mology (or Theory of Knowledge).
In the sphere of Rhetoric there is no great Stoical
accomplishment to record. Although there were Stoics
for example, Panaetius and Seneca who were profici-
ents in literary composition, and could express them-
selves with elegance, and although there were among
the Stoics rhetoricians of the ornate stamp, such as
Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, 1 the whole tendency
1 " Inspired with hyperboles," as Strabo puts it.
46 THE STOIC CREED
of the school was to sit loose to the mere linguistic
clothing of thought. Substance, not form, was to them
the main thing ; and it little, mattered should the
grammar be defective or the expression faulty, if the
meaning were intelligible. Take Marcus Aurelius's
writing, and you find that it is bald and unimpassioned ;
and we have already seen that Rusticus, his teacher,
encouraged him to that. This lack of sympathy with
style, however, did not prevent Epictetus from rising
occasionally to heights of real eloquence ; but that,
perhaps, was owing more to the fire and energy of his
nature and to the intensity of his convictions than to
any conscious effort at effect. For though in his most
generous mood he can admit that the man who denies
that there is a faculty of expression or an art of literary
form is both impious and cowardly, impious, "for he
holds in disesteem the gifts that come from God " ;
cowardly, "for such a one seems to me to be afraid
lest, if there be any faculty of this kind, we shall not
be able to despise it " (Diss. ii. 23), nevertheless he
utters, at other times, a note of warning, lest eloquence
puff up the uninstructed and feeble, and sophistry lead
them astray. " For by what means now could any one
persuade a young man who excels in these matters that
he ought not to become an appendage to them, but
should make them an appendage to himself? Does he
not trample all such reasons under foot, and strut before
us elated and inflated, not suffering that any man should
reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected
and from what he has turned aside?" (Diss. i. 8).
Under any circumstances, rhetoric was always to be
taken as a .subsidiary study, useful only as subservient
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 47
to higher disciplines. " There is a certain value in the
power of speaking-, but it is not so great as that of the
will. When, then, I say these things, let no one think
that I require you to neglect speaking any more than 1
require you to neglect eyes or ears, or hands or feet, or
clothing or sandals. But if you ask me, What then is
the best of all things ? what shall I say ? The faculty
of speaking (rrjv ^pao-rt/oji/) ? I cannot say that ; but the
faculty of the will, when it is right, for this it is which
uses that and all other powers both small and great "
(Diss. ii. 23).
It was different with Formal Logic and with Episte-
mology. Owing to polemical exigencies, Formal Logic,
especially as ratiocination and intellectual fencing,
became a necessity to the Stoics ; and, in the hands of
Chrysippus, it did effective work both of an offensive
and of a defensive kind.
v/Butof the three intellectual disciplines, Epistemology
was the most important ; for here the canon or criterion
of truth was established, and Academic scepticism
and Epicurean hedonism were alike rebutted. Hence
Epictetus can say (Diss. ii. n) : "This is the beginning
of philosophy, a perception of the contention of men
with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the
contention, and a condemnation and distrust of that
which merely seems, and some inquiry concerning that
which seems, whether it seems rightly, and a discovery
of some rule (KCU/OFOS), as we have discovered a balance
for weights, and a carpenter's rule for straight and
crooked things. This is the beginning of philo-
sophy. . . . And to philosophize is this, to examine
and confirm the rules ; and, then, to use them when
48 THE STOIC CREED
they are known is the act of an upright and good
man."
Next comes Physics. By this, however, is not meant
merely observation of natural phenomena and scientific
investigation of nature and nature's laws after the
manner of the modern physicist, but, more still, the
metaphysical interpretation of the universe philosophy,
indeed, in its higher speculative reaches. That the
ancient Stoics did investigate nature in a scientific way,
up to the full light of the science of their day, is quite
true. But this was a minor part of their business.
Their great achievement was their Cosmogony or
Theory of the world, and their Theology or philosophical
conception of God. Their physics, therefore, was pre-
eminently Ontology : it was Science of Being occupied
with the three great entities, God, the World, and the
Human Soul.
Lastly comes Ethics.
This was the crown and glory of the Stoical sciences.
As philosophy was to them a substitute for religion, it
was, above all things, their aim to make it a rule of
life, " a way of living " not merely, as now, a necessary
part of a University curriculum? but a power operative
for good in daily action. If, then, men were to be
guided in their conduct, it was not enough to teach
them to reason, or to harangue, or to speculate. You
may feed the imagination on cosmogony, you may
sharpen the intellect by logic, you may train literary
faculty through rhetoric, but you cannot nourish the
soul, or produce a robust, manly character, unless you
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 49
bring your cosmogony into a definite immediate relation
with living, and utilize your logic and your eloquence
for the defence and establishment of life- directing
truth. 1 "What does it matter to me," said Epictetus
(Frag.\ "whether things are composed of atoms or
of similar parts, or of earth and fire? For, is it not
sufficient to know the nature of good and evil, and the
measures of the desires and the aversions, and also of
the inclinations and the disinclinations, using these as
rules to manage the affairs of life, but leaving alone
the things that are above us ? " And of Logic he said,
"The handling of sophistical and hypothetical argu-
ments, and of those that reach conclusions by means
of questioning, and, in a word, of all arguments such
as these, relates to duty (vepl Ka^Kovros), though this
is not known to the many " (Diss. i. 7). So that even
Dialectic is subordinated by him to an ethical end,
and is valued as an aid to right living.
Hence Ethics to the Stoic becomes specifically and
par excellence " philosophy" ; 2 and Epictetus lays down
three topics with which it is concerned namely, (i)
the desires and the aversions ; (2) impulses and acts,
including, of course, duty and its various forms ; (3) the
assents (o-vyKarafleWs), or the relation of the will to
truth and falsehood, "freedom from deception and
rashness of judgment." Earlier, Ethics had been de-
fined as including the following subjects: "appetite,
good and evil, the affects, virtue, the chief good,
1 See Seneca on the Liberal Sciences, Ep. 88.
2 See Seneca, Ep. 89 ; also 88. But some of the earlier Stoics
were even more pronounced, such as Ariston of Chios, the pupil
of Zeno, who despised speculation, and made Ethics everything.
4
50 THE STOIC CREED
primary value (hones turn), actions, duties, exhortations
and dissuasions." "This is the division," says Dio-
genes Laertius (vii. 51), "made by Chrysippus, and
Archedemus, and Zeno of Tarsus, and Apollodorus, and
Diogenes, and Antipater, and Posidonius ; for Zeno of
Citium, and Cleanthes, belonging to an earlier date,
treat of these things more simply."
Hence, also, the Stoical Ethics, although not in any
systematic fashion, traversed the whole range of Prac-
tical Philosophy this, at any rate, in the Roman period.
Not only did it occupy itself with character and conduct
(which is the province of Ethics, strictly conceived),
but it took in hand also the investigation of the Emo-
tions, Politics or the science of human beings formed
into societies (the equivalent of the modern Sociology
and Economics), and Natural Theology, or the Know-
ledge of God, and determination of the relations be-
tween Him and man over and above the theological
speculations of the physics.
It did, further, as seen pre-eminently in Epictetus,
show its intensely practical character by laying down
rules for the guidance of the individual in the discharge
of his duties and social relations, 1 and as a means of
testing his progress (Trpo/coTn)) in the higher life. For
the same purpose, it counselled systematic self-exami-
nation review, every night or evening, of one's con-
duct during the day, so as to ascertain precisely what
one had done well, and thereby find encouragement,
or done ill, and thereby be stimulated to amendment. 2
It even discoursed on the ethics of reading books
1 See, e.g., Epictetus, Diss. iii. 16 ; and Seneca, Ep. 94.
2 See also Seneca, De Ird, iii. 36.
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 51
(Epictetus, Diss. iv. 4). One branch only of practical
ethics does it seem not to have found very congenial
namely, Casuistry, or consideration of cases of con-
science, when different duties conflict, and instances in
experience when the utile is opposed to the honestum.
This subject came distinctly into view in the Middle
Stoa, but not even Panaetius gave it a thorough hand-
ling ; and Cicero developed it, as a branch of moral
philosophy, in addition to the formulated teaching of
Panaetius, in the third book of the De Officiis.
How thoroughly practical the Stoical ethics was, or
became, may be seen, further, from Epictetus's mode
of lecturing. He delights in similes and concrete ex-
amples, dealing with the incidents and situations of
daily life ; his discourses are full of homely illustra-
tions, so that thereby he may be helpful to the man
of the work-a-day world.
Ill
Such, then, was the Stoic conception of Philosophy
and of its various branches. It is obvious that all the
fundamental subjects that occupy the philosopher's
attention to-day, were here, in one shape or other,
included. Greater precision, of course, has been given
to the definitions, and fuller and deeper handling has
been accorded to many of the problems discussed. A
vast advance has been made, all along the line, in know-
ledge and in insight, since the days when Stoicism was
an independent philosophic power in the world. Much
has come with lengthened experience and a deeper
life ; but the main conceptions and the leading themes
continue the same.
52 THE STOIC CREED
IV
A further point must now be noted. As the Stoic
philosophy was pre-eminently and essentially a rule of
living, as its aim was to help men in the formation of
character and the discharge of daily duty, its demands
on the personal character of the philosopher were ex-
tremely high. "The residue of life is short. Live as
on a mountain. It matters not whether here or there ;
everywhere you are a citizen of the city of the world.
Let men see and witness a true man, a life conformed
to nature. If they cannot hear him, let them make
away with him. Better that, than life on their
terms" (Aurelius, Med. x. 15). This is best seen in
the Dissertations of Epictetus.
In the first place, Stoicism required that the philo-
sopher be himself a man of simplicity of aim and a person
thoroughly convinced of his doctrines convinced, not
merely upon bare authority, but upon rational grounds. 1
Indeed, Epictetus held that firm conviction is the one
thing that is practically irresistible in the world ; and
by this he explained the fact that senseless opinions so
often gain a hold on mankind when sensible teaching
fails. "Why is it," he asks his disciples, "that the
vulgar are stronger than you?" "Because," he
answers, "they utter these stale words from their real
opinions (a? Soy/ucmoi/), but you utter your elegant
words from the lips. For this reason they (your words)
are feeble and dead ; and it is sickening to listen to
your exhortations and your miserable virtue, which
1 See Epictetus, Diss. ii. 19.
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 53
is prated up and down. Thus the vulgar have the
advantage over you ; for everywhere opinion is strong,
opinion is invincible" (Diss. iii. 16).
Next, the philosopher must show his principles in
his life: he must be a man of noble character and
consistent walk and conversation. "Practice before
precept" is the test. Not the distinctive cloak and
beard make the philosopher, but the life. " Above all
things, the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than
the sun ; and if it is not, he must of necessity be a
gambler and a rogue, inasmuch as, while he himself is
entangled in some vice, he will censure others " (Epic-
tetus, Diss. iii. 22). l "Such will I show myself to you
faithful, modest, noble, unperturbed. Not also then
deathless, unageing ? not also diseaseless? No, but
dying as a god, sickening as a god. This is within my
power ; this I can do. But the other things are not
within my power ; I cannot do. I will show the sinews
of a philosopher. What sinews are these ? Desire
never failing of its object, aversion not liable to chances,
proper impulse, diligent purpose, assent that is not
precipitate. These you shall see" (Diss. ii. 8). Surely
a man of that stamp might very well command, as the
greatest of the Stoics did command, the confidence and
the esteem of his fellow-men.
But, thirdly, the philosopher must have wide human
sympathies, and must not despise the plain man he
has a clear duty towards his illiterate and unsophisti-
cated brother. The opprobrium of contempt for the
1 See also Diss. iv. 8.
54 THE STOIC CREED
unlearned (which is only, indeed, the revelation of the
contemner's own inefficiency as a philosophic teacher)
is well exposed by Epictetus in the words (Diss. ii. 12) :
4 'Yes, indeed, give to any one of us whom you please
a plain man to converse with, and he cannot find out
how to deal with him ; but, when he has moved the
man a little, if he meets him inopportunely, he can no
longer handle him, but henceforth either reviles or
ridicules him, and says, ' He is a plain man ; it is not
possible to deal with him.' But a guide, when he finds
a man wandering about, leads him into the desired
way, and does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave
him. Do you also show him the truth, and you will
see that he follows. But so long as you do not show
him, do not ridicule him, but rather realize your own
incapacity."
Again, the philosopher must know his business, and
have a high idea of his vocation. Hence, he must not
aim at praise, but at benefiting his hearers. " Rufus
was wont to say, * If you have leisure to praise me,
I am speaking to no purpose.' Consequently, he used
to speak in such a way that each of us sitting there
supposed that some one had accused him individually
he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before
the eyes the faults of each. The philosopher's school,
ye men, is a surgery : you ought not to go out of it
pleased, but pained. For you are not in sound health
when you enter ; but one has dislocated his shoulder,
another has an abscess, another a fistula, another is
suffering from a headache. Do I then sit and utter to
you small thoughts and witty sayings that you may
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 55
praise me and go away, one with his shoulder just as
it was when he entered, another with his head still
aching 1 , another with his fistula, and another with his
abscess? Is it for this, then, that young men shall
quit home, and leave their parents and their friends, and
relatives and property, that they may say to you,
' Wonderful ! ' as you utter your witty sayings ? Did
Socrates do this, did Zeno, did Cleanthes ? " (Epictetus,
Diss. iii. 23).
Lastly, the philosopher must be careful not to offend
by careless neglect of his body : he must guard against
repelling people from philosophy by his own personal
habits and appearance. 1
Fine dress, indeed, is not the desideratum. Once
there came to Epictetus a young rhetorician with
elaborately dressed hair, and in ornamental attire. 2
Epictetus must needs chaff this fashionable youth on his
dandyism, but with a serious purpose under it. Through
a process of Socratic cross-questioning, not without a
touch of humour, he tried to get him to understand
that he was expending his exertions in the wrong
direction. Not the body but the will, not the outward
form but the inward being, is the fit subject for care
and decoration. But though that was suitable treat-
ment of the young rhetorician under the circumstances,
Epictetus saw, with deepest insight, the hopeful sign
even in the love of outward adornment, still more did
he estimate aright the value of personal cleanliness,
and so, on occasion, he could say (Diss. iv. n): "I,
indeed, had rather, by the gods, that a young man in
1 This against the Cynics. 2 See Diss. iii. i.
56 THE STOIC CREED
his first movement toward philosophy came to me with
his hair dressed than dishevelled and dirty. For there
is discernible in him a certain impression of the beauti-
ful, and a desire for what is becoming- (evo-^ri/xovos) ;
and where it appears to him to be, there also he
practises his art." For the rest, it is only necessary to
show him and to say, " Young- man, you are seeking
the beautiful, and you do well. Know, then, that it
grows there where your reason is ; there seek it where
are your inclinations and disinclinations, your desires
and aversions, for this is what you have in yourself as
a special honour, but the poor body (TO crw/mnov) is
by nature clay. Why do you spend labour upon it
heedlessly? If you learn nothing else, you will learn
from time, that it (the body) is nothing? But if one
came to me besmeared with filth, and with a moustache
down to the knees, what have I to say to him ? By
what likeness can I draw him on ? For with what
that is like beauty has he ever busied himself, so that
I might change his course, and say, ' Not here is
beauty, but there ' ? Will you have me say to him,
' Beauty consists, not in being besmeared with filth,
but in the reason' ? For, does he desire reason? has
he any impression of it in his mind? Go, and talk to
a pig, that he wallow not in the mire."
In this exposition, it has not been possible, except
incidentally, to bring out the fact that, although the
conception of Philosophy remained the same through-
out all the ages of Stoicism and little alteration was
made upon the constituent sciences, nevertheless the
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 57
subject-matter underwent change as time passed.
Hence it may be proper here, although anticipating
what is to follow, to note briefly the steps or stages
in the development of Stoicism, following the list of
founders and leaders as given at the end of Chapter II.
The general form of the system was fixed and deter-
mined once for all by the three great founders, each of
whom, however, had his own way of enunciating and
emphasizing the doctrines. To Zeno the school is in-
debted for its general physical theory, for the value
attached to logic as propaedeutic, and for the uncom-
promising purity of its ethics and the demand for
" plain living and high thinking." Cleanthes stands
conspicuous as the religious interpreter of its physics,
poetically expressed, and, consequently, touched by
emotion yet of the calm contemplative kind, deeply
reverential and devoutly submissive to the world-order ;
and for his unqualified materialism and the stress he
laid on the principle of " strain " or "tension." The
logician par excellence is Chrysippus systematizing,
safeguarding, and controverting. This, however, is
specially to be observed, that, while, by one and
all, ethics was regarded as supreme, the other two
disciplines (logic and physics) were enthusiastically
cultivated. The founders were essentially dialecticians
as well as ethicists, and their moral theory rested on
metaphysical principles drawn from a reasoned study
of the universe.
By the presidents of the Middle Stoa the fundamental
doctrines were accepted and tenaciously held, but they
58 THE STOIC CREED
were carried forward, and, in the process, modified or
transformed. Two names, in particular, have import-
ance here namely, Panaetius and his learned successor
Posidonius. These two leaders mark the transition to
the Roman period, for both were greatly instrumental
in the propagation of Stoicism in the Roman world.
They were both eclectics, and both directly influenced
distinguished Romans, such as Cicero. To Panaetius,
in especial, may roundly be ascribed the merit of having
rendered Stoicism a potent working system. He de-
voted his energies to its ethics and shaped its teaching
on " Duties," so as to give a really helpful place to
" indifferent " things in the formation of character ; he
endeavoured to rid the system of the incubus of Divina-
tion ; and he expressed advanced views on the existence
of the gods and the theology of the day. Less marked
in their immediate influence were his disbelief in the
doctrine of the final conflagation and the recurring
world-cycles ; and, conformably with this, his refusal to
allow any personal existence to the individual human
soul after death.
The eclectic movement thus typified in Panaetius
certainly transformed the system, but without discard-
ing its basal principles.
Hence issued the Stoicism of the Roman period
which was largely eclectic.
For one thing, Ethics was now pursued with
unflagging energy, and both logic and physics were
thrown into the background. This is seen conspicu-
ously in Epictetus and in Seneca. Not, however,
that physics and logic were absolutely disowned
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 59
by these masters ; on the contrary, Seneca wrote
a treatise on Natural Questions, and often speaks of
physics elsewhere in the terminology and from the
view-point of an Older Stoic ; and both Epictetus and
Aurelius reproduce sympathetically, although not always
consistently, the physics of the Earlier Stoa, and the
former can, when he thinks fit, utilize its logic. But
ethics was to them the supreme interest, and that which
rendered philosophy the noble and purifying study that
it seemed to be. Hence, the severity of the older ethics
was toned down by them ; and the sharp-cut distinction
between the wise man and the fool (though still re-
garded as ideally valid) ceased to be an absolute contrast,
marking off two mutually exclusive classes, and the
fact of moral progress in the individual and the need
for acquiring character now got due recognition. 1 In
like manner, full acknowledgment was made of degrees
in virtue and in vice ; 2 thereby taking off the edge of
the older teaching and giving hope to struggling aspir-
ing humanity. Moreover, the warm breath of emotion
was now breathed upon the ideal wise man, so that he
became far more human than the original hard and
harsh portraiture of the passionless and indifferent sage
would have led us to anticipate. Force of circumstances
had driven men to the intuitions of the heart, and the
result was an accession of winsomeness to the ethical
creed, which thereby became more generally effective.
In the next place, we have now the pantheism of the
Older Stoics tending steadily to theism. The Universe
is constantly personalized, and the Deity is spoken of
as Creator, Father, Guardian, and men are viewed as
1 See Seneca, Ep. 75. 2 Ibid. 72.
as
L
60 THE STOIC CREED
His sons. 1 Thus the goodness, as well as the majesty
and might, of the supreme cause is recognized, and this
goodness is seen to operate through love. Moreover,
sin is set forth as disloyalty to an unseen Master, whose
eye is ever upon us, who knows our every thought, and
to whom we are in very truth responsible. The God
"with whom we have to do" becomes to the later
Stoics a living actuating presence, in many ways re-
sembling the God of Hebrew and of New Testament
Scripture. The motto that Seneca gives to Lucilius for
a rule of life is this, " So live among men, as if the eye
of God were upon you ; and so address yourself to God,
asjf men heard your prayer " (Ep. 10).
In the last place, the Cosmopolitanism of the Stoics
ow attains a warmth and intensity that it did not
before possess. This arose from various causes (a)
from the spectacle before men's eyes of many diverse
nationalities and creeds united in one great Common-
wealth, in the vast Roman Empire, thereby suggesting
to the imagination an Empire vaster still, and one more
homogeneous and complete, only needing to be inter-
preted in the light of Christianity to yield the Civitas
Dei of St. Augustine ; (b) from the growth of the
theistic conception and, along with this, the vision of a
future life beyond the grave, enforcing the conviction
that, if there is a God, He must care for His children
and provide for their everlasting security, and if all
men are His children, thus precious to Him, none of
them should be despised by us here ; (c) from the
corruption of the times, which sent forth the Stoics as
missionaries and moral preachers aglow, therefore,
1 See Epictetus, Diss. i. 9.
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY 61
with the enthusiasm of humanity and the desire to
reclaim and to reform mankind.
It was thus a real change that was effected when the
philosopher was transformed into the preacher, and the
attempt was made to win men to righteousness by
" sweet reasonableness " rather than by hard intellectual
disputation, and when ethics became dominated by a
religious motive and made it its chief aim to arouse the
conscience. The elements of the original system were
all there ; but the combination of them was different,
and the use to which the whole was put was insistently
curative. The note was sounded clear and significant
" The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : you
ought not to go out of it pleased, but pained."
CHAPTER IV
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
"There be but two causes from which can spring an error in
the demonstration of any conclusion in any Science whatsoever.
And those are Ignorance or want of Understanding, and
Negligence. For as in the adding together of many and great
Numbers, he cannot fail, that knoweth the Rules of Addition, and
is also all the way so carefull as not to mistake one number, or
one place for another ; so in any other Science, he that is perfect
in the Rules of Logick, and is so watchfull over his Pen, as not
to put one word for another, can never fail of making a true,
though not perhaps the shortest and easiest demonstration. 3 '
HOBBES.
I
IT has already been stated that Logic has a wide
meaning in the mouth of the Stoic ; including Rhetoric,
as well as Logic in the narrower sense or "dialectic,"
and Theory of Knowledge.
Of the Stoical Rhetoric nothing further need be
said. It was cultivated in a watchful spirit, although
encouraged in so far as it aided the appreciation of the
niceties attaching to the handling of words and the
proper use of them in discourse. Elegant expression
of thought was not discountenanced, but it was con-
demned when it exerted, as it tended to do, an
undue power over the will, persuading through the
emotions and not convincing through the reason.
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 63
II
For Logic in its stricter signification, the earlier
Stoics, like most of the other early Greek sects, had a
distinct enthusiasm ; and, under the lead of Chrysippus,
they devoted much attention to it. They cherished it,
however, not so much because of the positive results it
yielded, as because it was a powerful instrument for
testing theories and exposing fallacies and preparing
the way for truth. In one of the various similes which
Diogenes Laertius (vii. 40) tells us they applied to
philosophy, namely, that of "an all-productive field,"
they likened Logic to the fence that surrounds the
field, while ethics is the fruit, and physics is the soil
or the trees. As a fence, it was greatly used by them.
Nevertheless, they did not contribute much of any
permanent value towards perfecting it. They did,
indeed, make some alterations on the doctrine of
Aristotle and additions to it, but these were not of
high importance. Their fame as dialecticians is
associated chiefly with their zeal for definition, with
a certain treatment of the categories, and with a
special and original handling of hypothetical inferences,
still more, perhaps, with a love for trivial intellectual
puzzles and an inordinate use of the syllogism, 1 and
of Sorites, and a tendency to defiant argumentation.
Their spirit in this respect is typified by Chrysippus,
who is said to have requested of his master Cleanthes,
"Give me the principles, and the proofs I will find for
myself" (Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 7).
1 Hence the point in Lucian's caricature of Chrysippus in The
Auction of Lives or The Sale of Philosophers (Blwv
64 THE STOIC CREED
The later Stoics must be, so far, separated from the
earlier in this matter, that they were much less enthusi-
astic for logical studies. Practical interests engrossed
their attention, and the clamant corruption of the
Roman Empire naturally left them with little inclination
to pursue abstract subjects that had only a distant
reference to conduct. Hence, Epictetus often speaks
disparagingly of the power of resolving syllogisms, and
of dealing with hypothetical arguments, as compared
with the power over oneself and the right use of
appearances ; 1 and in Marcus Aurelius there is scarcely
a reference to formal logic at all.
Two points, however, deserve to be specially noted
on the side of the Stoic Logic. One is the view of
Logic, in its negative aspect^ as a safeguard against
error. This, no doubt, is but the reverse side of the
positive characteristic that logic deals with truth and
is an aid to correct thinking ; but the prominence that
the Stoics gave to it is testimony to their appreciation
of the power of falsehood over men and the tendency of
human nature to fall into error. If correct reasoning
did not imply the possibility of reasoning incorrectly,
logic would be a useless science ; but if men may err in
their thinking, then it becomes of the utmost import-
ance that they be equipped against such error, for the
consequences of mistake are frequently disastrous.
Hence, while quite alive to the fact that logical training
sharpens the intellect and gives nimbleness to thought,
the Stoics laid the stress upon its negative function
upon its power to expose and refute fallacies. They
accepted it as furthering truth ; but they valued it
1 See, e.g., Diss. in. 24.
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 65
specially as a detector of error " as a prophylactic
against the deceitfulness of arguments and the plausi-
bility of language." This is a point of view of very
great importance ; and logicians have again awakened,
though only recently, to the full significance of it.
"When one of those who were present said [to
Epictetus], ( Persuade me that logic is necessary,' he
answered, ' Do you wish me to prove this to you ? '
* Yes.' ' Then, must I needs prove it dialectically ? ' He
admitted. * How, then, will you know if I am imposing
on you by sophistic arguments (av o-c <ro^i'<ro>fuu) ? '
The man was silent. * You see, then,' he said, ' that you
are yourself admitting that logic is necessary, if without
it you cannot know even as much as this, whether logic
is necessary or not necessary ' " (Diss. ii. 25).
The other point is the doctrine that words and
thoughts are the same thing, only looked at from
different sides a second note of modernity that is
extremely striking, anticipative of Max Muller and
his followers. This led the Stoics to their famous
distinction of " inward reason " and " embodied reason "
or "speech" (Xoyos ti/Sid#Tos and Aoyos 7rpo(/>opi/cos),
a distinction that played a great part in the Juda^o-
Hellenistic thought of Alexandria in the first century
B.C., as seen in Philo Judasus ; one, too, that seems
to have influenced the Christian conception of the
Divine Logos, as given in the prologue of the Gospel
of St. John ("in the beginning was the Logos . . .
and the Logos was made flesh "),* and that was re-
1 The Stoics, however, in their doctrine of logos were influenced
by Heracleitus, who belonged to Ephesus, where also (according-
to tradition) St. John wrote his Gospel,
5
66 THE STOIC CREED
iterated and emphasized by the Church Fathers of the
early Christian centuries (Justin Martyr, for instance),
and, through them, became the property of the schools
of Christendom in later times.
Ill
s. X
But the most important part of the Stoic Logic is
their Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge (Erkennt-
nistheorie), to which we now turn.
Here, the object is to determine the nature of the
human mind and the criterion of truth partly, indeed,
to trace the genesis of knowledge and to analyze the
concept of it, but still more, to ascertain its import, its
validity, and its limits. So far as genesis and analysis
of concept are concerned, the operation belongs in
strictness to psychology ; yet such psychology is a
necessary prelude to the right understanding of
cognition in its metaphysical and deeper meaning.
(i) Exposition
The points of particular interest in it are these :
First, the Stoic conceived the human mind as in
substance material, and he regarded it as at birth, a
tabula rasa SL blank page or sheet of clean paper. As
such, it has its knowledge to acquire from experience.
The senses are the primary source, whence it derives
impressions. These impressions (^avrao-uu) are of
two kinds : they may be either true or false. False
impressions may arise from one of two sources from
the mind itself, and so be mere subjective delusions ;
or from hasty or excited inference or from careless
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 67
perception, thereby leading us to mistake one object
for another. We have the first case exemplified in the
visions or hallucinations of madmen ; Orestes mistak-
ing his sister for a fury exemplifies the second. It is
characteristic of true impressions that they come from
objects and conform to them ; they lay hold on the
mind, and are the means whereby the mind lays hold
on reality. Hence, the Stoics denominated them
4 'grasping impressions" or " apprehending representa-
tions" (<avTaortai KaraX^TTTt/cat). In a definition which
very probably emanated from Zeno, they are set down
by Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. vii. 248) as " repre-
sentations proceeding from the object and agreeing
with it (KO.T avro TO vTrap^oi/), stamped and sealed
upon the soul, such as could have no existence but for
the existence of the object." A similar definition is
given in Diogenes Laertius (vii. 35), where " apprehend-
ing representation " is distinguished from what is " non-
apprehensible " (d/<aTaA>;7rToi/) by the circumstance
that the former proceeds from a real object and
conforms to it ; not so the latter, which either has no
relation to the object at all, or, if it has a relation, it
does not conform to it,v" inasmuch as a clear impres-
sion is wanting." These apprehending representations
are, according to an image of Zeno, the closed hand or
fist, only needing the determinate and strenuous grasp
of the other hand (i.e., only needing to be connected
and systematized) to make them absolutely complete
and sure knowledge (Cicero, Acad. ii. 47). Their
'distinguishing feature is, that they are clear, dis-
tinct, perspicuous (eVapyeis) ; thereby revealing both
themselves and the object that produced them, just as
68 THE STOIC CREED
light shows both itself and other things besides.
Consequently, they are irresistible (TTA^KTIKCII'), and
carry complete conviction along with them. In the
crass materialism of Cleanthes, they are actual dints
made upon the soul by outward things the impres-
sions of a seal upon wax ; and the strength or
clearness that characterizes them is due to the physical
property of tightening, strain, or tension (TOVOS).
This was modified by Chrysippus, who maintained
that they are simply alterations or changes in the
soul. 1
> Nevertheless, next, the mind, although material and
at birth a clean slate, is not a purely inert thing
susceptible of impressions, without responding. On
the contrary, it is active and responsive, and is
capable of manipulating the material that is supplied
to it, and of giving its free assent (o-vyKara'tfeo-is) in
the conviction that impressions produce. The con-
ception that underlies this seems to be, that the minds
of men are formed according to one definite plan a plan
that unfolds itself as the individual's experience grows"}
Hence, the genesis of knowledge is this : Starting
with sense-impressions, these produce memory, and
repeated acts of memory generate experience,jand from
experience the mind, through its native power, forms
concepts and turns sensation into knowledge, j These
concepts are of two classes. Some of them are pro-
duced by the mind spontaneously ; others of them
reflectively. Those of them that are spontaneously
produced are common to men, inasmuch as mind is
1 See Diogenes Laertius, vii. 36.
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 69
genetically the same in all human beings and develops
in the same way, under the practically identical
experiences of life all the world over. They are,
accordingly, distinguished as " natural concepts,"
"primary concepts," " pre- conceptions," "common
notions " (TrpoX-tj\j/a<s, Kowai twoiai). These form the
criterion of our fundamental beliefs ; and as they
take a wide range, they refer to intellectual, to moral,
and to religious truth alike. Hence, among them we
find the notion of God, 1 and the leading ethical notions
such as the Good, and the supremacy of the higher
over the lower nature. " Implanted in us," says
Seneca, "are the seeds of all ages and of all arts;
and out of the hidden the master, God, produces our
faculties " (De Beneficiis, iv. 6). Hence, the practical
test of pre-conceptions is consensus gentium or the
general consent of mankind: "for we are wont to
lay much stress on the conception (prcesumptioni) of all
jnen, and among us it is regarded as an index of its
truth, that a thing seems so to all : as, for example,
that there are gods we infer, among other things,
from this, that a belief in God is implanted in all men ;
nor is there any people so far outside the range of
laws and morals as not to believe in some gods "T
(Ep. 117).
.iWe must not, however, regard these common notions
as (in the vulgar sense) innate, notwithstanding the
ambiguous epithet "implanted." There was no_ such
thing as an "innate idea," according to the teaching
of the Stoic, if by that term be meant an idea born
with us, brought with us full-grown at our birth, and
1 See Seneca, Ep. 117.
70 THE STOIC CREED
wrapped also in an appropriate pre-natal name. 1
Knowledge is not reminiscence, as Plato taught, basing
his doctrine on the belief of the pre-existence of the
soul a belief that the Stoics did not share. All (so
the Stoic maintained) has to be learned by the individual
from experience, sense supplying the raw material :
even the notion of God is dependent upon our experience
of the external world. But what is innate is the
spontaneous power of concept forming, on the basis of
man's common experience, and so the power of reach-
ing higher truths than mere sense-impressions could
alone afford a power that is distinct from the deliberate,
methodical, or consciously logical concept-forming of
philosophical reflection, which gives us the other or
second class of concepts. 2 -\
-^4 But surely it may be asked, in connexion with the
common notions, May not men err? Yes, replied the
Stoic ; but not in the natural concepts themselves,
1 This, notwithstanding occasional unguarded expressions, as
by Epictetus in Dtss. ii. 1 1 .
2 When answering 1 Thomas Burnet's criticism of Locke's
critique of innate moral ideas as given in the Essay concerning
Human Understanding, and the question whether Locke "allows
any powers to be innate to mankind," Locke wrote on the margin
of his copy of Burnet's tract "I think noe body but this author
who ever read my book could doubt that I spoke of innate ideas ;
for my subject was the understanding, and not of innate powers. "
That is precisely what a Stoic might have written : the mind has
innate powers, not innate ideas. So it is interesting to recall that
Descartes, in reply to objections, defined innate idea, not as an
actual existence in the mind antecedent to, and independent of,
experience, but simply as a potentiality "a faculty in ourselves
of eliciting it (noshabere in nobis ipsis facultatem illam eliciendi)."
This gives the key to the interpretation of his real doctrine, not-
withstanding many passages and phrases in his writings to the
contrary.
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 71
only in the application of them : " for this is the cause
to men of all their evils, their not being able to adapt
the common notions to particular cases" (Epictetus,
Diss. iv. i). For example, all are agreed that the Good
is desirable, and is to be followed in all circumstances ;
but some men place the good in things not in our
own power (wealth, prosperity, etc.), whereas it is to
be found only in things that are within our own
power namely, in the will and its acts. u " When one
man says, ' He has done well ; he is a brave man,'
and another says, * Not so ; but he is obstinate,' then
the disputes arise among men one with another. This
is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians, and
the Egyptians and the Romans not whether holiness
should be preferred to all things, and in all cases
should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's
flesh or not holy " (Epictetus, Diss. i. 22). 7"
-f- In this way, it will be seen that the Stoic Episte-
mology struck direct at the root of scepticism ; and,
indeed, it was consciously aimed at Pyrrho and his
brother sceptics. According to the sceptics, Truth
is unattainable, all is uncertainty and doubt ; and the
best thing that one can do is to assent to nothing,
to suspend one's judgment. 1 'To this the Stoic replied,
that Reason itself can conquer doubt, that, through
its spontaneous working, it shines by its own light and
discloses truth ; and he maintained further that absolute
scepticism is suicidal.* " Propositions that are sound
and perspicuous," says Epictetus (Diss. ii. 20), "are
of necessity used even by those who contradict them ;
and, perhaps, a man might consider it to be the
1 This is cleverly caricatured in Lucian's Auction of Lives.
72 THE STOIC CREED
greatest proof of a thing's being perspicuous that it
is found to be necessary even for him who denies it
to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if
a man should deny that there is anything universally
true, it is evident that he must make the contrary
negation, that nothing is universally true. Slave !
not even this. For what else is this than to affirm
that if there is anything universal it is false ? " He
also bursts forth indignantly against the Academics
who have failed "to cast away or blind their own
senses, though they have tried with all their might
to do it." "What! is there not a miscarriage ?" he
exclaims. " A man, when he has received from nature
measures and rules for knowing the truth, does not
further strive to add to these and to make up what
is lacking, but, quite the contrary, tries to take away
and to destroy whatever is fitted to give us a knowledge
of the truth" (Dz'ss. ii. 20). So Antipater in reply to
Carneades, in Cicero's Academica (ii. 9): "Whoever
asserts that nothing can be known with certainty
must, at any rate, believe that he can with certainty
know this." The Stoics saw with clearness that, on
the assumption of absolute nescience, fixed principles
and consistent action were alike impossible, intellect
and will both became paralyzed, the ban was laid on
thought and on conduct too. ~f*
(2) Analysis and Estimate
Now, with regard to this teaching, it may be
remarked :
f First, in laying the origin of knowledge in sense-
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 73
experience, the Stoics only did what the Cynics before
them and the Epicureans contemporaneously with them
did, and what modern psychologists are practically
unanimous in doing 1 , and what is necessary to be done
if the growth of the human mind, as disclosed to our
observation, is to be correctly represented. It is
through sense - impressions that the individual first
becomes aware of himself, and not otherwise does he
gain a knowledge of the external world and of his
fellow-men. But, in order to a full presentation of
the case, the " object" in sense-perception must be
analyzed far more carefully than it was by the Stoics,
and many things must be taken account of by the
genetic psychologist that did not come within the
Stoic's ken. In the first place, Heredity, as psycho-
logists have now come to see, is a potent factor in
the determination and development of the individual
mind ; and it forbids our regarding the mind in the
strict Stoical sense, as a clean tablet, a sheet of white
paper. Palimpsest would be a better figure, though
not perfect. The mind, at birth, brings with it the
impress of the past experience of ancestors of the
race. The individual has transmitted to him, not only
nervous, but also mental predispositions, which count
for much. They are the a priori element in the mind,
which explains in part the rapidity with which he
progresses in knowledge and acquires such complex
conceptions as those of space and time. In the second
place, account must be taken of another social fact,
namely this, that the individual is born into a formed
language. No doubt, through his own experience,
the child learns a vast number of things that are
74 . THE STOIC CREED
indispensable to knowledge. As he is carried to and
fro in the nursery, and is brought into contact with
this object and with that, he is laying in a store of
impressions that will stand him in good stead some
day. But by means of Language, into which he is
born, he is introduced to knowledge far beyond his
own experience. When he is taught, as he is at the
earliest moment, to call this a dog, that a cat, this
a tree, that a house, and when he hears these animals
and things so denominated in all kinds of circumstances
and with many specific differences (dogs of all sizes
and colours and in many different attitudes are still
"dogs"), he is thereby taught to assimilate and to
discriminate in a most effective, albeit unconscious,
fashion, and has, moreover, imparted to him, through
the word-symbol, the idea of an object, whose complex
presentation (form, size, colour, solidity, etc.) could be
reduced to unity only after long and laborious effort.
Otherwise put, words are bottled-up knowledge ; and
thereby the process of acquiring knowledge is vastly
hastened and the possibility of further progress
secured.
These, then, are two great advantages that the indi-
vidual gets from being a social creature the member
of a family and of a race, and not a simple isolated
unit. As he develops in society, heredity and formed
language tell powerfully upon him, and show us that
his mind must be viewed as more than a tabula
rasa. ^
~^Next, objection may be taken to the doctrine of
"apprehending representations." Yet perhaps it is
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 75
more to the form or wording of it than to the actual
matter or substance. True, the phrase is an ambiguous
one, and is of doubtful interpretation. There is, first,
the difficulty of correctly rendering the term "appre-
hending " (KOLTaXfjTrrLKtj). Are we to take it as active,
or as passive, or as both? And what is it that the
mind apprehends ? Is it the impression or representa-
tion ; or is it the object, the reality ? Some view it one
way, others another. 1 But, supposing these points
settled, there next comes the difficulty of the term
"representation" (<avTa<na). If this be regarded as
designating an intervening "idea" or tertium quid
between the percipient and the object perceived, then
all the objections that the Scottish philosophers, headed
by Thomas Reid, and nobly aided by Sir William
Hamilton, have brought against representationism or
"the ideal system " would apply here. In particular,
it may be urged that if we know only the representation
or intervening idea and yet maintain, as Zeno did, that
it "comes from the object and agrees with it," still
more, if we assert that it "resembles" the object, as
the impression stamped on wax resembles the figure
on the seal, we must know both things. If we are
ignorant of either, then the assertion that the one
comes from and "agrees with" or "resembles" the
other is a mere assumption, a begging of the question. 2
Yea more, if we lay stress upon the point that the
perceiving mind, as well as the object perceived, was
1 Zeller takes one view here, Hirzel another, Ueberweg another,
and Stein another.
2 Compare Case's criticism of selected representational theories,
mutatis mutandis, in \\\^ Physical Realism^ also, S. Bailey's Letters
on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, ist and 2nd series.
76 THE STOIC CREED
looked upon by the Stoics as itself material, if we
press home the doctrine of Cleanthes that the impres-
sions themselves are actual dints or prints upon the
soul, further objections, as specially directed against
crude materialism, will not be wanting. But if, on the
other hand, we neglect for the moment the Stoic
machinery or mechanism of perception, and fix our
attention on the fact of certitude connected with per-
ception that was intended to be expressed, then perhaps
we may find here, not an inane conception, but a point
of real significance. Not only are the Stoics explaining
the mode of perception (in which they are necessarily
crude), they are also aiming at supplying a Criterion
of Truth ; and that criterion they declare to be the
power that the mind has of laying hold of reality
through the strength and clearness of consentient
impressions, as proved by the undoubting conviction
of the percipient at least, if the percipient be a wise
man. It is quite true that this last qualification, "if
the percipient be a wise man," leaves a margin of
difficulty, and opens the door to the objection (urged,
as a matter of fact, in olden times against the Stoics)
that you have only to claim to be yourself the wise
man and to dub the man who disagrees with you a
fool, and the matter is ended. But this objection is
inconclusive and superficial. For we must not forget
that we do all of us, whether Stoics or not, consciously
or unconsciously, guide ourselves, in the matter of
sense-perception, by an ideal or absolutely normal
standard : we suppose healthy perfectly-working sense
organs (eyes, for instance, uninjured and free from
visual defect) and a healthy mind, free from aberration ;
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 77
and we make carefully planned experiments to test our
perceptive powers, and bring our scientific knowledge
to bear, so as to correct for the personal equation.
Our methods are far more exact, and our knowledge
of the fallacies of sense-perception far more precise and
fuller, 1 but the principle that underlies this procedure
is precisely that of the Stoics, who, from the time of
Zeno, clearly laid down the nature of false or unfounded
sense-impressions, and, in doing so, implicitly defined
the foolish man as the hasty, the careless, the prejudiced
percipient, or as a man suffering from mental disorder;
while the wise man is he of unclouded mind, calm,
careful, deliberate, unprejudiced. Impressions equally
affect the wise and the unwise ; but, while the latter
may give an occasional or accidental assent to them,
the former has the characteristic of yielding a free,
consistent, and unerring assent, and of stamping them
with his approval. " For as in a balance the scale
must needs fall down if weights are placed in it, so
the mind must yield to things perspicuous ; for just as
no animal can resist seeking for what appears suited
to its nature (the Greeks call it ot/cetov), so it is not
possible to refuse assent to an object that is per-
spicuous " (Cicero, Acad. ii. 37). Moreover, as Epic-
tetus said (Diss. ii. 20), it is the greatest proof of
a thing's being perspicuous, "that it is found to be
necessary even for him who denies it to make use of
it at the same time." And if even a wise man may
sometimes seem to be mistaken, the story of Sphaerus
may show us how the Stoic surmounted this difficulty.
It is recorded of Sphaerus, a disciple of Cleanthes, that,
1 See Professor Sully, Illusions.
78 THE STOIC CREED
after he had gone to Alexandria, to the court of Ptolemy
Philopator, the king on one occasion, when the question
was raised whether a wise man would allow himself to
be guided by opinion, and Sphasrus had affirmed that
he would not, desiring to confute him, caused some
wax pomegranates to be set before him, and when
Sphaerus was deceived by them, exclaimed in triumph
that he had given his assent to a false perception. To
this Sphaerus cleverly replied that he had not assented
to their being pomegranates, but only to the probability
of their being so; for " an apprehending representa-
tion," he said, " is a different thing from what is prob-
able " (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 6).
Now, to put the matter in more modern phraseology,
the point is that, given the normal percipient, vividness
and warmth of impression do create conviction ; and,
through concentration of the mind upon it, we come
to take in the character of the impressing object, and
to feel its power. Moreover, we can verify and test
our experience of it ; and as itself is found to be part
of a general system and to have a place in an ordered
scheme of things, that very fact adds strength to it,
and gives it a cogency that is irresistible. We have
now, according to the figure of Zeno, the clenched
hand in the grasp of reality. Reality reveals itself to
us, and we give our voluntary assent to it.
In a similar way, the wise man in Ethics (for, as
virtue is knowledge to the Stoic. Epistemology has
a necessary connexion with morality) can penetrate
appearances (<^ai/raoriat), and refuse to give assent to
those that are false, while no one can prevent his
assenting to such as are true : he affirms the good and
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 79
denies the evil. 1 Hence, Marcus Aurelius declares that
objects of aversion and desire do not press upon us,
it is we that make up to them ; if we let our judgment
about them lie still, they too will keep still. 2 . And a
celebrated simile of Epictetus is also in place here.
''As is a dish of water, such is the soul. As is the
ray of light that falls on the water, such are the appear-
ances. When, then, the water is moved, the ray seems
to be moved, yet it is not moved " (Diss. iii. 3). Here,
too (in Ethics), assent is voluntary and is determined
by the reason ; for
" He that complies against his will
Is of his own opinion still " ; 3
and not the least important ground of ethickl convic-
tion resides in perception of the fact that this or that
ethical notion works into a system of moral thought
and attaches itself to consistent moral practice. Vivid-
ness of moral principles and, therefore, strength of
conviction, is gained by constant application of the
principles : life reacts upon thought, and truth becomes
all the clearer when it is assimilated by the individual
and acted on in conduct.
Thirdly, objection may be taken to the form of the
Stoic doctrine of " pre-conceptions " or "common
notions " a doctrine rife in the school from Cleanthes
downwards. But there is truth in the substance of it.
Reason is, indeed, generically identical in men, and acts
1 See Epictetus, Dissertations, i. 8 and ii. 23.
2 Meditations, xii. 1 1 and vi. 52.
a Butler, Hudibras, Pt. iii. Canto 3.
8o THE STOIC CREED
both spontaneously and reflectively ; and human ex-
perience is, in fundamental points, very much the same
in every land and in every century. There is a natural
untaught logic, instinctive and effective, as well as a
highly organized logic of the trained disputant. Even
on the plain man life's experiences enforce truth ; and it
counts for much that every human being has uniform
natural surroundings and is born into society. Where-
fore, there is such a thing as common convictions
among mankind, irresistible beliefs ; and these come
with an authority that is altogether their own. Given
man and given the world in which he lives, and certain
notions will inevitably emerge, accredited by his reason
or satisfying his natural wants. He lays hold of them
and trusts them, and frames his life accordingly. They
are, therefore, in a special sense secure, and need not
the ad captandum argument of Epictetus : " Let the
Pyrrhics and the Academics come and make their
defence. For I, as to my part, have no leisure for
these things, nor am I able to join with them and
advocate common usage. If I had a petty lawsuit
about a small field, would I call in another to advocate
my cause ? With what, then, am I satisfied ? With
that which belongs to the matter in hand. How, indeed,
perception is effected, whether through the whole or the
part, perhaps I am unable to explain ; and both opinions
perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I
know with perfect certainty. How do you know it ?
Never, when I wish to swallow anything, do I carry the
bit there [to your mouth], but here [to mine]. Never,
when I wish to take bread, do I take a broom, but I
always go to the bread as to a mark. And do you
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 81
yourselves who confute the senses act otherwise ?
Which of you, wishing to enter a bath, ever went into
a mill ? " (Diss. i. 27).
Some have asserted that there is an incompatibility
between the Stoic doctrine of pre-conceptions or natural
notions and that of the sense origin of knowledge.
But, in reality, there is no such incompatibility, unless
we interpret pre-conceptions as literal innate ideas
which was not what the Stoics intended. It might be
a valid objection to say that this natural power of
forming concepts is incompatible with thoroughgoing
materialism, but that is a different affair. If mind
is essentially active, there is no inconsistency in hold-
ing that its activity is first elicited by and exercised
upon material supplied by the senses, and yet that
itself has the power of reading the hidden meaning
of this material of apprehending truth, as well as
reality.
Objection has also been taken to the Stoic test of a
pre-conception. That test is consensus gentium, the
general or universal consent of mankind. This, it has
been said, is to appeal to mere vulgar or uncriticized
opinion ; and it is, moreover, inconsistent with the
Stoic's contempt for the plain man, whom he regarded
as other than a wise man.
But by " universal consent " the Stoics did not mean
the consent of everybody throughout the world and
throughout the ages, without exception. They quite
well knew that there were people who will deny any-
thing ; and of such people they had ample experience in
6
82 THE STOIC CREED
their own day. What they meant was that pre-
conceptions are everywhere accepted when the mind is
calm, clear, and unprejudiced when, therefore, it is in
the state that characterizes the wise man. On the
other hand, they quite readily admitted that the plain
man might be a wise man. In order to a sound judg-
ment, learning was not indispensable : it was enough
if a man were intelligent, and, above all, were of
upright character. What distinguished the wise man
was not so much intellectual acumen as moral excel-
lence ; and so far were the Stoics from despising the
plain man, that they drew no marked distinction between
him and the cultured man, but laid the emphasis on the
distinction between the good man and the bad man.
(3) Summary
\ Viewing their Epistemology as a whole, then, we can
very well see that the Stoics set themselves strenuously
to grapple with the problem of the nature and validity
of knowledge, and not without success. They were,
indeed, handicapped by their materialism ; but, apart
from that, they proceeded on suggestive lines, and in
measure anticipated thoughts that were to be fully
productive only many centuries later, (in the cri-
terion of truth, for instance, Descartes and Spinoza
were foreshadowed ; and it would not be difficult to
find Stoic parallels to the Epistemological teaching of
Thomas Reid and Lotze.^, Though they erred in con-
ceiving the mind as originally a sheet of clean paper,
they rectified this, in great part, when they allowed
the mind's native activity to count for much in know-
ledge ; and they had implicit faith in reason. They
LOGIC: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 83
thoroughly understood that to criticize reason itself
is impossible ; for that would imply possession of a
reason above reason, and another reason above that,
and so on ad infinitum^ whereas absolute distrust of
reason is both intellectual and volitional imbecility.
Naturally, their doctrine of sense-perception was, in
many ways, immature ; but their clear recognition of
the fact that reality is given in perception, and their
distinction between hasty inference and calm un-
prejudiced assent, assent, too, that is not forced
upon the mind by compulsion, but is voluntarily
rendered, are points of the greatest importance for
theory of knowledge, significant for all time. 2
1 See Epictetus, Diss. i. 17.
2 In a wider sense, it is interesting to compare this doctrine of
assent with Cardinal Newman's position in The Grammar of
Assent, and with Professor James's Will to Believe.
CHAPTER V
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL
" Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive. . . . But
in this, notwithstanding- what hath been surmised by some learned
men, there seems to be no Atheism. For, so long as the world is
supposed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which is
itself animated by soul and directed by understanding, it follows
that all parts thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced
unto the same indivisible stem or principle, to wit, a Supreme Mind ;
which is the concurrent doctrine of Pythagoreans, Platonics, and
Stoics." BERKELEY.
I
BY Physics, as already said, the Stoics did not alone
understand what in modern science is designated by
that name, but rather the metaphysical explanation
of the world, comprising 1 Cosmogony, Rational
Psychology, and Theology. The mixed nature of it
may in part be judged from the enumeration of topics
with which, according to Diogenes Laertius (vii. 67),
it dealt namely, " bodies, first principles, elements, the
gods, limits, place, and the void " ; or, again, dividing
according to genera, "the world, the elements, and
the investigation of causes (TO amoAoyiKoV)." It was,
in great measure, philosophy interpreting nature to the
reason ; endeavouring to satisfy the intellect by giving
a coherent view of the cosmic system, and determining
man's place, lot, and destiny therein.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 85
The problem was, Given the universe, with our multi-
farious experiences of it and our relations to it, how
are we to interpret it ? Clearly, the interpreting term
must be the principle of unity. But this unity must
not be incompatible with plurality and diversity ;
otherwise, we have not explained the world that we
know, but have merely ignored a prominent factor in
it. In our experience, things change. But, in order
to change, there must be presupposed something
changeless, law, or process, or substance. There
are differences on all hands in nature ; and if these are
to be gathered up in a unity, that unity must be one
from which they are also seen to emerge. In the
solution, God, the World, and the human Soul must
all find a place ; and there must also be an Eschatology,
or doctrine of last things.
The problem was not new to thinking minds how
could it, as curiosity is natural to man ? It had been
bravely faced by the pre-Socratic philosophers, and
solutions on two distinct lines had been offered of it.
The Eleatics had fixed exclusively on the unity, and
had denied the possibility of change, regarding it
simply as a delusion of the senses. Heracleitus of
Ephesus, "the obscure," started with plurality and
change, with the perpetual motion and transmutation
that are discernible alike in human consciousness and
in outward nature, and explained them in the light of
the world-ruling reason, the cosmic logos^ the permanent
"antiphonal rhythm," " which, proceeding uniformly
from movement to movement, as in some intricate
musical theme, might link together in one those con-
86 THE STOIC CREED
tending, infinitely diverse impulses." 1 To him, "the
many are the moving realisation of the Eternal One.
' Being ' was always ' becoming ' not a state but a
process, not rest but motion and its true image was
the flame which in kindling extinguishes, and in ex-
tinguishing kindles that which is its fuel. . . . His two
cardinal contributions to physics were, his resolution of
mechanical change into continuous dynamical progress,
and, as its consequent, the idea of an unbroken sequence
of successions, constituting an invariable cosmic march
or rhythm of events, which might be personified as an
unalterable cosmic will or destiny (81/07, Aoyos, ct/xap/xeVr/),
or generalised into an abstract uniformity of natural
law. He himself persistently interpreted it as the
expression of an ethical order ; and his followers, the
school of Ephesus, continued to be the avowed and
scornful antagonists of all who remained content with
base materialistic Sensationalism." 2
The primitive matter, according to Heracleitus, was
Fire, rationally determined : from this all things orderly
proceed, and by it they are all consumed. "This one
order of all things," he says, "was created by none of
the gods, nor yet by any of mankind, but it ever was,
and is, and shall be eternal fire ignited by measure,
and extinguished by measure." 3 Thus, in the midst of
all diversity and change, there is rational order,
universal causality ; and man's wisdom lies in recogni-
1 Walter Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 12.
2 Principal Rendall, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus To Himself,
pp. xviii and xx. See also Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, \. 73-79 ;
and Windelband, A History of Philosophy, part i. chap. i.
sec. 4.
3 Quoted by Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i. 64.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 87
tion of this and in submission: " Therefore, we ought
to follow the universal ; but, though the logos is
universal, the majority of men live as though they had
an intelligence of their own (ws tSi'av IXOVTCS <f>p6vr)criv,
Sextus Empiricus, vii. 133) : " " they do not understand
how that which is discordant is concordant with itself:
as with the bow and the lyre, so with the world it is
the tension of opposing forces that makes the structure
one." Such universal order, harmonizing opposites,
is designated by Heracleitus logos to which are
ascribed, besides unity and rationality, eternity, omni-
presence, and divinity. It is the eternal divine reason
immanent in the world, and finding its highest interpre-
tation in ethical order.
II
It was to Heracleitus that the Stoics attached
themselves in Physics, although they did not by any
means follow him slavishly. On the contrary, their
deep religious sentiment and their leanings towards a
theistic interpretation of the world (seen conspicuously
in the Later Stoa) led them to part from him at many
points.
They began, in true monistic fashion, by positing a
primitive substance. This primitive substance, or
original source of all things, is Fire fire, however, not
in its grosser earthly form, but as a sublimated all-
pervasive essence or ether, denominated (though not by
the Stoics themselves) "ethereal fire" (jrvp at0e/>toSes),
called by Cleanthes "fiery breath" (TTV^O). This
primordial fire, which is also the Deity, is eternal ; and
88 THE STOIC CREED
from all eternity, it is possessed of activity of thought
and of will. Endowed thus with inherent productive
power or creative activity, it is the " seminal reason "
(Xdyos o-Trep/mTtKos) of the world, manifesting itself in the
various phenomena of the universe as " seminal reasons "
(Aoyot a-TTfpfjiaTLKoC) termed by Aurelius (Med. ix. i)
" certain germs of future existences, [endowed with]
productive capacities of realisation, change, and pheno-
menal succession." 1 This thinking volitional Ether
known technically as "artificial fire" (irvp TC^VLKOV)
produces from itself the world that now is, all pheno-
menal existence ; giving birth to solid and fluid, to earth
and air, etc., by means of the two principles of condensa-
tion and expansion, the solidity of matter being due to
the former, and its various qualities or attributes being
got from the latter (TWOS, strain or tension). First, in the
order of evolution, came a fiery vapour yielding moisture
(TO vypoV), which, by and by, condensed, and, in con-
densing formed the four elements, becoming respectively
1 This conception of "the seminal reason " was a chief point
that early Christian writers .(especially those who had themselves
been philosophers) laid hold of, so as to connect Greek thought
with Christian teaching 1 . Thus, Justin Martyr, maintaining that
every man at birth shares in the universal reason and so has in
him a \6yos crTrepfj.ari.Kby (which, of course, he associated with Christ
as the Logos), holds that, on this account, men such as Socrates
who lived noble lives before the coming of Christ could be saved :
he even claimed them as Christians. "Those," he says (Apology,
41), "who have lived with reason (^era \6yov), even though they
were reckoned atheists, are Christians, such as, among the Greeks,
Socrates, Heraclitus, and those like them." And well may
Heracleitus be included here, for the doctrine of the logos may be
said to have originally emanated from him ; and he enunciated it
more in the spirit of a prophet making a revelation, than of a
philosopher maintaining an intellectual position hence, perhaps,
his designation "the obscure."
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 89
fire, water, air, earth ; l so that the four elements are
but tension in different degrees or grades. By the
intermingling of its elements the individual thing is
produced. 2 This is the celebrated theory of mixture, or
Kpao-is oY oA.ov, " which is in effect a denial of the axiom
that two bodies cannot occupy the same space." 3 All
things that exist in the world thus partake of the divine
substance, but in different degrees. What appears in
inorganic matter as cohesion or "hold" (c&s), becomes
in plants " vital force" (<vo-is), manifesting living
growth; in animals, "soul irrational" (*jsvxfj aXoyos),
endowed, perhaps, with the power of inference (which
Chrysippus, for instance, allowed to dogs), but devoid
of self-consciousness and ignorant of the meaning of
existence; in man, as "soul rational," possessed of
self-consciousness and the higher thought (^v^y \6yov
ZXOVCTO).* The heavenly bodies, sun, moon, stars, and
planets, inasmuch as they are made of very pure fire,
stand specially near to God, and may be themselves
regarded as divinities : their unsurpassed brilliancy and
heat and the regularity of their movements seemed to
sanction that conception. Man shows in himself the
divine especially, in his soul ; and, indeed, according
Zeno, he was originally formed out of the divine
substance is con-substantial with the divine. Under
any circumstances, his Reason (Xoyos, TO ^ye/Aoi/i/coi/) is a
ray of the celestial fire, a spark from the primal ether
"that particle of Zeus, which Zeus gives to every
1 See Dlog. Lae'rt. vii. 135. a Ibid. vii. 151.
3 Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. u.
4 See Sextus Empiricus, ix. 81 and viii. 2 ; also, Marcus Aurelius,
Meditations, vi. 14.
90 THE STOIC CREED
man for his controller and governor." 1 "And from
Him [God] have descended the seeds, not only to my
father and my grandfather, but to all things that have
been begotten and are nourished on the earth, but
chiefly to those that possess reason, for these alone are
privileged by nature to hold communion with God, being
united with Him in intercourse through reason : why
may not a man then call himself a citizen of the world ?
why not a son of God ? " (Epictetus, Diss. i. 9). This
reason is essentially "the ruling faculty" in man ; and
hence to it are subordinated the other seven parts of the
soul, namely, the five senses, speech, and reproduction.
It is significantly (so the later Stoics were fond of regard-
ing it) the daemon or genius (6 Sat/Mov), in each individual
man, his guardian angel, given him by Zeus to direct
his life, as Aurelius had expressed it in the passage
just quoted (Med. v. 27) as Menander designates it,
fAvcrrayioybs rov {JLOV. Into the Universal Reason, whence
he came, man is resolved again: "You exist but as a
part inherent in a greater whole. You will vanish into
that which gave you being ; or rather, you will be
transmuted into the seminal and universal reason "
(Aurelius, iv. 14). 2 The world is a macrocosm (at least,
so taught Cleanthes), to which man is exactly corre-
spondent as microcosm. The Deity, therefore, is the
soul of the world, 3 and inhabits it as Divine Reason
possessed of " infinite power and transcendent wisdom,"
as well as, according to later views, of "absolute good-
ness " ; and whereas in man the seat of the reason is the
1 Aurelius, Med. v. 27. See also Epictetus, Diss. \. 3.
2 See also Epictetus, Diss. i. 9.
3 See Seneca, Qucestiones Naturales, ii. 45.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 91
breast, the seat of the world's reason (so taught
Cleanthes) is the sun. 1 All things that are undergo
perpetual flux or change, and are ever passing into
something which they are not now ; as Heracleitus put
it, "all things are in flow" (n-avra pet), or "change is
the path upwards and downwards, and the world exists
according to it." 2 " Watch how all things continually
change, and accustom yourself to realise that Nature's
prime delight is in changing things that are, and making
new things in their likeness. All that is, is as it were
the seed of that which shall issue from it " (Aurelius,
Med. iv. 36). Hence, the world itself has only a
temporary existence. It comes from God, the primal
ether, completes its course, and then is absorbed in God
again. This takes place according to an infinite and
unvarying series of cycles. At the end of each cycle
comes a great conflagration (e/cTrv/owo-ts) ; and then, as
the Pythagoreans too had taught, things begin to run
their course (there is a "regeneration," or TraAiyycveo-ia),
in the exact same way as before : the exact same
incidents and events come round in one cycle as had
happened in the previous cycles ; the same people, the
same experience, the same history and achievements,
the same failures are reproduced inexorable fate and
dire necessity rule all. 3 From God and to God
issuing, becoming, and reabsorption is the invariable
order ; to be repeated times without end. In the midst
of all, what remains steadfast is the divine primal
1 Different Stoics, however, located it differently.
2 Diogf. Laert. ix. i.
3 This doctrine of World-cycles had an immense fascination for,
and was elaborated by, Cleanthes ; but many eminent Stoics (e.g.,
Panatius) rejected it.
92 THE STOIC CREED
fire, 1 consuming all, yet itself consumed by none.
Universal law, too, or fixed course of things, continues ;
so that Destiny or Fate rules the Deity, as well as
mundane affairs. Yea, this Fate or Destiny is, from
one point of view, itself the Deity ; although, from
another point of view, the Deity is the Reason of the
World and divine Forethought or Providence (TrpoVoia).
" In the God's work there is providence everywhere.
For, the action of chance is the course of nature, or
the web and woof of the dispositions of providence.
From providence flows all ; and side by side with it is
necessity and the advantage of the Universe, of which
you are a part" (Aurelius, Med. ii. 3).
Ill
This cosmic theory is, in many ways, a striking one,
although it does not possess for modern thought the
interest and significance of the rival Epicurean theory
which, with a difference, was that of Democritus and
the Atomists. In view of the nebular hypothesis and
of several more recent physical conceptions, a certain
scientific interest attaches to the teaching that the
universe originated in a fiery vapour ; and if it be so,
as physicists have maintained, that the earth is destined
to be absorbed in the sun, the doctrine of the final
conflagration ceases to be an absolutely wild unbridled
fancy, and the early Christian writers were justified in
bringing it into comparison with the Scripture pre-
sentation of the end of the world. 2 Perhaps, too, the
conception of recurrent cycles and of the return of all
1 Personified as Zeus or Jupiter. See, e.g., Seneca, Ep. 9.
2 See, e.g., Marcus Minucius Felix, Octavius, 33.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 93
created things to the bosom of the primal substance is
but a far-off and dimly conscious recognition of the
doctrine of the conservation of energy. But the real
interest in the theory for the present day is not scientific
but philosophical. In the face of modern materialism
and of pantheism, it is instructive to see how these
same doctrines were maintained and held together by
the most materialistic, and yet the most fervently
religious, of the ancient Greek sects. Points, therefore,
to be specially noted are the following :
First, as the world, with all that it contains, is the
product of divine power, and, when viewed pantheisti-
cally in strict Stoic fashion, is itself the Deity, it is
necessarily perfect. It is an organic unity, with its
parts adapted to each other, and each necessary to the
perfection of the whole. "There is nothing existent,"
says Balbus, in the De Nattirti Deorum (ii. 13), "that
is not defective, except the universe, which is well
provided and fully complete and perfect in all its parts
and members."
Next, the Deity is in essence material ; yet, this
materialism is dynamic and not mechanical it includes
all mental and spiritual characteristics, summed up in
Thought and Will, or in the single term Active
Reason.
This fact that the primitive matter is characterized
by reason and activity deprives the Stoic materialism
of what would otherwise be a baneful influence, and
explains how the Stoical ethics and also the Stoical
theology should be so highly spiritualistic as they
94 THE STOIC CREED
unquestionably are. 1 Matter is simply one aspect of
the first cause, and expresses the passive principle
(with nothing derogatory thereby connoted) ; while
the other aspect is the active principle, as reason and
will, and this active principle is supreme. 2 If, in this,
spiritualism and materialism seem blended in a con-
fusing fashion, one can only ask whether there is
anything more confusing here than is to be found in
many modern forms of materialism e.g., in Clifford's
doctrine of matter as " mind-stuff," or in Tyndall's
conception of it as "the promise and potency of every
form and quality of life," or in Haeckel's ascription to
it of an "atomic soul" possessed of "will and
sensation." 3
Thirdly, if the Deity is material, so also is everything
that proceeds therefrom : so is the human soul, which
is simply a fiery current diffused throughout the body,
and grows along with the body, developing gradually
under sense-experiences, and reaching the full power of
reason only when the individual attains the age of
fourteen. Moreover, it holds the body together. And
not only is the human soul material, but material are
all its qualities and properties as well emotions and
intellections, truth and knowledge, virtue and morality.
" Whatever acts is corporeal (o-w/xa)." 4 " It is a dictum
1 See, for instance, Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus, and Epictetus,
passim.
2 See Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 139.
3 Thoroughgoing: materialism was carried out in early Christian
times by Tertullian, whose leading principle was, "What is not
body is nothing at all (nihil enim, si non corpus est)."
4 Diog. Laert. vii. 38.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 95
of ours that the good is corporeal (corpus], because
what is good acts, and whatever acts is corporeal." 1
Here, again, nothing derogatory is implied in
designating the soul material. Man's mind has a
passive and an active side. But, as ethics and
knowledge both repose on the mind's activity, the
Stoical materialism is practically innocuous.
It is worth remarking, however, that although
the soul's materiality follows deductively from the
materiality of the primal fire, nevertheless the Stoics,
true to their experiential tendencies, based it also on
certain observed facts. Thus, Cleanthes argued that
it was proved (a) by the circumstance that not only
bodily qualities, but also mental capacity, are trans-
mitted by ordinary generation from parent to child ;
and (b] by the sympathy of the soul with the body
seen in the fact that, when the body is struck or cut,
the soul is pained ; and when the soul is torn by anxiety
or depressed by care, the body is correspondingly
affected. 2
Further, the Stoic eschatology calls for remark.
According to the doctrine of reabsorption into the
primal fire, everything is indestructible: though a
thing may change its form, itself persists. The human
soul, therefore, is in this sense immortal. But about
this reabsorption of the soul, there are several unex-
plained difficulties in Stoicism :
1 Seneca, Ep. 117.
- These arguments were reproduced afterwards among 1 early
Christians by Tertullian, in support of his doctrine of the
traducianist origin of the soul.
96 THE STOIC CREED
First, whether the absorption takes place immediately
on the death of the individual ; or whether the individual
continues to exist as an individual till the great con-
flagration ; or whether he falls by degrees into the
Deity, through a process of gradual purification, was
not dogmatically determined. For each of these
positions high Stoical authority could be quoted ; and
high authority could be quoted also for suspense of
judgment on the point. All that even Aurelius can say
is : "Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage,
thou hast come to shore ; get out. If, indeed, to
another life, there is no want of gods, not even there.
But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to
be held by pains and pleasures." 1 And even among
those who maintained that the individual soul lived on
till the conflagration (which was the earlier opinion),
there was doubt as to whether this held of all souls or
only of the souls of the wise ; Cleanthes upholding
the first of these opinions, and Chrysippus the
second. 2
Next, whether, when the individual is absorbed, the
past experience of his life on earth has any effect, by
way of unconscious influence or impulse, in urging on
or causing his return to individual existence, is not
plain. It is in itself quite conceivable that desire of
individual life might remain, or, at any rate (to put it
more exactly), that the fact of a man's having existed
individually here might leave a permanent effect, which
would tell, though unconsciously to the man himself,
in procuring his future reissuing from the divine source.
1 Med. in. 3. See also Epictetus, Diss. iii. 13, 24.
2 See Diog. Laert. vii. 157.
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 97
This point, however, seems not to have occurred to the
Stoics. The doctrine of Unconscious Will had to await
Schopenhauer.
Nor, thirdly, did the Stoics settle whether any
recollection of former states of existence remains to the
individual when he does return again to the earth, and
the new cycle runs. Had they accepted the Platonic
doctrine of Ideas and Reminiscence, their answer
would, presumably, have been in the affirmative. But
that doctrine was disowned by them. They maintained,
however, that the Socrates of a future period would
not be numerically one with the Socrates of the present
the two would simply be alike. And if, as some
Stoics held, this similarity between the two Socrateses
was accompanied by marked differences, then, perhaps,
an answer in the negative would be necessitated.
But, all this apart, the noteworthy point is, that
(from the time of Cleanthes, at any rate) Immortality,
as continued, though not endless, existence after death,
was a doctrine of the Stoics ; and this not merely
"subjective" immortality, such as the Comtists or
Positivists of to-day promise us as our sole consolation
namely, posthumous fame, or the continuance of a
man's name and influence among posterity, the abiding
effect of his life and work upon succeeding generations.
This kind of immortality they admitted, and they even
regarded it as a " good " (at least the later Stoics did) ;
but, with moments of inconsistency and vacillation,
they demanded something more. While, on occasion,
Seneca could say, as he contemplated the possibility of
a young man's death, " he lived, and passed away to
posterity, and gave himself to be a memory," he was
7
98 THE STOIC CREED
too well aware, like Marcus Aurelius, that the most
lasting fame is but of brief duration, to rest satisfied
with this. Speaking of death, he says, "The day that
you dread as though it were your last is the birthday
of eternity," 1 and so he advocates a personal or "ob-
jective " immortality, and supports it by characteristic
reasoning. To him, as to other later Stoics, the im-
mortality of the soul was not only a logical consequence
from the Stoical physics ; it was also corroborated by
the fact of men's general belief in it, and thus came
with particular authority. And the object of the belief
is to Seneca, in his highest apocalyptic moments, no
vague colourless hereafter, no mere abstraction of the
intellect, but a vivid, definite future life of bliss, a state
in which we shall revel in ineffable light, and have the
mysteries of nature revealed to us, and in which we
shall hold intercourse with the gods and with the spirits
of the blessed. His delineation in such^a mood almost
approaches to the warm glowing picture of the Christian
teaching in the New Testament. 2 Thus did the later
Stoicism try to meet the claims of the human heart,
which the earlier Stoicism had to a large extent ignored,
and to adjust its pantheism to the deeper personal needs
of human nature, which were more and more making
themselves felt. Had the views of Plato regarding im-
mortality (as disclosed, say, in the Phcedo] affected the
older Stoics, their treatment of the future state would
have been different ; but it is one of the peculiarities
of the case that the earlier Stoics, though conversant
1 Ep. 102: "Dies iste quern tanquam extremum reformidas
seterni natalis est."
2 See Epp. 26, 55, 63, 102, 120,
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 99
with Plato, left it to Seneca to appreciate Plato's teach-
ing in this connexion, and to advance upon it. 1
IV
But now comes the inevitable criticism.
First, the Cosmology of the Stoics, although in many
ways remarkable, is not in its ultimate principle philo-
sophically satisfactory. The origin of the world is not
really explained by the doctrine of Matter, even when
the materialism is not mechanical but dynamic.
As to the conception of Matter, in relation to Active
Reason or the Supreme Mind, one of four conceivable
views may be maintained : (i) First, we may posit two
distinct entities God on the one side, and matter on
the other ; each of them independent, and each eternal.
(2) Secondly, we may posit two distinct entities God
and matter ; but the latter, though eternal, not inde-
pendent of the other, but eternally derived from it.
(3) Thirdly, we may posit God as the alone independent
and eternal, and matter as the product of His creative
power, brought into existence through His efficiency.
(4) Fourthly, we may posit one sole existence, eternal
and self-contained ; and, if we favour Idealism, this
sole existence will be God as Mind or Spirit, if Material-
ism, it will be matter or the world (mundus).
Now, as to the first of these, two independent and
eternal existences, though the words seem to have
sense before we consider them, yield a contradiction in
terms. For, by the supposition, matter is exclusively
1 See S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius,
bk. iv. chap. ii.
ioo THE STOIC CREED
shut out from mind : there are no bonds of causation
between them, and they have no points of community.
But, if so, there is no means whereby the two can be
brought together : they must for ever remain apart,
and by no possibility could the world, as we know it,
have come into being at all. Dualism of this stamp is
utterly unworkable.
As to the second, we have not here, as in the previous
case, a self-contradiction ; for the eternity of matter is
quite a tenable notion, if matter be not from the begin-
ning rigidly shut out from intelligence, but, on the con-
trary, be conceived as something harmonized from the
first ordered, with its parts in rational relationship.
This was Aristotle's idea, which he claims to have been
first thrown out by himself namely, not the eternity of
matter per se, but the eternity of matter as a cosmos.
The strong point about it is, that it clearly recognizes
that an eternal Deity must have an eternal manifesta-
tion, and that matter absolutely unordered is an im-
potent conception. But it is liable to objection on the
score that it seems not to perceive that the modes of
Divine manifestation actual, possible, or conceivable
are countless. We can dogmatically affirm ordered
matter to be necessarily eternal only if we can prove it
to be the sole possible means whereby the Deity can
objectify Himself. That, however, cannot be done ;
for Spirit may reveal itself to spirit, and in and through
spirit be manifested ; and a world of spirits would meet
the requirements of the divine manifestation, as well as
a material universe, and so the cosmos need not be
eternal the eternal may be the spirit world.
In the third view, the dependence of the world on
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 101
the Divine Mind is recognized, and a suggestive view
of its origin offered. We now start with a matter that
is inchoate and only gradually brought into a cosmos ;
and so we posit a beginning that gives scope for
development and temporal evolution. The inchoate
matter may be designated a "chaos " ; but it is a chaos
that is not absolute, but only relative. An absolute
chaos would bring us back to the inconceivable and
self -contradictory position of the first hypothesis.
Matter as chaos can simply mean matter not yet
brought into the ordered relations that we are ac-
quainted with in the world of our experience. To us,
or from our point of view, it is "without form and_
void"; l yet, inasmuch as it is in relation to the Creative
Intelligence, it is not the absolutely formless, but the
potentially formed and implicitly rational world-mass.
It is to be conceived, therefore, as implicating develop-
ment and change ; time being needed to make the
implicit explicit, or to bring the potential into actuality.
Such a conception is compatible with the revelations of
modern science ; and, moreover, it gives us the true
philosophical signification of the Absolute, whereon the
world is dependent. By the Absolute is not meant the
unrelated and unrelatable, or that which is, by its very
nature, out of all relation. On the contrary, it means
that which is potentially relatable to everything. A
being out of relation (both actual and potential) to
everything could never be brought into relation with
anything. There is nothing in itself whereby it could
be done ; nor is there anything outside itself whereby
1 Gen. i. 2. This Biblical phrase the Septuagint translates
" invisible and unfurnished" (doparos Kal a/caraovceiJao-TOs).
102 THE STOIC CREED
it could be done. Not in itself; for, being the abso-
lutely unrelated, there is, ex hypothesi^ no point of
attachment with the related. Not in anything outside ;
for, as things outside are all in relation, they could not
strip themselves of relation so as to come within range
of the non-related. The phrase " unrelated to every-
thing" is exactly synonymous with the phrase " unre-
latable to anything"; while, on the other hand, " re-
lated to anything" is synonymous with " relatable to
everything."
The fourth position is the assertion of Monism, and
is logically the declaration that one half of the dualism
of our experience is illusion. If we take the idealistic
standpoint here, then we assert that God is all, and
matter, save in appearance, is not ; if the materialistic
standpoint, then, though we may use the name God, we
empty it of its proper meaning, and assert the sole
supremacy of matter. But, either way, we merely
assert ; we do not prove. And this was what the
Stoics, especially those of the Earlier Stoa, occupying
the materialistic position, did. To them, all is matter.
Thought, reasoning, feeling, will each is material ; as
much so as the human body or inorganic things. God
Himself is matter. But this really explains nothing.
The distinctive feature of life, or of consciousness, or of
thought, is simply ignored when it is swamped in the
same category with what is lifeless, unconscious, or
irrational. It is on the face of it plausible to declare
(as Zeno, carrying out his doctrine of strain or tension,
does) that one divine material substance pervades
everything; appearing in the inorganic as " hold " or
eis, in plants as " vital force" or <vVis, in animals as
PHYSICS: NATURE, GOD, THE SOUL 103
"irrational soul" or ^VXTJ aAoyos, and in man as
"rational soul" or 1/^77 \6yov e^owa. But when we
ask, What really has "hold" in common with "vital
force," or "vital force" with "soul "or with "reason"?
we find that we have surmounted the difficulty only in
words. In their ultimate unity, the Stoics assumed
mind, with all its characteristics, in matter ; and the
evolution of the world from the primal material fire
became possible, only because in the primal fire are
presupposed rationality and will. Yet, even thus, God
is not, except in the sense of the material world ; and,
although to the Later Stoa (Epictetus, Seneca, etc.), and
in connexion with ethics, the Deity assumed a personal
spiritual aspect, He is only an impersonal force to the
founders of the school, and could scarcely be other if
the Stoical physics is to be strictly adhered to.
This suggests, for another point, that the physics
and the ethics of the Stoics (more especially, the ethics
of the Roman period) are not metaphysically of a piece :
speculative materialism rules the one, intense scorn of
moral materialism dominates the other. This will be
impressed upon us with sufficient fulness later on. But,
meanwhile, it may be well to observe that there are
points in the ethical teaching that are affected for ill
by the physical speculations. One such point is the
conception of evil ; of which cosmic pantheism, looking
upon the world as perfect, could give no adequate
rendering. Another has reference to the doctrine of
all-controlling necessity or fate. This had sometimes a
numbing influence on practice, and tended to encourage
people in a too servile acquiescence in the existing state
104 THE STOIC CREED
of things. Hence, with the exception of Epictetus
(himself originally a slave), the Stoics did not overtly
condemn slavery as an institution, but accepted it.
Nevertheless, their predominant altruism led them to
treat slaves with great humaneness and consideration,
looking upon them as friends and brothers. This was
the result of their enthusiasm of humanity ; the purity
and fervour of which may be seen in No. 47 of Seneca's
Letters, dealing with the treatment of slaves : unus
omnium parens mundus est.
Still another point may be mentioned namely, the
impossibility of progress beyond a certain limit either
to the individual or to the world, if the doctrine of
recurrent cycles be insisted on. If each age simply
reproduces in all its details its predecessor, then the
power of Destiny is too strong to allow the number of
good men being ever increased or the number of bad
men diminished ; and as for the world itself, it must,
on this doctrine, for ever retain its included imperfec-
tions its flaws and its defects. "Do not hope for
Utopia " 1 such is the counsel. The reflection is, to
say the least of it, not stimulating and encouraging.
So much for leading conceptions. The remainder of
the physical speculations, dealing more specifically with
the Stoic Theology, is best understood in the light of
the Ethics, and so is deferred to Chapter XL
1 Aurelius, Med. ix. 29.
CHAPTER VI
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST
"Now, as Science demands the radical extirpation of caprice
and the absolute reliance upon law in nature, there grew with the
growth of scientific notions a desire and determination to sweep
from the field of theory this mob of gods and demons, and to place
natural phenomena on a basis more congruent with themselves."
TYNDALL.
" It should never be forgotten that the natural philosophy of
Epicurus is the foundation of his ethics ; its raison d'etre is, that
it renders possible a theory of conduct." W. WALLACE.
I
LIKE Stoicism, Epicureanism is distinctively an ethical V
system :; but it is ethics reposing on physics, and so
implicates psychology and theory of knowledge. (Like
Stoicism, too, it finds the germ of both its physics and
its ethics in earlier Greek systems ; the physics being
derived from Democritus and the Atomic philosophers,
and the ethics from Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school. 1 J
Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), like the founders of Greek
schools generally, was a voluminous writer produc-
ing "three hundred scrolls," it is said, written, as
Diogenes Laertius boasts (x. 17), " without any cita-
/ * A book of Theodorus, the Cyrenaic, On the Gods, is said
especially to have influenced Epicurus. See Diogenes Laertius,
ii. 12. )
105
106 THE STOIC CREED
tion from other writers, but filled simply with his own
sentiments (<covai)," thereby differing", he adds, from
the Stoic Chrysippus, whose writings were overloaded
with quotations from other authors. But he suffered
the fate of most of the others his works are lost.
We have, indeed, three letters of his and pome frag-
ments of his writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius }
we have also the papyri discovered more than a century
ago at Herculaneum/f and we have copious accounts of
Epicureanism in Cicero (e.g., in De Natura Deorum
and De Finibus, etc.u But the (master himself must
be studied either in the writings of his followers, or in
the criticism and partial accounts of subsequent philo-
sophers (Greek and Latin), who were, to say the least
of it, not always particularly sympathetic.^ We are
fortunate, however, in possessing the philosophical
masterpiece of a great Roman poet, who was, first
and foremost, a follower of Epicurus the famous
didactic poem of Lucretius (95-52 B.C.), entitled
De Reriim Naturft, ("On the Nature of Things"),
in which the cosmology and general system of the
Epicureans are worked out with considerable fulness
and with great enthusiasm, and in which the strength
of personal conviction aids the poetic imagination
and adds force to the felicitous diction, so that the
picture becomes at once vivid, fascinating, and im-
pressive.
\Thrown thus, to such a large extent, on Lucretius,
we naturally raise the question, whether it is safe to
trust him, as substantially reproducing the doctrine of
Epicurus, j
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 107
For one thing, we must take care not wholly to
discount Lucretius himself. Lucretius was unquestion-
ably an able thinker ; and he was, moreover, a genuine
poet. And it i^incredible that a disciple thus endowed
should simply repeat his master. ) Three things, at any
rate, - characterize him a clear grasp of his subject,
with an extraordinary power of happy illustration (the
mark of a genuine philosopher) ; an intense enthusiasm
of humanity ; and a deep, poetic, speculative and
scientific interest in Nature, after the manner of
Wordsworth :
" To the solid ground 4
Of Nature trusts the mind that builds for aye ;
Convinced that there, there only she can lay
Secure foundation." (Miscellaneotts Sonnets, i. 34.)
He also responded unreservedly to the charm of Nature ;
revelling more especially in mountain scenery and in
the grander aspects of the outer world, as became a
philosopher, to whom the mountain is the natural
symbol of mental ascent and of wide and clear philo-
sophical outlook, and he was attracted by every mode
and form of motion, as being significant of the unceasing
activity of the primordial atoms, and suggestive of life
and energy.
But, on the other hand, though we must not discount
Lucretius himself, we(must not forget that the Epicurean
school was perhaps the strictest of all schools of
antiquity in insisting on the scholars adhering rigor-
ously to the master's dogmas. Summaries of Epicurus's
teaching (/cv/nai Soat) were prescribed to be learned by
heart, and little more was encouraged in the pupil than
a servile repetition of the master's thought. Epicurus
io8 THE STOIC CREED
himself frequently made such summaries for the use of
inquiring followers. Three such we have, as already
hinted, in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius's Lives
of the Philosophers^ in the shape of Letters giving a
sort of epitome of his philosophy one addressed to
Herodotus, on the Epicurean cosmogony and theory
of knowledge ; another to Pythocles, regarding the
heavenly bodies, offering natural explanations of their
phenomena, so as to dispel superstition and rid the
soul of superstitious fear ; and a third to Menceceus,
on the Epicurean Ethics, or Pleasure as the Chief Good.
Moreover, every Epicurean had for the master the most
ardent personal devotion. He even exalted him to the
place of deity in his veneration. This comes out again
and again in Lucretius, whose language in extolling
Epicurus is that of the enthusiastic worshipper o dis-
closing whole-hearted and unbounded admiration. 1 He
is not even second in this respect to ^Lucian, who
designates Epicurus " a saint indeed J who was inspired
in the highest sense ; who alone combined, and taught
others to combine, the good with the true, and was
thus the deliverer and saviour of those who would con-
sent to learn from him" (see his Alexander of Abono-
teicbus).
Furthermore, it was (characteristic of the disciples of
Epicurus that they had likenesses of the master " not
only in pictures, but even on their goblets and rings "
(Cicero, De Finibus, v.
Taking all these things into consideration, then, and
remembering also that the teaching of Lucretius, in
1 See, particularly, the prologues to Books i. in. v. and VI.
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 109
so far as it can be tested by the letters and fragments
of Epicurus himself, stands the test, we may safely
enough accept Lucretius as a faithful expositor, even
while we do not ignore Lucretius's own ability and
originality.
Trusting thus to Lucretius, let us now give an
outline of the physical and the intellectual parts of the
system, 1 so as to point the contrast to Stoicism.
II
We begin with the Atomic theory, as explanatory
of the origin and formation of the world.
Basing his physics on the principle Ex nihilo nihilfit^
in nihilum nil posse rcverti, " Out of nothing, nothing
comes ; into nothing, nothing can be turned (ovSei/
ytVerat CK TOV /xr) 6Wos, ovfttv <f>@ipTa.L eis TO /a) 6V)," 2
Epicurus begins by positing Atoms and the Void
(TO KCI/OI/) i.e. atoms in motion and empty space
as the sole existences. Not atoms as material par-
ticles alone are sufficient ; they must be presumed
to be in motion : and not atoms and motion are
enough ; there must also be empty space, else how
could motion be possible, or how could an explanation
be given of such physical facts as the different weights
of bodies similar in size or bulk? Furthermore, this
space must be taken as infinite or unbounded. As to
the atoms, they are conceived as absolutely dead things
exceedingly minute, invisible, solid, material bodies,
qualitatively identical, but quantitatively different
different, that is, in shape, size, and weight. They
1 The ethical part is, at present, outside our consideration.
2 See Epistle in Diog. Laert. x. 38.
no THE STOIC CREED
are eternal or uncreated, and indestructible " strong
in their solid singleness." This last property of in-
destructibility, implying 1 in it indivisibility, belongs to
them because of their exceptional hardness and solidity :
they have no void or empty space within them ; there-
fore they cannot be broken up (hence the name aro/xos,
atom]. Their motion, too, is indestructible. They
are infinite in number, and have an indefinite (unlimited,
though not absolutely limitless) number of shapes,
sizes, and weights. They possess no secondary
qualities such as colour, taste, smell. They move
naturally in parallel straight lines downwards, like
rain falling perpendicularly from the heavens to the
earth. And yet, if this perpendicular downward motion
were the sole one, it would be impossible for matter to
form into masses there could be no such thing as
aggregation, and the formation of the world would be
impossible. Accordingly, a further supposition is
necessary namely, that the atoms have in them the
power of swerving or declining from the straight line,
even though it be but to the smallest possible extent
the power of passing out of the orderly march of the
regular atomic dance, symbolized by the motes in a
sunbeam, and so of crossing each other and of coming
into contact and collision, thereby rendering combina-
tion and interaction possible.
"This point of the subject also," says Lucretius
(ii. 216-224), "we wish you to understand namely,
that atoms, when they are borne straight downwards
through the void by their own weight, do usually, at
an uncertain time and at uncertain places, push them-
selves a little from their course, just so far that you
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST in
can call it a change of inclination. If they were not
in the habit of swerving" thus, they would all fall
straight down through the deep void ; and no clashing
would be effected nor collision produced among the
primary elements : in which case, Nature would never
have produced anything (ita nil imquam natura
creasset)."
This clashing and concourse of atoms is " uncertain,"
both as to place and as to time ; that is, it is casual or
fortuitous it is owing to chance, is haphazard, or
occurs at random. Purpose or final end in nature,
there is none. On the contrary, Nature's characteristic
is, that it is uniform or is subject to law: it is the
grossest superstition (so Lucretius holds) to look upon
it as in any way manifesting design that leads to
the demoralizing and baneful doctrine of the existence
and overruling care therefore, in Lucretius's view,
capricious interference of the gods, a doctrine that
had so cramped and terrorized and debased mankind,
but which must be got rid of at all costs. Indeed, it
was one of the chief recommendations of the Atomic
Theory to the Epicureans that it enabled them to
dispense with the supernatural not, however, with
the existence of the gods, but with their interference in
mundane affairs. Nature is ruled by law, and no
supersensible being can in any way alter that fact or
counteract it. Hence, Epicurus located the gods in
the intermundia, or spaces between the worlds (for
there are many worlds, as he taught, and not one
only) ; allowing them a life of placid ease and com-
fort, such as Tennyson pictures in his " Lucretius "-
above the turmoils and trials of earth, and indiffer-
ii2 THE STOIC CREED
ent to the sorrows and the hardships and the fate of
men.
" The gods, who haunt
The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud, nor moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans,
Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
Their sacred everlasting- calm ! "
The apparent design manifest in the universe is
explicable on purely naturalistic principles. "For,
certainly, not by design (nam certe neque consilio] did
the primary elements of things dispose themselves each
in their own order, after sage deliberation (sagaci
mente], nor, indeed, did they settle by agreement what
motions each should produce ; but because, on account
of their great number and the variety of the changes
that they undergo, they are for an indefinite length of
time agitated, through the excitation of blows all the
world over, they do at length, after having experienced
every kind of motion and combination, settle into those
positions, whereby this world of ours is produced and
exists" (Lucretius, i. 121-128). . . . "For," he says
in another place (v. 187-194), "the primary elements
of things were so many in number, and excited by
blows in so many ways, through untold time, and were
accustomed so to be borne and carried forward by their
own weight and to meet in all manners and to make
all kinds of trial of what their combinations might be
able to effect, that it is not surprising if they fell at last
into such positions and acquired such motions as those
by which this universe of things, by renovation, is now
carried on."
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 113
In other words, it could not but be that an infinite
number of atoms, combining in all possible ways during
an infinite time, should hit upon combinations so
regular and orderly as to appear to us to be works of
deliberate purpose and prevision. Such is the com-
bination, or rather countless number of combinations,
that goes to form what we understand by the universe.
Thus, then, out of atoms in motion and the void,
according to fixed immutable laws, the whole material
universe, in the view of Lucretius, was constructed ;
the mode of formation being to him and to the
Epicureans in general, as to Democritus, very much
that which has been insisted on by modern science.
In Democritus and Epicurus and Lucretius, we have
the undoubted precursors of Tyndall, Huxley, Buchner,
Haeckel. Indeed, it has been roundly maintained that
"the general outlines of the atomic doctrine has been
long accepted as in the main true ; in all important
features it is superior to any other physical theory of
the universe which existed up to the seventeenth
century. In his theory of light, Lucretius was in
advance of Newton. In his theory of chemical affinities
(for he describes the thing though the nomenclature
was unknown to him) he was in advance of Lavoisier.
In his theory of the ultimate constitution of the atom
he is in striking agreement with the views of the ablest
living physicists. The essential function of science
to reduce apparently disparate phenomena to the ex-
pressions of a single law is not with him the object
of a moment's doubt or uncertainty. " l
How far the Atomic theory needs to be modified
1 J. W. Mackail, Latin Literature, p. 44.
8
i [4 THE STOIC CREED
in the light of the phenomena of radio-activity recently
discovered, is not here the question. Enough that the
Electron theory now definitely formulated by physicists
simply modifies ; resolving the atom into minuter
particles, and proving that it is not the ultimate unit
of matter.
Ill
But atoms and the void, if they are effective thus
far, can also (according to the Epicureans) go farther
they can explain to us the nature and phenomena of
Life and of Mind.
In this view, Life is simply the result of particular
collocations of particular atoms ; and human conscious-
ness, sensation, perception, reflection the soul, with
all its properties and functions are the product of the
elementary material particles, variously combining and
reacting: life and consciousness alike are but " modes
of motion."
Let us see, then, the Epicurean account of Psychology,
as given by Lucretius.
The Soul or Mind is, of course, material. There is
nothing in existence that is immaterial, save empty
space, the void ; and the void can of itself effect
nothing. But the soul is an efficient agent. There-
fore, it is material. As material, it is constructed out of
four elements namely, heat, air, vapour, and a fourth
substance to which no name is given (east omnino
nominis expers). To this unnamed constituent is
assigned the higher functions of the soul feeling,
intellection, volition.
Nevertheless, the soul differs from grosser material
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 115
things in being* composed of exceedingly minute, smooth,
round atoms (the very swiftness of thought proves the
extreme fineness and subtlety of the mental particles) ;
and, though far lighter in itself than the body, so
light, indeed, that when at death it departs from the
body, the body is practically as heavy as it was
before, it is, yet, so intimately connected with the
body, so closely conjoined with it and perfectly adapted
to it (tarn conjuncta atque uniter apta est\ that it can
move, support, and even lift the body. Notwith-
standing, it perishes along with the body. No part
of it survives death. As being wholly dependent on
the body, it is mortal. Still, the distinction between
the rational and the irrational part of the soul, although
both parts are mortal, is a very valid and a highly
important one. The rational or higher soul Lucretius
calls animus or mens ; the irrational or lower soul is
to him anima. The former is seated in the breast ;
the latter is diffused throughout the body.
Sensation belongs neither to the soul alone nor to
the body alone, but to their mutual motions and inter-
actions. It is generated, in true Epicurean fashion,
following Empedocles, by material effluxes and pores ;
and the phenomena of the different senses sight,
hearing, etc. are simply owing to difference in the
number, shape, motion, and mode of arrangement of
the atoms, just as different arrangement of the letters
of the alphabet produces different words. From all
objects of sense, effluvia or tiny films are incessantly
passing off in countless numbers and in all directions.
These " images" or et&oAa, when they strike the eye,
u6 THE STOIC CREED
pass into the pre-adapted pores, and thereby produce
the sensation of vision. So that it is not the object
itself that we directly see in visual perception, but the
images from it. Between the percipient and the
external object come the material species or forms ;
thereby rendering sense-perception an indirect or repre-
sentative process. Nevertheless, as the images are
material effluxes from bodies, perception, though in-
direct, is trustworthy ; just as our knowledge of a
person from his portrait solely is, to that extent, trust-
worthy. In this way, Sensation may very well be
taken as the Criterion of Truth at any rate, it is the
highest criterion that we have, and the testimony of
the senses cannot be gainsaid. We must stand some-
where ; we cannot help taking something as true. For,
as Lucretius puts it, " if any one thinks that nothing can
be known, he is ignorant also of whether that [namely,
that nothing can be known] can be known, since
he confesses that he knows nothing " ; and he refuses
to argue with such a man, inasmuch as he occupies
an inverted position (iv. 468-470). In other words,
absolute scepticism is suicidal. You must, therefore,
assume truth somewhere ; and this somewhere reflec-
tion and experience prove to be the senses.
But may not the senses be refuted ? No ; for what
would be the means of refutation ? Not reason ; for
reason has arisen from the senses, and if these be false,
so too must it be. Not the senses themselves, set in
opposition one against the other ; for each sense has
its own faculty and its own province and cannot be
interfered with by any of the others the ears cannot
refute the eyes, or the touch the ears, or the taste the
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 117
touch. Nor yet, again, the whole of the senses taken
in a body ; for, as each must be trusted equally, there
is no ground for distrusting them collectively. " What,
therefore, at any time whatsoever has seemed to them
true, is true (proinde quod in quoquest his msum tempore,
verumst)." 1 Sensation, then, is everything ; and even
the higher intellectual processes (conception, thought,
etc.) are dependent on it, and their truth must
ultimately be tested by it. They are all, moreover,
simple functions of the atoms, differing in number,
shape, size, and combination.
But this very doctrine of the atoms itself how can
it be testified by sensation, or brought to the touchstone
ot sense-perception, seeing that atoms are invisible
and, in a sense, imaginary? All opinion or belief,
whether referring to the future or to the invisible, says
Epicurus, is, if true, verified by sensation either directly
or indirectly. It is verified directly, when we can test
it by actual experience (I believe, say, that to-morrow
will be fine ; and this belief is true if, when to-morrow
comes, the day proves to be fine) ; it is verified indirectly
(in cases where direct verification is out of the question,
as in the hypothesis of the atoms), when sense-
experience has nothing to say against it (17 p
But if intellect and sense can thus be explained on
the Atomic theory, so can pleasure and pain.
1 De Rerum Nat. iv. 476-496.
2 The handling- of the Criterion of Truth was designated by the
Epicureans "Canonic," and corresponded in great part to the
" Logic " of the Stoics.
u8 THE STOIC CREED
To the Epicurean, pleasure means simply the
harmonious and orderly movement of the atoms ;
while pain is the feeling that ensues when there are
jarring and discord among them.
The case of Will is peculiar.
The Epicureans strenuously upheld, against the
Stoics, the conception of Free Will. The'y would not
allow fate to be absolutely supreme : there was a
province rescued from its grasp. This was the province
of inward mental freedom, where we find a principle
that can " break the laws of fate," the iron bonds of
invariable sequence (quod fatifaedera rumpaf]. Lucretius
distinctly designates \\. fatis avolsa potestas " the power
wrested from the fates." The proof of such a power
the Epicureans found, in the first instance, in man's
consciousness of effort in deliberation and of causality
in volition in the effect of will in moving and guiding
the body. 1 But not here alone, if the Atomic theory is
to be thoroughgoing and effective. For, man's soul is
made up of material particles. Free will, then, must
ultimately be an inherent property of the soul-atoms.
But if of the soul-atoms, then also, more or less, of all
atoms whatsoever ; for soul-atoms differ from others
(organic and inorganic) simply in degree of fineness,
size, and shape, not in essential quality. Hence, the
Epicureans held inconsistently with their primary
position that atoms are absolutely dead things that
atoms, taken in themselves and apart from their
aggregation into masses of matter (which aggregation
nullifies or counteracts their inherent spontaneity)
1 Lucretius, ii. 257-262.
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 119
possess intrinsically a certain power of free will.
This, in its first original form, is their power of declina-
tion or swerving from the straight line of breaking the
law of gravity which is nature's " necessity," and of
introducing " freedom," thereby making a cosmos
possible. This power, of course, unlike free will in
man, is unconscious in the atoms ; but, nevertheless, it
is to be subsumed under the same category. 1
Free will in man, like thought and the higher
mental functions, attaches to "the fourth principle of
the soul," by means of which it acts upon the various
elements of the anima scattered throughout the body
and produces bodily movements.
n his physical speculations, Epicurus was deeply
indebted to Democritus (born about 460 B.C.) and his
school. The Atomic theory was the great distinctive
feature of Democritus's teaching, as it was of his master
Leucippus ; and Epicurus accepted it, though with
important differences. He was no mere literal repeater
of the doctrine, but transformed it at vital pointsyand
adhered to it with a motive of his own.
tin the first place, the interest of Democritus in
Nature was purely scientific : he had no ulterior end in
physical research " Science for science's sake " was his
motto. To Epicurus, on the other hand, the Atomic
theory commended itself, not primarily for any scientific
or speculative reason, but, first and chiefly, because of its
ethical and religious bearings. ) It seemed to him to be
1 This point has been admirably worked out by Dr. John
Masson in his The Atomic Theory of Lucretius, chap. vii.
120 THE STOIC CREED
most consonant with the theory of pleasure as the
summum bonum, which was the ruling feature in Epi-
curus's philosophy, and/it struck at the root of religious
superstition by excluding the gods from arbitrary and
capricious interference with the government of the
world. JThis was a point of great importance, in face of
the base and debasing religious notions, beliefs, and
practices of the age.
But, next, EEpicurus, \vhile adopting the Atomic
theory generally, fnade important alterations on it?)
/For one thing, he denied that atoms falling perpen-
dicularly down would ever come into collision, and so
that a cosmos could ever be formed on that sole
assumption. In order to cope with the difficulty,
Democritus had imagined that atoms differed from each
other in their velocity t j Some fell more swiftly than
others ; and so the swifter would overtake the slower,
and thereby collisions would occur, tThis appeared to
Epicurus to be an erroneous interpretation of falling
bodies. A famous passage in the second book of
Lucretius (225-239) puts the argument in a vivid form.
No doubt, it is there maintained, difference in velocity
is in point when you are dealing with bodies falling
through air or through water, where you have to take
into account the resisting medium. But this does not
hold in the case of a pure vacuum. " A pure vacuum
can afford no resistance to anything in any place, or at
any time, but must go on allowing a thing what its
own nature demands." Now, "what its own nature
demands " is, according to Epicurus, free movement or
liberty to the atoms to swerve from the vertical, even
to the slightest imaginable extent, to begin with.
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 121
Consequently, on the basis of this physical doctrine
of atomic declination, Epicurus went on to establish
his doctrine of free will.
(To Democritus, there was no such thing as free will :
the uniformity of nature and the reign of law, extending
to every being and to all departments of existence,^)
forbade that. This teaching, in the view ofxpicurus,
neglected J to take account of the testimony of con-
ciousness. (Free will isja fact of our experience, and
the great fact on which ethics reposes ; and "&S- ethics
was the prime consideration for Epicurus,) this fact
must be conserved, and, if conserved, explained : and
the explanation seemed to him to be found in atomic
declination in the supposition of an innate spontaneity
in the atoms, whereby atomic combinations and inter-
actions might be rendered possible.
There was also a^difference between Epicurus and
Democritus as to the composition of the soul.y' As has
been seen, ^Epicurus demanded four elements heat,
air, vapour, and an unnamed fourth. To Democritus,
the soul was "a kind of fire (-rrvp rt)." It consisted,
therefore, wholly of atoms the same in shape as those
of fire namely, round ; and the only differences between
soul-atoms and fire-atoms that he allowed were
differences of arrangement, and, probably, of size
the soul-atoms being the smaller. J
( \
Now, reverting to the Epicurean teachingAthe con-
trast to Stoicism at crucial points will be apparemx
There is,^first, the conception of the formation of the
universe by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, thereby
122 THE STOIC CREED
excluding- providence and all teleological reference ;
there is, next, the erection of sensation into the criterion
of truth, or test of the validity of knowledge ; and,
further, there is the characteristic doctrine of free will.
^^
With regard to the first of these, it may be allowed
that the fortuitous clash of atoms, although origin-
ally undesigned, might conceivably give rise to a
cosmos, in so far as the mere collocation of material
bodies is concerned their aggregation into masses,
their mechanical and chemical actions and reactions.
Modern science admits this : even Lord Kelvin, with
all his insistence on teleology as necessary to the
explanation of the world, allowed as much in certain
recent utterances. But although this infinite dance
and collision of atoms, continuing from all eternity,
might, owing 1 to the infinity of combinations accident-
ally stumbled into, end in the present arrangement
that we understand as the material cosmos, neverthe-
less there is no explanation here of the vital and
conscious phenomena of our experience. How, from
the mere fortuitous dance and interminable clash and
jostling- of dead material particles, is Life generated?
There is more than matter and motion here ; there
is spontaneous movement and purposive selection.
Vitalism is not mechanism, as even great chemists like
Professor Bunge x in Germany and Professor Japp 2 in
Scotland are forward to allow. The physiologist also
1 See his Text-book of Physiological and Pathological Chemistry,
Lecture I.
L> See his Presidential Address to the Chemical Section of the
British Association, in 1898, on Stereochemistry and Vitalism.
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 123
knows that even the phenomenon of nutrition is not
wholly explicable by chemical and physical laws,
inasmuch as the wall of the intestine refuses to behave
like a mere dead membrane ; and the botanist, just
because he is here dealing- with living membranous
tissue, has ceased to explain the rise of the sap in a
tree simply by endosmose. The intervention of life in
the membrane makes all the difference. How, again,
in the case of Sensation, do atoms that are themselves
colourless, scentless, soundless (for, as said, they have
no secondary qualities), give rise by mere collocation
to colour, scent, sound ? How, still more, do we get
in this way the higher processes of Mind, conception,
judgment, reasoning, thought, so different, not only in
quantity, but in kind, from the properties of inorganic
matter? In consciousness and self-consciousness and
the processes of reflective thought, we have reached
something of the nature of an organic unity, whose
ruling feature is internal purposive development and
spontaneous activity. These chasms namely, between
the lifeless and the living, on the one hand, and, on
the other hand, between the merely animate or living
and the conscious thinking life are the standing
difficulty for the Epicurean physics, as for pure material-
ism in whatsoever age. If man is not "a mere
automaton," if consciousness be more than a bare
" epiphenomenon " or useless adjunct of brain process,
then mechanism cannot fully explain him, or account for
his distinctive mental characteristics. "Ex nihilo
nihil fit" is the great principle that Lucretius is con-
stantly using. Nowhere is it more applicable than
here, against himself.
i2 4 THE STOIC CREED
The obvious way of surmounting the difficulty is by
tacitly assuming that, in the atoms themselves, after
all, there is contained the germ of life and consciousness.
And this is what Epicureanism did ; but it was done
illogically. Frequently does Lucretius apply to atoms
such terms as " seeds," "seeds of things," "pro-
creative matter (genitalis materies)" "concert (con-
cilium)," " generative concert," and so on ; and, as we
have seen, he endows them with "will." But this is
virtually to acknowledge that atoms (which he began
by maintaining to be absolutely dead things) and the
void are not, after all, sufficient to explain the whole
phenomena of our experience ; that, for the world as
we know it at all events, for the organic and conscious
parts of it there is needed a force or power other than
what is material (call it by whatever name you please),
adequate to give the explanation of, or to account for,
the "inner design" that life and mind, biological and
. psychical facts alike, display. In other words, the
highest facts in our experience are not explicable by
the principles of Epicurean physics, but are simply
slurred over in it ; and what plausibility the explana-
tion possesses is got from the circumstance that it
assumes those higher facts in the lower, and thereby
obtains for the lower a greater potency than rightfully
belongs to them.
But the Epicurean Criterion of Truth what of it ?
Certainly, knowledge begins with sensation ; Stoic
and Epicurean were agreed on that. But the Stoic
insisted that, although sensation is indispensable, it
cannot by itself explain experience to us, or show how
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 125
knowledge is possible. In all knowledge, there is a
mental element that must be taken account of, as well
as a sense element ; and the native activity of the mind
is a fundamental fact that must be duly appraised.
Hence the Stoic's insistence on the mind's assent in
knowledge, and of the power it has of grasping reality
and truth in the various ways laid down in his Episte-
mology, as we have detailed in Chapter IV.
Nor is the Epicurean doctrine of free will very
satisfactory.
It was vigorously attacked in ancient times (as we
see in Cicero, for example), and the Stoics opposed it.
And there is real ground for this. Although the theory
may be said to be in line with that of unconscious will
in Schopenhauer, it is far from impregnable. No light
is really thrown upon the problem by simply designat-
ing the power of declination in the material atoms
"will"; nor is man's volitional freedom explained
by being referred back to such declination. If "the
bonds of fate" are to be broken, it certainly cannot be
done in this way. To subsume two such things as the
unconscious swerving of dead material particles from
the vertical and the intensely conscious purposive
determination of a man in making a choice, under the
same category "will," seems very like juggling with
words* There is no true explanation in this ; and
Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Ideas at once suggests
itself as applicable here "mere empty talk and
picturesque metaphor (KcpoAoyetv cori KOL /xTa</>opas
SECTION C. MORALITY AND RELIGION
CHAPTER VII
PREDECESSORS OF THE STOICS IN ETHICS
"Nee philosophia sine virtu te est, nee sine philosophia
virtus. " SENECA.
"Above all things, the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer than
the sun." EPICTETUS.
" Diogenes, one terrible frosty morning, came into the market-
place, and stood naked, shaking, to show his tolerance. Many of
the people came about him, pitying him : Plato passing by, and
knowing he did it to be seen, said to the people, as he went by :
' If you pity him indeed, let him alone to himself.' "BACON.
I
IN recounting the probable sources from which the
Stoics drew their ethical doctrines, in so far as they
were dependent on ethicists that had preceded them,
we naturally think first of Plato and his transcendent
system, so grandly set forth in the Dialogues. To us
who owe so much to Platonism, who find Platonic
thought and conceptions woven into the very texture
of Western culture and civilization, including law and
jurisprudence, no less than metaphysics, morality, and
religion, it would seem impossible that a great ethical
school, created shortly after Plato's time, and on the
very spot, should not have drunk in the Platonic spirit
and drawn freely from the Platonic fountain. But that
126
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 127
was not the way of the schools of ancient Athens ;
and, as a matter of fact, neither the Stoics, 1 nor any
of the early post-Platonic sects, owned a large debt to
Plato. On the contrary, they went, for the most part,
on entirely different lines, and reverted to the views of
pre-Socratic thinkers, who, one would have supposed,
were superseded. In Stoicism, the spritualism of Plato
was supplanted by materialism, and his imposing
Theory of Ideas was not merely ignored but deliberately
rejected, j This certainly needs explanation, and more
reasons than one immediately suggest themselves.
On the one hand, there is the consideration that the
Platonic teaching, being so supremely speculative, was
little in touch with common life and the everyday world.
Plato was "the dragon" to use a simile of Confucius,
when comparing Laotsze with himself he soars in the
air, ignoring terra firma. Neither the mode of thinking
nor the subject-matter of thought was the same to
Plato as to the Stoics : it is very much the difference
between viewing ethics from the high contemplative
and purely theoretical side (including its aesthetic
aspect), and viewing it as a.practical thing, designed as
a rule of life and . guide to conduct. On the other
hand, the Platonic ethics subordinated the individual
4o the State, and hardly recognized him as an individual
at all ; whereas the moment had now come (politically
determined) when individualism in Greece had strongly
asserted itself (just as it did, centuries afterwards, in
Western Europe, at the time of the Renaissance and the
Reformation), and Zeno and his immediate successors
1 Things were different, of course, with the later Eclectics, such
as Seneca.
128 THE STOIC CREED
were under the power of this impulse. [The worth of
the individual, and his destiny, and how best he was to
achieve his perfection these were the points that
occupied the first place in the Stoic's interest. 1 j Nor,
further, must we forget that if Plato was studied by
the Stoics as interpreted by his successors in the
Academy, there were sufficient grounds for refusing to
accept him as an unerring and satisfactory guide.
But, be the explanation what it may, the fact
remains : Plato's was not an outstanding influence to
the Stoics. Nevertheless, he did to some extent affect
them that was inevitable. They accepted his defini-
tion of virtue as knowledge or insight ; they reproduced
his doctrine of the cardinal virtues ; his anthropology
left traces on their teaching ; they were affected by
some of his sociological views as set forth in the
Republic ; and they shared with him the recognition of
the world as a living being and the conception of the
anima mundi. Yet, even while accepting these views,
the Stoics modified and handled them in a fashion of
their own. Such an argument, for instance, as the
following, to prove that the world is rational, put into
the mouth of Zeno by Cicero (De- Nat. Deor. ii. 8),
would sound strange in Plato: " That which reasons is
superior to that which does not reason. But nothing
is superior to the world. Therefore, the world reasons."
Or this: " Nothing that is itself destitute of life and
reason can generate a being possessed of life and
reason. But the world generates beings possessed of
life and reason. Therefore, the world is itself possessed
1 Compare this with Christianity, when the individual again
emerges.
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 129
of life and reason." The poetic glow of a great
imagination (working by intuition and suggestion
rather than by analysis) is here replaced by dry logical
ratiocination : the cramped view of the formal dia-
lectician takes the place of the wide synthetic sweep of
the philosopher.
As with Plato, so with Aristotle. Although
Aristotle's physics and his logic left their mark on
Stoicism (the latter more especially through Chrysippus),
and although it would not be difficult to trace the
working of his psychology in the Stoic handling of the
human impulses and desire, his ethics had only a very
limited influence. Indeed, the distinctive Aristotelian
positions such as, that virtue is a habit, 1 and that it
resides in the mean, and that it requires favouring
fortune (good health, external goods, and such like)
for its proper development could not well fit into the
Stoical scheme. They were necessarily uncongenial to
thinkers who dealt so largely with the ideal of virtue
(non-empirically constructed), and whose object was to
raise men to a platform where worldly prudence and
calculation of consequences and dependence upon
fortune and environment were waived aside.
Moreover, with Aristotle intellect or contemplation
was the chief thing, and he held it to be the highest
aim of man to achieve the contemplative disposition.
That he regarded as the characteristic of the philosopher;
and he "thought that the highest aim for a State was
to turn out philosophers, and that the highest aim for
1 Of course, the Stoics recognized habit in the formation of
character.
130 THE STOIC CREED
an individual was to be a philosopher." 1 He even
conceived the Deity solely from this standpoint of con-
templation, not defining Him as an ethical being, but
as self-reflective, as " thinking upon thought."' The
Stoics, on the other hand, viewed man first and chiefly
from the side of his activities ; perceiving rightly
enough that these are what have for him the greatest
interest and mould his destiny. Volition comes first ;
practical interests come first. So that, what we find
is this, the battle of intellectualism versus voluntarism
going on then, as it goes on now ; and pragmatism,
for the time being, had gotten the victory. 3
II
But if Plato and Aristotle had only a modified and
indirect influence on Stoical ethics, a very direct and
effectual influence came from the Cynics. 4
This may have been accidental, as the story about
Zeno's first introduction to philosophy through Crates
seems to suggest. It is recorded by Diogenes Laertius
(vii. 3) that Zeno, on his arrival at Athens, after ship-
wreck, in pursuit of business, happened to take up the
Memorabilia of Xenophon, at a bookseller's stall, and,
on reading part of it with interest and appreciation,
desired to know where such men as there depicted
were to be found. Crates, the Cynic, chanced to be
passing at the moment, and the bookseller pointed to
1 Sir A. Grant, Aristotle, p. 101. " Metaphysics, xi. 9.
3 See Appendix.
4 The name Cynic is likely derived from the gymnasium
Cynosarges, which the Cynics frequented ; although the personal
habits and temper of the Cynics went far to justify opponents in
applying the term as though it were derived from Ktw, a dog.
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 131
him. Zeno joined him and became his disciple, and
thus started his life of philosopher under the Cynic
banner.
Whether this story be literally true or not, it declares
the undoubted fact that the Cynics, who claimed to be
the only real representatives of the Socratic teaching,
greatly impressed the Stoics, beginning with the founder
Zeno.
What, then, was the Cynics' view of life, and of man
and his aspirations and his relations to nature and to
God? for these are the main questions that engaged
the attention of the Stoics.
In the Symposium of Xenophon, Antisthenes, the
founder of the Cynic school, is introduced as upholding
the thesis that his wealth is the thing of which he is
most proud, and, at the same time, he expresses him-
self shocked at the principle of Callias that the way to
make men just and upright is by giving them money.
The seeming paradox is resolved by observing the
double meaning of ' ' wealth " or ' ' money. " You cannot
buy uprightness with material coin ; but you may be
wealthy, though poor and lacking such coin, in spiritual
riches. "I hold to the belief," he says, "that wealth
and poverty lie not in men's estate but in men's souls,"
"wealth of my sort will make you liberal of nature."
The soul is the great thing, and its health the first
concern ; and the discourse on this text that he gives
is an advocacy of the wisdom, for the soul's sake, of
sitting loose to the pleasures of the world, of moderating
and suppressing one's desires, of finding the source of
happiness and peace in the mind and inward being, not
132 THE STOIC CREED
in external circumstances or the so-called good things
of life, which are variable and uncertain and which
perish in the using, leaving one unsatisfied. It is the
characteristic of the wise man that he is self-sufficient
independent of fortune's favour and of everything outside
himself: he is master of the world by being master of
his own desires. Hence, he can endure hardness without
repining and can even rejoice in it ; and asceticism is his
natural element.
This is robust moral teaching. But there are dangers
attaching to it. The self-sufficiency of the wise man,
if not carefully watched and guarded, may degenerate
into pride and self-satisfaction and ostentation (as too
frequently it did among the Cynics), and, consequently,
into contempt for others. There is a story of Antis-
thenes, recorded by Diogenes Laertius (ii. 5), which
illustrates this. One day Antisthenes was seen turning
the torn part of his cloak towards the spectator, so as
to attract his attention and, doubtless, to draw forth his
regard. Whereupon Socrates, exactly gauging the
situation, remarked, " I see your vanity through your
cloak." Another illustration refers to Diogenes the
Cynic. Once, on entering Plato's house, he ostenta-
tiously trampled on his fine carpet, remarking, " Thus
I tread on Plato's pride." "Yes, Diogenes," was
Plato's answer, "with another pride of your own"
(Diog. Lae'rt. ii. 53). Here, Cynicism has become
rudeness ; which is further exemplified by a familiar
incident in the life of Diogenes. When Alexander the
Great visited him, as he lay basking in the sun, at -
Corinth, Alexander saluted him, and desired to know if
there was anything that he wanted. To this Diogenes
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 133
brusquely replied: "Only that you stand out of
my sunshine." Certainly, good manners did not
characterize the sage from Sinope. 1
Further, the Cynic, bound up in his self-sufficiency,
was narrow-minded and despised things of the intellect.
He contemned learning, and spurned speculation. But,
worst of all, in reducing his creed to practice, he set
conventionality at defiance, gave his tongue undue
licence, and gloried in offensive bodily habits, forget-
ting that "cleanliness is next to godliness." Diogenes
lived in a tub ; the decencies of life were scarcely
observed by him or by others of his persuasion ; and
opponents had just ground for the attacks that they
made in this connexion. Moreover, the Cynics were
a kind of " mendicant order in philosophy," and begged
their bread. The wallet was their badge. No very
high conception of independence here !
But take the Cynic doctrine of self-sufficiency at its
highest and best, stripped of the debasing aberrations
which attended the attempt to carry it out into practice,
often rendering the nobility of it unrecognizable (just
as the shell-fish and seaweed and pebbles and other
marine things that gathered around Glaucus and ad-
hered to him transformed the sea-god almost past
recognition 2 ), and we see that its nature is to purify
and ennoble him who entertains it and tries to mould
his life accordingly. With true Socratic earnestness
(and the leading Cynics were earnest), it inculcates
patience and endurance and a contempt for self-
indulgence and for pleasure that produces strength
1 See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32 ; and Arrian, Anabasis, vii. i.
2 See Plato, Republic, x. n.
134 THE STOIC CREED
and beauty of soul. " I would rather be mad than
pleased (juai/a'^v /x,aAAoi/ 17 ^o-flen?]/)," 1 said Antisthenes ;
and thereby he showed, at least, that he aimed at
raising character high.
In all this, we have the first draft of the Wise Man,
which the Stoics accepted and took over but improved
upon, and which explains to us how "the Cynic"
became to them the technical name for the Ideal
Sage. 2
G>ut, next, in order to a happy life for the individual,
Cynics dwelt much on the necessity of living in
accordance with nature ; and it was, doubtless, from
this source that the Stoics derived the conception and
the formulaTj Yet, between the teaching of the two
schools there was a great contrast. The " nature" to
which the Cynics wished to return was that of unre-
strained unconventional living. Hence, Antisthenes
took as a model for civilized man the life of the lower
animals and of primitive man ; thereby interpreting
nature in a way that did not safeguard the higher
morality, but might be looked upon as sanctioning im-
morality and licentiousness. " The Cynics took the
savage as their teacher in all seriousness, just as
Diderot and Rousseau did in a later age. (They glori-
fied the state of nature with inexhaustible eloquence
and ingenuity, and they never wearied of anathematis-
ing the pernicious influence of civilisation." 3 Thus,
they cast aside the sound Aristotelian dictum that the
1 Diog. Laert. vi. 4.
2 See Epictetus, Dissertations, Hi. 22.
3 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, vol. ii. p. 144, Eng. tr.
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 135
true test of what is natural is the end or reXos, and
that you are to interpret the lower by the higher, and
not, contrariwise, the higher by the lower ; so that man
is to be estimated, not by what he was or even by what
at any moment he is, but by what he has it in him to
be or to become.
In their doctrine on this point, the Stoics were wiser.
They looked to the ideal, and refused to copy the
habits either of the lower animals or of primitive man.
Hence, they rose to the conception of a pure and noble
individual, sharer in the divine, and of a universal
brotherhood of mankind, and preached the necessity of
the individual regarding himself as a citizen of the
world and discharging social duties. The Cynics, on
the other hand, were strictly individualistic in their
teaching. Personal freedom, individual independence,
was to them the great thing, and of the salvation of
the community or of the world they were sceptical.
Hence the Cynic was anti-social in his tendencies, and
lived as much outside society as he could, avoiding
social duties and renouncing family ties, devoid of
patriotism and devoted to criticism of accepted ideals,
living as a wanderer and a beggar. Only contemning
the general run of mankind, whom he regarded as
deluded, he contracted a spirit of sourness and cen-
soriousness, which frequently expressed itself in bitter
satire, thus justifying the modern acceptation of the
term "cynical" as synonymous with acerbity and
malignant utterance. Whatever the Stoics were, they
were not cynical in this sense ; and it signalizes their
philosophy that, in Marcus Aurelius, it could produce
a "philosopher-king" a man of gentle, noble nature,
136 THE STOIC CREED
who could both devote himself to statesmanship and
to the furtherance of the interests of the empire, and
could carry the spirit of his philosophy into the dis-
charge of his onerous duties.
But there is a further point to be noticed in con-
nexion with Cynicism^-namely, its attitude towards
the popular religion. I As it was the Cynic's function to
criticize and oppose established customs and accepted
ideals, it might naturally be supposed that he would
disown religion and make a .gneedy end of the gods and
of the heroes of mythology. I This, however, was not
what he did ; and, when we remember his acceptance
of primitive man as his model for life and conduct, we
can readily see that he could not consistently have done
it. For, to primitive man were due the gods and the
accredited mythologies ; and so these mythologies must
somehow be accepted^ if we are to return to a life con-
formable to nature. I Obviously, hqwever, they could
not be accepted by philosophers in their bare literality,
and so they must be allegorized. (The allegorical
method, consequently, was the great method in the
hands of the Cynics, and those stories of the gods and
of the heroes which appealed so forcibly to the un-
tutored fancy became the subjects of rationalistic inter-
pretation were taken as the mere popular expression
of philosophical conceptions.
To the Cynics the Stoics were here indebted ; for
this same allegorical method came to play a great part
in their religious philosophy, keeping them philosophers
while they also remained loyal citizens ; and through
them it was handed on to Philo the Jew, who applied
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 137
it to the Old Testament to its early historical records
and its anthropomorphic way of viewing the Deity ;
and thence to Origen and the Catechetical school of
Alexandria, who included the New Testament in their
scope ; and thence to Biblical critics in later ages so
that the principle has permanently affected Christian
exegesis.
In these respects, at any rate, there is a real affinity
and causal connexion between Cynicism and Stoicism,
though it would not be difficult to show that the Cynics
also found the germs of their system in previous philo-
sophic thought. But with essential affinities there are
also essential differences, which will be obvious as we
proceed ; and " perhaps we nearest touch the spring of
difference," as Sir Alexander Grant puts it (The Ethics
of Aristotle, vol. i. pp. 317, 318), " by observing that
Cynicism is essentially mere negation, mere protest
against the external world ; while Stoicism is essentially
positive, essentially constructive, ap4 tends in many
ways to leaven the external world. I Cynicism despised
the sciences, disdained politics, exploded the social
institutions, and ridiculed patriotism or the distinctions
of country. Zeno, on the contrary, rearranged the
sciences according to his views : he enjoined the wise
to mix in affairs ; and he conceived not a mere negation
of patriotic prejudices, but the positive idea of cosmo-
politanism. Cynicism, therefore, is a withdrawal from
the world into blank isolation, while Stoicism is the
withdrawal into an inner life, which forms to its votaries
an object of the highest enthusiasm. Hence the elation,
often hyperbolical, which tinges the Stoical austerity ;
138 THE STOIC CREED
hence the attractiveness of the doctrine and its spread
over the world. And connected, too, with the positive
and constructive impulse of Stoicism, we may reckon
its plastic character, its external eclecticism, and its
tendency to be influenced and modified by the course
of surrounding civilisation."
Ill
One other name needs here to be mentioned namely,
that of Heracleitus. We have already seen how deeply
indebted the Stoics were to Heracleitus's physics (see
p. 87). It is most likely that they were influenced
also by his ethics ; at any rate, he held views allied to
theirs, and was the first in Greek philosophy to express
such. These were associated with his doctrine of logos,
or the universal reason. The world, according to him,
is permeated by reason. This all-pervasive reason is
not simply intellectual, but also ethical. Order as
natural law exists everywhere in the universe, but
that order is beneficent and rewards him who subjects
himself to it. The phenomena of nature have an
ethical significance, and may be interpreted as a guide
to human conduct. " The wise man will despise that
for which the masses strive, as a worthless and perish-
able thing. He will not take his own caprices, but the
common law, for his standard ; will avoid nothing more
than presumption, the overstepping of the bounds
which are set for the individual and for human nature ;
and in thus subjecting himself to the order of the whole,
he will reach that satisfaction which Heracle'itus is said
to have declared to be the highest end of life. It
depends only upon man himself whether he is happy.
PREDECESSORS OF STOICS IN ETHICS 139
The world is always as it ought to be ; l it must be our
part to accommodate ourselves to the universal order ;
the character of a man is his daemon [is a god, rjQos
dvfyxoTTw Satfiwv]." 2 This means, at any rate, that the
world is so constructed as that character may appear
and develop in it, and that the crowning glory of human
beings is character is their right relation to one an-
other, to the whole, and to the supreme reason in which
they share.
This was the pronounced teaching of the Stoics also.
To them, too, the world-order is ethical, and character
is man's highest concern and his greatest achievement.
To Heracleitus and to Zeno alike more still, perhaps,
to Cleanthes, as judged by his Hymn to Zeus the
universal logos guides all things wisely and for the
best ; and by all alike Matthew Arnold's definition of
the Supreme would have been accepted "the Eternal
not ourselves that makes for righteousness." Ethics
conditions their pantheism, and makes it glow. 3
1 This is viewed from the side of God, or sub specie ceternitatis,
as Spinoza would put it ; it is only from man's standpoint that
some things appear just and others unjust.
2 Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 97-98 (Eng. tr.).
3 The conception of God as "Moral World-Order" was repro-
duced by Fichte in modern times. Wherein ethical pantheism is
inadequate, I have tried to point out in Theism as grounded in
Human Nature, pp. 394-396.
CHAPTER VIII
ETHICS : EXPOSITION
"And virtue is self-sufficient for happiness." ZENO.
" This very place, which you call banishment, is fatherland to
those who inhabit it. So, nothing is wretched, unless you think
it ; and, on the other hand, every lot is blessed if it be borne with
equanimity. " BOETHIUS.
" Non qui parum habet, sedquipluscupit, pauper est." SENECA.
"The aids to noble life are all within." MATTHEW ARNOLD.
I
IN their analysis of human nature, the Stoics started
with the Platonic conception, that man is a compound
being consisting of two p'arts, a body and a soul. In
one place, indeed, Marcus Aurelius seems to make a
threefold division of man. "Body, soul, mind," he
says (Med. iii. 16), "these three"; but immediately
he adds, "to the body belong sensations, to the soul
impulses, to the mind principles " thereby showing
that it is not a true trichotomy that he has in view,
but simply a loose classification of psychical processes
into sense, impulse, and intellection. "The im-
pressions of sense," he continues, "we share with
cattle of the field: the pulls of impulse with brute
beasts, with catamites, with Phalaris, or Nero ; and
mind is still the guide to obvious duties, even for the
atheist, the traitor, and for those who lock the door
140
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 141
for sin." To the same import is the other passage
(Med. xii. 3), where a similar trichotomy occurs :
" You consist of three parts body, breath, mind.
The first two are yours, to the extent of requiring 1
your care : the third only is properly your own." Here,
body and breath go together as constituting the mere
animated corporeal instrument, and mind stands
opposed as reason. 1
But, while starting with the Platonic conception of
man in his twofold nature, the Stoics further followed
Plato (at least, the Plato of the Phcedo and allied
dialogues) in looking on the body as a hindrance or
impediment to the soul, or, at any rate, the tool that
the soul employs to effect its ends. "That which
pulls the strings, remember," says Marcus Aurelius
(Med. x. 38), "is the power concealed within; there
is the mandate, the life, there, one may say, the man.
Never confound it with the mere containing shell, and
the various appended organs. They may be compared
to tools, with this difference, that the connexion is
organic. Indeed, apart from the inner cause which
dictates action or inaction, the parts are of no more
use than the weaver's shuttle, the writer's pen, or the
coachman's whip." To Seneca, in like manner, the
body is but the clog and prison-house and punishment
of the soul ; or it is the fetter that deprives the soul of
its liberty ; or, again, it is an inn which the soul in its
sojourn occupies but for a brief moment (see Epp. 65
and 102).
1 There is only a superficial resemblance between these tricho-
tomies and that of St. Paul in i Thess. v. 23 "Spirit and soul
and body (rb irvevp.a, tta.1 ^xtf, Ka.1 rb <r<2;u,a)."
142 THE STOIC CREED
This, apparently, was to depart from the original
position of Zeno, that man was wholly formed out of
the divine essence, and that there is nothing inherently
derogatory in matter, and serves to show that the strict
physical speculations of the school had ultimately but a
feeble hold on the Ethics.
The soul, on the other hand, is that part of man which
contains the master-faculty of reason, characterized by
self-consciousness and moral perception (see Epictetus,
Diss. i. i), and therefore the authoritative and ruling
principle in man (TO ^ye/xoviKoi/), that which guides him
to right thought and right action. It is one, permeat-
ing ttye whole body ; though to the later Stoics,
influenced by Plato, more especially to Seneca, 1 it
assumes a twofold character, inasmuch as man's nature
is cleft asunder and reason is opposed to appetite and
passion, and the battle in the individual, as experience
testifies, is unceasing between the higher and the lower
between the spirit and the flesh. These two terms,
indeed, " spirit" and " flesh," are found as a contrast
in^Seneca, and they signify much. The ruling faculty
is "the diviner part" of man is "the god within";
and it is man's peculiar glory to be swayed by it.
Hence, in distinctive Stoic phraseology, it is man's
prerogative " to live agreeably to nature " (6/^oA.oyov/AeVws
rrj <j>va-fL ijv, vivere convenienter naturce}.
Now, what is "living agreeably to nature"? It is,
in the first place, according to Cleanthes, living con-
formably to the course of the universe ; for the universe
is under the governance of reason, and man has it as
1 See, e.g., Ep. 71.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 143
his privilege to know or become acquainted with the
world-course, to recognize it as rational and cheerfully
to conform to it. This, according to him, is true
freedom of will not acting without motive, or apart
from set purpose, or capriciously, but humbly ac-
quiescing in the universal order, and, therefore, in
everything that befalls one here : "in regno nati sumus:
deo parere libertas est." l In the next place, it resolves
itself, in Epictetus's favourite phrase, into the right use
of appearances, i.e. y into a correct insight into true
values, which is conditioned by our clearly perceiving
what is and wRat is not in our power, and by our re-
garding the latter as wholly indifferent (neither good
nor bad), neither to be eagerly avoided nor earnestly
pursued), while scrupulously laying hold of the former. \
In this second sense, it consists in what Chrysippus held
to be its chief meaning 2 namely, in living agreeably
loJMman nature, which, again, he interpreted as mean-
ing conformably to the nature of a being who, unlike
the brutes, not only uses appearances but also under-
stands and interprets them. 3 In this case, true freedom
consists in emancipation from the thraldom of irrational
desires (wealth, lust, domination, the passions), in the
eradication of our desires and the reduction of our
wants to the smallest possible number, and in subjection
to the will under the supremacy of reason. 4
1 Seneca, De Vita Beata, 15.
2 " By that nature in accordance with which we are to live,
Chrysippus understands both the common nature and the human
in particular " (Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 53).
3 See Epictetus, Diss. i. 6 and 13.
4 See ibid. ii. i. This doctrine of the right use of appearances
as constituting freedom was shared by the Stoics with the Cynics.
144 THE STOIC CREED
These two views of the life according to nature,
though distinct, are not antagonistic. On the contrary,
the one is the necessary complement of the other
"the way of both is one." 1 The first is the inter-
pretation of the rational life from the standpoint of
the universal or the whole, and the second is its inter-
pretation on the level of human nature, a part of the
whole and meaningless if divorced from it. The first
is ontological, and determines the Stoic theology ; the
second is psychological, and gives us the Stoic theory
of virtue and happiness their theory of Conscience,
for " the ruling faculty" is " conscience," and the very
term conscience (crweicfycris) sterns to have been coined
in the Stoic mint and to have come to us from thence. 2
It is the second of these interpretations that is at
present before us, as we sketch the Stoic ethics.
II
The ethical teaching of the Stoics, as of all great
moralists, centred in consideration of man's happiness
and its relation to virtue. To them, as to Aristotle,
happiness was something that must be self-sufficient,
which,' again, resolved itself into the position that
"a good man shall be satisfied from himself " (Prov.
xiv. 14). "Dig within," says Aurelius (Med. vii. 59).
Diogenes claims to have been taught it by Antisthenes. See
Epictetus, Diss. iii. 24.
1 Aurelius, Med. v. 3.
2 "The most important of moral terms, the crowning triumph
of ethical nomenclature, (Twetdyais, conscientia, the internal, abso-
lute, supreme judge of individual action, if not struck in the mint
of the Stoics, at all events became current coin through their
influence " (Lightfoot, St. Pauls Epistle to the Philippians, p. 301).
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 145
" Within is the fountain of good ; ever dig, and it will
ever well forth water." Happiness consists, therefore,
not in the possession of anything external, but in con-
trol of a man's own self, in strength of will illuminated
by reason. It is inward, and resides in his ability to
estimate the true worth of things and to act accordingly. v
Says Epictetus (Dtss. iv. 4): " There is only oneway
to happiness, /xta o8b<s CTTI evpoiav (let it be ready to hand
in the morning, during the day, and at night) namely,
to turn away from what is beyond the power of choice,
to regard nothing as one's own, to give over all things
to the divinity (r<3 S<u/Aoj/ia>), to fortune, making them the
superintendents of these things, whom Zeno also has
made so." This presupposes the distinction that there
are some things " in our power " (TO. e<' fjfuv) and others
"not in our power" (TO, OVK <' fjplv). Health, wealth,
property, friends, the body, death, and such like, are
outwith us and beyond our command they "depend
on chance," as Cicero puts it: therefore, we are to sit
loose to them, to use them as things "indifferent."
But our own will, and the formation of judgments and
opinions, assent and approval these are in our power,
and in the proper management of them consists our
felicity and peace. 1 In our power, in particular, is
virtue and the choice of what is right and good ; in the
pursuit of which lie man's distinction and his bliss.
"Take care, when you see a man honoured above
others, or great in power, or otherwise esteemed, that
you do not regard him as happy, being carried away
by the appearance. For if the essence of the good be
in those things that are in our own power, neither envy
1 See Epictetus, Diss. i. i and iv. i.
10
146 THE STOIC CREED
nor jealousy has any place, and you yourself will not
desire to be a general, a president, or a consul, but to
be free. And to this there is one road, scorn of the
things that are not in our own power " (Epic. Encheir.
19). Control the desires, then ; yea, as the older Stoics
held, eradicate them. Therein lies the secret of happi-
ness : ** Seek not that the things which happen should
happen as you wish, but wish the things which happen
to be as they are, and you will have an even flow of
life "(#*. 8).
Now, let us look more narrowly at this doctrine of
the source of man's happiness, after premising that,
unlike Buddha and Schopenhauer, the Stoic started i/
with the acknowledgment that life is good and worth
living, and that man naturally desires happiness and
aims at it. The first impulse of every animal, as
Chrysippus said, is to preserve and to protect itself
" the first thing proper to it is its own existence and
the consciousness thereof" (Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 52). This
means that its primary aim is to live, to obtain food
and drink, to reproduce its kind, and, in a word,
to find and continue the adaptation of internal to
external relations. In success lies its happiness ; in
failure its unhappiness. 1 Otherwise put, the good is
naturally attractive, and we are drawn to it when we
perceive it. " For, as the money-changer is not allowed
to reject Csesar's coin, nor the greengrocer, but if you
show the coin, whether he will or not, he must give up
what is sold in exchange for the coin, so it is also in
1 Cf. Spinoza's doctrine of conatus in his Ethica (see, e.g., Pars
i. prop. 1 8).
ETHICS*:' EXPOSITION 147
the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it
immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself.
But never will the soul reject the manifest (Ivapyrf)
appearance of the good, any more than people will reject
Caesar's coin. Thence is derived every movement both
of man and of God " (Epictetus, Diss. iii. 3).
It is not in inclination towards the good that there
is any difficulty, according to the Stoics. Where
difficulty arises is in the application to particular cases.
Some men place the good in outward prosperity ;
others in internal character. Philosophy begins only
when the contradiction between these two is felt and
the reason of it inquired into ; and it is the aim of
philosophy to establish that the good is internal and
resides in the will, and not external or dependent on
things beyond us.
Well, then, to face directly the point before us the
source of man's happiness.
Pleasure, Apathy, Desire
First of all, as we have seen, nothing external can
really affect us : it is only what we ourselves allow
our mind, and, therefore, our desire, to rest upon and
entertain that can either injure or benefit us. "The
view taken is everything ; and that rests with yourself.
Disown the view, at will ; and behold, the headland
rounded, there is calm, still waters and a waveless
bay " (Aurelius, Med. xii. 22).
Hence the correct notion of pleasure and pain.
While the one is in itself no good, the other is not
in itself an evil ; each becomes such only through our
148 THE STOIC CREED
judgment or opinion of it. "Pain," says Aurelius
(Med. viii. 28, 29), "is either an evil for the body
and if so, let the body state its case ; or for the soul
but the soul can maintain its own unclouded calm,
and refuse to view it as an evil. For every judgment
or impulse or inclination or avoidance is within, and
nothing evil can force entrance there. Efface im-
pressions, reiterating to yourself It rests now with
me, that within this soul of mine there be no vice,
nor desire, nor any perturbation at all ; perceiving
the true nature of all things, I use each at its proper
worth. Remember this prerogative is yours by
nature." Cleanthes went farther, and maintained that
pleasure is not only not a good, but is "contrary to
nature" and "worthless." It was his opinion that
all the emotions (love, fear, grief) are weaknesses :
they lack that strain or tension (roVos) which he so
persistently emphasized, and on which the strength
of the soul, no less than that of the body, depends,
and which constitutes in man self-control, and robust
moral fibre (cyKpareta), and also conditions every
virtue ; 1 they are on the side of loosening and col-
lapse, not on that of coherence, persistence, and
stability. "The freehold of the mind none other may
contravene ; fire cannot touch it, nor steel, nor tyrant,
nor slander, nor any other thing ; so long as it
abides * poised as a sphere self-orbed ' " (Aurelius,
Med. viii. 41).
The doctrine under consideration is put most strik-
1 The Stoics took over the cardinal virtues from Plato, and gave
a handling of each wisdom, self-control, courage, righteousness
or justice.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 149
ingly in connexion with the passionlessness or apathy -
(a7ra0ia) of the ideal wise man. On him mental
perturbation is without effect ; for perturbation, as
Zeno defined it (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 6), is "a
commotion of the mind repugnant to reason and
against nature." Desires, therefore, in so far as they
are bare feelings, are no motive to him : it is only
the desires of reason, such as arise from his conception
of the unity' and rationality of life and of the universe,
that can move him. Feelings, of course, as psychical
states, the sage, like every other human being, ex-
periences feelings of pleasure and pain ; but they do
not in any way disturb or unhinge him under them
he remains self-poised. t It is recorded of Pompey that,
when he visited Posidonius with a view to hearing
him discourse on the Stoic philosophy, he found him
seriously ill and much pained. He graciously saluted
him, and expressed his disappointment at not being
able to hear him lecture. "But you are able," was
the reply, "nor can I allow that bodily pain should
caus/e so great a man to come to me in vain."
Whereupon, Posidonius proceeded to discourse to him
seriously and copiously, from his couch, on the Stoic
theme that nothing is good unless it be honourable ;
and, when interrupted by frequent paroxysms of pain,
he exclaimed: "You are making no impression, pain!
although you are hard to bear, I will never admit that
you are an evil" (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 61). In this
way, the wise man, being self-sufficient, alone is free
and alone is a king ; he is rich in the midst of poverty,
and happy though in physical torment. He never
yields to anger, or resentment, or envy, or fear, or
150 THE STOIC CREED
grief, or even to joy or to lust ; J nor does he experience
pity or compassion, or show forgiveness, 2 for he cannot
compassionate or pardon another, who, he conceives,
is simply suffering from what he himself, if such suffer-
ing were his, would regard as no evil. 3 Hence, further,
the ideal sage has no desire for fame, and scorns the
pursuit of it, and is relieved from all anxiety above
both the future and the past. 4 He is thus the equal
of Zeus himself ; and to him, if the doctrine is to be
consistently carried out, Zeus becomes "a subject for
compliments, rather than a power to be reckoned
with." As Horace puts it (Ep. i. i, 106-7) :
" Ad summam, sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives,
Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum."
' 'The ultimate end," said Ariston, "is to live in
entire indifference towards the things that are inter-
mediate between virtue and vice, not making any
distinction between them, but treating- all as equal ;
for the wise man is like a good actor, who, whether
he personates Thersites or Agamemnon, plays the part
of each fitly" (Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 2). 5
It is on the ground of this same indifference towards
things external that the Stoic both permitted and,
1 \
1 The Stoics, according to Cicero, classified the emotions in a
fourfold way ; two of them having respect to goods (namely, joy
and lust) and two to evils (namely, fear and grief). Under each of
the four, they had many groups or subdivisions ; and their delight
in minute distinctions may very well be seen from examples in the
Tusculan Disputations, bk. iv.
2 See Seneca, De Clementia, ii. He calls pity "the vice of a
petty spirit (est enim vitium pusilli animi)."
3 See Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 64. 4 See Aurel. Med. ii. 14.
5 For a characterization of the wise man, see Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 64.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 151
under certain conditions, counselled suicide (eaytoyij).
As death is a thing destined to all, and its advent,
therefore, beyond our power to prevent, in other
words, as it is one of the things " indifferent" (dSta^opa,
res medice, indifferentes], it is not to be dreaded by the
wise man. Rather, the wise man, just because he is
wise, may, if life's circumstances be such as to impede
his development or impair his usefulness, properly
enough accelerate its advent. The soul is at best but
the "hospes comesque corporis." " Hence, they say
also that with good reason may the wise man deprive
himself of life, for the sake either of his fatherland
or of his friends, or if he be suffering from very acute
pain, or from mutilations, or from incurable diseases "
(Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 66). This is the doctrine of what
Epictetus calls "the open door." "When he (God)
does not supply the necessaries, he gives the signal for
retreat, opens the door, and says to you, Go " (Epic.
Diss. iii. 13). " Only," he adds in another place (Diss.
i. ,29), " you must not do it thoughtlessly, you must not
do it as. a coward, nor on any slight pretext." So, too,
Marcus Aurelius (Med. v. 29): "You can live here on
earth, as you think to live after your departure hence.
If others disallow, then indeed it is time to quit ; yet
even so, not as one aggrieved. The cabin smokes so
I take leave of it. Why make ado ? But so long as
there is no such notice to quit, I remain free, and none
will hinder me from doing what I will ; that is, to
conform to the nature of a reasonable social being." 1
1 For an interesting- casuistical discussion, turning on the fact
of individual peculiarities, of when and to whom suicide is per-
missible, see Cicero, De Officiis, i. 31.
152 THE STOIC CREED
Virtue and Happiness
In the next place, happiness, to the Stoic, means
virtue not something- added on to it from without as
its reward, but virtue itself as a realized state in the
individual. Virtue, therefore, is the sole ultimate
source of happiness, issuing naturally and inevitably
in it: as Zeno puts it, "Virtue is self-sufficient for
happiness." 1 In that case, virtue is not merely the
chief but the only good ; and vice, issuing in misery,
is the only evil.
Now, what is virtue? It is wisdom (<J>p6vr)o-L<>) i.e.,
k is moral insight, or the clear and consistent percep-
tion of what is good and what is evil, and the eager
intentional accepting of the one and rejecting of the
other. As Seneca defines it (Ep. 20): "It is always
to will and not to will the same thing. You need
scarcely add the qualification that what you will must
be what is right. The same thing cannot* always
please any one unless it be right." Virtue, therefore,
lies in the will, in the disposition and the intention,
and not alone in the overt action. "Character," as
Stobaeus expresses it (Eclogce^ ii. 36), "is the fountain
of life from which actions severally flow." 2 " Cleanthes
useth this example : ' I sent,' saith he, ' two boys into
the Academy to seek out Plato, and to bring him unto
1 " However, Panaetius and Posidonius do not admit that virtue
is self-sufficient, but that there is need also of good health and
competence and strength " (Diog. Lae'rt. vii. 65). This reminds
one of Adam Smith, who enumerates the constituents of happiness
as health, a good conscience, and freedom from debt.
2 ^0os 6rn 71-177^7 filov, ct0' ^s cu /card /ufyos 7iy)as ptovai.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 153
me. The one of them sought him out in all galleries
and porches where he was wont to walk, and ran
through all other places wherein he had any hope to
find him out, and at length, being weary with his way,
and frustrate of his hope, returned home. The other
stood gazing at the next juggler, or mountebank, or
whilst he wandereth up and ,down and playeth with his
fellows and companions, seeth Plato passing by, and
found him whom he sought not. I,' saith Cleanthes,
4 will commend that boy who performed that he was
commanded, to his uttermost, and will chastise that
other who was more fortunate in laziness. / It is the
will that is the lawful mistress of these actions, the
condition whereof must be considered, if thou wilt
have me to be thy debtor. It is a small matter to
wish a man well, except thou pleasure him ; it
is a small matter to have pleasured, except thou
hadst a will to do it'" (Seneca, De Beneficiis, vi. n,
Thomas Lodge's tr.). j Hence, "the measure of
the man's worth is the worth of his aims " ; 1 and
it is only according to his purpose and intention
that a* man is either to be praised "or to be blamed
for his acts; 2 and "'the guilty deed lies in the very
hesitation, everi~)though it should never be actually
accomplished." 8 /
This doctrine of the inwardness of morality was
fundamental to the Stoics, 4 and must be taken in
1 Marcus Aurelius, Med. vii. 3.
2 Epictetus, Diss. iv. 8.
3 Cicero, De Ojficiis, iii. 8.
4 As it was also to Christ, in His Sermon on the Mount.
154 THE STOIC CREED
connexion with their famous distinction of the two
kinds of Duty "the suitable" or "fitting" and "the
right," KaOrjKov and Karop^w/xa, a distinction (together
with the elaborate working out of it) that entitled them
to be regarded as the originators of what Bentham calls
Deontology or the science of duty. Indeed, the term
"duty" (KaOrjKov) is said to have been first employed
in the technical ethical sense by Zeno, who wrote a
treatise On Duty (Diog. Laert. vii. 2i). 1 But duty, as
Ka.6rJKov, is simply the suitable or fitting, and not that
absolute rule of right that the term designates to-day.
It is applicable only to things "indifferent" (officium
medium}^ and signifies any action in everyday life that
meets a want or serves a purpose, any line of conduct
for which a reason may be given. It is not, therefore,
strictly speaking, "virtue," which-moves in a different
and a higher sphere. \ Strict virtue is KaropO^a (honestum,
or rectum, or officium perfectum] duty in its purest form,
which is not simply conformity to right reason, but con-
formity which flows from the will, the full knowledge,
and the simple intention of the wise man. Hence, in
this specific sense, and from the point of view of abstract
theory, virtue is indivisible : there cannot be degrees of
it. There can be degrees only in things that have
relative value ; but virtue has absolute worth it is to
be sought for its own sake, and is the same under all
circumstances. It is not, therefore, a "habit (!is),"
as Aristotle had taught it can neither diminish nor
increase: it is, in distinctive Stoic terminology, a
1 The Stoic's mode of handling Duty, in all its practical detail,
including the seasonable and decorous (decorum, TO irptirov) in
conduct, may be seen in Cicero's De Officiis.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 155
, or " disposition " : a decrescere summum bonum
non potest nee virtuti ire retro licet. . . . Incrementiim
maxima non est ; nihil invenis rectius recto (Seneca,
Ep. 66).
But if there are not degrees in virtue, neither 'are
there degrees in vice : all sins are equal ; omission of
the most trivial duty and commission of the most glaring
crime stand precisely on the same plane. 2 " They also
maintain," says Diogenes Laertius (vii. 64, 65), "that
all sins are equal, as says Chrysippus in the fourth
book of his Ethical Questions and Persaeus and Zeno.
For if what is true is not more than true, nor what is
false more than false, so also a deceit is not more than
deceit, nor a sin than sin. For he who is a hundred
stadia distant from Canopus and he who is only one
are both equally not in Canopus ; and so also he who
commits a greater and he who commits a less sin are
both equally not in the right path. As a stick must
be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either
1 Diog. Laert. vii. 89.
2 See Sextus Empiricus, Opera, vii. 453 (422-23). Compare St.
James (ii. 10) : " For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet
stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all." On the other
hand, it is interesting to observe that Calvinism, which has so
much in common with the stern side of Stoicism, viewing 1 sins from
the standpoint of Theology, makes distinction between them. In
answer to the Question, "Are all transgressions of the law of God
equally heinous in themselves, and in the sight of God ? " the
Westminster Divines have no difficulty in replying, in The Larger
Catechism, "All transgressions of the law of God are not equally
heinous ; but some sins in themselves, and by reason of several
aggravations, are more heinous in the sight of God than others " ;
and, immediately after, they proceed to enumerate the kinds and
sources of aggravation namely, "the persons offending," "the
parties offended," "the nature and quality of the offence," and
" circumstances of time and place."
156 THE STOIC CREED
just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just or
more unjust than unjust." 1 This carries with it the
paradox that there are two, and only two, classes of
men the good and the bad, or, as the Stoics called
them, " the wise" and "the foolish." 2 The good are
wholly good, the bad are wholly bad ; for, at this high
ethical level, the alternative is, either perfection or
nothing at all. As Cicero puts if (De Finibus, iv. 19) :
" All who are not wise are equally miserable ; all wise
men are perfectly happy : all actions done rightly are
equal to one another; all offences are equal." Hence
Zeno's paradox, that "those who are not wise are
unfriendly and hostile, and slaves, and aliens to each
other, parents to children, and brothers to brothers,
and relatives to relatives ; while the wise alone are
citizens and friends and relatives and free ; so that to
the Stoics parents and children are enemies, for they
are not wise" (Diog. Laert. vii. 28). 3
This stern doctrine was further intensified by the
teaching that the vast majority of men belong to the
class of the foolish that, indeed, human nature in
general is utterly depraved, and that there seems little
hope of reformation. Qn this topic Seneca loves to
dwell ; and, not unnaturally, considering the times in
which he lived and the state of Rome in the days of
1 "Heracleides of Tarsus, however, "he adds, " the acquaintance
of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus say that sins are not
equal."
2 See Stobseus, Eclogce, ii. 7. n. Compare Christ's teaching in
the Parables.
3 That the good or wise alone can be friends, was a prominent
Stoic doctrine, previously maintained by Aristotle. See, e.g.,
Epictetus's famous chapter on Friendship (Diss. ii. 22).
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 157
Nero, he appeals to experience in confirmation of his
view. " Hereof our ancestors and predecessors com-
plained, hereat we ourselves are aggrieved ; and for
this will our successors sigh, because good customs
are abolished, impieties have pre-eminence, and human
affairs grow worse and worse, and men leave no wicked-
ness or sin unsought after. ... In a word, we may
always boldly say thus of ourselves, that we are evil,
and (unwillingly I speak it) we always shall be " (De
Ben. i. 10). He also maintains (ibid. iv. 27): "We
do not say this, that all vices are in all men as particular
vices are in some ; * but that a wicked and foolish man
lacks not any vice. ... All vices ate in all men, butx-
not all are prominent in each." { Upon this Zeller
remarks : " It hardly requires to be noticed how nearly
this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues
of the heathen, how close a resemblance the Stoic
doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the
unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom
and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and
unbelievers." *M
But now, if virtue be the sole source of human
happiness, certain things follow.
In the first place, time or the length of a. man's days
on earth has nothing to do with it. For happiness, or
4 ' even flow of life" (evpota /?tbv), it is all one whether
we have lived a single day or a hundred years, if within
the single day our life has been full, its quality
perfect: it is quality, not quantity, that determines.
Hence it is only in duration that Zeus in his goodness
1 The Stoics, Epicureans^ and Sceptics (Eng. tr.), p. 275, n. i.
158 THE STOIC CREED
excels the good man. " Life is long," says Seneca
(Ep. 93), " if it be full ; but it is full when the mind has
achieved its development and realized it capacities. . . .
As a man of small stature may be a perfect man ; so,
in a small measure of time* life may be perfect. Age is
among things external to us. How long I may live is
an accident ; but how long I may be a man depends
upon myself." Again, he says (Ep. 74) : " The highest
good is neither diminished nor increased. . . . Whether
you make a circle larger or smaller is but a matter of
size, not of shape ; and though the one remain a long
time, and you immediately obliterate the other and
reduce it to the dust on which it was inscribed, yet
each was the same figure. That which is right is not
a matter of magnitude or of number or of time ; it can
neither be extended nor contracted. Take an upright
life of a hundred years' duration, or whatsoever number
you choose, and reduce it to a single day ; the one is
as upright as the other." J
This is precisely the doctrine of "the eternity"
of the soul espoused by Spinoza, ages after, in his
Ethica. By " eternity" Spinoza did not mean, any
more than the Stoics meant by happiness or evpoia
/?iov, duration : he meant, as they meant, quality of life
not length of days, but kind. 2
1 See also Aurelius, Med. ii. 14.
2 "By eternity," he says (Ethica, i., Def. 8), "I understand
existence itself, so far forth as it is conceived to follow necessarily
from the definition alone of the eternal thing-. Explanation. For
such existence, like the essence of the thing, is conceived as eternal
truth, and, consequently, it cannot be explained by duration or
time, even although the duration be conceived as without beginning
or end."
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 159
In the next place, it is only another aspect of the
Stoic doctrine when we say that virtue is its own
reward ; or, to put it otherwise, that man is made to be
virtuous virtue is the function of his soul. But an
organ is not paid for discharging its function : the
reward lies simply in its service.. Says Marcus Aurelius
(Med. ix. 42): "When you complain of some breach
of faith or gratitude, take heed first and foremost to
yourself. Obviously the fault lies with yourself, if you
had faith that a man of that disposition would keep
faith, or if in doing a kindness you did not do it upon
principle, nor upon the assumption that the kind act
was to be its own reward. What more do you want in
return for a service done ? Is it not enough to have
acted up to nature, without asking wages for it?
Does the eye demand a recompense for seeing, or the
feet for walking ? Just as this is the end for which they
exist, and just as they find their reward in realising the
law of their being, so too man is made for kindness, and
whenever he does an act of kindness or otherwise helps
forward the common good, he thereby fulfils the law of
his being and comes by his own." 1
But if virtue is its own reward, vice is its own
severest punishment. "As Zeus has ordained, so act.
But if you do not act so, you will suffer loss, you will
be punished. What will be the punishment ? Nothing
else than not having done your duty : you will lose
fidelity, modesty, decency. Do not look for greater
penalties than these " (Epictetus, Diss. iii. 7).
Moreover, the worth of virtue is independent of man's
appreciation of it. A thing is what it is, and is neither
1 See also vii. 73, 74 ; also, Epictetus, Diss. iii. 24.
160 THE STOIC CREED
better nor worse for being- praised. "True beauty
needs no addition, any more than law, or truth, or
kindness, or self-respect. For which of these can
praise beautify, or censure mar? Is the emerald less
perfect for lacking praise? or is gold, or ivory, or
purple? a lyre or a poniard, a floweret or a shrub?"
(Aurelius, Med. iv. 20). 1
Epicurean Hedonism
The Stoic doctrine of virtue as the ethical end will
still further be elucidated, if we refer to the contrasting
doctrine of pleasure. (To the Epicurean teaching of
pleasure as the summum bonum, the Stoics were in
entire and absolute opposition. They attacked it with
unwearied persistence, and with many arguments^-the
most striking of which were drawn from the psychology
of pleasure and pain.
( (i) In the first place, they objected to the term " plea-
sure " as being ambiguous. It refers properly, they
maintained, only to bodily pleasures, or, in addition, to
such secondary pleasures as caji be traced ultimately to
the body as their source ; butjthe Epicureans often gave
it a wider connotation, and thereby gained an illegitimate
plausibility for their doctrine. 2 ) (2) In the next place,
pleasure, even as applied to agreeable sensation, has
two meanings (a) the positive signification of a settled
state, and (b) the negative signification of mere absence
of pain ; and these two are by no means the same thing.
(3) Again, if pleasure be the highest good, then pain
1 See also Cicero, De Officiis, i. 4.
2 Clearly this was an ignoratio elenchi. If you are to vanquish
an opponent in dialectics, you must meet him on his own ground.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 161
must be the greatest evil the two are incompatible ;
and so a man in pain must be the most miserable and
pitiable of beings. But, as a matter of fact, pain is
regarded by the virtuous as quite secondary, and, while
they bear it with magnanimity, they can be entirely
happy under it, seeing that their mind or conscience is
at rest. (4) Once more, virtue is universally admired
and praised, not because of the pleasure it procures, but
because it is virtue ; and if people ever suspect that a
moral hero has acted as he did simply for the sake of
pleasure, they at once cease to regard him as a hero,
(5) But, even as applied to bodily sensation, pleasure is
not the sign of health and continued efficiency, but is an
index of degeneracy and decline it is the indication
that a faculty or organ has reached its highest point and
is on the way to decay. 1 (6) Then, again, the doctrine
was attacked on the ground that it takes account only
of a part of human nature, and omits its altruistic and
sympathetic side. This was a line of attack that was
possible only to developed Stoicism, when the value
of the humaner virtues came to be realized ; but it is
very frequent in (say) Epictetus. It was aimed at the
Epicurean conception of " unperturbedness " (dra/oa^'a)
as the supreme good the state of agreeable feeling,
unalloyed by pain ; thereby making the feelings (TrdOrj)
the criterion of moral worth, and placing man's peace
of mind in something that was esentially fleeting and
unstable. This appeared to Epictetus to be a wholly
mistaken and a very derogatory view to take. Of it he
said contemptuously, that Epicurus had placed man's
good in " the husk " (meaning the body), and so had to
1 This is not psychologically correct.
II
162 THE STOIC CREED
maintain that, though a social being 1 , a man must not
yield to his social affections, or his social impulses,
otherwise he will disturb his tranquillity (taking upon
him the burdens and sorrows of others), and so fail to
reach the state of arapa^ta. For this reason, he must
cease caring for his offspring, as well as refuse to take
part in public affairs all such duties would interfere
with his personal tranquillity and ease. On this
Epictetus makes a vigorous onslaught (Diss. i. 23)
from the side of altruism and the sympathetic emotions,
insisting that nature is too strong for Epicurus here.
For, he says, " Epicurus knows that if once a child is
born, it is no longer in our power not to love it, or to
care about it " ; and he concludes with a striking home
thrust " For my part, I think that, even if your father
and your mother had been told by an oracle that you
would say these things, they would not have cast you
off." Thus, truth, according to Epictetus, may be
found in other parts of human nature than reason the
social instincts at any rate can guide us. " Thus also
Epicurus mutilated all the offices of a man and those of
the head of a house, and of a citizen, and of a friend,
but human desires he did not mutilate, for he could not "
(Diss. ii. 20). (7) Then, lastly, another argument may
be mentioned. If pleasure be the chief good, it was
urged, as by Cleanthes (see Stobaeus, Floril. vi. 37),
that wisdom had been given to men for evil.
1
Enthusiasm of Humanity
This brings us to a further point in the Stoic char-
acterization of virtue, a point that took firm hold of the
later Stoics in particular namely, that virtue is a social
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 163
thing, and that the individual's good is bound up in
that of the community : what is good for the community
is good for him ; what is good for him is good for the
community. " What is not good for the swarm is not
good for the bee " ; " all that befalls the individual is
for the good of the whole " (Aurelius, Med. vi. 54
and 45).
" Zeus," says Epictetus (Diss. i. 19), " has made the
nature of the rational animal such that it cannot obtain
any good proper to itself, unless it contribute something
to the common interest; In this way, it is no longer
unsocial for a man to do everything for the sake of
himself. For what do you expect ? that a man should
stand aloof from himself and his own interest? And
how in that case could there be one and the same prin-
ciple to all namely, the principle of affection (oiKctWis)
for themselves?" And, again (ibid. ii. 5): "What
are you ? A man. If you look at yourself as separate
from other men, it is according to nature to live to old
age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you look at
yourself as a man, and as a part of a certain whole, for
the sake of that whole it may now become you to be
sick, at another time to sail the seas and to run
into danger, at another time to be in want, and,
perchance, to die before your time."
Yea more, it is only by Altruism that the individual's
own highest good can be realized. " Nor can any one
live happily who looks only to himself, who turns all
things to his own advantage : you must live for others,
if you wish to live for yourself" (Seneca, Ep. 48).
Hence the relation between self-interest and altruism,
according to Stoic teaching. Self-interest is a necessity
164 THE STOIC CREED
a man must attend, and should attend, to his own
interest and preservation ; but, in doing so, he is also
furthering- the interest of others. The two are mutually
implicated, and there is no true severance between
them. " If, after all, they (the gods) take no thought
for anything to do with .us, then it is in my own power
to take thought for myself; and what I have to
consider is my own interest ; and the true interest of
everything is to conform to its own constitution and
nature ; and my nature owns reason and social obliga-
tion ; socially, as Antoninus, my city and my country is
Rome, as a man, the world. These are the societies,
whose advantage can alone be good to me " (Aurelius,
Med. v\. 44).
This raises the question, then, in general, What is
the community in whose interest is bound up that of
the individual ? In the first instance, no doubt, it is a
man's family ; then his tribe ; then his city or his
nation the particular people to which he himself
belongs. But there is no logical stopping-point even
here. You must go on from people to people, and from
race to race, until you have embraced mankind, fit is
not blood-relationship, but community of reason, that v
makes men brothers. And so the Stoic said, Every
man is a citizen of the world : he finds in every Bother
man a brother and a friend as Musonius puts it,|" The
world is the common fatherland of all men." M He even
went farther, and maintained that every man is a citizen
of a still larger world. Says Epictetus (Diss. ii. 5) :
" Do.^ou not know that, as a foot alone is no longer a
foot, "so you alone are no longer a man? For what is
1 Kou/i) irarpls avdp&iruv WQ-VTW 6 ^607*05 tffrlv.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 165
a man ? A part of a State first of that which is made
up of gods and men ; then of that which is said to be
next to the other, which is a small copy of the universal
State." Also, " The greatest and most powerful and
most comprehensive of all is the community (o-vcrnyfia)
that is composed of men and God " (Diss. i. 9).
Humanity, then, is, to the Stoic, more than a collec-
tion of human beings it is an organism ; and each unit
is more than a part it is a member ; and humane offices
of man to man are more than acts of duty they are
the promptings of love : membra sumus corporis magni
(Seneca, Ep. 95). 1 " If you substitute meros for melos
part for member you do not yet love men from your
heart ; you have yet no certitude of joy in doing kind-
ness ; they are still bare duty, not yet a good deed to
yourself" (Aurelius, Med. vii. 13).
This doctrine contained in it the condemnation of
Slavery not of slavery in the sense of gradation of
ranks and classes in society, but of slavery in the sense
that one's subordinate and v servant is in his nature an
inferior being, a mere implement, to be disposed of and
used precisely as his master or his owner chooses,
just as to the modern employer of labour his workmen
are merely " hands." 2 "How, then," asks Epictetus
(Diss. i. 13), " shall a man endure such persons as this
slave ? " " Slave ! " he replies, " will you not bear with
your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor,
and has been begotten as a v son from the same seeds
and of the same descent from above ? But if you have
1 The similarity of this teaching (metaphor and substance alike)
to that of St. Paul is obvious.
2 That was Aristotle's view, and is disowned by Stoicism.
166 THE STOIC CREED
been put in any such higher place, will you immediately
make yourself a tyrant ? Will you not remember what
you are, and whom you rule ? that they are kinsmen,
that they are brethren by nature, that they are the
offspring of Zeus? But I have purchased them, and
they have not purchased me ? Do you see where you
are looking? that it is towards the earth, that it is
towards the pit, that it is towards those wretched laws
of dead men ? But towards the laws of the gods you
are not looking." It was in answer to the question
whether a master may not sometimes accept a favour
from his slave that Seneca made the beautiful reply
" There is one parent of us all, the world (umis omnium
parens mundus est)." * Purchase, property, of one man
by another is now seen to mean nothing as to real
proprietorship : the superior is acknowledged to be as
dependent on the inferior as the inferior on the
superior ; the power of helping is not confined to one
class, but the lower may bless the higher, as the higher
the lower. That was a great step gained in the
advance of the larger thought. A common parentage
means mutual helpfulness and mutual love.
This cosmopolitanism and enthusiasm of humanity
had for the Stoic far-reaching consequences. It shaped
anew his doctrine of forgiveness of injuries ; making
him no longer stand aloof and refuse forgiveness to an
offending brother, but urging him to extend compassion,
on the plea that the injurer and the injured are both
akin sharers in the same nature, members of the same
family. It taught him, besides, the true function and
1 De Ben. iii. 28.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 167
the correct conception of punishment. "Society,"
says Seneca (De Ira, ii. 31), "cannot continue, if the
parts of it do not assist and maintain one another.
We will not, therefore, strike a man because he has
offended, but that he may offend no more ; nor should
punishment ever refer to the past, but to the future,
for it does not minister to anger but is preventive
(non enim irascitur sed cavef}." This might have been
a sentence from Austin the jurist, or a quotation from
J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism ; or it might have been taken
from More's Utopia, where we read that the end of
punishment " intendeth nothing else but the destruc-
tion of vices and saving of men : with so using and
ordering them, that they cannot choose but be good,
and what harm soever they did before, in the residue
of their life to make amends for the same."
The Stoic's altruism also seems to have justified to
him the position, that no one willingly inflicts an injury
on another a position that the later Stoics, such as
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, 1 make a great deal of.
As it is man's nature to be social, and as his reason
shows him that sociality is a law of the universe, and
what he rationally sees he naturally submits to, the
person inflicting an injury does so from ignorance, not
knowing what he does.
This same deep-seated altruism produced in the
Stoic that wide charity and generosity of spirit that
so frequently, especially among the Roman Stoics,
characterized him, and prevented his becoming either
a bigot or an ascetic. His tolerance was a conspicuous
1 See Epictetus, Diss. i. 18 and 28, and ii. 26 ; also, Aurelius,
Med. ii. i, iv. 3, etc.
168 THE STOIC CREED
feature, not disproved even by Aurelius's persecution
of the Christians ; for that did not proceed from
religious intolerance, but was dictated by political
motives, supported by the belief (mistaken, no doubt,
yet real) that the Christians did not act from inward
conviction, but from "mere perversity." 1 In the true
cosmopolitan spirit, Epictetus counsels us, when any
one speaks evil of us, to harbour no ill-will against
him, but to bear a gentle mind towards him, consoling
ourselves with the reflection, " So it appeared to him "
(Encheiridion, 42). This, of course, might be simply
the gracious condescension of the superior person
contemptuous of those who differ from him or who
criticize him. But, as a matter of fact, it was not.
The Stoic was no cynic (in the modern sense of that
term), and his charity was genuine. On the other
hand, the Stoic was no hermit. Although the wise
man, being self-sufficient, is independent of all forms
of government and of distinctive nationality, neverthe-
less his philosophy taught him that for the generality
of people a man should remain in the State and perform
faithfully his duties as citizen, whatever they might
be "staunchly every hour, as a Roman and a man,
resolving to do the work in hand, with scrupulous and
unaffected dignity, affectionately, freely, justly " (Aurel.
Med. ii. 5) ; should marry also, if there were no sufficient
reason to the contrary, and enter into the various home
and family relationships, discharging conscientiously
his part as husband, father, friend ; 2 and when, after
years of toil, he might rightfully seek a haven of rest,
1 Aurelius, Med. xi. 3.
2 See Cicero, De Finibus, iii. 20, 68 ; Seneca, De Otio, iii. 2.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 169
he is counselled to do it, not out of dislike of mankind,
but simply for satisfaction and repose. His philosophy
taught him, further, that if by a selfish act he sinned
against the community and thereby forfeited his place
and cut himself off as a member from the whole, he
might yet be reinstated in his organic position : that
is his special privilege. " Have you ever seen a
dismembered hand," asks Aurelius (Med. viii. 34), "or
foot, or decapitated head, lying severed from the body
to which it belonged? Such does a man, so far as he
can, make himself, when he refuses to accept what
befalls, and isolates himself, or when he pursues self-
seeking action. You are cast out from the unity of
nature, of which you are an organic part ; you dis-
member your own self. But there is this beautiful
provision, that it is in your power to re-enter the unity.
No other part of the whole doth God privilege, when
severed and dismembered, to reunite. But consider
the goodness of God, with which he has honoured
man : he has put it in his power never to be sundered
at all from the whole ; and if sundered, then to rejoin
it once more, and coalesce, and resume his contributory
place." 1
1 It is a disputed point how far the Stoic Cosmopolitanism was
due to the non-Hellenic nationality of the leading- Stoics ; but,
anyhow, the fact of non-Hellenic nationality is very noteworthy.
" Zeno was from Citium, a Phoenician colony in Cyprus, and him-
self belonged to the Semitic race. . . . Of his disciples, Persseus
came also from Citium ; Herillus was from Carthage ; Athenodorus
from Tarsus ; Cleanthes from Assus in the Troad. The chief
disciples of Cleanthes were Sphaerus of the Bosporus, and
Chrysippus from Soli in Cilicia. Chrysippus was succeeded by
Zeno of Sidon, and Diogenes of Babylon ; the latter taught
Antipater of Tarsus, who taught Panastius of Rhodes, who taught
170 THE STOIC CREED
Moral Progress
The Stoics took over from Socrates the doctrine that
virtue may be taught. The proof they gave of this
position was the fact that "bad men may become
good " (BrjXov CK TOV yweo-QoLL dyaflovs e* <avAooj/) ; and the
great proof of the reality of virtue adduced by Posidonius
was the fact that "Socrates and Diogenes and Ant.is-
thenes made progress in it" (Diog. Laert. vii. 54).
This conception of progress (irpoKo-rrrj) in the moral
life toned down the original sternness of the Stoic
teaching of the absolute nature of virtue, and became
the great source of moral impulse to the unsophisticated
to struggling and imperfect humanity. Many of the
most telling passages in Seneca have reference to this
very subject.
But though the Stoics thus acknowledged the
possibility of teaching virtue and upheld the fact of
progress, and, therefore, the potency of habit, in the
upbuilding of character, they were divided in opinion
as to whether virtue could be lost ; Chrysippus holding
Posidonius of Apamea in Syria. There was another Athenodorus,
from Cana in Cilicia ; and the early Stoic Archedemus is mentioned
by Cicero as belonging to Tarsus. The names of Nestor, Atheno-
dorus, Cordylion, and Heraclides may be added to the list of
Stoical teachers furnished by Tarsus. Seleucia sent forth
Diogenes ; Epiphania, Euphrates ; Scythopolis, Basilides ; Ascalon,
Antibius ; Tyre, Antipater ; Sidon, Boethus ; Ptolemais, Diogenes.
We see then what an Oriental aspect this catalogue presents.
Not a single Stoic of note was a native of Greece proper" (Sir A.
Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 307). The genuine Greek
despised the Barbarian (even Plato and Aristotle did), and made
a very marked distinction between the freeborn citizen and the
slave.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 171
that it could, and Cleanthes that it could not "the
one saying that it can be lost by drunkenness and
melancholy, the other that it cannot, on account of the
firm perceptions " (Diog. Laert. vii. 65).
The difficulty that confronted them here was real, and
was precisely that which later Christian times had to
face with regard to salvation and divine grace ; and the
solution in both cases was substantially the same. If
the Stoic school was divided over virtue, Christian
theologians have been equally divided over salvation ;
some upholding the dogma of "the perseverance of the
saints," and others maintaining the possibility of finally
" falling away."
Preference and Avoidance
But practical morality was further encouraged when
the doctrine of "indifferent" things was revised and
developed, as it soon came to be. The dogma in its
original form such, possibly, as it came from the
hands of Ariston of Chios, to whom Diogenes Laertius 1
ascribes the origination of it made a sharp and uncom-
promising division between things in our power and
things not in our power, including in the latter class
the vast majority of things that people in general most
desire (health, bodily vigour, favourable circumstances,
etc.), and maintained that things of this class were
wholly "indifferent," having no real value whatever,
and allowing of no degrees or grades among them.
This was soon found to be too drastic and too much
opposed to ordinary experience and regardless of the
plain man's capacity ; and so the important concession
1 See vii. 31.
172 THE STOIC CREED
was made that, in special connexions and for definite
purposes, some indifferent things (such as mental ability,
health, bodily vigour, favourable circumstances) were
better than others, and therefore were to be pursued,
while their opposites (mental impotence, ill-health,
feebleness of body, etc.) were to be eschewed. This
was the famous distinction between " things to be
preferred" (7rpo>7y//,e'j/a, prcepostia) and " things to be
avoided " (aTroTrpo^y/xeW, rejectd], which allowed a man
living in the world and wishful to discharge his duties
to society and to himself to cultivate aptitudes, to
make selection among circumstances, to husband re-
sources, and to follow definite objects with zest and
appreciation. A certain number of indifferent things
were now conceived as having "value" (<lia), and so
were regarded as being " according to nature," whereas
only those things that "have no value" (a7raia) were
relegated to the category of " contrary to nature." *
But though these things having value might be pre-
ferred, nothing must be done or chosen or accepted
that would lead to the deterioration of character that
was an indispensable restriction. "What, then, if a
dried fig should fall into your lap ? Take it and eat it ;
for thus far may you value even a dried fig. But if I
shall stoop down and overturn another, or be over-
turned by another, and shall flatter those who have
entered in, neither is a dried fig worth that nor any of
the things that are not good, which the philosophers
1 There was also a third class of indifferent things recognized
namely, those that were "absolutely indifferent" (T& ica0d7ra
d8id(f>opa), such as, whether the hairs on one's head are in number
odd or even.
ETHICS: EXPOSITION 173
have persuaded me not to regard as good " (Epictetus,
Diss. iv. 7).
This sphere of " indifferent things," as thus inter-
preted, is the sphere of "duty," as KO.OTJKOV, to which
we have already referred ; the conception of which
brought the Stoical ethics into close contact with
morality in everyday life. It was the acknowledgment
that counsels of perfection are valuable and may be
appropriate for the select few ; but that, for the many,
there are needed counsels that are in sympathy with
the efforts and aspirations of frail and feeble mortals
counsels that pay some consideration to the circum-
stance that, while the spirit is willing, the flesh may
be weak.
CHAPTER IX
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS
"It is from considering the relations which the several appetites
and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above
all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea
of the system or constitution of human nature. And from the idea
itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, i.e., constitution,
is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears, that
its nature, i.e., constitution or system, is adapted to measure
time." BUTLER.
" In regno nati sumus : deo parere libertas est." SENECA.
"The seat of law is the bosom of Almighty God." HOOKER.
BEFORE proceeding, it may be well to emphasize and
further explain one or two of the leading positions in
the Stoical Ethics.
I
And, first of all, the formula, "Live agreeably to
nature."
Many people have stumbled at this phrase, regarding
it as indefinite, and unsuitable to express the central
thought of the system. Now, it is quite true that the
term " nature " is ambiguous: it may be used in a
wider and in a narrower sense, as designating the
whole or as indicating merely a part. But, in either
case, the meaning is perfectly plain, and the twj
significations are complementary of each other.
174
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 175
"nature" be taken in its wider sense, as designating
the whole, then the life that is counselled in the injunction
"live agreeably to nature" is that of law and order,
conscious and willing conformity to the processes of
the universe, to the general course of things ; and as
the order of nature (in this sense) is conceived by the
Stoic as rational, it means submission to reason in all
the modes of its manifestation?] If, on the other hand,
"nature" be interpreted as human nature, then the
phrase is equally intelligible, if we avoid the Cynic error
of making savage and uncultured nature the type, and
place the type in developed civilized nature, and
especially in man's ideals and aspirations.^ The meaning
now is, that man has a distinct place in the world, as a
social being endowed with reason is a member of a
corporate whole whose good is the supreme end and in
which the individual's good is inseparably bound up
He is thus conceived as a complex of many powers and
principles, duly graded, with the supremacy accorded
to conscience nr thp prar.tir.al reason. That is the con-
ception of a system or constitution that Butler afterwards
so lucidly defined. 1 Viewing the matter thus, the Stoic
raised no question as to the legitimacy of the hierarchy
of principles that human nature disclosed. He was
undisturbed, on the one hand, by any troublesome
problems about origin, such as have perplexed later
moralists (origin of moral ideas and guiding axioms),
and, on the other hand, by any doctrine of evolution
biological or other. He took his stand firmly on the
empirical position /accepting human nature as some-
thing given, which it was his duty to analyze and try
1 See Preface to his Sermons,
176 THE STOIC CREED
to understand, and in the analysis and understanding
of which he rested content.^
And there is no doubt that his analysis was remark-
ably striking, and his teaching, on its practical side,
salutary to a degree. He clearly saw the supreme
value of the ethical side of man's constitution, and
set himself to advocate its significance accordingly.
Hence,J Stoicism is and ever must be an important
element in philosophy ; and it has exerted immense
influence in moulding philosophical teaching in the past.
All the great ethical philosophies of Western Europe
have been indebted to iLj Need we refer to Kant and
to Butler? or is it more than necessary to allude to
Thomas Reid and the Scottish philosophers generally ?
No one can read the last part of the Ethica of Spinoza
without being struck with its purely Stoic aspect ; and
Stoicism is very apparent in the Ritschlian teaching of
" value-judgments " at the present day. If we turn to
poetry, it will be sufficient to instance Pope's Essay on
Man, which is simply Stoicism in verse, although Pope
has in part misconceived the doctrine of apatheia ; and
Matthew Arnold is a Stoic poet in chief, and his prose,
too, bears impress of the Porch.
II
Nor is the Stoic doctrine of the Will without signifi-
cance. Untrammelled by any abstract theory of
volitional freedom, as also by the false antithesis
between internal and external motives that has so
frequently played havoc in ethical systems, no less than
by the question as to whether motives are really
causes, the Stoics went direct to the psychological and
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 177
experiential fact that man, as a rational being, has the
power of recognizing the rationality of the cosmic order
and of cheerfully submitting to it, and, in the sphere of
ethics, that he has a conception of the ideal good, and
the power of identifying himself therewith. /This
doctrine British philosophers of to-day are in the habit
of associating specially with T. H. Green 1 and his
followers./ But it is Stoical in its essence, and was
then, as it is now, the main cause of the stimulating
energy that high ethical teaching possesses, and
of its wholesome elevating influence on life and
practice.
This doctrine of the will must be taken in connexion
with the Stoic psychology of Desire. Although not
essaying an elaborate analysis, such as we find in
Aristotle, partly in the Nicomachean Ethics^ partly in
the De Anim&Jthe Stoics made desire and the rigjit.
handling of it practically the centre of their systemy
According to this, they determined merit and demerit,
gauged impulse and allied processes, and appraised the
ethical character of an act. " In comparing sins so
far as they admit of general comparison Theophrastus
sagely observes that sins of desire are more heinous
than sins of passion. For passion is an estrangement
1 "The motive which is thus necessarily involved in the act of
will, is not a motive in the same sense in which each of the parties
to the controversy constantly uses the term. It is not one of the
mere desires or aversions, between which the advocate of * free-
will' supposes a man to exercise an arbitrary choice, and of
which the strongest, according to the opposite view, necessarily
prevails. It is constituted by the reaction of the man's self upon
these, and its identification of itself with one of them, as that of
which the satisfaction forms for the time its object" (Pro-
legomena to Ethics, bk. ii. chap. i).
12
178 THE STOIC CREED
from reason, accompanied by sense of pain and inward
constriction ; but sins of desire, in which pleasure gets
the better of us, imply more of feminine incontinence.
/And surely it is right and philosophical to say that
sinning with pleasure is more culpable than sinning
with pain./ The latter is like acting under provocation,
and being driven into passion by pain : the former is a
spontaneous impulse towards wrong, driving one to
satisfaction of desire " (Aurelius, Med. ii. 10).
Ill
Again, a very strong point in Stoicism was its
attempt to withdraw mankind from the futile pursuit of
happiness in varying and uncertain circumstances, and
its locating true felicity in the mind, and especially in
the virtuous disposition. This, of course, did not
originate with the Stoics. Nothing, for example,
could surpass the beautiful prayer of Socrates at the
end of the Phcedrus: "Beloved Pan, and all ye other
gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the
inward soul ; and may the outward and inward man
be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy,
and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate
man and he only can bear and carry." But what
characterized the Stoics was the emphasis that they
laid on this doctrine, the variety of applications that
they made pf it, and the noble way in which they
unweariedly J insisted that the source of the highest
human bliss is the mind conscious to itself of rightT?
"Remember that your Inner Self is inexpugnable,
when once it rallies to itself and consistently declines
to act against its will, even though the defiance may
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 179
be irrational. How much more, then, when its judg-
ment is rational and made with circumspection ?
Therefore the mind free from passions is a citadel ;
man has no stronger fortress to which he can fly for
refuge and remain impregnable. Ignorant is he, who
has not seen this ; unhappy he, who, having seen, yet
flies not to the refuge " (Aurelius, Med. viii. 48). This
was their protest, true and emphatic, valid for all time,
against moral materialism against the degrading
tendency to place genuine worth in the accessories of
ethical life, instead of in the life itself. Right well did
the Stoic see that, when a man fixes his heart on any-
thing outside his character, farewell to all high moral
action and to noble thought. "Alexander suffered
great misfortune when the Greeks came upon the
Trojans and destroyed Troy, and when his brothers
perished ? By no means ; for no one is harmed by the
action of another, and what happened then was only
the destruction of the storks' nests. But his misfortune
was when he lost modesty, fidelity, hospitality, and
decorum. When did Achilles suffer misfortune?
When Patroclus died ? Not so ; but when he began
to be angry, when he wept for a maiden, when he
forgot that he was at Troy, not to get possession of
mistresses, but to fight. These things are the mis-
fortunes of men, this is beleaguering, this is destruction,
when right opinions are pulled down, when they are
corrupted" (Epictetus, Diss. i. 28). l
1 " Resolve to be thyself; and know that he
Who finds himself, loses his misery."
(Matt. Arnold, "Self-dependence.")
i8o THE STOIC CREED
IV
A fourth striking peculiarity is the Stoic's insistence
on altruism his cosmopolitanism and doctrine of the
universal brotherhood of man: " We are made for co-
operation, like the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the
upper and the lower rows of teeth " (Aurelius, Med.
ii. i). This struck at the very root of selfishness;
and by teaching the individual habitually to view his
actions in the light of deeds done by one who was yet
not isolated and independent, but part of a body, in
living communion and intercommunion with the whole,
enunciated a truth of the greatest practical significance.
(Morality now became the chief concern of life, for
morality was essentially social ; and the notion of virtue
was widened, so as to have a really ennobling effect on
character. No cramped, stunted ethics was offered to
mankind, but an expansive ethics social, universal ;
the true import of which would be apparent to the
world only as thought matured and men tried to adjust
their practice to their profession^ The contrast was
explicitly to Epicureanism not so much, however, in
the area that ethical action covered (for the Epicurean,
too, recognized the social character of morality), as in
the motive and disposition : it was the exaltation of
jjjiselfishness against egoistic hedonism and selfishness.
/ In this respect, Stoicism showed a distinct parallel to
Christianity, and, as a matter of fact, is very likely
to have affected the early Christian teaching more
especially that of St. Paul, who himself belonged to a
city that was a chief seat of Stoicism (namely, Tarsus]J
and who could, on occasion, as in the Areopagus at
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 181
Athens, turn his Stoical knowledge effectively to account.
Only, there is this great difference, that the Christian
enthusiasm for humanity originates in love for the per-
sonal Christ, in devotion to a divine Person, and is
stimulated by His example. Natural fellow-feeling and
brotherly affection thus becomes intensified ; and it is
rendered effective in a way that nothing else can do
when it is based in personal religion. At all events,
it was this very sentiment of universal brotherhood,
prompted by true altruistic motive, that broke down
the distinctions of caste among the Stoics, putting
Epictetus, the lame slave, on a level with Marcus
Aurelius, the Roman Emperor, on the principle that
" The rank is but the guinea stamp,
The man's the gowd for a' that " ; l
and that enabled Aurelius himself to work steadily
towards the realization of his own ideal "The con-
ception of an equal commonwealth based on equality
of right and equality of speech, and of imperial rule
respecting first and foremost the liberty of the sub-
ject " (Med. i. 14). And it is the same sentiment,
working slowly yet surely, that in Christian lands has
procured the abolition of slavery, has made consistently
for freedom (social, political, and religious), obliterating
cfass animosities, and stirring the spirit of philanthropy
so deeply as it does in Christendom at the present
day. 1
1 Burns.
2 For a laudation of the social duties and the proof of their pre-
eminence, see Cicero, De Officiis, \. 43-45.
182 THE STOIC CREED
V
Once more, Stoicism, like Christianity, was distin- ^
guished by its appreciation of man's dignity and worth.
The Stoics conceived men. to be akin to God, rays
from the divine light, parts* of the primal substance,
even children of the one great Father " for we also,"
said Cleanthes, " are Thy offspring."
As a consequence of this, they strenuously insisted
upon the cultivation of self-respect and of an independ-
ent spirit, in a way and with an urgency that would
have satisfied Kant himself or the poet Burns. To
them, as to Kant, self-respect was not so much a virtue
as the foundation of all virtue. In the 25th section of
the Encheiridion, Epictetus puts it in a very homely
way: " How much are lettuces sold for? An obolus,
perhaps. If any one, then, give up the obolus and
receive the lettuces, and you do not give up and receive,
think not that you are worse off than he who receives.
For, as he has the lettuces, so you have the obolus,
which you did not give. Likewise, also, in the other
matter. Have you not been invited to the feast of so
and so ? It was because you did not give to him who
issues the invitation the price at which the supper is
sold ; and he sells it for flattery, he sells it for obse-
quiousness. Give then the price, if it will profit
you, for which it is sold. But if you will not give the
price and yet will have the things, you are greedy
and fatuous. Have you nothing, then, in lieu of the
supper? Yes, indeed, you have this, that you have
not flattered him whom you would not ; you have
this, that you have not endured his door-attendants."
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 183
"This do, my Lucilius, vindicate thy dignity (vin-
dica te tibi)." 1
They counselled, also, in the spirit of a rational ethic,
rather than in the merely sentimental fashion of the
present day, kindness to the lower animals. Naturally
enough, in conformity with their system, the brute
creation was conceived as being subservient to the uses
of man. As the Stoic physics was geocentric, so the
ethic was homocentric: "Is it not palpable that the
lower forms exist for the higher, and the higher for one
another? And things with breath of life are higher
than things without ; and things with reason than with
breath alone" (Aurelius, Med. v. 16). But they said,
"You have reason ; unreasoning creatures and the world
of material things have none : therefore in your deal-
ings with them rise superior and free " (ibid. vi. 23).
As another consequence of their appreciation of man's
worth, they maintained the indissoluble connexion be-
tween ethics and religion. The law of the universe, they
held, is the law of God; and the bindingness of morality
on us is the bindingness of rationality, echoing or repro-
ducing the divine reason. And even human laws, they
taught, are to be obeyed by men because they are not
arbitrary enactments of the individual with a view to
his own selfish ends, but embodiments of the universal
reason subservient to the interests of the whole. Law,
therefore, is one with God ; at all events, where law is,
God is. Jurisprudence, as much as cosmic order, or the
rational conduct of the individual, implies the Deity :
"the seat of law," as Hooker afterwards put it, " is the
bosom of Almighty God." Heracleitus, too, had said that
1 Seneca, Ep. \.
184 THE STOIC CREED
"all human laws are nurtured by the one divine law;
for this prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all,
and has something over." Nor was this a mere senti-
ment with the Stoic, but a living, operative principle,
turned to great use. It was embodied by the Emperor
Aurelius in his State legislation. Need we wonder that
the great jurists of the second and third centuries of
the Christian era worked under the impulse of Stoic
principle? Who but the Stoically-minded were thus
competent ? None were so able to enshrine the moral
law that legislated within in the form of the actual law
operating without ; and none were so successful in
bringing State and conscience into unison and harmony.
r
/ Particularly noticeable is the Stoic's appreciation of
the regenerative power of a virtuous life in the worldf?
He maintained that virtue could be taught ; but, though
not despising theory and theoretical teaching, he held
that the most potent schoolmaster is the life of indi-
vidual men clearly displayed. ^We learn by copying,
more than from prelection. JHence, (a) in the first
place, he had certain moral heroes, certain supreme
examples of strenuous moral living, whom he held up
for imitation such as Socrates, Hercules, Antisthenes,
Diogenes./ These he set forth as models. For this
purpose he had to idealize them. He was not unaware
of defects in the actual men : Seneca, for instance,
admits that Socrates had flaws and shortcomings, and
these are not to be followed. 1 But though the models
1 That there never was a perfect concrete example of the Stoic
Wise Man, is strongly urged by Lucian in his Hermotimus.
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 185
may not have been absolutely flawless, they were
supremely worthy of imitation, and were set forth ac-
cordingly. Even a halo was thrown round them, just
as was done by the great Church painters with medi-
aeval Christian saints. Thus the account of Diogenes,
the Cynic, that Epictetus gives us is considerably dif-
ferent from that which common history owns. The
asperities, bohemianism, and rudeness of that rugged
character are passed by, and in their place we find the
following: "But come now, Did Diogenes love nobody,
who was so gentle and humane that, for the sake of
men in general, he gladly undertook so great labours
and hardships of the body? But how did he love?
As became a minister of Zeus, at the same time con-
cerned for men and also as subject to God. Therefore,
the whole earth was fatherland to him alone, and no
selected place ; and being taken prisoner, he did not
long for Athens or his acquaintances and friends there,
but he made acquaintance with the pirates themselves,
and tried to reform them ; and when he was sold later
on, he lived in Corinth as before at Athens, and he
would have done exactly the same had he gone to the
Pgrrhaebi. Thus is freedom acquired " (Diss. iii. 24).
/ But, (b) next, the Stoic pointed to right living as a
model in whatsoever Stoic it was found, however
humble he might be./ We have already seen (Chapter
III. p. 52) how strict he was in demanding purity of
life in the philosopher and professional teacher, but he
aimed at high achievement in all. Hence, he counselled
the progressive and aspiring to keep constantly before
him some real example as known to him in life ; as
says Marcus Aurelius (Med. vi. 48), " Nothing is more
i86 THE STOIC CREED
cheering than exemplifications of virtue in the char-
acters of those about us, suggesting themselves as
copiously as possible. We should keep them always
ready to hand " : and that he acted on his own counsel
is evident from the beautiful picture that he draws of
Antoninus Pius in Book I. of the Meditations^ and from
the glowing tribute that he pays to his mother and to
all the instructors that helped to mould his character,
out of a full and grateful heart.
And there is no question that the most effective way
of teaching morals is by example. Precept is not to be
contemned ; but precept divorced from practice is a
weak force compared with high doctrine embodied in a
life. Such life embodiment is what people can see and
understand ; and, coming into immediate contact with
it, they can feel its power and inspiration. It thus
comes to them with warmth, clothed in flesh and blood,
and thereby influences.
VII
Yet again, the Stoic made it his special endeavour to
be helpful to the earnest ; and so put his principles to
practical use all round. He condescended to teach the
duties of everyday life. We do not, indeed, find in
any of the masters an elaborate classification and
handling of duties such as is given us by Kant 1 or by
Richard Price, 2 or such as may be found in Bishop
Martensen, 3 or in Professor Newman Smyth, 4 or in Dr.
1 The Metaphysic of Ethics (Sample's translation).
2 A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals.
3 Christian Ethics (Eng. tr.).
4 Christian Ethics.
ETHICS: SPECIAL POINTS 187
W. S. Bruce; 1 butXve do find, even in the earliest
writers (such as Zeno and Cleanthes), analyses and
definitions of the four cardinal virtues (which was then
the recognized and authoritative enumeration of duties),?
and we find division of virtues into primary and
secondary, or subordinate, with explications ; 2 and
there are abundant instances of counsels, though not
in systematic fashion, but thrown out at all points,
regarding numerous social and religious duties. 3 _The
Stoic preachedjthe necessity of a man's attending to
his own highest interest and of developing his better
self to the fullest extent only thus can virtue be
realized ; he sketched his functions as a worthy member
of the community, with social obligations of the various
relationships in life (citizen, husba-nd, father, friend)
laid upon him ; and, suffused as he was with piety and
devotion, he enforced the duty and the privilege of
serving God. /This gives the nucleus of the threefold
classification of man's duties current in modern treatises
on practical ethics duties v to oneself, duties to one's
neighbour, duties to Gody And, indeed; the Stoic
teacher would have been untrue to his great purpose of
reclaiming the fallen and of purifying society, if he had
not legislated for man as man and turned his attention
to the remedy of clamant evils in everyday life.
1 Social Aspects of Christian Morality.
2 The primary are the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, self-control,
courage, righteousness) ; to each of which is attached a list of
species or varieties, duly discriminated, which constitute the
secondary or subordinate virtues. See Diogenes Laertius, vii.
92 ; Stobasus, Eel. ii. 60, 9 W.
3 Stoicism is, in this respect, like the Bible ; and it finds its
parallel in Proverbs in O.T. and in St. Paul's practical counsels in
N.T.
CHAPTER X
ETHICS: DEFECTS
" Et in seipso totus, teres atque rotundus." HORACE.
" In lazy apathy let Stoics boast
Their virtue fix'd ; 'tis fix'd as in a frost." POPE.
" Certainly, Vertue is like pretious Odours, most fragrant, when
they are incensed, or crushed : For Prosperity doth best discover
Vice ; But Adversity doth best discover Vertue." BACON.
BUT with all these merits (and they are great), the
Stoic Ethics had its weak points ; and to these it now
becomes necessary to advert.
I
For one thing, it over-emphasized the stern, austere,
unsympathetic side of morality in its paradoxical doc-
trine of the Wise Man, and thereby disturbed the true
balance of human nature, and, to a certain extent,
rendered its own teaching impracticable. If it was the
fault of Epicureanism that it made too much of pleasure,
it is certainly the fault of Stoicism that it made too
little of pain. This was, doubtless, an inheritance from
Cynicism. Its dogma of Passionlessness or aTrdOtia
its contempt for pain and pleasure and its indifference
towards objects of affection is in an extreme : it is too
unbendingly Puritanical. Of it one might say, what
Stoicism itself said of Epicurus's counsel that parents
188
ETHICS: DEFECTS 189
should not bring up their children, " Nature is too
strong for it." Their apathy, although not "lazy"
(as Pope designated it), is certainly " virtue fix'd " and
" fix'd as in a frost." l It was originally circumscribed
and frigid, and, even to the end, it failed to appreciate
the multifarious interests of human nature. When
Epictetus counsels (Encheir. Hi.), " If you love an
earthen jar, say, 'It is an earthen jar that I love,' for,
when it is broken, you will not be disturbed ; if you
kiss your little child or your wife, say that it is a human
being whom you are kissing, for, when either of them
dies, you will not be disturbed," 2 he simply lays bare,
in concrete form, the fundamental weakness of the
Stoical indifference. For, surely, child and wife are
more to father and husband than "a human being" ;
and even the earthen jar, through the power of associa-
tion, becomes more to us than a mere thing of earth
and clay, valuable simply for its utility. Again, it may
very well be true that, if a man is unhappy, it is his
own fault, for God has made all men to be happy ; but
it does not follow, as Epictetus makes it, that his
unhappiness is no concern of yours (Diss. iii. 24) ;
and if a man grieves at being parted from you, his
friend, it is but harsh consolation to tell him that "he
simply suffers the consequences of his own folly," for
he should never have supposed that you two could
remain together for ever.
The defect of the Stoical Ideal is that it does not ,,
sufficiently recognize the emotions. A large section of
human nature (and that a most important one) was
1 Essay on Man, ii. 101. 3 See also Diss. iii. 24.
190 THE STOIC CREED
practically cut off from the wise man's cognizance : he
lived according to a mere part of his nature and ignored
the rest. The great power of an ideal lies in the fact
that it addresses itself to the heart lays hold of the
affections and stimulates our aspirations. But bare
emotionlessness cannot do this. Apathy, at best,
attaches itself to the heroic side of our being ; but it is
impotent to attract us, like the amiable and gentle
virtues : it is stern and unlovable, and lacks the milk
of human kindness. Hence it is suitable (and has been
found to be so) to men in times of great turmoil, hard-
ship, and persecution, when the world seemed so much
out of joint that it would not tolerate high principle, or
give quarter to any one who would not accept might for
right, and fall in meekly with the prevailing vices and
oppressions. It was precisely the philosophy for Epic-
tetus, the lame slave, over whom Epaphroditus acted
the part of tyrant ; for Seneca the tutor and hapless
guide of Nero uncertain of royal favour, with the
prospect of untimely death before his eyes, and the
thought of it never long absent from his mind ; for
Boethius, the martyr of Ticinum, barbarously used by
the untutored Ostrogothic king. Men of the heroic
stamp, when heroism was supremely needed, found in
it a consolation and a power which gentler natures,
under more favourable circumstances, scarcely dis-
covered. In the midst of Neronic cruelties and injus-
tices, or in the battlefield or camp (as was the case with
Marcus Aurelius), among the Quadi, or at Carnuntum,
the Stoic found his solace in withdrawing into himself
and making himself realize that happiness resides in the
soul and not in external fortune, and that inward recti-
ETHICS: DEFECTS 191
tude is beyond the reach of tyrant, of untoward circum-
stance, or of war. But, in happier days, this solace is
less required ; and then men come to feel that there is
such a thing as the beatify of virtue (in distinction from
its sublimity and grandeur], and the soothing influence
of goodness most effectually exerts itself when no sharp
line is drawn between inward felicity and outward
circumstances when the two are felt to be in harmony,
and the latter ministers to, and does not oppose, the
former, man and his environment being reconciled.
In this connexion, it is interesting to compare the
early Stoic contempt for the sympathetic and amiable
virtues with the position of Christianity, which has
elevated humility, meekness, and the passive graces
(patience, long-suffering, and the like) to the highest
place. The Christian, like the Stoic, aims at being
self-sufficient ; but what a difference there is between
the two kinds of self-sufficiency ! The difference has
been admirably expressed by Professor Findlay in the
contrast that he draws between the Pauline and the
Stoic conceptions of self-sufficiency or avrap/ceta, thus :
"The Christian self-sufficiency is relative; it is an
independence of the world through dependence upon
God. The Stoic self-sufficiency pretends to be absolute.
The one is the contentment of faith, the other of pride.
Cato and Paul both stand erect and fearless before a
persecuting world : one with a look of rigid and defiant
scorn ; the other with a face now lighted up with un-
utterable joy in God, now cast down with sorrow and
wet with tears for God's enemies. The Christian
martyr and the Stoic suicide are the final examples
iQ2 THE STOIC CREED
of these two memorable and contemporaneous protests
against the evils of the world " {Christian Doctrine and
Morals, p. 34). * So, further, there is an absolute
contrast between Stoicism and Christianity in the
matter of the kindlier feelings. There is nothing in
the Stoic teaching like the sentence, "He shall not
break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax " ;
nor like this, "If thine enemy smite thee on the one -
cheek, offer him the other also"; nor like this, " Be
ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving
each other, even as God also in Christ forgave you "
(Eph. iv. 32).
Yet the need for recognizing the sympathetic and
tender side of human nature came more and more to
be felt by the Stoics ; and, as time went on, they tried
to adjust their teaching to this requirement. It is note- *
worthy that the Roman period of Stoicism is far more
expansive and humane than the earlier Greek period.
The meaning of this is that, pressed, on the one side
by the demand to show some living example of the
ideal wise man, and, on the other side, by the constant
cry of the emotions for a more adequate recognition,
they made important alterations in their system, which
had indeed the effect of rendering it more popular, but
at the expense of consistency. It may reasonably be
doubted whether any system should be finally con-
demned on the simple ground that it has failed to
produce any man who lived exactly up to its highest
precepts. For the use of an ideal is precisely to show
what should be done, or what ought to be aimed at,
1 See also Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 303.
ETHICS: DEFECTS 193
and to stimulate to a nearer and nearer approach to
that, acting- all the while as a beacon and a lure ; and
it is enough if this ideal embody desirable elements that
are realizable, though never actually realized by the
individual here, and if it elevate and encourage and
improve him who strives to attain to it. We need not,
then, lay great stress on the fact that, when the Stoics
pointed to Hercules, or to Socrates, or to any other of
the very few saints of their calendar, you were able to
establish shortcomings and failings in the example, and
to prove that each was far from perfect. But it is
different if we are able to prove that some of the
elements in the ideal are either not realizable, or are
such as, if realized, are not desirable would not
expand our nature, but cramp and contract it. And
this, or something like it, might be done in the case
of the ideal sage. In some respects, his is a non-
human and an unattainable condition, and a condition
which, if attained, would not be wholly desirable : at
best, it is agreeable only to a side of man's nature.
Hence, the Stoics, even in Zeno's time, amended
their doctrine of indifferent things, or things not in
our own power ; admitting that a relative value exists
among them : there are 'grades of indifference ; some
things being preferable to others, and, therefore, in
certain circumstances and for certain ends, to be more
or less eagerly pursued. Indeed, the later Stoics went
so far in their endeavour to adapt their conceptions to
the notions and customs of the vulgar, that they virtually
split up Stoicism into an esoteric and an exoteric
portion. 1 The result was that even great teachers
1 See Cicero, De Officiis, ii.
13
194 THE STOIC CREED
lent the weight of their authority to doubtful practices
as when Penaetius, if Cicero is to be relied on,
justified the advocate or patronus in his practice
of defending the plausible, even when it was not
true.
Again, the Stoics (as we have already seen) had by
and by to admit that there are degrees in virtue and
in vice, as well as in pleasure and in pain. And
when they perfected their teaching of Altruism, and
emphasized the fact that every man is a citizen of the
world, with privileges and obligations corresponding,
they paid homage to the affections in a way that
struck at the root of their fundamental dogma. Their
system now became far more effective, but it became
inconsistent.
So, in like manner, their doctrine of moral progress
(Trpo/coTHJ, profectus}) and their counsel of daily self-
examination (after the manner of the Pythagoreans),
carried faithfully out by the conscientious Stoic, so as
to gauge his shortcomings and stir him up to amend-
ment, were concessions to practical human needs, and
gave working power to what might otherwise have
been an inoperative abstract teaching. 1 If men can
advance in character, if habits may be formed and
count for much, 2 if the " foolish " may become " wise,"
there are degrees in virtue and in vice ; and, as virtue
is by degrees contracted, vice is by degrees abandoned.
That is not a doctrine of theoretical perfection, but a
fact of moral experience ; and the recognition of it gave
a great fulcrum to Stoic Ethics.
1 See Epictetus, Diss. \. 4 ; Hi. 2.
3 See Epictetus's wise handling- of habit in Diss, ii. 18.
ETHICS: DEFECTS 195
II
Another point in which Stoicism erred was its
doctrine that injury is done only unwittingly. It
taught that a man who harmed another did so from
ignorance, and, therefore, unintentionally. 1 " If others
are doing right, you have no call to feel sore ; if wrong,
it is not wilful, but comes of ignorance. Just as No
soul wilfully misses truth, none wilfully disallows
another's due" (Aurelius, Med. xi. 18). This was a
remnant of the old Socratic teaching (as laid down
in the Protagoras, for instance), that no man sins
willingly, or that vice is ignorance and virtue
knowledge ; but it assumes a new aspect in its Stoical
setting.
The position may be met by the rejoinder that, as a
patent fact of our experience, native bad principle
exists, and that a man, from the very circumstance
that his nature is depraved, that he is possessed of
malevolent, as well as of benevolent, affections, may
take real conscious delight in injuring another and in
gratuitously inflicting pain. 2 The beast in him, or the
fiend in him, is a factor that you cannot ignore, and
which you certainly do not eliminate by simply
slurring over.
The ground of the Stoic dictum is, that a man is a
member of society, and, therefore, his good is bound
up with the good of every other member of society.
And so, when one man injures another, he is thereby
1 See Epictetus, Diss. i. 28.
2 See this point very ably argued by Professor Bain in his
Dissertations on Leading Philosophical Topics, pp. 84-104.
196 THE STOIC CREED
injuring himself, for his own good and the good of the
other are one ; and if he clearly saw this, he would
refrain from injuring, inasmuch as no man wishes evil
to himself. "It is man's special gift to love even
those who fall into blunders : it operates as soon as it
suggests, that men are your brothers, that sin is of
ignorance and unintentional, that in a little you will
both be dead, that, above all, no injury is done you ;
your Inner Self is not made worse than it was before "
(Marcus Aurelius, Med. vii. 22).
And, no doubt, if man were purely a rational being,
this appeal to reason would be enough and effective.
But man is not purely or solely rational he is emotive
and emotional also, and is moved by inclination and
desire ; and the malignant emotions are a part of his
nature, as has just been said, and must be taken
account of. That being so, it is no comfort to me,
when injured by some one, to suppose that the injurer
acts ignorantly ; for such may not have really been the
case : his inclination may have mastered his judgment.
And as for the offender himself, the way to gain him
is, not to prove to him that his conduct is irrational,
as being really against his own self-interest, but to win
him to oneself, or to the right, by love and kindness.
The road to reformation lies through the affections,
more than through the reason, as Epictetus clearly
saw when he said: "Every thing has two handles
one by which it may be carried, and the other by which
it may not be carried. If your brother wrongs you,
take it not by this handle, that he wrongs you, for that
is the handle by which it may not be carried ; but take
it rather by this handle, that he is your brother,
ETHICS: DEFECTS 197
nourished along with you, and you will take it by the
handle whereby it may be carried" (Encheir. 43). *
Furthermore, this doctrine of injury as involuntary
regards sin as a mere defect, just like blindness in a
man bereft of sight, and it led to counsel that, if
consistently acted on, would have undermined morality
itself. Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius frequently
give us the advice to take no heed of the man who
harms us, inasmuch as he has no power to hurt our
soul. But, surely, he has power to hurt our soul if his
injuring us simply leads to our passively ignoring him,
instead of our actively attempting his reformation, by
resistance or merited punishment, in whatsoever form.
Our generosity must not be allowed to degenerate into
spiritual pride, or into selfish disregard of our brother's
highest good, or even into passive acquiescence in
wrong out of mistaken deference to the doer. There
is something noble in Epictetus's deliverance, but it is
inadequate (Encheir. 30): "Duties are in general
measured by relations. A man is a father. The
injunction is to care for him, to submit to him in all
things, to suffer him when he rebukes, when he strikes.
1 The later Stoics in general came to acknowledge this. See,
e.g., Aurelius, Med. xi. 18 : "Kindness is invincible if only it is
honest, not fawning- or insincere. What can the most aggressive
do, if you keep persistently kind, and as occasion offers gently
remonstrate, and seize the moment, when he is bent on mischief,
for trying quietly to convert him-to a better frame of mind ? ' Not
so, my son, we are made for other ends ; you cannot hurt me, you
hurt yourself, my son.' Then point him gently to the general law
of things, that neither do the bees act so, nor any of the gregarious
animals ; but avoid any touch of irony or fault-finding, and be
affectionate and conciliatory in tone ; not in schoolmaster style,
or to show off before others, but quietly in his own ear, even if
others are standing by."
198 THE STOIC CREED
'But he is a bad father.' Were you then by nature
settled with a good father ? Nay, but with a father.
* My brother wrongs me.' Preserve then your own
position towards him, nor scrutinize what it is that he
is doing, but what it is necessary for yourself to do
that your will may be according to nature. For
another will not damage you, unless you yourself will
it ; but then will you be damaged when you imagine
that you are damaged."
Ill
Valuable as the doctrine of adiaphora or indifferent
things was as a protest against moral materialism
and self-indulgence, still, in its strictest form, it was
too unbending ; and, even to the end, the Stoic Ethics
never shook itself entirely free of inadequate notions of
some of the things that it regarded as indifferent. It
is obvious to remark that the doctrine, unless properly
safeguarded, might easily lend itself to abuse and lead
to antinomianism ; and, as a matter of fact, it did so
lead among the Stoics themselves in particular cases.
But the conclusion is by do means necessary or logical.
The most that can be said is, that the doctrine affords a
ready excuse, though no real justification, to him who
wishes to live loosely, and that it does not sufficiently
conserve the ordinary civilities and proprieties of life.
Two views of the Stoics in special, in this connexion,
call for remark their view of the Body and their view
of Death.
As being one of the adiaphora, the Body was conceived
as alien to man, enslaved to disease and evil chance,
ETHICS: DEFECTS 199
a clog and hindrance, and gladly to be thrown off
like a worn garment. "What am I? 'A poor soul
laden 'with a corpse ' said Epictetus " (Aurelius, Med.
iv. 41).
But surely, the body is not this alien and despicable
something, to be classed among things not in our
power, along with possessions, riches, and the like,
and so to be summarily dismissed from our regard.
It is not something foreign to us and embarrassing,
but, on the contrary, a constituent part of ourselves
helpful, controllable, desirable, to be tended and
cherished, and, as one of the most wonderful structures
of nature, to be gloried in. 1 It is not in the same
sense a thing external to us as are riches or property ;
and its health is inseparably bound up with our highest
mental and moral good and welfare. The right view
of it is that expressed by Browning in his Rabbi Ben
Ezra :
i
" To man, propose this test
Thy body at its best,
How far can that project thy soul on its lone way?
Let us not always say,
' Spite of this flesh to-day,
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole ! '
As the bird wings and sings,
Let us cry, * All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh
helps soul.' "
For one thing, however, the Stoics are to be
commended : they absolutely condemned slovenly
neglect of the body (thereby differing from the Cynics)
1 So Athenagoras and the early Christian Apologists generally
(Justin Martyr, etc.) saw.
200 THE STOIC CREED
and strictly demanded personal cleanliness or purity.
This they did on two grounds : "first, in order that you
may do the acts pertaining to a man ; then, in order
that you may not be offensive to those with whom you
come in contact." Although it does not quite reach
the doctrine that "cleanliness is next to godliness,"
the teaching in the chapter in Epictetus on the subject
(Diss. iv. n) is in striking contrast to the doctrine of
"the sanctity of dirt" preached and practised by
mediaeval ascetics. "If nature entrusted you with a
horse, would you overlook him and neglect him ? And
now think you that you have been entrusted with your
own body as with a horse. Wash it, wipe it, take care
that no one turn away from you, that no one get out of
your way. But who does not get out of the way of
a dirty man ? " Further still, the Stoics maintained
that the man who neglects his body is lacking
in the perception of beauty, and so rules himself
out of court so far as philosophy is concerned. "For
not even by the appearance of the body ought we
to drive away the many from philosophy ; but, as in
other things the philosopher should show himself
cheerful and undisturbed, so also in things relating to
the body. * See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I
want nothing ; see how I am houseless and cityless
and a fugitive, if so it be, and without a hearth I live
more free from trouble and more prosperous than all of
noble lineage and than the rich. But look at my little
body also that it is not spoiled by my austere mode of
life.' But if a man says this to me who has the
appearance and countenance of a condemned man,
which of the gods will persuade me to approach
ETHICS: DEFECTS 201
philosophy that makes men such persons ? Not so ; I
would not do it, even though I were going to become a
wise man." 1
In like manner, Death is not the thing "indifferent,"
to which we may sit so loose that we may lawfully court
it when we think fit. The countenancing of suicide
(Igayuyrj) is a chief blot in the Stoic Ethics. 2 Doubtless,
it fell in with the Stoic teaching about adiaphora : we
are not to fear death, but, seeing that it must come tc
us some time, must be ready to meet it at any time.
But it is really subversive of the Stoics' great principle
that a man is sufficient for himself that inward calm
may be maintained, and complete satisfaction found in
the soul. To despise death, or not to dread it, when it
comes in the course of nature, is one thing ; to court
death, and of our own accord to effect it, is quite
another. We have a duty towards life, as well as to-
wards death ; and we must take care that courage as
it faces the latter do not mean cowardice turning away
from the former. 3 Moreover, as Plato urged, a man's
life is not his own, but God's, and can be given up only
when He recalls it. This the Stoics, being thoroughly
1 For the remainder of the passage about the unkempt young-
man, see Chapter III. p. 55.
2 Spinoza, who had so much in common with the Stoics in Ethics,
says of suicide : " Persons who kill themselves are impotent in
mind, and have been thoroughly conquered by external causes
repugnant to their nature " (Ethica, iv. 18).
3 Speaking of courage, Aristotle very fitly says (Nic. Eth.
iii. 7): "To seek death as a refuge from poverty, or love, or
any painful thing, is not the act of a brave man, but of a coward.
For it is effeminacy thus to fly from vexation ; and in such a case
death is accepted, not because it is noble, but simply as an escape
from evil."
202 THE STOIC CREED
conversant with the thoughts of Plato, quite well knew :
Cato of Utica spent a portion of the night on which he
committed suicide by reading the Phcedo. But they met
the objection with the rejoinder that suicide is per-
missible only when the suicide recognizes that it is
God's will that he should go. Yet, when we remember
that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, suffocated
himself in old age, because, through a fall, he had
broken one of his fingers ; and that Cleanthes, for even
less reason, continued his abstinence till he died of
starvation, we have difficulty in seeing how so trivial a
cause could be regarded by earnest and thinking men
as a sign from the Deity, or as sufficient justification
for an act so solemn as self-murder. The story about
Cleanthes, as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (vii. 7),
is that, suffering from swollen gums, he was enjoined
by his physician to fast for two days. At the end of
that time, he had so far recovered that permission was
given him to return to his former habits. But he re-
fused, saying that he had now thus far traversed the
way, and, consequently, continued his fast till he died.
"Indifference" of that sort, doubtless, seemed to ex-
hibit moral freedom and strength of will ; but it may be
taken rather as proving how inadequate the Stoic's
estimate of human life still was, and how far short he
fell of grasping the full meaning of his own doctrine of
man's dignity and of apprehending the true nature of
God. And even the deed itself was frequently spoiled
by being done theatrically. This, at any rate, applies
to Stoics of the Roman period. The suicide of Cato of
Utica was dramatic ; so, too, was that of Seneca ; so of
others. On reading the narrative of these and similar
ETHICS: DEFECTS 203
cases, one cannot help feeling that there was an element
of acting that is out of place. 1
On the same lines, we find a further proof of the
Stoic's inability to estimate human life at its true value,
in the fact that he made no definite stand against in-
fanticide. Even the humane Seneca defends the practice.
"Children," he says, "if they are born weakly and
deformed, we drown. It is not anger but reason to
separate the useless from the sound " (De Ira, i. 15).
IV
1 Last of all, the Stoics, despising pleasure and uncom-
promisingly upholding virtue, could hardly fail to be
unjust to the Epicurean ethical endJ Many of their
criticisms, indeed, of pleasure as the summum bonum
might find a place in so subtle a modern book as
Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, and are effective ; but it
was still open to an Epicurean to argue that his con-
ception of pleasure did not tally with that of the Stoics,
and, consequently, that many of the criticisms had no
relevance to him they were simply beside the point.
In the first place, the Stoic, entertaining a low opinion
of the body, could not place a very high price on
pleasure. Pleasure must needs seem to him to be little
more than a synonym for selfishness, and so required
to be fought with outright from the beginning. But in
pleasure, it might be rejoined, there is nothing in itself
1 Epicurus had a summary way of getting rid of the fear of
death, without invoking suicide. He reasoned, "While we exist,
death is not present ; and when death is present, we do not exist ;
therefore, death is nothing to us."
204 THE STOIC CREED
either selfish or unselfish, but merely a fact of the
human constitution, necessary and natural, and so to
be accepted like every other natural fact, and to be
made the most of. There is no demerit in being pleased :
pleasure is simply an indication that our organism is
working- harmoniously and well. But there is no merit
in being pained : pain in itself is simply an indication
that our system is out of sorts that something has
gone wrong. To hug pain as a virtue is the sign of an
unhealthy and abnormal subject. This was the position
that the Epicurean took up, and in which he occupied
strong psychological ground.
In the next place, the Stoic laid the stress on the
lower pleasures, and, noting the tendency in man to
exceed in them, set forth pleasure as in itself debasing
and derogatory to man. That there are debasing
pleasures, the Epicurean readily admitted ; but he did
his very utmost to counteract them he denied that
man's real happiness resided in these. I The greatest
calumny on Epicurus isto identity him with the
sensualist or the epicure.,/ This will best be seen, if we
turn to Epicurus himself. In his letter to Menoeceus,
as given in Diogenes Laertius (x. 27), he thus defines
pleasure in its ethical aspect :
. 'VAVhen, then, we say that pleasure is the chief good,
(we are not speaking of the pleasures of the profligate^
or those that lie in sensual enjoyment (aTroAcuxrei), as
some who are ignorant and not of our way of thinking,
or interpreting us in the worst sense, suppose, V&ut
freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from per-
turbatiorv)(dAA.a TO pyre aXyelv Kara crw/xa /xryre raparreo-^at
For it is not continuous drinkings and
ETHICS: DEFECTS 205
carousals, nor the enjoyments of boys and women, nor
of fish and other such things as a lavish table affords,
that produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning (v^wv
Aoyioyxos) which both searches for the reasons of every
choice and avoidance and banishes opinions, from which
the greatest confusion lays hold on souls."
He then goes on, in the same section, to set forth
prudence as the leading virtue, from which the other
virtues spring ; for it is not possible, he maintains, to
live pleasantly unless one also live prudently and
honourably and justly, and it is not possible to live
prudently and honourably and justly without also living
pleasantly: for "the virtues are connate (o-v/xTre^Kcun)
with living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is insepar-
able from them."
This gives a different complexion to the matter, and
shows, at any rate, that not all the Stoic criticisms of
Epicurean hedonism were just. There is need here, as
in so many other cases, of the logical distinguo.
The same is seen if we turn to Desire. [From the
Stoic criticism, one would infer that Epicurus had
only a very low and unworthy doctrine of desire. But
the contrary is the fact : his views on this important
topic are extremely high. He divided desires into three
classes: (i) those that are natural and necessary,
(2) those that are natural but not necessary, (3) those
that are neither natural nor necessaryyf* * He regarded
as natural and necessary those that remove pains, as
drink when one is thirsty ; as natural but not necessary,
such as merely vary the pleasure without taking away
pain, as very expensive foods ; and as neither natural
nor necessary, such things as crowns and erection of
206 THE STOIC CREED
TykE
"/Diog.
public statues "/Diog. Laert. x. 31). These differ in
their psychological significance. /The first class are
easily satisfied and at small expense ; nor is there very
great difficulty in satisfying the second. It is the third
class that create the supreme difficulty ; for they are .
" vain " desires, and have neither limit nor moderation.^/
Resist transgression of the limit, then. On the duty
of moderating the desires, if true happiness is to be
secured, Epicurus insisted with as great pertinacity as
the Stoics, and he gave utterance to many sage maxims
which even the Stoics did not disdain to make use of.
Thus, one saying of Epicurus, Seneca loves to quote
namely/'" If you wish to make Pythocles happy,
add not to his riches, but take away from his desires}'
Nothing could go more direct to the heart of the matter
than that. Seneca could only paraphrase it when he
said, "It is not he who has little, but he who desires
more, that is poor." And there is shrewd pagan wis-
dom in this of Epicurus : " We are born once, twice we
cannot be born : for eternity we must be non-existent.
Yet thou who art not master of to-morrow puttest off
the right time. The life of all of us is ruined by pro-
crastination, and it is on this account that each of us
dies before he is ready."
The truth is that hedonism is not incompatible with
high moral efforts and aspirations, and Zeno and
Epicurus were not so far apart as themselves supposed ;
and, when the day of eclecticism arrived, this became
apparent. "Says Epicurus 'When I was sick, I did
not converse about my bodily ailments, nor discuss such
1 See Cicero, De Finibus, i. 13.
ETHICS: DEFECTS 207
matters with my visitors ; but continued to dwell upon
the principles of natural philosophy, and more parti-
cularly how the understanding, while participating in
such disturbances of the flesh, yet remains in unperturbed
possession of its proper good. And I would not,' he
adds, ' give the doctors a chance of blustering and
making ado, but let life go on cheerily and well.'
Imitate Epicurus in sickness, if you are sick, or in any
other visitation. To be loyal to philosophy under
whatsoever circumstances, and not join the babel of the
silly and the ignorant, is a motto for all schools alike.
Stick only to the work in hand, and to the tool you
have for doing it." So wrote Marcus Aurelius (Med.
ix. 41).
CHAPTER XI
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION
" Estne Dei sedes nisi terra et pontus et aer
Et caelum et virtus? Superos quid quaerimus ultra?
Juppiter est quodcunque vides quodcunque moveris."
LUCAN.
" Cujus rei ordo est etiam praedictio est." SENECA.
"From Nature's chain whatever link you strike,
Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike."
POPE.
" We are Thine offspring-, alone of mortal things that live and
walk the earth, moulded in image of the All." CLEANTHES.
WE return now to the subject of ontology, or specula-
tion on being, which we so far considered already under
the heading- of Physics, in Chapter V. ; and we do so
with the advantage of approaching the problems through
a previous knowledge of the Stoic Ethics. For, as we
have seen, the ruling formula, "Live agreeably to
nature," is susceptible of a twofold interpretation, and,
according as we accept the one or the other, we are
brought face to face with the psychology of ethics or
with ethical ontology. If by " nature" we mean solely
or chiefly human nature, then the formula introduces us
to ethics as psychology ; if we give it the wider significa-
tion, and understand by it the world-order, then we have
presented to us ethics as metaphysics. Supposing,
208
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 209
however, the question to be asked, in due modern
fashion, Can there be ethics without metaphysics?
then the Stoic answer would unquestionably be, " No ;
morality is rational, and so is founded on cosmology
and the intellectual interpretation of the universe. In
its higher reaches and in its deeper foundations, ethics
is justified only by a reference to the Whole, and the
world-order is necessary for the explanation of the
ethical order." 1
It is the metaphysical aspect, then, that now engages
us. What is "Living agreeably to nature" in its
ultimate ontological signification ?
I
On this head, the teaching of the Stoics was as
follows :
The World one and perfect
The world is a cosmos or universe a whole consist-
ing of interrelated parts and, consequently, informed by
reason : there is a world-course, a system of universal
causation. As Marcus Aurelius puts it (Med. vii. 9),
4 'All things intertwine one with another, in a holy
bond : scarce one thing is disconnected from another.
In due co-ordination they combine for one and the same
order. For the world-order is one made out of all
things, and God is one pervading all, and being is one,
and law is one, even the common reason of all beings
possessed of mind, and truth is one : seeing that truth
is the one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed
with the same reason." " All that now happens follows
in the train of consequence ; else you must deny reason
1 This answer goes back to Heracleitus. See Chap. VII. p. 138.
210 THE STOIC CREED
to the sovereign ends which guide the impulse of the
World-soul " (ibid. 75).
Hence, taken in its entirety, the world is perfect (this
is the view sub specie czternitatis}. This means that
there is really no such thing as evil in it ; for what is
real is true it is as it rmist be. Pain and suffering,
indeed, there are ; but these are not evils, because
necessary and conducive to ultimate good : they are
only the " masks" that children use with which to
frighten us. They are even necessitated by the law
of relativity, or the principle that a relative implies a
corelative pleasure would have no meaning, if there
were not pain ; up involves down ; valley needs hill :
" take away one and you take away all " (Aulus Gellius,
Nodes Attic "ae, vii. i). Neither are sin itself and sinful
actions a real evil, being necessary. " When some
piece of shamelessness offends you, ask yourself, Can
the world go on without shameless people ? Certainly
not ! Then do not ask for the impossible. Here you
see is one of the shameless, whom the world cannot get
on without. Similarly in any case of foul play or breach
of faith or any other wrong, fall back on the same
thought. When once you remember that the genus
cannot be abolished, you will be more charitable to the
individual" (Aurelius, Med. ix. 42). Again, "The
gourd is bitter : drop it then ! There are brambles in
the path : then turn aside ! It is enough. Do not go
on to argue, Why pray have these things a place in the
world? The natural philosopher will laugh at you,
just as a carpenter or cobbler would laugh, if you began
finding fault because you saw chips or parings lying
about their shop. And yet they have a place for the
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 211
rubbish ; but Nature has nothing outside herself.
Herein is the marvel of her handiwork, that thus self-
circumscribed she yet transmutes into herself every
content that seems corrupt and old and useless, and
from the same materials recreates afresh : so as to
avoid the need of fresh substance from without, or of
some place for her refuse. Her own space, her own
material, and her own handiwork suffice " (ibid.
viii. 50).
Providence : Optimism
The World-course, proceeding uniformly, and not
capriciously or at mere random, is synonymous with
the presidency and overruling providence of God. The
course of the world is teleologically determined. ' ' Thee
doth all this system that rolls round the earth obey in
what path soever Thou guidest it, and willingly is it
governed by Thee" (Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus}. Nature's
uniformity bespeaks both wisdom and goodness ; and
this means the Divine Reason in its prevision and pre-
arranging. Hence, the individual and the community
alike are under the rule and forethought of the Supreme :
i.e., in regard to great things, for small things seemed
to the Stoic (though not at all times) too insignificant
to attract the divine care magna di curant, parva
negligunt. 1 In this way, Providence being both
universal and special, no man should be over-anxious
about what is to happen to him here : all is graciously
and wisely ordered. A man's lot and the circumstances
of life are both in the hands of the Deity. He is part
of the whole ; and God cares for the whole, and,
therefore, for the parts. "For each is best, what
1 See Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 66.
212 THE STOIC CREED
Nature brings : and best too at the time, when Nature
brings it. * Earth is in love with rain, and holy aether
loves.' Yes, the world-order is in love with fashioning
whatever is to be. To the world-order I profess, ' Thy
love is mine.' Is there not a truth implicit in the
familiar ' as it listeth ' ? Either You live on where
you are ; to that you are well used : or You move off,
and so doing have your wish : or You die, and your
service is finished. There is no other alternative. So
be of good cheer" (Aurelius, Med. x. 20-22).
This optimism was characteristic of the Stoics in
their speculative moods ; although, when they were
confronted by the actual experience of life's pains and
hardships and by the deep-rooted depravity of human
nature, they could not help sometimes giving expression
to pessimistic thoughts. This is very noticeable in
Seneca, who, even when administering comfort in
bereavement, cannot help being despondent. "There
is nothing so deceitful," thus he consoles Marcia on the
loss of her son (Ad Marciam de Consolatione, 22), "as
human life, nothing so insidious : nor would any one,
in sooth, accept it, were it not given us without our
knowledge. Therefore, if it is happiest of all not to be
born, it is next best, I think, to be quickly restored,
after a brief life, to the Whole again." '"Think of
bathing," says Aurelius (Med. viii. 24), "and its
accessories oil, sweat, filth, foul water, and all things
nauseating. So is it with every part of life, and each
material thing." However, this pessimism is not a
fixed creed, but a mere transient state not the basis
for a philosophy, but a fleeting mood (such as we find
in a poet like Byron) ; and optimism was the prevailing
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 213
temperament of the Stoic, producing" in him a cheerful
and willing acquiescence in the ways of Providence :
non pareo deo, sed adsentior (Seneca, Ep. 96). ''So
long as things that are to come are unknown to me,"
said Chrysippus, " I hold always by the things that
are more favourable for obtaining the things that are
according to nature ; for God Himself made me such
as to choose these." " But if, indeed," adds Epictetus,
"I knew that it were now fated for me to be sick, I
would even myself move to it ; for the foot also, if it
had intelligence, would move to be mired " (Diss. ii. 6).
' ' I am in harmony with all, that is a part of thy harmony,
great Universe," said Aurelius (Med. iv. 23). " For me
nothing is early and nothing late, that is in season for
thee. All is fruit for me, which thy seasons bear, O
Nature ! from thee, in thee, and unto thee are all things.
' Dear City of Cecropsf saith the poet: and wilt not
thou say, ' Dear City of God ' ? "
This Stoical optimism is a most significant fact, and
has a lesson for the present time. Among other things,
it gives us in a very striking fashion a practical refuta-
tion of the theory frequently advocated to-day, that
" temperament and circumstance, not logic, make the
difference between a pessimist and an optimist." l That
temperament and circumstance count for much, is
quite true ; but, were they all-potent, Stoicism ought
to have been the most pessimistic of creeds, for there
have seldom been darker, sadder times than those in
which it was propagated at Rome. If ever it were
justifiable for a man to take the worst possible view of
the government of the universe and to maintain on
1 Leslie Stephen, An Agnostic s Apology, p. 177.
214 THE STOIC CREED
system that life is utterly detestable and bad, it was
while Nero and the other human monsters occupied
the Imperial throne, and when pagan society was
rotten to the very core. Yet, those were the times
when Stoical optimism was strenuously preached, and
when faith saw, behind the corruption and brutalities
and inhumanities of life, the universal righteousness
and wisdom.
fs God personal or impersonal ?
Nevertheless, whether the supreme providence is a
living personal God or merely an impersonal principle,
the course of nature, or the universe itself, is very
doubtful. Had the Stoic physics ruled the ethics,
there would have been no doubt. There the law of
causation and the uniformity of nature are supreme,
and the Ethereal Fire is impersonal. There, too, the
term Cosmos was used indifferently, as by Chrysippus,
of the ordered universe, which consists of heaven and
earth and all that they contain, or of God, the source
from which the ordered universe proceeds and whereby
it is perfected. But the physics did not drastically rule
the ethics. The conception of the Deity as primitive
ethereal fire came to be practically regarded as an
intellectual speculation merely, with little or no influence
on the ethical doctrine ; and the conception of the
Divine personality, as distinct from the universe,
became more and more articulate. Accordingly, Epic-
tetus speaks, almost uniformly, in language of the most
fervent theism. To his intensely religious nature, God is
personal ever-present " Father," "Creator," "Ruler,"
" Guardian," seeing our every deed, knowing our every
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 215
thought, and holding us responsible to Him for our
character and conduct. He is omnipresent, and, like
the Deity of Butler, rules through conscience. "So
that," he counsels us (Diss. \. 14), " when you have shut
the doors and made darkness within, remember never
to say that you are alone ; for you are not, but God is
within, and your Daemon 1 is within, and what need
have they of light to see what you are doing ? To this
God you ought also to swear an oath, just us the
soldiers do to Caesar. . . . And what shall you swear?
Never to disobey, and never to make accusations, and
never to find fault with any of the things that have
been given by him, and never unwillingly to do or to
obey any of the things that are necessary."
Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, is, for the most
part, a pantheist. Yet, the pantheism that appeals to
him is based less on the hylozoism of the earlier Stoics
than on the rationality of the All, intellectually con-
ceived : it is spiritualistic or idealistic rather than physi-
cal or materialistic. " You exist but as a part inherent
in a greater whole. You will vanish into that which
gave you being ; or rather, you will be retransmuted
into the seminal and universal reason" (Med. iv. 14).
One main difficulty in precisely determining the Stoic
conception of the nature of God arises from the fact
that, apart from the philosophical doctrine of the Deity,
the Stoics accepted the popular notion of the existence
of "the gods." They accepted even the popular
mythology, but were very careful to interpret it in a
way of their own they used it simply as symbolical
of higher truth, thereby copying the Cynics. But this
1 This is the equivalent of "guardian angel."
216 THE STOIC CREED
fact that the Stoic acknowledged " the gods" makes
it difficult to say when he is speaking philosophically
of the Deity or popularly of the gods of polytheism.
Still, a Supreme Being, as Active Reason, is conceived
as underlying all and guiding all ; and, even when the
idea of personality is not grasped, it is the notion of
a supreme all-permeating, all-comprehending essence
that stimulates the Stoic and gives impulse to his
aspirations. More especially is this so, when the
Deity is conceived on His moral side, as purity and
righteousness, and the thought of Him is given to
man as a motive to the formation of right character.
" You are a leading object," cries Epictetus, addressing
his fellow-man (Diss. ii. 8), "you are a piece of God,
you have in yourself something that is a part of Him.
Why then are you ignorant of your high descent ? . . .
Wretched one, you are carrying about a god with you,
and are ignorant of it. Do you think that I mean an
external god of silver or of gold? In yourself you
bear Him, and you perceive not that you are defiling
Him with your impure thoughts and filthy deeds."
" Without Thee, O Divinity," says Cleanthes, address-
ing Zeus, "no deed is done on earth, nor in the
ethereal vault divine, nor in the deep, save only what
wicked men do in the folly of their hearts." If religion
means response of the human soul to the impact of the
world Spirit, there is genuine religion here.
Proofs of God^s existence
The existence of God, although maintained to be so
obvious as not to require a proof, 1 was, nevertheless,
1 See Balbus, in Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii.
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 217
proved by the Stoics in various ways. The physical
argument, drawn from the leading doctrine of the
primitive ether or all - pervading creative and pre-
servative fire, was what Cleanthes laid the stress on.
But countless other proofs were adduced by the school,
partly inductive, partly deductive. Inductively, they
reasoned from human nature, from history, from the
world ; deductively, from the a priori conception of
God, and the logic of necessity.
(i) Take, first, their inductive proofs, (a) They had
the argument from man's constitution in the form of
their doctrine of TrpoAij^eis or common notions. God
is, they reasoned, for we have a primary notion of
Him : in other words, the notion of a God inevitably
arises in us during life's experiences. This, when
interpreted in modern language, is just the psycho-
logical position that " God is a necessity of human
nature." In this connexion, the Stoics, like Kant
afterwards, laid the burden of the testimony on man's
moral nature : to them, as to him, God is a moral
necessity, a postulate that alone is competent to solve
the riddle and clear the mystery of human life. His
existence is thus established on the evidence of Con-
science, as Cicero explicitly puts it in De Officiis y iii. 10 ;
or, as it is even more strikingly put by Seneca (Ep. 41),
" Near to you is God ; He is within you. ... A holy
Spirit dwells within us, watcher and guardian (sacer
intra nos spiritus sedet observator et custos)" And
how God operates through conscience is thus : He
notes conduct and keeps back from sin, He guards us
against temptation, and He inspires us with thoughts
" upright, just, and pure." The distance between this
218 THE STOIC CREED
and the famous utterance of Cardinal Newman, in his
memorable Letter Addressed to his Grace the Duke of
Norfolk^ is not so very great: "Conscience is not a
long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent
with oneself; but it is a messenger from Him, who,
both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a
veil, and teaches and rules us by His representatives.
Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet
in its informations, a monarch in its peretnptoriness,
a priest in its blessings and anathemas."
(b) The complement of this is the argument from
history, or the general consent of mankind (consensus
gentium) seen in the past as in the present, in this
people as in that. Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab
omnibus creditum est.
(c] Teleology, or the adaptation of means to ends
in the external world, gives us the third inductive
proof. "How is it possible," they reasoned, "that
a city or a house cannot continue, not even for the
shortest time, without an administrator and curator,
but this so great and beautiful structure should be
administered thus orderly without purpose and by
chance? There is, then, one who administers" (Epic.
Diss. ii. 14). This reminds one of Bacon's famous
utterance (in the beginning of the Essay Of Atheisme] :
" I had rather beleeve all the Fables in the Legend,
and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this
universall Frame is without a Minde. . . . It is true,
that a little Philosophy inclineth Mans Minde to
Atheisme ; But depth in Philosophy bringeth Mens
Mindes about to Religion'. For while the Minde of
Man looketh upon Second Causes Scattered, it may
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 219
sometimes rest in them, and goe no further : But
when it beholdeth the Chaine of them, Confederate
and Linked together, it must needs flie to Providence,
and Deitie."
As part of this same teleological view of the universe,
must be taken men's actual experience of the moral
government of the world. Says Aurelius (Med. iv. 10) :
" ' All that happens, happens aright.' Watch narrowly,
and you will find it so. Not merely in the order of
events, but in just order of right, as though some
power apportions all according to worth." 1 The
cosmic order, then, is moral, as well as natural ; and
experience is the proof of it. We have heard the echo
of this in very recent times.
(2) Take, next, the leading deductive proofs.
Deductively, God's existence is proved (a) by the
necessity of truth, as applied to propositions regarding
the future. This is Chrysippus's argument, mainly
against the Epicureans, as given in Cicero, in the
De Fato. It runs as follows :
All propositions are either true or false. This holds
of propositions that refer to the future, as much as to
other kinds of propositions. But all such propositions
are true only when they are necessary i.e., when
what they affirm must come to pass ; they are false,
when they affirm an impossibility. Whatever, therefore,
happens must of necessity follow from the causes that
produce it. This means that God, as Fate, or as
Course of Nature, is.
(b) Again, it is proved from the very notion of the
1 This is very remarkable, as basing 1 the argument on experi-
ence, and not merely (as with Heracleitus) on metaphysics.
220 THE STOIC CREED
world as a universe. The world as a whole, it is
argued, is perfect (so reasons Balbus, reproducing
Chrysippus, in Cicero's De Naturfi, Deorum, ii.). It
must, therefore, contain in itself all the qualities and
excellences that are to be found in its parts, only in
a superior degree (in this we seem to hear Descartes
speaking). 1 But reason, wisdom, and virtue are ex-
cellences that are in parts of the world : we find
them in man, though imperfectly. This means that
there must be a being in whom they exist perfectly.
"The world, therefore, has virtue: it is also wise,
and, consequently, a god."
(c) Thirdly, God exists, because what will necessarily
come to pass is foreknown by Him : His own nature,
as supreme reason, implies that.
(d) To which, fourthly, may be added the comple-
mentary argument, frequently insisted on by the Stoics,
from Divination. Divination is ; but nothing could be
predicted or divined, unless things were foreordained.
Therefore, God is.
These arguments have more than an historical
interest ; they show the human mind vigorously at
work on the theistic problem, and they touch points
that go to the very root of theism.
Against Agnosticism
The Supreme Being, thus proved to exist, may, of
course, be known by man. The Stoics would have had
little sympathy with that extreme form of agnosticism
put forward by Herbert Spencer in his First Principles,
and defended in other of his works, founded on an
1 The view was also Scholastic.
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 221
erroneous conception of the Absolute and on a mistaken
apprehension of the relativity of knowledge, and which
makes the Deity absolutely transcendent, and, there-
fore, unknowable. 1 He is, to the Stoic, the universal
reason, immanent in the world, pervading it, and so in
necessary contact with that which shares pre-eminently
in itself namely, the reason of man. "The philoso-
phers say that we ought first to learn this, that there is
a God and that He provides for all things, and that it
is not possible to hide from Him, not only our acts, but
even our intentions and our thoughts. Next, we should
learn what is the nature of the Gods ; for such as they
are found to be, he who would please and obey them
must needs try with all his might to become like them.
If the Divine is faithful, he too must be faithful ; if free,
he too must be free ; if beneficent, he too must be
beneficent ; if magnanimous, he too must be magnani-
mous ; as being, then, a follower (ggXom/v) of God, he
must both do and say everything consistently with
this " (Epictetus, Diss. ii. 14).
Yet, there is a wholesome, modified agnosticism in
the Stoic theology, especially in its later Roman form,
the positive conception of God being qualified by con-
sideration of the fact that man is limited or finite in his
knowledge. Right well, for instance, does Seneca
realize that it is not possible for us to comprehend fully
the power that made all things, although we may dis-
cover him in part on every hand. On two points, only,
is he perfectly assured namely, that there is a God,
and that we are to ascribe to Him all majesty and
goodness.
1 Cf. my Theism as grounded in Human Nature, pp. 160-172.
222 THE STOIC CREED
The Deity limited by Fate
Nevertheless, the Supreme Being, in the Stoic
theology, is subject to a peculiar limitation. Strangely
to modern Western thought, but not strangely to any
ancient Greek, He is conceived as under the sway of
Fate. Behind the throne of Zeus stands Moira ; and
Fate rules in the affairs of men : irrevocabilis humana
pariter ac divina cursus -vehit (Seneca, De Prov. v. 6).
Hence, Cleanthes in his Hymn to Zeus speaks in-
differently of "Zeus," "the Universal Reason,"
"Destiny."
Obviously, this conception, if strongly obtruded, or
if tenaciously held and applied with logical rigour,
would produce a very cramping effect upon ethics, and
might be disastrous in the sphere of conduct. 1 But,
with a noble inconsistency or a sublime forgetful ness,
the Stoics did not allow the conception unduly to
obtrude itself; and, although they used it as a solace
in the case of adverse fortune and untoward occurrences,
they cast it aside, or quietly ignored it, in the province
of ethical effort, in training the will and shaping the
mind, in dealing with those highest of all things
" things within our own power." It is recorded of Zeno
that once, when he was chastizing a slave for theft, the
slave said, "It was fated that I should steal (et/xa/m)
/xoi KAei/'ai)." "Yes," replied Zeno, "and that you
should be beaten" (Diog. Laert. vii. 19). That, from
the Stoic standpoint, is the proper answer.
1 Compare with this the Calvinistic theology, which is the
strictly logical outcome of its primary conception of God as
Absolute Sovereign.
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 223
Mythology and Divination
Finally, the Stoics, while accepting mythology,
acquiesced also in the propriety of consulting the
oracles and paying regard to signs. They were
though not without great exceptions, such as Panaetius
firm believers in Divination ; and they supported
their belief by a vast collection of instances, which
might well be commended at the present day to the
consideration of the Society for Psychical Research.
II
Now, on this ontological teaching several observa-
tions immediately occur.
The problem of Evil
In the first place, with regard to the problem of Evil
physical and moral.
(i) The doctrine that the universe is perfect discloses
an unreconciled discrepancy between the Stoic concep-
tion of evil, especially moral evil or sin, and the dictates
of conscience. Roseate optimism does not meet the
necessities of the case. As the world is perfect, evil,
according to the Stoics, is simply apparent and not
real : it has no essential being ; it is merely, from the
point of view of the intellect, absence of light shade
or necessary contrast. "As a mark is not set up to
be missed," says Epictetus (Encheir. 27), "even so the
nature of evil exists not in the universe."
But this, clearly, solves nothing. To deny that sin is,
is simply the boldness of dogmatic assertion, and con-
tradicts our common experience. It does, indeed, get
rid of one moral difficulty the difficulty that so pained
224 THE STOIC CREED
Job, and that has weighed upon earnest souls in all ages
namely, how, if God is, can the wicked prosper and
the virtuous be in adversity ? According to the Stoics,
the so-called prosperity of the wicked is no prosperity,
for it concerns only external goods mere adiaphora ;
whereas the adversity of the righteous is no real adver-
sity, inasmuch as it does not harm the soul. But if so,
how comes it that there can be such a thing as remorse
or self-reproach ? If " the thing that is shameful ought
to be blamed, and that which is blameable is worthy of
blame " (Epictetus, Diss. iii. 26), then sin is a reality
and mars the perfection of the universe, not being
a necessity. If the universe be perfect, "whatever
is, is right " : it could not have been otherwise than as
it is ; and if mere causal sequence is to determine all,
a thing that is, being the necessary result of antecedents,
is as it ought to be. A philosophy that submerges
ethics, rather than assimilates it, cannot be final.
(2) There is more to be said in favour of the Stoical
position that evil is good under disguise, and is
ultimately conducive to the best. This position
Chrysippus affirmed when he compared evil to the
coarse jest in the comedy (see Aurelius, Med. vi. 42) ;
for, just as the jest, though offensive in itself, improves
the piece as a whole, "so too you may criticize evil
regarded by itself, yet allow that, taken with all else,
it has its use" (Plutarch, Adv. Stoic. 14). So, in the
Hymn to Zeus, Cleanthes, while quite admitting that
"what wicked men do in the folly of their hearts" is
not to be imputed to the Supreme Being, but to the
doers themselves, nevertheless regards the Supreme
Being as having "fitted all, evil with good, in one
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 225
great whole, so that in all things reigns one reason
everlastingly. " This is, doubtless, true ; but it does
not solve the problem it only makes us somewhat
more ready to acquiesce in the existence of evil, by
making us more hopeful.
(3) It is also but the inculcation of a faith a noble
faith, no doubt, yet not an intellectual solution of the
difficulty when Seneca rises to what one might call
the Scriptural height of regarding suffering as discipli-
nary, and as God's token of love and Fatherly affection
for His children. With lucidity and light, the subject
is worked out in his treatise, De Providential If, on
the one hand, he there maintains that " calamity is the
occasion of virtue " and that " he is vanquished without
glory who is vanquished without danger," he strongly
insists, on the other hand, on the immense value of
hardships and difficulties in forming character and in
producing manly generous spirits. We are soldiers, he
says, we are sailors, and need to be inured to dangers
in order that we may despise them, and to be exercised
in order that our faculties and organs may develop
and attain perfection. We have to grow, like trees ;
and trees become strong and noble and root themselves
securely in the earth only when exposed to frequent
winds and tempests : " fragile are the plants that grow
in the sunny valley." Yea, further, it is the most
promising pupils to whom the master gives the hardest
tasks ; and sometimes, moreover, the individual has to
suffer for the sake of the general, and good men are
afflicted in order to teach others how to endure.
1 Or, to give it its full title, Quare Align a incommoda bonis viris
accidant cum Providentia sit.
15
226 THE STOIC CREED
All this is noble and true, and is not even marked by
that incompleteness that usually characterizes pagan
conceptions of suffering namely, an inadequate
realization of the fact that the sufferings of the in-
dividual may be beneficial, not only to himself, but to
his fellow-men that by a man's patient heroism
mankind in general are blessed.
And Seneca's view was that of other great Stoics.
Says Epictetus (Diss. iii. 24): "For this purpose he
(God) at one time leads me hither, at another time
sends me thither, shows me to men as poor, without
authority, and sick ; sends me to Gyara, leads me
into prison ; not because he hates me, far from that,
for who hates the best of his own servants ? Nor yet
because he cares not for me, for he does not neglect
any even of the smallest things ; but with the view of
exercising me and of using me as a witness to others."
Yet, with all this, there is no due appreciation in
Stoicism of the fact that, as each individual is essen-
tially a social being, the sufferings that he is called
upon to endure are in great measure vicarious ; and, in
cases where he suffers through others' faults or sins,
his sufferings are of the nature of atonement, thereby
reacting for good upon those whose wrong - doing
entailed them. This is the philosophy of suffering
that is implicated in the great truth of the solidarity of
mankind, and that illumines much.
(4) A word remains to be said on the Stoic position
that evil, and, therefore, sin, is necessary on the law of
relativity: without evil we should have no conscious-
ness or realization of good.
The law of relativity is undoubtedly a commanding
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 227
principle in human experience things are known by
us only in relation to their opposites, and our desires
repose on relativity : as Heracleitus long ago said,
" sickness makes health pleasant and good; hunger,
satiety ; weariness, rest." But the law need not be so
interpreted as to require that these opposites must
be absolute contrasts. In order to consciousness, we
must have change : a uniform temperature, continued
indefinitely without variation, would be to us the same
thing as no temperature at all. But change does not
necessarily mean transition to the entirely opposite
state. Degrees of warmth would give us consciousness
of heat, as much as a temperature in which warmth
alternates with extreme cold. And so we should be
conscious of good without experience of positive sin
or evil, if there were within good itself change from
one degree to another, or if there were varieties of
good. All that is required by the law of relativity is
perception of difference ; and that does not demand
two absolutely contrasting states it would be enough
if there were two degrees of one state : I might quite
well know what good is, without knowing sin or evil,
if I had experience of diverse kinds of good, or if my
perception of righteousness admitted of various ap-
plications or were compatible with various modes of
apprehension. The world might very well be full of
interest to me, though sin were eliminated, if holiness
were susceptible of increase or of progressive realiza-
tion.
The doctrine of Fate
Next, the Stoics' teaching about Fate creates a
difficulty. We seem here to be in the iron grasp of
228 THE STOIC CREED
inexorable law, from which God, in any true sense of
the term, is excluded ; or, if He be included, we are in
the grasp of an ultra-Calvinistic theology that seems to
paralyze human freedom. "Whatever befalls," says
Marcus Aurelius (x. 5), "was fore-prepared for you
from all time ; the woof of causation was from all
eternity weaving the realisation of your being, and
that which should befall you." "Does aught befall
you ? It is well a part of the destiny of the universe
ordained for you from the beginning ; all that befalls
was part of the great web " (ibid. iv. 26). And there
is no doubt that, even in the greatest of the Stoic
Doctors, Fate at times appears as a coercive force,
or compulsive power, overriding all : ducunt volentem
Fata, nolentem trahunt.^- "The universal cause is like
a winter torrent ; it sweeps all before it " (Aurelius,
Med. ix. 29).
It may, however, be maintained that the Stoics at
their best got beyond this position, and meant little
more by Fate than that things happen in the world
according to law and order, that events are part of
a general plan or system, and that human actions
must work out their consequences ; and, as applied
to God, that not even the Deity acts arbitrarily and
capriciously, but with Him, too, law and order hold,
and reason guides the world. If so, they were on the
track of a great truth a truth that is seen in its fulness
only when we throw into the conception of God's
governance of the universe the ideas of love and mercy,
as well as those of intelligence and justice. It is not
1 This is the opposite of Epicurus's dictum that " we are our own
masters, r6 Trap Tj/jids adt<rTrorov" (Diog. Lae'rt. x. 133).
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 229
really to ascribe blind fate to the Deity, or to deprive
Him of genuine freedom, to say that every evil deed on
man's part, and every silly action, must receive its due
recompense of reward. For, how else than under the
conception of "must" can you suppose the Divine
Government, if righteous, to be carried on? If there
is order, there is necessity. This seems to be what
Seneca meant when he said that, if we maintain that
all the good things of life come to us from " Nature,"
that is simply " changing the name of God, for what
else is Nature but God?" "You shall not also lie,"
he adds, "if you call Him fate; for, whereas fate is
nothing else than a series of causes woven together,
He it is that is the first cause of all and on whom all
the rest depend " (De Beneficiis, iv. 7, 8). Moreover,
though Zeno identified Fate with Providence (d^ap^v-^
with Trpovoia), Cleanthes rejected this identification,
in face of the existence of evil in the world ; for evil,
he thought, though fated, cannot be said to owe its
being to forethought or providence though pre-
determined, it is not foreordained. Furthermore,
Cleanthes, notwithstanding that he was strenuously
materialistic in his physical speculations regarding the
universe, and even in his theoretic explanation of mind,
can yet infuse into his submission to the Cosmic Order
such an amount of willing acquiescence as to give us
the impression of the deepest religious feeling. " Lead
me, O Zeus," he cries (Encheir. 53), "and thou
Destiny, whithersoever I am ordained by you to go.
I will follow without hesitation. And even if, in evil
mood, I will not, none the less must I follow."
Let it be noted, however, that the Stoic acquiescence
230 THE STOIC CREED
differs from that of the Christian theist, inasmuch as it
is lacking in hope and definite faith as to the future of
the individual man who willingly acquiesces in his
Destiny. The light of Revelation has made a vast
difference in this particular, and the gain is on the side
of him who has clear conviction that his lot is deter-
mined by a living, loving Person. 1
Divination
In like manner, how can the conception of God as
absolute law or order be reconciled with the belief in
divination ?
The two are irreconcilable, if divination be regarded
in its purely superstitious aspect. But, probably, the
Stoics in their philosophy did not so conceive it. They
did, indeed, accept the mythology of the popular faith,
but interpreted it allegorically, in Cynic fashion. And
if they made much of omens, prodigies, consultations
of the oracle, and such like, may it not have been in
the belief that, to the sincere inquirer, God spoke in
these things to the conscience ; just as the daemon of
Socrates, to which they frequently referred as an
example, had a moral significance ? This, at all events,
seems to be the suggestion in the passage on Divination
in Epictetus's Encheiridion (chap. 32): "Come then
boldly to the gods as your advisers ; and, for the rest,
when any advice has been given to you, remember
whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you will
be slighting if you obey them not."
Plausibly, it may be held that the Stoic's belief in
1 Compare the Stoic's view of Providence with (e.g.) that of
Ps. ciii.-cvii.
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 231
divination was nothing more nor less than his acknow-
ledgment (half unconscious, of course) of the existence
of the supersensuous and supernatural his mode of
expressing the fact that Revelation there is, and that
the Supreme is the source of it. 1 He reasoned that,
if God is, He must reveal Himself to man ; while, on
the other hand, if there is found to be truth in divina-
tion, God is. It is a deep thought that Balbus expressed
when he said (Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 66): " There
never was a great man without some divine inspiration
(sine aliquo adflatu divino)." At the same time, the
Stoic drew a clear distinction between the different
kinds of divination, as we see from the first book of
Cicero's De Dimnatione. Some kinds, he said, are
technical or artificial ; others are natural. To the
technical group belong astrology, prodigies, all the
art of the augur and the haruspex i.e., of the pro-
fessional soothsayers ; and the ground of foreknow-
ledge and prediction here lies in practised sagacity and
in the lengthened and accumulated observation of many
generations of men in other words, in general, if not
absolutely uncontradicted, experience. The diviner's
forecasts, indeed, may sometimes be wrong ; but that
is owing to one of two causes either to ignorance of
some particular sign, or to the circumstance that there
is an unobserved or purposely concealed fact among the
facts observed or disclosed.
All this is strictly in accordance with the true
scientific method of induction namely, trained obser-
vation and accumulation of instances ; and its value,
if any, must depend upon the number and amount
1 See Seneca, Naturales Qucestiones, ii.
232 THE STOIC CREED
of proved coincidences, and upon the possibility of
eliminating the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.
But it is different with the second group of cases,
with instances of natural divination. Under this class
come dreams, frenzy, vaticinations. The personal
character of the instrument or agent of revelation now
plays the important part. He must be a man of clear
and unclouded intellect unclouded because free from
the grosser habits and passions of the body (such as
are produced by gluttony and drunkenness), and a man
of purity of life : "for true divination belongs rather to
a sound mind than to a sick body" (Cicero, De Div.
i. 38). This is simply saying, in a far off way and in
a dim light, what is said in the full blaze of spiritual
insight and supreme wisdom in the New Testament,
"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see
God." When, therefore, it was urged against prophetic
dreams, as by Aristotle, in his little treatise On Prophecy
in Sleep, that such dreams cannot come from God
because they are not given to the wisest and the best
men, we can easily imagine the Stoic answer vte. t The
dreamer must be good, before we can trust his vision ;
and the better he is, the more rational our trust in his
prevision.
We are not, then, to dismiss the Stoical doctrine as
pure superstition ; we are rather to see in it in the
principle of it, though not in all the details the
adumbration of a great truth. Bearing testimony as
it does to the supernatural, it has only to be purified
and expanded on the lines of this " natural " divination
to eventuate in the conception of true prophecy ; where
the religious man, delivering a heaven-sent message,
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 233
becomes an authority, not because of any mere official
position, such as that of priest or augur, nor yet
because of nature's laws or the cosmic order having
been broken in imparting to him illumination, but
because the prophet himself specially reflects the
divine in his own character, and, therefore, stands
nearer to God and has a deeper insight into His
ways and will than the majority of his fellow-men
possesses.
Hence, the Stoics' proof of the existence of God from
Divination, although it moved in a circle, may very
well be justified. The Stoics reasoned that "as God
is, Divination must be true " ; and, again, "as Divina-
tion is true, God is." That is certainly a circle; but
it is a circle that includes the whole universe of the
realities amidst which we move. Consequently, it
must return upon itself. Clearly, if there be a God,
He must manifest Himself to mankind ; and, again,
from the manifestations of Himself to mankind, we
are justified in asserting His existence. Given divina-
tion, then, as such a manifestation, the being of God
is assured ; or, starting with the idea of God, then
divination is a manifestation of Him, if it be in the
line of true inspiration. Either way, the argument
holds, although the form of it be circular.
Prayer
The same acknowledgment of the supernatural that
we have in the doctrine of divination (whether alto-
gether consistently with the general philosophical
system, is another matter) is made by the Stoics in
the recognition of Prayer. "And the wise man,
234 THE STOIC CREED
they say, will pray, asking good things from the
gods, as says Posidonius in the first book of his
Duties (Trept KaOyKovruv), and Hecaton in the
thirteenth book of his Paradoxes" (Diog. Lae'rt.
vii. 54).
Indeed, there are few things finer in the Greek
language than Cleanthes's Hymn to Zeus, or than
many of the impassioned prayers of Epictetus. Yet
the purpose of prayer with the Stoics is a very noble
one. It is not so much to obtain some object of desire
as to be freed from desiring objects. "The gods
either have power, or they have not. If they have not,
why pray at all? If they have, why not pray for
deliverance from the fear, or the desire, or the pain,
which the thing causes, rather than for the withholding
or the giving of the particular thing? Assuredly, if
they can help men at all, this is the way of help. But
perhaps you will say, The gods have put all that in my
own power. Then is it not better to exercise your
power and remain free, rather than to be set on what
is not in your own power, and become a slave and
cringer ? And who told you that the gods do not assist
us even to what is in our own power? Begin there
with your prayers, and you will see. Instead of ' Oh !
to enjoy her caresses ! ' pray you against lusting after
the enjoyment. Instead of ' Rid me of my enemy ! '
pray you against desire for the riddance. Instead of
' Spare my little one ! ' pray you that your fears may
be at rest. Be this the direction of your prayers, and
watch what comes " (Aurel. Med. ix. 40). And even
where temporal things may lawfully be prayed for, it
must be in the simplest, most confiding, manner. " An
THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 235
Athenian prayer Rain, rain> dear Zetis, upon Athenian
tilth and plains. We should either not pray at all, or
else in this simple, noble sort." So wrote Marcus
Aurelius (Med. v. 7).
Reference has just been made to Cleanthes's Hymn
to Zeus. That noble production has the merit of being
the perfection of Stoic prayers ; and it also gives us a
concise summary of the whole Stoic theology, as
formulated in the earlier days. It is intellectual and
pantheistic ; but it is touched, also, with that emotional
fervour that intellectual pantheism is capable of produc-
ing. It may very well, then, be reproduced here in full,
as a fitting conclusion to the chapter :
" Above all gods most glorious, invoked by many a
name, almighty evermore, who didst found the world
and guidest all by law O Zeus, hail ! for it is right
that all mortals address thee. We are thine offspring,
alone of mortal things that live and walk the earth
moulded in image of the All ; therefore, thee will I
hymn and sing thy might continually. Thee doth all
this system that rolls round the earth obey in what
path soever thou guidest it, and willingly is it governed
by thee : so dread is the bolt thou wieldest in thy hands
invincible, to do thy pleasure, that flameth double-edged
and faileth never lo, beneath its stroke all nature
shivers ; therewith too thou dost regulate that Reason
universal that comes and goes through all things,
mingling with lights that are great and lights that are
lesser . . . for that thou art so great, sovran supreme
for evermore ; without thee, O Divinity, no deed is
done on earth, nor in the ethereal vault divine, nor in
the deep, save only what wicked men do in the folly of
their hearts. Nay more, what is uneven, thy skill doth
make even ; what knew not order, it setteth in order ;
and things that strive find all in thee a friend. For
thus hast thou fitted all, evil with good, in one great
236 THE STOIC CREED
whole, so that in all things reigns one reason ever-
lastingly. Now, this the wicked among mortals, for
their undoing, shun till it slips from them ; who yearning
ever in the quest of goods neither behold God's all-
pervading law nor listen to it, though by obedience
thereto noble their life might be in accord with reason.
No, but of themselves are they driven, crazed, to divers
vices, some exerted in unlovely striving for renown,
some turned to lawless pursuit of gain, some to soft
luxury and the train of sensual joys, longing vehe-
mently the while for the opposite of that they get.
But do thou, Zeus, giver of every good thing, wrapt in
cloud and bright lightnings, save mankind from woful
ignorance ; do thou, Father, dispel it from the soul ;
grant that we may attain to true judgment, which is
thy stay in thy just rule of all things ; that so being
held in honour we may requite thee in honour, chanting
thy deeds right on, as is most fit for our mortality,
since nor mortal men, no, nor gods, have any greater
privilege than duly at all times to hymn the universal
Law." 1
1 Among- the many translations of the Hymn, this one made by
a former distinguished student of my own, Mr. George Watt, B.A.
(Cantab.) deserves a high place.
CHAPTER XII
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM
" Nunquam nimis dicitur quod nunquam satis discitur. " SENECA.
"Among- the statutes of the Ephesians was an injunction, to
meditate continually on some ancient model of virtue." MARCUS
AURELIUS.
"Where Gods are not, spectres rule." NOVALIS.
I
FROM what has now been said, it will be felt that
the Stoical philosophy is not a dead thing, a mere
past system effete and useless, to be put aside as
a relic of antiquity, arousing only an antiquarian
curiosity, but is something instinct with life, and is
capable of creating a genuine sympathetic interest.
It breathes a fine spirit, and, in its later forms, touches
the heart, while at the same time it appeals to the
intellect.
What value it has as science and speculation (formu-
lated by the founders), we saw with sufficient fulness in
Chapters III. to V. In that respect, it is very much
a philosophy of common sense and is the precursor of
much modern theory, especially of the teaching of
Thomas Reid and the Scottish School. It has both its
strength and its weakness, though the former is much
greater than is usually acknowledged at the present
237
238 THE STOIC CREED
moment. It has distinct significance as Theory of
Knowledge. To that we need not return.
But, looking back on its ethical and religious teach-
ing, outlined in Chapters VIII. to XL, we may well
ask, What, in this teaching, is of permanent value, and
has special interest for the present day ?
The answer to this question has been given from
various points of view ; two of them, in particular,
characteristic of recent times. First, high authorities
have commended Stoicism as an antidote to, or a sub-
stitute for, systematic organized religion especially,
for the Christian religion, whose pronounced super-
naturalism and doctrinal theology had become offensive.
Secondly, it has seemed to some that, without in any
way affecting people's attitude towards the Christian
religion, Stoicism may very properly be studied for its
practical counsels and wise moral precepts. It was,
doubtless, for some such reason as the second of these
that Lord Avebury (then Sir John Lubbock), not very
many years ago, when recommending to the College of
Working Men in London " the Hundred best Books,"
included in his list Marcus Aurelius's Meditations and
the Encheiridion of Epictetus. With this practical
ethical view, we may readily enough sympathize ; and
it does not seem necessary to dwell upon it. What-
ever can help one, whether Christian or not, in the
effort to live a higher life, to make character stronger
and conduct purer, may very safely be recommended
for study and assimilation. Stoicism, especially in its
later phases, can undoubtedly do this in a very marked
degree.
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 239
But it is different with the first of the answers.
When Stoicism is opposed to systematic theology, and
particularly to the Christian faith (whether on scientific
or on other grounds), critical examination becomes
necessary. Marcus Aurelius is the Stoic in special now
selected for our imitation, 1 and his teaching is offered
us as a worthy substitute for the so-called emasculated
conceptions of the dogmatic believer. No personal
God, no future life, no supernatural, but morality in its
virgin purity, independent of and unassisted by con-
siderations of heaven or of hell, with a metaphysics
definite enough to rescue it from being absolutely
vague, yet not so precisely defined as to become dog-
matic this is the gospel that can alone avail (so we
are told), and that alone is worthy of an age of emanci-
pated thought and scientific enlightenment. Renan
here leads the way. In his brilliant treatise on the
great Stoic Emperor, he designates the Meditations
(or, as he calls them, the Thoughts) " the gospel for
those who do not believe in the supernatural," "a
veritable eternal gospel, which will never grow old, for
it affirms no dogma. . . . Science may destroy God and
the soul, while the book of the Thoughts remains young
yet in life and truth. The religion of Marcus Aurelius,
as was occasionally that of Jesus, is the absolute re-
ligion that which results from the simple fact of a
high moral conscience placed face to face with the
universe. It is neither of one race nor of one country.
No revolution, no advance, no discovery, can change
1 The popularity of Marcus Aurelius in Great Britain is seen,
inter alia, by the large number of English translations of the
Meditations made within the past ten years.
240 THE STOIC CREED
it." A similar attitude has been taken up by others,
as the following sentence from Leslie Stephen's An
Agnostics Apology (pp. 345-346) may show: u The
rationalist may well feel that on many points he would
sympathise more closely with Marcus Aurelius than
St. Paul. The Stoical view of the world and life may
appear to him worthier, freer from antiquated mytho-
logy, and more congenial to modern thought, than
that of the great Apostle." 1
Now, there can be no doubt that, if one wish to
oppose Stoicism to the doctrinal Christian religion, it
can best be done by taking Aurelius as the typical
Stoic. For he has thrown off much of the harshness
of the older system, and yet he is far less intense in his
emotional nature than (say) Epictetus or Seneca, and is
more scientifically-minded, and supernaturalism does
recede with him into the background. There is nothing
in his Meditations corresponding to that vivid present-
ment of the immortality of the soul and of its future
state that we found, under the "Physics," in Seneca.
His conception of God, too, is mainly abstract and
pantheistic, and is, in part, a contrast to that of
Epictetus. On the other hand, there is a calm re-
iterated insistence on three great ideas, which may,
indeed, be taken as the sum of his creed. First, the
fleetingness of life and of the world, and, therefore, the
vanity of clinging to life or of putting our trust in
external things and in fickle fortune. The transitori-
ness of fame, in particular, exercises his mind ; and,
naturally to Imperial Caesar under the circumstances,
1 The significance of Aurelius's teaching was brought out by Sir
Frederick Pollock in Mind, ist series, vol. iv. pp. 47-68.
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 241
he broods much over the fact of how soon even great
names are forgotten. " The accustomed phrases of old
days are the archaisms of to-day. So, too, the names
that were once on all men's lips, are now as it were
archaisms Camillus, Casso, Volesus, Dentatus ; and
a little later, Scipio and Cato ; yes, even Augustus,
and so with Hadrian and Antoninus. All things fade,
as a tale that is told, and soon are buried in complete
oblivion. This is true even of the shining lights of
fame. As for the rest, no sooner is the breath out of
them, than they are ' to fortune and to fame unknown.'
And what, after all, is eternity of fame? Just empti-
ness " (Med. iv. 33). Secondly, the necessity of doing
our duty now and here, not relying on the past
(which is gone) nor waiting for the future (which
is not ours) ; and public interest, or the good of the
community, is the test of Duty. Thirdly, unqualified
belief in the wisdom, righteousness, and goodness of
Providence, i.e., of the World-order (personality being
out of count) and implicit trust therein. Whatever
befalls us here, and whenever it befalls us, is and must
be for the best ; for it is conducive to the good of the
whole, and what is serviceable to the whole cannot be
prejudicial to any one of its parts. This optimism
necessarily carries, as a corollary, contentment with
our lot in life and meek submission to our fate. Still,
it does not paralyze us and render progress impossible.
We are not to fold our hands and sleep, because all
things are ordered well: on the contrary, we are to
work and do our duty, and show ourselves worthy of
our lot. There is no more strenuous preacher of the
gospel of work than Aurelius, except Carlyle.
16
242 THE STOIC CREED
So that, thus far, we may very readily acquiesce in
the verdict of Matthew Arnold, himself a Stoic in very
large measure. "In general," he says, "the action
Marcus Aurelius prescribes is action which every sound
nature must recognise as right, and the motives he
assigns are motives which every clear reason must
recognise as valid. And so he remains the especial
friend and comforter of all clear-headed and scrupulous,
yet pure-hearted and upright, striving men, in those
ages most especially that walk by sight, not by faith,
but yet have no open vision. He cannot give such
souls, perhaps, all they yearn for, but he gives them
much; and what he gives them, they can receive"
(Essays in Criticism, vol. i. p. 378).
But, over and above this, there is clearly discernible
in Aurelius a supernatural strain ; and neither he nor
any of the greater Roman Stoics were anti-super-
naturalists, in the sense of the modern rationalist or
freethinker. They delighted to view the world, as
Spinoza did, sub specie ceternitatis. They were, for
the most part, believers in divination and in the pro-
priety and utility of prayer ; and even Renan has to
admit that, in the Meditations^ there is just "a little
insignificant spot" of the supernatural, "which does
not mar the marvellous beauty of the whole." Yea,
in Epictetus and in Seneca, the world and its govern-
ance are set forth in a view that comes remarkably
near St. Paul's conception of the God in whom we
live and move and have our being ; and their ethical
theory, with its pronounced altruism and doctrine of
the solidarity of the race, might, but for the inversion
of historical sequence, be designated emphatically
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 243
Pauline. No wonder that the Encheiridion should have
been "adopted as a religious work in the early Chris-
tian Church," and should have been twice paraphrased
about the sixth century of our era, once specially
"for the use of monastic bodies!" 1 Human nature
was not to the later Stoic, any more than it is to the
Christian, summed up in the one word " reason " ; and
the religious, no less than the moral, sentiments, were
duly recognized and definitely provided for by him.
II
Hence, the answer to our question must not lay the
stress on the absence of dogmatism in Stoicism ; nor
must it put the Stoical philosophy in flat opposition to
modern dogmatism. The "spot" to which Renan
refers, even in Marcus Aurelius's Meditations, is more
than "little" and "insignificant"; and if it be the
criterion of "a veritable eternal gospel, which will
never grow old," that "it affirms no dogma," then
Aurelian Stoicism cannot stand the test no philosophy
can, which bases its positions on metaphysics : would
it be a real gospel (good news) if it did ? Moreover, if
religion results "from the simple fact of a high moral
conscience placed face to face with the universe," that
conscience must discern under the universe a Person,
for moral relations can exist only between persons, and,
however much you may admire, you cannot worship
abstract law or order. But what the answer must
emphasize are points such as the following, each of
which has its own significance for to-day.
1 Simplicius's famous commentary on the Encheiridion^ from the
Neo-platonic point of view, belongs to the same sixth century A.D.
244 THE STOIC CREED
First, its vivid realization of the universe as a whole,
a system consisting of interrelated and mutually
necessary parts. " Subsequents follow antecedents by
bond of inner consequence ; it is no mere numerical
sequence of arbitrary and isolated units, but a rational
interconnexion. And just as things existent exhibit
harmonious co-ordination, so too things coming into
being display not bare succession, but a marvellous
internal relationship " (Aurelius, iv. 45). That is both
scientific and philosophical, nor could either the modern
scientist or Spinoza himself have put it more felicitously.
Next, its deep sympathy with Nature, and its clear
insight into Nature's workings and processes. There
is a note of modernity here, too, that is very striking.
On the one hand, we have anticipation of the man of
science of to-day, demanding facts and concrete ex-
perience ; and, on the other hand, we have Wordsworth
and the poets of Nature foreshadowed. " Watch well,"
counsels Aurelius (Med. iii. 2), "the grace and charm,
that belong even to the consequents of nature's work.
The cracks, for instance, and crevices in bread-crust,
though in a sense flaws in the baking, yet have a
fitness of their own, and a special stimulus to tickle
the appetite. Figs, again, just at perfection, gape.
In ripe olives, the very nearness of decay adds its own
beauty to the fruit. The bending ears of corn, the
lion's scowl, the foam that drips from the wild boar's
mouth, and many other things, though in themselves
far from beautiful, yet looked at as consequents on
nature's handiwork, add new beauty and appeal to the
soul, so that if one attains deeper feeling and insight
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 245
for the workings of the universe, almost everything,
even in its consequents and accidents, seems to yield
some pleasing combination of its own. Thus the actual
jaws of living beasts will be not less picturesque than
the imitations produced by artists and sculptors. The
old woman and the old man will have an ideal loveli-
ness, as youth its ravishing charm, made visible to the
eyes that have the skill. Such things will not appeal
to all, but will strike him only who is in harmony with
Nature, and her sincere familiar."
This shows great observation of Nature and intimate
communing with her, but there is wanting that keen
appreciation of the beauty of Nature as manifesting the
divine and the ideal that is characteristic of modern
philosophy. The beauty recognized is that of suitability
to circumstances or adaptation of means to ends, rather
than the beauty of shade and colour, seen in the clouds
and the sunset, etc., it is scientific more than aesthetic.
This is in line with the Stoic's central conception of
morality, which emphasizes the grandeur, rather than
the beauty, of holiness. Order and harmony, in nature
and in morals alike, are to him supreme : the artistic
side of either is only secondary hardly even that.
Again, its intensely experiential character. Both its
psychology and its ethics, no less than its religion, are
based on, and tested by, experience. Human nature
as we find it, and the external world as known to our-
selves through inductive study of it, are the stable
foundations of the Stoic philosophy ; and speculation
and theory are only subsequent and grounded on our
knowledge of these.
246 THE STOIC CREED
This also is very modern. The " reign of law" in
Nature which science postulates, is the very keystone
of Stoicism ; and the Stoical conception of the cosmic
process as ethical or righteous, reached through in-
tently watching the outcome of occurrences and events
and the trend of human history, is a clear anticipation
of Fichte and Matthew Arnold, a clear recognition of
"the eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteous-
ness," a finger-post to Hegel and the philosophy of
history.
A further point is its unwearied insistence upon
Character as the supreme concern for man. This gives
a distinctive note to Stoicism, and marks it off from
the opportunism of other creeds and other times. "No
compromise" was here the motto, "no tampering
with principle." Hence the stimulating power that
Stoicism has had in every age when men have shown
themselves to be really in earnest, and the standing
rebuke it has been to worldly-mindedness and in-
differentism. "Live as on a mountain. It matters not
whether here or there ; everywhere you are a citizen of
the city of the world. Let men see and witness a true
man, a life conformed to nature. If they cannot bear
him, let them make away with him. Better that, than
life on their terms" (Aurelius, Med. x. 15).
Further, its reverent and devout spirit, and, in
particular, its acknowledgment and keen appreciation
of the psychological basis of religion, and, therefore, its
recognition of the need of religion for man. To the
Stoics, God is a necessity of human nature ; which is
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 247
technically expressed by saying that He is a Tr
or primary conception of the mind, and, popularly, in the
argument known as consensus gentium, or the general
consent of mankind. No great help, however, was
given by Stoicism in determining the idea of God,
inasmuch as the Stoics oscillated between pantheism
and monotheism, and seemed not to feel the need of an
absolutely definite conception. Nevertheless, the idea
had for them ethical or moral, as well as intellectual,
content, so that the nature of man that craved for or
demanded a Deity was his whole nature, not merely a
part of it not the intellect alone (as with Aristotle),
nor the conscience alone (as with Kant), nor feeling
chiefly (as with Schleiermacher). Not a little of their
theistic reasoning would commend itself to the modern
theist, who essays above all things to find a thorough-
going basis in human nature (feeling, intellect, and
will alike) for his Natural Theology. 1
Next, its firm belief in the World as a manifestation
of Divine Order, and man's life and human society as a
plan of God. "Order is Heaven's first law"; and
social order is binding, not simply through its utility,
but because it comes with the divine sanction law
in every form means God. The consequence of this
conviction was an optimism which was both invigorating
and robust, and a trust and submission so unflinching
that even to come into contact with it elevates and
stirs. " Man, be desperate now, as the saying is, on
behalf of happiness, on behalf of liberty, on behalf of
high-mindedness. Lift up your head at this time as one
1 Cf. my Theism as grounded in Hitman Nature.
248 THE STOIC CREED
released from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say,
* Use me for the future for whatsoever purpose Thou
wiliest, I am of one mind with Thee, I am Thine ;
nothing do I refuse of the things that seem good to
Thee ; whithersoever Thou wiliest, lead me ; in what-
soever dress Thou wiliest, clothe me. Dost Thou will
me to hold a position of authority, to live as a private
individual, to remain here, to go into exile, to be poor,
to be rich ? I will be Thy advocate for all these
positions to men ; I will show the nature of each
of them what it is ' " (Epictetus, Diss. ii. 16).
" Man, you have been a citizen of the great world
city " so does Aurelius close his Meditations. "Five
years or fifty, what matters it ? To every man his due,
as law allots. Why then protest? No tyrant gives
you your dismissal, no unjust judge, but nature who
gave you the admission. It is like the praetor
discharging some player whom he has engaged.
' But the five acts are not complete ; I have played but
three.' Good : life's drama, look you, is complete in
three. The completeness is in his hands, who first
authorised your composition, and now your dissolution ;
neither was your work. Serenely take your leave ;
serene as he who gives you the discharge."
There is here a very noble trait of Stoic teaching.
What alone is wanting in this matter of willing
acquiescence in the Deity and one's destiny is the hope
or faith as to the individual's future that characterizes
the modern theist, or the thinker who has a firm
apprehension of the personality of God. The ultimate
destination of the present world, according to Stoical
notions, is to be burned up at the Great Conflagration,
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 249
and yet, in the cycle-revolution, to be reproduced again
with all its imperfections. The sinful, troubled, sorrow-
ing individuals that now are, will be reborn to the same
sins, troubles, sorrows, time after time ; no progress
being made in the future, nor advance of any kind.
This, certainly, should have toned down the Stoic's
optimism ; it might have been expected, at any rate, to
strip it somewhat of its exuberance. It was, perhaps,
some such feeling as this that led a section of the later
Stoics notably Pansetius to dissent from the doctrine
of World-cycles, which had so fascinated the founders
of the School, and had been so carefully and fully
elaborated by Cleanthes. But their implicit trust in the
World-order remained, notwithstanding ; and the Stoic's
attitude has its lessons for the moderns.
Once again, the high estimate that the Stoics
entertained of human nature itself, as partaking of the
divine. Human reason is a part of the KOII/OS Aoyos, or
universal reason : " Each man's mind is god, an efflux
of deity " (Aurelius, Med. xii. 26). Hence man's dignity
and worth, especially on the side of virtue and will-
power or self-control. " Virtue and truth are the same
in man as in God." There is no great step from this to
the Scriptural teaching of man as made in the image of
God " in our image, after our likeness." 1 It is a noble
view to take of a man (a) that he need not, if he care,
break the law of righteousness at all ; but, (b) that, if
he do break it, he has it in his power to retrace his
steps and to regain his position. Only to a being
of transcendent worth could the motto be given as
1 Gen. i. 26.
250 THE STOIC CREED
his rule of conduct, " Bear and forbear (di/e
f t the vivid apprehension (in the case of the
later Stoics) of the dependence of true happiness, on
the one hand, on cheerful submission to the course
of the world, as being a manifestation of Divine law
and rule, both wise and good ; and, on the other
hand, on realization of the fact of the brotherhood
of man, " not by blood or physical descent, but by
community of mind" and "partnership with the
Divine," and willing performance of the duties thence
arising, on the ground that society or the community is
an organism, part of the Divine order, and subservient
// to the highest good. Peace within is the great thing ;
and peace within can be got only from a high conception
S^of Duty and an effort faithfully to do our work. We
rave here a voice from the past meeting a voice in the
present. "There is in man a Higher than love of
Happiness : he can do without happiness, and instead
thereof find Blessedness ! Was it not to preach forth
this Higher that sages and martyrs, the Poet and the
Priest, in all times, have spoken and suffered ; bearing
testimony, through life and through death, of the
Godlike that is in Man, and how in the Godlike only
has he Strength and Freedom ? Which God-inspired
Doctrine art thou also honoured to be taught ; O
heavens ! and broken with manifold merciful Afflictions',
even until thou become contrite and learn it ! O, thank
thy Destiny for these ; thankfully bear what yet remain :
thou hadst need of them ; the Self in thee needed to be
annihilated. By benignant fever-paroxysms is Life
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 251
rooting out the deep-seated chronic disease, and
triumphs over Death. On the roaring billows of Time
thou art not engulfed but borne aloft into the azure of
Eternity. Love not Pleasure ; love God. This is the
Everlasting Yea, wherein all contradiction is solved :
wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him "
(Carlyle, Sartor Re 'sartus, ii. 9).
Again, could anything, on high religious lines, be
nobler than the following utterance of Epictetus about
Duty, and about the privilege of man as a rational
being to live in conscious union with the Supreme
and to joyfully serve Him? "For," he says, "had
we understanding, ought we to do anything else,
jointly and severally, than hymn the divine, and praise
Him, and rehearse His benefits? Ought we not, when
digging or ploughing or eating, to sing this hymn to
God ? * Great is God, inasmuch as He has given us
those instruments whereby we till the earth. Great is
God, inasmuch as He has given us hands, and swallow-
ing, and a belly, and the power of growing secretly and
breathing while we sleep.' These things it were meet
that every one should praise, and should chant the greatest
and most divine hymn, inasmuch as He has given us the
faculty of understanding these things and of using the
proper way. What then ? Since the majority of you are
blinded, ought there not to be someone to fill this place,
and, on behalf of all, to sing the hymn to God ? For
what else can I do, an old lame man, than sing hymns
to God ? If, indeed, I were a nightingale, I would do
as a nightingale ; if a swan, as a swan, But now I
am a rational being ; it behoves me to sing of God.
252 THE STOIC CREED
This is my work ; this I do, nor will I relinquish this
post, so long* as I am permitted, and you I exhort to
join in the same song " (Diss. i. 16).
Ill
In all these respects, then, Stoicism may be con-
fidently affirmed to have perennial value ; and, in
particular, its ethico-religious interpretation of the
universe, not only stands as a notable landmark in
the history of philosophy, but possesses the illumi-
nating and inspiriting power of a great truth, to
which modern philosophy is again reverting, and
which, one would fain believe, will continue to exert
an influence so long as sane thought and right reason
retain their hold on mankind. And, coming down to
practice, when we look at such treatises as the Dis-
sertations and the Encheiridion of Epictetus and the
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, as aids to practical
ethics, we see that these can never die : the wisdom
that is enshrined in them is for all ages. If, in the
words of Farrar, "the Manual [of Epictetus] was to
antiquity what the Imitatio of Thomas a Kempis was
to later times, and what Woodhead's Whole Duty of
Man y or Wilberforce's Practical View of Christianity,
have been to large sections of modern Englishmen " ;
so also it is the case that "no systematic treatise of
morals so simply beautiful was ever composed [as the
Encheiridion^ and to this day the best Christian may
study it, not with interest only, but with real advantage.
It is like the voice of the Sibyl, which, uttering things
simple, and unperfumed, and unadorned, by God's grace
reacheth through innumerable years " (Seekers after God,
PRESENT-DAY VALUE OF STOICISM 253
p. 222). And if so with Epictetus, so too with Aurelius :
not even the best Christian need despise the high
ethical teaching of the Meditations^ which fair-minded /
thinkers like John Stuart Mill (see his posthumous
essay on the Utility of Religion) have deemed worthy
of being brought into comparison with the Sermon on
the Mount, all the more so that the author's life was
conscientiously moulded on his own precepts. As well
despise the Bookof Proverbs, or the Epistle of St. James,
or the exhortations of St. Paul, as the Meditations.
Nor can the philosophical writings of Seneca be
other than helpful to high-toned people, eager about
right living.
The problems of life are too complex and man's
interest in them too intense to permit of our neglect-
ing, much less despising, any serious effort, in what-
soever age and from whatsoever quarter, to cope with
them ; and the issues are too momentous and too far-
reaching, to justify illiberality in any form. Wisdom
is not the monopoly of any century, or of any person,
or of any people, but "is justified of all her children."
Moreover, to theists, the notion of a progressive revela-
tion (place and time being essential moments) is so
necessary to the adequate conception of the Divinity,
that it forbids our restricting the divine revelation to
a single age or section of mankind to a single school
or country. Christian theism is even more emphatic.
For if Christ is " the Light of the world," it would be
a very feeble rendering of that supreme truth to main-
tain that the Light did not shine in the far past, as in
the near present, nor there, but only here, and that He
254 THE STOIC CREED
who "made of one blood all nations of men," left all
nations of men, save a very few, and all individuals,
save a miserable minority, to sit in utter darkness and
to generate only falsehood and error. The thought
is utterly derogatory to our idea of God, and more
especially as that is presented to us in Christ, which
will not allow our shutting ourselves out from inter-
course and sympathy with the great intellectual past
and from the noble souls that illuminated former times
and alien lands, and put posterity under an undying
obligation. We cut ourselves off from history, and
we cut ourselves off from the fulness of the Christian
conception alike, if we do not appreciate the high
teaching of the Stoics, which, as a matter of fact, led
up to and served in measure to mould the ethics of the
New Testament, and if we cannot include in "the
communion of saints " those pure and noble thinkers
(pagans, as we grimly call them) who strove so hard
for the cause of righteousness on the earth, enriching
humanity, and made the advent of the later civilization
possible. Here, as strongly as anywhere, comes home
to us the sentiment that "truth is catholic, and nature
APPENDIX
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM
(See pp. 9 and 130)
THE prominence of Pragmatism as a philosophical
doctrine at the present moment, and its contact with
Stoicism at important points, demand, perhaps, that
some brief account of it be here offered and some
estimate made of its value.
Pragmatism (from the Greek Trpay/xa, signifying act or
deed) is the name that has been given to the recent
movement in philosophy which lays the stress on doing
or the practical activities of human nature in the inter-
pretation of truth and reality. It originated some time
ago with Mr. Charles S. Peirce in America, but has
come to Great Britain (name and thing) mainly through
Professor William James of Harvard University, who,
taking it from Mr. Peirce, reproduced it a few years
since in his Will to Believe, and, later on, in his Philo-
sophical Conceptions and Practical Results^ and who is
at present actively engaged in defending it against all
comers in philosophical magazines British and other.
It has been further developed by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller,
of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, who, unmindful of
the august associations of the old literary term, has re-
255
256 APPENDIX
christened it "Humanism" with reference, presum-
ably, to the fact that it makes "man the measure"
(homo mensura], or bases itself in human nature and
human experience. 1
Of course, it is not a new thing in philosophy to have
the practical side of man's nature calling for recognition.
Indeed, every philosophy that is supremely and in the
first instance ethical (such as that of the Stoics), may
be termed "pragmatical"; and Kant himself maybe
designated a pragmatist, if you look merely at the fact
that his Ethics gives us his highest teaching, supple-
menting and transcending that of the Pure Reason.
But what is new is the attempt to base cognition as
well as ethics on practice to lay theory of knowledge,
as well as morality and aesthetics, on this foundation.
According to Pragmatism, it is not man's intellect or
reason (as has been so long maintained) that determines
reality and truth, but his will and his feelings action
with a purpose or for an end, action in response to
human needs ; and thought itself springs from the same
practical root as Professor James puts it "concepts
are teleological instruments." That is true which
serves an end or works out a purpose in other words,
which is useful, which produces beneficial consequences,
which satisfies us ; that is false which fails to do this.
Says the pragmatist, "If it can make no practical
difference which of two statements be true, then they
are really one statement in two verbal forms ; if it can
make no practical difference whether a given statement
be true or false, then the statement has no real mean-
ing." Again, "The ultimate test for us of what a truth
means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires."
And again, "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts
of an object, we need only consider what effects of a
1 For a keen controversy regarding it, see Mind for the years
1904-1906.
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 257
conceivably practical kind the object may involve
what sensations we are to expect from it and what
reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these
results, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the
object, so far as that conception has positive significance
at all." 1 Still further, as Mr. Schiller maintains, 2
" The truth of a thing is to be found in its validity
which, however, must be connected rather than contrasted
with its origin. ' What a thing really is ' appears from
what it does, and so we must study its whole career.
We study its past to forecast its future, and to find out
what it is really 'driving at.' Any complete explana-
tion, therefore, is by final causes, and implies a know-
ledge of ends and aims which we can often only
imperfectly detect." Hence, Mr. Schiller holds that all
Axioms were originally Postulates : you begin by assum-
ing, guessing, supposing, and then act on your
assumption, guess, or supposition ; and if your action
succeeds, the assumption is justified, and if it goes on
succeeding time after time, then the postulate becomes
an axiom you regard it as universal and as necessary.
The appeal, then, is to experience and consequences :
truth, in order to be true, must have practical results,
it must work yea more, in the wider humanism, it
consists in consequences, more especially if these are
good. Our beliefs are determined by practical interest.
We believe what serves our purpose, or what points to
an end which we desire, or what satisfies our needs :
we disbelieve what serves no purpose, or what has
proved to be misleading or inadequate to meet our
wants. So, too, of morality : human needs and their
satisfaction determine between right and wrong, and
give us the ethical notions.
Thus, then, in pragmatism (not least in its developed
1 See Mind, as already referred to.
2 See his chapter in Mr. Start's Persona! Idealism, p. 125.
17
258 APPENDIX
form of humanism), the stress is laid on human nature,
and more particularly on the practical needs of it ; and
reality, as well as truth, is that which interests us and
in which we find satisfaction. Other reality there can
be none ; for, until a thing interests us and wins our
affection, it is nothing to us, but, when it does so, it
cannot be taken as anything apart from the subject
its nature is, in measure, determined by its relation to
the subject. Reality and truth alike, therefore, are
tested by experience and find their verification therein ;
and, in the long run, the two are one.
And so, on its negative side, pragmatism is a protest
against a priorism and Absolutism ; neither of which
submits to experience. Indeed, it owes its existence to
reaction against that extreme intellectualism which so
long ruled, where man was contemplated simply as a
rational being, his emotive and his volitional nature
being ignored. It is, consequently, essentially inductive
in its method, and breathes the scentific spirit through-
out. It will not permit truth to be relegated to a
transcendent sphere to which experience has no access,
nor will it allow experience to be dictated to by mere
unverified and unverifiable a priori conceptions. The
Absolute, if it is taken in the pure metaphysical sense,
as we find it, say, in Mr. Bradley's Appearance and
Reality, is a mere name without a meaning, "a
worthless technicality " : it sheds no light on life's
problems, it solves no difficulties ; on the contrary, it
darkens and confuses. Difficulties disappear only under
what works, and hypotheses have value only if they be
working hypotheses.
Thus we are done with the old order of things ;
and the advance of science has effected the change.
"'God geometrises,' it used to be said; and it was
believed that Euclid's Elements (I am quoting Professor
James, Mind, vol. xiii. p. 459) literally reproduced his
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 259
geometrising. There is an eternal and unchangeable
* Reason ' ; and its voice was supposed to reverberate
in Barbara and Celarent. So also of the ' laws of
Nature,' physical and chemical, so of natural history
classifications all were supposed to be exact and
exclusive duplicates of pre-human archetypes buried
in the structure of things, to which the spark of divinity
hidden in our intellect enables us to penetrate. The
anatomy of the world is logical, and its logic is that of
a university professor, it was thought. . . . But the
enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these
latter days has well nigh upset the notion of any one of
them being a more literally objective kind of thing than
another. There are so many geometries, so many
logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so
many classifications, each one of them good for so much
and yet not good for everything, that the notion that
even the truest formula may be a human device and
not a literal transcript has dawned upon us. ... It is
to be doubted whether any theoriser to-day, either in
mathematics, logic, physics, or biology, conceives
himself to be literally re-editing processes of Nature or
thoughts of God. The main forms of our thinking, the
separation of subjects from predicates, the negative,
hypothetic, and disjunctive judgments, are purely human
habits. The ether, as Lord Salisbury said, is only a
noun for the verb to undulate. . . . The suspicion is in
the air nowadays that the superiority of one of our
formulas to another may not consist so much in its
literal ' objectivity,' as in subjective qualities like its
usefulness, its ' elegance,' or its congruity with residual
beliefs. Yielding to these suspicions, and generalising,
we fall into something like the humanistic state of
mind. Truth we conceive to mean anywhere, not
duplication, but addition ; not the constructing of inner
copies of already complete realities, but rather the
2 6o APPENDIX
reacting on imperfect realities so as to bring about
a clearer result." Consequently, truth is synthetic in
its nature, and not merely analytic.
Such, then, is Pragmatisn or Humanism in brief
summary. Let us note also briefly its merits and its
defects.
II
One great merit is its insistence on or recourse to
Experience (widely interpreted), and the necessity of
recognizing the emotional and volitional sides of human
nature, no less than its rational or intellectual side.
That we attend only to what interests us, and that what
interests us serves some end or purpose, is a common-
place of modern psychology. We think with a view to
an end ; and we believe, in great part, because our
belief works out in practice. Human needs do certainly
lie at the root of cognition and of belief, no less than of
conduct ; and we think and believe in a particular way
so long as that way satisfies us or ministers to our
desires only, in estimating our desires, we must take
the whole man into account and not merely a part of
him ; we must view him totus^ teres atqtie rotundus. A
belief, for the most part, is not a simple but a complex
thing. If it is grounded in the intellect, it is affected also
by feeling, association, and interest or conation ; and
the strength of it, in the case of any firm conviction, is
only partially accounted for by pointing out its ration-
ality : it is the result of many co-operant factors. The
forces that play upon us, moulding this way or that, are
very diverse, and they all have a practical bearing.
Consequently, it is "wisdom" rather than " know-
ledge " that determines belief, cro<ux more than eVto-TTJ/x^ ;
and faith enters in, for there is always a venture in
belief we trust, where we cannot see.
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 261
Pragmatism is thus a wholesome protest against a
too narrow or one-sided interpretation of human nature,
and against wild speculation divorced from experience.
If the primary motive that impels mankind is to live and
to continue living, then everything must be tested by its
bearing on this primordial impulse. To live is to work ;
and whatever conserves life, and, still more, whatever
conduces to its betterment and fulness, as well as to
its conservation, is of primary importance.
Consequently, pragmatism deals with concrete ex-
perience, and refuses to be guided by mere abstract
thought. "It is the individual concrete experience in
all its fulness," says Mr. Schiller (in Personal Idealism,
p. 127), " which every man worthy of the name wants
philosophy to interpret for him ; and a philosophy
which fails to do this is for him false."
In this way, in its theory of knowledge, pragmatism
refuses to separate subject from object, or to counten-
ance any such unmanageable antithesis between mind
and matter as that which Descartes and the Cartesians
made. Reality is given in and through our activities ;
apart from these, it is a name without a meaning.
So, also, with regard to character and conduct, it
insists on concrete experience, and interprets ethical
notions in the light of the whole of man's nature, taken, of
course, in relation to his environment (social, in particular).
Hence, it protests against mere criticism of incidental
points in its doctrine, against mere logic-chopping,
which dissects without uniting in a comprehensive view
" confutation by single decisive reasons." It insists
that " the one condition of understanding humanism is
to become inductive-minded oneself, to drop rigorous
definitions, and follow lines of least resistance on the
whole.' " *
1 Professor James, in Mind, vol. xiv. pp. 190-191.
262 APPENDIX
Lastly, pragmatism has good ground for resisting
Absolutism, if by Absolutism is meant the doctrine that
demands an Absolute out of all relation to us and
incapable of ever being brought into relation ; or if it
means a ghostly otiose something, serving no purpose
and explanatory of nothing at all. If the Absolute be
approached from the side of our activities, an Absolute
of the purely intellectual and bloodless type is an
impossibility. " Pure thought ' which is not tested
by action and correlated with experience, means nothing,
and in the end turns out mere pseudo-thought." l
III
But pragmatism or Humanism, with its virtues, has
also its defects ; two of which may here be specialized.
For one thing, it over-emphasises action or the mill.
In its eagerness to avoid the lop-sidedness of in-
tellectualism, it is prone to fall into the opposite
extreme of pure voluntarism. It objects to intellect-
ualism (an objection perfectly relevant to intellectual
monism, Spinozistic or other) that, while the intellect-
ualist explicitly admits that man is not merely intellect,
but has also feelings and conative impulses which must
be reckoned with by the philosopher, he has no sooner
made the admission than he proceeds to ignore it,
going on his way henceforth unimpeded by it and
building up his system on the sole assumption that
man is an intellectual being, and that everything must
be explained and interpreted solely in the light of
reason. But the intellectualist may very well turn
round on the pragmatist and say, * * You too are very
explicit in your enunciation that man's personality
consists of feeling, intellect, and will (not of one of
1 Mr. Schiller, Personal Idealism , p. 128.
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 263
these alone, but of all three, and all three mutually
implicated and interactive) ; more especially, you insist
that there is "no intellection except for practical
purposes." 1 But immediately you go on as though
will was everything. It suits you, in advocating
voluntarism, to associate intellection with volition
(and rightly enough) ; but it is no less convenient for
you (and this wrongly) forthwith to forget that, if the
theoretical is nothing apart from the practical, 'the
practical is always the theoretical in its fulfilment." 1
This, I say, is what the intellectualist may very
properly rejoin. For there is no question that pragmat-
ists are disposed to commit two errors.
In the first place, they are apt to forget, and they
do forget, that if knowledge and morality, if our ideas
and our conduct, are determined by an end or purpose,
this very fact of end or purpose, this very fact of a
plan being presupposed, implies an intellectual factor.
In all conscious actions, intellectual postulates are
involved. We must apprehend what we consciously
aim at, otherwise our volition would become chance-
determined. The true and the right cannot lie in the
mere realization of an end or purpose, unless the end
or purpose be itself first assumed to be true or right,
unless we have some pre-determined or accepted scale
of values. There are ends and ends ; and even with
false or unrighteous ends we may, under certain
circumstances, be satisfied : in other words, realizing
an end and resting satisfied therewith characterize the
true and the right, and the false and the wrong, alike ;
and if the distinction between these is to be upheld,
a criterion must be found outside mere desire and its
fulfilment.
But, in the next place, pragmatists deal unfairly
with intellect. Sometimes they ignore it, or so sub-
1 See Professor James, The Will to Believe, p. 140.
264 APPENDIX
ordinate it to will and feeling as to disparage it ;
thereby forgetting their own doctrine that man must
be taken in his entire personality, that feeling, intellect,
and will are all functions of human nature, and each is
of co-ordinate value with the others, and that they are,
moreover, mutually implicated where the one is, the
others are also. There can be no real harmony or
complete development of our being, if any one of these
is degraded. But sometimes also they write as though
intellect were actually resolved into feeling and volition,
were actually created or "originated" by action;
thereby confounding things that differ, and dispensing
with that mental function which is perhaps the most
fundamental of all, and without which there could be
no discrimination or apprehension of difference, and,
therefore, no consciousness.
The other defect that calls for notice is, that prag-
matism, though strong psychologically ', is weak meta-
physically.
Indeed, metaphysics is distasteful to the pragmatist
or humanist: he condemns "all noble, clean-cut, fixed,
eternal, rational, temple-like systems of philosophy "
(so Professor James puts it) ; * and he gives the
following in the humanist's defence: "These con-
tradict the temperament of Nature, as our dealings
with Nature and our habits of thinking have so far
brought us to conceive it. They seem oddly personal
and artificial, even when not bureaucratic and pro-
fessional in an absurd degree. We turn from them
to the great unpent and unstayed wilderness of Truth
as we feel it to be constituted, with as good a conscience
as rationalists are moved by when they turn from our
wilderness into their neater and cleaner intellectual
abodes."
1 See Mind, vol. xiii. p. 467.
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 265
This surely is an extreme position. For, although
metaphysical systems may not, any one of them, be
fully satisfactory although you may be dissatisfied
with Spinoza and Hegel and the Absolutists generally
nevertheless, Nature itself is nothing, even according
to the humanists, unless teleologically interpreted, and
that means metaphysics ; nor is Experience enough to
guide us (as even Locke discovered), unless we take
along with it its rational implications.
Surely, if human wants are to be the test of truth,
as humanists maintain, our rational wants must count
for something ; and the craving for unity is as natural,
and, therefore, as legitimate, as any other. It is mis-
leading to represent Nature as " the great unpent and
unstayed wilderness of Truth," and to set it in direct
opposition to the rational interpretation of Nature.
Nature is only an "unpent and unstayed wilderness"
in the sense that our experience is ever widening and
ever deepening. But if nature is uniform and our
experience is amenable to law, that means that the
principles of it are fixed, and, in that sense, may be
designated "eternal." No metaphysical system need
regard Nature as a known completed whole ; stationary ,
therefore, for we have exhausted it ; unprogressive, for
it has nothing further to reveal. Metaphysics is quite
compatible with evolution and development, and with
a progressive revelation in a progressive experience.
But it holds that "evolution," "development," "pro-
gress " must proceed upon lines that are already fore-
shadowed ; and that the process presupposes a whole,
within which it operates and towards which it tends,
and in the light of which, although we may not yet
have perfect vision, it finds its interpretation. Have
we perfect vision of any ideal ? And yet ideals are
what move us and lead us to higher and ever higher
acquisitions. Science, Religion, Morality, Politics,
266 APPENDIX
Education aim at the ideal. Not one of these has full
perception of that at which it aims ; and yet the con-
cept is definite enough to be effective. Shall the ideal
of the metaphysician alone be incompetent, as being
the ideal of a whole interpenetrating and inclusive of
all human aspirations and activities (both theoretical
and practical), and giving meaning to every other ideal ?
At any rate, it is implicitly supposed in science, as in
the other provinces, and its ineradicability from human
nature, and the satisfaction that it brings to the in-
dividual in harmonizing life and experience, should
commend it to the pragmatist and humanist, to whom
harmony and satisfaction are everything.
INDEX
Absolute, the, conception of,
101 ; and pragmatism, 258,
362.
Academics, their relation to
Zeno, 23.
Agnosticism, 220.
Air, as first principle, 3.
Altruism, in Stoicism, 162-169,
194.
Anaxagoras, 3.
Anaximander, 2.
Anaximenes, 3.
Anima mundi, go, 128.
Animals, lower, kindness to,
183-
Antinomiamsm, 32.
Antisthenes, as ethicist, 131 ;
his vanity, 132 ; his high
teaching, 134 ; on the right
use of appearances, 144 n. ;
as ideal sage, 170, 184.
Apathy (airdOeia), 149, 189.
Aristippus, 105.
Ariston of Chios, 49 n. ; on in-
different things, 150, 171.
Aristophanes, 7.
Aristotle, on Anaxagoras, 4 ;
on rhetoric, 12 ; referred to,
17 ; his definition of phil-
osophy, 40 ; his idea of
matter as eternal, 100 ;
criticism of Plato's Ideas, 125 ;
his relation to the Stoics, 23,
129; his test of the natural,
135 ; on virtue as a habit,
154 ; on friendship, 156 n. ; on
slaves, 165 n. ; on desire, 177 ;
encourage, 201 n. ; on dreams,
232 ; his theism, 247.
Arnim, von, 27.
Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 139,
179 n. ; as Stoic, 176 ; on
Marcus Aurelius, 242 ; 246.
Arrian, 29, 31 n., 133 n.
Assent (criry/cardfleo-is), 43, 78.
Athenagoras, 199 n.
Atoms and Atomic Theory, 3,
109-125.
Augustine, St., 60.
Aurelius, Marcus, quoted and
referred to, passim ; his Medi-
tations, 30, 240 ; his private
character, 33 ; reproduces
the leading ethical positions,
140-207, passim ; pronounced
in his theological views,
208-236, passim ; his modern-
ity, 239 ; his optimism, 241.
Avebury, Lord, 238.
Avoidance, 171.
Axioms, as postulates, 257.
Bacon, quoted, 218.
Bailey, Samuel, 75 n.
Bain, on rhetoric, 12 ; on male-
volent affections, 195 n.
Belief, 260.
Benn, Alfred W., 8 n.
Bentham, 154.
Body, in relation to soul, 141 ;
defects in Stoic view of, 198.
Boethius, quoted, 25 ; his
Vision, 36 ; as Stoic, 190.
Bradley, F. H., 258.
Browning, quoted, 199.
Bruce, Dr. W. S., 187.
Buddha, 146.
Bunge, Prof., 122.
267
268
INDEX
Burns, quoted, 181 ; on in-
dependence, 182.
Butler, Bishop, 175, 176.
Butler, Samuel, quoted, 79.
Calvinism, 155 n., 222 n., 228.
Campbell, Principal G., 12.
Canonic, 117 n.
Carlyle, 241 ; on Blessedness,
250.
Case, President of Corpus
Christi College, Oxford, 75 n.
Casuistry, 51.
Catechetical School, of Alex-
andria, 137.
Catechism, The Larger, quoted,
I 55 n -
Cato, of Utica, 202.
Certainty, 7.
^* Character, 32, 246.
Christianity, and the individual,
128 n. ; and inwardness of
morality, 153 n. ; its cosmo-
politanism, 1 80; its apprecia-
tion of man's dignity, 182 ;
elevates the gentler virtues,
191 ; and Stoicism, 239, 243 ;
on acquiescence, 248 ; and
progressive revelation, 253.
Chrysippus, referred to and
quoted, passim ; his place in
Stoicism, 27, 28 ; his con-
tributions to the creed, 57 ;
his view of impressions, 68 ;
of life according to nature,
143; his theistic proof, 219;
on sin, 224.
Cicero, referred to and quoted,
passim ; on Socrates, 5 ;
his De Officiis, 30, 51 ; on
Stoic terminology, 43.
Cleanthes, quoted and referred
to, passim ; his place in
Stoicism, 27, 28 ; duplicates
the sciences, 42 ; his con-
tributions, 57 ; view of im-
pressions, 68 ; world-cycles,
gin., 249 ; proofs of the soul's
immortality, 95 ; his death,
202 ; on fate and providence,
229 ; his Hymn to Zeus, 235.
Clifford, W. Kingdon, 94.
Comtists, their conception of
immortality, 97.
Conflagration, final, disowned
by Pansetius, 58, 91 n. ; in
Stoic physics, 91 ; 248.
Confucius, 127.
Conscience (crvveidrjais), 144.
Consensus gentium, 69, 81, 98,
218, 247.
Cosmogony, of the Stoics,
87-92 ; of the Epicureans,
105-125.
Cosmopolitanism, Stoic, 60,
162-169, 1 80 ; its non-
Hellenic origin, 169 n. ;
Christian, 180.
Courage, Aristotle on, 201 n.
Crates, 130.
Cross -questioning, Socratic
method of, 6 ; as applied by
Epictetus, 55.
Cycles, recurrent, disowned
by Pansetius, 58, 91 n. ; in
Stoic physics, 91 ; 248.
Cynics, relation to Zeno, 23 ;
their name, 130 n. ; influence
on the Stoics, 130-138 ; their
ideal sage, 131 ; individualis-
tic and anti-social, 135 ; their
allegorical method, 136 ; on
right use of appearances, 143 n.-
Death, Stoic view of, 201.
Democritus, 3 ; and Epicurean
physics, 105 ; his relation to
Epicureans, 119-121.
Descartes, his method, 7 ; on
innate ideas, 70 n. ; criterion
of truth, 82 ; 220 ; on mind
and matter, 261.
Desires, treatment of, by Stoics,
25 ; to be eradicated, 146 ;
nature of, 147 ; as motives,
149 ; psychology of, 177.
Destiny, 92, 227.
Dialectic, Socratic, 6 ; as logic,
62.
Dill, S., 99 n.
Diogenes, the Cynic, 23 ; his
rudeness, 132 ; as ideal sage,
184 ; Epictetus's account of,
185.
INDEX
269
Diogenes Laertius, quoted,
passim.
Divination, disowned by
Panastius, 58, 223 ; as
Theistic proof, 220, 233 ;
doctrine of, 230-233.
Divinities, the heavenly bodies,
89.
Doubt, how to be conquered,
16, 71.
Dualism, 100.
Duty, Panastius on, 58 ; kinds
of, 154, 173 ; classes of, 186 ;
as the way tp peace, 250.
Eclecticism, of Romanperiod,58.
Emotions, the, according to
Cleanthes, 148 ; how classi-
fied, 150 n.
Empedocles, his doctrine of
sense-perception, 3.
Epictetus, quoted and referred
to, passim ; his Dissertations
characterized, 29 ; private
character, 33 ; conception of
ethics, 49; as a lecturer, 51 ;
on the qualifications of a
philosopher, 52-56 ; and the
rhetorician, 55 ; on cleanliness
and pursuit of the beautiful,
55 ; makes ethics supreme,
58 ; his view of life according
to nature, 143 ; his view of
suffering, 226 ; on prayer,
234 ; on duty and conscious
service of the divine, 251.
Epicureans, their physics, 24 ;
Cosmology, 105-125; sources
of our knowledge of, 106 ;
their ethical end criticized,
1 60, 203.
Epicurus, 105 ; his relation to
disciples, 107 ; on the gods,
in, 120; his relation to
Democritus, 119-121 ; on fear
of death, 203 n. ; his definition
of pleasure, 204 ; on desire,
205.
Epistemology, 47, 66-83 f
Epicureans, 115.
Eristic, defined, 13 ; and the
Megarics, 23.
Eschatology, 95.
Eternity, to the Stoics, 158 ;
to Spinoza, i^Sn.
Ether, 88.
Ethics, 48, 126-207; as de-
veloped historically, 56 ; re-
lation to religion, 183 ; its
practical character, 186 ; re-
lation to Theology, 208-236.
Evil, nature of, to Stoicism, 103,
210; problem of, 223-227.
Evolution, and metaphysics,
265.
Example, power of, in Ethics,
184-186.
Experience, Stoic regard for,
245; appeal to, in pragmatism
and Humanism, 257, 260.
Farrar, Dean, 34 ; quoted, 252.
Fate, 92 ; effect of, in Stoicism,
103 ; as limiting the Deity,
222 ; doctrine of, 22^-230.
Fichte, 139 ., 246.
Findlay, Prof., quoted, 191.
Fire, as first principle, 3.
Foreknowledge, divine, 220.
Freedom, wherein it consists,
*43-
Friendship, only between the
wise or good, 156.
Gellius, Aulus, on lav/ of rela-
tivity, 210.
rVw0i (reavrdv, 5.
God, to later Stoics, 60 ; as
universal substance, 87-92;
material, 93 ; in relation to
matter, 99 ; as creative intel-
ligence, 101 ; as impersonal
force, 103 ; his personality,
214, 243 ; as supreme being,
216 ; proofs of his existence,
216-220, 246; agnosticism
regarding, 220 ; limited by
fate, 222 ; as conceived by
Aristotle, 130 ; Christian con-
ception of, 253.
Gods, the, 215.
Gomperz, 8 ., 14, 86 n. ; on
Protagorean dictum, 16 n. ;
quoted, 134.
270
INDEX
Good, the, 146.
Gorgias, quoted, 15.
Grant, Sir A., 20 n. ; quoted,
129, 137.
Green, T. H., quoted, 177 n.
Grote, George, on the Sophists,
14.
Habit, 129; virtue not a habit,
154; yet habit necessary for
moral progress, 170, 194.
Haeckel, 94, 113.
Hamilton, Sir W., 18 ., 75.
Happiness, its nature, 144 ;
means of, 145, 178, 250;
relation to virtue, 152 ; to
length of days, 157.
Hedonism, Epicurean, 160, 203.
Hegel, on the Sophists, 14 ; on
philosophy of history, 246 ;
as absolutist, 265.
Heracleitus, 365 n. ; change, 85 ;
logos, 85, 88 n. ; fire, 86 ; flux,
91 ; his influence on the Stoic
ethics, 138-139; on human
law, 183 ; on relativity, 227.
Heredity, important to psycho-
logist, 73.
Hirzel, 27, 75 n.
Homo mensura, 16.
Hooker, quoted, 183.
Horace, quoted, 150.
Humanism, 9 ; 255-266.
Humanity, how conceived by
Stoics, 165.
Hume, 18 n.
Huxley, 113.
Idea, innate, 69 ; ideas, Pla-
tonic theory of, disowned by
Stoics, 97, 127.
Ideal, power of, 192 ; vision of,
265.
Immortality, according to So-
crates, 9 ; according to Pan-
setius, 58 ; according to
Cleanthes and other Stoics,
97-
Impressions (0avrao"tat), false
and true, 66.
Indifferent things (adtdtpopa), 58,
145 ; Ariston of Chios on,
150; the doctrine revised,
171, 193 ; defects of doctrine,
198.
Infanticide, 203.
Injury, forgiveness of, 166 ;
infliction of, 167, 195.
Intellectualism, 130, 258, 262.
James, Prof. W., 9, 83 n. ; on
pragmatism and humanism,
255, 258, 264.
James, St., quoted, i55.
Japp, Prof., 122.
Job, and problem of evil, 224.
John, St., and Logos concep-
tion, 65.
Jurisprudence, and religion,
183 ; influence of Stoicism
upon, 184.
Justin Martyr, 66, 88., 199 n.
, 154, 173.
Kant, his debt to Stoicism, 176 ;
on self-respect, 182 ; referred
to, 186 ; his theistic proof,
217 ; 247 ; as pragmatist, 256.
Kar6/30a>/ia, 154.
Kelvin, Lord, 122.
Knowledge, relativity of, in
Protagoras, 15 ; Pyrrhonist
theory of, 26 ; Stoic theory
of, 47, 66-83 Epicurean
theory of, 115-1 17.
Laertius, Diogenes, quoted,
passim.
Language, important to psycho-
logist, 73.
Laotsze, 127.
Laws, human, their relation to
religion, 183, 247.
Leucippus, 1 19.
Life, how explained on Epi-
curean principles, 114, 122;
in accordance with nature,
142, 174, 208; worth living,
146.
Lightfoot, Bishop, 20 n., 192 n.;
quoted, 144 n.
Like, recognized by like, 3.
Locke, 22 ; on innate ideas,
70 n. ; and experience, 265.
INDEX
271
Logic,place of, in Stoic sciences,
44 ; how conceived, 45, 62 ;
on its negative side, 64 ; in
relation to words, 65.
A6705, in Logic, 65 ; of Hera-
cleitus, 85, 138; o-rrepfjiaTiKos,
88.
Lotze, 82.
Lucian, 63 n., 71 n., 184 n. ;
quoted, 108.
Lucretius, 106 ; quoted and re-
ferred to, passim ; as expositor
of the Epicurean system, 107.
Mackail, J. W., quoted, 113.
Macrocosm, 90.
Man, his original constitution,
89 ; twofold nature of, 140 ;
his submission to God, 247.
Martensen, Bishop, 186.
Masson, Dr. J., ngn.
Materialism, of pre-Socratics,
3 ; of Stoics, 27, 93 ; specula-
tive and moral, 103 ; criticized,
122-124.
Matter, its relation to the
Supreme Mind, 99.
Mechanism, 122.
Megarics, relation to Zeno, 23.
Menander, 90.
Method, allegorical, among
Cynics, 136; among Stoics,
215.
Microcosm, 90.
Mill, J. S., i8n., 167, 253.
Mind, a tabula rasa, 66 ; its
activity, 68 ; Supreme, and
matter, 99 ; how explained on
Epicurean principles, 1 14-1 19.
M. Minucius Felix, 92 n.
Monism, 102.
Morality, Stoic, its essence, 43 ;
inwardness of, 152.
More, Sir Thomas, quoted, 167.
Musonius, 54, 164.
Nature, different meanings of
term, 143, 174; Stoic's ap-
preciation of, 244.
Nature, human, living accord-
ing to, 142, 174, 208 ; de-
praved, 156 ; partaking of the
divine, 249 ; in pragmatism,
258.
Newman, Cardinal, 83 n. ; on
Conscience, 218.
Notions, common (Trpo\ri\f/eis), 69,
79, 81, 217.
Nous, of Anaxagoras, 3.
Ontology, Stoic, 84-104 ; 207-
236.
Optimism, 211, 247.
Order, social, source of, 247.
Origen, 137.
Pain, as conceived by the
Epicureans, 1 18; by the Stoics,
147, 210 ; as disciplinary, 225.
Panastius, 30, 45 ; his place in
Stoicism, 58 ; on self-suffici-
ency of virtue, 152 n. ; 194 ;
world-cycles, 249.
Pantheism, Stoic, 59 ; and evil,
103 ; of Marcus Aurelius, 215.
Parmenides, 3.
Pater, Walter, 85.
Paul, St., 141 ., 165 n., 180,242.
Pearson, A. C., 27^.; quoted,
28, 29.
Peirce, C. S., 255.
Perception, sense, doctrine of
Empedocles, 3 ; of Stoics, 66,
72; of Epicureans, 115.
Perturbation, defined, 149.
Pessimism, 212.
3?ai>Ta.aiai KaTaX^TrriKal, 66, 74.
Philo, Judaeus, 65, 137.
Philosophy, Pre-Socratic, 2 ;
vision of, in Boethius, 36 ;
defined by Stoics, 38 ; char-
acteristics of, 40 ; not opposed
to science, 40; its constituents,
41 ; its relation to psychology,
41 ; its requirements of its
devotees, 52 ; stages of its de-
velopment among the Stoics,
56-61 ; the philosopher as
preacher, 61 ; as epistemology,
66-83 ; its problem, 85 ; in re-
lation to Stoic cosmology, 87 ;
in relation to Epicurean cos-
mology, 105-125 ; among the
Cynics, 130-138 ; in relation
272
INDEX
\
to Stoic Ethics, 140-207 ; in
relation to Stoic Theology and
Religion, 208-236 ; Scottish,
75, 176, 237.
Physics, Stoic, 48, 84-104 ;
Epicurean, 109-125.
Plato, quoted and referred to,
passim ; on Anaxagoras, 4 ;
his relation to Socrates, u ;
to reminiscence, 70; to modern
world, 126 ; to Stoics in ethics,
126-129; on man's life as a
trust, 201.
Pleasure, opposed by Stoics in
ethics, 25 ; as defined by them,
44 ; in Epicurean psychology,
118; in Stoic teaching, 147;
objections to, as summum
bonum, 160-162 ; criticism so
far unjust, 203-207.
Plutarch, quoted, 224.
Pollock, Sir F., 240 n.
Pompey, and Ppsidonius, 149.
Pope, 176 ; quoted, 189.
Posidonius, 45, 58 ; and Pompey,
149; on self-sufficiency of
virtue, 152 .
Pragmatism, 9, 130, 255-266.
Prayer, 233, 236.
Pre-conception. See " Notions,
common."
Preference, 171.
Price, Richard, 186.
Progress, moral, 50, 170, 194.
Prophecy, 232.
Protagoras, as student of mind,
12 ; on relativity of Know-
ledge, 15.
Providence (frpovoia), 24, 92, 211,
241.
Psychology, Stoic conception of,
41 ; how worked out by Stoics,
66-72 ; estimate of, 72-83 ;
Epicurean, 114-119 ; estimate
of, 121-125.
Punishment, Stoic view of, 167.
Pyrrho, 26, 71.
Reabsorption of soul, 96.
Reality, how determined, 261.
Reid, Thomas, 75, 82 ; 176,
237-
Relativity, of knowledge, 15 ;
law of, 210, 226.
Religion, psychological basis
of, 44 ; its relation to ethics,
183 ; Stoic view of, 207, 246.
Renan, on Marcus Aurelius, 239.
Rendall, Dr., 86.
Representations, apprehending,
67, 74-
Revelation, 231 ; progressive,
2 53- .
Rhetoric, among the Stoics, 45,
62.
Rufus, C. Musonius, 54, 164.
Scepticism, absolute, suicidal,
?i 83, 117.
Schiller, F. C. S., 9; on
Humanism, 255.
Schleiermacher, 247.
Schopenhauer, 97, 125, 146.
Sciences, how classified by
Stoics, 42.
Self-examination, 50.
Self-interest, its relation to
altruism, 163.
Self-knowledge, 5.
Self-sufficiency, of Cynic, 132-
134; of Stoic, 149.
Seneca, quoted and referred to,
passim ; his writings char-
acterized, 29 ; as stylist, 45 ;
makes ethics supreme, 58 ;
on immortality, 97 ; on de-
pravity of human nature, 157;
as Stoic, 190 ; his death, 202 ;
in pessimistic mood, 212 ; his
view of sin and evil, 225.
Sensation, to the Stoics, 66 ; to
the Epicureans, 115; as
criterion of truth, 116.
Sextus Empiricus, 67, 87, Sgn.,
'55
Sidgwick, Henry, 203.
Simplicius, 243 n.
Sin, as disloyalty to the
Supreme, 60 ; a mere defect,
197 ; 210, 223.
Slavery, in Stoic view, 104 ;
condemned implicitly, 165.
Smith, Adam, 152 n.
Smyth, Prof. Newman, 186.
INDEX
273
Socrates, his impulse, i ; char-
acteristics of, i ; as originator
of psychological study, 2 ;
on Anaxagoras, 4 ; on self-
knowledge, 5 ; his philosophic
interest, 6 ; his method, 6 ;
how far allied to Sophists, 7 ;
charge against him, 7 ;
different presentation of, in
Plato and in Xenophon, 8 ;
his ethical dictum, 8 ; on self-
control, 9; on utility in
ethics, 9 ; his theism, 9 ; on
immortality, 9 ; founder of
mental and moral science,
10 ; his attractive power, 10 ;
source of Greek schools, 1 1 ;
his relation to the Sophists,
11 ; opposed to their leading
principle, 16 ; his place in
philosophy, 18; his personal
character, 18 ; as Stoic ideal
sage, 19, 170, 184.
Sophistry, defined, 13.
Sophists, as anticipating
Socrates, 2 ; as educationists,
ii ; as philosophers, 12; as
politicians, 13 ; nature of
their art, 14 ; their view of
thought, 15.
Soul, immortality of, 9, 97 ; a
fiery current, 94; according
to Epicureans, 1 14 ; according
to Democritus, 121 ; relation
to the body, 141 ; its nature,
142.
Spencer, Herbert, 18 n., 220.
Spinoza, 82, 139 n., 146 . ; on
eternity, 158 ; his debt to
Stoicism, 176 ; on suicide,
201 ; his monism, 262.
Stein, 27, 44, 75 n.
Stephen, Leslie, quoted, 213,
240.
Stilpo, the Megaric, 23.
Stobaeus, on character, 152.
Stoic, the term, i n. ; the Stoic
neither bigot nor hermit, 167.
Stoicism, how it arose, 21 ; the
founders controversialists, 24 ;
evolution of, and materials,
26; place of Cleanthes in,
18
27 ; of Chrysippus, 28 ; of
Zeno, 28 ; lack of system,
28; characteristics of Stoic
writings, 28 ; why un-
systematized, 31 ; teaching
tested by experience, 32 ;
leaders of, 34; and rhetoric,
45; and logic, 47; and
epistemology, 47 ; and ethics,
48 ; and life, 52 ; in its de-
velopment, 56-61 ; worked
out in detail, 62 - 236 ; as
revised, 192; present-day
value of, 237-254.
Strabo, 45 n.
Substance, how graded, 89.
Suffering, nature of, 225, 226.
ZiryKarcifleo-is, 43.
Suicide, permitted by Stoics,
151 ; this view of, criticized,
201.
Sully, 77 n.
144.
Teleology, of Socrates, 9 ; of
the Stoics, 25, 211, 218.
Tennyson, quoted, 112.
Tension (rttvos), 68, 88, 148.
Tertullian, 94 n., 95 n.
Thales, 2 ; his first principle, 3.
Theism, tendency towards, in
later Stoicism, 59, 214.
Theology, Stoic, 84-104 ; 207-
236.
Truth, criterion of, to Stoics,
76; to Epicureans, 116;
criticism of, 124.
Tyndall, 94, 113.
Ueberweg, 75 n.
Universe, the, according to
Stoics, 87-104 ; according to
Epicureans, 109-125; in Stoic
ontology, 209 ; as a whole,
244.
Vice, no degrees of, 155 ; in-
compatible with true friend-
ship, 156 ; its own punish-
ment, 159.
Virtue, 145; cardinal, 148 n.,
187 ; nature of, and relation
274
INDEX
to happiness, 152 ; indivis-
ible and no degrees of, 154 ;
its own reward, 159 ; in-
dependent of appreciation,
159; its social character,
162-169 > may be taught, 107,
184 ; doubtful as to whether
it may be lost, 170; its
regenerative power in life,
184; classification of virtues,
1 86 ; revised, 193.
Vitalism, 122.
Voluntarism, 130, 263.
Wallace, W., quoted, 21.
Water, as first principle, 3.
Watt, G., 236 n.
Will, the, in Stoic psychology,
77, 78 ; in Epicurean
psychology, 118; free, in
Epicurean teaching, 121 ;
criticism of, 125 ; in Stoic
teaching, 143 ; power over,
145 ; significance of doctrine,
176.
Windelband, 86 n.
Wise man, of Cynics, 132 ; of
Stoics, 135; his self-suffi-
ciency, 149 ; defects of,
1 88.
Wordsworth, quoted, 107 ; 244.
World, the, 90 ; perfect, 93,
209; ethical order, 138-139;
theistic proof from, 219, 220;
as a whole, 244 ; a manifesta-
tion of divine order, 249.
World-cycles, 91, 249.
Xenophon, referred to, i, 6 .,
8 ., 9; quoted, 19 ; his rela-
tion to Socrates, 1 1 ; his
characterization of Socrates,
19.
Zeller, referred to, 8 n. , 27, 33,
75 n. ; quoted, 138, 157.
Zeno, the Stoic, how drawn to
philosophy, i, 18 ; as founder,
20, 28 ; his obligation to
Greek schools, 23 ; as eclectic,
23 ; opposed to Epicurean
physics, 24 ; opposed to
Epicurean ethics, 25 ; his
private character, 33 ; his
contributions, 57 ; his death,
202 ; on fate, 222, 229.
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