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The 

STORY  OF  THE 
GREAT  WAR 


DIPLOMATIC  AND 
STATE    PAPERS 


Austin  M.  Knight,  Rear  Admiral,  t/.  S.  Navy.    President  of  the 

Naval  War  College,  Newport,  Rftcfjie  Island,  since  1913.    Author 

of  "Modern  Seamanship" 


VOLUME  II 


P.     F.    COLLIER    &    SON,     NEW    YORK 


^y  ^cv 


S'  'ORY  OF         E 


GREA'    WAR 


DIPLOMATIC  AND 
STATE    PAPERS 


Vf 

VOLUME  II 


P.    F.    COLLIER    &    SON,    NEW   YORK 


Copyright  1916 
BY  P.  F.  COLUER  &  SON 


CONTENTS 

PART  I.— ECONOMIC  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 

CHAPTEB  PAGB 

I.    GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  GERMANY 331 

II.    INDUSTRIAL  RIVALRY .  339 

III.  GERMANY  IN  THE  EAST — WORLD  POLICY 345 

IV.  THE  CUSTOMS  UNION 351 

V.    THE  PAN-GERMAN  LEAGUE 361 

PART    II.— DIRECT    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR 

VI.  ASSASSINATION  OF  FRANZ  FERDINAND — AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  366 

VII.  SERBIA'S  REPLY 373 

VIII.  DIPLOMATIC  EXCHANGES 378 

IX.    PREPARATION  FOR  WAR 387 

PART  III.— RESOURCES  AND  ARMAMENT  OF  THE  NATIONS 
AND  MOBILIZATION  OF  FORCES 

X.    TERRITORIAL  AND  GEOGRAPHICAL  COMPARISONS 394 

XI.    POPULATION  AND  RACIAL  CHARACTERISTICS 402 

XII.    FINANCIAL   RESOURCES — GERMANY   AND   AUSTRIA     ....  410 

XIII.  ASSEMBLING  OF  THE  GERMAN  ARMIES 418 

XIV.  FRENCH  MOBILIZATION 423 

XV.    BRITAIN — RUSSIA — AUSTRIA 430 

PART  IV.— DIPLOMATIC  PAPERS  RELATING  TO  THE  ORIGIN 

OF  THE  WAR,  COLLATED  FROM  THE  OFFICIAL 

DOCUMENTS 

LIST  OF  OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS 439 

LIST  OF  SOVEREIGNS  AND  DIPLOMATS 441 

IMPORTANT  DATES  PRECEDING  THE  WAR 451 

WARNINGS  OF  HOSTILE  INTENTIONS 454 

REPORT  OF  M.  CAMBON  IN  1913 461 

THE  ASSASSINATION  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  ARCHDUKE 467 

ATTEMPTS  AT  MEDIATION 482 

325 

A— Gt.  War  2 


326  CONTENTS 


PART  IV.— DIPLOMATIC  PAPERS  RELATING  TO  THE  ORIGIN 

OF  THE  WAR,  COLLATED  FROM  THE  OFFICIAL 

DOCUMENTS— Continued 

PAGE 

THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  NOTE  TO  SERBIA 488 

TEXT  OF  THE  NOTE 492 

CONTROVERSY  OVER  TIME  LIMIT 495 

CHRONOLOGICAL  ARRANGEMENT  OF  DATES 496 

SERBIA'S  REPLY  TO  THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  NOTE     ....  520 

BEGINNING  OF  MOBILIZATION 527 

KAISER  AND  CZAR  EXCHANGE  TELEGRAMS 564 

HENRY  OF  PRUSSIA  AND  GEORGE  V 577 

SIR  EDWARD  GREY  REFUSES  TERMS  OF  NEUTRALITY    ....  581 

FURTHER  EXCHANGES  BETWEEN  WILLIAM  AND  NICHOLAS     .     .  587 

RUSSIA  EXPLAINS  HER  EFFORTS  FOR  PEACE 608 

GERMAN  DECLARATION  OF  INTENTIONS  TOWARD  BELGIUM     .     .  613 

SERBIA'S  POSITION  EXPLAINED 614 

VON  BETHMANN-HOLLWEG  EXPLAINS  GERMANY'S  POSITION  IN 

THE  REICHSTAG 624 

SIR  EDWARD  GOSCHEN'S  INTERVIEW  WITH  VON  JAGOW  628 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

REAR  ADMIRAL  AUSTIN  M.  KNIGHT,  U.  S.  N.     .     .     .     Colored  Frontispiece 

Opposite  page  388 

SAILORS  ON  GERMAN  BATTLESHIP 

LE  COURBET,  FRENCH  BATTLESHIP 

BRITISH  BATTLE  FLEET  WITH  DIRIGIBLE  AND  HYDROPLANE 

GERMAN  SQUADRON  OF  PREDREADNOUGHTS 

OST-FRIESLAND,  GERMAN  BATTLESHIP 

JAPANESE  BATTLESHIP  KONGO 

CAIO-DUILIO,  ITALIAN  BATTLESHIP 

QUEEN  ELIZABETH,  BRITISH  BATTLE  CRUISER 

Opposite  page  452 

ENGLISH  GUN-LAYER  SIGHTING  His  GUN 

GERMAN  AVIATOR  AND  His  PILOT  RECEIVING  INSTRUCTIONS 

ZEPPELIN  OVER  LONDON  AT  NIGHT 

FRENCH  TORPEDO  BOAT  DESTROYER  FAUX 

LOOKING  THROUGH  SUBMARINE'S  PERISCOPE 

FRENCH  SOLDIERS  BETWEEN  THE  TRENCHES 

ITALIAN  BERSAGLIERI  AIDING  A  COMRADE 

CHARGE  OP  BRITISH  INDIAN  TROOPS 


Opposite  page  516 

ARCH  OP  TRIUMPH,  PARIS 

JAMES  WATSON  GERARD,  UNITED  STATES  AMBASSADOR  TO  GERMANY 

BRAND  WHITLOCK,  UNITED  STATES  AMBASSADOR  TO  BELGIUM 

LION  OF  WATERLOO,  BELGIUM 

EQUESTRIAN  STATUE  OF  PETER  THE  GREAT,  PETROGRAD 

AUSTRIAN  BATTLESHIP  IN  THE  BAY  OF  CATTARO 

TRIESTE  ON  THE  ADRIATIC 

BRANDENBURG  GATE,  BERLIN 

327 


328  LIST    OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 

Opposite  page  580 

FRENCH  MUNITION  WORKS 

PRESS  WORKS  No.  II  AT  ESSEN,  GERMANY 

CUTTING  A  GREAT  STEEL  PLATE  WITH  HYDRAULIC  SHEARS 

POURING  MOLTEN  STEEL  INTO  MOLDS  IN  THE  FRENCH  MUNITION 

WORKS 

SMELTERS  AND  COKE  OVENS  AT  LUBECK,  GERMANY 
SPRAYS  OF  MELTED  METAL,  CREUSOT  MUNITION  WORKS 
FINISHING  A  GREAT  STEEL  PLATE 

AN  AUSTRIAN  SO.S-CENTIMETER  GUN  FROM  THE  SKODA  WORKS 
SCENE  IN  THE  KRUPP  WORKS — OPEN  HEARTH  WORKS  No.  VI 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

PAGE 

ITALY  BEFORE  UNIFICATION  (1815) 334 

BRITISH  EMPIRE  (NAVAL  STATIONS) 341 

ITALY  IN  1914  (POLITICAL) 355 

AUSTRIA,   1815-1914 372 

POLAND  AND  ITS  DIVISIONS  FROM  1772-1914 385 

WEALTH  AND  POPULATION  OF  THE  WARRING  NATIONS 404 

ARMIES  OF  THE  CONTESTING  NATIONS     . .  419 

NAVIES  OF  THE  CONTESTING  NATIONS 424 

GERMAN-FRENCH  FRONTIER,  FORTRESSES  OF 429 

GERMAN  CONFEDERATION  OF  1815 433 

GERMAN-BELGIAN  FRONTIER,  STRATEGIC  RAILROADS  ON     .....  437 


329 


PART  I  — ECONOMIC  CAUSES  OF 
THE  WAR 


CHAPTER    I 

GREAT     BRITAIN     AND     GERMANY 

OVERSHADOWING  all  other  issues  which  brought  the  Euro- 
pean nations  into  conflict  loomed  the  fundamental  differences 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  A  large  body  of  expert 
opinion,  not  inadequately  substantiated  by  a  cumulation  of  symp- 
toms and  events,  held  that  the  war  as  between  those  two  countries 
was  due  to  commercial  jealousy,  which  had  fomented  so  long  that 
any  unrelated  incident  would  suffice  to  bring  on  war. 

Certainly  that  is  what  happened.  In  the  German  apologies  for 
the  war  Great  Britain  was  bitterly  accused  of  envying  German 
prosperity  and  of  welcoming  the  war  as  an  opportunity  to  crush 
German  commercial  and  industrial  competition.  The  strenuous 
efforts  of  British  business  interests  to  capture  German  trade 
have  been  cited  as  proof.  For  the  British  it  was  submitted  that 
Great  Britain  entered  the  war  only  after  extreme  hesitation, 
and  that  the  war  on  German  trade  was  a  result  rather  than 
the  object  of  the  conflict.  Germany,  the  British  charged,  was 
waging  war  for  economical  aggrandizement.  Bearing  upon  this 
accusation,  the  dynamic  forces  which  swung  Germany  into  the 
front  rank  of  nations  as  an  ambitious  competitor  of  the  world's 
trade  in  a  comparatively  short  time  may  be  reviewed.  Besides  a 
sentimental  yearning  for  national  unity,  two  factors  operated  to- 
gether to  mold  the  many  petty  German  states  into  a  united  nation. 
The  spectacular  part  was  played  by  the  Prussian  army,  under  the 
control  of  domineering  land-owning  aristocrats  like  Prince 
Bismarck.  Equally  important,  if  less  striking,  was  the  work  of 
the  industrial  capitalists.  They  had  built  railways  binding  the 

331 


332     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Germanys  together  with  bonds  of  steel;  they  had  economically 
federated  the  Germanys  in  the  Tariff  League  (Zollverein),  pre- 
paring the  way  for  political  union.  After  the  formation  of  the 
German  Empire,  1871,  the  influence  of  the  two  elements — the 
landed  aristocracy  of  army  officers  and  the  business  aristoc- 
racy of  wealth — was  manifested  in  the  demand  for  a  protective 
tariff.  The  former  demanded  a  high  tariff  on  imported  food- 
stuffs to  raise  the  price  of  their  own  farm  products;  the  latter 
required  a  tariff  wall  to  keep  foreign  manufactures  from 
entering  into  competition  with  German  articles  in  the 
home  market.  Bismarck  adopted  the  protective-tariff  policy 
in  1879. 

The  principal  motive  for  the  high  tariff  in  Germany  has  been 
viewed  as  political,  and  in  a  narrower  sense  dynastic.  It  has 
been  indicated  by  Professor  Veblen  that  the  ruling  class  in  Ber- 
lin had  intentionally  manipulated  customs  barriers  from  the  time 
of  the  Zollverein  in  order  to  weld  together  the  German  race 
and  differentiate  it  sharply  from  its  neighbors.  From  this  the 
German  universities  had  devolved  a  school  of  "patriotic  econ- 
omy," which  had  really  a  remote  relation  to  economy,  being 
termed  a  most  uneconomic  industrial  nationalism. 

Whether  due  to  tariff  protection  or  to  the  German  genius  for 
applying  natural  science  to  industry,  or  to  German  thoroughness, 
or  to  aggressive  commercial  methods,  the  business  interests  pros- 
pered under  the  German  confederation.  Mills  and  mines  multi" 
plied  wealth.  Titanic  ocean  steamships  carried  German  wares 
to  the  ends  of  the  earth.  By  1912  Great  Britain's  foreign  com- 
merce exceeded  Germany's  by  about  $1,300,000,000 ;  but  German 
commerce  had  trebled  since  1883,  while  British  commerce  had 
not  quite  doubled.  The  German  Government  derived  rich  reve- 
nues from  the  customs  duties  on  an  expanding  commerce,  and 
viewed  with  satisfaction  the  prodigious  increase  in  wealth  and 
population;  population  increased  from  forty-one  to  sixty-six  mil- 
lions between  1871  and  1912,  which  furnished  men  and  money 
for  an  ever-growing  army.  On  the  other  hand,  the  industrial 
and  land-owning  classes  considered  the  army  as  protection  and 
insurance  for  their  interests.  In  one  respect,  however,  the  Ger- 


GREAT    BRITAIN   AND    GERMANY  333 

man  business  community  was  dissatisfied.  The  German  mer- 
chant marine,  although  it  had  rapidly  expanded,  was  still  four 
times  outranked  by  British  shipping.  Great  Britain's  superior- 
ity was  ascribed  to  her  earlier  economical  development,  to  the 
fact  that  Germany  had  very  little  seacoast,  and  to  the  superiority 
of  the  British  navy.  Germany,  therefore,  set  herself  to  over- 
come these  handicaps.  There  was  evidence  that  German  busi- 
ness interests  consciously  hoped  for  the  overthrow  of  British 
naval  power  and  for  the  annexation  of  an  Atlantic  port  by  Ger- 
many. 

The  open  confession  of  such  desires  by  German  journal- 
ists like  Maximilian  Harden  and  by  German  shipping  magnates 
like  Herr  Ballin  explained  why  Belgians  feared  the  loss  of  Ant- 
werp and  Ostend,  and  the  British  the  loss  of  the  sea. 

The  striking  feature  of  Germany's  development  was  her  rapid 
conversion  into  what  might  almost  be  termed  a  condition 
approaching  an  industrial  unit.  Her  industrial  and  commer- 
cial population,  which  in  1882  was  only  45  per  cent  of  the  whole, 
was  in  1895  50  per  cent,  and  in  1907  56  per  cent.  It  was  pos- 
sible for  a  country  sufficiently  vast  in  area  and  varied  in  resource 
to  expand  its  manufactures  without  ceasing  to  be  self-contained ; 
the  United  States  would  be  a  case  in  point  were  it  not  for  its 
cotton  export.  But  in  a  country  like  Germany  its  vast  manu- 
facturing expansion  could  not  have  taken  place  without  the 
acquisition  of  a  wide  foreign  market;  and  as  manufacturers 
required  raw  materials,  and  as  foreigners  could  not  buy  unless 
they  also  sold,  large  exports  necessitated  large  imports.  The 
exports  of  Germany  steadily  came  to  consist  more  and  more  of 
manufactured  goods,  and  its  imports  more  and  more  of  food- 
stuffs and  raw  materials.  Germany  again  might  conceivably 
have  been  so  placed  as  to  have  access  by  land  to  its  chief  mar- 
kets. She  has,  indeed,  access  by  land  to  a  large  part  of  the 
European  continent;  but  that  only  furnished  a  comparatively 
small  part  of  the  market  she  obtained.  As  long  ago  as  1900 
a  German  economist  estimated  that  70  per  cent  of  German  for- 
eign trade  was  overseas,  and  the  proportion  in  1914  was  even 
greater. 


334 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 


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ITALY  BEFORE   UNIFICATION    (1815) 


GREAT    BRITAIN   AND    GERMANY  335 

When  the  bill  creating  the  German  navy  was  pending  in  1900 
Germany's  leading  economists  combined  to  publish  a  series  of  lec- 
tures in  its  support  under  the  significant  title  of  "The  Politics 
of  Trade  and  Power."  The  recurrent  refrain  was  that  unless 
the  sea  could  be  kept  open  the  well-being  of  the  German  nation 
was  insecure.  One  of  their  persuasives  for  a  big  navy  ran: 
"In  one  way  or  another,  twenty-four  to  twenty-six  millions 
of  Germans,  out  of  a  population  at  that  time  of  some  fifty-five 
millions,  are  dependent  for  their  livelihood  and  work  upon  un- 
restricted import  and  export  by  water.  The  freedom  of  the  sea 
and  vigorous  competition  in  the  world's  markets  are,  therefore, 
questions  of  life  and  death  for  the  nation,  and  questions  in  which 
the  working  classes  are  most  deeply  concerned." 

Germany's  situation  in  this  respect  did  not  improve  as  time 
elapsed.  It  was  left  to  Prince  von  Billow  to  state  the  position 
with  the  utmost  emphasis :  "We  are  now  vulnerable  at  sea.  We 
have  intrusted  millions  to  the  ocean."  Were  Germany  deprived 
of  them  she  "could  not  have  returned  to  the  comfortable  exist- 
ence of  a  purely  inland  state.  We  should  have  been  placed  in 
the  position  of  being  unable  to  employ  and  support  a  consider- 
able number  of  our  millions  of  inhabitants  at  home.  The  result 
would  have  been  an  economic  crisis  which  might  easily  attain 
the  proportions  of  a  national  catastrophe."  According  to  these 
economists  and  to  Prince  von  Billow,  the  one  way  to  ward  off 
this  catastrophe  was  to  build  a  gigantic  navy. 

It  has  been  denied  that  Great  Britain  was  envious  of  Ger- 
many's commercial  achievements.  "We  were  always  told,"  said 
the  British  in  effect,  "that  we  must  wake  up  and  emulate  Ger- 
man enterprise  and  German  industry  in  manufactures  or  we 
should  be  outstripped  in  the  race.  But  we  did  not  even  put  up  a 
tariff  on  German  goods.  We  knew  that  Germany  was  our  best 
customer.  As  for  any  thought  of  drawing  the  sword  to  destroy 
a  commercial  rival,  no  one  who  knows  this  country  believes  that 
it  was  ever  entertained.  Yet  to  Germans  without  number  this 
belief  has  been  an  article  of  faith." 

A  free  spokesman  of  this  belief  was  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg 
while  in  the  United  States.  Sketching  Germany's  commercial 


336  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

progress  the  world  over  as  an  earnest  German  propagandist,  he 
wrote: 

"The  German  iron  industry  has,  because  of  its  improved 
methods,  obtained  a  great  part  of  England's  trade.  German 
machinery,  except  in  the  textile  business,  is  more  efficient  than 
English  machinery.  The  field  of  electricity  has  been  entirely 
abandoned  by  England  to  America  and  Germany.  German  dye- 
stuffs  are  now  even  shipped  by  way  of  America  and  Canada  and 
back  to  England.  German  proprietary  medicines  have  conquered 
the  world  market,  and  German  competition  is  felt  everywhere. 
Then,  too,  is  the  enormous  increase  in  German  shipping.  Ger- 
many has  been  building  up  a  magnificent  merchant  marine,  with 
ships  that  exceed  in  comfort  and  size  anything  launched  from 
England's  shipyards.  Even  in  the  tramp-steamer  business,  the 
backbone  of  English  shipping,  the  Germans  have  made  big  in- 
roads. So  while  the  trade  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  since 
1870  has  risen  from  $2,000,000,000  to  $5,500,000,000,  that  of 
Germany  has  risen  from  $1,000,000,000  to  $5,000,000,000— in 
other  words,  while  Germany's  trade  is  now,  1914,  five  times  what 
it  was  in  1870,  English  trade  is  only  two  and  a  half  times  its 
former  amount.  For  a  commercial  nation  such  as  England  this 
condition  is  very  serious.  It  goes  to  the  very  core  of  the  nation's 
existence.  Therefore  Great  Britain  faced  the  alternative  of  get- 
ting better  habits  of  work,  improved  machinery,  better  educa- 
tion, better  knowledge  of  foreign  languages — that  is,  being 
more  industrious,  less  luxurious,  and  more  painstaking,  or  of 
fighting." 

It  was  not  Germany's  militarism  which  England  feared,  Dr. 
Dernburg  held,  but  German  trade  and  commerce,  which  she 
could  not  destroy  because  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  behind 
them.  Nevertheless,  she  entered  the  war,  relying  on  her  allies 
to  do  her  share  of  the  land  fighting  for  her. 

Dr.  Dernburg's  sketch  of  his  view  of  Great  Britain's  predica- 
ment as  a  result  of  successful  German  competition  may  well  be 
read  in  conjunction  with  a  picture  drawn  of  Germany's  internal 
condition,  seen  as  actually  due  to  being  gorged  with  industrial 
productiveness  by  an  English  authority,  C.  R.  L.  Fletcher.  In 


GREAT    BRITAIN   AND    GERMANY  337 

endeavoring  to  weigh  the  causes  that  determined  Germany  to 
strike  in  1914,  he  concluded  that  her  economical  position  was  the 
leading  factor : 

"We  have  the  fact  that  the  enormous  increase  of  the  mineral, 
agricultural,  and  manufacturing  output  of  Germany  herself  has, 
instead  of  leading  to  greater  contentment  and  prosperity  inside, 
actually  been  leading  in  the  reverse  direction — toward  an  eco- 
nomic and  financial  crisis.  There  are  not  nearly  enough  markets 
or  outlets  for  this  newly  accumulated  wealth.  It  is  manipulated 
by  financiers  for  their  private  ends,  and  these  have  speculated 
with  it  beyond  the  bounds  of  prudence.  Much  of  German  capital 
is  locked  up  in  hazardous  enterprises  both  inside  and  outside 
Europe.  Credit  was  not  actually  impaired  in  the  early  months 
of  1914,  but  it  was  in  danger  of  being  impaired ;  creditors  were 
becoming  'nervous/  and  a  'sensitive*  condition  of  credit  is  a  very 
dangerous  condition.  The  last  loans  of  the  German  Government 
were  not  at  all  readily  subscribed ;  the  expenses  of  the  army  had 
frightened  all  who  were  willing  to  lend,  and  the  expenditure  on 
public  works  and  on  experiments  in  'state  socialism'  frightened 
them  even  more. 

"Moreover,  the  increase  of  population  has,  during  the  last  ten 
or  more  years,  led  to  a  necessary  importation  of  corn  and  meat 
on  a  very  large  scale,  and  this  to  feed  a  country  whose  fleet 
emphatically  does  not  command  the  seas  of  the  world.  The  agri- 
cultural interest  has  cried  out  against  this  importation,  and  the 
Government  had  to  conciliate  it  by  imposing  a  high  tariff  on 
such  imports — result,  the  prices  of  food  have  gone  up,  and  there 
has  been  a  quarrel  between  the  country  producer  and  the  town 
consumer  of  food. 

"On  the  other  hand,  for  want  of  a  market,  the  prices  of  manu- 
factured articles  have  actually  gone  down.  The  manufacturers 
have  not  dared  to  stop  the  output  of  their  goods  for  fear  of  angry 
workmen  and  strikes ;  and  they  are  hard  put  to  it  to  pay  wages. 
This,  above  all  things,  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  cry  for  more  colonies 
and  for  larger  markets  abroad.  And  the  trade  that  has  been 
hardest  hit  by  this  want  of  markets  is  just  the  iron  trade,  whose 
fluctuations  affect  not  only  the  provinces  of  the  Rhine  and  West 


838     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

phalia,  but  the  provinces  of  Silesia  as  well ;  in  fact,  the  naturally 
richest  provinces  of  the  empire. 

"But  the  governing  classes,  the  Prussian  noblemen,  the  great 
financiers,  the  great  shipmasters,  and  the  great  manufacturers 
know  perfectly  well  that  anything  like  an  economic  or  commercial 
crisis,  nay,  anything  like  what  English  financiers  call  a  'panic,' 
would  bring  them  toppling  to  the  ground.  France  could  survive 
a  great  many  panics,  though  she  would  squeal  very  loudly  when 
they  came.  In  England,  city  men  used  to  say  there  was  one 
panic  every  nine  years.  We  take  our  panics  calmly.  Germany 
cannot  afford  to  do  so.  Indeed,  she  cannot  afford  to  take  any- 
thing calmly,  and  she  does  not  try.  There  remains,  then,  for  the 
German — loose  and  absolved  from  the  older  form  of  the  ten  com- 
mandments— but  one  resource,  war.  His  own  goods  (credit, 
capital,  finance,  or  whatever  you  like  to  call  them)  may  fail  him. 
But  his  fist  is  mailed;  his  machine  is  ready;  his  neighbor  is 
weak." 

There  remains  another  and  final  view  to  be  cited — from  a 
British  source — in  which  the  Germans  discerned  the  true  atti- 
tude of  England  toward  their  maritime  and  commercial  develop- 
ment. It  was  revealed  in  a  certain  article  in  the  "Saturday 
Review"  in  September,  1897,  which  caused  a  considerable  stir. 
As  England  and  Germany  competed  in  every  corner  of  the  globe 
the  view  was  frankly  expressed  that  England's  prosperity  could 
only  be  saved  if  Germany  were  destroyed : 

"In  the  Transvaal,  at  the  Cape,  in  Central  Africa,  in  India 
and  the  East,  in  the  islands  of  the  Southern  Sea,  and  in  the  Far 
Northwest,  wherever — and  where  has  it  not? — the  flag  has  fol- 
lowed the  Bible,  and  trade  has  followed  the  flag,  there  the  Ger- 
man bagman  is  struggling  with  the  English  peddler.  Is  there  a 
mine  to  exploit,  a  railway  to  build,  a  native  to  convert  from 
breadfruit  to  tinned  meat,  from  temperance  to  trade  gin,  the 
German  and  the  Englishman  are  struggling  to  be  first.  A  million 
petty  disputes  build  up  the  greatest  cause  of  war  the  world  has 
ever  seen.  If  Germany  were  extinguished  to-morrow,  the  day 
after  to-morrow  there  is  not  an  Englishman  in  the  world  who 
would  not  be  richer.  Nations  have  fought  for  years  over  a  city 


INDUSTRIAL    RIVALRY  339 

or  a  right  of  succession.  Must  they  not  fight  for  £250,000,000 
of  commerce?"  At  that  time,  it  will  be  seen,  a  most  tangible 
conflict  of  economic  interests  existed  between  England  and  Ger- 
many, and  England,  moreover,  was  the  only  great  power  which 
could  make  war  on  Germany  without  running  an  enormous  risk, 
and  even  with  a  prospect  of  success. 


CHAPTER    II 

INDUSTRIAL     RIVALRY 

/GERMANY'S  industrial  progress  had  increasingly  approached 
^-*  that  of  Great  Britain.  The  economic  conditions  of  both  were 
becoming  alike.  Germany  too  existed,  as  has  been  shown,  more 
and  more  by  her  world  commerce  and  less  by  her  home  industries. 
The  difference  between  the  two  countries  lay  in  the  fact  that 
England  was  bound  up  in  her  world  commerce  and  that  all  world 
affairs  were  her  own.  This  was  not  yet  the  case  with  Germany. 
Trade  figures  alone  did  not  make  a  world  power.  From  the 
German  viewpoint  the  spirit  of  world  politics  was  needed.  Ger- 
many had  great  exports  and  imports,  built  ships  and  produced 
coal,  iron,  machinery,  and  dry  goods  in  large  quantities.  But 
the  spirit  of  world  politics  was  not  yet  Germany's  and  to  in- 
culcate it  became  a  mission  of  the  German  pamphleteers.  Ger- 
man trade  competition  in  the  world's  markets,  however,  reached 
out,  and  its  success  did  not  suffer  from  the  fact  that  it  was  not 
avowedly  in  pursuit  of  nationalism  but  of  profit. 

Due  to  commercial  rivals  abroad,  British  industry  was  at  low 
ebb  as  far  back  as  1879,  when  Parliament  appointed  a  commission 
to  study  the  subject.  It  was  left  for  another  commission  on  the 
depression  of  trade  to  discover,  after  investigating  the  matter 
for  sixteen  months  in  1885  and  1886  by  means  of  an  immense 
number  of  consular  reports  and  statistics,  that  the  trouble  was 
German  competition.  Another  parliamentary  commission 
reached  the  same  conclusion  in  1896. 


340  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Germany  was  battering  against  a  considerable  financial  wall 
built  of  accumulated  British  wealth  abroad.  The  aggregate 
capital  value  of  British  over-sea  investments  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  was  approximately  $19,500,000,000,  and  the  aggregate 
income  therefrom  $1,000,000,000.  The  geographical  distribution 
of  these  investments  was  as  follows : 

IN  BRITISH  DOMINIONS,   COLONIES,  AND  POSSESSIONS 

India  (including  Ceylon) $2,235,000,000 

Australia  and  New  Zealand 2,040,000,000 

Africa 2,005,000,000 

Canada 2,115,000,000 

Other  British  Possessions 455,000,000 


$8,850,000,000 

IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 

United  States $3,160,000,000 

Argentina 1,645,000,000 

Brazil 675,000,000 

Mexico 405,000,000 

Japan 370,000,000 

Chile 285,000,000 

Egypt 375,000,000 

Uruguay 200,000,000 

China 190,000,000 

Peru : 160,000,000 

Cuba 145,000,000 

European  countries 850,000,000 

Other  foreign  countries 460,000,000 


$8,920,000,000 
In  British  dominions 8,850,000,000 


Grand  total   British   possessions 
and  foreign  countries $17,770,000,000 

A— Gt.  War  2 


INDUSTRIAL    RIVALRY 


341 


B— Gt.  War  2 


342     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

This  total  comprised  the  capital  invested  in  colonial  and  foreign 
loans  and  in  public  undertakings  or  companies.  It  did  not  include 
any  provision  for  the  very  large  amounts  of  British  capital  pri- 
vately invested  abroad  in  land,  buildings,  etc.,  nor  embrace  the 
large  amounts  of  capital  employed  abroad  by  the  large  banking, 
mercantile  and  shipping  houses  of  London,  Liverpool,  Man- 
chester, Glasgow,  etc.,  in  financing  international  trade.  Author- 
ities have  assumed  that  these  private  investments  amount  to 
10  per  cent  of  the  public  investments  (which  is  deemed  a  very 
moderate  estimate),  and  on  this  estimate  a  further  sum  of  $1,- 
775,000,000  must  be  added  to  the  total  already  arrived  at,  mak- 
ing an  aggregate  of  $19,545,000,000.  This  estimate  was  con- 
firmed by  calculations  based  upon  the  capitalization  of  the 
income  tax  reported  from  abroad  for  assessment  to  the  British 
revenue  authorities. 

The  geographical  distribution  of  British  foreign  and  colonial 
investments,  upon  further  scrutiny,  showed  that  only  $850,- 
000,000,  or  4.4  per  cent  of  the  total  was  placed  in  Europe,  the 
remaining  95.6  per  cent  being  invested  where  it  could  not  suffer 
disturbance  or  even  partial  damage  by  the  war.  The  earning 
power  of  the  various  undertakings — railways,  manufactories, 
mines,  street  railroads,  electric  lighting  undertakings,  cattle 
ranches,  tea,  coffee,  and  rubber  plantations,  water  works, 
nitrate  fields,  etc.,  were  probably  seriously  impaired  for  a  time, 
and  while  that  condition  continued  the  British  income  under- 
went a  reduction. 

No  other  country  occupied  such  a  strong  position  as  Great 
Britain  in  this  respect.  Germany's  over-sea  investments  had  a 
capital  value  of  about  $5,000,000,000  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
Of  this  total  $850,000,000  was  placed  in  Russia,  and  became  dead 
capital.  The  German  investments  in  Turkey,  about  $200,000,000, 
and  in  Rumania,  about  $225,000,000,  may  almost  be  similarly 
classified  till  the  war  is  over.  The  remainder  of  Germany's 
foreign  investments  was  overseas — $750,000,000  in  the  United 
States  and  $600,000,000  in  South  America. 

British  exports  of  manufactured  goods  in  1912  were  worth 
$1,925,000,000.  Those  of  Germany  and  Austria  together 


INDUSTRIAL   RIVALRY  343 

amounted  to  $1,790,000,000,  or  nearly  as  large.  The  war  stopped 
this  latter  trade,  but  the  figure  is  presented  to  show  its  approxi- 
mation to  that  of  Great  Britain.  Again,  in  the  British  Empire 
alone  Germany's  trade  had  been  worth  about  $500,000,000  a 
year,  of  which  the  British  over-sea  possessions  took  about  $125,- 
000,000.  In  every  British  market  Germany  was  increasingly 
successful  in  selling  her  goods,  notably  iron  and  steel  manu- 
factures, electrical  goods,  brass  goods,  railway  materials,  china, 
earthenware  and  glass,  hardware,  cutlery,  musical  instruments, 
paper,  clocks,  and  textiles.  In  respect  of  many  of  these  com- 
modities German  competition  meant  as  much  to  Great  Britain  as 
that  of  all  the  rest  of  the  world  put  together.  In  other  parts  of 
the  world  Germany  had  been  equally  or  even  more  successful  in 
establishing  her  commerce.  The  following  statement  shows  the 
comparative  success  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  in  supplying 
the  chief  foreign  markets  in  the  year  1913 : 

From  From 

Great  Britain  Germany 

Russia $75,000,000  $266,000,000 

France 210,000,000  «  196,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 51,000,000  293,000,000 

Italy 115,000,000  125,000,000 

Belgium 101,000,000  140,000,000 

Holland 148,000,000  438,000,000 

Norway 41,000,000  46,000,000 

Sweden 53,000,000  126,000,000 

Denmark 37,000,000  87,000,000 

Switzerland 23,000,000  130;000,000 

Portugal 22,000,000  <  13,000,000 

Spain 40,000,000  v  28,000,000 

United  States 280,000,000  178,000,000 

Mexico 11,000,000  25,000,000 

Brazil 80,000,000  54,000,000 

Argentina 118,000,000  64,000,000 

Chile 39,000,000  34,000,000 

China 57,000,000  35,000,000 

Japan 62,000,000  33,000,000 


344     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

In  this  list  of  nineteen  countries  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Germany 
was  the  largest  exporter  to  ten,  and  in  the  remaining  nine  she 
was  Great  Britain's  most  formidable  competitor.  Even  in  Latin 
America,  which  was  chiefly  developed  by  British  capital,  German 
goods  obtained  a  great  hold.  In  Argentina,  Chile,  Brazil,  an& 
Mexico,  British  capital  has  about  $3,000,000,000  invested.  These 
four  countries  took  in  1913  $177,000,000  of  German  goods.  Year 
by  year  the  Germans  successfully  wooed  these  important  South 
American  markets.  In  Chile  Germany  had  almost  as  much  trade 
as  Great  Britain,  although  British  investments  in  that  country 
were  worth  nearly  $300,000,000. 

Nevertheless  Germany  was  not  satisfied  with  her  legitimate 
encroachments  on  the  British  hold  of  international  trade.  There 
were  other  fields  for  her  to  conquer.  The  British  share  of  the 
world's  trade  was  26.5  per  cent,  while  Germany's  was  12.5  per 
cent,  so  that  the  latter  had  considerable  headway  to  make  before 
outpacing  her  competitor.  Austria's  share  was  3  per  cent; 
France's  9.3  per  cent;  Belgium's  6.5  per  cent;  Russia's  4  per  cent. 
The  six  powers  named  thus  had  61.8  per  cent  of  the  world's  trade, 
so  that  countries  transacting  three-fifths  of  the  commerce  of  the 
globe  were  directly  involved  in  the  war. 

The  connection  between  this  commercial  rivalry  and  colonial 
expansion  is  very  close.  The  two  questions  were  constantly  in- 
terlocking. In  face  of  her  increasing  need  of  foreign  markets 
there  had  been  a  growing  discontent  in  Germany  over  her  meager 
share  in  the  colonial  world.  Inevitably  her  attention  turned 
enviously  toward  the  prosperous  colonies  of  her  weaker 
neighbors. 

Little  Holland  and  little  Germany  were  more  fortunate  in  ac- 
quiringover-sea  possessions  than  great  Germany.  When  Germany 
asked  Holland  to  join  the  empire  she  not  only  wanted  the  mouths 
of  the  Rhine  (which  are  Dutch)  as  trade  outlets,  but  to  share  in 
the  rich  Dutch  colonies.  She  had  also  tried  by  legitimate  offers 
of  purchase  to  acquire  the  colonies  of  Portugal  and  Belgium.  A 
frequent  criticism  of  Bismarck  was  that  he  ought  to  have  taken 
Algeria  from  France  instead  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  No  country 
being  in  such  real  need  of  raw  material,  Germany  claimed  that 


GERMANY    IN   THE    EAST— WORLD    POLICY     345 

she  could  make  better  use  of  Walfish  Bay,  Portuguese  Angola, 
or  the  Belgian  Congo  than  their  present  owners. 

In  looking  for  colonies  Germany  found  that  the .  land  not 
already  occupied  by  the  other  colonizing  nations  was  inconsider- 
able in  area,  unfavorably  located,  thinly  populated,  and  not 
possessed  of  commercial  advantages.  But  such  as  was  available 
Germany  occupied,  not  because  she  deemed  it  adequate  for  her 
needs,  but  because  at  the  moment  she  saw  no  other  chance  of 
meeting  the  exigencies  which  she  knew  were  certain  to  arise 
in  the  near  future.  The  colonies  thus  founded  on  the  west  and 
east  coasts  of  Africa  and  in  the  South  Seas  speedily  proved  their 
unsuitability  for  colonization  by  white  men,  and  the  improb- 
ability of  their  affording,  before  the  lapse  of  a  century,  any- 
thing like  an  adequate  market  for  German  manufactures.  These 
colonies  certainly  were  in  area  nearly  a  million  square  miles,  but 
their  products  were  not  greatly  in  excess  of  $5  per  square 
mile,  a  sum  too  small  to  be  consequential.  The  population  of 
14,000,000  was  too  undeveloped  and  too  sparse  to  make  the 
creation  of  a  state  possible.  All  the  desirable  land  for  colonies 
was  already  in  the  hands  of  other  nations,  and  the  Germans 
realized  with  bitterness  that  they  had  been  able  to  secure  what 
they  held  simply  because  other  nations  did  not  consider  it  to 
be  of  value.  Hence  it  became  clear  that  any  project  for  colonial 
expansion  could  not  be  pursued  without  running  into  conflict 
with  other  nations. 


CHAPTER    III 

GERMANY     IN     THE     EAST  —  WORLD     POLICY 

/GERMANY,  laboring  under  these  unfavorable  conditions,  cast 
^JT  her  eye  in  one  direction  where  no  other  country  had  a  prior 
claim.  She  saw  in  Asia  Minor  a  market  most  suited  to  her  wares, 
and  entered  upon  a  scheme  for  building  a  railroad  through  that 
Turkish  territory  to  Bagdad.  The  dense  valleys  of  Mesopo- 
tamia, which  once  supported  dense  populations,  were  deserts 


346  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

that  could  be  reclaimed  by  irrigation.  The  German  colonial 
enterprises  in  other  directions  had  been  thwarted  and  limited 
by  other  powers.  Yet  in  the  financing  of  the  Bagdad  Railroad 
Germany  had  a  considerable  rival  in  France  and  they  fought  to 
control  it  until  an  agreement  was  reached.  The  plan  did  not 
proceed  without  Great  Britain's  intervention.  The  dominant 
English  view  was  that  the  German  plea  of  the  need  of  economic 
development  in  Asia  Minor  was  merely  a  blind  to  a  sinister 
political  project  of  wresting  Egypt  and  India  from  the  British 
Empire.  Germany  had  wrung  sweeping  concessions  from 
the  sultan.  The  enterprise  came  to  be  known  as  the  Bagdad 
Railroad,  although  the  rights  Germany  obtained  to  construct  the 
line  from  the  Mediterranean  coast  to  Bagdad  represented  the 
smallest  part  of  the  concessions.  The  German  promoters  had 
the  privilege  to  extend  the  rails  in  almost  any  direction.  They 
were  granted  vague,  all-embracing  "development"  concessions 
for  irrigating,  land  purchase,  mining,  trading,  and  forest  rights. 
But  to  be  really  profitable  the  railroad  must  extend  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  Germany  needed  an  eastern  port  for  a  terminus. 
Great  Britain  balked  this  extension  by  reviving  a  shadowy  pro- 
tectorate over  Koweit,  a  little  principality  which  contained  the 
logical  harbor  for  a  gulf  terminus.  The  Germans  complained 
that  Great  Britain  wrested  this  important  point  from  Turkey, 
and  through  her  possession  of  the  Bahrein  Islands  and  Cape 
Jask  increased  the  obstacles  with  which  she  could  oppose  all 
competing  shipping  going  out  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  For  the 
British  it  was  contended  that  they  were  suspicious  of  a  certain 
clause  in  the  Turkish  concession  agreement  which  granted  the 
right  to  the  Germans  of  taking  necessary  measures  to  protect 
their  property  from  the  Bedawi  bandits  who  infested  the  desert. 
This  privilege,  the  British  feared,  might  readily  serve  as  an 
excuse  for  the  establishment  of  a  military  outpost  under  the 
guise  of  a  commercial  center  on  the  confines  of  India.  Such  a 
German  port  on  the  Persian  Gulf  might  even  form  a  base  for 
spies  to  encourage  Hindu  sedition. 

The  Bagdad  Railway  concession  was  viewed  as  the  first  step 
toward  a  German  protectorate  over  Turkey,  which  incidentally; 


GERMANY    IN   THE    EAST— WORLD    POLICY     347. 

meant  to  Russia  the  end  of  her  dream  of  reaching  Constantinople. 
The  British  even  denounced  it  as  "crooked."  The  Turkish 
Government  had  not  only  surrendered  very  valuable  rights, 
but  had  guaranteed  the  railway  builders  a  certain  annual  income 
for  every  mile  they  put  in  operation.  In  the  opinion  of  qualified 
authorities  there  was  no  prospect  of  the  railroad  earning  any- 
thing like  the  amount  of  this  guarantee  for  a  great  many  years. 
This  meant  a  heavy  drain  on  the  already  bankrupt  Turkish 
treasury.  In  other  words  Turkey  had  become  heavily  indebted 
to  Germany. 

Having  placed  every  obstruction  she  could  to  prevent  the 
project  extending  toward  the  Persian  Gulf,  Great  Britain  later 
came  to  an  agreement  with  Russia  regarding  their  respective 
spheres  of  commercial  influence  in  Persia,  so  as  to  erect  a  new 
barrier  between  India  and  Germany's  ambitions  in  the  east. 
There  were  also  valuable  oil  fields  in  Persia  to  be  safeguarded 
from  any  extension  of  Germany's  influence  in  that  quarter. 

Great  Britain's  interference  with  the  Bagdad  Railway  project 
added  another  grievance  to  the  others  which  Germany  harbored 
against  her  great  rival.  Most  Germans  viewed  it  as  a  legitimate 
development  scheme  which  the  British  had  ruined  from  pure 
spite.  They  placed  it  beside  Walfish  Bay  as  an  example  of  the 
British  policy,  as  one  critic  put  it,  "of  trying  to  smother  Ger- 
many— of  denying  it  a  place  in  the  sun." 

Foiled  or  restricted  in  her  economical  schemes  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion, Germany  also  fretted  under  the  disadvantage  of  all 
the  trade  routes  being  securely  held  by  Great  Britain.  Look 
where  she  may,  she  found  Great  Britain's  commerce  everywhere 
safeguarded.  She  had  established  herself  on  every  island  of 
the  oceans  and  at  every  other  point  which  commanded  the  trade 
routes.  At  Gibraltar  she  controlled  the  entrance  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  at  Malta  the  communications  between  that  sea's  eastern 
and  western  basin;  at  Cyprus  the  entrance  to  the  Suez  Canal 
and  Egypt.  Germany  had  to  bear  with  the  condition  that  Great 
Britain  thus  controlled  the  shortest  water  route  to  India,  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  the  Pacific.  Great  Britain  had  also  extended 
her  influence  over  the  longer  route  by  way  of  Africa,  through  St. 


348     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Helena  and  Ascension,  as  well  as  through  her  African  colonies, 
while  the  route  through  the  Red  Sea  into  the  Strait  of  Babel 
Mandeb  was  protected  by  the  island  of  Perim.  The  way  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean  led  furthermore  through  the  Strait  of  Magellan, 
on  the  route  to  which  lay  the  Falkland  Islands,  while  in  the 
Pacific  was  the  important  British  port  of  Singapore. 

The  construction  of  continental  railroads  (the  Siberian  Rail- 
road among  them)  was  designed  to  afford  the  European  nations 
scope  to  be  independent  of  the  water  routes  under  the  control 
of  Great  Britain.  The  Bagdad  Railroad  certainly  appeared  to 
have  this  among  its  aims. 

Germany  did  not  possess  a  single  port  of  call  along  the  entire 
route  from  her  possessions  in  Africa  to  the  Pacific.  Great 
Britain  monopolized  coaling  stations  on  islands  and  at  seaports 
which  afforded  sufficient  protection  for  the  transfer  of  coal,  a 
policy  which  proved  an  efficient  weapon  for  Great  Britain  to 
wield  in  her  commercial  rivalry  with  Germany.  The  latter's 
nationals  complained  that  Great  Britain  had  succeeded  in  thwart- 
ing every  attempt  of  Germany  to  obtain  naval  and  coaling 
stations.  German  merchantmen  and  warships  were  there- 
fore obliged  to  obtain  supplies  from  coaling  stations  owned 
by  other  nations,  chiefly  those  of  Great  Britain.  The  fact  that 
the  latter  benefited  in  this  way  through  Germany's  lack  of 
stations  added  to  the  indictment  against  her. 

"Here  was  an  actual  example  of  Germany's  need  of  elbow 
room,"  one  German  writer  charged,  "and  of  the  manner  in 
which  England  has  set  up  an  iron  barrier  in  the  way  of  Ger- 
many's necessary  expansion.  It  is  evident  that  sooner  or  later 
it  will  be  absolutely  necessary  for  Germany  to  break  away  from 
these  bonds  which,  in  the  long  run,  will  render  her  navigation 
unendurable." 

As  outlined  by  Dr.  Dernburg,  Germany's  colonial  ambitions 
were  legitimate  enough.  The  aims  he  assigned  to  Germany  in 
her  colonial  policy  were:  Safe  outlets  for  a  rapidly  increasing 
population  in  a  restricted  territory;  arable  lands  to  provide 
cheap  food  for  her  people ;  regions  where  she  could  procure  her 
raw  materials  without  let  or  hindrance;  productive  districts  to 


GERMANY    IN   THE    EAST— WORLD    POLICY     349 

prevent  monopolies  in  the  markets  of  certain  foodstuffs;  and 
the  consolidation  of  her  money  market  by  buying  in  her  own 
colonies  foodstuffs  which  if  bought  from  foreigners,  would 
deplete  her  store  of  gold. 

As  to  German  colonies  being  a  safe  outlet  for  a  rapidly  in- 
creasing population  in  a  restricted  territory,  a  French  authority, 
Professor  Andler  of  the  University  of  Paris,  took  this  view : 

"It  is  usual  to  say  that  Germany  requires  new  territories  for 
her  surplus  population.  But,  as  a  fact,  it  is  no  longer  the  Ger- 
man masses  who  emigrate.  The  emigrants  number  barely 
20,000  a  year.  They  are  an  intellectual  proletariat,  rich  in 
diplomas  and  light  in  pocket.  German  industry  is  capable  of 
absorbing  the  million  surplus  men  who  are  born  each  year. 
It  cannot  absorb  the  20,000  surplus  technicians  manufactured 
by  its  schools  of  arts  and  crafts.  Germany  is  not  suffering  from 
a  plethora  of  men,  but  from  an  excess  of  certificated  students, 
clerks,  doctors  without  patients,  engineers  without  employment. 
It  is  not  that  her  population  is  overcrowded,  but  that  her  division 
of  labor  is  ill  devised.  Suffering  at  home  from  this  curse  of  in- 
numerable declasses  too  ambitious  to  work  with  their  hands, 
she  exports  them,  and  inflicts  them  on  the  world  at  large.  She 
gains  by  getting  rid  of  them  herself,  and  by  increasing  her 
sphere  of  influence  abroad  through  them.  But  it  is  the  greed 
of  these  adventurers  which  feeds  the  Pan-German  press  with 
its  dreams." 

Against  this  view  of  Germany's  colonies  being  an  asylum  for 
sybarites  we  have  Admiral  Werner's  dictum  that  "the  German 
colonies  have  another  and  a  greater  destiny  than  to  offer  an 
easy  refuge  for  men  who  are  weary  of  Europe  and  the  derelicts 
of  our  nation."  The  "greater  destiny"  was  indicated  by  Baron 
von  Stengel.  "Without  colonies,"  he  said,  "the  German  Empire 
may  be  a  great  European  power,  but  it  can  never  be  a  World 
Power.  Now  Germany  must  be  a  World  Power,  if  she  would 
not  be  crushed  by  such  World  Powers  as  Russia  and  America." 

Utterances  of  discerning  and  highly  competent  publicists, 
flowing  intermittently  throughout  the  present  kaiser's  reign, 
showed  all  too  clearly  the  trend  of  the  German  national  mind. 


350     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Germany,  in  the  classification  of  nations,  had  become  an  in- 
dustrialized country,  needing  elbow  room  and  new  arteries  of 
trade  for  her  surplus  products.  Hence  behind  the  more  or  less 
official  publicists  demands  for  continental  and  colonial  expan- 
sion and  for  race  ascendancy  was  the  driving  momentum  of 
economical  necessity. 

These  aspirations  became  shaped  in  the  economic  World  Policy 
of  Germany  (Weltpolitik) ,  initiated  in  Palestine  by  the  kaiser 
in  1898,  and  menacingly  hinted  at  by  Prince  von  Billow,  the 
then  chancellor,  in  a  speech  before  the  Reichstag  the  following 
year,  when  he  declared:  "It  has  been  said  that  once  in  every 
century  there  is  a  great  settlement,  a  great  liquidation,  in  view 
of  a  fresh  distribution  of  influence,  power  and  possession  on 
the  globe.  Are  we  on  the  eve  of  such  a  new  partition  of  the 
.earth?  In  any  case  ....  we  cannot  and  we  will  not  stand 
apart,  like  dreamers,  while  others  divide  the  cake  between  them. 
If  the  English  talk  of  a  Greater  Britain,  and  the  French  of  a 
New  France,  if  Russia  is  opening  up  Asia  for  herself,  we  too 
have  a  right  to  a  Greater  Germany." 

This  world  policy  has  been  given  several  interpretations  by 
the  Germans  themselves.  The  earliest  definition  attempted 
appeared  to  be  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  imperial  government, 
whether  by  subventions  or  by  the  intervention  of  its  official 
representatives,  to  help  Germans  to  extend  their  commerce 
throughout  the  world.  Then  it  became  enlarged  to  embrace 
projects,  either  of  peaceful  penetration  or  of  dismemberment, 
especially  in  countries  which  seemed  disorganized,  to  provide  an 
outlet  for  the  population  of  Germany.  Instead  of  permitting 
emigrants  to  settle  in  the  United  States,  where  they  were  lost 
to  Germany,  the  Government  should  direct  them  to  unoccupied 
territories,  where  they  could  form  colonies  of  settlement  under 
the  direct  control  or  under  the  influence  of  the  empire. 

A  later  development  of  the  policy  laid  stress  on  a  new  condi- 
tion, which  was  that  Germany,  with  her  colossal  industries  and 
highly  developed  agricultural  system,  had  no  longer  any  surplus 
population  for  emigration.  She  had  actually  to  induce  foreign 
laborers  to  join  her  workers.  She  must  seek,  therefore,  not 


THE    CUSTOMS    UNION  351 

colonies  for  settlement,  but  colonies  to  be  exploited.  These  were  to 
be  developed  by  German  capitalists,  engineers,  planters  and 
capitalists,  who  would  dire'ct  the  labor  of  the  native  population. 
They  would  thus  learn  to  become,  like  the  British,  "a  nation  of 
masters."  But  for  this  purpose  vast  territories  were  needed, 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  acquire  them. 

Finally  the  aspiration  grew,  and  became  expressed  as  a  plank 
of  the  world  policy,  that  Germany  did  not  play  a  part  in  world 
politics  proportionate  to  her  strength.  So  henceforward  Ger- 
many's voice  must  be  raised,  and  heard,  on  every  question 
economic,  colonial  or  other  considerations  stirred  in  any  part 
of  the  world.  The  Government  must  not  allow  any  acquisition 
of  territory,  influence  or  economic  advantage  by  another  nation 
to  pass  without  claiming  its  share  or  compensation. 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE     CUSTOMS     UNION 

THE  war  had  not  been  long  in  progress  before  Germany,  fore- 
handed as  is  her  wont,  planned  to  establish  on  the  conclusion 
of  hostilities  a  customs  union  of  the  Central  Powers  on  aggressive 
lines.  After  her  occupation  of  Belgium  reports  were  current 
that  she  contemplated  or  had  extended  her  Zollverein  to  that 
country.  An  aggressive  customs  union  means  an  economic  war; 
Before  the  conflict  came  Great  Britain  had  charged  that  Ger- 
many employed  the  most-favored-nation  clauses  in  her  com- 
mercial treaties  to  the  detriment  of  British  interests  and  those 
of  the  other  allied  countries.  In  her  preparation  for  the  war, 
Great  Britain  complained,  Germany  had  used  her  resources  and 
commercial  relations  with  Great  Britain  for  purposes  of  aggres- 
sion. It  was  predicted  that  the  economic  war  foreshadowed  by 
Germany's  plan  to  form  an  aggressive  customs  union  would  be 
a  permanent  barrier  to  the  peaceful  development  of  Europe. 
This  threatened  economic  effect  of  the  war  has  a  deep  root* 


352  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

The  plan  of  a  customs  union,  continental  in  scope,  dates  as  far 
back  as  the  accession  of  the  kaiser,  and  must  be  recognized  as 
among  the  indirect  economic  causes  of  the  war  in  that  it  was 
one  of  the  seeds  of  Pan-Germanism,  whose  later  developments 
brought  Germany  to  the  heroic  frame  of  mind  of  challenging 
Europe  to  combat. 

In  1914  it  was  not  difficult  to  discern  symptoms  of  present-day 
Pan-Germanism  in  an  economic  program  ventilated  through  a 
semiofficial  source  in  1892.  It  was  contained  in  a  anonymous 
work  ascribed  to  a  distinguished  publicist  of  the  time,  Julius  von 
Eckardt,  who  for  many  years  superintended  the  press  bureau 
of  the  German  foreign  office.  In  it  was  set  forth  the  Neuer 
Kurs  (the  "New  Co.urse"),  as  the  aspirations  of  the  new  im- 
perial was  called. 

German  opinion,  up  to  that  period,  had  accepted  as  a  program 
and  as  a  limitation  of  German  action  in  the  East: — (1)  The 
open  door  in  the  markets  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  guaran- 
ties against  Russian  encroachments.  (2)  As  an  extreme 
measure,  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  Serbia  to  induce  her  to 
enter  into  the  sphere  of  influence  of  Austrian  power  and 
economy.  Beyond  those  limits  it  was  not  deemed  wise  to  involve 
the  empire.  Von  Eckardt,  as  the  spokesman  of  a  broader  im- 
perial economic  policy,  viewed  that  Germany's  great  position 
imposed  duties  which  did  not  exist  for  old  Prussia  under 
Wilhelm  I,  as  she  was  only  a  second-class  power.  With  Europe 
divided  by  rival  ambitions  by  the  Balkan  policy  of  Russia,  which 
ran  counter  to  the  designs  of  Austria,  and  by  the  incurable 
resentment  of  France,  with  Russia  and  France  intrenching 
themselves  economically  behind  high  protective  tariffs,  and  with 
the  McKinley  tariff  bill  confronting  all  Europe  by  a  North 
America  armed  against  European  industrial  competition,  it 
was  necessary,  Von  Eckardt  submitted,  to  organize  Europe.  As 
he  foresaw  the  future,  it  was  incumbent  on  Germany  to  found  a 
customs  union  as  well  as  a  military  union  of  the  central  European 
states.  These  central  states  alone  remained  of  Europe  if  Russia 
and  France  pursued  their  separate  paths,  and  if  England  relied 
only  on  her  own  resources  and  the  markets  of  her  vast  colonial 


THE    CUSTOMS   UNION  353 

dominions;  and  those  states  only  remained  on  condition  that 
they  formed  an  economic  unit  large  enough  to  be  able  to  adopt 
an  independent  customs  policy.  The  solidifying  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  thus  necessary : 

"If  it  were  possible  to  give  the  Triple  Alliance  a  basis  other 
than  that  of  immediate  political  and  military  exigencies;  if  the 
object  were  to  give  it  a  durable  character,  this  could  only  be 
done  by  providing  the  allied  nations  with  an  economic  interest 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  system  politically  followed  by  their 
governments.  The  establishment  for  a  long  series  of  years  of 
an  alliance  at  once  political  and  economic  between  the  three 
Central  European  Powers  might  become  the  starting  point  of  a 
new  European  system.  If  the  three  leading  states  combined 
to  form  a  rampart  which  would  permanently  repel  invasion  of 
central  Europe  from  east  and  west,  the  adhesion  of  the  other 
powers  might  be  counted  almost  as  a  certainty." 

Here  the  attractive  picture  was  presented  of  an  economic 
union,  buttressing  the  political  and  military  union  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  which  would  draw  neighboring  nations  into  the  bund. 
Germany  would  be  in  a  position  to  disarm  the  dislike  and  distrust 
of  her  neighbors  by  a  "great  civilizing  enterprise,"  i.  e. : 

"A  great  customs  union,  created  on  the  initiative  of  Germany, 
would  prove  to  the  world  irrefutably  that  the  foundation  of  the 
German  Empire  had  been  a  necessity  and  a  benefit  to  Europe. 
If  we  'could  effectively  demonstrate  that  the  concentration  of 
national  forces  had  made  us  capable  of  solving  great  problems 
of  civilization,  it  could  be  no  longer  cast  in  our  teeth  that  the 
great  German  undertaking  of  1870  had  resulted  merely  in  in- 
creased armaments,  universal  military  service  and  an  elabora- 
tion of  militarism,  which  is  sucking  out  the  marrow  from  the 
bones  of  all  the  nations. 

"The  Triple  Alliance,  created  with  a  view  to  war,  would  be- 
come an  instrument  to  serve  the  interests  of  peace.  This  trans- 
formation would  be  no  less  advantageous  to  the  immediate  ends 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  than  to  its  European  position.  No  method 
could  be  more  profitably  employed  to  effect  this  transformation 
than  the  establishment  of  a  customs  organization  open  to  all 


354     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

friendly  nations.  Nothing  could  better  prove  the  mission  and 
importance  of  a  unified  Germany  than  the  initiation  of  an  under- 
taking so  essential  to  the  program  of  civilization. 

"This  project  of  transforming  the  purely  political  alliance 
founded  by  Prince  Bismarck  into  an  alliance  at  once  political 
and  economic,  which  would  keep  the  door  open  for  an  entente 
embracing  the  whole  of  central  Europe  obviously  exceeds  the 
program  of  the  founder  of  the  empire.  Yet  the  idea  is  not  an- 
tagonistic but  complementary  to  the  first  conception." 

French  critics  interpreted  the  proposal  as  primarily  one  de- 
signed to  create  an  industrial  trust  of  the  central  European 
states,  strong  enough  in  itself  to  resist  American  competition, 
with  an  attraction  to  neighboring  states  so  potent  that  they 
would  of  their  own  accord  ask  to  enter  it  in  order  to  avoid  im- 
poverishment. The  delicate  question  was  hinted  whether  the 
entente  would  be  confined  to  customs,  with  a  reminder  of  Fried- 
rich  List's  old  axiom,  affirmed  as  a  truth  proved  by  experience, 
that  commercial  union  and  political  union  were  twins,  and  that 
"one  could  not  be  born  without  the  other."  States  united  by  a 
Zollverein,  it  was  observed,  readily  entered  into  military  con- 
ventions. If  the  Scandinavian  states,  Belgium  and  Holland 
were  so  impressed  by  the  commercial  splendor  of  Germany  as 
to  join  the  Triple  Alliance,  would  military  conventions  with 
those  states  be  long  delayed?  The  French  commentators  only 
saw  in  any  such  customs  union  a  forerunner  to  a  military  pact 
by  pointing  to  the  history  of  the  German  Zollverein  as  an  answer 
to  the  question.  So  they  perceived  in  the  new  European  system 
aimed  at  by  the  "New  Course"  a  military  and  commerical  organ- 
ization of  Europe  formed  in  the  initiative  and  hence  under  the 
hegemony  of  Germany.  If  matured,  neither  Serbia  nor  Bulgaria, 
nor  any  other  Balkan  state  could  long  remain  outside  its  sphere 
of  influence.  France's  inclusion  in  the  Austro-German  customs 
union,  her  watchful  publicists  discerned,  was  an  objective  of 
Germany,  who  might  draw  her  in  by  persuasion  before  bringing 
more  active  pressure  to  bear  upon  her.  They  saw  this  in  an 
early  remark  of  Bismarck's  revealed  in  a  conversation  (recorded 
in  1884)  the  chancellor  had  with  Comte  de  Saint- Vallier,  the 


THE    CUSTOMS   UNION 


355 


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ITALY  IN  1914   (POLITICAL) 


356     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

French  Ambassador  to  Germany:  "The  irresistible  pressure 
and  even  violence  by  which  the  Russian  political  organism 
was  forcing  its  way  toward  the  light  and  warmth  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, not  only  threatened  the  existence  of  Austria,  but  de- 
prived French  influence  and  interests  of  possible  future  in  the 
East."  Bismarck  himself,  however,  with  an  unerring  eye  for  facts 
which  saved  him  from  any  allusions  as  to  the  opposition  of 
hostile  forces,  or  as  to  his  own  strength,  had  abandoned  the  idea 
of  a  customs  union  for  Central  Europe.  Such  a  plan  presented 
to  him  in  1880  brought  the  response :  "I  too  look  upon  a  customs 
entente  embracing  the  two  empires  as  an  ideal  end  which 
could  dictate  the  direction  in  which  we  should  develop  all  our 
politico-commercial  activities."  But  beyond  this  he  did  not 
go. 

German  publicists  did  not  allow  the  project  to  rest.  While 
their  utterances  could  not  always  be  accepted  as  straws  showing 
the  course  whither  the  immature  economic  policy  of  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  was  tending,  they  were  viewed  as  echoes,  when  they  were 
not  inspirers,  of  German  public  opinion.  Their  ideas,  as  the 
present  war  has  shown,  have  acted  as  powerful  suggestions  both 
on  the  German  people  and  government,  and,  at  the  least,  were 
always  symptomatic."  Hence  a  history  of  any  great  economic 
movement,  especially  when  it  hinges  on  eventual  war,  cannot 
ignore  them. 

One  of  the  most  prominent  of  Bismarckian  publicists,  Paul 
Dehn,  wrote  in  1884:  "In  the  economic  life  of  the  old  world, 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  must  maintain  a  close 
union  defensively  against  the  superior  and  overpowering  com- 
petition of  the  English,  the  French  and  the  Russians,  who  are 
now  in  the  ascendency;  and  to  recapture  their  rightful  share  in 
the  exchange  of  wealth  between  Europe  and  the  East.  From 
this  point  of  view  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  bound 
together  by  common  economic  interests  in  Central  Europe  form 
a  great  domain  which  would  be  very  happily  rounded  off  by  the 
adhesion  of  Switzerland,  Belgium  and  Holland  in  the  West,  and 
of  Poland  and  Lithuania  in  the  East.  If  the  states  of  central 
Europe  wish  to  insure  their  commercial  vitality,  and  consequently 


THE    CUSTOMS    UNION  357 

their  political  life  and  independence,  they  must  unite  with  a 
full  consciousness  of  their  intentions ;  they  must  seek  new  forms 
within  which  this  great  domain  of  common  interests  might  be 
realized  without  violence  to  national  sentiment  or  to  existing 
conditions  which  have  the  sanction  of  political  rights.  Ger- 
many, by  virtue  of  her  situation  in  the  heart  of  Europe  and 
the  economic  importance  of  this  situation  is  called  upon  to  play 
the  leading  part  in  the  center  of  this  domain  of  interests." 

This  advocate  of  a  vast  European  Zollverein  was  content  to 
depict  its  need  and  advantages  without  entering  into  the  thorny 
question  of  how  Poland,  Lithuania,  or  even  Holland  and 
Switzerland  could  be  brought  into  the  commerical  Triple 
Alliance  without  a  war.  But  he  suggested  some  elastic  com- 
binations. One  was  a  customs  parliament  or  a  customs  federal 
council  to  deliberate  on  the  customs  business  of  the  entire  con- 
federation; another  a  narrow  confederation  to  which  the  coun- 
tries not  reduced  to  complete  economic  dependence  should  be 
attached  by  simple  but  permanent  treaties  of  commerce. 

The  gain  to  Germany  by  a  readjustment  of  the  economic 
frontiers  of  Europe  was  generally  seen  to  be  "an  appreciable 
reenforcement  of  her  economic  power."  A  customs  alliance  with 
nations  who  remained  more  agricultural  than  Germany  would 
give  Germany  extended  outlets  for  her  manufactured  products, 
additional  markets  to  buy  raw  materials  and  cereals,  and  stable 
guarantees  for  the  price  of  foodstuffs.  Austria-Hungary  would 
also  be  enabled  to  dispose  of  her  surplus  crops  among  the  grow- 
ing industrial  population  of  Germany,  while  Austria's  then  in- 
fant industries  would  find  support  in  the  powerful  industries  of 
Germany. 

As  to  this  prospect,  seemingly  assured  to  the  self-interested 
nations,  French  commentators  again  interposed  with  an  inquiry : 
Would  Russia  be  induced  to  detach  Poland  and  Lithuania  from 
her  economic  system  and  allow  them  to  join  the  Austro-German 
customs  union?  The  question,  asked  in  those  early  days,  loses 
none  of  its  pertinency  in  being  repeated  in  the  midst  of  the  war  of 
1914,  which  duly  made  Poland  and  Lithuania  part  of  Germany's 
captured  territories  with  which  to  trade  in  the  peace  proposals. 

C— Gt.  War  2 


358     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

The  radiating  force  of  the  military  and  economic  alliance  of  the 
Central  Empires  was  moreover  seen  by  Paul  Dehn  to  extend 
inevitably  to  Rumania  and  Turkey.  "And  even  France,"  he  pre- 
dicted, "would  find  it  advantageous  to  enter  the  union.  Within 
it  she  might  form  friendships  that  would  be  of  service  to  her 
against  Transoceanic  competition,  from  which  she  suffers  as 
much  as  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary."  Here  it  will  be  seen 
that  American  competition  was  not  lost  sight  of. 

German  economic  aims,  then,  in  the  eighties  of  the  previous 
century  embraced  France,  and  bred  a  pacific  policy  toward  that 
country  provided  France  raised  no  objections  to  the  projects  for 
the  commercial  absorption  of  all  the  small  adjacent  nations  from 
the  Baltic  and  the  Rhine  to  the  Hellespont.  Apparently  Germany 
awaited  the  time  when  the  pressure  of  economic  life  and  the 
efforts  of  publicists  induced  France  to  enter  the  customs  union 
for  the  protection  of  her  commercial  enterprises. 

Seeking  the  line  of  least  resistance  the  Pan-German  advo- 
cates of  an  economic  union  became  mainly  preoccupied  with 
Holland  and  Belgium  in  1897,  and  onward.  As  to  Holland, 
one  publicist,  Fritz  Bley,  identified  with  the  Pan-German  League 
wrote : 

"We  require  these  Dutch  territories,  already  fertilized  by  Ger- 
man blood,  for  the  indispensable  expansion  of  our  economic 
dominions.  On  a  Rhine  that  has  become  German  to  the  mouth 
we  need  the  free  traffic  which  the  silent  resistance  of  Holland 
now  hampers.  A  customs  union,  a  common  organization  of 
naval  and  military  strength — the  language  of  command  being 
High  German  in  the  army  and  Low  German  in  the  fleet — a  joint 
management  of  our  possessions  beyond  the  seas,  carried  on  in  a 
spirit  of  Dutch  prudence  and  practical  utility — these  would  be 
the  objects  of  a  Germano-Dutch  alliance.  If  Holland  were  merely 
a  continental  power,  this  alliance  would  not  be  consummated 
until  the  day  when  Germany  would  impose  her  just  claims  by 
force.  But  as  the  vast  transoceanic  possessions  of  Holland  are 
daily  crumbling  away  under  a  growing  menace,  the  merchant 
princes  of  the  Amstel  and  the  Meuse  are  impelled  by  considera- 
tions of  personal  interest  to  make  common  cause  with  us." 


THE    CUSTOMS    UNION  359 

The  persuasive  here  advanced  for  Holland  to  amalgamate 
with  Germany,  economically  and  otherwise,  was  that  the  colonies 
were  threatened  by  Japan,  and  that  in  fear  of  Japanese  aggres- 
sion Holland  should  place  herself  under  the  protection  of 
Germany.  Holland's  destiny  would  thus  be  established  in 
unison  with  that  of  the  other  nations  embraced  in  the  customs 
union : 

"Consider  our  history  and  contemporary  world  economics. 
Such  a  consideration  would  lead  to  an  urgent  demand  that  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Italy,  the  Balkan  States,  the  two  Netherlands, 
Switzerland,  and  finally,  if  possible,  the  Scandinavian  countries, 
should,  with  their  colonies,  combine  in  a  common  customs  union, 
adopting  a  system  of  free  trade  or  graduated  tariffs  internally, 
but  vigorously  protectionist  externally.  By  no  other  means 
will  they  be  able  to  maintain  their  right  to  existence,  and  insure 
the  food  supply  of  their  populations  as  against  the  vast  territories 
of  Russia,  England,  and  North  and  South  America.  Similarly 
with  the  Dutch  we  desire  an  international  alliance.  We  do  not 
wish  to  form  a  single  state  with  them." 

The  actual  existence  of  Holland  was  even  viewed  as  incom- 
patible with  the  safety  of  Germany  by  another  publicist,  Ernst 
von  Halle,  whose  deliberations  carried  weight: 

"Germany  has  on  various  sides  military  and  political,  national 
and  economic  frontiers,  which  in  course  of  time  will  be  unten- 
able, in  view  of  the  exigencies  of  modern  national  life.  It  is 
monstrous  from  the  economic  and  geographic  commercial  stand- 
point, that  the  mouths  of  two  of  her  greatest  rivers,  the  Danube 
and  the  Rhine,  especially  the  latter,  the  most  important  artery 
of  national  traffic,  as  well  as  a  series  of  the  leading  ports  for 
German  international  exchange,  should  be  in  the  hands  of 
foreigners.  A  little  coast  nation  is  in  a  position  to  influence 
traffic  on  the  lower  Rhine,  and  to  take  measures  there  which  are 
solely  to  its  own  interest,  and  not  to  that  of  the  Hinterland.  In 
the  future  the  German  Empire  must  be  able  to  establish  and 
support  her  lines  of  defense  on  the  most  favorable  position.  A 
Holland  too  weak  on  land  is  a  permanent  danger  to  Germany's 
most  important  industrial  regions." 


SGO     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Economic  factors  thus  entered  largely  into  the  Pan-Germanic 
schemes  for  European  and  colonial  expansion  for  which  the 
proposed  customs  union  embracing  her  neighborhood  was,  as 
viewed  by  Germany's  foes,  an  entering  wedge.  The  manifold 
extent  of  these  aspirations  toward  a  greater  Germany  may 
therefore  be  glanced  at.  Some  of  them  were  so  visionary  that 
even  official  Germany,  much  as  it  might  have  jogged  on  the 
pamphleteers,  could  hardly  be  taxed  with  being  the  progenitor 
of  them  all.  Ancient  anti-Russian  currents  were  set  flowing  in 
1881  by  Paul  de  Legarde,  who  wrote :  "We  must  create  a  central 
Europe,  which  will  guarantee  the  peace  of  the  entire  continent 
from  the  moment  when  it  shall  have  driven  the  Russians  from  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  Slavs  from  the  south,  and  shall  have  con- 
quered large  tracts  to  the  east  of  our  frontiers  for  German 
colonization."  Constantin  Frantz  sought  a  great  confederation 
of  the  central  European  states,  whose  central  core  would  be  the 
western  German  states,  rounded  off  by  Russia  and  Austria,  with 
a  belt  of  smaller  states,  Holland,  Belgium,  Flanders,  Lorraine, 
Switzerland,  Franche-Comte,  Savoy,  and,  in  the  east,  all  the 
Balkan  States  together  with  others  to  be  carved  out  of  Russian 
Poland.  For  the  construction  of  this  confederation,  Russia  would 
have  to  be  thrust  back  beyond  the  Pruth  to  the  Dniester,  and 
the  reconstituted  Russo-German  frontier  would  be  the  line 
marked  by  Brest-Litovsk,  Bialystok,  and  Grodno. 

The  Franco-Russian  alliance  intervened  to  sober  the  Russo- 
phobia  of  the  publicists  for  a  few  years.  Then  followed  a  propa- 
ganda aiming  at  pure  Germanism.  Between  1894  and  1904 
the  future  of  Germany  was  seen  to  lie  in  a  violent  setback  to 
Russia.  In  this  struggle  Austria,  which  was  to  be  a  bulwark 
against  Slavism,  was  becoming  more  and  more  Slav  herself. 
Hence  Austria  must  be  colonized  with  pure  Germans,  as  Russian 
Poland  and  all  the  conquered  Lithuanian  territory  would  be,  this 
emigration  to  be  organized,  administered,  and  insisted  upon  by 
the  Imperial  Government.  Friedrich  List  had  earlier  planned  the 
intensive  colonization  of  Hungary  and  of  the  riparian  regions  of 
the  Danube :  "The  right  and  left  banks  of  the  Danube,  from  Press- 
burg  to  its  mouth,  the  northern  provinces  of  Turkey,  and  the  east- 


THE    PAN-GERMAN    LEAGUE  361 

ern  coasts  of  the  Black  Sea  offer  large  tracts  of  land,  naturally 
fertile  and  as  yet  unexplored,  to  German  colonists."  He  dreamed 
of  a  vast  Germano-Magyar  Empire,  stretching  from  the  Adriatic 
to  the  Black  Sea. 


THE      PAN-GERMAN      LEAGUE 

rpHIS  plan  of  continental  expansion  was  fathered  by  the  Pan- 
-L  German  League,  whose  "nebulous  dreams  of  the  future,"  as 
formulated  by  Professor  Ernst  Hasse,  the  league's  head  in  1894, 
produced  a  rebuke  from  Prince  von  Billow.  On  all  the  frontiers 
of  Germany,  Hasse  wished  to  delimit  a  military  "glacis,"  the 
width  of  a  day's  march,  where  only  pure-bred  Germans  might 
live,  chosen  from  among  former  noncommissioned  officers,  to 
whom  the  state  would  assign  lands  at  minimum  rents  in  pay- 
ment of  their  services.  Military  boundaries,  like  those  which 
protected  the  Russians  and  the  Austrians  against  the  Tartars, 
would  form  a  closely  guarded  girdle  round  Germany,  where  no 
foreigner  would  be  allowed  to  own  landed  property  or  invest- 
ments. Von  Billow's  policy  had  already  adopted  and  set  in  mo- 
tion this  process  of  expropriation  in  Poland.  In  twenty  years 
60,000  German  colonists  had  been  established  on  the  dismembered 
estates  of  the  great  Polish  landowners.  This  was  a  negligible 
percentage  according  to  Hasse,  who  considered  that  on  the  Polish 
frontier  alone  some  million  portions  of  land  should  have  been 
allotted  to  the  surplus  German  population.  Hasse  demanded  the 
return  of  the  Netherland  countries  (Belgium,  Holland,  and 
Luxemburg)  to  the  German  confederation ;  other  parts  of  France 
in  addition  to  Alsace-Lorraine;  Bohemia  and  Moravia  from 
Austria;  the  restoration  by  Russia  of  all  the  territory  lost  to 
Prussia  by  the  treaties  of  1815,  from  Cracow  to  Grodno,  includ- 
ing Warsaw  (the  war  of  1914  has  already  brought  this  area  into 
Germany's  hands),  while  Austria  could  be  compensated  by 
Saloniki. 


862     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

A  Germanic  Europe  found  favor,  especially  in  its  economic 
aspects,  among  the  numerous  professors  in  the  ranks  of  the  Pan- 
German  League.  The  part  the  German  universities  played  in 
shaping  the  national  aims,  economic,  military,  political,  or  racial, 
cannot  well  be  overlooked,  as  their  professors  were  ardently 
occupied  amid  their  specific  duties  in  molding  the  thought  of  the 
ruling  class  and  inspiring  its  scions  with  a  proud  and  aggressive 
ambition.  Professor  Albrecht  Wirth  of  Munich  in  1906  thus 
viewed  the  project  of  pure  Germanism  aforementioned: 

"In  order  to  live,  and  to  lead  a  healthy  and  joyous  life,  we 
need  a  vast  extent  of  fresh  arable  land.  This  is  what  imperial- 
ism must  give  us.  Germany  may  reap  the  fruits  of  Russian 
policy  if  she  has  sufficient  courage.  What  would  be  the  use  of  a 
Germanism  flourishing  in  Brazil  or  in  South  Africa?  It  would 
further  the  expansion  of  the  German  race  very  greatly,  but  it 
would  contribute  very  little  to  the  might  of  the  German  Empire. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  continental  expansion  of  German  terri- 
tory, the  multiplication  on  the  Continent  of  the  German  peas- 
antry, whose  activities  and  capacities  are  so  immeasurably 
superior  to  the  obtuse  nonchalance  of  the  muzhiks,  would  form 
a  sure  barrier  against  the  advance  of  our  enemies  and  a  secure 
basis  for  our  growing  power." 

Aims  toward  colonial  expansion,  however,  did  not  fade  in  the 
face  of  a  preference  for  continental  expansion.  Economic  con- 
siderations in  favor  of  the  former  were  too  weighty.  So  colonial 
projects  no  less  vast  and  aggressive  were  coupled  with  the  con- 
tinental plan.  They  were  focused  on  all  the  unoccupied  terri- 
tory of  the  world,  and  also  on  much  that  was  occupied — long 
preempted  and  possessed  by  other  powers.  Even  to  a  neutral 
onlooker  they  revealed  an  insatiable  appetite  for  conquest. 

In  this  colonial  struggle,  with  Great  Britain  as  the  rival  to 
eclipse,  the  projects  contemplated,  as  already  mentioned,  were 
those  of  penetration  and  dismemberment.  The  semiofficial 
pamphleteers  trained  their  guns  on  the  South  American  re- 
publics. Thus  Professor  J.  Unold  of  Munich : 

"The  Germans  seem  marked  out  by  their  labors  and  their 
aptitudes  to  be  the  teachers,  and  the  intellectual,  economic,  and 


THE    PAN-GERMAN   LEAGUE  363 

political  leaders  of  these  peoples  (the  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
Americans).  If  they  fail  in  their  mission,  sooner  or  later  these 
countries  will  fall,  as  a  result  of  political  or  financial  bankruptcy, 
under  the  domination  and  exploitation  of  the  United  States." 

Emigration  must  be  organized,  the  German  publicists  de- 
manded, and  the  German  Empire  must  direct  it.  "A  farseeing 
policy  is  required,"  Friedrich  Lange  urged,  "ruthlessly  applying 
all  the  resources  of  its  (the  state's)  power  in  concluding  treaties 
with  foreign  states,  which  are  eager  to  receive  our  emigrants, 
and  so  would  in  the  end  accept  the  conditions  accounted  neces- 
sary by  our  Government.  The  Argentine  and  Brazilian  Re- 
publics, and  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  all  those  needy  republics 
of  South  America,  would  accept  advice  and  listen  to  reason, 
voluntarily  or  under  coercion." 

Another  publicist,  Josef  Ludwig  Reimer,  foresaw  the  Latin- 
American  states  as  eager  and  willing  to  accept  an  accession  of 
German  colonization  and  money,  with  territorial  concessions  and 
representation  for  Germans  on  their  public  bodies.  In  this 
"moral  and  material  assistance,"  they  would  see  "an  efficacious 
reenforcement  against  their  natural  enemy,  the  United  States  of 
the  North,  an  enemy  who  will  not  only  exact  commercial  con- 
cessions from  them,  but  territorial  concessions,  and  even  the 
relinquishment  of  their  nationality,  as  soon  as  it  is  powerful 
enough."  The  Pan-German  theorists  also  staked  out  claims  in 
the  United  States,  relying  on  the  German-Americans  to  pave  the 
way  for  pure  Germanism  there,  and  in  Australia,  where  they 
looked  for  a  decadence  of  English  power. 

These  were  remote  dreams  of  economic  and  colonial  aggran- 
dizement. More  within  the  purview  of  practical  national  en- 
largement seemed  projects  of  dismemberment,  opening  easier 
doors  for  German  domination  in  Turkey,  Morocco,  and  Central 
Africa,  where  African  Germany  was  to  include,  plus  existing 
German  colonies,  the  Portuguese  possessions  of  Mozambique  and 
Angola  and  the  Belgian  Congo ;  also,  in  the  event  of  a  victorious 
war,  the  French  Congo  and  the  British  possessions. 

Maximilian  Harden,  whose  editorial  pen  has  been  wielded  with 
greater  effect  than  any  other  German  publicist,  saw  in  the  next 


364      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

century  only  three  or  four  great  powers  in  the  world — Russia, 
China,  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  confederations  (the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States) .  To  counterbalance  her  three  great  rivals 
Germany,  he  reasoned,  in  1911,  must  have  all  Europe;  but  France 
alone  stood  in  the  path  of  this  consummation :  "We  are  in  a  posi- 
tion to  offer  the  French  more  than  any  other  power  could  offer 
them — guarantees  for  a  great  African  Empire;  the  possibility 
of  reducing  expenditure  in  the  army  and  devoting  the  surplus  to 
ship  building;  safer  and  more  remunerative  investments  for 
their  capital  than  the  stock  of  the  eastern  states  of  Europe; 
organizers  of  industry  and  commercial  agents."  As  the  war  of 
1914  proved,  France  remained  in  the  way. 

Behind  Austrian  economic  ambitions  in  the  Near  East  were 
similar  propelling  forces  which  aimed  at  more  than  commercial 
supremacy.  Pan-Magyarism,  a  twin  sister  of  German  imperial- 
ism, an  auxiliary  of  Pan-Germanism,  flourished  in  Hungary. 
This  party  viewed  Hungary  as  the  natural  guardian  of  the  in- 
dependent development  of  the  southern  European  states.  The 
Magyars  were  willing  to  be  the  friends  of  Rumania,  Serbia,  etc., 
provided  they  were  not  asked  to  grant  rights  to  the  Rumanians 
and  Serbians  of  Hungary.  They  further  agreed  to  form  an 
alliance  with  Serbia,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria  on  condition  that 
the  Magyars  were  masters  in  this  confederation.  Opposed  to 
this  Pan-Magyarism  was  an  Austrian  Pan-Germanism  which 
aimed  at  securing  a  share  of  the  glory,  the  power,  and  the  pros- 
perity of  Germany  for  Austria  by  attaching  the  German  prov- 
inces of  Austria  to  the  German  Empire.  Another  party  that 
developed  and  adopted  a  form  of  imperialism  known  as  "Trial- 
ism,"  espoused  by  the  murdered  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand. 
Its  program  sought  the  inclusion  of  a  southern  Slav  kingdom  in 
the  Austro-Hungarian  compromise,  abolishing  "dualism,"  and 
substituting  a  composite  monarchy,  the  framework  of  which 
would  henceforth  be  triple,  not  dual.  In  the  view  of  this  party, 
there  were  two  pursuits  Austrian  foreign  policy  must  never 
forego:  Austria  must  have  access  to  the  Mediterranean,  and 
she  must  be  supreme  in  the  western  Balkans.  Always  was  Sa- 
loniki  a  coveted  objective  kept  in  view.  "The  commercial  route 


THE    PAN-GERMAN    LEAGUE  365 

to  Saloniki  must  be  kept  open  to  us,"  wrote  Leopold  von 
Chlumecky,  describing  this  party's  external  policy  in  1907. 
"Saloniki  is  destined  to  be  the  furthermost  postern  in  the  south- 
east for  southern  Austrian  and  Hungarian  trade.  Saloniki  is 
our  hope  of  the  future.  Some  day,  when  Asia  Minor  is  opened 
up  to  civilization,  when  railways  traverse  Mesopotamia  and  con- 
nect Smyrna  with  the  Persian  Gulf,  Macedonia,  the  highway  of 
the  vast  transcontinental  traffic,  which  will  pass  from  central 
Europe  to  Asia  Minor,  will  enjoy  a  new  prosperity,  and  Saloniki 
will  be  a  place  of  considerable  importance." 

Following  these  parties  came  a  maritime  party,  which  aimed 
at  colonial  and  naval  expansion,  thereby  indicating  substantial 
prizes  of  another  sort  for  Austria-Hungary.  Its  policy  taught 
that  all  nations  had  a  right  "to  live  their  lives,"  which  the  nations 
of  to-day  sought  to  do  by  a  vast  universal  commerce.  It  pictured 
Trieste  as  a  great  trading  emporium  and  the  Danube  a  mighty 
artery,  through  which  all  the  trade  of  central  Europe  would  flow 
into  Asia  Minor,  by  the  adoption  of  a  strong  naval  and  com- 
mercial policy.  Its  partisans  pointed  out  that  Austria  had  at  her 
disposal  one  of  the  most  daring  sea-faring  populations  in  the 
world — the  sailors  of  Dalmatia — and  that  the  Suez  Canal  might 
have  made  the  fortune  of  Trieste  more  readily  than  that  of  any 
European  port  if  Austria  had  been  able  to  create  a  suitable 
maritime  equipment.  They  cherished  the  hope  that  the  oppor- 
tunity for  insuring  this  prosperity  would  return  on  the  not  dis- 
tant day  when  the  New  World  had  become  industrially  self- 
sufficing  and  when  European  trade  sought  outlets  in  Nearer  Asia, 
and  in  the  Far  East,  thrown  open  to  European  civilization.  As 
to  territorial  ambitions  of  this  party,  they  were  colonial  rather 
than  continental.  They  wanted  Austrian  colonies  on  the  Medi- 
terranean shores.  They  deprecated  looking  to  Saloniki  as  an 
objective,  predicting  that  its  trade  would  never  have  more  than 
local  importance  until  Trieste  developed  into  a  great  port. 

But  of  all  these  policies  that  of  Pan-Magyarism  has  prevailed, 
and,  starting  with  the  economic  crushing  of  Serbia,  instigated 
the  Great  War. 


PART  II  — DIRECT   CAUSES  OF  THE 
WAR 


CHAPTER    VI 

ASSASSINATION     OF     FRANZ     FERDINAND — 
AUSTRIA'S     ULTIMATUM 

IT  was  the  boast  of  the  greater  European  powers,  during  the 
Balkan  Wars  of  1912  and  1913,  and  after,  that  the  "conflagra- 
tion in  the  Balkans  had  been  localized" — i.  e.,  that  none  of  the 
western  nations  would  be  involved  in  the  complications  growing 
out  of  the  trouble  in  the  Balkans.  The  conflagration  in  the 
mountainous  peninsula  had  been  "localized,"  it  was  true;  but 
the  smouldering  fire  that  remained  after  the  Balkan  Wars  was 
to  flare  forth,  during  the  summer  of  1914,  to  spread  over  Europe 
from  the  Shetland  Islands  to  Crete  in  one  grand  flame,  and  to 
drop  sparks  on  the  remaining  four  continents.  That  smoulder- 
ing fire  was  the  doctrine  known  as  Greater  Serbianism,  some- 
times wrongly  spoken  of  as  Pan-Serbianism. 

As  during  the  nineteenth  century  one  after  another  the  Balkan 
States  gained  independence  from  Turkish  sovereignty  and  the 
germ  of  what  is  called  Nationalism  was  born  in  them,  each 
looked  about  to  see  in  what  direction  its  boundaries  might  be 
extended.  The  appetite  of  Nationalism,  with  these  small  states 
as  with  the  greater  countries,  demanded  that  under  the  flag  of 
a  given  nation  must  be  gathered  all  the  peoples  of  that  nation ; 
if  some  of  them  dwell  in  foreign  lands  those  lands  must  be 
conquered;  if  foreigners  live  within  the  borders  of  the  country 
those  foreigners  must  be  "ironed  out" — the  crushing  machinery 
of  despotic  government  must  be  brought  into  use  to  force  them 
to  adopt  the  language,  literature,  traditions,  and  religion  of  the 

366 


ASSASSINATION    OF    FRANZ    FERDINAND       367 

nation  which  considered  them  alien.  And  the  appetite  of  Na- 
tionalism demanded  one  thing  more — that  the  political  bound- 
aries of  a  nation  conform  with  the  "natural  boundaries"  as  they 
seemed  to  be  delimited  by  mountains,  rivers,  and  coasts. 

The  kingdoms  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  had  shown  symptoms 
of  Nationalism  long  before  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912  and  1913 ; 
when  they  emerged  from  those  wars  with  their  territories  almost 
doubled  the  idea  took  even  greater  hold  on  them.  As  Turkish 
sovereignty  and  influence  became  less  feared,  Austrian  domi- 
nance replaced  them. 

Austria  did  nothing  to  allay  this  fear ;  she  stood  as  a  Teutonic 
bulwark  between  a  growing  Slavic  menace  (in  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro) on  the  south  and  the  already  formidable  Slavic  menace 
(Russia)  on  the  east.  In  her  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, which  were  transformed  from  protectorates  to  integral 
parts  of  the  Austrian  Empire  in  1908,  there  dwelt  thousands  of 
peasants  who  were  of  Serbian  nationality ;  in  more  concise  terms 
they  were  of  the  same  racial  stock  as  the  Serbians.  After  Serbian 
prestige  rose  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912  and  1913 
these  Serbian  subjects  of  Austria  desired  more  than  ever  to  be 
a  part  of  the  Slav  kingdom ;  this  desire  was  shared  by  the  leading 
factions  in  Serbia  itself;  the  doctrine  of  "Greater  Serbia"  de- 
manded that  the  aims  of  the  desire  be  materialized.  Besides,  the 
"natural  boundaries"  of  Serbia  seemed  to  take  in  the  greater 
part,  if  not  all,  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  for  they  stretched 
along  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Adriatic  and  shut  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  off  from  that  sea. 

Propaganda  began  to  spread  throughout  Serbia  and  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  reminding  the  Serbs  in  all  three  places  that  they 
must  work  to  bring  themselves  under  one  government,  and  that 
government  their  own ;  they  were  urged  to  keep  up  their  efforts 
to  standardize  their  religion,  their  speech,  their  traditions ;  they 
were  called  upon,  by  this  same  propaganda,  to  substitute  Austria 
for  Turkey  as  the  object  of  national  Serbian  hate. 

But  Austria,  too,  had  the  disease  of  Nationalism,  and  she  had 
been  engaged  since  1908  in  "ironing  out"  the  Serbs  within  her 
borders.  Thus  great  friction  was  engendered,  and  when,  on 


368     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

June  28,  1914,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  the  crown 
prince  and  his  morganatic  wife  visited  the  Bosnian  city  of  Sara- 
jevo, they  and  the  officials  of  the  city  and  province  knew  that  the 
lives  of  the  pair  were  in  danger  from  Serbian  intrigue. 

The  archduke  had  gone  to  Bosnia  on  his  first  visit  to  take 
charge  of  military  maneuvers  there,  and  before  he  left  the  Aus- 
trian capital  the  Serbian  minister  had  expressed  doubt  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  the  visit,  telling  the  court  that  the  Serbian  population 
in  Bosnia  might  make  unfavorable  demonstrations.  The  fears 
of  the  Serbian  minister  proved  to  be  well  founded;  Sarajevo  dis- 
played many  Serbian  flags  on  the  day  of  his  arrival.  The  arch- 
duke's party,  in  automobiles,  proceeded  to  the  Town  Hall  after 
leaving  the  railway  station,  passing  through  crowded  streets. 
The  city  officials  were  gathered  at  the  Town  Hall  to  give  him  an 
official  welcome.  A  bomb,  hurled  from  a  roof,  fell  into  the  arch- 
duke's car;  he  caught  it  and  threw  it  to  the  pavement,  where  it 
exploded,  doing  no  damage  to  either  him  or  his  wife,  but  injuring 
two  adjutants  in  the  car  following.  One  Gabrinovics,  a  Serbian 
from  Trebinje,  was  arrested  as  the  assailant. 

The  archduke  proceeded  to  the  Town  Hall,  and  after  berating 
the  city  officials  listened  to  the  speeches  of  welcome.  As  he  and  his 
wife  were  departing  a  Serbian  student,  named  Prinzip,  who  was 
later  arrested,  rushed  out  from  the  crowd  and  fired  point-blank 
at  the  couple  with  a  revolver.  Both  were  hit  a  number  of  times 
and  died  some  hours  later  from  their  wounds. 

Great  excitement  immediately  prevailed  in  Sofia  and  Vienna, 
and  in  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  to  a  lesser  degree.  What  retri- 
bution would  Austria  demand?  The  Austrian  press  openly 
avowed  that  the  plot  on  the  archduke's  life  had  been  hatched  in 
official  circles  in  Serbia,  and  the  Austrian  Government  made  no 
attempt  to  suppress  these  statements.  One  hour  after  the 
tragedy  had  taken  place  it  had  assumed  an  official  and  inter- 
national complexion. 

A  punitive  war  against  Serbia  was  immediately  urged  in 
Vienna.  On  June  29,  1914,  anti-Serbian  riots  broke  out  in 
Bosnia,  Sarajevo  was  put  under  martial  law,  and  the  bodies  of 
the  assassinated  couple  began  the  mournful  journey  to  Vienna. 


ASSASSINATION    OF    FRANZ    FERDINAND       369 

On  July  2,  1914,  Prinzip  confessed  that  he  had  apprised  the  Pan- 
Serbian  Union  of  his  attempt  to  kill  the  archduke,  and  on  the  same 
day  the  first  intimation  came  that  the  matter  was  considered  a 
serious  one  in  Germany — the  kaiser  became  "diplomatically  ill." 
Then,  for  twenty  days  there  was  an  outward  calm  in  the  capitals 
of  Europe,  but  behind  the  scenes  the  diplomats  were  at  work; 
the  great  question  was  how  far  Russia  would  go  in  defending 
her  Slavic  sister  state  against  the  impending  demands  of  Austria. 

These  demands  were  made  public  in  a  note  which  Austria  sent 
to  Serbia  on  July  23,  1914.  Serbia  was  given  till  6  p.  m.,  July  25, 
1914,  to  comply  with  the  ultimatum,  which  read  as  follows : 

"On  March  31,  1909,  the  Royal  Serbian  Minister  in  Vienna,  on 
the  instructions  of  the  Serbian  Government,  made  the  following 
statements  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government: 

"  'Serbia  recognizes  that  the  fait  accompli  regarding  Bosnia  has 
not  affected  her  rights,  and  consequently  she  will  conform  to  the 
decisions  that  the  powers  will  take  in  conformity  with  Article 
XXV  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  At  the  same  time  that  Serbia 
submits  to  the  advice  of  the  powers  she  undertakes  to  renounce 
the  attitude  of  protest  and  opposition  which  she  has  adopted 
since  October  last.  She  undertakes  on  the  other  hand  to  modify 
the  direction  of  her  policy  with  regard  to  Austria-Hungary  and 
to  live  in  future  on  good  neighborly  terms  with  the  latter.' 

"The  history  of  recent  years,  and  in  particular  the  painful 
events  on  June  28  last,  have  shown  the  existence  in  Serbia  of 
subversive  movement  with  the  object  of  detaching  a  part  of 
Austria-Hungary  from  the  monarchy.  The  movement  which 
had  its  birth  under  the  eyes  of  the  Serbian  Government,  has  had 
consequences  on  both  sides  of  the  Serbian  frontier  in  the  shape  of 
acts  of  terrorism  and  a  series  of  outrages  and  murders. 

"Far  from  carrying  out  the  formal  undertakings  contained  in 
the  declaration  of  March  31,  1909,  the  Royal  Serbian  Govern- 
ment has  done  nothing  to  repress  these  movements.  It  has  per- 
mitted the  criminal  machinations  of  various  societies  and  associ- 
ations, and  has  tolerated  unrestrained  language  on  the  part  of 
the  press,  apologies  for  the  perpetrators  of  outrage  and  the 
participation  of  officers  and  functionaries  in  subversive  agita- 


370  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT    WAR 

tion.  It  has  permitted  an  unwholesome  propaganda  in  public 
instruction.  In  short,  it  has  permitted  all  the  manifestations 
which  have  incited  the  Serbian  population  to  hatred  of  the 
monarchy  and  contempt  of  its  institutions. 

"This  culpable  tolerance  of  the  Royal  Serbian  Government  had 
not  ceased  at  the  moment  when  the  events  of  June  28  last  proved 
its  fatal  consequences  to  the  whole  world. 

"It  results  from  the  depositions  and  confessions  of  the  criminal 
perpetrators  of  the  outrage  of  June  28  that  the  Sarajevo  assas- 
sinations were  hatched  in  Belgrade,  that  the  arms  and  explosives 
with  which  the  murderers  were  provided  had  been  given  to  them 
by  Serbian  officers  and  functionaries  belonging  to  the  Narodna 
Obrava,  and,  finally,  that  the  passage  into  Bosnia  of  the  criminals 
and  their  arms  was  organized  and  effected  by  the  chiefs  of  the 
Serbian  Frontier  Service. 

"The  above-mentioned  results  of  the  magisterial  investigation 
do  not  permit  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  pursue  any 
longer  the  attitude  of  expectant  forbearance  which  it  has  main- 
tained for  years  in  face  of  the  machinations  hatched  in  Belgrade 
and  thence  propagated  in  the  territories  of  the  monarchy.  These 
results,  on  the  contrary,  impose  on  it  the  duty  of  putting  an  end 
to  intrigues  which  form  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  tranquility  of 
the  monarchy. 

"To  achieve  this  end  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  sees 
itself  compelled  to  demand  from  the  Serbian  Government  a 
formal  assurance  that  it  condemns  this  dangerous  propaganda 
against  the  monarchy  and  the  territories  belonging  to  it,  and 
that  the  Royal  Serbian  Government  shall  no  longer  permit  these 
machinations  and  this  criminal  and  perverse  propaganda. 

"In  order  to  give  a  formal  character  to  this  undertaking  the 
Royal  Serbian  Government  shall  publish  on  the  front  page  of 
its  official  journal  for  July  26  the  following  declaration : 

"  'The  Royal  Government  of  Serbia  condemns  the  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  i.  e.,  the  ensemble  of  ten- 
dencies of  which  the  final  aim  is  to  detach  from  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy  territories  belonging  to  it,  and  it  sincerely  deplores 
the  fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal  proceedings. 


ASSASSINATION    OF    FRANZ    FERDINAND       371 

"  'The  Royal  Government  regrets  that  Serbian  officers  and 
functionaries  participated  in  the  above-mentioned  propaganda 
and  thus  compromised  the  good,  neighborly  relations  to  which 
the  Royal  Government  was  solemnly  pledged  by  its  declaration 
of  March  31,  1909.  The  Royal  Government,  which  disapproves 
and  repudiates  all  idea  of  interfering  or  attempt  to  interfere 
with  the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any  part  whatsoever  of 
Austria-Hungary,  considers  it  its  duty  formally  to  warn  officers 
and  functionaries,  and  the  whole  population  of  the  kingdom, 
that  henceforward  it  will  proceed  with  the  utmost  rigor  against 
persons  who  may  be  guilty  of  such  machinations,  which  it  will 
use  all  its  efforts  to  anticipate  and  suppress.' 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  further  undertakes: 

"1.  To  suppress  any  publications  which  incite  to  hatred  and 
contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  and  the  general 
tendency  of  which  is  directed  against  its  territorial  integrity. 

"2.  To  dissolve  immediately  the  society  styled  Narodna 
Obrava,  to  confiscate  all  its  means  of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed 
in  the  same  manner  against  other  societies  and  their  branches 
which  are  addicted  to  propaganda  against  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy.  The  Royal  Government  shall  take  the  necessary 
measures  to  prevent  the  societies  dissolved  from  continuing  their 
activity  under  another  name  and  form. 

"3.  To  eliminate  without  delay  from  public  instruction  in 
Serbia,  not  only  as  regards  the  teaching  body,  but  also  as 
regards  the  methods  of  instruction,  everything  that  serves  or 
might  serve  to  foment  the  propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

"4.  To  remove  from  the  military  service  and  from  the  Ad- 
ministration in  general  all  officers  and  functionaries  guilty  of 
propaganda  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  whose 
names  and  deeds  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  reserves  to 
itself  the  right  of  communicating  to  the  Royal  Government. 

"5.  To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Serbia  of  representatives 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  in  the  suppression  of  the 
subversive  movement  directed  against  the  territorial  integrity  of 
the  monarchy. 


372 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 


SERBIA'S    REPLY  373 

"6.  To  take  judicial  proceedings  against  accessories  to  the 
plot  of  June  28  who  are  on  Serbian  territory.  Delegates  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  will  take  part  in  the  investiga- 
tion relating  thereto. 

"7.  To  proceed  without  delay  to  the  arrest  of  Major  Voija 
Tankositch  and  of  the  individual  named  Milan  Ciganovitch,  a 
Serbian  state  employee,  who  have  been  compromised  by  the 
results  of  the  magisterial  inquiry  at  Sarajevo. 

"8.  To  prevent  by  effective  measures  the  cooperation  of  the 
Serbian  authorities  in  the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and  explosives 
across  the  frontier,  and  to  dismiss  and  punish  severely  officials 
of  the  frontier  service  at  Schabatz  and  Loznica  guilty  of  having 
assisted  the  perpetrators  of  the  Sarajevo  crime  by  facilitating 
the  passage  of  the  frontier  for  them. 

"9.  To  furnish  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  with  ex- 
planations regarding  the  unjustifiable  utterances  of  high  Serbian 
officials,  both  in  Serbia  and  abroad,  who,  notwithstanding  their 
official  position,  did  not  hesitate  after  the  crime  of  June  28  to 
express  themselves  in  interviews  in  terms  of  hostility  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government,  and  finally; 

"10.  To  notify  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  without 
delay  of  the  execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the  pre- 
ceding heads. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  expects  the  reply  of  the 
Serbian  Government  at  the  latest  by  six  o'clock  on  Saturday 
evening,  July  26,  1914." 


CHAPTER    VII 

SERBIA'S      REPLY 

E CAUSE  this  note  was  so  specific  in  its  demands  it  is  best  to 
give  in  full  the  Serbian  reply  to  it,  which  was  issued  within 

the  period  set  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  note.     The  Serbian 

answer  in  full  was  as  follows: 

.  War  2 


374     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  has  received  the  communica- 
tion of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 
and  it  is  persuaded  that  its  reply  will  remove  all  misunderstand- 
ing tending  to  threaten  or  to  prejudice  the  friendly  and  neigh- 
borly relations  between  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  and 
the  kingdom  of  Serbia. 

"The  Royal  Government  is  aware  that  the  protests  made  both 
at  the  tribune  of  the  National  Skupshtina  (the  Serbian  legis- 
lative body)  and  in  the  declarations  and  the  acts  of  responsible 
representatives  of  the  state — protests  which  were  cut  short  by 
the  declaration  of  the  Serbian  Government  made  on  March  18 — 
have  not  been  renewed  toward  the  great  neighboring  monarchy 
on  any  occasion  and  that  since  this  time,  both  on  the  part  of  the 
Royal  Governments  which  have  followed  on  one  another,  and  on 
the  part  of  their  organs,  no  attempt  has  been  made  with  the  pur- 
pose of  changing  the  political  and  judicial  state  of  things  in  this 
respect. 

"The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  has  made  no  repre- 
sentations save  concerning  a  scholastic  book  regarding  which 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  has  received  an  entirely 
satisfactory  explanation.  Serbia  has  repeatedly  given  proofs  of 
her  pacific  and  moderate  policy  during  the  Balkan  crises,  and  it  is 
thanks  to  Serbia  and  the  sacrifice  she  made  exclusively  in  the 
interest  of  the  peace  of  Europe  that  this  peace  has  been  pre- 
served. The  Royal  Government  cannot  be  held  responsible  for 
manifestations  of  a  private  nature,  such  as  newspaper  articles 
and  the  peaceful  work  of  societies — manifestations  which  occur 
in  almost  all  countries  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  which,  as  a 
general  rule,  escape  official  control — all  the  less  in  that  the  Royal 
Government  when  solving  a  whole  series  of  questions  which 
came  up  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  has  displayed  a 
great  readiness  to  treat  prevenance,  and  in  this  way  succeeded  in 
settling  the  greater  number  to  the  advantage  of  the  progress  of 
the  two  neighboring  countries. 

"It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  Royal  Government  has  been 
painfully  surprised  by  the  statements  according  to  which  per- 
sons of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  are  said  to  have  taken  part  in  the 


SERBIA'S    REPLY  375 

preparation  of  the  outrage  committed  at  Sarajevo.  It  expected 
that  it  would  be  invited  to  collaborate  in  the  investigation  of 
everything  bearing  on  this  crime,  and  it  was  ready  to  prove 
by  its  actions  its  entire  correctness  to  take  steps  against  all 
persons  with  regard  to  whom  communications  had  been  made 
to  it,  thus  acquiescing  in  the  desire  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government. 

"The  Royal  Government  is  disposed  to  hand  over  to  the  courts 
any  Serbian  subject,  without  regard  to  his  situation  and  rank, 
for  whose  complicity  in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  it  shall  have  been 
furnished  with  proofs,  and  especially  it  engages  itself  to  have 
published  on  the  front  page  of  the  official  journal  of  July  13-26 
the  following  announcement : 

"  'The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemns  all  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  that  is  to  say,  all  tendencies 
as  a  whole  of  which  the  ultimate  object  is  to  detach  from  the 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  territories  which  form  part  of  it, 
and  it  sincerely  deplores  the  fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal 
actions.  The  Royal  Government  regrets  that  Serbian  officers 
and  officials  should,  according  to  the  communication  of  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government,  have  participated  in  the  above- 
mentioned  propaganda,  thereby  compromising  the  good  neigh- 
borly relations  to  which  the  Royal  Government  solemnly  pledged 
itself  by  its  declaration  of  March  31,  1909.  The  Government, 
which  disapproves  and  repudiates  any  idea  or  attempt  to  inter- 
fere in  the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any  part  of  Austria- 
Hungary  whatsoever,  considers  it  its  duty  to  utter  a  formal  warn- 
ing to  the  officers,  the  officials,  and  the  whole  population  of  the 
kingdom  that  henceforth  it  will  proceed  with  the  utmost  rigor 
against  persons  who  render  themselves  guilty  of  such  actions, 
which  it  will  use  all  its  force  to  prevent  and  repress.' 

"This  announcement  shall  be  brought  to  the  cognizance  of  the 
Royal  army  by  an  order  of  the  day  issued  in  the  name  of  his 
Majesty  the  King  by  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  and 
shall  be  published  in  the  next  official  bulletin  of  the  army. 

"1.  The  Royal  Government  engages  itself,  furthermore,  to 
lay  before  the  next  meeting  of  the  Skupshtina  an  amendment  to 


376  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

the  press  law,  punishing  in  the  severest  manner  incitements  to 
hate  and  contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  and  also 
all  publications  of  which  the  general  tendency  is  directed  against 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  monarchy.  It  undertakes  at  the 
forthcoming  revision  of  the  constitution  to  introduce  an  amend- 
ment whereby  the  above  publications  may  be  confiscated,  which 
is  at  present  forbidden  by  the  terms  of  Article  XXII  of  the 
constitution. 

"2.  The  Government  does  not  possess  any  proof,  nor  does  the 
note  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnish  such,  that  the 
Society  Narodna  Obrana  and  other  similar  societies  have  up  to 
the  present  committed  any  criminal  acts  of  this  kind  through  the 
instrumentality  of  one  of  their  members.  Nevertheless,  the 
Royal  Government  will  accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  and  will  dissove  the  Narodna  Obrana  Society 
and  any  other  society  which  shall  agitate  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

"3.  The  Royal  Serbian  Government  engages  itself  to  eliminate 
without  delay  for  public  instruction  in  Serbia  everything  which 
aids  or  might  aid  in  fomenting  the  propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary  when  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnishes 
facts  and  proofs  of  this  propaganda. 

"4.  The  Royal  Government  also  agrees  to  remove  from  the 
military  service  (all  persons)  whom  the  judicial  inquiry  proves 
to  have  been  guilty  of  acts  directed  against  the  integrity  of  the 
territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  and  it  expects  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  to  communicate  at  an  ulterior 
date  the  names  and  the  deeds  of  these  officers  and  officials  for  the 
purposes  of  the  proceedings  which  will  have  to  be  taken. 

"5.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  it  is  not  quite 
clear  as  to  the  sense  and  object  of  the  demands  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  that  Serbia  should  undertake  to  accept 
on  her  territory  the  collaboration  of  delegates  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  but  it  declares  that  it  will  admit  what- 
ever collaboration  which  may  be  in  accord  with  the  principles  of 
international  law  and  criminal  procedure,  as  well  as  with  good 
neighborly  relations. 


SERBIA'S    REPLY  377 

"6.  The  Royal  Government,  as  goes  without  saying,  considers 
it  to  be  its  duty  to  open  an  inquiry  against  all  those  who  are,  or 
shall  eventually  prove  to  have  been,  involved  in  the  plot  of 
June  28,  and  who  are  in  Serbian  territory.  As  to  the  participa- 
tion at  this  investigation  of  agents  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
authorities  delegated  for  this  purpose  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  the  Royal  Government  cannot  accept  this  demand, 
for  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  constitution  and  of  the 
law  of  criminal  procedure.  Nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases 
it  might  be  found  possible  to  communicate  the  results  of 
the  investigation  in  question  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  repre- 
sentatives. 

"7.  On  the  very  evening  that  the  note  was  handed  in  the 
Royal  Government  arrested  Major  Voija  Tankositch.  As  for 
Milan  Ciganovitch,  who  is  a  subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy,  and  who  until  June  15  was  employed  as  a  beginner 
in  the  administration  of  the  railways,  it  has  not  yet  been  possible 
to  (arrest)  him.  In  view  of  the  ultimate  inquiry  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  is  requested  to  have  the  goodness  to  com- 
municate in  the  usual  form  as  soon  as  possible  the  presumptions 
of  guilt,  as  well  as  the  eventual  proofs  of  guilt,  against  these 
persons  which  have  been  collected  up  to  the  present  in  the  in- 
vestigations at  Sarajevo. 

"8.  The  Serbian  Government  will  strengthen  and  extend  the 
measures  taken  to  prevent  the  illicit  traffic  of  arms  and  explosives 
across  the  frontier.  It  goes  without  saying  that  it  will  immedi- 
ately order  an  investigation  and  will  severely  punish  the  frontier 
officials  along  the  line  Schabatz-Losnitza  who  have  been  lacking 
in  their  duties  and  who  allowed  the  authors  of  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo  to  pass. 

"9.  The  Royal  Government  will  willingly  give  explanations 
regarding  the  remarks  made  in  interviews  by  its  officials,  both 
in  Serbia  and  abroad,  after  the  attempt,  and  which,  according  to 
the  statement  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  were 
hostile  toward  the  monarchy,  as  soon  as  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  has  (forwarded)  it  the  passages  in  question  of  these 
remarks  and  as  soon  as  it  has  shown  that  the  remarks  made  were 


378     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

really  made  by  the  officials  regarding  whom  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment itself  will  see  about  collecting  proofs. 

"10.  The  Royal  Government  will  inform  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  of  the  execution  of  the  measures  comprised  in 
the  preceding  points,  in  so  far  as  that  has  not  already  been  done 
by  the  present  note,  as  soon  as  such  measure  has  been  ordered 
and  executed. 

"In  the  event  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  consider- 
ing that  it  is  to  the  common  interest  not  to  precipitate  the  solu- 
tion of  this  question,  it  is  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a  pacific 
understanding,  either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision  of 
The  Hague  International  Tribunal  or  to  the  great  powers  which 
took  part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Ser- 
bian Government  on  March  18-31,  1909." 


CHAPTER    VIII 

DIPLOMATIC     EXCHANGES 

THIS  reply  from  Serbia  was  not  deemed  satisfactory  by 
Austria-Hungary  and  relations  with  Serbia  were  immediately 
broken  off.  On  the  following  day,  July  26,  1914,  "diplomatic 
conversations,"  the  object  of  which  was  to  smooth  over  the  dif- 
ferences between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  took  place  in 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna  between  representatives  of 
the  three  nations  whose  capitals  these  were. 

Austria-Hungary  sent  to  the  various  governments  the  follow- 
ing "circular  note"  on  July  27,  1914 : 

"The  object  of  the  Serbian  note  is  to  create  the  false  impres- 
sion that  the  Serbian  Government  is  prepared  in  great  measure 
to  comply  with  our  demands. 

"As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  Serbia's  note  is  filled  with  the 
spirit  of  dishonesty,  which  clearly  lets  it  be  seen  that  the  Serbian 
Government  is  not  seriously  determined  to  put  an  end  to  the 
culpable  tolerance  it  hitherto  has  extended  to  intrigues  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy. 


DIPLOMATIC    EXCHANGES  379 

"The  Serbian  note  contains  such  far-reaching  reservations  and 
limitations  not  only  regarding  the  general  principles  of  our 
action,  but  also  in  regard  to  the  individual  claims  we  have  put 
forward,  that  the  concessions  actually  made  by  Serbia  become 
insignificant. 

"In  particular,  our  demand  for  the  participation  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  authorities  in  investigations  to  detect  accomplices  in 
the  conspiracy  on  Serbian  territory  has  been  rejected,  while  our 
request  that  measures  be  taken  against  that  section  of  the  Serbian 
press  hostile  to  Austria-Hungary  has  been  declined,  and  our 
wish  that  the  Serbian  Government  take  the  necessary  measures 
to  prevent  the  dissolved  Austrophobe  associations  continuing 
their  activity  under  another  name  and  under  another  form  has 
not  even  been  considered. 

"Since  the  claims  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  of  July  23, 
regard  being  had  to  the  attitude  hitherto  adopted  by  Serbia, 
represent  the  minimum  of  what  is  necessary  for  the  establish- 
ment of  permanent  peace  with  the  southeastern  monarchy,  the 
Serbian  answer  must  be  regarded  as  unsatisfactory. 

"That  the  Serbian  Government  itself  is  conscious  that  its  note 
is  not  acceptable  to  us  is  proved  by  the  circumstances  that  it  pro- 
poses at  the  end  of  the  note  to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration 
— an  invitation  which  is  thrown  into  its  proper  light  by  the  fact 
that  three  hours  before  handing  in  the  note,  a  few  minutes  before 
the  expiration  of  the  time  limit,  the  mobilization  of  the  Serbian 
army  took  place." 

The  Great  powers  were  not  willing  to  go  to  war  without  first 
trying  mediation  between  the  two  kingdoms  in  southeastern 
Europe,  and  even  Russia,  which  was  known  to  be  a  potential  ally 
of  Serbia,  showed  a  disposition  to  use  diplomacy  before  force. 
When  the  demands  made  by  Austria-Hungary  in  her  note  of 
July  25, 1914,  became  known  in  the  Russian  capital,  the  following 
note  was  immediately  telegraphed  to  Vienna: 

"The  communication  [the  circular  note  quoted  above]  made 
by  Austria-Hungary  to  the  powers  the  day  after  the  pres- 
entation of  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade  leaves  a  period  to  the 
powers  which  is  quite  insufficient  to  enable  them  to  take  any 


380     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

steps  \vhich  might  help  to  smooth  away  the  difficulties  that  have 
arisen. 

"In  order  to  prevent  the  consequences,  equally  incalculable  and 
fatal  to  all  the  powers,  which  may  result  from  the  course  of 
action  followed  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  it  seems 
to  us  to  be  above  all  essential  that  the  period  allowed  for  the 
Serbian  reply  should  be  extended.  Austria-Hungary,  having 
declared  her  readiness  to  inform  the  powers  of  the  results  of  the 
inquiry  upon  which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  base 
their  accusations,  should  equally  allow  them  sufficient  time  to 
study  them. 

"In  this  case,  if  the  powers  were  convinced  that  certain  of  the 
Austrian  demands  were  well  founded,  they  would  be  in  a  position 
to  offer  advice  to  the  Serbian  Government. 

"A  refusal  to  prolong  the  term  of  the  ultimatum  would  render 
nugatory  the  proposals  made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  the  powers,  and^  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  very 
bases  of  international  relations." 

A  copy  of  this  note  was  at  the  same  time  sent  to  London  with 
the  addenda:  -"M.  Sazonoff  (Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs)  hopes  that  his  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  will 
share  the  point  of  view  set  forth  above,  and  he  trusts  that 
Sir  E.  Grey  will  see  his  way  to  furnish  similar  instructions  to 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna." 

But  on  the  same  day,  July  25,  1914,  the  Government  at  Vienna 
informed  the  powers  that  the  note  to  Serbia  was  not  an  ulti- 
matum; it  was  merely  a  demarche,  ^and  in  it  Austria  had 
threatened  to  start  military  preparations,  not  operations.  The 
requested  delay,  therefore,  was  not  granted.  That  day  was 
eventful  in  London,  too,  for  the  Foreign  Office  was  notified  by 
the  German  Ambassador  that  though  Germany  had  not  been 
apprised  beforehand  of  the  contents  of  Austria's  note  to  Serbia, 
the  German  nation  would  nevertheless  stand  by  its  ally.  "The 
German  Ambassador  read  to  me,"  said  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  a 
telegram  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  "a  telegram  from 
the  German  Foreign  Office  saying  that  his  Government  had  not 
known  beforehand,  and  had  had  no  more  than  other  powers  to 


DIPLOMATIC    EXCHANGES  381 

do  with  the  stiff  terms  of  the  Austrian  note  to  Serbia,  but  that 
once  she  had  launched  the  note,  Austria  could  not  draw  back. 
Prince  Lichnowsky  (German  Ambassador  at  London)  said,  how- 
ever, that  "if  what  I  contemplated  was  mediation  between  Aus- 
tria and  Russia,  Austria  might  be  able  with  dignity  to  accept 
it."  He  expressed  himself  as  personally  favorable  to  this  sug- 
gestion. 

"I  concurred  in  his  observation,  and  said  that  I  felt  I  had  no 
title  to  intervene  between  Austria  and  Serbia,  but  as  soon  as 
the  question  became  one  as  between  Austria  and  Russia,  the 
peace  of  Europe  was  affected,  in  which  we  must  all  take  a  hand. 

"I  impressed  upon  the  ambassador  that,  in  the  event  of  Rus- 
sian and  Austrian  mobilization,  the  participation  of  Germany 
would  be  essential  to  any  diplomatic  peace.  Alone  we  could  do 
nothing.  The  German  Government  agreed  with  my  suggestion, 
to  tell  the  French  Government  that  I  thought  it  the  right  thing 
to  act  upon  it." 

On  July  26,  1914,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  informed 
the  German  Government  that  he  was  instructed  to  state  that 
any  annexation  by  Austria-Hungary  of  Serbian  territory  would 
not  be  looked  upon  by  Russia  with  indifference.  The  German 
Emperor,  who  had  been  away  from  Berlin,  returned  hastily  to 
the  capital.  As  the  crisis  approached  the  British  Government 
once  more  attempted  to  have  the  matters  in  dispute  settled  by 
mediation.  The  following  telegram  was  dispatched  from  Down- 
ing Street  to  the  British  Ambassadors  at  Paris  and  Rome: 
"London,  Foreign  Office,  July  26,  1914.  Would  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  be  disposed  to  instruct  ambassador  here  to  join 
with  representatives  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  myself 
to  meet  here  in  conference  immediately  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
covering an  issue  which  would  prevent  complications?  You 
should  ask  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  whether  he  would  do 
this.  If  so,  when  bringing  the  above  suggestions  to  the  notice 
of  the  Governments  to  which  they  are  accredited,  representa- 
tives of  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg,  could  be  author- 
ized to  request  that  all  active  military  operations  should  be 
suspended  pending  results  of  the  conference." 


382     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

But  this  move  had  come  too  late.  The  British  Ambassador  to 
Berlin  reported  by  telegraph  to  his  Government  on  July  27,  1914, 
that  the  Imperial  German  Government  considered  that  the  pro- 
posed conference  amounted  practically  to  a  court  of  arbitra- 
tion and  could  not  be  called  except  at  the  behest  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Russia.  The  German  Government  therefore  turned 
down  the  British  proposal.  But  Germany  was  not  for  provoking 
a  war;  the  German  Ambassador  at  London  informed  the  British 
Foreign  Office  that  his  Government  was  willing  to  accept  in 
principle  the  mediation  of  the  powers  between  Austria  and 
Russia. 

The  question  of  whether  the  alliances  between  the  various 
nations  would  hold  under  a  strain  now  became  pointed.  The 
Russian  Government  informed  the  British  Government  on  July 
27,  1914,  that  the  impression  prevailed  in  Berlin  and  Vienna 
that  England  would  stand  aloof  under  any  circumstances,  dif- 
ferences between  Russia  and  Austria  notwithstanding.  But  on 
the  same  day  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  dispelled  these  impressions  in  a  telegram  to  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  "The  impression  ought  to  be 
dispelled  by  the  orders  we  have  given  to  the  First  Fleet,"  it  read 
in  part,  "which  is  concentrated,  as  it  happens,  at  Portland,  not 
to  disperse  for  maneuver  leave."  On  July  28,  1914,  the  British 
Government  was  informed  that  France  and  Russia  were  agree- 
able to  having  a  conference  called  in  London ;  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment had  already  reported  that  it  agreed  to  this  plan,  but  the 
refusal  of  Germany,  mentioned  above,  rendered  these  com- 
munications useless. 

On  July  28,  1914,  the  British  Government  was  informed  by 
telegram  from  its  Ambassador  at  Vienna  that  "Austria-Hungary 
cannot  delay  warlike  proceedings  against  Serbia,  and  would 
have  to  decline  any  suggestions  of  negotiations  on  basis  of  Ser- 
bian reply. 

"Prestige  of  Dual  Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could 
now  prevent  conflict."  This  telegram,  be  it  noted,  made  use  of 
the  term  "military  proceedings"  instead  of  "military  prepara- 
tions" and  therefore  had  the  effect  of  changing  Austria-Hun- 


DIPLOMATIC    EXCHANGES  383 

gary's  note  to  Serbia  into  an  ultimatum.  Russia,  on  July  28, 
1914,  began  to  mobilize  troops  near  Odessa,  Moscow,  Kieff  and 
Kazan,  and  on  the  following  day  this  fact  was  communicated 
officially  to  the  Government  at  Berlin. 

As  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  were  about  to  come  to  grips 
Germany  made  it  plain  that  she  would  stand  by  her  ally,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. In  times  of  peace  there  may  have  been  doubt 
throughout  Europe  as  to  the  strength  of  the  bonds  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  but  the  German  Government  was  not  disposed  to  rely 
on  these  doubts  when  the  critical  moment  came.  The  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  was  asked  to  visit  the  German  Chancellor 
and  as  a  result  of  this  visit  the  former  sent  the  following  telegram 
to  the  British  Foreign  Office : 

"Berlin,  July  29, 1914.  I  was  asked  to  call  upon  the  chancellor 
to-night.  His  excellency  had  just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

"He  said  that  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia  a  European 
conflagration  might,  he  feared,  become  inevitable,  owing  to  Ger- 
many's obligations  as  Austria's  ally,  in  spite  of  his  continued 
efforts  to  maintain  peace.  He  then  proceeded  to  make  the 
following  strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He  said  that  it  was 
clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the  main  principle  which 
governed  British  policy,  that  Great  Britain  would  never  stand 
by  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict  there 
might  be.  That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Ger- 
many aimed.  Provided  that  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  were 
certain,  every  assurance  would  be  given  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  the  Imperial  Government  aimed  at  no  territorial 
acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  France  should  they  prove  victorious 
in  any  war  that  might  ensue. 

"I  questioned  his  excellency  about  the  French  colonies,  and 
he  said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that 
respect.  As  regards  Holland,  however,  his  excellency  said  that, 
so  long  as  Germany's  adversaries  respected  the  integrity  and 
neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready  to  give  his 
Majesty's  Government  an  assurance  that  she  would  do  likewise.- 
It  depended  upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany 
might  be  forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war 


384      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

was  over  Belgian  integrity  would  be  respected  if  she  had  not 
sided  against  Germany. 

"His  excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had  been 
chancellor  the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  you  were  aware, 
to  bring  about  an  understanding  with  England ;  he  trusted  that 
these  assurances  might  form  the  basis  of  that  understanding 
which  he  so  much  desired.  He  had  in  mind  a  general  neutrality 
agreement  between  England  and  Germany,  though  it  was  of 
course  at  the  present  moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and 
an  assurance  of  British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  the  pres- 
ent crisis  might  possibly  produce  would  enable  him  to  look 
forward  to  a  realization  of  his  desire. 

"In  reply  to  his  excellency's  inquiry  how  I  thought  his  request 
would  appeal  to  you,  I  said  that  I  did  not  think  it  probable  that 
at  this  stage  of  events  you  would  care  to  bind  yourself  to  any 
course  of  action  and  that  I  was  of  opinion  that  you  would  desire 
to  retain  full  liberty." 

Here  for  the  first  time  the  matter  of  Belgian  neutrality  entered 
into  the  diplomatic  discussions;  the  danger  of  a  Pan-European 
conflict  was  apparent,  for  the  diplomats  from  then  on  were  less 
concerned  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  dispute  with  Serbia  than 
with  the  possibilities  that  a  war  in  western  Europe  might  entail. 
On  the  same  day,  July  29,  1914,  the  German  Ambassador  at 
London  was  officially  informed  that  if  the  European  crisis  involved 
nothing  more  than  disputes  between  Russia  and  Austria  .on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  military  operations  of  Austria  in  Serbia  on 
the  other,  England  would  keep  out  of  the  trouble,  but  if  Ger- 
many went  to  war  with  Russia,  or  if  France  went  to  war, 
England  could  not  stand  quietly  aside.  News  had  come  that 
day  that  Austria  had  declared  war  on  Serbia  the  day  before. 
The  declaration  read  as  follows: 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Serbia,  not  having  replied  in  a 
satisfactory  manner  to  the  note  remitted  to  it  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  in  Belgrade  on  July  23,  1914,  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  finds  itself  compelled  to  proceed  to  safe- 
guard its  rights  and  interests  and  to  have  recourse  for  this  pur- 
pose to  force  of  arms. 


DIPLOMATIC    EXCHANGES 


385 


HEAVY    LINE      FRONTIER 
OF    POLAND    IN    1772 


POLAND  AND   ITS  DIVISION   FROM   1772-1914 


386     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"Austria-Hungary  considers  itself,  therefore,  from  this 
moment  in  a  state  of  war  with  Serbia." 

At  the  same  time  the  Government  at  Vienna  issued  this  note 
to  the  foreign  ambassadors  there  with  the  request  that  they  for- 
ward it  to  their  respective  governments : 

"In  order  to  bring  to  an  end  the  subversive  intrigues  origi- 
nating from  Belgrade  and  aimed  at  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment has  delivered  to  the  Royal  Serbian  Government  a  note  in 
which  a  series  of  demands  were  formulated,  for  the  acceptance 
of  which  a  delay  of  forty-eight  hours  has  been  granted  to  the 
Royal  Government.  The  Royal  Serbian  Government  not  having 
answered  this  note  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  are  themselves  compelled  to  see  to  the  safe- 
guarding of  their  rights  and  interest,  and  with  this  object,  to 
have  recourse  to  force  of  arms. 

"Austria-Hungary,  who  has  just  addressed  to  Serbia  a  formal 
declaration,  in  conformity  with  Article  I  of  the  convention  of 
October  18,  1907,  relative  to  the  opening  of  hostilities,  considers 
itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  Serbia. 

"In  bringing  the  above  notice  to  the  powers,  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  has  the  honor  to  declare  that  Austria-Hungary 
will  act  during  the  hostilities  in  conformity  with  the  terms  of 
the  Conventions  of  the  Hague  of  October  18,  1907,  as  also  with 
those  of  the  Declaration  of  London  of  February  28,  1909,  pro- 
vided an  analogous  procedure  is  adopted  by  Serbia." 

The  great  question  as  to  what  Russia  would  do  was  answered 
by  a  note  issued  at  St.  Petersburg,  July  28,  1914,  which  stated 
that  Russia  wished,  above  all,  to  maintain  peace.  But  the 
moments  during  which  words  alone  would  be  availing  were  fast 
passing.  Austria-Hungary  was  mobilizing  her  armies,  and  not 
all  of  the  mobilization  was  on  her  southern  frontier ;  some  corps 
were  gathered  at  points  from  which  a  blow  from  Russia  might 
be  warded  off,  or  offensive  move  against  Russia  made. 

On  July  30,  1914,  the  German  Government  sent  a  short  note 
to  St.  Petersburg,  in  which  three  questions  were  asked.  These 
were:  the  reason  for  the  Russian  mobilization,  which  Berlin 


PREPARATION    FOR    WAR  387 

knew  to  be  in  progress ;  whether  it  was  directed  against  Austria ; 
and  on  what  terms  Russia  might  be  induced  to  demobilize. 

The  Czar,  on  July  31, 1914,  sent  a  note  to  the  German  Emperor 
in  which  he  said  in  part :"....  It  is  technically  impossible  td 
discontinue  our  military  operations,  which  have  been  rendered 
necessary  by  Austrian  mobilization.  We  are  far  from  wishing 
for  war,  and  so  long  as  negotiations  with  Austria  regarding 
Serbia  continue,  my  troops  will  not  undertake  any  provocative 
actions."  This  was  an  admission  that  Russian  general  mobiliza- 
tion was  in  progress. 


CHAPTER    IX 

PREPARATION     FOR     WAR 

A 5  a  matter  of  fact,  during  the  last  days  of  July,  1914,  all  the 
Governments  in  Europe  had  their  military  departments  busy 
on  the  problem  of  preparing  for  the  first  blows  in  war ;  these  in- 
cluded not  only  the  six  leading  powers,  but  also  the  Scandinavian 
countries,  Spain,  Portugal,  all  the  Balkan  kingdoms,  and  Belgium 
and  Holland.  The  diplomatic  exchanges  that  were  meanwhile 
taking  place  were  known  to  all  experienced  statesmen  to  be 
hardly  more  than  masks. 

On  August  1,  1914,  the  kaiser  declared  Germany  to  be  "in 
a  state  of  war."  This  did  not  carry  with  it  a  declaration  of 
war  against  any  power,  but  had  the  effect  of  putting  the  entire 
German  Empire  under  martial  law,  everything  being  in  readi- 
ness to  cope  with  an  enemy.  On  the  same  day  the  kaiser  made 
an  important  speech  in  which  he  said,  "A  fateful  hour  has  fallen 
for  Germany.  Envious  peoples  everywhere  are  compelling  us 
to  our  just  defense.  The  sword  has  been  forced  into  our  hands. 

"I  hope  that  if  my  efforts  at  the  last  hour  do  not  succeed  in 
inducing  our  opponents  to  see  eye  to  eye  with  us  and  in  maintain- 
ing peace,  we  shall,  with  God's  help,  so  wield  the  sword  that  we 
shall  restore  it  to  its  sheath  again  with  honor."  The  last  efforts 
of  which  he  so  hopefully  spoke  proved  fruitless — at  five  o'clock 


388  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT    WAR 

that  evening  he  signed  an  order  mobilizing  the  German  army, 
and  Russia  and  Germany  went  to  war  two  hours  later.  A 
demand  made  upon  the  French  Government  by  the  German 
Government,  asking  the  intentions  of  France  in  case  Russia 
went  to  war  with  Germany,  received  an  unsatisfactory  reply  on 
August  2,  1914,  and  France  on  the  same  day  mobilized  its  army, 
though  it  declared  war  on  no  power.  On  August  3,  1914,  Ger- 
man troops  entered  French  territory,  for  Germany  did  not  wish 
to  be  delayed  in  a  campaign  in  the  west  by  waiting  for  diplomatic 
exchanges  to  take  place ;  war  between  Germany  and  France  began 
at  the  moment  the  foreign  soldiers  crossed  into  France. 

It  was,  in  theory  at  least,  over  the  matter  of  Belgian  neutrality 
that  England  and  Germany  went  to  war.  As  soon  the  British 
Government  saw  that  hopes  for  peace  were  no  longer  possible 
Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  to  its  ambassadors  in  Germany  and 
France  the  following  telegram;  "London,  July  31,  1914;  I  still 
trust  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view  of  prospect  of 
mobilization  in  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  his  Majesty's 
Government,  in  view  of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French 
[and  German]  Government  is  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  power  violates  it.  A 
similar  request  is  being  addressed  to  the  German  [and  French] 
Government.  It  is  important  to  have  an  early  answer." 

To  this  telegram  the  French  Government,  on  August  1,  1914, 
answered  that  it  stood  ready  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality  pro- 
vided no  other  power  threatened  or  violated  it.  Germany 
hesitated  to  give  a  definite  reply  immediately  for  fear  of  dis- 
closing the  plans  of  campaign  she  had  against  France. 

On  August  3,  1914,  German  troops  moved  into  Luxemburg, 
en  route  for  France,  and  it  was  then  known  that  a  German 
invasion  of  Belgium  would  be  inevitable.  But  before  taking  this 
step  Germany  tendered  certain  proposals  to  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment, assuring  it  that  if  peaceful  passage  were  given  to  German 
troops  Belgium  would  be  given  a  subsidy.  But  the  Belgian 
Government  turned  down  these  proposals  and  the  king  sent  this 
telegram  to  the  British  monarch :  "Remembering  the  numerous 
proofs  of  your  majesty's  friendship  and  that  of  your  predecessor, 


FIGHTING  SHIPS 


FROM  THE 


NAVIES  OF  SEA-POWERS  AT  WAR 

SAILORS   •  SQUADRON   •  BATTLE  FLEET   •    OST-FRIESLAND 
LE  COURBET  •  KONGO  •  CAIO-DUILIO  •  QUEEN  ELIZABETH 


Sailors  on  a   German   battleship.     Events  prove   that   they  have  such  efficiency  and 
hardihood  as  is  displayed  on  the  warships  of  nations  with  long  traditions  of  the  sea 


i  f.pyright,  Medem  Photo  S 


The  French  battleship  "  Courbet,"  completed  in  1913.    She  mounts  twelve  12-inch 
gune  and  is  a  sister-ship  of  the  "Jean  Bart,"  the  "Paris,"  and  the  "France" 


XJB  I 

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if  I 
J*  I 

ii! 


HI 


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J    T.      r 
§    1      I 

Pi 


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£  I    I 


•s  I 

il  j 

c  "«    I 


IJ  i 
a!  I 


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JIHIIIIIMI 


PREPARATION    FOR    WAR  389 

of  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in  1870,  and  the  proof  of  the 
friendship  which  she  has  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme 
appeal  to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium." 

Italy  and  England  were  now  the  only  two  important  powers 
in  Europe  which  were  not  embroiled  in  war,  but  the  moment 
was  rapidly  approaching  when  the  former  could  no  longer  keep 
out  of  it,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  to  see  that  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe  was  not  upset.  On  August  4,  1914,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  said  in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  "The  French  fleet 
is  now  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  northern  coasts  of  France 
are  defenseless.  If  a  foreign  fleet  engaged  in  war  against 
France  should  come  down  and  battle  against  those  defenseless 
coasts,  we  could  not  stand  aside.  We  felt  strongly  that  France 
was  entitled  to  know  at  once  whether,  in  the  event  of  attack  on 
her  unprotected  coasts,  she  could  rely  on  our  support.  I  gave 
the  engagement  to  the  French  Ambassador  last  night  that  if 
the  German  fleet  goes  into  the  English  Channel  or  into  the  North 
Sea  to  attack  French  shipping,  or  the  French  coast,  the  British 
fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its  power.  That  answer  is 
subject  to  the  approval  of  Parliament.  It  is  not  a  declaration 
of  war.  I  understand  that  the  German  Government  would  be 
prepared,  if  we  would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality,  to  agree 
that  its  fleet  would  not  attack  the  northern  coasts  of  France. 
That  is  far  too  narrow  an  engagement."  Germany  had  thrown 
down  the  gauntlet  in  showing  she  intended  to  invade  Belgium; 
Great  Britain  here  threw  down  the  gauntlet.  It  could  be  but 
a  question  of  hours  before  Germany  and  England  went  to  war. 

Meanwhile,  because  war  was  already  on  between  Germany 
and  France,  the  latter  did  not  go  to  the  trouble  of  issuing  a 
declaration  of  war.  And  on  August  4,  1914,  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment announced  that  "The  Italian  Cabinet  has  decided  that 
while  some  of  the  European  powers  are  at  war  Italy  is  at  peace 
with  all  the  belligerents.  Consequently  the  citizens  and  sub- 
jects of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  are  obliged  to  observe  the  duty  of 
neutrality."  This  declaration  of  neutrality  severed  the  bonds 
that  held  Italy  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  On  the  same  afternoon, 

E— Gt.  War  2 


390     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

August  4,  1914,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  was  handed 
his  passports  and  departed;  simultaneously  this  official  state- 
ment was  given  to  the  German  press :  "In  consequence  of  a  Rus- 
sian attack  on  German  territory  Germany  is  in  a  state  of  war 
with  Russia. 

"The  French  reply  to  Germany's  note  has  been  received  in  the 
meantime,  and  is  of  an  unsatisfactory  character.  In  addition 
France  has  ordered  the  mobilization  of  her  army  so  that  the 
outbreak  of  war  between  Germany  and  France  must  be  awaited 
at  any  moment."  The  moment  came  that  same  evening  when  this 
additional  statement  was  given  to  the  German  press:  "On  the 
morning  of  August  2  French  airmen  flew  over  Nuremberg  and 
threw  bombs,  while  during  the  night  of  August  1  French  aero- 
planes flew  over  the  province  of  the  Rhine. 

"During  the  forenoon  of  August  2  a  number  of  French  officers 
dressed  in  German  uniforms  crossed  the  German  frontier  from 
Holland,  while  on  the  same  day  French  troops  crossed  the  Ger- 
man border  in  Upper  Alsace  near  Belfort. 

"We  consider  ourselves  as  having  been  attacked  by  France 
before  diplomatic  relations  were  broken  off." 

In  so  far  as  the  history  of  the  war  itself  is  concerned  these 
statements  were  of  no  value,  nor  were  those  by  which  France 
proved  provocation  to  go  to  war.  But  in  the  history  of  diplo- 
macy and  international  law  they  are  of  importance,  for  they 
showed  that  superior  intelligence  which  governments  obtained  by 
means  of  telegraph  and  telephone  rendered  the  actions  of  am- 
bassadors, as  well  as  the  formal  declarations  of  war,  posthumous. 
Man's  inventive  genius,  instead  of  making  war  more  remote, 
brought  it  on  him  more  readily. 

On  August  4,  1914,  the  last  chance  for  averting  war  between 
England  and  Germany  went  by.  On  that  date  the  British  Foreign 
Office  had  telegraphed  to  its  Envoy  at  Brussels:  "You  should 
inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure  is  applied  to  them 
by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart  from  neutrality,  his  Maj- 
esty's Government  expect  that  they  will  resist  by  any  means  in 
their  power,  and  that  his  Majesty's  Government  will  support 
them  in  offering  such  resistance,  and  that  his  Majesty's  Govern- 


PREPARATION    FOR    WAR  391 

ment  in  this  event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France,  if 
desired,  in  offering  to  the  Belgian  Government  at  once  common 
action  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  use  of  force  by  Germany 
against  them,  and  a  guarantee  to  maintain  their  independence 
and  integrity  in  future  years." 

Germany,  through  its  Intelligence  Department,  was  aware  that 
this  note  had  been  sent,  but  the  invasion  of  Belgium  began,  never- 
theless. Then  came  an  ultimatum  from  England.  As  soon  as  the 
British  Foreign  Office  had  learned  that  German  troops  had 
crossed  the  border  and  that  the  fortifications  at  Liege  had  been 
summoned  to  surrender  to  the  German  army,  this  telegram  was 
sent  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin : 

"London  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914.  We  hear  that  Ger- 
many has  addressed  note  to  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
stating  that  German  Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry  out, 
if  necessary,  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indis- 
pensable. 

"We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has  been  violated 
at  Gemmenich. 

"In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany 
declined  to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting  Belgium  as 
France  gave  last  week  in  reply  to  our  request  made  simul- 
taneously at  Berlin  and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that  request  and 
ask  that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of  this 
morning  [which  said  that  England  was  bound  to  protest  against 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality]  be  received  here  by  twelve  o'clock 
to-night.  If  not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for  your  passports 
and  to  say  that  his  Majesty's  Government  feel  bound  to  take  all 
steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the 
observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  part  as 
ourselves." 

Midnight  of  August  4, 1914,  came  and  the  German  Government 
had  not  yet  made  a  reply  to  this  note;  fifteen  minutes  of  grace 
were  allowed,  and  then  the  British  Government  formally  de- 
clared war. 

The  next  move  of  a  world  power,  toward  belligerency,  came  in 
the  Far  East.  In  1911  Japan  and  England  had  entered  an 


392     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  which  bound  each  to  come  to  the 
other's  aid  should  that  other  become  involved  in  war  with  more 
than  one  nation.  Japan  readily  agreed  to  live  up  to  its  part,  and 
on  August  16,  1914,  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  which  read : 

"Tokyo,  August  16,  1914.  We  consider  it  highly  important 
and  necessary  in  the  present  situation  to  take  measures  to  remove 
the  causes  of  all  disturbances  of  the  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  to 
safeguard  the  general  interests  as  contemplated  by  the  agree- 
ment of  alliance  between  Japan  and  Great  Britain. 

"In  order  to  secure  a  firm  and  enduring  peace  in  eastern  Asia, 
the  establishment  of  which  is  the  aid  of  the  said  agreement,  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  sincerely  believes  it  to  be  its 
duty  to  give  the  advice  to  the  Imperial  German  Government  to 
carry  out  the  following  two  propositions : 

"First.  To  withdraw  immediately  from  Japanese  and  Chinese 
waters  German  men-of-war  and  armed  vessels  of  all  kinds,  and 
to  disarm  at  once  those  which  cannot  be  so  withdrawn. 

"Second.  To  deliver  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  15  to 
the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities,  without  condition  or  compen- 
sation, the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chau,  with  a  view  to 
the  eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China. 

"The  Imperial  Japanese  Government  announces  at  the  same 
time  that  in  the  event  of  its  not  receiving  by  noon  on  August  23, 
1914,  an  answer  from  the  Imperial  German  Government,  signi- 
fying its  unconditional  acceptance  of  the  above  advice  offered  by 
the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  Japan  will  be  compelled  to  take 
such  action  as  she  may  deem  necessary  to  meet  the  situation." 

The  time  limit  set  for  the  German  reply  came  and  passed  with 
no  official  communication  with  Berlin.  Consequently  the  Japanese 
Government  declared  war  in  the  following  proclamation : 

"Issued  at  Tokyo,  August  23,  1914,  at  6  p.  m. 

"We,  by  the  Grace  of  Heaven,  Emperor  of  Japan,  seated  on  the 
throne  occupied  by  the  same  dynasty  from  time  immemorial,  do 
hereby  make  the  following  proclamation  to  all  our  loyal  and 
brave  subjects: 

"We  hereby  declare  war  against  Germany,  and  we  command 
our  army  and  navy  to  carry  on  hostilities  against  that  empire 


PREPARATION    FOR    WAR  393 

with  all  strength,  and  we  also  command  our  competent  author- 
ities to  make  every  effort,  in  pursuance  of  their  respective  duties, 
to  attain  the  national  aim  by  all  means  within  the  limits  of  the 
law  of  nations. 

"Since  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  the  calam- 
itous effect  of  which  we  view  with  grave  concern,  we  on  our  part 
have  entertained  hopes  of  preserving  the  peace  of  the  Far  East 
by  the  maintenance  of  strict  neutrality,  but  the  action  of  Ger- 
many has  at  length  compelled  Great  Britain,  our  ally,  to  open 
hostilities  against  that  country,  and  Germany  is  at  Kiao-chau,  its 
leased  territory  in  China,  busy  with  warlike  preparations,  while 
its  armed  vessels  cruising  the  seas  of  eastern  Asia  are  threaten- 
ing our  commerce  and  that  of  our  ally.  Peace  of  the  Far  East  is 
thus  in  jeopardy. 

"Accordingly,  our  Government  and  that  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty,  after  full  and  frank  communication  with  each  other, 
agreed  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  general  interests  contemplated  in  the  Agreement 
of  Alliance,  and  we  on  our  part,  being  desirous  to  attain  that  ob- 
ject by  peaceful  means,  commanded  our  Government  to  offer  with 
sincerity  an  advice  to  the  Imperial  German  Government.  But 
on  the  last  day  appointed  for  the  purpose,  however,  our  Govern- 
ment failed  to  receive  an  answer  accepting  their  advice.  It  is 
with  profound  regret  that  we,  in  spite  of  our  ardent  devotion  to 
the  cause  of  peace,  are  thus  compelled  to  declare  war,  especially 
at  this  early  period  of  our  reign,  and  while  we  are  still  in  mourn- 
ing for  our  lamented  mother. 

"It  is  our  earnest  wish  that  by  the  loyalty  and  valor  of  our 
faithful  subjects  peace  may  soon  be  restored  and  the  glory  of  the 
empire  be  enhanced." 

Germany  made  no  reply  to  the  Japanese  declaration.  On 
August  19,  1914,  the  emperor  had  sent  word  to  the  garrison  at 
Kiao-chau  that  it  was  to  defend  itself  against  all  attacks  made 
by  the  Japanese,  and  when  the  commander  there  heard  of  the 
Japanese  declaration  he  issued  a  statement  in  which  he  invited 
the  Japanese,  if  they  wanted  the  place,  to  come  and  fight  for  it. 


PART   III  — RESOURCES  AND  ARMAMENT  OF 

THE  NATIONS  AND  MOBILIZATION 

OF  THE  FORCES 


CHAPTER    X 

TERRITORIAL     AND     GEOGRAPHICAL 
COM  PARISONS 

fundamental  factor  in  war  is  territory.  Whether  war  be 
•*•  viewed  from  the  point  of  its  relation  to  the  racial  char- 
acteristics of  the  nations  who  are  opposed,  or  to  national 
rivalries,  or  to  imperial  ambitions,  the  solid  fact  remains  that 
war  is  of  peoples  who  live  upon  a  certain  land  domain,  who 
possess  frontiers  that  may  be  attacked  and  must  be  defended, 
and  whose  patriotism  coheres  with  geographical  boundaries.  The 
riches  of  a  country  depend  upon  territory  and  the  density  of 
population.  Consequently  the  proportion  of  men  able  to  bear 
arms  depends  upon  territory,  and  the  power  of  self -maintenance 
under  times  of  stress — such  as  a  blockade — is  again  a  territorial 
question. 

First  of  all,  then,  in  order  to  be  able  to  make  a  comparison  of 
the  forces  opposed  to  each  other  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
their  respective  territorial  powers  must  be  contrasted  and  their 
geographical  locations  each  to  the  other  must  be  taken  into 
account.  Mere  size  does  not  tell  all  the  tale,  nor  even  acreages  of 
cultivated  land,  nor  yet  even  land  subordinated  in  some  way  or 
other  to  the  processes  of  manufacturing.  On  the  other  hand, 
geographical  isolation  may  be  a  matter  of  feet  instead  of  leagues, 
as  for  example,  the  natural  barrier  between  East  Prussia  and 
Petrograd  is  a  marshy  country  scores  of  square  miles  in  extent, 

394 


GEOGRAPHICAL    COMPARISONS  395 

while  the  geographical  boundary  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Serbia  is  but  a  river,  the  opposite  banks  of  which  may  easily  be 
raked  by  modern  artillery. 

The  Germanic  nations,  known  as  the  Central  Powers,  which 
were  allied  at  the  opening  of  the  war  were  the  German  Empire 
and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  The  area  of  the  German 
Empire  (exclusive  of  colonial  possessions)  in  1914  was  208,- 
825.2  square  miles.  The  area  of  the  Austrian  Empire  was 
115,831.9,  and  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hungary  was  125,641.2.  In 
addition  to  these,  the  area  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was 
19,767.9,  making  the  total  area  of  the  territories  of  the 
Central  Powers  the  sum  of  470,093.2  square  miles,  or  a  little 
over  one-sixth  the  size  of  the  United  States,  not  including 
Alaska. 

The  nations  known  as  the  "Allies"  in  popular  speech,  consisted, 
at  the  opening  of  the  war,  of  the  British  Empire,  the  French 
Republic,  and  the  Russian  Empire.  Using  the  same  basis  of 
comparison,  the  area  of  the  British  Isles  was  121,633  square 
miles;  the  area  of  the  Republic  of  France  was  207,129  square 
miles,  and  the  area  of  European  Russia,  including  Finland  and 
Poland,  and  excluding  territory  within  the  Arctic  circle,  was 
approximately  2,500,000  square  miles.  Serbia  had  an  area  of 
34,000  square  miles.  Belgium,  although  in  no  way  responsible 
for  the  outbreak  of  the  war — no  matter  from  what  point  of  view 
it  may  be  considered — because  the  nation  to  suffer  most  at  first 
and  in  the  very  earliest  days  of  the  war  was  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies.  Her  area,  exclusive  of  over-sea  possessions,  was  11,373 
square  miles.  This  makes  a  total  of  2,874,135  square  miles  for  the 
Allies,  a  preponderance  of  territory  which  seems  extraordinarily 
disproportionate  until  it  is  realized  that  the  British  Isles,  France, 
Belgium,  and  Serbia  together  were  far  smaller  than  the  com- 
bined territories  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  that  only  a  small 
proportion  of  European  Russia  was  liable  to  become  a  part  of 
the  actual  field  of  conflict. 

Passing  on  to  larger  figures,  that  is  to  say  to  the  total  area  of 
all  the  possessions  of  the  nations  involved,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  preponderance  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  is  even  greater. 


896     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Thus  the  German  Empire,  inclusive  of  colonial  possessions  in 
Africa,  in  Asia,  and  in  the  Pacific,  contained  1,236,600  square 
miles.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  as  previously  stated,  was 
261,239  square  miles,  there  being  no  over-sea  colonies.  This 
makes  a  total  of  1,497,839  square  miles  as  the  total  territory  of 
the  Central  Powers. 

Balanced  against  this  come  the  enormous  figures  of  the  three 
great  allied  empires.  The  area  of  the  British  Empire  was 
approximately  13,158,712  square  miles,  the  Republic  of  France 
and  her  colonies  4,983,086  square  miles,  and  the  Russian  Empire 
8,394,018  square  miles.  The  three  empires  combined  thus  made 
a  total  of  26,535,816  square  miles,  or  but  very  little  less  than  one- 
half  of  the  total  land  area  of  the  earth.  These  figures  are  com- 
piled from  the  latest  sources  before  the  opening  of  the  war,  but 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  some  of  the  figures  are  approximate. 
For  example  the  French  possessions  in  Africa,  of  enormous  ex- 
tent, have  not  been  surveyed,  and  there  are  vast  stretches  of 
Arctic  Siberia  and  Arctic  Canada  which  are  but  half  explored. 
The  small  territories  of  Belgium  and  Serbia  may  be  added  to  the 
total  of  the  three  great  allied  empires,  and  thus  practically  one- 
half  of  the  earth  on  this  globe  was  opposed  to  the  million  and  a 
half  square  miles  of  the  Central  Powers. 

Owing  to  Bulgaria's  position  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  also 
owing  to  aggrievement  following  the  results  of  former  Balkan 
wars,  Bulgaria  joined  the  Central  Powers  later  in  the  war. 
Turkey,  also,  fearing  the  loss  of  Constantinople  to  the  Russians 
as  a  result  of  the  coalition  of  the  Allies,  threw  her  forces  on  the 
side  of  Germany.  The  area  of  Bulgaria  was  only  43,000  square 
miles,  but  the  Ottoman  or  Turkish  Empire  was  territorially 
very  large,  containing  1,420,448  square  miles,  or  almost  as  much 
as  Germany,  Austria,  and  Bulgaria  combined.  In  round  numbers, 
and  for  easy  remembrance,  it  may  be  said  that  the  territory  of 
the  Central  Powers  engaged  in  the  war  was  about  three  million 
square  miles. 

For  a  long  time  Italy  maintained  neutrality,  but  the  onrush  of 
conditions  forced  her  into  the  war,  also  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
The  territory  of  European  Italy  was  110,623  square  miles,  and 


GEOGRAPHICAL    COMPARISONS  397 

inclusive  of  her  African  possessions  the  territory  under  the 
Italian  flag  was  706,623  square  miles. 

The  territory  of  the  Japanese  Empire,  also,  needs  to  be  taken 
into  consideration,  for  the  reason  that  Japan,  while  not  entering 
the  European  theatre  of  war,  declared  herself  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies  by  the  capture  of  Kiao-chau,  a  district  leased  from  China 
by  Germany,  and  the  very  next  month  declared  to  be  a  German 
protectorate.  The  territorial  extent  of  the  Japanese  Empire 
was  254,266  square  miles,  inclusive  of  Korea.  These  are  the 
principal  factors  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  mere  ques- 
tion of  the  territorial  extent  of  the  opposing  forces. 

The  geographical  position  of  the  belligerent  countries,  with 
their  corresponding  advantages  and  disadvantages,  is  the  next 
factor  to  be  considered.  The  geographical  position  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  is  best  expressed  by  the  fact  that  they  are  central. 
They  have  all  the  advantages  of  being  in  a  united  whole.  When, 
later  in  the  war,  Serbia  was  conquered,  Bulgaria  joined  the 
Central  Powers  and  Turkey  was  swung  into  line,  the  same  con- 
dition held  true.  Germany  and  her  allies  were  a  homogeneous 
unit,  geographically  considered.  From  the  point  of  view  of  land 
defense  very  little  of  Germany's  frontiers  bordered  upon  enemy 
territory.  The  small  section  that  confronted  France  on  the  west 
and  the  larger  section  facing  Russia  on  the  east  were  her  only 
open  points  of  attack.  Her  sea  front,  except  for  the  small  sec- 
tion near  the  mouth  of  the  Rhine,  was  on  the  Baltic,  and  secure 
from  naval  attack  except  by  the  Russian  fleet,  and  Russia  has 
never  been  a  naval  power.  Her  Mediterranean  outlet,  near 
Trieste  and  Fiume,  menaced  by  the  Mediterranean  fleets  of  the 
allied  powers,  was  comparatively  safe,  for  the  Austrian  fleet  was 
an  efficient  fighting  unit,  especially  so  for  defense. 

As  opposed  to  this  was  the  openness  of  England,  France,  and 
Russia  to  naval  attack.  England  has  but  a  small  proportion  of 
land  to  seacoast,  and  France  is  open  to  the  sea  on  three  sides. 
Russia,  fronting  the  Baltic,  possessed  an  infinitely  inferior  fleet, 
to  which  the  Allies  could  send  no  reenforcement  as  long  as  the 
Skager  Rack  and  Cattegat  Straits  were  the  only  way  into  the 
Baltic;  moreover,  by  the  Kiel  Canal,  connecting  the  North  Sea 


398     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

and  the  Baltic,  the  remodeling  of  which  was  completed  in  a  few 
months  before  the  declarations  of  war,  a  German  naval  fleet 
would  possess  an  enormous  advantage  over  an  allied  fleet,  en- 
deavoring to  force  entrance  into  the  Baltic.  In  addition  to  this, 
while  the  Central  Powers  could  work  together  on  both  fronts 
with  great  ease,  thanks  to  the  excellent  system  of  German  rail- 
ways, Great  Britain  and  France  had  no  means  of  direct  com- 
munication with  their  great  ally  in  the  east  of  Europe.  Thus, 
in  a  measure,  the  Central  Powers  were  not  attacking  the  Allies 
at  any  one  time,  though  it  might  truly  be  said  that  they  were 
being  attacked  by  the  Allies.  In  the  event  of  any  lack  of 
synchronization  between  the  plans  of  Russia  and  those  of  the 
western  allies,  German  and  Austrian  troops  could  be  massed 
first  on  one  side  of  the  field  of  operations  and  then  on  the  other. 
Such  action  was  impossible  to  the  Allies.  At  the  time  of  the 
great  German  advance  on  Paris,  Russia  could  gi\T3  no  aid.  At 
the  time  of  the  German  advance  on  Riga,  Britain  and  France 
could  give  no  aid.  Both  German  advances  were  checked  and  the 
invaders  driven  back,  not  by  the  armies  of  the  Allies,  but  by  two 
noninterlocking  parts  of  the  armies  of  the  Allies.  At  the  same 
time,  the  susceptibility  to  attack  on  both  sides  prevented  the 
Central  Powers  from  deflecting  all  their  men  to  either  front,  and 
thus  by  the  mere  existence  of  passive  menace,  prevented  the 
Central  Powers  from  using  their  geographic  advantage  to  the 
full. 

Their  disadvantage,  in  the  military  sense  of  the  recognition  of 
geographical  conditions,  was  that  the  Central  Powers  had  con- 
stantly to  bear  in  mind  the  necessity  of  fighting  upon  two  fronts. 
Russian  activity,  while  important  to  Britain  and  France,  was 
a  matter  with  which  their  policy  had  nothing  to  do ;  the  coordina- 
tion of  movements  on  the  west  front  was  a  matter  entirely  out- 
side the  scope  of  the  operations  of  the  Russian  commanders. 
The  German  military  staff,  on  the  other  hand,  had  the  tail:  of 
constantly  coordinating  two  separate  campaigns,  to  determine 
where  the  greatest  number  of  men  should  be,  to  avoid  weakening 
the  one  side  or  the  other  at  the  wrong  moment,  and  to  conduct 
a  dispartite  series  of  campaigns. 


GEOGRAPHICAL    COMPARISONS  399 

The  advantages,  again  considered  geographically,  greatly  out- 
weigh the  disadvantages.  The  first  of  these  was  the  homo- 
geneity of  the  Central  Powers.  A  general  could  attend  a  war 
council  in  Berlin  in  the  evening,  and  one  in  Vienna  the  next 
morning.  The  influence  of  Germany  was  an  understood  thing, 
moreover,  and  in  Vienna  there  was  a  readiness  to  accept  and 
carry  out  the  policies  of  the  German  military  staff.  There  was 
also  a  geographical  homogeneity,  due  to  modern  facility  of  com- 
munication. Not  only  in  mobilization,  but  in  the  entire  conduct 
of  the  war,  the  geographic  nearness  of  points  in  Germany  and 
Austria  was  brought  about  by  an  excellent  east  and  west  rail- 
way system.  This  disadvantage  of  fighting  on  two  fronts  was 
partly  compensated  by  the  fact  that  within  three  days  enormous 
masses  of  men  could  be  moved  from  Galicia  to  the  Rhine,  or  from 
the  Belgian  frontier  to  the  wastes  of  East  Prussia.  In  all  Europe 
there  is  no  stretch  of  land  so  well  suited  by  nature  for  this  task 
of  fighting  upon  two  fronts  as  the  area  of  the  combined  Austrian 
and  German  Empires.  This  is  emphasized  by  the  topography  of 
the  Baltic  Plain,  the  Rhine  and  Danube  valleys.  One  might  say, 
in  a  measure,  that  this  stretch  of  territory  has  not  wasted  any  of 
its  natural  mountain  defenses  by  flinging  them  athwart  the 
territory.  Thus  the  Vosges  defend  against  France,  the  Alps 
against  Italy,  the  Transylvanian  Alps  against  Rumania — in  the 
event  of  that  nation  entering  the  war  with  Russia — the  Car- 
pathians behind  Galicia  against  Russia's  Southern  attacks,  and 
the  marshy  country  east  of  East  Prussia  against  Russian  north- 
ern attack.  Yet  it  is  to  be  added  that  these  very  advantages  of 
defense  were  also  disadvantages  of  attack.  The  march  through 
Belgium  would  not  have  been  necessitated  if,  for  example,  the 
portion  of  Central  Powers  territory  that  confronted  France  had 
been  of  the  same  character  as  that  which  confronted  Russia. 
The  mountainous  character  of  that  frontier  was  a  determining 
factor  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium.  The  invasion  of  Belgium  was 
a  determining  factor  in  the  relation  which  Germany  sustained  in 
the  war  to  the  allied  powers,  and  especially  to  the  neutral  nations. 
The  relation  of  the  neutral  nations,  in  modern  warfare,  which 
requires  such  immense  supplies,  is  a  factor  of  great  importance 


400  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT    WAR 

for  success  in  the  field.  Therefore,  to  close  the  syllogism,  the 
mountainous  character  of  the  Vosges  country  was  the  primary 
factor  in  determining  the  relation  of  all  other  countries  to  the 
Central  Powers,  a  factor  constantly  arising  at  every  point  in  the 
Great  War.  On  such  geographical  factors  does  the  strategy  of 
huge  campaigns  depend.  One  more  example  may  be  given.  In 
the  battles  of  the  Marne  it  became  evident  that  France's  strong- 
est defense  was  the  Argonne  Forest,  in  the  battle  of  the  Aisne  it 
became  clear  that  the  geological  formation  of  a  river  bank  made 
the  German  position  almost  impregnable. 

The  topographical  position  of  the  allied  powers  is  the  next 
factor  to  be  considered.  Germany's  geographical  resources  have 
been  touched  upon,  and  to  them  may  be  added  the  fact  that,  if 
invaded,  she  had,  at  the  Rhine,  a  marvelous  line  to  fall  back 
upon.  The  first  factor  to  be  considered  in  France  is  its  openness 
to  attack.  Thanks  to  the  Vosges  and  the  Argonne,  a  line  of 
great  strength  could  be  established  (it  was  so  established  and  was 
so  held  in  the  teeth  of  determined  attack)  from  Belfort  to 
Verdun.  But  north  of  Verdun  the  earth-making  forces  have 
not  been  kind  to  France,  in  a  military  sense.  From  Verdun  to 
the  North  Sea  is,  geographically  speaking,  open  country.  This 
is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  availability  of  forts  in  open  coun- 
try, it  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that  there  is  no  geographical  de- 
fense. Between  the  German  border  and  Paris  there  is  no  topo- 
graphical barrier  to  an  invading  army.  The  Germans  found  this 
out  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  and  it  had  not  been  forgotten. 

The  next  great  factor  in  the  topography  of  northern  France 
is  partly  artificial,  namely,  the  railroads.  Everything  in  France 
centers  in  Paris.  All  the  railroads  and  all  the  waterways  go  to 
the  nation's  capital.  This  is  a  strength  politically,  but  a  weak- 
ness geographically,  for,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  in  a  geographical 
sense,  difficulty  of  access  is  strength,  ease  of  access  is  weakness. 
German  railways  move  troops  to  the  frontier.  French  railways 
move  troops  to  and  from  Paris.  This  topography  explains  all  the 
earlier  part  of  the  war.  It  explains  why  Belfort  to  Verdun  was 
held,  and  held  stubbornly,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  reach- 
ing central  France,  because  central  France  is  a  plain.  It  ex- 


GEOGRAPHICAL    COMPARISONS  401 

plains  why  the  retreat  to  the  Marne  was  made,  and  also  why  it 
was  made  with  such  stubborn  resistance,  for  the  nearer  to  Paris 
the  nearer  to  the  source  of  supply,  and  the  very  factor  which 
makes  Paris  dangerous  to  the  whole  country,  if  seized,  makes  it, 
at  the  same  time,  an  extraordinary  source  of  supply.  France's 
problem,  then,  geographically  speaking,  was  to  establish  an  arti- 
ficial line  of  defense  between  the  natural  barrier  of  the  Belfort- 
Verdun  line  and  the  railroad  barrier  at  Paris.  The  line  from 
Verdun  to  Paris  was  the  line  of  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 
Being  held,  it  stopped  the  German  drive  and  drove  the  invader 
back. 

The  geographical  position  of  Britain  lies  in  a  word.  She  is 
an  island.  Defended  by  a  powerful  navy,  she  was  safe  from  easy 
invasion.  On  the  other  hand,  her  territory  is  so  fully  occupied, 
every  inch  of  ground  is  so  valuable,  that  she  could  not  deplete 
her  garrisons  too  greatly.  As  long  as  France  was  facing  Ger- 
many, and  England  was  bottling  up  the  German  fleet,  France 
could  leave  almost  her  whole  country  without  defense.  There 
was  no  need  for  troops  to  the  center,  west,  or  south.  The  sea 
frontier  needed  not  to  be  defended,  the  Spanish  frontier  was  at 
peace,  and  the  Italian  border  was  that  of  a  power,  first  a  neutral 
and  then  an  ally.  Besides,  should  there  have  been  any  invasion 
of  France  at  the  Bay  of  Biscay  or  the  Mediterranean,  Paris, 
where  all  matters  center,  is  far  away.  Far  otherwise  was  it 
with  Britain.  Even  to  help  France  the  actual  territory  of  Great 
Britain  might  not  be  left  unguarded.  Accordingly,  France  could 
only  count  upon  a  small  army  support  in  the  form  of  an  expedi- 
tionary force,  the  assistance  of  Britain  to  the  Allies  being  mainly 
naval,  industrial,  and  financial,  as  well  as  moral.  Yet,  even  so, 
the  expeditionary  force  proved  a  deciding  factor  in  the  German 
drive  on  Paris.  Geographically,  however,  the  isolation  of  Eng- 
land as  an  island  precluded  the  ability  suddenly  to  mobilize  all 
her  forces  and  throw  them  at  a  definite  point  in  the  manner  that 
the  Central  Powers  were  able  to  do. 

Viewing  matters  still  in  their  geographical  aspect,  Russia 
held  a  peculiar  place.  Her  immense  extent  coupled  to  her  flat- 
ness and  the  entire  absence  of  natural  geographical  boundaries, 


402     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

made  small  invasions  easy  and  crippling  invasion  difficult.  An 
army  invading  Russia  could  be  led  on  mile  after  mile  into  the 
interior,  until,  at  last,  in  order  to  supply  a  few  army  corps,  a 
vast  horde  of  men  would  be  required  to  maintain  the  line  of  com- 
munication. And,  even  then,  Russia  would  scarcely  have  felt  the 
wound.  The  French  policy  is  a  retreat  to  a  definite  point,  and 
then  a  firm  stand.  The  Russian  policy  is  a  continuing  retreat, 
each  advance  of  the  enemy  making  his  position  more  dangerous. 
Her  lack  of  ports,  while  a  geographical  question,  rather  belongs 
to  matters  of  blockade,  which  will  be  dealt  with  later.  Russia 
had  nothing  but  her  size  as  a  geographical  advantage,  and  her 
isolation  from  her  allies  rendered  it  necessary  for  her  to  face 
every  issue  alone. 


CHAPTER    XI 

POPULATION     AND     RACIAL     CHAR- 
ACTERISTICS 

WITH  the  areas  of  the  respective  territories  thus  compared, 
and  the  geographical  positions  touched  upon  in  so  far  as 
their  larger  factors  bear  upon  the  war,  it  follows  naturally  that 
the  next  matter  to  be  compared  is  the  population  of  the  several 
opposing  nations  and  the  density  of  that  population  to  the  terri- 
tory involved.  If  to  this  consideration  of  population  be  added 
the  consideration  of  the  cultivated  land  adjacent  to  the  theatres 
of  war,  the  second  great  problem  of  invasion,  known  as  "living 
off  the  enemy's  country,"  will  be  brought  into  view.  This  is  the 
second  great  resource  of  nations,  their  people  and  the  food 
supply. 

Beginning,  again,  with  the  Central  Powers,  the  population  of 
the  German  Empire,  according  to  the  census  of  1910,  was  64,- 
925,993,  of  which  over  40,000,000  were  in  Prussia.  The  popula- 
tion of  Austria,  according  to  census  taken  in  the  same  year,  was 
28,571,934,  and  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hungary,  20,886,487,  while 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  added  1,931,802  to  the  amount,  making 


RACIAL    CHARACTERISTICS  403 

for  the  Dual  Monarchy  a  total  of  51,390,223.  In  round  figures 
116,000,000  may  be  taken  as  the  combined  population  of  this 
central  group.  Adding  thereto  nations  which  entered  the 
theatre  of  war  later,  Bulgaria  with  4,337,513,  and  Turkey  in 
Europe  with  1,891,000  inhabitants,  the  total  reaches,  in  round 
figures,  123,000,000  inhabitants,  exclusive  of  possessions  outside 
of  Europe. 

The  powers  forming  the  group  of  the  Allies :  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia,  largely  owing  to  the  huge  population  of  the  latter, 
show  a  still  larger  number  of  inhabitants.  Thus,  despite  the 
small  territory  of  the  British  Isles,  the  population  in  the  census 
of  1911  was  45,370,530.  The  population  of  France,  with  a  far 
larger  territory  in  1911  was  39,601,509.  The  population  of 
Belgium,  a  small  but  intensive  manufacturing  country,  in  1911 
census  was  7,490,411.  The  population  of  Serbia,  as  per  the 
census  of  1910,  was  2,911,701.  The  population  of  European 
Russia,  in  the  census  of  1911,  was  148,207,700,  inclusive  of 
Poland  and  Finland.  This  makes  a  total  of  243,581,851  inhabit- 
ants, in  round  figures  243,000,000,  or  not  quite  twice  as  many  as 
the  populations  of  the  Central  Powers. 

The  disproportion  is  far  from  being  as  great  as  it  seems, 
mainly  because  of  questions  of  conscription  and  military  pre- 
paredness, matters  which  will  be  discussed  when  dealing  with  the 
armaments  of  the  nations.  Yet,  even  by  mere  figures  of  popula- 
tion, it  will  readily  be  seen  that  the  relation  of  population  to  area 
alters  the  respective  apparent  strength.  In  round  figures  the 
243,000,000  people  of  the  Allies  are  spread  out  over  3,000,000 
square  miles  of  area.  The  123,000,000  of  the  Central  Powers, 
including  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  in  Europe,  are  only  spread  over 
518,175  square  miles,  or,  in  round  figures,  half  a  million  square 
miles  of  area.  In  very  rough  figures,  then,  it  may  be  said,  that 
the  Allies  had  twice  as  large  a  population  settled  upon  six  times 
as  large  a  territory. 

There  remains  yet  in  the  population  question  the  matter  of 
race.  Here  the  Germans  began  with  an  immense  advantage. 
Berlin  and  Vienna  were  friends,  and  their  chancelleries  worked 
in  unison.  England,  France,  and  Russia  had  long  been  national 


404 


THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 


RACIAL    CHARACTERISTICS  405 

enemies.  It  is  not  so  long  since  Waterloo,  it  is  but  a  very  short 
time  since  the  Crimean  War,  and  the  passes  north  of  India  are 
defensively  guarded,  not  against  warlike  tribes,  but  against  the 
feared  aggressions  of  the  Russian  bear.  One  organized  rule 
dominated  the  policies  of  the  Central  Powers,  three  governed 
those  of  the  Allies.  One  organized  intention  governed  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  three  different  thoughts  and  intentions  ruled  among 
the  Allies.  To  what  extent  Serbia  or  Russia  or  Germany  were 
responsible  for  the  war  is  not  so  much  a  matter  of  history  as  of 
interpretation  of  history,  and  is  dealt  with  elsewhere  in  this 
volume. 

In  this  regard  one  cannot  do  better  than  cite  figures  instead  of 
mere  opinions.  Thus  it  would  be  fair  to  compare  the  Teutonic 
group  of  the  Central  Powers  with  the  Teutonic  group ;  the  Celtic 
group,  the  Italic  group,  and  the  Slavic  group  among  the  Allies  to 
determine  whether  numerically,  at  least,  this  insistence  on 
superiority  is  upheld. 

The  facts  in  the  case  are  as  follows:  The  census  of  1910 
showed  a  foreign  population  in  the  German  Empire  of  1,259,873, 
and  the  population  of  Alsace-Lorraine  (three-fourths  Celtic) 
was  1,874,014.  Over  1,000,000  Jews  are  listed,  over  600,000 
professing  Judaism.  Thus  nearly  3,000,000,  in  round  figures, 
are  to  be  subtracted  from  the  German  population  as  non- 
Teutonic.  It  will  be  noted  that  these  figures  assume  all  other 
persons  residing  in  Germany  to  be  Teutons,  a  position  admissible 
only  for  purposes  of  comparison,  since  other  countries  will  be 
assumed  to  be  a  single  ethnic  stock.  Germany,  thus,  may  claim 
61,000,000  Teutons.  But  when  attention  is  turned  to  Austria- 
Hungary  the  German  claim  is  far  different.  According  to  the 
census  for  1910  the  proportion  of  Germans  (all  Teuton  stocks) 
in  Austria  was  but  35.58  per  cent  of  the  population,  in  Hungary 
it  was  only  10.40  per  cent.  If,  then,  ethnic  numerical  superiority 
is  to  be  considered  as  a  factor,  Germany  has  no  rightful  influ- 
ence in  Vienna  at  all.  In  exact  figures,  the  census  of  1910  gave 
9,950,266  Germans  in  Austria  and  1,903,357  Germans  in  Hun- 
gary, in  round  figures  about  12,000,000  together.  Neither  Bul- 
garia nor  Turkey  are  Teuton,  and  therefore  need  not  enter  into 

F— Gt.  War  2 


406     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

the  calculation.  As  a  grand  total,  then,  the  Teutons  in  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  group  number  73,000,000. 

England,  regarded  as  a  Teuton  country,  possesses  a  popula- 
tion of  34,045,290,  the  difference  from  the  total  of  the  British 
Isles,  consisting  of  Celtic  Ireland,  Celtic  Wales,  Celtic  Isle  of 
Man,  and  partly  Celtic  Scotland,  being  over  11,000,000. 

If  to  the  (roughly)  40,000,000  of  France  be  added  the  11,000,- 
000  of  Celts  from  the  British  Isles,  then,  as  against  the  73,000,000 
Teutons,  there  are  51,000,000  Celts.  Of  course,  as  is  well  known, 
there  is  a  very  large  admixture  of  Italic  stock  in  the  French, 
particularly  in  the  south,  but  this  will  not  alter  the  totals. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  only  one  Italic  nation  is  engaged  in  the 
war,  viz.,  Italy,  the  figures  of  this  branch  of  the  race  are  not  so 
great.  Yet,  even  so,  of  this  racial  stock  alone,  there  are,  in 
round  numbers,  35,000,000  to  be  considered.  The  Celtic  and 
Italic  stocks  opposed  to  the  Teutons  of  Germany,  therefore,  pre- 
sent a  larger  numerical  proportion. 

Now  let  the  Slavic  stock  be  taken  into  account.  It  appears  that 
in  the  German  Empire  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  there 
are  37,000,000  Slavs,  or,  to  put  it  another  way,  there  are  more 
Slavs  under  the  flags  of  the  Central  Powers  than  the  population 
of  England.  In  addition  to  this  there  are  over  4,000,000  Slavs 
in  Bulgaria  who  came  under  the  flags  of  the  Central  Powers.  This 
makes  the  Slav  population  of  the  Central  Powers  larger  than  the 
population  of  France.  When,  therefore,  the  statement  is  made 
that  "millions  of  German-speaking  people"  are  under  the  autoc- 
racy of  Russia,  the  fact  that  over  41,000,000  Slavs  are  under  the 
imperial  control  of  the  houses  of  Hohenzollern  and  Hapsburg  is 
to  be  taken  into  account. 

In  European  Russia  over  148,000,000  are  enumerated,  ex- 
clusive of  Finland,  in  which  possession  87  per  cent  are  Finnish, 
which  is  a  Mongolian  stock.  Of  this  it  is  estimated,  according 
to  the  census  of  1910,  that  110,000,000  are  Slavs,  this  in- 
cluding the  Caucasus,  where  only  a  little  over  30  per  cent  are 
Slav.  The  figures  of  the  entire  empire  may  be  of  service.  For 
this,  according  to  the  census,  the  Slavs  form  71.7  per  cent,  the 
Turco-Tartars  10.6  per  cent,  the  Finns  4.5  per  cent,  the  Jews  3.9 


RACIAL    CHARACTERISTICS  407 

per  cent  (mainly  in  Poland),  the  Lithuanians  2.4  per  cent,  the 
Germanic  group  1.6  per  cent,  the  Cartvelians  1.1  per  cent,  and 
all  other  races  less  than  1  per  cent.  The  last  detailed  ethno- 
graphical census  was  taken  in  1897,  and  since  that  time  there  has 
been  a  certain  change,  but  not  enough  to  disturb  the  proportions 
greatly,  except  in  the  case  of  Jews.  In  that  census  there  were 
found  200,000  representatives  of  the  Germanic  race  divided, 
according  to  official  figures,  as  follows:  Germans,  180,000; 
Swedes,  14,000  (mainly  in  Finland) ;  Norsemen  and  Danes, 
1,600. 

To  condense  the  figures  of  Slav  and  Teuton  comparison  into 
a  phrase,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  Central  Powers  hold  rule 
over  41,000,000  Slavs  of  a  different  ethnic  stock;  and  that  Russia 
holds  rule  over  a  quarter  of  a  million  Teutons.  The  figures  are 
somewhat  startling.  They  show  the  chancelleries  of  Berlin  and 
Vienna  dealing  with  a  nonhomogeneous  group  of  ethnic  stocks, 
and  they  show  England,  France,  and  Russia,  respectively,  far 
more  homogeneous,  each  within  its  own  borders. 

Since  the  point  under  consideration  is  merely  that  of  ethnic 
factors,  the  political  questions  involved  in  the  management  of 
these  different  races  must  be  deferred.  But  the  direct  ethnic 
offsets  hold  a  different  place.  Again  viewing  the  Central  Powers 
first,  it  is  clear  that,  except  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  German 
Empire  is  a  homogeneous  ethnic  unit  of  a  Teutonic  stock.  Bul- 
garia is  a  homogeneous  ethnic  unit  of  Slav-Mongol  stock.  But 
it  is  far  otherwise  with  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  figures  are 
revelative.  In  Austria  the  percentages  are  as  follows :  German 
(Teutonic)  35.58  per  cent;  Bohemian,  Moravian,  and  Slovak 
(Slav)  23.02;  Polish  (Slav)  17.77;  Ruthenian  (Slav)  12.58; 
Slovenian  (Slav)  4.48;  Italian  and  Latin,  2.75;  Serbo-Croatian 
(Slav)  2.80.  In  Hungary  the  percentages  show  a  far  smaller 
proportion  of  Teutonic  stock,  and  a  far  greater  diversity  of 
ethnic  variability.  The  figures  are:  Magyar  (Finno-Tartar) 
54.50  per  cent;  Rumanian  (Italo-Slavic)  16.10;  German  (Teu- 
tonic) 10.40;  Slovak  (Slav)  10.70;  Serbo-Croatian  3.60;  Ruthe- 
nian (Slav)  2.50.  These  figures  are  exclusive  of  Serbia.  It  thus 
appears  that  Hungary  has  a  majority  that  is  neither  Teuton  nor 


408  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

Slav,  but  Finno-Tartar,  in  other  words,  a  branch  of  the  Mon- 
golian. They  are  not  Aryans,  and  do  not  belong  to  the  Indo- 
European  race,  but  more  closely  resemble  the  Chinese  in  their 
ethnic  origin.  The  Central  Powers,  then,  ethnically  speaking, 
embrace  Teuton,  Slav,  and  Finno-Tartar  stocks,  with  at  least 
eight  different  languages  (not  dialects) . 

The  ethnic  variability  of  the  opposing  nations  may  next  be 
presented.  Of  these  France  is  the  most  homogeneous.  Strongly 
Italic  in  the  south,  almost  purely  Celtic  in  the  northwest,  the 
people  of  France  are  Italo-Celts.  Their  language  is  the  same 
throughout  the  entire  republic,  and  there  are  no  internecine  race 
rivalries. 

The  British  Isles  is  less  united.  Once  inhabited  solely  by 
Celts,  successive  Teutonic  invasions  of  Angles,  Saxons,  Danes, 
and  Normans,  partly  engulfed  the  Celts  and  partly  drove  them  to 
the  westward.  Thus  the  south  and  east  of  England  is  largely 
Teutono-Celtic  while  the  counties  of  Cornwall  and  Devon,  Wales, 
and  all  the  English  counties  bordering  thereon,  the  Highlands  of 
Scotland,  all  of  Ireland  save  the  province  of  Ulster,  and  the  Isle 
of  Man  are  Celtic.  Ireland,  especially,  isolated  by  the  sea,  has 
retained  her  Celtic  fervor,  and  does  not  abide  happily  under. 
English  rule.  Here  political  discussion  is  deferred,  but,  as  an 
ethnic  fact,  these  Celtic  countries  are  a  discordance  to  British 
Teutonism,  even  though  that  Teutonism  has  been  much  diluted 
by  the  ancient  British  stock,  which,  as  has  been  said,  was  Celtic. 
The  Italic  invasion  of  the  Romans  gave  little  Italic  infusion.  In 
the  war  the  Finno-Tartaric  Magyars  of  Hungary  supported 
Teuton  Germany,  and  in  the  same  manner  the  Celtic  Irish  of 
Ireland  supported  semi-Teutonic  England,  but  their  ethnic  dis- 
similarities remain. 

The  third  of  the  great  empires  opposing  the  Central  Powers  has 
ethnic  problems  of  its  own,  but  with  one  exception  the  stocks  are 
not  so  divergent.  Finland  is  inhabited  by  a  Finno-Tartaric 
stock,  not  greatly  dissimilar  in  ethnic  origin  from  the  Magyars 
of  Hungary.  They  speak  their  own  language,  and,  indeed,  to  a 
very  great  extent  have  home  rule.  In  1910,  however,  the  bonds 
holding  Finland  to  Russia  were  a  little  more  closely  drawn.  In 


RACIAL    CHARACTERISTICS  409 

Russia  the  ethnic  difference  lies  not  so  much  in  the  intrusion  of 
alien  races  (except  the  Semitic  Jew)  as  in  the  division  of  the 
Slav  races.  Of  these  there  are  four :  Great  Russian,  the  eastern 
group,  the  political  ruling  stock;  Little  Russia,  the  southern 
group,  including  Little  Russian  and  Ruthenian;  Serbo-Croatian 
or  the  southwestern  group,  including  Bulgarian  and  Serbo- 
Croatian;  and  Czech  or  the  western  group,  including  Polish, 
Bohemian,  and  related  languages.  Of  these,  Little  Russia, 
Poland,  and  Bohemia  were  once  great  kingdoms,  and  have  never 
lost  their  desire  for  independence.  The  Tartar  and  other  Mon- 
golian admixture  in  European  Russia  is  not  large,  is  quite  inde- 
terminate, and  is  in  no  way  organized  as  an  ethnic  unit,  as,  for 
example,  by  a  common  tongue.  Its  influence,  therefore,  is 
negligible. 

But  in  the  case  of  the  Jews  Russia  has  found  an  ethnic  prob- 
lem. This  she  solved  (speaking  in  geographical  terms)  by  con- 
fining them  to  a  region  known  as  "The  Pale,"  which  includes  one- 
fifth  of  European  Russia.  Heavy  fines  precluded  the  Jews  from 
leaving  this  section,  which  is  very  large.  In  the  census  of  1897 
the  total  number  of  Jews  in  Russia  was  given  at  5,215,805.  Of 
this  number  93.9  lived  within  the  Pale.  The  United  States  Immi- 
gration Commission  in  1910  estimated  the  number  of  Jews  in 
Russia  at  4,000,000,  and  an  unofficial  estimate  at  the  opening  of 
the  war  placed  the  number  at  less  than  3,000,000.  There  are  no 
Great  Russians  in  America,  no  Ukrainian  (Russian)  Little  Rus- 
sians, but  a  vast  number  of  Russian  Jews.  It  is  estimated  that 
there  are  more  Jews  in  the  United  States  now  than  in  Russia. 
The  fact  is  notable  in  the  consideration  of  the  ethnic  forces  op- 
posed in  the  war,  since  so  much  has  been  said  and  written  about 
the  Jews  in  Russia  that  it  is  overlooked  that  they  are  a 
negligible  number. 

The  fourth  of  the  empires  opposing  the  Central  Powers,  that 
of  Italy,  is  almost  a  homogeneous  unit,  certainly  politically.  Yet 
between  the  North  Italian  and  the  South  Italian  group  there  is  a 
wide  difference.  The  North  Italian  has  a  strong  Celtic  and  a 
slight  Teutonic  (Lombard)  infusion.  The  South  Italian  is 
Italic,  and  in  Calabria  and  Sicily  there  is  a  strong  strain  from 


410  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

an  African  stock  closely  related  to  the  present  Berbers.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  language,  Italian  is  everywhere  spoken,  but 
with  such  strong  dialectic  differences  that  these  seem  almost 
like  separate  tongues. 

Here,  then,  are  the  geographical  resources  of  the  countries 
opposed  in  the  war,  their  topographical  relations  and  the  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  superincumbent  on  these.  Here, 
also,  are  the  peoples  opposed  in  the  war,  or  to  speak  more  accu- 
rately, the  populations  inhabiting  the  territories  politically 
opposed  in  the  war,  showing  the  ethnic  stocks  involved,  with  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages.  It  will  be  seen  that  Teuton  Eng- 
land is  opposing  Teuton  Germany.  It  will  be  noted  that  41,- 
000,000  Slavs  under  the  German  flag  are  arrayed  against  the 
Slavic  Empire  of  Russia.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  Finno-Tartar 
inhabitants  of  Finland  have  a  place  in  the  czar's  army,  and  the 
Finno-Tartars  of  Hungary  form  the  flower  of  the  kaiser's 
cavalry.  Whatever  political  developments  may  have  been,  what- 
ever may  be  considered  the  most  advanced  form  of  civilization, 
English,  French,  German,  Italian,  or  Russian,  strict  ethnography 
declares  that  this  is  not  a  war  of  peoples,  it  is  not  based  upon 
mutual  ethnic  antagonisms,  and  brother  race  is  fighting  against 
brother  race  on  the  battle  fields  of  the  east  and  west. 


CHAPTER    XII 

FINANCIAL     RESOURCES  —  GERMANY 
AND     AUSTRIA 

MODERN  warfare,  however,  depends  to  a  very  great  extent  on 
a  third  factor  of  resource.  This  is  the  factor  of  finance.  In 
the  wars  of  a  thousand  years  ago  if  a  soldier  was  armed  with 
sword  and  shield,  his  munitions  of  war  were  complete.  If  the 
horseman  had  spear  and  shield  he  needed  no  more.  An  archer's 
fighting  equipment  consisted  of  his  bow,  a  sheaf  of  arrows  and  an 
extra  bowstring.  The  armies  were  not  large  and  they  lived  off 


FINANCIAL    RESOURCES  411 

the  country.  If  such  was  not  rich  enough  to  support  the  forag- 
ing of  a  small  army,  it  was  not  worth  the  winning.  Mere  num- 
bers played  a  great  part  in  such  wars  and  moral  strength  played 
a  still  more  important  part.  Roman  drill  and  Roman  self-con- 
fidence made  Rome  the  mistress  of  the  world.  Modern  war 
knows  nothing  of  this.  A  storm  of  shrapnel  will  destroy  a 
regiment  of  the  Death's  Head  Hussars,  the  Coldstream  Guards 
or  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  as  quickly  as  it  will  the  rawest 
assemblage  of  recruits,  and  mere  men,  no  matter  how  heroic 
and  unflinching,  cannot  stem  the  tide  of  modern  war.  Leonidas 
held  back  the  whole  Persian  army  at  the  Pass  of  Thermopylae, 
but  Belgium  could  not  hold  back  Germany.  War  is  with  men, 
but  it  is  with  money,  too. 

Finances  are  even  more  complex  than  questions  of  race.  For 
example,  the  wealth  of  the  United  States  is  estimated  at  $150,- 
000,000,000,  that  of  the  German  Empire  at  $80,000,000,000,  yet 
it  would  be  absurd  to  deduce  therefrom  that  the  United  States 
was  twice  as  well  able  economically  to  finance  a  war  as  Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  wealth  of  Russia  is  estimated  at  $40,000,- 
000,000,  and  that  of  Italy  at  $20,000,000,000,  yet  Russia  is 
financially  able  to  stand  the  strain  of  a  long  war  at  least  ten 
times  as  well  as  Italy,  and  Italy  is  able  to  sustain  the  shock  of 
the  opening  of  war  far  better  than  Russia.  With  these  safe- 
guards, the  following  approximations  of  comparative  wealth 
may  be  of  value:  German  Empire,  $80,000,000,000;  Austria- 
Hungary,  $25,000,000,000;  Bulgaria,  $2,000,000,000,  and  Tur- 
key, $9,000,000,000,  or  $116,000,000,000  for  the  Central  Powers. 
The  wealth  of  the  nations  forming  the  group  of  the  Allies  is  as 
follows :  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  (not  the  empire) ,  $85,000,- 
000,000;  France,  $50,000,000,000;  Russia,  $40,000,000,000; 
Italy,  $20,000,000,000,  and  Belgium,  $9,000,000,000,  or  $204,000,- 
000,000,  for  the  Allies.  In  this  war,  too,  the  over-sea  wealth 
must  be  estimated,  since  wealth  can  be  transported  in  some 
measure,  while  geographical  territory  cannot.  The  over-sea 
wealth  of  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  Empires  needs  not 
to  be  taken  into  account,  since  they  afforded  no  financial  aid  at 
the  opening  of  the  war  and  rapidly  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 


412  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Allies.  On  the  other  hand  the  vast  colonial  possessions  of  the 
British  Empire,  in  India,  Canada,  Australia  and  South  Africa; 
the  huge  slice  of  Africa  and  Cochin  China  owned  by  the  French 
Republic,  the  Belgian  Congo,  and  the  Italian  colonies  on  the 
south  shore  of  the  Mediterranean  bring  the  combined  wealth 
of  the  Allies  to  close  upon  $600,000,000,000,  or  more  than  five 
times  as  much  as  that  of  the  Central  Powers.  As,  however, 
the  convertibility  of  the  wealth  of  the  Allies  is  only  about  one- 
third  of  that  of  the  Central  Powers,  it  follows  that  the  difference 
in  estimated  wealth  gives  the  Allies  about  twice  as  much  as 
the  Central  Powers. 

Immediately  after  gross  wealth  comes  the  question  of  finan- 
cial stability.  There  are  many  means  of  determining  this,  but 
one  of  the  simplest  is  that  of  revenue.  The  combined  revenues 
of  all  the  nations  in  the  world,  according  to  the  statistics  of 
the  United  States  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce, 
is,  in  round  figures,  $12,000,000,000.  Of  this  amount  Germany 
has  over  $2,000,000,000,  Austria-Hungary  over  $1,000,000,000; 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria  together  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  billion, 
or  three  and  a  half  billion  dollars  for  the  annual  revenue  of  the 
allied  powers.  As  against  this,  the  Allies'  strength  in  this 
regard  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  British  Empire  over 
$2,000,000,000 ;  France,  over  $1,000,000,000 ;  Italy  half  a  billion ; 
Russia  less  than  $2,000,000,000;  Belgium,  $150,000,000.  This 
totals  to  five  and  a  half  billion  dollars  for  the  annual  revenue 
of  the  allied  powers. 

If  one  were  comparing  solely  the  financial  strength  and 
stability  of  the  contrasted  nations,  it  might  be  well  to  proceed 
from  this  point  to  a  comparison  of  the  exports  and  imports  of 
each,  determining  the  character  of  each  and  the  preponderance 
of  the  former  over  the  latter  in  value  in  order  to  express  the 
earning  value  of  each  nation.  But  the  subject  under  view  is 
not  this  contrast  of  nations  solely  as  economic  units,  but  of 
nations  at  war.  It  is  obvious  that  if  two  nations — Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  for  example — have  revenues  approximately  the 
same,  $2,000,000,000,  and  one  spends  twenty  per  cent  on 
military  and  naval  preparedness  while  the  other  spends  ten  per 


FINANCIAL   RESOURCES  413 

cent,  the  former  will  be  better  equipped  than  the  latter,  though 
their  revenues  were  equal.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  expenditure 
for  military  and  naval  equipment  that  tells  the  tale,  as  well  as 
the  holding  well  in  hand  of  a  sufficient  store  of  ready  money  to 
use  in  the  case  of  quick  mobilization.  Military  budgets  are  an 
unsafe  guide,  taken  by  themselves.  To  use  the  same  nations 
as  an  example,  if  Germany  voted  $300,000,000  (as  she  did  for 
the  year  ending  March,  1914),  and  Great  Britain  $350,000,000 
(as  she  did  for  the  year  ending  December,  1913),  it  does  not 
follow  that  Great  Britain  thereby  increased  in  military  strength 
proportionately  to  Germany.  On  the  contrary,  the  necessity 
of  keeping  up  the  huge  military  and  naval  establishment  de- 
manded by  the  vastly  larger  territory  of  the  British  Empire 
forced  Great  Britain  to  an  upkeep  expenditure  considerably 
larger  than  that  of  Germany.  Each  of  these  factors  is  to  be 
taken  into  account  when  measuring  financial  strength. 

Again  taking  the  Central  Powers  first,  it  may  be  well  to  see 
how  Germany  financed  the  war  at  the  outset.  Using  the  valua- 
tion of  twenty-five  cents  for  a  mark,  it  will  be  recalled  that  Ger- 
many planted  $31,600,000  in  gold  from  the  French  indemnity 
in  the  famous  war  chest  at  Spandau,  shortly  after  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War  of  1870-1871.  In  June,  1913,  eleven  months 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  European  War,  the  Reichstag 
voted  to  double  this  amount  in  gold,  the  addition  to  be  known  as 
the  Spandau  Tower  Reserve,  but  not  to  be  placed  in  the  tower. 
This  was  deposited  in  the  Reichsbank,  yet  not  to  be  counted  as 
among  the  bank's  holdings.  In  the  vaults  of  that  bank  were 
normally  $300,000,000  in  specie,  chiefly  gold,  and  during  the 
last  couple  of  months  before  the  war  this  had  been  brought  up 
to  near  $400,000,000. 

The  concentration  of  finances  shows  that  Germany  had  been 
making  ready  against  war  in  financial  matters  as  well  as  in 
military  affairs,  as  have  all  the  other  European  powers.  Ger- 
many was  mobilized  against  France  in  1905,  but  the  Algeciras 
Conference,  which  patched  up  the  agreement,  was  a  matter  largely 
arranged  by  the  financial  interests.  In  other  words,  the  armies 
were  ready,  but  the  resource  of  money  was  not.  Modern  war 


414  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

cannot  be  run  without  huge  expenditures.  The  moneybags 
were  not  ready  for  mobilization. 

Then  came  the  dramatic  year  of  1911.  The  Morocco  incident 
aroused  France,  the  Panther  incident  added  to  the  friction 
between  England  and  Germany,  and  European  bankers  began 
withdrawing  their  support  from  Germany.  It  is,  perhaps,  not 
an  extreme  estimate  to  say  that  Germany  was  conducting  from 
72  to  74  per  cent  of  her  commercial  affairs  on  borrowed  money. 
Paris  and  London  began  to  call  their  loans.  New  York  followed 
suit.  German  financial  circles  suffered  a  shock.  They  tried  to  raise 
money  in  the  United  States,  borrowing  from  Peter  to  pay  Paul, 
and  offered  large  interest.  To  some  extent  they  were  successful, 
but  the  lenders  stipulated  that  the  money  should  be  used  for 
"legitimate"  purposes,  in  other  words,  that  it  should  not  be  used 
in  a  hostile  sense  against  the  nations  who  were  the  lenders.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  the  German  bankers  were  asked  if  they 
were  in  a  position  to  be  able  to  meet  the  expense  of  war  and 
replied  in  a  decided  negative.  The  kaiser's  reply  has  become 
historic. 

"Gentlemen,"  he  said,  "when  I  next  call  on  you,  I  shall  expect 
you  to  be  ready." 

The  German  bankers  continued  their  preparations,  as  directed. 
Two  years  later,  in  1913,  that  year  marked  by  startling  military 
preparations  on  every  hand,  with  government  securities  in  every 
part  lower  than  they  had  been  for  a  generation,  a  huge  Prussian 
loan  was  unsuccessfully  precipitated.  Its  failure  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  there  was  no  way  of  disguising  that  the  proceeds  of 
the  loan  were  to  meet  the  cost  of  the  new  military  program 
that  had  been  promulgated. 

Subsequent  to  this  fiasco,  for  it  was  nothing  less,  came  Ger- 
many's drastic  action  of  putting  a  tax  on  capital,  a  recourse 
never  resorted  to,  save  under  urgent  conditions.  Moreover,  the 
tax  was  so  burdensome,  that  nothing  but  the  realization  that 
national  safety  was  at  stake  could  have  justified  it.  It  laid  an 
impost  on  incomes  of  both  sexes  as  low  as  $250  per  annum,  and 
on  all  fortunes  from  $2,500  upwards.  Kings  and  princes  were 
taxed  in  the  same  ratio  as  professional  men  and  small  trades- 


FINANCIAL    RESOURCES  415 

men.  On  his  personal  fortune  of  $35,000,000  the  kaiser  had  to 
pay  a  tax  of  $500,000  and  on  his  income  of  $3,500,000  per  year, 
the  8  per  cent  tax  netted  $280,000.  The  kaiser's  personal  con- 
tribution to  the  war,  therefore,  was  nearly  a  million  dollars. 
Another  half  million  was  secured  by  taxes  from  members  of 
the  emperor's  family.  The  big  industries  were  forced  to  yield 
up,  and  the  tax  upon  the  Krupps  alone  was  over  $2,500,000. 

At  this  point  a  serious  complication  occurred,  which  had  an 
important  effect  upon  Germany's  financial  resources  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  war.  This  was  the  fact  that  when  the  war  actually 
broke  out,  this  tax  had  not  been  collected,  although  the  assess- 
ments had  been  made.  Accordingly  it  was  impossible  for  Ger- 
many to  have  recourse  to  a  moratorium,  since  the  Government 
could  not  suspend  the  heavy  taxation  on  which  it  was  relying 
as  a  second  reserve,  immediately  upon  the  emptying  of  the  war 
chest  at  Spandau,  and  it  could  not  collect  the  taxes  if  the  people 
could  not  collect  their  debts. 

The  condition  of  the  Reichsbank,  in  spite  of  this  situation, 
had  remained  good  during  the  spring  of  1914.  On  April  23, 
for  example,  the  Imperial  Bank  return  showed  increases  over 
the  preceding  week  of  more  than  $10,000,000  in  gold  and  more 
than  $5,000,000  in  silver,  while  the  note  circulation  had  been 
reduced  by  $30,000,000  and  the  total  note  circulation  was  $22,- 
593,000  below  the  tax-free  maximum.  June  told  another  story. 
On  June  30  the  bank  returns  displayed  a  reduction  of  $16,- 
000,000  and  a  reduction  of  $50,000,000  in  the  bank  deposits 
(counting  all  its  489  branches),  while  the  note  circulation  in- 
creased by  a  trifle  over  $150,000,000.  In  July,  matters 
strengthened,  and  on  July  23,  the  day  before  the  publication  of 
the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  there  was  an  increase  in  gold 
and  deposits  and  a  fair  decrease  in  note  circulation.  Between 
July  23  and  August  1,  the  day  of  the  declaration  of  war  with 
Russia,  the  stock  of  gold  dropped  $25,000,000,  and  the  note 
circulation  jumped  $300,000,000. 

Then  came  war  and  war  measures.  The  first  of  these  was 
the  authorization  of  an  extraordinary  expenditure  to  the  extent 
of  $1,250,000,000.  The  Reichsbank  was  officially  put  in  charge 


416  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

of  the  money  she  had  in  her  vaults  at  the  Spandau  Tower 
Reserve,  and  also  of  the  funds  in  the  Spandau  war  chest.  The 
tax  on  notes  for  which  there  was  no  bullion  to  redeem,  was 
removed,  all  paper  money  was  made  legal  tender  and  the  bank 
was  relieved  of  its  obligation  to  give  gold  for  paper  when  such 
was  demanded.  Special  loan  institutions  were  established  in 
connection  with  the  Reichsbank  and  special  loan  paper  was 
issued  on  almost  any  basis,  even  for  the  smallest  sums,  this 
loan  paper  being  given  a  semiofficial  status.  Through  this 
means  the  Government  was  able  to  secure  the  taxes,  by  enabling 
the  public  to  borrow  on  almost  all  its  existing  investments.  By 
these  policies  Germany  was  able  to  open  the  war  with  a  large 
store  of  gold  and  silver,  without  a  moratorium  and  with  a  large 
amount  of  money  coming  in  from  the  direct  tax  ready  to  back 
up  the  stores  already  in  hand. 

Germany  is  the  banker  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  for  that 
reason  much  space  has  been  given  to  her  financial  resources 
immediately  prior  to  and  at  the  opening  of  the  war.  Austria- 
Hungary,  from  the  financial  point  of  view,  was  a  source  of 
weakness  rather  than  strength  to  the  Central  Powers,  im- 
mediately before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  though  immediately 
afterward,  under  the  stimulus  of  national  need,  energetic 
measures  did  much  to  put  Austria-Hungary  on  an  independent 
war  footing.  Austria's  "war  chest"  was  small  and  surrounded 
with  so  much  secrecy  that  it  was  often  declared  to  be  nonexistent. 
Yet  the  Austrian  army  and  navy  was  kept  up  to  a  high  standard, 
the  budget  for  1913  being  over  $100,000,000  for  military  and 
naval  purposes  alone.  This  sum  is  large,  when  it  is  remembered 
that  Austria  has  no  colonies  to  defend,  and  that  a  large  part  of 
her  border  is  that  of  Germany,  a  friendly  neighbor. 

Passing  directly  to  the  question  of  Austro-Hungary's  financial 
preparedness,  or,  in  other  words,  to  her  financial  resources  at 
the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  one  comes  suddenly  face 
to  face  with  the  great  weakness  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  the 
ethnic  conflict,  the  clash  of  opposing  races.  "In  the  Reichsrat/' 
says  an  authority,  writing  of  the  fall  and  winter  of  1913,  fol- 
lowing upon  the  extension  of  army  and  navy  programs,  "parlia- 


FINANCIAL    RESOURCES  417 

mentary  activities  were  made  practically  impossible  by  the 
disorderly  and  obstructionist  tactics  of  the  opposition.  At  the  end 
of  December,  1913,  the  Ruthenians,  who  had  been  most  trouble- 
some, consented  for  a  time  to  abandon  their  obstruction  in  order 
that  a  few  important  bills  might  be  passed.  The  month  was 
not  allowed  to  pass  without  a  renewal  of  obstruction  in  the 
Lower  House,  this  time  by  the  Czech  minority.  The  quarrels 
between  Germans  and  Czechs  in  1913  had  led  to  the  dissolution 
of  the  Bohemian  Provincial  Diet.  On  March  5,  the  Reichsrat 
had  been  called  together  again,  for  the  purpose  of  voting 
military  and  financial  measures;  but  as  the  Czechs  were  clearly 
bent  on  resuming  their  obstructionist  tactics,  the  Reichsrat  was 
prorogued  on  March  16.  Neither  budget  nor  army  bill  had  been 
voted." 

In  the  meantime  scenes  of  even  worse  disorder  and  violence 
had  been  proceeding  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament.  The  guards 
were  called  in  to  expel  members  of  the  opposition  on  several 
occasions,  and  it  was  on  one  of  these  occasions,  when  the  entire 
opposition  members  of  Parliament  had  been  expelled  by  force, 
that  the  Army  Bill  was  passed.  A  loan  bill,  authorizing  a  4V& 
per  cent  loan  of  approximately  $100,000,000,  also  failed  of 
passage  until  after  members  had  been  expelled  from  the 
chamber.  The  budget  debate  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament 
finally  ended  on  May  6,  when  a  loan  of  $80,000,000  was  ordered 
as  Hungary's  share  in  the  extraordinary  joint  naval  and  military 
expenditures  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  In  Austria,  owing  to  the 
parliamentary  entanglement,  the  Government  issued  Treasury 
bills  to  provide  for  current  expenses  and  on  June  3  called  for 
a  loan,  for  military  purposes,  of  about  $45,000,000.  To  follow 
out  the  workings  of  these  loans,  and  the  share  borne  in  them 
by  Germany,  would  avail  little  in  showing  the  financial  resources 
of  Austria,  by  reason  of  the  financial  coalition  which  practically 
occurred  between  the  Central  Powers  soon  after  the  opening  of 
the  war. 


418  THE  STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

CHAPTER    XIII 

ASSEMBLING     OF     THE     GERMAN     ARMIES 

"HIKE  German  mobilization  was  the  greatest  movement  of  peo- 
•*-  pie  that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Nearly  four  million  people 
had  to  be  transported  from  every  part  of  the  empire  to  her  bor- 
ders. The  manner  in  which  the  population  is  distributed  made 
the  task  extremely  difficult.  Berlin,  Rhenish  Westphalia,  Upper 
Silesia,  and  Saxony,  especially  had  to  send  their  contingents  in 
every  direction,  since  the  eastern  provinces  are  more  thinly 
settled  and  had  to  have  a  stronger  guard  for  the  borders  immedi- 
ately. The  result  was  a  hurrying  to  and  fro  of  thousands  and 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  soldiers,  besides  a  flood  of  civilians  who 
had  to  reach  their  homes  as  soon  as  possible.  Countries  where 
the  population  is  more  regularly  distributed  have  an  easier  task 
than  Germany,  with  its  predominating  urban  population. 

"The  difficulties  of  the  gigantic  undertaking  were  also  in- 
creased by  the  necessity  for  transporting  war  materials  of  every 
sort.  In  the  west  are  chiefly  industrial  undertakings,  in  the  east 
mainly  agricultural.  Horse  raising  is  mostly  confined  to  the 
provinces  on  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  but  chiefly  to  East 
Prussia,  and  this  province,  the  farthest  away  from  France,  had 
to  send  its  best  horses  to  the  western  border,  as  did  also 
Schleswig-Holstein  and  Hanover.  Coal  for  our  warships  had  to 
go  in  the  other  direction.  From  the  Rhenish  mines  it  went  to 
the  North  Sea,  from  Upper  Silesia  to  the  Baltic.  Ammunition 
and  heavy  projectiles  were  transported  from  the  central  part  of 
the  empire  to  its  borders.  And  everywhere  these  operations  had 
to  be  carried  on  with  haste.  .  .  . 

"And  how  was  it  carried  on?  No  one  could  have  wondered  if 
there  had  been  hundreds  of  unforeseen  incidents,  if  military 
trains  had  arrived  at  their  stations  with  great  delays,  if  there 
had  resulted  in  many  places  a  wild  hugger-mugger  from  the 
tremendous  problems  on  hand.  But  there  was  not  a  trace  of  this. 
.  .  .  All  moved  with  the  regularity  of  clockwork.  Regiments 


ASSEMBLING    OF   THE    GERMAN   ARMIES       419 


GREAT  BRITAIN      6OOOOO 

NOT  INCLUDING    COLONIAL,  AND   INDIAN   ARMIES 

BULGARIA       S50  OOO 


SERBIA  350OOO 

BELGIUM  I80OOC 

MONTENEGRO          ^-OOOO 


420  THE  STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

that  had  been  ordered  to  mobilize  in  the  forenoon  left  in  the 
evening  for  the  field,  fully  equipped.  .  .  . 

"A  thing  that  raised  the  national  enthusiasm  still  higher  was 
the  appearance  of  the  troops  in  brand-new  uniforms,  complete 
from  head  to  feet.  The  first  sight  of  these  new  uniforms  of 
modest,  field  gray,  faultlessly  made,  evoked  everywhere  the  ques- 
tion :  Where  did  they  come  from  ?  On  the  first  day  of  mobiliza- 
tion dozens  of  cloth  manufacturers  appeared  at  the  War  Ministry 
with  offers  of  new  material.  'We  don't  want  any'  was  the  aston- 
ishing reply.  Equal  amazement  was  caused  by  the  faultless 
boots  and  shoes  of  the  new  troops,  especially  in  view  of  the  recent 
famous  'boot  speech'  of  the  French  Senator  Humbert. 

"Small  arms,  cannon,  and  ammunition  are  so  plentiful,  that 
they  have  merely  to  be  unpacked.  In  view  of  all  this,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  the  regiments  marching  in  were  everywhere  greeted 
with  jubilation,  and  that  those  marching  out  took  leave  of  their 
garrisons  with  joyful  songs.  No  one  thinks  of  death  and  destruc- 
tion, every  one  of  happy  victory  and  joyful  reunion.  German 
discipline,  once  so  slandered,  now  celebrates  its  triumph. 

"There  was  still  another  matter  in  which  the  troops  gave  their 
countrymen  cause  for  rejoicing.  Not  one  drunken  man  was 
seen  during  these  earnest  days  on  the  city  streets.  The  General 
Staff  had,  moreover,  wisely  ordered  that  during  the  mobiliza- 
tion, when  every  one  had  money  in  his  pockets,  alcoholic  drinks 
were  not  to  be  sold  at  the  railroad  stations.  .  .  . 

"The  army  is  increased  to  many  times  its  ordinary  strength 
by  the  mobilization.  It  draws  from  everywhere  millions  of  sol- 
diers, workmen,  horses,  wagons,  and  other  materials.  The  entire 
railway  service  it  at  its  disposal.  .  .  .  Not  only  is  our  great 
army  mobilized,  but  the  whole  folk  is  mobilized,  and  the  distri- 
bution of  labor,  the  food  question,  and  the  care  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  are  all  being  provided  for.  The  whole  German  folk 
has  become  a  gigantic  war  camp,  all  are  mobilized  to  protect 
kaiser,  folk,  and  fatherland,  as  the  closing  report  of  the  Reichs- 
tag put  it." 

From  this  German  statement  of  German  mobilization  by  a 
German  committee  of  men  of  the  utmost  standing  in  the  empire 


ASSEMBLING    OF    THE    GERMAN    ARMIES       421 

certain  things  stand  out  very  clearly.  Of  this  the  first  one  is 
that,  with  a  peace  strength  of  less  than  a  million,  on  the  very 
first  flush  of  mobilization,  every  possible  contingency  for  the 
mobilization  of  four  million  men  was  at  hand.  German  mobiliza- 
tion, therefore,  was  not  the  devising  of  plans  to  carry  out  a  pro- 
ject, but  it  was  rather  the  putting  into  action  of  a  vast  interact- 
ing series  of  preparation  that  had  long  been  made  and  carefully 
conceived  for  an  attack  upon  the  powers  to  the  westward.  From 
every  point  of  view,  looking  at  the  mobilization  at  the  opening  of 
the  war,  Germany's  was  the  most  rapid  and  the  most  complete, 
and,  as  the  "Truth  about  Germany"  states,  it  was  perhaps  the 
imost  marvelous  piece  of  military  mobilization  that  the  world 
has  ever  seen. 

As  mobilization  finally  results  in  army  corps,  and  is  designed  to 
fit  into  a  frame,  the  component  parts  of  an  army  corps  may  be 
set  forth  to  show  the  way  in  which  all  the  various  units  have  to 
be  drawn  together  to  their  places  on  a  battle  front.  A  complete 
army  corps  of  the  German  scheme  consists  of  56,000  combatants 
and  12,000  men  in  the  supply  train.  Of  this,  63.81  per  cent  are 
infantry,  11.56  per  cent  cavalry,  10.99  field  artillery,  4.21  per 
cent  light  artillery,  4.21  engineer  corps,  etc.,  hospital  corps  1.04, 
and  miscellaneous  2.02  per  cent.  There  are  4  brigades  with  24 
battalions,  there  are  24  batteries  of  field  artillery  with  144  guns, 
there  are  8  squadrons  of  cavalry,  4  howitzer  batteries  with  16 
heavy  howitzers,  a  machine-gun  section,  a  battalion  of  rifles,  a 
battalion  of  engineers,  a  telegraph  section,  a  bridge  train,  6 
provision  columns,  7  wagon-park  columns,  a  stretcher-bearer 
column,  a  horse  depot,  a  field  bakery,  12  field  hospitals,  and  8 
ammunition  columns. 

One  has  but  to  think  of  the  various  places  from  which  these 
men  and  stores  must  come,  of  the  thousands  of  horses  and 
hundreds  of  wagons,  of  the  millions  of  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion, speeding  from  different  points  over  different  railroads,  and 
when  disembarked  by  roads,  by  lanes,  even  by  small  bypaths 
to  the  appointed  place  on  the  battle  front,  to  realize  what  a  mar- 
velous feat  is  mobilization  of  a  modern  army  at  the  time  of  an 
outbreak  of  war. 

G— Gt.  War  2 


422  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

An  insight  into  the  manner  in  which  this  can  be  carried  out, 
and  incidentally,  an  insight  into  the  preparedness  of  Germany 
for  the  war,  is  seen  in  an  analysis  of  the  extraordinary  and  other- 
wise inexplicable  network  of  railways  recently  erected  by  Ger- 
many to  tap  the  frontiers  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg. 

"In  the  southwest  corner  of  Prussia,"  says  Walter  Littlefield, 
writing  on  this  subject,  "is  a  rectangular  piece  of  territory,  the 
western  and  eastern  sides  of  which  are  formed  respectively  by 
the  Belgian  and  Luxemburg  frontiers  and  the  River  Rhine.  .  .  . 
Five  years  ago,  this  little  corner  of  Prussia  had  about  15.10  miles 
of  railway  to  every  hundred  square  miles  of  territory.  At  the 
opening  of  the  war  this  had  increased  to  28.30.  In  five  years, 
without  any  apparent  industrial  and  commercial  demand  for  it, 
this  traction  has  been  increased  to  nearly  twice  its  length. 
Villages  of  less  than  1,300  inhabitants  have  been  linked  up  with 
double-track  lines.  For  example,  Pelm  is  2%  miles  from  Gerol- 
stein,  a  town  principally  of  comic-opera  fame,  and  yet  over  this 
short  distance,  between  the  two  villages,  there  are  laid  down 
six  parallel  lines  of  rail,  besides  numerous  additional  sidings.  .  . . 
Few  of  these  lines,  it  is  to  be  noted,  cross  the  frontier.  Three  of 
them,  as  late  as  last  May  (this  was  written  in  the  fall  of  1914), 
led  to  blind  terminals  within  a  day's  march  of  it — the  double  line 
from  Cologne  via  Stolberg  to  Weiwertz,  the  double  line  from 
Cologne  via  Junkerath  and  Weiwertz  to  St.  With  and  the  double 
line  from  Remagen  via  Hillesheim  and  Pelm  to  Pronsfeld." 

"Another  point  that  is  noticeable,"  says  another  observer, 
quoted  in  the  same  article,  "is  that  provision  exists  everywhere 
at  these  new  junctions  and  extensions  for  avoiding  an  upline 
crossing  a  down  line  on  the  level,  the  upline  is  carried  over  the 
down  line  by  a  bridge,  involving  long  embankments  on  both 
sides  (so  new  that  as  yet  nothing  has  had  time  to  grow  on  them) 
at  great  expense,  but  enormously  simplifying  traffic  problems, 
when  it  comes  to  a  question  of  full  troop  trains  pushing  through 
at  the  rate  of  one  every  quarter  of  an  hour,  and  the  empty  cars 
returning  eastward  at  the  same  rate. 

"The  detraining  stations  are  of  sufficient  length  to  accommo- 
date the  longest  troop  train  (ten  cars)  easily,  and  they  gener- 


FRENCH    MOBILIZATION  423 

ally  have  at  least  four  sidings  apart  from  the  through  up  and 
down  lines.  Moreover,  at  almost  every  station  there  are  two 
lines  of  sidings  long  enough  for  troop  trains,  so  that  they  can  be 
used  to  some  extent  as  detraining  stations,  and  so  that  a  couple 
of  troop  trains  can  be  held  up  at  any  time  while  traffic  continues 
uninterrupted." 

Such  facts  of  railway  preparedness  explain,  in  a  great  meas- 
ure, the  means  whereby  Germany  was  able  to  launch  upon  the 
Belgian,  Luxemburg,  and  French  frontiers  such  a  vast  array  of 
fully  equipped  troops  almost  at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  It  must  be  left  to  the  reader  to  determine  whether 
there  is  any  connection  between  this  activity  of  railroad  building 
in  a  district  industrially  inactive  on  a  frontier  that  was  always 
held  inviolate,  and  the  violation  of  that  territory  by  means  of 
these  very  railroads.  Facts  remain  facts,  however,  and  the 
absolutely  admitted  facts  declare  that  German  mobilization  was 
directed,  not  at  the  French  frontier,  but  at  the  frontier  of  Luxem- 
burg and  Belgium,  especially  at  the  great  Belgian  plain,  com- 
manded and  dominated  by  the  great  fortress  of  Liege.  In  the 
story  of  that  siege  will  be  shown  its  topographic  position.  As 
bearing  upon  the  subject  of  mobilization,  however,  it  is  to  be 
remembered  that  at  this  point,  Belgium,  and  not  at  France,  was 
directed  the  main  first  mobilization  of  the  German  army. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

FRENCH      MOBILIZATION 

T71RENCH  mobilization  was  smooth,  but  slow.  France's  great 
•*•  disadvantage,  making  her  mobilization  slow,  was  that  her 
regiments  were  not  territorially  recruited,  whereas  the  German 
army  was  entirely  based  on  territorial  recruitment.  Where  it 
would  take  a  French  regiment  to  receive  its  reserve  men  and  be 
completed  on  war  footing  in  about  four  days,  the  German  regi- 
ment could  be  completed  on  war  footing  within  four  to  five  days. 


424 


THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 


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FRENCH   MOBILIZATION  425 

France  in  recognition  of  this  weakness  had  on  her  eastern 
borders  special  troops  stationed  called  "troops  de  couverture." 
Moreover,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  all  the  French  railways  center 
in  Paris,  and  the  nearness  of  the  capital  to  the  frontier  is  a  gain 
as  well  as  a  source  of  danger.  Therefore,  from  the  railways 
running  to  the  frontier  from  Paris,  and  from  the  strong  garrison 
at  the  great  Verdun  to  Belfort  chain  of  forts,  France  was  able 
to  bring  into  effect  at  once  enough  men  to  present  a  strong  face 
to  the  foe. 

Here  Germany's  reason  for  invading  Belgium  appeared. 
French  mobilization  assumed  the  integrity  of  Belgium  and  Lux- 
emburg. Her  mobilization  was  directed  to  the  German  frontier. 
Had  Germany  been  able  to  go  through  Belgium  without  an  hour's 
delay  the  situation  would  have  been  serious  for  France,  for  she 
mobilized  on  the  wrong  front.  Germany  had  correctly  assumed 
that  France  would  expect  her  to  abide  by  the  treaties,  and  con- 
sequently by  disavowing  these  obligations  had  outguessed  her 
Gallic  neighbor.  The  speedy  mobilization  of  Belgium,  and  the 
heroic  defense  of  that  little  land  by  its  gallant  citizens,  did  much 
to  alter  the  possible  destinies  of  the  war,  not  because  there  was 
at  any  time  any  expectation  that  Belgium  would  be  able  entirely 
to  resist  the  passage  of  the  armies  of  the  kaiser,  but  because  the 
delay  which  her  defense  caused  gave  the  French  troops  time  to 
mobilize  in  the  direction  whither  the  blow  was  designed. 

The  first  movement  against  Germany  was  when  M.  Eyschen, 
a  member  of  the  cabinet  of  the  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  drove  in 
his  motor  car  across  the  great  Adolf  Bridge,  which  had  been 
seized  by  Germany  and  confronted  the  leading  officer  of  the  Ger- 
man advance  guard  with  a  copy  of  the  treaty  guaranteeing  the 
neutrality  of  the  state.  The  reigning  Grand  Duchess  Marie 
Adelaide  blocked  the  way  with  her  motor  car,  she  was  ordered 
to  return  at  once,  and  when  General  Vandyck,  commandant  of 
Luxemburg,  arrived,  he  was  confronted  with  a  revolver. 

At  the  end  of  July,  when  there  was  evidence  that  the  storm 
which  had  been  brewing  ever  since  Austria  sent  an  ultimatum  to 
Serbia  on  July  23,  1914,  thirteen  classes  of  Belgian  recruits  were 
called  to  the  colors;  but  even  so,  at  its  full  war  strength  on 


426  THE  STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

August  1,  1914,  the  entire  army  numbered  only  160,000  men. 
Owing  to  the  small  size  of  the  Belgian  army  and  the  small  terri- 
tory of  that  country,  and  also  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  is  one  of 
the  most  thoroughly  equipped  countries  of  the  world  so  far  as 
railroads  are  concerned,  Belgian  mobilization  presented  few 
difficulties  for  the  concentration  of  the  few  available  troops. 

But  Belgium  was  in  the  midst  of  reorganization  of  its  national 
defenses  and  its  army,  and  so  was  de  facto  unprepared  to  use  to 
the  utmost  the  advantages  of  great  fortresses  of  Liege,  Namur, 
and  Amsterdam,  which  could  have  been  made  almost  impreg- 
nable if  the  necessary  field  army  and  artillery  material  had  ex- 
isted. The  fortresses  of  Liege  and  Namur  demanded  a  garrison 
of  about  250,000  men  and  artillery,  and  there  were  only  about 
30,000  men  disponible.  If  the  organization  of  the  national  de- 
fense of  Belgium  had  been  completed,  the  Belgian  army  would 
have  been  probably  of  a  strength  of  over  600,000  men,  well 
trained,  instead  of  the  poorly  trained  army  of  about  160,000 
combatants  equipped  only  for  parade,  and  the  story  of  that  part 
of  the  Great  War  would  have  been  another. 

The  German  cavalry  entered  Belgium  and  pushed  on  ahead, 
and  a  few  stray  shots  were  fired,  but  the  first  Belgian  town  of 
Limburg,  on  the  road  to  Liege,  was  occupied  without  attack.  At 
Verviers  a  weak  Belgian  force  was  driven  out  by  the  strong 
advance  guard  of  the  German  cavalry.  This  was  the  "peaceful 
invasion  of  Belgian  territory"  spoken  of  in  the  earliest  telegrams 
sent  to  the  kaiser  from  the  advancing  army.  Then  the  German 
troops  suddenly  found  themselves  confronted  by  the  destruction 
of  the  Trois  Fonts  tunnels,  and  by  the  wrecked  bridges  across 
the  Meuse.  The  attack  upon  Vise,  which  had  been  figured  by  the 
Germans  to  be  a  matter  of  form,  and  not  requiring  a  body  of 
troops  of  any  size,  was  stopped  by  blown-up  bridges,  and  a  de- 
tachment of  German  engineers,  undertaking  to  build  a  new 
pontoon  bridge,  was  shot  to  pieces.  Belgium,  having  thus  thrown 
down  the  gauntlet,  concentrated  its  troops,  a  little  over  100,000, 
on  a  line  back  of  the  forts  of  Liege  and  Namur.  King  Albert 
himself  was  at  the  front,  and  not  only  directed,  but  also  led  the 
defense. 


FRENCH    MOBILIZATION  427 

This  gallant  action  on  the  part  of  Belgium  formed  a  screen 
behind  which  the  French  troops  could  mobilize  in  full  order  and 
with  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  intention  of  the  enemy.  Already 
the  skies  were  filled  with  scouting  aircraft  and  wireless  messages 
buzzed  incessantly  from  the  overhead  scouts  of  the  movements  of 
the  hostile  troops  rushing  from  Berlin,  from  Cologne,  from  every 
point  of  the  German  Empire  to  the  three  frontiers  of  Luxem- 
burg, Belgium,  and  France.  And,  all  the  while,  the  band  of 
devoted  heroes  at  Liege  held  to  their  ideal  of  independence,  and 
Belgium  grew  to  be  a  bigger  thing  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  as 
her  territory  grew  hourly  smaller  by  the  encroachment  of  the 
German  invaders. 

French  mobilization,  in  spite  of  the  prompt  action  in  sending 
the  first  half  million  to  the  front,  became  disorganized  under  the 
discovery  of  the  plans  of  Germany.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  French  railroad  systems  all  center  in  Paris.  Therefore,  in 
order  to  divert  the  troops  to  what  was  seen  to  be  the  point  of 
attack,  brigades  had  to  be  brought  back  from  the  Verdun-Belfort 
district  and  transshipped  to  the  north.  This,  in  a  word,  was  the 
answer  to  the  question  why  France  did  not  rush  to  the  aid  of 
Belgium  and  hurl  her  forces  at  the  Germans  at  the  gates  of 
Liege.  For  that  mobilization  they  were  not  ready.  The  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  had  been  considered  as  a  true  military  barrier. 

A  glance  at  the  railroad  map  of  France  shows  how  thoroughly 
(and  unwisely)  France  had  trusted  to  this  treaty,  the  treaty 
that  became  famous  when  it  was  declared  by  Germany  to  be 
merely  a  "scrap  of  paper,"  for  while  there  are  good  transport 
facilities  to  the  Franco-German  frontier,  there  were  few  to  the 
Franco-Belgian  frontier.  The  motor  busses  practically  saved  the 
day,  and  nearly  all  the  French  troops  went  to  the  northern  front 
by  this  means  of  transport.  Still  more  difficult  was  the  question 
of  munitions.  The  German  railways  brought  troops  at  forty 
miles  an  hour,  the  French  lines  carried  munitions  at  forty  miles 
per  day.  For  her  German  frontier  she  was  ready.  For  this  new 
contingency  she  was  unprepared. 

For  this  unpreparedness  France  paid  dearly.  Some  of  her 
richest  provinces  were  invaded  and  held  all  through  the  early 


428  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

part  of  the  war  by  Germany,  almost  solely  because  her  trans- 
portation of  troops  to  the  crucial  point  was  not  effective.  The 
mere  presence  of  the  Germans  over  so  large  a  section  of  French 
territory  was  due  solely  to  the  rapidity  of  the  German  mobiliza- 
tion, which  was  the  result  of  long  years  of  preparation.  Even 
behind  the  Belgian  screen  France  did  not  move  rapidly  enough  to 
save  herself,  only  barely  rapidly  enough  to  save  Paris.  The 
plan  of  General  Joffre,  which  entailed  a  gradual  retreat  to  let 
the  Germans  expand  far  from  their  base,  while  the  French  con- 
centrated between  the  border  and  Paris,  was  a  move  determined, 
not  by  any  special  theory  of  war,  nor  yet  by  special  configuration 
of  the  country,  but  by  the  slowness  of  mobilization.  The  initial 
success  of  Germany  was  a  victory  of  thorough  preparedness,  the 
initial  defeats  of  the  French  army  were  the  results  of  military 
preparedness  hampered  by  politics. 

As  the  campaign  developed,  the  mobilization  of  the  Germans  on 
the  west  front  was  seen  to  have  a  double  purpose.  The  armies 
of  Von  Kluck  were  to  hold  Belgium  and  the  north  of  France, 
while  the  armies  of  the  crown  prince  were  to  march  through 
Luxemburg  and  batter  down  the  Verdun-Belfort  line.  It  has  been 
shown  how  the  rapid  mobilization  and  gallant  defense  of  Liege 
by  the  Belgians  delayed  the  former.  Without  aircraft  it  was 
more  than  possible  that,  behind  the  screen  of  the  forests  of 
Luxemburg,  France  might  not  have  known  what  forces  were 
being  concentrated  on  that  frontier,  and  might  have  weakened 
the  line  to  rush  troops  against  Von  Kluck.  But  the  French 
aviators,  who  are  the  best  in  the  world,  were  able  to  fly  over  the 
territory  of  Germany  and  Luxemburg  where  troops  were  mobi- 
lizing, and  the  information  they  sent  down  was  sufficiently 
alarming  to  keep  France  from  weakening  the  Franco-German 
fortress-defended  line  too  seriously.  This,  again,  handicapped 
France  from  being  able  to  go  to  the  support  of  Belgium.  The 
dramatic  plan  of  the  crown  prince's  hammering  march  to  Paris 
failed  absolutely  and  completely  by  the  successful  defense  of 
Verdun. 


FRENCH   MOBILIZATION 


429 


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THE    FORTRESSES    ON    THE    GERMAN-FRENCH    FRONTIER 


430  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

CHAPTER    XV 

BRITAIN  —  RUSSIA  —  AUSTRIA 

THE  initial  mobilization  of  Great  Britain  was  a  matter  as  well 
managed  as  that  of  Germany.  For  precision  there  was  noth- 
ing to  choose  as  between  them.  Yet,  comparing  the  German 
and  British  mobilizations,  one  thing  stands  out  clearly,  viz.,  that 
Germany  was  ready  and  Britain  unready,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  Germany  had  to  move  4,000,000  men  and  England  only 
100,000.  To  offset  this,  Britain  had  to  mobilize  stores  and  sup- 
plies, not  only  for  her  own  100,000  expeditionary  force,  but  for 
a  large  part  of  the  armies  of  France  and  for  all  the  armies  of 
Belgium.  Even  the  very  motor  busses  that  carried  French  troops 
from  Paris  to  the  Belgian  frontier  were  largely  English,  two 
cargoes  of  100  vehicles  each  being  rushed  across  the  English 
Channel  on  the  same  day. 

The  food  question  for  the  Belgian  army  and  for  the  French 
armies  on  the  Belgian  frontier  was  acute  at  the  opening  of  the 
war.  France  was  ready  and  prepared  to  handle  any  eventuality 
in  the  way  of  supplies  that  might  be  needed  on  the  Belfort- 
Verdun  line,  but  she  was  not  prepared  for  the  conditions  in  the 
rear  of  the  Belgian  frontier.  Britain  came  to  the  support  of 
France  and  Belgium  without  a  day's  delay.  She  rushed  food  and 
munitions  to  the  front,  and  on  one  occasion  Kitchener  fed  two 
French  army  corps,  or  80,000  troops,  for  eleven  days  without  the 
slightest  hitch.  A  moment's  thought  will  show  that  this  means 
not  only  the  ability  to  send  food,  but  also  to  organize  the  entire 
mechanism  of  the  preparing  and  handling  of  that  food. 

This  was  made  possible  largely  by  what  was  known  in  Britain 
as  the  motor-lorry  system,  unlike  that  of  any  other  army,  intro- 
duced in  1911.  Horse  transport  was  relegated  solely  to  the  work 
of  distributing,  the  conveyance  of  supplies  to  the  areas  occupied 
being  performed  wholly  by  motor  transport.  As  the  daily  run 
of  a  motor  lorry  may  be  put  at  100  miles,  it  follows  that  an  army 
could  advance  fifty  miles  from  its  railhead  and  still  be  easily 


BRITAIN— RUSSIA— AUSTRIA  431 

served  with  food  and  ammunition.  Thus,  for  the  first  time  in 
the  history  of  war,  the  British  army  had  devised  a  system 
whereby  fresh  meat  and  bread  could  be  supplied  daily  to  a  dis- 
tant army.  If,  as  the  Germans  declared,  the  British  soldier 
thought  more  of  his  food  than  fight,  this  desire  at  least  had 
the  effect  of  keeping  the  supply  system  to  the  topmost  notch. 
The  same  principle  was  used  for  ammunition  columns,  in  no  case 
any  of  the  men  from  the  front  being  detailed  in  the  work  of  look- 
ing after  munitions  or  supplies.  Thus,  while  British  mobilization 
of  men  consisted  mainly  of  the  expeditionary  force  of  100,000, 
the  British  mobilization  of  auxiliary  columns  for  aiding  the 
supply  system  of  the  Belgian  and  French  army  was  of  a  size  large 
enough  to  look  after  several  corps.  By  this  means,  recruits  could 
be  constantly  forwarded  to  the  field  of  war,  secure  in  the  knowl- 
edge that  no  matter  how  rapidly  men  were  rushed  to  the  front, 
the  question  of  supplies  was  already  considered  and  the  requisites 
were  in  place  awaiting  the  use  of  the  new  troops. 

England's  mobilization,  especially  when  it  is  remembered  that 
after  the  first  150,000  it  was  all  volunteers,  was  a  marvelous 
thing.  How  many  men  were  sent  no  one  could  tell  but  Kitchener, 
and  if  ever  a  man  was  born  with  a  gift  for  telling  nothing,  that 
man  is  Kitchener.  How  steadily  recruits  poured  over  no  one 
knew.  Officially,  only  enough  men  were  sent  to  fill  up  the  losses 
in  the  150,000,  but  before  the  end  of  the  year  England's  trained 
forces  were  immense.  The  details  of  the  mobilization  of  that  first 
100,000  men  (the  first  group  of  the  expeditionary  force)  were 
marvelous.  The  railroads  running  to  the  southeast  were  put  into 
Government  hands,  trains  were  scheduled  at  twelve  minutes' 
distance  apart,  to  run  day  and  night,  every  troop  train  was  on 
schedule,  and  every  one  was  unloaded  and  out  of  the  depot  in 
time  for  the  next  train  to  pull  in,  every  transport  was  at  the 
dock  waiting,  with  another  ready  to  take  her  place,  and  the 
expeditionary  force  was  in  Boulogne  in  less  than  forty-eight 
hours  after  the  first  mobilization  order  had  been  sent  out.  It  is 
not  to  be  forgotten  that  Britain  commandeered  every  ship  she 
needed  from  her  huge  mercantile  marine,  and  thus  had  trans- 
ports not  only  for  troops  but  also  for  supplies. 


432      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

For  a  moment  one  may  glance  at  a  side  issue,  but  an  important 
one  in  the  mobilization,  namely  the  mobilization  of  horses.  The 
French  bought  horses  by  the  thousand  in  Texas.  Yet  English 
farriers  inspected  them,  paid  for  them,  put  them  in  charge  of 
their  own  men  on  their  own  ships,  landed  them  in  England  or 
Bordeaux,  fed  them  into  prime  condition  at  England's  own  ex- 
pense, and  then  delivered  them  to  the  French  battle  line  ready 
for  service.  In  the  first  week  of  the  war  the  total  output  of  the 
English  rifle  factories  was  10,000  rifles  a  week  (a  rifle  will  shoot 
well  for  only  4,000  rounds),  by  the  seventh  week  of  the  war 
there  were  eleven  factories  with  a  weekly  output  of  40,000  rifles 
each,  and  more  being  built  on  every  hand.  In  addition  to  this, 
between  August  and  December,  1914,  English  money  mobilized 
— it  is  the  word — rifle  orders  in  the  United  States  to  the  extent 
of  $650,000,000.  It  is  a  matter  of  knowledge  that  many  of  the 
Russian  munition  orders  were  either  financed  or  indorsed  by 
British  capital.  In  a  word,  while  England's  military  mobiliza- 
tion of  her  regular  troops  was  rapid  and  efficient,  and  while  her 
recruiting  of  volunteers  was  the  greatest  support  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  a  volunteer  army  that  could  ever  be  imagined,  the  chief 
importance  and  the  chief  wonder  of  Britain's  mobilization  was 
her  mobilization  of  commerce  and  of  trade.  She  made  it 
possible  for  French  soldiers  to  be  used  at  their  full  power,  and 
France's  perennial  weakness — supply  organization — was  sup- 
plemented by  that  very  thing  which  is  the  British  army's  chief 
boast. 

It  is  time,  now,  to  turn  to  the  eastern  theatre  of  war,  and 
there  the  diplomatic  questions  underlying  mobilization  become 
excessively  intertwined.  All  European  powers  watch  each  other 
like  falcons  above  their  prey,  in  the  constant  endeavor  to  discern 
the  slightest  sign  of  unusual  military  activity.  The  tornado  of 
conflicting  reports  at  the  end  of  July,  1914,  as  to  which  power 
had  begun  mobilizing  first,  as  to  whether  army  maneuvers  were 
a  cloak  for  mobilization,  as  to  whether  activity  in  arsenals  was 
not  a  threat  or  as  to  the  manipulation  of  finances,  were  all  due 
to  a  single  thing — the  knowledge  that  a  week's  advantage  in 
mobilization  might  mean  a  huge  advantage,  an  advantage  in 


BRITAIN— RUSSIA— AUSTRIA 


433 


434  THE  STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

position  so  great  that  thousands  of  lives  might  be  lost  because  of 
the  two  days'  delay.  It  has  been  shown  how  the  conquest  of 
France's  richest  northern  provinces  by  Germany  was  due  to  the 
difference  in  speed  of  mobilization.  There  was  a  great  deal  of 
misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  the  American  public  about  this 
very  importance  of  mobilization.  "Supposing  Russia  did  mobilize 
first,  or  Austria,"  people  said,  "what  about  it?  No  one  has 
declared  war."  Mobilization  is  like  two  western  desperadoes 
watching  each  other.  They  do  not  wait  until  the  other  man  has 
drawn  his  gun  and  has  them  covered,  but  trouble  begins  at  the 
slightest  move  toward  the  hip  pocket.  Any  move  toward  mobi- 
lization is  a  move  toward  a  nation's  hip  pocket. 

Germany  did  not  dare  to  let  Russia  mobilize.  Had  a  large 
Russian  army  been  concentrated  in  Poland,  had  Russia  been 
allowed  to  intrench  herself  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  had  she  had 
the  opportunity  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  seize  the  fortress 
of  Thorn  and  to  secure  control  of  the  Vistula  River,  there  would 
have  been  little  to  stop  the  armies  of  the  czar  from  marching  into 
Berlin.  General  mobilization  by  one  power,  therefore,  abso- 
lutely compels  countermobilization  by  another  power,  and  unless 
diplomatic  agreements  are  speedily  made  and  the  mobilization 
checked,  it  is  a  prelude  to  war. 

The  diplomatic  interpretations  of  the  discussion  over  mobiliza- 
tion have  been  dealt  with  elsewhere,  but  it  may  be  summarily 
said  here  that  Austria  was  the  first  of  the  great  powers  to  begin 
mobilization  in  the  first  part  of  July,  in  order  to  frighten  Serbia 
into  submission  in  the  controversy  that  arose  from  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  Austrian  Crown  Prince  at  Sarajevo  (in  Bosnia, 
Austria)  on  June  28,  1914.  Serbia  mobilized,  and  it  was  gener- 
ally believed  that  this  action  was  due  to  Serbia's  knowledge  that 
Russia  was  secretly  mobilizing.  By  about  July  10,  1916,  Ger- 
many believed  herself  satisfied  that  Russia  was  actually  mobiliz- 
ing, and  she  also  began  secretly  to  do  so.  France  became  sus- 
picious of  German  military  activity,  and  by  the  end  of  the  third 
week  and  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  week  in  July  a  general,  but 
unadmitted,  military  preparation  was  in  progress.  Actual  and 
admitted  mobilization  is  more  or  less  arbitrarily  placed  as  of 


BRITAIN— RUSSIA— AUSTRIA  435 

August  1,  1914,  which  date  is  now  generally  regarded  as  the 
opening  of  the  Great  War. 

In  any  consideration  of  Russian  mobilization  it  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Russia  had  three  armies,  not  one,  to  mobilize,  i.  e.,  the 
armies  of  European  Russia,  of  the  Asiatic  Russia,  and  of  the 
Caucasus.  It  is  also  to  be  remembered  that,  unlike  the  German 
system  in  which  every  man  has  a  definite  place  in  a  particular 
corps,  the  Russian  system  holds  its  reserves  as  reserves  solely, 
and  organizes  them  after  they  have  been  gathered  together.  Slow 
mobilization  is  therefore  an  evil  not  to  be  avoided.  For  this 
reason  one  must  expect  to  find  Russian  mobilization  occurring, 
not  on  the  frontier,  but  at  a  point  sufficiently  far  therefrom  to  be 
safe  from  hostile  attack  during  the  period  of  disorganization. 

The  line  Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk  was  the  main  field  selected, 
because  of  its  central  location  between  the  Austro-German 
frontiers,  and  more  particularly  because  it  was  well  covered  from 
attack  by  the  intrenched  fortress  and  camp  of  Warsaw.  The 
troops  and  reserves  from  Little  Russia,  especially  from  the  Kiev 
district,  were  readily  available  on  lines  converging  to  the  Aus- 
trian city  of  Lemberg  in  Galicia,  and,  it  was  estimated,  could 
take  the  front  in  ten  days.  From  this  district  five  army  corps 
are  raised.  From  the  Odessa  district  to  the  south  two  more 
army  corps  could  be  counted  upon,  and  these  could  reach  the 
scene  of  operations  in  twelve  or  thirteen  days.  In  actual  speed 
of  mobilization  the  Austrian  army  was  ready  first,  but  the  Rus- 
sian army  protected  and  covered  the  slow  mobilization  and  con- 
centration of  its  forces  by  a  dense  curtain  of  cavalry  masses,  for 
which  task  the  rapidly  mobilized  Cossack  cavalry  was  especially 
well  fitted.  These  cavalry  engagements — for  the  Russians  were 
met  by  the  Hungarian  cavalry — effectually  screened  the  actual 
gathering  of  the  armies,  and  led  Austria  into  the  error  of  sup- 
posing Russia  to  be  quite  unready.  But,  although  Austria  had 
been  the  first  to  begin  actual  mobilization,  her  strategic  railways 
on  the  frontier  were  so  poor  that  it  was  not  until  August  10, 1914, 
that  she  was  ready  to  advance,  and  even  then  that  single  line  of 
railroad  running  from  the  Bug  to  the  Vistula  was  deficient  in 
rolling  stock.  Austrian  military  organization  was  excellent,  Hun- 


436     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

garian  railroad  organization  was  utterly  inadequate  to  cope  with 
the  sudden  requirements  of  modern  warfare. 

The  Austrian  army  advanced  on  Russia  in  force,  expecting 
the  success  of  the  German  armies  to  the  east.  From  the  plans 
as  they  developed,  and  particularly  from  railroad  orders  given 
to  the  lines  crossing  Germany,  it  was  expected  that  before  Russia 
could  be  mobilized  sufficiently  to  do  more  than  give  a  temporary 
check  to  the  Austrian  army,  several  German  army  corps  could  be 
released  from  the  western  front  and  sent  to  the  Russian  border 
to  take  the  burden  of  Russian  invasion  away  from  Austria.  But 
the  resistance  of  Belgium  against  Von  Kluck's  armies,  the  re- 
sistance of  France  against  the  armies  of  the  crown  prince,  and 
the  resistance  of  England  to  all  naval  action,  prevented  any 
release  of  the  German  armies,  and  the  mobilization  orders  for 
the  transference  of  German  troops  from  the  western  theatre  to 
the  eastern  theatre  of  war  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  the 
struggle  proved  to  be  unavailing,  for  the  men  could  not  be  spared. 
Slowly  but  heavily  the  mobilization  of  Russian  forces  continued. 
Lacking  strategic  railroads,  lacking  the  motor-lorry  system  of 
England,  the  heavy-footed  but  untiring  Russian  infantry  marched 
the  scores  and  hundreds  of  miles  from  their  homes  to  the  front. 
The  Russian  dirigibles  and  aeroplanes  were  more  than  a  match 
for  the  Austrian  aircraft,  and  kept  them  back  from  flying  over 
the  country  to  determine  the  number  of  forces  opposing.  Then 
the  action  of  the  Russian  "steam  roller"  began,  and  with  more 
men  marching  in  every  day,  unwearied  despite  their  long  travel, 
the  steam  roller  gathered  force.  But,  in  one  regard,  Russia  had 
miscalculated.  She  had  never  contemplated  the  terrific  wastage 
of  ammunition  that  is  required  for  modern  artillery  duels,  gun 
conflicts  that  are  necessary  before  troops  can  advance,  and  in  the 
first  few  weeks  of  the  war  her  ammunition  was  all  shot  away. 
Without  ammunition  the  steam  roller  could  not  continue,  and  the 
advance  of  the  Russians  upon  Austrian  territory  was  first  halted 
and  then  driven  back.  Here,  again,  then,  was  a  campaign 
successfully  begun  because  of  a  better  mobilization  of  men 
than  was  expected,  and  lost  because  of  a  lack  of  mobilization 
of  supplies. 


BRITAIN— RUSSIA— AUSTRIA 


437 


H— Gt.  War  2 


438  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

A  great  deal  has  been  said  of  the  slowness  of  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion, and  much  of  it  is  undoubtedly  true.  But  little  has  been  said 
about  the  steadiness  of  Russian  mobilization.  The  Russian 
officer,  almost  always  a  noble,  and  belonging  to  what  is  probably 
the  most  polished  and  most  cultured  class  in  Europe,  an  aristo- 
crat to  his  finger  tips,  possesses  the  power  of  commanding  men, 
and  understands  his  Slav  soldiers.  He  knows  that  no  army  in  the 
world  can  begin  to  compare  with  the  Russian  for  enduring  hard- 
ship, and  that  no  troops  in  the  world  can  sustain  so  large  a  pro- 
portion of  loss  and  still  advance.  Forced  marches  that  would 
kill  English  troops  can  be  handled  by  a  Russian  army  without 
great  fatigue.  The  principal  note  in  the  gathering  of  the  czar's 
armies  was  that  day  by  day,  week  by  week,  from  every  corner  of 
the  empire,  men  went  to  the  front.  It  was  not  the  sudden  con- 
centration of  Germany,  it  was  not  the  eager  formation  of  France, 
it  was  not  the  heroic  sturdiness  of  Belgium,  it  was  not  the  accus- 
tomedness  to  active  service  of  the  British  regulars,  it  was  a 
gradual  transition  of  an  idealistic  people  from  contemplation 
into  action. 

To  the  Russian,  more  than  to  any  other  of  the  peoples  engaged 
in  the  war,  mobilization  spells  advance,  advance  in  a  thousand 
ways.  Germany,  France,  and  England  were  practically  un- 
changed in  temperament  and  viewpoint  by  the  mere  processes 
of  mobilization,  but  old  Russia  became  new  Russia  almost  within 
a  month.  War  is  the  greatest  unifier  of  racial  dissension  in  the 
world,  and  when  the  first  three  months  of  war  were  over,  the 
German  Empire,  the  British  Empire,  the  Republic  of  France  and 
her  colonies,  and  above  all,  the  Russian  Empire,  were  welded  by 
the  grim  forces  of  necessity  into  homogeneous  units.  Moreover, 
mobilization  and  the  conditions  of  war  bring  into  high  relief  the 
powers  and  the  characters  of  the  several  nations,  and  as  the 
story  of  the  war  is  told,  its  developments  portray  the  changing 
appreciations  of  the  national  combatants  for  each  other,  and  of 
the  neutral  nations  for  all. 


PART    IV— DIPLOMATIC    PAPERS    RELATING 

TO  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR,  COLLATED 

FROM  THE  OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS 


IDEALIZING  the  importance  of  presenting  its  case  to  the 
•*-*>  neutral  world,  each  of  the  warring  nations  published  its 
diplomatic  correspondence  leading  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
at  a  period  during  hostilities  when  the  publication  seemed  best 
calculated  to  serve  the  end  in  view. 

THE    OFFICAL    DOCUMENTS 

British  White  Papers,  July  20  to  September  1,  1914. 

Belgian  Gray  Book,  April  7,  1914,  to  September  30,  1914. 

German  White  Book,  July  23  to  August  4,  1914. 

French  Yellow  Book,  March  17,  1913,  to  September  4,  1914. 

Russian  Orange  Book,  July  23  to  August  6,  1914. 

Serbian  Blue  Book,  June  29  to  August  4,  1914. 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  June  29  to  August  24,  1914. 

Official  publications  in  the  press  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy,  July  30  to  December  6,  1914. 

Various  speeches  by  officers  of  the  Governments. 

It  is  from  these  official  documents,  cast  into  one  form  by  re- 
arranging all  letters,  telegrams,  proclamations,  speeches,  etc.,  in 
their  chronological  order,  that  the  following  history  of  the 
diplomatic  controversy  is  compiled. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  the 
books  of  the  six  principal  allies  against  the  Teutonic  Powers  are 
threefold  in  number  the  books  of  those  powers ;  and  that,  from 
choice  of  their  promulgators  the  books  of  the  Teutonic  Powers 
are  also  disproportionately  less  in  total  volume,  owing  to  the 

439 


440  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

almost  entire  absence  in  them  of  communications  between  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Germany;  while  the  correspondence  between 
their  adversaries  is  presented  by  these  with  a  fulness  which 
gives  the  neutral  reader  the  impression  that  nothing  of  impor- 
tance has  been  withheld — indeed,  that  the  Allies  (to  use  for  con- 
venience the  popular  designation  of  the  anti-Teutonic  powers) 
have  laid  all  their  cards  face  upward  on  the  table.  The  intelligent 
reader  will  not  have  to  be  cautioned  that  this  is  a  psychological, 
rather  than  logical,  inference. 

If  any  prevalent  arguments  on  either  side  fail  to  be  upheld  by 
the  evidence  here  given,  it  will  be  because  this  evidence  does  not 
appear  in  the  official  documents ;  the  editors  feel  that  their  func- 
tions do  not  warrant  their  inclusion  of  pleas  or  testimony  formed 
outside  of  the  records  mentioned  above.  The  time  will  not  come 
until  long  after  the  close  of  the  war  when  the  conflicting  claims 
in  the  vast  amount  of  propagandial  literature  issued  by  both 
parties  can  be  judicially  weighed  by  impartial  historians,  and 
presented  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion.  In  the  meantime,  how- 
ever, we  can  bring  before  this  court  the  case  as  officially  pre< 
sented  by  the  contesting  parties,  a  "perfect  enumeration"  of  all 
the  available.  The  editor  acts  merely  in  a  reporting  capacity. 
He  does  not  discriminate  between  "Trojan  and  Tyrian,"  unless 
it  be  called  discrimination  to  refuse  by  allotment  of  lesser  space 
to  inflict  on  the  party  neglecting  fully  to  present  its  case  a 
penalty  beyond  that  which  necessarily  results,  in  adverse  effect, 
on  the  mind  of  the  reader  from  this  omission. 

In  brief,  the  controversy  is  presented  as  a  case  in  law.  The 
evidence  is  given  in  the  correspondence  between  ministers  of 
state  and  the  pleadings  are  presented  in  the  words  of  respon- 
sible statesmen,  who  apply  this  evidence  to  the  issues  in 
question. 

Since  the  validity  of  the  evidence  is  based  not  only  on  its 
inherent  motive  but  on  the  character  and  authority  of  those 
communicating  it,  and  the  force  of  the  pleadings  is  even  more 
dependent  upon  the  character  and  authority  of  the  advocates, 
it  is  necessary  at  the  outset  to  state  the  offices  held  by  the  chief 
representatives  of  the  parties  to  the  controversy,  and  to  present 


STATE    PAPERS  441 

something  of  their  past  records,  especially  in  the  case  of  the 
more  responsible  statesmen.  This  will  also  serve  to  make  graphic 
the  story  of  the  great  trial  before  the  bar  of  the  world;  it  will 
visualize  it  as  a  contest,  man  to  man,  in  which  the  distance 
between  the  combatants  is  eliminated,  .and  they  seem  to  be  in 
each  other's  presence,  testifying  and  arguing  in  behalf  of  their 
respective  causes,  as  in  a  case  at  law.  And,  when  it  is  borne  in 
mind  that  these  persons  are  representative  of  the  dignity  of 
great  and  sovereign  peoples,  the  exponents  and  conservators  of 
their  national  and  individual  rights  and  aspirations,  their  ideas 
and  ideals  of  civilization,  the  contest  will  gain  rather  than  lose 
in  impressiveness  by  the  concrete  form  in  which  it  is  presented. 
The  sovereigns  and  statesmen  of  the  anti-Teutonic  allies  are  listed 
first ;  of  the  -Teutonic  allies  next,  and  a  few  statesmen  of  neutral 
countries  who  were  involved  in  the  controversy  last. 


LIST    OF    SOVEREIGNS    AND    DIPLOMATS 
GREAT     BRITAIN 

George  V,  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  Emperor  of 
India,  and  Sovereign  of  the  entire  British  Empire. 

Haldane,  Richard  Burdon  (Viscount),  Lord  High  Chancellor. 
Born  1856,  studied  German  at  Gottingen,  member  Parliament 
for  Haddingtonshire  1885-1911;  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
1905-12 ;  Lord  High  Chancellor  1912.  As  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  Haldane,  introduced  into  his  department  several  innova- 
tions, the  knowledge  of  which  he  had  acquired  during  his  resi- 
dence at  Gottingen  and  in  his  frequent  visits  to  the  Continent. 
He  has  been  in  public  life  since  entering  Parliament  in  1885,  and, 
despite  his  later  removal  from  the  office  which  he  held  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  is  still  recognized  as  one  of  Great  Britain's 
most  brilliant  men.  Previous  to  the  war,  he  was  looked  on  as  an 
especially  warm  friend  of  Germany,  and  frequently  went  to 
Berlin  in  the  interests  of  British  amity  with  that  country. 


442  THE    STORY   OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

Grey,  Sir  Edward:  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Born  April  25,  1862,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
1892-95 ;  Secretary  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  December,  1905. 

Of  the  conduct  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  since  1906  GilberV 
Murray  in  his  "Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey"  ("Claren- 
don Press,"  Oxford,  1915)  says: 

"In  general,  Grey  is  often  supposed  to  represent  the  principle 
of  continuity  in  foreign  policy,  but  this  is  not  quite  exact.  In  cer- 
tain very  large  issues  the  Liberal  Government  of  1906  and 
onward  agreed  entirely  with  the  conservative  policy  of  Lord 
Salisbury  (Prime  Minister),  and  Lord  Lansdowne  (Foreign 
Secretary) ,  and  therefore  followed  their  action.  On  other  issues 
it  differed.  For  instance,  it  stopped  indentured  Chinese  labor 
in  the  Transvaal,  and  it  granted  immediate  self-government  to 
South  Africa.  But  in  Europe  the  policy  has  been  mostly  con- 
tinuous. The  principles  are  conveniently  stated  in  the  House  of 
Commons  debate  of  foreign  policy  on  November  27,  1911 : 

"  '1.  In  my  opinion  the  wise  policy  for  this  country  is  to  ex- 
pand as  little  as  possible/  'I  say  without  any  hesitation  that  we 
do  not  desire  accessions  of  territory,  and  in  saying  that  I  am  not 
speaking  for  one  small  section  of  the  House.  I  believe  I  am 
speaking  for  the  nation  at  large.'  The  first  sentence  comes  from 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  second  from  Mr.  Bonar  Law  (leader  of  the 
opposition). 

"This  is  made  a  little  clearer  in  a  latter  sentence  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  speech.  'If  there  are  to  be  changes  of  territory 
brought  about  by  good  will  and  negotiation  between  other 
powers,  then  we  are  not  an  ambitious  competing  party.  .  .  . 
And  if  it  is  wise  policy  not  to  go  in  for  great  schemes  of  expan- 
sion ourselves,  then  I  think  it  would  be  morally  and  diplo- 
matically wrong  to  indulge  in  a  dog-in-the-manger  policy  in 
regard  to  others.'  In  particular,  he  explains,  if  Germany  wishes, 
'by  friendly  arrangement  with  other  powers,'  to  extend  her 
territories,  we  do  not  wish  to  stand  in  her  way,  or  to  claim 
'compensations.' ' 

Nicholson,  Sir  Arthur:  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 


STATE    PAPERS  443 

Bertie,  Sir  Francis :  Ambassador  to  France.  Born  August  17, 
1844;  private  secretary  to  Hon.  R.  Bourke  (Under-Secretary 
State),  1874-80;  attached  to  Embassy,  Berlin,  1878;  Assistant 
Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  1894 ;  Ambassador 
to  Rome,  1903 ;  Paris,  1905. 

Buchanan,  Sir  George:  Ambassador  to  Russia.  Born  Copen- 
hagen November  25,  1854;  entered  Diplomatic  Service  1875; 
Third  Secretary,  Rome,  1878;  Second  Secretary,  Tokyo,  1879; 
Second  Secretary,  Vienna,  1882;  Berne,  1889;  British  Agent  to 
Venezuela  Arbitration  Tribunal,  1898;  Secretary  Embassy, 
Rome,  1900;  Berlin,  1901-3;  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  Sofia, 
1903-8;  Hague,  1908-10;  St.  Petersburg,  1910. 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward:  Ambassador  to  Germany.  Born  July 
18,  1847;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1869;  Attache,  Madrid, 
1870;  Buenos  Aires,  1873;  Second  Secretary,  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
1877;  Constantinople,  1881;  Secretary  Legation,  Peking,  1885; 
Copenhagen,  1888;  Lisbon,  1890;  Secretary  Embassy,  Washing- 
ton, 1893 ;  St.  Petersburg,  1894 ;  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary,  Belgrade,  1898-1900 ;  Copenhagen,  1900-5  ; 
Ambassador,  Vienna,  1905-8;  Berlin,  1908. 

Rumbold,  Sir  Horace:  Counsellor  German  Embassy  and 
Charge  d'Affaires.  Born  February  5,  1869;  Attache,  Hague, 
1888;  Charge  d'Affaires,  Munich,  1908;  served  at  Cairo,  Teheran, 
and  Athens;  Counsellor  Embassy,  Tokyo,  1909;  learned  in 
Arabic,  Persian,  and  Japanese. 

De  Bunsen,  Sir  Maurice :  Ambassador  in  Austria.  Born  Janu- 
ary 8,  1852;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1877;  Secretary  Lega- 
tion, Tokyo,  1891;  Secretary  Embassy,  Constantinople,  1897- 
1902;  Paris,  1902-5;  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Pleni- 
potentiary, Lisbon,  1905 ;  Ambassador,  Madrid,  1906-13 ;  Vienna, 
1913. 

Beaumont,  Henry  Dawson:  Charge  d'Affaires,  Turkey.  Born 
February  4,  1867;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1892;  served  in 
Copenhagen,  Madrid,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Monte- 
negro; Charge  d'Affaires,  Turkey,  1914. 

Villiers,  Sir  Francis :  Minister  to  Belgium.  Born  August  13, 
1852;  entered  Foreign  Office,  1870;  Assistant  Under-Secretary 


444  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

State  Foreign  Affairs,  1896-1905 ;  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary,  Portugal,  1905-11 ;  Belgium,  1911. 

Des  Graz,  Charles  Louis :  Minister  to  Serbia.  Born  March  2, 
1860;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1884;  Constantinople,  Te- 
heran, Athens;  Counsellor  Embassy,  Rome,  1905;  Charge 
d'Affaires,  Cettinje,  1906;  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary,  Peru  and  Ecuador,  1908-13;  Minister,  Serbia, 
1913. 

Crackanthorpe,  Dayrell  Eardley  Montague :  First  Secretary  of 
Legation  to  Serbia.  Born  September  9,  1871 ;  entered  Diplomatic 
Service,  1896 ;  Madrid,  Washington,  Brussels,  Bucharest,  Vienna, 
Belgrade,  1913. 

Rodd,  Sir  Rennell:  Ambassador  to  Italy.  Born  November  9, 
1858;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1883;  Berlin,  Athens,  Rome, 
Paris;  Secretary  Embassy,  Rome,  1901-4;  Envoy  Extraordinary 
and  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  Sweden,  1904-8;  Ambassador, 
Italy,  1908. 

FRANCE 

Poincare,  Raymond :  President  of  the  Republic. 

Viviani,  Rene :  President  of  the  Council,  a  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  Premier  of  the  Cabinet.  Had  been  Minister  of  In- 
struction in  the  Cabinet  of  Gaston  Doumergue,  which  resigned 
June  2,  1914;  Poincare  asked  him  at  that  time  to  form  a 
cabinet,  but  Ambassador  Paleologue  intimated  from  St.  Peters- 
burg that  the  Czar  feared  a  Viviani  ministry  would  modify  the 
three  years'  military  service  law,  and  therefore  another  was 
sought  for  this  position.  After  the  failure  of  the  Ribot  Cabinet 
on  June  12,  1914,  he  was  again  called  upon,  and,  no  objec- 
tions being  made,  he  formed  the  ministry  acting  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  After  the  beginning  of  the  hostilities  he 
retained  the  position  of  President  of  the  Council  without 
portfolio. 

Jonnart,  Charles  Celestin:  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Born  December  27,  1857;  Governor  General  Algiers  and  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior. 

Pichon,  Stephen :  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.    Born  August 


STATE    PAPERS  445 

10,  1857  Diplomatic  Service  in  Hayti,  San  Domingo,  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  and  at  Peking  during  the  Boxer  Rebellion. 

Bienvenu-Martin,  Jean  Baptiste :  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
i'Jfairs.  Born  July  22,  1847;  Minister  Instruction,  1905;  in 
public  life  since  1878. 

Doumergue,  Gaston:  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Born 
1863;  Minister  Colonies,  1902-5;  Commerce,  1906-7;  Premier, 
resigning,  June  2,  1914. 

Delcasse,  iTheophile:  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Born 
March  1,  1852;  started  life  as  journalist;  Counsellor  General; 
Under-Secretary  Colonies,  1893;  Colonial  Minister,  1894-5; 
Foreign  Minister,  1898-1905;  Minister  Marine,  1905-13;  Medi- 
ator between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  1899;  Ambassador, 
St.  Petersburg,  1913 ;  Minister  Foreign  Affairs,  1913.  Is  one  of 
the  strong  men  of  France ;  in  1904  was  the  French  negotiator  of 
the  Anglo-French  Convention  (the  "Entene")  concerning 
Egypt  and  Morocco;  was  sacrificed  to  assuage  German  feeling 
at  the  time  of  the  Algeciras  conference;  called  the  "Deadly 
Enemy  of  Germany." 

Berthelot:  Political  Director. 

Cambon,  Paul :  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain.  Born  January 
20,  1843;  Ambassador  Madrid,  Constantinople,  and  at  London, 
1898. 

Fleuriau,  M.  De:  Charge  d' Affaires,  London. 

De  Manneville :  Charge  d'Aff aires,  Germany.  Born  February 
27,  1865;  entered  Diplomatic  Service  at  Berlin,  1893;  later  at 
London ;  a  Minister  of  the  First  Class  in  1904. 

Paleologue,  Maurice:  Ambassador  to  Russia.  Born  January 
13,  1859;  served  in  Foreign  Office  and  Diplomatic  Service  at 
Rome,  Berlin,  Peking,  Korea,  and  in  Bulgaria. 

Cambon,  Jules :  Ambassador  to  Germany.  Born  April  5, 1845 ; 
entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1874;  Ambassador,  Washington, 
1897;  Madrid,  1902;  Berlin,  1907. 

Allize :  Minister  at  Munich,  Germany. 

Ronssin,  P. :  Consul  General  at  Frankfort,  Germany. 

Dumaine,  Chilhaud :  Ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary. 

d'Apchier-le-Maugin :  Consul  General  at  Budapest. 


446     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Bompard,  Maurice:  Ambassador  to  Turkey.  Born  May  17, 
1854;  Minister,  First  Class,  1898;  Ambassador  to  Russia,  1902. 

Klokowski,  Antony:  Minister  to  Belgium.  Born  September 
23,  1855 ;  served  at  Yokohoma,  Calcutta,  and  Bangkok. 

Boppe,  Jules:  Minister  to  Serbia.  Born  June  26,  1862;  en- 
tered Diplomatic  Service,  1890 ;  served  at  Constantinople  and  St. 
Petersburg. 

Barrere,  Camille:  Ambassador  to  Italy. 

Bapst,  Constant :  Minister  to  Holland. 

Mollard,  Armard :  Minister  to  Luxemburg. 

Chevalley :  Minister  to  Norway. 

Thiebaut,  Eugene :  Minister  to  Sweden. 

Farges :  Consul  General  at  Basle,  Switzerland. 

RUSSIA 

Nicholas  II:  Emperor  (Czar). 

Sazonof :  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Suchomlinof ,  Vladimir  Alexandrovitch :  Minister  for  war.  In 
1890  at  the  age  of  forty-eight  Suchomlinof  was  made  a  major 
general,  and  in  1904  became  commander  of  Russia's  most  im- 
portant military  zone — Kiev.  In  1909  he  was  appointed  to  the 
post  which  he  has  since  relinquished,  and  the  amazing  rapidity 
with  which  Russia  mobilized  her  army  in  August,  1914,  can  be 
accredited  to  the  methods  which  he  instituted.  As  a  writer  he  is 
known  as  "Shpioa"  (Spur),  and  is  the  biographer  of  Peter  the 
Great,  Frederick  the  Great,  and  Murat. 

Benckendorff,  Count  A. :  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain.  Born 
in  Berlin,  August  1,  1849;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1869; 
served  at  Rome,  Vienna;  Minister  Copenhagen,  1897-1903;  Am- 
bassador London,  1903. 

Isvolsky,  Alexander  P.:  Ambassador  to  France;  was  Russian 
negotiator  of  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907  regarding 
Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  Tibet. 

Swastopoulo :  Charge  d'Aff aires,  France. 

Swereiev,  S.  N. :  Ambassador  to  Germany. 

Broniersky,  A. :  Charge  d'Affaires,  Germany. 


STATE    PAPERS  447 

Schebeko,  N. :  Ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary. 
Koudacheff,    Prince    Nicholas:    Charge    d' Affaires,    Austria- 
Hungary. 

Salviatti,  A. :  Consul  General  at  Fiume. 
Kazansky :  Acting  Consul  General  at  Prague. 
Strandtman:  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Serbia. 


B  E  L  G I UM 

Albert:  King  of  the  Belgians. 

Davignon,  M.  J. :  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Elst,  van  der,  Baron :  Secretary  General. 

Renkin,  J. :  Colonial  Minister. 

Lalaing  H.  de,  Count :  Minister  to  Great  Britain.  Entered  For- 
eign Office,  1879;  served  Vienna,  Bucharest,  Berlin,  Hague, 
London;  Minister,  Brazil,  1893;  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary,  Bucharest,  1898;  Berne,  1899;  London, 
1903. 

Guillaume,  Baron :  Minister  to  France. 

Beyens,  Baron :  Minister  to  Germany. 

De  Dudzeele,  Errembault,  Count:  Minister  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

De  Welle,  Michotte,  Baron :  Minister  to  Serbia. 

Grenier,  A.,  Baron :  Minister  to  Spain. 

Fallen,  Baron :  Minister  to  Holland. 

SERBIA 

Peter  Karageorgevitch :  King. 

Pashitch,  Nikola  P. :  Prime  Minister.  In  1878,  at  the  age  of 
thirty-two,  M.  Pashitch  entered  the  Serbian  Parliament,  and  in 
three  years  he  became  leader  of  the  "Old  Radicals."  Always  a 
champion  of  liberty,  he  joined  the  Zayenchar  Mutiny  of  1883,  and, 
of  twenty-two,  he  alone  escaped  execution  by  flight.  Upon  his 
return  he  was  appointed  Mayor  of  Belgrade  and  in  1893  Minister 
to  Russia,  where  he  made  a  lasting  impression.  In  1899  he  was 
again  accused  of  hatching  a  conspiracy,  but  Russia  served  him 


448     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

well  and  intervention  saved  him.  To  him,  in  no  slight  degree, 
does  Serbia  owe  Russia's  friendship,  and  to  his  efforts  has  been 
attributed  the  Balkan  Alliance. 

Patchou,  Dr.  Laza:  Acting  Prime  Minister  and  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Boschkovitch :  Minister  to  Great  Britain. 

Vesnitch,  M.  R. :  Minister  to  France. 

Spalaikovitch,  Dr.  M. :  Minister  to  Russia. 

Yovanovitch,  Dr.  M. :  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Germany. 

Yovanovitch,  Yov.  M. :  Minister  to  Austria-Hungary. 

Georgevitch,  M. :  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Turkey. 

Michailovitch,  Ljub :  Minister  to  Italy. 


ITALY 

Victor  Emmanuel  (Vittorio  Emanuele)  III. :  King. 

San  Giuliano,  Antonio  di,  Marquis:  Minister  Foreign  Affairs. 
Born  Catania,  December  10, 1852 ;  Mayor  Catania,  1879 ;  member 
Chamber  Deputies,  1882-1904 ;  Senate,  1904 ;  Under-Secretary  for 
Industry  and  Commerce,  1892-3 ;  Minister  Posts  and  Telegraph, 
1899-1900 ;  Minister  Foreign  Affairs,  1905-6 ;  Ambassador,  Lon- 
don, 1906-10 ;  Minister  Foreign  Affairs,  1910.  His  opposition  to 
war  with  Austria  precipitated  his  downfall.  Said  to  be  the  re- 
pository of  more  European  secrets  than  any  European  states- 
man since  Bismarck. 

D'Avarna,  Duke :  Ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary. 

Salandra:  Premier.    Appointed  November  5,  1914. 

Sonnino,  Baron  Sidney:  Minister  Foreign  Affairs.  Born 
March  11,  1847;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1867;  Parliament, 
1880;  Minister  Finance,  1893-4;  Treasury,  1894-96;  Interior, 
1906  and  1909-10 ;  Foreign  Affairs,  November  5,  1914. 

JAPAN 

Yoshihito:  Emperor. 

Shigenobu  Okuma,  Count:  Prime  Minister. 

Takaaki  Kato,  Baron  •  Minister  Foreign  Affairs. 


STATE    PAPERS  449 

GERMANY 

William  (Wilhelm)  II. :  Kaiser  of  Germany,  King  of  Prussia. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Dr.  Theobald  von:  Imperial  Chancellor. 
Born  November  29,  1856,  at  Hohenfinow,  Brandenburg;  entered 
Civil  Service,  1879;  Prussian  Minister  Interior,  1905;  Imperial 
Secretary  of  State  and  Vice  President  of  Prussian  Council, 
1907;  Imperial  Chancellor,  1909;  member  of  Reichstag  since 
1890.  His  actions  before  the  present  war  seemed  to 
indicate  an  earnest  desire  for  the  peace  of  Europe;  he 
appeared  to  oppose  the  military  party  and  align  himself 
with  the  moderates.  His  manner  is  frank  to  the  point  of 
bluffness. 

Jagow,  Gottlieb  von :  Secretary  of  State.  Born  June  26,  1863 ; 
entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1895,  at  Rome;  Minister  to  Rome, 
1907;  Ambassador,  1908;  Minister  Foreign  Affairs,  1913; 
credited  with  postponing  the  inevitable  conflict  between  Italy 
and  Austria  while  at  Rome. 

Zimmerman,  von :  Under-Secretary  of  State.  Appointed  1911 ; 
previously  Vice  Consul  Shanghai;  Consul  at  Tientsin  and  in 
Diplomatic  Corps. 

Lichnowsky,  Prince  Karl  Maximilian:  Ambassador  to  Great 
Britain.  Born  1860;  Attache,  London,  1885;  Counsellor  Em- 
bassy, Vienna;  Foreign  Office,  Berlin;  Ambassador  to  London, 
1912.  Member  Roman  Catholic  party.  Did  all  he  could  to 
prevent  rupture  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany.  Was  very 
popular  in  England. 

Schoen,  Baron  Wilhelm  von:  Ambassador  to  France.  Born 
June  3,  1851 ;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1877 ;  Madrid,  Hague; 
Athens,  Berne,  Paris,  Copenhagen,  St.  Petersburg;  Ambassador, 
Paris,  1910. 

Pourtales,  Count  Frederic :  Ambassador  to  Russia.  Born  Octo- 
ber 24,  1853 ;  appointed  St.  Petersburg,  1908. 

Tschirschky,  Heinrich  von :  Ambassador  to  Austria-Hungary. 
Born  August  15,  1858;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1873; 
Constantinople,  Vienna,  St.  Petersburg;  Ambassador  to  Vienna, 
1907. 


450     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Below  Saleske,  Konrad  von :  Minister  to  Belgium.  Born  April 
18,  1866;  Secretary  Legation,  Athens;  Ambassador,  Constanti- 
nople, 1907. 

Storck,  von :  Secretary  Legation  in  Serbia. 

Flotow,  Hans  von :  Ambassador  to  Italy.  Born  September  10, 
1862 ;  entered  Diplomatic  Service,  1893 ;  Second  Secretary  Lega- 
tion, Washington,  Hague,  Paris. 

Buch,  von :  Minister  to  Luxemburg. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

Francis  Joseph  (Franz  Josef) :  Emperor. 

Berchtold,  Count  Leopold:  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  Born  April  18,  1863 ;  saw  Diplomatic  Service  in  Paris, 
London;  Ambassador  to  St.  Petersburg,  1906;  appointed  Secre- 
tary of  State,  1914;  emulated  his  predecessor,  Count  d'Heren- 
thal,  the  annexor  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  in  strong  foreign 
policy. 

Macchio,  Dr.  K.,  Baron :  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Forgach,  Count :  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Diplomatic  Service  in  Belgrade  and  Dresden* 

Tisza,  Count  Stephen :  President  of  the  Ministry  of  Hungary. 
Born  April  22,  1861 ;  served  as  President  Ministry,  1903-06. 

Mensdorff,  A.:  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain.  Born  Septem- 
ber 5, 1861 ;  Diplomatic  Service  in  Paris,  London,  St.  Petersburg ; 
Secretary  Ambassador,  London,  1896-1904 ;  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary, 1903-04 ;  Ambassador,  1904. 

Szecsen,  Count  Nicolaus :  Ambassador  to  France. 

Szapary,  Count  Josef :  Ambassador  to  Russia. 

Czernin,  Count  Jaromir :   Charge  d'Affaires,  Russia. 

Szogyeny,  Count  Ladislaus :  Ambassador  to  Germany. 

Zehlitschka :  Consul  General  in  Turkey. 

Clary,  S.,  Count :  Minister  to  Belgium. 

Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  Baron :  Minister  to  Serbia. 

Hoflehner :  Consular  Agent  at  Nish,  Serbia. 


STATE    PAPERS  451 

TURKEY 

Mohammed  V :  Sultan. 

Said  Halim  Pasha,  Prince :  Grand  Vizier. 

Tewf  ik  Pasha :  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain. 

NEUTRAL     NATIONS 

Loudon :  Dutch  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Eyschen,  Dr. :  Minister  of  State  and  President  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Luxemburg. 

Gerard,  James  Watson :  American  Ambassador  to  Germany. 

Penfield,  Frederic  Courtland:  American  Ambassador  to  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

Whitlock,  Brand :  American  Minister  to  Belgium. 

It  will  be  convenient  for  the  reader,  before  entering  into  the 
diplomatic  history  of  the  war,  to  have  before  him  the  dates  of 
the  war  marking  diplomatic  crises. 


IMPORTANT  DATES  PRECEDING 
THE  WAR 

June  28,  1914.  Assassination  of  Austrian  hereditary  Arch- 
duke Franz  Ferdinand  at  Sarajevo,  Bosnia. 

July  23,  1914.    Austria-Hungary  hands  note  to  Serbia. 

July  24,  1914.  Russia  proposes  extension  of  time  limit  in 
note ;  decides  on  mobilization  in  South  Bosnia ;  and  seeks  uncon- 
ditional support  of  Great  Britain  in  conflict  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary. Great  Britain  proposes  four-power  intervention. 

July  25,  1914.  Austria-Hungary  sends  memorandum  to 
powers  containing  dossier  of  evidence  discovered  at  Sarajevo 
trial,  and  declares  dispute  lies  wholly  between  her  and  Serbia. 
Serbia  replies  to  note,  having  previously  ordered  mobilization. 
Austro-Hungarian  Legation  leaves  Belgrade.  Germany  refuses 
to  enter  mediation  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  wish- 


452     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

ing  to  "localize"  the  conflict,  and  proposes  mediation  of  powers 
between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary.  Russia  mobilizes  four- 
teen army  corps  on  Austro-Hungarian  frontier.  Great  Britain 
asks  Austria-Hungary  to  extend  time  limit  and  suspend  hostili- 
ties pending  four-power  conference. 

July  26,  1914.  Russia  proposes  direct  conversations  to  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. France  and  Italy  accept  four-power  conference 
in  London. 

July  27,  1914.  William  II  returns  from  Norway  cruise  to 
Potsdam.  Austria-Hungary  informs  Russia  she  will  respect  Ser- 
bian integrity  and  independence.  Russia  agrees  to  four-power 
conference  if  direct  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary  fail. 

July  28,  1914.  Austria-Hungary  breaks  off  direct  negotia- 
tions with  Russia;  refuses  four-power  mediation;  declares  war 
on  Serbia,  and  mobilizes  eight  army  corps.  Russia  begins  par- 
tial mobilization.  Great  Britain  asks  Germany  her  plan  of 
mediation  between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary. 

July  29,  1914.  Germany  attempts  to  secure  neutrality  of 
Great  Britain  in  case  of  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian  war. 
Great  Britain  warns  Germany  that  if  France  is  involved  in  war 
she  will  support  her. 

July  30,  1914.  Austria-Hungary,  advised  by  Germany,  agrees 
to  resume  negotiations  with  Russia,  but  not  on  basis  of  Serbian 
reply.  Germany  asks  Russia's  explanation  of  her  mobilization. 
Russia  agrees  to  stop  mobilization  if  Austria-Hungary  respects 
Serbian  sovereignty.  After  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia  orders  general  mobilization  of  army  and  navy.  France 
reminds  Great  Britain  of  her  naval  agreement.  Great  Britain 
refuses  Germany's  proposal  that  she  remain  neutral  if  French 
territory  in  Europe  is  respected,  and  proposes  that  Germany 
occupy  Belgrade  and  force  mediation  by  the  powers. 

July  31,  1914.  Austria-Hungary  accepts  Anglo-German  pro- 
posal for  four-power  mediation  on  basis  of  temporary  prosecu- 
tion of  military  measures  against  Serbia.  Russia  agrees  to  take 
no  military  action  pending  negotiations.  Germany  refuses  to 
press  Austria-Hungary  so  long  as  Russia  mobilizes;  sends  ulti- 
matum to  Russia  and  France,  and  refuses  to  answer  about  re- 


THE   MACHINES 


AND  THE 


METHODS   USED   IN   BATTLE 

GUN  LAYER    •    AVIATOR    •    CHARGE    •    DESTROYER 
FIRST  AID    •    PERISCOPE    •    ZEPPELIN   •   THE  DEAD 


A   British   gun-layer   sighting   his   gun.     Modern  gunfire  adds  to  the  skill  of  the  gunners 
and  the  precise  mechanism,  expert  directions  of  range  finders  and  corrections  of  spotters 


'""* 


A  night  raid  on  London  in  October,  1915.     The  great  Zeppelin  is  marked 
by  searchlights  but  the  shells  are  bursting  Tar  below  it 


Interior  of  a  British  submarine,  showing  the  officer  in  command  looking  into  the 
periscope  where  a  view  from  the  surface  of  the  sea  is  reflected 


STATE    PAPERS  453 

specting  neutrality  of  Belgium.     France  agrees  to  respect  this 
neutrality. 

August  1,  1914.  Austria  orders  general  mobilization,  but 
continues  discussion  with  Russia,  and  gives  way  on  only  point 
remaining  at  issue.  Germany  orders  general  mobilization  and 
declares  war  on  Russia.  France  orders  general  mobilization. 
Great  Britain  refuses  Germany's  request  to  secure  French  neu- 
trality in  Russo-German  war,  and  to  remain  neutral  herself  if 
Germany  respect  Belgian  neutrality.  Belgium  declares  she  will 
uphold  neutrality.  Italy  decides  to  remain  neutral. 

August  2,  1914.  Great  Britain  agrees  to  give  naval  aid  to 
France  in  event  of  German  attack.  Germany  sends  ultimatum 
to  Belgium  about  passage  of  troops.  German  troops  enter 
Luxemburg. 

August  3,  1914.  Germany  declares  war  on  France  and  bids 
for  British  neutrality  by  offering  not  to  attack  northern  French 
coast  nor  use  Belgium  and  Dutch  ports  as  bases.  Great  Britain 
refuses  offer.  Belgium  refuses  Germany's  ultimatum. 

August  4,  1914.  Germany  sends  second  ultimatum  to  Bel- 
gium, threatening  force,  and  offers  Great  Britain  not  to  annex 
Belgian  territory.  Great  Britain  demands  that  Germany  respect 
Belgian  neutrality,  and  in  default  of  reply  declares  war  on 
Germany. 

August    5,  1914.    Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Russia. 

August  6,  1914.  Montenegro  declares  war  on  Austria- 
Hungary. 

August    9,  1914.     Serbia  declares  war  on  Germany. 

August  10,  1914.     France  declares  war  on  Austria-Hungary. 

August  12,  1914.  Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Austria- 
Hungary. 

August  12,  1914.     Montenegro  declares  war  on  Germany. 

August  23,  1914.     Japan  declares  war  on  Germany. 

August  27,  1914.     Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Japan. 

August  28,  1914.     Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Belgium. 

November  3,  1914.     Russia  declares  war  on  Turkey. 

November  5,  1914.  France  and  Great  Britain  declare  war 
on  Turkey. 

I_Gt.  War  2 


454     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

May  23,  1915.     Italy  declares  war  on  Austria-Hungary. 
June  3,  1915.    San  Marino  declares  war  on  Austria-Hungary. 
August  20,  1915.     Italy  declares  war  on  Turkey. 
October  14,  1915.     Bulgaria  declares  war  on  Serbia. 
October  15,  1915.     Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Bulgaria. 
October  19,  1915.     Russia  and  Italy  declare  war  on  Bulgaria. 


WARNINGS    OF    HOSTILE    INTENTIONS 

The  first  evidence  presented  before  the  court  of  nations  was 
that  of  France,  in  regard  to  the  hostile  intentions  of  Germany. 
To  this  Germany  has  made  no  official  answer  in  the  form  of 
documentary  evidence,  and  any  inference  as  to  the  hostile  inten- 
tions of  France  against  Germany,  if  there  were  any,  must  be 
inferred  by  the  reader  without  any  help  from  cross-examination 
by  the  official  advocates  of  Germany.  The  value  of  the  French 
evidence  must  be  judged  by  later  events.  Have  they,  or  have 
they  not,  corroborated  the  anticipations  of  France,  held  for  a  year 
before  the  war,  as  to  an  attack  upon  her  by  Germany? 

On  March  17,  1913,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  wrote  to  M.  Jonnart,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in 
Paris,  transmitting  reports  by  French  military  and  naval  attaches 
in  Berlin  to  their  respective  French  departments  on  German 
military  affairs,  and  called  his  attention  to  the  importance  of  the 
documents.  Delay,  he  said,  in  the  publication  of  the  reports  was 
due  to  lack  of  funds  wherewith  to  provide  for  these  military 
measures.  The  rich  classes  objected  to  a  forced  levy  in  times  of 
peace,  and  the  Federal  states  to  the  Imperial  Government  adopt- 
ing direct  taxation  which  had  heretofore  been  reserved  to  them. 

"However  this  may  be,  in  increasing  the  strength  of  the  German  army 
the  empire  desires  to  leave  nothing  to  chance  in  the  event  of  a  possible  crisis. 

"The  German  changes  have  produced  a  result  unexpected  by  that  coun- 
try, viz.,  the  proposal  of  the  Government  of  the  [French]  Republic  to  re- 
establish the  three  years'  service,  and  the  manly  determination  with  which 
this  proposal  has  been  welcomed  in  France.  The  surprise  occasioned  by 
these  proposals  of  insisting  on  the  absolute  necessity  of  an  increase  of 
German  military  strength;  the  German  proposals  are  represented  as  a  reply 


t 
STATE    PAPERS  455 

to  our  own.  The  reverse  is  the  case,  since  the  immense  military  effort 
which  France  is  undertaking  is  but  the  consequence  of  German  initiative. 

"The  Imperial  Government  is  constantly  rousing  patriotic  sentiment. 
Every  day  the  emperor  delights  to  revive  memories  of  1813.  Yesterday  eve- 
ning a  military  tattoo  went  through  the  streets  of  Berlin,  speeches  were 
delivered  in  which  the  present  situation  was  compared  to  that  of  a  hundred 
years  ago.  ...  It  was  of  course  to  be  expected  that  national  patriotism 
would  be  worked  up  just  when  fresh  sacrifices  are  being  required,  but  to 
compare  the  present  time  to  1813  is  to  misuse  an  historical  analogy.  If, 
to-day,  there  is  anything  corresponding  to  the  movement  which  a  hundred 
years  ago  roused  Germans  to  fight  the  man  of  genius  who  aspired  to  uni- 
versal dominion,  it  is  in  France  that  such  a  counterpart  would  have  to  be 
sought,  since  the  French  nation  seeks  but  to  protect  itself  against  the 
domination  of  force. 

"Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  both  countries 
makes  the  situation  grave." 

The  first  inclosure  in  M.  Cambon's  letter  was  the  report  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Serret.  He  speaks  of  a  "virulent"  article  in 
the  "Kolnische  Zeitung"  ("Cologne  Gazette")  on  the  menace  of 
France,  which,  though  immediately  disavowed  by  the  Govern- 
ment, cannot  be  disregarded,  since  its  sentiments  have  been  ap- 
proved by  other  prominent  newspapers,  and  it  appears  to  express 
a  "real  feeling"  among  the  people,  a  "latent  anger."  It  throws 
light  on  the  present  German  armaments. 

"For  some  time  now  it  has  been  quite  a  common  thing  to  meet  people 
who  declare  that  the  military  plans  of  France  are  extraordinary  and  un- 
justified. In  a  drawing  room  a  member  of  the  Reichstag  who  is  not  a 
fanatic,  speaking  of  the  three  years'  service  in  France,  went  so  far  as  to 
say:  'It  is  a  provocation;  we  will  not  allow  it/  More  moderate  persons, 
military  and  civil,  glibly  voice  the  opinion  that  France  with  her  40,000,000 
inhabitants  has  no  right  to  compete  in  this  way  with  Germany. 

"To  sum  up,  people  are  angry,  and  this  anger  is  not  caused  by  the  shriek- 
ing of  certain  French  papers,  to  which  sober-minded  people  pay  little  atten- 
tion. It  is  a  case  of  vexation.  People  are  angry  at  realizing  that  in  spite 
of  the  enormous  effort  made  last  year,  continued  and  even  increased  this 
year,  it  will  probably  not  be  possible  this  time  to  outrun  France  completely. 

"To  outdistance  us,  since  we  neither  will  nor  can  be  allied  with  her,  is 
Germany's  real  aim.  .  .  . 

"At  the  moment  when  German  military  strength  is  on  the  point  of  ac- 
quiring that  final  superiority  which,  should  the  occasion  arise,  would  force 
us  to  submit  to  humiliation  or  destruction,  France  suddenly  refuses  to 
abdicate,  and  shows,  as  Renan  said:  'her  eternal  power  of  renaissance  and 
resurrection.'  The  disgust  of  Germany  can  well  be  understood. 

"Of  course  the  Government  points  to  the  general  situation  in  Europe  and 
speaks  of  the  'Slav  Peril.'  As  far  as  I  can  see,  however,  public  opinion 


456     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

really  seems  indifferent  to  this  'Peril,'  and  yet  it  has  accepted  with  a  good 
grace,  if  not  with  welcome,  the  enormous  burdens  of  these  two  successive 
laws.  .  .  . 

"To  sum  up,  if  public  opinion  does  not  actually  point  at  France,  as  does 
the  'Kolnische  Zeitung,'  we  are  in  fact,  and  shall  long  remain  the  nation 
aimed  at.  Germany  considers  that  for  our  40,000,000  of  inhabitants  our 
place  in  the  sun  is  really  too  large. 

"Germans  wish  for  peace — so  they  keep  on  proclaiming,  and  the  em- 
peror more  than  anyone — but  they  do  not  understand  peace  as  involving 
either  mutual  concessions  or  a  balance  of  armaments.  They  want  to  be 
feared  and  they  are  at  present  engaged  in  making  the  necessary  sacrifices. 
If  on  some  occasion  their  national  vanity  is  wounded,  the  confidence  which 
the  country  will  feel  in  the  enormous  superiority  of  its  army  will  be  favor- 
able to  an  explosion  of  national  anger,  in  the  face  of  which  the  moderation 
of  the  Imperial  Government  will  perhaps  be  powerless. 

"It  must  be  emphasized  again  that  the  Government  is  doing  everything 
to  increase  patriotic  sentiment  by  celebrating  with  eclat  all  the  various 
anniversaries  of  1813. 

"The  trend  of  public  opinion  would  result  in  giving  a  war  a  more  or  less 
national  character.  By  whatever  pretext  Germany  should  justify  the  Euro- 
pean conflagration,  nothing  can  prevent  the  first  decisive  blows  being  struck 
at  France." 

The  second  inclosure  in  M.  Cambon's  letter  is  the  report  of 
M.  de  Faramond,  Naval  Attache.  He  says  that  there  will  be 
no  increase  in  the  German  fleet  this  year,  and  that  the  whole 
military  effort  will  be  directed  against  France. 

By  October  1,  1914,  the  imperial  army  will  be  increased  from 
720,000  to  860,000  men,  and  proposed  legislation  will  place  the 
army  corps  near  the  French  frontier  most  nearly  on  a  war  foot- 
ing, in  order  on  the  very  day  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  to 
attack  us  suddenly  with  forces  very  much  stronger  than  our 
own.  It  is  absolutely  imperative  for  the  Imperial  Government 
to  obtain  success  at  the  very  outset  of  the  operations.  .  . 

"William  II  cannot  allow  a  retreat  to  enter  into  his  calculations,  al- 
though the  German  soldier  is  no  longer  to-day  what  he  was  forty  years  ago, 
a  plain  religious  man,  ready  to  die  at  the  order  of  his  king.  When  it  is 
remembered  that  at  the  last  elections  4,000,000  votes  were  cast  by  the 
Socialists  and  that  the  franchise  is  only  obtained  in  Germany  at  the  age 
of  twenty-five,  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  active  army,  composed  of  young 
men  from  twenty  to  twenty-five,  must  contain  in  its  ranks  a  considerable 
proportion  of  Socialists. 

"It  would  indeed  be  foolish  to  think  that  the  German  Socialists  will  throw 
down  their  rifles  on  the  day  when  France  and  Germany  come  to  blows;  but 
it  will  be  very  important  that  the  Imperial  Government  should  persuade 


STATE    PAPERS  457 

them  that  on  the  one  hand  we  are  the  aggressors,  and  on  the  other  that  they 
can  have  entire  confidence  in  the  direction  of  the  campaign  and  its  final 
result.  .  .  . 

"And  it  is  because  a  German  defeat  at  the  outset  would  have  such  an 
incalculable  effect  on  the  empire  that  we  find  in  all  the  plans  worked  out 
by  the  general  staff  proposals  for  a  crushing  offensive  movement  against 
France. 

"In  reality  the  Imperial  Government  wishes  to  be  in  a  position  to  meet 
all  possible  eventualities.  It  is  from  the  direction  of  France  that  the 
danger  seems  to  them  greatest.  .  .  . 

"In  this  connection  I  think  it  is  interesting  to  quote  a  conversation  which 
a  member  of  our  embassy  had  the  other  evening  with  the  old  Prince  Henckel 
von  Donnersmarck,  as  it  may  serve  to  reflect  the  opinions  which  dominate 
court  circles. 

"Referring  to  the  new  German  military  proposals  Prince  Donnersmarck 
spoke  as  follows: 

"  'French  people  are  quite  wrong  in  thinking  that  we  harbor  evil  de- 
signs and  want  war.  But  we  cannot  forget  that  in  1870  popular  opinion 
forced  the  French  Government  to  make  a  foolish  attack  on  us  before  they 
were  ready.  Who  can  assure  us  that  public  opinion,  which  in  France  is  so 
easily  inflamed,  will  not  force  the  Government  to  declare  war?  It  is 
against  this  danger  that  we  wish  to  protect  ourselves. ' ' 

The  prince,  a  veteran  of  the  French  war,  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Germany  would  again  conquer  France  in  event  of 
another  war. 

"Frenchmen,  who  have  a  great  facility  for  work,  are  not  as  punctual  as 
Germans  in  the  fulfillment  of  their  duty.  In  the  coming  war  that  nation 
will  be  victorious  whose  servants  from  the  top  of  the  ladder  to  the  bottom 
will  do  their  duty  with  absolute  exactitude,  however  important  or  small  it 
may  be.  And  Prince  Donnersmarck  added:  'An  exactitude  which  played 
so  great  a  role  forty  years  ago  in  moving  an  army  of  500,000  men  will  have 
a  far  greater  importance  in  the  next  war,  when  it  will  be  a  question  of 
moving  masses  far  more  numerous.' 

"In  this  way  the  old  prince  gave  expression  to  the  confidence  shared  by 
all  Germans  in  the  superiority  of  their  military  organization." 

The  attache  then  discusses  German  finances. 

He  mentions  particularly  the  large  loans  raised  by  the  empire  and 
Prussia:  500,000,000  marks  on  January  29,  1912,  and  350,000,000  marks  on 
March  7,  1913.  Quite  an  important  part  of  these  loans  must  have  been 
applied  to  military  expenses. 

"The  military  law  of  1913  will  require  quite  exceptional  financial 
measures. 

"According  to  the  indications  given  by  the  semi-official  press,  the  'non- 
recurring' expenditure  will  amount  to  a  milliard  marks,  while  the  'perma- 
nent* annual  expenditure  resulting  from  the  increase  of  effectives  will  ex- 
ceed 200,000,000  marks. 


458     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"It  seems  certain  that  the  'nonrecurring'  expenditure  will  be  covered 
by  a  war  contribution  levied  on  capital.  Small  fortunes  would  be  ex- 
empted and  those  above  20,000  marks  would  be  subject  to  a  progressive 
tax.  Presented  in  this  guise  the  war  tax  would  not  be  objected  to  by  th? 
Socialists,  who  will  be  able,  in  accordance  with  their  usual  tactics,  to  re< 
ject  the  principle  of  the  military  law  and  at  the  same  time  to  pass  the 
votes  which  assure  its  being  carried  into  effect." 

The  attache  then  discusses  a  subject  already  mentioned — the 
persuasion  of  the  rich  and  bourgeois  classes  by  the  Government 
to  submit  to  the  increased  taxation  by  "noisy  celebrations  of  the 
centenary  of  the  War  of  Independence"  in  order  to  convince  them 
of  the  necessity  of  sacrifice,  and  to  remind  them  that  France  is 
to-day,  as  100  years  ago,  their  hereditary  enemy. 

"If  it  is  established  that  the  German  Government  are  doing  their  ut- 
most to  secure  that  the  payment  of  this  enormous  tax  should  be  made  in 
full,  and  not  by  way  of  installment,  and  if,  as  some  of  the  newspapers  say, 
the  whole  payment  is  to  be  complete  before  July  1,  1914,  these  facts  have 
a  formidable  significance  for  us,  for  nothing  can  explain  such  haste  on  the 
part  of  the  military  authorities  to  obtain  war  treasure  in  cash  to  the 
amount  of  a  milliard." 

On  April  2,  1913,  M.  Etienne,  French  Minister  of  War,  wrote 
to  M.  Jonnart,  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  enclosing 
a  German  official  secret  report  concerning  strengthening  of  the 
army.  This  report  is  interesting  in  that  it  mentions  knowledge 
that,  as  a  result  of  her  entente  with  France  and  Russia,  Great 
Britain  was  prepared  to  send  an  expeditionary  force  of  100,000 
to  the  Continent,  and  confesses  that  Germany  refrained  from 
declaring  war  on  France  at  the  time  of  the  Agadir  incident  be- 
cause of  "the  progress  made  by  the  French  army,  the  moral 
recovery  of  the  nation,  and  the  technical  advance  in  the  realm 
of  aviation  and  of  machine  guns." 

"Public  opinion  is  being  prepared  for  a  new  increase  in  the  active  army, 
which  would  ensure  Germany  an  honorable  peace  and  the  possibility  of 
properly  ensuring  her  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  The  new  army 
law  and  the  supplementary  law  which  should  follow  will  enable  her  almost 
completely  to  attain  this  end.  .  .  . 

"Neither  ridiculous  shriekings  for  revenge  by  French  chauvinists,  nor 
the  Englishmen's  gnashing  of  teeth,  nor  the  wild  gestures  of  the  Slavs  will 
turn  us  from  our  aim  of  protecting  and  extending  Deutschtum  (German 
influence)  all  the  world  over. 

"The  French  may  arm  as  much  as  they  wish,  they  cannot  in  one  day 
increase  their  population.  The  employment  of  an  army  of  black  men  in  the 


STATE    PAPERS  459 

theatre  of  European  operations  will  remain  for  a  long  time  a  dream,  and 
in  any  case  be  devoid  of  beauty. 

"Our  new  army  law  is  only  an  extension  of  the  military  education  of  the 
German  nation.  Our  ancestors  of  1813  made  greater  sacrifices.  It  is  our 
sacred  duty  to  sharpen  the  sword  that  has  been  put  into  our  hands  and  to 
hold  it  ready  for  defense  as  well  as  for  offense.  We  must  allow  the  idea 
to  sink  into  the  minds  of  our  people  that  our  arma/tnents  are  an  answer  to 
the  armaments  and  policy  of  the  French.  We  must  accustom  them  to  think 
that  an  offensive  war  on  our  part  is  a  necessity,  in  order  to  combat  the 
provocations  of  our  adversaries.  We  must  act  with  prudence  so  as  not  to 
arouse  suspicion,  and  to  avoid  the  crises  which  might  injure  our  economic 
existence.  We  must  so  manage  matters  that  under  the  heavy  weight  of 
powerful  armaments,  considerable  sacrifices,  and  strained  political  rela- 
tions, an  outbreak  (Losschlageri)  should  be  considered  as  a  relief,  because 
after  it  would  come  decades  of  peace  and  prosperity,  as  after  1870.  We 
must  prepare  for  war  from  the  financial  point  of  view;  there  is  much  to  be 
done  in  this  direction.  We  must  not  arouse  the  distrust  of  our  financiers, 
but  there  are  many  things  which  cannot  be  concealed. 

"We  must  not  be  anxious  about  the  fate  of  our  colonies.  The  final  re- 
sult in  Europe  will  settle  their  position.  On  the  other  hand  we  must  stir 
up  trouble  in  the  north  of  Africa  and  in  Russia.  It  is  a  means  of  keeping 
the  forces  of  the  enemy  engaged.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely  necessary  that 
we  should  open  up  relations,  by  means  of  well-chosen  agents,  with  influential 
people  in  Egypt,  Tunis,  Algeria,  and  Morocco,  in  order  to  prepare  the  meas- 
ures which  would  be  necessary  in  the  case  of  a  European  war.  Of  course 
in  case  of  war  we  should  openly  recognize  these  secret  allies;  and  on  the 
conclusion  of  peace  we  should  secure  to  them  the  advantages  which  they 
had  gained.  These  aims  are  capable  of  realization.  The  first  attempt  which 
was  made  some  years  ago  opened  up  for  us  the  desired  relations.  Un- 
fortunately these  relations  were  not  sufficiently  consolidated.  Whether  we 
like  it  or  not  it  will  be  necessary  to  resort  to  preparations  of  this  kind,  in 
order  to  bring  a  campaign  rapidly  to  a  conclusion. 

"Risings  provoked  in  time  of  war  by  political  agents  need  to  be  care- 
fully prepared  and  by  material  means.  They  must  break  out  simultaneously 
with  the  destruction  of  the  means  of  communication;  they  must  have  a 
controlling  head  to  be  found  among  the  influential  leaders,  religious  or 
political.  The  Egyptian  School  is  particularly  suited  to  this  purpose;  more 
and  more  it  serves  as  a  bond  between  the  intellectuals  of  the  Mohammedan 
world. 

"However  this  may  be,  we  must  be  strong  in  order  to  annihilate  at  one 
powerful  swoop  our  enemies  in  the  east  and  west.  But  in  the  next  European 
war  it  will  also  be  necessary  that  the  small  states  should  be  forced  to  follow 
us  or  be  subdued.  In  certain  conditions  their  armies  and  their  fortified 
places  can  be  rapidly  conquered  or  neutralized;  this  would  probably  be  the 
case  with  Belgium  and  Holland,  so  as  to  prevent  our  enemy  in  the  west 
from  gaining  territory  which  they  could  use  as  a  base  of  operations  against 
our  flank.  In  the  north  we  have  nothing  to  fear  from  Denmark  or  Scan- 
dinavia, especially  as  in  any  event  we  shall  provide  for  the  concentration 


460     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

of  a  strong  northern  army,  capable  of  replying  to  any  menace  from  thia 
direction.  In  the  most  unfavorable  case,  Denmark  might  be  forced  by  Great 
Britain  to  abandon  her  neutrality;  but  by  this  time  the  decision  would  al- 
ready have  been  reached  both  on  land  and  on  sea.  Our  northern  army,  the 
strength  of  which  could  be  largely  increased  by  Dutch  formations,  would 
oppose  a  very  active  defense  to  any  offensive  measures  from  this  quarter. 

"In  the  south,  Switzerland  forms  an  extremely  solid  bulwark,  and  we 
can  rely  on  her  energetically  defending  her  neutrality  against  France,  and 
thus  protecting  our  flank. 

"As  was  stated  above,  the  situation  with  regard  to  the  small  states  on 
our  northwestern  frontier  cannot  be  viewed  in  quite  the  same  light.  This 
will  be  a  vital  question  for  us,  and  our  aim  must  be  to  take  the  offensive  with 
a  large  superiority  from  the  first  days.  For  this  purpose  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  concentrate  a  large  army,  followed  up  by  strong  Landwehr  forma- 
tions, which  will  induce  the  small  states  to  follow  us  or  at  least  to  remain 
inactive  in  the  theatre  of  operations,  and  which  would  crush  them  in  the 
event  of  armed  resistance.  If  we  could  induce  these  states  to  organize  their 
system  of  fortification  in  such  a  manner  as  to  constitute  an  effective  protec- 
tion for  our  flank  we  could  abandon  the  proposed  invasion.  But  for  this, 
army  reorganization,  particularly  in  Belgium,  would  be  necessary  in  order 
that  it  might  really  guarantee  an  effective  resistance.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, their  defensive  organization  was  established  against  us,  thus  giving 
definite  advantages  to  our  adversary  in  the  West,  we  could  in  no  circum- 
stances offer  Belgium  a  guaranty  for  the  security  of  her  neutrality.  Ac- 
cordingly, a  vast  field  is  open  to  our  diplomacy  to  work  in  this  country  on 
the  lines  of  our  interests. 

"The  arrangements  made  with  this  end  in  view  allow  us  to  hope  that  it 
will  be  possible  to  take  the  offensive  immediately  after  the  complete  con- 
centration of  the  army  of  the  Lower  Rhine.  An  ultimatum  with  a  short- 
time  limit,  to  be  followed  immediately  by  invasion,  would  allow  a  sufficient 
justification  for  our  action  in  international  law. 

"Such  are  the  duties  which  devolve  on  our  army  and  which  demand  a 
striking  force  of  considerable  numbers.  If  the  enemy  attacks  us,  or  if  we 
^ish  to  overcome  him,  we  will  act  as  our  brothers  did  a  hundred  years  ago; 
the  eagle  thus  provoked  will  soar  in  his  flight,  will  seize  the  enemy  in  his 
steel  claws  and  render  him  harmless.  We  will  then  remember  that  the 
provinces  of  the  ancient  German  Empire,  the  County  of  Burgundy  and  a 
large  part  of  Lorraine,  are  still  in  the  hands  of  the  French;  that  thousands 
of  brother  Germans  in  the  Baltic  provinces  are  groaning  under  the  Slav 
yoke.  It  is  a  national  question  that  Germany's  former  possessions  should 
be  restored  to  her." 


STATE    PAPERS  461 

REPORT    OF    M.    CAMBON    IN    1913 

On  May  6,  1913,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  wrote  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  in  Paris,  giving  an  account  of  an  interview  with  the 
German  Secretary  of  State,  Herr  von  Jagow,  concerning  the 
conference  of  ambassadors  in  London  on  May  5th,  and  the 
results  there  obtained.  It  was  agreed  by  Cambon  and  Von 
Jagow  that  the  immediate  crisis  was  over.  Cambon  submitted 
proofs  of  the  anxiety  of  the  German  Government  over  the  crisis. 

"1.  Von  Jagow  had  questioned  a  colleague  of  Cambon  about  Russia's 
situation  in  the  Far  East,  whether  there  was  cause  for  Russia  to  fear 
difficulties  in  that  quarter  which  would  cause  her  to  retain  troops  there. 
The  ambassador  answered  him  that  he  knew  of  absolutely  no  trouble  in  the 
Far  East,  and  that  Russia  had  her  hands  free  for  Europe. 

"2.  The  mobilization  of  the  German  army  is  not  restricted  to  the  recall 
of  reservists  to  their  barracks.  There  is  in  Germany  a  preliminary  measure 
which  we  have  not  got,  and  which  consists  in  warning  officers  and  men  of 
the  reserve  to  hold  themselves  ready  for  the  call,  in  order  that  they  may 
make  the  necessary  arrangements.  It  is  a  general  call  to  'attention,'  and 
it  requires  an  incredible  spirit  of  submission,  discipline,  and  secrecy  such  as 
exists  in  this  country,  to  make  a  step  of  this  kind  possible.  If  such  a 
warning  were  given  in  France,  a  thrill  would  run  through  the  whole  coun- 
try, and  it  would  be  in  the  papers  the  next  day.  .  .  . 

"The  intention  of  the  General  Staff  is  to  act  by  surprise.  'We  must  put 
on  one  side,'  said  General  von  Moltke,  'all  commonplaces  as  to  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  aggressor.  When  war  has  become  necessary  it  is  essential  to 
carry  it  on  in  such  a  way  as  to  place  all  the  chances  in  one's  own  favor. 
Success  alone  justifies  war.  Germany  cannot  and  ought  not  to  leave 
Russia  time  to  mobilize,  for  she  would  then  be  obliged  to  maintain  on  her 
eastern  frontier  so  large  an  army  that  she  would  be  placed  in  a  position 
of  equality,  if  not  of  inferiority,  to  that  of  France.  Accordingly,'  added 
the  general,  'we  must  anticipate  our  principal  adversary  as  soon  as  there 
are  nine  chances  to  one  of  going  to  war,  and  begin  it  without  delay  in  order 
ruthlessly  to  crush  all  resistance.' 

"This  represents  exactly  the  attitude  of  military  circles  and  it  cor- 
responds to  that  of  political  circles;  the  latter,  however,  do  not  consider 
Russia,  in  contradistinction  to  us,  as  a  necessary  enemy.  .  .  . 

"From  these  events  the  following  conclusions  may  be  drawn  .  .  .  these 
people  are  not  afraid  of  war,  they  fully  accept  its  possibility  and  they  have 
consequently  taken  the  necessary  steps.  They  wish  to  be  always  ready. 

"As  I  said,  this  demands  qualities  of  secrecy,  discipline  and  of  per- 
sistence; enthusiasm  alone  is  not  sufficient.  This  lesson  may  form  a  useful 
subject  of  meditation  when  the  Government  of  the  [French]  Republic  ask 
Parliament  for  the  means  of  strengthening  the  defenses  of  the  country." 


462     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

On  July  30,  1913,  M.  Pichon,  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  made  an  official  report  on  the  state  of  German  public 
opinion,  as  derived  from  French  diplomatic  and  consular  agents. 
It  said  that : 

"1.  The  treaty  of  November  4,  1912,  is  considered  a  disappointment  for 
Germany. 

"2.  France — a  new  France — undreamed  of  prior  to  the  summer  of  1911, 
is  considered  ...  to  want  war. 

"Members  of  all  the  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  from  the  Conservatives  to 
the  Socialists  [and  of  all  classes  of  the  people]  are  unanimous  on  these  two 
points,  with  very  slight  differences  corresponding  to  their  position  in  society 
or  their  political  party.  Here  is  a  synthesis  of  all  these  opinions: 

"The  treaty  of  November  4  is  a  diplomatic  defeat,  a  proof  of  the  in- 
capacity of  German  diplomacy  and  the  carelessness  of  the  Government  (so 
often  denounced),  a  proof  that  the  future  of  the  empire  is  not  safe  without 
a  new  Bismarck;  it  is  a  national  humiliation,  a  lowering  in  the  eyes  of 
Europe,  a  blow  to  German  prestige,  all  the  more  serious  because  up  to 
1911  the  military  supremacy  of  Germany  was  unchallenged,  and  French 
anarchy  and  the  powerlessness  of  the  Republic  were  a  sort  of  German 
dogma.  .  .  . 

"And  the  attitude  of  France,  her  calmness,  her  reborn  spiritual  unity, 
her  resolution  to  make  good  her  rights  right  up  to  the  end,  the  fact  that 
she  has  the  audacity  not  to  be  afraid  of  war,  these  things  are  the  most 
persistent  and  the  gravest  cause  of  anxiety  and  bad  temper  on  the  part  of 
German  public  opinion.  .  . . 

"German  public  opinion  is  divided  into  two  currents  on  the  question  of 
the  possibility  and  proximity  of  war. 

"There  are  in  the  country  forces  making  for  peace,  but  they  are  un- 
organized and  have  no  popular  leaders.  They  consider  that  war  would  be 
a  social  misfortune  for  Germany,  and  that  caste  pride,  Prussian  domina- 
tion, and  the  manufacturers  of  guns  and  armor  plate  would  get  the  greatest 
benefit,  but  above  all  that  war  would  profit  Great  Britain. 

"The  forces  consist  of  the  following  elements: 

The  bulk  of  the  workmen,  artisans,  and  peasants,  who  are  peace  loving 
by  instinct. 

"Those  members  of  the  nobility  detached  from  military  interests  and 
engaged  in  business,  such  as  the  grands  seigneurs  of  Silesia  and  a  few 
other  personages  very  influential  at  court  who  are  sufficiently  enlightened 
to  realize  the  disastrous  political  and  social  consequences  of  war,  even  if 
successful. 

"Numerous  manufacturers,  merchants  and  financiers  in  a  moderate  way 
of  business,  to  whom  war,  even  if  successful,  would  mean  bankruptcy,  be- 
cause their  enterprises  depend  on  credit,  and  are  chiefly  supported  by  foreign 
capital. 

"Poles,  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Schleswig-Holstein — con- 
quered, but  not  assimilated  and  suddenly  hostile  to  Prussian  policy.  There 
are  about  7,000,000  of  these  annexed  Germans. 


STATE    PAPERS  463 

"Finally,  the  governments  and  the  governing  classes  in  the  large  south- 
ern states — Saxony,  Bavaria,  Wiirttemburg,  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Baden — are  divided  by  these  two  opinions:  an  unsuccessful  war  would 
compromise  the  Federation  from  which  they  have  derived  great  economic 
advantages;  a  successful  war  would  profit  only  Prussia  and  Prussianiza- 
tion,  against  which  they  have  difficulty  in  defending  their  political  inde- 
pendence and  administrative  autonomy. 

"These  classes  of  people  either  consciously  or  instinctively  prefer  peace 
to  war;  but  they  are  only  a  sort  of  makeweight  in  political  matters,  with 
limited  influence  on  public  opinion,  or  they  are  silent  social  forces,  passive, 
and  defenseless  against  the  infection  of  a  wave  of  warlike  feeling. 

"An  example  will  make  this  idea  clear:  The  110  Socialist  members  of 
the  Reichstag  are  in  favor  of  peace.  They  would  be  unable  to  prevent  war, 
for  war  does  not  depend  upon  a  vote  of  the  Reichstag,  and  in  the  presence 
of  such  an  eventuality  the  greater  part  of  their  number  would  join  the  rest 
of  the  country  in  a  chorus  of  angry  excitement  and  enthusiasm. 

"Finally  it  must  be  observed  that  these  supporters  of  peace  believe  in 
war  in  the  mass  because  they  do  not  see  any  other  solution  for  the  pres- 
ent situation.  In  certain  contracts,  especially  in  publishers'  contracts,  a 
clause  has  been  introduced  cancelling  the  contract  in  the  case  of  war.  They 
hope,  however,  that  the  will  of  the  emperor  on  the  one  side,  France's 
difficulties  in  Morocco  on  the  other,  will  be  for  some  time  a  guaranty  of 
peace.  Be  that  as  it  may,  their  pessimism  gives  free  play  to  those  who 
favor  war.  .  .  . 

"On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  war  party  with  leaders  and  followers, 
a  press  either  convinced  or  subsidized  for  the  purpose  of  creating  public 
opinion ;  it  has  means  both  varied  and  formidable  for  the  intimidation  of  the 
Government.  It  goes  to  work  in  the  country  with  clear  ideas,  burning 
aspirations,  and  a  determination  that  is  at  once  thrilling  and  fixed. 

"Those  in  favor  of  war  are  divided  into  several  categories;  each  of  these 
derives  from  its  social  caste,  its  class,  its  intellectual  and  moral  education, 
its  interests,  its  hates,  special  arguments  which  create  a  general  attitude 
of  mind  and  increase  the  strength  and  rapidity  of  the  stream  of  war- 
like desire. 

"Some  want  war  because  in  the  present  circumstances  they  think  it  is 
inevitable.  And,  as  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the  sooner  the  better. 

"Others  regard  war  as  necessary  for  economic  reasons  based  on  over- 
population, overproduction,  the  need  for  markets  and  outlets;  or  for  social 
reasons,  i.  e.,  to  provide  the  outside  interests  that  alone  can  prevent  or 
retard  the  rise  to  power  of  the  democratic  and  socialist  masses. 

"Others,  uneasy  for  the  safety  of  the  empire,  and  believing  that  time 
is  on  the  side  of  France,  think  that  events  should  be  brought  to  an  imme- 
diate head.  It  is  not  unusual  to  meet,  in  the  course  of  conversation  or  in 
the  pages  of  patriotic  pamphlets,  the  vague  but  deeply  rooted  conviction  that 
a  free  Germany  and  a  regenerated  France  are  two  historical  facts  mutu- 
ally incompatible. 

"Others  are  bellicose  from  'Bismarckism/  as  it  may  be  termed.  They 
feel  themselves  humiliated  at  having  to  enter  into  discussions  with  France, 


464     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

at  being  obliged  to  talk  in  terms  of  law  and  right  in  negotiations  and  con- 
ferences where  they  have  not  always  found  it  easy  to  get  right  on  their 
side,  even  when  they  have  a  preponderating  force.  From  their  still  recent 
past  they  derive  a  sense  of  pride  ever  fed  by  personal  memories  of 
former  exploits,  by  oral  traditions,  and  by  books,  and  irritated  by  the 
events  of  recent  years.  Angry  disappointment  is  the  unifying  force 
of  the  Wehrvereine  [defense  leagues]  and  other  associations  of  Young 
Germany. 

"Others  again  want  war  from  a  mystic  hatred  of  revolutionary  France; 
ethers,  finally,  from  a  feeling  of  rancor.  These  last  the  people  who  heap  up 
pretexts  for  war. 

"Coming  to  actual  facts,  these  feelings  take  concrete  form  as  follows: 
The  country  squires,  represented  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Conservative  party, 
want  at  all  costs  to  escape  the  death  duties,  which  are  bound  to  come  if 
peace  continues.  In  the  last  sitting  of  the  session  which  has  just  closed 
the  Reichstag  agreed  to  these  duties  in  principle.  It  is  a  serious  attack 
on  the  interests  and  privileges  of  the  landed  gentry.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  aristocracy  is  military  in  character,  and  it  is  instructive  to  compare 
the  Army  List  with  the  Year  Book  of  the  nobility.  War  alone  can  prolong 
its  prestige  and  support  its  family  interest.  During  the  discussions  on  the 
Army  Bill  a  Conservative  speaker  put  forward  the  need  for  promotion 
among  officers  as  an  argument  in  its  favor.  Finally  this  social  class,  which 
forms  a  hierarchy  with  the  King  of  Prussia  as  its  supreme  head,  realizes 
with  dread  the  democratization  of  Germany  and  the  increasing  power  of 
the  Socialist  party,  and  considers  its  own  days  numbered.  Not  only  does 
a  formidable  movement  hostile  to  agrarian  protection  threaten  its  material 
interests,  but  in  addition  the  number  of  its  political  representatives  de- 
creases with  each  legislative  period.  In  the  Reichstag  of  1878,  out  of  397 
members,  162  belonged  to  the  aristocracy;  in  1898,  83;  in  1912,  57.  Out 
of  this  number  27  alone  belong  to  the  Right,  14  to  the  Center,  7  to  the  Left, 
and  1  sits  among  the  Socialists. 

"The  higher  bourgeoisie,  represented  by  the  National  Liberal  party,  the 
party  of  the  contented  spirits,  have  not  the  same  reasons  as  the  squires 
for  wanting  war.  With  a  few  exceptions,  however,  they  are  bellicose.  They 
have  their  reasons,  social  in  character. 

"The  higher  bourgeoisie  is  no  less  troubled  than  the  aristocracy  at  the 
democratization  of  Germany.  In  1871  they  had  125  members  in  the  Reich- 
stag; in  1874,  55;  in  1887,  99;  in  1912,  45.  They  do  not  forget  that  in  the 
years  succeeding  the  war  they  played  the  leading  role  in  Parliament,  help- 
ing Bismarck  in  his  schemes  against  the  country  squires.  Uneasily  bal- 
anced to-day  between  Conservative  instincts  and  Liberal  ideas  they  look 
to  war  to  settle  problems  which  their  parliamentary  representatives  are 
painfully  incapable  of  solving.  In  addition,  doctrinaire  manufacturers  de- 
clare that  the  difficulties  between  themselves  and  their  workmen  originate  in 
France,  the  home  of  revolutionary  ideas  of  freedom — without  France  indus- 
trial unrest  would  be  unknown. 

"Lastly,  there  are  the  manufacturers  of  guns  and  armor  plate,  big  mer- 
chants who  demand  bigger  markets,  bankers  who  are  speculating  on  the 


STATE    PAPERS  465 

coming  of  the  golden  age  and  the  next  war  indemnity — all  these  regard 
war  as  good  business. 

"Among  the  'Bismarckians'  must  be  reckoned  officials  of  all  kinds,  repre- 
sented fairly  closely  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Free  Conservatives  or  Impe- 
rial party.  This  is  the  party  of  the  'pensioned,'  whose  impetuous  senti- 
ments are  poured  out  in  the  Tost.'  They  find  disciples  and  political  sym- 
pathizers in  the  various  groups  of  young  men  whose  minds  have  been 
trained  and  formed  in  the  public  schools  and  universities. 

"The  universities,  if  we  except  a  few  distinguished  spirits,  develop  a 
warlike  philosophy.  Economists  demonstrate  by  statistics  Germany's  need 
for  a  colonial  and  commercial  empire  commensurate  with  the  industrial 
output  of  the  empire.  There  are  sociological  fanatics  who  go  even  further. 
The  armed  peace,  so  they  say,  is  a  crushing  burden  on  the  nations:  it 
checks  improvement  in  the  lot  of  the  masses  and  assists  the  growth  of 
Socialism.  France,  by  clinging  obstinately  to  her  desire  for  revenge, 
opposes  disarmament.  Once  for  all  she  must  be  reduced  for  a  century  to 
a  state  of  impotence;  that  is  the  best  and  speediest  way  of  solving  the 
social  problem. 

"Historians,  philosophers,  political  pamphleteers,  and  other  apologists 
of  German  Kultur  wish  to  impose  upon  the  world  a  way  of  thinking  and 
feeling  specifically  German.  They  wish  to  wrest  from  France  that  intel- 
lectual supremacy  which,  according  to  the  clearest  thinkers,  is  still  her 
possession.  From  this  source  is  derived  the  phraseology  of  the  Pan- 
Germans  and  the  ideas  and  adherents  of  the  Kriegsvereine  [war  leagues], 
Wehrvereine,  and  other  similar  associations  too  well  known  to  need  par- 
ticular description.  It  is  enough  to  note  that  the  dissatisfaction  caused  by 
the  treaty  of  November  4  has  considerably  swelled  the  membership  of 
colonial  societies. 

"We  come  finally  to  those  whose  support  of  the  war  policy  is  inspired 
by  rancor  and  resentment.  These  are  the  most  dangerous.  They  are  re- 
cruited chiefly  among  diplomatists.  German  diplomatists  are  now  in  very 
bad  odor  in  public  opinion.  The  most  bitter  are  those  who  since  1905 
have  been  engaged  in  the  negotiations  between  France  and  Germany;  they 
are  heaping  together  and  reckoning  up  their  grievances  against  us,  and 
one  day  they  will  present  their  accounts  in  the  war  press.  .  .  . 

"During  the  discussion  on  the  Army  Bill  one  of  these  warlike  diplo- 
matists exclaimed :  'Germany  will  not  be  able  to  have  any  serious  con- 
versation with  France  until  she  has  every  sound  man  under  arms.' 

"In  what  terms  will  this  conversation  be  couched?  The  opinion  is  fairly 
widely  spread,  even  in  Pan-German  circles,  that  Germany  will  not  declare 
war  in  view  of  the  system  of  defensive  alliances  and  the  tendencies  of  the 
emperor.  But  when  the  moment  comes  she  will  have  to  try  in  every  possi- 
ble way  to  force  France  to  attack  her.  Offense  will  be  given  if  necessary. 
That  is  the  Prussian  tradition. 

"Must  war,  then,  be  considered  as  inevitable? 

"It  is  hardly  likely  that  Germany  will  take  the  risk  if  France  can  make 
it  clear,  to  the  world  that  the  Entente  Cordiale  and  the  Russian  alliance 
are  not  mere  diplomatic  fictions  but  realities  which  exist  and  will  make 


466     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

themselves  felt.  The  British  fleet  inspires  a  wholesome  terror.  It  is  well 
known,  however,  that  victory  on  sea  will  leave  everything  in  suspense. 
On  land  alone  can  a  decisive  issue  be  obtained. 

"As  for  Russia,  even  though  she  carries  greater  weight  in  political  and 
military  circles  than  was  the  case  three  or  four  years  ago,  it  is  not  believed 
that  her  cooperation  will  be  sufficiently  rapid  and  energetic  to  be  effective. 

"People's  minds  are  thus  getting  used  to  consider  the  next  war  as  a  duel 
between  France  and  Germany." 

On  November  22,  1913,  M.  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  reported  to  M.  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
in  Paris,  an  account  of  a  recent  conversation  between  the 
Kaiser  and  the  King  of  the  Belgians  in  the  presence  of  General 
von  Moltke,  Chief  of  the  General  German  Staff,  which  gravely 
impressed  King  Albert.  It  showed  that  German  enmity  against 
France  was  increasing,  and  that  the  Kaiser  had  ceased  to  be 
the  friend  of  peace.  The  Kaiser  had  come  to  believe  that  war 
with  France  was  inevitable;  and,  when  it  did  come,  that  Ger- 
man success  was  certain.  General  von  Moltke  strengthened  his 
sovereign  in  these  opinions : 

"This  time  the  matter  must  be  settled,  and  your  majesty  can  have  no 
conception  of  the  irresistible  enthusiasm  with  which  the  whole  German 
people  will  be  carried  away  when  that  day  comes. 

"The  king  of  the  Belgians  protested  that  it  was  a  travesty  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  French  Government  to  interpret  them  in  that  sense,  and  to 
let  oneself  be  misled  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  French  nation  by  the 
ebullitions  of  a  few  irresponsible  spirits  or  the  intrigues  of  unscrupulous 
agitators. 

"The  emperor  and  his  chief  of  the  General  Staff  nevertheless  persisted 
in  their  point  of  view. 

"During  the  course  of  this  conversation  the  emperor  seemed  overstrained- 
and  irritable.  As  William  II  advances  in  years,  family  traditions,  the  re- 
actionary tendencies  of  the  court,  and  especially  the  impatience  of  the  sol- 
diers, obtain  a  greater  empire  over  his  mind.  Perhaps  he  feels  some  slight 
jealousy  of  the  popularity  acquired  by  his  son,  who  flatters  the  passions 
of  the  Pan-Germans  and  who  does  not  regard  the  position  occupied  by 
the  empire  in  the  world  as  commensurate  with  its  power.  Perhaps  the 
reply  of  France  to  the  last  increase  of  the  Germany  army,  the  object  of 
which  was  to  establish  the  incontestable  supremacy  of  Germany  is,  to  a 
certain  extent,  responsible  for  his  bitterness,  for,  whatever  may  be  said, 
it  is  realized  that  Germany  cannot  go  much  further. 

"One  may  well  ponder  over  the  significance  of  this  conversation.  The 
emperor  and  his  chief  of  the  General  Staff  may  have  wished  to  impress 
the  king  of  the  Belgians  and  induce  him  not  to  make  any  opposition  in 
the  event  of  a  conflict  between  us.  .  .  . 


STATE    PAPERS  467 

"The  Emperor  William  is  less  master  of  his  impatience  than  is  usually 
supposed.  I  have  known  him  more  than  once  to  allow  his  real  thoughts 
escape  him.  .  .  . 

"If  I  may  be  allowed  to  draw  a  conclusion  I  would  submit  that  it  would 
be  well  to  take  account  of  this  new  factor,  namely,  that  the  emperor  is 
becoming  used  to  an  order  of  ideas  which  were  formerly  repugnant  to  him, 
and  that,  to  borrow  from  him  a  phrase  which  he  likes  to  use,  'we  must 
keep  our  powder  dry.'  " 

[See  also  letter  of  M.  Allize,  French  Minister  at  Munich,  of 
July  10,  1914,  in  pages  following.] 

The  next  evidence  presented  before  the  court  of  the  world 
is  that  by  Serbia  and  her  witnesses,  the  nations  thus  far,  to  all 
appearances,  interested  solely  in  maintaining  the  peace  of 
Europe,  as  to  Serbia's  nonresponsibility  for  the  assassination  of 
the  hereditary  Archduke  of  Austria  at  Sarajevo,  Bosnia,  on 
June  28,  1914,  and  as  to  her  sincere  desire  to  do  all  she  could, 
short  of  impairing  her  sovereignty  and  suffering  national 
humiliation;  and  that  by  Austria-Hungary  and  the  same  wit- 
nesses that  were  brought  forward  by  Serbia  as  to  Serbia's  com- 
plicity in  the  assassination,  and  to  Austria-Hungary's  right  to 
fix  this,  and  to  exact  guaranties  that  Serbia  should  not  in  the 
future  prosecute  her  evil  designs  against  Austria-Hungary. 


THE     ASSASSINATION    OF    THE     AUSTRIAN 

ARCHDUKE 

On  June  28, 1914,  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
reported  to  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  the  assassination  that  day  of 
the  hereditary  Archduke  of  Austria  and  his  wife  at  Sarajevo, 
Bosnia. 

On  June  29,  1914,  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at 
Vienna,  telegraphed  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Belgrade,  that  the  Vienna  press 
asserted  that  magisterial  inquiry  had  already  shown  that  the 
Sarajevo  outrage  was  prepared  at  Belgrade;  that  the  whole 


468     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

conspiracy  in  its  wider  issues  was  organized  there  among  youths 
inspired  with  the  great  Serbian  idea;  and  that  the  Belgrade 
press  was  exciting  public  opinion  by  articles  about  the  intoler- 
able conditions  in  Bosnia,  papers  containing  which  were  being 
smuggled  in  large  quantities  into  Bosnia. 

On  the  same  day,  June  29,  1914,  Ritter  von  Storck,  Secretary 
of  the  German  Legation  at  Belgrade,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister,  Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen  being  absent  from  his  post 
on  leave,  reported  to  Count  Berchtold,  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  in  Vienna,  the  following  facts: 

"Yesterday  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  the  Amselfeld  was  cele- 
brated with  greater  ceremony  than  usual,  and  there  were  celebrations  in 
honor  of  the  Serbian  patriot,  Milos  Obilic,  who  in  1389  with  two  companions 
treacherously  stabbed  the  victorious  Murad. 

"Among  all  Serbians,  Obilic  is  regarded  as  the  national  hero.  In  place 
of  the  Turks,  however,  we  are  now  looked  on  as  the  hereditary  enemy, 
thanks  to  the  propaganda  which  has  been  nourished  under  the  aegis  of 
the  royal  Government  and  the  agitation  which  for  many  years  has  been 
carried  on  in  the  press. 

"A  repetition  of  the  drama  on  the  field  of  Kossovo  seems,  therefore,  to 
have  hovered  before  the  minds  of  the  three  young  criminals  of  Sarajevo, 
Princip,  Cabrinovic,  and  the  third  person  still  unknown,  who  also  threw 
a  bomb.  They  also  shot  down  an  innocent  woman  and  may,  therefore,  think 
that  they  have  surpassed  their  model. 

"For  many  years  hatred  against  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  has  been  sown  in 
Serbia.  The  crop  has  sprung  up  and  the  harvest  is  murder. 

"The  news  arrived  at  about  five  o'clock;  the  Serbian  Government  at 
about  ten  o'clock  caused  the  Obilic  festivities  to  be  officially  stopped.  They 
continued,  however,  unofficially  for  a  considerable  time  after  it  was  dark. 
The  accounts  of  eye-witnesses  say  that  people  fell  into  one  another's  arms 
in  delight,  and  remarks  were  heard  such  as:  'It  serves  them  right;  we  have 
been  expecting  this  for  a  long  time,'  or  'This  is  revenge  for  the  annexation 
[of  Bosnia].'" 

On  the  following  day  (June  30, 1914) ,  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian 
Minister  at  Vienna,  warned  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  by  telegraph,  that  the  tendency  in  Vienna  was  becom- 
ing more  and  more  apparent  to  represent,  in  the  eyes  of  Europe, 
the  assassination  as  the  act  of  a  conspiracy  engineered  in  Serbia. 

The  idea  was  to  use  this  as  a  political  weapon  against  Serbia. 
Great  attention  should  therefore  be  paid  to  the  tone  of  the 
Serbian  press. 


STATE    PAPERS  469 

On  the  same  day  (June  30, 1914) ,  Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge 
d'Affaires  in  Berlin,  in  two  telegrams  informed  M.  Pashitch  that 
the  Berlin  press  was  misleading  German  public  opinion  on  the 
outrage;  that  German  hostility  toward  Serbia  was  growing, 
being  fostered  by  false  reports  from  Vienna  and  Budapest, 
which  were  diligently  spread  in  spite  of  contradictions  by  some 
newspapers  and  news  agencies. 

On  the  same  day  (June  30,  1914),  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian 
Minister  at  Vienna,  reported  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  a  conversation  he  had  held,  in  the  absence  of  Count 
Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  with  Baron  Macchia,  Under-Secretary  of  the  Foreign 
Department.  In  this  the  Serbian  Minister  adopted  the  following 
line  of  argument : 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemn  most  energetically  the  Sarajevo 
outrage  and  on  their  part  will  certainly  most  loyally  do  everything  to  prove 
that  they  will  not  tolerate  within  their  territory  the  fostering  of  any  agi- 
tation or  illegal  proceedings  calculated  to  disturb  our  already  delicate  rela- 
tions with  Austria-Hungary.  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  Government  are 
prepared  also  to  submit  to  trial  any  persons  implicated  in  the  plot  in  the 
event  of  its  being  proved  that  there  are  any  in  Serbia.  The  Royal  Serbian 
Government,  notwithstanding  all  the  obstacles  hitherto  placed  in  their  way 
by  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy  (creation  of  an  independent  Albania,  oppo- 
sition to  Serbian  access  to  the  Adriatic,  demand  for  revision  of  the  Treaty 
of  Bucharest,  the  September  ultimatum,  etc.)  remained  loyal  in  their  desire 
to  establish  a  sound  basis  for  our  good  neighborly  relations.  You  know 
that  in  this  direction  something  has  been  done  and  achieved.  Serbia  intends 
to  continue  to  work  for  this  object,  convinced  that  it  is  practicable  and 
ought  to  be  continued.  The  Sarajevo  outrage  ought  not  to  and  cannot 
stultify  this  work." 

M.  Yovanovitch  said  that  he  had  communicated  the  substance 
of  this  conversation  to  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors. 

On  the  same  day  (June  30,  1914),  the  Serbian  Prime  Minister 
received  from  M.  Georgevitch,  Serbian  Charge  d'Affaires  at 
Constantinople,  the  information  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Am- 
bassador there  had  told  him  that,  in  recent  conversations,  Count 
Berchtold,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Prime  Minister  and  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  with  the 
attitude  of  the  Serbian  Government,  and  desired  friendly 
relations  with  it. 

j_Gt.  War  2 


470     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

On  the  same  day  (June  30,  1914 ,  Herr  von  Storck,  Secretary 
of  the  German  Legation  at  Belgrade,  telegraphed  to  Count  Berch- 
told  that  he  had  asked  Herr  Gruic,  General  Secretary  of  the 
Serbian  Foreign  Office,  what  measures  the  Royal  Serbian  police 
had  taken,  or  proposed  to  take,  to  follow  up  clues  to  the  crime 
which  notoriously  were  partly  to  be  found  in  Serbia,  and  that 
the  reply  was  that  the  matter  had  not  yet  engaged  the  attention 
of  the  police. 

On  July  1,  1914,  M.  Pashitch,  Serbian  Prime  Minister  was 
informed  by  telegraph  from  the  Serbian  Minister  in  London, 
M.  S.  Boschkovitch,  that,  basing  their  conclusion  on  Austrian 
reports,  the  English  press  attributed  the  Sarajevo  outrages  to 
Serbian  revolutionaries.  He  was  informed  by  telegraph  on  the 
same  day,  by  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna,  of 
popular  hostile  demonstrations  in  front  of  the  Serbian  Legation, 
which  were  quelled  by  the  police.  A  Serbian  flag  was  said  to 
have  been  burned. 

"Hatred  against  Serbians  and  Serbia  is  being  spread  among  the  people, 
especially  by  the  lower  Catholic  circles,  the  Vienna  press,  and  military 
circles.  Please  do  what  is  possible  to  prevent  demonstrations  taking  place 
in  Serbia,  and  to  induce  the  Belgrade  press  to  be  as  moderate  as  possible 
in  tone.  ...  It  is  expected  that  decision  as  to  the  attitude  to  be  adopted 
toward  Serbia  and  the  Serbians  will  be  taken  after  the  funeral  [of  the 
archduke] ." 

Thereupon,  on  the  same  day  (July  1,  1914),  M.  Pashitch 
warned  all  the  Serbian  legations  at  foreign  courts  of  the  evident 
purpose  of  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  press  to  take  political 
advantage  of  the  act  of  a  "young  and  ill-balanced  fanatic." 
All  ranks  of  Serbian  society,  official  and  unofficial,  he  said,  con- 
demned the  act,  recognizing  that  it  would  be  most  prejudicial 
not  only  to  good  relations  with  Austria-Hungary,  but  to  their 
coreligionists  in  that  country. 

"At  a  moment  when  Serbia  is  doing  everything  in  her  power  to  improve 
her  relations  with  the  neighboring  monarchy  it  is  absurd  to  think  that 
Serbia  could  have  directly  or  indirectly  inspired  acts  of  this  kind.  On  the 
contrary,  it  was  of  the  greatest  interest  to  Serbia  to  prevent  the  perpetra- 
tion of  this  outrage.  Unfortunately  this  did  not  lie  within  Serbia's  power, 
as  both  assassins  are  Austrian  subjects.  Hitherto  Serbia  has  been  careful 
to  suppress  anarchic  elements,  and  after  recent  events  she  will  redouble 
her  vigilance,  and  in  the  event  of  such  elements  existing  within  her  bor- 


STATE    PAPERS  471 

ders  will  take  the  severest  measures  against  them.  Moreover,  Serbia  will 
do  everything  in  her  power  and  use  all  the  means  at  her  disposal  in  order 
to  restrain  the  feelings  of  ill-balanced  people  within  her  frontiers.  But 
Serbia  can  on  no  account  permit  the  Vienna  and  Hungarian  press  to  mis- 
lead European  public  opinion  and  lay  the  heavy  responsibility  for  a  crime 
committed  by  an  Austrian  subject  at  the  door  of  the  whole  Serbian  nation 
and  on  Serbia,  who  can  suffer  only  harm  from  such  acts.  .  .  . 

"Please  .  .  .  use  all  available  channels  in  order  to  put  an  end  as  soon  as 
possible  to  the  anti-Serbian  campaign  in  the  European  press." 

On  the  same  day  (July  1,  1914),  Herr  Jehlitschka,  Austrian 
Consul  General  to  Turkey,  wrote  from  Uskub,  in  European 
Turkey,  to  Count  Berchtold,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at 
Vienna,  of  the  actions  at  Prestina  on  the  525th  anniversary 
of  the  battle  of  the  Amselfeld  (1389),  for  the  first  time  officially 
celebrated  as  the  "Festival  of  the  Liberation"  of  the  Serbian 
nation,  and  carefully  prepared  to  make  it  an  especially  solemn 
and  magnificent  demonstration  of  Serbian  nationality. 

"The  propaganda  connected  with  this  at  the  same  time  extended  to 
Croatia,  Dalmatia,  and  Bosnia,  but  especially  to  Hungary;  those  who  took 
part  in  it  received  free  passes  on  the  Serbian  state  railways;  food  and 
lodging  at  low  prices,  maintenance  by  public  bodies,  etc.,  were  promised.  .  .  . 

"The  various  speeches  .  .  .  dealt  .  .  .  with  the  well-known  theme  of  the 
union  of  all  Serbia  and  the  'liberation  of  our  brethren  in  bondage'  beyond 
the  Danube  and  the  Save,  even  as  far  as  Bosnia  and  Dalmatia. 

"When,  during  the  course  of  the  evening,  the  news  of  the  horrible  crime 
of  which  Sarajevo  had  been  the  scene  was  circulated,  the  feeling  which 
animated  the  fanatical  crowd  was,  to  judge  by  the  numerous  expressions  of 
applause  reported  to  me  by  authorities  in  whom  I  have  absolute  confidence, 
one  that  I  can  only  characterize  as  inhuman. 

"In  view  of  this  attitude  of  the  population,  which  was  also  displayed 
at  Uskub,  all  attempts  of  the  Serbian  press  to  divest  Serbia  of  the  moral 
responsibility  for  a  deed  which  was  received  by  a  representative  gathering 
with  such  unvarnished  satisfaction  collapse  miserably." 

On  July  2,  1914,  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
reported  to  M.  Viviani,  Prime  Minister  in  Paris,  the  resent- 
ment against  Serbia  in  Austrian  military  circles  and  by  those 
persons  opposed  to  Serbia's  maintenance  of  the  position  she 
had  acquired  in  the  Balkans.  If  the  Serbian  Government  refused 
as  intolerable  to  its  dignity  the  demand  of  Austria-Hungary 
that  the  Serbian  Government  investigate  into  the  origin  of  the 
archduke's  assassination,  he  feared  that  this  would  furnish 
Austria-Hungary  a  ground  for  resort  to  military  measures. 


472  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT    WAR 

On  the  same  day  (July  2,  1914),  Dr.  M.  R.  Vesnitch,  Serbian 
Minister  at  Paris,  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister 
at  Belgrade,  that  the  French  Government  advised  Serbia  to 
remain  calm,  in  official  circles  as  well  as  in  public  opinion. 

On  July  3,  1914,  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna, 
sent  two  reports  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
the  first  containing  an  account  of  a  mob  which  gathered  before 
the  Serbian  Legation  on  July  2,  on  account  of  his  having  hoisted 
the  national  flag  at  half-mast  as  a  sign  of  mourning ;  the  bodies 
of  the  victims  of  the  Sarajevo  tragedy  having  been  brought  that 
day  to  the  Austrian  capital.  The  police  dispersed  the  mob.  The 
papers  of  July  3,  under  the  heading  of  "Provocation  by  the 
Serbian  Minister,"  falsely  described  the  incident.  The  minister 
mentioned  by  name  leading  instigators  of  attacks  in  the  Aus- 
trian and  German  press  on  Serbia  as  haranguing  the  crowd. 
In  the  second  letter  he  reported  a  conversation  he  had  had  with 
Baron  Macchio,  Austro-Hungarian  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  which  the  Baron  severely  censured  the  Belgrade 
press  for  its  antimonarchical  propaganda,  and,  implicitly,  the 
Serbian  Government  for  not  controlling  the  press.  The  Serbian 
Minister  had  replied  that  the  press  was  free,  and  that  there  was 
no  means  of  curbing  it  except  by  going  to  law;  and,  in  rejoinder, 
he  censured  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  which  could 
control  the  press  of  its  empire,  for  permitting  it  shamefully  to 
attack  Serbia  by  accusing  the  whole  nation  of  being  an  ac- 
complice in  the  Sarajevo  crime.  Baron  Macchio  had  replied: 
"We  accuse  only  those  who  encourage  the  Great  Serbian  scheme, 
and  work  for  the  realization  of  its  object."  Yovanovitch  had 
rejoined  that,  till  the  assassination,  Bosnia  Serbs  had  been  uni- 
formly called  "Bosniaks,"  yet  the  assassin  was  now  described 
as  "a  Serb,"  and  no  mention  was  made  that  he  was  a  Bosnian 
and  an  Austrian  subject.  This  was  evidently  to  cast  odium  upon 
Serbia. 

On  July  4,  1914,  Dr.  M.  R.  Vesnitch,  Serbian  Minister  at 
Paris,  reported  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at  Belgrade,  a 
recent  conversation  with  M.  Viviani,  the  new  French  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  on  the  Sarajevo  incident. 


STATE    PAPERS  473 

"I  described  to  him  briefly  the  causes  which  had  led  to  the  outrage  and 
which  were  to  be  found,  in  the  first  place,  in  the  irksome  system  of  Govern- 
ment in  force  in  the  annexed  provinces,  and  especially  in  the  attitude  of 
the  officials,  as  well  as  in  the  whole  policy  of  the  monarchy  toward  any- 
thing orthodox.  He  understood  the  situation,  but  at  the  same  time  expressed 
the  hope  that  we  should  preserve  an  attitude  of  calm  and  dignity  in  order 
to  avoid  giving  cause  for  fresh  accusations  in  Vienna. 

"After  the  first  moment  of  excitement  public  opinion  here  has  quieted 
down  to  such  an  extent  that  the  minister-president  himself  considered  it 
advisable  in  the  Palais  de  Bourbon  to  soften  the  expressions  used  in  the 
statement  which  he  had  made  earlier  on  the  subject  in  the  Senate." 

On  the  same  day  (July  4,  1914),  Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Serbian 
Minister  at  Petrograd,*  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Min- 
ister at  Belgrade,  that  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
M.  Sazonof,  had  expressed  his  opinion  that  the  outrages  upon  the 
Serbs  in  Bosnia  would  increase  the  sympathy  of  Europe  for 
Serbia;  that  the  accusations  made  in  Vienna  would  not  obtain 
credence  and  that  therefore  Serbia  should  remain  calm. 

On  the  same  day  (July  4,  1914),  Count  Szecsen,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  telegraphed  to  Count  Berch- 
told,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  that,  in  officially 
thanking  M.  Poincare  for  his  sympathy  over  the  Sarajevo 
tragedy,  the  President  had  excused  the  hostile  demonstrations 
against  Serbia  by  citing  those  against  all  Italians  in  France  after 
the  assassination  of  President  Carnot. 

"I  drew  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  that  crime  had  no  connection  with 
any  anti-French  agitation  in  Italy,  while  in  the  present  case  it  must  be 
admitted  that  for  years  past  there  has  been  an  agitation  in  Serbia  against 
the  [Dual]  Monarchy  fomented  by  every  means,  legitimate  and  illegitimate. 

"In  conclusion,  M.  Poincare  expressed  his  conviction  that  the  Serbian 
Government  would  meet  us  with  the  greatest  willingness  in  the  judicial 
investigation  and  the  prosecution  of  the  accomplices.  No  state  could  divest 
itself  of  this  duty." 

On  the  same  day  (July  4,  1914),  M.  de  Manneville,  French 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  reported  to  M.  Viviani,  President 
of  the  Council  in  Paris,  a  conversation  with  Herr  von  Zimmer- 
mann,  German  Under-Secretary  of  State,  in  which  von  Zimmer- 
mann  had  expressed  the  hope  that  Serbia  would  satisfy  Austria's 

*Although  the  name  St.  Petersburg  was  not  changed  officially  to  Petro- 
grad until  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  latter  name  is  used  uniformly 
in  the  Serbian  Blue  Book  and  Russian  Orange  Book. 


474  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

demands  with  regard  to  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
the  accomplices  in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo.  Otherwise  she  would 
be  condemned  by  the  whole  civilized  world. 

"The  German  Government  do  not  then  appear  to  share  the  anxiety  which 
is  shown  by  a  part  of  the  German  press  as  to  possible  tension  in  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Governments  of  Vienna  and  Belgrade,  or  at  least  they 
do  not  wish  to  seem  to  do  so." 

Two  days  later  (July  6,  1914),  M.  Paleologue,  French  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg,  reported  to  M.  Viviani,  Prime 
Minister  at  Paris,  a  recent  interview  which  M.  Sazonof,  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  had  with  Count  Czernin,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  the  request  of  the  latter. 
The  Count  intimated  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
would  perhaps  be  compelled  to  search  for  the  instigators  of  the 
crime  of  Sarajevo  on  Serbian  soil.  M.  Sazonof  interjected: 

"No  country  has  had  to  suffer  more  than  Russia  from  crimes  prepared 
on  foreign  territory.  Have  we  ever  claimed  to  employ  in  any  country  what- 
soever the  procedure  with  which  your  papers  threaten  Serbia?  Do  not 
embark  on  such  a  course." 

On  the  same  day  (July  6,  1914),  M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch, 
Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna,  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  at  Belgrade,  that  the  excitement  in  military  and  govern- 
ment circles  against  Serbia  was  growing,  owing  to  the  tone  of 
the  press,  which  was  diligently  exploited  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Legation  at  Belgrade.  On  the  same  date  he  informed  the 
Prime  Minister  in  detail  of  the  press  agitation  against  Serbia. 
By  headlines  the  people  were  led  to  infer,  on  the  date  of  the 
crime  of  Sarajevo,  that  the  two  perpetrators  were  Serbs  from 
Serbia  proper.  In  later  reports  there  was  a  marked  tendency 
to  connect  the  crime  with  Serbia.  Belgrade  was  indicated  as  the 
place  of  its  origin  by  the  visit  to  that  capital  of  the  assassins, 
and  by  the  bombs  originating  there,  which  facts  had  been  eluci- 
dated at  the  trial  of  the  assassins  in  Sarajevo.  The  Hungarian 
press  claimed  that  there  was  evidence  to  show: 

"1.  That  the  perpetrators  while  in  Belgrade  associated  with  the  comi- 
tadji  [revolutionist]  Mihaylo  Ciganovitch;  and  (2)  that  the  organizer  and 
instigator  of  the  outrage  was  Major  Pribitchevitch.  .  .  . 

"Further  .  .  .  the  latest  announcement  which  the  Hungarian  Korre- 
spondenzbureau  made  to  the  newspapers  stated: 


STATE    PAPERS  475 

"  'The  inquiries  made  up  to  the  present  prove,  conclusively  that  this 
outrage  is  the  work  of  a  conspiracy.  Besides  the  two  perpetrators, 
a  large  number  of  persons  have  been  arrested,  mostly  young  men,  who 
are  also,  like  the  perpetrators,  proved  to  have  been  employed  by  the 
Belgrade  Narodna  Odbrana  in  order  to  commit  the  outrage,  and  who 
were  supplied  in  Belgrade  with  bombs  and  revolvers.'  [This  item  was 
later  recalled.] 

"At  the  same  time  the  Vienna  Korrespondenzbureau  published  the  fol- 
lowing official  statement: 

"  'We  learn  from  authoritative  quarters  that  the  inquiries  relating  to  the 
outrage  are  being  kept  absolutely  secret.  All  the  details,  therefore,  which 
have  appeared  in  the  public  press  should  be  accepted  with  reserve.' 

"Nevertheless  the  Budapest  newspapers  continued  to  publish  alleged 
reports  on  the  inquiry.  In  the  last  'report'  of  the  Budapest  newspaper 
'A  Nap,'  which  was  reprinted  in  yesterday's  Vienna  papers,  the  tendency 
to  lay  the  responsibility  for  the  outrage  on  the  Narodna  Odbrana  is  still 
further  emphasized.  According  to  this  report  the  accused  Gabrinovitch  had 
stated  that  General  Yankovitch  is  the  chief  instigator  of  the  outrage  " 

On  the  same  day  Herr  Hoflehner,  Austro-Hungarian  Consular 
Agent  at  Nish,  Serbia,  wrote  to  Count  Berchtold,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  of  the  satisfaction  and  even  joy  ex- 
jpressed,  especially  in  the  leading  circles,  over  the  crime  at 
Sarajevo. 

On  the  next  day  (July  7,  1914) ,  M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Ser- 
bian Minister  at  Vienna,  wrote  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister 
at  Belgrade,  that,  though  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  had  appealed 
to  the  Prime  Ministers  of  Austria  (Count  Berchtold)  and  of 
Hungary  (Count  Tisza),  and  to  the  Minister  of  Finance  (Herr 
Bilinski)  for  calmness,  it  was  impossible  to  tell  what  attitude 
toward  Serbia  the  Government  would  take. 

"For  them  one  thing  is  obvious ;  whether  it  is  proved  or  not  that  the  out- 
rage has  been  inspired  and  prepared  at  Belgrade,  they  must  sooner  or  later 
solve  the  question  of  the  so-called  Great  Serbian  agitation  within  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy.  In  what  manner  they  will  do  this  and  what  means 
they  will  employ  to  that  end  has  not  as  yet  been  decided;  this  is  being 
discussed  especially  in  high  Catholic  and  military  circles.  The  ultimate 
decision  will  be  taken  only  after  it  has  been  definitely  ascertained  what  the 
inquiry  at  Sarajevo  has  brought  to  light.  .  .  . 

"Austria-Hungary  has  to  choose  one  of  the  following  courses:  either  to 
regard  the  Sarajevo  outrage  as  a  national  misfortune  and  a  crime  which 
ought  to  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  evidence  obtained,  in  which 
case  Serbia's  cooperation  .  .  .  will  be  requested  in  order  to  prevent  the 
perpetrators  escaping  the  extreme  penalty;  or,  to  treat  the  Sarajevo  out- 


476  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

rage  as  a  Pan-Serbian,  South-Slav,  and  Pan-Slav  conspiracy  with  every 
manifestation  of  the  hatred,  hitherto  repressed,  against  Slavdom.  There 
are  many  indications  that  influential  circles  are  being  urged  to  adopt  the 
latter  course:  it  is,  therefore,  advisable  to  be  ready  for  defense.  Should 
the  former  and  wiser  course  be  adopted,  we  should  do  all  we  can  to  meet 
Austrian  wishes  in  this  respect." 

On  July  9,  1914,  M.  Pashitch  telegraphed  to  all  the  foreign 
Serbian  Legations  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Crown  Prince 
Alexander  was  receiving  daily  threatening  letters  from  Austro- 
Hungarians,  and  that  they  should  make  use  of  this  information 
with  other  foreign  ministers  and  journalists. 

On  July  10,  1914,  M.  Allize,  French  Minister  in  Munich,  wrote 
to  M.  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Paris,  that  the 
Bavarians  were  asking  the  object  of  the  new  German  arma- 
ments. 

"Recognizing  that  no  one  threatens  Germany,  they  ^consider  that  German 
diplomacy  had  already  at  its  disposal  forces  sufficiently  large  and  alliances 
sufficiently  powerful  to  protect  German  interests  with  success." 

Nevertheless,  public  opinion  will  support  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment in  any  enterprise  in  which  they  might  energetically  em- 
bark, even  at  the  risk  of  conflict. 

"The  state  of  war  to  which  all  the  events  in  the  East  have  accustomed 
people's  minds  for  the  last  two  years  appears  no  longer  like  some  distant 
catastrophe,  but  as  a  solution  of  the  political  and  economic  difficulties  which 
will  continue  to  increase." 

On  July  11,  1914,  M.  d'Apchier-le-Maugin,  French  Consul 
General  at  Budapest,  reported  to  M.  Vivian,  Prime  Minister  at 
Paris,  that  Count  Tisza,  Hungarian  Prime  Minister,  had  re- 
fused to  make  to  the  Hungarian  Chamber  any  disclosures  on  the 
Sarajevo  incident  until  the  judicial  inquiry  was  closed.  The 
chamber  approved. 

"He  did  not  give  any  indication  whether  the  project  of  a  demarche 
[proceeding]  at  Belgrade,  with  which  all  the  papers  of  both  hemispheres 
are  full,  would  be  followed  up." 

The  virulence  of  the  Hungarian  press  has  diminished,  and  the 
papers  are  unanimous  in  advising  against  this  step,  which  might 
be  dangerous. 

"The  semiofficial  press  especially  would  desire  that  for  the  word 
'demarche,'  with  its  appearance  of  a  threat,  there  should  be  substituted 


STATE    PAPERS  477 

the  expression  'pourparlers'  [conversations],  which  appears  to  them  more 
friendly. 

"The  general  public,  however,  fears  war.  It  is  said  that  every  day  can- 
non and  ammunition  were  being  sent  in  large  quantities  toward  the  fron- 
tier. .  .  .  The  Government,  whether  it  is  sincerely  desirous  of  peace,  or 
whether  it  is  preparing  a  coup,  is  now  doing  all  that  it  can  to  allay  these 
anxieties.  .  .  .  Their  optimism  to  order  is,  in  fact,  without  an  echo;  the 
nervousness  of  the  Bourse,  a  barometer  which  cannot  be  neglected,  is  a  sure 
proof  of  this;  without  exception,  stocks  have  fallen  to  an  unaccountably 
low  level." 

On  July  14,  1914,  Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Charge  d' Af- 
faires at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  that  Herr  von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State,  had 
told  him  that  Austria-Hungary,  as  a  great  power,  could  not  toler- 
ate the  provocative  attitude  of  the  Serbian  press. 

On  the  same  day  M.  Yov.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister 
at  Vienna,  wrote  M.  Pashitch  that  the  Literary  Bureau  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Office,  which  supplied  the  press  with 
material  and  set  its  tone,  was  exciting  opinion  against  Serbia. 
Official  German  circles  in  Vienna  were  especially  ill  disposed 
toward  Serbia.  The  "Neue  Freie  Presse,"  under  instructions 
from  the  Vienna  Press  Bureau,  summarized  the  feeling : 

"We  have  to  settle  matters  with  Serbia  by  war;  it  is  evident  that  peace- 
able means  are  of  no  avail.  And  if  it  must  come  to  war  sooner  or  later, 
then  it  is  better  to  see  the  matter  through  now. 

"The  Bourse  is  very  depressed.  There  has  not  been  such  a  fall  in  prices 
in  Vienna  for  a  long  time." 

On  the  same  day,  July  14,  1914,  M.  Pashitch  sent  two  letters 
to  all  the  foreign  Serbian  Legations. 

In  the  first  letter  he  gave  specific  illustrations  of  misinforma- 
tion by  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  such  as  that  Austro-Hun- 
garian subjects  were  maltreated  in  Belgrade,  and  were  now  panic- 
stricken,  and  that  there  had  been  a  demonstration  against  the 
Austrian  Minister  at  the  funeral  of  Dr.  Hartwig,  the  Russian 
Minister.  There  was  no  foundation  whatever  for  these  state- 
ments. 

In  the  second  letter  he  notified  the  Legations  that  the  AustrQr 
Hungarian  news  bureaus,  the  channel  of  Serbian  news  to  the 
world,  misrepresented,  through  garbling  extracts,  the  tone  of  the 


478     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Belgrade  press,  and  that  all  Serbian  papers  were  forbidden  entry 
into  Austria-Hungary. 

"With  us  the  press  is  absolutely  free.  Newspapers  can  be  confiscated 
only  for  lese-majeste  or  for  revolutionary  propaganda;  in  all  other  cases 
confiscation  is  illegal.  There  is  no  censorship  of  newspapers." 

Accordingly  the  Serbian  foreign  ministers  were  instructed  to 
give  out  information  that  the  Serbian  Government  lacked  the 
power  to  control  the  newspapers,  and  further  to  spread  knowl- 
edge of  the  fact  that  it  was  Austro-Hungarian  papers  which 
originated  all  the  controversies,  while  the  Serbian  ones  only  re- 
plied. There  was  no  desire  in  Serbia  to  provoke  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

On  July  15,  1914,  M.  Yov.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at 
Vienna,  reported  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
that  the  Ministers  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  been  consulting 
about  the  Sarajevo  incident,  and  that  it  appeared  nothing  was 
decided.  Count  Berchtold,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  had  gone  to  Ischl,  where  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  was  recovering  from  the  shock  of  the  assassination,  to 
report  to  him.  Count  Tisza,  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister,  had 
replied  evasively  to  interpellations  made  in  the  Hungarian  Parlia- 
ment by  the  Opposition.  Owing  to  the  absence  on  leave  from  his 
post  of  the  War  Minister  and  his  chief  of  staff,  the  Bourse  had 
recovered. 

"One  thing  is  certain:  Austria-Hungary  will  take  diplomatic  steps  at 
Belgrade  as  soon  as  the  magisterial  inquiry  at  Sarajevo  is  completed  and 
the  matter  submitted  to  the  court." 

In  a  second  letter  of  the  same  date  M.  Yovanovitch  reported  to 
M.  Pashitch  that  it  was  thought  that  the  inquiry  had  not  pro- 
duced sufficient  evidence  to  justify  officially  accusing  Serbia  more 
than  for  tolerating  in  her  borders  certain  revolutionary  elements. 
Austro-Hungarian  methods  were  criticized  in  diplomatic  circles 
and  the  Serbian  attitude  was  commended  as  in  accord  with  the 
dignity  of  a  nation. 

"In  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  appears  that  the  German  Foreign  Office 
does  not  approve  of  the  anti-Serbian  policy  of  Vienna,  the  German  Embassy 
here  is  at  this  very  moment  encouraging  such  a  policy." 


STATE    PAPERS  479 

In  a  third  letter  of  the  same  date  M.  Yovanovitch  informed  the 
Prime  Minister  that  it  appeared  that  Austria-Hungary  would  not 
invite  the  Serbian  Government  to  assist  her  in  discovering  and 
punishing  the  culprits  of  the  Sarajevo  crime,  but  would  make  it  a 
case  against  Serbia  and  the  Serbians,  or  even  against  the  Jugo- 
slavs (on  her  own  border),  looking  in  this  for  the  approval  of 
Europe,  which  would  prepare  the  way  for  the  sharp  reactionary 
measures  she  contemplated  to  take  internally  to  suppress  the 
great  Serbian  propaganda  and  the  Jugo-Slav  idea.  The  Govern- 
ment must  take  some  action  for  the  sake  of  its  prestige  at  home 
as  well  as  abroad.  .  .  . 

The  accusation  against  Serbia  will  extend  from  April,  1909, 
to  the  present.  Austria-Hungary  will  claim  to  the  powers  that 
the  facts  developed  therein  give  her  the  right  to  take  diplomatic 
steps  at  Belgrade,  and  demand  that  Serbia  in  future  act  as  a 
loyal  neighbor.  Austria-Hungary  will  ask  Serbia  to  accept  un- 
conditionally her  demands. 

On  the  same  day,  July  15,  1914,  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  reported  to  M.  Viviani,  Prime  Minister  at  Paris, 
that  certain  press  organs  in  Vienna,  specifically  the  "Militarische 
Rundschau,"  represented  France  and  Russia  as  incapable  of  hold- 
ing their  own  in  European  affairs,  and  that  Austria-Hungary, 
with  the  support  of  Germany,  could  therefore  subject  Serbia  to 
any  treatment  she  pleased.  The  "Rundschau"  argued  that  now 
was  the  most  propitious  time  for  the  war  in  which  Austria- 
Hungary  would  have  to  engage  in  two  or  three  years  at  the  latest. 

"At  this  moment  the  initiative  rests  with  us:  Russia  is  not  ready,  moral 
factors  and  right  are  on  our  side,  as  well  as  might.  Since  we  shall  have 
to  accept  the  contest  some  day,  let  us  provoke  it  at  once.  Our  prestige, 
our  position  as  a  great  power,  our  honor,  are  in  question;  and  yet  more, 
for  it  would  seem  that  our  very  existence  is  concerned.  .  .  . 

"Surpassing  itself,  the  'Neue  Freie  Presse'  of  to-day  reproaches  Count 
Tisza  for  the  moderation  of  his  second  speech,  in  which  he  said:  'Our  rela- 
tions with  Serbia  require,  however,  to  be  made  clear.'  These  words  rouse 
its  indignation.  For  it  tranquillity  and  security  can  result  only  from  a 
ivar  to  the  knife  against  Pan-Serbism,  and  it  is  in  the  name  of  humanity 
that  it  demands  the  extermination  of  the  cursed  Serbian  race." 

On  July  16,  1914,  Dr.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires 
at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  at  Belgrade, 


480     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

that  Secretary  of  State  Von  Jagow  had  informed  him  that  re- 
ports of  the  German  Minister  at  Belgrade  pointed  to  the  existence 
of  a  great  Serbian  propaganda,  which  should  be  energetically 
suppressed  by  the  Serbian  Government  in  the  interest  of  good 
relations  with  Austria-Hungary. 

On  July  17  M.  Boschkovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  London,  tele- 
graphed to  M.  Pashitch  that  the  Austrian  Embassy  there  was 
endeavoring  to  favor  the  idea  that  Austria  must  give  a  good 
lesson  to  Serbia.  Despite  peaceable  official  statements  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary the  way  was  preparing  for  diplomatic  pressure 
upon  Serbia  which  might  develop  into  an  armed  attack. 

On  the  same  day,  July  17,  M.  Ljub  Michailovitch,  Serbian  Min- 
ister at  Rome,  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch  that  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  Prime  Minister  of  Italy,  had  stated  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador: 

"Any  step  undertaken  by  Austria  against  Serbia  which  failed  to  take 
into  account  international  considerations  would  meet  with  the  disapproval 
of  public  opinion  in  Italy,  and  that  the  Italian  Government  desire  to  see  the 
complete  independence  of  Serbia  maintained." 

On  July  19,  1914,  M.  Pashitch  telegraphed  a  long  notice  to  the 
foreign  Serbian  legations,  telling  of  the  accusation  of  the  Aus- 
trian press  from  the  time  of  the  Sarajevo  outrage  that  the  crime 
was  the  direct  result  of  the  great  Serbian  idea,  propagated  by 
various  associations  such  as  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  which  were 
tolerated  by  the  Serbian  Government.  The  notice  detailed  the 
attitude  of  the  Serbian  Government  toward  the  Serbian  press, 
presented  in  the  preceding  correspondence.  In  regard  to  its  atti- 
tude toward  Austria-Hungary  it  said : 

"The  Serbian  Government  at  once  expressed  their  readiness  to  hand  over 
to  justice  any  of  their  subjects  who  might  be  proved  to  have  played  a  part 
in  the  Sarajevo  outrage.  The  Serbian  Government  further  stated  that  they 
had  prepared  a  more  drastic  law  against  the  misuse  of  explosives.  The 
draft  of  a  new  law  in  that  sense  had  already  been  laid  before  the  State 
Council,  but  could  not  be  submitted  to  the  Skupshtina  [Serbian  Parliament], 
as  the  latter  was  not  sitting  at  the  time.  Finally,  the  Serbian  Government 
stated  that  they  were  ready,  as  heretofore,  to  observe  all  those  good  neigh- 
borly obligations  to  which  Serbia  was  bound  by  her  position  as  a  Euro- 
pean state. 

"From  the  date  of  the  perpetration  of  the  outrage  until  to-day  not  once 
did  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  apply  to  the  Serbian  Government 


STATE    PAPERS  481 

for  their  assistance  in  the  matter.  They  did  not  demand  that  any  of  the 
accomplices  should  be  subjected  to  an  inquiry,  or  that  they  should  be  handed 
over  to  trial.  In  one  instance  only  did  the  Austrian  Government  ask  for 
information;  this  was  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  certain  students  who  had 
been  expelled  from  the  Pakratz  Teachers'  Seminary  and  had  crossed  over 
to  Serbia  to  continue  their  studies.  All  available  information  on  this  point 
was  supplied." 

The  notice  related  the  anti-Serbian  propaganda  conducted  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  press,  the  interpellations  in  the  Hungarian 
Parliament,  etc.,  and  the  probable  intention  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  to  demand  a  categorical  reply  from  Serbia, 
which,  if  not  satisfactory,  would  be  followed  by  war. 

That  Austria-Hungary  was  picking  a  quarrel  had  been  evi- 
denced by  her  use  of  an  exploded  rumor  of  a  contemplated  attack 
on  the  Austrian  Legation  in  Belgrade  to  prove  how  excited  public 
opinion  was  in  Serbia,  and  to  what  lengths  she  was  ready  to  go. 

"There  is  reason  for  apprehension  that  some  step  is  being  prepared 
againt  us  [in  the  evident  intention]  that  the  inquiry  which  is  being  made 
is  not  to  be  limited  to  the  perpetrators  and  their  possible  aiccomplices  in 
the  crime,  but  is  most  probably  to  be  extended  to  Serbia  and  the  Great 
Serbian  idea.  .  .  . 

"On  the  other  hand  the  Serbian  Government  have  given  their  particu- 
lar attention  to  the  improvement  and  strengthening  of  their  relations 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  which  had  lately  become  strained  as 
a  result  of  the  Balkan  wars  and  of  the  questions  which  arose  therefrom. 
With  that  object  in  view  the  Serbian  Government  proceeded  to  settle  the 
question  of  the  Oriental  Railway,  the  new  railway  connections,  and  the 
transit  through  Serbia  of  Austro-Hungarian  goods  for  Constantinople, 
Sofia,  Saloniki,  and  Athens. 

"The  Serbian  Government  consider  that  their  vital  interests  require 
that  peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  Balkans  should  be  firmly  and  lastingly 
established.  And  for  this  very  reason  they  fear  lest  the  excited  state  of 
public  opinion  in  Austria-Hungary  may  induce  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment to  make  a  demarche  which  may  humiliate  the  dignity  of  Serbia 
as  a  state,  and  to  put  forward  demands  which  could  not  be  accepted. 

"I  have  the  honor,  therefore,  to  request  you  to  impress  upon  the  Govern- 
ment to  which  you  are  accredited  our  desire  to  maintain  friendly  relations 
with  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  suppress  every  attempt  directed  against  the 
peace  and  public  safety  of  the  neighboring  monarchy.  We  will  likewise 
meet  the  wishes  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  in  the  event  of  our  being 
requested  to  subject  to  trial  in  our  independent  courts  any  accomplices  in 
the  outrage  who  are  in  Serbia — should  such,  of  course,  exist. 

"But  we  can  never  comply  with  demands  which  may  be  directed  against 
the  dignity  of  Serbia,  and  which  would  be  inacceptable  to  any  country  which 
respects  and  maintains  its  independence. 


482     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"Actuated  by  the  desire  that  good  neighborly  relations  may  be  firmly 
established  and  maintained,  we  beg  the  friendly  Governments  to  take  note 
of  these  declarations  and  to  act  in  a  conciliatory  sense  should  occasion  or 
necessity  arise." 


ATTEMPTS    AT    MEDIATION 

With  Serbia's  case  now  fully  before  the  courts  of  Europe, 
there  began  a  movement  among  the  powers  desiring  to  keep 
the  peace  of  the  continent  for  mediation  between  the  disputants. 
This  was  begun  by  Germany  and  Great  Britain. 

On  July  20,  1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  wrote  to  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British  Charge 
d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  recounting  a  conversation  with  the  German 
Ambassador,  Prince  Lichnowsky.  The  prince  said  that  Austria 
was  certainly  going  to  take  some  step  in  the  Serbian  matter ;  that 
the  situation  was  uncomfortable,  and  that  it  would  be  desirable 
if  Russia  could  act  as  a  mediator  with  regard  to  Russia.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  presumed  that  the  Austrian  Government  would  not 
do  anything  until  they  had  first  disclosed  to  the  public  their  case 
against  Serbia,  founded  upon  what  they  had  discovered  at  the 
trial  of  the  Sarajevo  assassins.  This  would  make  it  easier  for 
other  powers,  such  as  Russia,  to  counsel  moderation  in  Belgrade. 
The  more  reasonable  the  demands  of  Austria,  the  easier  it  would 
be  to  smooth  things  over. 

"I  hated  the  idea  of  a  war  between  any  of  the  great  powers,  and  that 
any  of  them  should  be  dragged  into  a  war  by  Serbia  would  be  detestable. 
"The  ambassador  agreed  whole-heartedly  in  this  sentiment." 

On  the  same  day,  July  20,  1914,  M.  Yov.  Yovanovitch,  Ser- 
bian Minister  at  Vienna,  reported  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister 
at  Belgrade,  that  the  word  had  been  passed  round  in  Vienna  to 
maintain  absolute  secrecy  about  what  was  being  done  in  the  Ser- 
bian matter.  There  was  no  room  for  the  optimism  reported  to 
exist  in  Belgrade.  It  was  highly  probable  Austria-Hungary  was 
preparing  for  war  against  Serbia. 

"The  general  conviction  that  prevails  here  is  that  it  would  be  nothing 
short  of  suicide  for  Austria-Hungary  once  more  to  fail  to  take  advantage 
of  the  opportunity  to  act  against  Serbia.  It  is  believed  that  the  two  oppor- 


STATE    PAPERS  483 

trinities  previously  missed — the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  the  Balkan  War — 
have  been  extremely  injurious  to  Austria-Hungary.  In  addition,  the  con- 
viction is  steadily  growing  that  Serbia,  after  her  two  wars,  is  (completely 
exhausted,  and  that  a  war  against  Serbia  would,  in  fact,  merely  mean  a  mili- 
tary expedition  to  be  concluded  by  a  speedy  occupation.  It  is  also  believed 
that  such  a  war  could  be  brought  to  an  end  before  Europe  could  intervene. 
"The  seriousness  of  Austrian  intentions  is  further  emphasized  by  the 
military  preparations  which  are  being  made,  especially  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Serbian  frontier." 

On  the  same  day,  July  20,  1914,  a  French  consular  report  was 
made  from  Vienna  to  the  Government  at  Paris,  which  referred 
to  the  diplomatic  situation. 

"Much  will  be  demanded  of  Serbia;  she  will  be  required  to  dissolve  sev- 
eral propagandist  societies,  she  will  be  summoned  to  repress  nationalism, 
to  guard  the  frontier  in  cooperation  with  Austrian  officials,  to  keep  strict 
control  over  an ti- Austrian  tendencies  in  the  schools;  and  it  is  a  very  dim- 
cult  matter  for  a  government  to  consent  to  become  in  this  way  a  policeman 
for  a  foreign  government.  They  foresee  the  subterfuges  by  which  Serbia 
will  doubtless  wish  to  avoid  giving  a  clear  and  direct  reply;  that  is  why 
a  short  interval  will  perhaps  be  fixed  for  her  to  declare  whether  she  accepts 
or  not.  The  tenor  of  the  note  and  its  imperious  tone  almost  certainly  insure 
that  Belgrade  will  refuse.  Then  military  operations  will  begin. 

"There  is  here,  and  equally  in  Berlin,  a  party  which  accepts  the  idea 
of  a  conflict  of  widespread  dimensions;  in  other  words,  a  conflagration. 
The  leading  idea  is  probably  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  start  before 
Russia  has  completed  the  great  improvements  of  her  army  and  railways, 
and  before  France  has  brought  her  military  organization  to  perfection. 
But  on  this  point  there  is  no  unanimity  in  high  circles;  Count  Berchtold 
and  the  diplomatists  desire  at  the  most  localized  operations  against  Serbia. 
But  everything  must  be  regarded  as  possible." 

The  report  commented  on  the  departure  from  usage  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  press  in  prominently  reporting  the  remarks 
of  the  most  obscure  Serbian  newspapers, 

"which,  just  on  account  of  their  obscurity,  employ  language  freer,  bolder, 
more  aggressive,  and  often  insulting.  This  work  of  the  official  agency  has 
obviously  for  its  aim  the  excitement  of  public  feeling  and  the  creation  of 
opinion  favorable  to  war.  The  fact  is  significant." 

On  July  21  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
reported  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Paris,  that  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  to  Ger- 
many, had  declared  to  the  German  Government  that  Serbia  was 
willing  to  entertain  Austria's  requirements  arising  out  of  the 
Sarajevo  outrage,  provided  that  she  asked  only  for 


484     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"judicial  cooperation  in  the  punishment  and  prevention  of  political  crimes, 
but  that  he  was  charged  to  warn  the  German  Government  that  it  would 
be  dangerous  to  attempt,  through  that  investigation,  to  lower  the  prestige 
of  Serbia. 

"M.  Browniewsky,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  mentioned  this 
subject  to  Herr  von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State.  Von  Jagow  said 
that  he  supposed  the  German  Government  now  had  full  knowledge  of  the 
note  prepared  by  Austria,  and  were  therefore  willing  to  give  the  assurance 
that  the  Austro-Serbian  difficulties  would  be  localized.  The  Secretary  of 
State  protested  that  he  was  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  contents  of  that 
note,  and  expressed  himself  in  the  same  way  to  me.  I  could  not  help  show- 
ing my  astonishment  at  a  statement  which  agreed  so  little  with  what  cir- 
cumstances lead  one  to  expect. 

"I  have  also  been  assured  that  from  now  on  the  preliminary  notices 
for  mobilization,  the  obje>ct  of  which  is  to  place  Germany  in  a  kind  of 
'attention'  attitude  in  times  of  tension,  have  been  sent  out  here  to  those 
classes  which  would  receive  them  in  similar  circumstances.  That  is  a  meas- 
ure to  which  the  Germans,  constituted  as  they  are,  can  have  recourse  with- 
out indiscretion  and  without  exciting  the  people.  It  is  not  a  sensational 
measure,  and  is  not  necessarily  followed  by  full  mobilization,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  but  it  is  none  the  less  significant." 

On  the  same  day,  July  21,  1914,  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  notified  the  French  Lega- 
tions at  London,  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Rome  that  the  Ber- 
lin Bourse  was  extremely  weak  on  the  20th,  probably  on  account 
of  anxiety  over  the  Serbian  question,  and  that  M.  Cambon, 
French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  had  grave  reason  that  Germany 
would  support  Austria-Hungary  in  her  contemplated  demarche 
at  Belgrade  without  seeking  to  play  the  part  of  mediator. 

On  the  same  day,  July  21,  1914,  Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen, 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  wrote  a  long  letter  to 
Count  Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  re- 
viewing the  situation.  Most  of  his  statements  have  been  given 
in  more  moderate  language  in  the  preceding  correspondence. 
He  describes  how  the  relations  between  Serbia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  have  been  "poisoned"  by  Serbian  national  aspirations, 
due  to  the  great  Serbian  propaganda  (carried  on  in  Austria- 
Hungary  as  well  as  in  Serbia),  and  to  Serbian  success  in  the 
Balkan  wars.  This  chauvinism  has  increased  to  a  paroxysm, 
bordering  on  insanity.  The  policy  is  to  separate  from  Austria- 
Hungary  the  southern  Slav  provinces,  and  so  abolish  the  Dual 


STATE    PAPERS  485 

Monarchy  as  a  great  power.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are  ex- 
pected to  revolt,  and  the  Slav  regiments  in  the  Austro-Hungarian 
army  to  mutiny.  Out  of  the  ruins  will  be  builded  the  great  Ser- 
bian Empire,  and  that  in  the  immediate  future. 

Serbian  newspapers  without  fear  of  reprimand  discuss  the  de- 
creptitude  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  insult  her  officials,  and 
even  "the  exalted  person  of  our  ruler."  The  press  is  the  educator 
of  the  Serbian  people;  it  promoted  the  great  Serbian  propa- 
ganda, from  which  sprang  the  crime  of  Sarajevo.  Political 
parties  and  governmental  policy  are  wholly  subservient  to  it. 
Its  accusations  that  the  sudden  death  of  the  Russian  Minister, 
Dr.  Hartwig,  was  due  to  poison  are  on  the  verge  of  insanity — 
the  London  "Times"  called  them  ravings.  The  people,  in  grati- 
tude for  the  past,  and  in  anxiety  for  the  future,  outbid  one 
another  in  servility  to  Russia.  They  despise  Austria-Hungary  as 
powerless,  for  internal  and  external  reasons.  The  serious  words 
of  our  statesmen  are  regarded  as  "bluff." 

"This  picture  leads  up  to  the  (conclusion  that  a  reckoning  with  Serbia, 
a  war  for  the  position  of  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  as  a  great  power,  even  for 
its  existence  as  such,  cannot  be  permanently  avoided. 

"If  we  delay  in  clearing  up  our  relations  with  Serbia  we  shall  share 
the  responsibility  for  the  difficulties  and  the  unfavorable  situation  in  any 
future  war  which  must,  however,  sooner  or  later  be  carried  through.  .  .  . 

"Should  we  therefore  .  .  .  put  forward  far-reaching  requirements  joined 
to  effective  control — for  this  alone  could  clear  the  Augean  stable  of  great 
Serbian  intrigues — then  all  possible  consequences  must  be  considered,  and 
from  the  beginning  there  must  be  a  strong  and  firm  determination  to  carry 
through  the  matter  to  the  end. 

"Half  measures,  the  presentation  of  demands,  followed  by  long  dis- 
cussions and  ending  only  in  an  unsound  compromise,  would  be  the  hard- 
est blow  which  could  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary's  reputation  in 
Serbia  and  her  position  in  Europe." 

On  July  22,  1914,  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British  Charge 
d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs  at  London,  that  he  had  had  an  interview  with 
the  German  Secretary  of  State,  Herr  von  Jagow,  who  insisted 
that  the  question  at  issue  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary 
was  for  these  alone  to  settle,  without  interference  from  outside, 
and  said  that  it  was  inadvisable  for  the  German  Government  to 
approach  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  on  the  matter. 

K— Gt.  War  2 


486     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

The  German  Secretary  had  frequently  emphasized  to  the  Serbian 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  M.  Yovanovitch,  that  Austro-Ser- 
bian  relations  should  be  put  on  a  proper  footing.  He  thought 
that  Austria  had  acted  toward  Serbia  with  great  forbearance. 

On  the  same  day,  July  22,  1914,  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  notified  the  foreign  French 
legations  of  the  information  in  M.  Cambon's  report  of  the  21st, 
and  said  that  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Prime  Minister  at 
Rome,  was  interceding  with  Austria-Hungary  that  nothing  im- 
practicable be  demanded  of  Serbia ;  thus,  that  the  dissolution  of 
the  Narodna  Odbrana  be  required,  and  not  a  judicial  inquiry  into 
the  causes  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo.  Evidently  the  Cabinet  at 
Vienna,  under  pressure  of  the  press  and  military  party,  is  trying 
to  intimidate  Serbia  by  extreme  demands,  expecting  German  sup- 
port in  this  policy. 

"I  have  asked  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  [M.  Dumaine]  to  use 
all  his  influence  with  Count  Berchtold  [the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs]  and  to  represent  to  him  in  a  friendly  conversation  how  much 
Europe  would  appreciate  moderation  on  the  part  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, and  what  consequences  would  be  likely  to  be  entailed  by  violent 
pressure  on  Serbia." 

On  the  same  day,  July  22,  1914,  M.  Dumaine  reported  to  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  Count  Berchtold  was  still  at  Ischl  evi- 
dently waiting  for  the  decision  of  Kaiser  Francis  Joseph  on  the 
Serbian  question. 

"The  intention  of  proceeding  against  Serbia  with  the  greatest  sever- 
ity ...  of  'treating  her  like  another  Poland,'  is  attributed  to  the  Govern- 
ment. Eight  army  corps  are  said  to  be  ready  to  start  on  the  campaign, 
but  M.  Tisza  [Hungarian  Prime  Minister],  who  is  very  disturbed  about 
the  excitement  in  Croatia,  is  said  to  have  intervened  actively  in  order  to 
exercise  a  moderating  influence. 

"In  any  case  it  is  believed  that  the  demarche  will  be  made  at  Belgrade 
this  week.  The  requirements  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  with 
regard  to  the  punishment  of  the  outrage,  and  to  guarantees  of  control  and 
police  supervision,  seem  to  be  acceptable  to  the  dignity  of  the  Serbians; 
M.  Yovanovitch  [Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna]  believes  they  will  be  accepted. 
M.  Pashitch  [Serbian  Prime  Minister]  wishes  for  a  peaceful  solution,  but 
says  that  he  is  ready  for  a  full  resistance.  He  has  confidence  in  the 
strength  of  the  Serbian  army ;  besides,  he  counts  on  the  union  of  all  the  Slavs 
in  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  to  paralyze  the  effort  directed  against  his  country. 

"Unless  people  are  absolutely  blinded,  it  must  be  recognized  here  that 
a  violent  blow  has  every  chance  of  being  fatal  both  to  the  Austro-Hun- 


STATE    PAPERS  487 

garian  army  and  to  the  cohesion  of  the  nationalities  governed  by  the  em- 
peror, which  has  already  been  so  much  ^compromised. 

"Herr  von  Tschirschky,  the  German  Ambassador,  is  showing  himself  a 
supporter  of  violent  measures,  while  at  the  same  time  he  is  willing  to  let 
it  be  understood  that  the  Imperial  Chancellery  would  not  be  in  entire  agree- 
ment with  him  on  this  point.  "The  Russian  Ambassador  [M.  Schebeko], 
who  left  yesterday  for  the  country  in  consequence  of  reassuring  explana- 
tions made  to  him  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  has  confided  to  me 
that  his  Government  will  not  raise  any  objection  to  steps  directed  toward 
the  punishment  of  the  guilty  and  the  dissolution  of  the  societies  which  are 
notoriously  revolutionary,  but  could  not  accept  requirements  which  would 
humiliate  Serbian  national  feeling." 

On  the  same  day,  July  22,  1914,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French 
Ambassador  at  London,  reported  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  had 
told  him  that  Prince  Lichnowsky,  had  stated  that  a  demarche 
of  Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia  was  expected  at  Berlin,  and 
that  the  German  Government  was  endeavoring  to  hold  back 
the  Austro-Hungarians,  but  thus  far  had  been  unsuccessful. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  answered  that  he  would  like  to  believe 
that  Austria-Hungary,  before  intervening  at  Belgrade,  were 
assured  that  the  Serbian  Government  had  been  cognizant  of 
the  conspiracy  resulting  in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo,  and  had  not 
done  all  in  their  power  to  prevent  the  crime. 

"For  if  it  could  not  be  proved  that  the  Serbian  Government  were  re- 
sponsible and  implicated  to  a  certain  degree,  the  intervention  of  Austria- 
Hungary  would  not  be  justified  and  would  arouse  against  them  the  opinion 
of  Europe." 

The  Italian  Ambassador  and  Serbian  Minister,  M.  Boschko- 
vitch,  share  Sir  Edward  Grey's  apprehensions.  M.  Boschkovitch 
fears  that  demands  will  be  made  on  the  Serbian  Government 
which  their  dignity  and  public  opinion  may  not  allow  them  to 
accept  without  protest. 

"Notwithstanding  the  sacrifices  which  Serbia  has  made  for  her  recent 
victories  she  can  still  put  400,000  men  in  the  field,  and  public  opinion, 
which  knows  this,  is  not  inclined  to  put  up  with  any  humiliation. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  an  interview  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassa- 
dor [Count  Mensdorff],  asked  him  to  recommend  his  Government  not  to 
depart  from  the  prudence  and  moderation  necessary  for  avoiding  new  con- 
plications,  not  to  demand  from  Serbia  any  measures  to  which  she  could 
not  reasonably  submit,  and  not  to  allow  themselves  to  be  carried  away 
too  far." 


488      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

THE    AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN    NOTE    TO 

SERBIA 

The  expected  blow  now  fell  on  Serbia.  On  the  same  day,  July 
22,  1914,  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  sent  out  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors 
in  Berlin,  Rome,  Paris,  London,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Constanti- 
nople, the  contents  of  the  note  which  was  to  be  presented  on  the 
morrow  to  the  Serbian  Government. 

A  justification  of  the  demands  in  it  were  given.  All  of  the 
complaints  here  made  against  Serbia  have  already  been  given, 
except  the  charge  that 

"individuals  belonging  formerly  to  bands  employed  in  Macedonia  had  come 
to  place  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  terrorist  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary. 

"The  patience  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  in  the  face  of  the 
provocative  attitude  of  Serbia,  was  inspired  by  the  territorial  disinterested- 
ness of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  hope  that  the  Serbian 
Government  would  end  in  spite  of  everything  by  appreciating  Austria- 
Hungary's  friendship  at  its  true  value.  By  observing  a  benevolent  attitude 
toward  the  political  interests  of  Serbia,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment hoped  that  the  kingdom  would  finally  decide  to  follow  an  analogous 
line  of  conduct  on  its  own  side.  In  particular,  Austria-Hungary  expected 
a  development  of  this  kind  in  the  political  ideas  of  Serbia,  when,  after  the 
events  of  1912,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  by  its  disinterested 
and  ungrudging  attitude,  made  such  a  considerable  aggrandizement  of 
Serbia  possible." 

This  benevolence,  however,  was  repaid  by  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment tolerating  the  propaganda  which  ended  in  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo. 

"In  the  presence  of  this  state  of  things  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment have  felt  compelled  to  take  new  and  urgent  steps  at  Belgrade  with 
a  view  to  inducing  the  Serbian  Government  to  stop  the  incendiary  move- 
ment that  is  threatening  the  security  and  integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

"The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  convinced  that  in  taking 
this  step  they  will  find  themselves  in  full  agreement  with  the  senti- 
ments of  all  civilized  nations,  who  cannot  permit  regicide  to  become  a 
weapon  that  can  be  employed  with  impunity  in  political  strife  and  the 
peace  of  Europe  to  be  continually  disturbed  by  movements  emanating 
from  Belgrade." 


STATE    PAPERS  489 

The  ambassadors  were  instructed  each  to  submit  a  copy  of  the 
note  to  the  Government  to  which  he  was  accredited,  together 
with  a  dossier 

"elucidating  the  Serbian  intrigues '  and  the  connection  between  these  in- 
trigues and  the  murder  of  the  28th  of  June." 

On  the  following  day,  Thursday,  July  23,  1914,  Count  Berch- 
told  telegraphed  to  Count  Mensdorff,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambas- 
sador at  London,  that,  as  Great  Britain  of  all  the  powers  might 
be  most  easily  led  to  form  an  impartial  judgment  on  the  action 
taken,  in  presenting  the  copy  of  the  note,  he  should  point  out 
that  Serbia  might  have  rendered  less  acute  the  serious  steps  she 
must  expect  from  Austria-Hungary  by  spontaneously  investi- 
gating the  conspiracy  tending  to  the  crime  of  Sarajevo,  and  that 
on  the  contrary  she  had  endeavored  to  wipe  out  all  its  traces,  for 
example,  in  the  case  of  the  Serbian  civil  servant  Ciganovic,  who 
was  compromised  by  the  independent  testimony  of  both  of  the 
assassins,  and  who  was  in  Belgrade  on  the  day  of  the  crime, 
yet  whom  the  director  of  the  Serbian  press  declared  to  be  com- 
pletely unknown  in  that  city. 

"The  short  time  limit  attached  to  our  demand  must  be  attributed  to  our 
long  experience  of  the  dilatory  arts  of  Serbia. 

"The  requirements  which  we  demand  that  Serbia  should  fulfill,  and  which 
indeed  contain  nothing  which  is  not  a  matter  of  icourse  in  the  intercourse 
between  states  which  are  to  live  in  peace  and  friendship,  cannot  be  made 
the  subject  of  negotiations  and  compromise;  and,  having  regard  to  our 
economic  interests,  we  cannot  take  the  risk  of  a  method  of  political  action 
by  which  it  would  be  open  to  Serbia  at  pleasure  to  prolong  the  crisis  which 
has  arisen." 

Later  in  the  day  Count  Mensdorff  had  an  interview  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  sub- 
stance of  which  Sir  Edward  communicated  on  the  same  date  to 
Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

Count  Mensdorff  intimated  the  general  nature  of  the  note. 
Sir  Edward  regretted  the  time  limit  set  as  akin  to  an  ultimatum, 
and  so  likely  to  inflame  opinion  in  Russia,  and  render  difficult 
securing  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Serbia.  If  it  later  developed 
that  proceedings  were  unduly  protracted,  a  time  limit  could  then 
be  set.  By  that  time  Russian  opinion  would  be  less  excited,  and, 
if  the  case  appeared  strong  against  Serbia,  the  Russian  Govern- 


490     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

ment  would  be  in  a  position  to  influence  Serbia  to  reply  satis- 
factorily to  the  demands  of  the  note.  A  time  limit  was  generally 
a  thing  used  only  as  a  last  resort,  when  all  other  means  had 
failed. 

Count  Mensdorff  instanced  the  bad  faith  of  Serbia  in  not  ful- 
filling her  promise  of  1909  to  live  on  neighborly  terms  with 
Austria-Hungary,  and  said  that,  on  the  contrary,  she  had  con- 
ducted an  agitation  to  disintegrate  that  country,  which  made  it 
absolute  for  Austria  to  protect  herself.  On  this  Sir  Edward 
did  not  comment.  He  said  that  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Cam- 
bon,  and  the  Russian,  Count  Benckendorff,  and  others  were 
agreed  that  those  who  had  influence  at  St.  Petersburg  should 
exert  it  on  behalf  of  patience  and  moderation. 

"I  had  replied  that  the  amount  of  influence  that  icould  be  used  in  this 
sense  would  depend  upon  how  reasonable  were  the  Austrian  demands  and 
how  strong  the  justification  that  Austria  might  have  discovered  for  making 
her  demands.  The  possible  consequences  of  the  present  situation  were  ter- 
rible. If  as  many  as  four  great  powers  of  Europe — let  us  say,  Austria, 
France,  Russia,  and  Germany — were  engaged  in  war,  it  seemed  to  me  that 
it  must  involve  the  expenditure  of  so  vast  a  sum  of  money,  and  such  an 
interference  with  trade,  that  a  war  would  be  accompanied  or  followed  by 
a  complete  collapse  of  European  credit  and  industry.  In  these  days,  in  great 
industrial  states,  this  would  mean  a  state  of  things  worse  than  that  of  1848, 
and,  irrespective  of  who  were  victors  in  the  war,  many  things  might  be 
completely  swept  away. 

"Count  Mensdorff  did  not  demur  to  this  statement  of  the  possible  'conse- 
quences of  the  present  situation,  but  he  said  that  all  would  depend  upon 
Russia. 

"I  made  the  remark  that,  in  a  time  of  difficulties  such  as  this,  it  was 
just  as  true  to  say  that  it  required  two  to  keep  the  peace  as  it  was  to  say 
ordinarily  that  it  took  two  to  make  a  quarrel.  I  hoped  very  much  that,  if 
there  were  difficulties,  Austria  and  Russia  would  be  able  in  the  first  instance 
to  discuss  them  directly  with  each  other. 

"Count  Mensdorff  said  that  he  hoped  this  would  be  possible,  but  he  was 
under  the  impression  that  the  attitude  in  Petrograd  had  not  been  very 
favorable  recently." 

On  the  same  day,  July  23, 1914,  before  the  copy  of  the  note  had 
been  presented  to  him,  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  notified  the  French  Ambassadors  at 
London,  Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  and  Rome,  that  it  was  reported 
by  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  that  the  inten- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary  was  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  severity 


STATE    PAPERS  491 

against  Serbia,  while  keeping  eight  army  corps  ready  to  start 
operations. 

Nevertheless  Baron  Macchio,  Austro-Hungarian  Under-Secre- 
tary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  assured  M.  Dumaine  that  the  tone 
and  demands  of  the  note  were  such  ac  to  allow  us  to  count  on  a 
peaceful  result. 

"In  view  of  the  customary  procedure  of  the  Imperial  Chancellery,  I  do  not 
know  what  confidence  ought  to  be  placed  in  these  assurances.  .  .  . 

"The  Serbian  Minister  [M.  Vesnitch]  holds  that  as  M.  Pashitch  [Serbian 
Prime  Minister]  wishes  to  come  to  an  understanding,  he  will  accept  those 
demands  which  relate  to  the  punishment  of  the  outrage  and  to  the  guaran- 
ties for  control  and  police  supervision,  but  that  he  will  resist  everything 
which  might  affect  the  sovereignty  and  dignity  of  his  country. 

"In  diplomatic  circles  at  Vienna  the  German  Ambassador  [Von 
Tschirschky]  is  in  favor  of  violent  measures,  while  at  the  same  time  he 
confesses  that  the  Imperial  Chancellery  is  perhaps  not  entirely  in  agree- 
ment with  him  on  this  point;  the  Russian  Ambassador  [Schebeko],  trusting 
to  assurances  which  have  been  given  him,  has  left  Vienna,  and  before  his 
departure  confided  to  M.  Dumaine  that  his  Government  will  not  raise  any 
objection  to  the  punishment  of  the  guilty  and  the  dissolution  of  the  revo- 
lutionary associations,  but  that  they  could  not  accept  requirements  which 
were  humiliating  to  the  national  sentiment  of  Serbia." 

On  the  same  day,  July  23,  1914,  M.  Allize,  French  Minister  at 
Munich,  reported  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  that  the  Bavarian  press 
were  optimistic  over  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Serbian  question, 
but  that  official  circles  were  pessimistic. 

The  note  was  presented  at  6  p.  m.,  Thursday,  July  23,  1914,  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  Baron  Giesl  von 
Gieslingen,  to  the  Serbian  Minister  of  Finance,  M.  Laza  Patchou, 
in  the  absence  of  M.  Pashitch,  the  Prime  Minister,  who  was 
away  electioneering.  The  time  limit  for  acceptance  of  its  de- 
mands was  forty-eight  hours.  Giesl  added  verbally  that,  if  the 
demands  were  not  accepted  within  that  period,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Legation  would  leave  Belgrade  on  the  morrow,  Friday, 
at  10  a.  m.  This  information  was  telegraphed  that  evening  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Petrograd,  M.  Sazonof,  by  the 
Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Belgrade,  M.  Strandtman.  Through 
him  M.  Patchou  solicited  the  help  of  Russia,  declaring  that  no 
Serbian  Government  could  accept  the  demands  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  M.  Patchou  at  the  same  time  telegraphed  to  the 


492     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

foreign  Serbian  Legations  the  news  of  the  delivery  of  the  note, 
and  informed  them  that  he  was  in  a  position  to  state  that  no 
Serbian  Government  could  accept  its  demands  in  their  entirety. 


TEXT    OF    THE    NOTE 

The  following  are  the  contents  of  the  note : 

"On  March  31,  1909,  the  Royal  Serbian  Minister  to  the  court  of  Vienna 
made  the  following  statement,  by  order  of  his  Government: 

"  'Serbia  declares  that  she  is  not  affected  in  her  rights  by  the  situation 
established  in  Bosnia,  and  that  she  will  therefore  adapt  herself  to  the  deci- 
sions which  the  powers  are  going  to  arrive  at  in  reference  to  Article  XXV 
of  the  Berlin  Treaty.  By  following  the  councils  of  the  powers,  Serbia  binds 
herself  to  cease  the  attitude  of  protest  and  resistance  which  she  has  assumed 
since  last  October,  relative  to  the  annexation,  and  she  binds  herself  further 
to  change  the  direction  of  her  present  policies  toward  Austria-Hungary,  and 
in  the  future  to  live  with  the  latter  in  friendly  and  neighborly  relations.' " 

Here  follow  the  charges  with  which  the  reader  is  already 
familiar :  That  there  is  in  Serbia  a  movement  to  separate  certain 
territories  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  which,  devel- 
oped under  the  eyes  of  the  Government  of  Serbia,  has  found  ex- 
pression beyond  that  kingdom  in  a  series  of  acts  of  terrorism 
and  assassination. 

The  Serbian  Government  has  done  nothing  to  suppress  the 
movement,  its  violent  propaganda  in  public  education  and  the 
press,  or  the  participation  in  its  intrigues  by  public  officials. 

"It  becomes  plain  from  the  evidence  and  confessions  of  the  criminal 
authors  of  the  outrage  of  June  28  that  the  murder  at  Sarajevo  was  con- 
ceived in  Belgrade,  that  the  murderers  received  the  arms  and  bombs  with 
which  they  were  equipped  from  Serbian  officers  and  officials  who  belonged 
to  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  and  that,  lastly,  the  transportation  of  the  crimi- 
nals and  their  arms  to  Bosnia  was  arranged  and  carried  out  by  leading 
Serbian  frontier  officials. 

"These  results  impose  upon  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  the  duty 
to  terminate  intrigues  which  constitute  a  permanent  menace  for  the  peace 
of  the  monarchy. 

"In  order  to  obtain  this  purpose,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  is 
forced  to  demand  official  assurance  from  the  Serbian  Government  that  it 
condemns  the  propaganda  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  i.  e.,  the  en- 
tirety of  the  machinations  whose  aim  it  is  to  separate  parts  from  the 


STATE    PAPERS  493 

monarchy  which  belong  to  it,  and  that  Serbia  binds  herself  to  suppress 
with  all  means  this  criminal  and  terrorizing  propaganda. 

"In  order  to  give  to  these  obligations  a  solemn  character,  the  Royal 
Serbian  Government  will  publish  on  the  first  page  of  its  official  organ  of 
July  26,  1914,  the  following  declaration: 

"  'The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemns  the  propaganda  directed 
against  Austria-Hungary,  i.  e.,  the  entirety  of  those  machinations  whose  aim 
it  is  to  separate  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  territories  belong- 
ing thereto,  and  she  regrets  sincerely  the  ghastly  consequences  of  these 
criminal  actions. 

"  'The  Royal  Serbian  Government  regrets  that  Serbian  officers  and  offi- 
cials have  participated  in  the  propaganda,  cited  above,  and  have  thus  threat- 
ened the  friendly  and  neighborly  relations  which  the  Royal  Government  was 
solemnly  bound  to  cultivate  by  its  declaration  of  March  31,  1909. 

"  'The  Royal  Government,  which  disapproves  and  rejects  every  thought 
or  every  attempt  at  influencing  the  destinations  of  the  inhabitants  of  any 
part  of  Austria-Hungary,  considers  it  its  duty  to  call  most  emphatically  to 
the  attention  of  its  officers  and  officials,  and  of  the  entire  population  of  the 
kingdom,  that  it  will  henceforward  proceed  with  the  utmost  severity  against 
any  persons  guilty  of  similar  actions,  to  prevent  and  suppress  which  it  will 
make  every  effort.' 

"This  explanation  is  to  be  brought  simultaneously  to  the  cognizance  of 
the  royal  army  through  an  order  of  his  majesty  the  king,  and  it  is  to  be 
published  in  the  official  organ  of  the  army. 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  binds  itself,  in  addition,  as  follows: 

"  '1.  To  suppress  any  publication  which  fosters  hatred  of,  and  contempt 
for,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  whose  general  tendency  is  di- 
rected against  the  latter's  territorial  integrity. 

"  '2.  To  proceed  at  once  with  the  dissolution  of  the  society  Narodna 
Odbrana,  to  'confiscate  their  entire  means  of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed  in 
the  same  manner  against  the  other  societies  and  associations  in  Serbia 
which  occupy  themselves  with  the  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Royal  Government  will  take  the  necessary  measures,  so  that  the  dis- 
solved societies  may  not  continue  their  activities  under  another  name  or 
in  another  form. 

"  'Without  delay  to  eliminate  from  the  public  instruction  in  Serbia,  so 
far  as  the  corps  of  instructors  as  well  as  the  means  of  instruction  are  con- 
cerned, that  which  serves,  or  may  serve,  to  foster  the  propaganda  against 
Austria- Hungary. 

"  '4.  To  remove  from  military  service  and  the  administration  in  general 
all  officers  and  officials  who  are  guilty  of  propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  whose  names,  with  a  communication  of  the  material  which 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  possesses  against  them,  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  reserves  the  right  to  communicate  to  the  Royal 
Government. 

"  '5.  To  consent  that  in  Serbia  officials  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment cooperate  in  the  suppression  of  a  movement  directed  against  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  monarchy. 


494     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"  '6.  To  icommence  a  judicial  investigation  against  the  participants  of 
the  conspiracy  of  June  28,  who  are  on  Serbian  territory.  Officials,  dele- 
gated by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  will  participate  in  the  exam- 
inations. 

"  '7.  To  proceed  at  once  with  all  severity  to  arrest  Major  Voja  Tankosic 
and  a  certain  Milan  Ciganowic,  Serbian  state  officials,  who  have  been  com- 
promised through  the  result  of  the  investigation. 

"  '8.  To  prevent  through  effective  measures  the  participation  of  the 
Serbian  authorities  in  the  smuggling  of  arms  and  explosives  across  the 
frontier,  and  to  dismiss  those  officials  of  Shabatz  and  Loznica  who  assisted 
the  originators  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  in  crossing  the  frontier. 

"  '9.  To  give  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  explanations  in  re- 
gard to  the  unjustifiable  remarks  of  high  Serbian  functionaries  in  Serbia 
and  abroad  who  have  not  hesitated,  in  spite  of  their  official  position,  to 
express  themselves  in  interviews  in  a  hostile  manner  against  Austria- 
Hungary  after  the  outrage  of  June  28. 

"  '10.  The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  expects  a  reply  from  the 
Royal  Government,  at  the  latest  by  Saturday,  25th  inst.,  at  6  p.  m.  A 
memoir  concerning  the  results  of  the  investigations  at  Sarajevo,  so  far  as 
they  concern  points  7  and  8,  is  inclosed  with  this  note.' " 

INCLOSURE 

"The  investigation  carried  on  against  Gabrilo  Princip  and  accomplices 
in  the  court  of  Sarajevo,  on  account  of  the  assassination  on  June  28,  has 
so  far  yielded  the  following  results: 

"  '1.  The  plan  to  murder  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  during  his  stay  in 
Sarajevo  was  conceived  in  Belgrade  by  Gabrilo  Princip,  Nedeljko,  Gabri- 
nowic,  and  a  certain  Milan  Ciganowic  and  Trifko  Grabez,  with  the  aid  of 
Major  Voja  Tankosic. 

"  '2.  The  six  bombs  and  four  Browning  pistols  which  were  used  by  the 
criminals  were  obtained  by  Milan  Ciganowic  and  Major  Tankosic,  and  pre- 
sented to  Princip  Gabrinowic  in  Belgrade. 

"  '3.  The  bombs  are  hand  grenades,  manufactured  at  the  arsenal  of  the 
Serbian  army  in  Kragujevac. 

"  '4.  To  insure  the  success  of  the  assassination,  Milan  Ciganowic  in- 
structed Princip  Gabrinowic  in  the  use  of  the  grenades  and  gave  instruc- 
tions in  shooting  with  Browning  pistols  to  Princip  Grabez  in  a  forest  near 
the  target  practice  field  of  Topshider  (outside  Belgrade). 

"  '5.  In  order  to  enable  the  crossing  of  the  frontier  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina by  Princip  Gabrinowic  and  Grabez,  and  the  smuggling  of  their  arms, 
a  secret  system  of  transportation  was  organized  by  Ciganowic.  The  entry 
of  the  criminals  with  their  arms  into  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  effected 
by  the  frontier  captains  of  Shabatz  (Rade  Popowic)  and  of  Loznica,  as 
well  as  by  the  custom-house  official  Rudivoy  Grbic  of  Loznica  with  the  aid 
of  several  other  persons.' " 

On  the  same  day  that  the  note  was  presented  to  Serbia,  July 
23,  1914,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  German  Chancellor, 


STATE    PAPERS  495 

wrote  a  circular  letter  to  the  German  Ambassadors  at  Paris, 
London,  and  St.  Petersburg,  embodying  and  enforcing  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  arguments  justifying  the  note.  These  the  ambassa- 
dors were  instructed  to  present  to  the  Foreign  Offices  of  the 
countries  to  which  they  were  accredited.  The  chancellor  com- 
mended the  self-restraint  of  Austria-Hungary  in  thus  far  avoid- 
ing war  with  Serbia.  Now,  however,  he  feared  that  Serbia  would 
not  comply  with  the  just  demands  of  the  country  she  had  injured, 
but  would  adopt  "a  provocative  attitude  toward  Austria-Hun- 
gary." 

"Nothing  would  remain  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  unless  it 
renounced  definitely  its  position  as  a  great  power,  but  to  press  its  demands 
with  the  Serbian  Government,  and,  if  need  be,  enforce  the  same  by  appeal 
to  military  measures,  in  regard  to  which  the  (choice  of  means  must  be  left 
with  it." 

The  ambassadors  were  charged  to  give  special  emphasis  to  the 
view 

"that  in  this  question  there  is  concerned  an  affair  which  should  be  settled 
solely  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  the  limitation  to  which  it  must 
be  the  earnest  endeavor  of  the  powers  to  insure.  We  anxiously  desire  the 
localization  of  the  conflict  because  every  intercession  of  another  power  on 
account  of  the  various  treaty  alliances  would  precipitate  inconceivable 
consequences." 

The  ambassadors  were  instructed  by  the  chancellor  to  send  him 
telegraphic  reports  of  their  interviews. 


CONTROVERSY    OVER    THE    TIME 
LIMIT 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the  two  following  days  is  oc- 
cupied chiefly  with  the  attempt  of  Serbia  and  the  powers  not  party 
to  the  dispute  to  have  the  time  limit  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note 
extended.  In  order  to  save  repetition  the  correspondence  here- 
after will  be  given  under  the  heads  of  the  dates  when  letters,  tele- 
grams, etc.,  were  sent,  and  the  subheads  of  the  countries  in  whose 
official  reports  they  are  found. 


496  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

CHRONOLOGICAL    ARRANGEMENT    OF 

DATES 

FRIDAY,      JULY     24,      1914 

Serbia.  M.  Strandtman,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Bel- 
grade, telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
at  Petrograd,  that  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  of  Serbia,  had  re- 
turned to  the  capital,  and  would  give  an  answer  to  Austria  within 
the  prescribed  time,  showing  the  points  which  are  acceptable  or 
unacceptable. 

"To-day  an  appeal  will  be  addressed  to  the  powers  to  defend  the  inde- 
pendence of  Serbia,  Then,  added  Pashitch,  if  war  is  inevitable,  we  will 
make  war." 

Great  Britain.  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d'Affaires 
at  Belgrade,  telegraphed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  M.  Pashitch  had 
told  him  that  the  Austrian  demands  were  considered  unacceptable 
by  the  Serbian  Government,  and  that  it  trusted  to  Great  Britain 
to  induce  Austria  to  moderate  them.  M.  Pashitch  was  dejected 
and  anxious. 

Riissia.  The  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  Prince  Regent  of 
Serbia,  telegraphed  to  Czar  Nicholas  II  of  Russia  that  the 
Serbian  Government  had  been  willing  from  the  first  to  open  an 
inquiry  in  Serbia  as  to  complicity  of  Serbian  subjects  in  the 
crime  of  Sarajevo. 

"The  demands  contained  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  are,  however, 
unnecessarily  humiliating  for  Serbia,  and  incompatible  with  her  dignity  as 
an  independent  state.  .  .  . 

"We  are  prepared  to  accept  those  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  conditions 
which  are  compatible  with  the  position  of  an  independent  state,  as  well  as 
those  to  which  your  majesty  may  advise  us  to  agree,  and  all  those  persons 
whose  complicity  in  the  crime  may  be  proved  will  be  severely  punished 
by  us.  Certain  of  the  demands  .could  not  be  carried  out  without  changes 
in  our  legislation,  which  would  need  time.  .  .  .  We  may  be  attacked  at  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limit  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  which  is  con- 
centrating upon  our  frontier.  We  are  unable  to  defend  ourselves,  and  we 
beg  your  majesty  to  come  to  our  aid  as  soon  as  possible.  The  much-appre- 
ciated good  will  which  your  majesty  has  so  often  shown  toward  us  inspires 
us  with  the  firm  belief  that  once  again  our  appeal  to  your  noble  Slav  heart 
will  not  pass  unheeded.  .  .  ." 


STATE    PAPERS  497 

Russia.  M.  Broniewsky,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin, 
telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  St. 
Petersburg,  that  the  Berlin  press  in  the  main  warmly  welcomed 
the  uncompromising  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary. 

"The  semiofficial  'Lokal-Anzeiger'  is  particularly  violent;  it  describes  as 
fruitless  any  possible  appeals  that  Serbia  may  make  to  St.  Petersburg,  Paris, 
Athens,  or  Bucharest,  and  concludes  by  saying  that  the  German  people 
will  breathe  freely  when  they  learn  that  the  situation  in  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula is  to  be  cleared  up  at  last." 

Serbia.  Dr.  Spalaikovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg, 
telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch  a  report  of  a  chance  interview  with 
Count  Pourtales,  the  German  Ambassador.  The  Count  had  said 
that  peace  with  Austria-Hungary  depended  on  Serbia  alone, 
since  the  matter  lay  entirely  between  the  two  disputants. 

"In  reply  I  told  Count  Pourtales  that  he  was  under  a  misapprehension, 
and  that  he  would  see  before  long  that  this  was  not  a  question  merely  be- 
tween Serbia  and  Austria,  but  a  European  question." 

Austria-Hungary.  Count  Mensdorff,  Austro-Hungarian  Am- 
bassador at  London,  telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  that  he  had  handed  a  copy  of 
the  note  to  Serbia  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 

"At  the  fifth  heading  he  asked  what  it  meant;  to  introduce  officials  of 
our  Government  in  Serbia  would  be  equivalent  to  the  end  of  Serbian  political 
independence.  I  answered  that  cooperation  of,  e.  g.,  police  officials,  in  no 
way  affected  the  sovereignty  of  the  state. 

"He  regretted  the  time  limit,  as  in  this  way  we  should  be  deprived  of 
the  possibility  of  quieting  the  first  outbreak  of  excitement  and  bringing 
pressure  to  bear  upon  Belgrade  to  give  us  a  satisfactory  answer.  It  was 
always  possible  to  send  an  ultimatum  if  answer  was  not  satisfactory. 

"I  developed  our  point  of  view  at  length.  (Necessity  of  defense  against 
continued  revolutionary  undertakings  which  threaten  the  territory-  of  the 
[Dual]  Monarchy,  protection  of  our  most  vital  interests,  'complete  failure 
of  the  conciliatory  attitude  which  we  had  hitherto  often  shown  to  Serbia, 
who  had  had  more  than  three  weeks  to  set  on  foot  of  her  own  accord  inves- 
tigations as  to  accomplices  in  outrage,  etc.) 

"The  Secretary  of  State  repeated  his  objections  to  the  short  time  limit, 
but  recognized  that  what  was  said  as  to  complicity  in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo, 
as  well  as  many  of  our  other  requirements,  was  justified. 

"He  would  be  quite  ready  to  look  on  the  affair  as  one  which  only  con- 
cerned Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia.  He  is,  however,  very  'apprehensive* 
that  several  great  powers  might  be  involved  in  a  war.  Speaking  of  Russia, 


498     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Germany,  and  France,  he  observed  that  the  terms  of  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance  might  be  more  or  less  to  the  same  effect  as  those  of  the  Triple 
Alliance. 

"I  fully  explained  to  him  our  point  of  view,  and  repeated  with  emphasis 
that  in  this  case  we  must  stand  firm  so  as  to  gain  for  ourselves  some  sort 
of  guaranties,  as  hitherto  Serbian  promises  have  never  been  kept.  I  under- 
stood that  in  the  first  place  he  considered  the  question  only  as  it  influences 
the  position  of  Europe.  He  must,  however,  in  order  to  be  fair  to  our  point 
of  view,  put  himself  in  our  situation. 

"He  would  not  go  into  any  more  detailed  discussion  on  this  subject,  said 
he  must  have  time  to  study  the  note  more  carefully.  He  was  to  see  the 
German  and  the  French  Ambassadors,  as  he  must  first  of  all  exchange  ideas 
with  the  powers  who  are  allies  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  respectively, 
but  have  themselves  no  direct  interest  in  Serbia." 

Count  Szecsen,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  tele- 
graphed to  Count  Berchtold  that,  on  his  presentation  of  the 
copy  of  the  note  to  Serbia  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  French  Act- 
ing Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  point  five  in  the  note  had 
seemed  to  make  a  special  impression  on  the  secretary,  since  he 
had  asked  that  it  be  reread. 

"I  took  the  opportunity  to  impress  on  him  that  the  question  was  one 
which  must  be  brought  to  an  issue  directly  between  Serbia  and  us,  but 
that  it  was  in  the  general  interests  of  Europe  that  the  trouble  which  for 
years  past  had  been  kept  up  by  Serbian  intrigues  against  us  should  at  last 
make  way  for  a  clear  situation. 

"All  friends  of  peace  and  order,  and  I  placed  France  in  the  first  rank 
of  these,  should  therefore  give  serious  advice  to  Serbia  to  change  completely 
her  attitude  and  to  satisfy  our  just  demands. 

"The  minister  said  that  it  was  the  duty  of  Serbia  to  proceed  energetically 
against  any  accomplices  of  the  murderers  of  Sarajevo,  a  duty  which  she 
could  not  escape.  While  laying  special  stress  on  the  sympathy  of  France 
for  Austria-Hungary,  and  on  the  good  relations  which  existed  between  our 
two  countries,  he  expressed  the  hope  that  the  controversy  would  be  brought 
to  an  end  peacefully  in  a  manner  corresponding  to  our  wishes. 

"The  minister  avoided  every  attempt  to  palliate  or  to  defend  in  any  way 
the  attitude  of  Serbia." 

In  a  second  telegram  Count  Szecsen  reported  that  Baron  von 
Schoen,  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  had  officially  informed 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that,  in  the  view  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  the  Serbian  con- 
troversy concerned  only  the  two  parties  to  it,  and,  in  case  that 
third  states  should  wish  to  intervene,  Germany  would  be  on  the 
side  of  her  ally.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  replied  that  his  Govern- 


STATE    PAPERS  499 

ment  agreed  that  the  controversy  concerned  Belgrade  and  Vienna 
alone,  and  he  hoped  for  a  peaceful  solution. 

Count  Szapary,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold  that,  on  presenting  the 
copy  of  the  note  to  Serbia  to  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  the  minister  had  questioned  the  fact  of  the  out- 
rages complained  of  arising  in  Serbia,  and  declared  that  the 
note  was  a  pretext  for  war  on  Serbia. 

"I  said  to  him  that  no  one  among  us  was  attacking  the  integrity  of  Serbia 
or  the  dynasty.  M.  Sazonof  expressed  himself  most  vigorously  against  the 
dissolution  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  which  Serbia  would  never  undertake. 
The  participation  of  imperial  and  royal  officials  in  the  suppression  of  the 
revolutionary  movements  elicited  further  protest  on  the  part  of  the  minister. 
Serbia  then  will  no  longer  be  master  in  her  own  house.  'You  will  always  be 
wanting  to  intervene  again,  and  what  a  life  you  will  lead  Europe!'  I  an- 
swered that  if  Serbia  shows  good  will  it  will  be  a  quieter  life  than  hitherto. 

"The  commentary  added  to  the  communication  of  the  note  was  listened 
to  by  the  minister  with  fair  composure;  at  the  passage  that  our  feelings 
were  shared  by  those  of  all  civilized  nations,  he  observed  that  this  was  a 
mistake.  With  all  the  emphasis  I  could  command,  I  pointed  out  how  regret- 
table it  would  be  if  we  could  not  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia  on 
this  question,  in  which  everything  which  is  most  sacred  to  us  was  at  stake, 
and,  whatever  the  minister  might  say,  everything  which  is  sacred  in  Russia. 
The  minister  attempted  to  minimize  the  monarchical  side  of  the  question. 

"With  regard  to  the  dossier  which  was  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govern- 
ments, M.  Sazonof  wanted  to  know  why  we  had  given  ourselves  this  trouble, 
as  we  had  already  delivered  the  ultimatum.  This  was  the  best  proof  that 
we  did  not  really  desire  an  impartial  examination  of  the  matter.  I  said  to 
him  that  the  results  which  had  been  attained  by  our  own  investigations  were 
quite  sufficient  for  our  procedure  in  this  matter,  which  had  to  do  with 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  and  that  we  were  only  ready  to  give  the 
powers  further  information  if  it  interested  them,  as  we  had  nothing  to 
keep  secret. 

"M.  Sazonof  said  that  now  that  the  ultimatum  had  been  issued  he  was 
not  in  the  least  curious.  He  represented  the  matter  as  if  we  only  wanted 
to  make  war  with  Serbia  whatever  happened.  I  answered  that  we  were 
the  most  peace-loving  power  in  the  world,  but  what  we  wanted  was  security 
for  our  territory  from  foreign  revolutionary  intrigues,  and  the  protection 
of  our  dynasty  from  bombs.  .  .  . 

"In  spite  of  his  relative  calm,  the  attitude  of  the  minister  was  through- 
out unaccommodating  and  hostile." 

The  Russian  "Official  Gazette"  announced  that  the  Govern- 
ment were  closely  and  anxiously  following  the  Serbian  contro- 
versy, to  which  Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent. 


500  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAK 

Count  Szapary  telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold  that,  after  a 
council  of  ministers  which  had  lasted  five  hours,  M.  Sazonof  had 
received  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales. 

M.  Sazonof  took  the  position  that  the  Serbian  question  was  a 
European  affair,  the  settlement  of  1909  having  been  made  under 
the  auspices  of  all  the  powers.  He  pointed  out 

"that  Austria-Hungary  had  offered  a  dossier  for  investigation  when  an  ulti- 
matum had  already  been  presented.  Russia  would  require  an  international 
investigation  of  the  dossier,  which  had  been  put  at  her  disposal.  My  Ger- 
man colleague  at  once  brought  to  M.  Sazonof 's  notice  that  Austria-Hungary 
would  not  accept  interference  in  her  difference  with  Serbia,  and  that  Ger- 
many also  on  her  side  could  not  accept  a  suggestion  which  would  be  contrary 
to  the  dignity  of  her  ally  as  a  great  power. 

"In  the  further  course  of  the  conversation  the  minister  explained  that 
that  which  Russia  could  not  accept  with  indifference  was  the  eventual  inten- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary  'to  devour  Serbia.'  Count  Pourtales  answered 
that  he  did  not  accept  any  such  intention  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary, 
as  this  would  be  contrary  to  the  most  special  interest  of  the  monarchy. 
The  only  object  of  Austria-Hungary  was  'to  inflict  on  Serbia  justly  deserved 
chastisement.'  M.  Sazonof  on  this  expressed  his  doubts  whether  Austria- 
Hungary  would  allow  herself  to  be  contented  with  this  even  if  explanations 
on  this  point  had  been  made. 

"The  interview  concluded  with  an  appeal  by  M.  Sazonof  that  Germany 
should  work  with  Russia  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  The  German  Am- 
bassador assured  the  Russian  Minister  that  Germany  certainly  had  no  wish 
to  bring  about  a  war,  but  that  she  naturally  fully  represented  the  interests 
of  her  ally." 

Count  Pourtales  telegraphed  his  Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  that  M.  Sazonof  was  very  much  agitated. 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Mensdorff,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  London,  to  explain  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  action  taken 
toward  Serbia  was  not  a  formal  ultimatum  but  "merely  a 
demarche  with  a  time  limit,"  which  if  not  acceded  to,  would  be 
followed  only  by  Austria's  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  and 
beginning  military  preparations. 

"If  Serbia  were  to  give  way  only  under  the  pressure  of  our  military 
preparations,  we  should  indeed  have  to  demand  that  she  should  make  good 
the  expenses  which  we  had  incurred;  as  is  well  known,  we  have  already  had 
twice  (1908  and  1912)  to  mobilize  because  of  Serbia." 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Szapary,  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  a  report  of  his  interview 


STATE    PAPERS  501 

with  Prince  Koudacheff,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna. 
The  prince  had  stated  that  St.  Petersburg  was  apprehensive  that 
the  demarche  might  take  the  form  of  humiliating  Serbia,  and 
this  would  have  an  echo  in  Russia. 

"I  explained  .  .  .  the  danger,  not  only  to  the  integrity  of  the  [Dual] 
Monarchy,  but  also  to  the  balance  of  power  and  the  peace  of  Europe,  which 
would  be  involved  in  giving  further  scope  to  the  great  Serbian  propaganda, 
and  how  all  the  dynasties,  and  not  least  the  Russian,  would  apparently  be 
threatened  if  the  idea  took  root  that  a  movement  which  made  use  of  mur- 
der as  a  national  weapon  could  be  continued  with  impunity. 

"I  pointed  out  that  we  did  not  aim  at  any  increase  of  territory,  but  only 
at  the  maintenance  of  what  we  possess,  a  point  of  view  which  could  not  fail 
to  be  understood  by  the  Russian  Government." 

Russia.  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
telegraphed  to  Prince  Koudacheff,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at 
Vienna,  to  ask  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  time  limit  in  the  note  to  Serbia  be  ex- 
tended, as  it  left  to  the  powers  insufficient  time  for  conciliation. 

"Austria-Hungary,  having  declared  her  readiness  to  inform  the  powers 
of  the  results  of  the  inquiry  upon  which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment base  their  accusations,  should  equally  allow  them  sufficient  time  to 
study  them. 

"In  this  case,  if  the  powers  were  convinced  that  certain  of  the  Austrian 
demands  were  well  founded,  they  would  be  in  a  position  to  offer  advice  to  the 
Serbian  Government. 

"A  refusal  to  prolong  the  term  of  the  ultimatum  would  render  nugatory 
the  proposals  made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  the  powers, 
and  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  very  bases  of  international  relations." 

M.  Sazonof  communicated  this  message  to  London,  Rome, 
Paris,  and  Belgrade,  with  the  request  that  in  the  three  former 
cases  similar  instructions  be  given  to  their  Ambassadors  at 
Vienna. 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  that  he  had  said  to  Count  Mensdorff, 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  London,  that  it  was  a  matter 
for  great  regret  that  a  time  limit,  and  such  a  short  one  at  that, 
had  been  insisted  upon  at  this  stage  of  the  proceedings. 

"The  murder  of  the  archduke  and  some  of  the  circumstances  respecting 
Serbia  quoted  in  the  note  aroused  sympathy  with  Austria,  as  was  but 
natural,  but  at  the  same  time  I  had  never  before  seen  one  state  address 

L— Gt.  War  2 


502  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

to  another  independent  state  a  document  of  so  formidable  a  character. 
Demand  No.  5  would  be  hardly  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  Serbia's 
independent  sovereignty  if  it  were  to  mean,  as  it  seemed  that  it  might,  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  to  be  invested  with  a  right  to  appoint  officials  who 
would  have  authority  within  the  frontiers  of  Serbia. 

"I  added  that  I  felt  great  apprehension,  and  that  I  should  concern  my- 
self with  the  matter  simply  and  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  peace 
of  Europe.  The  merits  of  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Serbia  were  not 
the  concern  of  his  majesty's  Government,  and  such  comments  as  I  had  made 
above  were  not  made  in  order  to  discuss  those  merits. 

"I  ended  by  saying  that  doubtless  we  should  enter  into  an  exchange  of 
views  with  other  powers,  and  that  I  must  await  their  views  as  to  what  could 
be  done  to  mitigate  the  difficulties  of  the  situation." 

Sir  George  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  sought  an  interview  with  him, 
as  the  Austrian  step  clearly  meant  war.  At  the  interview  M. 
Sazonof  had  said  Austria's  demands  were  provocative  and  im- 
moral, some  being  impossible  of  acceptance.  She  would  never 
have  taken  such  action  unless  Germany  had  first  been  consulted. 
He  hoped  Great  Britain  would  proclaim  her  solidarity  with 
Russia  and  France.  France  would  fulfill  the  treaty  obligations 
with  Russia,  besides  supporting  Russia  in  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions. Sir  George  said,  that  personally  he  did  not  expect  any 
declaration  of  this  kind  from  Great  Britain.  Direct  British 
interests  were  nil  in  Serbia,  British  public  opinion  would  not 
permit  Great  Britain  to  enter  war  on  her  behalf.  M.  Sazonof 
replied  that  the  general  European  question  was  involved,  and 
Great  Britain  could  not  afford  to  efface  herself  from  the  prob- 
lems now  at  issue. 

Evidently  Sazonof  wants  Great  Britain  to  join  in  warning 
Austria  that  her  intervention  in  Serbia  will  not  be  tolerated. 
But  suppose  Austria  nevertheless  wars  in  Serbia,  will  Russia 
forthwith  declare  war  on  Austria? 

A  council  of  ministers  is  being  held  this  afternoon  on  mobiliza- 
tion. At  a  meeting  to-morrow,  where  the  czar  will  preside,  a 
decision  will  be  come  to. 

Sir  George  said  the  important  thing  to  do  was  to  influence 
Austria  to  extend  the  time  limit.  M.  Paleologue,  the  French 


STATE    PAPERS  503 

Ambassador,  was  either  set  on  war  or  was  bluffing,  and  which- 
ever it  was,  our  only  chance  for  peace  was  to  adopt  a  firm  and 
united  attitude.  There  was  no  time  to  carry  out  Sir  George's 
suggestion.  The  British  Ambassador  then  said  that  his  Govern- 
ment might  perhaps  warn  Austria  that  war  would  probably 
mean  Russian  intervention,  which  would  involve  France  and 
Germany,  and  so  make  it  hard  for  Great  Britain  to  keep  out  of  the 
conflict.  M.  Sazonof  answered  that  Great  Britain  would  sooner 
or  later  be  dragged  into  war ;  war  would  be  rendered  more  likely 
by  Great  Britain  if  she  did  not  make  common  cause  with  Russia 
and  France.  President  Poincare  and  M.  Viviani,  President  of 
the  Council,  being  in  Russia,  it  appears  as  if  Austria  had  taken 
advantage  of  their  absence  from  France  to  present  their  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia.  Even  though  we  do  not  join  them  it  seems 
that  France  and  Russia  are  determined  to  make  a  strong  stand. 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  tele- 
graphed to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  he  was  assured  by  M.  Schebeko, 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  that  Russia  would  not  be  indif- 
ferent to  the  humiliation  of  Serbia.  Prince  Koudacheff,  the 
Russian  Charge  d'Affaires,  had  told  Count  Berchtold,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  note  to  Serbia 
was  unusual  and  peremptory,  and  drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering 
its  acceptance  impossible.  The  count  replied  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  would  leave  Belgrade  at  the  time  set  if 
Serbia  did  not  yield.  The  Dual  Monarchy  felt  that  its  very 
existence  was  at  stake.  The  step  taken  by  the  Government  was 
approved  by  the  country.  He  did  not  think  objections  would  be 
raised  by  the  powers. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  informed  Sir  Francis  Bertie,  British  Am- 
bassador at  Paris  of  a  conversation  with  M.  Cambon,  the  French 
Ambassador  at  London,  over  an  intended  interview  that  after- 
noon of  Sir  Edward  with  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German 
Ambassador. 

"I  would  say  to  the  ambassador  that,  of  course,  if  the  presentation  of  this 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  did  not  lead  to  trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia,  we 
need  not  concern  ourselves  about  it;  but,  if  Russia  took  the  view  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  which  it  seemed  to  me  that  any  power  interested  in 
Serbia  would  take,  I  should  be  quite  powerless,  in  face  of  the  terms  of  the 


504     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

ultimatum,  to  exercise  any  moderating  influence.  I  would  say  that  I  thought 
the  only  chance  of  any  mediating  or  moderating  influence  being  exercised 
was  that  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  ourselves,  who  had  not  direct  inter- 
ests in  Serbia,  should  act  together  for  the  sake  of  peace,  simultaneously  in 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 

"M.  Cambon  said  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  mediation  by  the  four 
powers,  he  had  no  doubt  that  his  Government  would  be  glad  to  join  in  it;  but 
he  pointed  out  that  we  could  not  say  anything  in  St.  Petersburg  till  Russia 
had  expressed  some  opinion  or  taken  some  action.  But,  when  two  days 
were  over,  Austria  would  march  into  Serbia,  for  the  Serbians  could  not 
possibly  accept  the  Austrian  demand.  Russia  would  be  compelled  by  her 
public  opinion  to  take  action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked  Serbia,  and  there- 
fore, once  the  Austrians  had  attacked  Serbia,  it  would  be  too  late  for  any 
mediation. 

"I  said  that  I  had  not  contemplated  anything  being  said  in  St.  Peters- 
burg until  after  it  was  clear  that  there  must  be  trouble  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  I  had  thought  that  if  Austria  did  move  into  Serbia,  and  Russia 
then  mobilized,  it  would  be  possible  for  the  four  powers  to  urge  Austria  to 
stop  her  advance,  and  Russia  also  to  stop  hers,  pending  mediation.  But  it 
would  be  essential  for  any  chance  of  success  for  such  a  step  that  Germany 
should  participate  in  it. 

"M.  Cambon  said  that  it  would  be  too  late  after  Austria  had  once  moved 
against  Serbia.  The  important  thing  was  to  gain  time  by  mediation  in 
Vienna.  The  best  chance  of  this  being  accepted  would  be  that  Germany 
should  propose  it  to  the  other  powers. 

"I  said  that  by  this  he  meant  a  mediation  between  Austria  and  Serbia. 

"He  replied  that  it  was  so." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  the  results  of  the  interview  with 
Prince  Lichnowsky  to  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British  Charge 
d'Affaires  at  Berlin.  Sir  Edward's  statements  were  those  he  had 
decided  upon  in  his  interview  with  M.  Cambon.  The  prince  re- 
plied that  Austria  might  be  expected  to  move  unless  Serbia 
accepted  her  demands  in  toto.  He  suggested  that  Serbia  ought 
in  no  case  to  give  a  negative  reply.  A  partial  acceptance  if  sent 
at  once  might  afford  an  excuse  to  Russia  against  immediate 
action.  Sir  Edward  asked  Sir  Horace  to  submit  his  views  to  the 
German  Secretary  of  State,  Herr  von  Jagow. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  advise  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, if  it  were  proved  that  any  Serbian  officials,  however  sub- 
ordinate, were  accomplices  in  the  murder  of  the  archduke,  to  give 
Austria  the  fullest  satisfaction  in  the  way  of  expressing  concern 
with  regret.  For  the  rest  they  must  reply  as  they  consider  best 


STATE    PAPERS  505 

in  Serbian  interests.    The  only  chance  for  Serbia  is  to  reply 
favorably  to  as  many  points  in  the  note  as  the  time  limit  allows. 

"Serbian  Minister  here  has  begged  that  his  majesty's  Government  will 
express  their  views,  but  I  cannot  undertake  responsibility  of  saying  more 
than  I  have  said  above,  and  I  do  not  like  to  say  even  that  without  knowing 
what  is  being  said  at  Belgrade  by  French  and  Russian  Governments.  You 
should  therefore  consult  your  French  and  Russian  colleagues  as  to  repeat- 
ing what  my  views  are,  as  expressed  above,  to  Serbian  Government. 

"I  have  urged  upon  German  Ambassador  that  Austria  should  not 
precipitate  military  action." 

France.  M.  Viviani,  French  Prime  Minister,  who  had  not  yet 
seen  the  note  to  Serbia,  wrote  from  Reval,  Russia,  to  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  to 
send  on  to  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  the  fol- 
lowing information  and  instructions: 

In  M.  Viviani's  conversation  with  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  it  was  agreed  to  prevent  Austrian  inter- 
vention in  the  internal  affairs  of  Serbia  of  a  kind  which  Serbia 
might  consider  as  an  attack  on  her  sovereignty  and  independ- 
ence. This  view  should  be  communicated  to  Count  Berchtold,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  moderation 
counseled  him,  cooperation  in  this  should  be  secured  from  the 
Russian  and  British  Ambassadors  in  Vienna.  The  British  Am- 
bassador, Sir  George  Buchanan,  had  informed  M.  Sazonof  that 
his  Government  might  join  in  a  demarche  (proceeding)  for  re- 
moving any  danger  to  general  peace,  and  telegraphed  his  Govern- 
ment to  that  effect.  M.  Sazonof  has  instructed  Count  Bencken- 
dorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  to  secure  such  coopera- 
tion. M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  should 
be  instructed  to  back  him  up.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  sent  to  M. 
Viviani,  returning  from  Russia  on  La  France,  and  to  the  French 
Ambassadors  at  London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  St.  Petersburg,  and 
Rome,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Belgrade,  the  contents  of  the 
Austrian  note  to  Serbia,  and  an  account  of  the  circumstances  of 
the  delivery  of  the  copy  to  the  French  Government  by  "Count 
Szecsen,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador.  M.  Berthelot, 
French  Political  Director,  in  obedience  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin's 
instructions,  had  confined  himself  to  stating  to  the  ambassador 


506  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

that  painful  feeling  would  be  aroused  in  French  public  opinion 
by  the  categorical  nature  of  the  note,  and  its  short  time  limit, 
and  its  presentation  to  Serbia  at  a  time  when  the  President  and 
Prime  Minister  of  France  were  at  sea,  and  could  not  exert,  in 
cooperation  with  statesmen  of  other  powers  not  directly  inter- 
ested, that  soothing  influence  on  Serbia  and  Austria  which  was 
so  desirable  in  the  interest  of  general  peace. 

In  a  letter  to  these  ambassadors  and  minister,  and  to  the 
French  Minister  at  Stockholm  (M.  Thiebaut),  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin  said  that  M.  Berthelot,  French  Political  Director,  had 
advised  M.  Vesnitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Paris,  that  Serbia 
should  play  for  delay  by  asking  that  she  be  allowed  time  to  verify 
the  evidence,  presumably  one  sided,  adduced  by  Austria  in 
support  of  her  note  to  Serbia,  and,  above  all,  that  Serbia 
should  declare  herself  ready  to  submit  to  the  arbitration  of 
Europe. 

Italy  had  not  been  consulted  by  Austria  in  regard  to  the  note, 
nor  even  informed  of  it.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  informed  these 
same  representatives  at  foreign  courts  (with  exception  of  the 
Ambassador  at  Vienna),  that  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  had  reported  that  the  chief  fear  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  military  party  was  that  Serbia  would  accede  to  the  de- 
mands of  Austria-Hungary;  and  that  M.  Yov.  Yovanovitch, 
Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna  thought  his  Government  would  give 
way  on  all  points  save  the  order  to  the  army  dictated  to  King 
Peter,  dismissal  of  officers  suspected  by  Austria,  and  interference 
by  foreign  officials  in  Serbia.  M.  Yovanovitch  hoped  that  a 
discussion  on  these  points  might  be  started  which  would  lead  to 
arbitration  by  the  powers. 

The  feeling  in  Germany  was  warlike.  The  tone  of  the  press 
there  was  intimidating,  particularly  toward  Russia.  Italy  was 
exercising  moderating  influence  at  Vienna. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  notified  the  French  representatives  at  the 
above  courts  and  at  Vienna  of  the  contents  of  the  circular  note 
of  the  German  Government  delivered  him  that  day  by  Baron  von 
Schoen,  the  German  Ambassador.  Said  the  Acting  Foreign 
Secretary : 


STATE    PAPERS  507 

"I  called  the  German  Ambassador's  attention  to  the  fact  that  while  it 
might  appear  legitimate  to  demand  the  punishment  of  all  those  who  were 
implicated  in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo,  on  the  other  hand  it  seemed  difficult  to 
require  measures  which  could  not  be  accepted,  having  regard  to  the  dignity 
and  sovereignty  of  Serbia;  the  Serbian  Government,  even  if  it  was  willing 
to  submit  to  them,  would  risk  being  carried  away  by  a  revolution. 

"I  also  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Schoen  that  his  note  only  took  into  ac- 
count two  hypotheses:  that  of  a  pure  and  simple  refusal  or  that  of  a  pro- 
vocative attitude  on  the  part  of  Serbia.  The  third  hypothesis  (which  would 
leave  the  door  open  for  an  arrangement)  should  also  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration; that  of  Serbia's  acceptance  and  of  her  agreeing  at  once  to  give 
full  satisfaction  for  the  punishment  of  the  accomplices  and  full  guaranties 
for  the  suppression  of  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda  so  far  as  they  were 
compatible  with  her  sovereignty  and  dignity. 

"I  added  that  if  within  these  limits  the  satisfaction  desired  by  Austria 
could  be  admitted,  the  means  of  obtaining  it  could  be  examined;  if  Serbia 
gave  obvious  proof  of  good  will  it  could  not  be  thought  that  Austria  would 
refuse  to  take  part  in  the  conversation. 

"Perhaps  they  should  not  make  it  too  difficult  for  third  powers,  who 
could  not  either  morally  or  sentimentally  cease  to  take  interest  in  Serbia, 
to  take  an  attitude  which  was  in  accord  with  the  wishes  of  Germany  to 
localize  the  dispute. 

"Herr  von  Schoen  recognized  the  justice  of  these  considerations  and  vague- 
ly stated  that  hope  was  always  possible.  When  I  asked  him  if  we  should 
give  to  the  Austrian  note  the  character  of  a  simple  m/ise  en  demeure,  which 
permitted  a  discussion,  or  an  ultimatum,  he  answered  that  personally  he 
had  no  views." 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  to 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  that  official  German  opinion  supported 
Austria  in  not  abating  her  demands  on  Serbia.  There  was 
pessimism  in  diplomatic  circles.  The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires, 
M.  Broniewsky,  had  bitterly  noted  the  presentation  of  the  note 
to  Serbia  during  the  absence  from  France  of  the  French  Presi- 
dent and  Prime  Minister.  He  thought  that  William  II,  in  his 
desire  to  support  the  monarchic  principle,  was  becoming  less 
inclined  to  show  a  conciliatory  attitude. 

In  a  second  letter  M.  Cambon  reported  an  interview  he  had 
just  had  with  Herr  von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State.  The 
secretary  supported  the  Austrian  note  to  Serbia.  It  was  that 
country's  domestic  affair,  and  he  hoped  that  the  dispute  would 
be  localized. 

"I  asked  him  if  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  really  been  entirely  ignorant  of 
Austria's  requirements  before  they  were  communicated  to  Belgrade,  and  as 


508      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

he  told  me  that  that  was  so,  I  showed  him  my  surprise  at  seeing  him  thus 
undertake  to  support  claims  of  whose  limit  and  scope  he  was  ignorant. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  interrupted  me,  and  said:  'It  is  only  because  we  are 
having  a  personal  conversation  that  I  allow  you  to  say  that  to  me.' 

"  'Certainly,'  I  replied,  'but  if  Peter  I  humiliates  himself,  domestic 
trouble  will  probably  break  out  in  Serbia;  that  will  open  the  door  to  fresh 
possibilities,  and  do  you  know  where  you  will  be  led  by  Vienna?'  I  added 
that  the  language  of  the  German  newspapers  was  not  the  language  of  per- 
sons who  were  indifferent  to,  and  unacquainted  with,  the  question,  but  be- 
tokened an  active  support.  Finally  I  remarked  that  the  shortness  of  the 
time  limit  given  to  Serbia  for  submission  would  make  an  unpleasant  im- 
pression in  Europe. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  answered  that  he  quite  expected  a  little  excitement 
(un  pen  d'emotion)  on  the  part  of  Serbia's  friends,  but  that  he  was  count- 
ing on  their  giving  her  wise  advice. 

"  'I  have  no  doubt,'  I  then  said  to  him,  'that  Russia  would  endeavor  to 
persuade  the  Cabinet  of  Belgrade  to  make  acceptable  concessions;  but  why 
not  ask  from  one  what  is  being  asked  from  the  other,  and  if  reliance  is 
being  placed  on  advice  being  given  at  Belgrade,  is  it  not  also  legitimate  to 
rely  on  advice  being  given  at  Vienna  from  another  quarter?' 

"The  Secretary  of  State  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  that  depended  on 
circumstances;  but  immediately  checked  himself;  he  repeated  that  the  diffi- 
culty must  be  localized.  He  asked  me  if  I  really  thought  the  situation  seri- 
ous. 'Certainly,'  I  answered,  'because  if  what  is  happening  is  the  result  of 
due  reflection,  I  do  not  understand  why  all  means  of  retreat  have  been  cut  off.' 

"All  the  evidence  shows  that  Germany  is  ready  to  support  Austria's  at- 
titude with  unusual  energy.  The  weakness  which  her  Austro-Hungarian 
ally  has  shown  for  some  years  past  has  weakened  the  confidence  that  was 
placed  in  her  here.  She  was  found  heavy  to  drag  along.  Mischievous  legal 
proceedings,  such  as  the  Agram  and  the  Friedjung  affairs,  brought  odium 
on  her  police  and  covered  them  with  ridicule.  All  that  was  asked  of  the  police 
was  that  they  should  be  strong;  the  conviction  is  that  they  were  violent. 

"An  article  which  appeared  in  the  'Lokal  Anzeiger'  this  evening  shows 
also  that  at  the  German,  Chancellery  there  exists  a  state  of  mind  to  which 
we  in  Paris  are  naturally  not  inclined  to  pay  sufficient  attention,  I  mean  the 
feeling  that  monarchies  must  stand  together.  I  am  convinced  that  great 
weight  must  be  attached  to  this  point  of  view  in  order  to  appreciate  the 
attitude  of  the  Emperor  William,  whose  impressionable  nature  must  have 
been  affected  by  the  assassination  of  a  prince  whose  guest  he  had  been  a 
few  days  previously. 

"It  is  not  less  striking  to  notice  the  pains  with  which  Herr  von  Jagow, 
and  all  the  officials  placed  under  his  orders,  pretend  to  everyone  that  they 
were  ignorant  of  the  scope  of  the  note  sent  by  Austria  to  Serbia." 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  reported 
to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  as  follows : 

"The  intentions  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  his  ministers  could  not  be 
more  pacific,  a  fact  of  which  the  President  of  the  [French]  Republic  and. 


STATE    PAPERS  509 

the  president  of  the  council  have  been  able  to  satisfy  themselves  directly; 
but  the  ultimatum  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  just  de- 
livered to  the  Cabinet  at  Belgrade  introduces  a  new  and  disquieting  element 
into  the  situation. 

"Public  opinion  in  Russia  would  not  allow  Austria  to  offer  violence  to 
Serbia.  The  shortness  of  the  time  limit  fixed  by  the  ultimatum  renders 
still  more  difficult  the  moderating  influence  that  the  powers  of  the  Triple 
Entente  might  exercise  at  Vienna. 

"On  the  other  hand,  M.  Sazonof  [Russian  Prime  Minister]  assumes  that 
Germany  will  desire  to  support  her  ally  and  I  am  afraid  that  this  impres- 
sion is  correct.  Nothing  but  the  assurance  of  the  solidarity  of  the  Triple 
Entente  can  prevent  the  German  powers  from  emphasizing  their  provoc- 
ative attitude." 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  reported  to 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin  an  interview  with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Cambon  and  Grey  were  agreed 
that  everything  must  be  done  to  avert  the  crisis,  and  that  the 
British  Cabinet  should  take  the  initiative  in  offering  mediation 
by  the  four  powers  not  directly  interested,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia  and  Germany.  If  Germany  assented,  time  would  be 
gained,  and  this  was  the  essential  point. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  told  me  that  he  would  discuss  with  Prince  Lichnowsky 
the  proposal.  I  mentioned  the  matter  to  my  Russian  colleague  [Count 
Benckendorff]  who  is  afraid  of  a  surprise  from  Germany,  and  who  imagines 
that  Austria  would  not  have  dispatched  her  ultimatum  without  previous 
agreement  with  Berlin. 

"Count  Benckendorff  told  me  that  Prince  Lichnowsky,  when  he  returned 
from  leave  about  a  month  ago,  had  intimated  that  he  held  pessimistic  views 
regarding  the  relations  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin.  He  had  ob- 
served the  uneasiness  caused  in  this  latter  capital  by  the  rumors  of  a  naval 
entente  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  by  the  czar's  visit  to  Bucharest, 
and  by  the  strengthening  of  the  Russian  army.  Count  Benckendorff  had 
concluded  from  this  that  a  war  with  Russia  would  be  looked  upon  without 
disfavor  in  Germany. 

"The  Under-Secretary  of  State  [Sir  Arthur  Nicholson]  has  been  struck, 
as  all  of  us  have  been,  by  the  anxious  looks  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  since  his 
return  from  Berlin,  and  he  considers  that  if  Germany  had  wished  to  do  so 
she  could  have  stopped  the  dispatch  of  the  ultimatum. 

"The  situation,  therefore,  is  as  grave  as  it  can  be,  and  we  see  no  way  of 
arresting  the  course  of  events. 

"However,  Count  Benckendorff  thinks  it  right  to  attempt  the  demarche 
upon  which  I  have  agreed  with  Sir  Edward  Grey." 

In  a  second  letter  M.  Cambon  reported  receipt  of  the  details 
of  the  Austrian  ultimatum. 


510  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

"In  consultation  with  my  Russian  colleague,  who  thinks  it  extremely 
difficult  for  his  Government  not  to  support  Serbia,  we  have  been  asking 
ourselves  what  intervention  could  avert  the  conflict. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  having  summoned  me  for  this  afternoon,  I  propose  to 
suggest  that  he  should  ask  for  the  semiofficial  intervention  of  the  German 
Government  at  Vienna  to  prevent  a  sudden  attack." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  informed  the  French  Ambassadors  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna  and  Rome,  and  the  Ministers  at 
Stockholm  and  Belgrade  of  M.  Cambon's  report,  and  his  (Bien- 
venu-Martin's)  willingness  to  cooperate  in  the  proposed  con- 
ciliatory action  at  Vienna. 

Belgium.  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
notified  the  Belgian  Ministers  at  Paris,  London,  Berlin,  Vienna, 
and  St.  Petersburg 

"that  the  Government  had  under  consideration  an  address  to  the  powers  who 
guarantee  Belgian  independence  and  neutrality  assuring  them  of  Belgium's 
determination  to  fulfill  the  international  obligations  imposed  upon  her  by 
treaty  in  the  event  of  a  war  breaking  out  on  her  frontiers. 

"The  Government  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  such  a  communica- 
tion would  be  premature  at  present,  but  that  events  might  move  rapidly  and 
not  leave  sufficient  time  to  forward  suitable  instructions  at  the  desired 
moment  to  the  Belgian  representatives  abroad. 

"In  these  circumstances  I  have  proposed  to  the  King  [Albert]  and  to  my 
colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  who  have  concurred,  to  give  you  now  exact  in- 
structions as  to  the  steps  to  be  taken  by  you  if  the  prospect  of  a  Franco- 
German  war  became  more  threatening. 

"I  inclose  herewith  a  note,  signed  but  not  dated,  which  you  should  read 
to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  which  you  should  give  him  a 
copy,  if  circumstances  render  such  a  communication  necessary. 

"I  shall  inform  you  by  telegram  when  you  are  to  act  on  these  instructions. 

"This  telegram  will  be  dispatched  when  the  order  is  given  for  the  mobili- 
zation of  the  Belgian  army  if,  contrary  to  our  earnest  hope  and  to  the  ap- 
parent prospect  of  a  peaceful  settlement,  our  information  leads  us  to  take 
this  extreme  measure  of  precaution." 

The  note  inclosed  said  that  Beligum  had  "most  scrupulously" 
observed  the  obligations  of  neutrality  imposed  on  her  by  the 
treaties  of  April  19,  1839,  and  would  "strive  unflinchingly"  to 
fulfill  them  whatever  the  new  circumstances  might  be. 

"The  friendly  feelings  of  the  powers  toward  her  have  been  so  often 
reaffirmed  that  Belgium  confidently  expects  that  her  territory  will  remain 
free  from  any  attack,  should  hostilities  break  out  upon  her  frontiers. 

"All  necessary  steps  to  insure  respect  of  Belgian  neutrality  have  never- 
theless been  taken  by  the  Government.  The  Belgian  army  has  been  mobi- 


STATE    PAPERS  511 

lized  and  is  taking  up  such  strategic  positions  as  have  been  chosen  to  secure 
the  defense  of  the  country  and  the  respect  of  its  neutrality.  The  forts  of 
Antwerp  and  on  the  Meuse  have  been  put  in  a  state  of  defense.  .  .  . 

"These  measures  are  intended  solely  to  enable  Belgium  to  fulfill  her  in- 
ternational obligations;  and  it  is  obvious  that  they  neither  have  been  nor 
can  have  been  undertaken  with  any  intention  of  taking  part  in  an  armed 
struggle  between  the  powers  or  from  any  feeling  of  distrust  of  any  of 
those  powers." 

On  the  following  day  this  notification  was  also  sent  to  the 
Belgian  Ministers  at  Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg. 


SATURDAY,      JULY     25,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed  from  Lembach  to  his 
Under-Secretary,  Baron  von  Macchio,  that  Russia  through  Prince 
Koudacheff,  its  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna,  was  pressing  for 
an  extension  of  the  time  limit  in  the  note  to  Serbia,  and  that 
he  should  tell  the  prince  this  would  not  be  granted,  but  that, 
even  after  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations,  Serbia  could 
have  peace  by  complying  unconditionally  with  Austria-Hungary's 
demands — in  which  case,  however,  she  must  pay  the  cost  of 
Austro-Hungarian  military  measures. 

Later,  Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Szapary,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  Prince  Kouda- 
cheff had  based  his  request  on  the  powers  being  taken  by  surprise 
in  the  demands  on  Serbia,  and  therefore  that  Russia  should 
have  time  to  consider  the  evidence  in  the  case  as  presented  in 
Austria-Hungary's  dossier.  These  grounds,  said  Count  Berch- 
told, rested  on  a  mistaken  hypothesis. 

"Our  note  to  the  powers  was  in  no  way  intended  to  invite  them  to  make 
known  their  own  views  on  the  subject,  but  merely  bore  the  character  of  a 
statement  for  information,  the  communication  of  which  we  regarded  as  a 
duty  laid  on  us  by  international  courtesy.  .  .  .  We  regarded  our  action  as 
concerning  us  and  Serbia  alone." 

Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at 
Belgrade,  telegraphed  Count  Berchtold  that  the  Serbian  Cabinet 
on  the  evening  of  the  24th  and  morning  of  the  25th  had  been 
preparing  its  reply  to  the  note,  and  would  deliver  it  before  the 


512  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

time  limit  expired;  preparations  were  being  made  by  the  Ser- 
bian Government  and  army  for  removal  into  the  interior; 
foreign  legations  expected  to  have  to  follow;  the  Russian  Lega- 
tion was  already  packing  up;  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation 
were  ready  to  leave  Belgrade  by  the  6.30  p.  m.  train. 

Count  Berchtold  notified  Count  Szapary  at  St.  Petersburg, 
on  the  same  day,  that,  in  case  of  Russia  reconsidering  her 
position,  and  refusing  to  be  swept  away  by  the  bellicose 
elements,  he,  with  the  support  of  his  German  colleague,  Count 
Pourtales,  a  close  understanding  with  whom  was  presumed, 
should  impress  upon  M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  Austria-Hungary,  in  event  of  war  with  Russia, 
would  not  stand  alone. 

"That  we  had  striven  up  till  now,  so  far  as  in  us  lay,  to  preserve  the 
peace  which  we  considered  to  be  the  most  precious  possession  of  nations,  was 
shown  by  the  course  of  events  during  the  last  forty  years,  and  by  the  his- 
torical fact  that  our  gracious  emperor  has  won  for  himself  the  glorious  title 
of  'Protector  of  the  Peace.' 

"We  should,  therefore,  most  sincerely  deplore  the  disturbance  of  the 
European  peace,  because  we  also  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  strengthening 
of  the  Balkan  States  in  a  position  of  political  and  national  independence 
would  prove  to  the  advantage  of  our  relations  with  Russia,  and  would  also 
remove  all  possibility  of  antagonism  between  us  and  Russia;  also  because 
we  have  always  been  ready,  in  the  shaping  of  our  own  policy,  to  take  into 
consideration  the  dominant  political  interests  of  Russia. 

"Any  further  toleration  of  Serbian  intrigues  would  undermine  our  ex- 
istence as  a  state  and  our  position  as  a  great  power,  thus  also  threatening 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  We  are,  however,  convinced  that  it  is  to 
Russia's  own  interests,  as  her  peaceful  leaders  will  clearly  see,  that  the 
existing  European  balance  of  power  which  is  of  such  importance  for  the 
peace  of  the  world,  should  be  maintained.  Our  action  against  Serbia,  what- 
ever form  it  takes,  is  conservative  from  first  to  last,  and  its  object  is  the 
necessary  preservation  of  our  position  in  Europe." 

In  a  supplementary  telegram  Count  Berchtold  instructed 
Count  Szapary  to  explain  that  point  five  in  the  note  to  Serbia 
was  interpolated  merely  out  of  practical  considerations,  and  not 
to  infringe  on  the  sovereignty  of  Serbia. 

"By  'collaboration'  in  point  five,  we  are  thinking  of  the  establishment  of  a 
private  'Bureau  de  Surete'  at  Belgrade,  which  would  operate  in  the  same 
way  as  the  analogous  Russian  establishments  in  Paris  and  in  cooperation 
with  the  Serbian  police  and  administration." 

Other  ambassadors  were  similarly  instructed. 


STATE    PAPERS  513 

Russia.  M.  Broniewsky,  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin, 
telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof  reporting  that  he  and  the  British 
Ambassador,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  had  urged  the  German 
Secretary  of  State,  Herr  von  Jagow,  to  advise  Vienna  to  extend 
the  time  limit  in  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia.  Von  Jagow  had 
telegraphed  the  request  to  Vienna,  but,  owing  to  the  absence  of 
Count  Berchtold  from  the  capital,  feared  that  it  would  have  no 
result. 

"Moreover,  he  has  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  Austria  yielding  at  the 
last  moment,  and  he  is  inclined  to  think  that  such  a  step  on  her  part  might 
increase  the  assurance  of  Serbia.  I  replied  that  a  great  power  such  as 
Austria  could  give  way  without  impairing  her  prestige,  and  I  adduced 
every  other  similar  argument,  but  failed,  nevertheless,  to  obtain  any  more 
definite  promise.  Even  when  I  gave  him  to  understand  that  action  must 
be  taken  at  Vienna  if  the  possibility  of  terrible  consequences  was  to  be 
avoided,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  answered  each  time  in  the 
negative." 

M.  Sevastipoulo,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris,  tele- 
graphed M.  Sazonof  that,  at  his  instance,  the  French  representa- 
tive at  Vienna  had  been  instructed  to  request  extension  of  the 
time  limit  in  the  note  to  Serbia. 

Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  tele- 
graphed that  the  British  representative  at  Vienna  had  been 
instructed  to  do  the  same,  and  also  to  discuss  the  prevention  of 
hostilities  should  the  request  be  refused. 

M.  Sazonof  replied  by  telegraph  that  in  event  of  hostilities, 
Russia  counted  on  Great  Britain  siding  at  once  and  definitely 
with  France  and  Russia  in  order  to  maintain  the  European 
balance  of  power  for  which  Great  Britain  had  constantly  inter- 
vened in  the  past  and  which  would  certainly  be  compromised 
by  the  triumph  of  Austria. 

Count  Pourtales,  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
handed  a  note  verbale  to  M.  Sazonof,  denying  the  press  report 
that  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  was  instigated  by  the  Ger- 
man Government,  and  declaring  that  this  government  "had  no 
knowledge  of  the  text"  of  the  note  to  Serbia  before  it  was 
presented,  and  had  "exercised  no  influence  upon  its  contents.'* 

"Germany,  as  the  ally  of  Austria,  naturally  supports  the  claims  made 
by  the  Vienna  Cabinet  against  Serbia,  which  she  considers  justified. 


514     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"Above  all  Germany  wishes,  as  she  has  already  declared  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  Austro-Serbian  dispute,  that  this  conflict  should  be 
localized." 

The  same  statement  was  made  to  the  French  Government  by 
Baron  von  Schoen,  the  German  Ambassador,  and  to  the  British 
Government  by  Count  Benckendorff,  the  Russian  Ambassador. 
The  count  asked  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  the  British  Government  bring  conciliatory  pressure 
on  Austria. 

"Grey  replied  that  this  was  quite  impossible.  He  added  that,  as  long  as 
complications  existed  between  Austria  and  Serbia  alone,  British  interests 
were  only  indirectly  affected;  but  he  had  to  look  ahead  to  the  fact  that 
Austrian  mobilization  would  lead  to  Russian  mobilization,  and  that  from 
that  moment  a  situation  would  exist  in  which  the  interests  of  all  the  powers 
would  be  involved.  In  that  event  Great  Britain  reserved  to  herself  full 
liberty  of  action." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Francis  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at 
Paris,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
French  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  hoped  that  Ser- 
bia's reply  to  Austra-Hungary's  demands  would  be  sufficiently 
conciliatory  to  obviate  extreme  measures,  but  said  that  there 
would  be  revolution  in  Serbia  if  she  were  to  accept  the  demands 
in  their  entirety. 

Sir  George  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  M.  Sazonof,  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  said  that  the  explanations  of  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  Count  Szapary,  did  not  quite  correspond 
with  information  received  from  German  quarters,  which  infor- 
mation came  too  late  to  affect  negotiations  at  Vienna. 

"The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Serbia  was  quite  ready  to  do 
as  you  had  suggested  and  to  punish  those  proved  to  be  guilty,  but  that  no 
independent  State  could  be  expected  to  accept  the  political  demands  which 
had  been  put  forward.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thought,  from  a 
conversation  which  he  had  with  the  Serbian  Minister  [Dr.  Spalaikovitch] 
yesterday,  that,  in  the  event  of  the  Austrians  attacking  Serbia,  the  Serbian 
Government  would  abandon  Belgrade,  and  withdraw  their  forces  into  the 
interior,  while  they  would  at  the  same  time  appeal  to  the  powers  to  help 
them.  His  excellency  was  in  favor  of  their  making  this  appeal.  He  would 
like  to  see  the  question  placed  on  an  international  footing,  as  the  obligations 
taken  by  Serbia  in  1908,  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  Austrian  ultima- 
tum, were  given  not  to  Austria,  but  to  the  powers. 


STATE    PAPERS  515 

"If  Serbia  should  appeal  to  the  powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready  to 
stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy.  It  was  possible,  in  his  opinion,  that  Serbia  might  propose 
to  submit  the  question  to  arbitration. 

"On  my  expressing  the  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate 
war  by  mobilizing  until  you  had  had  time  to  use  your  influence  in  favor  of 
peace,  his  excellency  assured  me  that  Russia  had  no  aggressive  intentions, 
and  she  would  take  no  action  until  it  was  forced  upon  her.  Austria's  action 
was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia.  She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the 
present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  and  establishing  her  own  hegemony 
there.  He  did  not  believe  that  Germany  really  wanted  war,  but  her  atti- 
tude was  decided  by  ours.  If  we  took  our  stand  firmly  with  France  and 
Russia  there  would  be  no  war.  If  we  failed  them  now,  rivers  of  blood  would 
flow,  and  we  would  in  the  end  be  dragged  into  war. 

"I  said  that  England  could  play  the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and 
Vienna  to  better  purpose  as  friend  who,  if  her  counsels  of  moderation  were 
disregarded,  might  one  day  be  converted  into  an  ally,  than  if  she  were  to 
declare  herself  Russia's  ally  at  once.  His  excellency  said  that  unfortunately 
Germany  was  convinced  that  she  could  count  upon  our  neutrality. 

"I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilized,  Germany  would  not  be 
content  with  mere  mobilization,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but 
would  probably  declare  war  at  once.  His  excellency  replied  that  Russia 
could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush  Serbia  and  become  the  predominant  power 
in  the  Balkans,  and,  if  she  feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she  will 
face  all  the  risks  of  war." 

Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  tele- 
graphed to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  Herr  von  Jagow,  German 
Secretary  of  State,  had  instructed  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  Herr  von  Tschirscky,  to  present  to  Count  Berchtold, 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Grey's  sug- 
gestion of  an  extension  of  the  time  limit  for  Serbia's  reply,  but 
that,  owing  to  Berchtold's  absence  from  the  capital,  the  exteiv 
sion  would  probably  not  be  granted.  Von  Jagow  did  not  know 
what  Austria-Hungary  had  ready  on  the  -spot,  but  admitted 
that  they  meant  to  take  military  action.  He  also  admitted 
that  Serbia  "could  not  swallow"  certain  of  Austria-Hungary's 
demands. 

"I  asked  whether  it  was  not  to  be  feared  that,  in  taking  military  action 
against  Serbia,  Austria  would  dangerously  excite  public  opinion  in  Russia. 
He  said  he  thought  not.  He  remained  of  opinion  that  crisis  could  be  local- 
ized. I  said  that  telegrams  from  Russia  in  this  morning's  papers  did  not 
look  very  reassuring,  but  he  maintained  his  optimistic  view  with  regard  to 
Russia.  He  said  that  he  had  given  the  Russian  Government  to  understand 


516  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

that  the  last  thing  Germany  wanted  was  a  general  war,  and  he  would  do  all 
in  his  power  to  prevent  such  a  calamity.  If  the  relations  between  Austria  and 
Russia  became  threatening,  he  was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  your  sug- 
gestion as  to  the  four  powers  working  in  favor  of  moderation  at  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg. 

"Secretary  of  State  confessed  privately  that  he  thought  the  note  left 
much  to  be  desired  as  a  diplomatic  document.  He  repeated  very  earnestly 
that,  though  he  had  been  accused  of  knowing  all  about  the  contents  of  that 
note,  he  had  in  fact  had  no  such  knowledge." 

Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  Italian  Secretary  General  was  of 
opinion  that  Austria  will  only  be  restrained  by  Serbia's  uncon- 
ditional surrender,  and  that  there  was  reliable  information  she 
intended  to  seize  the  Saloniki  Railway. 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  tele- 
graphed Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  language  of  the  Vienna  press 
left  the  impression  that  the  surrender  of  Serbia  was  neither 
expected  nor  desired,  and  that  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
Berchtold  would  go  to  Ischl  to  communicate  Serbia's  reply  as 
soon  as  it  was  presented. 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade, 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  forecast  of  the  Serbian  reply, 
and  said  that  the  Serbian  Government  considered  it  would  be 
fully  satisfactory  unless  Austria-Hungary  was  determined  on 
war  at  any  cost.  In  a  supplementary  telegram  he  said  that  in 
view  of  his  French  and  Russian  colleagues  not  having  received 
instructions  from  their  governments  and  of  the  proposed  con- 
ciliatory terms  of  the  Serbian  reply,  he  had  not  offered  advice 
to  the  Serbian  Government.  It  was  highly  probable  the  Russian 
Government  had  urged  the  utmost  moderation  on  Serbia. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  Sir  George  Buchanan,  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  he  could  not  promise  to 
Russia  more  than  he  had  done. 

"I  do  not  consider  that  public  opinion  here  would  or  ought  to  sanction 
our  going  to  war  over  a  Serbian  quarrel.  If,  however,  war  does  take  place, 
the  development  of  other  issues  may  draw  us  into  it,  and  I  am  therefore 
anxious  to  prevent  it. 

"The  sudden,  brusque,  and  peremptory  character  of  the  Austrian  de- 
marche makes  it  almost  inevitable  that  in  a  very  short  time  both  Russia 
and  Austria  will  have  mobilized  against  each  other.  In  this  event,  the  only 


MONUMENTS    TO    VICTORY 

AND 

NATIONAL    HEROES 

PETROGRAD  •  BELGIUM  •  PARIS  •  BERLIN  •  COVETED  PORTS 
MEN    WHO    REPRESENT    AMERICA    IN    UNQUIET   CAPITALS 


* 


The  Arc  de  Triomphe  de  I'Ktoile,   Paris,  whose  magnificent  reliefs  commemorate  the 
victories   of  Napoleon  I.    The   finest  streets  of  the  city  radiate  from  this  monument 


Hat-on   Gerard,  the  American  Ambassador  to  Berlin,  who  handled  difficult  diplomat'c 
situation-    to   the   satisfaction   of  his   countrymen    and    Germany  and  earned  the  gratitude  of 
the  Allies  by  his  work  in  behalf  of  their  countrymen  in  Germany 


Brand  Whitlock,  American  Minister  to  Belgium,  who  chose  to  remain  at  Brussels  when  the 

Belgian  Government  was  removed   to  France.     His  tact  has  made  it  possible  for  him   to  aid 

the  Belgian  people  greatly  while  working  harmoniously  with  German  officials 


; i 

i 
I 


Ii 


i  ! 

Z  2 


If 


I 

I 


Copyright,  Underwood  &  Underwood 


The  monument  to  Peter  the  Great  in  Petrograd.    This  ruler,  the  creator  of  modern  Russia, 
won  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  planned  that  Russia  should  include  Constantinople 


PI  ! 


hi 

•Or 


In 


-  -     : 
-OH   i 


j|   ] 


If  I 


13 


K  i 

•C    O  : 

1  a  i 

"      - 


81 


-    —       : 
I"      I 


STATE    PAPERS  517 

chance  of  peace,  in  my  opinion,  is  for  the  other  four  powers  to  join  in  asking 
the  Austrian  and  Russian  Governments  not  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to 
give  time  for  the  four  powers  acting  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  to  try 
and  arrange  matters.  If  Germany  will  adopt  this  view,  I  feel  strongly 
that  France  and  ourselves  should  act  upon  it.  Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly 
cooperate. 

"No  diplomatic  intervention  or  mediation  would  be  tolerated  by  either 
Russia  or  Austria  unless  it  was  clearly  impartial  and  included  the  allies 
or  friends  of  both.  The  cooperation  of  Germany  would,  therefore,  be  es- 
sential." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British 
Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  the  same  effect,  and  also  that 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  at  London,  was  per- 
sonally favorable  to  the  suggestion  of  mediation  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  which  he  thought  Austria  might  be  able  with  dignity 
to  accept. 

"I  impressed  upon  the  ambassador  that,  in  the  event  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  mobilization,  the  participation  of  Germany  would  be  essential  to 
any  diplomatic  action  for  peace.  Alone  we  could  do  nothing.  The  French 
Government  were  traveling  at  the  moment,  and  I  had  had  no  time  to  con- 
sult them,  and  could  not  therefore  be  sure  of  their  views,  but  I  was  pre- 
pared, if  the  German  Government  agreed  with  my  suggestion,  to  tell  the 
French  Government  that  I  thought  it  the  right  thing  to  act  upon  it." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen, 
British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  the  text  of  the  Russian  telegram 
sent  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  asking  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  for  extension  of  the  time  limit  for  the 
Serbian  reply,  and  protesting  that  a  refusal  would  be  "against 
international  ethics."  Grey  asked  Bunsen  to  support  the  Rus- 
sian position. 

"I  trust  that  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  consider  it  too  late 
to  prolong  the  time  limit,  they  will  at  any  rate  give  time  in  the  sense  and 
for  the  reasons  desired  by  Russia  before  taking  any  irretrievable  steps." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade,  an  account  of  an  interview  of 
M.  Boschkovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  London,  with  Sir  Arthur 
Nicholson,  British  Under-Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

"He  mentioned  that  both  the  assassins  of  the  archduke  were  Austrian 
subjects — Bosniaks;  that  one  of  them  had  been  in  Serbia,  and  that  the 
Serbian  authorities,  considering  him  suspect  and  dangerous,  had  desired 
to  expel  him,  but  on  applying  to  the  Austrian  authorities  found  that  the 

M— Gt.  War  2 


518  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

latter  protected  him,  and  said  that  he  was  an  innocent  and  harmless  in- 
dividual." 

France. — M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
reported  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Paris,  an  interview  with  Baron  Beyens,  Belgian 
Minister  at  Berlin. 

"The  Belgian  Minister  appears  very  anxious.  .  .  .  He  is  of  opinion  that 
Austria  and  Germany  have  desired  to  take  advantage  of  the  fact  that, 
owing  to  a  combination  of  circumstances  at  the  present  moment,  Russia  and 
England  appear  to  them  to  be  threatened  by  domestic  troubles,  while  in 
France  the  state  of  the  army  is  under  discussion.  Moreover,  he  does  not  be- 
lieve in  the  pretended  ignorance  of  the  Government  of  Berlin  on  the  sub- 
ject of  Austria's  demarche. 

"He  thinks  that,  if  the  form  of  it  has  not  been  submitted  to  the  Cabinet 
at  Berlin,  the  moment  of  its  dispatch  has  been  cleverly  chosen  in  consulta- 
tion with  that  Cabinet,  in  order  to  surprise  the  Triple  Entente  at  a  moment 
of  disorganization. 

"He  has  seen  the  Italian  Ambassador,  who  has  just  interrupted  his 
holiday  in  order  to  return.  It  looks  as  if  Italy  would  be  surprised,  to 
put  it  no  higher,  at  having  been  kept  out  of  the  whole  affair  by  her  two 
Allies." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  notified  the  French  Legations  at  London, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Stockholm  of  a  visit  made 
him  by  Baron  von  Schoen,  the  German  Ambassador,  to  protest 
against  an  article  in  the  Echo  de  Paris  calling  his  demarche  of 
yesterday  a  "German  threat."  M.  Berthelot,  French  Political 
Director,  assured  him  that  no  private  information  had  been 
given  out  by  the  Foreign  office  of  the  demarche,  and  that  the 
article  merely  showed  that  Ihe  proceeding  was  known  elsewhere 
than  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  The  German  Ambassador  did  not 
take  up  the  allusion. 

M.  PalSologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  re- 
ported to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  that  M.  Sazonof,  Russian 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  been  unfavorably  impressed 
by  the  evasive  replies  and  recriminations  of  Count  de  Pourtales, 
the  German  Ambassador,  over  the  note  to  Serbia. 

"The  ministers  will  hold  a  council  to-morrow  with  the  czar  presiding. 
M.  Sazonof  preserves  complete  moderation.  'We  must  avoid,'  he  said  to  me, 
'everything  which  might  precipitate  the  crisis.  I  am  of  opinion  that,  even 
if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  come  to  blows  with  Serbia,  we  ought 
not  to  break  off  negotiations.'  " 


STATE    PAPERS  519 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  to 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin  the  interview  with  Herr  von  Jagow,  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State,  by  Sir  Horace  Rumbold. 

"The  British  Charge  d'Affaires  inquired  of  Herr  von  Jagow,  as  I  had 
done  yesterday,  if  Germany  had  had  no  knowledge  of  the  Austrian  note 
before  it  was  dispatched,  and  he  received  so  clear  a  reply  in  the  negative 
that  he  was  not  able  to  carry  the  matter  further;  but  he  could  not  refrain 
from  expressing  his  surprise  at  the  blank  cheque  given  by  Germany  to 
Austria. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  having  replied  to  him  that  the  matter  was  a  domestic 
one  for  Austria,  he  remarked  that  it  had  become  essentially  an  inter- 
national one." 

Later  in  the  day  M.  Cambon  reported  the  interview  between 
Herr  von  Jagow  and  M.  Broniewski,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires 
at  Berlin. 

"M.  Broniewski,  like  myself,  has  heard  the  rumor  that  Austria,  while 
declaring  that  she  did  not  desire  an  annexation  of  territory,  would  occupy 
parts  of  Serbia  until  she  had  received  complete  satisfaction.  'One  knows,' 
he  said  to  me,  'what  this  word  "satisfaction"  means.'  M.  Broniewski's  im- 
pressions of  Germany's  ultimate  intentions  are  very  pessimistic." 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  reported  to  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  Prince  Koudacheff,  Russian  Charge 
d'Affaires,  had  sent  his  Government's  request  of  an  extension  of 
the  time  limit  for  the  Serbian  reply  to  Count  Berchtold,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  two  tele- 
grams, one  addressed  to  him  on  his  journey,  and  the  other  to 
Ischl,  his  destination.  The  prince  does  not  expect  any  result. 
Baron  Macchio,  General  Secretary  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign  Office,  had  received  "with  icy  coldness"  the  prince's 
expostulation  that  the  submission  by  Austria-Hungary  of  griev- 
ances against  Serbia  without  permitting  time  for  their  examina- 
tion was  not  consonant  with  international  courtesy.  The  baron 
replied  that  one's  interests  sometimes  exempted  one  from 
being  courteous. 

"The  Austrian  Government  is  determined  to  inflict  humiliation  on  Serbia : 
it  will  accept  no  intervention  from  any  power  until  the  blow  has  been  de- 
livered and  received  full  in  the  face  by  Serbia." 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  reported  to  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  the  request  by  the  Russian  Government 


520  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

for  Italy's  cooperation  in  securing  from  Austria-Hungary  an 
extension  of  the  time  limit  for  the  Serbian  reply,  came  too  late 
for  action  thereon,  owing  to  the  absence  from  Rome  of  the  Prime 
Minister,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  notified  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  report  had  come  from  Vienna  of  rupture 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia. 

"Large  crowds  consisting  of  several  hundred  persons  are  collecting  here 
before  the  newspaper  offices  and  a  demonstration  of  numbers  of  young 
people  has  just  passed  through  the  Pariser-platz  shouting  cries  of  'Hurrah' 
for  Germany,  and  singing  patriotic  songs.  The  demonstrators  are  visiting 
the  Siegessaiil  [column  of  victory],  the  Austrian  and  then  the  Italian 
Embassy.  It  is  a  significant  outburst  of  chauvinism.  .  .  . 

"In  financial  circles  measures  are  already  being  taken  to  meet  every 
eventuality,  for  no  means  of  averting  the  crisis  is  seen,  in  view  of  the  de- 
termined support  which  Germany  is  giving  to  Austria. 

"I,  for  my  part,  see  in  Great  Britain  the  only  power  which  might  be 
listened  to  at  Berlin. 

"Whatever  happens,  Paris,  St.  Petersburg,  and  London  will  not  succeed 
in  maintaining  peace  with  dignity  unless  they  show  a  firm  and  absolutely 
united  front." 

At  the  hour  of  expiration  of  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  M. 
Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  reported  to  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  Prince  Koudacheff,  the  Russian  Charge 
d'Affaires,  had  presented  alone  his  request  for  an  extension  of  the 
time  limit,  it  seeming  to  the  representatives  of  the  other  powers 
useless  to  support  him  when  there  was  no  time  to  do  so. 

"At  the  last  moment  we  are  assured  that  the  Austrian  Minister  has  just 
left  Belgrade  hurriedly;  he  must  have  thought  the  Serbian  Government's 
acceptance  of  the  conditions  imposed  by  his  Government  inadequate." 


SERBIA'S      REPLY      TO      THE      AUSTRO- 
HUNGARIAN      NOTE 

A  few  minutes  before  6  p.  m.,  July  25,  1914,  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment made  its  reply  to  the  Austrian  note. 

This  declared  that  no  attempts  had  been  made,  or  declarations 
uttered,  by  responsible  representatives  of  Serbia,  tending  to  sub- 
vert Austro-Hungarian  rule  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  since 
March  31,  1909,  when  protests  against  the  annexation  of  these 


STATE    PAPERS  521 

countries  made  in  the  Skupshtina  (Serbian  Parliament)  were 
cut  short  by  declarations  of  the  Serbian  Government.  It  drew 
attention  to  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  had  since  then  made 
no  complaint  in  this  connection  save  in  regard  to  a  school  book, 
concerning  which  it  had  received  an  entirely  satisfactory  ex- 
planation. 

"Serbia  has  several  times  given  proofs  of  her  pacific  and  moderate  policy 
during  the  Balkan  crisis,  and  it  is  thanks  to  Serbia  and  to  the  sacrifice  that 
she  has  made  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  European  peace  that  that  peace 
has  been  preserved.  The  Royal  Government  cannot  be  held  responsible  for 
manifestations  of  a  private  character,  such  as  articles  in  the  press  and  the 
peaceable  work  of  societies — manifestations  which  take  place  in  nearly  all 
countries  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  and  which,  as  a  general  rule, 
escape  official  control.  The  Royal  Government  are  all  the  less  responsible, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  the  solution  of  a  series  of  questions 
which  arose  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  they  gave  proof  of  a 
great  readiness  to  oblige,  and  thus  succeeded  in  settling  the  majority  of 
these  questions  to  the  advantage  of  the  two  neighboring  countries. 

"For  these  reasons  the  Royal  Government  have  been  pained  and  sur- 
prised at  the  statements,  according  to  which  members  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Serbia  are  supposed  to  have  participated  in  the  preparations  for  the  crime 
committed  at  Sarajevo;  the  Royal  Government  expected  to  be  invited  to 
collaborate  in  an  investigation  of  all  that  concerns  this  crime,  and  they 
were  ready,  in  order  to  prove  the  entire  correctness  of  their  attitude,  to 
take  measures  against  any  persons  concerning  whom  representations  were 
made  to  them.  Falling  in,  therefore,  with  the  desire  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government,  they  are  prepared  to  hand  over  for  trial  any  Serbian 
subject,  without  regard  to  his  situation  or  rank,  of  whose  complicity  in  the 
crime  of  Sarajevo  proofs  are  forthcoming,  and  more  especially  they  under- 
take to  cause  to  be  published  on  the  first  page  of  the  'Journal  officiel,'  on 
the  date  of  July  26,  the  following  declaration": 

[Here  follows  the  declaration  required  by  Austria-Hungary, 
with  alterations  intended  to  lessen  the  humiliation,  which  changes 
will  be  noted  in  a  following  criticism  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign  Office.] 

"This  declaration  will  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Royal  army 
in  an  order  of  the  day,  in  the  name  of  his  majesty  the  king,  by  his  Royal 
Highness  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  and  will  be  published  in  the  next 
official  army  bulletin. 

"The  Royal  Government  further  undertake: 

"1.  To  introduce  at  the  first  regular  convocation  of  the  Skupshtina  a 
provision  into  the  press  law  providing  for  the  most  severe  punishment  of 
incitement  to  hatred  or  contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
and  for  taking  action  against  any  publication  the  general  tendency  of 


522     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

which  is  directed  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Government  engage  at  the  approaching  revision  of  the  Constitution 
to  cause  an  amendment  to  be  introduced  into  Article  XXII  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  such  a  nature  that  such  publication  may  be  confiscated,  a  pro- 
ceeding at  present  impossible  under  the  categorical  terms  of  Article  XXII 
of  the  Constitution. 

"2.  The  Government  possess  no  proof,  nor  does  the  note  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  with  any,  that  the  'Narodna  Odbrana' 
and  other  similar  societies  have  committed  up  to  the  present  any  criminal 
act  of  this  nature  through  the  proceedings  of  any  of  their  members. 
Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Government  will  accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  and  will  dissolve  the  'Narodna  Odbrana"  Society 
and  every  other  society  which  may  be  directing  its  efforts  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

"3.  The  Royal  Serbian  Government  undertake  to  remove  without  delay 
from  their  public  educational  establishments  in  Serbia  all  that  serves  or 
could  serve  to  foment  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary,  whenever  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  with  facts  and  proofs  of 
this  propaganda. 

"4.  The  Royal  Government  also  agree  to  remove  from  military  service 
all  such  persons  as  the  judicial  inquiry  may  have  proved  to  be  guilty  of  acts 
directed  against  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  they  expect  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  to  com- 
municate to  them  at  a  later  date  the  names  and  the  acts  of  these  officers  and 
officials  for  the  purposes  of  the  proceedings  which  are  to  be  taken  against 
them. 

"6.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they  do  not  clearly  grasp 
the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the  demand  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  that  Serbia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the  collaboration  of  the 
organs  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  upon  their  territory,  but  they 
declare  that  they  will  admit  such  collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  principle 
of  international  law,  with  criminal  procedure,  and  with  good  neighborly 
relations. 

"6.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Royal  Government  consider  it  their 
duty  to  open  an  inquiry  against  all  such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may 
be,  implicated  in  the  plot  of  June  28,  and  who  happen  to  be  within  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  kingdom.  As  regards  the  participation  in  this  inquiry  of 
Austro-Hungarian  agents  or  authorities  appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  the  Royal  Government  cannot  accept  such 
an  arrangement,  as  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  constitution  and  of  the 
law  of  criminal  procedure;  nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases  communications 
as  to  the  results  of  the  investigations  in  question  might  be  given  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  agents. 

"7.  The  Royal  Government  proceeded,  on  the  very  evening  of  the  de- 
livery of  the  note,  to  arrest  Commandant  Voislav  Tankossitch.  As  regards 
Milan  Ziganovitch,  who  is  a  subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  who  up  to  June  28  was  employed  (on  probation)  by  the  directorate  of 
railways,  it  has  not  yet  been  possible  to  arrest  him. 


STATE    PAPERS  523 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  requested  to  be  so  good  as  to 
Bupply  as  soon  as  possible,  in  the  customary  form,  the  presumptive  evidence 
of  guilt,  as  well  as  the  eventual  proofs  of  guilt  which  have  been  collected 
up  to  the  present,  at  the  inquiry  at  Sarajevo  for  the  purposes  of  the  later 
inqury. 

8.  The  Serbian  Government  will  reinforce  and  extend  the  measures 
which  have  been  taken  for  preventing  the  illicit  traffic  of  arms  and  ex- 
plosives across  the  frontier.  It  goes  without  saying  that  they  will  immedi- 
ately order  an  inquiry  and  will  severely  punish  the  frontier  officials  on  the 
Schabatz-Loznitza  line  who  have  failed  in  their  duty  and  allowed  the 
authors  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  to  pass. 

"9.  The  Royal  Government  will  gladly  give  explanations  of  the  remarks 
mada  by  their  officials  whether  in  Serbia  or  abroad,  in  interviews  after  the 
cr*me  which  according  to  the  statement  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment were  hostile  toward  the  [Dual]  Monarchy,  as  soon  as  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  have  communicated  to  them  the  passages  in  question  in 
these  remarks,  and  as  soon  as  they  have  shown  that  the  remarks  were  actu- 
ally made  by  the  said  officials,  although  the  Royal  Government  will  itself 
take  steps  to  collect  evidence  and  proofs. 

"10.  The  Royal  Government  will  inform  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment of  the  execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the  above  heads, 
in  so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been  done  by  the  present  note,  as  soon  as 
each  measure  has  been  ordered  and  carried  out. 

"If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not  satisfied  with  this  reply, 
the  Serbian  Government,  considering  that  it  is  not  to  the  common  interest  to 
precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question,  are  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a 
pacific  understanding,  either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision  of 
the  International  Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to  the  Great  Powers  which 
took  part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment on  March  31,  1909." 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  to  Belgrade,  Baron  Giesl  von 
Gieslingen,  to  whom  the  reply  was  delivered,  on  comparing  it 
with  his  instructions,  declared  it  unsatisfactory,  and  informed 
M.  Pashitch,  the  Serbian  Prime  Minister  that  he  and  his  legation 
would  leave  Belgrade  that  evening,  turning  over  his  Govern- 
ment's interests  in  Serbia  to  the  German  Legation.  Rupture  in 
diplomatic  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  he 
said,  was  a  fait  accompli.  These  events  M.  Pashitch  reported  on 
the  same  day  to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad,  and  further 
announced : 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  have  summoned  the  Skupshtina  to  meet 
on  July  27  at  Nish,  whither  all  the  ministries  with  their  staffs  are  proceed- 
ing this  evening.  The  crown  prince  has  issued,  in  the  name  of  the  king,  an 
order  for  the  mobilization  of  the  army,  while  to-morrow  or  the  day  after  a 


524  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

proclamation  will  be  made  in  which  it  will  be  announced  that  civilians  who 
are  not  liable  to  military  service  should  remain  peaceably  at  home,  while 
soldiers  should  proceed  to  their  appointed  posts  and  defend  the  country  to 
the  best  of  their  ability,  in  the  event  of  Serbia  being  attacked." 

The  Austrian  Minister  left  Belgrade  at  6.30  p.  m.  for  Vienna. 
On  the  same  day  the  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna,  M.  Yov. 
Yovanovitch,  received  his  passports.  On  the  same  day  the 
Serbian  reply  was  presented  at  Vienna,  where  it  received  the 
following  commentaries  by  the  Foreign  Office : 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  limits  itself  to  establishing  that  since 
the  declaration  of  March  31,  1909,  there  has  been  no  attempt  on  the  part 
of  the  Serbian  Government  to  alter  the  position  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. 

"With  this  she  deliberately  shifts  the  foundation  of  our  note,  as  we  have 
not  insisted  that  she  and  her  officials  have  undertaken  anything  official  in 
this  direction.  Our  gravamen  is  that  in  spite  of  the  obligation  assumed  in 
the  cited  note,  she  has  omitted  to  suppress  the  movement  directed  against 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  monarchy. 

"Her  obligation  consisted  in  changing  her  attitude  and  the  entire  direc- 
tion of  her  policies,  and  in  entering  into  friendly  and  neighborly  relations 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  not  to  interfere  with  the  pos- 
session of  Bosnia. 

"The  assertion  of  the  Royal  Serbian  Government  that  the  expressions 
of  the  press  and  the  activity  of  Serbian  associations  possess  a  private  char- 
acter and  thus  escape  governmental  control,  stands  in  full  contrast  with 
the  institutions  of  modern  states  and  even  the  most  liberal  of  press  and 
society  laws,  which  nearly  everywhere  subject  the  press  and  the  societies 
to  a  certain  control  of  the  state.  This  is  also  provided  for  by  the  Serbian 
institutions.  The  rebuke  against  the  Serbian  Government  consists  in  the 
fact  that  it  has  totally  omitted  to  supervise  its  press  and  its  societies,  in  so 
far  as  it  knew  their  direction  to  be  hostile  to  the  [Dual]  Monarchy. 

"The  assertion  [that  the  Serbian  Government  was  ready  to  proceed 
against  all  persons  in  regard  to  whom  it  would  receive  information]  is  in- 
correct. The  Serbian  Government  was  accurately  informed  about  the 
suspicion  resting  upon  quite  definite  personalities  and  not  only  in  the  posi- 
tion, but  also  obliged  by  its  own  laws  to  institute  investigations  spontan- 
eously. The  Serbian  Government  has  done  nothing  in  this  direction." 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Office  objected  to  the  altera- 
tions made  by  Serbia  in  the  declaration  published  in  the  official 
organ.  This,  in  the  Serbian  reply,  began : 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemns  every  propaganda  which 
should  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary. 

"The  Austrian  demand  reads:  'The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemns 
the  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary.  .  .  .'  The  alteration  of  the 


STATE    PAPERS  525 

declaration  as  demanded  by  us,  which  has  been  made  by  the  Royal  Serbian 
Government,  is  meant  to  imply  that  a  propaganda  directed  against  Austria- 
Hungary  does  not  exist,  and  that  it  is  not  aware  of  such.  This  formula  is 
insincere,  and  the  Serbian  Government  reserves  itself  the  subterfuge  for 
later  occasions  that  it  had  not  disavowed  by  this  declaration  the  existing 
propaganda,  nor  recognized  the  same  as  hostile  to  the  [Dual]  Monarchy, 
whence  it  could  deduce  further  that  it  is  not  obliged  to  suppress  in  the 
future  a  propaganda  similar  to  the  present  one." 

Objection  was  similarly  made  to  the  alteration  in  the  Serbian 
apology  for  acts  of  Serbian  officers.  This  apology  began : 

"The  Royal  Government  regrets  that  according  to  a  communication  of 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  certain  Serbian  officers  and  function- 
aries have  participated  in  the  propaganda. 

"The  formula  as  demanded  by  Austria  reads:  The  Royal  Government 
regrets  that  Serbian  officers  and  functionaries  .  .  .  have  participated.  .  .  . 
Also  with  this  formula  and  the  further  addition  'according  to  the  declara- 
tion of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,'  the  Serbian  Government  pursues 
the  object,  already  indicated  above,  to  preserve  a  free  hand  for  the  future. 

"Austria  had  demanded: 

"1.  To  suppress  every  publication  which  incites  to  hatred  and  contempt 
for  the  [Dual]  Monarchy,  and  whose  tendency  is  directed  against  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  monarchy. 

"We  wanted  to  bring  about  the  obligation  for  Serbia  to  take  care  that 
such  attacks  of  the  press  would  cease  in  the  future. 

"Instead  Serbia  offers  to  pass  certain  laws  which  are  meant  as  means 
toward  this  end,  viz: 

"(a)  A  law  according  to  which  the  expressions  of  the  press  hostile  to 
the  [Dual]  Monarchy  can  be  individually  punished,  a  matter  which  is 
immaterial  to  us,  all  the  more  so,  as  the  individual  prosecution  of  press 
intrigues  is  very  rarely  possible  and  as,  with  a  lax  enforcement  of  such 
laws,  the  few  cases  of  this  nature  would  not  be  punished.  The  proposition, 
therefore,  does  not  meet  our  demand  in  any  way,  and  it  offers  not  the  least 
guaranty  for  the  desired  success. 

"(6)  An  amendment  to  article  22  of  the  constitution,  which  would  per- 
mit confiscation,  a  proposal  which  does  not  satisfy  us,  as  the  existence  of 
such  a  law  in  Serbia  is  of  no  use  to  us.  For  we  want  the  obligation  of  the 
Government  to  enforce  it  and  that  has  not  been  promised  us. 

"These  proposals  are  therefore  entirely  unsatisfactory  and  evasive  as 
we  are  not  told  within  what  time  these  laws  will  be  passed,  and  as  in  the 
event  of  the  not  passing  of  these  laws  by  the  Skupshtina  everything  would 
remain  as  it  is,  except  in  the  event  of  a  possible  resignation  of  the  Govern- 
ment. 

"2.  The  propaganda  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  affiliated  societies 
hostile  to  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  fills  the  entire  public  life  of  Serbia;  it  is 
therefore  an  entirely  inacceptable  reserve  if  the  Serbian  Government  asserts 
that  it  knows  nothing  about  it.  Aside  from  this,  our  demand  is  not  com- 
pletely fulfilled,  as  we  have  asked  besides: 


526  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

"To  confiscate  the  means  of  propaganda  of  these  societies  to  prevent  the 
reformation  of  the  dissolved  societies  under  another  name  and  in  another 
form. 

"In  these  two  directions  the  Belgrade  Cabinet  is  perfectly  silent,  so  that 
through  this  semiconcession  there  is  offered  us  no  guaranty  for  putting  an 
end  to  the  agitation  of  the  associations  hostile  to  the  monarchy,  especially 
the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

"3.  The  Serbian  Government  first  demands  proofs  for  a  propaganda 
hostile  to  the  monarchy  in  the  public  instruction  of  Serbia  while  it  must 
know  that  the  textbooks  introduced  in  the  Serbian  schools  contain  objec- 
tionable matter  in  this  direction  and  that  a  large  portion  of  the  teachers 
are  in  the  camp  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  affiliated  societies. 

"Furthermore  the  Serbian  Government  has  not  fulfilled  a  part  of  our 
demands,  as  we  have  requested,  as  it  omitted  in  its  text  the  addition  de- 
sired by  us:  'as  far  as  the  body  of  instructors  is  concerned,  as  well  as  the 
means  of  instruction' — a  sentence  which  shows  clearly  where  the  propaganda 
hostile  to  the  monarchy  is  to  be  found  in  the  Serbian  schools. 

"4.  By  promising  the  dismissal  from  the  military  and  civil  services  of 
those  officers  and  officials  who  are  found  guilty  by  judicial  procedure,  the 
Serbian  Government  limits  its  assent  to  those  cases,  in  which  these  persons 
have  been  charged  with  a  crime  according  to  the  statutory  code.  As,  how- 
ever, we  demand  the  removal  of  such  officers  and  officials  as  indulge  in  a 
propaganda  hostile  to  the  monarchy,  which  is  generally  not  punishable  in 
Serbia,  our  demands  have  not  been  fulfilled  in  this  point. 

5.  The  Serbian  reply  declared  that  Serbia  was  willing  to  per- 
mit that  cooperation  of  officials  of  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  on  Ser- 
bian territory  which  does  not  run  counter  to  international  law 
and  criminal  law. 

"The  international  law,  as  well  as  the  criminal  law,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  this  question;  it  is  purely  a  matter  of  the  nature  of  state  police  which 
is  to  be  solved  by  way  of  a  special  agreement.  The  reserved  attitude  of 
Serbia  is  therefore  incomprehensible  and  on  account  of  its  vague  general 
form  it  would  lead  to  unbridgeable  difficulties. 

"6.  The  Austrian  demand  was  clear  and  unmistakable: 

"1.  To  institute  a  criminal  procedure  against  the  participants  in  the 
outrage. 

"2.  Participation  by  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  officials  in  the  ex- 
aminations ('recherche'  in  contrast  with  'enquete  judiciaire'). 

"3.  It  did  not  occur  to  us  to  let  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  officials 
participate  in  the  Serbian  court  procedure;  they  were  to  cooperate  only  in 
the  police  researches  which  had  to  furnish  and  fix  the  material  for  the 
investigation. 

"If  the  Serbian  Government  misunderstands  us  here,  this  is  done  de- 
liberately, for  it  must  be  familiar  with  the  difference  between  'enquete 
judiciaire'  and  simple  police  researches.  As  it  desired  to  escape  from  every 
control  of  the  investigation  which  would  yield,  if  correctly  carried  out, 


STATE    PAPERS  527 

highly  undesirable  results  for  it,  and  as  it  possesses  no  means  to  refuse  in 
a  plausible  manner  the  cooperation  of  our  officials  (precedents  for  such  police 
intervention  exist  in  great  numbers)  it  tries  to  justify  its  refusal  by  show-  * 
ing  up  our  demands  as  impossible. 

"  (In  reference  to  arrest  of  conspirators) . 

"7.  This  reply  is  disingenuous.  According  to  our  investigation,  Cigano- 
wic,  by  order  of  the  police  prefect  in  Belgrade,  left  three  days  after  the 
outrage  for  Ribari,  after  it  had  become  known  that  Ciganowic  had  par- 
ticipated in  the  outrage.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  therefore  incorrect  that 
Ciganowic  left  the  Serbian  service  on  June  28.  In  the  second  place,  we  add 
that  the  prefect  of  police  at  Belgrade,  who  had  himself  caused  the  departure 
of  this  Ciganowic  and  who  knew  his  whereabout,  declared  in  an  interview 
that  a  man  by  the  name  of  Milan  Ciganowic  did  not  exist  in  Belgrade. 

"9.  (In  reference  to  expressions  made  against  Austria-Hungary  by 
Serbian  officials  in  interviews.) 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  must  be  aware  of  the  interviews  in 
question.  If  it  demands  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  that  it 
should  furnish  all  kinds  of  detail  about  the  said  interviews  and  if  it  reserves 
for  itself  the  right  of  a  formal  investigation,  it  shows  that  it  is  not  its  in- 
tention seriously  to  fulfill  the  demand. 

"10.   (In  reference  to  referring  the  dispute  to  arbitration  of  the  powers.) 

"The  Serbian  Note,  therefore,  is  entirely  a  play  for  time." 


BEGINNING      OP      MOBILIZATION 

The  diplomatic  issue  now  became  that  over  mobilization  by 
Russia:  whether  it  was  a  threat  of  war  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary alone,  or  against  Germany  as  well. 

On  the  day  of  Serbia's  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  note, 
July  25,  1914,  General  von  Chelius,  German  honorary  aide  to  the 
Czar,  sent  a  telegram  to  Kaiser  William  II  through  the  German 
Foreign  Office,  which  stated: 

"The  maneuvers  of  the  troops  in  the  Krasnoe  camp  were  suddenly  inter- 
rupted and  the  regiments  returned  to  their  garrisons  at  once.  The  maneu- 
vers have  been  cancelled.  The  military  pupils  were  raised  to-day  to  the 
rank  of  officers  instead  of  next  fall.  At  headquarters  there  obtains  great 
excitement  over  the  procedure  of  Austria.  I  have  the  impression  that  com- 
plete preparations  for  mobilization  against  Austria  are  being  made." 

On  the  same  day  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
London,  telegraphed  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs : 

"Grey  has  told  the  German  Ambassador  [Prince  Lichnowsky]  that  in 
his  opinion  Austrian  mobilization  must  lead  to  Russian  mobilization,  that 
grave  danger  of  a  general  war  will  thereupon  arise,  and  that  he  sees  only 


528  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

one  means  of  reaching  a  peaceful  settlement,  namely,  that,  in  view  of  the 
Austrian  and  Russian  mobilizations,  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  Great 
Britain  should  abstain  from  immediate  mobilization,  and  should  at  once 
offer  their  good  offices.  Grey  told  me  that  the  first  essential  of  this  plan 
was  the  consent  of  Germany  and  her  promise  not  to  mobilize.  He  has 
therefore,  as  a  first  step,  made  an  inquiry  on  this  point  at  Berlin." 

On  the  same  day  the  German  Chancellor,  Dr.  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  telegraphed  to  Prince  Lichnowsky : 

"The  distinction  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  between  an  Austro-Serbian 
and  an  Austro-Russian  conflict  is  perfectly  correct.  We  do  not  wish  to  in- 
terpose in  the  former  any  more  than  England,  and  as  heretofore  we  take 
the  position  that  this  question  must  be  localized  by  virtue  of  all  powers  re- 
fraining from  intervention.  It  is  therefore  our  hope  that  Russia  will  re- 
frain from  any  action  in  view  of  her  responsibility  and  the  seriousness  of 
the  situation.  We  are  prepared,  in  the  event  of  an  Austro-Russian  con- 
troversy, quite  apart  from  our  known  duties  as  Allies,  to  intercede  between 
Russia  and  Austria  jointly  with  the  other  powers." 

SUNDAY,      JULY      26,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Count  Szapary,  telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold, 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Vienna,  that  Count  Pourtales 
the  German  Ambassador,  upon  hearing  reports  of  measures  for 
Russian  mobilization,  had  called  the  attention  of  M.  Sazonof,  the 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  fact  that  nowadays 
mobilization  was  a  highly  dangerous  form  of  diplomatic  pressure. 

"For,  in  that  event,  the  purely  military  consideration  of  the  question  by 
the  general  staffs  would  find  expression,  and  if  that  button  were  once 
touched  in  Germany,  the  situation  would  get  out  of  control. 

"M.  Sazonof  assured  the  German  Ambassador  on  his  word  of  honor  that 
the  reports  on  the  subject  were  incorrect;  that  up  to  that  time  not  a  single 
horse  and  not  a  single  reservist  had  been  called  up,  and  that  all  the  meas- 
ures that  were  being  taken  were  merely  measures  of  preparation  in  the 
military  districts  of  Kiev,  Odessa,  and  perhaps  Kazan  and  Moscow." 

M.  Suchomlinoff,  Russian  Minister  for  War,  had  immediately 
after  this,  summoned  Major  von  Eggeling,  German  Military 
Attach^,  and  confirmed  M.  Sazonof's  assurance  in  detail.  As 
reported  by  the  major,  he  said : 

"For  the  present  merely  preparatory  measures  would  be  taken,  not  a 
horse  would  be  taken,  not  a  reservist  called  up.  If  Austria  crossed  the 
Serbian  frontier,  the  military  districts  of  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  and  Kazan, 


STATE    PAPERS  529 

which  face  Austria,  would  be  mobilized.  In  no  circumstances  will  mobiliza- 
tion take  place  on  the  German  front,  Warsaw,  Vilna,  and  St.  Petersburg. 
Peace  with  Germany  is  earnestly  desired.  ...  I  gave  the  Minister  for  War 
to  understand  that  his  friendly  intentions  would  be  appreciated  by  us,  but 
that  we  should  also  consider  mobilization  against  Austria  to  be  in  itself 
extremely  threatening." 

Russia.  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed 
the  Ambassador  at  Rome  to  persuade  the  Italian  Government  to 
act  in  the  interests  of  peace  by  bringing  influence  to  bear  on  her 
ally,  Austria-Hungary,  and  by  opposing  the  view  that  the  dis- 
pute with  Serbia  could  be  localized.  Russia  cannot  possibly 
avoid  coming  to  the  help  of  Serbia.  M.  Kasansky,  Acting  Consul 
at  Prague,  telegraphed  that  Austro-Hungarian  mobilization  had 
been  ordered.  M.  Sazonof  reported  to  M.  Schebeko,  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  an  interview  just  held  with  Count  Szapary,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador. 

"After  discussing  the  ten  demands  addressed  to  Serbia,  I  drew  his  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that,  quite  apart  from  the  clumsy  form  in  which  they 
were  presented,  some  of  them  were  quite  impracticable,  even  if  the  Serbian 
Government  agreed  to  accept  them.  Thus,  for  example,  points  one  and 
two  could  not  be  carried  out  without  recasting  the  Serbian  press  law  and 
associations  law,  and  to  that  it  might  be  difficult  to  obtain  the  consent  of 
the  Skupshtina.  As  for  enforcing  points  four  and  five,  this  might  lead  to 
most  dangerous  consequences,  and  even  to  the  risk  of  acts  of  terrorism  di- 
rected against  the  Royal  Family  and  against  Pashitch,  which  clearly  could 
not  be  the  intention  of  Austria.  With  regard  to  the  other  points  it  seemed 
to  me  that,  with  certain  changes  of  detail,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  find 
a  basis  of  mutual  agreement,  if  the  accusations  contained  in  them  were 
confirmed  by  sufficient  proof. 

"In  the  interest  of  the  maintenance  of  peace,  which,  according  to  the 
statements  of  Szapary,  is  as  much  desired  by  Austria  as  by  all  the  powers, 
it  was  necessary  to  end  the  tension  of  the  present  moment  as  soon  as 
possible.  With  this  object  in  view  it  seemed  to  me  most  desirable  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  should  be  authorized  to  enter  into  a  private 
exchange  of  views  in  order  to  redraft  certain  articles  of  the  Austrian  note 
of  July  23  in  consultation  with  me.  This  method  of  procedure  would  per- 
haps enable  us  to  find  a  formula  which  would  prove  acceptable  to  Serbia, 
while  giving  satisfaction  to  Austria  in  respect  of  the  chief  of  her  demands. 
Please  convey  the  substance  of  this  telegram  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  in  a  judicious  and  friendly  manner." 

Communicated  to  Russian  Ambassadors  in  Germany,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy.  The  Ambassador  at  Berlin  was  re- 
quested to  communicate  the  contents  of  the  telegram  to  Secre- 


530  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

tary  of  State  von  Jagow,  and  express  to  him  the  hope  that  he 
would  advise  Vienna  to  meet  Russia's  proposal  in  a  friendly 
spirit. 

M.  Sevastopoulo,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Paris,  telegraphed  M. 
Sazonof  that,  when  M.  Berthelot,  French  Political  Director,  in- 
formed Count  Szecen,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  of  the 
Serbian  reply  to  the  ultimatum,  the  count  did  not  conceal  his 
surprise  that  it  was  not  accepted. 

In  a  supplementary  telegram  he  said  M.  Berthelot  was  con- 
vinced that  Germany's  aim,  in  her  negotiations  at  Paris,  was  to 
intimidate  France  to  mediate  with  Russia. 

M.  Broniewsky,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  reported  noisy 
demonstrations  there  by  a  crowd  largely  composed  of  Austrians 
on  news  of  Austrian  mobilization,  and  anti-Russian  shouting  by 
the  crowd  before  the  Russian  Embassy.  No  precautions  were 
taken  by  the  police. 

Germany.  Major  von  Eggeling  telegraphed  to  the  German 
Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  that  it  was  certain 
mobilization  had  been  ordered  for  Kiev  and  Odessa;  it  was 
doubtful  at  Warsaw  and  Moscow,  and  improbable  elsewhere  in 
Russia. 

The  Chancellor  telegraphed  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  after  Austria-Hungary's  official  declara- 
tion to  Russia,  that  she  had  no  intention  to  annex  the  territory 
of  Serbia  or  to  impair  her  sovereignty,  the  responsibility  for 
a  European  war  rested  on  Russia. 

"We  depend  upon  France,  with  which  we  are  at  one  in  the  desire  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  that  it  will  exercise  its  influence  at 
St.  Petersburg  in  favor  of  peace." 

This  telegram,  without  the  final  sentence,  the  Chancellor  sent 
also  to  Count  Pourtales,  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  at  London,  add- 
ing in  the  latter  case  that  a  call  was  expected  for  the  several 
classes  of  Russian  reserves,  which  would  be  equivalent  to  mo- 
bilization, and,  in  this  case,  Germany  would  be  forced  to  mobilize, 
much  against  her  wish. 

"We  ask  [Great  Britain]  to  act  on  this  understanding  at  St.  Peters- 
burg with  all  possible  emphasis." 


STATE    PAPERS  531 

Count  Pourtales  was  directed  to  make  the  following  declara- 
tion to  the  Russian  Government: 

"Preparatory  military  measures  by  Russia  will  force  us  to  counter- 
measures  which  must  consist  in  mobilizing  the  army. 

"But  mobilization  means  war. 

"As  we  know  the  obligations  of  France  toward  Russia,  this  mobilization 
would  be  directed  against  both  Russia  and  France.  We  cannot  assume  that 
Russia  desires  to  unchain  such  a  European  war.  Since  Austria-Hungary 
will  not  touch  the  existence  of  the  Serbian  Kingdom,  we  are  of  the  opinion 
that  Russia  can  afford  to  assume  an  attitude  of  waiting.  We  can  all  the 
more  support  the  desire  of  Russia  to  protect  the  integrity  of  Serbia  as 
Austria-Hungary  does  not  intend  to  question  the  latter.  It  will  be  easy  in 
the  further  development  of  the  affair  to  find  a  basis  for  an  understanding." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  For- 
eign Affairs  at  London,  that  it  was  the  belief  of  the  German 
Ambassador,  Herr  von  Tschirscky,  that  Russia  would  keep 
quiet  during  the  chastisement  of  Serbia.  Everything,  said  Von 
Tschirscky,  depended  on  the  personality  of  the  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  could  resist  easily  the  pressure  of  a 
few  newspapers;  pan-Slav  agitation  in  Russia  was  over;  inter- 
vention in  behalf  of  Serbia  would  open  up  Swedish,  Polish, 
Ruthenian,  Rumanian,  and  Persian  questions;  France,  too, 
was  not  in  a  condition  for  war.  Von  Tschirscky  doubted  that 
Russia,  who  had  no  right  to  assume  a  protectorate  over 
Serbia,  would  assert  it  by  action;  Germany  knew  what  she 
was  about  in  backing  up  Austria-Hungary;  the  Serbian  con- 
cessions were  all  a  sham,  as  proved  by  the  Government 
previously  ordering  mobilization  and  preparing  to  retire  from 
Belgrade. 

Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Berlin,  tele- 
graphed Sir  Edward  Grey  that  Kaiser  William  was  returning 
suddenly  that  night  (from  a  sea  trip  to  Norway)  on  his  own 
initiative,  and  that  the  Foreign  Office  regretted  it,  owing  to  the 
speculation  and  excitement  which  it  would  cause.  Herr  von 
Zimmermann,  German  Under-Secretary  of  State,  had  inferred 
from  Russia's  statement  that  she  would  intervene  in  case  of 
annexation  of  Serbian  territory;  that  she  would  not  do  so  if  no 
territory  were  taken. 


532     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

In  a  supplementary  telegram  Sir  Horace  informed  Sir  Edward 
that  Von  Zimmermann  considered  that  the  communication  by 
Germany  to  Austria-Hungary  of  his  (Grey's)  hope  for  a  favor- 
able view  of  the  Serbian  reply  implied  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment associated  itself  to  a  certain  extent  with  Grey's  hope.  It 
did  not,  however,  go  beyond  this. 

Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  telegraphed 
Sir  Edward  Grey  that  Austria-Hungary  had  informed  the  Italian 
Government  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  to  Belgrade  had 
been  recalled,  but  that  this  did  not  imply  a  declaration  of  war. 

Sir  Edward  telegraphed  to  Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  Sir  Francis 
Bertie,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  Charge 
d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  ask  if  the  ministers  of  foreign  affairs 
at  their  courts  would  instruct  their  ambassadors  at  London  to 
meet  with  him  in  conference  "to  discover  an  issue  which  would 
prevent  complications,"  and  to  suggest  that  the  ministers  should 
instruct  their  representatives  at  Belgrade, Vienna,  and  St.  Peters- 
burg to  request  a  suspension  of  military  operations  pending  re- 
sults of  the  conference. 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  tele- 
graphed to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  Russian  Ambassador, 
M.  Schebeko,  just  returned  from  leave  of  absence,  thinks  Austria* 
Hungary  determined  on  war,  and  that  it  will  be  impossible  for 
Russia  to  remain  indifferent.  He  and  the  French  Ambassador, 
M.  Dumaine,  doubt  whether  the  principle  of  Grey's  suggestion 
that  Russia,  being  an  interested  party,  is  entitled  to  have  a  say 
in  a  purely  Austro-Serbian  dispute,  would  be  accepted  by  either 
Austria-Hungary  or  Germany. 

France.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  notified  M.  Viviani,  Prime  Minister  on  board  La  France, 
and  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin, 
Vienna,  and  Rome,  of  the  events  at  Belgrade  on  Saturday,  July 
25,  ending  with  the  order  for  mobilization  given  by  the  Serbian 
Government,  which  had  retired  to  Kragoujewatz,  whither  it  was 
followed  by  the  French  and  Russian  Ministers.  At  Vienna 
people  "soothe  themselves  with  the  illusion  that  Russia  'will  not 
hold  firm.' " 


STATE    PAPERS  533 

"It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Italy  is  bound  by  the  engagements  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  only  if  she  has  been  consulted  beforehand. 

"From  St.  Petersburg  we  learn  that  M.  Sazonof  [Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs]  has  advised  Serbia  to  ask  for  British  mediation.  At  the  Council 
of  Ministers  on  the  25th,  which  was  held  in  presence  of  the  emperor,  the 
mobilization  of  thirteen  army  corps  intended  eventually  to  operate  against 
Austria  was  considered;  this  mobilization,  however,  would  only  be  made 
effective  if  Austria  were  to  bring  armed  pressure  to  bear  upon  Serbia,  and 
not  till  after  notice  had  been  given  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  upon 
whom  falls  the  duty  of  fixing  the  day,  liberty  being  left  to  him  to  go  on 
with  negotiations  even  if  Belgrade  should  be  occupied.  Russian  opinion 
makes  clear  that  it  is  both  politically  and  morally  impossible  for  Russia  to 
allow  Serbia  to  be  crushed. 

"In  London  the  German  demarche  was  made  on  the  25th,  in  the  same 
terms  as  those  used  by  Baron  von  Schoen  at  Paris.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has 
replied  to  Prince  Lichnowsky  that  if  the  war  were  to  break  out  no  power 
in  Europe  could  take  up  a  detached  attitude.  He  did  not  express  himself 
more  definitely  and  used  very  reserved  language  to  the  Serbian  Minister 
[M.  Boschkovitch] .  The  communication  made  on  the  evening  of  the  25th 
by  the  Austrian  Ambassador  makes  Sir  Edward  Grey  more  optimistic; 
since  the  diplomatic  rupture  does  not  necessarily  involve  immediate  mili- 
tary operations,  the  Secretary  of  State  is  still  willing  to  hope  that  the 
powers  will  have  time  to  intervene. 

"At  Berlin  the  language  used  by  the  Secretary  of  State  [Von  Jagow] 
to  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  [Broniewsky]  is  unsatisfactory  and  dila- 
tory; when  the  latter  asked  him  to  associate  himself  with  a  demarche  at 
Vienna  for  an  extension  of  the  time  limit,  he  replied  that  he  had  already 
taken  action  in  this  sense  but  that  it  was  too  late;  to  the  request  for  an 
extension  of  the  time  limit  before  active  measures  were  taken,  he  replied 
that  this  had  to  do  with  a  domestic  matter,  and  not  with  a  war  but  with 
local  operations.  Herr  von  Jagow  pretends  not  to  believe  that  the  Aus- 
trian action  could  lead  to  general  consequences. 

"A  real  explosion  of  chauvinism  has  taken  place  at  Berlin.  The  German 
Emperor  returns  direct  to  Kiel.  M.  Jules  Cambon  thinks  that,  at  the  first 
military  steps  taken  by  Russia,  Germany  would  immediately  reply,  and 
probably  would  not  wait  for  a  pretext  before  attacking  us. 

"At  Vienna,  the  French  Ambassador  [Dumaine]  has  not  had  time  to 
join  in  the  demarche  of  his  Russian  colleague  [Schebeko]  for  obtaining  an 
extension  of  the  time  limit  fixed  for  Serbia;  he  does  not  regret  it,  this 
demarche  having  been  categorically  rejected,  and  England  not  having  had 
time  to  give  instructions  to  her  representative  about  it. 

"A  note  from  the  British  Embassy  has  been  delivered  to  me:  it  gives 
an  account  of  the  conversation  between  the  British  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg  [Buchanan]  and  M.  Sazonof  and  M.  Paleologue.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  thinks  that  the  four  powers  who  are  not  directly  interested  ought  to 
press  both  on  Russia  and  Austria  that  their  armies  should  not  cross  the 
frontier,  and  that  they  should  give  time  to  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
Italy  to  bring  their  mediation  into  play.  If  Germany  accepts,  the  British 

N— Gt.  War  2 


534  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Government  has  reason  to  think  that  Italy  also  would  be  glad  to  be  as- 
sociated in  the  joint  action  of  England  and  France;  the  adherence  of  Ger- 
many is  essential,  for  neither  Austria  nor  Russia  would  tolerate  any  in- 
tervention except  that  of  impartial  friends  or  Allies. 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  informed  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin  that  a  telegram  from  Vienna  stated  that  diplomatic 
rupture  between  Austria  and  Serbia  had  taken  place,  and  Austria 
was  proceeding  to  military  measures.  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano, 
the  Prime  Minister,  would  return  in  two  days  to  Rome.  The 
president  of  the  council  had  given  Barrere  the  impression  that 
Italy  would  be  neutral  in  case  of  war,  maintaining  "an  attitude  of 
observation."  M.  Salandra  [afterward  Prime  Minister]  had  said 
that: 

"  'We  shall  make  the  greatest  efforts  to  prevent  peace  being  broken ;  our 
situation  is  somewhat  analogous  to  that  of  England.  Perhaps  we  could  do 
something  in  a  pacific  sense  together  with  the  English.'  M.  Salandra  stated 
definitely  to  me  that  the  Austrian  note  had  been  communicated  to  Rome  at 
the  last  moment." 

M.  Barrere,  in  a  second  'telegram,  said  that  the  greater  part  of 
Italian  public  opinion  was  hostile  to  Austria  "in  this  serious 
business." 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  tele- 
graphed that  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  ad- 
vised Serbia  to  ask  for  British  mediation.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin 
thereupon  telegraphed  M.  de  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'Affaires,  Lon- 
don, that  France  desired  British  mediation.  M.  Paleologue  re- 
ported at  greater  length  M.  Sazonof's  determination  to  secure  a 
peaceful  solution  to  the  Serbian  question. 

"  'Up  to  the  last  moment,'  he  declared  to  me,  'I  shall  show  myself  ready 
to  negotiate.' 

"It  is  in  this  spirit  that  he  has  just  sent  for  Count  Szdpary  to  come  to 
a  'frank  and  loyal  explanation.'  M.  Sazonof  commented  in  his  presence  on 
the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  article  by  article,  making  clear  the  in- 
sulting character  of  the  principal  clauses.  'The  intention  which  inspired 
this  document,'  he  said,  'is  legitimate  if  you  pursued  no  aim  other  than  the 
protection  of  your  territory  against  the  intrigues  of  Serbian  anarchists; 
but  the  procedure  to  which  you  have  had  recourse  is  not  defensible.'  He 
concluded :  'Take  back  your  ultimatum,  modify  its  form,  and  I  will  guarantee 
you  the  result.' 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  showed  himself  moved  by  this 
language;  however,  while  awaiting  instructions,  he  reserves  the  opinion 


STATE    PAPERS  535 

of  his  Government.  Without  being  discouraged  M.  Sazonof  has  decided  to 
propose  this  evening  to  Count  Berchtold  the  opening  of  direct  conversa- 
tions between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  on  the  changes  to  be  introduced 
into  the  ultimatum. 

"This  friendly  and  semiofficial  interposition  of  Russia  between  Austria 
and  Serbia  has  the  advantage  of  being  expeditious.  I  therefore  believe  it 
to  be  preferable  to  any  other  procedure  and  likely  to  succeed." 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  reported  to  M. 
Bienvenu-Martin  that  M.  Schebeko,  Russian  Ambassador,  had 
returned  in  haste  from  Russia,  whither  he  had  gone  on  the  assur- 
ance of  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  the  demands  on  Serbia  would  be  acceptable.  Other 
Austrian  officials  had  taken  the  same  attitude,  which  is  quite 
usual  in  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy,  and  this  procedure  haa 
greatly  increased  the  irritation  of  the  Russian  Government. 

M.  Schebeko,  seizing  advantage  of  the  delay  of  mobilization, 
will  make  a  proposal  calculated  to  test  the  value  of  the  pacific 
declarations  of  Germany.  This  is  for  a  conference  of  the  British, 
French,  Italian,  and  German  Ambassadors,  to  refuse  concurrence 
in  which  the  German  Ambassador,  M.  Tschirsky,  will  almost  cer- 
tainly have  to  plead  the  principle  of  "localizing  the  conflict." 

"My  impression  is  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  although 
surprised  and  perhaps  regretting  the  vigor  with  which  they  have  been  in- 
spired, will  believe  themselves  obliged  to  commence  military  action." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  reported  to  M.  Viviani  on  La  France  and 
to  the  ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna, 
and  Rome  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Serbia  made 
by  Austria-Hungary. 

"According  to  a  telegram  from  M.  Jules  Cambon  [at  Berlin],  the  British 
Ambassador  [Sir  Edward  Goschen]  thinks  that  there  is  a  slight  yielding; 
when  he  observed  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  ask  him 
to  intervene  between  Austria  and  Serbia,  but,  as  this  question  ceased  to  be 
localized,  to  intervene  with  England,  France,  and  Italy  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  the  Secretary  of  State  declared  that  he  would  do  his  best  to 
maintain  peace." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  also  reported  that  Italy,  not  having  been 
consulted  about  the  note  to  Serbia,  felt  herself  relieved  from  all 
responsibility  in  the  grave  step  taken  by  her  ally.  He  also  told 
of  his  answer  to  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Schoen,  who 
sought  France's  influence  to  keep  Russia  from  war,  that  Germany 


536  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT    WAR 

ought,  on  her  side,  to  influence  Austria-Hungary  to  avoid  mili- 
tary operations  leading  to  the  occupation  of  Serbia,  and  the  con- 
sequent intervention  of  Russia. 

"The  ambassador  having  observed  to  me  that  this  could  not  be  reconciled 
with  the  position  taken  up  by  Germany  'that  the  question  concerned  only 
Austria  and  Serbia,'  I  told  him  that  mediation  at  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 
burg would  be  the  act  of  the  four  other  powers  less  interested  in  the  question. 

"Herr  von  Schoen  then  intrenched  himself  behind  his  lack  of  instructions 
in  this  respect,  and  I  told  him  that  in  these  conditions  I  did  not  feel  myself 
in  a  position  to  take  any  action  at  St.  Petersburg  alone." 

After  his  visit  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  at  5  p.  m.  Baron  von 
Schoen  went  to  see  M.  Berthelot,  the  Political  Director,  to 
have  an  account  of  the  interview  officially  published  in  the  press. 
The  article  he  proposed  indicated  the  most  amicable  cooperation 
between  France  and  Germany  in  the  furtherance  of  European 
peace. 

"The  Political  Director  replied  at  once,  'Then,  in  your  opinion,  every 
thing  is  settled,  and  you  bring  us  the  assurance  that  Austria  accepts  the 
Serbian  note  or  will  enter  into  conversations  with  the  powers  on  this  mat- 
ter?' The  ambassador  having  .  .  .  vigorously  denied  the  suggestion,  it  was 
explained  to  him  that  if  there  was  no  modification  in  Germany's  negative 
attitude,  the  terms  of  the  suggested  'note  to  the  press'  were  exaggerated, 
and  of  a  nature  to  give  a  false  security  to  French  opinion  by  creating  il- 
lusion on  the  real  situation,  the  dangers  of  which  were  only  too  evident. 

"To  the  assurances  lavished  by  the  German  Ambassador  as  to  the 
optimistic  impressions  which  he  had  formed,  the  Acting  Political  Director 
replied  by  asking  if  he  might  speak  to  him  in  a  manner  quite  personal  and 
private,  as  man  to  man,  quite  freely  and  without  regard  to  their  respective 
functions.  Baron  von  Schoen  asked  him  to  do  so. 

"M.  Berthelot  then  said  that  to  any  simple  mind  Germany's  attitude  was 
inexplicable  if  it  did  not  aim  at  war;  a  purely  objective  analysis  of  the 
facts  and  the  psychology  of  the  Austro-German  relations  led  logically  to 
this  conclusion.  In  the  face  of  the  repeated  statement  that  Germany  was 
ignorant  of  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  note,  it  was  no  longer  permissible 
to  raise  any  doubt  gn  that  point;  but  was  it  probable  that  Germany  would 
have  arrayed  herself  on  the  side  of  Austria  in  such  an  adventure  with 
her  eyes  closed?  Did  the  psychology  of  all  the  past  relations  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin  allow  one  to  admit  that  Austria  could  have  taken  up  a  position  with- 
out any  possible  retreat,  before  having  weighed  with  her  ally  all  the  con- 
sequences of  her  uncompromising  attitude?  How  surprising  appeared  the 
refusal  by  Germany  to  exercise  mediating  influence  at  Vienna  now  that 
she  knew  the  extraordinary  text  of  the  Austrian  note!  What  responsibility 
was  the  German  Government  assuming  and  what  suspicions  would  rest 
upon  them  if  they  persisted  in  interposing  between  Austria  and  the  powers, 


STATE    PAPERS  537 

after  what  might  be  called  the  absolute  submission  of  Serbia,  and  when  the 
slightest  advice  given  by  them  to  Vienna  would  put  an  end  to  the  night- 
mare which  weighed  on  Europe! 

"The  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  by  Austria,  her  threats  of  war, 
and  the  mobilization  which  she  was  undertaking  make  peculiarly  urgent 
pacific  action  on  the  part  of  Germany,  for  from  the  day  when  Austrian  troops 
crossed  the  Serbian  frontier,  one  would  be  faced  by  an  act  which  without 
doubt  would  oblige  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet  to  intervene,  and  would  risk 
the  unloosing  of  a  war  which  Germany  declares  that  she  wishes  to  avoid. 

"Herr  von  Schoen,  who  listened  smiling,  once  more  affirmed  that  Ger- 
many had  been  ignorant  of  the  text  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  had  ap- 
proved it  only  after  its  delivery;  she  thought,  however,  that  Serbia  had 
need  of  a  lesson  severe  enough  for  her  not  to  be  able  to  forget  it,  and 
that  Austria  owed  it  to  herself  to  put  an  end  to  a  situation  which  was 
dangerous  and  intolerable  for  a  great  power.  He  declared  besides  that  he 
did  not  know  the  text  of  the  Serbian  reply,  and  showed  his  personal  sur- 
prise that  it  had  not  satisfied  Austria,  if  indeed  it  was  such  as  the  papers, 
which  are  often  ill  informed,  represented  it  to  be. 

"He  insisted  again  on  Germany's  peaceful  intentions  and  gave  his  im- 
pressions as  to  the  effect  that  might  arise  from  good  advice  given,  for  in- 
stance, at  Vienna,  by  England  in  a  friendly  tone.  According  to  him  Aus- 
tria was  not  uncompromising;  what  she  rejects  is  the  idea  of  a  formal 
mediation,  the  'spectre'  of  a  conference:  a  peaceful  word  coming  from 
St.  Petersburg,  good  words  said  in  a  conciliatory  tone  by  the  powers  of  the 
Triple  Entente,  would  have  a  chance  of  being  well  received.  He  added, 
finally,  that  he  did  not  say  that  Germany  on  her  side  would  not  give  some 
advice  at  Vienna. 

"In  these  conditions  the  Political  Director  announced  that  he  would  ask 
the  minister  if  it  appeared  to  him  opportune  to  communicate  to  the  press 
a  short  note  in  a  moderate  tone." 

M.  Chevalley,  French  Minister  at  Christiania,  telegraphed  to 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin  that  the  whole  German  fleet  in  Norway  was 
returning  to  Germany.  M.  d'Annoville,  French  Charge  d'Aff aires 
at  Luxemburg,  telegraphed  that  the  last  four  classes  of  [Ger- 
man] reservists  set  at  liberty  had  been  forbidden  to  leave  their 
places  of  residence,  and  were  ordered  to  hold  themselves  at  the 
disposition  of  the  Kommandutur  at  any  moment. 

MONDAY,      JULY      27,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  On  the  following  day  Count  Szapary,  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  telegraphed  Count 
Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  of  a  conversa- 
tion he  had  just  had  with  M.  Sazonof. 


538  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

Mistaken  impressions,  he  told  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  were  abroad  in  Russia  as  to  Austria-Hungary's  inten- 
tions. 

"We  were  credited  with  wishing  to  push  forward  into  Balkan  territory, 
and  to  begin  a  march  to  Salonica  or  even  to  Constantinople.  Others, 
again,  went  so  far  as  to  describe  our  action  merely  as  the  starting  point  of 
a  preventive  war  against  Russia.  I  said  that  all  this  was  erroneous,  and 
that  parts  of  it  were  absolutely  unreasonable.  The  goal  of  our  action  was 
self-preservation  and  self-defense  against  hostile  propaganda  by  word,  in 
writing,  and  in  action,  which  threatened  our  integrity.  It  would  occur  to 
no  one  in  Austria-Hungary  to  threaten  Russian  interests,  or  indeed  to  pick 
a  quarrel  with  Russia.  And  yet  we  were  absolutely  determined  to  reach 
the  goal  which  we  had  set  before  us,  and  the  path  which  we  had  chosen 
seemed  to  us  the  most  suitable.  As,  however,  the  action  under  discussion 
was  action  in  self-defense,  I  could  not  conceal  from  him  that  we  could  not 
allow  ourselves  to  be  diverted  from  it  by  any  consequences,  of  whatever 
kind  they  might  be. 

"M.  Sazonof  agreed  with  me.  Our  goal,  as  I  had  described  it  to  him,  was 
an  entirely  legitimate  one,  but  he  considered  that  the  path  which  we  were 
pursuing  with  a  view  to  attaining  it  was  not  the  surest.  He  said  that  the 
note  which  we  had  delivered  was  not  happy  in  its  form.  He  had  since 
been  studying  it,  and  if  I  had  time,  he  would  like  to  look  it  through  once 
more  with  me.  I  remarked  that  I  was  at  his  service,  but  was  not  authorized 
either  to  discuss  the  text  of  the  note  with  him  or  to  interpret  it.  Of  course, 
however,  his  remarks  were  of  interest.  The  minister  then  took  all  the 
points  of  the  note  in  order,  and  on  this  occasion  found  seven  of  the  ten 
points  admissible  without  very  great  difficulty;  only  the  two  points  dealing 
with  the  collaboration  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  officials  in  Serbia  and  the 
point  dealing  with  the  removal  of  officers  and  civil  servants  to  be  designated 
by  us,  seemed  to  him  to  be  unacceptable  in  their  present  form.  With  regard 
to  the  first  two  points,  I  was  in  a  position  to  give  an  authentic  interpretation 
in  the  sense  of  your  excellency's  telegram  of  the  25th  instant;  with  regard  to 
the  third,  I  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  a  necessary  demand.  Moreover, 
matters  had  already  been  set  in  motion.  The  Serbians  had  mobilized  on  the 
previous  day,  and  I  did  not  know  what  had  happened  since  then." 

Count  Berchtold  instructed  Count  Szapary  by  telegraph  to 
declare  to  M.  Sazonof  that,  so  long  as  the  war  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Serbia  remained  localized,  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  did 
not  aim  in  any  way  at  territorial  acquisitions  of  any  sort. 

Count  Szogyeny,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to  Count 
Berchtold  that  M.  Sazonof  had  explained  to  Count  Pourtales,  the 
German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  he  could  not  guar- 
antee that  Russia  had  not  begun  mobilization,  and  confessed  that 
certain  necessary  military  measures  were  being  taken. 


STATE    PAPERS  539 

"Major  von  Eggeling,  German  Military  Attache  at  St.  Petersburg,  re- 
ports that  the  Russian  Minister  for  War,  M.  Suchomlinof,  has  given  him  his 
word  of  honor  that  not  a  man  or  a  horse  has  been  mobilized ;  however, 
naturally,  certain  military  precautions  have  been  taken;  precautions  which, 
as  the  German  military  attache  adds  .  .  .  'are  to  be  sure  pretty  far-reach- 
ing.' " 

Count  Berchtold  informed  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors 
at  Berlin,  Rome,  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburg  of  the  annota- 
tions of  his  Government  to  the  Serbian  reply. 

Germany.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Consulate  at  Kovno,  Russia, 
telegraphed  to  the  German  Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg,  that  Kovno  had  been  declared  to  be  in  a  state  of  war. 

The  German  Minister  at  Berne,  Switzerland,  telegraphed  to  the 
Chancellor  that  the  French  Fourteenth  Corps  had  discontinued 
maneuvers. 

Count  Pourtales,  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  tele- 
graphed to  the  Chancellor  at  Berlin : 

"The  Secretary  of  War  [Suchomlinof]  has  given  me  his  word  of  honor 
that  no  order  to  mobilize  has  as  yet  been  issued.  Though  general  prepara- 
tions are  being  made,  no  reserves  were  called  and  no  horses  mustered. 
If  Austria  crossed  the  Serbian  frontier,  such  military  districts  as  are  di- 
rected toward  Austria,  viz  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  Kazan,  are  to  be  mobi- 
lized. Under  no  circumstances  those  on  the  German  frontier,  Warsaw, 
Vilni,  St.  Petersburg.  Peace  with  Germany  was  desired  very  much. 
Upon  my  inquiry  into  the  object  of  mobilization  against  Austria  he 
shrugged  his  shoulders  and  referred  to  the  diplomats.  I  told  the  secretary 
that  we  appreciated  the  friendly  intentions,  but  considered  mobilization 
even  against  Austria  as  very  menacing." 

The  Chancellor  telegraphed  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Am- 
bassador at  London : 

"We  know  as  yet  nothing  of  a  suggestion  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  to  hold 
a  quadruple  conference  in  London.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  place  our  ally 
in  his  dispute  with  Serbia  before  a  European  tribunal.  Our  mediation  must 
be  limited  to  the  danger  of  an  Austro-Russian  conflict." 

This  was  supplemented  by  a  telegram : 

"We  have  at  once  started  the  mediation  proposal  in  Vienna  in  the  sense 
as  desired  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  We  have  communicated  besides  to  Count 
Berchtold  the  desire  of  M.  Sazonof  for  a  direct  parley  with  Vienna." 

Russia.  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London, 
telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  St. 
Petersburg,  to  know  if  his  views  on  direct  discussions  with  the 


540     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Vienna  Cabinet  harmonized  with  Grey's  scheme  for  mediation  by 
the  four  powers,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Germany. 

"Having  heard  from  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that  you 
would  be  prepared  to  accept  such  a  combination,  Grey  decided  to  turn  it 
into  an  official  proposal,  which  he  communicated  yesterday  to  Berlin,  Paris, 
and  Rome." 

M.  Sazonof  replied  by  telegraph  that  the  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  had  asked  him  if  the  Rus- 
sian Government  thought  it  desirable  for  Great  Britain  to  take 
the  initiative  in  convoking  a  conference  in  London  of  the  four 
powers. 

"I  replied  that  I  have  begun  conversations  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  under  conditions  which,  I  hope,  may  be  favorable.  I  have  not, 
however,  received  as  yet  any  reply  to  the  proposal  made  by  me  for  revis- 
ing the  note  between  the  two  Cabinets. 

"If  direct  explanations  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  were  to  prove  impos- 
sible, I  am  ready  to  accept  the  British  proposal,  or  any  other  proposal  of  a 
kind  that  would  bring  about  a  favorable  solution  of  the  conflict. 

"I  wish,  however,  to  put  an  end  from  this  day  forth  to  a  misunderstand- 
ing which  might  arise  from  the  answer  given  by  the  French  Minister  of 
Justice  to  the  German  Ambassador,  regarding  counsels  of  moderation  to  be 
given  to  the  Imperial  [Russian]  Cabinet." 

This  telegram  Benckendorff  communicated  to  Grey  on  the  fol- 
lowing day. 

M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  to  the  Russian  Ambassadors  at  Paris, 
London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome  that  the  Serbian  reply  exceeded 
expectations  in  its  moderation  and  desire  to  afford  the  fullest 
satisfaction. 

"We  do  not  see  what  further  demands  could  be  made  by  Austria,  unless 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  is  seeking  for  a  pretext  for  war  with  Serbia." 

M.  Isvolsky,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  telegraphed  to  M. 
Sazonof  that  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Schoen,  had 
confirmed  his  declaration  of  yesterday  in  writing,  i.  e. : 

"1.  That  Austria  has  declared  to  Russia  that  she  seeks  no  territorial 
acquisitions  and  that  she  harbors  no  designs  against  the  integrity  of 
Serbia.  Her  sole  object  is  to  secure  her  own  peace  and  quiet. 

"2.  That  consequently  it  rests  with  Russia  to  avoid  war. 

"3.  That  Germany  and  France,  entirely  at  one  in  their  ardent  desire  to 
preserve  peace,  should  exercise  their  moderating  influence  upon  Russia. 

"Baron  von  Schoen  laid  special  emphasis  on  the  expression  of  solidarity 
of  Germany  and  France.  The  Minister  of  Justice  is  convinced  that  these 


STATE    PAPERS  541 

steps  on  the  part  of  Germany  are  taken  with  the  evident  object  of  alienat- 
ing Russia  and  France,  of  inducing  the  French  Government  to  make  repre- 
sentations at  St.  Petersburg,  and  of  thus  compromising  our  ally  in  our 
eyes;  and  finally,  in  the  event  of  war,  of  throwing  the  responsibility  not  on 
Germany,  who  is  ostensibly  making  every  effort  to  maintain  peace,  but  on 
Russia  and  France." 

In  a  supplementary  telegram  M.  Isvolsky  stated  that  the  tele- 
gram from  Belgrade  to  Paris,  giving  the  Serbian  reply  to  the  Aus- 
trian note  was  delayed  twenty  hours,  and  that  the  telegram  from 
the  French  Foreign  Office  containing  instructions  to  support  Rus- 
sia's representations,  which  had  been  sent  at  the  special  urgent 
rate  at  11  a.  m.,  July  25,  1914,  only  reached  its  destination  at 
6  p.  m. 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  this  telegram  was  intentionally  delayed  by  the 
Austrian  telegraph  office." 

M.  Isvolsky  telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof : 

"The  Austrian  Ambassador  [Count  Szecsen]  has  informed  the  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  [M.  Bienvenu-Martin]  that  to-morrow,  Tues- 
day, Austria  will  proceed  to  take  'energetic  action'  with  the  object  of 
forcing  Serbia  to  give  the  necessary  guaranties.  The  minister  having  asked 
what  form  such  action  would  take,  the  ambassador  replied  that  he  had  no 
exact  information  on  the  subject,  but  it  might  mean  either  the  crossing  of 
the  Serbian  frontier,  or  an  ultimatum,  or  even  a  declaration  of  war." 

M.  Broniewsky,  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  tele- 
graphed M.  Sazonof: 

"I  begged  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  [Von  Jagow]  to  support 
your  proposal  in  Vienna  that  Szapary  [Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg]  should  be  authorized  to  draw  up,  by  means  of  a  private 
exchange  of  views  with  you,  a  wording  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands 
which  would  be  acceptable  to  both  parties.  Jagow  answered  that  he  was 
aware  of  this  proposal  and  that  he  agreed  with  Pourtales  [German  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburg]  that,  as  Szapary  had  begun  this  conversation,  he 
might  as  well  go  on  with  it.  He  will  telegraph  in  this  sense  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna.  I  begged  him  to  press  Vienna  with  greater  in- 
sistence to  adopt  this  conciliatory  line;  Jagow  answered  that  he  could  not 
advise  Austria  to  give  way." 

In  a  second  telegram  M.  Broniewsky  gave  an  account  of  an 
interview  just  held  between  Von  Jagow  and  the  French  Am- 
bassador, M.  Jules  Cambon: 

"Cambon  endeavored  to  induce  Von  Jagow  to  accept  the  British  proposal 
for  action  in  favor  of  peace  to  be  taken  simultaneously  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  at  Vienna  by  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Italy,  and  France.  Cambon 


542  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

suggested  that  these  powers  should  give  their  advice  to  Vienna  in  the 
following  terms:  'To  abstain  from  all  action  which  might  aggravate  the 
existing  situation.'  By  adopting  this  vague  formula,  all  mention  of  the 
necessity  of  refraining  from  invading  Serbia  might  be  avoided.  Jagow 
refused  point  blank  to  accept  this  suggestion  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of 
the  ambassador,  who  emphasized,  as  a  good  feature  of  the  suggestion,  the 
mixed  grouping  of  the  powers,  thanks  to  which  the  opposition  between  the 
Alliance  and  the  Entente — a  matter  of  which  Jagow  himself  had  often 
complained — was  avoided." 

Nicholas  II  telegraphed  his  reply  to  the  appeal  for  Russian 
aid  made  by  Prince  Alexander  of  Serbia  on  July  25,  1914.  It 
assured  the  prince  of  the  Czar's  cordial  sympathy  with  the  Ser- 
bian people. 

"The  existing  situation  is  engaging  my  most  serious  attention,  and  my 
government  are  using  their  utmost  endeavor  to  smooth  away  the  present 
difficulties.  I  have  no  doubt  that  your  highness  and  the  Royal  Serbian 
Government  wish  to  render  that  task  easy  by  neglecting  no  step  which 
might  lead  to  a  settlement,  and  thus  both  prevent  the  horrors  of  a  new 
war  and  safeguard  the  dignity  of  Serbia. 

"So  long  as  the  slightest  hope  exists  of  avoiding-  bloodshed,  all  our 
efforts  must  be  directed  to  that  end;  but  if  in  spite  of  our  earnest  wish  we 
are  not  successful,  your  highness  may  rest  assured  that  Russia  will  in  no 
case  disinterest  herself  in  the  fate  of  Serbia." 

M.  Schebeko,  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  telegraphed  to 
M.  Sazonof  of  a  conversation  he  had  had  in  the  absence  of  Count 
Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  with  Baron  Macchio, 
the  Under-Secretary. 

"I  drew  his  attention  to  the  unfavorable  impression  produced  in  Russia 
by  the  presentation  of  demands  by  Austria  to  Serbia,  which  it  was  quite 
impossible  for  any  independent  state,  however  small,  to  accept.  I  added  that 
this  method  of  procedure  might  lead  to  the  most  undesirable  complications, 
and  that  it  had  aroused  profound  surprise  and  general  condemnation  in 
Russia.  We  can  only  suppose  that  Austria,  influenced  by  the  assurances 
given  by  the  German  representative  at  Vienna,  who  has  egged  her  on 
throughout  this  crisis,  has  counted  on  the  probable  localization  of  the  dispute 
«vrith  Serbia,  and  on  the  possibility  of  inflicting  with  impunity  a  serious 
blow  upon  that  country.  The  declaration  by  the  Russian  Government  that 
Russia  could  not  possibly  remain  indifferent  in  the  face  of  such  conduct 
has  caused  a  great  sensation  here." 

Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  tele- 
graphed to  M.  Sazonof: 

"Grey  has  just  informed  the  German  Ambassador,  who  came  to  question 
him  as  to  the  possibility  of  taking  action  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  such  action 


STATE    PAPERS  543 

ought  rather  to  be  taken  at  Vienna,  and  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  were  the 
best  qualified  to  do  so.  Grey  also  pointed  out  that  the  Serbian  reply  to 
the  Austrian  note  had  exceeded  anything  that  could  have  been  expected  in 
moderation  and  in  its  spirit  of  conciliation.  Grey  added  that  he  had  there- 
fore come  to  the  conclusion  that  Russia  must  have  advised  Belgrade  to  re- 
turn a  moderate  reply,  and  that  he  thought  the  Serbian  reply  could  form 
the  basis  of  a  peaceful  and  acceptable  solution  of  the  question. 

"In  these  circumstances,  continued  Grey,  if  Austria  were  to  begin  hostili- 
ties in  spite  of  that  reply,  she  would  prove  her  intention  of  crushing 
Serbia.  Looked  at  in  this  light,  the  question  might  give  rise  to  a  situation 
which  might  lead  to  a  war  in  which  all  the  powers  would  be  involved. 

"Grey  finally  declared  that  the  British  Government  were  sincerely  anx- 
ious to  act  with  the  German  Government  as  long  as  the  preservation  of 
peace  was  in  question;  but,  in  the  contrary  event,  Great  Britain  reserved  to 
herself  full  liberty  of  action." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  Ambassador  at 
Vienna,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  London,  that  he  had  consulted  with  his  colleagues 
about  the  mediation  of  the  four  powers,  and  the  impression  was 
that  the  note  to  Serbia  was  intentionally  drawn  to  make  war 
inevitable,  and,  until  Serbia  had  been  punished,  no  proposals  for 
mediation  would  be  listened  to. 

"This  country  has  gone  wild  with  joy  at  the  prospect  of  war  with 
Serbia,  and  its  postponement  or  prevention  would  undoubtedly  be  a  great 
disappointment. 

"I  propose,  subject  to  any  special  directions  you  desire  to  send  me,  to 
express  to  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  hope  of  his 
majesty's  Government  that  it  may  yet  be  possible  to  avoid  war,  and  to  ask 
his  excellency  whether  he  cannot  suggest  a  way  out  even  now." 

Sir  Francis  Bertie,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  telegraphed  to  Grey 
that  France  had  accepted  his  proposal  for  the  four-power  media- 
tion, and  sent  the  necessary  instructions  to  her  representatives 
at  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg. 

"Instructions  have  been  sent  to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  con- 
cert with  his  British  colleague  as  to  the  advisability  of  their  speaking 
jointly  to  the  German  Government.  Until  it  is  known  that  the  Germans 
have  spoken  at  Vienna  with  some  success,  it  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  be  dangerous  for  the  French,  Russian,  and 
British  Ambassadors  to  do  so." 

Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to 
Grey: 

"Secretary  of  State  [Von  Jagow]  says  that  conference  you  suggest  would 
practically  amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in  his  opinion, 


544  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

be  called  together  except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia.  He  could  not 
therefore  fall  in  with  your  suggestion,  desirous  though  he  was  to  cooperate 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  I  said  I  was  sure  that  your  idea  had  nothing 
to  do  with  arbitration,  but  meant  that  representatives  of  the  four  nations 
not  directly  interested  should  discuss  and  suggest  means  for  avoiding  a 
dangerous  situation.  He  maintained,  however,  that  such  a  conference  as 
you  proposed  was  not  practicable.  He  added  that  news  he  had  just  re- 
ceived from  St.  Petersburg  showed  that  there  was  an  intention  on  the  part 
of  M.  de  Sazonof  [Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  to  exchange  views 
with  Count  Berchtold  [Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]. 
He  thought  that  this  method  of  procedure  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory 
result,  and  that  it  would  be  best,  before  doing  anything  else,  to  await  out- 
come of  the  exchange  of  views  between  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Govern- 
ments. 

"In  the  course  of  a  short  conversation  Secretary  of  State  said  that  as 
yet  Austria  was  only  partially  mobilizing,  but  that  if  Russia  mobilized 
against  Germany  latter  would  have  to  follow  suit.  I  asked  him  what  he 
meant  by  'mobilizing  against  Germany.'  He  said  that  if  Russia  only 
mobilized  in  south,  Germany  would  not  mobilize,  but  if  she  mobilized  in 
north,  Germany  would  have  to  do  so  too,  and  Russian  system  of  mobilization 
was  so  complicated  that  it  might  be  difficult  exactly  to  locate  her  mobiliza- 
tion. Germany  would  therefore  have  to  be  very  careful  not  to  be  taken  by 
surprise. 

"Finally,  Secretary  of  State  said  that  news  from  St.  Petersburg  had 
caused  him  to  take  more  hopeful  view  of  the  general  situation." 

Sir  George  Buchanan,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  tele- 
graphed Grey  an  account  of  the  interview  between  M.  Sazonof, 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Count  Szapary,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  in  which  Sazonof  had  pointed 
out  that  Austria's  demands  entailed  entire  revision  of  existing 
Serbian  laws,  and  were  moreover  incompatible  with  Serbia's 
dignity  as  an  independent  state;  and  that  it  would  be  useless 
for  Russia,  being  an  object  of  suspicion  in  Austria,  to  offer  her 
good  offices. 

"In  order,  however,  to  put  an  end  to  the  present  tension,  he  thought  that 
England  and  Italy  might  be  willing  to  collaborate  with  Austria." 

Sir  George  told  M.  Sazonof  that  Grey  could  do  nothing  more 
than  he  had  promised  on  the  24th  inst.,  and  that  the  Russian 
Minister  was  mistaken  if  he  believed  that  peace  would  be 
promoted  by  Great  Britain  telling  Germany  it  would  have  to 
deal  with  her  as  well  as  with  Russia  and  France  if  it  supported 
Austria  by  force  of  arms. 


STATE    PAPERS  545 

"Their  attitude  would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace,  and  we 
could  only  induce  Germany  to  use  her  influence  at  Vienna  to  avert  war  by 
approaching  her  in  the  capacity  of  a  friend  who  was  anxious  to  preserve 
peace.  His  excellency  must  not,  if  our  efforts  were  to  be  successful,  do  any- 
thing to  precipitate  a  conflict.  I  trusted  that  the  Russian  Government  would 
defer  mobilization  ukase  for  as  long  as  possible,  and  that  troops  would  not 
be  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier  even  when  it  was  issued. 

"The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that,  until  the  issue  of  the 
imperial  ukase,  no  effective  steps  toward  mobilization  could  be  taken,  and 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  profit  by  delay  in  order  to  com- 
plete her  military  preparations  if  it  were  deferred  too  long." 

In  a  supplementary  telegram  Buchanan  reported  that  M. 
Sazonof  had  proposed 

"that  the  modifications  to  be  introduced  into  Austrian  demands  should  be 
the  subject  of  direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  Eward  Goschen,  British  Ambassador 
at  Berlin,  that  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German  Ambassador  at 
London,  had  informed  him  that  Germany  accepted  in  principle 
the  four-power  mediation,  reserving  its  right  as  ally  to  help 
Austria  if  attacked. 

"He  has  also  been  instructed  to  request  me  to  use  influence  in  St.  Peters- 
burg to  localize  the  war  and  to  keep  up  the  peace  of  Europe. 

"I  have  replied  that  the  Serbian  reply  went  further  than  could  have  been 
expected  to  meet  the  Austrian  demands.  German  Secretary  of  State  [Von 
Jagow]  has  himself  said  that  there  were  some  things  in  the  Austrian  note 
that  Serbia  could  hardly  be  expected  to  accept.  I  assumed  that  Serbian 
reply  could  not  have  gone  as  far  as  it  did  unless  Russia  had  exercised  con- 
ciliatory influence  at  Belgrade,  and  it  was  really  at  Vienna  that  moderating 
influence  was  now  required.  If  Austria  put  the  Serbian  reply  aside  as  being 
worth  nothing  and  marched  into  Serbia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined 
to  crush  Serbia  at  all  costs,  being  reckless  of  the  consequences  that  might 
be  involved.  Serbian  reply  should  at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  dis- 
cussion and  pause.  I  said  German  Government  should  urge  this  at  Vienna. 

"I  recalled  what  German  Government  had  said  as  to  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  if  the  war  could  not  be  localized,  and  observed  that  if  Germany 
assisted  Austria  against  Russia  it  would  be  because,  without  any  reference 
to  the  merits  of  the  dispute,  Germany  could  not  afford  to  see  Austria  crushed. 
Just  so  other  issues  might  be  raised  that  would  supersede  the  dispute  be- 
tween Austria  and  Serbia,  and  would  bring  other  powers  in,  and  the  war 
would  be  the  biggest  ever  known;  but  as  long  as  Germany  would  work  to 
keep  the  peace  I  would  keep  closely  in  touch.  I  repeated  that  after  the 
Serbian  reply  it  was  at  Vienna  that  some  moderation  must  be  urged." 

Grey  telegraphed  Buchanan  at  St.  Petersburg,  referring  him 
to  the  above,  and  informing  him  that  the  Russian  Ambassador 


546  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

at  London,  Count  Benckendorff  had  told  him  [Grey]  that  the 
impression  prevailed  in  German  and  Austrian  circles  that  Great 
Britain  would  stand  aside  in  event  of  war.  This  the  Ambassa- 
dor deplored  for  its  adverse  effect  on  peace. 

Grey  informed  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  of  his  interview  just  held  with  Count  Mensdorff, 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  London. 

"Mensdorff  said  that  the  Austrian  Government,  very  reluctantly  and 
against  their  wish,  were  compelled  to  take  more  severe  measures  to  enforce 
a  fundamental  change  of  the  attitude  of  enmity  pursued  up  to  now  by 
Serbia.  .  .  .  We  would  understand  that  the  Austrian  Government  must 
consider  that  the  moment  had  arrived  to  obtain,  by  means  of  the  strongest 
pressure,  guaranties  for  the  definite  suppression  of  the  Serbian  aspirations 
and  for  the  security  of  peace  and  order  on  the  southeastern  frontier  of 
Austria. 

"As  the  peaceable  means  to  this  effect  were  exhausted,  the  Austrian 
Government  must  at  last  appeal  to  force.  Their  action,  which  had  no  sort 
of  aggressive  tendency,  could  not  be  represented  otherwise  than  as  self- 
defense.  Also  they  thought  that  they  would  serve  a  European  interest  if 
they  prevented  Serbia  from  being  henceforth  an  element  of  general  unrest 
such  as  she  had  been  for  the  last  ten  years.  The  high  sense  of  justice  of 
the  British  nation  and  of  British  statesmen  could  not  blame  the  Austrian 
Government  if  the  latter  defended  by  the  sword  what  was  theirs,  and  cleared 
up  their  position  with  a  country  whose  hostile  policy  had  forced  upon  them 
for  years  measures  so  costly  as  to  have  gravely  injured  Austrian  national 
prosperity.  Finally,  the  Austrian  Government,  confiding  in  their  amicable 
relations  with  us,  felt  that  they  could  count  on  our  sympathy  in  a  fight 
that  was  forced  on  them,  and  on  our  assistance  in  localizing  the  fight,  if 
necessary. 

"Count  Mensdorff  added  on  his  own  account  that,  as  long  as  Serbia  was 
confronted  with  Turkey,  Austria  never  took  very  severe  measures  because 
of  her  adherence  to  the  policy  of  the  free  development  of  the  Balkan  States. 
Now  that  Serbia  had  doubled  her  territory  and  population  without  any  Aus- 
trian interference,  the  repression  of  Serbian  subversive  aims  was  a  matter 
of  self-defense  and  self-preservation  on  Austria's  part.  He  reiterated  that 
Austria  had  no  intention  of  taking  Serbian  territory  or  aggressive  designs 
against  Serbian  territory. 

"I  said  that  I  could  not  understand  the  construction  put  by  the  Austrian 
Government  upon  the  Serbian  reply,  and  I  told  Count  Mensdorff  the  sub- 
stance of  the  conversation  that  I  had  had  with  the  German  Ambassador 
this  morning  about  that  reply. 

"Count  Mensdorff  admitted  that,  on  paper,  the  Serbian  reply  might  seem 
to  be  satisfactory;  but  the  Serbians  had  refused  the  one  thing — the  coopera- 
tion of  Austrian  officials  and  police — which  would  be  a  real  guaranty  that 
in  practice  the  Serbians  would  not  carry  on  their  subversive  campaign 
against  Austria. 


STATE    PAPERS  547 

"I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  as  if  the  Austrian  Government  believed  that, 
even  after  the  Serbian  reply,  they  could  make  war  upon  Serbia  anyhow, 
without  risk  of  bringing  Russia  into  the  dispute.  If  they  could  make  war 
on  Serbia  and  at  the  same  time  satisfy  Russia,  well  and  good;  but,  if  not, 
the  consequences  would  be  incalculable.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  I  quoted 
this  phrase  from  an  expression  of  the  views  of  the  German  Government. 
I  feared  that  it  would  be  expected  in  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Serbian  reply 
would  diminish  the  tension,  and  now,  when  Russia  found  that  there  was 
increased  tension,  the  situation  would  become  increasingly  serious.  Already 
the  effect  on  Europe  was  one  of  anxiety.  I  pointed  out  [as  an  instance  of 
this]  that  our  fleet  was  to  have  dispersed  to-day,  but  we  had  felt  unable 
to  let  it  disperse.  We  should  not  think  of  calling  up  reserves  at  this  moment, 
and  there  was  no  menace  in  what  we  had  done  about  our  fleet;  but,  owing 
to  the  possibility  of  a  European  conflagration,  it  was  impossible  for  us  to 
disperse  our  forces  at  this  moment.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  Serbian  reply 
already  involved  the  greatest  humiliation  to  Serbia  that  I  had  ever  seen 
a  country  undergo,  and  it  was  disappointing  to  me  that  the  reply  was 
treated  by  the  Austrian  Government  as  if  it  were  as  unsatisfactory  as  a 
blank  negative." 

Grey  informed  Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at 
Rome,  that  the  Italian  Ambassador  at  London  had  stated  to 
Sir  Arthur  Nicholson,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that 
Italy  agreed  to  the  four-power  conference,  and  that  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giuliano,  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  would 
recommend  to  Germany  the  suggestion  that  Russia,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  Serbia  should  suspend  military  operations  pending 
result  of  the  conference,  and  would  inquire  what  procedure  Ger- 
many proposed  to  be  followed  at  Vienna. 

Sir  Francis  Bertie,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  sent  Grey  a 
memorandum  of  M.  Bienvenu-Martin's,  French  Acting  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  as  to  steps  to  be  taken  to  prevent  hostilities 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  has  been 
requested  to  act  in  concert  with  the  British  Ambassador  there 
in  Grey's  plan.  M.  Paul  Cambon,"  Ambassador  at  London,  has 
been  appointed  France's  representative  in  the  four-power  con- 
ference. France  is  ready  to  instruct  her  representatives  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Belgrade  to  induce  these  govern- 
ments to  abstain  from  hostilities  pending  the  results  of  the 
conference. 

But  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  considers  success  of  the  conference 


548  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

depends  on  the  action  Berlin  is  willing  to  take  at  Vienna  before- 
hand. 

Sir  George  Buchanan,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  tele- 
graphed to  Grey  an  account  of  an  interview  just  had  with  M. 
Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Sazonof  was  conciliatory 
and  optimistic. 

"Sazonof  said  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  stand  aside  if  the  powers  accepted 
the  proposal  for  a  conference,  but  he  trusted  that  you  would  keep  in  touch 
with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  the  event  of  its  taking  place." 

France.  M.  Farges,  Consul  General  at  Basle,  Switzerland, 
reported  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Paris,  that  German  officers  on  leave  in  this  district  had 
been  ordered  to  return  to  Germany,  and  that  owners  of  motor 
cars  in  Baden  had  been  ordered  to  be  ready  to  place  them  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Government,  and  secrecy  enjoined  as  to  the  order 
under  penalty  of  fine.  People  at  Basle  are  uneasy,  and  banking 
facilities  restricted. 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London,  reported  to 
M.  Bienvenu-Martin  that  the  German  and  Austrian  Ambas- 
sadors there  were  letting  it  appear  that  they  were  sure  Great 
Britain  would  preserve  neutrality  in  case  of  war.  Sir  Arthur 
Nicholson,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had,  however, 
assured  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German  Ambassador,  that  Great 
Britain  was  free  to  intervene  if  she  judged  it  expedient.  To 
make  this  understood  in  Germany,  nevertheless,  that  Govern- 
ment should  be  made  to  know  for  certain  that  they  will  find 
Great  Britain  by  the  side  of  France  and  Russia. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  telegraphed 
that  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  using  con- 
ciliatory language  to  the  ambassadors,  and  was  restraining  the 
press,  particularly  in  recommending  great  moderation  toward 
Germany. 

M.  Bompard,  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  telegraphed  from 
Therapia  that  the  Turks  were  delighted  at  the  misfortunes  of 
Serbia,  and  thought  that  Russia  will  not  intervene  in  her  favor 
under  circumstances  which  would  extend  the  war  beyond  Serbia 
and  Austria. 


STATE    PAPERS  549 

"The  unanimous  feeling  in  Ottoman  political  circles  is  that  Austria,  with 
the  support  of  Germany,  will  attain  her  objects,  and  that  she  will  make 
Serbia  follow  Bulgaria  and  enter  into  the  orbit  of  the  Triple  Alliance." 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London,  reported  the 
interview  between  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador. 

"The  attitude  of  Great  Britain  is  confirmed  by  the  postponement  of  the 
demobilization  of  the  fleet.  The  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  [Winston 
Churchill]  took  this  measure  quietly  on  Friday  on  his  own  initiative;  to- 
night Sir  Edward  Grey  and  his  colleagues  decided  to  make  it  public.  This 
result  is  due  to  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  Serbia  and  Russia." 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  London,  reported  news 
from  St.  Petersburg  of  the  willingness  of  Russia  to  stand  aside 
if  Serbia  appealed  to  the  powers.  Accordingly  Sir  Edward  Grey 
will  proceed  with  his  plan  of  a  conference,  on  the  understanding 
that,  pending  its  results,  Russia,  Austria,  and  Serbia  abstain 
from  active  military  operations.  To  this  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, Prince  Lichnowsky  is  favorably  disposed.  Later  M.  de 
Fleuriau  reported  that  the  Serbian  Minister  at  London,  M. 
Boschkovitch,  had  not  yet  received  instructions  to  ask  for  British 
mediation.  Possibly  telegrams  to  that  effect  had  been  stopped 
on  the  way. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  having  received  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pro- 
posal for  the  four-power  conference,  authorized  M.  de  Fleuriau 
to  represent  France  in  it.  He  repeated  his  conviction  of  failure 
of  the  conference  unless  Germany's  influence  were  first  exercised 
pacifically  at  Vienna. 

"I  have  also  noted,  during  Baron  von  Schoen's  observations,  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  was  particularly  susceptible  when  the  words 
'mediation,'  'intervention,'  'conference'  were  used,  and  was  more  willing  to 
admit  'friendly  advice'  and  'conversations.'  " 

De  Fleuriau  reported  that  Italy  had  accepted  intervention  by 
the  powers  to  prevent  military  operations.  Germany  had  not 
yet  replied  to  Italy's  request  for  information  as  to  procedure  to 
be  followed  with  regard  to  Austria-Hungary. 

M.  Barrere,  Ambassador  at  Rome,  reported  his  interview  with 
the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  in  which  that  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  repudiated  his  reported  approval  of  the  action  of 
Austria-Hungary. 

O— Gt.  War  2 


550  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

"He  is  convinced  that  Austria  will  not  withdraw  any  of  her  claims,  and 
will  maintain  them,  even  at  the  risk  of  bringing  about  a  general  conflagra- 
tion ;  he  doubts  whether  Germany  is  disposed  to  lend  herself  to  any  pressure 
on  her  ally.  He  asserts,  however,  that  Germany  at  this  moment  attaches 
great  importance  to  her  relations  with  London,  and  he  believes  that  if  any 
power  can  determine  Berlin  in  favor  of  peaceful  action,  it  is  England. 

"As  for  Italy  she  will  continue  to  make  every  effort  in  favor  of  peace. 
It  is  with  this  end  in  view  that  he  had  adhered  without  hesitation  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  meeting  in  London  of  the  ambassadors  of 
those  powers  which  are  not  directly  interested  in  the  Austro-Serbian 
dispute." 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  the  interview 
of  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British  Ambassador,  with  the  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State,  and  said  that  Herr  von  Jagow's 
language  confirmed  that  of  Baron  von  Schoen  at  Paris. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  then  notified  the  French  Ambassadors  at 
London,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome,  of  his  inter- 
view with  Count  Szeesen,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador, 
and  the  memorandum  he  had  submitted  criticizing  the  Serbian 
reply  to  the  Austrian  note. 

Belgium.  Baron  Beyens,  Minister  at  Berlin,  reported  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Brussels,  the  diplo- 
matic situation  at  the  German  capital.  Germany  had  not  replied 
to  the  British  proposal.  "The  decision  rests  with  the  emperor." 


TUESDAY,      JULY      28,      1914 

Serbia.  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  this  day  telegraphed  to  M.  Pashitch,  Serbian  Prime 
Minister,  that  Serbia's  reply  to  the  Austrian  note  being  unsatis-* 
factory,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 

"was  compelled  to  see  to  the  safeguarding  of  their  rights  and  interests,  and, 
with  this  object,  to  have  recourse  to  force  of  arms.     Austria-Hungary  con 
sequently  considers  herself  henceforward  in  a  state  of  war  with  Serbia." 

M.  Pashitch  telegraphed  this  news  from  Nish  to  all  the  Ser- 
bian Legations  abroad. 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Petrograd,  gave  the 
information  officially  to  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs. 


STATE    PAPERS  551 

"I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  excellency  of  this  regrettable  act,  which 
a  great  power  had  the  courage  to  commit  against  a  small  Slav  country  which 
only  recently  emerged  from  a  long  series  of  heroic  but  exhausting  battles, 
and  I  beg  leave  on  this  occasion  of  deep  gravity  for  my  country  to  express 
the  hope  that  this  act,  which  disturbs  the  peace  of  Europe  and  revolts  her 
conscience,  will  be  condemned  by  the  whole  civilized  world  and  severely  pun- 
ished by  Russia,  the  protector  of  Serbia. 

"I  beg  your  excellency  to  be  so  kind  as  to  lay  this  petition  from  the  whole 
Serbian  nation  before  the  throne  of  his  majesty." 

Austria-Hungary.  An  official  communication  was  given  to  the 
press  at  Vienna  summarizing  the  Government's  criticism  of  the 
Serbian  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  note. 

"Inasmuch  as  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands  constitute  the  minimum 
regarded  as  necessary  for  the  reestablishment  of  a  permanent  peace  in  the 
southeast  of  the  [Dual]  Monarchy,  the  Serbian  reply  is  considered  to  be 
insufficient. 

"That  the  Serbian  Government  is  aware  of  this  appears  from  the  fact 
that  they  contemplate  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  by  arbitration,  and  also 
from  the  fact  that  on  the  day  on  which  their  reply  was  due,  and  before  it 
was  in  fact  submitted,  they  gave  orders  for  mobilization." 

Count  Szogyeny,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold  that  Germany  had  declined  to 
take  part  in  the  four  power-conference 

"on  the  ground  that  it  is  impossibe  for  Germany  to  bring  her  ally  before 
a  European  court  in  her  settlement  with  Serbia." 

Baron  von  Muller  telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold  from  Tokyo, 
Japan,  that  the  semiofficial  Japan  "Times"  concludes  a  leading 
article  on  the  Serbian  question  with  the  statement  that  Japan 
is  on  the  best  of  terms  with  the  three  great  powers  con- 
cerned, Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and  Russia,  while  it  is 
in  no  way  interested  in  Serbia.  He  infers  that,  in  case  of 
war,  Japan  would,  as  a  matter  of  course,  maintain  strict 
neutrality. 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin  the 
report  made  by  Count  Mensdorff,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
at  London,  of  his  interview  on  the  27th  with  Sir  Edward 
Grey. 

"I  believe  that  I  need  not  specially  point  out  to  your  excellency  that 
Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference,  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  our  conflict  with 
Serbia,  appears,  in  view  of  the  state  of  war  which  has  arisen,  to  have  been 
outstripped  by  events." 


552      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  Count  Mensdorff  in  London  to 
explain  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  detail  the  dossier  of  charges 
against  Serbia  accompanying  the  Austrian  note,  and 

"make  clear  to  him  that  the  offer  of  Serbia  to  meet  points  in  our  note  was 
only  an  apparent  one,  intended  to  deceive  Europe  without  giving  any  guar- 
anty for  the  future. 

"As  the  Serbian  Government  knew  that  only  an  unconditional  acceptance 
of  our  demands  could  satisfy  us,  the  Serbian  tactics  can  easily  be  seen 
through :  Serbia  accepted  a  number  of  our  demands,  with  all  sorts  of  reser- 
vations, in  order  to  impress  public  opinion  in  Europe,  trusting  that  she 
would  not  be  required  to  fulfill  her  promises.  In  conversing  with  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  your  excellency  should  lay  special  emphasis  on  the  circumstance  that 
the  general  mobilization  of  the  Serbian  army  was  ordered  for  the  afternoon 
of  July  25  at  three  o'clock,  while  the  answer  to  our  note  was  delivered  just 
before  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed — that  is  to  say,  a  few  minutes  before 
six  o'clock.  Up  to  then  we  had  made  no  military  preparations,  but  by  the 
Serbian  mobilization  we  were  compelled  to  do  so." 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Szapary,  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  an  account  of  an  interview  with  the  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Vienna.  Count  Berchtold  had  informed  M. 
Schebeko  of  Austria-Hungary's  inability  to  concur  in  Russia's 
proposal  to  take  the  Serbian  reply  to  the  Austrian  note  as  a 
starting  point  for  an  understanding  between  the  disputants. 

"No  one  in  pur  country  could  understand,  nor  could  anyone  approve 
negotiations  with  reference  to  the  wording  used  in  the  answer  which  we  had 
designated  as  unsatisfactory.  This  was  all  the  more  impossible  because, 
as  the  ambassador  knew,  there  was  a  deep  feeling  of  general  excitement 
which  had  already  mastered  public  opinion.  Moreover,  on  our  side  war  had 
to-day  been  declared  against  Serbia. 

"In  reply  to  the  explanations  of  the  ambassador,  which  culminated  in 
asserting  that  we  should  not  in  any  way  suppress  the  admitted  hostile 
opinion  in  Serbia  by  a  warlike  action,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  we  should 
only  increase  it,  I  gave  him  some  insight  into  our  present  relations  toward 
Serbia  which  made  it  necessary,  quite  against  our  will,  and  without  any 
selfish  secondary  object,  for  us  to  show  our  restless  neighbor,  with  the 
necessary  emphasis,  our  firm  intention  not  to  permit  any  longer  a  movement 
which  was  allowed  to  exist  by  the  Government,  and  which  was  directed 
against  the  existence  of  the  [Dual]  Monarchy.  The  attitude  of  Serbia 
after  the  receipt  of  our  note  had  further  not  been  calculated  to  make  a 
peaceful  solution  possible,  because  Serbia,  even  before  she  transmitted  to  us 
her  unsatisfactory  reply,  had  ordered  a  general  mobilization,  and  in  so 
doing  had  already  committed  a  hostile  act  against  us.  In  spite  of  this, 
however,  we  had  waited  for  three  days.  Yesterday  hostilities  were  opened 
against  us  on  the  Hungarian  frontier  on  the  part  of  Serbia.  By  this  act 


STATE    PAPERS  553 

we  were  deprived  of  the  possibility  of  maintaining  any  longer  the  patience 
which  we  had  shown  toward  Serbia.  The  establishment  of  a  fundamental 
but  peaceful  amelioration  of  our  relations  toward  Serbia  had  now  been 
made  impossible,  and  we  were  compelled  to  meet  the  Serbian  provocation 
in  the  only  form  which  in  the  given  circumstances  was  consistent  with 
the  dignity  of  the  monarchy." 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Mensdorff  in  London 
of  his  interview  with  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Am- 
bassador in  Vienna.  Bunsen  had  explained  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
position. 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin  to  com- 
municate to  the  German  Chancellor  or  Secretary  of  State  the 
following  information: 

"According  to  mutually  consistent  reports,  received  from  St.  Petersburg, 
Kiev,  Warsaw,  Moscow,  and  Odessa,  Russia  is  making  extensive  military 
preparations.  M.  Sazonof  has  indeed  given  an  assurance  on  his  word  of 
honor,  as  has  also  the  Russian  Minister  of  War,  that  mobilization  has  not 
up  to  now  been  ordered;  the  latter  has,  however,  told  the  German  Military 
Attache  that  the  military  districts  which  border  on  Austria-Hungary — Kiev, 
Odessa,  Moscow,  and  Kazan — will  be  mobilized  should  our  troops  cross  the 
Serbian  frontier. 

"Under  these  circumstances  I  would  urgently  ask  the  Cabinet  at  Berlin 
to  take  into  immediate  consideration  the  question  whether  the  attention 
of  Russia  should  not  be  drawn,  in  a  friendly  manner,  to  the  fact  that  the 
mobilization  of  the  above  districts  amounts  to  a  threat  against  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  that,  therefore,  should  these  measures  be  carried  out,  they 
would  be  answered  by  the  most  extensive  military  countermeasures,  not  only 
by  the  [Dual]  Monarchy  but  by  our  ally,  the  German  Empire. 

"In  order  to  make  it  more  easy  for  Russia  to  withdraw,  it  appears  to  us 
appropriate  that  such  a  step  should,  in  the  first  place,  be  taken  by  Germany 
alone;  nevertheless  we  are  ready  to  take  this  step  in  conjunction  with 
Germany. 

"Unambiguous  language  appears  to  me  at  the  present  moment  to  be  the 
most  effective  method  of  making  Russia  fully  conscious  of  all  that  is  involved 
in  a  threatening  attitude." 

Russia.  Consul  General  at  Fiume  telegraphed  to  M.  Sazonof, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  a  state  of 
siege  had  been  proclaimed  in  Slavonia,  in  Croatia,  and  at  Fiume, 
and  reservists  of  all  classes  called  out. 

M.  Broniewsky,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  telegraphed 
M.  Sazonof  that  the  local  papers  had  not  published  in  extenso 
the  Serbian  reply,  evidently  being  well  aware  of  the  calming 
effect  it  would  have  on  German  readers. 


554     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

M.  Schebeko,  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  telegraphed  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  order  for  general  mobilization  had  been 
signed. 

M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  the  ambassadors  at  London,  Paris, 
Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome: 

"In  face  of  the  hostilities  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  it  is 
necessary  that  Great  Britain  should  take  instant  mediatory  action,  and  that 
the  military  measures  undertaken  by  Austria  against  Serbia  should  be  im- 
mediately suspended.  Otherwise  mediation  will  only  serve  as  an  excuse  to 
make  the  question  drag  on,  and  will  meanwhile  make  it  possible  for  Aus- 
tria to  crush  Serbia  completely  and  to  acquire  a  dominant  position  in  the 
Balkans." 

Germany.  The  Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  con- 
fidentially reported  to  the  Government  of  Germany  that  the  evi- 
dence presented  by  Austria-Hungary  was  conclusive  of  the  com- 
plicity in  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  of  members  of  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment and  army,  and  the  existence  of  organized  Serb  propa- 
ganda against  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Austria-Hungary  therefore 
was  justified  in  her  action  as  well  as  demands  against  Serbia. 

The  Chancellor  telegraphed  to  Count  Pourtales,  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg: 

"We  continue  in  our  endeavor  to  induce  Vienna  to  elucidate  in  St.  Peters- 
burg the  object  and  scope  of  the  Austrian  action  in  Serbia  in  a  manner 
both  convincing  and  satisfactory  to  Russia.  The  declaration  of  war  which 
has  meanwhile  ensued  alters  nothing  in  this  matter." 

Count  Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Vienna,  tele- 
graphed to  the  German  Chancellor  that  the  British  mediation 
proposal,  "owing  to  the  opening  of  hostilities  by  Serbia,"  was 
"belated."  William  II  at  10.45  p.  m.,  sent  the  following  message 
to  Nicholas  II: 

"I  have  heard  with  the  greatest  anxiety  of  the  impression  which  is 
caused  by  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia.  The  unscrupu- 
lous agitation  which  has  been  going  on  for  years  in  Serbia  has  led  to  the 
revolting  crime  of  which  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  has  become  a  victim. 
The  spirit  which  made  the  Serbians  murder  their  own  king  and  his  consort 
still  dominates  that  country.  Doubtless  you  will  agree  with  me  that  both 
of  us,  you  as  well  as  I,  and  all  other  sovereigns,  have  a  common  interest 
to  insist  that  all  those  who  are  responsible  for  this  horrible  murder  shall 
suffer  their  deserved  punishment. 

"On  the  other  hand,  I  by  no  means  overlook  the  difficulty  encountered 
by  you  and  your  Government  to  stem  the  tide  of  public  opinion.  In  view 


STATE    PAPERS  555 

of  the  cordial  friendship  which  has  joined  us  both  for  a  long  time  with 
firm  ties,  I  shall  use  my  entire  influence  to  induce  Austria-Hungary  to 
obtain  a  frank  and  satisfactory  understanding  with  Russia.  I  hope  con- 
fidently that  you  will  support  me  in  my  efforts  to  overcome  all  difficulties 
which  may  yet  arise. 

"Your  most  sincere  and  devoted  friend  and  cousin." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
sent  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Lon- 
don, the  text  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  declaration  of  war  against 
Serbia.  This  was  followed  by  the  statements : 

"Austria-Hungary,  who  has  just  addressed  to  Serbia  a  formal  declara- 
tion, in  conformity  with  Article  I  of  the  convention  of  October  18,  1907, 
relative  to  the  opening  of  hostilities,  considers  herself  henceforward  in  a 
state  of  war  with  Serbia. 

"In  bringing  the  above  to  notice  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's  embassy,  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  the  honor  to  declare  that  Austria-Hungary 
will  act  during  the  hostilities  in  conformity  with  the  terms  of  the  conven- 
tions of  the  The  Hague  of  October  18,  1907,  as  also  with  those  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  of  February  28,  1909,  provided  an  analogous  procedure  is 
adopted  by  Serbia." 

The  French  Embassy  informed  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  France 
accepted  his  four-power  mediation  proposal,  and  had  appointed 
M.  Paul  Cambon  her  representative  in  the  conference. 

Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  com- 
municated to  Grey  a  telegram  from  M.  Sazonof ,  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  which  stated  that  his  interviews  with  the 
German  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales,  confirmed  his  impression 
that  Germany  would  support  Austria-Hungary's  uncompromising 
attitude. 

"The  Berlin  Cabinet,  who  could  have  prevented  the  whole  of  this  crisis 
developing,  appear  to  be  exerting  no  influence  on  their  ally.  .  .  . 

"This  attitude  of  the  German  Government  is  most  alarming. 

"It  seems  to  me  that  Great  Britain  is  in  a  better  position  than  any  other 
power  to  make  another  attempt  at  Berlin  to  induce  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  take  the  necessary  action.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  key  of  the 
situation  is  to  be  found  at  Berlin." 

Sir  Francis  Bertie,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  telegraphed  Grey 
that  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
realized  the  position  of  Great  Britain. 

"He  quite  appreciates  the  impossibility  for  his  [British]  majesty's 
Government  to  declare  themselves  'solidaires'  with  Russia  on  a  question 
between  Austria  and  Serbia,  which  in  its  present  condition  is  not  one 


556      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

affecting  England.  He  also  sees  that  you  cannot  take  up  an  attitude  at 
Berlin  and  Vienna  more  Serbian  than  that  attributed  in  German  and  Aus- 
trian sources  to  the  Russian  Government. 

"The  German  Ambassador  [Baron  von  Schoen]  has  stated  that  Austria 
would  respect  the  integrity  of  Serbia,  but  when  asked  whether  her  inde- 
pendence also  would  be  respected,  he  gave  no  assurance." 

Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  that, 
after  conference  with  his  French  and  Italian  colleagues,  he  had 
found  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow  had,  while 
refusing  to  take  part  in  the  proposed  conference,  said  to  all  of 
them  that  he  desired  to  work  with  their  Governments  for  the 
maintenance  of  general  peace. 

"We  therefore  deduced  that  if  he  is  sincere  in  this  wish  he  can  be 
objecting  only  to  the  form  of  your  proposal.  Perhaps  he  himself  could 
be  induced  to  suggest  lines  on  which  he  would  find  it  possible  to  work 
with  us." 

Maurice  de  Bunsen,  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  telegraphed  that 
Count  Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  declared  Austria- 
Hungary  could  not  delay  military  proceedings  against  Serbia, 
and  so  declined  the  mediation  proposed. 

"Prestige  of  [Dual]  Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  now  pre- 
vent conflict." 

The  Ambassador  supplemented  this  in  a  longer  telegram,  giv- 
ing details  of  his  interview  with  Count  Berchtold. 

Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  Ambassador  at  Rome,  telegraphed  an  ac- 
count of  an  interview  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Prime  Min- 
ister, had  just  had  with  the  Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires. 

If  explanations  were  given  of  mode  in  which  Austrian  agents 
would  intervene  under  Articles  V  and  VI  of  the  note  to  Serbia, 
Serbia  might  still  accept  the  whole  note.  This  explanation  could 
be  imparted,  without  loss  of  dignity  to  Austria,  through  the 
powers,  who  might  then  advise  Serbia  to  accept  the  note  with- 
out conditions. 

The  Marquis  pointed  out  a  passage  in  the  Austrian  note  which 
had  been  misinterpreted  by  Serbia,  and  so  might  be  used  as  a 
basis  for  settlement,  namely,  that  regarding  cooperation  of  Aus- 
trian agents  in  Serbia;  this  was  to  be  only  in  investigation,  not 
in  judicial  or  administrative  measures. 


STATE    PAPERS  657 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Serbia,  telegraphed 
from  Nish  that  he  was  urging  greatest  moderation  on  the  Ser- 
bian Government  pending  mediatory  efforts  by  the  powers. 

"Two  Serbian  steamers  fired  on  and  damaged,  and  two  Serbian  merchant 
•  vessels  have  been  captured  by  a  Hungarian  monitor  at  Orsova." 

This  was  supplemented  by  a  telegram  that  war  had  been  de- 
clared by  Austria. 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, explaining  the  nature  of  his  proposed  four-power  conference. 
No  suggestion  would  be  put  forward  that  has  not  previously  been 
ascertained  to  be  acceptable  to  Austria  and  Russia.  A  direct 
exchange  of  views  between  these  countries  is  preferable  to  all 
other  methods.  This  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
M.  Sazonof,  is  reported  to  have  offered.  If  Austria  accepts, 
the  situation  will  become  less  critical.  Prince  Lichnowsky,  Ger- 
man Ambassador  at  London,  reports  that  his  Government  has 
counseled  moderation  at  Vienna.  This  is  very  satisfactory. 

A  supplementary  telegram  read: 

"German  Government,  having  accepted  principle  of  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Eussia  by  the  four  powers,  if  necessary,  I  am  ready  to  pro- 
pose that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  should  suggest  the  lines  on  which 
this  principle  should  be  applied.  I  will,  however,  keep  the  idea  in  reserve 
until  we  see  how  the  conversations  between  Austria  and  Russia  progress." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  George  Buchanan,  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  his  satisfaction  over  prospect  of  direct  exchange 
of  views  between  Russia  and  Austria,  and  readiness  to  facilitate 
this  if  he  knew  what  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  proposes  that  the  ministers  at  Belgrade  do. 

"Could  he  not  first  mention  in  an  exchange  of  views  with  Austria  his 
willingness  to  cooperate  in  some  such  scheme?  It  might  then  take  more 
concrete  shape." 

Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  report 
to  Grey  on  the  28th  inst.  of  an  interview  with  the  German  Chan- 
cellor, Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg.  The  Chancellor  was  most 
anxious  for  Germany  and  Great  Britain  to  work  together  for 
European  peace,  as  they  had  successfully  done  in  last  preceding 
crisis.  He  could  not  accept  the  four-power  proposal,  since  the 
conference  would  look  like  an  "Areopagus"  of  two  groups  of  two 


558  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

powers,  each  sitting  in  judgment  on  two  other  powers,  but  this 
refusal  should  not  militate  against  his  strong  desire  for  effective 
cooperation.  He  was  doing  his  best  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg 
to  get  both  powers  into  friendly  direct  discussion,  but  if,  as  re- 
ported, Russia  had  mobilized  fourteen  army  corps  in  the  south, 
this  would  put  it  out  of  his  power  to  continue  preaching  mod- 
eration at  Vienna.  Austria,  who  was  only  partially  mobilizing, 
would  have  to  take  similar  measures;  so,  if  war  results,  Russia 
will  be  responsible. 

Goschen  remarked  that  surely  part  of  the  responsibility  rested 
on  Austria  for  refusing  to  accept  the  almost  wholly  compliant 
reply  of  Serbia,  or  to  admit  it  as  a  basis  for  discussion.  The 
Chancellor  repeated  his  views  about  the  Serbian  question 
being  wholly  Austria's  affair,  with  which  Russia  had  nothing 
to  do. 

"Austrian  colleague  said  to  me  to-day  that  a  general  war  was  most  un- 
likely, as  Russia  neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a  position  to  make  war.  I  think 
that  that  opinion  is  shared  by  many  people  here." 

Ambassador  Buchanan  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  report 
of  interview  with  M.  Sazonof ,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  who  thanked  Grey  for  his  language  to  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky,  the  German  Ambassador.  Sazonof  was  pessimistic. 
Buchanan  asked  him  if  he  would  be  satisfied  with  Austria's 
assurances  to  respect  Serbia's  integrity  and  independence.  He 
replied:  Not  if  she  attacked  Serbia;  that  he  would  order  mo- 
bilization on  the  day  that  Austria  crossed  the  Serbian  frontier. 

"I  told  the  German  Ambassador  [Count  Pourtales],  who  appealed  to  me 
to  give  moderating  counsels  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  from 
the  beginning  I  had  not  ceased  to  do  so,  and  that  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  should  now  in  his  turn  use  his  restraining  influence.  I  made 
it  clear  to  his  excellency  that,  Russia  being  thoroughly  in  earnest,  a  general 
war  could  not  be  averted  if  Serbia  were  attacked  by  Austria." 

Ambassador  de  Bunsen  at  Vienna  telegraphed  news  of  Aus- 
tria's declaration  of  war  against  Serbia,  and  her  declination  of 
Russia's  suggestion  of  direct  discussion  with  her.  Russian 
Ambassador  Schebeko  said  that  the  London  conference  now 
offered  the  only  prospect  of  European  peace,  and  he  was  sure 
Russia  would  agree  to  it. 


STATE    PAPERS  559 

"So  long  as  opposing  armies  have  not  actually  come  in  contact,  all  hope 
need  not  be  abandoned." 

France.  M.  Viviani,  French  Prime  Minister,  on  board  La 
France,  telegraphed  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  at  Paris,  approving  his  course.  Russia  was  not 
responsible  for  present  situation,  and  Germany  could  not  with 
grace  refuse  to  counsel  Austria,  provoker  of  the  crisis.  He 
approved  Grey's  proposition  of  a  four-power  conference. 

"The  action  of  the  four  less  interested  powers  cannot  ...  be  exerted  only 
at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  In  proposing  to  exert  it  also  at  Belgrade, 
which  means,  in  fact,  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade,  Sir  E.  Grey  grasps  the 
logic  of  the  situation ;  and,  in  not  excluding  St.  Petersburg,  he  offers,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  Germany  a  method  of  withdrawing  with  perfect  dignity 
from  the  demarche  by  which  the  German  Government  have  caused  it  to  be 
known  at  Paris  and  at  London  that  the  affair  was  looked  upon  by  them  as 
purely  Austro-Serbian  and  without  any  general  character." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  replied  to  M.  Viviani  that  Germany  had 
taken  no  sincere  action  to  hold  back  Austria,  and  was  opposing 
Grey's  plan  of  mediation,  thus  dooming  it  to  failure.  Austria  will 
take  energetic  measures  to-morrow,  the  29th,  to  compel  Serbia  to 
give  them  the  satisfaction  demanded,  and  has  begun  to  mobilize. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassador  at  London,  reported  interviews 
of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  with  Count 
Mensdorff,  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  and  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky,  German  Ambassador.  The  first  continued  to  maintain 
that  the  Serbian  reply  was  unacceptable.  The  second  talked  like 
Baron  von  Schoen  at  Paris;  he  desired  Great  Britain  to  use 
moderating  influence  at  St.  Petersburg.  Grey  replied  that  this 
would  be  embarrassing,  as  Russia  had  been  moderate  from  the 
beginning,  especially  in  her  pacific  advice  to  Serbia.  It  was  at 
Vienna  that  action  was  necessary,  and  there  Germany's  help 
was  indispensable.  News  had  come  from  St.  Petersburg  of  the 
first  direqt  conversations  between  Russia  and  Austria,  that  of 
Prime  Minister  Sazonof  and  Ambassador  Szapary.  Secretary 
Grey  and  Under-Secretary  Nicholson  were  doubtful  of  its  suc- 
cess, since  M.  Sazonof  had  not  yet  secured  assent  to  a  revision  of 
the  Serbian  note  by  the  two  cabinets. 

"In  any  case,  at  a  moment  when  the  least  delay  might  have  serious  con- 
sequences, it  would  be  very  desirable  that  these  direct  negotiations  should 


560      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

be  carried  on  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  hamper  Sir  E.  Grey's  action,  and  not 
to  furnish  Austria  with  a  pretext  for  slipping  out  of  the  friendly  inter- 
vention of  the  fcur  powers. 

"The  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  having  made  a  determined  effort  to 
obtain  Herr  von  Jagow's  adherence  to  Sir  E.  Grey's  suggestion,  the  German 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  it  was  best  to  await  the  result  of 
the  conversation  which  had  been  begun  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna. 
Sir  E.  Grey  has,  in  consequence,  directed  Sir  E.  Goschen  to  suspend  his 
demarche  for  the  moment.  In  addition,  the  news  that  Austria  has  just 
officially  declared  war  against  Serbia  opens  a  new  phase  of  the  question." 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  an  inter- 
view of  Herr  von  Jagow  with  M.  Broniewsky,  Russian  Charge 
d'Affaires,  in  which  the  German  Secretary  of  State  was  hopeful 
that  Austria-Hungary's  willingness  to  converse  with  Russia 
after  the  expiration  of  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia  might  discover  an 
issue  from  present  difficulties.  M.  Cambon  adds  that  perhaps 
Austria  is  seeking  time  to  make  her  preparations. 

Von  Jagow  told  Cambon  that  he  could  not  accept  the  kind  of 
conference  proposed  by  Grey,  and  that  success  depended  on  medi- 
ation taking  another  form. 

"I  laid  stress  upon  the  danger  of  delay,  which  might  bring  on  war,  and 
asked  him  if  he  wished  for  war.  He  protested,  and  added  that  direct  con- 
versations between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  were  in  progress,  and  that 
from  now  on  he  expected  a  favorable  result." 

Von  Jagow  had  made  the  same  suggestion  to  the  British  and 
Italian  Ambassadors. 

"My  colleagues  and  I  thought  that  this  was  only  a  question  of  form,  and 
the  British  Ambassador  is  going  to  suggest  to  his  Government  that  they 
should  change  the  wording  of  their  proposal,  which  might  take  the  character 
of  a  diplomatic  demarche  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 

"In  consequence  of  the  repugnance  shown  by  Herr  von  Jagow  to  any 
demarche  at  Vienna,  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  put  him  in  a  dilemma  by  ask- 
ing him  to  state  himself  precisely  how  diplomatic  action  by  the  powers  to 
avoid  war  could  be  brought  about. 

"We  ought  to  associate  ourselves  with  every  effort  in  favor  of  peace 
compatible  with  our  engagements  toward  our  ally;  but  to  place  the  respon- 
sibility in  the  proper  quarter,  we  must  take  care  to  ask  Germany  to  state 
precisely  what  she  wishes." 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  reported  that 
M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  said 
"Austria  is  unwilling  to  converse." 


STATE    PAPERS  561 

M.  Dumaine,  Ambassador  to  Vienna,  reported  the  declaration 
of  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  British  Ambassador  Bunsen  that  discussion  of  the 
Serbian  reply  was  useless,  war  having  been  declared.  M. 
Schebeko,  Russian  Ambassador,  said  that  his  position  from  the 
beginning  had  been  that  the  question  was  not  of  localizing  the 
war,  but  preventing  it.  The  declaration  of  war  made  pourparlers 
by  the  four  powers  extremely  difficult.  The  German  formula, 
"Mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia,"  is  unsuitable,  since  it 
assumes  a  dispute  between  the  two  empires  which  does  not  exist. 


WEDNESDAY,      JULY      29,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  On  the  following  day,  July  29,  1914,  Count 
Berchtold,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Vienna,  telegraphed 
the  Ambassadors  at  St.  Petersburg,  London,  Paris,  and  Rome, 
copies  of  a  memorandum  which  he  had  handed  Herr  von 
Tschirscky  that  day  in  answer  to  the  demarche  made  by  the 
German  Ambassador,  namely  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ment  should  accept  the  Serbian  reply  either  as  satisfactory  or  as 
a  basis  for  discussion.  The  memorandum  declared  that,  con- 
trary to  the  assumption  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  at  whose  instance  the  proceeding  was  taken, 
the  parts  of  the  Serbian  reply  which  were  not  accepted  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary are  the  most  vital  in  it,  since  they  contain  the 
guarantees  for  Serbia's  observance  of  the  demands  made  on  her. 
So,  too,  it  is  an  assumption  that  the  action  taken  against  Serbia 
was  directed  against  Russia  and  her  influence  in  the  Balkans. 
Austria-Hungary  does  not  charge  Russia  with  instigating  the 
Serbian  propaganda  against  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Our  feelings 
toward  her  are  entirely  friendly. 

Austria-Hungary  cannot  adopt  the  desired  attitude  toward  the 
Serbian  reply  since  this  has  already  been  outstripped  by  events. 
Our  declaration  of  war  was  made  after  vainly  waiting  three 
days  for  Serbia  to  abandon  her  point  of  view. 

"If  the  British  Cabinet  is  prepared  to  use  its  influence  on  the  Russian 
Government  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  between  the  great 


562     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

powers,  and  with  a  view  to  the  localization  of  the  war  which  has  been 
forced  upon  us  by  many  years  of  Serbian  intrigues,  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  could  only  welcome  this." 

Ambassador  Szecsen  telegraphed  from  Paris  that  France  was 
unmistakably  making  military  preparations. 

"The  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Schoen  is  commissioned  to  discuss 
these  preparations  with  M.  Viviani  [French  Prime  Minister]  to-day,  and 
to  point  out  that  in  these  circumstances  Germany  may  be  compelled  to  take 
similar  measures  which  necessarily  could  not  be  kept  secret,  and  which 
could  not  fail  to  cause  great  public  excitement  when  they  became  known. 
In  this  way  the  two  countries,  although  they  are  only  striving  for  peace, 
will  be  compelled  to  at  least  a  partial  mobilization,  which  would  be 
dangerous. 

"Further,  in  accordance  with  these  instructions,  Baron  Schoen  will  de- 
clare that  Germany  has  a  lively  desire  that  the  conflict  between  us  and 
Serbia  should  remain  localized,  and  that  in  this  Germany  relies  on  the  sup- 
port of  France." 

Ambassador  Szogyeny  telegraphed  from  Berlin  that  as  early 
as  the  26th  inst.  the  German  Government  had  warned  Russia 
that  mobilization  by  her  would  cause  German  mobilization. 

"Another  telegram  has  to-day  been  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  stating  that 
owing  to  the  further  progress  of  the  Russian  measures  of  mobilization 
Germany  might  be  brought  to  mobilize." 

Ambassador  Szapary  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  that 
M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  greatly 
excited  over  the  alleged  disinclination  of  Austria-Hungary  to 
continue  exchange  of  ideas  with  Russia,  and  over  her  mobiliza- 
tion, which  is  supposed  to  be  more  extensive  than  necessary,  and 
therefore  directed  against  Russia. 

I  visited  the  minister  to  explain  matters.  I  agreed  that  you 
(Count  Berchtold)  had  declined  to  discuss  the  wording  of  the 
Serbian  reply,  but  made  it  clear  that  we  had  no  intention,  if 
the  conflict  remained  localized,  to  annex  Serbian  territory 
or  touch  her  sovereignty,  and  would  always  be  ready  to  keep 
in  touch  with  St.  Petersburg  on  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian 
interests. 

M.  Sazonof  accepted  the  assurance  in  regard  to  territory,  but 
on  the  point  of  sovereignty  said  he  must  continue  to  believe  that 
our  coercion  of  Serbia  would  result  in  her  becoming  our  vassal, 
and  that  this  would  upset  equilibrium  in  the  Balkans,  and  so 


STATE    PAPERS  563 

involve   Russian   interests.     Russia   recognized   our  legitimate 
interest  there,  but  its  assertion  must  be  acceptable  to  Serbia. 

"I  expressed  the  view  that  this  was  not  a  Russian  but  a  Serbian  interest, 
whereupon  M.  Sazonof  claimed  that  Russian  interests  were  in  this  case 
Serbian  interests,  so  that  I  was  obliged  to  make  an  end  of  the  vicious  circle 
by  going  on  to  a  new  topic. 

"I  mentioned  that  I  had  heard  that  there  was  a  feeling  of  anxiety  in 
Russia,  because  we  had  mobilized  eight  corps  for  action  against  Serbia.  M. 
Sazonof  assured  me  that  it  was  not  he  (who  knew  nothing  about  this)  but 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  who  had  expressed  this  anxiety.  I  endeavored 
to  convince  the  minister  that  any  unprejudiced  person  could  easily  be  per- 
suaded that  our  southern  corps  could  not  constitute  a  menace  for  Russia. 

"I  indicated  to  the  minister  that  it  would  be  well  if  his  Imperial  Master 
were  informed  of  the  true  situation,  as  it  was  urgently  necessary,  if  it  was 
desired  to  maintain  peace,  that  a  speedy  end  should  be  put  to  the  military 
competition  which  now  threatened  to  ensue  on  account  of  false  news. 

"The  minister  further  informed  me  that  a  ukase  would  be  signed  to-day, 
which  would  give  orders  for  a  mobilization  in  a  somewhat  extended  form. 
He  was  able,  however,  to  assure  me  in  the  most  official  way  that  these 
troops  were  not  intended  to  attack  us.  They  would  only  stand  to  arms  in 
case  Russian  interests  in  the  Balkans  should  be  in  danger.  An  explanatory 
note  would  make  it  clear  that  this  was  a  measure  of  precaution,  since  we, 
who  in  any  case  have  the  advantage  of  quicker  mobilization,  have  now  also 
already  so  great  a  start.  In  earnest  words  I  drew  M.  Sazonof's  attention 
to  the  impression  which  such  a  measure  would  make  in  our  country.  I 
went  on  to  express  doubt  whether  the  explanatory  note  would  be  calculated 
to  soften  the  impression,  whereupon  the  minister  again  gave  expression  to 
assurances  regarding  the  harmlessness  (!)  of  this  measure." 

Count  Berchtold  telegraphed  to  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin  that 
the  Russian  military  districts  of  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  and  Kazan 
were  being  mobilized.  The  ambassador  should  notify  the  German 
Government  of  this,  and  emphasize  that  if  Russian  mobilization 
were  not  stopped  without  delay,  Austria-Hungary  would  follow 
with  general  mobilization.  The  representatives  of  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  at  St.  Petersburg,  and,  if  necessary,  at  Paris, 
will  declare  the  same  to  the  Government  there.  We  will  not  be 
diverted  from  our  course  against  Serbia. 

Germany.  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  telegraphed  to 
Ambassador  von  Schoen  at  Paris  to  protest  against  the  military 
measures  France  was  reported  to  be  taking,  and  say  that,  in  an- 
swer, Germany  would  have  to  proclaim  "a  threatenting  state  of 
war." 


664      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"While  this  would  not  mean  a  call  for  the  reserves  or  mobilization,  yet 
the  tension  would  be  aggravated.  We  continue  to  hope  for  the  preservation 
of  peace." 

Count  Pourtales,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  had  an  inter- 
view with  M.  Sazonof ,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  which  he  re- 
ported as  follows : 

"The  secretary  tried  to  persuade  me  that  I  should  urge  my  Government  to 
participate  in  a  quadruple  conference  to  find  means  to  induce  Austria- 
Hungary  to  give  up  those  demands  which  touch  upon  the  sovereignty  of 
Serbia.  I  could  merely  promise  to  report  the  conversation  and  took  the 
position  that,  after  Russia  had  decided  upon  the  baneful  step  of  mobilization, 
every  exchange  of  ideas  appeared  now  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 
Besides,  Russia  now  was  demanding  from  us  in  regard  to  Austria-Hungary 
the  same  which  Austria-Hungary  was  being  blamed  for  with  regard  to 
Serbia,  i.e.,  an  infraction  of  sovereignty.  Austria-Hungary  having  promised 
to  consider  the  Russian  interests  by  disclaiming  any  territorial  aspiration 
— a  great  concession  on  the  part  of  a  state  engaged  in  war — should  there- 
fore be  permitted  to  attend  to  its  affairs  with  Serbia  alone.  There  would 
be  time  at  the  peace  conference  to  return  to  the  matter  of  forbearance 
toward  the  sovereignty  of  Serbia. 

"I  added  very  solemnly  that  at  this  moment  the  entire  Austro-Serbian 
affair  was  eclipsed  by  the  danger  of  a  general  European  conflagration,  and 
I  endeavored  to  present  to  the  secretary  the  magnitude  of  this  danger. 

"It  was  impossible  to  dissuade  Sazonof  from  the  idea  that  Serbia  could 
not  now  be  deserted  by  Russia." 


THE      KAISER     AND      CZAR     EXCHANGE 
TELEGRAM  S 

William  II  received  the  following  telegram  from  Nicholas  II : 

"I  am  glad  that  you  are  back  in  Germany.  In  this  serious  moment  I  ask 
you  earnestly  to  help  me.  An  ignominious  war  has  been  declared  against 
a  weak  country  and  in  Russia  the  indignation  which  I  fully  share  is  tre- 
mendous. I  fear  that  very  soon  I  shall  be  unable  to  resist  the  pressure  ex- 
ercised upon  me  and  that  I  shall  be  forced  to  take  measures  which  will  lead 
to  war.  To  prevent  a  calamity  as  a  European  war  would  be,  I  urge  you  in 
the  name  of  our  old  friendship  to  do  all  in  your  power  to  restrain  your  ally 
from  going  too  far." 

The  Kaiser  replied  at  6.30  p.  m. : 

"I  have  received  your  telegram  and  I  share  your  desire  for  the  conserva- 
tion of  peace.  However,  I  cannot — as  I  told  you  in  my  first  telegram — 
consider  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  as  an  'ignominious  war.'  Austria- 
Hungary  knows  from  experience  that  the  promises  of  Serbia  as  long  as  they 
are  merely  on  paper  are  entirely  unreliable. 


STATE    PAPERS  565 

"According  to  my  opinion  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  is  to  be 
considered  as  an  attempt  to  receive  full  guaranty  that  the  promises  of 
Serbia  are  effectively  translated  into  deeds.  In  this  opinion  I  am  strength- 
ened by  the  explanation  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet  that  Austria-Hungary 
intended  no  territorial  gain  at  the  expense  of  Serbia.  I  am  therefore 
of  opinion  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  Russia  to  remain  a  spectator 
in  the  Austro-Serbian  war  without  drawing  Europe  into  the  most  terri- 
ble war  it  has  ever  seen.  I  believe  that  a  direct  understanding  is  possi- 
ble and  desirable  between  your  Government  and  Vienna,  an  understanding 
which — as  I  have  already  telegraphed  you — my  Government  endeavors 
to  aid  with  all  possible  effort.  Naturally  military  measures  by  Russia, 
which  might  be  construed  as  a  menace  by  Austria-Hungary,  would  accel- 
erate a  calamity  which  both  of  us  desire  to  avoid  and  would  undermine 
my  position  as  mediator  which — upon  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and 
aid — I  willingly  accepted." 

The  Czar  answered: 

"Thanks  for  your  telegram,  which  is  conciliatory  and  friendly,  whereas 
the  official  message  presented  to-day  by  your  ambassador  to  my  minister  was 
conveyed  in  a  very  different  tone.  I  beg  you  to  explain  this  divergency.  It 
would  be  right  to  give  over  the  Austro-Serbian  problem  to  the  Hague 
Tribunal.  I  trust  in  your  wisdom  and  friendship." 

Russia.  M.  Broniewsky,  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  tele- 
graphed to  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  Herr 
von  Jagow,  German  Secretary  of  State,  had  told  him  no  news  had 
been  received  from  Vienna  as  to  acceptance  of  private  discussions 
at  St.  Petersburg — that  it  was  very  difficult  for  him  to  produce 
any  effect  at  Vienna,  especially  openly. 

"He  even  added,  in  speaking  to  Cambon,  that  were  pressure  brought  to 
bear  too  obviously,  Austria  would  hasten  to  face  Germany  with  a  fait  ac- 
compli." 

Von  Jagow  had  heard  from  St.  Petersburg  that  you  were  more 
inclined  than  previously  to  find  a  compromise  acceptable  to  all 
parties.  I  replied  that  this  had  been  your  position  from  the  out- 
set, provided  the  compromise  were  acceptable  not  only  to  Aus- 
tria, but  equally  to  Russia.  He  then  said  that  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion on  the  frontier,  of  which  he  had  heard,  would  render  an  un- 
derstanding with  Austria  difficult  as  she  was  making  no  prepara- 
tions on  the  Russian  frontier.  I  replied  that  I  had  information 
in  my  possession  that  Austria  was  mobilizing  there,  and  that  our 
mobilization  was  in  reply  to  it.  But  our  measures,  I  assured 
him,  were  not  directed  against  Germany. 

P_Gt.  War  2 


566     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Alexander,  Crown  Prince  of  Serbia,  telegraphed  to  Nicholas  II 
his  gratitude  for  the  sympathy  extended  to  Serbia  by  the  Czar 
on  the  28th  inst. 

"It  fills  our  hearts  with  the  belief  that  the  future  of  Serbia  is  secure  now 
that  it  is  the  object  of  your  majesty's  gracious  solicitude.  These  painful 
moments  cannot  but  strengthen  the  bonds  of  deep  attachment  which  bind 
Serbia  to  Holy  Slav  Russia." 

M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  Ambassador  Isvolsky  at  Paris  that 
Germany  had  decided  to  mobilize  if  Russia  did  not  cease  her 
military  preparations. 

"As  we  cannot  comply  with  the  wishes  of  Germany,  we  have  no  alterna- 
tive but  to  hasten  on  our  own  military  preparations  and  to  assume  that  war 
is  probably  inevitable.  Please  inform  the  French  Government  of  this,  and 
add  that  we  are  sincerely  grateful  to  them  for  the  declaration  which  the 
French  Ambassador  made  to  me  on  their  behalf,  that  we  could  count  fully 
upon  the  assistance  of  our  ally,  France.  In  the  existing  circumstances  that 
declaration  is  especially  valuable  to  us. 

"[Communicated  to  the  Russian  Ambassadors  in  Great  Britain,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Italy,  and  Germany.]" 

Great  Britain.  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
London,  reported  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  that  Russia  would  mobilize  at  Odessa,  Kiev,  Moscow, 
and  Kazan.  This  information  had  been  officially  sent  by  Russia 
to  Berlin  on  the  28th  inst.,  with  assurances  that  there  was  no 
aggressive  intention  against  Germany.  The  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor, M.  Schebeko,  was  still  retained  at  Vienna.  Direct  com- 
munication between  Austria  and  Russia  was,  however,  at  an 
end,  owing  to  Austria's  declaration  of  war  on  Serbia.  Mediation 
by  London  Cabinet  to  end  Austria's  military  operations  was 
therefore  most  urgent.  If  these  continued  Austria  would  crush 
Serbia  while  the  conference  was  continuing. 

Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to 
Grey  a  report  of  his  interview  with  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg. 

He  informed  me  that  Austria-Hungary  refused  to  act  on  your 
suggestion  to  make  the  Serbian  reply  the  basis  of  discussion. 
Von  Jagow  had  written  to  Vienna  that,  though  Serbia  had  shown 
a  certain  desire  to  meet  the  demands  made  on  her,  nevertheless 


STATE    PAPERS  567 

he  appreciated  Austria's  requirement  of  guaranties  which  were 
absent  in  the  Serbian  reply : 

"The  Chancellor  then  went  on  to  say  that  the  hostilities  which  were 
about  to  be  undertaken  against  Serbia  had  presumably  the  exclusive  ob- 
ject of  securing  such  guaranties,  seeing  that  the  Austrian  Government  al- 
ready assured  the  Russian  Government  that  they  had  no  territorial  designs. 

"He  advised  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  should  this  view  be 
correct,  to  speak  openly  in  this  sense.  The  holding  of  such  language  would, 
he  hoped,  eliminate  all  possible  misunderstandings. 

"As  yet,  he  told  me,  he  had  not  received  a  reply  from  Vienna. 

"From  the  fact  that  he  had  gone  so  far  in  the  matter  of  giving  advice  at 
Vienna,  his  excellency  hoped  that  you  would  realize  that  he  was  sincerely 
doing  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  danger  of  European  complications." 

Goschen  reported  an  interview  with  the  German  Secretary  of 
State.  Von  Jagow  was  much  depressed. 

"He  reminded  me  that  he  had  told  me  the  other  day  that  he  had  to  be 
very  careful  in  giving  advice  to  Austria,  as  any  idea  that  they  were  being 
pressed  would  be  likely  to  cause  them  to  precipitate  matters  and  present  a 
fait  accompli.  This  had,  in  fact,  now  happened,  and  he  was  not  sure  that 
his  communication  of  your  suggestion  that  Serbia's  reply  offered  a  basis  for 
discussion  had  not  hastened  declaration  of  war.  He  was  much  troubled  by 
reports  of  mobilization  in  Russia,  and  of  certain  military  measures,  which 
he  did  not  specify,  being  taken  in  France.  He  subsequently  spoke  of  these 
measures  to  my  French  colleague  [M.  Jules  Cambon]  who  informed  him 
that  French  Government  had  done  nothing  more  than  the  German  Govern- 
ment had  done,  namely,  recalled  officers  on  leave.  His  excellency  denied 
German  Government  had  done  this,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  true.  My 
French  colleague  said  to  under-Secretary  of  State  [Herr  von  Zimmermann] 
that,  when  Austria  had  entered  Serbia,  and  so  satisfied  her  military  pres- 
tige, the  moment  might  then  be  favorable  for  four  disinterested  powers  to 
discuss  situation  and  come  forward  with  suggestions  for  preventing  graver 
complications.  Under-Secretary  of  State  seemed  to  think  idea  worthy  of 
consideration,  as  he  replied  that  would  be  a  different  matter  from  con- 
ference proposed  by  you." 

Grey  replied  to  Goschen,  stating  his  appreciation  of  the  Dr. 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  language,  and  assuring  the  Chancellor 
that  Great  Britain  would  strain  every  effort  for  peace. 

"If  he  can  induce  Austria  to  satisfy  Russia  and  to  abstain  from  going 
so  far  as  to  come  into  collision  with  her,  we  shall  all  join  in  deep  gratitude 
to  his  excellency  for  having  saved  the  peace  of  Europe." 

Ambassador  Buchanan  at  St.  Petersburg  telegraphed  to  Grey 
that  partial  mobilization  had  been  ordered.  This  said  M.  Sazo- 
nof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  against  Austria-Hungary 


568     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

alone.  Direct  conversation  with  St.  Petersburg  having  been  re- 
fused by  Vienna,  he  would  urge  Germany  that  a  return  be  made 
to  your  proposal  of  a  four-power  conference. 

Ambassador  Bunsen  reported  from  Vienna  that  there  was  no 
step  to  be  taken  at  present  to  stop  war  with  Serbia,  to  which  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  was  fully  committed  by  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  Kaiser  Francis  Joseph's  appeal  to  his 
people,  published  this  morning.  In  the  opinion  of  Duke 
d'Avarans,  the  Italian  Ambassador,  Russia  might  be  quieted  by 
Austria-Hungary  making  a  binding  engagement  not  to  destroy 
Serbian  independence  nor  seize  Serbian  territory,  but  this  she 
would  refuse  to  do. 

Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  Ambassador  at  Rome,  telegraphed  that  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  would  urge  in  Berlin  an  exchange  of 
views  by  the  powers  in  London,  and  suggest  that  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  propose  a  formula  acceptable  to  his  Govern- 
ment. 

"The  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  remarked  that  it  was  difficult  to 
make  Germany  believe  that  Russia  was  in  earnest.  As  Germany,  however, 
was  really  anxious  for  good  relations  with  ourselves,  if  she  believed  that 
Great  Britain  would  act  with  Russia  and  France  he  thought  it  would  have  a 
great  effect." 

Grey  replied  to  Rodd  that  the  London  conference  was  now  im- 
practicable owing  to  the  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  that 
Italy  must  now  speak  at  Berlin  and  Vienna. 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  that  the 
German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  said  he  was  endeav- 
oring to  make  Austria  satisfactorily  explain  at  St.  Petersburg 
the  scope  of  her  proceedings  in  Serbia,  but  information  comes 
from  Vienna  that  Austria  declines  to  discuss  the  Serbian  issue. 
Germany  opposes  the  four-power  conference.  I  asked  her  to 
present  her  plan  to  prevent  war  between  Russia  and  Austria, 
France  and  Italy  joined  with  my  request. 

"Let  mediation  come  into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany 
thinks  possible  if  only  Germany  will  'press  the  button'  in  the  interests  of 
peace." 

Goschen  telegraphed  back  to  Grey  that  he  had  had  an  inter- 
view with  Bethmann-Hollweg  who  had  just  returned  from 


STATE    PAPERS  569 

Potsdam.    The  Chancellor  feared  Germany's  being  drawn  into 
war  by  Russia  attacking  her  ally. 

"He  then  proceeded  to  make  the  following  strong  bid  for  British  neu- 
trality. He  said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the  main 
principle  which  governed  British  policy,  that  Great  Britain  would  never 
stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be. 
That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Germany  aimed.  Provided  that 
neutrality  of  Great  Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be  given 
to  the  British  Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  aimed  at  no  ter- 
ritorial acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  France  should  they  prove  victorious 
in  any  war  that  might  ensue. 

"I  questioned  his  excellency  about  the  French  colonies,  and  he  said  that 
he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that  respect.  As  regards 
Holland,  however,  his  excellency  said  that,  so  long  as  Germany's  adversaries 
respected  the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was 
ready  to  give  his  majesty's  Government  an  assurance  that  she  would  do 
likewise.  It  depended  upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany 
might  be  forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war  was  over, 
Belgian  integrity  would  be  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 

"His  excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had  been  Chancellor 
the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  you  were  aware,  to  bring  about  an 
understanding  with  England;  he  trusted  that  these  assurances  might 
form  the  basis  of  that  understanding  which  he  so  much  desired.  He  had  in 
mind  a  general  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and  Germany, 
though  it  was  of  course  at  the  present  moment  too  early  to  discuss  details, 
and  an  assurance  of  British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  present  crisis 
might  possibly  produce,  would  enable  him  to  look  forward  to  realization  of 
his  desire. 

"In  reply  to  his  excellency's  inquiry  how  I  thought  his  request  would 
appeal  to  you,  I  said  that  I  did  not  think  it  probable  that  at  this  stage  of 
events  you  would  care  to  bind  yourself  to  any  course  of  action  and  that  I 
was  of  opinion  that  you  would  desire  to  retain  full  liberty." 

Grey  informed  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris  of  a  conversation 
he  had  had  with  M.  Paul  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador. 

I  told  Cambon  that  I  would  inform  the  German  Ambassador 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  to-day  that  he  must  not  suppose  by  my 
friendly  tone  that  we  should  stand  aside  in  event  of  a  general 
war  following  failure  of  efforts  to  maintain  peace.  However,  I 
warned  Cambon  that  the  case  of  Serbia  was  not  like  that  of 
Morocco,  in  which  we  had  made  a  special  agreement  with  France, 
but  one  in  which  we  did  not  feel  called  to  take  a  hand. 

"M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very  clearly.  He 
understood  it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy 
between  Teuton  and  Slav  we  should  not  feel  called  to  intervene ;  should  other 


570  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

issues  be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France  become  involved,  so  that  the 
question  became  one  of  the  hegemony  of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide 
what  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  do.  He  seemed  quite  prepared  for  this 
announcement,  and  made  no  criticism  upon  it. 

"He  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He  anticipated  a  de- 
mand from  Germany  that  France  would  be  neutral  while  Germany  at- 
tacked Russia.  This  assurance  France,  of  course,  could  not  give;  she  was 
bound  to  help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked." 

Grey  telegraphed  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  of  his  con- 
versation with  Prince  Lichnowsky,  in  which  he  had  pointed  out 

"that  the  Russian  Government,  while  desirous  of  mediation,  regarded  it  as 
a  condition  that  the  military  operations  against  Serbia  should  be  suspended, 
as  otherwise  a  mediation  would  only  drag  on  matters,  and  give  Austria 
time  to  crush  Serbia.  It  was,  of  course,  too  late  for  all  military  operations 
against  Serbia  to  be  suspended.  In  a  short  time,  I  supposed,  the  Austrian 
forces  would  be  in  Belgrade,  and  in  occupation  of  some  Serbian  territory. 
But  even  then  it  might  be  possible  to  bring  some  mediation  into  existence, 
if  Austria,  while  saying  that  she  must  hold  the  occupied  territory  until  she 
had  complete  satisfaction  from  Serbia,  stated  that  she  would  not  advance 
further,  pending  an  effort  of  the  powers  to  mediate  between  her  and 
Russia." 

In  a  following  message  Grey  related  to  Goschen  a  second  con- 
versation with  Prince  Lichnowsky,  in  which  he  told  the  German 
Ambassador  that,  in  event  of  a  general  war,  the  issues  might 
be  so  great  that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests,  and  he 
should  not  think  that  Great  Britain  would  stand  aside. 

"He  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked  whether  I  meant 
that  we  should,  under  certain  circumstances,  intervene? 

"I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  anything  that  was 
like  a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pressure  by  saying  that,  if  things  be- 
came worse,  we  should  intervene.  There  would  be  no  question  of  our 
intervening  if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France  was  not  in- 
volved. But  we  knew  very  well,  that  if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  we 
thought  British  interests  required  us  to  intervene,  we  must  intervene  at 
once,  and  the  decision  would  have  to  be  very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of 
other  powers  had  to  be.  ... 

"The  German  Ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what  I  had  said;  indeed, 
he  told  me  that  it  accorded  with  what  he  had  already  given  in  Berlin  as  his 
view  of  the  situation." 

In  still  another  message  Grey  informed  Goschen  that  he  had 
said  to  the  German  Ambassador,  in  reference  to  the  suggestion 
of  San  Giuliano,  the  Italian  Prime  Minister  of  mediation  between 
Russia  and  Austria,  that  it  would  not  be  mediation  to  urge 


STATE    PAPERS  571 

Russia  to  stand  aside  and  give  Austria  a  free  hand  to  go  any 
length  she  pleased. 

Grey  informed  Ambassador  Bunsen  at  Vienna  that  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  Mensdorff,  had  offered  to  submit  him 
a  long  memorandum  justifying  the  action  of  his  government 
toward  Serbia.  Grey  refused  to  discuss  the  Serbian  question 
now  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was  imperilled.  The  greater  ques- 
tion settled,  the  powers  might  be  free  to  obtain  satisfaction  for 
Austria  in  the  lesser. 

"In  reply  to  some  further  remarks  of  mine,  as  to  the  effect  that  the  Aus- 
trian action  might  have  upon  the  Russian  position  in  the  Balkans,  he  said 
that,  before  the  Balkan  war,  Serbia  had  always  been  regarded  as  being 
in  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence." 

Bunsen  reported  to  Grey  that  the  news  of  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion was  not  generally  known  in  Vienna. 

France.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  notified  the  Ambassadors  at  St.  Petersburg,  London, 
Berlin,  Rome,  Vienna,  and  Constantinople,  and  the  Minister  to 
Serbia,  that  the  Austro-German  attitude  was  becoming  clearer. 

"Austria,  uneasy  concerning  the  Slav  propaganda,  has  seized  the  op- 
portunity of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  in  order  to  punish  the  Serbian  intrigues, 
and  to  obtain  in  this  quarter  guaranties  which,  according  as  events  are 
allowed  to  develop  or  not,  will  either  affect  only  the  Serbian  Government  and 
army,  or  become  territorial  questions.  Germany  intervenes  between  her  ally 
and  the  other  powers  and  declares  that  the  question  is  a  local  one,  namely, 
punishment  of  a  political  crime  committed  in  the  past,  and  sure  guaranties 
for  the  future  that  the  anti-Austrian  intrigues  will  be  put  an  end  to.  The 
German  Government  thinks  that  Russia  should  be  content  with  the  official 
and  formal  assurances  given  by  Austria  that  she  does  not  seek  territorial 
aggrandizement  and  that  she  will  respect  the  integrity  of  Serbia;  in  these 
circumstances  the  danger  of  war  can  come  only  from  Russia,  if  she  seeks 
to  intervene  in  a  question  which  is  well  denned.  In  these  circumstances  any 
action  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  must  take  place  at  St.  Petersburg  alone. 

"The  attitude  at  Berlin,  as  at  Vienna,  is  still  dilatory.  In  the  former 
capital,  while  protesting  that  the  Germans  desire  to  safeguard  general 
peace  by  common  action  between  the  four  powers,  the  idea  of  a  conference 
is  rejected  without  any  other  expedient  being  suggested,  and  while  they 
refuse  to  take  any  positive  action  at  Vienna.  In  the  Austrian  capital  they 
would  like  to  keep  St.  Petersburg  in  play  with  the  illusion  of  an  entente 
which  might  result  from  direct  conversations,  while  they  are  taking  action 
against  Serbia. 

"In  these  circumstances  it  seems  essential  that  the  St.  Petersburg 
Cabinet,  whose  desire  to  unravel  this  crisis  peacefully  is  manifest,  should 


572  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

immediately  give  their  adherence  to  the  British  proposal.  This  proposal 
must  be  strongly  supported  at  Berlin  in  order  to  decide  [Secretary  of  State] 
Von  Jagow  to  take  real  action  at  Vienna  capable  of  stopping  Austria  and 
preventing  her  from  supplementing  her  diplomatic  advantage  by  military 
successes.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would,  indeed,  not  be  slow 
to  take  advantage  of  it  in  order  to  impose  on  Serbia,  under  the  elastic 
expression  of  'guaranties'  conditions  which,  in  spite  of  all  assurances  that 
no  territorial  aggrandizement  was  being  sought,  would  in  effect  modify  the 
status  of  eastern  Europe,  and  would  run  the  risk  of  gravely  compromising 
the  general  peace  either  at  once  or  in  the  near  future." 

Ambassador  Paleologue  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  that 
Russia  would  acquiesce  in  any  measures  proposed  by  France  and 
Great  Britain  to  maintain  peace.  Minister  Klobukowski  re- 
ported from  Brussels  that  the  Belgian  Government  regarded 
Germany's  attitude  as  enigmatical,  and  justifying  every  ap- 
prehension. 

"It  seems  improbable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would 
have  taken  an  initiative  which  would  lead,  according  to  a  preconceived  plan, 
to  a  declaration  of  war,  without  previous  arrangement  with  the  Emperor 
William. 

"The  German  Government  stand  'with  rounded  arms'  ready  to  take 
peaceful  or  warlike  action  as  circumstances  may  require;  a  sudden  inter- 
vention against  us  would  not  surprise  anybody  here. 

"The  Belgian  Government  are  taking  steps  which  harmonize  with  the 
statement  made  to  me  yesterday  by  M.  Davignon  that  everything  will  be 
put  in  readiness  for  the  defence  of  the  neutrality  of  the  country." 

Ambassador  Dumaine  reported  from  Vienna: 

"The  French  Consul  at  Prague  confirms  the  mobilization  of  the  Eighth 
Army  corps,  and  that  of  the  Landwehr  division  of  this  army  corps.  The 
cavalry  divisions  in  Galicia  are  also  mobilizing;  regiments  and  cavalry 
divisions  from  Vienna  and  Budapest  have  already  been  transported  to 
the  Russian  frontier.  Reservists  are  now  being  called  together  in  this 
district. 

"There  is  a  rumor  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  in  order  to 
be  in  a  position  to  meet  any  danger,  and  perhaps  in  order  to  impress  St. 
Petersburg,  intend  to  decide  on  a  general  mobilization  of  their  forces  on 
July  30,  or  August  1.  The  Austrian  Emperor  will  return  from  Ischl  to 
Vienna  to-morrow." 

Ambassador  Paleologue  reported  from  Berlin  that  Austria- 
Hungary  refused  direct  conversation  offered  by  Russia. 

"Austria  is  hurrying  on  her  military  preparations  against  Russia,  and 
is  pressing  forward  the  mobilization  which  has  begun  on  the  Galician 
frontier.  As  a  result  the  order  to  mobilize  will  be  dispatched  to-night  to 


STATE    PAPERS  573 

thirteen  army  corps,  which  are  destined  to  operate  eventually  against 
Austria." 

Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  reported  from  Berlin  his  inter- 
view with  the  German  Secretary  of  State.  Von  Jagow  was 
awaiting  reply  from  Vienna  to  his  request  to  hold  direct  con- 
versation with  Russia.  He  considered  that  the  Serbian  reply 
afforded  a  basis  for  negotiation. 

"I  said  that  it  was  just  on  that  account  that  I  considered  the  rupture 
by  Austria,  after  she  had  received  such  a  document,  inexplicable. 

"The  Secretary  of  State  then  remarked  that  with  eastern  nations  one 
could  never  obtain  sufficient  guaranties,  and  that  Austria  wished  to  be 
able  to  supervise  the  carrying  out  of  promises  made  to  her,  a  supervision 
which  Serbia  refused.  This,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  is  the 
cardinal  point.  I  answered  Herr  von  Jagow  that  Serbia,  as  she  wished  to 
remain  independent,  was  bound  to  reject  the  control  of  a  single  power,  but 
that  an  International  Commission  would  not  have  the  same  character.  The 
Balkan  States  have  more  than  one,  for  instance  the  Financial  Commission 
at  Athens.  One  could  imagine  among  other  combinations,  a  Provisional 
International  Commission,  charged  with  the  duty  of  controlling  the  police 
inquiry  demanded  by  Austria;  it  was  clear,  by  this  instance,  that  the  reply 
of  Serbia  opened  the  door  to  conversations  and  did  not  justify  a  rupture. 

"I  then  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  if,  leaving  aside  direct  conversa- 
tions between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  to  which  Sir  E.  Grey  had  given 
his  adherence,  he  did  not  think  that  common  action  could  be  exercised 
by  the  four  powers  by  means  of  their  ambassadors.  He  answered  in 
the  affirmative,  adding  that  at  this  moment  the  London  Cabinet  were 
confining  themselves  to  exercising  their  influence  in  support  of  direct 
conversations." 

He  gave  a  summary  of  the  interview  between  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  and  British  Ambassador  Goschen. 

"The  attitude  of  the  German  Chancellor  is  very  probably  the  result  of 
the  last  interview  of  Sir  E.  Grey  with  Ambassador  Lichnowsky.  Up  to 
quite  the  last  days  they  flattered  themselves  here  that  England  would  re- 
main out  of  the  question,  and  the  impression  produced  on  the  German 
Government  and  on  the  financiers  and  business  men  by  her  attitude  is 
profound." 

Ambassador  Dumaine  reported  from  Vienna  that  he  and  his 
British,  Russian,  and  Italian  colleagues  agreed  that  war  is  now 
certain  between  Austria  and  Serbia  since  all  attempts  to  avoid  it 
have  failed.  The  Italian  Ambassador,  Duke  d'Avarna,  said 

"it  is  very  probable  that  the  imminence  of  a  general  insurrection  among 
the  Southern  Slav  inhabitants  precipitated  the  resolutions  of  the  [Dual] 
Monarchy.  He  still  clings  to  the  hope  that,  after  a  first  success  of  the 


574  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

Austro-Hungarian  arms,  but  not  before  this,  mediation  might  be  able  to 
limit  the  conflict." 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
informed  the  ambassadors  at  London,  Berlin,  St.  Petersburg, 
Rome,  Vienna,  and  Constantinople,  and  the  minister  to  Ser- 
bia, of  a  semiofficial  communication  made  by  the  German 
Ambassador. 

Germany,  said  Baron  von  Schoen,  was  continuing  its  efforts 
to  induce  Austria-Hungary  to  hold  direct  conversations  with 
Russia,  being  in  no  way  impeded  by  her  ally's  declaration  of 
war  on  Serbia.  Germany  did  not  know  Austria's  intentions. 

A  second  message  was  sent  to  these  French  representatives 
abroad  reporting  an  interview  of  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  and  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

M.  Isvolsky  communicated  the  telegram  from  Sazonof,  Rus- 
sian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Berlin,  notifying  Germany 
of  Russian  mobilization  in  the  southern  provinces,  and  the  tele- 
grams from  Sazonof  to  London  asking  Great  Britain  to  use  her 
influence  as  quickly  as  possible  with  Austria  to  secure  cessation 
of  military  operations,  and  stating  that  he  believed  Germany 
was  favoring  her  ally's  uncompromising  attitude. 

Ambassador  Barrere  at  Rome  reported  that  the  Italian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  had  been  officially  informed  of  the 
above  telegrams. 

M.  Viviani,  who  had  now  reached  Paris  and  resumed  his  office 
of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  instructed  Ambassador  Paul 
Cambon  at  London  to  request  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  renew  at  Berlin 
his  proposal  of  four-power  mediation,  the  principle  of  which  had 
been  accepted  by  both  Germany  and  Russia. 

"I  would  ask  you  also  to  point  out  to  the  British  Secretary  of  State  how 
important  it  would  be  for  him  to  obtain  from  the  Italian  Government  the 
most  whole-hearted  continuance  of  their  support  in  cooperating  in  the 
action  of  the  four  powers  in  favor  of  peace." 

M.  Paul  Cambon  reported  that  Grey  had  invited  Germany  to 
propose  her  own  formula  for  peace  as  acceptable  to  Great  Brit- 
ain, France,  and  Italy. 

"The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  to  me  that  Germany's 
reply  to  this  communication  and  to  that  of  Russia  concerning  the  mobiliza- 


STATE    PAPERS  575. 

tion  of  four  army  corps  on  the  Austrian  frontier  would  allow  us  to  realize 
the  intentions  of  the  German  Government. 

"Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  disguise  the  fact  that  he  found  the  situation  very 
grave  and  that  he  had  little  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution." 

Ambassador  Paleologue  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  of 
the  notification  by  the  German  Ambassador  that  Russia  must 
stop  mobilization  or  Germany  would  mobilize. 

"The  tone  in  which  Count  Pourtales  delivered  this  communication  has 
decided  the  Russian  Government  this  very  night  to  order  the  mobilization 
of  the  thirteen  army  corps  which  are  to  operate  against  Austria." 

Belgium.  M.  Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  notified 
the  ministers  at  Berlin,  Vienna,  Paris,  London,  St.  Petersburg, 
Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg  that  the  Belgian  Government 
had  decided  to  place  the  army  upon  a  strengthened  peace  footing. 

"This  step  should  in  no  way  be  confused  with  mobilization. 

"Owing  to  the  small  extent  of  her  territory,  all  Belgium  consists,  in 
some  degree,  of  a  frontier  zone.  Her  army  on  the  ordinary  peace  footing 
consists  of  only  one  class  of  armed  militia;  on  the  strengthened  peace 
footing,  owing  to  the  recall  of  three  classes,  her  army  divisions  and  her 
cavalry  division  comprise  effective  units  of  the  same  strength  as  those  of 
the  corps  permanently  maintained  in  the  frontier  zones  of  the  neighboring 
powers." 

THURSDAY,      JULY      30,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  On  the  following  day  Count  Berchtold, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed  to  Count  Szapary  at 
St.  Petersburg  his  answer  to  the  ambassador's  telegram  of 
July  29 : 

"I  am  of  course  still  ready  to  explain  to  M.  Sazonof  [Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs]  the  various  points  contained  in  our  note  addressed  to 
Serbia  which,  however,  has  already  been  outstripped  by  recent  events.  I 
should  also  attach  special  importance,  in  accordance  with  the  suggestion 
made  to  me  through  M.  Schebeko  [Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna],  also, 
to  discussing  on  this  occasion  in  a  confidential  and  friendly  manner  the 
questions  which  affect  directly  our  relations  toward  Russia.  From  this 
it  might  be  hoped  that  it  would  be  possible  to  remove  the  ambiguities  which 
have  arisen  and  to  secure  the  development  in  a  friendly  manner  of  our 
relations  toward  our  neighbors,  which  is  so  desirable  an  object." 

This  was  followed  by  another  telegram.  Count  Berchtold  said 
that  he  had  explained  to  Russian  Ambassador  Schebeko  what 
seemed  his  flat  refusal  to  discuss  matters  directly  with  Russia, 


676  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

which  had  so  hurt  the  feelings  of  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 

"This  must  rest  on  a  misunderstanding,  as  M.  Schebeko  and  myself  had 
discussed  the  practical  questions  two  days  before,  a  fact  which  the  am- 
bassador confirmed  with  the  observation  that  he  had  fully  informed  M. 
Sazonof  of  this  conversation. 

"M.  Schebeko  then  explained  why  our  action  against  Serbia  was  regarded 
with  such  anxiety  at  St.  Petersburg.  He  said  that  we  were  a  great  power 
which  was  proceeding  against  the  small  Serbian  state,  and  it  was  not  known 
at  St.  Petersburg  what  our  intentions  in  the  matter  were;  whether  we  de- 
sired to  encroach  on  its  sovereignty,  whether  we  desired  completely  to  over- 
throw it,  or  even  to  crush  it  to  the  ground.  Russia  could  not  be  indifferent 
toward  the  future  fate  of  Serbia,  which  was  linked  to  Russia  by  historical 
and  other  bonds.  At  St.  Petersburg  they  had  taken  the  trouble  to  use  all 
their  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  them  to  accept  all  our  conditions, 
though  this  was  indeed  at  a  time  when  the  conditions  afterward  imposed 
by  us  could  not  yet  be  known.  But  even  with  reference  to  these  demands 
they  would  do  everything  they  could  in  order  to  accomplish  at  any  rate  all 
that  was  possible. 

"I  reminded  the  ambassador  that  we  had  repeatedly  emphasized  the  fact 
that  we  did  not  desire  to  follow  any  policy  of  conquest  in  Serbia,  also  that 
we  would  not  infringe  her  sovereignty,  but  we  only  desired  to  establish  a 
condition  of  affairs  which  would  offer  us  a  guarantee  against  being  dis- 
turbed by  Serbia.  To  this  I  added  a  somewhat  lengthy  discussion  of  our  in- 
tolerable relations  with  Serbia.  I  also  gave  M.  Schebeko  clearly  to  under- 
stand to  how  large  an  extent  Russian  diplomacy  was  responsible  for  these 
circumstances,  even  though  this  result  might  be  contrary  to  the  wishes  of 
the  responsible  authorities. 

"I  referred  to  the  Russian  mobilization  which  had  then  come  to  my 
knowledge.  Since  this  was  limited  to  the  military  districts  of  Odessa,  Kiev, 
Moscow,  and  Kazan  it  had  an  appearance  of  hostility  against  the  [Dual] 
Monarchy.  I  did  not  know  what  the  grounds  for  this  might  be,  as  there 
was  no  dispute  between  us  and  Russia.  Austria-Hungary  had  mobilized 
exclusively  against  Serbia;  against  Russia  not  a  single  man;  and  this 
would  be  observed  from  the  single  fact  that  the  first,  tenth,  and  eleventh 
corps  had  not  been  mobilized.  In  view,  however,  of  the  fact  that  Russia 
was  openly  mobilizing  against  us,  we  should  have  to  extend  our  mobilization 
too,  and  in  this  case  I  desired  to  mention  expressly  that  this  measure  did 
not,  of  course,  imply  any  attitude  of  hostility  toward  Russia." 

Germany.  Military  Attache  Eggeling  at  St.  Petersburg  tele- 
graphed to  William  II  that  Prince  Troubetzki  had  said  to  him 
yesterday :  "Thank  God  that  a  telegram  from  your  emperor  has 
come !" 

"He  has  just  told  me  the  telegram  has  made  a  deep  impression  upon  the 
czar  but  as  the  mobilization  against  Austria  had  already  been  ordered  and 


STATE    PAPERS  577 

Sazonof  [Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  had  convinced  his  majesty  that  it 
was  no  longer  possible  to  retreat,  his  majesty  was  sorry  he  could  not  change 
it  any  more.  I  then  told  him  that  the  guilt  for  the  measureless  conse- 
quences lay  at  the  door  of  premature  mobilization  against  Austria-Hungary 
which  after  all  was  involved  merely  in  a  local  war  with  Serbia,  for  Ger- 
many's answer  was  clear  and  the  responsibility  rested  upon  Russia  which 
ignored  Austria-Hungary's  assurance  that  it  had  no  intentions  of  territorial 
gain  in  Serbia.  Austria-Hungary  mobilized  against  Serbia  and  not  against 
Russia  and  there  was  no  ground  for  an  immediate  action  on  the  part  of 
Russia.  I  further  added  that  in  Germany  one  could  not  understand  any 
more  Russia's  phrase  that  'she  could  not  desert  her  brethren  in  Serbia' 
after  the  horrible  crime  of  Sarajevo.  I  told  him  finally  he  need  not  wonder 
if  Germany's  army  were  to  be  mobilized." 

At  1  a.  m.  the  German  Kaiser  telegraphed  to  Nicholas  II: 
"My  ambassador  has  instructions  to  direct  the  attention  of  your  Gov- 
ernment to  the  dangers  and  serious  consequences  of  a  mobilization.  I  have 
told  you  the  same  in  my  last  telegram.  Austria-Hungary  has  mobilized  only 
against  Serbia,  and  only  a  part  of  her  army.  If  Russia,  as  seems  to  be  the 
case,  according  to  your  advice  and  that  of  your  Government,  mobilizes 
against  Austria-Hungary,  the  part  of  the  mediator  with  which  you  have 
intrusted  me  in  such  friendly  manner  and  which  I  have  accepted  upon  your 
express  desire,  is  threatened  if  not  made  impossible.  The  entire  weight 
of  decision  now  rests  upon  your  shoulders,  you  have  to  bear  the  respon- 
sibility for  war  or  peace." 


HENRY  OF  PRUSSIA  AND  GEORGE  V 

The  Czar  at  once  replied : 

"I  thank  you  from  my  heart  for  your  quick  reply.  I  am  sending  to-night 
Tatisheff  (Russian  honorary  aide  to  the  Kaiser)  with  instructions.  The 
military  measures  now  taking  form  were  decided  upon  five  days  ago,  and  for 
the  reason  of  defense  against  the  preparations  of  Austria.  I  hope  with  all 
my  heart  that  these  measures  will  not  influence  in  any  manner  your  posi- 
tion as  mediator,  which  I  appraise  very  highly.  We  need  your  strong 
pressure  upon  Austria  so  that  an  understanding  can  be  arrived  at  with  us." 

Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  brother  of  the  Kaiser,  telegraphed 
to  the  King  of  Great  Britain  from  Berlin : 

"I  arrived  here  yesterday  and  have  communicated  what  you  were  so  good 
as  to  say  to  me  at  Buckingham  Palace  last  Sunday  to  William,  who  was  very 
thankful  to  receive  your  message. 

"William,  who  is  very  anxious,  is  doing  his  utmost  to  comply  with  the 
request  of  Nicholas  to  work  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  He  is  in  con- 
tinual telegraphic  communication  with  Nicholas,  who  has  to-day  confirmed 
the  news  that  he  has  ordered  military  measures  which  amount  to  mobiliza- 
tion, and  that  these  measures  were  taken  five  days  ago. 


578  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

"We  have  also  received  information  that  France  is  making  military 
preparations  while  we  have  not  taken  measures  of  any  kind,  but  may  be 
obliged  to  do  so  at  any  moment  if  our  neighbors  continue  their  preparations. 
This  would  then  mean  a  European  war. 

"If  you  seriously  and  earnestly  desire  to  prevent  this  terrible  mis- 
fortune, may  I  propose  to  you  to  use  your  influence  on  France  and  also 
on  Russia  that  they  should  remain  neutral.  In  my  view  this  would  be  of 
the  greatest  use.  I  consider  that  this  is  a  certain  and,  perhaps,  the  only 
possible  way  of  maintaining  the  peace  of  Europe.  I  might  add  that  Ger- 
many and  England  should  now  more  than  ever  give  each  other  mutual  sup- 
port in  order  to  prevent  a  terrible  disaster,  which  otherwise  appears  in- 
evitable. 

"Believe  me  that  William  is  inspired  by  the  greatest  sincerity  in  his 
efforts  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  But  the  military  preparations  of  his 
two  neighbors  may  end  in  compelling  him  to  follow  their  example  for  the 
safety  of  his  own  country,  which  otherwise  would  remain  defenseless." 

George  V  replied: 

"I  am  very  glad  to  hear  of  William's  efforts  to  act  with  Nicholas  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  I  earnestly  desire  that  such  a  misfortune  as  a 
European  war — the  evil  of  which  could  not  be  remedied — may  be  pre- 
vented. My  Government  is  doing  the  utmost  possible  in  order  to  induce 
Russia  and  France  to  postpone  further  military  preparations,  provided 
that  Austria  declares  herself  satisfied  with  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  and 
the  neighboring  Serbian  territory  as  a  pledge  for  a  satisfactory  settlement 
of  her  demands,  while  at  the  same  time  the  other  countries  suspend  their 
preparations  for  war.  I  rely  on  William  applying  his  great  influence  in 
order  to  induce  Austria  to  accept  this  proposal.  In  this  way  he  will  prove 
that  Germany  and  England  are  working  together  to  prevent  what  would 
be  an  international  catastrophe.  Please  assure  William  that  I  am  doing 
all  I  can,  and  will  continue  to  do  all  that  lies  in  my  power,  to  maintain 
the  peace  of  Europe." 

Russia.  M.  Strandtman,  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Serbia,  tele- 
graphed from  Nish  to  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
at  St.  Petersburg,  that  Prince  Regent  Alexander  had  yesterday 
published  a  manifesto,  signed  by  all  the  Serbian  Ministers,  on 
Austria's  declaration  of  war  against  Serbia. 

M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  to  the  ambassadors  at  Berlin,  Vienna, 
Paris,  London,  and  Rome: 

"The  German  Ambassador  [Count  Pourtales],  who  has  just  left  me,  has 
asked  whether  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied  with  the  promise  which  Aus- 
tria might  give — that  she  would  not  violate  the  integrity  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Serbia — and  whether  we  could  not  indicate  upon  what  conditions  we  would 
agree  to  suspend  our  military  preparations.  I  dictated  to  him  the  follow- 
ing declaration  to  be  forwarded  to  Berlin  for  immediate  action : 


STATE    PAPERS  579 

"  'If  Austria,  recognizing  that  the  Austro-Serbian  question  has  assumed 
the  character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready  to 
eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  points  which  violate  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Serbia,  Russia  engages  to  stop  her  military  preparations.' 

"Please  inform  me  at  once  by  telegraph  what  attitude  the  German 
Government  will  adopt  in  face  of  this  fresh  proof  of  our  desire  to  do  the 
utmost  possible  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  question,  for  we  cannot 
allow  such  discussions  to  continue  solely  in  order  that  Germany  and 
Austria  may  gain  time  for  their  military  preparations." 

Ambassador  Swerbeiev  telegraphed  from  Berlin  that  the  order 
for  the  mobilization  of  the  German  army  and  navy  had  just  been 
issued.  He  followed  this  with  a  telegram  stating  that  Secretary 
of  State  von  Jagow  had  just  telephoned  him  that  the  news  was 
false : 

"the  news  sheets  had  been  printed  in  advance  so  as  to  be  ready  for  all 
eventualities,  and  they  were  put  on  sale  in  the  afternoon,  but  they  have 
now  been  confiscated." 

Ambassador  Swerbeiev  telegraphed  from  Berlin  to  M.  Sazonof 
that  he  had  presented  the  minister's  telegram  of  July  29  to  Sec- 
retary of  State  von  Jagow,  who  "declared  that  he  considered  it 
impossible  for  Austria  to  accept  our  proposal." 

Great  Britain.  Ambassador  Bunsen  telegraphed  from  Vienna 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs: 

"Russian  Ambassador  [Schebeko]  hopes  that  Russian  mobilization  will 
be  regarded  by  Austria  as  what  it  is,  viz.,  a  clear  intimation  that  Russia 
must  be  consulted  regarding  the  fate  of  Serbia,  but  he  does  not  know  how 
the  Austrian  Government  are  taking  it.  He  says  that  Russia  must  have 
an  assurance  that  Serbia  will  not  be  crushed,  but  she  would  undertsand 
that  Austria-Hungary  is  compelled  to  exact  from  Serbia  measures  which 
will  secure  her  Slav  provinces  from  the  continuance  of  hostile  propaganda 
from  Serbian  territory. 

"The  French  Ambassador  [Dumaine]  hears  from  Berlin  that  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  [Tschirsky]  is  instructed  to  speak  seriously  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  against  acting  in  a  manner  calculated  to 
provoke  a  European  war. 

"Unfortunately  the  German  Ambassador  is  himself  so  identified  with 
extreme  anti-Russian  and  anti-Serbian  feeling  prevalent  in  Vienna  that 
he  is  unlikely  to  plead  the  cause  of  peace  with  entire  sincerity. 

"Although  I  am  not  able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  information  that 
the  German  Ambassador  knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Serbia  before  it  was  dispatched,  and  telegraphed  it  to  the  German  Emperor. 
I  know  from  the  German  Ambassador  himself  that  he  indorses  every  line 
of  it." 


580     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Ambassador  Buchanan  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  to 
Grey  of  an  interview  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

"M.  Sazonof  said  that  German  Ambassador  [Count  Pourtales]  had  told 
him  yesterday  afternoon  that  German  Government  were  willing  to  guaran- 
tee that  Serbian  integrity  would  be  respected  by  Austria.  To  this  he  had 
replied  that  this  might  be  so,  but  nevertheless  Serbia  would  become  an 
Austrian  vassal,  just  as,  in  similar  circumstances  Bokhara  had  become  a 
Russian  vassal.  There  would  be  a  revolution  in  Russia  if  she  were  to 
tolerate  such  a  state  of  affairs. 

"M.  Sazonof  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in  possession  of  Russian 
Government  that  Germany  was  making  military  and  naval  preparations 
against  Russia — more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland. 

"German  Ambassador  had  a  second  interview  with  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  2  a.  m.,  when  former  completely  broke  down  on  seeing  that  war 
was  inevitable.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonof  to  make  some  suggestio'n  which 
he  could  telegraph  to  German  Government  as  a  last  hope.  M.  Sazonof 
accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to  German  Ambassador  a  formula. 

"  'If  Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict  with  Serbia  has  assumed  char- 
acter of  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate 
from  her  ultimatum  points  which  violate  principle  of  sovereignty  of  Serbia, 
Russia  engages  to  stop  all  military  preparations.' 

"Preparations  for  general  mobilization  will  be  proceeded  with  if  this 
proposal  is  rejected  by  Austria,  and  inevitable  result  will  be  a  European 
war.  Excitement  here  has  reached  such  a  pitch  that,  if  Austria  refuses  to 
make  a  concession,  Russia  cannot  hold  back,  and  now  that  she  knows  that 
Germany  is  arming,  she  can  hardly  postpone,  for  strategical  reasons,  con- 
verting partial  into  general  mobilization." 

Ambassador  Goschen  telegraphed  from  Berlin  to  Grey: 

"Secretary  of  State  [Von  Jagow]  informs  me  that  immediately  on 
receipt  of  Prince  Lichnowsky's  [German  Ambassador  in  London]  telegram 
recording  his  last  conversation  with  you  he  asked  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment whether  they  would  be  willing  to  accept  mediation  on  basis  of  oc- 
cupation by  Austrian  troops  of  Belgrade  or  some  other  point  and  issue 
their  conditions  from  here.  He  has  up  till  now  received  no  reply,  but  he 
fears  Russian  mobilization  against  Austria  will  have  increased  difficulties, 
as  Austria-Hungary,  who  has  as  yet  only  mobilized  against  Serbia,  will 
probably  find  it  necessary  also  against  Russia.  Secretary  of  State  says  if 
you  can  succeed  in  getting  Russia  to  agree  to  above  basis  for  an  arrange- 
ment and  in  persuading  her  in  the  meantime  to  take  no  steps  which  might 
be  regarded  as  an  act  of  aggression  against  Austria  he  still  sees  some 
chance  that  European  peace  may  be  preserved. 

"He  begged  me  to  impress  on  you  difficulty  of  Germany's  position  in  view 
of  Russian  mobilization  and  military  measures  which  he  hears  are  being 
taken  in  France.  Beyond  recall  of  officers  on  leave — a  measure  which  had 
been  officially  taken  after,  and  not  before,  visit  of  French  Ambassador 


FORGING   THE 
WEAPONS   OF    MODERN   WAR 


WORKS  AT  ESSEN,  LUBECK,  CREUSOT  AND  SKODA, 
IN  GERMANY.  FRANCE  AND  AUSTRIA 


Catting   bars  of  steel   in   the   Schneider   works  at  Creusot.  France.    In  organization 
and  output  these  French  munitions  factories  rival  the  famous  Krupp  works  at  Essen 


x  E    = 


. 
X  C      : 

B    O     = 

ill 


1     i 

e    : 


Official  Preach  Photograph 

A  fascinating  picture  showing  sprays  of  mo'.ten  metal  in  the  French  munitions 
works  at  Creusot,  France 


Finishing  accurately  a  great  plate  of  steel  in  the  wonderfully 
organized  gun  works  at  Crensot 


STATE    PAPERS  581 

[Jules  Cambon]  yesterday — Imperial  Government  had  done  nothing  special 
in  way  of  military  preparations.  Something,  however,  would  have  soon 
to  be  done,  for  it  might  be  too  late,  and  when  they  mobilized  they  would 
have  to  mobilize  on  three  sides.  He  regretted  this,  as  he  knew  France  did 
not  desire  v/ar,  but  it  would  be  a  military  necessity. 

"His  excellency  added  that  telegram  received  from  Prince  Lichnowsky 
last  night  contains  matter  which  he  had  heard  with  regret,  but  not  exactly 
with  surprise,  and  at  all  events  he  thoroughly  appreciated  frankness  and 
loyalty  with  which  you  had  spoken. 

"He  also  told  me  that  this  telegram  had  only  reached  Berlin  very  late 
last  night;  had  it  been  received  earlier  chancellor  would,  of  course,  not 
have  spoken  to  me  in  the  way  he  had  done." 

Ambassador  Bertie  telegraphed  from  Paris  to  Grey  the  report 
of  Germany's  request  to  Russia  to  be  informed  on  what  condi- 
tions Russia  would  consent  to  demobilization. 

"The  answer  given  is  that  she  agrees  to  do  so  on  condition  that  Austria- 
Hungary  gives  an  assurance  that  she  will  respect  the  sovereignty  of  Serbia 
and  submit  certain  of  the  demands  of  the  Austrian  note,  which  Serbia  has 
not  accepted,  to  an  international  discussion. 


SIR     EDWARD     GREY     REFUSES      TERMS      OF 
NEUTRALITY 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  in  answer 
to  his  telegram  of  July  29 : 

"His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the  Chancel- 
lor's proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

"What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French  colonies 
are  taken  and  France  is  beaten,  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French 
territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

"From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for 
France,  without  further  territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be 
so  crushed  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  great  power,  and  become  subordinate 
to  German  policy. 

"Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this 
bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the 
good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

"The  chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever  obliga- 
tion or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could 
not  entertain  that  bargain  either. 

"Having  said  so  much  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine  whether  the  prospect 
of  a  future  general  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and  Germany 
offered  positive  advantages  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  tying  our  hands 
now.  We  must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to  act  as  circumstances  may  seem 

Q— Gt.  War  2 


582     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

to  us  to  require  in  any  such  unfavorable  and  regrettable  development  of  the 
present  crisis  as  the  chancellor  contemplates. 

"You  should  speak  to  the  chancellor  in  the  above  sense,  and  add  most 
earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  maintaining  the  good  relations  between  Eng- 
land and  Germany  is  that  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve 
the  peace  of  Europe;  if  we  succeeded  in  this  object,  the  mutual  relations  of 
Germany  and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso  facto  improved  and  strength- 
ened. For  that  object  his  majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that  way  with 
all  sincerity  and  good  will. 

"And  I  will  say  this:  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the 
present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavor  will  be  to  promote  some 
arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  as- 
sured that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or 
her  Allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have 
desired  this  and  worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan 
crisis,  and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding  object,  our  relations  sensibly 
improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto  been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of 
definite  proposals,  but  if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any 
that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hope- 
ful that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow  may  make  possible  some 
more  definite  rapprochement  between  the  powers  than  has  been  possible 
hitherto." 

Grey  telegraphed  Ambassador  Buchanan  at  St.  Petersburg : 

"German  Ambassador  [Prince  Lichnowsky]  informs  me  that  German 
Government  would  endeavor  to  influence  Austria,  after  taking  Belgrade  and 
Serbian  territory  in  region  of  frontier,  to  promise  not  to  advance  further, 
while  powers  endeavored  to  arrange  that  Serbia  should  give  satisfaction 
sufficient  to  pacify  Austria.  Territory  occupied  would  of  course  be  evacu- 
ated when  Austria  was  satisfied.  I  suggested  this  yesterday  as  a  possible 
relief  to  the  situation,  and,  if  it  can  be  obtained,  I  would  earnestly  hope 
that  it  might  be  agreed  to  suspend  further  military  preparations  on  all 
sides. 

"Russian  Ambassador  [Count  Benckendorff]  has  told  me  of  condition 
laid  down  by  M.  Sazonof  [Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs],  as  quoted 
in  your  telegram  of  July  30,  and  fears  it  cannot  be  modified;  but  if  Aus- 
trian advance  were  stopped  after  occupation  of  Belgrade,  I  think  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs'  formula  might  be  changed  to  read  that  the 
powers  would  examine  how  Serbia  could  fully  satisfy  Austria  without  im- 
pairing Serbian  sovereign  rights  or  independence. 

"If  Austria,  having  occupied  Belgrade  and  neighboring  Serbian  territory, 
declares  herself  ready,  in  the  interest  of  European  peace,  to  cease  her  ad- 
vance and  to  discuss  how  a  complete  settlement  can  be  arrived  at,  I  hope 
that  Russia  would  also  consent  to  discussion  and  suspension  of  further  mili- 
tary preparations,  provided  that  other  powers  did  the  same. 

"It  is  a  slender  chance  of  preserving  peace,  but  the  only  one  I  can  sug- 
gest if  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  can  come  to  no  agreement  at 
Berlin.  You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs." 


STATE    PAPERS  583 

Grey  wrote  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris  enclosing  a  copy  of  a 
letter  he  had  written  to  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at 
London,  on  November  22,  1912,  and^  of  the  agreement  of  which 
M.  Cambon  had  just  reminded  him.  The  letter  was  as  follows: 

"From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval  and 
military  experts  have  consulted  together.  It  has  always  been  understood 
that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government  to 
decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by  armed 
force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation  between  experts  is  not,  and  ought 
not  to  be  regarded  as,  an  engagement  that  commits  either  Government  to 
action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  dis- 
position, for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the 
present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  cooperate  in  war. 

"You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  power,  it  might  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed  as- 
sistance of  the  other. 

"I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  un- 
provoked attack  by  a  third  power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general 
peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace, 
and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common.  If 
these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once 
be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what 
effect  should  be  given  to  them." 

Ambassador  Goschen  telegraphed  from  Berlin  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey: 

"The  Chancellor  [Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg]  told  me  last  night  that 
he  was  'pressing  the  button'  as  hard  as  he  could,  and  that  he  was  not  sure 
whether  he  had  not  gone  so  far  in  urging  moderation  at  Vienna  that  mat- 
ters had  been  precipitated  rather  than  otherwise." 

France.  M.  Viviani,  Prime  Minister,  informed  the  Ambas- 
sadors at  St.  Petersburg  and  London  that  Germany  had  notified 
Russia  of  her  decision  to  mobilize  unless  Russia  ceased  her 
military  preparations. 

"M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  declares  that  in 
these  circumstances  Russia  can  only  expedite  her  arming  and  consider  war 
as  imminent;  that  she  counts  on  the  help  of  France  as  an  ally;  and  that 
she  considers  it  desirable  that  England  should  join  Russia  and  France 
without  loss  of  time. 

"France  is  resolved  to  fulfill  all  the  obligations  of  her  alliance. 

"She  will  not  neglect,  however,  any  effort  toward  a  solution  of  the  con- 
flict in  the  interests  of  universal  peace.  The  conversation  entered  into 
between  the  powers  which  are  less  directly  interested  still  allows  of  the 


584  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

hope  that  peace  may  be  preserved;  I  therefore  think  it  would  be  well  that, 
in  taking  any  precautionary  measures  of  defense,  which  Russia  thinks 
must  go  on,  she  should  not  immediately  take  any  step  which  may  offer  to 
Germany  a  pretext  for  a  total  or  partial  mobilization  of  her  forces. 

"Yesterday,  in  the  late  afternoon,  the  German  Ambassador  [Baron  von 
Schoen]  spoke  to  me  of  the  military  measures  which  the  Government  of 
the  republic  were  taking,  adding  that  France  was  able  to  act  in  this  way, 
but  that  in  Germany  preparations  could  not  be  secret  and  that  French 
opinion  should  not  be  alarmed  if  Germany  decided  on  them. 

"I  answered  that  the  French  Government  had  not  taken  any  step  which 
could  give  their  neighbors  any  cause  for  disquietude,  and  that  their  wish 
to  lend  themselves  to  any  negotiations  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  peace 
could  not  be  doubted." 

Ambassador  Paleologue  reported  from  St.  Petersburg  that,  in 
deference  to  the  desire  of  M.  Viviani,  no  pretext  be  offered 
Germany  for  general  mobilization,  the  Russian  General  Staff  had 
suspended  all  measures  of  military  precaution. 

"Yesterday  the  chief  of  the  staff  sent  for  the  Military  Attache  of  the 
German  Embassy  and  gave  him  his  word  of  honor  that  the  mobilization 
ordered  this  morning  was  exclusively  directed  against  Austria. 

"Nevertheless,  from  an  interview  which  he  had  this  afternoon  with 
Count  Pourtales  [German  Ambassador],  M.  Sazonof  was  forced  to  the 
conclusion  that  Germany  does  not  wish  to  pronounce  at  Vienna  the  decisive 
word  which  would  safeguard  peace.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  has  received 
the  same  impression  from  an  exchange  of  telegrams  which  he  has  just 
had  personally  with  the  Emperor  William. 

"Moreover,  the  Russian  General  Staff  and  Admiralty  have  received 
disquieting  information  concerning  the  preparations  of  the  German  army 
and  navy. 

"In  giving  me  this  information  Mr.  Sazonof  added  that  the  Russian 
Government  are  continuing  none  the  less  their  efforts  toward  concilia- 
tion. He  repeated  to  me:  'I  shall  continue  to  negotiate  until  the  last 
moment.' " 

Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  reported  from  Berlin  of  the  official 
recall  of  the  press  announcement  of  German  mobilization,  but 
added  that  his  apprehension  of  the  plans  of  Germany  was  not 
diminished  thereby. 

"It  seems  certain  that  the  Extraordinary  Council  held  yesterday  eve- 
ning at  Potsdam  with  the  military  authorities  under  the  presidency  of  the 
emperor  decided  on  mobilization,  and  this  explains  the  preparation  of  the 
special  edition  of  the  'Lokal  Anzeiger,'  but  that  from  various  causes  (the 
declaration  of  Great  Britain  that  she  reserved  her  entire  liberty  of  action, 
the  exchange  of  telegrams  between  the  czar  and  William  II)  the  serious 
measures  which  had  been  decided  upon  were  suspended. 


STATE    PAPERS  585 

"One  of  the  ambassadors  with  whom  I  have  very  close  relations  saw 
Herr  von  Zimmermann  at  two  o'clock.  According  to  the  Under-Secretary 
of  State,  the  military  authorities  are  very  anxious  that  mobilization  should 
be  ordered,  because  every  delay  makes  Germany  lose  some  of  her  advan- 
tages. Nevertheless,  up  to  the  present  time  the  haste  of  the  General  Staff, 
which  sees  war  in  mobilization,  had  been  successfully  prevented.  In  any 
case  mobilization  may  be  decided  upon  at  any  moment.  I  do  not  know  who 
has  issued  in  the  'Lokal  Anzeiger,'  a  paper  which  is  usually  semiofficial, 
premature  news  calculated  to  cause  excitement  in  France. 

"Further,  I  have  the  strongest  reasons  to  believe  that  all  the  measures 
for  mobilization  which  can  be  taken  before  the  publication  of  the  general 
order  have  already  been  taken  here,  and  that  they  are  anxious  here  to 
make  us  publish  our  mobilization  first  in  order  to  attribute  the  responsi- 
bility to  us." 

M.  Viviani  instructed  Ambassador  Paul  Cambon  at  London  to 
inform  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
of  the  following  facts  of  French  and  German  military  prepara- 
tions, to  show  that,  "if  France  is  resolved,  it  is  not  she  who  is 
taking  aggressive  steps." 

"Although  Germany  has  made  her  covering  dispositions  a  few  hundred 
meters  from  the  frontier,  along  the  whole  front  from  Luxemburg  to  the 
Vosges,  and  has  transported  her  covering  troops  to  their  war  positions,  we 
have  kept  our  troops  ten  kilometers  from  the  frontier  and  forbidden  them 
to  approach  nearer. 

"By  leaving  a  strip  of  territory  undefended  against  sudden  aggression 
of  the  enemy,  the  Government  of  the  republic  hopes  to  prove  that  France 
does  not  bear,  any  more  than  Russia,  the  responsibility  for  the  attack. 

"In  order  to  be  convinced  of  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  compare  the  steps 
taken  on  the  two  sides  of  our  frontier ;  in  France  soldiers  who  were  on  leave 
were  not  recalled  until  we  were  certain  that  Germany  had  done  so  five 
days  before. 

"In  Germany,  not  only  have  the  garrison  troops  of  Metz  been  pushed  up 
to  the  frontier,  but  they  have  been  reenforced  by  units  transported  by  train 
from  garrisons  of  the  interior  such  as  Treves  or  Cologne;  nothing  like  this 
has  been  done  in  France. 

"The  arming  of  the  frontier  defenses  (clearing  of  trees,  placing  of 
armament,  construction  of  batteries,  and  strengthening  of  wire  entangle- 
ments) was  begun  in  Germany  on  Saturday,  the  25th;  with  us  it  is  going 
to  be  begun,  for  France  can  no  longer  refrain  from  taking  similar 
measures. 

"The  railway  stations  were  occupied  by  the  military  in  Germany  on 
Saturday,  the  25th;  in  France  on  Tuesday,  the  28th. 

"Finally,  in  Germany  the  reservists  by  tens  of  thousands  have  been  re- 
called by  individual  summons,  those  living  abroad  (the  classes  of  1903  to 
1911)  have  been  recalled,  the  officers  of  reserve  have  been  summoned;  in 
the  interior  the  roads  are  closed,  motor  cars  only  circulate  with  permits. 


586     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

It  is  the  last  stage  before  mobilization.  None  of  these  measures  has  been 
taken  in  France. 

"The  German  army  has  its  outposts  on  our  frontier;  on  two  occasions 
yesterday  German  patrols  penetrated  our  territory.  The  whole  Sixteenth 
Army  Corps  from  Metz,  reenforced  by  part  of  the  Eighth  from  Treves 
and  Cologne,  occupies  the  frontier  from  Metz  to  Luxemburg;  the  Fifteenth 
Army  Corps  from  Strassburg  is  massed  on  the  frontier. 

"Under  penalty  of  being  shot,  the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed  parts  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  are  forbidden  to  cross  the  frontier." 


FRIDAY,      JULY      31,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  On  the  following  day  Count  Berchtold, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed  the  ambassador  at 
Berlin,  Count  Szogyeny,  an  account  of  the  discussion  on  the 
30th  inst.  between  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  German  Ambassador  in  London,  Prince 
Lichnowsky. 

The  ambassador  was  instructed  to  thank  Secretary  of  State 
von  Jagow  for  communications  made  to  Austria-Hungary 

"and  to  declare  to  him  that  in  spite  of  the  change  in  the  situation  which 
has  since  arisen  through  the  mobilization  of  Russia,  we  are  quite  prepared 
to  entertain  the  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  negotiate  between  us 
and  Serbia. 

"The  conditions  of  our  acceptance  are,  nevertheless,  that  our  military 
action  against  Serbia  should  continue  to  take  its  course,  and  that  the 
British  Cabinet  should  move  the  Russian  Government  to  bring  to  a  stand- 
still the  Russian  mobilization  which  is  directed  against  us,  in  which 
case,  of  course,  we  will  also  at  once  cancel  the  defensive  military  counter- 
measures  in  Galicia,  which  are  occasioned  by  the  Russian  attitude." 

Ambassador  Szapary  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg: 

"The  order  for  the  general  mobilization  of  the  entire  [Russian]  army 
and  fleet  was  issued  early  to-day." 

Count  Berchtold  notified  the  Austro-Hungarian  representa- 
tives abroad : 

"As  mobilization  has  been  ordered  by  the  Russian  Government  on  our 
frontier,  we  find  ourselves  obliged  to  take  military  measures  in  Galicia. 

"These  measures  are  purely  of  a  defensive  character  and  arise  exclu- 
sively under  the  pressure  of  the  Russian  measures,  which  we  regret  exceed- 
ingly, as  we  ourselves  have  no  aggressive  intentions  of  any  kind  against 
Russia,  and  desire  the  continuation  of  the  former  neighborly  relations. 

"Pourparlers  between  the  Cabinets  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  appro- 


STATE    PAPERS  587 

priate  to  the  situation  are  meanwhile  being  continued,  and  from  these  we 
hope  that  things  will  quiet  down  all  around." 

Ambassador  Szecsen  telegraphed  from  Paris  that  the  German 
Ambassador  had  officially  declared  to  France 

"that  if  the  general  mobilization  ordered  by  the  Russian  Government  is  not 
stopped  within  twelve  hours,  Germany  also  will  mobilize.  At  the  same  time 
Baron  Schoen  has  asked  whether  France  will  remain  neutral  in  the  event  of 
a  war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  An  answer  to  this  is  requested  within 
eighteen  hours.  The  time  limit  expires  to-morrow  (Saturday)  at  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon." 

Ambassador  Szapary  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  that  he 
had  resumed  conversations  with  M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  but  that  the  "points  of  view  on  the  two 
sides  had  not  materially  approximated  to  each  other." 

"Meanwhile,  however,  it  has  appeared  from  the  conversations  between 
the  German  Ambassador  [Count  Pourtales]  and  M.  Sazonof  that  Russia 
will  not  accept  as  satisfactory  the  formal  declaration  that  Austria-Hungary 
will  neither  diminish  the  territory  of  the  Serbian  Kingdom  nor  infringe 
on  Serbian  sovereignty,  nor  injure  Russian  interests  in  the  Balkans  or 
elsewhere;  since  then,  moreover,  a  general  mobilization  has  been  ordered  on 
the  part  of  Russia." 


FURTHER     EXCHANGES      BETWEEN      WILLIAM 
AND      NICHOLAS 

Germany.  The  Czar  sent  the  following  telegram  to  William 
II: 

"I  thank  you  cordially  for  your  mediation,  which  permits  the  hope  that 
everything  may  yet  end  peaceably.  It  is  technically  impossible  to  discon- 
tinue our  military  preparations,  which  have  been  made  necessary  by  the 
Austrian  mobilization.  It  is  far  from  us  to  want  war.  As  long  as  the 
negotiations  between  Austria  and  Serbia  continue,  my  troops  will  under- 
take no  provocative  action.  I  give  you  my  solemn  word  thereon.  I  confide 
with  all  my  faith  in  the  grace  of  God,  and  I  hope  for  the  success  of  your 
mediation  in  Vienna  for  the  welfare  of  our  countries  and  the  peace  of 
Europe." 

This  telegram  of  the  Czar  crossed  with  the  following  sent  by 
the  Kaiser,  at  2  p.  m. : 

"Upon  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  your  request  for  my  aid,  I  have 
engaged  in  mediation  between  your  Government  and  the  Government  of 
Austria-Hungary.  While  this  action  was  taking  place  your  troops  were 
being  mobilized  against  my  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  whereby,  as  I  have 


588      THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

already- communicated  to  you,  my  med  ation  has  bocome  a^ost  illusory.  In 
spite  of  this  I  have  continued  it,  and  now  I  receive  reliable  news  that 
serious  preparations  for  war  are  going  on  on  my  eastern  frontier.  The 
responsibility  for  the  security  of  my  country  forces  me  to  measures  of 
defense.  I  have  gone  to  the  extreme  limit  of  the  possible  in  my  efforts 
for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  not  I  who  bear  the 
responsibility  for  the  misfortune  which  now  threatens  the  entire  civilized 
world.  It  rests  in  your  hand  to  avert  it.  No  one  threatens  the  honor  and 
peace  of  Russia  which  might  well  have  awaited  the  success  of  my  media- 
tion. The  friendship  for  you  and  your  country,  bequeathed  to  me  by  my 
grandfather  on  his  deathbed,  has  always  been  sacred  to  me,  and  I  have 
stood  faithfully  by  Russia  while  it  was  in  serious  affliction,  especially  dur- 
ing its  last  war.  The  peace  of  Europe  can  still  be  preserved  by  you  if 
Russia  decides  to  discontinue  those  military  preparations  which  menace 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary." 

Germany.    Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  telegraphed  to 
.Ambassador  Von  Flotow  at  Rome : 

"We  have  continued  to  negotiate  between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary 
through  a  direct  exchange  of  telegrams  between  his  Majesty  the  Kaiser 
and  his  Majesty  the  Czar,  as  well  as  in  conjunction  with  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Through  the  mobilization  of  Russia  all  our  efforts  have  been  greatly  handi- 
capped, if  they  have  not  become  impossible.  In  spite  of  pacifying  assur- 
ances Russia  is  taking  such  far-reaching  measures  against  us  that  the 
situation  is  becoming  continually  menacing." 

The  Chancellor  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Pourtales  at  St. 
Petersburg : 

"In  spite  of  negotiations  still  pending,  and  although  we  have  up  to  this 
hour  made  no  preparation*  for  mobilization,  Russia  has  mobilized  her  entire 
army  and  navy,  hence  also  against  us.  On  account  of  these  Russian  meas- 
ures we  have  been  forced,  for  the  safety  of  the  country,  to  proclaim  the 
threatening  state  of  war,  which  does  not  yet  imply  mobilization.  Mobiliza- 
tion, however,  is^bound  to  follow  if  Russia  does  not  stop  every  measure 
of  war  against  us  and  against  Austria-Hungary  within  twelve  hours,  and 
notifies  us  definitely  to  this  effect.  Please  to  communicate  this  at  once  to 
M.  Sazonof  and  wire  hour  of  communication." 

The  German  White  Book  states  that  Count  Pourtales  delivered 
the  note  at  midnight  of  this  day  (July  31). 

"The  reply  of  the  Russian  Government  has  never  reached  us. 

"Two  hours  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  the  czar  telegraphed 
the  kaiser  as  follows: 

"I  have  received  your  telegram.  I  comprehend  that  you  are  forced  to 
mobilize,  but  I  should  like  to  have  from  you  the  same  guaranty  which  I 
have  given  to  you,  viz.,  that  these  measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that 
we  shall  continue  to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two  countries  and  the 
universal  peace  which  is  so  dear  to  our  hearts.  With  the  aid  of  God  it 


STATE    PAPERS  589 

must  be  possible  to  our  long-tried  friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding  of 
blood.     I  expect  with  full  confidence  your  urgent  reply." 

The  Chancellor  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Schoen  at  Paris: 
"Russia  has  ordered  mobilization  of  her  entire  army  and  fleet,  there- 
fore also  against  us  in  spite  of  our  still  pending  mediation.  We  have, 
therefore,  declared  the  threatening  state  of  war  which  is  bound  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  mobilization  unless  Russia  stops  within  twelve  hours  all  measures 
of  war  against  us  and  Austria.  Mobilization  inevitably  implies  war.  Please 
ask  French  Government  whether  it  intends  to  remain  neutral  in  a  Russo- 
German  war.  Reply  must  be  made  in  eighteen  hours.  Wire  at  once  hour 
of  inquiry.  Utmost  speed  necessary." 

William  II  telegraphed  to  George  V  of  Great  Britain : 

"Many  thanks  for  your  friendly  communication.  Your  proposals  coin- 
cide with  my  ideas  and  with  the  communication  which  I  have  this  evening 
received  from  Vienna,  and  which  I  have  passed  on  to  London.  I  have  just 
heard  from  the  chancellor  that  intelligence  has  just  reached  him  that 
Nicholas  this  evening  has  ordered  the  mobilization  of  his  entire  army  and 
fleet.  J3.&  has  not  even  awaited  the  result  of  the  mediation  in  which  I  am 
engaged,  and  he  has  left  me  completely  without  information.  I  am  travel- 
ing to  Berlin  to  assure  the  safety  of  my  eastern  frontier,  where  strong 
Russian  forces  have  already  taken  up  their  position." 

Russia.  M.  Schebeko,  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  telegraphed  to 
M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  St.  Petersburg: 

"In  spite  of  the  general  mobilization,  my  exchange  of  views  with  Count 
Berchtold  and  his  colleagues  continues.  They  all  dwell  upon  the  absence  on 
Austria's  part  of  any  hostile  intentions  whatsoever  against  Russia,  and  of 
any  designs  of  conquest  at  the  expense  of  Serbia,  but  they  are  all  equally 
insistent  that  Austria  is  bound  to  carry  through  the  action  which  she  has 
begun  and  to  give  Serbia  a  serious  lesson,  which  would  constitute  a  sure 
guaranty  for  the  future." 

Great  Britain.  Ambassador  Goschen  telegraphed  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs: 

"The  [German]  Chancellor  [Bethmann-Hollweg]  informs  me  that  his 
efforts  to  preach  peace  and  moderation  at  Vienna  have  been  seriously 
handicapped  by  the  Russian  mobilization  against  Austria.  He  has  done 
everything  possible  to  attain  his  object  at  Vienna,  perhaps  even  rather  more 
than  was  altogether  palatable  at  the  Ballplatz.  He  could  not,  however,  leave 
his  country  defenseless  while  time  was  being  utilized  by  other  powers;  and 
if,  as  he  learns  the  case,  military  measures  are  now  being  taken  by 
Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  remain 
quiet.  He  wished  to  tell  me  that  it  was  quite  possible  that  in  a  very  short 
time,  to-day  perhaps,  the  German  Government  would  take  some  very 
serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of  going  to  have  an  audience 
with  the  emperor. 


590  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

"His  excellency  added  that  the  news  of  the  active  preparations  on  the 
Russo-German  frontier  had  reached  him  just  when  the  czar  had  appealed 
to  the  emperor,  in  the  name  of  their  old  friendship,  to  mediate  at  Vienna, 
and  when  the  emperor  was  actually  conforming  to  that  request." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Buchanan  at  St.  Peters- 
burg that  a  conversation  had  taken  place  between  Austria  and 
Russia  at  Vienna,  and  that  one  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been 
authorized  by  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Count 
Berchtold,  in  which  Austria  would  explain  the  ultimatum  to 
Serbia  and  discuss  any  questions  directly  affecting  Austro-Rus- 
sian  relations. 

"I  informed  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  regards  military  prepara- 
tions, I  did  not  see  how  Russia  could  be  urged  to  suspend  them  unless  some 
limit  were  put  by  Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops  into  Serbia." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  his  hope 
for  a  satisfactory  result  from  the  Austro-Russian  conversations. 

"The  stumblingblock  hitherto  has  been  Austrian  mistrust  of  Serbian 
assurances,  and  Russian  mistrust  of  Austrian  intentions  with  regard  to  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  Serbia.  It  has  occurred  to  me  that,  in  the 
event  of  this  mistrust  preventing  a  solution  being  found  by  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  Germany  might  sound  Vienna,  and  I  would  undertake  to  sound 
St.  Petersburg,  whether  it  would  be  possible  for  the  four  disinterested 
powers  to  offer  to  Austria  that  they  would  undertake  to  see  that  she  ob- 
tained full  satisfaction  of  her  demands  on  Serbia,  provided  that  they  did  not 
impair  Serbian  sovereignty  and  the  integrity  of  Serbian  territory.  As  your 
excellency  is  aware,  Austria  has  already  declared  her  willingness  to  respect 
them.  Russia  might  be  informed  by  the  four  powers  that  they  would  under- 
take to  prevent  Austrian  demands  going  the  length  of  impairing  Serbian 
sovereignty  and  integrity.  All  powers  would  of  course  suspend  further 
military  operations  or  preparations. 

"You  may  sound  the  Secretary  of  State  [Von  Jagow]  about  this  proposal. 

"I  said  to  German  Ambassador  [Prince  Lichnowsky]  this  morning  that 
if  Germany  could  get  any  reasonable  proposal  put  forward  which  made  it 
clear  that  Germany  and  Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace, 
and  that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable  if  they  rejected  it,  I 
would  support  it  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris,  and  go  the  length  of  saying 
that  if  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  it  his  majesty's  Government 
would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  consequences;  but,  otherwise,  I  told 
German  Ambassador  that  if  France  became  involved  we  should  be  drawn  in. 

"You  can  add  this  when  sounding  Chancellor  [Bethmann-Hollweg]  or 
Secretary  of  State  as  to  proposal  above." 

Goschen  telegraphed  Grey  that  the  whole  Russian  army  and 
fleet  were  mobilizing,  and  that  Kriegsgefahr  (imminence  of  war) 


STATE    PAPERS  591 

will  be  proclaimed  at  once  by  Germany,  as  it  can  be  only  against 
her  that  Russian  general  mobilization  is  directed.  German 
mobilization  would  follow  almost  immediately. 

Ambassador  Buchanan  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  that 
Russian  general  mobilization  had  been  ordered  because  of  news 
from  Vienna 

"that  Austria  is  determined  not  to  yield  to  intervention  of  powers,  and  that 
she  is  moving  troops  against  Russia  as  well  as  against  Serbia. 

"Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  making  active  mili- 
tary preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris : 

"I  still  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view  of  mobilization 
in  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  his  majesty's  Government,  in  view  of 
existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French  Government  are  prepared  to  engage 
to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  power  violates  it." 

The  same  telegram,  with  change  of  words,  "French  Govern- 
ment" to  "German  Government,"  was  sent  to  Ambassador 
Goschen  at  Berlin.  Grey  asked  Sir  Francis  Villiers,  Ambassa- 
dor at  Brussels,  to  inform  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  of  these  telegrams,  and  to  say: 

"I  assume  that  the  Belgian  Government  will  maintain  to  the  utmost  of 
their  power  their  neutrality,  which  I  desire  and  expect  other  powers  to  up- 
hold and  observe." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris : 

"Nobody  here  feels  that  in  this  dispute,  so  far  as  it  has  yet  gone,  British 
treaties  or  obligations  are  involved.  Feeling  is  "quite  different  from  what 
it  was  during  the  Morocco  question.  That  crisis  involved  a  dispute  directly 
involving  France,  whereas  in  this  case  France  is  being  drawn  into  a  dispute 
which  is  not  hers. 

"I  believe  it  to  be  quite  untrue  that  our  attitude  has  been  a  decisive  fac- 
tor in  situation.  German  Government  do  not  expect  our  neutrality. 

"We  cannot  undertake  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in  a  war.  I  have  so 
told  the  French  Ambassador,  who  has  urged  his  majesty's  Government  to 
reconsider  this  decision. 

"I  have  told  him  that  we  should  not  be  justified  in  giving  any  pledge  at 
the  present  moment,  but  that  we  will  certainly  consider  the  situation  again 
directly  there  is  a  new  development." 

Bertie  telegraphed  to  Grey  that  German  Ambassador  von 
Schoen  had  just  informed  M.  Viviani,  French  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  that  Germany  had  addressed  an  ultimatum  to 
Russia  to  demobilize,  saying  that,  if  it  were  not  complied  with 


592  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

within  twenty-four  hours,  Germany  would  order  complete  mobi- 
lization on  Russian  and  French  frontiers.  Viviani  wishes  to 
know  what,  in  these  circumstances,  will  be  Great  Britain's 
attitude. 

"German  Ambassador  is  going  to  call  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs 
to-morrow  at  1  p.  m.  in  order  to  receive  the  French  Government's  answer 
as  to  their  attitude." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris  that  French 
Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  at  Berlin  had  reported  to  M.  Paul 
Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  that  uncertainty  of 
Great  Britain's  intervention  was  encouraging  Germany  in  her 
warlike  attitude,  and  that  a  definite  declaration  by  Great  Britain 
on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France  would  decide  the  German  atti- 
tude in  favor  of  peace. 

Ambassador  Buchanan  telegraphed  from  St.  Petersburg  the 
following  proposition  (sent  also  to  France),  made  by  M.  Sazonof, 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs : 

"If  Austria  will  agree  to  check  the  advance  of  her  troops  on  Serbian 
territory;  if,  recognizing  that  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Serbia  has 
assumed  a  character  of  European  interest,  she  will  allow  the  great  powers 
to  look  into  the  matter  and  determine  whether  Serbia  could  satisfy  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Government  without  impairing  her  rights  as  a  sovereign 
state  of  her  independence,  Russia  will  undertake  to  maintain  her  waiting 
attitude." 

M.  Sazonof  adduced  the  latest  telegram  of  Nicholas  II  to  Wil- 
liam II  as  proof  of  sincerity  of  Russia's  attitude.  He  proposed 
that  the  conference  of  the  powers  be  held  in  London.  He  was 
grateful  to  Great  Britain ;  if  peace  were  secured,  it  would  be  due 
largely  to  her  efforts ;  Russia  would  never  forget  her  firm  attitude. 

Ambassador  Goschen  telegraphed  from  Berlin  that  he  had 
spent  an  hour  with  Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow,  urging  him  to 
accept  Grey's  proposal  to  make  another  effort  to  prevent  the  ter- 
rible catastrophe  of  a  European  war. 

"He  appreciated  your  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  but  said  it 
was  impossible  for  the  Imperial  Government  to  consider  any  proposal  until 
they  had  received  an  answer  from  Russia  to  their  communication  of  to-day 
[the  ultimatum]. 

"I  asked  his  excellency  why  they  had  made  their  demand  even  more 
difficult  for  Russia  to  accept  by  asking  them  to  demobilize  in  south  as  well. 


STATE    PAPERS  593 

He  replied  that  it  was  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  all  her 
mobilization  was  directed  only  against  Austria. 

"His  excellency  said  that  if  the  answer  from  Russia  was  satisfactory  he 
thought  personally  that  your  proposal  merited  favorable  consideration,  and 
in  any  case  he  would  lay  it  before  the  emperor  and  chancellor. 

"He  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor  William,  at  the  request  of 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  German  Foreign  Office  had  even  up  till  last 
night  been  urging  Austria  to  show  willingness  to  continue  discussions — and 
telegraphic  and  the  telephonic  communications  from  Vienna  had  been  of  a 
promising  nature — but  Russia's  mobilization  had  spoilt  everything." 

Ambassador  Bertie  telegraphed  from  Paris  that  he  had  pre- 
sented to  M.  Viviani,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Grey's  in- 
quiry concerning  France  respecting  Belgian  neutrality. 

"He  is  urgently  anxious  as  to  what  the  attitude  of  England  will  be  in 
the  circumstances  [which  may  arise  from  Germany's  ultimatum  to  Russia.]" 

The  German  Embassy  is  packing  up. 
In  a  supplementary  telegram  Bertie  informed  Grey : 
"French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
and  it  would  be  only  in  the  event  of  some  other  power  violating  that  neu- 
trality that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  necessity,  in  order  to  assure 
defense  of  her  own  security,  to  act  otherwise.     This  assurance  has  been 
given  several  times.    President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the 
Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed 
the  assurance  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day." 

France.  Raymond  Poincare,  President  of  France,  informed 
George  V  that  Germany  was  pushing  forward  military  prepa- 
rations, especially  on  the  French  frontier,  while  France  had  till 
now  confined  herself  to  indispensable  precautionary  measures. 

"We  are,  in  spite  of  the  moderation  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
and  the  calm  of  public  opinion,  on  the  eve  of  the  most  terrible  events. 

"From  all  the  information  which  reaches  us  it  would  seem  that  war 
would  be  inevitable  if  Germany  were  convinced  that  the  British  Government 
would  not  intervene  in  a  conflict  in  which  France  might  be  engaged;  if 
on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  convinced  that  the  entente  cordiale  would 
be  affirmed,  in  case  of  need,  even  to  the  extent  of  taking  the  field  side  by 
side,  there  would  be  the  greatest  chance  that  peace  would  remain  unbroken. 

"It  is  true  that  our  military  and  naval  arrangements  leave  complete 
liberty  to  your  majesty's  Government,  and  that,  in  the  letters  exchanged  in 
1912  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon,  Great  Britain  and 
France  entered  into  nothing  more  than  a  mutual  agreement  to  consult  one 
another  in  the  event  of  European  tension,  and  to  examine  in  concert  whether 
common  action  were  advisable. 

"But  the  character  of  close  friendship  which  public  feeling  has  given 
in  both  countries  to  the  entente  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  con- 


594  THE    STORY   OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

fidence  with  which  our  two  governments  have  never  ceased  to  work  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  and  the  signs  of  sympathy  which  your  majesty  has 
ever  shown  to  France,  justify  me  in  informing  you  quite  frankly  of  the  im- 
pressions of  all  France. 

"It  is,  I  consider,  on  the  language  and  the  action  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  henceforward  the  last  chances  of  a  peaceful  settlement  depend. 

"We,  ourselves,  from  the  initial  stages  of  the  crisis,  have  enjoined  upon 
our  ally  [Russia]  an  attitude  of  moderation  from  which  they  have  not 
swerved.  In  concert  with  your  majesty's  Government,  and  in  conformity  with 
Sir  E.  Grey's  latest  suggestions,  we  will  continue  to  act  on  the  same  lines. 

"But  if  all  efforts  at  conciliation  emanate  from  one  side,  and  if  Germany 
and  Austria  can  speculate  on  the  abstention  of  Great  Britain,  Austria's  de- 
mands will  remain  inflexible,  and  an  agreement  between  her  and  Russia 
will  become  impossible.  I  am  profoundly  convinced  that  at  the  present 
moment,  the  more  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia  can  give  a  deep  im- 
pression that  they  are  united  in  their  diplomatic  action,  the  more  possible 
will  it  be  to  count  upon  the  preservation  of  peace. 

"I  beg  that  your  majesty  will  excuse  a  step  which  is  inspired  only  by  the 
hope  of  seeing  the  European  balance  of  power  definitely  reaffirmed." 

Ambassador  Paul  Cambon  telegraphed  from  London  of  Grey's 
reply  to  Germany  on  attitude  of  Great  Britain  in  event  of  Euro- 
pean war. 

"The  Cabinet  Council  took  place  this  morning.  After  having  examined 
the  situation,  the  Cabinet  thought  that  for  the  moment  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  unable  to  guarantee  to  us  their  intervention;  that  they  in- 
tended to  take  steps  to  obtain  from  Germany  and  France  an  understanding 
to  respect  Belgian  neutrality;  but  that  before  considering  intervention  it 
was  necessary  to  wait  for  the  situation  to  develop. 

"I  asked  Sir  E.  Grey  if,  before  intervening,  the  British  Government 
would  await  the  invasion  of  French  territory.  I  insisted  on  the  fact  that  the 
measures  already  taken  on  our  frontier  by  Germany  showed  an  intention  to 
attack  in  the  near  future,  and  that,  if  a  renewal  of  the  mistake  of  Europe 
in  1870  was  to  be  avoided,  Great  Britain  should  consider  at  once  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  she  would  give  France  the  help  on  which  she  relied. 

"Sir  E.  Grey  replied  that  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  on  the  situation  had 
been  formed  only  at  the  moment;  that  the  situation  might  be  modified;  and 
that  in  that  case  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  would  be  called  at  once  in  order 
to  consider  it. 

"I  am  informed  that  the  Cabinet  will  meet  again  to-morrow,  and  that 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  will  be  certain  to  renew  the  dis- 
cussion. 

"The  letter  which  the  President  of  the  Republic  has  addressed  to  the 
King  of  England  should  be  given  to  the  king  this  evening.  This  step  will,  I 
am  sure,  be  taken  into  serious  consideration  by  the  British  Cabinet." 

M.  Viviani  notified  the  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Peters- 
burg, Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome,  of  France's  agreement  to  the 


STATE    PAPERS  695 

proposal  of  Great  Britain  to  Austria-Hungary  not  to  proceed 
further  against  Serbia  after  occupying  Belgrade,  and  to  await 
mediation  by  the  powers. 

"Sir  E.  Grey  made  this  suggestion  in  the  hope  that  military  preparations 
would  be  suspended  on  all  sides." 

Russia  had  already  agreed  to  stop  military  preparations  if 
Austria  eliminated  from  her  ultimatum  to  Serbia  all  points 
which  endanger  Serbian  sovereignty. 

"Sir  E.  Grey  thinks  that,  if  Austria  stops  her  advance  after  the  occupa- 
tion of  Belgrade,  the  Russian  Government  could  agree  to  change  their 
formula  in  the  following  way: 

"That  the  powers  would  examine  how  Serbia  should  give  complete  satis- 
faction to  Austria  without  endangering  the  sovereignty  or  independence  of 
the  kingdom.  In  case  Austria  should  declare  herself  ready,  in  the  interests 
of  Europe,  to  stop  her  advance  and  to  discuss  how  an  arrangement  might 
be  arrived  at,  Russia  could  also  consent  to  the  discussion  and  suspend  her 
military  preparations,  provided  that  the  other  powers  acted  in  the  same 
way." 

M.  Viviani  telegraphed  to  the  Ambassadors  at  London,  St. 
Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  and  Constantinople  that 
negotiations  had  begun  again  between  Austria  and  Russia, 
the  latter  having  accepted  the  formula  advised  by  Great 
Britain. 

"Nevertheless  .  .  .  Germany  .  .  .  has  not  ceased  to  encourage  the  uncom- 
promising attitude  of  Vienna;  the  German  military  preparations  continue; 
the  immediate  opposition  of  Germany  to  the  Russian  formula  was  declared 
at  Berlin  inacceptable  for  Austria  before  that  power  had  even  been  con- 
sulted; in  conclusion,  all  the  impressions  derived  from  Berlin  bring  con- 
viction that  Germany  has  sought  to  humiliate  Russia,  to  disintegrate  the 
Triple  Entente,  and  if  these  results  can  not  be  obtained,  to  make  war." 

Ambassador  Dumaine  telegraphed  from  Vienna: 

"General  mobilization  for  all  men  from  nineteen  to  forty-two  years  of 
age  was  declared  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  this  morning  at 
one  o'clock. 

"My  Russian  colleague  [M.  Schebeko]  still  thinks  that  this  step  is  not 
entirely  in  contradiction  to  the  declaration  made  yesterday  by  Count 
Berchtold  [Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]." 

Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  telegraphed  from  Berlin  that  Sec- 
retary of  State  von  Jagow  had  informed  him  that,  in  the  face 
of  total  mobilization  by  Russia,  Germany  had  declared 
Kriegsgefahrzustand  (imminence  of  war).  German  Ambas- 


596  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

sador  Schoen  had  been  instructed  to  ask  France  what  attitude 
she  intended  to  adopt. 

M.  Viviani  informed  Ambassador  Paleologue  at  St.  Petersburg 
of  the  Schoen  interview  and  the  ultimatum  he  had  delivered,  to 
be  replied  to  on  the  morrow  (Saturday)  at  1  p.  m. 

"I  shall  confine  myself  to  telling  him  that  France  will  have  regard  to  her 
interests.  The  Government  of  the  Republic  need  not  indeed  give  any  ac- 
count of  her  intentions  except  to  her  ally. 

"I  ask  you  to  inform  M.  Sazonof  [Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  of  this 
immediately.  As  I  have  already  told  you,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  Im- 
perial Government,  in  the  highest  interests  of  peace,  will  do  everything  on 
their  part  to  avoid  anything  that  might  render  inevitable  or  precipitate  the 
crisis." 

Minister  Klobukowski  telegraphed  from  Brussels  that 
L'Agence  Havas  having  announced  the  proclamation  of  "immi- 
nence of  war"  in  Germany,  he  had  assured  M.  Davignon,  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  France  would  respect  Belgian 
neutrality. 

"The  Russian  and  British  Ministers  appeared  much  pleased  that  in  the 
circumstances  I  gave  this  assurance,  which  further,  as  the  British  Minister 
told  me,  was  in  accordance  with  the  declaration  of  Sir  E.  Grey." 

Belgium.  M.  Davignon  reported  the  above  interview  to  the 
Belgian  Ministers  at  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London,  giving  the  exact 
words  of  the  French  Minister : 

"No  incursion  of  French  troops  into  Belgium  will  take  place,  even  if 
considerable  forces  are  massed  upon  the  frontiers  of  your  country.  France 
does  not  wish  to  incur  the  responsibility,  so  far  as  Belgium  is  concerned,  of 
taking  the  first  hostile  act. 

"I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski,  and  I  felt  bound  to  observe  that  we  had  al- 
ways had  the  greatest  confidence  in  the  loyal  observance  by  both  our  neigh- 
boring states  of  their  engagements  toward  us.  We  have  also  every  reason 
to  believe  that  the  attitude  of  the  German  Government  will  be  the  same  as 
that  of  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic." 

M.  Davignon  telegraphed  to  all  the  Belgian  Legations  abroad : 

"The  Minister  of  War  informs  me  that  [Belgian]  mobilization  has  been 
ordered,  and  that  Saturday,  August  1,  will  be  the  first  day." 

He  telegraphed  to  the  Belgian  Ministers  at  Berlin,  London,  and 
Paris,  that  the  British  Minster  had  reported  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
inquiry  to  France  and  Germany  if  they  would  respect  Belgian 
neutrality,  and  now  formally  states  that  he  presumes — 


STATE    PAPERS  597 

"that  Belpnvm  will  do  her  utmost  to  maintain  her  neutrality,  and  that  she 
desires  and  expects  that  the  other  powers  will  respect  and  maintain  it. 

"I  thanked  Sir  Francis  Villiers  for  this  communication,  which  the  Bel- 
gian Government  particularly  appreciate,  and  I  added  that  Great  Britain 
and  the  other  nations  guaranteeing  our  independence  could  rest  assured 
that  we  would  neglect  no  effort  to  maintain  our  neutrality,  and  that  we 
were  convinced  that  the  other  powers,  in  view  of  the  excellent  relations  of 
friendship  and  confidence  which  had  always  existed  between  us,  would  re- 
spect and  maintain  that  neutrality. 

"I  stated  that  our  military  forces,  which  had  been  considerably  developed 
in  consequence  of  our  recent  reorganization,  were  sufficient  to  enable  us  to 
defend  oursleves  energetically  in  the  event  of  the  violation  of  our  territory. 

"In  the  course  of  the  ensuing  conversation,  Sir  Francis  seemed  to  me 
somewhat  surprised  at  the  speed  with  which  we  had  decided  to  mobilize 
our  army.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  Netherlands  had  come  to  a  similar 
decision  before  we  had  done  so,  and  that,  moreover,  the  recent  date  of  our 
new  military  system,  and  the  temporary  nature  of  the  measures  upon  which 
we  then  had  to  decide,  made  it  necessary  for  us  to  take  immediate  and 
thorough  precautions.  Our  neighbors  and  guarantors  should  see  in  this 
decision  our  strong  desire  to  uphold  our  neutrality  ourselves. 

"Sir  Francis  seemed  to  be  satisfied  with  my  reply,  and  stated  that  his 
Government  were  awaiting  this  reply  before  continuing  negotiations  with 
France  and  Germany,  the  result  of  which  would  be  communicated  to  me." 

He  telegraphed  to  the  same  ministers  that  the  German  Minis- 
ter, Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  had  been  informed  of  Belgium's 
military  measures,  and  that  it  was  explained  to  him 

"a  consequence  of  our  desire  to  fulfill  our  international  obligations,  and 
that  they  in  no  wise  implied  an  attitude  of  distrust  toward  our  neighbors." 

The  German  Minister  was  reminded  of  instructions  his  Chan- 
cellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,  had  given  to  his  predecessor,  Herr 
von  Flotow. 

"In  the  course  of  the  controversy  which  arose  in  1911  as  a  consequence 
of  the  Dutch  scheme  for  the  fortification  of  Flushing,  certain  newspapers 
had  maintained  that  in  the  case  of  a  Franco-German  war  Belgian  neu- 
trality would  be  violated  by  Germany. 

"The  [Belgian]  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  suggested  that  a 
declaration  in  the  German  Parliament  during  a  debate  on  foreign  affairs 
would  serve  to  calm  public  opinion,  and  to  dispel  the  mistrust  which  was  so 
regrettable  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relations  between  the  two  countries. 

"Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  replied  that  he  had  fully  appreciated  the 
feelings  which  had  inspired  our  representations.  He  declared  that  Germany 
had  no  intention  of  violating  Belgian  neutrality,  but  he  considered  that  in 
making  a  public  declaration  Germany  would  weaken  her  military  position 
in  regard  to  France,  who,  secured  on  the  northern  side,  would  concen- 
trate all  her  energies  on  the  east. 

R_Gt.  War  2 


598     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"Since  then,  in  1913,  Herr  von  Jagow  [German  Secretary  of  State]  had 
made  reassuring  declarations  to  the  Budget  Commission  of  the  Reichstag 
respecting  the  maintenance  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

"Herr  von  Below  replied  that  he  knew  of  the  conversation  with  Herr  von 
Flotow,  and  that  he  was  certain  that  the  sentiments  expressed  at  that  time 
had  not  changed." 


SATURDAY,      AUGUST      1,      1914 

Austria.  On  the  following  day  Count  Szapary,  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  telegraphed  to  Count  Berchtold,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  an  interview  with  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  "I  first  warned  M.  Sazonof,"  said  the  count, 
"that  in  interpreting  my  instructions  to  him  I  must  leave  out  of 
account  the  new  condition  of  affairs  in  Vienna  created  by  the 
general  Russian  mobilization.  I  then  said  that  it  was  a  mistake 
that  Austria  had  declined  further  negotiations  with  Russia. 

"Your  excellency  was  not  only  quite  prepared  to  deal  with  Russia  on  the 
broadest  basis  possible,  but  was  also  especially  inclined  to  subject  the  text 
of  our  note  to  a  discussion  so  far  as  its  interpretation  was  concerned. 

"I  could  only  hope  that  the  course  of  events  had  not  already  taken  us 
too  far;  in  any  case,  I  regarded  it  as  my  duty  in  the  present  moment  of  ex- 
treme anxiety  to  prove  once  again  the  good  will  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government.  M.  Sazonof  replied  that  he  took  note  with  satisfaction  of  this 
proof  of  good  will,  but  he  desired  to  draw  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  nego- 
tiations at  St.  Petersburg  for  obvious  reasons  appeared  to  promise  less 
prospect  of  success  than  negotiations  on  the  neutral  terrain  of  London.  I 
replied  that  your  excellency,  started  from  the  point  of  view  that  direct  con- 
tact should  be  maintained  at  St.  Petersburg,  so  that  I  was  not  in  a  position 
to  commit  myself  with  regard  to  his  suggestion  as  to  London,  but  I  would 
communicate  on  the  subject  with  your  excellency." 

Germany.    The  German  White  Book  states : 

"As  the  time  limit  given  to  Russia  had  expired  without  the  receipt  of  a 
reply  to  our  inquiry,  the  kaiser  ordered  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  Ger- 
man army  and  navy  on  August  1,  at  5  p.  m. 

"The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  [Count  Pourtales]  was  in- 
structed that,  in  the  event  of  the  Russian  Government  not  giving  a  satis- 
factory reply  within  the  stipulated  time  he  should  declare  that  we  con- 
sidered ourselves  in  a  state  of  war  after  the  refusal  of  our  demands.  [He 
so  declared  at  5  p.  m.]  However,  before  a  confirmation  of  the  execution 
of  this  order  had  been  received,  that  is  to  say,  already  in  the  afternoon  of 
August  1,  Russian  troops  crossed  our  frontier  and  marched  into  German 
territory. 

"Thus  Russia  began  the  war  against  us. 


STATE    PAPERS  599 

"The  French  Prime  Minister  [M.  Viviani]  gave  an  equivocal  and  un- 
satisfactory reply  on  August  1  at  1  p.  m.,  which  gave  no  clear  idea  of  the 
position  of  France,  as  he  limited  himself  to  the  explanation  that  France 
would  do  that  which  her  interests  demanded.  A  few  hours  later,  at  5  p.  m.t 
the  mobilization  of  the  entire  French  army  and  navy  was  ordered. 

"On  the  morning  of  the  next  day  France  opened  hostilities." 

Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  telegraphed  to  Ambassador 
Lichnowsky  at  London : 

"Germany  is  ready  to  agree  to  the  English  proposal  in  the  event  of  Eng- 
land guaranteeing  with  all  her  forces  the  unconditional  neutrality  of 
France  in  the  conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Owing  to  the  Russian 
challenge  German  mobilization  occurred  to-day  before  the  English  pro- 
posals were  received.  In  consequence  our  advance  to  the  French  frontier 
cannot  now  be  altered.  We  guarantee,  however,  that  the  French  frontier 
will  not  be  crossed  by  our  troops  until  Monday,  August  3,  at  7  p.  m.,  in  case 
England's  assent  is  received  by  that  time." 

Lichnowsky  answered  that, Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secre- 
tary for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  asked  him 

"whether  I  thought  I  could  declare  that  in  the  event  of  France  remaining 
neutral  in  a  German-Russian  war  we  would  not  attack  the  French.  I  told 
him  that  I  believed  that  I  could  assume  responsibility  for  this." 

At  5.30  p.  m.  the  ambassador  telegraphed  that  Grey  had  just 
read  to  him  the  following  unanimous  declaration  of  the  British 
Cabinet : 

"The  reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  is  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
does  affect  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany  could  see  her  way  to  give 
the  same  positive  reply  as  that  which  has  been  given  by  France,  it  would 
materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension  here,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  com- 
batant while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain 
public  feeling  in  this  country. 

"On  my  question  whether,  on  condition  that  we  would  maintain  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  he  could  give  me  a  definite  declaration  with  regard 
to  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  the  minister  answered  that  that  was 
impossible,  but  that  this  question  would  play  a  great  part  in  public  opinion 
in  this  country.  If  we  violated  Belgian  neutrality  in  a  war  with  France 
there  would  certainly  be  a  change  in  public  opinion  which  would  make  it 
difficult  for  the  Cabinet  here  to  maintain  friendly  neutrality.  For  the  time 
there  was  not  the  slightest  intention  to  proceed  in  a  hostile  manner  against 
us.  It  would  be  their  desire  to  avoid  this  if  there  was  any  possibility  of 
doing  so.  It  was,  however,  difficult  to  draw  a  line  up  to  which  we  could  go 
without  intervention  on  this  side.  He  turned  again  and  again  to  Belgian  neu- 
trality, and  was  of  opinion  that  this  question  would  also  play  a  great  part. 


600     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"He  had  also  thought  whether  it  was  not  possible  that  we  and  France 
should,  in  case  of  a  Russian  war,  stand  armed  opposite  to  one  another  with- 
out attacking.  I  asked  him  if  he  would  be  in  a  position  to  arrange  that 
France  would  assent  to  an  agreement  of  this  kind.  As  we  wanted  neither 
to  destroy  France  nor  to  annex  portions  of  French  territory,  I  could  think 
that  we  would  give  our  assent  to  an  arrangement  of  this  kind  which  would 
secure  for  us  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain.  The  minister  said  he  would 
make  inquiries;  he  also  recognized  the  difficulties  of  holding  back  the  mili- 
tary on  both  sides." 

At  8.30  p.  m.  the  ambassador  telegraphed : 

"My  communication  of  this  morning  is  canceled  by  my  communication 
of  this  evening.  As  there  is  no  positive  English  proposal  before  us,  any 
further  step  in  the  sense  of  the  message  I  sent  is  superfluous." 

At  7.10  p.  m.  Ambassador  Pourtales  presented  at  St.  Peters- 
burg a  note  repeating  the  ultimatum  of  July  31,  and  closing: 

"Russia  having  refused  to  comply  with  [not  having  considered  it  neces- 
sary to  answer*]  this  demand,  and  having  shown  by  this  refusal  [this  atti- 
tude*] that  her  action  was  directed  against  Germany,  I  have  the  honor, 
on  the  instructicns  of  my  Government,  to  inform  your  excellency  as  follows : 

"His  majesty  the  emperor,  my  august  sovereign,  in  the  name  of  the 
German  Empire,  accepts  the  challenge,  and  considers  himself  at  war  with 
Russia. 

"*  The  words  in  brackets  occur  in  the  original.  It  must  be  supposed  that 
two  variations  had  been  prepared  in  advance,  and  that,  by  mistake,  they 
were  both  inserted  in  the  Note." 

Russia.  A  secret  telegram  was  sent  to  Russian  representatives 
abroad  announcing  Germany's  ultimatum  delivered  at  midnight, 
and  stating  the  German  Ambassador's  reply  to  the  inquiry  if  it 
meant  war :  "No,  but  we  are  very  near  it." 

Ambassador  Benckendorff  telegraphed  from  London  that  Sii 
Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  hoped  that  no  great 
power  would  open  hostilities  before  the  formula  for  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  disputes,  accepted  by  Russia  and  offered  to 
Germany,  had  been  considered.  Later  he  telegraphed  that  France 
had  agreed  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  but  that  Ger- 
many had  stated  she  could  give  no  definite  answer  to  the  question. 

Ambassador  Isvolsky  telegraphed  from  Paris : 

"The  Austrian  Ambassador  [Count  Szecsen]  yesterday  visited  Viviani 
[Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  and  declared  to  him  that  Austria,  far  from 
harboring  any  designs  against  the  integrity  of  Serbia,  was  in  fact  ready  to 
discuss  the  grounds  of  her  grievances  against  Serbia  with  the  other  powers. 
The  French  Government  are  much  exercised  at  Germany's  extraordinary 


STATE    PAPERS  601 

military  activity  on  the  French  frontier,  for  they  are  convinced  that,  under 
the  guise  of  Kreigszustand,  mobilization  is  in  reality  being  carried  out." 

Later  he  telegraphed  that,  hearing  from  St.  Petersburg  of  the 
German  order  of  general  mobilization,  President  Poincare  had 
signed  the  order  for  French  mobilization. 

"The  German  Ambassador  [Baron  von  Schoen]  has  just  visited  Viviani 
[Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  but  told  him  nothing  fresh,  alleging  the  im- 
possibility of  deciphering  the  telegrams  he  has  received.  Viviani  informed 
him  of  the  signature  of  the  order  for  moblization  issued  in  reply  to  that  of 
Germany,  and  expressed  to  him  his  amazement  that  Germany  should  have 
taken  such  a  step  at  a  moment  when  a  friendly  exchange  of  views  was  still 
in  progress  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  the  powers.  He  added  that  mobili- 
zation did  not  necessarily  entail  war,  and  that  the  German  Ambassador 
might  stay  in  Paris  as  the  Russian  Ambassador  had  remained  in  Vienna  and 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg." 

Great  Britain.  George  V  sent  the  following  telegram  to  Wil- 
liam II: 

"Many  thanks  for  your  telegram  of  last  night.  I  have  sent  an  urgent 
telegram  to  Nicholas,  in  which  I  have  assured  him  of  my  readiness  to  do 
everything  in  my  power  to  further  the  resumption  of  the  negotiations 
between  the  powers  concerned." 

Upon  receipt  of  the  telegram  from  -the  German  Kaiser  of 
August  1,  King  George  replied  that  there  must  be  a  misunder- 
standing in  regard  to  the  suggestion  of  the  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  made  to  the  German  Ambassador,  respecting  avoidance 
of  conflict  between  Germany  and  France,  while  the  possibility 
remained  of  an  agreement  being  arrived  at  between  Austria  and 
Russia. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  will  see  Prince  Lichnowsky  early  to-morrow  morn- 
ing in  order  to  ascertain  whether  there  is  any  misunderstanding  on  his 
side." 

King  George  replied  to  the  letter  of  President  Poincare  of 
July  31,  assuring  him  of  cooperation  of  their  two  Governments 
in  the  interest  of  peace. 

"I  admire  the  restraint  which  you  and  your  Government  are  exercising 
in  not  adopting  an  attitude  which  could  in  any  wise  be  interpreted  as  a 
provocative  one." 

Grey  sent  a  personal  message  from  King  George  to  Nicholas 
II  in  which  he  appealed  to  the  czar  to  remove  the  misunder- 
standing that  had  evidently  produced  the  deadlock  between  Rus- 


602     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

sia  and  Germany,  and  offered  his  assistance  in  reopening  the 
conversations  between  Russia  and  Austria. 

The  Czar  replied  to  King  George  that  attempts  at  peace  had 
been  that  afternoon  rendered  futile  by  Germany's  declaration  of 
war,  which  was  wholly  unexpected  by  him,  since  he  had  given 
William  II  "most  categorical  assurances  that  my  troops  would 
not  move  so  long  as  mediation  negotiations  continued." 

"In  this  solemn  hour  I  wish  to  assure  you  once  more  that  I  have  done 
all  in  my  power  to  avert  war.  Now  that  it  has  been  forced  on  me,  I  trust 
your  country  will  not  fail  to  support  France  and  Russia.  God  bless  and 
protect  you." 

Ambassador  Bertie,  telegraphing  from  Paris,  reported  an  inter- 
view that  morning  between  the  French  Political  Director  and 
German  Ambassador  Schoen. 

"M.  Berthelot  pointed  out  that  general  mobilization  in  Russia  had  not 
been  ordered  until  after  Austria  had  decreed  a  general  mobilization,  and 
that  the  Russian  Government  were  ready  to  demobilize  if  all  powers  did 
likewise.  It  seemed  strange  to  the  French  Government  that  in  view  of  this 
and  of  the  fact  that  Russia  and  Austria  were  ready  to  converse,  the  Ger- 
man Government  should  have  at  that  moment  presented  an  ultimatum  at 
St.  Petersburg  requiring  immediate  demobilization  by  Russia.  There  were 
no  differences  at  issue  between  France  and  Germany,  but  the  German  Am- 
bassador had  made  a  menacing  communication  to  the  French  Government 
and  had  requested  an  answer  the  next  day,  intimating  that  he  would  have 
to  break  off  relations  and  leave  Paris  if  the  reply  were  not  satisfactory. 
The  French  Government  considered  that  this  was  an  extraordinary  pro- 
ceeding. 

"The  German  Ambassador,  who  is  to  see  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs again  this  evening,  said  nothing  about  demanding  his  passports,  but 
he  stated  that  he  had  packed  up." 

Ambassador  Bunsen  telegraphed  from  Vienna  that  a  general 
mobilization  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  and  fleet  had  been 
ordered.  Minister  Villiers  telegraphed  from  Brussels: 

"Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  powers  will  observe  and  up- 
hold her  neutrality,  which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her 
power.  In  so  informing  me,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  [Davignon] 
said  that  they  believed  that  they  were  in  a  position  to  defend  themselves 
against  intrusion.  The  relations  between  Belgium  and  her  neighbors  were 
excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suspect  their  intentions;  but  he 
thought  it  well,  nevertheless,  to  be  prepared  against  emergencies." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  that  the 
Hamburg  authorities  had  detained  British  merchant  ship,5*  o»  un- 


STATE    PAPERS  603 

known  grounds,  and  instructed  him  to  request  the  German  Gov- 
ernment to  order  their  release. 

"The  effect  on  public  opinion  here  will  be  deplorable  unless  this  is  done. 
His  majesty's  Government,  on  their  side,  are  most  anxious  to  avoid  any  in- 
cident of  an  aggressive  nature,  and  the  German  Government  will,  I  hope, 
be  equally  careful  not  to  take  any  step  which  would  make  the  situation 
between  us  impossible." 

Later  Grey  telegraphed  Goschen  that  he  still  believed  it  possi- 
ble to  secure  peace  if  a  little  respite  could  be  gained  before  any 
great  power  began  war.  Russia  and  Austria  had  at  last  agreed 
to  accept  a  basis  of  mediation  which  is  not  open  to  objections 
raised  to  the  original  Russian  formula. 

"Things  ought  not  to  be  hopeless  so  long  as  Austria  and  Russia  are 
ready  to  converse,  and  I  hope  the  German  Government  may  be  able  to 
make  use  of  the  Russian  communications  referred  to,  in  order  to  avoid 
tension.  His  majesty's  Government  are  carefully  abstaining  from  any 
act  which  may  precipitate  matters." 

In  following  telegrams  Grey  sent  Goschen  the  Russian  formula 
as  amended  by  himself,  and  the  acceptance  of  the  same  by  Russia. 

Ambassador  Bertie  telegraphed  from  Paris  information  re- 
ceived from  President  Poincare  of  German  mobilization,  etc.,  and 
Russia's  desire  to  continue  pacific  conversations  with  Germany. 

"The  French  Government,  whose  wishes  are  markedly  pacific,  sincerely 
desire  the  preservation  of  peace  and  do  not  quite  despair,  even  now,  of  its 
being  possible  to  avoid  war." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Buchanan  at  St.  Petersburg 
that  reliable  news  had  come  from  Vienna  that  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government, 

"though  the  situation  has  been  changed  by  the  mobilization  of  Russia, 
would,  in  full  appreciation  of  the  efforts  of  England  for  the  preservation 
of  peace,  be  ready  to  consider  favorably  my  proposal  for  mediation  be- 
tween Austria  and  Serbia.  The  effect  of  this  acceptance  would  naturally 
be  that  the  Austrian  military  action  against  Serbia  would  continue  for  the 
present,  and  that  the  British  Government  would  urge  upon  Russian  Gov- 
ernment to  stop  the  mobilization  of  troops  directed  against  Austria,  in 
which  case  Austria  would  naturally  cancel  those  defensive  military  counter- 
measures  in  Galicia,  which  have  been  forced  upon  Austria  by  Russian 
mobilization. 

"You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  [M.  Sazonof]  and  say 
that  if,  in  the  consideration  of  the  acceptance  of  mediation  by  Austria, 
Russia  can  agree  to  stop  mobilization,  it  appears  still  to  be  possible  to 


604  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

preserve  peace.     Presumably  the  matter  should  be  discussed  with  German 
Government  also  by  Russian  Government." 

Ambassador  Bertie  telegraphed  from  Paris  that  orders  for 
general  mobilization  had  been  given  at  3.30  p.  m.,  in  answer  to 
the  German  Kriegsgefahrzustand  (imminence  of  war),  which, 
by  calling  out  troops  up  to  war  strength,  is  tantamount  to  mobi- 
lization. 

"The  Minister  of  War  is  anxious  that  it  should  be  explained  that  this 
act  of  mobilization  is  one  for  purely  defensive  purposes." 

Grey  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Bunsen  at  Vienna  an  account 
of  interviews  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  in  which 
Count  Mensdorff  gave  him  assurances  that  Austria  would  not 
impair  the  territorial  integrity  or  sovereignty  of  Serbia,  and  said 
that,  contrary  to  report,  Austria  was  willing  to  continue  con- 
versations with  Russia. 

Ambassador  Buchanan  telegraphed  Grey  of  an  interview  that 
morning  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which 
M.  Sazonof  recounted  his  conversation  with  Count  Szapary,  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  the  evening  before,  in  which  he  proposed 
the  London  conference. 

Ambassador  Bunsen  telegraphed  Grey  from  Vienna  that  the 
Russian  Ambassador,  Schebeko,  thought  that,  as  mobilization  is 
too  expensive  to  be  continued  long,  Germany  will  attack  Russia 
at  once.  Tension  now  is  greater  between  Russia  and  Germany 
than  between  Russia  and  Austria.  Russia  would  be  satisfied, 
says  Schebeko,  with  Austria's  acceptance  of  the  new  formula. 

"He  is  going  again  to-day  to  point  out  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs [Count  Berchtold]  that  most  terrific  consequences  must  ensue  from 
refusal  to  make  this  slight  concession.  This  time  Russia  would  fight  to 
the  last  extremity.  I  agree  with  his  excellency  that  the  German  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna  desired  war  from  the  first,  and  that  his  strong  per- 
sonal bias  probably  colored  his  action  here.  The  Russian  Ambassador  is 
convinced  that  the  German  Government  also  desired  war  from  the  first. 

"It  is  the  intention  of  the  French  Ambassador  [Dumaine]  to  speak 
earnestly  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  on  the  extreme  danger 
of  the  situation,  and  to  ask  whether  proposals  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  media- 
tion from  any  quarter  are  being  considered.  There  is  great  anxiety  to  know 
what  England  will  do.  I  fear  that  nothing  can  alter  the  determination  of 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  proceed  on  their  present  course,  if  they 
have  made  up  their  mind  with  the  approval  of  Germany." 


STATE    PAPERS  605 

Ambassador  Goschen  telegraphed  from  Berlin: 

"Orders  have  just  been  issued  for  the  general  mobilization  of  the  navy 
and  army,  the  first  day  of  mobilization  to  be  August  2." 

Later  he  telegraphed  that  Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow  had 
expressed  annoyance  at  detention  of  British  ships  at  Hamburg, 
and  promised  to  order  their  immediate  release. 

France.  M.  Viviani,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  informed 
the  ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and 
Rome  of  the  two  demarches  made  on  the  previous  evening  at 
Paris  and  St.  Petersburg — "the  one  rather  vague,  the  other  pre- 
cise and  conciliatory."" 

"Unfortunately  these  [latter]  arrangements  which  allowed  one  to  hope 
for  a  peaceful  solution  appear,  in  fact,  to  have  been  rendered  useless  by  the 
attitude  of  Germany  [in  presenting  her  ultimatum  to  Russia]. 

"The  attitude  of  Germany  proves  that  she  wishes  for  war.  And  she 
wishes  for  it  against  France.  [Here  he  recounted  the  interview  with  the 
German  Ambassador  Schoen  at  the  French  Foreign  Office.] 

"This  attitude  of  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  without  any  direct 
dispute,  and  although  he  has  not  received  any  definitely  negative  answer, 
is  characteristic  of  the  determination  of  Germany  to  make  war  against 
France.  The  want  of  sincerity  in  her  peaceful  protestations  is  shown  by 
the  rupture  which  she  is  forcing  upon  Europe  at  a  time  when  Austria  had 
at  last  agreed  with  Russia  to  begin  negotiations." 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  reported  Austria's 
willingness  to  continue  conversations  with  Russia. 

"The  ultimatum  to  Russia  can  only  do  away  with  the  last  chances  of 
peace  which  these  conversations  still  seemed  to  leave.  The  question  may  be 
asked  whether  in  such  circumstances  the  acceptance  by  Austria  was 
serious,  and  had  not  the  object  of  throwing  the  responsibility  of  the  con- 
flict on  to  Russia." 

He  told  of  the  interviews  of  the  British  Ambassador  with  Sec- 
retary of  State  von  Jagow,  in  which  Mr.  Goschen  vainly  pleaded 
that  Germany  use  her  influence  with  Austria  in  the  cause  of 
peace. 

"Germany's  ultimatum  coming  at  the  very  moment  when  an  agreement 
seemed  about  to  be  established  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  is 
characteristic  of  her  warlike  policy." 

It  looks  as  if  she  desired  war  on  her  own  account. 
M.  Viviani,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  notified  the  ambas- 
sadors at  Lor* don  and  Berlin  and  the  Minister  of  Brussels  of 


606     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

his   pledge  to   respect  Belgian   neutrality  as   given   to   Great 
Britain. 

Ambassador  Barrere  reported  from  Rome  an  interview  of  the 
German  Ambassador  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in 
which  Herr  von  Flotow  had  asked  the  intentions  of  Italy  in  the 
present  crisis. 

"The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  answered  that  as  the  war  undertaken  by 
Austria  was  aggressive  and  did  not  fall  within  the  purely  defensive  char- 
acter of  the  Triple  Alliance,  particularly  in  view  of  the  consequences  which 
might  result  from  it  according  to  the  declaration  of  the  German  Ambassador, 
Italy  could  not  take  part  in  the  war." 

M.  Viviani  reported  to  the  ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Peters- 
burg, Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  and  Constantinople  the 
visit  to  him  at  11  a.  m.  of  German  Ambassador  Schoen. 

"After  having  recalled  all  the  efforts  made  by  France  toward  an 
honorable  settlement  of  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict  and  the  difficulty  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia  which  has  resulted  from  it,  I  put  him  in  pos- 
session of  the  facts  as  to  the  pourparlers  which  have  been  carried  on  since 
yesterday  [in  reference  to  Austro-Russian  dispute]. 

"I  drew  attention  to  the  attitude  of  Germany  who,  abandoning  all 
pourparlers,  presented  an  ultimatum  to  Russia  at  the  very  moment  when 
this  power  had  just  accepted  the  British  formula  (which  implies  the  cessa- 
tion of  military  preparations  by  all  the  countries  which  have  mobilized)  and 
regarded  as  imminent  a  diplomatic  rupture  with  France. 

"Baron  von  Schoen  answered  that  he  did  not  know  the  developments 
which  had  taken  place  in  this  matter  for  the  last  twenty-four  hours,  that 
there  was  perhaps  in  them  a  'glimmer  of  hope'  for  some  arrangement, 
that  he  had  not  received  any  fresh  communication  from  his  Government, 
and  that  he  was  going  to  get  information.  He  gave  renewed  protestations 
of  his  sincere  desire  to  unite  his  efforts  to  those  of  France  for  arriving  at 
a  solution  of  the  conflict.  I  laid  stress  on  the  serious  responsibility  which 
the  Imperial  Government  would  assume  if,  in  circumstances  such  as  these, 
they  took  an  initiative  which  was  not  justified  and  of  a  kind  which  would 
irremediably  compromise  peace. 

"Baron  von  Schoen  did  not  allude  to  his  immediate  departure  and  did 
not  make  any  fresh  request  for  an  answer  to  his  question  concerning  the 
attitude  of  France  in  case  of  an  Austro-Russian  conflict.  He  confined  him- 
self to  saying  of  his  own  accord  that  the  attitude  of  France  was  not 
doubtful. 

"It  would  not  do  to  exaggerate  the  possibilities  which  may  result  from 
my  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador  for,  on  their  side,  the  Im- 
perial Government  continue  the  most  dangerous  preparations  on  our  frontier. 
However,  we  must  not  neglect  the  possibilities,  and  we  should  not  cease 
to  work  toward  an  agreement.  On  her  side  France  is  taking  all  military 


STATE    PAPERS  607 

measures  required  for  protection  against  too  great  an  advance  in  German 
military  preparations.  She  considers  that  her  attempts  at  solution  will 
only  have  a  chance  of  success  so  far  as  it  is  felt  that  she  will  be  ready 
and  resolute  if  the  conflict  is  forced  on  her." 

Ambassador  Paul  Cambon  reported  from  London  the  situa- 
tion between  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  especially  in  regard  to 
British  neutrality  and  Germany's  attitude  toward  Belgian  neu- 
trality. 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  will  ask  the  Cabinet  to  authorize  him  to  state  on 
Monday  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  British  Government  will  not 
permit  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

"In  the  second  place,  the  British  fleet  is  mobilized,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
will  propose  to  his  colleagues  that  he  should  state  that  it  will  oppose  the 
passage  of  the  Straits  of  Dover  by  the  German  fleet,  or,  if  the  German 
fleet  should  pass  through,  will  oppose  any  demonstration  on  the  French 
coasts.  These  two  questions  will  be  dealt  with  at  the  meeting  on  Monday. 
I  drew  the  attention  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  point  that,  if  during 
this  intervening  period  any  incident  took  place,  it  was  necessary  not  to 
allow  a  surprise,  and  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  think  of  intervening  in 
time." 

Minister  Mollard  presented  the  request  from  Dr.  Eyschen, 
Minister  of  State  of  Luxemburg,  for  an  assurance  that  France 
would  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy.  A  similar  re- 
quest has  been  made  to  Germany. 

M.  Viviani  returned  the  same  assurance  that  he  had  given  in 
the  case  of  Belgium. 

Belgium.  M.  Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  tele- 
graphed to  the  Ministers  at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and 
St.  Petersburg  to  carry  out  the  instructions  [in  case  of  war  be- 
tween France  and  Germany  becoming  imminent]  of  July  24; 
and  to  the  Ministers  at  Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg  to 
carry  out  instructions  [the  same]  of  July  25. 

SUNDAY,      AUGUST      2,      1914 

Austria-Hungary.  On  the  following  day,  Ambassador  Szogyeny 
telegraphed  from  Berlin  that  no  answer  had  been  received  from 
Russia  to  Germany's  demand  that  she  demobilize ;  that  Russian 
troops  had  crossed  the  German  frontier  at  Schwidden  (southeast 
of  Bialla) ;  and  that  Germany  therefore  regarded  herself- at  war 


608  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

with  Russia  and  had  that  morning  given  Ambassador  Swerbeiev 
his  passports. 

Germany.  Ambassador  Lichnowsky  telegraphed  from  London 
to  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  that  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
British  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  given  up  as  imprac- 
ticable his  suggestions  as  to  the  possibility  of  creating  lasting 
British  neutrality,  which  were  made  without  previous  inquiry 
of  France  and  without  knowledge  of  mobilization. 

RUSSIA  EXPLAINS   HER  EFFORTS 
FOR  PEACE 

Russia.  M.  Sazonof,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  published 
an  announcement  respecting  recent  events  in  correction  of  a 
"garbled  version"  appearing  in  the  foreign  press.  This  recited 
the  circumstances  of  the  Austrian  note  of  July  23  to  Serbia  and 
Serbia's  reply  of  the  25th. 

"Russia  considered  that  the  humiliation  of  Serbia,  involved  in  these 
demands,  and  equally  the  evident  intention  of  Austria-Hungary  to  secure 
her  own  hegemony  in  the  Balkans,  which  underlay  her  conditions,  were 
inadmissible.  The  Russian  Government,  therefore,  pointed  out  to  Austria- 
Hungary  in  the  most  friendly  manner  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  re- 
examine  the  points  contained  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  note.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  did  not  see  their  way  to  agree  to  a  discussion  of 
the  note.  The  moderating  influence  of  the  four  powers  at  Vienna  was 
equally  unsuccessful.  .  .  . 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  proceeded  to  mobilize  and  de- 
clared war  officially  against  Serbia,  and  the  following  day  Belgrade  was 
bombarded.  The  manifesto  which  accompanied  the  declaration  of  war 
openly  accuses  Serbia  of  having  prepared  and  carried  out  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo.  Such  an  accusation  of  a  crime  at  common  law,  launched  against 
a  whole  people  and  a  whole  State,  aroused,  by  its  evident  inanity,  wide- 
spread sympathy  for  Serbia  throughout  all  classes  of  European  society. 

"In  consequence  of  this  behavior  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, in  spite  of  Russia's  declaration  that  she  could  not  remain  indifferent 
to  the  fate  of  Serbia,  the  Russian  Government  considered  it  necessary  to 
order  mobilization  in  the  military  districts  of  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  and 
Kazan.  This  decision  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  fact  that  since  the 
date  when  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  was  communicated  to  the  Serbian 
Government,  and  since  the  first  steps  taken  by  Russia,  five  days  had  elapsed, 
and  yet  the  Vienna  Cabinet  had  not  taken  one  step  to  meet  Russia  half- 
way in  her  efforts  towards  peace.  Indeed,  quite  the  contrary;  for  the 
mobilization  of  half  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  had  been  ordered. 


STATE  PAPERS  609 

"The  German  Government  were  kept  informed  of  the  steps  taken  by 
Russia.  At  the  same  time  it  was  explained  to  them  that  these  steps  were 
only  the  result  of  the  Austrian  preparations,  and  that  they  were  not  in 
any  way  aimed  at  Germany.  Simultaneously,  the  Russian  Government 
declared  that  Russia  was  ready  to  continue  discussions  with  a  view  to  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  dispute,  either  in  the  form  of  direct  negotia- 
tions with  Vienna  or,  as  suggested  by  Great  Britain,  in  the  form  of  a 
conference  of  the  four  great  powers  not  directly  interested,  that  is  to  say, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy. 

"This  attempt  on  the  part  of  Russia  was,  however,  equally  unsuccess' 
ful.  Austria-Hungary  declined  a  further  exchange  of  views  with  Russia, 
and  the  Vienna  Cabinet  was  unwilling  to  join  the  proposed  conference 
of  the  powers. 

"Nevertheless  Russia  did  not  abandon  her  efforts  for  peace.  When  ques- 
tioned by  the  German  Ambassador  as  to  the  conditions  on  which  we  would 
still  agree  to  suspend  our  preparations,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
declared  that  these  conditions  were  Austria's  recognition  that  the  Austrq- 
Serbian  question  had  assumed  a  European  character,  and  a  declaration  by 
her  that  she  agreed  not  to  insist  upon  such  of  her  demands  as  were  incom- 
patible with  the  sovereign  rights  of  Serbia. 

"Germany  considered  this  Russian  proposal  unacceptable  to  Austria- 
Hungary.  At  that  very  moment  news  of  the  proclamation  of  general  mobi- 
lization by  Austria-Hungary  reached  St.  Petersburg. 

"All  this  time  hostilities  were  continuing  on  Serbian  territory,  and  Bel- 
grade was  bombarded  afresh. 

"The  failure  of  our  proposals  for  peace  compelled  us  to  extend  the  scope 
of  our  precautionary  military  measures. 

"The  Berlin  Cabinet  questioned  us  on  this,  and  we  replied  that  Russia 
was  compelled  to  begin  preparations  so  as  to  be  ready  for  every  emergency. 

"But  while  taking  this  precautionary  step,  Russia  did  not  on  that  ac- 
count abandon  her  strenuous  efforts  to  find  some  solution  of  the  situation, 
and  she  announced  that  she  was  ready  to  accept  any  proposed  settlement  of 
the  problem  that  might  be  put  forward,  provided  it  complied  with  the  con- 
ditions laid  down  by  her. 

"In  spite  of  this  conciliatory  communication,  the  German  Government 
on  July  31  demanded  of  the  Russian  Government  that  they  should  suspend 
their  military  measures  by  midday  on  August  1,  and  threatened,  should 
they  fail  to  comply,  to  proceed  to  general  mobilization. 

"On  the  following  day,  August  1,  the  German  Ambassador,  on  behalf  of 
his  Government,  forwarded  a  declaration  of  war  to  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs." 

M.  Sazonof  telegraphed  to  the  Russian  representatives  abroad 
"that  Germany  is  now  doing  her  utmost  to  foist  upon  us  the  responsibility 
for  the  rupture.  We  were  forced  to  mobilize  by  the  immense  responsi- 
bility which  would  have  fallen  upon  our  shoulders  if  we  had  not  taken 
all  possible  precautionary  measures  at  a  time  when  Austria,  while  con- 
fining herself  to  discussions  of  a  dilatory  nature,  was  bombarding  Belgrade 
and  was  undertaking  general  mobilization. 


610  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

"The  Emperor  of  Russia  had  promised  the  German  Emperor  that  he 
would  take  no  aggressive  action  as  long  as  the  discussions  with  Austria 
continued.  With  such  a  guarantee,  and  after  so  many  proofs  of  Russia's 
desire  for  peace,  Germany  neither  could,  nor  had  the  right  to,  doubt  our 
declaration  that  we  would  joyfully  accept  any  peaceful  settlement  com- 
patible with  the  dignity  and  independence  of  Serbia.  Any  other  solution, 
besides  being  entirely  incompatible  with  our  own  dignity,  would  assuredly 
have  upset  the  European  balance  of  power  by  securing  the  hegemony  of 
Germany.  The  European — nay,  the  world-wide — character  of  this  dis- 
pute is  infinitely  more  important  than  the  pretext  from  which  it  springs. 
By  her  decision  to  declare  war  upon  us,  at  a  moment  when  negotiations 
were  in  progress  between  the  powers,  Germany  has  assumed  a  heavy 
responsibility." 

Great  Britain.  Ambassador  Goschen  sent  from  Berlin  two 
telegrams  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
one  stating  that  Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow  had  just  informed 
him  that,  owing  to  certain  Russian  troops  having  crossed  the 
frontier,  Germany  and  Russia  were  in  a  state  of  war,  and  the 
other  that  the  reason  for  the  detention  of  British  ships  on  the 
day  preceding  was  laying  of  mines  and  taking  other  precau- 
tions. 

Ambassador  Villiers  telegraphed  from  Brussels  that  a  Ger- 
man force  had  entered  Luxemburg.  This  was  confirmed  by  a 
telegram  from  the  Minister  of  State  for  Luxemburg,  who  gave 
details,  and  added : 

"These  occurrences  constitute  acts  which  are  manifestly  contrary  to  the 
neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  as  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  of  London 
of  1867.  The  Luxemburg  Government  have  not  failed  to  address  an  ener- 
getic protest  against  this  aggression  to  the  representatives  of  his  majesty 
the  German  Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identical  protest  will  be  sent  by 
telegraph  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Berlin.  [Paris 
was  also  informed.]" 

Grey  telegraphed  Ambassador  Bertie  at  Paris : 

"After  the  Cabinet  this  morning  I  gave  M.  Cambon  [French  Ambas- 
sador in  London]  the  following  memorandum: 

"I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  German  fleet  comes 
into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations 
against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protec- 
tion in  its  power. 

"This  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy  of  his  majesty's 
Government  receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken 
as  binding  his  majesty's  Government  to  take  any  action  until  the  above 
contingency  of  action  by  the  German  fleet  takes  place. 


STATE  PAPERS  611 

"I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions  and  most  difficult 
issues  to  consider,  and  that  our  Government  felt  that  they  could  not  bind 
themselves  to  declare  war  upon  Germany  necessarily  if  war  broke  out 
between  France  and  Germany  to-morrow,  but  it  was  essential  to  the 
French  Government,  whose  fleet  had  long  been  concentrated  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, to  know  how  to  make  their  dispositions  with  their  north  coast 
entirely  undefended.  We  therefore  thought  it  necessary  to  give  them  this 
assurance.  It  did  not  bind  us  to  go  to  war  with  Germany  unless  the  Ger- 
man fleet  took  the  action  indicated,  but  it  did  not  give  a  security  to  France 
that  would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of  her  own  Mediterranean 
fleet. 

"M.  Cambon  asked  me  about  the  violation  of  Luxemburg.  I  told  him 
the  doctrine  on  that  point  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon 
in  1867.  He  asked  me  what  we  should  say  about  the  violation  of  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium.  I  said  that  was  a  much  more  important  matter;  we 
were  considering  what  statement  we  should  make  in  Parliament  to- 
morrow— in  effect,  whether  we  should  declare  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality to  be  a  casus  belli.  I  told  him  what  had  been  said  to  the  German 
Ambassador  on  this  point." 

France.  Ambassador  Paleologue  telegraphed  from  St.  Peters- 
burg that  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales  was  leaving 
the  Russian  capital  that  day,  and  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador,  Count  Szapary  had  not  yet  received  instructions 
from  Vienna  as  to  the  declaration  of  war. 

M.  Viviani,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  notified  the  Am- 
bassadors at  London,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome, 
Madrid,  and  Constantinople: 

"This  morning,  French  territory  was  violated  by  German  troops  at 
Ciry  and  near  Longwy.  They  are  marching  on  the  fort  which  bears  the 
latter  name.  Elsewhere  the  Custom  House  at  Delle  has  twice  been  fired, 
upon.  Finally,  German  troops  have  also  violated  this  morning  the  neutral 
territory  of  Luxemburg. 

"You  will  at  once  use  this  information  to  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that 
the  German  Government  is  committing  itself  to  acts  of  war  against  France 
without  provocation  on  our  part,  or  any  previous  declaration  of  war, 
whilst  we  have  scrupulously  respected  the  zone  of  ten  kilometers  which 
we  have  maintained,  even  since  the  mobilization,  between  our  troops  and 
the  frontier." 

Ambassador  Paul  Cambon  reported  from  London  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  declaration  of  the  British  Cabinet  as  to  protection  of 
France  by  the  British  fleet. 

"Afterwards  in  speaking  to  me  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  that 
of  Luxemburg,  the  Secretary  of  State  reminded  me  that  the  Convention  of 


612  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

1867,  referring  to  the  Grand  Duchy,  differed  from  the  Treaty  referring  to 
Belgium,  in  that  Great  Britain  was  bound  to  require  the  observance  of 
this  latter  Convention  without  the  assistance  of  the  other  guaranteeing 
powers,  while  with  regard  to  Luxemburg  all  the  guaranteeing  powers 
were  to  act  in  concert. 

"The  protection  of  Belgian  neutrality  is  here  considered  so  important 
that  Great  Britain  will  regard  its  violation  by  Germany  as  a  casus  belli. 
It  is  a  specially  British  interest  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, faithful  to  the  traditions  of  their  policy,  will  insist  upon  it,  even 
if  the  business  world  in  which  German  influence  is  making  tenacious 
efforts,  exercises  pressure  to  prevent  the  Government  committing  itself 
against  Germany." 

M.  Viviani  replied  to  M.  Paul  Cambon  that  the  promise  of  the 
British  Cabinet  was  "a  first  assistance  which  is  most  valuable 
to  us." 

"The  help  which  Great  Britain  intends  to  give  to  France  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  French  coasts  or  the  French  merchant  marine,  will  be  used 
in  such  a  way  that  our  navy  will  also,  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  con- 
flict, be  supported  by  the  British  fleet  in  the  Atlantic  as  well  as  in  the 
North  Sea  and  Channel.  I  would  note  that  British  ports  could  not  serve 
as  places  for  revictualling  for  the  German  fleet." 

M.  Viviani  telegraphed  to  Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  at  Berlin 
to  protest  to  the  German  Government  against  the  violation  of 
the  French  frontier  by  German  armed  forces,  as  "unjustified 
by  anything  in  the  present  situation." 

"The  Government  of  the  Republic  can  only  leave  to  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment the  entire  responsibility  for  these  acts." 

M.  Marcellin  Pellet,  Minister  at  the  Hague,  telegraphed  to 
M.  Viviani  that  the  German  Minister  had  called  on  M.  Loudon, 
Dutch  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  explain  the  necessity  for 
the  German  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg. 

Belgium.  M.  Davignon,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  tele- 
graphed to  the  ministers  at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and 
St.  Petersburg,  that  he  had  warned  the  German  Minister  at 
Brussels,  Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  that  the  French  Minister,  M. 
Klobukowski,  would  publish  the  formal  declaration  made  by  the 
German  Minister  on  August  1,  respecting  Belgian  neutrality. 

"When  I  next  met  Herr  von  Below  he  thanked  me  for  this  attention, 
and  added  that  up  to  the  present  he  had  not  been  instructed  to  make  us 
an  official  communication,  but  that  we  knew  his  personal  opinion  as  to  the 
feelings  of  security,  which  we  had  the  right  to  entertain  toward  our 


STATE  PAPERS  613 

eastern  neighbors.  I  at  once  replied  that  all  that  we  knew  of  their  in- 
tentions, as  indicated  in  numerous  previous  conversations,  did  not  allow 
us  to  doubt  their  perfect  correctness  toward  Belgium.  I  added,  however, 
that  we  should  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  possession  of  a 
formal  declaration,  which  the  Belgian  nation  would  hear  of  with  joy  and 
gratitude." 

Later,  the  German  Minister  presented  the  following  "very 
confidential"  note  to  Belgium. 


GERMAN      DECLARATION      OF      INTENTIONS 
TOWARD      BELGIUM 

"Reliable  information  has  been  received  by  the  German  Government  to 
the  effect  that  French  forces  intend  to  march  on  the  line  of  the  Meuse  by 
Givet  and  Namur.  This  information  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention 
of  France  to  march  through  Belgian  territory  against  Germany. 

"The  German  Government  cannot  but  fear  that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  the 
utmost  good  will,  will  be  unable,  without  assistance,  to  repel  so  considerable 
a  French  invasion  with  sufficient  prospect  of  success  to  afford  an  adequate 
guaranty  against  danger  to  Germany.  It  is  essential  for  the  self-defense 
of  Germany  that  she  should  anticipate  any  such  hostile  attack.  The  Ger- 
man Government  would,  however,  feel  the  deepest  regret  if  Belgium  re- 
garded as  an  act  of  hostility  against  herself  the  fact  that  the  measures  of 
Germany's  opponents  force  Germany,  for  her  own  protection,  to  enter 
Belgian  territory. 

"In  order  to  exclude  any  possibility  of  misunderstanding,  the  German 
Government  make  the  following  declaration: 

"1.  Germany  has  in  view  no  act  of  hostility  against  Belgium.  In  the 
event  of  Belgium  being  prepared  in  the  coming  war  to  maintain  an 
attitude  of  friendly  neutrality  toward  Germany,  the  German  Government 
bind  themselves,  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  possessions 
and  independence  of  the  Belgian  Kingdom  in  full. 

"  2.  Germany  undertakes,  under  the  above-mentioned  condition,  to  evacu- 
ate Belgian  territory  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

"  3.  If  Belgium  adopts  a  friendly  attitude,  Germany  is  prepared,  in 
cooperation  with  the  Belgian  authorities,  to  purchase  all  necessaries  for  her 
troops  against  a  cash  payment,  and  to  pay  an  indemnity  for  any  damage 
that  may  have  been  caused  by  German  troops. 

"4.  Should  Belgium  oppose  the  German  troops,  and  in  particular 
should  she  throw  difficulties  in  the  way  of  their  march  by  a  resistance  of 
the  fortresses  on  the  Meuse,  or  by  destroying  railways,  roads,  tunnels,  or 
other  similar  works,  Germany  will,  to  her  regret,  be  compelled  to  consider 
Belgium  as  an  enemy. 

"In  this  event  Germany  can  undertake  no  obligations  toward  Belgium, 
but  the  eventual  adjustment  of  the  relations  between  the  two  States  must 
be  left  to  the  decision  of  arms. 

S—Gt.  War  2 


614     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"The  German  Government,  however,  entertain  the  distinct  hope  that 
this  eventuality  will  not  occur,  and  that  the  Belgian  Government  will 
know  how  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of 
incidents  such  as  those  mentioned.  In  this  case  the  friendly  ties  which 
bind  the  two  neighboring  States  will  grow  stronger  and  more  enduring." 


MONDAY,      AUGUST      3,      1914 

Serbia.  On  the  following  day  M.  Yov.  Yovanovitch,  former 
Minister  to  Vienna,  and  now  at  Nish,  the  temporary  capital  of 
Serbia,  made  a  long  report  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, of  events  at  Vienna  from  the  days  following  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo  to  his  departure  from  the  Austrian  capital.  The  points 
in  this  are : 

SERBIA'S      POSITION      EXPLAINED 

1.  Constant  police  surveillance  of  the  Serbian  legation  and 
menacing  attitude  of  the  public. 

2.  Sudden  change  early  in  July  of  Austro-Hungarian  attitude 
to  the  Sarajevo  incident.  Press  begins  to  represent  it  as  a  mani- 
festation of  Serbian  intrigue  which  Austria  must  settle,  and 
alone,  with  Serbia — eventually  by  war. 

3.  Assistance  given  by  German  Embassy  to  this  press  agita- 
tion. 

4.  Austrian  financiers  declare  that  "a  settlement  with  Serbia" 
is  the  only  way  out  of  the  general  financial  and  economic  crisis 
prevailing   in   Austria-Hungary   since   annexation    of   Bosnia. 
Gold  secretly  and  gradually  withdrawn  from  circulation. 

5.  Austrian  Minister  of  War,  Krobatin,  and  Chief  of  Staff, 
Hetzendorf,  break  leave  of  absence  to  return  to  Vienna,  the 
latter  having  had  a  conversation  at  Carlsbad  with  German  Chief 
of  Staff,  Count  Moltke. 

6.  Reserves  retained  after  stipulated  period  for  maneuvers  had 
expired  and  their  numbers  augmented. 

7.  Noncommittal  answers  of  Count  Tisza,  Hungarian  Prime 
Minister,  to  interpolations  concerning  Serbia  in  Hungarian  Diet. 

8.  Refusal  at  Foreign  Office  in  Vienna  to  discuss  Sarajevo  in- 
cident with  foreign  representatives,  or  if  subject  was  mentioned. 


STATE  PAPERS  615 

assurances  that  nothing  would  be  done  against  Serbia  to  give 
uneasiness  to  the  powers,  in  particular  Russia.  Foreign  am- 
bassadors, thus  assured,  quit  Vienna  on  long  leaves  of  absence 
for  watering  places.  All  this  indicates  that  Austria-Hungary 
was  contemplating  sudden  action,  which,  when  a  fait  accompli, 
would  likely  be  accepted  by  the  powers  in  order  to  avoid  a  gen- 
eral war. 

9.  German  Ambassador,  Herr  von  Tschirschky,  the  only  foreign 
representative  informed  of  note  to  Serbia.    He  knew  its  minutest 
details,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  he  helped  draft  it.. 

10.  When  note  was  published,  French,  British,  and  Russian 
representatives  at  Vienna  asked  me  if  it  were  not  better  to  accept 
the  demands  and  avoid  war  for  the  present. 

"I  said  that  the  note,  which  amounted  in  fact  to  a  declaration  of  war 
upon  Serbia,  was  worded  in  such  a  way  that,  even  if  Serbia  should  accept 
all  the  conditions  without  reserve,  Austria-Hungary  would  still  find  an 
excuse  for  her  army  to  march  into  Serbia  at  any  time.  It  was  in  the  belief 
that  the  conflict  would  be  limited  to  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  that 
Austria-Hungary  had  drafted  such  a  note. 

"The  Russian  Ambassador,  M.  Schebeko  [then  absent  from  Vienna,] 
previously  to  the  presentation  of  the  note,  had  stated  on  several  occasions 
to  his  colleagues  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  Russia 
could  not  remain  indifferent  to  any  step  taken  by  Austria-Hungary,  which 
might  have  as  an  object  the  humiliation  of  Serbia.  Hence  the  apprehension 
felt  by  the  French  and  British  Ambassadors  and  the  Russian  Charge 
d' Affaires,  who  at  once  foresaw  the  possibility  of  war  between  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary." 

11.  Expressed  intention  of  Count  Berchtold,  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  chastise  Serbia  by  arms  without 
consent  of  European  concert.    Belief  expressed  by  German  Am- 
bassador that  Russia  would  permit  this,  owing  to  troubles  in 
Asia,  and  assurances  given  by  him  that  Germany  would  stand 
by  her  ally  in  the  matter. 

"These  statements  of  Herr  von  Tschirschky  have  induced  many  to  hold 
the  opinion  that  Germany  desired  to  provoke  a  European  war,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  better  to  have  war  with  Russia  before  the  latter  had 
completed  her  military  reorganization,  i.e.,  before  the  spring  of  1917. 
This  point  of  view  had  formerly  been  freely  discussed  and  even  written 
about  in  Vienna,  'The  longer  the  matter  is  postponed,  the  smaller  will 
become  the  chances  of  success  of  the  Triple  Alliance.'  On  the  other  hand, 
rumors  from  the  most  authoritative  diplomatic  sources  in  Berlin  reached 
me  in  Vienna,  to  the  effect  that  the  Wilhelmstrasse  [German  Foreign 


616  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Office]  did  not  approve  of  Austria's  policy  on  this  question,  and  that  Herr 
von  Tschirschky  has  exceeded  the  instructions  given  to  him." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  made  a  statement  in  the  House  of  Commons  as  to  the 
diplomatic  situation,  particularly  of  Great  Britain.  The  chief 
points  in  it  were : 

1.  The  peace  of  Europe  cannot  be  preserved,  despite  Great 
Britain's  earnest  and  consistent  efforts  to  that  end. 

2.  Great  Britain's  good  faith  in  this  matter,  is  proved  by  her 
actions  in  the  Balkan  crisis,  where  it  was  generally  admitted 
she  worked  for  peace. 

3.  Parliament  is  free  to  decide  on  attitude  of  Great  Britain. 
Here  the  secretary  referred  to  the  Moroccan  crisis  of  1906, 

and  said  that  then  he  had  taken  the  same  attitude  with  respect 
to  France. 

"That  position  was  accepted  by  the  French  Government,  but  they  said 
to  me  at  the  time,  and  I  think  very  reasonably,  'If  you  think  it  possible 
that  the  public  opinion  of  Great  Britain  might,  should  a  sudden  crisis  arise, 
justify  you  in  giving  to  France  the  armed  support  which  you  cannot 
promise  in  advance,  you  will  not  be  able  to  give  that  support,  even  if  you 
wish  it,  when  the  time  comes,  unless  some  conversations  have  already 
taken  place  between  naval  and  military  experts.'  There  was  force  in  that. 
I  agreed  to  it,  and  authorized  those  conversations  to  take  place,  but  on 
the  distinct  understanding  that  nothing  which  passed  between  military  or 
naval  experts  should  bind  either  Government  or  restrict  in  any  way  their 
freedom  to  make  a  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  they  would  give  that 
support  when  the  time  arose. 

"As  I  have  told  the  House,  upon  that  occasion  a  general  election  was 
in  prospect;  I  had  to  take  the  responsibility  of  doing  that  without  the 
Cabinet.  It  could  not  be  summoned.  An  answer  had  to  be  given.  I  con- 
sulted Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman,  the  Prime  Minister;  I  consulted 
Lord  Haldane,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State  for  War;  and  the  present 
Prime  Minister  [Henry  Asquith]  who  was  then  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer. They  authorized  that  [answer],  on  the  distinct  understanding 
that  it  left  the  hands  of  the  Government  free  whenever  the  crisis  arose." 

Here  the  secretary  read  his  reply  to  the  French  Ambassador, 
dated  November  22,  1912,  which  was  to  the  effect  stated.  It 
instanced  the  disposition  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  at  the 
time  as  "not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  cooperate  in  war," 
and  went  on  to  say 

"that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  at- 
tack by  a  third  power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general  peace, 


STATE  PAPERS  617 

it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  governments 
should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so. 
what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common." 

The  secretary  said  that  the  present  crisis  involved  Great  Brit- 
ain's obligations  to  France  in  a  less  formal  fashion. 

"While  we  were  pledged  to  give  nothing  but  diplomatic  support  to  France 
in  the  Morocco  affairs,  we  were  pledged  to  do  so  by  a  definite  public  agree- 
ment [the  Treaty  of  April  8,  1904].  But  no  Government  and  no  country 
has  less  desire  to  be  involved  in  war  over  a  dispute  with  Austria  and 
Serbia  than  the  Government  and  the  country  of  France.  France  is  in- 
volved in  it  because  of  her  obligation  of  honor  under  a  definite  alliance 
with  Russia.  It  is  only  fair  to  the  House  to  say  that  that  obligation  cannot 
apply  in  the  same  way  to  us.  We  are  not  parties  to  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance.  We  do  not  even  know  its  terms. 

"I  now  come  to  what  we  think  the  situation  requires  of  us.  We  have  had 
a  long-standing  friendship  with  France.  But  how  far  that  friendship 
entails  obligation,  let  every  man  look  into  his  own  heart,  and  his  own 
feelings,  and  construe  for  himself. 

"The  French  coasts  are  absolutely  undefended.  The  French  fleet  is 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  has  for  some  years  been  concentrated  there 
because  of  the  feeling  of  confidence  and  friendship  which  has  existed  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  My  own  feeling  is  that  if  a  foreign  fleet,  en- 
gaged in  a  war  which  France  had  not  sought,  and  in  which  she  had  not 
been  the  aggressor,  came  down  the  English  Channel  and  bombarded  and 
battered  the  undefended  coasts  of  France,  we  could  not  stand  aside,  and 
see  this  going  on  practically  within  sight  of  our  eyes,  with  our  arms  folded, 
looking  on  dispassionately,  doing  nothing. 

"Let  us  assume  that  out  of  the  situation  come  consequences  unforeseen, 
which  make  it  necessary  at  a  sudden  moment  that,  in  defense  of  vital 
British  interests,  we  should  go  to  war;  and  let  us  assume — which  is  quite 
possible — that  Italy,  who  is  now  neutral,  should  depart  from  her  attitude, 
what  then  will  be  the  position  in  the  Mediterranean  where  our  trade 
routes  are  vital  to  our  interests?  We  have  not  kept  a  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean which  is  equal  to  dealing  alone  with  a  combination  of  other  fleets 
in  the  Mediterranean.  We  would  have  exposed  this  country  from  our 
negative  attitude  at  the  present  moment  to  the  most  appalling  risk.  We 
feel  strongly  that  France  was  entitled  to  know — and  to  know  at  once — 
whether  or  not  in  the  event  of  attack  upon  her  unprotected  northern  and 
western  coasts  she  could  depend  upon  British  support.  In  these  compel- 
ling circumstances,  yesterday  afternoon  I  gave  to  the  French  Ambassador 
the  assurance  that  if  the  German  fleet  undertakes  hostile  operations 
against  the  French  coast  or  shipping  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the 
protection  in  its  power,  subject  to  the  ratification  of  Parliament. 

"I  understand  that  the  German  Government  would  be  prepared,  if  we 
would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality,  to  agree  that  its  fleet  would  not 
attack  the  northern  coast  of  France.  It  is  far  too  narrow  an  engage- 


618     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

ment  for  us.    And,  Sir,  there  is  the  more  serious  consideration — becoming 
more  serious  every  hour — of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium." 

Here  the  secretary  discussed  the  treaties  of  1839  and  of  1870 
between  the  powers  and  Belgium  respecting  preservation  of  her 
neutrality,  and  cited  in  particular  the  real  and  written  recog- 
nition by  Prince  Bismarck  of  the  sacredness  of  this  neutrality, 
and  the  speech  in  Parliament  by  William  E.  Gladstone  on  Great 
Britain's  obligation  to  maintain  it. 

He  then  reported  the  promise  he  had  just  secured  from  France 
to  respect  Belgian  neutrality,  the  evasive  answer  that  had  been 
given  by  Germany  in  regard  to  the  same,  and  Belgium's  promise 
to  maintain  her  neutrality. 

He  then  recited  Germany's  ultimatum  to  Belgium,  and  Bel- 
gium's appeal  to  King  George. 

"Diplomatic  intervention  took  place  last  week  on  our  part.  What  can 
diplomatic  intervention  do  now?  We  have  great  and  vital  interests  in  the 
independence — and  integrity  is  the  least  part — of  Belgium.  The  smaller 
States  in  that  region  of  Europe  ask  but  one  thing,  to  be  left  alone  and 
independent.  If  in  this  war  which  is  before  Europe  the  neutrality  of  one 
of  those  countries  is  violated,  and  no  action  be  taken  [by  the  powers]  to 
resent  it,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  whatever  the  integrity  may  be,  the  inde- 
pendence will  be  gone.  Mr.  Gladstone  said: 

"We  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of  Belgium  which  is  wider 
than  that  which  we  may  have  in  the  literal  operation  of  the  guaranty. 
It  is  found  in  the  answer  to  the  question  whether,  under  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  this  country,  endowed  as  it  is  with  influence  and  power,  would 
quietly  stand  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of  the  direst  crime  that 
ever  stained  the  pages  of  history,  and  thus  become  participators  in  the  sin. 

"If  Belgium's  independence  goes,  the  independence  of  Holland  will  follow. 
I  ask  the  House  from  the  point  of  view  of  British  interests  to  consider  what 
may  be  at  stake.  If  France  is  beaten  in  a  struggle  of  life  and  death,  loses 
her  position  as  a  great  power,  becomes  subordinate  to  the  will  and  power  of 
one  greater  than  herself — consequences  which  I  do  not  anticipate,  because  I 
am  sure  that  France  has  the  power  to  defend  herself  with  all  the  energy 
and  ability  and  patriotism  which  she  has  shown  so  often,  and  if  Belgium 
fell  under  the  same  dominating  influence,  and  then  Holland,  and  then 
Denmark,  then  would  not  Mr.  Gladstone's  words  come  true,  that  just 
opposite  to  us  there  would  be  a  common  interest  against  the  unmeasured 
aggrandizement  of  any  power? 

"It  may  be  said,  I  suppose,  that  we  might  stand  aside,  husband  our 
strength,  and  that,  whatever  happened  in  the  course  of  this  war,  at  the  end 
of  it  to  intervene  with  effect  to  put  things  right,  and  to  adjust  them  to  our 
own  point  of  view.  If,  in  a  crisis  like  this,  we  run  away  from  those  obli- 
gations of  honor  and  interest  as  regards  the  Belgian  treaty,  I  doubt 


STATE  PAPERS  619 

whether,  whatever  material  force  we  might  have  at  the  end,  it  would  be  of 
very  much  value  in  face  of  the  respect  that  we  should  have  lost.  And  do 
not  believe,  whether  a  great  power  stands  outside  this  war  or  not,  it  is 
going  to  be  in  a  position  at  the  end  of  it  to  exert  its  superior  strength. 
For  us,  with  a  powerful  fleet,  which  we  believe  able  to  protect  our  com- 
merce, to  protect  our  shores,  and  to  protect  our  interests,  if  we  are  engaged 
in  war,  we  shall  suffer  but  little  more  than  we  shall  suffer  even  if  we  stand 
aside. 

"We  are  going  to  suffer  terribly  in  this  war,  whether  we  are  in  it  or 
whether  we  stand  aside.  Foreign  trade  is  going  to  stop,  not  because  the 
trade  routes  are  closed,  but  because  there  is  no  trade  at  the  other  end. 
I  do  not  believe  for  a  moment  that  at  the  end  of  this  war,  even  if  we  stood 
aside,  we  should  be  in  a  material  position,  to  use  our  force  decisively  to 
undo  what  had  happened  in  the  course  of  the  war,  to  prevent  the  whole  of 
the  west  of  Europe  opposite  to  us  falling  under  the  domination  of  a  single 
power,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  our  moral  position  would  be  such  as  to 
have  lost  us  all  respect. 

"Mobilization  of  the  fleet  has  taken  place;  mobilization  of  the  army  is 
taking  place;  but  we  have  as  yet  taken  no  engagement  with  regard  to 
sending  an  expeditionary  armed  force  out  of  the  country,  because  I  feel 
that — in  the  case  of  a  European  conflagration  such  as  this,  unprecedented, 
with  our  enormous  responsibilities  in  India  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire, 
or  in  countries  in  British  occupation,  with  all  the  unknown  factors — we 
must  take  the  question  very  carefully  into  consideration,  until  we  know 
how  we  stand. 

"What  other  policy  is  there  before  the  House?  There  is  but  one  way  in 
which  the  Government  could  make  certain  at  the  present  moment  of  keep- 
ing outside  this  war,  and  that  would  be  that  it  should  immediately  issue 
a  proclamation  of  unconditional  neutrality.  We  cannot  do  that.  We 
should  sacrifice  our  good  name  and  reputation  before  the  world,  and 
should  not  escape  the  most  serious  and  grave  economic  consequences. 

"As  far  as  the  forces  of  the  crown  are  concerned,  we  are  ready.  I 
believe  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  [Winston 
Churchill]  have  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  readiness  and  the  efficiency  of 
those  forces  were  never  at  a  higher  mark  than  they  are  to-day,  and  never 
was  there  a  time  when  confidence  was  more  justified  in  the  power  of  the 
navy  to  protect  our  commerce  and  to  protect  our  shores. 

"The  most  awful  responsibility  is  resting  upon  the  Government  in  de- 
ciding what  to  advise  the  House  of  Commons  to  do.  We  have  made  clear  to 
the  House,  I  trust,  that  we  are  prepared  to  face  that  situation.  We  worked 
for  peace  up  to  the  last  moment,  and  beyond  the  last  moment.  We  believe 
we  shall  have  the  support  of  the  House  at  large  in  proceeding  to  whatever 
the  consequences  may  be  and  whatever  measures  may  be  forced  upon  us. 
The  country  has  not  had  time  to  realize  the  issue.  It  perhaps  is  stttl 
thinking  of  the  quarrel  between  Austria  and  Serbia,  and  not  the  compli- 
cations of  this  matter  which  have  grown  out  of  the  quarrel  between 
Austria  and  Serbia.  Russia  and  Germany  we  know  are  at  war.  We  do 
not  yet  know  officially  that  Austria,  the  ally  whom  Germany  is  to  support, 


620     THE  STORY  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

is  yet  at  war  with  Russia.    We  know  that  a  good  deal  has  been  happening  on 
the  French  frontier. 

"I  believe,  when  the  country  realizes  what  is  at  stake,  what  the  real  is- 
sues are,  the  magnitude  of  the  impending  dangers  in  the  west  of  Europe, 
we  shall  be  supported  throughout,  not  only  by  the  House  of  Commons,  but 
by  the  determination,  the  resolution,  the  courage,  and  the  endurance  of  the 
whole  country." 

France.  Minister  Klobukowski  telegraphed  from  Brussels 
the  answer  the  Belgian  Government  had  given  on  the  evening  of 
August  2  to  the  German  ultimatum : 

"The  information  as  to  the  French  movements  appeared  to  them  to  be 
inaccurate  in  view  of  the  formal  assurances  which  had  been  given  by  France, 
and  were  still  quite  recent;  that  Belgium,  which  since  the  establishment  of 
her  kingdom,  has  taken  every  care  to  assure  the  protection  of  her  dignity 
and  of  her  interests,  and  has  devoted  all  her  efforts  to  peaceful  development 
of  progress,  strongly  protests  against  any  violation  of  her  territory  from 
whatever  quarter  it  may  come:  and  that,  supposing  the  violation  takes 
place,  she  will  know  how  to  defend  with  energy  her  neutrality,  which  has 
been  guaranteed  by  the  powers,  and  notably  by  the  King  of  Prussia." 

M.  Klobukowski  added  in  a  supplementary  telegram : 

"To  the  assurance  which  I  gave  him  that  if  Belgium  appealed  to  the 
guarantee  of  the  powers  against  the  violation  of  her  neutrality  by  Germany, 
France  would  at  once  respond  to  her  appeal,  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  [M.  Davignon]  answered: 

"It  is  with  great  sincerity  that  we  thank  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public for  the  support  which  it  would  eventually  be  able  to  offer  us,  but 
'mder  present  conditions  we  do  not  appeal  to  the  guarantee  of  the  powers. 
At  a  later  date  the  Government  of  the  king  will  weigh  the  measures  which 
it  may  be  necessary  to  take." 

Ambassador  Paul  Cambon  telegraphed  from  London : 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  has  authorized  me  to  inform  you  that  he  was  making 
explanations  to  the  Commons  as  to  the  present  attitude  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, and  that  the  chief  of  these  declarations  would  be  as  follows : 

"  'In  case  the  German  fleet  came  into  the  Channel  or  entered  the  North 
Sea  in  order  to  go  round  the  British  Isles  with  the  object  of  attacking  the 
French  coasts  or  the  French  navy  and  of  harassing  French  merchant  ship- 
ping, the  British  fleet  would  intervene  in  order  to  give  to  French  shipping 
its  complete  protection,  in  such  a  way  that  from  that  moment  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  would  be  in  a  state  of  war.' 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  explained  to  me  that  the  mention  of  an  operation  by 
way  of  the  North  Sea  implied  protection  against  a  demonstration  in  the 
Atlantic  Ocean. 

"The  declaration  concerning  the  intervention  of  the  British  fleet  must 
be  considered  as  binding  the  British  Government.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has 


STATE  PAPERS  621 

assured  me  of  this  and  has  added  that  the  French  Government  were  there- 
by authorized  to  inform  the  Chambers  of  this." 

M.  Paul  Cambon  supplemented  this  by  a  telegram  stating : 

"Just  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  starting  this  morning  for  the  meeting  of 
the  Cabinet,  my  German  colleague  [Prince  Lichnowsky]  came  to  press  him 
to  say  that  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britian  did  not  depend  upon  respecting 
Belgian  neutrality.  Sir  Edward  Grey  refused  all  conversation  on  this 
matter. 

"The  German  Ambassador  has  sent  to  the  press  a  communique  saying 
that  if  Great  Britain  remained  neutral  Germany  would  give  up  all  naval 
operations  and  would  not  make  use  of  the  Belgian  coast  as  a  point  d'appui. 
My  answer  is  that  respecting  the  coast  is  not  respecting  the  neutrality  of 
the  territory,  and  that  the  German  ultimatum  is  already  a  violation  of  this 
neutrality." 

Later  M.  Paul  Cambon  telegraphed: 

"Sir  Edward  Grey  has  made  the  statement  regarding  the  intervention 

of  the  British  fleet.     He  has  explained,  in  considering  the  situation,  what 

he  proposed  to  do  with  regard  to  Belgian  neutrality;  and  the  reading  of  a 

letter  from  King  Albert  asking  for  the  support  of  Great  Britain  has  deeply 

-  stirred  the  House. 

"The  House  will  this  evening  vote  the  credit  which  is  asked  for;  from 
this  moment  its  support  is  secured  to  the  policy  of  the  Government,  and  it 
follows  public  opinion  which  is  declaring  itself  more  and  more  in  our 
favor." 

M.  Viviani  warned  M.  Paul  Cambon  that  the  German  Am- 
bassador Schoen  was  reported  to  have  said  at  the  Foreign  Office 
that  yesterday  eighty  French  officers  in  Prussian  uniform  had 
attempted  to  cross  the  German  frontier  in  twelve  motor  cars  at 
Walbeck. 

"Be  good  enough  urgently  to  contradict  this  news  which  is  pure  invention, 
and  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  [British]  Foreign  Office  to  the  German 
campaign  of  false  news  which  is  beginning." 

German  Ambassador  von  Schoen  had  a  farewell  audience  at  the 
Foreign  Office  at  6.45  p.  m.,  at  which  he  handed  M.  Viviani  a 
letter  stating  that  French  military  aviators  had  committed 
"flagrantly  hostile  acts"  on  German  territory,  one  throwing 
bombs  on  the  railway  near  Karlsruhe  and  Nuremberg,  and  had 
openly  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  Belgian 
territory. 

"I  am  instructed,  and  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  excellency,  that 
in  the  presence  of  these  acts  of  aggression  the  German  Empire  considers  it- 


622  THE    STORY   OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

self  in  a  state  of  war  with  France  in  consequence  of  the  acts  of  this  latter 
power. 

"At  the  same  time  I  have  the  honor  to  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  your 
excellency  that  the  German  authorities  will  detain  French  mercantile  ves- 
sels in  German  ports,  but  they  will  release  them  if,  within  forty-eight  hours, 
they  are  assured  of  complete  reciprocity." 

M.  Viviani  formally  challenged  as  inaccurate  the  allegations 
of  the  ambassador. 

M.  Viviani  instructed  Ambassador  Jules  Cambon  at  Berlin 
to  ask  for  his  passports. 

"I  request  you  at  the  same  time  to  protest  in  writing  against  the  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  by  German  troops,  of  which  notice  has 
been  given  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Luxemburg;  against  the  ultimatum  ad- 
dressed to  the  Belgian  Government  by  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels  to 
force  upon  them  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  to  require  of  that 
country  that  she  should  facilitate  military  operations  against  France  on 
Belgian  territory;  finally  against  the  false  allegation  of  an  alleged  projected 
invasion  of  these  two  countries  by  French  armies,  by  which  he  has  attempted 
to  justify  the  state  of  war  which  he  declares  henceforth  exists  between 
Germany  and  France." 

M.  Allize,  Minister  at  Munich,  was  also  instructed  to  ask  for 
his  passports. 

M.  Viviani  reported  to  the  French  representatives  abroad  that 
German  troops  had  violated  Belgian  territory  at  Gemmerich. 

Belgium.  Baron  von  der  Elst,  Secretary  General,  reported  an 
interview  at  1.30  p.  m.  with  Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German 
Minister. 

"The  minister  officially  informed  the  Belgian  Government  that  French 
dirigibles  had  thrown  bombs,  and  that  a  French  cavalry  patrol  had  crossed 
the  frontier  in  violation  of  international  law,  seeing  that  war  had  not  been 
declared. 

"The  secretary  general  asked  Herr  von  Below  where  these  incidents  had 
happened,  and  was  told  that  it  was  in  Germany.  Baron  van  der  Elst  then 
observed  that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand  the  object  of  this  com- 
munication. Herr  von  Below  stated  that  these  acts,  which  were  contrary 
to  international  law,  were  calculated  to  lead  to  the  supposition  that  other 
acts,  contrary  to  international  law,  would  be  committed  by  France." 

M.  Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  communicated  to 
Herr  von  Below  Saleske  Belgium's  reply  to  the  German  note. 

"This  note  has  made  a  deep  and  painful  impression  upon  the  Belgian 
Government. 

"The  intentions  attributed  to  France  by  Germany  are  in  contradiction  to 


STATE  PAPERS  623 

the  formal  declarations  made  to  us  on  August  1,  in  the  name  of  the  French 
Government. 

"Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  Belgian  neutrality  should  be 
violated  by  France,  Belgium  intends  to  fulfill  her  international  obligations  and 
the  Belgian  army  would  offer  the  most  vigorous  resistance  to  the  invader. 

"The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the  treaties  of  1870  vouch  for  the 
independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  under  the  guaranty  of  the  powers, 
and  notably  of  the  Government  of  his  majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

"Belgium  has  always  been  faithful  to  her  international  obligations,  she 
has  carried  out  her  duties  in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality,  and  she  has 
left  nothing  undone  to  maintain  and  enforce  respect  for  her  neutrality. 

"The  attack  upon  her  independence  with  which  the  German  Government 
threaten  her  constitutes  a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law.  No 
strategic  interest  justifies  such  a  violation  of  law. 

"The  Belgian  Government,  if  they  were  to  accept  the  proposals  sub- 
mitted to  them,  would  sacrifice  the  honor  of  the  nation  and  betray  their 
duty  toward  Europe. 

"Conscious  of  the  part  which  Belgium  has  played  for  more  than  eighty 
years  in  the  civilization  of  the  world,  they  refuse  to  believe  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium  can  only  be  preserved  at  the  price  of  the  violation  of 
her  neutrality. 

"If  this  hope  is  disappointed  the  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  resolved 
to  repel,  by  all  the  means  in  their  power,  every  attack  upon  their  rights." 

M.  Davignon  reported  this  action  to  the  Ministers  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Berlin,  London,  Paris,  Vienna,  and  The  Hague.  To 
the  same  representatives,  except  the  Minister  at  The  Hague,  he 
reported  a  statement  made  to  him  by  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels : 

"Although  I  have  received  no  instructions  to  make  a  declaration  from 
my  Government,  I  feel  justified,  in  view  of  their  well-known  intentions,  in 
saying  that  if  the  Belgian  Government  were  to  appeal  to  the  French  Gov- 
ernment as  one  of  the  powers  guaranteeing  their  neutrality,  the  French 
Government  would  at  once  respond  to  Belgium's  appeal;  if  such  an  appeal 
were  not  made  it  is  probable,  that — unless  of  course  exceptional  measures 
were  rendered  necessary  in  self-defence — the  French  Government  would  not 
intervene  until  Belgium  had  taken  some  effective  measure  of  resistance. 

"I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski  for  the  support  which  the  French  Government 
had  been  good  enough  to  offer  us  in  case  of  need,  and  I  informed  him  that 
the  Belgian  Government  were  making  no  appeal  at  present  to  the  guaranty 
of  the  powers,  and  that  they  would  decide  later  what  ought  to  be  done." 

Count  Lalaing,  Minister  at  London,  telegraphed  to  M.  Davig- 
non that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had 
informed  him  "that  if  our  neutrality  is  violated  it  means  war 
with  Germany." 


624  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

TUESDAY,      AUGUST      4,      1914 

Serbia.  On  the  following  day,  August  4,  1914,  M.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister,  recalled  the  legation  and  consulate  from  Ger- 
many. 

Austria-Hungary.  Ambassador  Mensdorff  telegraphed  from 
Berlin  that  Great  Britain  had  sent  to  Germany  its  ultimatum 
concerning  Belgium,  and  expected  an  answer  to-night  at  twelve 
o'clock. 

"Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  me  that  at  present  there  was  no  reason  why  he 
should  make  any  communication  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government, 
and  there  was  no  cause  why  a  conflict  should  arise  between  us,  so  long  as 
we  were  not  in  a  condition  of  war  with  France.  In  any  case,  he  hoped  that 
we  would  not  begin  hostilities  without  the  formality  of  a  previous  declara- 
tion of  war.  He  does  not  intend  to  recall  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen. 

"Should  we  be  at  war  with  France,  it  would  indeed  be  difficult  for  Great 
Britain,  as  the  ally  of  France,  to  cooperate  with  her  in  the  Atlantic,  and 
not  in  the  Mediterranean." 


VON      BET H  MANN- HOLLWEG     EXPLAINS      GER- 
MANY'S     POSITION      IN      THE     REICHSTAG 

Germany.  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  spoke  before 
the  Reichstag  (Imperial  Parliament).  The  points  of  his  address 
were  as  follows : 

1.  Germany  has  kept  the  peace  and  protected  the  peace  of 
Europe  for  forty-four  years,  yet,  under  the  pretense  that  she  was 
desirous  of  war, 

"enmity  has  been  awakened  against  us  in  the  East  and  the  West  and  chains 
have  been  fashioned  for  us.  The  wind  then  sown  has  brought  forth  the 
whirlwind  which  has  now  broken  loose.  We  wished  to  continue  our  work  of 
peace,  and,  like  a  silent  vow,  the  feeling  that  animated  everyone  from  the 
emperor  down  to  the  youngest  soldier  was  this:  Only  in  defence  of  a  just 
cause  shall  our  sword  fly  from  its  scabbard. 

"The  day  has  now  come  when  we  must  draw  it,  against  our  wish,  and 
in  spite  of  our  sincere  endeavors.  Russia  has  set  fire  to  the  building. 
We  are  at  war  with  Russia  and  France — a  war  that  has  been  forced 
upon  us." 

2.  Germany  has  endeavored  to  localize  the  conflict  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia.    All  other  European  Governments 
(particularly  Great  Britain)   save  one  took  the  same  attitude. 


STATE  PAPERS  625 

Russia  alone  asserted  that  she  had  to  be  heard  in  a  settlement  of 
the  matter. 

"Thus  the  danger  of  a  European  crisis  raised  its  threatening  head." 

3.  Russia  began  to  mobilize.    On  this,  Germany  declared  that 
Russian  military  measures  against  Austria-Hungary  would  find 
her  on  the  side  of  her  ally,  and  that  she  would  take  counter- 
measures,  coming  near  to  actual  war. 

"Russia  assured  us  in  the  most  solemn  manner  of  her  desire  for  peace, 
and  declared  that  she  was  making  no  military  preparations  against  us. 

"In  the  meantime,  Great  Britain,  warmly  supported  by  us,  tried  to  medi- 
ate between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg." 

4.  Kaiser  William  II  telegraphed  to  Nicholas  II  asking  for  the 
Czar's  assistance  in  smoothing  over  difficulties  between  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary.    Before  receipt  of  this  telegram  the  Czar 
asked  the  Kaiser  to  induce  Austria-Hungary  to  aid  him  in  in- 
ducing Vienna  to  moderate  her  demands  on  Serbia.    The  Kaiser 
accepted  the  role  of  mediator. 

5.  Germany  influenced  Austria-Hungary  to  resume  the  broken 
conversations  with  Russia. 

"But  before  the  final  decision  was  taken  at  Vienna,  the  news  arrived  that 
Russia  had  mobilized  her  entire  forces  and  that  her  mobilization  was  there- 
fore directed  against  us  also.  The  Russian  Government,  who  knew  from 
our  repeated  statements  what  mobilization  on  our  frontiers  meant,  did  not 
notify  us  of  this  mobilization,  nor  did  they  even  offer  any  explanation.  It 
was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  July  31  that  the  emperor  received  a  telegram 
from  the  czar  in  which  he  guaranteed  that  his  army  would  not  assume  a 
provocative  attitude  toward  us.  But  mobilization  on  our  frontiers  had 
been  in  full  swing  since  the  night  of  July  30-31,  and  France,  though  indeed 
not  actually  mobilizing,  was  admittedly  making  military  preparations. 

"What  was  our  position?  For  the  sake  of  the  peace  of  Europe  we  had, 
up  till  then,  deliberately  refrained  from  calling  up  a  single  reservist.  Were 
we  now  to  wait  further  in  patience  until  the  nations  on  either  side  of  us 
chose  the  moment  for  their  attack?  It  would  have  been  a  crime  to  expose 
Germany  to  such  peril.  Therefore,  on  July  31,  we  called  upon  Russia  to 
demobilize  as  the  only  measure  which  could  still  preserve  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  informed  her  that  in  case  our  demand  met  with  a  refusal,  we 
should  have  to  consider  that  a  state  of  war  existed. 

"No  answer  was  given,  and  we  mobilized  our  forces  on  August  1,  at 
5  p.  m." 

6.  France  evaded  our  direct  question  as  to  whether  she  would 
remain  neutral  in  a  Russo-German  war. 


626  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT   WAR 

"In  spite  of  this,  the  kaiser  ordered  that  the  French  frontier  was  to  be 
unconditionally  respected.  This  order,  with  one  single  exception*,  was 
strictly  obeyed.  France,  who  mobilized  at  the  same  time  as  we  did,  as- 
sured us  that  she  would  respect  a  zone  of  10  kilometers  on  the  frontier. 
What  really  happened?  Aviators  dropped  bombs,  and  cavalry  patrols  and 
French  infantry  detachments  appeared  on  the  territory  of  the  empire! 
Though  war  had  not  been  declared,  France  thus  broke  the  peace  and  actu- 
ally attacked  us." 

After  this  recital  the  Chancellor  entered  upon  his  oration 
proper. 

"Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity  (Notwehr) ,  and  necessity 
(Not)  knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg  and  perhaps 
have  already  entered  Belgian  territory. 

"Gentlemen,  that  is  a  breach  of  international  law.  It  is  true  that  the 
French  Government  declared  at  Brussels  that  France  would  respect  Bel- 
gian neutrality  as  long  as  her  adversary  respected  it.  We  knew,  however, 
that  France  stood  ready  for  an  invasion.  France  could  wait,  we  could  not. 
A  French  attack  on  our  flank  on  the  lower  Rhine  might  have  been  disas- 
trous. Thus  we  were  forced  to  ignore  the  rightful  protests  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  The  wrong — I  speak  openly — the  wrong 
we  thereby  commit  we  will  try  to  make  good  as  soon  as  our  military  aims 
have  been  attained. 

"He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are  and  is  fighting  for  his  highest  possession 
can  only  consider  how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through  (durchhauen) . 

"Gentlemen,  we  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Austria-Hungary. 

"As  for  Great  Britain's  attitude,  the  statements  made  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons  yesterday  show  the  standpoint  assumed  by 
the  British  Government.  We  have  informed  the  British  Government  that, 
as  long  as  Great  Britain  remains  neutral,  our  fleet  will  not  attack  the 
northern  coast  of  France,  and  that  we  will  not  violate  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  independence  of  Belgium.  These  assurances  I  now  repeat  be- 
fore the  world,  and  I  may  add  that,  as  long  as  Great  Britain  remains  neutral, 
we  would  also  be  willing,  upon  reciprocity  being  assured,  to  take  no  war- 
like measures  against  French  commercial  shipping. 

"Gentlemen,  so  much  for  the  facts.  I  repeat  the  words  of  the  emperor: 
'With  a  clear  conscience  we  enter  the  lists.'  We  are  fighting  for  the  fruits 
of  our  works  of  peace,  for  the  inheritance  of  a  great  past  and  for  our 
future.  The  fifty  years  are  not  yet  past  during  which  Count  Moltke  said 
we  should  have  to  remain  armed  to  defend  the  inheritance  that  we  won  in 
1870.  Now  the  great  hour  of  trial  has  struck  for  our  people.  But  with 
clear  confidence  we  go  forward  to  meet  it.  Our  army  is  in  the  field,  our 
navy  is  ready  for  battle — behind  them  stands  the  entire  German  nation — 
the  entire  German  nation  united  to  the  last  man. 

*Against  express  orders,  a  patrol  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  ap- 
parently led  by  an  officer,  crossed  the  frontier  on  August  2.  They  seem 
to  have  been  shot  down,  only  one  man  having  returned. 


STATE  PAPERS  627 

"Gentlemen,  you  know  your  duty  and  all  that  it  means.  The  proposed 
laws  need  no  further  explanation.  I  ask  you  to  pass  them  quickly." 

Secretary  of  State  von  Jagow  telegraphed  Ambassador  Lich- 
nowsky  at  London : 

"Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions,  by  repeating  most  positively 
formal  assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of  armed  conflict  with  Belgium, 
Germany  will,  under  no  pretence  whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory.  Sin- 
cerity of  this  declaration  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  we  solemnly  pledged 
our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to  respect  her  neutrality.  It  is  obvious  that  we 
could  not  profitably  annex  Belgian  territory  without  making  at  the  same 
time  territorial  acquisitions  at  expense  of  Holland.  Please  impress  upon 
Sir  E.  Grey  that  the  German  army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack 
across  Belgium,  which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable 
information.  Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it 
being  for  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance." 

Great  Britain.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, telegraphed  Ambassador  Goschen  at  Berlin  to  protest  to 
the  German  Government  against  its  violation  of  the  treaty  safe- 
guarding Belgian  neutrality,  and  to  request  an  immediate  assur- 
ance that  the  demand  made  upon  Belgium  would  not  be  proceeded 
with. 

Ambassador  Villiers  telegraphed  from  Brussels  that  the  Ger- 
man Minister,  Von  Below  Saleske,  had  addressed  a  note  to  M. 
Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

"stating  that  as  Belgian  Government  have  declined  the  well-intentioned 
proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the  Imperial  Government,  the  latter  will, 
deeply  to  their  regret,  be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary  by  force 
of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispensable  in  view  of  the  French 
menaces." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  back  that  Great  Britain  expected 
the  Belgian  Government  to  resist  by  any  means  in  their  power 
Germany's  invasion  of  their  neutrality,  and  that  the  British 
Government  were  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France  in 
common  action  to  resist  the  German  action  and  to  guarantee 
to  maintain  Belgian  independence  and  integrity  in  future 
years. 

Grey  protested,  through  Ambassador  Goschen,  to  the  German 
Government  against  the  continued  detention  of  British  merchant 
ships  at  Hamburg  and  other  German  ports,  as  in  direct  contra- 


628  THE    STORY    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

vention  of  international  law  and  of  the  assurances  given  by  Chan- 
cellor von  Bethmann-Hollweg. 

Villiers  telegraphed  from  Brussels : 

"German  troops  have  entered  Belgian  territory,  and  Liege  has  been 
summoned  to  surrender  by  small  party  of  Germans  who,  however,  were  re- 
pulsed." 

Grey,  on  the  basis  of  this  information,  telegraphed  Ambassa- 
dor Goschen  to  ask  the  German  Government  that  a  satisfactory 
answer  to  his  morning  telegram  be  received  in  London  by  twelve 
o'clock  at  night. 

"If  not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for  your  passports,  and  to  say  that  his 
majesty's  Government  feel  bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany 
is  as  much  a  party  as  ourselves." 

As  reported  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  August  8,  after  his  return 
to  London,  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  had  an 
interview  with  Herr  von  Jagow  on  this  same  day,  August  4. 


SIR     EDWARD      GOSCHEN'S      INTERVIEW 
WITH      VON      JAGOW 

"In  accordance  with  your  instructions  of  the  4th  inst.,  I  called  upon 
the  Secretary  of  State  that  afternoon  and  inquired,  in  the  name  of  his 
majesty's  Government,  whether  the  Imperial  Government  would  refrain 
from  violating  Belgian  neutrality.  Herr  von  Jagow  at  once  replied  that 
he  was  sorry  to  say  that  his  answer  must  be  'No,'  as,  in  consequence 
of  the  German  troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning,  Bel- 
gian neutrality  had  been  already  violated.  He  again  went  into  the  rea- 
sons why  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step, 
namely,  that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest  and  easiest 
way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their  operations  and  endeavor 
to  strike  some  decisive  blow  as  early  as  possible.  It  was  a  matter  of  life  and 
death  for  them,  as  if  they  had  gone  by  the  more  southern  route  they  could 
not  have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the  strength  of  the 
fortresses,  to  have  got  through  without  formidable  opposition  entailing 
great  loss  of  time.  This  loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the 
Russians  for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  German  frontier.  Rapidity  of 
action  was  the  great  German  asset,  while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible 
supply  of  troops.  I  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli 
of  the  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he  would  readily  under- 
stand, the  situation  exceedingly  grave,  and  I  asked  him  whether  there  was 
not  still  time  to  draw  back  and  avoid  possible  consequences,  which  both  he 


STATE  PAPERS  629 

and  I  would  deplore.  He  replied  that,  for  the  reasons  he  had  given  me,  it 
was  now  impossible  for  them  to  draw  back. 

"During  the  afternoon  I  received  your  further  telegram  of  the  same  date, 
and,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions  therein  contained,  I  again  pro- 
ceeded to  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office  and  informed  the  Secretary  of  State 
that,  unless  the  Imperial  Government  could  give  the  assurance  by  twelve 
o'clock  that  night  that  they  would  proceed  no  further  with  their  violation 
of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  stop  their  advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  de- 
mand my  passports  and  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  his  majesty's 
Government  would  have  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as 
much  a  party  as  themselves. 

"Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he  could  give  no  other 
answer  than  that  which  he  had  given  me  earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that 
the  safety  of  the  empire  rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Imperial 
troops  should  advance  through  Belgium.  I  asked  him  whether,  in  view  of 
the  terrible  consequences  which  would  necessarily  ensue,  it  were  not  possible 
even  at  the  last  moment  that  their  answer  should  be  reconsidered.  He  re- 
plied that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty-four  hours  or  more,  his  an- 
swer must  be  the  same.  I  said  that  in  that  case  I  should  have  to  demand  my 
passports.  This  interview  took  place  at  about  seven  o'clock.  In  a  short 
conversation  which  ensued  Herr  von  Jagow  expressed  his  poignant  regret 
at  the  crumbling  of  his  "en tire  policy  and  that  of  the  chancellor,  which  had 
been  to  make  friends  with  Great  Britain,  and  then,  through  Great  Britain, 
to  get  closer  to  France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work  in  Berlin 
was  to  me  also  a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  disappointment,  but  that  he 
must  understand  that  under  the  circumstances  and  in  view  of  our  engage- 
ments, his  majesty's  Government  could  not  possibly  have  acted  otherwise 
than  they  had  done. 

"I  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the  chancellor,  as  it  might 
be,  perhaps,  the  last  time  I  should  have  an  opportunity  of  seeing  him.  He 
begged  me  to  do  so.  I  found  the  chancellor  very  agitated.  His  excellency  at 
once  began  a  harangue,  which  lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes.  He  said 
that  the  step  taken  by  his  majesty's  Government  was  terrible  to  a  degree; 
just  for  a  word — 'neutrality,'  a  word  which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been 
disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper  Great  Britain  was  going  to  make 
war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired  nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with 
her.  All  his  efforts  in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this  last 
terrible  step,  and  the  policy  to  which,  as  I  knew,  he  had  devoted  himself 
since  his  accession  to  office  had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of  cards.  What  we 
had  done  was  unthinkable;  it  was  like  striking  a  man  from  behind  while  he 
was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain 
responsible  for  all  the  terrible  events  that  might  happen.  I  protested 
strongly  against  that  statement,  and  said  that,  in  the  same  way  as  he  and 
Herr  von  Jagow  wished  me  to  understand  that  for  strategical  reasons  it  was 
a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  Germany  to  advance  through  Belgium  and  vio- 
late the  latter's  neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to  understand  that  it  was, 
so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  'life  and  death'  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that 

T— Gt-  War  2 


630  THE    STORY    OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

she  should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's 
neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what 
confidence  could  anyone  have  in  engagements  given  by  Great  Britain  in  the 
future?  The  chancellor  said:  'But  at  what  price  will  that  compact  have 
been  kept.  Has  the  British  Government  thought  of  that?'  I  hinted  to  his 
excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of  consequences  could  hardly  be 
regarded  as  an  excuse  for  breaking  solemn  engagements,  but  his  excellency 
was  so  excited,  so  evidently  overcome  by  the  news  of  our  action,  and  so 
little  disposed  to  hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from  adding  fuel  to  the  flame 
by  further  argument.  As  I  was  leaving  he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Brit- 
ain joining  Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost  up  to  the 
last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working  with  us  and  support- 
ing our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  between  Austria  and  Russia.  I  said  that 
this  was  part  of  the  tragedy  which  saw  the  two  nations  fall  apart  just  at 
the  moment  when  the  relations  between  them  had  been  more  friendly  and 
cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years.  Unfortunately,  notwithstanding  our 
efforts  to  maintain  peace  between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had  spread 
and  had  brought  us  face  to  face  with  a  situation  which,  if  we  held  to  our 
engagements,  we  could  not  possibly  avoid,  and  which  unfortunately  en- 
tailed our  separation  from  our  late  fellow-workers.  He  would  readily  un- 
derstand that  no  one  regretted  this  more  than  I. 

"After  this  somewhat  painful  interview  I  returned  to  the  embassy  and 
drew  up  a  telegraphic  report  of  what  had  passed.  This  telegram  was  handed 
in  at  the  Central  Telegraph  Office  a  little  before  9  p.  m.  It  was  apparently 
never  dispatched."* 

Mr.  Goschen's  report  went  on  to  relate  the  attack  that  evening 
on  the  British  Embassy  by  a  mob  excited  by  the  report  in  a  fly- 
ing sheet  of  the  "Berliner  Tageblatt"  that  Great  Britain  had 
declared  war  on  Germany.  The  German  Government  repudiated 
the  report  and  did  all  it  could,  by  the  personal  apology  of  the 
secretary  of  state  and  by  police  protection,  to  make  amends  for 
what  Herr  von  Jagow  termed  "the  indelible  stain  on  the  reputa- 
tion of  Berlin." 

"On  the  following  morning,  August  5,  the  emperor  sent  one  of  his 
majesty's  aides-de-camp  to  me  with  the  following  message: 

"  "The  emperor  has  charged  me  to  express  to  your  excellency  his  regret 
for  the  occurrences  of  last  night,  but  to  tell  you  at  the  same  time  that  you 
will  gather  from  those  occurrences  an  idea  of  the  feelings  of  his  people  re- 
specting the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  joining  with  other  nations  against 
her  old  Allies  of  Waterloo.  His  majesty  also  begs  that  you  will  tell  the 
king  that  he  has  been  proud  of  the  titles  of  British  field  marshal  and  British 
admiral,  but  that  in  consequence  of  what  has  occurred  he  must  now  at  once 
divest  himself  of  those  titles.' 

*This  telegram  never  reached  the  British  Foreign  Office. 


STATE  PAPERS  631 

"I  would  add  that  the  above  message  lost  none  of  its  acerbity  by  the 
manner  of  its  delivery." 

At  11  a.  m.,  August  5,  Ambassador  Goschen  received  his  pass- 
ports. He  returned  to  London  on  the  following  day  without 
molestation  from  the  crowd,  although  this  could  not  be  said  of 
the  departure  of  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors.  He 
closed  his  report  with  a  compliment  to  the  American  Ambassador, 
Mr.  Gerard,  for  assistance  rendered  by  him  in  these  trying  times. 

France.  A  message  from  President  Poincare  was  read  at  an 
extraordinary  session  of  Parliament,  the  members  of  which  re- 
mained standing  during  the  reading.  This  announced  the  "vio- 
lent and  premeditated"  attack  on  France  by  Germary  in  "insolent 
defiance  of  the  law  of  nations"  being  delivered  before  any  declara- 
tion of  war,  and  asking  for  passports  by  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Paris.  The  president  recounted  the  pacific  course  of  French- 
men in  "burying  at  the  bottom  of  their  heart  the  desire  for  legiti- 
mate reparation,  of  the  wrong  done  their  country  by  Germany 
in  1871,  and  in  using  their  rejuvenated  strength  in  the  interest 
of  progress  and  for  the  good  of  humanity."  In  particular  he 
spoke  of  the  efforts  France  had  made  for  peace  since  Austria's 
ultimatum  to  Serbia.  He  solemnly  declared 

"that  France  had  made  up  to  the  last  moment  supreme  efforts  to  avert  the 
war  now  about  to  break  out,  the  crushing  responsibility  for  which  the 
German  Empire  will  have  to  bear  before  history.  (Unanimous  and  repeated 
applause.) 

"On  the  very  morrow  of  the  day  when  we  and  our  allies  were  publicly 
expressing  our  hope  of  seeing  negotiations  which  had  been  begun  under 
the  auspices  of  the  London  Cabinet  carried  to  a  peaceful  conclusion  Ger- 
many suddenly  declared  war  upon  Russia;  she  has  invaded  the  territory 
of  Luxemburg;  she  has  outrageously  insulted  the  noble  Belgian  nation 
(loud  applause),  our  neighbor  and  our  friend,  and  attempted  treacherously 
to  fall  upon  us  while  we  were  in  the  midst  of  diplomatic  conversation. 
(Fresh  and  repeated  applause.) 

"But  France  was  watching.  As  alert  as  she  was  peaceful,  she  was  pre- 
pared ;  and  our  enemies  will  meet  on  their  path  our  valiant  covering  troops, 
who  are  at  their  post  and  will  provide  the  screen  behind  which  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  our  national  forces  will  be  methodically  completed.  .  .  . 

"In  the  war  which  is  beginning  France  will  have  right  on  her  side, 
the  eternal  power  of  which  cannot  with  impunity  be  disregarded  by  nations 
any  more  than  by  individuals.  (Loud  applause.) 

"She  will  be  heroically  defended  by  all  her  sons;  nothing  will  break  their 
sacred  union  before  the  enemy;  to-day  they  are  joined  together  as  brothers 


632  THE    STORY   OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

in  a  common  indignation  against  the  aggressor,  and  in  a  common  patriotic 
faith.  (Loud  and  prolonged  applause  and  cries  of  'Vive  la  France.') 

"She  is  faithfully  helped  by  Russia,  her  ally  (loud  applause)  ;  she  is 
supported  by  the  loyal  friendship  of  Great  Britain.  (Loud  applause.) 

"And  already  from  every  part  of  the  civilized  world  sympathy  and  good 
wishes  are  coming  to  her.  For  to-day  once  again  she  stands  before  the 
universe  for  liberty,  justice,  and  reason  (loud  and  repeated  applause) 
'Haut  les  coeurs  et  vive  la  France!'*  (Prolonged  applause.)" 

M.  Viviani,  the  Prime  Minister,  spoke  before  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  He  recounted  those  actions  of  Germany  in  relation  to 
the  Austro-Serbian  crisis  on  which  the  light  of  subsequent  events 
cast  a  sinister  interpretation.  He  gave  the  fabricated  complaints 
against  France  for  violating  German  territory  presented  by 
Ambassador  von  Schoen  plainly  to  offset  the  true  charges 
made  by  France  of  German  violation  of  French  territory,  and 
declared : 

"At  no  time  has  any  French  aviator  penetrated  into  Belgium,  nor  has 
any  French  aviator  committed  either  in  Bavaria  or  any  other  part  of 
Germany  any  hostile  act.  The  opinion  of  Europe  has  already  done  justice 
to  these  wretched  inventions.  (Loud  applause.) 

"Against  these  attacks,  which  violate  all  the  laws  of  justice  and  all  the 
principles  of  public  law,  we  have  now  taken  all  the  necessary  steps;  they 
are  being  carried  out  strictly,  regularly,  and  with  calmness. 

"The  mobilization  of  the  Russian  army  also  continues  with  remarkable 
vigor  and  unrestrained  enthusiasm.  (Prolonged  applause,  all  the  deputies 
rising  from  their  seats.)  The  Belgian  army,  mobilized  with  250,000  men, 
prepares  with  a  splendid  passion  and  magnificent  ardor  to  defend  the  neu- 
trality and  independence  of  their  country.  (Renewed  applause.) 

"The  entire  British  fleet  is  mobilized  and  orders  have  been  given  to 
mobilize  the  land  forces.  (Loud  cheers,  all  the  deputies  rising  to  their  feet.)1' 

Belgium.  Baron  Fallen,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  re- 
ported to  M.  Davignon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Brussels, 
that  Holland  intended  to  institute  war  buoying  on  the  Scheldt 
(Dutch  river  leading  to  Antwerp  in  Belgium) .  The  river  would 
be  closed  at  night  only,  and  navigation  by  day  would  be  under 
Dutch  pilots.  Belgian  lightships  must  be  withdrawn  from  Dutch 
territory  to  facilitate  maintenance  of  its  neutrality. 

M.  Davignon  presented  passports  to  German  Minister  von 
Below  Saleske.  The  minister  intrusted  the  custody  of  the  Ger- 
man Legation  to  the  American  Minister,  Brand  Whitlock.  The 

*  Lift  up  your  hearts,  and  long  live  France! 


STATE  PAPERS  633 

Belgian  Minister,  Baron  Beyens,  at  Berlin,  asked  for  his  pass- 
ports. Before  leaving  he  telegraphed  a  report  of  the  German 
Chancellor's  speech  to  the  Reichstag  on  the  "infamous"  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality. 

"It  is  noteworthy  that  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  recognizes  without 
the  slightest  disguise,  that  Germany  is  violating  international  law  by  her 
invasion  of  Belgian  territory,  and  that  she  is  committing  a  wrong 
against  us." 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Minister  at  London,  telegraphed  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  informed  the 
British  Ministers  in  Norway,  Holland,  and  Belgium 

"that  Great  Britain  expects  that  these  three  kingdoms  will  resist  German 
pressure  and  observe  neutrality.  Should  they  resist  they  will  have  the  sup- 
port of  Great  Britain,  who  is  ready  in  that  event,  should  the  three  above- 
mentioned  Governments  desire  it,  to  join  France  and  Russia  in  offering 
an  alliance  to  the  said  Governments  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  the  use 
of  force  by  Germany  against  them,  and  a  guaranty  to  maintain  the  future 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  three  kingdoms.  I  observed  to  him  that 
Belgium  was  neutral  in  perpetuity.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  an- 
swered: This  is  in  case  her  neutrality  is  violated." 

M.  Davignon  reported  to  the  ministers  at  Paris,  London,  and 
St.  Petersburgall  the  important  diplomatic  happenings  respecting 
Belgium  from  July  31  to  the  appeal  to  the  powers  to  guarantee 
Belgian  neutrality,  which  was  under  present  deliberation. 

M.  Davignon  appealed  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  to 
cooperate  as  guarantors  of  her  territory  and  independence,  and 
to  employ  concerted  action  to  resist  by  force  German  violation  of 
the  same,  and  at  the  same  time 

"to  guarantee  the  future  maintenance  of  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  Belgium. 

"Belgium  is  happy  to  be  able  to  declare  that  she  will  undertake  the 
defense  of  her  fortified  places." 

King  Albert  made  an  address  to  the  Belgian  Parliament  which 
closed  as  follows : 

"The  army  is  equal  to  its  task.  The  Government  and  myself  have  full 
confidence.  The  Government  understands  its  responsibilities  and  will  main- 
tain them  till  the  end  to  safeguard  the  supreme  good  of  the  country.  If  the 
stranger  violates  our  territory  he  will  find  all  Belgians  gathered  round  their 
sovereign,  who  will  never  betray  his  constitutional  oath. 

"I  have  faith  in  our  destinies.  A  country  which  defends  itself  imposes 
respect  on  all  and  does  not  perish.  God  will  be  with  us." 


634  THE    STORY   OF   THE    GREAT   WAR 

War  was  now  on  between  Russia,  France,  Great  Britain  and 
Belgium  on  the  one  side,  and  Germany,  soon  and  certainly  to  be 
joined  by  Austria-Hungary,  on  the  other.  While  the  diplomatic 
controversy  continued,  it  was  over  minor  subjects,  such  as  what 
understanding,  if  any,  had  existed  before  the  war  between  Great 
Britain  and  Belgium  with  reference  to  the  former  landing  an 
expeditionary  force  on  the  soil  of  the  latter  in  event  of  hostili- 
ties with  Germany.  By  August  5,  1914,  all  the  main  evidence 
which  the  belligerent  powers  chose  to  present  was  before  the 
court  of  the  world's  opinion.  It  has  here  been  given  in  as  full  a 
form  as  the  exigency  of  space  has  permitted,  and  in  that  im- 
partial manner  which  a  strict  observance  of  editorial  ethics 
insures.  The  editor  has  refrained  from  cross-references  in- 
dicating a  conflict  of  evidence,  since  this  could  not  be  made  with- 
out exercising  a  judicial  function  into  which  biased  opinion 
might  creep.  It  will  be  easy  for  the  reader  to  make  these  com- 
parisons for  himself,  because  of  the  listing  of  the  correspondence 
by  countries  and  dates.  A  careful  study  of  the  data  here  given 
should  afford  everyone  an  answer  to  the  solemn  inquiry,  the 
greatest  ever  put  before  the  civilized  world :  Who  was  respon- 
sible for  the  war? 


Date  Due